Author Topic: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan  (Read 669386 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Asymetric Actors
« Reply #950 on: May 19, 2011, 08:24:09 PM »
 :-o :-o :-o

Any comments on the following YA?

http://www.tnr.com/print/article/world/88652/pakistan-united-states-relations-islam-afghan-taliban-terrorism

Asymmetric Actors

Why Pakistan will never break with its Islamist allies.
Larry P. Goodson
May 19, 2011 | 12:00 am






Pakistan’s long conflict with India shapes its national security worldview. Far smaller and weaker than its neighbor, Pakistan compensates with far higher military spending and a larger Army than it can afford, creating a national security state. India is never far from the minds of Pakistan’s national leaders, but the differential in size is such that Pakistan has had to develop a strategic triad of national security tools in order to counter it.

First, Pakistan has a large and tactically proficient conventional Army, but of the four wars it has fought with India, it happens to have lost all of them. Second, it has an arsenal of perhaps 100 nuclear weapons, but these too are hardly useful because India is an immediate neighbor and many of its key military installations and formations are so close to the border that it would not be able to hit the Indian army without hitting itself. The shortcomings of these first two aforementioned tools have led Pakistan to rely heavily on a third one, of which the United States generally disapproves: an arsenal of asymmetric actors, variously known as irregulars, guerrillas, and/or terrorists. In the last decade, the United States has persuaded Pakistan to turn on some of these groups, but Pakistan’s perceived security needs have ensured that it still tolerates or actively cultivates the existence of others. And while the successful U.S. operation against bin Laden might provide Pakistan with the cover it needs to break decisively with al Qaeda, it will also likely lead the country to rely on its other militant groups even more.

 

Unlike its unsuccessful army or its unusable nuclear weapons, Pakistan’s irregulars have been used early, often, and successfully throughout the country’s history. Since creating an Islamic homeland for South Asia’s Muslims was the founding idea of Pakistan, some variant of Islamic ideology has frequently been the motivational principle for these irregulars. Initially, the Islamic ideology centered on the split between India and Pakistan, especially in the Kashmir region, but over time it has taken on additional dimensions. The Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 deepened the sectarian divide within Pakistan and led to the creation of both Sunni and Shia militant groups within Pakistani society. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, also in 1979, combined with Pakistan’s simultaneous internal process of Islamization to beget the Afghan mujahideen and, eventually, the Taliban, which Pakistan supported as an instrument of its foreign policy right up to (and even a little beyond) September 11.

Operation Enduring Freedom, which began with the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, complicated issues for Pakistan. After years of developing, supporting, and using Islamist irregulars as a foreign policy tool, Pakistan had to choose whether to abandon those irregulars and side with the United States, which intended to attack the Islamists, or stay with the Islamists and be attacked by the United States. The second choice was unthinkable, given the worldwide condemnation of al Qaeda in the wake of the September 11 attacks, but giving up its most effective national security tool was also deeply unappealing. As a result, Pakistan made the obvious choice to modulate its efforts against Islamist irregulars, going after some while cultivating others, based on a firmly established and highly justified belief that Americans do not really understand Pakistan and will not stay in the region for the long haul anyway.

Here is how it works. Pakistan’s Islamist universe contains five major types of groups. (Of course, it’s not really that simple, as there is substantial cross-pollination and overlap among them all, but as rough categories the distinctions are still useful). The first groups are Kashmiri in orientation, or anti-Indian, and they are primarily motivated by a desire to free the area of Kashmir that is occupied by India. The most well-known of these groups are Harakat-ul-Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba. The second groups are sectarian, like the Sunni Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the Shia Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan and Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan. Third are the Afghan Taliban, who crossed into Pakistan in the face of American military pressure in late 2001 and 2002, just as their forebears did in the 1980s. Today, the remnants of the original Taliban leadership are based in and around Quetta and are known as the Quetta Shura Taliban, while the Haqqani Network operates out of North Waziristan, and the Hezb-i-Islami faction headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar is based in Bajaur. The fourth group is comprised of international jihadis like al Qaeda, who also fled into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002. Finally, a fifth and extremely problematic group for Pakistan are the Pakistani Taliban, like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and Tehrik-Nafaz-i-Shariat-i-Muhammadi, which have emerged since September 11 to challenge the legitimacy of the Pakistani state.

This last category of groups is the problem, in the eyes of Pakistan, as they have declared war on the state itself. Thus, although these groups are descended from the other organizations, share some similar ideological views, and frequently cross membership and otherwise cooperate, the Pakistani government has attempted to fight the Pakistani Taliban, at times sharing intelligence about them with the United States, which has attacked these groups from across the border in Afghanistan. Likewise, the sectarian militants are problematic for Pakistan since most of their attacks happen in metropolitan areas and always produce tit-for-tat responses, but government efforts to crack down on these groups are thwarted by sectarian and communitarian loyalties within the police forces and local communities, not by a malign effort on the part of federal government officials to allow those groups to continue to murder.

On the other hand, the anti-Indian groups and the Afghan Taliban are important instruments of state policy, and Pakistan’s national government has every desire to maintain and utilize them in order to project force and counter Indian influence on both its Afghan and Indian borders. Al Qaeda and the international jihadis, for their part, have been the most troublesome group for Pakistan to categorize, since they often serve as the ideological inspiration for the other groups, but the most important targets for the Americans. That is, they could not be easily attacked, but they also could not be easily left alone. The solution Pakistan arrived at was to attempt to disconnect al Qaeda from the other groups, defang their operational capability, and occasionally cooperate (albeit very quietly) in the capture or killing of some al Qaeda operatives.

 

The killing of bin Laden has the potential to change Pakistan’s strategy, but not the fundamental national security reality that has underpinned it. Pakistan still needs its favored Islamist irregulars, while it will still fight, sideline, or actively ignore its less-favored militant Islamic groups. Bin Laden’s death weakens al Qaeda tremendously, as Ayman Al-Zawahiri and the rest of the second level of leadership are undoubtedly scrambling to stay alive and cannot concentrate on operational matters or inspirational leadership. The factors that, prior to bin Laden’s death, constrained Pakistan from attacking al Qaeda more seriously probably still exist, but greater American success in going after the group can be expected and explained away by virtue of the large intelligence cache recovered by the Americans in Abbottabad. It might be possible, therefore, for Pakistan to make a cleaner break with al Qaeda as a byproduct of the bin Laden killing.

But here’s the catch: If bin Laden’s death means Pakistan can perhaps better turn the screws on al Qaeda, it will also likely cause it to rely on its other Islamist irregulars even more. The reason for this is that bin Laden being alive and on the loose meant the United States still had unfinished business in the region, but his death—when combined with American war-weariness—is already emboldening proponents of the “counterterrorism is enough” strategy, who argue the U.S. has no reason to continue a full-fledged occupation of Afghanistan. An American withdrawal from the region—something that is already very much anticipated by Pakistan—has now become more likely, with an accelerated timetable for that withdrawal also possible. As a result, Pakistan will feel even more need to cultivate its Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri groups in order to thwart the possibility of a pro-Indian government in Afghanistan, as well as continue to pursue its interests in Kashmir. The Americans, meanwhile, might rely on Pakistan as an essential conduit in supplying its war effort in Afghanistan—some 75 percent of U.S. supplies destined for Afghanistan cross Pakistani territory—but to Pakistan, the United States remains a far-away, fair-weather friend. In the wake of bin Laden, in other words, expect Pakistan to stand by the third leg of its national security triad—the one that has worked for it in the past and promises to still be there in the future.

Larry P. Goodson is a Professor of Middle East Studies at the U.S. Army War College and author of the forthcoming book, Pakistan: Understanding the Dark Side of the Moon, to be published by Palgrave MacMillan in 2012. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #951 on: May 20, 2011, 06:31:35 AM »
The US govt needs to think about the root cause of Pak-India conflict, its Kashmir. Attempts to gain strategic depth in Afghanistan, support of terror groups to wage war in India (who are now expanding to the western countries), waging jihad, development of nukes, all of these things relate to their quest to wrest Kashmir from India.

The legal situation wrt to Kashmir is quite clear, at Indian independence the ruler of Jammu (hindu dominated), Kashmir (muslim dominated), and Leh (Tibetan dominated) areas of "Kashmir", joined the Indian Union, along with tens of other princely states (who are part of the Indian Union). Pakistan which was formed as a muslim state, did not like this, and quite soon sent in irregulars and occupied parts of Kashmir (Pak occupied Kashmir). The point is that inspite of the formation of East (Bangladesh) and west pak (current Pak), a large population of muslims still choose to remain in India, so Pak has no right per se on Kashmir, just because its a muslim majority state.

After losing 4 wars (India has never started any), losing half their country (Bangladesh), suffering severe economic hardship, lack in development, rise of terrorism due to failed policies of supporting terror, most pakistanis know that they can never win back Kashmir. No Indian govt can give up Kashmir, the population would go ballistic. Yet the pakistani army living in la la land, believes it can, (a few years back Musharraf tried the Kargil misadventure). Paki army generals are delusional, because the US has always supported them, always asked India to bend over backwards to accomodate the purelanders. If the US and the world starts to understand the facts, and what can be changed and what is not even negotiable, Pakis will get the message.

Once the purelanders recognize that Kashmir is not even on the table, Pak has no reason to waste money on nukes, building a large army, or supporting terrors groups who have now graduated to threatening the US and Europe. India is no longer the economic basket case it was in the 60's and 70's. The current generation of senior Indian leaders, eg prime minister Man Mohan Singh was born in Pak (so he has a soft corner for Pak) will pass away soon, the new generation of Indian leaders dont have any sympathies or birth ties to pak, so one can be sure of a more aggressive Indian response. Interestingly, Musharraf (was born in India!) and ruled Pak.!.
« Last Edit: May 20, 2011, 06:39:16 AM by ya »

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #952 on: May 20, 2011, 07:21:11 AM »
Meanwhile, Pak runs into the waiting arms of China.

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #953 on: May 20, 2011, 12:45:05 PM »
Meanwhile, Pak runs into the waiting arms of China.

And India into US arms....so its a delicate dance. If China gets too close to Pak, India gets closer to US, which pisses of China. The main thing holding back India from America is the american propensity to support Pak. I think the Indo-US alliance will get stronger as China strengthens.  The Osama affair has irreversibly damaged relations between US-Pak...its like infidelity in marriage, very hard to overcome.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #954 on: May 20, 2011, 02:05:24 PM »
Alliance with India makes a lot of sense to me.

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #955 on: May 20, 2011, 02:05:43 PM »
I think Pakistan will not enjoy it's new relationship with China once the newness fades. China is a hard taskmaster and much less forthcoming with the bribes for the Army/ISI.

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #956 on: May 20, 2011, 02:15:57 PM »
http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2011/05/09/should-the-us-cut-off-aid-to-pakistan/how-to-reduce-pakistans-leverage

Dont agree with everything below, but the highlighted part is quite insightful.

How to Reduce Pakistan's Leverage

Updated May 10, 2011, 07:47 PM
George Perkovich is the director of the nuclear policy program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Aid is not the only independent variable that affects Pakistan. Other things the U.S. says and does are important, too.

If the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan, it would greatly reduce our reliance on the Pakistani security establishment.
For example, the United States’ effort to help India become a global power, including by building up its nuclear and advanced conventional armories, makes the Pakistani establishment ever more angry and distrustful of the United States. The deployment of unaccountable mercenaries like Raymond Davis turns average Pakistanis against the U.S. These and other U.S. policies, including drone attacks in the tribal areas, may be tactically necessary because Pakistan’s own security establishment will not do its best to counter terrorists acting against India and Afghanistan. India’s growing power and importance inevitably will make the U.S. and others seek favorable terms of cooperation with it.

But aid combined with these other U.S. policies clearly has not changed the Pakistani military’s obsession with contesting India. There is nothing India or the United States can realistically do that will change this self-destructive obsession because the problem is India’s existence itself.

The pattern in U.S.-Pakistan relations merely repeats mutual frustrations and failings since the early 1950s. The U.S. always treats Pakistan as a means to achieve a larger end -- preventing the export of terrorism from Afghanistan now -- and Pakistan uses the U.S. to build capabilities to fight India. In fact, Pakistan is more important than Afghanistan, and too important to instrumentalize.

The U.S. would do less harm, and perhaps more good, by seeking the most friendly possible end of the symbiotic relationship with the Pakistani Army and intelligence services. By moving decisively to negotiate conditions for the withdrawal of most U.S. military forces from Afghanistan, the U.S. would greatly reduce its reliance on the Pakistani security establishment and that establishment’s leverage on Washington. The U.S. could then concentrate on Pakistan’s civilian political-economic development, offering assistance only in and as the Pakistani state itself is clearly committed to combating terrorism and promoting internal development.

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #957 on: May 20, 2011, 02:21:04 PM »
There is nothing India or the United States can realistically do that will change this self-destructive obsession because the problem is India’s existence itself.

Funny, reminds me of another country that surrounding countries have a self-destructive obsession about because of it's existance. Must be an aspect of a unique ontology or something.


Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #958 on: May 20, 2011, 02:45:50 PM »
YA, in the past you have shared with me and I have posted here writings by Indian intel folks based around the idea of dissembling Pakistan altogether:  Pashtunistan (peeling the western half off from Afghanistan), Balochistan, settling border issues in favor of India, and destroying/taking Pak's nuke program. (Well maybe the last one is my idea  :-D ) or something like that. 

As I have been posting here for a couple of years now (based in part upon the influence of materials which you have shared with me) our Afpakia policy is utterly incoherent. 

When you think outside the box, what do you think?

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #959 on: May 20, 2011, 06:19:47 PM »
I wish I had the answers to the hard questions you pose. The simple answer is to not continue doing what we have been doing, since that is not working. So what have we been doing: We have been paying Pak for not sending terrorists over to the US. We have been killing of some terrorists (eg TTP) who are against the Pak state and the US, but not doing much to the haqqani group and others who support pak, but kill Americans. This approach has not yielded any significant benefits, because Pak will not kill the golden goose. If they kill all the terrorists that the US wants, then the moolah will stop coming, and it would weaken Pak vis a vis their state policy of terror against India. The new approach should therefore rely on imploding pakistan. As multiple other authors have correctly noted, Pak is not about to give up its "non-state actors".

I have a simple proposal, of which only one step (#2) is difficult, but not impossible. I am sure there are some in the US govt, who have a better understanding of those issues. If for some reason, step 2 is impractical,  all of the other steps can still be accomplished quite easily, even without denuking Pak....what puzzles me is why is the US govt not doing it and getting some brownie points, while extricating itself from a messy situation.

1. Kashmir: Recognize that Kashmir belongs to India, or at the very least that the US will not support Pak's quest to get it. This can be done quite simply by a speech by the POTUS and change of official US policy. This will demoralize the purelanders army, to start fixing their internal affairs. The immediate benefit would be that India will be drawn closer to the US sphere of influence and against China.

2.  Another important aspect is control of Pak's nukes. Pak is in many instances like N.Korea, punches above its weight, because of its nukes. Take away the nukes and the problem goes away. If the US wanted to, that could be done.
The nukes were not previously considered important,  because they only threatened India, but now with the jihadis pushing towards europe and the usa, they are raising concerns in the west. Another reason to take them away, that is less well recognized is that the nukes are not solely for the use of purelanders, but they belong to the ummah. It is not inconceivable that some hard line paki general decides to punish the great satan, or little satan for that matter. Infact, on balance the risk of a rogue nuclear attack on India is now less, because the hatred against the US is more than that against India. I think its in American interests to denuke them. With the nukes gone, Pak will behave, otherwise India will finish them off and partition them (Pashtoonistan/Afghanistan, as well as free balochistan)

3. Derecognize the Durrand line: Instead to recognize Pashtoon and afghan aspirations. This may be the best way to make peace with the taliban and gain their support long term. Remember, the Durrand line was arbitrarily created by the british, it never existed for centuries before that. Were the US to support this, the entire Afghan nation would support the US. AQ cannot survive, if the locals dont support them. With NWFP/FATA under pashtoon hands, the sanctuaries in pak go away.

4. With the nukes and NWFP/FATA gone, next would be Balochistan. Balochistan was a princely state which was annexed after they had declared independence. As pak unravels, Balochistan will gain independence. Helping the baloch gain independence will also send a message to Iran. Sindh is not a "pure" state, it will likely join the Baloch or India, since its made up of "immigrants" from India. Only the much weakened Pakistani Punjab (pakjab) will remain as the core.

Its important to complete the above steps, in a controlled manner, because Pak is moving towards that fate in an uncontrolled manner.

What I have not discussed is how to denuke Pakistan...since I dont know enough about their nukes.


 

« Last Edit: May 20, 2011, 06:23:03 PM by ya »

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #960 on: May 20, 2011, 06:26:03 PM »
Supposedly, there is a contingency plan to de-nuke Pakistan. Is it still viable? I dunno.....

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #961 on: May 20, 2011, 10:23:42 PM »
I heard it isn't viable any more , , ,

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #962 on: May 21, 2011, 06:50:07 AM »
The Paki nukes are the elephant in the room. Why would it be difficult to denuke pak. Yes a direct military strike on pak will be messy to say the least and not feasible politically. But there are other non-military ways to achieve the same goals. I think its worth thinking along those lines. The broad principle should be to weaken Pak territorially and increase the cost of keeping the nukes.
 
eg What is the impact of stopping US aid to pak and simultaneously getting rid of the Durrand line. At first glance, it would appear that China will replace the US as the big money donor, but with the Durrand line gone, China could no longer fund Pak without pissing off the pashtoons. Even the Haqqani group would prefer an enlarged Afghanistan. As Pak loses territory and aid dries up, it will no longer be feasible for them to maintain their nukes. With NWFP/FATA gone, other provinces namely Balochistan, followed by Sindh will want to be free. Having lost territory a weakened pak army will be forced to give up nukes.

I realize that some of the consequences might be unpredictable...but these need to be gamed.

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #963 on: May 21, 2011, 09:43:03 AM »
Leaving the Pak Army/ISI cartel in place is a mistake, one I think our current leadership is making.

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #964 on: May 21, 2011, 03:34:39 PM »
If the ISI/Army generals, keeper of the crown jewels lose power..Pak is in essence one step away from being denuked. The civilian govt in Pak is not enamoured with nuclear weapons, as they see that it has cost them their development.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #965 on: May 21, 2011, 04:17:06 PM »
"If the ISI/Army generals, keeper of the crown jewels lose power..Pak is in essence one step away from being denuked."

This seems quite pertinent!

Any thoughts on how to go about disempowering ISI/Army generals?

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #966 on: May 21, 2011, 06:37:10 PM »
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmTM6gyHxbo&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]

Here's an interesting interview with SSS of atimes, who is well connected with AQ and Taliban...he makes a few interesting points, in the wake of OBL's killing
1. Parts of the paki army may mutiny, as they are mad at the generals. Hopefully, it wont be the section dealing with nukes.
2. The taliban will be supportive of AQ, in the post OBL world, because they are a "courteous people"...referring to pashtoonwali, code of conduct.

ya

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #967 on: May 22, 2011, 05:54:55 PM »
http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/23/loud-explosion-heard-near-paf-museum.html

This is big news....so soon after the SSS interview. Interesting, that western media is mostly ignoring it. Looks like beard on beard type attack. Loss of two P3C Orions is a big loss for the pakis, apart from the idea that its likely that the terrorists had inside help...First, the US caused a lot of H&D (honor & dignity) loss with the OBL raid, now the military has been caught napping. I would be very surprised if Kayani and Pasha can keep their jobs...ofcourse they can always mount an attack on India to relieve the loss of H&D.

KARACHI: Militants stormed one of Pakistan’s main military bases in the country’s largest city late Sunday, triggering explosions and gunbattles three weeks after the US killing of Osama bin Laden. According to DawnNews there could be 10 to 12 attackers still inside the base as at least six reported to be dead amid terrorist’s attack.

DawnNews at 03:30 am reported that according to the Pakistan Navy’s spokesman, Commodore Irfan ul Haq, four Pakistan Navy officials and a Rangers soldier were martyred in the attack, while at least seven Navy officials were injured as well.

Two P3C aircrafts were also destroyed during the attack, he added.

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #968 on: May 22, 2011, 06:06:20 PM »
Is it possible that US forces did a covert op?

G M

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The embrace
« Reply #969 on: May 22, 2011, 07:02:42 PM »
 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3914bd36-8467-11e0-afcb-00144feabdc0.html

 

Pakistan turns to China for naval base
 
By Farhan Bokhari in Islamabad and Kathrin Hille in Beijing
 
Published: May 22 2011 13:22 | Last updated: May 22 2011 19:46
 


Pakistan has asked China to build a naval base at its south-western port of Gwadar and expects the Chinese navy to maintain a regular presence there, a plan likely to alarm both India and the US.
 
“We have asked our Chinese brothers to please build a naval base at Gwadar,” Chaudhary Ahmed Mukhtar, Pakistan’s defence minister, told the Financial Times, confirming that the request was conveyed to China during a visit last week by Yusuf Raza Gilani, Pakistan’s prime minister.
 
Hitherto, China has shied away from moves that might alienate the US and Beijing’s neighbours, such as India, Malaysia and Indonesia. “China’s rise is a beneficial force for peace and we have no hegemonic ambitions,” said a Chinese official familiar with Beijing’s security policy. (GM-These are not the droids you are looking for.)

But Christopher Yung, senior research fellow at National Defense University in Washington, said in a recent paper “the nature and degree of China’s access to out-of-area bases will be the ultimate indication and warning” of its eventual intention to become a global military power. A Pentagon official said: “We have questions and concerns about this development and [China’s] intentions. But that is why we believe it is important to have a healthy, stable and continuous military-to-military relationship.”
 
A senior Pakistani official familiar with Sino-Pakistani discussions on naval co-operation said: “The naval base is something we hope will allow Chinese vessels to regularly visit in [the] future and also use the place for repair and maintenance of their fleet in the [Indian Ocean region].”
 
Such a foothold would be the first overseas location offering support to the People’s Liberation Army navy for future out-of-area missions and so would be likely to reinforce international concerns over Beijing’s longer-term military ambitions.
 


“This will definitely be a ‘game changer’ in China’s defence and security relationships,” said Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, a south Asia security expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “The construction of a naval base in Gwadar would provide its own ships and possibly submarines with ‘permanent’ basing rights, along with the possibility of regular patrols and exercises in the Arabian Sea to protect the growing number of Chinese-flagged oil tankers traversing the region to meet its increasing energy demands from the Gulf region.”
 
As anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden have made the PLA Navy aware that it lacks port access for restocking with food and water, swapping staff and maintenance, the force is lobbying for the construction of foreign bases.
 .

G M

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China to US: Hands off Pakistan
« Reply #970 on: May 24, 2011, 09:24:01 AM »
http://hotair.com/archives/2011/05/24/china-to-us-hands-off-pakistan/

Barack Obama says that if the US has another chance to get a high-value terrorist target like Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, he’ll make the same call as he did earlier this month.  Not so fast, says China.  According to a report from India a few days ago, China has warned that an “attack” on Pakistan will be taken as an attack on China

DougMacG

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #971 on: May 24, 2011, 09:30:56 AM »
"China has warned that an “attack” on Pakistan will be taken as an attack on China"

Just thinking aloud here, but maybe we can cut out the middle man.

G M

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #972 on: May 24, 2011, 09:41:06 AM »
There is always value in calling when people are bluffing. Might undercut "regional superpower" ambitions a bit.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #973 on: May 24, 2011, 11:26:16 AM »
Yup.  Just look at all that spare bandwidth we have. 

Any predictions on how BO will respond?

This discussion might better belong on the US-China thread , , ,

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: The Jihadist Strategy for Pakistan
« Reply #974 on: May 25, 2011, 11:19:49 AM »


The United States and the Jihadist Strategy for Pakistan

On Monday, Pakistani security forces secured a key naval aviation base in Karachi after a 17-hour standoff with a team of jihadist operatives. Details remain sketchy of how this group, composed of as few as six and as many as 20 militants, was able to make its way into the high-security facility to destroy one U.S. supplied P-3C Orion anti-submarine and maritime surveillance aircraft and damage a second. What is clear, however, is that this latest attack is among the most significant to have targeted the country’s military establishment since the jihadist insurgency intensified in 2007.

The attack comes within three weeks of the U.S. unilateral military operation that killed al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden at a compound a mere three-hour drive from the capital. The discovery that the al Qaeda leader had been residing in a house for years at walking distance from the country’s military academy reinforced long-held international suspicions that elements within the Pakistani military-intelligence complex were sheltering al Qaeda’s apex leadership. The attack on the navy in Karachi shapes another related perception that the country’s security forces are unable to protect their own assets from jihadist attacks.

“Ironically, the Pakistani security establishment, which cultivated Islamist militants for its foreign policy objectives, is now the only thing standing in the way of the country descending into a jihadist anarchy.”
We have a paradoxical situation in which enemies of the state are being protected by elements within the security establishment, which itself as an institution is the target of the same jihadists. This warped situation works well for the strategic objectives of al Qaeda and its allies within the South Asian nation. Pakistani jihadists and their al Qaeda allies are happy to see the United States and the international community increase pressure on Islamabad and more important, engage in increased unilateral operations inside the country due to the lack of confidence in Islamabad’s intent and/or capability to deal with the situation on its own.

The ultimate jihadist dream is to create the circumstances in which the United States invades Pakistan either because of the fear that the Pakistanis have become weak to the point that they are unable to contain the jihadist threat, or worse, that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons were in danger of falling into the hands of radical forces. Each attack the jihadists launch against Pakistani security forces is designed to augment the American perception of threat. Demonstrating that the jihadists have significantly penetrated the country’s security organs further shapes this dynamic.

A U.S. invasion of Pakistan is the ideal outcome for the jihadists because they know that short-term American goals may undermine the state, but the long-term geopolitical interest of the United States in Pakistan is a strong Pakistan. So, they are happy to settle for increasing U.S. unilateral operations in the country. These, the jihadists hope, would help increase the anti-American sentiment and aggravate the mutual mistrust between Washington and Islamabad. The more the United States becomes aggressive toward Pakistan, the more it undermines the Pakistani state and its ability to govern a country that has already been significantly weakened by deteriorating political, security and economic conditions.

The jihadists have never been able to overthrow a sitting government in any Muslim country because they lack the capabilities to do so. But a template exists in the form of the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan in the mid-1990s when the country was in a state of chaos after years of civil war. The jihadists use this model wherever they operate — Iraq, Yemen, Somalia — with the goal of gradually eroding the incumbent state.

A key catalyst in this regard is U.S. military intervention, which from the jihadists’ point of view cannot be totally dismissed in the Pakistani context. Increasing U.S. action in Pakistan or pressure on Islamabad could lead to rifts within the military-intelligence complex — the one entity that stands in the way of jihadists’ being able to take over the state. In other words, the jihadist attacks on their own are not capable of bringing down the Pakistani state, and al Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban are aware of this.

Therefore, these attacks are designed to exacerbate fears that Pakistan is a failing state and gradually compel the United States to increase its overt and unilateral military and intelligence footprint in the country. The Sept. 11 attacks were designed to achieve the same goal and force the United States to invade Saudi Arabia. Washington didn’t take the bait and instead sent forces into Afghanistan and Iraq, thwarting the jihadist strategy.

A decade later, however, the jihadists seem to be creating the kind of circumstances in which the United States is slowly being pushed into Pakistan. Ironically, the Pakistani security establishment, which historically has cultivated Islamist militants for its foreign policy objectives, is now the only force standing in the way of the country descending into a jihadist anarchy. For the jihadists, the most effective way of weakening the Pakistani state is to play upon American fears and force it into a country of 180 million people.

From the point of view of al Qaeda and its allies, Pakistan, along with Afghanistan, would make for one large Talibanistan, which would have catastrophic implications for the region and the world at large. Thus, there is a method to the jihadist madness in Pakistan — to get the United States to help them achieve what they can’t on their own. Therefore, bin Laden’s death, at the hands of American forces engaged in an unprecedented unilateral action on Pakistani soil, may have helped the jihadist cause in a way that the life of the al Qaeda founder could not.


ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #975 on: May 26, 2011, 05:56:32 PM »

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ME27Df06.html

Al-Qaeda had warned of Pakistan strike
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

This is the first article in a two-part report.

ISLAMABAD - Al-Qaeda carried out the brazen attack on PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi on May 22 after talks failed between the navy and al-Qaeda over the release of naval officials arrested on suspicion of al-Qaeda links, an Asia Times Online investigation reveals.

Pakistani security forces battled for 15 hours to clear the naval base after it had been stormed by a handful of well-armed militants.

At least 10 people were killed and two United States-made P3-C

   
Orion surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft worth US$36 million each were destroyed before some of the attackers escaped through a cordon of thousands of armed forces.

An official statement placed the number of militants at six, with four killed and two escaping. Unofficial sources, though, claim there were 10 militants with six getting free. Asia Times Online contacts confirm that the attackers were from Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade, the operational arm of al-Qaeda.

Three attacks on navy buses in which at least nine people were killed last month were warning shots for navy officials to accept al-Qaeda's demands over the detained suspects.

The May 2 killing in Pakistan of Osama bin Laden spurred al-Qaeda groups into developing a consensus for the attack in Karachi, in part as revenge for the death of their leader and also to deal a blow to Pakistan's surveillance capacity against the Indian navy.

The deeper underlying motive, though, was a reaction to massive internal crackdowns on al-Qaeda affiliates within the navy.

Volcano of militancy
Several weeks ago, naval intelligence traced an al-Qaeda cell operating inside several navy bases in Karachi, the country's largest city and key port.

"Islamic sentiments are common in the armed forces," a senior navy official told Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity as he is not authorized to speak to the media.

"We never felt threatened by that. All armed forces around the world, whether American, British or Indian, take some inspiration from religion to motivate their cadre against the enemy. Pakistan came into existence on the two-nation theory that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations and therefore no one can separate Islam and Islamic sentiment from the armed forces of Pakistan," the official said.

"Nonetheless, we observed an uneasy grouping on different naval bases in Karachi. While nobody can obstruct armed forces personnel for rendering religious rituals or studying Islam, the grouping [we observed] was against the discipline of the armed forces. That was the beginning of an intelligence operation in the navy to check for unscrupulous activities."

The official explained the grouping was against the leadership of the armed forces and opposed to its nexus with the United States against Islamic militancy. When some messages were intercepted hinting at attacks on visiting American officials, intelligence had good reason to take action and after careful evaluation at least 10 people - mostly from the lower cadre - were arrested in a series of operations.

"That was the beginning of huge trouble," the official said.

Those arrested were held in a naval intelligence office behind the chief minister's residence in Karachi, but before proper interrogation could begin, the in-charge of the investigation received direct threats from militants who made it clear they knew where the men were being detained.

The detainees were promptly moved to a safer location, but the threats continued. Officials involved in the case believe the militants feared interrogation would lead to the arrest of more of their loyalists in the navy. The militants therefore made it clear that if those detained were not released, naval installations would be attacked.

It was clear the militants were receiving good inside information as they always knew where the suspects were being detained, indicating sizeable al-Qaeda infiltration within the navy's ranks. A senior-level naval conference was called at which an intelligence official insisted that the matter be handled with great care, otherwise the consequences could be disastrous. Everybody present agreed, and it was decided to open a line of communication with al-Qaeda.

Abdul Samad Mansoori, a former student union activist and now part of 313 brigade, who originally hailed from Karachi but now lives in the North Waziristan tribal area was approached and talks begun. Al-Qaeda demanded the immediate release of the officials without further interrogation. This was rejected.

The detainees were allowed to speak to their families and were well treated, but officials were desperate to interrogate them fully to get an idea of the strength of al-Qaeda's penetration. The militants were told that once interrogation was completed, the men would be discharged from the service and freed.

Al-Qaeda rejected these terms and expressed its displeasure with the attacks on the navy buses in April.

These incidents pointed to more than the one al-Qaeda cell intelligence had tracked in the navy. The fear now was that if the problem was not addressed, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply lines could face a new threat. NATO convoys are routinely attacked once they begin the journey from Karachi to Afghanistan; now they could be at risk in Karachi port. Americans who often visit naval facilities in the city would also be in danger.

Therefore, another crackdown was conducted and more people were arrested. Those seized had different ethnic backgrounds. One naval commando came from South Waziristan's Mehsud tribe and was believed to have received direct instructions from Hakeemullah Mehsud, the chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban). Others were from Punjab province and Karachi, the capital of Sindh province.

After Bin Laden was killed by American Navy Seals in Abbottabad, 60 kilometers north of Islamabad, militants decided the time was ripe for major action.

Within a week, insiders at PNS Mehran provided maps, pictures of different exit and entry routes taken in daylight and at night, the location of hangers and details of likely reaction from external security forces.

As a result, the militants were able to enter the heavily guarded facility where one group targeted the aircraft, a second group took on the first strike force and a third finally escaped with the others providing covering fire. Those who stayed behind were killed.

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #976 on: May 26, 2011, 06:04:17 PM »
Interesting article..
http://www.newsinsight.net/archivedebates/nat2.asp?recno=2147
Why Mehran
Pakistan's India obsession blinds it to the threat from caliphate forces, says N.V.Subramanian.

25 May 2011: Three complex and inter-related narratives drive terrorism in Pakistan. And the Pakistani Taliban attack on the Karachi naval base that killed a dozen commandoes and destroyed two US-supplied Orions could mark the beginning of the end of Pakistan and its replacement by an Islamist caliphate with nuclear weapons. The reasoning for this goes thus:

The so-called "mujahideen" war against the Soviet Union beginning in the late-Seventies marked a phase of the most unity between the terrorists and its state backers, the US, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and (quietly) China. Once the Soviets left Afghanistan, the Americans turned their back, the Saudis patronized the Taliban if only to keep terrorism away from home, and Pakistan hoped to replicate the "mujahideen" experiment in Jammu and Kashmir.
The Pakistan army and ISI have wanted strategic depth in Afghanistan against India, even though this makes little sense after Pakistan became a declared nuclear power in 1998. Control of Afghanistan for Pakistan also means muting opposition of the Pashtuns to the Durand Line which they correctly believe divides a greater Pakhtunistan between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Pakistan and the United States created and financed the Taliban to take over Afghanistan from the "mujahideen" who fell out with one another once in power. The US needed a stable Afghanistan to pipe out hydrocarbons from Central Asia for final evacuation from a Pakistani warm-water port. Pakistan had strategic interests in Afghanistan in relation to India and the Pashtun question as explained before. The only opposition to the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan came from the Northern Alliance backed by Russia, Iran, Central Asian republics and India.
Nine-eleven changed Pakistan's cozy equations in Afghanistan. The US war in Afghanistan deprived the Taliban/ Al-Qaeda of state power. With the assistance of the Pakistan army and ISI, their leaders were settled in FATA and later in Quetta. Pakistan was forced to ally in the US war because otherwise it had been warned of being "bombed back to the Stone Age".
FATA has always been a lawless area. Its fiercely Islamist tribes are very independent. As a launch pad for the Afghan "mujahideen" war, it became a melting pot for jihadis of several nations. In the thirty-two years since the start of the "mujahideen" war, a new generation of jihadis has grown on the ideologies, teachings and experiences of the Al-Qaeda and Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban is a product of that generation.
Like the Afghan Taliban/ Al-Qaeda want a Sharia state of Afghanistan, so the Pakistani Taliban dream and demand the same of Pakistan. After the Lal Masjid attack in which their young adherents were killed by the Pakistan army, the Pakistani Taliban views it inimically. Pakistan's collaboration with US drone attacks in FATA and the death of Osama Bin Laden in an American raid have furthered the enmity. While a US drone attack killed the Pakistan Taliban leader, Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistan army made him a prized target.

Pakistan's second terrorism narrative is directed against Jammu and Kashmir. The late Pakistani military dictator, Zia-ul-Haq, set in motion plans for that. When J and K's own insurgency sputtered out, Pakistan backed Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorism, which was independent of whatever else was going on in FATA and Afghanistan, apart from the shared terror-training infrastructure.

Pakistan's third terror narrative related to Indian interests in Afghanistan. Obsessed about Indian action on two fronts, Pakistan launched suicide attacks on India's embassy and mission personnel in Kabul and targeted its development projects. The ISI has instigated these attacks using the terrorist forces of the Haqqani Taliban.

The thing to understand is that Pakistan wants control of all these disparate terrorism narratives to suit its ends in Afghanistan and against India. The Lashkar-e-Toiba could be amenable for the moment to work under the overall guidance of Pakistan's state terror institutions like the army and ISI. But the FATA/ Quetta Shura Islamists have their own plans.
The Afghan Taliban wants Afghanistan preferably without the involvement of the ISI, which it hates. The Al-Qaeda will return to Afghanistan as guests of the Taliban if the US leaves, which does not appear immediately imminent. The Pakistani Taliban wants a Pakistani caliphate eventually joined to Afghanistan.
The Pakistan army and ISI believe they can continue to calibrate terrorism to win their aims. But the US is tired of Pakistani terrorism/ perfidy in Afghanistan. The American killing of Bin Laden has been a game-changer. Pakistan can no longer calibrate terrorism to extract aid, concessions and support from all parties simultaneously, including the US and the terrorists.

It is in this background that the Pakistani Taliban attack on the naval base must be seen. Caliphate forces are attacking Pakistan. Their aim is to weaken the Pakistan army and destroy its confidence about protecting Pakistan state interests. The destruction of two Orions in a heavily guarded base is no small matter.
The caliphate forces are pushing for the tide to turn, when more in the Pakistan military/ ISI and atomic establishments will switch sides to them. But of course the Pakistan army and ISI with their endless obsession about India do not read the writing on the wall. One more successful attack such as on the Mehran base will cripple the Pakistan military.

India must be ready and prepared to face any eventuality, including a nuclear incident within Pakistan triggered by terrorists.
N.V.Subramanian is Editor, www.NewsInsight.net, and writes internationally on strategic affairs. He has authored two novels, University of Love (Writers Workshop, Calcutta) and Courtesan of Storms (Har-Anand, Delhi). Email: envysub@gmail.com.

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #977 on: May 27, 2011, 01:05:21 PM »
Must say I had not thought of asking Pakis for war reparations, he certainly makes a good case..http://www.huffingtonpost.com/nake-m-kamrany/pakistans-duplicity-is-th_b_862950.html

As a matter of retribution, the United Sates has several options when duplicity is firmly ascertained via bin Laden tapes and computer files.

1. Take out Pakistan's atomic facilities, thereby neutralizing its ability to detonate atomic weapons in any future conflicts.
2. Dismantle the ISI apparatus and arrest its leadership for crimes against humanity, including judicial criminal prosecutions that have caused the death and dismemberment of thousands of American soldiers and Afghan soldiers and civilians in Afghanistan. But for Pakistan's duplicity, the United States and Afghanistan would not have suffered sustained casualties inside Afghanistan. ISI of Pakistan was the ring leader of a criminal conspiracy whose members included bin Laden and Al Qaeda, the Pakistani Taliban, the Jalaluddin Huqqani group, the Mullah Mohammad Omar and the Afghani Taliban, and the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar group.
3. Impose war reparation upon Pakistan equal to the present and future value of the following: Work-life earnings loss and the value of life of every American and Afghan soldier and civilian killed since 2001, and the present value and future value of every American and Afghan soldier and civilian who sustained partial or total disabilities for the remainder of their life, plus the military and civilian expenditures of the U.S. war in Afghanistan since 2001 (had Pakistan turned over bin Laden to the U.S. in 2001, there would have been no U.S. war involvement in Afghanistan. Plus $20 billion -- the amount of assistance that Pakistan has received from the United Sates since 2001, plus punitive damages for bad faith.
4. Dissect Pakistan into three smaller states -- Baluchistan for the Baluchi separatists including the city of Quetta, Pashtunistan for the Pashtun separatists covering the Pashtun tribal areas including Peshawar and the border areas, and Pakistan proper including Lahore and the Karachi areas. The ongoing domestic dissent in the Pashtun and Baluchi areas are rooted in the exploitative and discriminatory practices of the ruling class of Pakistan -- the Lahore elite -- who have alienated those groups.
5. Create a strong civilian government in Pakistan by dismantling the ISI, reducing Pakistan's military prowess and supporting the educated and secular population. Pakistan has a strong judiciary and press at this time. A strong civilian government is needed to implement democratic institutions and processes.
6. At a minimum, Pakistan must turn over to the United States Gulbuddin Hekmatyar from the Peshawar area, Jalaluddin Haqqani from the northern Waziristan area and Mullah Mohammad Omar from Quetta, Baluchistan area. These insurgents are shooting at American and Afghan soldiers inside Afghanistan and enjoy safe havens that are provided by ISI and are being sheltered in Pakistan.

It is extraordinary that Pakistan's former president, Mr. Musharraf, still denies that he knew where bin Laden was residing in Pakistan while the current prime minister, Mr. Yousuf Raza Gilani, and the Pakistani parliament are trying to shift the debate from Pakistan's duplicity to the American violation of Pakistan's sovereignty. They believe that the rubric of sovereignty will save the day for them. Not so. The Navy SEALs' possession and custody of bin Laden's computer files and tapes will end that debate, which may identify Pakistan as the most dangerous nation on earth.

Nake M. Kamrany is professor of economics and director of program in law and economics at the University of Southern California and a member of California Bar.

G M

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #978 on: May 27, 2011, 01:24:24 PM »
Wow. I never thought I'd agree so strongly with something from HuffPo.  :-o

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #979 on: May 27, 2011, 02:48:04 PM »
The world is a wonder, isn't it?  :lol:

"4. Dissect Pakistan into three smaller states -- Baluchistan for the Baluchi separatists including the city of Quetta, Pashtunistan for the Pashtun separatists covering the Pashtun tribal areas including Peshawar and the border areas, and Pakistan proper including Lahore and the Karachi areas. The ongoing domestic dissent in the Pashtun and Baluchi areas are rooted in the exploitative and discriminatory practices of the ruling class of Pakistan -- the Lahore elite -- who have alienated those groups.
5. Create a strong civilian government in Pakistan by dismantling the ISI, reducing Pakistan's military prowess and supporting the educated and secular population. Pakistan has a strong judiciary and press at this time. A strong civilian government is needed to implement democratic institutions and processes."

More followers of the YA-Crafty Doctrine  :-D

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #980 on: May 27, 2011, 05:39:01 PM »
The world is a wonder, isn't it?  :lol:

"4. Dissect Pakistan into three smaller states -- Baluchistan for the Baluchi separatists including the city of Quetta, Pashtunistan for the Pashtun separatists covering the Pashtun tribal areas including Peshawar and the border areas, and Pakistan proper including Lahore and the Karachi areas. The ongoing domestic dissent in the Pashtun and Baluchi areas are rooted in the exploitative and discriminatory practices of the ruling class of Pakistan -- the Lahore elite -- who have alienated those groups.
5. Create a strong civilian government in Pakistan by dismantling the ISI, reducing Pakistan's military prowess and supporting the educated and secular population. Pakistan has a strong judiciary and press at this time. A strong civilian government is needed to implement democratic institutions and processes."

More followers of the YA-Crafty Doctrine  :-D

Agreed, Karachi=Sindh, Lahore=Punjab, as envisioned, along with Balochistan and Pashtoonistan. It seems there is a convergence of opinions. I think Pak is been given one last chance to produce the rest of the jihadis..see belowhttp://www.dawn.com/2011/05/28/us-hands-over-%E2%80%98most-wanted-terrorists%E2%80%99-list-to-pakistan.html

"The list also includes Siraj Haqqani, the operational commander of the Haqqani network, the most violent group in the Afghan Taliban and believed to be run out of the Pakistani tribal areas; Ilyas Kashmiri, a senior member of al Qaeda once dubbed “the next Osama bin Laden”; and Atiya Abdel Rahman, the Libyan operations chief of al Qaeda who had emerged as a key intermediary between bin Laden and al Qaeda’s affiliate networks across the world.

The list was discussed during three separate meetings between senior Pakistani and US officials in the past two weeks, including today in Islamabad with Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, according to a US official, a Pakistani government official and a Pakistani intelligence official.

The United States views the list as a test of whether Pakistan is serious about fighting terrorists who have long enjoyed safe havens within its borders.
But the list does not only include militants the United States wants Pakistan to target. In the case of Omar, the United States is interested in determining whether he can be part of political reconciliation in Afghanistan, and is pushing the Pakistanis to facilitate such an outcome, according to two US officials. The United States has already opened a dialogue with a man believed to be an emissary of Omar, according to two senior Afghan officials, but is proceeding cautiously.

Clinton and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen, who flew into Islamabad ahead of Clinton, today urged Pakistan to support that process and do nothing to scuttle it, according to senior administration officials. Pakistani intelligence officials have in the past admitted they detained Afghan Taliban leaders who expressed a willingness to reconcile.

Speaking to the media in Islamabad, Clinton declined to address specific names but said the United States expects Pakistan to authorize “joint action against al Qaeda and its affiliates,” adding, “there is still much more work required, and it is urgent.”


ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #981 on: May 27, 2011, 07:08:02 PM »
And found this longish article http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=25009. What is surprising is, that much has come true...

Introduction
 
The recently reported assassination was a propaganda ploy aimed at targeting Pakistan. To understand this, it is necessary to examine how America has, in recent years, altered its strategy in Pakistan in the direction of destabilization. In short, Pakistan is an American target. The reason: Pakistan’s growing military and strategic ties to China, America’s primary global strategic rival. In the ‘Great Game’ for global hegemony, any country that impedes America’s world primacy – even one as historically significant to America as Pakistan – may be sacrificed upon the altar of war.
 
Part 1 of ‘Pakistan in Pieces’ examines the changing views of the American strategic community – particularly the military and intelligence circles – towards Pakistan. In particular, there is a general acknowledgement that Pakistan will very likely continue to be destabilized and ultimately collapse. What is not mentioned in these assessments, however, is the role of the military and intelligence communities in making this a reality; a veritable self-fulfilling prophecy. This part also examines the active on the ground changes in American strategy in Pakistan, with increasing military incursions into the country.
 
Imperial Eye on Pakistan
 
In December of 2000, the CIA released a report of global trends to the year 2015, which stated that by 2015, “Pakistan will be more fractious, isolated, and dependent on international financial assistance.”[1] Further, it was predicted, Pakistan:
 
Will not recover easily from decades of political and economic mismanagement, divisive politics, lawlessness, corruption and ethnic friction. Nascent democratic reforms will produce little change in the face of opposition from an entrenched political elite and radical Islamic parties. Further domestic decline would benefit Islamic political activists, who may significantly increase their role in national politics and alter the makeup and cohesion of the military – once Pakistan’s most capable institution. In a climate of continuing domestic turmoil, the central government’s control probably will be reduced to the Punjabi heartland and the economic hub of Karachi.[2]
 
The report further analyzed the trends developing in relation to the Pakistan-India standoff in the region:
 
The threat of major conflict between India and Pakistan will overshadow all other regional issues during the next 15 years. Continued turmoil in Afghanistan and Pakistan will spill over into Kashmir and other areas of the subcontinent, prompting Indian leaders to take more aggressive preemptive and retaliatory actions. India’s conventional military advantage over Pakistan will widen as a result of New Delhi’s superior economic position.[3]
 
In 2005, the Times of India reported on a US National Intelligence Council report, written in conjunction with the CIA, which predicted a “Yugoslavia-like fate” for Pakistan, saying that, “by year 2015 Pakistan would be a failed state, ripe with civil war, bloodshed, inter-provincial rivalries and a struggle for control of its nuclear weapons and complete Talibanisation.”[4]
 
In November of 2008, the US National Intelligence Council released a report, “Global Trends 2025,” in which they outlined major trends in the world by the year 2025. When it came to Pakistan, the report stated that, “Ongoing low-intensity clashes between India and Pakistan continue to raise the specter that such events could escalate to a broader conflict between those nuclear powers.”[5] It stated that Pakistan “will be at risk of state failure.”[6] In examining potential failed states, the report stated that:
 
[Y]outh bulges, deeply rooted conflicts, and limited economic prospects are likely to keep Palestine, Yemen, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and others in the high-risk category.  Spillover from turmoil in these states and potentially others increases the chance that moves elsewhere in the region toward greater prosperity and political stability will be rocky.[7]
 
The report referred to Pakistan as a “wildcard” and stated that if it is “unable to hold together until 2025, a broader coalescence of Pashtun tribes is likely to emerge and act together to erase the Durand Line [separating Pakistan from Afghanistan], maximizing Pashtun space at the expense of Punjabis in Pakistan and Tajiks and others in Afghanistan.”[8]
 
In January of 2009, a Pentagon report analyzing geopolitical trends of significance to the US military over the next 25 years, reported that Pakistan could face a “rapid and sudden” collapse. It stated that, “Some forms of collapse in Pakistan would carry with it the likelihood of a sustained violent and bloody civil and sectarian war, an even bigger haven for violent extremists, and the question of what would happen to its nuclear weapons,” and as such, “that ‘perfect storm' of uncertainty alone might require the engagement of U.S. and coalition forces into a situation of immense complexity and danger.”[9]
 
A top adviser to former President George Bush and current President Obama warned in April of 2009, that Pakistan could collapse within months, and that, “We have to face the fact that if Pakistan collapses it will dwarf anything we have seen so far in whatever we're calling the war on terror now.” The adviser and consultant, David Kilcullen, explained that this would be unlike the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, which each had a population of over 30 million, whereas “Pakistan has [187] million people and 100 nuclear weapons, an army which is bigger than the American army, and the headquarters of al-Qaeda sitting in two-thirds of the country which the Government does not control.”[10]
 
Target: Pakistan
 
Going back to the later years of the Bush administration, it is apparent that the US strategy in Pakistan was already changing in seeing it increasingly as a target for military operations as opposed to simply a conduit. In August of 2007, newly uncovered documents revealed that the US military “gave elite units broad authority” in 2004, “to pursue suspected terrorists into Pakistan, with no mention of telling the Pakistanis in advance.”[11]
 
In November of 2007, an op-ed in the New York Times stated categorically that, “the United States simply could not stand by as a nuclear-armed Pakistan descended into the abyss,” and that, “we need to think — now — about our feasible military options in Pakistan, should it really come to that.” The authors, Frederick Kagan and Michael O’Hanlon are both well-known strategists and scholars at the American Enterprise Institute and Brookings Institution, two of the most prominent and influential think tanks in the United States. While stating that Pakistan’s leaders are still primarily moderate and friendly to the US, “Americans felt similarly about the shah’s regime in Iran until it was too late,” referring to the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution in 1979. They warn:
 
The most likely possible dangers are these: a complete collapse of Pakistani government rule that allows an extreme Islamist movement to fill the vacuum; a total loss of federal control over outlying provinces, which splinter along ethnic and tribal lines; or a struggle within the Pakistani military in which the minority sympathetic to the Taliban and Al Qaeda try to establish Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.[12]
 
They state that the military solutions are “daunting” as Pakistan is a nation of 187 million people, roughly five times the size of Iraq. They wrote that, “estimates suggest that a force of more than a million troops would be required for a country of this size,” which led them to conclude, “Thus, if we have any hope of success, we would have to act before a complete government collapse, and we would need the cooperation of moderate Pakistani forces.” They suggested one plan would be to deploy Special Forces “with the limited goal of preventing Pakistan’s nuclear materials and warheads from getting into the wrong hand.” However, they admit that, “even pro-American Pakistanis would be unlikely to cooperate.” Another option, they contend:
 
would involve supporting the core of the Pakistani armed forces as they sought to hold the country together in the face of an ineffective government, seceding border regions and Al Qaeda and Taliban assassination attempts against the leadership. This would require a sizable combat force — not only from the United States, but ideally also other Western powers and moderate Muslim nations.[13]
 
The authors concluded, saying that any state decline in Pakistan would likely be gradual, therefore allowing the US to have time to respond, and placed an emphasis on securing Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal and combating militants. They finished the article with the warning: “Pakistan may be the next big test.”[14]
 
In December of 2007, the Asia Times Online ran a story about the US plan to rid Pakistan of President Musharraf, and that the US and the West, more broadly, had begun a strategy aimed at toppling Pakistan’s military. As part of this, the US launched a media campaign aimed at demonizing Pakistan’s military establishment. At this time, Benazir Bhutto was criticizing the ISI, suggesting they needed a dramatic restructuring, and at the same time, reports were appearing in the US media blaming the ISI for funding and providing assistance to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. While much of this is documented, the fact that it suddenly emerged as talking points with several western officials and in the media does suggest a turn-around against a long-time ally.[15]
 
Both Democratic and Republican politicians were making statements that Pakistan represented a greater threat than Iran, and then-Senator (now Vice President) Joseph Biden suggested that the United States needed to put soldiers on the ground in Pakistan in cooperation with the “international community.” Biden said that, “We should be in there,” and “we should be supplying tens of millions of dollars to build new schools to compete with the madrassas. We should be in there building democratic institutions. We should be in there, and get the rest of the world in there, giving some structure to the emergence of, hopefully, the reemergence of a democratic process.”[16]
 
In American policy-strategy circles, officials openly began discussing the possibility of Pakistan breaking up into smaller states, and increasing discussion that Musharraf was going to be “removed,” which obviously happened. As the Asia Times stated:
 
Another worrying thing is how US officials are publicly signaling to the Pakistanis that Bhutto has their backing as the next leader of the country. Such signals from Washington are not only a kiss of death for any public leader in Pakistan, but the Americans also know that their actions are inviting potential assassins to target Bhutto.
 
If she is killed in this way, there won't be enough time to find the real culprit,
but what's certain is that unprecedented international pressure will be placed on Islamabad while everyone will use their local assets to create maximum internal chaos in the country.[17]
 
Of course, this subsequently happened in Pakistan. As the author of the article pointed out with startlingly accurate foresight, “Getting Bhutto killed can generate the kind of pressure that could result in permanently putting the Pakistani military on a back foot, giving Washington enough room to push for installing a new pliant leadership in Islamabad.” He observed that, “the US is very serious this time. They cannot let Pakistan get out of their hands.”[18]
 
Thus, it would appear that the new US strategic aim in Pakistan was focused on removing the Pakistani military from power, implying the need to replace Musharraf, and replace him with a new, compliant civilian leadership. This would have the effect of fracturing the Pakistani elite, threatening the Army’s influence within Pakistani politics, and undertaking more direct control of Pakistan’s government.
 
As if on cue, in late December it was reported that, “US special forces snatch squads are on standby to seize or disable Pakistan's nuclear arsenal in the event of a collapse of government authority or the outbreak of civil war following the assassination of Benazir Bhutto.”[19]
 
The New York Times ran an article in early January 2008, which reported that, “President Bush’s senior national security advisers are debating whether to expand the authority of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military to conduct far more aggressive covert operations in the tribal areas of Pakistan.” The article stated that the new strategy was purportedly in response to increased reports of Al-Qaeda and Taliban activity within Pakistan, which “are intensifying efforts there to destabilize the Pakistani government.” Bush’s National Security team supposedly organized this effort in response to Bhutto’s assassination 10 days previously.[20]
 
Officials involved in the strategy discussions said that some “options would probably involve the C.I.A. working with the military’s Special Operations forces,” and one official said, “After years of focusing on Afghanistan, we think the extremists now see a chance for the big prize — creating chaos in Pakistan itself.” Of pivotal importance to the strategy, as the Times reported: “Critics said more direct American military action would be ineffective, anger the Pakistani Army and increase support for the militants.”[21] Perhaps this is not simply a “side-effect” of the proposed strategy, but in fact, part of the strategy.
 
As one prominent Pakistani political and military analyst pointed out, raids into Pakistan would expand anger and “prompt a powerful popular backlash” against the Pakistani government, losing popular support.[22] However, as I previously stated, this might be the intention, as this would ultimately make the government more dependent upon the United States, and thus, more subservient.
 
On September 3, 2008, it was reported that a commando raid by US Special Forces was launched in Pakistan, which killed between 15 and 20 people, including women and children. The Special Forces were accompanied by five U.S. helicopters for the duration of the operation.[23]
 
In February of 2009, it was reported that, “More than 70 United States military advisers and technical specialists are secretly working in Pakistan to help its armed forces battle Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas.” So not only are U.S. Special Forces invading Pakistani territory; but now US military advisers are secretly advising the Pakistani Army on its own operations, and the advisers are themselves primary made up of Special Forces soldiers. They provide the Pakistani Army “with intelligence and advising on combat tactics,” and make up a secret command run by US Central Command and Special Operations Command (presumably JSOC – Joint Special Operations Command).[24]
 
In May of 2009, it was reported that, “the U.S. is sending Special Forces teams into one of Pakistan's most violent regions as part of a push to accelerate the training of the Pakistani military and make it a more effective ally in the fight against insurgents there.” The Special Forces were deploying to two training camps in the province of Baluchistan, and “will focus on training Pakistan's Frontier Corps, a paramilitary force responsible for battling the Taliban and al Qaeda fighters.” Further, the project “is a joint effort with the U.K.,” which helps “fund the training, although it is unclear if British military personnel would take part in the initiative. British officials have been pushing for such an effort for several years.”[25]
 
In December of 2009 it was revealed that, “American special forces have conducted multiple clandestine raids into Pakistan's tribal areas as part of a secret war in the border region where Washington is pressing to expand its drone assassination programme,” which was revealed by a former NATO officer. He said these incursions had occurred between 2003 and 2008, indicating they go even further back than US military documents stipulate. The source further revealed that, “the Pakistanis were kept entirely in the dark about it. It was one of those things we wouldn't confirm officially with them.” Further, as the source noted, British “SAS soldiers have been active in the province” of Bolochistan in 2002 and 2003 and “possibly beyond.”[26]
 
The “Balkanization” of Pakistan: Blaming the Pakistanis
 
Selig S. Harrison is a director of the Asia Program at the Center for International Policy, senior scholar of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and former journalist and correspondent. “His reputation for giving ‘early warning’ of foreign policy crises was well established during his career as a foreign correspondent.  In his study of foreign reporting, Between Two Worlds, John Hohenberg, former secretary of the Pulitzer Prize Board, cited Harrison’s prediction of the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war eighteen months before it happened.” Further, “More than a year before the Russians invaded Afghanistan, Harrison warned of this possibility in one of his frequent contributions to the influential journal Foreign Policy.”[27]
 
On February 1, 2008, Selig Harrison threw his renowned “predictive” abilities on Pakistan in an op-ed for the New York Times in the run-up to the Pakistani elections. He started by stating that, “Whatever the outcome of the Pakistani elections, now scheduled for Feb. 18, the existing multiethnic Pakistani state is not likely to survive for long unless it is radically restructured.” Harrison then went on to explain that Pakistan would likely break up along ethnic lines; with the Pashtuns, concentrated in the northwestern tribal areas, the Sindhis in the southeast uniting with the Baluch tribesmen in the southwest, with the Punjab “rump state” of Pakistan.[28]
 
The Pashtuns in the north, “would join with their ethnic brethren across the Afghan border (some 40 million of them combined) to form an independent ‘Pashtunistan’,” and the Sindhis “numbering 23 million, would unite with the six million Baluch tribesmen in the southwest to establish a federation along the Arabian Sea from India to Iran,” presumably named Baluchistan; while the rump state of Pakistan would remain Punjabi dominated and in control of the nuclear weapons. Selig Harrison explained that prior to partition from India, which led to the creation of the Pakistani state in 1947, Pashtun, Sindhi and Baluch ethnicities had “resist[ed] Punjabi domination for centuries,” and suddenly:
 
they found themselves subjected to Punjabi-dominated military regimes that have appropriated many of the natural resources in the minority provinces — particularly the natural gas deposits in the Baluch areas — and siphoned off much of the Indus River’s waters as they flow through the Punjab.
 
The resulting Punjabi-Pashtun animosity helps explain why the United States is failing to get effective Pakistani cooperation in fighting terrorists. The Pashtuns living along the Afghan border are happy to give sanctuary from Punjabi forces to the Taliban, which is composed primarily of fellow Pashtuns, and to its Qaeda friends.
 
Pashtun civilian casualties resulting from Pakistani and American air strikes on both sides of the border are breeding a potent underground Pashtun nationalist movement. Its initial objective is to unite all Pashtuns in Pakistan, now divided among political jurisdictions, into a unified province. In time, however, its leaders envisage full nationhood.
 
... The Baluch people, for their part, have been waging intermittent insurgencies since their forced incorporation into Pakistan in 1947. In the current warfare Pakistani forces are widely reported to be deploying American-supplied aircraft and intelligence equipment that was intended for use in Afghan border areas. Their victims are forging military links with Sindhi nationalist groups that have been galvanized into action by the death of Benazir Bhutto, a Sindhi hero as was her father, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.[29]
 
This passage is very revealing of the processes and perceptions surrounding “Balkanization” and “destabilization.” What I mean by this, is that historically and presently, imperial powers would often use ethnic groups against each other in a strategy of divide and conquer, in order “to keep the barbarians from coming together” and dominate the region.
 
Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in his 1997 book, “The Grand Chessboard,” that, “Geopolitics has moved from the regional to the global dimension, with preponderance over the entire Eurasian continent serving as the central basis for global primacy.”[30] Brzezinski then gave a masterful explanation of the American global strategy, which placed it into a firm imperialistic context:
 
To put it in a terminology that hearkens back to the more brutal age of ancient empires, the three grand imperatives of imperial geostrategy are to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together.[31]
 
While imperial powers manipulate, and historically, even create the ethnic groups within regions and nations, the West portrays conflict in such regions as being the product of these “ethnic” or “tribal” rivalries. This perception of the East (Asia and the Middle East) as well as Africa is referred to as Orientalism or Eurocentrism: meaning it generally portrays the East (and/or Africa) as “the Other”: inherently different and often barbaric. This prejudiced perspective is prevalent in Western academic, media, and policy circles. This perspective serves a major purpose: dehumanizing a people in a region that an imperial power seeks to dominate, which allows the hegemon to manipulate the people and divide them against each other, while framing them as “backwards” and “barbaric,” which in turn, justifies the Western imperial power exerting hegemony and control over the region; to “protect” the people from themselves.
 
Historically and presently, Western empires have divided people against each other, blamed the resulting conflict on the people themselves, and thus justified their control over both the people, and the region they occupy. This was the strategy employed in major recent geopolitical conflicts such as the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Rwandan genocide. In both cases, Western imperial ambitions were met through exacerbating ethnic rivalries, providing financial, technical, and military aid and training to various factions; thus, spreading violent conflict, war, and genocide. In both cases, Western, and primarily American strategic interests were met through an increased presence militarily, pushing out other major imperial and powerful rivals, as well as increasing Western access to key economics resources.
 
This is the lens through which we must view the unfolding situation in Pakistan. However, the situation in Pakistan presents a far greater potential for conflict and devastation than either Yugoslavia or Rwanda. In short, the potential strategy of “Balkanization” and destabilization of Pakistan could dwarf any major global conflict in the past few decades. It’s sheer population of 187 million people, proximity to two major regional wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, its strategic location as neighbor to India, China, and Iran with access to the Indian Ocean, and its nuclear arsenal, combine to make Pakistan the potential trigger for a much wider regional and possibly global war. The destabilization of Pakistan has the potential to be the greatest geopolitical catastrophe since World War II.
 
Thus, Selig Harrison’s op-ed in the New York Times in which he describes the “likely” breakup of Pakistan along ethnic lines as a result of “ethnic differences” must be viewed in the wider context of geopolitical ambitions. His article lays the foundation both for the explanation of a potential breakup, and thus the “justification” for Western intervention in the conflict. His “predictive” capacities as a seasoned journalist can be alternatively viewed as pre-emptive imperial propaganda.
 
Fracturing Pakistan
 
The war in Afghanistan is inherently related to the situation in Pakistan. From the days of the Afghan-Soviet war in the 1980s, arms and money were flowing through Pakistan to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. During the civil war that followed, Pakistan armed and financed the Taliban, which eventually took power. When the U.S. and NATO initially attacked Afghanistan on October 7, 2001, this was primarily achieved through cooperation with Pakistan. When the war theatre was re-named “AfPak,” the role of Pakistan, however, was formally altered. While the previous few years had seen the implementation of a strategy of destabilizing Pakistan, once the “AfPak” war theatre was established, Pakistan ceased to be as much of a conduit or proxy state and became a target.
 
In September of 2008, the editor of Indian Defence Review wrote an article explaining that a stable Pakistan is not in India’s interests: “With Pakistan on the brink of collapse due to massive internal as well as international contradictions, it is matter of time before it ceases to exist.” He explained that Pakistan’s collapse would bring “multiple benefits” to India, including preventing China from gaining a major port in the Indian Ocean, which is in the mutual interest of the United States. The author explained that this would be a “severe jolt” to China’s expansionist aims, and further, “India’s access to Central Asian energy routes will open up.”[32]
 
In August of 2009, Foreign Policy Journal published a report of an exclusive interview they held with former Pakistani ISI chief Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, who was Director General of the powerful intelligence services (ISI) between 1987 and 1989, at a time in which it was working closely with the CIA to fund and arm the Mujahideen. Once a close ally of the US, he is now considered extremely controversial and the US even recommended the UN to put him on the international terrorist list. Gul explained that he felt that the American people have not been told the truth about 9/11, and that the 9/11 Commission was a “cover up,” pointing out that, “They [the American government] haven’t even proved the case that 9/11 was done by Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda.” He said that the real reasons for the war on Afghanistan were that:
 
the U.S. wanted to “reach out to the Central Asian oilfields” and “open the door there”, which “was a requirement of corporate America, because the Taliban had not complied with their desire to allow an oil and gas pipeline to pass through Afghanistan. UNOCAL is a case in point. They wanted to keep the Chinese out. They wanted to give a wider security shield to the state of Israel, and they wanted to include this region into that shield. And that’s why they were talking at that time very hotly about ‘greater Middle East’. They were redrawing the map.”[33]
 
He also stated that part of the reason for going into Afghanistan was “to go for Pakistan’s nuclear capability,” as the U.S. “signed this strategic deal with India, and this was brokered by Israel. So there is a nexus now between Washington, Tel Aviv, and New Delhi.” When he was asked about the Pakistani Taliban, which the Pakistani government was being pressured to fight, and where the financing for that group came from; Gul stated:
 
Yeah, of course they are getting it from across the Durand line, from Afghanistan. And the Mossad is sitting there, RAW is sitting there — the Indian intelligence agency — they have the umbrella of the U.S. And now they have created another organization which is called RAMA. It may be news to you that very soon this intelligence agency — of course, they have decided to keep it covert — but it is Research and Analysis Milli Afghanistan. That’s the name. The Indians have helped create this organization, and its job is mainly to destabilize Pakistan.[34]
 
He explained that the Chief of Staff of the Afghan Army had told him that he had gone to India to offer the Indians five bases in Afghanistan, three of which are along the Pakistani border. Gul was asked a question as to why, if the West was supporting the TTP (Pakistani Taliban), would a CIA drone have killed the leader of the TTP. Gul explained that while Pakistan was fighting directly against the TTP leader, Baitullah Mehsud, the Pakistani government would provide the Americans where Mehsud was, “three times the Pakistan intelligence tipped off America, but they did not attack him.” So why all of a sudden did they attack?
 
Because there were some secret talks going on between Baitullah Mehsud and the Pakistani military establishment. They wanted to reach a peace agreement, and if you recall there is a long history of our tribal areas, whenever a tribal militant has reached a peace agreement with the government of Pakistan, Americans have without any hesitation struck that target.
 
... there was some kind of a deal which was about to be arrived at — they may have already cut a deal. I don’t know. I don’t have enough information on that. But this is my hunch, that Baitullah was killed because now he was trying to reach an agreement with the Pakistan army. And that’s why there were no suicide attacks inside Pakistan for the past six or seven months.[35]
 
An article in one of Canada’s national magazines, Macleans, reported on an interview with a Pakistani ISI spy, who claimed that India’s intelligence services, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), have “tens of thousands of RAW agents in Pakistan.” Many officials inside Pakistan were convinced that, “India’s endgame is nothing less than the breakup of Pakistan. And the RAW is no novice in that area. In the 1960s, it was actively involved in supporting separatists in Bangladesh, at the time East Pakistan. The eventual victory of Bangladeshi nationalism in 1971 was in large part credited to the support the RAW gave the secessionists.”[36]
 
Further, there were Indian consulates set up in Kandahar, the area of Afghanistan where Canadian troops are located, and which is strategically located next to the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, which is home to a virulent separatist movement, of which Pakistan claims is being supported by India. Macleans reported on the conclusions by Michel Chossudovsky, economics professor at University of Ottawa, that, “the region’s massive gas and oil reserves are of strategic interest to the U.S. and India. A gas pipeline slated to be built from Iran to India, two countries that already enjoy close ties, would run through Baluchistan. The Baluch separatist movement, which is also active in Iran, offers an ideal proxy for both the U.S. and India to ensure their interests are met.”[37]
 
Even an Afghan government adviser told the media that India was using Afghan territory to destabilize Pakistan.[38] In September of 2009, the Pakistan Daily reported that captured members and leaders of the Pakistani Taliban have admitted to being trained and armed by India through RAW or RAMA in Afghanistan in order to fight the Pakistani Army.[39]
 
Foreign Policy magazine in February of 2009 quoted a former intelligence official as saying, “The Indians are up to their necks in supporting the Taliban against the Pakistani government in Afghanistan and Pakistan,” and that, “the same anti-Pakistani forces in Afghanistan also shooting at American soldiers are getting support from India. India should close its diplomatic establishments in Afghanistan and get the Christ out of there.”[40]
 
The Council on Foreign Relations published a backgrounder report on RAW, India’s intelligence agency, founded in 1968 “primarily to counter China's influence, [however] over time it has shifted its focus to India's other traditional rival, Pakistan.” For over three decades both Indian and Pakistani intelligence agencies have been involved in covert operations against one another. One of RAW’s main successes was its covert operations in East Pakistan, now known as Bangladesh, which “aimed at fomenting independence sentiment” and ultimately led to the separation of Bangladesh by directly funding, arming and training the Pakistani separatists. Further, as the Council on Foreign Relations noted, “From the early days, RAW had a secret liaison relationship with the Mossad, Israel's external intelligence agency.”[41]
 
Since RAW was founded in 1968, it had developed close ties with the Afghan intelligence agency, KHAD, primarily to do with intelligence sharing on Pakistan. In the 1980s, while Pakistan was funding, arming and training the Afghan Mujahideen with the support of Saudi Arabia and the CIA, India was funding two covert groups which orchestrated terrorist attacks inside Pakistan, which included a “low-grade but steady campaign of bombings in major Pakistani cities, notably Karachi and Lahore.” RAW has also had a close relationship with the CIA, as even six years before RAW was created, in 1962, the CIA created a covert organization made up of Tibetan refugees, which aimed to “execute deep-penetration terror operations in China.” The CIA subsequently played a part in the creation of RAW. In the 1980s, while the CIA was working closely with the ISI in Pakistan, RAW, while wary of their relationship, continued to get counterterrorism training from the CIA.[42]
 
In October of 2009, the New York Times reported that the US strategy “to vastly expand its aid to Pakistan, as well as the footprint of its embassy and private security contractors here, are aggravating an already volatile anti-American mood as Washington pushes for greater action by the government against the Taliban.” The U.S. gave Pakistan an aid deal of $1.5 billion per year for the next five years, under the stipulation of “Pakistan to cease supporting terrorist groups on its soil and to ensure that the military does not interfere with civilian politics.” President Zaradari accepted the proposal, making him even more unpopular in Pakistan, and further angering Pakistan’s powerful military, which sees the deal as interfering in the internal affairs of the country.[43]
 
America is thus expanding its embassy and security presence within the country, as the Embassy “has publicized plans for a vast new building in Islamabad for about 1,000 people, with security for some diplomats provided through a Washington-based private contracting company, DynCorp.” The NYT article referred to how relations were becoming increasingly strained between Pakistan and the US, and tensions were growing within the country exponentially, as “the American presence was fueling a sense of occupation among Pakistani politicians and security officials,” and several Pakistani officials stated that, “the United States was now seen as behaving in Pakistan much as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.” Futher:
 
In particular, the Pakistani military and the intelligence agencies are concerned that DynCorp is being used by Washington to develop a parallel network of security and intelligence personnel within Pakistan, officials and politicians close to the army said.
 
The concerns are serious enough that last month a local company hired by DynCorp to provide Pakistani men to be trained as security guards for American diplomats was raided by the Islamabad police. The owner of the company, the Inter-Risk Security Company, Capt. Syed Ali Ja Zaidi, was later arrested.
 
The action against Inter-Risk, apparently intended to cripple the DynCorp program, was taken on orders from the senior levels of the Pakistani government, said an official familiar with the raid, who was not authorized to speak on the record.
 
The entire workings of DynCorp within Pakistan are now under review by the Pakistani government.[44]
 
As revealed in the Wikileaks diplomatic cables, U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson wrote in September of 2009 that the U.S. strategy of unilateral strikes inside Pakistan “risk destabilizing the Pakistani state, alienating both the civilian government and military leadership, and provoking a broader governance crisis in Pakistan without finally achieving the goal.”[45]
 
In an interview with Press TV, Hamid Gul, former Inter-Services Intelligence chief revealed more of what he sees as the US strategy in Pakistan. He explained that with the massive expansion of the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, and alongside that, the increased security staff, the Chinese are becoming increasingly concerned with the sovereignty and security of Pakistan. He claimed that the money that the US government offered (with heavy conditions) to Pakistan, $1.5 billion every year for five years, will be spent under the direction of the Americans, and that “they are going to set up a large intelligence network inside Pakistan,” and ultimately “they really want to go for Pakistan's nuclear assets.” He further claimed that the Indians are trying to destabilize Pakistan; however, he explained, this does not necessarily mean disintegrate, but rather:
 
they are trying to destabilize Pakistan at the moment so that it feels weak and economically has to go begging on its knees to Americans and ask for succor and help. And in that process they will want to expect certain concessions with regards to nuclear power and also with regards to setting up their facilities here in Pakistan.[46]
 
When he was asked what America’s long-term goal was in regards to Pakistan, Gul responded that the goal:
 
for America is that they want to keep Pakistan destabilized; perhaps create a way for Baluchistan as a separate state and then create problems for Iran so that this new state will talk about greater Baluchistan... So it appears that the long-term objectives are really to fragment all these countries to an extent that they can establish a strip that would be pro-America, pro-India, pro-Israel. So this seems to be their long-term objective apart from denuclearizing Pakistan and blocking Iran's progress in the nuclear field.[47]
 
In Part 2 of ‘Pakistan in Pieces’, I will examine the specific ways in which the American strategy of destabilization is being undertaken in Pakistan, including the waging of a secret war and the expansion of the Afghan war into Pakistani territory. In short, the military and intelligence projections for Pakistan over the next several years (discussed in the beginning of Part 1 above) are a self-fulfilling prophecy, as those very same military and intelligence agencies that predict a destabilized Pakistan and potential collapse are now undertaking strategies aimed at achieving those outcomes.
 

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #982 on: May 31, 2011, 07:13:10 PM »
A few posts back, I posted an article by SSS, re: the recent attack on PNS Mehran. For his troubles the ISI took care of him.

Missing journalist Shahzad found dead
Missing journalist Shahzad found dead By Munawer Azeem and Waseem Ashraf Butt | From the Newspaper (1 hour ago) Today

Saleem Shahzad, who was the bureau chief for the Hong Kong-based Asia Times, an online publication, and the Italian news agency Adnkronos (AKI) and had worked for the Dawn Media Group’s evening newspaper Star for over a decade, was known for his investigative reporting on militancy and Al Qaeda. He had moved to Islamabad after Star closed down in 2007. – File Photo by AP

 
ISLAMABAD / GUJRAT: Tuesday added another chapter to the bloody history of Pakistan’s press freedom record when the body of missing journalist Syed Saleem Shahzad was found.

It was confirmed by the capital police as well as its counterparts in Mandi Bahauddin that a body buried in a local graveyard at Mandi Bahauddin was suspected to be that of Shahzad, an Islamabad-based journalist who had gone missing from the capital on Sunday evening. He had disappeared en route to a news channel’s office in Sector F-6 from his house in F-8/4.

Shahzad, who was the bureau chief for the Hong Kong-based Asia Times, an online publication, and the Italian news agency Adnkronos (AKI) and had worked for the Dawn Media Group’s evening newspaper Star for over a decade, was known for his investigative reporting on militancy and Al Qaeda. He had moved to Islamabad after Star closed down in 2007.

His book, “Inside Al-Qaeda & the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11”, had recently been published.

After his disappearance, the Human Rights Watch alleged that Shahzad had been picked up by the ISI and that the intelligence agency had threatened him last year as well when he had reported on the quiet release of Mullah Baradar, an aide to Mullah Omar, who had been captured by Pakistan earlier.

Ali Dayan, Pakistan researcher for HRW, also made public an email that Shahzad had sent then with the instructions to make it public in case something happened to him. The email provided Shahzad’s account of a meeting he held with two ISI officials on October 17, 2010.

After he disappeared on Sunday, there were allegations that he had been picked up by the ISI because of his recent story on the PNS Mehran base attack. Shahzad had reported that the attack took place after the Navy identified and interrogated a few of its lower-level officers for their ties with Al Qaeda.

Reporters without Borders also released a statement after Shahzad’s death was confirmed which said: “Experienced journalists in Islamabad said they suspected that Shahzad was kidnapped and executed by the military intelligence agency known as the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)…

“Sources close to Shahzad said he had reported getting several warnings from the security agencies in the past… This would tend to support the theory that he was kidnapped and killed in connection with his coverage of the attack on the naval base.”

On Tuesday it came to light that the body found at Head Rasul a day earlier was of the missing journalist. He was identified from the photos taken of the corpse on Tuesday during the postmortem at District Headquarters Hospital Mandi Bahauddin.

The police force’s efficiency knew no bounds on Tuesday. First the police force of Sara-i-Alamgir found an abandoned Toyota Corolla, which belonged to Shahzad, near the Upper Jhelum Canal. The vehicle, which had gone missing along with the journalist, had a broken window and a damaged ignition switch, hinting at car theft.

The police also found two CNICs and press cards, as well as other documents pertaining to Shahzad. They then contacted the Margalla police in Islamabad.

Once the police from Islamabad examined the car and determined its owner’s identity, they were informed by their counterparts that the Mandi Bahauddin police had found a body a day earlier.

According to the details collected by Dawn, some passersby spotted a corpse in the water on Monday. The Head Rasul police shifted the body to the DHQ.

Unusually quickly for Pakistani police, all legal formalities were completed, the autopsy was conducted on the unidentified body and it was handed over to Edhi Centre for burial. It was interred at the local graveyard temporarily.

According to the police, the postmortem report said that Shahzad had been subjected to severe torture. The report said he had 15 major injuries including fractured ribs and deep wounds on the abdomen.

It was also evident that the journalist’s hands and feet had been tied as there were marks on his wrists and ankles. However, his hands and feet were not tied when he was found.

The police said that the victim had been killed in the early hours of Monday.

The Mandi Bahauddin police told the capital police that there was no mortuary at the DHQ and Edhi Centre to keep the body; hence the pace at which it was buried.

The family, which was contacted by the capital police, identified him from the photographs, clothes and cards. Shahzad leaves behind a widow and three children.

Since the reports were first aired about the car and the body, condemnations had been pouring in from far and wide.

Human rights organisations, journalists and government officials were quick to condemn the incident. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani also ordered an immediate inquiry into the kidnapping and murder.

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #983 on: June 03, 2011, 08:11:18 PM »

Pakistan Civil War Now ON!
David Caploe    | Jun. 1, 2011, 6:13 AM | 445 | 
A A A
 
 
David Caploe


On May 11, we predicted the US assassination of Osama bin Laden in Abbotabad would herald the start of a civil war in Pakistan.
Not too many people took it seriously, but in the past two days that grim prophecy has been brutally confirmed.
The headline event in the New York Times is the killing this past weekend of the courageous Pakistani journalist Syed Saleem Shehzad by members of the organization we identified as the key player in the Islamic country's politics, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency, usually known as the ISI.
But the real story isn't simply the death of another journalist in Pakistan, a grim category in which it is a world leader.
Rather, it was the story Shehzad was working on -- the internal divisions within the ISI, which, again, we said would be the fault line out of which would erupt the Pakistan earthquake.

Shehzad had been receiving threats from the ISI for about three years because of his reporting that often relied on sources inside the intelligence agencies and inside the Taliban and other militant groups.
Which, of course, was exactly our point:
That every major player in Pakistani politics -- including the Taliban -- is riven with significant internal conflicts, some about power and personalities, but most significantly about policy:
namely, does Pakistan's future lie with the militants of Sunni political Islam -- or with the slavishly pro-Western lackeys -- or, even more potentially de-stabilizing, with genuinely democratic elements that reject both political Islam AND being the local agents of the US ?
The key event about which Shehzad was writing, and which was the direct cause of his death after three years of direct threats by Islamist elements within the ISI ?
A 16-hour battle that ensued at the navy's main base in Karachi when six -- please note, SIX -- attackers climbed over a wall and blew up two American-made naval surveillance planes.
Now, do you think SIX attackers of the navy's main base could have set off a 16-hour battle WITHOUT the help of at least SOME people inside ?
Not very likely, is it ?
Coming soon after the American raid on May 2 that killed Osama bin Laden, which caught the Pakistani Army and Air Force flat-footed, the attack on the naval base has shocked the entire country.
The armed forces chiefs have been deeply angered by the humiliation they have suffered from both episodes, and in particular the many questions raised about their competence by Pakistan’s increasingly rambunctious media.
Like we said in the immediate aftermath of Osama's killing, Pakistan's civil war is now going to become THE main event in the Arab / Muslim / Indian world.


Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/pakistan-civil-war-now-on--2011-5#ixzz1OHDIgDjy

Crafty_Dog

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #984 on: June 04, 2011, 04:14:11 AM »
I like Stratfor a lot, and here is its most recent rumination on the current sit-rep, but I am liking our YA more:
==========

U.S., Pakistan: The Unending Love-Hate Relationship

The United States and Pakistan are developing a special joint intelligence team designed to eliminate jihadist high value targets in the South Asian nation, according to media reports on Thursday. The reported move comes within days of a visit to Islamabad by U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen. The team will include CIA and Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) operatives. According to the reports, the team is assigned to hunt down top al Qaeda and Taliban leaders, including Afghan Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar; Ayman al-Zawahiri; the deputy of al Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, Sirajuddin Haqqani; the leader of Taliban forces in eastern Afghanistan, Atiya Abdel Rahman (purportedly the number three operational leader in al Qaeda); and Ilyas Kashmiri, the highest ranking Pakistani leader in al Qaeda who is involved in operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

“It is only reasonable to assume that Washington will continue to work on the unilateral path while pushing a viable joint operations program with the Pakistanis. In other words, the inherent problems in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship remain as is.”
That the CIA and ISI have agreed to joint operations aimed at eliminating key jihadist figures would be an extraordinary development considering that U.S.-Pakistani relations are at an all-time low. Washington and Islamabad were already at odds over American efforts to develop unilateral intelligence and military capabilities in Pakistan when U.S. Special Operations Forces on May 1 killed bin Laden in a compound some three hours’ drive time from the Pakistani capital in a unilateral operation. The incident massively aggravated tensions between the two sides, given that the Obama administration stated that its decision to go solo on the bin Laden hit was informed by concerns that the leaks within the Pakistani security system would jeopardize the mission.

So, the question is how — a mere month later — can the two sides come to an agreement on joint operations against top jihadist figures? Some of it can be explained by the fact that United States depends upon Pakistan for its regional strategy and that despite all the problems, Washington cannot simply afford to walk away from Pakistan and let it fall in its own jihadist abyss. Indeed, Mullen said, “I think the worst thing we could do would be cut them off…If the United States distanced itself from Pakistan, 10 years from now, 20 years from now, we go back and it’s much more intense and it’s much more dangerous. We’re just not living in a world where we can afford to be unengaged in a place like this.”

Accepting Pakistan for what it is and trying to stabilize it means that the United States must be careful not to completely undermine Islamabad, and thus needs to try and work with the Pakistanis. Unilateral operations that become public contribute to the undermining of the Pakistani state. This would explain the move to engage in joint operations so publicly — a long-standing Pakistani demand that in theory is designed to shore up the sagging credibility of the Pakistani government and its security establishment.

That doesn’t, however, solve the American problem in which it cannot afford to rely on a hemorrhaging Pakistani security system to fight jihadists on Pakistani soil, particularly when the United States is looking for high-level leaders who provide operational expertise, or inspirational leadership protected by, at the very least, rogue former employees of the Pakistani security apparatus. Therefore, it is only reasonable to assume that Washington will continue to work on the unilateral path while pushing a viable joint operations program with the Pakistanis. In other words, the inherent problems in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship remain as is. Liaison work between intelligence agencies is always a double game. The liaisons work together in mutual interest, while other operations deeper in the shadows work against each other. The purpose of the liaison work is to disguise those operations.

Even if the Pakistani security system was not compromised, there is another serious disconnect between the United States and the South Asian country. Washington and Islamabad agree that there ultimately has to be a negotiated settlement with local Taliban forces and that there are those with whom there can never be reconciliation. The problem is that there is a disagreement on the definition of what constitutes reconcilable Taliban.


ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #985 on: June 04, 2011, 04:19:55 PM »
Another paki bites the dusthttp://www.dawn.com/2011/06/05/ilyas-kashmiri-killed-in-us-drone-strike.html

Saleem SS the journalist who was tortured/killed after his coverage on the attack on PNS mehran had indicated that Ilyas kashmiri (ex-special forces of Pak) was involved. Within days, SSS and now Ilyas Kashmiri are  dead. The ISI turned him in. IK a noted terrorist, his death is most appreciated in India where he has carried out many operations.

IK was high up in Al-Qaeda, I would expect more revenge attacks in Pak. Reading their blogs, looks like the country is ready to fall apart. I am surprised that both Kiyani and Pasha have managed to stay on to their positions. Only a war with India can save paki H &D (honor and dignity).
 

G M

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #986 on: June 04, 2011, 04:30:41 PM »
Ya, do you think Pure-land might start a war w/ India then?

What do you think of this? http://the-diplomat.com/2011/05/17/how-china-can-fix-pakistan/

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #987 on: June 04, 2011, 05:02:22 PM »
China cannot replace USA. India would object to Chinese presence/role in Pak. To curry favor with the Chinese, Pak donated a large portion of Pak Occupied Kashmir to the chinese. Furthermore, even the Chinese dont want to get too close to  purelander issues, they have enough problems with their muslim minorities. They are happy selling their junk weapons, so the Chinese are a pain in the posterior, but nothing more.

If I was Kiyani, I would be thinking of the one thing that can take pressure off the military/ISI. A war with India will unite Pak, so it is very much on the general's interests to start one. Alternatively, a large terror attack in India will force a response from India.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: President Chamberlin pressed to limit drone attacks
« Reply #988 on: June 04, 2011, 08:49:11 PM »
WASHINGTON—Fissures have opened within the Obama administration over the drone program targeting militants in Pakistan, with the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan and some top military leaders pushing to rein in the Central Intelligence Agency's aggressive pace of strikes.

Such a move would roll back, at least temporarily, a program that President Barack Obama dramatically expanded soon after taking office, making it one of the U.S.'s main weapons against the Pakistan-based militants fighting coalition troops in Afghanistan.

The program has angered Pakistan, a key ally in the fight against Islamist militants. The debate over drones comes as the two sides try to repair relations badly frayed by the shooting deaths of two Pakistanis by CIA contractor Raymond Davis in January, a wave of particularly lethal drone strikes following Mr. Davis's release from Pakistani custody in March, and the clandestine U.S. raid that killed Osama bin Laden on May 2.

The White House National Security Council debated a slowdown in drone strikes in a meeting on Thursday, a U.S. official said. At the meeting, CIA Director Leon Panetta made the case for maintaining the current program, the official said, arguing that it remains the U.S.'s best weapon against al Qaeda and its allies.

The result of the meeting—the first high-level debate within the Obama administration over how aggressively to pursue the CIA's targeted-killing program—was a decision to continue the program as is for now, the U.S. official said.

Another official, who supports a slowdown, said the discussions about revamping the program would continue, alongside talks with Pakistan, which is lobbying to rein in the drone strikes.

Most U.S. officials, including those urging a slowdown, agree the CIA strikes using the pilotless aircraft have been one of Washington's most effective tools in the fight against militants hiding out in Pakistan. The weapons have killed some top al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and left militants off balance in a swath of mountainous territory along the Afghan border with Pakistan where they once operated with near impunity. No one in the administration is advocating an outright halt to the program.

 .Yet an increasingly prominent group of State Department and military officials now argue behind closed doors that the intense pace of the strikes aggravates an already troubled alliance with Pakistan and, ultimately, risks destabilizing the nuclear-armed country, said current and former officials familiar with the discussions.

U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Cameron Munter, backed by top military officers and other State Department officials, wants the strikes to be more judicious, and argues that Pakistan's views need to be given greater weight if the fight against militancy is to succeed, said current and former U.S. officials.

Defenders of the current drone program take umbrage at the suggestion that the program isn't judicious. "In this context, the phrase 'more judicious' is really code for 'let's appease Pakistani sensitivities,' " said a U.S. official. The CIA has already given Pakistani concerns greater weight in targeting decisions in recent months, the official added. Advocates of sustained strikes also argue that the current rift with the Pakistanis isn't going to be fixed by scaling back the program.

The debate has largely been muted until now, in part because the details of the program are classified and because drone strikes against militants have generally been popular with the White House and most Republicans and Democrats in Congress.

Pakistani officials have always publicly condemned the drone program; only in private have they consented to the campaign and acknowledged to having helped the CIA pinpoint targets.

Now Islamabad is lobbying Washington in public and private to curtail the strikes because of Pakistani complaints that they take a high civilian death toll.

Lt. Gen. Asif Yasin Malik, who commands Pakistani forces fighting militants in the country's northwest, said in an interview that drone strikes are making it harder to win allies among tribal leaders.

"It's a negative thing in my area of responsibility. It causes instability and impinges on my relationship with the local people," Gen. Malik said.

Advocates for reining in the program argue that the pace and scope of strikes have become politically unsustainable because of their unpopularity in Pakistan.

In a series of recent closed-door meetings, according to current and former U.S. officials, Ambassador Munter and some senior military officials argued that more selective targeting will maintain the strikes' effectiveness while easing the political blowback in Pakistan, making it easier for officials there to work with Washington.

"You can't take your foot off the gas completely—the drones have a suppressing effect on them," a U.S. official said of militant groups in the border areas. "On the other hand, the Pakistanis need some breathing space."

Pakistan has given some indications it would ramp up efforts to root out militants, following a renewed U.S. request to do so by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen during a visit to Pakistan last week.

National Security Council spokesman Tommy Vietor declined to discuss the covert program or any internal debate over its future.

"The president has issued a clear directive to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda, and the United States government is completely united behind that goal. I think the results speak for themselves," Mr. Vietor said.

The CIA's targeted killing program, ramped up by President George W. Bush in July 2008, was initially designed to target high-level al Qaeda leaders. Strikes averaged roughly one a week in the last half of 2008.

Mr. Obama has overseen a dramatic expansion of the program. The drones were originally used against specifically selected "high-value" targets, a list drawn up with Pakistani help.

But in the past year, the CIA has been targeting lower-level fighters after tracking their activities and movements.

The CIA last year conducted more than 100 strikes. The pace has slowed to roughly 30 in the first five months of 2011, partly over concerns about Pakistani reaction, a U.S. official said.

The latest drone strike came Friday, hitting three compounds in Pakistan's South Waziristan region and killing at least four people, according to an official familiar with the matter.

There is disagreement over how many civilian bystanders the strikes have killed. The Pakistanis say hundreds of civilians have died in the strikes, which is part of the reason they want them scaled back. The U.S. says 30 civilians have been slain. Both sides agree hundreds of militants have been killed.

The pushback by some U.S. officials against the drone program comes as U.S. diplomats and officials serving in Pakistan express dissatisfaction with what they see as the generally hostile tenor of the U.S.'s policy toward Pakistan.

These diplomats and officials say the deep vein of anti-Americanism that runs through Pakistani society forces its elected and military leaders, including army chief Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to distance themselves from Washington to avoid a popular backlash.

"What's worrying a lot of us is whether we're turning people who should be our natural allies into our adversaries," said a U.S. diplomat in Pakistan.

A senior U.S. official said the key is figuring out what level of drone strikes can satisfy U.S. security needs and at the same be tolerated by the Pakistanis. "I think we underestimate the importance of public opinion in Pakistan to our detriment," the official said. The Pakistanis have "a legitimate concern."

Islamabad has proposed narrowing the scope of the CIA program to target militants that have been agreed to by both sides, a Pakistani official said.


ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #989 on: June 05, 2011, 06:21:01 AM »
From the blogs...US-Pak relations:

Circa 2002

Circa 2009

Circa2011

Crafty_Dog

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Hi-speed or lo-speed departure
« Reply #990 on: June 06, 2011, 04:04:49 PM »
Looks like the YA-Crafty Strategy is not under consideration:
===============================================
Stratfor

During the final visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Afghanistan the drawdown set to begin in July loomed large. The commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, Gen. David Petraeus is in the process of formulating his recommendations to the White House for those drawdowns. While Petraeus has insisted that these numbers are still being formulated internally, the idea of reductions of U.S. forces in the order of 3,000-5,000 have been discussed in recent weeks.

There are currently nearly 100,000 U.S. troops and some 40,000 additional allied forces in the country. Responsibility for security across the country is slated to be turned over to Afghan hands by 2014, at which point all combat forces are expected to be withdrawn. Reports have begun to emerge that the White House is considering more significant reductions. With the killing of Osama bin Laden, a symbolic event, and the very real movement of Gen. Petraeus to the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the White House has at least given itself more room to maneuver in terms of adjusting timetables and modifying objectives, especially as the costs of the war continue to mount. Vice President Joe Biden and others advocated since at least 2009 for a more counterterrorism-focused and training-focused mission that would entail fewer troops, less combat and a lighter footprint.

In the end a Pentagon push for the surge that took place won out. But either way, the pressure to show demonstrable gains in security in an increasingly short time continues to mount. It’s really all about a question of what is achievable and how much should be invested in achieving that. On the one hand, there’s a push to really roll back the Taliban under the current counterinsurgency-focused strategy and reshape the security environment in the country before the U.S. withdraws. On the other side are skeptics that this can really be achieved or that achieving it is really worth the price in blood and treasure that the United States and its allies have been paying. On both sides it’s about an exit strategy, it’s about a withdrawal. The question is the pace and the risk that the United States is willing to accept in terms of the security environment it leaves behind as it withdraws. In terms of the Afghan security forces the question is what is good enough and how much more can be achieved before the U.S. begins to pull back in a big way as the 2014 deadline nears.

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G M

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #991 on: June 06, 2011, 04:08:04 PM »
Because it would require a helping of brains and balls. Something this administration lacks. Now, if there was a way to implement the Crafty-ya plan that would enrich Soros or some union thugs, then it might stand a chance.

ya

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Christopher Hitchens
« Reply #992 on: June 06, 2011, 08:07:36 PM »
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2011/07/osama-bin-laden-201107

Christopher Hitchens....

"Again to quote myself from 2001, if Pakistan were a person, he (and it would have to be a he) would have to be completely humorless, paranoid, insecure, eager to take offense, and suffering from self-righteousness, self-pity, and self-hatred. That last triptych of vices is intimately connected. The self-righteousness comes from the claim to represent a religion: the very name “Pakistan” is an acronym of Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and so forth, the resulting word in the Urdu language meaning “Land of the Pure.” The self-pity derives from the sad fact that the country has almost nothing else to be proud of: virtually barren of achievements and historically based on the amputation and mutilation of India in 1947 and its own self-mutilation in Bangladesh. The self-hatred is the consequence of being pathetically, permanently mendicant: an abject begging-bowl country that is nonetheless run by a super-rich and hyper-corrupt Punjabi elite. As for paranoia: This not so hypothetical Pakistani would also be a hardened anti-Semite, moaning with pleasure at the butchery of Daniel Pearl and addicted to blaming his self-inflicted woes on the all-powerful Jews."
« Last Edit: June 06, 2011, 08:15:25 PM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: Stay or go? 2.0 and Stratfor on Russia and India's interests , , ,
« Reply #993 on: June 07, 2011, 03:38:15 PM »
YA, your thoughts on these two?  There seems to be considerable divergence between the two.
==========================================================================

By KIMBERLY KAGAN AND FREDERICK KAGAN
It's been 18 months since President Obama announced the Afghan troop surge, and now July 2011—the date at which he promised that a withdrawal would begin—is nearly upon us. Washington still hasn't decided whether withdrawals will be "modest," as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is encouraging, or more substantial, as leaks to the media suggest the White House may prefer. What's clear from Afghanistan, though, is that nothing about conditions on the ground justifies the withdrawal of any U.S. or coalition forces.

The fight is approaching its peak, progress remains fragile and under assault, and we need every soldier we have—U.S., coalition and Afghan—to maintain momentum. The risks of a small withdrawal (say, 5,000 troops) are probably manageable. But any such withdrawal would be driven by politics rather than strategy.

Progress in the fight is undeniable. Coalition forces have driven the Taliban from their major safe havens in southern Afghanistan and are continuing to press into lesser enemy strongholds. The Taliban have launched operations to retake the ground they have lost, but so far to no avail.

Their tactics, moreover, indicate their weakness. Having long eschewed suicide bombings and direct attacks against Afghan civilians for fear of alienating the population, the Taliban are increasingly carrying out such attacks. The attacks, in turn, are driving a wedge between the enemy and the population, a phenomenon we have seen in Iraq and elsewhere.

There is every reason to believe that coalition forces and their increasingly effective Afghan partners can hold the gains in the south through this fighting season (that is, until November). This would allow them to create meaningful security zones around all of the major population centers in the south for the first time since 2001, but only if they have the resources and the time to do it.

Aggressive operations have managed to preserve a great degree of security in Kabul and are slowly expanding out from there. But the enemy still has safe havens within eastern Afghanistan that must be cleared before they are turned over to Afghan responsibility. So must the Haqqani network—which operates from eastern Afghanistan and is closely linked to al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, with international aspirations—be defeated.

It hasn't been possible so far to undertake such clearing operations in the east because the surge was limited to about 30,000 troops. Without the full-force package requested by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commanders first had to focus on southern Afghanistan, which was in imminent danger of falling to the Taliban in 2009. Removing U.S. forces prematurely will deny the coalition and the Afghans the ability to shift their forces to eastern Afghanistan. Afghan security forces, although holding and fighting well, are not yet able to meet the Taliban threat on their own.

Above all, the Afghan population needs confidence before it really commits to resisting the Taliban and supporting the government. It can gain such confidence only by seeing that the coalition and Afghan forces will successfully fight off the coming Taliban counterattack.

A successful fighting season this year would permit decisive operations in eastern Afghanistan in 2012. The same rules will apply to those operations, however: If the coalition can clear remaining safe havens in the east in 2012, the enemy is likely to counterattack in 2013, and the coalition and the Afghans will have to defeat that counterattack to demonstrate to the local people that the insurgents have lost and are not coming back.

This timeline of operations is fully consistent with the 2014 deadline, announced by President Obama and the NATO allies in Lisbon last year, for transferring security control to the Afghans and reducing the American footprint to whatever is required for sustained training and counterterrorism operations. This timeline would also likely permit the beginning of substantial reductions in forces in 2013, assuming that progress continues in the south as we defeat enemy counterattacks in the east.

Pressure for withdrawal is driven largely by concerns about the U.S. budget, frustration with Afghanistan's government, anger at Pakistan, and irrational exuberance about the impact of Osama bin Laden's death. But bin Laden's death isn't significant to the situation on the ground in Afghanistan today because it has no meaningful effect on popular attitudes about the likelihood of insurgent victory or defeat.

As for the other problems, premature withdrawal will make them all worse. The Afghan government will behave more counterproductively the more it believes that the U.S. isn't serious about succeeding. The Pakistani military is much more likely to double down on its support for insurgent proxies in Afghanistan if Mr. Obama reinforces its decades-long conviction that America will inevitably abandon the region. And Pakistani failures to address terrorist bases on their own territory will be compounded by the re-emergence of such sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

The economic argument for withdrawing troops faster makes even less sense. The marginal savings of pulling an additional 5,000 or even 15,000 troops out of Afghanistan 12 or 18 months early is trivial compared to the cost of failure in this effort. If we defeat ourselves in Afghanistan now, we will have to choose later whether to accept likely attacks on the U.S. homeland or to intervene militarily once again—at a much higher price than we could hope to save now. Withdrawal is a penny-wise but pound-foolish approach to an enduring national security problem.

If Mr. Obama announces the withdrawal of all surge forces from Afghanistan in 2012, the war will likely be lost. Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and other global terrorist groups will almost certainly re-establish sanctuaries in Afghanistan. The Afghan state would likely collapse and the country would descend into ethnic civil war. The outcome of this policy would be far worse than Nixon's decision to accept defeat in Vietnam, for it would directly increase the threat to the American homeland.

Americans may be tired of war, but war is not tired of us. Thousands of people around the world wake up every morning and think about how to kill Americans and destroy the American way of life. Right now, we have the momentum against those enemies in Afghanistan. This is the time to press the fight.

Ms. Kagan is president of the Institute for the Study of War. Mr. Kagan is director of the Critical Threats Project at the American Enterprise Institute. They have spent about 10 months in Afghanistan since 2009.

===============
Russia's Concern in a Post-U.S. Afghanistan

Russian National Security Adviser Nikolai Patrushev, while on a visit to the Indian capital Monday, said there was no military solution to the situation in Afghanistan. Patrushev, who is the former long-time head of the Russian Federal Security Service and the second most influential intelligence official after Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, explained that the problems of terrorism and drug trafficking in the southwest Asian nation would continue without some sort of negotiated settlement in the country that could allow for socio-economic development. Afghan forces on their own could not accomplish such tasks, and Russia is willing to provide the necessary assistance, the secretary of the Kremlin’s National Security Council said.

“Knowing that the Americans are unlikely to achieve some form of political resolution before they leave Afghanistan, the Russians are trying to step in and find with regional players some enduring strategy in the otherwise dysfunctional country.”
Patrushev’s remarks reflect Moscow’s growing concerns at the increasingly deteriorating situation in Afghanistan, especially as the United States and its NATO allies approach the endgame. The Americans have the choice of walking away from Afghanistan while it remains a threat, albeit one that is not so close to home. For the Russians, however, given their interests in Central Asia and the Caucuses, Afghanistan in a state of anarchy — or worse, dominated by the Taliban — represents a clear and present danger due to terrorism, drugs, and political and regional destabilization.

Knowing that the Americans are unlikely to achieve some form of political resolution before they leave Afghanistan, the Russians are trying to step in and find with regional players some enduring strategy in the otherwise dysfunctional country. India and Russia, along with Iran, share similar concerns, and have long been supportive of anti-Taliban forces. But each of these powers realizes that the Taliban are a reality and thus need to be contained through engagement.

Iran already has significant ties to the Afghan jihadist militia, cultivated over the years since the Taliban began their resurgence. The Russians also have their own connections, a legacy from their involvement in the 1980s. India remains the weak link in this chain because of its rivalry with Pakistan and Taliban linkages to Islamabad, despite its having the most overt business relationship, and a recently announced training deal with Afghan security forces.

The Russians, who have been in communication with the Pakistanis, especially as U.S.-Pakistani relations have suffered, understand the need to work with Islamabad. This would explain Patrushev’s statement that the joint fight against terrorism could help normalize relations between India and Pakistan. “India and Pakistan have specific relations, and we do not see it as our role to try to change them,” he said. “However, there is a threat which affects everyone, international terrorism, and there is an understanding by the sides that this needs to be resolved together.”

However, the Indian-Pakistani rivalry is not the only thing that Russia has to be concerned about vis-a-vis Afghanistan. U.S. influence on the Indians has created a disconnect between India and Iran, preventing India from being able to purchase crude from Tehran. Tightening U.S.-led measures against doing business with the Iranians has left the Indians without a means by which to pay for the crude.

In the past couple of days there have been reports that Saudi Arabia is willing to make up for the amount of oil that the Indians have not been getting from Iran due to American-led sanctions. It is not clear if India can use Saudi Arabia to substitute this shortfall, but it creates problems between India and Iran as Tehran is at loggerheads with both Washington and Riyadh.

As Russia gets more nervous about what will come from the aftermath of the U.S. pullout in Afghanistan, it will seek assistance to engineer some direction in the country. Ultimately, if the Russians are to come up with a way to deal with Afghanistan, then they must have reach a consensus with the key regional players, especially Pakistan and Iran — the two countries with the most influence in Afghanistan and with problems with India.

« Last Edit: June 07, 2011, 11:27:50 PM by Crafty_Dog »

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #994 on: June 11, 2011, 06:35:26 AM »
Re: the first article:
I think we should stay in Afghanistan only if we plan to take on the jihadi sanctuaries in Pak ourselves, or have a means to get the pak army to do the work for us. Otherwise, the talibs will play hide and seek with American forces by running back to Pak. We have now started to apply pressure on Pak to take action in N.Waziristan, this is good (10 years late), but likely to be ineffective since the paki army has no interest in that proposition. So it is time to come back from Afghanistan...since we are unwilling to take the hard decision of expanding the war (boots on the ground) into Pak.

Re: the second...its  part of the "great game" in central asia. Dont know what the US objectives and interests are. My instinct is to think that the US should support its interests through proxies and friendly countries and not have a permanent physical presence there. The US is seen as a foreign occupying power, that will not be acceptable to anyone longterm (Russians, Chinese, Purelanders, Afghanis, Iranians). Only India benefits from a US presence in Afghanistan, since the US is doing some of the work for the Indians and there is atleast partial convergence of interests.
« Last Edit: June 11, 2011, 06:37:56 AM by ya »

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #995 on: June 11, 2011, 06:46:39 AM »
I would be very surprised if Kayani and Pasha can keep their jobs....the common abdul is most displeased with the duo...the rank and file of the army is not too impressed either. Infact, by sending troops into N.Waziristan, Kayani will lose all respect amongst the population and lower ranks of the army. If he does not, his american masters will be most displeased.

I also find it ironic that Pak talks about strategic depth in Afghanistan, but its actually the Taliban who enjoy strategic depth in Pakistan against the US forces in Afghanistan.

The woes of an ostrich republic
 
Ayaz Amir
Friday, June 03, 2011
 
 
When the cover was blown from Osama bin Laden’s last gift to Pakistan – his choice of residence in Abbottabad, a favour we could have done without – it was only to be expected that the guardians of national ideology would be rendered speechless. There are some situations too embarrassing for words and this was one of them.

A frank admission of failure might have been more sensible. But this being no part of the Pakistani tradition, our guardians did the next best thing: climb the ramparts and blow the trumpets of national dignity and honour. For about 10-12 days it seemed as if Pakistan was trembling on the edge of a new declaration of independence. Politicians of all hues went wild with demands for an end to foreign aid.

It took only two brief visits – the first by Senator John Kerry, the second by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, with Admiral Mike Mullen in tow – to puncture this euphoric post-Osama myth of born-again national sovereignty.

Pakistan’s leadership – president, prime minister and the chief guardian himself, Gen Ashfaq Kayani – dutifully lined up before Kerry (who, it bears noting, holds no official position in the US administration) to hear him say that Pakistan’s conduct henceforth would be judged not by words but deeds.

Any doubts persisting about whether the mood of the Pakistani leadership had sobered up were laid to rest by the second visit. Hillary Clinton offered a sop to her interlocutors, something they would have been keen to hear: “...I want to stress again that we have absolutely no reason to believe anyone at the highest level of the government knew (about Osama).” But this came with a sting: “...we have reached a turning point....we look to Pakistan to take decisive steps in the days ahead.”

What those steps were was made clear a few days later by Admiral Mullen who told American TV channels that an operation by the Pakistan army in North Waziristan was on the cards. “It’s a very important fight,” he said, “and a very important operation.”

One doesn’t have to be much of a war genius to figure out what’s going on. The Americans give the army leadership a sort of clean chit about Bin Laden but get the army to agree on a new, and potentially dangerous, operation, something Kayani and company were resisting for some time. So much for national honour and sovereignty.

And look at the ISI’s predicament. Since the Raymond Davis affair its leadership was getting hot under the collar wanting to reduce the American footprint in Pakistan. Now the same leadership has to go along with the opening of a new front in North Waziristan. In other words, taking a strong stand on a relatively small issue but helpless in the face of a larger decision.

The Peshawar corps commander has of course said that an operation in North Waziristan is not imminent and that it will be undertaken “...when we want to do it, when it is militarily and otherwise in the national interest.” While he should be applauded for his outspokenness, he forgets that we often leave it to our foreign friends to define our national interest.

The fight against terrorism should be taken forward but we should think long and hard before going into North Waziristan. This already looks like a compromised operation not because we are talking about it but because, given the present state of army morale, it is hard to imagine any unit of the Pakistan army having its heart in it when the fighting begins.

Swat and South Waziristan were different. There was hope in the air that we were about to turn a corner in our fight against extremism. There was also the feeling that military success would be complemented by something equally daring on the political front. But with no end in sight to what increasingly looks like an intractable struggle, and with the political leadership largely uninvolved (neither the president nor the prime minister having visited the troops even once) that mood has vanished, giving way to a feeling of resignation and despondency.

The effects of the Osama raid and the attack on the Mehran base should also be taken into account. With military morale not at its highest it will take a minor miracle of leadership to inject a gung-ho spirit into the units going into North Waziristan. If at all undertaken, this has to be our own operation, with our hearts and souls in it. If carried out under American pressure, there is a risk it will be a half-cocked affair.

We have to get one thing straight. That we are amenable to American pressure is not so much because of our economic vulnerability, although that too is a problem, but because of our strategic double games: fighting some militants while nurturing and supporting others because of their presumed usefulness against India. Or as future insurance policy for Afghanistan.

The foremost condition for the reclamation of sovereignty is an end to these games, a final farewell to the use of militancy as a tool of foreign policy. Support for such organisations as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and a sovereign Pakistan are mutually contradictory aims. If we want to be masters in our own house we have to rid ourselves of the bitter legacy of ‘jihad’. It has caused Pakistan nothing but unmitigated harm and given a handle to others to use against us.

And can the godfathers of national security kindly get Afghanistan out of their system? Can’t we leave it to geography and cultural proximity to work their influences? Earlier on we propped up Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Then it was the Taliban. Now it is the Haqqanis. Can’t we get over this obsession of wanting to control things in Afghanistan? We never succeeded in the past, we won’t in the future. Afghan history has not been kind to would-be controllers.

The other half of our double games flows from our perceptions about India. The lashkar-this and the jaish-that have been pawns on our Indian chessboard. Without going into the details of our Indian obsession, suffice it to say that the world has changed, the sub-continent has changed, the dragons threatening us are no longer the same.

No one is saying bend the knee before India. Why should that even be a consideration? Larger neighbours can be a problem but we must learn to live with them. There’s no other choice. We have cultivated hostility towards India and all this has done is to drag us down, warping our thoughts and making them morbid, and crippling our ability to behave and function like a normal nation.

Pakistan has two problems – just two and no other: under-development and the curse of religious fundamentalism gone wild. Both are internal problems aggravated not by any international conspiracy – Zionist, Indian or American – but by our external obsessions. Unless the army, and here the key responsibility is the army’s, breaks free from its Indian bondage – and this is a bondage – there can be no peace for Pakistan.

Just think of it, clenching our mailed fist towards India but sucking up to the United States, acting upon American demands about necessary steps, what kind of sovereignty is this?

Islam is not the state religion of Pakistan, denial is. And our national emblem should be the ostrich, given our proclivity to bury our heads in the sand and not see the landscape around us as it is.

We need a drastic change of course, that’s for sure. The kind of civilian leaders we have, their quality we know. No hope for any miracles from that quarter. As for the military side, Kayani has begun to look too much like a dated product, a rep of the old order. He has outlived his usefulness. His extension may have been a Zardari political masterstroke, serving to protect his flanks, but otherwise it wasn’t a bright idea.

We need a change of guard, both political and military, the coming of some rebels to the fore. This is Pakistan’s foremost challenge...dependent, however, on divine grace because the political spectrum, from one end to the other, presents the aspect of a desert, the level and lonely sands (echoes of Shelley) stretching far away.
« Last Edit: June 11, 2011, 06:50:34 AM by ya »

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #996 on: June 11, 2011, 07:04:19 AM »

Pakistan Officials Colluding With Militants? US Presents Evidence

By NICK SCHIFRIN (@nickschifrin) and MATTHEW COLE
June 10, 2011
The United States' attempts to regain trust in Pakistan's intelligence service suffered a blow in the last few weeks when the CIA gathered evidence that U.S. officials believe shows collusion between militants and Pakistani security officials.

During a visit to Islamabad on Friday, CIA Director Leon Panetta confronted the head of Pakistan's intelligence service, showing him satellite and other intelligence that the CIA believes is evidence of Pakistani security's efforts to help Islamic militants based in Pakistan, according to U.S. and Pakistani officials.

According to the officials, Panetta revealed overhead imagery that showed two facilities where militants manufactured improvised explosive devices, known as IEDs, which are commonly used by militants fighting U.S. forces in Afghanistan. The "IED factories" were located in North and South Waziristan, where many militants are based.

The CIA passed intelligence in the past several weeks to their Pakistani counterparts, alerting them to the two facilities, but when Pakistani forces raided the facilities, the militants had disappeared.

In his meetings Friday, Panetta conveyed the CIA's belief that the militants had been warned by Pakistani security officials prior to the raids.

Panetta traveled to Islamabad just hours after his Congressional hearing to become secretary of defense, an unannounced trip that U.S. officials publicly described as a way to "discuss ways to improve cooperation." But behind the scenes, Panetta's visit -- expected to be his last as CIA chief -- underscored the lack of trust that U.S. officials continue to have in their Pakistani counterparts.

Since Osama bin Laden's death, senior U.S. officials have demanded that Pakistan prove that it intends to help crack down on terror networks within its own borders with concrete, specific steps.

Today, U.S. and Pakistani officials both admitted that the escape of militants making bombs for use against Americans in Afghanistan was a setback.

Pakistani officials made a rare admission that some kind of collusion was possible.

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #997 on: June 12, 2011, 05:20:05 AM »
The country is ripe for civil war....insha allah..


http://www.marketwatch.pk/news/pakistan-business-news/pakistan-poverty-increased-to-an-astonishing-43-percent


Pakistan Poverty increased to an astonishing 43 Percent
June 03, 2011


ISLAMABAD: For the third year in a row, the government of Pakistan refused to state how many people in the country live below the poverty line, although estimates based on data provided by the finance ministry in its economic survey suggest that the poverty rate may have increased to an astonishing 43%.

During much of the press conference, both Finance Minister Abdul Hafeez Sheikh and the finance secretary refused to answer the question on poverty and unemployment rates, despite the fact that nearly every journalist present started off by asking about those two key metrics of the nation’s economic health.


Process of Compiling: The question was usually summarily ignored by both the minister and other officials present before the finance secretary finally gave a non-answer, saying that he had no new information on the matter. Since the last poverty survey in 2006, there are no new figures on poverty, said Finance Secretary Waqar Masood, during a press conference that marked the release of the 2011 Economic Survey. The government is in the process of compiling the results of its new poverty survey and will be able to release the data next year. In 2006, the government had determined that 22.3%, a figure that hid the fact that there was an increasingly wide gap between the poverty rates in urban and rural areas. Poverty rates in urban areas are lower by as much as 20% compared to rural areas. The government uses the World Bank’s definition of poverty, which is any person earning less than $1.25 per day. In Pakistan, that figure comes to any person living on less than Rs3,243 per month. The government has not given any reason as to why it does not produce even estimates of the poverty rates, even though this year’s economic survey seems to include suggestions on how much it might have increased by. By the ADB’s estimates, as cited by the ministry of finance, every 10% increase in food prices pushes 2.2% of Pakistan’s population below the poverty line.

The ministry estimates that food prices have risen 94% since its last poverty survey. If the ADB’s estimates hold across several years, poverty in Pakistan has increased to an astonishing 43%. Data from the finance ministry suggest that nearly 75% of the population lives very close to the poverty line and very small changes can push very large numbers of people below it, while relatively medium-paced economic growth can also bring several million people out of poverty as well.[/b]]If the ADB’s estimates hold across several years, poverty in Pakistan has increased to an astonishing 43%. Data from the finance ministry suggest that nearly 75% of the population lives very close to the poverty line and very small changes can push very large numbers of people below it, while relatively medium-paced economic growth can also bring several million people out of poverty as well.

ya

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Re: Afpakia: Afghanistan-Pakistan
« Reply #998 on: June 12, 2011, 05:24:42 AM »
Pakis are getting paranoid..

G M

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The Onion perfectly captures Pakistan's help in the GWOT
« Reply #999 on: June 12, 2011, 05:32:53 AM »
http://www.theonion.com/articles/pakistani-intelligence-announces-its-full-cooperat,20681/


Pakistani Intelligence Announces Its Full Cooperation With U.S. Forces During Upcoming Top Secret June 12 Drone Strike On Al-Qaeda At 5:23 A.M. Near Small Town Of Razmani In North Waziristan