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62051
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: August 09, 2003, 04:15:19 PM »
THE WORLD
Jail Defects Abetted Terrorist's Escape
The bomb maker, with inside help, lifted his cell bars and walked out past dozing guards.
   
Jail Defects Abetted Terrorist's Escape
 
By Richard C. Paddock, Times Staff Writer


MANILA ? Fathur Rohman Al Ghozi did what many travelers do before taking a big trip: He got a haircut. He packed all his belongings. And he contacted his friends on his cell phone to tell them he was coming.

Then he walked out of his supposedly high-security jail cell at the Philippine police headquarters and vanished into the night.

The July 14 escape of the Jemaah Islamiah bomb maker along with two cellmates belonging to the brutal Abu Sayyaf kidnapping gang shocked the nation and has triggered a manhunt by 5,000 officers and 63 special police tracking teams.

The jailbreak is one of the biggest setbacks in Southeast Asia's struggle against Islamic extremists since two Bali nightclub bombings last October that killed 202 people. Al Ghozi, an Indonesian, is considered one of the Jemaah Islamiah operatives most capable of organizing and carrying out a large-scale attack.

A $180,000 reward for Al Ghozi, a huge sum by Philippine standards, has produced Elvis-style sightings. On one recent day, he was reported to be in six different places. But despite the police mobilization and official assurances that he would soon be recaptured, the 32-year-old fugitive, also known as "Mike the Bombmaker," continues to elude his pursuers.

Some officials fear that he has already hooked up with fellow extremists and begun planning new attacks in the region ? a concern heightened by the car bombing Tuesday of a Marriott hotel in Jakarta, the Indonesian capital, that killed 10 people. The soft-spoken Indonesian, who trained in Afghanistan in the 1990s, has ties to the Al Qaeda terrorist network and the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the southern Philippines.

"Al Ghozi is a leader," said Philippine police intelligence officer Rodolfo Mendoza, who interviewed him in jail. "Al Ghozi has the capacity to plan. He is very, very cool. He is not afraid."

Before his arrest in January 2002, Al Ghozi teamed up with some of the alleged Bali bombers and helped stage attacks in Manila and Jakarta that killed 24 people.

During interrogation, Al Ghozi gave police details of his training, travels and involvement in bomb plots in three countries. He was sentenced to 10 to 12 years in prison for obtaining more than a ton of explosives he planned to use to bomb embassies in Singapore. He was sentenced to an additional five years for immigration violations. He was about to be tried on murder charges for his part in the Manila blasts when he broke out of jail.

Al Ghozi's escape from Camp Crame, the sprawling national police headquarters in the center of metropolitan Manila, humiliated President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and highlighted corruption and incompetence in the police department.

"It's a big embarrassment," acknowledged Roilo Golez, Arroyo's national security advisor.

There has been a flurry of allegations that police received bribes to let Al Ghozi go, or that they released him in a plot to undermine the president. At least four officers, including the head of the intelligence unit responsible for holding him, are in custody and under investigation.

But given the way things work at Camp Crame, it is possible that Al Ghozi simply got away with a little help from his friends. Although authorities said they were holding him in a high-security prison, he actually was being kept in a cell on the second floor of an aging office building with only rudimentary security.

The camp was already well known for the escape of high-profile prisoners, including Khadafi Abubakar Janjalani, the current Abu Sayyaf leader who slipped out of the same cell in 1995 by climbing through a duct in the ceiling.

Jemaah Islamiah, a Southeast Asian terrorist network, and Abu Sayyaf both have long-standing ties to Al Qaeda. Authorities have previously said that they had no evidence of the two groups working together. They do now.

Police inexplicably put Al Ghozi in a cell with two Abu Sayyaf members, Abdulmukim Ong Edris and Merang Abante, who are both accused of kidnapping Americans.

Edris allegedly participated in the kidnapping of 20 people, including three Americans, at a resort on Palawan island. Guillermo Sobero, a tourist from Corona, Calif., was beheaded, and missionary Martin Burnham of Wichita, Kan., was killed during a rescue raid. Edris was also blamed for bombings in the southern Philippines that claimed 12 lives, including one attack in October that killed a U.S. Green Beret.

Abante was allegedly involved in the kidnapping of American Jeffrey Schilling of Oakland, who was later freed.

The three inmates were aided by Abu Ali, who had been arrested for helping Al Ghozi buy explosives. He had turned state's evidence and agreed to testify against Al Ghozi.

The police then released Ali from custody but gave him lodging and a job as janitor at the compound. Having gained the trust of the police, Ali was free to roam the jail, where he served as Al Ghozi's link to the outside world. After the escape, Ali was rearrested and described to police how he helped the three prisoners get away.

Three months before the breakout, Ali told the prisoners that the door to their cell could be opened by lifting up the bars and pushing them out of their holes in the concrete wall.

"Apparently it could be opened without opening the padlock," said police spokesman Ricardo De Leon. "That was a defect."

Ali said he brought cooking oil from the kitchen to lubricate the bars so they wouldn't squeak on the night of the breakout.

Ali gave the three cellmates information about the guards' routine and the best escape route. He bought Al Ghozi a cell phone so the prisoner could make arrangements for the getaway.

Once out of their cell, Al Ghozi and his cellmates could walk down a flight of stairs, past a guardroom and out an unlocked door to the yard outside.

The biggest danger was getting past the guardroom, but the guards were sleeping the night of the escape, police said.

From the door it was only about 20 feet to the jail compound's 7-foot outer wall. There is no barbed wire, no guard tower, no security patrol. Trees grow on both sides of the wall, providing excellent cover.

Most likely, the escapees walked right through a flimsy wooden gate that was usually left unlocked and unguarded. It has since been boarded up.

Once outside the jail compound, leaving Camp Crame was simple.

Security was so lax that an accomplice could have driven onto the base hours before the breakout and parked near the wall to wait for Al Ghozi, Edris and Abante. Police ask visitors to show identification when entering the base, but they do not bother keeping a record of who comes and goes.

The prisoners were not required to wear a distinctive prison uniform, so once they were outside the wall, they could easily blend in.

On the Saturday before the escape, Al Ghozi asked guards to bring in a barber, who cut his hair and shaved the beard he had grown since his arrest. Police did not go to the trouble of taking a new photo of Al Ghozi afterward.

Sometime that Sunday, Al Ghozi packed up family photos and his other personal belongings.

The guards typically filled out a log sheet reporting on the prisoners' whereabouts without bothering to check whether they were in their cells. As a result, police are not sure when the prisoners escaped, but they say it was sometime between 10 p.m. Sunday and 5 a.m. Monday. The police were so slow to notify their superiors that word of the escape did not reach the president until Monday afternoon, when a nationwide alert was issued. The trio had a head start of as many as 15 hours.

An angry Arroyo created an independent commission to investigate the escape.

"If there was collusion, this is the gravest act against our national security done so far by persons within the government," the president said.

On Thursday, officials said soldiers had captured Edris at a checkpoint on the island of Mindanao. Edris agreed to lead troops to Al Ghozi's hide-out, authorities said, but then grabbed a soldier's rifle in an attempt to escape. Soldiers shot and killed him. A massive search for Al Ghozi continued in the area on Friday.

The son of an Islamic militant, Al Ghozi attended the Al Mukmin boarding school in central Java, which was co-founded by radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, the alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiah. Bashir is now on trial in Jakarta for treason.

After graduation, Al Ghozi went to Afghanistan, where he received training in Al Qaeda camps. Jemaah Islamiah recruited him and sent him to the Philippines to learn the language and make contact with local militant groups.

Within a few years, he was fluent enough in Tagalog to be taken for a native. He hooked up with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and went to Camp Abubakar, then the group's main base, and began training other militants to handle explosives. After the Philippine military attacked and shut down Camp Abubakar, Jemaah Islamiah decided to seek revenge.

In August 2000, Al Ghozi joined a team of operatives under the direction of a man named Hambali ? an Al Qaeda operative who is Jemaah Islamiah's operations chief ? and detonated a car bomb outside the Jakarta residence of Philippine Ambassador Leonides Caday. The ambassador was seriously injured. Two others were killed.

Al Ghozi told police that he set off the bomb. Police say at least five of those who carried out the attack were later involved in the Bali nightclub blasts: Hambali, Imam Samudra, Mubarok, Dulmatin and Amrozi bin H. Nurhasyim, who was convicted Thursday and sentenced to death for his part in the Bali bombings.

Al Ghozi told police that in December 2000, he helped stage bombings in Manila at a transit station and four other civilian targets. The near-simultaneous blasts, also carried out under Hambali's direction, killed 22 and wounded 100.

A year later, Al Ghozi was helping plan seven simultaneous car bomb attacks on embassies and other targets in Singapore when the plot was uncovered and more than a dozen Jemaah Islamiah members were arrested.

Acting on a tip from Singapore, Philippine authorities seized Al Ghozi as he was preparing to fly to Bangkok for a meeting of Jemaah Islamiah leaders. At the meeting, the group began planning the Bali attack without him.

The U.S., which has close relations with the Philippines in part because of Arroyo's strong support for the Bush administration's war against terrorism, was alarmed by Al Ghozi's escape.

Francis Ricciardone, the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines, said Al Ghozi was one of Jemaah Islamiah's most dangerous operatives, not just because of his skill with explosives but also because of his ability to organize and motivate others.

"This is a person who has no scruples about killing innocent people who might happen to be in a subway station or in a shopping mall," the ambassador said. "It's not merely the skill at killing, but it's the coldblooded willingness, even eagerness, to murder people. People like that are very valuable in terrorist circles, and he can inspire others to be the same way. He's a dangerous man."

62052
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: August 08, 2003, 08:56:05 AM »
1147 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Philippine troops on Aug. 8 killed militant
Abdulmukim Edris, who escaped jail July 14 with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)
bomb-maker Fathur Rohman al Ghozi. Troops killed Edris and another man -- thought to be Mahmud Ismael, the commander of the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front -- as the men attempted to cross a checkpoint in the southern province of Lanao del Norte.

62053
Politics & Religion / Political Rants
« on: August 06, 2003, 11:19:42 PM »
Dan Rather, Jesse Jackson, Cokie Roberts, and a marine were hiking through the jungle one day when they were captured by cannibals.  They were tied up, led to the village, and brought before the chief.  The chief said, "I am familiar with your western custom of granting the condemned a last wish. Before we kill and eat you, do you have any last requests?"

Dan Rather said, "Well, I'm a Texan; so I'd like one last bowlful of hot, spicy chili." The chief nodded to an underling, who left and returned with the chili. Rather ate it all and said, "Now I can die content."

Jesse Jackson said, "You know, the thing in this life I am proudest of is my work on behalf of the poor and oppressed. So before I go, I want to sing "We Shall Overcome" one last time." The chief said, "Go right ahead, we're listening." Jackson sang the song, and then said, "Now I can die in peace."

Cokie Roberts said, "I'm a reporter to the end. I want to take out my tape recorder and describe the scene here and what's about to happen.  Maybe someday someone will hear it and know that I was on the job til the end."  The chief directed an aide to hand over the tape recorder, and Roberts dictated some comments. She then said, "Now I can die happy."  

The chief said, "And, Mr. Marine, what is your final wish?"  "Kick me in the ass," said the Marine.  "What?," said the chief. "Would you mock us in your last hour?"   No, I'm not kidding. I want you to kick me in the ass," insisted the Marine. So the chief untied the Marine, shoved him into the open, and proceeded to kick him in the ass. The Marine went sprawling, but then rolled to his knees, pulled a 9mm pistol from his waistband, and shot the chief dead. In the resulting confusion, he leapt to his haversack, pulled out an M16, and sprayed the cannibals with gunfire. In a flash, the cannibals were all dead or fleeing for their lives.

As the Marine was untying the others, they each asked him, "Why didn't you just shoot them? Why did you ask them to first kick you in the ass?"  "What!?" asked the Marine. "And have you assholes call me the aggressor?!?"

62054
Politics & Religion / Libertarian themes
« on: August 06, 2003, 03:38:34 PM »
US may adopt Fla. antiterror database


By Robert O'Harrow Jr., Washington Post, 8/6/2003

olice in Florida are creating a new counterterrorism database designed to give law enforcement agencies around the country a powerful new tool to analyze billions of records about both criminals and ordinary Americans.

 

Organizers said the system, the Multistate Anti-Terrorism Information Exchange, dubbed Matrix, enables investigators to find patterns and links among people and events faster than ever before, combining police records with commercially available collections of personal information about most American adults. It would let authorities, for example, instantly find the name and address of every brown-haired owner of a red Ford pickup within a 20-mile radius of a suspicious event.

The state-level program, aided by federal funding, is poised to expand across the nation at a time when Congress has been sharply critical of similar data-driven systems on the federal level, such as a Pentagon plan for global surveillance and an aviation passenger-screening system.

The Florida system is another example of the ongoing post-Sept. 11, 2001, debate about the proper balance between national security and individual privacy. Yesterday, Washington, D.C., and Homeland Security Department officials announced plans to launch a pilot law enforcement data-sharing network that will include Virginia, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and New York.

Paul Cameron, president of Seisint Inc., the Boca Raton, Fla., company that developed the Matrix system and donated it to the state, said: ''It is exactly how law enforcement worked yesterday, except it's extraordinarily faster. In this age of risks that appear immediately, you have to be able to respond immediately.''

Some civil liberties groups fear Matrix will dramatically lower the threshold for government snooping.

''It's going to make fishing expeditions so much more convenient,'' said Ari Schwartz, associate director of the Center for Democracy and Technology, a nonprofit that monitors privacy issues.

''There's going to be a push to use it for many different kinds of purposes,'' Schwartz said.

The Justice Department has provided $4 million to expand the Matrix program nationally and will provide the computer network for information-sharing among the states, according to documents and interviews. The Department of Homeland Security has pledged $8 million, state officials said.

In some ways, Matrix resembles other data-driven counterterrorism initiatives that began after the Sept. 11 attacks. The Pentagon's controversial Terrorism Information Awareness program also sought to use personal data in new ways, but on a far larger scale. Started by retired Admiral John Poindexter, the idea was to create a global data-surveillance system that might detect hints of threats. Lawmakers sharply limited the program's funding several months ago, and now some intend to shut it down.

A Justice Department document from early this year describes Matrix as an effort ''to increase and enhance the exchange of sensitive terrorism and other criminal activity information between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.''

Florida officials say the system will be used only by authorized investigators under tight supervision.

62055
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: August 05, 2003, 05:36:36 PM »
MILF Founder's Death Poses Hurdle For Peace Talks
Aug 05, 2003

Summary

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) founder Hashim Salamat reportedly died July 13, a Philippine government official told local media Aug. 4. Salamat's death was kept a secret to avoid a power struggle in the MILF and to maintain progress toward peace talks with the government. If the story of Salamat's demise is accurate, the peace talks -- which were postponed again on Aug. 4 -- might be in trouble, since a single voice for MILF no longer exists.

Analysis

Philippine rebel leader Hashim Salamat, founder and leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), died July 13 of an acute ulcer, Undersecretary of the Office of Muslim Affairs Datu Zamzamin Ampatuan told ABS-CBN News on Aug. 4. MILF leaders had kept Salamat's death a secret to avoid triggering a power struggle or undermining negotiations leading to peace talks, which were to have begun Aug. 4 in Malaysia but were postponed over MILF concerns that a formal cease-fire has yet to be worked out.

If accurate, the report of Salamat's death presents both openings and dangers for the peace process between the MILF and the Philippine government. On one hand, it was hard for Salamat to take part in negotiations, and his involvement -- or lack thereof -- was a sticking point. On the other hand, without Salamat, Manila will not be sure that it is dealing with the full leadership of the MILF in talks, and rogue elements of the MILF likely will break away, leaving any peace process incomplete.

Salamat was known to be ill and under medical care, particularly after a series of military operations left the MILF founder without a home. His alleged death came at a crucial time in negotiations with Manila, with the question of criminal charges against key MILF leaders standing in the way of the resumption of talks. The delay in announcing his death will leave the government unsure of any other promise or comment by MILF negotiators; even after Salamat's alleged death, the MILF was promising he would take part in negotiations in Kuala Lumpur.

Perhaps more troubling for Manila will be the power struggle in the MILF that Salamat's death will accelerate. The MILF already was split over the latest series of peace negotiations, and Salamat's death leaves no clear, single voice for the group. This both will weaken the MILF's bargaining position at peace talks -- if they are resumed after the latest delay on Aug. 4 -- and simultaneously increase the government's sense of urgency to get talks going to avoid losing momentum. Adding to the government's need to press forward with talks -- and make them successful -- is the recent coup attempt, which leaves President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo looking for a clear political victory to shore up her support.

Some MILF elements might not see this as the best time to negotiate if Salamat is dead. Rather, with the MILF weakened and the government at least challenged, if not threatened, some MILF commanders might see this as the perfect time to attack government forces, proving the MILF's strength and holding out for a time when the militant group stands to gain more from talks.

The MILF itself was formed in response to similar disagreements during peace negotiations between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the government, when Salamat and others refused to go along with the concessions agreed to by MNLF commanders. A repeat scenario is not inconceivable at this time either, raising the possibility of a new bombing or militant raid in the Philippines in an attempt to throw off the peace process.



Related Headlines
Mixed Opinions Disrupt Resumption of MILF-Philippine Talks
Jul 10, 2003
Widespread Repercussions of Philippine Prison Break
Jul 16, 2003
Arroyo May Emerge Stronger After Attempted Coup
Jul 30, 2003
Philippines: Government Seeking Split in Rebel Group
Mar 11, 2002
MILF: Short-Term Advantage, Long-Term Challenges

62056
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: August 04, 2003, 05:06:15 PM »
www.stratfor.com
Stratfor Weekly: The Wall of Sharon

Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
4 August 2003
 
by Dr. George Friedman

The Wall of Sharon

Summary

Seeking to end the risk of Palestinian attacks, Israel is
building a barrier to separate Palestinians and Israelis. For the
wall to work, it must be more like an iron curtain than the U.S.-
Mexican border. It must be relatively impermeable: If there are
significant crossing points, militants will exploit them.
Therefore, the only meaningful strategy is to isolate Israelis
and Palestinians. That would lead to a Palestinian dependency on
Jordan that might, paradoxically, topple the Hashemite regime in
Amman. If that happens, Israel will have solved a painful
nuisance by creating the potential for a strategic nightmare.

Analysis

Israel, under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, is in the process of
building a wall that ultimately will separate Israelis and
Palestinians along a line roughly -- but not at all precisely --
identical to the cease-fire lines that held from 1948 until 1967.
The wall is far from complete, but the logic for it is self-
evident: It represents Israel's attempt to impose a reality that
will both satisfy the Jewish state's fundamental security needs
and the minimal political demands of the Palestinians without
requiring Palestinian agreement or acquiescence. It is an
extraordinary attempt at applied geopolitics. The question is
whether it will work.

Let's begin with the technical aspect. It is possible, with
substantial effort, to create a barrier that not only stops
large-scale population movements but seriously inhibits small-
scale movements as well. The Iron Curtain was more than a
rhetorical term: We once walked along the Austro-Hungarian
border, seeing watch towers with machine guns and search lights;
concertina wire; wide, clear-cut killing fields where
infiltrators or exfiltrators could be observed day or night using
search lights and flares, and dense mine fields. The line ran
from the Baltic to the Yugoslav border. It did work -- there was
certainly some movement across, but only at great risk and
probable failure.

The purpose of the Iron Curtain was to prevent eastern Europeans
from moving to the west and away from Soviet occupation. It was
difficult to build and maintain, but it was built and it did work
quite well. It was built with World War II technology. The
Israeli project will involve more modern sensor technology, both
human and machine. Movement will not be spotted by the luck of
the flare, but with sound sensors, ground radar and unmanned
aerial vehicles. The point is that from a technical standpoint,
if the Iron Curtain could work, this can work. The challenge is
political and military, not technical.

From the Israeli standpoint, the driving force is desperation.
Suicide attacks have achieved what Palestinian planners hoped for
-- convincing the Israelis the status quo cannot be maintained.
The bombings have convinced Israeli leaders that the continued
physical occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza strip are not
an option. The problem the Israelis have had to confront is that
simply retreating and abandoning the occupation might not solve
their strategic problem. From the Israeli standpoint, the problem
of the Oslo accords is that they rested on a political decision
by the Palestinians, who had to guarantee that they would abandon
further claims -- and military operations -- against the state of
Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal.

The last two years convinced Israeli leaders of two things:
First, that any guarantee from a Palestinian government was
unstable and could not be regarded as permanent; and second, that
even if the Palestinian government was able to maintain its own
commitment to an agreement, it was incapable of guaranteeing that
all Palestinian factions would honor it. Israel observed the
ability of the Irish Republican Army, ETA and other groups to
continue operations without or against state sanctions. Since the
absolute minimum concession from the Palestinians had to be the
cessation of suicide bombings and related actions against Israel,
this posed an insuperable problem. On the one hand, the status
quo was untenable; on the other, a political foundation for
withdrawal appeared to be unattainable. Israel was trapped
between two impossible realities.

For Israel, the Camp David accords with Egypt provided the basic
model for negotiations with Arabs. Camp David consisted of three
parts:

1. Egyptian recognition that Israel could not be destroyed
through military action.
2. Israeli recognition that Egypt was capable -- as in 1973 -- of
carrying out military operations that were too costly for Israel.
3. Recognition that the Sinai desert could serve not only as
Israel's strategic depth in maneuver warfare, but equally well as
a demilitarized buffer zone large enough to prevent surprise
attack.

It was on this basis that Menachem Begin, Sharon's intellectual
and strategic mentor, reached agreement with Egypt to end
hostilities -- an agreement that remains the strategic foundation
of Israel's national security policy today. The crucial piece was
that the deal did not rely on Egypt's good will: The buffer was
sufficiently large that any Egyptian violation would be quickly
noticed and could be responded to militarily. In other words,
Israel could keep control of its fate without holding Egyptian
territory.

The Oslo agreement was an attempt to apply this same principle to
the Palestinian question. It was built on the Palestinian
recognition that Palestinians could not destroy Israel
militarily, and Israeli recognition that the cost of occupation
was greater than Israel could rationally bear. What was missing -
- and always has been -- was a third step. There has been no
possibility of disengagement. From the Israeli viewpoint, this
has meant that any settlement depended on both the continued
goodwill of the Palestinian state and the absence of dissident
anti-Israeli movements. Since neither could be guaranteed, no
solution was possible.

Hence, the fence. It should be noted that the creation of a fixed
barrier violates all Israeli military thinking. The state's
military doctrine is built around the concept of mobile warfare.
Israel's concern is with having sufficient strategic depth to
engage an enemy attack and destroy it, rather than depending on a
fixed barrier. From a purely military standpoint, Israel would
view this barrier as an accident waiting to happen. The view of
barriers (such as the Suez Canal) is that they can all be
breached using appropriate, massed military force.

This is the critical point. From the Israeli standpoint, the wall
is not a military solution. It is not a Maginot Line designed to
protect against enemy main force; it is designed to achieve a
very particular, very limited and very important paramilitary
goal. It is designed to stop the infiltration of Palestinian
paramilitaries into Israel without requiring either the direct
occupation of Palestinian territory -- something that has not
worked anyway -- nor precluding the creation of a Palestinian
state. It is not the Maginot Line, it is an Iron Curtain. And
this is where the conceptual problems start to crop up.

The Iron Curtain was a fairly impermeable barrier. Nothing moved
across it except at very clearly defined and limited checkpoints.
The traffic at these checkpoints was quite low during most of the
Cold War, and there was ample opportunity for inspection and
interrogation of traffic headed in either direction. Even so,
these checkpoints were used by Western intelligence both to
penetrate Warsaw Pact countries and to extract people. There were
other points along the frontier where more informal traffic
crossed, but what never took place -- particularly after the
Berlin Wall went up -- was mass, interzonal traffic on a
continual basis.

The Iron Curtain never looked like the U.S.-Mexican border, nor
can the U.S.-Mexican border become an Iron Curtain because
neither the United States nor Mexico wants that to happen. Trade
is continual, and the movement of illegal labor from Mexico to
the United States is informally viewed by the U.S. government as
necessary. The U.S.-Mexican border is therefore a barrier to
almost nothing -- virtually everything, legal and illegal, flows
across the barrier. As much as it is disliked, the flow is
needed.

For the Israeli security model to work, economic relations
between Israel and Palestine will have to be ruptured. The idea
of controlled movement of large numbers of workers, trucks and so
on across the border is incompatible with the idea of the fence
as a security barrier. Once movement is permitted, movement is
permitted. Along with that movement will come guerrillas, weapons
and whatever anyone wants to send across. You cannot be a little
bit pregnant on this: Either Israel seals its frontier, or the
fence is a waste of steel and manpower. If the wall is not
continual and impermeable, it may as well not be there.

The geopolitical idea underlying the fence is that that it will
not be permeable. If this goal is achieved, regardless of where
the final line of the fence will be, then economic and social
relations between Israel and Palestine will cease to exist except
through third-party transit. Forgetting the question of Jerusalem
-- for if Jerusalem is an open city, the fence may as well not be
built -- this poses a huge strategic challenge.

Palestinians historically have depended on Israel economically.
If Israel closes off its frontiers, the only contiguous economic
relationship will be with Jordan. In effect, Palestine would
become a Jordanian dependency. However, it will not be clear over
time which is the dog and which is the tail. Jordan already has a
large Palestinian population that has, in the past, threatened
the survival of the Hashemite Bedouin regime. By sealing off
Palestinian and Israeli territories, the Israelis would slam
Palestine and Jordan together. Over the not-so-long term, this
could mean the end of Hashemite Jordan and the creation of a
single Palestinian state on both sides of the Jordan River.

There are Israelis -- including Sharon, in our view -- who would
not object to this outcome. They have argued that the Hashemite
presence in Amman has long distorted the reality in the region.
The Hashemite regime was installed by Britain after World War I.
In the opinion of some Israelis, Jordan ought to be the real
Palestine. Therefore, if the fence results in the fall of the
Jordanian monarchy and the creation of a unitary Palestinian
state, these Israelis would find this a positive development.
Indeed, one argument goes that a Jordan with boundaries roughly
analogous to pre-1967 lines would undermine Palestinian radical
movements by creating a more stable, less aggressive Palestinian
nation-state.

Two other scenarios exist. In one, the Hashemites survive and
drive many of the Palestinians on the east bank of the Jordan
into the West Bank; the Israelis maintain their cordon sanitaire
and the Palestinian nation-state becomes an untenable disaster --
trapped between two enemies, Israel and Jordan. Israel would not
object to this, but the problem is that the level of desperation
achieved in Palestine might prove so chaotic that it either would
threaten Israeli national security or set into motion processes
in the Arab world -- and among Israel's Western allies -- that
would increase pressure on Israel. In other words, the Israelis
would wind up strategically where they started, with the non-
trivial exception of fewer or no suicide bombings.

The other scenario is that the Palestinians do merge with Jordan,
but -- given the dynamics of the Arab and Islamic worlds -- the
new nation-state does not moderate but instead generates, with
assistance from other Arabs, a major military strike force for
whom the fence represents at most a minor tactical barrier rather
than a strategic force. Under this scenario, the consequences
would be a return to the strategic situation of 1948-1967 (except
for Egypt's participation), with a potentially more powerful
enemy to the east. If Egypt were to change its policies, the
outcome could be strategically disastrous for Israel.

The problem with the fence, therefore, is this:

1. If it is to be effective as a barrier, it must be nearly
absolute; large-scale movement cannot be permitted.
2. If a Palestinian state is isolated, it would develop a
dependency on Jordan that could topple the Hashemite regime,
creating a potential strategic threat to Israel.

The fence strategy works only if the Palestinian-Jordanian
relationship yields a politically moderate Palestinian state.
That might happen, but there is no reason to be certain that it
will. The essential purpose of the fence is to give Israel
control of its security. The problem is that Israel can control
the construction of the fence, but not the evolution of events
after the fence is built. At some point in the process, Israel
becomes dependent on the actions of others.

This is Israel's core strategic dilemma. At some point, no matter
what it does, it becomes dependent on events that are not under
its control. In some scenarios, solving the problem of suicide
bombings leads into a massive deterioration of Israel's strategic
position. Israeli leaders obviously want to avoid that, but the
fence pushes out the strategic problem and paradoxically
intensifies it, rather than solving it. Israeli security
continues to depend on the decisions of the Palestinians. The
fence is an attempt to take control of Israel's future out of
Palestinian hands and place it securely in Israeli hands, but the
fact is that what the Palestinians do will continue to affect
Israel's security.

As is frequently the case in this world, Israel does not have
good choices. It has to make some bad ones work.
...................................................................

62057
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: August 04, 2003, 10:48:37 AM »
Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb
 Tehran's reactor program masks strides toward weapons capability, a Times investigation finds. France warns against exports to Islamic Republic.
   
French Report on Iranian Nuclear Program (Acrobat file)

*  Possible Uranium Enrichment Plant at Natanz

?  Closeup of Natanz Facility

?  Possible Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak

?  Closeup of Arak Facility

 Related Links
 

?  International Atomic Energy Agency

?  World Nuclear Assocation

?  Excerpts of 12/01 Rafsanjani Speech on Using Nuclear Weapon Against Israel (MEMRI) (PDF)

?  Carnegie Endowment for International Peace/ Non-Proliferation

?  Institute for Science and International Security

?  Center for Policy Studies in Russia

?  International Institute for Strategic Studies London

?  National Council of Resistance of Iran

?  State Dept. Fact Sheet on Nuclear Supplier's Group

 
Iran Closes In on Ability to Build a Nuclear Bomb
 
 

 
 
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Israel Approves Release of Prisoners
 
 
more >
 
 
     
By Douglas Frantz, Times Staff Writer


VIENNA ? After more than a decade of working behind layers of front companies and in hidden laboratories, Iran appears to be in the late stages of developing the capacity to build a nuclear bomb.

Iran insists that like many countries it is only building commercial nuclear reactors to generate electricity for homes and factories. "Iran's efforts in the field of nuclear technology are focused on civilian application and nothing else," President Mohammad Khatami said on state television in February. "This is the legitimate right of the Iranian people."

But a three-month investigation by The Times ? drawing on previously secret reports, international officials, independent experts, Iranian exiles and intelligence sources in Europe and the Middle East ? uncovered strong evidence that Iran's commercial program masks a plan to become the world's next nuclear power. The country has been engaged in a pattern of clandestine activity that has concealed weapons work from international inspectors. Technology and scientists from Russia, China, North Korea and Pakistan have propelled Iran's nuclear program much closer to producing a bomb than Iraq ever was.

No one is certain when Iran might produce its first atomic weapon. Some experts said two or three years; others believe the government has probably not given a final go-ahead. But it is clear that Iran is moving purposefully and rapidly toward acquiring the capability.

Among the findings:

? A confidential report prepared by the French government in May concluded that Iran is surprisingly close to having enriched uranium or plutonium for a bomb. The French warned other governments to exercise "the most serious vigilance on their exports to Iran and Iranian front companies," according to a copy of the report provided by a foreign intelligence service.

? Samples of uranium taken by U.N. inspectors in Iran in June tested positive for enrichment levels high enough to be consistent with an attempt to build a nuclear weapon, according to a foreign intelligence officer and an American diplomat. The Reuters news service first reported the possibility that the material was weapons-grade last month.

? Iran is concealing several weapons research laboratories and evidence of past activity at a plant disguised as a watch-making factory in a Tehran suburb. In June, U.N. inspectors were refused access to two large rooms and barred from testing samples at the factory, called the Kalaye Electric Co.

? Tehran secretly imported 1.8 tons of nuclear material from China in 1991 and processed some of it to manufacture uranium metal, which would be of no use in Iran's commercial program but would be integral to weapons production.

? As early as 1989, Pakistani generals offered to sell Iran nuclear weapons technology. Abdul Qadeer Khan, a Pakistani nuclear scientist regarded by the United States as a purveyor of nuclear secrets, has helped Iran for years. "Pakistan's role was bigger from the beginning than we thought," said a Middle Eastern intelligence official.

? North Korean military scientists recently were monitored entering Iranian nuclear facilities. They are assisting in the design of a nuclear warhead, according to people inside Iran and foreign intelligence officials. So many North Koreans are working on nuclear and missile projects in Iran that a resort on the Caspian coast is set aside for their exclusive use.

? Russian scientists, sometimes traveling to Iran under false identities and working without their government's approval, are helping to complete a special reactor that could produce weapons-grade plutonium. Moscow insists that it is providing only commercial technology for the civilian reactor under construction near the Persian Gulf port of Bushehr, an assertion disputed by Washington.

? In recent months, Iran has approached European companies to buy devices that can manipulate large volumes of radioactive material, technology to forge uranium metal and plutonium and switches that could trigger a nuclear weapon. European intelligence sources said Tehran's shopping list was a strong indication that Iran has moved to the late stages of weapons development.

Regional Impact

A nuclear-armed Iran would present the United States with a difficult political and military equation. Iran would be the first avowed enemy of Israel to possess a nuclear bomb. It also has been labeled by the Bush administration as a state sponsor of international terrorism.

Iranian nuclear weapons could shift the balance of power in the region, where Washington is trying to establish pro-American governments in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both of those nations border Iran and are places where Tehran wants to exert influence that could conflict with U.S. intentions, particularly in Iraq.

The Bush administration, which partly justified its war against Iraq by stressing concerns that Saddam Hussein had revived his nuclear weapons program, calls a nuclear-armed Iran unacceptable. At his news conference Wednesday, President Bush said he hopes international pressure will convince the Iranians that "development of a nuclear weapon is not in their interests," but he added that "all options remain on the table."

Foreign intelligence officials told The Times that the Central Intelligence Agency, which has long contended that Iran is building a bomb, has briefed them on a contingency plan for U.S. air and missile attacks against Iranian nuclear installations. "It would be foolish not to present the commander in chief with all of the options, including that one," said one of the officials.

A CIA spokeswoman declined to confirm or deny that such a plan has been drafted. "We wouldn't talk about anything like that," she said.

There is precedent for such a strike. Israeli fighter-bombers destroyed a French-built nuclear reactor outside Baghdad in 1981 shortly before it was to go online. The attack set back Iraq's nuclear program and drove it underground.

Taking out Iran's nuclear infrastructure would prove tougher, said Israeli military planners and outside analysts. For one thing, the facilities are spread around the country and small installations are still secret. At least one key facility is being built to withstand conventional airstrikes.

Contacts between Washington and Tehran are very limited, and analysts said U.S. decision-making is still dominated by a distrust of Iran rooted in the taking of American hostages during the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and an ideological aversion to negotiating with a regime regarded as extremist.

"The administration does not have a strategy because there is a fight in the administration over whether you should even deal with this government in Iran," said George Perkovich, a nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington.

Inspections' Challenge

For now, the Bush administration is pinning much of its hopes of containing Iranian nuclear ambitions on the same international inspection apparatus that it blames for failing to locate weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.

So far, the U.N.-affiliated International Atomic Energy Agency, based here in Vienna, has preferred negotiation to confrontation with Iran.

In a June 16 report to the 35 countries represented on the agency's board, its director-general, Mohamed ElBaradei, criticized Iran for concealing many of its nuclear activities. But he resisted U.S. pressure to declare Iran in violation of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which was created in 1968 to stop the spread of nuclear weapons.

Inspections are continuing along with Iranian roadblocks to a thorough examination, according to officials monitoring the progress. Still, IAEA officials hope to have a clearer picture of Iran's nuclear program by Sept. 8, when a follow-up report to the board is due.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry did not respond to telephone requests for interviews or to written questions for this article. Iran said last year that it plans to build six civilian reactors to generate electricity for its fast-growing population of 65 million. Ministry spokesman Hamid Reza Asefi has said that allegations that Iran is concealing a weapons program are "poisonous and disdainful rumors" spread by the United States.

Iran's civilian nuclear energy program started in 1974 and was interrupted by the Islamic Revolution. It got back on track in 1995, when Russia signed an $800-million contract to complete the commercial reactor at Bushehr, which is scheduled to come online next year.

Russia also promised to sell Iran the uranium fuel to power the reactor. But Iran maintains that it wants to develop its own nuclear fuel-making capability, a position that has roused international suspicions.

Typically, nations with civilian nuclear programs buy fuel from the countries that export the reactors because the fuel-making process is complicated and expensive. In the most common way to make the fuel, uranium ore is converted to a gas and pumped into centrifuges, where rotors spinning at twice the speed of sound separate isotopes. The process concentrates, or "enriches," the uranium to the point that fission can be sustained in a reactor, which pumps out heat to drive electrical turbines.

The same enrichment process can concentrate fissionable uranium at greater levels to produce material for a bomb.

Countries that try to enrich their own uranium or manufacture plutonium in special reactors are immediately suspected of trying to join the elite nuclear arms club. Israel, India and Pakistan developed their own plants for producing fissile material for bombs under the guise of commercial reactors.

Iran agreed not to produce nuclear weapons when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1970, which opened the door for it to acquire civilian reactors. The treaty does not prohibit Iran from producing or possessing enriched uranium but requires it to submit its nuclear facilities to international monitoring to ensure that materials are not diverted to weapons use.

Iran has permitted inspections of its declared commercial nuclear facilities. But last year, an Iranian exile group pinpointed a secret underground enrichment plant outside Natanz, a small mountain town about 200 miles south of Tehran known for its bracing climate and fruit orchards.

In December, the Institute for Science and International Security, a small think tank in Washington, published satellite photos of Natanz from the archives of a commercial firm, DigitalGlobe. The photos showed large-scale construction inside the perimeter of a security fence. Among the buildings were a pilot centrifuge plant and two underground halls big enough for tens of thousands of centrifuges, the institute said.

Pressure mounted to allow international monitors into Natanz, and senior IAEA officials visited the plant in February. They found 160 assembled centrifuges and components for 1,000 more. Moreover, the equipment was to be housed in bunkers 75 feet deep, with walls 8 feet thick.

The level of centrifuge development at Natanz already reflects thousands of hours of testing and advanced technological work, experts said. By comparison, Iraq had tested a single centrifuge for about 100 hours when IAEA inspectors began dismantling Baghdad's nuclear weapons program after the 1991 Persian Gulf War.

"They are way ahead of where Iraq was in 1991," said a U.N. official who is familiar with both programs.

Once it is up and running, Natanz could make enough material for a bomb within a year and eventually enough for three to five bombs a year, experts said.

Nuclear Neighbors

The Iranian exile group also revealed a secret site near Arak, a city of 400,000 in western Iran known as a historic center for weaving fine Persian carpets. Under international pressure, Iran conceded in February that it plans to build a special type of reactor there that will generate plutonium for research. Plutonium is the radioactive material at the heart of some of the most powerful nuclear bombs.

The disclosures cast previous Iranian government statements in a new light.

Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of an influential government council and president of Iran from 1989 to 1997, gave a speech on Dec. 14, 2001, that has been interpreted widely as both a signal that Iran wants nuclear weapons and a threat to use them against Israel. Describing the establishment of the Jewish state as the worst event in history, Rafsanjani warned, "In due time the Islamic world will have a military nuclear device, and then the strategy of the West would reach a dead end, since one bomb is enough to destroy all Israel."

Rafsanjani has since stepped back in his rhetoric, noting in a sermon on Friday that "because of religious and moral beliefs and commitments that the Koran has created for us, we cannot and will not pursue such weapons that destroy humanity."

On July 20, Iran unveiled a missile based on a North Korean design that brings Israel within range and hailed the event as an important step in protecting the Palestinians. Experts said the new missile could be armed with a small nuclear warhead, and Iran is developing a version that will carry a heavier payload.

"Today our people and our armed forces are ready to defend their goals anywhere," Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran's supreme leader, said in a ceremony unveiling the missile.

Many outside experts as well as Iranians say that even reformers linked to Iranian President Khatami believe that Iran needs a deterrent against its nuclear neighbors ? Israel, Russia and Pakistan ? and possibly against the United States.

"These weapons would guarantee the territorial integrity and national security of Iran," Nasser Hadian, a professor at Tehran University who is aligned with the reformers, said in a telephone interview from New York, where he is teaching at Columbia University. "We feel that we cannot possibly rely on the world to provide security for us, and this is felt by all the factions."

At a symposium in Rome in early July, ElBaradei told the audience that stopping the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons depends greatly on eliminating the incentives for states to possess them. "It is instructive that the majority of the suspected efforts to acquire WMD are to be found in the Middle East, a hotbed of instability for over half a century," he said.

A senior U.N. official said he is not sure that Iran is developing a bomb. But the different fates of Iraq and North Korea, the other members of what Bush called the "axis of evil," demonstrate why countries out of favor with the United States might want a nuclear weapon, he added.

Iraq did not have a bomb and was easily invaded, he said, while North Korea claims to have a bomb and is trying to use it as a bargaining chip with the U.S. for security assurances and possibly increased aid. "If a regime has the feeling that it is not on the right wavelength with the United States, its position is to have a nuclear weapon," he said.

Iran faces numerous technological obstacles before it can produce a nuclear bomb, according to intelligence officials and independent experts. Once those problems are solved or close to being solved, some experts said they expect Iran to withdraw from the nonproliferation treaty, as North Korea did, and close its doors to IAEA inspectors.

"They have made the decision to develop a breakout capability, which will give them the option to leave the treaty in the future and complete a nuclear weapon within six months or a year," said Gary Samore, director of nonproliferation programs at London's International Institute for Strategic Studies and a former Clinton administration security official. "I think the program is probably unstoppable through diplomatic means."

Others disagree.

"I don't believe they have passed the point of no return," said Perkovich, the nuclear weapons expert at the Carnegie Endowment. "We should try to reverse Iran's direction by providing better, low-cost options to fuel the Bushehr electricity plant and by easing the security concerns that make Iranians, reformers and hard-liners, interested in getting a bomb."

Diplomacy has proved an imperfect solution in the past. The Clinton administration persuaded China not to sell nuclear items to Iran in the mid-1990s. Administration officials later used sanctions and negotiations to convince Russia to curb technology transfers to Iran's civilian program that U.S. intelligence believed were being diverted to weapons work.

But Russia is committed to the Bushehr reactor, which generates 20,000 jobs for its beleaguered nuclear industry. The project also allows hundreds of Iranians to train in Russia, raising concerns within the intelligence community that knowledge and hardware for weapons work will slip through.

Officials in Moscow, outside experts and foreign intelligence officials said economics are driving continuing Russian assistance to the Iranian weapons program and that it is probably occurring without government approval. They said thousands of Russian physicists, mathematicians and other scientists are unemployed or paid a pittance at home, pushing them to sell their expertise elsewhere.

"Russian scientists are freelancing, leading to a leakage of expertise, and you can't control that," said Bobo Lo, a former Australian diplomat and associate fellow at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. "That's where it gets really messy with the Iranians."

Multiple Sites

"Iran has made tremendous progress during the last two years, and according to our estimates it could reach a technical capability to create a nuclear device by 2006," said Anton Khlopkov, a nuclear expert at Moscow's Center for Policy Studies in Russia. "The problem is neither Russia nor the U.S. nor the IAEA had a clear understanding about real Iranian achievements in the nuclear field."

U.S. Secretary of State Colin L. Powell echoed the sentiment in March, saying on a CNN program, "It shows you how a determined nation that has the intent to develop a nuclear weapon can keep that development process secret from inspectors and outsiders, if they really are determined to do it."

Plants as large as Natanz are not necessary to build a bomb. Once the technology is developed, as few as 500 centrifuges can enrich enough uranium for a small weapon, experts said. Hiding that number would be easy, said an IAEA official, which is why intelligence officials are concerned about several smaller, still-secret plants throughout Iran.

For example, officers from two foreign intelligence agencies said weapons research is being conducted at a plant outside Kashan. One of the intelligence officials said the plant was involved in nuclear fuel production in two large halls constructed 25 feet underground.

The National Council of Resistance of Iran, the Paris-based exile group that revealed the Natanz and Arak sites, said in July that it had pinpointed two more weapons research locations in a rural area called Hashtgerd about 25 miles northwest of Tehran. The group is the political arm of the Moujahedeen Khalq, which is listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist group, but independent experts said its information from inside Iran has often been accurate. IAEA inspectors' requests to visit the Hashtgerd sites have been refused by Iranian authorities.

This spring, after considerable pressure from the IAEA, Iran reluctantly allowed inspectors to visit a nondescript cluster of two warehouses and smaller buildings tucked into an alley in the Tehran suburb of Ab-Ali. The place, called the Kalaye Electric Co., claimed to be a watch factory, but Iran conceded it had been an assembly point for centrifuges.

When the IAEA team arrived in March, they were refused access to the plant. A second trip in May was slightly more successful ? inspectors entered the buildings, but two large rooms were declared off limits, according to new information from U.N. officials.

On June 7, inspectors returned to Iran for four days of probes at various sites. This time authorities refused to let them near Kalaye, U.N. officials said. They also were barred from using sophisticated testing equipment the team had brought from Vienna.

Such tests could detect a particle of enriched uranium within a huge radius and determine whether its concentration exceeded the 2%-to-5% level generally used in civilian reactor fuel. One IAEA official compared the ability of a swipe to detect enriched particles to finding a four-leaf clover in a field of clover 6 miles long, 9 miles wide and 150 feet deep.

But during their trip in June, IAEA inspectors took samples from an undisclosed location in Iran that tested positive for enriched uranium at a level that could be used in weapons, according to diplomatic and intelligence sources. IAEA officials refused to comment on the report.

Chinese Uranium Ore

Officials from two foreign intelligence services said Iranian scientists used nuclear material from a secret shipment from China to help enrich uranium at Kalaye and elsewhere.

China had long denied rumors about transferring nuclear materials to Iran. Early this year, U.N. officials said in interviews, the Chinese admitted selling Iran 1.8 tons of uranium ore and chemical forms of uranium used in the enrichment process in 1991.

Faced with a letter describing China's admission, Iranian authorities acknowledged receipt of the material, said the officials. At the same time, Iran said some of the chemicals were used at Tehran's Jabr ibn Hayan laboratory to make uranium metal, which has no use in Iran's commercial program but is a key part of a nuclear weapon.

In addition to China and Russia, Pakistan and North Korea have played central roles in Iran's nuclear program, according to foreign intelligence officers and confidential reports prepared by the French government and a Middle Eastern intelligence service.

North Korean technicians worked for years helping Iran develop the Shahab-3 missile, unveiled last month in Tehran. A foreign intelligence official and a former Iranian intelligence officer said the Koreans are now working on a longer-range Shahab-4 and providing assistance on designs for a nuclear warhead.

The foreign intelligence official said high-ranking North Korean military personnel have been seen at some of Iran's nuclear installations. A hotel is reserved for North Koreans in Tehran and a resort on the Caspian Sea coast northwest of Tehran has been set aside for their use, according to one of the sources and a U.N. official.

The centrifuges seen by IAEA officials at Natanz in February were based on a Pakistani design, according to intelligence officials. The design and other new evidence point to Pakistan as a bigger supplier of nuclear weapons technology to Iran than initially thought, said foreign intelligence officers, Iranian exiles and independent experts.

While U.S. intelligence is aware of Pakistan's help to Iran, the Bush administration has not pushed the issue with Islamabad because of Pakistan's role as an ally in the battle against the Al Qaeda terrorist network and Afghanistan's Taliban, outside experts and foreign intelligence officials said.

Signs of Pakistani Aid

The most convincing sign of Pakistan's role in Iran comes from what several people described as the long involvement in Iran of Khan, the scientist regarded as the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb.

The CIA concluded in a top-secret analysis last year that Khan shared critical technology on centrifuges and weapons-test data with North Korea in the late 1990s. The agency tracked at least 13 visits by Khan to North Korea over a span of several years, according to a January article in the New Yorker magazine.

Two former Iranian officials and American and foreign intelligence officials said Khan travels frequently to Tehran to share his expertise. Most recently, two of these people said, he has worked as a troubleshooter to iron out problems with the centrifuges and with weapons design.

Ali Akbar Omid Mehr, who was in charge of Pakistani affairs at Iran's Foreign Ministry in 1989 and 1990, said he came across Khan as he prepared what is known as a "green book" detailing contacts between Tehran and Islamabad.

"I saw that Mr. A. Q. Khan had been given a villa near the Caspian Sea for his help to Iran," Mehr said in an interview in Denmark, where he and his family live under assumed names since he defected in late 1995.

His account of the villa was supported by other Iranian exiles.

Khan might have played a role in a previously undisclosed offer from Pakistani military commanders to sell nuclear weapons technology to Iran in 1989, two former senior Pakistani officials said in separate interviews describing the episode.

According to their accounts, soon after Rafsanjani's election as president of Iran in 1989, he took Benazir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan, aside at a reception in Tehran and told her about the proposal from her generals.

Rafsanjani was commander of Tehran's armed forces at the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, and one of his goals as president was to reestablish his country as a regional power. He told Bhutto that the Pakistani generals wanted to transfer the technology secretly, on a military-to-military basis, but he wanted her to approve the transaction, the former Pakistani officials said.

Earlier that year, Bhutto had appeared before the U.S. Congress and promised that Pakistan would not export nuclear technology. Bhutto often bucked the generals, and the two officials said she blocked the transfer ? at least until she was ousted in 1996.

Current Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf said in an interview with The Times that his country never provided nuclear assistance to Iran, before or after he took office in a military coup in October 1999. "Zero," the general insisted. "Never worked ? even before ? never worked with Iran. This is the first time this has been raised, ever."

Pressured by the United States, Musharraf removed Khan as head of Pakistan's nuclear program nearly two years ago. Since then, Musharraf said, Khan has been retired and his travel is not monitored.

Other intelligence officials and governments disputed Musharraf's denial.

"There are convincing indications about the origin of the technology ? it is of Pakistani type ? but Iran undoubtedly controls the manufacturing process of centrifuges and seems even able to improve it," said the French government report on Iran's nuclear program, which was delivered in May to the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an organization of governments with nuclear programs.

A growing body of evidence suggests that Iran is simultaneously pursuing another way to produce material for a bomb.

This alternative is a heavy-water reactor, which could breed weapons-grade plutonium. In the initial stage of the program, Iran is building a plant to distill heavy water near the Qareh Chay River, about 35 miles from Arak. Heavy water, which is processed to contain elevated concentrations of deuterium, allows the reactor to operate with natural uranium as its fuel and produce plutonium.

This type of reactor is used in some places to generate electricity, but it is better known as a means of producing plutonium for weapons that bypasses uranium enrichment and its many technical obstacles. As a result, the presence of a heavy-water reactor is often regarded as a sign that a country is trying to develop a weapon.

American spy satellites had detected construction at Natanz before its existence was made public last year. But the work near Arak had remained secret because the plant under construction looked like any other distillery or similar factory, according to intelligence officials and U.N. authorities.

After exiles revealed Arak's existence, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, the president of Iran's atomic energy organization, informed the IAEA that the planned reactor was strictly meant for research and producing radioisotopes for medical use.

To many experts, however, the project raises another red flag. "For Iran, there is no justification whatsoever to have a heavy-water plant," said Samore of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Echoing him, a senior U.N. official said, "The heavy-water plant sticks out like a sore thumb."

Iran first tried to buy heavy-water reactors as turnkey projects from China and India in the mid-1990s, according to a previously undisclosed dossier prepared by a foreign intelligence agency and provided to The Times. Blocked on that front by the United States, according to former U.S. officials, Iran decided to build its own and turned to two Russian institutes.

The United States learned of the cooperation through telephone intercepts and imposed sanctions on the Russian institutes in 1999. The sanctions remain in effect, but officials with foreign intelligence agencies and the CIA said there is evidence that Russian scientists are still providing expertise for the project.

Khlopkov, the Russian nuclear expert, said he thinks it is unlikely that Russian scientists are helping Iran with any of its weapons programs. Still, he said, the recent disclosures about the Iranian program surprised Moscow and might cause Russia to cancel a second planned reactor unless Iran agrees to stricter international inspections of its nuclear facilities.

'Industrial Scale'

Despite Iran's progress, most experts said it is unlikely to develop a weapon without more outside help, particularly in procuring specialty technology. That is why some said they were alarmed by Iran's recent attempts to buy critical dual-use technology, which has military and civilian applications.

In November, German authorities blocked an attempt by businessmen allegedly working on behalf of Iran to acquire high-voltage switches that could be used for both breaking up kidney stones and triggering a nuclear weapon.

French authorities reported that French firms with nuclear expertise have received a rising number of inquiries from suspected Iranian front companies for goods with military uses.

In a previously undisclosed incident, French authorities recently stopped a French company from selling 28 specialized remote manipulators for nuclear facilities to a company in Dubai, United Arab Emirates, that the authorities said was a front for Iran's nuclear program.

Because the manipulators were designed to handle heavy volumes of radioactive material, intelligence authorities suspected they were destined for a plant in which uranium or plutonium would be reprocessed on a large scale.

"Such intent is indicative of a willingness to move from a laboratory scale to an industrial scale," said a European intelligence official who is familiar with details of the attempt.

The pattern of attempted purchases and the discovery of previously secret nuclear installations led the French government to conclude in May that Iran is using its civilian nuclear program to conceal a military program.

"Iran appears ready to develop nuclear weapons within a few years," said the French report to the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

62058
Politics & Religion / We the Unorganized Militia
« on: August 01, 2003, 11:17:21 PM »
CLIFTON, N.J.  ? A 15-year-old boy foiled an apparent abduction attempt when he pulled out his cell phone camera and snapped photos of a man trying to lure him into a car, police said.

The teen also photographed the vehicle's license plate and gave the evidence to police, who arrested a suspect the next day.

"It's surprising the kid had the presence of mind to use the technology under duress," Detective Capt. Robert Rowan told The Record of Bergen County (search) in Friday's editions.

The teen, whose name was not released by police, was walking home at about 7 p.m. Tuesday when a man, later identified by police as William MacDonald, pulled up beside him, Rowan said.

He offered to drive the boy to another town to look for girls, and then began "engaging in a sexually explicit conversation," Rowan said. The teen told him he wasn't interested, but MacDonald, 59, continued to follow him.

At that point, the boy took the pictures, and MacDonald got out of his car and grabbed him by the arm, Rowan said. A struggle followed, but the boy was able to break free and run away.

MacDonald was charged with attempting to lure a juvenile into a car, criminal restraint and simple assault. If convicted, he could face up to five years in state prison. He is being held on $25,000 bail.

A spokeswoman for Sprint (search), whose phone the boy used, said she had never heard of someone using the new technology to catch a criminal.

62059
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: August 01, 2003, 10:06:40 AM »
1128 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Renegade Philippine soldiers who attempted to carry out a coup might also have planned to kill President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Interior Secretary Jose Lina said Aug. 1, citing intelligence reports. However, Lina also said the reports still were in the process of being validated. Philippine officials have said the plot to remove the government is far from over, but currently is under control.

62060
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 31, 2003, 07:17:55 AM »
1154 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo has warned that even though the July 27 coup participants have been arrested and charge in the rebellion, a larger threat remains against the government. Since the coup, Arroyo has given authorities expanded powers that include the ability to arrest people without a warrant. Those powers will remain in effect until the situation is brought under control and the threat of future coup plots is removed, Arroyo said.

62061
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 30, 2003, 05:54:19 PM »
Arroyo May Emerge Stronger After Attempted Coup
Jul 30, 2003

Summary

An aborted coup attempt in Manila has raised doubts about the stability of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's presidency. However, beneath the surface, there is a possibility that the attempted ouster actually might bolster her power and position her well for re-election in 2004.

Analysis

The aborted July 27 coup attempt in Manila has raised grave doubts about the health of Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's presidency and administration. A tarnished international image and the perception of political weakness just before her government is scheduled to begin peace talks with militant separatists would seem to paint a dreary picture for the president's future. However, there is a possibility that, if massaged effectively, the coup attempt actually might bolster Arroyo's power and place her in a strong position for May 2004 presidential elections -- should she choose to run.

On the surface, Arroyo appears to be in political trouble. A clique of disgruntled officers and enlisted men seized a commercial center in Manila and made serious allegations about corruption and poor leadership in Arroyo's government before standing down and returning to their barracks. The incident was the first major challenge to the Arroyo government, and it occurred on the heels of the prison break debacle involving high-ranking Jama'ah Islamiyah militant and master bomb-maker Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, who remains at large. These recent events have damaged the president's credibility domestically and abroad, calling into question her viability as a a candidate in the next elections if she announces plans to seek re-election.

If Arroyo is as embattled as she looks, the implications could be serious -- not only for her political career but also for Aug. 4 peace talks with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Malaysia. The rebels might be less inclined to deal with a president they view as a lame duck. Also, on the international level, U.S.-Philippine relations could be deeply affected. Arroyo has built a close relationship with Washington since Southeast Asia became the second front in the U.S. war on international Islamic militant groups. If Arroyo is not re-elected, the nascent military alliance re-emerging in the ashes of the Cold War could reverse.

Supporters and those in Arroyo's administration fear that the aborted coup was only the first step in an extended campaign by elements in the military or her political opponents to unseat her or at least diminish her chances in upcoming elections. According to Stratfor sources in the Philippine military, Arroyo is unpopular because she has not alleviated corruption in the highest echelons of the military command and because she seems reluctant to allow the military to fully attack various insurgencies.

The coup attempt either was part of a larger, well-crafted plan by her political enemies or the result of disenchanted junior officers co-opted by civilian political players. Either way, it is becoming increasingly clear that the moves against Arroyo neither began nor ended on July 27.

There are signs that Sen. Gregorio Honasan was the true center of gravity in the coup attempt. Honasan has participated in a number of past coups and is the apparent ideological mentor for the rebels who attempted the latest coup. He is a supporter of former President Joseph Estrada and a 2004 presidential candidate. Lt. Senior Grade Antonio Trillanes IV, leader of the self-proclaimed "Magdalo group" that staged the failed rebellion, espoused Honasan's "National Recovery Program" campaign platform in video statements during the standoff. Numerous pamphlets about the program -- centered on cleaning up corruption -- were found in the rebel officers' possession.

Honasan also made headlines in the Philippines as one of two lawmakers to negotiate with the Magdalo group, and is seen by some as contributing to the standoff's peaceful resolution. The government now is investigating the extent to which Honasan might have been involved in the failed ouster. As an adviser to the Philippine Military Academy's Class of 1995, Honasan has had a close association with many of the coup participants, including Trillanes, but the police do not have sufficient evidence to charge him in connection with the rebellion. Honasan maintains his innocence.

Honasan's National Recovery Program has garnered much publicity and a great deal of sympathy among some segments of the population, as have the coup participants. In a country in which corruption is well established, the dissatisfied soldiers' claims struck a strong populist cord. It is highly possible the aborted coup constituted Honasan's opening move in a charge for the presidency -- and that follow-on actions might occur soon.

On July 29, Trillanes and four fellow members of the Magdalo group were transferred from their barracks to the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) -- a reported breach of the negotiated settlement between mutineers and the government. Stratfor sources in the Philippines say the move generated even more public support for the rebellious soldiers -- now are viewed as martyrs -- because the head of ISAFP, Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, was one of the coup's targets. Corpus resigned July 30, citing "deep restiveness" inside the officers' corp. However, at the time of Trillanes' transfer, he warned that more members of his group were ready to take further action if the government failed to keep its promises.

This in fact does not appear to be an idle threat. About 100 heavily armed men of the Magdalo group remain unaccounted for. In addition, the Philippine Guardians Brotherhood Inc., a nationwide organization of military and police officials, are know supporters of Honasan, and might act as the senator's reserve forces in any future action.

Arroyo, however, could be safer then she appears at first glance. Although there might be an ongoing campaign against the president, she might have made moves to insulate herself, and it's possible she was ready to take advantage of this event to bolster herself politically. The coup was well-telegraphed: Rumors appeared nearly a week in advance in the local press, giving Arroyo ample time to consider her options and prepare her actions and reactions.

First, the aborted coup and Arroyo's apparently capable managment of the crisis make the president look like a tough survivor. After all, a Philippine president's true mettle hasn't been tested until he or she puts down a coup or two.

Second, it gives Arroyo an opportunity to take the offensive against her opposition -- not only Honasan but also Estrada and his supporters. Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes already has vowed to uncover the "traitors" behind the rebellion. Reyes alleges the participants were well-funded and equipped with weapons from outside the military arsenal, and that this proves they received external assistance. One-time Estrada aide Ramon Cardenas was detained July 28 after weapons allegedly used by the mutineers were found in his home. Cardenas' lawyers claim police planted the arms. And though Estrada has denied any role in the coup attempt, in the media he has expressed sympathy for its participants.

Third, upcoming talks with the MILF also might not be as hamstrung as one might expect. The president now can argue that the rebels' best opportunity for a beneficial settlement is with her. The military has voiced its opposition to continued negotiations and is pushing the president to allow it to capitalize on recent tactical successes by finishing the rebels off in one last push. At this point, the MILF would understand if Arroyo felt she needed to appease the military.

Last, in the wake of the coup attempt, Arroyo has the opportunity, if not the need, to clean house politically. During her State of the Nation address on July 28 -- by declaring that a strong republic cannot be built in just "two or three years" and by not bidding farewell to the electorate -- Arroyo in effect hinted that she would run for re-election -- although previously she has pledged not to do so. The failed coup might give Arroyo the political support within the government to successfully address the very same problems the coup participants complained about. And in the end, the coup attempt could provide a strong platform from which to launch her campaign.

62062
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 30, 2003, 09:51:06 AM »
www.stratfor.com

1154 GMT - PHILIPPINES: The Moro Islamic Front (MILF) admits it bought guns from the Philippine military, MILF spokesman Eid Kabalu told AFP. However, Eid denied that the military supports the militant group works, noting that the guns most likely were purchased from individual soldiers. Philippine soldiers who attempted to overthrow the government on July 26 had accused the government of working with the militant group, as well as attacking Philippine citizens and blaming it on the MILF. The government has denied those charges.


1108 GMT - PHILIPPINES: The head of Philippine military intelligence, Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, resigned July 30, citing "deep restiveness" inside the officers corp. His resignation was one of the demands made by renegade soldiers who attempted to overthrow the government on July 26. However, National Security Adviser Roilo Golez denied there was a link between the demand and Corpus' resignation, noting that Corpus had been thinking about stepping down for more than a month.

62063
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 29, 2003, 11:43:06 PM »
Another deep thoughtful one from www.stratfor.com
------------

Today's Featured Analysis

Iraq: U.S. Seeks Compromise With Iran?

Summary

U.S. President George W. Bush reportedly has considered calling
in the services of former Secretary of State James Baker in Iraq.
Washington appears to be seeking Iran's help in courting Iraq's
Shiite majority, which will require some tough negotiations.
Baker, viewed by many to be among the top U.S. political
negotiators, likely would be used to help forge an agreement with
Tehran in this regard. If a deal is made, it could catapult Iran
from isolation to the position of regional hegemon.

Analysis

U.S. President George W. Bush has considered calling in the
services of former Secretary of State James Baker to help work
alongside L. Paul Bremer, the administrator of Iraq -- the second
major change in three months to the team overseeing
reconstruction, the Washington Post reported July 26. Though
unnamed administration officials said Baker might not want to the
job, the White House would still look for a "Baker-like figure"
to assist Bremer, sources told the newspaper.

Washington likely is seeking a senior statesman who can help to
stabilize the situation in Iraq by forging a deal with Tehran.
The occupation of Iraq is not going well for the United States,
which faces daily attacks from a mainly Sunni resistance
movement. Since neither retreat nor the use of excess force are
acceptable options for dealing with the resistance, Washington is
left with one alternative: Seek an alliance involving Iraq's
Shiite majority to counter the guerrilla movement and to help
keep Shiites' own anti-U.S. sentiment from moving toward armed
resistance. But the United States cannot court Iraq's Shiites
without the indulgence of Iran.

Ultimately, a U.S.-Iranian compromise concerning Iraq could leave
Iran as the regional hegemon -- operating under the auspices of
the United States -- and thus alter the geopolitical landscape of
the Persian Gulf and/or the Middle East.

So far, the United States does not appear to be able to stamp out
the armed resistance in Iraq, and the steady flow of American
casualties can have negative consequences for reconstructions
efforts. This -- coupled with the controversy over pre-war
allegations concerning Iraq's WMD and the general perception that
Washington lacks a clear strategy for dealing with the Iraqi
resistance -- have prompted a 17 percent drop in Bush's approval
ratings, which now register at 53 percent, according to recent
polls. In essence, Washington is desperately seeking a solution
to the problems it faces in stabilizing Iraq as the presidential
election campaign season nears.

Given the quarter-century of antagonism in Iranian-American
relations, a deal between the two countries over the
stabilization of Iraq might seem implausible, but in realpolitik
there are no permanent enemies or friends. The United States has
a long history of forging alliances with unanticipated
counterparts to solve strategic problems -- including Stalin, Mao
and the Afghan mujahideen during the 1980s. Given that both Iran
and the United States are capable of stirring up trouble for each
other, the United States will find it difficult or impossible to
rebuild Iraq -- with its large Shiite majority -- without some
kind of compact with Tehran.

Iran has difficulties of its own concerning its nuclear program,
domestic dissent and allegations that it harbors members of al
Qaeda and other militant organizations. As a result of the war
against terrorism, Iran is now surrounded by U.S. military
forces, and Tehran is searching for a way out of its increasingly
uncomfortable position. Iran traditionally has been wary of
threats to its security from both the north and south, but it now
has an unprecedented opportunity to secure its western border. If
Tehran can gain a sphere of influence in Iraq, it could create a
buffer zone that gives the country strategic depth and help to
insulate it from potential security threats.

The challenges that both Washington and Tehran are facing have
opened a window of opportunity for both: Each understands the
other's dilemmas and realizes that they can help one another in
the search for solutions. The United States wants to align itself
with the Shiite majority of Iraq, over which Iran wields
influence. Iran, on the other hand, would like to secure itself
against the risk of regime change -- whether through internal
forces acting at the instigation of the United States or as the
result of a U.S. attack. And -- with Iraq no longer a major
power, Syria buckling under U.S. pressure and Saudi Arabia
struggling with internal and external problems -- Iran can work
with the United States in order to eventually assert itself as
the regional power in the Persian Gulf and/or the Middle East.
The actual nature of this regional hegemonic status would, of
course, be subject to the oversight of the global hegemon, the
United States.

Enter James Baker.

Baker, a senior counselor at the Carlyle Group -- an influential,
U.S.-based private equity firm with extensive ties to the Saudi
royal family -- is quite possibly the best negotiator the United
States has in its diplomatic arsenal. He has an impressive track
record in international negotiations, with involvement in issues
such as the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the creation of
an anti-Iraq coalition in the 1991 Gulf War.

Washington would like to gain Iran's help in dismantling al Qaeda
and for Tehran to refrain from developing nuclear weapons.
However, the Bush administration might be willing to allow Iran
to play a greater role in the political reconstruction of Iraq,
in return for guarantees that U.S. interests will not be
threatened. If Iran agrees to such an arrangement, it would be
presented with a unique opportunity to become the regional
hegemon.

Within Iran, such a deal likely would play well. Reformists would
see the alliance as a move closer to the West and, therefore, as
a chance for liberalization and increased trade. Devout Shiites
would be see it as a way of protecting Iran from the reemergence
of a Sunni Iraq and the fulfillment of Khomeini's dream. In a
region where everyone is perceived as collaborating with the
Americans, the Iranians at least would be seen as having attained
real value from collaboration. Tehran would pay a price where the
Sunni jihadists are concerned, but the agendas of the two
entities don't really converge anyhow.

The greatest fear of Iran's Islamist regime is that it will be
overthrown -- either by direct military intervention from the
United States or by U.S.-instigated insurrection. However, a
compromise with Washington concerning Iraq would secure both the
Islamic revolutionary regime and the country's western flank, and
would position Iran to dominate the region in the long term.
Ultimately, the entire deal could be covertly struck: The United
States creates a Shiite-dominated government in Iraq that cracks
down on the guerrilla resistance movement; Iran covertly
cooperates with the United States against al Qaeda and dials back
its nuclear program. This does not require grand pronouncements,
like those that characterized the U.S. detente with China during
the Nixon administration; it could be handled and contained
politically.

Washington would have to alleviate any security concerns by
Israel in order to strike such an agreement with Tehran, which
sponsors Palestinian militant groups. Apart from that, however,
the United States -- unlike Iran -- has few inherent obstacles to
overcome in order to strike a deal. In our view, if Washington
could forge agreement with China to diminish the threat from
Communism, it likely could do the same with Islamism by aligning
with Shiite Iran to counter the threat from Sunni jihadists.

This would not be easily achieved, however, given the limitations
on Iran's maneuvering room: The most crucial issue for Tehran is
to avoid the perception in the Muslim world that is has
somersaulted from an anti-American position to a pro-American
one. The fact that the vast majority of the Muslim world is Sunni
also poses a problem for Tehran, which has been desperately
pursuing a policy predicated upon Shia-Sunni unity. A U.S.-
Iranian understanding would trouble particularly trouble Saudi
Arabia. Riyadh is loathe to see a rival power emerging in the
region, and the kingdom's influential Wahhabist religious
establishment is equally opposed to the possibility of growing
Shiite influence.

62064
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 29, 2003, 11:57:36 AM »
1150 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Four suspected leaders of the July 27 coup attempt in the Philippines were trained by U.S. Special Forces, AFP reported July 29, citing an unnamed Philippine military official. The four leaders -- Capt. Gerardo Gambala of the 32nd Infantry Battalion, 1st Lt. Laurence San Juan of the Light Reaction Company and Capt. Albert Baloloy and 1st Lt. Jose Enrico Demetrio Dingle of the Scout Ranger Battalion -- received sniper, night fighting and counterterrorism training in 2002 and later fought against elements of Abu Sayyaf on Basilan Island.

62065
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 28, 2003, 11:07:40 PM »
Tribute to Matthew Baker

Stratfor is mourning the loss of its chief analyst, Matthew
Baker, who has been with the company since its inception in 1996.
Matthew, aged 33, was shot and killed at his home in Austin,
Texas, on the evening of July 24.

As chief analyst, Matthew helped keep Stratfor's analysis ahead
of the mainstream media coverage. He was interviewed frequently
by the press as a military expert, especially during the Kosovo
war and again during the recent Iraq war. Matthew has been quoted
by many media sources, including the Boston Herald, Sun Sentinel,
London Free Press, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, FoxNews.com, the
Washington Times, and by Stars & Stripes and other military
journals.

He also has been interviewed on numerous radio and TV stations as
a military expert.

Matthew will be greatly missed by his friends and colleagues at
Stratfor, and we pay tribute to his exceptional dedication to his
work and to this company. We want our subscribers to know that
although Matthew's death leaves a void in our hearts, the best
way we can honor him is to continue to uphold his example in
providing excellence to our audience and customers.
...................................................................

Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
28 July 2003
 
by Dr. George Friedman

Iraq and the Broader War

Summary

The failure of the United States to achieve a decisive victory in
Iraq would have substantial consequences. The deaths of Qusai and
Odai Hussein last week reflect the American belief that
decapitating the guerrilla movement might be decisive. So far,
the tempo of operations by the guerrillas has not declined, but
that means nothing yet; it might take time for the effect of the
two deaths to ripple through the system. Nevertheless, it is
possible that the Hussein brothers were not critical to guerrilla
operations. Indeed, it is possible that those operations are
designed to continue without centralized leadership. Bringing the
guerrillas under control could be a daunting task, but the
current disarray within the Bush administration makes it much
harder to achieve.

Analysis

The Stratfor Weekly is supposed to focus on the most important
geopolitical issue of the week. The last six have been about
Iraq; this will make the seventh. Certainly, there are a great
many things happening in the world. However, our apparent
obsession with Iraq reflects our conviction that Iraq, right now,
is the pivot of the international geopolitical system. A global
war is under way between the United States and militant Islam.
That war is reshaping the international system. As with the Cold
War or World War II, a host of relationships in the international
system are aligning themselves along the axis defined by the war.
The Iraqi campaign is a subset of that global war; however, it is
a critical subset because the outcome of that campaign will
decisively shape the U.S.-Islamist conflict -- which in turn will
shape the international system.

The failure of the United States to achieve a decisive victory in
Iraq can have a massive effect on the global war. The United
States has now invaded two countries: Afghanistan and Iraq. In
both, the regime has been displaced and the strategic threat to
the United States eliminated. Yet in neither case has the United
States been able to impose a Pax Americanus. The inability to
reach a completely satisfactory outcome undermines the perception
the United States wanted to achieve -- relentless, irresistible
power. U.S. officials knew they could do nothing about anti-
Americanism in the Islamic world, so they moved to compensate by
increasing fear of the United States. The current situations in
Afghanistan and Iraq are, from this standpoint, unsatisfactory;
they undermine the intent of the war and represent a major crisis
in U.S. global strategy. Therefore, the next few weeks and months
are, in our mind, absolutely critical in defining the shape --
difficulty, length and outcome -- of not only the Iraq campaign
but the global war as well. We are at a defining moment.

There are four possible outcomes for the Iraq campaign:

1. The attacks against the Baath leadership will shatter the
Iraqi guerrillas, who will shortly fade away. This will set the
stage for the United States to exploit its Iraq victory by
redefining the dynamics of the Islamic world.
2. The guerrillas will be able to maintain the current tempo of
operations but not to increase it. This would represent a
strategic military victory for U.S. forces, but one with
potential political ramifications in the region and in the United
States.
3. The guerrillas increase their tempo of operations
dramatically, imposing higher casualties on American forces --not
threatening, in strictly military terms, the U.S. occupation of
strategic points of Iraq, but deeply undermining the intention
behind the invasion.
4. The guerrillas, coupled with a mass uprising of the
population, make the American presence in Iraq untenable --
forcing a withdrawal, shattering U.S. strategy in the broader
war.

There are variations on these themes, but these four general
outcomes are reasonably definitive categories.

Washington wants to limit the worst-case scenario to Case 2,
while working aggressively to achieve Case 1. The guerrilla
desire is to prevent their suppression, remaining in Case 2 while
working up the scale to Case 3 and, at some point, triggering a
massed uprising -- taking them to Case 4. For both sides, Case 2
is a barely tenable condition. U.S. forces do not want to be in a
guerrilla war tying down hundreds of thousands of troops,
creating an appearance of failure and preventing follow-on
operations. The guerrillas must show that they not only can
sustain the current level of operations but increase it, both for
internal morale reasons and political reasons.

We therefore have a situation that neither side wants to remain
static. However, the United States has a bigger problem than the
guerrillas: In the end, the longer the guerrillas can sustain the
current tempo of operations, the greater their credibility, their
ability to recruit and the greater their effect on the war as a
whole. The longer they can stay at this stage, the more likely
they are to move to Stage 3. The longer the United States stays
at Stage 3, the more difficult it will be to achieve Stage 1.
Therefore, while neither side wants the current status as an
outcome, the United States can afford it less. It must, if
possible, pacify the country.

This is why the deaths of Qusai and Odai Hussein are so
important. If the guerrilla war emanates primarily from the Baath
party, and if it is organized along the centralized lines the
party historically followed, then a decapitation strike against
the leadership is both a logical and deadly strategy. The deaths
of Odai and Qusai represent a major coup in two senses: First,
they mean that two of the movement's three key leaders have been
eliminated, and second, they demonstrate that U.S. intelligence
has successfully penetrated the Baath security system. This is of
potentially greater importance than the deaths -- the sense that
the United States has penetrated the guerrilla movement could
well destabilize it. Certainly, the insecurity of Saddam Hussein
increases dramatically, as does that of other guerrilla leaders.

There have been continued attacks since the deaths of Qusai and
Odai. Ten U.S. troops have been killed since the Hussein brothers
died, with additional casualties. Guerrilla operations have
intensified. The significance of this is ambiguous at this point,
but four explanations are possible:

1. The killings will take a while to seep through the system, as
will the security breach. Operations already planned are being
carried out and low-level planning for new operations is taking
place, but over time, the guerrilla movement will disintegrate.
This is the U.S. hope.
2. Odai and Qusai were not part of the military command and were
potentially estranged from the movement. Their security was
breached precisely because of their unimportance. The movement is
indeed a Baathist movement, but Odai and Qusai were not among its
leaders.
3. The movement is not modeled on traditional, centralized
guerrilla organizations but takes its bearings from al Qaeda,
with individual units free to operate independently and central
command offering only general guidance. Knocking out Saddam
Hussein and his sons won't affect the movement.
4. The guerrilla movement is not primarily Baathist, but either
is controlled by Jihadists from outside the country or is a
hybrid of Jihadists and well-trained remnants of the Iraqi army
who identify with the religious factions rather than with the
secular Baathists.

If Cases 2-4 are true, then killing Hussein himself will have
minimal effect on the guerrillas' ability to fight. Quite the
contrary, it would represent wasted effort -- a U.S. pursuit of
irrelevant figures that doesn't really hurt the guerrillas'
operations.

The fourth case is the most troubling possibility. Hussein was
deeply hated by many Iraqis, particularly Shiites in the south.
There are certainly tensions between Sunni and Shiite under any
circumstances, but if the Baathist element was to be eliminated,
the possibility of some sort of collaboration along Islamist
lines obviously increases. This is the concern of the U.S.
command in Iraq: Lt. General Ricardo Sanchez, who commands U.S.
troops in Iraq, said July 27, "I think as long as we're present
here in Iraq, we will always have the threat of Islamic
fundamentalists and terrorists coming to try to kill American and
coalition soldiers, and that is something that we will have to
contend with."

The issue is the mix. If the center of gravity for the Iraqi
guerrillas was in fact the Hussein family and the Baathist
leadership, the events of the past week should shatter the
movement. If the center of gravity is the Jihadists plus local
allies -- or more precisely, if the movement is designed not to
have a vulnerable center of gravity -- then, from the U.S.
viewpoint, the situation is much more dangerous. One of the
things that Sanchez said was, "We have to understand that we have
a multiple-faceted conflict going on here in Iraq. We've got
terrorist activity, we've got former regime leadership, we have
criminals, and we have some hired assassins that are attacking
our soldiers on a daily basis." If the situation is as
multifaceted as Sanchez describes, it is difficult to see how
there will be a rapid termination of the conflict; there are
simply too many oars in the water.

Add to this the fact that over the past few days, tensions have
risen between U.S. troops and Shiites in the south. The United
States has been trying to win over the Shiites and at least
prevent their participation in the guerrilla war. But the
Shiites' price is extremely high: Essentially, they want to
supplant the U.S. occupation forces as the government of Iraq.
That is something Washington is not prepared to consider. At the
same time, the Shiites are showing the ability to bring large
numbers into the streets for demonstrations against U.S. troops.
Combine a guerrilla war with an intifada, and you have the worst-
case situation for the United States.

U.S. forces must, at the very least, achieve two objectives.
First, the guerrilla war must be contained at the current level;
second, there must not, under any circumstances, be a Shiite
rising in the south. An expanded guerrilla war in the north and a
rising in the south would move the U.S. situation to the worst-
case scenario.

Preventing this requires political rather than military
leadership. Washington must make core decisions about the future
of U.S. relations with Shiites in general and with Iran in
particular. Just as Nixon split the communist bloc by forming an
alliance with Mao, so too does the United States see the need to
divide the Islamic world, which it cannot face as a single bloc.
Complex and sophisticated political maneuvering is needed to
split the Islamic world and, more immediately, to co-opt Muslims
in Iraq. If the United States can't achieve this, it must fight a
war on all fronts simultaneously -- hardly an ideal situation,
and possibly not winnable. Therefore, containing the Shiites in
Iraq at an affordable price represents not only a key to Iraq,
but to the entire war.

It is for this reason that we regard the events in Iraq as
definitive. At the moment, our expectations are low. The Bush
administration is in such internal disarray that it is not clear
whether it can make strategic decisions at this time. Command
appears to be in the hands of U.S. officials in Baghdad, whose
perspective is limited to this campaign rather than to the war as
a whole. In the meantime, Washington officials are maneuvering
against each other as if who held what post were a matter of
national significance. Whether CIA Director GeorgeTenet, National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld or any of the rest are here a week from now is not
nearly as important as the fact that there is a war to fight.

In fairness, the political infighting in Washington is inevitable
at times when wars enter crisis phases. The problem is that at
this moment, the debate does not appear to be concerned with what
strategy is to be followed either in the Iraq campaign or in the
war in general. Rather, the fighting is over who committed what
intelligence failure when. The situation in Iraq is difficult
enough, but the real threat to U.S. warfighting is that the
president will allow the "inside the Beltway" nonsense to
continue. There is a crisis in the war; he can fire someone,
everyone or no one. But the president must command, and that
command must generate political and military strategy.

Therefore, we would argue that there can be no strategic solution
to Iraq or the war until political order is imposed in the
administration. Killing Odai and Qusai Hussein can't possibly
hurt the warfighting effort, but their deaths are hardly a
substitute for a coherent strategy in which the military and
political aspects mesh.

62066
Politics & Religion / Political Rants
« on: July 28, 2003, 09:40:57 PM »
"It doesn't get any better (worse?) than this.

"Jessie Jackson has added former Chicago democratic congressman Mel Reynolds to Rainbow/PUSH Coalition's payroll. Reynolds was among the 176 criminals excused in President Clinton's last-minute forgiveness spree.

"Reynolds received a commutation of his six-and-a-half-year federal sentence for 15 convictions of wire fraud, bank fraud and lies to the Federal Election Commission. He is more notorious, however, for concurrently serving five years for sleeping with an underage campaign volunteer.

This is a first in American politics: an ex-congressman who had sex with a subordinate... won clemency from a president who had sex with a subordinate... then was hired by a clergyman who had sex with a subordinate.

"His new job?

"Youth counselor!!!

62067
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 28, 2003, 03:00:13 PM »
'This Was a Good Thing to Do'
Iraqis' greatest fear is that America will cut and run.

BY PAUL A. GIGOT
Monday, July 28, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT

NAJAF, Iraq--Toppling a statue is easier than killing a dictator. Not the man himself, but the idea of his despotism, the legacy of his torture and the fear of his return. This kind of reconstruction takes time.

Just ask the 20-some members of the new city council in this holy city of Shiite Islam. Their chairs are arrayed in a circle to hear from Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of defense, who invites questions. The first man to speak wants to know two things: There's a U.S. election next year, and if President Bush loses will the Americans go home? And second, are you secretly holding Saddam Hussein in custody as a way to intimidate us with the fear that he might return? Mr. Wolfowitz replies no to both points, with more conviction on the second than the first. But the question reveals the complicated anxiety of the post-Saddam Iraqi mind.





Most reporting from Iraq suggests that the U.S. "occupation" isn't welcome here. But following Mr. Wolfowitz around the country I found precisely the opposite to be true. The majority aren't worried that we'll stay too long; they're petrified we'll leave too soon. Traumatized by 35 years of Saddam's terror, they fear we'll lose our nerve as casualties mount and leave them once again to the Baath Party's merciless revenge.
That is certainly true in Najaf, which the press predicted in April would be the center of a pro-Iranian Shiite revolt. Only a week ago Sunday, Washington Post reporter Pamela Constable made Section A with a story titled "Rumors Spark Iraqi Protests as Pentagon Official Stops By." Interesting, if true.

But Ms. Constable hung her tale on the rant of a single Shiite cleric who wasn't chosen for the Najaf city council. Even granting that her details were accurate--there was a protest by this Shiite faction, though not when Mr. Wolfowitz was around--the story still gave a false impression of overall life in Najaf. On the same day, I saw Mr. Wolfowitz's caravan welcomed here and in nearby Karbala with waves and shouts of "Thank you, Bush."

The new Najaf council represents the city's ethnic mosaic, and its chairman is a Shiite cleric. Things improved dramatically once the Marines deposed a corrupt mayor who'd been installed by the CIA. Those same Marines have rebuilt schools and fired 80% of the police force. The city is now largely attack-free and Marines patrol without heavy armor and often without flak jackets. The entire south-central region is calm enough that the Marines will be turning over duty to Polish and Italian troops.

This is the larger story I saw in Iraq, the slow rebuilding and political progress that is occurring even amid the daily guerrilla attacks in Baghdad and the Sunni north. Admittedly we were in, or near, the Wolfowitz bubble. But reporters elsewhere are also in a bubble, one created by the inevitable limits of travel, sourcing and access. In five days we visited eight cities, and I spoke to hundreds of soldiers and Iraqis.

The Bush administration has made mistakes here since Saddam's statue fell on April 9. President Bush declared the war over much too soon, leaving Americans unprepared for the Baathist guerrilla campaign. (The Pentagon had to fight to get the word "major" inserted before "combat operations in Iraq have ended" in that famous May 1 "Mission Accomplished" speech.) But U.S. leaders, civilian and military, are learning from mistakes and making tangible progress.

One error was underestimating Saddam's damage, both physical and psychic. The degradation of this oil-rich country is astonishing to behold. Like the Soviets, the dictator put more than a third of his GDP into his military--and his own palaces. "The scale of military infrastructure here is staggering," says Maj. Gen. David Petraeus of the 101st Airborne. His troops found one new Iraqi base that is large enough to hold his entire 18,500-man division.

Everything else looks like it hasn't been replaced in at least 30 years. The General Electric turbine at one power plant hails from 1965, the boiler at one factory from 1952. Textile looms are vintage 1930s. Peter McPherson, the top U.S. economic adviser here, estimates that rebuilding infrastructure will cost $150 billion over 10 years.

All of this makes the reconstruction effort vulnerable to even small acts of sabotage. The night before we visited Basra, someone had blown up electrical transmission pylons, shutting down power to much of the city. That in turn triggered long gas lines on the mere rumor that the pumps wouldn't work. Rebuilding all of this will take longer than anyone thought.

Iraq's mental scars are even deeper. Nearly every Iraqi can tell a story about some Baath Party depredation. The dean of the new police academy in Baghdad spent a year in jail because his best friend turned him in when he'd said privately that "Saddam is no good." A "torture tree" behind that same academy contains the eerie indentations from rope marks where victims were tied. The new governor of Basra, a judge, was jailed for refusing to ignore corruption. Basra's white-and-blue secret police headquarters is called "the white lion," because Iraqis say it ate everyone who went inside.

"You have to understand it was a Stalinist state," says Iaian Pickard, one of the Brits helping to run Basra. "The structure of civic life has collapsed. It was run by the Baath Party and it simply went away. We're having to rebuild it from scratch."

This legacy is why the early U.S. failure to purge all ranking Baathists was a nearly fatal blunder. Officials at CIA and the State Department had advocated a strategy of political decapitation, purging only those closest to Saddam. State's Robin Raphel had even called de-Baathification "fascistic," a macabre irony to Iraqis who had to endure genuine fascism.

Muhyi AlKateeb is a slim, elegant Iraqi-American who fled the Iraqi foreign service in 1979 when Saddam took total control. (In the American way, he then bought a gas station in Northern Virginia.) But when he returned in May to rebuild the Foreign Ministry, "I saw all of the Baathists sitting in front of me. I couldn't stay if they did." He protested to U.S. officials, who only changed course after L. Paul Bremer arrived as the new administrator.

Mr. AlKateeb has since helped to purge the Foreign Ministry of 309 secret police members, and 151 Baathist diplomats. "It's an example of success," he says now, though he still believes "we are too nice. Iraqis have to see the agents of Saddam in handcuffs, on TV and humiliated, so people will know that Saddam really is gone." This is a theme one hears over and over: You Americans don't understand how ruthless the Baathists are. They'll fight to the death. You have to do the same, and let us help you do it.

Which brings up the other large American mistake: The failure to enlist Iraqi allies into the fight from the very start. Pentagon officials had wanted to do this for months, but they were trumped by the CIA, State and former Centcom chief Tommy Franks. The result has been too many GIs doing jobs they shouldn't have to do, such as guarding banks, and making easier targets for the Baathist-jihadi insurgency.

The new Centcom boss, Gen. John Abizaid, is now correcting that mistake by recruiting a 14,000-man Iraqi security force. He's helped by division commanders who are adapting their own tactics in order to win local support and eventually be able to turn power back over to Iraqis.

In Mosul in the north, Gen. Petraeus of the 101st Airborne runs the equivalent of a large Fortune 500 company. He's having to supply electricity, buy up the local wheat crop (everything here was bought by, or supplied by, Saddam's government), form a city council, as well as put down an insurgency. He's even run a Task Force Pothole to fix the local roads. It's no accident that an Iraqi turned the whereabouts of Uday and Qusay into the 101st Airborne. Like the Marines in Najaf, Gen. Petraeus's troops have made an effort to mingle with the population and develop intelligence sources.

In Kirkuk, Maj. Gen. Raymond Odierno's Fourth Infantry Division has had similar success tapping Iraqi informers to map what he calls the "network of mid-level Baathists" who are running the insurgency. Late last week they raided a house near Tikrit after an Iraqi tip and captured several Saddam loyalists, including at least five of his personal bodyguards. Some have been reluctant to talk, but Gen. Odierno observes that "when you mention Guantanamo, they become a lot more compliant."

The U.S. media have focused on grumbling troops who want to go home, especially the Third Infantry Division near Baghdad. And having been in the region for some 260 days, the Third ID deserves a break. But among the troops I saw, morale remains remarkably high. To a soldier, they say the Iraqis want us here. They also explain their mission in a way that the American pundit class could stand to hear.

"I tell my troops every day that what we're doing is every bit as important as World War II," says one colonel, a brigade commander, in the 101st. "The chance to create a stable Iraq could help our security for the next 40 or 50 years." A one-star general in the same unit explains that his father served three tours in Vietnam and ultimately turned against that war. But what the 101st is doing "is a classic anti-insurgency campaign" to prevent something similar here.

These men are part of a younger Army officer corps that isn't traumatized by Vietnam or wedded to the Powell Doctrine. They understand what they are doing is vital to the success of the war on terror. They are candid in saying the hit-and-run attacks are likely to continue for months, but they are just as confident that they will inevitably break the Baathist network.

The struggle for Iraq will be difficult, but the coalition is winning. It has the support of most Iraqis, a creative, flexible military, and the resources to improve daily lives. The main question is whether America's politicians have the same patience and fortitude as its soldiers.





The one word I almost never heard in Iraq was "WMD." That isn't because the U.S. military doesn't want, or expect, to find it. The reason, I slowly began to understand, is that Iraqis and the Americans who are here don't think it matters all that much to their mission. The liberation of this country from Saddam's terror is justification enough for what they are doing, and the main chance now isn't refighting the case for war but making sure we win on the ground.
"So I see they're giving Bush a hard time about the WMD," volunteers a Marine colonel, at the breakfast mess in Hilla one morning. "They ought to come here and see what we do, and what Saddam did to these people. This was a good thing to do."

Mr. Gigot is The Wall Street Journal's editorial page editor.

62068
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 28, 2003, 10:31:55 AM »
Islamic Militant Admits to Plot, Report Says
Suspect with Jemaah Islamiah ties told police he and an Egyptian were planning Manila attack.
       
By Richard C. Paddock, Times Staff Writer


MANILA ? A notorious Islamic militant arrested in May has confessed to police that he plotted to attack the Philippine presidential palace using Arab suicide bombers, according to a confidential police report of his interrogation.

Muklis Yunos, a suspect with links to Jemaah Islamiah, a Southeast Asian terrorist network, said he was on his way to Manila to prepare for the attacks when he was arrested with a co-conspirator, an Egyptian businessman, according to a copy of the Philippine police report obtained by The Times.

It was unclear whether Yunos and his associates had the capability and resources to pull off such an attack. One Philippine police investigator speculated that the plan was concocted as part of a successful counter-terrorism scheme to lure Yunos out of hiding and arrest him.

Details of the alleged bomb plot emerged as Southeast Asian authorities grapple with mounting activity by suspected terrorists.

In Indonesia this month, police arrested nine suspected Jemaah Islamiah members and seized weapons and enough explosives to make a device more powerful than the car bomb used in the October 2002 attack on a nightclub in Bali, which killed 202 people. Police said the group planned to blow up churches and assassinate five prominent Indonesians.

Jemaah Islamiah, which seeks to establish an Islamic state in the region, scored a significant victory when Fathur Rohman Al Ghozi, one of its most prominent members, managed to escape from prison in Manila this month. Also known as "Mike the Bombmaker," the Indonesian terrorist allegedly took part in bomb plots in Manila, Jakarta and Singapore before his arrest last year.

Authorities say Al Ghozi and two members of the Abu Sayyaf kidnap-for-ransom gang walked out of their cell at police headquarters in Manila during the middle of the night July 14. Authorities are investigating whether guards were bribed.

Following Al Ghozi's escape, the U.S. and other Western nations issued new warnings of terrorist threats in the Philippines.


------------------
Philippine Troops Surrender Peacefully in Mall Standoff
About 300 mutinous soldiers leave Manila's financial district for their bases after their attempt to oust the president fails.

  By Richard C. Paddock, Times Staff Writer


MANILA ? About 300 rebellious soldiers who had seized a shopping complex and rigged it with explosives in the hope of ousting Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo surrendered Sunday night, ending their siege less than 24 hours after it began.

Arroyo, who had authorized troops to use deadly force if necessary to drive the mutineers from Manila's financial district, was jubilant when she announced that negotiations had ended the standoff.

"The crisis is over," she declared at 10 p.m. "This has been a triumph for democracy."

Under the agreement, the rebels were allowed to keep their weapons and were transported back to their bases, not jail. Most looked tired and grim as they filed from the building and climbed into waiting trucks, but several said the protest was worthwhile because it gave them a chance to air grievances against the government.

"We were able to express ourselves," said a 27-year-old soldier who declined to give his name. "We will always be proud of that."

The renegades accused the Arroyo administration of selling guns and ammunition to Islamic rebels and guerrilla fighters, saying that the weapons are used to kill Philippine soldiers. The mutineers also accused the government of masterminding recent terrorist bombings in the southern Philippines to obtain more aid money from the United States and to provide a pretext for declaring martial law, so that Arroyo could remain in power.

With low ratings in the polls, Arroyo has said she does not plan to run in an election scheduled for next year.

The soldiers offered no proof of their allegations but called Arroyo a terrorist and demanded that she and her top military and police officials quit.

"We demand the resignation of our leaders in the present regime," the renegades said in a protest statement. "We are willing to sacrifice our lives today to pursue a program not tainted with politicking."

In an earlier televised speech Sunday, Arroyo rejected the soldiers' allegations and suggested that the mutineers were the ones engaging in terrorism when they set booby traps in the shopping mall.

"There is absolutely no justification for the actions you have taken," Arroyo told the soldiers in her address. "You have already stained the uniform. Do not drench it with dishonor. Your actions are already hovering at the fringes of outright terrorism."

The mutineers contended that they were not attempting to stage a coup. However, the protest might have gained popular support and drawn large crowds similar to the "people power" rebellions that installed Corazon Aquino as president in 1986 and Arroyo as president in 2001.

Police today arrested an aide of disgraced former President Joseph Estrada, whom Arroyo replaced, for alleged involvement in the mutiny. Police said Ramon Cardenas owned a house near Manila where officers found assault rifles, ammunition and red armbands similar to those used by the soldiers.

Having learned from her own rise to power, Arroyo had made sure that few members of the public could reach the Glorietta mall and the adjoining Oakwood Premier Hotel where the soldiers were holed up: Police had blockaded the roads.

The district, known as Makati City, is the commercial hub of Manila, with high-rise office buildings and five-star hotels.

In the afternoon, the president declared a "state of rebellion," giving the military and police the legal authority to arrest suspects without warrants. Arroyo set a deadline of 5 p.m. for her troops to move in but extended the deadline twice.

Under the final agreement, five leaders of the mutiny will face prosecution.

After the deal was struck, mutineers dismantled the explosives they had placed around the shopping center.

-------------------
Filipino Cops Arrest Ex-Aide in Uprising
 
By JIM GOMEZ, Associated Press Writer


MANILA, Philippines -- A key supporter of disgraced ex-President Joseph Estrada was arrested Monday and accused of supporting a failed military mutiny over the weekend, while the current Philippine leader ordered an independent probe into the causes of the uprising by junior officers.

Police have alleged that several cronies of Estrada, who was ousted by popular protest in 2001 and is standing trial on corruption charges, aided and fomented Sunday's rebellion.

Nearly 300 mutinous troops who seized a Manila shopping and apartment complex demanding the government resign gave up and retreated peacefully after some 19 hours.

Estrada, who has been in police custody for more than two years, insisted that he had nothing to do with Sunday's drama. "Neither I nor my supporters has a role in this whole thing, and personally, I have nothing to gain from this incident," he said.

President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo vowed Monday to punish the plotters and ordered an investigation into what caused the uprising that shook her presidency.

In a state of the nation address, Arroyo assured the country that she remains in control. The mutineers said they were protesting alleged corruption and misconduct within the military.

"I am constituting an independent commission to investigate the roots of the mutiny and the provocation that inspired it," she told the Congress, which responded with a standing ovation.

"Such actions are deplorable and will be met with the full force of law," she added.

Arroyo traveled to Congress aboard a helicopter and about 3,000 police officers and sharpshooters deployed outside the Congress building for her speech on Monday.

Outside, thousands of protesters called for her resignation, saying Arroyo had failed to give land to poor farmers, control graft and ease poverty.

"The people's call for Arroyo's resignation will continue to escalate, especially after the mutiny by young officers and soldiers," labor leader Elmer Labog said.

Protesters also burned a 12-foot effigy of Arroyo with moving legs, symbolizing the president on the run.

The Philippines has had about eight military uprisings and coup attempts since the "people power" ouster of dictator Ferdinand Marcos in 1986.

The force of Arroyo's words immediately fueled speculation that she might reverse an earlier promise not to stand in next year's presidential election.

Arroyo did not mention her political plans but pledged action to solve critical problems including terrorism, drugs, corruption, separatism and the struggling economy.

Police announced earlier Monday that they were using emergency powers granted by Arroyo to quell the mutiny to detain some of Estrada's associates. The powers allow arrests without warrants.

The first to be nabbed was Ramon Cardenas, a member of Estrada's Cabinet. Officials filed a complaint against him late Monday before the justice department in connection with his alleged role in the uprising. A lawyer for Cardenas, Abraham Expejo, said his client was innocent.

Officers said he owned a "safe house" for the rebel troops -- stacked with assault rifles, ammunition and the same red armbands used by the soldiers who seized an apartment and ritzy shopping complex in downtown Manila.

Police are trying to gather evidence against Sen. Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan, also suspected of providing help to the mutineers, said police official Eduardo Matillano. Honasan, a former army colonel who led seven coup attempts in the 1980s, has not been charged and has strongly denied the accusation.

Arroyo also promised to reform the police force, branded as corrupt and inept following the July 14 escape of three terror suspects thought to have bribed their way out of its main Manila headquarters.

Arroyo, however, failed to outline a widely expected change of senior police commanders -- something that had been included in a draft of her speech supplied to reporters. There was no explanation about the omission.

Financial markets plunged Monday in response to the failed mutiny, but major shares bottomed out early and contained their losses at 2.1 percent as traders focused on the quick, peaceful resolution to the crisis.

Five junior officers, who organized the uprising, were being questioned under guard, said army spokesman Lt. Col. Joselito Kakilala. The other mutinous troops were confined to their barracks.

The mutineers demanded the resignation of Arroyo, but backed down during talks with government negotiators and after Arroyo threatened to crush the rebellion with tanks and sharpshooters.

The renegades wired the apartment and shopping complex -- home to some of the city's richest citizens, foreign businesspeople and diplomats -- with explosives and booby traps.

The renegades complained of corruption and misconduct in the upper ranks of the military and government and complained that Muslim and communist rebels were buying weapons and ammunition from the military.

62069
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 28, 2003, 07:40:31 AM »
1122 GMT - PHILIPPINES: Philippines President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo
announced in a televised state of the nation address July 28 that an
independent commission would be set up to investigate the recent coup
attempt. Arroyo called the incident unfortunate and vowed that the men
involved would face punishment. She also said that the government must
determine and address what caused the soldiers to attempt a coup. Meanwhile, about 4,000 activists gathered outside the House of Representatives during Arroyo's speech, burning her pictures and shouting anti-Arroyo slogans.

www.stratfor.com

62070
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 28, 2003, 12:33:41 AM »
EARLY SUNDAY MORNING, he and roughly 50 heavily armed members of the Philippine military seized a commercial complex in Manila?s financial district and rigged the place with explosives, swearing to blow it up if they were attacked. At least two unnamed Americans were reported to be trapped inside, although members of the mutiny insisted they were holding no hostages. Government troops surrounded the complex but kept their distance.
 
       The uprising included several Special Operations officers who had earned decorations in the three-decade war against Muslim rebels in the south. The mutinous troops issued a statement complaining of favoritism and corruption. ?We demand the resignation of our leaders in the present regime,? it said. ?We are willing to sacrifice our lives today to pursue a program not tainted with politicking.? Armed Forces spokesman Lt. Col. Daniel Lucero said that the siege was not seen as a threat to power, and that the Manila government hoped for a peaceful resolution. Shortly afterward, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo gave the soldiers seven hours to return to their barracks or face ?reasonable force.?
       
       ? 2003 Newsweek, Inc.

62071
3/14/25

Prompted by my post today on this thread, I have just circled back here and modified the subject line to what you now see.

For my fellow Americans:

Regarded the phrase "well regulated militia":  Obviously it comes from our Second Amendment.  Due to the change in meaning of the term "well regulated" since the Bill of Rights was passed, the term is currently usually misunderstood as a call for lots of regulations.  Not so!  At the time the BoR was passed the meaning of the term was "smoothly running".  For example a "well regulated watch" (keep in mind the technology of the time) was one that ran smoothly and accurately.

Thus the vision for a "well regulated militia" was one that arose sua sponte of American Citizens getting together with their friends and neighbors to train and practice so that they could serve effectively as "minutemen" in the event of some sort of attack.

Think of who it was that fought the British and the Battle of Lexington and Concord.  They were the men who already had fought together against the French and Indians in the border wars of a couple of decades prior-- and that is why they had the cannons (!!!) and guns that the British were coming to confiscate.

Their collective resistance to being disarmed was the beginning of America.

Similarly, think of the phrase in the Constitution about "Letters of Marque"-- again a vision of citizenry with their own cannons (on ships in this case) in order to be able to defend themselves on the high seas.

In neither case was it necessary that the citizens be trained or regulated by the State governments.  Witness Title 10 USC Section 311.

In my considered opinion, there is a substantial possibility that massive civil unrest and disorder may come to America sometime soon.  Note my words here are NOT a prediction, merely a calculation of possible outcomes.

====================
Woof All:

This thread is for stories of citizen's stepping forward:

Crafty Dog
------------------------

CRIMENETDAILY
Bank robber caught
by fed-up customer
Man who witnessed previous holdup
now chooses to act, pounces on thief

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Posted: July 27, 2003
6:42 p.m. Eastern



? 2003 WorldNetDaily.com



 

As Yogi Berra might say, it was a case of deja vu all over again.

Last month, Andrew Green was inside the Riverside National Bank in Jensen Beach, Fla., when the establishment was robbed. He stood by helplessly as a witness to the crime. In an incredible coincidence, Green was inside the same branch when it was robbed again yesterday morning. But this time, there was a different outcome, as Green decided to take action and get involved by pursuing the alleged robber.

"At first I just wanted to follow him, so I could identify him to the police," Green told the Stuart News. "He was walking across the parking lot so nonchalantly and was changing his clothes as he walked."

Green watched as the suspect removed his hat and shirt, stuffing them into a plastic Wal-Mart bag. That's when he decided to pounce, tackling Thomas Poisal.

"He struggled a little on the way down," Green told the Palm Beach Post. "He looked a little shocked. He hadn't looked behind him a single time in the parking lot. It felt great," he added to the Post. "All my frustrations just went out of my body."

Deputies from the Martin County Sheriff's Office arrived to find Green and another witness holding Poisal in a bear hug, with $2,000 on the suspect.

"It was bibbity-bam, bibbity-boom," Lt. Mike McKinley told the Stuart News. "[Poisal's] got to know he had a very poor decision-making process today."

Poisal is being charged with armed robbery after telling the bank teller he had a gun, though none was recovered.  On June 2, Richard Mandile allegedly robbed the same bank after giving the teller a note, leaving Green amazed by the coincidence.

"What are the odds of this happening twice?" Green asked the Stuart News. "The first time I was really frustrated for not helping," he said. "But this time was great. Your adrenaline really gets pumping and you don't realize what you're doing."

62072
Politics & Religion / Myanmar (Burma):
« on: July 27, 2003, 10:00:05 PM »
Thailand's Thaksin Maneuvering for Top ASEAN Position?

Summary

Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has formulated a plan not
only to secure the release of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi,
but also eventually to democratize Myanmar, Thai Foreign Minister
Surakiart Sathirathai said at a foreign ministers' summit on July
24. Thaksin's campaign to rehabilitate Myanmar is motivated by a
desire not only to remove a thorn in the side of ASEAN -- and
facilitate his ascension to its leadership -- but also to secure
the benefits a peaceful and prosperous Myanmar would bring to
Thailand.

Analysis

Thailand has forged a proposal to secure the release of
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, and possibly even democratize
Myanmar, Thai Foreign Minister Surakiart Sathirathai said July 24
at a summit in Indonesia.

Bangkok has a multidimensional interest in resolving Myanmar's
issues: Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra is motivated not only
by a desire to remove a thorn from the side of the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations -- hoping to position himself to take
over the ASEAN leadership -- but also to secure the benefits a
peaceful and prosperous Myanmar would bring to his country.

Myanmar's ruling military junta took Suu Kyi into "protective
custody" on May 30. The opposition leader's detainment has
spawned condemnations from Europe, the United States and fellow
Asian nations. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad even
floated the idea of expelling Myanmar from ASEAN if it did not
respond to the mounting international concerns -- a sharp
divergence from the association's policy of noninterference in
its members' internal affairs. At the time Thaksin rebutted
Mahathir's suggestion, urging the international community to give
Myanmar time to resolve its own national issues.

Bangkok changed its tune, however, at the Asia Europe Meeting
(ASEM) in Bali on July 24. Sathirathai said that Thailand's peace
plan for Myanmar seeks the cooperation of six "like-minded"
countries and all interested internal parties. However,
Sathirathai neither addressed when the plan would be implemented
nor specified the names of the "like-minded" countries.

Foreign ministers who attended the ASEM said they would not
support a policy that would remove Myanmar from ASEAN.

Thaksin and Mahathir reportedly will discuss the Myanmar crisis
during upcoming talks on Langkawi Island in Malaysia on July 26
and 27. Thaksin also reportedly plans to meet with U.N. Envoy to
Myanmar Tan Sri Razali Ismail, who is the only outsider reported
to have met with Suu Kyi during her incarceration.

On the heals of Thaksin's high-level meeting in Malaysia is
Myanmar Foreign Minister Win Aung's scheduled visit to Bangkok
for economic talks on July 31. At this point, it still is
ambiguous whether his visit is part of the Thai peace plan, which
Sathirathai called a "road map."

Judging by the Thai foreign minister's ambitious announcement,
and the forthcoming diplomatic traffic, it appears that Thaksin
has cut a deal with Yangon -- or at least is trying his utmost to
do so. If the Thai prime minister can actually deliver what he is
offering -- Suu Kyi's release and a democratized Myanmar -- it
would be a major political victory for Thaksin, both at home and
abroad.

Thaksin fancies the retiring Mahathir's position as the chief
ideologue and voice of ASEAN. Rehabilitating Myanmar, the
multinational body's sole rogue member, would guarantee a large
amount of political capital and help Thaksin's ascension to the
coveted position.

It still remains to be seen how Mahathir -- who plans to retire
in October -- feels about Thaksin's designs. Deputy Prime
Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi is slated to take over Malaysia's
leadership, and Mahathir might be trying to position him as
regional leader as well. However, compared to Thaksin -- a self-
made billionaire and popular leader responsible for turning
around Thailand's economy in the wake of the Asian financial
crisis -- Badawi seems a less fitting candidate. Mahathir knows
this, and might decide to endorse Thaksin and help unify ASEAN --
a body he helped create -- behind a strong leader.

The Thai prime minister's campaign in Myanmar also would have
long-term domestic benefits. Thailand's western neighbor is host
to a number of rebel insurgencies and has been a source of
instability for Thailand for decades. The shared border is one of
Thailand's chief security concerns. Thaksin would like to do what
he can to pacify Myanmar and encourage economic growth both in
his neighbor and in northwestern Thailand, which suffers from its
proximity to the state. Since his election in 2001, Thaksin has
promised repeatedly to improve bilateral relations, which
remained stagnant during previous administrations. Thaksin also
might have enticed Yangon with economic aid, a gift that could be
mutually beneficial. If Myanmar's meager economy were to take a
positive upswing, there likely would be opportunities for Thai
businesses to help improve the country's paltry infrastructure.

It is conceivable that Thaksin quietly has offered some sort of
economic incentive to Yangon in exchange for Suu Kyi's release
and a minimal amount of political reform. As Myanmar's largest
consumer of its natural gas resources -- its major legitimate
source of foreign currency -- Bangkok certainly has some economic
leverage on its neighbor.

62073
Politics & Religion / We the Well-armed People
« on: July 25, 2003, 10:38:09 AM »
Walking a Thin Blue Line
*The 11-member Oregon Rangers say they help keep order in the forests. Officials don't want the armed group's assist but can't stop it.
*By Tomas Alex Tizon, Times Staff Writer


JUNCTION CITY, Ore. ? He looks just like a cop, standing there in his blue uniform, the silver badge on his chest glinting in the sunlight. There's the gun too, a .45-caliber semiautomatic pistol that he keeps holstered on a thick black belt.

Paul Ehrhardt, pausing in his driveway, identifies all the doodads on his belt: the extra bullet magazines, the pepper spray, the handcuffs ? almost everything a cop needs in the field. Only Ehrhardt isn't a cop. And neither are the 10 other members of his group, which organized a year ago and has since roused alarm among the locals.

The group ? a motley collection of gun hobbyists, volunteer firefighters, outdoorsmen and ex-military men and their wives ? calls itself the Oregon Rangers Assn. Their self-appointed mission is to help keep law and order in the forests.

Eventually they plan to recruit more members and to encourage other citizen groups around the state to start patrolling their own regions.

Never mind that no government agency officially recognizes them, that neighbors call them vigilantes. Twice a week, the rangers conduct armed patrols, usually in pairs, driving and hiking on back-country roads in the lush mountains on either side of town.

"You're either part of the solution," Ehrhardt says, as he loads his truck in preparation for a patrol, "or part of the problem."

The problem, in the words of fellow ranger Bryon Barnes, is there's "a whole lot of woods and not a whole lot of people patrolling them." The rangers say Oregon's forests are being desecrated by vandals and garbage dumpers, pot growers and poachers, and there aren't enough police to stop them.

The rangers' goal is to deter the bad guys by simply being present in the forests and, when appropriate, to report crimes and criminals to authorities. Nothing remarkable has happened in this first year, but if things should get ugly, they're prepared. The group's arsenal includes two AR-15 rifles (the civilian version of the military M-16), six pump-action shotguns and numerous hunting rifles and handguns.

"They have no authorization to be doing what they're doing," says Doug Huntington, a spokesman for the federal Bureau of Land Management, which manages most of the public land patrolled by Ehrhardt's group. "They give the impression they're law enforcement and they're not. When people arm themselves and go into the woods to enforce the law without any real authority, we can't condone it. We don't condone it."

But they can't stop it, either.

This Side of the Law

Oregon law allows people to carry firearms on public lands, and every member of the group has a concealed weapons permit and is certified to be an armed security officer. Oregon State Police investigated the rangers on suspicion of impersonating police officers but found their uniforms and badges just different enough to escape prosecution. The state police badge, for example, is a five-point star; the rangers' star has seven points.

Some wonder whether the group represents a new kind of post-9/11 militia. Unlike the militias of the late 1980s and 1990s, which were anti-government and often white-separatist in ideology, the rangers and a number of other isolated groups seem intent on making up for what they perceive as government's failure to enforce the law. These groups see themselves as aiding government.

"We have a rather comprehensive invitation to be preoccupied with patriotism and domestic security right now," says Richard Mitchell, a sociologist at Oregon State University who published a book last year on militia and survivalist groups. "It shouldn't surprise us if some people take matters into their own hands. They'll see it as a form of community service."

Typically, these groups figure out what skills and tools they have to offer and then come up with a "trouble scenario" in which they would be useful, Mitchell says.

There's also the element of trying to transcend everyday life, says James William Gibson, a militia expert at Cal State Long Beach. Being part of such a group "helps some people get out of the routines of their ordinary lives and have a modest adventure," Gibson says.

In New York last summer, a rabbi called for citizen patrols to protect Jewish neighborhoods in Brooklyn from terrorists. A group of 50, armed with handguns, shotguns and baseball bats, conducted a few patrols before protests forced its disbandment.

In Baytown, Texas, armed citizen volunteers last year took part in twice-a-week police ride-alongs to help local law enforcement. The volunteers had concealed weapons permits and took part in arrests. City officials recently banned volunteers from carrying weapons in the police cars, but the ride-alongs continue.

In Arizona, a number of citizen militias have formed near the Mexican border to help stop the flow of illegal immigrants from Latin America. The groups, under the wary eye of the U.S. Border Patrol, claim to have hundreds of members.

As with the Oregon Rangers, the stated goal for each group is not to oppose or replace law enforcement, but to be an unofficial adjunct; to be, in a phrase that Paul Ehrhardt repeats like a mantra, "part of the solution."

"They're walking a thin line," says Lane County Sheriff Jan Clements, who along with the Oregon State Police has kept a close watch on the rangers. Clements says the group so far has not crossed the line.

The Volunteers

Ehrhardt is 55, compact and raven-haired, amiable with a deferential way of talking, as if every sentence comes with an implied "sir" or "ma'am." He exudes earnestness.

"I'd rather be doing this than win the lottery!" he says.

The formal leader of the rangers, Ehrhardt twice tried to become a police officer, once with the Lane County Sheriff's Office and again with the Junction City Police Department. He changed his mind on the first and failed the agility test on the second. Now he says he's glad about not making it, because he can do his own kind of civic service "without all the paperwork."

Ehrhardt says he doesn't mind the grousing from local police. Having been a volunteer firefighter for the last 10 years, he says he's seen a lot of it. Police and fire agencies tend to be very territorial and complain about each other all the time, he says. The scrutiny on his group, he believes, is just part of that.

On this day, he's patrolling with his wife, Robin, 44, a nurse and co-founder of the group. The other members ? six men and three women ? are busy with other things. All have day jobs: There is a rancher, a hairdresser, a freelance photographer and a truck driver. Two work at a local tire shop. One works for a cellphone company. Another is in the Navy in Guam, and her husband, also a ranger, works at a scuba-diving shop. The couple in Guam manage the group's Web site and help with patrols when they're home.

The Ehrhardts make their living by running two adult foster-care homes on their seven-acre property, which is also headquarters for the Oregon Rangers Assn.

In the back of what appears to be a quaint country homestead is a gun range, which up until April was used by the rangers to hone their shooting skills. Neighbors complained to police about bullets flying through their property, and officials shut down the range as a training ground, citing zoning laws. The law, however, allows the Ehrhardts to shoot on their property, so bullets have kept flying and the neighbors have kept complaining.

"We're under siege here," says Michelle Palodichuk, who has lived on the adjacent lot for 26 years. Palodichuk calls the Ehrhardts vigilantes. Other neighbors call them worse names, and one is talking of having a neighborhood meeting to figure out what to do.

Wallace Keeler, 92, born and raised in the area, echoes the concern felt by many locals: "They're out there patrolling without any authority but acting like they have authority. Most of us here like the outdoors. What's going to happen when we run into them out there?"

The Ehrhardts, though annoyed by the complaints, say that as long as they're not breaking the law, they don't have to change.

The whole idea of the rangers started quietly enough, with just Paul and Robin Ehrhardt taking treks into the woods. Paul, an army veteran, had a zeal for guns and weaponry; Robin, with nursing and helping the sick. The couple's first date 10 years ago was at an emergency medical technician class at a local fire department.

They both caught the volunteer bug in a big way. They signed up at local fire departments. They married and became regular volunteers for the BLM and the U.S. Forest Service, clearing trails, cleaning dumps, repairing signs and equipment. In some ways, Robin Ehrhardt says, they've been patrolling the woods for the last decade.

It was during these stints that the couple saw the extent of lawlessness and lack of law enforcement in the woods. The BLM, for example, employs only two law-enforcement officers in the Lane County region.

For years, the couple talked about creating a citizens group to fill the void, and they finally did it after recruiting some like-minded friends. Like the Ehrhardts, most of the other rangers are ruralites native to the region.

Barnes, one of the original members, says he's a ranger purely "for the personal satisfaction thing." It has nothing to do with money or "getting my name in the paper," but with "making an iota of difference" in keeping the woods and mountains safe and pristine. "That's all that really matters to us," Barnes says.

'We Don't Go to Movies'

Lane County is mostly farmland and forest. It stretches from Oregon's central coast to the Cascade mountains, a space twice the size of Delaware, and 90% of it forestland. The rangers generally limit their patrols to places they can drive to in a couple of hours.

Within 15 minutes of leaving their home outside Junction City, the couple, in their silver Jeep Cherokee with its own dashboard-attached shotgun at the ready, are already deep in the woods, on an old logging road that winds like a gray ribbon between the lush, green foothills of the Coast Range.

"Paul and I, we don't go to movies," says Robin Ehrhardt. "We do this."

Along the way, Paul Ehrhardt, with a slight movement of his arm, gestures toward every passing road sign. Nearly every one has been shot up. Most mangled are the signs that read "No Discharging of Firearms."

At one point, he stops the truck and the couple listen.

"There's someone up there shooting," he says. The sound of gunfire cracks in the distant air, and for a moment, Ehrhardt considers his options, then drives away. The gunfire was coming from land owned by a timber company. He points to a small sign that says so. "If it was on public land, we would have gone up that road."

And who knows what they would have encountered. The couple brim with stories of close calls and tense encounters. There was one time, on a volunteer stint, when Robin Ehrhardt and a Forest Service worker drove into a grove where a drunken party was taking place. Most of the revelers appeared to be underage, and a large man approached their vehicle wielding a baseball bat.

"That bat was intended to hurt," Robin Ehrhardt says. She and her companion sped off before trouble started. It all happened very quickly, but she clearly remembers her fear. She says such parties, often involving teenagers, take place in the woods every weekend, and often result in some misbehavior, from littering to shooting up signs, trees and even animals.

Every few miles, the Ehrhardts point to garbage dumps, spots where somebody unloaded a truckload of refuse, everything from discarded pictures and books to refrigerators and car parts. Sometimes entire cars. The Ehrhardts groan at each sighting.

"What I'd like to do is reunite that garbage with its rightful owner," Paul Ehrhardt says while surveying one site.

Instead, the couple use their global positioning system to determine the coordinates of every new dumpsite, and then turn the information in to the BLM. This kind of pedestrian work makes up a large part of what the rangers do, they say, along with locating marijuana patches. Sometimes the patches are small plantations, with dozens of plants 10 feet high.

Looking for Trouble

At three different spots, Paul Ehrhardt climbs out of the truck and tromps deep into the forest, a forager seeking treasure, to look into several marijuana patches he found last year. As far as he knows, the growers harvested the marijuana, and he wants to see whether they have replanted. None has, but he says he'll keep checking.

The Ehrhardts say they have found eight plots of marijuana in the region, but police so far credit them with not a single case-solving lead. What worries law-enforcement officials the most is what might happen if the rangers ever run into the growers.

"Anytime you go into an area where there's drug-growing or drug labs, there's the potential for violent confrontations," says Sheriff Clements. "Those people will go to great lengths to protect their enterprise. The rangers might find themselves over their heads."

The Ehrhardts and the other rangers say they would much rather report criminals than confront them. Firearms, they say, would be used only as a last resort. But if things get ugly, they say they are capable of taking charge.

"If I'm going through a park and a guy is just beating his wife, I mean really beating her, I can't just leave," Paul Ehrhardt says. "I'm going to have to do something. I'm going to have to protect the public We don't want to use them, but if we need to, if we get into something spooky, we have the weapons at our disposal."

62074
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 25, 2003, 09:27:19 AM »
Item Number:14
Date: 07/25/2003
PHILIPPINES - ARROYO MOVES TROOPS TO MANILA (JUL 25/AFP)

AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE -- Hundreds of elite Philippine soldiers were
deployed to Manila to increase security in the capital, amid reports
of restiveness in the military.  President Gloria Arroyo said that difficulties with military had been resolved and denied the army was plotting a coup against her, reports Agence France-Presse.

"There has been some understandable restiveness, but I have resolved
this matter directly with the troops," said Arroyo.

62075
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 25, 2003, 12:18:14 AM »
PHILIPPINES
Cops Say Fugitive Bomb-Maker Still in Philippines
from Straits Times [Singapore] & AFP on Monday, July 21, 2003
MANILA -- Fugitive Indonesian bomb-maker Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi has not slipped out of the Philippines and elite tracking teams are on his heels, a police spokesman said on Monday.

National police chief Hermogenes Ebdane flew to the southern Philippines early on Monday to supervise the hunt by 5,000 men, spokesman Ricardo de Leon said.

The spokesman said police were working closely with Interpol and security authorities in the region and there appeared to be 'major developments' in the hunt.

Colonel Daniel Lucero said the military intelligence team that conducted surveillance on Al-Ghozi leading to his arrest in the commercial district of Manila in January 2002 has been recalled to help hunt him down again.

The team is familiar with Al-Ghozi and his contacts and could provide valuable assistance to the police who are searching for the Indonesian fugitive, he said.

Six police guards are facing administrative charges while four are also facing criminal charges after security at the jail was exposed as extremely lax, with guards to the easily-opened cells either absent or asleep.

Al-Ghozi was convicted last year after confessing to using part of a huge explosives cache to blow up a Manila train and other targets in December 2000, killing 22 people.

He said he planned to ship the rest to Singapore as part of a Jemaah Islamiah plot to blow up Western embassies there. -- AFP

Copyright @ 2003 Singapore Press Holdings. All rights reserved.
------------------

PHILIPPINES
Al-Ghozi's Captors Back to Square One
from Straits Times [Singapore] & AFP on Monday, July 21, 2003
MANILA - Military intelligence agents who earlier captured Jemaah Islamiah (JI) bomber Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi have been assigned to recapture him after his escape from a police jail, a spokesman said yesterday. Policemen staking out a Muslim part of Manila in their hunt for Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi. -- AP The military intelligence team that conducted surveillance on Al-Ghozi, leading to his arrest in Manila in January last year, has been recalled to hunt him down again, Colonel Daniel Lucero said.

The team is familiar with Al-Ghozi and his contacts and could provide valuable assistance to the police who are searching for the Indonesian fugitive, he added.

Al-Ghozi slipped out of the Philippine police headquarters' jail on July 14.

His escape, along with two members of the Abu Sayyaf Muslim kidnapping group, has harmed the Philippines' image as a reliable ally in the war against terror.

It has also raised questions of possible police connivance in the jailbreak.

Six police guards are facing administrative charges while four are also facing criminal charges after security at the jail was exposed as extremely lax, with guards either absent or asleep.

Al-Ghozi was convicted last year after he confessed to using part of a huge explosives cache to blow up a Manila train and other targets in December 2000, killing 22 people.

He said he planned to ship the rest to Singapore as part of a JI plot to blow up Western embassies there. -- AFP

Copyright @ 2003 Singapore Press Holdings. All rights reserved
-----------------

PHILIPPINES
Gov't Troops Foil NPA Plan to Bomb Transmitters
from Philippine Star [Manila] on Monday, July 21, 2003
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY - Military personnel of the 4th Infantry "Diamond" Division in Agusan del Norte foiled last Sunday a plan by the New People's Army (NPA) to sabotage a number of telecommunications transmitters in the province.

Major General Cristolito Balaoing, commanding general of the 4th ID, said that if the rebels succeeded in toppling the towers of the Philippine Long Distance and Telephone Co. (PLDT) and Philippine Telegraph and Telephone (PT&T), they would have succeeded in dealing a major blow to the province's telecommunications system.

Balaoing disclosed that 4th ID soldiers securing the transmitters on the Butuan City side of Mt. Mayapay engaged about 30 NPA rebels who were about to plant bombs on the various transmitters here.

Several communist rebels were killed in the engagement, the military said.

However, the wounded and the dead were carried away by their comrades in their escape, they added.

"The troops pursued the retreating rebels who were carrying with them their wounded and perhaps dead comrades and went to Barangay Olavi who then mixed with civilians," he reported. Copyright? Philstar.com, Inc. All Rights reserved
--------------

PHILIPPINES
Philippines May Find Fugitive Militant Soon-Minister
from Reuters on Wednesday, July 23, 2003
Philippine police expect results soon in the hunt for fugitive Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi -- a self-confessed member of Muslim militant group Jemaah Islamiah, Philippines Foreign Minister Blas Ople said on Wednesday.

A senior police official had said the police "expect to have results in two or three days" in the search for al-Ghozi, Ople told reporters on the sidelines of a meeting of Asian and European foreign ministers on this resort island. Al-Ghozi, an Indonesian, had been imprisoned in the Philippines for illegal possession of explosives and falsifying documents, but escaped last week with two other prisoners from a maximum security detention centre to the embarrassment of Philippine police. Al-Ghozi had been linked to actual and planned attacks on various targets in the region by Jemaah Islamiah, which has been linked to Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda network. Ople said he had told the police general on the phone he was probably being too optimistic about quickly finding al-Ghozi, but was assured there were grounds for such optimism. In an apparent reference to the criticism of the police after the escape, Ople said they had "a very strong incentive" to catch al-Ghozi. "The basis is self-preservation," Ople said. He also told reporters Indonesia had agreed to monitor its ports of entry for a possible attempt by al-Ghozi to return to his home country, and that 5,000 police were looking for him in the Philippines. "There is really no place to hide for al-Ghozi," Ople said. Copyright 2003 Reuters Limited.

62076
Politics & Religion / We the Well-armed People
« on: July 23, 2003, 09:09:53 PM »
Woof Logan:

  I think I understand your meaning.  

  What can you tell us about the Swiss approach to all of this?

Woof,
Crafty Dog

62077
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 23, 2003, 08:57:13 AM »
Geopolitical Diary: Thursday, July 24, 2003

After 82 postwar days of absorbing casualties in Iraq, the United States has inflicted two significant blows on the Iraqi resistance. Former Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein's two sons, Odai and Qusai, were confirmed killed in a six-hour raid in Mosul on July 22, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Ricardo Sanchez said at a news conference in Baghdad.

The demise of Odai and Qusai Hussein certainly will serve as a morale
booster for U.S. troops, who were unpleasantly surprised to find themselves embroiled in a guerrilla war when they expected to be bound for home following Operation Iraqi Freedom. For the troops, these deaths will serve as a light at the end of an unanticipated tunnel. They also could generate at least a temporary rebound in U.S. President George W. Bush's popularity ratings, which have fallen to their lowest levels since March.

The greater impact could be on Sunnis in Iraq -- both the resistance and the would-be U.S. collaborators.

Among their other roles in the ousted Iraqi government, Odai Hussein led the Saddam Fedayeen militia and Qusai Hussein the Special Security Organization and Republican Guard. Qusai Hussein was believed to control at least two of Iraq's intelligence services. These organizations are believed to be at the core of the Iraqi resistance. However, the degree to which the Hussein boys' deaths will directly impact the resistance remains unclear.

In spite of the deaths, the resistance will persist on the resources and
initiative of its individual operational cells -- at least for a while. But
before long, the degree to which the Hussein family controlled the
distribution of funds and coordinated guerrilla strategy will become
apparent.

The Baathist resistance in Iraq must be concerned about security. A "walk-in tip" reportedly clued the U.S. troops in on the villa in Mosul. The source might be the homeowner, who various reports say might have been Hussein's cousin. There have been other reports of betrayal within the Hussein family. Everyone from senior officers to family members to Hussein's personal bodyguards helped identify the bodies of Odai and Qusai Hussein.

Clearly, the intimidation tactics the resistance has directed at Sunni
collaborators are not working, and this, more than anything, will undermine the insurgents' continued ability to wage guerrilla war. Iraqi geography is not well-suited for a rural wasteland-based insurgency. Insurgents need to blend with the populace.

The recent captures and killings of senior Baathist commanders also could
answer these questions: How much of the Iraqi resistance comprises
unreformed Baathists and how many Jihadi volunteers does it contain? Some of Stratfor's sources say that foreign Islamist volunteers operate alongside the Baathists in Iraq. Despite the clash of ideologies, they apparently couldn't resist the opportunity to hunt American soldiers. Foreign mujahideen might be able to operate on leaner rations and draw support from outside the country, but they will stand out like sore thumbs if the Sunni community withdraws support for the resistance.

Sunnis who otherwise would cooperate with an interim government have been dissuaded by direct attacks from the resistance. They have lived in dread of a return of Hussein -- a fear the Baathists have played upon in their choice of "al Auda" (the Return) for the name of their insurgency. Until now, Hussein's return has not been unimaginable, and no one in their right mind would want to answer treason charges before the former dictator.

There now is real doubt for Hussein's future, although the resistance
undoubtedly will redouble its efforts to convince the Sunnis of al Auda.

About the only people outside the Sunni regions of Iraq who are likely to be uncomfortable with the deaths of Odai and Qusai Hussein are the leaders of Russia, China, France and Germany. It's not that they had any love for the Hussein brothers: Instead, U.S. success in Iraq will spoil what might have been a promising campaign to expand the role of the United Nations in Iraq -- at the expense of a unilateralist U.S. rule.

Leaders opposed to U.S. hegemony and unilateral action have looked on smugly as Washington's quick victory over the Iraqi military turned into a grinding guerrilla war. Stratfor's diplomatic sources say that they saw the United States as increasingly desperate over the loss of money and blood in Iraq. They took Washington's repeated and widespread requests for the deployment of international troops to Iraq as a clear sign of weakness, and with British Prime Minister Tony Blair on the ropes, they saw this as an opportune time to knock the United States back down to size.

When Washington ignored multilateral opposition and deftly dispatched the Iraqi regime, it reshaped the international system. The United States
demonstrated not only that it had the military force to achieve its goals on
its own (with a few willing allies in tow), but also that no constellation
of powers could coalesce to dissuade Washington from deploying that force. The United Nations could play cleanup, and allies could profit from the aftermath, but only at U.S. discretion.

Moscow, Beijing, Berlin and Paris are committed to rectifying the imbalance of global power, containing U.S. hegemonic action and reviving a multi-polar system with the United Nations at its core. Key to this is depriving the United States of the fruits of its conquest of Iraq, namely: 1. Use of Iraq as a strategic base from which to project power throughout the Middle East and 2. Control of Iraq's oil and the economic power it entails. Ideally, they also would like to teach the United States the folly of acting alone, but slapping Washington down would be enough to satisfy.

The U.N. Security Council meeting on July 22 was to have launched a new
phase in this campaign.

Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov told reporters before the meeting, "The situation in Iraq is continuing to deteriorate rapidly," requiring immediate action from the international community, which in turn requires a new resolution giving the U.N. a greater role in Iraq. China made a similar appeal on July 21. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan opened the council session echoing Ivanov's call for an early end to U.S. occupation of Iraq and transfer of power to an elected Iraqi government.

European Union foreign ministers issued a joint statement on July 22,
stating their willingness to participate in multilateral reconstruction
efforts in Iraq, but only under the auspices of the United Nations.

French President Jacques Chirac, accepting the inaugural Kuala Lumpur World Peace Award on July 22 for his opposition to the war against Iraq, chastised the United States for perpetuating "the law of the strongest. the law of the jungle." Chirac declared multilateralism the foundation for peace, and called the United Nations "unavoidable."

Stratfor's diplomatic sources say that representatives from Russia, China,
France and Germany, along with Annan, began the day with a plan for
adjusting relations with the United States. The core of that plan was
pushing through a U.N. resolution requiring the United States to hand over
supreme authority in Iraq first to the United Nations and then to an
Iraqi-elected government -- which they were convinced would contain none of the American "marionettes" in the current interim government.

The diplomats believed that the intensifying guerrilla war in Iraq and the
resulting billions of dollars in costs to the United States and dozens,
hundreds, or more U.S. deaths would convince Washington to accept a U.N. bailout -- and leash.

Moreover, Blair's political duress might be enough to cause him to break
ranks with the United States, further weakening Washington's position.

The Indian government, also holding out on providing military support to the United States in Iraq for lack of a U.N. mandate, announced July 22 that the preceding night, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell had said Washington is examining the possibility of a new U.N. resolution for an expanded U.N. role in Iraq. The suggestion seemed to validate the multilateralists' hopes and plans.

Certainly they expected the United States either to: 1. Try to craft the new resolution in such a way that it handed the burden to U.N. troops while retaining Washington's autonomy and authority in Iraq, 2. Reject a stronger resolution or 3. Accept a stronger resolution, but twist or ignore it in practice.

The UNSC planned to veto the first, wait for the Iraqi quagmire to change
Washington's mind on the second and address the third through careful
crafting of the resolution and management of its implementation.

These plans all might have met their fate with the Hussein brothers in Mosul today. All calculations were based on the belief that Washington was nearing desperation with the situation in Iraq and would make any deal to extricate itself from the quagmire -- a questionable belief, but one firmly held nonetheless. They also were premised on the belief that the Iraqi people would assent to U.N. leadership much more easily than to U.S. occupation -- again, a questionable proposition, and one unlikely to be tested now.

The deaths of Odai and Qusai Hussein will stiffen the U.S. resolve in Iraq
and could weaken the Iraqi resistance as well. In the end, there could be a new U.N. resolution -- and a greater U.N. role in Iraq -- but it will come
on U.S. terms.

62078
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 22, 2003, 06:27:13 AM »
Philippine police on Monday intercepted a container truck loaded with six
tons of sodium nitrate explosives. The explosives are believed to be part of a plan to attack targets in Manila and other urban areas in the country. The Philippine government recently signed a cease-fire agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, a Muslim separatist group from Mindanao, ahead of peace talks. Though this is more likely the work of the al Qaeda-aligned Abu Sayyaf group, a campaign of bombings by Muslim extremists throughout the Philippines would do nothing to advance peace talks with the MILF.

62079
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 21, 2003, 10:27:38 PM »
www.stratfor.com maintains its standards of thoughtful analyis-- Crafty

----------------------------
Please feel free to send the Stratfor Weekly to a friend
or colleague.

THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
21 July 2003
 
by Dr. George Friedman

U.S. Strategy: Perception vs. Deception

Summary

The Bush administration's continued unwillingness to enunciate a coherent picture of the strategy behind the war against al Qaeda -- which explains the war in Iraq -- could produce a dangerous domino effect. Lurking in the shadows is the not fully articulated perception that the Iraq war not only began in deception but that planning for the Iraq war was incompetent -- a perception driven by the realization that the United States is engaged in a long-term occupation and guerrilla war in Iraq, and the belief that the United States neither expected nor was prepared for this. Ultimately, this perception could erode Bush's support base, cost him the presidency and, most seriously, lead to defeat in the war against al Qaeda.

Analysis

We keep waiting for the moment when Iraq does not constitute the major global event of the week. We clearly are not there yet. In Iraq, the reality is fairly stable. The major offensive by the guerrillas forecast by both U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld and what seemed to be a spokesman for al Qaeda last weekend did not materialize. The guerrillas tried to shoot down a C-130 coming into Baghdad International Airport, and that was a significant escalation, but they missed -- and it was only a single act. Casualties continue to mount, but with the dead
averaging at just more than 10 per week, it has not come close to reaching a decisive level.

The deterioration of support in Washington and London is not yet decisive. Support for U.S. President George W. Bush sank from a percentage in the high 70s in the wake of the war, to just more than 50 percent in the past 10 days. But as we read the successive polls, the slump that hit when the WMD issue came to the fore -- along with the realization that the United States was dealing with a guerrilla movement -- has not accelerated. It slumped and held. Meanwhile, London headlines have focused on the apparent suicide of weapons expert David Kelly, the probable
source for a BBC story about British Prime Minister Tony Blair's manipulation of intelligence data. It is unclear whether these reports have had an impact on public opinion.

However, the current issue is not public opinion. Lurking behind this issue is the not fully articulated perception that the Iraq war not only began in deception but that planning for the Iraq war was incompetent -- a perception driven by the realization that the United States is engaged in a long-term occupation and guerrilla war in Iraq, and the belief that the United States in particular was neither expecting nor prepared for this.

A cartoon republished in the New York Times News of the Week section by Mike Smith of the Las Vegas Sun sums up this perception. A general, holding a paper titled "Guerrilla War In Iraq," says to a table full of generals, "We need to switch to Plan B." Another general responds, "There was a Plan A?" The media loves the trivial and can't grasp the significant. If the United States fabricated evidence about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as critics are claiming, the question is not whether it did so. The question is: Why did it do so? In other words, why was invading Iraq important enough to lie about -- if indeed it was a lie, which is far from clear. The emerging perception is that there was no Plan A and there is no Plan B -- that the decision to invade was arbitrary and that the lying was therefore gratuitous.

In other words, the Bush administration has a four-part public relations problem:

1. The perception that it lied about weapons of mass destruction
2. The perception that it had no strategic reason for invading
Iraq
3. The perception that it was unprepared for the guerrilla war
4. The perception that it is at a loss for what to do next

As we argued last week, lying in foreign policy does not bother the American public. From Woodrow Wilson's "too proud to fight" slogan in the 1916 presidential campaign, to Franklin D. Roosevelt's war planning with the British while publicly denying such plans, to John F. Kennedy claiming that the United States had nothing to do with the Bay of Pigs, what bothers the American public is the idea that the lying is not designed to hide the strategy, but to hide the fact that there is no strategy.

The media are clever. The public is smart. The media have the ability to generate intellectual mayhem within Washington. What should be troubling for Bush is that, as we review the local papers this past weekend, the deepest concern creeping into letters to the editor is that there is no underlying strategy, no point to it -- and no exit. Bush clearly retains a massive support base that is not, as we have said, continuing to erode. The media's fixation on "what did he know and when did he know it" will not erode it by itself, but the administration's continued unwillingness to reveal a strategy behind the war on al Qaeda likely will.

The core problem the United States has had in enunciating a
strategy rests on this: Since Sept. 11, 2001, al Qaeda has not carried out a strategic operation. It has carried out a series of tactical operations -- Bali, Mombassa, Riyadh, Casablanca and so on -- but it has not struck again at the United States in an operation of the magnitude of Sept. 11. The operations outside the United States are not, by themselves, sufficient to justify the global war the United States is waging. Preventing another Sept. 11 is worth the effort. However, as time passes, the perception -- if not the reality -- grows that Sept. 11 was al Qaeda's best and only shot at the United States. If that is true, then the level of effort we have seen on a global basis -- including the invasion of Iraq and certainly the continued occupation of Iraq in the face of insurrection -- simply isn't worth it. Or put differently, the United States is fighting an illusion and exhausting resources in the process.

The mere assertion of the threat will work if Bush and his
advisers have a pristine record of honesty with the public. At
the point where the public has reason to doubt the word of the president on anything concerning the war, it will affect his
ability to be authoritative on anything concerning the war.
Moreover, the president's basis for information on al Qaeda's
intentions and capabilities rests with confidence in the quality
of intelligence he is getting. The current crisis over who failed
to identify the forgery is trivial. However, it melds into two
other serious intelligence crises. First, did the intelligence
community fail in its analysis of Iraqi WMD? Second, and more serious in our view, did the intelligence community fail to understand former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's war plan and, therefore, fail to understand that the fall of Baghdad was not the end of the war but the beginning of the guerrilla phase?

Reasonable arguments can be made to justify each of these
failures. However, at the end of the day, if the CIA did not know about the forgery, did not understand the WMD situation in Iraq and did not anticipate the guerrilla war, then why should the public believe it regarding the on-going threat of al Qaeda? Pushing the argument further, if the intelligence community did in fact know about each of these things and the president chose to ignore them, then why should the public believe Bush when he talks about al Qaeda?

Bush cannot afford a crisis in the intelligence community or in
the public perception of his use of intelligence. More than any
of the other world wars in which the United States has
participated, this is an intelligence war. Al Qaeda does not have a geographical locus. It does not have a clean organizational chart. It is as much an idea as an organization. Everything that followed Sept. 11 has depended on the public's confidence in its intelligence community. If that confidence is destroyed, then everything else said about al Qaeda -- including that it is an ongoing threat that justifies a global war -- becomes subject to
debate.

If the CIA cannot be trusted, then the president can't be
trusted. If the president can't be trusted, then the urgency of
the war cannot be trusted. If the urgency of the war can't be
trusted, then the massive exertion being demanded of the U.S. military and public cannot be justified. Thus, having CIA
Director George Tenet fall on his sword and accept responsibility for the 16 words in the President's speech might make a lot of sense inside the beltway, but it is an act of breathtaking recklessness in the rest of the country. Even if he were responsible -- which we regard as pretty dubious --the White House does not seem to understand that desstroying the credibility of the CIA is the same thing as destroying the war effort. The entire war effort is based on the public's trust of the CIA's portrayal of the ongoing threat from al Qaeda. If the CIA isn't to be trusted, why should anyone believe that al Qaeda is a threat?

This self-destructive behavior by the Bush administration is not at all confined to undermining the credibility of the CIA.
Rumsfeld's incomprehensible behavior regarding the guerrilla war in Iraq was another axis of self-destruction. Back in May, any reasonable observer of the situation in Iraq -- including Stratfor -- saw that there was an organized guerrilla war under way. However, Rumsfeld, as late as June 30, not only continued to deny the obvious, but actually hurled contempt at anyone who said it was a guerrilla war. Rumsfeld's obstinate refusal to acknowledge what was obvious to everyone was the sort of behavior designed to undermine confidence in U.S. strategy by both the public and the troops in the field. Rumsfeld kept arguing that this was not Vietnam, which was certainly true, except in the sense that Rumsfeld was behaving like Robert McNamara. As in Vietnam -- and this is the only comparison there is between it and Iraq -- the behavior of the leadership made even supporters of the war and the troops in the field feel that there was no strategy.

Napoleon once said, "In battle, the morale is to the material as 2 is to 1." Maintaining the morale of one's forces depends on maintaining confidence in the military and political commanders. When forces are killing U.S. troops -- forces that the defense secretary dismisses -- the only conclusion the troops can draw is that either they are not very good soldiers, since they can't stop them, or that the defense secretary has taken leave of his senses. Either way, it undermines morale, increasing the need for the material. It is militarily inefficient to tell self-evident lies to troops.

Similarly, the United States is fighting a war against a barely visible force that cannot be seen by the naked eye, but only by the esoteric tools of the intelligence community. Making the head of that community appear to be a liar or a fool might make good sense in Washington, but it undermines trust in the one institution in which trust is essential if the war is to be prosecuted. It is not casualties that undermine public morale. It is the reasonable belief that if the CIA is incompetent, then neither the justification for the war nor the strategy driving the war can be trusted.

Bush has created a crisis. It is far from a fatal crisis, but it is a crisis that requires a radical readjustment in approach. The public explanation of the war and the reality of the war must come into alignment. Stratfor has extensively chronicled the underlying strategy of the war, and we will not repeat it here. That strategy has never been enunciated publicly. The connection between the war against al Qaeda, the Iraq campaign and future actions throughout the world never has been laid out in a conceptual framework. This is a complex war. It does not reduce itself to the simple dictum of Desert Storm enunciated by Secretary of State Colin Powell: First we will cut off the enemy, then we will surround the enemy, then we will kill the enemy. That was a good line and truly reflected the solution.

This war does not reduce to one-liners. However, there is a threat and there is a strategy. WMD make wonderful one-liners and they are not altogether irrelevant. But that is not what the war against Iraq was about, it is not the reason for fighting a guerrilla war and it is certainly only part of the broader war. The most dangerous thing Bush can do from his standpoint is to continue to play a bad hand rather than endure the pain of having to throw it in and reshuffle the deck. However, it will be easier to explain the real force driving U.S. strategy than to allow his presidency to degenerate into an argument of who forged a letter and whether he knew it.

The basic strategy behind a war always has been publicly
discussed. In World War II, after Dec. 7 and the German
declaration of war, the basic outlines of the war plan were
widely discussed in the media -- in spite of censorship. Everyone knew the Germany First strategy, the goal of landing in France at some point, the purpose of the bombing campaign, the nature of island hopping. No one expected to know the landing site in France or the next island to be invaded in the Pacific, but everyone understood the core strategy.

This is a much more complex war. That increases -- not decreases -- the need for strategic clarity among the public and the troops. The United States is not randomly in Iraq, and it is not there because Hussein was a butcher or because he might have had WMD. Those are good reasons, but not the real reason. The United States is in Iraq to force Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran to change their behavior toward al Qaeda and other Islamist groups. The United States already has overwhelmed the Saudis and is engaged in threatening Syria and Iran. This is visible to everyone who is watching. That is why the United States is in Iraq. It might or might not be good strategy, but it is a strategy that is much better than no strategy at all.

Admitting this undoubtedly will create a frenzy in the media
concerning the change in explanation. But there will be nothing to chew on, and the explanation will be too complex for the media to understand anyway. They will move on to the next juicy murder, leaving foreign policy to the government and the public. We suspect that before this is over, both Tenet and Rumsfeld will have to go, but that matters more to them than to the republic, which will endure their departure with its usual equanimity. Alternatively, Bush will continue to allow the battle to be fought over the question of "what did he know and when did he know it," which is a battle he cannot win. Bush has a strategic decision to make. He must align strategy with public perception or have his presidency ripped apart.
...................................................................

62080
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 21, 2003, 09:09:55 AM »
www.stratfor.com

Geopolitical Diary: Monday, July 21, 2003

Four U.S. soldiers were killed in action over the weekend -- including two
members of the 101st Airborne Division who were killed in an ambush west of Mosul that left another soldier injured. Sunday's ambush occurred near Tall Afar. The interesting thing about these attacks is that both took place outside the "Sunni Triangle" north and west of Baghdad, where attacks have been focused. The guerrillas appear to be expanding their operations deliberately, trying to unnerve U.S. troops and force their commanders to expand the combat arena -- and thereby stretch their resources even more. What is unclear is whether these were special operations at long distances by the Iraqis, or whether they indicated a sustained move into these regions -- and the answers to these questions will be critical.

U.S. officials have decided to raise an Iraqi army, designated as an Iraqi
"civil defense corps." Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, said the
force "will be made up of Iraqis who will be under American military command to help us basically with the armed part of the work we're doing." If they do nothing but help interpret both language and culture to the American troops, they will be beneficial. If they are not expected to engage in combat operations on their own, they can be spun up fairly rapidly."

The corps poses two challenges. The first is finding anyone willing to serve in it. There will be two classes of people volunteering: One class consists of criminals and down-and-outers who see a chance to come out on top in the new Iraqi order, with not much to lose if it fails; then there will be the people that Bremer wants: people rooted in the community with families -- people who in addition to serving in the force can also influence their communities. This is not an impossible idea by any means, but it does depend on one thing: being able to protect their families. The men will be safer on patrol with U.S. forces, but their families will not. If the United States can't protect them, the whole project fails. And protecting the families of troops always has been one of the nightmares of guerrilla warfare.

The second problem will be security. This force will be a treasure trove of
intelligence for the Baathists. If we were Baath commanders, our men would be standing in line to join up. Getting close up and personal with U.S. troops would provide tactical and operational intelligence. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong made it a point to place people in the Army of Vietnam (ARVN) slots where liaison with the Americans was heavy. It is unclear how you do a background check in Iraq, and we'd love to see the polygraphs. Keeping the force clean is going to be a nightmare -- that is, if Bremer plans to put up recruitment posters all over the country to create a force that "looks like Iraq," in former U.S. President Bill Clinton's old phrase. If, on the other hand, the bulk of the forces are to be raised from the Shiite regions -- where deals are being made -- and from the Kurdish regions, the security concerns might be less. Of course, the Kurds will engage in smuggling and the Shiites will report to Tehran, but they will be motivated to stop the Baath guerrillas, which is the item on the agenda.

If this is the case, then what is happening is that the United States will
recruit non-Sunni forces to share the burden of occupying the Sunni regions. As we have argued in the past, this is the only way to do it. It does not create a pro-American faction inside the Sunni regions, but it does increase the force available to engage and defeat the Baathists. Both the Kurds and Shiites have the interest to carry out the mission, but both will have to be induced to do so with political arrangements. In the case of the Shiites, those arrangements will be costly.

Since the idea of a general recruitment from the population strikes us as
self-defeating, we suspect that this proposal is the cover for the creation
of a combined U.S.-Shiite force for occupying Sunni areas. Whether we are right in this will be visible when the recruitment starts. Pay no attention to the first media reports on this, which will be staged carefully to show the diversity and motivation of the force. After the cameras leave, we will take a careful look at the force and see how many of their families live in the "Sunni Triangle."

62081
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 18, 2003, 06:22:52 AM »
1153 GMT - PHILIPPINES - Following an earlier announcement about plans for peace talks, government officials say Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) have signed a cease-fire, and that a new round of peace talks could begin as soon as July 21. Meanwhile, observers from Malaysia are expected to travel to Mindanao to make sure that the MILF, a separatist group seeking a Muslim homeland, abides by the cease-fire, the BBC reports
-----------------
1112 GMT - PHILIPPINES - Manila plans to halt military action against the
separatist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and has suspended arrest
warrants for some of the group's leaders in efforts to clear the way for
peace talks, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo announced July 18. MILF
Chairman Hashim Salamat and eight other militants will receive safe conduct passes, allowing them to travel to Malaysia for the next round of peace talks. Malaysia, where the next round of peace talks is to be held. No date was given for the talks, but reports indicated they could resume within days.

62082
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 17, 2003, 07:02:21 AM »
www.Strafor.com

Geopolitical Diary: Thursday, July 17, 2003

Gen. John Abizaid, commander of U.S. Central Command, said July 16 that the United States is facing "what I would describe as a classical guerrilla-type campaign against us. It's a low-intensity conflict in our doctrinal terms, but it's war however you describe it." He also said, "We're seeing a cellular organization of six to eight people armed with (rocket-propelled grenades), machine guns, etc., attacking us at some times and places of their choosing, and other times we attack them at times and places of our choosing."

This statement is an extremely significant event. Washington has been in a state of denial as to what is happening in Iraq, with U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld leading the charge to pretend that the obvious wasn't happening. Even if he knew privately what was going on --which we certainly would expect -- the public presentation reminded us of Baghdad Bob in his heyday. That, coupled with the obsession about forged letters and WMD, created a sense both at home and among troops in Iraq that the National Command Authority had lost track of reality in Iraq. Abizaid's statement tells us two things: First, he intends to wage a military campaign in Iraq, and second, he will define the reality in Iraq regardless of what the situation is in Washington.

This comes at a critical moment. U.S. newspapers were filled with reports on Wednesday of declining U.S. morale in Iraq. The decisions to delay the
return of forces to the United States obviously hit hard, as can be
imagined. The letdown from having been told that the war was won -- only to discover that it is just beginning -- also hit. But nothing frightens a
soldier more than the sense that the situation is out of control, no one is
in charge and no plans for waging war are in place. For more than two
months, U.S. forces have been involved in a guerrilla war with daily action, only to have Rumsfeld trivialize the problem -- that has to hurt.

How serious the war has become was driven home Wednesday when a
surface-to-air missile was fired at a C-130 near Baghdad International
Airport. It is not surprising that the guerrillas have surface-to-air
missiles; they had access to all weapons in the Iraqi arsenal, and weapons obviously were stored in anticipation of the war. C-130 pilots had been practicing evasion techniques for a while, executing maneuvers on approach and takeoff and occasionally dispensing flares designed to confuse infrared-guided missiles. Abizaid commented that a C-130 on which he was a passenger had executed such maneuvers. Obviously, commanders in Iraq are aware of the potential threats.

On the other hand, the attack failed. Indeed, the day of violence that was
predicted for July 16 did not occur -- or more precisely, the level of
violence did not rise above what has become normal, save for the attempt to bring down the plane. The questions raised by the C-130 incident are these: How many more missiles are in the Baathist arsenal, what other weapons are there, and how secure are the arms caches?

In the end, Abizaid's concession that there is a war on leads to the
question: What is the war plan? As we have noted in the past, suppressing
guerrilla forces with conventional forces is not an easy task. The
guerrillas clearly are embedded in the Sunni population. They are not
operating in isolated areas covered by terrain. This is urban and near-urban guerrilla warfare, reminiscent of the Battle of Algiers in the 1950s. It should be noted that the French won that battle, suppressing insurgent
forces in the city. They won through intense ruthlessness, coupled with a
large, friendly French population and an Arab population that was divided.
The French knew the city and had allies. It should be noted that in the end, they lost the war -- but they did win that battle.

The key problems in Iraq are that the United States does not have a large
American population on the ground, the troops don't know the terrain very well and, at the moment, U.S. allies among the Sunni community are few and under heavy American guard. Abizaid's strategy is not yet clear. Flailing away in search-and-seize missions based on poor intelligence is hardly the solution. Good intelligence is the solution, and that requires allies on the ground -- either to provide intelligence or to bear the burden of fighting or both.

Here is the problem now: Guerrilla war is political war, and it is not clear
that CINCENT (as we still call him) has the authority to make political
decisions, concerning alliances and so on. That seems to be in the hands of Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, and it is not clear how much strategic authority he has. This leads us to recall Saigon, where the
ambassador sometimes had one policy, the military another and the CIA a third -- it sort of didn't work. Unified command in a guerrilla war requires more than just military authority. Either Abizaid and Bremer have to be joined at the hip, or one of them has to have undisputed command authority. Right now, the issue is how much authority either of the leaders has to make the radical decisions that will be needed to fight a guerrilla war.

62083
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 17, 2003, 06:56:50 AM »
1148 GMT - PHILIPPINES - The United States has renewed its warning over terrorist threats in the Philippines after three Islamist militants -
including Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi, an alleged Jemaah Islamiyah bomb-maker -- escaped from jail in Quezon City on July 14. "The terrorist threat to Americans in the Philippines for kidnapping and bombings remains high, and the embassy (in Manila) continues to receive reports of ongoing activities by known terrorist groups," State Department officials said in a statement. Due to bomb-related incidents in Manila, U.S. citizens should avoid crowded public places such as nightclubs and bars and be especially alert while in other public places, like shopping malls or buses, the warning said.

62084
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 17, 2003, 12:05:10 AM »
Today's Featured Analysis

Iraqi Governing Council: A Window of Opportunity for the U.S.?

Summary

The United States has always clearly opposed the possibility of a
theocratic state in postwar Iraq. Now the U.S. administration has
crafted a new 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, which includes
seven Islamists. It appears Washington is trying to craft an
Islamic democracy that could be used as a future model for the
Arab Middle East and possibly for the larger Muslim world.

Analysis

The United States has brought together Iraq's various political
forces -- with the exception of the Baath Party -- under the
banner of the new 25-member Iraqi Governing Council. The U.S.
interim administration crafted the body, which involves 25
individuals who are representative of most of the country's
various religious and ethnic groups.

The council's composition suggests that the United States is
trying to strike a balance between imposing a Western-style
democracy and thwarting the emergence of an Iranian-style
theocratic state in Iraq. If the U.S. administrators pull it off,
it could result in the emergence of an Islamic democracy that
could be used as a model for future governments in the region. It
will require careful calibration, however, to move from theory to
reality.

The ethnic, ideological and religious mix in the IGC highlights
the diversity that is the hallmark of Iraq, a nation-state
created by Britain 1921, following the collapse of the Ottoman
Empire.

The IGC has 25 members, but a few of them warrant individual
mention. Prominent among this group is Ahmed Chalabi, of the
Pentagon-supported Iraqi National Congress. There are familiar
faces also from Iraq's Kurdish groups: Massoud Barzani of the
Kurdistan Democratic Party; Jalal Talabani of the Patriotic Union
of Kurdistan; Salaheddine Bahaaeddin, leader of the Kurdistan
Islamic Union; and Mahmoud Othman, founder and leader of the
Kurdish Socialist Party. Hamid Majid Mousa represents the Iraqi
Communist Party; he has been its secretary since 1993.

Two members from the Shia Islamist Dawa Party also are among the
group: Dawa leader Ezzedine Salim and spokesman Ibrahim al-
Jaafari. Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi represents Iraqi
Hezbollah.

Mohammed Bahr al-Ulloum, widely regarded as a liberal Shia, is
the only cleric on the council. Mohsen Abdel Hamid, secretary-
general of the Iraqi Muslim Brotherhood, represents Sunnis.
Abdel-Karim Mahoud al-Mohammedawi represents Iraqi Hezbollah.

In a sense, the U.S. administration has retained a member of the
old regime: Aquila al-Hashimi, a woman, was a Foreign Ministry
official and diplomat under Saddam Hussein. There are two other
women on the council: Raja Habib al-Khuzaai, a southern tribal
Shia leader; and Sondul Chapouk, representing the Turkmen
minority.

Iran also appears to have a say in the council. Abdel-Aziz al-
Hakim is the brother of Iranian-backed SCIRI leader Ayatollah
Mohammad Baqr al-Hakim. In all, 13 of the 25 members are Shia
Arabs -- which likely is an acknowledgement of Iraq's Shia
majority. The council also has five Sunni Arabs, five Sunni
Kurds, one Christian Arab and one Turkman.

The presence of seven Islamists on the council is consistent with
U.S. President George W. Bush's stated desire for the
establishment of an "Islamic democracy" in Iraq. Likely toward
this end, Bush appointed New York University law professor Noah
Feldman to head the committee and oversee the drafting of Iraq's
new constitution. Feldman has a doctorate in Islamic thought from
Oxford and wrote After Jihad: America and the Struggle for an
Islamic Democracy, published in 2003.

Following mounting resistance from militant Islamic clerics and
Arab nationalists -- and the ever-present threat of Iranian
interference -- Bush said April 24 that he was determined to see
an "Islamic democracy" built in Iraq. In other words, this was
the compromise the United States was willing to make in order to
avoid being seen as disregarding the Islamic sensibilities of the
Iraqi people, some of whom openly have called for an Islamic
state. The Bush administration's goal is for the government in
Baghdad not to threaten U.S. interests, nor to facilitate any
non-state actors who would wish to do so. Washington apparently
views the establishment of an Islamic democracy in Iraq as a
potential way of ensuring these goals.

The problem is that neither the United States nor the Iraqi
people have a model of Islamic democracy to emulate. Turkey and
Iran perhaps could be categorized as Islamic democracies-in-the-
making, but they won't get there anytime soon. Both appear to be
slowly moving toward some form of Islamic democracy -- albeit
from opposite directions.

If the task at hand in Iraq is to be accomplished, it will
require careful calibration on Washington's part. For the U.S.
administration, it will be important to show support for the
project without inadvertently discrediting ICG members,
especially the moderate Islamists, in the eyes of their domestic
audience. If the masses view the council as being a group of U.S.
lackeys, it will quickly lose the respect of the Iraqis, not to
mention the entire Arab world.

However, if the United States is able to strike this delicate
balance, it could have far-reaching consequences in terms of
redeeming the U.S. image in the Muslim world. An Islamic
democracy in Iraq might even be able to help stem the tide of
radical and militant forms of Islam.

Stratfor has argued that the war against Iraq was only part of a
campaign in the larger war on terrorism. The United States has
tried to avoid associating the war on terrorism with Islam, but
these efforts have proved futile. Recent Gallup, Pew Trust and
other polls suggest that an overwhelming majority of Muslims do
not trust U.S. foreign policy when it comes to their part of the
world.

In the case of Iraq, there is a widespread impression that the
United States effected regime change in order to secure its
energy interests. The new Iraqi council provides a window of
opportunity for the United States to practice damage control by
trying to transfer power to an elected Iraqi government -- but
that requires security. Daily attacks on U.S. forces offset the
possibility of a quick transfer of power.

The IGC is bound to face a crisis of legitimacy, since it is a
U.S.-appointed, not elected, body. In a sense, there is a window
of opportunity here for Washington to make great strides in its
broader war. A successful Islamic democracy in Iraq not only
would stabilize that country, but eventually could break support
for militant Islam on a global scale, and perhaps pave the way
for democratization in the greater Islamic world. This, however,
will acquire a great deal of effort and statesmanship from the
Bush administration.

62085
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 16, 2003, 04:00:35 PM »
Widespread Repercussions of Philippine Prison Break
Jul 16, 2003

Summary

The escape of a high-ranking Jamaah Islamiyah militant, Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, from a Philippine prison is an embarrassment for Manila and could contribute significantly to the operational capabilities of his organization. In addition, where the fugitive runs could have serious repercussions for negotiations between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.

Analysis

The escape of Fathur Rohman Al-Ghozi, the highest-ranking Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) militant to be captured in the Philippines, represents an embarrassment and long-term threat to Manila. Al-Ghozi, who is suspected of links with al Qaeda, and two Abu Sayyaf rebels escaped July 14 from the Philippine Intelligence Command building at Camp Crame in Quezon City.

Although the breakout presents no immediate security threat, if Al-Ghozi is not recaptured and returns to JI, his explosives expertise and other skills likely will increase the operational capabilities of JI and its affiliated groups. One of those groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), could face repercussions in negotiations for peace talks with Manila, and its members likely will be split on how to handle the fugitive if he flees to Mindanao.

Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo's administration has been humiliated by the escape. To add insult to injury, the escape occurred while Australian Prime Minister John Howard was in Manila to discuss counterterrorism measures with Arroyo. The incident severely undermines the confidence of Canberra and Washington for their ally in the war against international Islamic militant groups and damages Arroyo's image in the run-up to the country's 2004 presidential elections.

Although the government has beefed up security in Manila since the breakout, Al-Ghozi's escape will not cause a sharp deterioration in Philippine security in the near term. Al-Ghozi is more likely to be seeking sanctuary and to re-establish contact with his organization than to be plotting an attack within the country.

In the long run, however, Al-Ghozi poses a considerable threat to Manila and the rest of the region. He was arrested in January 2002 for possessing illegal explosives and, while in custody, reportedly admitted to involvement in the December 2000 bombing of a suburban train in Manila that killed 22 people and injured more than 120. Al-Ghozi also allegedly served as a demolitions expert and explosives trainer with the MILF. His technical and leadership skills could enhance JI's operational capabilities -- the group has not executed a significant attack since the Bali bombing in October 2002.

Al-Ghozi's MILF connection presents a delicate situation in the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. Logic would suggest that Al-Ghozi would flee to Mindanao, where he could find sanctuary in the jungle either with the MILF or the Abu Sayyaf insurgencies.

However, the MILF is in the process of fragile negotiations with Manila, which may or may not lead to peace talks in Malaysia, and Al-Ghozi?s connection to the group could hurt its chances for political gains. The MILF has offered to help the government in the manhunt for Al-Ghozi and the two rebels who escaped with him. It is hard to take the MILF offer at face value; most of its members would be seriously tempted to look the other way as the fugitive traveled through their territory. However, MILF leadership might be seriously tempted to turn in Al-Ghozi -- whose reputation and high profile would make him persona non grata in their eyes. Such a move would support the rebels? claims that they are merely an indigenous separatist movement with legitimate complaints against the government in Manila and not linked with JI, a suspected extension of al Qaeda. Despite the contradiction within the MILF, Al-Ghozi probably will be granted safe passage through the region.

With limited options in the Philippines, Al-Ghozi is likely to end up in Indonesia, where a weak security infrastructure and his relative anonymity would make it easier for him to travel.

62087
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 14, 2003, 11:25:27 PM »
WMD, Blame and Real Danger
Jul 14, 2003

Summary

The crisis du jour in Washington is a revelation that President George W. Bush quoted from a forged letter about Iraq trying to buy uranium from Niger in his State of the Union address. Congress, as usual, is missing the point. Weapons of mass destruction were not the primary reason Bush went to war in Iraq, but he certainly thought they were there. Everyone thought they were there. The critical issue is: Where are Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons today? What the CIA did with the Niger letter is of no real importance. What the CIA knows and doesn't know about the current war in Iraq and whether guerrillas control chemical or biological weapons is the critical issue that everyone is avoiding.

Analysis

The United States -- or at least Washington -- has come down with a full-blown case of the WMD flu. The trigger was the White House admission that President George W. Bush quoted intelligence in his State of the Union message that was based upon a forged document. During the speech, Bush claimed British and U.S. intelligence had information that Iraq had tried to purchase uranium from Niger. The document upon which the statement was based later was found to be a forgery.

On July 10, the White House -- via National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice -- blamed the incident on the CIA. The agency had vetted and approved Bush's speech and had failed to detect the forgery in time. CIA Director George Tenet fell on his sword on July 11, accepting full responsibility. The Democrats in Congress smelled blood and demanded a full investigation. Sen. John McCain (R.-Ariz.) came out in favor of hearings, so they are likely to commence -- at least in the Senate. What their outcome will be, and whether they achieve anything, is another matter.

The issue here is not whether the CIA made a mistake about a document. Stratfor sorts through mounds of information every day trying to distinguish the real from the bogus; mistakes are inevitable. To avoid a major mishap, an intelligence organization must measure each piece of evidence against a net assessment. We derive our net assessment from a huge volume of information and inference that allows us to make a judgment based upon the weight of a large sample of evidence -- a judgment in which no single piece of information is decisive.

In the case of the Niger intelligence, the issue is not whether the CIA screwed up in its analysis of a single document, but whether its net assessment of Iraq was correct. If the net assessment was incorrect, then it is important to discover why the mistake occurred.

The first question is whether the CIA's net assessment included a determination that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction -- defined as chemical, biological and/or nuclear weapons. The second question is how the CIA came to this conclusion. If it determined that Iraq had WMD (and this is now a question), then the issue is how the agency reached that conclusion. Whether right or wrong is less important than whether the conclusion was based on a sound intelligence process -- a sound intelligence process can still make mistakes. Another possibility is that the White House or Defense Department pressured the CIA to certify that Iraq had WMD in order to justify the war.

Here is the first real set of issues. First and foremost: Did the Bush administration go to war with Iraq because it feared Iraqi WMD, or did it go to war with Iraq for other reasons and use the WMD argument as public justification? This issue must frame the debate over WMD and U.S. intelligence. Stratfor's view, since early 2002, has been that the primary motivation for invading Iraq had nothing to do with WMD. Even if Iraq had had no weapons at all, the United States still would have invaded because of the country's strategic position and for psychological reasons. For reference, please see The Iraq Obsession and Iraq: Is Peace an Option?

The U.S. administration chose not to express its true reasons for going to war, believing such an admission would have undermined the effectiveness of the strategy in the Islamic world. Saying that the United States was going to attack Iraq in order to intimidate other countries that were permitting al Qaeda to use their territory would have made it difficult for some countries, such as Saudi Arabia, to change their policies. Since it was not possible to conduct one public diplomacy campaign in the Middle East, another in the United States and yet another in Europe, the administration chose a public justification for the war that did not represent the real reasons, but that was expected to be plausible, persuasive and -- above all else -- true.

This is the key. The Bush administration did not go into Iraq because of WMD. To the extent that U.S. officials said that was the primary reason, they were lying. However, they fully believed that there were WMD in Iraq, which is why using that as justification was so seductive. It was not simply the CIA's view that Iraq had at least chemical weapons. Almost all other intelligence agencies -- including French and Russian -- that dealt with the matter also believed it was true. There was a net assessment within the global intelligence community that Hussein had chemical weapons and would have liked to develop nuclear weapons. This net assessment was not based upon any one document. It was based, among other things, on some very public information:



There is no doubt that Iraq had chemical weapons in the past: Hussein used them on Iraqi citizens. If he did not destroy his stockpile, then he still had them. At the very least, Hussein's scientists knew how to make WMD and had the necessary facilities.


Israel destroyed an Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981 because it said it was close to developing nuclear weapons. Iraq had made a large investment in nuclear technology. Surely Hussein did not simply drop it after 1981.


Several Iraqi scientists were known to be working on biological weapons. Hussein controlled and protected these scientists as though they were extremely valuable to the Iraqi regime.

The global net assessment was that Iraq had chemical weapons and could create biological weapons if motivated to do so, and had a program for developing nuclear weapons but wasn't there yet. This net assessment was non-speculative. It wasn't even based on secret intelligence. It simply assumed that the Iraqi regime had not destroyed the weapons it had. If that was true, then Hussein had chemical weapons at least.

Hussein's behavior from the beginning of the inspection process supported this net assessment. If he did not have weapons of mass destruction, then he would have had no reason to act as he did. For example, he would have had no reason to forbid his scientists from speaking to U.N. inspectors outside the country. All they would have done was confirm that there were no weapons. Hussein would have had no reason to complicate the physical inspection process if there was nothing to find. And finally, when he produced the massive document on Iraqi weapons, he could have included a video showing the destruction of chemical weapons. Put simply, if he really didn't have WMD of any sort, then Hussein's behavior from November to March 2003 could only be described as bizarre and self-destructive. Even if he thought that the United States would attack regardless of whether he had WMD, Hussein had every reason to disprove the allegations if he could in order to complicate the diplomatic and domestic difficulties of the U.S. administration. Either Hussein was insane or he had weapons of mass destruction.

This seems to be the current argument: the United States justified its invasion of Iraq based on Iraqi WMD. U.S. forces have found no WMD inside the country. Therefore, either the CIA made a mistake or the administration lied. The administration tried to shift the blame to the CIA, under this logic. The Democrats hope to demonstrate that the CIA did not lie, but instead that the administration deliberately misrepresented the intelligence and pressured the CIA to change its story.

There is another way to look at what happened. The United States had multiple reasons for going to war with Iraq. The least important was WMD, but it chose to use that excuse because it required the least effort to make. The administration would have gone to war with Iraq regardless of WMD, but it believed, based on reasonable evidence, that there were WMD. In other words, the Bush administration did not tell the whole truth about its motives for invading Iraq, but it did believe that there were WMD in the country.

The congressional investigation will probe what the administration knew and when they knew it, in typical, tedious Washington style. But they will miss the real story, which is far more complex than the one presented. The administration hid its motives for invading Iraq but did expect to find WMD there. From the administration's point of view, the complexity of its motives never would have become an issue had a single round of chemical weapons been found. Either the administration set itself up for a fall, or it is as surprised as anyone that no WMD have been found.

Misleading the U.S. public about foreign policy is hardly novel. Numerous books chronicle how former President John F. Kennedy cut a secret deal with the Soviets over Cuba. In the deal, the United States promised to withdraw its missiles from Turkey as long as the Soviets kept it secret from the public. Franklin D. Roosevelt was drawing up war plans with the British while publicly declaring that he had no intention of getting involved in World War II. Dwight Eisenhower lied about the U-2 incident, claiming it was a weather plane that had gone off course -- 2,000 miles off course! As far as lies go, Bush's was pretty tame. Unlike Roosevelt, he never lied about wanting to go to war. Unlike Kennedy, he never hid a secret deal. And unlike Eisenhower, he never denied the U-2s were where they were supposed to be. The most he can be accused of is lying about his reason for war.

Even that was unnecessary -- if he knew it was a lie. But there is every reason to believe from the evidence that Bush believed, as did most intelligence agencies around the world, that Hussein had WMD. Everything Hussein did after November simply confirmed this belief.

The question, therefore, is what happened to the weapons? There are three possible explanations:

1. They never existed
2. Hussein destroyed them but didn't tell anybody.
3. They still exist.

Sherlock Holmes said that when the impossible is eliminated, then whatever is left, however improbable, must be the truth. We are in that situation now. It is impossible to believe Iraqi WMD never existed because it is an absolute fact that Hussein used chemical weapons on Iraqis. It is equally difficult to believe that he would have destroyed them without at least inviting former chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix to the party. What could Hussein possibly gain from destroying them in secret? It makes no sense. Why did he behave as he did if he had no weapons? We find it impossible to believe that Hussein once had WMD but destroyed them in secret.

Therefore, the extraordinarily improbable must be true: Iraqi WMD still exist. There is, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld notwithstanding, a guerrilla war under way in Iraq. It appears Hussein is alive, possibly somewhere in Iraq. Chemical and biological weapons never have been used in a guerrilla war. That does not mean that they would not make excellent weapons used against U.S. troops. Chemical and biological weapons do not require huge containers. The bunkers that were built around Iraq over the years, not all of them identified by U.S. intelligence, could be hiding not only Hussein and his staff, but also the missing WMD.

Congress is about to begin an investigation into a forgery about Niger uranium, WMD and the rest. Congress is missing the point. The issue is not whether the administration invented the story of WMD. It is also not whether the administration went to war over WMD. The real issue is where the WMD went and why the CIA doesn't have a definitive answer to that. The WMD issue as Congress if framing it is about as interesting as finding out when Kennedy really knew about Cuban missiles and what secret deals he really made. It is interesting, but not relevant. The urgent issue is: Where are Iraq's weapons of mass destruction?

62088
Tuhon Bill McGrath found this interesting piece.

7/25:  I've renamed this thread so that it may serve as the vehicle for related posts

Crafty Dog
-----------------------


Raging Against Self Defense
 
Permission is granted to distribute this article in its entirety, so long as full copyright information and full contact information is given for JPFO.
Copyright ? 2000 Sarah Thompson, MD
Published by
Jews For The Preservation of Firearms Ownership, Inc.
P.O. Box 270143
Hartford, WI 53027
Phone (262) 673-9745
www.jpfo.org



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Raging Against Self Defense:
A Psychiatrist Examines The Anti-Gun Mentality
By Sarah Thompson, M.D.
righter@therighter.com


"You don't need to have a gun; the police will protect you."

"If people carry guns, there will be murders over parking spaces and neighborhood basketball games."

"I'm a pacifist. Enlightened, spiritually aware people shouldn't own guns."

"I'd rather be raped than have some redneck militia type try to rescue me."
How often have you heard these statements from misguided advocates of victim disarmament, or even woefully uninformed relatives and neighbors? Why do people cling so tightly to these beliefs, in the face of incontrovertible evidence that they are wrong? Why do they get so furiously angry when gun owners point out that their arguments are factually and logically incorrect?

How can you communicate with these people who seem to be out of touch with reality and rational thought?

One approach to help you deal with anti-gun people is to understand their psychological processes. Once you understand why these people behave so irrationally, you can communicate more effectively with them.


Defense Mechanisms
Projection

About a year ago I received an e-mail from a member of a local Jewish organization. The author, who chose to remain anonymous, insisted that people have no right to carry firearms because he didn't want to be murdered if one of his neighbors had a "bad day". (I don't know that this person is a "he", but I'm assuming so for the sake of simplicity.) I responded by asking him why he thought his neighbors wanted to murder him, and, of course, got no response. The truth is that he's statistically more likely to be murdered by a neighbor who doesn't legally carry a firearm1 and more likely to be shot accidentally by a law enforcement officer.1

How does my correspondent "know" that his neighbors would murder him if they had guns? He doesn't. What he was really saying was that if he had a gun, he might murder his neighbors if he had a bad day, or if they took his parking space, or played their stereos too loud. This is an example of what mental health professionals call projection ? unconsciously projecting one's own unacceptable feelings onto other people, so that one doesn't have to own them.3 In some cases, the intolerable feelings are projected not onto a person, but onto an inanimate object, such as a gun,4 so that the projector believes the gun itself will murder him.

Projection is a defense mechanism. Defense mechanisms are unconscious psychological mechanisms that protect us from feelings that we cannot consciously accept.5 They operate without our awareness, so that we don't have to deal consciously with "forbidden" feelings and impulses. Thus, if you asked my e-mail correspondent if he really wanted to murder his neighbors, he would vehemently deny it, and insist that other people want to kill him.

Projection is a particularly insidious defense mechanism, because it not only prevents a person from dealing with his own feelings, it also creates a world where he perceives everyone else as directing his own hostile feelings back at him.6

All people have violent, and even homicidal, impulses. For example, it's common to hear people say "I'd like to kill my boss", or "If you do that one more time I'm going to kill you." They don't actually mean that they're going to, or even would, kill anyone; they're simply acknowledging anger and frustration. All of us suffer from fear and feelings of helplessness and vulnerability. Most people can acknowledge feelings of rage, fear, frustration, jealousy, etc. without having to act on them in inappropriate and destructive ways.

Some people, however, are unable consciously to admit that they have such "unacceptable" emotions. They may have higher than average levels of rage, frustration, or fear. Perhaps they fear that if they acknowledge the hostile feelings, they will lose control and really will hurt someone. They may believe that "good people" never have such feelings, when in fact all people have them.

This is especially true now that education "experts" commonly prohibit children from expressing negative emotions or aggression. Instead of learning that such emotions are normal, but that destructive behavior needs to be controlled, children now learn that feelings of anger are evil, dangerous and subject to severe punishment.7To protect themselves from "being bad", they are forced to use defense mechanisms to avoid owning their own normal emotions. Unfortunately, using such defense mechanisms inappropriately can endanger their mental health; children need to learn how to deal appropriately with reality, not how to avoid it.8

(This discussion of psychological mechanisms applies to the average person who is uninformed, or misinformed, about firearms and self-defense. It does not apply to the anti- gun ideologue. Fanatics like Charles Schumer know the facts about firearms, and advocate victim disarmament consciously and willfully in order to gain political power. This psychological analysis does not apply to them.)

Denial

Another defense mechanism commonly utilized by supporters of gun control is denial. Denial is simply refusing to accept the reality of a given situation.9 For example, consider a woman whose husband starts coming home late, has strange perfume on his clothes, and starts charging flowers and jewelry on his credit card. She may get extremely angry at a well-meaning friend who suggests that her husband is having an affair. The reality is obvious, but the wronged wife is so threatened by her husband's infidelity that she is unable to accept it, and so denies its existence.

Anti-gun people do the same thing. It's obvious that we live in a dangerous society, where criminals attack innocent people. Just about everyone has been, or knows someone who has been, victimized. It's equally obvious that law enforcement can't protect everyone everywhere 24 hours a day. Extensive scholarly research demonstrates that the police have no legal duty to protect you10 and that firearm ownership is the most effective way to protect yourself and your family.11 There is irrefutable evidence that victim disarmament nearly always precedes genocide.12 Nonetheless, the anti-gun folks insist, despite all evidence to the contrary, that "the police will protect you", "this is a safe neighborhood" and "it can't happen here", where "it" is everything from mugging to mass murder.

Anti-gun people who refuse to accept the reality of the proven and very serious dangers of civilian disarmament are using denial to protect themselves from the anxiety of feeling helpless and vulnerable. Likewise, gun owners who insist that "the government will never confiscate my guns" are also using denial to protect themselves from the anxiety of contemplating being forcibly disarmed and rendered helpless and vulnerable.

Reaction Formation

Reaction formation is yet another defense mechanism common among the anti-gun folks. Reaction formation occurs when a person's mind turns an unacceptable feeling or desire into its complete opposite.13 For example, a child who is jealous of a sibling may exhibit excessive love and devotion for the hated brother or sister.

Likewise, a person who harbors murderous rage toward his fellow humans may claim to be a devoted pacifist and refuse to eat meat or even kill a cockroach.14 Often such people take refuge in various spiritual disciplines and believe that they are "superior" to "less civilized" folks who engage in "violent behavior" such as hunting, or even target shooting. They may devote themselves to "animal welfare" organizations that proclaim that the rights of animals take precedence over the rights of people.15 This not only allows the angry person to avoid dealing with his rage, it allows him actually to harm the people he hates without having to know he hates them.

This is not meant to disparage the many wonderful people who are pacifists, spiritually inclined, vegetarian, or who support animal welfare. The key issue is not the belief itself, but rather the way in which the person experiences and lives his beliefs. Sincere practitioners seek to improve themselves, or to be helpful in a gentle, respectful fashion. They work to persuade others peacefully by setting an example of what they believe to be correct behavior. Sincere pacifists generally exhibit good will towards others, even towards persons with whom they might disagree on various issues.

Contrast the sincere pacifist or animal lover with the strident, angry person who wants to ban meat and who believes murdering hunters is justified in order to "save the animals" ? or the person who wants to outlaw self- defense and believes innocent people have the obligation to be raped and murdered for the good of society. For example, noted feminist Betty Friedan said "that lethal violence even in self defense only engenders more violence."16 The truly spiritual, pacifist person refrains from forcing others to do what he believes, and is generally driven by positive emotions, while the angry person finds "socially acceptable" ways to harm, abuse, or even kill, his fellow man.

In the case of anti-gun people, reaction formation keeps any knowledge of their hatred for their fellow humans out of consciousness, while allowing them to feel superior to "violent gun owners". At the same time, it also allows them to cause serious harm, and even loss of life, to others by denying them the tools necessary to defend themselves. This makes reaction formation very attractive from a psychological point of view, and therefore very difficult to counteract.


Defense Mechanisms Are Not Mental Illnesses
Defense mechanisms are normal. All of us use them to some extent, and their use does not imply mental illness. Advocates of victim disarmament may be misguided or uninformed, they may be stupid, or they may be consciously intent on evil, but that doesn't necessarily mean they are "mentally ill".

Some defense mechanisms, however, are healthier than others. A safe general rule is that a defense is healthy if it helps you to function better in your personal and professional life, and unhealthy if it interferes with your life, your relationships, or the well-being of others. Young children utilize projection and denial much more commonly than do healthy adults. On the other hand, "if projection is used as a defense mechanism to a very great extent in adult life, the user's perception of external reality will be seriously distorted."17

Defense mechanisms are also frequently combined, so that an anti-gun person may use several defense mechanisms simultaneously. For example, my unfortunate correspondent uses projection to create a world in which all his neighbors want to murder him. As a result, he becomes more angry and fearful, and needs to employ even more defense mechanisms to cope. So he uses projection to attribute his own rage to others, he uses denial that there is any danger to protect himself from a world where he believes he is helpless and everyone wants to murder him, and he uses reaction formation to try to control everyone else's life because his own is so horribly out of control.

Also, it's important to remember that not all anti-gun beliefs are the result of defense mechanisms. Some people suffer from gun phobia18, an excessive and completely irrational fear of firearms, usually caused by the anti-gun conditioning they've been subjected to by the media, politicians, so-called "educators," and others. In some cases, gun phobia is caused by an authentic bad experience associated with a firearm. But with all due respect to Col. Jeff Cooper, who coined the term "hoplophobia" to describe anti-gun people, most anti-gun people do not have true phobias. Interestingly, a person with a true phobia of guns realizes his fear is excessive or unreasonable,19 something most anti-gun folks will never admit.

Defense mechanisms distort reality

Because defense mechanisms distort reality in order to avoid unpleasant emotions, the person who uses them has an impaired ability to recognize and accept reality. This explains why my e-mail correspondent and many other anti-gun people persist in believing that their neighbors and co- workers will become mass murderers if allowed to own firearms.

People who legally carry concealed firearms are actually less violent and less prone to criminal activity of all kinds than is the general population.20 A person who has a clean record, has passed an FBI background check, undergone firearms training, and spent several hundred dollars to get a permit and a firearm, is highly unlikely to choose to murder a neighbor. Doing so would result in his facing a police manhunt, a trial, prison, possibly capital punishment, and the destruction of his family, job, and reputation. Obviously it would make no sense for such a person to shoot a neighbor - except in self-defense. Equally obviously, the anti-gun person who believes that malicious shootings by ordinary gun owners are likely to occur is not in touch with reality.21


The Common Thread: Rage
In my experience, the common thread in anti-gun people is rage. Either anti-gun people harbor more rage than others, or they're less able to cope with it appropriately. Because they can't handle their own feelings of rage, they are forced to use defense mechanisms in an unhealthy manner. Because they wrongly perceive others as seeking to harm them, they advocate the disarmament of ordinary people who have no desire to harm anyone. So why do anti-gun people have so much rage and why are they unable to deal with it in appropriate ways? Consider for a moment that the largest and most hysterical anti-gun groups include disproportionately large numbers of women, African- Americans and Jews. And virtually all of the organizations that claim to speak for these "oppressed people" are stridently anti-gun. Not coincidentally, among Jews, Blacks and women there are many "professional victims" who have little sense of identity outside of their victimhood.

Identity as Victim

If I were to summarize this article in three sentences, they would be:


(1) People who identify themselves as "victims" harbor excessive amounts of rage at other people, whom they perceive as "not victims."
(2) In order psychologically to deal with this rage, these "victims" utilize defense mechanisms that enable them to harm others in socially acceptable ways, without accepting responsibility or suffering guilt, and without having to give up their status as "victims."

(3) Gun owners are frequently the targets of professional victims because gun owners are willing and able to prevent their own victimization.

Thus the concept of "identity as victim" is essential. How and why do members of some groups choose to identify themselves as victims and teach their children to do the same? While it's true that women, Jews, and African- Americans have historically been victimized, they now participate in American society on an equal basis. And other groups, most notably Asian-Americans, have been equally victimized, and yet have transcended the "eternal victim" mentality.

Why, for example, would a 6'10" NBA player who makes $10 million a year see himself as a "victim"? Why would a successful, respected, wealthy, Jewish physician regard himself as a "victim"? Conversely, why might a wheelchair bound woman who lives on government disability NOT regard herself as a victim?

I would argue it's because the basketball player and the physician believe that their identities are dependent on being victims ? not because they have actually been victimized, but because they're members of groups that claim victim status. Conversely, the disabled woman was probably raised to believe that she is responsible for her own success or failure.

In fact, many people who have been victims of actual violent crime, or who have survived war or civil strife, support the right of self-defense. The old saying is often correct: "a conservative is a liberal who has been mugged."

Special Treatment and Misleading Leaders

Two reasons for these groups to insist on "victim" status seem likely. First, by claiming victim status, members of these groups can demand (and get) special treatment through quotas, affirmative action, reparations, and other preferential treatment programs.

Second, these people have been indoctrinated to believe that there is no alternative to remaining a victim forever. Their leaders remind them constantly that they are mistreated in every imaginable way (most of them imaginary!), attribute every one of life's misfortunes to "racism" or "sexism" or "hate crimes", and dream up ever more complex schemes for special treatment and favors.22 These leaders are the ones who preach that the entire Black experience is slavery and racism, or that Jewish history before and after the Holocaust is irrelevant,23 or that happily married women are really victims of sexual slavery.24

Likewise, the NAACP is suing firearms manufacturers to put them out of business,25 and is especially opposed to the inexpensive pistols that enable the poor to defend themselves in gang-ridden inner cities. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) proposed evicting anyone who dares to keep a tool of self-defense in any of its crime-infested housing projects. Jewish leaders, especially those in the politically correct "Reform" branch, preach that gun control is "a solemn religious obligation",26 contrary to the teachings of their sacred scriptures and their own history.27 Law enforcement agencies falsely teach women that they are safest if they don't resist rapists and robbers,28 while women's organizations advocate gun control, thus rendering women and their children defenseless.

Victimhood is good business for organizations that foster victim status. As victims, the members depend upon the organization to protect them, and the organization in turn relies on members for funding and political power. In the interest of self-preservation, these organizations work hard at preserving hatred and bigotry and at keeping their members defenseless ? and therefore dependent.

Anti-gun groups love victims!

From my observations, pro-victimhood is a feature of all of the anti-gun special interest groups, not just the ones mentioned here. Every organization that supports gun control apparently wants its members to be helpless, terrified and totally dependent on someone else to control every aspect of their lives. It doesn't matter whether it's a religious, racial, ethnic, political, social, or charitable group. From Handgun Control, Inc. to the Anti- Defamation League to the Million Mom March, they all want you to live in fear. In this scheme, soccer moms are "victims" just as much as are inner-city minorities.

If these organizations truly cared about the people for whom they claim to speak, they would encourage safe and responsible firearms ownership. They would help people to learn how to defend themselves and their families so that they wouldn't have to live in fear. They would tell everyone that one of the wonderful things about being an American is that you have the right to keep and bear arms, the right to defend yourself, and how these rights preserve the right to be free.

The psychological price of being a victim

In our current society, victimhood has many perceived benefits, but there are some serious drawbacks. Victims tend to see the world as a scary and threatening place. They believe that others treat them differently, unfairly, and even maliciously ? and that they are helpless to do anything about it. This belief, that they are being mistreated and are helpless to resist, generates tremendous rage, and often, serious depression.

But for victims to show rage openly can be dangerous, if not outright suicidal. For example, a battered woman who screams at or hits her attacker may provoke worse beatings or even her own murder. And a person who successfully defends himself loses his status as "victim." For someone whose entire identity is dependent on being a victim, the loss of victim status is just as threatening as loss of life.

So, unable psychologically to cope with such rage, people who view themselves as victims: (1) use defense mechanisms to displace it into irrational beliefs about neighbors killing each other, and the infallibility of police protection, and (2) attempt to regain control by controlling gun owners, whom they wrongly perceive as "the enemy".

Say NO to being a victim!

But no one needs to be a victim! Quite simply, it's not very easy to victimize a person who owns and knows how to use a firearm. If most women owned and carried firearms, rapes and beating would decrease.29 Thugs who target the elderly and disabled would find honest work once they realized they were likely to be looking down the barrel of a pistol or shotgun. It's nearly impossible to enslave, or herd into concentration camps, large numbers of armed people.


Communicating with anti-gun people
How can you communicate more effectively with an anti-gun person who is using unhealthy defense mechanisms? There are no quick and easy answers. But there are a few things you should keep in mind.

Anger and attacks do not work

Most gun owners, when confronted by an anti-gun person, become angry and hostile. This is understandable, because gun owners increasingly face ridicule, persecution and discrimination. (If you don't believe this, ask yourself if anyone would seriously introduce legislation to ban African- Americans, women, or Jews from post offices, schools, and churches. Even convicted felons aren't banned from such places ? but peaceful armed citizens are!) But an angry response is counterproductive.

It's not helpful to attack the person you're trying to persuade. Anything that makes him feel more fearful or angry will only intensify his defenses. Your goal is to help the person feel safe, and then to provide experiences and information that will help him to make informed decisions.

Be Gentle

You should never try to break down a defense mechanism by force. Remember that defense mechanisms protect people from feelings they cannot handle, and if you take that protection away, you can cause serious psychological harm. And because defense mechanisms operate unconsciously, it won't do any good to show an anti-gun person this article or to point out that he's using defense mechanisms. Your goal is gently and gradually to help the person to have a more realistic and rational view of the world. This cannot be done in one hour or one day.

As you reach out to people in this way, you need to deal with both the illogical thought processes involved and the emotional reactions that anti-gun people have to firearms. When dealing with illogical thought processes, you are attempting to use reason and logic to convince the anti-gun person that his perception of other people and his perception of firearms are seriously inaccurate. The goal is to help him to understand that armed citizens and firearms are not threats, and may even save his life.


Reversing Irrational thoughts
The Mirror Technique

One approach that can be helpful is simply to feed back what the anti-gun person is telling you, in a neutral, inquisitive way. So, when replying to my anonymous e-mail correspondent (above), I might respond, "So you fear if your neighbors had guns, they would use them to murder you. What makes you think that?" When you simply repeat what the person has said, and ask questions, you are not directly challenging his defenses. You are holding up a mirror to let him see his own views. If he has very strong defenses, he can continue to insist that his neighbors want to murder him. However, if his defenses are less rigid, he may start to question his position.

Another example might be, "Why do you think that your children's schoolteachers would shoot them?" You might follow this up with something like, "Why do you entrust your precious children to someone you believe would murder them?" Again, you are merely asking questions, and not directly attacking the person or his defenses.

Of course the anti-gun person might continue to insist that the teachers really would harm children, but prohibiting them from owning guns would prevent it. So you might ask how using a gun to murder innocent children is different from stabbing children with scissors, assaulting them with baseball bats, or poisoning the milk and cookies.

It's important to ask "open-ended" questions that require a response other than "yes" or "no". Such questions require the anti-gun person actually to think about what he is saying. This will help him to re-examine his beliefs. It may also encourage him to ask you questions about firearms use and ownership.

The "What Would You Do?" Technique

Once you have a dialogue going with an anti-gun person, you might want to insert him into a hypothetical scenario, although doing so is a greater threat to his defenses, and is therefore more risky. You might ask how he would deal with a difficult or annoying co-worker. He will likely respond that he would never resort to violence, but "other people" would, especially if they had guns. (Projection again.) You can then ask him who these "other people" are, why they would shoot a co-worker, and what the shooter would gain by doing so.

Don't try to "win" the argument. Don't try to embarrass the person you're trying to educate. Remember that no one likes to admit that his deeply held beliefs are wrong. No one likes to hear "I told you so!" Be patient and gentle. If you are arrogant, condescending, hurtful or rude to the anti-gun person, you will only convince him that gun owners are arrogant, hurtful people ? who should not be trusted with guns!


Defusing Emotional reactions
The "You Are There" Technique

Rational arguments alone are not likely to be successful, especially since many people "feel" rather than "think". You also need to deal with the emotional responses of the anti-gun person. Remember that most people have been conditioned to associate firearms with dead toddlers. So you need to change the person's emotional responses along with his thoughts.

One way to do this is to put the anti-gun person (or his family) at a hypothetical crime scene and ask what he would like to have happen. For example, "Imagine your wife is in the parking lot at the supermarket and two men grab her. One holds a knife to her throat while the other tears her clothes off. If I see this happening and have a gun, what should I do? What would happen next? What if after five minutes, the police still haven't arrived?"

Just let him answer the questions and mentally walk through the scenario. Don't argue with his answers. You are planting seeds in his mind than can help change his emotional responses.

The Power of Empathy

Another emotion-based approach that is often more successful is to respond sympathetically to the plight of the anti-gun person.

Imagine for a moment how you would feel if you believed your neighbors and co-workers wanted to kill you and your family, and you could do nothing at all about it except to wait for the inevitable to occur.

Not very pleasant, is it?

This is the world in which opponents of armed self-defense live. All of us have had times in our lives when we felt "different" and had to contend with hostile schoolmates, co- workers, etc. So we need to invoke our own compassion for these terrified people. Say something like, "It must be awful to live in fear of being assaulted by your own neighbors. I remember what it was like when I was the only (Jew, Mormon, African-American, Republican) in my (class, football team, workplace) ? and even then I didn't think anyone was going to kill me." It's essential that you sincerely feel some compassion and empathy; if you're glib or sarcastic, this won't work.

Using empathy works in several ways. First, it defuses a potentially hostile interaction. Anti-gun people are used to being attacked, not understood, by advocates of gun rights. Instead of an "evil, gun-toting, extremist", you are now a sympathetic, fellow human being. This may also open the door for a friendly conversation, in which you can each discover that your "opponent" is a person with whom you have some things in common. You may even create an opportunity to dispel some of the misinformation about firearms and self-defense that is so prevalent.

This empathy technique is also useful for redirecting, or ending, a heated argument that has become hostile and unproductive. It allows you to escape from the dead end of "guns save lives" vs. "the only reason to have a gun is to murder children." With empathy you can reframe the argument entirely. Instead of arguing about whether more lives are saved or lost as a result of gun ownership, you can comment on how terrifying it must be to live in a country where 80 million people own guns "solely for the purpose of murdering children".

You should not expect any of these approaches to work immediately; they won't. With rare exceptions, the anti-gun person is simply not going to "see the light," thank you profusely, and beg you to take him shooting. What you are doing is putting tiny chinks into the armor of the person's defenses, or planting seeds that may someday develop into a more open mind or a more rational analysis. This process can take months or years. But it does work!


Corrective Experiences
Perhaps the most effective way to dissolve defense mechanisms, however, is by providing corrective experiences30. Corrective experiences are experiences that allow a person to learn that his ideas about gun owners and guns are incorrect in a safe and non-threatening way. To provide a corrective experience, you first allow the person to attempt to project his incorrect ideas onto you. Then, you demonstrate that he is wrong by your behavior, not by arguing.

For example, the anti-gun person will unconsciously attempt to provoke you by claiming that gun owners are uneducated "rednecks," or by treating you as if you are an uneducated "redneck." If you get angry and respond by calling him a "stupid, liberal, socialist", you will prove his point. However, if you casually talk about your M.B.A., your trip to the Shakespeare festival, your vegetable garden, or your daughter's ballet recital, you will provide him with the opportunity to correct his misconceptions.

If you have used the above techniques, then you have already provided one corrective experience. You have demonstrated to the frightened, anti-gun person that gun owners are not abusive, scary, dangerous and sub-human monsters, but normal, everyday people who care about their families, friends and even strangers.

As many gun owners have already discovered, the most important corrective experiences involve actually exposing the fearful person to a firearm. It is almost never advisable to tell someone that you carry a concealed firearm, but there are ways to use your own experience favorably.

For example, if you're dealing with an anti-gun person with whom you interact regularly and have a generally good relationship ? a coworker, neighbor, church member, etc. ? you might indirectly refer to concealed carry. You should never say anything like "I'm carrying a gun right now and you can't even tell," especially because in some states that would be considered illegal, "threatening" behavior. But you might consider saying something like, "I sometimes carry a firearm, and you've never seemed to be uncomfortable around me." Whether to disclose this information is an individual decision, and you should consider carefully other consequences before using this approach.

First-hand experience

Ultimately, your goal is to take the anti-gun person shooting. Some people will accept an invitation to accompany you to the range, but others are too frightened to do so, and will need some preliminary experience.

First, you want to encourage the anti-gun person to have some contact with a firearm in whatever way feels most comfortable to him. Many people seem to believe that firearms have minds of their own and shoot people of their own volition. So you might want to start by inviting him simply to look at and then handle an unloaded firearm. This also provides you the opportunity to show the inexperienced person how to tell whether a firearm is loaded and to teach him the basic rules of firearms safety.

Encourage the newcomer to ask questions and remember that your role is to present accurate information in a friendly, responsible and non-threatening way. This is a good time to offer some reading material on the benefits of firearms ownership. But be careful not to provide so much information that it's overwhelming. And remember this is not the time to launch into anti-government rants, the New World Order, conspiracy theories, or any kind of political talk!

Next, you can invite your friend to accompany you to the shooting range. (And if you're going to trust each other with loaded guns, you should consider yourselves friends!) Assure him that no one will force him to shoot a gun and he's free just to watch. Let him know in advance what he will experience and what will be expected of him. This includes such things as the need for eye and ear protection, a cap, appropriate clothing, etc. Make sure you have a firearm appropriate for your guest should s/he decide to try shooting. This means a lower caliber firearm that doesn't have too much recoil. If your guest is a woman, make sure the firearm will fit her appropriately. Many rifles have stocks that are too long for small women, and double-stack semi-autos are usually too large for a woman's hand.

Remember that just visiting the range can be a corrective experience. Your guest will learn that gun owners are disciplined, responsible, safety-conscious, courteous, considerate, and follow the rules. He will see people of all ages, from children to the elderly, male and female, enjoying an activity together. He will not see a single "beer-swilling redneck" waving a firearm in people's faces.

In my experience, most people who visit a range will decide they do want to try shooting. Remember to make sure your guest understands all the safety rules and range rules before allowing him to handle a firearm. If you don't feel competent to teach a newcomer to shoot, ask an instructor or range master to assist. Remember to provide lots of positive feedback and encouragement. If you're lucky, you'll recruit a new firearms enthusiast.

But even if your guest decides that shooting is "not for him", he will have learned many valuable lessons. He will know basic rules of firearms safety, and how to clear a firearm should he need to do so. This may well save his life someday. He will know that guns do not fire unless a person pulls the trigger. He will know that gun owners are friendly, responsible people, not very different from him. Even if he chooses not to fire a gun ever again, he will be less likely to fear and persecute gun owners. And who knows ? a few months or years later he may decide to become a gun owner.

Why these techniques do not always work

You should remember that you will not be successful with all anti-gun people. Some people are so terrified and have such strong defenses, that it's not possible for someone without professional training to get through. Some people have their minds made up and refuse to consider opening them. Others may concede that what you say "makes sense," but are unwilling to challenge the forces of political correctness. A few may have had traumatic experiences with firearms from which they have not recovered.

You will also not be successful with the anti-gun ideologues, people like Charles Schumer and Dianne Feinstein. These people have made a conscious choice to oppose firearms ownership and self-defense. They almost always gain power, prestige, and money from their anti-gun politics. They are not interested in the facts or in saving lives. They know the facts and understand the consequences of their actions, and will happily sacrifice innocent people if it furthers their selfish agenda. Do not use these techniques on such people. They only respond to fears of losing the power, prestige and money that they covet.31

Conclusion

By better understanding advocates of civilian disarmament, and by learning and practicing some simple techniques to deal with their psychological defenses, you will be much more effective in your efforts to communicate with anti-gun people. This will enable you to be more successful at educating them about the realities of firearms and self- defense, and their importance to our liberty and safety.

Educating others about firearms is hard work. It's not glamorous, and it generally needs to be done one person at a time. But it's a very necessary and important task. The average American supports freedom of speech and freedom of religion, whether or not he chooses to exercise them. He supports fair trials, whether or not he's ever been in a courtroom. He likewise needs to understand that self- defense is an essential right, whether or not he chooses to own or carry a gun.


? 2000, Sarah Thompson.

Dr. Thompson is Executive Director of Utah Gun Owners Alliance, www.utgoa.org and also writes The Righter, www.therighter.com, a monthly column on individual rights.

Notes

1 Lott, John R., Jr. 1998. More Guns, Less Crime. University of Chicago Press. Pp. 11-12; Proposition B: More Security Or Greater Danger?, St. Louis Post-Dispatch. March 21, 1999.

2 Lott 1998, Pp. 1-2.

3 Kaplan, Harold M. and Sadock, Benjamin J. 1990. Pocket Handbook of Clinical Psychiatry. Williams & Wilkins. P. 20.

4Brenner, Charles. 1973. An Elementary Textbook of Psychoanalysis (rev. ed.). Anchor Books. Pp. 91-93; Lefton, Lester A. 1994. Psychology (5th edition). Allyn & Bacon. Pp. 432-433.

5 Brenner 1973. P. 91.

6 Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 20; Lefton 1994, p. 432.

7 Talbott, John A., Robert E. Hales and Stuart C. Yudofsky, eds. 1988. Textbook of Psychiatry. American Psychiatric Press. P.137.

8 "Kids Suspended for Playground Game." Associated Press. April 6, 2000.

9 Lightfoot, Liz. "Gun Return to the Nursery School Toy Chest." The London Telegraph. May 22, 2000. Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 20; Lefton 1994, p. 433.

10 Stevens, Richard W. 1999. Dial 911 and Die. Mazel Freedom Press. [Analyzes the law in 54 U.S. jurisdictions]; see, e.g., Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) [no federal constitutional right to police protection.]

11 Kleck, Gary and Gertz, Marc. 1995. Armed Resistance to Crime: The Prevalence and Nature of Self- Defense with a Gun. Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology. Vol. 86 (Fall), pp. 150-187.

12 Simkin, Jay, Zelman, Aaron, and Rice, Alan M. 1994. Lethal Laws. Jews for the Preservation of Firearms Ownership.

13 Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 20; Lefton 1994, p. 433.

14 Brenner 1973, p. 85.

15 Veith, Gene Edward, Jr. 1993. Modern Fascism: Liquidating the Judeo-Christian Worldview. Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing. Pp. 39-40 [fascism exalts nature, animals and environment].

16 Japenga, A. 1994. Would I Be Safer with a Gun? Health. March/April, p. 54.

17 Brenner 1973, p. 92.

18 Kaplan and Sadock 1990, p. 219.

19 American Psychiatric Association. 1994. Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition. P. 410.

20 Lott 1998, pp. 11-12.

21 Most American gun owners are not violent criminals and will not be potential killers. "The vast majority of persons involved in life-threatening violence have a long criminal record and many prior contacts with the justice system." Elliott, Delbert S. 1998. Life Threatening Violence is Primarily a Crime Problem: A Focus on Prevention. University of Colorado Law Review. Vol. 69 (Fall), pp. 1081-1098, at 1093.

22 Sowell, Thomas. 2000. Blacks and bootstraps. Jewish World Review (Aug.14). http://www.jewishworldreview.com

23x Wein, Rabbi Berel. 2000. The return of a Torah scroll and confronting painful memories. Jewish World Review (July 12).

24 Dworkin, Andrea. "Terror, Torture and Resistance". http://www.igc.org/Womensnet/dworkin/TerrorTortureandResistance.html

25 Mfume, Kweisi, speech at the 90th annual NAACP meeting, July 12, 1999. http://www.naacp.org/president/speeches/90th%20Annual%20Meeting.htm

26 Yoffie, Rabbi Eric H. Speech supporting the Million Mom March, May 14, 2000. http://uahc.org/yoffie/mmm.html

27 "If someone comes to kill you, arise quickly and kill him." The Talmud, Tractate Sanhedrin. 1994. The Schottenstein Edition. New York: Mesorah Publications. Vol. 2, 72a.

28 Rape and Sexual Assault, Dean of Students Office for Women's Resources and Services McKinley Health Education Dept., University Police, University of Illinois; Hazelwood, R. R. & Harpold, J. 1986. Rape: The Dangers of Providing Confrontational Advice, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin. Vol. 55, pp. 1-5.

29 Lott 1998, pp. 78, 134-37.

30 Frank, Jerome D. 1961. Persuasion and Healing. The Johns Hopkins Press. Pp. 216-217.

31 Richardson, H. L. 1998. Confrontational Politics. Gun Owners Foundation. 1

62089
Politics & Religion / The Lawrence Decision
« on: July 09, 2003, 10:52:40 PM »
With permission from Rick, I post his email to me here. He is occupied with other matters and will not be participating.

I think this is a quality analysis and presents important points for
consideration. Do note that there are some lawyerly specific terms here,
such as "dicta" that have very specific meaning. No time to comment now, I'm out the door to "do The Dune" and train sticks.

If I have a chance later, I will offer a brief summary of my preference for
structuring the issue in 9th amendment terms.

Marc
----------------

Marc,

As I saw that case, two issues existed. First, did the State of Texas
possess the power to ban "deviate sexual intercourse" between two persons of the same sex? Second, if Texas did possess that power, then does the US Constitution prohibit the State of Texas from exercising that power?

The majority opinion in Lawrence does not deal with the first issue. It only
addresses the second issue when it holds that the term "liberty" in the US
Constitution includes a right of two persons of the same sex to engage
consensually in anal or oral sex in private. Justice O'Connor opined that
the statute violated equal protection because it applied only to persons of
the same sex.

I do not agree with the majority's opinion for several reasons.

The 14th Amendment clearly provides that a State may deprive a person of liberty with due process of law. Until Lawrence, two main violations of due process could occur in a State statute: A) the statute's language was so vague or overbroad as to provide a normal person with insufficient notice of the prohibited conduct; or, B) the conduct prohibited by the statute was a fundamental right "deeply rooted in this nation's history and traditions". If alternative B applies, then the reviewing court was supposed to apply strict scrutiny to the law in question and determine if a rational basis for prohibiting such conduct exists.

The majority opinion in Lawrence does not argue that private, consensual
anal or oral sex are fundamental rights deeply rooted in this nation's
history and traditions. It cannot do so, because no such history or
tradition exists in the U.S. At the time of its ratification, the Constitution took effect in 13 States, all of which banned sodomy. As of 1961, sodomy was prohibited in all 50 States.

Instead, the majority creates a new, less severe requirement for applying
the rational basis test. In Lawrence, the majority cited an "emerging
awareness" that liberty to gives to adults in conducting their sex lives,
p.11. As evidence of this "emerging awareness", the majority cites the ALI Modern Penal Code, a 1981 European Court of Human Rights decision, a 1957 British Parliamentary recommendation to decriminalize sodomy, the reduction of sodomy prohibitions from all 50 States in 1961 to 13 States today, dicta in Planned Parenthood vs. Casey (1992) and an equal protection decision, Romer vs. Evans (1996). That's very weak legal precedent upon which to base this substantial dilution in due process review.

My major objection to this reasoning is that legislative policy decisions to
decriminalize certain conduct do not amount to a per se recognition of a
federal constitutional right. At most, the legislative decriminalization of
certain conduct creates a State statutory right or privilege to engage in
the previously banned conduct. But the majority had to rely upon this false constitutional argument in order to obtain its desired result, the
nullification of the Texas statute.

The long term damage of this decision to the rule of law is incalculable.
Now, it will be sufficient for courts to apply rational basis review if the
petitioners merely demonstrate "an emerging awareness" through a change in legisltive policy in half of the States. This creates another means by which the amendment process can be circumvented. Now, a petitioner does not need even to show a 3/4 majority of the States to cause constitutional change. According to the majority, Bowers was incorrectly decided in 1986 because 25 States had decriminalized sodomy.

I support the legislative policy to decriminalize sodomy between consenting adults. However, the US Constitution says what it says. Some of what it said in 1787 was not right; e.g., the 3/5 capitation and its recognition of slavery. Maybe the drafters should have foreseen the need to define more clearly personal liberty as it related to all sorts of various sex acts in private. They did not do so.

More importantly, I resent the majority's sloppy analysis, its use of dicta,
and its use of foreign legislation. Most importantly, I resent the
majority's lack of courage to hold that private consensual sodomy between adults is a fundamental right deeply rooted in this nation's history and traditions. Instead, its expediency to achieve a popular policy result has opened a Pandora's box that subjects all of us to a judicial tyranny that could nullify any legislative policy decision because it does not comport with the political views of 5 appointed Justices. In the long run, this is the real danger from this decision.

Rick
----------------------
Hi, Marc,

Thanks for passing that along. Have you read the decision?


"It only addresses the second issue when it holds that the term "liberty" in
the US Constitution includes a right of two persons of the same sex to
engage consensually in anal or oral sex in private."

This is what they said:


"a) Resolution of this case depends on whether petitioners were free as
adults to engage in private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under
the Due Process Clause. For this inquiry the Court deems it necessary to
reconsider its Bowers holding. The Bowers Court's initial substantive
statement--"The issue presented is whether the Federal Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy ... ," 478 U. S., at 190--discloses the Court's failure to appreciate the extent of the liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married couple were it said that marriage is just about the right to have sexual intercourse. Although the laws involved in Bowers and here purport to do not more than prohibit a
particular sexual act, their penalties and purposes have more far-reaching
consequences, touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home. They seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter upon relationships in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons. Pp. 3-6. "These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed
under compulsion of the State." Ibid.

Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right.



(d) Bowers' rationale does not withstand careful analysis. In his dissenting
opinion in Bowers Justice Stevens concluded that (1) the fact a State's
governing majority has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice, and (2) individual decisions concerning the intimacies of physical
relationships, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of
"liberty" protected by due process. That analysis should have controlled
Bowers, and it controls here. Bowers was not correct when it was decided, is not correct today, and is hereby overruled. This case does not involve minors, persons who might be injured or coerced, those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners' right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in private conduct without government intervention. Casey, supra, at 847. The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual's personal and private life. Pp. 17-18."


Notice they said the TX statute furthers no legitimate state interest.
That's a rational basis review, a low standard. That is, they compared the
right to fundamental rights, but didn't use a strict level of review. From
what I can tell, they threw the TX law out using the lowest of the three
standards.


"Until Lawrence, two main violations of due process could occur in a State
statute: A) the statute's language was so vague or overbroad as to provide a normal person with insufficient notice of the prohibited conduct; or, B) the conduct prohibited by the statute was a fundamental right "deeply rooted in this nation's history and traditions". If alternative B applies, then the reviewing court was supposed to apply strict scrutiny to the law in question and determine if a rational basis for prohibiting such conduct exists."

There are alternatives besides A and B. You have a high standard of review for the B cases, and when the right being taken away isn't "fundamental" you have a lower standard of review which looks for a legitimate state interest. Something in the middle would be the right to abortion.

"Instead, the majority creates a new, less severe requirement for applying the rational basis test."


He's got it backwards.


"....According to the majority, Bowers was incorrectly decided in 1986
because 25 States had decriminalized sodomy...."


Not what they said. (see above)


"Instead, its expediency to achieve a popular policy result has opened a
Pandora's box that subjects all of us to a judicial tyranny that could
nullify any legislative policy decision because it does not comport with the
political views of 5 appointed Justices."

The TX law failed to meet a constitutional test, as it should have. So Marc,
if depriving people of an interest in the non-criminalization of their
personal, private and consentual relationships, requires a legitimate state
interest, maybe you can to explain to me what the legitimate state interest in this case was?


Ilene
--------------------------

Hi Ilene:

The next several days are extremely busy for me but quickly:

I have read the entire decision (can someone print it here?)and its why I
find Rick's reasoning so strong.

To summarize my position, the law is wrong and should be repealed. This does not change the fact that the LEGAL reasoning of the decision is suprisingly weak upon examination and I can understand Scalia's concerns. IMHO the correct analysis would be through the still sleeping 9th Amendment, combined with the "pursuit of happiness" of the Declaration of Independence, which is, IMHO, a form of "legislative history" of the Constitution.

Rick has drawn my attention to the problem presented by my analysis by the 10th Amendment and the fact of sodomy laws in all 13 states in 1789. I need to refresh my memory on the law/issues presented by the Bill of Rights applicability to the States before answering him.

But, as clever as I am, ;-) my superior interpretation :-p is a digression from the question presented here of the merits of the Lawrence decision.

This is a very broad decision, and like Roe, the logic used can and will be
used to take the Court very deep into the cultural wars. And, like Roe, the
socio-political-legal trends already in play, make this end run of  democracy, via logic that masks judicial imperialism, unnecessary even to the ends desired.  Many of the results of the coming incursion into the cultural wars may please me, and others not, but at the moment (and I do confess to mixed feelings) I am of the thought that the opinion's reasoning is as unsound as the result is pleasing.

Question: Where else might this decision's rationale be applied? I see
already that an officer thrown out of the military for open gayness has
filed suit on its basis.
---------------------
(Folks, what follows here is pretty damn high level legal thinking IMHO-Crafty)

Ilene,

IMO, the Lawrence decision is very dangerous. If left unchecked, it
undermines the entire rule of law. It is based upon Justice Stevens' dissent in Bowers vs Hardwick. There, with sweepingly loose language, he argued that majority votes on moral choices alone were insufficient to constitute a rational basis for any law that restricts personal liberty.

Well, all laws restrict personal liberty. And all laws constitute moral
choices about individual conduct. The value of the majority view as to what constitute those choices is the heart of representative democracy in our republic. That is the heart of the social contract. It is the fairest way
for society to make those choices.

If "liberty" as set forth in the US Constitution includes private,
non-commercial, consensual sodomy between adults, then that conduct must constitute a fundamental right. Isn't liberty one of the three unalienable rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence? But Lawrence vs Texas did not come to that conclusion.

Bowers vs Hardwick had two holdings. First, it held that sodomy between
consenting adults was not a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution. Second, it found a rational basis for the Georgia anti-sodomy
statute.

Lawrence vs Texas only deals with the second part of the Bowers holding. It refuses to hold that the proscribed conduct is a fundamental right. But, as you point out correctly in your post, rational basis analysis alone is used in cases where fundamental rights are not involved. Private, consensual, non-commercial sex between adults is part of liberty, says the Lawrence majority. But we need only use a rational basis test. Therefore, liberty is not a fundamental right?!@#

In our republic, how do the people make their moral choices about laws? They make them through their elected representatives by voting for them in elections. Or they vote directly for those moral choices in referenda or constitutional amendment initiatives.

But Lawrence adopts Stevens' dissent and says that majority vote alone is
insufficient to prove a rational basis for the moral choice to ban sodomy.
Then, why are the majority votes to decriminalize sodomy alone sufficient to prove an emerging awareness of sodomy's inclusion in liberty?! Why is the majority vote of the American Law Institute sufficient to prove no rational basis? Why did the majority votes to decriminalize sodomy in 25 States prove the absence of a rational basis in 1986 sufficient to make the Bowers decision wrong when it was made? That's what one of your excepts from Lawrence says in your post above.

I guess the relevance of majority votes to the Lawrence court depend upon whether the majority of Supreme Court justices agree with the value judgments made by the different majorities. That can be the only logical extension of an opinion that fails to find a fundamental right to privacy under the facts of Lawrence. That creates a dangerous precedent that can be used by unscrupulous people for their own personal aggrandizement. For, in its current form, Lawrence can now be used to impose restrictions as long as the politicians pack the court with justices who share their moral choices. Liberty is not a fundamental right. Or, at least, some portions of liberty are not fundamental rights. Then, we can watch as other parts of liberty slip from fundamental to non-fundamental rights.

Where will the line be drawn? Who will draw it? What will be their criteria?

That is what I was trying to convey to Marc.

So long,

Rick

62090
Politics & Religion / Libertarian themes
« on: July 08, 2003, 05:17:13 PM »
MIT Students To 'Track' Politicians

Turn tables on feds with website to
monitor government officials


Posted: July 7, 2003
5:00 p.m. Eastern

By Jon Dougherty
? 2003 WorldNetDaily.com


Modeled after a Defense Department concept that
ostensibly could keep tabs on every American, a
pair of Massachusetts Institute of Technology
students have created a website in which users
can "track" politicians and government officials.

The project, called Government Information
Awareness, or GIA, was developed by Chris
Csikszentmihalyi, assistant professor at the MIT
Media Lab, and graduate student Ryan McKinley.

The goal was to design a site that would act as
"sort of a citizen's intelligence agency,"
Csikszentmihalyi told the Boston Globe.

The GIA model was inspired by a Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency creation
known as Total Information Awareness, or TIA,
which later was renamed the Terrorism
Information Awareness system after it was
learned TIA could be used to monitor the activities
of millions of Americans in the government's
search for possible terrorists.

TIA is capable of analyzing financial, medical,
consumer, educational and travel data, among
other pieces of information, to formulate a pattern
of behavior that would match pre-determined
terrorist profiles.

"The goal of the Terrorism Information Awareness
program is to revolutionize the ability of the
United States to detect, classify and identify
foreign terrorists ? and decipher their plans ? and
thereby enable the U.S. to take timely action to
successfully preempt and defeat terrorist acts,"
says a DARPA description of the program.

Congress limited the scope of the program after
complaints from a number of civil liberties
organizations.

Many of those concerns were addressed in a letter
to the U.S. Senate by the Association for
Computing Machinery, which stated that
"because of serious security, privacy, economic,
and personal risks associated with the
development of a vast database surveillance
system, we recommend a rigorous, independent
review of these aspects of TIA."

"There are important steps that the government
can take now to increase our security without
creating a massive surveillance program that has
the potential of doing more harm than good," said
the letter. "Federal, state and local governments
already have information systems in place that
could play major roles with highly focused
'terrorist spotting.'"

Nevertheless, the architects of GIA say their goal is
similar, only in reverse; they want average citizens
to be able to keep track of information relating to
government employees and politicians.

GIA's mission is "to empower citizens by providing
a single, comprehensive, easy-to-use repository of
information on individuals, organizations, and
corporations related to the government of the
United States of America," according to a
description posted on the GIA website.

Also, GIA's mission is "to allow citizens to submit
intelligence about government-related issues,
while maintaining their anonymity" and "to allow
members of the government a chance to
participate in the process."

"In the United States, there is a widening gap
between a citizen's ability to monitor his or her
government and the government's ability to
monitor a citizen," says the website. "Average
citizens have limited access to important
government records, while available information is
often illegible. Meanwhile, the government's
eagerness and means to oversee a citizen's
personal activity is rapidly increasing."

McKinley told the Boston Globe "total
information" should be a two-way street between
government and civilians.

"If total information exists, really the same effort
should be spent to make the same information at
the leadership level at least as transparent ? in my
opinion, more transparent," he said.

Part of the technology involved in the site is
similar to data mining software used by such
search engines as Google. That includes, said the
Globe, "independent political sites like
opensecrets.org, as well as sites run by
government agencies."

Also, Csikszentmihalyi and McKinley took
advantage of round-the-clock political coverage by
cable channels such as C-SPAN. The MIT students
use video cameras to capture images of people on
screen, which are generally accompanied by their
names.

The Globe says a computer program then "reads"
each name and matches it to existing information
about that person already stored on site.



Jon E. Dougherty is a staff reporter and columnist for
WorldNetDaily.

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=33455


Government Information Awareness......a 'citizens' intelligence agency'.....

I like it.

http://opengov.media.mit.edu/GIA/TIA/

62091
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 08, 2003, 01:01:27 PM »

62092
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 08, 2003, 12:34:53 PM »
Item Number:14
Date: 07/08/2003
PHILIPPINES - GOVERNMENT SEIZES REBEL CAMP (JUL 08/PHILSTAR)

PHILIPPINE STAR -- New People's Army (NPA) rebels and Philippine
security forces fought in Aeta village in Zambales province, reports
the Philippine Star.  Some 20 rebels were killed and five police officers were killed in the clash. Government troops were trying to seize a makeshift NPA training camp when rebel snipers fired on them.  After a bloody firefight, the army captured the camp.

62093
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 08, 2003, 01:24:27 AM »
More quality analysis from www.stratfor.com
--------------------------

U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategies in Iraq
Jul 07, 2003

Summary

The appointment of Gen. John Abizaid as head of U.S. Central Command opens a new phase in both the Iraq campaign and the war on al Qaeda. In order to wage follow-on operations against al Qaeda, an effective counterinsurgency operation must be launched against the Iraqi guerrillas. This is a politico-military imperative. Politically, the United States must demonstrate its effectiveness against the full spectrum of opponents. Militarily, the United States must show it can project forces from Iraq while the base of operations remains insecure. Directly suppressing an insurrection without indigenous support historically has been difficult, but Iraq has a built-in opposition to the guerrillas: the Shiites in the south. But their desire to dominate an Iraqi government -- and their ties to Iran -- runs counter to U.S. policy. This means Washington will have to make some difficult choices in Iraq, and in the end will give away some things it does not want to give away.

Analysis

U.S. Army Gen. John Abizaid will officially take over as head of Central Command during the week of July 7. His mission will be not only to stabilize the situation in Iraq, but also to command the main U.S. offensive against al Qaeda. The summer offensive that Stratfor has written about has begun, and Abizaid's mission will be to wage war, integrate the various operations into a coherent whole and achieve the goal of the offensive: to further undermine al Qaeda's ability to strike at the U.S. homeland.

In war, no plan unfolds as expected. This war began in a completely unexpected fashion on Sept. 11, 2001. As is inevitable, the course of the war has taken unexpected turns. The most recent and significant turn of this war has been the emergence of a guerrilla war in Iraq. To be more precise, it appears to us that in Iraq, as in Afghanistan, the fighters on the ground understood that they could not win a conventional war. Rather than engage in the sort of conflict at which the United States excels, they put up token conventional resistance, all the while planning to engage the United States in unconventional warfare over an extended period.

In other words, the Iraqi forces understood that they could not defeat the United States in conventional war. Instead, the Iraqi war plan consisted of declining conventional engagement and subsequently engaging U.S. forces in operations in which their advantages were minimized and their weaknesses were exposed.

This has left the United States with the following battle problem: It must wage the broader summer offensive while simultaneously containing, engaging and defeating the Iraqi guerrillas. This is not an easy task, not only because it spreads U.S. forces thinner than planned, but also because the challenge posed by the guerrillas has trans-military implications, politically and psychologically. Abizaid must not ignore these considerations and must integrate them into his war plan. This is neither easy nor optional.

It is useful to begin by recalling the overarching strategic purpose of all of these operations: the disruption of al Qaeda and potential follow-on groups to prevent further major attacks on the United States. The Iraq campaign was an element in this broader strategy, designed to achieve these three goals, in increasing importance:

1. The elimination of a regime that potentially could support al Qaeda operations.

2. The transformation of the psychological architecture of the Islamic world. The perception in the Islamic world, developed since the U.S. withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 and reaffirmed by events since then, was that the United States was incapable of resolute action. The United States was seen as powerful militarily, but as lacking the political will to use that power. U.S. forces withdrew after taking minimal casualties in Beirut and Somalia. In Afghanistan, the United States halted operations after seizing major cities, apparently because it was unwilling to engage in more extended conflict. The U.S. invasion of Iraq was designed to change the Islamic world's perception -- accepting anger at the United States in exchange for greater fear.

3. The creation of a base of operations that would allow the United States to bring political and military pressure to bear on a cluster of nations the U.S. administration sees as directly or indirectly sustaining al Qaeda operations -- in particular Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iran. Riyadh began shifting its position prior to the Iraq invasion. Immediately after the end of the campaign, the United States turned its attention to follow-on operations against Syria and Iran. These operations have been primarily political since the end of the Iraq campaign, but the constant threat exists that they could move to a military phase at any point.

The guerrilla war in Iraq strikes directly at the second objective of the Iraqi campaign. It is what Stratfor has called a trans-military goal: It is rooted in a military operation but ultimately arrives at an issue that transcends the purely military -- namely the psychological perception of the United States and the credibility of U.S. military threats. As a secondary matter, it also complicates the logistics of follow-on operations after Iraq. At the moment, that is not the primary issue -- although it should be emphatically noted that an evolution in the conditions in Iraq very well could undermine the U.S. ability to use Iraq as a base of operations.

The problems that have arisen in Afghanistan and Iraq are rooted in U.S. strategy. The United States invaded both countries as a means toward other ends, rather than as ends in themselves. The invasion of Afghanistan was intended to disrupt al Qaeda's main operational base. The invasion of Iraq was intended to bring U.S. power to bear against al Qaeda's enablers in the region. In neither case did the United States have an intrinsic interest in either country -- including control of Iraq's oil.

The United States could achieve its primary purpose in each country without complete pacification. In Afghanistan, the U.S. administration accepted from the beginning that the complex tribal and ideological conflicts there would make pacification impossible. U.S. forces seized the major cities and a few strategic points, kept most forces in protected garrisons and conducted military operations as opportunities to combat al Qaeda arose. U.S. forces avoided any attempts at pacification projects, understanding that the level of force and effort required to achieve any degree of pacification far outstripped U.S. interests and probably U.S. resources. The United States had a limited mission in Afghanistan and ruthlessly focused on that, while publicly professing ambitious and complex goals.

The Iraq campaign took its primary bearings from the Afghan campaign. The goals were to shatter the Iraqi army and displace the Iraqi regime. These goals were achieved quickly. The United States then rapidly pivoted to use its psychological and military advantage to pressure Syria and Iran. As in Afghanistan, pacification was not a primary goal. Pacification was not essential to carrying on the follow-on mission. But the U.S. reading of the situation in Iraq diverged from that of Afghanistan. The U.S. administration always understood that the consequences of the invasion of Afghanistan would be the continuation and intensification of the chaos that preceded that invasion. The underlying assumption in Iraq was that the postwar Iraqi impulse would be toward stability. The U.S. administration assumed that the majority of the Iraqi public opposed Saddam Hussein, would welcome the fall of his regime, would not object to an American occupation and, therefore, would work harmoniously with the United States in pacification projects, easing the burden on the United States tremendously.

The U.S. administration expected the defeat of the Taliban to devolve into guerrilla warfare. The United States did not expect the defeat of the Baath regime to devolve into guerrilla warfare. It did not expect the Shiites to be as well-organized as they are, nor did they expect this level of Shiite opposition to a U.S. occupation. In other words, the strategic understanding of the Iraqi campaign took its bearings from the Afghan campaign -- and the United States had no interest in pacification -- but at the same time, the United States did not expect this level of difficulty and danger involved in pacifying Iraq, because U.S. intelligence misread the situation on the ground.

At its current level of operations, the guerrilla war does not represent a military challenge to the United States. Therefore, the first and third goals are for the moment achieved. The United States has displaced the Iraqi regime, limiting its ability to engage in strategic operations with the United States, and U.S. forces can conduct follow-on operations should they choose to. But the United States is in serious danger of failing to achieve its second goal: transforming the psychological perception of the United States as an irresistible military force.

It certainly is true that the guerrilla war does not represent a strategic threat to the United States. But on one level, the reality is irrelevant. Perception is everything. The image that the U.S. Army is constantly taking casualties and is unable to cripple the guerrillas undermines the perception that the United States wanted to generate with this war. The reality might be that the United States is overwhelmingly powerful and the guerrilla war is a minor nuisance. The perception in the Islamic world will be that the United States does not have the power to suppress Saddam Hussein's guerrillas. It will complicate the politico-military process that the United States wanted to put into motion with the invasion. It is therefore a situation that the United States will have to deal with.

The United States has, in essence, two strategic options:

1. Afghanistize the conflict. Move into secure base camps while allowing the political situation on the ground to play itself out. Allow the tension between Shiite and Sunni to explode into civil war, manipulating each side to the U.S. advantage, while focusing militarily on follow-on operations in Syria, Iran and elsewhere. In other words, insulate the U.S. military from the Iraqi reality, and carry on operations elsewhere.

2. Try to engage and defeat the guerrillas through counterinsurgency operations, including direct military attacks and political operations.

The dilemma facing the United States is this: From a strictly military perspective, Option 1 is most attractive. From a political and psychological perspective, Option 1 is unacceptable. It also creates a military risk: The insurgency, unless checked, ultimately could threaten the security of U.S. forces in Iraq no matter how well-defended they were in their secure facilities. On the other side of the equation, counterinsurgency operations always require disproportionate resources. The number of insurgents is unimportant. The number of places they might be and the number of locations they might attack dictate the amount of resources that must be devoted to them. Therefore, a relatively small group of guerrillas can tie down a much larger force. A sparse, dispersed and autonomous guerrilla force can draw off sufficient forces to make follow-on operations impossible.

The classical counterinsurgency dilemma now confronts the United States. The quantity of forces needed to defeat the guerrillas is disproportionate to the military advantage gained by defeating them. Failure to engage the guerrilla force could result in a dramatic upsurge in their numbers, allowing them to become unmanageable. The ineffective engagement of guerrillas could result in both the squandering of resources and the failure to contain them. The issue is not how large the guerrilla force is but how sustainable it is. At this stage of operations, the smaller the force the more difficult it is to suppress -- so long as it is large enough to carry out dispersed operations, has sufficient supplies and the ability to recruit new members as needed. At this point, the Iraqi guerrilla force is of indeterminate size, but it is certainly well-dispersed and has sufficient supplies to operate. Its ability to recruit will depend on arrangements made prior to the U.S. occupation and the evolution of the conflict. This sort of guerrilla warfare does not provide readily satisfactory solutions for the occupying power.

The classic solution of a guerrilla threat to an occupying power is to transfer the burden of fighting to an indigenous force. Not accidentally, the Iraqi guerrillas in recent days attacked and killed seven Iraqis being trained for this role. Inventing a counterinsurgency force beyond your own forces in the midst of conflict is not easy. Nevertheless, successful containment of a guerrilla force must involve either an indigenous force motivated to suppress the guerrillas or, alternatively, forces provided by a faction hostile to the guerrilla faction -- an ethnic or religious group that shares the occupier's interest in suppressing the guerrillas.

The greatest threat the United States faces in Iraq is not the guerrillas. It is the guerrillas combined with a rising among the Shiites south of Baghdad. If the guerrilla rising combines with an intifada -- a mass rising that might not use weapons beyond stones, but that could lead to a breakdown of U.S. controls in the south -- it would represent a most untenable situation. An intifada, apart from its intrinsic problems, could complicate logistics. Demonstrators likely would clog the supply routes from the south. Suppressing an intifada not only is difficult, it has political and psychological consequences as well.

It is imperative that the United States prevent a rising among the Shiites. It is also imperative that the United States find a native faction in Iraq that is prepared to take on some of the burden of suppressing the primarily Baathist guerrillas. The United States is afraid of a Shiite uprising, but could use the Shiites in suppressing the Baathists. The Shiites are the center of gravity of the situation.

Shiite leaders have made it clear that they want to dominate any new Iraqi government -- and that they expect the United States to create such a government. The United States has been concerned that Iran influences and even might control the Shiites and that handing over power to the Iraqi Shiites would, in effect, make Iran the dominant force in Iraq and ultimately in the Persian Gulf. That is a reasonable concern. Indeed, it violates the core U.S. strategy. The United States invaded Iraq, in part, to coerce Iran. To argue that the only way to stay in Iraq is to strengthen Iran makes little sense. On the other hand, if the United States continues to refuse to create a native government in Iraq, the probability of a Shiite rising is substantial.

The key to a U.S. strategy in Iraq, therefore, rests in Iran. If regime change in Iran could be rapidly achieved or a substantial accommodation with the Iranian government could be negotiated, then using the Iraqi Shiites to man an Iraqi government and bear the brunt of the counterinsurgency operation would be practical. The key is to reach an agreement with Iran that provides the United States with substantial assurances that the Iranian government would neither support nor allow Iranians to provide support to al Qaeda.

The regime in Tehran has no love for the Sunnis, nor do the Sunnis for the Shiites. The events in Pakistan show how deeply sectarian religious violence is rooted in the Islamic world. The United States cannot supplant Islamic fundamentalism. It can potentially manipulate the situation sufficiently to control the direct threat to the United States. In other words, if the United States can reach an understanding with Iran over al Qaeda and nuclear weapons, then the Shiites in Iraq could become a solution rather than a problem.

If there is to be an agreement with Iran, the United States must demonstrate to Iranian hardliners first that it has the ability to destabilize the Islamic Republic, and second that it is prepared not to do so in return for Shiite cooperation. Without this, any alliance with Iran over Iraq rapidly would spiral out of U.S. control, and Iran would become uncontrollable. The key for the United States is to demonstrate that it has leverage in Iran. The United States does not want to overthrow the Iranian government. It simply wants to demonstrate its ability to destabilize Iran if it chose to. If it can do that, then other things become possible.

It follows that the United States likely shortly will work to reignite the demonstrations in Iran -- in all probability in the next few days. The purpose will not be to overthrow the Iranian government -- that is beyond U.S. capabilities. Instead, it will be designed to persuade Iranian leaders -- including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei -- that some form of cooperation with the United States over issues that matter to the Americans is in their interest, and could result in something that the Iranians have longed dreamed of: a Shiite-dominated Iraq.

This strategy is extraordinarily convoluted and fraught with difficulties. But the prospect of fighting a counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq, alone, without indigenous support, is equally fraught with danger. So too is attempting an Afghan solution -- packing forces into air bases and army camps and allowing the insurrection to evolve. There are few good choices in Iraq at the moment. Alliance with the Shiites is extremely difficult and risky, but the other choices are equally difficult. If the Iranian/Shiite play fails, then it will be time to choose between counterinsurgency and enclaves.

62094
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 07, 2003, 03:33:07 PM »
NIGERIA
Kidnapped OFWs in Nigeria Freed
from Agence France Presse on Monday, July 07, 2003
LAGOS--Two Filipino oil workers who were kidnapped by pirates in Nigeria's western Niger Delta region and held for two weeks have been freed, their embassies said Monday.

"They are OK," Philippine Ambassador to Nigeria Masaranga Umpa told Agence France-Presse. "They have been released, through the intervention of the governor of Delta State (James Ibori)."

Another captive, a German national, was also freed.

The German embassy's spokesman confirmed that the men were free but could give no further details. Both embassies said the hostages were now in the company of embassy staff.

An armed gang stormed a US-owned oil industry tugboat as it made its way through the swamps of the western delta last month and captured its German captain and two Filipino crewmen.

The trio were held in a village in the home area of the restless Ijaw ethnic group, which in March launched a rebellion against its perceived political marginalization.

But the motive for the kidnap appears to have been purely criminal. The men's captors demanded 25 million naira (equivalent to 197,000 dollars or 168,000 euros) in ransom and 400,000 naira for food.

Neither embassy could say if a ransom had been paid.

The men worked for the Florida-based oil services company Seabulk, which works as a sub-contractor supplying crews and vessels to the Anglo-Dutch oil giant Shell in the delta.

In March, unrest among the Ijaws forced Shell and major US oil firm ChevronTexaco to shut down their operations in the western Delta, cutting more than 40 percent from Nigeria's oil output.

Production is now returning to normal, but the situation remains tense. Even before the March uprising the kidnapping of oil workers was fairly common.

Copyright 2003 www.inq7.net

62095
Politics & Religion / Political Rants
« on: July 03, 2003, 09:24:32 PM »
Hate My Father? No Ma'am!
By Glenn Sacks
 

 

The university professor began the first class of the semester by announcing that she was an "anti-imperialist, anti-heterosexist Marxist-feminist." She read us the famous quote from Robin Morgan, the leading feminist and former editor of Ms. Magazine, who said "kill your fathers, not your mothers."  Seeing the students' shocked faces, she added "Kill is too strong.  Hate your fathers, not your mothers."  I guess she was a moderate.

One of the male students in the class, obviously feeling chastised, said the defense I've heard young men say hundreds of times--"don't blame us for what happened to women in the past--blame our fathers and grandfathers."

I've ruminated darkly over those words many times, and when thinking of my father and grandfather, I can't help but be struck by the special burdens they shouldered as men, because they were men, and how these special burdens have now become a blank space in our history.

Hate my grandfather? My grandfather was a milkman.  A young immigrant who enlisted to fight in World War I out of gratitude to the country which had allowed him to escape Russian Czarist tyranny.  A man who, wounded in the decisive Battle of the Argonne Forest in 1918, received the Purple Heart and the French Croix de Guerre.  A tender father who stayed up half the night stroking the fevered brow of his sickly youngest daughter--a "daddy's girl"-- before going to work at three in the morning. A man who put his safety and even his life on the line during the violent union strikes and battles of the 1930s, because he believed that workers have the right to decent wages and living conditions.

Hate my father? The man who worked six days a week for 25 years yet somehow always had time to spend with me? Who never once let me down? Who worked 12 hour days when my sister and I were toddlers so he could ensure that we would be provided for? Who recalls sadly as he looks at his little granddaughter that he doesn't even remember what we looked like at that age, because he was rarely able to be home?

The successful feminist re-writing of the pre-feminist past as a virtual dark ages where men lived like nobles and women were their serfs is at the core of the "hate your father" idea. Tens of millions of male blue collar workers--who put their bodies on the line in the coal mines and steel mills so their wives and children could live in safety and comfort--have been turned into oppressors.  Their wives and children, for whom these men sacrificed so much, have been turned into their victims.  

Edited out of our history are the tragedies of millions of American men who were killed or maimed on what early trade unionists called the "battlefield of labor."  The miners who died in cave-ins, explosions, or of black lung disease.  The sailors and fisherman who died at sea. The oil refinery workers killed in explosions. The factory workers killed in industrial accidents. The construction workers who died carving train tracks and then highways through majestic mountain cliffs or the scorching desert.  The construction workers who died building our bridges, dams, high rises, stadiums, and apartments.

All of them have been forgotten, in part because there is no natural constituency which would like to remember them--the right generally does not dwell on yesterday's struggling blue collar workers and heroic union men, and the left is beholden to the feminists, for whom any mention of men as special contributors or as victims is strictly forbidden.

The only credit left for men is the military, and even this has been partially hijacked.  We now speak of "the men and women who fought and died in our wars" as if even one percent of our military casualties were ever suffered by women, or as if women were ever conscripted the way men were.

Feminists once excoriated our society--correctly--for ignoring the massive, hidden contributions of women in child-rearing and housework.  They asked new and important  questions like "Who cooked the last supper?" and, even better, "Who washed the dishes afterwards?"  But we have now come full circle--men's special and unique contributions (hazardous jobs, long work hours, long commutes, time away from the family, etc.) are ignored, and any reference to them as a male burden is "sexism."

I thought of this recently  when I took my young son to a large model train exhibition, one rich in 1940s and 1950s Americana.  Looking at the huge displays of trains cutting through mountain peaks, of bridges and railroad trusses towering hundreds of feet above canyons and rivers, of towns and their factories and coal mines, of the sheer industrial might of the old America, I felt torn inside.  I know that this was a world where many Americans were terribly mistreated--blacks, Latinos, some women, and often the working-class and the poor.  Yet I couldn't also help but feel a tug of nostalgia as I looked at a world which men--through their ingenuity, strength, and raw physical courage--had carved out of wilderness.  Men of my generation have endured relentless criticism,  and even the best of us must struggle just to attain the moral status automatically granted to women.  Yet in this older world, it seems,  there was respect for men and the special sacrifices they made.

And perhaps someday, the professor's dictum "hate your father" aside, there will be some respect for the sacrifices my father and grandfather made, the uniquely male sacrifices they made. Hate my father?  No ma'am!

62096
Politics & Religion / WW3
« on: July 03, 2003, 07:08:03 AM »
www.stratfor.com

Geopolitical Diary: Thursday, July 3, 2003

The change of command at CENTCOM is scheduled for July 7, the U.S.
Department of Defense announced today. That answers the question we posed on June 26, when we wrote, "Since our view is that Iraq is now in crisis and that the crisis is intensifying, it follows that an accelerated change of command is in order. If [Defense Secretary Donald] Rumsfeld grasps the magnitude of the challenge -- and by now he would have to be in a coma not to -- he will dramatically speed up the transition at CENTCOM." Clearly, Rumsfeld is not in a coma. We can speculate as to why he has chosen to speak about Iraq as he has, but that is no longer all that interesting. The fact is the change of command at CENTCOM will take place at the earliest possible moment, which means Rumsfeld fully understands the severity of the situation, regardless of what he says.

Obviously, it will be left to Gen. John Abiziad to craft the counterinsurgency strategy. However, the Philadelphia Enquirer reported that Paul Bremer, the U.S. administrator in Iraq, is asking for a 33 percent increase in the number of troops in Iraq. Reuters quoted a "senior Pentagon official" -- also known as Rumsfeld (we never have figured out why Washington officials play these games, but they all do) -- as saying, "There has been no such request. There are still remnants that are going to try to do harm to our forces. And there are still going to be casualties. The other side is if you put more troops in, you put more targets in there." But you also increase the risk to the guerrillas. Either way, it is clear that a bottoms-up review of U.S. strategy will take place under Abiziad's control, and that review is under way now. Abiziad is in-theater now but will return next week for the change-of-command ceremony. We expect that he also will present his recommendations to Rumsfeld and U.S. President George W. Bush.

It should be noted that there appears to be a decrease in Iraqi guerrilla
operations in the past 24 hours, since Operation Sidewinder got into high
gear. Therefore, an argument can be made -- and we suspect it will be
made -- that more troops mean more Sidewinders, not that 24 hours means a whole lot.

As if Iraq and al Qaeda weren't enough, it looks fairly certain that the
United States will send nearly 1,000 Marines to Liberia. There has been an
ongoing civil war there, and the country is essentially in a state of chaos.
U.N. General-Secretary Kofi Annan asked the United States to send troops to Liberia. U.S. officials did not want to get involved there, but Annan was insistent and Washington was trapped. Having made the case for intervention in Iraq against Annan's wishes, U.S. officials were hard-pressed to reject Annan's call for intervention in Liberia. The logic is not crisp, but the public relations are. We suspect Annan enjoyed maneuvering the United States into an intervention. As of this hour, the intervention is not a done deal. Washington is hoping for any miracle that would keep it from sending troops into a situation that is both hopeless and not directly related to what the administration sees as core U.S. interests. But the probability is that the Marines will go in -- although the mission and exit strategy are not clear to us at all, and imaginative explanations is what we do for a living.

Japan buckled under U.S. pressure today. The Japanese were moving toward a deal worth $2 billion to develop the Azadegan oil field in Iran. The United States is putting intense pressure on Iran to curtail its nuclear
development program and one of the levers is to try to isolate Iran
economically. Japan's decision to reconsider its investment is a measure of the intensity of Washington's campaign. Japan imports all of the oil it
uses. It constantly is looking for long-term sources of oil as a matter of
core national policy. It also has a core national policy to maintain its
security relationship with the United States. The two cores collided, and
the United States won. The Japanese certainly are not happy to have been put in this position.

Making Japan unhappy is fairly gratuitous these days. What U.S. officials
really want to do is to make the Iranians unhappy. We suspect that they are quite unhappy with both the pressure and its effectiveness. What we continue to anticipate is the Iranian response. The student uprising in Iran has collapsed, but the Iranians continue to regard the rising as an American plot. It is very dangerous to make an enemy feel it is being crushed without actually crushing them. The heavier the pressure on the Iranians, without breaking them, the greater the pressure is for Iran to try to do something decisive -- like stir up the Iraqi Shiites. The United States is on a tightrope with Iran, which is why the faster Abiziad can get control of the situation in Iraq -- assuming he can get control -- the happier Washington is going to be.

62097
Politics & Religion / Current Events: Philippines
« on: July 02, 2003, 11:34:31 AM »
Not exactly current events, but from today's WSJ:

--------------

Deja Vu
In 1901 Philippines, Peace Cost
More Lives Than the War Itself
Remember the Maine?

It was the catalyst for a brief war and then a longer occupation of a foreign country that claimed far more casualties than the war itself.

The American battleship Maine was standing by in Havana harbor in February 1898, as the U.S. and Spain went toe-to-toe over Cuba's independence. For several years, Cuban insurgents had been revolting against Spain's colonial government, and the country was a wreck. Thousands of civilians were caught in the crossfire.

Some Americans fervently wanted President McKinley to help Cuba renounce its mother country. American investors were losing fortunes in the conflict.

But others, equally fervently, opposed intervening in another nation's revolution. The U.S. economy had barely recovered from a recession, and if Spain were able to enlist Old World allies, America's military could be routed.

President McKinley began putting diplomatic pressure on Spain to end the war and declared he wouldn't tolerate a prolonged conflict.

Then, on Feb. 15, 1898, the Maine blew up.

History has never definitively fixed the blame for the explosion and death of 260 American sailors, but prowar forces quickly denounced the "cowardly Spanish conspiracy," as one newspaper put it. In Congress, militants forced the moderates into retreat, and on April 25, Congress declared war on Spain.

It was "a splendid little war," John Hay, America's ambassador to England, later wrote. It was brief (four months long), inexpensive, and "only" 460 American soldiers died in battle. Late in 1898, representatives of Spain and America met in Paris to negotiate a peace treaty. The U.S. paid Spain $20 million to vacate not only Cuba, but also Guam, Puerto Rico and the 7,100-island archipelago of the Philippines. Although Filipinos were barred from negotiations, the U.S. decided to take control of their country.

McKinley, who had earlier confessed he couldn't locate the Philippines on a map "within 2000 miles," claimed, "there was nothing left for us to do but to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them." A policy of "benevolent assimilation," he called it.

Over the next three years, some 4,000 Americans -- about 10 times the number killed in the war itself -- died trying to quell Filipino resistance. More than 200,000 Filipinos, mostly civilians, also died.

In 1901, the U.S. established a civilian colonial government in Manila, and quickly made advocating independence a crime punishable by prison.

From the Filipinos' point of view, their country had simply been passed from one oppressor to another. Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, leader of the country's independence movement, condemned the "violent and aggressive seizure" of the Philippines "by a nation which has arrogated to itself the title 'champion of oppressed nations.'&"

The Sedition Law, passed the same year, went so far as to impose long imprisonment, even death, on anyone who spoke, wrote or published "scurrilous libels" against the colonial government.

In America, meanwhile, a debate raged over whether the U.S. had the right to govern another country without its citizens' consent. Andrew Carnegie, arguing against the occupation, said, "Our young men volunteered to fight the oppressor; I shall be surprised if they relish the work of shooting down the oppressed."

Mark Twain also sympathized with the Filipinos, pitying them for having "progress and civilization" foisted on them by the "Blessings-of-Civilization Trust."

Those who supported America's presence in the Philippines used both moral and economic arguments. "The Philippines are ours forever," proclaimed Republican Sen. Albert Beveridge of Indiana. "And just beyond the Philippines are China's illimitable markets. We will not retreat from either. We will not abandon our opportunity in the Orient. We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee under God, of the civilization of the world."

The conflict in the Philippines was neither little nor splendid. Outmanned and outgunned, Filipino forces used guerrilla tactics, picking off U.S. soldiers in small skirmishes.

American soldiers responded by turning some areas of the country into "a howling wilderness," as Gen. Jacob Smith put it. Col. George S. Anderson conceded that American soldiers killed indiscriminately during raids on villages. "Many men were shot as they fled," he said, "but they probably all deserved it."

Three years after the battle for the Philippines began, the U.S. declared the war over, and slowly began to withdraw its forces.

Gradually, life began to return to normal. But many Americans never understood what their country wanted with the Philippines. As the comic character Mr. Dooley pondered in 1898, "I don't know what to do with th' Ph'lippeens anny more thin I did las' summer, befure I heerd tell iv thim ... 'twud be a disgrace f'r to lave befure we've pounded these frindless an' ongrateful people into insinsibility."

62098
Politics & Religion / Libertarian themes
« on: July 02, 2003, 05:18:56 AM »
Your Papers, Please
"...How did [Americans] manage to reverse [their] thinking? When did appeals to the lessons of history become treasonous? How did philosophic principles collapse into patriotic slogans? The answers to such questions underlie explanations for the much broader phenomenon of the collapse of Western civilization itself. Our very survival -- both as individuals and as a civilization -- depends upon a radical transformation of our thinking, one that compels us to confront those silent voices within us that can so easily erupt into bloodbaths..."

Butler Shaffer

Georgetown, Texas. Like a lynch mob fueled by a fear of the unknown and a willingness to see strangers as threats to be quickly dispatched, the herd impulse has, since 9/11, become mobilized on behalf of a war against shadows. Even beyond the violent and repressive reactions of the American government, the most unsettling consequence of the WTC attacks has been the nearly total collapse of the minds of most Americans.

For the duration of the war -- which government officials tell us will go on forever! -- men and women have rationed their intelligence and allowed what they would have heretofore regarded as their "fundamental principles" to be conscripted into the service of the state.

Americans who, five years ago, were so incensed at Bill Clinton's perjured testimony that impeachment proceedings were brought, now exhibit a willingness to be lied to about matters of far greater concern than oval office shenanigans. As the Bush administration continues to pile lie upon lie, it is evident that most Americans are completely indifferent to the purposes for the attack upon Iraq. I suspect that, if Bush and his fellow war conspirators were to publicly announce that the Iraqi invasion was deigned for no other purpose than to put money into their pockets, most Americans -- led by their electronic cheerleaders on talk-radio and cable television -- would praise them for showing "ambition" and "leadership!"

America is becoming the Nazi Germany we feared in my childhood. For those who were not around during those years, you can get a flavor for the anti-tyrannical sentiments of the time by watching any number of movies depicting the Nazi police-state. The constant presence of police; the insistence upon showing "your papers" to whichever government underling demanded them; the awareness that neither your person nor home was immune from state searches or seizures; the disappearance of people into unknown prison camps; neighbors spying upon neighbors, and children betraying their parents to the state; and the domination of society by a military and bureaucratic arrogance, arbitrariness, and absolutism, were constantly chilling examples of the dangers of state power.

How did we manage to reverse our thinking? When did appeals to the lessons of history become treasonous? How did philosophic principles collapse into patriotic slogans? The answers to such questions underlie explanations for the much broader phenomenon of the collapse of Western civilization itself. This is a topic around which my articles revolve, and has been addressed by numerous historians, as well as Carl Jung, whose psychological explanations add a depth to the inquiry unmatched by others.

A preoccupation with war has long been symptomatic of the decline of societies that practice it. Wars are essentially conducted by governments against their own people -- with "others" being held up as fear-objects around which to enlist the obedience and submission of their own citizenry. Any nation in wartime is telling us what George Bush, John Ashcroft, Tom Ridge, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, et al., are now telling us -- if we will suspend our indifference to truth long enough to observe -- namely, that society can only be held together by armed force, threats, imprisonment, and death. When coercion supplants cooperation; when the inviolability of the individual is sacrificed to some alleged collective security; and when violence is equated with "patriotism" and peace with "un-Americanism," the days of such a society are numbered.

<?<?For those who desire to understand the attraction that this violent, destructive system has for most of us, a new book, War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning, by Chris Hedges, offers one of the most powerful critiques of the war system since Randolph Bourne. Not content to moralize against war or to call it names, Hedges analyzes the topic from an historical, psychological, and institutional perspective, drawing upon literary and mythological works to illustrate his observations. At the same time, his book is quite critical of war, not the kind of read that flag-waving, "United We Stand" jingoists will find comforting.

Hedges has been a foreign correspondent for some fifteen years for such news organizations as the Christian Science Monitor and the New York Times. You may be more familiar with him as the recent commencement speaker at Rockford College, where he was hooted, heckled, and air-horned by war-lovers in the audience. Intellectual bankruptcy is another symptom of a dying culture, wherein discomforting ideas and criticisms can only be met with the kind of unfocused, thoughtless rage that is becoming increasingly evident in radio and television programming. For the herd-oriented, a new idea can only be countered not by clear thinking, but by blasts from an air-horn!

Hedges observes that "tates at war silence their own authentic and humane culture" and, in so doing, "erode the moral fabric" of a society. He adds: "[w]ar breaks down long-established prohibitions against violence, destruction, and murder," and leads to a situation in which "the domination and brutality of the battlefield is carried into personal life." "War," he goes on, "fills our spiritual void," and helps to erase "unsettling undercurrents of alienation and dislocation" in our lives. In words that reflect the disquieting climate in which we live, Hedges observes "a growing fusion between those in the state who wage war...and those who believe they understand and can act as agents for God."

I cannot exaggerate the importance of these observations. They force us, as do the writings of Jung, Krishnamurti, and others, to confront the "dark side" forces that reside within each of us no less than they did within tyrants and their supporters in other times and places. They also compel us to reconsider our thinking. The idea of creating systems designed to threaten, coerce, and kill, and to imbue such agencies with principled legitimacy, and not expect them to lead to wars, genocides, and other tyrannical practices, expresses an innocence we can no longer afford to indulge.

Hedges reminds us of the culture of war, which "is peddled by mythmakers" throughout society, including the modern media. You can observe such mythmaking as the media struggles to find evidence of "heroism" in a "war" that is more realistically described as a campaign of brutish bullying. A truckload of soldiers take a wrong turn on a road, are captured by Iraqi forces and later released, then brought back to America as "POW heroes"; the irresponsibility of single mothers leaving their infant children at home to go fight in a war; and the Hollywood-like staging of the "rescue" of Private Lynch, who is then brought back to America as a "heroine", are among the more apparent examples of the war system playing with smoke and mirrors in an effort to convince boobus Americanus of the nobility of the cause.

While the institutionalized butchery of the war system makes it difficult for me to equate it with heroism, one does, on occasion, find individual acts of a heroic quality even in battle. My favorite candidate for this role is Warrant Officer Hugh Thompson, a helicopter pilot in the Vietnam War who came upon the scene of what we now know as the "My Lai Massacre." After becoming aware that what he was observing was not the ordinary combat of warfare, but a calculated slaughter of Vietnamese civilians by troops led by Lt. Calley, Thompson set his helicopter down between the civilians and the American troops. He then ordered his own crew to turn their machine guns on the American soldiers and, if they persisted in the slaughter, to fire on them. Thompson then took the civilians to safety and reported the incident, which led to the prosecution of Calley.

I doubt that there will be any statues of Hugh Thompson erected anywhere soon, or that he will be leading any Memorial Day parades. His actions were too heroic, for he stood up to the very excesses of butchery that Hedges informs us destroys our sense of humanity and, with it, our civilization. I would much rather have Hugh Thompson as my neighbor than I would any of the myriad of retired generals who became television network fixtures in the mythmaking to which we have become accustomed these past many months.

Our very survival -- both as individuals and as a civilization -- depends upon a radical transformation of our thinking, one that compels us to confront those silent voices within us that can so easily erupt into bloodbaths. While most of us continue to focus on the "Nazi holocaust" as the epitome of statist butchery, we must recall that the 20th century was the "holocaust century." Some 200,000,000 of our fellow human beings were slaughtered in various wars and genocides, and tens of millions more were wounded, both physically and spiritually, in ways that never heal.

Because we fear the responsibility for our actions, we have allowed ourselves to develop the mentality of slaves. Contrary to the stirring sentiments of the Declaration of Independence, we now pledge "our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor" not to one another for our mutual protection, but to the state, whose actions continue to exploit, despoil, and destroy us. The poet, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, declared: "I am waiting for the war to be fought which will make the world safe for anarchy." While I share his sentiment, it is nonetheless evident that wars only bring up from the depths of our dark side the kinds of moral flotsam and jetsam that have surfaced in Washington, D.C. In the process, they destroy those qualities of peace, liberty, spiritual centeredness, mutual respect, and sense of individual responsibility which, alone, make for the greatness of any civilization.

Butler Shaffer teaches at the Southwestern University School of Law.

62099
Politics & Religion / Political Rants
« on: July 01, 2003, 09:31:40 PM »
Woof Rog et al:

  I could go at length on the merits of why I don't like her (a bag lady-- the $100k commodities deal that was a pay off to her husband the governor; a criminal-- the missing files from her law firm found in her quarters, the theft of White House furniture; her participation in peddling pardons;  a socialist-- the effort to socialize American medicine, etc etc etc) but instead I'll share the following:

Crafty
-----------------
Some Late Night TV show comments about our beloved Hillary........

"Hillary's got this huge book, it's a memoir of her life and times at the
White House. In the book she says when Bill told her he was having an
affair, she said 'I could hardly breath, I was gulping for air.'
No, I'm  sorry, that's what Monica said."
     David Letterman


"Hillary Clinton's book hits the stores this Monday. Oh
boy, it took her a long time to write it. But in her defense, every time she
tried to use the desk, Bill was always using it for a date."
       Jay Leno


"Hillary Clinton's 506-page memoirs comes out next week.
So much of her personality shines through, that in the end, you'll want
to sleep with an intern."
         Craig Kilborn


"In Hillary Clinton's new book 'Living History,' Hillary
details what it was like meeting Bill Clinton, falling in love with him,
getting married, and living a passionate, wonderful life as husband and
wife. Then on page two, the trouble starts."
         Jay Leno


"Hillary Clinton has finished her memoirs for publication
next year, while Bill has barely finished the first chapter. Well, in all
fairness, Fiction is a lot harder to write."
         Jay Leno

"Hillary Clinton, our junior senator from New York, announced that
she has no intentions of ever, ever running for office of the
President of the United States. Her husband, Bill Clinton, is bitterly
disappointed. He is crushed. There go his dreams of becoming a
two-impeachment family."
         David Letterman

"Last night, Se! nator Hillary Clinton hosted her first
party in her new home in Washington. People said it was a lot like the parties she used to host at the White House. In fact, even the furniture was the same."
         Jay Leno

"Senator Hillary Clinton is attacking President Bush for
breaking his campaign promise to cut carbon dioxide emissions, saying
a promise made, a promise broken. And then out of habit, she demanded that Bush spend the night on the couch."
         Late, Late Show host Craig Kilborn

"Hillary Clinton is the junior senator from the great state of New York.
When they swore her in, she used the Clinton family Bible. You know,
the one with only seven commandments."
         David Letterman

"CNN found that Hillary Clinton is the most admired woman in America.
Women admire her because she's strong and successful. Men admire her because she allows her husband to cheat and get away with it."
         Jay Leno

62100
Politics & Religion / Political Rants
« on: July 01, 2003, 02:45:06 PM »
BY DIANE RAVITCH
Tuesday, July 1, 2003 12:01 a.m. EDT

Students across the state of New York recently took their Regents' examinations, the tests that they must pass in order to get a high school diploma. A year ago, the state education department was embarrassed when Jeanne Heifetz, a vigilant parent in Brooklyn, announced her discovery that state officials had expurgated literary selections on the English examination. Words and sentences that might offend anyone had been quietly deleted from passages by writers such as Elie Wiesel, Isaac Bashevis Singer, and Franz Kafka.

New York's penchant for bowdlerizing literature, it turns out, was not unique to the Empire State. The educational publishing industry follows very specific guidelines to ensure that school children are not exposed to words or topics that might be controversial, especially those that are related to gender, race, religion, or sex. I compiled a list of over 500 words that are banned by one or more publishers. Some are relatively obsolete, like "authoress" or "geezer," but others are everyday words that one is likely to encounter in the newspaper, like "landlord," "senior citizen," "dogma," "yacht" or "actress" (what would the late Katherine Hepburn have made of that?).


 

Since my book appeared, I have received a large number of letters from people in the educational publishing industry, offering fresh material about the sanitizing that occurs on a regular basis. In Michigan, the state does not allow mention of flying saucers or extraterrestrials on its test, because those subjects might imply the forbidden topic of evolution. A text illustrator wrote to say that she was not permitted to portray a birthday party because Jehovah's Witnesses do not believe in celebrating birthdays. Another illustrator told me that he was directed to airbrush the udder from his drawing of a cow because that body part was "too sexual."
A review of my book in the Scotsman, an Edinburgh newspaper, said that a well-known local writer for children sold a story to an American textbook company, along with illustrations. The U.S. publisher, however, informed her that she could not show a little girl sitting on her grandfather's lap, as the drawing implied incest. So, the author changed the adult's face, so that the little girl was sitting on her grandmother's lap instead. A contributor to a major textbook series prepared a story comparing the great floods in 1889 in Johnstown, Pa., with those in 1993 in the Midwest, but was unable to find an acceptable photograph. The publisher insisted that everyone in the rowboats must be wearing a lifevest to demonstrate safety procedures.

A freelance writer sent me the "bias guidelines" for a major publisher of texts and tests. The "bias guidelines" consist of advice to writers and editors about words and topics that must be avoided, as well as specifications for illustrations. Like other publishers, this one requires adherence to gender and ethnic balance. All lessons, test questions, and illustrations must reflect the following ratios: 50-50 male-female; 45% Caucasian; 25% African American; 22% Hispanic American; 5% Asian American; 5% American Indian and others; and 3% "persons with disabilities." These figures do not total 100%, nor do they represent actual U.S. Census numbers, but the principle of representation is well understood by writers and editors. American society, as represented in the textbooks, is perfectly integrated by race, ethnicity, gender, age, and disability.

When it comes to illustrations in textbooks, certain images--women cooking, men acting assertive, scenes of poverty, and old people walking with the aid of a cane or a walker--are likewise considered unacceptable. The specifications for photographs, I have learned, are exquisitely detailed. Men and boys must not be larger than women and girls. Asians must not appear as shorter than non-Asians. Women must wear bras, and men must not have noticeable bulges below the waist. People must wear shoes and socks, never showing bare feet or the soles of shoes, and their shoelaces must be solid black, brown, or white. People must never gesture with their fingers, nor should anyone be depicted eating with the left hand. Things to avoid: holiday decorations and scenes in which a church or a bar appears in the background.

There are so many rules, one wonders how they manage to keep track of them. Even after its national humiliation a year ago, the New York State Education Department still manages to make mistakes. On the last administration of the Regents' English examination in January, the state asked high school seniors to write about a poem by Matthew Arnold. However, the examination did not mention the name of this famous poem ("Dover Beach"); it inexplicably offered only one stanza of the four-stanza poem; and it changed or misquoted an important line. Instead of Arnold's exclamation, "Ah, love, let us be true to one another!" it stated, "Ah, friend, let us be true to one another!"


 

As the example shows, bowdlerization is not only dishonest, it leads to dumbing down of language and ideas. And of one thing I am convinced: The widespread censorship of language and ideas in education caused by the demands of advocacy groups will not end unless it is regularly exposed to public review and ridicule. The next time someone in a publishing office or a state education agency suggests deleting a literary passage from a test or textbook because it contains the word "anchorman" or shows a witch flying around on a broomstick, perhaps someone in the room will say, "Wait, if we do that, people will laugh at us."

Ms. Ravitch is author of "The Language Police: How Pressure Groups Restrict What Students Learn" (Knopf, 2003).

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