Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on October 13, 2006, 06:25:58 AM
-
www.stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: The Non-Reactions to the North Korean Test
One of the rules of geopolitical analysis is that you should pay little attention to what people say and a great deal of attention to what they do. Applying that principle to the North Korean explosion (nuclear, fizzled or other) causes us to come to a singular conclusion: there is no great concern among the major powers about what happened. No one is doing anything on their own and no one can agree on what should be done together. If this is a crisis, no one is acting that way.
The United States and Japan, it is true, have imposed sanctions on North Korea. However, China and Russia aren't going along with this, therefore the action is fairly meaningless. It's like a balloon with two holes in it: it defeats the entire purpose. The United States, it should be added, can't be surprised by the Russian and Chinese position. Moscow and Beijing have always been wary of following the U.S. sanctioning protocol with other countries, and they were always unlikely to follow the Americans on North Korea. Given that fact -- and given that Washington knows it -- U.S. and Japanese sanctions are more a gesture than an action.
If one listens to conventional analyses of the situation, North Korea poses a threat to the international community, and the key countries -- the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea -- are searching for ways to achieve the common goal of a non-nuclear North Korea. This is the community-of-nations theory of international relations, also known as multilateralism. It makes an assumption of a common interest that really isn't accurate. In fact, all of the key players have very different interests.
China, for example, sounds like a country that is quite upset that North Korea did something it didn't want. It behaves as a country that is quite content with North Korea's move, as it should be; the test flouts America's will and the United States is unable to do anything about it. American impotence is of direct interest to China. The United States has maneuvered itself into a position of taking primary responsibility for dealing with North Korea's threat. China, seeking a dominant position in Asia, welcomes anything that makes the United States appear incapable of carrying out this role. The weaker the United States appears, the greater the vacuum for China to step into. Beijing is going to make the appropriate sounds, but will also make certain that the United States looks as helpless as possible.
The Russians, too, are pleased to see North Korea's challenge to the United States and America's inability to respond; they are not going to bail Washington out. Russia sees itself as locked in a duel with the United States in the former Soviet Union. It holds the Americans responsible for the recent crisis in Georgia, as well as for a generally aggressive stance in Ukraine and Central Asia. The Russians are delighted to see the United States bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. Anything that adds to American pain can only help.
Now, one might say that both Moscow and Beijing should be concerned that the unstable government in Pyongyang might threaten them with nuclear weapons. In our view, neither China nor Russia sees Pyongyang as unstable, politically or mentally. They are not worried about North Korean nukes because (a) North Korea doesn't really have nuclear weapons yet and (b) North Korea will be wiped from the face of the Earth by China or Russia should it strike at them and Pyongyang knows it. The risks are low and the benefits are high for both China and Russia. The appropriate expressions of concern will be uttered, but neither country will do anything.
Japan is concerned -- but not to the point of taking any unilateral action, because it can't. South Korea is far more worried about a conventional war than North Korean nukes, and does not want the government in Pyongyang to fall under any circumstances. The task of integrating a post-Communist North Korea with the South would cripple South Korea for decades. The South Koreans are not happy North Korea tested a nuke, but they are not about to do anything to destabilize the situation.
Multilateral approaches assume that there is a common interest in a solution and that the problem is working out the process to get there. There are indeed times when there is a common interest among nations, but they are rarer than times when interests diverge. In the case of North Korea, what we see is not a group of nations struggling to find a way to achieve a common goal. Rather, we see a group of nations pretending to have a common goal, and using that as a cover for pursuing very different ends. China and Russia view this as weakening the United States and they like it. South Korea does not want chaos to the North. Japan is waiting for someone else to take a risk. And the United States is out of options and allies.
The only good news for Washington is that it might discover that the test was not a nuclear test at all. That would relieve it of the burden of doing something, and therefore not make it look nearly as helpless as it now does. Indeed, discovering that there was no nuclear blast would solve a lot of problems; it would show that not doing anything was the result of prudence, and not of a lack of options.
-
Thanks Crafty for the Strat report. I don't agree completely, but it makes a nice takeoff point for discussion.
Strat makes several assertions or conclusions that are arguably valid, but could also be looked at differently. At the core they seem to see this as a U.S. public relations challenge with the U.S. looking impotent. IMO, that assumes that people buy the anti-American rhetoric of the regime (they are doing this because they are threatened by the U.S., they demand 2-party talks with the U.S., etc.).
Blame goes to the NK regime IMO, not Clinton, Carter, Bush or China. If they fed their people or allowed any human effort at having an economy maybe one could then argue that defense and exerting sovereignty are healthy or righteous interests. That is not the case.
If there is a PR problem it should go to China who has influence and leverage, who laid down the line that was then crossed.
Strat quote: "The United States has maneuvered itself into a position of taking primary responsibility for dealing with North Korea's threat."
Yes, the current and previous President said this was unacceptable. But I assume the same goes for statements of all others in the 6-party talks except for the DPRK and the UN and all the non-proliferation nations. This is NOT acceptable. Unfortunately, all this is in the context of the Iraq experience: the 12 years of resolutions without enforcement or consequences, the lack of support for action from so much of the world, and the enormous difficulty, tragedy and yet unknown outcome of finally taking bold action.
Strat continued: "the United States is out of options and allies."
Obviously there is an elephant in the room, a militatary strike in the spirit of Ozirak, the Israeli strike on an Iraqi nuclear facility in June 1981, is very carefully not being mentioned or discussed in any way. Ozirak reference: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/mcnair41/41osi.htm
I see that China is working on a new fence: http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/10/17/asia/AS_GEN_China_NKorea_Fence.php Perhaps that is in preparation for the fall of the NK regime and perhaps they are considering stronger actions after they feel they can control the flow of refugees - pure speculation on my part. As Strat wrote, they also have an interest in seeing the status quo continue. They certainly do not fear the NK regime.
The U.S. allies with the most to fear from a nuclear NK are obviously South Korea first (if they are still our ally), then Japan and ...Taiwan, oops another elephant in the room.
I don't know the timeframe for North Korea becoming a real threat. If this is a U.S. problem, then the political timeframe for this administration taking any action is 2 years. In the Ozirak link above, the time frame was also driven by a leader with a deadline to leave office.
Under my theory that this really is a China problem first and with China not wanting Japan and Taiwan to accelerate their militarization or increase their defense cooperation with the U.S., I presume China could shut this down one way or another in a short order if or when that decision is made.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2006/10/16/video-mark-steyn-on-north-korea/
-
We need a thread dedicated to NK. So here it is, started with yet another post pilfered from GM :-D
The Sunday Times October 22, 2006
Kim tested by rise of armed resistance
Michael Sheridan, Far East Correspondent
AN underground resistance movement in North Korea, capable of smuggling out videos of executions and staging violent acts of defiance, has emerged as the Kim Jong-il dictatorship faces international sanctions for testing a nuclear bomb.
The latest evidence of North Koreans willing to risk their lives to tell their story is a video showing the execution by firing squad of a woman convicted of murder committed in the course of stealing food last July.
Captured by a bystander with a tiny camera, it shows the victim being tied to a stake, watched by other convicts, in a field next to the Juyi River in the north.
There are sounds of people muttering in Korean, ?See, that?s how they blindfold them,? as three executioners prepare to fire. Shouted commands are then heard.
As a ragged series of 12 shots resounds, blurry clouds of smoke break out around the distant figure, which slumps in its bonds. The body is then wrapped in what appears to be a plastic bag for burial.
The video was aired by Japan?s Asahi Television, which said the dead woman was named Yoo Bun Hee, but gave no details of how it obtained the pictures. North Korean exiles said they believe it is authentic.
The footage provides a clue to an unexplained series of border incidents earlier this year which North Korean officials blamed on a shadowy ?resistance?.
In one clash North Korean border guards confronted three men creeping at night across the frozen Tumen River from China. In the ensuing fight the intruders stabbed several soldiers and escaped, leaving a bag containing three guns, ammunition, a video camera and a phone.
On the same night in late January men opened fire on a frontier post at the town of Huiryeong, causing an unknown number of casualties before escaping.
Chinese witnesses and foreign diplomats say there have been repeated outbreaks of gunfire, usually at night, along the mountainous barren borderlands. Lim Chun Yong, a former North Korean special forces officer who has defected, claimed that four or five groups of an ?armed resistance? were in the area.
?The people say among themselves that the regime is worse than the Japanese colonists,? he told South Korea?s Dong-A Ilbo newspaper.
The constant traffic of traders and escapees along the 850-mile border has eroded totalitarian controls to the point where clandestine goods and ideas now thrive in the frontier provinces. Smuggled mobiles allow North Koreans to make calls on Chinese networks by capturing their signals at the border.
Because there are no barriers to calling South Korea or the United States from China, they can talk to family members and enemies of the regime.
The latest video is proof that Chinese currency and DVDs are in circulation, because some witnesses to the execution had been forced to watch as punishment for possessing such things.
People smugglers and black-marketeers are rife. Chinese sources said some North Korean border guards could be bribed to turn a blind eye.
When the rivers freeze or dry to a trickle, it is almost impossible to seal the frontier. Chinese travellers report that in some areas North Korean officials are too nervous to go out at night and military reinforcements have been brought in from politically reliable units.
Experts on the regime do not expect it to fold quickly or easily. The exiled Hwang Jang-yop, 83, who was the chief ideologue in Pyongyang before his astonishing defection to the South in the late 1990s, says only the overthrow of Kim Jong-il could end its nuclear ambitions.
Kim could also easily withstand the envisaged United Nations sanctions, he added.
The next step in the crisis is still in doubt after Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State, cast doubt on reports that Kim had expressed regrets and promised no more tests. Instead, she said, North Korea seemed bent on escalation.
-
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/10/korea...e_horrors_of_li.html
Korea's Nightmare: Horrors of Life in the North
By Peter Brookes
As many problems as North Korea's Stalinist dictatorship makes for the rest of the world, what it inflicts upon its captive population is far, far worse. Life in Kim Jong Il's iron-fisted police state is a hellish nightmare.
It's the most repressive country on earth, under absolute control of "Dear Leader" Kim. Fear, intimidation and wild-eyed propaganda dominate every aspect of society.
From outside, it can seem comical - like Pyongyang's recent boast that Kim had fired 11 holes in one - in 11 holes, of course - the first time he played golf. Somehow, that whopper was supposed to boost the tyrant's image.
But let's take a peek behind Kim's Iron Curtain.
The U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom reported in 2005: "There are virtually no personal freedoms in North Korea." Indeed, any and all civil liberties are considered a threat to the regime.
Radios and TVs are hard-wired to pre-set frequencies, over which North Koreans are subjected to constant propaganda, martial music, or B-grade Korean War flicks (this time, they win.) All homes display pictures of the "Dear Leader" and his father, "Great Leader" Kim Il Sung.
Crimes in "Kim-land" include defecting (or just trying), slandering Kim or the government, listening to foreign broadcasts, reading "subversive" material - even sitting on a newspaper that displays Kim's picture.
Failure to play by the rules can mean a bullet to the back of the head or time in one of Kim's seven political gulags, hard-labor camps that hold more than 200,000 men, women and children. The North Korean Freedom Coalition estimates that 400,000 to 1 million political prisoners have perished, some in gas chambers, in these camps since they were set up in 1972.
The regime has been accused of using political prisoners as guinea pigs in medical experiments. Public executions of tortured prisoners aren't uncommon.
One former North Korean prison guard who defected said: "They trained me not to treat the prisoners as human beings . . . beating and killing is an everyday affair . . . they're just like dogs or pigs."
A single person's offense can get an entire family - sometimes up to three generations - sent to the gulag. Female prisoners, who become pregnant - sometimes due to rape by prison guards - often undergo forced abortions. Infanticide, at the hands of guards, takes place, too.
Making matters worse, North Korea has been fighting a famine since 1995. Natural disasters such as annual floods account for some of the food shortages, but most is due to failed agricultural and economic policies.
As a result, as many as 2.5 million people (out of a population of 22 million) have died due to starvation/disease over the last decade. While accurate numbers are near impossible to come by, today , 7 percent are believed to be starving, and 37 percent chronically malnourished, reports Freedom House.
Even more tragic, many children born during the famine have been orphaned - and suffer from mental/physical handicaps due to severe malnutrition early in life. Defectors report cases of cannibalism.
And while North Korea has received massive influxes of international food aid, relief groups say Pyongyang uses food as a weapon, directing aid to the most loyal segments of society, while withholding it from others. People have subsisted on twigs, bark and grass for years. Local cooperatives mix grass with grain to produce horrid, drab olive "Franken-food."
As many as 300,000 North Koreans have fled to northern China. But Beijing won't let relief groups assist them (for fear of encouraging others), so refugees are victimized by locals into near-slavery or prostitution or returned as criminals - to an almost certain death sentence.
And while common people starve, the elite spends millions on luxuries. Kim's cognac bill is $500,000 a year. When he has a craving, he sends his personal chef abroad to fetch his favorite nosh. And then there's Dear Leader's female "happiness teams"
North Korea spends one-third of its gross domestic product on a million-man army, ballistic missiles and an expensive nuclear-weapons program, while the country's hospitals , desperately short of supplies, are little more than hospices .
The regime may now have a nuke, but it's had a weapon of mass destruction for years. Unfortunately for the North Korean people, that WMD is their "Dear Leader," Kim Jong Il.
Peter Brookes is a columnist for The New York Post , a Heritage Foundation senior fellow and author of "A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States."
-
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2006/10/world_war_ii_is_over.html
Allow Japanese Nukes
By Charles Krauthammer
The first stop on Condoleezza Rice's post-detonation, nuclear reassurance tour was Tokyo. There she dutifully unfurled the American nuclear umbrella, pledging in person that the United States would meet any North Korean attack on Japan with massive American retaliation, nuclear if necessary.
An important message, to be sure, for the short run, lest Kim Jong Il imbibe a little too much cognac and be teased by one of his "pleasure squad" lovelies into launching a missile or two into Japan.
But Rice's declaration had another and obvious longer-run intent: to quell any thought Japan might have of going nuclear to counter and deter North Korea's bomb.
The Japanese understood this purpose well. Thus, at a joint news conference with Rice, Foreign Minister Taro Aso offered the boilerplate denial of even thinking of going nuclear: "The government of Japan has no position at all to consider going nuclear."
The impeccably polite Japanese were not about to contradict the secretary of state in her presence. Nonetheless, the very same Aso had earlier the very same day told a parliamentary committee that Japan should begin debating the issue: "The reality is that it is only Japan that has not discussed possessing nuclear weapons, and all other countries have been discussing it."
Just three days earlier, another high-ranking member of the ruling party had transgressed the same taboo and called for open debate about Japan's acquiring nuclear weapons.
The American reaction to such talk is knee-jerk opposition. Like those imperial Japanese soldiers discovered holed up on some godforsaken Pacific island decades after World War II, we continue to act as if we, too, never received news of the Japanese surrender. We applaud the Japanese for continuing their adherence to the MacArthur constitution that forever denies Japan the status of Great Power replete with commensurate military force.
Of course Japan has in recent decades skirted that proscription, building a small but serious conventional military. Nuclear weapons, however, have remained off the table.
As the only country ever to suffer nuclear attack, Japan obviously has its own reasons to resist the very thought. But now that the lunatic regime next door, which has already overflown Japan with its missiles, has officially gone nuclear, some rethinking is warranted.
Japan is a true anomaly. All the other Great Powers went nuclear decades ago -- even the once-and-no-longer great, such as France; the wannabe great, such as India; and the never-will-be great, such as North Korea. There are nukes in the hands of Pakistan, which overnight could turn into an al-Qaeda state, and North Korea, a country so cosmically deranged that it reports that the "Dear Leader" shot five holes-in-one in his first time playing golf and also wrote six operas. Yet we are plagued by doubts about Japan's joining this club.
Japan is not just a model international citizen -- dynamic economy, stable democracy, self-effacing foreign policy -- it is also the most important and reliable U.S. ally after only Britain. One of the quieter success stories of recent American foreign policy has been the intensification of the U.S.-Japanese alliance. Tokyo has joined with the United States in the development and deployment of missile defenses and aligned itself with the United States on the neuralgic issue of Taiwan, pledging solidarity should there ever be a confrontation.
The immediate effect of Japan's considering going nuclear would be to concentrate China's mind on denuclearizing North Korea. China calculates that North Korea is a convenient buffer between it and a dynamic, capitalist South Korea bolstered by American troops. China is quite content with a client regime that is a thorn in our side, keeping us tied down while it pursues its ambitions in the rest of Asia. Pyongyang's nukes, after all, are pointed not west but east.
Japan's threatening to go nuclear would alter that calculation. It might even persuade China to squeeze Kim Jong Il as a way to prevent Japan from going nuclear. The Japan card remains the only one that carries even the remote possibility of reversing North Korea's nuclear program.
Japan's response to the North Korean threat has been very strong and very insistent on serious sanctions. This is, of course, out of self-interest, not altruism. But that is the point. Japan's natural interests parallel America's in the Pacific Rim -- maintaining military and political stability, peacefully containing an inexorably expanding China, opposing the gangster regime in Pyongyang, and spreading the liberal democratic model throughout Asia.
Why are we so intent on denying this stable, reliable, democratic ally the means to help us shoulder the burden in a world where so many other allies -- the inveterately appeasing South Koreans most notoriously -- insist on the free ride?
letters@charleskrauthammer.com
-
Cracking the Hermit Kingdom
By Gordon Cucullu and Joshua Stanton
FrontPageMagazine.com | October 24, 2006
The twin fizzles of North Korea?s attempted long-range Fourth of July rocketry and its semi-successful nuclear test encourage those who favor procrastination as a viable foreign policy. In the long run, it affords little comfort that North Korea?s weapons don?t work well, because it cannot stop Kim Jong-il?s patience and marketing of more and better rockets. After 15 years of stalling, lying, and cheating his way through nuclear negotiations, Kim Jong-il could be the subject of a Country & Western song. We must accept the fact that he is faithful to his nuclear weapons programs, and unfaithful to anyone who would take them away from him. As Ambassador Christopher Hill put it, ?North Korea can have nuclear weapons or it can have a future.? Kim Jong-il has chosen; he means to build the Arsenal of Terror. Now, we must choose whether we will let him.
Can we disarm Kim Jong-il at less risk of a catastrophic war than the risks of continuing with the present course? We think so, but not through conventional diplomatic or military means.
Some analysts talk of military strikes directed at key facilities. Newt Gingrich has suggested that the Kim regime be told privately, on unequivocal terms, that every time he stands a missile up for testing it will be killed on the pad. Some suggest reacting against any movement toward another nuclear test with a strike against the deeply dug-in, highly protected test equipment. Strikes might set some of those programs back but probably could not destroy his underground nuclear facilities. The other side of the cost-benefit ledger is heavy: domestic forces might compel Kim Jong-il to respond, and that could escalate into a second Korean War and the destruction of Seoul, which lies within artillery range of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Economic sanctions have the benefit of attacking Kim Jong-il?s economic vulnerabilities. For the past year, the Treasury Department has been constricting the financial arteries that support Kim Jong-il?s palace economy: illegal weapons, narcotics, and counterfeiting. These measures have shown some promising results. Japan?s new Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe, just added his muscle to the squeeze by denying North Korean merchant ships access to Japan?s ports and by vigorously attacking one of Kim?s great sources of foreign cash: Korean Yakuza operations in western Japan. UN Resolution 1718 (which, by itself, justified John Bolton?s confirmation) freezes or cuts off funds for his WMD-related assets and accounts, and even bans him from purchasing luxury items, such as his French Cognac supplies. The object of this goes beyond the inducement of derelium tremens. Louis XIV said, ?L??tat, c'est moi,? but Kim Jong-il has perfected it in practice. He stands atop a precarious pyramid of faction-riven Party hacks, intelligence service thugs, and what former Ambassador Jim Lilley calls ?hard-faced generals.? Kim Jong-il knows that too many missed payments to these men, whose endemic corruption requires constant care and feeding, puts him a trigger squeeze from oblivion.
Others have proposed a naval blockade, but Kim?s protectors, including China and South Korea, might help diffuse the effect of the more onerous sanctions. Another less risky option could be almost as devastating: the Treasury Department could designate North Korea itself as an ?entity of concern? for money laundering, under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. That would instantly sever all of North Korea?s connections to the international finance system, but would have collateral effects in other countries whose cooperation we would prefer to obtain through polite requests.
All of these measures will have an effect, but they will take time. They might also cause Kim Jong-il to squeeze his suffering people even harder, and in the end, they might mean little more than replacing one evil tyrant with another. They might force Kim Jong-il to negotiate, but not in good faith. They might weaken the regime, but they won?t necessarily replace it with one that will live in peace.
We still have not spoken of North Korea?s greatest vulnerability: its citizens?s disapproval. We think of North Korea as a stable, opaque, Orwellian monolith, but recently we have seen cracks in the fa?ade. Refugees and defectors report a recent wave of uprisings and expressions of dissent. A few of the disturbances, such as the rising in the Onsong Concentration Camp and the planned mutiny of the Chongjin garrison, were significant. Most, however, were localized, and the regime was able to keep them that way by taking great pains to isolate its subjects from outside world and compartmentalize them from internal communication among themselves.
Geography is also on the regime?s side. North Korea?s terrain is rugged. Its road and communications infrastructure is decrepit. (Its original dictator, Kim Il Sung, died of a heart attack, because ambulances could not negotiate the road to one of his mountain hideaways in time.) Today, even Kim Jong-il?s concentration camps are not, physically speaking, ?concentrated;? they are really scattered networks of guarded hamlets where uprisings are easy to contain and from which escape is a formidable challenge. All information comes from tightly controlled Party outlets. Radios and televisions are pre-set with approved frequencies. Listening to any of the few sources of ?unofficial? information ? South Korean, Japanese, or ?foreign? stations ? is punishable with immediate exile of the suspect and his entire family to a labor camp.
Despite all of these countermeasures, the information blockade on which Kim Jong-il?s power depends is breaking down. Since the famine that killed 2.5 million North Koreans in the 1990?s, hundreds of thousands of North Koreans have voted with their feet and risked death by crossing the border into China. Some of these refugees later returned to North Korea and spoke of China?s comparative prosperity. China arrested others and ruthlessly sent them back to the North Korean gulag. A few escaped to South Korea or elsewhere. This refugee flow is Beijing?s recurring nightmare. China dreads the prospect of an imploding North Korea releasing millions of refugees along the countries? 900-mile border. China, which barely suppressed the SARS outbreak, worries that North Koreans ? whose immune systems are weakened by malnutrition and a lack of basic medical care ? could bring a plague of diseases and burden its economy.
Some of these refugees are crossing out of economic desperation. There is an active business of smuggling goods and people across the Chinese-North Korean border. But most refugees are probably motivated by politics to some degree ? because the government has put them in a low-priority category for food rations, because they have lost all faith in their government, or a combination of both. The moment they see the relative prosperity of China, they realize the magnitude of the propaganda barrage inside North Korea. Meanwhile, corruption, disillusionment, and societal decay have accelerated the corrosive effect on the information blockade. Cell phones, tunable radios, and South Korean DVD?s are now available, even in Pyongyang, to those who know where to find them, even though the possession of these items can be a death-camp offense. There is a growing network of underground churches inside North Korea, a remarkable phenomenon given the ruthless repression with which the Communists have attacked any religion other than the worship of the two Kims.
This below-the-radar decline of the Cult of Kim has led to some surprising results. Last month, Thai authorities arrested as many as 300 North Korean refugees who survived a dangerous journey across China, along a thousand-mile underground railroad run largely by Christian missionaries and sympathizers. On every inch of this journey, they risked forcible repatriation to North Korea if caught by Chinese authorities. Of these 300, half asked to go to the United States ? a nation they had been indoctrinated since birth to hate and fear as an imperialist warmonger. Their remarkable yearning for freedom led them to choose America instead of South Korea, where they already share a common language and customs. According to a recent New York Times report, ?$10,400 will buy a package deal to get someone out of North Korea and, armed with a fake South Korean passport, on a plane or boat to South Korea within days.? It is simply a matter of money; the bodies of those who try to escape without it wash up in bullet-ridden heaps beside the Tyumen River. Yet still, more make the risky crossing.
More also want to know the truth. The Broadcasting Board of Governors recently cited surveys from 2003 and 2004, which found that 28 to 31 percent of North Korean refugees had listened to the Voice of America, and that 18 percent had listened to Radio Free Asia. They tuned in to these forbidden broadcasts in spite of the terrible risk of being caught. The percentage of listeners is probably higher today. Yet two years after the North Korean Human Rights Act authorized the expansion of Radio Free Asia, along with more programs to smuggle information into North Korea, our government is only starting the process of expanding radio broadcasts to the North. North Korea?s hysterical reaction speaks volumes about the subversive potential of broadcasting. The letters North Korean refugees write to Radio Free Asia are inspiring. To be sure, survey samples based on refugees are skewed, but the North Korean people do appear to be an emerging market for such subversive ideas as tolerance, religious freedom, pluralism, free markets, and democracy.
There is another side to breaking down the isolation of the North Korean people that observers tend to overlook ? getting information out of North Korea. In a land still described by popular media as the Hermit Kingdom, the factual vacuum about conditions inside North Korea partially explains why nations have failed to coordinate a common response to such issues as famine, food aid, human rights, crime, and weapons proliferation. Ask most Americans about conditions within North Korea, and you will elicit a shrug. In contrast, even closed societies such as the former Soviet Union and present-day China are open volumes compared to reclusive North Korea. The Great Famine was the most heartrending example of this. By the time international relief agencies gleaned through sparse information and agreed that a famine was killing millions of North Koreans, it was too late to save many of them. A German physician, Norbert Vollertsen, fled North Korea with photos of malnourished children in striped pajama uniforms. When he tried to tell the South Korean people this terrible news, he was beaten by South Korean police, threatened with expulsion, and threatened by pro-North Korean Stalinists determined to protect the South?s appeasement-based Sunshine policy from the truth about conditions in the North. In a more recent and highly suspicious incident, Vollertsen was attacked by a group of unidentified men on a street in downtown Seoul. South Korean Police dismissed the incident and accused Vollertsen of being drunk, although he proceeded to give a speech before an audience that can confirm otherwise.
To their everlasting shame, many in South Korea choose to live in cognitive dissonance and outright denial about conditions inside their northern neighbor. Many South Koreans dismiss reports of grave human rights abuses as ?U.S. propaganda,? and dispute reports of conditions within North Korea?s gulag, to include the reported experimental poison gas chamber at Camp 22. Repeatedly, when the U.N. has considered resolutions condemning North Korea?s atrocities against its people, South Korea abstained or refused to vote. Now, Foreign Minister Ban Ki-Moon, who presided over this shameful diplomacy, is about to become the new UN General Secretary.
While educating South Koreans and others is important, tearing open the bamboo curtain and allowing the light of truth to both penetrate and escape from the North is essential. North Koreans must learn what is happening in their own districts, provinces, and country, and the rest of the world should share this information. Already, this process has made a courageous start. Brave guerrilla cameramen recently brought out video of public executions, labor camps, starving soldiers sent home to die, South Korean food aid stolen by the military, and acts of dissent. A Seoul-based news site, The Daily NK, collects and publishes reports from defectors, traders, and clandestine journalists who cross the border between North Korea and China.
Our government can do much more to support the breaking of this blockade. It can start by breaking our own State Department?s blockade on the appropriation and distribution of funds already authorized under the North Korean Human Rights Act. It should also help to expand this network of clandestine journalists inside North Korea. Many of these journalists could be recruited from the same source that produced the concentration camp survivor, defector, journalist, and author Kang Chol-Hwan ? the ranks of thousands of North Korean refugees in South Korea and in third countries. A select group of them, properly trained in clandestine reporting, could return to their homeland to tell their stories. We could provide them satellite telephones and cameras to transmit their reports without making the risky journey across the border. With enough money, it is possible to smuggle large quantities of i-pods, cell phones, and micro-radios into North Korea, so that the people could hear the news these journalists reported. Eventually, we could train other refugees in basic technical skills, the fundamentals of how democratic government works, and eventually, medicine, so that the underground could begin to provide essential services that the regime stopped providing years ago. Eventually, these volunteers could become the core of new civil society in a scarred, traumatized, and chaotic post-Kim Jong-il Korea.
Ultimately, the key rests with China?s treatment of refugees. China must realize that its refugee policy is earning the eternal enmity of the North Korean people for the sake of a dying regime. One day, North Koreans will make up one-third of the population of a united Korea, which will be one of China?s largest trading partners and trade corridors, and as an added bonus, might not require a large U.S. military presence for its defense. It must begin to accept North Korean refugees in large numbers, even if only in UN-run refugee camps along its border. The United States and a coalition of other nations could foot the bill for refugee care, something that is vastly cheaper than recovering from missile strikes. The establishment of these refugee camps, or ?feeding stations? if you prefer, would be predicated on the notion that all inhabitants would eventually be repatriated to Korea or resettled outside of China.
From Washington, North Korea looks as stable as East Germany, Romania, and Albania looked in 1988. In reality, those regimes hung by tenuous threads, disguising political weakness behind statist omnipotence, waiting for the sword stroke that freed their subjects from oppression. By reaching out to the North Korean people with truth, hope, food, and medical care, we can do much to undermine the cult of hate and isolation on which Kim Jong-il?s grip on power depends. Diplomacy has failed, sanctions are only a partial solution, and military strikes carry an unacceptable risk of disaster. The root of the crisis is Kim Jong-il. We must help the North Korean people uproot him. We must help them achieve what Koreans and Americans have dreamed of for more than half a century: a Korean that is united and free.
Click Here to support Frontpagemag.com.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Lt. Col. Gordon Cucullu is a former Special Forces lieutenant colonel and author of the best-selling book Separated at Birth. Joshua Stanton practices law in Washington, D.C., and blogs at One Free Korea.
-
Geopolitical Diary: A Return to Six-Party Talks
During a meeting in Beijing on Tuesday, representatives from China, North Korea and the United States agreed to restart six-party nuclear talks in the near future. Afterward, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, Washington's chief negotiator, was upbeat, telling the press that the next round of talks, though still requiring a lot of preparation, likely will lead to "substantial progress" in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Hill also gave most of the credit to the Chinese.
These were exactly the words Beijing was hoping to hear. Despite its protestations prior to and following North Korea's October nuclear test, China has demonstrated the ability to benefit politically from North Korea's actions. Whether this was through shrewd Chinese maneuvering following the test or prior knowledge that the test would take place is less significant than the fact that, either way, China once again has come out on top.
China has used North Korea's missile program and nuclear threats to demonstrate its value to the United States as the only path through which Washington can control the actions of the "rogue" North Korean regime. North Korea's early October nuclear test has threatened to add another blot to the Bush administration's record as the Nov. 7 congressional elections approach, and the test has been characterized by opponents of the administration as a clear failure of U.S. policies on North Korea and proof that U.S. President George W. Bush had the wrong focus with the war in Iraq.
China has pulled that brand out of the fire, giving the U.S. administration a moral victory days before the election. Hill, White House spokesman Tony Snow, U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Bush were quick to tout the win, saying Pyongyang's agreement to return to the talks was proof that the administration's tough policy toward North Korea, and its cooperation with China, were the proper tools to rein in North Korea's behavior.
In return for the political pre-election assist, the United States is giving China full credit for the resumption of talks, and Beijing will certainly ask for other favors in the future. To bring North Korea back to the table, Beijing used a combination of carrots and sticks. On one hand, China restricted some trade and increased its troop presence along the North Korean border, and Hong Kong impounded North Korean ships for "safety violations." On the other hand, Beijing assured Pyongyang of Chinese support and offered to soften the U.S. approach to North Korea.
South Korea and Russia have welcomed the news that the talks are back on, even though a date has not yet been set, but Japan has remained somewhat reticent, reminding Washington, Seoul and Tokyo of their earlier agreement that six-party talks would not resume unless North Korea gave up its nuclear ambitions beforehand. Japan does not want to see a temporary U.S. policy, based on political expediency, derail what Tokyo sees as progress toward regime change in North Korea. It also does not want to lose the convenience of having North Korea as a foil to shape domestic dialogue on Japan's military and constitutional reforms.
For North Korea, the resumption of talks has always been possible -- so long as it could lead to Pyongyang's broader goals of a nonaggression pact or peace accord with the United States and, more immediately, the removal of the economic sanctions against the regime (such as the frozen accounts in Macao). And if China offers certain guarantees, Pyongyang will respond -- even if the North Korean leadership continues to look for ways to become more independent of its former sponsor.
But as Hill correctly pointed out, the news that the nuclear talks will resume is no cause to break out the champagne and cigars. North Korea and China will continue playing their own political games once talks resume, and the United States is no more willing to allow North Korea to continue developing its nuclear program now than it was before the test. Add in Japan's intransigence, and the talks could again be destined for failure -- or another temporary solution that fails to finally resolve the situation (something that seems possible only after a fundamental regime shift in Pyongyang, or at least a shift in the North Korean worldview).
Rather, the only ones really celebrating are the Chinese -- who once again have transformed a perceived regional crisis into a diplomatic coup -- and their North Korean counterparts, who have tested a nuke (though it was a fizzle of a test) and been rewarded with a resumption of dialogue. This is a political gain for China -- one Washington is willing to grant in order to gain at least a week of positive airtime about Bush's foreign policy success. And Beijing sits back smugly in the knowledge that Washington has called in another favor -- one Beijing will expect to be paid in kind at a future date.
www.stratfor.com
-
WSJ
Faith-Based Nonproliferation
We'll believe it when Kim Jong Il hands over his plutonium.
Wednesday, February 14, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
So after a couple of decades of broken promises, missile launches and nuclear tests, North Korea's Kim Jong Il has finally decided to give up his nuclear ambitions in return for diplomatic recognition and foreign aid. The Bush Administration will no doubt be praised with scorn for finally being "reasonable" and recognizing "reality," but the exercise strikes us as something close to faith-based nonproliferation.
Perhaps the best thing we can say about the deal is that it is marginally better than the "Agreed Framework," the 1994 accord in which the Clinton Administration agreed to hand over two light-water reactors and 500,000 tons of fuel oil a year in exchange for North Korea's promise to freeze its plutonium program. Pyongyang pocketed the oil, only to demand more compensation within a few years while secretly enriching uranium in a separate nuclear program that it only acknowledged in 2002.
This time there are no nuclear reactors on offer, and North Korea will get only 5% of the promised one million tons of fuel oil and humanitarian assistance up front. The remaining 95% is contingent upon North Korea providing a full accounting of all of its nuclear programs within 60 days, and ultimately agreeing to dismantle the works. That includes nuclear bombs, spent fuel and the clandestine uranium program--which it now denies having but that the Bush Administration insists does exist.
The other difference from 1994 is that China is a party to this accord. Beijing has by far the most leverage of any country on Pyongyang, as its political patron and supplier of most of its energy needs. China was instrumental in getting Pyongyang back to the negotiating table after a three-year absence, and the U.S. is counting on it to help ensure the North's cooperation.
A senior Administration official tells us that there has been a "sea change" in the Chinese attitude toward North Korea since last summer's missile launch--read: Beijing is furious--and that Beijing is now "heavily invested" in making sure that the deal succeeds. We can only hope this is so.
However, Kim has proven he can stand up to China before, and the dictator's habit is to strike an agreement and then try to renegotiate it along the way for better terms. He will have many chances to do so under yesterday's accord, because the commitments and timetables are vague to say the least. His one important specific promise is to shut down his plutonium facility, at Yongbyon, within 60 days.
The accord makes no mention of the plutonium his regime has produced, nor of the eight or more nuclear bombs he is thought to possess. Nor does it refer to his uranium enrichment program, much less specify that international inspectors will be able to roam the country's vast network of underground installations for evidence of where that program might be. Bush Administration officials say that they believe that all of Kim's nuclear activities are covered under the agreement, and that Kim will be expected to come clean in his 60-day declaration.
But if he doesn't? One danger of this accord is that it will start a traditional "arms control" process in which Kim can stall and protest, and the U.S. will be pressured to make even further concessions. We can already see the lineup of South Koreans, Chinese, American media and State Department officials all suggesting that the Bush Administration is being obstinate and "unrealistic" if it insists on intrusive inspections, or on recovering all of Kim's plutonium.
Meanwhile, the immediate effect of the fuel assistance and promises of diplomatic recognition will sustain Kim's regime, allowing him to sell the deal at home as a victory for his missile and nuclear blackmail. The timing is especially ironic given that Kim's position arguably has never been more precarious thanks to U.S.-imposed financial measures against the North's international banking activities.
Treasury's blacklisting of Banco Delta Asia in Macau in September 2005--and the demonstration effect on other banks that did business with the North--essentially shut down Pyongyang's access to the global banking system. The U.S. is now promising to review its Banco Delta Asia action within 30 days. If that results in the government of Macau releasing some portion of the $24 million in BNA's North Korean accounts, it's yet another prop for the regime.
All of which is to say that this is far from the nonproliferation model set by Libya's Moammar Gadhafi in the wake of Saddam Hussein's ouster in 2003. Gadhafi relinquished his entire nuclear program up front, and only later--once compliance was verified and the nuclear materials removed from the country--did the U.S. take Libya off the terror list and provide other rewards.
Perhaps Mr. Bush feels this is the best he can do in the waning days of his Administration. Or perhaps, in the most favorable interpretation, he wants to clear the decks of this issue in order to have more political capital to control Iran's nuclear ambitions. Iran may look at this deal, however, and conclude it has little to lose by raising the nuclear stakes. We'd like to believe this will turn out better, but history doesn't support such faith.
-
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070214-120013-3871r.htm
-
WSJ
Pyongyang's Perfidy
By JOHN R. BOLTON
May 18, 2007; Page A17
Over a month has passed since sweetness and light were due to break out on the Korean Peninsula. On Feb. 13, the Six-Party Talks in Beijing ratified a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, providing for Pyongyang to give up its nuclear programs. The first step, 60 days after ratification, was to be that North Korea "will shut down and seal for the purpose of eventual abandonment" the Yongbyon nuclear facility, and readmit inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Other steps were to follow, but the first move was unequivocally to be made by Pyongyang. The 60 days came and went, and indeed, another 35 days have come and gone. No IAEA inspectors have been readmitted, and not even Pyongyang claims that it has "shut down" Yongbyon.
Instead, observers -- especially Iran and other nuclear weapons aspirants -- have witnessed embarrassing U.S. weakness on a supposedly unrelated issue, unmentioned in the Feb. 13 agreement. That issue involves North Korea's widely publicized demand that approximately $25 million frozen in Macau-based Banco Delta Asia (BDA) accounts be released and transferred to Pyongyang. The funds came from North Korean counterfeiting of U.S. currency, money laundering and other fraudulent activities uncovered by a U.S. Treasury investigation begun in 2003. The accounts were frozen in 2005 and the BDA was promptly put on Treasury's blacklist for illicit activity.
While the Bush administration denies a direct link, the North Koreans have said publicly that they will not comply with the bilateral agreement until the BDA funds are safely under their control. This obvious quid pro quo is not only embarrassing, it sets a dangerous precedent for other regimes that would blackmail the U.S. What are the consequences of the BDA meltdown?
First, the timetable of the Feb. 13 agreement is already shredded. President Bush said at the time of the deal: "Those who say that the North Koreans have got to prove themselves by actually following through on the deal are right, and I'm one." Assistant Secretary of State Chris Hill, the deal's U.S. architect and chief negotiator, said: "We need to avoid above all missing deadlines. It's like a broken-window theory: one window is unrepaired, and before you know it you'll have a lot of broken windows and nobody cares."
Those statements were correct when made, and they are correct today. Sadly, however, they no longer seem to be "operative."
Second, by making secret side deals with North Korea, the State Department has left itself vulnerable to future renegotiation efforts. This is the North's classic style: Negotiate hard to reach an agreement, sign it, and then start renegotiating, not to mention violating the deal at will. America's serial concessions on BDA simply confirm to Pyongyang that State is well into the "save the deal" mode, which bodes well for future North Korean efforts to recast it. Consider the sequence of administration positions on BDA: Initially, the criminal investigation and the nuclear issue were not supposed to be connected, but the North insisted and the U.S. gave in.
Then, North Korea moved the renegotiation into high gear, demanding the return of the funds as a precondition to complying with its own commitments. Unwilling to "just say no," the Bush administration tried to distinguish between "licit" and "illicit" funds, returning only those that were legitimate. (This, of course begs the question whether anything that the criminal conspiracy running North Korea does is "licit.") Even the "licit" funds returned, however, were to be used only for "humanitarian" projects in North Korea rather than returned to Kim Jong Il's grasp -- although how in an age of the U.N.'s "Cash for Kim" program the State Department thought this was to be verified remains a mystery.
Nevertheless, North Korea was not satisfied, insisting that all the funds had to be returned to the actual account holders, with no restrictions on their use, even though all agree that at least some were acting illicitly. This, too, State accepted.
Third, we now face the nagging question whether there are other secret side deals beyond BDA. Of course, the BDA agreement was not so secret that Kim Jong Il was barred from knowing about it, by definition. Most troubling, however, is that State apparently thought it too sensitive to share with the American people until the February deal broke down in an unavoidably public way. But even this was not enough for North Korea, which, sensing U.S. weakness, continues to press for more. Although conflicting stories abound, North Korea may be seeking not just the return of the BDA funds, but something much more significant: guaranteed access to international financial markets, even through an American bank. Indeed, this week Wachovia Corp. confirmed that it had been approached by the State Department to assist in the transfer of funds.
Here, the issue is inescapably related to North Korea's nuclear program. The North's access to international financial markets to launder its ill-gotten revenues is critical both to continued financing of its nuclear regime and to keeping Kim Jong Il in power. If this is even close to what the State Department is prepared to do, who will ever again take us seriously when we threaten financial strangulation of rogue states and terrorist groups? Granting this North Korean demand would make U.S. concessions on BDA look paltry by comparison.
Fourth, the BDA affair calls the remainder of the Feb. 13 agreement into question. Just to remind, 2007 is the 13th anniversary of the Agreed Framework, a predecessor U.S.-North Korean agreement, and the 15th anniversary of the Joint North-South Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In all likelihood, it is also the 13th and 15th anniversaries, respectively, of North Korea's first violations of those agreements. No serious observer contends there is any sign of a strategic decision by North Korea to give up its nuclear program, which means, therefore, there is no more reason to believe the North will comply with the Feb. 13 deal than it has complied with its predecessors.
It is not even clear if North Korea actually gave up anything significant in the Feb. 13 deal. It is entirely possible, for example, that Yongbyon is now a hulk, well past its useful life span, and that the North agreed, in effect, to shut down a wreck. Even if Yongbyon is not in such parlous condition, it may be that the North has extracted all the plutonium possible from the fuel rods it has, and that Yongbyon therefore offers it nothing more. Here, the omissions in the Feb. 13 agreement become significant. The deal says nothing about the plutonium, perhaps weaponized perhaps not, that North Korea has already reprocessed.
How these issues play out will have ramifications far beyond North Korea, particularly for Iran. Some say the Bush administration entered the Feb. 13 deal because it desperately needed a success. One thing is for certain: It does not need a failure. The president can easily extricate himself from the deal, just based on North Korea's actions to date. He should take the first opportunity to do so.
Mr. Bolton is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the U.N. and Abroad," forthcoming this fall from Simon & Schuster.
-
bit outdated but Gertz On NK - still producing nukes - gee - what a surprise.
http://www.washtimes.com/national/20070424-104648-6053r.htm
I have trouble of thinking of any Presidential candidate with the strength and clear track record to prove that he can stand up to these foreign threats - except for Gingrich. Let's hope he runs IMO.
McCain maybe, but enough leadership skills. Romeny maybe - but not proven.
I can't think of a single Dem who I feel would not sell the US out for expediency.
-
A Whistleblower's Tale
Remember Oil for Food? Here's the story of how the U.N. propped up Pyongyang.
BY MELANIE KIRKPATRICK
Sunday, July 8, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
It's been more than six months since the U.S. first shone a light on the corruption in the United Nations Development Program in North Korea--a scandal potentially involving tens of millions of dollars used to help prop up the nuclear-armed regime of one of the world's most dangerous dictators. But never mind. It's all a Bush administration plot.
Such, apparently, is the considered view of the UNDP, which has spent the past half-year variously disputing the U.S. disclosures, justifying UNDP actions on "humanitarian" grounds, or offering an everyone-does-it defense. Ad Melkert, the former Dutch politician who is the No. 2 official at the UNDP and the point person for oversight of the program, even threatened to "retaliate" against the U.S., according to Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to the U.N.
In any case, Mr. Melkert seems to be more worried about his own job than the integrity of the organization he leads. In a June 23 article titled, "Smear Campaign, U.S. Against Melkert," the Dutch daily De Telegraaf, citing "insiders at the UNDP," reported that "conservative forces in the American government want the scalp of Ad Melkert."
So it's perhaps the right moment for a reality check courtesy of the man who blew the whistle on it all--Artjon Shkurtaj, an Albanian-born accountant who served as chief of operations for all U.N. operations in North Korea from November 2004 to September 2006. Mr. Shkurtaj--a veteran of UNDP programs in Bangladesh, East Timor, Kosovo, Mexico, India and elsewhere--was outraged at the violations he encountered in North Korea. After two years of trying to persuade his superiors at UNDP headquarters in New York to take corrective action, he took his information to the U.S. mission to the U.N. in May 2006. The UNDP responded by firing him this March.
A preliminary report by U.N. auditors, issued last month, confirms massive violations of U.N. rules regarding hiring practices, the use of foreign currency, and inspections of U.N.-funded projects. In a series of interviews in New York, Mr. Shkurtaj says the auditors (who were barred by North Korea from going there) barely scratched the surface of the misconduct.
We get quickly to the bottom line: Did the U.N. money go to the humanitarian projects it was supposed to fund? "How the hell do I know?" responds Mr. Shkurtaj--oversight was so poor, the involvement of North Korean workers assigned by the government so extensive and the use of cash so prevalent, that it was impossible to follow the money trail.
Mr. Shkurtaj arrived in North Korea on Nov. 4, 2004. He says one of his first indications that something was amiss was when checks denominated in euros and made out to "cash" arrived on his desk for signature. "Rule No. 1 in every UNDP country in the world is that you have to operate in local currency," he says, "not in hard currency. It's the rule No. 1 of development . . . in order to support the local economy and not devalue or destroy the local currency."
"I didn't sign the checks for about a week," he says, and then "it became a real mess. Headquarters contacted me, and said, 'Don't become a problem. You're going to wind up a PNG, a persona non grata, and ending up a PNG means the end of your career with the U.N. . . . We are authorizing you to go ahead and sign the checks. . . . So I started signing."
"Every morning from 8 to 10, we would issue checks" in euros for staff and projects, Mr. Shkurtaj says. "Then the checks, instead of going directly to the people or institutions by mail, as they should go [as specified by U.N. rules], the checks were given to the driver of our office." The driver would take them to the Foreign Trade Bank, where he would "exchange them into cash and come back to the office." North Korea did not permit Mr. Shkurtaj to have access to the UNDP's accounts at the Foreign Trade Bank, which refused even to keep his signature on file.
Then, every day at noontime, "North Koreans saying they represented U.N.-funded projects would come to receive cash at the UNDP offices." Mr. Shkurtaj says he was not allowed to require the North Koreans to sign receipts for the money or even to present IDs. "I had to trust them," he says. "But, hey, if headquarters tells me to give the money away, I'll give the money away."
On Aug. 16, 2006, a few weeks before Mr. Shkurtaj left North Korea, the UNDP resident representative, Timo Pakkala, issued a memo to the staff noting "an increased use of cash payments, in some cases to payees that are not authorized to receive payments." Citing "UNDP policy," Mr. Pakkala ordered future payments be made by bank transfer or "non-cash cheque." He also ordered staff to obtain receipts and not give money to unidentified people.
Mr. Shkurtaj says nothing happened. "The same routine continued." On Jan. 31, in a memo to Kemal Dervis, head of the UNDP, he urged that "the cashing of checks from the UNDP driver must be stopped and UNDP must demand access to the Foreign Trade Bank in all transactions with our accounts."
As the recent U.N. audit confirmed, the North Koreans who worked at UNDP were selected by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which also collected their salaries; both practices were violations of U.N. rules. Mr. Shkurtaj notes, too, that North Koreans selected by the government performed "core" functions such as dispensing cash--another violation of the rules. All communications tools--fax and telex equipment, computer servers, the local area network--"were in the hands of the North Koreans." "All the backup data [for the office's computers] were in a storage place completely isolated with a North Korean the chief of it." When Mr. Shkurtaj wanted to file a secure report, "I would go use the telex and communications satellite at the German Embassy or other embassies in the compound."
A North Korean--Li Kum Sun--controlled the office safe in her job as "finance officer." "Damn it," says Mr. Shkurtaj, "you had security-evacuation plans in the hands of a North Korean. It's unbelievable." One of his few on-the-job successes was to get control of the safe and petty cash taken away from Ms. Li and handed over to him in March 2006.
The U.N. audit also found numerous irregularities regarding on-site inspections of UNDP projects. Most projects are located outside Pyongyang, and Mr. Shkurtaj says one way to determine whether the required annual field visits actually took place is whether the inspectors filed expense accounts. "Everybody--meaning one driver, one translator . . . and one or two international staff would have received per diems," he says, or submitted vouchers for gas or overtime. "That is the proof that people checked the project." Yet, "in nearly two years in North Korea. . . . I signed for a maximum of two or three" such trips.
Mr. Shkurtaj recounts two inspections he attempted to carry out himself. In one case, UNDP paid for 300 computers intended for Kim Il Sung University. "Instead of the computers coming to UNDP, they went to a warehouse outside town, and we were allowed to inspect them only after a month and a half of fighting [with the government]. Then we were allowed to inspect only one computer in one box. The other boxes were not allowed to be opened."
Another inspection charade involved GPS equipment supposedly going to an agricultural project on flood control. "They didn't allow us for 3 1/2 months to see the GPSs that we gave them," Mr. Shkurtaj says.
Finally, he says, "they took us to the outskirts of Pyongyang, to an empty building, completely empty--no desk, no chairs, no nothing. We come in and go to the first floor. Empty. We go to the second floor. Empty. On the last door of the second floor, we enter. There is only one desk in the middle of the room, and on the desk are the GPS devices that we provided. Now, you're telling me we are providing GPS devices for an empty building, without people working inside?"
During the years he worked for UNDP in Pyongyang, Mr. Shkurtaj says he filed numerous reports to his superiors but got nowhere. Finally, with several months to go in his tour of duty in North Korea, he was recalled to New York.
He says that David Lockwood, deputy assistant administrator of the UNDP, told him, "Look, it would be good for your future if you come to New York and from here we'll send you somewhere else in the world. But you have rocked the boat too much right now and you should leave for your own good."
Mr. Shkurtaj's last day in North Korea was Sept. 26, 2006. When his contract came up for renewal in March--the vast majority of U.N. employees operate under work contracts--he was told that after 13 years of employment at UNDP his services would no longer be needed.
A few months before his dismissal, he received an "outstanding" rating in his annual review, dated Dec. 14, 2006, and signed by Romulo Garcia, chief of the Northeast Asia and Mekong Division. Mr. Garcia described Mr. Shkurtaj as "quick, professional, highly competent, creative, hard working and dedicated."
Mr. Shkurtaj has filed a complaint with the U.N. Ethics Office, asking for reinstatement under the U.N. whistleblower protection policy. Yesterday Rep. Ilena Ros-Lehtinen, ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, wrote U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon asking him to look into Mr. Shkurtaj's dismissal. His case "appears to be a fundamental test of the UN's whistleblower protection policy, one of the touted hallmarks of internal U.N. reform in recent years," she writes. "It is also highly relevant to whether UNDP has adequately internalized the need for increased transparency and accountability." Her request followed a similar letter to Mr. Ban last week from Sen. Norman Coleman, asking that Mr. Shkurtaj be accorded whistleblower protection.
Meanwhile, Mr. Shkurtaj has sent his wife and two children home to Italy--he is an Italian citizen--and is fast depleting his savings. He says he is "living like a bum" in New York.
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of The Wall Street Journal's editorial page.
-
stratfor.com
-
I think this is the article you were posting, I don't understand either China's strategy or Stratfor's analysis of it.
China: Fearing a U.S.-North Korean Thaw
July 16, 2007 20 42 GMT
Summary
The six-party nuclear talks are slated to resume July 18 in Beijing now that North Korea has shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor. Before then, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill will hold a bilateral meeting with North Korean chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Gwan. The recent progress on the North Korean nuclear issue is raising new concerns in Beijing, sending it on a mission to reclaim its influence over the U.S.-North Korean relationship.
Analysis
Now that North Korea has shut down the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, the six-party nuclear talks have been set to resume July 18 in Beijing. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill will meet one-on-one with North Korean chief nuclear negotiator Kim Kye Gwan before then.
Signs that Washington and Pyongyang might begin a series of bilateral security talks, coupled with the recent progress on the North Korean nuclear issue, have caused China some concern, prompting Beijing to seek to restore its influence over the U.S.-North Korean relationship.
China has hosted the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program, publicly calling numerous times for dialogue between Pyongyang and Washington. While Beijing sought to avoid another war on the Korean Peninsula, it knew such a scenario was very remote. It used its ties with, and influence over, North Korea to help manage Chinese relations with the United States, using its role as mediator and facilitator of the talks to reduce U.S. pressure on China in other areas.
However, the growing rift between Beijing and Pyongyang and the decline in North Korean reliance on Chinese exports steadily have eroded Beijing's ability to command obedience from Pyongyang. North Korean oil imports from Russia's Primorsky region via deals brokered through Moscow, for example, have risen precipitously in recent years. And while China still exerts influence over North Korea, Chinese oil stoppages no longer hold the bite they once did.
The long delay between the Feb. 13 agreement and North Korea's shutdown of Yongbyon was not a big problem for Beijing. While it did show some limitations of Beijing's ability to manipulate North Korea, it kept Washington looking to Beijing to keep North Korea in line. But the rapid shift -- just three weeks -- from the return of North Korean funds deposited in Macau's Banco Delta Asia (long a sticking point in the six-party process) to Pyongyang's announcement of the shutdown has left China concerned that the process is moving out of its control. Pyongyang's offer of direct bilateral defense talks with Washington and Washington's relatively positive response to this have magnified Chinese fears.
North Korea's offer of direct military talks with the United States, something that could be part of -- or a supplement to -- a peace accord between the two nations, sidesteps China's role as facilitator. China remains a signatory to the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War, along with North Korea and the United States. (South Korea refused to sign at the time.) Washington's positive response, as well as rumors that the United States is even considering normalized relations with North Korea -- or at least a liaison office in Pyongyang -- is adding to China's sense of isolation.
For China, this is more than just the short-term issue of using North Korea's latest crisis as a lever in U.S.-Chinese relations; North Korean nuclear crises come and go. Rather, there is a deeper concern in Beijing regarding a true U.S.-North Korean rapprochement. North Korea is a critical component of China's buffer strategy. China has significant land borders and so has created a system of buffers to protect the heartland around the Yellow, Yangtze and Pearl rivers. This buffer zone was created over the course of China's history and includes Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and Tibet, among other parts of China. It offers strategic depth and supplements China's defense forces with natural barriers.
Historically, China viewed Korea as part of this buffer zone, even if it was not formally part of the Chinese nation. During the Korean War, the fear of losing North Korea as a strategic buffer to U.S. forces triggered Chinese intervention. And while Washington is currently not threatening to march up to the Yalu, China's need for North Korea as a strategic buffer remains strong. A saying used by the Chinese during the Korean War maintains that relations between China and North Korea are as close as lips and teeth: When the lips are gone, the teeth get cold. When North Korea ceases to be a friendly buffer state, China accordingly gets nervous and feels vulnerable.
For Beijing, helping the inter-Korean reconciliation process was not much of a concern. For geographic and economic reasons, a unified Korea would more than likely shift toward China -- but a U.S.-friendly North Korea is a different story. And even if it is unlikely that Washington and Pyongyang will make immediate friends and become close allies, Beijing is worried that it is losing control of the process, and thus its ability to shape its own strategic environment.
Beijing is now looking for a way to reclaim its influence over the U.S.-North Korean relationship. One method will be to press for four-party talks on shaping a peace accord. These talks would include China, the United States and the two Koreas, drawing on Seoul's similar concern that it is being left out of the U.S.-North Korean process. This would also help keep Russia out in the cold as far as influence over the six-party talks is concerned. Another means by which Beijing could address this issue would be to offer support for South Korean attempts to resurrect the North Korean economy by tying existing economic activities on the China-North Korea border to those on the inter-Korean border (such as the inter-Korean Kaesong industrial complex).
However remote, the threat Beijing perceives from any sign of a U.S.-North Korean rapprochement is very real. Hence, China's primary goal at the talks beginning July 18 will be to reclaim influence over the U.S.-North Korean relationship.
-
Thanks for the save Doug! (PS I accidentally deleted your email about Scott G. :oops: Would you resend it please?)
As for the NK situation, at the moment it looks like President Bush may actually have a win on this one. As for Strat's analysis, I can't really comment-- I haven't understood the NK situation all along :lol:
-
The North Koreans shut down a known reactor and the South Koreans delivered oil to them. The difference between this and the Clinton agreement is that this administration is reacting with caution, acknowledging that other covert reactors may still exist. Bill Clinton and Madeline Albright reacted with an end zone dance that could have made Randy Moss blush.
What I fail to grasp is why a rogue NK is useful to China in 2007.
--
National Security Director Steven Hadley on Fox News Sunday: http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,289361,00.html
"It's a first step in implementing an agreement that was reached last February, which is part of an overall framework of a year ago September, and under that framework, they need to give up their entire nuclear program."
[Understood. But what effect — what practical effect does the shutdown at Yongbyon have on their ability to continue to produce nuclear devices?]
"It means they will no longer be able to process to produce the plutonium from which they — of those nuclear weapons that are made out of plutonium. We have concerns they may have a covert enrichment program. That will be the next subject of discussions..."
[And that's a uranium deal, right?]
"This is basically enriching uranium to the point where it can be used for nuclear weapons."
[Harder to do than with plutonium, correct?]
"Harder to do. We've had concerns they have a covert program. They at one point admitted that program. But the route that they have used to date is the reprocessing route. That will be shut down. That route will be cut off, assuming these facilities are shut down. We will then pursue to work through toward disabling, ultimately dismantling that program, getting a full accounting of what they've been doing with any covert enrichment program, and finally getting them to turn over any nuclear materials from which nuclear weapons have or could be made."
-
Bush's North Korea Meltdown
By JOHN R. BOLTON
October 31, 2007; Page A21
Facts about Israel's Sept. 6 raid on a suspected nuclear facility in Syria continue to emerge -- albeit still incompletely, especially regarding the involvement of the Democratic People's Republic of (North) Korea. Important questions remain, such as whether its personnel were present when the attack occurred, and whether they had been working to clone the Yongbyon nuclear facility in the Syrian desert since the North Korean commitment in February (the latest in a long series) to give up its nuclear programs.
Seemingly unperturbed, however, the Bush administration apparently believes North Korea is serious this time, unlike all the others. The concessions continue to flow in essentially only one direction, crossing repeated "red lines" Washington had drawn.
These include: (1) the humiliating U.S. collapse on North Korea's access to international financial markets; (2) accepting a mere "freeze" of Yongbyon (misleadingly called "disablement" by the administration) rather than real dismantlement; (3) failing to ensure enforcement of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1718's sanctions, imposed after Pyongyang's nuclear test; and (4) the State Department's palpable hunger to remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism and the Trading With the Enemy Act's prohibitions, and re-establish full diplomatic relations.
The Bush administration's most serious concession is forthcoming, in which the U.S. will accept, with little or no concrete verification, Pyongyang's imminent declaration that it actually has very little nuclear activity other than what we have long known about at Yongbyon.
Even critics from the left now worry that State is conceding far more than it should. Jack Pritchard, the special envoy for negotiations with North Korea who resigned during Secretary of State Colin Powell's tenure because our policy was too unyielding, said recently that North Korean officials think "they can ask for and get what they want from the Bush administration because [it] is so eager to demonstrate a diplomatic achievement." Mr. Pritchard concluded, "The North Koreans are rubbing their hands together with glee."
Our current Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and other partisans of the six-party talks respond to all internal administration complaints or criticisms by asking, "What is your alternative? What would you have us do otherwise, risk war on the Peninsula?" Herewith, some responses:
First, it is simply inapposite to judge every tactical decision -- to accede or stand firm on this or that subsidiary point -- by forecasting the complete demise of the entire six-party process if North Korean sensibilities are ruffled by occasionally saying "no." Indeed, showing tactical toughness can frequently enhance the long-term prospects for success, not reduce them. Sadly, however, toughness at the tactical or strategic level is no longer the hallmark of our North Korea policy. Weakness is the watchword.
Second, before it is too late, President Bush has to draw a deep line in the sand on verification. The State Department has yet to say anything publicly about how verification will be accomplished, especially on the North's uranium-enrichment efforts, giving rise to the suspicion that our negotiators don't really have a clue what they mean. The idea of North Korea for years engaged in cloning Yongbyon in Syria (or anywhere else -- Burma, for instance) should be a fire bell in the night. President Reagan's mantra of "trust but verify" in the Cold War days didn't offend anyone, and if it offends Kim Jong Il, that should tell us something. If anything, however, with North Korea, President Bush should reverse Reagan's order: Let's see real verification, and leave trust until later.
Third, consider the severely negative effect these repeated concessions have on our relations with Japan and South Korea. President Bush used to stress that this was a "six-party" process, but now all of the action is bilateral. The State Department's lust to remove North Korea from the terrorism list is having a profoundly negative impact on our treaty ally, Japan, the nation most directly threatened by Pyongyang's nuclear capability. Thomas Schieffer, the Bush administration's ambassador to Japan, reportedly complained recently to the president that he was "cut out of the process." State should explain why it trusts North Korea more than our ambassador to Tokyo, and why we ignore Tokyo's concerns over North Korea's kidnappings of Japanese citizens.
South Korea is facing a critical presidential election in December. The last thing Washington should do is pursue concessionary policies that might enhance the prospects for a new president who follows the same appeasement line as incumbent President Roh Moo-hyun. If South Korea can discard Mr. Roh's rose-colored glasses, our overall prospects will improve considerably, but our unquestioning embrace of North Korea could have exactly the wrong impact in the South's volatile politics.
Fourth, and most importantly, the right response to the North Korean threat is to apply pressure steadily and consistently, rather than hastily releasing it. After its nuclear test, Pyongyang faced growing pressure from the cumulative impact of Chinese anger, U.N. Security Council sanctions, ongoing implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), and the U.S. Treasury's continuing financial squeeze.
There was a plan, of sorts, and it was producing some evidence of success. Instead of squeezing harder, such as by encouraging refugee flows out of the North, the administration did a U-turn. It let a desperate North Korea up off the mat, provided tangible economic support for this appallingly authoritarian regime, allowed Kim Jong Il to relegitimize himself, and undercut the PSI world-wide.
The icing on Kim's cake is that for years -- before, during and after the 2005 and 2007 "agreements" -- North Korea was happily violating its commitments. Instead of focusing China on solving the problem of the regime it has propped up for so long, we absolved China, sidelined Japan, inserted ourselves and started life-support for the administrators of the world's largest prison camp.
This will perpetuate the North Korean problem, not solve it. Any by perpetuating Kim Jong Il's regime, and its continuing threat, it is actually the State Department's policy that poses the greater risk to international peace and security. This is true not only for Pyongyang, but for other would-be proliferators watching our ongoing failure to stop North Korea.
The debate within the Bush administration is not yet over, although time is short before irreparable harm is done. Growing restiveness in Congress among Republicans and Democrats may increasingly become a factor. For President Bush, I can only hope he re-reads his first term speeches on North Korea.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations," out next week from Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions.
WSJ
-
Foggy Bottom Apostate
January 25, 2008; Page A14
Jay Lefkowitz, President Bush's special envoy for human rights in North Korea, has recently pointed out that our current approach to Pyongyang is failing. Lord help a diplomat who tells the truth.
Mr. Lefkowitz, growled Condoleezza Rice at a Tuesday press conference in Europe, "doesn't work on the six-party talks [on North Korea], he doesn't know what's going on in the six-party talks and he certainly has no say in what American policy will be in the six-party talks." For good measure, the Secretary added that she "would doubt very seriously that [the Chinese and Russians] would recognize" Mr. Lefkowitz's name.
In this Foggy Bottom version of the vanishing commissar, Mr. Lefkowitz is being written out of the Administration's North Korea policy for a speech he gave last week at the American Enterprise Institute. Noting that it has been more than two years since Pyongyang pledged to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and more than two weeks since it violated the latest deadline to disclose the full extent of that program, Mr. Lefkowitz observed that "it is increasingly clear that North Korea will remain in its present nuclear status when the Administration leaves office in one year."
Mr. Lefkowitz also noted that the rationale for the six-party talks (which include China, Japan, Russia and South Korea in addition to the U.S. and North Korea) has largely evaporated since it's become clear that neither China nor South Korea were prepared to exert any meaningful leverage on Pyongyang to abandon its weapons. "What we had hoped would be a process in which Beijing and Seoul would simultaneously withhold carrots and use their considerable influence over Pyongyang to end its nuclear activities has evolved into a process that provides new carrots without a corresponding cost to Pyongyang." Instead, he added all too accurately, the talks have deteriorated into the North Korean-U.S. bilateral negotiation that Kim Jong Il always wanted.
It wasn't long ago that Mr. Lefkowitz's comments, which also recommended linking human-rights to security issues with the North, would have been a fair reflection of President Bush's own views. But apparently not any more, as Mr. Bush has accepted Ms. Rice's judgment that one more "Dear Mr. Chairman" letter, or one more aid shipment, or one more diplomatic concession will cause Kim to change his ways.
State is even claiming that North Korea has fulfilled the requirements necessary to get itself off the list of state sponsors of terrorism, one of Pyongyang's key demands. A contrary assessment is provided by the Congressional Research Service, which recently noted "reports from reputable sources that North Korea has provided arms and possibly training to Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka." State also seems to be ignoring, or suppressing, evidence of Pyongyang's nuclear proliferation, which was brought to light after Israel destroyed an apparent North Korean nuclear facility in September.
We understand why Ms. Rice would be unhappy to hear her policy contradicted by Mr. Lefkowitz. We would be more understanding if that policy had any record of success. Kim Jong Il has now had nearly a year and two deadlines to fulfill his nuclear promises and shows no intention of doing so. Chances are he now figures he can wait out this Administration and hope for better terms from President Clinton.
On present course, Ms. Rice is setting President Bush up to spend his final year begging Kim to cooperate by offering an ever growing and more embarrassing list of carrots. Mr. Bush would do better to listen to Mr. Lefkowitz, while ordering Ms. Rice to introduce him to the Chinese and Russians.
WSJ
-
Gen. Burwell B. Bell
The North Korean Threat
By MELANIE KIRKPATRICK
February 23, 2008; Page A9
On the Acela between
New York and Washington
The Cold War may be over, but Gen. Burwell B. (B.B.) Bell is still on duty. This American soldier is serving in the one place on the planet where that conflict hasn't ended, and where it has the potential to turn "hot" in the blink of an eye: the Korean Peninsula. With a new president taking over in Seoul on Monday promising to take a tougher line with Pyongyang, it's a good moment to revisit the subject of the North's military capabilities -- and the South's readiness.
In Pentagon lingo, Gen. Bell is "triple-hatted." He commands the 28,500 U.S. forces in South Korea, the combined U.S.-South Korean forces in time of war, and the United Nations forces that have been stationed south of the 38th parallel since 1953, when the armistice in the Korean War was signed. As such, he is probably the world's leading expert on North Korea's military strength.
That's the topic we start with as we chat aboard the express train taking the general and his entourage from New York to Washington, where he'll report to the president the next day. The general is in plain clothes -- for security reasons, U.S. military officers don't travel in uniform -- but that doesn't stop passengers from staring at the straight-backed men in buzz cuts as we climb aboard at Pennsylvania Station in midtown Manhattan. We are escorted by local police officers and two of the soldiers who have been patrolling Penn Station since the 9/11 attacks.
In light of all the publicity given the six-party disarmament talks, it's interesting that the first words out of Gen. Bell's mouth don't include "nuclear." "First and foremost, I'm worried . . . about the conventional threat that the North Korean military poses to South Korea," he says.
"What worries me is that North Korea is a 'military first' country where all their resources and their focus goes into the maintenance of the military apparatus . . . This is a very large military, over a million men under arms in a very small country of only 22 million people. That means . . . [at] any time 5% of the whole country, regardless of age, [is] serving on active duty."
The North Korean army is in the midst of its winter training cycle right now, the general says. He notes that Pyongyang didn't bother to inform the U.N. command in advance, as required under the armistice accord. "Every time we conduct a large exercise, 30 days before that exercise . . . we inform them just like we're supposed to. . . . But they don't afford us with the same privileges. I will tell you that. We have to find out through other means what they are up to." Six-party negotiators take note: Kim Jong Il is not in the habit of keeping promises.
Gen. Bell describes the North Korean military as deployed in a "threatening posture" with "about 70% of their force within 90 miles of the demilitarized zone." Their equipment is old -- the Russians and the Chinese have stopped supplying them -- and training is poor. The army's capabilities have deteriorated in recent years, he says -- a factor, some argue, in Kim Jong Il's reluctance to give up his nuclear program. The North Korean dictator knows his army's potential to hammer the South with conventional arms isn't as good as it used to be.
Even so, Gen. Bell says, the North Koreans "certainly have the capability of bringing aerial fires, rocket and conventional cannon artillery to bear against Seoul . . . They don't need to bring any guns forward. So, they can certainly, at a moment's notice, engage targets in Seoul, should they choose to." He adds: "There would be casualties. But I will tell you, our purpose is to quickly eliminate that threat." Some of the missiles, many believe, would be carrying chemical weapons.
On the nuclear threat, Gen. Bell states bluntly, "We don't know what we don't know." North Korea tested a nuclear device in October 2006, but, he says, it is "totally unclear to me" whether the country has the capability of delivering a nuclear weapon on a missile. That's why the six-party talks are important, he says, even though the North Koreans refused to declare their nuclear programs on Dec. 31, as they had promised. Why did they miss the deadline?
"I can't speculate," the general responds, but "I assume that they want something that they're going to negotiate for." They've "slowed the process down, and it's disquieting, but nevertheless they're still disabling their [Yongbyon nuclear] reactor. That process has gone forward. . . . We've got people up there, the five parties, [and] there are people supervising, observing [the] removal of these fuel rods."
Things are "pretty quiet" along the DMZ these days, Gen. Bell says, though there's "a flare-up every now and then" and "there is some kind of engagement with a North Korean citizen once or twice a month" -- usually a ship straying into South Korean waters. Most such visitors want to be repatriated, he says -- any North Korean may stay in South Korea if he wishes -- but "we see defections from their military from time to time."
Overall, he says, North Korea specializes in "wild cyclical flows in behavior" -- what he characterized in Senate testimony last year as "alternating provocations and engagement overtures." Lately, however, "they haven't shown that kind of aggressive provocative stuff." Kim Jong Il has even invited the New York Philharmonic to visit later this month, he notes. "That sounds really nice, doesn't it? Meanwhile, his army is training like crazy in their forward position." Sarcasm noted.
Gen. Bell addressed the Korea Society earlier in the day on the subject of the South's readiness to take more responsibility for its own defense. He stresses this point in our conversation.
The Republic of Korea's military "is world class," he says. Or, as he told the Korea Society, in language that befits his native Oak Ridge, Tenn. (and explains why Bell impersonators abound at the Pentagon), "This beast can hunt." To translate from the Tennessean: "I proclaim loudly and clearly that the capacities of the [South] Korean forces are second to none on the globe, and it would not be wise for the North Koreans to test that."
The South Korean army has already largely replaced the U.S. Second Infantry Division along the DMZ. And on April 17, 2012, the South will take full responsibility for its own defense in wartime, with the U.S. military in a supporting role -- 59 years after the end of the Korean War. Meanwhile, the U.S. base in the heart of downtown Seoul is being moved south.
South Korea's anti-American President Roh Moo-hyun leaves office Monday, and while any man with four stars on his shoulders knows better than to publicly diss the leader of a U.S. ally, it's not hard to see that Gen. Bell is counting the days. "The alliance weathered a couple of storms recently," he told the Korea Society, "but it's got to rain a little for the flowers to grow."
This particular flower is called Lee Myung-bak. He's the former businessman, legislator and mayor of Seoul who is the president-elect. The general calls Mr. Lee "pro-American" and notes that he was elected "by an overwhelming majority" of voters on a platform that promised to improve relations with the U.S.
Gen. Bell points to a recent poll showing that 77% of South Koreans support having U.S. troops in their country. To Americans who say the U.S. should pack up and go home, he says, "The Republic of Korea several years ago sent a message to Americans that perhaps we weren't welcome . . . But I can flat tell you that those days are behind us."
Gen. Bell thinks the U.S. military will have a role on the peninsula even after reunification of the two Koreas. The alliance "has purpose throughout the 21st century and beyond," he says. "The mutual defense treaty between the two nations has merit outside the single context of North Korea."
A rising China goes unmentioned here. "It's not to anybody's advantage to create a security vacuum which could lead to misunderstanding and even conflict," the general says. "You know, when you look at the history in that area of the world it's replete with conflict after conflict after conflict. It's been very quiet for 55 years and there's no reason why it ought not to be throughout this century and beyond." He also notes that 25% of the world's trade goes through Northeast Asia.
Gen. Bell is the senior-most general in the U.S. Army, and Korea is his last posting before retirement. He began his military career in 1969 as a second lieutenant in a cavalry unit in the Fulda Gap. It was the height of the Cold War.
"Bad Hersfeld, Germany," he says, "12 kilometers from the East-West German border. Unbelievable military apparatus just across the border, facing us." Thirty-nine years later and 5,000 miles east, it's deja vu along the DMZ.
Gen. Bell talks of the "negative Cold War environment" that pertains in the North, the global economic miracle that has passed it by, and the "tortured" people. He expresses the hope that North Korea will "take down that wall," as the East Germans did. But "until then, we've got to deter and be ready."
Ms. Kirkpatrick is a deputy editor of the Journal's editorial page.
WSJ
-
Salvaging Our North Korea Policy
By JOHN R. BOLTON
March 17, 2008
WSJ
There are signs, albeit small ones, that the Bush administration may be reaching the end of its patience with the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear weapons program. These signs could prove illusory. But as it nears its end, the administration has a serious responsibility: It must not leave its successor with an ongoing, failed policy. At a minimum, President Bush should not bequeath to the next president only the burned-out hulk of the Six-Party Talks, and countless failed and violated North Korean commitments.
David Gothard
Since they were conceived in spring 2003, the Six-Party Talks have stumbled around inconclusively. And for the last 13 months, Pyongyang has ignored, stalled, renegotiated and violated the Feb. 13, 2007 agreement.
Throughout all this "negotiation," which has mostly consisted of our government negotiating with itself, North Korea has benefited enormously. It's been spared the truly punishing sanctions that concerted international effort might have produced. In large part because of the appeasement policies of the two previous South Korean governments, Pyongyang has not felt the full impact of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) on its outward proliferation efforts. The U.S. has muzzled its criticism of North Korea's atrocious oppression of its own citizens. And, perhaps most humiliatingly of all, the U.S., in a vain effort at chasing the mirage, gave up its most effective pressure point -- the financial squeeze -- allowing Pyongyang renewed access to international markets through institutions like Banco Delta Asia.
In fact, the protracted Six-Party Talks have provided Kim Jong-il with the most precious resource of all: the time to enhance, conceal and even disperse his nuclear weapons programs. Time is nearly always on the side of the would-be proliferator, and so it has proven here. In exchange for five years of grace to North Korea, the U.S. has received precious little in return.
Pyongyang is now stonewalling yet again on its promise to disclose fully the details of its nuclear programs, including its uranium enrichment efforts and its outward proliferation. The successful Israeli military strike against a Syrian-North Korean facility on the Euphrates River last September highlighted the gravity of the regime's unwillingness to do anything serious that might restrict its nuclear option.
President Bush should spend the next 10 months rectifying the Six-Party concessions and put North Korea back under international pressure -- efforts that would be welcomed by Japan, and South Korea's new, far more realistic President Lee Myung-bak. Here are the steps to take:
- Declare North Korea's repeated refusal to honor its commitments, especially but not exclusively concerning full disclosure of its nuclear programs, unacceptable. This is the easiest step, and the most obvious. It can happen immediately. Accept no further partial "compliance," as the State Department continuously tries to do. Make public what we know about the North's Syria project, and its uranium enrichment and missile programs, so our 2008 presidential candidates can have a fully-informed debate.
- Suspend the Six-Party Talks, and reconvene talks without North Korea. Although the talks could be jettisoned altogether, continuing them without the North allows Japan, South Korea and the U.S. to begin applying real pressure to China, the one nation with the capacity to bring Pyongyang's nuclear program to a halt. China has feared to apply such pressure, worried that it could collapse Kim Jong-il's regime altogether -- an accurate assessment of the regime's limited staying power. Nonetheless, the effect of Chinese reticence has been to preserve Kim and his nuclear program. It is vital that China know this policy is no longer viable.
- Strengthen international pressure on North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Ramp up PSI cooperation with South Korea. Remind Russia of its own voluntarily-assumed obligations as a PSI core member. Remind China as well to comply with the sanctions imposed on North Korea by U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1695 and 1718 (which followed the North's 2006 ballistic missile and nuclear tests), and honor its other counterproliferation obligations. Tell them we will be watching with particular care, and that Chinese failure to increase pressure on North Korea will have implications in Sino-American bilateral relations. We can make this point privately to China rather that trumpet it publicly, but it should be made without ambiguity.
- Squeeze North Korea economically. Return the regime to limbo outside the international financial system, and step up action against its other illicit activities, such as trafficking in illicit narcotics and counterfeiting U.S. money. These and other "defensive measures" are nothing more than what any self-respecting nation does to protect itself, and the U.S. should never have eased up on them. Even now they can have a measurable impact on Kim Jong-il's weak and unsteady regime.
- Prepare contingency plans for humanitarian relief in the event of increased North Korean refugee flows or a regime collapse. Both China and South Korea have legitimate concerns about the burdens they would face if the North collapsed, or if increased internal economic deprivation spread instability. America and Japan should make it plain that they will fully shoulder their share of providing humanitarian supplies and assistance if either happened. Moreover, President Lee should increase pressure on Pyongyang -- by reiterating that South Korea will fully comply with its own constitution and grant full citizenship to any refugees from the North, however they make their way to the South.
Doubtless there are other steps. President Bush will not likely be able to solve the threat posed by North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Nonetheless, he still has time to implement policies that will allow him to leave office with the nation back on offense -- thereby affording his successor the chance to vindicate a return to the original Bush administration national security strategy.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions, 2007).
-
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Plutonium on the Euphrates
April 24, 2008; Page A12
What really happened in the Syrian desert near the Euphrates River on the night of September 6, 2007? The Bush Administration is finally due to answer that question today when it briefs Members of Congress. We've been hearing, and the press is now reporting, that the Administration will confirm that Israel bombed what the U.S. believes was a nascent plutonium-producing nuclear reactor being built with North Korea's assistance.
Everyone who has looked at the incident has suspected as much, despite official refusals to talk about it. But the Administration's acknowledgment of it, even in classified briefings, makes its current stance toward North Korea seem odder than ever.
The State Department has already given up on holding North Korea to its promise to disclose all of its nuclear activities. But now it appears that Foggy Bottom and President Bush are prepared to forgive North Korea for telling what the U.S. now agrees were lies about the North's nuclear proliferation to a Middle Eastern autocrat who is an enemy of America. At the same time, Bush Administration officials are saying that it is good policy to trust Kim Jong Il's declarations on his stockpiles of plutonium.
So: Israel had to risk war with Syria to destroy a nuclear facility built with the help of lying North Koreans. But no worries, the U.S. says it can still trust North Korea to tell the truth about its current programs. This makes us wonder if the unofficial U.S. nonproliferation policy is to have Israel bomb every plutonium facility that the North Koreans decide to sell.
If a Democratic President were pursuing the Bush Administration's North Korean diplomacy, Republicans would hoot him out of town. Mr. Bush should beware of diplomats dangling "legacies" before him. Otherwise, his real legacy on North Korea may be turning nuclear nonproliferation into a global farce.
-
Vetoing the Verifiers
May 8, 2008; Page A14
The State Department is justifying its decision to let North Korea renege on its pledge to give a "complete declaration of its nuclear programs" by promising a strict verification regime. So why is Foggy Bottom cutting its own verification experts out of the loop?
The State Department's systematic exclusion of its own Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation has gone unreported as the North Korean diplomacy proceeds. But it is causing concern on Capitol Hill and has already led to a proposal to require State to submit a report to Congress describing how the U.S. will verify any nuclear deal. Sponsored by Florida Republican Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, the legislation passed the House Foreign Affairs Committee last week with the support of Democratic Chairman Howard Berman.
The mandate of the verification bureau, as described on the State Department's Web site, is to provide oversight "on all matters relating to verification or compliance with international arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament agreements and commitments." It "supports the Secretary" in "developing and implementing robust and rigorous verification and compliance policies."
The verification bureau was created by a Republican Congress in 1999 over the objections of the Clinton Administration and State Department careerists who didn't want agreements subject to additional oversight. The bureau's biggest success to date is Libya, where it played a central role in dismantling the country's WMD programs in 2003. There the bureau worked closely with experts from the Departments of Defense and Energy as well as with Britain and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
North Korea is a different story. The verifiers "have no voice so far," one person close to the process told us. They aren't part of the negotiating teams talking to the North Koreans and they've been excluded from key internal meetings. No one from the verification bureau participated in a recent State Department trip to Pyonygang intended to work out verification issues.
Nor is the verification bureau in charge of monitoring the disabling of the North's nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. One bureau professional took part, but he was invited for his technical expertise; he was not there as a verifier. Paula DeSutter, the assistant secretary who heads the bureau, declined to comment.
Incredibly, the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs is calling the shots – talking to the North Koreans, hand picking experts to work at Yongbyon, and overseeing disablement. Call it the Chris Hill Show. Mr. Hill – the assistant secretary for East Asia – has also made a mockery of the interagency process. The verification bureau's Pentagon counterparts, who were closely involved in the six-party Korean diplomacy until mid-2005, have also been kept in exile.
Now there's talk that the East Asia bureau – not the verification bureau – will also end up monitoring any final six-party agreement. Not only does East Asia lack the technical expertise to verify a nuclear agreement, its staffers would hardly be eager to find violations in an accord negotiated by their superiors. There's even talk State may outsource some of the inspection work to China, which will be chairing a verification group within the six-party group. But China would have no incentive to blow the whistle on its client state.
The fact that Mr. Hill and his boss, Secretary Condoleezza Rice, are marginalizing their own verifiers is further reason to doubt their North Korea deal. The diplomats want to deliver a "success" and are afraid that if the verifiers get a close look, they will expose it as a fraud. Among the uncomfortable questions: Where is all of the plutonium North Korea has produced over the years? What happened to the uranium program that Pyongyang once boasted about but now says does not exist? What exactly did the North proliferate to Syria?
No verification can deliver 100% certainty, and North Korea, with its history of cheating and lying, would be a difficult case under even the most stringent inspection regimes. The disarmament of Libya succeeded because Moammar Gadhafi decided to cooperate. There's zero indication that Kim Jong Il shares that frame of mind.
North Korea's geography offers special challenges too. It's a mountainous country, with caves hiding mobile missile launchers aimed at Seoul. The military has vast underground facilities built with the help of its former Soviet patrons. Will these be open to inspectors? Even assuming that Kim will allow unimpeded and unannounced access – a leap of diplomatic faith – special expertise is needed to decide where to inspect and what to look for.
The State Department's verification bureau was created in the spirit of Ronald Reagan's slogan, "trust but verify." The Gipper was referring to the disarmament of the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but his principle applies equally to North Korea today. If Foggy Bottom won't trust its own verifiers enough to make them part of any disarmament deal, then the rest of us shouldn't trust any deal struck by the Bush State Department.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds,
-
All very confusing. On one hand the libs will refuse to recognize Bush for this and will find a way to spin it. Like the crat hack Holbrooke (the pseudo diplomate) of course is saying this whole accomplishment with N Korea was by way of an accident but his real point is of course that if only Bush would have done it the liberal way and talk more with our enemies we would have seen this much sooner. Then you have Bolton who in my opinion is about the only guy really saying like it is denouncing this as the "end of the Bush doctrine".
http://news.yahoo.com/s/mcclatchy/20080626/wl_mcclatchy/2976984
****U.S.-North Korea accord began with an 'accidental' meeting in Berlin
By Warren P. Strobel, McClatchy Newspapers Thu Jun 26, 7:07 PM ET
WASHINGTON — Meeting in Berlin, Germany in January 2007 , in what was portrayed at the time as an accidental encounter, Christopher Hill , the State Department's top Asia hand, and his North Korean counterpart sketched out a deal to resume nuclear negotiations.
ADVERTISEMENT
The North Koreans had proposed the venue, but Hill had to find an excuse to be there. "I need to be in Berlin , and I need a cover story," Hill told his mentor and one-time boss, Richard Holbrooke , the former U.N. ambassador. Holbrooke arranged for Hill to deliver a speech.
Just three months earlier, North Korea had exploded its first atomic device. The Bush administration responded to the underground test with a campaign for U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang , and Chinese-led six-nation talks aimed at denuclearizing North Korea fell into a deep freeze.
The talks between Hill, known for his aggressive, risk-taking diplomacy, and North Korean envoy Kim Kae -gwan led to a pair of public agreements last year that culminated in this week's nuclear breakthrough.
North Korea on Thursday handed over a 60-page declaration of its nuclear activities, and President Bush announced a partial lifting of U.S. sanctions.
The Berlin talks also marked a historic turnabout for President Bush , current and former U.S. officials said.
Until then, Bush had refused to engage in one-on-one diplomacy with a regime he reviled, at least outside the Chinese-organized six-nation framework. He still refuses direct talks with Iran , another troublesome nuclear aspirant.
"That was the change, the single point. You can put your finger on that, and watch the pivot," said Jack Pritchard , who served as Bush's special envoy for North Korea from 2001-2003.
Added Holbrooke: "No matter how much they try to say it wasn't a change in policy, it was," and led directly to this week's events.
Now Bush, who for most of his presidency has been accused of using too little diplomacy, faces unfamiliar criticism that he has given away too much.
Even some proponents of the peace talks say North Korea's nuclear declaration contains less than it promised last year. It covers North Korea's known efforts to produce plutonium for nuclear weapons, but says nothing about the weapons themselves— nor about an alleged covert program aimed at a uranium-based bomb or the North's nuclear cooperation with countries such as Syria .
"I think it's a very sad day. . . . It reflects the collapse of the Bush doctrine," said former undersecretary of state John Bolton , a leading hawk on proliferation issues.
Bush and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice argue that it's important to focus first on the most immediate threat— the North's plutonium stock— and advance in stages.
But "proceeding in stages is entirely advantageous to North Korea ," because it will it draw out every step to gain more rewards, Bolton said.
Precisely why Bush changed course so dramatically on North Korea — a country he famously included in his "Axis of Evil" and whose leader, Kim Jong Il, he said he loathed— remains a mystery.
But officials cite the White House's plate was overflowing with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan ; the declining influence of administration hawks such as former Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Bolton; the Republican defeat in the November 2006 mid-term elections; and the tireless efforts of Hill, who had Rice's consistent backing.
Bush also may have wanted a historic foreign policy agreement before he left office.
"There's certainly a desire on the legacy issue here," said Carolyn Leddy , who worked on counter-proliferation at the White House's National Security Council until last November, and is critical of the deal Bush struck.
Leddy recalled that after the October 2006 North Korean nuclear test, "we were all geared up to look at new sanctions mechanisms." Then, she said, "all off a sudden, it was no more sanctions . . . no more sticks."
The stage was set for the two days of meetings in Berlin in January.
Holbrooke, telling his part of the story for the first time, told McClatchy Newspapers that he invited Hill, who served as his deputy in the 1995 Dayton negotiations that ended the war in Bosnia , to give a speech to the American Academy in Berlin , which Holbrooke chairs. A press conference was scheduled, in case Hill had important news to announce. Rice also happened to be en route to Berlin , from a mission to the Middle East .
The outlines of a deal that Hill and North Korea's Kim reached were codified the following month at the six-party talks.
The North would shut down its Yongbyon nuclear reactor and deliver a list of its nuclear programs. North Korea in return would get heavy fuel oil for its electricity needs, and Washington would begin removing it from its list of state sponsor of terrorism, and from under the Trading with the Enemy Act.
Bush has doggedly stuck to the deal, even as criticism from his conservative allies has mounted.
Not even intelligence data showing North Korea helped Syria construct an alleged nuclear reactor— Israel bombed the facility last September— derailed it.
"If he could, (Bush) would much rather ignore, isolate and verbally condemn North Korea ," said Jon Wolfsthal , a proliferation expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies .
"Reality intervened," he said. "The Bush doctrine, the neoconservative view of regime change as a tool for nonproliferation, was left on the battlefields of Iraq ."****
-
The NK situation continues to befuddle me. I lack confidence in Bush's judgment and fear Bolton is right.
-
By JOHN R. BOLTON
Yesterday, North Korea declared all its political and military agreements with the South "dead" -- the latest in a string of confrontational moves taken by Pyongyang against Seoul and the U.S. In the past few weeks, the North confirmed it possessed enough plutonium for four to five nuclear warheads; threatened to retain its nuclear weapons until America withdraws its nuclear protection from the South; denounced the appointment of Seoul's new unification minister as "an open provocation"; and proclaimed that a routine South Korean military exercise had so inflamed tensions that "a war may break out any time."
The Associated Press concluded from all this that North Korea "sounded open to new ideas to defuse nuclear-tinged tensions." Some State Department quarters will warmly receive that analysis; a senior careerist at State once called earlier North Korean provocations "a desperate cry for help." Others will say Kim Jong Il just wants attention, that these moves are simply a "coming out" exercise after his recent illness.
Unfortunately, early signs are that Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is falling prey to such logic and downplaying the significance of Pyongyang's nuclear program. It may well be that the Obama administration wants to emphasize domestic economic issues and limit foreign affairs priorities to the Arab-Israeli conflict. But neglecting North Korea is a dangerous gamble with very high stakes.
Most troubling is Mrs. Clinton's unwillingness to acknowledge North Korea's uranium-enrichment efforts. In her confirmation hearing, she said these efforts were "never quite verified." Although we know precious little about the North's progress, including how much weapons-grade uranium may have been produced, Mrs. Clinton cast doubt on whether uranium enrichment was a serious subject at all. Pressed on this point on Jan. 23 at State's daily briefing, the department spokesman said "we don't know" whether such a program exists.
Of course, the easiest way to solve a difficult problem is to conclude there really isn't one. (This was John Kennedy's technique for eliminating the U.S. "missile gap" with the Soviet Union, which he had deployed so effectively against Richard Nixon.) For years, State's permanent bureaucracy has been trying to wish away North Korea's uranium-enrichment program. If President Barack Obama's State Department takes this strategy, Pyongyang will once again have occasion to contemplate the profound wisdom of the ancient North Korean riddle: Why negotiate with the Americans when we do so well by letting them negotiate with themselves?
Equally tempting -- and equally dangerous -- is the notion that North Korea is not a truly pressing problem. After all, the argument goes, the North already has nuclear weapons, so unlike Iran there is no line to prevent it from crossing. Accordingly, there is no urgency to reconvene the six-party talks with the Koreas, Russia, China and Japan to end the North's nuclear program, and certainly not to take any concrete measures to apply meaningful pressure to Kim Jong Il's regime.
By contrast, George Mitchell, the newly appointed special envoy to the Middle East, arrived in the region five days after being named, and the endless cycle of meetings on Iran's nuclear program among the U.N. Security Council's five permanent members and Germany will resume in days. The special envoy for Afghanistan-Pakistan is gearing up rapidly. And there's now even a special envoy for climate change.
But so far, there is no special envoy for North Korea. Mrs. Clinton's first press conference last Tuesday provided another opportunity to announce the position and name the envoy, but she passed, even though she was asked specifically about the six-party talks. There are persuasive arguments against reviving the unhappy Clinton administration practice of unleashing numerous Big Beast envoys in the State Department. But make no mistake: In such an ecosystem, if your issue does not have a Big Beast, then it is not a Big Issue.
The belief that North Korea is not an imminent danger is closely related to the fallacy that it is "merely" a threat to peace and security in Northeast Asia, a longstanding State Department fixation. In fact, North Korea is an urgent threat in the Middle East, both because of its nuclear program and its strenuous efforts to proliferate ballistic missile technology there.
The clone of North Korea's Yongbyon reactor -- under construction in Syria until it was destroyed by Israel in September 2007 -- demonstrates beyond debate how the North's nuclear program contributes directly and palpably to Middle East tensions. Trying to ignore or downplay the relationship guarantees that we will resolve neither Pyongyang's, nor Tehran's, nuclear ambitions.
Ironically, North Korea's provocations may well precipitate the appointment of a U.S. special envoy to continue the six-party talks. If so, the North will have succeeded yet again, suckering Washington into more fruitless negotiations which have no prospect of eliminating the North Korean threat. By whittling away our time, they will continue to prevent the U.S. from implementing stronger measures to undermine Kim Jong Il's regime.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
-
If Ronald Reagan didn't pursue what the left derided as "star wars" we wouldn't be able to do this now would we?
****ABC News' Martha Raddatz, Adm. Timothy Keating, head of the U.S. Pacific Commands, said that the military is prepared to shoot down any North Korean ballistic missile -- if President Obama should give the order.
There are reports that Kim Jung Il is advancing his nuclear plans for North Korea and Washington is watching closely. Admiral Keating says that the U.S. military is ready and prepared to respond to the launch of any missiles by North Korea.
(AP Photos)"If a missile leaves the launch pad we'll be prepared to respond upon direction of the president," Keating told ABC News. "I'm not a betting man but I'd go like 60/40, 70/30 that it will, they will attempt to launch a satellite. There's equipment moving up there that would indicate the preliminary stages of preparation for a launch. So I'd say it's more than less likely."
"Should it look like it's not a satellite launch -- that it's something other than a satellite launch -- we'll be ready to respond."
Intelligence reports suggest that North Korea is preparing a long-range missile test. Earlier this week, North Korea announced its plans to send a satellite into orbit as part of its space program.
However, many in the international community assert that North Korea's satellite test is simply a means of concealing a long-range missile test -- a move that would flare existing tension in the region.
Related
Will North Korea Launch a Long-Range Missile?NKorea Building Underground Fuel Facility?Clinton Fears North Korean Power StruggleKeating said that the military is ready to respond with at least five different systems: destroyer, Aegis cruiser, radar, space-based system and ground-based interceptor. All of these work in conjunction with one another to protect against any missile threat.
Destroyers are fast, multi-purpose warships that can be used in almost any type of naval operation. They would likely play a defensive role, helping to repel an air attack and offering a platform for gunfire and missiles to hit airborne objects.
The Aegis cruiser is part of the Navy's computer-based command and control system that integrates radar and missiles to fight against land, air and sea attacks. For Keating, the Aegis combat system can tracks threats and counter any short- or medium-range missiles.
Radars vary in type and design, but the military would likely employ a range of sea-based and early warning radars to detect the presence of a North Korean missile, track warheads' movement and more easily home in on the position of a missile to knock it down.
Space-based infrared system is a defense system that provides warning of any missile launches, detecting the threat and employing other tools to obliterate it.
Ground-based interceptor is a weapon that seeks and destroys incoming ballistic missiles outside of the earth's atmosphere. Its sensors give the military the ability to locate and obliterate a North Korean missile.
"We will be fully prepared to respond as the president directs," Keating said. "Everything that we need to be ready is ready. So that's ready twice in one sentence, but we're not kidding, it doesn't take much for us to be fully postured to respond."****
-
Does the Empty-suit have the huevos? I guess we'll find out.
-
Can open. Worms everywhere , , ,
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2009/03/airliner-threat.html
Friday, March 06, 2009
The Airliner Threat
It its latest attempt at sabre-rattling, North Korea has threatened to shoot down a South Korean airliner during next week's exercises between ROK military forces and their American counterparts.
Reuters has the warning, issued by the official Korean Central News Agency:
"Security cannot be guaranteed for South Korean civil airplanes flying through the territorial air of our side and its vicinity ... above the East Sea of Korea (Sea of Japan) in particular, while the military exercises are under way," the North's KCNA news agency quoted a statement from a government official as saying.
In response, South Korean airlines have announced plans to re-route flights approaching Seoul from the east, placing them farther away from North Korean territory. Singapore Airlines, which also operates a number of flights into and out of Seoul, has adopted a similar policy. Other carriers, including Japan Airlines, All Nippon Airways and Air China, said they have no plans to alter their flight routes.
There was no word from U.S. carriers that service South Korean destinations, including Northwest Airlines and United.
Pyongyang's warning is almost certainly a prelude to the expected launch of a Tapeodong-2 long-range missile, now being prepared at a test site on North Korea's east coast. DPRK officials claim the rocket will be used to put a satellite into orbit, but western analysts dispute that statement. There were no signs of a satellite deployment during previous TD-2 launches in 1998 and 2006. Intelligence officials in the U.S., Japan and South Korea believe the launch is nothing more than a test of the extended-range missile, capable of hitting U.S. territory throughout the Pacific.
North Korea is expected to announce a "closure area" for air and naval traffic in preparation for the test. The restricted area may extended into commercial air corridors over the Sea of Japan --the same routes used by airliners flying into Seoul from the east. However, the launch of a single missile, from a location on the North Korean coast, would pose a minimal threat to commercial air traffic.
But the warning statement--and anticipated closure area--will achieve an important goal: minimizing air traffic over the Sea of Japan during the upcoming missile test. That will make it for North Korean air defenses to keep tabs on U.S. platforms expected to monitor the launch, namely the RC-135S "Cobra Ball," and the RC-135V/W "Rivet Joint."
Cobra Ball is a dedicated Measures and Signatures Intelligence (MASINT) aircraft, configured to track ballistic missile flights at long range. Normally based at Offut AFB, Nebraska, at least one RC-135S will be deployed to Kadena AB, Japan in preparation for the North Korean test. Rivet Joint is a dedicated SIGINT platform, used to monitor enemy communications and threat emitters, providing additional threat warning to Cobra Ball and other allied assets.
Indeed, the greatest risk to our reconnaissance platforms--and commercial airliners--comes from North Korean fighters and long-range surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), not the TD-2. The DPRK maintains a number of older fighters, mostly MiG-21s and MiG-19s, on alert at bases on it eastern coast. While both have limited ranges, they could (potentially) intercept an RC-135 operating within 150 NM of the DPRK coastline, or a commercial jet approaching ROK airspace.
A second threat comes from the aging SA-5 "Gammon" SAM system, purchased from Russia more than 20 years ago. North Korea has two SA-5 complexes, located an Ongo-dak and Tokchae-san. Together, they provide overlapping coverage of the eastern coast, and airspace south of the DMZ. With a range of at least 150 NM, the SA-5 is optimized for engagements against large, non-maneuvering targets like reconnaissance aircraft and commercial airliners.
In response, Washington and Seoul should make it very clear that any provocative move by Pyongyang will result in a strong military response. The U.S. and South Korea have a variety of assets that could target the SA-5 sites and airfields housing MiG-21s and MiG-19s. If North Korea sends its fighters on an intercept mission, they should be shot down. If one of the SA-5 complexes "paints" a recce flight or an airliner, the site will be hit with an ATACMS, anti-radiation missiles, cruise missiles or a combination of those weapons.
It's no accident that North Korea has grown increasingly bold in its provocations toward the U.S. and our allies in the Far East. Sensing weakness and indecision in the Obama Administration, Kim Jong-il is quite willing to test the limits of our patience--and response options.
Less than two months into Mr. Obama's term, Pyongyang has announced plans to launch another TD-2 (on a flight path that may carry it over Japan); vowed military against South Korea, and threatened to disrupt commercial air service along busy east Asia corridors.
The U.S. response? Nothing more than mild diplomatic warnings. No wonder Mr. Kim is feeling his oats.
-
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D96Q4L200&show_article=1
N. Korea warns intercepting 'satellite' will prompt counterstrike+
Mar 8 05:45 PM US/Eastern
PYONGYANG/BEIJING, March 9 (AP) - (Kyodo)—North Korea warned Monday that any move to intercept what it calls a satellite launch and what other countries suspect may be a missile test-firing would result in a counterstrike against the countries trying to stop it.
"We will retaliate (over) any act of intercepting our satellite for peaceful purposes with prompt counterstrikes by the most powerful military means," the official Korean Central News Agency quoted a spokesman of the General Staff of the Korean People's Army as saying.
If countries such as the United States, Japan or South Korea try to intercept the launch, the North Korean military will carry out "a just retaliatory strike operation not only against all the interceptor means involved but against the strongholds" of the countries, it said.
"Shooting our satellite for peaceful purposes will precisely mean a war," it added.
North Korea earlier announced it is preparing to put a communications satellite into space, but outside observers suspect it may in fact be a test-firing of a long-range ballistic missile.
The United States, Japan and South Korea have said that even if Pyongyang calls the launch a missile test, it would violate existing U.N. Security Council resolutions.
The same North Korean statement said the country's military will cut off communications with its South Korean counterparts during the U.S.- South Korean exercises for the duration of the exercises beginning Monday.
A separate, more rare statement by the KPA's Supreme Command was quoted by the KCNA as saying that its soldiers are under orders to be "fully combat-ready" during U.S.-South Korean military exercises beginning Monday.
The North's armed forces have been ordered to "deal merciless retaliatory blows" should there be any intrusion "into the sky and land and seas of the DPRK even an inch."
DPRK stands for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, North Korea's official name.
North Korea has demanded a stop to this month's U.S.-South Korean exercises, and said earlier it cannot guarantee the security of South Korean civilian airplanes flying through its territorial airspace while they are under way.
-
Hey all
N.Korea conducts second nuclear test, U.N. to meet(and do What ? oh ,I know nothing ,just like the obama) :-o
SEOUL (Reuters) – North Korea conducted a second nuclear test Monday that was far more powerful than its first one, triggering an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting on the hermit state's defiant act, but financial markets wobbled only briefly on the news.
U.S. President Barack Obama said Pyongyang's attempts at developing nuclear weapons was a threat to international peace and security, while the North's neighbor and long-time benefactor, China, said it was "resolutely opposed" to the test.
Russia, which also called the test a threat to regional security, said the blast was about equal in power to the U.S. atom bomb dropped on the Japanese city of Nagasaki in World War Two.
Ratcheting up tensions further, North Korea test-fired three short-range missiles just hours later, Yonhap news agency said.
Officials in Washington and Beijing said North Korea had warned their governments of the test about an hour before detonation but nearby Japan said it was not given advance notice.
Germany, Britain and France were among the nations condemning the test while U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he was "deeply worried."
Monday's blast was up to 20 times more powerful than the North's first nuclear test about 2 1/2 years ago, underscoring the advances in its nuclear program despite multilateral talks on ending Pyongyang's nuclear weapons ambitions.
The latest test will confound the international community, which has for years tried a mixture of huge aid pledges and tough economic sanctions to persuade the impoverished North to give up efforts to build a nuclear arsenal.
It is also bound to raise concerns about proliferation, a major worry of the United States which has in the past accused Pyongyang of trying to sell its nuclear know-how to states such as Syria.
NORTH KOREAN LEVERAGE
Analysts said the test also will serve to raise North Korea's leverage in any negotiations with the United States.
It comes as speculation has mounted that leader Kim Jong-il, his health uncertain after reports of a stroke last year, wants to strengthen an already iron grip on power so he can better secure the succession for one of his three sons.
The nuclear test dealt another blow to South Korean markets, already unsettled by fears of domestic unrest after former President Roh Moo-hyun, who had been questioned over his links to a corruption scandal, jumped to his death during the weekend.
South Korea's main stock market index fell more than 6 percent at one stage on worries by some that investors would flee.
But the decline was short-lived and analysts said investors were used to the North's repeated saber-rattling, even as it became more aggressive, and would likely panic only if there was military conflict on a peninsula where 2 million troops face each other across one of the world's most heavily armed borders.
North Korea already is so isolated there is little left with which to punish an autocratic government that has long been willing to take dealings with the outside world to the brink.
At home, its leaders repeatedly stress the threat from a hostile United States to justify heavy spending on the military that keeps them in power but which has meant deepening poverty, at times famine, for most of the rest of its 23 million people.
The official KCNA news agency said the North had "successfully conducted one more underground nuclear test on May 25 as part of the measures to bolster up its nuclear deterrent for self-defense in every way."
The country's first nuclear test, in October 2006, was considered to have been relatively weak, about 1 kiloton, suggesting design problems.
SECURITY COUNCIL TO MEET
China Monday echoed concerns by other permanent members of the Security Council, which was due to go into an emergency session later Monday.
"The Chinese side vehemently demands North Korea abides by its denuclearization promises, stop any actions which may worsen the situation and return to the six-party talks process," the Foreign Ministry said in a statement on its website (www.mfa.gov.cn).
"The Chinese government calls on all sides to calmly and appropriately deal (with the situation)."
Analysts said, however, Beijing was unlikely to back stronger sanctions as part of a new U.N. Security Council resolution.
Obama said it was "a matter of grave concern to all nations" and warranted action by the international community.
North Korea had for weeks threatened to conduct the test in response to tighter international sanctions following its April launch of a rocket, widely seen as a disguised long-range missile that violated U.N. resolutions.
Following the tightened sanctions, Pyongyang also said it would no longer be a party to six-country talks on giving up its nuclear weapons program.
"North Korea's strategic objective hasn't changed. That objective is to win the attention of the Obama administration, to push the North Korea issue up the agenda," said Xu Guangyu, a researcher at the China Arms Control and Disarmament Association.
Boyo( Obamas foriegn policy in a nut shell : You're right its all our fault we diserve it , we surrender. :evil:)
-
Also to be remembered here is the presence Iranian scientists at these things, the NK nuke operation in Syria neutralized by Israel, recent reports that Pak is upgrading its nuke program-- probably with US money!!!-- The Gathering Perfect Clusterfcuk gains momentum. :cry: :x
-
This piece strikes me as a bit glib-- but still worthy of the read:
Geopolitical Diary: North Korea's Nuclear Program in the Past and Future
May 26, 2009
North Korea conducted a nuclear test on Monday, a little more than two and a half years after its first such test in October 2006. Since the early 1990s, North Korea has been engaged in a public balancing act between nuclear development and negotiations with the international community — particularly the United States. One of the key factors driving the North’s nuclear program is its own insecurity when faced with the United States’ full might. At its core, the nuclear program is about regime survival — not only now, but into the future.
Pyongyang’s focus on a nuclear program is rooted in its history. The Korean War showed North Korea how quickly the U.S. military could reverse a situation, pushing the North’s forces from their nearly complete conquering of the Korean Peninsula back up to the Yalu River line in a matter of weeks. But even before the vast difference in military capability between North Korea and the United States was reinforced by that war, North Korea, the united Korea before it and even the earlier Korean kingdoms occupied a rather insecure geographical position in Asia.
The Korean Peninsula traditionally has been an invasion route and contested territory between the two regional competitors, China and Japan. It has developed a limited repertoire of tactics to deal with this unchosen geographic position: It can attempt isolation (the so-called “Hermit Kingdom”); play regional competitors against one another (a similar strategy was employed, ultimately to failure, as Korea sought to avoid the push of colonialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries); or find a third-party sponsor to provide protection from its neighbors (for example, as the United States provided protection for South Korea in the second half of the 20th century).
North Korea has employed varieties of these tactics — from playing the Russians and Chinese off one another during the Cold War (and exploiting both powers’ fears of a U.S. occupation of the entire peninsula) to developing a fortress mentality, closing itself off to outside ideas and influence. Even North Korea’s nuclear program, in some ways, has been used at times to draw U.S. attention and maintain U.S. involvement in part to ensure the peninsula doesn’t end up once again stuck between an aggressive China and expansionist Japan.
But the nuclear program, as it developed, also was a manifestation of North Korea’s “Juche” self-reliance philosophy — a philosophy born from centuries of having to rely on others and almost always being sorely disappointed in the end. By developing a nuclear capability, even if in the early stages, North Korea is moving closer to a point where neither its neighbors nor the United States have many options for threatening it without facing a deadly response.
For decades, Pyongyang maintained a massive conventional military, replete with short- and medium-range missiles, rockets and artillery aimed at the nearby South Korean capital, Seoul, as a deterrent to any military action against the North. But this was not seen as a sufficient deterrent to the United States — which continued to carry out military operations around the world against seemingly powerful regimes that ultimately were unable to respond in a manner that truly threatened Washington or even made it think twice. Pyongyang could not be sure that Washington would always consider Seoul as the deciding factor, its threats to turn the city into a “sea of fire” notwithstanding.
Pyongyang’s nuclear and long-range missile programs, then, were part of an effort to demonstrate that North Korea would be able to respond to the United States or other distant aggressors. Initially, Pyongyang was willing to trade away its developing capability in return for more concrete assurances from Washington (whether through a formal peace accord or normalized relations) that Pyongyang would not end up in the U.S. military’s gun sights. But Pyongyang quickly found that its conventional deterrent, coupled with the very different views found among its neighbors and the United States (Beijing rarely agreed to the most stringent sanctions, Seoul was often conflicted about risking destabilizing the North, and Japan opposed concessions), meant that it could escalate a threat, then partly back down in exchange for an economic or political reward — all without really halting its nuclear and missile progress.
The 2006 nuclear test, part of a concerted effort to draw the United States back to the bargaining table, triggered a perhaps surprisingly soft response. In essence, the United States and others gave Pyongyang a sound talking to, and then returned to negotiations. This convinced some among the North Korean elite, particularly in the military, that not only would North Korea never have to give up its nuclear deterrent, but it also could accelerate development with little risk of backlash. This thinking came to the fore again after Kim Jong Il suffered a stroke in 2008, without a clear line of succession. The situation set off intensified maneuvering in Pyongyang as various factions — including the military — sought to take advantage and gain strength.
North Korea’s attempted satellite launch last month and the nuclear test on Monday are both as much about demonstrating Kim Jong Il’s continued strength at home as they are about warning the world (and particularly the United States) not to mess with Pyongyang while the reorganization of top leaders is under way. But it is also an attempt by Pyongyang to show the world that North Korea is both willing to follow through on its threats and not afraid of the consequences (perhaps because it has seen how ineffectual the “consequences” of past actions were).
In essence, North Korea is saying that it does not need to rely on anyone else — that is has found another way to ensure the security of the Korean Peninsula from its neighbors, without relying on outside exploitation. This is, of course, not entirely true: North Korea remains heavily dependent upon China for energy, food and cash, and has grown used to periodic food and fuel aid handouts from the international community, South Korea and the United States.
But to summarize the North Korean behavior as mere attempts to attract U.S. attention or to bargain fails to take into consideration the deep-rooted insecurities of North Korea and its predecessor states on the Korean Peninsula. What the “shrimp between two whales” is trying to do is find a way to avoid being crushed or eaten. It may not fit exactly with international norms, but it has worked for Pyongyang so far.
-
Russia fears Korea conflict could go nuclear
link
By Oleg Shchedrov
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia is taking security measures as a precaution against the possibility tension over North Korea could escalate into nuclear war, news agencies quoted officials as saying on Wednesday.
Interfax quoted an unnamed security source as saying a stand-off triggered by Pyongyang's nuclear test on Monday could affect the security of Russia's far eastern regions, which border North Korea.
"The need has emerged for an appropriate package of precautionary measures," the source said.
"We are not talking about stepping up military efforts but rather about measures in case a military conflict, perhaps with the use of nuclear weapons, flares up on the Korean Peninsula," he added. The official did not elaborate further.
North Korea has responded to international condemnation of its nuclear test and a threat of new U.N. sanctions by saying it is no longer bound by an armistice signed with South Korea at the end of the 1950-53 Korean War.
Itar-Tass news agency quoted a Russian Foreign Ministry official as saying the "war of nerves" over North Korea should not be allowed to grow into a military conflict, a reference to Pyongyang's decision to drop out of the armistice deal.
"DANGEROUS BRINKMANSHIP"
"We assume that a dangerous brinkmanship, a war of nerves, is under way, but it will not grow into a hot war," the official told Tass. "Restraint is needed."
The Foreign Ministry often uses statements sourced to unnamed officials, released through official news agencies, to lay down its position on sensitive issues.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has condemned the North Korean tests but his foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, has warned the international community against hasty decisions. Russia is a veto-wielding permanent member of the U.N. Security Council which is preparing to discuss the latest stand-off over the peninsula.
In the past, Moscow has been reluctant to support Western calls for sanctions. But Russian officials in the United Nations have said that this time the authority of the international body is at stake. Medvedev told South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, who called him on Wednesday, that Russia was prepared to work with Seoul on a new U.N. Security Council resolution and to revive international talks on the North Korean nuclear issue.
"The heads of state noted that the nuclear test conducted by North Korea on Monday is a direct violation of a U.N. Security Council resolution and impedes international law," a Kremlin press release said.
-
"Clinton slams N. Korea's rhetoric, 'belligerent' actions"
I'm sure Kim Jong Il is shaking in his boots. :-o
Let's hope action is taken besides useless rhetoric...
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Wednesday that North Korea "has ignored the international community" and "continues to act in a provocative and belligerent manner toward its neighbors."
"There are consequences to such actions," Clinton said, referring to recent saber-rattling and nuclear activities in North Korea.
The country has chosen to violate "specific language of the U.N. Security Council resolution 1718" and "abrogated obligations it entered into though the six-party talks," Clinton said Wednesday during an appearance with the Egyptian foreign minister. The U.N. resolution, adopted in 2006 after North Korea's first nuclear test, condemned the test and imposed sanctions on the country.
-
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again,
Stop, or I'll say stop again....
-
You mean that doesn't work?
:-o
-
May 28, 2009
John Bolton, prophet
Ethel C. Fenig
Last week, on May 20, the Wall Street Journal published former UN ambassador John Bolton's op-ed prophetically titled "Get Ready for Another North Korean Nuke Test."
Five days later--boom! Well, why not? As Bolton noted
What the North has lacked thus far is the political opportunity to test without fatally jeopardizing its access to the six-party talks and the legitimacy they provide. Despite the State Department's seemingly unbreakable second-term hold over President Bush, another test after 2006 just might have ended the talks.
So far, the North faces no such threat from the Obama administration. Despite Pyongyang's aggression, Mr. Bosworth has reiterated that the U.S. is "committed to dialogue" and is "obviously interested in returning to a negotiating table as soon as we can." This is precisely what the North wants: America in a conciliatory mode, eager to bargain, just as Mr. Bush was after the 2006 test.
If the next nuclear explosion doesn't derail the six-party talks, Kim will rightly conclude that he faces no real danger of ever having to dismantle his weapons program. North Korea is a mysterious place, but there is no mystery about its foreign-policy tactics: They work. The real mystery is why our administrations -- Republican and Democratic -- haven't learned that their quasi-religious faith in the six-party talks is misplaced.
For good measure, the North Koreans sent up a few missiles the next day--and yes, Ms. Tina Fey, they can reach Alaska. And Alaska, governed by Sarah Palin (R) is part of the United States.
And what will Iran learn from North Korea? Bolton concluded
Negotiations like the six-party talks are a charade and reflect a continuing collapse of American resolve. U.S. acquiescence in a second North Korean nuclear test will likely mean that Tehran will adopt Pyongyang's successful strategy.
It's time for the Obama administration to finally put down Kim Jong Il's script. If not, we better get ready for Iran -- and others -- to go nuclear.
Expanding his ideas in a May 25 New York Times op-ed, Bolton warns of the dangerous results of President Barack Hussein Obama's (D) insistence on arms control; (read arms reduction.)
Today's real proliferation threat, however, is not Israel, but states like Iran and North Korea that become parties to the alphabet soup of arms control treaties and then violate them with abandon. Without robust American reactions to these violations - not apparent in administration thinking - more will follow.
And right on schedule, as, to no one's surprise ( well, except maybe the entire Obama administration) Parisa Hafezi and Zahra Hosseinian report in the Washington Post
Ahmadinejad on Monday rejected a Western proposal for it to "freeze" its nuclear work in return for no new sanctions and ruled out any talks with major powers on the issue.
The comments by the conservative president, who is seeking a second term in a June 12 election, are likely to further disappoint the U.S. administration of President Barack Obama, which is seeking to engage Iran diplomatically.
Instead he
proposed a debate with Obama at the United Nations in New York "regarding the roots of world problems" but he made clear Tehran would not bow to pressure on the nuclear issue.
"Our talks (with major powers) will only be in the framework of cooperation for managing global issues and nothing else. We have clearly announced this," Ahmadinejad said.
"The nuclear issue is a finished issue for us," he told a news conference. "From now on we will continue our path in the framework of the (U.N. nuclear watchdog) agency."
Iran has recently fired missiles which can not only reach Israel but southern Europe, other Arab countries and US forces in the Gulf.
Bolton thus reminds us
The Senate, which must approve any treaty with a two-thirds supermajority, is now the only obstacle to Obama administration policies that will seriously weaken the United States. Voters should remind their representatives on Capitol Hill that they have a responsibility to keep us safe.
But as Andy Borowtiz noted
U.S. to Respond to North Korea with 'Strongest Possible Adjectives'
And will speak those same adjectives to Iran. And then will be shocked, shocked, shocked that they will have no effect, downplay a North Korean and Iranian missile threat while frantically attempting even more engagement.
Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2009/05/john_bolton_prophet.html at May 28, 2009 - 11:54:03 AM EDT
-
http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-6448-Norfolk-Military-Affairs-Examiner~y2009m5d27-Fasttrack-to-failure
Fast-track to failure
May 27, 5:44 PM
It's not often that we beat John Bolton to the punch on North Korea. But in this column on April 26th--about three weeks ahead of Dr. Bolton's Wall Street Journal op-ed--we predicted more trouble with Pyongyang:
From the moment Mr. Obama entered the presidency, it has been clear that Pyongyang planned to test him. By late February. intelligence agencies in the U.S., Japan and South Korea were detecting suspicious activity at Musudan-ri, North Korea's long-range missile test facility. Preparations for a launch of a Tapeodong-2 ICBM were underway.
"...In response, Washington (once again) turned the other cheek, seeking only mild punishment for North Korea's violation of existing U.N. resolutions. American officials have also urged the DPRK to return to the Six Party nuclear talks, which have been stalled for months.
[snip]
Not surprisingly, Pyongyang was undeterred. The missile test went off as scheduled on April 5th, but a satellite never reached orbit. Intelligence analysts report that the TD-2's third stage failed, although its unclear if the missile actually carried a satellite payload. Many experts remain convinced that the launch was nothing more than a missile test.
In response, Washington vowed to seek new sanctions against North Korea. Meanwhile, Kim Jong-il's regime was moving on to other, equally outrageous acts. Less than a year after (supposedly) shuttering its nuclear efforts, Pyongyang promised to restart the program.
Of course, North Korea did more that restart its nuclear efforts. Earlier this week, the DPRK conducted its second, underground nuclear test, a blast in the 10-20 kiloton range. That's roughly the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima during World War II, and demonstrates that Pyongyang has completely mastered the nuclear weapons cycle. North Korea's first nuclear test (in 2006) was a dud, raising questions about the reliability of Kim's nuclear technology.
To be fair, Ambassador Bolton deserves credit for predicting the recent test, noting that the military and scientific imperatives made it all-but-inevitable. We thought the next nuclear test would be later this year, but clearly, Kim Jong-il is on an accelerated timetable.
Consider the events that have followed the nuclear blast. The hours that followed saw a series of short-range missile launches, affirming North Korea's ability to build nuclear weapons and (eventually) mate them to various delivery platforms. And, if that's not enough, Pyongyang has announced that it is no longer bound by the armistice that ended the Korean war, and has threatened to attack allied vessels that try to inspect North Korean merchant ships.
The reaction from Washington? Nothing but sharply-worded statements, pleas for U.N. action and invitations for North Korea to return to the bargaining table. No wonder Kim Jong-il is feeling his oats.
In fact, our "evolving" policy toward Pyongyang is rather remarkable, given the recent, dangerous turn of events in northeastern Asia. In less than two months, North Korea has demonstrated its ability to launch a crude ICBM, detonated a nuclear weapon that will (one day) be carried by that missile, and promised additional provocations unless the U.S., South Korea and Japan play ball with Kim's regime. Put another way, Washington and its allies better cough up more aid--and avoid new sanctions--or the DPRK will raise the ante again.
The Obama Administration seems to believe that Pyongyang has already played its trump card with Monday's nuclear test. At some point, the thinking goes, North Korea will be desperate for food and fuel and meekly return to negotiations. That will allow everyone to forget about the recent unpleasantness, and get back to the diplomatic " Rope-a-Dope" that passes for bargaining with North Korea.
Unfortunately, there are a few problems with that theory. Truth is, Mr. Kim can create more havoc, exacerbating the crisis that now engulfs the Korean peninsula. The crab fishing season is now underway along the Northern Limit Line (the maritime extension of the DMZ), an area that saw pitched battles between DPRK and South Korean gunboats a few years ago. Given the current tensions in Korea, the potential for new battles is growing. How would Mr. Obama respond to a naval "war" that quickly spreads to land?
Or, how would the commander-in-chief react if North Korean MiGs or surface-to-air missiles begin firing on U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan, or south of the DMZ? Would he order attacks on the DPRK missile sites, or beg the U.N. to take action? And, what about a repeat of Pyongyang's commando attack on the South Korean presidential mansion (the Blue House) in the 1970s? Or the terrorist bombings in the 80s that brought down a RIK airliner, killing hundreds of passengers, or a decapitation strike against South Korean leaders during a state visit to Burma? All of these options remain a part of Kim Jong-il's playbook, and history demonstrates that the North Korean leader is not afraid to raise the stakes, in pursuit of his goals.
Carried to their extreme, Kim's plans could (ultimately) include a general attack against South Korea, though most "experts" have long discounted that possibility. Still, that scenario cannot be completely ruled out. Sixty percent of the North Korean Army is located within 60 miles of the DMZ, meaning that Kim Jong-il could launch a limited invasion with virtually no intelligence warning. Did we mention that he now has nukes?
Against this deteriorating backdrop, how should the U.S. respond? While the time for diplomatic carrots and U.N. resolutions has clearly passed, Mr. Obama remains wedded to that approach, with little regard for wider, long-term consequences. Consider the examples of South Korea and Japan. Over the past three months, both have been threatened by their enemy's long-range missiles, and now that same regime has detonated a nuclear weapon.
That leaves Tokyo and Seoul with a sobering choice. Remain under the American umbrella (which Washington appears reluctant to use), or consider building their own nukes. With their advanced technological and industrial bases, both Tokyo and Seoul could have nuclear weapons in a little over a year, a development that would likely spur all-out arms race in the region. And rest assured, the nuclear option is being quietly discussed in both capitals, as confidence in American (read" the Obama Administration) sinks like a rock.
At the very least, this should be an interesting summer on the Korean peninsula. Borrowing John Bolton's crystal ball, we can easily envision naval clashes between North and South Korea, and American involvement is almost assured. Ditto for some sort of ambush involving a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the Sea of Japan or the Yellow Sea. Beyond that, the situation grows even dicier.
Clearly, no one wants another Korean War, but there are steps the Obama Administration should be taking now, to deter Pyongyang's aggression. For starters, how about re-imposing some of the financial sanctions that (among other things) froze the assets of North Korean leaders stashed in a Macau bank. The amount of the money was rather small, but it got the attention of Kim Jong-il. Moreover, it spurred a rare stretch of "good" behavior from the DPRK, until the U.S. released the assets.
Additionally, Washington should press ahead with naval exercises involving South Korea vessels along the Northern Limit Line, as a show of resolve against Pyongyang. Potential attacks by DPRK vessels should bring an immediate response by both navies, aimed at neutralizing the maritime threat. On the political front, Mr. Obama needs to lean on China--hard. Not only can Beijing put additional pressure on Pyongyang, it can help in more practical ways, too.
At the top of that list is barring over-flights and landings by transports that routinely ferry arms to Iran and Syria. Deprived of that aerial route--and with allied warships stopping North Korean merchant vessels--Pyongyang will feel the pressure rather quickly and reconsider its actions.
Regrettably, there are no indications that the Obama Administration is prepared to adopt--and maintain--a tougher line against North Korea. Indeed, the president's policies for dealing with the DPRK are on a fast track to failure, following the precedent set by Bill Clinton and George W. Bush--with one exception. Neither Mr. Clinton nor Mr. Bush had to deal with a North Korean regime that was nuclear-capable. Now, Mr. Obama is facing one with nukes, but he has no realistic plan for handling the situation, beyond myopic diplomacy.
-
http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-6448-Norfolk-Military-Affairs-Examiner~y2009m5d29-No-crisis
What crisis?
May 29, 9:07 PM
Over the past five days, North Korea has detonated its second nuclear device; test-fired at least six missiles of various types, announced it is no longer bound by the armistice that ended the Korean War, and threatened more "defensive measures" against the U.S. and South Korea.
But don't worry, there's no "crisis" on the Korean peninsula. If you don't believe us, just ask Defense Secretary Robert Gates.
En route to a meeting of Pacific region defense chiefs, Mr. Gates told reporters on Friday that the situation in Korea hasn't reached the crisis stage, at least not yet.
Glad he cleared that one up. Of course, Mr. Gates' assessment begs a rather obvious question: if this isn't a crisis, then pray tell, what is. Tensions on the peninsula are at their highest level since the infamous, 1976 "tree-cutting" incident--which resulted in the murder of two U.S. Army officers by North Korean troops--and the capture of the USS Pueblo in 1968.
And North Korea is doing everything it can to exacerbate the situation. In the hours since Secretary Gates' made his comments, Pyongyang has test-fired a long-range surface-to-air missile (the same type that could be used to engage U.S. reconnaissance aircraft), and intelligence analysts have detected vehicle movement at a missile complex--the same one where the DPRK launched a crude ICBM in early April.
Oh, and did we mention that Chinese fishing boats have vacated Korean waters in the middle of the lucrative crab season? U.S. officials aren't sure if the departure was ordered by Beijing, or simply a decision by Chinese captains. Apparently, the folks at Foggy Bottom have never watched an episode of The Deadliest Catch. Chinese skippers devote the same effort to the Yellow Sea season that American captains put into their crabbing expeditions in the Bering Sea. Put another way, it would take a cataclysmic event--and a directive from Beijing--to prompt a mass exodus by the Chinese crab fleet.
In the meantime, U.S. and South Korean units have moved to WATCHCON 2, the second-highest readiness level for surveillance and intelligence-gathering activity. That means that virtually every available ISR asset is focused on North Korea, in an effort to glean additional information on Pyongyang's intentions.
Even General George Casey, the Army Chief of Staff, felt compelled to tell reporters that our ground forces could handle a sudden attack from North Korea, despite the on-going demands of Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army's 2nd Infantry Division has been based on the peninsula for more than 50 years, and currently backs up the South Korean units that man forward defensive positions along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).
Readers will note that General Casey didn't speculate as to whether 2 ID will be called into combat. Fact is, Casey--and everyone else in the Pentagon--simply don't know. Most of North Korea's combat power, roughly two-thirds of its army, is located within 60 miles of the DMZ. That means that first and second-echelon invasion forces are located at their jumping-off points for a push against the south. As the Defense Intelligence Agency cautioned a few years ago, North Korea has the ability to mount a limited invasion against the ROK, and the warning time would be measured in hours, not days.
But it's not a crisis.
In fairness to Mr. Gates, he is merely following the administration party line. Despite the gravity of recent events, President Obama--and his national security team--have barely mentioned the situation in Korea, trying to deny Kim Jong-il the attention he craves. But it's a little hard to ignore a nuclear test, given Pyongyang's propensity for sharing nuclear and missile technology with other rogue states. That's why North Korea is still the top story for most papers and TV news programs, despite the administration's best efforts to manage our response and how it is covered.
Indeed, it could argued that the DPRK's continuing belligerence has made a mockery of Mr. Obama and his policy. In reaction to the nuclear test and recent missile launches, the President has turned to the United Nations, imploring the Security Council to pass another toothless resolution. That sort of timid reply didn't exactly send shivers down Mr. Kim's spine, so the North Korean dictator has decided to continue his challenge. If recently-detected activity is any indication, Pyongyang may be preparing for another ICBM test, literally challenging the U.S. to do something about it.
Clearly, no one wants another Korean War, but there are steps the administration could take, short of conflict, that could deter North Korea. For starters, the U.S. (along with South Korea, Japan and other regional partners) need to reimpose strict financial sanctions against Pyongyang. Targeting the private bank accounts of the DPRK regime produced a burst of cooperation two years ago, because it denied Kim Jong-il of the cash needed to buy consumer goods and luxuries for his allies, ensuring their continued support.
Additionally, the United States should tighten the maritime inspection regime imposed on North Korea. Not only would it limit Pyongyang's WMD export activities, it would also complicate other activities that support the regime. Keeping North Korean mother ships in port would curtail drug smuggling and counterfeiting, denying other sources of revenue for the DPRK. The naval inspection program--make it a full-fledged quarantine--would also reduce the infiltration of North Korean agents into South Korea, reducing intelligence collection and potential sabotage efforts.
Unfortunately, the current inspection program has a serious deficiency--it doesn't cover air routes. Mr. Obama should lean hard on China (and other countries) to deny overflight and landing rights for cargo aircraft that travel between North Korean and its customers in the Middle East. Elimination of the "air option"--coupled with the naval quarantine--would make it almost impossible for Kim Jong-il to ship his most important products to his most valuable customers.
Of course, China can (and should) do much more to bring Pyongyang into line. If Beijing continues to balk, there are other steps that the administration must take, including greater military aid to our allies; bolstering U.S. military forces in the region, moving our own tactical nukes back into South Korea, and encouraging both Seoul and Tokyo to pursue their own nuclear deterrents. Collectively, those measures should convince Kim Jong-il (and his supporters in Beijing) that all options are on the table in dealing with the North Korean threat.
Sadly, the chances that Mr. Obama will "get tough" with the DPRK are somewhere between "slim" and "none." Pyongyang has judged the president to be weak, and will continue its program of provocation and confrontation, hoping to undermine the current ROK government, and strain our alliances with South Korea and Japan. Kim Jong-il hasn't achieved those goals (yet), but he's making progress, thanks to a new administration that is failing its first, major foreign policy crisis.
-
Right after North Korea's first nuclear test, in October 2006, Senator Bob Menendez explained that the event "illustrates just how much the Bush Administration's incompetence has endangered our nation." The New Jersey Democrat hasn't said what he thinks North Korea's second test says about the current Administration, so allow us to connect the diplomatic dots.
AP
At the time of the first test, the common liberal lament was that Kim Jong Il was belligerent only because President Bush had eschewed diplomacy in favor of tough rhetoric, like naming Pyongyang to the "axis of evil." Never mind that the U.S. had continued to fulfill its commitments under the 1994 Agreed Framework, including fuel shipments and the building of "civilian" nuclear reactors, until the North admitted it was violating that framework in late 2002. Never mind, too, that by 2006 the Bush Administration had participated in multiple rounds of six-party nuclear talks, or that it had promised to normalize relations with the North.
Nevertheless, President Bush adopted the views of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had internalized the views of Bush Administration critics. Led by Christopher Hill (now President Obama's ambassador in Baghdad), the U.S. announced the resumption of the six-party talks -- only three weeks after the first North Korean test. Mr. Hill also held direct bilateral talks with the North Koreans, something Pyongyang had long sought and Mr. Bush had long resisted.
In February 2007, the six parties agreed to a statement in which North Korea promised to shut down and seal its nuclear reactor and bring in inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency to monitor compliance. The typical reaction was that the Bush Administration had finally seen the error of its ways. Columnist Steve Chapman of the Chicago Tribune captured the media consensus by calling it a "surprising breakthrough that belied [Mr. Bush's] hard-line record and shrewdly advanced American interests in a vital part of the world."
As part of the deal, the North promised to provide a complete list of its nuclear programs within 60 days. But Kim's minions refused to provide the list until the U.S. released $25 million in North Korean assets deposited at the Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, which had been sanctioned under the Patriot Act for money laundering and counterfeiting. The Administration even enlisted the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to get the funds to Pyongyang after no international bank would go near the transaction.
By then it was summer and North Korea promised again to provide a complete nuclear report, this time by the end of the year. In exchange, it got more diplomatic goodies: The U.S. said it would work toward a peace agreement with the North once the nuclear issue had been resolved; South Korea proposed a "South-North economic community"; and Japanese Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda pledged to improve relations despite unresolved issues regarding Japanese citizens abducted by the North.
Amid this Western accommodation, in September 2007 Israel bombed a Syrian nuclear facility that U.S. and Israeli intelligence believe was supplied by North Korea. Pyongyang denied any role, and the U.S. kept its diplomacy active. However, North Korea ignored its end-of-year deadline for producing its nuclear declaration. When it did finally produce one, six months later, it included an incomplete plutonium record and nothing about its uranium nuclear program. The North did publicly destroy the cooling tower of its reactor at Yongbyon for the TV cameras, but it balked at any credible verification process.
Still, the Bush Administration decided to put the best face on it. Mr. Bush announced last June that he was lifting restrictions on the North under the Trading With the Enemy Act. He also removed North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
This is the state-of-play that the Bush Administration bequeathed its successor. And it was a diplomatic approach that the Obama Administration made clear it was ready to pursue. But then Kim Jong Il decided to return to his familiar script, raising the ante by launching a ballistic missile in April, expelling U.N. inspectors, boycotting the six-party talks and then detonating a second bomb last week.
Whatever is driving Kim, no one can say it's U.S. bellicosity. Our guess is that Kim must figure President Obama will soon come calling with his own "carrots" in return for more empty disarmament promises. That's what the U.S. has always done before.
We offer this timeline of diplomatic futility as a suggestion that maybe it's time to try something different. The U.S. is now working to secure a fresh U.N. sanctions resolution, and good luck making that stick. North Korea has never honored any commitment, or abided by any convention, or respected any international law. And until some very clear signal is sent by the U.S. and its allies that they will not be gulled again by the allure of negotiations, it never will.
-
NYT
U.S. Weighs Intercepting North Korean Shipments
Published: June 7, 2009
WASHINGTON — The Obama administration signaled Sunday that it was seeking a way to interdict, possibly with China’s help, North Korean sea and air shipments suspected of carrying weapons or nuclear technology.
The administration also said it was examining whether there was a legal basis to reverse former President George W. Bush’s decision last year to remove the North from a list of states that sponsor terrorism.
The reference to interdictions — preferably at ports or airfields in countries like China, but possibly involving riskier confrontations on the high seas — was made by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton. She was the highest-ranking official to talk publicly about such a potentially provocative step as a response to North Korea’s second nuclear test, conducted two weeks ago.
While Mrs. Clinton did not specifically mention assistance from China, other administration officials have been pressing Beijing to take such action under Chinese law.
Speaking on ABC’s “This Week,” Mrs. Clinton said the United States feared that if the test and other recent actions by North Korea did not lead to “strong action,” there was a risk of “an arms race in Northeast Asia” — an oblique reference to the concern that Japan would reverse its long-held ban against developing nuclear weapons.
So far it is not clear how far the Chinese are willing to go to aid the United States in stopping North Korea’s profitable trade in arms, the isolated country’s most profitable export. But the American focus on interdiction demonstrates a new and potentially far tougher approach to North Korea than both President Clinton and Mr. Bush, in his second term, took as they tried unsuccessfully to reach deals that would ultimately lead North Korea to dismantle its nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Obama, aides say, has decided that he will not offer North Korea new incentives to dismantle the nuclear complex at Yongbyon that the North previously promised to abandon.
“I’m tired of buying the same horse twice,” Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates said last week while touring an antimissile site in Alaska that the Bush administration built to demonstrate its preparedness to destroy North Korean missiles headed toward the United States. (So far, the North Koreans have not successfully tested a missile of sufficient range to reach the United States, though there is evidence that they may be preparing for another test of their long-range Taepodong-2 missile.)
In France on Saturday, Mr. Obama referred to the same string of broken deals, telling reporters, “I don’t think there should be an assumption that we will simply continue down a path in which North Korea is constantly destabilizing the region and we just react in the same ways.” He added, “We are not intending to continue a policy of rewarding provocation.”
While Mr. Obama was in the Middle East and Europe last week, several senior officials said the president’s national security team had all but set aside the central assumption that guided American policy toward North Korea over the past 16 years and two presidencies: that the North would be willing to ultimately abandon its small arsenal of nuclear weapons in return for some combination of oil, nuclear power plants, money, food and guarantees that the United States would not topple its government, the world’s last Stalinesque regime.
Now, after examining the still-inconclusive evidence about the results of North Korea’s second nuclear test, the administration has come to different conclusions: that Pyonyang’s top priority is to be recognized as a nuclear state, that it is unwilling to bargain away its weapons and that it sees tests as a way to help sell its nuclear technology.
“This entirely changes the dynamic of how you deal with them,” a senior national security aide said.
While Mr. Obama is willing to reopen the six-party talks that Mr. Bush began — the other participants are Japan, South Korea, Russia and China — he has no intention, aides say, of offering new incentives to get the North to fulfill agreements from 1994, 2005 and 2008; all were recently renounced.
“Clinton bought it once, Bush bought it again, and we’re not going to buy it a third time,” one of Mr. Obama’s chief strategists said last week, referring to the Yongbyon plant, where the North reprocesses spent nuclear fuel into bomb-grade plutonium.
While some officials privately acknowledged that they would still like to roll back what one called North Korea’s “rudimentary” nuclear capacity, a more realistic goal is to stop the country from devising a small weapon deliverable on a short-, medium- or long-range missile.
In conducting any interdictions, the United States could risk open confrontation with North Korea. That prospect — and the likelihood of escalating conflict if the North resisted an inspection — is why China has balked at American proposals for a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that would explicitly allow interceptions at sea. A previous Security Council resolution, passed after the North’s first nuclear test, in 2006, allowed interdictions “consistent with international law.” But that term was never defined, and few of the provisions were enforced.
North Korea has repeatedly said it would regard any interdiction as an act of war, and officials in Washington have been trying to find ways to stop the shipments without a conflict. Late last week, James B. Steinberg, the deputy secretary of state, visited Beijing with a delegation of American officials, seeking ideas from China about sanctions, including financial pressure, that might force North Korea to change direction.
“The Chinese face a dilemma that they have always faced,” a senior administration official said. “They don’t want North Korea to become a full nuclear weapons state. But they don’t want to cause the state to collapse.” They have been walking a fine line, the official said, taking a tough position against the North of late, but unwilling to publicly embrace steps that would put China in America’s camp.
To counter the Chinese concern, Mr. Steinberg and his delegation argued to the Chinese that failing to crack down on North Korea would prompt reactions that Beijing would find deeply unsettling, including a greater American military presence in the region and more calls in Japan for that country to develop its own weapons.
Mrs. Clinton seemed to reflect this concern in the interview on Sunday. “We will do everything we can to both interdict it and prevent it and shut off their flow of money,” she said. “If we do not take significant and effective action against the North Koreans now, we’ll spark an arms race in Northeast Asia. I don’t think anybody wants to see that.”
While Mrs. Clinton also said the State Department was examining whether North Korea should be placed back on the list of state sponsors of terrorism, she acknowledged that there was a legal process for it. “Obviously we would want to see recent evidence of their support for international terrorism,” she said.
That evidence may be hard to come by. While North Korea has engaged in missile sales, it has not been linked to terrorism activity for many years. And North Korea’s restoration to the list would be largely symbolic, because it already faces numerous economic sanctions.
-
Fox News.com - 19 June 2009
The U.S. military is preparing for a possible intercept of a North Korean flagged ship suspected of proliferating weapons material in violation of a U.N. Security Council resolution passed last Friday, FOX News has learned.
The USS John McCain, a Navy destroyer, is positioning itself in case it gets orders to intercept the ship Kang Nam as soon as it leaves the vicinity off the coast of China, according to a senior U.S. defense official. The order to inderdict has not been given yet, but the ship is moving into the area.
"Permission has not been requested. Nor is it clear it will be," a military source told FOX News. "This is a very delicate situation and no one is interested in precipitating a confrontation."
The ship left a port in North Korea Wednesday and appears to be heading toward Singapore, according to a senior U.S. military source. The vessel, which the military has been tracking since its departure, could be carrying weaponry, missile parts or nuclear materials, a violation of U.N. Resolution 1874, which put sanctions in place against Pyongyang.
The USS McCain was involved in an incident with a Chinese sub last Friday - near Subic Bay off the Philippines. The Chinese sub was shadowing the destroyer when it hit the underwater sonar array that the USS McCain was towing behind it.
This is the first suspected "proliferator" that the U.S. and its allies have tracked from North Korea since the United Nations authorized the world's navies to enforce compliance with a variety of U.N. sanctions aimed at punishing North Korea for its recent nuclear test.
The ship is currently along the coast of China and being monitored around-the-clock by air.
The apparent violation raises the question of how the United States and its allies will respond, particularly since the U.N. resolution does not have a lot of teeth to it.
The resolution would not allow the United States to board the ship forcibly. Rather, U.S. military would have to request permission to board -- a request North Korea is unlikely to grant.
North Korea has said that any attempt to board its ships would be viewed as an act of war and promised "100- or 1,000-fold" retaliation if provoked.
State Department spokesman Ian Kelly said that the resolution allows states to seek permission to inspect cargo.
"If permission is not granted, then the flag state, the owner of the ship, is instructed to send that ship to a port for -- for a formal inspection to be made," Kelly said, adding that he would not go into any details of any particular ship or the way inspections are conducted.
"We would hope that -- that North Korea would -- would comply with international law and -- and allow the inspection," he said.
Since the U.S. does not expect to be granted permission, it expects to be asked to interdict that it will have to shadow the ship until it runs out of fuel. At that point, the ship would likely have to be towed into the port.
The U.S. military may request that the host country not provide fuel to the ship when it enters its port. North Korean merchant ships usually need fuel as they approach Singapore and the ports of eastern India. When tipped off, Indian port authorities are stringent enforcers of UN sanctions against ships carrying contraband.
The U.S. Navy does not need to enforce the sanctions. Instead, it could "poison the host," a move that entails working behind the scenes with Indian Ocean port authorities to inspect and confiscate illegal cargos.
This move worked last year when U.S. officials reportedly warned Indian officials in advance of a North Korean transport aircraft that had requested permission to fly through Indian airspace on the way to Iran after stopping in Burma to refuel. The Indians refused to allow the aircraft to fly through their airspace. The aircraft reportedly was carrying gyroscopes for ballistic missiles.
The Kang Nam is known to be a ship that has been involved in proliferation activities in the past -- it is "a repeat offender," according to one military source. The ship was detained in October 2006 by authorities in Hong Kong after the North Koreans tested their first nuclear device and the U.N. imposed a subsequent round of sanctions.
"North Korea does not export anything other than weapons," a U.S. official told FOX News. "And this ship is presumed to be carrying something illicit given its past history."
The latest tension follows a Japanese news report that North Korea may fire a long-range ballistic missile toward Hawaii in early July.
Defense Secretary Robert Gates said Thursday the military is "watching" that situation "very closely," and would have "some concerns" if North Korea launched a missile in the direction of Hawaii. But he expressed confidence in U.S. ability to handle such a launch.
Gates said he's directed the deployment of the Theater High Altitude Area Defense, a mobile missile defense system used for knocking down long- and medium-range missiles.
"The ground-based interceptors are clearly in a position to take action. So, without telegraphing what we will do, I would just say ... I think we are in a good position, should it become necessary, to protect the American territory."
-
June 21, 2009
North Korea uncovered: Palaces, labour camps and mass graves
By Miranda Prynne
US researchers are using the internet to reveal what life is really like behind the closed borders of the world's last Stalinist dictatorship
The most comprehensive picture of what goes on inside the secret state of North Korea has emerged from an innovative US project. The location of extraordinary palaces, labour camps and the mass graves of famine victims have all been identified. The online operation that has penetrated the world's last remaining iron curtain is called North Korea Uncovered. Founded by Curtis Melvin, a postgraduate student at George Mason University, Virginia, it uses Google Earth, photographs, academic and specialist reports and a global network of contributors who have visited or studied the country. Mr Melvin says the collaborative project is an example of "democratised intelligence". He is the first to emphasise that the picture is far from complete, but it is, until the country opens up, the best we have.
Palaces
The palatial residences of the political elite are easy to identify as they are in sharp contrast to the majority of housing in the deeply impoverished state. Though details about many palaces' names, occupants and uses are hard to verify, it is known that such buildings are the exclusive domain of Kim Jong-Il, his family and his top political aides. Kim Jong-Il is believed to have between 10 and 17 palaces, many of which have been spotted on Google Earth:
1) Mansion complex near Pyongyang
This may be Kim Jong-Il's main residence. His father lived here surrounded by the huge, ornate gardens and carefully designed network of lakes. Tree-lined paths lead to a swimming pool with a huge water slide, and next to the complex there is a full-size racetrack with a viewing stand and arena. There is a cluster of other large houses around the mansion, forming an enclosed, elite community. It appears to be reached via an underground station on a private railway which branches off from the main line.
2) Kangdong estate
This lies about 18 miles north-east of Pyongyang and has an elaborate garden, set around many lakes. There are numerous guest houses, and a banqueting hall, within the security-fenced perimeter. Kenji Fujimoto, who served as Kim Jong-Il's cook from 1988 until 2001, said entertainment at Kangdong included bowling, shooting and roller-skating. There is also a racetrack next to the complex and Kangdong airfield is just 2.5 miles away.
3) Unnamed palace on the banks of the Changsuwon lake
The residence sits across the lake from a couple of other mansions which may house relatives of the current occupant. One Google Earth tag suggested that this might be the home of Kim Yong Nam, the second-in-command in North Korea's leadership.
4) Jungbangsan or Hwangju palace
An enormous mountain retreat set in manicured gardens with lakes and winding paths. It allegedly has several entrances to an underground facility within the steep hill next to the mansion. Google Earth reveals a railway track which runs along the top of the hill then disappears mysteriously into its east side.
5) Nampo Mansion
Estate covering a huge area with an unusual chain of dammed lakes. There are many buildings making up the mansion compound, which probably cater for members of the North Korean leadership.
6) Yongpong Mansion
Kim Jong-Il's residence on the banks of Lake Yongpong, near the city of Anju, which he uses as a private hunting retreat. According to one defector, Han Young Jin, writing in 2005, it is known for its lakeside fishing spots and hunting ground, which was completed in 1984. The mansion was originally further south and was moved after an enlargement in 1979. The estate contains the main house and 10 security and support facility buildings.
7) The Wonsan Palace
One of Kim Jong-Il's favourite holiday destinations, sitting on a peninsula lined with white sand beaches. Wonsan is where Kim Jong-Il and his relatives enjoy fishing, hunting guillemots, jetskiing and swimming during the winter. Lee Young Kuk, who worked as one of Kim Jong-Il's guards from 1979 to 1988, claimed that Kim also spent time at Wonsan hunting roe deer, pheasants and wild geese. The palace is conveniently next door to an airfield. Kim Jong-Il's enormous private yacht was caught by satellite image at anchor up the coast in Wonsan harbour. On board the vessel there is a 50-metre pool with two water slides.
8) The Hyangsan Chalet
Large mountain retreat, located on the Horang ridge at an altitude of about 1,000m. Han Young Jin described it as a traditional Korean-style building, completed in 1984, with beautiful views of the Myohyang mountains. The compound contains three buildings for security and support facilities, and there are reports of several entrances to an underground facility beneath Hyangsan. The chalet allegedly is where Kim Il-Sung died.
Gulag-style prison camps
North Korean prison camps are split into two main types. Firstly the kwan li-so, translated as "political penal-labour colonies". These camps contain the political prisoners, and often their families, who are imprisoned without trial, usually for life. Sentences involve slave labour within the camps. The other type of camp, the kyo-hwa-so, are smaller penal-labour camps. These usually hold criminal offenders who are subject to a judicial process and fixed sentencing, after which they can be released. Kyo-hwa-so prisoners are also forced to do hard labour in mining, logging, textile manufacturing and more.
A US Human Rights Committee report in 2006 asserted that there were more than 200,000 prisoners throughout North Korea, a figure that may now have risen to 300,000. Estimates claim more than 400,000 have died in the system in 30 years. What little is known about these camps comes mainly from the testimonies of ex-detainees and ex-prison guards. Most of their accounts date back to the 1980s and 1990s and little new evidence has since come to light.
1) Kyo-hwa-so 1
A labour camp in Gaechun, South Pyongan province. Lee Soon Ok, who was imprisoned here until 1994, described prisoners dying from torture and maltreatment, their bodies dumped on the mountainsides "like animals". At the time of her imprisonment from 1986, around 6,000 people were held within the camp's high walls and electric fences, and its main industries were clothes and shoe manufacturing.
2) Kwan-li-so 14
This is near Kaechon, South Pyongan province, on the north bank of the Taedong River opposite camp 18. It measures 25 to 31 miles by 19 miles, and contains about 15,000 prisoners, according to Kim Yong, who was held there from 1995-96. Kim said the main industries were mining and farming and that many people died due to malnutrition, disease and mining accidents.
3) Kwan-li-so 15
This is located at Yodok in South Hamgyong province. Descriptions of the camp by refugees cover all the years from 1977 to 1999. These include Kang Chol Hwan, the author of Aquariums of Pyongyang: Ten Years in the North Korean Gulag, whose small village within camp 15 suffered about 100 deaths every year due to malnutrition and disease. In the 1990s Yodok held more than 45,000 prisoners, surrounded by a barbed-wire fence up to 4m high and walls topped with electric wires. Along the fence were watchtowers patrolled by guards carrying automatic rifles and hand grenades. In the camp there was a gypsum quarry, textile plants, distilleries and a gold mine, where there were frequent accidents. Lee Young Kuk, a prisoner until 1999, witnessed numerous public executions and shootings in the camp.
4) Kwan li-so 16
Less is known about this camp at Hwasong, North Hamgyong province than the others. This could be because it lies adjacent to another highly secret location, the Mount Mantap nuclear testing site, and it is close to the Musudan-ri missile-testing facility. The camp measures 18 miles by 16 miles and is believed to hold 10,000 prisoners.
5) Kwan li-so 18
This camp lies at Bukchang on the south bank of the Taedong River, South Pyongan province. Kim Yong, who was transferred here in 1996 and escaped in 1998, said it held approximately 50,000 people, mainly the families of those imprisoned in camp 14. Bukchang was less severe than camp 14, but Kim Yong still witnessed prisoners dying of malnutrition and being shot. The main industries were coal mining, brick making and cement making.
6) Kwan li-so 22
Camp located at Hoeryong in North Hamgyong province, the north-eastern tip of the country. Former guard Ahn Myong Chol described it as one of the largest prison camps, containing around 50,000 prisoners within an area 31 miles long by 25 miles wide. Hoeryong is infamous for reports of chemical weapons experiments on humans, and glass gas chambers, revealed in a BBC documentary Axis of Evil in 2004.
Mass graves
North Korea was hit by a famine in the 1990s that killed a huge number of its people. Estimates of the death toll between 1995 and 1998 vary from 600,000 to 3.5 million from a population of 22 million. The US State Department claims two million died of starvation in these years. While thousands starved, particularly in the north-east, the regime continued to prioritise weapons buying and sent shipments of international aid to politically favoured areas on the west coast.
1) Hamhung mass graves
Hamhung city in South Hamgyong province was among the worst affected by famine. In 1998 a former engineering student told Kyodo News Services that more than 10 per cent of the city's population, including his mother, had starved to death, while another 10 per cent fled the city to find food. Google Earth images have revealed mass graves on the hills around the city of Hamhung. One can see a multitude of distinctive mounds packed on to the slopes. The graves begin within a well-organised cemetery then spread. The small mounds consume the entire hill, the hills around it and nearly all the unoccupied land surrounding the city. One North Korea Uncovered researcher, Joshua Stanton, believes the number of graves exceeds 100,000, and if the smaller and less dense burial areas are included, the total could be twice that figure.
2) Unnamed graves
This is another burial ground just east of the capital, Pyongyang, where the small mounds are again visible on the hillsides. There are other large, haphazard burial grounds in North Korea. No date or cause of death relating to these graves can be determined from the satellite images. But most commentators agree it is unlikely that normal circumstances could produce such a great density of burials. The concentration of graves would be consistent with published reports filed from Hamhung during the famine.
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-uncovered-palaces-labour-camps-and-mass-graves-1711573.html
-
By GORDON G. CHANG
At this moment the Kang Nam, a North Korean tramp freighter, is on the high seas tailed by a team of American destroyers and submarines and watched by reconnaissance satellites and aircraft. The vessel had cleared the Taiwan Strait at the end of last week as it headed south. Yesterday, it was reported to have turned back north toward the Chinese coast. On board, its cargo could contain plutonium pellets, missile parts or semi-ripe melons. In any event, Washington wants to know what is in the rusty ship's hold.
Why the interest in this particular vessel? The Kang Nam is a "repeat offender" and known to carry "proliferation materials." As an unnamed American official told Fox News this month, "This ship is presumed to be carrying something illicit given its past history." United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874, unanimously passed on June 12, broadened the concept of illicit cargoes as far as North Korea is concerned. It prohibits Pyongyang from selling arms, even handguns. The Kang Nam's U-turn is a sure sign that it is carrying contraband and is now seeking a safe port.
The Security Council, while banning Pyongyang's export of weapons, has not given U.N. member states the means of enforcing the new restrictions. Resolution 1874 calls upon countries to inspect North Korean cargoes on the high seas -- but only "with the consent of the flag State," in this case North Korea. Should Pyongyang refuse -- as it most certainly would -- a member state can, within the terms of the resolution, direct a vessel to "an appropriate and convenient port" for inspection by local officials. Should Pyongyang refuse to divert the ship, the resolution contemplates the filing of a report to a U.N. committee.
It looks as if Washington will file such a report soon. Last week, the U.S. promised China it would abide by the restraints imposed by Resolution 1874. This means, in all probability, that the U.S. will be reduced to watching the Kang Nam unload illegal cargo items at some port.
Yet Washington does not have to adopt such a feeble approach. The North Koreans have, inadvertently, given the U.S. a way to escape from the restrictions of the new Security Council measure. On May 27, the Korean People's Army issued a statement declaring that it "will not be bound" by the armistice that ended fighting in the Korean War. This was at least the third time Pyongyang has disavowed the interim agreement that halted hostilities in 1953. Previous renunciations were announced in 2003 and 2006.
The U.N. Command, a signatory to the armistice, shrugged off Pyongyang's belligerent statement. "The armistice remains in force and is binding on all signatories, including North Korea," it said immediately after the renunciation, referring to the document's termination provisions. That may be the politically correct thing to say, but an armistice as a legal matter cannot remain in existence after one of its parties, a sovereign state, announces its end. Today, whether we like it or not, there is no armistice.
Furthermore, there has never been a peace treaty formally ending the Korean War. This means the U.S., a combatant in the conflict, as leader of the U.N. Command, is free to use force against Pyongyang. On legal grounds, the U.S. Navy therefore has every right to seize the Kang Nam, treat the crew as prisoners of war, and confiscate its cargo, even if the ship is carrying nothing more dangerous than melons. Because the Navy has the right to torpedo the vessel, which proudly flies the flag of another combatant in the war, it of course has the right to board her.
But does America have the will to do so? "Rules must be binding. Violations must be punished. Words must mean something," President Barack Obama said in the first week of April, reacting to North Korea's test of a long-range missile. Unfortunately, the president's words have apparently meant little because Kim Jong Il's belligerent state has, since that time, detonated a nuclear device, handed out harsh sentences to two American reporters, and announced the resumption of plutonium production. North Korea has threatened nuclear war several times in recent days and this month sent one of its patrol boats into South Korean waters. American envoys, in response, have issued stern warnings, participated in meetings in the region, and engaged in high-level diplomacy in the corridors of the U.N. None of these measures, however, has led to the enforcement of rules or the punishment of the North Korean regime.
North Korea's words, in contrast, have meant something. It has, as noted, ended the armistice. Of course, no one is arguing that the nations participating in the U.N. Command resume a full-scale land war in Asia. Yet recognizing the end of the temporary truce would allow the U.S. to use more effective measures to stop the North Korean proliferation of missile and nuclear technologies. The Bush administration sometimes got around to warning Kim Jong Il about selling dangerous technologies but never did anything about it.
Instead, President George W. Bush outsourced the problem to the U.N. In October 2006, in response to the North's first nuclear detonation, the Security Council passed a resolution aimed at halting North Korean proliferation. Unfortunately, Beijing refused to implement the new rules, calling the measures unacceptable, even after voting in favor of them. Since then, more evidence has come to light of North Korea's transfer of nuclear weapons technologies to Iran and Syria.
The lesson of the last few years is that the U.N. is not capable of stopping North Korean proliferation. No nation can stop it except the U.S. Of course, ending North Korea's sales of dangerous technologies to hostile regimes will anger Pyongyang. This month, for instance, the North said that interception of the Kang Nam would constitute an "act of war."
Yet, as much as the international community would like to avoid a confrontation, the world cannot let Kim Jong Il continue to proliferate weapons. Moreover, it is unlikely that he will carry through on his blustery threats. The North Koreans did not in fact start a war when, at America's request, Spain's special forces intercepted an unflagged North Korean freighter carrying Scud missiles bound for Yemen in December 2002. Even though the Spanish risked lives to board the vessel, Washington soon asked Madrid to release it. At the time, the Bush administration explained there was no legal justification to seize the missiles.
Now, the Obama administration has no such excuse. There is definitely a legal justification to seize the Kang Nam. North Korea, after all, has resumed the Korean War.
Mr. Chang is the author of "Nuclear Showdown: North Korea Takes On the World" (Random House, 2006).
-
Ironic that the Obama led military is now pointing out how we should be able to shoot down any ICBM from N. Korea that threatens US soil.
Remember how the left did and still does lambast Reagan's antiballistic defence strategy and mocks it as starwars?
Why if BO was President this strategy would never have been undertaken, we would have no defense against this threat and now this guy is acting tough by taking advantage of Reagan's wisdom.
All the while he and his socialist cohorts consider Reagan a destroyer of worlds.
I hope Dick Morris is right before this coutnry gets sold out and BO crashes and burns in the poll ratings.
We got to get him kicked out of office before its too late.
-
Amen CCP.
@Anyone:
Any word on the sit rep with that NK tanker we are shadowing?
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2009/06/changing-course.html
Changing Course
For more than a week, the USS John S. McCain has been shadowing a North Korean merchant vessel, believed to be carrying illegal weapons.
Now that ship--the Kang Nam--appears to be heading back home. As the AP reports:
U.S. officials said Tuesday that a North Korean ship has turned around and is headed back toward the north where it came from, after being tracked for more than a week by American Navy vessels on suspicion of carrying illegal weapons.
The move keeps the U.S. and the rest of the international community guessing: Where is the Kang Nam going? Does its cargo include materials banned by a new U.N. anti-proliferation resolution?
Originally, the North Korean cargo vessel was believed enroute to Myanmar, carrying a load of missile parts. The two rogue nations have drawn closer in recent years, although Myanmar has little need for ballistic missiles. However, various intelligence agencies and anti-proliferation groups have reported that Pyongyang has been attempting to sell missiles to the Myanmar regime since 2005.
There is also the possibility that Myanmar was merely a trans-shipment point, but those reports are also unconfirmed. With U.S. naval vessels trailing the Kang Nam--and hints that we might board and search the vessel--North Korea decided to recall the ship and its cargo.
Still, no one can actually be sure the the Kang Nam is heading back to the DPRK. In the past, North Korean ships involved in illicit activities (most notably, drug running) have operated from Chinese coastal waters. Under that scenario, the vessel would rendez-vous with another ship and transfer the cargo.
However, given the constant surveillance of the Kang Nam, accomplishing that transfer would be difficult, if not impossible. It's also unlikely that Beijing would want to be associated with that activity, particularly as U.S. envoys press China to put more pressure on Pyongyang.
The most likely scenario? In a few days, the Kang Nam slips back into port at Nampo, and the cargo is unloaded. Then, it's shipped to Sunan Airfield, near Pyongyang, and loaded onto an IL-76 transport, which flies the cargo to the customer.
As we noted almost three years ago, North Korea has long used airlift to move high-value cargo to its most important clients, including Iran. And that illustrates a rather serious "hole" in current efforts to contain Pyongyang. While the U.S. (and other naval powers) are actively tracking DPRK maritime shipments, there is no comparable effort for air transfers.
In some cases, those shipments would be almost impossible to stop. With a lighter load, an IL-76 can fly non-stop from North Korea to Iran. However, those flights do require direct routing (through Chinese or Russian airspace). Without it, North Korea or Iranian airlifters would be forced to make refueling stops, providing an opportunity for the U.S. to lobby for third-party inspections, or deny access to the airfields.
As with other attempts to pressure Pyongyang, China would be a key player in eliminating the air option. But (apparently) there are limits to Beijing's cooperation. Intelligence reports indicate that North Korean IL-76s sometimes use Chinese airfields during flights to the Middle East. Without more assistance from the PRC, North Korea's "air bridge" will remain open, and Kim Jong-il will retain a critical option for shipping missile and WMD cargoes to his customers.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2009/07/03/north-korean-burmese-alliance-grows-closer/
North Korean-Burmese alliance grows closer
POSTED AT 5:15 PM ON JULY 3, 2009 BY ED MORRISSEY
Any room for one more in the Axis of Evil Alternative Ethics Outlook? Burma, called Myanmar by the ruling military junta, sent its military leaders to North Korea for secret talks last year, resulting in a closer military and economic alliance just coming to light now, according to the Telegraph. Pyongyang has begun supplying the Burmese regime with weapons in defiance of UN arms embargos on both countries:
A 37-page document in Burmese obtained by Radio Free Asia detailed a visit by 17 Burmese officials, including General Thura Shwe Mann, the chief of staff of the army and Burma’s third-ranked leader, to Beijing and Pyongyang last November.
The stated aim of the visit was “to modernize the Burmese military and increase its capabilities through visiting and studying the militaries” of China and North Korea, and a memorandum of understanding was signed with North Korea counterparts on November 27.
The report also says the Burmese delegation was shown North Korean surface-to-air missiles and rockets, along with naval and air defense systems and tunnel construction, including how Pyongyang stores aircraft and ships underground to protect them from aerial attack.
None of this comes as any great shock, as Pyongyang needs all the customers it can get for its weapons systems, and Burma needs weapons systems to maintain its iron grip on power. The path of the Kang Nam, the North Korean ship trailed by the US Navy and suspected of illegal gun-running, originally appeared to lead to Burma, before American pressure forced it to turn around. This revelation confirms that Kim Jong-Il has turned the rogue nation of Burma into a client state.
If we needed more proof of Kim’s inclination to act as a proliferator, it would be difficult to find anything better. He partners with fellow rogue states to move weapons around the world while his people starve to death. The only action that will get his attention is a blockade, which is why Kim keeps threatening war when the US and its Pacific Rim allies attempt to impose it. It may not be a bluff; if we cut off his ability to sell weapons, Kim will have no choice but to either surrender to the six-party agenda or to attempt to seize the entire Korean peninsula.
-
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=57e_1250289703
-
http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/2009/09/us-shifts-policy-willing-to-meet-1on1-with-north-korea.html
-
By PETER M. BECK
North Korea's nuclear program has preoccupied foreign policy makers for years, but it's not the only problem on the Korean Peninsula. Kim Jong Il's regime looks increasingly unstable and could collapse. That could lead to North Korea's reunification with the South and could present foreign leaders with the expensive task of modernizing the North's economy.
There are three plausible scenarios for a Korean reunification. One would be sudden and bloodless like what Germany experienced. The worst would be a reunification marked by the kind of violence Vietnam suffered. The third is somewhere between the first two and akin to the chaotic post-Communist transitions of Romania and Albania.
Any one of these outcomes would be expensive. The North's economy is in shambles. It collapsed in the 1990s amid a famine that likely killed hundreds of thousands of people. Fixing the economy will require new infrastructure, starting with the power grid, railway lines and ports. This alone will cost tens of billions of dollars. Few of the North's factories meet modern standards and it will take years to rehabilitate agricultural lands. The biggest expense of all will be equalizing North Koreans' incomes with their richer cousins in the South, whether through aid transfers or investments in education and health care.
Even the best-case German model will cause South Koreans heartburn. Despite the $2 trillion West Germany has paid over two decades, Bonn had it relatively easy in the beginning. East Germany's population was only one-quarter of West Germany's, and in 1989 East German per capita income was one-third of the West's. The two Germanies also had extensive trade ties.
North Korea's per capita income is less than 5% of the South's. Each year the dollar value of South Korea's GDP expansion equals the entire North Korean economy. The North's population is half the South's and rising thanks to a high birth rate. North and South also barely trade with each other. To catch up to the South, North Korea will need more resources than East Germany required if living standards on both sides of the peninsula are to be close to each other.
More than a dozen reports by governments, academics and investment banks in recent years have attempted to estimate the cost of Korean unification. At the low end, the Rand Corporation estimates $50 billion. But that assumes only a doubling of Northern incomes from current levels, which would leave incomes in the North at less than 10% of the South.
At the high end, Credit Suisse estimated last year that unification would cost $1.5 trillion, but with North Korean incomes rising to only 60% of those in the South. I estimate that raising Northern incomes to 80% of Southern levels—which would likely be a political necessity—would cost anywhere from $2 trillion to $5 trillion, spread out over 30 years. That would work out to at least $40,000 per capita if distributed solely among South Koreans.
Who would foot such a bill? China is the greatest supporter of the current regime in Pyongyang, with trade, investment and economic assistance worth $3 billion a year. Even if that flow continues, it's only a fraction of the $67 billion a year needed to equal $2 trillion over 30 years. Japan is willing to pay $10 billion in reparations for having colonized the North in the 20th century, but that too would barely make a dent.
That leaves international institutions like the World Bank as well as South Korea and the United States. Building a modern economy in North Korea would be a wise investment in peace and prosperity in North Asia. Policy makers need to think about where that money will come from and how it should be spent to minimize the risk of wasting it in post-reunification confusion.
Mr. Beck is the Pantech Research Fellow at Stanford University and teaches at American University and Ewha Womans University.
-
http://alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/TOE60Q019.htm
-
Whenever the NorKs act up, either they need a cash/aid infusion, or China needs to pressure the US for something.
-
Power Balances and the ChonAn Incident
United States Defense Secretary Robert Gates met Tuesday with South Korean Defense Minister Kim Tae Young and announced the official date for the long-delayed naval exercises called “Invincible Spirit,” which will be held on July 25-28 in the East Sea. The exercises will include the USS George Washington Carrier Strike Group and four F-22 Raptors among a host of other American and Korean ships and aircraft. On Wednesday, Gates and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton — accompanied by a delegation of top U.S. officials from the military, State Department and National Security Council — will hold the first ever “2+2” round of talks with their South Korean counterparts in a show of solidarity after the alleged North Korean surprise attack on the South Korean navy corvette, the ChonAn, on March 26.
In short, the United States is attempting to give a substantial commitment to South Korea to show that it will come to its defense when needed, and dispel fears to the contrary that were raised following the ChonAn incident. Gates, along with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen and Pacific Command Chief Admiral Robert Willard, stressed that the military exercise is only the first step in what will be a series of exercises between the two states to demonstrate alliance strength, improve operational skills and readiness and deter North Korea from future provocations. The meeting will conclude with a joint statement about the alleged attack and an outline of future military cooperation. Previously, the United States held 2+2 talks with regional partners like Japan and Australia, but not South Korea, so the meetings between the top defense and foreign affairs ministers are meant to represent a promotion of the status of the U.S. and Korean alliance. The two sides will also likely discuss their decision to delay the transfer of wartime operational control over Korean forces for three years to 2015, and may discuss ways to ratify the Korea-U.S. free trade agreement that was signed in 2007.
From the Korean point of view, this commitment badly needed demonstrating. Seoul’s response to the ChonAn incident has been constrained from the start, and the United States bears some responsibility. Unwilling to risk a war with North Korea, Seoul pursued mostly symbolic and diplomatic means of retribution. But even these efforts were diluted or moderated, primarily due to intervention by China and unwillingness on the part of the United States to pressure Beijing. The limitations on Korea’s ability to rally an international response was emblematized by the United Nations Security Council’s presidential statement on the incident, which condemned the attack without naming North Korea as the attacker.
“The ChonAn incident has brought into relief the constraints that bind the different players in Northeast Asia.”
From the United States’ point of view, instability on the peninsula became entangled in the broader U.S.-China dynamic, and Washington proved unwilling to risk a deeper rift with China. This is why the United States repeatedly delayed the military exercises and has resisted sending its aircraft carrier to the West Sea. But the vacillations and cautiousness in dealing with Beijing gave Seoul the impression that Washington’s response was not as rapid and unequivocal as it should have been and that its commitment to the alliance was weaker than promised.
In this way, the ChonAn incident has brought into relief the constraints that bind the different players in Northeast Asia. In the aftermath of the Korean War, a balance of power was put in place enabling the United States to remove the majority of its forces, as it is currently attempting to do with Iraq and eventually Afghanistan. This balance has held so far, but it has faced serious tests. The ChonAn incident presented yet another test, and each player performed a role. North Korea orchestrated a sudden and inflammatory provocation as part of its strategy of keeping enemies off guard and neighbors divided, called attention to matters of its concern — such as the disputed maritime border and lack of a peace treaty — and managed to pull all of this off with relative impunity. South Korea scrambled to respond to the incident in a way that would appear strong without triggering an internecine war, while striving to reassure its public, get assistance from the United States (its chief security guarantor) and win over other international players.
Meanwhile, China served as an abettor of the North Korean regime amid a barrage of criticism from the United States and its allies. It managed to mount such harsh resistance to U.S. plans as to extract concessions, creating divisions between Washington and a disappointed (but still needy) Seoul. Japan and Russia remained aloof; Russia basically supported Beijing, and Tokyo basically supported Washington. The United States struggled to balance its commitment to the alliance with its desire to maintain relations with China, a crucial economic player and one Washington would rather not fight with at present. And yet Beijing inevitably remained opposed to the U.S. response since it brought the most powerful navy in the world — and by no means an ally — right up to China’s strategic core.
While the balance of power continues to hold, recent events reveal that it cannot be taken for granted. The sinking of the ChonAn would normally be considered an act of war, and not all regions would be able to prevent a downward spiral of unintended consequences after such an event. Pyongyang’s alleged ambush seems a particularly flagrant and reckless example of its time-tried strategy – a fact that may reflect the political elite’s attempt to manage a potentially highly destabilizing leadership succession. Most importantly, China’s regime is facing up to some deeply held fears about future strategic challenges. It sees greater U.S. pressure coming to bear against its economic policies and growing regional influence; it sees heightening internal and external risks to its economic model and social cohesion; and it fears that too much compromise with foreign powers will lead it to the fate of its predecessor, the nationalist Chinese republic that undermined its own credibility by allowing foreign powers to take advantage of it through economic and naval means. Beijing’s perspective explains its staunch resistance to the American and Korean show of force. But crucially, with the United States preoccupied with the task of establishing balances of power elsewhere, Washington itself has played a decisive role in putting limits on the alliance’s show of force.
-
Dispatch: Koreas Refocusing Policy Postures
November 18, 2010 | 1938 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
Following South Korea’s declaration that the Sunshine Policy has failed and North Korea threatening another nuclear test, Analyst Rodger Baker examines politics on the peninsula.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
The South Korean Unification Ministry’s latest white paper declares the Sunshine Policy a failure. The Sunshine Policy set up under former President Kim Dae Jung to encourage North Korea to change its behavior through friendly actions through economic assistance. The Unification Ministry said that this is been a failure, that the North Koreans have not changed their behavior, the North Korean population is no better off, and that it remains in effect a threat to South Korea.
As the South Koreans are reviewing their North Korean policies, the North Koreans appear to be ramping up for another nuclear test or at least making it appear that that’s what they’re doing. There are increasing reports from the region that there is activity at North Korea’s nuclear test site, and this is raising concerns that Pyongyang is going to carry out its third test.
The North Koreans have a reputation of raising the stakes before they reenter negotiations. What they will do is that they will use that to shape the discussions and shape the sense of immediacy. It brings people into the negotiations in a way where you want to deal with the immediate issue of the nuclear test, and other issues that are long-standing maybe take out second place. The North Koreans gain the benefit of going back to the status quo before they have to start stepping down from there.
As the North Koreans really try to solidify the new leadership, there is always a push for some grand and bold action to make it clear who’s in charge. When Kim Jong-Il came to power there was the Taepodong launch. With Kim Jong Un, it very well may be a nuclear test just to show that from the beginning he is strong, he is tough.
From the South perspective they’re looking at starting to take over security responsibility for the peninsula from the United States - you have changes in that dynamic with the U.S. defense relationship where really the two Koreas are our re-looking at each other. In North, you have the leadership transition underway, in the south we really moved beyond some of the past types of governments considered pro-North Korean. But also you have a new pressure building for both Koreas.
The Chinese have become much more assertive in their political behavior and even in their military behavior in the region. Japan is starting to wake up it seems - feeling threats from China, feeling threat from Russia. The United States is re-engaging in the region. And what happens when you have these large powers coming and pressing against each other in the Pacific region, very often where it all overlaps is the Korean peninsula. In southern Seoul and in Pyongyang, they’re feeling this increasing pressure, an increasing sense of concern for what historically they would’ve called the minnow between whales.
-
Breaking News Alert
The New York Times
Sat, November 20, 2010 -- 9:00 PM ET
-----
North Koreans Unveil New Plant for Nuclear Use
North Korea showed a visiting American nuclear scientist last
week a vast new facility it secretly and rapidly built to
enrich uranium, confronting the Obama administration with the
prospect that the country is preparing to expand its nuclear
arsenal or build a far more powerful type of atomic bomb.
Whether the calculated revelation is a negotiating ploy by
North Korea or a signal that it plans to accelerate its
weapons program even as it goes through a perilous leadership
change, it creates a new challenge for President Obama.
The scientist, Siegfried S. Hecker, a Stanford professor who
previously directed the Los Alamos National Laboratory, said
in an interview that he had been "stunned" by the
sophistication of the new plant.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/21/world/asia/21intel.html?emc=na
-
Woof,
It is about to hit the fan in Korea guys: www.msnbc.msn.com/id/40329269/ns/world_news-asiapacific
P.C.
-
Before moving to this disconcerting developement I would like to take a moment to note that on Fox's Brett Baier Special Report yesterday, there was a good discussion (especially Krauthammer-- no surprise there) on the role of China in enabling the Norks and that the real issue was to , , , demotivate the Chinese in this direction. Apparently a trial balloon has been floated quite recently about the US lending the Sorks some tactical nukes, something the Chinese really don't want. The conversation went on to suggest that encouraging Japan to nuclearize would really freak the Chinese too. Bottom line, the idea is to make clear to the Chinese that if they don't want the Sorks and the Japanese going nuke, they had best choke the supply lines to the Norks-- without which the Norks cannot survive.
=========
North Korea and South Korea have reportedly traded artillery fire Nov. 23 across the disputed Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the Yellow Sea to the west of the peninsula. Though details are still sketchy, South Korean news reports indicate that around 2:30 p.m. local time, North Korean artillery shells began landing in the waters around Yeonpyeongdo, one of the South Korean-controlled islands just south of the NLL. North Korea has reportedly fired as many as 200 rounds, some of which struck the island, injuring at least 10 South Korean soldiers, damaging buildings and setting fire to a mountainside. South Korea responded by firing some 80 shells of its own toward North Korea, dispatching F-16 fighter jets to the area and raising the military alert to its highest level.
South Korean President Lee Myung Bak has convened an emergency Cabinet meeting, and Seoul is determining whether to evacuate South Koreans working at inter-Korean facilities in North Korea. The barrage from North Korea was continuing at 4 p.m. Military activity appears to be ongoing at this point, and the South Korean Joint Chiefs of Staff are meeting on the issue. No doubt North Korea’s leadership is also convening.
The North Korean attack comes as South Korea’s annual Hoguk military exercises are under way. The exercises — set to last nine days and including as many as 70,000 personnel from all branches of the South Korean military — span from sites in the Yellow Sea including Yeonpyeongdo to Seoul and other areas on the peninsula itself. The drills have focused in particular on cross-service coordination and cooperation in recent years.
Low-level border skirmishes across the demilitarized zone and particularly the NLL are not uncommon even at the scale of artillery fire. In March, the South Korean naval corvette ChonAn was sunk in the area by what is broadly suspected to have been a North Korean torpedo, taking tensions to a peak in recent years. Nov. 22 also saw South Korean rhetoric about accepting the return of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula, though the United States said it has no plans at present to support such a redeployment.
While the South Korean reprisals — both artillery fire in response by self-propelled K-9 artillery and the scrambling of aircraft — thus far appear perfectly consistent with South Korean standard operating procedures, the sustained shelling of a populated island by North Korea would mark a deliberate and noteworthy escalation.
The incident comes amid renewed talk of North Korea’s nuclear program, including revelations of an active uranium-enrichment program, and amid rumors of North Korean preparations for another nuclear test. But North Korea also on Nov. 22 sent a list of delegates to Seoul for Red Cross talks with South Korea, a move reciprocated by the South, ahead of planned talks in South Korea set for Thursday. The timing of the North’s firing at Yeonpyeongdo, then, seems to contradict the other actions currently under way in inter-Korean relations. With the ongoing leadership transition in North Korea, there have been rumors of discontent within the military, and the current actions may reflect miscommunications or worse within the North’s command-and-control structure, or disagreements within the North Korean leadership.
-
second post
Summary
North Korea and South Korea exchanged artillery fire near their disputed border in the Yellow Sea/West Sea on Nov. 23. The incident raises several questions, not the least of which is whether Pyongyang is attempting to move the real “red line” for conventional weapons engagements, just as it has managed to move the limit of “acceptable” behavior regarding its nuclear program.
Analysis
Special Topic Page
Conflict on the Korean Peninsula
North Korea and South Korea exchanged artillery fire near the Northern Limit Line (NLL), their disputed western border in the Yellow Sea/West Sea on Nov. 23. The incident damaged as many as 100 homes and thus far has killed two South Korean soldiers with several others, including some civilians, wounded. The South Korean government convened an emergency Cabinet meeting soon after the incident and called for the prevention of escalation. It later warned of “stern retaliation” if North Korea launches additional attacks. Pyongyang responded by threatening to launch additional strikes, and accused South Korea and the United States of planning to invade North Korea, in reference to the joint Hoguk military exercises currently under way in different locations across South Korea.
The incident is the latest in a series of provocations by Pyongyang near the NLL this year following the sinking of the South Korean warship ChonAn in March. Over the past several years, the NLL has been a major hotspot. While most border incidents have been low-level skirmishes, such as the November 2009 naval episode, a steady escalation of hostilities culminated in the sinking of the ChonAn. The Nov. 23 attack on the South Korean island of Yeonpyeongdo represents another escalation; similar shellings in the past were for show and often merely involved shooting into the sea, but this attack targeted a military base. It also comes amid an atmosphere of higher tensions surrounding the revelation of active North Korean uranium enrichment facilities, South Korea’s disavowal of its Sunshine Policy of warming ties with the North and an ongoing power succession in Pyongyang.
Over the years, North Korea has slowly moved the “red line” regarding its missile program and nuclear development. It was always said that North Korea would never test a nuclear weapon because it would cross a line that the United States had set. Yet North Korea did test a nuclear weapon in October 2006, and then another in May 2009, without facing any dire consequences. This indicates that the red line for the nuclear program was either moved, or was rhetorical. The main question after the Nov. 23 attack is whether Pyongyang is attempting to move the red line for conventional attacks. If North Korea is attempting to raise the threshold for a response to such action, it could be playing a very dangerous game.
However, the threat North Korea’s nuclear program poses is more theoretical than the threat posed by conventional weapons engagements. Just as it seems that a North Korean nuclear test would not result in military action, the ChonAn sinking and the Nov. 23 attack seem to show that an “unprovoked” North Korean attack also will not lead to military retaliation. If this pattern holds, it means North Korea could decide to move from sea-based to land-based clashes, shell border positions across the Demilitarized Zone or take any number of other actions that certainly are not theoretical.
The questions STRATFOR is focusing on after the Nov. 23 attack are as follows:
Is North Korea attempting to test or push back against limits on conventional attacks? If so, are these attacks meant to test South Korea and its allies ahead of an all-out military action, or is the North seeking a political response as it has with its nuclear program? If the former, we must reassess North Korea’s behavior and ascertain whether the North Koreans are preparing to try a military action against South Korea — perhaps trying to seize one or more of the five South Korean islands along the NLL. If the latter, then at what point will they actually cross a red line that will trigger a response?
Is South Korea content to constantly redefine “acceptable” North Korean actions? Does South Korea see something in the North that we do not? The South Koreans have good awareness of what is going on in North Korea, and vice versa. The two sides are having a conversation about something and using limited conventional force to get a point across. We should focus on what the underlying issue is.
What is it that South Korea is afraid of in the North? North Korea gives an American a guided tour of a uranium enrichment facility, then fires across the NLL a couple of days after the news breaks. The South does not respond. It seems that South Korea is afraid of either real power or real weakness in the North, but we do not know which.
-
Any expect Barry to vote present and/or grovel?
-
This is a genuine question GM, what would your propose?
======
WASHINGTON — President Obama and South Korea’s president agreed Tuesday night to hold joint military exercises as a first response to North Korea’s deadly shelling of a South Korean military installation, as both countries struggled for the second time this year to keep a North Korean provocation from escalating into war.
The exercise will include sending the aircraft carrier George Washington and a number of accompanying ships into the region, both to deter further attacks by the North and to signal to China that unless it reins in its unruly ally it will see an even larger American presence in the vicinity.
The decision came after Mr. Obama attended the end of an emergency session in the White House Situation Room and then emerged to call President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea to express American solidarity and talk about a coordinated response.
But as a former national security official who dealt frequently with North Korea in the Bush administration, Victor Cha, said just a few hours before the attack began, North Korea is “the land of lousy options.”
Mr. Obama is once again forced to choose among unpalatable choices: responding with verbal condemnations and a modest tightening of sanctions, which has done little to halt new attacks; starting military exercises that are largely symbolic; or reacting strongly, which could risk a broad war in which South Korea’s capital, Seoul, would be the first target.
The decision to send the aircraft carrier came as the South Korean military went into what it termed “crisis status.” President Lee said he would order strikes on a North Korean base if there were indications of new attacks.
North Korea’s artillery shells fell on Yeonpyeong Island, a fishing village whose residents fled by ferry to the mainland city of Inchon — where Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s troops landed 60 years ago this fall, three months after the outbreak of the Korean War.
Today, Inchon is the site of South Korea’s main international airport, symbolizing the vulnerability of one of the world’s most vibrant economies to the artillery of one of the world’s poorest and most isolated nations.
A senior American official said that an early American assessment indicated that a total of about 175 artillery shells were fired by the North and by the South in response on Tuesday.
But an American official who had looked at satellite images said there was no visible evidence of preparations for a general war. Historically, the North’s attacks have been lightning raids, after which the North Koreans have backed off to watch the world’s reaction. This one came just hours after the South Koreans had completed a long-planned set of military exercises, suggesting that the North Korean attack was “premeditated,” a senior American official said.
Television reports showed large plumes of black smoke spiraling from the island, as dozens of houses caught fire. The shelling killed two marines and wounded 18 people. The South put its fighter planes on alert — but, tellingly, did not put them in the air or strike at the North’s artillery bases. Mr. Obama was awakened at 3:55 a.m. by his new national security adviser, Thomas E. Donilon, who told him of the attack.
Just 11 days before, North Korea had invited a Stanford nuclear scientist to Yongbyon, its primary nuclear site, and showed him what was described as a just-completed centrifuge plant that, if it becomes fully operational, should enable North Korea to enrich uranium into nuclear fuel and add to its arsenal of 8 to 12 nuclear weapons.
Taken together, the nuclear demonstration and the attack were widely interpreted as an effort to bolster the credentials of Kim Jong-un, the heir apparent as the country’s leader, and the son and grandson of the only two men who have run the country. When his father, Kim Jong-il, North Korea’s ailing leader, was establishing his credentials, the North conducted a similar series of attacks.
“They have a 60-year history of military provocations — it’s in their DNA,” said a senior administration official. “What we are trying to do is break the cycle,” a cycle, he said, that has North Korea’s bad behavior rewarded with “talks, inducements and rewards.” He said that the shelling would delay any effort to resume the six-nation talks about the North’s nuclear program.
While Mr. Obama was elected on a promise of diplomatic engagement, his strategy toward the North for the past two years, called “strategic patience,” has been to demonstrate that Washington would not engage until the North ceased provocations and demonstrated that it was living up to past commitments to dismantle, and ultimately give up, its nuclear capacity.
The provocations have now increased markedly, and it is not clear what new options are available. Beijing’s first reaction on Tuesday was to call for a resumption of the six-nation talks involving North and South Korea, Russia, Japan, China and the United States. The last meeting was two years ago, at the end of the Bush administration.
Mr. Obama’s aides made it clear in interviews that the United States had no intention of returning to those talks soon. But its leverage is limited.
When North Korea set off a nuclear test last year just months after Mr. Obama took office, the United States won passage of a United Nations Security Council resolution that imposed far harsher sanctions. The sanctions gave countries the right, and responsibility, to board North Korean ships and planes that landed at ports around the world and to inspect them for weapons. The effort seemed partly successful — but the equipment in the centrifuge plant is so new that it is clear that the trade restrictions did not stop the North from building what Siegfried S. Hecker, the visiting scientist, called an “ultramodern” nuclear complex.
============
Page 2 of 2)
By far the biggest recent disruption of relations came in March, when a sudden explosion sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors. South Korean and international investigators said the blast was caused by a North Korean torpedo. The North has vehemently denied it. If the North was responsible for the sinking, it would be the most lethal military attack since the end of the Korean War in 1953.
President Lee of South Korea decided not to respond militarily to the sinking and was praised by Washington for his restraint. To make North Korea pay a price, he imposed new food restrictions on the North and ended trade worth several hundred million dollars that had been intended to induce the desperately poor North Koreans to choose income over military strikes. But some analysts believe that the cutoff in food aid was an excuse, if not a motivation, for Tuesday’s attack.
Choi Jin-wook, a North Korea expert at the Korea Institute for National Unification, a research institute in Seoul, said, “It’s a sign of North Korea’s increasing frustration.”
“Washington has turned a deaf ear to Pyongyang, and North Korea is saying: ‘Look here. We’re still alive. We can cause trouble. You can’t ignore us.’ ”
Yet for Mr. Obama, much stronger responses, including a naval quarantine of the North, carry huge risks. A face-off on the Korean Peninsula would require tens of thousands of troops, air power and the possibility of a resumption of the Korean War, a battle that American officials believe would not last long, but might end in the destruction of Seoul if the North unleashed artillery batteries near the border.
Pressing against a precipitous reaction is that the North’s attacks have a choreographed character, even a back-to-the-future feel. The last time North Korea engaged in acts this destructive was in the 1980s, when it blew up a South Korean airliner and also detonated a bomb in Myanmar in a botched attempt to assassinate the visiting South Korean president. Both attacks were said to be ordered by Kim Jong-il, who was then the heir to Kim Il-sung, his father and North Korea’s founder.
Now Mr. Kim’s youngest son, Kim Jong-un, is in that position. He was promoted on Sept. 28 to the rank of four-star general, a prerequisite for his ascendancy to power. Many see these attacks as the effort of a man the Chinese now say is 25 years old to establish his military credentials.
-
The shelling across the Northern Limit Line between North Korea and South Korea recently has raised a lot of questions as to just what the North Koreans are doing — why they carried out this act at this particular time. One of the elements to that is really to better understand what is the Northern Limit Line, why is it there and how do the North Koreans view this.
At the end of the Korean War, as the armistice was being discussed, there was a general agreement on where the DMZ — the demilitarized zone - would go between the two Koreas. However, there was no agreement on where the maritime border would go on the west coast. The United Nations unilaterally drew the Northern Limit Line — putting it within three nautical miles of the North Korean coast, which was standard territory at the time. It also placed five islands just south of the NLL under South Korean or under U.N. control at the time. And in many ways, that boxed in the North Koreans, and it protected the southern port at Incheon.
The North Koreans never recognized the NLL, and by the late 1950s they were already complaining about it. They were suggesting the creation of what they called the MDL — the military demarcation line. This would have been a line that matches more along the 12 nautical miles and runs fairly diagonally between North Korea and South Korea in the West Sea. For the North Koreans, this would give them access to Haeju, their southern deepwater port. It would also give them access to critical crab-fishing grounds in the area.
For the South Koreans however the shape of the MDL, from their perspective, would put Incheon at risk, and South Korea and the United Nations refused to change the line.
As the Cold War was drawing to a close, the North Koreans were looking at ways to modify and change their economic structure. They knew they couldn’t be fully reliant upon the Chinese, upon the Soviets or the Russians after that point. And they started looking into the idea of special economic zones, of trying to increase trade. Ports became very important for them, and they started looking again at Haeju and they started looking again at the Northern Limit Line.
By the end of the 1990s and the firm establishment of Kim Jong Il as the new leader of North Korea, the Northern Limit Line became a very hot area once again. There were two incidents at the end of 1999 and the beginning of the 2000s of shelling between the two Koreas — a maritime fight which had ships sunk on both sides. Tensions began to rise along that line. The North Koreans started calling for a renegotiation of the line and demanding that the South Koreans back away from their positions along that line.
When we look at North Korea’s broad strategic behavior in trying to force negotiations over critical issues, we see them posturing, we see them raising crises so they can step back from them in return for talks and for negotiations. But as we’ve seen in the issues of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missiles, they’ve reached a point where it’s very hard now to create a crisis because they’ve already tested nuclear weapons; they’ve already launched long-range missiles. In general, any red line — real or imagined — has already been crossed.
We’re seeing now on the NLL that the North Koreans are having a step up even to a higher state of activity to be able to draw attention to the NLL. So shelling into the water doesn’t do it, missile tests doesn’t do it, shooting between boats doesn’t necessarily do it, even the incident with the Chon An didn’t seem to bring this NLL issue back up onto the table. They’re now shelling South Korean islands.
The question is how far do the North Koreans have to go before the crisis either draws attention in the way they want or forces a response from the South Koreans and, ultimately, from the United States.
-
Building on the previous post, , ,
Deciphering North Korea's Provocations
North Korean artillery began shelling the island of Yeonpyeongdo in disputed waters Tuesday afternoon (local time). The island is occupied by South Korea and located in the West (Yellow) Sea south of the Northern Limit Line that South Korea claims as its territory, but north of the Military Demarcation Line that North Korea claims as its territory. Homes were destroyed and at least two South Korean soldiers were killed. South Korean artillery responded in kind, and South Korean F-16 fighter jets were scrambled.
Looking back, in 1968, North Korean commandoes staged an attack on the Blue House, the South Korean president’s office and residence, in an assassination attempt against South Korean President Park Chung Hee. In 1983, North Korean special agents killed four members of the South Korean Cabinet on a visit to Myanmar, and in 1987 they caused an explosion on a South Korean airplane that killed 115 people. There were running gunbattles in the hills of South Korea in 1996 as Koreans pursued commandoes that had infiltrated the South via submarine. Even today, small arms fire and even artillery fire are routinely exchanged between the North and the South — particularly in the disputed waters west of the Demilitarized Zone. Naval skirmishes occurred there in 1999, 2002 and 2009, and it was in these same waters that the South Korean corvette ChonAn (772) sank in March.
The ChonAn sinking combined with the wider context really brings this recent incident into relief. Despite what Seoul and its allies consider to be irrefutable proof of Pyongyang’s culpability in the sinking of the ChonAn, there was no meaningful reprisal against the North beyond posturing and rhetoric. Needless to say, international sanctions have not succeeded in chastening North Korea in recent years.
“The question is, what exactly is Pyongyang pushing for?”
History is rife with examples of sunken warships that either served as a pretext for war or were ignored in the name of larger geopolitical interests. But while the ChonAn sinking was not incomparable to other fatal incidents in North-South relations on the Korean Peninsula, it has certainly been a new low-water mark for the last decade. And historical precedent or not, it is generally worth taking note when one country does not respond to the aggression of another that has committed an overt act of war by sinking a ship and taking dozens of sailors’ lives. Perhaps the most overt result of the ChonAn sinking other than some very serious internal retrospection regarding South Korea’s military and its defense posture was the tension between the United States and South Korea over Washington’s hesitancy to deploy an American aircraft carrier at Seoul’s request as a demonstration of the strength and resolve of the alliance (due to Washington’s sensitivity to Beijing’s opposition).
Indeed, the subsequent compromise between Seoul and Washington was supposed to center on an enhanced schedule of military exercises over time — including both new exercises and the expansion of existing ones. Among these was supposed to be the Hoguk 2010 exercise that began Monday and included some 70,000 South Korean troops conducting maneuvers — including on the very island shelled by North Korea, Yeonpyeongdo — an annual exercise in which the United States has often participated. Yet American participation was withdrawn earlier in the month at effectively the last minute over a “scheduling conflict” — in reality once again likely due to American concerns about the broader regional dynamic, including China’s and Japan’s reaction (the drills would have involved U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawa partaking in an amphibious invasion of a small island, which would have been somewhat provocative in the current tense atmosphere over island sovereignty in Northeast Asia). What’s more, the United States has little interest in seeing conflict flare up between the North and the South, so its calculus may in fact be not only wider regional concerns but also specifically the tension on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, part of the American motivation to withdraw its participation in Hoguk 2010 may very well have been to avoid provoking North Korea, even at the expense of further disappointing its South Korean ally.
Even before the Hoguk 2010 withdrawal, the U.S. hesitancy had enormous impact on Seoul, which, in the South Korean mind, was refused immediate and unhesitating reinforcement by its most important ally at the worst possible moment because of other American interests in the region. The state of the alliance is still strong, and exercises at more convenient times can be expected. But the course of events in 2010 in terms of the American commitment to the alliance may well define South Korean strategic thinking for a decade.
For North Korea, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine a more successful course of events. It struck at its southern rival with impunity and, as a bonus, provoked potentially lasting tensions in the military alliance arrayed against it. The North also wants to avoid all-out war, so Pyongyang is not without its disincentives in terms of provoking Seoul. Note that North Korea’s actions have been limited to disputed areas and of a nature that would be difficult to interpret as a prelude to a larger, broader military assault (one to which the South Korean military would be forced to respond). Instead Pyongyang appears to be calling attention to the disputed maritime border, at least in part a bid to emphasize the need for a peace treaty or some similar settlement that would resolve the disadvantageous status quo in the sea and give Pyongyang the assurances of non-aggression from the United States that it desires.
Yet Pyongyang enjoys a significant trump card — its “nuclear” option. By this, STRATFOR does not mean North Korea’s fledgling nuclear program, which may or may not include workable atomic devices. We mean the legions of hardened conventional artillery positions within range of downtown Seoul and able to rain down sustained fire upon the South Korean capital, home to about 46 percent of the country’s population and source of about 24 percent of its gross domestic product. Though North Korea’s notoriously irrational behavior is actually deliberate, carefully cultivated and purposeful, Seoul is still an enormous thing to gamble with, and South Korea — and the United States, for that matter — can hardly be faulted for not wanting to gamble it on military reprisals in response to what amount to (admittedly lethal) shenanigans in outlying disputed areas.
The problem that has emerged for the United States and its allies is that “red lines” exist only if they are enforced, and both Iran and North Korea have become expert at pushing and stretching them as they see fit. Though (despite rhetoric and appearances) Pyongyang absolutely wants to avoid war, especially during the transition of power, it has now established considerable room to maneuver and push aggressively against its southern rival.
So, what exactly is Pyongyang pushing for? What does it seek to achieve through the exertion of this pressure? Is it still within the realm of its behavior throughout most of the past decade, in which provocations were intended to give it the upper hand in international negotiations, or is it now asking for something more? The North Korean regime has been extraordinarily deliberate and calculating, and one would think it remains so. But is this ability to calculate weakening as a result of the internal strains of the power transition, or other unseen factors? Finally, what is Pyongyang ultimately aiming at as it takes advantage of South Korea’s inability to respond?
-
The NorKs wouldn't do shiite without the nod from with China's power structure, at least no big moves. Were I the president, I'd advise China informally that Japan is not reacting well to the NorKs having nukes and is strongly considering withdrawing from the US-Japanese defense treaty and developing their own nukes. The China-NorK gambit depends on us and the other interested countries trying to be reasonable and allowing ourselves to be shaken down. The answer is to say no mas, and force China to work with us and S. Korea to work on a "soft landing" for the end of the NorK monstrosity. China does not want a nuclear and militarized Japan (no one else in asia does either) and China doesn't want a shooting war between the Koreas either, or a violent collapse of the NorKs with waves of millions of starving N. Koreans flooding into Northern China.
Time to put an end to the shakedowns and push China to act in it's own long term interest.
-
Woof,
From the horse's mou...well pick your body part :-P
www.korea-dpr.com/forum/
P.C.
-
Second post:
Woof,
Artillery fire heard as war games begin:
www.businessweek.com/news/2010-11-27/artillery-heard-in-north-korea-u-s-carrier-enters-yellow-sea.html
P.C.
-
Regarding the 'horse's mouth': http://www.korea-dpr.com/forum/
The name of the other Korean entity is the "South Korean puppet"? Try a word count on that, lol. The U.S. then is the real enemy? We are the "imperialists" even though for half century plus have never invaded their space or rescued a single starving innocent from their millions. Amazing to me how this writing style is nearly identical to that of the former Saddam Hussein regime.
Who other than their own leadership says that DPRK couldn't quit threatening the world and open their economy for commerce, aid and travel tomorrow?
-
http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/ground-defense-command-likely-to-be-set-up-to-coordinate-armies
Ground Defense Command likely to be set up to coordinate armies
Sunday 28th November, 03:21 PM JST
TOKYO —
The Defense Ministry has been making final adjustments toward establishing a Ground Defense Command that will coordinate the operations of the Ground Self-Defense Force’s regional armies, sources at the ministry and the Self-Defense Forces said Saturday.
The proposed change is likely to be included in the new National Defense Program Guidelines the government plans to adopt at a cabinet meeting on Dec 10, according to the sources.
The move is aimed at boosting operational coordination within the GSDF, but the sources said the new higher body is unlikely to be given a command authority, although it was originally sought.
Under the current SDF command structure, the defense minister, in times of emergencies, gives operational commands to the Air Self-Defense Force mainly through its Air Defense Command and to the Maritime Self-Defense Force via its Self-Defense Fleet.
Because the GSDF has no such unified command, the minister would give commands to each of the five regional armies, a process some critics say is cumbersome compared with the other two defense branches.
Efforts had been made within the ministry since 2004 to consider unifying the lines of command in the regional armies at a ground command, but they fizzled out due to opposition from the GSDF.
Under the new plan, the Eastern Army, now headquartered at Camp Asaka in and around Tokyo’s Nerima Ward and responsible for defending the Kanto region, would be abolished and replaced by the new command.
**Looks like Japan is moving to address the growing threats from China and the NorKs.**
-
http://hotair.com/greenroom/archives/2010/11/28/korea-verbose-silence-interpolation/
Korea: Verbose Silence, Interpolation
posted at 8:27 pm on November 28, 2010 by J.E. Dyer
One of the most worrisome aspects of the Obama administration’s foreign policy is the effective inconsistency of its “information” posture. The crisis on the Korean peninsula is a case in point. Most Americans are probably under the impression that the USS George Washington carrier group is being sent as a show of force in response to North Korea’s provocative shelling incident on 23 November. But the naval exercise the carrier group is heading for has been scheduled for months.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2010/11/29/new-wikileaks-docs-revealed-china-open-to-korean-reunification/
New Wikileaks docs revealed: China open to Korean reunification?
posted at 6:00 pm on November 29, 2010 by Allahpundit
Time for the daily diplo document dump, which should be a 5 p.m. staple for at least the next week. Most of you will go looking for the Times’s write-up but the Guardian’s is better in this case. Here’s what I meant yesterday when I said that, for an ostensibly anti-war organization, Wikileaks sure is cavalier about the sort of escalation between rivals that some of these documents might ignite. At a moment when U.S./ROK wargames are going on in the Yellow Sea, with four South Koreans dead within the past week from North Korean shelling, how’s crazy Kim going to react upon learning that his chief benefactor might soon be ready to pull the plug on foreign aid and let North Korea disintegrate? Anyone excited to toss that particular match into the powder keg and see if anything pops?
The leaked North Korea dispatches detail how:
• South Korea’s vice-foreign minister said he was told by two named senior Chinese officials that they believed Korea should be reunified under Seoul’s control, and that this view was gaining ground with the leadership in Beijing…
In highly sensitive discussions in February this year, the-then South Korean vice-foreign minister, Chun Yung-woo, told a US ambassador, Kathleen Stephens, that younger generation Chinese Communist party leaders no longer regarded North Korea as a useful or reliable ally and would not risk renewed armed conflict on the peninsula, according to a secret cable to Washington…
“The two officials, Chun said, were ready to ‘face the new reality’ that the DPRK [North Korea] now had little value to China as a buffer state – a view that, since North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006, had reportedly gained traction among senior PRC [People's Republic of China] leaders. Chun argued that in the event of a North Korean collapse, China would clearly ‘not welcome’ any US military presence north of the DMZ [demilitarised zone]. Again citing his conversations with [the officials], Chun said the PRC would be comfortable with a reunified Korea controlled by Seoul and anchored to the US in a ‘benign alliance’ – as long as Korea was not hostile towards China. Tremendous trade and labour-export opportunities for Chinese companies, Chun said, would also help ‘salve’ PRC concerns about … a reunified Korea.
China ran the numbers and concluded they could absorb up to 300,000 North Korean refugees, so clearly they’re taking this possibility seriously. More ominously, a Chinese diplomat also allegedly told his American counterpart that China has “much less influence than most people believe” over the North Korean leadership. Maybe that’s self-serving spin aimed at creating plausible deniability for China the next time Kim does something nutty, but officials in the White House told Marc Ambinder last week that China was as surprised as we were by the revelation of North Korea’s new uranium enrichment facility. That jibes with a bunch of cables highlighted in the NYT’s story tonight claiming that Chinese knowledge of — and control over — the NorKs’ activities isn’t as robust as we’d like to think.
On May 13, 2009, as American satellites showed unusual activity at North Korea’s nuclear test site, officials in Beijing said they were “unsure” that North Korean “threats of another nuclear test were serious.” As it turns out, the North Koreans detonated a test bomb just days later.
Soon after, Chinese officials predicted that negotiations intended to pressure the North to disarm would be “shelved for a few months.” They have never resumed…
In June 2009, at a lunch in Beijing shortly after the North Korean nuclear test, two senior Chinese Foreign Ministry officials reported that China’s experts believed “the enrichment was only in its initial phases.” In fact, based on what the North Koreans revealed this month, an industrial-scale enrichment plant was already under construction. It was apparently missed by both American and Chinese intelligence services.
The Chinese also allegedly believed that Kim would hand power to a military junta and not the young, untested Kim Jong-un. Wrong again. Could be that they’re simply playing dumb, but if they’re not then (a) the situation right now on the Korean peninsula is even more precarious than thought and (b) it’s unclear whether China could bring about reunification even if it wanted to. This takes us back to yesterday’s post about McCain’s comments: What reason is there to believe that, faced with a Chinese embargo and total social collapse, the North Korean military would opt to reunify instead of to go out fighting? Some soldiers might agree to lay down their arms for survival’s sake, but others will be so rabidly nationalistic that they’ll prefer death to absorption by South Korea. (Wouldn’t be the first time that cult members have opted for suicide.) All it would take to touch off a war on the peninsula is for a few well-placed NorK officers to give the orders to shell Seoul. What then?
Another question: To what extent have Chinese and South Korean actions over the past week been guided by the looming release of these documents? Remember that the State Department has been warning allies about what was coming, so today’s news won’t be a surprise to Beijing or Seoul (but it probably will to Pyongyang). Does this explain why South Korea’s president is suddenly talking very tough about responding to provocations while quietly canceling artillery drills that might escalate the situation further? He needs to put on a brave face for South Korean voters who are turning increasingly hawkish towards the NorKs, but he may be worried that the news about China favoring reunification has North Korea in an unusually desperate position. The solution: Speak loudly and carry a conspicuously small stick.
-
U.S. Calls On China to Rein in North Korea
U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen called on Wednesday for China to “step up” its efforts in handling of the latest crisis on the Korean Peninsula in a speech at the Center for American Progress. Mullen specifically dismissed China’s offer to host a new round of consultations among the six parties involved in Korean peninsular affairs, saying that to do so would merely reward North Korea for its “provocative and destabilizing” behavior. His comments echoed rejections of China’s offer by the South Koreans, Japanese and even the North Koreans.
The situation on the peninsula remains edgy. Washington and Seoul have concluded military exercises, only to declare they will hold more. South Korea warned of further attacks and North Korea persisted in defiant statements and actions, yet again advertising its ongoing uranium enrichment. Meanwhile, the flurry of crisis diplomacy continues. South Korean Foreign Minister Kim Sung Hwan met with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, while China allegedly prepares to send State Councilor and top foreign policy expert Dai Bingguo to North Korea, possibly for a meeting with Dear Leader Kim Jong Il. The United States, South Korea and Japan have scheduled a trilateral meeting in a week’s time to unite their positions.
The spotlight fell on China almost immediately after North Korea fired artillery shells at South Korean-controlled Yeonpyeong Island on Nov. 23. Mullen and other American leaders called upon China to act “responsibly,” and the Korean and Japanese presidents did the same. Needless to say, Beijing is North Korea’s primary supporter through economic, military and political relations, and Beijing has often shielded Pyongyang from international criticisms and sanctions through its seat on the United Nations Security Council. China received Kim twice this year, a year commemorating the 60th anniversary of their alliance since Chinese intervention into war on the North’s behalf in 1950.
” The question is whether the North meets preconditions acceptable to the United States and its allies, or whether they can be assured in some substantial way that those conditions will be met.”
But the focus falls on China not only because of its direct leverage over the North. It also does so because of perceptions among foreign powers, intensifying over the past year, that China is becoming increasingly hard-headed and aggressive in managing its foreign policy across its periphery and beyond. One of the signal examples of this tendency was Beijing’s staunch defense of North Korea after the sinking of the ChonAn in March, which caused the United States to balk in making shows of alliance strength throughout the region. South Korea, the United States and even Japan have a firm interest in preventing China from exercising the same amount of control over the aftermath of the latest incident, for fear that it should be further emboldened. They see this repeat offense by North Korea as a crucial test of whether they can still shape the way China interacts with the international community, or whether Beijing has, in effect, become unresponsive to its obligations to them.
But Beijing is being asked to compromise on a subject it considers essential for its strategic well being. North Korea is a buffer zone that China fought to gain in 1950, and has maintained despite numerous North Korean-engineered crises. Nor does China consider any alternative scenario attractive — previously, China suffered invasion and humiliation at the hands of the Japanese through this very route into the Chinese heartland. Putting pressure on the North runs extreme risks for the regime’s stability, either collapse with dire ramifications on the Chinese border provinces, or capitulation that could bring the American alliance to China’s border. Better to keep the North standing and isolated and require that foreign powers seek redress for their qualms through China.
Yet, keeping a leash on North Korea is difficult. Pyongyang is demanding direct talks with the Americans on forging a peace treaty to replace the 1954 armistice, and has called attention to the disputed maritime border, where violence has occurred for years. It’s an effort to raise awareness of its grievances, to show that conditions will never be stable or secure on the line without a peace treaty, and to avoid having to discuss its nuclear program. The United States and its partners have refuted the concept of a peace treaty or other arrangement without first addressing the nuclear weapons program, but the North replies by ratcheting up the tension.
Therefore, North Korea has become a liability that the Chinese cannot abandon. The result is a test of Beijing’s much-vaunted assertiveness in foreign affairs. If it refuses to yield, it makes itself more conspicuous as an abettor of North Korea’s belligerence and invites greater pressure from foreign powers that are becoming more and more distrustful of how Beijing intends to wield its growing international influence. Yet, if Beijing backs down, and agrees to provide token participation in pressuring the North, it risks either succeeding and precipitating dramatic change on the peninsula or miscalculating and watching in dismay as its inch of lost North Korean leverage turns into a mile. And at this point, backing down will also risk appearing weak in front of its increasingly nationalistic domestic audience.
The six parties involved in peninsular stability are still committed to holding negotiations. The question is whether the North meets preconditions acceptable to the United States and its allies, or whether they can be assured in some substantial way that those conditions will be met. If China is not seen nudging North Korea in this direction, or is seen as obstructing it, then it risks attracting increased negative attention to itself and even getting sidelined in the event that a breakthrough between North Korea and the United States occurs. Tellingly, Russia has reiterated its condemnation of Pyongyang’s attack, leaving China with less cover in the event that it does not shift to a position that is more accommodating toward American and South Korean demands.
-
http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2009/09/office-39-200909?currentPage=all
NorKfellas.
-
A resumption of six-party talks will not resolve the Korean crisis, as all parties have different goals, Vice President of Strategic Intelligence Rodger Baker says.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Colin Chapman: North Asia remains on edge with no sign of an end to the tension after the attacks by North Korea just over a week ago. Welcome to agenda I’m Colin Chapman, and on the agenda next week is a significant tripartite meeting between Japan, South Korea and the United States, but the chances for any kind of solution to the crisis are not good. You can see the tactical details of the exchange of fire between North Korea and South Korea on our website, along with satellite imagery that we’ve obtained and military analysis. Joining me to discuss this is Rodger Baker. Rodger, what’s your analysis of where things stand now?
Rodger Baker: We’re at a very delicate position right now in Northeast Asia. Certainly, every side is making a case that none of them want war, none of them want this to escalate, and yet the South Koreans have a incentive to — if there’s another North Korean action — to respond extremely strongly. The North Koreans may have a sense that they need to show one more time that they’re tough. The Chinese are offering talks that they don’t nobody’s going to come to, so we’re at kind of an uncertain moments as we watch the situation unfold.
Colin Chapman: Yet some people are clutching at straws. For example, North Korea has hinted it might allow international investment in mining in its country, a strange step if you’re planning a major war.
Rodger Baker: One of the things they been watching it to see whether or not the North Korean behavior with the shelling of this island fits within their typical pattern of creating crises in order to head into negotiations, and this seemed a step beyond what they’ve normally done in the past. Yet in the background we’re seeing certain actions but that still fit in the old patterns. So we’ve seen regular inspection tours by Kim Jong Il and his son. We’ve also seen an announcement today by the North Koreans that they’ve upgraded to ministry status a natural resources department and that’s suggesting that they’re going ahead with earlier plans to expand foreign investment in mining and try to draw in other individuals and if you’re about to head into a war that’s probably not something you would be doing.
Colin Chapman: The key to all this is of course China, but as you’ve said yourself North Korea is a liability that China simply cannot abandon.
Rodger Baker: Certainly when you look at China’s relations with North Korea its been a bit contentious. The Chinese sometimes appear not to be able to control the North Koreans or they get drawn into situations of tension with their other neighbors or with the United States over North Korea. At the same time the Chinese are able to manipulate that. But in the end when you look at the Chinese, North Korea serves as a strategic buffer. North Korea presents effectively the United States from being able to place troops right along the Chinese border and so no matter what you hear from the Chinese talking about maybe supporting reunification or not supporting the North Koreans or standing back, in the end they’re going to ensure that something is that position whether it be North Korea ,whether it be a Chinese-run North Korea, that creates that sense of space so they can’t have the United States coming up against the Yalu River.
Colin Chapman: Did WikiLeaks come up with anything that might be relevant here?
Rodger Baker: Some of the things we’ve seen and what got a lot of play was the idea, for example, that the Chinese had considered letting the two Koreas and letting South Korea run that. It’s kind of a misrepresentation of the Chinese position. Certainly at times Chinese scholars or Chinese officials will say things like that and they say that to appease the South Koreans. They say that to let the United States think that they’re not offensive or they’re not out trying to be dominant in the region. But in general if you look at the Chinese position the Chinese now no less than in 1950 have an interest to prevent the United States from coming up to the Yalu River.
Colin Chapman: The date in the diary is this tripartite meeting between Japan and South Korea, and the United States but is there any real prospect that it could come up with any kind of solution?
Rodger Baker: The meeting between the United States and its two key Northeast Asian allies — Japan and South Korea — is probably not going to come up with some amazing new policy on North Korea or new way of resolving the situation. However the United States really feels it does need to demonstrate first and foremost its strong commitment to these allies, solidify that that military commitment as well as the political commitment and only then after talking with the three of them will the U.S. even begin to consider how it might go back into negotiations with North Korea and maybe allow China to facilitate those. So right now this is about the U.S. showing to its allies and showing to the region that the United States does give a strong defense commitment to countries that it works with.
Colin Chapman: I talked to three former envoys to Seoul this week and all of them agreed that South Korea had handled this in a pretty cool and sensible fashion, but they think the solution is now going to be the resumption of the six-party talks. Do you agree with that?
Rodger Baker: Well I think if you look at the six-party talks, its questionable whether the six-party talks or any other multilateral forum is going to resolve the situation and that’s because as you look at each of the players they don’t necessarily have the same end goal in mind. So for China, as we’ve noted, the Chinese are really not ultimately interested in a reunified Korea at least not one that would in any way be a potential challenger or competitor or be an ally to the United States. The South Koreans don’t necessarily want to rush reunification. The United States is not looking to get involved in either a conflict in the region or to abandon its position in the region and the Japanese are always cautious about the idea of a unified Korea as being really something that could that could challenge Japanese interests in the region. The Russians haven’t decided whether or not they’re getting back involved. The North Koreans certainly don’t want to become subservient to the South Koreans so we when look at the six-party talks, the six-party talks may be about stopping the North Koreans from having nuclear weapons but the North Koreans already have them. There is very little that the North Koreans would get in giving up a capability they already have. So I think if you look at the six-party talks in particular, the Chinese use the talks as a way to manage the situation but not as a way to resolve the situation. They use it to keep the other players in check, they use it to gain leverage over some of the other players, but in the end I don’t think we have anybody who’s actually expecting these talks, these negotiations, to resolve either the North Korean nuclear issue or the broader picture which is the division of the Korean Peninsula.
Colin Chapman: Rodger Baker there, ending this week’s Agenda. I’m Colin Chapman at STRATFOR, thanks for being with us today.
-
A comprehensive, and glum, assessment of what will likely occur if the Kim Family regime in N. Korea collapses:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/609-maxwell.pdf
-
The Korean peninsula was divided by the world’s great powers as World War II came to an end. That division persists today, of course, and is the greatest source of instability in East Asia, thanks largely to North Korea’s belligerence.
The division also feeds a sentiment in both Koreas of victimization, the sense that outsiders hurt us, ripped us apart.
In many discussions about Korean reunification between, for instance South Koreans and Americans, the statement “We didn’t ask for this” is the ultimate trump card a South Korean can pull to make the American stop, reconsider themselves and feel a twinge of guilt.
In South Korea, there’s also another way that this sense of victimization manifests itself. Many South Koreans say they believe that, even now, the world’s great powers don’t want the two Koreas to get back together.
Well, it’s rare that a moment presents itself for other countries to actually say how they feel about the reunification of the two Koreas, but it happened Friday afternoon in Seoul.
Ambassadors from three of South Korea’s neighbors spoke at a conference marking the 20th anniversary of the Korea Institute for National Unification, a government-funded think tank associated with the Ministry of Unification, which deals with North Korea-related matters.
Now, normally, the words of diplomats are a bit convoluted and, well, boring, so journalists like us usually just summarize them.
But on Friday, each of the three ambassadors talked about experiences in which South Koreans had told them they didn’t think the country they represent wanted reunification to happen. And each of them had a strong, succinct response that yes, actually, they would like to see the Koreas reunite with Seoul in the lead.
So we decided to give them to you without a filter on this post.
We should point out – as the hosts of the KINU conference did several times – that China’s ambassador to South Korea was also invited to Friday’s meeting, had confirmed his attendance but canceled at the last minute. In other words, the stance many of us would like to hear on the topic, Beijing’s, remains a mystery.
The key statements from the diplomats:
Kathleen Stephens, U.S. Ambassador to South Korea
“The U.S. vision on Korean unification is in the context of our vision for the entire Asia-Pacific region. We want to see shared prosperity, shared peace and genuine stability. It’s within that context that we support reunification – too long postponed, too long delayed, too tragically prolonged – by peaceful means and in accordance with the wishes of the Korean people.
“President Obama and President Lee Myung-bak in June 2009 signed a joint vision statement, a vision of the U.S.-Korea relationship. I want to read to you one sentence, there’s more, but one sentence, because this is our vision. ‘Through our alliance, we aim to build a better future for all people on the Korean peninsula, establishing a durable peace on the peninsula and leading to peaceful reunification on the principles of free democracy and a market economy.’
“That’s what we’re trying to do. Now, I emphasize this because nothing has disturbed me more over the years than at times having it suggested to me by Korean friends or others that somehow the United States thinks the division of the Korean peninsula is right or even serves U.S. interests. Nothing could be further from the truth.
“We look, from the perspective now of 2011, at the division of this peninsula and at the division of the Korean people as one of the great tragedies of the 20th Century.”
Muto Masatoshi, Japan Ambassador to South Korea
“I want to talk about [South] Korean people’s perception of how Japanese look at unification. A lot of people used to say we are negative or reluctant to support it. People would say Japan does not want a very strong country next to us. Well, that is not true. That is not based on reality or how our relations are.
“The reunification of Korea is a big benefit for us. I would like to quote three reasons for that.
“First of all, the reduction of tension on the Korean peninsula will certainly promote peace and stability in East Asia.
“Second, with reunification, we will have a big market here and big business opportunities will emerge out of reunification.
“Thirdly, South Korea is very active in promoting peace and stability and prosperity in the world. Korea is a very good partner in our international relations. And we would like to see a very strong partner next to us, which has a very similar interest to us.”
Konstantin Vnukov, Russia Ambassador to South Korea
“The situation on the Korean peninsula directly affects the security of the Russian people who live very close on the neighboring Russian Far East as well as influences the large scale, rapid-development plans of my government for Siberia and the Russia Far East region.
“From this point of view, the establishment in future of a democratic, prosperous and friendly-towards-us united Korea fully reflects Russian political and economic interests.
“We are convinced that there is no alternative to political and diplomatic settlement of the situation. Moreover, the six-party talks from our point of view is the optimal mechanism for making necessary decisions on all the issues, including, of course, the main issue, which is the nuclear problem.
“Using our obvious advantages, in particular good relations with both Korean states … Russia is doing everything possible to normalize the situation on the peninsula.”
-
This could get interesting , , ,
-
This could get interesting , , ,
Ronery no more.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TEvacFETvM[/youtube]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TEvacFETvM
-
ROK on "emergency alert".
-
North Korean Leader Kim Jong Il on Aug. 24
STRATFOR Book
• North Korea’s Nuclear Gambit: Understanding Pyongyang’s Survival Strategy
North Korean leader Kim Jong Il died the morning of Dec. 17, according to an official North Korean News broadcast at noon Dec. 19. Initial reports say Kim died of a heart attack brought on by fatigue while on board a train. Kim is believed to have suffered a stroke in 2008, and his health has been in question since.
Kim’s death comes as North Korea was preparing for a live leadership transition in 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of Kim’s father and North Korea’s founding leader, Kim Il Sung, a transition that had been intended to avoid the three years of internal chaos the younger Kim faced after his father’s death in 1994. Kim Jong Il had delayed choosing a successor from among his sons to avoid allowing any one to build up their own support base independent of their father. His expected successor, son Kim Jong Un, was only designated as the heir apparent in 2010 after widespread rumors in 2009 and thus has had little experience and training to run North Korea and little time to solidify his own support base within the various North Korean leadership elements. Now, it is likely that Kim Jong Un’s uncle, Jang Song Thaek, will rule behind the scenes as Kim Jong Un trains on the job. Like the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, it is likely that North Korea will focus internally over the next few years as the country’s elite adjust to a new balance of power. In any transition, there are those who will gain and those who are likely to be disenfranchised, and this competition can lead to internal conflicts.
The immediate question is the status of the North Korean military. Kim Jong Un is officially the Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the Workers Party of Korea and was recently made a four-star general, but he has no military experience. If the military remains committed to keeping the Kim family at the pinnacle of leadership, then things will likely hold, at least in the near term. There were no reports from South Korea that North Korea’s military had entered a state of heightened alert following Kim Jong Il’s death, suggesting that the military is on board with the transition for now. If that holds, the country likely will remain stable, if internally tense.
Kim’s death does not necessarily put an end to recently revived discussions with the United States and others over North Korea’s nuclear program. Pyongyang has increasingly felt pressured by its growing dependence on China, and these nuclear talks provide the potential to break away from that dependence in the long term.
-
This could go under Glibness but are we not going to send the N. Korean people our condolences at their time of grieving? Have we no manners or are we run by right wing zealots? And what about adding a stop on the Presidential apology tour - I wonder what role our crippling sanctions played in his demise.
-
This could get interesting , , ,
Ronery no more.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TEvacFETvM[/youtube]
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5TEvacFETvM
Let the grave dancing begin! :-D
-
(http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/plugged-in/files/2011/12/NKlights.jpg)
Tiny carbon footprint!
Pyongyang is the only lighted area north of the border.
-
"North Korea now endorsed by Al Gore!"
Seems like a joke or an opposition gotcha, but yes in fact N.K. peasants are the closest model available to the lifestyle they think we should adopt. Don't fly, don't drive, don't heat your home, don't cook your food, don't light your house after dark.
We keep getting more efficient but we never break the correlation between prosperity and energy use.
The other perfect part about the so-called communist model is that the rulers are not subject to the same restrictions as the peasants.
-
This could go under Glibness but are we not going to send the N. Korean people our condolences at their time of grieving? Have we no manners or are we run by right wing zealots? And what about adding a stop on the Presidential apology tour - I wonder what role our crippling sanctions played in his demise.
The administration caught reading the forum. Right as we found out that Jimmy Carter's 'private' mission on behalf of Pres. Bill Clinton was not so private, the not so private citizen Jimmy Carter has extended our condolences not? on behalf of the Obama administration:
http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/inside-politics/2011/dec/21/ex-president-carter-sends-condolences-kim-jong-un/
Former President Jimmy Carter has sent North Korea a message of condolence over the death of Kim Jong-il and wished "every success" to the man expected to take over as dictator, according to the communist country's state-run news agency.
A dispatch from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) said Mr. Carter sent the message to Kim Jong-un, Kim Jong-il's son and heir apparent.
"In the message Jimmy Carter extended condolences to Kim Jong Un and the Korean people over the demise of leader Kim Jong Il. He wished Kim Jong Un every success as he assumes his new responsibility of leadership, looking forward to another visit to [North Korea] in the future," the KCNA dispatch read.
When contacted by The Washington Times for comment, the Carter Center provided an email contact to a spokeswoman who is out of the office until the New Year.
-
http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/21/was-kim-jong-il-murdered-in-power-struggle-with-north-koreas-military/
Was Kim Jong-il murdered in power struggle with North Korean military?
Peter Goodspeed Dec 21, 2011 – 6:00 AM ET | Last Updated: Dec 21, 2011 1:20 PM ET
REUTERS/Kyodo
Mourning period: North Koreans gather to make a call of condolence for deceased leader Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang Wednesday
.Comments
Email
Twitter
inShare.8
.
Suspicion of North Korea runs deep in South Korea, so it wasn’t a surprise that within hours of the announcement of Kim Jong-il’s death Monday, some South Korean newspapers were asking if the Dear Leader had been murdered.
While North Korea’s Central News Agency reported Monday that Mr. Kim died of a heart attack last Saturday on a train while heading to an unidentified destination, Seoul’s Korea Times newspaper ran a headline, “Suspicions arise over cause of death”.
According to the newspaper, North Korean defectors doubt Pyongyang’s state-controlled media reports of Mr. Kim’s death. They cautiously suggested the dictator may have been murdered.
Related
Mysterious uncle key to Kim Jong-un’s power in North Korea
Peter Goodspeed: Kim arrived on a rainbow, leaves behind starving country
Inside North Korea: Peter Goodspeed recalls the grey, empty streets of the Hermit Kingdom
.
REUTERS/Yonhap
South Korean soldiers patrol along the military fence near the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas in Yeoncheon, northeast of Seoul Wednesday
.
A political scientist, An Chan-il, was quoted as saying Mr. Kim may have been killed by elements within the North Korean government who disagreed with his policies.
“After his third son Jung-un was named for a dynastic leadership succession, many military officers, especially those in their 50s, were dismissed,” Mr. An told the Korea Times. “I think these people could have held deep resentment about Kim and North Korea’s next leader.
“A rumor is circulating that earlier a high-ranking North Korean official was shot dead,” he said. “This has yet to be confirmed, but such talk is evidence that discontent was brewing among some people in the North.”
Mr. An speculated hardline elements in the military may have also resented recent policy changes introduced by Mr. Kim.
“As their vested interests were hurt due to Kim Jong-il, I would not rule out the possibility that some military officers, who believed their clout and influence had been damaged, could have played a role in his death,” he said.
The newspaper said Chun Yo-ok, a member of South Korea’s National Assembly from the ruling Grand National Party also raised the possibility Mr. Kim might have been killed as a result of a power struggle.
Several years ago, a Japanese professor wrote a book arguing that Kim Jong-il died in 2003 and had been represented by body doubles ever since.
The latest conspiracy theories gained life from the fact that just hours before officials announced Mr. Kim’s death, U.S. officials were leaking news that they had negotiated a breakthrough deal to have North Korea suspend uranium enrichment in exchange for a resumption of food aid from Washington.
Late Sunday, officials in Washington warned several news organizations that the White House was about to announce it would provide North Korea with 240,000 tons of high protein biscuits and vitamins over the next year.
KCNA/Reuters
Kim Jong-il (wearing sunglasses) and his son Kim Jong-un (in black suit second from left) pose in October 2010 with soldiers at an undisclosed location in North Korea.
..
The United States suspended food aid to North Korea in 2009 when Pyongyang resumed its nuclear weapons program and exploded a nuclear device. Talks to resume the aid, in exchange for North Korea’s return to Six Party Talks had dragged on for years as Pyongyang repeatedly placed demands on how any aid might be delivered.
KNS/AFP/Getty Images
Kim Jong-Il lies in state at the Kumsusan Memorial Palace in Pyongyang Tuesday
.
Washington insisted it should be allowed to monitor food distribution to ensure donations did not go to North Korea’s military.
Just before Kim Jong-il died, North Korea was said to have caved in and handed Washington a diplomatic coup by agreeing to accept U.S. aid and U.S. conditions.
U.S. officials said that within days of announcing the resumption of food deliveries, North Korea was going to announce a suspension of its uranium enrichment program and a return to the Six Party talks in Beijing.
Kim’s death has now delayed both countries’ announcements indefinitely.
More from the Post’s Peter Goodspeed
Kim Jong-un stepped forward to bow before his father’s flower-banked bier, there was a dark-suited man standing behind him, in a long line of uniformed generals, who stood out.
Jang Song-thaek, Mr. Kim’s 65-year-old uncle, may be the North Korean equivalent of former Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping — a career technocrat, who was mysteriously purged from power in 2004 only to return 18 months later to become the second-most powerful man in North Korea.
For months, Mr. Jang has been described by many analysts as the power behind the throne in North Korea and designated as a potential regent and political mentor for the young Mr. Kim.
.
China knew early of Kim Jong-il’s death: reports
North Korea’s primary ally, learned on Saturday Mr. Kim had died that day, two days before Pyongyang’s official announcement, a leading South Korean newspaper reported Wednesday.
JoongAng Ilbo quoted an unidentified source in Beijing as saying the Chinese ambassador to North Korea had obtained intelligence of Kim’s death and reported it to the capital on Dec. 17, the day Kim died of an apparent heart attack while on a train.
“North Korean informed China of Kim’s death through diplomatic channels on the following day,” the source was quoted as saying.
South Korea’s foreign ministry told a press briefing on Tuesday that China did not know of the death in advance of North Korea’s official announcement.
“We heard several times that (China) did not find out (Kim’s death) beforehand,” said the ministry’s spokesman Cho Byung-jae.
Top South Korean intelligence and military officials have come under criticism for failing to learn of Kim’s death before the official announcement by Pyongyang.
When South Korean President Lee Myung-bak left on a state visit for Japan last week, North Korean leader Kim Jong-il had been dead for about four hours, indicating that neither Seoul nor Tokyo — or Washington — had any inkling of his death.
South Korea’s National Intelligence Service chief Won Sei-hoon told lawmakers that China might have detected some signals earlier but he could not verify it, according to media reports.
China has given no official comment or even hints suggesting it was told of Kim’s death before the public announcement. But Beijing has in the past been give advance notice from North Korea of major events, diplomats have said. In 2006, North Korea told China 20 minutes or more beforehand that it would hold its first nuclear test blast, they said.
REUTERS
-
By George Friedman
After U.S. President Barack Obama visited the Korean Demilitarized Zone on March 25 during his trip to South Korea for a nuclear security summit, he made the obligatory presidential remarks warning North Korea against continued provocations. He also praised the strength of U.S.-South Korean relations and commended the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed there. Obama's visit itself is of little importance, but it is an opportunity to ask just what Washington's strategy is in Korea and how the countries around North Korea (China, Russia, South Korea and Japan) view the region. As always, any understanding of current strategy requires a consideration of the history of that strategy.
The Korean War and the U.S. Proto-Strategy
Korea became a key part of U.S. Cold War-era containment strategy almost by accident. Washington, having deployed forces in China during World War II and thus aware of the demographic and geographic problems of operating on the Asian mainland, envisioned a maritime strategy based on the island chains running from the Aleutians to Java. The Americans would use the islands and the 7th Fleet to contain both the Soviets and the Chinese on the mainland.
Korea conceptually lay outside this framework. The peninsula was not regarded by the United States as central to its strategy even after the victory of the communists in the Chinese civil war. After World War II, the Korean Peninsula, which had been occupied by the Japanese since the early 1900s, was divided into two zones. The North came under the control of communists, the South under the control of a pro-American regime. Soviet troops withdrew from the North in 1948 and U.S. troops pulled out of the South the following year, despite some calls to keep them in place to dissuade communist aggression. The actual U.S. policy toward an invasion of the South by the North is still being debated, but a U.S. intervention on the Korean Peninsula clearly violated Washington's core strategic principle of avoiding mainland operations and maintaining a strategic naval blockade.
U.S. strategy changed in 1950, when the North Koreans invaded the South, sparking the Korean War. Pyongyang's motives remain unclear, as do the roles of Moscow and Beijing in the decision. Obviously, Pyongyang wanted to unite the peninsula under communist control, and obviously, it did not carry out its invasion against Chinese and Russian wishes, but it appears all involved estimated the operation was within the capabilities of the North Korean army. Had the North Korean military faced only South Korean forces, they would have been right. They clearly miscalculated the American intent to intervene, though it is not clear that even the Americans understood their intent prior to the intervention. However, once the North Koreans moved south, President Harry Truman decided to intervene. His reasoning had less to do with Korea than with the impact of a communist military success on coalition partners elsewhere. The U.S. global strategy depended on Washington's ability to convince its partners that it would come to their aid if they were invaded. Strategic considerations aside, not intervening would have created a crisis of confidence, or so was the concern. Therefore, the United States intervened.
After serious difficulties, the United States managed to push the North Korean forces back into the North and pursue them almost to the Yalu River, which divides Korea and China. This forced a strategic decision on China. The Chinese were unclear on the American intent but did not underestimate American power. North Korea had represented a buffer between U.S. allies and northeastern China (and a similar buffer for the Soviets to protect their maritime territories). The Chinese intervened in the war, pushing the Americans back from the Yalu and suffering huge casualties in the process. The Americans regrouped, pushed back and a stalemate was achieved roughly along the former border and the current Demilitarized Zone. The truce was negotiated and the United States left forces in Korea, the successors of which President Obama addressed during his visit.
North Korea: The Weak, Fearsome Lunatic
The great mystery of the post-Cold War world is the survival of the North Korean regime. With a dynamic South, a non-Communist Russia and a China committed to good economic relations with the West, it would appear that the North Korean regime would have found it difficult to survive. This was compounded by severe economic problems (precipitated by the withdrawal of economic support from the Chinese and the Russians) and reported famines in the 1990s. But survive it did, and that survival is rooted in the geopolitics of the Cold War.
From the Chinese point of view, North Korea served the same function in the 1990s as it did in 1950: It was a buffer zone between the now economically powerful South Koreans (and the U.S. military) and Manchuria. The Russians were, as during the Korean War, interested in but not obsessed by the Korean situation, the more so as Russia shifted most of its attention west. The United States was concerned that a collapse in North Korea would trigger tensions with the Chinese and undermine the stability of its ally, South Korea. And the South Koreans were hesitant to undertake any actions that might trigger a response from North Korean artillery within range of Seoul, where a large portion of South Korea's population, government, industry and financial interests reside. In addition, they were concerned that a collapsing North would create a massive economic crisis in the South, having watched the difficulties of German integration and recognizing the even wider economic and social gap between the two Koreas.
In a real sense, no one outside of North Korea was interested in changing the borders of the peninsula. The same calculations that had created the division in the first place and maintained it during and after the Korean War remained intact. Everyone either had a reason to want to maintain an independent North Korea (even with a communist regime) or was not eager to risk a change in the status quo.
The most difficult question to answer is not how the United States viewed the potential destabilization of North Korea but rather its willingness to maintain a significant troop level in South Korea. The reason for intervening in the first place was murky. The U.S. military presence between 1953 and 1991 was intended to maintain the status quo during the Cold War. The willingness to remain beyond that is more complex.
Part of it simply had to do with inertia. Just as U.S. troops remain in Germany a generation after the end of the Cold War, it was easier not to reconsider U.S. strategy in Korea than to endure the internal stress of reconsidering it. Obviously, the United States did not want tensions between South Korea and North Korea, or to have the North Koreans misunderstand a withdrawal as an invitation to try another military move on the South, however unlikely. The Japanese saw Korean unification as problematic to their interests, since it could create a nearby industrial economic power of more than 70 million people and rekindle old rivalries. And North Korea, it would seem, actually welcomes the American presence, believing it limits South Korean adventurism. Between inertia and what we will call a proto-strategy, the United States remains.
With the loss of its Cold War patrons and the changing dynamic of the post-Cold War world, the North Koreans developed a survival strategy that Stratfor identified in the 1990s. The Koreans' intention was to appear -- simultaneously -- weak, fearsome and crazy. This was not an easy strategy to carry out, but they have carried it out well. First, they made certain that they were perceived to be always on the verge of internal collapse and thus not a direct threat to anyone but themselves. They went out of their way to emphasize their economic problems, particularly the famines in the 1990s. They wanted no one to think they were intent on being an aggressor unless provoked severely.
Second, they wanted to appear to be fearsome. This would at first blush seem to contradict the impression of weakness, but they managed it brilliantly by perpetually reminding the world that they were close to developing nuclear weapons and longer-range missiles. Recognizing that the Americans and Japanese had a reflexive obsession with nuclear weapons, Pyongyang constantly made it appear that they were capable of developing nuclear weapons but were not yet there. Not being there yet meant that no one had to do something about the weapons. Being close to developing them meant that it was dangerous to provoke them. Even North Korea's two nuclear tests have, intentionally or incidentally, appeared sub-par, leaving its neighbors able to doubt the technological prowess of the "Hermit Kingdom."
The final piece was to appear crazy, or crazy enough that when pressed, they would choose the suicide option of striking with a nuclear weapon, if they had one. This was critical because a rational actor possessing one or a few weapons would not think of striking its neighbors, since the U.S. counterstrike would annihilate the North Korean regime. The threat wouldn't work if North Korea was considered rational, but, if it was irrational, the North Korean deterrence strategy could work. It would force everyone to be ultra-cautious in dealing with North Korea, lest North Korea do something quite mad. South Korean and U.S. propaganda did more for North Korea's image of unpredictability than the North could have hoped.
North Korea, then, has spent more than two decades cultivating the image to the outside world of a nation on the verge of internal economic collapse (even while internally emphasizing its strength in the face of external threats). At the same time, the country has appeared to be on the verge of being a nuclear power -- one ruled by potential lunatics. The net result was that the major powers, particularly South Korea, the United States and Japan, went out of their way to avoid provoking the North. In addition, these three powers were prepared to bribe North Korea to stop undertaking nuclear and missile development. Several times, they bribed the North with money or food to stop building weapons, and each time the North took the money and then resumed their program, quite ostentatiously, so as to cause maximum notice and restore the vision of the weak, fearsome lunatic.
The North was so good at playing this game that it maneuvered itself into a position in which it sat as an equal with the United States, Japan, Russia, China and South Korea -- and it would frequently refuse to attend the six-party talks. The ability to maneuver itself into a position equal to these powers was North Korea's greatest achievement, and it had a tremendous effect on stabilizing the regime by reinforcing its legitimacy internally and its power externally. Underneath this was the fact that no one was all that eager to see North Korea collapse, particularly since it was crazy and might have nuclear weapons. North Korea created a superb strategy for regime preservation in a very hostile region -- or one that appeared hostile to the North Koreans.
Crucially for Pyongyang, North Korea was of tremendous use to one power: China. Even more than North Korea's role as a buffer state, its antics allowed China to emerge as mediator between the inscrutable Pyongyang and the frustrated United States. As China's economy grew, its political and military interests and reach expanded, leading to numerous tensions with the United States. But Beijing recognized that North Korea was a particular obsession of the United States because of its potential nuclear weapons and American sensitivity to weapons of mass destruction. Whenever North Korea did something outrageous, the United States would turn to China to address the problem. Having solved it, it was then inappropriate for Washington to press China on any other issue, at least for a while. Therefore, North Korea was a superb mechanism for the Chinese to deflect U.S. pressure on other issues.
For all of their occasional provocations, the North Koreans have been careful never to cross a line with conventional or nuclear power to compel a response from the South or the United States. Their ability to calibrate their provocations has been striking, even as their actions have escalated through nuclear tests to military action against South Korean ships and islands in the West Sea. Also striking is the manner in which those provocations have increased China's leverage with the United States.
The Difficulty of Extrication
At this point, it would be difficult for the United States to withdraw from South Korea. The North Korean nuclear threat fixes the situation in place, even for troops that aren't relevant to that threat. The troops could be withdrawn, but they won't be because the inertia of the situation makes it easier to leave them there than withdraw. As for the South Koreans, they simultaneously dislike the American presence and want it there, since it ensures U.S. military involvement in any crisis.
While the U.S. troop presence in Korea may not make the most sense in a global U.S. military strategy, it ironically seems to fit, at least for now, the interests of the Chinese, South Koreans and Japanese, and even in some sense the North Koreans. The United States, as the global power, therefore is locked into a deployment that does not match the regional requirements, requires endless explanation and is the source of frequent political complications. What we are left with is a U.S. strategy not based necessarily on the current situation but one tied to a historical legacy, left in place by inertia and held in place by the North Korean nuclear "threat."
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Read more: The United States in Korea: A Strategy of Inertia | Stratfor
-
Looks like we are going to do nothing to stop the Norks from testing what appears to be an ICBM , , ,
-
Looks like we are going to do nothing to stop the Norks from testing what appears to be an ICBM , , ,
It's ok, Obama has a gift.....
-
Looks like we are going to do nothing to stop the Norks from testing what appears to be an ICBM , , ,
And what do you suggest we do? :?
I'm sure Romney would solve the problem. :roll:
-
Looks like we are going to do nothing to stop the Norks from testing what appears to be an ICBM , , ,
And what do you suggest we do? :?
I'm sure Romney would solve the problem. :roll:
Perhaps having a president that doesn't bow and grovel would help?
No worries, Japan has been nuked before. They'll get over it.
-
Japan has made noise about shooting it down should it go over Japan. At the very least we should issue a statement in support, but we don't do even that. That said the correct answer is that WE should shoot it down.
THANK GOD, and President Reagan, we have something of a Star Wars capability!
To let the NORK whackos develop the capabiity to reach the US with a nuclear missile is stupid, naive, and profoundly weak. Of such weakness, terrible things arisse.
-
I enjoyed this opinion piece by former NY Times Editor Bill Keller. I like things that indicate the end of something unimaginably evil is either possible or inevitable, like the PRC and the DPRK. He is saying we should be preparing now for the aftermath of the regime.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/30/opinion/keller-the-day-after.html?pagewanted=1&_r=2 Excerpt:
"The big question we should be asking is: What about the Day After? If the regime’s days are numbered, the end is likely to be messier than anything we’ve seen in the Arab Spring. Why aren’t we sitting down with the Chinese, South Koreans, Japanese and Russians and making a plan to prevent nuclear material from being sold to the Russian mafia or the Chinese triads; to keep some panicky general from incinerating Seoul (minutes away as the artillery shell flies); to dissuade China or Russia from sending in troops to take advantage; to prevent Nuremberg-minded prison commandants from bulldozing the evidence into mass graves; to fend off an even more monumental human calamity than the famine of the mid-90s? Then, how do we reunify Korea without bankrupting the South? "
-
An extremely thoughtful piece, Doug. Thank you for bringing it to my attention. I also think the "day after" discussion is key. A mini-Marshall plan (for lack of a better term) is probably needed, not to mention the discussion about nukes brought by the author (and the need to educate an entire people about liberty, free thought, agriculture, technology and gods only know what else).
-
Ditto.
-
Kim Jong Un and a mystery woman clap as they watch a performance by North Korea's new Moranbong band, July 6, 2012. …
Who is she?
That's what people around the world want to know about a mysterious young woman who appeared with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at a pair of events over the weekend.
The woman first appeared with Kim on North Korean state television on Sunday at a ceremony marking the 18th anniversary of his grandfather and North Korea founder Kim Il Sung's death. She is believed to be the same woman shown in a photograph released by the Korea News Service on Monday showing Kim and others clapping during a July 6 performance by new Moranbong band in Pyongyang. (The unusual performance included appearances by Disney characters—including Mickie Mouse, Minnie Mouse and Winnie the Pooh—not often seen in North Korea, which traditionally shuns entertainment of the West.)
The mystery woman sparked a crush of media coverage in South Korea, where some speculate that she could be Kim's younger sister or wife. No official details about her identity have been released.
According to London's Telegraph, "South Korean intelligence sources" say the woman is Hyon Song Wol, a singer "who used to front the Bochonbo Electronic Music Band" and "responsible for a string of hits that included 'Footsteps of Soldiers,' 'I Love Pyongyang,' 'She is a Discharged Soldier' and 'We are Troops of the Party.'"
Her popularity "peaked in 2005 with the song 'Excellent Horse-Like Lady,'" the Telegraph said, adding:
Hyon subsequently disappeared from public view at the time that Kim emerged as the heir-apparent to his father, Kim Jong Il.
There are reports that 28-year-old Kim Jong Un was ordered to break off his relationship with Hyon by his father and that she later married an officer in the North Korean army with whom she has a baby.
The North Korean government is notoriously secretive when it comes to its leaders. It took more than a day to announce the death of Kim Jong Il in December. And as the Associated Press points out, little personal information is known about Kim himself, though he is thought to be in his late 20s. Kim's younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, was born in 1987, the AP said.
-
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/07/26/north_korea_s_extreme_makeover
-
http://blog.skepticaldoctor.com/2010...erpt-1991.aspx
I went several times during the festival to Pyongyang Department Store Number 1. This is in the very centre of the city. Its shelves and counters were groaning with locally produced goods, piled into impressive pyramids or in fan-like displays, perfectly arranged, throughout the several floors of the building. On the ground floor was a wide variety of tinned foods, hardware and alcoholic drinks, including a strong Korean liqueur with a whole snake pickled or marinated in the bottle, presumably as an aphrodisiac. Everything glittered with perfection, the tidiness was remarkable.
It didn't take long to discover that this was no ordinary department store. It was filled with thousands of people, going up and down the escalators, standing at the corners, going in and out of the front entrance in a constant stream both ways - yet nothing was being bought or sold. I checked this by standing at the entrance for half an hour. The people coming out were carrying no more than the people entering. Their shopping bags contained as much, or as little, when they left as when they entered. In some cases, I recognised people coming out as those who had gone in a few minutes before, only to see them re-entering the store almost immediately. And I watched a hardware counter for fifteen minutes. There were perhaps twenty people standing at it; there were two assistants behind the counter, but they paid no attention to the 'customers'. The latter and the assistants stared past each other in a straight line, neither moving nor speaking.
Eventually, they grew uncomfortably aware that they were under my observation. They began to shuffle their feet and wriggle, as if my regard pinned them like live insects to a board. The assistants too became restless and began to wonder what to do in these unforeseen circumstances. They decided that there was nothing for it but to distribute something under the eyes of this inquisitive foreigner. And so, all of a sudden, they started to hand out plastic wash bowls to the twenty 'customers', who took them (without any pretence of payment). Was it their good luck, then? Had they received something for nothing? No, their problems had just begun. What were they to do with their plastic wash bowls? (All of them were brown incidentally, for the assistants did not have sufficient initiative to distribute a variety of goods to give verisimilitude to the performance, not even to the extent of giving out differently coloured bowls.)
............(more in between)
I also followed a few people around at random, as discreetly as I could. Some were occupied in ceaselessly going up and down the escalators; others wandered from counter to counter, spending a few minutes at each before moving on. They did not inspect the merchandise; they moved as listlessly as illiterates might, condemned to spend the day among the shelves of a library. I did not know whether to laugh or explode with anger or weep. But I knew I was seeing one of the most extraordinary sights of the twentieth century.
I decided to buy something - a fountain pen. I went to the counter where pens were displayed like the fan of a peacock's tail. They were no more for sale than the Eiffel Tower. As I handed over my money, a crowd gathered round, for once showing signs of animation. I knew, of course, that I could not be refused: if I were, the game would be given away completely. And so the crowd watched goggle-eyed and disbelieving as this astonishing transaction took place: I gave the assistant a piece of paper and she gave me a pen.
....rest at the link:
http://blog.skepticaldoctor.com/2010...erpt-1991.aspx
-
North Korea's Destiny
October 23, 2012 | 0902 GMT
Stratfor
By Robert D. Kaplan and Rodger Baker
As we have pointed out previously, in the principal divided-country scenarios of the second half of the 20th century -- North and South Vietnam, East and West Germany, North and South Yemen -- reunification was thought of for decades as only a remote possibility, before it suddenly occurred in a tumultuous, fast-moving fashion, in a way few of the experts had predicted, making a mockery of so many policy papers written on the subject. The current division of the Korean Peninsula should be seen in this light. Not only is the collapse of the regime in the northern half of the peninsula possible, but if and when it does occur, the process might be quicker than many suspect.
In a century of seamless digital communications that are remaking world politics, the survival of such a hermetic regime as North Korea, built on information control, certainly appears problematic. Behind the weird artificiality of the regime itself lies something quite ancient: The very concept of a leader in his mid- or late-20s, with no experience, made a four-star general and hailed as the "brilliant comrade" harks back to bizarre descriptions of ceremonial politics associated with the deep past. How much longer can such a situation go on?
To gauge the expiration date of the regime, it helps to describe its various stages of life, which one can divide into three generations of leadership. The first generation was the authentic revolutionaries and fighters: those of the anti-Japanese guerrilla struggle during World War II and of the struggle against American-supported South Korea during the Korean War. North Korea's ruler for the first half-century of its existence, Kim Il Sung, was the towering rock of this generation. This generation had immense stores of credibility encapsulated in Kim Il Sung's very charisma, comparable to that enjoyed by the Yugoslav and Albanian World War II communist guerrilla leaders and Cold War-era strongmen, Josip Broz Tito and Enver Hoxha, who did not rely on the Soviet Red Army for their countries' liberation from Nazi rule.
The second generation was the sons and daughters of those hardened fighters. This was a generation of privilege, of those who had accomplished nothing on their own, and thus had no inherent credibility. What's more, they had little intellectually to offer their countrymen, educated as they were in the Soviet Union, Mao Zedong's China and Communist Eastern Europe. And so the members of this generation harbored little or no real-world knowledge. This generation was represented by Kim Il Sung's son, Kim Jong Il, who simply had no ability to foster change. The relative prosperity of the elder Kim's North Korea -- in the late 1950s it actually was richer than South Korea -- further undermined this younger generation, which governed at a time of extreme poverty and occasional famine and thus had little to rely on but repression in order to stay in power.
The third generation, typified by the current ruler, Kim Jong Un, has possibilities, however. This generation, brought up after the collapse of communism as a world movement and geopolitical force, was sent to study in places like the United Kingdom, Austria and Switzerland and thus has gained more exposure to the West, however limited and pampered their individual experiences abroad might have been. Moreover, this third generation is not necessarily tied to the second generation's grim militarism -- to wit, the North Korean submarine infiltrations of South Korea and Japan during the 1980s. As for the North's sinking of the South Korean corvette in 2010, that was not something that a 20-something-year-old like Kim Jong Un decided upon on his own; such a decision was made by members of the second generation in order to ensure their own survival and that of the new third generation in power. Members of this third generation, which is only now starting to fill leadership positions in the bureaucracy, might -- because of their Western exposure and their own relative lack of political baggage -- actually be the ones to sell the country out by becoming power brokers in their own right for the economic exploitation of the country.
Much of North Korea's natural resources, such as coal, oil, lead and tungsten, lie in the northern two-fifths of the country, where much of the factories and population are also located -- in other words, close to China. China has detailed knowledge of North Korean companies -- something that the West totally lacks. Thus, a third generation sellout of its own country could take the form of an enhanced economic opening to China -- a quasi-liberalization of sorts, which would move North Korea away from Stalinism toward being a reform-Communist buffer state between China and South Korea, modeled in Beijing's own image. Of course, this implies a gradual change played out over years in order to stave off regime collapse, with the third generation all the while getting rich by off-loading the assets of the state to China and maybe some other countries.
But what if this process fails? What if a sell-off of state assets leads to economic changes that trigger political ones? Remember, the more oppressive and artificial a regime is, the more sudden can be its implosion. It may be that North Korea's eventual transition to a more normal state simply cannot be managed from the top.
If that is the case, then the next question is: How does one define collapse? The loss of central authority in the capital of Pyongyang, while fast-moving in a historical sense, might nevertheless play out over weeks rather than days. So at what point does China move forces across the Yalu and Tumen rivers to prevent a massive flight of refugees northward? At what point does the South Korean military act? Because North Korea is a heavily militarized state, the direction in which its commanders decide to defect -- to Beijing or to Seoul -- will be critical.
As we have previously written, there is, concomitantly, the strong likelihood of the mother of all humanitarian interventions in the event of a regime collapse. This is a country of 24.3 million people, many of whom subsist in utter poverty on the brink of starvation, and the responsibility for their welfare presently rests with the regime in Pyongyang. But if central authority disintegrates, the population will instantly become the responsibility of the so-called international community, which in this case means the militaries of the United States, South Korea and China.
In a fast-moving crisis, regional power balances for years and decades to come can be decided upon by crucial decisions made over hours or days. Such decisions may determine whether regime collapse leads to a veritable Beijing-run protectorate in the northern half of the peninsula or the eventual unification of the two Koreas. A reunified Greater Korea would perforce be run from Seoul, as South Korea's population of 48.5 million is twice the size of North Korea's, and its economy by some estimates is 37 times as large. And remember, Beijing is Seoul's largest trading partner. That means that even in the case of a Communist collapse in the North, China's very economic heft and geographical proximity will allow it to find a way to take advantage of any new political reality. Conversely, Japan, particularly because of the bad memories associated with the 1910-1945 occupation, may find it hard to have as close relations with a new Korean super-state as China.
Nevertheless, a unified Korea would be very nervous about ending up overly dependent upon China, given its size, proximity and history of periodic domination over the peninsula. It is likely that a Greater Korean state would, with the help of the United States and maybe Russia, seek to balance China and Japan against each other.
The key realization is that Asian geopolitics may in future years shift enormously, depending on the internal dynamics of one backbreakingly poor and diplomatically isolated state.
.
Read more: North Korea's Destiny | Stratfor
-
Q. Why did the United States stop after spring 1951 at the 38th Parallel, thereby ensuring a subsequent sixty-year Cold War and resulting in chronic worries about a North Korea armed with nuclear weapons and poised to invade its neighbor to the south?
A. Americans were haunted by the nightmare of November 1950 to February 1951. After the brilliant Inchon invasion, and MacArthur’s inspired rapid advance to the Yalu River and the Chinese border, the sudden entrance of an initial quarter-million Chinese Red Army troops, with hundreds of thousands to follow, had sent the Americans reeling hundreds of miles to the south (in the longest retreat in American military history), back across the 38th Parallel, with Seoul soon being lost to the communists yet again. Matthew Ridgway had arrived in December 1950 to try to save the war, and had done just that by April 1951, when he was replaced as senior ground commander by Gen. Van Fleet and in turn took over the theater command from the relieved MacArthur. But the Americans had been permanently traumatized by the Chinese entry and the North Korean recovery after the all-but-declared American victory of October 1950.
Ridgway, after the UN forces’ amazing recovery in early 1951, was in no mood to go much farther across the 38th Parallel. From his study of MacArthur’s debacle in Fall 1950, he knew well that the peninsula in the north became more rugged and expansive and would swallow thousands of troops as they neared the Chinese and Russian borders, and had to be supplied from hundreds of miles to the rear. Such a second advance through North Korea was felt, accurately or not, to risk a regional nuclear war with the Soviet Union, to draw in hundreds of thousands more Chinese Red Army troops, and to ensure another year or two of war at a time when the American public was thoroughly tired of this new concept of a “police action” and an “accordion war.” And while critics railed at silly political restraints on U.S. airpower that might have destroyed Chinese or Russian staging areas across the border, they did not appreciate that such attacks might also have prompted similar enemy attention on U.S. supply centers in Japan.
Moreover, the UN coalition had been created under quasi-coercive premises in Fall 1950. The war was seen as about over, and allied deployment might well amount to only garrison duty. European participation in Korea was also predicated on ensuring an American commitment to keeping the Soviets out of Western Europe. But by the time UN troops arrived in Korea, the Chinese were invading and slaughtering the coalition in the retreat to the south. Most European participants simply wanted a truce at any cost and an end to the war.
Further, the U.S. had been drawn into a depressing propaganda war. We were responsible for rebirthing Japan, Italy, and Germany as pro-Western democracies, while Russian and Chinese communists posed as the true allies of the war’s victims that were continuing their war against fascism, against a capitalist American Empire that had joined the old Axis. In the case of Korea, Americans took over constabulary duties from Japanese militarists and supported South Korean authoritarians, while Soviet and Chinese-backed hardened communists in the North posed as agrarian reformers — or so the global leftist narrative went. For many Americans, the thought of fighting a nearly endless civil war was less desirable than an armistice and an end to the hostilities, even though after three years of fighting and 36,000 American dead (and over a million Koreans lost), the borders remained almost unchanged.
Was that stalemate wise, given the later trajectory of North Korea to the present insanity? Perhaps not — but the American effort nonetheless jumpstarted the South, which eventually evolved into a nation with consensual government and the world free-market powerhouse of today.
-
North Korea put a satellite into orbit for the first time Wednesday, and in the process successfully tested a three-stage, intercontinental ballistic missile. Pyongyang had told the world that the launch would be delayed for technical reasons, but that now looks like a head fake.
If so, it was a classic North Korean maneuver that shows Kim Jong Eun is a successor in the mold of his father and grandfather. Both the U.S. and China tried to convince the young dictator to give up the test. His defiance will reinforce the internal North Korean mythology of foreigners supplicating at the feet of the Great Leader, who resists their blandishments. Conducting such ostensibly heroic acts is a means to solidify control over the military leadership, which he has been purging.
The North Korean people are being told to celebrate, but their leaders' victories have brought them nothing but misery. South Korea estimates that the missile program that culminated in Wednesday's launch has cost $1.3 billion, enough to feed the country's entire population for years. They continue to go hungry for the sake of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them against Japan and the United States.
Enlarge Image
Close
Associated Press
A screen at the General Satellite Control and Command Center shows the moment North Korea's Unha-3 rocket is launched in Pyongyang, North Korea, Wednesday, Dec. 12, 2012.
.The missile program does bring significant benefits to the Kim family and cronies. They make money exporting missile technology to rogue states, especially Iran, and South Korean media are reporting that Iranian scientists were present at the launch. So the world-wide press attention to the North's triumph is free advertising for proliferation.
If the past is any guide, this is the beginning of another round of nuclear blackmail. After Pyongyang first tested a nuclear device in October 2006, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice rushed to cut a deal that traded energy aid and other benefits for the disabling of the main nuclear facilities. Two years later, the Bush Administration removed North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in return for a verbal agreement to accept a verification regime. The North reneged on that in two months.
The North has since acknowledged that, in addition to its plutonium program, it is also enriching uranium as a path to making more bombs. The West has no way of knowing how many centrifuge facilities are hidden in caves and tunnels. According to North Korean logic, another nuclear test now would add to the pressure on the West to provide more aid.
Beijing wants to make sure that the young Kim's regime is secure, and it only acts against the North when it fears Washington might be on the verge of taking punitive action. China's own leadership transition is also incomplete, with key appointments for foreign policy posts still to be announced. For now State Councilor Dai Bingguo, a strong defender of Pyongyang, remains in charge of foreign policy, meaning only light measures can be expected from the United Nations. Likewise, South Korea and Japan are about to hold elections that will likely bring in new administrations.
The Obama Administration is also in flux, but with four years left to run it has an incentive to stop pretending it can buy off the Kim regime. The North Korean nuclear threat to U.S. security is no longer theoretical, even if it will still take time for Pyongyang to build a warhead small enough to fit on its new missile. The only way to prevent a Korean nuclear threat to American territory is by working toward regime change, not another short-lived deal with the North.
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/02/world/asia/north-koreas-leader-kim-jong-un-makes-overture-to-south.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130102
-
Movement of Missiles by North Korea Worries U.S.
By THOM SHANKER and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: January 17, 2013
WASHINGTON — The discovery by American intelligence agencies that North Korea is moving mobile missile launchers around the country, some carrying a new generation of powerful rocket, has spurred new assessments of the intentions of the country’s young new leader, Kim Jong-un, who has talked about economic change but appears to be accelerating the country’s ability to attack American allies or forces in Asia, and ultimately to strike across the Pacific.
The new mobile missile, called the KN-08, has not yet been operationally deployed, and American officials say it may not be ready for some time. But the discovery that the mobile units have already been dispersed around the country, where they can be easily hidden, has prompted the White House, the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to reassess whether North Korea’s missile capabilities are improving at a pace that poses a new challenge to American defenses.
On Thursday, speaking in Italy, the departing defense secretary, Leon E. Panetta, broke from the usual Obama administration script — which is to write off North Korea as a broke and desperate country — and told American troops that he was increasingly worried about another, longer-range North Korean missile, one that was successfully tested last month and reached as far as the Philippines, and could lob a warhead much farther.
“Who the hell knows what they’re going to do from day to day?” Mr. Panetta said. “And right now, you know, North Korea just fired a missile. It’s an intercontinental ballistic missile, for God sakes. That means they have the capability to strike the United States.”
After he spoke, Pentagon officials said Mr. Panetta did not mean to imply that North Korea could now hit the continental United States, although intelligence and military assessments have said that Hawaii is within range. But the North has made progress toward its goal of fielding a missile that could cross the Pacific, a goal the previous defense secretary, Robert M. Gates, warned at the end of his time in office could be fulfilled by 2016.
An intensive study of the long-range missile test-flight conducted by North Korea last month, one administration official said, found that it was “largely a success, if you define success as showing that they could drop a warhead a lot of places in Asia.”
The more immediate mystery for the administration, however, is what North Korea may intend with the intermediate-range KN-08, which was first shown off by the North in a military parade last April. At the time, many analysts dismissed it as a mock-up. In fact, it has never been test-flown. But parts, including the rocket motors, have been tested separately, according to officials familiar with the intelligence reports, who described the missile developments on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the assessments.
Officials familiar with North Korean missile technology say the KN-08 weapon is designed with a range capable of striking South Korea, Japan and parts of Southeast Asia — although with uncertain accuracy.
North Korea is aware that it is a focus of American spy satellites, so the decision to roll the missile around the country to potential deployment sites might well have been partly motivated by a desire to send a message to the United States, or at least to get Washington’s attention — which it did. Officials said that North Korea’s advancements in missile technology were among the most significant reasons that Mr. Panetta, as he approached the end of his tenure, had spent so much time in Asia. Much of his effort has been aimed at spurring the development of a regional missile defense system to be deployed with allies, particularly Japan and South Korea.
There is no evidence that the KN-08 has been fitted with a nuclear warhead. While North Korea conducted nuclear tests in 2006 and in 2009 — just months after President Obama took office — American intelligence officials have said that the North has not miniaturized a nuclear device small enough to be fitted as a warhead atop its missiles. Some believe that may be the goal of its next test — and perhaps, some intelligence reports speculate, of continuing cooperation on missile design between Iran and North Korea. The Iranians, one official noted, “are grappling with the same issues.”
In fact, much remains uncertain about North Korea’s new missile. There was no question where the mobile launching trucks that carried the missile came from: they are Chinese, and almost certainly imported in violation of United Nations sanctions against the North. The new missile, like most in the North Korean arsenal, appeared to be based on Russian technology.
The missile developments are among a number of steps that have convinced American officials that, a year after his ascension as the third generation to inherit the role as North Korea’s dictator, Mr. Kim is proving as confrontational with the West as his father and grandfather. American specialists also warn of the prospect of a third nuclear test, for which preparations are evident.
For the Obama administration, whose last diplomatic effort with the North ended in failure nearly a year ago, the steps are reminders that everything they have tried in the past four years to lure the country out of isolation — or at least contain its nuclear and missile programs — has largely failed.
If nothing else, however, the missile efforts in the North have spurred American efforts to build a network of antimissile capabilities across Northeast Asia. Japan already has one American X-band radar, officially known as the AN/TPY-2, which is a central element in a complex technical architecture for identifying ballistic missiles and coordinating a response by interceptors. And last September, during his travels in the region, Mr. Panetta and his Japanese hosts announced a major agreement to deploy a second advanced missile-defense radar on Japanese territory.
-
http://live.wsj.com/video/opinion-north-korea-ticking-time-bomb/700BFBD7-C102-45BF-B992-E0C5F9C0F65B.html?mod=opinion_video_newsreel#!700BFBD7-C102-45BF-B992-E0C5F9C0F65B
-
http://espn.go.com/nba/story/_/id/9009814/dennis-rodman-north-korea-kim-jong-un-wants-barack-obama-call
Is basketball the key to diplomacy?
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/as-north-korea-blusters-south-breaks-taboo-on-nuclear-talk.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&smid=fb-share
From the article:
Adding to South Koreans’ worries, the North and its nuclear arsenal are in the hands of a young new leader, Kim Jong-un, whose brinkmanship appears to be an effort to ensure the support of his nation’s powerful military.
The South also has a new president, Park Geun-hye, the daughter of a military strongman who stood firm against North Korea, who herself also faces pressure to stand fast against the North. Just two weeks after her inauguration, Ms. Park faces a crisis as the North makes vague threats interpreted by many South Koreans as the precursor to some sort of limited, conventional military provocation. Ms. Park has promised to retaliate if her nation is attacked, aware of the public anger directed at her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, when he showed restraint after the North shelled a South Korean island in 2010, killing four people.
That kind of limited skirmish is more likely than a nuclear attack, but such an episode could quickly inflame tensions and escalate out of control. Over the years, North Korea has sent armed spies across the border, dug invasion tunnels under it and infiltrated South Korean waters with submarines
-
Why not?
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/as-north-korea-blusters-south-breaks-taboo-on-nuclear-talk.html?pagewanted=1&_r=0&smid=fb-share
From the article:
Adding to South Koreans’ worries, the North and its nuclear arsenal are in the hands of a young new leader, Kim Jong-un, whose brinkmanship appears to be an effort to ensure the support of his nation’s powerful military.
The South also has a new president, Park Geun-hye, the daughter of a military strongman who stood firm against North Korea, who herself also faces pressure to stand fast against the North. Just two weeks after her inauguration, Ms. Park faces a crisis as the North makes vague threats interpreted by many South Koreans as the precursor to some sort of limited, conventional military provocation. Ms. Park has promised to retaliate if her nation is attacked, aware of the public anger directed at her predecessor, Lee Myung-bak, when he showed restraint after the North shelled a South Korean island in 2010, killing four people.
That kind of limited skirmish is more likely than a nuclear attack, but such an episode could quickly inflame tensions and escalate out of control. Over the years, North Korea has sent armed spies across the border, dug invasion tunnels under it and infiltrated South Korean waters with submarines
-
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/north-korea-armistice/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
:x :x
-
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/north-korea-armistice/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
:x :x
The good news is Dennis Rodman can't do any worse than Buraq or his foreign policy team.
-
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/north-korea-armistice/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
:x :x
The good news is Dennis Rodman can't do any worse than Buraq or his foreign policy team.
That cracked me up.
-
By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman
On Jan. 29, I wrote a piece that described North Korea's strategy as a combination of ferocious, weak and crazy. In the weeks since then, three events have exemplified each facet of that strategy. Pyongyang showed its ferocity Feb. 12, when it detonated a nuclear device underground. The country's only significant ally, China, voted against Pyongyang in the U.N. Security Council on March 7, demonstrating North Korea's weakness. Finally, Pyongyang announced it would suspend the armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953, implying that that war would resume and that U.S. cities would be turned into "seas of fire." To me, that fulfills the crazy element.
My argument was that the three tenets -- ferocity, weakness and insanity -- form a coherent strategy. North Korea's primary goal is regime preservation. Demonstrating ferocity -- appearing to be close to being nuclear capable -- makes other countries cautious. Weakness, such as being completely isolated from the world generally and from China particularly, prevents other countries from taking drastic action if they believe North Korea will soon fall. The pretense of insanity -- threatening to attack the United States, for example -- makes North Korea appear completely unpredictable, forcing everyone to be cautious. The three work together to limit the actions of other nations.
Untested Assumptions
So far, North Korea is acting well within the parameters of this strategy. It has detonated nuclear devices before. It has appeared to disgust China before, and it has threatened to suspend the cease-fire. Even more severe past actions, such as sinking a South Korean ship in 2010, were not altogether inconsistent with its strategy. As provocative as that incident was, it did not change the strategic balance in any meaningful way.
Normally North Korea has a reason for instigating such a crisis. One reason for the current provocation is that it has a new leader, Kim Jong Un. The son of former leader Kim Jong Il and the grandson of North Korea's founder Kim Il Sung, Kim Jong Un is only 30 years old, and many outside North Korea doubt his ability to lead (many inside North Korea may doubt his ability, too). One way to announce his presence with authority is to orchestrate an international crisis that draws the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea into negotiations with North Korea -- especially negotiations that Pyongyang can walk away from.
The North Korean regime understands the limits of its strategy and has been very sure-footed in exercising it. Moreover, despite the fact that a 30-year-old formally rules the country, the regime is a complex collection of institutions and individuals -- the ruling party and the military -- that presumably has the ability to shape and control the leader's behavior.
It follows that little will change. U.S. analysts of North Korea will emphasize the potential ferocity and the need for extreme vigilance. The Chinese will understand that the North Koreans are weak and will signal, as their foreign minister did March 9, that in spite of their vote at the United Nations, they remain committed to North Korea's survival. And most people will disregard Pyongyang's threat to resume the Korean War.
Indeed, resuming the Korean War probably is not something that anyone really wants. But because there are some analysts who think that such a resumption is plausible, I think it is worth considering the possibility that Pyongyang does want to restart the war. It is always worth examining an analysis based on the assumption that a given framework will not hold. For the record, I think the framework will hold, but I am simply examining the following hypothetical: This time, North Korea is serious.
To assess Pyongyang's sincerity, let's begin with two untested assumptions. First, assume North Korea has determined that it is unable to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon within a meaningful time frame. Either there are problems with constructing the device or its missiles are unreliable. Alternatively, assume it has decided that any further development of weapons will likely lead to attacks by the United States against its nuclear facilities. In other words, assume it expects to lose its nuclear capability because it cannot move forward or because moving forward will invite attacks against nuclear facilities.
The second assumption, more likely accurate, is that North Korea has realized that the strategy it has followed since the 1990s is no longer working. The strategy has lost its effectiveness, and North Korean ferocity, weakness and insanity no longer impress anyone. Rather than generating financial and other concessions, the strategy has simply marginalized North Korea, so that apart from sanctions, there will be no talks, no frightened neighbors, no U.S. threats. Kim Jong Un would not announce himself with authority, but with a whimper.
An Unlikely Scenario
Taken together, these assumptions constitute a threat to regime survival. Unless its neighbors bought into the three premises of its strategy, North Korea could be susceptible to covert or overt foreign involvement, which would put the regime on the defensive and reveal its weakness. For the regime, this would be a direct threat, one that would require pre-emptive action.
It would be a worst-case scenario for Pyongyang. We consider it highly unlikely. But assume North Korea deems it more likely than we do, or assume that, despite the scenario's improbability, the consequences would be so devastating that the risk could not be borne.
It is a scenario that could take form if the North Korean nuclear threat were no longer effective in establishing the country's ferocity. It would also take form if North Korea's occasional and incomprehensible attacks were no longer unpredictable and thus were no longer effective in establishing the country's insanity. In this scenario, Pyongyang would have to re-establish credibility and unpredictability by taking concrete steps.
These concrete steps would represent a dramatic departure from the framework under which North Korea has long operated. They would obviously involve demands for a cease-fire from all players. There would have to be a cease-fire before major force could be brought to bear on North Korea. Last, they would have to involve the assumption that the United States would at least take the opportunity to bomb North Korean nuclear facilities -- which is why the assumptions on its nuclear capability are critical for this to work. Airstrikes against other targets in North Korea would be likely. Therefore, the key would be an action so severe that everyone would accept a rapid cease-fire and would limit counteraction against North Korea to targets that the North Koreans were prepared to sacrifice.
The obvious move by North Korea would be the one that has been historically regarded as the likeliest scenario: massive artillery fire on Seoul, the capital of South Korea. The assumption has always been that over a longer period of time, U.S. air power would devastate North Korean artillery. But Seoul would meanwhile be damaged severely, something South Korea would not tolerate. Therefore, North Korea would bet that South Korea would demand a cease-fire, thereby bringing the United States along in its demand, before U.S. airstrikes could inflict overwhelming damage on North Korea and silence its guns. This would take a few days.
Under this scenario, North Korea would be in a position to demand compensation that South Korea would be willing to pay in order to save its capital. It could rely on South Korea to restrain further retaliations by the United States, and China would be prepared to negotiate another armistice. North Korea would have re-established its credibility, redefined the terms of the North-South relationship and, perhaps having lost its dubious nuclear deterrent, gained a significant conventional deterrent that no one thought it would ever use.
I think the risks are too great for this scenario to play out. The North would have to assume that its plans were unknown by Western intelligence agencies. It would also have to assume that South Korea would rather risk severe damage to its capital as it dealt with North Korea once and for all than continue to live under the constant North Korean threat. Moreover, North Korea's artillery could prove ineffective, and it risks entering a war it couldn't win, resulting in total isolation.
The scenario laid out is therefore a consideration of what it might mean if the North Koreans were actually wild gamblers, rather than the careful manipulators they have been since 1991. It assumes that the new leader is able to override older and more cautious heads and that he would see this as serving both a strategic and domestic purpose. It would entail North Korea risking it all, and for that to happen, Pyongyang would have to believe that everything was already at risk. Because Pyongyang doesn't believe that, I think this scenario is unlikely.
It is, however, a necessary exercise for an analyst to find fault with his analysis by identifying alternative assumptions that lead to very different outcomes. At Stratfor, we normally keep those in-house, but in this case it appeared useful to think out loud, as it were.
We'd welcome well-thought-out alternatives. With so many emails, we can't promise to answer them all, but we make it a practice to read them all.
Read more: Considering a Departure in North Korea's Strategy | Stratfor
-
My money is on China using the usual "Good totalitarian, bad totalitarian" game on the rest of the world.
-
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/21/who_is_whois?page=0,0
From the article:
Determining who is responsible for an attack often depends on asking "cui bono?" -- who benefits? In attacks on South Korea, the North is always the lead suspect, but the target set for this attack apparently included no South Korean or U.S. government agencies. Most attacks focus on extracting money or valuable information, but that did not happen in this case. Nor did the attacker try to disrupt critical infrastructure and services. What is left is political motivation. Cyberattacks are a new and attractive form of protest and coercion. The Russians used them against Estonia; the Iranians used them against the United States. In such company, North Korea would feel right at home.
But governments are not the only ones to use these new tools. Political groups like Anonymous routinely hack websites or launch denial of service attacks (essentially, flooding the target network with traffic so that it is knocked offline). If North Korea is a suspect, so are political activists, perhaps hacktivists from China or South Korea's thriving Internet community. At the same time, the fact that a new, unknown group calling itself "Whois Team" has claimed credit means little. They could be the authors of the attack, they could be an outside group that is simply taking credit, or they could be a cover for state-sponsored efforts.
-
Top news: North Korea severed its only line of communication with the South Korean military on Wednesday, saying that north-south military communication is unnecessary when "a war may break out at any moment." The announcement, carried by the official news agency, comes only one day after Pyongyang ordered its rocket and artillery units to be combat ready, targeting U.S. bases on the mainland, Hawaii, and Guam.
North Korea previously cut off communications with the Red Cross and the U.S. military over the international response to its third nuclear test in February. According to the New York Times, however, the joint industrial park at Kaesong remains open, with workers and trucks continuing to cross the border.
"There do not exist any dialogue channel and communications means between the DPRK and the U.S. and between the north and the south," said the statement carried by the official Korean Central News Agency. "Not words but only arms will work on the U.S. and the South Korean puppet forces."
North Korea last severed all military communication in 2009, when the United States and South Korea conducted joint military drills.
United Nations: The final draft of an U.N. arms trade treaty was sent to member governments Wednesday, bringing the goal of an international treaty regulating conventional weapons sales one step closer to fruition. According to analysts, however, several countries may still block approval by consensus, in which case negotiators would most likely seek two-thirds majority approval in the General Assembly next week.
-
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/aggressive-talk-from-north-korea-concerns-us-leaders/2013/03/29/85dec134-989c-11e2-814b-063623d80a60_story.html?hpid=z1
From the article:
Behind the sudden decision to strengthen mainland American defenses against North Korean missiles is a fear that Pyongyang’s biggest benefactor, China, may no longer be able to act as a guarantor of baseline stability on the Korean Peninsula.
In the past month, North Korea has ignored Chinese warnings by threatening a nuclear strike on the United States and renouncing the 60-year armistice with South Korea. The rhetorical escalation followed advances in missile technology and a nuclear weapons test that China had opposed.
-
http://rt.com/news/chinese-military-korea-alert-184/
-
http://rt.com/news/chinese-military-korea-alert-184/
Others believe openly that the US strategy is geared not towards the destabilization of North Korea, but that of China. Li Jie, an expert with a Chinese navy research institution, has told Reuters that “the ultimate strategic aim is to contain and blockade China, to distract China's attention and slow its development. What the US is most worried about is the further development of China's economy and military strength."
They are greatly overestimating our current leadership.
-
See my post of a few hours ago on the US-Russia thread :lol: :roll: :cry:
-
By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman
Editor's Note: George Friedman originally wrote this Geopolitical Weekly on North Korea's nuclear strategy on Jan. 29. More than two months later, the geopolitical contours of the still-evolving crisis have become more clear, so we believe it important to once again share with readers the fundamentals outlined in this earlier forecast.
North Korea's state-run media reported Sunday that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has ordered the country's top security officials to take "substantial and high-profile important state measures," which has been widely interpreted to mean that North Korea is planning its third nuclear test. Kim said the orders were retaliation for the U.S.-led push to tighten U.N. sanctions on Pyongyang following North Korea's missile test in October. A few days before Kim's statement emerged, the North Koreans said future tests would target the United States, which North Korea regards as its key adversary along with Washington's tool, South Korea.
North Korea has been using the threat of tests and the tests themselves as weapons against its neighbors and the United States for years. On the surface, threatening to test weapons does not appear particularly sensible. If the test fails, you look weak. If it succeeds, you look dangerous without actually having a deliverable weapon. And the closer you come to having a weapon, the more likely someone is to attack you so you don't succeed in actually getting one. Developing a weapon in absolute secret would seem to make more sense. When the weapon is ready, you display it, and you have something solid to threaten enemies with.
North Korea, of course, has been doing this for years and doing it successfully, so what appears absurd on the surface quite obviously isn't. On the contrary, it has proved to be a very effective maneuver. North Korea is estimated to have a gross domestic product of about $28 billion, about the same as Latvia or Turkmenistan. Yet it has maneuvered itself into a situation where the United States, Japan, China, Russia and South Korea have sat down with it at the negotiating table in a bid to persuade it not to build weapons. Sometimes, the great powers give North Korea money and food to persuade it not to develop weapons. It sometimes agrees to a halt, but then resumes its nuclear activities. It never completes a weapon, but it frequently threatens to test one. And when it carries out such tests, it claims its tests are directed at the United States and South Korea, as if the test itself were a threat.
There is brilliance in North Korea's strategy. When the Soviet Union collapsed, North Korea was left in dire economic straits. There were reasonable expectations that its government would soon collapse, leading to the unification of the Korean Peninsula. Naturally, the goal of the North Korean government was regime survival, so it was terrified that outside powers would invade or support an uprising against it. It needed a strategy that would dissuade anyone from trying that. Being weak in every sense, this wasn't going to be easy, but the North Koreans developed a strategy that we described more than 10 years ago as ferocious, weak and crazy. North Korea has pursued this course since the 1990s, and the latest manifestation of this strategy was on display last week. The strategy has worked marvelously and is still working.
A Three-Part Strategy
First, the North Koreans positioned themselves as ferocious by appearing to have, or to be on the verge of having, devastating power. Second, they positioned themselves as being weak such that no matter how ferocious they are, there would be no point in pushing them because they are going to collapse anyway. And third, they positioned themselves as crazy, meaning pushing them would be dangerous since they were liable to engage in the greatest risks imaginable at the slightest provocation.
In the beginning, Pyongyang's ability to appear ferocious was limited to the North Korean army's power to shell Seoul. It had massed artillery along the border and could theoretically devastate the southern capital, assuming the North had enough ammunition, its artillery worked and air power didn't lay waste to its massed artillery. The point was not that it was going to level Seoul but that it had the ability to do so. There were benefits to outsiders in destabilizing the northern regime, but Pyongyang's ferocity -- uncertain though its capabilities were -- was enough to dissuade South Korea and its allies from trying to undermine the regime. Its later move to develop missiles and nuclear weapons followed from the strategy of ferocity -- since nothing was worth a nuclear war, enraging the regime by trying to undermine it wasn't worth the risk.
Many nations have tried to play the ferocity game, but the North Koreans added a brilliant and subtle twist to it: being weak. The North Koreans advertised the weakness of their economy, particularly its food insecurity, by various means. This was not done overtly, but by allowing glimpses of its weakness. Given the weakness of its economy and the difficulty of life in North Korea, there was no need to risk trying to undermine the North. It would collapse from its own defects.
This was a double inoculation. The North Koreans' ferocity with weapons whose effectiveness might be questionable, but still pose an unquantifiable threat, caused its enemies to tread carefully. Why risk unleashing its ferocity when its weakness would bring it down? Indeed, a constant debate among Western analysts over the North's power versus its weakness combines to paralyze policymakers.
The North Koreans added a third layer to perfect all of this. They portrayed themselves as crazy, working to appear unpredictable, given to extravagant threats and seeming to welcome a war. Sometimes, they reaffirmed they were crazy via steps like sinking South Korean ships for no apparent reason. As in poker, so with the North: You can play against many sorts of players, from those who truly understand the odds to those who are just playing for fun, but never, ever play poker against a nut. He is totally unpredictable, can't be gamed, and if you play with his head you don't know what will happen.
So long as the North Koreans remained ferocious, weak and crazy, the best thing to do was not irritate them too much and not to worry what kind of government they had. But being weak and crazy was the easy part for the North; maintaining its appearance of ferocity was more challenging. Not only did the North Koreans have to keep increasing their ferocity, they had to avoid increasing it so much that it overpowered the deterrent effect of their weakness and craziness.
A Cautious Nuclear Program
Hence, we have North Korea's eternal nuclear program. It never quite produces a weapon, but no one can be sure whether a weapon might be produced. Due to widespread perceptions that the North Koreans are crazy, it is widely believed they might rush to complete their weapon and go to war at the slightest provocation. The result is the United States, Russia, China, Japan and South Korea holding meetings with North Korea to try to persuade it not to do something crazy.
Interestingly, North Korea never does anything significant and dangerous, or at least not dangerous enough to break the pattern. Since the Korean War, North Korea has carefully calculated its actions, timing them to avoid any move that could force a major reaction. We see this caution built into its nuclear program. After more than a decade of very public ferocity, the North Koreans have not come close to a deliverable weapon. But since if you upset them, they just might, the best bet has been to tread lightly and see if you can gently persuade them not to do something insane.
The North's positioning is superb: Minimal risky action sufficient to lend credibility to its ferocity and craziness plus endless rhetorical threats maneuvers North Korea into being a major global threat in the eyes of the great powers. Having won themselves this position, the North Koreans are not about to risk it, even if a 20-something leader is hurling threats.
The China Angle and the Iranian Pupil
There is, however, a somewhat more interesting dimension emerging. Over the years, the United States, Japan and South Korea have looked to the Chinese to intercede and persuade the North Koreans not to do anything rash. This diplomatic pattern has established itself so firmly that we wonder what the actual Chinese role is in all this. China is currently engaged in territorial disputes with U.S. allies in the South and East China seas. Whether anyone would or could go to war over islands in these waters is dubious, but the situation is still worth noting.
The Chinese and the Japanese have been particularly hostile toward one another in recent weeks in terms of rhetoric and moving their ships around. A crisis in North Korea, particularly one in which the North tested a nuclear weapon, would inevitably initiate the diplomatic dance whereby the Americans and Japanese ask the Chinese to intercede with the North Koreans. The Chinese would oblige. This is not a great effort for them, since having detonated a nuclear device, the North isn't interested in doing much more. In fact, Pyongyang will be drawing on the test's proverbial fallout for some time. The Chinese are calling in no chits with the North Koreans, and the Americans and Japanese -- terribly afraid of what the ferocious, weak, crazy North Koreans will do next -- will be grateful to China for defusing the "crisis." And who could be so churlish as to raise issues on trade or minor islands when China has used its power to force North Korea to step down?
It is impossible for us to know what the Chinese are thinking, and we have no overt basis for assuming the Chinese and North Koreans are collaborating, but we do note that China has taken an increasing interest in stabilizing North Korea. For its part, North Korea has tended to stage these crises -- and their subsequent Chinese interventions -- at quite useful times for Beijing.
It should also be noted that other countries have learned the ferocious, weak, crazy maneuver from North Korea. Iran is the best pupil. It has convincingly portrayed itself as ferocious via its nuclear program, endlessly and quite publicly pursuing its program without ever quite succeeding. It is also persistently seen as weak, perpetually facing economic crises and wrathful mobs of iPod-wielding youths. Whether Iran can play the weakness card as skillfully as North Korea remains unclear -- Iran just doesn't have the famines North Korea has.
Additionally, Iran's rhetoric at times can certainly be considered crazy: Tehran has carefully cultivated perceptions that it would wage nuclear war even if this meant the death of all Iranians. Like North Korea, Iran also has managed to retain its form of government and its national sovereignty. Endless predictions of the fall of the Islamic republic to a rising generation have proved false.
I do not mean to appear to be criticizing the "ferocious, weak and crazy" strategy. When you are playing a weak hand, such a strategy can yield demonstrable benefits. It preserves regimes, centers one as a major international player and can wring concessions out of major powers. It can be pushed too far, however, when the fear of ferocity and craziness undermines the solace your opponents find in your weakness.
Diplomacy is the art of nations achieving their ends without resorting to war. It is particularly important for small, isolated nations to survive without going to war. As in many things, the paradox of appearing willing to go to war in spite of all rational calculations can be the foundation for avoiding war. It is a sound strategy, and for North Korea and Iran, for the time being at least, it has worked.
Read more: Ferocious, Weak and Crazy: The North Korean Strategy | Stratfor
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/world/asia/kerry-in-china-seeking-help-on-north-korea.html?partner=MYWAY&ei=5065&_r=1
-
North Korea and Intelligence
U.S. officials keep underestimating the nuclear threat..
Secretary of State John Kerry visited Beijing on the weekend, with no discernible progress in persuading China to drop its support for its North Korean clients. That's a familiar China bites U.S. story. The more important—and disquieting—news is the dispute over the North Korean threat among U.S. intelligence agencies.
The dispute broke into public view on Thursday when Congressman Doug Lamborn (R., Colo.) read an unclassified sentence from a new assessment by the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency. The DIA has concluded with "moderate confidence" that North Korea may have a nuclear warhead small enough to be placed on a ballistic missile. This judgment arrives two months after North Korea tested a nuclear device—its third—and when another test missile launch is expected any day.
That news produced a scramble inside the Obama Administration, with Director of National Intelligence James Clapper issuing a statement telling everyone not to worry. Mr. Clapper quoted a separate Pentagon statement that "it would be inaccurate to suggest that the North Korean regime has fully developed and tested the kinds of nuclear weapons referenced in the passage." And in any case, Mr. Clapper added, "the statement read by the Member is not an Intelligence Community assessment" (his emphasis).
Neither of these not-to-worry statements is reassuring, especially given the U.S. intelligence track record on North Korea. Even if Pyongyang hasn't so far "fully developed" a missile that can nuke Los Angeles, the point is that it is making major progress. It's also important to understand that an "intelligence community assessment" is a lowest-common denominator bureaucratic consensus that is often wrong.
U.S. illusions about North Korea's nuclear threat go back two decades to the Clinton Administration's claim that it had stopped North Korea's plutonium-weapons program. The 1994 Agreed Framework supposedly froze the North's nuclear programs in exchange for food and energy aid.
The North kept making plutonium even as it was also developing a secret uranium-enrichment program, which it finally admitted to State Department official James Kelly in October 2002. The North later denied it had ever made such an admission, and the U.S. foreign policy elite proceeded to blame John Bolton and other Bush officials for supposedly lying about the uranium-enrichment intelligence.
Kim Jong Il, father of current dictator Kim Jong Eun, tested the North's first nuclear device in 2006. Prodded by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and her emissary Chris Hill, President Bush proceeded to cut his own nuclear deal with the North, this time writing uranium enrichment out of the script. In 2007, an intelligence official told the Senate that the U.S. no longer had "high confidence" that such a facility existed.
It would have to wait until 2010 for Mr. Bolton to be proved right. That November, Siegfried Hecker, a former director at Los Alamos, was given a tour by North Korea of a state-of-the-art enrichment facility, which he described as "stunning."
Mr. Hecker suspects that the North also has a second covert facility to produce highly enriched, bomb-grade uranium, which may have been the fissile material used in its latest nuclear test in February. Mr. Hecker notes that tests are essential for the North to master the miniaturization technology it needs to put a warhead on a missile.
As for those missiles, the North has also been making notable strides. In December it successfully placed a satellite in orbit using a three-stage missile. The smaller Musudan missile that it may soon launch is modeled on a Soviet submarine-launched missile and may be able to reach as far away as Guam, where the U.S. has a military base.
Even normally cautious analysts are alarmed. "We have assessed for some time that North Korea likely has the capability to mount a plutonium-based nuclear warhead on the shorter range Nodong missile, which has a range of about 800 miles," writes David Albright of the centrist Institute for Science and International Security.
Estimating the North's capabilities is always going to be tricky given the country's totalitarian secrecy. A degree of uncertainty is inherent in any intelligence assessment, but that uncertainty applies as much to understating the threat as to overstating it.
In 1962 the consensus of the U.S. intelligence community was that Russia wouldn't dare field missiles in Cuba. In 1990 U.S. intelligence grossly underestimated Saddam Hussein's WMD programs, before overstating them in 2003. A notorious national intelligence estimate in 2007 claimed that Iran had halted its nuclear-weapons work.
For two decades U.S. officials have pretended that Pyongyang will give up its weapons and that its technological progress is too slow to pose a real threat. Now we're learning the opposite is closer to the truth. A wiser policy begins by recognizing that no negotiation is going to end what will sooner or later become the North's ability to kill millions of Americans. The only way to end the threat is a new policy aimed at ending the regime.
-
Does China Really Want a Nuclear Japan and South Korea?
The potential for an atomic arms race in East Asia is real. Beijing must realize this..
By Senator BOB CORKER
North Korea's increased belligerence has alarmed the U.S. and its allies and heightened tensions in the Asian-Pacific region. As usual, though, the hand-wringing in Washington, Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul isn't accompanied by any new ideas on what to do to solve the perennial problem of Pyongyang and its illicit nuclear weapons program.
Most problematic, perhaps, is that nothing has altered the strategic calculus of China—the most influential player with respect to North Korea, and the one without which it is hard to see a resolution.
North Korea was high on the agenda during my recent visit to Northeast Asia, but the reaction in Beijing to Pyongyang's bluster and threats was markedly different than in Tokyo or Seoul. Officials I met with in Japan and South Korea, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Park Gyun-hye, voiced similar concerns over North Korea's growing capabilities and the potential consequences of escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula.
In contrast, my Chinese interlocutors seemed rather nonplused by our allies' reaction to the prospect of an enduring "nuclear-armed" North Korea. China views North Korea as a nuisance—a distraction from the domestic challenges that Beijing must confront as it continues its remarkable economic growth and development.
Chinese officials are urging all parties to remain calm and avoid actions that could escalate tensions on the Korean peninsula. Yet one I met with went so far as to suggest that the U.S. routinely overstates the North Korean threat. This particular Chinese official's advice on dealing with North Korea: The U.S. should "just relax." That precise sentiment may not be shared by all Chinese officials, but it is emblematic of Beijing's overall laissez-faire approach to North Korea.
Telling the U.S. to relax is relatively easy for Beijing to do, as Pyongyang is a nominal "ally." Washington, Tokyo and Seoul don't have that luxury in the face of Pyongyang's continued threats, the possibility of pre-emptive nuclear strikes, and the North's maturing nuclear and missile capabilities. Indeed, most analysts believe that North Korea is pursuing the ability to mount a miniaturized nuclear warhead on a ballistic missile that could reach the continental U.S. As reports in recent days have noted, at least one U.S. intelligence agency has "moderate confidence the North currently has nuclear weapons capable of delivery by ballistic missiles."
The recent flight of two nuclear-capable B-52 bombers over South Korea was a welcome demonstration of U.S. security commitments to our allies in Tokyo and Seoul. But U.S. assurances may no longer be enough to maintain stability in the region. A number of Japanese and South Korean officials I met on my trip expressed genuine concerns over our ability to keep our security commitments to them given our worsening fiscal situation.
While the administration has repeatedly reaffirmed U.S. extended deterrence commitments to Japan and South Korea, there are growing voices in the region advocating greater national defense self-sufficiency and additional military capabilities. The Obama administration's recent decision to delay a long-scheduled Minuteman 3 missile test in order to avoid actions that might "exacerbate the current crisis with North Korea," according to a senior U.S. defense official, likely did nothing to assuage those regional allies.
Undoubtedly, these potential posture shifts are indicative of growing insecurity in Tokyo and Seoul. Tokyo is considering revising the way it interprets its constitution to enable the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to operate as a "normal" military. There is growing public sentiment in South Korea for developing its own nuclear deterrent—and if Seoul pursues such an approach, Tokyo likely won't be far behind. Japan already possesses the relevant technology, and South Korea is now seeking to develop additional civilian nuclear capabilities.
With the prospect of a nuclearized region, Beijing's relatively blasé attitude toward Pyongyang is all the more problematic. This attitude is seemingly driven by Chinese national interests, including a desire to maintain stability on the Korean peninsula and prevent a flood of refugees into China. Yet Beijing's reluctance to use its economic leverage and influence over Pyongyang could present a greater near-term challenge to its security than any perceived threat of refugees spilling across its border.
In recent weeks, former senior Obama administration officials have suggested that China is slowly shifting its stance on North Korea, pointing to Beijing's support for additional United Nations sanctions. Yet there is no tangible evidence that China has undertaken measures to attempt to modify North Korea's behavior. Food and fuel continue to flow across the Chinese border into North Korea. Chinese financial institutions reportedly continue to process North Korean transactions.
During Secretary of State John Kerry's visit to Beijing over the weekend, Chinese officials merely reiterated the same tepid talking points urging "dialogue and consultation." According to Chinese state television, Premier Li Keqiang advised the U.S. to avoid actions that could provoke the North. "There's no need to pick up a stone and hurt your own foot," he reportedly told Mr. Kerry.
That attitude is unacceptable. China must understand that so long as North Korea remains a threat, the U.S. will pursue a deeper and more visible military presence in the region, and Washington will continue to showcase its military muscle in China's backyard. Moreover, Tokyo and Seoul will explore measures to strengthen their own defensive and offensive capabilities. The potential for a nuclear arms race in East Asia is real and not merely a theoretical exercise.
As successive administrations—Republican and Democratic—have discovered through trial and error, there is no easy solution on North Korea. However, if the policy objective remains the denuclearization of the North, then the U.S. must get serious with China and develop a tailored strategy to persuade Beijing that the costs of its continued support for Pyongyang far outweigh any perceived benefits. For starters, the U.S. should make clear that any financial institution that continues to handle tainted North Korean funds runs a reputational risk and potential blacklisting, particularly those seeking to gain a foothold in the global financial system.
The time is past due for Washington and Beijing to engage in an honest and frank dialogue on the future of the Korean peninsula. The status quo is no longer an option.
Mr. Corker, a U.S. senator from Tennessee, is the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
-
http://trumanproject.org/doctrine-blog/north-korea-never-a-threat-to-take-lightly/
From the article:
I suspect what kept me up at night is still what keeps up whoever is in that job now. Trash talk by North Korea is nothing new, but the focus is on what are they actually doing with their military forces. Media reports government officials saying they have not seen signs of North Korea mobilizing its military forces. I’d say that in and of itself means little.
-
English version of Korean economic reporting
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/04/16/2013041601219.html
Why Korea's Middle Class Is Collapsing
Global consulting firm McKinsey said in a report on Sunday that half of all middle-class Korean households risk falling into poverty as they are trapped by slow income growth and increased expenditures.
The proportion of middle-class households shrank from 75.4 percent in 1990 to 67.5 percent in 2010, and 55 percent of middle-class families are having a tough time making ends meet as they are burdened by debt, according to McKinsey.
The biggest reason for the decline of the middle class is a drop in the number of high-paying jobs with major business conglomerates, which led to a standstill in income growth. Productivity of major manufacturers increased 9.3 percent on average annually from 1995 to 2010, but their overseas production also rose from 6.7 percent in 2005 to 16.7 percent in 2010, resulting in an average 2 percent fall a year in domestic hiring.
Small- and mid-sized businesses, which account for 88 percent of domestic jobs, and the service sector, which accounts for 70 percent, are suffering from low productivity.
Productivity in SMEs plummeted from 49 percent of the level of major conglomerates in 1990 to 27 percent in 2010, while pay stands at half the amount of the conglomerates. In Germany, SMEs’ productivity stands at 62 percent of the level of big businesses, and salaries at 90 percent. In the service sector, productivity reaches 40 percent of the level of big companies.
But while incomes stagnate, the mortgage repayment burden is mounting, as is education spending for children. As a result, the household savings rate fell from 20 percent in 1994 to just 3 percent in 2012, the lowest in the OECD, while household debt surged.
The consulting firm pointed out that Korea has the world’s highest suicide rate and is seeing a surge in divorces and a low birthrate, all of which also contribute to the decline of the middle class. At this rate, the Korean economy would be "unable to continue growth," it added.
If the Korea is to obtain a new growth engines, it must boost the competitiveness and efficiency of small businesses and the service sector. This solution is nothing new, but no concrete measures have been put into practice so far.
In order for the economy to gain momentum again and to create high-quality jobs, businesses wallowing in low productivity must be left to fail according to the principles of the free market and their workers must shift to new and efficient industries. That is the only way to improve productivity across the board, restore the middle class and enhance the quality of life.
-
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/07/16/panama-north-korean-ship/2520109/
-
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/10272953/Kim-Jong-uns-ex-lover-executed-by-firing-squad.html
-
South Korea Focuses on a Blue-Water Navy
Analysis
October 30, 2013 | 0835 Print Text Size
South Korea Focuses on a Blue-Water Navy
A helicopter leaves South Korea's Choe Yeong destroyer during drills in 2010. (LEE JIN-MAN-POOL/Getty Images)
Summary
Recent reports of South Korean shipbuilding and naval plans demonstrate that the country's maritime ambitions are far greater than simply focusing on the threat from North Korea. According to a Defense News report that cited a South Korean navy source, as well as recent comments by Rep. Chung Hee Soo of the ruling Saenuri Party, Seoul is seriously considering greatly expanding its blue-water maritime capabilities. Several challenges lie ahead -- difficulties developing or acquiring needed technology, the ever-present danger from North Korea and fiscal constraints -- but South Korea's long-term interests are closely linked to the sea.
Analysis
The South Korean navy already had plans to commission three more highly capable destroyers by 2023 and to greatly enhance its subsurface fleet with larger, more powerful submarines. However, recent reports indicate that the South Koreans are also seeking to build the second ship of the Dokdo-class landing platform helicopter ship before 2019 with a ski ramp in order to launch fixed-wing aircraft. Furthermore, Seoul is exploring the possibility of building two 30,000-ton light aircraft carriers between 2028 and 2036.
Though the South Korean military remains fixated on the threat across the demilitarized zone, it is also increasingly pursuing ambitious maritime goals. It is important to remember that historically, forces emanating from China and Japan have threatened Korea. Indeed, the Koreans had to combat Japanese fleets during the Japanese invasions of Korea between 1592 and 1598. To that end, maintaining the maritime capability to prevent an amphibious landing on the Korean Peninsula is also a key mission of the South Korean military.
As the Chinese continue their extensive naval modernization and the Japanese pursue their military normalization, the South Koreans are determined not to be left behind. South Korea and Japan continue to be locked in a largely maritime territorial dispute over the Dokdo Islands (known as the Takeshima Islands in Japan). Furthermore, with explosive economic growth in the 1970s as well as its status as a peninsula with a virtually closed land border, South Korea is also currently entirely dependent on sea-lanes of trade and communication for its survival. And as a major trading power at a time when the United States is pursuing a closer military relationship with its regional maritime competitor, Japan, South Korea has further reason to bolster its naval capability.
Add the fact that South Korea's military superiority over the North is continuing to grow and it is easy to see why the South, part of a peninsular region that has historically prioritized the development of its land forces, is increasingly devoting resources to shipbuilding. That is not to say that the reported naval ships to be built cannot be useful against the North, but such expensive vessels are not the most efficient use of resources to be used against the North Korean threat. Already the South employs cruise missiles and fighter-bombers with the range to strike targets across the breadth and length of North Korea. In addition, the larger, 3,000-ton submarines the South Korean navy is building are better suited to blue-water operations than the 1,800-ton submarines currently in use.
For all South Korea's ambitious plans, significant obstacles remain. Increased tensions with North Korea could force Seoul to shift its focus and resources to its land and air forces. The South could also encounter problems in the development of the indigenous technologies it is pursuing to equip its future vessels, and it could face disagreements in negotiations with foreign partners, particularly the United States, in fielding the technologies Seoul does not plan to develop itself, such as improved Aegis radar and vertical takeoff and landing aircraft. However, the greatest obstacle remains the tight fiscal situation at a time of economic uncertainty. This is abundantly highlighted in the clash over the cost of a new fighter between the South Korean Defense Acquisition Program Agency and Finance Ministry on one side and the South Korean air force on the other.
While constraints may force the South Koreans to temporarily delay or moderate their maritime ambitions, South Korea remains a country whose fate and national interests are closely tied to the sea. Forced to disproportionately allocate resources to its land forces due to the crisis on the peninsula, the South Koreans will increasingly seek to strengthen their blue-water capabilities in response to the developing Chinese and Japanese naval programs.
Read more: South Korea Focuses on a Blue-Water Navy | Stratfor
-
http://www.dickmorris.com/history-of-the-korean-war-dick-morris-tv-history-video/?utm_source=dmreports&utm_medium=dmreports&utm_campaign=dmreports
-
Let this be a lesson to the rest of you:
(the inhumanity of man to man just never ceases does it? I wonder what Dennis Rodman will say.
PS My Rodman story:
Katherine and I driving in a rental in our short stay in Los Angeles back around 1998 on hiatus to Hawaii. I noticed a Rolls Royce. Pulled up along side it and looked over. The driver then looked back at me - it was Dennis. In the passenger side was a comedian whose name I forever forget. The comedian saw Katherine and jested that I roll down our window as he tapped Rodman on the shoulder. I do not want to imagine what he was thinking. Needless to say I didn't. We pulled into the hotel and Rodman behind us. I just remember thinking that he didn't look as wide as on TV. Same impression I had when I saw Shaquille in Orlando airport in 1996. They are huge of course and large shouldered. But when they are that tall proportionately one just seems to notice the height. I recall seeing Shaq get on an elevator suddenly and the shock on the faces of the people already standing in the elevator as he ducks to get inside.)
Back to a quick respite from evil:
Kim Jong Un fed his uncle to 120 starving dogs: report
Olivier Knox, Yahoo News
By Olivier Knox, Yahoo News 46 minutes ago
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un (R), accompanied by his uncle Jang Song Thaek (L), waves as he inspects a parade of the Worker-Peasant Red Guards at Kim Il-Sung Square in Pyongyang, on September 9, 2013
Forget the hangman’s noose, the firing squad or lethal injection: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un executed his uncle and a handful of the man’s aides by feeding them to a horde of 120 starving dogs, according to a shocking account.
Jang Song Thaek, the former No. 2 official in the secretive regime, was stripped naked and tossed into a cage along with his five closest aides.
“Then 120 hounds, starved for three days, were allowed to prey on them until they were completely eaten up. This is called ‘quan jue’, or execution by dogs,” according to the Straits Times of Singapore. The daily relied on a description of the execution in a Hong Kong newspaper that serves as the official mouthpiece of China’s government.
“The entire process lasted for an hour, with Mr. Kim Jong Un, the supreme leader in North Korea, supervising it along with 300 senior officials,” the Straits Times said in a piece published Dec. 24, 2013, but only now getting traction in the United States. Two American national security officials contacted for comment said they had not heard that account, which first appeared in the Wen Wei Po newspaper on Dec. 12, 2013.
While China acts as North Korea’s patron, relations between the two have been strained. The United States wants Beijing to take a more active role in pressuring Kim’s Stalinist regime in Pyongyang to give up its nuclear weapons. The Straits Times suggested that China’s government leaked the account of the December execution to signal its anger at Kim’s government.
The United States has labored to get a grip on what kind of leader Kim Jong Un will be, amid worries in Washington that he is more reckless than his father, Kim Jong Il, whom he succeeded as supreme leader in December 2011.
-
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/world/asia/north-korea-live-fire-exchange/index.html?hpt=hp_t2
-
http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/world/asia/north-korea-live-fire-exchange/index.html?hpt=hp_t2
It seems like the world's thugs have figured out that they have no one to stop them.
-
APRIL 17, 2014 4:00 AM
New Spotlight on North Korea’s Horrors
A U.N report exposes gulags and systematic torture going back decades.
By Marco Rubio
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/375920/new-spotlight-north-koreas-horrors-marco-rubio
This week, Australian justice Michael Kirby, who led the U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in North Korea, is briefing members of the U.N. Security Council regarding the widespread atrocities being committed on a daily basis against innocent people by one of the world’s most repressive regimes.
Given Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine and other global challenges, the report of this U.N. commission has not received the attention it deserves.
Under the dictatorship of Kim Jong Un, the North Korean regime routinely engages in torture, arbitrary detentions, indiscriminate disappearances, starvation, and executions. North Koreans who pay insufficient homage to the country’s deceased founder, Kim Il Sung, can be sent to prison along with their families. Prisoners are often subjected to human experiments, denied food, and essentially worked to death in North Korea’s network of infamous prison camps.
Pyongyang continues to isolate itself and its people from the rest of the world. There is no freedom of the press or access to the Internet. If you are one of the “lucky elite” in North Korea to have access to a radio, the simple act of tuning your dial to a foreign broadcast could result in your imprisonment or even execution. Similarly, there is no freedom of religion, and members of North Korea’s dwindling community of Christians face significant persecution.
The horrific, systematic violations of human rights in North Korea have been going on for many years. And for far too long, these abuses have taken a back seat to international concerns about North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program and other provocative behavior. Publicly and frequently documenting the widespread abuses and mistreatment of the North Korean people is an important step toward change and a potential deterrent to other would-be human-rights abusers.
This is exactly what the three-member United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Human Rights in North Korea did with their report, after spending a year looking into the North Koreans’ plight. During hearings in Seoul, Tokyo, London, and Washington, the commission heard firsthand accounts from individuals who fled torture and inhumane conditions in North Korea. Some of them will join Justice Kirby in briefing Security Council members this week.
Their report concludes that crimes against humanity were committed in North Korea over a multi-decade period “pursuant to policies established at the highest level of the state.”
North Korea, unsurprisingly, refused to cooperate with the COI investigation. Many countries in the region did support the commission — with the important exception of China, which refused to grant the commission access to its territory, raising concerns about Beijing’s ongoing support for Pyongyang.
Yet despite these attempts to withhold access, more information about the brutality of the Kim regime is emerging, as North Korean defectors courageously share their personal stories of deprivation and, ultimately, survival. I was honored to be able to meet with a number of North Korean defectors on a trip to South Korea earlier this year and to hear their stories firsthand. They told me that it is important to recognize that exposing the regime’s heinous crimes against humanity as often and as publicly as possible is one of our most powerful tools against the continued brutality of the North Korean regime.
I am under no illusion that this commission will profoundly alter the present-day horrific human-rights situation for the long-suffering North Korean people. But I do believe that the work of the Commission of Inquiry will raise — and, indeed, already has raised — public consciousness about the deplorable plight of the North Korean people.
When we look back at the Holocaust and the murders of millions of innocents in Europe during World War II, many ask why we didn’t do more to stop those atrocities until it was too late for so many who did not survive to see the day the camps were liberated. Some hide behind supposed lack of knowledge, but in this day and age, we have no excuse. Anyone with an Internet connection can use Google Earth to view the modern-day gulags in North Korea.
It is time for the United States and for all who cherish freedom to make it our common cause to pressure the regime to open these camps for international inspection and to make clear that those involved in these horrific crimes will one day be held accountable.
-
Amen to that!
In a not-unrelated vein, some analysts are wondering if the Norks are behind the mysterious explosion that suddenly sank a ferry yesterday or the day before with several hundred people on it. It would not be the first time the Norks have done this. Didn't they wipe out the Sork cabinet while in Thailand several years ago or something like that?
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/report-n-korea-has-nuclear-warheads-for-missiles/
-
Is Korea up to it's old tricks or does this mean something with regard to power shift in N Korea?
*****The Koreas
Till Kimdom come
An unusual visit to South Korea by a powerful Northern trio raises plenty of questions
Oct 11th 2014 | SEOUL | From the print edition Timekeeper CloseSave this article
THE surprise at the Asian games, in the South Korean city of Incheon, did not come on the track. Rather it was when three of North Korea’s most powerful men suddenly appeared on October 4th, the day of the games’ closing ceremony.
The seniority of the men visiting South Korea was unprecedented. Though it was at least the third trip south for Kim Yang Gon, North Korea’s point-man on relations with the South, it was the first for Choe Ryong Hae, thought to be the closest aide of the young dictator, Kim Jong Un—until watchers believed he had been purged in May. Most surprising, however, was Hwang Pyong So, head of the political bureau of the Korean People’s Army and probably the North’s second-in-command.
The trio dropped in with only a day’s notice and had, it appears, no particular message. Still, they were warmly welcomed by the South’s unification minister for lunch and tea; Mr Hwang in turn conveyed Mr Kim’s “heartfelt greetings” to President Park Geun-hye. They also met Ms Park’s national security adviser, Kim Kwan-jin, and the prime minister, Chung Hong-won. After months of refusals, the North agreed to a new round of talks soon.
On the face of things, it marks a transformation of the lousy North-South relations since Ms Park took office last year. North Korea has fired a score of rockets into seas around the Korean peninsula this year. A relentless propaganda offensive has taken aim at Ms Park. Now, North Korea may want to patch up with the South as its relations with China sour. Remarkably, the Chinese media made no mention this week of the 65th anniversary of the two countries’ ties; North Korean mouthpieces returned the compliment. But money usually counts for much with the North. It may be keen to see South Korean trade sanctions eased and to restart hard-currency tours to Mount Kumgang, a resort shut off since 2008, when a soldier shot dead a South Korean tourist.
High-level officials from the North have not come south since the funeral of a former president, Kim Dae-jung, in 2009. Indeed, no one as senior as Mr Hwang has ever visited South Korea before, says Michael Madden, who runs “North Korea Leadership Watch”, a blog. Mr Hwang arrived in full military garb and on Mr Kim’s personal plane. Sending its heavyweights for snaps with foreign officials makes North Korea look “more like a sovereign state, less like a gangster fiefdom”, says Robert Kelly of Pusan National University. North Korea is burnishing its image elsewhere, too. Last month its foreign minister attended the UN’s General Assembly, for the first time since 1999, and in Europe a senior diplomat even met the EU’s top human-rights official.
All this has rumbled on while the young Mr Kim has been out of view. He was last seen on September 3rd, attending a concert with his wife. Mr Kim’s late father, Kim Jong Il, would disappear for months. But his son has been much more visible, and this is his longest absence yet. He even skipped a set-piece meeting of the North’s parliament.
Mr Kim, who may be 31, is fat, drinks heavily and smokes even in front of the cameras. In July he was seen limping. Gout and an ankle injury are thought to be reasons for his “discomfort” announced by state media last month—possibly the first-ever acknowledgment of problems with a North Korean leader’s health.
Now Mr Hwang’s sudden appearance in the South has some wondering who wields ultimate power in the North. Mr Hwang has been promoted five times this year, an “unprecedented, almost scary” rise, says Mr Madden. He gained his most senior title yet, that of vice-chairman of the National Defence Commission—the North’s top executive body, headed by Mr Kim—at the very gathering from which Mr Kim was absent.
Mr Hwang is also an official of the Organisation and Guidance Department (OGD), seen by some as a party within the party and established by Kim Jong Il to keep rivals and relatives in check. It has the power to appoint and dismiss all party members. Jang Jin-sung, a former propaganda official for Kim Jong Il who fled the North in 2004, thinks there has been a power grab. Mr Hwang arrived in Incheon flanked by two bodyguards: a move that Mr Jang sees as lèse-majesté, for hitherto only the supreme leader could ever be seen to be guarded. The trio looked in control, “not like anyone’s delegation”, says Aidan Foster-Carter, an analyst of North Korea at Leeds University. They also stinted in public on flattering the Young Leader; and rather than bridle at questions about his ill health, they denied any problem.
Few besides Mr Jang support the theory of a coup, however. Had the Kim family been overthrown, there would presumably have been troop movements, particularly in sensitive border areas. And, despite strained ties, the top brass would surely first turn to China for reassurance, says Hahm Chai-bong of the Asan Institute, a South Korean think-tank. Still, the tantalising possibility arises of Mr Kim being at the centre of a cult, but not the centre of power.
As soon as the trio had returned home, calls grew in South Korea for a response to their unusual gesture. For the first time, members of the ruling conservative party asked to lift trade sanctions introduced in 2010 after a South Korean corvette was torpedoed, killing 46. Yet just three days after the visit, North and South Korean ships exchanged fire when a Northern patrol boat crossed a disputed maritime boundary. The North can surprise. But it can also be wearyingly predictable.
From the print edition: Asia
-
Mystery Of Kim Jong Un's Disappearance May Be Solved
AP | By KIM TONG-HYUNG
Posted: 10/28/2014 8:14 am EDT Updated: 10/28/2014 10:59 pm EDT
SEOUL, South Korea (AP) — South Korea's spy agency believes it has solved the mystery of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's 6-week public absence that set off a frenzy of global speculation, a lawmaker who attended the agency's closed-door briefing said Wednesday.
The National Intelligence Service told legislators Tuesday that a foreign doctor operated on Kim in September or October to remove a cyst from his left ankle, lawmaker Shin Kyung-min said. He said the spy agency also told lawmakers that the cyst could recur because of Kim's obesity, smoking and heavy public schedule.
After last being seen in state media on Sept. 3, Kim reappeared on Oct. 14 hobbling with a cane, but smiling and looking thinner. The speculation during his absence was particularly intense because of the Kim family's importance to the country locked in a long-running international standoff over its nuclear and missile programs. The family has ruled the nation since its founding in 1948.
Shin said the spy agency identified Kim's condition as tarsal tunnel syndrome, an often painful condition that is caused by the compression of a nerve, sometimes because of a cyst. Surgery is generally seen as a last resort after other treatments are unsuccessful.
No weight should be put on the foot for 10 days after an operation, and an improvement in symptoms may take two to three months, according to the website of the NYU Langone Medical Center's Department of Neurosurgery.
It wasn't immediately clear how the information about Kim's condition was obtained by the spy agency, which has a spotty track record of analyzing developments in opaque North Korea.
The agency also told the lawmakers that North Korea has expanded one of its five political prisoner camps in the country. The agency said it believes authorities are relocating inmates held in the Yodok camp, northeast of Pyongyang, to the expanded camp in the northeastern town of Kilju, according to Shin's office.
Shin said the agency also believes that North Korea recently used a firing squad to execute several people who had been close to Kim Jong Un's uncle, Jang Song Thaek, who was considered the country's No. 2 power before his sudden purge and execution in December 2013.
In an intelligence success, South Korea's spy agency correctly said that Jang had likely been dismissed from his posts before North Korea officially announced his arrest.
However, it received heavy criticism when its director acknowledged that it had ignored intelligence indicating North Korea's impending shelling of a South Korean island in 2010. It also came under fire because of reports that it only learned of the 2011 death of then leader Kim Jong Il, the father of Kim Jong Un, more than two days after it occurred when state media announced it to the world.
___
Associated Press writer Hyung-jin Kim contributed to this report
-
I wondered what ankle injury could take a leader out for 6 weeks. Maybe they flew him to the best in the world, in Cuba, where Hugo Chavez was treated.
"the agency also believes that North Korea recently used a firing squad to execute several people who had been close to Kim Jong Un's uncle, Jang Song Thaek, who was considered the country's No. 2 power before his sudden purge and execution in December 2013."
And Joe Biden thinks he gets rough treatment.
I wouldn't want to be the doctor who tells Dear Leader he's overweight and smokes too much.
-
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/21/obama-north-koreas-attack-cybervandalism-not-act-w/
-
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/dec/21/obama-north-koreas-attack-cybervandalism-not-act-w/
North Korea acted stupidly. Beer summit!
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2014/12/21/obama-has-no-idea-how-to-handle-north-korean-attack-on-private-citizens/
-
http://mediamatters.org/video/2014/12/21/sharyl-attkisson-compares-sony-hack-to-benghazi/201973
-
http://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2014/12/norad_santa_says_north_korean.html
-
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/24/new-study-adds-to-skepticism-among-security-experts-that-north-korea-was-behind-sony-hack/?emc=edit_th_20141226&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
-
North Korea: The Shortcomings of a Successful Missile Test
Analysis
May 15, 2015 | 14:38 GMT
Print
Text Size
A man watches a report on a North Korean missile launch at the Seoul Railway Station in March 2014 in Seoul, South Korea. (Chung Sung-Jun/Getty Images)
Summary
On May 9, North Korea tested its new KN-11 submarine-launched ballistic missile under the watchful gaze of U.S. satellites, aircraft and observation ships. North Korea’s launch was successful: military personnel ejected the missile from underwater, its engine ignited at the surface and it flew about 150 meters (490 feet) before crashing into the sea. Fully developing this technology would extend the reach of North Korean nuclear missile systems and improve the country's second-strike capability in case its ground-based facilities are taken out. The smoothness of the test and the resulting media attention, however, obscure the major obstacles to developing this capacity. Developing the missile technology is one step, but Pyongyang also needs a suitable ballistic missile submarine of the requisite size, endurance and stealth — something that it does not have and will find challenging to develop.
Analysis
Pyongyang is naturally secretive about its submarine-launched ballistic missile program and has carefully guarded the details of it. Because of this, post-test estimates of the program’s progress have varied. An anonymous South Korean defense official told the media that North Korea could develop a fully operational system within two to three years. U.S. officials, however, believe a fully functional system is far from completion and allege the test was not actually carried out from a submarine. Instead, they suggest it was a simulated firing to test an underwater ejection system, perhaps from a towed launch pad.
Fielding a submarine-launched ballistic missile is difficult. The technology is much more complex than land-based missile technology, which itself has already proved challenging for North Korea. Underwater launch first requires a successful ejection system and a gas generator for reducing hydrodynamic resistance. Still, a reliable submarine-launched ballistic missile is not completely out of North Korea’s reach. With time, continuous tests and the necessary resources, the North Koreans could eventually develop a successful system.
North Korea's Geographic Challenge
The technology for the missile system itself, however, is just one aspect of a successful system. A sea-based nuclear missile capability hinges on developing an adequate carrier vessel — a ballistic missile submarine. Without a large, stealthy and long-range submarine, the North Korean submarine-launched ballistic missile effort will simply consume significant resources without altering the nuclear equation.
On paper, North Korea’s submarine fleet is quite large, comprising around 70 vessels. But the majority of these are mini-submarines that displace about 300 tons of water and are unsuited for operations beyond littoral waters. The North Korean navy’s largest submarines at the moment are Chinese Type 033 vessels. These are copies of Russia’s 1950s-era Romeo-class submarines and displace 1,830 tons. Rumors suggest North Korea is developing a replacement for these submarines: the Sinpo-class. These new vessels, however, are unlikely to exceed the capabilities of the improved Type 033 variants currently in use and will be of around the same size, displacing approximately 1,500 tons.
Unfortunately for Pyongyang, the Sinpo-class submarines under development simply do not meet the requirements to be an adequate ballistic missile launching platform. In order to function in this capacity, a submarine would need to be of sufficient size to carry a ballistic missile. The smallest submarine to ever carry a submarine-launched ballistic missile is the Soviet Zulu IV-class, which carried one to two nuclear ballistic missiles, displaced approximately 2,000 tons and was a full quarter heavier than North Korea’s Chinese Type 033 or Sinpo-class submarines. Pyongyang will need bigger vessels in the future to carry one to two missiles in an operational capacity. To carry more would require a new and entirely different class of submarine.
Despite these challenges, the benefits of a fielded submarine-launched ballistic missile are substantial. This capability would give North Korea two advantages not offered by ground-based missiles. First, it would extend the reach of North Korea's missile systems and theoretically enable it to strike targets outside of ground-based missile range. Second, submarine-launched missiles, because they are offshore and mobile, would give North Korea a second-strike capability, allowing it to retaliate against attacks on its land-based nuclear bases and launch pads. These benefits assume, however, that North Korea’s submarines have an adequate level of endurance, the amount of time a vessel can remain at sea unsupported. Submarines would need to be able to remain unsupported long enough to reach targets beyond the range of land-based missiles. In order to fulfill a second-strike role, vessels would need to be deployed for months far from vulnerable ports and remain ready for counterattack.
North Korea’s current Type 033 submarines, even with modifications, cannot meet these endurance requirements. A fully functioning KN-11 missile would have a range of approximately 2,500 kilometers (1,553 miles). The Type 033 submarine has a range of around 15,000 kilometers. This is not enough to approach within 2,500 kilometers of the U.S. mainland and return without at-sea refueling. Were North Korea to refuel these vessels at sea, it would significantly degrade the stealth variable of these vessels.
Stealth would be essential in order to avoid being detected and neutralized by an enemy in long patrols at sea or a mission to the U.S. mainland. The Type 033 is a diesel electric boat and can be stealthy in short missions within littoral waters. Beyond these near-shore environments, however, the submarine would have a more difficult time concealing itself without the noise or clutter typically found in littoral waters. The Type 033 would also be forced to spend significant time at the surface to recharge its batteries by running its diesel engines, a process for which they need atmospheric oxygen. Many of the latest conventional submarines, by contrast, are equipped with air-independent propulsion, which means they do not need to surface to run their engines.
Without an adequate submarine, the resources Pyongyang is investing in new missile technology will not improve the capability of its existing land-based missile program. The missiles in the current KN-08 program will still have greater range and will be able to be more rapidly dispersed in large numbers and in difficult terrain. Eventually, North Korea could develop a suitable ballistic missile submarine, but it would take several years to complete. Such a development would truly change the nuclear equation. For now, however, the successful test conducted May 9 is not going to alter North Korea’s nuclear capability.
-
I forget where I saw this idea recently, but the suggestion was that the Chinese are the ones in the best position to pressure the Norks about their nukes and that the way to pressure the Chinese to do so was to threaten to help/encourage the Japanese to go nuke and develop their military.
edited to add that the suggestion also included the South Koreans.
-
I forget where I saw this idea recently, but the suggestion was that the Chinese are the ones in the best position to pressure the Norks about their nukes and that the way to pressure the Chinese to do so was to threaten to help/encourage the Japanese to go nuke and develop their military.
At this point, both Japan and Taiwan would be best served by going nuclear. Another Obama legacy!
-
I forget where I saw this idea recently, but the suggestion was that the Chinese are the ones in the best position to pressure the Norks about their nukes and that the way to pressure the Chinese to do so was to threaten to help/encourage the Japanese to go nuke and develop their military.
At this point, both Japan and Taiwan would be best served by going nuclear. Another Obama legacy!
Yes, he is the President who ended non-proliferation. Legitimized NK and paved Iran's path, what could possibly go wrong? Everyone goes nuclear but the worst countries have no fear of (mutually) assured destruction.
For one thing, if Iran destroyed Israel tomorrow or if NK landed a bomb on Los Angeles, Secretary Kerry would immediately accerate diplomatic efforts with them. Perhaps require more self inspection. No one would expect him to strike back.
And Trump would threaten a trade war.
-
Well if history serves us correctly here NK is playing the same game they always play.
They are all bluff awaiting another appeasing deal the West is great at caving into.
-
By Paul McLeary with Adam Rawnsley
3-2-1. The big news over the weekend was North Korea’s long-range rocket launch which it claimed put a satellite into space. The move, which comes just weeks after the North tested a nuclear device, has rattled world leaders and added to some existing tensions between Washington and Beijing.
Almost immediately upon news of the launch, the U.S. and South Korea announced they were kicking off “formal consultations” over deploying the U.S.-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system to South Korea. A statement released on Saturday by U.S. Forces-Korea claimed the system “would be focused solely on North Korea and contribute to a layered missile defense that would enhance the Alliance’s existing missile defense capabilities against potential North Korean missile threats.” But Beijing isn’t so sure.
Beijing unhappy. The Chinese government has long cited concerns over the potential deployment of THAAD’s radar system to South Korea, which can penetrate deep into China. The Lockheed Martin-built THAAD is a long-range missile defense system that can knock ballistic missiles out of the sky at high altitudes, even outside the earth’s atmosphere. Japanese Defense Minister Gen Nakatani said late last year that Tokyo is considering deploying the system the bolster its Patriot missile capability.
And if you need to see what THAAD looks like in action, here’s some video.
As concerning as the North’s actions are, Ben Goodlad, an analyst at IHS Aerospace, Defence and Security, urged some caution. It’s “important to remember that this wasn't a ballistic missile test, however the rocket motors tested during the launch could be used to form the first and second stages of any future weapon," he said. Reports indicate that the satellite launched Sunday weighed about 440 pounds, doubling the weight of a satellite launched in a similar test in 2012.
Blame Clinton (the other one). The launch came up on the campaign trail here in the States, with Republican presidential hopefuls using it to try and secure some national security leverage. Texas Senator Ted Cruz reached back almost two decades in assigning blame for the North’s ability to launch the rocket and continuing ability to test nuclear devices, FP’s John Hudson writes. “The fact that we’re seeing the launch and we’re seeing the launch from a nuclear North Korea is a result of the failures of the first Clinton administration” for loosening sanctions against the nation, Cruz said. “What we are seeing with North Korea is foreshadowing of where we should be with Iran.”
-
stratfor
Summary
Editor's Note: This analysis explores the ongoing tensions between Washington and Seoul over a U.S. proposal to deploy an anti-ballistic missile system. Tomorrow, Stratfor will consider the broader picture, namely, the competing U.S. and Chinese strategies that underscore the controversy.
Planned April discussions over the deployment of a U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system on the Korean Peninsula have strained the U.S.-South Korea defense relationship. The Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense missile system, known as THAAD, is a mobile and air-transportable anti-missile platform and a key component of U.S. layered air defense. The United States argues this layered system is necessary to protect South Korea as well as U.S. forces deployed there.
In recent weeks, however, China has voiced strong opposition to any THAAD deployment in South Korea. Russia and North Korea have followed suit. Beijing has not so subtly reminded Seoul that China, not the United States, is South Korea's major trading partner and that any deployment could have significant political and economic costs. In reply, Seoul has said that it will make a decision on THAAD based on its own national interests. Beijing's public commentary, however, is making it likely that Seoul will decide to accept the deployment, rather than continue with its policy of strategic ambiguity. Regardless, South Korea's public hesitation in accepting the THAAD systems highlights the country's subtle desire for greater independence in its defense, challenges to the U.S. regional strategy, and China's rising concern.
Analysis
South Korea has not yet taken a concrete stance on whether it will accept THAAD deployments. There are several reasons for this posture. First, according to South Korean officials, the United States has not yet issued a formal request to deploy the system, meaning that there have been no consultations. This is technically true but South Korea and others have known for years that the United States considers Korea a prime location for THAAD deployment. Reports in South Korean media said that the U.S. military had already assessed potential sites in South Korea — a fact Seoul is aware of.
Seoul's second reason for remaining noncommittal stems from concern about maintaining its balance between the United States and China. While the United States is South Korea's most significant defense partner, China is South Korea's largest trading partner. Seoul has also worked for years to use its political ties with Beijing to help manage the North Korean threat. As North Korea's largest trading partner as well as its main economic and security patron, China is in a singular position to assist South Korea in its relationship with North Korea.
Risks of Deployment
THAAD deployment — as seen vividly in Beijing's public objections — carries immediate political risks for South Korea. The question is whether the benefits of deployment outweigh those risks. Authorizing the deployment of THAAD would increase the robustness of South Korea's layered missile defense system. THAAD would protect against tactical and theater ballistic missiles, at ranges up to 200 kilometers (125 miles) and altitudes up to 150 kilometers (93 miles). A THAAD battery, typically composed of nine transporter or launcher vehicles with eight missiles each, two mobile tactical operations centers and a ground-based X-band radar, also uses a "kinetic kill" system. The system does not employ explosive warheads and can intercept hostile ballistic missiles inside or outside the earth's atmosphere.
Interactive
Interactive Graphic: Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
North Korea's missile systems, too, are layered, using artillery and KN-02 ballistic missiles for short-range attack, Scuds for further reach, Nodong missiles for medium-range and Taepodong missiles for long-range. South Korea is most concerned about North Korea's artillery rockets and ability to launch saturation attacks with short-range missiles. Fears of North Korea's more advanced Nodong missiles — which THAAD would counter — are less pressing.
But South Korea's defense system also includes Patriot PAC-3 systems for point defense and Aegis-equipped destroyers as the initial source of interceptors to knock out ballistic missiles during their mid-course flight. The PAC-3 system has proven itself capable of intercepting less advanced Scud missiles. Practically, the systems in place may be enough to protect South Korea — in a time of war many of North Korea's longer-range missiles would likely target U.S. bases in Japan. This is not to minimize the ballistic missile threat from North Korea. For Seoul, however, there are reasons to consider different air defense architecture. This architecture would deal with the full range of the threat from North Korea while giving South Korea a degree of operational independence and a freer hand in designing its own defenses.
Over the past decade, South Korea has sought to create a defense architecture that is more independent of the United States. Seoul is not necessarily looking to expel U.S. forces from the country but it cannot be sure that U.S. interests will always align with those of South Korea. Seoul also finds it politically fraught to be entirely dependent upon the United States for its defense. Washington has pressured Seoul to tighten defense ties with Japan — a move that many South Koreans oppose for historical reasons.
The United States has also been pushing for changes in the defense alliance architecture that would allow U.S. forces in South Korea to deploy elsewhere in times of crisis. Seoul fears that granting the United States this option would ultimately lead to South Korea being tied politically to any overseas U.S. war. Finally, South Korea is concerned that the United States is overly cautious about Chinese concerns to the detriment of South Korean interests. Seoul was frustrated by the long delay in a U.S. show of naval force off South Korea's coast following the March 2010 sinking of the ROKS Cheonan, allegedly by North Korean torpedoes.
Seeking More Independence
In addition to these strategic concerns, Seoul would like to boost its own domestic defense industry for economic reasons and technological development. It would also wean South Korea off of its dependence on the United States for supplies and defense. Seoul already invested money toward its own air defense network called the Korea Air Missile Defense, a series of systems that would include U.S. elements but not be completely tied into the U.S.-Japanese anti-ballistic missile architecture. The system would free up Seoul to pursue missile and anti-missile development projects with Israel or even Russia.
Washington has long hesitated to more fully share missile development technology with South Korea — a stance that has been a bone of contention between the two allies. The United States argues that reliance on U.S. systems preserves the balance of power because it reduces South Korea's ability to unilaterally begin a war with North Korea. While THAAD would bolster South Korea's immediate defense — or at least the defense of U.S. bases in South Korea — it would do little to improve South Korea's ability to develop its own systems or expand its own defense industry.
The South Korean debate over THAAD deployment has become highly public — something that Seoul never intended to happen. Managing the U.S. defense relationship has been a controversial topic in domestic politics with South Korean political parties expressing competing views. Though the government in Seoul — whether conservative or liberal — largely agrees that South Korea must maintain a robust defense alliance with the United States, the exact balance and level of self-determination are both hotly contested. Even before the introduction of the question of political risk to Chinese relations, the THAAD decision was subject to competition within Seoul.
However, China's decision to so actively and publicly decry a deployment that has yet to be officially requested has forced Seoul to openly and immediately address the issue. It has also pushed Seoul toward approving at least a limited THAAD deployment on the Korean Peninsula — if only to underscore the independence of its decision-making.
Editor's Note: This is the first of two analyses on THAAD deployment in South Korea, read the second part here.
-
http://www.allenbwest.com/michellejesse/just-in-south-korea-on-high-alert-after-north-koreas-latest-move
-
http://www.allenbwest.com/michellejesse/just-in-south-korea-on-high-alert-after-north-koreas-latest-move
This is very bad news. Luckily, we have Team "Smart Power" on the job!
:roll:
-
Summary
Editor's Note: This is the first installment of a five-part series examining the measures that could be taken to inhibit North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The purpose of this series is not to consider political rhetoric or noninvasive means of coercion, such as sanctions. Rather, we are exploring the military options, however remote, that are open to the United States and its allies, along with the expected retaliatory response from Pyongyang.
Few countries intrigue and perplex like the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Isolated by choice from the ebbs and flows of the international system, North Korea is an island of its own making. It is often painted as a weak, fearsome lunatic with delusions of grandeur and aspirations to become a nuclear power, but the truth is a little more complicated. Despite outward appearances, Pyongyang is not reckless in its ambition. Nor does it foolhardily invite destruction. It walks a fine line, hoping to quietly attain a credible nuclear deterrent without inciting world powers to take decisive action.
Deterrence has always been a part of North Korea's survival strategy. Pyongyang's calculated disarray is primarily for the benefit of potential aggressors, advising caution should provocation lead to a disproportionate response. Thriving on contradiction, Pyongyang simultaneously depicts itself as fragile to the point of collapse yet immeasurably strong. This act has served the Kim dynasty well, gaining concessions from major powers that normally would not have been afforded.
North Korea has a good read on the world's inability and unwillingness to respond, not only because of upcoming U.S. elections but also because of the risk of pre-emption: Pyongyang's conventional deterrent raises the cost of intervention far higher than it is at most other places. The window for a military option to stem Pyongyang's nuclear program is closing, but that does not necessarily mean a strike is more likely now than before. Still, the balance is delicate, and should Pyongyang overplay its hand, the repercussions could be catastrophic.
Analysis
North Korea's biggest fear is to be coerced into a position of subservience, having to prostrate itself before China (its primary benefactor) or another powerful country. Its carefully curated image of aggressive unpredictability is intended to preserve its authoritarian and regulated society and, as a result, its isolation. The North is unlikely to expose itself to the international community unless it can guarantee two things: the primacy and security of its leaders, and an effective military deterrent. And there are few deterrents as effective as nuclear weapons. Pyongyang's unswerving progress toward developing a nuclear capability reflects the singular obsession with which it chases its goals and why the West takes its threats seriously.
North Korea's Geographic Challenge
Security and longevity have always been at the forefront of Pyongyang's reasoning. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Korean Peninsula was divided into its constituent parts, sandwiching a Russian-backed northern Korean administration between mainland China and the U.S. Army Military Government in Korea to the south. North Korea flourished during the Cold War, maintaining strong connections with the rest of the communist bloc. Until the 1970s, North Korea was more prosperous than the South. Things changed, however, in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s.
As Cold War structures crumbled around the North and its defense partners became less viable, Pyongyang realized it had to adapt to survive, especially in the face of a burgeoning South Korea. Beyond an asymmetric approach to defense — including assassination attempts, high-profile kidnappings, bombings and subterranean excavations — North Korean began pursuing other options to safeguard its existence. It soon realized that a fledgling nuclear program provided a weighty bargaining chip. Transitions of power within the ruling Kim family served to make Pyongyang only more insular and unpredictable. The Inter-Korean Summit in 2000 led to a reduction of provocation across the peninsula, but Pyongyang's imperatives remained unchanged.
Being branded a rogue state by the United States did little to dampen the flame of juche, the ideology installed by Kim Il Sung and the epitome of Korean self-reliance. Juche effectively calls for North Korea to stand alone economically, militarily and on the world stage. North Korea began to act up again in 2010, in advance of another transition of power within the Kim family, sinking a South Korean naval vessel and launching artillery at a prominent border island. Then in 2013, the country threatened once more to withdraw from the 1953 Armistice Agreement. Under Kim Jong Un's tenure, North Korea has prioritized strategic weaponry over all else. Despite widespread condemnation from the international community, Pyongyang has actually accelerated its nuclear weapons program, for it sees a credible nuclear arsenal as the only guarantor against Western-imposed regime change.
A Generational Congress
All eyes were on North Korea for its 7th Workers' Party Congress at the beginning of May, the first such meeting in more than 35 years. It was also the first time Western journalists were invited en masse to attend, albeit with strict limitations and the ever-present threat of deportation. The congress served many purposes, not least of which was to consolidate and institutionalize Kim Jong Un's rule and move away from the informal lines of command and political fiefdoms that developed under the rule of his father. Shedding his previous title of first secretary, Kim was introduced as party chairman for the first time.
During his address on May 7, Kim was quick to point out the advances made by the country's nuclear weapons and missile programs. He singled out Pyongyang's burgeoning nuclear capability as the protective layer that will enable economic development, a concept known as byungjin. But considering that North Korea's nuclear aspirations have saddled the country with economic sanctions, the statement appears somewhat ironic. That said, the announcement of a five-year economic plan is telling: Kim is accepting the kind of responsibility once shouldered by his grandfather, Kim Il Sung, and solidifying his primacy at the head of the people's republic.
Pyongyang is optimistic to consider itself a nuclear power. A variety of tests and launches indicate that North Korea is assembling the constituent parts of a re-entry vehicle, but nothing decisively suggests that it has a fully functional nuclear ballistic missile. The country's fourth successful underground nuclear test was conducted Jan. 6, followed a month later by a satellite launch into orbit. This was trailed by ground tests of a rocket nose cone capable of withstanding atmospheric re-entry. Meanwhile, North Korean scientists proceeded with the controlled ignition of a solid rocket engine and, allegedly, the development of a miniaturized nuclear warhead.
On top of these nuclear stepping-stones were a number of ballistic missile tests, including the use of mobile land-based platforms and submarine launches, the latter theoretically within strike range of Guam and Japan. Though these tests included some failures — most notably three successive failures of the Musudan mobile intermediate-range ballistic missile system — they demonstrate clear progress in developing most of the individual segments of a viable nuclear deterrent. And North Korea's intent is to keep progressing until Pyongyang has a survivable weapon it can launch at short notice that will deliver a nuclear payload to the continental United States.
In response, efforts by the international community seeking denuclearization of North Korea are falling short. Pyongyang's position is deliberately opaque, primarily because it is beneficial to keep the West uncertain as to North Korea's true capabilities. If the missile program's well-publicized failures can nonetheless create enough doubt in the minds of U.S. policymakers, it might be enough to defer any possible strike. If success is not assured in North Korea's nuclear program, is direct action justifiable? Yet, North Korea is coming late to the nuclear game, and the technologies it is pursuing are already decades old. For many strategists and speculators alike, it is simply a case of when, not if. The key question then becomes: Can the United States afford to let Pyongyang cross the nuclear Rubicon? If the answer is no, then consideration must be given to the ways in which countries opposing North Korea, primarily the United States and South Korea, will use military force to neuter the nuclear program and impose compliance. The threat alone might be impetus enough for Pyongyang to take the final steps, as Stratfor's expert on North Korea, Rodger Baker, considers:
As Pyongyang approaches a viable nuclear weapon and delivery system, the pressure is rising for the United States and other countries to pre-empt it. Consequently, the final moments of North Korea's transition from a working program to a demonstrated system are the most dangerous, providing a last chance to stop the country from becoming a nuclear weapons state. For North Korea, then, these final steps must happen quickly. Because 2016 is a presidential election year in the United States, Pyongyang may feel it has a window to finalize its nuclear arms program while the United States is preoccupied with domestic politics and unlikely to take military action. Furthermore, having just held parliamentary elections and facing a presidential contest in 2017, South Korea, too, is in the midst of political transition. North Korea is making a gamble, one that bets both on its read of U.S. politics and on its own ability to overcome technological hurdles.
This is the cost calculation faced by policymakers in the United States and South Korea as they consider a political decision that could lead to military action. The United States is the singular military power that has both the intent and the capability to conduct such an operation and would naturally take the lead. Washington has also been branded a target for North Korean aggression, along with Seoul and Tokyo.
In the coming installments, we will examine the options available to the United States and its allies should they decide to act militarily against North Korea. We will also consider, in turn, the nature of any retaliation or counterstrike by Pyongyang. The focus here is on offensive action rather than diplomacy, though it is important to note that Washington does not make decisions lightly or in isolation. Though political will must drive military intent, the opportune time for offensive action is rapidly running out. This, theoretically, makes the final stages of Pyongyang's nuclear program the most risky — it is clear the North is nearing the final steps, and once it has a viable nuclear weapon, it is too late for Washington to intervene. These are the waning moments for any practical intervention. In light of this, the second part of this series will examine what targets would need to be struck if the United States chooses to take action.
-
https://www.facebook.com/prageru/videos/1079959035380285/
-
Shooting Down North Korea’s Missiles
Kim wants the ability to make U.S. cities his nuclear hostages.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in May 2016. ENLARGE
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in May 2016. Photo: European Pressphoto Agency
Jan. 2, 2017 1:10 p.m. ET
7 COMMENTS
Kim Jong Un announced Sunday that North Korea is about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile that can reach the U.S. mainland. If he proceeds with the test, the U.S. should shoot it down.
The test itself is not a shock. Four previous tests of the Taepodong-2 missile were disguised as satellite launches, and two of them succeeded in putting objects into orbit over the U.S. The news here is that the young dictator is so confident of becoming a full nuclear power that he has dispensed with the fig leaf of a space program.
This is one more sign that Kim is racing to the finish line of full nuclear-weapons capability. Thae Yong Ho, the No. 2 in the North Korean Embassy in London until he defected, warned last week that Kim wants to deploy nuclear-armed missiles by the end of 2017.
The North already has the technology to launch a nuclear weapon against South Korea and Japan. But hurdles remain to deploying an ICBM with a nuclear warhead. Chief among them is a re-entry vehicle capable of withstanding extremes of temperature and vibration. A successful test could provide the North with valuable data to work the problem.
The U.S. has ship-based missile defenses in the region, and intercepting the test would have the dual purpose of slowing Kim’s nuclear progress and demonstrating an effective deterrent. Kim may figure the U.S. won’t take such action as it prepares to inaugurate a new President and South Korea is riven by an impeachment trial of President Park Geun-hye. But the U.S. right to self defense provides ample justification, and U.N. Security Council resolutions ban the North from pursuing its missile program.
Even the defensive use of force carries risks that Kim would retaliate, but the larger risk is letting a man as reckless as Kim gain the means to hold American cities hostage. Kim evidently believes that once the North has a credible ability to destroy Seattle or Chicago, the U.S. will have no choice other than to accept it as a normal nuclear state. The Obama Administration, in consultation with President-elect Donald Trump, can demonstrate its bipartisan resolve to thwart that plan.
-
http://www.aei.org/publication/how-to-really-deal-with-the-north-korean-nuclear-threat/?utm_source=paramount&utm_medium=email&utm_content=AEITODAY&utm_campaign=021017
==============================
Stratfor
U.S., South Korea: Upcoming Military Exercises Expected To Focus On Pre-Emptive Strikes
Situation Reports
February 9, 2017 | 15:35 GMT Print
Text Size
The United States and South Korea are set to hold annual Key Resolve and Foal Eagle exercises in early March, with the joint drills expected to be the largest ever, Arirang News reported Feb. 9. The drills will focus heavily on developing pre-emptive strike capabilities versus North Korea. There is also a possibility that the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system (THAAD) could be incorporated into the Key Resolve simulated exercises. Seoul is continuing to focus its efforts on pre-emptive strike doctrine and capabilities alongside the United States as North Korea moves closer to accumulating viable nuclear delivery systems.
-
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/02/14/kim-jong-uns-older-brother-killed-north-korean-spies-poison1/
-
paracom.paramountcommunication.com/ct/40431535:sQNPGdlN4:m:1:1488789220:CA3B073C770DA6C1F7C0CED5199E75B7:r
-
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-suspends-north-koreas-coal-imports-striking-at-regimes-financial-lifeline/2017/02/18/8390b0e6-f5df-11e6-a9b0-ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.cefc8d0e23db&wpisrc=nl_evening&wpmm=1
Perhaps if this weren't WaPo more prominent mention might have been given to the possibility that the phone call with President Trump played a role here.
-
I hope the result of this is not a million Koreans starve to death.
-
It most certainly seems to be a significant development.
-
I thought the news said VX gas? Now they reveal that was just more AP fake news. Apparently they don't know what killed him.
It seem hard to believe one of the involved women claims she thought it was some sort of candid camera pranks when one sees the video of the murder.
https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/malaysia-no-cause-death-determined-yet-north-korean-073333799.html
-
Ummm , , , a lot of this intel seems to me quite unsuitable for public release , , , :x :x :x
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/north-korea-missile-program-sabotage.html?emc=edit_na_20170304&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
also see:
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/04/world/asia/left-of-launch-missile-defense.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article
How fg stupid do they have to be to publicize this?!? :x :x :x :x :x :x :x :x :x
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/02/24/world/asia/north-korea-propaganda-photo.html?action=click&contentCollection=Asia%20Pacific&module=RelatedCoverage®ion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article
WASHINGTON — Three years ago, President Barack Obama ordered Pentagon officials to step up their cyber and electronic strikes against North Korea’s missile program in hopes of sabotaging test launches in their opening seconds.
Soon a large number of the North’s military rockets began to explode, veer off course, disintegrate in midair and plunge into the sea. Advocates of such efforts say they believe that targeted attacks have given American antimissile defenses a new edge and delayed by several years the day when North Korea will be able to threaten American cities with nuclear weapons launched atop intercontinental ballistic missiles.
But other experts have grown increasingly skeptical of the new approach, arguing that manufacturing errors, disgruntled insiders and sheer incompetence can also send missiles awry. Over the past eight months, they note, the North has managed to successfully launch three medium-range rockets. And Kim Jong-un, the North Korean leader, now claims his country is in “the final stage in preparations” for the inaugural test of his intercontinental missiles — perhaps a bluff, perhaps not.
An examination of the Pentagon’s disruption effort, based on interviews with officials of the Obama and Trump administrations as well as a review of extensive but obscure public records, found that the United States still does not have the ability to effectively counter the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. Those threats are far more resilient than many experts thought, The New York Times’s reporting found, and pose such a danger that Mr. Obama, as he left office, warned President Trump they were likely to be the most urgent problem he would confront.
Continue reading the main story
Related Coverage
U.S. Strategy to Hobble North Korea Was Hidden in Plain Sight MARCH 4, 2017
interactive
THE INTERPRETER
What One Photo Tells Us About North Korea’s Nuclear Program FEB. 24, 2017
Kim Jong-un Says North Korea Is Preparing to Test Long-Range Missile JAN. 1, 2017
North Korea, Rebuking Trump, Says It Can Test Long-Range Missile ‘Anytime’ JAN. 9, 2017
Continue reading the main story
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
Iran
India
Thailand
China
Mongolia
Italy
Russia
Scud B/C/ER
180–600 miles
Spain
North
Korea
KN-11
600 miles
Norway
Britain
Nodong
800 miles
Japan
Greenland
(Denmark)
Guam
Musudan
2,200 miles
Australia
Papua
New Guinea
Canada
North Korea’s Growing Reach
The potential range of North Korea’s current weapons, particularly the KN-14 and KN-08 missiles, would put most of the world in reach of its nuclear warheads.
KN-14
6,200 miles
United
States
KN-08
7,200 miles
Mexico
Estimated
ranges
Source: The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
By Troy Griggs
Mr. Trump has signaled his preference to respond aggressively against the North Korean threat. In a Twitter post after Mr. Kim first issued his warning on New Year’s Day, the president wrote, “It won’t happen!” Yet like Mr. Obama before him, Mr. Trump is quickly discovering that he must choose from highly imperfect options.
Continue reading the main story
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
He could order the escalation of the Pentagon’s cyber and electronic warfare effort, but that carries no guarantees. He could open negotiations with the North to freeze its nuclear and missile programs, but that would leave a looming threat in place. He could prepare for direct missile strikes on the launch sites, which Mr. Obama also considered, but there is little chance of hitting every target. He could press the Chinese to cut off trade and support, but Beijing has always stopped short of steps that could lead to the regime’s collapse.
In two meetings of Mr. Trump’s national security deputies in the Situation Room, the most recent on Tuesday, all those options were discussed, along with the possibility of reintroducing nuclear weapons to South Korea as a dramatic warning. Administration officials say those issues will soon go to Mr. Trump and his top national security aides.
The decision to intensify the cyber and electronic strikes, in early 2014, came after Mr. Obama concluded that the $300 billion spent since the Eisenhower era on traditional antimissile systems, often compared to hitting “a bullet with a bullet,” had failed the core purpose of protecting the continental United States. Flight tests of interceptors based in Alaska and California had an overall failure rate of 56 percent, under near-perfect conditions. Privately, many experts warned the system would fare worse in real combat.
So the Obama administration searched for a better way to destroy missiles. It reached for techniques the Pentagon had long been experimenting with under the rubric of “left of launch,” because the attacks begin before the missiles ever reach the launchpad, or just as they lift off. For years, the Pentagon’s most senior officers and officials have publicly advocated these kinds of sophisticated attacks in little-noticed testimony to Congress and at defense conferences.
Photo
The KN-14, one of two types of intercontinental ballistic missiles that North Korea is developing, at a military parade in the capital, Pyongyang, in October 2015, in an image released by the nation's government. Credit Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters
The Times inquiry began last spring as the number of the North’s missile failures soared. The investigation uncovered the military documents praising the new antimissile approach and found some pointing with photos and diagrams to North Korea as one of the most urgent targets.
After discussions with the office of the director of national intelligence last year and in recent days with Mr. Trump’s national security team, The Times agreed to withhold details of those efforts to keep North Korea from learning how to defeat them. Last fall, Mr. Kim was widely reported to have ordered an investigation into whether the United States was sabotaging North Korea’s launches, and over the past week he has executed senior security officials.
The approach taken in targeting the North Korean missiles has distinct echoes of the American- and Israeli-led sabotage of Iran’s nuclear program, the most sophisticated known use of a cyberweapon meant to cripple a nuclear threat. But even that use of the “Stuxnet” worm in Iran quickly ran into limits. It was effective for several years, until the Iranians figured it out and recovered. And Iran posed a relatively easy target: an underground nuclear enrichment plant that could be attacked repeatedly.
In North Korea, the target is much more challenging. Missiles are fired from multiple launch sites around the country and moved about on mobile launchers in an elaborate shell game meant to deceive adversaries. To strike them, timing is critical.
Advocates of the sophisticated effort to remotely manipulate data inside North Korea’s missile systems argue the United States has no real alternative because the effort to stop the North from learning the secrets of making nuclear weapons has already failed. The only hope now is stopping the country from developing an intercontinental missile, and demonstrating that destructive threat to the world.
Continue reading the main story
Recent Comments
Jamie Nichols 35 minutes ago
Many Americans no doubt share the mindset of one reader as reflected in his rhetorical question: "How can we be so incredibly stupid to...
Glengarry 37 minutes ago
"I inherited a mess". Oh my I had a good laugh over that one!Of course you did, the world is a messy place. The dynamics of which change...
progressiveMinded 37 minutes ago
Acton: “the tweet could come to be seen as a ‘red line’ and hence set up a potential test of his credibility.”As a starting point, let's...
See All Comments Write a comment
Photo
KN-08 ballistic missiles were paraded through Pyongyang in July 2013 on mobile launch vehicles that can be hidden in caves or underground, making the missiles hard to track and target. Credit Kyodo News
“Disrupting their tests,” William J. Perry, secretary of defense in the Clinton administration, said at a recent presentation in Washington, would be “a pretty effective way of stopping their ICBM program.”
Decades in the Making
Three generations of the Kim family have dreamed that their broken, otherwise failed nation could build its own nuclear weapons, and the missiles to deliver them, as the ultimate survival strategy. With nukes in hand, the Kims have calculated, they need not fear being overrun by South Korea, invaded by the United States or sold out by China.
North Korea began seeking an intercontinental ballistic missile decades ago: It was the dream of Kim Il-sung, the country’s founder, who bitterly remembered the American threats to use nuclear weapons against the North during the Korean War.
His break came after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when out-of-work Russian rocket scientists began seeking employment in North Korea. Soon, a new generation of North Korean missiles began to appear, all knockoffs of Soviet designs. Though flight tests were sparse, American experts marveled at how the North seemed to avoid the kinds of failures that typically strike new rocket programs, including those of the United States in the late 1950s.
The Rise of Missile and Nuclear Tests
The frequency of missile tests has risen dramatically under Kim Jong-un, with a recent increase in nuclear tests as well.
25
20
Nuclear test
15
Missile test
10
5
0
’01
’06
’09
’11
’13
’16
’17
Kim Jong-un
Kim Jong-il
1994–2011
2011–
Includes only major systems. Omits engine firings at ground facilities, ejection tests of submarine missiles, and firings of artillery, short-range rockets and air-defense missiles.
Source: Center for Strategic and International Studies
By The New York Times
The success was so marked that Timothy McCarthy of the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey wrote in a 2001 analysis that Pyongyang’s record “appears completely unique in the history of missile development and production.”
In response, President George W. Bush in late 2002 announced the deployment of antimissile interceptors in Alaska and California. At the same time, Mr. Bush accelerated programs to get inside the long supply chain of parts for North Korean missiles, lacing them with defects and weaknesses, a technique also used for years against Iran.
Threat Grows in Obama Era
By the time Mr. Obama took office in January 2009, the North had deployed hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles that used Russian designs, and had made billions of dollars selling its Scud missiles to Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, the United Arab Emirates and Yemen. But it aspired to a new generation of missiles that could fire warheads over much longer distances.
In secret cables written in the first year of the Obama administration, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton laid out the emerging threat. Among the most alarming released by WikiLeaks, the cables described a new path the North was taking to reach its long-range goal, based on a missile designed by the Soviets decades ago for their submarines that carried thermonuclear warheads.
It was called the R-27. Unlike the North’s lumbering, older rockets and missiles, these would be small enough to hide in caves and move into position by truck. The advantage was clear: This missile would be far harder for the United States to find and destroy.
The North Korean Arsenal
The rockets currently being tested have a wide range of sizes and capabilities.
No flight tests to date
6ft
Scud B/C/ER
KN-11
Nodong
Musudan
KN-14
KN-08
600
7,200
180–600 miles
800
2,200
6,200
Primary engines believed to be based on Soviet R-27 missile system
Includes only major systems. Omits engine firings at ground facilities, ejection tests of submarine missiles, and firings of artillery, short-range rockets and air-defense missiles.
Source: The James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
By The New York Times
“North Korea’s next goal may be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of threatening targets around the world,” said an October 2009 cable marked “Secret” and signed by Mrs. Clinton.
The next year, one of the new missiles showed up in a North Korean military parade, just as the intelligence reports had warned.
By 2013, North Korean rockets thundered with new regularity. And that February, the North set off a nuclear test that woke up Washington: The monitoring data told of an explosion roughly the size of the bomb that had leveled Hiroshima.
Days after the explosion, the Pentagon announced an expansion of its force of antimissile interceptors in California and Alaska. It also began to unveil its “left of launch” program to disable missiles before liftoff — hoping to bolster its chances of destroying them. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, announced the program, saying that “cyberwarfare, directed energy and electronic attack,” a reference to such things as malware, lasers and signal jamming, were all becoming important new adjuncts to the traditional ways of deflecting enemy strikes.
Photo
Intermediate-range Musudan missiles rolled through Pyongyang during a parade in 2015. Credit Kyodo News
He never mentioned North Korea. But a map accompanying General Dempsey’s policy paper on the subject showed one of the North’s missiles streaking toward the United States. Soon, in testimony before Congress and at public panels in Washington, current and former officials and a major contractor — Raytheon — began talking openly about “left of launch” technologies, in particular cyber and electronic strikes at the moment of launch.
The North, meanwhile, was developing its own exotic arsenal. It tried repeatedly to disrupt American and South Korean military exercises by jamming electronic signals for guided weapons, including missiles. And it demonstrated its cyberpower in the oddest of places — Hollywood. In 2014, it attacked Sony Pictures Entertainment with a strike that destroyed about 70 percent of the company’s computing systems, surprising experts with its technical savvy.
Last month, a report on cybervulnerabilities by the Defense Science Board, commissioned by the Pentagon during the Obama administration, warned that North Korea might acquire the ability to cripple the American power grid, and cautioned that it could never be allowed to “hold vital U.S. strike systems at risk.”
Secret Push, and New Doubts
Not long after General Dempsey made his public announcement, Mr. Obama and his defense secretary, Ashton B. Carter, began calling meetings focused on one question: Could a crash program slow the North’s march toward an intercontinental ballistic missile?
There were many options, some drawn from General Dempsey’s list. Mr. Obama ultimately pressed the Pentagon and intelligence agencies to pull out all the stops, which officials took as encouragement to reach for untested technologies.
The North’s missiles soon began to fail at a remarkable pace. Some were destroyed, no doubt, by accident as well as by design. The technology the North was pursuing, using new designs and new engines, involved multistage rockets, introducing all kinds of possibilities for catastrophic mistakes. But by most accounts, the United States program accentuated the failures.
Get the Morning Briefing by Email
What you need to know to start your day, delivered to your inbox Monday through Friday.
Receive occasional updates and special offers for The New York Times's products and services.
See Sample Manage Email Preferences Privacy Policy
The evidence was in the numbers. Most flight tests of an intermediate-range missile called the Musudan, the weapon that the North Koreans showed off in public just after Mrs. Clinton’s warning, ended in flames: Its overall failure rate is 88 percent.
Nonetheless Kim Jong-un has pressed ahead on his main goal: an intercontinental ballistic missile. Last April, he was photographed standing next to a giant test-stand, celebrating after engineers successfully fired off a matched pair of the potent Russian-designed R-27 engines. The implication was clear: Strapping two of the engines together at the base of a missile was the secret to building an ICBM that could ultimately hurl warheads at the United States.
In September, he celebrated the most successful test yet of a North Korean nuclear weapon — one that exploded with more than twice the destructive force of the Hiroshima bomb.
His next goal, experts say, is to combine those two technologies, shrinking his nuclear warheads to a size that can fit on an intercontinental missile. Only then can he credibly claim that his isolated country has the know-how to hit an American city thousands of miles away.
In the last year of his presidency, Mr. Obama often noted publicly that the North was learning from every nuclear and missile test — even the failures — and getting closer to its goal. In private, aides noticed he was increasingly disturbed by North Korea’s progress.
With only a few months left in office, he pushed aides for new approaches. At one meeting, he declared that he would have targeted the North Korean leadership and weapons sites if he thought it would work. But it was, as Mr. Obama and his assembled aides knew, an empty threat: Getting timely intelligence on the location of North Korea’s leaders or their weapons at any moment would be almost impossible, and the risks of missing were tremendous, including renewed war on the Korean Peninsula.
Hard Decisions for Trump
Continue reading the main story
Photo
The single successful test flight in a run of Musudan missile failures came in June, shown in this image from North Korea’s state-run news agency. The Musudan had an overall failure rate of 88 percent, much higher than the 13 percent failure rate of the Soviet-era missile on which it was based. Credit Korean Central News Agency, via Reuters
As a presidential candidate, Mr. Trump complained that “we're so obsolete in cyber,” a line that grated on officials at the United States Cyber Command and the National Security Agency, where billions of dollars have been spent to provide the president with new options for intelligence gathering and cyberattacks. Now, one of the immediate questions he faces is whether to accelerate or scale back those efforts.
A decision to go after an adversary’s launch ability can have unintended consequences, experts warn.
Once the United States uses cyberweapons against nuclear launch systems — even in a threatening state like North Korea — Russia and China may feel free to do the same, targeting fields of American missiles. Some strategists argue that all nuclear systems should be off limits for cyberattack. Otherwise, if a nuclear power thought it could secretly disable an adversary’s atomic controls, it might be more tempted to take the risk of launching a pre-emptive attack.
“I understand the urgent threat,” said Amy Zegart, a Stanford University intelligence and cybersecurity expert, who said she had no independent knowledge of the American effort. “But 30 years from now we may decide it was a very, very dangerous thing to do.”
Mr. Trump’s aides say everything is on the table. China recently cut off coal imports from the North, but the United States is also looking at ways to freeze the Kim family’s assets, some of which are believed held in Chinese-controlled banks. The Chinese have already opposed the deployment of a high-altitude missile defense system known as Thaad in South Korea; the Trump team may call for even more such systems.
The White House is also looking at pre-emptive military strike options, a senior Trump administration official said, though the challenge is huge given the country’s mountainous terrain and deep tunnels and bunkers. Putting American tactical nuclear weapons back in South Korea — they were withdrawn a quarter-century ago — is also under consideration, even if that step could accelerate an arms race with the North.
Mr. Trump’s “It won’t happen!” post on Twitter about the North’s ICBM threat suggests a larger confrontation could be looming.
“Regardless of Trump’s actual intentions,” James M. Acton, a nuclear analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, recently noted, “the tweet could come to be seen as a ‘red line’ and hence set up a potential test of his credibility.”
-
China’s North Korea Feint
Beijing isn’t cutting economic support to its nuclear client state.
A coal yard beside Yalu River on the North Korean side of the border.
A coal yard beside Yalu River on the North Korean side of the border. Photo: Getty Images
Updated March 5, 2017 6:34 p.m. ET
36 COMMENTS
Is China greeting the Trump era by getting tough on North Korea? That may be the impression Beijing has tried to convey by announcing a suspension of coal imports from the nuclear-armed state. But there is less here than meets the eye.
As is often the case regarding Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang, the details of the coal cutoff are murky. In the most generous telling, China has decided to squeeze North Korea’s key source of hard currency to punish it for acting in destabilizing ways—testing missiles, assassinating overseas enemies with VX nerve agent and the like. By this logic, Beijing is signalling a desire to work with the new U.S. Administration on the shared goal of denuclearizing the Kim regime. North Korean state media have pushed this line, slamming China for “dancing to the tune of the U.S.”
Yet Beijing has said that it had to cut off coal imports to comply with United Nations sanctions passed in November. According to the Foreign Ministry, Chinese imports in 2017 have already approached the U.N.’s annual value limit of $400 million. Beijing would hardly deserve applause for buying its full quota and then stopping to meet its legal obligations.
A year ago the Chinese also promised to comply with an earlier round of U.N. sanctions on North Korean mineral exports. But Beijing made sure those sanctions included a loophole exempting transactions for undefined “livelihood purposes.” It then proceeded to rack up record purchases of North Korean coal.
After November’s sanctions moved to nullify the “livelihood” loophole with hard caps, Beijing promised a cutoff—yet still imported more North Korean coal in December than in any previous month of the year. Its total coal imports for 2016, a year in which it twice voted for sanctions on such purchases, rose 14.5% from 2015 and totaled more than $1 billion.
Pyongyang can fund a lot of missile tests with that money. Then there is the unspecified sum China will soon begin paying for 4,000 metric tons of North Korean liquefied petroleum gas, an arrangement quietly announced this month and spotted by Victor Cha of the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Beijing sustains Pyongyang in countless other ways, including access to Chinese oil, banks, trading firms, ports and front companies. Contrast this with China’s unofficial economic sanctions on South Korea merely for wishing to defend itself against North Korean nuclear missiles by installing advanced U.S.-made antimissile defenses.
Beijing is clearly exploring its options in the Trump era, which is no doubt why it dispatched foreign-policy chief Yang Jiechi to Washington this week to meet the President and some of his senior aides. The coal gambit may have been a gift of sorts to Mr. Trump after he reaffirmed traditional U.S. policy toward Taiwan.
Whatever Beijing intends, it is clear that Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capabilities pose a direct and increasingly intolerable threat to U.S. security, and that the threat will end only when the Kim dynasty is deposed. If Beijing won’t cut its economic lifelines to the North, the Trump Administration should use financial sanctions on Chinese entities to force the issue.
-
by Rodger Baker
"Irrational" North Korea has done it again. Even with U.S. and South Korean forces gathered on the peninsula for their largest annual joint military exercises, Pyongyang launched four ballistic missiles early on March 6. Three landed in the sea west of Japan, within Tokyo's 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. As expected, the "irrational" Pyongyang's actions elicited the usual cries of condemnation, triggered a brief dip in the South Korean stock market and led South Korea's acting president, Hwang Kyo Ahn, to reiterate the need for South Korea to rapidly deploy the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system — something that will undoubtedly further perturb North Korea’s closest friend, China.
I use "irrational" in quotation marks for a reason. I have already discussed the use of "provocation" as a lazy term for describing North Korea's actions. But Pyongyang's latest moves, as well as the current U.S. review of North Korean policy, offer an opportunity to talk about the idea of the rationality of nations, governments and leaders. North Korea provides what could be a textbook case of the mixed perceptions of rationality and irrationality — a tool with utility beyond today’s feisty standoff between the hermit state and its geopolitical rivals.
More Than Just Emotion
At Stratfor, we are often asked why we default to attributing rationality to the behavior of governments. Many argue that the behavior of other governments (or our own at times) appears irrational. Think of the economically devastating land reform instituted by Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe in 2000, or former British Prime Minister David Cameron’s decision to hold a referendum on the Brexit, or the U.S. plan in Iraq that assumed the country's disparate ethnic and sectarian divides would simply be overcome by the downfall of a dictator. We all know individuals who act in an irrational manner, whether because of emotional stress or stimuli, fatigue, mental conditions or any number of other reasons. Few of us can honestly say that we have never acted on impulse, out of emotion (be it anger or love), or out of a failure to think things through before engaging in some ill-advised endeavor that we hope will end in minor embarrassment and a funny story rather than in tragedy.
If individuals are susceptible to such irrational behavior, why not governments? Deploying secret agents to assassinate someone who was apparently such a low-level threat that he traveled without a security team seems irrational, or at least purely emotional. All the more so when the attack was done with a banned chemical weapon in an airport of one of the few countries with relatively good diplomatic relations with North Korea, and a key hub for the nation’s sanctions-skirting economic activity. Launching four ballistic missiles a few days after positive meetings with China (which eased tensions after Beijing had recently hit the North Korean economy by cutting off coal imports), and thus further justifying Seoul’s pursuit of the THAAD system to the detriment of China’s interests, just seems irrational. Why hurt the one country that continues to give North Korea international support and appeared intent on strengthening its relationship with Pyongyang rather than isolating it even more?
Our assertion of rationality as the default analysis does not claim that all decisions are perfect, or that errors cannot be made. Irrational or responsive decisions are possible, and even "rational" decisions can lead to catastrophes. But we do assert that choices made by governments are generally based on more than emotion or randomness. Rationality differs based on one's point of view, place and time. If I assume irrationality on the subjects of my inquiry, if I find their behavior illogical or unwise, my first job is to reassess my understanding of their perspective of rationality. This is the obligation of the analyst: to challenge the impulse to impose one's own sense of rationality upon others. What is it that has shaped those subjects' worldview, their perception of risk and reward, of threat and opportunity?
Back to the Geopolitical Basics
Even a cursory glance at North Korea reveals a worldview molded by geography and history. North Korea is a tiny country with insufficient arable land that is squeezed between China and South Korea, the latter of which hosts tens of thousands of U.S. forces. Historically, the unified Korea was caught between China and Japan, the proverbial minnow between whales. Today North Korea remains squeezed between whales, though this time the United States and China, and its basic question is whether it wants to subsume its national authority and identity to one of its neighbors or remain independent in policy and ideology. If Pyongyang prefers the latter, it can neither draw too close to China nor allow its economy and culture to open up fully to the West. Historically, North Korea has followed a path of isolation, of nominal fealty to China while maintaining domestic control — an approach that has been called the "poison-shrimp" strategy of being more dangerous to invade than to ignore.
This leads to a perspective of rationality that is very different than that of most analysts in the United States. Even if South Korea can partially understand the North’s sense of rationality, it does not match the national interests of Seoul, which in many ways is in the same position as Pyongyang but has allowed itself, much like Japan, to cede its national independence to the United States for years. The attribution of rationality to North Korea’s leadership is not a justification for its actions, nor does it argue that the North has only one path to pursue. Rather, it seeks to understand the behavior of the country's rulers — a vital step toward predicting both action and reaction.
The second component is to assess the structure of power within the nation's leadership. No leader, no matter how dictatorial, operates alone. There are bureaucracies, formal and informal systems of relationships, and power, money, finances and resources that shape how a government or ruling group works. For a leader to lead, there must be those willing to carry out orders, and shy of a very small organization, that requires several layers of power and control. So, policy goes beyond the actions of a single individual. The system itself, then, provides in some ways a check on irrationality. Any decision, any command, must pass through this often complex system of power. By their very nature, governments slow down action, providing the equivalent of counting to 10 before responding to an emotionally charged situation.
A Careful Balance
In North Korea's case, elections are certainly a bit of a sham, but Kim Jong Un doesn't stay in power simply because of his family name. He is the third generation of Kim leadership in North Korea, and the least prepared or qualified of any for the task of leading the country, since his father delayed training or anointing a successor for fear that power would begin to form around the son, rather than himself. But the Kims are not divine leaders, holding power because none dare to challenge their right to lead. Instead, they must constantly manipulate, balance and counterbalance the various interest groups and power centers in North Korea.
The primary task of a Kim leader is to ensure that no single faction or small group of factions becomes too powerful. This involves a combination of reward (access to foreign funds and opportunities), punishment (death, at the extreme) and distribution of power among different groups as well as inducements to spy on one another. A perception of unpredictability by Kim may be beneficial to a point, but complete unpredictability would undermine the balance quickly, since there would be no way to ensure long-term power or influence, and the system would quickly turn against the leader. In many ways this is similar to the story that Thae Yong Ho, the recently defected deputy ambassador to the North Korean Embassy in London, has been telling in media interviews in South Korea and beyond.
One of the most striking things about North Korea is that its apparent irrationality has nonetheless allowed it to continue down a fairly independent path under three different paramount leaders, even as the world around them changed (at times, dramatically). This alone should suggest that there is rationality hidden in North Korea's behavior. Pyongyang has shown continuity of action, continuity of policy and, most important, continuity of leadership but for a few executions. North Korea has pursued variations of this policy since the end of the Cold War, seeking cooperation with the South to create a stronger single Korean confederation, playing various regional players off of one another, and pursuing in earnest a nuclear deterrent to reduce the perceived threat of U.S. military and political action to destabilize the government and force its collapse.
Assuming irrationality in the actions of North Korea, or of any other government, is often based on the cognitive error of mirror imaging — believing that others hold the same cultural, political, economic or moral norms as you, your culture or your government. Even among Western countries, there are many different ways that nations perceive rationality and their national interests. How much more misleading is it to apply Western or U.S. norms to North Korea's perception and decision-making? Assuming irrationality, then, is simply a poor analytic practice. Again, seeking to understand another's basis for rationality does not imply that all decisions are the "right" ones, or the most effective. Governments rarely have the luxury of a complete set of options, of time, or of full information when making choices or planning strategy. And in many cases, objective desire plays a role. Rationality does not exclude bad decisions, or more commonly, limited options.
One of the most important values to presuming rationality in others, particularly "foes," is that irrationality, by its very nature, is unpredictable. But rationality provides context within which to predict behavior, or at least to understand general patterns of behavior. That said, rationality must then be matched with reality. Governments are large entities. Decisions are being made at many levels, within many time frames. Contradictory actions are entirely possible, even frequent. Mistakes are made. Insufficient information, time or resources constrain decision-making and action. Internecine struggles for power or influence can lead to all sorts of chaos. But assuming irrationality is just lazy analysis.
North Korea is not irrational. But understanding its unique rationality is no small task.
-
second post
March 7, 2017 7:00 p.m. ET
45 COMMENTS
With the arrival of a C-17 transport plane at Osan Air Base outside Seoul on Monday, the U.S. and South Korea began deploying the advanced Thaad antimissile system after years of uncertainty and months sooner than expected. With North Korea’s behavior becoming more dangerous, the sooner this system becomes operational the better.
Thaad—Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense—is far more capable than the Patriot and Aegis systems currently deployed around Korea. It can scan across 1,000 kilometers, intercept missiles 200 kilometers away and coordinate with U.S. and Japanese assets elsewhere in the region.
South Koreans were reminded of the need for defenses Monday when Pyongyang fired four missiles into the Sea of Japan. The North also barred Malaysian nationals from leaving the country unless Malaysia drops its inquiry into last month’s chilling assassination of Kim Jong Un’s brother in Kuala Lumpur.
North Korea is able to terrorize the region because of China, which poses as a responsible power but still protects Pyongyang economically and diplomatically. Beijing has raged against Thaad with bogus claims that it threatens China. But Chinese leaders’ real fear is that Thaad will deepen the U.S.-South Korea alliance, an outcome they apparently consider worse than North Korea’s continued nuclearization and military threats.
“South Korea will sacrifice its fast-developing relations with China if it should be seduced into the [Thaad] defense network,” Chinese state media warned in 2014. After Seoul decided last summer to proceed anyway, Beijing responded with unofficial sanctions against South Korean pop stars, cosmetics exports and tourism. Especially hard hit was Lotte, the company that agreed to provide land for the Thaad battery and has since faced arbitrary inspections, fines, store closures, licensing holdups, public protests, cyberattacks and other difficulties.
U.S. and South Korean leaders deserve credit for sticking to last year’s decision to deploy Thaad despite this pressure. Pentagon chief Jim Mattis made Seoul his first overseas visit last month, and President Trump has spoken with South Korean leaders several times, including a phone call Monday.
The broader lesson is that China’s support for the Kim regime is increasingly harming its own interests. Chinese leaders have long feared that turning on Pyongyang could cause a chaotic collapse, but their abdication of responsibility has now brought Thaad to the Korean Peninsula and otherwise strengthened defense cooperation among the U.S., Japan and South Korea. As the North’s nuclear threat grows, South Korea and Japan will inevitably consider going nuclear themselves.
South Korean officials say Thaad could be operational by April. We hope so, especially as China will continue its economic pressure campaign to block it. A Foreign Ministry spokesman said Tuesday that China will respond to the Thaad deployment and “the consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea.” The wiser course would be for Beijing to reconsider its dangerous patronage of Kim Jong Un.
-
By Bret Stephens
March 27, 2017 7:05 p.m. ET
47 COMMENTS
Rex Tillerson was widely criticized earlier this month when he suggested that “efforts of the past 20 years to bring North Korea to a point of denuclearization have failed.” The secretary of state then promised “a new approach” without offering details.
Perhaps he doesn’t yet know what that new approach is. But recognizing failure is the first step on the road to wisdom.
Since the end of the Cold War the U.S. has pursued a three-pronged approach toward North Korea. First has been a policy of inducements aimed at getting Pyongyang to change its ways. These include the unilateral removal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea in 1991, yearly shipments of heavy fuel for most of the 1990s, South Korea’s construction of the Kaesong Industrial Complex inside North Korea in 2003, and the removal of North Korea from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism in 2008.
–– ADVERTISEMENT ––
None of it worked. North Korea is too cynical, greedy and poor to stay bribed for long. And it knows it cannot abandon its nuclear program, lest it also forsake the only reason the West would pay bribes in the first place.
Then there are sanctions. North Korea may be the “most sanctioned” country on earth, as Barack Obama pointed out in 2015, but sanctions on North Korea tend to fail because China has generally been reluctant to enforce them. China last year imported $1.2 billion of North Korean coal, above the level allowed by U.N. sanctions. More recently, Beijing announced that it would cut off coal imports from Pyongyang, but only after it had already purchased its annual quota. And politically influential Chinese individuals continue to help the North evade sanctions through front companies.
Finally there is what the Obama administration called “strategic patience”—a policy of waiting for the regime to collapse or change course.
Strategic patience would be a more plausible policy if time weren’t working against us. The North is now preparing its sixth nuclear test. Its ability to marry a nuclear warhead to an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of hitting the U.S. mainland is no longer a theoretical risk. A state-of-the-art uranium-enrichment plant gives it the ability to produce as many as eight bombs a year. Some of those bombs could be shared with or sold to Iran or other malign actors.
So what’s the alternative?
It’s time to make regime change in North Korea the explicit aim of U.S. policy, both on strategic and humanitarian grounds. But there are two ways in which regime change can be pursued—and one can be used in furtherance of the other.
The first type of regime change is pro-China. Beijing has little sympathy for Kim Jong Un, who brutally purged his regime of its China sympathizers after coming to power five years ago. But Beijing’s distaste is tempered by its interest in the existence of North Korea as an independent state, mainly because it has good reason to fear the strength and example of a unified, democratic Korea led from Seoul.
Pro-China regime change would take the form of a coup, in which Kim would be given the choice of exile or execution, to be replaced by a pro-Beijing figure willing to move the country from totalitarianism to authoritarianism—a Korean replay of the transition from Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping. The U.S. would recognize the new government in exchange for verifiable nuclear disarmament, sealing the division of the peninsula.
The U.S. could support such a policy and work with China to achieve it because it would ease the suffering of North Korea’s people and put the country’s nuclear arsenal in safer (and more negotiable) hands. China should support it because it would maintain the North as a buffer state and get rid of a regime that might otherwise collapse in unpredictable and dangerous ways.
Achieving such regime change will be tricky, but China could move things along by cutting off fuel supplies to the North and “inviting” Kim and his family for an extended luxury vacation.
And if the Chinese aren’t amenable to this strategy? In that case, the U.S. should support the anti-China model of regime change, aiming not only at the end of the Kim regime but of North Korea itself.
That would mean a formal U.S. declaration in favor of unification. Other steps might include cutting off Chinese banks and companies that do business with Pyongyang from access to U.S. dollars, undertaking a campaign to highlight Chinese mistreatment of North Korean refugees, and further speeding the deployment of antiballistic missile systems to South Korea. As another inducement, Donald Trump could return to his suggestion last year that the South should have an independent nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Trump is scheduled to meet Xi Jinping at Mar-a-Lago next month. It would be a good occasion for the president to ask his Chinese counterpart which kind of regime change he’d prefer.
Write bstephens@wsj.com.
-
This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.
-
This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.
Even peacefully, reunification of Korea would be an epic economic and humanitarian crisis.
-
This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.
Even peacefully, reunification of Korea would be an epic economic and humanitarian crisis.
Undoubtedly. It made me think of the differences between the States and Mexico; cultural, economic, legal... and the two are much more closely tied in many ways than North and South Koreas' are, and the fact that the US and Mexico being drastly different. Still, it does make one think that maybe it's time to let the milk spill, and clean it up.
I have been thinking since you posted this, and it occurs to me; "we're both law enforcement, and have been for a while. Would either of us fail to execute an arrest warrant forr a murderer, just because it would throw a family or town into economic chaos?"
Kim Jong-un is no different. If it was me, he'd be gone so fast his head would spin, and (to me), we'd all collectively pick up the pieces afterwards, whatever they may be.
Obviously, it would cost a great many lives, but it is no different than what Europe suffered after WWII.
-
I'm not advocating against the fall of the NorK power structure, I'm just pointing out that S. Korea and China dread the epic problems associated with that fall.
http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/defense/326094-how-north-korea-could-kill-up-to-90-percent-of-americans-at-any
This has gone on too long. Take the hit, end the regime on humanitarian grounds, reunite the peninsula... done deal. This has gone on long enough.
Even peacefully, reunification of Korea would be an epic economic and humanitarian crisis.
Undoubtedly. It made me think of the differences between the States and Mexico; cultural, economic, legal... and the two are much more closely tied in many ways than North and South Koreas' are, and the fact that the US and Mexico being drastly different. Still, it does make one think that maybe it's time to let the milk spill, and clean it up.
I have been thinking since you posted this, and it occurs to me; "we're both law enforcement, and have been for a while. Would either of us fail to execute an arrest warrant forr a murderer, just because it would throw a family or town into economic chaos?"
Kim Jong-un is no different. If it was me, he'd be gone so fast his head would spin, and (to me), we'd all collectively pick up the pieces afterwards, whatever they may be.
Obviously, it would cost a great many lives, but it is no different than what Europe suffered after WWII.
-
:-o :-o :-o
-
http://mwi.usma.edu/five-fatal-challenges-warfighting-korea/
-
An important and timely reminder of reality!!!
-
I have had our webmaster merge two threads.
-
North Korea: U.S. Increases Pressure on China to Act
April 10, 2017 | 20:12 GMT Print
Text Size
(Stratfor)
The U.S. missile strike on a Syrian air base on April 6 during the summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping, at which North Korea's nuclear weapons program was a topic at hand, no doubt sent a clear message to Beijing about the United States' willingness to use military force. Following the strike, the USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group was rerouted toward the Korean Peninsula, making that message even more explicit. At a time when the United States is reviewing its policy in dealing with North Korea, the deployment both ramps up military pressure on Pyongyang and broadens U.S. options in the region.
However, the prospect of unilateral military action against North Korea has unnerved U.S. allies. Both Japan and South Korea have expressed concerns about a possible U.S. strike aimed at derailing North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The Japanese Defense Ministry says Tokyo has not been informed of any preparations for an attack and said it would raise objections if it gets indications of a pending attack. The government in Seoul also appeared jittery about the safety and security risks that a preemptive strike would pose.
As the United States considers ways to thwart Pyongyang's nuclear weapons and missile programs, a military response remains a credible option, but one that could invite highly costly consequences. Unlike in Syria, Washington cannot assume that North Korea would not respond to an attack in kind. A retaliatory North Korean artillery strike against the South or assaults on U.S. military bases in South Korea and Japan could easily spiral into a wider regional conflict. If a U.S. strike takes place without first consulting China, Beijing's reactions could cause further complications.
And as North Korea's nuclear infrastructure becomes more sophisticated, it grows more difficult to design a military campaign that could eliminate the entire program and facilities, especially in the absence of credible intelligence. Those challenges repeatedly plagued successive U.S. administrations, long delaying any use of force by the United States to deter North Korea. In 1994, U.S. President Bill Clinton considered military action against the North, coming the closest any U.S. president has come, but he opted instead to engage in talks in an effort to thwart Pyongyang's nuclear program. North Korea's test of a long-range rocket in 1998 and a new U.S. tone under President George W. Bush's administration in 2001 brought an end to that approach.
With its recent moves, the Trump White House is delivering an ultimatum to the Chinese to either work with the United States in stopping North Korea's drive for a nuclear deterrent or deal with the consequences of U.S. action on secondary sanctions as it develops a credible military option and enlarges its military footprint in the region. Beijing, for its part, continues to urge diplomacy, but it also has shown some willingness to increase pressure on the North as it aims to ease Washington's challenges on trade and on other fronts and simultaneously reassesses its options against Pyongyang.
During an April 10 visit to South Korea by Wu Dawei, China's special envoy in charge of dealing with North Korea's nuclear program, both sides reportedly agreed to adopt "an even stronger U.N. resolution" in the event that the North conducts an additional test of a nuclear weapon. However, any Chinese action in dealing with North Korea will stop short of creating instability in North Korea by cutting Pyongyang's economic lifeline. But as Beijing struggles with its unpredictable and increasingly recalcitrant neighbor, even those in Chinese policy circles are beginning consider a different approach, including a possible decapitation strategy, to bring North Korea's leadership to heel.
-
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4399076/China-deploys-150-000-troops-North-Korea-border.html
-
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4399076/China-deploys-150-000-troops-North-Korea-border.html
I believe that is most likely to secure China's border to
prevent a flood of NorK refugees should the state collapse. Hopefully this means China is giving the NorKs the Fredo kiss.
-
http://redstatewatcher.com/article.asp?id=73169
http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/790843/world-war-3-china-bomb-north-korea-kim-jong-un-nuclear-test
-
This announcement is quite bizarre all of a sudden.
some sort of pscyhological game ?
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/white-house-no-evidence-north-korea/2017/04/11/id/783854/
-
My understanding has been that they are sedulously working on the ICBM thing AND making bombs small enough to put on them.
The point is to prevent them from having these two things in hand i.e. Nork threats of nuke war at this point in time are empty.
-
My understanding has been that they are sedulously working on the ICBM thing AND making bombs small enough to put on them.
The point is to prevent them from having these two things in hand i.e. Nork threats of nuke war at this point in time are empty.
The good news is that North Korea agreed to freeze its nuclear program in 1994 under intense diplomatic pressure (sarcasm alert) from President Bill Clinton and Secretary of State Madeline Halflbright, consummated with billions in graft aid.
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15210254/ns/politics/t/mccain-criticizes-bill-clinton-north-korea/#.WO5yPzvyvIU
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/dprkchron
So that settles it. :wink:
Fast forward: "North Korea says it has conducted five successful nuclear tests: in 2006, 2009, 2013 and in January and September 2016."
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11813699
That doesn't mean NK has a "working nuclear weapon" but they have the pieces of the puzzle including significant range delivery systems.
There seems to be a lot of positioning and gamesmanship going on right now, besides the administration making mis-statements intentional and unintentional. For what purpose we don't know...
-
The Adventure continues!
-
"There seems to be a lot of positioning and gamesmanship going on right now, besides the administration making mis-statements intentional and unintentional. For what purpose we don't know..."
Is he trying to bully the bully?
Have the made the calculation the bully of Korea will back down?
It is easier for us, but it is S Korea on the front lines:
http://mengnews.joins.com/view.aspx?aId=2929444
What a horrible thought.
But how much longer can we wait before doing anything?
-
I wonder if the navy has the means to shoot down Kim's missile if it does not crash on its own. I think Kim will back down. He probably is not willing to risk *his* own life
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/military-confrontation-US-Carl-Vinson/2017/04/12/id/784045/
-
Situation Reports
April 13, 2017 | 00:21 GMT Print
Stratfor
The North Korean government appears to be preparing for a nuclear test at the Punggye-ri test site, according to an April 12 report by 38 North, a program of the U.S.-Korea Institute at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, part of Johns Hopkins University. The U.S. government believes a test could come the morning of April 15 local time, the White House bureau chief for Voice of America said via Twitter. April 15 is a politically significant date for Pyongyang because it marks the 105th anniversary of the birth of North Korean founder Kim Il Sung. An April 12 editorial in the Global Times, a Chinese newspaper that sometimes reflects the opinions of the country's leaders, cautioned that Beijing may allow tougher U.N. sanctions against North Korea should it carry out another nuclear test.
-
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/apr/13/pentagon-us-dropped-largest-non-nuclear-bomb-in-af/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWTJNd05HRTFNRFl4TWpZMCIsInQiOiI5RXcxR3pTaWJVd1wvY1wvZ3NGZU5kTWlFeWYxamZua3hrNDk3bG9lXC8xZTRaZU8yNmVuU1NkcFlGMld2TWFjcjBjNkk4VXZucGNyNEt1dlN2Zm1xYlFxTloxc2NXbnE2VllDU1wvYklBbkFuZFBoVTU4TE05MUg5RGZWR2pObTRCVngifQ%3D%3D
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9_chcr16C_Q
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i9H50tHiHjs
-
"Attention North Korea , , ,"
and maybe Iran too
-
http://solutions.heritage.org/geopolitics-flash-points/north-korea/
-
Maps in the original not printing here:
Analysis
All eyes are focused on the Korean Peninsula. Signs suggest that North Korea is preparing to conduct another nuclear weapons test, perhaps as soon as April 15, to commemorate the 105th anniversary of the birth of the country's founder, Kim Il Sung. If Pyongyang follows through, the act will be nothing short of a provocation.
As tensions mount, China has stressed the importance of diplomacy and of preventing the situation from escalating to an "irreversible and unmanageable stage." So far, U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has relied largely on non-kinetic means such as additional sanctions and increased enforcement or enhanced regional missile defense to keep North Korea's nuclear ambitions in check. But Washington has made clear that it will keep all of its options open. As the United States demonstrated with its limited cruise missile strike in Syria on April 6, it is willing to take unilateral military action. And considering North Korea's dogged efforts to advance its nuclear program, the Trump administration will have to carefully calculate the risks of a potential military strike.
A Range of Options
Action against North Korea could take many shapes or forms, from a limited strike to a large-scale military offensive targeting all of North Korea's military assets. On the lowest end of the scale, the United States could launch a strike to punish North Korea for continuing to develop its nuclear and missile arsenal and to deter it from pursuing nuclear weapons in the future. A punitive strike may be limited to a single base or facility in the country, with the threat of further action down the line if Pyongyang doesn't alter its behavior. Though this kind of attack offers the best way to keep the situation from escalating, it would by no means ensure that North Korea heeds the United States' warning and eases up on its nuclear and missile development. Nor does it eliminate the risk that Pyongyang may respond to the strike in kind.
Alternatively, the United States could elect to launch a more comprehensive punitive or preventive strike in an attempt to physically interrupt the nuclear and missile programs' maturation. The strikes would still be limited, focusing only on nuclear and missile infrastructure to signal that the United States is not trying to orchestrate a change in the country's leadership. This kind of operation, such as a strike on a single target, would encourage North Korea to curb its response so as not to provoke further attacks — though a full-scale retaliation could not be ruled out.
If Washington judges that Pyongyang is likely to launch a counterattack regardless, it may decide a comprehensive campaign to degrade or eliminate North Korea's retaliatory capacity would be most prudent. This scenario would best position the United States and its allies against a North Korean response, but it would entail significant risks, virtually guaranteeing full-blown war on the Korean Peninsula. Consequently, a campaign of this magnitude would require buy-in from regional actors — something that has yet to manifest — and a buildup of military assets far greater than what the United States has deployed in the region so far. A more limited strike, be it a focused punitive strike or a larger one targeting nuclear and missile infrastructure, is more likely at this point. In the meantime, the Pentagon has rerouted several carrier strike groups to the waters surrounding the Korean Peninsula.
Weighing the Risks
Such an operation could involve cruise missiles as well as fixed-wing aircraft conducting strikes against various facilities across North Korea. Prime targets include the nuclear reactor or uranium enrichment facility at Yongbyon, as well as North Korean nuclear scientists. Should the United States plan more extensive strikes aimed at disabling all elements of the North Korean nuclear program, it may also deploy special operations forces to go after underground facilities that airstrikes couldn't easily or reliably destroy. But the broader the target set, the greater the risk of retaliation. North Korea has a hefty arsenal of short- and medium-range missiles that it could launch at nearby targets, including U.S. military facilities elsewhere in the region. Pyongyang's conventional artillery, moreover, could also do significant damage to northern areas of South Korea, reaching as far as the country's capital. U.S. military planners would likely view this kind of escalation as an unacceptable risk.
The United States will base its decision about whether and how to strike North Korea in large part on the kind of reaction it anticipates from Pyongyang. North Korea has many reasons to mount a credible retaliation to any action taken against it, not only to maintain the appearance of a powerful actor on the global stage but also to ensure domestic stability. A weak response from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un's administration could undermine its legitimacy among the country's public or perhaps prompt a palace coup. At the same time, however, Pyongyang understands that a significant retaliation would meet with a commensurate response, which could cripple North Korea's military capabilities.
If the United States determines the country is unlikely to take that kind of chance, it will have little else standing in the way of a military strike. Short of that scenario, however, Washington may still be willing to assume the risks of a limited retaliation. The United States could consider the launch of a small number of missiles that might be intercepted, for example, or incursions by North Korean special operations forces into South Korean territory to be acceptable consequences. Even low-level naval skirmishes may not be considered too great a repercussion. Still, anticipating the scale of North Korea's response is a daunting and treacherous gamble.
Beijing's Options
Then there's China's response to consider. Until now, Beijing has stressed diplomatic solutions to ease the rising tension, all the while warning against the chain reaction that military action against Pyongyang could set off. Beijing has consistently made clear that its red line on the issue is war or instability on the Korean Peninsula; China wants to make sure that it has a pliable buffer state along its northeastern border.
In the event of a military strike against North Korea, China could intervene, either to support the North Korean government or to facilitate a power transition without jeopardizing order in the country. Its options for intervention range from military backing for Pyongyang to support for a U.S.-led military campaign to a decapitation strike. But whatever path it chooses, it will stay focused on ensuring the North Korean state's continuity and preventing any scenario that could lead the Korean Peninsula to unify under a competing power.
The United States would doubtless risk a response in kind from China should it launch a military strike without consulting Beijing. And if Washington were to launch a full-scale campaign against North Korea, or if a limited attack spirals into a war, the likelihood of a Chinese military intervention to secure its interests on the Korean Peninsula will climb. Along with its desire to keep a buffer between its territory and U.S. forces in South Korea, China is worried about the threat of spillover from a potential conflict in North Korea.
What to Watch Out For
The window has not closed on a diplomatic solution to the problem. Pyongyang may decide to postpone its nuclear test, and the United States, in turn, could delay military action in favor of tougher sanctions. Still, given the high stakes at play, Stratfor will be watching closely for early warnings of impending military action.
North Korea's Nuclear Test
Having weighed the risks of another nuclear test, the North Korean government may be rethinking the move. On April 14, the country's foreign minister said in an interview that Pyongyang would forge ahead with the test "whenever supreme headquarters sees fit," not necessarily on April 15. Delaying the nuclear test, however, also carries enormous risk for North Korea since it could embolden the United States and provide an opportunity for a punitive strike. Preparations for a military parade to commemorate the founder's birthday appear to be on track so far. If the current leader tries to reduce his own visibility during the festivities, his behavior could indicate that he perceives a high risk of military action.
Defensive Preparations Near the North-South Border
South Korea is always on alert during its northern neighbor's test cycles. And because it is a prime target for North Korea's prospective retaliatory action, the country is anxious about the possibility of a military strike — all the more so as it deals with prolonged political instability at home. South Korea's acting president has ordered his military to intensify preparations. But reports have yet to surface that the country is bolstering security at the border.
A Shutdown at China's Border
Overall, we are on the lookout for any sign that China is changing its military posture or taking steps to evacuate foreigners from North Korea. Reports suggest that China is mobilizing troops along the border, though we have not been able to verify these claims. Nonetheless, Air China — one of two airlines with service to North Korea — has announced that it is canceling flights to the country starting April 17. As one of the only countries that operate flights to North Korea, China may be trying to prove that it is willing to ramp up its economic pressure on Pyongyang. Otherwise, it may have canceled the flights simply because of low passenger turnout. The move could also be a precautionary measure, though, and we're watching to see whether it indicates that China is preparing for a military crisis.
Changes in Travel Plans or Diplomatic Activity
Changes to the itinerary of U.S. Vice President Mike Pence's impending 10-day tour of the Asia-Pacific region would be a red flag. He is expected to celebrate Easter with U.S. forces in South Korea. A sudden uptick in diplomatic activity between the United States and China, likewise, could signal imminent action in North Korea.
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html?emc=edit_na_20170415&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html?emc=edit_na_20170415&nl=breaking-news&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0
Yeah, I was thinking the same thing.
http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a19877/how-the-military-will-be-revolutionized-by-laser-weaponry/
"Unlike their fictional cousins in video games and movies, lasers don't make a sizzling noise as they burn through the air. Lasers can also be invisible, unless they pass through a medium such as smoke or fog. Someone under fire from a laser weapon may not know they're under attack until holes start appearing in things, things get very hot, and ammunition starts exploding."
-
http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20170414000750
[Robert Park] Japan and China visibly preparing for preventive strike fallout
Published : 2017-04-16 17:48
Updated : 2017-04-16 17:48
Japan and China have already taken clear-cut measures to safeguard their nationals and interests in the event of a looming military confrontation.
Meanwhile, Korean civilians -- who would suffer most devastatingly as “collateral damage” on account of preventive strikes against North Korea -- remain singularly and inexplicably vulnerable as well as thoroughly unprepared for the possibility.
Bewilderingly, South Korea’s opposition to such strikes has yet to be delivered to the US in an unequivocal and unwavering manner.
As political scientist John Delury stated regarding the “pre-emptive strike” scheme for a March 10 report, “The role of a South Korean president, whether liberal or conservative, is to be the person who gently takes that option off the table. The South Korean president has to be saying, ‘If you take out their missile pad, they take out our capital.’ But that hasn’t been happening.”
Trump’s “unpredictability” renders South Korea’s present ambiguity on the vital matter all the more perilous. It is critical to immediately clarify with counterparts in the US the South’s stance.
Brian Bridges, an adjunct professor of Asian politics at Lingnan University, told Bloomberg for an April 12 report: “This has the potential to turn into a conflagration that Asia hasn’t seen since the Vietnam war. If anything, his unpredictability makes the situation more risky because the North Koreans aren’t 100 percent sure he won’t attack.”
Many analysts have stressed that the risk of miscalculated military operations -- via adversaries misreading each other’s intentions -- remains among the gravest and most credible dangers the Korean Peninsula and people face today.
South Korea should pay closer attention to relevant developments in Japan.
In March, Japan began civilian evacuation drills preparing for a North Korea-related contingency.
During a bilateral government meeting preceding last week’s Trump-Xi summit, Japan’s Kyodo News reports Washington informed Tokyo it is highly possible they will strike the North and that the US president intended to deliver this plan to Xi.
Following the US-China summit, the Huanqiu Shibao, one of China’s state-run newspapers, addressed war rumors relevant to the Korean Peninsula as of legitimate concern, calling for heightened vigilance over this particular period on Tuesday. Kim Jong-un is generally believed to be preparing a nuclear or missile test, or possibly another type of provocation this month for his grandfather’s birthday and/or for the foundation date of the North Korean armed forces on April 25.
On Wednesday, Japan’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported the US has accepted Tokyo’s request for bilateral consultation preceding military action against North Korea. Somehow, South Korea seems to be left out when the region, in the wake of US strikes, would be required to absorb the full force of Kim Jong-un’s reprisals while woefully unprotected.
KBS reported Tuesday a senior researcher at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies warned “a US pre-emptive strike against North Korea will cause massive civilian casualties in South Korea,” further pointing out that the North’s counterattack “would not deal a severe blow to US troops, however South Korea‘s capital region, with a population of 25 million, is within the range of the North’s artillery attack.”
Cheong Seong-chang, senior research fellow at the Sejong Institute, stated for an April 11 article: “If the US attacks the Yongbyon facility, it will open the curtains to the worst-case scenario -- nuclear war -- as North Korea could attack South Korea’s nuclear plants or Seoul using nuclear weapons. ... Japan will support the US in attacking North Korea.”
On Sunday, former Japanese Cabinet Minister Shigeru Ishiba -- who has openly advocated for his country to establish the capability to conduct “pre-emptive” strikes against North Korea, and may become prime minister -- declared “Seoul might turn into a sea of fire,” while “calling for measures to rescue Japanese citizens in Seoul.” As Dong-A Ilbo pointed out in an editorial Tuesday, “Such a remark was publicly made by such an influential politician, which is simply petrifying.”
None can convincingly deny that Japan would be considerably more privy to what the US may or may not do, given the undisguised closeness of the Abe and Trump administrations.
As Joongang Ilbo pointed out in an April 10 editorial, Trump phoned Shinzo Abe before the Trump-Xi summit to discuss issues that would be raised, while no such conversation was held with Seoul.
Following the summit, Trump spoke for 45 minutes with Abe but only 20 minutes with South Korea’s Prime Minister and acting President Hwang Kyo-ahn.
We witnessed a similar disparity during Rex Tillerson’s time in Asia, and in other settings.
Most conspicuously and alarmingly, while Trump has appointed ambassadors to Japan, China and Russia, none has yet been named for Korea.
On Tuesday, Japanese Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga conveyed Tokyo’s support for Washington’s consideration of “all options” vis–a–vis North Korea.
Japanese media reports the return of Tokyo’s ambassador to the South was linked to the need for facilitating the evacuation of Japanese citizens in the event of war.
It seems both China and Japan are not quite convinced that threats of a US strike on North Korea are merely bombast. The fact that both countries’ leaders have had summit meetings with Trump -- while South Korea has not -- and are taking such substantial measures ought not to be dismissed by South Koreans.
In a March 20 commentary titled “Bombing North Korea is not an option,” Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times reminds that multiple “waves” of preventive strikes would be needed to achieve US stated objectives as “North Korean nuclear and missile programs are widely dispersed, including underground and underwater.”
“It is unlikely that the whole program could be destroyed in a single wave of strikes, which would immediately raise the prospect of nuclear retaliation by the North,” Rachman wrote.
A positive and commendable step in the proper direction is that Seoul’s unification minister, Hong Yong-pyo, has stepped forward to declare South Korea’s opposition to American military action against North Korea. Through a media conference Monday, Hong stated the government will need to “consult with Washington about a pre-emptive strike against the North considering the impact it would have on the security of South Korea.” The above suggests, however, that this conversation has yet to sufficiently take place. Hong added “South Korea cannot see eye to eye with the US on every military decision,” KBS reported.
The South Korean government must now deliver the equivalent message to US authorities and “gently” but categorically remove the US military strike option “off the table” -- so that such a catastrophic misstep would never be left to chance nor a distressed, unprepared and precariously assailable populace abandoned to such agonizing speculation.
By Robert Park
Robert Park is a founding member of the nonpartisan Worldwide Coalition to Stop Genocide in North Korea, minister, musician and former prisoner of conscience. He can be reached at wcsgnk1@protonmail.com. -- Ed.
-
http://observer.com/2017/03/rex-tillerson-north-korea-threat-strategic-patience/
Rex Tillerson: North Korea Threat Is Imminent, Strategic Patience Is Over
All options are on the table—including South Korea and Japan becoming nuclear powers
By Austin Bay • 03/23/17 6:30am
The dire threat North Korea presents to peace in East Asia starts with this fact: The Korean War never really ended.
It may shock some mainstream media minds to discover that Donald Trump is already a Korean War president, but so was Barack “Nobel Peace Prize” Obama, and every other American president since Dwight Eisenhower and Harry Truman. Truman was president in 1950 when, with the backing of Soviet Russia, North Korea’s “Great Leader” Kim Il Sung launched a surprise invasion of South Korea. The war Kim the First (Kim 1) began would eventually involve the U.S. and Communist China.
The Military Demarcation Line dividing the United Nations’ “truce village” of Panmunjom doesn’t legally demarcate the political boundary between North Korea and South Korea. It simply splits a demilitarized zone (DMZ) separating two warring armies ostensibly observing the fragile ceasefire the 1953 armistice established. The DMZ more or less reflects the final positions of the dug-in Free World and Communist armies.
Unfinished historical business? The Korean War isn’t the past. It’s a complex geo-political nightmare of the present. North Korea’s now-dynastic “Kim family” Communist regime creates the nightmare—and economically and politically exploits the fears it incites. The Kim dictatorship apparently believes that perpetuating the threat of another massively destructive conventional war with South Korea and its allies is essential.
History demonstrates that the North Korean regime is responsible for the ceasefire’s fragility. Since 1953, Pyongyang has repeatedly shattered the ceasefire, waging in belligerent fits and spasms a calculated, contained, yet always deadly war of aggression against South Korea. The March 26, 2010 attack on the corvette Cheonan is a particularly bloody example. Forty-six South Korean sailors died when a North Korean torpedo sank the ship. It was the highest death toll from a single North Korean attack since the 1960s.
The Kim dynasty also employs assassination and terror to kill its enemies (real and imagined) throughout the world.
East Asia is one of the world’s most economically productive regions. Seoul, Tokyo and Shanghai confirm that. The Kim dynasty’s “contained war” implicitly threatens damage (to various degrees) to these multi-trillion dollar contributors to global GDP. (Damage Shanghai? China believes a conventional war on the Korean peninsula could drive millions of refugees into northern China.)
The “contained war” willfully risks igniting a devastating, uncontained multi-polar war that could spread far beyond East Asia.
Why? The explanation links two dynastic goals. Pyongyang’s paranoid Communists still believe that they can ultimately obtain their key 1950 war objective: a Korea unified under Korean Communist control. They have also concluded that, in order to maintain control of the North Korean state, they must maintain a perpetual state of war. Both Kim Il Sung’s son and successor, Kim Jong Il (Kim 2), and his successor, current dictator Kim Jong Un (Kim 3) have pursued these goals.
The Kims don’t threaten to die fighting; they are already fighting. For a price, paid in aid or cash or food or fuel, their regime will restrain itself and end its latest belligerent fit. It may also tone down its violent rhetoric—until the next time. This summarizes the regime’s script for rattling its enemies and extorting bribes.
Time—time passes. Time has passed. There have been dozens of next times.
Now, North Korea’s next times routinely involve ballistic missiles and nuclear devices.
In 2011, North Korea began an accelerated ballistic missile test program. Since then, it has conducted over 30 live-fire tests. Still, the tests tended to follow the script. North Korea would issue rhetorical threats then fire a missile.
A missile test launch in August 2016 demonstrated improved capabilities. After traveling 1,000 kilometers, the missile splashed into the Sea of Japan but inside Japan’s maritime Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Missile tracking data confirmed the strike location. A threat? No, a North Korean missile had physically violated Japanese sovereignty.
North Korea’s first nuclear test, conducted in 2006, was a fizzle, with a yield of about 0.7 kilotons. But a decade makes a difference. On September 9, 2016, North Korea claimed that it tested a nuclear warhead. Warhead or not, the device was nuclear and powerful. Monitors estimated its yield at 20 to 30 kilotons (about twice the size of the Hiroshima bomb).
It’s 2017. Kim Jong Un possesses ballistic missiles with near-intercontinental range. His regime has nuclear devices and, over time, intends to produce nuclear weapons. On March 6, 2017 his forces launched a volley of four ballistic missiles. This time, three landed in Japanese waters. The next day, Pyongyang announced that the missile launches were “practice” for targeting U.S. bases in Japan.
Practice for a first strike in a regional war? Yes.
North Korean extended-range missiles can already threaten Guam and parts of Alaska. Some analysts think the Hawaiian Islands are in range.
North Korea has declared that it will soon deploy long range missiles that can target the continental U.S. In March 2013, North Korea revealed that Austin, Texas (where South Korea’s Samsung Electronics Co. has a manufacturing facility) is a potential target. Washington, D.C. appeared on the target list.
On February 12, 2017 the regime tested a new intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM), the Pukgukson-2 (Polaris-2). Solid fuel propels the missile, so Kim Jong Un’s troops can launch it on short notice. A tracked transporter erector-launcher (TEL) fired the missile, so the new missile is mobile. North Korea has few paved roads; a tracked TEL isn’t road bound. Moreover, the Pukgukson-2 was cold-launched—expelled from the TEL before main booster ignition. Missile experts say that indicates that a submarine can launch it.
The bottom line is that over the last eight months the regime has conducted weapons tests that demonstrate that it’s acquiring the operational military capabilities required to launch a very uncontained nuclear war.
The North Korean regime’s “contained war” strategy has exploited two policies that have been more or less strategic constants since 1953. The first is Communist China’s tacit long-term support for North Korea’s Communist dictatorship.
Beijing’s support for Pyongyang circa 2017 may not be as iron-clad as its support circa 1997, but that support remains.
The second policy, “contained war,” exploited the policy of “strategic patience” followed by South Korea, Japan and the U.S. It was part of the U.S. Cold War strategy of “containment.” South Korea and its allies would militarily contain North Korea. South Korea would pursue economic development and political liberalization. Over time, the North Korean regime might “mellow,” to appropriate George Kennan’s word for diminishing Soviet belligerence.
Until that change occurred, South Korea would absorb small attacks, no matter how vicious and provocative, in order to prevent a confrontation escalating to all-out war. Seoul’s northern suburbs are still within range of North Korea tube and rocket artillery. Even a short conventional war might kill tens of thousands of civilians. South Korea would definitely suffer severe economic loss.
“Soft power” appeals might solicit North Korean cooperation and eventually reduce its aggressiveness. So South Korea, Japan and the U.S. tried soft power—and did they ever.
The Clinton Administration’s 1994 Agreed Framework gave Kim Il Sung heavy fuel oil and technical assistance if his regime would shut down the nuclear reactors it used to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The U.S. would even help North Korea acquire light water nuclear reactors for electrical generation if it permitted International Atomic Energy Agency inspections and complied with other IAEA safeguards. In 2002, the U.S. determined that North Korea had violated the Agreed Framework and had an ongoing uranium enrichment program. Indeed, it did.
In 2000 South Korea began its Sunshine Policy—soft power on steroids. South Korea would reward North Korea with “economic incentives” in exchange for political cooperation. Seoul’s goal was eventual détente and peace.
Then, North Korea conducted its 2006 nuclear test. The test was supposed to scare South Korea, and it did. Pyongyang refused Seoul’s demand that it halt its nuclear weapons program.
In 2008, the South Korean government decided that Sunshine would diminish as long as the North sought nuclear weapons. Current incentive programs would continue, but there would be no new endeavors until North Korea ended its nuclear quest. North Korea conducted another nuclear test in 2009. The Cheonan incident solidified opposition to the Sunshine Policy. In November 2010, South Korea’s Unification Ministry terminated the program.
The Sunshine Policy’s “soft power” failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. UN sanctions may have hindered it, but they haven’t stopped it, either. The “Panama Papers” scandal revealed that the Panamanian law firm, Mossack Fonseca, helped a financial firm fund North Korea’s nuclear weapons program. According to investigators, the firm’s owners were based in Pyongyang. The Kim regime knows how to evade sanctions by hiring the skillfully incurious.
By 2010, South Korea and Japan had concluded that “strategic patience” had failed. President Barack Obama said “strategic patience” still guided U.S. policy, but he also approved the deployment of a U.S. Army Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense battery to South Korea. The battery arrived this February.
In Seoul on March 17, after visiting the DMZ, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson succinctly sketched America’s evolving position: “Let me be very clear: the policy of strategic patience has ended. We are exploring a new range of diplomatic, security, economic measures. All options are on the table.”
All options included the possible acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Korea and Japan. Japan and South Korea are already investing in improved ballistic missile defense systems.
A day later in a sit-down interview with the Independent Journal Review, Tillerson insisted, “Our objective is a denuclearized Korean peninsula. A denuclearized Korean peninsula negates any thought or need for Japan to have nuclear weapons. We say all options are on the table, but we cannot predict the future. So we do think it’s important that everyone in the region has a clear understanding that circumstances could evolve to the point that for mutual deterrence reasons, we might have to consider that. But as I said yesterday, there are a lot of… there’s a lot of steps and a lot of distance between now and a time that we would have to make a decision like that.”
When the interviewer pressed him about how to “get ahead” of North Korea, Tillerson added, “We’re not sure if we can get ahead of them. If they just continue, you know, we’re headed to a place no one wants to be… if they continue with their testing and continue the development of both their weapons and their delivery systems, then we’re going to find ourselves in a place that’s even more dangerous than we are today.”
The Independent Journal Review’s interview transcript indicates that Tillerson used the word “imminent” at least four times—“imminent circumstances” and “imminent threat.” “Imminent” is a politically flammable term and, in regards to Iraq, still incites bitter argument. The Bush administration never used the word “imminent” to describe Saddam Hussein’s potential use of weapons of mass destruction. However, it definitely portrayed the threat Saddam posed as dire and urgent.
Saddam had a WMD record. His forces had used chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers and Kurdish rebels. WMD was certainly part of Saddam’s “threat profile.”
“Imminent” is an important word. In 2002, the Bush administration argued that 9/11 demanded the international legal concept of “imminent threat” be revised to deal with 21st century adversaries.
Inaction, particularly when an adversary has WMD, entails risk. Inaction when an adversary is a terrorist with WMD may entail unacceptable risks.
Unlike the Bush administration, the Trump administration has deliberately and emphatically used the word “imminent.” Secretary of State Tillerson repeated it. Diplomats know he was sending a message.
On February 13, the day after the Pukgukson-2 launch, assassins in Malaysia murdered Kim Jong Un’s half-brother, Kim Jong Nam. The hit team killed him at the Kuala Lumpur airport in front of a closed circuit television camera.
Korean media report that North Korean defectors repeatedly asked Jong Nam to politically challenge Jong Un. One defector group in Europe even asked him to lead a government in exile. Jong Nam rejected the proposal. Though he said he supported reform in North Korea, Jong Nam also said he supported his younger brother.
Yet, Kim Jong Un decided his brother presented a growing threat to his regime, so had his brother killed. The assassins apparently sprayed Jong Nam’s face with liquid nerve agent VX. When delivered with missile warheads or artillery shells, VX is a weapon of mass destruction, “the most deadly chemical weapon ever produced.”
Is war with North Korea a “trip wire” conflict? Yes. It has been since Kim Il Sung’s surprise attack in 1950. With Kim Jong Un in charge any “incident of escalation” could lead to conflagration.
The Trump administration is clearly pressuring China. I guarantee Beijing gulped when Tillerson suggested that South Korea and Japan might acquire nuclear weapons—and it was supposed to. China has regarded the presence of U.S. forces in Japan as a brake on a revival of Japanese militarism. In the mid-1980s, I attended a U.S. Army War College reception for a Chinese military officer who had given a talk to War College students. The Chinese officer wore his uniform; most of the American student officers wore business suits. I overheard a part of a conversation the Chinese officer was having with a group of students. The subject was the forward deployment of U.S. forces in Japan and specifically the stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Japan. The Chinese officer smiled. “The U.S. Navy in Yokahama…in China we think this is very good.” His eyes twinkled. I doubt they’re twinkling now.
Japan doesn’t really want nuclear weapons, and China definitely doesn’t want Japan to acquire nuclear weapons.
But the Kim dynasty’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them continues unabated and the threat they pose is increasing.
China must bring decisive pressure on North Korea’s regime. By decisive, I mean pressure that terminates North Korea’s nuclear weapons program.
Perhaps China can produce a diplomatic miracle and convince Kim Jong Un that ending the program is the only way he and his regime will survive. This diplomatic miracle would deserve a Nobel Peace Prize.
China may have the covert wherewithal to induce the North Korean military to conduct “regime change from within.” I suspect this fear haunts Kim Jong Un. Kim Jong Nam reportedly had numerous friends in China.
If China cannot bring decisive pressure, or refuses to do so, then the threat of a high-intensity war fought to determine the Kim dynasty’s fate will eventually become imminent. Should this last phase of the Korean War erupt, it won’t be confined to the peninsula. If nuclear weapons strike cities the casualties will be enormous.
Like Rex Tillerson said, “…we’re headed to a place no one wants to be.”
Austin Bay is a contributing editor at StrategyPage.com and adjunct professor at the University of Texas in Austin. His most recent book is a biography of Kemal Ataturk (Macmillan 2011). Bay is a retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel.
-
Trump’s Art of the China Deal
Will Xi Jinping really help the U.S. contain North Korea?
President Donald Trump, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago, in Palm Beach, Fla.
President Donald Trump, left, and Chinese President Xi Jinping walk together after their meetings at Mar-a-Lago, in Palm Beach, Fla. Photo: Associated Press
April 16, 2017 5:44 p.m. ET
42 COMMENTS
President Trump is reversing some of his foreign-policy positions, but this should be no great surprise and so far the changes are mainly for the better. Mr. Trump is never going to pursue a consistent geopolitical strategy because he doesn’t think that way. As President he is approaching the world as he does everything else—as a transactional deal maker who wants agreements that he can sell as a security or economic success. Exhibit A is his recent engagement with China over North Korea’s nuclear missile program.
Mr. Trump campaigned last year as the President who would challenge China’s trade practices, naming Beijing a currency manipulator “on day one.” But after the election President Obama advised him to make North Korea’s nuclear advances a priority. Mr. Trump had no problem shifting quickly from threatening China on trade to using trade as a lever to get China to help the U.S. restrain or end North Korea’s nuclear threat.
“Why would I call China a currency manipulator when they are working with us on the North Korean problem? We will see what happens!” Mr. Trump tweeted on Easter Sunday, explaining why his Treasury Department chose not to slap the manipulator label on China. This policy shift has the added benefit of recognizing that China has been trying for months to prop up its currency, not devalue it for trade advantages.
Meanwhile, the Trump Administration has made a theme of ramping up political pressure on North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un. The Pentagon sent a carrier group to the East China Sea for maneuvers with the Japanese navy. Mr. Trump tweeted after his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping this month that “I have great confidence that China will properly deal with North Korea. If they are unable to do so, the U.S., with its allies, will!”
H.R. McMaster, Mr. Trump’s national security adviser, warned North Korea on Sunday that its “destabilizing” behavior “can’t continue” after the North launched another missile Saturday, albeit a failure that exploded soon after launch. There’s been much media speculation that a U.S. cyber attack helped to scuttle the missile launch. We’d like to think so, though no one in government has confirmed it.
The problem is that so far there’s little evidence that China is changing its policy toward Pyongyang. The case for optimism includes some editorials in Chinese state media criticizing the Kim regime, as well as reports that China has turned back North Korean ships carrying coal exports. The White House also points to China’s decision last week to abstain at the U.N. and not join Russia in vetoing a resolution condemning Syria’s nuclear attack.
But none of this deterred Mr. Kim from his Saturday missile test or from a public parade of military hardware and missiles. China’s trade with the North has grown tenfold in the last 15 years, even as China has claimed to support United Nations sanctions to punish Pyongyang. And China has played a double game on the North’s coal exports in the past. (“China’s North Korea Feint,” March 5, 2017.)
China’s official rhetoric toward the North also hasn’t changed, with Foreign Minister Wang Yi telling reporters Friday that “we call on all parties to refrain from provoking and threatening each other, whether in words or actions, and not let the situation get to an irreversible and unmanageable stage.”
That’s the usual Chinese formulation blaming the U.S. and the North equally for tensions on the Korean peninsula. China still shows no sign of considering regime change in the North, even to a friendly new dictator who wouldn’t pursue intercontinental nuclear missiles. And it hasn’t shown that it’s willing to enforce sanctions to a degree that would seriously squeeze the North.
Perhaps that will change, as Mr. Trump’s hopeful tweets imply. But China is expert at offering cosmetic concessions while adhering to what it considers its long-term national interests. China’s goal now may be to coax Mr. Trump into the same multinational arms-control dialogue with North Korea that has failed three previous U.S. Presidents.
Mr. Trump’s art of the deal includes keeping adversaries guessing, but eventually China may choose to test how far he is willing to go to stop a Korean nuclear missile. Mr. Trump needs to make clear what he will do if China won’t make a Korean deal.
-
https://mobile.nytimes.com/2017/04/15/world/asia/north-korea-missiles-pyongyang-kim-jong-un.html
-
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/329952-us-unlikely-to-have-been-behind-botched-north-korean-missile-launch
-
http://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/329952-us-unlikely-to-have-been-behind-botched-north-korean-missile-launch
Disinfo, IMHO.
-
http://thehill.com/policy/international/330080-former-un-ambassador-it-only-gets-worse-with-north-korea
-
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-travelogue-20170419-story.html
There's no such thing as a failed missile launch: Lessons from North Korea, the post-truth capital of the world
In this Saturday, April 15, 2017, photo, soldiers salute as their national anthem is played during a
Soldiers salute as their national anthem is played during a military parade to celebrate the 105th birthday of Kim Il Sung, in Pyongyang, North Korea. (Wong Maye-E / Associated Press)
Jonathan Kaiman
All afternoon we obsessively checked our phones, seeking a reason — or even a clue — as to why North Korea wouldn’t let us leave.
I was among roughly two dozen foreign correspondents, tourists, and diplomats waiting at the Pyongyang airport’s departure gates on Monday. Our flight to Beijing was scheduled for 8:30 a.m.; now it was nearly 4 p.m., and as the evening loomed, the question felt increasingly urgent. We had no explanation for the delay, and no information on rescheduling. Soon, as we exhausted the limited cellular data allotted by our exorbitantly expensive North Korean plans, we would have no connection to the outside world.
Saturday was the most important day on the North Korean calendar — the 105th birthday of its founding president, Kim Il Sung. His grandson, Kim Jong Un, planned to preside over a massive military parade in Kim Il Sung’s honor, and the North Korean government invited about 100 foreign journalists to attend. It clearly intended to send a dark but unambiguous message to the outside world: that the country was well-armed, unfazed by U.N. sanctions over its budding nuclear program, and prepared to go to war with the U.S.
It clearly intended to send a dark but unambiguous message to the outside world.
All week, the mood was tense. The U.S. had reportedly dispatched a naval strike group to the Korean peninsula, and there were reports that officials were considering a preemptive strike. (It would later turn out that the naval group was headed in the opposite direction.) North Korea threatened to retaliate, raising the specter of nuclear conflict. "We will go to war if they choose,” a high-ranking North Korean official told the Associated Press.
So at the airport, we puzzled over the delay and feared the worst. We ruled out the weather, unofficial Chinese government measures, and a mechanical issue with the plane — Pyongyang and Beijing both had clear skies, and a flight from Pyongyang to the Russian city of Vladivostok was also grounded. Several people waiting had visited North Korea on multiple occasions, and they were equally perplexed.
Rumors flew. What if the government had closed its airspace for a missile test? What if it didn’t want us to leave? Suddenly, just after 4 p.m., the departures board went dark, and the group went quiet.
‘Liberation of the fatherland,’ then sandwiches
On April 12, I flew from northeastern China to Pyongyang on Air Koryo, North Korea’s state airline. About a half-hour after takeoff, a flight attendant announced that we had entered North Korean airspace. "Our President, Kim Il Sung, came across the river with great ambition for his country,” she said in English. “It reminds us of his revolutionary exploits in his liberation of the fatherland.” She then distributed sandwiches.
Since the late 1940s, the Kim family has ruled North Korea with an iron fist — hundreds of thousands of political prisoners have died in its vast network of internment camps, according to best estimates. Any sign of dissent, or even disillusionment, can carry unspeakable consequences.
Its capital, Pyongyang, is a city of clean streets and modest apartment blocks. It’s also an urban testament to a personality cult so entrenched that it subsumes many aspects of its residents’ daily lives. Golden statues of Kim Il Sung and his son Kim Jong Il, the country’s ruler from 1994 to 2011, tower over the city. Their smiling portraits stare out from socialist-style edifices, living room walls, and red lacquer badges that all North Korean adults are required to wear in public, on their left lapels over their hearts.
Reporter Jonathan Kaiman with his government minder Kim Jin Hyok.
Reporter Jonathan Kaiman with his government minder Kim Jin Hyok. (Los Angeles Times)
Each journalist was assigned a government minder. We were not allowed to report, or even leave the hotel, on our own. On Thursday, my minder — Kim Jin Hyok, 27, a handsome Foreign Ministry employee — roused me at 4 a.m. for an “important event,” and instructed me to leave my phone and computer in the hotel room.
Bleary-eyed, the journalists stumbled onto our buses, spent four hours in a security line — every bag, every camera, every pocket was scoured — and arrived at a huge, empty square. At one end was a red-carpeted stage, and behind that, Ryomyong Street — a row of gleaming new high-rise residential buildings that, according to North Korean media, were built within a year.
“The mode of the respected leader Kim Jong Un is to improve the living standards of the people,” one official told me. “It’s to show that even if the U.S. places sanctions on us, we can still move forward at tremendous speed.”
People soon began filing in, until the square was a sea of dark suits, military uniforms and colorful dresses. I saw thousands of soldiers; many were heartrendingly small and thin, a reminder of the malnutrition that remains widespread outside the capital.
At about 9:30, Kim Jong Un arrived in a black Mercedes limousine. The crowd roared. The country’s prime minister gave a speech. After about 15 minutes, Kim stepped back into his limousine. He never said a word.
When he departed, the applause abruptly stopped. It echoed for several seconds, as if within a vast stone church.
What do you do for fun?
North Korea is perhaps the world’s foremost post-truth society. Most citizens cannot access the Internet, or unfiltered foreign information of any kind. Domestic media exists only to glorify the country’s leaders, or rehash ideological dogma and grievances against South Korea and the U.S.
Our minders constantly hovered over us, openly surveilling our cameras and notebooks. We had no recourse — even our minders had minders. They’d taken our passports on arrival. If they caught us photographing something forbidden — an off-duty soldier, a particularly revered political portrait — they didn’t hesitate to forcibly delete our photos.
Everything raised questions. Who decided our itinerary, and why didn’t our minders ever seem to know it until the last minute? Why were we allowed to photograph some portraits of the Kims, but not others? What was the average salary in Pyongyang? The minders didn’t know, or wouldn’t tell us.
In the absence of information, we formed our impressions through visual details, the cadence of conversations, the hum of Pyongyang’s city life.
Through the bus window, we observed the city’s old-fashioned bicycles, its pastel-colored mid-rises, its construction sites and rail depots. Experts had told me that the country’s economy was improving, and it appeared to be true. New cars lined the streets. Women wore high heels; men wore sneakers. Some rode electric bicycles, cellphones pressed against their ears.
“Do you believe in God?” my minder suddenly asked me as we sat on the bus. It was a surprising question — North Korea is an officially secular state, where religion is severely restricted.
“Not really,” I replied. “Do you?”
He paused, and smiled. “I believe in Juche revolutionary ideology,” he said, referring to Kim Il Sung’s ideology of self-reliance.
I laughed, and he laughed too.
We chatted about ourselves — our jobs, our families, our friends and relationships. He agreed to interpret several interviews with ordinary Pyongyang residents. I asked them about the U.S.-North Korea relationship, and they responded with state-sanctioned lines about “U.S. imperialist aggression” or “the benevolence of the respected Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un.”
Yet other questions elicited incoherent answers or blank stares. Nobody could explain what they did for fun. A woman expressed her hope to someday visit Mt. Paektu, North Korea’s holy mountain. A man said that he was an architect. I could find no better way to ask the question, so I changed the subject.
Missile launch? What missile launch?
Saturday’s military parade was a blur of color and noise. For two hours, Kim stood and waved from a high rostrum, overlooking an endless procession of tanks, missile-bearing trucks, and soldiers who goose-stepped with such precision that the ground shook. Civilians marched by clutching North Korean flags, their necks craned towards Kim. They shouted “long live,” tears streaming down their faces.
Analysts expected North Korea to mark the holiday with a missile or nuclear test — and sure enough, the following morning, U.S. and South Korean officials reported that North Korea had tested a missile, though it fizzled shortly after takeoff.
In the U.S., talking heads debated the prospects of war. Yet North Korean state media didn’t announce the test — it never reports on failures. For ordinary North Koreans, it simply never happened.
That afternoon, at the Pyongyang Zoo, hundreds of middle-class Pyongyang residents filed past healthy-looking seals, hippos and orangutans. Three little girls petted a tortoise, their eyes filled with wonder, as their mother snapped pictures. No military marches piped in through speakers, and no portraits of dictators adorned the walls.
You can’t fake this, I thought. These were real people with loving families, having genuine fun. Some of them were almost certainly the same people I’d seen sobbing at the parade. The thought filled me with sadness.
Departure board goes dark
On Monday, my minder and I said goodbye. He returned my passport, and I stepped through immigration.
An hour after the departure board went dark — and just as we began wondering how we’d spend the night — it flickered back to life. An airline employee announced that all flights would depart immediately. She gave no further information — no explanation, no apology. We boarded the tired-looking Tupolev jet, and held our breaths as it shuddered down the runway.
This time, when we crossed the Yalu River and the flight attendant praised Kim Il Sung’s “revolutionary exploits,” the words filled me with relief.
-
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39694640
-
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-39694640
Xi urges restraint. Isn't restraint what got us to this point?
Are we moving really expensive assets around the globe and briefing congress only to allow him to continue to build his arsenal and threaten the world? I hope not.
-
"Are we negotiating?"
"Always."
-
No one who could bothered to protect our electronic grid from and EMP so now suddenly Woosley is making this case
no kidding:
http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/james-woolsey-kim-jong-un-missiles/2017/04/28/id/787157/
-
I don't get the impression that Kim could care less if S or N Koreans die in a war but the question remains is he willing to face certain death if a war comes because he would die for sure (or taken the way of Saddam Hussein - forced into a hole, arrested and hanged for crimes against humanity.
I would guess this young man for all his bluster would not choose to die. But I could not fathom betting lives of millions of people on it:
http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/Trump-North-Korea-United-States-nuclear-test/2017/04/29/id/787221/
-
https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/korea-expert-theres-only-one-141228223.html
Either give up the butcher and live like kings the rest of your lives or die.
-
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-china-idUSKBN17Z1TA?utm_source=twitter&utm_medium=Social
WORLD NEWS | Wed May 3, 2017 | 11:27am EDT
North Korean media issues rare criticism of China over nuclear warnings
A man walks the the street decorated with flags as North Korea prepares to mark Saturday's 105th anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-sung, North Korea's founding father and grandfather of the current ruler, in central Pyongyang, North Korea April 12, 2017.
North Korea's state media published a rare criticism of China on Wednesday, saying Chinese state media commentaries calling for tougher sanctions over Pyongyang's nuclear program were undermining relations with Beijing and worsening tensions.
A commentary carried by the official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) referred to recent commentaries in China's People's Daily and Global Times newspapers, which it said were "widely known as media speaking for the official stand of the Chinese party and government."
"A string of absurd and reckless remarks are now heard from China every day only to render the present bad situation tenser," it said.
"China had better ponder over the grave consequences to be entailed by its reckless act of chopping down the pillar of the DPRK-China relations," the commentary said, referring to North Korea by the acronym for its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.
China is North Korea's neighbor and only major ally and the United States has pressed it to use its influence to rein in North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. Diplomats say Washington and Beijing are negotiating a possible stronger U.N. Security Council response - such as new sanctions - to North Korea's repeated ballistic missile launches.
The KCNA commentary charged that the Chinese articles had attempted to shift the blame to Pyongyang for "deteriorated relations" between China and North Korea and U.S. deployment of strategic assets to the region.
It also accused China of "hyping up" damage caused by North Korean nuclear tests to China's three northeastern provinces.
Chinese state media calls for North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program were "a wanton violation of the independent and legitimate rights, dignity and supreme interests" of North Korea and constituted "an undisguised threat to an honest-minded neighboring country which has a long history and tradition of friendship," it said.
ALSO IN WORLD NEWS
After North Korea criticism, China says wants to be good neighbor
Trump to wade into Middle East politics on first foreign trip
The KCNA commentary said calls by "some ignorant politicians and media persons" in China for stricter sanctions on North Korea and not ruling out military intervention if it refused to abandon its nuclear program, were "based on big-power chauvinism."
It said North Korea's nuclear program was needed for the "existence and development" of the country and "can never be changed nor shaken."
"The DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China," the commentary said.
Earlier on Wednesday, China called on all parties in the Korean standoff to stay calm and "stop irritating each other" a day after North Korea said the United States was pushing the region to the brink of nuclear war.
(Reporting by David Brunnstrom in Washington; Editing by Frances Kerry)
-
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/05/103_228651.html
China urges citizens in N. Korea to return home Posted : 2017-05-02 13:52Updated : 2017-05-03 17:
North Korean soldiers carry the Korean People's Army flag as they walk past residential buildings along Ryomyong street in Pyongyang, North Korea, Apr. 13. / AP-Yonhap
By Ko Dong-hwan
The Chinese Embassy in North Korea has advised Korean-Chinese residents to return home amid concern that the North's military provocations may trigger a U.S. attack on the North, according to a source.
The embassy began sending the message on Apr. 20, five days before the North celebrated the 85th anniversary of the Korean People's Army with a show of military power, Radio Free Asia said Tuesday.
The U.S.-based station specializes in North Korea.
The station cited a Korean-Chinese living in the North's capital, who said he left for China late last month after the embassy contacted him.
He said he has been visiting China every two to three months but, after being told he should "stay in China for a while," left North Korea a month early.
"The embassy has never given such a warning. I was worried and left the country in a hurry," said the man, whose name was withheld.
But he said that most Korean-Chinese residents in Pyongyang were ignoring the message.
The city's "peaceful" atmosphere, despite the global crisis due to the state's threats involving missiles and nuclear tests, might have kept them unaware of the situation, he added.
The embassy's warning indicates that China is worried that the saber-rattling North and U.S. moves to destabilize the Kim Jong-un regime might affect Chinese citizens abroad.
The North was expected to conduct its sixth nuclear test around the 105th anniversary of the state's founder Kim Il-sung's birth on Apr. 15 and/or on the national military anniversary on Apr. 25.
The test did not happen on either day, except a fizzled missile test on Apr. 29.
-
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/05/12/conventional_artillery_and_nuclear__missiles_in_north_korea_111363.html
Well worth reading, IMHO.
-
Maybe... maybe not. Remember when the Iraq defector made the Bush administration think everything would be simply great after Saddam was toppled in Iraq?
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/cia-director-met-high-level-north-korean-defector/
-
https://youtu.be/FpQx7sxKv-I (https://youtu.be/FpQx7sxKv-I)
[youtube]https://youtu.be/FpQx7sxKv-I[/youtube]
Stratfor thinks US will attack NK within weeks...
-
https://youtu.be/FpQx7sxKv-I (https://youtu.be/FpQx7sxKv-I)
[youtube]https://youtu.be/FpQx7sxKv-I[/youtube]
Stratfor thinks US will attack NK within weeks...
It does sound very plausible.
-
They have the most to lose. Some insight here surprising actually:
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2017/04/why-south-koreans-arent-afraid-of-a-military-standoff.html
-
If we are not planning to militarily end this regime, moving carriers around the globe is an expensive way to play mind games with this lunatic.
Wouldn't it be great if deal maker President has orchestrated an overwhelming joint effort of China, Russia, US and South Korea to free this prison camp and rescue the inmates.
-
If we are not planning to militarily end this regime, moving carriers around the globe is an expensive way to play mind games with this lunatic.
Wouldn't it be great if deal maker President has orchestrated an overwhelming joint effort of China, Russia, US and South Korea to free this prison camp and rescue the inmates.
It would be nice, but I expect the best case is that China sits on the sidelines and let's it happen.
-
"Wouldn't it be great if deal maker President has orchestrated an overwhelming joint effort of China, Russia, US and South Korea"
China has much to gain from N Korea. Look how Trump *caved* in one Mar a Lago meeting with Xi Jinping. For years China is a currency manipulator and Xi Jinping plays Trump like fiddle makes a few worthless faints like he is going to help with N Korea and viola. We never hear a single peep from Trump about them being currency manipulators again.
So he gave up his position within a matter of minutes and runs around telling us what a great deal maker he is.
I felt duped frankly.
-
My understanding (supported by Scott Grannis btw) is that China it has been some years since China has been exporting unemployment via its exchange rate. Thus, a good deal by Donald to get something for the nothing of a no longer valid accusation.
Also, note that the US navy sailed close by one of the fake islands yesterday.
OBAMA left a very bad situation with regards to the South China Sea-- as we here have covered closely for several years now and left an even worse situation with the Norks. What would you have Trump do? Fg with them over the SCC while asking for their help with the Norks is a tough hand to play.
-
"...What would you have Trump do? Fg with them over the SCC while asking for their help with the Norks is a tough hand to play."
Agreed, though he also needs to f with them to show he's not afraid to act alone. Besides South China Sea and NK, there are many more pieces in that puzzle not counting the unknown unknowns.
The perception of Trump having a screw or two loose actually helps in negotiations with this kind of rival. George H.W. and George W weren't going to screw with them, Clinton and Obama wouldn't even want to but Trump might.
China is an export based economy. Their house of cards collapses if exports to the US collapses IMHO. The regime is held up by power and by their public's perception of security and prosperity. Collapse the economy and all they have left is military power that could conceivably turn against failed leadership.
Trump is a buy-American, imports-are-all-bad politician. He's wrong but that isn't the point.
It could be that China has a real fear of what Trump could do to them without firing a shot. That's a nice negotiating position to be in; get what you want by agreeing to do nothing.
I understand the game China has played to their advantage regarding NK and the US in a past tense sense. They have played us and played the NK threat like a fiddle going back to Madeline halfbright and however many decades it has been. I also believe NK has been a thorn in Chinese side and an unnecessary cost to them. NK poses risks to them too.
Jump forward to 2017 and the Denny S theory of backyards. Maybe China's thinking is changing on NK. They don't need an American war in their backyard. They don't need Japan accelerating their militarization and testing their own nuclear warheads. NK poses a direct threat to Japan. Same for Taiwan and South Korea.
Trump has publicly (and privately to China?) threatened to take care of the NK threat without Chinese help if he cannot get their help. The collapse of his predecessor's foreign policy was symbolized by the drawing of red lines drawn and crossed without consequence. Don't be that guy.
He also publicly bragged that he delegates military details to people like Gen Mattis who no doubt already has access to more than one plan, ready to go on NK when he gets the word.
In the context of Ya's post and the Stratfor report of public alert warnings sounded in Guam, maybe Trump already has Xi on board for some kind of operation that makes both countries look good and the world a little safer.
More likely, advisers worried about safety in the short run will talk him out of it.
-
"China is an export based economy. Their house of cards collapses if exports to the US collapses IMHO. The regime is held up by power and by their public's perception of security and prosperity. Collapse the economy and all they have left is military power that could conceivably turn against failed leadership."
Exactly.
China spends more on "internal security" than defense. Actually, China doesn't have a military, intelligence service or law enforcement agencies. Those belong to the Chinese Communist Party. I hesitate to mention this, as I don't want to give the dems any ideas.
-
" Thus, a good deal by Donald to get something for the nothing of a no longer valid accusation."
Please explain to me what he got.
-
Arguably he got some Chinese pressure on the Norks. Even if this turns out to be an illusion, he gave up nothing when he gave up the currency manipulator argument.
""China is an export based economy. Their house of cards collapses if exports to the US collapses IMHO. The regime is held up by power and by their public's perception of security and prosperity. Collapse the economy and all they have left is military power that could conceivably turn against failed leadership."
"Exactly."
A point all of us have been making on the China-US thread for some years now. Of course a trade war would have formidable consequences for all concerned, but quite a bit more for the Chinese I'm thinking.
-
http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201705270029.html
U.S. to deploy 3rd carrier group to deter strike North Korea
-
https://www.yahoo.com/news/north-korea-war-catastrophic-worst-153740284.html
-
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/29/japan-vows-to-take-action-with-us-after-north-korea-missile-test.html
-
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2017/05/28/mattis_nothing_scares_me_i_keep_other_people_awake_at_night.html
DICKERSON: Help people understand what a conflict with North Korea would be like and how it would be different.
MATTIS: A conflict in North Korea, John, would be probably the worst kind of fighting in most people's lifetimes.
Why do I say this? The North Korean regime has hundreds of artillery cannons and rocket launchers within range of one of the most densely populated cities on earth, which is the capital of South Korea.
We are working with the international community to deal with this issue. This regime is a threat to the region, to Japan, to South Korea, and in the event of war, they would bring danger to China and to Russia as well.
But the bottom line is, it would be a catastrophic war if this turns into combat, if we are not able to resolve this situation through diplomatic means.
DICKERSON: North Korea has been testing missiles. Are they getting any better at their capability?
MATTIS: We always assume that, with a testing program, they get better with each test.
DICKERSON: You say North Korea is a threat to the region. Is North Korea a threat to the United States?
MATTIS: It is a direct threat to the United States. They have been very clear in their rhetoric.
We don't have to wait until they have an intercontinental ballistic missile with a nuclear weapon on it to say that now it has manifested completely.
DICKERSON: What is the line in North Korea that, if the regime crosses that line, in your view, the U.S. should take action?
MATTIS: I would prefer not to answer that question, John. The president needs political maneuver room on this issue.
We do not draw red lines unless we intend to carry them out. We have made very clear that we are willing to work with China, and we believe China has tried to be helpful in this regard.
DICKERSON: Give me a sense, if you can, of the time when you think North Korea gets to the point of no return.
MATTIS: We consider it a direct threat even today, the North Korean threat.
As far as that specific threat, I don't want to put a timeline on it. At this time, what we know, I would prefer to keep silent about, because we may actually know some things the North Koreans don't even know.
-
https://www.yahoo.com/news/otto-warmbier-roommate-north-korea-145630543.html
moral of story: do not travel to country where leaders starve their people to death, and starve their dogs so they will tear apart people they don't like (including relatives) .
-
http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-trump-prisoners-20170621-story.html
-
I had a fascinating conversation today with a fascinating man.
His prediction was that the Norks would be solved by China in return for our conceding the South China Sea.
-
I had a fascinating conversation today with a fascinating man.
His prediction was that the Norks would be solved by China in return for our conceding the South China Sea.
That would not be good. However, it may be the best deal we can get at this point.
-
Looks like we have another lurker on the forum :-D
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/238409/north-korea-and-iran-weapons-of-mass-destruction?utm_source=tabletmagazinelist&utm_campaign=02ea17d165-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_27&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c308bf8edb-02ea17d165-207194629
-
with very high altitude nuclear explosions to create huge electro magnatic pulses.
:|
though wonder if even feasible and probably no one even knows if it would work or the side damage would be
? fallout
-
with very high altitude nuclear explosions to create huge electro magnatic pulses.
:|
though wonder if even feasible and probably no one even knows if it would work or the side damage would be
? fallout
Crashing China's grid coupled with the nuke launch would probably be enough to get WWIII going. Probably something we want to avoid...
North Korea's economic system has already destroyed much of it's grid already.
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/140226-north-korea-satellite-photos-darkness-energy/
(http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/02/140226-north-korea-satellite-photos-darkness-energy/#/76991.jpg)
-
I was wondering if it could pre-emptively knock out much of their military firepower before they even get started
-
I was wondering if it could pre-emptively knock out much of their military firepower before they even get started
I doubt it. We can only hope that their military firepower has the quality that communist produced products typically have. Some have suggest that the masses of artillery shells they stockpiled may have a large failure rate. We can only hope.
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/north-koreas-military-the-ultimate-paper-tiger-could-still-19121
-
Some Options:
* Full force trade and banking sanctions with China
* nukes for Japan
* lots of right of passage sails in SCS
-
Some Options:
* Full force trade and banking sanctions with China
* nukes for Japan
* lots of right of passage sails in SCS
3 is fairly useless IMHO. One and two are what will really get things going, if the US and Japan are serious about making China do the right thing here.
-
I was wondering if it could pre-emptively knock out much of their military firepower before they even get started
I assume that is exactly how it would start. Take out all known sites before they know what hit them. The risk among many is that we miss something that could take out 20 million people in Seoul. If they did anything like that, it would ensure that the ending of the conflict would be the end of the regime as opposed to a survivable series of Osirak-like strikes.
The other category of risk is that North Korea (and Iran) perfect nuclear weapons and long range delivery systems while we dither, raising the danger level exponentially.
-
I was wondering if it could pre-emptively knock out much of their military firepower before they even get started
I assume that is exactly how it would start. Take out all known sites before they know what hit them. The risk among many is that we miss something that could take out 20 million people in Seoul. If they did anything like that, it would ensure that the ending of the conflict would be the end of the regime as opposed to a survivable series of Osirak-like strikes.
The other category of risk is that North Korea (and Iran) perfect nuclear weapons and long range delivery systems while we dither, raising the danger level exponentially.
You can't keep kicking the can down the road when you are rapidly running out of road.
-
"You can't keep kicking the can down the road when you are rapidly running out of road."
The view from my secure midwest armchair location with no immediate family in harm's way:
It sure would be great to wake one day to the news that our President had created a quiet coalition between the US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, for just this one purpose and they successfully disarmed and dethroned the little dictator.
Easier now than later.
-
The Right of Passage sails option would need to be in conjunction with the other measures. I should also mention more arm sales to Taiwan. President Trump did this the other day. More!
As I presently see it, China benefits from and prefers North Korea as it is and has zero interest in helping us. Trump tweeted yesterday that Chinese trade with the Norks has increased 40% this year even as it pretended to help.
Ditto Russia. Look at the list of conflicts between us: Syria/Middle East/axis with Iran; Crimea/Ukraine; NATO/East Europe/Lavtia, Lithuania, Estonia; the Arctic.
For both Russia the Norks tie down a major commitment of US assets.
Without a full force "Trade War/Sanctions or Else" threat to China, a threat of CONSIDERABLE risks, China will not change course. At the very least the Chinese will counter with a demand for recognition of its illegal claims to the South China Sea.
Also see http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-north-korea-options-20170705-story.html
-
The Right of Passage sails option would need to be in conjunction with the other measures. I should also mention more arm sales to Taiwan. President Trump did this the other day. More!
As I presently see it, China benefits from and prefers North Korea as it is and has zero interest in helping us. Trump tweeted yesterday that Chinese trade with the Norks has increased 40% this year even as it pretended to help.
Ditto Russia. Look at the list of conflicts between us: Syria/Middle East/axis with Iran; Crimea/Ukraine; NATO/East Europe/Lavtia, Lithuania, Estonia; the Arctic.
For both Russia the Norks tie down a major commitment of US assets.
Without a full force "Trade War/Sanctions or Else" threat to China, a threat of CONSIDERABLE risks, China will not change course. At the very least the Chinese will counter with a demand for recognition of its illegal claims to the South China Sea.
Yes. We are rapidly getting to the point of making hardball deals. The are painful economic pressure points we can use on China, but they may end up with results we don't want.
-
Probably it would be best to make the threat privately at first.
Once it goes public, as is most likely to be the case, world wide stock markets, most certainly including our own, would crash precipitously.
Are the American people up for this? Does President Trump have the credibility to make the case?
-
Probably it would be best to make the threat privately at first.
Once it goes public, as is most likely to be the case, world wide stock markets, most certainly including our own, would crash precipitously.
Are the American people up for this? Does President Trump have the credibility to make the case?
Probably not.
-
In which case we should just STFU?
For those not willing to concede the point, I would add to my list that it is time to have a super candid conversation with the Sork weenie of a president and tell him he needs to take the additional THAADS. Add in talk about going nuke too!
If the Sorks are not willing to fight for themselves, then WTF are we doing there anyway? Maybe the capabilities there would be put to better use in asserting right of passage in the SCS?
-
This is a time for hard choices for a lot of different players. If S. Korea isn't 100% in, then it's time we both reconsider the alliance. If I was Japan and Taiwan, getting some nuclear credibility with Beijing would be at the top of the list.
-
"Are the American people up for this? Does President Trump have the credibility to make the case?"
No and no. There isn't going to be an all-out trade war between the US and China. If there is, it is a gaffe, not an American President acting in the best interest of the country. (MHO)
"China benefits from and prefers North Korea as it is and has zero interest in helping us. Trump tweeted yesterday that Chinese trade with the Norks has increased 40% this year even as it pretended to help."
China prefers the status quo over helping us with NK, but do they prefer the status quo to having Japan, S Korea and Taiwan go nuclear over this unanswered threat? My guess is no.
If the US taking down NK was a certainty, would China choose pretend to help or oppose? (I don't know the answer to that.)
Russia is a wild card. Do they matter? Is their only interest to stick it to the US at every opportunity or is it more complicated than that? Doesn't the stock in their own evil threat go down when everybody goes nuclear? Russia shares a border with NK. This potential war goes better for us and worse for the NK regime if all borders are covered.
Is it legal for Trump to disarm a nuclear threat and depose a rogue nation? Does congress need to declare war or authorize the use of military force? Yes? Would they? No?
-
Worth noting, if I have it correcting is that the Sork weenie president got in because the sounder voters were divided between two other candidates?
As for whether the Sorks are "all in" having their capital city and its sprawl (something like our DC, NYC, and LA all rolled into one) in range of several thousand Nork artillery bunkered in mountain sides can affect the will to fight. I doubt most Americans would be up to it under similar circumstances.
That said, "So what?"
-
Worth noting, if I have it correcting is that the Sork weenie president got in because the sounder voters were divided between two other candidates?
As for whether the Sorks are "all in" having their capital city and its sprawl (something like our DC, NYC, and LA all rolled into one) in range of several thousand Nork artillery bunkered in mountain sides can affect the will to fight. I doubt most Americans would be up to it under similar circumstances.
That said, "So what?"
This is the problem. North Korea isn't likely to start being Canada anytime soon, and Seoul and increasingly Doug in America's Midwest face growing threats from it.
The longer this goes on, the worse our options are. It's no longer a matter of having to eat a shit sandwich or not. It's now just a choice of one shit sandwich or another shit sandwich.
-
But wait! There's more!
And we have yet to discuss recently what seems to me the probability that Iran is working with the Norks on both missiles and bombs. The Norks lack cash and recently somehow Iran has come into $150B US.
If we allow the Norks to establish this capability, it seems probable the the Iranians will do so as well.
-
second post
Putin’s Assist for North Korea
Russia sends a message to Trump by nixing a U.N. resolution.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4. Photo: /Associated Press
July 6, 2017 7:01 p.m. ET
25 COMMENTS
President Trump meets with Vladimir Putin on Friday, and the Russian strongman sent his early regards on Thursday by nixing a U.S. resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning North Korea’s latest missile launch. The resolution didn’t stipulate any action, but our friends the Russians still objected.
The Kremlin excuse is that the draft U.S. statement referred to the rocket as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Never mind that North Korea claims the missile was the equivalent of an ICBM, and the U.S. and other analysis of the trajectory and altitude suggest the same.
“The rationale [for Russia’s rejection] is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to other Security Council members. “Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue.”
The likelier explanation is that Mr. Putin wanted to send a message that he can make trouble if Mr. Trump resists a “reset” in U.S.-Russia ties. Russia has also joined with China in trying to coax the U.S. and South Korea to cease military exercises in Northeast Asia in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear program. But that would merely ratify Pyongyang’s current stockpile and missile progress, assuming it even honored such a freeze, which it would not.
Russia and China are authoritarian powers seeking to dominate their regions, but the problem with tolerating such “spheres of influence” is that regional powers often collaborate to stir trouble beyond those spheres. As they are now abetting North Korea.
Appeared in the July 7, 2017, print edition.
-
Strange, I was told Putin and Trump were BFFs! Or, that Trump was Putin's sockpuppet.
second post
Putin’s Assist for North Korea
Russia sends a message to Trump by nixing a U.N. resolution.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, second from right, inspects the preparation of the missile launch, July 4. Photo: /Associated Press
July 6, 2017 7:01 p.m. ET
25 COMMENTS
President Trump meets with Vladimir Putin on Friday, and the Russian strongman sent his early regards on Thursday by nixing a U.S. resolution at the U.N. Security Council condemning North Korea’s latest missile launch. The resolution didn’t stipulate any action, but our friends the Russians still objected.
The Kremlin excuse is that the draft U.S. statement referred to the rocket as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Never mind that North Korea claims the missile was the equivalent of an ICBM, and the U.S. and other analysis of the trajectory and altitude suggest the same.
“The rationale [for Russia’s rejection] is that based on our (Ministry of Defense’s) assessment we cannot confirm that the missile can be classified as an ICBM,” Russia’s U.N. mission said in an email to other Security Council members. “Therefore we are not in a position to agree to this classification on behalf of the whole council since there is no consensus on this issue.”
The likelier explanation is that Mr. Putin wanted to send a message that he can make trouble if Mr. Trump resists a “reset” in U.S.-Russia ties. Russia has also joined with China in trying to coax the U.S. and South Korea to cease military exercises in Northeast Asia in return for North Korea freezing its nuclear program. But that would merely ratify Pyongyang’s current stockpile and missile progress, assuming it even honored such a freeze, which it would not.
Russia and China are authoritarian powers seeking to dominate their regions, but the problem with tolerating such “spheres of influence” is that regional powers often collaborate to stir trouble beyond those spheres. As they are now abetting North Korea.
Appeared in the July 7, 2017, print edition.
-
I have commented on the probabilities of Nork cross-breeding with the Iranians, but in the last couple of days I have seen a number of reports that the Nork mobile missile launcher and other missile related equipment (including parts of missiles in question) were CHINESE.
Would love to have some citations for this.
This does make considerable sense-- my initial read being that the Chinese are being this as a way of forcing us to acquiesce in its conquest of the SCS , , , AND break our alliance with South Korea.
-
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2016/11/23/is-china-using-north-korea-for-nuclear-blackmail-against-the-us/#e37c24f2f8d1
Is China Using North Korea For Nuclear Blackmail Against The US?
Anders Corr , CONTRIBUTOR
I cover international politics, security and political risk.
“Some White House officials believe that if Mr. Trump follows through on campaign vows to label China a currency manipulator and slaps Chinese imports with hefty tariffs, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make it a point to be uncooperative on North Korea.”
China’s linkage of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. trade issues would be close to using the nuclear weapons of a proxy country to blackmail the United States.
A Wall Street Journal article recently stated that “Some White House officials believe that if Mr. Trump follows through on campaign vows to label China a currency manipulator and slaps Chinese imports with hefty tariffs, Chinese President Xi Jinping will make it a point to be uncooperative on North Korea.” The main issue on which the U.S. needs Chinese cooperation on North Korea is to stop its development of nuclear weapons that can reach the United States. If the White House officials are correct, China’s linkage of cooperation on North Korea to U.S. trade issues would be close to using the nuclear weapons of a proxy country to blackmail the United States.
A South Korean man watches a TV newscast reporting the visit to China by North Korea's Kim Jong-un, at a railway station in Seoul on May 20, 2011. Kim Jong-Un began a visit to China, according to Seoul media reports, signified Beijing's approval of the North's succession process. JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images
China has arguably done this before, including through nuclear assistance to proliferating authoritarian countries. China is a major ally of Pakistan, whose China-assisted nuclear weapons threaten India. China is an ally of Russia, whose nuclear weapons threaten the U.S. and Europe. China is an ally of Iran, whose China-assisted nuclear weapons development threatens Israel and Saudi Arabia, both of which are U.S. allies. In other words, China assists all the major nuclear-armed countries that oppose the United States and its democratic allies. Why is that? Could it be that China is purposefully supporting nuclear proxies against the United States? If one of these proxies launches just a few weapons against the U.S., and destroys our economy, tax base, and therefore our defense industry, China could sit the conflict out, high and dry, and announce itself afterwards as the next global hegemon.
Giving into authoritarians with nuclear weapons, as one writer in the Atlantic recently proposed to do with North Korea, is not the answer. The U.S., our European allies, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, are all democracies, and have bigger, better, and more innovative economies than the autocrats. If democracies could unify against the threat of authoritarian regimes, we could use strong economic sanctions and a robust military defense to dissuade them from their current path of authoritarian militarization. We should start with China, whose economy has the most to lose from trade sanctions, and which supports lesser autocrats worldwide. If we wait and do nothing about nuclear proliferation among autocrats, which is essentially what we have done for the last few decades, we abandon millions of people in our cities to the whims of nuclear-armed tin pot dictators like Kim Jong-un.
-
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/
-
https://warontherocks.com/2017/07/north-koreas-icbm-a-new-missile-and-a-new-era/
"My reconstruction of the missile's trajectory, assuming the North Korean claims are correct, give it a maximum range of perhaps 8,000 kilometers," John Schilling, a consultant to the 38 North website, told Yonhap News Agency.
So, if I am not mistaken, if a NorK ICBM were based in another country, like Iran, then all of europe would be in range, correct? All our Asian allies as well, right?
-
Too bad Obama-Hillary undid President Bush's foresight with the ABM deals with Poland and Czech Republic , , , Good thing President Trump is looking to rectify that.
-
A VDH piece this week on NK seemed to have no solution or idea in it:
https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/07/13/west-can-neither-live-with-nor-take-out-north-korean-nukes-n2353920
There are reports that we had a clear chance of taking out Kim Jung UN on July 4 at the missile launch site (and didn't take it):
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-didn-t-kill-kim-jong-un-icbm-test-july-4-2017-7
Regime change was not the goal? Huh??
After dithering and floundering on Osama bin Laden (1998), Iran, NK, healthcare, economics and so many other issues, it would be nice once in a while if the US had a plan instead of just talk and running up military, spending and debt.
This will be easier, safer, later??
I wouldn't want to be accused over at the UN of taking out a guy who is seriously threatening to destroy half the world.
-
A VDH piece this week on NK seemed to have no solution or idea in it:
https://townhall.com/columnists/victordavishanson/2017/07/13/west-can-neither-live-with-nor-take-out-north-korean-nukes-n2353920
There are reports that we had a clear chance of taking out Kim Jung UN on July 4 at the missile launch site (and didn't take it):
http://www.businessinsider.com/why-us-didn-t-kill-kim-jong-un-icbm-test-july-4-2017-7
Regime change was not the goal? Huh??
After dithering and floundering on Osama bin Laden (1998), Iran, NK, healthcare, economics and so many other issues, it would be nice once in a while if the US had a plan instead of just talk and running up military, spending and debt.
This will be easier, safer, later??
I wouldn't want to be accused over at the UN of taking out a guy who is seriously threatening to destroy half the world.
Killing Lil' Kim would almost guarantee kicking off a major war, if not WWIII. It may be a bullet we have to bite, but we really need to exhaust every other option first.
-
"Killing Lil' Kim would almost guarantee kicking off a major war, if not WWIII. It may be a bullet we have to bite, but we really need to exhaust every other option first."
You are right - that is the thinking of the military experts who know more than me and advise Pres. Trump that keeps it from happening.
I think any American President also fears the international relations aftermath and our own domestic reaction to it. Easier to just keep kicking the can down the road, as was done by others at different times with OBL, Saddam, Iran and NK. Let the next administration deal with it. Is that in the best interest of the country?
Exhausting all other options, it's been 60 years, and 30 years since the phony Clinton- Albright deal where they promised to not do what is now done.
A strike should be done only if/when we are as ready as is possible with all possible allies to put down whatever happens in response.
My view is that if we conduct a surgical strike, in this case he is standing there and then he just falls over dead from a strike he can't see and nothing else... I'll bet there would be confusion, contention, struggle and decisions to be made from the inside to figure out who is in charge and what to do next. If their next move is to set off major offensive attacks, it is a suicide mission and the end of the regime, just as he would face now.. If the successors reaction is to continue the same games of the last decades, now they know we might strike them at any time for their threats. Think of the Reagan strike on Khadafy.
We missed him but his life and his decision making changed. Iran and whoever else threatens us would also feel the effect. The message to those who do is, don't.
-
Regions & Countries
Topics
Themes
Series
Editor's Note:
North Korea demonstrated at least a rudimentary capability to launch a road-mobile intercontinental ballistic missile with its latest test of the Hwasong-14. At the extreme estimates of its range, the missile has the ability to strike parts of the western United States. More tests and developments will be necessary to increase the Hwasong-14's range, payload and re-entry system, and questions remain about North Korea's ability to miniaturize a nuclear weapon and make it rugged enough to mount on the missile. Even so, Pyongyang is clearly well on its way to realizing its goal of a long-range nuclear weapons capability. This is the first installment in a three-part series examining the implications of this development for the United States' relationship with North Korea.
War is rarely the first option for countries trying to preserve or enhance their strategic positions. The United States and North Korea alike would rather avoid a conflict on the Korean Peninsula, which would be complicated and costly for all parties involved. Neither wants war; each side strongly prefers an alternative path to resolve the core issues underlying the crisis. Yet their differing strategic imperatives and desired end states leave little room for compromise.
As North Korea draws closer to achieving long-range missile capabilities, something it sees as a security guarantee, the United States faces mounting pressure to act. But as Washington tries to coerce North Korea to end its quest for more sophisticated arms, Pyongyang feels compelled to accelerate its nuclear weapons and missile development. Each country is merely acting to preserve its interests. But their interests are driving them closer to a physical confrontation.
The Rational Assumption
Geopolitics teaches us to assume rationality on the part of actors on the international stage. The assumption doesn't suppose that individual leaders are somehow beyond the influence of emotion, misinformation or miscalculation. Rather it acknowledges the deeper forces at work, from the interactions of place and people that shape national characteristics and strategic culture to the systems and structures that develop in countries over time. No leader operates free of these constraints and compulsions. Though they still have leeway to shape their policies and actions, leaders, as individuals and as a collective group, do so within limits defined in large part by the environments in which they emerged. The rationality we assume from leaders is not universal; it is the product of their place and time under the influence of factors such as history, geography and economics.
The key, then, is to understand what guides the rationality of a country's leadership, on an individual level and in the government as a whole. After all, no one individual rules a country, since no single person could extend power over an entire population without the help of intermediaries. And each layer of leadership adds another set of constraints to the exercise of power. Disagreements arise in governments and in the populations they preside over. But the forces that influence the options available to leaders are far larger than the concerns of the individual. It is an analyst's job to understand and explain these factors, and a policymaker's job to take them into account when considering how to achieve a desired outcome.
Even so, it is sometimes simpler in international relations to assume one's adversaries are crazy. They don't follow the desired path or react in the anticipated way, so they must be acting irrationally. If one makes the wrong assumptions of an adversary (or even of an ally), however, the response to a given action may be far from what was intended.
Of course, understanding the other side doesn't guarantee the desired outcome, either. Irreconcilable differences in interests and perceptions of risk can get in the way of compromise. The most viable solution often is to constantly adjust one's actions to manage these contradictions, even if they prove insurmountable. At times, though, the differences can be so intractable as to drive nations into conflict if each side's pursuit of contrary interests leads to fear and insecurity for the other. Moves by one nation to constrain the threatening behavior it perceives from another then perpetuate the cycle of action and reaction. In the case of North Korea and the United States, the contradiction in their interests is growing ever starker as Pyongyang accelerates its nuclear weapons program and nears its goal of developing a missile capable of striking the continental United States.
As Pyongyang draws closer to the deliverable long-range nuclear weapon it has long pursued, Washington will be forced to decide whether to accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and live with that reality or to take the necessary steps to disarm it.
A Mutual Misunderstanding
Misunderstandings, misapplied assumptions and mismatched goals have characterized relations between the United States and North Korea for decades. Washington expected — or at least hoped — that North Korea would collapse on its own under the force of economic and social pressures. The evaluation misjudged the country as the Asian equivalent of an Eastern Bloc state waiting for the Soviet Union's demise to break free from the shackles of a foreign-imposed power structure. North Korea hasn't collapsed. In fact, in times of trouble, its neighbors (and even the United States) have helped stabilize the government in Pyongyang for fear that the consequences of the country's failure would be more dangerous than the risks entailed in its survival. North Korea, meanwhile, considered itself a fixture on the United States' target list, a remnant of the Cold War that Washington was trying to toss on the ash heap of history.
The two have had many opportunities for some form of reconciliation over the years. Time and again, though, progress has run afoul of perceived threats, diverging commitments, changing priorities, domestic politics and even extraregional events. As Pyongyang draws closer to the deliverable long-range nuclear weapon it has long pursued, Washington will be forced to decide whether to accept North Korea as a nuclear-armed state and live with that reality or to take the necessary steps to disarm it. The cost of action is high, but so is the perceived threat of inaction.
-
The United States and North Korea appear to be on a collision course. Their differing interests are reaching a point of irreconcilability, and each side sees in the other a significant threat to its national interests. To understand the rapidly shrinking timeline for a potential conflict between the two, we must first state a few assumptions about each country's view of the other.
These assumptions are based on more than merely statements by individual leaders, which often are more about subjective desire than about objective reality. Instead, they are founded on a geopolitical analysis and intelligence study of the United States and North Korea drawing from assessments of history and strategic culture as well as studies of politics, economics and past behavior. Assumptions, of course, can be wrong and must be constantly tested; they also evolve over time, as circumstances and evidence change. But for now, these are our baseline assumptions about the key actors in the Korean crisis.
The View from Pyongyang
North Korea has long considered the United States, and not South Korea, its primary adversary. Pyongyang sees the long-term presence of U.S. military forces in South Korea as a direct, intentional hindrance to unification of the Korean Peninsula on its own terms. And when North Korea denounces joint exercises between U.S. and South Korean armed forces as practice for military action against it, it sincerely believes in the threat that it's decrying. North Korea has deterred the United States from military action for decades through a combination of political tactics and a robust military capacity that would create mass casualties for U.S. forces on the ground and for civilians in Seoul. Pyongyang, meanwhile, ensured that it never became enough of a threat that the cost of nonintervention would exceed that of intervention from Washington's point of view.
Since the final years of Kim Jong Il's rule, however, North Korea's core leadership has reassessed its position. The government has begun to doubt that its frontline conventional weapons, even when supplemented with biological or chemical weapons, would deter U.S. military action or stop Washington from taking steps to overthrow it. A peace accord and nonaggression pact are no longer sufficient to guarantee the North Korean system's survival, a perception that has been reinforced again and again, most notably when the United States invaded Iraq despite the risks entailed. (Various so-called "color" revolutions, the Arab Spring uprisings, and the ouster and death of Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi even after his country gave up its weapons of mass destruction program likewise put Pyongyang on edge.)
North Korea's Artillery Concentration
Under current leader Kim Jong Un, North Korea has drastically accelerated its nuclear and missile programs to try to develop a demonstrable capacity to strike at the continental United States with a nuclear weapon. The capability, from Pyongyang's perspective, would provide the only viable assurance that the United States would not work to overthrow the Kim administration through political, economic or military action. Pyongyang fully recognizes that the closer it gets to demonstrating the ability to strike the United States, the more pressure Washington will feel to stop the program, whatever the means. But the high cost of military action, which could rapidly expand beyond the Korean Peninsula, still keeps the United States from following through, as do political differences with its two regional allies, South Korea and Japan. China's objections have also deterred Washington from action.
North Korea, then, is caught in a conundrum: It feels it needs a nuclear capability to deter interference in its government, yet it understands that developing its deterrent will increase the chances of intervention. As a result, Pyongyang relies on the complexities of the region and the costs of military action to keep the United States at bay long enough that it can realize its nuclear ambitions. It's a dangerous gamble, but one that North Korea's leaders feel is worth the risk, since capitulation is the only alternative.
Washington's Perspective
For the United States, North Korea has long been a secondary problem. Though the country is a perpetual source of potential regional instability, its neighbors, and its own economic limitations, always manage to keep it in check. North Korea's nuclear program presented Washington with one of its first major post-Cold War crises. But the United States avoided military action in 1994 through diplomacy, and in the years since, its general policy toward Pyongyang has been to manage the issue and put off conflict. Confronted with the price of military intervention, the United States preferred declaring moratoriums on Pyongyang's missile testing, isolating it financially and making the occasional diplomatic deal. Washington, after all, has always expected North Korea to collapse at any moment, so waiting a while longer has been the more logical policy.
But in recent years, the U.S. view has started to change. Isolation, sanctions and stern statements from the United Nations have hardly slowed North Korea's drive toward a viable nuclear deterrent. Pyongyang no longer treats its nuclear and missile programs as bargaining chips to trade away in negotiations. And as its nuclear weapons development continues, nearing a point where the threat reaches the continental United States, moratoriums on testing are not enough. The sense is growing in the United States that Pyongyang's quest for nuclear capability is a crisis that can't be punted down the road any longer.
A North Korea armed with missiles that can deliver nuclear weapons to the United States is a danger Washington cannot accept. Even if the U.S. government assumes that Pyongyang wouldn't start a war (an idea not everyone agrees with), questions remain over how it would use its new capability. North Korea could, for example, use it to constrain Washington's responses to regional moves or perhaps share its weapons technology with other "rogue" states, thereby significantly altering the global nuclear landscape. Given the pace of Pyongyang's missile tests, Washington sees that the window for taking one last shot at non-military action is rapidly closing.
The United States wants to avoid war, but to do so, it feels it must make clear that it will use military action if necessary. Washington's airstrike against the Syrian government for allegedly using chemical weapons, recent ballistic missile tests and higher-profile military exercises on the Korean Peninsula were all meant in part to demonstrate that the United States is willing to resort to military action in the absence of a better option. The U.S. government is using the threat perhaps more to try to sway China and Russia than it is to change North Korea's behavior. From Washington's point of view, Beijing alone has the leeway to propose a nonmilitary solution to the North Korean crisis. Not only is China Pyongyang's primary economic backer, but it is also keenly interested in keeping the North Korean system in place as a buffer at its border.
From the Other Sides
But the risk of intervention outweighs the risk of inaction for Beijing. China still considers instability in North Korea, or the political and military repercussions of trying to overturn the leadership there, a greater danger than Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program. It continues to believe, moreover, that for all Washington's bluster, the United States wouldn't follow through on military action to stop North Korea's missile development because doing so would risk starting an East Asian war. For China, which already lives with a nuclear-armed North Korea at its border, not to mention a nuclear India, Pakistan and Russia, Pyongyang's growing capabilities are a problem, but not an unmanageable one. The United States poses a bigger risk to its strategic interests. At the same time, China's options to respond have dwindled as Pyongyang has steadily restricted Beijing's communications and influence with it.
South Korea, too, has been coping with the North Korean military threat for decades. North Korea's nuclear program threatens South Korea, aimed as it is at the U.S. alliance structure. Nevertheless, Seoul understands that its national interests and those of Washington may diverge in the future, or at least not fully coincide. South Korea also foresees little danger of North Korea trying to reunify through force; U.S. support notwithstanding, Seoul's military capabilities have grown since 1950, and the international system is no longer conducive to military action on Pyongyang's part. In the event of another war between the two Koreas, China would be just as likely to intervene on the side of the South as on that of the North, if only to prevent the United States from getting involved.
Seoul and Beijing are each interested in managing the situation and forestalling conflict rather than in resolving the issue immediately. The advancement in North Korea's ballistic missile range, though a paradigm shift for the United States, represented only a small change for the region's overall security. Consequently, South Korea and China are trying to convey through their remaining channels with North Korea that they are willing to delay a crisis to shield Pyongyang from potential military action. Their assurances may embolden North Korea, but for Seoul and Beijing alike, delaying a confrontation is the preferable path, especially since neither see much chance of a true compromise between Washington and Pyongyang. China, meanwhile, maintains a sliver of hope that Washington may eventually accept the reality in North Korea and adjust its behavior toward the government in Pyongyang accordingly, backing off from military threats in favor of dialogue and management.
Russia and Japan each play a slightly smaller role and differ in their views of the situation. Moscow, which wants to avoid a war but lacks much clout with Pyongyang, is using the crisis to emphasize the threat Washington poses to international peace and stability. And Japan feels the change in North Korea's nuclear development perhaps more acutely than does South Korea. The missiles Pyongyang has been testing serve a more valuable military purpose aimed at Japan and the U.S. bases there than they do trained on South Korea, a country that has long been within the demonstrated reach of North Koreas' missiles. Tokyo sees the standoff with North Korea as an opportunity to fortify its position as the key U.S. ally in the region and to counter China's growing influence. In addition, the threat of Pyongyang gives the Japanese government further justification for its decision to lift the constitutional restrictions on the use of its armed forces.
Population Density
If these assumptions stand, a time is fast approaching when the United States won't be able to sit back and delay action anymore. Washington still has several options short of military action, but history has so far shown that the tactics are only temporary. Every deferral enables North Korea to move closer to its goal of developing a long-range nuclear missile while reinforcing Pyongyang's notion that U.S. security guarantees are nonbinding and rarely outlast a single president. Whether each side's perceptions of the other are accurate matters less than whether North Korea and the United States believe them and make their decisions accordingly.
-
we don't have near as much to lose as the S Koreans.
Unless NK attacks us outright I don't see us being able to do anything.
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Poll-War/2017/07/18/id/802285/
I guess most Americans think it is better for K to have nucs on ICBMs that can reach us.
I would totally for military action now if it were not the blowback to S Korea.
-
True sanctions with those who trade with Norks (CHINA!) trade War with China, sailing the SCS, nukes to Japan (and Sorks?), rebuild/strengthen regional alliances (Australia, and others --Philippines may or may not be possible) build alliance with India.
These are all options.
-
" trade War with China "
well we got that Democrat GS guy Cohen in WH talking Trump out of any such thing.
I also like the idea on the internet few days ago about kicking the Chinese students all 345 K of them out of our universities
But the Universities would go crazy with that. Think of all the cash they get and the rest.
-
This is how wars begin: not through the rash actions of erratic warmongers, but through the slow confrontation of irreconcilable differences. When the threat of inaction appears to exceed the threat of action, and compromise is off the table, conflict looks unavoidable.
North Korea and the United States appear to be well past the point of compromise. Pyongyang feels that its security hinges on a deterrent that would make Washington think twice about trying to overthrow North Korea's leadership or launching military action against the country. Washington, meanwhile, can't tolerate Pyongyang's efforts to develop a reliable nuclear weapon and delivery system that could strike the continental United States. Having nearly attained its security goal, North Korea can't delay further missile tests without giving the United States time to build national and international political support for military intervention. The United States similarly can't stop at a moratorium on North Korea's missile tests since only a few steps separate Pyongyang from long-range weapons capability. And past measures have done little to roll back North Korea's progress.
In the absence of a suitable middle ground with Pyongyang, Washington is counting on China and Russia to finally pressure North Korea into cooperating. Under the best-case scenario, further sanctions and isolation would cause factions of North Korea's elite to revolt, overthrow the Kim government and divert the country from its current course. But that outcome is not likely. The risk of destabilizing the country, on the other hand, would be high — too high for Beijing and Moscow to accept, especially when they have doubts that the United States will make good on its threat of military action. North Korea sees hesitation on the part of China, Russia and even South Korea and figures their reluctance to act will restrain a U.S. strike against it.
North Korea's Arms Push
Neither side wants war. The threat of physical conflict must be credible, however, if Washington wants to change Pyongyang's behavior or to convince Beijing that the risk of inaction outweighs the risk of direct action. The more credible the threat of war, the more pressure Pyongyang would feel to complete its program, and quickly. The more the looming prospect of conflict pushes China and Russia to try to prevent war, calling for talks and claiming the real danger lies in U.S. military action, the more confident Pyongyang would become that it can finish testing before Washington intervenes. And the closer North Korea gets to realizing its weapons ambitions without China's interference, the closer Washington gets to military action. That's not to say that war is inevitable, though. Changes in intelligence assessments, in leadership, in interpretations and in perceptions can always intervene unexpectedly. Or it may be that our core assumptions are simply wrong.
The U.S. military has for several years operated under the assumption that Pyongyang already possesses a nuclear weapon and the ability to deliver it at least regionally. But North Korea is unlikely to use a limited number of nuclear weapons to start a war with the United States, with its vastly superior military and nuclear arsenal. Consequently, traditional forms of nuclear deterrence could still keep Pyongyang in check. Political will may be lacking in the United States to undertake military action against North Korea that would disrupt economic and trade activity and leave behind a massive reconstruction project in Northeast Asia, if not lead to a regional conflict.
North Korea's government may be more risk averse than it seems. Pyongyang may not be willing to push its testing far enough to incite the United States to intervene. Alternatively, North Korea might not respond to a surgical strike against some of its nuclear and missile facilities, enabling Washington to interrupt its weapons development without triggering a full-blown war on the peninsula. Some Chinese commentaries have suggested that limited attacks on North Korea — even a single symbolic strike on a mobile missile ahead of a test — would shake the government enough to change its behavior. Pyongyang otherwise may feel sufficiently confident in its progress with the missile program that it shifts focus to political reconciliation with South Korea in an effort to ensure both its national security and its future economic prospects.
Geopolitics does not teach determinism. Despite the constraints and compulsions it creates, a country's geography can't eliminate every possible option. For all their differences, the United States and North Korea, perhaps ironically, share the same goal: avoiding a war. But each sees the other's path as untenable for its own national security. A war between the United States and North Korea is not inevitable, but it is growing increasingly likely — and not because their leaders are crazy.
-
Stratfor Worldview
worldviewer35811493132323
situation report
Jul 22, 2017 | 14:33 GMT
U.S.: House Sanctions Bill Amended To Include North Korea
The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives released details July 21 of a revised bill pertaining to sanctions against Iran, Russia and North Korea. The bill is similar to the Iran/Russia sanctions bill that was passed in the Senate in June, but also includes additional sanctions on North Korea. Controversy surrounded the extent of proposed changes in the Senate version, especially when it came to modifying existing sanctions against Russia. Similar to the sanctions bill in the Senate, this bill turns many Obama-era discretionary sanctions on Russia into mandatory ones. At the same time, it prevents any increase in scope on energy projects: The Senate bill now bars U.S. citizens from working globally on any deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale project that involves a Russian firm. Previous sanctions only restricted U.S. personnel from participating in projects inside of Russian territory or the country's exclusive economic zones. The House is expected to consider the bill on the floor next week, possibly on Tuesday.
-
* * * * * *
The United States and China met to discuss trade issues. The meeting ended without agreement on anything. The obligatory joint press conference after the talks, where everyone pretends that everything was fine, was canceled. The only comment came from a U.S. official who said there were frank discussions, which means that the talks were tough and full of threats.
At the beginning of Donald Trump’s presidency, GPF expected that these kinds of confrontations would take place. But both countries put aside their disagreements to deal with another overriding issue: North Korea’s nuclear program. The issue emerged shortly after Trump’s inauguration, when it became apparent that North Korea was moving aggressively to develop a nuclear delivery capability. After analyzing the military reality, the United States was reluctant to launch a strike against North Korea and instead pursued negotiations.
During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the United States in April, discussions between Xi and Trump turned from trade and related policies to the question of North Korea. Over the years, the United States had relied on the Chinese to act as an intermediary and restrain North Korea. Trump asked Xi to play that role again, offering to reward China for its cooperation by softening the U.S. negotiating position on trade. We know that this happened because of various leaks, because of the lack of further confrontation over trade and because Trump tweeted that China’s help on North Korea would lead to a better deal for China.
But China has clearly failed to persuade North Korea to halt its nuclear program. There are two possible explanations for this. The first is that North Korea doesn’t trust China but does trust that having a nuclear weapon would block any American attempts to destabilize the North Korean regime. The second possible explanation is that China did not want to persuade North Korea this time. The reason is simple: Although China cares a great deal about trade, it cares much more right now about its geopolitical balance with the United States. North Korea has the United States on a hook. If the U.S. chooses not to attack North Korea, it would appear weak, and China would in turn look stronger. And if the U.S. chooses to attack, it could be portrayed as a lawless aggressor. In a full-scale attack, the U.S. would likely take out North Korea’s nuclear program, and China would be spared that problem. China would then claim that it had been busy mediating, and had nearly reached a deal, when the American cowboys struck.
This posturing matters a great deal to Beijing. China depends on maritime trade, and it requires easy passage through the South and East China seas to access the ocean. But the seas are riddled with small islands, and the U.S. Navy can easily block China’s access. With a navy that is in no position to challenge the U.S. at sea, China is left vulnerable to a potential blockade. Its best strategy is to convince one of the countries in the region, like the Philippines or Indonesia, to align with it to allow free passage. This strategy may be a long shot, but it matters greatly to China. The perception of U.S. weakness or recklessness on North Korea might cause some movement in these countries. And even if it doesn’t, either an attack or a failure to attack would create political problems for the U.S. in the region.
I believe that some variant of the second explanation was behind China’s failure to move North Korea. But the lack of results on this issue meant that trade, having been put on the back burner since the Trump-Xi summit, was now back at the forefront. The U.S. no longer had any reason to go easy on China, and China was not prepared to cave. This is both because the Chinese are good negotiators who play a weak position extremely well, and because the Chinese are trying to understand how Trump’s weak political position will intersect with trade talks.
The trade issue is a perfect example of how economic, military and political positions are inseparable in real life. Nations do not bargain on economic matters in a vacuum. In this case, the trade issue was bound up with possible war in North Korea as well as domestic U.S. politics. To fully understand the trade issue, you can’t examine trade on its own. And this is a great example of how these things intersect, but it’s far from a unique one. In international relations, all dimensions intersect and become part of a single fabric.
-
China Prepares for a Crisis Along North Korea Border
Beijing bolsters defenses along its 880-mile frontier and realigns forces in surrounding regions
By Jeremy Page
July 24, 2017 4:40 p.m. ET
290 COMMENTS
maps in original
BEIJING—China has been bolstering defenses along its 880-mile frontier with North Korea and realigning forces in surrounding regions to prepare for a potential crisis across their border, including the possibility of a U.S. military strike.
A review of official military and government websites and interviews with experts who have studied the preparations show that Beijing has implemented many of the changes in recent months after initiating them last year.
They coincide with repeated warnings by U.S. President Donald Trump that he is weighing military action to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, while exerting pressure on China to do more to rein in Pyongyang.
Recent Chinese measures include establishing a new border defense brigade, 24-hour video surveillance of the mountainous frontier backed by aerial drones, and bunkers to protect against nuclear and chemical blasts, according to the websites.
China’s military has also merged, moved and modernized other units in border regions and released details of recent drills there with special forces, airborne troops and other units that experts say could be sent into North Korea in a crisis. They include a live-fire drill in June by helicopter gunships and one in July by an armored infantry unit recently transferred from eastern China and equipped with new weaponry.
China’s Defense Ministry didn’t respond directly when asked if the recent changes were connected to North Korea, saying only in a written statement that its forces “maintain a normal state of combat readiness and training” on the border. It has denied previous reports of thousands of extra Chinese troops moving into border areas.
Crisis Planning
China is realigning armed forces in its east and northeast to prepare for contingencies in North Korea.
NORTHERN THEATER
COMMAND
Sources: Jamestown Foundation (military units); James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies via the Nuclear Threat Initiative (nuclear facilities)
A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman on Monday said: “Military means shouldn’t be an option to solve the Korean Peninsula issue.”
Chinese authorities have nonetheless been preparing for North Korean contingencies, including economic collapse, nuclear contamination, or military conflict, according to U.S. and Chinese experts who have studied Beijing’s planning.
China’s recent changes in force structure, equipment and training are connected to nationwide military reforms launched last year to overhaul Soviet-modeled command structures and prepare better for combat beyond China’s borders, those experts say.
In the northeast, however, those reforms are geared predominantly toward handling a North Korean crisis, the experts say.
China’s contingency preparations “go well beyond just seizing a buffer zone in the North and border security,” said Mark Cozad, a former senior U.S. defense intelligence official for East Asia, now at the Rand Corp.
“Once you start talking about efforts from outside powers, in particular the United States and South Korea, to stabilize the North, to seize nuclear weapons or WMD, in those cases then I think you’re starting to look at a much more robust Chinese response,” he said. “If you’re going to make me place bets on where I think the U.S. and China would first get into a conflict, it’s not Taiwan, the South China Sea or the East China Sea: I think it’s the Korean Peninsula.”
China, like many foreign governments, still considers a U.S. military strike unlikely, mainly because of the risk of Pyongyang retaliating against South Korea, an American ally whose capital of Seoul lies within easy reach of the North’s artillery.
The Pentagon declined to discuss U.S. planning efforts. American officials didn’t respond to questions about steps taken by China. But top American officials say they are focused on diplomatic and economic pressure, and view military action as a last resort.
Although technically allied to Pyongyang, Beijing wouldn’t necessarily defend its regime, but is determined to prevent a flood of North Koreans from entering northeastern China and to protect the population there, U.S. and Chinese experts say.
Beijing also appears to be enhancing its capability to seize North Korean nuclear sites and occupy a swath of the country’s northern territory if U.S. or South Korean forces start to advance toward the Chinese border, according to those people.
That, they say, would require a much larger Chinese operation than just sealing the border, with special forces and airborne troops likely entering first to secure nuclear sites, followed by armored ground forces with air cover, pushing deep into North Korea.
It could also bring Chinese and U.S. forces face to face on the peninsula for the first time since the war there ended in 1953 with an armistice—an added complication for the Trump administration as it weighs options for dealing with North Korea.
Beijing has rebuffed repeated American requests to discuss contingency planning, American officials say.
China has long worried that economic collapse in North Korea could cause a refugee crisis, bring U.S. forces to its borders, and create a united, democratic and pro-American Korea. But China’s fears of a U.S. military intervention have risen since January as Pyongyang has test-fired several missiles, including one capable of reaching Alaska.
“Time is running out,” said retired Maj. Gen. Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché to Moscow now attached to several Chinese think tanks. “We can’t let the flames of war burn into China.”
He wrote an unusually outspoken article for one of those think tanks in May arguing that China should “draw a red line” for the U.S.: If it attacked North Korea without Chinese approval, Beijing would have to intervene militarily.
A man in Dandong offered tourists the use of binoculars to view the North Korean side of the Yalu River in April.
A man in Dandong offered tourists the use of binoculars to view the North Korean side of the Yalu River in April. Photo: Damir Sagolj/REUTERS
China should demand that any U.S. military attack result in no nuclear contamination, no U.S. occupation of areas north of the current “demarcation line” between North and South, and no regime hostile to China established in the North, his article said.
“If war breaks out, China should without hesitation occupy northern parts of North Korea, take control of North Korean nuclear facilities, and demarcate safe areas to stop a wave of refugees and disbanded soldiers entering China’s northeast,” it said.
Maj. Gen. Wang said he didn’t speak for the government. But his article isn’t censored online—as it would likely be if Beijing disapproved—in China and other Chinese scholars and military figures recently voiced similar views.
In recent weeks, some details of China’s preparations have also emerged on the military and government websites.
The new border defense brigade patrolled the entire frontier in June to gather intelligence and has drawn up detailed plans for sealing it in a crisis, according to the military’s official newspaper.
Aerial drones would help identify targets, supplementing the new 24-hour video surveillance and addressing problems with “information access, rapid mobility and command and control,” another report in the newspaper said.
Many other units in the northeast have recently conducted new combat-focused training for the kind of joint military operations that experts say would be needed for an intervention within North Korea.
In one drill, a new “combined arms brigade” simulated battle against a “blue team” with artillery, tanks and helicopters, state television reported in June.
The new Northern Theater Command, which controls forces in the northeast, also now incorporates units in eastern China that experts say could be launched across the Yellow Sea toward North Korea.
Meanwhile, authorities in Jilin province, which borders North Korea, are reinforcing and expanding a network of underground shelters and command posts to withstand air, nuclear or chemical attack, local government notices show.
Chinese soldiers recently patrolled the streets of Dandong near the North Korean border.
Chinese soldiers recently patrolled the streets of Dandong near the North Korean border. Photo: Jiwei Han/ZUMA PRESS
Such facilities were needed “to respond to the complicated security situation surrounding the province,” Jilin’s civil air defense bureau said in a notice on its website, which also features photos and specifications of U.S. military aircraft.
In May, Jilin’s government unveiled what it called China’s first “combat-ready big data disaster preparedness center” in an underground facility designed to protect critical military and government data from nuclear or chemical attack.
Jilin authorities declined to comment, citing the sensitivity of the subject.
China’s military reforms aren’t complete and the People’s Liberation Army, or PLA, remains ill-prepared for a North Korean operation, some experts say.
“I don’t see the PLA at this time being particularly enthusiastic about being tasked to undertake a potential near-term mission in North Korea,” said Dennis Blasko, a former U.S. military attaché in Beijing.
But China, like the U.S., has been surprised by how fast North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has progressed, say foreign diplomats and experts. Beijing also worries that Pyongyang’s actions are now harming Chinese security interests, since the U.S. deployment in South Korea in April of a missile-defense system that China says can track its own nuclear missiles, diplomats and experts say.
Beijing’s interests “now clearly extend beyond the refugee issue” to encompass nuclear safety and the peninsula’s long-term future, said Oriana Skylar Mastro, an assistant professor at Georgetown University who has studied China’s planning for a North Korean crisis.
“China’s leaders need to make sure that whatever happens with (North Korea), the result supports China’s regional power aspirations and does not help the United States extend or prolong its influence,” Ms. Mastro said.
—Ben Kesling in Washington contributed to this article.
Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com
-
One of the few times I agree with Lindsay Graham:
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/lindsey-graham-north-korea-ICBM/2017/08/01/id/805023/
I do not agree with Pat Buchanan that a nuclear armed Iran and N Korea is acceptable and no transgender troops are not going to protect us from that:
http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/pat-buchanan-need-transgender-troops/2017/07/31/id/804940/
-
That's right ccp. On national security issues, 'Reaganite' Buchanan is with the leftists and Lindsey Graham is with the hawks. It seems like common sense to me to want to take out a lunatic that is actively and seriously threatening us.
Peace through strength. The more strength we have, the less we need to use it. And vice versa, all hell broke loose during our periods of retreat and weakness.
Choosing our battles and the timing of them carefully is a form of wisdom. Unwillingness to use our strength, ever, is weakness.
-
A report last night on the One America Network (OAN, see my post referencing it on the Media thread) asserts that this technology is ready to go and is a solution to the Nork problem:
http://defense-update.com/20150516_champ.html
-
" A report last night on the One America Network (OAN, see my post referencing it on the Media thread) asserts that this technology is ready to go and is a solution to the Nork problem:
http://defense-update.com/20150516_champ.html "
Glad to see military taking MY advice: :-D 8-) :lol:
from previous post of July 5 :
*** "start the attack
« Reply #231 on: July 05, 2017, 06:01:44 PM »
Reply with quote Modify message Remove message
with very high altitude nuclear explosions to create huge electro magnatic pulses.
undecided
though wonder if even feasible and probably no one even knows if it would work or the side damage would be
? fallout"****
-
Umm , , , if I understand correctly, not quite-- there is no nuclear explosion with the HPM.
-
• North Korea: North Korea conducted a submarine-launch ballistic missile ejection test July 30, according to an anonymous U.S. defense official who spoke to CNN. An ejection test assesses the systems responsible for pushing the missile out of the submarine far enough above the surface of the water for the missile’s rockets to ignite. While North Korea is believed to have one submarine capable of launching ballistic missiles, it’s unknown if Pyongyang has the technology required to ignite, stabilize and correct for an SLBM’s trajectory. This was the third ejection test North Korea conducted in July and the fourth this year.
• South Korea: We continue to monitor military deployments in and around the Korean Peninsula. Seoul is currently reviewing U.S. strategic assets in the area. The nuclear-powered aircraft carriers USS Carl Vinson and USS Ronald Reagan could be redeployed to the region. (Both were previously stationed in waters near the Korean Peninsula.)
The USS Vinson was not scheduled for deployment again until January 2018. Twelve F-16s and 200 airmen have also been deployed to South Korea for a four-month rotation. In addition, South Korean President Moon Jae-in has ordered the “temporary” deployment of the remaining four launchers that would complete the United States’ THAAD installation. Only two launchers were initially set up when the South Korean government blocked the remaining four.
-
no more road left to kick the can down!
https://www.conservativereview.com/articles/levin-bolton-call-out-north-korea-weve-negotiated-25-years
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/09/us/politics/trump-north-korea.html?emc=edit_ta_20170809&nl=top-stories&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
-
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/345908-mattis-warns-north-korea-of-destruction-of-its-people
-
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/08/10/obama-admin-found-out-about-north-koreas-mini-nukes-back-in-2013-but-downplayed-report/
-
Third post
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/345982-the-memo-could-trumps-hard-line-work-on-north-korea
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/morning-jolt/450355/north-korea-agression-toward-south-korea?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=170810_Jolt&utm_term=Jolt
-
This *proves* the Obamamiester long ago decided to accept NK as a military nuclear power:
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/08/10/susan-rice-urges-trump-tolerate-nuclear-weapons-north-korea/
despite as John Bolten pointed out the ridiculous mantra from multiple politicians including Brock the Great repeatedly stating the line "all options are on the table" (that everyone knew was BS)
So now Rice basically tells Kim you can have your nucs!
And that is what Bolten asked yesterday do we accept NK as a nuclear power or do we use military force?
Krauthammer FWIW accepts NK as a nuc power. I don't.
How would NK be if they have a 100 deliverable nuclear warheads? let alone a few with questionable accuracy ? would that be better?
Next up would also of course be Iran. How would we like them having 50 or 100 nucs?
Brockster has obviously accepted them as a nuc power too.
He could have been honest but he never has been.
-
By The Editorial Board
Aug. 9, 2017 7:12 p.m. ET
652 COMMENTS
When Donald Trump threatened North Korea with “fire and fury” Tuesday if it continues to menace the U.S. with nuclear weapons, he provoked almost as much backlash at home as in Pyongyang. The usual diplomatic suspects, including some American lawmakers, claimed his remarks hurt U.S. credibility and were irresponsible.
The President’s point was that the North’s escalating threats are intolerable; he didn’t set any red lines. True to form, Pyongyang responded by putting the U.S. island of Guam in its cross hairs. Mr. Trump may be guilty of hyperbole (quelle surprise), but that is far less damaging to U.S. credibility than Barack Obama’s failure to enforce his prohibition on the Assad regime’s use of chemical weapons in Syria. The foreign-policy elite who claim to be shocked also don’t have much credibility after their policy across three Administrations led to the current North Korean danger.
While the President’s words were unusually colorful, the Communist-style language may have been part of the message: Kim Jong Un isn’t the only one who can raise the geopolitical temperature. The U.S. has military options to neutralize the regime’s nuclear threat if it continues to develop long-range missiles, and the U.S. is considering those options.
National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster said as much in an interview Saturday, explaining that Pyongyang’s nuclear threat is “intolerable from the President’s perspective. So of course, we have to provide all options to do that. And that includes a military option.” Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reinforced that message Wednesday, warning North Korea to stop acting in ways that could “lead to the end of its regime.”
Last week Senator Lindsey Graham told a morning television program, “There is a military option to destroy North Korea’s program and North Korea itself.” The South Carolina Republican revealed that Mr. Trump told him there will be war if the North continues to develop long-range missiles: “He has told me that. I believe him. If I were China, I would believe him, too, and do something about it.”
The China reference is a tip-off that the main audience for this rhetorical theater is in Beijing. Kim Jong Un won’t stop now that he’s so close to his goal of a nuclear deterrent. But China might restrict the flow of oil to the North, for example, if it believes that stronger action on its part could forestall a U.S. pre-emptive strike.
The other audience for Mr. Trump’s remarks is the North Korean leadership around the young Kim. If they believe they are doomed by Kim’s nuclear course, their best chance of self-preservation is to remove him. Regime change and then reunification is the ultimate solution to the North Korean problem.
One statement isn’t going to change minds in Beijing or Pyongyang. The Trump Administration can also signal its seriousness by imposing secondary sanctions on more Chinese companies, financial institutions and individuals. The U.S. also needs to move more military assets into the region to make the use of force credible.
Striking North Korea remains a last resort because the regime can hit the South with nuclear, chemical and conventional weapons. Yet in 1994 then-President Bill Clinton used the threat of military action as he tried to force the North to give up its nuclear program. But former President Jimmy Carter exceeded his diplomatic mandate and maneuvered Mr. Clinton to accept a deal that propped up Pyongyang without adequate inspections.
Diplomacy works best when there is a credible stick to go with the carrots. The Trump Administration has the right idea, even if the President’s words lack the usual diplomatic politesse.
Appeared in the August 10, 2017, print edition.
-
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/08/10/is-it-already-too-late-to-stop-north-korea/
-
One more ballistic missile test by NK in the direction of Guam, will be crossing Trump's orange line. He is goading Kim to do just that, so that he can say he acted in self defense.
-
Does anyone know at least with public knowledge anything about the accuracy of their guidance systems. Can they actually hit Guam or Hawaii or Alaska (or hopefully Hollywood - just kidding - hope CD no near Hollywood)?
It is not too late. Unless we want NK to become an even greater menace with multiple times the number and power of their nucs in the years to come.
It is like watching the tech stocks crash in 2000. Wringing hands praying and hoping for the bleeding to stop until some ( me ) realize I lost most of it.
Time to take action. Sure it will be terrible . Sure it is easy for me to say sitting here on the East coast but I don't see any other way. It will only get worse not better.
Unlike bidding our time like mutually assured destruction doctrine , in this case bidding time has only benighted our enemy.
Imagine NK with 5 times the nucs and better delivery systems .
And if we get rid of NK regime then maybe, then take aim at Iran nun program , then maybe just maybe Iran will get the message loud and clear.
Or we can talk stupid, with words like "we need more" and "better" and "serious diplomacy", or "all options are on the table".
-
No kidding but to actually hear an Obama disciple say this is to my knowledge new:
http://www.newsmax.com/Politics/administrations-susan-rice-national-security-adviser-nuclear-weapons/2017/08/10/id/807027/
-
Stratfor on NK
http://www.financialsense.com/stratfor/north-korea-gets-specific-its-guam-threat
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-guam-shielded-north-korean-missiles-high-tech-defenses/
-
http://observer.com/2017/08/donald-trump-north-korea-diplomatic-military-strategy/
Trump’s Full-Court Press Is Squeezing the Nukes Out of North Korea
The hermit kingdom is starting to blink now that China isn’t its shield
By Austin Bay • 08/14/17 8:00am
President Donald Trump with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, and National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster on August 11, 2017. JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
The Trump administration’s “pressure strategy” is disrupting the North Korean regime.
In March of this year, the Trump foreign policy team of Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis, and the Tweeter-in-Chief himself began a coordinated attack on Kim Jong-un’s regime, with the interim goals of disrupting its political and military plans, psychologically rattling its leaders, and exposing the regime’s grave weaknesses. The ultimate goal was to set conditions for achieving the long-range goal: denuclearizing the Korean peninsula.
The great Chinese strategist Sun Tzu said that the best strategy is to attack the enemy’s plans. With a soldier-scholar like Jim Mattis in the Trump administration, a stroke or two of Sun Tzu should surprise no one.
As a result, the Trump team is taking diplomatic, economic and military actions—not drawing feckless rhetorical red lines. Its actions are seizing the initiative, limiting the enemy’s options, and exploiting the enemy’s weakness. These actions are designed to force the thugs in Pyongyang to ditch their nuclear weapons and quietly rot within the starving confines of their Communist gulag.
* * *
We aren’t engaged in a game. This is the latest phase of the Korean War. Though war is not a sport, some sports analogies are instructive. Basketball’s full-court press is a defensive attack on the offense’s “plan” to score—which would be a sportscaster’s description of the Trump administration’s North Korea policy. In basketball, teams employ a relentless full-court press to degrade an opponent’s ability to move the ball, deny easy shot attempts, and disrupt shots the opponent takes. “Pressing” teams try to force their opponents to make mistakes that lead to turnovers. A sustained press that forces mistakes dispirits an opponent.
NATIONAL POLITICS
Observer Delivered to Your Inbox
Receive important daily stories covering politics and influential opinion leaders.
SIGN UP
The U.S. can do more than run an aggressive defense. America, when it decides to use it, has the premier global offense. North Korea cannot “press” American power; it can only provoke it.
And it has provoked America to the point that Trump is promising fire and fury.
* * *
Employing diplomacy, economic power, military power and information power (the ability to gather and communicate intelligence) in concert is a geo-strategic full-court press.
The acronym for the four elements of geo-strategic power is DIME: “Diplomatic,” “Information,” “Military” and “Economic” power. Coordinating these elements creates a synergistic force whose sum is greater than its parts. I explained this to an eighth grade history class and the kids got it. Diplomacy was my index finger, Information the middle finger, Military the ring finger, and Economic power the little finger. Individually, the fingers poke, but together they form a fist.
I showed the kids my fist and threw a punch in the air. I told them that in other circumstances this wasn’t a weapon but a grip on a tool. They got that, too.
Unfortunately, coordinating the elements of power is very difficult. The U.S. government’s civilian agencies don’t play well together—protecting their budgets and their political turf in the Washington swamp is their first priority. So in the field the military does it all ad hoc. Company, field grade and general officers become diplomats in helmets. Combat engineers are developmental aid experts.
* * *
Yet the Trump administration is using all elements of power in a coordinated effort to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.
Start with the D for Diplomacy. The U.S. has forged a solid alliance committed to Korean denuclearization. The U.S., Japan, South Korea and Australia are the principle front line nations, but western European nations and key members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) add economic and political weight. India is in the background. China is the man in middle, and it knows India is in the background.
All of the east and southeast Asian nations have a common security interest in denuclearization: They are already in range of North Korean missiles.
U.S. diplomats have also succeeded in getting the UN to impose harsh economic and political sanctions on North Korea.
I for Information began in earnest with Tillerson’s declaration that the era of strategic patience with the Kim regime is over. Trump’s threats of fury and fire mock Kim Jong-un. Yes, Trump outraged the pearl-clutchers in the American foreign policy establishment. American presidents aren’t supposed to talk like that!
Except they do. Take Harry Truman for example.
The theater of threat is a key element in North Korea’s intimidation and extortion routine. Trump’s fiery threat pushed Kim Jong-un off center stage. Now Trump has the rhetorical threat initiative, not the fat kid.
Trump also has a track record for following through on a threat. In April, he punished Syrian President Bashir al-Assad for using chemical weapons. Trump isn’t seeking a legacy like Bill Clinton; he isn’t bogged down in Iraq like George Bush; and he isn’t a faculty lounge poseur like Barack Obama touting red lines then failing to back words with deeds. Trump has demonstrated that he will act. That’s important information from the bad cop.
This information is a suavely packaged threat from the good cops: National Security Adviser Lieutenant General H.R. McMaster told ABC News “…We are not closer to war than a week ago, but we are closer to war than we were a decade ago.”
This information adds spine to the bad cop and good cops’ coercive diplomacy: Pyongyang’s insistent violation of previous deals and arrangements has left Washington, Tokyo and Seoul with nil interest in conceding anything to the dictatorship, but particularly on the issues of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
M for Military: The U.S. and its allies have massive and modern forces. They are full spectrum forces employing everything from the bayonet to ballistic missiles, anti-ballistic missiles and cyber weapons. South Korea’s ground forces are highly-trained and well led. Japan has quietly developed offensive strike capabilities. The allies have deployed a missile defense “thin shield” that is capable of shooting down a volley of North Korean IRBMs. Trump would use the entire arsenal if he had to, and China knows this.
E is for Economic, meaning sanctions and financial restrictions. However, the most pertinent policy tool can be summarized in a tweet. Recall that Trump indicated China would have a better trade deal if it helped curb North Korea.
How is the Trump team managing to pull it off? Here’s my guess: Trump and Tillerson aren’t from the D.C. swamp. Mattis was a combat soldier who also served as a diplomat with a helmet.
* * *
America wants China to add additional pressure. It believes China has the power to squeeze the nukes out of North Korea.
But China has its own interests—some of which conflict with U.S. interests. For example, U.S. and Chinese interests conflict in the South China Sea. On August 7, the U.S., Australia and Japan urged ASEAN to create a “South China Sea code of conduct” defining rules for resolving disputes in the region that are “legally binding, meaningful, effective, and consistent with international law.” The three nations emphasized their “strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions,” which is a direct slap at Beijing. It appears the deal being offered does not demand that China withdraw from its man-made islets.
China knows it can ill-afford a trade war with the U.S., Japan and Europe. This code of conduct amounts to a “semi-win-win” if everyone in the region agrees to it and lives by it. It is an example of coordinated diplomacy to encourage China to help denuclearize North Korea—and help itself economically and politically.
* * *
Has the Trump pressure strategy produced positive results?
North Korea has blinked, but the sensationalist mainstream media, from The New York Times to CNN, have missed it.
But the sharp minds at 38north.org didn’t. They reported, “Anyone familiar with the North’s statements knows that over the past month there has been a major shift in Pyongyang’s formulation about negotiating.”
Yet CNN quoted North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho as saying “…We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table…”
38north provided the correction:
“Unless the hostile policy and nuclear threat of the U.S. against the D.P.R.K. are fundamentally eliminated, we, under no circumstances, will put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table and will not flinch even an inch away from our path of strengthening of the nuclear forces, which is chosen by ourselves.”
To interpret Pyongyang’s statement as the “we just might talk about getting rid of the nukes” signal it is requires that the interpreter possess certain skills. The interpreter must know the relevant history, have common sense (a skill related to historical knowledge), pay close attention to current developments, and maintain an open mind free of ideological and emotional-political distortion. Unfortunately, the contemporary U.S. mainstream media fall short in all four skill sets.
Responding to Trump’s rhetorical fireworks, Kim threatened to fire missiles at Guam. Remember, Guam is U.S. soil.
It’s where America’s day begins.
Following that North Korean threat, Australian prime minister Malcolm Turnbull said his country would immediately come to the aid of the U.S. if North Korea attacks Guam.
Japan announced it may intercept the North Korean missiles with anti-ballistic missiles.
But here’s the big news: now China is warning North Korea that it’s on its own “if it launches missiles threatening U.S. soil and there is retaliation…” China, however, “would intervene if Washington strikes first. ”
China is clearly separating itself from the Kim regime and saying it will not defend North Korea if North Korea attacks U.S. territory. China is no longer North Korea’s shield.
Did Trump’s in-your-face provoke Kim into a rhetorical threat that went too far, one that led to the Chinese warning? Fair question to ask.
When you read or hear so-called experts argue it’s too late to stop North Korea from obtaining operational nuclear weapons—turn the channel or cancel your subscription. The suits are spewing tripe.
* * *
Blinking is a good sign, but it isn’t retreat.
In an article that appeared in The Observer on July 11, I sketched the administration’s six options for courses of action.
In the last month, we’ve seen Option 1 (another “do the right thing” bid to Beijing) pursued with a stroke or two from Option 2 (coercive diplomacy directed at China).
The interim results have reduced but not eliminated the need for Option 6 (delayed reprisal and the war to denuclearize).
However, the threat to Guam increases the probability the Trump administration will employ Option 4:
“Return of serve. This is an operation that could support several diplomatic options. The U.S., South Korea and Japan could use their ABMs to intercept every North Korean test launch. They might also employ cyber warfare to disrupt tests (perhaps they have already done so). The objective of ‘Return of Serve’ is to stymie the test program and embarrass Kim Jong-un.“
Get in his face and block his shots. Pressure basketball? No, pressure diplomacy to stop a nuclear war.
Austin Bay is a contributing editor at StrategyPage.com and adjunct professor at the University of Texas in Austin. His most recent book is a biography of Kemal Ataturk (Macmillan 2011). Bay is a retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel.
-
Previously on these pages: It would be great to wake one day to the news that our President had created a quiet coalition between the US, China, Russia, South Korea and Japan, for just this one purpose and they successfully disarmed and dethroned the dictator. Easier now than later.
Since then... Russia voted for sanctions. China voted for sanctions. China will stop the import from NK of coal, iron ore, fish and other items shorting them of a billion in badly needed hard currency.
Supporting us in a military operation against the nuclear threat of Kim Jung Un is one more step away.
They help in this not because they like us or want to help us but for their own purposes and because the world's largest economy and military still has levers if we are willing to use them.
-
Missile technology "via black market"... (?)
http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-north-korea-missiles-north-korea-nuclear-north-korea-missiles-650504
The speed at which North Korea has ramped up its missile and nuclear defense programs within the last two years is reportedly due to purchases Kim Jong Un’s regime has made on a weapons black market linked to Ukraine and Russia, as the United States and the globe fret over a potential military conflict.
A new report released Monday by the International Institute for Strategic Studies explains the North has made “astounding strides” in missile development, and it could not have done so without a high-performance liquid-propellant engine, or LPE, provided by a “foreign source.”
-
My theory has been it was the Iranians, but this certainly sounds plausible.
At any rate, this does not rule out my notion that the Iranians are there as well, in effect outsourcing/sharing nuke efforts. (Remember the Nork nuke plant in Syria that Israel took out some years ago?)
-
Stratfor Worldview
worldviewer35811493132323
Aug 29, 2017 | 00:07 GMT
North Korea: Latest Missile Test Overflies Hokkaido, Lands in Pacific
North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean.
(Stratfor)
Save As PDF
At around 5:58 a.m. local time, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean. Early indications are that the missile had a flight time of around 14 minutes, had an apogee of 550 kilometers (340 miles) and splashed down some 2,700 kilometers from its launch point. While these numbers point to a medium-range ballistic missile, the possibility remains that the North Koreans either tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with an early engine cutoff or were experimenting with a heavier warhead. Alternatively, the missile could have failed before reaching its full theoretical range. The latter possibility is reinforced by reports that the missile broke into three parts before landing.
The launch site of the latest missile test is believed to be near Sunan, where Pyongyang's international airport is located. Launching from this site continues the trend of North Korea testing its missiles from diverse locations across the country. This makes it harder to predict where and when the next North Korean weapons test will occur. It also adds to the difficulty of targeting North Korea's dispersed missile arsenal in a conflict scenario.
North Korea is heavily constrained by geography when it comes to testing long-range missiles. There is virtually no direction in which North Korea could launch an IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at a standard or minimum-energy trajectory without overflying another country's territory. Previously, Pyongyang sought to sidestep this constraint by testing its long-range missiles at a lofted trajectory, which minimizes the flight distance from the launch point by maximizing the apogee of the missile's flight. North Korea has done this with its latest ICBM and IRBM tests this year. This type of flight profile places more stress on its missiles, but Pyongyang wants to test its long-range missiles in a standard trajectory because it is the trajectory that it would rely on for missile attacks against Guam, Hawaii or the continental United States.
Because of its limitations, the missile flight path of today's launch is the least provocative one North Korea could have chosen for a standard trajectory test. The part of Japan that was overflown is lightly populated, and in the event of an accidental impact on Japanese territory it carries the least risk of damage or casualties.
In the past, Japan has emphasized its willingness to shoot down any North Korean missile deemed likely to land on Japanese soil. Tokyo, however, has maintained an ambiguous line on whether it would intercept North Korean ballistic missiles overflying its territory. It is risky to try to do so, since a miss could publicly undermine confidence in the country's ballistic missile defenses. Japan also doesn't want to encourage North Korea to test missiles that overfly Japanese territory, though until now Pyongyang has largely limited itself to high-trajectory tests that would splash down in the Sea of Japan or in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Having tested a ballistic missile over Japanese territory — and not one disguised as a satellite launch vehicle, as in previous cases — the North Koreans will feel more emboldened in continuing ballistic missile tests over Japan.
-
I would certainly think so.
The fact the NorKs got away with it is very disconcerting.
Stratfor Worldview
worldviewer35811493132323
Aug 29, 2017 | 00:07 GMT
North Korea: Latest Missile Test Overflies Hokkaido, Lands in Pacific
North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean.
(Stratfor)
Save As PDF
At around 5:58 a.m. local time, North Korea launched a ballistic missile that flew over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido before landing in the Pacific Ocean. Early indications are that the missile had a flight time of around 14 minutes, had an apogee of 550 kilometers (340 miles) and splashed down some 2,700 kilometers from its launch point. While these numbers point to a medium-range ballistic missile, the possibility remains that the North Koreans either tested an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) with an early engine cutoff or were experimenting with a heavier warhead. Alternatively, the missile could have failed before reaching its full theoretical range. The latter possibility is reinforced by reports that the missile broke into three parts before landing.
The launch site of the latest missile test is believed to be near Sunan, where Pyongyang's international airport is located. Launching from this site continues the trend of North Korea testing its missiles from diverse locations across the country. This makes it harder to predict where and when the next North Korean weapons test will occur. It also adds to the difficulty of targeting North Korea's dispersed missile arsenal in a conflict scenario.
North Korea is heavily constrained by geography when it comes to testing long-range missiles. There is virtually no direction in which North Korea could launch an IRBM or intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) at a standard or minimum-energy trajectory without overflying another country's territory. Previously, Pyongyang sought to sidestep this constraint by testing its long-range missiles at a lofted trajectory, which minimizes the flight distance from the launch point by maximizing the apogee of the missile's flight. North Korea has done this with its latest ICBM and IRBM tests this year. This type of flight profile places more stress on its missiles, but Pyongyang wants to test its long-range missiles in a standard trajectory because it is the trajectory that it would rely on for missile attacks against Guam, Hawaii or the continental United States.
Because of its limitations, the missile flight path of today's launch is the least provocative one North Korea could have chosen for a standard trajectory test. The part of Japan that was overflown is lightly populated, and in the event of an accidental impact on Japanese territory it carries the least risk of damage or casualties.
In the past, Japan has emphasized its willingness to shoot down any North Korean missile deemed likely to land on Japanese soil. Tokyo, however, has maintained an ambiguous line on whether it would intercept North Korean ballistic missiles overflying its territory. It is risky to try to do so, since a miss could publicly undermine confidence in the country's ballistic missile defenses. Japan also doesn't want to encourage North Korea to test missiles that overfly Japanese territory, though until now Pyongyang has largely limited itself to high-trajectory tests that would splash down in the Sea of Japan or in Japan's exclusive economic zone. Having tested a ballistic missile over Japanese territory — and not one disguised as a satellite launch vehicle, as in previous cases — the North Koreans will feel more emboldened in continuing ballistic missile tests over Japan.
-
If I have this right, haven't the Japanese now allowed the precedent and by so doing given the Norks the option of putting them into the 18th century at will?
-
If I have this right, haven't the Japanese now allowed the precedent and by so doing given the Norks the option of putting them into the 18th century at will?
Time will tell but I am thinking this was the game changer, allows Trump to tell China that Japan and many others are going nuclear now unless the NK threat is shut down.
As Clinton, Bush, Obama should have known, this doesn't get easier later.
It is hard for me to believe this will go by answered.
-
" It is hard for me to believe this will go by answered. "
We have already basically heard from Bannon and others that pro active military measures are off the table.
Just not going to do it.
Already decided better NK go nuclear then use military to stop them.
Same for Iran
Isn't it obvious?
GAme over . It is accepted as fact we are check mated
-
On Special Report last night one of the panelists commented that the Norks have overflown Japan three times previously, but apparently not for many years, thus this is the first time since the Norks have gone nuke. He added that in the Norks mind it may be that they are badly pressed by the dramatic decrease in oil etc due to the new sanctions and as usual feel the need to do something in response to the US-Sork joint exercises.
I'm not seeing anyone yet making the connection that I am-- that an overflight enables an EMP attack. Perhaps one of the sundry policy makers who read this forum :-D will act upon this?
Back on August 11 President Trump spoke about there being immediate consequences if the Norks messed with us or our allies and there also was his comment that sure sounded like the threat of nuclear devastation.
In "The Odyssey" there was a chapter where Odysseus was sailing between between two monsters and the slightest miscalculation would have led to the doom of his crew and him. (Names of the monsters?) President Trump (and we with him) is now sailing between being revealed as a blusterer or a warmonger. The man's lack of gravitas and the disloyal opposition's near treasonous mindset make him an exceedingly poor candidate for explaining to the country (which has lost its collective mind) what needs to be done.
CCP may be right, it may be game over. If so, this also means China gets the South China Sea.
FWIW IMHO we do still have game to play. Trade War with China (Coincidentally Trump is making big tariff noises right now) and enabling the Japanese to go nuke are both big cards to play.
-
second post of day:
====================
What a Korean Agreement May Look Like
Aug 24, 2017
By George Friedman
It’s a toss-up whether the United States and North Korea will sue for peace or opt for war. Still, there appears to be interest on both sides in easing tensions. U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has even intimated a possibility for direct talks. Informal talks have taken place for the past few months, of course, but these would have clearer imperatives: that Pyongyang not fire missiles at Guam and that the United States reduce the amount of military exercises it holds with South Korea. But is it even possible to reach a settlement on the terms they want?
The U.S. demand is easy to state but difficult to implement. It wants North Korea to reverse course on its nuclear weapons program. Merely halting the progress Pyongyang has already made would enable North Korea to resume development at a later date. In fact, earlier agreements fell apart because they neglected to include such a provision, and so the North Koreans were able to pick up exactly where they left off. Hence the current crisis.
Correcting that mistake would entail dismantling certain facilities and, since the U.S. would never expect North Korea to honor its commitment, Washington would demand permanent inspectors with unfettered access to every facet of the program to remain in the country. So while the U.S. demand may seem modest, it is in fact radical. Simply forfeiting a nuclear weapons program would give Pyongyang nothing. The government is unlikely to accept peace on these terms unless it can demand some substantial concessions from Washington.
This brings us to North Korea’s demands, which are much broader than Washington’s. Pursuing a nuclear weapons program, one meant to discourage any threat to the regime and thus ensure its survival, demanded a huge amount of resources. The North Koreans have not come this far simply to walk away with nothing to show for it. If they were to agree to abandon their program, they would do so only if another means of security were in place.
North Korean soldiers look at South Korea across the DMZ in 2011 in Panmunjom, South Korea. CHUNG SUNG-JUN/Getty Images
This would likely require a new regional framework whereby the U.S. would enhance North Korea’s position at the expense of its allies. The framework would also have to weaken U.S. influence in the region, perhaps by relinquishing its relationship with South Korea and withdrawing its forces from the peninsula, or perhaps by keeping its Navy out of the Sea of Japan. Maybe U.S. aircraft would be prohibited from flying near Korean airspace, and maybe Washington would have to rework its treaties with Japan so that its troops there did not threaten North Korea. In short, if North Korea must abandon its military capabilities, so too must the United States, or so the thinking of Pyongyang would go. The U.S. will not alter the regional balance of power lightly. And even if it did, it would have to consider the financial burden of propping up the government in Pyongyang. The United States is unlikely to accept this.
War is the one option the U.S. has to prevent North Korea from completing its nuclear weapons program – if it has not done so already – without giving up anything (except blood) in return. But, as has been widely discussed, this option would be difficult and bloody, and if success is measured by the elimination of all nuclear facilities, there is no guarantee that it would be successful. North Korea is not particularly keen on the prospect of war, either – it knows war introduces the possibility of annihilation. But it has come to read the fear in South Korea, which would likely bear the brunt of the war, as a check on U.S. intent. This dramatically reduces the chance of war.
That means North Korea has options and therefore the upper hand in negotiations, at least for now. It can press on with its nuclear program, or it can, in theory, negotiate a redeployment of U.S. forces. If there are no negotiations, North Korea gets a nuclear weapons program. If there are negotiations, and the negotiations fail, North Korea gets a nuclear weapons program. If there are negotiations, and the negotiations succeed, North Korea will lose its nuclear weapons program but gain a tremendous amount of concessions from the United States. Either way, North Korea comes out ahead.
Of course, agreements have been made and broken before. If North Korea surrendered its program, the U.S. could renege on whatever promises it made, re-establish military ties with South Korea, and re-deploy its naval and air forces. The government in Pyongyang understands as much – even expects as much – so it is highly unlikely to reverse course on its program.
It is easier to hold talks than to reach a settlement. It is easier to reach a settlement than to honor it. And this is why wars happen. Wars create a finality that diplomacy can’t. Sometimes.
-
"We have already basically heard from Bannon and others that pro active military measures are off the table."
My take on that was that Bannon was contradicting Trump by saying that, and was out immediately afterward.
It is said about the President, one thing he doesn't lack is courage. Maybe so, but a strike on NK requires a level of courage beyond building a shopping center or anything Clinton, Bush or Obama ever did.
At the very least, I expect an Osarik* type strike within about 48 hours of getting the information straight about what just happened.
* Israeli air strike carried out on 7 June 1981 which destroyed an Iraqi (Saddam) nuclear reactor under construction 10.5 miles southeast of Baghdad. That took courage and the world condemned it. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_487
To Un: Oh, look, we can hit any of your sites anytime we want to. Hit 2 or 3 of his most threatening sites including the launch site of the latest missile and do it soon so people know which Dear Leader caused it.
Or we can sit by and let the world and our allies be held hostage by one more murderous tyrant.
-
Scylla and Charbidis?
On Special Report last night one of the panelists commented that the Norks have overflown Japan three times previously, but apparently not for many years, thus this is the first time since the Norks have gone nuke. He added that in the Norks mind it may be that they are badly pressed by the dramatic decrease in oil etc due to the new sanctions and as usual feel the need to do something in response to the US-Sork joint exercises.
I'm not seeing anyone yet making the connection that I am-- that an overflight enables an EMP attack. Perhaps one of the sundry policy makers who read this forum :-D will act upon this?
Back on August 11 President Trump spoke about there being immediate consequences if the Norks messed with us or our allies and there also was his comment that sure sounded like the threat of nuclear devastation.
In "The Odyssey" there was a chapter where Odysseus was sailing between between two monsters and the slightest miscalculation would have led to the doom of his crew and him. (Names of the monsters?) President Trump (and we with him) is now sailing between being revealed as a blusterer or a warmonger. The man's lack of gravitas and the disloyal opposition's near treasonous mindset make him an exceedingly poor candidate for explaining to the country (which has lost its collective mind) what needs to be done.
CCP may be right, it may be game over. If so, this also means China gets the South China Sea.
FWIW IMHO we do still have game to play. Trade War with China (Coincidentally Trump is making big tariff noises right now) and enabling the Japanese to go nuke are both big cards to play.
-
"Scylla and Charbidis?"
Ding! We have a winner!
Thank you.
I just saw a report that Ding Dong is now implying overflights of Guam are on the menu? If he tries, I'm thinking it is time for action.
-
second post
Nuclear Missiles Over Tokyo
Accepting a nuclear North Korea probably means a nuclear Japan.
A South Korean watches a broadcast on North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch in Seoul, South Korea, Aug. 2.
A South Korean watches a broadcast on North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch in Seoul, South Korea, Aug. 2. Photo: heon-ky/epa-efe/rex/shutterstock/EPA/Shutterstock
By The Editorial Board
Aug. 29, 2017 7:09 p.m. ET
46 COMMENTS
Residents of northern Japan awoke Tuesday to sirens and cellphone warnings to take cover as a North Korean rocket flew overhead. The intermediate-range missile test will further roil the politics of security in Northeast Asia and is another prod toward Japan acquiring its own nuclear deterrent.
Pyongyang tested long-range missiles over Japan in 1998 and 2009, claiming they were satellite launches. The first shocked Japanese and led to cooperation with the U.S. on theater missile defense. After the second, Tokyo curtailed the North’s funding sources within Japan’s ethnic Korean community. Tuesday’s launch is even more threatening because U.S. and allied intelligence agencies assess that North Korea now has the ability to hit Japan with a miniaturized nuclear warhead mounted on a missile.
Much of Japan is protected by its own missile defenses as well as systems operated by U.S. forces in the region. Japan also recently deployed four Patriot PAC-3 missile-defense batteries to the west of the country, but these didn’t cover the northern island of Hokkaido overflown by Tuesday’s missile.
–– ADVERTISEMENT ––
Japan’s ultimate security is the U.S. defense and nuclear umbrella, with its treaty guarantee that the U.S. will respond if Japan is attacked. But the logic of deterrence depends on having a rational actor as an adversary, and rationality can’t be guaranteed in North Korea. Its recent development of an ICBM capable of hitting the U.S. mainland also changes the equation. If North Korea attacked Tokyo and the U.S. responded with an attack on Pyongyang, U.S. cities might then be endangered.
Japanese leaders have long resisted building their own nuclear arsenal, but that could change if they conclude America isn’t reliable in a crisis. Or Japanese may simply decide they can’t have their survival depend on even a faithful ally’s judgment. Some Japanese politicians are already talking about their own nuclear deterrent. And while public opinion currently opposes nuclear weapons, fear could change minds. Japan has enough plutonium from its civilian nuclear reactors for more than 1,000 nuclear warheads, and it has the know-how to build them in months.
This prospect should alarm China, which would suddenly face a nuclear-armed regional rival. The U.S. also has a strong interest in preventing a nuclear Japan, not least because South Korea might soon follow. East Asia would join the Middle East in a new era of nuclear proliferation, with grave risks to world order. This is one reason that acquiescing to a North Korea with nuclear missiles is so dangerous.
Yet this is the line now peddled by former Obama National Security Adviser Susan Rice and former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who says the U.S. must begin “accepting it and trying to cap it or control it.” Having said for eight years that a nuclear North is unacceptable, they now say that President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had better get used to it.
But “control it” how? North Korea has made clear it won’t negotiate away its nuclear program. The U.S. can threaten mutual-assured destruction, but Tuesday’s missile test over Japan shows how North Korea will use its nuclear threat to coerce and divide the U.S. and its allies. Accepting a nuclear North Korea means accepting a far more dangerous world.
Appeared in the August 30, 2017, print edition.
-
third post
North Korea Negotiations Aren’t Dead Yet
Aug 30, 2017
By Xander Snyder
On Aug. 28, we wrote that North Korea’s testing of short-range ballistic missiles over the weekend could be seen as an act of conciliation. Later that day, North Korea tested another missile whose message was unmistakable. The missile – the Hwasong-12, which hypothetically has just enough range to hit parts of Alaska but not the U.S. West Coast – flew over Japan. Initially there was concern that the missile could be targeting Japan itself, causing the government in Tokyo to issue flash warnings to tell citizens in the north to seek shelter. The missile ultimately landed in the ocean.
The test on Aug. 28 was clearly an escalation, but it, too, must be considered in the context of ongoing negotiations. With the proper perspective, the launch seems less like the irrational maneuverings of an unpredictable dictator and more like a regime expressing displeasure with a hang-up either in negotiations or in the direction they’re taking.
Action and Reaction
A test of this sort is disruptive, but there’s no reason to believe negotiations with North Korea have stopped. North Korea wouldn’t have cut backchannel communications before the launch, because it wouldn’t want the launch to be seen as a pre-emptive strike, triggering a counterstrike and a war with the United States that it doesn’t want. It is true, however, that the launch was unprecedented. North Korea has previously launched missiles for its space program that flew over Japan – in 1998 and 2009 – but those were high enough that they were not in Japanese airspace. Tests that don’t follow old patterns are more likely to be interpreted as an actual attack, since it’s unlikely that an attacking force would mimic procedures that it had previously made public. This means that while Kim Jong Un is walking a fine line, he believed this test was within the tolerable limits of potential provocation.
The response from the U.S., Japan and South Korea has been relatively muted. Japan carried out a series of anti-missile drills, presumably to respond with a similar show of strength. But what Japan didn’t do is just as telling. The government’s J-alert system notified the public several minutes before the missile flew overhead, and yet the government didn’t try to shoot the missile down. This means one of two things: either Japan did not truly feel threatened by the launch, or Japan is incapable of reliably targeting and destroying incoming ballistic missiles and didn’t want to expose this vulnerability with a public failure. Either way, Japan’s response indicates that negotiations are still ongoing; if Japan believed North Korea had actually targeted its mainland, it would have been willing to take more risks with whatever capabilities it does have.
Pedestrians in Tokyo watch the news on a huge screen displaying a map of Japan and the Korean Peninsula on Aug. 29, 2017, following a North Korean missile test that passed over Japan. TOSHIFUMI KITAMURA/AFP/Getty Images
The American response was also subdued. In the past, the U.S. has answered North Korean missile tests with overflights of B1-B strategic bombers, a clear threat to the regime. This time, however, South Korea conducted a live bombing exercise with four F-15K fighter jets. The press release indicated this was a practice run (using bunker-busting bombs) for an attack on North Korea’s leadership, but fighter jets – which carry fewer munitions than a strategic bomber – hardly make the same threat as U.S. B1-Bs.
South Korea doesn’t appear to be interested in going much further for now. In addition to the F-15K drills, South Korea released some videos of its own prior ballistic missile tests. It also said in a press release that it is now drafting a plan that would account for “full-fledged” war with North Korea in the event that the North launches an offensive on the South. Although South Korea is trying to appear as though it is getting tough on North Korea, it’s inconceivable that the government in Seoul doesn’t already have several plans for a response to a North Korean attack. They’ve had seven decades to prepare.
Lingering Questions
Japan falls under the U.S. security umbrella, but it’s the South Korean and U.S. militaries that are the major threat to North Korea. So the obvious question is: Why Japan?
For starters, Japan once perpetrated a brutal occupation of Korea. It was Japan’s invasion – and subsequent loss – of Asia in World War II that created the circumstances that allowed for the founding of the North Korean regime. North Korea has not forgotten the threat that a powerful, aggressive Japan can pose to the Korean Peninsula.
More recently, Japan imposed new unilateral sanctions last week against the North. It’s difficult to tell how effective sanctions have been against the regime. To this point, coal and other export sanctions have cost the country hundreds of millions of dollars with no noticeable effect on the progress of its missile technology. If anything, it seems like the cadence of North Korea’s missile tests has increased following the implementation of sanctions. During a parliamentary briefing on Aug. 28, however, South Korea’s intelligence agency said the North had begun a campaign to identify “disgruntled citizens” as public fatigue with sanctions has grown. Though the public announcements of intelligence agencies shouldn’t be taken at face value, it’s possible that sanctions are beginning to affect Pyongyang’s control of its domestic situation. In that case, Japan’s latest sanctions could threaten to actually damage the regime’s position.
Given the limited options on the table for a legitimate compromise, it seems like both sides are realizing that whatever compromise they discuss would be extremely difficult to implement. For a deal to happen, the U.S. would need to ensure that North Korea has not only abandoned its nuclear weapons program, but also that its ability to resume the program is removed. This would mean intrusive inspections that the North is unlikely to accept. At the same time, the North Korean regime would need certainty that it is, in fact, secure from the U.S. and its allies, which would likely entail a diminished U.S. presence in the Pacific. Washington is unlikely to accept these terms either.
Kim Jong Un gambled that he correctly understood his adversaries’ red lines when he gave the order to conduct the latest missile test. For now it appears he was right, and if so, it probably bought him more leverage in the negotiations. But we also can’t mistake a casual response from the U.S. as acceptance, since a purposeful phase of cooling tensions is what we’d expect to see before an actual strike.
-
Does anyone else feel exhausted from the years of hand wringing over N Korea?
It's obvious they can't be stopped with diplomacy.
It's obvious a pre emptive military strike is ruled out by the those who do the deep strategizing over such things. (Unless as Doug has suggested Trump just might be different)
I wish the news cycle would stop WASTING my time with this.
If we are going to let them go nuclear then stop bugging my head with it every time they fire a missile.
Same for Iran. Stop the stupid talk talk and more talk.
Just accept what Susan Rice said ( I can safely assume she speaks for the greatest human to ever walk the face of the Earth )
which was something to the effect :
" A nuclear N Korea " is not so bad..........
Obviously if the ONE know s this why can 't we just sit back and let it happen.
So what. Just do the Facebook thing and say wonderful things to each other all day long.
-
So what. Just do the Facebook thing and say wonderful things to each other all day long.
FaceHUGGERbook
(https://vignette1.wikia.nocookie.net/avp/images/3/39/FacehuggerA11080.png/revision/latest?cb=20161110195801)
-
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/North-Koreas-ultimatum-to-America-504213
-
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/North-Koreas-ultimatum-to-America-504213
Superbly reasoned and articulated. She agrees with the view held around here and takes it further in reasons and persuasion.
[I'm not able to cut and paste out of the article]
"If you appease an enemy on behalf of an ally, then you aren't an ally."
Needing China on this, indefinitely, means we can't effectively confront China on other things, South China Sea, trade, etc.
This is tied to the same problem with Iran. Not only Japan and most Asian countries need to go nuclear, so does Saudi, Egypt, Jordan and others in the Middle East.
If the US does not directly defeat the North Korean threat now, we are no longer a superpower and nuclear non-proliferation is longer the policy of the world. This kind of threat is permanent if not stopped.
-
North Korea has sent the international community scrambling once again. Pyongyang's sixth nuclear test appeared to show substantial progress toward attaining a credible deterrent. In an emergency U.N. Security Council meeting Sept. 4, the United States called for the "strongest possible measures" to be imposed against North Korea. And it is now drafting a proposal for further sanctions, which it hopes to submit for a vote Sept. 11.
If the United States holds to this one-week timeline for a vote, it would be unprecedented in terms of speed. China and Russia, who normally try to insulate North Korea, usually assent to some level of sanctions in the wake of nuclear tests, but it ordinarily takes weeks of talks to achieve critical U.S.-China consensus. This test, though, is particularly embarrassing for China, given it came during the BRICS summit, paralleling North Korea's missile test during China's Belt and Road summit in May. However, both Russia and China have reiterated their position that sanctions alone are not a sufficient response to North Korea and that they must be accompanied by dialogue. They will continue to repeat this argument in the days and weeks to come.
If Russia and China assent to new sanctions, they are unlikely to be the sort of harsh measures touted by the United States. The last set of U.N. sanctions passed Aug. 5 avoided applying too much pressure on North Korea in a compromise with Chinese and Russian wishes. Moreover, these former sanctions are still in the implementation phase until early November — another argument Russia and China could use against the U.S. push for new swift, harsh measures.
There are a number of sectors that the United States and its allies could target for sanctions pressure. Chief among them would be North Korea's massive textile exports. Other avenues could be sanctions on supplies of crude and refined oil products, a ban on the use of North Korean labor abroad, or further financial sanctions. But even where the United States can secure U.N. sanctions, the slow-moving economic pressure would be unlikely to deter North Korea until it has achieved a credible nuclear deterrent.
The United States also has unilateral options. The U.S. Department of Treasury might opt for further secondary sanctions, namely against Chinese financial institutions. This, too, would run up against the fact that going after larger Chinese institutions could damage the U.S. economy and would not likely change China's strategy toward North Korea.
The North Korean nuclear test also provoked a flurry of military announcements. The United States confirmed Sept. 5 that it had agreed to ease limits on South Korea's ballistic missile defense measures that have been in discussion since late July. U.S. President Donald Trump also said that he would allow Japan and South Korea to buy sophisticated military equipment, likely referring to air- and sea-launched cruise missiles, targeting systems and other hardware. Such sales would take years to finalize and are distinct from the current situation with North Korea.
Other military measures, however, bear close monitoring. The United States is considering an accelerated and increased rotation of tactical and strategic assets to the Korean peninsula and to the surrounding region. This includes the dispatch of F-22 and F-35B stealth fighters to South Korea on a rotational basis. U.S. submarines and aircraft carriers will also likely be deployed in increased numbers around the Korean peninsula.
South Korea's political and diplomatic posture will also be critical here, especially given that Seoul has advocated a softer response toward Pyongyang. South Korean Minister of National Defense Song Young-moo said South Korea would lay aside dialogue and turn to punishing the North. South Korean President Moon Jae-in said the goal is still the same, but it is not the time for talks. This does not mean, however, that Moon has fully abandoned his push for more amicable relations — he has left the door open for low-level engagement even as he shores up the South's defenses.
Amid all of this, it is important to remember that North Korea will continue to test weapons according to its technical timeline. It has also not yet cast aside its threat of an "enveloping strike" on Guam. Separately, South Korea's defense ministry said Sept. 4 that North Korea appears to be preparing another missile test, possibly of an intercontinental ballistic missile.
-
Stratfor Worldview
France
See More
on geopolitics
Sep 6, 2017 | 11:20 GMT
Negotiating a Path to Dialogue With North Korea
By Rodger Baker
VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
North Korea is making every effort to broadcast that it feels it can tolerate war on its territory far better than the United States could, having withstood the Japanese invasion, World War II and the Korean War.
(
The path toward dialogue with North Korea looks fainter by the day. Washington is calling for increased isolation of the North Korean government, announcing expanded arms sales to South Korea and Japan, and promising to deploy additional strategic assets in and around the Korean Peninsula. Even the South Korean government has said that dialogue may have to wait, since North Korea's latest nuclear test and rapid-fire missile launches threaten to destabilize the security balance in East Asia.
Beijing, meanwhile, has kept up its calls for talks, though it also has advocated stronger sanctions on Pyongyang. The most important thing, China insists, is that the United States and North Korea sit down to talk — whether in a multilateral, trilateral, bilateral or whatever possible format. From Beijing's perspective, dialogue is the only way to ease the heightened tensions in Korea, while excessive sanctions or coercive tactics are largely ineffective, if not counterproductive. It's becoming increasingly obvious, however, that Washington and Beijing differ in their thinking about talks with North Korea. Having just returned from two weeks spent engaged in unofficial dialogues and exchanges in the region, I can attest that the gulf separating China from the United States is as wide as the media makes it out to be. But the reasons behind the divergence are different from the ones so often described in the news.
The Value of Talk
Washington sees talks as a means to an end — in this case, the denuclearization of North Korea. Negotiations are worth the effort only if they will roll back Pyongyang's weapons programs. In two and a half decades of talks though, each agreement struck to that end has broken down, and all the while, North Korea has slowly but steadily improved its nuclear and missile capabilities. Politicians in the United States consequently have come to view dialogue as appeasement or even capitulation. By negotiating with Pyongyang, Washington has "allowed" North Korea to become a nuclear state and to use that status against it.
The issue, at its heart, is about more than North Korea. It's about the national security strategy that Washington has crafted over the past two centuries, a strategy built on the judicious use of force abroad to demonstrate that the United States is a reliable ally. "Allowing" North Korea to attain a long-range nuclear missile after decades of declaring that such an outcome would never happen may not, in itself, fundamentally alter the U.S. security situation. But it could change the perception of the United States' power, influence and commitment to its allies. Talk is cheap and, without concrete action to back it up, potentially damaging.
For China, on the other hand, the end result is less important than the dialogue itself. The very act of engaging in talks helps relieve the immediate tensions, from Beijing's point of view, and reduces the chances of an accident or miscalculation that could lead to conflict.
There's a logic to this position. Isolation and containment without engagement haven't discouraged North Korea in its quest for nuclear weapons or changed Pyongyang's feeling that its leadership is under threat from the United States. Economic pressure, moreover, has done little to weaken the government's resolve: In 1998, during its worst years of famine, North Korea developed and tested its first satellite launch vehicle. While it's true that talks haven't stopped North Korea from developing its arsenal, nor have they reassured Pyongyang enough to drop its strategic weapons program, they have slowed the pace of development and testing. North Korea has delayed tests during brief periods of negotiation. It even destroyed the cooling tower of the Yongbyon reactor amid negotiations in 2008 (and then began rebuilding it when the discussions broke down). Beijing already informally considers North Korea a nuclear weapons state, albeit one with limited capabilities. And since ignoring or denying the reality won't change the situation for the better, it argues, could talking really make things worse?
Notwithstanding the improvement in their range, which may now extend to the U.S. mainland, China doesn't see North Korea's missiles as a greater threat to the United States now than they were before. Pyongyang, after all, already could launch missiles at U.S. bases in South Korea, Japan, and probably Guam and Hawaii, too, meaning its nuclear-capable weapons already offered it a deterrent. Securing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) won't increase North Korea's risk to the United States, Beijing asserts, not least of all because Pyongyang's long-range missiles are liquid-fueled and, as a result, take longer to fire up. Washington would have enough time to launch a pre-emptive strike on Pyongyang should it feel the need, and failing that, its layered missile defense system would take care of the problem, at least in theory.
Furthermore, assuming the goal of North Korea's nuclear program really is to ensure the Kim dynasty's continued reign, then Pyongyang is susceptible to traditional means of deterrence. North Korea won't launch its missiles proactively because doing so would invite the destruction of its government. From China's perspective, the United States isn't closing in on some dreadful deadline that will require a military solution, rather than a program to manage North Korea in the long term. And if it is, the best path forward is to reduce the sense of crisis instead of amplifying it with rash statements and shows of military force.
Reassessing the Palliative Approach
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been largely satisfied with merely managing the North Korea issue. Part of the reason for this strategy was the belief (extant in some circles to this day) that the government in Pyongyang would collapse at any moment, that it would simply disintegrate as the governments of so many other Communist bloc countries did after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The conventional military threat that North Korea posed to South Korea was another factor; the cost of physical intervention on the Korean Peninsula outweighed the danger Pyongyang presented. At the same time, North Korea wasn't going to start a war it couldn't win. So though Pyongyang was a bit of a destabilizing force from a political standpoint, it wasn't a direct military threat to the United States, least of all to the continental United States.
Today, that perception is changing rapidly. The problem isn't so much that a few unreliable nuclear-tipped ICBMs could bring the United States to its knees but that the country has spent more than a century trying to ensure that no power could threaten to bring war to its mainland. What's more, the United States does not share China's view of North Korea as a rational actor that responds to traditional deterrence theory. North Korea operates more like a kingdom of old than like a modern nation state. The willingness and ability of the country's elite to sacrifice the population, and to accept higher levels of risk, make it less predictable and, by extension, less coercible. The sorts of deterrents that kept the Soviet Union or China from belligerency may not work on North Korea. Management may no longer be a politically viable option for the United States, even if it is militarily possible.
Misreading Pyongyang
China and the United States alike have based their assessments of the situation on their perceptions of North Korea's capability, intent and predictability. But both of them may be misreading Pyongyang. The United States has misjudged the effectiveness of sanctions on the North for decades. More recently, North Korea's missile test flight over Japan surprised China, which thought that Pyongyang had backed off its launches for fear of military reprisal from the United States and was instead preparing to resume negotiations.
And that brings us to the North Korean strategy. Pyongyang is using unofficial channels to emphasize that it will not entertain negotiations devoted to denuclearization but that it is open to talks that would lead the United States and its allies to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. With characteristic bravado, North Korea claims that it already has hundreds of warheads, hinting that it may have acquired additional nuclear material through the Russian black market. The declaration may sound incredible at face value, but then again so did the notion that the North had developed hydrogen-bomb technology a year ago. Pyongyang hides just enough plausible truth in its boasts to make other countries rethink their intelligence assessments and expectations. To strengthen its case, meanwhile, North Korea is committed to demonstrating its ability to field both atomic and hydrogen bombs while perfecting its submarine-launched ballistic missiles, along with land-based, road-mobile systems. We haven't seen the last of North Korea's missile tests, no matter what sanctions the U.N. Security Council devises.
Pyongyang envisions itself as the David to Washington's Goliath, the righteous underdog taking aim at the U.S. behemoth with an ICBM for a sling and a hydrogen bomb warhead for a stone. North Korea is making every effort to broadcast that it feels it can tolerate war on its territory far better than the United States could, having withstood the Japanese invasion, World War II and the Korean War. By contrast, the United States hasn't experienced an international conflict on its continental territory for well over a century and lacks the political stamina to accept the risk of war on its mainland or so North Korea imagines. So while Pyongyang's nuclear program is primarily an effort to ensure the government's survival, as Washington and Beijing assume, it is also an attempt to shape the regional security dynamic. A conventional deterrent, such as the military capabilities that Pyongyang long relied on to discourage a physical intervention on the Korean Peninsula, will only keep the United States from taking proactive action. A nuclear weapon, however, could be enough to change Washington's strategic assessment of Asia, compelling the United States to reduce and eventually withdraw its forces in South Korea.
And even if North Korea doesn't use its nuclear capabilities to start a war, the sheer fact of their accomplishment could prove the futility of U.S. security guarantees to South Korea. The achievement also could give Pyongyang the leverage it needs to engage in a direct dialogue with the United States geared toward normalizing their relations, conceivably bringing North Korea one step closer to unification through nonmilitary means. Pyongyang has set an ambitious deadline for reaching the first benchmark in its broader political alignment: North Korea plans to be a recognized and normalized nuclear weapons state by the 2020 Summer Olympic Games in Tokyo. Between now and then, it expects a confrontation with the United States, and it is letting Washington decide what shape the conflict will take — military or merely political.
Neither Beijing nor Washington is exactly right about the prospect of negotiating with North Korea. China assumes that North Korea would agree to suspend its missile and nuclear programs in talks so long as the United States promised to ease up on its military activity on the Korean Peninsula. The United States, meanwhile, assumes that coercion is the most effective way to get North Korea to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons. But North Korea has little intention of delaying, much less ending, its nuclear and missile programs. Pyongyang wants to come back to the negotiating table — but this time as a peer among fellow nuclear powers.
-
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2017/09/04/n-korea-has-already-beaten-the-world-to-the-punch.html
Well worth watching.
-
Michael Yon
September 5 at 12:02pm ·
NORK: Just after the latest detonation, I asked a well-connected friend what he and his contacts think.
He is connected very high in the USG. One day, he took me up to Condoleeza Rice's office but she was not around. I always liked her and would have been good to say hello. She should have ran for President.
His response:
Sorry for the late response. I thought it was a posting and I saved it for reading. I didn't see it was a question just to me.
Anyway, my contacts at DoD and DoS say different things, mostly tracking their mission, but agree, in different words, on one thing:
The test is a red line and the bet by Russia, China, and DPRK is that the US will not cross it.
It is becoming increasingly apparent that the DPRK is the sock puppet of an international conspiracy headed by Russia and China to destabilize the Pacific and the adjacent east and southeast Asian landmass.
To not cross the red line and PUNISH the DPRK is to throw Seoul under the bus, which is exactly the same as throwing Japan and the wider southeast Asian nations, plus Australia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and in the long run, India under the bus. American credibility is being severely tested, which is precisely the goal of China and Russia. The DPRK is the low risk/high reward stooge in this massive geopolitical power play, but given their resources and dependence on the kindness of "strangers", they have no choice in this game of brinkmanship.
Generally, both the DoD and DoS agree that war is the only long term solution to this issue. It is an international crisis perpetrated by wanna-be global powers to bring down the US's influence in the Pacific and diminish the US maritime reach (military, trade, influence, and defense).
Put the foreign policy of the Obama and Clinton administrations into the equation, you will see why Russia and China are playing this game. They may actually have US nuclear codes (they've no doubt changed by now, but merely knowing old ones says a lot about the new ones). Obama did publicly release the exact, precise, number of nuclear weapons, from which any idiot could accurately extrapolate the various platforms, throws, and targets. In other words, our national nuclear arsenal has been compromised for eight years.
Given Obama's radical draw down of the defense budget and the wear and tear on our existing equipment in the Middle East (don't doubt Iran is in on this deal with Russia and China), the US is clearly in a compromised offensive posture.
But, to allow DPRK to get away with this provocation means we lose the Pacific and China will see this as a green light to run amok and seize whatever they want and intimidate the rest.
Generally, my contacts see war or capitulation.
-
Sounds like MY's friend has been lurking here :-)
===========================================
Article and advertisement, all in one:
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/09/07/exclusive-north-korea-openly-threatens-electromagnetic-pulse-attack-for-first-time/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=daily&utm_content=links&utm_campaign=20170908
-
second post
The United States is doggedly pushing for tough new U.N. Security Council sanctions on North Korea. In spite of resistance from China and Russia, Washington is hoping to put the sanctions before the council on Sept. 11. Meanwhile, the threat of another possible North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launch looms. Countries around the world are being forced to strategize under pressure, and the United States is increasing its efforts to enforce international isolation.
Though Manila is the fifth-largest trading partner for Pyongyang, the Philippines announced that it has halted trade with North Korea, citing the stipulations of the Aug. 5 U.N. Security Council resolution. North Korea-Philippines trade increased from 2015 to 2016 and totaled $28.8 million in the first half of 2017 — mostly in the form of electronics, bananas and garments exported from the Philippines to North Korea. But now that the Philippines is heavily reliant on Washington's help in its fight against the Islamic State in Marawi, Manila is surely more receptive to high-profile U.S. pressure on Pyongyang's trade partners.
The United States has also been working to persuade Latin American countries to cut diplomatic ties with North Korea. So far, only Mexico has complied. On Sept. 8, the Mexican government gave the North Korean ambassador to the country 72 hours to leave, citing Pyongyang's recent nuclear test. Mexico has been North Korea's primary trading partner in the region, and has maintained diplomatic relations with the country since 1980. In 2015, Pyongyang bought roughly $45 million worth of Mexican oil, while Mexico City bought a little less than $14 million in computer parts from North Korea. But, like the Philippines, Mexico has reason to align with the United States. It is currently working to get the best NAFTA deal and is eager to maintain access to U.S. consumer markets.
Other Latin American countries that have North Korean embassies or trade with the country are Brazil, Chile, Peru, Paraguay, Cuba, Venezuela and Colombia. Under continued pressure from the United States, Peru could possibly follow Mexico's lead in breaking ties. However, Chile, Cuba and Venezuela have remained staunchly opposed to the idea. Brazil, for its part, has not yet made its stance clear. If reluctance continues, the United States could threaten to impose sanctions on or increase trade barriers for Latin American countries that seek to do business with Washington while maintaining diplomatic or trade ties with Pyongyang.
The United States will likely propose its sanctions at the U.N. Security Council meeting next week, and if it suggests a harsh resolution that threatens North Korea's economic lifelines, Russia or China could abstain from voting or even veto. Regardless, both countries will cite a need for further dialogue. To that end, Beijing is working hard to convince the European members of the Security Council to reconsider Washington's proposed sanctions. Chinese President Xi Jinping told French President Emmanuel Macron on Sept. 8 that he hoped France could play a "constructive role" in restarting talks on North Korea by expanding the focus beyond just sanctions. Macron said that France was working to maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and he emphasized that his country valued China’s role in resolving the issue. That conversation came after Xi's Sept. 7 discussion with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, which yielded agreement on tougher sanctions but also emphasized continuing dialogue.
These negotiations are all taking place as North Korea begins celebrations for its Day of the Foundation of the Republic on Sept. 9. South Korea believes this holiday could be another opportunity for ICBM tests, and has completed the deployment of its U.S.-provided Terminal High Altitude Area Defense anti-missile system. Meanwhile, the United States marches on, attempting to slow down North Korea's nuclear weapons program in any way it can. So far, however, its efforts have done little to deter Pyongyang.
-
In less than six months, the XXIII Olympic Winter Games will begin in Pyeongchang, South Korea. But with an increasingly militant North Korea located less than 161 kilometers (100 miles) away, legitimate concerns have arisen over the event's potential disruption. Thomas Bach, the president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC), recently said he was closely monitoring the situation, adding that it would be a topic of discussion at the committee's upcoming meeting in Peru. Even so, it's hard not to wonder who will bear the responsibility of ensuring the safety of athletes and spectators in Pyeongchang. The answer has been constantly evolving for over four decades.
A defining moment for the question of the sporting event's security came in 1972. During the Munich Olympics, the Palestinian terrorist group Black September took 11 Israeli coaches and athletes hostage; all of them died during a botched rescue attempt by German authorities. At the time, the committee's leaders classified the incident as an "internal problem" for the German government. The IOC, they insisted, should not get involved. Even in the aftermath of the massacre, the committee paid little attention to security because of its long-standing conviction that politics and sports don't mix. When it became apparent that the world of international sports needed to take some sort of action, the IOC made sure to place the task in someone else's hands: those of the independently run local organizing committees established for each Olympic Games.
A decade after the Munich attack, the IOC softened its stance somewhat following the election of a new president, Juan Antonio Samaranch. Far more progressive than his predecessors, Samaranch listened to the advice of IOC member Ashwini Kumar, who emphasized the IOC's pressing need to participate fully in the games' security planning process.
Pulled From the Sidelines
The first cities to host the Olympics in the wake of the Munich Games were Innsbruck, Austria and Montreal, Canada. Visitors noted in both events that the sites — particularly the Olympic Villages where athletes were housed — resembled fortresses. Instead of a multinational sporting event, the Olympics seemed to be a primarily military exercise with a few athletic contests on the side. Of course, neither Innsbruck nor Montreal received financial or logistical support from the IOC as they bolstered their defenses. The Innsbruck Organizing Committee, for its part, followed the IOC's example by passing the responsibility for security down the chain in hopes of saving money.
The situation didn't improve much at the 1976 Winter Olympics in Lake Placid, New York or the 1980 Summer Games in Moscow. Though neither event suffered attacks, they did experience several problems that revealed the systemic flaws in granting a single organization the sole burden of managing security. For instance, the Lake Placid Organizing Committee unwittingly offered a contract for security equipment to a company under investigation by the U.S. government for links to terrorist groups.
A few years later, things finally began to change. Serving as the IOC's security liaison, Kumar argued that a lack of attacks in 1976 and 1980 didn't necessarily equate to efficient security planning. Though organizing committees continued to shoulder the bulk of the burden of coordinating the Olympics' security, Kumar insisted that the IOC take on a bigger role by facilitating information sharing between the committee, national intelligence agencies and host city authorities. The IOC began to quickly transform from an uninterested bystander to an invested middleman, tracking the activities of terrorist organizations such as the West German Baader-Meinhof Group and the Japanese Red Army.
The clearest example of Kumar's ideas in action came ahead of the 1988 Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. Amid fears that North Korea might try to disrupt the event, IOC member Willi Daume wrote to Samaranch with an unusual plan: Daume wanted the committee president to persuade the Soviet Union's National Olympic Committee to lean on its government to apply economic pressure against Pyongyang. Though there is little evidence that Samaranch followed through with the proposal, that Daume saw the IOC as an avenue of influence over the North Korean government marked a significant shift in policy. Far from refusing to mix politics and sports, Daume now urged Samaranch to preserve the Olympic movement through "decisive political ways."
Playing to Precedent
The striking similarities between the tense buildups to the 1988 Olympics in Seoul and to the 2018 Olympics in Pyeongchang are hard to ignore. In both cases, the games have been seen as a way to broker some form of peaceful exchange between the North and South. And in both cases, mounting bluster by Pyongyang in the run-up to the Olympics has exacerbated leaders' fears of an impending attack.
In 1987, two North Korean terrorists blew up a Korean Air flight in hopes of undermining the public's confidence in South Korea to host a secure international sporting event. In recent days, North Korea fired a missile over Japan and tested what may have been a thermonuclear device. While the Seoul Olympics ended without major incident, there is no guarantee that next year's games will do the same.
At this late stage in the event's planning process, it would be impossible to move the 2018 Olympics to another location. And the solution to greater security is not, as U.S. President Donald Trump has suggested, to respond with "fire and fury." Instead, the best chance for peaceful games is to follow the precedent of the past three decades. Complete security may be impossible to achieve, but effective and efficient security isn't.
Stratfor
YOU'RE READING
Who Will Protect the Next Olympics From North Korea?
CONNECTED CONTENT
2 Geo | 1 Topics
SHARE & SAVE
-
Just over a week after North Korea's test of a nuclear device, the United States has secured a fresh set of U.N. sanctions against the country. The speed with which the United Nations Security Council adopted these measures is unprecedented — sanctions on North Korea ordinarily take weeks of back and forth with China, North Korea's main defender, as well as consultations with Russia. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley even thanked China, in particular Chinese President Xi Jinping. The new U.N. sanctions will bite deeper into the North Korean economy than those past, but fall short of the sweeping measures included in a version leaked Sept. 7.
That draft included a full ban on a range of oil products sold to North Korea, a freeze on the assets and travel of top North Korean leaders — including Kim Jong Un — as well blacklisting military-controlled airline Air Koryo. These broad measures — particularly the oil embargo — were unpalatable for both China and Russia, neither of which wants to see North Korea collapse. Negotiations toward the end of the week led to a second draft of the resolution, circulated Sept. 10.
The sanctions as adopted will cap refined petroleum shipments into North Korea at 2 million barrels per year (compared with 2.19 million in 2016) and crude oil to current levels (estimated at 10,000 barrels per day). They will also fully ban condensates and natural gas liquids. The biggest blow to the North Korean economy, however, is a ban on the purchase of the country's textile exports. In 2016, textiles accounted for around $752 million of North Korean exports, out of an estimated total of $3 billion. Aug. 5 U.N. measures following intercontinental ballistic missile tests went after coal, which accounts for about a third of North Korea's total exports.
The new sanctions are evidently a compromise solution, though, because Russia and China are keen to leave North Korean lifelines in place. A full oil embargo wasn't enacted, although initially proposed. Sanctions also did not blacklist Kim himself or North Korea's singular airline. And, unlike the earlier draft, the current resolution leaves in place an exception allowing Russia to transship coal through the North Korean port of Rajin via rail. The new resolution also fails to include hoped-for sweeping allowances when it comes to forceful inspections of North Korean vessels. Instead, countries must have permission from the state that flagged the vessel and can only inspect it on reasonable grounds. The measures also omitted a full ban on foreign labor. Rather, countries employing foreign workers would need to seek approval by a U.N. Security Council committee, with an exception given for existing contracts. North Korea's 50,000-100,000 overseas workers earn $1.2 billion to $2.3 billion each year, primarily in foreign currency that can be used to make overseas purchases.
The text of the resolution includes calls for further work to reduce tensions with the goal of a settlement and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — language that is in line with Chinese and Russian statements. The North Korean Foreign Ministry warned that the United States would pay a price if the sanctions passed, and another test in the coming days would be characteristic of Pyongyang. These measures will do little to actually prevent North Korea from pursuing its nuclear deterrent — the country has numerous ways of sustaining itself amid economic hardship, as it proved during a massive famine that ran from 1994-1998. These new sanctions will be just as difficult to enforce as those in the past, and North Korea's timeline to gain a credible nuclear deterrent keeps getting shorter.
-
Unless, and until China's feet are held to the fire, this is just pissing in the wind.
Just over a week after North Korea's test of a nuclear device, the United States has secured a fresh set of U.N. sanctions against the country. The speed with which the United Nations Security Council adopted these measures is unprecedented — sanctions on North Korea ordinarily take weeks of back and forth with China, North Korea's main defender, as well as consultations with Russia. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley even thanked China, in particular Chinese President Xi Jinping. The new U.N. sanctions will bite deeper into the North Korean economy than those past, but fall short of the sweeping measures included in a version leaked Sept. 7.
That draft included a full ban on a range of oil products sold to North Korea, a freeze on the assets and travel of top North Korean leaders — including Kim Jong Un — as well blacklisting military-controlled airline Air Koryo. These broad measures — particularly the oil embargo — were unpalatable for both China and Russia, neither of which wants to see North Korea collapse. Negotiations toward the end of the week led to a second draft of the resolution, circulated Sept. 10.
The sanctions as adopted will cap refined petroleum shipments into North Korea at 2 million barrels per year (compared with 2.19 million in 2016) and crude oil to current levels (estimated at 10,000 barrels per day). They will also fully ban condensates and natural gas liquids. The biggest blow to the North Korean economy, however, is a ban on the purchase of the country's textile exports. In 2016, textiles accounted for around $752 million of North Korean exports, out of an estimated total of $3 billion. Aug. 5 U.N. measures following intercontinental ballistic missile tests went after coal, which accounts for about a third of North Korea's total exports.
The new sanctions are evidently a compromise solution, though, because Russia and China are keen to leave North Korean lifelines in place. A full oil embargo wasn't enacted, although initially proposed. Sanctions also did not blacklist Kim himself or North Korea's singular airline. And, unlike the earlier draft, the current resolution leaves in place an exception allowing Russia to transship coal through the North Korean port of Rajin via rail. The new resolution also fails to include hoped-for sweeping allowances when it comes to forceful inspections of North Korean vessels. Instead, countries must have permission from the state that flagged the vessel and can only inspect it on reasonable grounds. The measures also omitted a full ban on foreign labor. Rather, countries employing foreign workers would need to seek approval by a U.N. Security Council committee, with an exception given for existing contracts. North Korea's 50,000-100,000 overseas workers earn $1.2 billion to $2.3 billion each year, primarily in foreign currency that can be used to make overseas purchases.
The text of the resolution includes calls for further work to reduce tensions with the goal of a settlement and peaceful denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula — language that is in line with Chinese and Russian statements. The North Korean Foreign Ministry warned that the United States would pay a price if the sanctions passed, and another test in the coming days would be characteristic of Pyongyang. These measures will do little to actually prevent North Korea from pursuing its nuclear deterrent — the country has numerous ways of sustaining itself amid economic hardship, as it proved during a massive famine that ran from 1994-1998. These new sanctions will be just as difficult to enforce as those in the past, and North Korea's timeline to gain a credible nuclear deterrent keeps getting shorter.
-
Stratfor Worldview
Sep 15, 2017 | 01:15 GMT
North Korea: Pyongyang Fires a Second Missile Over Japan
Save As PDF
North Korea shows no signs of stopping or even slowing down its attempts to achieve an effective nuclear deterrent. And neither will it cease test-firing projectiles on a ballistic trajectory over Japan. In late August, Pyongyang penetrated Japanese airspace for the first time in some years, a move that sparked international condemnation. With its follow-up test early on Sept. 15, North Korea launched another ballistic missile over Japan's northern island of Hokkaido. The projectile travelled the equivalent distance from Los Angeles to Washington DC before dropping into the northern Pacific Ocean. The launch site — near Pyongyang International Airport in the city's Sunan district — was the same as the Aug. 29 test.
Sending the missile over the northern Japanese island of Hokkaido also echoes the previous test launch. Given its small geographic size and position, North Korea has few options for test-firing missiles along a full trajectory. Overflying Japan is one of the least provocative options available to Pyongyang, and Hokkaido was likely chosen because of its sparse population and low risk of accidental collateral damage.
More prominently, the range enables Pyongyang to effectively reach Guam, and the strategic U.S. facilities there.
In the interim period since the last test, North Korea carried out a controlled nuclear detonation, most likely of a hydrogen bomb. This is another step forward along the parallel track of developing a viable nuclear deterrent. In the wake of that nuclear test — and tougher sanctions from the United Nations — North Korea issued further threats directed against the United States and Japan.
Early reports suggest the Sept. 15 missile flew around 3,700 kilometers (2,300 miles) for 17 minutes with an apogee of approximately 770 kilometers (480 miles). The apogee, range data and flight time all point to the projectile launched by North Korea being an intermediate range ballistic missile. More prominently, the range enables Pyongyang to effectively reach Guam, and the strategic U.S. facilities there. This was something the prior Aug. 29 test wasn't able to achieve.
This latest launch is North Korea's longest-range demonstrated flight of a ballistic missile. (The intercontinental ballistic missiles tested in July were fired at a lofted trajectory, meaning they did not demonstrate their full distance.) North Korea will continue testing devices according to its technical requirements. The two relatively successful tests of what appears to be Hwasong-12 missiles on minimum energy or standard trajectories over Japan indicate the growing satisfaction by North Korea with the system's reliability. It is likely that North Korea will therefore soon introduce the missile into operational rotation with its missile units, if it has not done so already. The testing of the Hwasong-12, which shares a similar first stage with the Hwasong-14 ICBM, is also an incremental step towards the next stage in missile testing over Japan. This would involve testing a Hwasong-14 ICBM over the island country.
South Korea warned of the likelihood of a North Korean missile test since the end of August, highlighting launch preparations and initially speculating that a projectile would be tested to coincide with North Korea's Day of the Foundation of the Republic, Sept. 9. In response to this most recent test, Seoul fired a ballistic missile of its own off South Korea's east coast. As for Japan, Tokyo said that it is in contact with the United States as it gauges an appropriate response: The two have already called a U.N. Security Council meeting for Sept. 14. It seems certain, however, that regardless of further measures taken against it, this won't be the last missile test that North Korea conducts.
-
Reality Check
By George Friedman
The US Faces Unsavory Choices in the Korean Peninsula
In its attempt to deal with the threat from Pyongyang, the U.S. is facing another obstacle: South Korea.
For months now, the U.S. has been trying different measures to get North Korea to give up its nuclear program. In recent weeks, many have assumed that an attack on North Korea was no longer on the table – that there would be some sort of diplomatic solution, mainly focused on sanctions, that would force Pyongyang to fall in line.
But it’s dubious to believe that sanctions would cause North Korea to abandon something that it believes is so fundamental to its national security.
That seems to have been confirmed over the weekend by U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley, who said that the U.N. Security Council has exhausted its options in dealing with North Korea and that the matter might have to be handed over to the Pentagon. We are therefore at the point where the possibility of military action must be taken seriously again. But in its attempt to deal with the threat from Pyongyang, the U.S. is facing another obstacle: South Korea.
======================
Nikki Haley, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, speaks during a meeting of the U.N. Security Council concerning North Korea at U.N. headquarters, Sept. 11, 2017, in New York City. Drew Angerer/Getty Images
Enormous Casualties
South Korea has rejected the idea of attacking North Korea, asserting that it cannot risk another war on the Korean Peninsula, especially a conflict likely to cause even more bloodshed than the Korean War. Until a few weeks ago, we had assumed that, though South Korea was reluctant to go to war, it would remain subordinate to the United States. Both would participate in a war, and Seoul would allow the U.S. to use its forces, facilities and airspace. An attack without South Korean cooperation would be possible but would raise serious challenges.
North Korea would respond to a U.S. attack by inflicting enormous casualties on Seoul, South Korea’s capital and economic hub, using the artillery that is in range of the city. The South Koreans rejected the war option precisely because they could not accept these casualties. The North’s artillery is just as dangerous to South Korea as nuclear weapons are to the United States. The U.S. intention was to attack and destroy this artillery over time – but the problem was time. The longer it would take to neutralize this position, the greater the casualties. There doesn’t seem to be a rapid solution, given North Korea’s air defenses around the artillery.
Any nation must oppose an action that might lead to the destruction of its capital city and hundreds of thousands of citizens. If the United States gave South Korea prior warning of an attack, the South might feel compelled to inform the North in an attempt to save the city. If the United States attacked without informing the South Koreans, and the North Koreans opened fire, the South might make a sudden and radical decision to publicly repudiate its defense treaty with the U.S. in order to get North Korea to halt shelling. In the heated atmosphere, with North Korea under air attack and South Korea being shelled, the political exchanges would be unpredictable, and the political consequences long lasting.
This could shift the strategic reality of the Western Pacific. If an attack did trigger a radical shift in South Korea that included the removal of U.S. forces in the South, the Korean Peninsula would consist of two powers hostile to the United States – which might lead to some understanding between the two on coexistence. Japan, to this point armed but not officially, would have to accommodate itself in some way to the Korean Peninsula or, alternatively, openly arm itself. The Chinese would have an open opportunity to fish in the troubled waters of the Koreas.
This is all speculation, of course, but embedded in this speculation is a truth: South Korea cannot allow the destruction of its capital. The United States has been trying to persuade the South to accept this risk, but to no avail. Seoul prefers dealing with the North Koreans directly, without the Americans at its side.
A Confident Pyongyang
The North Koreans, on the other hand, clearly feel secure. They have sufficiently obfuscated the status of their program and hope that the U.S. is uncertain as to its progress. Washington would need sufficient, reliable intelligence about the status of the North’s nuclear program and the location of its nuclear facilities to launch an attack. Once North Korea has deliverable nuclear weapons able to reach the United States, any attack on Pyongyang might lead to a strike against the U.S. – Washington would need to be confident North Korea hasn’t reached this stage yet.
The North Koreans also understand that getting the Security Council to agree on anything is unlikely – Haley’s statement over the weekend is essentially an admission of that fact. Pyongyang also has significant control over its population, and once it gets nuclear weapons, its position in the world will change.
The U.S. still has the option to attack, but whether it does or not, it’s position in the Western Pacific will weaken. If the United States doesn’t attack and North Korea acquires nuclear weapons that can reach the U.S., the value of the U.S. defense treaty with the South will plummet – the basis of the alliance is after all the North Korean threat, and the likelihood that the U.S would engage a nuclear-armed Pyongyang would be very small.
It is possible the U.S. could persuade South Korea to change its position, but the potential casualties are daunting. For the United States, finding a way to eliminate North Korea’s artillery within the first hours of a war, while attacking its nuclear facilities, would be a key part of its attack plan. But even this would appear too risky to the South Koreans.
South Korea must make some sort of arrangement with North Korea. The South seems to be saying that it would be interested in such an entente, and the North would likely be interested in finding a basis for commerce with the South. Another option would be allying with a third power. An alliance with Japan is a historical impossibility, and China is not loved by either side. It is an option, but an option that both North and South Korea would not enjoy.
A very coldblooded analysis places the destruction of North Korea’s nuclear capability as the logical choice strategically for the U.S. The case can be made that protecting the U.S. from nuclear attack must take precedence for an American president over the fate of Seoul. It’s all logical and coldblooded, but among the more unsavory choices I have seen. There could, however, be another solution out there – one based in technology. In the United States, people tend to think technology solves all ills. Perhaps this could be the solution to the crisis.
-
Newt suggests we may have an EMP like weapon . Mad Dog Mattis has obviously been studying the military strategy as put forward here on this board:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rMPWTciRulI
-
Among other things, this could serve as an EMP test:
=============================================
WSJ
North Korea Warns of Hydrogen-Bomb Test Over Pacific Ocean
Threat made in response to U.S. president’s speech before U.N.; Kim Jong Un calls Donald Trump ‘mentally deranged’
North Korea May Test Hydrogen Bomb Over Pacific
North Korea's top diplomat said the country might test a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean in response to President Donald Trump's threat to ‘totally destroy’ North Korea. Photo: AP
By Jonathan Cheng
Updated Sept. 22, 2017 7:18 a.m. ET
490 COMMENTS
SEOUL—North Korea’s foreign minister said the country could detonate a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean in response to President Donald Trump’s speech before the United Nations that warned the U.S. would annihilate North Korea if forced to defend itself or its allies.
The threat, made in remarks by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho in New York, would mark a dramatic escalation in action from Pyongyang, which in the past month has already launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles over Japan and tested what it claimed was a hydrogen bomb.
“In my opinion, perhaps we might consider a historic aboveground test of a hydrogen bomb over the Pacific Ocean,” Mr. Ri said in a video broadcast on a South Korean news channel. The last aboveground nuclear detonation in the world was China’s atmospheric test of a hydrogen bomb on Oct. 16, 1980.
Related
Trump Expands U.S. Sanctions on Dealings With North Korea
China Counters Trump’s Positions in U.N. Speech
U.S. Cautioned at Security Council Meeting Over Iran, North Korea
Russian Diplomat Chides, Chastises Trump in U.N. Speech
North Korea Nuclear Threats Don’t Stop Aid From South
Trump Issues Dire Warning to North Korea in Address to U.N.
North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho at Beijing airport this month.
North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho at Beijing airport this month. Photo: Mark Schiefelbein/Associated Press
Mr. Ri said he didn’t know for sure what North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was planning.
The remarks from Mr. Ri came hours after Mr. Kim said through Pyongyang’s state media early on Friday that he was considering the “highest level of hard-line countermeasure” after Mr. Trump’s speech.
South Korean President Moon Jae-in, who was flying from New York to Seoul, didn’t have any comment, a spokesman said. The U.S. State Department didn’t immediately respond to a request for comment.
On Friday morning, Mr. Trump tweeted: “Kim Jong Un of North Korea, who is obviously a madman who doesn’t mind starving or killing his people, will be tested like never before!”
Japan’s top government spokesman said on Friday it was “completely unacceptable” that North Korea was threatening regional security.
What a War With North Korea Might Look Like
What a War With North Korea Might Look Like
Around the Korean peninsula, American leaders have been openly discussing what was once unthinkable: A military intervention in North Korea. If this were to happen, here’s how specialists on North Korean security see things playing out. Graphic: Sharon Shi for The Wall Street Journal
Asked at a press conference about Mr. Ri’s threat of a nuclear test in the Pacific, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said Japan was prepared for any possibility.
Scott LaFoy, a U.S.-based missile analyst, said North Korea could follow through on such a threat, although many questions remained about North Korea’s missile capabilities, including whether it can miniaturize a nuclear weapon to fit on the tip of a missile and whether it can make a warhead robust enough to survive re-entry through the Earth’s atmosphere.
Still, such a provocation was within the realm of possibility, Mr. LaFoy said.
“It’s been on my list of ‘possible cases’ for a couple of weeks now,” he said.
It was also theoretically possible for North Korea to carry out the threat by loading a hydrogen bomb onto a ship and detonating it in the Pacific, Mr. LaFoy said.
Trump Threatens to 'Destroy' North Korea
President Donald Trump threatened to "totally destroy North Korea" if the U.S. is forced to defend itself or its allies against Pyongyang's aggression, in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly on Tuesday. Photo: Reuters
Hours before Mr. Ri’s remarks, Mr. Kim, in a rare first-person statement published through the official Korean Central News Agency, said Mr. Trump was a “gangster fond of playing with fire” who was unfit to be president and described his U.N. remarks as the “mentally deranged behavior” of a frightened leader.
“I am now thinking hard about what response he could have expected when he allowed such eccentric words to trip off his tongue,” Mr. Kim said in the statement. “Whatever Trump might have expected, he will face results beyond his expectation.”
Mr. Kim didn’t specify what countermeasures he had in mind but warned he would “definitely tame the mentally deranged U.S. dotard with fire,” suggesting the possibility of further nuclear and missile tests.
During his first speech before the U.N. General Assembly on Tuesday, Mr. Trump described Mr. Kim as “Rocket Man” on a “suicide mission” and warned that the U.S. could “totally destroy North Korea” if it was forced to defend itself or its allies.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un Photo: KCNA/KNS/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Mr. Kim said he had expected Mr. Trump to stick to some of his previous rhetoric during his U.N. speech but he was taken aback by Mr. Trump’s bellicosity.
“The mentally deranged behavior of the U.S. president openly expressing on the U.N. arena the unethical will to ‘totally destroy’ a sovereign state…makes even those with normal thinking faculty think about discretion and composure,” Mr. Kim said.
He added: “I’d like to advise Trump to exercise prudence in selecting words and to be considerate of whom he speaks to when making a speech in front of the world.”
The Korean Central News Agency also took a swipe at Chinese state media for their criticisms of North Korea’s recent behavior.
The Threat From North Korea’s Missiles
In a vitriolic commentary published Friday, KCNA lambasted the Communist Party’s flagship newspaper People’s Daily and its sister publication, the nationalist Global Times tabloid, for recent articles that “insulted” North Korea with “extremely ill-boding words.”
The agency also attacked Chinese media for “openly resorting to interference in the internal affairs of another country,” describing such acts as “little short of driving a wedge between the two countries.”
“The Chinese media had better watch how the DPRK smashes the hostile forces’ arrogance and highhanded practices, rather than kowtowing to the ignorant acts of the Trump administration,” KCNA said, referring to North Korea by its preferred name.
KCNA derided Chinese President Xi Jinping’s diplomatic exchanges with Mr. Trump, accusing China of “going under the armpit of the U.S. while holding a white flag to blame the good neighbor.”
“The DPRK does not have to lie on its face just as China did when it visited the U.S.,” the Pyongyang-based agency said, in an apparent reference to the April meeting between Messrs. Xi and Trump in Florida.
—Kwanwoo Jun in Seoul, Chun Han Wong in Beijing and Alastair Gale in Tokyo contributed to this article.
-
Stratfor Worldview
Sep 23, 2017 | 00:00 GMT
How North Korea Could Pull Off a Pacific Nuclear Test
Would North Korean leader Kim Jong Un really provoke a further international outcry with an atmospheric nuclear test blast?
(STR/AFP/Getty Images)
Print
Save As PDF
With the steady escalation of both multilateral and U.S. sanctions against it, North Korea is threatening once again to ratchet up its response. The week began with U.S. President Donald Trump telling the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 19 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was on a "suicide mission" and the United States would "totally destroy" North Korea if necessary to protect itself and its allies. Trump followed up his remarks by signing an executive order on Sept. 21 that will allow the U.S. Treasury Department to go after entities trading with North Korea. On Sept. 22, Kim responded by promising countermeasures.
Kim’s vague threat was sharpened by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, who speculated to reporters in New York that Kim might be considering carrying out "the most powerful detonation of an H-bomb in the Pacific." Ri said he did not know what Kim was considering and that the nature of the response was entirely Kim’s decision.
These threats don't necessarily suggest that North Korea would immediately detonate a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific Ocean, but it's not impossible that it could. Ri's allusion to Kim's power to choose a course of action is similar to North Korea's August threat against Guam, which was followed by missile tests but none along the lines of those that had been outlined.
A North Korean nuclear test in the Pacific likely would involve launching a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile over the ocean and exploding the warhead at a high altitude. Such a test also likely would involve flying the missile and its warhead over Japan. A flight over Japan would showcase the likely flight path of an intercontinental ballistic missile launched toward the U.S. mainland as well.
North Korea could try to minimize collateral damage from an atmospheric nuclear test by testing at a very high altitude — perhaps as high up as the edge of space — in a remote location of the Pacific where there is little maritime traffic. A high-altitude test also could allow North Korea to get around the limitations of its still rudimentary re-entry technology.
Even with the measures North Korea could take to minimize the damage of an atmospheric nuclear explosion, the risk of such a test is always substantial. An accident or miscalculation could result in a nuclear explosion at a location and altitude that differs from the original intent. Depending on the exact yield of the warhead, a very high-altitude nuclear test demonstration could also result in a significant electromagnetic pulse effect that would damage or at least disrupt radar, satellite and radio networks.
Because of the Pacific Ocean's vast size and the likely remoteness of the detonation zone, dispersal and dilution would serve to limit the overall human exposure to radioactive material. While there is a large volume of trans-Pacific shipping traffic, a high-altitude test would unlikely have a long-term effect on shipping beyond the impact of the electromagnetic pulse. There also is a low probability that a surface-level test would even have an impact on shipping lanes, given the Pacific's size.
The closer a test occurs to the surface, the more damage any nearby infrastructure would suffer, and the higher the environmental damage and radioactive fallout will be. A surface-level test would have a destructive, but localized impact on sea life, or on any unlucky passing vessel. A nuclear test that occurs over a known fishing zone could affect the fishing industry. Human exposure to radiation would ultimately be limited, but the test would create a perception of exposure that could negatively affect demand.
Even a North Korean nuclear test over the Pacific that results in few or no casualties would be deemed highly provocative. No country has carried out an atmospheric nuclear test since China in 1980, and that was in the remote Lop Nur basin of Xinjiang province within its own territory. Such a test today would mark a violation of long-established bans on nuclear testing beyond just the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
A Pacific test would isolate North Korea further internationally and would likely invite additional economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, including reluctant powers such as Russia and China. An impending North Korean live nuclear test also would provide added impetus to the argument that Japan and the United States should shoot down North Korean missiles, despite the risk that the intercept attempt could fail. Intelligence forewarning permitting, the United States could even attempt to destroy the missile on its launch pad before it could fly. And a nuclear test over the Pacific would reinforce the narrative that North Korea is not an entirely rational or predictable nation.
Stratfor
YOU'RE READING
How North Korea Could Pull Off a Pacific Nuclear Test
-
The United States has declared war on North Korea, according to North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su Yong. In a brief news conference in New York on Sept. 25, Ri said that U.S. President Donald Trump's recent statements to the U.N. General Assembly were tantamount to a declaration of war and that all of the members of the United Nations clearly heard that it was the United States that first declared war on North Korea. Therefore, Ri argued, Pyongyang has a right to self-defense under the U.N. charter and would be justified if it were to shoot down U.S. strategic bombers, even outside North Korean territory.
Over the past week, the rhetoric between the United States and North Korea has rapidly escalated. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un responded to Trump's Sept. 19 U.N. speech by saying that Pyongyang was seriously considering the "highest level of hard-line countermeasures in history." The statement, accompanied by a picture of Kim sitting at a desk and looking intently into the camera — reminiscent of U.S. presidential addresses to the nation during times of crisis — was clarified later to suggest Pyongyang could carry out an atmospheric nuclear test in the Pacific Ocean.
Though much of the escalation has been rhetorical rather than concrete, both North Korea and the United States are inching closer to backing up their words with action to demonstrate their positions. The United States is openly discussing shooting down North Korea's next missile test, and North Korea has responded with what it considers to be an equivalent threat: the possibility of shooting down U.S. strategic bombers near the Korean Peninsula. Pyongyang has long equated the U.S. strategic bombers patrolling the peninsula to its own missile program and has warned that it could launch missiles to the U.S. coastline in a parallel show of range and force.
Trump's comments to the United Nations and the additional sanctions his administration recently imposed against North Korea could be seen as one step along the traditional path to U.S. military action. This path involves the U.S. making a strong case to the international community before resorting to unilateral action justified by the inability or unwillingness of the world to act. Washington has yet to take concrete action to suggest that it is preparing to strike. It has not changed its force posture or made moves to evacuate the 125,000-140,000 American civilians living in South Korea. Neither does North Korea appear to be significantly altering the positions of its forces, though it is exploiting increased U.S. threats to rally the North Korean population around the embattled government in Pyongyang.
Though neither the United States nor North Korea is making the formal movements that would suggest an imminent, purposeful military conflict, the fever pitch between the two and the increased shows of force do raise the likelihood that an accident or miscalculation could lead to conflict. North Korea and the United States have not agreed on basic rules of engagement for air encounters. So, should North Korea decide to scramble aircraft to intercept U.S. flights, even if it has no intent to engage, the potential for an accidental collision is high. North Korean aircraft have collided with U.S. aircraft in the past, last in 2001 off the Chinese coast, but military tension wasn't nearly as high then. U.S actions could be just as risky: If Pyongyang follows through on its threat to test a nuclear device in the Pacific, Washington could try to shoot down the launch, particularly if the weapon is on a trajectory that could bring it near the U.S. coast. In each scenario, tit-for-tat responses could lead to a rapid escalation unintended by either side.
Amid the intensifying standoff, signs of back-channel diplomatic efforts should be watched for, even if it appears that there is little space for a compromise that would satisfy both sides. Russia is working with North Korea diplomatically, and the North Korean Foreign Ministry official in charge of North America is in Russia this week, creating one such space for possible back-channel diplomacy. China's actions should also be watched closely. China's relationship with North Korea has been strained for the past several years, and many of the United States' warnings of military action could be meant more to convince China to take a stronger stand rather than to directly convince North Korea to change its course of action. Any changes in military postures will, of course, also be significant. These include the possibility that the United States could change the way it conducts its strategic bomber missions, by switching to stealth aircraft or expanding fighter escorts, for example.
The probability of intentional war is still relatively low without additional escalation, but the potential for accidental conflict is increasing. North Korea has threatened that in the near future it could test its missiles near the U.S. territory of Guam, test its missiles off the U.S mainland coast, intercept U.S. bombers near the Korean Peninsula and conduct an atmospheric nuclear test over the Pacific Ocean. The United States has been less specific in its threats, but it has increased its strategic bomber flights, has talked more openly about shooting down North Korean missiles and has discussed sending additional strategic assets to the region. And more physical action makes it more likely that accident and miscalculation could follow.
-
second post
With the steady escalation of both multilateral and U.S. sanctions against it, North Korea is threatening once again to ratchet up its response. The week began with U.S. President Donald Trump telling the U.N. General Assembly on Sept. 19 that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was on a "suicide mission" and the United States would "totally destroy" North Korea if necessary to protect itself and its allies. Trump followed up his remarks by signing an executive order on Sept. 21 that will allow the U.S. Treasury Department to go after entities trading with North Korea. On Sept. 22, Kim responded by promising countermeasures.
Kim’s vague threat was sharpened by North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho, who speculated to reporters in New York that Kim might be considering carrying out "the most powerful detonation of an H-bomb in the Pacific." Ri said he did not know what Kim was considering and that the nature of the response was entirely Kim’s decision.
These threats don't necessarily suggest that North Korea would immediately detonate a hydrogen bomb in the Pacific Ocean, but it's not impossible that it could. Ri's allusion to Kim's power to choose a course of action is similar to North Korea's August threat against Guam, which was followed by missile tests but none along the lines of those that had been outlined.
A North Korean nuclear test in the Pacific likely would involve launching a nuclear-tipped ballistic missile over the ocean and exploding the warhead at a high altitude. Such a test also likely would involve flying the missile and its warhead over Japan. A flight over Japan would showcase the likely flight path of an intercontinental ballistic missile launched toward the U.S. mainland as well.
North Korea could try to minimize collateral damage from an atmospheric nuclear test by testing at a very high altitude — perhaps as high up as the edge of space — in a remote location of the Pacific where there is little maritime traffic. A high-altitude test also could allow North Korea to get around the limitations of its still rudimentary re-entry technology.
Even with the measures North Korea could take to minimize the damage of an atmospheric nuclear explosion, the risk of such a test is always substantial. An accident or miscalculation could result in a nuclear explosion at a location and altitude that differs from the original intent. Depending on the exact yield of the warhead, a very high-altitude nuclear test demonstration could also result in a significant electromagnetic pulse effect that would damage or at least disrupt radar, satellite and radio networks.
Because of the Pacific Ocean's vast size and the likely remoteness of the detonation zone, dispersal and dilution would serve to limit the overall human exposure to radioactive material. While there is a large volume of trans-Pacific shipping traffic, a high-altitude test would unlikely have a long-term effect on shipping beyond the impact of the electromagnetic pulse. There also is a low probability that a surface-level test would even have an impact on shipping lanes, given the Pacific's size.
The closer a test occurs to the surface, the more damage any nearby infrastructure would suffer, and the higher the environmental damage and radioactive fallout will be. A surface-level test would have a destructive, but localized impact on sea life, or on any unlucky passing vessel. A nuclear test that occurs over a known fishing zone could affect the fishing industry. Human exposure to radiation would ultimately be limited, but the test would create a perception of exposure that could negatively affect demand.
Even a North Korean nuclear test over the Pacific that results in few or no casualties would be deemed highly provocative. No country has carried out an atmospheric nuclear test since China in 1980, and that was in the remote Lop Nur basin of Xinjiang province within its own territory. Such a test today would mark a violation of long-established bans on nuclear testing beyond just the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
A Pacific test would isolate North Korea further internationally and would likely invite additional economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure, including reluctant powers such as Russia and China. An impending North Korean live nuclear test also would provide added impetus to the argument that Japan and the United States should shoot down North Korean missiles, despite the risk that the intercept attempt could fail. Intelligence forewarning permitting, the United States could even attempt to destroy the missile on its launch pad before it could fly. And a nuclear test over the Pacific would reinforce the narrative that North Korea is not an entirely rational or predictable nation.
-
https://www.daybydaycartoon.com/comic/the-art-of-dealing-with-it/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+DayByDayCartoon+%28Day+by+Day+Cartoon+by+Chris+Muir%29
-
Sept. 27, 2017 It’s unclear just how much damage North Korea can inflict on Seoul.
By Xander Snyder
For all the attention rightly paid to the nuclear weapons program of North Korea, any country considering a military strike against Pyongyang needs to account for its artillery. Eliminating these conventional weapons, fixated as they are on civilian populations in South Korea, is critical, since Kim Jong Un has threatened to use them to turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” It’s enough to make its potential targets question the wisdom of war.
There’s no question that the North can strike Seoul. There are some questions, however, over just how much damage it can inflict. And the answers to these questions lie at the heart of the political exchange between South Korea, which wants to avoid war, and the United States, which is more disposed to attack. Each side is trying to convince the other that its course of action is correct. Understanding the dynamics at play requires understanding what exactly is at stake if the North, as it has long pledged to do, fires its artillery at the South.
To Bring an Enemy to Heel
At its closest point, Seoul, the city most at risk from an artillery barrage, lies about 24 miles (39 kilometers) from the demilitarized zone. There’s a spot on the DMZ, near the southwestern part of the Imjin River, that dips just a little farther (about 15 miles) toward South Korea, a tract of flat land that would be relatively easy for an invading force to pass through. It is here that North Korea has fixed its closest artillery on the South Korean capital. But the DMZ is long, and Pyongyang can’t afford to put all its artillery in the areas in which it would do the most damage to Seoul. It must defend its entire border, so its artillery is spread more thinly than perhaps it would like.
(click to enlarge)
More important than the placement of these guns, however, is the sheer number of them that can reach their target. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimates that North Korea has more than 21,000 artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers aimed at Seoul. But only three types of them have the range to hit Seoul: the 170 mm Koksang self-propelled guns and the 240 mm and 300 mm MRLs. The 170 mm Koksang has an effective range of approximately 25 miles (which can be boosted to approximately 50 miles with rocket-propelled shells); the 240 mm and 300 mm MRLs have a range of about 50 miles and 95 miles, respectively. It’s unclear exactly how many pieces of this artillery North Korea possesses, but estimates put the number at about 700-1,000, some of which are probably stationed closer to Pyongyang to defend the capital.
(click to enlarge)
What works against North Korea is that the bigger, longer-range artillery pieces tend to fire more slowly. As soon as they begin to fire at Seoul, their positions would be revealed and would therefore be subject to U.S. and South Korean counterstrikes – and quickly, by notably superior equipment. Self-propelled artillery such as the Koksang is designed to mitigate this problem, and though it can be fired and relocated comparatively more quickly than towed artillery, it still cannot evade U.S. and South Korean targeting systems forever. The only way it could is if it is placed in fortified positions in the mountains or beneath the ground, but such positions clearly obstruct the firing path. MRLs can fire several projectiles at once, but they are easier to shoot out of the air by counter-artillery systems. Seoul might not be able to intercept all of them, but it could intercept some of them, thereby reducing the amount of damage Seoul would take. In other words, North Korea may have as many as 1,000 guns aimed at Seoul in a geographically advantageous position, but there are only so many rounds Pyongyang could fire before its guns would be destroyed or moved.
Then there is the question of strategy. If the North has only a small window of opportunity to hit Seoul, why would it waste precious time exclusively attacking civilian populations? If the North believes that winning the war requires destroying the South’s military, then it would want to strike military installations, not civilians. Based on the size of the North’s crude oil reserves, moreover, many experts believe that North Korea can wage war only for a few months at most. So if Pyongyang believes it has only a little time to attack, it might optimize its time by attacking military targets.
Still, there is more than one way to bring an enemy to heel. One strategy North Korea has likely explored is targeting South Korean infrastructure – power plants, water and sewage treatment facilities, and so on – that makes life in Seoul possible. If North Korea could strike these facilities, firing fast enough to prevent rapid repair, then it could kill many more civilians than it could by directly targeting civilians. Put simply, it is possible for Pyongyang to render parts of Seoul uninhabitable without completely leveling the city.
No Comfort
For these reasons, it seems unlikely that North Korea could turn Seoul into a “sea of fire.” The Nautilus Institute, a think tank that studies North Korea, reached a similar conclusion in a report published in 2012. Based on the range, fire rate and rate of attrition – how quickly artillery pieces will be taken out once they’ve been fired – roughly 30,000 residents of Seoul would die in the initial volley, with as many as 35,000 more dead by the end of the day and 50,000 more dead by the end of the week, according to the report.
But these figures are based on a deliberately outlandish assumption: that North Korea uses every piece of capable artillery it has to fire on cities like Seoul at optimal fire rates with a limitless supply of ammunition – with no misfires or misses. If Pyongyang attacks military installations instead, Nautilus estimates the causalities to decrease dramatically to 2,800 from the initial barrage, and most of them would be soldiers.
Notably, the report was written before North Korea tested the 300 mm MRL, so the figures could be somewhat higher. They could be higher still if Pyongyang used chemical or biological weapons on the South. The South Korean Ministry of Defense estimated that North Korea has 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, with the ability to produce up to 12,000 tons (an annualized rate of production) during wartime. It’s unclear, however, if North Korea has the capability to affix these weapons to its short-range artillery rockets. Nor is it clear what kind of biological agents Pyongyang has, but it’s safe to assume casualties would increase if it had them and chose to use them.
None of this, of course, is any comfort to Seoul. To say that tens of thousands, as opposed to millions, will die in the opening salvo of a war is to offer no solace to its residents or its leaders. It justifies Seoul’s aversion to war absolutely. The desire to avoid casualties of any magnitude is central to South Korea’s imperatives, and it’s difficult to imagine a scenario in which the United States persuades Seoul to act against its own interests.
-
By Omar Lamrani
Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor
Omar Lamrani
Omar Lamrani
Senior Military Analyst, Stratfor
On paper, deterrence is fairly straightforward concept. But in practice, the policy can look quite different depending on the nations implementing and being targeted by it.
(JUNG YEON-JE/AFP/Getty Images)
Since the turn of the millennium, war between nuclear powers has never loomed so near. As North Korea sprints toward the finish line in its race to build a credible nuclear deterrent, the window of opportunity to stop it is shrinking. With time running out, the United States may yet launch a preventive strike against Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, convinced that military intervention is the only way to halt its smaller adversary in its tracks.
Within this narrow time frame, the risk of conflict on the Korean Peninsula will spike as the United States weighs the costs and benefits of attacking a country whose arsenal is already formidable. But should Washington opt against a preventive strike, or put off the decision for too long, the few options before it will be reduced to one: deterrence.
Armed and Dangerous
On paper, deterrence is a fairly straightforward concept: One country uses the threat of retaliation to stave off the attacks of another. But in practice, deterrence can look quite different depending on the nations implementing and being targeted by it. The circumstances that gave rise to the very concept of nuclear deterrence — the United States' Cold War-era showdown with the Soviet Union — are radically different than those Washington now faces as its standoff with Pyongyang grows tenser by the day. And in many ways, deterring North Korea would be far trickier than deterring the Soviet Union ever was.
The most pressing danger the United States would have to worry about is miscalculation. Though North Korea's development of a fully functional nuclear weapon and delivery arsenal would take the option of a preventive strike off the table, it wouldn't preclude a pre-emptive strike aimed at stopping an imminent attack. In fact, because North Korea would have the ability to inflict catastrophic damage in a single go, the United States, South Korea and Japan would have even more reason to try to detect and block an attack by Pyongyang before it happens.
South Korea has already taken steps to improve its response time. Under its "proactive deterrence" strategy, Seoul has compressed its military chain of command to speed up decision-making, while with the still-developing Kill Chain program it aims to be able to detect and pre-empt any North Korean missile launch before it occurs. These programs are only a small part of the broader strategies that the United States, South Korea and Japan will put in place against North Korea. But the ability to act faster comes with its own dangers as well. Under pressure to issue a quick and overwhelming response ahead of a seemingly imminent nuclear attack — or, from Pyongyang's perspective, a strike meant to decapitate the government of Kim Jong Un — parties on each side could easily trigger a devastating conflict on the basis of false intelligence or a simple misunderstanding.
A Race With No Winners
At the same time, the current strategic balance among the world’s biggest nuclear powers would begin to break down. The United States would inevitably ramp up its ballistic missile defense development, which would spur other nations to respond, perhaps in kind, or by adjusting nuclear posture or abandoning arms agreements. Already, the United States has a foundation of operational missile defenses to build on, ranging from regionally focused systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), to strategic systems with the ability to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles, such as the U.S. Ground-Based Midcourse Defense.
This gradual buildup of U.S. missile defenses will meet vehement opposition from China and Russia. After all, a reliable anti-ballistic missile network could rob Beijing and Moscow of their own strategic deterrents, enabling Washington to launch a devastating first strike before intercepting and destroying any Chinese or Russian missiles that survive for use in a retaliatory strike. It came as no surprise when China pushed back against the recent deployment of the THAAD system to South Korea, or when Russia did the same in response to the United States' plans to bolster Europe's missile defenses. Any U.S. strategy of deterrence against North Korea that centers on missile defense would thus have wider global consequences, creating fertile ground for renewed rivalries and weakening the arms control regimes already in place.
All for One, and One for All
North Korea's newfound capabilities would also raise questions among the United States' allies about the reliability of extended deterrence. Under this policy, the United States has tried to ward off attacks against South Korea and Japan by vowing to come to their defense, regardless of whether North Korea could target U.S. cities with nuclear weapons. But would the United States truly be willing to risk Los Angeles to save Tokyo or Seoul? As Washington's partners ask themselves this question, the prospect of "decoupling" — the breakdown of an extended deterrence umbrella as once-protected partners hedge their bets by seeking out their own defenses — will become all the more likely.
Of course, the United States could ease their fears somewhat by deploying tactical nuclear weapons to the region (most likely to South Korea). U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently discussed this possibility with South Korean Defense Minister Song Young Moo amid polls that showed nearly 70 percent of South Koreans support the move. If the talks result in action, it would place U.S. nuclear weapons directly in the line of fire, reducing the need for Seoul or Tokyo to create their own nuclear deterrents. It would also fortify the United States' extended deterrence policy by giving Washington and its allies more options: Rather than having to resort to strategic nuclear weapons, they could respond to North Korean chemical or nuclear attacks on the battlefield with the less drastic option of tactical nuclear weapons — at least, in theory. The actual fallout of introducing tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula would likely be much messier, dimming any prospect of someday denuclearizing the region while ratcheting up the risk of a wider nuclear war.
The United States has tried to reassure its Asian allies in more conventional ways as well. Washington recently agreed to lift the traditional payload limit in place on South Korean ballistic missiles, and it offered to sell both partners more advanced military equipment. But even as these moves shore up the United States' alliances in Northeast Asia, they will reduce Washington's ability to dictate the pace and outcome of events in the region, as South Korea and Japan expand their capabilities. And if either country, more emboldened and more powerful than ever, initiates its own offensive against North Korea, it could drag the United States into a war that was not of its choosing.
Perils Proliferate
A policy of deterrence against North Korea would carry new concerns for proliferation, too. Not only could South Korea and Japan seek out their own nuclear weapons, but North Korea would also set a troubling precedent for other nations: So far it is the only country to have joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty before subsequently withdrawing to pursue nuclear weapons. Moreover, there is a chance that North Korean nuclear and ballistic missile technology could spread to other countries. Though Pyongyang wouldn't be eager to undermine its deterrent by selling nuclear weapons technology, it's possibile that the cash-strapped and isolated government would sell missile development technology to longtime partners such as Iran.
While the precarious world of deterrence is certainly preferable to nuclear war, it comes with its own problems and perils. And given the particularly high level of mistrust and risk of miscalculation on both sides of the dispute over North Korea’s nuclear program, the next era of nuclear deterrence may well be the most dangerous the world has witnessed yet.
-
North Korea: Where China Can Beat the US
Oct 10, 2017
By Jacob L. Shapiro
Of all the parties involved in the Korean missile crisis, the most difficult to read is China. The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s almost daily platitudes about the need for a peaceful resolution do little to reveal what China’s real interests and objectives are – and what they are is multiple and conflicting. At one level, China is concerned with the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula. China doesn’t want Pyongyang to have nuclear weapons, and it doesn’t want the peninsula to unify. But at the same time, what happens on the Korean Peninsula also affects China’s relationship with the U.S., and despite the deep economic ties between the two countries, from Beijing’s perspective that is a relationship defined ultimately by fear and mistrust.
(click to enlarge)
Roots of Mistrust
To understand where this mistrust comes from, we need to revisit some history. When North Korea invaded South Korea on June 25, 1950, it did so without Chinese participation. What assistance China did offer before the invasion was rebuffed by Kim Il Sung’s young regime, confident as it was that it would not only succeed in its attack but that the invasion would provoke a popular uprising in South Korea as well. North Korea’s invasion caught the U.S. flat-footed. In its panicked analysis of what had happened, the U.S. feared that the invasion might be part of a much larger attack by the communist bloc against U.S. interests. That is why two days later, then-U.S. President Harry Truman ordered the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait.
At the time of Truman’s order, the People’s Republic of China was less than a year old. It was led by Mao Zedong, who was deeply suspicious of U.S. intentions toward his regime. Mao’s concerns were not unfounded. Mao remembered what happened after World War I, when, upon arrival at Versailles, Chinese delegates discovered that the U.S. had recognized a Japanese claim over Chinese territory that European powers had once held. Mao also lived through the United States’ breaking off support for the Chinese Communists – after the U.S. had supported them in their fight against Japan in World War II – because of the Cold War. The U.S. instead poured its resources into rebuilding Japan, which had invaded and brutally occupied China during the war. In addition, the U.S. threw its support behind Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalists in the hopes that they would defeat the upstart Communist forces. (The term “Chinese nationalists” has always been something of a misnomer – the Communists were just as nationalistic as Chiang’s forces, but that is what history has come to call them.)
Moving the 7th Fleet into the Taiwan Strait was the last straw for Mao. To him, the U.S. was the only thing standing between his Communist Party of China and the creation of a unified Chinese nation-state beholden to no one but the Chinese people themselves. But China could do nothing to avenge the slight directly. It didn’t have the military force necessary to conquer Taiwan with the 7th Fleet standing guard. The only place China could hope to respond was in North Korea, where the rugged geography negated some of the advantages of the United States’ technological and military superiority. China entered the Korean War in October 1950, and because of China’s intervention, the Korean War ended in a stalemate that remains unresolved to this day.
Cycles of History
Fast forward to today, and it is plain to see that the more things change, the more they stay the same. Korea is still divided, and despite momentous growth in the economy and the military capabilities of the People’s Republic of China, Taiwan remains outside of its control. But it’s not just the strategic reality that is the same. It’s also true that for China, the North Korea and the Taiwan issue are inextricably linked.
On Dec. 2, soon after the U.S. presidential election, President-elect Donald Trump did something that no U.S. president had done for more than 37 years: He had direct contact with the president of Taiwan. It may seem a small thing, but for Beijing, this was not a trivial moment. It took Trump another two months to accept the “One China” policy – two months where Chinese strategic planners were left to wonder what the United States’ true intentions were with regard to Taiwan, and China’s territorial integrity in general.
Chinese vendors sell North Korean and Chinese flags on the boardwalk next to the Yalu River in the border city of Dandong, northern China, across from the city of Sinuiju, North Korea, on May 24, 2017. KEVIN FRAYER/Getty Images
From the perspective of the Communist Party of China’s political legitimacy, Taiwan is the only part of China it has been unable to capture and integrate into its revolution. From the perspective of China’s defense strategy, Taiwan is an island 100 miles (160 kilometers) away from the mainland that a powerful navy could use as a base from which to blockade China or even to attack the mainland. If Taiwan were to gain U.S. recognition and perhaps even host U.S. forces, what is already a Chinese handicap would become an existential threat. It would also make a mockery of China’s faux-aggressiveness in the South China Sea, and would make previous American freedom of navigation operations look friendly in comparison.
China also faced another potential threat from the Trump administration: the potential that the U.S. might block Chinese exports from the U.S. market. A trade conflict between the two sides would hurt both parties, but China was always going to be hurt more, and President Xi Jinping could not afford an economic crisis in the lead-up to this month’s Party Congress, where he will solidify his dictatorship over the country.
What China needed, then, was a bargaining chip, a way of turning its position of weakness into one of strength. Enter North Korea. China had to proceed carefully. On the
one hand, China had to appear to have enough control over Pyongyang to divert the Trump administration from following through on some of its threats to redefine the U.S.-China economic relationship. On the other hand, China could not overstate its influence in North Korea such that the U.S. could hold China directly accountable for failure to help denuclearize the Korean Peninsula. The July 2017 revelation by China’s Ministry of Defense that contact between the Chinese People’s Liberation Army and North Korea’s military forces has completely ceased in recent years was meant to underline the limits of what Trump’s bargain with Xi at Mar-a-Lago in April had bought.
In reality, Xi has as little control over Kim Jong Un’s actions as Mao had over Kim Il Sung’s. But Xi does not need total control over Kim’s regime to use Kim to China’s advantage; all he needs is for China and North Korea to share an interest in limiting U.S. power in Asia, and there is little to suggest that interest is going away anytime soon. North Korea is pursuing a nuclear weapons programs to establish a nuclear deterrent against the United States. China doesn’t have to make such moves. It already has nuclear weapons and is far more powerful than Pyongyang. That allows China to be more pragmatic – that is, cooperative – in its dealings with the United States. But China’s pragmatism and willingness to work with the U.S. should not obscure the fact that, like North Korea, China is deeply suspicious of U.S. motives.
This, in turn, is one of the major limiting factors on the U.S. ability to attack North Korea. China has a mutual defense treaty with North Korea. And China, though it would prefer the status quo on the Korean Peninsula, does not necessarily lose if the U.S. were to try to solve the North Korea issue by force. This is because the attempt, absent some unknown technological devilry, wouldn’t work. The U.S. has tried and failed twice to win a war on the Asian mainland, and the situation in Korea hasn’t improved enough to think that the third time would be any different. China can’t beat the U.S. at sea, and it can’t take back Taiwan, but it can beat the U.S. in North Korea. That allows China to remind the U.S. that, though Beijing may not yet be able to achieve One China, its memory is long, its patience is vast, and classes in Confucian humility are readily available to those who seek them out.
-
A few points in response:
1. 'US would lose in NK'. We don't know that. This isn't 1950 and how is Vietnam analogous if we didn't invade the North. We don't have to 'win' and rule them; we have to disarm them of missiles and nukes.
2. Trump is not Carter etc. He WILL recognize Taiwan. (He already has.) I will come down sort of like "Mr. Gorbochev, Tear Down This Wall. His advisers will all say no, too dangerous, too provocative and then he will do it.
3. China's ego-like victory over the US by prolonging the NK crisis is trivial compared to Japan arming and going nuclear.
Japan updates satellite technology for domestic 'GPS', which also gives them the best view ever of NK (and China).
http://www.wsj.com/video/japan-launches-new-geo-positioning-satellite/969CA88B-D8A6-4D85-B6D0-41CD8C2AC40A.html
Given all that, I see NK as more a crisis for China. When will they see that?
-
A few points in response:
1. 'US would lose in NK'. We don't know that. This isn't 1950 and how is Vietnam analogous if we didn't invade the North. We don't have to 'win' and rule them; we have to disarm them of missiles and nukes.
2. Trump is not Carter etc. He WILL recognize Taiwan. (He already has.) I will come down sort of like "Mr. Gorbochev, Tear Down This Wall. His advisers will all say no, too dangerous, too provocative and then he will do it.
3. China's ego-like victory over the US by prolonging the NK crisis is trivial compared to Japan arming and going nuclear.
Japan updates satellite technology for domestic 'GPS', which also gives them the best view ever of NK (and China).
http://www.wsj.com/video/japan-launches-new-geo-positioning-satellite/969CA88B-D8A6-4D85-B6D0-41CD8C2AC40A.html
Given all that, I see NK as more a crisis for China. When will they see that?
The NorKs have threatened China. China's pet monster might just turn on it.
-
I could be wrong, but I'm seeing trade war with China, though seriously painful for us, our stock markets, and the world economy, as being a winning strategy for us.
-
I could be wrong, but I'm seeing trade war with China, though seriously painful for us, our stock markets, and the world economy, as being a winning strategy for us.
A serious economic downturn in China would be a major threat to internal stability.
-
North Korea’s Next Test
Oct 12, 2017
By Xander Snyder
Conventional wisdom is that North Korea is developing nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent to a U.S. military strike against it, and this is true. But less discussed is what comes next. Once the North has a deliverable nuclear weapon – one that can both be mounted on a missile and handle the stress of re-entry through the atmosphere to hit a target – the regime will be secure. Then, Pyongyang can move on to its long-term objective: unifying the Korean Peninsula under its leadership, whether under a federation or a union.
This is still very far off. The U.S. remains an obstacle that would have to be removed, whether by causing a diplomatic split between Washington and Seoul, ejecting U.S. forces from the peninsula or both. Along the way, North Korea would gradually increase pressure on South Korea, bullying it bit by bit into accepting greater concessions. Since South Korea is focused on preventing war, it is likely that, if these steps were sufficiently small, it would not try to resist through force. The North hasn’t yet fulfilled its first objective, but it may be close, and we may be seeing its strategy to achieve its second objective slowly taking shape.
Small Steps
Over the weekend, the North reportedly restarted operations at and claimed sole sovereignty over the Kaesong industrial complex. Kaesong was previously jointly managed by South Korea and North Korea, one of the few areas of cooperation between the two countries. It was closed last February, a month after Pyongyang’s fourth nuclear test, and South Korea pulled its workers out. Though some experts believe that the North has been managing production at the site for as long as six months, it was only last week that state media announced that North Korea had sole legal authority over the plant’s assets.
A Radio Free Asia report supports the North Korean announcement, noting on Oct. 6 that 19 textile factories had been reopened and are in operation. South Korean businessmen with interests in the Kaesong facility have asked the South Korean government for permission to visit the site to confirm the story, saying this would represent a seizure of South Korean corporate assets.
There are two ways to interpret this development. They aren’t mutually exclusive, but they do have conflicting implications. The first is that North Korea is suffering from the increasingly stringent economic sanctions and needs to use the Kaesong complex to produce textiles for domestic consumption. But while it’s true that sanctions are more extensive today than in the past, the North Korean regime has long faced sanctions and nevertheless survived and pushed forward with its nuclear and ballistic missile programs.
This undated picture released from North Korea’s official Korean Central News Agency on Sept. 16, 2017, shows North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspecting a launching drill of the medium- and long-range strategic ballistic rocket Hwasong-12 at an undisclosed location. STR/AFP/Getty Images
The second interpretation is that North Korea is gaining confidence in its deterrent capability and is beginning to take these small steps against South Korea. Several events over the past couple of days – while not outrightly confirming this interpretation – do seem to support it. First, at the end of September, shortly after Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test (which, due to its high yield, many believed to be the detonation of a hydrogen bomb), the regime threatened to conduct a nuclear test over the Pacific. Such a test would likely entail using a ballistic missile to carry the nuclear warhead out over the ocean before detonation. Were this to happen, it would almost certainly demonstrate that North Korea had developed a deliverable nuclear weapon. (The only exception would be if the North conducted the test in space, since such a test would not require re-entry capability.)
Calm Before the Storm
Kim Jong Un has stated clearly in the past that the deployment of U.S. and allied forces in and around the Korean Peninsula is a threat to North Korea. After North Korea test-launched a ballistic missile over the Japanese island of Hokkaido in mid-September, Kim specifically cited ongoing U.S.-South Korean drills as the reason for the test. He used the success of the test to claim that Guam, which houses a U.S. air base, was also within reach of his missiles. From North Korea’s perspective, the massive U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula that makes these drills possible is a major threat. If military exercises become commonplace, it is far easier for one apparent drill to quickly morph into a real strike. Habituation breeds complacency, which provides the opportunity for surprise.
In recent days, the U.S., South Korean and Japanese militaries have been busy. Four events in particular stand out. The first was an air-to-ground missile test the night of Oct. 10 involving two U.S. B-1B strategic bombers and a combination of F-15Ks from the Japanese and South Korean air forces. Similar drills have occurred before, but the U.S. Air Force emphasized that this was the first time one had taken place at night. Second, the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier and a Japanese destroyer participated in joint naval drills Oct. 11 off the southwest coast of Okinawa. Third, the Los Angeles-class USS Tucson, a nuclear-powered attack submarine, arrived Oct. 11 at the South Korean port of Jinhae. Though this was a scheduled port call, the presence of nuclear submarines in Korea has been a less frequent event than the B-1B drills over the past several months. Finally, more joint naval drills involving the U.S. and South Korea are planned for Oct. 14.
The drills and naval movements are normal; the frequency in such a short span of time is not. It could be that the U.S. is accumulating forces to prepare for a pre-emptive strike or to discourage another nuclear test. The drills are also happening only days after U.S. President Donald Trump made statements on Twitter and at a press conference that seem to indicate that the diplomatic phase is nearing its end. We rarely give credence to public statements by political leaders, but in this case they can be considered in the context of unfolding events. Over the weekend, Trump tweeted that U.S. diplomacy with North Korea hadn’t worked and that “only one thing will work” to stop the North’s missile program.
The tweets came after Trump referenced “the calm before the storm” at a press conference Oct. 5. If the U.S. were planning a pre-emptive strike on North Korea, maintaining a sense of calm is a reasonable thing to do in order to confuse the North as to the United States’ true intentions. The U.S. might also do something resembling the military drills of the past several months, which Washington could claim were simply routine, to lull Pyongyang into complacency. On the other hand, the announcement of such a strategy runs counter to its execution.
Nevertheless, Kim is in no position to assume that what his enemies’ forces are doing on and around the peninsula is routine. If he has a deliverable nuclear weapon, and if he believes that an attack by the U.S. is imminent, now would be the time for the test that he threatened in September. Preparations could already be underway. North Korea held a major rally in the capital on Oct. 7, and notably absent were two officials who head the country’s nuclear weapons and missile development programs. Of course, this is North Korea, and we can’t rule out that they were simply purged by the regime, but both programs’ recent successes make this explanation less likely. If Pyongyang goes through with its threatened test over the Pacific, and if the weapon survives re-entry, it would demonstrate to the world that North Korea has an effective nuclear deterrent.
U.S. officials have repeatedly said that the U.S. national interest dictates that North Korea be prevented from acquiring a deliverable nuclear weapon. If the North succeeds in a nuclear test over the ocean, it will have crossed that red line, forcing the U.S. to rethink its strategy not only on the Korean Peninsula but in the entire Western Pacific. We might also someday look back at recent events like the takeover of the Kaesong complex as the first steps toward the North asserting greater control over the South.
-
As the United States works to prevent North Korea from attaining a credible nuclear deterrent, it is using all the tools it has. Its campaign to isolate North Korea includes pressing trade partners around the world to stop doing business with the North and suspend diplomatic relations with the government in Pyongyang. In Latin America, the U.S. demands have met with mixed results. Some countries have broken off their relationships with North Korea, but others have shrugged off the pressure.
In September, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to cut off trade with any country that continued to do business with the North Koreans. A few weeks earlier on a trip through Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Panama, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence emphasized that Latin American governments should suspend both trade and diplomacy with Pyongyang in light of its nuclear weapons program. Pence's message was aimed in particular at Chile, which has rejected the idea.
Their trade relationships with China may explain why Chile and other Latin American countries are willing to risk the ire of the United States by continuing diplomatic relations with North Korea. As is the case among many of the region's other economies, China is Chile's top trading partner. Beijing has made it clear that it opposes the U.S. strategy of suspending diplomatic relations with North Korea. As they try to strike a balance between U.S. and Chinese interests, those Latin American countries may impose some trade restrictions on North Korea while keeping diplomatic lines intact.
Mexico and Peru Lean Toward the U.S.
Other Latin American countries have severed diplomatic relations with North Korea. On Sept. 8, just days after Pyongyang's most recent nuclear test explosion, the Mexican government expelled the North Korean ambassador and suspended trade with his country. Mexico and North Korea established diplomatic relations in the 1980s, but their bilateral trade levels have remained low. But Mexico filled an important North Korean need by selling it oil. In 2015, for example, Mexico sent almost $45 million worth of oil to North Korea, which is dependent on petroleum imports. At the same time, Mexico bought less than $14 million worth of North Korean goods, mainly computer parts.
That Mexico was the first Latin American country to suspend diplomatic and trade relations with North Korea under the Trump administration is not surprising. Since more than 80 percent of Mexican exports go to the United States, Mexico clearly has more to lose by alienating its northern neighbor than it has to gain by maintaining relations with North Korea. This is an especially sensitive time for the U.S.-Mexican trade relationship, as the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) enters a crucial phase. Despite Mexico's desire to cultivate closer trade ties with China to use as leverage in the NAFTA talks, Washington still holds a much greater influence with Mexico. In 2016, Mexico's trade deficit with China reached $60 billion, while at the same time, Mexico had a more than $60 billion trade surplus with the United States. Additionally, Mexico's geographic proximity to the United States increases the strength of U.S. influence relative to China's.
A week after Mexico cut diplomatic and trade ties with North Korea, Peru followed suit. Economics alone may not have been the chief factor guiding Peru's decision, however. In 2015, trade between Peru and North Korea reached just more than $20 million, much of it consisting of Peruvian exports of mineral commodities such as copper to North Korea. And though China is Peru's top trading partner, Lima has historically had close security ties with Washington, developed as they cooperated to combat drug trafficking. It appears that in this case, security took priority over economic ties.
It's also possible that Peru’s decision on North Korea could have involved a favor in exchange, but it remains unclear whether that is the case. Peruvian authorities had asked the United States to extradite Peru's former president, Alejandro Toledo, who is wanted in connection with a corruption scandal involving bribes in government contracts signed with Brazilian engineering company Odebrecht during his term. According to a Sept. 25 report by Peruvian newspaper El Comercio, the extradition process has gained recent momentum.
North Korean trade with select Latin American countries
Brazil and Chile Seek to Remain Neutral
In Brazil, the only country in the Americas that has embassies in both North and South Korea, neutrality is an important foreign policy concept. In its relations with other countries, Brazil aims to remain open to dialogue and neutral in conflicts involving third parties. So, while Brazil's foreign ministry immediately issued a statement condemning North Korea's Sept. 3 nuclear test, at the same time it said that the situation on the Korean Peninsula could be solved only through dialogue. Brazil has indicated that it will restrict trade with North Korea, but it has, so far, refused to close the embassy in Pyongyang that it opened in 2009 under former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. The extent of Brazilian trade with North Korea, which topped out at $400 million a decade ago, had always been relatively small. However, its mission in Pyongyang allows Brazil to gather valuable information about the ongoing dispute while allowing it to act as an informal bridge between the West and North Korea.
For those reasons, the Brazilian government hesitates to accede to Washington's demand to cut ties with Pyongyang. During President Michel Temer's visit to the United Nations General Assembly in September, a U.S. delegation reportedly met with Brazilian government officials to discuss North Korea, but in light of Brazil's preference for dialogue, any U.S. entreaties for it to cut diplomatic links with Pyongyang went unheeded. Additionally, China is Brazil’s main trade partner, making the government in Brasilia even more likely to take the same position — that the conflict with Pyongyang should be settled with talks.
Just like Brazil, Chile will try to preserve its diplomatic and trade ties with Pyongyang. The exact amount of total trade between Chile and North Korea is difficult to determine. That's because some South Korean imports that originate in the Kaesong industrial complex, a joint Korean economic zone inside North Korea, could be reported by Chilean officials as coming from North Korea. The same muddy accounting may apply to Chile's exports to North Korea. But economics aside, China's influence also plays a big part in the Chilean policy decision.
Venezuela and Cuba Side With North Korea
Venezuela and Cuba are members of a different club of Latin American countries. Both share ideological and security ties with North Korea, and both currently have strained relations with the United States. There is little desire on their part to sever diplomatic ties with North Korea. Over the past few months, Venezuelan government officials have been hit with larger sanctions by Washington, while relations between the United States and Cuba have grown increasingly frosty.
In terms of economic relations, there are no reliable statistics on the amount of trade between North Korea and Cuba or Venezuela. In Venezuela's case, its relationship with North Korea is driven not only by ideological affinity, but also by the shared perception that its government, like the government in Pyongyang, is being threatened by the United States. The Venezuelan-North Korean relationship is still incipient, but the security partnership between the two countries could strengthen as Caracas turns to increasingly more authoritarian actions in its attempt to put down opposition and dissident groups. These are tactics that Pyongyang has mastered. North Korea could, for example, supply Venezuela with weapons, training and limited security assistance.
Cuba, on the other hand, is North Korea’s main point of entry to Latin America. The North Korean ambassadors expelled from Mexico and Peru may have gone to Cuba, since Havana is their base. The countries' security relationship is well established. Four years ago, a North Korean ship that departed Cuba was seized in Panama and was found to be carrying a cargo of weapons. At the time, Cuba claimed that the shipment was part of an agreement with North Korea to repair its obsolete defensive weapons.
The United States will continue to ramp up the pressure on Latin American countries that maintain diplomatic and trade relations with North Korea. However, there are limits to what that pressure will accomplish. Brazil and Chile are unlikely to follow the decisions made by Mexico and Peru to cut diplomatic ties with Pyongyang. They likely will add trade restrictions with North Korea but will maintain contact as a way to accommodate both U.S. and Chinese pressure. Meanwhile, Venezuela and Cuba may even increase cooperation with North Korea as their relations with the United States deteriorate furthe
-
From Iran thread, as it applies to NK:
[Years ago Stratfor wrote of the Iranians being a very serious military problem , , , and that was then.]
Similarly the Norks.
----
What is the morality of waiting for North Korea to inflict a strike that could potentially kill 90% of Americans? Good point! What are the lessons of other threats? Act sooner, before the threat becomes too large.
Choices for us:
1) The easy answer: kick the can down the road. Worked for Madelyn Halfbright, Clinton, Bush and Obama. This is NOT the right answer but it is one down side of our system of government. In 4 years or 8 years and counting down, it will be someone else's problem. Russia, China, NK, Iran, Hitler, etc. don't think that way. Funny that none of those are term limited democracies.
2) The right answer from a national security point of view is to take out the threat.
3) The moral answer is to take out the threat, take down the regime and free the people.
4) In the context of politics, diplomacy and international law, we should time the takedown to be an immediate response to NK crossing a red line, such as firing a missile toward or over Japan. Control the news cycle. NK fired, the US and allies responded - 'disproportionately'. That is better (diplomatically than having our action called a first strike.
Note how worthless the 'UN Security Council' is with security threats Russia and China holding permanent seats with a veto while many of our best allies do not.
The choice is simple, do nothing which includes all the hot air about diplomacy, sanctions etc that have failed and failed and failed and make us less safe and our allies and west coast in danger, or take decisive action and face the consequences.
Is North Korea (or Iran) an imminent threat? Note how Un backed off of his direct threat on Guam. He was handing Trump his justification.
From the dictionary on imminent: impending, close (at hand), near, (fast) approaching, coming, forthcoming, on the way, in the offing, in the pipeline, on the horizon, in the air, just around the corner, coming down the pike, expected, anticipated, brewing, looming, threatening...
Imminent does not mean instant like minutes or seconds. During the Iraq debate, the threat was described as "a grave and gathering danger", a better descriptor but that still means imminent. The threat is on the way. The NK threat ship has sailed. Nothing short of military strikes on military locations, as best as we can identifythem, can stop it. Allowing the threat to grow larger and stronger is nothing short of irresponsible. MHO.
-
I very much like your initiative in articulating our causus belli.
Exploring it a bit further, I suspect one of the most common rejoinders, if not THE most common rejoinder, will be that once they have nuclear capability, they will no motive to initiate nuclear war and that MAD logic will take over-- and that therefore there is no need for a war of choice.
-
" xploring it a bit further, I suspect one of the most common rejoinders, if not THE most common rejoinder, will be that once they have nuclear capability, they will no motive to initiate nuclear war and that MAD logic will take over-- and that therefore there is no need for a war of choice. "
I assume that is the rationale of Rice/Obama when they admit a nuclear capable NK is "not so bad"
-
Yes, of course.
So, what is our bullet point response?
-
if we do not use military force the NK will continue to expand their nuclear capability and threaten the whole SE Asia and more distant targets.
I conclude we should just assassinate Kim and his top henchmen, if we can . Then be ready for any response if HIS underlings have the chuztpa to give a military response.
I wonder what the war game guys have concluded about this scenario.
Are they really against it because it won't work, or risk too high, or political fall out or all of it?
One wonders what the NK people really think of Kim and his mob. They may be totally blacked out from the rest of the world and or just too terrified to pretend/think otherwise .
Do they know how much they suffer from the hands of the monsters who control them? How much is brain washing and how much is sheer fear? Don't know.
If Kin and his mob were dead would the average N Korean really fight to the death?
-
Dick Morris never met a subject on which he is not an expert, but he makes a point which we here have been making for some time now.
http://www.dickmorris.com/emp-north-korea-threatens-congress-dawdles-lunch-alert/?utm_source=dmreports&utm_medium=dmreports&utm_campaign=dmreports
-
Dick Morris never met a subject on which he is not an expert, but he makes a point which we here have been making for some time now.
http://www.dickmorris.com/emp-north-korea-threatens-congress-dawdles-lunch-alert/?utm_source=dmreports&utm_medium=dmreports&utm_campaign=dmreports
:-D
Well said!
-
My snark, or his analysis? :lol:
-
My snark, or his analysis? :lol:
Your snark!
(https://i.ytimg.com/vi/nhLmV2iPFn0/hqdefault.jpg)
He looks like 50% of every lesbian couple I have ever met in real life.
-
"He looks like 50% of every lesbian couple I have ever met in real life."
I bow to the GM of snark, our very own GM! :lol:
-
• North Korea: Reports of food shortages and poor crop yields continue to come out of North Korea. Farmers are no longer accepting help from temporary workers to harvest crops, and there is now instability in market prices as well. North Korea has survived famines in the past by accepting mass civilian deaths and some food aid from other countries. We need to determine whether or not this will induce a breaking point. If it does, what would a breaking point look like?
-
• North Korea: Reports of food shortages and poor crop yields continue to come out of North Korea. Farmers are no longer accepting help from temporary workers to harvest crops, and there is now instability in market prices as well. North Korea has survived famines in the past by accepting mass civilian deaths and some food aid from other countries. We need to determine whether or not this will induce a breaking point. If it does, what would a breaking point look like?
War.
-
By moving carrier strike groups and stealth fighter jets into the region, the United States will enhance its force posture in and around North Korea.
The preparations do not necessarily suggest that the United States is getting ready to launch a war — though they will elevate the risk in the region.
Tracking U.S. military movements around the Korean Peninsula will offer insight into the standoff between Washington and Pyongyang.
North Korea is still racing to achieve a comprehensive nuclear deterrent. And the closer it gets to its goal, the less time the United States and its allies have to try to stop it. Depending on factors such as the strength of U.S. intelligence, the progress of North Korea's missiles and nuclear programs and how much risk Washington and its allies are willing to tolerate, the United States may already have missed its opportunity for preventive military action. Official assessments indicate that, at most, Washington has 18 months before the window closes; after that, the United States and its allies probably will have no choice but to adopt a policy of deterrence toward North Korea.
As the clock ticks down, we're constantly scanning the horizon for signs of an impending strike on North Korea, such as the evacuation of nonessential personnel from South Korea or a heightened alert level in the region. Most of these have yet to materialize, suggesting that military action is unlikely this year. Others, however, have already manifested.
The United States is enhancing its force posture in and around North Korea. Three U.S. carrier strike groups are en route to the Western Pacific, where they will conduct a combined exercise in mid-November. The gathering is a rare occurrence — the last time three U.S. aircraft carrier strike groups convened for a combined exercise was in 2007 — and will give the United States a powerful force within striking distance of North Korea. The U.S. Air Force, meanwhile, has announced that, for the first time, it will send a squadron of a dozen F-35A stealth fighter jets to Kadena Air Base in Japan in early November for a six-month deployment. Stealth fighters would figure prominently in a potential U.S. strike on North Korea. The United States has also dispatched several submarines, including at least one nuclear cruise missile submarine, to Korean waters. And finally, the U.S. military recently revealed that it increased its stockpile of munitions in Guam by about 10 percent between late August and late September. The small island in Micronesia is a major fuel and ammunition storage area for the U.S. military in the Pacific region, and it would play a central role in a conflict with North Korea.
Taken together, these developments suggest that the United States is preparing for a confrontation. But that doesn't necessarily mean that Washington is gearing up to start a war with Pyongyang. The United States and it allies are in a precarious standoff with North Korea. Military preparations, exercises and movements like the ones underway near the Korean Peninsula may simply be a part of the United States' effort to keep its options for handling North Korea open. Not every deployment is a prelude to military action.
Nevertheless, these types of developments give an idea of what a prospective military campaign would look like, while also raising the risk in the region. Consequently, tracking them is critical. North Korea, after all, will be watching out for the same kinds of military movements and preparations from the United States. If it concludes that a strike is imminent, Pyongyang will be more likely to resort to pre-emptive action. And even if both sides manage to avoid a war, buildups and exercises to contain and deter North Korea may well be the new normal.
-
This article lays out the claim that the regime of NK is a criminal enterprise. I agree but would take it further, what makes them a sovereign state, which to me implies some level of legitimacy?
North Korea's Criminal Sovereinty
https://townhall.com/columnists/austinbay/2017/11/01/north-koreas-criminal-sovereignty-n2403131?utm_source=thdaily&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=nl&newsletterad=
The U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute aptly described North Korea's peculiar situation as "criminal sovereignty" unique in the world's "national security arena." The Kim regime "uses state sovereignty to protect itself from external interference in its domestic affairs while dedicating a portion of its government to carrying out illicit international activities in defiance of international law and the domestic laws of numerous other nations."
North Korea deals and ships heroin throughout Asia. It supplies drug-abusing factory workers in neighboring China with methamphetamines. Bureau 39 operates cigarette and exotic animal smuggling schemes and smuggles weapons worldwide. In February 2017, media reported that North Korea had shipped encrypted communications systems and man-portable anti-aircraft missiles to unnamed countries in Asia and Africa.
North Korea's Foreign Ministry doubles as a Bureau 39 smuggling front. North Korea's North African embassies allegedly smuggle illicit rhino horn and elephant ivory, natural products much-prized in Asia. Their diplomats also smuggle Congolese gold.
-
http://www.askaprepper.com/usaf-developed-new-bomb-creates-general-darkness-champ/
Electromagnetic pulse attacks are one of the most alarming threats facing the western world.
There are two reasons for that:
#1. The damage the attack would actually do, would be extreme. Look around you at all the things you use every day. How many of them contain electronics? An EMP attack would destroy them all – and it would also destroy most of the infrastructure you rely on. Utilities, traffic signals, the railways and much more would all be wrecked by electromagnetic pulse. So, using such a weapon against the aging and overly-taxed United States power grid could quickly wreak havoc and ultimately cause millions of deaths in America.
Related: 5 Things You Need to Do When There’ll Be No Rule of Law
#2. The second reason is that, politically, they’re a weapon that’s very easy to use for blackmail. After all, an EMP attack on the USA wouldn’t directly kill anyone. As the famous Don Cheadle noted in the ever-relevant Ocean’s 11, this new weapon “is a bomb — but without the bomb”.
So, sure, thousands of people would die as transportation, medical and water purification systems failed, but nobody would be killed by the actual weapon. Would the USA be able, politically, to retaliate with a nuclear strike when the enemy had “only” detonated a weapon in space, a couple of hundred miles above the country? After all, the explosion wouldn’t even be in US airspace – that ends at an altitude of 50 miles. Would Congress agree to incinerate North Korean cities in reply to a “soft” attack like an EMP? In a sane world they would, because a big EMP would do more damage to the USA than actually nuking a single decent-sized city would, but the indirect nature of an EMP attack makes it a gray area.
Related: Affordable Vehicles That Can Survive an EMP
Unfortunately the risk of an EMP attack by a rogue state, especially North Korea, is increasing fast. In fact Pyongyang announced in September that they’ve developed a weapon that’s suitable for using as a high-altitude EMP, and they’ve made enough technological progress recently that this claim has to be taken seriously.
Now, experts reporting to the House Committee on Homeland Security are urging the federal government to develop its own EMP capability as a deterrent. If the USA could reply in kind to an EMP attack, instead of having to escalate to nuclear strikes on actual ground targets, a potential attacker will know that a counterstrike is almost inevitable.
What’s caused this is the realization that, when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, most people have been seriously underestimating the threat. The Pentagon now think the Stalinist regime already has around 60 nuclear warheads, and can reach the USA with them. So far, North Korea doesn’t have a missile capable of reaching the contiguous states, and even if they developed one it wouldn’t have the accuracy to hit even a large target like a city. The problem is, if they opted for an EMP attack, that doesn’t matter.
emp military manual
DoD Technical Report – EMP Handbook for Air Force Communications Service
To devastate a huge chunk of the USA with an EMP, all the North Koreans have to do is get a warhead to detonate somewhere in a target area hundreds of miles across. That doesn’t need much in the way of technology to achieve. Building a rocket capable of carrying the warhead is a brute-force problem; it’s just a matter of packing enough fuel into a big enough steel tube, and there’s no need for sophisticated guidance systems. As long as the rocket can be relied on to go in the right direction, a clockwork timer is literally good enough.
Even worse, they wouldn’t necessarily even need a big rocket. A nuclear-armed satellite could be launched into low Earth orbit, then commanded to detonate as it passed over the USA. Alternatively, weapons could be suspended from balloons and released so high-altitude winds would carry them across North America. Warheads could even be launched by SCUD-type missiles from commercial ships off the US coast, to explode at high altitude several hundred miles inland. There are lots of options; what matters is that, however the attack was launched, it would be devastating.
Related: Emergency Bag to Keep in Your Car in Case of an EMP
It wouldn’t be hard for the USA to develop its own EMP capability, allowing any country that attacked in this way to get a rapid dose of its own medicine. In fact, a software edit would probably allow current strategic weapons – Trident II sub-launched missiles or Minuteman-III ICBMs – to detonate a warhead at high altitude. Modifying warheads to create a much greater EMP effect wouldn’t be much harder; the USA already knows how to do that. It’s most likely that modified weapons would be launched by Trident, which can carry up to twelve warheads – that would allow an attacker to be blanketed with relatively small weapons, each devastating electronics and power cables over a radius of hundreds of miles.
If the Pentagon decides to build this capability the chances of a hostile nation launching an EMP attack at the USA go way down; it might be politically risky for a president to nuke another country in response to a “non-lethal” attack on infrastructure, but nobody can complain if the USA retaliates like for like.
The problem is, it might take years for even the simplest weapons program to work its way through the Washington bureaucracy, so even if a decision was made tomorrow there isn’t much chance of the capability existing before about 2023 at the earliest – and a deterrent doesn’t work until the weapons actually exist. But it might come to life sooner than everyone expects. Keep reading…
If the North Koreans know that the USA can’t retaliate with EMP weapons now, but will be able to in a few years, they might just be tempted to get their attack in before America can reply to it. That’s quite a low risk strategy; if they launch a successful EMP it’s going to delay the US program by years, or maybe kill it off altogether – it depends how much damage their attack does. This isn’t a reason to not build an American EMP weapon; the risk exists already, and the USA has to be able to deter it. What it does mean is that there’s a trade-off; the USA has to accept a higher risk of EMP attack for a few years, in exchange for it dropping sharply once the country is able to reply in kind.
Related: How To Make A Tin Can Directional WiFi Antenna to Extend your Communication after an EMP
What the US government has to do is identify the simplest way to build an EMP capability – even if it’s not perfect – and get it into service as fast as possible. Then a better one can be developed, if necessary. What we have to do is take another look at the precautions we’ve taken against EMP and make sure they’re up to the job – because the risk of an attack looks like it’s quite a bit higher than it seemed to be just a few months ago.
But given the last few years’ international and national rise of turmoils, the US together with the private company Boeing, had decided to “bring to life” such an weapon that would make an EMP attack actually a preventable homeland security catastrophe. So, after years of discussions and failed experiments, Boeing has announced that it successfully tested an electromagnetic pulse missile capable of disabling electronics without affecting structures. The Counter-electronics High-powered Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) was tested by a Boeing Phantom Works/U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory Directed Energy Directorate team on October 16 at the Utah Test and Training Range. This American military project is an attempt to develop a device with all the power of a nuclear weapon but without the death and destruction to people and infrastructure that such a weapon causes. Theoretically, the new missile system would pinpoint buildings and knock out their electrical grids, plunging the target into darkness and general disconnectedness.
-
South Korea’s Bow to Beijing
Seoul caves on Thaad missile defenses and a democratic alliance.
South Korea's President Moon Jae-In speaks during a joint press conference with U.S. President Donald Trump at the presidential Blue House in Seoul, Nov. 7.
South Korea's President Moon Jae-In speaks during a joint press conference with U.S. President Donald Trump at the presidential Blue House in Seoul, Nov. 7. Photo: jim watson/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
By The Editorial Board
Nov. 7, 2017 6:17 p.m. ET
145 COMMENTS
Donald Trump on Tuesday praised Moon Jae-in for “great cooperation” on containing the threat from North Korea and said there has been “a lot of progress.” The South Korean President also made a show of unity after their summit in Seoul, but Mr. Moon’s recent actions suggest he is an unreliable friend.
Mr. Moon favors appeasing Kim Jong Un to lower tension on the Korean Peninsula, including direct talks even as the North continues its nuclear and missile tests. He wants to reopen the Kaesong Industrial Zone that provided Pyongyang with about $100 million in hard currency a year. That’s bad enough, but Mr. Moon is also working against U.S. policy in the wider region. Last week he caved to Chinese pressure on missile defense, rewarding Beijing for its bullying behavior and support for the Kim Jong Un regime.
Earlier this year, the missile threat from the North caused Seoul to deploy the U.S.-made Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense (Thaad), which can shoot down missiles in a range of more than 200 kilometers. Beijing objected forcefully, claiming that the system’s powerful radar could monitor China’s nuclear missile sites. Thaad also meshes with other U.S. missile defense systems at sea, in Japan and on American territory.
China’s larger fear is that South Korea will be drawn into a closer relationship with other U.S. allies. A key theme of Mr. Trump’s trip is cooperation among the region’s democracies to protect a “free and open Indo-Pacific,” building on past efforts to deepen ties between South Korea and Japan. If South Korea were to put aside its reservations about working with Japan, it would deal a serious blow to China’s bid for hegemony in Asia.
Beijing unleashed a diplomatic and economic assault this year to convince newly elected President Moon to back down on Thaad. Official spokesmen and state-run media blamed Seoul for harming relations. Beijing closed South Korean-owned stores in China, stopped Chinese tourists from visiting, and even blocked the broadcast of Korean television dramas.
Last week Mr. Moon folded. Foreign Minister Kang Kyung-wha announced a deal to settle the Thaad dispute on Chinese terms. South Korea promised not to deploy more Thaad radars and launchers, leaving South Korea vulnerable to future North Korean attacks, since the six current launchers don’t cover northern South Korea, including the capital Seoul. Without more launchers, North Korean missiles could overwhelm the system.
Seoul also agreed not to join America’s regional missile-defense system, which will limit the effectiveness of the defenses in South Korea and Japan. And South Korea agreed not to join a military alliance with the U.S. and Japan in the future. So Beijing achieved its goal of stymieing the U.S. agenda of collective defense in Asia along the lines of Europe’s NATO.
What did Seoul get in return? A meeting between Mr. Moon and Chinese President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of this week’s APEC summit in Vietnam, as well as a trip to Beijing this year. China tacitly agreed to stop its embargoes on South Korean products. No word on whether it will stop supporting Pyongyang with oil and food, but don’t count on it.
Mr. Moon has called for “balanced diplomacy” between the U.S. and China. But his willingness to compromise the security of his own country and its allies in the face of Chinese pressure is anything but balanced. It’s understandable that the U.S. and South Korean Presidents showed a united front Tuesday, but Mr. Moon’s actions have undermined the alliance against Kim Jong Un.
-
What Trump Really Said in South Korea
Nov 9, 2017
By Jacob L. Shapiro
The importance of any speech is tricky to gauge. Occasionally, they can have great significance, like when Secretary of State Dean Acheson left South Korea out of the U.S. security umbrella in a speech to the National Press Club in 1950, an omission that, in a way, helped start the Korean War. But mostly they reside in the garbage bin of history. There’s a wide gulf between rhetoric and reality, and what is said for political purposes often has little to do with the impersonal forces that shape action. I remember watching then-Secretary of State John Kerry thunder away at a State Department briefing about Syria’s use of chemical weapons in August 2013, thinking to myself that surely a U.S. military strike on Syria was imminent. (I even went on television and said as much. Thankfully, the internet saves all things, so I can always look back and relive my mistake.) At the time, I couldn’t see how else Kerry’s severe language could be explained. But of course, the U.S. decided not to strike, despite then-President Barack Obama’s red line and despite Kerry’s fiery speech.
On Nov. 8, U.S. President Donald Trump gave us a new speech to consider. Addressed to South Korea’s National Assembly, it had three main objectives. First, to convey to South Korea the gravity of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the depth of the United States’ commitment to preventing North Korea from acquiring nukes that threaten American soil. Second, to begin building a case to the American people for the U.S. to fight again on the Korean Peninsula. And third, to scare Kim Jong Un, and any country that may support his regime, into capitulating before a war starts. The odds of Trump achieving the third objective are slim at best, which means he will soon face a grave decision. What he decides will define his presidency and shape the balance of power in East Asia for years to come.
Peace Through Strength
Trump’s remarks to the National Assembly were effusive and complimentary, but the content of the message was no different from his prior comments about South Korea. In September, he took to Twitter to criticize Seoul for what he called appeasement of the North Koreans. Many feared at the time that Trump’s comments may poison relations between Seoul and Washington. The tweets, however, were only an expression of frictions that already existed. The problem in the relationship started May 9 with the election of President Moon Jae-in, whose administration opposes a pre-emptive U.S. strike on North Korea.
U.S. President Donald Trump (R) addresses the National Assembly in Seoul on Nov. 8, 2017. JIM WATSON/AFP/Getty Images
This threw a wrench in U.S. plans. From an operational perspective, attacking North Korea without South Korea’s help makes an already difficult operation close to impossible. There had been several signs in the first half of the year that the U.S. was preparing for military action against North Korea. In fact, at one point in May, three U.S. aircraft carriers had converged on the Western Pacific, and the U.S. seemed poised to strike. But Moon’s election forced the U.S. to slow its preparations and devote additional time to diplomacy. From a political perspective, Seoul’s defiance of Washington suggested weakness. Pyongyang intuited that there may be a split in U.S.-South Korean relations that it could exploit to bring about one of its long-cherished goals: the complete withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula.
Despite Trump’s lofty rhetoric in Seoul, little has changed since the September tweets. South Korea and the U.S. still don’t see eye to eye on what should be done about North Korea. As long as that is the case, the U.S. will find it difficult to convince the North that it should fear American threats. So although Trump was far more gracious speaking to the South Korean National Assembly than he was on Twitter, his message was the same: Peace in our time can be achieved only through strength. Trump’s entire visit to Asia is symbolic, an attempt to shore up U.S. relations with key allies in the Pacific. But no ally is more important and more skeptical right now than South Korea, and no speech is going to allay South Korea’s concerns.
The Other Audiences
Other parts of Trump’s speech focused on the nature of North Korea’s dictatorship. These remarks were directed not at South Korean lawmakers – they are plenty familiar with their neighbor’s woeful economic situation and strict societal controls – but at the American public. That Trump’s speech was delivered at 11 a.m. Seoul time meant that it aired during prime-time hours in the United States. Trump laid out the reasons it is important for the United States to ensure that North Korea does not acquire nuclear capabilities. He made his argument from a security standpoint, an ethical standpoint and even a religious standpoint.
But the two men Trump was speaking to most forcefully were Kim Jong Un and Chinese President Xi Jinping. Trump’s words for Kim have been consistently bellicose, and that trend continued in Seoul. But Trump also went out of his way to criticize China in the speech. At one point, he told a story about a baby born in North Korea whose father was Chinese. The baby, according to Trump, was killed and taken away in a bucket, deemed undeserving of life because of its ethnic impurity. He finished the story with a rhetorical question: “So why would China feel an obligation to help North Korea?”
Trump is now in China, meeting with Xi. Publicly he has said nice things about the Chinese leader – that he has been very helpful on the North Korea issue and that there are many areas where the U.S. and China will be able to cooperate, such as the much-ballyhooed but insignificant business deals that will be signed during the trip. But make no mistake – the main topic of conversation between Trump and Xi is North Korea, and here, Trump has very little to be happy about. The U.S. president will demand to know why China has been selective in its enforcement of sanctions against North Korea, and why China is trading more with North Korea in 2017 than it was in 2016, even if it has abided by restrictions on importing North Korean coal. Xi will continue his charade of looking helpful on North Korea without actually helping.
The obstacles that have blocked an attack so far are still in place. South Korea, the critical ally, remains unconvinced that the U.S. can protect Seoul from North Korea’s artillery. The U.S. electorate favors an attack right now, according to recent polls, but once the fighting starts, support in the U.S. would decline faster than North Korea’s resolve. And U.S. diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the peninsula are being stymied by China and Russia, both of which have an interest in seeing the U.S. bogged down and distracted with what is, from their perspectives, a side issue. It wouldn’t take much to watch Trump’s speech and come away thinking the U.S. is readying for an imminent attack on North Korea. (After 2013, I should know.) But it is more likely that this is a continuation of the U.S. attempt to cow North Korea into submission, not a cry to let slip the dogs of war.
-
China is sending a message on the Korean Peninsula. On Nov. 24, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced it would temporarily close the Sino-Korean Friendship Bridge. The ministry stated that the bridge, which carries anywhere between 50 and 70 percent of the trade between China and North Korea, will be reopened after repairs have been made, possibly as soon as Dec. 4. The decision follows a Nov. 21 announcement that Air China would suspend flights between Beijing and North Korea, citing a lack of demand. Although both suspensions are justifiable, Beijing appears to be using these subtle maneuvers to signal displeasure with Pyongyang.
In the past, economic considerations alone have rarely dictated a decision to suspend the sensitive airline route, carried by China's most important state-owned airline. In addition, China's previous maintenance on the bridge typically stopped at the structure's halfway point, and don't seem to make a full closing of the bridge necessary. Despite anticipation that a four-day visit to North Korea by Chinese President Xi Jinping's envoy earlier this month might improve bilateral relations, the recent announcements indicate a strained relationship.
The envoy visit — the first such communication between the two countries in at least a year — was ostensibly done as part of the Chinese Communist Party's tradition of sending diplomats to neighboring communist countries to inform them of leadership changes following the Party Congress. However, North Korea reportedly made several requests for China to ease sanctions during the envoy's visit, and the widely speculated meeting with Kim Jong Un didn't take place. In the end, Beijing seemingly snubbed the requests for leniency.
Instead, Beijing appears to be stepping up its enforcement of economic measures to comply with U.S. sanctions more closely. The Chinese government is reportedly conducting a thorough investigation of all companies trading with North Korea, as well as entities and individuals targeted by U.S. sanctions earlier this year. The authorities have also arrested the head of a major shipping company operating cargo ships linking North Korea and China, resulting in the suspension of nearly all shipping lines between the Chinese port city of Dalian and North Korea.
Beijing's decision to increase pressure on Pyongyang serves multiple purposes: to relieve U.S. pressure on China to cut economic ties with North Korea and to deter a U.S. military intervention on the Korean Peninsula. But China doesn't appear ready to change its fundamental policy toward North Korea. China has never been convinced that sanctions will alter North Korean behavior or stop the country from pursuing its nuclear program. Instead, China has argued sanctions will only further provoke North Korea and leave China to bear most of the consequences. Unless China's interests on the Korean Peninsula are guaranteed, the country will likely remain unwilling and unable to pressure North Korea enough to satisfy the United States.
-
Seven Crucial Truths About North Korea
North Koreans reacting to footage of a ballistic missile test being shown in a public square in Pyongyang this July. Kim Won-Jin/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
You’re an Interpreter subscriber, so you weren’t surprised that North Korea would test another intercontinental ballistic missile, as it did on Tuesday. Nor were you surprised by its range, which appears to be potentially greater than in any previous test.
Still, it’s worth reviewing some of the basic truths that inform the grizzled — yet stoic — pessimism we’ve all developed together on this issue. If only for the sake of friends and family members to whom you might want to forward this, who can join you in being unsurprised by the next test.
(1) It’s over. We failed. North Korea is a nuclear power now.
Policymakers will debate for years the precise moment at which the door closed to preventing or rolling back North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. But that door is closed. The North Koreans have little reason to give up their weapons programs, which bring them security against their otherwise vastly superior adversaries, and we have no way to make them.
Well, there’s one way: an invasion. But North Korea’s missiles are mobile, so it could fire off at least one or two before we were able to take them out. This means full-on war is virtually guaranteed to bring a North Korean nuclear strike against a major American city. (This assumes North Korea can mount a warhead on a missile, but we have little reason to doubt that they can.)
In technical terms, that is described as a “credible deterrent capability.” In non-technical terms, it means we have no options but to accept their nuclear status as a fact of life.
(2) North Korea can strike Washington and New York now.
Past tests demonstrated that North Korea can strike major West Coast cities in the U.S. This test, according to analysts, showed that it can reach East Coast cities now, too. That includes Washington and New York. Alex Wellerstein, a professor at the Stevens Institute of Technology, put together some maps, using a tool he designed, showing the likely blast and radiation radius of hypothetical North Korean strikes on those cities. It’s disturbing stuff:
The blast and radiation radius of a hypothetical North Korean nuclear strike on New York Alex Wellerstein
The blast and radiation radius of a hypothetical North Korean nuclear strike on Washington. Alex Wellerstein
(3) North Korea is rational, which means it won’t start a war.
The “good” news is that North Korea has no intention of starting a war, which it would surely lose. In other words, no, North Korea is not going to nuke your city out of the blue. This often gets lost in portrayals of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s leader, as a wild-eyed lunatic. But as we’ve written many times, Mr. Kim might be eccentric, but he has repeatedly proven himself to be rational. Ruthless and morally reprehensible, but rational.
There is just no other plausible way to explain how he has won and held onto power in a country with such ruthless elite politics. Nor is there any other way to explain how he’s kept his country from succumbing to its enemies or the forces of history. And no rational leader invites national suicide, which is all Mr. Kim would achieve by provoking a war.
And the United States has its own nuclear weapons, as well as overwhelming conventional military superiority, to deter North Korea. And deterrence works. It’s how we’ve lived for decades with the threat of Russian and Chinese nuclear weapons. That same logic applies to North Korea.
(4) China isn’t going to solve the North Korea problem for us.
American leaders have, since North Korea’s nuclear program began, invested their hopes and their strategies in China. If only Beijing were properly motivated, the conventional wisdom goes, it could rein in its North Korean ally and neighbor.
But maybe it’s time to consider why this strategy never seems to work.
North Korea is convinced that giving up its nuclear weapons would invite an American invasion, as happened to Libya after it surrendered its own warheads. China can put a lot of pressure on little North Korea, but nothing that will scare Mr. Kim more than the threat of national destruction.
In any case, North Korea and China have been increasingly at odds. North Korea’s weapons tests often seemed timed to humiliate and defy Beijing. China has imposed its own sanctions in response. So while Americans sometimes perceive China as supporting North Korea’s provocations, in fact the opposite is true.
(5) North Korea can probably endure almost any level of economic punishment.
Even the most severe sanctions probably wouldn’t impose anything that North Korea hasn’t survived before. In the 1990s, the country’s economy and food supply collapsed simultaneously, setting off a famine that killed up to one-tenth of the population. Since then, North Korea has improved its agricultural practices. So while it would rather avoid another economic collapse, it probably believes, with some reason, that it could survive one if it had to.
(6) North Korea’s goal isn’t war, but it’s still scary.
No one knows for sure what Mr. Kim wants except for Mr. Kim, of course. But North Korea’s actions still speak pretty loudly. And they suggest one of two long-term strategies. Analysts disagree about which is more plausible; we see the case for both.
What these strategies have in common is a desire to secure North Korea’s place in the world.
Theory one, most widely held among experts, says that North Korea wants to use its nukes to pressure the world into accepting it as a legitimate member of the international community. This, the thinking goes, would bring trade and normalization while keeping Mr. Kim’s government in power, sort of like China’s opening in the 1970s. That’s scary because it means Mr. Kim isn’t giving up until we accept his government as it is — cruel, provocative and nuclear-armed.
Theory two, more controversial, says that North Korea ultimately wants to reunify with South Korea. The North can never be truly secure, in this view, as long as the freer and more prosperous South remains independent, implicitly undermining the North’s reason to exist as a separate state. This doesn’t mean invading and conquering South Korea outright, but rather slowly building ties between the two Koreas — and breaking the South away from its American protectors — until they reunify bloodlessly.
(7) Worry, but don’t burst a blood vessel.
The greatest risk, analysts tend to say, is from an accident or miscalculation that might send North Korea and the United States into an unintended conflict. That’s how war would start. Maybe, for instance, the United States sends a bomber near North Korea as a symbolic threat, but the bomber veers off course toward Pyongyang, which North Korea perceives as the start of a war, leading it to fire off its missiles in perceived self-defense.
These sorts of scenarios are unlikely, and require a whole bunch of things to go wrong. But the odds aren’t zero, and if it happened, entire cities could be destroyed. It’s hard to know how to conceptualize that sort of high-risk, low-probability event. It’s worth worrying about. But you’re still at far greater risk from, say, smoking. Or a car accident. Or not having sufficient health care.
-
What do folks here think of this? I don't quite get what changed with one test, greater range? As it flies higher and further, aren't we better able to shoot it down?
A merger with South Korea is absurd. Un would have to conquer S.K. to rule them or give up power to be part of an economically advanced democracy. Peaceful reunification is what our side wants, I thought.
Should Japan, S.K., Taiwan, others now go nuclear? Should the US support that?
Does anyone remember when non-proliferation was our policy?
------------------------------------------------------------------------
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/could-north-koreas-missile-test-lead-to-talks-some-see-a-slight-opening/2017/11/29/412e4b78-d509-11e7-9461-ba77d604373d_story.html?utm_term=.8a579b7605f0
This could lead to talks? What is there to talk about? How about unilaterally assured destruction.
If I believe the NYT article, does this now free us to just contain them and ignore them, except for the military team in charge of shooting down whatever they launch and destroying them in a second strike situation.
-
Well, if I have it right, the gist of it was if we were going to stop them we would have to do so BEFORE the Norks had the capability they now assert they have proven themselves to have.
IMHO the idea of "No worries, we now have the stability of MAD" misses that the Norks, who have military superiority over the Sorks, (double check me on this) may now believe themselves free to act in ways that they would not have acted previously free of concern that were push to come to shove the US would go nuclear.
I've seen some quibbling that the Norks have yet to prove they can make a warhead that would survive re-entry, but in my opinion this is glib, facile, and stupid because re-entry is irrelevant to an EMP attack.
-
"But North Korea’s missiles are mobile, so it could fire off at least one or two before we were able to take them out. This means full-on war is virtually guaranteed to bring a North Korean nuclear strike against a major American city. (This assumes North Korea can mount a warhead on a missile, but we have little reason to doubt that they can.)"
This also neglects to say that we have no idea ( and I doubt) they have the guidance technology to explode over Manhattan.
So they are shooting missles due East ..... to blow up over the Ocean. Hitting the Pacific Ocean is no great guidance feat.
And what logic. If their getting nucs is really no biggie - that is unless some grave miscalculation - then what the hell we worrying about this for the past 25 yrs (while doing nothing but talk)
And so what if Iran gets nucs - they are rational - they do not want unilaterally assured destruction - so what.
Logical rationalizing away a gigantic threat does not make it go away
Magical thinking - like all Democrats.
-
https://www.cnbc.com/2017/11/29/nikki-haley-to-china-cut-off-oil-to-north-korea-or-else.html
I will put this in the Nikki Haley thread as well. :wink:
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/29/china-bank-sanctions-north-korea-missile-response-/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTjJVMU56bGxOV00wTURoaiIsInQiOiJKV3F2ZzBCOENPbCtqOUZlSWF3XC9OdGpxNXNkRHY3NzBJZG1GazhnZE8ySDFzd2ZCZFpVSjdVWFRkc0xmZ0RmNVNGUVpBU1BXUlI1Smowb3hzamcxZUNPcFZ5blRrZ1NQejNqOTBralU2dXdHWEI4N0c3UEZ1am5Lb3lNdklLaCsifQ%3D%3D
-
Items from Nov. 29
North Korea: DailyNK, an online newspaper based in South Korea, reported that the North Koreans’ command-and-control system is limited in mountainous areas. According to the report, residents in these areas say they get orders from authorities in Pyongyang a week later than people living in other areas. What does the command-and-control system look like in North Korea’s south, where the bulk of the country’s artillery is located? What is the source of this report, and why would this media outlet release this information now?
• Finding: North Korea’s military command structure is highly centralized, relying heavily on orders issued directly by the supreme leader. Its military doctrine has a rigid chain of command that is meticulously followed. But there are signs that decentralized command is possible during an attack. Each infantry regiment consists of three infantry battalions, each with its own artillery, which helps to ensure that regiments can act independently on the battlefield. We also know that, in the past, North Korea has had a number of unit-level storage depots throughout the country. The existence of these depots suggests that isolated emplacements are expected to continue to fight even without direction. On the other hand, North Korea’s behavior during artillery offensive fire in 2010 suggests that the military operated with a strong centralized command structure. The North successfully used “time on target” tactics. This is when rounds from different units, at varying distances, arrive at the same time on the same target. North Korea also demonstrated a high degree of inter-service coordination, with simultaneous, smooth operation of artillery, the navy and the air force. In preparation for the attack, North Korea laid new communications cable, and it was apparently a high-priority assignment – the work was obviously done using a mechanized trencher.
-
https://twitter.com/NorthmanTrader/status/877240223129882624
2 minute video
DONALD TRUMP on North Korea, in a 1999 interview with the great Tim Russert on NBC’s “Meet the Press”: RUSSERT: “You say … as president, you would be willing to launch a preemptive strike against North Korea’s nuclear capability.” TRUMP: “First I’d negotiate. I would negotiate like crazy. And I’d make sure that we tried to get the best deal possible. Look, Tim. If a man walks up to you on a street in Washington, because this doesn’t happen, of course, in New York … and puts a gun to your head and says give me your money, wouldn’t you rather know where he’s coming from before he had the gun in his hand?
“And these people, within three or four years, are going to be having nuclear weapons, they’re going to have those weapons pointed all over the world, and specifically at the United States, and wouldn’t you be better off solving this really … the biggest problem the world has is nuclear proliferation … If that negotiation doesn’t work, you better solve the problem now than solve it later, Tim … Jimmy Carter, who I really like, he went over there, so soft, these people are laughing at us.” …
RUSSERT: “Taking out their nuclear potential would create a fallout.” TRUMP: “Tim, do you know that this country gave them nuclear reactors, free fuel for 10 years. We virtually tried to bribe them into stopping and they’re continuing to what they’re doing. And they’re laughing at us, they think we’re a bunch of dummies. I’m saying that we have to do something to stop.” RUSSERT: “If the military told you, ‘Mr. Trump, you can’t do this’”. TRUMP: “You’re giving me two names. I don’t know. You want to do it in five years when they have warheads all over the place, every one of them pointing to New York City, to Washington and every one of our -- is that when you want to do it? Or do you want to do something now?
-
https://twitter.com/NorthmanTrader/status/877240223129882624
2 minute video
Clinton, the schmooze king thought he could charm the tyrant family, and he and we got taken for a ride. W. kept putting it off while dealing with Iraq which we all know what happened with that . And up next was the worse one of all O. Who quietly decided behind all our backs Korea was a fait accompli and just jived us all along that he was actually serious about it.
Now we have the first man who is serious about it. After, just as he predicted, the damage is done and the problem is 10 times as bad.
-
"Clinton, the schmooze king thought he could charm the tyrant family, and he and we got taken for a ride. W. kept putting it off while dealing with Iraq which we all know what happened with that . And up next was the worse one of all O. Who quietly decided behind all our backs Korea was a fait accompli and just jived us all along that he actually serious about it.
Now we have the first man who is serious about it. After, just as he predicted, the damage is done and the problem is 10 times as bad."
Worse than not doing anything about the threats, our Dem Presidents made threats worse while calling bad agreements accomplishments, Clinton and Madam Halfbright on NK and Obama with Iran. If you believed them, these threats were dealt with. George W and Cheney didn't strike NK nuclear facilities, but at least we knew these terrible threats were left behind, growing to haunt us later.
Our form of government (4 year Presidential terms) is great but not well-suited for dealing with long term threats these multi-generational, dictatorial enemies who can fight longer wars. Harry Truman, a Democrat, didn't use his 4 year term as an excuse for inaction. He ordered the use of atomic weapons less than 4 months after learning of that capability. but that situation was different - we were already at war with Japan.
Pre-emptive action is difficult to take in our system, but leaving threats in place to grow is far worse.
North Korea is not an isolated threat. They are proliferators. They aren't going to sit still during another 4, 8, 16, 32 years of inaction.
We took no action against the Iranian regime after recovering our hostages and then thousands of Americans were killed in Iraq with Made in Iran IEDs.
Trump said to China what I have been asking him to say. It is in their own best interest to put down the nuclear threat of North Korea. Why does the Chinese inner circle want Japan, S.K, Taiwan and others, Vietnam, Australia, all nations to be nuclear armed? If an NK missile can now reach halfway around the world to Washington DC, it can reach anywhere on earth.
Does Russia want Japan and the whole region to be nuclear armed?
I am so old that I remember when even Democrats were anti-proliferation, and the Chinese and Russians too.
We stopped Saddam. Isn't it someone else's turn? If not, Mr. Trump, do something, and do it now - while we have resources in the area and before their capabilities grow further.
-
http://havokjournal.com/national-security/evacuation-order-things-are-getting-real-in-korea/?utm_source=Havok+Journal&utm_campaign=a7325e126e-Havok_Journal_Daily&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_566058f87c-a7325e126e-214571297
-
http://havokjournal.com/national-security/evacuation-order-things-are-getting-real-in-korea/?utm_source=Havok+Journal&utm_campaign=a7325e126e-Havok_Journal_Daily&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_566058f87c-a7325e126e-214571297
This is a clue!
-
http://havokjournal.com/national-security/evacuation-order-things-are-getting-real-in-korea/?utm_source=Havok+Journal&utm_campaign=a7325e126e-Havok_Journal_Daily&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_566058f87c-a7325e126e-214571297
This is a clue!
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/12/05/threat-real-millions-tokyo-take-part-north-korean-nuclear-attack/
This too.
You'd think they wouldn't need the drills, given all their experiences with constant Kaiju attacks.
-
In North Korea, Is the United States’ Loss Russia’s Gain?
Dec 7, 2017
By Xander Snyder
Last week, North Korea conducted yet another missile test, and yet again the world clutched its pearls in horror. The thing is, North Korean weapons tests are, by their nature, provocative, so we shouldn’t be too surprised when they incite condemnation among countries whose security they would impair. What is sometimes surprising, though, are what the reactions reveal about a country’s intentions – and therefore how that country means to use the North Korea crisis to its advantage.
Leverage
Russia is a case in point. On Dec. 5, Russia’s deputy foreign minister said Moscow was prepared to “exert its influence” on Pyongyang to resolve the brewing conflict. In fact, he had outlined a three-part strategy even before the missile test. The first part would require the United States to halt military drills with South Korea. North Korea would, in turn, stop testing its missiles. The second part would entail direct negotiations between North Korea, South Korea and the United States. The third part would involve a process where “all the involved countries [would] discuss the entire complex of issues of collective security in Asia.” The implication, of course, is that Russia would have a role in creating the agreement.
The deputy foreign minister’s proposals are hardly novel, but they raise some important questions. In what ways and to what degree does Russia have leverage over North Korea? What outcome would best advance Moscow’s interests?
The answer to the first question likely begins and ends with oil. Russia has long been suspected of supplying North Korea with oil (international sanctions limit such activity), but recent reports from a collective of journalists called Asia Press International claim that the price of oil there has fallen by 40 percent. We have not yet confirmed the amount of oil Russia has exported to North Korea, and so we have not verified the fall of the price of oil, but it’s easy to see why Russia would want to help Pyongyang. Doing so creates dependency, and dependency creates leverage that Russia could use in future negotiations with China or the United States.
Keeping the oil flowing, moreover, serves Moscow’s interests by helping to preserve the power of Kim Jong Un. Russia may not be a particularly close ally of North Korea, but its shared border means that its security is, to an extent, tied to North Korea’s. If Pyongyang and Washington go to war, how long would Russia tolerate the presence of U.S. troops so close to its border? How many North Korean refugees would it allow in its territory? The Kim regime, for all its faults, insulates Russia from the devil it doesn’t know.
This helps to explain why some 1,000 Russian marines are conducting live-fire exercises in Primorye, near Russia’s border with North Korea, according to the Russian Defense Ministry. Military exercises in Russia’s east are not unprecedented, but they are uncommon. (The last time Russia conducted military exercises in the Far East was February 2016.) The U.S. and South Korea, meanwhile, are conducting exercises involving 230 warplanes and 12,000 troops. For its part, China is performing naval exercises in the Yellow Sea and East China Sea, having alluded in a state-supported newspaper that South Korea could become a major rival.
Valid though Russia’s reasons for helping Pyongyang may be, Moscow’s peace plan suffers from the same flaw that every other proposed plan suffers: compliance. The U.S. wants North Korea to suspend its nuclear weapons program entirely. The only way to ensure that that happens is on-the-ground inspections to which Kim would never agree.
The plan also ignores North Korea’s technological advancement. It’s true that North Korea had not tested its missiles in more than 70 days, and it’s true that the U.S.-South Korean military exercises may be to blame for the tests’ resumption. But the most recent test showcased significant improvements in range and in deliverable payload weight. If North Korea can improve its missiles without live-testing them, then clearly a moratorium won’t arrest the program. The Russian proposal, if implemented, would fail to resolve this issue.
Damned If It Does, Damned If It Doesn’t
As for the United States, Washington has no good options. Failing to prevent North Korea from acquiring a deliverable nuclear weapon – which it can then use, with impunity, to make demands of its neighbors – undermines the credibility of the United States’ security guarantee in the Pacific. Executing a pre-emptive attack that forces South Korea into a war risks undermining the same credibility. A security guarantee isn’t a security guarantee if a country has to fight and die in a war it didn’t want.
Faced with this impossible situation, the U.S. has through some media leaks shown it is considering unconventional ways to disarm North Korea without invading it. On Dec. 6, two anonymous U.S. officials leaked details about a microwave weapon that could be delivered on a low-flying missile to destroy electronics that the North would need to launch its intercontinental ballistic missiles. Whether these technologies would work, let alone if they exist, is beside the point. Creating the appearance of viable alternatives gives the U.S. some maneuverability in a world full of red lines.
The U.S. is also focusing on ballistic missile defense, reportedly now scouting for additional locations on the West Coast to erect systems. But ballistic missile defense systems are simply not yet reliable enough to provide the surety needed to construct a dependable strategy around them. In fact, on Dec. 4, The New York Times reported that U.S.-supplied BMD systems may have failed as many as five times in preventing missile attacks on Saudi Arabia by Yemeni rebels.
(click to enlarge)
North Korea will soon possess a deliverable nuclear weapon – if it does not possess one already. The speed with which it has developed its program has exceeded expectations, including ours. Some analysts believe Pyongyang will have one in only a few months. The window for U.S. intervention, if it even still exists, is rapidly closing. But even if the U.S. were to attack North Korea, there is no guarantee it would destroy the nuclear program entirely. And there’s nothing to stop the survivors from starting from scratch in the event their program were, in fact, annihilated. This time they would have even more effective propaganda to galvanize the public.
The United States, then, is damned if it does and damned if it doesn’t. It can bet the lives of soldiers on the uncertain prospect of taking out North Korea’s nuclear program. It can conduct a pre-emptive nuclear attack. Or it can live with a nuclear North Korea. It’s an unenviable position, to say the least.
-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinchon_Museum_of_American_War_Atrocities
-
https://www.newsmax.com/politics/lindsey-graham-donald-trump-attacks-north-korea/2017/12/14/id/831860/
Of course I am no expert but I have feeling that NK is not all its cracked up to be and will fold with less damage then might be thought.
Just a hunch .
Like Saddam's army ..... though he did not have nucs........ :|
-
Impure Attitudes in North Korea
Dec 15, 2017
By George Friedman
Vice Marshal Hwang Pyong So, a senior North Korean military commander, is presumed to have been executed in North Korea. He was head of the General Political Bureau, which oversees the military. According to South Korean intelligence, the bureau was being “audited,” and Hwang and his deputy were being “punished” for their reportedly “impure attitude” toward the Kim Jong Un regime.
Reports of tension between Kim and Hwang, and Kim and the General Political Bureau, were leaked by South Korean intelligence in mid-November. At the time, it was not clear how true it was or why South Korea was leaking it. We assume that South Korea was trying to show there was political tension in North Korea, and that exploiting that tension made more sense than striking North Korea.
That the General Political Bureau is being audited (whatever that means) is more important than the apparent execution. Tension between the body that carries out Kim’s wishes and Kim could imply serious dissent. Even if Kim carries out a series of executions, he needs the bureau to oversee the system. If he loses its loyalty, or its leaders lose their lives, running North Korea becomes that much harder. The weakness of any dictatorship is that the leader must still rely on others to carry out the orders. It therefore matters a great deal whether Hwang’s apparent death is the end or the beginning of the purges.
Hwang Pyong So, director of the North Korean military’s General Political Bureau, gets into a car as he leaves a hotel at Incheon on Oct. 4, 2014. BAY ISMOYO/AFP/Getty Images
Hwang was accused of having an impure attitude, a concept that is ambiguous at best — although evidently it was enough to get him killed. Newer reports say that he and his deputy had accepted bribes in exchange for promotions, but if true, they could hardly be alone in this transgression. There is probably more to the story. The implication here is that Kim and Hwang had a disagreement, and that Hwang’s view extends to some in the General Political Bureau. Kim reportedly called for punishment as “a warning to others.”
At this point, political strategy comes into play. For the North Koreans, the obvious political and strategic question is this: Should they move forward on intercontinental ballistic missile development and create a missile that could strike the United States with precision? This would require completing work on the guidance system, which the North Koreans presumably can do. But North Korea is most vulnerable in the time between making the decision and actually having an ICBM in a position to deter a U.S. attack. It is in the gap between the decision and deployment that U.S. intelligence might detect North Korea’s action and strike. And for all the concern of what such an attack might do to South Korea, the North Koreans must be dreading the consequences for them.
If opposition to a strategy occurred, it would come from the military. Senior military officers are obsessed with the weakness of their own side. They know everything that is wrong with their capabilities because that’s what they live with daily. They tend to assume the other side has far greater capabilities and are therefore much more cautious than their civilian counterparts. At critical times, civilian leaders tend to overestimate the military in order to justify the strategy they have locked themselves into.
In the United States, it was civilians such as former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld who advocated going into Iraq, while the former chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Eric Shinseki, warned against it unless the force was much larger than what was available.
Assume for a moment that Kim thinks the military can whip up a guidance system in a couple of weeks and that the military is uncertain whether it is doable. In that case, Kim, who might be betting a busted flush, might think of them as having an “impure attitude.” Sometimes civilians are right and the military is wrong, and vice versa, but the military tends to be more cautious.
The South Koreans relayed this information to show that there was tension inside North Korea, and that, given time, this tension might result in a shift in policy. It’s possible that the military wants to push ahead and Kim is resisting, but I tend to doubt that. Or it may be that the military is having doubts about Kim’s policy, and Kim took action before resistance to his policy became resistance to him.
Always put yourself on the other side of the hill. The North Koreans view the United States as a massive military power. Pushing the U.S. hard might beget an unpleasant response, and President Donald Trump has broadcast that he doesn’t want to talk and has hinted that he is ready for war. If you are a North Korean general and you know that you are not ready for a war on multiple levels, that would tend to increase your caution. In that case, more threats and feints by the United States make sense — unless the General Political Bureau has been cured of its impure attitudes.
-
South Korea: With Oil Tanker's Seizure, Seoul Shows Its Displeasure With China
Relations between Seoul and Beijing continue to erode. South Korea revealed Dec. 29 that last month it had seized a Hong Kong-flagged tanker involved in an at-sea transfer of refined petroleum products to a North Korean vessel, a violation of sanctions against North Korea under U.N. Security Council Resolution 2375. The announcement comes as the United Nations is considering a list of 10 ships to sanction for illicit trade with North Korea, and follows the U.S. Treasury Department's release of images of Chinese vessels transferring petroleum products to North Korean ships at sea in contravention of U.N. sanctions. The incident will strengthen U.S. criticism of China's support for North Korea.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/2/china-covertly-offering-north-korea-missiles-aid-t/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiT1dVNFl6WXdNVFE1TURGbSIsInQiOiJPcndLZzN3WE5NajZCMnBqa21sWGhXUlNHTzJXSzBreDF0QlU0WEx4eW5CMzVBQnZReER2RjhZVHhEOGlMdGc3YUxmMExtZEduZ2h5VFU1aFdjMkVTaEhUWDgxZjFmdFViK3lpcG5NRHFkdjFXR2xHalkxU0NVellqYmJsYjI1cCJ9
-
North Korea
If Iran is coming to grips with its geographic constraints, then North Korea is a case study in how a geographically weak country can turn weakness into strength. Defiant as ever, Kim Jong Un raised the possibility Jan. 1 of easing tensions with South Korea during the same speech in which he threatened the entire continental United States with nuclear weapons. Kim’s statement could be read two ways. The first would be that North Korea is looking for a way to extricate itself from the cycle of escalation while still saving face. The second would be that North Korea believes the U.S. has bluffed on a military strike and so is looking to split South Korea from the United States. The second interpretation appears more likely.
(click to enlarge)
The story here is not North Korea – where bellicose threats and strange diplomatic overtures are normal behavior – but South Korea. The South, which would bear the brunt of a war on the peninsula, understandably doesn’t want the U.S. to launch a pre-emptive strike on North Korea’s nuclear program. South Korea’s imperative is to prevent that from happening at all costs. It’s one thing for South Korea to urge the U.S. not to undertake an attack in private. It’s quite another to do it in public, which South Korea has done repeatedly. It betrays a distrust between Washington and Seoul, and alliances are built on a certain degree of trust.
Consider the following developments in the six weeks leading up to Kim’s announcement. On Nov. 17, the chairwoman of South Korea’s ruling party contradicted U.S. President Donald Trump, insisting that war with North Korea was not on the table. On Dec. 14, South Korean President Moon Jae-in traveled to China, and when he left, Seoul and Beijing’s positions on a strike against North Korea were aligned. On Dec. 19, Moon suggested delaying major annual U.S.-South Korean military exercises until after the Paralympics in March. Moon has already enthusiastically responded to Kim’s proposal of discussions over a North Korean delegation at the Winter Olympics, and South Korea’s state-run Institute for National Security Strategy has already said it believes the North will ask for the South to remove certain sanctions against Pyongyang – to which it said Seoul’s agreement “cannot be ruled out.”
Of course, the U.S. doesn’t want to attack North Korea either. Washington has been hoping that a combination of sanctions and impressive military threats would cow Pyongyang into submission. South Korea’s public and repeated resistance to a U.S. strike undermines the most important part of a nonviolent U.S. strategy to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons: a credible threat of military action.
Kim Jong Un seems to have learned from a mistake that his grandfather made. In 1950, Kim Il Sung ordered an invasion of South Korea. The overt act of aggression, especially in the context of the Cold War, provoked a U.S. response, which caught North Korea by surprise. This time around, Kim Jong Un has no intention of trying to conquer South Korea by force. He is instead biding his time, betting that Washington will not ignore Seoul’s pleas. If it does, the U.S. will have done the hard work of destroying the U.S.-South Korea alliance without North Korea having to do much of anything. The goal is to split the U.S. off from South Korea, and eventually to get the U.S. to withdraw its military forces from the peninsula.
-
http://www.aei.org/publication/three-surprising-things-about-the-north-korean-threat-i-learned-on-a-recent-trip-to-south-korea/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTVdNM05UY3lOV1JpWldVeCIsInQiOiJndTRaQnZCYTZQUVlvUVV4K2I3RXgxa0VDVmVzM2Q1dG1OdE9Tc3RNXC9mQ0pjbThQTVA4QVwvaVhjMlkzN09oaDJzeFE5TXdMamhZTHhqVU5SRG03SWVQaW5KdjRDc1Y5Vk1TdEdZQlVzWWpINmpXUWltc2t6Y0E1bWdxcTlISkR6In0%3D
-
Third post
North Korea: Hollow Words Ring in the New Year
Jan 3, 2018
By Phillip Orchard
In his New Year’s Day address, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for direct talks with South Korea and expressed interest in North Korea’s participation in February’s Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. The following day, South Korean President Moon Jae-in called for urgent measures to ensure the North’s participation in the games, and Seoul’s unification minister proposed that the two sides meet at the Demilitarized Zone for direct talks over the matter on Jan. 9.
Fresh off its longest-range ICBM test to date in late November — a missile theoretically capable of landing a nuke in the lap of Lady Liberty in New York Harbor — North Korea is trying to portray itself as a country negotiating from a position of newfound strength. In combination with the apparent olive branch to Seoul, Kim insisted that the North has completed its nuclear deterrent and ordered mass production of the new missiles, but also said nukes would be used only to repel invasion. In effect, the North is probing for opportunities to gain relief from international sanctions, gain recognition as a responsible and confirmed nuclear power, and potentially drive a deeper wedge in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. However, the underlying fundamentals of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula have not changed. Pyongyang can neither make substantive concessions nor cash in on the success of its nuclear weapons program to reshape the regional security landscape to its liking.
A Dangerous Window
Despite the leap in nuclear and ballistic missile development made by the North over the past few years, Pyongyang is still, in most ways, acting out of vulnerability. This is primarily because it still cannot conduct a nuclear strike on the mainland United States with any high degree of certainty. It is true that the North has now demonstrated the ability to fly a ballistic missile the 13,000+ kilometers (about 8,100 miles) it must travel to strike the U.S. east coast. But it has yet to publicly demonstrate a mastery of the technology to keep the missile intact and on target as it re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere — by far the most difficult part of ballistic missile development. Without it, the North doesn’t have a deliverable nuclear warhead capable of threatening the U.S.
In short, the North still does not appear to have the capabilities to force the U.S. to negotiate with it as nuclear equals. Despite periodic back-channel talks between U.S. and North Korean officials over the past year — and despite Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s statement in mid-December that the U.S. would be open to direct talks without preconditions, which the White House walked back shortly thereafter — the U.S. has shown no indication that it’s willing to ease off its demands for complete denuclearization.
The problem for the North is this means it remains firmly within the most dangerous window of its nuclear development: where it has demonstrated a high probability that it will achieve a full nuclear deterrent but hasn’t yet done so. The likelihood of a U.S. military operation to address the North’s nuclear program is highest in this window. This doesn’t mean the North’s conventional deterrent is any less powerful. The artillery the North has amassed within easy striking distance of Seoul (not to mention uncertainty surrounding the North’s arsenal of biological and chemical weapons) may very well be enough to keep the U.S. from attacking. And the North may very well think it has the U.S. backed into a corner. But the possibility of war remains high enough that the North has little choice but to play every card it has to try to forestall the Americans.
Moreover, the North has come under unprecedented sanctions pressure. Sanctions alone will not be enough to force the North to capitulate. The North’s sophisticated capabilities for cheating sanctions, along with its ongoing lifelines to China and Russia, continue to give the North some breathing room. But by all accounts, the international sanctions effort has inflicted no small amount of pain on the North. Notably, Kim’s New Year’s address focused heavily on the sanctions; he even admitted that the North needed to improve its “ability to be self-reliant,” hinting that the pressure may be getting to Pyongyang. This heightens the potential for resistance to the regime’s policy from within elite circles in Pyongyang or the possibility that discontent among the military’s rank and file will lead to a substantive erosion in readiness.
Pyongyang may see an opening to use Seoul to potentially gain some sanctions relief and keep the Americans at bay. South Korea still very much fears that the U.S. will decide it is necessary to undertake unilateral military action that puts tens of thousands of lives in the capital at risk. Given its desire to avoid a military confrontation in which it would suffer far more immediate casualties than its allies, the administration in Seoul is keen to replicate the “Sunshine” engagement policies of South Korean
administrations of the late 1990s to mid-2000s. By opening direct talks with Seoul and attending the Olympics, Pyongyang thinks it may be able to strengthen the doves in South Korea and potentially widen the distance between Seoul and Washington — or, if the U.S. supports Seoul’s engagement strategy, then the distance between Washington and Tokyo, which would like the U.S. to decisively end the North Korean threat.
At minimum, it will put a more positive spotlight on the North internationally and undermine efforts to isolate Pyongyang as an illegitimate pariah, potentially weakening interest in expanding or even enforcing the sanctions. If Pyongyang can succeed in gaining even minor concessions — whether in the form of sanctions relief or a brief freeze in U.S.-ROK drills as proposed by Moon Jae-in — then it can demonstrate to skeptics within the regime that its strategy is paying off and will herald even greater benefits once its nuclear deterrent is complete. If none of this comes to pass, then it will have come at the cost only of sending a pair of figure skaters to Pyeongchang.
Small Advantages
Regardless, this apparent opening doesn’t herald a major strategic shift from the North or change the trajectory of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. There are two primary reasons for this: First, for the foreseeable future, Pyongyang can do little to weaken the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The main thing that could shatter the U.S. security guarantees to South Korea is if the U.S. decides that sacrificing Seoul is an acceptable price to pay for mitigating the North’s nuclear threat to the U.S. homeland. Even if such a scenario were likely to lead to an irrevocable long-term loss of trust and strategic rationale for the alliance, the South would have little choice but to cooperate with the U.S. in an effort to minimize the damage as much as possible during operations.
We think this scenario is unlikely. But Seoul’s strategy in lieu of war still relies heavily on the power only the U.S. can bring to bear. In the short term, Seoul gains negotiating leverage the more a unilateral U.S. attack appears imminent (even if it undermines this somewhat by repeatedly insisting that it will not allow a U.S. pre-emptive attack). Over the long-term, Seoul is betting big on deterrence, for example by investing heavily in anti-missile and anti-artillery capabilities. But the South does not yet have the conventional military capabilities, much less a nuclear arsenal to fully deter the North without U.S. support. Its biggest long-term security challenges come not from the north, but to the east and west, from China and Japan, respectively. Thus, whether or not the U.S. chooses the military option in regard to North Korea, Seoul still needs the Americans. This means the South Koreans and the Americans need to continue conducting the sorts of joint military drills Pyongyang so loathes.
The second reason is similar: North Korea cannot yet suspend its missile and nuclear tests indefinitely without giving up on a fully formed deterrent and thus remaining
uncomfortably within the window where the probability of a U.S. attack is highest. It is no longer pursuing the strategies of the 1990s and 2000s, when it was willing to delay its nuclear progress by a few years in exchange for sanctions relief and economic support. This time around, it’s too close to realizing its nuclear dream. And with an inevitable resumption of testing will come a resumption of sanctions pressure, U.S.-ROK drills and doubts about the viability of Seoul’s “Sunshine” policies, and thus a return to the status quo.
The major shift in the crisis on the Korean Peninsula will come only when Pyongyang convinces the U.S. that the costs of attacking the North are steeper than those of living with a nuclear North — or vice versa. Until then, we’re in a phase of North Korean posturing to its audience in Pyongyang while probing for small advantages abroad.
The post North Korea: Hollow Words Ring in the New Year appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/06/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-missile-intelligence.html?emc=edit_ta_20180106&nl=top-stories&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
-
second post
January 3, 2018
The underlying fundamentals of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula have not changed.
By Phillip Orchard
In his New Year’s Day address, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un called for direct talks with South Korea and expressed interest in North Korea’s participation in February’s Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. The following day, South Korean President Moon Jae-in called for urgent measures to ensure the North’s participation in the games, and Seoul’s unification minister proposed that the two sides meet at the Demilitarized Zone for direct talks over the matter on Jan. 9.
Fresh off its longest-range ICBM test to date in late November — a missile theoretically capable of landing a nuke in the lap of Lady Liberty in New York Harbor — North Korea is trying to portray itself as a country negotiating from a position of newfound strength. In combination with the apparent olive branch to Seoul, Kim insisted that the North has completed its nuclear deterrent and ordered mass production of the new missiles, but also said nukes would be used only to repel invasion. In effect, the North is probing for opportunities to gain relief from international sanctions, gain recognition as a responsible and confirmed nuclear power, and potentially drive a deeper wedge in the U.S.-South Korean alliance. However, the underlying fundamentals of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula have not changed. Pyongyang can neither make substantive concessions nor cash in on the success of its nuclear weapons program to reshape the regional security landscape to its liking.
A Dangerous Window
Despite the leap in nuclear and ballistic missile development made by the North over the past few years, Pyongyang is still, in most ways, acting out of vulnerability. This is primarily because it still cannot conduct a nuclear strike on the mainland United States with any high degree of certainty. It is true that the North has now demonstrated the ability to fly a ballistic missile the 13,000+ kilometers (about 8,100 miles) it must travel to strike the U.S. east coast. But it has yet to publicly demonstrate a mastery of the technology to keep the missile intact and on target as it re-enters the Earth’s atmosphere — by far the most difficult part of ballistic missile development. Without it, the North doesn’t have a deliverable nuclear warhead capable of threatening the U.S.
In short, the North still does not appear to have the capabilities to force the U.S. to negotiate with it as nuclear equals. Despite periodic back-channel talks between U.S. and North Korean officials over the past year — and despite Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s statement in mid-December that the U.S. would be open to direct talks without preconditions, which the White House walked back shortly thereafter — the U.S. has shown no indication that it’s willing to ease off its demands for complete denuclearization.
The problem for the North is this means it remains firmly within the most dangerous window of its nuclear development: where it has demonstrated a high probability that it will achieve a full nuclear deterrent but hasn’t yet done so. The likelihood of a U.S. military operation to address the North’s nuclear program is highest in this window. This doesn’t mean the North’s conventional deterrent is any less powerful. The artillery the North has amassed within easy striking distance of Seoul (not to mention uncertainty surrounding the North’s arsenal of biological and chemical weapons) may very well be enough to keep the U.S. from attacking. And the North may very well think it has the U.S. backed into a corner. But the possibility of war remains high enough that the North has little choice but to play every card it has to try to forestall the Americans.
Moreover, the North has come under unprecedented sanctions pressure. Sanctions alone will not be enough to force the North to capitulate. The North’s sophisticated capabilities for cheating sanctions, along with its ongoing lifelines to China and Russia, continue to give the North some breathing room. But by all accounts, the international sanctions effort has inflicted no small amount of pain on the North. Notably, Kim’s New Year’s address focused heavily on the sanctions; he even admitted that the North needed to improve its “ability to be self-reliant,” hinting that the pressure may be getting to Pyongyang. This heightens the potential for resistance to the regime’s policy from within elite circles in Pyongyang or the possibility that discontent among the military’s rank and file will lead to a substantive erosion in readiness.
Pyongyang may see an opening to use Seoul to potentially gain some sanctions relief and keep the Americans at bay. South Korea still very much fears that the U.S. will decide it is necessary to undertake unilateral military action that puts tens of thousands of lives in the capital at risk. Given its desire to avoid a military confrontation in which it would suffer far more immediate casualties than its allies, the administration in Seoul is keen to replicate the “Sunshine” engagement policies of South Korean administrations of the late 1990s to mid-2000s. By opening direct talks with Seoul and attending the Olympics, Pyongyang thinks it may be able to strengthen the doves in South Korea and potentially widen the distance between Seoul and Washington — or, if the U.S. supports Seoul’s engagement strategy, then the distance between Washington and Tokyo, which would like the U.S. to decisively end the North Korean threat.
At minimum, it will put a more positive spotlight on the North internationally and undermine efforts to isolate Pyongyang as an illegitimate pariah, potentially weakening interest in expanding or even enforcing the sanctions. If Pyongyang can succeed in gaining even minor concessions — whether in the form of sanctions relief or a brief freeze in U.S.-ROK drills as proposed by Moon Jae-in — then it can demonstrate to skeptics within the regime that its strategy is paying off and will herald even greater benefits once its nuclear deterrent is complete. If none of this comes to pass, then it will have come at the cost only of sending a pair of figure skaters to Pyeongchang.
Small Advantages
Regardless, this apparent opening doesn’t herald a major strategic shift from the North or change the trajectory of the crisis on the Korean Peninsula. There are two primary reasons for this: First, for the foreseeable future, Pyongyang can do little to weaken the U.S.-South Korean alliance. The main thing that could shatter the U.S. security guarantees to South Korea is if the U.S. decides that sacrificing Seoul is an acceptable price to pay for mitigating the North’s nuclear threat to the U.S. homeland. Even if such a scenario were likely to lead to an irrevocable long-term loss of trust and strategic rationale for the alliance, the South would have little choice but to cooperate with the U.S. in an effort to minimize the damage as much as possible during operations.
We think this scenario is unlikely. But Seoul’s strategy in lieu of war still relies heavily on the power only the U.S. can bring to bear. In the short term, Seoul gains negotiating leverage the more a unilateral U.S. attack appears imminent (even if it undermines this somewhat by repeatedly insisting that it will not allow a U.S. pre-emptive attack). Over the long-term, Seoul is betting big on deterrence, for example by investing heavily in anti-missile and anti-artillery capabilities. But the South does not yet have the conventional military capabilities, much less a nuclear arsenal to fully deter the North without U.S. support. Its biggest long-term security challenges come not from the north, but to the east and west, from China and Japan, respectively. Thus, whether or not the U.S. chooses the military option in regard to North Korea, Seoul still needs the Americans. This means the South Koreans and the Americans need to continue conducting the sorts of joint military drills Pyongyang so loathes.
The second reason is similar: North Korea cannot yet suspend its missile and nuclear tests indefinitely without giving up on a fully formed deterrent and thus remaining uncomfortably within the window where the probability of a U.S. attack is highest. It is no longer pursuing the strategies of the 1990s and 2000s, when it was willing to delay its nuclear progress by a few years in exchange for sanctions relief and economic support. This time around, it’s too close to realizing its nuclear dream. And with an inevitable resumption of testing will come a resumption of sanctions pressure, U.S.-ROK drills and doubts about the viability of Seoul’s “Sunshine” policies, and thus a return to the status quo.
The major shift in the crisis on the Korean Peninsula will come only when Pyongyang convinces the U.S. that the costs of attacking the North are steeper than those of living with a nuclear North — or vice versa. Until then, we’re in a phase of North Korean posturing to its audience in Pyongyang while probing for small advantages abroad.
-
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/its-time-to-bomb-north-korea/
-
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/01/08/its-time-to-bomb-north-korea/
This makes sense to me, of course it depends on what the most trusted military and intelligence experts would say in private. No one seems to weigh the risk of non-action against the risks of taking action. I can't believe China wouldn't rather take apart in the plan rather than be blind-sided and be left to neighbor the aftermath.
Russia also shares a coastal border with North Korea. Are they better off with a nuclear armed, rogue regime, dark economy next door to their biggest eastern sea port, or would they be better off with an emerging, vibrant, natural resource purchasing, free economy next door?
This is a great opportunity for the largest powers in the world to do something right. They won't fight back as hard or as long if we come at them from 5 or 6 sides, China, US, SK, Russia, Japan, and whoever else is threatened by them IMHO.
-
Rumor has it that McMaster entertains some sort of first strike and that Mattis opposes.
-
Military Quietly Prepares for a Last Resort: War With North Korea
By HELENE COOPER, ERIC SCHMITT, THOMAS GIBBONS-NEFF and JOHN ISMAYJAN. 14, 2018
WASHINGTON — Across the military, officers and troops are quietly preparing for a war they hope will not come.
At Fort Bragg in North Carolina last month, a mix of 48 Apache gunships and Chinook cargo helicopters took off in an exercise that practiced moving troops and equipment under live artillery fire to assault targets. Two days later, in the skies above Nevada, 119 soldiers from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division parachuted out of C-17 military cargo planes under cover of darkness in an exercise that simulated a foreign invasion.
Next month, at Army posts across the United States, more than 1,000 reserve soldiers will practice how to set up so-called mobilization centers that move military forces overseas in a hurry. And beginning next month with the Winter Olympics in the South Korean town of Pyeongchang, the Pentagon plans to send more Special Operations troops to the Korean Peninsula, an initial step toward what some officials said ultimately could be the formation of a Korea-based task force similar to the types that are fighting in Iraq and Syria. Others said the plan was strictly related to counterterrorism efforts.
In the world of the American military, where contingency planning is a mantra drummed into the psyche of every officer, the moves are ostensibly part of standard Defense Department training and troop rotations. But the scope and timing of the exercises suggest a renewed focus on getting the country’s military prepared for what could be on the horizon with North Korea.
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis and General Joseph F. Dunford Jr., the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, both argue forcefully for using diplomacy to address Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. A war with North Korea, Mr. Mattis said in August, would be “catastrophic.” Still, about two dozen current and former Pentagon officials and senior commanders said in interviews that the exercises largely reflected the military’s response to orders from Mr. Mattis and service chiefs to be ready for any possible military action on the Korean Peninsula.
Continue reading the main story
President Trump’s own words have left senior military leaders and rank-and-file troops convinced that they need to accelerate their contingency planning.
During the 82nd Airborne exercise in Nevada last month, Army soldiers practiced moving paratroopers on helicopters and flew artillery, fuel and ammunition deep behind what was designated as enemy lines. Credit U.S. Army
In perhaps the most incendiary exchange, in a September speech at the United Nations, Mr. Trump vowed to “totally destroy North Korea” if it threatened the United States, and derided the rogue nation’s leader, Kim Jong-un, as “Rocket Man.” In response, Mr. Kim said he would deploy the “highest level of hard-line countermeasure in history” against the United States, and described Mr. Trump as a “mentally deranged U.S. dotard.”
Mr. Trump’s rhetoric has since cooled, following a fresh attempt at détente between Pyongyang and Seoul. In an interview last week with The Wall Street Journal, Mr. Trump was quoted as saying, “I probably have a very good relationship with Kim Jong-un,” despite their mutual public insults. But the president said on Sunday that The Journal had misquoted him, and that he had actually said “I’d probably have” a good relationship if he wanted one.
A false alarm in Hawaii on Saturday that set off about 40 minutes of panic after a state emergency response employee mistakenly sent out a text alert warning of an incoming ballistic missile attack underscored Americans’ anxiety about North Korea.
A Conventional Mission
After 16 years of fighting insurgents in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, American commanding generals worry that the military is better prepared for going after stateless groups of militants than it is for its own conventional mission of facing down heavily fortified land powers that have their own formidable militaries and air defenses.
The exercise at Fort Bragg was part of one of the largest air assault exercises in recent years. The practice run at Nellis Air Force Base in Nevada used double the number of cargo planes for paratroopers as was used in past exercises.
The Army Reserve exercise planned for next month will breathe new life into mobilization centers that have been largely dormant as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have wound down. And while the military has deployed Special Operations reaction forces to previous large global events, like the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, those units usually numbered around 100 — far fewer than some officials said could be sent for the Olympics in South Korea. Others discounted that possibility.
At a wide-ranging meeting at his headquarters on Jan. 2, Gen. Tony Thomas, the head of the Special Operations Command in Tampa, Fla., warned the 200 civilians and service members in the audience that more Special Forces personnel might have to shift to the Korea theater from the Middle East in May or June, if tensions escalate on the peninsula. The general’s spokesman, Capt. Jason Salata, confirmed the account provided to The New York Times by someone in the audience, but said General Thomas made it clear that no decisions had been made.
By U.S. ARMY/82ND AIRBORNE DIVISION
The Army chief of staff, Gen. Mark A. Milley, in several recent meetings at the Pentagon, has brought up two historic American military disasters as a warning of where a lack of preparedness can lead.
Military officials said General Milley has cited the ill-fated Battle of the Kasserine Pass during World War II, when unprepared American troops were outfoxed and then pummeled by the forces of Field Marshal Erwin Rommel of Germany. General Milley has also recently mentioned Task Force Smith, the poorly equipped, understrength unit that was mauled by North Korean troops in 1950 during the Korean War.
In meeting after meeting, the officials said, General Milley has likened the two American defeats to what he warns could happen if the military does not get ready for a possible war with North Korea. He has urged senior Army leaders to get units into shape, and fretted about a loss of what he has called muscle memory: how to fight a large land war, including one in which an established adversary is able to bring sophisticated air defenses, tanks, infantry, naval power and even cyberweapons into battle.
Speaking in October at the annual meeting of the Association of the United States Army, General Milley called Pyongyang the biggest threat to American national security, and said that Army officers who lead operational units must prepare to meet that threat.
“Do not wait on orders and printed new regulations and new manuals,” General Milley told the audience. “Put simply, I want you to get ready for what might come, and do not do any tasks that do not directly contribute to increasing combat readiness in your unit.”
His concerns have drifted down to the Army’s rank and file. And troops at bases and posts around the world routinely wonder aloud if they will soon be deployed to the Korean Peninsula.
But unlike the run-up to the Iraq war, when the Pentagon had already begun huge troop movements in 2002 to prepare for the invasion that began in 2003, military officials insist that this is not a case of a war train that has left the station.
“This could be as simple as these guys reading the newspaper,” said Derek Chollet, an assistant secretary of defense during the Obama administration, referring to the rush by military officials to get ready. “You’re not seeing any massive military movements” that would indicate that a decision has been made to go to war, he added.
There have been no travel warnings advising Americans to stay away from South Korea or Japan, and no advisories warning American businesses to be cautious.
It is unlikely that the Pentagon would launch military action on the Korean Peninsula without first warning Americans and others there, military officials said — unless the Trump administration believes that the United States could conduct a one-time airstrike on North Korea that would not bring any retaliation from Pyongyang to nearby Seoul.
Some officials in the White House have argued that such a targeted, limited strike could be launched with minimal, if any, blowback against South Korea — a premise that Mr. Mattis views with skepticism, according to people familiar with his thinking.
But for Mr. Mattis, the planning serves to placate Mr. Trump. Effectively, analysts said, it alerts the president to how seriously the Pentagon views the threat and protects Mr. Mattis from suggestions that he is out of step with Mr. Trump.
“The military’s job is to be fully ready for whatever contingencies might be on the horizon,” said Michèle A. Flournoy, a top Pentagon official in the Obama administration and co-founder of WestExec Advisors, a strategic consultancy in Washington.
“Even if no decision on North Korea has been made and no order has been given,” Ms. Flournoy said, “the need to be ready for the contingency that is top of mind for the president and his national security team would motivate commanders to use planned exercise opportunities to enhance their preparation, just in case.”
In the case of the 82nd Airborne exercise in Nevada last month, for instance, Army soldiers practiced moving paratroopers on helicopters and flew artillery, fuel and ammunition deep behind what was designated as enemy lines. The maneuvers were aimed at forcing an enemy to fight on different fronts early in combat.
Officials said maneuvers practiced in the exercise, called Panther Blade, could be used anywhere, not just on the Korean Peninsula. “Operation Panther Blade is about building global readiness,” said Lt. Col. Joe Buccino, a public affairs officer with the 82nd Airborne. “An air assault and deep attack of this scale is very complex and requires dynamic synchronization of assets over time and space.”
Another exercise, called Bronze Ram, is being coordinated by the shadowy Joint Special Operations Command, officials said, and mimics other training scenarios that mirror current events.
This year’s exercise, one of many that concentrate on threats from across the world, will focus extensively on underground operations and involve working in chemically contaminated environments that might be present in North Korea. It will also home in on the Special Operations Command’s mission of countering weapons of mass destruction.
Beyond Bronze Ram, highly classified Special Operations exercises in the United States, including those with scenarios to seize unsecured nuclear weapons or conduct clandestine paratrooper drops, have for several months reflected a possible North Korea contingency, military officials said, without providing details, because of operational sensitivity.
Air Force B-1 bombers flying from Guam have been seen regularly over the Korean Peninsula amid the escalating tensions with Pyongyang — running regular training flights with Japanese and South Korean fighter jets that often provoke North Korea’s ire. B-52 bombers based in Louisiana are expected to join the B-1s stationed on Guam later this month, adding to the long-range aerial firepower.
Pentagon officials said last week that three B-2 bombers and their crews had arrived in Guam from their base in Missouri.
But unlike the very public buildup of forces in the run-up to the 1991 Persian Gulf war and the 2003 Iraq war, which sought to pressure President Saddam Hussein of Iraq into a diplomatic settlement, the Pentagon is seeking to avoid making public all its preparations for fear of inadvertently provoking a response by Mr. Kim, North Korea’s leader.
Last week, diplomats from North Korea and South Korea met for the first time in two years in a sign of thawing tensions. On Tuesday, Canada and the United States will host a meeting in Vancouver, British Columbia, of foreign ministers from countries that supported the United Nations-backed effort to repel North Korean forces after the 1950 invasion of South Korea. The ministers are seeking to advance the diplomatic initiative forged by Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson.
It is a balance that Mr. Mattis and senior commanders are trying to strike in showing that the military, on the one hand, is ready to confront any challenge that North Korea presents, even as they strongly back diplomatic initiatives led by Mr. Tillerson to resolve the crisis.
An exchange this month illustrated perfectly the fine line the Pentagon is walking, as an Air Force three-star general caught her colleague emphasizing military prowess perhaps a tad too much, and gently guided him back.
During a briefing with reporters on Capitol Hill, Lt. Gen. Mark C. Nowland was asked whether the Air Force was prepared to take out North Korean air defenses.
“If you’re asking us, are we ready to fight tonight, the answer is, yes, we will,” General Nowland, the Air Force’s top operations officer, responded. “The United States Air Force, if required, when called to do our job, will gain and maintain air supremacy.”
The words were barely out of his mouth when Lt. Gen. VeraLinn Jamieson, the Air Force’s top intelligence officer, interrupted.
“I’ll also add that right now, the Defense Department is in support of Secretary of State Tillerson, who’s got a campaign to be the lead with North Korea in a diplomatic endeavor,” General Jamieson said.
General Nowland quickly acknowledged in a follow-up question that the military was in support of Mr. Tillerson’s diplomatic push.
-
Trump and Haley know full well this latest N Korea overture with the South is a phony dog and pony show.
S Korea which has more to lose then us of course are playing alont probably wringing their hands ready to beg for N Korea to be nice
-
North Korea’s Unlikely Strategic Opening
Jan 16, 2018
By George Friedman
The assumption about North Korea’s nuclear program has been that it is primarily needed for regime preservation. North Korea has been perpetually concerned about an American intervention, along with other threats. It sees Japan as a potential enemy that has attacked and occupied Korea before. It also has historical animosity toward Russia and China. The Soviets supported the North Korean invasion of the South but when North Korean forces faced American forces, and crumbled, the Soviets avoided taking risks on North Korea’s behalf. China similarly was unwilling to intervene in support of North Korea until U.S. forces neared the Yalu River and threatened China. The North was subsequently devastated as the United States and China used it as an arena to fight their war. Finally, North Korea has viewed South Korea as a U.S. proxy, bound to the United States by treaty and national strategy.
From the North Koreans’ point of view, they live in a tough neighborhood, filled with threats former and current and with putative allies that did not raise a finger to help North Korea in times of need. Some of these threats emerged long ago, from the American perspective. The Korean view of history has a longer timeframe. The view that the North Koreans wanted a nuclear weapon to guarantee their national security seemed accurate and seemed to forecast the American response: taking steps to prevent a nuclear North Korea. But the situation has become more complicated than that.
(click to enlarge)
Shared Views
Seoul saw a potential American strike on Pyongyang as a direct threat to South Korean interests. The ability of North Korea to impose a massive bombardment on South Korea’s capital was a risk the South couldn’t accept. What’s more, it wasn’t obvious that South Korea and the United States, acting together, could mitigate the threat. South Korea, therefore, resisted any American military operation. Japan continued to maintain a more aggressive attitude toward North Korea. South Korea saw China and Russia as pretending to mediate, while in fact both were content to see the U.S. get bogged down in the Korean Peninsula.
In this sense, the North and the South had similar views. The United States, Japan, China and Russia each had their own interests and each saw the Korean Peninsula today as serving the same purpose it served decades before. For them, it was an arena for playing out their own national ambitions and fears. The North Koreans had always felt this way. The South Koreans, however, were comfortable with their relations with the United States and its military guarantees. But the value of those guarantees had changed with the threat of a pre-emptive strike.
The placement of massive artillery, ancient as much of it might be, north of the Demilitarized Zone was in retrospect a brilliant move. Artillery does not have to be state of the art to hurl explosives for miles. Large concentrations of fortified artillery are difficult to destroy, and Seoul’s position so close to the border makes it an easy target.
Artillery also compelled South Korea to rethink its view of North Korea as its primary adversary. Instead, it began to see the North as a country with a shared basic interest. The devastation of the Korean War is seared into both countries’ memories. It led North Korea to develop a nuclear capability. It led South Korea to refuse to participate in an attack on Pyongyang with the primary aim of destroying its nuclear capability. They both have an interest in not permitting the peninsula to become a battlefield again.
The issue now is how far this joint vision goes. Each has fears of the other. The North is poor and oppressive. The South is economically vibrant. The North sees South Korea’s economic well-being and culture as a threat to the authority of its regime. The South does not intend to be conquered by the North.
A Basis for Cooperation
The two states, however, understand that the logic they have been following necessarily leads to different outcomes. If the primary goal is to exclude third parties who might wage war or be sanguine about a war being waged, then neither state can allow itself to be drawn into these foreign ambitions. And if that is the case, then each must find a degree of trust in the other, and a basis for cooperation.
North Korea seems to have seen this most clearly, or at least it has a more immediate interest in splitting South Korea from the United States and, to a lesser extent, from Japan. Pyongyang would like to see South Korea’s refusal to allow a strike on the North expand into a rupture, particularly when it comes to defense, between Seoul and Washington. Forcing the United States out of the Korean Peninsula is unlikely. But it is a goal shared by China and North Korea. To an extent, this is a replay of 1950.
For South Korea, ejecting the U.S. from the peninsula carries enormous risks. It is North Korea’s task to make those risks seem far less dangerous than the risk of war. North Korea cannot pretend to abandon its regime nor can the South Koreans pretend to abandon theirs. The logical outcome is for North Korea to propose some agreement in which the two Koreas maintain separate regimes and political orders, but act toward the rest of the world with some unity.
The North’s fear of the South’s economic dominance and the South’s fear of being subjugated by the North likely make any such entente impossible. But there are major powers, namely China and Russia, that would give a great deal to see the U.S. expelled from the Korean Peninsula. That would shift the balance of power in the Northwest Pacific dramatically. Of course, South Korea – and North Korea – would not want Russia and China to operate in the region without fear. Worse, their old enemy Japan would now have to rearm and that would resurrect a historic nightmare.
Unless the North or the South dramatically reforms their regimes, it is difficult to imagine an entente, or South Korea breaking its alliance with the United States. And using a nuclear threat against the South would cement that relationship. Still, it is worth trying from the North’s point of view, and worth considering from the South’s. The near nuclear capability gives the North opportunities it did not have before. But South Korea is an industrial democracy of the first order, and North Korea is not, to say the least. But having split South Korea and the United States on pre-emptive strike, the North has nothing to lose in seeing how far reconciliation between Pyongyang and Seoul can go. And China and Russia can only be smiling, while Japan must be contemplating its own nuclear plans.
-
As a Stratfor contributor, I generally avoid prescribing policy. But today I can't resist, having found myself in a position to report a policy prescription available nowhere else in English. Philip Bobbitt has come up with a novel proposal for managing the mess in North Korea, which BBC China published in Chinese on Jan. 28. Having access to the English original, as well as five other essays Bobbitt has published in English, I'll use this column to do two things. First, I'll summarize professor Bobbitt's proposal. Second, I'll suggest in ways that its author could not, modesty forbidding, why it's so important that the proposal comes from Philip Bobbitt and why we should listen to him.
A Chinese Nuclear Umbrella Over North Korea
At the center of Bobbitt's solution is the proposal that China extend its nuclear umbrella over North Korea as the United States extends its nuclear umbrella over its allies in the region. This arrangement could reduce Kim Jong Un's incentive to further develop his own country's nuclear capabilities, thereby freeing up resources to bolster North Korea's weak economy. While the plan is not without its own risks — would such a scenario set up a new rivalry between two superpowers that could spark proxy conflicts around the world? — Bobbitt develops it by first critiquing the alternatives and then exploring the motivations of each of the major players to accept this counterintuitive idea. The main alternatives are three: doing more of what we've been doing — diplomacy backed by sanctions; resorting to military force; or allowing North Korea to continue its nuclear buildup in a context of containment and deterrence. Bobbitt is not alone in seeing problems with each.
The first option almost refutes itself. More of the same pressures will produce only more of the same ineffective results. Some proponents hope that more of the same could buy time for a coup or an assassination to unseat Kim. But playing the waiting game is dangerous in a race against North Korea's increasing command of the relevant technologies. China, too, has a lot to lose no matter what scenario a waiting game produces.
If the first option is bland, the second is insane. As Bobbitt put it in an essay last year in Time magazine, "The consequence of a US preemptive strike" against North Korea would leave "Seoul in ruins." Further, it may "well unravel both the system of US alliances and US non-proliferation efforts in the region for which our deterrent has been responsible." Finally, the consequences of such an attack would be disastrous for China in several ways, unleashing a flood of refugees across its border and giving rise to the prospect of a unified Korea backed by the United States right next door.
The third option, containment, has defenders among those who say the strategy worked with Russia and China. Why not North Korea? Bobbitt's reply is to point out the major differences between the three nations and their interests:
"North Korea's paramount goal is to unite the Korean Peninsula. There is no geostrategic ambition so compelling as the unification of societies that have been rendered asunder by war. And while the US deterrent would doubtless protect the US homeland, striking the US homeland is not the North Korean objective. Rather its objective is to put South Korea in the position of asking the United States to leave the Peninsula so as to avoid a conflict that would destroy both North and South Korea."
Further steps in that scenario would surely involve South Korea and Japan developing nuclear capabilities once Seoul had expelled the United States from the Korean Peninsula. Here again, China would find itself more endangered, not less.
A Complex of Initiatives
Having dismissed each of the main options currently on the table, Bobbitt makes the case for his own: "A nuclear guarantee for the inviolability of the North Korean regime from China is the basis for this option, although it sits inside a larger complex of initiatives." And it is this larger complex of initiatives that gives Bobbitt's proposal the plausibility it might otherwise lack. He reminds us that the Korean War never really ended. "Legally, the (conflict) is merely in abatement and has not terminated because no final peace settlement has been agreed upon." He recalls that, after World War II, it was not until 1975 that the Helsinki Accords finally sealed a peace agreement between the Soviet Union and Western states.
Bobbitt continues, and for the sake of precision, I want to quote his own words: "I propose a similar conference, convened by the UN, to include North Korea, South Korea, Japan, China, the US and Russia with the objective of finally ending the Korean War and recognizing the borders of both Koreas. Roughly speaking, the US and China would be in the position of the US and the Soviet Union at Helsinki."
What could motivate China to extend its nuclear umbrella over North Korea, and what would motivate North Korea to accept such an offer?
For China, both carrots and sticks could help make the deal seem more appealing. The sticks are the incalculable consequences of the other three scenarios. The carrot? "It would secure for China a diplomatic role as a great power that its economic growth alone cannot achieve."
North Korea's motivation, meanwhile, stems from a deep distrust of assurances by China or the United States that regime change is not the endgame. "Only the capability to deploy hydrogen warheads launched by long-range ballistic missiles that could destroy American cities can provide an ironclad guarantee for the regime." And right now, China has that capability.
North Korea might gain long-range nuclear capability and might believe that such a capability would assure its safety. Look at Libya and Iraq for counterexamples that demonstrate the need for nukes. But Bobbitt sees a flaw in this logic that could lead to the destruction of Kim Jong Un's government:
"Changes in technology derived from the revolution in rapid computation that is still accelerating will decisively erode North Korea's retaliatory capabilities. Techniques like hardening and concealment that currently protect the North Korean arsenal are rapidly being made obsolete by advances in accuracy, the timing of detonation and remote sensing devices. New guidance systems, rapid data processing and communications, artificial intelligence and many of the other byproducts of the computer revolution are driving this development. Absent the new North Korean threat to the American homeland, the US might well forgo the pursuit of such damage limiting capabilities because the acquisition of this capacity brings with it other risks, like launch-on-warning protocols. But North Korea's maneuvers to secure its future have made it now so deadly to the US that its eventual destruction is sealed."
The Value of Expertise
I quote professor Bobbitt again at some length because in matters of nuclear technology, I am out of my depth but he is not. In addition to serving as the Herbert Wechsler professor of federal jurisprudence and the director of the Center for National Security at Columbia Law School, he is the author of Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear Strategy and the editor, with Sir Lawrence Freedman and Dr. Gregory Treverton, of U.S. Nuclear Strategy: A Reader.
And that's just the beginning. He has written another six books, including the monumental The Shield of Achilles about the succession of different constitutional orders since the Treaty of Westphalia; Terror and Consent: The Wars for the Twenty-First Century; and, most recently, The Garments of Court and Palace: Machiavelli and the World That He Made. (For a summary of these three books, see my column introducing Bobbitt.)
As if that were not enough to make him a voice of authority, he has served as associate counsel to the president; as the counselor on international law for the Department of State; and as the director for intelligence programs, the senior director for critical infrastructure and the senior director for strategic planning at the National Security Council. He also put in a stint as senior fellow in war studies at Kings College, London, and another as research fellow at Nuffield College, Oxford.
Throughout his career, Bobbitt has thought long and hard about how constitutional law, war and strategy relate to one another. The peace treaties that conclude great wars establish the ground rules for successive constitutional orders. Strategies for carrying large institutions into the future need to shake off obsolete social contracts and craft new contracts in light of the new constitutional order. We can no more go backward in history than an old man can become young.
I know that it is a mark of modernity and the Enlightenment's scientific revolution that we are no longer supposed to accept arguments from authority. Something is not true just because Aristotle said it; arguments, like science, should stand on their own merits. I also know that in the current environment, a distrust of authorities and their vaunted expertise is deepening. But sometimes real authority, backed by learning and experience, exists. Philip Bobbitt knows whereof he speaks. We, and the Chinese, could do a lot worse — a whole lot worse — than listen to him.
-
Bloody Noses and Black Eyes: What's in a Limited Strike on North Korea?
By Rodger Baker
VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
Rodger Baker
Rodger Baker
VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
Kim Il Sung Square in Pyongyang, North Korea.
(NARVIKK/iStock/Getty Images)
Connections
Articles
Regions & Countries
Topics
Themes
Print
Save As PDF
Listen
Highlights
Support is building within Washington for a limited strike against North Korea over its pursuit of nuclear arms.
A U.S. strike could have serious ramifications but inaction is not without its risks.
Because of the lack of firm knowledge on North Korea's inner workings, it is impossible to deduce how Pyongyang would react to a so-called bloody nose strike.
Numerous stories are circulating once again, both in the media and in the halls of policy and punditry in Washington, Seoul and Beijing, that the United States is considering a "bloody nose" strike against North Korea. By some accounts, the U.S. administration withdrew backing from its candidate for ambassador to South Korea, Victor Cha, because of his opposition to a limited strike against Pyongyang. Other reports suggest there is an emerging cadre of "hawks" on North Korea who are expanding their influence over U.S. foreign policy, raising the likelihood of at least some form of military action. The challenge in deciphering the signals is that, with or without a planned strike, there is strong logic not only in keeping the option on the table, but also front and center in the minds of all actors in Northeast Asia.
In our 2018 Annual Forecast, we identified the myriad risks of military action on the Korean Peninsula, asserting that the longer-term risks of the North's nuclear weapons program are unlikely to outweigh the costs of military action in the near term. Our baseline assessment is that the United States ultimately will establish a more robust management structure on and around the Korean Peninsula to contain Pyongyang but that it will not strike North Korea this year. But, as we have noted several times, this is ultimately a political decision that rests upon advice from different quarters, as well as cost and benefit assessments, force structure, risk perceptions, the balance of long-term strategic considerations and nearer-term political and security concerns.
The Benefits of a Bloody Nose
A bloody nose strike, however, is something that conceivably could straddle both options — military action and enhanced containment. According to this idea, Washington needs to demonstrate its clear and unwavering willingness to use military means to achieve its goal to convince the North Koreans of the seriousness of the U.S. position on nuclear proliferation. This does not negate dialogue or containment; instead, it's a way to ensure North Korea is not misreading U.S. signals — either willfully or inadvertently. For nearly three decades, Pyongyang and Washington have engaged in an on-again, off-again standoff over North Korea's nuclear and missile programs.
But Pyongyang has crossed several "red lines" by launching satellites, testing intermediate and long-range missiles and conducting six underground nuclear tests. It is clear that North Korea's leadership questions the U.S. willingness to use force to stop the nuclear weapons program, and Pyongyang continues to see the program, at least in part, as a means of ensuring Washington never overcomes its reticence to pursue another Korean War. Unlike Syria, Libya or Iraq, North Korea has pursued weapons of mass destruction for decades, and the international community has offered only stern words and imposed limited (until recently) economic constraints in response.
To U.S. proponents of the bloody nose strategy, Pyongyang has dealt Uncle Sam a black eye by undermining Washington's credibility.
U.S. proponents of the bloody nose strategy often cite Pyongyang's continuing WMD program as proof of the weakness and ineffectiveness of U.S. policy toward North Korea. To them, Pyongyang has dealt Uncle Sam a black eye by undermining Washington's credibility internationally, brushing off U.S. threats and cajoling and, in the process, proving that the United States is weaker than it tries to appear. In addition to repaying a black eye with a bloody nose, advocates of a limited strike against North Korea's missile and nuclear infrastructure argue that Kim Jong Un and the rest of North Korea's leaders are rational actors who know they could never win a war against the United States, ensuring that any U.S. strike would, at a bare minimum, force the North Korean government to cease its missile and nuclear tests. In the best-case scenario, proponents suggest a limited strike would so shock the North Korean elite that they would rebel against Kim to save their own skins or that it would persuade China to take physical action to effect "regime modification" and halt the North's confrontational attitude out of fears of unmanageable conflict and destabilization on the Korean Peninsula.
Opponents, however, posit that such a strike is just as likely to trigger an all-out war on the peninsula as it is to persuade the North to retreat from its confrontation with the United States. North Korea is a small country surrounded by larger powers, and much of Pyongyang's defensive posture lies in a combination of striking first before falling back into the mountains to try and outlast the larger opponent. A strike against a North Korean missile or nuclear facility, for example, could convince the North that it must strike out with all available systems to disrupt any U.S. facilities and logistics to complicate any further U.S. action. Even in the absence of a full escalation, North Korea may feel compelled to respond to a limited U.S. strike with similar action to re-establish a sense of deterrence. As a result, tit-for-tat responses to aggression could precipitate a larger conflict. In either case, the North could respond to a limited strike by firing at U.S. bases in South Korea, the port infrastructure in Pusan (from which the United States would likely bring additional materiel into Korea) or even Japan, Guam and Hawaii.
Grappling With the Unknown Unknowns
Perhaps more than in other cases, the problem is that it is nearly impossible to accurately intuit the North's likely response, although expecting North Korea to act as a "responsible" nuclear weapons state is equally difficult. Repurposing former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's maxims for a new conflict, there are perhaps even more unknown unknowns in North Korea than there are known unknowns. This situation heightens the risks of any course of action — as well as inaction. Known unknowns include the quantity, range and accuracy of the North Korean missiles (even though some of these are known knowns). Other known unknowns include the hierarchy of authority to use tactical and strategic systems (and it remains unclear whether a so-called decapitation strike that kills or disrupts the leadership would automatically trigger a military response instead of dissuading one). Regardless of a possible U.S. strike, the known unknowns certainly also apply to the assumption of North Korean leaders' rationality — and just what form of rationality that is.
Unknown unknowns are, by their very nature, unquantifiable. They may relate to apparently known assumptions or questions but they rest on faulty or outdated logic, as well as on intentional or natural misinterpretations and misunderstandings. There may be aspects of North Korea's internal leadership organization, flow of information and intent that few have explored, largely because of the paucity of knowledge of the North Korean government's inner workings. And then there are the assumptions regarding the relation between the North Korean people and their leadership, between the military commanders and the forces, and, more concretely, between the basic elements of production and consumption. For decades, the United States has grounded its core North Korea policy on the idea that the regime is on the brink of collapse. This may have been wishful thinking or completely inaccurate — or maybe the country really is a mere accident away from complete implosion.
Repurposing former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's maxims for a new conflict, there are perhaps even more unknown unknowns in North Korea than there are known unknowns.
North Korea has been a notoriously difficult intelligence target because of linguistic difference, the closed system that limits operatives' ability to hide in plain sight, the outdated communications system and infrastructure, as well as the intentional misinformation campaigns often propagated by South Korea, China, Japan, Russia or the United States. Near-term intelligence assessments on the pace of North Korea's nuclear and missile programs, for example, proved woefully insufficient until very recently (and may now risk swinging too far in the opposite direction). There are also many questions about the future of North Korea's relations with China, its economic activities and its ability to provide domestic services. It is, quite simply, a tall order to gather meaningful intelligence about the North, leaving many unknown unknowns to accompany the known unknowns.
All this brings us back to the debate over whether to deal North Korea a bloody nose. One could make the case that a North Korean leadership acting rationally could respond to a bloodied nose with two diametrically opposed reactions: It could reasonably seek conciliation or it could reasonably put all hands on deck in preparation for a major war. Each has its own logic, and it may be that even Kim doesn't know which way he would sway if push came to shove. But inaction is just as clearly problematic. Economic sanctions and political isolation appear to have little coercive effect on Pyongyang. In fact, they may even be reinforcing the perception that the leadership must swiftly complete the nuclear and missile programs — and even demonstrate their capacity in a live-fire test over the Pacific. There are reports that some members of the elite are feeling the pain of sanctions, but it is unclear whether they have the intent or capability to alter the regime's course, particularly as North Korea is so close to achieving the technical aspects of its goals after so many sacrifices.
If the United States conducts a targeted strike against some aspect of North Korea's nuclear or missile infrastructure (and even some Chinese scholars and strategists have advocated such a move) and the strike triggers a change in behavior — if not regime — in North Korea, it not only would lead to a more stable situation in Northeast Asia, but also remind the rest of the world of the United States' intent to stem nuclear proliferation and willingness to take risks to counter challenges. Even if the North doesn't come to the negotiating table, a demonstration of military action would further reinforce Washington's containment strategy against Pyongyang. The minimum cost of miscalculation in such action, however, is war on the Korean Peninsula — if not a larger conflagration that would draw in Japan, China and Russia, disrupt the global technology supply chain, result in mass casualties and damage much infrastructure. Few models of a new Korean War offer anything less than major destruction and death, even if the United States ultimately emerges victorious.
The Cost of Inaction
But the cost of inaction is not trivial. If North Korea completes and demonstrates its nuclear missile program, it would seriously undermine the reliability of the United States in halting proliferation, perhaps encouraging others, whether opponents or allies, to race down the nuclear path themselves. Even if there isn't a nuclear domino effect, trust in U.S. assurances may diminish rapidly, weakening the United States' security posture. In addition, North Korea is not merely pursuing nuclear weapons to secure the government from U.S. military action; it is doing so to exploit such a situation to shift the strategic calculation in South Korea. Pyongyang has made no secret of the fact that it considers its nuclear capability the precondition to reshaping the overall security situation in Northeast Asia and ultimately undermining the U.S. alliance structure. A North Korea with nuclear arms may not lash out with such weapons, but it could feel more confident using conventional weapons against South Korea to demonstrate Washington's unwillingness to back its allies through thick and thin.
In the end, the question of a bloody nose strike is not so simple. U.S. credibility is on the line, and that credibility is the backbone of Washington's global security posture. After all, despite its military might, the United States is outnumbered no matter where it goes. If the willingness of others to host U.S. forces and be the first line of defense begins to wane, the United States ultimately may find itself forced to retreat all the way to its own coasts. That is, of course, a rather far reach from the current North Korean standoff, but in strategic terms (and looking at past global powers) it is not an unreasonable fear. The debate now is whether to give North Korea a bloody nose in return for the black eye it has given the United States, or whether Pyongyang can simply be bottled up — even if it is too great a nuisance for any powers, China included. Because after all, Beijing is sporting a bit of a shiner from the North too.
-
second post:
The Political Games at the 2018 Winter Olympics
After years of preparation in South Korea, the Pyeongchang Olympics will open Feb. 9 in the mountainous northeast. But the crisis of the past year driven by North Korea's nuclear weapons program — and an unexpected outreach from leader Kim Jong Un — has added an element of geopolitical drama to the world's premier winter sporting festival. The XXIII Winter Olympiad will draw thousands of athletes and spectators to the Alpensia Resort in Pyeongchang county and to the nearby coastal town of Gangneung during Feb. 9-25. It will be followed by the Paralympic Games at the same venues during March 9-18. Beyond the pause in exchanges of hostile rhetoric between North Korea and the United States, the games themselves do not hold geopolitical relevance. Instead, what matters in that realm will come after the Olympic torch is extinguished, gauged by the North Korean reaction to the resumption of joint drills by the U.S. and South Korean militaries. Although it appears that the goodwill may last throughout the competition, events throughout the games could offer signs of what is to come.
Cracks in Inter-Korean Outreach
Although the Olympic teams of both Koreas will march as one in the opening ceremony and athletes from both will compete together on the women's ice hockey team, this bilateral goodwill can only go so far to change the broader picture. It is the U.S.-North Korean dynamic that will decide how the crisis plays out from there. The South is caught between the contradictory strategies of these two powers and will navigate between them. Watch for attempts at progress in South Korean President Moon Jae In's outreach to North Korea outside narrow Olympics-related issues, particularly during potential meetings with North Korean No. 2 Kim Yong Nam, who is attending the games.
The North is hoping that it can open up a hole in sanctions, attract South Korean tourists (not specifically banned by any resolutions and a key source of potential currency) and even reopen the joint Kaesong industrial complex. U.S. pressure will keep such openings narrow, but the efforts bear monitoring. South Korea will also make every effort to get U.S. and North Korean representatives to hold some sort of talks or consultation. The U.S. administration has left this possibility deliberately ambiguous. And a test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in California on Feb. 5 was canceled reportedly in deference to the Pyeongchang Games — a possible signal of an open door. However, the current U.S. and North Korean postures will make such a meeting difficult, and in the long term, their interests are incompatible, leaving little room for progress.
Throughout the games, North Korea will likely try to further goad the South by emphasizing its willingness to walk away from the detente. It will use sudden switches and cancellations to express its displeasure at any sign that South Korea may follow a path that goes against the North's narrative or goals. It will also issue more warnings that U.S.-South Korea military exercises after the games will provoke a reaction. The games will also bring South Korean domestic acrimony about the North Korean rapprochement, particularly in the form of protests by the opposition right wing. Similar protests in January earned a stern rebuke in North Korean media and led to the cancellation of goodwill events between the North and South at North Korea's Mount Kumgang. Concretely, however, such protests will not necessarily change Moon's calculation about the warming of ties — because they come from the opposition, and besides some minor local races in June, Moon's party faces no imminent elections.
North Korea is, in part, using the Olympics detente, initiated when the North accepted the long-standing outreach from the South, to buy time.
North Korea Shaping the Narrative
North Korea is, in part, using the Olympics detente, initiated when the North accepted the long-standing outreach from the South, to buy time. The government in Pyongyang is framing a narrative that presents it as the good-faith actor in reaching out, giving it the ground to snap back after the games by portraying Washington as acting in bad faith. This dynamic plays into Chinese and Russian narratives that U.S. aggression is the only thing pushing North Korea toward hazardous, disruptive action. Because the North needs to continue weapons testing to prove its nuclear deterrent, such narratives can provide some cover for its erstwhile defenders in the United Nations. As such, North Korea is unlikely to engage in any tests or overt "provocations" during the games, but a military parade on Feb. 8 gave it a chance to display components of its "state nuclear force" to its people in a show of its newest ICBMs. Such displays would not jeopardize the games but will be a way to emphasize its strength and perhaps imply it has achieved its deterrent without engaging in tests that risk provoking U.S. ire (and potentially triggering a limited strike).
The U.S. Presents Its Side of the Story
U.S. Vice President Mike Pence will travel to Pyongchang and will likely make remarks amplifying U.S. pressure. The White House has already made it clear that it views North Korean outreach as an attempt to "hijack" the narrative of the Olympic Games for its own gain. President Donald Trump's State of the Union address was crafted to counter this narrative, condemning North Korea's treatment of its civilians and outlining its threat to the United States. At the same time, leaks emphasized that the administration continued to consider launching a so-called "bloody nose" punitive strike on the North, with a continued de-emphasis on dialogue and the announcement of fresh sanctions. In a symbolic rebuke of Pyongyang, Pence will be accompanied to South Korea by the father of Otto Warmbier, the U.S. student who died in June 2017 shortly after being released from a North Korean prison. And, most important, watch for any signs that the United States and South Korea have settled on a date for their post-Olympics military drills.
The U.S. Military Buildup Continues
The United States has been careful to shape perceptions of the current rapprochement in terms of U.S. pressure, citing it as the compelling force bringing North Korea to any sort of cooperative outreach. Watch for high-profile interdictions of goods bound for North Korea and the shaming of North Korean suppliers. As part of this broader pressure front, and monthslong efforts to beef up options for military action, monitor the movement of U.S. carriers into the region. The USS Carl Vinson is already in the Western Pacific in the vicinity of the South China Sea. Another carrier, the USS Ronald Reagan, is stationed in its Japanese home port, and North Korea has accused the United States of planning to send the USS John Stennis as well, although on the eve of the games, it was still in port at its Kitsap base in Washington.
Regardless of what takes place between the opening of the Olympics and the end of the Paralympics, the next phase of the Korean crisis will likely unfold with joint U.S.-South Korean military drills and a resumption of North Korean weapons tests as Pyongyang takes the final steps toward its nuclear deterrent. And as both sides pursue their mutually incompatible goals, it will leave little room for cooperation.
-
https://www.dailywire.com/news/27017/walsh-north-korea-matt-walsh
-
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5393069/Australian-Kim-Jong-impersonator-Seoul-Winter-Olympics.html
-
Good for him!
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/456429/north-korean-nuclear-standoff-america-has-upper-hand&hl=en&geo=US?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=180215_Jolt&utm_term=Jolt
-
Victor Davis Hanson makes a number of good points here. He argues that we now have the upper hand, that time is on our side and that the US should use the 5 advantages we have right now (below) and not strike NK in desperation.
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/456429/north-korean-nuclear-standoff-america-has-upper-hand
[Hanson] "Bombing the North Koreans [now] ... would be an act of desperation, not an act of confidence."
"The world may not recognize it, but the U.S. is slowly winning."
[5 reasons the US has the upper hand right now:]
1. Japan, South Korea, and the United States are rushing to expand several missile-defense systems that may soon not just end North Korea’s first-strike capability, but China’s as well.
2. There is serious talk in Japan about developing nuclear weapons. Obviously, Japanese missiles would be pointed at North Korea and China, not the United States. The world has assumed over the last 20 years that unstable regimes such as North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan would go nuclear and threaten Western democracies. The next round of proliferation is more likely to be among Western democracies themselves. A nuclear Japan (or South Korea or Taiwan) would not be in China’s interest.
3. There is evidence that tough new sanctions are eroding an already anemic North Korea. The U.S. economy is booming; North Korea’s is collapsing. China already is preparing for a flood of refugees across the Chinese–North Korean border.
4. The United States has an array of ways to ratchet up pressure on China to force North Korea to denuclearize — ranging from tougher trade sanctions to denying visas to thousands of Chinese students and property holders.
5. Donald Trump’s approval ratings are up somewhat. And with an improving economy, the Trump administration is gaining clout at home and abroad. On foreign matters, Trump is letting subordinates such as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, Secretary of Defense James Mattis, National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster, Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, and CIA director Mike Pompeo do the talking. And they are lining up the world against North Korea.
-
Thank you for fleshing out the content of the prior post :wink:
-
https://www.military.com/daily-news/2018/02/18/fort-shafter-developing-evacuation-plan-americans-south-korea.html
-
By George Friedman
Korea After the Olympics
South Korea wants to avoid a war, but reconciliation with the North is no panacea either.
The Pyeongchang Olympics are nearly over, which means the focus will soon return to the North Korean nuclear program. Somewhere along the way, the nuclear program went from being a crisis, likely to precipitate war at any moment, to being an issue of concern. There are thousands of issues around the world that governments are unhappy or uneasy about, but few rise to the level of garnering anything beyond public statements. Plenty of statements about the North’s nukes are still to come, but the sense now is that the core issue is settled and all that’s left is to define how the new reality works.
The Backdrop
Let’s begin by considering the geopolitical imperatives of the relevant actors.
North Korea, like all countries, values its own preservation above all else. Next, it wants to unify the Korean Peninsula under its control, or at least get as close to that as it can. North Korea faces a series of threats. One is the United States, which is determined to block the North from dominating the peninsula. Japan feels the same. Russia and China are ostensibly on the opposing side, but Russia and China do not have many interests in common with North Korea except when it comes to frustrating or repelling the United States. The only reason either Russia or China would support the North’s ambitions would be to undermine the U.S. position in the Northwest Pacific. They will risk little but gladly reap the rewards.
(click to enlarge)
South Korea’s imperative is to uphold its status as a leading industrial and technical power. It has no desire to see Pyongyang fall because underwriting the cost of North Korea’s reconstruction could cripple the South’s economy. Nor does it want a recurrence of the 1950-53 war, which is just another threat to its economic position. Seoul wants to have U.S. guarantees to deter North Korean adventurism, but it doesn’t want Washington to push too far and start a war.
The United States has an imperative to prevent North Korea from obtaining weapons that could strike the U.S. mainland. Washington also has an imperative to defend its position as the dominant air and naval power in the Northwest Pacific in order to contain China and Russia. U.S. bases in South Korea, as well as in Japan, are critical to this effort.
Japan’s imperative is to protect the homeland from nuclear strikes and maintain its maritime access to raw materials and markets. It also needs to prevent the emergence of a unified Korea, which would be a potential rival, forcing Japan to significantly rearm its military – possibly even to develop nuclear weapons if the new Korean state possessed nukes. Japan’s overriding interest is to have the United States defend it against North Korean attack and guarantee its maritime security.
(click to enlarge)
China’s overriding imperative is to gain control over the nearby seas. It is frightened by the prospect that the U.S. could blockade it, so excluding the U.S. from these areas – and from the Western Pacific altogether – would ensure that China has access to the global oceans for its trade. Beijing looks at events in the Korean Peninsula as potentially weakening the United States, and so it has no desire to try to resolve it – to varying degrees, every outcome is a win for China. If the U.S. strikes North Korea, China can portray the U.S. as an aggressor. If it doesn’t, it can portray the U.S. as weak. And if North and South Korea reach an agreement that limits the U.S. presence on the peninsula, or expels it completely, then China’s goals are met.
Russia has no overwhelming imperatives when it comes to the peninsula, save that anything that makes the U.S. appear weaker makes Russia look stronger.
The New Reality
The United States could tolerate North Korea’s nuclear program until it started approaching the point where it was a legitimate threat to the U.S. in early 2017. The U.S. was restrained, however, by South Korea’s imperative to avoid a war that would weaken the South’s economy. The U.S. turned to China to mediate an agreement, which of course failed.
With the United States’ threats drained of some legitimacy, North Korea could ease up. It slowed its effort to complete an intercontinental ballistic missile that could deliver a nuclear payload to the United States. Such a system would require extensive testing of both the missile and the nuclear weapons, and such tests cannot be hidden. So, at the moment, the North Koreans have not developed an ICBM that can threaten the United States, and they likely could not without showing their hand. This reduced the pressure on the United States to attack. Inadvertently, it also kept U.S.-South Korean relations intact, therefore not undermining the U.S. position in the region.
This also opened the door for North Korea to launch its diplomatic offensive, designed to draw the South into some sort of relationship that excluded the United States. It is hard to imagine what this would look like, but it would likely satisfy the South’s wish to avoid war and the North’s wish to diminish the U.S. presence on the peninsula. How the two Koreas could trust each other is of course a question, particularly when one is a nuclear power, but the alternative is hard for the South to accept – strikes against the North’s nuclear facilities triggering a massive artillery bombardment of Seoul and wrecking a great deal of the South’s economy.
The North has dangled the offer, and the South is intrigued. The U.S. can’t stand in the way without looking like a warmonger, but given that development of the North Korean nuclear and missile programs has apparently slowed, Washington has been willing to get out of the way. The issue will be whether the evolution of relations with the North will include an end to or radical modification of the U.S.-South Korea defense pact. Obviously, China would be delighted to assume responsibility for guaranteeing South Korea’s defense against the North, and it would likely be quite sincere. But then South Korea would face the prospect of its old enemy Japan rearming while the U.S. was searching for another country to anchor its strategy in the region. This would sow massive uncertainty, which South Korea doesn’t want.
Seoul will do almost anything to avoid a war, but the danger of an agreement with Pyongyang is that the South could find itself subordinate to the North. (South Korea is much wealthier and more developed, but North Korea has the nukes.) Since that is pretty much what the North wants, the question is what South Korea will do. In the long run, the risk of an agreement for South Korea is almost as great as the risk of war. There are too many unknowns for the South. And that means that this issue will likely become a crisis again before this is over.
-
By The Editorial Board
Feb. 27, 2018 7:05 p.m. ET
103 COMMENTS
Former Obama National Security Adviser Susan Rice and others who say the U.S. can live with a nuclear-armed North Korea cite deterrence and the North’s certain destruction if it attacks Americans. This is a convenient faith, but alas it ignores the threat of proliferation to other regimes or actors that might also use weapons of mass destruction against Americans.
This proliferation threat was in sharp relief Tuesday with leaks from a confidential United Nations report alleging that Pyongyang is circumventing trade and financial sanctions and plying its military wares and knowhow to dozens of nasty foreign customers, including Bashar Assad’s Syria.
The Journal’s Ian Talley reports that the North has shipped 50 tons of supplies to Syria, including “high-heat, acid-resistant tiles, stainless-steel pipes and valves,” likely for use in a chemical weapons plant. The report, written by the Panel of Experts that oversees North Korea’s compliance with U.N. resolutions, reveals more than 40 shipments between 2012 and 2017. It also claims Pyongyang sent weapons experts to Syria multiple times as recently as the past two years.
This would solve the mystery of how Assad obtained the sarin gas he used against his people in 2013 and again in 2017. The U.S. believes he is still using chlorine gas against civilians. In 2007 North Korea worked with Syria to build a nuclear-weapons facility at Al Kibar—until Israel destroyed it in a military raid, against the advice of George W. Bush and Condoleezza Rice.
The chemical-weapons news also underscores the porousness of U.N. sanctions as the North sells whatever it can for cash to keep its dictatorship afloat. If sanctions are going to stop North Korea, the U.S. and its allies will have to start boarding ships and commandeering aircraft believed to be carrying WMD material. North Korea will sell anything to any bad actor for a price.
Appeared in the February 28, 2018, print edition.
-
By George Friedman
Before the Pyeongchang Olympics began, there were fears that North Korea would do something provocative during the games. Instead, the opposite happened. North Korea still stole the show, but it did so by using the Olympics to signal its openness to reconciliation with South Korea. With the closing ceremony behind us, this will be the lasting significance of the 2018 games.
After the ceremony concluded, China’s special envoy to South Korea met with South Korean President Moon Jae-in. The usual diplomatic niceties were exchanged after the meeting, but given that the meeting took place at a critical moment for the region, we need to consider the major issue that was under discussion, which was obviously relations between North and South Korea.
The Olympics may simply have been an interregnum in the crisis over North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. Or it may represent a profound shift not only in relations between the two Koreas but also in the strategic realities of the region. The United States wants no such shift. Washington was unhappy with the Olympics diplomacy. The U.S. has no appetite for war with North Korea, but neither does it want reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula – unless it’s on Washington’s terms. It’s Seoul, though, that would be literally staring down the barrel should war break out. And so, Seoul opened its own dialogue with Pyongyang, separate from any U.S.-North Korean discussion that may have been underway.
Meanwhile, China does want a strategic shift on the peninsula. One of China’s major problems is that it does not control the waters off its east coast. The U.S. Navy’s presence is more than a challenge to the Chinese navy – it’s a challenge to China’s survival. As important, the formal and informal alliance system the U.S. has created – from Singapore to Indonesia to Taiwan to South Korea and Japan – represents a line of containment that China needs to break. If the events of the Olympics lead to a breach in U.S.-South Korean relations, they are of great importance to the Chinese.
(click to enlarge)
When the North Korea crisis began, there was a broadly held, erroneous assumption that China was as alarmed by North Korea’s behavior as the United States was, and therefore that it would serve as both a negotiator and a source of pressure. In fact, the Chinese were quite pleased to see North Korea back the U.S. into a corner. If the U.S. attacked, it would be seen as an aggressor and would be blamed for all collateral damage. If the U.S. refused to attack, it could be portrayed as weak and unable to stand up to North Korea. Either result would benefit China, at little or no cost.
The North Koreans were aware that the Chinese regarded North Korea as expendable. Their relationship with China has always been shaped by the Korean War, in which China did not get involved until its own borders were threatened, quite willing to accept the destruction of the North Korean state. Even had China wished to be an honest broker, history makes China suspect in North Korea’s eyes.
By creating a situation in which any hostile U.S. action included the potential devastation of Seoul, the North Koreans drove a wedge between the two allies. They forced South Korea to take steps that took away the initiative from the U.S. and, frankly, they forced it to prepare for a nuclear North Korea. The North then used the Olympics as its chance to step into the space it had created between the U.S. and South Korea. What happens next is the question. South Korea would obviously like to maintain its relationship with the U.S. while building a relationship with North Korea. North Korea, however, has no reason to go along with that.
From North Korea’s standpoint, its greatest strategic weakness is its economy. If it released the controls, the economy might surge, but then the regime might also be at risk. South Korea, on the other hand, is a vast economic success. Its primary interest is retaining that economic success, which means avoiding war. Before North Korea’s recent evolution, the U.S. guaranteed the South’s security and economic success. Now, the U.S. threatens it.
Given the situation, some sort of entente, or even confederation, is conceivable. Each side would retain its own regime, but the economic benefits of South Korea would help buttress the North Korean regime rather than threaten it. From the South’s point of view, this wouldn’t be the worst outcome. The South’s economy would be secure, and war would be avoided. From the North’s point of view, it might complicate regime preservation, or it might guarantee it, but either way Pyongyang would have control over relations with Seoul.
The complexities of such an arrangement would be enormous, yet the basic concept is simple. And it’s a concept that worries the United States and delights China. It would likely mean the end of the U.S.-South Korean defense relationship. That would be a risk South Korea would have to take, but at the moment, it’s the relationship itself that makes the situation perilous. The South may consider it. In that case, the U.S. position in the northern waters near China would weaken, and a crack would open in the containment structure. Japan would have to deal with this strange compound Korea, which would divert its attention away from China as well.
If this is what China is hoping for, then the Chinese special envoy’s visit to South Korea is the logical step. There is little to discuss with North Korea. But China would certainly like to see defense relations between the U.S. and South Korea broken, as much as North Korea would. For this, China might be willing to sweeten the deal for South Korea by making special rules for the access of South Korean goods to China possible, or offering other economic incentives that would induce South Korea in some way. With the Olympics over and the Koreas at a bit of a loss for what to do next, this is where China will want to be particularly helpful. And it’s where the U.S. has to consider the possible consequences of staying on its present course.
-
South Korea: Two recently appointed South Korean special envoys answerable directly to the South Korean president attended a dinner hosted by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Pyongyang on March 5. This is the first time Kim has met with officials from South Korea, and it suggests the offer made during the Winter Olympics for some kind of reconciliation was genuine. The envoys will stay another day before heading home. Then they reportedly will fly to the United States to brief Washington on the situation and discuss the next steps.
-
North Korea: Two South Korean envoys returned from a two-day visit to Pyongyang with news that North Korea has agreed to freeze nuclear and missile tests while dialogue between the two countries continues. They also said Pyongyang expressed a willingness to denuclearize if North Korea’s safety could be guaranteed. North Korea reportedly “understood” why South Korea needed to go ahead with military exercises with the United States. Japan has reacted to this story with consternation and the U.S. with caution. The envoys are due to visit Washington soon. This is a major shift in North Korea’s posture. Can North Korea achieve regime survival and unification at the same time?
=======================
Stratfor:
Highlights
North Korea will continue to use inter-Korean dialogue to break out of the constraints of the U.S. relationship.
But Pyongyang's apparent outreach to the United States could be contingent on changes to U.S. forces in the Korean Peninsula — concessions the United States is unlikely to give.
While China and Russia will push for a continued easing of tensions, U.S. ally Japan will be wary of a sudden shift in the U.S. position.
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un has set late April as the date for the third inter-Korean summit, to be held in Panmunjom. Kim said he would be willing to hold talks with the United States geared toward normalization of relations and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and is willing to suspend nuclear and ballistic missile tests while engaged in dialogue. Kim said denuclearization was his father's dying wish, and something for which he also strived.
The Big Picture
Stratfor's 2018 Annual Forecast said that the United States will work to renew the resolve of its regional allies South Korea and Japan against North Korea. Pyongyang's outreach to Seoul is meant to try to break this resolve in hopes of easing U.S.-led pressure. However, the United States is still very much the deciding factor in this dynamic.
This is not the first time North Korea has used a near brink-of-war moment to try and break out of the constraints of its contentious relationship with the United States. The North used the 1993-94 nuclear crisis to obtain the Agreed Framework, and there were plans for the first inter-Korean summit before Kim Il Sung died that summer. After the North's 1998 attempted satellite launch, which overflew Japan, the North ultimately pressed for a diplomatic breakout, hosting then South Korean President Kim Dae Jung in the first inter-Korean summit and significantly expanding diplomatic relations around the world. The North's first nuclear test in 2006 led to a brief breakout and the second inter-Korean summit in 2007. In each case, the North used the crises to find a way to expand its operational space, to ease sanctions and to change the dynamic around the Peninsula, even if only briefly.
It is important to understand just what North Korea is and is not saying. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not merely about the removal of North Korea's nuclear potential. It is also about the U.S. force structure in the Peninsula, and potentially even the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea. Kim said the removal of the North's nuclear weapons would be contingent on the guaranteed safety of his government and the removal of threats against the North — but the North frequently refers to the U.S. military forces in the South as being a threat against the North. The suspension of missile and nuclear tests may not include shorter range systems (the North debuted what appeared to be variants of the Iskander missile system at its most recent military parade, but hasn't yet tested these systems), and it also may not include satellite launches, something North Korea claims it has the international right to carry out.
Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is not merely about the removal of North Korea's nuclear potential. It is also about the U.S. force structure in the Peninsula.
What the North has done is place the United States in a situation where it must make the next move. The South has already agreed to the summit, and there are unconfirmed reports that the South also told the North that the April joint military exercises with the United States would still happen. But Washington will have to see if it is ready to re-enter dialogue with the North. So far, the official U.S. conditions were that talks must be about denuclearization of the North, and that the North would need to show its sincerity through the suspension of nuclear and missile tests. Pyongyang has offered each of these conditions. But Washington was waiting to engage in dialogue until North Korea was in much worse shape from sanctions and isolation. U.S. President Donald Trump's administration does not want another round of dialogue that leads simply to another delay, that leaves the North's weapons program largely intact, and pushes any resolution — or conflict — farther down the road rather than resolving the problem now.
North Korea has set the stage for a U.S. response. The South will strongly push for the dialogue to carry on, and for the inter-Korean tensions to ease so Seoul can focus on its domestic economic troubles. China and Russia will come out and demand the United States respond in the affirmative. Washington has been adamant that it wants to pursue a maximum pressure campaign, and has rolled in its key allies, including Japan, which will be wary of any sudden shift in the U.S. position. If the United States re-engages now, it risks a repeat of past efforts. If it fails to engage, it risks undermining the relationship with South Korea and a shift in international cooperation for the continued containment strategy. Like his father and his grandfather before him, Kim Jong Un has proven — at least for the moment — to be adept at reading the international situation, and is making the effort to exploit these differences to gain time and space. The next move will be from Washington.
-
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/377642-white-house-north-korea-must-take-steps-before-trump-kim-meeting?userid=188403
-
The WSJ seems to think that President Trump and the US have no additional options to up the pressure as part of negotiations e.g. really hitting all Chinese companies, naval blockade , , , That said, this piece is not stupid.
============================
The Trump-Kim Summit
The President is giving recognition before any nuclear concessions.
By The Editorial Board
March 9, 2018 5:59 p.m. ET
310 COMMENTS
A diplomatic breakthrough is easy when you offer the other side what it wants. And Donald Trump on Thursday gave North Korea something it has long craved: a summit with a sitting U.S. President. Perhaps this will be the start of a stunning nuclear disarmament, but it could also end up in a strategic defeat for the United States and world order.
Mr. Trump doesn’t do normal diplomacy, and this leap to a face-to-face meeting had his impulsive trademarks: spur of the moment in response to a Kim Jong Un offer relayed through South Korean mediators; no vetting with his senior advisers or as far as we can tell our Japanese allies; and no pre-planning. What could go wrong?
Mr. Trump tweeted Thursday that “sanctions will remain until an agreement is reached,” which is somewhat reassuring. But like his predecessors, he is giving the Kim regime a substantial reward before it takes verifiable steps toward denuclearization. Even a brief meeting will boost North Korea’s claim to be a nuclear power that must be given respect and recognition. In return, Kim appears to have given nothing other than the promise not to test his weapons in the interim. He can resume those tests at any time.
Mr. Trump can claim credit for putting the diplomatic and sanctions screws on North Korea to a greater extent than any previous President. And it’s possible that pressure may have hurt the North Korean economy enough that Kim chose this moment to change tack. (The Trump critics who claimed he was trying to blow up the world but now say he’s leaping too fast to diplomacy are especially amusing to watch. They wouldn’t give him credit if Kim disarmed entirely.)
But it’s also possible, and perhaps more likely, that Kim is seizing the opportunity to weaken the U.S.-South Korea alliance after the South’s President Moon Jae-in broke ranks with the U.S. and took a softer line on the North. There is no reason to think that North Korea has changed its long-term goals of becoming a recognized nuclear power, expelling U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula and conquering South Korea.
These aims might seem unrealistic, but they are core precepts of the North’s ideology. Kim Jong Un, who took power in 2011 after the death of his father, cannot easily discard them without risking his own legitimacy.
Kim is probably borrowing from his father’s playbook and will use negotiations about nuclear weapons to further those goals. His nuclear and missile scientists will use the pause in testing to consolidate their progress, while North Korean diplomats demand the U.S. sign a formal peace treaty to end the Korean War and withdraw its forces from the South.
That is unacceptable to the U.S. and South Korea because, even without nuclear weapons, the North’s conventional military could do massive damage to Seoul. So will the U.S. offer other sweeteners instead, such as an early relaxation of sanctions? China and Russia, which on Friday expressed support for the summit, will no doubt push the U.S. to allow their trade with the North to resume.
This is the real danger of a summit. It raises expectations so high that the Trump Administration will be tempted to take the advice of career American diplomats who believe the U.S. should accept the North as a nuclear power. They believe the U.S. can then “manage the problem” through a combination of deterrence and appeasement.
The global media circus—and it will be a show for the ages—will also play to Mr. Trump’s self-image as a master negotiator. If he walks away from a summit with nothing, the media will call the exercise a failure and blame him.
All of which makes this summit a walk on the wild side that has more risks of failure for Mr. Trump and the U.S. than for Kim. High-level meetings are appropriate when the North offers specific proposals for denuclearization in lower-level negotiations. That isn’t likely to happen until the country’s economy is on its knees and Kim faces internal threats to his rule. If Mr. Trump goes through with this diplomatic nuclear theater, he’d better be prepared to walk away if Kim does what North Korea has always done before.
-
First, must start with the admission that all conservatives including me thought Obama was naive, stupid and wrong in 2008 to say he would meet with the mullahs in Iran. A US Presidential summit elevates the standing of tyrants in their own countries.
This is different, why? Because it is Trump, for one thing. You can take that two ways. To a liberal and their view of the other leaders, you are only elevating the tyrant to the level of Trump, not to the level of a US President. In NK it might be seen as elevating Trump to the level of Kim.
On the other side of this, Trump has earned the right to communicate with NK any way he wants because he is the only person in the world in the last 3 decades to get their attention.
From the previous post, WSJ: "This is the real danger of a summit. It raises expectations so high..."
No it doesn't. Everyone except Trump has already accepted that 1) NK is nuclear, 2) the US and the world isn't going to do anything about it, 3) the global policy of non-proliferation is dead and all major actors now need nukes, and 4) NK's main industry will be the export of weapons and technology to rogue nations.
Danger lies in the policy of doing nothing, which was everyone but Trump's answer to the crisis, what crisis?
Talks are a way of crossing off the idea that this could be solved with talks.
The next step is to announce the date and location. Since the theme is to break rules, Trump should insist that the meeting take place in Taiwan and the US will graciously provide the security. Give China until May to disarm NK and we will cancel the Taipei Summit.
Trump can combine this photo-op with a nuclear technology transfer and sale summit with allies Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Singapore, etc. if China is fine with everyone having their allies nuclear armed. He can also announce a site search in Taiwan for a new US Embassy while he's there.
One more idea, strike the nuclear sites and palaces while Un is arriving at the summit and negotiate from a position of strength.
-
The difference is that Obama was a pussy, perennially being grabbed by the pussy and Trump has the Norks surrounded by various aircraft carrier groups and squeezed by ever tightening sanctions.
-
The difference is that Obama was a pussy, perennially being grabbed by the pussy and Trump has the Norks surrounded by various aircraft carrier groups and squeezed by ever tightening sanctions.
Are there many people out there who think they got over on Trump in any sort of deal?
-
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/27/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear.html
-
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-ready-to-discuss-denuclearization-u-s-officials-say-1523213724
-
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2018/04/north-and-south-korea-to-officially-end-war-after-65-years-new-report-says/?utm_source=ktp&utm_campaign=alt&utm_medium=facebook
-
After decades of lamenting the Korean Peninsula's division, South Koreans increasingly regard reunification as unnecessary and undesirable.
The split between North and South Korea along the 38th parallel, though seemingly arbitrary, follows approximately the same border that divided the peninsula's northern and southern kingdoms in antiquity.
The division reflects the reality of contemporary geopolitics, which suggests that if reunification does happen, it will more likely occur under Beijing's wing than under Washington's.
============================
According to legend, a gaggle of junior young men from the U.S. Army and State Department divided Korea, armed with nothing more than a pencil and a wall map from National Geographic magazine. The day after the atomic bombing of Nagasaki, with Japan's surrender imminent, they got abrupt orders to split the Korean Peninsula into Soviet and American administrative zones until elections could be held for a new national government. For lack of a better idea, they simply drew a line along the 38th parallel.
Elections took place on either side of the line in the summer of 1948, but they produced two separate governments. That August, on the third anniversary of Japan's surrender, Gen. Douglas MacArthur told South Korea's National Assembly that "an artificial barrier has divided your land. This barrier must and shall be torn down." Yet 70 years on, the border has not budged. MacArthur's position officially remains the default assumption; Koreans from North and South alike regularly talk of minjok, their shared kinship. A "Basic Agreement" signed in Pyongyang and Seoul in 1991 defined Korea not as two separate states but as one going through a "special interim." The same year, a joint Korean team competed in the World Table Tennis Championships under a new national flag. The "June 15th North-South Joint Declaration" in 2000 spoke of "the noble will of the entire people who yearn for the peaceful reunification of the nation," and Jeong Se Hyun, South Korea's minister of unification between 2002 and 2006 and the engineer of the "Sunshine Policy" of North-South rapprochement, continues to insist that the "national division was a tragedy."
Today, the situation on the Korean Peninsula is much the same, despite the combined Korean women's hockey team that entered the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics this year under the united Korean flag. The only thing that seems to have changed is that now South Koreans are increasingly concluding that national division is anything but a tragedy. According to polls conducted by the Korea Institute for National Unification, the 69 percent of South Koreans who favored reunification in 2014 has shrunk to 58 percent this year, and fully 72 percent of South Koreans in their 20s now feel that reunification is unnecessary.
After the Pyeongchang Games ended, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un issued a call to "write a new history" of the peninsula's unification. I doubt that this column is what he had in mind, but a look at Korea's history over the long term does cast fresh light on its divisions — and seems to suggest that South Koreans know what they are talking about. The North-South divide is not, in fact, an artificial and interim arrangement. Rather, North-South divides have characterized Korea for most of the last 6,000 years. Geopolitics has always answered the questions of whether and where the Korean Peninsula would be divided.
An Early Lead for the North
Most of Korea's history has unfolded in China's shadow. Whenever China was dominant, the peninsula's center of gravity lay in the North, while the South — to varying degrees — formed an underdeveloped periphery. Only during the last six centuries, when Japan's gravitational force often rivaled that of China, was the peninsula pulled southward. The shift tended to erode the North's lead in development over the South between 1400 and 1900. But it wasn't until the mid-1970s that an unprecedented gap began to open between a developed South Korea and a backward North Korea. And in the 21st century, China's rising wealth and power are drawing South Korea back toward it, with profound effects on the peninsula's division. No one knows where matters will stand 20 or 30 years from now. Of one thing we can be certain, though: There is no sense in which either a unified Korea or a peninsula centered South of the Han River is "natural."
Korea's early history was largely about finding ways to deal with what came its way from the bigger, more sophisticated worlds to its north and east. People in China's Yellow and Yangtze river valleys began domesticating rice and millet around 7500 B.C. and were giving up their mobile, foraging lifestyles to reside in permanent, settled villages by 5500 B.C. By contrast, rice didn't reach the Korean periphery until about 4400 B.C., and millet not until 3600 B.C. Even then, Koreans became farmers only slowly. Permanent villages started appearing in the North around 2000 B.C. and spread south of the Han River only after 1500 B.C., possibly thanks to Manchurian immigrants who also imported from China the first metal weapons and tools that Koreans had seen.
The biggest villages and richest graves remained in northern Korea, and Chinese texts tell us that by about 400 B.C., some sort of organized government was forming in the North. This state, Gojoseon — better known by the older transliteration of Chosun — had its capital at what is now Pyongyang. We know little about its archaeology, but it apparently fell to a Chinese kingdom called Yan, based around modern Beijing, only to break away in 195 B.C. under the leadership of a Chinese rebel before the Han Dynasty reconquered it and turned it into a cluster of provinces in 109 B.C. Throughout this back-and-forth, two facts dominate: Northern Korea was consistently richer, more populous and more developed than southern Korea, and it was in every way a Chinese satellite. Burials from Pyongyang, such as the sumptuous Soganni Tomb 212, are stuffed with Chinese silk, lacquer and jewelry that came from as far afield as Sichuan. Southern Korean tombs are not. Korea was as deeply divided 2,000 years ago as it is today. But in antiquity it was the North that was developed and the South that was backward.
Korea's early history was largely about finding ways to deal with what came its way from the bigger, more sophisticated worlds to its north and east.
In and out of China's Sphere of Influence
Northern Korea remained part of the Chinese cultural sphere even after the Han Dynasty fell in A.D. 220, but it managed to free itself from direct Chinese rule. The empire's former Korean provinces reconstituted themselves as the independent kingdom of Goguryeo. From its capital at Pyongyang, Goguryeo took over most of the peninsula and much of Manchuria, too, by the 470s, eventually posing such a threat that China's Sui Dynasty bankrupted itself to launch massive but unsuccessful invasions between 612 and 614. Goguryeo had arrived as a great power in East Asia.
Yet even in the kingdom's moment of glory, geopolitical shifts were overtaking the Pyongyang elite. In Japan, a new kingdom called Yamato unified most of the archipelago and opened itself to China, and southern Koreans grew rich trading with it. Copying the sophisticated ways of northern Korea, they formed their own states and rebelled against Pyongyang's rule. In 676, one of these new states — Silla, with its capital at Gyeongju in the far southeast — overthrew Goguryeo completely.
The South enjoyed a golden age in the eighth and ninth centuries, catching up quickly on the North's lead in development. Then as now, however, geopolitics was a delicate business. If Silla could exploit its central position cleverly, it could hold the balance of power between Japan and China. On the other hand, if it lost control, it might be crushed between these bigger states. This is precisely what happened in the early 10th century, when a breakaway northern state called Goryeo — from which the modern name "Korea" comes — allied itself with Japan. Sandwiched between two rivals, Silla abruptly collapsed.
Goryeo built a capital at Gaegyeong (traditionally transliterated as Kaesong), almost exactly halfway up Korea's west coast, just north of the modern Demilitarized Zone. The location was a good choice: Silla's success had left the peninsula more united and integrated than ever before, and a centrally located capital now made more sense than one at Pyongyang. Goryeo flourished after 1100, becoming famous for its lacquer and celadon pottery. Choe Yun Ui built the world's first printing press with movable type there, 200 years before Gutenberg's press in Europe, and Korean scientists carried out precocious experiments with gunpowder weapons.
But despite these triumphs, Goryeo's rulers had little more joy than Silla's leaders did at balancing China and Japan. Sometimes China was the scarier neighbor, and in 1271, Goryeo's Prince Wonjong formally submitted to Kublai Khan, the Mongol warlord who had become China's emperor. For the next 80 years, Korea once again paid tribute to the Chinese Empire, as it had done under the Han Dynasty more than a millennium earlier. This time, though, when the empire fell apart in the 1350s, Goryeo broke free — only to find itself immediately exposed to devastating raids from Japanese pirates. Gunpowder weapons eventually gave Korean fleets the edge, but Japan was beginning to matter more than China. When a coup overthrew Goryeo's King U in 1392, the new Joseon Dynasty recognized this reality by moving its capital south to Hanyang (modern-day Seoul), closer to where the action was.
Over the next 400 years, a unified Korean state ruled from Seoul worked out how to play China and Japan off each other. At the same time, a sense of Korean identity grew on the peninsula. Korean bureaucrats even abandoned the Chinese script in 1446 in favor of the native hangul alphabet. But the delicate balance broke down in 1592. Japan's chancellor, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, invaded Korea after uniting the Japanese archipelago, as a prelude to conquering China itself. Korea hung on only by renewing its tributary relationship with China.
When Hideyoshi died in 1598, his successors abandoned his aggressive policies, and as the 17th century wore on all three Northeast Asian powers accepted a regional equilibrium in which none tried to resolve its problems through violence. Each promoted internal unity and increasingly closed its borders. Korea probably was more unified and peaceful in the 18th century than ever before.
Shifting the Balance
How long this equilibrium could have lasted in the absence of external shocks is anyone's guess. As it was, however, the biggest geostrategic upheaval of all — the intrusion of the West — blew it apart in the 19th century. Though the three Northeast Asian countries each took measures to keep Western merchants and missionaries off their territory — Korea went furthest of all, earning the nickname "Hermit Kingdom" — Westerners turned to force in the mid-19th century. In 1840, Britain shot its way into China, and the United States opened Japan 14 years later by threatening to do the same. Korea held out the longest, sinking an American gunboat at Pyongyang and killing its crew in 1866. But the same year, a French force raided Ganghwa Island to punish Korea for massacring Christians. Recognizing the strategic importance of the island, which controlled access up the Han River to Seoul, Americans assaulted it again in 1871, killing hundreds of defenders for the loss of just three attackers. Japan, meanwhile, launched its own attack on Ganghwa in 1876, having responded to the arrival of U.S. forces with a crash modernization program. Unable to resist, Korea opened its ports to Japanese trade and admitted Americans too in 1882.
The biggest geostrategic upheaval of all — the intrusion of the West — blew Korea's equilibrium apart in the 19th century.
China made a last big push to keep Korea in its orbit in the 1880s, but Japan had already shifted the geostrategic balance too far. In 1894-95, Tokyo's modernized fleets and armies smashed those of Beijing, which had merely grafted a few Western steamboats and cannons onto their antiquated organizations. The resulting Treaty of Shimonoseki formally ended Korea's status as a vassal of Beijing. When Russia tried to step into China's shoes, Japan defeated it, too, in 1905. Japan turned Korea into a protectorate and then annexed it outright in 1910, submerging it into a colonial empire that grew to include Manchuria in 1931 and much of coastal China after 1937.
In the 1930s, Northeast Asia looked rather like what Hideyoshi had hoped for in the 1590s, with its center of gravity in Tokyo. Not even Japan's total defeat in 1945 entirely erased the pattern, thanks to Washington's eagerness to rebuild Japan as a bulwark against Soviet communism.
An Indelible Line
Dividing Korea along the 38th parallel ended a millennium of unity but was in a sense just the latest version of the geostrategic balance that emerged as early as 1400. Korea once again was caught between China and the rising force of Japan. The growing involvement of Russia and the United States since the late 19th century enlarged the stage on which Korea's story played out but did not change the fundamental fact that the peninsula's fate depends on the balance between the continental powers to its northeast and the maritime ones to its southwest. A division at the 38th parallel made a lot of sense during the Cold War, and North Korean leaders were right to worry after their Soviet patron's collapse in 1991 that the peninsula might be reunited on American terms. Had it not been for China's resurgence in the 1990s, that might very well have happened.
Looking at the long term suggests that the 20-something South Koreans who see no need for unification are right: The division of Korea — in roughly the same place as the North-South boundary in antiquity — reflects the reality of contemporary geopolitics. And that same reality suggests that if reunification does happen, it is more likely to be under Beijing's wing than under Washington's.
-
South China Morning Post is reliable, but they obviously have no access to the test site.
-----------------------------------------------
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2143171/north-koreas-nuclear-test-site-has-collapsed-and-may-be-why-kim-jong-un
North Korea’s nuclear test site has collapsed ... and that may be why Kim Jong-un suspended tests
The mountain’s collapse after a fifth blast last fall has led to the creation of a massive ‘chimney’ that could leak radioactive fallout into the air, researchers have found
PUBLISHED : Wednesday, 25 April, 2018, 2:51pm
The last five of Pyongyang’s six nuclear tests have all been carried out under Mount Mantap at the Punggye-ri nuclear test site in North Korea’s northwest.
One group of researchers found that the most recent blast tore open a hole in the mountain, which then collapsed upon itself. A second group concluded that the breakdown created a “chimney” that could allow radioactive fallout from the blast zone below to rise into the air.
-
This is something that should be easy to detect, yes?
-
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/north-korea-denuclearization-disarming-will-not-happen/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-04-25&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
I can't say I disagree that some are spiking the football too soon.
-
"Contrary to a lot of the White House talking points, Kim’s trial balloon about “denuclearizing” doesn’t mean he’s open to disarming. It’s 30-year-old jargon for getting America to abandon the South Koreans"
or the other way around - to drive a wedge between US and S Korea and get them to abandon the US.
I don't know if Trump could be flattered into falling for (likely) ruses but I know Bolton or Haley can't.
-
From the EMP thread on the SC&H forum:
Dr. Peter Fry LPSCrfp16-12.pdf
Dr Fry appeared on the Mark Levin show this past Sunday evening-- VERY much worth tracking down and watching (Would someone find it and post it on the EMP thread please?). A serious and credible man with the government job that gives him access to much that we do not know.
Anyway, among the things he discussed was the EMP variation of Nork nuke strategy. Short version: he very much regards it as a realistic scenario.
In that case then does it matter that the Norks have no yet developed a re-entry shield (though presumably they are working on it right now)?
-
https://www.spartareport.com/headline/trump-is-claiming-wins-on-north-korea-before-the-game-really-starts/
-
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/385286-the-memo-korean-thaw-gives-trump-a-big-boost?userid=188403
-
Pondering how the Nobel people will weasel their way out fo giving The Donald the NPP :
Give the prize instead to both Korean heads of state
Give it to China's Xi.
Give it to Hillary since she helped Trump get elected ........
With regards to China'a Xi there is a lot more to the public eye then we can see.
Kim met with him not long ago
In some way China surely sees it is NOW (with Trump as Prez vs the wish washy Brock) in their interests to get N Korea to change course.
I am wondering if before they saw NK as a nice buffer between them and the US . A poker chip they could play over and over again against us.
Now they may see a peaceful N and S Korea situation more to their liking. What I mean if there is no war between N and S K then why should S K permit the US to have a military presence on the peninsula just off their coast.
S Korea being a bit of dupes will oblige and kick the US out. As China increases its military power in Asia that would suit them just fine.
Se we get rid of the nuclear threat and China gets us out of Korea.
Next play is how will China get us out of Okinawa ?
-
https://www.nationalreview.com/news/south-korean-president-trump-deserves-nobel-peace-prize/
-
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/its-time-for-real-talk-about-north-korea/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-04-30&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
-
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/04/its-time-for-real-talk-about-north-korea/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-04-30&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
Opposing view: "Kim will, in the end, trade away his nukes."
No one knows the future but I like the thinking of this author better.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/01/kim-jong-un/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.9fda6398ca35
Why North Korea will give up its nukes
By Spencer Kim May 1
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, left, prepares to shake hands with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. April 27, 2018. (Korea Summit Press/AP)
Spencer Kim is chairman and CEO of CBOL Corporation, a California aerospace company, and co-founder of the nonprofit Pacific Century Institute, which fosters understanding among the peoples of the Pacific Rim.
SEOUL — I hear it so often. The most important thing to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is regime survival and the most important thing to him is his nuclear arsenal. But by historically meeting with South Korean President Moon Jae-in Friday, Pyongyang has shown what is most important. Nukes are, and always were, subservient to regime well-being.
Kim, who has god-like status among his people, has in effect told them four things:
1) The nukes program has served its purpose, and we will stop work on it now.
2) All efforts will focus on making you rich, like the Chinese and South Koreans.
3) I have started a new era of Korean history by reaching out to the South.
4) Our nukes have tamed the Yankees, and now I am going to trade them for permanent security and leverage to make you rich.
Kim cannot now say, “Oops, I misread the situation — let’s go back to being poor but proud with nukes!” He has mounted a tiger and cannot get off without being eaten. He must ride it all the way to his destination.
Let’s give credit where credit is due. First, to U.S. President Donald Trump for his involvement, without which no deal was ever going to be made, and for pushing the maximum pressure campaign. This campaign is aimed at pushing Pyongyang into a corner so it has to choose between regime survival and nukes and has to thus cry uncle by choosing regime survival.
Second, Moon deserves credit for realizing that if he wanted to be “Nixon to China,” he had to first be Nixon by shoring up his right wing domestically and proving to his ally in the White House that he was also an advocate of maximum pressure, all while signaling deftly to Kim that if he ever wanted to make a deal, now is the time.
And finally, let’s give credit to Kim. He was dealt a weak hand. His is the smallest, poorest and least-loved country in Northeast Asia, by far. He faces four existential threats to his regime’s existence, from: the United States (militarily), South Korea (culturally, with the siren song of absorption), internally (a coup could rise from a newly entrepreneurial class if things go too slow or from the masses below if the economy shatters) and China (Chinese high-handedness and Korean prickliness go back millennia).
Regarding China, people who really understand North Korea reference this saying: “When the door is open, they curse America. When the door is closed, they curse China.” It is no different today than in the past. Maximum pressure meant the Chinese maneuvered and positioned themselves as the only lifeline to North Korea — a situation as odious to Pyongyang as it is dangerous. Kim’s uncle was executed under suspicion of some kind of collusion with China; his half-brother was poisoned to death in Malaysia because he was a possible alternative ruler in any China-inspired coup.
What is needed to address all four existential threats? For starters, a peace treaty to forestall any U.S. military adventurism. Second, a relationship with the South that eschews absorption for long-term rapprochement and economic assistance. Third, China-style economic reform that assures Kim’s control of the regime and establishes rapid development as his source of legitimacy instead of resistance against the U.S. bogeyman. Finally and most importantly, the end of international sanctions and the beginning of economic diversification, to reduce reliance on China and avoid becoming a de facto Chinese province.
When he created the “byungjin” (parallel development) policy of pursuing both nuclear missiles and economic development simultaneously, did Kim foresee that he needed the former if he was ever going to have enough bargaining chips for a solution to all four of his threats? If so, he is one smart guy. If not, he is lucky. But planned or not, I give him credit for seeing this opportunity for what it is.
And don’t forget, in this “new era” of North-South history, Kim, who is young and faces no elections, will be in charge in the North for decades while he deals with a string of future South Korean presidents. He has the chance, more than any other person, to shape Korea’s future.
The exact details and timing may be devilish, and there may be some temporary twists on the road, but Kim will, in the end, trade away his nukes.
-
Certainly a plausible analysis-- and certainly I hope he is right!!!
My prior post and its subject line was prompted by a sense of far too much self-congratulatory assumption of the conclusion.
-
Certainly a plausible analysis-- and certainly I hope he is right!!!
My prior post and its subject line was prompted by a sense of far too much self-congratulatory assumption of the conclusion.
I agree. A lot of high fiving and no agreement, no accomplishment, not even a meeting site - so far.
Kim Jung Un has: a cute wife, wealth, power, and the adoration of everyone still alive who surrounds him. He has an ego Trump could only hope for (yet he is one push of a button away from elimination.) He likes the limelight, photographed with Xi, big smiles, with Moon and now with the 'leader of the free world'. He has heard crowds chant "Nobel" for Trump. It is Un who will get the Nobel (you heard it here first), maybe Trump grudgingly too and Moon, if this dark chapter of human history gets put behind us right now.
What an opportunity! They can (attempt to) copy the Chinese model of economic freedom without democratization. Yes, it would spiral out of control and his people will eventually hang him, but hey ... give it a try. )
He could go to a Heritage Foundation seminar, study Singapore and Hong Kong, become a free trade zone on the newly strategic land that bridges China, Russia and South Korea, with ports on two seas.
His keeper Xi Jinping already told him what to do, and it probably was not to cause a "fire and fury" war with America on their border.
He needs sanctions lifted and Trump, Pompeo and Bolton are not going to take the usual song and dance for that.
They don't need nuclear weapons that they can't use.
It would not take much to make N.K. the fastest growing economy in the world and Nobel prize winning Kim Jung Un a worldwide hero.
-
IIRC the cutie is his sister , , ,
-
http://www.thediplomad.com/2018/04/trumps-seoul-train.html
Friday, April 27, 2018
Trump's Seoul Train
Just a quick post as I get ready to go out the door to get a flight to California. Be back in a week.
A most remarkable diplomatic development is occurring right in front of our eyes. The Korean War is about to end, or at least, there's a great probability that it will. The press reporting here in the USA on this incredible development is rather low-key, muted, and often buried below stories about Stormy Daniels, Michael Cohen, Royal baby photos, and, of course, the never-ending Jim Comey book tour and interview extravaganza.
The Korean War, often referred to as the "Forgotten War," proved a bitter, horrible conflict that few if any saw coming or were prepared to handle. The war, which began June 25, 1950 with a Stalin-encouraged invasion of the South, "ended" with an armistice on July 27, 1953. It cost somewhere above 2.5 million lives, perhaps as many as three million--including some one million Chinese "volunteers." (Personal note: In 1979, I talked to a Chinese diplomat who had been a "volunteer." He said he had never seen firepower like the one that US forces could bring to bear on the battlefield-- "brutal," he called it.)
That old armistice has been an on-and-off affair with lots of violent and deadly incidents since then. The two Koreas remain divided by one of the most heavily militarized borders in the world, and that division has been a potential WWIII flashpoint since 1953. The end of the Cold War did not see an end to the tense situation along that divide, and, in fact, saw an increase in tensions as North Korea went on a drive to develop a deliverable nuclear weapon. The dictatorship in Pyongyang has been one of if not the most reprehensible regime in the world. The people of North Korea live not only with the constant threat of war thanks to their leaders, but exist under horrific daily conditions. North Korea has to be the most miserable country on earth, and one of the few that regularly threatens global destruction.
We are now seeing the leaders of the two Koreas meeting, vowing to formalize the end of the war and to seek a way to denuclearize the peninsula. Huh? What happened? It must have been some tweet from Hillary or Obama, or some wise statement by Pelosi or Corbyn that did it. Gotta be. Or that Kim Jung-un, he's really just a pussy cat who loves his people and peace. Can't possibly be the man in the White House, because we all just KNOW that he's a clown and a loudmouth who doesn't know what he's doing, and thank God, that at least Putin controls him, or who knows what would happen, eh?
Sorry, scoffers. Trump gets the credit.
President Trump played Kim like Perlman plays a violin. Trump quickly got the measure of the dictator and checked him at every move, despite the pearl-clutching and couch-fainting in the West. Kim launched rockets; Trump labelled him "Rocket man" and ridiculed his pretensions. Kim bragged about his nuclear button, Trump fired back that his was much bigger and, unlike Kim's, it was guaranteed to work. SecDef Mattis, in his low-key USMC way, reminded the world that, if need be, we have a military solution to the Korean problem. The US Navy closed in on the peninsula and the USAF deployed bombers. US-ROK military exercises went ahead. Trump went to the Chinese and drove home their responsibility for keeping Kim under control and, not so subtly, asked the Chinese whether their relations with the US were less important than their relations with Kim. Kim got the message; met with the CIA Director; has agreed to a one-on-one with Trump. We have now the first real opportunity since 1953 to turn the page on the Korean War. Things can, of course, go wrong, but they seem to be going quite right.
Trump gets the credit.
-
(click to enlarge)
The North and South have fundamentally diametric economic and political systems and national ideologies. They also have very large guns pointed at each other’s head. Neither side has much reason to trust the other to refrain from trying to exploit the chaos that would come with a transition and force reunification on their own terms. This trust gap is not going away, nor is the prisoner’s dilemma. True reunification would require breathtaking courage from leaders on both sides, who would need to ignore immediate incentives and assume enormous risk while going through the process.
This is, in part, why only two modern states have achieved negotiated, peaceful reunification. One was Yemen in 1990, and its experience ever since has been nothing anyone wants to replicate. The more instructive comparison is Germany, which reunified the same year. Prior to being sliced in two by outside powers, both Germany and Korea were cohesive cultural, linguistic and ethnic entities. Yet both became locked in a protracted zero-sum contest for supremacy between their competing halves. Both are surrounded by countries that, through the long-term lens of their own geopolitical imperatives, would rather see them stay divided. Both had U.S. troops stationed on half their home soil. And like the North, East Germany suffered greatly from the loss of Soviet aid and security.
In most ways, though, the two Germanys were much better suited for reunification. By 1991, they were far more integrated than the Koreas are today, and the East was already beginning to disintegrate. East Germany had never adopted North Korea’s extreme version of totalitarianism and collectivism, and it didn’t derive its legitimacy from as intense a narrative of permanent siege by outside forces. The economic disparities between the two Koreas are also far wider. By 1991, West Germans were two to three times as wealthy as their eastern brethren, while South Koreans are estimated to be between 12 and 40 times richer than North Koreans (the North’s opacity explains the wide range in estimates). Thus, reunification was considerably less taxing for the West than it would be for the South, which likely wouldn’t enjoy the same level of outside funding for the process that the West Germans did.
Despite their age-old suspicion of a united Germany, neighboring powers like France and the United Kingdom accepted reunification in service of the broader project of European integration, with NATO and the common market diminishing the threat of German domination of the Continent. None of Korea’s neighbors have a similar cause to tolerate a process that puts a more powerful state on their doorstep.
North Korea, despite its poverty, has already proved capable of surviving without Soviet support. And though Pyongyang does not want to be beholden to Chinese patronage, this lifeline isn’t going to dry up anytime soon, given China’s ascendancy and interest in retaining the North as a buffer state. As a result, North Korea is more likely to be able to hold out on reunification if it doesn’t like the terms. By comparison, West Germany and its allies were able to gradually entice the East Germans away from the wheezing USSR, which couldn’t afford to keep up heavy subsidies to its client states anyway. For all intents and purposes, West Germany absorbed East Germany. North Korea won’t willingly follow suit. And unlike East Germany, North Korea has nukes.
-
I wonder what sparked this sudden interest in hope and change on the Korean peninsula?
http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/08/c_137164363.htm
They always show a picture of the leaders all relaxed and photogenic, yet the timing of the meeting indicates they are everything but relaxed about what is to come.
We can only speculate and figure out what was said now from what their actions are later.
Each of these men has unimaginable power in his own world but faces risks of that changing much more than we do on the world stage. Both are extremely rational men that will act in their own best interest as self perceived. That is my view, unlike our old assumption that his father and grandfather were irrational madmen.
Un is either asking what should I do or Xi is telling him what he should do and the answers aren't simple.
From Un's point of view, reunification makes him personally obsolete and puts him in danger of eventually going the way of Saddam, being tried by his own people for the crimes that kept him in power. The South isn't going to unify to be subjects of the North. Unification is defeat for Un.
China, they say, wants to keep N.K. as a sovereign buffer state from what is a de facto alliance of South Korea, the US and perhaps Japan, Taiwan and others. Xi does not want an NK vs. US war on his border, no matter how it goes, fighting over all the wrong issues from China's point of view. They would be forced to either jump in or look weak and irrelevant for not doing so. For one thing, if China jumped in on NK's side, Xi would find China facing military opposition where he is now unopposed such as where he is militarizing the South China Sea. He benefits far more from the status quo, let the US giant fall back to sleep, not by waking them up. His navy and military are catching up with the US. The longer he goes without engagement, the more they can catch up. His waiting game is for Trump to lose power back to the US parties of global weakness.
It seems to me, his advice to Un is to have NK become what China is now - on a small scale. Get rid of nukes in exchange for guarantees of permanent sovereignty. Open up economically and in other ways, while still keeping central party power and restricted individual rights. That model seems unstable to me but is working for XI and the ruling party of China.
Maybe Un can get a planeload of money from Trump like Iran did from Obama in exchange for not needing to fight a new foreign war.
Trump wins if NK denuclearizes. He will pay to get that and most certainly would lift all sanctions in exchange for real verification. What does NK need nukes for anyway. They probably don't work and he can't use them anyway. Supposedly he can now reach the west coast of the US with his missiles. That is assuming they are not shot down making him look impotent. Threatening a strike has power but doing it would be to lose power. Losing power is Un's greatest and only fear.
My advice to Un is the same as Xi's. Take the deal.
-
Maybe China will guarantee Nork security?
-
Maybe China will guarantee Nork security?
Yes, maybe China AND the US will guarantee their security since no one wants to invade or rule them anyway. If Kim Jung Un is serious about denuclearization / disarming and if both sides are serious about verification, it will most certainly have to include a non-aggression agreement with the US. Make a Senate ratified treaty with the US that outlasts an administration, lesson learned from the Iran deal. Denuclearization and meet some agreed human rights benchmarks in exchange for security. Have the US verify de-nuke and some international group certify progress on human rights. If they break the agreement, both China and US need to be off the hook on any security or sovereignty commitment - and down he goes.
I don't think China, S.K., Russia or the US want to govern his fiefdom, one of the world's poorest places. We simply want to end the threat and lessen the human rights abuses. If he is no longer a threat to the US and to his neighbors and all nations agree to his nation's controversial right to exist, why not give him guarantees - so long as he complies on his part. If Un is bold, this could be quite a breakthrough for all sides. He keeps power and his people have the opportunity to get a better life, to earn luxuries - like food.
On the other side of it, if this is just another attempt to bluff people like the Madeline Halfbright deal with freebies given for false promises, I think they are wasting their time trying that with people like Trump, Bolton and Pompeo. I wonder what Trump and US do with this threat if negotiations fail, but I would rather think now about how this can work if they succeed.
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/world/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear-trump-sanctions.html?emc=edit_th_180512&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=496411930512
-
North Korea: We’re starting to get a clearer picture of what the U.S. is demanding from North Korea ahead of their summit in June. Over the weekend, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined stringent conditions before the U.S. is willing to lift sanctions on Pyongyang including the transfer of nuclear scientists overseas, the destruction of nuclear data and so forth. Pompeo also said Kim Jong Un understands why his preferred phased and synchronized approach to denuclearization – the basis of past failed agreements – is unacceptable to Washington. National Security Adviser John Bolton said the North would not receive any benefits until it fully denuclearized. In exchange, the U.S. hinted at some assurances of regime security for Pyongyang while offering to help revive the North Korean economy and allow private U.S. investment. Curiously, however, Pompeo later seemed to imply that the U.S. may be content with a deal that merely prevents the North from being able to strike the U.S. mainland. Such a deal would likely decouple Northeast Asia from the U.S. alliance network, something that has been a strategic objective for China and North Korea for some time. There’s good reason to doubt that North Korea would agree to U.S. demands, hence why Pompeo appears to be keeping options open for a “lesser” deal. Either way, we need to figure out North Korea’s end game here. If the U.S. allows North Korea to keep some of its weapons while assuring only that the U.S. mainland won’t be attacked, other countries, most notably Japan, would sound the alarm. Be on the lookout for their responses.
-
North Korea Manages Expectations, One Provocation at a Time
May 18, 2018
By Phillip Orchard
The United States, it seemed, had finally done the impossible – it had managed to bring the government of North Korea to the negotiating table to end its nuclear program. Pyongyang had been signaling since March, if not earlier, that it was ready to deal. The North had warmed up to the South, having attended the Olympics and having gone behind enemy lines for the first time to meet with the South Korean president. By all accounts, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo heard what he wanted to hear during his trip to Pyongyang last week. National Security Adviser John Bolton was drawing up his plans. North Korea had yet to back out of the negotiations.
Everything looked as it should.
If all this seemed too good to be true, well, that’s because it was. On May 15, Pyongyang abruptly pulled out of high-level talks on reunification with South Korea scheduled for this week, citing the continuation of major U.S.-South Korean military drills. The timing seemed curious – North Korea had proposed the talks just days earlier, the U.S.-South Korean exercises had been scheduled for months, and North Korea had intimated that the exercises wouldn’t derail the talks, anyway. Later that day, Pyongyang threatened to scrap the June 12 summit in Singapore between Kim Jong Un and Donald Trump. Among other grievances, the North cited Bolton’s repeated demands for immediate, rather than phased, denuclearization along the lines of the U.S. deal with Libya in 2003.
Pyongyang’s aversion to the Libya deal is unsurprising; the Gadhafi regime agreed to it, only to fall, partly at the hands of the United States, less than a decade later. Here too, it’s the timing that’s surprising, considering that Bolton had been pushing Libya as a model for months, but it can be explained in one of two ways. The first is domestic politics. It’s possible that hardliners in Pyongyang had grown uneasy with the pace at which Kim appeared to be rushing toward a deal, sparking an internal struggle over where to go from here. If he was serious about fully capitulating to U.S. demands, then we would expect major resistance. The problem with this explanation is there’s no hard evidence suggesting that Kim is facing any backlash at all, nor that the North has any intention to capitulate.
The second and more obvious explanation is that the North Koreans are who we thought they were. We’ve never been convinced that Kim was serious about handing over his nukes, and this week’s events only validate our doubts. What Pyongyang has done in the past few days is merely an attempt to manage expectations, clarify its position and strengthen its hand ahead of a landmark negotiation.
Conflicting Visions
North Korea appears to be laying the groundwork for an alternative plan — just one that will look nothing like what Bolton and, with somewhat more wiggle room, Pompeo laid out last weekend. Indeed, there are reasons to seriously consider reports that Kim is mulling a “Vietnam-style” economic liberalization. And there have been signs that Pyongyang is preparing the North Korean public — long conditioned to accept a permanent police state as the price to pay for fighting the evil American imperialists — to accept an accommodation with their great foe. On May 17, for example, NK News reported that authorities have been removing anti-American propaganda in the capital city.
But the North intends to do so as a nuclear power, and its outreach to the U.S. is chiefly about obtaining recognition from Washington as such. In the Trump administration’s view, denuclearization needs to be complete, verifiable and irreversible — and, importantly, completed by the end of Trump’s first term. According to Bolton, every one of the North’s nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, along with its associated equipment, plus its ballistic missiles, must be dismantled and shipped to the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in Tennessee before North Korea gets anything tangible in exchange. The U.S. even wants North Korea’s nuclear scientists to leave the country. To North Korea, denuclearization is more of an aspirational long-term goal. Maybe, for example, it would someday work toward global disarmament, with some near-term caps on the size and shape of its arsenal in exchange for a departure of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula.
Nothing about the North’s recent behavior suggests that it is backing off this position. Since it first opened the door to a rapprochement during Kim’s New Year’s speech, the North has conceded very little of substance. True, it has frozen missile and nuclear tests, but it already has large stockpiles of nuclear weapons, and while its long-range missile program is incomplete, it’s advanced enough to make the U.S. reconsider an attack – as is its conventional weapons along the demilitarized zone that threaten more than half of South Korea’s population. And though Pyongyang seems ready to dismantle one nuclear test site, there’s nothing to stop it from keeping its many others open (besides, the site in question was likely made unusable after a test in September 2017).
(click to enlarge)
North Korea, moreover, doesn’t have much use for the sort of economic assistance the U.S. is apparently offering (mostly private investment) at this point. Releasing American prisoners, which Kim recently did, is a measure of good faith but is strategically meaningless. His historic summit with South Korean President Moon Jae-in in April was, at best, just the start of a decadeslong process toward reunification. He got a sitting U.S. president to break precedent and meet with a North Korean leader face to face without giving up a thing.
Open Doors
The question is what happens when the White House comes to terms with the truth: that the North believes that it’s bargaining from a position of strength, and that it won’t give up its nukes willingly. The United States can either accept a deal that effectively lets North Korea have nuclear weapons, or it can try to halt its program by force.
The North’s statements this week were meant to nudge Trump toward the former option. One way to read the KCNA warnings is that they are an attempt to drive a wedge between Trump and hardliners like Bolton. (Already, the White House is distancing itself from Bolton’s Libya rhetoric.) Pyongyang believes Trump has a political interest in reaching a deal by June, regardless of what the regime actually concedes. People like Bolton, in the view of North Koreans, complicate things by overselling what the North is willing to give up, making the president less willing to compromise. Whether or not this view is accurate — and it’s hard to see why Bolton would push Libya as a model otherwise — it’s clear that the North had grown concerned that a rare opportunity was slipping away.
The North can probably tolerate a deal that permanently freezes its intercontinental ballistic missile tests – which would enable Trump to claim a victory insofar as it secures the U.S. mainland from an attack. (Indeed, this is a possibility Pompeo alluded to last weekend.) Such an agreement would probably come alongside a slow denuclearization process and measures nudging the U.S. toward the exits. This would help the North stave off war and potentially obtain some sanctions relief without substantially undermining its nuclear deterrent any time soon. Perhaps even more enticing for Pyongyang, an ICBM freeze would also raise doubts in South Korea and Japan about Washington’s commitment to their security, doubts that could undo their longstanding alliances.
If nothing else, the North needs a symbolic agreement, one that allows both sides to save face and prolong the negotiations. The threat of U.S. force is still too potent – and the North’s deterrent is too close to completion — to walk away from the table completely, as the North has done repeatedly in the past. And this means it needed to manage expectations in Washington and keep the door open for a deal that would end the standoff largely on Pyongyang’s terms.
The post North Korea Manages Expectations, One Provocation at a Time appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
-
https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/05/north-korean-negotiations-success-is-possible/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202018-05-21&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
-
North Korea, Iran: North Korean media reported that Iran and North Korea have signed a memorandum of understanding on technology cooperation. Little detail was provided. The two countries have a history of cooperating on missile and nuclear technology. The timing is interesting, of course – the Iran nuclear deal is all but dead, and North Korean nuclear negotiations are clouded in uncertainty. This is something to keep our eyes on.
• Finding: No additional details have been released by either side. On the surface, at least, it appears to be a low-level cultural exchange. (The memorandum of understanding was signed by the heads of the two countries’ national libraries.) If Tehran and Pyongyang were keen to resume technological cooperation in the military realm, we’d expect the two sides to do so quietly to avoid stoking a backlash from other powers whose support both countries are trying to woo to improve their positions against the U.S.
-
Trump needs to start and end this meeting without a handshake photo - unless and until he makes the agreement. The photo opp is the achievement if you are Un. CVID is the achievement the rest of the world needs.
CVID = Complete Verifiable Irreversible Denuclearization (Dismantlement)
The term doesn't leave a lot of wiggle room. Either it is or it is not Complete. Verifiable. Irreversible. Denuclearization. Not exactly what Madeline Halfbright negotiated. (
Obama White House: "We reaffirm our commitment to our common goal, shared by the international community, to achieve the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea in a peaceful manner."
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/north-koreas-nuclear-program-irreversible-15537
The incongruent term was to achieve all this "in a peaceful manner". It will be achieved when the threat of regime change level force is perceived as real and imminent.
Bush Presidency: Also all talk, no action, bad results:
https://www.usip.org/publications/2006/01/dismantling-dprks-nuclear-weapons-program-practicable-verifiable-plan-action
At least they came up with the parameters.
-
By Michael O’Hanlon
June 4, 2018 6:52 p.m. ET
28 COMMENTS
Should the U.S. bring its nearly 30,000 troops home from the Korean Peninsula in return for North Korean nuclear disarmament? An adviser to South Korean President Moon Jae-in recently suggested the answer might be yes. And Kim Jong Un likely won’t give up the bomb without an end to the U.S.-South Korea alliance in its current form.
This might sound like a reasonable trade-off, but recall that the North Korean threat consists of much more than nuclear weapons. Pyongyang maintains a huge conventional military, robust special forces, stocks of chemical and biological arms, and hundreds of artillery tubes and missile launchers in range of Seoul. If these threats could also be substantially reduced, it would be fair to ask about the future of the alliance.
Yet consider its tremendous benefits. A strong U.S.-led alliance system has been very good for international peace and stability, and the U.S.-South Korea alliance has been an integral part of that broader community. This transcends specific threats from North Korea, Russia or any other hostile power.
South Korea is the world’s 11th-largest economy and remains influential. No one should want to return to the anarchy that prevailed in Europe and East Asia a century ago, when countries had weak and shifting relationships but no enduring bonds. The result was two world wars followed by catastrophic conflict in Korea.
In military terms, the alliance has proved its mettle beyond the Korean Peninsula. The U.S. has some 60 allies and security partners. But few countries have shown the same commitment to collaborative global military operations, combined with the same fighting capability, as South Korea. It has the largest military by head count of any American ally, and arguably one of the toughest and most combat-capable forces. For future security missions—counterterrorism, protection of sea lanes, cyberdefense—the alliance offers great benefits for the U.S.
Then there is South Korea’s immediate security—and, most of all, concerns about China. South Koreans are in no hurry to pick a fight with a rising China, as even a reunified Korea would have only 5% of China’s population. China isn’t an enemy Koreans can afford to have, but also not a country most Koreans want to trust and deal with on their own. Some kind of alliance with the U.S. would reassure Koreans about their future security and role in the world.
What kind of alliance would make sense if the North Korean danger disappeared? A first option would be a modestly scaled-back version of today’s, with no more than 25,000 troops stationed at all times. The U.S. would retain something like its current mix of U.S. forces: a brigade of heavy Army forces, additional ground-logistics capabilities, two wings of Air Force fighters and attack aircraft, as well as facilities in Korea’s southeast. But this would be backed by a commitment to send hundreds of thousands of troops for the direct defense of South Korea. Under this scenario, a hypothetical China threat would replace today’s real North Korean threat for military planning.
The other option would be perhaps 5,000 to 8,000 troops. This wouldn’t emphasize a Chinese invasion threat, but rather binational or multinational expeditionary operations throughout the region and globe. Most of today’s American fighter aircraft in Korea, with their relatively short ranges, might return to the U.S., as would logistics capabilities to bring in more than 300,000 in the case of a general war.
The heavy Army brigade now in Korea might be transformed into a light brigade, better suited for peacekeeping missions. It could be based at a new regional peacekeeping center where other nations—even China—could send forces to train. U.S. special forces would remain in modest numbers. Some U.S. Navy ships might be located in Korea too. Perhaps the U.S. could create a hub for ships employing robotics and artificial intelligence, given South Korea’s excellence in those areas.
We don’t need to answer these questions now, but it isn’t too soon to start the debate. And it is definitely not too soon to oppose any North Korean demand to end the U.S.-South Korea alliance as part of a nuclear deal.
Mr. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
-
An Australian observer covers the horse race side of the contest, a light summary of the interests and strengths of key participants. He has Trump (5:1) 3 times more likely to win than Un (15:1).
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/06/06/usnorth_korea_are_you_feeling_lucky_113514.html
-
:-D
-
The obama crowd stumbling all over themselves trying to validate themselves:
https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/susan-rice-north-koreans-were-not-prepared-be-serious-when-obama-was
Sorry Sue. You and Barry were actually epic failures . :wink:
-
"You and Barry were actually epic failures"
Fact check: True.
From the article: Appearing on CBS's "Face the Nation" on Sunday, one of former President Obama's top advisers was asked why Obama didn't try to negotiate with Kim Jong Un during his eight years in office (when the North Korean nuclear threat accelerated).
"There were efforts at discussions," Rice responded. "The problem is that, at every turn, the North Koreans would make commitments and then break them."
"The fact of the matter is that I believe the North Koreans were not prepared to be serious under Kim Jong Un with respect to sitting at the table until they perfected their nuclear program and their missiles."
No. The difference is that an American President with the power to take down his regime has convinced Un that his demise is imminent.
-----------------------------
I watched that interview Sunday and I watched her previously on the same show passing the lie of Benghazi to the world. I suppose it wasn't Rice's first appearance since that epic lie and there has been a host change since then, but when was she ever called out on what REALLY then with that prepared and scripted lie she told all networks? Who wrote it, why did she agree to deliver it, what was the consequence of lying to cover for Obama's failure and phony reelection, and why is she still held out as a credible guest? (The questions are rhetorical. We all know as she did then she would be REWARDED for lying to confuse the issue and allow Obama to cover his foreign policy failures through his reelection.
Now it's Comey, Brennan and Clapper too held out as voices of wisdom to share. No wonder these shows get such horrible ratings. You can watch for hours, tolerate endless commercials and know less at the end than when you started.
Then we hear about Presidential dishonesty with this President, Trump, as if his mischaracterizations and inaccuracies are something new to the Oval Office when in fact Obama following W Bush proved that voters do not prefer truth.
-
eijing will support warmer ties between the United States and North Korea, so long as their dialogue does not precipitate a complete collapse or, conversely, a rapid rapprochement in their relations.
China will likely increase its economic influence over Pyongyang to ensure North Korea does not fall into the United States' orbit.
Chinese leaders will base their actions on the North Korean nuclear issue on the principle of maintaining the balance of power on the peninsula in regard to the United States.
The Big Picture
U.S. President Donald Trump's decision in March to meet with Kim Jong Un has dramatically reshaped Beijing's calculations and posture toward North Korea. The ramifications of the summit, however, will ultimately determine China's role. With the amicable meeting setting the stage for subsequent dialogue, China will work to insert itself into the equation to increase its economic leverage to keep North Korea in its orbit.
See 2018 Third-Quarter Forecast
See Coping With a Nuclear North Korea
The June 12 summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was historic even if it didn't produce any earth-shattering breakthrough — and that's just how China wants it. Though short on specifics regarding critical issues such as denuclearization and U.S. security guarantees, the summit's amicable atmosphere assuaged Beijing's immediate fears about hostilities on its doorstep. For Beijing, the prospect for better ties between Washington and Pyongyang is a positive outcome, so long as the dialogue does not produce outright failure or a sudden rapprochement that leads to what China might call Kim's "Nixon moment." Amid expectations that Washington and Pyongyang will steer their relations between these two extremes — while remaining mindful about the potential for another false dawn — China will look to insert itself into the discussions so it can shape the future of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with its interests.
In Chinese policy circles, the expectations for a significant breakthrough in the runup to the summit were relatively low. But Beijing also did not desire the return of any stalemate, preferring instead continued dialogue. Having previously acknowledged its limited ability to influence either side, Beijing had framed the North Korean crisis as one whose solution lies in bilateral talks alone. In turn, China has expressed hopes that such talks could initiate more comprehensive nuclear and political negotiations that would ultimately allow it to play a more significant role. Nonetheless, after restoring its strained relationship with North Korea and regaining its role on the peninsula, Beijing hopes to insert itself into the equation — especially if the summit ushers in a mechanism to manage the Korean issue.
North Korea's reduction (if not eradication) of its nuclear capacity and cessation of further missile tests would represent a net gain for China — especially if the United States also halts military exercises with South Korea. Beijing entertains few hopes that Pyongyang will truly abandon its nuclear weapons or that Washington will ease strategic pressure on China if the peninsula becomes a nuclear-free zone. But the latest dialogue will ease Beijing's immediate concerns about military confrontations while also providing the country with a counterargument to regional neighbors such as South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, who support the advancement of U.S.-led defense deployments and even nuclear weapons in Northeast Asia.
What Comes Next
Wary of becoming the odd country out, Beijing's next priority will be to ensure its continued role in shaping events on the peninsula. China is aware that both Washington and Pyongyang hope to bypass, or at least reduce, their reliance on it in its usual role as mediator. Mindful of this potential point of convergence, China harbors concerns that follow-up meetings could result in a tactical alignment or even a deal that could jeopardize its strategic interests on the peninsula. Still, as the major regional power and a signatory of the 1953 Korean War armistice, China views itself as an indispensable actor in any peace deal that determines the peninsula's future.
China is likely to use its economic influence to ensure that North Korea does not fall into the United States' orbit. Tentative detente between North Korea and the United States will make it easier for Beijing to wield its economic influence — and even challenge the sanctions against the communist state — to ensure Pyongyang remains closer to China than the United States. By doing so, China would gain a tool to defend itself against growing U.S. pressure on trade and other issues. Beijing has already eased its unilateral punitive measures against North Korea and has a strong incentive to maintain the economic momentum — to the extent that it has encouraged Pyongyang to emulate China and open up its economy. After all, a more liberal North Korean economy would offer Beijing a more stable neighbor and increase prosperity in China's northeast, which is isolated due to its lack of sea access and Pyongyang's policies.
Beijing welcomes the prospect of warmer ties between Washington and Pyongyang, but it will base its ultimate perception and actions on the balance of power on the peninsula and its position regarding the United States. The summit could offer China a chance to help shape relations on its northeastern frontier, but the rapid developments on the peninsula could provide a stern test of Beijing's role and its desire to preserve its strategic interests in the area.
-
The Donald said this:
"Everybody can now feel much safer than the day I took office. There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea. Meeting with Kim Jong Un was an interesting and very positive experience. North Korea has great potential for the future!" Trump wrote on Twitter."
oh ok. I will sleep great tonight.
Kim told Donald who then relayed the message to us.
:-P
-
The Donald said this:
"Everybody can now feel much safer than the day I took office. There is no longer a Nuclear Threat from North Korea. Meeting with Kim Jong Un was an interesting and very positive experience. North Korea has great potential for the future!" Trump wrote on Twitter."
oh ok. I will sleep great tonight.
Kim told Donald who then relayed the message to us.
He had me with safer now than under Obama.
Yes there is a chance that Trump will brag too early about solving this; there is obviously a lot (everything) that can still go wrong.
Missing are the words verifiable and irreversible.
If we accomplish all that is promised with our new friend, we will be partners with the N.K. human rights record.
Democrats and never-Trumpers actually made us safer, convinced Kim that Trump was ready to launch a nuclear war against them. Standing up to G7, standing up to Iran, standing up to TPP, standing up to Paris accords, standing up to China, standing up to his own party all make him look ready to stand up to the threats of the little dictator. The choosing of Bolton, Pompeo, Mattis and the big boost in the defense budget all act to make the peace through strength threat credible.
The China card is interesting. Xi has been meeting with China. Some say Trump will try to lure N.K. out of China's orbit. China can easily fight that by providing money and oil etc. Competing for their affection is the opposite of maximum pressure. I see that Pompeo raced straight to Xi after the Singapore meeting.
Peace treaty between N.K. and S.K. alone would be historic - and likely to happen. It costs them nothing. Moving our forces out of S.K. would save the US a little money.
Here is the video Trump gave Kim: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A838gS8nwas
A real peace treaty with the US would go through the US Senate. Iran warns NK that Trump will nullify deal. Trump can't if this is done right.
Kim can't use his nuclear force anyway. It violates all of HIS objectives, like to live a long, prosperous life. He is done if he strikes first and he is done if he strikes second. And there is a very good chance we can shoot down whatever he shoots up.
It also seems to me that all his weaponry isn't as ready and usable as we are told. Dangerous? Yes. Accurate, reliable, ready? Don't know. A world class arms race is expensive.
If the US removes nukes from S.K., and I didn't know we kept any there, we can blow up Pyongyang from Montana in 29 minutes (Newt said). Or strike from other parts of the triad like the Pacific fleet.
The Nobel Peace Prize joke is real. They hate Trump and would hate giving it to him but Kim may have already won. It would be a shame if Kim deceived us and something happened to him before the ceremony.
The hardest part of this is to keep up the pressure and the threat of destruction while working together constructively on the details of the plan. There will be ups and downs.
Trump shouldn't brag mission accomplished at the first meeting but critics like Schumer are just as foolish to criticize him after one day for not having all the details nailed down yet when his party botched this for decades.
The video above, done in Korean too, gives a very tempting and imaginative look at what NK could become, switching the lights on and seeing high rises going up.
The visit to Singapore visit was a taste of prosperity too.
-
https://www.dailywire.com/news/31740/trumps-big-north-korean-moment-either-masterstroke-ben-shapiro?utm_source=shapironewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=061318-news&utm_campaign=position1
-
masterstroke or debacle
Trump blundered coming out of the meeting declaring a victory so soon.
If Kim does not follow through on his verbal promises he will make the world's greatest deal maker a total fool.
Unless there is more we do not know about, but I doubt it. Keeping my fingers crossed in NJ ............
:|
-
https://www.dailywire.com/news/31740/trumps-big-north-korean-moment-either-masterstroke-ben-shapiro?utm_source=shapironewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=061318-news&utm_campaign=position1
"Korean officials have been promising that same thing for years"
True but some differences between now and 1996:
1. This is DT and that was WJC. This is Un; that was Il. No differences?
2. This is the beginning of a process; that was the end of one.
3. Secretary of State is Mike Pompeo, first in his class at West Point, Magna Cum Laude Harvard Law School. SecState then was Madeline Halfbright.
Pompeo negotiated this agreement. He was previously National Security Director working on the same NK question. Does anyone think he doesn't know exactly what Madeline Albright's agreement says, and what was the outcome?
4. National Security is John Bolton; then it was Sandy Burglar. No difference?
5. Def Sec now is Mad dog Mattis with a new, enlarged budget, then is was a Secretary of Dismantling American Defense.
6. Then all foreign affairs staffers came out of the same school of cautious diplomatic manners and military avoidance. Now we have the Disrupter, not afraid of offending anyone or breaking the mold.
7. Then we knew the administration would never take a military action on the border of China and Russia. Now we know or at least all believe he will.
8. Then NK had no strike capability. Now they do. Can't just drop or ignore this.
9. Then we had no lever. Now Un knows war games begin on his coast the minute he looks unserious. And having to spend billions to move equipment around might mean we aren't playing war games this time.
10. Then, China was just as duplicitous as NK and covered for them. Now China has been called out, has plenty of other issues with the US, larger issues than NK to China, all intertwined in their negotiations with Trump.
Same thing? Will have the same horrible outcome? I don't think so. Does anyone think Trump will look the other way and forget out while this fizzles and leave it to his successors to deal with? I don't think so. Trump wants this, success here makes him a historic figure and success here makes him more likely to succeed on other issues, Iran, China and ally trade for examples. He is likely to be relentless until this is done.
-
Key Point: Strong sanctions in place and staying in place, with option to go Genghis Khan.
-
Key Point: Strong sanctions in place and staying in place, with option to go Genghis Khan.
Agreed.
Jim Talent, a defense hawk Republican Senator, said this morning that China is on board, wants this to work, meaning (he believes) China will support the whole Trump effort with North Korea. If true, that is quite different than their back stabbing of all previous efforts. If true, this can succeed. We will see in their actions.
I also wondered during Trump's bizarre support of Russia to re-join 'G7', nonsensical on the face of it, if he was teasing Russia to not undermine his efforts with NK. Russia is also a bigger world player with its nukes if fewer other rogue nations have them. Like China, Russia's nuclear clout drops as Japan and the whole region goes nuclear to defend against the NK threat.
Accepting a nuclear North Korea means rejection (permanently) of non-proliferation and a forever more dangerous globe. It won't be solved later if it isn't solved now. This requires support of a few key players and is FAR more important than a mostly meaningless communique photograph with (failing) European placeholders.
-
All true. There are plenty of reasons China should side with us and not because we show weakness to them but because we show strength and resolve.
http://freebeacon.com/columns/the-real-summit/
Now, with Singapore behind us, China is ready to ease the pressure.
[https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-china/china-suggests-north-korea-sanctions-relief-as-trump-kim-meet-idUSKBN1J80F5]
That cannot happen if denuclearization is to succeed.
Let's increase Xi's blood pressure a little. There are plenty of options. For starters, kill the defense sequester. In addition to conducting freedom of navigation operations, penalize China for militarizing islands in the South China Sea. Levy tariffs. Sell the F-35 to Taiwan. Warn the region that, if negotiations with Kim fail, America may be forced to reintroduce the tactical nuclear missiles that were removed from the Korean peninsula in 1991.
Will China protest, and U.S. doves cry? Of course they will.
(http://fb12.akamaized.net/up/2018/06/Pompeo-Xi.jpg)
Mike Pompeo lays out the plan and the options for Xi Jinping
-----------------------------
China can take a number of bad things from their perspective off the table, like us selling F-35's to Taiwan and Japan going nuclear during Trump's presidency, by holding the line with us right now against rogue N.K.
Historic Moment: If everyone acts decisively in their own best interest right now, the NK nuclear threat gets eliminated and "The Korean War" is officially over. Enough Nobels for everyone to get one, like Al Gore's movie crew received.
-
Yes.
I suspect Trump's references to someday US troops leaving South Korea is part of the price with China.
-
Trump, Pompeo Offer Conflicting Versions of North Korea Talks
President says he has solved the threat in Pyongyang, while his secretary of state cites ‘risks’
What Comes Next After the Trump-Kim Summit?
After the historic meeting between President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, The Wall Street Journal's Gerald F. Seib asks: Who might be in the spotlight over the next couple of months? Photo: Getty
By Jessica Donati and
Louise Radnofsky
Updated June 15, 2018 4:09 p.m. ET
110 COMMENTS
WASHINGTON—President Donald Trump’s assertion Friday that he has “solved” the North Korean nuclear-weapons threat again diverged from how Secretary of State Mike Pompeo depicted the outcome of this week’s summit between Mr. Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un.
Mr. Pompeo, in meetings in South Korea and China after the summit, said much work remains before North Korea gives up its nuclear weapons and told Chinese officials on Thursday that “there are still risks we won’t achieve that.”
Mr. Trump’s claim on Friday, in remarks to reporters at the White House, echoed Twitter messages he sent earlier in the week after his summit with Mr. Kim in Singapore, when he said: “There is no longer a nuclear threat from North Korea.” The view also has been disputed by some U.S. experts on diplomacy with North Korea.
Mr. Trump’s remarks have contrasted with views expressed by Mr. Pompeo, who is in charge of driving the diplomatic process forward after the Singapore meeting. The conflicting public statements risk sending mixed signals that set back the process, some say.
“What [Trump] may have done is undermined his leverage for solving the problem,” said Robert Einhorn, a former U.S. negotiator on North Korea’s missile programs. “Secretary Pompeo and State Department are playing a responsible role in not exaggerating what has been achieved and not minimizing the challenges ahead.”
Mr. Pompeo engaged in a flurry of diplomacy since the summit, traveling to China and South Korea to drum up support among regional players. Late on Thursday night, he tweeted that on his final day on the road, he had met two presidents, held four bilateral meetings and met with embassy teams, “A great day for American diplomacy.”
Meeting with South Korean officials in Seoul on Thursday, Mr. Pompeo said: “It could be the case that our effort will not work, but we are determined to … reset the conditions for North Korea’s participation in the community of nations.”
The State Department, asked about the contrasting assessments, said, “The President made clear he did not expect we could solve all issues in one meeting.”
Mr. Trump’s assertions about solving the nuclear threat from North Korea have come under criticism this week for giving China an incentive to loosen its enforcement of international sanctions against North Korea. The president has conceded that Beijing may already be relenting on hard-won U.N. sanctions.
Both Republicans and Democrats have said that the U.S. should continue its policy of maximum pressure until North Korea proves it is dismantling its nuclear weapons program.
Mr. Pompeo presented a measured vision of the process ahead, telling reporters on Thursday that the modalities for verifying whether North Korea is holding up its side of the bargain were just “beginning to develop.”
The top U.S. diplomat also countered criticism that the joint statement signed by Messrs. Kim and Trump was scant on detail and that it failed to define the goal of the talks as being complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization. The document didn’t reflect the “great deal of work done” already, Mr. Pompeo told reporters.
Mr. Trump on Friday also continued to draw attention by praising Mr. Kim in an interview on “Fox & Friends.” Mr. Trump said: “He speaks and his people sit up in attention. I want my people to do the same.”
After the interview, he told reporters that he had been kidding and added, “You don’t understand sarcasm.”
Asked about North Korean human-rights abuses perpetrated by Mr. Kim, Mr. Trump said, “I can’t speak to that.”
It wasn’t clear if this contradicted an earlier White House statement that said the issue was raised in the meeting.
Mr. Trump also indicated that he planned to call North Korean officials over the weekend but didn’t elaborate.
-
A Troops for Nukes Trade?
U.S. forces in South Korea do far more than protect Seoul.
U.S. and South Korean army soldiers pose on a floating bridge on the Hantan river during a joint military exercise in this 2015 file photo.
U.S. and South Korean army soldiers pose on a floating bridge on the Hantan river during a joint military exercise in this 2015 file photo. Photo: Ahn Young-joon/Associated Press
By The Editorial Board
June 17, 2018 3:33 p.m. ET
36 COMMENTS
President Trump sowed confusion in Asia last week when he called U.S.-South Korea joint military exercises “very provocative.” He suspended them until further notice and mused that he’d eventually like to bring all U.S. troops in Korea home. North Korea, Russia and China were pleased—American allies not so much.
“We will be stopping the war games which will save us a tremendous amount of money,” Mr. Trump said in Singapore, but which exercises does he mean? Vice President Mike Pence met with GOP Senators last week and suggested that Mr. Trump meant two annual combined exercises, the Ulchi Freedom Guardian in August and the Foal Eagle in late winter or early spring. But the Pentagon hasn’t confirmed that, and U.S. allies were caught off guard.
Mr. Pence’s spokeswoman later said regular training exercises and exchanges would continue, which is essential. The U.S. and South Koreans are constantly working to sharpen their skills in using weapons and responding to enemy tactics. This includes amphibious landings, parachute drops and responding to North Korean artillery. Stopping those drills would be military malpractice.
Canceling the two giant exercises will also reduce readiness, since they are timed to coincide with North Korea’s exercises and involve allied troops and U.S. forces from other theaters. Mr. Trump made the offer as a unilateral concession, but it’s notable that Kim Jong Un has offered no comparable military gesture. Returning three Americans his government took as hostages and promising to return veterans’ remains aren’t threat-reducing.
If Mr. Trump wants to remove provocations from the peninsula, how about asking Kim to pull North Korean forces back from the Demilitarized Zone and take Seoul out of artillery range? That would justify the exercise cancellation as a goodwill offer.
Beyond the exercises is Mr. Trump’s interest in using U.S. troops in South Korea as a negotiating tool in nuclear talks. U.S. forces working alongside a democratic ally aren’t the same as the illegal development of nuclear weapons by a state sponsor of terrorism.
Mr. Trump seems to think the South Koreans are getting a free ride on the U.S. taxpayer, but that’s false. Nearly all of the 28,500 U.S. troops on the peninsula have begun moving to Camp Humphreys, a giant new U.S. Army base south of Seoul. The base cost some $11 billion to build and South Korea paid more than $10 billion. Seoul also pays for roughly half of the operating costs of U.S. forces in the country.
Then there’s the larger strategic picture in East Asia. U.S. forces don’t merely deter a North Korean invasion of South Korea. They also prevent China, which has considerable economic sway over Seoul, from exerting more political control over Seoul’s foreign policy. The troops are also a forward deployment to protect regional democracies like Japan and Taiwan, and the U.S. alliance with Japan is crucial to containing China’s ambition to dominate the Western Pacific.
The good news is that Congress is waking up to Mr. Trump’s troops-for-nukes predilections. Republican Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska added a sense of the Senate amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that says “the significant removal of United States military forces from the Korean Peninsula is a non-negotiable item as it relates to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” of North Korea.
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis called his counterparts in South Korea and Japan Thursday to reaffirm America’s “ironclad defense commitments” and “determination to maintain the readiness of its forces in the region.” But with Mr. Trump you never know.
U.S. deployments overseas are part of a global strategy of alliances to deter war, prevent the emergence of a dominant regional power like China, and keep threats as far as possible from the U.S. homeland. The size and nature of U.S. forces in Korea can be rethought if North Korea completely and credibly gives up its nuclear program and ceases to threaten the South. But in the meantime U.S. forces should not be a chit in a trade with Kim Jong Un.
-
"If Mr. Trump wants to remove provocations from the peninsula, how about asking Kim to pull North Korean forces back from the Demilitarized Zone and take Seoul out of artillery range?"
I would assume all of that is on the table.
"Republican Senator Dan Sullivan of Alaska added a sense of the Senate amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act that says “the significant removal of United States military forces from the Korean Peninsula is a non-negotiable item as it relates to the complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization” of North Korea."
The Senate doing its job here is a good thing for Trump, strengthens his hand in negotiations. If NK wants a peace treaty with the US that isn't repealed with executive order of his successor or by Trump himself, that goes through the Senate. Kim Jung Un knows that.
There will be no peace treaty that doesn't allow a US second strike if NK strikes the US or allies first. OTOH, this let's-keep-things-the-way-they-are mentality is also dangerous; it led to where we are now.
If Congress wants to strengthen Trump's hand, they should pass and hand him authorization to make first strike attacks against N.K. including the Dear Leader palaces at any time that the President alone determines NK is not faithfully and expediently proceeding toward 'complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization'. That would answer the only unknown in the whole complex equation, Why would Un give up his nukes.
-
Who knows what is going on in the talks with Sec State Pompeo and the Norks, but I fear the President has made it harder by being too effusive since Singapore.
-
"... but I fear the President has made it harder by being too effusive since Singapore."
On the surface view of it, absolutely true, shameful if anyone but Trump did it. I wrote that he shouldn't even shake hands and instead they took romantic walks. But Kim knows full well Trump can turn on a dime back to "Fire and Fury" with an ego and a temper and the military muscle to back it up if this doesn't go through.
Not just DT, but Kim Jung Un is a world hero if he pulls this off. He gets a peace treaty with the strongest power on earth and an opportunity to try out something like the hugely successful Chinese economic model, or he continues to rule the darkest corner of earth under more pressure and danger than ever before if he doesn't.
-
http://carolineglick.com/the-donald-trump-negotiations-academy/
-
Reality Check
By Phillip Orchard
Frozen Peace: Where the Korea Standoff Goes From Here
An indefinite “freeze for freeze” may be all that’s obtainable.
Predictably, last week’s Singapore summit was long on pomp and short on substance. The summit was rushed, leaving insufficient time to hammer out anything more than a symbolic statement in which Pyongyang committed to even less than it did in talks with the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations in 1993, 1994 and 2005. More important, neither North Korea nor the U.S. was prepared to make any meaningful concessions on their red lines anyway. It’s doubtful that the U.S. will have the leverage to force the North to agree to a formal deal on complete, verifiable and irreversible disarmament anytime soon.
However, the outlines of a tacit deal on the size and shape of the North’s nuclear and missile arsenals are beginning to take shape. In fact, the bulk of such an arrangement might already be in place. And it could have considerably more staying power than the meatier deals with North Korea that were repeatedly inked and scrapped in the past.
Still Miles Apart
Ahead of the summit, to avoid backing itself into an untenable political position that would bolster Pyongyang’s negotiating position, the White House began lowering expectations for the talks. Since then, the Trump administration has been referring to it as merely the first step in a long process toward denuclearization.
This week, the U.S. took the next step by announcing the suspension of annual major joint military exercises with South Korea, with the stipulation that they will resume if the North bails on its commitments, though it’s still unclear what steps the U.S. expects to see. Whether or not the North is serious about giving up its nukes, we would expect a series of reciprocal good faith measures like Washington’s freeze on drills, Pyongyang’s freeze on missile and nuclear tests, dismantlement of test facilities and so forth. In any standoff with stakes this high, either side would need to move extremely cautiously to avoid getting played by the other, meaning this phase could easily take years.
But to demonstrate that it is indeed serious about denuclearization, the North would eventually need to take a step that can’t be quickly reversed. Test freezes can end with the flick of a match, and test facilities can be rebuilt (for missile tests, very quickly) – as was the nuclear cooling tower the North blew up in 2008 in exchange for concessions from the United States. Denuclearization will remain notional until the North concedes, at minimum, something on par with what Iran did in 2015, eliminating part of its stockpile of fissile material and giving inspectors the near-unfettered access needed to detect new weapons-grade enrichment.
The problem for the U.S. is the North has yet to express a willingness to hand over its nukes, particularly within the 2.5-year timeline laid out by the White House. In Pyongyang’s view, denuclearization means effectively the same thing as what the U.S. agreed to in 1968 when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires nuclear states to pursue disarmament at some point in a utopian future. And unless the U.S. is willing to go to war over the issue, there’s little reason to think that the North will back down. No U.S. guarantee can replace the sense of security that nukes give the North. China is unwilling to do what it would take to bring the North to its knees on Washington’s behalf. Ultimately, the North just isn’t important enough for the U.S. to go all in to disarm it.
Without movement on either of the two variables that matter most in the standoff – the North’s willingness to hand over its hard-won nukes, or the willingness of the U.S. or another power to try to take them by force – the center of gravity will shift to secondary aims. The diplomatic process will focus on servicing respective political needs, managing the North’s behavior as a nuclear power, and jockeying for regional influence as East Asia comes to terms with its new reality.
Living Without a Resolution
In this environment, the path of least resistance for both sides will be to accept that an indefinite “freeze for freeze” may be all that’s obtainable.
The U.S. can live with this arrangement if it thinks it’s stopping the North’s intercontinental ballistic missile program short of being able to strike the U.S. mainland with any sense of reliability. In other words, it could stomach a nuclear North for some of the same reasons it’s been able to tolerate a nuclear Pakistan: Islamabad doesn’t have the missile technology needed to strike the U.S., and disarming the country would require an exceedingly costly war. Politically, the Trump administration will want to show that it has, in fact, brought the North to heel, but this could conceivably be managed with occasional, even if symbolic, concessions by Pyongyang that sustain a sense of momentum toward denuclearization.
The North can live with this if it thinks the arrangement forestalls a U.S. attack in perpetuity, opens the door to sanctions relief, and undermines the ability of the U.S. and South Korea to oust the regime by force. It thinks the Trump administration now has a political imperative to stick with the diplomatic process. It already has a large enough nuclear arsenal to pose a deterrent, even if the lack of future testing may prevent it from obtaining larger-yield hydrogen bombs. And though its ICBM remain unproven, U.S. assets and allies are well within range of its more proven missiles, and its ICBMs – even if lacking proven re-entry and targeting technology – can at least fly far enough to theoretically put the U.S. within reach, potentially giving Washington still greater pause before attacking. More than anything, it effectively cements the North’s nuclear status, allowing Pyongyang to begin its pivot to economic development.
South Korea can live with this arrangement because it forestalls a war that would put Seoul at risk of annihilation and creates space for it to pursue its own, more substantive rapprochement with Pyongyang in a less tense environment. Reports this week that Pyongyang and Seoul may open talks on moving artillery back from the demilitarized zone suggest that the North now feels secure enough to join the South on the risky road to reunification, even if both sides will proceed forward at a glacial pace.
-
Is North Korea Balking at Denuclearization?
North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un visits the Chemical Material Institute of the Academy of Defense Science on August 23, 2017.
The political framework for North Korean denuclearization has been worked out at the top level, but the technical details still need to be fleshed out.
Even if North Korea continues to overhaul parts of its nuclear program, the lack of any concrete agreement means that there will not necessarily be a return to the heightened tensions of 2017.
The current situation is a continuation of the negotiation dynamic between the two countries in which the United States signals it is aware of all the details of North Korea's activities. As there is more disclosure, this dynamic will continue.
As long as the political framework precedes the technical concerns, there will be hope for a lasting breakthrough.
The Key Takeaway
It appears that North Korea has, at least until recently, been conducting activities that contribute to the development of its nuclear and missile programs. However, with no agreements yet in place, such activities do not necessarily signal unwillingness to reverse course in exchange for trade-offs from the United States. Signs will emerge in the coming negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his North Korean counterpart that will show whether Pyongyang is truly committed to denuclearization – namely, through the disclosure of sites and clearer public statements by North Korea.
The Big Picture
In Stratfor's 2018 Annual Forecast, we noted that both the United States and North Korea would need to start the North Korean denuclearization process by first mustering a political framework around denuclearization before advancing dialogue into the thorny technical details. The dynamic has now entered this second, more fraught phase.
See 2018 Annual Forecast
See Asia-Pacific section of the 2018 Annual Forecast
See Coping With a Nuclear North Korea
What Happened
According to recently released satellite imagery acquired by the Middlebury Institute for International Studies, North Korea appears to have expanded one of its missile manufacturing plants, the Chemical Material Institute located in the city of Hamhung, between April and June.
The plant produces solid-fueled ballistic missiles and warhead re-entry vehicles, both of which are essential components in North Korea's development of a credible nuclear deterrent. The imagery, released July 2, shows the construction of several new buildings on the site, which North Korean leader Kim Jong Un visited in August 2017 to review expansion activities. It also revealed construction at two facilities nearby; a new entry road was built at one and demolition work was completed at the other.
Some Background
At the historic June 12 summit between Kim and U.S. President Donald Trump, Washington and Pyongyang agreed to cooperate toward the eventual goal of ensuring the total denuclearization of North Korea. But they didn't establish any formal details or agreements.
In the weeks following the Trump-Kim meeting, speculation – especially in the U.S. media – has been mounting over whether North Korea truly intends to denuclearize and what exactly the process of denuclearization would look like.
The first of the lower-level post-summit meetings between the United States and North Korea began July 1, when officials from both countries met in the village of Panmunjom in the demilitarized zone. Pompeo is also rumored to be preparing for a trip to North Korea soon, perhaps as early as July 6. This negotiation phase will be critical in determining whether the two sides can make real progress or whether they will fall back into the well-trodden territory of enmity.
The Broader Picture
The July 2 satellite imagery comes after a week of other reports that North Korea is continuing its missile and nuclear development program. The country has reportedly upgraded facilities around reactors at the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center and, according to U.S. intelligence leaks, maintained the operation of secret uranium enrichment sites while continuing to manufacture Transporter Erector Launchers for medium-range missiles. The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency is also reportedly circulating an internal assessment that North Korea does not intend to engage in full denuclearization.
What Really Matters
In the wake of these reports, the media has speculated that North Korea's construction activities indicate a lack of dedication to the denuclearization process. But as Stratfor noted even before the June 12 summit, the most difficult part of making progress in an outreach effort such as this is always the technical details. And those concrete details can't even be arranged without the greater political will and open communication of those at the top.
This will be a back-and-forth process, in which North Korea attempts to bluff and the United States uses a variety of tools to call Pyongyang out.
The United States and North Korea have provided evidence of that political will, and they are beginning the process of hammering out the details. And since no formal deals have yet been made, the North Korean actions between April and June cannot be construed as violations of any agreement.
The first concrete action in the process of denuclearization will be for North Korea to disclose the full scope of its weapons program and facilities. Washington is worried that Pyongyang may try to obfuscate that information. And indeed, it's possible that the week of media leaks about North Korean actions may be an organized attempt by the United States to show that it already has a deep knowledge of the country's weapons program.
-
second post
y Andrew Jeong
Updated July 6, 2018 11:28 a.m. ET
69 COMMENTS
SEOUL—North Korea is thought to be developing a new submarine capable of launching nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, a senior South Korean lawmaker said, signaling an increased threat to U.S. and allied forces while raising doubts about the regime’s pledges to disarm.
Evidence gathered by South Korea’s military suggests Pyongyang is working on the submarine on its east coast, said Kim Hack-yong, who chaired the legislature’s defense committee until his term ended a few weeks ago. Mr. Kim, who belongs to a conservative opposition party that is skeptical of dialogue with Pyongyang, cited intelligence provided last week by defense officials.
Satellite imagery reviewed by South Korean intelligence officials showed the movement of laborers and materials at the port of Sinpo, where the submarine appears to be under construction at an indoor facility, an aide to Mr. Kim said.
A Defense Ministry spokesman said he couldn’t comment on details pertaining to intelligence activities but stressed that Seoul and Washington continue to monitor North Korea’s military facilities.
Related Video
What Would Peace Look Like on the Korean Peninsula?
The two Koreas have technically been at war for more than six decades. That's about to change, say North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and South Korea's Moon Jae-in. But what would peace on the peninsula look like?
North Korea’s submarine-launched ballistic missile program was first publicized in 2014. North Korea is believed to have undertaken four to six test launches of its SLBM model known as the KN 11. The test firing of a missile in 2016 that traveled 300 miles signaled that the program was progressing.
Pyongyang’s ability to mount nuclear weapons on those missiles and what the firing range would potentially be with a newly built submarine remains unanswered—as does the question of where North Korea is getting the technology.
U.S. officials consider the program a threat because such missiles are harder to identify and destroy before launch, potentially giving North Korea a greater element of surprise in an attack. The U.S. Embassy in Seoul couldn’t immediately comment.
As Secretary of State Mike Pompeo visits Pyongyang, North Korean weapons developments have raised questions about North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s commitment to denuclearize following his agreement with President Donald Trump in Singapore last month. Their joint statement lacked specifics, leaving the regime wiggle room as to what exactly constitutes denuclearization.
In Pyongyang on Friday, Mr. Pompeo was expected to press North Korean officials for concrete steps to deliver on those pledges, such as a timeline for disarmament.
In recent days, though, satellite images have indicated North Korea is expanding a missile-production facility and erecting a new building at one of its plutonium-producing reactors.
Related Coverage
North Korea’s Secret Army: How Operatives Abroad Aid the Regime (May 18)
Trump, Kim Begin New Phase of Diplomacy (June 15)
Denuclearization Means Different Things to Kim and Trump, North Korean Defector Says (May 14)
North Korea also appears to be preparing for its annual summer military exercises and hasn’t ceased sending orders to its spies in South Korea through coded messages, said Mr. Kim, the lawmaker.
The latest evidence shows the need to maintain pressure on North Korea and force the regime to negotiate, said Yang Uk, the chief defense analyst at Korea Defense and Security Forum, a Seoul-based private think tank.
“It’s too early to say if the North Koreans have defaulted on the Singapore agreement to denuclearize,” he said. “But earlier satellite images have already shown enough evidence proving North Korea has not abandoned its SLBM program.”
Hwang Jin-ha, a retired South Korean Army lieutenant-general and the former chairman of the defense committee at the country’s legislature, said he believed the latest information to be credible. Mr. Hwang, a former lawmaker, belongs to the same party as Kim Hack-yong.
North Korea’s navy operates a fleet of about 70 submarines, alongside 430 surface combat ships, according to South Korea’s Defense Ministry. It also maintains 250 amphibious vessels and 20 minesweepers.
South Korea’s navy has about 10 submarines, according to the ministry. It maintains 110 surface combat ships and 10 amphibious vessels. Seoul, however, possesses advanced assets, including three Aegis-equipped warships able to intercept incoming ballistic missiles.
The North’s pursuit of nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles has led to several rounds of sanctions against the regime and threats of U.S. military action from Mr. Trump.
But a detente has emerged this year, driven in large part by South Korean President Moon Jae-in, bringing the U.S. and North Korean leaders to their first meeting.
Mr. Kim, the third-generation dictator, has declared his nuclear force complete and said he wanted to focus on rebuilding his sanctions-strained economy.
After the Singapore summit, the U.S. and South Korea agreed to suspend military exercises that had angered Pyongyang and that Mr. Trump had described as provocative and expensive.
The regime, meanwhile, agreed to return the remains of U.S. military personnel killed in the 1950-53 Korean War. That hasn’t happened; it wasn’t immediately clear whether Mr. Pompeo’s trip to Pyongyang would yield progress on that front.
-
third post
North Korea nuclear talks have hit a speed bump. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo left Pyongyang on Saturday and arrived in Japan, where he spoke of the progress made on all issues – though he admitted that further talks were needed to iron out details. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, however, calling the meeting “regrettable” in light of what it called unilateral U.S. demands to denuclearize. This may be part and parcel of the negotiation process, but it’s hard to ignore that North Korea has not agreed to concrete steps going forward, has contradicted U.S. assessments of meetings and has cozied up to China even more than usual.
======================
FWIW I'm sensing it is time for President Trump to tell them it is time to shit or get off the pot and if the latter go full tilt sanctions-- hitting the Chinese firms involved as well.
If not, he will be taken as a blowhard here and elsewhere.
Shit or get off the pot applies to President Trump as well.
-
third post
North Korea nuclear talks have hit a speed bump. U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo left Pyongyang on Saturday and arrived in Japan, where he spoke of the progress made on all issues – though he admitted that further talks were needed to iron out details. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry released a statement, however, calling the meeting “regrettable” in light of what it called unilateral U.S. demands to denuclearize. This may be part and parcel of the negotiation process, but it’s hard to ignore that North Korea has not agreed to concrete steps going forward, has contradicted U.S. assessments of meetings and has cozied up to China even more than usual.
======================
FWIW I'm sensing it is time for President Trump to tell them it is time to shit or get off the pot and if the latter go full tilt sanctions-- hitting the Chinese firms involved as well.
If not, he will be taken as a blowhard here and elsewhere.
Shit or get off the pot applies to President Trump as well.
Yes
-
July 19, 2018
By Phillip Orchard
North Korea Talks Are Still at Square One
The U.S. has less leverage now than before.
When U.S. President Donald Trump agreed to meet with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in Singapore in June, he flipped the script on the normal diplomatic approach with an adversary like Pyongyang. The strategy was basically to celebrate the optics of the unprecedented high-level summit, get some sort of agreement, and figure out the details later.
The impulse to do this was understandable; previous strategies hadn’t worked. In the face of long stretches of withering sanctions pressure and threats of fire and fury, punctuated by fruitless periods of engagement and economic inducement, North Korea built nuclear weapons anyway, plus a healthy ballistic missile arsenal. And by helping to reduce tension and start a dialogue, the summit could make it easier for both sides to agree on a viable roadmap forward.
But diplomatic ingenuity and imagination will lead to little more than symbolism and stagecraft if out of step with underlying realities. Nimble diplomacy can pry open a window of opportunity, but it cannot hammer one out of a brick wall. Trump has been just as captive to this reality as his predecessors. Willingness to buck orthodoxy goes only so far.
The White House is evidently still searching for a way to backfill the Singapore agreement with substance. By all indications, the U.S. and North Korea are still miles apart on where to start.
Over the past few weeks, particularly since U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo came home reportedly exasperated and empty-handed from his trip to Pyongyang, the White House has been seeking to reduce expectations for quick progress with North Korea. On Tuesday, Trump himself said there’s now no time limit for North Korea’s denuclearization. This is a marked departure from the days following the summit when Trump said the North Korean nuclear threat had been resolved, and when the U.S. was still touting a timeline that would see North Korea hand over its nukes before the end of Trump’s first term.
The fact remains that North Korea has yet to explicitly declare in public an intent to hand over its nukes. In the Trump administration’s view, denuclearization needs to be complete, verifiable and irreversible – CVID for short. In Pyongyang’s view, denuclearization means effectively the same thing as what the U.S. agreed to in 1968 when it signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which requires Washington and other nuclear states to pursue disarmament – some day.
It’s certainly possible that North Korea has been much more explicit behind the scenes about denuclearizing on U.S. terms. It has a long and distinguished track record of duplicity. Such tactics have helped put it in the position it finds itself in today: a nuclear power, for all intents and purposes, stringing along the world’s sole superpower. And given its interest in staving off a war, easing sanctions pressure and exploring opportunities for major concessions from the U.S. – in particular, a substantially reduced U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula – Pyongyang would have an interest in saying whatever Washington needed to hear to get a protracted diplomatic process going.
But the joint communique signed at the Singapore summit didn’t contain an explicit commitment to CVID, nor did it outline any concrete steps toward that goal. And since then, none of Pyongyang’s actions have hinted that it’s willing to budge on the core issue, despite even the U.S. suspension of joint military drills with South Korea. It has continued work on nuclear facilities and stalled on dismantling missile test sites. When Pompeo tried to push CVID as the basis for negotiations, according to widespread reports, the North essentially shut down and politely waited for him to leave. So long as the U.S. is unable or unwilling to bear the risks of attempting to deal with the issue by force, it just doesn’t have much leverage. And there’s an argument to be made that it has even less leverage now that there are strong political incentives to show some kind of tangible progress.
In effect, North Korea is returning the negotiations to the format of those conducted with past U.S. administrations: a protracted slog over minor concessions that do little to bring about a grand bargain. The difference now is that North Korea is bargaining as a nuclear power, and the sanctions front is already starting to unravel. The sorts of tangible concessions the U.S. would normally be pushing for publicly at this point – controls on the shape, size and safety of the North’s nuclear program – would likely require an unpalatable admission by the U.S. that CVID is not actually on the table. Otherwise, a tacit “freeze for freeze” deal – in which the U.S. refrains from conducting major joint military drills with the South, while the North refrains from testing any ballistic missiles capable of striking the U.S. – may still be all that is obtainable. Most parties with a stake in the issue (Japan excepted) can likely live with such a deal, even if it would be inherently fragile. That’s only a failure if measured against successes declared after Singapore that never were.
-
any better result would have been a shock
While it is good Trump is trying I don't know why anyone thinks anything else would change . A big question is how much of this is China turning up the screws on us now in are behind at least some of this:
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-north-korea-negotiations-20180721-story.html#
Trump has shown himself to be more naive then Obama is some regards
lately at least
-
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/399604-us-intelligence-agencies-determine-that-north-korea-is-constructing
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/world/asia/north-korea-dismantling-missile-facilities.html
-
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/399604-us-intelligence-agencies-determine-that-north-korea-is-constructing
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/world/asia/north-korea-dismantling-missile-facilities.html
"U.S. intelligence agencies indicate North Korea is building new missiles, "
Sounds to me like Trump is putting his knowledge of this out to Un publicly. A development like this might actually help the process, it gives Trump cause to make a military strike during the so-called negotiations..
It doesn't make sense that Un was just going to give it all up based on a charm offensive.
-
"It doesn't make sense that Un was just going to give it all up based on a charm offensive."
Yes , hard to believe the prospect of a hotel gambling golf resort for the rich and famous with the gigantic letters TRUMP atop the building is going to buy him over.
(maybe the beautiful girls could.)
-
So, what now?
Do we keep "negotiating" without bringing something more to our game? Or?
Or is Trump going to wait until after the elections?
-
So, what now?
Do we keep "negotiating" without bringing something more to our game? Or?
Or is Trump going to wait until after the elections?
Well if Kim has nucs and ICBMs we don't have forever to negotiate
seems like we really need to know what Kim is doing . One would think he is using this negotiating process to delay for more development of his nucs
we can't just trust him.
Just don't know.
I feel safer not less with Bolton in there
but I am not a South Korean sitting in Seoul praying not to wake up to fire and brimstone and roof caving in and my sheets on fire
-
So, what now?
Do we keep "negotiating" without bringing something more to our game? Or?
Or is Trump going to wait until after the elections?
Armchair: if we were Trump...
First, can we predict what Mattis, Bolton and Pompeo each with present options and advice, then what should and what will Trump do?
Mattis respects and fears the start of using force there but has a menu of options already prepared for the President. Bolton is a hawk but takes a little different level of confidence to be talking to the Commander in Chief while his finger is on the button than network work or giving debate advice. Pompeo I believe is the go-to guy. If I were Trump I would lean toward what Pompeo thinks will sway Un from the options presented by Mattis. Then I would tell Un in almost specific terms the details of the impending attack, but not the timing. Give enough notice to either change course or at least not panic knowing the first strike will be a limited strike versus the second if needed that would not. I expect Trump to lay out in public what Un faces if what they are discussing in private isn't working.
If a full scale war is needed, maybe they can schedule it between the American election and our Christmas break, and let Un know that as well.
Another video we could share: General Mattis, what keeps you awake at night? Mattis: "Nothing. I keep other people awake at night."
-
Phillip Orchard |September 5, 2018
The denuclearization process with North Korea is going nowhere fast. Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said the U.S. has no plans to suspend any more major military exercises with South Korea. Mattis also said that smaller-scale exercises in the South would continue, lending credence to the North’s accusation that a nuclear submarine recently dropped off a fresh contingent of U.S. special operations forces at the Jinhae naval base for training. Halting these kinds of exercises was Washington’s portion of the tacit “freeze for freeze” agreement the United States and North Korea appeared to have reached a few months ago.
Also last week, U.S. President Donald Trump abruptly canceled a long-planned visit to Pyongyang by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, just days after Pompeo finally named a special envoy to spearhead working-level negotiations with the North. Trump’s decision was reportedly motivated by a letter he received the same day from Kim Jong Un’s spy chief, Kim Yong Chol, who warned that negotiations may fall apart if the White House fails to take steps toward negotiating a peace treaty with the North.
There’s no reason to believe North Korea is holding up its end of the bargain either. Most available evidence suggests Pyongyang continues to develop its ballistic missiles and its enrichment capabilities.
North Korea never pledged to denuclearize on the timeline the White House said it would, of course, and since Singapore, it has stymied the diplomatic process over largely symbolic issues. The two sides are at an impasse over how to move forward. The White House wants full denuclearization. Full denuclearization is a non-starter for Pyongyang. Surrendering its nuclear program would only invite an attack. A partial handover is possible, but the U.S. won’t abide by an agreement that simply allows the North to rebuild what it just gave away. A peace treaty is possible, but the North would demand that the U.S. withdraw its 28,000 troops from the peninsula – a nonstarter without full denuclearization. And even if Washington signed a peace treaty, it would be sacrificing its one source of leverage over the North.
(click to enlarge)
The issue is simple, if not easy. Unless the U.S. is willing to address North Korea’s nuclear program by force, the White House doesn’t have much leverage to induce capitulation. Washington can try to influence the size and shape of the North’s nuclear and missile arsenals, as well as its behavior as a nuclear power, and it could tolerate a nuclear North Korea for many of the same reasons it’s learned to live with a nuclear Pakistan: Islamabad doesn’t have the long-range missile technology needed to strike the U.S., and the alternative would be an exceedingly costly war. But it doesn’t exactly have much leverage for these lesser aims, either. International sanctions pressure has been gradually weakening, and South Korea has been busy pursuing its own reconciliation with the North in ways that are likely to further ease international pressure on Pyongyang. The U.S. has already played its military exercises card, and it won’t pull U.S. forces from the peninsula – at least not right now. It has promised economic investment to appeal to Kim’s designs on economic development, but Kim can’t do so without threatening his regime’s continued rule. And with Trump having declared in June that North Korea was no longer a nuclear threat, there’s political pressure on the White House to show results. Time is on the North’s side.
The U.S. is now attempting to regain some of the leverage it lost. It’s why the U.S. is threatening to restart military exercises that Pyongyang believes are a rehearsal for invasion. It’s also why the U.S. has tried to reinvigorate the sanctions regime. Yet it’s hard to see military drills or sanctions doing much to break the impasse. They haven’t yet – not even when international pressure peaked in 2017. That means the U.S. likely has bigger issues in mind in crafting its North Korea strategy — namely, China and Russia, the two countries most responsible for keeping the Kim regime afloat.
Over the past month, for example, the U.S. (unsuccessfully) sought a U.N. Security Council resolution to halt shipments of refined petroleum products to the North. It also slapped new penalties on Russian banks accused of laundering money on behalf of North Korean front companies (one of them based in China) and on a pair of Russian shipping firms accused of conducting ship-to-ship oil transfers with sanctioned North Korean ships. Last week, Vox reported that the U.S. is considering new secondary sanctions targeting Chinese and Russian banks and firms. The recent sanctions were too small to hurt much, but the sanctions could be read as warning shots of worse things to come. Given the fragility of the Russian and Chinese economies, it’s doubtful that either government missed the message.
The White House and the U.S. State Department, meanwhile, have both singled out China and Russia in their statements on North Korea. It’s safe to assume that they shifted the blame for political reasons, but China and Russia have always been bigger strategic threats than North Korea. The U.S. may not be able to resolve the North Korea nuclear crisis, but it can certainly weaponize it against its enemies. (In fact, it already has. Trump said Pompeo’s visit may not be rescheduled until after U.S.-China relations are repaired, suggesting the White House is eager to bind the two issues together.)
To be clear, neither Russia nor China are interested in a nuclear North Korea. It’s just that the threat it poses to them is subordinate to the threat the U.S. poses. North Korea, then, is just a bargaining chip. Moscow has sustained low-level economic support to Pyongyang as a way to bolster its image as global power-broker and seek concessions from the U.S. on, say, Ukraine and Syria. China supported the U.N. sanctions to forestall a war that might end with U.S. forces back on its border, but it continued to play ball because it thought doing so would keep the U.S. satisfied on trade.
In other words, every party to the Korean crisis – except for the two Koreas – is once again playing a bigger game. This is a familiar role for North Korea, which has long served as a pawn between outside powers. That’s why the North went nuclear in the first place. And in three weeks, Kim will celebrate the 70th anniversary of his country’s founding (reportedly with an envoy from Chinese President Xi Jinping) with Pyongyang in the rare of position of being able to bend this game to its advantage.
-
maybe if Trump promised to rename all of his buildings "Kim towers"...
meantime Kim cooled off some things and just bought another six months of time.
-
maybe if Trump promised to rename all of his buildings "Kim towers"...
meantime Kim cooled off some things and just bought another six months of time.
So, to play the same game China plays with the NorKs, put US nukes in Taiwan. If Xi wants the nukes out, he will insure the NorKs are nuke-free as well. Tit for tat. Enough screwing around.
-
" So, to play the same game China plays with the NorKs, put US nukes in Taiwan. If Xi wants the nukes out, he will insure the NorKs are nuke-free as well. Tit for tat. Enough screwing around."
Cuban missel situation in reverse.
Would Taiwan go for that?
-
The U.S. is continuing to put Russia at the center of the North Korea nuclear issue. On Friday, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo accused Russia of actively working to undermine U.N. Security Council sanctions on the Hermit Kingdom. This came a day after similar comments were made by U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley, who called for an urgent meeting of the UNSC for Monday, and following the U.S. imposition of new sanctions on two firms, one Russian and one Chinese, that have allegedly been acting as front companies for North Korean interests. Sanctions enforcement is certainly key to getting any kind of substantive concessions from Pyongyang, and Russia has certainly been acting as a lifeline for North Korea. But the U.S. is also motivated by its broader strategic concerns regarding China and Russia here, putting North Korea in a familiar role at the center of a burgeoning competition between larger powers.
-
Dissonance between the U.S. and South Korea. The United States is opposing plans made by Seoul and Pyongyang to set up a no-fly zone over the demilitarized zone, Reuters reported, citing unnamed sources. On Tuesday, the U.S. State Department expressed concern over how quickly the two Koreas are moving to develop a cross-border railway. Meanwhile, bilateral talks on sharing the cost of stationing U.S. troops in South Korea apparently have stalled. (The current arrangement expires at the end of 2018.) These reports come a week after a minor tiff broke out between the U.S. and South Korea over North Korean sanctions. The short version: Washington objected to deliberations Seoul held for lifting sanctions it imposed on Pyongyang in 2010. U.S. and South Korean interests in denuclearizing North Korea were never going to fully align, but the differences between them are becoming more apparent now that Seoul is getting much of what it wants. Watch for efforts by Pyongyang and Beijing to try to exploit these divides.
-
The elections are over. Over to you President Trump-- what are you going to do?
https://www.dailywire.com/news/38239/breaking-north-korea-moves-forward-missile-ben-shapiro?utm_source=shapironewsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_content=111218-news&utm_campaign=position2
-
I have speculated here that the Iranians (using the Obama-Kerry $150 billion?) may be behind the sudden acceleration in the Nork missile progress.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FoGklkSeq3g&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=429a4bf28d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-429a4bf28d-&mc_cid=429a4bf28d&mc_eid=%5BUNIQID%5D&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=9c4339e10c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-9c4339e10c-6358189&mc_cid=9c4339e10c&mc_eid=d7eaaa3130
-
I have speculated here that the Iranians (using the Obama-Kerry $150 billion?) may be behind the sudden acceleration in the Nork missile progress.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FoGklkSeq3g&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=429a4bf28d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-429a4bf28d-&mc_cid=429a4bf28d&mc_eid=%5BUNIQID%5D&utm_source=Clarion+Project+Newsletter&utm_campaign=9c4339e10c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_03_03_09_50&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_60abb35148-9c4339e10c-6358189&mc_cid=9c4339e10c&mc_eid=d7eaaa3130
No way! I'm sure Obama/Kerry got them to promise they wouldn't!
-
North Korea, post-conference. After the Hanoi conference between U.S. President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ended early, satellite images published by Washington think tank 38 North and confirmed by South Korea’s National Intelligence Service show that North Korea is rebuilding a launch site that it had previously agreed to destroy. The construction apparently began before the Hanoi summit. The launch site isn’t as important as it’s being made out to be; neither of North Korea’s two intercontinental ballistic missile tests in 2017 was launched from the site. Regardless, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton responded by making clear that, if the construction is in fact underway, North Korea can forget about sanctions relief. In the U.S. Senate, a bill was introduced Tuesday that seeks to impose additional sanctions on banks that do any business with the North Korean government. Yesterday, the United Nations reported that North Korea’s food production last year was the worst in a decade, and studies from South Korea-based research institutions suggest that the North’s economy could have shrunk by between 3.5 and 5 percent in 2017. This raises the question of how bad the North’s domestic situation really is, but, as we’ve written before, it remains extremely unlikely the North would give up its nuclear weapons in exchange for anything that the U.S. is willing to give.
-
The Logic of Trump’s North Korea Approach
He’s wisely stuck with sanctions, and it isn’t as if his predecessors ever had much success.
59 Comments
By Michael O’Hanlon
March 5, 2019 7:19 p.m. ET
There is lots to criticize in President Donald Trump’s North Korea policy. He sounds insensitive to the case of Otto Warmbier, displays more warmth toward Kim Jong Un than South Korea’s leaders, depicts military exercises with the South as “very provocative” and exaggerates his progress. Yet there may be a method here.
Mr. Trump’s approach to the North Korea problem has developed a certain logic: First, maintain strong international sanctions until a deal is struck. These sanctions cut North Korea’s trade by at least half in 2018, according to the Korea Development Institute. Second, sustain the U.S.-South Korea military deterrent. Although Mr. Trump’s rhetoric regrettably wavers, American troops remain in South Korea, and small-scale exercises have continued even as large ones have been curtailed. Third, use Mr. Trump’s personal chemistry with Mr. Kim to keep the risks of war within bounds while also giving Mr. Kim time to decide if he will accept a reasonable deal at the negotiating table.
Mr. Trump’s willingness to walk away in Hanoi, when Mr. Kim apparently insisted on the lifting of almost all key sanctions in exchange for limited nuclear concessions, was welcome in this regard. So, as my colleague Jung Pak points out, was Mr. Trump’s willingness to consider a peace treaty and the opening of diplomatic offices between the U.S. and North Korea during the same summit—a smart way to keep President Moon Jae-in, who is eager for rapprochement with Pyongyang, on board.
Mr. Trump’s approach to North Korea harks back in some ways to that of the Clinton administration, when former President Jimmy Carter and later former Defense Secretary Bill Perry made special efforts to reach out to Pyongyang. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice made similar efforts in George W. Bush’s administration. But these démarches were undertaken with Kim Jong Il, a particularly mercurial North Korean leader who was more interested in acquiring nuclear weapons than opening up to the world. They also were pursued in fits and starts, with misalignment between leaders in Seoul and Washington often impeding any sustained strategy.
As a result, over their 24 years in office Presidents Clinton, Bush and Obama failed to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions in any meaningful way. By the end of that period, North Korea had conducted five nuclear tests—a sixth followed, in 2017—and built an arsenal of several dozen nuclear warheads that continues to grow even as testing has been suspended. The U.S.-South Korea alliance was sustained through those two dozen years—but otherwise the record of traditional approaches to North Korea policy has been unblemished by much success. Mr. Trump’s strategy today should be evaluated partly against this sad legacy.
Kim Jong Un may be as brutal a leader as his father. But youthful perspective could change the situation substantially. With decades of rule potentially ahead of him, and with a nuclear arsenal already in place, he shows some interest in reform and détente. His byungjin strategy of development aspires to maintain a nuclear deterrent while reforming the economy. By showing a willingness to tolerate some parts of the North Korean arsenal at least for some time while lifting sanctions and encouraging foreign investment in exchange for elimination of nuclear production capabilities, Mr. Trump is making a smart offer to Mr. Kim. It may prove hard for the dictator to turn down.
No American or South Korean strategy can ensure success in nuclear negotiations; Washington and Seoul can only establish the parameters and boundaries within which Mr. Kim will decide on his next course of action. Mr. Trump has, with his outreach to Mr. Kim, effectively taken “bloody nose” military options off the table. But they were never advisable to begin with.
To be sure, throughout any future attempts at diplomacy, economic pressure must be preserved even in the face of Chinese, South Korean and Russian efforts to relax it. And the U.S. military alliance with South Korea must be undergirded by more numerous, smaller exercises as well as various modernization and readiness enhancements, even as large exercises are suspended. Mr. Trump probably should not reward Mr. Kim with a third summit absent some real reason to think he will deliver. But maybe, just maybe, as his choices become clearer, Mr. Kim will be inclined to do so.
Mr. O’Hanlon is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution.
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/13885/north-korea-human-rights
-
A raid on North Korea … in Spain. On Tuesday, a Spanish judge ruled to unseal details regarding a raid of the North Korean embassy in Madrid. Ten masked men entered the embassy on Feb. 22 carrying fake guns, ordered people tied up, and stole a number of computers and documents. Cheollima Civil Defense, a group that says it helps North Korean defectors, claimed responsibility for the raid but said it did not use force to enter the embassy out of regard for Spain. Following the raid, which came just a week before the U.S.-North Korea summit in Hanoi, several members of the group flew to the U.S. and turned over information stolen from the embassy to the FBI. Madrid is now asking that the intruders be extradited to face justice in Spain.
-
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2019/03/29/a_revolution_against_north_koreas_guerrilla_dynasty_and_gulag_state_114294.html?fbclid=IwAR2RmGEtKRuyM2jF8WrYifOuSDY6rplyYXqedTW-_XSSxTsqtJksKOmcQag
-
Deter? Detente? NATO Has Lessons for the North Korean Conundrum
A U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor from Kadena Air Base, Japan, conducted a flyover in the vicinity of Osan Air Base, South Korea, in response to recent provocative action by North Korea in 2016.
By Brad Roberts Lawrence Livermore National Lab, Council on Foreign Relations Read bio
April 22, 2019
Topics
Commentary
The U.S.-ROK alliance needs a strategy that supports best-case outcomes — and hedges against worst-case scenarios.
In the current moment of uncertainty and debate in the U.S.-ROK alliance about how to proceed in dealing with North Korea, it is useful to look for lessons in the experience of the transatlantic alliance. For decades, NATO has debated how to best balance deterrence and détente. The debate has its origins in the 1960s, as NATO adjusted to a changing world, and the Harmel Report of 1968, which argued that alliances serve both military and political purposes and must set agendas to maintain adequate defenses while promoting dialogue with the aim of resolving conflicts. NATO has also debated how to ensure that its deterrence and defense posture remains “fit for purpose” in an ever-changing security environment. NATO heads of state and government have for decades repeatedly expressed a commitment to maintain an “appropriate mix” of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities for deterrence at the lowest levels necessary in the security environment as it exists.
Related: The US and North Korea Are Back to Talking Tough
Related: The Plan to Resurrect the North Korea Nuclear Talks
Related: After Raising the Stakes for North Korea Summit, Trump Walks Away
The necessary balance between deterrence and détente is nowhere in more debate than in Seoul. On the one hand, there is broad agreement that the peace process with the North should be given a chance. This persists despite widespread disagreement about its prospects for success. In order to give peace a chance, various forms of military restraint have been put in place, including the cancellation of major exercises. Also on hold are the joint U.S.-ROK efforts to strengthen and adapt the regional deterrence architecture that began a decade ago. On the other hand, there is widespread recognition that North Korea continues to develop its deterrent forces even while engaging in the détente process. There is also rising concern about the negative impacts of China’s military modernization on the regional security environment. Thus in Seoul there is a rising debate about whether and how long to sustain the current deterrence restraint. As I heard repeatedly in a recent visit: “give peace a chance…don’t let the deterrence agenda get in the way…but will we know when it’s time to give up our cautious optimism?”
What should be done? How should deterrence and détente be balanced in the current circumstances?
Most Read
1
The French Ambassador Is Retiring. Here’s What He Really Thinks About Washington.
2
DARPA Seeks Space Robots to Repair Satellites
3
Deter? Detente? NATO Has Lessons for the North Korean Conundrum
Subscribe
Receive daily email updates:
Subscribe to the Defense One daily.
Be the first to receive updates.
Advertisement
Strengthening Deterrence, 2010-2018
The need to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture is not new. A decade ago, in recognition of the emerging nuclear and missile threat from the North, the U.S.-ROK alliance committed to a joint effort to strengthen and adapt the regional deterrence architecture to address new challenges. To that end, they agreed to tailor deterrence strategy, including extended nuclear deterrence, to new circumstances. To focus this effort, the bilateral Extended Deterrence Policy Committee, or EDPC, was formed in 2010. The EDPC helped identify the necessary adaptations through joint studies and analysis, including with the use of tabletop exercises. In 2012, it produced a tailored deterrence strategy to guide bilateral planning and force development. In April 2015, the EDPC and the Counter-Missile Capabilities Committee merged to become the Deterrence Strategy Committee. In 2016, an additional venue was added within the 2+2 framework, called the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group, to address broader regional security issues. The Trump administration has continued the dialogue on deterrence and the process of adapting the U.S. deterrent, as reflected in its reviews of nuclear and missile defense policy and posture. But there appears to be no practical agenda for further steps at this time to strengthen and adapt the regional deterrence architecture at this time.
Pursuing Détente from 2018
Don't Miss
Rose Gottemoeller, then Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, joined Anatoly Antonov, then Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, in a side event at the 2013 NPT Prepcom in Geneva.
America, You’re Not Listening to Us
The Sodium Guidestar at the Air Force Research Laboratory Directed Energy Directorate's Starfire Optical Range.
Laser Weapons: A Blueprint for Adding Them to the Force
Pentagon Wants to Test A Space-Based Weapon in 2023
Samwell Tarly, left, a junior intelligence officer of sorts, helps sort through after-action reviews at The Citadel.
What ‘Game of Thrones’ Teaches Us About Intelligence
This March 17, 2019 photo shows an aerial view of Offutt Air Force Base and the surrounding areas affected by flood waters in Neb.
US Air Force Needs $5 Billion To Fix Weather-Damaged Bases
Advertisement
The process of dialogue and summitry has not yet taken a decisive turn to success or failure. At this time, we can conceive of three possible outcomes.
First: definitive success. This would bring a peace treaty, denuclearization, and the termination of the United Nations Command. Whether it would also bring an end to the U.S. role as a security guarantor on the peninsula is an open question. A key uncertainty would be the extent to which China is seen as a military threat.
Second: definitive failure. This would bring a renewal of “maximum pressure” and debate about whether something more is needed in the way of preventive war, given the failure of the pressure campaign in this scenario. This would stoke great anxiety about the credibility and effectiveness of the alliance’s deterrence posture and the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent.
Third: stalemate. This would bring incomplete progress—an armistice without a peace agreement or denuclearization, or perhaps a peace agreement without denuclearization. An alternative outcome could involve removal of the North Korean threat to the United States but not to South Korea or Japan. These outcomes would stoke great anxiety about deterrence. Peace without denuclearization would bring especially complex questions about the future of U.S. extended deterrence.
As of spring 2019, we face neither clear success, nor clear failure, nor stalemate, but prolonged uncertainty. There is piecemeal progress on détente, but also continued evidence of North Korea’s further development of a medium-sized nuclear strike force. Anxieties about the consequences for the balance of confidence in the separate deterrent postures of the North and South are taking shape in Seoul. A rising sense of vulnerability has driven new debates, including deliberation over whether to maintain the posture of deterrence restraint or return to strengthening.
Some in Seoul argue that the Deterrence Strategy Committee should stand down entirely while the experiment in peace-making proceeds, as another sign of good faith by the U.S.-ROK alliance to help renew momentum. This is a distinctly minority view. Others in Seoul argue that the DSC should continue to identify steps to strengthen deterrence and that the alliance should take them, given the advances North Korea is making in operationalizing its nuclear deterrent. This too is a minority view. The majority view is that the effort to identify potential next steps in the strengthening and adaptation process should continue, but that those steps should be held in reserve for the moment.
Advertisement
In my assessment, the DSC process can serve three useful purposes in the current period of uncertainty. It can serve as a hedge against a breakdown of the peace process by defining what the alliance would be prepared to do in such a contingency. It can also serve as an incentive for Kim Jong-un to stay at the table by reinforcing the alliance’s message that further pursuit of nuclear capabilities will bring not advantage but risk. Finally, it can serve as a partial foundation for exploring how deterrence challenges might evolve over the coming decade if and when competition for advantage in cyber space and outer space intensifies.
At this time of uncertainty, the alliance needs a strategy that supports best-case outcomes but also hedges against worst-case scenarios. Harmel would advise that because the alliance serves both military and political purposes, it should sustain the process of strengthening and adapting deterrence while continuing to pursue denuclearization. But it doesn’t make sense to put this approach front-and-center in the alliance’s public diplomacy. Until there is some clarity about the results of the current détente and the real prospects for denuclearization, further steps to strengthen the alliance’s deterrence posture should speak for themselves. As one expert in Seoul put it, let’s keep the process “on simmer.”
Back to the NATO Analogy
As the U.S.-ROK alliance tries to re-balance deterrence and détente in light of new evidence about Kim’s intentions and rising anxiety in the South, we should expect an intensifying political debate. But when it comes to deterrence, we should not simply expect a return to the discussion that was underway before the Trump-Kim opening. Rather, we should expect a different debate—one involving more difficult questions for the United States. What is the “appropriate mix” of deterrence and defense capabilities for the U.S.-ROK alliance? What would make it “fit for purpose?”
Over the last decade, the U.S.-ROK alliance has sought to strengthen its deterrence posture comprehensively with political measures to signal collective resolve, strong leadership messages, a balance of conventional forces favorable to the alliance, improved long-range strike capabilities, missile defenses, resilience in cyber space, and what the United States calls “a tailored nuclear component.” That is, the United States has maintained (and is modernizing) the ability to deploy nuclear bombs into the region with both strategic and non-strategic aircraft, with the expectation of potentially doing so during mounting political-military crisis. It has also committed to two supplemental capabilities in the U.S. nuclear posture for bolstering extended deterrence. The United States backs these capabilities with a clear declaratory policy, reserving the right to employ nuclear weapons when the vital interests of an ally are at risk.
Both capitals have broadly supported this overall approach over the last decade. But a minority camp deems it inadequate and its voice is becoming more insistent. Policymakers in the United States should expect a spike of interest in South Korea in restoring a permanent U.S. nuclear presence (all U.S. nuclear weapons were removed from South Korea at the end of the Cold War). They should also expect a rising debate in South Korea about whether it should provide for its own nuclear deterrence requirements if the United States is unwilling to do so.
Advertisement
What about “fit for purpose?” Over the years, I have regularly heard South Koreans argue that “the nuclear deterrence you give your European allies is more and better than what you give your Asian allies.” This argument has become much more frequent and impassioned, despite persist U.S. efforts to explain the logic of the different extended deterrence postures in Europe and Asia. There is a steadily rising demand in Seoul for “NATO-like” nuclear deterrence arrangements, but there are many misperceptions of what “NATO-like” actually means.
NATO’s nuclear deterrent has three main elements. The first is political: high-level political statements about the roles of nuclear weapons in alliance strategy, along with supporting declaratory policies from the capitals of its three nuclear-armed members. The second is military-technical: the capabilities to employ nuclear weapons. For NATO, this means the “sharing arrangements” provided by fighter-aircraft certified for both conventional and nuclear munitions, which are operated by some NATO members and prepared to deliver weapons in war under the authority of the U.S. president. These offer deterrent value because they demonstrate to potential adversaries that an attack on one will be treated as an attack on all and will necessarily implicate the United States in a response. The third is procedural: a consultative process that informs policy development and planning in peacetime, that would inform leadership decision-making in a crisis, and that would share the burden of decision in war.
Some of these elements are already in place in the U.S.-ROK alliance. Additional elements might be adopted and new elements might be created. Each would involve benefits, costs, and risks, though advocates and opponents of different options generally focus on only one aspect or another. In assessing costs and risks, it will be important to look beyond the peninsula for the consequences of different U.S.-ROK deterrence postures for regional security more broadly and for the global nonproliferation regime.
In sum, the next big deterrence debates in the U.S.-ROK alliance will likely focus on the needed “tailored nuclear component” that will be “fit for purpose” for deterring a North Korea that has not denuclearized. As nuclear policy is inherently controversial, stakeholders in a sound approach should start the homework required to promote informed debate now.
The views expressed here are those of the author and should not be attributed to any institution with which he is affiliated.
-
By Phillip Orchard
North Korean Missiles and the US Red Line
For perhaps the first time in decades, Pyongyang feels like it’s operating from a position of strength.
The tacit deal between the U.S. and North Korea is still holding: In exchange for scaled back joint U.S.-South Korea military exercises, North Korea has held off on intercontinental ballistic missile testing. U.S. President Donald Trump affirmed as much during his state visit to Tokyo this weekend, brushing off Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s concerns about North Korea’s tests of new short-range missiles, which it launched into the sea of Japan earlier this month – Pyongyang’s first ballistic missile tests in more than a year and a half. So long as the North refrains from resuming ICBM testing, the U.S. can be content to let the impasse drag out indefinitely, even if in public Washington continues to demand full denuclearization.
(click to enlarge)
But the test of the North’s newest missiles, which appear curiously similar to Russian Iskanders, along with other recent developments, illustrates the reality that Pyongyang can’t as easily stand pat. It needs sanctions relief and economic aid. It’s keen to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its allies and further reduce U.S. military options. And now, with a growing capability to deposit a nuclear weapon just about anywhere in the region, it can move more aggressively to try to meet its needs – even without crossing Washington’s red line of testing missiles that can hit the U.S. mainland.
South Korea in the Crosshairs
North Korea’s primary reason for going nuclear was regime security. Pyongyang watched as Moammar Gadhafi and Saddam Hussein abandoned their nuclear programs and met inglorious deaths. It noted that when China, India and Pakistan went nuclear, the West briefly raised hell before quickly shifting to engagement.
But there are other benefits to its nuclear program. For example, there’s newfound prestige abroad and, perhaps more important for the regime of Kim Jong Un, at home. It also allows Pyongyang to act more aggressively in the region without worrying about an overreach that would trigger major blowback. The risks of going to war with a nuclear state are simply too high to respond to a provocation with enough conventional force to deter future provocations, typically forcing other regional powers to hold or at least limit their fire out of fear of escalation. This paradigm has kept a lid on India and Pakistan’s conflict over Kashmir since the late 1990s.
North Korea could put this dynamic in play with the South. Reunification of the Korean Peninsula is a geopolitical imperative for both Seoul and Pyongyang. Neither can reunify by force without significant outside help. Under President Moon Jae-in, South Korea, in an effort to stave off another U.S. war on the peninsula, align the strategic interests of the two Koreas, and lay the groundwork for a long-term reconciliation, has pursued a robust engagement agenda with the North. Pyongyang, which needs economic assistance and is keen to see the U.S. gone from the peninsula, would prefer that these happen through reconciliation rather than provocation. But, constrained primarily by the inflexibility of the U.S. position on sanctions and by other factors like his declining popularity at home, Moon’s outreach has largely stalled. And U.S.-South Korea exercises, though scaled back and redesigned to avoid simulating an invasion of the North, have continued.
Thus, one goal of North Korea’s latest missile and artillery tests is to persuade Seoul that, if forced by Washington to pick a side, Pyongyang is its best long-term bet. The particular missile tested reinforces this message in two ways. One, it is the North’s first solid-fuel short-range ballistic missile with a range covering all of South Korea, including major U.S. military bases in the southern parts of the country and key ports where U.S. forces would arrive to support an invasion. (Unlike their relatively unstable liquid fuel counterparts, solid fuel engines don’t need to be fueled up right before use, allowing for quicker launches, greater mobility, camouflaging and pre-positioning options.) Two, the Iskander can fly on a flat trajectory at an altitude of 25-30 miles (40-50 kilometers). This would potentially allow it to exploit a coverage gap in the U.S. missile defense architecture currently deployed on the peninsula; that altitudeis just outside of the range of Patriot missile interceptors and just below the engagement floor of THAAD and Aegis systems. For good measure, it’s also believed to have greater maneuverability at low altitudes than most ballistic missiles, further complicating missile defense plans.
In other words, Pyongyang is trying to make the case to Seoul that preserving U.S. security guarantees is no longer worth the cost of derailing reconciliation with the North. The new missile alone won’t do the trick; South Korea can’t abandon the leverage of U.S. backing just yet, and it still needs U.S. counterstrike guarantees to remain in place. But, at a time when the White House is repeatedly threatening to pull up stakes if Seoul doesn’t pay the full cost of the U.S. presence on the peninsula (plus, per Donald Trump’s insistence, as much as a 50 percent premium), it deepens the wedge between Washington and Seoul and tilts Seoul’s long-term calculus in Pyongyang’s favor.
South Korea is certainly preparing for the day when it needs to stand on its own. Recent moves by the South, such as the launch of new military exercises aimed at accelerating the return of wartime operational control over its own forces from the U.S., should be viewed in this light.
Getting Washington’s Attention
The new missile tests were also aimed at nudging Washington away from its Hanoi summit position of refusing any sanctions relief until the North fully denuclearizes. Sanctions have never been able to bring the Kim regime to its knees. But Kim is increasingly staking his legacy on his ability to deliver economic prosperity – repeatedly pledging in public that while a nuclear program brought isolation and poverty, nuclear statehood will bring the opposite. Now, he needs to show some results. The international sanctions regime could unravel even if the U.S. declines to relent; Russia or China could block renewal of U.N. sanctions. But with these and other countries wary of getting slapped with secondary sanctions by the U.S., Pyongyang is eager to get Washington to back off as well.
In this context, that the North’s new missile appears at minimum inspired by Russian missile designs is noteworthy. There’s currently no evidence that Moscow helped the North build its new missile. North Korea has proved adept at swiping and cloning other military technologies in the past, and since Russia has exported Iskanders to other countries and used them in Syria, it’s not hard to imagine the North accessing the technology in other ways. (South Korea and Ukraine also have missile programs inspired by the Iskander.)
(click to enlarge)
But it’s also not far-fetched to hypothesize that there’s indeed a fresh set of Russian fingerprints on North Korea’s new missiles. The tests occurred less than three weeks after Kim’s high-profile visit with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Vladivostok in late April. Russia shares the North’s interest in seeing the U.S. alliance structure in Northeast Asia unravel. And for decades, Moscow has sought to retain influence in Pyongyang primarily as leverage against Washington on other more pressing issues in Central and Eastern Europe. Whether or not Moscow actually transferred missile technology to Pyongyang, the tests serve as a reminder that it could if the U.S. doesn’t play ball elsewhere – perhaps even helping Pyongyang overcome critical hurdles in its ICBM program.
This suits Pyongyang’s interests. At present, the North has yet to demonstrate that it has mastered ICBM re-entry capability – the trickiest part of long-range missile development. Its Hwasong-15 ICBMs can fly far enough to hit the U.S. mainland, but there’s no evidence they can hit their target with any degree of certainty. To keep the U.S. from stalling indefinitely on sanctions relief, Pyongyang wants to persuade Washington of its ability (with a bit of outside help) of making this last leap in missile technology. It’s attempting to make the case that the suspension of its ICBM program was a good faith move meriting reciprocal concessions and that, most important, it was a choice – one that Pyongyang could choose to reverse.
We’re doubtful that Pyongyang will push forward with ICBM testing again anytime soon, with or without Moscow’s help. There just wouldn’t be that much to gain by provoking the U.S. in such a manner, and potentially a lot to lose. At minimum, doing so would make it easier for the U.S. to sustain a broad sanctions front. But for perhaps the first time in decades, the North feels like it’s operating from a position of strength and has every interest in seeing just what nuclear statehood entitles it. Don’t expect Kim to stay quiet.
-
https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/06/north-koreas-nuclear-bomb-much-bigger-previously-thought/157469/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
-
just wait till they get to megaton size a bomb in next few yrs
-
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/07/north-korean-icbm-can-hit-anywhere-in-the-united-states-us-forces-korea-acknowledges/?utm_campaign=DailyEmails&utm_source=AM_Email&utm_medium=email
-
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2019/07/north-korean-icbm-can-hit-anywhere-in-the-united-states-us-forces-korea-acknowledges/?utm_campaign=DailyEmails&utm_source=AM_Email&utm_medium=email
A nuclear Japan and/or Taiwan could reach all over Asia.
-
North Korea Likely Suffering Worst Downturn Since 1990s
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-16/north-korea-likely-suffering-worst-downturn-since-1990s-famine
Or he could make a deal with Trump and change the course of history...
-
" .Or he could make a deal with Trump and change the course of history..."
This could be N Korea:
http://acerealty.co.kr/sale/for_sale.php
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/huawei-secretly-helped-north-korea-build-maintain-wireless-network-washington-post_3011690.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=b3ef5a181f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_07_22_09_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-b3ef5a181f-239065853
-
By GPF Staff
Daily Memo: North Korea’s Missile Tests,
All the news worth knowing today.
North Korea’s missile tests. North Korea launched two short-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan early on Friday. The first, which traveled an estimated 430 kilometers (270 miles) at an altitude of just around 50 kilometers, appears to be another KN-23 – the solid-fueled missile that Pyongyang first tested back in May. This particular missile is important for two reasons. First, it represents another step forward in North Korea’s effort to develop missiles with solid-fuel engines, which are much easier to move, camouflage and launch quickly – and which could have major implications for its development of submarine-launched ballistic missiles. (It’s notable that the test came just two days after North Korean state media showed Kim Jong Un checking in on the construction of a new submarine.) Second, the KN-23 is believed to be a clone of Russia’s Iskander missiles, which can fly on a low trajectory with a greater degree of maneuverability than most ballistic missiles, posing major challenges for missile defense systems. Notably, the second missile, which flew some 690 kilometers, is a new type of missile. It flew at the same altitude at the first, but with the range to potentially put U.S. bases in Japan in the crosshairs. It’s tempting to interpret every North Korean missile test as intended to increase pressure on the Trump administration in the nuclear negotiations. And, indeed, this one came as U.S. national security adviser John Bolton was visiting South Korea, and it follows North Korean grousing about upcoming U.S.-South Korean military exercises and frustration over U.S. inaction on sanctions relief. But North Korea has practical reasons to do these tests, which are critical to the development of more sophisticated missiles. And after the May tests, the U.S. effectively made it clear that so long as it doesn’t test intercontinental ballistic missiles, Pyongyang is free to test as many shorter-range missiles as it likes.
=========================================================
South Korea, Russia: What to Make of a Midair Interception Over Disputed Waters
Seoul said it fired warning shots at a Russian aircraft in its claimed airspace on July 23, but Moscow denied that it intruded on South Korean airspace.
(KOREA POOL/AFP/Getty Images)
Stratfor's geopolitical guidance provides insight on what we're watching out for in the week ahead.
Print
LinkedIn
Twitter
Facebook
Mail
Save As PDF
Bookmark
Listen
The Big Picture
With Russia and China cooperating more closely in the Asia-Pacific and Seoul-Tokyo tensions at a high, a series of incidents in South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone and claimed airspace raises questions about Seoul's place amid broader regional shifts.
See Asia-Pacific: Among Great Powers
What Happened
An odd set of confrontations unfolded July 23 around the Korean Peninsula involving South Korea, Russia, China and Japan. According to an official South Korean account of the events, early on July 23, two Chinese H-6 bombers entered South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) near Ieodo, a submerged rock claimed by both South Korea and China in the Yellow Sea. They later entered the ADIZ once again at Ulleung island off South Korea's east coast in the Sea of Japan before being joined by Russian TU-50 bombers and re-entering the ADIZ for a third time. After this, a Russian A-50 early warning aircraft and two Tu-95 bombers entered the ADIZ around Dokdo Island — a maritime space that Japan also claims as the Takeshima Islands — before the A-50 passed into South Korean-claimed airspace, leaving it and then reentering it again. South Korea scrambled jets to respond to both alleged entries by the A-50, firing both warning shots and flares.
This map shows the overlapping air defense identification zones in the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan.
Moscow, on the other hand, insists its aircraft did not impinge on any country's airspace and that their movement was part of a maiden joint long-range Sino-Russian patrol that had been previously scheduled to overfly international waters in the Sea of Japan and the East China Sea. Russia also underscored that it does not recognize the South Korean-declared ADIZ. South Korea filed formal diplomatic protests with Russia over the incidents. Japan followed suit, saying the Russian and Chinese bombers entered Japan's ADIZ in the East China Sea and that it had also scrambled jets in response. Tokyo also specifically condemned both South Korea and Russia for the actions in its airspace.
What It Could Mean
The anomalous series of events raises several questions. Intrusions into East China Sea airspace claimed by both China and Japan are fairly common — even sometimes involving South Korea. While the Japanese routinely scramble aircraft to counter East China Sea intrusions, it's unusual to see Russian aircraft in the area near South Korea in which the July 23 incident took place, making this encounter the first of its kind.
While a navigational error due to human error or equipment malfunction could have sent Russia's A-50 over Dokdo, the Russian flight path reported by South Korea shows a fairly tight loop around the disputed feature, raising the possibility that the Russian pilot's course was deliberate. Even if accidental, the Sino-Russian joint exercise and other ongoing activities highlight that infractions will inevitably become more frequent as Russia and China continue to increase aerial patrols in the airspace over the Sea of Japan, raising the risk that further incidents will occur. If it was an intentional act, the aircraft's entry into South Korea's claimed airspace would be both a brazen and risky maneuver, raising questions about Russia's intent — and, in the broader context of the joint exercise, perhaps China's as well. Notably, the alleged Chinese entry into South Korea's ADIZ was limited to Ieodo, a feature that China also claims and the site of frequent challenges to South Korean claims.
If it was an intentional act, the aircraft's entry into South Korea's claimed airspace would be both a brazen and risky maneuver, raising questions about Russia's intent.
South Korea's response was also unusually vehement — warning shots are rarely part of such an interception. For South Korea, the passage through the airspace around Dokdo is particularly troublesome given that the land feature there is its anchor in its efforts to extend its ADIZ to the northeast. That this was part of long-planned Russia-China joint patrols that included incursions in other corners of the ADIZ is doubly concerning for Seoul. It also marks an actual Russian flight over South Korean-claimed airspace — which is of much greater significance than an ADIZ fly-through.
Background
This series of incidents, which comes amid greater alignment between Russia and China in the Asia-Pacific, echoes an apparently coordinated action between the two countries in 2016 to sail through Japanese-claimed waters in the East China Sea around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. The Dokdo/Takeshima incident also comes amid a dispute between South Korea and Japan that has morphed into a low-level trade war — providing increased incentive for South Korea to underscore its sovereignty over the disputed geographical features.
-
More weapons tests. For the fifth time in just over two weeks, North Korea carried out a weapons test, this time launching two short-range ballistic missiles early Saturday morning off its east coast. U.S. defense officials said the missiles, which flew about 250 miles (400 kilometers), resembled other recent tests. U.S. President Donald Trump shrugged off the launches – noting that they were of short-range missiles – while praising a new letter from North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. Trump acknowledged that the tests were intended to show Pyongyang’s discontent with U.S.-South Korean military exercises and voiced his own displeasure with the cost to the U.S. of such joint drills. North Korea has not tested any long-range intercontinental missiles since late 2017, a sign that, the White House says, the diplomatic track has borne fruit. American allies in the region like South Korea and Japan, which are within range of the missiles now being tested, are less enthusiastic about the fact that the North has effectively been given a green light to test increasingly sophisticated short-range weapons. South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff said more missile tests were highly probable. Meanwhile, Trump tweeted today that Kim expressed an interest in restarting U.S.-North Korean talks once the ongoing U.S.-South Korea drills are over.
-
Japan says South Korea fails to understand North Korea threat with ending of intelligence pact
Ties between the East Asian neighbours, both important US allies, were already at their lowest ebb in years before South Korea’s decision to end the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA)
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3024106/japan-says-south-korea-fails-understand-north-korea-threat
-
https://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/290884/north-korean-israeli-shadow-war
-
U.S. Targets North Korean Hacking as Rising National-Security Threat
For Pyongyang, cyber prowess is crucial source of revenue, political leverage
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un’s willingness to talk about denuclearization may stem from a belief that the country’s cyber arsenal can partially supplant its weapons as a threat to other nations. Photo: KCNA/KNS/Associated Press
By Ian Talley and
Dustin Volz
Sept. 15, 2019 7:00 am ET
WASHINGTON—New U.S. sanctions against North Korean hackers and revelations about North Korean malware show how Pyongyang’s cyber operations have become a crucial revenue stream and a security threat that soon could rival its weapons program, U.S. and industry officials say.
North Korea’s hacks of financial systems and critical infrastructure world-wide reveal sophisticated cyber capabilities developed to counter global sanctions and expand Pyongyang’s geopolitical power, according to these officials.
The U.S. Treasury Department, in blacklisting the three hacking groups allegedly run by North Korea’s primary intelligence service, said Friday they collectively were responsible for operations across 10 countries, stealing hundreds of millions of dollars from banks and cryptocurrency exchanges, pilfering military secrets, destabilizing infrastructure and intimidating adversaries.
Attacks that cyber experts suspect were orchestrated by North Korea are becoming more frequent.
Treasury says one collective, called Lazarus Group, and two subsidiaries, known as Bluenoroff and Andariel, have stolen around $700 million in the last three years and have attempted to steal nearly $2 billion.
U.S. security officials and cyber experts say those sums of money likely underrepresent the amount of cash Pyongyang’s hackers have secured. United Nations investigators last month tallied proceeds from all reported operations, including those carried out by other North Korean hacking groups, at $2 billion in recent years. Some thefts likely aren’t reported to authorities for fear of embarrassment and exposure, a senior U.S. official said.
North Korean officials didn’t respond to a request for comment but historically have denied accusations of engaging in malicious cyber activity.
Treasury said it also has been working with the Department of Homeland Security’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, as well as with the U.S. military’s Cyber Command in recent months to disclose malware samples to private industry. Last week, under its North Korean malicious cyberactivity rubric “Hidden Cobra,” the administration issued a public alert about a new version of malware dubbed “ELECTRICFISH” that burrows into victims’ computers to steal data.
Senior administration and industry officials say that many reported, but not publicly disclosed, attacks on banks and other companies bear hallmarks of North Korean involvement.
“Though these operations may fund the hackers themselves, their sheer scale suggests that they are a financial lifeline for a regime that has long depended on illicit activities to fund itself,” said John Hultquist, director of intelligence analysis at the U.S. cybersecurity company FireEye Inc.
Cyber Command ranks North Korea’s capabilities along with China, Russia and Iran as top strategic threats to U.S. national security.
Underscoring the geopolitical leverage its hacking abilities give Pyongyang, industry experts say North Korean leader Kim Jong Un ’s willingness to at least talk about denuclearization over the past year may be from a belief that the country’s cyber arsenal can partially supplant its weapons as a threat to other nations.
U.N. investigators and members of a North Korean defectors group in South Korea say the North’s hackers are carefully selected and groomed at an early age by the military and secret services and given specialized training. Photo: Wong Maye-E/Associated Press
“North Korea’s cyber operations broaden the Kim family regime’s toolkit for threatening the military, economic, and even the political strength of its adversaries and enemies,” said Mathew Ha and David Maxwell, North Korean experts at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, a Washington nonpartisan think tank, in a report.
With the U.N. and U.S. squeezing traditional high-value revenue streams such as North Korean coal exports, the hacking operations appear to be so lucrative for the cash-hungry regime that cybersecurity experts say it is unlikely Pyongyang will be pressured through sanctions into curtailing its malicious behavior.
U.S. officials say their investigations show that some of the money from cyber-theft is channeled into Mr. Kim’s nuclear weapons and ballistic-missile programs. Cyber-enabled heists also have become an essential source of revenue keeping the regime in power and insulating the economy from the global sanctions meant to force Pyongyang into giving up its weapons of mass destruction, U.S. and U.N. officials say.
In addition, North Korea’s cyberattacks generate income in ways that are harder to trace than many of its other illicit activities, U.N. officials said in a report last month. The U.N. is investigating at least 35 reported North Korean cyberattacks across five continents targeting banks, cryptocurrency exchanges and mining companies.
The Trump administration previously has blamed the Lazarus Group for the WannaCry worm, which was unleashed in 2017, infecting more than 300,000 computers in more than 150 countries, crippling banks, hospitals and other companies. The Justice Department last year charged a North Korean operative, Park Jin Hyok, and unnamed co-conspirators, tying them to the WannaCry work, the 2014 hack on Sony Pictures and the $81 million stolen from Bangladesh’s account at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in 2016.
It was only a typo in the Bangladesh heist that prevented the hackers from stealing $851 million they planned to transfer, officials say.
Since the beginning of 2019 alone, North Korean agents have attempted five major cyber-thefts world-wide, including a successful $49 million heist from an institution in Kuwait, according to the U.N.
U.N. investigators and members of a North Korean defectors group in South Korea say the North’s hackers are carefully selected and groomed at an early age by the military and secret services and given specialized training.
North Korean cyber collectives often use a variety of different schemes for revenue generation, as well as lay the groundwork for future hacks, according to experts on North Korea and cybersecurity.
U.S. intelligence, security companies and North Korea watchers say that while they believe many of the freelance operations are largely for revenue-generation purposes, they also represent a major threat because of their infiltration of Western security systems.
They do so by working as software programmers who contract their services through freelance platforms, concealing that they are North Korean agents.
Many companies rely on the freelance software platforms where “there’s no vetting process or validation to ensure you’re not working with sanctioned entities,” said a top official at a private technology company that sells its products to the U.S. government and other Western allies.
-
some good points:
https://patriotpost.us/articles/65971-video-bolton-vs-trump-on-north-korea-2019-10-09
John Bolton
from Pravda . (all very eager to publish ):
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/politics/bolton-trump-north-korea.html
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/politics/bolton-trump-north-korea.html
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/us/politics/bolton-trump-north-korea.html
Bolton is right but his approach is missing one step. Trump needs to be reelected if NK is going to be denuclearized.
-
Ding! Ding! We have a winner!
-
https://www.zdnet.com/article/confirmed-north-korean-malware-found-on-indian-nuclear-plants-network/?fbclid=IwAR2ZgDweSaA1ncb3fLmG7IEN5EGMF5DQVHd5HjHyiH_T44JTPdm7KdCsH9g
-
Trump's Defense Price Hike Rocks the U.S.-South Korean Alliance
4 MINS READ
Nov 15, 2019 | 22:08 GMT
The Big Picture
The U.S.-South Korean alliance, central to U.S. regional strategy in Asia, has gone through ups and downs due to South Korean political upheaval, Seoul's troubled relations with Tokyo and differences over North Korea. New disagreements over defense costs will add another challenge that could complicate their relationship.
What Happened
As far as price hikes go, it is a large one. U.S. President Donald Trump has reportedly demanded that South Korea pay $4.7 billion next year — or 400 percent more than what it currently pays — for continued U.S. defense protection. The move comes as the Special Measures Agreement, the burden-sharing pact that covers how much South Korea pays for the U.S. military presence on its soil, is once again up for renegotiation.
This is not the first time that Trump has sought to increase the price South Korea pays for the U.S. military presence. When the Special Measures Agreement came up for negotiation last year, Trump demanded a 50 percent increase before settling on an 8 percent rise. At the same time, the countries agreed to revisit the agreement every year. Ultimately, Trump's demand is likely to hurt the key U.S.-South Korean alliance and lead Seoul to seriously question its dependence on Washington and continue its push toward more self-reliance on defense.
Why It Matters
Reportedly alarmed at the abrupt price hike, the Pentagon and the State Department are struggling to justify the increase to their South Korean partners. The two institutions are reportedly seeking to do so by counting — for the first time — readiness, joint drills and force rotations into the payment scheme. To date, South Korea has rejected these reasons, arguing that they exceed the scope of the bilateral defense agreement and that Seoul should pay only for the direct basing upkeep of the U.S. presence in South Korea.
For South Korea, the request amplifies a growing sense that the United States is untrustworthy, as well as a desire to become more self-reliant in security and pursue more independent policies.
Given that Trump has come down on price before, he could compromise once more during negotiations that could last several months. But given its initial position, there is less chance that the United States will lower its demand enough to avoid tarnishing ties with South Korea. It is possible that the United States could reduce the price if South Korea agreed to renew its intelligence-sharing pact with Japan amid the East Asian neighbors' recent deteriorating ties, maintain a ban on Huawei technology, and/or agree to host U.S. intermediate-range missiles, but it is unclear whether Trump would view such issues as meaningful compromises.
The Upshot
The U.S.-South Korean relationship is a longstanding and important military alliance in the region. If Washington refuses to reduce its price for troop deployments, it could deal a significant blow to bilateral ties, especially as South Korea's government could hardly countenance the costs ahead of legislative elections in April 2020.
The request is symptomatic of two wider drives. For the United States, the price demand stems from the White House's push to renegotiate and potentially restructure its military commitments around the world, particularly with countries that have developed into wealthy states that can afford significant defensive outlays. For South Korea, the request amplifies a growing sense that the United States is untrustworthy, as well as a desire to become more self-reliant in security and pursue more independent policies, both of which could complicate Washington's regional strategies. Greater friction in the alliance would likely accelerate Seoul's move away from Washington to the extent that South Korea could even consider acquiring nuclear weapons in the long term — something that a number of former South Korean officials have already deemed a potential necessity.
-
South Korea should be able to defend it's self without us.
Trump's Defense Price Hike Rocks the U.S.-South Korean Alliance
4 MINS READ
Nov 15, 2019 | 22:08 GMT
The Big Picture
The U.S.-South Korean alliance, central to U.S. regional strategy in Asia, has gone through ups and downs due to South Korean political upheaval, Seoul's troubled relations with Tokyo and differences over North Korea. New disagreements over defense costs will add another challenge that could complicate their relationship.
What Happened
As far as price hikes go, it is a large one. U.S. President Donald Trump has reportedly demanded that South Korea pay $4.7 billion next year — or 400 percent more than what it currently pays — for continued U.S. defense protection. The move comes as the Special Measures Agreement, the burden-sharing pact that covers how much South Korea pays for the U.S. military presence on its soil, is once again up for renegotiation.
This is not the first time that Trump has sought to increase the price South Korea pays for the U.S. military presence. When the Special Measures Agreement came up for negotiation last year, Trump demanded a 50 percent increase before settling on an 8 percent rise. At the same time, the countries agreed to revisit the agreement every year. Ultimately, Trump's demand is likely to hurt the key U.S.-South Korean alliance and lead Seoul to seriously question its dependence on Washington and continue its push toward more self-reliance on defense.
Why It Matters
Reportedly alarmed at the abrupt price hike, the Pentagon and the State Department are struggling to justify the increase to their South Korean partners. The two institutions are reportedly seeking to do so by counting — for the first time — readiness, joint drills and force rotations into the payment scheme. To date, South Korea has rejected these reasons, arguing that they exceed the scope of the bilateral defense agreement and that Seoul should pay only for the direct basing upkeep of the U.S. presence in South Korea.
For South Korea, the request amplifies a growing sense that the United States is untrustworthy, as well as a desire to become more self-reliant in security and pursue more independent policies.
Given that Trump has come down on price before, he could compromise once more during negotiations that could last several months. But given its initial position, there is less chance that the United States will lower its demand enough to avoid tarnishing ties with South Korea. It is possible that the United States could reduce the price if South Korea agreed to renew its intelligence-sharing pact with Japan amid the East Asian neighbors' recent deteriorating ties, maintain a ban on Huawei technology, and/or agree to host U.S. intermediate-range missiles, but it is unclear whether Trump would view such issues as meaningful compromises.
The Upshot
The U.S.-South Korean relationship is a longstanding and important military alliance in the region. If Washington refuses to reduce its price for troop deployments, it could deal a significant blow to bilateral ties, especially as South Korea's government could hardly countenance the costs ahead of legislative elections in April 2020.
The request is symptomatic of two wider drives. For the United States, the price demand stems from the White House's push to renegotiate and potentially restructure its military commitments around the world, particularly with countries that have developed into wealthy states that can afford significant defensive outlays. For South Korea, the request amplifies a growing sense that the United States is untrustworthy, as well as a desire to become more self-reliant in security and pursue more independent policies, both of which could complicate Washington's regional strategies. Greater friction in the alliance would likely accelerate Seoul's move away from Washington to the extent that South Korea could even consider acquiring nuclear weapons in the long term — something that a number of former South Korean officials have already deemed a potential necessity.
-
Allies like Germany and South Korea should not have to pay for their own security because _____ .
Trump's willingness to take on these tough issues is a political winner for him at home. His 'unconventional' style is a plus in negotiations. A real straight shooter might say that we will pay it all if you don't - as we have for decades.
-
" .South Korea should be able to defend it's self without us."
I don't know.
N K has nuclear devices
S K does not.
the balance of power would be greater shifted I think.
Plus with China to the North the US presence in the South may make sense from that angle.
-
" .South Korea should be able to defend it's self without us."
I don't know.
N K has nuclear devices
S K does not.
the balance of power would be greater shifted I think.
Plus with China to the North the US presence in the South may make sense from that angle.
Yes, also nuclear superpower Russia borders NK, a short missile flight from South Korea, population 50 million. My advice to the S. Koreans is to pay the Americans the 4.7B for the cost of their share of the security.
Our defense cost is 570B for 300 million people.
(https://image.shutterstock.com/image-vector/north-korea-south-japan-china-600w-725108365.jpg)
-
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/march/how-south-korea-economy-develop-quickly
11th largest economy in the world. Post-WWII, there were times when the NorKs had a higher standard of living, Now, more South Koreans have high speed internet than Americans, per capita.
A Nuclear S. Korea makes China push for a nuclear free Korean peninsula.
-
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/march/how-south-korea-economy-develop-quickly
11th largest economy in the world. Post-WWII, there were times when the NorKs had a higher standard of living, Now, more South Koreans have high speed internet than Americans, per capita.
A Nuclear S. Korea makes China push for a nuclear free Korean peninsula.
This. Our cutting the cord could actually make the region and the world safer because S.K. and Japan would either need to go nuclear or China would need to disarm N.K to make that unnecessary.
Separate from security, they don't need our financial support of their defense anymore, see G M's info, (and they aren't all that appreciative of it anyway).
-
Yes.
I would note that one of the things that made me sit up and notice that perhaps Trump was more than I had thought was when during one of debates with the Dowager Empress he referenced maybe leaving it to Japan and South Korea to go nuclear.
The foreign policy establishment and the chattering class were aghast!
OTOH I was intrigued.
-
Let's see. Norks not bending at all. Question presented: When push comes to shove, do we threaten/go to war? What does Trump do? Suspends indefinitely the joint training exercises with the Sorks which PO the Norks (Given regular rotation of US forces, these training exercises are necessary to maintain actual readiness) AND demands Sorks cover all costs of US presence. Sorks must decide what to do. Pay up, or go nuke on their own as well (similar question presented for Japanese).
China too must decide what to do. Current trajectory suggests Sorks and Japanese going nuke--definitely NOT to China's liking!
==========================================
The U.S. walks out on South Korea. The strain in U.S.-South Korea relations doesn’t appear to be going away anytime soon. A U.S. delegation in charge of negotiating a new defense cost-sharing framework with South Korea walked out on talks Tuesday. A U.S. State Department official said South Korea did not respond adequately to U.S. conditions but that Washington has not ruled out further talks. The U.S. is asking South Korea to increase its annual payments from $870 million to around $5 billion for the cost of hosting 28,500 U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula. The current cost-sharing arrangement is set to expire next month. The failed talks come just one day after South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo met with his Chinese counterpart and agreed to set up more military hotlines and foster defense cooperation – the same day the U.S. and South Korea agreed to suspend indefinitely an annual joint air exercise. Meanwhile, Jeong also met on Tuesday with Saudi officials, including the crown prince, to discuss strengthening bilateral defense ties. Saudi Arabia is a leading oil supplier to South Korea and Seoul's largest trade partner in the Middle East.
-
"China too must decide what to do. Current trajectory suggests Sorks and Japanese going nuke--definitely NOT to China's liking!"
Yes. Wouldn't China be better off to eliminate NK threat or support us in that as opposed to inspiring ALL of their regional rivals to go permanently nuclear? The only explanation is that the interests of China and the interests of their rulers is different. Danger on the outside helps the regime with nationalism and compliance on the inside. But the cost of their goal of military superiority escalates as everyone else around them militarizes. Meanwhile, their growth is curbed and their debt issues are front and center due to the trade war challenge to their economic model.
Too bad to have both issues going on simultaneously, NK and trade/theft. China can't give Trump a big win in the middle of negotiations but they lose far more if they don't.
Ironically, all of it supports the idea of a second Trump term to finish the job that no one else would take on or finish. Add a Republican House and Senate into the mix and his hand in negotiations is strengthened.
-
China is hoping for a president that they will be able to work with, and perhaps a son with a substance abuse problem in need of employment...
"China too must decide what to do. Current trajectory suggests Sorks and Japanese going nuke--definitely NOT to China's liking!"
Yes. Wouldn't China be better off to eliminate NK threat or support us in that as opposed to inspiring ALL of their regional rivals to go permanently nuclear? The only explanation is that the interests of China and the interests of their rulers is different. Danger on the outside helps the regime with nationalism and compliance on the inside. But the cost of their goal of military superiority escalates as everyone else around them militarizes. Meanwhile, their growth is curbed and their debt issues are front and center due to the trade war challenge to their economic model.
Too bad to have both issues going on simultaneously, NK and trade/theft. China can't give Trump a big win in the middle of negotiations but they lose far more if they don't.
Ironically, all of it supports the idea of a second Trump term to finish the job that no one else would take on or finish. Add a Republican House and Senate into the mix and his hand in negotiations is strengthened.
-
How to Defeat Kim Jong Un
Double down on sanctions, punish the regime’s criminal activities and provide ‘intrusive aid.’
By Nicholas Eberstadt
Dec. 10, 2019 6:44 pm ET
Dictator Kim Jong Un posing with North Korean troops. PHOTO: KCNA VIA KNS/AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES
The latest phase in the North Korean nuclear crisis is a race against time inside North Korea itself. Which will come first: nuclear breakout or economic breakdown? Washington should be moving much more forcefully to tilt the outcome in the West’s favor.
On the one hand, Pyongyang presses ahead with production of nuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Kim Jong Un publicly announced as much nearly two years ago, on New Year’s Day 2018. Mr. Kim successfully parlayed a temporary halt to nuclear and ICBM testing into the summitry with President Trump—with the North manufacturing more strategic weapons all the while. When Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal is sufficiently developed, Mr. Kim will likely switch back to confrontation, renewing nuclear brinkmanship, this time with the mainland U.S. at risk.
At the same time, American and international sanctions are undermining the North Korean economy, pushing it closer to dislocation. Sanctions seldom work, but North Korea is an exception, given its highly distorted and dependent economy. Through guile and strategic deception, Pyongyang desperately hopes to persuade the U.S. to abandon sanctions, because Mr. Kim is spending down his currency reserves and his strategic stores of food and energy. To outsiders, everything will look “normal”—until it starts to spin out of the regime’s control.
America’s national security depends on forestalling North Korea’s strategic breakout and hastening the breakdown of its war economy. That calls for “maximum pressure” once again—this time with gusto. Three decades of failed denuclearization talks demonstrate that diplomatic negotiations with the Kim family simply can’t get the U.S. where it wants. “Threat reduction,” on the other hand, can begin as soon as the U.S. says it does.
How to proceed? Here are a few suggestions:
• Double down on economic sanctions. Chinese, Russian and other interests regularly violate existing U.S. and United Nations Security Council strictures. Yet Washington has a fearsome tool for coercing compliance with sanctions against North Korea: the U.S. dollar, still the world’s reserve currency.
The U.S. can ban sanction-busting commercial and financial entities from future dollar-denominated transactions. For many globalized entities, such “secondary sanctions” would amount to a financial death blow. To restore credibility to the sanctions campaign, the U.S. will probably have to make examples of some important Chinese and Russian companies.
• Treat Pyongyang like the criminal enterprise it is. No other regime games its national sovereignty and converts its diplomatic immunity into criminal revenue like North Korea. Cybercrime, drug running, currency counterfeiting, human trafficking, nuclear proliferation—the gangster state in North Korea profits from all of these and more.
The U.S. needs a sustained diplomatic and law-enforcement initiative to name, shame and blacklist malefactors. The North’s money trails lead through familiar terror bazaars in the Middle East, and rolling these back would be a twofer. And don’t forget the illicit activities North Korean embassies routinely run in countries with which the U.S. has friendly relations—including ivory and rhino-horn smuggling by its diplomats in various African capitals.
And remember Otto Warmbier. A U.S. court has awarded his family a $500 million judgment against Pyongyang for his death. Washington should aggressively enforce it. Until it’s satisfied, nothing owned by the Kim regime should enjoy free passage—anywhere in the world.
While we’re at it, why not purchase on the secondary debt market a few hundred million dollars’ worth of bank loans from the 1970s on which North Korea has since defaulted? These could be had at a very steep discount. Holding such debt would give Washington the sovereign right to hunt down and seize hidden North Korean bank accounts and other loot stashed abroad.
• Prepare for the next North Korean food crisis. The first external sign that economic pressure is crippling the North Korean economy will likely be a spiraling of cereal prices and a collapse of the exchange rate of the North Korean won in domestic markets. The second could be a hunger crisis. Pyongyang will have no compunction about starving hostages from disfavored classes to loosen the sanctions noose. The U.S. and its allies must be prepared to offer “intrusive aid”—a program designed and administered by impartial outsiders, not North Korean apparatchiks—to feed the needy directly. This is the path to breaking the country’s war economy.
If a U.S.-led North Korean threat-reduction effort looks likely to succeed, Pyongyang will use every menacing gambit it can muster to get America’s leaders to desist. They must not be unnerved. Mr. Kim intends to threaten the U.S. with nuclear weapons. America has to stop him before his leverage grows.
Mr. Eberstadt is a political economist at the American Enterprise Institute.
-
"The U.S. and its allies must be prepared to offer “intrusive aid”—a program designed and administered by impartial outsiders, not North Korean apparatchiks—to feed the needy directly."
How does he propose we do that?
-
I'm guessing the idea is that when the starvation hits, that we are ready to offer humanitarian aid on our terms or not at all.
I like that Eberstadt is looking to WIN.
-
https://www.newsmax.com/newsfront/gen-jack-keane-north-korea-missile-christmas/2019/12/24/id/947180/
I guess the concept of Trump - KIm condominium towers with associated luxury golf course did not excite Kim enough........... :wink:
-
December 24, 2019 Open as PDF
North Korea and the Threat of ICBMs
By: George Friedman
Rumors have been swirling that North Korea is about to test an intercontinental ballistic missile. The source for this latest rumor is U.S. intelligence, though North Korea has been warning it will perform such a test. North Korea tested three ICBM boosters in 2017. Those tests didn’t prove mastery of missile reentry capabilities or an effective guidance system, but if North Korea does successfully demonstrate such capabilities for an ICBM, it will change the dynamic between the North and the United States. Pyongyang has demonstrated its ability to field a nuclear weapon and to successfully test-fire non-intercontinental weapons. That means that the continental United States is not at risk of a nuclear attack from the North. But if an ICBM is successfully tested, that means that, regardless of intentions, North Korea has the ability to strike the United States. That would force the U.S. to rethink its strategy.
U.S. Strategy
The U.S. has accepted the idea that North Korea has the ability to strike neighboring countries allied with the United States, including Japan and South Korea. The United States had no strategy for neutralizing the North’s nuclear capability. An attack on nuclear facilities with non-nuclear weapons would have probably eliminated the weapons, but its success would have depended on two things. First, that the intelligence the U.S. had on the location of these facilities was completely accurate. Second, that all facilities that needed to be struck were vulnerable to air attack or possibly attack by special operations forces. Some, particularly those housing key facilities and storage, might have been buried deep underground or hardened in some way to render them minimally vulnerable to non-nuclear military action.
The United States was not prepared to initiate a nuclear attack on North Korea, since it could set a precedent that might turn against American interests. As important, North Korea had developed an alternative strategy that was hard to counter. Over the decades, it created a heavy concentration of artillery and rockets well in range of Seoul, which is close to the North Korean border. A U.S. attack on North Korea would have been countered by a massive artillery attack by the North on Seoul. And with artillery well dispersed in hardened locations, suppression by air before massive damage and casualties would have been difficult.
The U.S. strategy was to accept the existence of shorter-range nuclear weapons and to engage in negotiations to persuade North Korea to abandon its nuclear arsenal. These discussions failed for obvious reasons. North Korea’s strategic goal is regime preservation and territorial integrity. Surrounded by countries that theoretically could have an interest in attacking the North, the development of a nuclear deterrent was essential to its national strategy. An attempt to intrude on the North was only a theoretical possibility, but the farfetched can turn out to be a real threat, and nations need a deterrent for farfetched options that the other side may suddenly find to be quite reasonable.
What emerged was a fairly stable situation. North Korea could not strike at the U.S. The South Koreans were pleased that Seoul was not at risk under the circumstances. The Japanese recalculated the risks from the North without a U.S. deterrent but did nothing overt. The option of an American strike remained but was unlikely. The option of a North Korean attack on Seoul was even more unlikely. The U.S. was not going to get Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear capability, but at the same time, Washington was not on a hair trigger to strike the North. What appeared once to be a near-war situation now seemed contained. This should have been a satisfactory solution for both sides; the North Korean regime was secure and the threat of a nuclear attack on the United States was left off the table.
A Window of Opportunity
This is why the rumors of a North Korean ICBM test seem hard to fathom, as it only increases the risk to the North. A test of an ICBM is unmistakable given its trajectory and speed. The major issues over an ICBM’s effectiveness relate to both the robustness of the launch vehicle and warhead, and the quality of the guidance system. The chances that the North will attain a fully functional ICBM after only a handful of trials are not zero, but fairly close. In the end, the guidance system is the trickiest part of the development process, and must be tested in ways that the U.S. could spot.
In other words, if North Korea tests an ICBM capable of hitting the United States, there is most likely to be a gap, perhaps an extended one, before it attains a reliable system. North Korea, therefore, would be signaling the intent to deploy a weapon that could deliver nuclear warheads to the United States without having one. And it is in that window, the precise size of which is not fully predictable, that the U.S. could act without risking a nuclear response.
At that point, the U.S. calculus has to be reconsidered. The U.S. was prepared to risk a regional nuclear weapon in exchange for North Korea's refraining from developing a warhead that could reach the U.S. Now the U.S. has to determine whether it will risk a North Korean first strike on the United States. And this time, the U.S. is the one that will have to examine what is considered farfetched. Military options that could fail, and assaults on Seoul that had been taken off the table, could be put back on the table. The regional powers didn’t want a U.S. strike. But now the question is no longer what they will tolerate but what the U.S. can risk. Can the U.S. live with a North Korea capable of striking the United States with nuclear weapons? This becomes a much different problem, and one that the U.S. has in the past clearly communicated to North Korea, with suitable threats.
This therefore raises the question of why the North would move from a position of relative security, to one where risks to it mount greatly. Why would North Korea challenge a clear red line that the U.S. has drawn? What benefit can it gain? If it gets an ICBM, I will assume that it still would not wish to challenge the United States given the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. North Korea has behaved rationally and with cunning in the past. Why take risks that it didn’t have to?
One explanation is that Pyongyang is fueling this speculation to frame some future negotiations but has no intention of actually testing an ICBM. Another explanation might be that North Korea read the U.S. political chaos as creating a window between test and deployment that would force negotiations at a time when the U.S. is willing to be more flexible on emerging issues, either for political gain or because of uncertainty of authority. Or perhaps the North has calculated that a nuclear threat to the United States has more value than what it risks.
There is another theory I will add to the farfetched. North Korea’s closest ally is China. I have noted in the past that evolutions in the nuclear threat have tended to take place at times when China was facing significant friction with the U.S. The U.S. would ask China to intervene with North Korea, and then, on returning to the negotiating table, Beijing would reasonably point out that it had done a major service for the United States, and it would be churlish of the U.S. to press China on lesser economic matters.
U.S.-China tensions over trade are ongoing. A nuclear confrontation with North Korea would certainly divert U.S. attention and passion away from China. And inevitably, the U.S. would ask China to intervene and be relieved when its intervention succeeds. It is interesting that China has already issued a warning to North Korea not to do anything to destabilize its situation. Since China ought to welcome the diversion so that it can smooth things out, for a price, the warning to the North makes little sense. It would explain why North Korea would be taking unnecessary risks in testing ICBMs. Of course, given China’s warning, a test may not even be launched.
A North Korean ICBM test would make little sense, as it would undercut the safety of the regime and the country’s territorial integrity. But in the world of the farfetched, which we must at least consider, North Korea cannot readily refuse Chinese requests, and signaling that there might be an ICBM test or two is not a major risk and a valuable favor to bank. I would not throw this scenario out for consideration except that it is hard to understand why North Korea would goad the United States at a time when American politics would seem to make the U.S. less predictable. The usual American answer on all complex political problems is that the other side is crazy. North Korea has not survived since World War II by being crazy. Ruthless, yes. Willing to take risk, certainly. But this particular risk either is an illusion or needs a much stronger imperative.
-
January 15, 2020 Open as PDF
Palace Intrigue and Paranoia in North Korea
By: Phillip Orchard
Two years ago, during his annual New Year’s Day address to the nation, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un effectively declared that the North was ready to shed its moniker as the Hermit Kingdom. The North, according to Kim, had “completed” its nuclear deterrent against the United States. Kim hinted at a new openness to diplomacy and economic integration with the outside world. Three months later, he announced a landmark shift away from Kim Il Sung’s 1960s-era “byungjin” policy, which called for parallel development of the military and economy, in favor of one focused primarily on restoring national prosperity. A string of historic summits with the South Korean and U.S. presidents quickly followed, as did a two-year freeze on nuclear and long-range missile tests. But, critically, what didn’t follow was relief from the crippling U.S.-led sanctions regime, much less an end to joint U.S.-South Korean exercises – nor even lower-hanging fruit like an official declaration ending the Korean War.
As a result, Pyongyang welcomed the 2020s by turning back the clock – but also by displaying signs that something wasn’t quite right in the capital.
In a speech at the Dec. 28-31 Workers’ Party of Korea’s Central Committee plenum, Kim restored the byungjin doctrine, announced the end of Pyongyang’s moratoriums on nuclear and long-range missile tests, boasted about a “new strategic weapon” and warned of hard times to come in the “long-term confrontation with the U.S.” He also presided over a sweeping politburo reshuffle, reportedly dumping economic reformers and diplomats who had been central to negotiations with the United States in favor of figures whose backgrounds point to a renewed emphasis on weapons development and ties with countries like Russia. Curiously, he then ghosted on his New Year’s Day address for the first time, drawing parallels to 1957, when his grandfather skipped the speech following a major purge of political opponents. Kim then disappeared from what passes as the public eye in North Korea for more than a week – coincidentally, the same week that the U.S. killed Iranian Gen. Qassem Soleimani, the U.S. reportedly increased surveillance flights over the North, and reports emerged in South Korean media that the U.S. had deployed Reapers to the South ahead of purported decapitation strike drills in the fall. North Korean state media barely mentioned the killing, something out of character for a propaganda machine wired to seize any opportunity to paint the U.S. as the demogorgon. All the while, the North's repeatedly threatened “Christmas surprise” – expected to be some kind of missile test if the U.S. didn’t meet Pyongyang's end-of-year deadline for progress in negotiations – never arrived.
The curious confluence of events fueled all sorts of regional speculation about chaos in Pyongyang. Had divides in the North over the path forward ruptured, leading to a paralyzing power struggle that sent Kim scrambling for cover? Had the Soleimani killing put Kim on notice? North Korean palace intrigue is simply too murky to say much definitively. But Pyongyang has good reasons to think a window of opportunity to begin integrating with the international community has closed. Just don’t expect Pyongyang to be content with staying out in the cold for long.
Threats at the Door
To discern the state of play in Pyongyang, it’s worth examining each of the recent developments individually, starting with the hot topic of the day: Is a decapitation strike against Kim by the U.S. or its allies a real possibility?
The Kim regime is famously paranoid about assassination. This is partly why Kim Jong Un refused for six years to leave the North after taking power and still does so only swaddled in bubble wrap. It’s not completely unfounded; South Korea has for years been boasting about a plan known as “Kill Chain,” involving new capabilities to launch surgical preemptive strikes if war appears imminent. And the Trump administration openly debated plans for a “bloody nose” strike against the North in 2017. Kim, meanwhile, likely ordered the execution of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, in 2013 out of fear he might plot with Beijing to oust the young leader. Similar fears compelled him to dispatch a pair of unwitting, VX-toting femme fatales to take out his brother, Kim Jong Nam, at the Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. Shortly after Kim Jong Nam’s demise, evidence emerged of a foiled assassination plot against Kim Jong Un being staged out of Chinese and Russian border regions. Pyongyang, moreover, is no stranger to the assassination game itself; in 1983, it attempted to kill South Korean President Chun Doo-hwan during a visit to Burma.
The question really comes down to U.S. capability and interest. The U.S. could certainly use a number of precision-guided missiles to go after Kim. But succeeding would hinge on targeting intelligence that the U.S. is highly unlikely to have in all but a narrow set of circumstances. U.S. Reapers can’t just hang out above Ryongsong waiting for a kill shot the way they could in Baghdad. And even if the U.S. did have an opportunity to take Kim out, it would be exceedingly risky to use it. To be sure, North Korea could experience a dramatic transformation following the death of Kim, whose cult of personality is central to the regime’s legitimacy. But taking out Kim wouldn’t do anything about the North’s nukes, nor the thousands of missiles and conventional artillery within range of Seoul. And it would risk kicking off a civil war in a nuclear state known for institutionalized paranoia and questionable command and control structures.
Either way, what matters most here is that Kim, like his father and grandfather, consistently behaves in ways that suggest he believes the threat of decapitation is real. This fear was illustrated by state media’s silence on Soleimani; the Kim regime evidently can’t even stomach public awareness of the fact that assassinations happen. And for any number of reasons, this has only deepened their conviction that regime survival requires both a viable nuclear arsenal and a willingness to use it if an attempt to end the Kim era appears nigh.
Threats From Within
The second question worth investigating is: Do the Central Committee purges, doctrine reversal, and evidence of internal divides suggest that pressure on Kim is approaching a breaking point? Kim was taught from a young age that the best way to navigate the ruthless political environment in Pyongyang was to eliminate potential rivals long before they become an actual threat. As a result, shake-ups, purges, rehabilitations and executions at senior levels are fairly routine in Pyongyang. Still, the fact remains that the North has failed to get out from under excruciating sanctions pressure, and it’s now facing contentious decisions on, for example, whether or how much of its nuclear and missile programs to bargain away in pursuit of relief – plus likely divides over Kim’s outreach to the South, his efforts to keep China and Russia at arm’s length, and his nascent steps toward economic liberalization.
As noted, the North Korean government’s legitimacy, and thus the fortunes of the North Korean elite, is deeply tied to the Kim family’s cult of personality. And by assassinating his brother, Kim likely eliminated the only realistic replacement – though his sister, Kim Yo Jong, is worth keeping an eye on. She was promoted at the plenum and has reportedly been issuing orders to the military. The two siblings are believed to be close, with Kim Jong Un keeping her in the spotlight during high-profile summits with South Korean President Moon Jae-in and U.S. President Donald Trump, for example. Still, whether her promotion is evidence that the North Korean leader is merely tightening his inner circle and short on loyalists or that he’s unwittingly grooming a potential successor is impossible to say. Most likely, the dynamic in Pyongyang is a more extreme form of the one surrounding Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has succeeded in intertwining his fate with that of the Chinese Communist Party more broadly. Kim probably cannot be ousted altogether, but he can be gradually stripped of powers and relegated to figurehead status. If such a scenario comes to pass, managing relations with the North would become ever more complicated.
‘Eating Grass’ vs. Playing Hardball
The developments of the past few weeks likely point to a somewhat more mundane reality: Pyongyang is simply digging in for another spell of belt tightening in the endless campaign to “defeat imperialism” – or, as Vladimir Putin put it, “eating grass” if that’s what it takes to hold on to its nukes. Absent a willingness to risk the staggering costs of attempting to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear program by force, the U.S. just doesn’t have the leverage to force Pyongyang to budge. But Pyongyang likewise hasn’t demonstrated the capability to force the U.S. to give up its demand for complete, verifiable and irreversible dismantlement. And until the U.S. backs off from its maximalist demands, there won’t be much room for Pyongyang to open up to the world on its own terms or force other regional powers to play ball.
The North will push Russia and China to continue their nascent efforts to unwind U.N. Security Council sanctions. If the international sanctions regime were to collapse, the U.S. would likely keep its sanctions in place – not to mention its troops within striking distance. But with the North capable of finding relief elsewhere and holding a major military deterrent, it could live with a quiet impasse with the U.S. and refrain from provocations aimed at pushing Washington back to the negotiating table. Thus, the U.S. may eventually be inclined to tacitly consent to such a move by Moscow and Beijing. But for the time being, Moscow and Beijing both have bigger fish to fry with the U.S. and are unlikely to act on Pyongyang’s behalf unless doing so strengthens their position somehow in other negotiations with Washington.
The North will also continue probing for ways to deepen the wedge between South Korea and the U.S. (One official who survived the recent politburo reshuffle was an architect of the North’s outreach to the South.) Reunification is an imperative for both Koreas, and Seoul has been openly frustrated at the lack of progress on cross-border economic measures aimed at coaxing Pyongyang out of its shell. But meaningful reconciliation with the South would be exceedingly fragile even in the best of circumstances. As it stands, the South remains unwilling to defy the U.S. by embracing Pyongyang too closely, and it needs the leverage it derives from its alliance with the U.S. to manage the rapprochement.
Perhaps the only real card the North has to play, then, is a resumption of long-range missile testing. There are any number of plausible explanations for why Pyongyang stood pat over the holidays. It’s possible that the lack of a test is the result of internal divides. It’s possible that Pyongyang thought twice about provoking the U.S. It’s possible that it felt it succeeded in getting Washington's attention – or that it received a small concession from, say, China in exchange for holding off. It’s also possible that the “new strategic weapon" just isn’t ready for testing yet. (The North has far more ambitious goals for its missile program than the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missiles it tested in 2017, and systems like solid-fuel long-range missiles, particularly submarine-launched ballistic missiles, are an order of magnitude more difficult to develop.)
(click to enlarge)
Whatever the case, don’t be surprised when North Korea starts back down this road. The foremost risk of crossing the U.S. red line by testing another ICBM is that it provokes a U.S. military response. Just how big this risk is depends on how willing you think the U.S. is to go to war with a country that would, at minimum, impose staggering casualties on U.S. and allied troops – and that may very well be capable of plopping nukes down on U.S. bases around the region and beyond. The game has changed since the days of endless fruitless negotiations with the “ferocious, weak and crazy” country led by Kim’s father. To be clear, war with the U.S. is a big enough risk that the North likely won’t jump straight to ICBM tests. The primary goal for the time being will remain getting the U.S. to put sanctions relief on the table in exchange for a permanent freeze. So expect it to toe the line with, say, shorter-range tests or other demonstrations of new capabilities before crossing it. Even then, it would leave the U.S. room to convince itself it need not retaliate, for example by leaving doubt about whether it has finally mastered the all-important issue of ICBM reentry and targeting systems. But the lesson from 2017 for the North was that high-profile tests are the only way to get the U.S. to the table. And it won’t be content to eat grass forever.
-
N. Korea sees bad time for missile test
U.S. vote, Chinese virus get in way
BY GUY TAYLOR THE WASHINGTON TIMES SEOUL | North Korea has delayed its much-anticipated “Christmas surprise” of a major intercontinental ballistic missile test out of concern that such a provocation — after two years of stopstart nuclear diplomacy — would trigger sharp negative reactions from Washington and the international community.
South Korean analysts, including a high-level defector from the North, say Pyongyang’s planning for a launch also has been delayed by the coronavirus outbreak in China, which shares a long border with North Korea and serves as its closest security and economic ally.
“The most friendly country of North Korea — China — is having serious difficulties, and North Korea doesn’t want to make things worse,” said Lee Gee-dong, vice president of the Institute for National Security Strategy in Seoul. “I think for the coming three or four months, it will be quite quiet and the North Koreans will not carry out any provocative or dangerous actions against the world.”
After three inconclusive meetings between President Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, Pyongyang threatened to take a “new path” if the U.S. didn’t back off its demands for swift denuclearization by the start of 2020. But Mr. Lee said in an interview that North Korea’s Mr. Kim likely believes the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) would anger and unsettle China as well as nearby Russia.
The Kim regime’s apparent concern is that a major missile launch at this time would make Moscow and Beijing less willing to stand up for Pyongyang on the international stage — essentially paving
the way for Washington to pressure the U.N. Security Council to increase sanctions on North Korea.
“The North Koreans did not come through with any ‘Christmas present’ and they have not taken any ‘new path’ because they are well aware of the side effects that could be had,” Mr. Lee told The Washington Times. He said the Kim regime is “wary of ruining the relationship it has successfully built with Russia and China and the support it is getting from those two countries.”
Kim In-tea, a former North Korean official who defected a decade ago and now works as an analyst with Mr. Lee in Seoul, said the Kim regime appears most focused at the moment on an internal reshuffling in preparation for “a long-term stall in negotiations” with Washington.
“About 30% of 230 high-level cadres inside the North Korean government have been reshuffled,” he said, adding that the moves mainly involve officials tasked with managing domestic affairs. The regime, he said, “is preparing to go through the current diffi culties it is facing.”
One high-profile move has been the elevation of outspoken retired army Col. Ri Son-gwon as North Korea’s foreign minister, although U.S. offi cials say they are still trying to get a clear read on Mr. Ri, who has no history of involvement in denuclearization talks.
There is also uncertainty over how North Korea will react to impending U.S.-South Korean joint military drills. Pyongyang has seized on such drills in the past to justify provocative missile tests.
The U.S. election calendar is also factoring heavily into the Kim regime’s calculus, said Haksoon Paik, a longtime North Korea analyst and president of the Sejong Institute, a prominent South Korean think tank.
“North Korea understands that Donald Trump is in a reelection campaign and perceives him to be unlikely to do anything new with regard to U.S. policy toward North Korea,” Mr. Paik said.
“I think 2020 will be a year in which the United States and North Korea, even though they do not mention it publicly, both understand each other,” he said. “The North Koreans will not provoke as long as the United States does not provoke, and I think Donald Trump understands that as long as we do not provoke Kim Jong-un, he will not respond or make the first move.”
Mr. Trump is being closely watched after U.S.-North Korean denuclearization talks essentially stalled out since the breakdown of the February 2019 Hanoi summit. Mr. Trump made no mention of North Korea in his State of the Union address last week, and the White House announced an unexpected change to its North Korea policy team Tuesday.
Officials said Alex Wong, who had been overseeing operations in the State Department’s special representative for North Korea office, has been nominated to be political affairs ambassador at the United Nations. The move could suggest that Mr. Trump is de-emphasizing North Korea from his foreign policy agenda.
The president has shown signs of cooling to the idea of a third summit with Mr. Kim after months of North Korean rejection to repeated U.S. requests for working-level negotiations. CNN reported this week that Mr. Trump has told foreign policy advisers he does not want another summit before the election, although National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien has left the diplomatic door open.
“We’ll have to see as to whether another summit between the leaders is appropriate,” Mr. O’Brien told an audience at the Atlantic Council on Tuesday. “President Trump has made it very clear that if he can get a great deal for the American people, he’ll go to a summit, he’ll go to a meeting, he’ll talk to just about anybody. But we have to be able to get a good deal.”
“Right now,” Mr. O’Brien said, “there’s not a scheduled summit.”
Some analysts say Pyongyang’s unwillingness to engage in working-level talks has led to wariness in the administration about being tricked by a regime that has a history of drawing out negotiations indefinitely while clandestinely building up its nuclear and missile arsenals.
“It will take working-level negotiations to produce a [denuclearization] deal,” David Maxwell, a North Korea analyst with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, said in comments circulated online Wednesday, “but Kim has to allow them. Instead he is still relying on blackmail diplomacy to support his long con. The administration is not falling for it.”
The stalemate is starkly different from 2017, when Mr. Trump responded to North Korean threats, nuclear detonations and ICBM tests by asserting that the U.S. would respond with “fire and fury like the world has never seen” if Pyongyang did not halt its provocations.
The brinkmanship later led to a diplomatic push and a historic June 2018 summit in Singapore, where Mr. Kim agreed to “work toward” the goal of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in exchange for security guarantees from Washington. North Korea also halted ICBM and nuclear tests as a show of good faith in possible follow-on negotiations.
Then came the February 2019 Hanoi summit, where Mr. Trump walked away from negotiations. He said the North Koreans demanded sweeping sanctions relief in exchange for only a limited commitment to destroy part of their nuclear arsenal. The Kim regime challenged that characterization.
While the Hanoi collapse remains a matter of debate, the North Koreans have carried out waves of short-range missile tests. It also made headlines by demanding that the U.S. change its “calculation method” by the end of 2019 or the Kim regime would take a “new path.”
The ultimatum triggered fears that a resumption of long-range ICBM tests may be imminent.
However, some argue that the Kim regime was trying to send a basic message to Washington in the aftermath of Hanoi.
Mr. Paik said the North Koreans came out of Hanoi believing Mr. Trump wanted an initial denuclearization deal but was overridden by hard-line advisers such as Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and then-National Security Adviser John R. Bolton, whom Pyongyang accused of wanting to overthrow the regime.
What the Kim government has been demanding since is that “the U.S. give up its regime change policy and come up with a policy of accommodating peaceful coexistence with North Korea,” Mr. Paik said.
The big question now, he said, is whether Mr. Trump can “really override the opposition of hardliners in his government and in the wider Washington national security establishment — even if he is reelected.”
Mr. Trump fired Mr. Bolton in September, but it remains to be seen what impact new players in the administration, particularly Mr. O’Brien, will have on North Korea diplomacy.
“We’d like to see negotiations continue if they are negotiations that lead to North Korea honoring the commitment that Chairman Kim made in Singapore,” Mr. O’Brien said Tuesday.
“If there was an opportunity to move the ball forward for the American people, [Mr. Trump] is always willing to do that. Whether it’s viewed to be politically expedient or not, he’s looking to do things that are good for the country.”
Watching the U.S. vote
-
“The North Koreans will not provoke as long as the United States does not provoke, and I think Donald Trump understands that as long as we do not provoke Kim Jong-un, he will not respond or make the first move.”
- Same for Iran. Some might call that winning. Bellicose Isolationism in place of groveling appeasement and 'diplomacy' is dangerous! Terrible! But all of the sudden it's quiet on the enemy front.
Tough situation for NK. Close the border where the lives-saving aid comes in. Import a virus you have no ability to deal with, or starve and freeze to death the masses without the aid. Choose one.
Someone should alert Thomas Friedman / NYT that the lying, suppressing, oppressing, totalitarian regimes may not be the best model for governing.
-
There are some who think the NorKs are already being ravaged by the virus.
“The North Koreans will not provoke as long as the United States does not provoke, and I think Donald Trump understands that as long as we do not provoke Kim Jong-un, he will not respond or make the first move.”
- Same for Iran. Some might call that winning. Bellicose Isolationism in place of groveling appeasement and 'diplomacy' is dangerous! Terrible! But all of the sudden it's quiet on the enemy front.
Tough situation for NK. Close the border where the lives-saving aid comes in. Import a virus you have no ability to deal with, or starve and freeze to death the masses without the aid. Choose one.
Someone should alert Thomas Friedman / NYT that the lying, suppressing, oppressing, totalitarian regimes may not be the best model for governing.
-
In South Korea, COVID-19 Burdens an Already Strained Economy
Highlights
• South Korea's domestic COVID-19 outbreak will dampen 2020 economic growth, particularly if it spreads outward from its current epicenter and halts production in key regions.
• The country's robust public health infrastructure and proactive response to the virus strongly position it to manage the outbreak, although some of South Korea's containment efforts are causing sharp, if short, economic pain.
• Going into April legislative elections, slowing economic growth and the spread of the virus will hurt allies of President Moon Jae-in at the polls, which would divide the government.
________________________________________
South Korea's growing number of domestic COVID-19 cases puts the country's already beleaguered economy under further strain, risking the ruling progressive camp's position in upcoming legislative elections that could render President Moon Jae In a lame duck. This worsens a difficult situation given South Korea's deep links to the Chinese economy, also hit by COVID-19.
As of March 2, South Korea's infections stood at 4,300 — the highest outside of China and up dramatically from 31 under two weeks before. Currently, manufacturing inside South Korea has remained largely undisrupted, but the possibility that the outbreak could force shutdowns in the current epicenter or spread and spike in key economic hubs such as Busan, Ulsan and Seoul raises the risk of supply chain disruptions that could ripple through the regional and global economy — possibly disrupting or delaying semiconductor and automotive exports.
The Big Picture
________________________________________
Alongside Iran and Italy, South Korea has rapidly emerged as a hub in the global COVID-19 outbreak. With its export-oriented economy already suffering from a slowdown in global demand and the effects of China's own coronavirus outbreak, this will further sap 2020 growth ahead of key legislative elections.
________________________________________
The Geopolitics of Disease
Economic Fallout
The immediate concern within South Korea is to contain the spread of the virus and to avoid major disruptions to the economy. Following a mass spread at a large church, the eastern city of Daegu has become the epicenter of COVID-19 in South Korea, and now accounts for the vast majority of cases there and in neighboring North Gyeongsang province. South Korea's robust public health infrastructure and proactive approach to monitoring and tracing the outbreak have so far succeeded in preventing massive upticks in other regions and further hurting the economies of impacted regions, even as the infection count has risen overall.
The virus epicenter is South Korea's "rust belt," where heavy industry has long been concentrated. Daegu and North Gyeongsang boast over 20 percent of automotive parts production in South Korea. Already hurting from COVID-19 related supply chain disruptions in China, South Korean auto parts manufacturers now face the risk of disruption to their production lines domestically. On top of this, demand for automobiles in China is set to decline in 2020, and already there are projections for a 20 percent drop for 2020 auto sales in South Korea itself due to dampened consumer demand around the COVID-19 outbreak.
In South Korea, the COVID-19 outbreak also risks far greater economic disruptions if it spreads farther in the adjacent Southeastern Maritime Industrial Region, which encompasses the cities of Busan, Ulsan and parts of South Gyeongsang province. A Hyundai motor plant had to shut down briefly in Ulsan, although elsewhere production is largely continuing as normal. A spread to Seoul would present even graver risks to economic growth and continuity given its essential role in the South Korean economy, as it would shut down a wider variety of sectors and impact more of the labor force.
Mitigation
South Korea's government has moved quickly to try to offset the economic damage wrought by COVID-19. Already, South Korea's economy was facing major headwinds given sluggish global demand overall, a pre-virus cyclical slowdown in China as well as challenges for the critical semiconductor sector given low prices and a trade war with Japan. South Korea had been looking ahead to something of an economic rebound in 2020 with the quieting of the U.S.-China trade war, projections of a semiconductor price rebound and the de-escalation of Japan tensions.
Much of the economic fallout will be felt by smaller enterprises unable to muster the resources needed to weather the crisis.
The COVID-19 outbreak, however, has darkened this picture. Projections for South Korean GDP growth in 2020 stood at 2.3 at the start of the year, but now the central bank projects that this will drop to 2.1 percent due to the virus, only slightly up from the likely 1.9 percent GDP growth of 2019. Much of the economic fallout will be felt by smaller enterprises unable to muster the resources needed to weather the crisis. To offset this impact, South Korea's government has spent $3.3 billion and announced plans for $16 billion in emergency spending to support businesses hurt by the outbreak, and pledged to push for another $5 billion in supplementary budget spending in March. The central bank, for its part, has expanded its special loans program by $4.1 billion to boost liquidity.
Politics
Moon's handling of COVID-19 is already under the microscope, much like Chinese President Xi Jinping and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Moon's approval rating dropped 5.3 percent between mid-January and late February, hitting 44.7 percent — its lowest level since November. A petition calling for Moon's impeachment for his COVID-19 management has garnered more than 1.2 million signatures.
Such a groundswell of disapproval of Moon's handling of the crisis does not pose an immediate threat to his tenure given that such petitions are nonbinding, though it may portend political setbacks in the coming months. On April 15, Moon's progressive political camp will defend its position in parliament in elections that will put all 300 seats up for grabs. The conservative parties have banded together into the new United Future Party, hoping to unite the right-wing portion of South Korea's sharply divided political scene. Moon may lose less ground than the outpouring of criticism suggests. This is because both Daegu and the neighboring provinces of North and South Gyeongsang were conservative bastions in the 2017 presidential election, meaning the areas feeling the greatest impact were unlikely to have turned out for the progressives. If the outbreak continues, however, and spreads beyond these areas, Moon will certainly face further political headwinds.
A strong conservative win at the polls could see Moon reduced to lame-duck status in the final two years of his term. The progressives are shy of a majority, forcing them to seek allies from the center. Further erosion of this position would make it difficult for Moon to pursue his hoped-for outreach to North Korea, which is already hamstrung by Washington-Pyongyang acrimony, as well as by his broader justice department and economic reforms agenda. Moon's COVID-19 policies have come under particular scrutiny given his failure to impose a blanket ban on Chinese travelers. This spotlight on Moon's China policies could strain his attempts to reach out to China amid acrimony with Japan and stagnation in the U.S.-North Korea dynamic. A South Korean government with stronger conservative voices would also see a push for a closer defense alignment with the United States, increasing pressure to resolve thorny defense cost-sharing talks with the United States and work more closely to counter China's rise.
Ultimately, the next phase of South Korea's COVID-19 outbreak will be critical in terms of its domestic ramifications. South Korea's proactive focus on testing and management may mean it can stem the spread of the disease, confining its most dire effects to the current epicenter — though this will still have a sharp, if short-term, economic impact due to containment efforts. A sustained or escalated outbreak will further damage South Korea's economy — and the spread of the virus across the globe could reduce demand in key Western consumer markets of the highly export-oriented power.
-
US.-South Korea cooperation. Absent any last-minute breakthrough in cost-sharing talks between Washington and Seoul, at least 4,000 South Korean civilian personnel at U.S. military bases in the country will be furloughed on Wednesday. The previous stopgap cost-sharing arrangement expired on Dec. 31, with the Trump administration demanding as much as a five-fold increase in South Korean contributions to the cost of hosting some 28,000 U.S. troops in the country. The furlough itself is mostly just a headache for the two militaries – albeit a particularly painful headache given that both sides are also grappling with disruptions stemming from the coronavirus outbreak on the peninsula. But these sorts of bilateral disputes are worth watching closely in the context of the broader strategic divergence between the U.S. and South Korea.
Increasing uncertainty about how North Korea will handle potential political upheaval due to its own coronavirus outbreak likewise gives any potential hit to U.S.-South Korea operational readiness added significance. U.S. Secretary Mike Pompeo on Monday reiterated that the Trump administration will not relax sanctions on North Korea without substantial steps on denuclearization – but also that Washington remains keen to resume negotiations with Pyongyang. North Korea’s Foreign Ministry dismissed Pompeo’s remarks.
-
obesity rate in US ~ 1/3
in N Korea it is 0.00000004
(1 out of 25.55 million)
leader Kim Jong Un
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/kim-jong-un-north-korea/index.html
-
obesity rate in US ~ 1/3
in N Korea it is 0.00000004
(1 out of 25.55 million)
leader Kim Jong Un
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/kim-jong-un-north-korea/index.html
Funny.
"The US is monitoring intelligence that North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un, is in grave danger after a surgery, according to a US official with direct knowledge.
Kim recently missed the celebration of his grandfather's birthday on April 15, which raised speculation about his well-being. He had been seen four days before that at a government meeting."
----------------------
I think missing his grandfather's birthday is a big deal. Like my insinuation with Iran, Un has more direct contact with China than we see. He could also be out of sight recovering from plastic surgery, like the way Hillary, Nancy P and Plugs disappear from time to time.
Who is Little Rocket Man's chosen successor?
-
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/kim-jong-un-news-health-north-korea-successor-leader-a9476416.html
maybe he should consider AOC since Bernie is too old
-
obesity rate in US ~ 1/3
in N Korea it is 0.00000004
(1 out of 25.55 million)
leader Kim Jong Un
https://www.cnn.com/2020/04/20/politics/kim-jong-un-north-korea/index.html
Funny.
"The US is monitoring intelligence that North Korea's leader, Kim Jong Un, is in grave danger after a surgery, according to a US official with direct knowledge.
Kim recently missed the celebration of his grandfather's birthday on April 15, which raised speculation about his well-being. He had been seen four days before that at a government meeting."
----------------------
I think missing his grandfather's birthday is a big deal. Like my insinuation with Iran, Un has more direct contact with China than we see. He could also be out of sight recovering from plastic surgery, like the way Hillary, Nancy P and Plugs disappear from time to time.
Who is Little Rocket Man's chosen successor?
I am not sure he has one, which should make things quite interesting.
-
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/in-a-bismarck-moment-south-korea-chooses-china-over-the-west/
-
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/in-a-bismarck-moment-south-korea-chooses-china-over-the-west/
Fine. The US troops in S Korea can be redeployed to Taiwan.
-
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/04/28/kim-jong-un-china-north-korea/
-
May 4, 2020 View On Website
Open as PDF
Long Live Kim?
By: Phillip Orchard
For nearly three weeks in April, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un was either dead, hanging on by a thread following botched heart surgery, or happily waiting out the COVID-19 crisis at a beachfront palace in Wonsan, depending on how one pieced together the conflicting scraps of evidence leaking out of Pyongyang. Or maybe he’d been usurped by his sister and a military faction he’d marginalized. All that truly seemed clear was that something was amiss: The 36-year-old skipped for the first time the crucial April 15 ceremonies marking the birth of his grandfather, North Korean founder Kim Il Sung. (Kim’s hold on power requires repeated reminders to the public of his lineage.) He was also a no-show at the April 25 anniversary commemoration of the founding of the Korean People’s Army. State media went silent on his whereabouts.
But then, on May 1, he returned to the public eye as abruptly as he disappeared, grinning and holding court during an inspection of a fertilizer plant with his sister in tow. His physical appearance showed no signs that he’d just escaped a brush with death as reported; the only visible change was a small scar on his right wrist. For good measure, North Korean troops on Sunday opened fire on a South Korean border post in the demilitarized zone for the first time in several years. The timing of the incident suggests it was intended to signal that Kim is both alive and fully in charge.
It’d be easy to dismiss this as just another mysterious absence in a reclusive regime known to stoke palace intrigue as a way to underscore its strategically valuable reputation abroad as “ferocious, weak and crazy.” But the incident underscored an uncomfortable reality for North Korea’s neighbors: The North is a nuclear state, where paranoia about enemies both foreign and domestic is hardwired into the structure of the regime. Kim is hardly a paragon of health, and both his father and grandfather suffered from cardiovascular problems. He will not have an obvious heir for another 25 years or more, and actuarial tables suggest a high probability that he won’t last that long. And while the Kim regime may be an endless source of headaches for the region, the risks associated with regime collapse in Pyongyang are worse.
The Devil You Know
North Korea’s strategic orientation for the next few years would be fairly predictable, with or without Kim, so long as the regime remains intact. To be clear, unpredictability itself – say, an attack on a South Korean warship here, a cartoonish execution of a prominent official there – will remain a core North Korean tactic. And when Kim indeed dies, history suggests that the North for a spell would be even more inclined to indulge in minor acts of provocation to ward off outside powers and to allow his successor(s) to consolidate power.
But on the biggest geopolitical issues, there’s little reason to think Pyongyang would fundamentally change course. The North would still see itself as the proverbial minnow among whales, deeply distrustful of all its more powerful neighbors and adept at playing them off each other to get what it needs to survive. Its growing nuclear and missile arsenal would still be essential for carving out room for maneuver – and an immense source of national pride that Kim’s successor would need to keep the public and the military on his or her side. It would still need to agitate for sanctions relief, and it would still be willing to make empty pledges to get it – but unwilling to substantially weaken its bargaining position by denuclearizing. It would still have an interest in pursuing eventual reunification with the South, but this road will remain littered with major political and security pitfalls. It would have an interest in cracking open its economy to wean itself off its dependency on China and lessen its vulnerability to famine, but its fear of allowing competing power centers to proliferate, along with its need to keep the public in permanent fear of outsiders, would require a tightly controlled liberalization process – and willingness to backtrack at the first sign of trouble.
However, continuity requires an orderly succession process that preserves internal stability. Regimes such as Kim’s typically survive when enough power brokers – particularly those who control guns and money – benefit from the status quo. And the North Korean regime is structured for survival. But since Kim has no obvious successor, this would likely have to happen in one of two ways.
(click to enlarge)
One involves regime elites rallying around another member of the Kim family as a regent, if not an outright replacement, to maintain legitimacy among the public. The most likely candidate here is Kim’s younger sister, Kim Yo Jong, who’s long been considered a member of the inner circle. Since Kim Jong Un took power, she’s been at his side at most of his high-profile international appearances. She’s also received a series of promotions through substantive roles (including, most recently, on April 11 – the last time Kim was seen in public prior to May 1) – and has reportedly been designated by Kim Jong Un to take over since last year. There’s ample reason to doubt that she has the independent power base needed to be much more than a figurehead, not least of which that she’s a 32-year-old woman in a rigidly patriarchal system. But she would likely be backed by other heavy hitters in Pyongyang, particularly Kim Jong Un’s no. 2, Supreme People’s Assembly head Choe Ryong Hae. He’s the North’s first nominal head of state outside the Kim family and was instrumental in helping Kim Jong Un redistribute power to the party at the expense of the military. As the son of one of Kim Il Sung’s close comrades in the anti-Japanese resistance, his bloodline works in his favor. It’s also worth noting here that Choe's own son is believed to be married to Kim Yo Jong.
The other possibility is that the establishment, concluding sooner or later that they’ll have to survive without the legitimacy conferred upon them by the Kim bloodline, starts to build a more formalized collective leadership structure – something akin to Dengist China or the Vietnamese Communist Party today. This would involve a careful division of power and resources among heads of the North’s byzantine party and state organs and the leaders of the various military and security services – figures like hardliner general Kim Yong Chol, missile chief Ri Pyong Chol and intel boss Jong Kyong Thaek. Kim has kept internal factions in zero-sum competition for years, so they’d have to conclude that the regime’s survival depends on them working together. To replace the power over the public derived from the Kim cult of personality – and to dig a deeper well of patronage with which to keep elites fat and happy – the regime may need to shift the country’s focus to worshipping on the altar of the almighty dollar. But collective leadership structures are inherently prone to paralysis, and opening the country without jeopardizing regime solidarity would be extraordinarily risky. It’s hard to see anyone steering the country quickly away from its familiar course.
What Happens When No One Is in Charge
The thing keeping the North’s neighbors up at night is that an orderly transition of power can hardly be assumed. Both Kim Jong Un and his father, Kim Jong Il, were clearly designated successors with clear, inherited mandates to rule. Yet, it took years for each to win the loyalty of elder elites and to consolidate power. Kim Jong Il was rumored to be the target of coup plots even before he formally took power in 1994. He then had the misfortune of taking over as the North was reeling from the collapse of the Soviet Union (its foremost patron), with the resulting instability leading to another major coup attempt in 1996. To survive, he was forced to defer authority increasingly to the military, which parlayed this opportunity into control of state-owned industries and other lucrative sources of patronage.
When Kim Jong Un took power at the tender age of 28, his youth and inexperience similarly threatened to keep him beholden to the military. He needed to restore institutional balance and develop an independent power base. This meant leaning heavily on his cult of personality. It also meant taking on the military and just about anyone else capable of challenging his authority. Things got ugly; nearly all the aforementioned power brokers have been purged at one time or another, to say nothing of high-profile executions of his uncle, Jang Song Thaek, and other figures close to Kim Jong Il who supported Kim Jong Un’s ascent to the throne. Even his beloved sister, Kim Yo Jong, has been bumped down a time or two. But he’s succeeded in cementing himself at the center of the power structure and as a singular source of regime legitimacy with the public. He’s kept the military, intelligence and internal security services divided, albeit satisfied by the nuclear and missile programs. All military, state and party institutions have been kept in constant competition with one another and in fear of losing favor with Kim.
(click to enlarge)
This approach may have made Kim indispensable in Pyongyang and immune to fratricide. But it makes a power vacuum almost inevitable if he dies abruptly. A collective leadership structure would be inherently fragile, especially in light of the economic stress North Korea would probably still be under, not to mention the need in such times to be able to act decisively. Conditions would be ripe for power grabs from the start. And though Kim Yo Jong may be able to leverage her position to keep competing factions in balance, there are a number of other Kim family members – Kim’s uncle, Kim Pyong Il, for example, or his apparently disinterested hipster brother, Kim Jong Chul – who a power-hungry faction could try to persuade or coerce into claiming the throne as a figurehead on their behalf. Even Kim Jong Un felt compelled to assassinate his half-brother, Kim Jong Nam, in 2017 to inoculate himself from potential usurpers.
Add to these conditions Pyongyang’s paranoia about external meddling. The U.S. and Japan want to prevent a nuclear North Korea from altering the regional balance of power. China wants a buffer state, at minimum, between it and U.S. forces. South Korea wants to reunify the peninsula either by diplomatic means or by force, depending on which party is in power in Seoul. Whether or not any foreign powers would want to spark an internal power struggle pursuant to their preferred outcome, a weak and fractious government in Pyongyang would certainly expect them to try. Moreover, if an internal power struggle turns violent or threatens to spill across the border, North Korea’s neighbors would indeed have plenty of reason to intervene quickly. China, for example, would be tempted to try to secure the North’s nukes and prevent a flood of refugees from washing over the Yalu. South Korea would want to take control of the belt of artillery positions and biological and chemical weapons stockpiles located near Seoul and prevent China from turning the North into a de facto colony. It would want the U.S. to come along for the ride.
Military intervention would be far easier said than done, the existence of fanciful regime change contingency plans like the U.S. and South Korea’s “Oplan 5029” notwithstanding. Still, North Korea’s military would be on hair-trigger alert at a time when its already-shaky command-and-control systems are under immense stress. And if the result of Kim keeping the military and security services in permanent competition is multiple armed factions vying for control once he’s gone – with each trying to demonstrate to audiences at home and abroad that it’s the one in control by, say, popping off a long-range missile or two – it could become unclear to troops on the ground who’s issuing orders and to what end. This would make diplomatic efforts to head off unintended escalation difficult as well. The downside of a decades-long isolation strategy is it leaves you blind and bereft of influence if a regime starts to fall apart.
None of the worst-case scenarios are inevitable or even likely. But if succession goes sideways, the odds of North Korea turning into a powder keg would be uncomfortably high given what’s at stake. It’s why many in the region find themselves in the strange situation of saying: Long live Kim.
-
Daily Memo: North Korea Backs Down, Putin Promises Changes
Kim Jong Un reportedly halted plans to attack South Korea.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Kim backs down. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un suspended plans for “military action” against South Korea, per state media on Wednesday. North Korea also reportedly began taking down loudspeakers blasting propaganda toward the South – something that doesn’t particularly bother Seoul but that drives Pyongyang batty when South Korea cranks up its own loudspeakers. This caps several weeks of hostility from the North toward Seoul, ostensibly over the launching of balloons carrying food and anti-Kim propaganda across the Demilitarized Zone by activists in the South. The North’s recent moves have been peculiar, to say the least, but point mostly toward internal stresses. The most likely explanation was that Kim was trying to help his sister, Kim Yo Jong, consolidate some power, as his alleged health problems over the past few months exposed how unprepared the regime is for an untimely demise by the leader. When the regime gets preoccupied with power struggles in the capital, it often makes a big show of external hostility in order to both impress the masses at home and warn outside powers against any attempts at political meddling.
Meanwhile, North Korea is widely believed to be under immense economic pressure. (China is reportedly quietly increasing grain shipments to the North.) But Pyongyang still needs Seoul’s cooperation to get a lot of what it wants from the U.S. and elsewhere – and can’t afford to make it politically impossible for the Moon Jae-in administration to stay the reconciliation course.
-
A Trump Retreat From Korea?
A good way to look weak on China and help Biden get to his right on national security.
By The Editorial Board
July 17, 2020 7:12 pm ET
A couple of months ago we heard that President Trump was pushing the Pentagon to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan, Germany and South Korea. We started calling around and were told to focus on Afghanistan, as the other two deployments were safe in an election year.
Bad call. Mr. Trump has since ordered the withdrawal of 9,500 of the 34,500 U.S. troops stationed in Germany, (MARC: some to go to Poland?) and now we read Friday in the Journal that he may do the same with U.S. forces in Seoul. You never know with Mr. Trump how much of this leak is negotiating bluster, but it’s the President’s worst national-security idea since he floated a Taliban visit to Camp David last year.
The U.S. has some 28,500 troops on the Korean peninsula. The main strategic purpose is defending against North Korea, but the deployments also protect America’s security interests and reassure the region that the U.S. is committed to defending America’s friends against a threatening China.
As he likes to do, Mr. Trump has been seeking more money from South Korea to pay for the U.S. mission, though Seoul contributed some $926 million in 2019. South Korean President Moon Jae-in has balked at the U.S. demands, which are for $1 billion or more a year, and we’re told the talks are deadlocked.
Mr. Trump is considering his options, including some reduction of force. But even a partial U.S. retreat from the East Asian flashpoint would echo around the world as a sign of American weakness. It also wouldn’t save money since the Pentagon would have to pay the troops even if they come home, and it would cost far more to have to send those forces back to the region in a crisis.
Above all, a U.S. retreat would be a gift to the hawks in China who want to push the U.S. out of the region. Withdrawal would confirm their view that the U.S. is in decline and can no longer be trusted, and it would shock our allies in Japan and Taiwan.
Senator Ben Sasse, the Nebraska Republican, didn’t hold back Friday in criticizing the potential withdrawal: “This kind of strategic incompetence is Jimmy Carter-level weak. Why is this so hard? We don’t have missile systems in South Korea as a welfare program; we have troops and munitions there to protect Americans. Our aim is to give the Chinese communist leadership and the nuclear nut tyrannizing his North Korean subjects something to think about before they mess with us.”
As for the domestic U.S. politics, a withdrawal certainly doesn’t fit an election strategy of running against Joe Biden as a naif who’d be eaten alive by Chinese President Xi Jinping. Mr. Biden would quickly get to Mr. Trump’s right on China and foreign policy, and he’d be able to quote Republicans in the Senate like Mr. Sasse who agree with him.
Mr. Trump’s cavalier treatment of allies, and the threat he may walk away from long-time alliances, is one risk of a second term. Apart from North Korea’s young dictator, Kim Jong Un, a U.S. retreat in Korea would most please Mr. Xi.
-
Passing the baton? North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is delegating more and more power to a number of aides, but foremost his sister, Kim Yo Jong. That’s at least according to South Korea’s National Intelligence Service, which said Thursday that the move was intended to “reduce the leader's stress over governance and to avoid responsibility for policy failures.” You can read this as a sign of weakness (i.e., he’s short on loyalists and being forced to elevate one of the few people in the Hermit Kingdom theoretically capable of replacing him while sustaining the Kim dynasty). You could also read it as a sign of strength (i.e., he’s confident enough in his grip on power to take the long view and prep for a nightmare scenario in which he dies before his own heir is ready to succeed him).
More interesting, Kim announced on Thursday that the Workers’ Party of Korea would hold in January its 8th Congress, where a new five-year plan is set to be unveiled, likely shedding quite a bit of insight on the regime’s thinking and concerns. The resolution calling for the Congress emphasized national economic development, which makes sense given the immense economic stress weighing on the country due to international sanctions, recent flooding and the pandemic. But it would be noteworthy if economic development is framed as taking priority over national defense; in the past, subtle shifts in party-speak have signaled major shifts in Pyongyang’s approach to matters like negotiations over its nuclear program and reconciliation with Seoul.
Additional Intelligence
• IHS Markit's preliminary purchasing manager's composite output index for the eurozone registered at 51.6 in August, down from 54.9 in July, indicating that the recovery of the eurozone’s economy is slowing down.
• Libya’s Turkey-backed Government of National Accord announced it will halt military operations against its main rival, the Russia-backed Libyan National Army, for the next two months.
• The U.S. Department of Treasury announced it would impose sanctions on six senior Syrian government officials, including Bashar Assad’s top press officer and leaders of the Baath Party, as well as the commander of the National Defense Forces.
• Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko accused the United States of being behind the protests in Belarus over the presidential election.
• Russia and Syria held joint military exercises in the Syrian port city of Tartus involving 600 Russian and Syrian troops as well as 11 warships.
• Brazil’s Central Bank this week increased the number of bank notes in circulation by 1.3 billion. Roughly 65 percent of the additional bank notes were 50 real bills (equivalent to about $9) and 100 real bills. The total number of bank notes in circulation now stands at 8.4 billion.
-
Kim Jung Ill
Hard-living tyrant in coma, sister taking charge, SoKo diplomat claims in latest round of rumors
https://www.foxnews.com/world/kim-jong-un-coma-sister-take-control-south-korean-official-alleges
-
North Korean missile development. As we have repeatedly explained, North Korean denuclearization was always a pipe dream. The only thing that's changed is that White House officials lately have been publicly admitting as much. Given that it’s election season, the Trump administration has naturally been keen to keep the president’s stalled negotiations with Kim Jong Un out of the spotlight. But like Kim in his recent monthslong game of hide and seek, the North’s nuclear and missile programs are still alive.
While both the U.S. and Pyongyang have been preoccupied with internal matters, the North still needs to agitate for sanctions relief from the U.S. The best way it can do this is to tiptoe back up to the U.S.’ red line on intercontinental ballistic missile development. Indeed, White House and U.S. intelligence officials apparently believe Pyongyang is gearing up to unveil a solid-fuel ICBM in October, which if tested successfully would mark a major leap forward in its missile capabilities.
Another Pentagon official said Wednesday that the North may also be focusing on submarine-launched missiles, which would require solid-fuel engines. Perhaps it’s no surprise, then, that senior U.S. and South Korean officials quietly held talks Wednesday on finding ways to get negotiations back on track.
===========================
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/09/report-north-korea-could-unveil-new-ballistic-missile-capable-of-reaching-us-right-before-presidential-election/?utm_campaign=DailyEmails&utm_source=AM_Email&utm_medium=email&utm_source=Master+List&utm_campaign=5a32fd0cf0-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2020_09_03_09_41&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9c4ef113e0-5a32fd0cf0-61658629&mc_cid=5a32fd0cf0
-
Koreas: Kim Apologizes for Pyongyang’s Killing of South Korean Official
What Happened: North Korean leader Kim Jong Un formally apologized to the people of South Korea for the recent killing of a South Korean official, according to a Sept. 25 announcement from South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s office.
Why It Matters: A direct and swift apology from Kim is highly unusual, as is the South Korean decision to release the full text of North Korea's notice, reflecting the sensitivity of the incident. The killing complicates Moon’s efforts to reconcile with North Korea by further exacerbating the domestic political headwinds, as well as the challenges of navigating the U.S.-North Korea stalemate.
Background: North Korean troops shot and killed a South Korean government worker after he crossed a maritime border between the two countries. The incident was the first known killing of a South Korean civilian by North Korea since 2008.
-
https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/10/north-korea-unveils-very-destabilizing-icbm/169178/
-
second
North Korea unveils seemingly new, larger ICBM at military parade
Kim Jong Un claims nation has not had a single COVID-19 case
North Korea shows what appears to be its newest and largest ICBM in a military parade early Saturday in Pyongyang to mark the 75th anniversary of the nation's ruling party. © Kyodo
KIM JAEWON, Nikkei staff writer
October 10, 2020 15:39 JSTUpdated on October 10, 2020 22:34 JST
SEOUL -- North Korea displayed what appears to be a new intercontinental ballistic missile that is larger than its predecessors at a military parade early Saturday to mark the 75th anniversary of the founding of the nation's ruling party.
The weapon was shown at the end of an event that South Korean media says began around midnight and went on until about 2 a.m. The missile was carried on a mobile erector launcher with 22 wheels, larger than the vehicle that transported the Hwasong-15 missile that was featured in a February 2018 parade.
The Hwasong-15's estimated range is 13,000 km, making it capable of carrying a nuclear warhead to the U.S. mainland.
Edited footage that aired on North Korean television in the evening showed leader Kim Jong Un watching over the parade, which featured goose-stepping soldiers, fireworks, tanks and aircraft formations in front of cheering crowds. No masks were to be seen among the crowds.
Kim said the nation had not had a single COVID-19 case. The leader also vowed to strengthen the isolated country's military power, but said he would not employ it unless the nation is threatened.
"We do not empower our war-deterrence capabilities targeting a specific country. We empower it to protect ourselves," Kim said in a speech at the event. "But if anyone harms our country's security, we will punish it with the most powerful attacks."
The Joint Chiefs of Staff of South Korea's military said the parade featured many weapons that they are now analyzing. "Intelligence authorities of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. are following up on the event," the JCS said in a statement.
The parade comes as relations with Seoul grow tense. Kim issued a rare apology to South Korean President Moon Jae-in for the killing of a fisheries official from the South in its waters last month. Seoul has requested a joint investigation, a request Pyongyang has not responded to.
Analysts say Kim may seek to provoke the U.S. around the time of the presidential election in early November.
"Kim Jong Un will likely engage in some type of major provocation in the coming months in an effort to grab the world's attention and put the next U.S. administration on the defensive," said Scott Seaman, a director at Eurasia Group.
"But the risk is low of a provocation occurring and then sparking a confrontation with the U.S. that badly rattles markets; this is in part because the U.S. will be distracted by domestic problems."
==========================
-
https://www.breitbart.com/asia/2020/11/11/report-north-korea-estimated-have-60-nuclear-warheads/
-
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=bae9e860486c225ccfb13c91df6a0252_60929c0b_6d25b5f&selDate=20210505&goTo=A09&artid=0&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=washingtontimes-E-Editions&utm_source=washingtontimes&utm_content=Read-Button
-
The Acceleration of North Korea’s Missile Program
5 MIN READMay 7, 2021 | 15:00 GMT
A woman walks past a screen showing footage of a North Korean missile test in Seoul, South Korea, on March 29, 2020.
A woman walks past a screen showing footage of a North Korean missile test in Seoul, South Korea, on March 29, 2020.
(JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images)
Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea has rapidly accelerated its longer-range ballistic missile and nuclear programs. But Pyongyang has also focused on short-range systems as part of an effort to modernize its military capability for contingencies on the Korean Peninsula.
The Threat of North Korea’s Missile Programs
In March, North Korea carried out a cruise missile test, as well as a test of maneuverable short-range ballistic missiles. The two tests came amid the spring training exercises and ended a year-long lapse in missile tests as Pyongyang focused its attention on managing the COVID-19 crisis. Satellite imagery and photos from military parades suggest North Korea may be preparing another test of its submarine-launched ballistic missile, perhaps coinciding with the launch of its new ballistic missile submarine. These tests reflect the two prongs of North Korea’s overall defense strategy: securing second-strike nuclear capability against the United States, and modernizing its missile and rocket systems for operations on the Korean Peninsula.
The United States has long been concerned by North Korea’s intermediate and long-range missile programs, particularly coupled with Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program. But South Korea and nearby Japan have been equally (if not more) concerned with the shorter-range systems in North Korea’s arsenal, which are designed to strike at U.S. and U.S.-allied military facilities in the region. For Seoul and Tokyo, Pyongyang’s shorter-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and large-caliber multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) have not only proven to be more reliable but are also more likely to be used in regional contingencies that may fall shy of a full war with the United States. The 2010 shelling of South Korea’s Yeonpyeong islands, for example, included North Korean MLRS systems, inflicting damage on military and civilian infrastructure.
An Evolving Defense Posture
As the Cold War neared its end, Kim Il Sung accelerated the development of North Korea’s nuclear program, seeking to ensure a domestic deterrent capability amid weakening support from Russia and China. Under Kim Il Sung, North Korea carried out few ballistic missile tests, and none with a range to strike at U.S. territory. Rather than domestic testing, North Korea relied on transferred technology, joint development with third countries, and avoiding demonstrations of failure. The ambiguity of the effectiveness of these systems was seen as more valuable than proving them, and the fear was that failure may have invited more aggressive action from South Korea or the United States.
The U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework was intended to dissuade further North Korean nuclear developments, but the death of Kim Il Sung shortly before the agreement was signed in 1994 altered the North Korean trajectory. Upon taking control of North Korea, Kim Jong Il sought to shore up his support from the military and pursued a demonstrable long-range missile, in the guise of a space launch vehicle, as a way to showcase North Korea’s defensive strength, even amid years of famine. However, under Kim Jong Il, North Korea coupled its missile and nuclear development with a series of dialogues, using the programs as much for bargaining chips as for national defense. It wasn’t until after Kim Jong Il’s stroke in 2008 that the North rapidly accelerated its long-range nuclear weapons program, with Kim seeking to hand over a completed capability to his successor.
Kim Jong Un: Nuclear Deterrence Plus Military Modernization
North Korea’s most dramatic and sustained advancements have come under Kim Jong Un, who has emphasized the dual focus on long-range nuclear deterrence and in-theater military modernization. Despite its large military, North Korea cannot compete head-to-head with South Korea or the United States, and much of Pyongyang’s conventional deterrent, particularly its frontline artillery systems, have become outdated. Kim Jong Un has focused on managing North Korea’s weaknesses by completing long-range, nuclear-capable missile systems and ramping up the development of short-range missiles and large-caliber multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The strategic systems have focused on road-mobile missiles, and shortening the time from deployment to launch. This is intended to provide at least some potential for a second strike capability, something reinforced by Pyongyang’s focus on a submarine-launched ballistic missile. Together, these systems raise the cost calculus for the United States of any pre-emptive strike against North Korea, as Pyongyang may retain the ability to strike back with a nuclear-armed missile.
The other half of the strategy has focused on short-range missiles, including more advanced anti-ship missiles and missiles with more complex flight paths, in an effort to counter U.S., South Korean and Japanese missile defense systems. The heavy focus in recent years on MLRS systems like the KN25, which seem to blur the line between rockets and missiles, serves as a conventional deterrent, increasing North Korea’s ability to overwhelm in-theater missile defense systems and target allied airfields, military bases and supply centers. North Korea’s frontline artillery has long been a deterrent to military action, but primarily as a saturation attack against the greater Seoul area. The newer systems Pyongyang is developing and deploying are more tactical in nature, increasing range and accuracy. Rather than a desperate volley quickly overwhelmed by U.S. and South Korean forces, the newer systems provide the North with a more intentional counter-strike capability.
-
May 19, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF
The US and South Korea's Shaky Alliance
Strategic divides and domestic troubles on both sides won’t make their reconciliation easy.
By: Phillip Orchard
South Korean President Moon Jae-in will arrive in Washington for a state visit this week with the U.S.-South Korean alliance appearing to have regained its footing. South Korea is playing nice with Japan, relatively speaking, for the sake of furthering U.S. multilateral aims in the region. Seoul is even hinting at a willingness to cooperate with the Quad (India, Japan, the U.S. and Australia) in some areas, despite its extreme reluctance to antagonize Beijing and its enduring suspicion of Tokyo. It’s also pledged to cooperate more closely with Washington on addressing supply chain vulnerabilities exposed by the pandemic, particularly with regard to semiconductors. For its part, the U.S. has stopped threatening to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula if Seoul doesn't pay more for the pleasure of keeping U.S. troops there. And its recently concluded North Korea policy review, though short on detail, appears to adopt aspects of Seoul's preferred approach to managing its tempestuous northern cousin.
The apparent recovery in bilateral ties after a stormy few years – ones that cast unprecedented doubt on the longevity of the alliance – speaks to its resilience. There’s a brief window of opportunity to fortify the partnership around an expanding set of mutual interests. But deep strategic divides and domestic troubles on both sides won’t make it easy.
What Went Wrong
U.S.-South Korean relations under Moon were bound to be strained almost from the start. He took office in May 2017, just as the “fire and fury” era of the U.S.-North Korea standoff was peaking. His top priority, naturally, was heading off a war in which South Korea would almost certainly bear the bulk of Pyongyang's wrath. His fledgling administration pursued this in several ways, including by publicly signaling an unwillingness to cooperate with the U.S. in a major assault against the North. Either in spite of or because of these efforts, the immediate threat of war subsided. And he then set about attempting to redirect the Trump administration's attention toward the possibility of some sort of grand bargain with North Korea, particularly once Kim Jong Un himself began signaling a willingness to talk.
Moon did this, in part, to try to put the threat of a U.S.-North Korea war to rest for good and to try to establish a new basis for relations with the North that accounted for, implicitly or otherwise, the fact that it had become a nuclear state. He also did it because North-South reconciliation is a strategic imperative for both Seoul and Pyongyang. And he did it because, having replaced a corruption-plagued conservative as president, he had a lot of political capital to spend on reviving the pro-engagement “sunshine” policy his predecessor had discarded.
The Trump administration saw the political and strategic merit in following Seoul's lead. Neither “maximum pressure” nor the Obama-era “strategic patience” policies had achieved much, and it was worth exploring the possibility of bringing North Korea in from the cold and, crucially, potentially out of Beijing's orbit.
But coaxing North Korea out of its shell by dangling, say, promises of economic cooperation would have to be a slow process at best – certainly not one that fit the timelines of U.S. political calendars. Moreover, it would have to be accompanied by concessions on the U.S. and South Korean defense postures on the peninsula. It would require tremendous understanding that the North’s biggest constraints on reconciliation are often opaque power struggles at home. And it would require no small amount of tolerance for setbacks, a willingness even to be extorted at times by a mercurial Pyongyang famous for backsliding with its hand out.
However possible a reconciliation process with Pyongyang really is, it’s hard to see much progress ever being made without the U.S. and the South marching to the same beat. And as setbacks piled up, it became clear that the Moon and Trump administrations weren't. South Korea, for example, needed movement on sanctions relief for some of its cross-DMZ initiatives to proceed. The U.S., having reached a tacit agreement with Pyongyang on suspending intercontinental ballistic missile tests (essentially keeping the U.S. mainland secure while keeping Seoul and Tokyo at risk), had lost much of its urgency to get a broader deal done. So it balked on sanctions relief while maintaining its nonstarter demand for “complete, verifiable, irreversible denuclearization.” Seeing itself in an unprecedented position of strength courtesy of successful tests conducted in 2017, Pyongyang shrugged its shoulders and focused on its efforts to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its northeast Asian allies.
(click to enlarge)
Other strains in the U.S.-South Korean alliance made the environment ripe for outside meddling. Most prominent were the U.S. threats to abandon South Korea over stalled burden-sharing negotiations. This contributed to the resurgence of historical South Korean-Japanese tensions (which tend to accompany doubts about U.S. commitments to the region), resulting in a brief trade war and a near-collapse of a trilateral intelligence-sharing pact that the U.S. had spent a decade trying to forge. There were also signs of emerging strategic divergence between Washington and Seoul over China – not to mention what Seoul saw as a lack of support when Beijing took aim at its economy over the installation of a U.S. missile defense system in the South.
What Might Go Wrong
The bottom line is that South Korea had good reasons to fear being abandoned by the U.S. and being entangled by the U.S. in a war it didn’t want to fight. Fears of one or the other are common in any alliance, but fearing both at once is rare because the weaker ally is likely to feel extorted and look for a way out before the partnership turns into a politically unsustainable vassalage.
But the atmospherics, at least, have indeed shifted markedly in recent months. Much of the improvement will probably turn out to be low-hanging fruit: The U.S., which is vulnerable to becoming militarily overstretched, has a growing interest in discouraging allies, particularly prosperous ones with growing military budgets, from free-riding on U.S. security guarantees. But then again, backing off demands that mostly just made capitulation politically impossible for Seoul was easy enough.
And it’s no surprise that the Biden administration's core focus on strengthening a multilateral architecture in the Indo-Pacific has contributed to a modest improvement between Tokyo and Seoul. Despite their historical issues and Seoul's long-term suspicion about Japan’s remilitarization, there are a variety of areas – cybersecurity, supply chain resilience, countering Chinese economic coercion and market distortion, North Korea's shorter-range missiles, sea-lane security – where the two sides would be better off cooperating.
This applies to the U.S.-South Korean alliance as well. A major lesson of the past year for governments everywhere is that a definition of national security that focuses solely on physical threats – and ignores things like economic coercion, critical supply chains, epidemiology, environmental degradation, cybersecurity, emerging technologies, misinformation, transnational corruption and so forth – is too narrow. Moon and U.S. President Joe Biden would have plenty to talk about even if contentious military matters were off the table.
But there's no ignoring deeper bilateral issues altogether – at least, not for Moon. That’s partly because Seoul is perpetually concerned about seeing its interests ignored in U.S. regional strategies. It’s also because Moon, whose popularity has plummeted over mostly unrelated issues heading into his final year in office, is running out of time and political capital to spend on setting the alliance on what Seoul feels is a sustainable course.
With China, it's mostly a matter of reaching a common understanding of what Seoul can stomach in countering China's various coercion efforts. The South is heavily dependent on the Chinese economy and exceedingly reluctant to poke the dragon. The U.S. doesn't need South Korea to play as large a military role in the region as it does Japan. But given the extent of U.S. investment in the South, as well as the South's rapidly expanding technological chops, it's reasonable enough for the U.S. to expect tangible cooperation on at least some aspects of core U.S. concerns with China.
North Korea, as always, is trickier because there simply isn't much low-hanging fruit to pick. The U.S. hasn't publicly released its policy review yet, but there were a few noteworthy bits in the White House's description of its conclusions. For example, the U.S. has adopted Seoul and Pyongyang's phrasing of the ultimate goal as “denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula,” rather than merely denuclearizing the North. The U.S. is rejecting both strategic patience and maximum pressure while seeking a “calibrated practical approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy” with Pyongyang and making “practical progress” without putting U.S. security at risk. At the risk of reading too much into bureaucratic argle-bargle here, there are two possible interpretations. Either the U.S. is signaling its willingness to pursue the path of engagement envisioned if not yet fully taken by Moon, or, given the paucity of details, it's signaling an unwillingness to commit to any particular path forward with the North, given that most of them inevitably fail.
It's safe to assume that the U.S. is keen mainly to keep its options open. The dirty little secret, though, is that the U.S. isn't inclined to spend much time or energy on North Korea at all. This is why maximum pressure had effectively morphed into strategic patience by President Donald Trump's last year in office. From the U.S. perspective, success with Pyongyang is too fleeting, and there are many bigger fish to fry at home and elsewhere in Northeast Asia to get bogged down with. From the South Korean perspective, though, keeping the North at bay in the short term while forging a viable long-term road to reconciliation with the North is everything. Eventually, it will need more than just rhetorical assurances from the U.S.; it’ll need concessions on the North the U.S. is none too eager to give. And North Korea, which desperately needs sanctions relief and is still keen to find out just how much leverage its arsenals give it, is really good at making sure it can't be ignored.
-
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2021/06/north-korea-has-collapsed-the-headline-you-dont-want-to-ever-see/
-
https://www.foxnews.com/opinion/north-korea-kim-jung-un-regime-stability-bruce-klingner?fbclid=IwAR1k6btDe743TBXKv320K7URR2PbVvd3jbFhS5qXISwBfxxmzVbay3Pxjc8
-
Moving ahead. The U.S. and South Korea are going ahead with major annual joint drills, shrugging off warnings from Pyongyang. The drills, however, are expected to be scaled back somewhat. North Korea often sees the drills as indistinguishable from preparations for an invasion.
-
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-appears-to-have-restarted-yongbyon-nuclear-reactor-11630268905?mod=breakingnews
-
Why not? Who is going to stop them?
https://www.wsj.com/articles/north-korea-appears-to-have-restarted-yongbyon-nuclear-reactor-11630268905?mod=breakingnews
-
Why not? Who is going to stop them?
Not Biden voters.
-
Why not? Who is going to stop them?
Not Biden voters.
They are busy basking in the glory of their glorious end of the Afghan war!
-
Brief: North Korea Tests a Missile and Biden
Pyongyang has a habit of challenging U.S. presidents early in the terms.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: North Korea has been relatively quiet for the past year or so while it deals with pandemic pressures and other internal matters, which means it was late in its tradition of testing new U.S. presidents during their first few months in office. But a challenge was only a matter of time. Nothing has fundamentally changed about Pyongyang’s geopolitical situation: It has been in desperate need of sanctions relief for years, and it is perpetually upset about major annual U.S.-South Korean joint exercises that, from the North’s vantage point, are nearly indistinguishable from preparations for an invasion. Given enduring Western concerns about its nuclear and missile arsenals, Pyongyang feels like it has the upper hand.
What Happened: North Korea said it test-launched a pair of new long-range cruise missiles over the weekend. According to North Korean state media, the missiles hit targets around 1,500 miles away, ostensibly giving them the range to reach Japan. The missiles were described as a "strategic weapon," implying that they're capable of carrying nuclear payloads, though this has not been confirmed.
Japan and Korea
(click to enlarge)
As is usually the case, Pyongyang gave ample warning of the tests. It announced in January that it was developing an intermediate-range cruise missile. The mobile launchers believed to have been used in the test were shown off at military parades last year and in January. (Pyongyang almost always eventually tests the weapons it unveils in military parades.) And over the past month or so it's repeatedly warned that the latest round of U.S.-South Korean drills would compel it to develop a new strategic weapons.
Bottom Line: Opting for cruise missiles with its latest provocation is a crafty move for Pyongyang. For one, if the tests were indeed successful, they would demonstrate a new level of technological sophistication – and capabilities intended to thwart the missile defense plans of the U.S. and its regional allies. For another, cruise missile launches aren't banned under current sanctions – only ballistic missiles are – so this ostensibly won't undermine the North's case for sanctions relief. Finally, by testing something that puts Japan and South Korea in reach but not the U.S. homeland (as an intercontinental ballistic missile test would), it may further its goal of driving a wedge between the U.S. and its core regional allies. At this point, however, North Korea is unlikely to compel the U.S. to return to the negotiating table ready to make meaningful concessions.
-
By: Geopolitical Futures
Korean missile tests. South Korea reportedly conducted a successful test of a new submarine-launched ballistic missile late last week. It’s a major leap in capabilities for the South, which is on the verge of becoming one of only a handful of countries capable of SLBM attacks. The next step in North Korea’s missile ambitions is widely believed to be an SLBM; a test in this area in the coming weeks wouldn't be surprising. The South Korean navy, meanwhile, rolled out a new frigate sporting anti-sub capabilities.
-
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=2edc004d88747c50f446b862f39f1b71_61488849_6d25b5f&selDate=20210920
-
The Reach of North Korea’s Weapons
2 MIN READJan 25, 2022 | 23:23 GMT
People watch a news broadcast with file footage of a missile test at a railway station in Seoul on Jan. 25, 2022, after North Korea fired two suspected cruise missiles according to South Korea's military.
People watch a news broadcast with file footage of a missile test at a railway station in Seoul on Jan. 25, 2022, after North Korea fired two suspected cruise missiles according to South Korea's military.
(JUNG YEON-JE/AFP via Getty Images)
North Korea’s January missile tests highlight Pyongyang’s continued focus on strengthening its conventional military deterrent capability while keeping pace with advancements in South Korea’s missile developments, as well as expanded anti-missile systems in Korea and the broader region. A more robust conventional deterrent would give North Korea more confidence in its relations with the United States and its neighbors, and may offer Pyongyang greater room for escalation if political or security relations worsen.
North Korea has tested eight missiles since Jan. 1, including two hypersonic missiles, two rail-launched short-range ballistic missiles, two tactical guided missiles, and two cruise missiles. January is an unusual time for North Korea to test missiles, and the pace of tests this year is significantly higher than the past two years amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Pyongyang also recently suggested that it may lift its self-imposed moratorium on long-range ballistic missile and nuclear tests, though South Korean officials have yet to report any unusual activity at North Korea’s primary nuclear test site.
Since the collapse of U.S.-North Korea nuclear negotiations in early 2019, Pyongyang has primarily tested shorter-range missile systems and larger-caliber multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), which are designed to overwhelm or evade missile defense on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea has also continued to test its second-strike capabilities, including its rail-launched missiles and its submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
In addition to ballistic and cruise missiles, North Korea has expanded the range and accuracy of its MRLS systems over the past several years — moving away from its old dependence on outdated artillery systems that primarily targeted major population centers, and shifting to more tactical systems that can strike at key military targets in South Korea.
-
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/south-korea-election-president-yoon-suk-yeol-teach-rude-boy-kim-jong-manners/
-
vowing to teach "rude boy" Kim Jong Un "some manners"
outstanding !
while Kim is testing new long range missile:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60702463
-
The U.S. Needs to Bankrupt North Korea’s War Machine
Diplomacy won’t stop Kim Jong Un from launching missile tests. That happens only when the money runs out.
By Nicholas Eberstadt
March 28, 2022 6:43 pm ET
Rocket Man is on another blasting spree. Last week Pyongyang tested a “monster” intercontinental ballistic missile, reportedly designed to strike any spot in the U.S. and overwhelm American missile defenses with multiple warheads. Since the beginning of the year North Korea has conducted more than a dozen launches—including cruise, rail-based, hypersonic and intermediate-range ballistic missiles—as well as an unsuccessful long-range missile test earlier this month. But why now? What does Kim Jong Un want from his sudden fireworks display?
The explanations from Washington and Asian capitals for these latest launches sometimes sound like the naive foreign-policy punditry from the 1990s, at the very start of Pyongyang’s methodical march to nuclear status. We hear that the Kim regime is trying to get our attention, for example, or that it is shoring up its domestic legitimacy.
Have we really learned so little from a generation of confrontation with this revisionist state? By now it should be clear to observers that Pyongyang fires off new weapons because their development is vital to its fundamental strategic goal of unifying the Korean Peninsula under Kim rule.
To achieve unconditional unification on its own terms, North Korea would first have to break the U.S.-South Korean military alliance. Pyongyang hopes to do that through a nuclear showdown with America. We don’t need to guess about this. Immediately after the latest ICBM launch, one North Korean media outlet explained Mr. Kim’s reasoning for building these new armaments: “the long-term demand of our revolution,” the North Korean term for conquest of the South, presupposes “the inevitability of the longstanding confrontation with the U.S. imperialists.” The logic is simple: No weapons testing, no unification.
This is why regular and recurrent missile launches and nuclear detonations are an essential and entirely predictable feature of North Korea’s behavior. New weaponry has to be tested before the North’s scientists and generals can be certain that it works. Pyongyang is totally committed to strategic modernization, for which Mr. Kim laid out a program in detail at the Party Congress early last year. Advancing that agenda will require continual performance checks on the new equipment, just as past progress in nuclear and missile capabilities necessitated North Korea’s previous experiments.
But why the current flurry of launches? The likely answer is that this is simply Pyongyang’s first opportunity to conduct them. Though Pyongyang has proved adept at keeping outsiders in the dark about its weapons programs, the record suggests North Korea tests prototypes essentially as soon as it can.
The regime seems unwilling (perhaps doctrinally incapable) of waiting until later to test its munitions when it can launch them now—hoping to rush them to mass production as soon as possible.
Planned tests are of course sometimes scheduled for propagandistic considerations—July 4 and North Korean national holidays being especially favored dates for launches and explosions. But the North generally seems to test its new equipment as soon as it is deemed ready, which sometimes turns out to be before it actually is, as this month’s launchpad failure of a long-range missile attests.
Yet for all its haste, Pyongyang also takes curiously long breaks between launches. It’s been more than four years since the North last tested an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Outsiders know precious little about the workings of the overall North Korean economy and even less about its defense sector, but it’s a fair guess that protracted hiatuses between weapons tests are often the result of resource constraints. North Korea’s economy is tiny, inefficient and undependable, while missile and nuclear programs are exacting and extremely expensive (and all the more costly for technologically backward societies). Furthermore, the North Korean economy is painfully prone to unexpected dislocations and severe slumps.
The most recent tests signal that the North Korean economy is finally recovering after Mr. Kim’s draconian Covid lockdowns all but incapacitated it. Economic constraints may also be a reason Pyongyang’s weapons testing dropped off after the United Nations Security Council’s 2017 spate of comprehensive economic sanctions. And they could help explain why the tempo of missile and nuke tests under Kim Jong Il (a notoriously miserable economic manager, even by North Korean standards) was so much slower than under his son Kim Jong Un before those 2017 sanctions. Declaring a self-imposed moratorium—as the North did in 2018—sounds so much better than saying you are unable to scrape together the cash.
President Biden caught a break by entering office while North Korea was suffering from acute, if self-inflicted, economic woes. The recent spate of missile tests suggests North Korea’s weapons programs are back in the black. Further menacing tests may lie in store—we shouldn’t rule out nuclear ones. And the return to testing means we should also expect a resumption of North Korea’s brand of nuclear diplomacy.
Rather than trying to appease Mr. Kim, the Biden administration and the rest of the international community would be well served in identifying, and squelching, the new resource flows funding the North Korean war machine. Pyongyang has launched a lucrative new career in cybercrime. The Kim regime has also benefited from Russian and Chinese sanction-busting. There could well be other illicit revenues worth pursuing; the U.S. intelligence community should find out.
Thirty years of fruitless attempts at diplomatic engagement with the North have demonstrated that outsiders can’t alter the regime’s determination to become a nuclear power. But forceful international economic penalties, tirelessly and creatively applied, can throw sand in the gears of the North’s military programs. We should address this task with the seriousness it deserves. If we don’t try to stop North Korea from becoming a greater threat, we will enter a world in which Pyongyang can credibly threaten the American homeland with nuclear missiles.
Mr. Eberstadt holds a chair at the American Enterprise Institute and is a senior adviser to the National Bureau of Asian Research.
-
The Constraints and Drivers of Japan-South Korea Rapprochement
8 MIN READSep 5, 2022 | 14:00 GMT
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attend a meeting in Tokyo on July 18, 2022.
South Korean Foreign Minister Park Jin (left) and Japanese Foreign Minister Yoshimasa Hayashi attend a meeting in Tokyo on July 18, 2022.
(KIM KYUNG-HOON/POOL/AFP via Getty Images)
Foreign and domestic constraints will limit the scope of the ongoing rapprochement between South Korea and Japan, though steps to normalize trade relations and increase intelligence sharing are likely in the years ahead. South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol is attempting to make good on his campaign promise to restore and re-normalize relations with Japan, with Park Jin, the South Korean Foreign Minister, regularly meeting with his Japanese counterpart, Yoshimasa Hayashi, to find ways to resolve bilateral disagreements. South Korean and Japanese relations traditionally go through an up-and-down phase depending on the political leanings of the South Korean president, while Japanese views are slightly more standard in what they want out of South Korea for good relations. Liberal South Korean leaders would like Japan to take more responsibility for its World War II-era atrocities and thus hold a colder view of cooperation with Japan, while conservative South Korean leaders tend to view Japan as a necessary part of northeast Asian security (South Korea-U.S.-Japan) against communism from North Korea and China and have a warmer attitude toward Japan. Most Japanese conservative leadership would like South Korea to stop bringing up World War II-era atrocities committed by Imperial Japan, abide by previous treaties or agreements, and move forward with contemporary security, economic and social concerns. The two countries have been in a trade war since 2019 that started when Japan removed South Korea from the ''whitelist'' of favored trading nations because of a 2018 South Korean court ruling that Japanese firms were still liable to pay damages to victims of wartime atrocities. South Korea responded by boycotting some Japanese goods and Japanese-style stores and restaurants like Izakayas (popular drinking establishments) in South Korea, and many of its citizens stopped traveling to Japan for tourism. Seoul also dropped the term ''partner'' from its description of Tokyo in a defense white paper in 2021, which is a downgrade in how South Korea views the trustworthiness of Japan and prevents the countries from working closely.
The two nations continuously argue over Japan's responsibility for wartime atrocities committed by the Japanese empire from 1910-1945. Tokyo contends the issues were settled under the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations, but Seoul has argued that those deals were made by South Korea's then-military dictator Park Chung-hee so the terms must be renegotiated.
In 2015, after negotiating with South Korea's conservative president Park Geun Hye, Japan paid $8.3 million to settle the longstanding complaints from former South Koren ''comfort women,'' who the Japanese army used as sex slaves during World War II. In 2017, under liberal President Moon Jae-in, South Korean courts argued that the 2015 deal was invalid and must be renegotiated. In 2018, South Korean courts ruled that Japanese automobile company Mitsubishi was liable and owed roughly $750,000 to victims of WWII-era forced labor, which Mitsubishi has since refused to pay, backed by Tokyo who cites the 1965 Treaty of Basic Relations treaty.
South Korean civic groups and the government routinely protest that some Japanese textbooks omit some of the worst actions the Imperial Japanese Army took during its occupation of South Korea from 1910-1945.
Japanese officials sometimes visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, which commemorates convicted war criminals from World War II along with other fallen Japanese soldiers. The site also has enshrined some Koreans against their will, which garners strict rapprochement from South Korean officials and citizens.
In the coming years, shared views on North Korea and China, along with U.S. pressure, will drive South Korea and Japan to improve their bilateral relationship. South Korea is concerned about a more bellicose North Korea and will seek to rely more on Japan to protect South Korea's eastern flank with overlapping missile defense systems and naval patrols, and threaten North Korean territory with conventional arms in the event of a conflict on the peninsula. To achieve this, Seoul and Tokyo must have robust intelligence-sharing and regular military coordination. Japan would like South Korea to present a credible first-strike threat to North Korean leadership and ballistic missile launchers that threaten Japanese territory. Additionally, in the case of a conflict in Taiwan, China is likely to attack Japan because they would need to cripple U.S. forces on Okinawa. This would result in war between the two countries and economic ties being cut. If such a war is declared, Japan will need a closer relationship with South Korea to maintain access to the South Korean trade and tourism market, and, in turn, cushion the blow of losing that access to China (Japan's largest trade partner). The U.S. military leadership also wants South Korea and Japan to maintain close bilateral relations to lessen the United States' security burden in Northeast Asia (namely, leading actions against North Korea), which would free U.S. forces to focus on a potential Taiwanese conflict.
A statement issued by the U.S. Department of Defense in June stressed the need for improved bilateral ties between South Korea and Japan, which would relieve the United States from serving as the middle-man for intelligence-sharing and military coordination between two of its closest regional allies.
North Korean ballistic missiles tend to land between the Korean peninsula and Japan. In 2019, North Korea threatened then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe with a ballistic missile strike.
However, South Korea and Japan's economic dependence on China, as well as domestic social pressures, will limit the scope of any bilateral agreements. China is the largest trading partner for both South Korea and Japan, and is willing to exercise economic coercion against its neighbors for pursuing policies that overtly displease Beijing. Without a formal agreement, tensions over the disputed Dokdo/Takeshima Island, while in essence settled as South Korean territory, will remain a thorn in the side of future discussions and negotiations between Seoul and Tokyo. In addition, anti-Japanese sentiment among South Korean voters will continue to dampen Seoul's appetite for increased cooperation with Tokyo, while the nationalistic sentiments in Japan will similarly restrict Japanese politicians' willingness to publicly pursue rapprochement with South Korea.
China accounts for roughly 25% of South Korea's exports and 21.6% of Japanese exports. The United States is second with 15% and 18%, respectively.
Chinese citizens organized a boycott of Lotte, a South Korean chaebol (conglomerate) in 2017 following the South Korean deployment of THAAD, a missile defense system that Beijing heavily criticized as threatening Chinese territory; the last Lotte store in China will close by the end of this year. During an address to Japanese officials this past June, the U.S. ambassador to Japan warned against Chinese economic coercion and intellectual property theft.
South Korea and Japan claim ownership of an island that sits between the two countries, called Dokdo in South Korea and Takeshima in Japan (the international community calls it the Liancourt Rocks). Currently, South Korea has de-facto ownership over the island, with a South Korean family living there, and a police force stationed on the island as well. But the Japanese government still claims the island.
Japan and South Korea will not become treaty allies anytime soon, though they will likely resume small-scale bilateral naval exercises and military cooperation. Conservative President Yoon's five-year term will not see South Korea sign a formal alliance agreement with Japan, as the bilateral problems that inhibit such a treaty will not be quickly resolved. But Yoon will restore the normal business ties with Japan that were cut during his predecessor's term, with red tape being reduced or eliminated on key industrial exports, and tourism resuming to pre-trade war levels. Bilateral naval exercises are likely to take place as well, but they are extremely unlikely to occur in South Korean waters as long as the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force flies the controversial Rising Sun flag. It is extremely likely that the two nations will proactively share intelligence specifically regarding North Korea (they never truly stopped sharing reactive intelligence related to missile launches, such as trajectories and impact locations). But it is somewhat unlikely that South Korea and Japan will agree on a single North Korea containment strategy, nor will the nations agree on a Chinese or Russian strategy. Seoul and Tokyo will also likely discuss cooperating on supply chains as part of the CHIPS 4 alliance, a U.S. proposal to boost semiconductor manufacturing between Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the United States.
The election of a liberal South Korean president in 2027 would threaten continued Japanese-South Korean rapprochement. Like his conservative predecessors, Yoon supports building closer relations with Japan within the U.S. security umbrella. But liberal South Korean presidents have tended to lean closer toward China, and have traditionally supported more autonomy from the U.S.-led security umbrella in the region.
The Rising Sun flag was adopted in 1870. It was the main flag of the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during World War II. Many liken it to the Nazi swastika and believe it should be removed from contemporary use.
-
A more confident and desperate North Korea
America should just say ‘no’ to normalizing a nuclearized adversary
By Joseph R. DeTrani
On Sept. 9 Kim Jong-un, at a session of the Supreme People’s Assembly, made it officially clear that North Korea will remain a nuclear weapons state with an expansive nuclear doctrine that includes the preemptive use of nuclear weapons.
Clearly, this was a message from Mr. Kim to the United States and South Korea. He was telling the United States that any future negotiations will focus on arms control issues, not denuclearization. And in this context, Mr. Kim now appears confident that the United States eventually will relent and accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, something the North has been pursuing since the Six Party Talks from 20032009. North Korea was told then and continues to be told now, that the United States will never accept the North as a nuclear weapons state, concerned that other countries would pursue their own nuclear weapons program, despite U.S. extended deterrence commitments, and that a nuclear weapon or fissile material for a dirty bomb would be provided to a rogue state or terrorist organization.
Equally concerning was Mr. Kim’s other pronouncement that North Korea now has a nuclear “first use” doctrine that includes the preemptive use of nuclear weapons in response to an attack or an imminent attack on the leadership or its nuclear command structure or, indeed, a threat to the existence
of the state. South Korean President Yoon Suk yeol, during his campaign, had publicly stated that a pre-emptive strike was an option for his country in response to an imminent attack from North Korea. It appears that this may have been Mr. Kim’s response — we also have a preemptive use policy — to Mr. Yoon’s comments about a pre-emptive strike.
Although Mr. Kim’s Sept. 9 expansive commentary on the preemptive use of nuclear weapons was not too surprising, since he had made similar comments about the preemptive use of nuclear weapons on April 25 at a military parade celebrating the 90th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People’s army, it was noteworthy in that Mr. Kim now stated clearly — what many suspected — that North Korea will never give up its nuclear weapons, seemingly dashing any hope for the resumption of denuclearization talks.
On Sept. 16, the United States and South Korea will convene a session of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group. At the May 2022 summit of President Biden and Mr. Yoon, it was agreed that the EDSCG would be reactivated since its last meeting in 2018. Both presidents agreed to enhance extended deterrence capabilities and resume robust annual joint military exercises. Accordingly, from Aug. 22 to Sept. 1, the largest joint military exercise in five years, Ulchi Freedom Shield, was successfully conducted with live-fire exercises that involved thousands of troops and land, sea, and air forces. These developments on the Korean peninsula are happening at a time when North Korea has been supportive of Russia in its war with Ukraine. Pyongyang has recognized the breakaway Donetsk People’s Republic and the Luhansk People’s Republic and reportedly is providing Russia with rockets and millions of artillery shells.
Unconfirmed reporting also mentioned North Korea sending workers to these breakaway provinces of Ukraine and possibly also sending troops to aid Russia and these breakaway provinces in the war with the government of Ukraine. No doubt this is a calculated move on the part of Mr. Kim to secure Russia’s support — its veto power as one of the five permanent members of the Security Council — in the United Nations to ensure that no further sanctions will be imposed on Pyongyang, regardless of their reckless behavior, to include a seventh nuclear test. Additionally, North Korea would receive needed oil, natural gas, and wheat from Russia, in exchange for Pyongyang’s support in the war with Ukraine. Although North Korea has had close relations with Russia, going back to Joseph Stalin and the Soviet Union’s support of North Korea during the Korean War and through the 1980s when the Soviet Union was helping North Korea with its missile and nuclear programs, to include the provision of a research nuclear reactor in the 1980s, and aid that abruptly ceased with the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991. However, aligning with a revanchist Russia probably isn’t the option Mr. Kim and his father, Kim Jong-il, wanted to pursue. Rather, it was normalizing relations with the United States. This goes back to former President Jimmy Carter’s meeting in Pyongyang with Kim Il-sung in 1994, former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright’s meetings in Pyongyang with Kim Jong-il in 2000 and Mr. Kim’s meetings with former President Donald Trump in 2018 and 2019.
North Korea wants a normal relationship primarily with the United States. We know this from almost 30 years of negotiations and informal meetings and exchanges. The problem was and is that North Korea wants this normal relationship on their terms — accepting them as a nuclear weapons state. This has been and is the rub — we correctly continue to say “no.” Normalization is available with complete and verifiable denuclearization and significant progress on human rights. We should hold to this principled decision.
Joseph R. DeTrani is the former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea and the former director of the National Counterprolif-eration Center. The views are the author’s and not any government agency or department.
On Sept. 16, the United States and South Korea will convene a session of the Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group.
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvNfHJcJeKg
-
Gauging South Korea's Response to the North's Upcoming Nuclear Test
6 MIN READOct 26, 2022 | 20:05 GMT
File footage of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is seen on a television screen at a train station in Seoul, South Korea, on Sept. 9, 2022.
File footage of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is seen on a television screen at a train station in Seoul, South Korea, on Sept. 9, 2022.
(ANTHONY WALLACE/AFP via Getty Images)
South Korea will likely react to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test with its own show of force, but the risk of Chinese retaliation and triggering another war with Pyongyang will limit how far Seoul can go in its response. Late last month, South Korea's National Intelligence Service (NIS) said it expected North Korea to conduct a nuclear test between Oct. 16 and Nov. 7. It's highly unlikely that South Korean authorities would have made this timeline public if they weren't extremely confident in their intelligence and had a response prepared. Since the test hasn't occurred yet, it's widely expected to happen within the next two weeks per the NIS timeframe. North Korea has not tested a nuclear weapon since it began a self-imposed moratorium on such tests in 2017 amid increased outreach to South Korea and the United States. But while notable, the restarting of North Korean nuclear tests does not inherently alter the security situation in the region since Pyongyang has already demonstrated it is a nuclear power with advanced, high-yield devices. This means that barring an exceptionally unlikely scenario in which North Korea conducts an unprecedented above-ground or atmospheric nuclear test, tensions on the Korean Peninsula will remain high but will not become critical. But while the test may not significantly alter the North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea's response will still be key in gauging the greater trajectory of Seoul's national security policies and relationship with Pyongyang.
The last nuclear weapon that North Korea tested in 2017 was a supposed hydrogen bomb with an estimated yield as high as 250 kilotons. The bomb the United States dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, by comparison, had a 20-kiloton yield. The current U.S. arsenal of nuclear weapons includes the W80 and W87, which have yields of up to 150 kilotons and 300 kilotons, respectively.
South Korea will react to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test with an immediate display of force, while increasing military cooperation with the United States and Japan in the medium-to-long term. While North Korea hasn't tested a nuclear device despite signs it is fully prepared to do so, it has conducted over 40 tests of other weapons since the beginning of this year. South Korea has reacted to these recent weapons tests with proportionate demonstrations of military force, including by testing its own homegrown ballistic missiles. For South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, failing to react to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test with an even greater show of force than demonstrated in response to North Korea's ballistic missile tests would convey a major sign of weakness that would have disastrous domestic political effects, with Yoon's approval ratings likely sinking even further below its current 32%. It would also give North Korean leader Kim Jong Un a major propaganda victory by enabling him to claim that his Juche (or ''self-reliance'') strategy is working. In response to North Korea's nuclear test, Seoul will thus seek to showcase its military's capacity to conduct ''decapitation'' strikes against North Korean leadership from all sides with conventional weapons — likely by having South Korean naval vessels deploy airstrikes, ballistic missiles and/or long-range artillery against either island targets or dummy targets in the East Sea/Sea of Japan. In the medium-to-long term, South Korea will also look to speed up the development and deployment of a localized missile defense program similar to Israel's Iron Dome, and will seek to increase the size and scope of bilateral military drills with the United States. In addition, South Korea will look to potentially conduct bilateral military drills with Japan, which likely also use the nuclear test to further justify its own remilitarization efforts. Tokyo may even use the common threat of North Korea to broach new bilateral military cooperation with Seoul (though this could be complicated by the two countries' ongoing tensions over World War II-era grievances, like the use of forced labor and sexual slavery during Imperial Japan's occupation of South Korea).
South Korea maintains a ''decapitation'' strategy as a conventional way to counter North Korea's nuclear weapons. This would see Seoul launching fast, precision airstrikes, bombing raids, surface-to-surface missile attacks and/or potential commando raids aimed at taking out North Korean leadership and key military installations before North Korea could react, if South Korean leadership believes that a nuclear attack is imminent.
On October 4, North Korea tested a missile over Japan for the first time in five years. In response, South Korea conducted long-range rocket artillery and air strike demonstrations, and also tested one of its own homemade ballistic missiles.
In 2021, Reuters reported that South Korea was developing its own indigenous missile defense system, using a combination of Patriot Missile batteries and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) batteries, with an expected completion date of 2035.
Fears of provoking painful Chinese retaliation, however, will ultimately limit the scope of South Korea's response to the North Korean nuclear threat. A growing number of South Koreans support an increase in deterrence against the North, which includes nuclear weapons. According to recent polls, roughly 70% of South Koreans support the development of a domestic nuclear weapons program, and more than half (56%) support rehosting U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korean territory. The placement of such deadly warheads so close to China's border, however, would infuriate Beijing, given the extremely grave security threat it would pose. Should Seoul make such a decision, China would retaliate more swiftly and painfully than it has to previous transgressions, like South Korea's deployment of THAAD batteries in 2017. For example, instead of boycotting a single South Korean industry (as it did in 2017), Beijing could introduce a blanket boycott on most South Korean goods. Alternatively, China could ban its nationals from traveling to South Korea, which would severely harm the South Korean economy. South Korea is also limited in its ability to conduct physical military actions against North Korea, as even a low-level shelling or strike on a military base or infrastructure could restart the Korean conflict by breaking the unsigned cease-fire. In addition, the United States remains highly unlikely to support a direct attack on North Korea, which would give China a stronger casus belli to build up its military forces and potentially speed up the timeline for an invasion of Taiwan by labeling the West as the aggressor, in addition to renewing the Korean war. And South Korea remains highly unlikely to conduct such an attack without first consulting the United States, since doing otherwise would cause irrevocable harm to Seoul's alliance with Washington.
Given these risks, South Korea will thus refrain from taking any actions that could destabilize the region, despite mounting domestic pressure for a more hawkish approach to North Korea.
Before COVID-19 disrupted travel, Chinese tourists in South Korea spent an average of $3,000 per person. In 2020 alone, the loss of Chinese tourists cost South Korea an estimated $2 billion in revenue.
China has directly supported the development of the North Korean nuclear program and the impending test by continuing to send Pyongyang economic aid in violation of U.N. sanctions. This means that China will likely vote against any additional U.N. sanctions proposed in response to North Korea's upcoming nuclear test.
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WARJLEjDQRg&t=4s
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LTCceQcogD4
-
https://rumble.com/vqmkwn-why-north-korea-is-the-hardest-country-to-escape.html
-
https://nypost.com/2023/06/03/trump-congratulates-kim-jong-un-on-north-korea-entry-into-who-board/
Not sure I get the head game here
Trump thinks the way to deal with a mass murderer is making him a friend, and that he is gullible naive and just needs some tender love and recognition.
Well, Kim still has not allowed Trump to build condos on the N Korean Bch to my knowledge .
-
could she on the right politically
because in S Korea conservatives a staunchly against the Kim regime
and the libs there are more conciliatory?
https://www.nknews.org/2021/06/north-korean-defector-yeonmi-park-muddles-human-rights-message-with-partisanship/
some reported inconsistencies of Yeomi 's story ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeonmi_Park
OTOH hand is the NK news sympathetic with N Korea government ?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NK_News
hard to know who to believe
but Ms Park's story while possible "embellished" is still valid and her comparison to Columbia Univ is also valid whether the Left will admit it or not.
I hear her story , her opinions and agree with them.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/2/north-korea-targets-us-intel-figures-secret-cyber-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=CpW6EdlhoPs7nQzDrtz7cQnNlI5PL8E7rjV75i6GgjUvasWeXagYHVL9KH357QXV&bt_ts=1685718705182
-
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=fa0b1df5a98444eee5677945f4b93f7e_659577e1_6d25b5f&selDate=20240103
-
second
Seoul's priorities. South Korea’s Foreign Ministry published its annual diplomatic white paper on Wednesday. For the first time, the document describes Japan as South Korea’s “cooperative partner” and highlights Seoul’s efforts to fully restore relations with Tokyo. It also emphasizes South Korea’s desire to advance its relationship with the United States to the “highest level.”