May 29, 2024
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Russian Strategy in the Sahel
As the U.S. leaves Niger, Moscow’s intentions are becoming clearer.
By: Ronan Wordsworth
A date has been set for the United States to fully demobilize from its military bases in Niger. On Sept. 15, American forces will leave at a time when the West continues to lose ground to Russian influence in the Sahel. As this happens, a clearer picture of Moscow’s broader regional strategy is beginning to form.
The Sahel has long been a hotbed for global terrorism. It was initially identified in the so-called Global War on Terror as a threat to Africa and to U.S. and Europe security because of its potential to nurture extremism and to export extremists through legal migration channels to Europe. Unsurprisingly, Brussels and Washington have each spent hundreds of millions of dollars in the Sahel, with Niger receiving a substantial portion of U.S. training and support. The fact that Russia is now taking over and deploying resources and personnel to Africa amid a stagnating war in Ukraine attests to the importance of the region.
This explains why in March the U.S. engaged in negotiations to remain in Niger. During those talks, U.S. officials said they gave the Nigerien junta a pathway for continuing the relationship, which included a planned roadmap for a return to democracy (which no Nigerian leader has been able to provide) and a reconsideration of its choice to supply yellowcake, a uranium concentrate powder, to Iran. Clearly, the talks were unsuccessful; reports indicate that the junta has already agreed to move forward with the sale of hundreds of tons of the substance to Iran, even though it has denied doing so. U.S. and Nigerien officials met again in mid-May as a last ditch effort to ease tensions and keep a foothold in the country, but these talks failed too, thus the deadline for Washington’s departure.
The U.S. has since halted much of its support to Niger. Though some in the government expected deliveries of things like drones and weaponry to continue, it should not come as a surprise. Washington provides tons of material to countries like Niger, but it does so with strings attached: It tends not to provide military assistance to governments that come to power through coups, and it usually requires certain discussions and degrees of influence in exchange. Moscow has no such compunction. It has a long history providing arms to the region, and it leverages its relationship to curry favor with its regimes. Russia has already provided anti-air defense systems to Niamey, as well as some 100 Russian soldiers and military instructors “to train local forces in the fight against terrorism.” That Russia provides drones, equipment, arms, and ammunition without restrictions will continue to set it apart from Washington when dealing with governments across Africa.
Niger typifies Russian strategy in North and West Africa, but it is only one of many countries the Kremlin is trying to woo. Sao Tome and Principe, for example, recently signed a military cooperation agreement with Russia that calls for military training, logistical support and "possible collaborations" involving Russian ships and planes. The president of Guinea-Bissau recently visited Moscow and declared that Russia was a “permanent and loyal ally.” Guinea-Bissau has had a military agreement with Russia since November 2018, but it’s highly likely that during the president’s trip there was an updated framework agreement proposed to increase military cooperation. Russia also announced that it will be opening an embassy in Equatorial Guinea. The EU was slow to react but has now expressed significant alarm at the developments.
Russia's Increased Presence in Africa
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Why is Russia interested in this part of Africa? First, since its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Moscow has been in search of friendly governments to support it in the international arena and help it avoid diplomatic and economic isolation. Many governments across Africa have bought into the Kremlin’s portrayal of the war as an anti-imperial conflict. Ukraine has fought back, dispatching Foreign Minister Dymtro Kuleba to a dozen African countries (some of which had never received a Ukrainian government delegation before) during four separate visits since early 2022. Kyiv also developed an Africa-focused communications strategy to counter Russian propaganda.
Second, Moscow is establishing a trade corridor to funnel natural resources from the region to Russia – and away from Europe. Russia provides weapons and military equipment, while its paramilitaries protect African military leaders as well as mining operations. In exchange, the African military juntas permit Russian firms to extract gold, oil, diamonds and other valuable commodities. From there, Russia can transport the commodities north to Libyan ports, where they are loaded onto ships and sold abroad. (Thanks to its close partnership with Libya, Russia is also able to disguise its natural gas as Libyan and sell it to Europe, undermining European efforts to end its dependence on Russian energy while refilling the Kremlin’s coffers.) If Niger were to sell yellowcake to Iran, as both Nigerien and Western officials have alleged it may, then the corridor to the Mediterranean would be an ideal route. It is also a superb choice for migrants who aspire to reach Europe – a journey that Moscow and Minsk have not just endorsed but facilitated in recent years to sow discord in European politics and society.
Finally, and perhaps most consequential for Western interests, Russia seeks to unite its allies from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic. For a long time, Russia has been pursuing naval bases along the coasts of Africa. (It previously struck a deal with Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, who was removed from power during a coup in 2019.) In February, it reportedly started courting the West African country of Togo in a bid to extend its Sahel corridor to the Atlantic Ocean. Elsewhere in West Africa, Senegal’s recently inaugurated president has emphasized anti-colonialism, casting doubt on the future of Dakar’s relations with Paris, its former ruler. He has also spoken openly about drawing closer to the pro-Russia Alliance of Sahel States (comprising Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger). For Russia, an Atlantic naval base would give it more secure access to trans-Atlantic trade routes and support its logistics chain to its Sahelian allies.
The focal point for Russia’s Africa strategy at the moment is Libya, whose rival authorities can both claim good relations with the Kremlin. Wagner mercenaries long fought alongside Gen. Khalifa Haftar’s forces in the east, while Russian diplomats kept in contact with the Government of National Unity in Tripoli. Besides the several thousand ex-Wagner military contractors who were already in the country, Russia has been sending professional soldiers to Libya since February. In the past month alone, it deployed 1,800 troops alongside several hundred special operators. Since April, Russian frigates have made at least five deliveries of military equipment to Tobruk. Moscow’s military build-up in North Africa poses a serious threat to Europe, but Russia’s forces are more likely to be deployed across the region than they are to remain in Libya.
Russia's Prospective Missile Range from Tobruk, Libya
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Following its withdrawal from Afghanistan, the U.S. is determined to ensure that its exit from Niger goes smoothly. One hundred U.S. troops have already departed, but approximately 1,000 remain. They will leave behind an expensive drone base that provided Sahelian governments with intelligence and reconnaissance for their fight against Islamist insurgencies. However, Washington remains convinced of the importance of monitoring and, when necessary, actively disrupting Islamist extremist networks across the Sahel, so it continues to seek a new home for its counterterrorism operations.
Meanwhile, Russia has been proactive in ensuring this will not be an easy task for the United States. In addition to building links between its African allies, Moscow is trying to push further into Lusophone countries. It is also prioritizing collaboration with the new Senegalese president and other countries along the Atlantic coast, including Togo. By forming tighter alliances across the region, Russia will benefit economically and politically, while gaining the ability to threaten NATO in new ways – all of which will increase Moscow’s future bargaining power.
