Fire Hydrant of Freedom

https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/chinas-role-anti-israel-college-protests-act-war-expert-says?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR3zWqDGAmm1JzcIV1n2EStg3tWlhgLbTp7Hb2-TXsIdPKoA49z34Cg190Y_aem_AYgrYrtMnpwXr7H2boocIUomhWHw9ubzs9nv8cTH6RD6z2P-hT7Y_HI5xWwAR0OEbtK6Lrd-oGbsI7aTOPO9GKRw

https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2024/05/former-government-official-charged-falsely-accusing-colleagues-involvement/?fbclid=IwZXh0bgNhZW0CMTAAAR3X8SnqQ6Sev8PwZpej_kLuOtXV8CepjbDMQMNSPxQiwjssAoe9yfJFM2E_aem_AbGDvJpsg3P5KrD5F7cly-P3xSY7THy3iDTCzo7Iq8YITGaS7H-mzxBa5eHcRYnCqSIVcCTec5uNfH7E6asTmfCK

https://amgreatness.com/2024/05/07/support-for-speaker-johnson-is-growing-among-democrats/

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-s-crimea-bridge-bluster-appears-to-have-paid-off/ar-BB1lXZpx?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=d0f3ce8bd33144e3a15e655b9ee0eca5&ei=5

https://amgreatness.com/2024/05/07/matt-gaetz-cries-foul-after-federal-bureau-of-prisons-denies-his-request-to-interview-former-trump-advisor-peter-navarro/

https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/biden-voter-registration-meeting-raises-eyebrows-on-capitol-hill-election-interference/ar-BB1lWYVr?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=31b4f8682a7f4bdbaa3032b2dbeb5976&ei=52

Have not watched this, but the title tease is tempting:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7ikcyVzWSyU

 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gM07qFvcTE8&t=35s

Looks like the chickens are coming home to roost , , ,


==========
FO

(4) RUSSIA URANIUM BAN TO DRIVE UP LONG-TERM NUCLEAR ENERGY COST: President Biden is expected to sign the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act, which will ban Russian enriched uranium imports, which make up 24% of foreign uranium fuel imports.
Nuclear fuel market research firm UxC president Jonathan Hinze said the spot price of uranium fuel could jump as much as 20% if the Biden administration does not continue waivers for Russian uranium fuel imports.

According to Energy Information Administration data, U.S. sources account for only 5% of uranium fuel deliveries to U.S. nuclear power generators.

Why It Matters: Uranium fuel contracts are negotiated years in advance. However, this will very likely contribute to increasing energy prices as uranium fuel prices increase. Russia could retaliate with an immediate export ban to the U.S., undermining likely Biden administration plans to continue Russian uranium import waivers. This will likely spur domestic uranium mining and enrichment development, but this could take years. In the meantime, many coal power plants are slated to shut down by 2030 when new EPA emissions rules require coal plants to implement carbon capture technology or shut down. – R.C.

second

Have not watched this yet:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cS8dAj9kxRQ

https://www.c-span.org/video/?297544-1/the-farhud-roots-arab-nazi-alliance-holocaust

https://www.jpost.com/Features/In-Thespotlight/Recounting-Farhud-that-ended-2400-years-of-Iraqi-Jewry

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-13610702

https://shc.stanford.edu/arcade/interventions/farhud-forgotten-ordeal-iraqi-jews

China Has Crossed Biden’s Red Line on Ukraine
The president warned Xi not to provide ‘material support’ to Russia. Will there be consequences?
By Matt Pottinger
April 30, 2024 4:55 pm ET



President Biden warned China two years ago not to provide “material support” for Russia’s war in Ukraine. On Friday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken conceded that Xi Jinping ignored that warning. China, Mr. Blinken said, was “overwhelmingly the No. 1 supplier” of Russia’s military industrial base, with the “material effect” of having fundamentally changed the course of the war. Whatever Mr. Biden chooses to do next will be momentous for global security and stability.

Mr. Biden can either enforce his red line through sanctions or other means, or he can signal a collapse of American resolve by applying merely symbolic penalties. Beijing and its strategic partners in Moscow, Tehran, Pyongyang and Caracas would surely interpret half-hearted enforcement as a green light to deepen their campaign of global chaos. Mr. Xi sees a historic opportunity here to undermine the West.

This is a moment akin to President Obama’s 2013 red-line failure in Syria. When dictator Bashar al-Assad defied Mr. Obama’s warning not to use chemical weapons on his people, the president abstained from military action, and the consequences were dire. Six months later Moscow launched its 2014 invasion of Crimea—the beginning of the now-decadelong Ukraine War. A failure to act decisively against China now would open a path for Russian victory in Ukraine.

Mr. Biden drew his red line on March 18, 2022, three weeks after Vladimir Putin launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. “I made no threats,” Mr. Biden said after a video call with Mr. Xi that day. But Mr. Biden said he made sure the Chinese president understood he would “be putting himself in significant jeopardy” and risking China’s economic ties with the U.S. and Europe if he materially supported Russia’s war.

Mr. Biden’s cabinet reinforced his ultimatum with specific warnings. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo warned that the administration could “essentially shut” China’s biggest chip maker, Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corp., in response to its chips being used by the Russian military. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen threatened financial sanctions. She followed up with a pledge late last year “to take decisive, and surgical, action against financial institutions that facilitate the supply of Russia’s war machine.”

Trade data suggest Beijing was careful to avoid overtly crossing the red line in 2022. But in 2023, when the Biden administration applied only token sanctions on Iranian entities that provided thousands of kamikaze drones to the Russians—drones that have saturated Ukrainian air defenses and caused widespread carnage—the Chinese probably decided that Mr. Biden’s bluster was a bluff. In March 2023, Mr. Xi visited the Kremlin in a bold show of solidarity with Mr. Putin. It turned out to be a watershed in Moscow’s war, effectively turning the conflict into a Chinese proxy war with the West.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies found that Chinese support for Russia’s military manufacturing skyrocketed beginning in early 2023. Mr. Blinken specifically mentioned to his Chinese counterparts “machine tools, microelectronics, nitrocellulose—which is critical to making munitions and rocket propellants—and other dual-use items that Moscow is using to ramp up its defense industrial base.” News reports over the past year also point to China’s provision of military vehicles, drones, bulletproof vests, gunpowder and satellite imagery.

Fracturing the West through proxy wars in Europe and the Middle East fits neatly within Mr. Xi’s exhortation to his bureaucracy to seek opportunity in international turmoil. “The most important characteristic of the world is, in a word, ‘chaos,’ and this trend appears likely to continue,” Mr. Xi told a seminar of Chinese Communist Party leaders in January 2021. “The times and trends are on our side.” As Mr. Xi departed a Kremlin meeting in March 2023, he went further, effectively declaring himself and Mr. Putin agents of chaos. “Right now there are changes, the likes of which we haven’t seen for 100 years,” he said. “And we are the ones driving these changes together.”

As the Biden team contemplates the potential costs of imposing sanctions on major Chinese banks and other systemically important companies, it must also weigh the costs of failing to do so. China’s leaders are vulnerable to meaningful sanctions. In late 2017, the Trump administration quietly but firmly threatened to impose sanctions on China’s main energy producer after Beijing resisted U.S. requests to restrict oil exports to North Korea. China knew the threat was credible and quickly agreed to co-sponsor an unprecedented United Nations Security Council resolution capping exports.

Today, that credibility is looking threadbare. Beijing’s official statements after the Blinken visit made no mention of the American complaint, and a Chinese Foreign Ministry official said flatly: “The Ukraine issue is not an issue between China and the United States. The U.S. side should not turn it into one.”

Worse, there are signs Beijing and its axis of chaos, which includes Russia, Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela, is planning the next phase of violent disruption. Beijing welcomed a delegation from Hamas on the same day Mr. Blinken left China—a fact Chinese officials kept from the American delegation. More ominously, Mr. Xi dispatched one of his most trusted aides, former spy agency chief and current Politburo member Chen Wenqing, to Moscow for a nine-day visit. The purpose of the trip was to tighten intelligence and security cooperation and pave the way for Mr. Putin’s visit to Beijing next month.

In a telling essay this month in the Chinese Communist Party’s top ideological and policy journal, Chen Yixin—the current head of China’s premier spy agency—promoted the idea of waging “struggle” far beyond China’s borders. Mr. Chen’s essay in the magazine Qiushi included a line that may as well serve as the informal slogan of the axis of chaos: “Seek advantages and avoid disadvantages in chaos.”

Mr. Pottinger served as deputy national security adviser, 2019-21. He chairs the China program at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and is author of “The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan,” forthcoming in July.

(1) BIDEN ANNOUNCES NEW CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MEMO: The White House announced that President Biden signed a new National Security Memorandum on protecting U.S. critical infrastructure, which will replace the Obama-era Presidential Policy Directive 21.

According to the memo, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will lead the whole-of-government effort to secure critical infrastructure, and the federal intelligence agencies will collect and share threat intelligence with critical infrastructure owners and operators.

Why It Matters: U.S. critical infrastructure and services remain vulnerable to cyberattacks and criminal hackers. Newly planned AI systems meant to enhance operational technology and security, create new vulnerabilities state-linked and criminal hackers can exploit.

Offensive cyber operations have a significant advantage over defensive operations, and U.S. Army Cyber Command has led the way with “persistent engagement” which is intended to keep adversaries on the defensive. However, officials now say state-linked hackers are using a similar “persistent engagement” doctrine against U.S. infrastructure. – R.C.

May 1, 2024
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Don’t Expect Too Much From Venezuela’s Elections
The slow transition continues.
By: Allison Fedirka

The Venezuelan opposition has unexpectedly united around a single candidate: Edmundo Gonzalez. And though this is good news for a movement that has long been hindered by its inability to set aside its differences, much remains in the way of true regime change, which should still be seen as a long-term goal rather than a plausible outcome of the July 28 elections.

It’s fair to say that in the past Venezuela’s opposition has stood in the way of its own success. Ideological disagreements aside, personality-based divisions have prevented the opposition from presenting a unified front, leading to declining resources, manpower and electoral weight. In fact, the opposition boycotted elections from 2018 to 2021 on the grounds that they were unfair, and as a result, the ruling government ran uncontested, keeping a strong hold on elected posts. The movement returned to elections in 2021, but President Nicolas Maduro has since declared it illegal for the leading candidate, Maria Corina Machado, to be on the ballot this year, reviving concerns that the opposition would fall into its old habits and leave itself no better off than it was before.

But it seems as though the opposition has learned its lesson and is eager to see more success at the July 28 polls. Despite being the most popular opposition candidate, Machado stepped out of the race and threw her support behind Gonzalez, a candidate that could actually make it onto the ballot. Other influential opposition figures such as Henrique Capriles and Juan Guaido also back Gonzalez. As of today, the Maduro government and election observers recognize Gonzalez’s candidacy. This effectively challenges the Maduro government to honor its commitment to free and fair elections.

It does not guarantee electoral success. Despite Venezuela’s many economic challenges, the government remains in control and has managed to keep the opposition at bay through political imprisonment, intimidation and media influence. It’s highly motivated to win since losing would result in exile or prison for many prominent officials. Maduro himself relies heavily on a network of power brokers, each contributing to the economy’s – and thus the regime’s – well-being. While the different factions of the government don’t always agree (particularly when it comes to the legacy of former President Hugo Chavez), their shared interests are strong enough to force cooperation. Arguments for a negotiated transition that protects Maduro and his cronies have been made, but they don’t see them as viable because the opposition is unable to guarantee that it will make good on its promises.

Importantly, some segments of the Venezuelan public do not wish to see regime change. The government clearly has not solved the root causes of the country’s economic problems, but it has successfully navigated around them and found temporary solutions. The government is still an important employer, even if wages remain depressed. (Many employees have to find side jobs, and Caracas has embraced that need through the creation of VenApp, a platform that connects potential gig workers with government service and repair work.) With the help of foreign private firms and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, Venezuela has managed to improve food self-sufficiency enough to ease its dependence on imports. Caracas has also learned from other countries under U.S. sanctions to keep daily life livable. The traditional grocery stores in major cities, for example, now face competition from Iranian shops that offer low prices for comparable goods due to wholesale prices and different product origins. Anecdotal reports even suggest the same grocery list can be purchased at Iranian markets for less than half the price at traditional supermarkets. None of these measures permanently fix the Venezuelan economy, but they might be enough for those who stand to lose a lot from an unknown economic future brought about by regime change.

The opposition’s failure to recognize these realities causes it to underestimate the strength of the forces it competes against. Gonzalez, among others, clearly stated that the opposition’s main objective is to restore democratic institutions, values and practices in the country. Its ability to do so is predicated on three elements: free and fair elections, the assumption of electoral victory and an orderly transition with no retaliation. Historically, the regime has guaranteed none of these conditions. Even so, the opposition remains committed to these ideals, putting it on an unlevel playing field against a government that has more resources but fewer reservations about how they are used.

Moreover, the Maduro regime’s ability to manipulate the electoral system should not be ignored. The decision to declare Machado ineligible for the 2024 ballot marks only the most recent instance of electoral malfeasance. A few years ago, when the opposition won a supermajority in the National Assembly, the government, threatened by the fact that their enemies now had the ability to rewrite the constitution and impeach officials, simply created a new, parallel legislature composed of regime loyalists. (This legislature remains in place today.) The government can thus be expected to try to shape the election’s outcome to its liking. In fact, rumors have already emerged that Caracas plans to run a Chavista candidate in an effort to split the opposition vote.

Hovering over the elections is the United States. Washington’s behavior toward Venezuela suggests it sees regime change as a long-term goal, not one that will be achieved this summer. It lifted sanctions on Venezuela under the condition that the government honors the Barbados Agreement, which calls for free and fair elections. The omission of Machado from the ballot put Maduro’s compliance with these agreements in question. The U.S. responded by first reimposing sanctions on Venezuelan gold operations. After a few months, when it became clear the government was not going to change its ways, Washington adjusted its approach to oil sanctions, reflecting a desire to balance regime change with U.S. interests. In April, for example, Washington announced the planned revocation of Special License 44, which allowed U.S. companies to invest in and export Venezuelan oil. By May 31, the U.S. will go back to how it conducted oil business with Venezuela. There will be full sanctions in place against doing business with Venezuelan oil operations, but companies can apply (and often receive) special waivers to engage. This will inevitably reduce the revenue available to the Maduro regime, but importantly the waivers allow the U.S. to keep its foot in the door. Washington needs to ensure economic access to Venezuela down the line and cannot take itself out of the market entirely, especially now that European and Russian companies and others are looking for a way in. The U.S. is more than willing to wait for regime change rather than push for something immediately, especially if doing so reduces the chance of revolution or a civil war that would jeopardize its interests.

Venezuela’s elections in July need to be viewed as part of the broader transition process, not a watershed moment in their own right. The fact that the Maduro regime and the U.S. are talking, that Caracas signed the Barbados Agreement, and that the opposition is getting its act together all prove that a transition is underway. But they also reveal the constraints to regime change, which, barring an unforeseen event, will come slowly.

https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/nato-russia-spending-membership-eab4a10a?mod=hp_lead_pos9

Maps and graphics too
==================

NATO Prepares to Face Russia—and Problems of Its Own
By Daniel MichaelsFollow
April 30, 2024 12:01 am ET


ADAZI MILITARY BASE, Latvia—NATO troops from 14 nations amassed last month in a wooded area here to take part in the alliance’s biggest military exercise since the Cold War. Once again, the focus was Russia.

The drill began in the early morning darkness with a warning: Enemy forces had crossed Latvia’s border with Russia and were closing on the capital. Communicating in various languages over different kinds of radios, the troops raced to push the mock invaders toward wetlands that would bog down their tanks.

“What’s most important is to demonstrate readiness to act quickly and deploy to defend Latvian and NATO borders,” said Latvian Army Col. Oskars Kudlis, who was commanding a brigade of heavy armored vehicles from a position in the forest. The response required troops from as far away as Canada and Albania to work out kinks in communications, absorb one another’s battlefield practices and coordinate disparate weapons systems.

Ever since Moscow seized the Crimean Peninsula from Ukraine in 2014, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has had its eye on Europe’s border with Russia. This year’s exercise, called Steadfast Defender 2024, aims to send a message to Moscow: The alliance stands ready to defend its members—especially those near Russia’s border, including Latvia.

After the Cold War, differences in language, communications systems and weaponry within NATO mattered little because its troops rarely fought shoulder-to-shoulder. Instead, many rotated through short-term deployments in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere, planned long in advance. Equipment needs were clear and each ally handled its own provisioning.

Now, preparing for coalition warfare is once again NATO’s priority, and troops have to know how to work together on the battlefield. “The integration of all the countries is a challenge,” said Canadian Army Lt. Col. Jonathan Cox, who helped lead Exercise Crystal Arrow, the Latvian portion of the NATO maneuvers, which include air, land and sea drills across the alliance.

NATO, which marked its 75th anniversary on April 4, is getting stronger in some ways. Finland and Sweden have joined after decades of shunning membership. NATO’s European members are spending more on defense than they have since the Cold War. This year, for the first time in decades, the European members, on an aggregate basis, will meet their financial commitment to the alliance, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said recently.

But the alliance is plagued by other disputes. Leaders disagree on whether Ukraine and other aspiring members should be allowed to join. The contest to succeed Stoltenberg later this year has sparked acrimony between longtime members and newer ones from the former Eastern bloc.

And many NATO countries, including six of its 12 founding members, remain far from hitting the military budgeting levels they pledged to achieve a decade ago. That low spending has made them the target of attacks from Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, sparking doubts about the alliance’s future if he wins in November.


Throughout history, many military alliances—including those that defeated Napoleon and won World War II—involved allied armies operating separately under common command. NATO’s objective is to prepare allies to fight side-by-side.

This year’s exercises, the largest since 1988, are being staged over four months through May, at locations stretching from the Arctic Circle to the Black Sea. They involve roughly 90,000 troops, 1,100 combat vehicles, 80 aircraft and 50 naval vessels.

The operation in Latvia was one of several staged near Europe’s border with Russia. In 2016, after Moscow had seized the Crimean Peninsula and helped foment rebellion in Ukraine’s east, NATO members agreed to rotate troops constantly through its vulnerable eastern members, specifying which member nation would take the lead in defending each country.

The U.S. took the lead in Poland, Germany did so with Lithuania, the U.K. with Estonia and Canada with Latvia. After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, NATO beefed up its forces in those countries and added partnerships in Slovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria.

Border force
The defense of each NATO state along the alliance's eastern border is led by one member nation, with others supporting it.

Host countries

Other NATO members

FINLAND

NORWAY

Lead nation: United Kingdom

SWEDEN

Supporting nations: France, Iceland

ESTONIA

RUSSIA

Canada

LATVIA

Albania, Czech Republic, Iceland,

Italy, Montenegro, North Macedonia,

Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain

Germany

LITHUANIA

Belgium, Czech Republic, Luxembourg,

Netherlands, Norway, U.S.

Baltic Sea

BELARUS

U.S.

Croatia, Romania,

United Kingdom

POLAND

UKRAINE

GERMANY

CZECH REP.

Czech Republic

SLOVAKIA

MOL.

Germany, Slovenia

AUSTRIA

France

HUNGARY

Hungary

Belgium, Luxembourg,

North Macedonia,

Poland, Portugal, U.S.

ROMANIA

Croatia, Italy, Turkey, U.S.

CROATIA

ITALY

SERBIA

Black Sea

Italy

BULGARIA

Albania, Greece, Montenegro,

North Macedonia, Turkey, U.S.

TURKEY

GREECE

Source: NATO
The partnerships have interwoven allies more closely than at any time since the Cold War, when the U.S., Britain and France kept troops permanently stationed in West Germany.

The Latvian exercise, staged near the capital, Riga, was one of NATO’s most international this year. Eleven member nations that already had troops deployed in Latvia, including Canada, were joined by forces from the U.S., Iceland, and Latvia’s neighbor, Estonia.

Canadian forces stationed in Latvia constitute Ottawa’s largest current overseas troop deployment. For many of those Canadians, defending against Russia is personal because they previously were stationed at a base in western Ukraine, training local forces in the years before Russia’s 2022 invasion. Two years ago, Moscow hit that base with missiles, destroying the barracks where Canadians had lived.


Canadian Army Lt. Col. Dan Richel, deputy commander of the Latvian operation led by Col. Kudlis, was posted with his family from Quebec to Latvia last August to help expand Canada’s presence. Most of his colleagues in the local headquarters are Latvian. He has started to learn the language, though most routine business is conducted in English, he said.


Latvian Army Col. Oskars Kudlis commended a brigade of heavy armored vehicles. PHOTO: DANIEL MICHAELS/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
NATO countries agreed in 2014 that by this year each would spend at least 2% of gross domestic product on defense.

Latvia, which was invaded by the Soviet Union in 1940 and didn’t win independence until 1991, will spend 2.4% of its GDP on defense this year, part of a plan to hit 3% in 2027. Canada allocates about 1.3% of its GDP to its military and has no plan to hit 2%.

NATO’s Stoltenberg and U.S. NATO Ambassador Julianne Smith chastised Canada this year for being among the only alliance countries not seeking to achieve the agreed target.


If Canada fails to meet its commitments, “how does that reflect on the coherence of the alliance?” said retired Vice Admiral Mark Norman, a former head of Canada’s navy who recently visited NATO headquarters in Brussels. Canada would probably increase defense spending only under duress “because the threat perception is just not there,” Norman said of the prevailing opinion inside Canada.

One of the alliance’s most fundamental divisions is a disparity in how member countries view threats. NATO lists terrorism and Russia as its main threats. Many officials in Turkey and other member nations along the Mediterranean Sea are more worried about regional conflicts, illegal migration and terrorism than about Russia.

Almost one-third of Latvia’s population of about 1.9 million people is Russian, a legacy of Soviet times. Tensions are high inside the country and along its borders with Russia and Belarus, an authoritarian state under Moscow’s sway.


Troops from 14 nations took part in Crystal Arrow. PHOTO: SGT. ERIKS KUKUTIS/LATVIAN ARMY
NATO planners consider an outright Russian invasion of a neighboring member country unlikely in the near future, though recently some military officials in NATO countries said Moscow could be strong enough to attack in a few years. Over the shorter term, they worry that Moscow might spark conflict in nearby countries by agitating local Russians and using tensions as pretext to intercede, as the Kremlin did in eastern Ukraine a decade ago.

Latvia joined NATO in 2004, 13 years after it gained independence from the Soviet Union. Since then, the alliance’s requirements and standards have compelled Latvia’s armed forces to modernize. Western military vehicles have replaced old Soviet models.

During the Crystal Arrow exercise, a battalion led by Latvian Army Lieut. Col. Gaidis Landratovs operated alongside U.S. troops. They played forces invading from the fictional nation of Occacus, identified with red Xs on their equipment. NATO avoids using names of real adversaries in training.

Canadian Lt. Col. Cox, temporarily stationed in Latvia to oversee NATO’s international battle group there, was commander of the defending forces, which included troops from 11 nations. When the mock invasion began, his forces moved and took defensive positions, awaiting word on their attackers.

Soldiers speaking different languages struggled to communicate. English and French are NATO’s official languages, but fluency varies.

Another problem, said Cox, was “radios that sometimes work together and most of the time don’t. But there’s always comms problems, no matter what happens.”


Operations succeed because of simple plans and integration, he said. “Every country has their own way of doing it, but the intent and the effect was the same across the battle group,” he said.

Uniformity has long been a challenge for NATO. In Crystal Arrow, allies deployed Canadian LAV-6 armored vehicles, American, German and Polish tanks, and Latvia’s British-made CVR-T reconnaissance vehicles. Each requires different spare parts and maintenance.

Standardizing big gear is daunting because producing it is a lucrative business that few countries want to surrender. The U.S. has about three-dozen main military systems such as planes, ships and tanks. In Europe, where most countries protect their national arms producers and often compete for export orders, alliance members use 172 models, according to NATO’s most senior military official, Dutch Admiral Rob Bauer.


Smaller equipment can be problematic, too. Planners have struggled for years to ensure that secure field radios from various countries are compatible, a challenge deepened by the need for digital encryption and measures to counter electronic warfare.

After the Cold War, such technical differences mattered little because NATO troops from different countries rarely fought alongside one another. Now, they need to be able to share equipment and know that one army’s cannons can fire another’s shells.

Alliance planners have set equipment norms and worked to ensure that gear operates interchangeably. But even for one of NATO’s most basic standards, 155-millimeter artillery shells, members produce 14 different models, Bauer said. Some shells can’t go into other launchers, while some may fit but not link to targeting software.

Many of the nearly 200 different weapons systems provided to Ukraine have come from NATO nations. The hodgepodge has created a maintenance nightmare for Ukraine, which has had to scrounged to obtain spare parts for many.

U.S. Army Capt. Malcolm Edgar, who commands Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles in Lithuania, said finding ways around differences is one benefit of multicountry exercises like Crystal Arrow.

“We’re not just saying we can do this together,” but showing it’s possible, said Edgar. “It’s all about getting the sets and reps in.”


This year’s NATO exercises, including the one in Latvia, involve roughly 90,000 troops, 1,100 combat vehicles, 80 aircraft and 50 naval vessels. PHOTO: SGT. GATIS INDREVICS/LATVIAN ARMY
Write to Daniel Michaels at Dan.Michaels@wsj.com

(6) NELSON: CHINA COULD ATTEMPT TO BLOCK U.S. FROM THE MOON: National Aeronautical and Space Administration (NASA) Administration Bill Nelson warned that China could attempt to block the United States from accessing the moon.

“I think it’s not beyond the pale that China would suddenly say, ‘We are here [on the moon]. You stay out,’” Nelson said.

Nelson added that China’s interest in the south pole of the moon is based on the likely presence of ice, which could be melted and turned into hydrogen. He called the South Pole a kind of “gas station” for space travel.

Beijing continues with ambitious plans to land astronauts on the moon by 2030 and previously announced a joint moon base project with Russia.

Why It Matters: Space and the moon represent another area for competition with strategic implications. China is not a signatory to the Artemis Accords, in which 38 countries have agreed to peacefully share space exploration. – M.S.

Hallelujah!

I remember her positively.

https://secure.winred.com/service-and-honor/help-mayra-win-v2-hf/?recurring=true&amount=30&utm_campaign=20240429_CS-SUMMIT-2.114992_t1478496-2577&ex_tid=20240429_CS-SUMMIT-2.114992_t1478496-2577

https://www.oann.com/newsroom/desantis-and-trump-meet-privately-in-miami-to-discuss-campaigning-bury-the-hatchet/

https://www.wsj.com/world/asia/the-dark-horse-alliance-racing-forward-to-take-on-china-b4949625?mod=latest_headlines

Lots of pictures in the story



The Dark-Horse Alliance Racing Forward to Take On China
A U.S. charm offensive, a new leader in the Philippines and forceful Chinese actions have helped forge a new era of ties between Washington and Manila

April 29, 2024 8:00 am ET

Four years ago, the U.S. and its oldest ally in Asia were close to breaking up.

The Philippines had declared it wanted to exit a cornerstone defense pact between the countries. Then-President Rodrigo Duterte favored a realignment toward Beijing.

Today, the alliance is at its strongest in decades. The striking turnaround is the result of a U.S. charm offensive, a new leader in Manila and forceful Chinese actions against the Philippines in the South China Sea.

Some 16,000 American and Filipino military personnel are training in annual exercises called Balikatan, which began on April 22 and will feature America’s Himars rocket launcher and Stinger antiaircraft missiles. The goal is to make sure they can smoothly operate side-by-side if they have to go to war together.

Earlier this month, Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.made his second visit to the White House in less than a year. Days before that, navy ships and aircraft from the U.S., Japan, Australia and the Philippines held joint drills in the South China Sea—a strong show of force in support of Manila. Just weeks prior, on a trip to the Philippines, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken lauded what he called an extraordinary expansion in ties, echoing his counterpart Enrique Manalo, who said: “We’ve been on hyperdrive over the past year or so.”

The shift marks a win for the Biden administration’s strategy to counter China by shoring up America’s alliances.

“China continues to overplay its hand and drive Manila right into the arms of Washington,” said Zack Cooper, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute whose research focuses on U.S. strategy in Asia. Still, he said he is surprised by how quickly the relationship has accelerated in a short period.


The U.S. gained access to four additional Philippine military bases last year, taking the total to nine. A number of them are at locations that would be significant if a conflict were to break out in the South China Sea or the Taiwan Strait, two major flashpoints in Asia. The bases aren’t U.S.-controlled, but they are sites the American military would seek to use during hostilities to disperse its forces, launch aircraft and missiles, and complicate Beijing’s calculations.

Washington is pouring tens of millions of dollars into upgrading runways and building warehouses, fuel storage and barracks at the sites, some of which are fairly basic. The Biden administration is seeking $128 million more for construction.

The sites represent efforts by the two sides to build out places where they can operate and exercise together, Adm. John Aquilino, head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said in remarks to reporters last week. “And then ultimately, if need be, and the mutual-defense treaty were to be activated, those are places where we would fight together,” he said. 


Air bases along China’s southeastern coast facing Taiwan have undergone significant infrastructure upgrades in recent years. Analysts say these changes are a sign of Beijing’s preparations for a conflict over Taiwan. Photo Illustration: Adam Adada

That is valuable because America has only a few operating bases in the region, said Cooper of the American Enterprise Institute. In a conflict, its well-known facilities such as Kadena Air Base in Japan and Andersen Air Force Base in the U.S. territory of Guam would likely be targets of Chinese attack, he said.

“The real challenge for the U.S. is: How do you diversify away from the handful of facilities that we’ve used in Asia over decades?” he said.

Cooper said the Philippines is a perfect option because of its location in the center of the first island chain, referring to a stretch of territory from the Japanese archipelago through Taiwan to the Philippines and the South China Sea.


U.S. forces are getting more familiar with the Philippine military sites via a busy schedule of drills. Participating in the Balikatan exercises are a group of U.S. Marines designed to rapidly move forward in a conflict with China and hop from island to island. Members of the Marine Littoral Regiment will train on Philippine islands less than 100 miles from Taiwan.

In another strong signal, the U.S. Army’s newest midrange-missile launcher arrived in the Philippines this month for its first Indo-Pacific outing. From the northern Philippines, the weapon system, called Typhon, could reach targets including Taiwan, Chinese bases in the South China Sea, sites along the Chinese mainland coast and even some military infrastructure deeper inside mainland territory, said Collin Koh, a senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

“What to me is surprising is the choice of the first deployment—it’s actually the Philippines instead of so-called much closer allies in Asia like Japan,” said Koh. “We are seeing a rather unprecedented reinvigoration of U.S.-Philippines defense relations.”

That process has unfolded especially rapidly over the past year. China has made it increasingly difficult for the Philippines to resupply a military outpost Manila maintains in the South China Sea, on a reef Beijing also claims. Chinese coast guard and maritime militia ships have collided with Philippine resupply boats and blasted them with water cannons, injuring Filipino personnel on two occasions last month.


The Philippines is pushing back by broadcasting Chinese tactics to the world and drawing closer to the U.S. Washington in return has shown strong support to make the case it is a reliable ally, to deter China from escalating further and to ensure the South China Sea remains open for business. 


“For decades, the alliance had been rather moribund,” said Jay Batongbacal, director of the Institute for Maritime Affairs and Law of the Sea in the Philippines. “Now, because of the way that China has been asserting itself in the South China Sea, this has given an opportunity to the Philippines to draw on the alliance and leverage it for developing its own defense capabilities.”

The Philippines military—long focused on internal security operations—is finally getting the training and experience it needs for external defense, he said. 

China’s 2012 seizure of a South China Sea site has weighed heavily on the U.S.-Philippines alliance. American officials were involved behind the scenes in negotiations during the weekslong standoff between Chinese and Philippine ships over Scarborough Shoal. When Beijing took control of the site, Manila felt the U.S. hadn’t done enough to defend its ally.


At the time, the U.S. also declined to say whether the countries’ mutual-defense treaty covered an attack in the South China Sea, deepening distrust in the Philippines where many believe U.S. equivocation emboldened China. In Washington, officials worried that Manila, counting on U.S. support, might make a mistake or take an overzealous step, leaving the U.S. to fight China.

Relations deteriorated further when Rodrigo Duterte came to power in the Philippines in 2016. Duterte was deeply distrustful of the U.S., crimped military exercises between the two and stalled U.S. upgrades of Philippine military sites. He also underplayed his country’s differences with Beijing in the South China Sea, where China was turning reefs into military bases.


Filipino fishermen in wooden boats sail past a Chinese coast-guard ship. PHOTO: TED ALJIBE/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY I
MAGES
As the U.S. began to see China as its No. 1 threat, the Trump administration turned to fix some of the long-festering grievances. Washington stated clearly in 2019 that the mutual-defense treaty applied to an attack on the Philippines in the South China Sea—a position the Biden administration has since repeated dozens of times.

Marcos’s 2022 election presented an opening—and the U.S. went for it. President Biden met Marcos on the sidelines of a United Nations event a few months later, marking the first of seven meetings to date between Marcos and either Biden or U.S. Vice President Kamala Harris. A parade of U.S. officials has made its way to the Philippines since 2022.

Koh, from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, said the Biden administration is trying to make the most of Marcos’s time in office, unsure of how political shifts in Washington and Manila might change the dynamic in the future.

“You want to make sure everything is in place such that you could future proof the relationship,” he said.

Peter Landers contributed to this article.

Write to Niharika Mandhana at niharika.mandhana@wsj.com

U.S.-China Tensions
Tracking the complicated relationship of the world's two largest economies



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We had the absence of conflict with Russia due to his craftiness and look what Baraq 3.0/Biden have done with  that.

He never dissed Putin personally-- not an accident!  If he has an honorable off ramp for Putin he might well be tempted.

https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/drag-queen-leads-children-in-free-palestine-chant-at-queer-storytime-for-palestine-5638702?utm_source=Goodevening&src_src=Goodevening&utm_campaign=gv-2024-04-28&src_cmp=gv-2024-04-28&utm_medium=email&est=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYvAqcwcVzc7PzLYPrHFRB710wA0AIj31kx5JTWZu9FddhEg4S8RP&utm_content=1

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Britain Does Its Part in Ukraine and on Defense Spending
Our military budget will reach 2.5% of GDP by 2030. European allies need to step up as well.
By Rishi Sunak
April 26, 2024 4:01 pm ET



To China's frustration, the Aukus partnership between the U.S., U.K. and Australia to deliver Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines is gaining ground, despite funding challenges to the U.S. submarine industrial base. Images: U.S. Navy/Zuma Press/AP Composite: Mark Kelly
Britons understand and appreciate the vital role the U.S. plays in the world. We are proud to be Washington’s closest ally and welcome the supplemental support for Ukraine that Congress passed and President Biden signed Wednesday.

This funding will make a huge difference in the fight against tyranny in Europe. We welcome the administration’s leadership, which advances not only our interests but also those of the U.S.

China and Iran are closely watching what happens in Ukraine. A victory for authoritarianism and aggression would make us all less secure. For those who recognize the need for Europe to do more for its own security, America’s aid package is an inspiration and an incentive to do so.

The U.K. has acted. This week I announced a major and immediate increase in Britain’s support for Ukraine and in our defense spending, which will reach 2.5% of gross domestic product by 2030. We understand that being an ally means matching words with actions.

That is why the U.K. fought against fascism and communism, and alongside the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is why we both stood firmly with Ukraine and most recently joined in the defense of international shipping from Houthi attacks. It is why we helped protect Israel from Iran’s missiles and drones. When the going gets tough, we are a steadfast partner: a fellow permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, always by America’s side.

Since Russia’s invasion, the U.K. has been at the forefront of the coalition supporting Ukraine. We were proud to have been the first European country to mobilize lethal aid, from tanks to long-range weapons.

We know that being an ally also requires burden-sharing and investment. At the 2014 North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit in the U.K., we agreed that each member state was to contribute 2% of its GDP toward defense. We spearheaded that effort because we worried that since the end of the Cold War, Europeans nations had been cutting defense budgets and relying only on NATO for their security. This wasn’t sustainable—and the U.S. and the U.K. are winning the argument for changing course. In 2014, only four NATO members spent 2% on defense. Today, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg puts the figure at 18.

Since 2020 the U.K. has increased defense spending steadily, and as chancellor I granted the largest single increase in spending since the end of the Cold War. As Winston Churchill understood, failing to rearm only emboldens your adversaries. And as Ronald Reagan demonstrated, boosting defense spending is the best way to deter enemies and ensure our values prevail.

The U.K.’s increased investment has allowed us to commit to new capabilities such as the alliance among Australia, the U.K. and the U.S. Aukus will contribute to security in areas such as the Indo-Pacific—one of America’s top priorities. The U.K. also is putting more funding into our nuclear deterrent, which forms part of NATO’s nuclear umbrella, and the stockpiles vital to war readiness on the Continent and in Ukraine.

During a visit to Poland and Germany this week, I agreed to enhance our defense-spending commitments with the biggest single investment for a generation.

We will provide more for Ukraine—with a package that brings total U.K. military support to nearly $15 billion. Overall European support is now $180 billion. The U.K. was the first country to make a long-term security guarantee with Ukraine, which I signed on my visit to Kyiv in January. We will now commit to sustain our support for Ukraine at least at the same levels until the end of the decade.

We are also increasing overall defense spending. Our new baseline is 2.5% of GDP, effective immediately. This will mean an additional $93.6 billion for defense over the next six years.

As I told Mr. Stoltenberg this week, I hope this will become the new baseline for all allies. America should be assured that more European countries are stepping up. Our friends and neighbors are listening to our argument that we can’t expect America to pay any price and bear any burden if we on this side of the Atlantic aren’t prepared to invest in our own security.

Among America’s allies, including the whole of the rest of the Group of Seven, the U.K. is the biggest spender on defense by a significant margin. This is bolstered by our close intelligence cooperation and military interoperability. Above all, however, what distinguishes our partnership is our shared willingness to act.

The challenges to global security are growing. Members of an axis of authoritarian states—Russia, Iran, North Korea and China—are determined to challenge the post-Cold War order that has provided unprecedented prosperity. We must act to deter our enemies, defend our values and secure our interests. Our decision to increase our defense budget proves that—as it always has—the U.K. stands ready to play its role.