Second post of the morning
For the record, IIRC it was Bremer who made the decision to disband the Iraqi Army. That noted, I think it worth the time to read his current take on things.
Please do note (attention JDN
) his echoing of my point that Baraq telegraphed to the Iraqis a complete lack of intention to stay-- which underlines the plea of the Iraqis in my previous post.
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By L. PAUL BREMER
Geography is forever and Iraq lives in a rough neighborhood. For millennia, leaders in Mesopotamia have survived by making fine calculations about power. And in the wake of the U.S. decision to withdraw all troops from their country, Iraq's leaders have drawn their own conclusions about what comes next. Events so far seriously impair the security and economic gains of the last four years, and endangers the slow but steady progress toward a sustainable political settlement.
The year after the American-led coalition overthrew Saddam's dictatorship in 2003, al Qaeda in Iraq revealed a cynical plan to kill and maim Shiites to spark a sectarian war. It almost worked. Only President George W. Bush's courageous decision to surge additional troops in early 2007 saved the country.
Iraqi civilian casualties this year have been less than 5% what they were in 2007. In the wake of better security, the Iraqi economy has blossomed. According to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index, per capita income today is six times what it was under Saddam. Three times as many Iraqis have access to drinkable water. Thirty times as many have telephones.
A residual American military presence in Iraq would have helped us achieve three security goals: striking al Qaeda and Iranian terrorists still active in Iraq; helping train Iraqi security forces; and dampening tensions along the "green line," the contested demarcation between the Kurdish north and Arab south. Our withdrawal makes all three objectives more difficult to sustain.
EnBut the most important reasons for a continued American military presence were always political. Such a presence would demonstrate to Iraq's neighbors—and especially to Iran—that America had a lasting interest in containing the Iranian quest for regional hegemony. It would also be a clear sign of American intent to stick with the Iraqis as they work to develop durable political institutions.
The benefits of a continued military presence were illustrated by the political conflagration that flared within 24 hours of our departure. Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, issued an arrest warrant for the country's vice president, a Sunni, who then fled to the northern Kurdish area.
It did not have to be this way. Last year, American military commanders recommended retaining a minimum of 20,000 troops after 2011 to maintain stability. Quiet diplomacy had secured the agreement of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani not to oppose a continued American presence. That gave Mr. Maliki maneuvering room with his Islamist followers.
But this summer, extensive leaks in Washington made clear that the administration was prepared to consider a residual force of only 3,000. Such a force would be barely sufficient to provide for its own protection, let alone carry out the three necessary security tasks. This was understood in Baghdad—but how could an Iraqi leader ask for more troops than the U.S. government was offering? They could only conclude that the American government was not serious about staying on.
The administration compounded the problem with its approach to the question of immunities for our troops if they were to stay on. Naturally the U.S. had to insist on those immunities, which have been an essential feature of all Status of Forces Agreements we have signed over the past half century—including the one with Iraq. This issue was sensitive for Iraqi politicians but the American approach made it impossible by insisting that the Iraqi Parliament, not just the government, had to approve any immunities.
Iraqi leaders decided that these two hurdles made the game not worth the candle. One resists with difficulty the conclusion that some in the U.S. government intended this outcome, which allowed them to argue that the U.S. wanted to keep troops in Iraq but the Iraqis refused to provide the necessary immunities. In any event, a post-American crisis was not long in coming.
Where does this leave us? The stakes could not be higher. Much depends on how the current crisis is resolved. Further collapse would be a disaster for Iraqis, leading to more terrorism there and elsewhere and possibly threatening Iraq's young democratic institutions. It would do serious damage to American interests, too, leaving Iran in a position to assert more influence in Iraq and the region.
A better outcome could strengthen Iraqi's young political institutions. To encourage that path, the U.S. needs to move vigorously on the political and diplomatic fronts in Iraq and with its neighbors. We should mount a full-court effort to broaden economic, commercial and cultural relations between the U.S. and Iraq while we encourage a peaceful resolution of today's political impasse.
This past week's bombings in Baghdad also underscore the need for better intelligence about the terrorist threat. Regrettably, the most useful intelligence can be collected only on the ground, and we have lost a significant capability through our withdrawal. Still, we should work to expand intelligence cooperation with the Iraqis.
We should also seek ways to extend our contacts with the Iraqi military, with the eventual goal of returning at least a cadre of U.S. forces to Iraq. Training Iraqi forces outside Iraq, in the U.S. or elsewhere, could be a useful step. Finally, we should recognize that most Iraqis don't want to become pawns of Iran and would welcome robust American diplomatic engagement in the region to balance Iranian influence.
President Obama made a serious mistake in withdrawing all American forces. He has a chance to begin to remedy the results, but there's no time to lose.
Mr. Bremer was U.S. presidential envoy to Iraq in 2003-04.
