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« Last post by Crafty_Dog on May 19, 2024, 01:51:17 PM »
The ‘Uniparty’ Is Real—but It Isn’t What You Think
Democrats and Republicans aren’t overzealous about foreign intervention. They’re feckless about American leadership.
By Dalibor Rohac
May 19, 2024 3:43 pm ET
From Ralph Nader to Steve Bannon, self-styled populists and outsiders have disparaged Washington’s “uniparty.” When this critique turns to foreign policy, the uniparty is accused of groupthink and militarism—dragging the U.S. into unnecessary and endless wars while neglecting the concerns of regular Americans.
While the epithet is often overstated and used in bad faith, it contains a kernel of truth. Foreign-policy experts from both parties agree on a lot, and that consensus can lead to poor decisions. The wars in Gaza and Ukraine, as well as America’s geopolitical competition with China, expose a bipartisan problem of this sort that critics of U.S. foreign policy frequently miss.
Today’s uniparty isn’t defined by a zeal to export democracy and launch ill-advised wars against governments that don’t threaten us. Rather, it is defined, on both the Democratic and the Republican side, by a lack of initiative and an urge to do things on the cheap and halfheartedly, to manage crises instead of resolving them. It is also fundamentally dishonest, as it suggests that peace and security can be sustained without major sacrifices.
On Oct. 10, when it was perfectly clear that Israel could no longer tolerate living side by side with Hamas and that this terrorist organization would have to meet the same fate as ISIS, President Biden promised that he would “make sure Israel has what it needs to take care of its citizens, defend itself and respond to this attack.” Today, when support for the Jewish state has become a political liability for Mr. Biden in Michigan, his support for Israel is wobbly at best.
Ukraine is a similar story. Ukrainians are fully aware that “for as long as it takes” means until the end of 2024, when a new supplemental appropriation bill will be necessary. And whatever assistance the Biden administration has provided has come with strings attached. The U.S. is denying important weapons systems to Kyiv or restricting its use of them.
The problem is bipartisan. As Israel divides Democrats, Ukraine divides Republicans. Project 2025, the Heritage Foundation’s manifesto for the next Republican administration, admits as much, offering only the faint hope “that next conservative President” will seize “a generational opportunity to bring resolution to the foreign policy tensions within the movement.”
The list goes on. Unlike in the early 19th century, when the U.S. successfully defeated the Barbary pirates and their sponsors, freedom of navigation hasn’t been restored to the Red Sea, as Houthi rebels continue to control what is normally one of the world’s busiest shipping lanes.
Even on China, there are few signs that the sudden centrality of Beijing’s threat has been translated into effective action, or that it would be under a second Trump administration. As the China archhawk Elbridge Colby tweeted recently, “Americans are war-weary and more skeptical of military interventions. Taiwan matters a great deal to Americans. But it’s not existential and it’s remote to most.”
In short, as the world burns and new conflagrations loom, our uniparty pretends that business as usual is adequate—or, worse yet, that ignoring the world will somehow enable us to address problems at home. It is an illusion. If you’re concerned about the southern border, our asylum system being overrun, or about the fentanyl crisis, you have to care about the political stability and security of America’s neighbors to the south—a subject on which both political parties remain largely silent.
The U.S. needs to adjust to a more dangerous world. It is past time to prioritize hard power over other areas of government spending—in other words, more guns and less butter—and plug the holes left by decades of enjoying the “peace dividend.” Yet keeping the existing entitlement schemes intact even as they head for bankruptcy remains a central tenet of America’s uniparty—a rare point of domestic bipartisan consensus in a polarized time.
As the eras of World War II and the Cold War illustrate, the U.S. can lead the world. That requires political leadership capable of defeating the complacent, feckless, and shortsighted uniparty.
Mr. Rohac is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.