Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 337508 times)

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #450 on: December 06, 2016, 06:02:20 AM »
BTW, apparently last week the Chinese flew nuclear capable planes around Taiwan.

I am assuming the Obama administration sprung into action at this provocative act towards a country we are obligated to defend.

Perhaps a red line was drawn?

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #451 on: December 06, 2016, 07:18:48 AM »
BTW, apparently last week the Chinese flew nuclear capable planes around Taiwan.
I am assuming the Obama administration sprung into action at this provocative act towards a country we are obligated to defend.
Perhaps a red line was drawn?

Right.  And what is the evidence that China walks on eggshells worrying what the US (Pres. Obama) thinks about their every provocative move?

It was a phone call.  Marc Thiessen, Washington Post, also thought it was brilliant.  Just saying, under new management shortly.
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trumps-taiwan-call-wasnt-a-blunder-it-was-brilliant/2016/12/05/d10169a2-bb00-11e6-ac85-094a21c44abc_story.html?utm_term=.f9d0f781699f

G M

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Beijing takes aim at Macau currency flight
« Reply #452 on: December 08, 2016, 06:31:34 PM »
http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/economy/article/2053045/beijing-takes-aim-macau-gaming-industry-cut-currency-flight

Beijing takes aim at Macau gaming industry to cut currency flight
Move to slash in half the amount China UnionPay bank card holders can withdraw from ATMs in enclave expected to take effect Saturday

Beijing is about to turn its guns back on the gaming industry in its battle against the multi-billion-yuan outflow of capital from its economy as Macau prepares to slash in half the amount of cash China UnionPay bank card holders can withdraw from ATM machines in the city.
The move to cut the daily withdrawal limit from 10,000 to 5,000 patacas is expected to take effect from Saturday and follows the discovery that as much as 10 billion patacas in China UnionPay ATM withdrawals were made in one month alone.
It also comes amid so far unanswered claims that the customer voucher scheme run by Marina Bay Sands casino resort in Singapore – which apparently allows China UnionPay card users to buy gaming chips in breach of China’s strict currency controls – has seen billions of yuan flow out of the mainland.
The Monetary Authority of Macau’s ATM withdrawal cut is understood to be a reaction to attempts by illicit money movers to circumvent Beijing’s move at the beginning of this year to cap at 100,000 yuan (HK$112,600) the annual amount that UnionPay card holders could withdraw.


China backflips on currency policy with controls to stem yuan’s outflow

The Monetary Authority declined to answer questions from the Post.
A Macau finance industry insider told the Post: “What has happened is that individuals are turning up at ATM machines with stacks of cards from individual account holders and are withdrawing 10,000 a time.
Macau prepares to slash in half the amount of cash China UnionPay bank card holders can withdraw from ATM machines in the city. Photo: REUTERS
“The authorities have decided it is time to act and Beijing is backing the move.’’
Two years ago, Beijing put the squeeze on the multi-billion yuan flow of illicit cash through Macau by imposing a crackdown on the use of UnionPay point of service machines, which were being used to disguise overseas transactions as local mainland ones.
It also cracked down on the practice of pawnshops paying cash for products such as jewellery and watches bought with UnionPay cards to subvert currency controls.
The pressure appears to have had a possible knock-on effect in other casino jurisdictions like Singapore.
Macau to become a centre for yuan settlement, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang confirms

An investigation by the Post has uncovered claims that a voucher scheme operated by Marina Bay Sands casino resort in the Lion City could be an attempt to get around China’s currency controls. The scheme allows certain customers using UnionPay cards to exchange vouchers for casino chips in apparent contravention of the terms and conditions of use of the UnionPay cards.
By press time Thursday night, Marina Bay Sands – which had defended the practice – Singapore’s Casino Regulatory Authority and China UnionPay had not responded to questions from the Post about the scheme.
Gamblers are using more complex methods to circumvent Beijing's attempts to stop mainland money being gambled in Macau
Macau political commentator Sonny Lo said: “At the end of the day, national security is at stake for Beijing when it comes to the integrity of their currency and its outflow in massive amounts. This is what is behind these increasing moves by Beijing to stem capital outflow.”

The latest moves follow a fall in China’s foreign ­exchange reserves in November despite Beijing’s attempts to close the door on ­capital outflows.
The larger-than-expected decline in the world’s biggest stockpile of foreign exchange exposed the flaws in Beijing’s current ­approach of selling state reserves to support the yuan and was likely to force the authorities to take a stricter line on outbound investment and payments, analysts said.
The reserves shrank by US$69.1 billion last month to US$3.052 trillion, according to data released by the People’s Bank of China. The mainland has lost nearly US$1 trillion worth of reserves since the figure peaked in June 2014.
Documents obtained earlier by the Post show capital outflow controls are already in force involving forex clearance for outbound investment of more than US$5 million, plus stricter reviews in place over very large deals. Both outbound investment and these mega deals are set to limit the speed and size of capital flow.

Additional reporting by Gary Cheung and Wendy Wu

G M

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The Other Israel
« Reply #453 on: December 10, 2016, 05:48:40 PM »
The Other Israel
By Bruce Walker

Israel, through no fault of its own, is a pariah nation almost completely surrounded by larger nations that do not even recognize the existence of the State of Israel.  Iran routinely refers to Israel as the "Little Satan," and European nations typically take overtly anti-Israeli policies to curry favor with Islam.  Yet Israel is not alone in being disparaged for no reason other than that it is small and its enemies are large.

Taiwan, the Republic of China, is a free land that has political and civil values precisely like what we ought to want the rest of the world to have.  Freedom House has only two nations in Asia stretching from Sinai to Sakhalin listed as "Free," Japan and Taiwan, which has a freer press than even Israel or South Korea.  The contrast between Taiwan and most nations in Asia is as stark as the contrast between Israel and the nations surrounding it in west Asia and north Africa.


Freedom House gives Taiwan the "1" rating (the highest rating) for political rights and "2" for civil rights, exactly the same rating as Israel.  China, by contrast, is listed as "unfree," the worst category, and it has a "7" rating (the lowest rating) for political rights and a "6" (the second lowest rating) for civil rights.

Taiwan is a prosperous land, despite the absence of natural resources.  The island's per capita GDP is $47,000 per year – higher than Germany or France or Canada – and just as Taiwan is as free and democratic as Israel, Taiwan is as prosperous as Israel, despite, like Israel, having no real wealth except the diligence and intelligence of its people.

The per capita income in China is that is 30% of the per capita income in Taiwan.  The per capita income of Jordan and Egypt, to pick two peaceful nations as close to Israel as China is to Taiwan, is 30% of the per capita income of Israel.  Indeed, Taiwan has a high per capita income than any nation in Asia – including Japan and South Korea – except Singapore.

Taiwan has no fewer than five political parties with seats in its national legislature and ten parties with seats in municipal or county government.   Tsai Ing-wen, elected like Trump earlier this year, was the first woman to be elected president of the Taiwan, and real feminists (there aren't any, of course) would be thrilled that Trump talked to her when Obama and Hillary did not.

Our attitude toward Taiwan reeks of the same sort of sick double standard we are used to seeing in how nations that ought to know better deal with Israel.  Both states represent the answer to virtually all our national security and diplomatic problems.  Indeed, Taiwan and Israel are, in a practical sense, our two best allies in the world.

But there is another reason to celebrate rather than timidly skirt around the success of Taiwan and Israel.  The transformation of the rest of Asia and Africa into countries that embrace civil rights, democracy, peaceful prosperity, and friendly relations with all who will be friendly in return is the precise solution to the problems of the world.

If the rest of west Asia and Africa had the levels of freedom and liberty and prosperity that exist in Israel, our problem with global terrorism would largely vanish as the liberated peoples in these lands found better use for their sons and daughters than as suicide bombers.  If the Pacific Basin from the shores of Asia to the coast of Latin America had the levels of freedom and liberty and prosperity that exist in Taiwan, the flood of illegal aliens across our southern border would slow to a tickle as these people found in their native lands a good place to live.

President Trump ought to continue what he seems to have started: not shrinking from our true and most logical friends in the world, Taiwan and Israel, but rather publicly recognizing the truth that these nations are models, not pariahs, and that despite daunting obstacles and enemies, both of these nations work in the way we wish all other nations worked.

Israel, through no fault of its own, is a pariah nation almost completely surrounded by larger nations that do not even recognize the existence of the State of Israel.  Iran routinely refers to Israel as the "Little Satan," and European nations typically take overtly anti-Israeli policies to curry favor with Islam.  Yet Israel is not alone in being disparaged for no reason other than that it is small and its enemies are large.

Taiwan, the Republic of China, is a free land that has political and civil values precisely like what we ought to want the rest of the world to have.  Freedom House has only two nations in Asia stretching from Sinai to Sakhalin listed as "Free," Japan and Taiwan, which has a freer press than even Israel or South Korea.  The contrast between Taiwan and most nations in Asia is as stark as the contrast between Israel and the nations surrounding it in west Asia and north Africa.

Freedom House gives Taiwan the "1" rating (the highest rating) for political rights and "2" for civil rights, exactly the same rating as Israel.  China, by contrast, is listed as "unfree," the worst category, and it has a "7" rating (the lowest rating) for political rights and a "6" (the second lowest rating) for civil rights.

Taiwan is a prosperous land, despite the absence of natural resources.  The island's per capita GDP is $47,000 per year – higher than Germany or France or Canada – and just as Taiwan is as free and democratic as Israel, Taiwan is as prosperous as Israel, despite, like Israel, having no real wealth except the diligence and intelligence of its people.

The per capita income in China is that is 30% of the per capita income in Taiwan.  The per capita income of Jordan and Egypt, to pick two peaceful nations as close to Israel as China is to Taiwan, is 30% of the per capita income of Israel.  Indeed, Taiwan has a high per capita income than any nation in Asia – including Japan and South Korea – except Singapore.

Taiwan has no fewer than five political parties with seats in its national legislature and ten parties with seats in municipal or county government.   Tsai Ing-wen, elected like Trump earlier this year, was the first woman to be elected president of the Taiwan, and real feminists (there aren't any, of course) would be thrilled that Trump talked to her when Obama and Hillary did not.

Our attitude toward Taiwan reeks of the same sort of sick double standard we are used to seeing in how nations that ought to know better deal with Israel.  Both states represent the answer to virtually all our national security and diplomatic problems.  Indeed, Taiwan and Israel are, in a practical sense, our two best allies in the world.

But there is another reason to celebrate rather than timidly skirt around the success of Taiwan and Israel.  The transformation of the rest of Asia and Africa into countries that embrace civil rights, democracy, peaceful prosperity, and friendly relations with all who will be friendly in return is the precise solution to the problems of the world.

If the rest of west Asia and Africa had the levels of freedom and liberty and prosperity that exist in Israel, our problem with global terrorism would largely vanish as the liberated peoples in these lands found better use for their sons and daughters than as suicide bombers.  If the Pacific Basin from the shores of Asia to the coast of Latin America had the levels of freedom and liberty and prosperity that exist in Taiwan, the flood of illegal aliens across our southern border would slow to a tickle as these people found in their native lands a good place to live.

President Trump ought to continue what he seems to have started: not shrinking from our true and most logical friends in the world, Taiwan and Israel, but rather publicly recognizing the truth that these nations are models, not pariahs, and that despite daunting obstacles and enemies, both of these nations work in the way we wish all other nations worked.



Read more: http://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2016/12/the_other_israel.html

Crafty_Dog

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Capital flight problems for China
« Reply #454 on: December 10, 2016, 07:10:59 PM »
For the charts themselves go to
feedproxy.google.com/~r/blogspot/tMBeq/~3/5_BzpgDO-Tc/chinas-problem-is-too-much-money.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=email


China's problem is too much money
Posted: 09 Dec 2016 11:30 PM PST
The Chinese yuan has fallen from a high 6 per dollar three years ago to 6.91 today, and China's foreign exchange reserves have fallen from a high of $3.99 trillion in mid-2014 to $$3.05 trillion as of the end of November. Yet despite the almost 25% decline in China's forex reserves (a key component of China's monetary base), the amount of money in China continues to grow, and has increased over 10% in the past year. There is something wrong with this picture.

A declining yuan alongside declining forex reserves is powerful evidence of significant capital flight. Investors, individuals, and corporations apparently wish to reduce their exposure to the Chinese economy, and that's why the demand for yuan is falling. This problem won't be solved until the dollar value of the Chinese money supply declines by enough to match the decline in the demand for yuan. That can be accomplished by 1) shrinking the monetary base and the money supply, 2) devaluing the yuan vis a vis the dollar, and/or 3) inflating the Chinese price level. Alternatively, China could take steps to boost confidence in the yuan (e.g., by allowing the monetary base to shrink) or boost the demand for yuan (e.g., anything that improves China's long-term economic growth potential).

China's forex reserves are declining because the central bank is selling its foreign assets (mostly held in dollar securities), in an effort to try to support the currency; in effect the central bank is accommodating capital flight. The fact that the currency continues to decline suggests that forex sales have not been sufficient to stem the decline. It's not too hard to see why: the central bank is not allowing the decline in reserves to shrink the monetary base, and indeed, the amount of yuan in circulation continues to rise. Ordinarily, capital flight that is accommodated by central bank sales of forex would result in a shrinkage in the money supply, and that shrinkage would eventually bring the supply of yuan back into line with the declining demand for yuan.

To make matters worse, the ongoing increase in the amount of yuan in China, despite the decline in the demand for same, means the central bank is selling dollar assets and buying Chinese assets, thus “degrading” the quality of the yuan and allowing the oversupply of yuan to continue. The central bank is not allowing capital flight to shrink the monetary base. Replacing dollar assets with yuan-denominated assets in the monetary base is eroding the effective quality of the yuan, and that does little or nothing to maintain confidence in the yuan.

China is not taking adequate steps to address the decline in the demand for yuan. This means that the problem of capital flight and the decline in the value of the yuan will continue, despite China's best efforts to physically stem capital flight. It also means that Chinese inflation is likely to rise. Unless properly addressed, these problems will persist, and they will further weaken the Chinese economy. That is not good for China or for the world. It's difficult to see how exactly this will play out, and what impact it could have on the U.S. economy.

A crisis is not likely imminent, however, since China still sits on a virtual mountain of forex reserves, and the dollar value of Shanghai Composite Index is up over 15% since January. But as John Cochrane muses, and today's WSJ op-ed points out, there are disturbing things going on that bear watching.

At the very least, this makes Trump's demand that China boost the value of its currency vis a vis the dollar a virtual impossibility. (!!!!!!!!!!!)

 

The chart above summarizes the central facts. As it suggests, the persistence of capital flight is forcing the central bank to devalue the yuan.

 

Despite the yuan's decline in recent years, it is still very strong against a basket of trade-weighted, inflation-adjusted currencies.
 

 


ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #456 on: December 12, 2016, 04:13:05 AM »
Trump could work out a deal to build a resort hotel/casino on the man made island.

Steve Wynn could add  his casino too.

Take that  Macau.



Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #459 on: December 12, 2016, 12:22:13 PM »
I thought you might find it interesting ;-)

Crafty_Dog

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Crafty_Dog

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wsJ: China weaponizes islands, contrary to prior promises
« Reply #461 on: December 15, 2016, 09:08:54 AM »
China Installs Weapons in South China Sea, Satellites Show
President Xi Jinping had pledged not to place arms on the islands in the Spratly archipelago
0:00 / 0:00
China has installed weapons on all seven of the artificial islands it has built in disputed water of the South China Sea, according to a U.S. think tank’s analysis of satellite imagery. Photo: Digitalglobe/Reuters
By Jeremy Page
Updated Dec. 15, 2016 6:20 a.m. ET
308 COMMENTS

BEIJING—A U.S. think-tank report that China has installed antiaircraft and other weapons on all seven islands it has built in the South China Sea is raising the stakes in a regional dispute as U.S. President-elect Donald Trump signals he is ready to confront Beijing on territorial issues.

The Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative said late Wednesday that satellite imagery showed China had installed the weapons in recent months, despite President Xi Jinping’s pledge not to militarize the islands in the Spratly archipelago, where Beijing’s territorial claims overlap with those of several other governments.

China’s Defense Ministry in a statement on its website Thursday afternoon reiterated that any reef construction was mainly for civil use, though it appeared to also send a message to the U.S. “As to the necessary military facilities, they are mainly for defense and self-defense, which is appropriate and legal. For example, if someone is showing off their strength on your doorstep, can’t you even prepare a slingshot?”

China’s island-building over the past three years has raised fears in the U.S. and among its Asian allies and partners that Beijing plans to use its expanding military power to enforce its territorial claims and to take control of a shipping route that carries more than $5 trillion of world trade annually.

The U.S. says it doesn’t take sides in the territorial dispute but has often sent military planes and ships through the area, sometimes close to Beijing’s artificial islands, to demonstrate its right to freedom of navigation through what it sees as international waters.

Mr. Trump has indicated he will take a much harder line than his predecessor toward China, suggesting in the past two weeks alone that he would review U.S. commitments on the highly sensitive issue of Taiwan and accusing Beijing of building a “massive military complex” in the South China Sea.

Those comments have revived tensions in the region, which had appeared to ease over the past months, in particular as Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte set aside Manila’s South China Sea dispute with Beijing in favor of expanding economic links.

“If the [AMTI] report is true, then it is a cause for serious concern because it tends to raise tension and undermine peace and stability in the region,” Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs spokesman Charles Jose said.
An aerial photo of Subi Reef taken Nov. 17. ENLARGE
An aerial photo of Subi Reef taken Nov. 17. Photo: CSIS/AMTI DigitalGlobe

Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop echoed the sentiment. “The building of artificial islands and the possible militarization is creating an environment of tension and mistrust between claimants and other regional states,” she said. Canberra signed a deal on Wednesday with Washington to base U.S. F-22 Raptor stealth jet fighters in Australia’s north from next year, a sign of the U.S. military commitment to the region.

China’s weapons deployment predates Mr. Trump’s recent remarks and is in line with Beijing’s long-term strategy to steadily upgrade military facilities on the islands, which it says are mainly for purposes such as weather monitoring and search and rescue.

“I want to stress that deployment of necessary defense facilities by China on its own territory has nothing to do with militarization,” said Foreign Ministry spokesman Geng Shuang in a regular briefing on Thursday.

But analysts say the new weaponry will significantly enhance China’s capability to control the surrounding waters and to enforce a potential air-defense identification zone in the area like the one Beijing declared in 2013 over the East China Sea, where it has a territorial dispute with Japan. China has said it reserves the right to declare such a zone in the South China Sea as well.
Fiery Cross Reef, Nov. 10.
Fiery Cross Reef, Nov. 10. Photo: CSIS/AMTI DigitalGlobe

The deployments are unlikely to disrupt Beijing’s outreach to other claimants, but could compound efforts by some to upgrade defense ties with the U.S. and their own armed forces; Vietnam, especially, has been expanding the South China Sea islands it controls—although on a much smaller scale.

“We mustn’t interpret this as being specifically directed at President-elect Trump,” said Ian Storey, an expert on maritime security at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore. “Nevertheless, it will fuel the debate in Washington over how the U.S. should respond to Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea.”

Mr. Storey said the U.S. might send military ships or planes near China’s man-made islands to demonstrate its right to freedom of navigation once more before President Barack Obama leaves office, operations that have become largely symbolic. “Beijing will be more concerned about what happens after Trump is inaugurated in January, he added.

    ‘I say this often but it’s worth repeating—we will cooperate where we can and be ready to confront where we must.’
    —Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, in Australia on Wednesday.

AMTI, run by the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, said that since June and July it had tracked construction of hexagonal structures on three artificial islands—Fiery Cross, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef—where China has built airstrips large enough to accommodate military aircraft.

Those structures are nearly identical to defensive fortifications built earlier at four smaller artificial islands, which appear to include antiaircraft guns and probably close-in weapons systems, or CIWS, designed to track and shoot down cruise missiles, AMTI said.

Adm. Harry Harris, commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, said in a speech at an Australian think tank on Wednesday that the U.S. “will not allow the shared domains to be closed down unilaterally no matter how many bases are built on artificial features in the South China Sea.” He added, “We will cooperate where we can and be ready to confront where we must.”

AMTI said the weapons it identified could be used to back up a defensive umbrella provided by a future deployment to the islands of mobile surface-to-air missile systems.

—Cris Larano in Manila and Rob Taylor in Canberra, Australia, contributed to this article.

Crafty_Dog

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WSJ: China begins to close the door on the South China Sea
« Reply #462 on: December 15, 2016, 06:39:48 PM »
China Arms Its Great Wall of Sand
New Spratly bases are equipped to take on a superpower adversary.
Dec. 15, 2016 7:28 p.m. ET
14 COMMENTS

For a man who stood at the White House in September 2015 and promised not to militarize the South China Sea, Xi Jinping is sure doing a lot of militarizing. Satellite photos released Thursday indicate China has deployed powerful antiaircraft and antimissile systems to all seven of its new artificial islands in the Spratly archipelago, along shipping lanes that carry $5 trillion in trade a year. This is a “massive military complex,” as Donald Trump noted recently, and it’s worth detailing how massive.

Three years ago these were only specks of land, some submerged at high tide, but China has since built 3,000 acres of territory. (The flight deck of the newest U.S. aircraft carrier, the USS Gerald Ford, is only 4.5 acres.) This is more space, with more potential military value, than China would need simply to face down its smaller neighbors—suggesting that, as U.S. Navy Commander Thomas Shugart wrote recently, “China perhaps has a larger foe in mind.”
In this satellite image released on Dec. 13, CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative identifies what appear to be antiaircraft guns and what are likely to be close-in weapons systems on the artificial island Johnson Reef in the South China Sea. ENLARGE
In this satellite image released on Dec. 13, CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative identifies what appear to be antiaircraft guns and what are likely to be close-in weapons systems on the artificial island Johnson Reef in the South China Sea. Photo: CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative/DigitalGlobe/Reuters

As Commander Shugart wrote at the website War on the Rocks, three of China’s artificial islands are comparable in size to typical fighter bases in mainland China, with facilities that could be large enough for an entire fighter division of 17,000 personnel. Subi Reef now has a harbor bigger than Hawaii’s Pearl Harbor, and the aptly named Mischief Reef has a land perimeter nearly equal to Washington, D.C.’s.

That’s enough space to deploy, hide and defend mobile missiles that would threaten targets across the South China Sea, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore and beyond. The boost to China’s already formidable “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities will be substantial. If Beijing also deploys floating nuclear-power plants to the area, as it intends, then its military facilities would be even more likely to become permanent fixtures on the East Asian map.

So it’s significant that, as the Center for Strategic and International Studies said in releasing its satellite images, Beijing has equipped its artificial islands with antiaircraft guns, targeting radar for guiding missiles and other weapons, and close-in weapons systems for defending against cruise-missiles. “We did not know that they had systems this big and this advanced there,” said researcher Greg Poling. “It means that you are prepping for a future conflict.”

The Philippines expressed “serious concern” through a spokesman Thursday, but President Rodrigo Duterte remains in an appeasing mood toward China. Indonesia in a first joined this week with India in urging China to respect the international Law of the Sea. Vietnam has begun to harden its modest defenses on the Spratly features it controls. It deployed mobile rocket launchers in August, an understandable response that nonetheless raises the risk of accident or miscalculation.

All of this means Donald Trump will soon take office facing a daily risk of hostilities over islands that didn’t exist when President Obama was last sworn in. “We will not allow the shared domains to be closed down unilaterally—no matter how many bases are built on artificial features in the South China Sea,” U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris said in Australia on Wednesday.

Nearly two years ago Admiral Harris warned that China was building a “Great Wall of Sand” at sea. Here’s hoping Mr. Trump seeks his good counsel come January.
 



bigdog

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« Last Edit: December 16, 2016, 10:46:36 PM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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Re: 10 Reasons China will have trouble fighting a modern war
« Reply #466 on: December 17, 2016, 01:40:38 AM »
http://warontherocks.com/2015/02/ten-reasons-why-china-will-have-trouble-fighting-a-modern-war/

Although the article raises many valid points, China is planning on short, sharp wars and intends to use asymmetrical 4th gen warfare. They will not fight in a way that allows us to use our strengths. When the Gulf war resulted in our very lopsided victory, China totally changed it's gameplan and set to modernizing it's military.


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: China's aircraft carrier
« Reply #468 on: December 17, 2016, 07:46:52 AM »
second post

China's first operational aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, carried out its first live fire exercise in the Bohai Sea a few days ago, according to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense. The carrier scrambled J-15 jets to engage targets with live ordnance while the ship itself practiced anti-missile defense drills by engaging incoming threats with its air defense systems. The flight deck of the Liaoning is of a ski-ramp design, which means that aircraft have to obey a weight limit in order to take off. This, in turn, negatively affects their fuel capacity and ordnance payload. Nevertheless, imagery and video released by the Chinese military highlighted how the embarked J-15 aircraft are still able to deploy with a limited number of PL-12 air-to-air missiles and YJ-83 anti-ship missiles.

In addition to launching and recovering aircraft, the Liaoning also practiced operating alongside other vessels as a combined battle group, with frigates and destroyers acting as escorts to the aircraft carrier, fulfilling various roles as dictated by the scenario. Despite rapid progress, China's carrier aviation remains in the early stages of development. The Liaoning has yet to embark a full compliment of aircraft and only initial batches of the carrier's actual aircrew have been trained. Furthermore, the live fire exercise carried out by the Liaoning battle group took place very close to Chinese shores, and not far from the carrier's homeport.

China previously announced that the Liaoning was ready for combat, but the reality is that the aircraft carrier will largely remain a training vessel focused on the development of initial cadres of carrier aviation pilots and crew. Nevertheless, China has an ambitious carrier program in place, with another ski-ramp carrier design nearing completion, closely followed by a more modern catapult design shortly after. China's third aircraft carrier, incorporating the catapult design, will be the first fully-capable Chinese aircraft carrier and will embark the full range of carrier aircraft types required — aircraft that are currently under development in China.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: The fish of the South China Sea
« Reply #469 on: December 17, 2016, 07:49:33 AM »
Third post:

Lots of charts and maps in the original, which was written in February:

=====================

Forecast

    South China Sea tensions will rise in the long-term as China exhausts its near-shore fisheries and continues to push outward to secure further stocks.
    In Asia, consumption of fish will increase with population and industrialization, boosting pressure on claimant countries to control their waters.
    Fishing vessels will continue to spark short, sharp crises and risk further upset to the delicate balance in Asia's disputed waters.

Analysis

China is pushing outward. The country has made steady moves to reclaim its role as the pre-eminent power in the Pacific Rim. This expansion, however, differs from those made at any other time in its history. For most of China's existence, it was a continental power endowed with sufficient resources with an economy driven by self-contained markets. External trade was a factor but moved mostly by land, primarily via the Silk Road. Sea trade also did occur, but China's coast was generally a liability — a point of incursion to protect from raiders and hostile powers. China was not compelled to explore the seas and seek new lands.

Until recently, modern China hewed to this pattern. This began to change by the late 1990s, when China's economic boom started to strain domestic resources. At the turn of the century, imports of key commodities began to outstrip domestic production, exports ballooned and China became reliant on maritime transport. The very success of China's economic growth brought new vulnerabilities.

Because the United States maintains effective control of the world's oceans, this is a difficult move for China. Beijing has opted for a two-pronged strategy: diversifying away from sea routes with its Belt and Road Initiative and building up its naval strength, capacity and reach. But the push to solidify its claims to maritime territory is upsetting the balance of power in the Pacific Rim and challenging a pillar of the U.S.-centric world order: freedom of navigation.
Many Waters

China's reorientation toward the sea is particularly disruptive given Asia's geopolitics. Although Europe and Asia share the Eurasian landmass, their geopolitics differ fundamentally. Europe, a continent crowded with nations vying for space, is defined by land borders that ebb and flow like the tides. East Asia, by contrast, is defined by the sea and ringed by populous coasts, a space defined by maritime transit and resources. The sea serves as both the barrier and the pathway between the mainland and the archipelago. Europe's land borders might be contentious, but they can at least be clearly delineated. Maritime borders are ephemeral and subject to diverse concepts of use and passage.

What has emerged is a rising sense of competition and even potential conflict in the South and East China seas, driven by fear of losing control of key supply lines, competing maritime territorial claims, differing interpretations of maritime agreements, and competition for resources in these seas themselves. Much has been said about competition over sub-sea mineral resources, from claims of vast potential reserves of oil and natural gas to seabed methane and ocean mining. Although oil and natural gas reserves are actively exploited around the periphery of these seas, little significant exploration has been done in much of the contested areas, and assertions of a "second Arabian Gulf" are greatly exaggerated.

But there is one very real and actively exploited resource in those waters that is often overlooked: fish and other marine foodstuffs. Clashes over fishing grounds are frequent, volatile and mostly out of the control of the various regional governments. Given the size of the seas, maritime patrols are infrequent. The absence of strong regulation or enforcement allows room for gray areas to be exploited and territorial waters to be violated. Poor regulation and enforcement of boundaries make the security situation even more opaque and complex. Fishermen are both exploited by and exploit nationalist government sentiments and willfully push the boundaries of fisheries. As with the agricultural sector, the fishing industry and its countless small-scale producers, can have a disproportionate effect on political decision-making.
Feeding Asian Growth

In Asia, fish and other marine foodstuffs play a greater role in diets than in the West. Seafood production is an important source of employment and a vital component of national economies. Asian fisheries make up half the global total capture production, and six of the top 10 producers of marine products are in Asia.

In South Korea and Japan, seafood makes up about 20 percent of the protein supply and contributes more than 15 percent in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. It makes up more than 10 percent of protein supply in Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam, and while it was at around 8.5 percent in China, between 2008 and 2011 there was a 13 percent increase in the role of seafood in China's national protein consumption. By comparison, seafood provides a little over 5 percent of protein consumption in the United Kingdom, a little less than 5 percent in the United States and less than 4.5 percent in Germany.

In addition to its important role in national diets (and national food security), seafood also plays an important economic role. There are an estimated 1.72 million fishing vessels plying the waters of the South China Sea alone, employing some 5.4 million people. And Asia's fleets are growing faster than those of the rest of the world. Since the late 1980s, the overall size of the world's fishing fleets has stabilized, but the Asian fleet has nearly doubled, comprising around three-quarters of the world's powered fishing vessels. In 2014, Asia contributed a third of global seafood exports, with China alone accounting for 12.5 percent of total global exports, up from just 7 percent in 2007, with the value of China's exports growing nearly 200 percent over the same period. In Indonesia, fisheries contribute more than 3 percent to total national gross domestic product. In other countries, the numbers are harder to come by, as fisheries are often included with agriculture and forestry in statistics. Many countries in Asia have sizable local fishing communities, and as with agricultural concerns, these often have a greater political impact than their economic share might suggest.

Fish and other maritime products are particularly important to China. After the 1978 economic opening and reform program, Beijing actively sought to expand its fishing fleet and activities. Since then, China's seafood production has grown at a rate of 7.6 percent per year, making China the largest single producer of seafood in the region and second only to a combined Southeast Asia.

The value of the fishing industry in China has risen to 1.9 trillion yuan ($289 billion) in 2013, with fish now its top agricultural export. There were nearly 10,000 fish processing companies in China in 2013, employing 400,000 workers, predominately in Shandong, Liaoning and Fujian. Overall, the fisheries and marine foodstuffs industries in China provide nearly 14.5 million jobs, and China boasted 695,000 fishing vessels in 2013, a sharp rise from the 52,225 in 1979. Chinese fishermen earn almost 50 percent more than their farming counterparts, and as of 2010, China was spending $4 billion a year in subsidies to the industry.
Dwindling Resources

The marine fishing industry has long been important in Asia, and in the 20th century, it saw several boom and bust cycles with the expansion of mechanized fishing fleets and increased consumption and export patterns. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982 and designed to clarify maritime use and international regulations, may have inadvertently spurred both an expansion of regional fishing and increased competition and confrontation in the enclosed waters of Asia. The creation of UNCLOS introduced a use-it-or-lose-it element to exploitation of maritime resources, and Asian countries responded with increased fishing activity. Already strained fisheries grew even less productive, triggering a further expansion of fishing outward from the coasts to the formerly common and now contested waters farther out. UNCLOS also defined what a nation could claim as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ), spurring countries to claim previously unimportant landmasses in order to capture a larger EEZ.

In 1978, China set the goal of self-sufficiency in fishery products, finally achieving it in 2002. But as elsewhere in Asia, this rapid rise in activity saw depletion of stocks along the Chinese coast. In 1985, nearly 90 percent of Chinese fishing was inshore, but by 2002, the last year for reliable statistics, that had fallen to just under 65 percent, and the share of offshore fishing continues to rise. Chinese government plans to expand fishing, fish processing and exports of fishery products will impact this trend even more. The Chinese fish processing industry is operating at only around 70 percent of capacity, failing to reach the full utilization rates called for in the 12th Five-Year Plan, which ran from 2011-2015. China's 2015 agriculture report contains calls for even more overall fish production, with goals of 73 million tons annually by 2020 and 77 million tons by 2024, and a call to increase exports to 5.4 million tons by 2024.

As much as China's expansion of regulatory and defensive activity in the South China Sea is driven by strategic security and protection of transport routes, it is also driven by the immediate realities of China's maritime products production and consumption. China couches much of its activities in the South China Sea as focusing on the safety of fishing fleets and argues that the waters are Chinese waters traditionally, thus open for Chinese fleets. In the face of criticism from neighbors, China has argued at times that its fleets need to fish, and if they cross into others' waters accidentally, this is not something China can always stop or control. In 2012, the Chinese government assessed its main fishing areas — the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea. The survey recognized the significantly reduced stocks in the Bohai and Yellow seas and called for a reduction in fishing to allow stocks to replenish. But it argued for an increase in fishing in the East and South China seas, and Beijing encouraged fishing through fuel subsidies and surveys of fishing stocks around the disputed Spratly Islands.

Confrontations over fishing are one of the most active and visible forms of competition in the South China Sea and the enclosed waters of Asia. The increase in fishing, the decrease in near-shore stocks, government subsidies to spur the maritime industry, and rising consumption of fisheries products at home and abroad are only adding to the frequency of clashes over fishing fleets — clashes that have the potential to explode into more active military confrontation. Looking north to the two Koreas, at least two recent maritime incidents between the two countries, ones that led to the sinking of ships and killing of naval personnel, occurred as each country sought to protect its claimed fishing waters in the Yellow Sea. Throughout Asian waters, fishing vessels are engaged in violent confrontations with other nations' coast guards, ships' crews are arrested and detained, and vessels are confiscated and scuttled. These contribute to national tensions and social distrust among nations.

Governments are also exploiting their fishing fleets at times to reinforce nationalist sentiments and territorial claims. It is not unusual to see reports of massive Chinese or Taiwanese fleets setting off adorned with nationalist slogans and asserting rights to fish around contested islets. In 2014, amid a standoff between China and Vietnam over China's moves to build a permanent oil platform near the South China Sea's Paracel Islands, both countries encouraged fishing fleets to enter the area to disrupt their adversaries' plans and to complicate matters for the others' maritime security forces. But such exploitation has unintended consequences. Fishing fleets often pursue their catch into contested areas, assuming that their governments will provide protection. Governments at times are forced to try to rein in these very fishing fleets that they encourage, or at least turn a blind eye to. And with the massive fleets at sea, each seeking whatever advantage it can garner, even if that means fishing contested waters or violating national maritime territories, the chances for unintended confrontations grow. This is a process that may be relatively easy to turn on but hard to turn off.

Subsea mineral resources, national sovereignty and critical supply lines are all drivers of regional maritime policy and sources of friction, but fisheries are an active and somewhat uncontrollable force that can serve as the spark of confrontation. Expanding fisheries activities in enclosed waters means greater chances for accidents, illegal activity and confrontation. As the drive for agricultural land drove conflict and expansion on land, the drive for maritime resources, particularly fisheries products, is driving a "land grab" in Asia's enclosed seas. Maritime security and naval forces are growing in size, assertions of national sovereignty are becoming more concrete, and keeping track of the 1.72 million fishing vessels in the South China Sea alone is not only a daunting task, it is one that can draw neighbors into more active confrontation.


Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: Vietnam showing more spine than Obama
« Reply #470 on: December 17, 2016, 10:57:32 AM »
Summary

As China tries to make nice with some of its rivals in the South China Sea, Vietnam is quietly building up its own maritime defenses. Over the past month, a series of satellite images has shown that Hanoi is accelerating its island reclamation and fortification efforts in the Spratly island chain. Combined with its pursuit of defense partnerships with the United States, Russia, France and India, as well as its improving air and naval assets, Vietnam appears determined to thwart China's ambitions to expand its claims over the disputed waters.

Some of Vietnam's neighbors, however, may spoil its plans. The Philippines and Malaysia have given in to Chinese pressure and agreed to manage their territorial feuds with Beijing through bilateral talks rather than international arbitration. Though Vietnam has tried to avoid drawing China's ire by mending ties with it in other ways, Hanoi's continued defiance on maritime issues could incite retaliation from Beijing that leaves Vietnam with little choice, in the end, but to follow its neighbors' lead.
Analysis

Vietnam's practice of fortifying islands and reefs under its control is nothing new. Military installations and garrisons have dotted the features of the Spratly archipelago — including the Southwest Cay, Sin Cowe Island and Spratly Island itself — for some time. But over the past two years, Vietnam has redoubled its efforts to reclaim and build up these islets and reefs, creating over 50 hectares (120 acres) of new land in the archipelago in spite of U.S. calls for it to stop so as to avoid escalating tensions in the sea.
Vietnam Engineers a Deterrent

Based on satellite imagery, Vietnam's latest projects on Spratly Island include the extension of a 600-meter (2,000-foot) runway to 1,200 meters and the construction of two large hangars, in addition to the two that already existed. Once these projects are finished, the island will be able to accommodate most of the Vietnamese air force's aircraft. According to an assessment by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, they also indicate that Hanoi will probably deploy noncombat aircraft, such as its PZL M28B maritime surveillance planes and CASA C-295 transport planes, to Spratly Island. Meanwhile, dredging work has been spotted at the nearby Ladd Reef that could be designed to provide shelter for Vietnamese vessels inside the lagoon. Unconfirmed reports indicated that Vietnam has positioned rocket artillery in the island chain as well, though Hanoi has denied the claims.

The new features are no match for China's aggressive buildup in the South China Sea, but they are notable for their position. Located on the sea's southwestern rim, Spratly Island stands apart from most of the other islets in the Spratly archipelago, boasting a comparatively large exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of its own. It also serves as Vietnam's key military outpost in the Spratly island chain, just as the Thitu and Taiping islands do for the Philippines and Taiwan, respectively. But perhaps just as important, Spratly Island rests on the western edge of the nine-dash line that China insists delineates its South China Sea holdings. Under Beijing's definition, Spratly Island — and the vast potential resources that fall within its EEZ — belongs to China. Should Vietnam's claim to the island be verified, it could invalidate the rest of the nine-dash line boundary as well. Hanoi is not taking any chances as China's creeping encroachment has left Vietnam's island defenses vulnerable, and it hopes that bolstering its military posture in the Spratlys will help to ward off any further Chinese advances.
China Treads Carefully

Vietnam's moves come at a time of relative calm in the ongoing South China Sea dispute. To different degrees, the Philippines and Malaysia have acquiesced to China's request to handle territorial spats through its preferred mechanism: diplomatic negotiations and joint arrangements that align with Beijing's interests. Though it remains to be seen whether this trend will continue, several factors can explain why it is happening now. For one, China has gradually gained the tactical upper hand in the region over the past six years as it has modernized its military, developed its islands and acquired new deep-sea drilling technology.

MARC: NOTE WELL THIS PARAGRAPH:
That said, China has also experienced significant strategic setbacks, not least of which was a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that negated Beijing's competing claims with the Philippines in the South China Sea. As a result, China seems to have abandoned the outright use of force for a subtler two-track strategy: Using economic and tactical concessions to entice cooperation from some claimants while maintaining pressure against more vocal opponents with limited punitive measures. The former have included offers of joint energy development projects and fishing regulations, while the latter have included diplomatic complaints and interdictions.

Having found themselves with fewer options for countering China's maritime ambitions, many South China Sea claimants — including the Philippines and Malaysia — have adopted a more conciliatory approach toward Beijing. Though these countries have continued to expand their defense ties with other powers, they have relented in their refusal to settle disputes through bilateral talks with China. Vietnam, however, has proved the exception.

China sees Vietnam's land reclamation efforts as a provocation, but it has neither the legal grounds nor the appetite to militarily challenge it. Nevertheless, it has the means to pressure Vietnam or undermine Hanoi's territorial claims, should it so choose. For instance, Beijing could increase its holdings in the Paracel Islands or send coast guard patrols near the Spratlys. It could also begin bidding on or exploring for energy resources around Spratly Island, including in the nearby Vanguard Bank, which Beijing tried to develop in the 1990s. But each of these measures would also risk renewing regional suspicions of China's intentions, undermining its own goal of reaching one-on-one deals with the sea's claimants that ultimately work in its favor.

G M

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Obama's weakness, fecklessness and China
« Reply #471 on: December 18, 2016, 11:36:29 AM »


http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/18/world/asia/muted-us-response-to-chinas-seizure-of-drone-worries-asian-allies.html?_r=0

Muted U.S. Response to China’s Seizure of Drone Worries Asian Allies
By JANE PERLEZDEC. 18, 2016

BEIJING — Only a day before a small Chinese boat sidled up to a United States Navy research vessel in waters off the Philippines and audaciously seized an underwater drone from American sailors, the commander of United States military operations in the region told an audience in Australia that America had a winning military formula.

“Capability times resolve times signaling equals deterrence,” Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr. told a blue-chip crowd of diplomats and analysts at the prestigious Lowy Institute in Sydney, Australia, the leading city in America’s closest ally in the region.

**And what is missing in that formula today?**

In the eyes of America’s friends in Asia, the brazen maneuver to launch an operation against an American Navy vessel in international waters in the South China Sea about 50 miles from the Philippines, another close American ally, has raised questions about one of the admiral’s crucial words. It was also seen by some as a taunt to President-elect Donald J. Trump, who has challenged the One China policy on Taiwan and has vowed to deal forcefully with Beijing in trade and other issues.

**It was "seen by some", in the NYT breakroom, as a taunt to Trump, to anyone else, it is seen as China once again grabbing Obama by the p*ssy.**



“The weak link is the resolve, and the Chinese are testing that, as well as baiting Trump,” said Euan Graham, the director of international security at the Lowy Institute. “Capability, yes. Signaling, yes, with sending F-22 fighter jets to Australia. But the very muted response means the equation falls down on resolve.”

**Until Trump is sworn in as President, he has no power to do anything to address China's acts. Can anyone get Obama on the phone from the Golf Course?**

Across Asia, diplomats and analysts said they were perplexed at the inability of the Obama administration to devise a strong response to China’s challenge. It did not even dispatch an American destroyer to the spot near Subic Bay, a former American Navy base that is still frequented by American ships, some noted.

**You know who isn't surprised? The Chinese! Know who else? Anyone paying attention the last eight f*cking years.**


After discussions at the National Security Council on how to deal with the issue, the Obama administration sent a démarche to China demanding the return of the drone. On Saturday, China said it would comply with the request but did not indicate when or how the equipment would be sent back.

**Oh no! Not the STRONGLY WORDED LETTER!**


The end result, analysts said, is that China will be emboldened by having carried out an act that amounted to hybrid warfare, falling just short of provoking conflict, and suffering few noticeable consequences.

“Allies and observers will find it hard not to conclude this represents another diminishment of American authority in the region,” said Douglas H. Paal, the vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

**Not an accident.**

Significantly, the Chinese grabbed the drone not only in international waters but outside even the “nine-dash line” that China uses as a marker for its claims in the South China Sea. In so doing, analysts said, Beijing was making the point that the entire sea was its preserve, even though it is entirely legal for the United States to conduct military operations in waters within 200 miles of the Philippines, an area known as an exclusive economic zone.

**Under Obama's watch, China went from "peaceful rise", to the Honey Badger of Asia. Fundamentally transformed!**


In the last dozen years, China has steadily showed off its growing military prowess to the countries around the South China Sea, which carries trillions of dollars of world trade and which China values for its strategic access to the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean.

As China has built up its navy and its submarine fleet in the last decade, it has also emphasized what it calls its “inherent” right to dominate the regional seas, and to challenge the presence of the United States, its allies and partners in Asia.

The drone episode, which occurred on Thursday and was first broadcast by CNN despite efforts by the Obama administration to settle it quietly, was of a different nature and just as disquieting as past confrontations with China that involved bigger ships and more dangerous maneuvers, analysts said.

In 2001, soon after President George W. Bush came to office, an American spy aircraft, an EP-3, was forced to land on Hainan Island after colliding with a Chinese fighter jet. The Chinese stripped the plane of its assets and returned it broken down to its parts and packed in boxes.


In 2009, two months after President Obama took office, Chinese vessels swarmed a United States Navy reconnaissance ship, the Impeccable, in what the Pentagon said were dangerous and unprofessional maneuvers.

This time, China chose a more unconventional method to challenge the United States and hastened the timetable, challenging a president-elect rather than a newly installed president as it has in the past.

**Again, no. If Obama could be bothered with this while on his last multi-million dollar taxpayer funded vacation, I am sure he would pat the author on the head for this tongue-bath.**

The drone itself, known as an unmanned underwater vehicle, was not a particularly important piece of equipment. Such drones are deployed to gather military oceanographic data and are available over the counter for about $150,000, the Pentagon said. Data from the drone would no doubt be used to help track China’s growing submarine fleet, naval experts said.

More important than the equipment was the principle of freedom of navigation in international waters, and whether China was in the process of imposing its own rules in the South China Sea — more than 800 miles away from its coastline, said Alexander Vuving, a specialist on Vietnam at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawaii.

“This is China showing that it is in the process of setting the rules in the South China Sea, imposing its own view in the South China Sea and saying the South China Sea should be its own backyard,” Mr. Vuving said.

“If China can get away with this incident with impunity,” he added, “this will send a chilling message to countries in the region.”

Some leaders, like President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines, will feel validated in a pivot away from the United States toward China, Mr. Vuving said. “Others, like the Vietnamese, will have to seriously rethink their regional outlook.”

Vietnam — always fearful of China, its neighbor to the north, but also careful not to alienate Beijing — has tried in the last few years to draw closer to the United States, while still maintaining a careful distance.


In 2011, as China became more assertive in the South China Sea, Vietnam accused China of instructing three high-speed patrol boats to cut the cables of a Vietnamese oil and gas survey ship.

The authoritarian Vietnamese government was so furious that it allowed anti-Chinese demonstrations in Hanoi.

In 2014, China moved a billion-dollar oil rig to waters close to the Paracel Islands that both Vietnam and China claim, and then blasted a flotilla of Vietnamese ships with water cannon.

Since then, China has hardened its position, sometimes referring to the South China Sea a “core interest” in which there is no room for compromise, though others in the region call it bullying by the Chinese president, Xi Jinping.

Under that vision, China would be in control from the waters of Indonesia to Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines and up to Japan.

In the East China Sea, China and Japan are at odds over an uninhabited island chain, known as the Senkaku in Japan and the Diaoyu in China. In June, China sent a warship for the first time into the waters around the islands, further escalating tensions.

Japan has been more outspoken than other Asian countries in its support for the Obama administration’s objections to China’s construction of military facilities on seven artificial islands in the South China Sea.

But in Tokyo, the government was watching the outcome of the drone episode with some anxiety. So far, Washington’s restrained response has not been reassuring.



Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #473 on: December 19, 2016, 03:17:40 PM »
BD:

Love seeing you around here again.  Thanks for another typically excellent contribution.


G M

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Re: China’s Capture of U.S. Underwater Drone Violates Law of the Sea
« Reply #474 on: December 19, 2016, 05:52:43 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #475 on: December 19, 2016, 08:42:32 PM »
That is very witty, and if I may, a touch wide of the mark IMHO. 

When China blows off Int'l Law its blandishments with the other countries on the SCS become much less effective and it runs the risk of motivating others to spend more on military and form alliances. 

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #476 on: December 19, 2016, 08:45:39 PM »
That is very witty, and if I may, a touch wide of the mark IMHO. 

When China blows off Int'l Law its blandishments with the other countries on the SCS become much less effective and it runs the risk of motivating others to spend more on military and form alliances. 


Like the Philippines? Anyone seen Australia's Navy lately?

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #477 on: December 20, 2016, 10:51:02 AM »
The Philippines is/was/can be an unsinkable aircraft carrier for the US.  Australia has been a good, sturdy ally of US but understandably will not go it alone.


ccp

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Giant rooster that looks like Trump in China
« Reply #479 on: December 31, 2016, 10:19:58 AM »
I am not clear this was supposed to be a parody of Trump or some liberal American is just making this up.

But it could be a good marketing move if was on purpose.
Every huffington post reader will visit this place in china so they can yuck it up sending selfies to their marxist friends.

G M

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Re: Giant rooster that looks like Trump in China
« Reply #480 on: December 31, 2016, 10:28:46 AM »
I am not clear this was supposed to be a parody of Trump or some liberal American is just making this up.

But it could be a good marketing move if was on purpose.
Every huffington post reader will visit this place in china so they can yuck it up sending selfies to their marxist friends.

The "Socialist with Chinese characteristics" business owner would love to have an influx of "da bizi" spend money at this mall, and buy a smaller version.

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« Last Edit: January 01, 2017, 01:22:52 PM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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Re: year in review
« Reply #482 on: January 01, 2017, 12:54:15 PM »
https://www.lawfareblog.com/year-review-south-china-sea-edition

https://www.lawfareblog.com/chinas-ridiculously-weak-legal-argument-against-complying-south-china-sea-arbitration-award

China doesn't have a strong legal argument against complying with international law? NFW!  :-o

China has the world's oldest argument: "Come over here and make me do it, Motherf*cker".

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #483 on: January 01, 2017, 01:24:11 PM »
Thank you for the citation BD  :-)

ccp

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« Last Edit: January 09, 2017, 02:40:55 PM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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G M

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Ted Cruz Snubs China, Meets with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen
« Reply #486 on: January 09, 2017, 06:03:42 PM »
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/01/09/ted-cruz-snubs-china-meets-with-taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen/

A one China policy could mean we only recognize the Republic of China, not the PRC. Although that really could lead to war.


DougMacG

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Re: Ted Cruz Snubs China, Meets with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen
« Reply #487 on: January 09, 2017, 06:32:10 PM »
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/01/09/ted-cruz-snubs-china-meets-with-taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen/

A one China policy could mean we only recognize the Republic of China, not the PRC. Although that really could lead to war.

It could lead to war, but why?  They haven't shown any sign of caring what we think on anything else.

[And why is Ted Cruz re-starting his campaign.  Someone appoint him to the Supreme Court!]

G M

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Re: Ted Cruz Snubs China, Meets with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen
« Reply #488 on: January 09, 2017, 06:46:00 PM »
Things are fragile in China. If Trump did use tariffs to punish China, it's might bring them into line, or it might cause things to spiral out of control.


https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/01/09/ted-cruz-snubs-china-meets-with-taiwan-president-tsai-ing-wen/

A one China policy could mean we only recognize the Republic of China, not the PRC. Although that really could lead to war.

It could lead to war, but why?  They haven't shown any sign of caring what we think on anything else.

[And why is Ted Cruz re-starting his campaign.  Someone appoint him to the Supreme Court!]

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #489 on: January 09, 2017, 08:15:08 PM »
Interesting move by Cruz.  I'm thinking Trump could put it to "good cop bad cop" effect.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #490 on: January 09, 2017, 08:52:04 PM »
Interesting move by Cruz.  I'm thinking Trump could put it to "good cop bad cop" effect.

Once we have an American as president, come the 20th, we might be able to build a real alliance among China's unhappy neighbors.

G M

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War with Russia and China?
« Reply #491 on: January 11, 2017, 07:05:29 PM »
https://readfomag.com/2017/01/09/09-january-2017-war-with-russia-and-china-here-are-two-new-indicators/

 War with Russia and China? Here Are Two New Indicators

A US Army (USA) Soldier assigned to the 1st Infantry Division, mans a .50 caliber M2HB machine gun mounted atop a High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), during a patrol along Logistics Support Area (LSA) Anaconda, near Balad Air Base (AB), Iraq. The area is being cleared of threats so Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) personnel can call in an air strike. The image is silhouetted against the setting sun.

In an Executive Intelligence Summary from last month, I pointed out two additional indicators that bolster the case for a potential conflict with China and Russia.  I didn’t see these two stories reported anywhere other than in military channels, and certainly not through the mainstream media.  But they’re significant and I want you to know about them.

The potential for conflict with both Russia and China are scenarios I’m watching closely, because a war with either of these “near peer” competitors would likely involve cyber activity which could absolutely target us here at home.  Although cyber attacks would likely focus on military command and control targets, we can’t rule out the possibility that our internet and other critical infrastructure won’t be targeted in the process.  I’ve explained why and in greater detail in previous EXSUMs.  Now on to the indicators…

The first is that the US Navy will be unveiling a new strategy for surface combat as early as today, which is just two years after their move to what’s called distributed lethality.  That means that Navy ships, instead of operating in one mass formation, will break up into several smaller formations.  This focus on splitting a large formation into small groups and increasing lethality means that adversaries will have more numerous target groups as opposed to one mass formation.  And given electronic warfare and the capability to present decoy targets to adversary targeting systems, the US Navy is betting that they’ll be harder to hit as a result.  The carrier strike groups will remain operational, but will launch aircraft and missiles from the rear of a sea battle, while distributed formations stay closer to the fight.  This is most likely in response to recent Chinese weapons developments, which includes a series of upgrades to anti-ship missiles, and the expectation that a naval conflict is growing more likely.  China’s strategy is to use long-range air-to-air and anti-ship missiles in what’s called an anti-access/area denial strategy.  I’ll be paying close attention this week to see what comes of the Navy’s new strategy in response.

And the second is that the Army announced that Fort Stewart, Georgia’s 3rd Infantry Division will be changing the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, which is light infantry, into an armored brigade combat team equipped with Abrams tanks.  After 15 years of fighting in mostly irregular wars, leaders at the Pentagon and their concept of reality has been quickly hurtling back to earth.  For years, there was a Pentagon battle over force structure and becoming lighter, faster, and more lethal to respond to small, global contingencies, or maintaining the ability to fight large scale conventional wars.  Some leaders didn’t see the need for maintaining conventional readiness because up until about four years ago, few people were ringing alarms about conventional threats.  But now that a conventional war in Europe looks like a growing possibility, the Army is renewing focus on military readiness and increasing conventional warfighting capabilities, while playing catch up to electronic and cyber warfare; both of which will undoubtedly play a role in the next war.  2nd BCT’s sister brigade, the 1st Heavy Brigade Combat Team, and other units from the 3rd Infantry Division completed several rotations to Europe in 2015 as a part of Operation Atlantic Resolve.  Operation Atlantic Resolve is part of the $3 billion package called the European Reassurance Initiative, which is meant to bolster the defense of Europe against Russian aggression.

Having an additional armored brigade at 3rd ID is directed at one problem: conventional, force-on-force warfare, specifically against Russia.  I expect President-Elect Trump’s defense policy regarding Europe to be wrought with fragmentary changes (FRAGOs for the military folks).  Trump’s desire to pursue better relations with Russia must be weighed against Russia’s regional policy goals concerning eastern Europe.  What NATO wants is bad for Russia, and what Russia wants is bad for NATO.  While Trump is cooling on war rhetoric with Russia, our European allies are engaging in the regional arms race in lock step with Russia in preparation for war.  The US military defense posture in Europe is nearing a war footing as well, and Trump will be forced to make a decision on whether to pursue a high-risk friendship with Russia or continue the strategy of being Europe’s backstop.  On the current trajectory, Trump will have to choose and he’ll likely alter history.

DougMacG

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Re: War with Russia and China?
« Reply #492 on: January 12, 2017, 08:44:27 AM »
Good article.  I am interested in what war with either Russia or China would look like in the theoretical, game-theory, sense.  The experts and military strategists must be playing this out all the time.  A look at it from either side must lead to the conclusion that both sides are worse off than before no matter how it plays out, IMO.

The best analysis for understanding the behavior of these geo-rivals for me is the Denny S backyard theory.  China has all these impending conflicts in its own neighborhood, obsessed with Taiwan and constantly testing its expansion of power in the South China Sea.  Russia is always in conflict threat of conflict with the much weaker states on its immediate border, and they reach further out every time they win, annex or conquer one.

Unlike say Nazi Germany versus England, France, etc, there is no desire in China to rule the US and no desire in the US to rule China.  A strike on the US by China would be for the purpose of having us back off from one of their regional conflicts, IMHO.

I mostly see China as a business.  It's a ruthless totalitarian regime, but a business.  Every major city and state in the US is a major customer of Chinese goods.  They could attempt a Hiroshima, Nagasaki like nuclear attack on LA, San Fran or Seattle, but it would trigger an economic war, not just a military one.  In terms of power, they could be hurt in that worse than us even if we did not strike back militarily.  A full blown trade blockage with justification and resolve from us would trigger a kind of retraction and collapse in China that could end the rule of the regime.  

If a shootout or mini-conflict erupted in their neighborhood, China versus US, and they were to lose it, just having the US engage in the region would lower the intimidation factor in their region that they currently rely on.

They have as much reason as us to be conflict averse.
« Last Edit: January 12, 2017, 08:49:36 AM by DougMacG »

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #493 on: January 15, 2017, 11:08:25 PM »
Mmmmm , , , AND they are a bubble, they economic model also has turned the country into a toxic dump, and they have 108 young males for every 100 females , , ,

Crafty_Dog

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Sec Def Mattis pays a visit
« Reply #494 on: February 07, 2017, 09:55:47 AM »
Defense Secretary Jim Mattis concluded a successful visit to South Korea and Japan this weekend, the first overseas trip by a Trump cabinet member and a welcome gesture of reassurance to Asian allies threatened by North Korea and China. Now officials in Seoul and especially Tokyo want to see how President Trump follows up when he hosts Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Washington on Friday.

Mr. Mattis said in Seoul that the U.S. commitment to South Korea is “ironclad” and that “it is a priority for President Trump’s Administration to pay attention to the northwest Pacific.” He warned North Korea that “any attack on the United States or on our allies will be defeated and any use of nuclear weapons will be met with a response that will be effective and overwhelming.”

He also reconfirmed plans for South Korea this year to deploy the advanced U.S.-made missile-defense system known as Thaad. This would boost protection against the North and facilitate cooperation among Seoul, Tokyo and Washington—which is why China doesn’t like it and is using informal economic sanctions to get Seoul to scotch its plans.

Whether Seoul caves will be a major test of the U.S. alliance as the Trump Administration finds its footing and South Koreans ride out their continuing presidential impeachment scandal and prepare to elect a new leader later this year.

In Tokyo, where the political leadership is more steady but concerns are mounting over Chinese bullying in the East China Sea, Mr. Mattis offered similarly broad assurances. Most important, he reaffirmed that the U.S.-Japan security treaty applies to the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands, which China claims for itself and regularly threatens using civilian and paramilitary ships.

Mr. Mattis also praised Japan’s government for increasing defense spending. The U.S.-Japan alliance, he said, is “a model of cost-sharing and burden-sharing” and “an example for other nations to follow.” This is especially important because as a candidate Donald Trump suggested several times that Japan is a free rider on U.S. security commitments, a view that underestimates Japan’s contributions to regional security and the value of basing U.S. troops at low cost near Asia’s many flash points.

Mr. Trump’s comments still sting, which is why his summit with Mr. Abe this week is highly anticipated in Tokyo and other allied capitals. The two men have had several promising exchanges since November’s election, including phone calls and a Trump Tower meeting, but these addressed few specifics of the bilateral relationship.

If Mr. Trump this week follows Mr. Mattis in affirming the U.S. commitment to Japanese control of the Senkakus, he will go a long way to putting U.S.-Japan alliance concerns to rest. He would also help deter Chinese aggression, while underscoring that Washington remains a guarantor of world order in the face of authoritarian challengers.


Crafty_Dog

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Round Two to China
« Reply #496 on: February 09, 2017, 09:03:24 PM »
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/318874-trump-to-honor-one-china-policy

================================

Stratfor:

In his first phone call with Chinese President Xi Jinping since taking office, U.S. President Donald Trump on Feb. 10 told his counterpart that his administration will honor the so-called one-China policy, a long-standing diplomatic formula underpinning Washington's relations with Beijing and Taipei. According to a White House statement, Trump and Xi spoke at length about a range of bilateral issues. Trump's affirmation of existing U.S. policy of maintaining only unofficial ties with Taiwan came at the request of the Chinese president. (Mainland China and Taiwan both adhere to the idea that there is only one China, so if a country forges ties with either Beijing or Taipei, it must sever ties with the other.)

Relations between Washington and Beijing have been effectively frozen since December, when Trump broke diplomatic tradition by taking a congratulatory phone call from Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen — the first such call since Washington and Beijing established diplomatic relations in 1979. Trump later suggested his administration may depart from its long-standing position on Taiwan if Beijing proves unwilling to make concessions on other issues such as trade. Beijing has repeatedly warned, however, that its one-China policy is nonnegotiable.

Trump's turn back to the status quo suggests that heated debates are still unsettled within the new administration about how to manage U.S.-China relations. Trump's campaign included ample hard-line rhetoric about China, and his team's statements on a range of issues — currency manipulation, China's militarization of contested waters in the South China Sea, its willingness to contain North Korea's nuclear program, and a potential easing of tensions between the United States and Russia — have triggered a broad reassessment inside Beijing. With the Chinese leadership preoccupied with maintaining control of a precarious economic rebalancing process and preparing for the key Party Congress later this year, this would not be a good time for significantly soured relations with Washington. Escalating trade tensions or growing security threats in the Western Pacific would jeopardize China's focus on internal stability, even if Beijing will have some countermeasures at its disposal — particularly in the economic, cybersecurity and maritime realms — as evidenced by China's seizure of a U.S. naval drone in the South China Sea in December.

Recently, there have been indications that Washington may soften its positions to defuse tensions. Earlier this week, for example, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson appeared to walk back comments he made during his Senate confirmation hearings in which he appeared to advocate a blockade of Beijing's man-made islands in contested parts of the South China Sea. Meanwhile, during his recent trip to Japan and South Korea, U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis emphasized diplomatic solutions to the South China Sea issue. According to The New York Times, the debate inside the White House on Feb. 9 centered on whether it should publicly reaffirm its commitment to the one-China policy. But even with Trump's apparent endorsement of the policy, Beijing expects no easy relief. The new administration in Washington may still have other options to leverage its relationship with Taiwan in pursuit of concessions from Beijing, potentially through increased arms sales or defense cooperation. In fact, the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 included for the first time a section on senior military exchanges with Taiwan.

For Taipei, the latest shift from the White House is a significant setback. The Democratic Progressive Party-led government has exercised great caution to avoid further antagonizing Beijing. But its pro-independence policies and ongoing pursuit of economic autonomy have apparently broken the cross-strait diplomatic truce forged under previous administrations. China has moved quickly to pressure Taiwan with diplomatic isolation, military intimidation and targeted economic coercion, and Beijing is also reportedly discussing more intensively the conditions under which to use military options against Taipei. If the White House begins to see its interests as once again diverging from Taipei's and wavers on its commitments, Taiwan might find itself the target of even more Chinese posturing and harassment operations.
« Last Edit: February 10, 2017, 05:15:35 AM by Crafty_Dog »

Crafty_Dog

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wSJ concurs on scoring Round Two
« Reply #497 on: February 10, 2017, 09:55:03 AM »

By Te-Ping Chen
Updated Feb. 10, 2017 12:19 p.m. ET
199 COMMENTS

BEIJING—China’s wait-and-see approach to U.S. President Donald Trump’s periodic diplomatic outbursts has paid off with the president dropping his threat to upend a cornerstone of Beijing-Washington relations.

After weeks of several phone run-ins with world leaders, Mr. Trump committed to a longstanding agreement that the U.S. won’t recognize Taiwan diplomatically in a phone call with President Xi Jinping late Thursday.

The Trump administration had already moved to temper heated rhetoric around U.S. policy in Asia, and marked a detente in a relationship that was thrown into uncertainty by Mr. Trump’s December phone conversation with Taiwan’s leader, which broke decades of diplomatic protocol.

Beijing, which had made clear to the Trump administration that U.S. adherence to the “One China” policy was an inviolable precondition for relations, praised Mr. Trump’s change of heart. Mr. Xi expressed his appreciation during the call, according to the official Xinhua News agency.
More

    Trump Commits to ‘One China’ Policy
    Heard: China’s Inconveniently Expanding U.S. Exports

China’s Foreign Ministry also welcomed Mr. Trump’s pledge to uphold the policy, “We appreciate that,” said ministry spokesman Lu Kang, who didn’t directly address in a Friday briefing a question about whether China had had to make any concessions in return.

More than three weeks after Mr. Trump took office, the absence of any call with China, the U.S.’s largest trading partner but also the object of some of Mr. Trump’s sharpest criticism, was growing increasingly conspicuous.

An official briefed on the discussion said Mr. Trump’s comments on the “One China” policy were short compared with long, formulaic assurances made by his predecessors. Putting the call together was the work of many people over many days, the official said.

Mr. Trump’s blunt style has posed a challenge for protocol-conscious Chinese officials wary of unpredictable turns in the conversation. In previous calls with leaders, Mr. Trump chided Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto over the country’s drug cartels and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull over a refugee-resettlement agreement Australia reached with the Obama administration.

Chinese analysts said Mr. Trump’s change in rhetoric was inevitable. “Some things you don’t need to be anxious to respond with tits-and-tats for,“ said Zhang Ruizhuang, professor of international relations at Nankai University in Tianjin. ”Instead, give him some time, and let him slowly realize things on his own.”

Beijing has taken a measured approach to Mr. Trump’s signals from before he took office that he might walk back the U.S. commitment to the “One China” policy. It protested Mr. Trump’s December call with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, but blamed Ms. Tsai for the exchange. Editorials in state media cited Mr. Trump’s inexperience in foreign relations.

China has considered Taiwan a breakaway province since Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists set up a government there in 1949, after years of civil war.

    ‘The most important thing is that Trump accepts the ‘One China’ policy, but that certainly doesn’t mean that his China policies are fully formed.’
    —Zhu Feng, a professor focusing on international relations at Nanjing University

The call between the two leaders means work can now start on a crowded agenda in U.S.-China relations, beset by discord over trade as well as the North Korean nuclear threat and Beijing’s assertiveness in the South China Sea.

“The most important thing is that Trump accepts the ‘One China’ policy, but that certainly doesn’t mean that his China policies are fully formed,” said Zhu Feng, a professor focusing on international relations at Nanjing University.

Mr. Trump has been vocal in his criticisms of Chinese currency and trade policy, and threatened during his campaign to slap a 45% trade tariff on Chinese goods and declare China a currency manipulator on his first day in office.

Since his inauguration, Mr. Trump has yet to carry out such combative actions, but his heated rhetoric has caused anxiety, including in the U.S. business community in China, which feared repercussions against American companies amid a possible deterioration in ties.

In recent days, the Trump administration had sought to clarify its approach to Asia. Last week, U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis paid visits to U.S. allies South Korea and Japan to reassure them that the U.S. plans to continue stationing troops in both countries, following suggestions by Mr. Trump that their presence—which serves as a bulwark against military incursions by Beijing and Pyongyang—was too costly for the U.S.

Similarly, prior to his confirmation as Mr. Trump’s secretary of state, Rex Tillerson walked back previous statements that the U.S. might block China’s access to islands it has built in the South China Sea, saying that the U.S. should be “capable” of limiting such access, should a contingency occur.

In written answers provided to the Senate, Mr. Tillerson also indicated he intended to adhere to the “One China” policy, saying Taiwan “should not be treated as a bargaining chip.”

Mr. Trump’s December call with Ms. Tsai had sparked both celebrations and anxiety in Taiwan, including fears that the island might become a chess piece in U.S.-Chinese relations.

In a statement released following the Trump-Xi call, Taiwan’s top agency for policy toward Beijing expressed hopes that the U.S. would continue to support the peaceful development of cross-strait relations and urged Beijing to engage in dialogue over differences with the self-ruled island.

On social media, Chinese users rejoiced on Friday at Mr. Trump’s acceding to the “One China” policy. “America is so scared of China, Trump’s called to surrender!” wrote one user on the country’s Twitter-like Weibo platform. “Trump must not have heard of that old Chinese saying: You can escape at first, but not for long!” said another.

—Kersten Zhang contributed to this article.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #498 on: February 10, 2017, 10:38:18 AM »
China treated Obama like their prison bitch, now let's see if they roll Trump.

Crafty_Dog

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