Author Topic: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, etc)  (Read 337543 times)

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: South-South China Sea
« Reply #350 on: March 27, 2016, 10:31:55 AM »

In the South China Sea, China's Gaze Moves South
Analysis
March 26, 2016 | 13:00 GMT Print
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The Malaysian navy, as well as Indonesia's, often must approach ships belonging to the Chinese coast guard carefully when monitoring maritime disputes in the South China Sea. (Rahman Roslan/Getty Images)

Summary

China's activities in the eastern part of the South China Sea have garnered a lot of attention. Around the Paracel and Spratly islands, the United States, Japan and regional partners (primarily Vietnam and the Philippines) are expanding security cooperation to counter China's growing naval presence. But in the sea's south, China's relationships with Indonesia and Malaysia have largely been unexplored. Though not as dramatic as maneuvers in the east, developments in the south offer a more holistic picture of the maritime trade, energy flows and resource use — especially fishing — that define disputes in the South China Sea.

Analysis

Two Chinese vessels prevented an Indonesian patrol boat from impounding a Chinese fishing vessel near the Natuna Islands on March 19. Indonesia claims the vessel was trespassing in its exclusive economic zone, but China asserts that the area is its traditional fishing ground. Though Indonesian authorities failed to impound the ship, they did arrest the fishermen. Officials also threatened to appeal to an international court of arbitration and respond to future incidents with larger vessels.

In a similar event March 25, about 100 Chinese fishing boats were detected allegedly encroaching on waters near the Luconia Shoals, which Malaysia administers but China claims. Two Chinese coast guard vessels were reportedly guarding the fishing boats. Malaysia's navy monitored the situation, threatening legal action if the boats trespassed into its exclusive economic zone. But China's Foreign Ministry again reiterated Chinese fishing boats' rights to operate in the area.

These developments come ahead of a U.N. Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the Philippines' case to invalidate China's claims to disputed areas in the South China Sea, including the Scarborough Shoal. The ruling, expected sometime in 2016, will also clarify the legality of China's so-called nine-dash maritime line, which demarcates the country's perceived area of control in the South China Sea — and overlaps with Indonesia's and Malaysia's exclusive economic zones. China ultimately will not recognize the court's decision. Instead, it will use its surveying, construction and military activities, as well as its fishing activities — whether encouraged by the Chinese government or prompted by fishermen — to bolster its territorial claims ahead of the ruling, not only in the Scarborough Shoal and Spratly archipelago but also in the southern South China Sea.

Calmer Waters to the South

Indonesia and China do not have competing territorial claims in the South China Sea, and China recognizes Indonesia's sovereignty over the Natuna Islands. But because of the overlap in territory caused by China's nine-dash maritime line, the two countries have sparred over fishing rights. Indonesia launched a crackdown on illegal fishing in 2014 by sinking foreign vessels caught operating without permission. In 2015, the country destroyed an impounded Chinese fishing vessel. Earlier, in 2010 and 2013, it attempted to impound Chinese ships illegally fishing off the Natuna Islands, though Chinese maritime law enforcement vessels forced Indonesia to back off in both instances.

Yet China and Indonesia have managed to de-escalate tensions in these cases, and they will likely do so again this time. After all, China would rather contain the situation than push a country that perceives itself as a regional peacemaker to support the other countries opposing China's claims in the South China Sea. Moreover, Indonesia does not want to antagonize China while it expands maritime cooperation and economic ties with the Chinese government. Neither does Malaysia, which also seeks greater economic ties with China, despite territorial quarrels and spats over fishing rights with the country.

To the east, this civility is missing from feuds in the Paracels, the Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal. There, China is preparing for a larger U.S. and Japanese military role to assist the major contestants in their South China Sea disputes and to block China's rise as a naval power. The United States and Japan signed defense cooperation deals with the Philippines in 2014 and 2016, respectively. Japan has allowed for a transfer of military hardware to boost Philippine coast guard capabilities and is even considering signing a deal that would enable Japanese ships and planes to refuel and resupply in the Philippines. On March 18, Washington and Manila announced the five locations in the Philippines where U.S. forces will have access to bases, including two bases about 300 kilometers from the disputed Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal. The United States and Japan are also cooperating with Vietnam to develop its coast guard.

By comparison, U.S. and Japanese security and military connections with Indonesia and Malaysia are underdeveloped. Malaysia and Indonesia want it this way, mainly because neither wants to pick a side and risk jeopardizing its lucrative ties with China or exacerbating tensions in the South China Sea and the region.

Making Preparations Nonetheless

But China may have no choice but to expand into southern waters. From Beijing's perspective, its military presence in the Paracels and Spratlys is required to contend with the growing U.S. and Japanese activities and, more important, to emerge as a major naval power with global ambitions. China's maneuvers in the south are equally important, aimed at ensuring its access to fishing grounds, smooth trade and energy flows through maritime routes that traverse major choke points, patrolled and controlled by Indonesia and Malaysia (as well as Singapore). China knows all too well that either country could halt this traffic in case of a conflict.

And despite their more cordial ties with China, Malaysia and Indonesia will nevertheless protect their maritime and territorial rights. Their waters are not as overfished as those along China's coast, tempting Chinese fishermen to explore. China's need to find abundant fishing grounds, along with its expanded naval exercises and patrols in the south, will prompt stronger security ties between the United States, Japan and other countries. In the meantime, accidental or unplanned breaches by Chinese fishing vessels, which are generally not under tight government control, could lead to snap decisions and actions, sparking conflict in the region.

The United States and its regional partners will seek to rally support for a joint response against China's activities in the South China Sea, undertaking shared patrols, flyovers and other security measures. But, short of military intervention, they can do nothing to stop China's land reclamation, military and fishing activities. They could, and likely will, approach Indonesia and Malaysia, but these countries will be more cautious in challenging China. And Beijing will be preparing for these scenarios, too. It will push ahead with its military activities in the Paracel and Spratly islands, all the while deepening economic engagement with Indonesia and Malaysia to keep them from aligning against it in regional disagreements.

Crafty_Dog

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Philippines considering a submarine
« Reply #351 on: March 31, 2016, 05:53:58 AM »
China

China has moved from deploying weapons to a disputed South China Sea island to test-firing them, according to several reports. China recently tested a YJ-62 anti-ship cruise missile from Woody Island, claimed by both Vietnam and Taiwan. China also recently shipped surface-to-air missiles and an associated radar system to the island, as well as J-7 and J-11 fighter jets as part of what the U.S. has called the "militarization" of the South China Sea. Pentagon spokesman Peter Cook wouldn't confirm or deny the report, citing the sensitivity of intelligence issues.

Philippines

The Philippine military is considering whether to buy a submarine in its pursuit of a stronger military to hedge against the rise of China's territorial ambitions. President Benigno Aquino floated the prospect of a submarine force on Wednesday, citing the need to modernize the country's armed forces. The sub would be the first for the Philippines and likely an expensive purchase for the country's relatively small defense budget.

DougMacG

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US-China, Obama Faces a Tough Balancing Act Over South China Sea
« Reply #352 on: March 31, 2016, 09:21:55 AM »
This is especially hard when you have a US President who is uninformed, disengaged and unprincipled. 

I wonder how those daily briefings are going - that he missed on the Middle East...

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/asia/obama-xi-jinping-meeting-washington.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0

Obama Faces a Tough Balancing Act Over South China Sea

"Expectations that anything of substance will be accomplished in the 90-minute meeting between Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi are minimal."


G M

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Re: US-China, Obama Faces a Tough Balancing Act Over South China Sea
« Reply #353 on: March 31, 2016, 01:32:20 PM »
This is especially hard when you have a US President who is uninformed, disengaged and unprincipled. 

I wonder how those daily briefings are going - that he missed on the Middle East...

http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/30/world/asia/obama-xi-jinping-meeting-washington.html?ref=todayspaper&_r=0

Obama Faces a Tough Balancing Act Over South China Sea

"Expectations that anything of substance will be accomplished in the 90-minute meeting between Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi are minimal."



The Chinese are openly contemptuous of Buraq.


Crafty_Dog

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US finally getting excrement together?
« Reply #355 on: March 31, 2016, 08:29:02 PM »

Crafty_Dog

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Even POTH is waking up
« Reply #356 on: April 07, 2016, 05:18:26 AM »
Asian countries are increasingly pushing back against China’s sweeping territorial claims and bullying tactics in the South China Sea. On Sunday, a Japanese submarine made a port call in the Philippines for the first time in 15 years, a sign of growing security cooperation. Last week, Vietnam seized a Chinese ship for illegally entering its territorial waters, and Indonesia threatened to defend its own claims with F-16 fighter jets.

Meanwhile, President Obama used a meeting with President Xi Jinping last week to deliver what one administration official described as “a very direct and unvarnished earful” about how seriously Washington views China’s behavior. And on Monday the United States and the Philippines began annual war games that will certainly show that the Philippines can count on the United States to counter Beijing.

The South China Sea is rich in natural resources and serves as a vital waterway for $5 trillion in trade. The Chinese have been engaged in a campaign to transform contested reefs and rocks into artificial islands with airstrips and other military structures. This has alarmed neighboring countries, which have competing claims and fear that China will use these islands to interfere with navigation and other countries’ rights to fish and drill for oil and gas.
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One result of the rising friction is a new defense agreement that will allow the United States to station weapons and troops at five bases in the Philippines for the first time in more than 20 years. Another is a marked increase in regional military spending. The United States recently carried out two patrols by warships and aircraft into territory claimed by China and is planning a third.

The Philippines is challenging Beijing’s assertions of sovereignty over most of the South China Sea in the international arbitration court, and a decision is expected by the end of June. Although China ratified the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, guaranteeing unimpeded passage on the high seas for trade, fishing and oil exploration, it has refused to participate in the Philippine case. American officials worry that Beijing may reject the court ruling or even pre-emptively build up more islands.

The United States, which takes a neutral position on the competing claims, has pushed all countries, especially China, to stop militarizing land masses and adding to them. It has also promised to recognize the claims of whichever side wins the arbitration case. While there was no breakthrough in the Xi-Obama meeting, the Chinese president stressed his desire to work with the United States and “realize no conflicts or confrontation.” But some sort of confrontation seems increasingly likely as long as China refuses to resolve the maritime disputes peacefully.


G M

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Coiling spring-- good summary of China's strategy
« Reply #358 on: May 14, 2016, 06:37:02 AM »
http://qz.com/680123/beijing-is-setting-the-stage-for-war-in-the-south-china-sea/

I'm sure either 3AM Hillary or Littlefingers will handle this well.
« Last Edit: May 14, 2016, 04:55:22 PM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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Beijing rattling sabres at Taiwan
« Reply #359 on: May 16, 2016, 07:04:49 AM »
1992 Consensus called key to cross-Straits ties
By Peng Yining (China Daily)
Updated: 2016-05-07 07:37
CommentsPrintMailLargeMediumSmall
 1992 Consensus called key to cross-Straits ties
Taiwan's Democratic progessive party (DPP) leader Tsai Ing-wen attends to the talent competition of children with mental disabilities in Taiwan, file photo. [Photo/IC]

'Mainland won't tolerate any vagueness' on whether Tsai endorses one-China principle

A denial of the 1992 Consensus principle that Taiwan and the mainland are both parts of one China would change cross-Straits relations and cause the collapse of the political mutual trust and process of dialogue between the two sides, experts say.

"The island's new leader has to answer whether she endorses the 1992 Consensus - it's not an optional question," Li Yihu, head of Peking University's Taiwan Institute, said on Friday. "The new leader has to voice a clear position on this issue."

Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party, will assume the island's leadership on May 20 and deliver her inaugural speech.

"Cross-Straits relations have come to a turning point," said Li. "The mainland won't tolerate any vagueness regarding the Consensus."

In a front-page commentary on Thursday, People's Daily, the flagship newspaper of the Communist Party of China, stressed that not adhering to the 1992 Consensus constitutes sabotage of the common political foundation for cross-Straits ties.


According to the commentary, the development of cross-Straits relations in the past two decades has proved that the relations have a bright future with the endorsement of the Consensus. And without it, the peaceful development of the relations would be off course and could founder, it said.

"It is very rare for People's Daily to have a commentary like this on its front page," said Li. "The article shows the central leadership's firm position on this point. It's an official message and a powerful statement."


Li said the mainland has reiterated the importance of the Consensus and the serious consequences of not adhering to the principle.

"Economic loss is obvious, and the political impact would be inevitable," he said. "All the consequences would have to be borne by the Taiwan leadership."

But the island's new leader has been trying to skirt around the issue, said Ni Yongjie, deputy director of Shanghai's Taiwan Research Institute.

"Tsai did say she would prefer preserving the status quo. But without the Consensus, the status quo would not exist," he said, adding that Tsai could use the opportunity on May 20 to explicitly endorse the Consensus.

Zhu Songling, director of the Institute of Cross-Straits Relations at Beijing Union University, said the mainland has been unequivocal and has warned that further development of cross-Straits relations would be set back by its denial.

"Tsai's dodging of inquiries about her position on the Consensus is actually destroying cross-Straits ties," he said.

G M

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So much for the peaceful rise of China...
« Reply #360 on: May 16, 2016, 07:21:16 AM »
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTdOnDSPZ_Q

[youtube]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rTdOnDSPZ_Q[/youtube]

‎China‬'s ‪‎PLA‬ army enlists rap-style music video to recruit young soldiers

Published on May 2, 2016
The People's Liberation Army has released a rap-style music video filled with masculine lyrics and advanced weaponry in an attempt to attract more young people to join the military.
The song, called Battle Declaration, was posted on 81.cn, the PLA Daily's website, on Thursday. It is the first hip-hop video made by the PLA.
Previous PLA songs have been sung to the accompaniment of orchestral melodies, and their lyrics were carefully worded to avoid being too aggressive. By comparison, Battle Declaration, in an unmistakable effort to cater to the taste of young people, features a popular hip-hop style, and the lyrics hide neither combativeness nor a desire to fight.
The video starts with a young PLA soldier touching his uniform and putting on his cap. Then a man's voice comes in and says, "There are always missions in soldiers' minds, enemies in their eyes, responsibilities on their shoulders, and passions in their hearts."
The song then continues: "There could be a war at any time. Are you ready for that?"
The video shows soldiers training and exercising, fighter jets conducting dogfights and missiles being fired, among other military activities.
Almost all of the PLA's best weaponry is displayed in the video, including the aircraft carrier Liaoning, J-11 fighter jet, Type-99A tank and DF-11 ballistic missile.
Satellites and spacecraft also appear in the video, which indicates the PLA has placed unprecedented importance on its space force, said a PLA publicity expert who asked to be identified only as Jiao.
Moreover, the appearance of the military's space assets also intends to impress upon viewers that "the PLA is no longer the poorly equipped one that they saw from TV dramas, but a powerful force as modernized as the United States military," he told China Daily.
Jiao said the hip-hop video could be a big help in recruiting young people.
The PLA is striving to recruit more educated young people. An increasing number of media reports say some young people spare no efforts to avoid military service.
Colonel Wu Qian, a spokesman for the Defense Ministry, said at a news conference on Thursday that a man's youth is not only about being cool, but also about being responsible for the nation and its security.

G M

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Trump’s nuclear arson in Asia: Spengler
« Reply #361 on: May 16, 2016, 07:26:20 AM »
http://atimes.com/2016/05/trumps-nuclear-arson-in-asia/

Trump’s nuclear arson in Asia: Spengler

BY DAVID P. GOLDMAN on MAY 3, 2016 in AT TOP WRITERS, CHINA, DAVID P. GOLDMAN, JAPAN, KOREAS, SPENGLER
Late last year I spent some time with a former chief of China’s military intelligence, a bruiser with an ax to grind against the United States. Halfway through a long tirade about America’s alleged abuse of its global power, he interrupted himself and said: “There’s one thing we appreciate about America, though. You keep the Japanese away from us.”

Some Asian countries abhor American power, some like it, and some live with it reluctantly. But they all have one thing in common: They trust the United States of America more than they trust each other. There’s no regional balance-of-power arrangement that could replace America as a strategic buffer.

That’s why Donald Trump’s April 29 suggestion that Japan and South Korea should acquire nuclear weapons was the craziest single statement on foreign policy of any major American presidential candidate since the Second World War. “You have so many countries already — China, Pakistan, you have so many countries, Russia — you have so many countries right now that have them,” said Trump. “Now, wouldn’t you rather, in a certain sense, have Japan have nuclear weapons when North Korea has nuclear weapons?”

nuclear_blast

Trump’s April 29 foreign policy address made some good points, or rather points that would have been good if they had been in a different speech by a different candidate. But the core of the speech was Trump’s narcissistic claim that he would negotiate a “great deal” for the United States with its Russian and Chinese rivals. You don’t start negotiations by pouring gasoline around the conference table and flicking a cigarette lighter. Trump can’t un-ring that bell. Any negotiations he were to undertake in Asia would be a disaster.

The Japanese and South Koreans were horrified, with good reason. As CNN reported, “So high was the level of concern, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe felt the need to respond publicly, saying, ‘whoever will become the next president of the United States, the Japan-U.S. alliance is the cornerstone of Japan’s diplomacy.’ Japan remains the only country to have had nuclear weapons used against it and has had a non-nuclear policy and pacifist constitution since the end of World War II. Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida added, ‘It is impossible that Japan will arm itself with nuclear weapons.'”
Trump doesn’t read books, except the ghostwritten tomes that have appeared under his name, and probably doesn’t know that that the Japanese army killed about 25 million Chinese during the Second World War, the vast majority of them civilians. The scale of Japanese atrocities makes the mind reel, and China remains traumatized by the memory. Japan has never acknowledged the scale of its wartime misdeeds, unlike Germany. Japan and China fear each other and take extraordinary measures to keep provocation below the threshold of danger. As Kyle Mizokami wrote in The National Interest:
It is perhaps China’s greatest nightmare: a nuclear-armed Japan. Permanently anchored off the Asian mainland, bristling with nuclear weapons, a nuclear Japan would make China’s security situation much more complex than it is now, and force China to revise both its nuclear doctrine and increase its nuclear arsenal. To be perfectly clear, Japan has no intention of building nuclear weapons. In fact, it has a strong aversion to nukes, having been the only country to actually be on the receiving end of a nuclear strike on its cities. Japan’s strategic situation would have to grow very dire for it to undertake such a drastic and expensive option. At the same time, China has no interest in provoking Japan into building them. China’s nuclear “no first use” policy is in part aimed at reassuring Japan that, unless it were attacked first with nuclear weapons, it will not use them in wartime.
China grudgingly respects the United States for acting as a superpower in East Asia. By keeping Japan under the American strategic umbrella, Washington in effect told China that it did not have to prepare for war with Japan. Trump has now told China to prepare for a nuclear-armed Japan.

Trump understands nothing about China.  “China respects strength and by letting them take advantage of us economically, which they are doing like never before, we have lost all of their respect,” he said on April 29. The merits of this claim are beside the point (China’s real effective exchange rate has risen by 40% since 2009, not fallen as Trump alleged). China’s first three priorities are security, security, and security. Its economy comes far down the list. If China believes that it faces an existential threat by the adversary that devastated it between 1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, and 1945, when America won the Pacific war, it will make any sacrifice it thinks necessary in order to prevail.

China has invested massively in its strategic forces, including carrier-killer surface-to-ship missiles, satellite-killer missiles, ultra-quiet diesel electric submarines, a new generation of ICBM’s, as well as cyber war capabilities. Trump presumably would threaten to restrict Chinese exports; China would respond by massively shifting resources to its military sector. America’s interest lies in persuading China that it can feel security within its borders without projecting power in such a way as to destabilize the region around it, as it threatens to do by constructing artificial islands for military use in the South China Sea. The worst possible thing would be to introduce the wild card of a Japanese nuclear threat into the discussion.
Beijing will never believe that Trump is merely a blithering, blathering ignoramus. In China’s imperial system, every public statement is weighed carefully, for words cannot be retracted. The Chinese will remember that Trump proposed to put nuclear weapons into the hands of the Japanese and treat him as a dangerous enemy. And the consequences for Asian and American security will be dire.

The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of Asia Times.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #362 on: May 16, 2016, 07:33:09 AM »
Or it might realize it might be a good idea to start working to restrain the Norks and to start respecting international law in the South China Sea.

Thanks in great part to the Obama-Kerry-supported by Hillary Iran nuke deal, the era of nuclear non-proliferation is over.  Thanks too to Obama-Clinton, the US's ability to lead world wide Pax Americana to the benefit of all (most certainly including China) is over.

Throw in the Norks going nuke, and well , , , the facts have changed and thus too our strategy must change.

« Last Edit: May 16, 2016, 07:35:39 AM by Crafty_Dog »

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #363 on: May 16, 2016, 07:36:42 AM »
Or it might realize it might be a good idea to start working to restrain the Norks and to start respecting international law in the South China Sea.


I have a HUMINT source that says that things feel very unstable in China right now. Reminded of the Cultural Revolution at the start.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #364 on: May 16, 2016, 07:44:29 AM »
So, if I was Xi Jinping, and feeling threatened by internal strife, I wait until the Hilderbeast is sworn in, then through diplomatic channels let it be know that China does indeed have ALL her emails, and if she makes one peep about the reunification with the renegade province, or a confrontation with Japan or other asian parties, it all gets dumped online.

If things get bad enough, fast enough, then they just say fcuk it, Obama is a P*ssy and go for broke.

DougMacG

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Re: Beijing rattling sabres at Taiwan
« Reply #365 on: May 16, 2016, 07:50:59 AM »
This must be one of the most Orwellian concepts of our time, that the PRC is a world and US recognized country and Taiwan is not.  "We" favor 'reunification', a one-China policy, and yet that is perhaps our biggest fear in the world.  Pres. Obama would bring America to Taiwan's side militarily in an invasion, why?  To preserve freedom?  To fight against rule by executive orders?  To oppose the big hand of government?  Because an invasion would have crossed his "red line"??

Maybe big-talk, 'little fingers' can break through the political correctness without starting a world war.

The median household income is three time higher in Taiwan than China.  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Median_income
http://www.forbes.com/sites/moneybuilder/2010/06/24/one-big-difference-between-chinese-and-american-households-debt/

Economically, wouldn't it make more sense for Taiwan (or Hong Kong) to take over China?

Who would want to do what's in the people's best interests when you have a politburo, central planning committee designing 'smart growth' that knows what's best for you?  (Like Venezuela, reminds me of here...)

Speaking of openness, freedom and self-determination that we don't seem to favor, I wonder how the next Chexit (China exit) vote will go in the various provinces...

And I wonder how our freedom and independence would be coming along by now had we not had outside help in the 1700s.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #366 on: May 16, 2016, 08:06:34 AM »
I doubt "Littlefingers" could tell you which Korea is an ally and which is an enemy.


Crafty_Dog

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2 articles: Glick, Spengler: South China Sea is Lost
« Reply #368 on: May 23, 2016, 09:32:34 AM »

1)  SPENGLER:  http://atimes.com/2016/05/americas-instructive-humiliation-in-the-south-china-sea/

 America’s instructive humiliation in the South China Sea: Spengler

By David P. Goldman on May 20, 2016 in AT Top Writers, China, David P. Goldman, Southeast Asia, Spengler   

“Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should: We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good,” wrote Rudyard Kipling in 1902 after the Boers humiliated the British Army in the first round of the Boer War. America should express the same gratitude towards China, which has humiliated America in the South China Sea. By exposing American weakness without firing a shot, Beijing has taught Washington a lesson which the next administration should take to heart.

Last year I asked a ranking Pentagon planner what America would do about China’s ship-killer missiles, which reportedly can sink an aircraft carrier a couple of hundred miles from its coast. If China wants to deny the American navy access to the South China Sea, the official replied, we can do the same: persuade Japan to manufacture surface-to-ship missiles and station them in the Philippines.

It didn’t occur to Washington that the Philippines might not want to take on China. The country’s president-elect Rodrigo Duterte explained last year (as David Feith reported in the Wall Street Journal), “America would never die for us. If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened … America is afraid to go to war. We’re better off making friends with China.”

statue_planet

It isn’t only the Philippines who see the obvious. China claims the support of 40 countries for its position that territorial claims to the South China Sea should be resolved by direct negotiations between individual countries, rather than before a United Nations tribunal constituted under the UN Convention on Law of the Seas, as Washington wants. A joint statement by the foreign ministers of China, Russia and India after a meeting in Moscow last month supported China’s position.

The 7th Fleet was the eight-hundred-pound gorilla in the South China Sea after World War II, relying on a weapons system now more than nine decades old, namely the aircraft carrier. That was before China fielded its DF-21 “carrier killer” surface-to-ship missile. The latest iteration of the missile, designated DF-26, reportedly has a range of 2,500 miles. New technologies, including lasers and rail guns, might defeat the new Chinese missiles, but a great deal of investment would be required to make them practical, as a January report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies argued.
DF-26 missiles at 2015 WWII victory parade in Beijing

DF-26 missiles at 2015 WWII victory parade in Beijing

The new generation of diesel-electric submarines first launched by Germany in the early 1980s, moreover, is quiet enough to evade sonar. Diesel electric subs “sank” American carriers in NATO exercises. Even without its surface-to-ship missiles, which can swamp existing defenses of US vessels, China’s stealth submarines can sink American carriers, and anything else that floats.

Perhaps a greater concern is the next generation of Russian air defense, the new S-500 anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems might make the American F-35 stealth fighter obsolete before it becomes operational. Writing in The National Interest, Dave Majumdar warns that the new Russian systems are “so capable that many US defense officials worry that even stealth warplanes like the F-22, F-35 and the B-2 might have problems overcoming them.” Pentagon officials think that the present generation of Russian anti-aircraft missiles embodied in the S-400 can overcome the jamming capabilities of existing F-16’s. Once Russia put a few S-400 systems on the back of trucks in Syria, it owned the skies over the Levant. The Pentagon doesn’t want to find out how good it is.

Russian commentator Andrei Akulov details the alleged superiority of the S-500, due for deployment next year:

    The S-500 is expected to be much more capable than the current S-400 Triumph.

    For instance, its response time is only 3-4 seconds (for comparison, the response time of S-400 is nine to ten seconds).

    The S-500 is able to detect and simultaneously attack (as well as make speeds of up to 4.3 miles per second) up to ten ballistic missile warheads out at 600 km flying at speeds of twenty-three thousand feet per second.

    Prometey can engage targets at altitudes of about 125 miles, including incoming ballistic missiles in space at ranges as great as 400 miles.

Akulov concludes, “It’s not often that a relatively inexpensive air defense weapon is able to make a trillion dollar fighter program obsolete. That’s exactly what the S-500 missile system will do to US brand new F-35 stealth fighter.”
US F-35

US F-35

China and Russia have narrowed the technology gap with the United States, and in some instances have probably leapfrogged America’s military. In the past, the United States responded to such circumstances (for example the Russian Sputnik launch of 1957) by pouring resources into defense R&D at national laboratories, universities and private industries. Instead, Washington today is spending the lion’s share of a dwindling defense budget on systems that may not work at all.

At an estimated lifetime cost of $1.5 trillion, the F-35 is the costliest weapons system in American history. Even before a myriad of technical problems delayed its deployment, Pentagon planners warned that the flawed aircraft would degrade US defenses by consuming most of the Pentagon’s research and development budget. A still-classified report signed by several four-star generals was handed to President George W. Bush midway-through his second term warning of this baleful outcome. Bush ignored it. Former Air Force official Jed Babbin detailed the aircraft’s flaws in the Washington Times last year, concluding, “The F-35 program is an example of how weapons shouldn’t be bought. It needs to be stopped in its tracks.”

Those are the facts on the ground (as well as the air and sea). It’s not surprising that America’s allies in Asia want an accommodation with China. Nothing short of a Reaganesque effort to restore America’s technological edge will change this.

The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of Asia Times.

(Copyright 2016 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)


=======================

2)  GLICK

China took over the Spratly Islands, and with them, the South China Sea last week. Due to the fact that the US has scrapped the navy, spent in excess of a trillion dollars on the F-35 that still isn't operational, and devoted its attentions to making the military friendly to men who prefer dresses, in the face of China's move, the US has no options. It has been checkmated.

This means that the US has lost the South China Sea to China, and with it, its dominant position that it has held since World War II.

This is the biggest story of the decade from the perspective of global security and US national security. And yet, there has been almost no coverage of the event, no coverage of the significance of China's action. There has been no notable discussion of what this means for US-China trade, what it means for the alliance structure the US built in the far East with Japan and South Korea.

There are two main reasons for the silence.

First, as Ben Rhodes said so contemptuously, most reporters don't know anything international affairs. And so they cannot fathom the significance of the massive changes taking place in the global arena. They are simply too stupid or ignorant or ideologically driven to adequately cover their subjects and their editors are too stupid' politically motivated or driven by internet ads to understand why it is important to publish stories that have nothing to do with Beyonce or Bruce Jenner in a dress.

The other reason there has been no discussion of this massive loss of US power is because the White House doesn't want to discuss it. Obama has marketed himself as a genius. His pivot to Asia, was brilliant. His plan to apologize to the Japanese for the nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki which put an end to World War II and saved the lives of an estimated 1 million American soldiers, is the last word in 21st century statecraft.

It wouldn't do for the public to be made aware of the fact that Obama's imbecilic stewardship of US-Asian relations has led to China emergence as the predominant power in Asia at America's expense.

And since in the echo chamber, the Blob reports what Ben Rhodes and Obama tell them to report, there has been radio silence.

For more information read my friend David Goldman's story linked in the first response. 
============================================================

 America’s instructive humiliation in the South China Sea: Spengler

By David P. Goldman on May 20, 2016 in AT Top Writers, China, David P. Goldman, Southeast Asia, Spengler   

“Let us admit it fairly, as a business people should: We have had no end of a lesson: it will do us no end of good,” wrote Rudyard Kipling in 1902 after the Boers humiliated the British Army in the first round of the Boer War. America should express the same gratitude towards China, which has humiliated America in the South China Sea. By exposing American weakness without firing a shot, Beijing has taught Washington a lesson which the next administration should take to heart.

Last year I asked a ranking Pentagon planner what America would do about China’s ship-killer missiles, which reportedly can sink an aircraft carrier a couple of hundred miles from its coast. If China wants to deny the American navy access to the South China Sea, the official replied, we can do the same: persuade Japan to manufacture surface-to-ship missiles and station them in the Philippines.

It didn’t occur to Washington that the Philippines might not want to take on China. The country’s president-elect Rodrigo Duterte explained last year (as David Feith reported in the Wall Street Journal), “America would never die for us. If America cared, it would have sent its aircraft carriers and missile frigates the moment China started reclaiming land in contested territory, but no such thing happened … America is afraid to go to war. We’re better off making friends with China.”

statue_planet

It isn’t only the Philippines who see the obvious. China claims the support of 40 countries for its position that territorial claims to the South China Sea should be resolved by direct negotiations between individual countries, rather than before a United Nations tribunal constituted under the UN Convention on Law of the Seas, as Washington wants. A joint statement by the foreign ministers of China, Russia and India after a meeting in Moscow last month supported China’s position.

The 7th Fleet was the eight-hundred-pound gorilla in the South China Sea after World War II, relying on a weapons system now more than nine decades old, namely the aircraft carrier. That was before China fielded its DF-21 “carrier killer” surface-to-ship missile. The latest iteration of the missile, designated DF-26, reportedly has a range of 2,500 miles. New technologies, including lasers and rail guns, might defeat the new Chinese missiles, but a great deal of investment would be required to make them practical, as a January report from the Center for Strategic and International Studies argued.
DF-26 missiles at 2015 WWII victory parade in Beijing

DF-26 missiles at 2015 WWII victory parade in Beijing

The new generation of diesel-electric submarines first launched by Germany in the early 1980s, moreover, is quiet enough to evade sonar. Diesel electric subs “sank” American carriers in NATO exercises. Even without its surface-to-ship missiles, which can swamp existing defenses of US vessels, China’s stealth submarines can sink American carriers, and anything else that floats.

Perhaps a greater concern is the next generation of Russian air defense, the new S-500 anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems might make the American F-35 stealth fighter obsolete before it becomes operational. Writing in The National Interest, Dave Majumdar warns that the new Russian systems are “so capable that many US defense officials worry that even stealth warplanes like the F-22, F-35 and the B-2 might have problems overcoming them.” Pentagon officials think that the present generation of Russian anti-aircraft missiles embodied in the S-400 can overcome the jamming capabilities of existing F-16’s. Once Russia put a few S-400 systems on the back of trucks in Syria, it owned the skies over the Levant. The Pentagon doesn’t want to find out how good it is.

Russian commentator Andrei Akulov details the alleged superiority of the S-500, due for deployment next year:

    The S-500 is expected to be much more capable than the current S-400 Triumph.

    For instance, its response time is only 3-4 seconds (for comparison, the response time of S-400 is nine to ten seconds).

    The S-500 is able to detect and simultaneously attack (as well as make speeds of up to 4.3 miles per second) up to ten ballistic missile warheads out at 600 km flying at speeds of twenty-three thousand feet per second.

    Prometey can engage targets at altitudes of about 125 miles, including incoming ballistic missiles in space at ranges as great as 400 miles.

Akulov concludes, “It’s not often that a relatively inexpensive air defense weapon is able to make a trillion dollar fighter program obsolete. That’s exactly what the S-500 missile system will do to US brand new F-35 stealth fighter.”
US F-35

US F-35

China and Russia have narrowed the technology gap with the United States, and in some instances have probably leapfrogged America’s military. In the past, the United States responded to such circumstances (for example the Russian Sputnik launch of 1957) by pouring resources into defense R&D at national laboratories, universities and private industries. Instead, Washington today is spending the lion’s share of a dwindling defense budget on systems that may not work at all.

At an estimated lifetime cost of $1.5 trillion, the F-35 is the costliest weapons system in American history. Even before a myriad of technical problems delayed its deployment, Pentagon planners warned that the flawed aircraft would degrade US defenses by consuming most of the Pentagon’s research and development budget. A still-classified report signed by several four-star generals was handed to President George W. Bush midway-through his second term warning of this baleful outcome. Bush ignored it. Former Air Force official Jed Babbin detailed the aircraft’s flaws in the Washington Times last year, concluding, “The F-35 program is an example of how weapons shouldn’t be bought. It needs to be stopped in its tracks.”

Those are the facts on the ground (as well as the air and sea). It’s not surprising that America’s allies in Asia want an accommodation with China. Nothing short of a Reaganesque effort to restore America’s technological edge will change this.

The opinions expressed in this column are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the view of Asia Times.

(Copyright 2016 Asia Times Holdings Limited, a duly registered Hong Kong company. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #369 on: May 23, 2016, 09:36:18 AM »
Who could have seen this coming?

Re: POTH: US demands Chinese block cyberattacks
« Reply #200 on: March 12, 2013, 06:43:15 PM »

 rolleyes

As China works to turn the Pacific into their lake, they'll seriously consider our protests.

 rolleyes
« Last Edit: May 23, 2016, 09:38:05 AM by G M »

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Re: South China Sea is Lost, The Singapore to Taiwan Sea
« Reply #370 on: May 23, 2016, 10:20:05 AM »
Leftists since Rules for Radicals have known that those who control the language control the issue.  Why doesn't the man who renamed Mt. McKinley rename the South formerly China Sea?

My suggestion:  The Singapore to Taiwan Sea. 

Other ideas: The Sea of Freedom or the Sea of Deposed Communist Leaders.

Is he courageous enough to stand up to Americans but not to the Chinese?

G M

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Re: South China Sea is Lost, The Singapore to Taiwan Sea
« Reply #371 on: May 23, 2016, 10:24:31 AM »
Leftists since Rules for Radicals have known that those who control the language control the issue.  Why doesn't the man who renamed Mt. McKinley rename the South formerly China Sea?

My suggestion:  The Singapore to Taiwan Sea. 

Other ideas: The Sea of Freedom or the Sea of Deposed Communist Leaders.

Is he courageous enough to stand up to Americans but not to the Chinese?

Yes. traditional Americans, and Churchill's bust are the only enemies in Obama's worldview.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #372 on: May 25, 2016, 04:38:05 PM »
Remember at the end of WW 2 how Japan's largest in the world battleships were sunk in minutes in the battle of Midway. 

Could not some missiles do the same thing with carriers?  Some experts think so:

http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/26/china-dongfeng-21d-missile-us-aircraft-carrier-427063.html

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #373 on: May 25, 2016, 05:56:47 PM »
Remember at the end of WW 2 how Japan's largest in the world battleships were sunk in minutes in the battle of Midway. 

Could not some missiles do the same thing with carriers?  Some experts think so:

http://www.newsweek.com/2016/02/26/china-dongfeng-21d-missile-us-aircraft-carrier-427063.html

The Chinese will toast our electrical grid long before it gets to sinking carrier groups.

Crafty_Dog

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #374 on: May 25, 2016, 10:40:13 PM »
My response on FB to Big Dog in response to his piece:

Sorry, as the serious read it is, it took me a few days to get to it. Certainly a very interesting piece, but IMHO entirely too sanguine.

For example, it suggests that China lacks the motivation to create the infrastructures necessary for being a true superpower that the US had in its adversary of the Soviet Empire.

1) China is a fascist state and does not need the assent of the people as we do here;
2) As a fascist state with a military deep in the political power structure with deep internal contradictions (both economic and demographic, foreign adventurism will have great appeal.

The piece does not even consider the slow moving Russian invasion of East Europe or its expansionism into the Arctic; the end of the era of nuclear non-proliferation; the 4th Generation War with Islamic Fascism; the likelihood of Europe to cease being what it has been-- perhaps via Balkanization; the impending financial crisis of the US government; the diminished hollowed out state of the US military, etc etc.

Instead it compares who is generating more patents. Relevant I suppose, but with the Chinese stealing out trade secrets and ignoring our patent rights to our face, just how significant is that really?

Nonetheless the piece does make many interesting points and I thank you for it.

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #375 on: May 26, 2016, 08:06:20 AM »
Nice response.

"...it compares who is generating more patents. Relevant I suppose, but with the Chinese stealing out trade secrets and ignoring our patent rights to our face, just how significant is that really?"

Within that observation is the fact they are actively conducting cyber warfare against us.  so... we aren't driving our innovation forward at all like we could be while they are catching and passing us in terms of raw size of the economy.  They are more motivated militarily, less restrained and have far more manpower available.  Project that forward and they can have twice the arsenal and fleet based on our last years' technology, while ours at half the size will also be based on last years' technology.

It comes back to a previous point, the constraint they face now seems to be business relations, not fear of President Obama led military response. 

To me, this rivalry isn't about China who has its own problems.  It is about unleashing America's economic growth engine if we don't want others to surpass us economically, technologically, militarily or to simply implode from within.

ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #376 on: May 26, 2016, 08:37:27 AM »
The weapons systems are too damn expensive.  We have read numerous times how billions goes down the  money hole  .  The projects are always years behind schedule.

The one read they don't work .  I dunno.  The new destroyer ship was just accused of being somewhat unstable at sea.

13 billion aircraft carriers can be sunk with a missile worth in the millions.

As GM reminds us .  The Chinese appear to have the capacity to simply shut our grid down.

We don't even spend the estimate couple of billion to protect much of our electronic infrastructure from an EMP.

I would like to hear more from members of the intelligence and armed services committees in Congress and the Senate.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #377 on: May 26, 2016, 05:12:13 PM »
"As GM reminds us, the Chinese appear to have the capacity to simply shut our grid down."

THIS.

We too can shut down theirs I believe but the consequences for us would be many, many, many times worse.

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #379 on: June 01, 2016, 06:39:51 PM »
Didn't they try this once already?

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #380 on: June 01, 2016, 06:45:45 PM »
Didn't they try this once already?

http://atimes.com/2016/03/the-strategy-behind-chinas-adiz-in-the-east-china-sea/

The strategy behind China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea
BY HARRY KAZIANIS on MARCH 17, 2016 in ASIA TIMES NEWS & FEATURES, CHINA
While the world wonders whether the People’s Republic of China is taking incremental steps towards establishing an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in the South China Sea, detailed analysis of Beijing’s already established ADIZ in the East China Sea seems to point to an interesting conclusion: it may not be actively enforcing the zone and it could be part of a sophisticated “bargaining” strategy.

The above concept — and many other interesting conclusions detailing the declared East China Sea ADIZ along with an exploration of a possible South China Sea ADIZ — are part of a new report released by the US-China Economic and Security Review titled “ADIZ Update: Enforcement in the East China Sea, Prospects for the South China Sea, and Implications for the United States.”

The idea that Beijing might not be enforcing its ADIZ in the East China Sea is not entirely new. Indeed, Japanese scholars and retired defense officials on the sidelines of conferences I have personally attended over the last several years have also said as much. One prominent retired Japanese Defense Force official at a conference I attended in 2014 called it “An ADIZ on paper only.”

Chinese Su-27 fighters
Chinese Su-27 fighters can hit targets in East China Sea.
Reinforcing such ideas to a wider audience, the report nicely pulls together various strands of evidence of why China declared the zone and the reasons why enforcement today would be difficult — even with untold billions of dollars spent to modernize Beijing’s armed forces.

No integrated command

The report points out two big shortcoming China would need to overcome militarily. The first is the issue of command structure, something often overlooked. As the report explains:

“China is moving toward greater jointness in the administration of its ADIZ. China has established a joint operations command center (JOCC) in the East China Sea.  A May 2015 report from Kanwa Defense Review—a magazine focused on Chinese defense issues—suggests the JOCC integrates People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Air Force, Navy aviation, and Army aviation forces. Administering the ADIZ through a JOCC would facilitate the integration of radar data and the coordination of interceptors. It is unclear when China established its East China Sea JOCC. China previously may have lacked an integrated command center for the administration of its ADIZ, which may have hampered China’s ability to identify, track, and intercept foreign military aircraft.”

Radar lacking?

The second is important radar infrastructure, which could be lacking — and points to greater problems in maritime and air domain awareness:

“China’s network of land-based radar systems probably is broadly capable of tracking aircraft in its ADIZ, although some analysts suggest its effectiveness may suffer from a gap in coverage resulting from a division of radar assets between the PLA Air Force and PLA Navy. In addition to its land-based radar systems, China has more than a dozen airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft that could increase the PLA’s monitoring capabilities. It is unclear to what extent AEW&C aircraft are integrated into China’s ADIZ enforcement operations. A PLA Daily report from January 2014 indicated China planned to keep at least one AEW&C aircraft available at all times to support the ADIZ.”

Rely on ‘ratchet effect’

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands claimed by Japan and China
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands claimed by both Japan and China.
So if China may not have the full capability of enforcing an ADIZ over the East China Sea, why make such a declaration in the first place? Here, the report, citing research by the always smart US Congressional Research Service, points out that:

“[China] may be seeking to advance its position [in the East China Sea] over the long term after a short spike in tension, leaving a new status quo with the East China Sea ADIZ in place. [China] would acquire strategic advantage by asserting a maximalist position, then seeming to back down, while preserving some incremental gain — akin to a ‘ratchet’ effect. According to this theory, [China] would project a calm image and justify the East China Sea ADIZ as a ‘reasonable’ step to which foreign nations should not object. If there is an accident, crisis, or loss of life, Beijing could then blame Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei, or Washington.”

In other words, China seemingly asserts itself with the strongest of possible negotiating positions — that of a grand ADIZ in the East China Sea, laying down the largest of markers possible in the contested space above the Senkaku Islands. Publicly, and most likely for purposes of domestic politics, Beijing can take a very hard line towards its long-time rival Japan. It has the option of enforcing the zone selectively, just as Beijing sends various types of naval vessels near the Senkakus to enforce its claims on the water, having the ability to ratchet up or down the level of activity as it desires.

South China replay?

In times of lowered tensions or when it so wishes, Beijing could announce it is easing restrictions in its ADIZ, all in an effort to show it is pursuing a so-called “restrained” approach. Or it could offer to ease restrictions as part of a bilateral negotiation with Japan — say limiting its ADIZ to just military and not civilian aircraft. But as time passes, and as China’s military prowess increases, it can slowly (if it so chooses), enforce the zone with greater confidence — if accurate, a very smart strategy indeed. In fact, China loses nothing with declaring an ADIZ it may have difficulty enforcing and looks strong, while Japan, South Korea and the United States all scramble to react and look weak — as many perceived was as the case in late 2013.

And this would all have repercussions in the South China Sea. Beijing could take this same approach, declaring an ADIZ in the months or years to come, using the same playbook as described above. Indeed, with China building islands in the South China Sea — with new airfields being a big part of this approach along with radar sites and anti-aircraft batteries — Beijing may already be on its way towards implementing such an approach.

Harry Kazianis (@grecianformula) is a non-resident Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest , a non-resident Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute as well as a fellow for National Security Affairs at the Potomac Foundation.  He is the former Executive Editor of The National Interest and former Editor-In-Chief of The Diplomat. The views expressed are his own.



ccp

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #383 on: June 04, 2016, 12:41:45 PM »
working with China to improve security in Asia........ :cry: :x
But China IS the security threat.

Like making pals with Iran.  

Can we be friends?  Can we be friends?  can we be friends?
With Pepsi generation music in background.

Why this is so beautiful.  I wish I could have thought of this.

So wise and smart.  So able to see beyond the rancor.  God what genius....

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #384 on: June 04, 2016, 01:25:36 PM »
working with China to improve security in Asia........ :cry: :x
But China IS the security threat.

Like making pals with Iran.  
Can we be friends?  Can we be friends?  can we be friends?
With Pepsi generation music in background.
Why this is so beautiful.  I wish I could have thought of this.
So wise and smart.  So able to see beyond the rancor.  God what genius....

China is our friend, our rival, our partner AND our enemy.  This would be tricky situation to deal with even if we were trying to act in our own best interests.

As our "friend", they won't lift a finger to stop North Korea, and keep building up their fleet, bases and intentions in the Taiwan to Singapore Sea.

As our enemy, they have neglected to take action against little Taiwan for all these years even knowing Obama would do nothing to stop them.  Something is stopping them.

As our (economic) partner, they are susceptible to us sneezing over here.  If our economy was roaring right now, their own economic growth would have been maintained.  The worst thing we can do hurt them would be to elect 4 more years of stagnation and decline at home.  It is hurting all of the rest of the world.

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #385 on: June 04, 2016, 01:40:20 PM »

"As our enemy, they have neglected to take action against little Taiwan for all these years even knowing Obama would do nothing to stop them.  Something is stopping them."

If they move on Taiwan and fail, it would quite possibly topple the CCP from power.

DougMacG

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #386 on: June 04, 2016, 02:56:45 PM »
"As our enemy, they have neglected to take action against little Taiwan for all these years even knowing Obama would do nothing to stop them.  Something is stopping them."
If they move on Taiwan and fail, it would quite possibly topple the CCP from power.

Failure might include having an unprovoked invasion become messy.  Quite interesting to ponder. 

Their main threat to power is from within.  Japan isn't going to take them again and the US isn't coming in.  If they start something they can't easily finish or that gives life to new dissent, perhaps other turmoil might develop.

The communist party knows one way to stay in power, maintain the status quo where political and physical oppression is offset with rising incomes for the masses. 

It has been a long time since protesters were massacred in Tiananmen Square, aka the "June Fourth Incident", 27 years ago today.  Does the ruling party have the will to do that today?  Probably yes.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiananmen_Square_protests_of_1989

G M

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #387 on: June 04, 2016, 03:03:12 PM »
As much money as Beijing puts into upgrading the PLA, PLAN, PLAAF, they put even more into the CCP's "Internal Security" entities. That is the CCP's biggest worry. The PLA and the "People's Armed Police" are trained and equipped to kill as many Chinese as needed to keep the CCP in power.


 

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Follow up to "Stratfor: China'r military reorganization"
« Reply #388 on: June 04, 2016, 03:07:45 PM »
http://dailysignal.com/2016/03/09/china-hikes-defense-budget-by-7-6-percent/

In December, the Chinese announced the establishment of three new services: a separate ground forces command; the elevation of the Second Artillery to the status of a service; and the creation of a separate service to control China’s space, electronic warfare, and computer network attack forces. Subsequently, the Central Military Commission was reorganized from four General Departments to 15 departments, commissions, and offices.

Finally, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has announced a transition from seven military regions to five theater or war zone joint commands. Coupled with the announcement of a 300,000-man cut in the size of the People’s Liberation Army made in September 2015, the PLA is clearly undergoing a massive, fundamental overhaul.

It is not clear why the Chinese defense budget increase was scaled back, although some analysts think it may reflect China’s slowing economy. It is worth noting, however, that the increase in the People’s Liberation Army budget is still substantially higher than the growth of any Western military.

It also remains to be seen how the growth in the Chinese external security budget (i.e., for the PLA) compares with that for internal security, including the People’s Armed Police (PAP) and provincial-level public security forces. For the past several years, the internal security budget has grown more quickly than the defense budget, to the point where overall spending on internal security may outpace that for external defense.
« Last Edit: June 04, 2016, 06:36:13 PM by Crafty_Dog »

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US Third Fleet to South China Sea?
« Reply #390 on: June 15, 2016, 08:40:32 AM »
By Paul McLeary with Adam Rawnsley

Bulking up. The U.S. Navy’s Third Fleet is moving out, and is sending ships to patrol the waters of the East China and South China seas. The deployment of more Navy vessels to bulk up the Japan-based U.S. Seventh Fleet likely will not sit well with Beijing, but “this is real. The commitment of the 3rd Fleet [operating] forward is real,” Adm. Scott Swift, the commander of the Pacific Fleet told Japan’s Nikkei Asian Review.

The San Diego-based Third Fleet has traditionally stayed close to the U.S., but Navy leaders say they need to widen the U.S. presence in East Asia. The Third's Pacific Surface Action Group -- including the guided-missile destroyers USS Spruance and USS Momsen -- already deployed to the region in April.

Swift added that the Navy needs to utilize the "total combined power" of the 200 ships and 1,200 aircraft that make up the entire Pacific Fleet, and that ships from the Third will regularly begin making the trips further west, as tensions between China and its neighbors continue to rise amid land reclamation projects, and fishing disputes, in the region.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: China's Future-- serious read
« Reply #391 on: June 27, 2016, 11:39:12 AM »
Analysis

Editor's Note: This is the next installment of an occasional series on China's transformation.

Between 1864 and 1871, something extraordinary happened in the heart of Europe. In three short wars, each following hot on the heels of the last, the Continent's great powers failed to unite to contain an ascendant Prussia. The failure to build a coalition against Prussia — during the Danish-Prussian War of 1864, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1871 — resulted in the unification of Germany under Prussian dominion in early 1871. A few decades later, Germany was the leading power on the European continent, rivaling Great Britain for influence in global economic and political affairs. Its power would continue to grow, virtually unchecked, until 1914. How it managed such a feat is important when considering China's ambitions today.

It is scarcely an overstatement, in light of later events, to suggest that Prussia's rise and eventual unification of Germany was a watershed in the history of modern international politics. Even at the time, it was understood by leading statesmen in Britain, Russia and France as a profound shift in the European balance of power — one that directly threatened their own position and interests. In short, few, if any, observers outside of Germany desired Prussia's rise, and well before Otto von Bismarck launched the first of the conquests that produced a unified German nation-state, Europe's leading figures expressed concern over, and even called for containing, Prussian expansionism. Why did these calls go largely unheeded? What prevented Europe from uniting to halt Prussia's rise?

Europe's failure to contain Prussia represents an enduring challenge for international relations theory, which generally expects balances of power to form organically and efficiently from competition among states. If there are exceptions to this theory, the real world implications are many, especially for rising powers such as China. Most international relations scholars regard states as rational actors bent on survival in a competitive and potentially dangerous strategic environment and therefore anticipate that as one or several states grow in wealth and military power, others will emerge to balance against them, either by encouraging domestic economic growth or by forming alliances with other threatened states. From this process, scholars argue, arise the equilibriums known as international balances of power. Only rarely, and for reasons that continue to puzzle both scholars and policymakers, do these stabilizing balances fail to form or function.

A Question of Agency

The story of Prussia's rise taps into fundamental questions of the relationship between structure and agency in international relations. Prussia's ability to skirt the formation of a balancing coalition by its European rivals forces us to consider how emerging powers sometimes succeed in overcoming or preventing efforts to contain them. But the significance of this event extends beyond the theoretical realm. For a country like China today, the Prussian advance offers lessons in the arts of subterfuge and manipulation in international politics. As they struggle to avoid concerted containment by the United States and its Asian allies, China's leaders would do well to consider the example of Prussia under Bismarck.

International politics is a complex affair. The factors that shape events are many and often lie beyond the control of individual leaders or institutions, including states. In Prussia's case, a combination of historical, geographic and demographic forces provided a powerful thrust for the construction of a German state. Prussian dominance also profited from the emergence of communication and transport technologies that made it feasible for people in distant locales to imagine themselves as part of a single nation. In China's case, a variety of structural factors help explain the developments of the past decade. For example, China's large and relatively well-educated populace, combined with the ready supply of capital from international markets and ravenous demand for cheap goods in the United States and Europe, lent enormous momentum to the country's post-Mao "Reform and Opening," creating conditions that facilitated China's rise in the decades that followed.

By the same token, one could point to numerous events in surrounding countries — intra-European power struggles and domestic politics in Britain, Russia and France in the 1860s, or in the United States today, for instance — to account for European powers' ineffective response to Prussia's rise, or for what might look like underwhelming progress in the U.S. "pivot" to Asia. Indeed, one could even argue that Britain, France and Russia failed to effectively balance against Prussia in the 1860s because they did not see it as a true threat, or that the U.S. pivot has remained relatively limited because China, in fact, poses little real or immediate threat to American interests in the region. After all, China is decades from being able to truly challenge U.S. military dominance in Asia, let alone globally, and faces immense risks domestically that could stall, or even undermine, its rise to regional pre-eminence.

But these explanations, though helpful and no doubt partly true, miss an important aspect of Prussia's story, and possibly of China's, too. In placing emphasis either on structural factors — geography, demography, technology — or on the unpredictable messiness of domestic politics in surrounding countries, they obfuscate the role that Prussian strategy and statecraft played in neutralizing unified opposition to its rise in the 1860s and the role that Chinese statecraft has had in hampering the formation of an effective U.S.-led coalition to constrain China today. In particular, they neglect the ways in which Prussia and arguably China struggled (and in important ways succeeded) to represent their rise as consistent with the status quo and concordant with the long-term interests and principles of the status quo's upholders. In Prussia's case, these efforts amounted to a rhetorical and diplomatic sleight of hand that, in making a persuasive case for the legitimacy of Prussia's claims and of their congruence with international norms, immobilized opposition to Prussian expansion just long enough for Bismarck to ensure Germany's unification and transformation into an industrial and military juggernaut.

Spinning Narratives

As the political scientist Stacie Goddard argues, Prussia deployed a mix of rhetorical strategies to legitimize its expansion in 1864, 1866 and 1871, often tailoring its claims to the specific interests of the countries it dealt with. For example, in its war with Denmark in 1864, Prussia mobilized Austrian support and ensured British and Russian noninterference by defending its actions as a way of upholding prior treaties and fending off incursion by the Danish — a move that spoke to conservative European powers' desire to preserve the post-Napoleonic legal and political order. At other times, Prussia appealed to the principle of national self-determination, framing itself as a liberator of German-speaking peoples in non-German territories to stave off criticism from democratic Britain and post-Revolution France — a strategy, as Goddard suggests, of "setting rhetorical traps" to neutralize potential opposition.

Taken together, Goddard argues, these strategies made it difficult for leaders in Britain and France to overcome their own mutual distrust of each other, leading to an inability to balance against Prussia or justify expending national resources on military containment, let alone marshaling domestic popular support for war. By presenting its rise as consistent with powerful norms such as national self-determination, sovereign freedom from external intervention, and the maintenance of treaties, Prussia succeeded in deterring full-scale containment by Europe's major powers. European leaders were aware, even frightened, of Prussia's rise — but they could not justify the expense and risks of coalescing to oppose it.

What lessons can China's leaders glean from Prussia's example? It can be argued that Beijing has already taken several cards from Bismarck's playbook. At a time when the United States and Europe flirt with concepts of humanitarian intervention and democracy promotion, China has proclaimed itself a staunch defender of national sovereignty and sovereign freedom from external intervention — powerful and appealing norms not only to countries liable to find themselves on the receiving end of U.S. interventionism but also to many within the United States and Europe. Likewise, China wields concepts such as "economic interdependence," "development" and "multipolarity" to temper overt criticism of its rise. Such terms also go some way to legitimize Beijing's policies in regions such as Central Asia and Africa — after all, it is difficult for U.S. policymakers on the global stage to openly decry a multipolar world, or to condemn interdependence and development outright. It is not surprising, against this backdrop, that China in 2004 reframed its "peaceful rise" in more politically neutral terms, as "peaceful development."

This is not to suggest that China's rhetorical strategies are always and perfectly successful, or to deny that many of its counterparts view such rhetoric as thin cover for naked self-interest. The crucial point is that regardless of China's intent, its actions have yet to provoke concerted, effective balancing by the United States and its allies. As noted above, this may merely reflect confused domestic politics in Washington or that the United States and its Asian allies have more pressing tasks. But these facts do not negate the important role that China's political and foreign policy rhetoric — and its generally low-key behavior in international bodies such as the United Nations — play in staving off more overt efforts at containment by the United States, Japan and others.

To be sure, the Prussian analogy has its limits. The events of the 1860s gain their meaning because we know what came after. In China's case, what may now look to some like a failure by the United States to balance against China's rise could look, five or 10 years from now, like wisdom on Washington's part. China may be best positioned among the United States' potential competitors to challenge American dominance in the coming decades, but it also faces immense political, social and economic challenges at home — challenges compounded by the country's extreme regional geographic and socio-economic imbalances. These are factors and forces that threaten to halt China's rise well before it becomes a tangible danger to U.S. interests. As Stratfor has observed, these challenges will likely come to a head in the next 5-10 years, beyond which it is unclear if the Communist Party government can survive, at least in a form recognizable today.

Nonetheless, China, despite mounting risks and recent stumbles, is growing more powerful. And as it does, the consequences of lethargy will increase for the countries whose interests and positions are directly threatened by China's rise. So, too, will Beijing need to avert containment — an effort that, if Prussia's example is any lesson, will require steadfast and effective defense of China's actions in ways that neutralize opposition by rivals and mobilize support from allies and domestic audiences elsewhere. If, like Prussia in the 1860s, China makes it through the next 10 years without provoking conspicuous balancing by the United States and its partners, it will undoubtedly have its rhetoric partly to thank.

Crafty_Dog

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Stratfor: US-Chinese naval cooperation in South China Sea
« Reply #392 on: July 09, 2016, 02:12:55 PM »
Forecast

    Though tension is rising in the South China Sea, it will not lead to a break in military ties between the United States and China.

    Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2016 will serve as a crucial venue for the U.S. and Chinese navies to practice common operational procedures and build relationships among personnel.

    China's military reform will somewhat disrupt the institutionalized channels of communication between the two as the organizational structure of the People's Liberation Army changes.

Analysis

The Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) biennial naval exercise is in full swing, and this year's has already proved to be an occasion of many firsts. Not only is RIMPAC 2016 the largest of its kind to date, but the navies of Denmark, Italy and Germany — none traditionally considered a Pacific power — are also making initial appearances in the exercise. Moreover, for the first time in RIMPAC's history, a non-American ship (in this case, a Singaporean frigate) led the multinational group comprising vessels from the United States, Japan, Indonesia and India from the Western Pacific to Hawaii, the site of the exercises. The move was a subtle message from Washington that it wants its Asian partners to take the lead in securing the region.

Yet despite these notable firsts, it is China's second showing at the exercise that is attracting the most attention. The relationship between Beijing and Washington has come under increasing strain in recent months amid Chinese displays of force and U.S. naval activity near Beijing's claims in the South China Sea. As tension between the two countries continues to mount, both will search for ways to avoid crises while managing those that do arise. Joint exercises such as RIMPAC 2016 may be just the answer they are looking for.

Lasting Imperatives Outweigh Temporary Friction

During the past few months, Beijing has heatedly opposed the U.S. role in the South China Sea, and in April it symbolically snubbed Washington by denying the USS John C. Stennis a visit to Hong Kong. In the lead-up to the June 3-5 Shangri-La Dialogue, one of Asia's biggest security summits, it was clear that the relationship between the two countries was on the rocks. Though Chinese state media outlets enthusiastically reported on meetings between lead Chinese delegate Adm. Sun Jianguo and dignitaries from at least eight other countries, they made no mention of talks between him and U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter or U.S. Pacific Command chief Adm. Harry Harris.

In fact, it was far from certain whether China would even be asked to attend RIMPAC 2016. In response to deteriorating ties, members of Congress and many U.S. think tanks pressured President Barack Obama to withdraw Beijing's invitation. But ultimately, Obama chose to prioritize maintaining close military ties with China, and Carter eventually announced that two U.S. Navy ships would sail from Guam alongside five Chinese warships on their way to the RIMPAC exercise.

Despite the diplomatic jabs the two countries have traded, they appear to have reached an understanding of sorts. Although each has immutable strategic goals that conflict with the other's, China and the United States agree that they need to manage their differences as well as they can to avoid a complete breakdown in ties — a development that, for two nuclear powers, would be disastrous. This mutual arrangement has been made possible in part by Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has shown greater receptiveness than his predecessor, Hu Jintao, to the idea of normalizing his country's military relationship with the United States. His positive approach was made clear in December 2015, when Washington's approval of a $1.83 billion arms sale to Taiwan provoked a pro forma response from Xi's administration, rather than the cutoff in military cooperation that was customary under Hu.

Indeed, the past year marked many milestones in confidence building between the U.S. and Chinese militaries. In September 2015, Washington and Beijing signed two annexes to a 2014 memorandum of understanding on safe conduct in air and maritime encounters, one of which set procedures for the use of a defense telephone link between U.S. and Chinese officials. A month later, Chinese Adm. Wu Shengli used the hotline to contact U.S. Adm. John Richardson three days after the USS Lassen conducted a freedom of navigation operation within 12 nautical miles of the Spratly Islands' Subi Reef, which Beijing claims. Though the incident did not demonstrate the hotline's real-time use during a crisis, it did show China's initiative in using the new tools available to communicate with the United States.

This year's RIMPAC exercise will smooth their interactions even more. It took the U.S. and Chinese naval ships several days to reach Hawaii from Guam, affording plenty of opportunities to practice joint maneuvering drills and implement the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea. The code, a set of protocols signed in 2014 that governs the communications and conduct of naval ships to minimize the risk of accidents, is particularly important as U.S. and Chinese vessels encounter one another more frequently in the South China Sea. At the exercise itself, which began on June 30 and will last until Aug. 4, the U.S. and Chinese navies will participate in several drills on anti-piracy, gunnery, and search and rescue operations. Sailors and officers will also have the chance to work with one another and with their foreign peers in structured and unstructured activities onshore. Though such interaction is undoubtedly meant to generate positive publicity, it also speaks to one of RIMPAC's lesser-known functions: promoting personal relationships between sailors and officers of different navies that will endure as they move up through the ranks.

Putting It Into Practice

The primary value of joint exercises — familiarizing working-level military officials with one another and with the protocols that streamline communication — makes military interactions more predictable. This will be crucial in the coming years as the United States and China enter periods of political transition. The United States, for its part, is preparing to hold its presidential election, while China is readying itself for the 19th Communist Party Congress in 2017, when many senior military leaders are likely to be replaced. The cultivation of stable ties between the militaries' lower ranks will ensure that relations continue to be well regulated in the face of what could be a politically delicate time.

That said, military-to-military cooperation has its limits; it is a means of managing conflict, not eliminating it. Although Xi's administration has pursued closer military ties with Washington, that has not resolved disputes between China and the United States. If anything, those feuds have intensified even as the countries' military bonds have strengthened. Furthermore, the People's Liberation Army is currently undergoing one of the biggest restructurings in its history, and many of its organizational and command-and-control hierarchies remain unclear, even to Chinese personnel. The reform will likely impede the use of established channels of communication over the next five years or so as Beijing finishes revamping its military.

The United States and China's new conflict management mechanisms will probably be put to the test sooner than later. The U.N. Permanent Court of Arbitration is expected to rule on the Philippines' case against China's maritime claims on July 12, as RIMPAC completes its second week, and the court's decision will almost certainly ratchet up tensions between China and the United States. But Beijing and Washington are aware of how valuable close military cooperation can be for mitigating risk, and both will be reluctant to jeopardize it.

Lead Analyst: Thomas Vie

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Re: International Law Court rules against China; China says FY
« Reply #396 on: July 13, 2016, 06:09:08 AM »
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/world/asia/south-china-sea-hague-ruling-philippines.html?emc=edit_na_20160712&nlid=49641193&ref=cta&_r=0

I would hate to be on a Philippine flagged boat anywhere near that area.

I am calling on President Trump in conjunction with all the other countries in the region to rename the formerly South China Sea.

Let them devalue their country and currency, let them sell cheap goods cheaply to American consumers, but don't let them control the Taiwan to Singapore Sea, the South Sea of Fallen Totalitarian Regimes.  It belongs to all of us.

http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=2134.msg96258#msg96258

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Re: US-China (& Japan, South China Sea-- Vietnam, Philippines, etc)
« Reply #397 on: July 13, 2016, 11:04:37 AM »
 :evil: :evil: :evil:

Crafty_Dog

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Indonesia guards its front door
« Reply #399 on: July 30, 2016, 07:25:48 AM »

Indonesia Guards Its Front Door
Analysis
July 28, 2016 | 09:30 GMT Print
Text Size
The Indonesian government blows up a foreign fishing vessel in its waters earlier this year. Indonesian authorities have confronted at least three Chinese fishing boats in 2016 near the country's remote and resource-rich Natuna Islands. (SEI RATIFA/AFP/Getty Images)
Forecast

    Chinese fishing vessels will continue to cross into Indonesia's exclusive economic zone near the Natuna Islands.
    Indonesia will maintain its aggressive stance to cement its hold on the area — part of its broader imperative to control the sprawling archipelago.
    Jakarta will build military, fishing and energy facilities on the islands, pursuing a strategy similar to that of other claimants in the South China Sea.

Analysis

At least three times this year, Indonesian authorities have confronted Chinese fishing vessels in the waters near the remote Natuna Islands, an area whose 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) overlaps China's expansive nine-dash line. Each time, Jakarta has made a point of widely publicizing the incursions despite Beijing's objections. In the wake of the run-ins, Indonesian President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo visited the islands and promised to boost defense, fishing and natural gas production in the area. Despite its provocative fishing activities in the South China Sea, however, China is not the sole target of Indonesia's defensive measures; Jakarta has also made a public show of destroying dozens of Malaysian and Vietnamese vessels found fishing in the area. For Indonesia, protecting the Natuna Islands — however small and remote they may be — is key to exerting control of its territory and affirming its position in Asia's waterways.

A Maritime Fulcrum

Indonesia holds an unparalleled position in the Pacific. Its islands stretch from the Andaman to the Philippine Sea, covering more than 4,800 kilometers (3,000 miles), a span wider than the continental United States. What's more, in a region whose geopolitics revolves around water, Indonesia sits at the juncture of Asia's two key oceans, the Indian and the Pacific. But the nation is also intensely fragmented. Of its 17,508 islands, only 6,000 are inhabited, and water covers most of Indonesia's territory. Anti-imperialist sentiment first united these disparate and ethnically distinct islands, and then decades of military rule and anticommunist fervor held them together. After emerging from New Order rule of longtime President Suharto in 1998, however, the country needed a new unifying strategy.


EEZ

The 1994 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea grants nations an exclusive economic zone of up to 200 nautical miles from the coast and around some islands, carrying rights to marine resources. This makes the official status of tiny rocks, reefs and islands essential.

Under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo, who took office in 2014, that strategy has been to make Indonesia a "maritime fulcrum" between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Controlling the seas that constitute so much of Indonesia's territory is not only essential to keep the nation together, but it also enables Indonesia to increase its prominence in Asia, making it an indispensible nation to Pacific powers. Jokowi's fulcrum concept boils down to three main priorities: to build up maritime defense, focus on securing and exploiting resources, and develop logistics throughout the archipelago. The idea is not to turn Indonesia into a great power in the Pacific but to make the most of its position by ensuring control over its broad swath of territory. Only with full control of its waterways and flanking oceans can Indonesia take advantage of its position on key trade routes. To do so requires building up naval capabilities and port connectivity.

Troubling the Waters

Though Indonesia has an imperative to control the entire archipelago, certain areas must to be targeted first. The Natunas, a group of 272 islands in the Tudjuh archipelago at the northern edge of Riau Islands Province, are among them. But as the regional powers challenge the balance established by the United States — the Pacific's pre-eminent force — Indonesia's maritime fulcrum strategy has run up against China's own push into the South China Sea. Patrol vessels from Indonesia's Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries encountered and apprehended a Chinese fishing vessel near the Natuna Islands on March 20, detaining its crew and taking the boat in tow. After a Chinese coast guard vessel intervened and freed the fishing boat, Beijing insisted that its fishermen had been in China's traditional waters, a phrase China often uses in defense of its fishing vessels' forays inside the nine-dash line. A second run-in occurred on May 27, when an Indonesian navy frigate seized another Chinese fishing boat for fishing in roughly the same area. And last month, Jakarta announced a third confrontation, in which Indonesian naval vessels fired warning shots at Chinese-flagged fishing vessels on June 18. Some reports indicate that seven crew members were detained, and the Chinese Foreign Ministry said one fisherman was shot.

China is not particularly interested in provoking Indonesia over this remote corner of the South China Sea. For one thing, between the Philippines and Vietnam, Beijing has bigger problems. For another, China does not want to make Indonesia any more receptive than it already is to military cooperation with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a U.S.-supported alliance structure of which Indonesia is a member. But by encouraging its fishermen to fish along the full extent of the nine-dash line, Beijing is pursuing a dangerous strategy to shore up its claims in the South China Sea. As the largely autonomous, ungovernable fishing vessels follow fish over wide stretches of sea, they inevitably pass into disputed waters. For Beijing, these incursions are a net positive, reinforcing their claims to traditional use. At the same time, however, they invite unpredictable reactions from the countries that claim the waters. In this case, Indonesia's response seems to have taken China by surprise.

An Unforgiving Policy

Indonesia has become increasingly staunch in defending the Natunas, not only against China but also against its neighbors. In late 2014, Indonesia implemented a policy whereby foreign fishing vessels that are in its waters illegally are sunk. Some of the earliest vessels sunk were Chinese, but since December 2014, many have been Malaysian or Vietnamese. Of the 57 fishing vessels that Indonesia has detained in 2016 for illegally fishing around the Natuna Islands, 49 were Vietnamese.

Since Vietnam and Malaysia are closer to Indonesia than China is, their fishing vessels are a more regular nuisance (the EEZ is formalized by treaty neither on its northern boundary with Vietnam nor on part of its eastern boundary with Malaysia). But China poses a more pressing threat to Indonesia's territorial integrity. That large Chinese coast guard vessels intervened on behalf of the fishing vessels seized near the Natunas underscores that threat. Territorial disputes with Malaysia and Vietnam, by contrast, have been put on the back burner. In fact, Malaysia is keen to cooperate with Indonesia not only in the Malacca Strait, an area of shared interest, but also in the far-flung Sulu and Celebes seas to curb piracy. The sudden escalation with China has caused Jakarta to question whether it needs to double down on its maritime strategy to manage a different sort of neighbor.

A Sea of Resources

Though the Natuna Islands are just one of many regions that Indonesia wants to secure, they have become a priority for Jakarta. Visiting the islands on June 23, shortly after the third fishing boat incident, Jokowi called the Natunas the "front door" of Indonesia. The country controls most of the waters approaching the Malacca Strait through the Natunas' EEZ. Moreover, the route is key to east-west trade (especially for the economies of Northeast Asia), and its importance will only grow: By the mid-2020s, the Asia-Pacific region's demand for oil will likely rise by at least 5 million barrels per day, meaning that nearly one-fifth of the world's oil will pass through the region.

In addition, the islands provide access to vital resources. The fisheries near the Natunas offer opportunities for Indonesia to expand its fishing beyond core areas where overfishing has devastated stocks of several species. After the incidents with Chinese fishing boats, Jakarta announced plans to raise the catch in the Natuna Sea from 9.3 percent of sustainable levels to 40 percent by mid-2017 — up to 1 million tons of production. Jakarta also plans to relocate 400 fishing vessels from Java by the end of October and up to 6,000 over the long term. The Natuna EEZ boasts the West Natuna Basin, already an important area for natural gas production. Furthermore, the East Natuna Field, located in the northern part of the Natuna EEZ, is the largest untapped natural gas field in Asia, containing an estimated 1.3 trillion cubic meters of recoverable natural gas. Indonesia is banking on the East Natuna Field — in addition to those on Papua — to expand its natural gas production by as much as 70 percent over the next decade. In fact, on July 12, state-owned energy company Pertamina announced plans to sign a memorandum of understanding with the National Iranian Oil Co. and to start operations before 2030.

Given all that the islands have to offer, it is not surprising that Indonesian military leaders have been calling to bolster defense of the Natuna Islands for the past two years. Since March, Jakarta has unveiled various plans to do so. Less than a week after Jokowi's visit to the islands, Indonesia's legislature voted to increase the 2016 defense budget by nearly 10 percent, to around $8.25 billion. A few days later, the Indonesian government announced plans to build military bases on the islands and to improve the existing Ranai air base. On July 13, Indonesia's minister of defense pledged to send warships and a fighter jet to the area, deploy surface-to-air missiles, and improve ports and airstrips.

But boosting Indonesia's presence in the Natunas — whether through military deployments, fishing activity or energy production — will take time. In the meantime, incursions by Chinese (as well as Vietnamese and Malaysian) vessels will continue. And though they are Indonesia's front door, the Natunas are just one part of Jakarta's larger strategy to achieve control of its vast territorial holdings.

Lead Analyst: Evan Rees