Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on November 01, 2006, 10:20:27 AM
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Guns and Better
Max Boot surveys five centuries' worth of military revolutions.
BY ROBERT H. SCALES
Tuesday, October 31, 2006 12:01 a.m. EST
The subject of technology in modern warfare has been covered by many scholars and soldiers before. But Max Boot takes a refreshingly novel approach in "War Made New." He uses battles as metaphors to demonstrate that revolutions in military affairs, or RMAs, have a pedigree. Tracing the history of warfare from the French invasion of Italy in the late 15th century to Afghanistan and Iraq today, Mr. Boot contends that RMAs are the preserve of Western militaries or of non-Western militaries, like Japan's, clever enough to mimic the Western style of war. These RMAs, he says, have been decisive agents of both military success and geopolitical change.
Mr. Boot is an insightful observer of the profession of arms, a gifted amateur who has learned to know war without experiencing it. His last major work was the excellent "The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power" (2002). "War Made New" concentrates on four RMAs that occurred over five centuries. The first began with the rise of European states that alone possessed the bureaucratic and technological capacity to equip armies and navies with gunpowder weapons. The Industrial Revolution fueled the next two RMAs: one powered by steel and steam (World War I) and the other by electricity and oil (World War II). The fourth turning point that made war new, Mr. Boot says, is the contemporary rise of information technology.
Mr. Boot takes a daring--and successful--tack in approaching his subject; rather than attempt to be exhaustively comprehensive, he treats battles like lily pads, jumping from one to the next in quick succession across the pond of history. Thus the warfare we read about includes the British defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Prussian victory over the Austrians at the Battle of K?niggr?tz in 1866, the Japanese navy's vanquishing of the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima in 1905, and the German invasion of France in 1940. Mr. Boot admits to selecting battles that reinforce his thesis. Thus to illustrate his point that the most determined enemy in the late 19th century could not stand against an army equipped with small-bore rifles and machine guns--gifts of the Industrial Revolution--the author chooses the butchering of the Mahdi Army at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898 during the fight for British supremacy in the Sudan.
Mr. Boot exercises his skill as an editorialist to craft riffs, sort of cognitive connective tissue, that tie together his battlefield images. In three pages he gives a remarkably precise explanation of total war, as embodied by World War I, along with its social, political and economic repercussions. In five pages he distills the story of the U.S. Navy's creation of large-deck aircraft carrier materiel and doctrine. He succeeds in recounting the development of American armored doctrine during the interwar period in a single paragraph.
Despite the concision of the writing, a reader's attention might begin to fade--save for the fact that Mr. Boot also has a gift for knowing when to stir into the mix little-known, topically irrelevant tidbits about his key actors. For instance, he interjects to tell us that King Francis I of France, within three years of his launching the gunpowder revolution, died when he cracked his cranium against a door jamb in one of his palaces. Or that Gen. Curtis LeMay's reputation as a borderline sociopath was due in large measure to a perpetual scowl brought on by Bell's Palsy contracted in 1942. We learn that Col. Hector "Fighting Mac" McDonald, a popular British hero who achieved fame during the Battle of Omdurman, took his life so as not to suffer the consequences of a court-martial for pedophilia.
On the whole, Mr. Boot's argument for the decisiveness of the first three RMAs is persuasive, even if one is tempted to cite battles that undermine his thesis (yes, gunpowder mastery made all the difference at Obdurman, but only a year after that battle a few determined Afrikaners embarrassed the British Army with their home-grown use of Western weapons technology during the Boer War). Less convincing is Mr. Boot's argument for today's information-powered RMA.
Daily headlines keep getting in his way. Tomorrow's emerging war-winning technologies such as satellite sensors, laser weapons and cyber attacks seem to be less than compelling when juxtaposed with the reality that our challenges are now human, not technological. All the high-tech gear that Mr. Boot describes in his final chapters hasn't done much to make our soldiers and marines more culturally aware and adaptive or better able to shape the perceptions of our friends or break the will of our enemies.
The big news coming out of the information RMA may well be written by an adaptive enemy who has learned--after 500 years of trying--how to lessen the effectiveness of Western technology through the imaginative use of patience, ideological fanaticism and an enthusiasm for death. Contemporary experience in Afghanistan, Iraq and Lebanon suggests that our enemies may be evolving their own revolution, this one in cultural, not technological, affairs.
Yet one can't help concluding that Mr. Boot believes tomorrow's RMAs will ultimately continue the Western tradition of winning against less technologically advanced enemies. Mr. Boot is a penetrating writer and thinker, and his opinions are influential in military circles. However understandable his confidence about the future might be, his seeming underestimation of the threat from our current enemies is the only drawback to an otherwise brilliantly crafted history.
Maj. Gen. Scales, who retired from active duty in 2000, is the president of Colgen Inc., a company specializing in defense consulting. You can buy "War Made New" from the OpinionJournal bookstore.
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Space Supremacy
It's the goal of America's new space policy.
by Michael Goldfarb
11/02/2006 12:00:00 AM
ON OCTOBER 18, the Washington Post reported on "the first revision of U.S. space policy in nearly 10 years." The specifics of that revision remain largely classified; however, the government did post an unclassified overview of the new policy which can be read here.
According to that document, "the President authorized a new national space policy on August 31, 2006 that establishes overarching national policy that governs the conduct of U.S. space activities." The document sets out a series of principles, goals, and guidelines that largely conform to the recommendations of the Commission to Assess United States National Security, Space Management, and Organization--otherwise known as the Rumsfeld Commission. That commission, which presented its recommendations in January of 2001, was authorized by a coalition of Republican senators who were concerned by the fact that "annual [Defense] budgets repeatedly short-change space programs," and was chaired by Donald Rumsfeld, who had become the nominee for Secretary of Defense by the time the commission's recommendations were delivered.
The ultimate goal of this new policy, as recommended by the commission more than five years ago, is to assure that the United States is able to "develop and deploy the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests." As General Lance W. Lord, the former commander of Air Force Space Command, told an Air Force conference in September of 2005, "Space supremacy is our vision for the future."
And space supremacy is now the official policy of the United States government. Among the principles set forth in the new document is that the United States "rejects any limitations on the fundamental right of the United States to operate in and acquire data from space;" furthermore, "the United States will view purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights." It goes on to assert that the United States will "preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space . . . and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests." In an outright rejection of the sovereignty of the international community in space, the new policy also states that the United States "will oppose the development of new legal regimes or other restrictions that seek to prohibit or limit U.S. access to or use of space."
THIS WAS BIG NEWS in the foreign press, where headlines characterized the policy as a new imperialism. The Independent blared "America intends to claim a new empire," and the Times of London proclaimed "America wants it all--life, the Universe and everything." The administration's domestic critics have blasted the policy as unilateral and unnecessary. Both points were made by the American Prospect's Matthew Yglesias, who wrote that,
having failed to kill Osama bin Laden, or stabilize Iraq, or resolve issues relating to Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, the administration is preparing to tackle the pressing issue of Martian invaders. That, and also the extremely hypothetical chance that someday in the future some other country--Russia or China or India, one assumes--will find itself engaged in a struggle for space supremacy with the United States. . . . If we're worried about space at all, the thing to do is strengthen agreements among the major powers to avoid an arms race--that will make everyone happy.
The only problem is that this "extremely hypothetical" scenario is already reality. Earlier this month the Pentagon confirmed that China had tested a ground-based anti-satellite laser and had disabled a U.S. satellite in the process. There has long been speculation about China's research into high-energy laser weapons for the purpose of disrupting satellite communications, but this was the first hard proof that the Chinese were capable of deploying such a system.
(This was not, howevever, the first attempt by a foreign government to interfere with American military satellites. As General Lord pointed out in an interview with Harrison Donnelly in the journal Military Aerospace Technology, "during Operation Iraqi Freedom, Saddam Hussein tried to take away our precision strike capability by jamming our GPS satellites. Then-Secretary of the Air Force James G. Roche stated, 'The war in space has begun.' And I'd add: 'We didn't start it.'")
Mind you, China's recent test was probably not its first experiment with asymmetric methods of countering America's current space superiority. Last summer the Department of Defense submitted a report to Congress on the state of the Chinese military and concluded that "China is working on, and plans to field, ASAT [anti-satellite weapons] systems." Even before then, Larry M. Wortzel, former director of the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, was at the Heritage Foundation pointing to "ample evidence from Chinese scientific and military journals that the PRC is developing maneuvering micro-satellites that can attach themselves to enemy satellites and destroy or jam them, or could be used to collide with and destroy enemy satellites."
Wortzel, now chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, said he took "the reports [of a Chinese ASAT test] at face value." "Space is absolutely militarized," Wortzel said, "Chinese armed forces and military planners believe space is just another domain" for military operations. "There's no doubt the Chinese will put weapons into space" with the aim of "destroying command and control and communications satellites." Wortzel also expressed concern that while the United States and the Soviet Union had long ago resolved to avoid "interfering" with each other's satellites--as such interference would likely be interpreted as a prelude to attack--it's not clear that the Chinese have "thought through the implications" of such actions.
But space supremacy isn't only about the emerging military threat from China. The apparent stalemate that has developed between the United States and North Korea--or between the United States and Iran for that matter--is more than anything, the result of a paucity of options. Air strikes present tremendous risks to American interests and offer only the possibility, significant as it may be, of retarding those programs. Wortzel says space-based weapons systems like the rods from god or Brilliant Pebbles might "give us increased options" when dealing with rogue states. Space supremacy could become the big stick that allows American policymakers to walk more softly on the international stage.
Is there a diplomatic alternative to space supremacy? Probably not. As Wortzel explains, the difficulties of verifying compliance with any negotiated prohibition are likely to be insurmountable. But even if verification were possible, it's not at all clear that a diplomatic alternative would be preferable. Much like the English navy once secured the world's sea lanes, so too might the America Air Force secure space for 21st century commerce. As Everett Dolman, a professor at the School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, told the Kansas City Star, "While the rest of the world will condemn us for it, within five years of having a domain in place it will be seen as a public good."
Of course, nothing is foreordained. As Pavel Podvig, an expert on Soviet ASAT systems, explains, the Soviets started down the path toward space supremacy more than 40 years ago--only to abandon their efforts after a cost-benefit analysis. Podvig says there is an "institutional inertia" driving many of these programs as the aerospace industry positions itself to gain access to the billions of federal dollars that would be authorized for any space-based system. He'd be surprised if any of the proposed systems "survive the reality-check" of the appropriations process given their enormous price-tags and uncertain potential.
But those are political decisions for the American people to make. With its new space policy, the Bush administration has offered its vision for the future.
Michael Goldfarb is deputy online editor at THE WEEKLY STANDARD.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/863kzilj.asp?pg=2
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U.S. trains Iraqis in river warfare tactics
By Tony Perry, Times Staff Writer
November 4, 2006
Hoping to restrict the smuggling of weapons and fighters along the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, the U.S. Navy has brought Iraqi security forces to America for training on river warfare tactics.
On Thursday, 16 members of the Iraqi Riverine Police Force finished a six-week course at a Navy training facility in Mississippi to prepare them to patrol the wide waterways that have served as smuggling corridors and danger zones for centuries.
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The Navy routinely trains foreign military forces in such tactics. For the Iraqis, the training emphasized the possibility of combat.
"We know the likelihood of them getting shot at is very high," said Navy Cmdr. Lance Bach. "We practiced on how to return fire and how to get out of the kill zone."
Navy officials hope the 16 will teach other Iraqi security personnel techniques for guiding small boats, inspecting suspicious vessels, and landing or evacuating "friendlies" on the shore.
Additional Iraqis are likely to take the course given at the Naval Small Craft Instruction and Technical Training School at Stennis Space Center, Miss. The school is part of the Naval Special Warfare Center, based in Coronado, Calif..
Assisted by four interpreters, Navy instructors taught the group techniques for patrolling in 25-foot boats armed with M60 machine guns. Much of the training was on how to react to ambush attacks.
"We pushed 'em hard," said Navy Chief Petty Officer Rob Rheaume.
Historians suggest the lawlessness of Ramadi, now an insurgent hotspot, derives from its long involvement with smuggling rings using the Euphrates. Some smuggling is to avoid taxation on consumer goods. In other cases, smuggling aids the insurgency.
"In the absence of police or security forces, smugglers, using canoes and diesel-powered boats, move freely along these rivers," said the Iraqi newspaper Azzaman, referring to the Tigris, Euphrates and the Shatt al Arab waterway in southern Iraq.
The Shatt al Arab, which divides Iran and Iraq, is an important smuggling route for oil being illegally exported from Iraq. The 16 Iraqis who graduated on Thursday will be deployed along the Tigris River, which runs through Baghdad.
One of them, who used the name Abu Ali, said he and his comrades learned "how to fight and fight hard." Along with the training, there was also time to see some Americana, including museums and a four-hour trip to Wal-Mart.
"It's a beautiful thing," Abu Ali said of Wal-Mart. "You need a whole day to spend there."
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Geopolitical Diary: Rumsfeld's Legacy
U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld resigned on Wednesday after the Democrats succeeded in securing a majority hold on the U.S. House of Representatives in midterm elections.
Rumsfeld is perhaps among the most visionary defense secretaries who have served in the U.S. government, but that hardly has made him an effective one -- and it certainly has not stopped him from being a political liability.
Rumsfeld's primary goal, and the reason that U.S. President George W. Bush brought him into the government in the first place, was to bring about a seminal shift in the shape of the U.S. military. He sought to skip over an entire generation of military hardware -- such as the F-22, which is only now entering the military's toolkit -- and instead focus on the development of fundamentally new technologies, so that 20 years from now the United States would be fielding technology two generations ahead of any potential foes.
Part and parcel of this change would be a massive reduction in the size of the military, with the army suffering the largest cuts in manpower and resources. There would be a corresponding emphasis on light, highly mobile forces with high-tech capabilities such as long-range hypersonic cruise missiles, smart drones and the ability to insert small forces anywhere in the world at a moment's notice.
Rumsfeld's biggest failing was not his plan, or even his execution of it. It was that reality intervened, in the form of the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq war, and he refused to shift course in midstream. Rumsfeld was designing a military that could defeat state power by the precise applications of force while minimizing the exposure of U.S. forces; but the U.S.-jihadist war brought to the table a foe that thrived in chaotic regions where state control was weak or nonexistent. Rumsfeld's plan could overturn the Taliban or Saddam Hussein's government, but it could not muster the manpower necessary to impose order on the resulting chaos. Without sufficient "boots on the ground," the United States has proven unable to deny militants the environment in which they thrive.
The nature of the war the United States found itself fighting changed, and Rumsfeld demonstrated over and over that he lacked the ability to change with it.
His replacement, former CIA director Robert Gates, is in theory being brought in specifically to implement the very changes that Rumsfeld for the longest time refused to admit were necessary. Gates is part of the Iraq Study Group, a cadre of senior statesmen who have been out of government for over a decade -- he left government in 1993 -- recently tasked to come up with alternatives to the current Iraq strategy.
Their recommendations will be interesting to read, and Gates' efforts to implement them will be fascinating to watch. Congressional confirmation for Gates should come very easily and quickly -- he has no great political ambitions and is on the team that is supposed to come up with non-ideological recommendations for the way forward.
But what he will not be doing is prepping the United States for the next threat. Gates is a placeholder -- a competent placeholder for sure, but a placeholder nonetheless. Facing a hostile Congress, the Bush administration has sharp limitations on its actions and we will be seeing no revolutionary proposals from a defense secretary who will be in his job a maximum of two years.
The irony is that, instead of leaping ahead by a generation, U.S. forces have now been saddled with the worst of both worlds: an exhausted military that will take years to repair, and limited progress in the modernization that they will likely need a generation from now.
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http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=technologyNews&storyid=2006-11-17T082415Z_01_L1751091_RTRUKOC_0_US-MIDEAST-WEAPONS.xml&src=rss&rpc=22
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JERUSALEM (Reuters) - Israel is using nanotechnology to try to create a robot no bigger than a hornet that would be able to chase, photograph and kill its targets, an Israeli newspaper reported on Friday.
The flying robot, nicknamed the "bionic hornet", would be able to navigate its way down narrow alleyways to target otherwise unreachable enemies such as rocket launchers, the daily Yedioth Ahronoth said.
It is one of several weapons being developed by scientists to combat militants, it said. Others include super gloves that would give the user the strength of a "bionic man" and miniature sensors to detect suicide bombers.
The research integrates nanotechnology into Israel's security department and will find creative solutions to problems the army has been unable to address, Deputy Prime Minister Shimon Peres told Yedioth Ahronoth.
"The war in Lebanon proved that we need smaller weaponry. It's illogical to send a plane worth $100 million against a suicidal terrorist. So we are building futuristic weapons," Peres said.
The 34-day war in Lebanon ended with a U.N.-brokered ceasefire in mid-August. The war killed more than 1,200 Lebanese, mostly civilians, and 157 Israelis, mostly soldiers.
Prototypes for the new weapons are expected within three years, he said.
? Reuters 2006. All Rights Reserved.
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Weird-- The NY Times calls for a bigger military:
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Editorial
The Army We Need
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Published: November 19, 2006
One welcome dividend of Donald Rumsfeld?s departure from the Pentagon is that the United States will now have a chance to rebuild the Army he spent most of his tenure running down.
Mr. Rumsfeld didn?t like the lessons the Army drew from Vietnam ? that politicians should not send American troops to fight a war of choice unless they went in with overwhelming force, a clearly defined purpose and strong domestic backing. He didn?t like the Clintonian notion of using the United States military to secure and rebuild broken states.
And when circumstances in Afghanistan and Iraq called for just the things Mr. Rumsfeld didn?t like, he refused to adapt, letting the Army, and American interests, pay the price for his arrogance.
So one of the first challenges for the next defense secretary and the next Congress is to repair, rebuild and reshape the nation?s ground forces. They need to renew the morale and confidence of America?s serving men and women and restore the appeal of career military service for the brightest young officers.
That will require building a force large enough to end more than three years of unsustainably rapid rotations of units back into battle, misuse of the National Guard, overuse of the Reserves and conscription of veterans back into active service.
Congress also needs to work harder at rebuilding the links between the battlefront and the home front that a healthy democracy needs. That does not require reinstating the draft ? a bad idea for military as well as political reasons. It requires a Congress willing to resume its proper constitutional role in debating and deciding essential questions of war and peace. If Congress continues to shirk that role, expanding the ground forces would invite some future administration to commit American forces recklessly to dubious wars of choice.
But keeping the Army in its present straitjacket would bring bigger and more immediate problems. Even assuming an early exit from Iraq, the Army?s overall authorized strength needs to be increased some 75,000 to 100,000 troops more than Mr. Rumsfeld had in mind for the next few years.
A force totaling 575,000 would permit the creation of two new divisions for peacekeeping and stabilization missions, a doubling of special operations forces and the addition of 10,000 to the military police to train and supplement local police forces. The Marine Corps, currently 175,000, needs to be expanded to at least 180,000 and shifted from long-term occupation duties toward its real vocation as a tactical assault force ready for rapid deployment.
That big an increase cannot be achieved overnight. It will take many months, and many billions of dollars, to recruit, train and equip these men and women. Every 10,000 added will cost roughly $1.5 billion in annual upkeep, plus tens of billions in one-time recruitment and equipment expenses.
But all the needed money can be found by reordering priorities within the defense budget. Thanks to six years of hefty budget increases, there is no shortage of defense dollars. They just need to go where the actual wars are. Contrary to pre-9/11 predictions, the early 21st century did not turn out to be an era of futuristic stealthy combat in the skies and high seas. Instead, American forces have been slogging it out in a succession of unconventional ground wars and nation-building operations.
If the new Pentagon leaders and the new Congress are prepared to take on the military contracting lobbies, they could take as much as $60 billion now going to Air Force fighters, Navy destroyers and Army systems designed for the conventional battlefield and shift it to training and equipping more soldiers for unconventional warfare. America cannot afford to dribble away money on corporate subsidies disguised as military necessities.
Congress also needs to hold the executive branch accountable for the use of American troops abroad. Administration officials must be pressed to explain intelligence claims and offer plausible strategies. Pentagon leaders should be instructed to stop using National Guard units for overseas combat instead of homeland security. And uniformed commanders should be pushed for candid assessments about conditions on the ground and the realistic choices available to policy makers.
Rebuilding the Army and Marine Corps is an overdue necessity. But it is only the first step toward repairing the damage done to America?s military capacities and credibility over the past six years.
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A Fresh Look at the Draft
By George Friedman
New York Democrat Charles Rangel, the new chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, has called for the reinstatement of the draft. This is not new for him; he has argued for it for several years. Nor does Rangel -- or anyone else -- expect a proposal for conscription to pass. However, whether this is political posturing or a sincere attempt to start a conversation about America's military, Rangel is making an important point that should be considered. This is doubly true at a time when future strategies are being considered in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the available force is being strained to its limits.
The United States has practiced conscription in all major wars since the Civil War. During the Cold War, the United States practiced conscription continually, using it to fight both the Korean and Vietnam wars, but also to maintain the peacetime army. Conscription ended in 1973 as the U.S. role in Vietnam declined and as political opposition to the draft surged. From that point on, the United States shifted to a volunteer force.
Rangel's core criticism of the volunteer force is social. He argues that the burden of manning the military and fighting the war has fallen, both during Vietnam War conscription and in the volunteer army, for different reasons, on the lower and middle-lower classes. Apart from other arguments -- such as the view that if the rich were being drafted, the Vietnam and Iraq wars would have ended sooner -- Rangel's essential point is that the way the United States has manned the military since World War II is inherently unjust. It puts the lower classes at risk in fighting wars, leaving the upper classes free to pursue their lives and careers.
The problem with this argument is not the moral point, which is that the burden of national defense should be borne by all classes, but rather the argument that a draft would be more equitable. Rangel's view of the military and the draft was shaped by Vietnam -- and during Vietnam, there was conscription. But it was an inherently inequitable conscription, in the sense that during most of the war, deferments were given for students. That deferment, earlier in the war, extended to graduate school. As a result, by definition, the less-educated were more vulnerable to conscription than the more-educated. There were a host of deferments, including medical deferments, and the sophisticated could game the system easily. A draft, by itself, does not in any way guarantee equity.
During the final years of the Vietnam-era draft, the deferment system was replaced by a lottery. This was intended to (and, to some extent, did) reduce the inequities of the system, although sophisticated college students with low numbers continued to find ways to avoid conscription using the complex rules of the Selective Service system -- ways that the less-educated still couldn't use. The lottery system was an improvement, but in the end, it still meant that some would go into harm's way while others would stay home and carry on their lives. Basing the draft on a lottery might have mitigated social injustice, but basing life-and-death matters such as going to war on the luck of the draw still strikes us as inappropriate.
The switch from deferments to the lottery points out one of the key problems of conscription. The United States does not need, and cannot afford, a military that would consist of all of the men (and now, we assume, women) aged 19-21. That would create a force far too large and far too inexperienced. The lottery was designed to deal with a reality in which the United States needed conscription, but could not cope with universal conscription. Some method had to be found to determine who would and would not serve -- and any such method would be either unfair or arbitrary.
Americans remember World War II as, in many ways, the morally perfect war: the right enemy, the right spirit and the right military. But World War II was unique in that the United States had to field an enormous military. While some had to man truly essential industries, and some were medically disqualified, World War II was a case in which universal conscription was absolutely needed because the size of the force had to be equal to the size of the total pool of available and qualified manpower, minus essential workers. Unless it suited the needs of the military, no one was deferred. Married men with children, brilliant graduate students, the children of the rich and famous -- all went. There were still inequities in the kinds of assignments people got and the pull that was sometimes used. But what made the World War II conscription system work well was that everyone was needed and everyone was called.
Not everyone is needed in today's military. You might make the case for universal service -- people helping teachers and cleaning playgrounds. But there is a fundamental difference between these jobs and, at least in principle, the military. In the military, you might be called on to risk your life and die. For the most part, that isn't expected from teacher's aides. Thus, even if there were universal service, you would still be left with the dilemma of who gets to teach arts and crafts and who goes on patrol in Baghdad. Universal conscription does not solve the problem inherent in military conscription.
And there is an even more fundamental issue. During World War II, conscription, for just about everyone, meant service until the end of the war. During the Cold War, there was no clear end in sight. Since not everyone was conscripted, having conscripts serve until the end of the war could mean a lifetime of service. The decision was made that draftees would serve for two years and remain part of the reserve for a period of time thereafter.
Training during World War II took weeks for most combat specialties, with further training undertaken with soldiers' units or through combat. In World War II, the United States had a mass-produced army with plenty of time to mature after training. During Vietnam, conscripts went through basic training and advanced training, leaving a year for deployment in Vietnam and some months left over after the tour of duty. Jobs that required more complex training, from Special Forces to pilots to computer programmers, were handled by volunteers who served at least three years and, in many cases, longer. The draftee was used to provide the mass. The complexities of the war were still handled by a volunteer force.
The Battle of the Bulge took place 62 years ago. The Tet Offensive was nearly 39 years ago. The 90-day-wonder officers served well in World War II, and the draftee riflemen were valiant in Vietnam, but military requirements have changed dramatically. Now the military depends on highly trained specialists and groups of specialists, whose specialties -- from rifleman to warehouse worker -- have become more and more complex and sophisticated. On the whole, the contemporary Army, which historically has absorbed most draftees, needs more than two years in order to train draftees in their specialties, integrate them with their units and deploy them to combat.
Today, a two-year draft would be impractical because, on the whole, it would result in spending huge amounts of money on training, with very little time in actual service to show for it. Conscription could, of course, be extended to a three- or even four-year term, but with only selective service -- meaning that only a fraction of those eligible would be called -- that extension would only intensify the unfairness. Some would spend three or four years in the military, while others would be moving ahead with schools and careers. In effect, it would be a huge tax on the draftees for years of earnings lost.
A new U.S. draft might force the children of the wealthy into the military, but only at the price of creating other inequities and a highly inefficient Army. The training cycle and retention rate of a two-year draft would swamp the Army. In Iraq, the Army needs Special Forces, Civil Affairs specialists, linguists, intelligence analysts, unmanned aerial vehicle operators and so on. You can draft for that, we suppose, but it is hard to imagine building a force that way.
A volunteer force is a much more efficient way to field an Army. There is more time for training, there is a higher probability of retention and there are far fewer morale problems. Rangel is wrong in comparing the social base of this Army with that of Vietnam. But the basic point he is trying to make is true: The makeup of the U.S. Army is skewed toward the middle and lower-middle class. But then, so are many professions. Few children of the wealthy get jobs in the Social Security Administration or become professional boxers. The fact that the Army does not reflect the full social spectrum of the country doesn't mean very much. Hardly anything reflects that well.
Still, Rangel is making an important point, even if his argument for the draft does not work. War is a special activity of society. It is one of the few in which the citizen is expected -- at least in principle -- to fight and, if necessary, die for his country. It is more than a career. It is an existential commitment, a willingness to place oneself at risk for one's country. The fact that children of the upper classes, on the whole, do not make that existential commitment represents a tremendous weakness in American society. When those who benefit most from a society feel no obligation to defend it, there is a deep and significant malaise in that society.
However, we have been speaking consistently here about the children of the rich, and not of the rich themselves. Combat used to be for the young. It required stamina and strength. That is still needed. However, there are two points to be made. First, many -- perhaps most -- jobs in today's military that do not require the stamina of youth, as proven by all the contractors doing essentially military work in Iraq. Second, 18- to 22-year-olds are far from the most physically robust age group. Given modern diet and health regimens, there are people who are substantially older who have the stamina and strength for combat duty. If you can play tennis as well as you claim to for as long as you say, you can patrol a village in the Sunni Triangle.
We do not expect to be taken seriously on this proposal, but we will make it anyway: There is no inherent reason why enlistment -- or conscription -- should be targeted toward those in late adolescence. And there is no reason why the rich themselves, rather than the children of the rich, should not go to war. Or, for that matter, why older people with established skills should not be drawn into the military. That happened in World War II, and it could happen now. The military's stove-pipe approach to military careers, and the fact that it allows almost no lateral movement into service for 40- to 60-year-olds, is irrational. Even if we exclude combat arms, other specialties could be well-served by such a method -- which also would reduce the need for viciously expensive contractors.
Traditionally, the draft has fallen on those who were barely adults, who had not yet had a chance to live, who were the least equipped to fight a complex war. Other age groups were safe. Rangel is talking about drafting the children of the rich. It would be much more interesting, if the United States were to introduce the draft, to impose it in a different way, on entirely different age groups. Let the young get on with starting their lives. Let those who have really benefited from society, who have already lived, ante up.
Modern war does not require the service of 19-year-olds. In the field, you need the strong, agile and smart, but we know several graying types who still could hack that. And in the offices that proliferate in the military, experienced businesspeople would do even better at modernizing the system. If they were drafted, and went into harm's way, they would know exactly what they were fighting for and why -- something we hardly think most 19-year-olds really know yet.
Obviously, no one is going to adopt this crackpot proposal, even though we are quite serious about it. But we ask that you take seriously two points. Rangel is correct in saying that the upper classes in American society are not pulling their weight. But if the parents haven't served, we cannot reasonably expect the children to do so. If Americans are serious about dealing with the crisis of lack of service among the wealthiest, then they should look to the wealthiest first, rather than their children.
Send questions or comments on this
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How would the public opinion in the US react towards a draft?
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No one is taking Rangel seriously. He is a long-time rabble rouser who enjoys posturing for TV cameras. Due to his seniority in Congress he is in a position to start investigations and be a pain-in-the-butt. That said, there has been a goodly amount of corrupt looking practices by the Bush Administration that do deserve investigation. Of course Rangel will try to take it further than that.
The Stratfor piece preceding your post has a pretty sound analysis IMHO. The military doesn't want it, the people don't want it. Its going nowhere.
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Top Marine: Troops under too much strain
November 22, 2006
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The new Marine Corps commandant said Wednesday that the longer than anticipated pace of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is putting an unacceptable strain on his troops.
Gen. James Conway said the service is unable to meet its goal of giving Marines twice as much time at home as in a war zone.
He said unless the demand on the corps eases, he may have to propose increasing the size of the force.
The Marine Corps is the smallest of the Pentagon's military services. The Coast Guard, which is even smaller, is part of the Department of Homeland Security.
Currently there are 180,000 Marines on active duty and about 40,000 in the active reserves. Marine units serve seven-month deployments in Iraq or Afghanistan.
Conway, who led Marine units into Iraq in 2003 and served on the Pentagon's joint staff, said his troops should get 14 months of relief before they are sent back.
Typically, however, they get only seven or eight months home before being returned to combat, he said.
Assuming the Marines' top job little more than a week ago, Conway told reporters at a Pentagon roundtable discussion that he sees two ways to alleviate stress on troops.
"One is reducing the requirement [of a set deployment time]. The other is potentially growing the force for what we call the long war," Conway said.
Some units are serving their fourth tours in Iraq, and the strain on their families has raised concern that Marines will start leaving the service when their enlistments are up.
"There is stress on the individual Marines that is increasing, and there is stress on the institution to do what we are required to do, pretty much by law, for the nation," he was quoted by The Associated Press as saying.
The current rotation of troops to Iraq is also limiting training, he said.
"We're not sending battalions like we used to for the mountain warfare training, the jungle training," he told reporters. "We're not doing combined arms exercises that we used to do for the far maneuver-type activities we have to be prepared to do."
Conway said he doesn't know whether an expected adjustment in strategy in Iraq will result in the need for more Marines, so he's holding off on making any formal recommendations.
Copyright 2006 CNN. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed. Associated Press contributed to this report.
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Gotham)
Price: $35.00
Release Date: 10/19/2006
War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today
by Max Boot
The United States spends more on developing and testing new weapons each year than any other nation spends on its entire defense. Given what military history teaches us, says Max Boot, that might be $70 billion well spent. Over the past 500 years, after all, war?s victors have been distinguished not so much by their wealth or size as by their ability to exploit new combat technologies. The empires that first mastered gunpowder weapons gave way to the nations that were quickest to harness steam power and steel. In the years leading up to World War II, the Soviet Union grabbed the advantage in tank warfare while the United States mastered in bombers and aircraft carriers. A fourth military revolution?the Information Revolution?finds the U.S. with no obvious battlefield rival, Boot says. But history also tells us that no technological advantage ever lasts.
Boot is a ?fantastic writer,? said Phillip Carter in Slate.com. Despite the grand sweep of War Made New, the book unfolds as a string of dramatic vignettes, from ?the drubbing of the Spanish Armada in 1588? to ?Japan?s smashing of the Russian fleet in 1905? and beyond. All the while, Boot seems determined to prove that new technology has provided a meaningful advantage only for nations that already excelled at an ?institutional, almost bureaucratic? approach to raising armies and deploying them wisely. But Boot suddenly abandons this mitigating idea when he arrives at America?s 1991 war in the Persian Gulf. Smart bombs and similar gadgetry bedazzle him, and he loses sight of the fact that none of our technological advantages will do America much good if our enemies decide to completely avoid conventional warfare.
Boot does acknowledge that the military?s industrial-era organizational structure may now be an albatross, said Frank Hoffman in Armed Forces Journal. He hints that forces that are able to decentralize decision-making may hold the edge in the future. Even so, Boot?s ?brilliantly crafted history? leaves you wondering if he isn?t utterly mistaken about the current revolution, said Robert H. Scales in The Wall Street Journal. Maybe technology?s long reign is over and ?the big news? of the current century will be ?written by an adaptive enemy who has learned?after 500 years of trying?how to lessen the effectiveness of Western technology through the imaginative use of patience, ideological fanaticism, and an enthusiasm for death.?
The Paradox of Military Technology
While various setbacks in the war on terror underscore the limits of American power, it is important not to lose sight of the bigger picture: we live in the age of American supremacy. Part of the explanation for U.S. dominance surely lies in America?s economic strength. But Europe and Japan are similarly wealthy, yet their global sway lags far behind. What they lack is America?s superior military capabilities. In the words of Gregg Easterbrook: ?The American military is now the strongest the world has ever known, both in absolute terms and relative to other nations; stronger than the Wehrmacht in 1940, stronger than the legions at the height of Roman power.? Although the dominance of U.S. forces can still be challenged when they come into close contact with the enemy on his home turf, they are undisputed masters of the ?commons? (sea, air, and space), which allows them to project power anywhere in the world at short notice.
Information technology is central to American military dominance. Not all of the changes wrought by the information age are obvious at first glance, because the basic military systems of the early twenty-first century look roughly similar to their predecessors of the second industrial age?tanks, planes, aircraft carriers, missiles. Military analyst Michael O?Hanlon notes that ?basic propulsion systems and designs for aircraft, ships, and internal-combustion vehicles are changing much more gradually than in the early twentieth-century, when two of those three technologies had only recently been invented.? The average speed of a U.S. Navy destroyer has not increased in the past 100 years. The U.S. Air Force continues to rely on B-52H bombers last built in 1962. And the Marine Corps still uses helicopters that flew in the Vietnam War. But since the mid-1970s, the communications, targeting, surveillance, and ordnance technologies that make such ?legacy? systems considerably more potent have been changing with great rapidity?and to America?s great advantage.
Yet in this period of American hegemony, Americans continue to feel vulnerable. As we learned on September 11, and continue learning on the battlefields of Iraq, the most advanced weapons systems and most sophisticated information technology are hardly a perfect shield against other kinds of destructive power. The paradox of our age is that modern technology is both the great separator and the great equalizer in military affairs: Technological supremacy separates America from the rest of the world, and yet modern technology leaves America vulnerable to vicious groups and gangs armed with AK47s, car bombs, or portable WMDs. To understand the future of warfare, we need to understand both sides of this paradox: specifically, how information technology has increased America?s conventional military supremacy (in land, sea, air, and space), and how this military edge may be subverted by determined radicals armed with new technologies of death.
Land Warfare
Advanced armies are still structured, as they have been since the 1940s, around armored forces complemented by light infantry troops who move by vehicle, truck, and aircraft. The best tank in the world is probably the American Abrams (of which the U.S. has 9,000) but the British Challenger II, the German Leopard II, the Israeli Merkava Mk. 4, and the Russian T-80 and T-90 come within striking distance. All modern tanks have stabilized turrets, night-vision capabilities, laser range-finders, and targeting computers that allow them to fight in conditions?on the move or in the dark?that would have stymied earlier models. In addition, composite or reactive armor offers far more protection than in years past, and main guns firing depleted-uranium rounds have far more penetrating power.
While armored vehicles have improved over the years, so have anti-armor weapons. These range from heavy missiles fired from vehicles or aircraft (such as the U.S. Hellfire and Russian Ataka-V) to hand-held versions (such as the U.S. Javelin, the Franco-German Milan, and the Russian Kornet). In addition, even the most advanced tanks can be disabled by other tanks, massive mines, aerial bombs, or artillery shells. The full impact of advances in anti-armor technology has not yet become apparent because most of the forces that have fought modern tanks in recent years?Iraqis, Palestinians, Chechens?have not possessed the latest defensive weapons. But the U.S. success in wiping out Iraqi tanks from stand-off ranges suggests that, in the constant struggle between offense and defense, the advantage may have shifted against heavy armor. The Israelis got a taste of what the modern era has in store when, in August 2006, their tanks and troops ran into a blizzard of advanced anti-tank rockets during their attacks on Hezbollah?s strongholds in southern Lebanon.
The U.S. Army is responding to these changes by budgeting at least $124 billion?and possibly a great deal more?to develop a Future Combat System that will replace much of its current armored force with a family of lighter vehicles, manned and unmanned, with stealth designs that will make them harder to detect and hybrid-electric engines that will lessen their fuel requirements. (One of the chief disadvantages of the gas-guzzling Abrams is its heavy dependence on vulnerable supply lines.) Future vehicles will feature advanced composite armor designed to deliver more protection than current models for the same amount of weight, but they will rely for protection less on armor and more on locating and destroying the enemy before they are attacked. Critics believe this places too much faith in ?perfect situational awareness,? and that these vehicles will not be of much use against guerrillas who can strike with no warning.
As usual, the infantryman?s tools have changed least of all. A modern soldier has better protection than his forefathers if he wears Kevlar body armor, but his firepower?which comes primarily from a handheld assault rifle like the M-16 or AK-47 and from a variety of crew-served mortars and machine guns?does not vary significantly from that of a G.I. or Tommy in World War II. Electronic guns that are capable of spitting out a million rounds a minute have been developed, and might permit a soldier to stop an incoming rocket-propelled grenade with a solid wall of lead. But such weapons are years away from being fielded.
Unfortunately for Western soldiers, the proliferation of small arms can put even the most primitive foes on an almost equal footing with the representatives of the most advanced militaries. There are 250 million military and police small arms knocking around the world, and more are being manufactured all the time by at least 1,249 suppliers in 90 countries.
The salvation of information age infantry, at least when they are conducting conventional operations, is their ability to use a wireless communications device to call in supporting fire on exact coordinates. It is doubtful that any military force will again enjoy the preponderance of power of General H. H. Kitchener at Omdurman, but Americans dropping Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) on Afghan tribesmen armed with Kalashnikovs?or even on Iraqi soldiers with outdated T-72 tanks?came close. The American edge decreases considerably, however, when its troops have to deploy for peacekeeping or counterinsurgency operations which leave them exposed to low-tech ambushes. ?With the possible exceptions of night-vision devices, Global Positioning Systems, and shoulder-fired missiles,? writes retired Major General Robert Scales, a former commander of the Army War College, ?there is no appreciable technological advantage for an American infantryman when fighting the close battle against even the poorest, most primitive enemy.?
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Naval Warfare
Navies remain divided, as they have been since the dawn of the second industrial age, into aircraft carriers, submarines, and surface ships. The major difference is that blue-water naval competition has disappeared after more than 500 years. No one even tries to challenge the U.S. Navy anymore on the high seas. Virtually every other navy in the world is little more than a coastal patrol force.
The U.S. has 12 aircraft carriers, nine of them Nimitz-class, nuclear-powered supercarriers that can carry more than 70 high-performance aircraft such as the F/A-18 Super Hornet. A tenth supercarrier is in the works. No one else has a single one. France has the world?s only other nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, but it is half the size of the Nimitz. Russia has one aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, that rarely leaves port, and it has sold another one, the Admiral Gorshkov, to India. Britain has three small Invincible-class aircraft carriers that are used only for helicopters and vertical-takeoff Harrier jets. France, Italy, Spain, Japan, and South Korea have similar helicopter carriers in the works. These ships are comparable to the U.S. Navy?s 12 amphibious assault ships, which transport helicopters, jump jets, and Marines.
Whenever they leave port, U.S. capital ships are surrounded by surface and submarine escorts. Twenty-four Ticonderoga-class cruisers and 45 (and counting) Arleigh Burke-class destroyers come equipped with Aegis phased-array radar which can track up to 900 targets in a 300-mile radius. These surface combatants can also operate on their own or in conjunction with smaller vessels such as frigates and minesweepers.
In World War II, ships that didn?t carry aircraft were limited to firing torpedoes or heavy guns with a range of less than 30 miles. Starting in the 1960s some submarines were equipped with intercontinental range ballistic missiles, but their targeting was so imprecise that it made no sense to equip them with conventional warheads. Ballistic-missile subs became a mainstay of nuclear deterrence. The development of accurate cruise missiles starting in the 1970s allowed submarines and surface combatants to hit land targets hundreds of miles away with conventional ordnance. Improvements in torpedo design, including the development of rocket-propelled supercavitating torpedoes, also allow submarines to do more damage in their traditional anti-ship role.
The U.S. has the world?s largest fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (54) and nuclear-powered ballistic-missile subs (16). Russia comes in second with 37 attack submarines and 14 ballistic missile subs. Britain has 15 nuclear-powered submarines, followed by France with 10, and China with six. Not only are U.S. submarines more numerous, they are also more advanced. The most sophisticated are three 1990s-vintage Seawolfs described by one defense analyst as ?the fastest, quietest, and most heavily armed undersea vessels ever built.?
Because of the growing power of each of its vessels and the lack of competitors, the U.S. Navy has consolidated its high seas hegemony even while its fleet has shrunk from almost 500 ships in the 1980s to fewer than 300 in the early years of the twenty-first century. The potency of U.S. naval vessels is increased by linking together sensors and weapons systems with a tactical computer network known as FORCEnet.
While the U.S. Navy probably will remain unchallenged in blue waters, it faces greater threats as it gets closer to shore. Here water currents, thermal layers, and various obstacles can interfere with even the most advanced sensors, and a variety of defensive weapons systems lurk in wait.
More than 75,000 anti-ship missiles are owned by 70 countries. A few are ballistic, but most are of the cruise-missile variety. Their potency was proved in 1987 when French-made Exocets fired by an Iraqi aircraft crippled the frigate USS Stark, killing 37 sailors. Earlier, Argentina used Exocets to sink two British ships during the 1982 Falklands War. Newer anti-ship cruise missiles such as the Russian-made Yakhont, Sunburn, and Uran are even deadlier because they have faster speeds, greater stealth capabilities, and more accurate, GPS-enhanced targeting. Russia is selling these missiles to customers abroad and some nations like China are developing their own versions. Israel suffered the consequences during its recent Lebanon war when an Iranian-provided C-802 cruise missile crippled one of its warships off the coast of Lebanon.
U.S. warships have sophisticated defensive systems to guard against air attack: Incoming missiles can be deflected by electronic countermeasures, flares, or chaff, or destroyed by naval aircraft, sea-to-air Standard missiles, or, as a last resort, by rapid-fire, radar-guided Phalanx guns. But, like the Stark, a warship could be caught by surprise or overwhelmed by a flurry of missiles coming from different directions.
Even more worrisome from an American viewpoint is the fact that transport ships and fuel tankers which have to replenish a fleet at sea have no protection when they are outside the defensive range of a battle group. They are as vulnerable as supply convoys on the roads of Iraq. Because a supercarrier has only about a three-day stockpile of JP-5 jet fuel (6,500 barrels a day are needed during combat operations), the most powerful warship in history could be rendered useless if its fuel tankers were sunk.
The threat to shipping, civil and military, is increased by diesel submarines. The latest diesel submarines have ultra-quiet electric engines that make them hard to detect with sonar, and they are much cheaper to buy or produce than a nuclear-powered submarine. Russia has exported Kilo-class diesel-electric subs to China, India, Iran, and Algeria, among others. China is producing its own Song-class diesel submarines in a bid to challenge U.S. naval hegemony using the same strategy that Germany, with its U-boats, once used to challenge British dominion of the waves. U.S. antisubmarine defenses are quite sophisticated, especially in open waters, but even American sensors can have trouble tracking quiet diesel subs in noisy coastal waters.
Mines, which can be scattered by submarines or other vessels, represent another major threat to shipping. More than 300 different varieties are available on the world market. They can be triggered by changes in magnetic fields, acoustic levels, seismic pressure, or other factors. Some come equipped with microelectronics that allow them to distinguish between different types of ships, while others have small motors that allow them to move around. This makes it difficult to certify that a shipping channel is free of mines?it may have been safe an hour ago, but not any more. Demining technology has lagged behind; the U.S. Navy, for one, has never placed much emphasis on lowly minesweepers. It has paid a price for this neglect. In 1987, during operations to prevent Iran from closing the Persian Gulf, an Iranian mine of World War I design nearly sank the frigate USS Samuel Roberts. Four years later, in the Gulf War, the cruiser USS Princeton and the amphibious landing ship USS Tripoli were nearly blasted apart by Iraqi mines. And even a cheap motorboat packed with explosives can pose a significant threat to a modern warship. The USS Cole, an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, was badly damaged in such a terrorist attack in 2000.
All of these threats could be largely negated if U.S. fleets were to stay far out at sea, but they have to approach fairly close to land to launch aircraft or missiles with operational ranges of only a few hundred miles. Moreover, the places where the U.S. Navy is likely to fight in the future are dangerously narrow. The Persian Gulf is only 30 miles wide at its narrowest point, the Taiwan Strait only 100 miles wide.
To maintain its dominance, the U.S. Navy regularly updates the electronics and weapons aboard its warships even as the hulls and propulsion systems remain unchanged. It also plans to build a variety of unmanned vessels along with a CVN-21 aircraft carrier to replace the Nimitz-class, a Zumwalt-class DD(X) destroyer to replace Oliver Hazard Perry-class frigates and Spruance-class destroyers, a CG(X) cruiser to replace the Ticonderoga-class cruisers, and a smaller and speedier Littoral Combat Ship with no direct parallel in today?s fleet that would focus on clearing mines, hunting submarines, and fighting terrorists in coastal waters. All of these new vessels will have improved defenses and information-processing tools as well as ?plug and play? capacity that will allow them to be quickly reconfigured for different missions. They will also incorporate composite materials, stealthier designs, and electric propulsion to make them harder to detect, though an aircraft carrier with a 4.5-acre flight deck can never exactly hide.
Whether all of these warships are truly needed, given the U.S. Navy?s already substantial lead over all competitors, remains an open question. A program to develop giant sea bases?perhaps akin to offshore oil-platforms?that would allow American ground and air forces to operate overseas might be of greater use, given the growing difficulty the U.S. has had in gaining basing and overflight rights from other countries. But what seems clear, on sea as on land, is that the development of new weapons systems will continue to augment American supremacy while leaving American military forces vulnerable to various ?low-tech? attacks.
Aerial Warfare
Fighters such as the American F-15 and the Russian MiG-29 were designed in the 1970s for air-to-air combat, but this has become almost as rare as ship-to-ship actions. Since the Israelis destroyed much of the Syrian air force in 1982, and the U.S. and its allies made similarly quick work of the Iraqi air force in 1991, few if any aircraft have been willing to challenge top-of-the-line Western militaries. (The U.S. Air Force hasn?t produced an ace?an airman with at least five aerial kills?since 1972.) That may change with the sale to China of the Russian-built Sukhoi Su-30, whose performance characteristics are said to exceed those of the F-15C, but the F/A-22 Raptor, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and the Eurofighter should restore the Western edge. The odds of future aerial dogfights, however, still remain slim.
Modern surface-to-air missiles pose a more immediate danger, because they are cheaper and easier to operate. The U.S. and its allies have developed effective methods of neutralizing most existing air defenses. In addition to jammers, radar-seeking missiles, and decoys, the U.S. employs stealth technology, first used on the F-117 Nighthawk, then on the B-2 Spirit, and now on the F/A-22 and F-35. Future aircraft may be designed with ?visual stealth? technology to make them almost invisible even in daylight. No other nation has deployed any stealth aircraft. But advanced sensor networks may now be able to detect first-generation stealth planes. The Serbs actually managed to shoot down an F-117 in 1999.
None of the most sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, such as Russia?s double-digit SAMs (SA-10, SA-15, SA-20), was available to Iraq, Serbia, Afghanistan, or other states that the U.S. has fought in recent years, but they are being sold to other customers, including China, Vietnam, Kazakhstan, South Korea, Greece, and Cyprus. So are shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles such as the American FIM-92 Stinger, British Starstreak, French Mistral, Chinese Qianwei-2, and the Russian SA-7 Grail, SA-14 Gremlin, SA-16 Gimlet, and SA-18 Grouse. There are at least 100,000 such systems in the arsenals of over 100 states and at least 13 non-state groups such as Hezbollah, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the Tamil Tigers. The best models have a range of 23,000 feet.
The potential of hand-carried missiles was demonstrated in the 1980s when Stingers took a significant toll on Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan. The threat is sufficient for the U.S. to rely increasingly on unmanned drones for high-risk missions and to mandate that manned aircraft in war zones stay above 15,000 or 20,000 feet. SAMs pose an especially great threat to helicopters, which don?t have the option of flying that high, and for airplanes taking off or landing. Three cargo aircraft leaving Baghdad International Airport have been seriously damaged by missiles, and, while all of them survived, several U.S. helicopters hit with SAMs in Iraq and Afghanistan did not. An Israeli jetliner was almost shot down in Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 by al Qaeda operatives firing an SA-7. Only the terrorists? targeting error prevented the deaths of 271 passengers and crew. Other civilian airliners are sure to be less lucky.
Assuming that warplanes can reach their destination, the growing precision of bombs and missiles has made it possible to take out targets with fewer and smaller munitions than ever before. (The U.S. Air Force?s latest bomb carries only 50 pounds of explosives.) Weapons are getting smarter all the time. The U.S. Sensor-Fuzed Weapon, first employed in the current Iraq War, disperses 40 ?skeet? anti-armor warheads that use infrared and laser sensors to find and destroy armored vehicles within a 30-acre area. The Tactical Tomahawk, which entered production in 2004, can loiter up to three hours while searching for targets and receiving in-flight retargeting instructions.
The U.S. preponderance in smart bombs and missiles helps to compensate for the relatively small size of its manned bomber force. As of 2005, the U.S. Air Force had only 157 long-range bombers (B-52s, B-1s, B-2s), a considerable fall not only from World War II (when the U.S. had 34,780) but also from the end of the Cold War (360). While few in number, each B-2 can perform the work of thousands of B-29s by ?servicing? 80 ?aim points? per sortie.
Tankers such as the KC-10 and KC-135 vastly extend the range and effectiveness of combat aircraft. Cargo-lifters like the U.S. C-5, C-17, and C-130 and the Russian An-70 and An-225 also perform an invaluable, if unglamorous, role in projecting military power around the world. The U.S. owns 740 tanker aircraft and 1,200 cargo aircraft?far more than any other country. A lack of such support aircraft makes it difficult for even the relatively sophisticated European militaries to move their forces very far.
A host of other aircraft, ranging from JSTARS and AWACS to Rivet Joint and Global Hawk, perform surveillance and electronic-warfare missions in support of combat forces. Their numbers have been growing: While there were only two JSTARS in the Gulf War, in the Iraq War there were 15. But commanders have become so reliant on these systems that there never seem to be enough to go around?the so-called LD/HD problem (Low Density/High Demand). These, too, are vital U.S. assets that few other nations have.
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Space Warfare
A growing amount of surveillance, communications, and intelligence work is being performed by unmanned aircraft and satellites. In 2001 the U.S. had an estimated 100 military satellites and 150 commercial satellites in orbit, as much as the rest of the world combined. The U.S. spends more than $15 billion a year on military space, perhaps 90 percent of the global total. The most advanced U.S. surveillance satellites can reportedly pick out a six-inch object from 150 miles above. (This is an estimate for Keyhole imaging satellites which can work day or night but cannot penetrate cloud cover. Lacrosse or Onyx systems that use radar imaging can work in all kinds of weather. They can reportedly distinguish objects 3 to 9 feet across. Satellite capabilities are strictly classified; these are only informed guesses.) A new generation of satellites uses stealth technology so that other countries will not be able to track the satellites? movement and thus know when to hide equipment from American eyes.
Yet the advantage the U.S. military derives from mastery of space is slowly eroding. GPS, a system developed by the Defense Department, is now widely available for countless commercial applications that have spawned a $30-billion-a-year industry. A potential enemy could use GPS signals to locate targets in the U.S. the same way the U.S. military uses it to locate targets in Iraq or Afghanistan. The U.S. could jam or degrade GPS signals in wartime, but it would have to do so very selectively for fear of imposing a severe toll on the economy, because GPS devices are now essential for civil aviation, shipping, and other functions. In addition, the European Union in cooperation with China is launching its own GPS constellation, known as Galileo, that would be outside of direct U.S. control.
More and more countries?at least forty to date?are lofting their own satellites. In addition, various multinational organizations such as the Asia Satellite Corp., Arab Satellite Communications Organization, International Telecom Satellite Organization, and European Space Agency have launched their own satellites. But getting access to space no longer requires having your own satellite. A growing number of private firms such as Google, DigitalGlobe, and Space Imaging sell or give away high-resolution satellite photos via the Internet. The best of these offer imagery of sufficient quality to identify objects one and a half feet wide. The Israeli-owned ImageSat International offers customers the opportunity to redirect its EROS-A imaging satellite (launched in 2000 aboard a Russian rocket) and download its data in total secrecy with few if any restrictions. Its CEO boasts: ?Our customers, in effect, acquire their own reconnaissance satellite ... at a fraction of the cost that it would take to build their own.? The private satellite industry is becoming so pervasive that the U.S. military now relies upon it to provide some of its own imaging (typically low-resolution pictures used for mapping) and much of its communications needs.
Targets identified from space could be attacked either with terrorist (or commando) missions or with the growing number of missiles spreading around the world. More than two dozen nations have ballistic missiles and by 2015 at least a dozen will have land-attack cruise missiles. Either type of projectile could be topped with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads. Eight or nine countries already have nuclear weapons and more are trying to get them, in part to offset the tremendous U.S. advantage in conventional weaponry.
In response, the U.S. is working on a variety of missile defenses. The most advanced are the ground-based Patriot Advanced Capability 3 and the sea-based Standard Missile 3, which have been deployed already to protect U.S. troops overseas. The deployment of a long-heralded system designed to protect the U.S. homeland against long-range missiles began in 2004 with the installation of interceptors in Alaska. Eventually, the U.S. plans to field a multi-layered defense using a variety of sensors and weapons on land, sea, air, and space. Also in the works are systems designed to defeat low-flying cruise missiles, which are hard to distinguish from ground clutter. But whether these systems will protect Americans against the most likely or most deadly types of attacks remains an open question.
Robotic Warfare
The falling size and cost of electronics has made it possible to decrease the number of people needed to operate major weapons systems or, in some instances, eliminated the need for human operators altogether. Maintaining the engines aboard a ship used to require dozens of sailors to work for extended periods in noisy, grimy, cramped quarters. The new DD(X) destroyer will have an engine room controlled entirely by remote sensors and cameras. Or, to take another example, consider the evolution of the long-range bomber from the B-29, which had a crew of 11, to the B-2 which can hit many more targets but has a crew of just two, who spend much of their time supervising the autopilot functions.
The greatest advances in robotics have been made in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), with the U.S. in the lead, Israel following close behind, and at least 40 other countries trying to catch up. By the time of the Iraq War in 2003, the U.S. had fielded six major UAVs: the Air Force?s Predator and Global Hawk, the Army?s Hunter and Shadow, and the Marines? Pioneer and Dragon Eye. These ranged in size from the 27,000-pound Global Hawk (comparable to a Lear jet) to the five-pound Dragon Eye (more like a model airplane). What they had in common was that they were all designed as surveillance systems. But in a pattern that echoes the history of manned flight, UAVs such as the Predator were soon put to work attacking enemy positions.
Soon to be deployed are drones built especially for combat?Boeing?s X-45 and Northrop Grumman?s X-47. In Matthew Brzezinski?s fanciful description, the former is ?flat as a pancake, with jagged 34-foot batwings, no tail and a triangular, bulbous nose? that give it the appearance of ?a set piece from the television program Battlestar Galactica,? while the latter is a ?a sleek kite-shaped craft with internal weapons bays for stealth and curved air intakes like the gills of a stingray.? Both are designed to be almost invisible to radar and to perform especially dangerous missions like suppressing enemy air defenses. The major difference is that the X-45 is supposed to take off from land like the F-15, while the X-47 is to operate off aircraft carriers like the F-18. Also in development is the Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft which is designed to perform the functions of an attack helicopter like the Apache. An unmanned helicopter, known as Fire Scout, is already being bought by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Unlike the Predator, most of these new UAVs do not require constant control by a human operator; newer UAVs can be programmed to fly themselves and even drop munitions without direct human intervention.
Further into the future may be projects such as a nuclear-powered UAV that could fly at 70,000 feet and stay on station for months or even years at a time; a UAV ?tender? that could serve as a mother ship for launching and recovering smaller UAVs; UAV tankers that could refuel other UAVs in flight; and vertical-takeoff UAV cargo-carriers that could supply troops in a combat zone. Many of these UAVs could use smart munitions with their own target-recognition systems, thus introducing another layer of robotics into the process. An existing example is the Low-Cost Autonomous Attack System, a 100-pound bomb with fins and a small turbojet engine that allow it to loiter over an area for up to 30 minutes, using a laser-radar sensor to search for high-priority targets based on programmed algorithms. Once it picks out a target, it can configure its multi-mode warhead into the most appropriate form?fragmentation explosives for unprotected soldiers or an armor-piercing projectile for tanks?prior to impact.
The most revolutionary UAVs are the smallest. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) is working on aerial vehicles the size of an insect or a hummingbird that could hover undetected and perch on a telephone pole or a window ledge. Some models have no wings at all; others use flapping, bird-style wings. They are designed to be cheap enough that they could saturate a battlefield with sensors.
Unmanned ground vehicles are not as advanced as UAVs, but they are starting to play a growing role as well. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have used robots with names like PackBot, Matilda, Andros, and Swords to search tunnels, caves, and buildings for enemy fighters and explosives. ?Some are as big as a backhoe. Others can be attached to a backpack frame and carried by a soldier,? writes the trade industry publication Defense News. ?They move on treads or wheels, climb over obstacles with the aid of flippers, mount stairs, peep through windows and peer into caves with cameras and infrared sensors, sniff for chemical agents, and even operate a small ground-penetrating radar.?
As this description indicates, ground-based robots, like their aerial counterparts, are still used mainly for reconnaissance. But weapons are beginning to be mounted on them, too. The Talon, a two-foot-six-inch robot which looks like a miniature tank and was designed for bomb disposal, was sent to Iraq equipped with grenade and rocket launchers as well as a .50-caliber machine gun. It is controlled remotely by a soldier using a video screen and joystick.
Developing more sophisticated unmanned ground vehicles will be tougher than developing better UAVs because there are so many more obstacles that can impede movement on the ground. But progress is rapidly being made. In 2004, DARPA sponsored a race in the Mojave Desert to see if an autonomous robotic vehicle could complete a 132-mile course. That year, the furthest any competitor got was 7.4 miles, but in 2005 four vehicles finished the entire course, with the winner (a souped-up Volkswagen Touareg) claiming the $2 million prize. Buoyed by these results, the Pentagon is pushing ahead with plans for new ground robots such as the MULE (Multifunction Logistics and Equipment Vehicle), a two-and-a-half-ton truck that could carry supplies into battle or wounded soldiers out of it; the Armed Robotic Vehicle, a five-ton mini-tank that could be equipped with missiles or a .30mm chain gun; and the Soldier Unmanned Ground Vehicle, a 30-pound, man-portable scout that comes equipped with weapons and sensors. These are all integral elements of the Army?s Future Combat System.
Scientists are also trying to create a self-powered robotic suit?an exoskeleton?that could enable soldiers to carry far heavier loads, move much faster, and conceivably even leap short buildings in a single bound. A prototype developed at the University of California, Berkeley, allows a soldier to carry 180 pounds as if it were less than five pounds.
The U.S. Navy is exploring robotic technology for a variety of its own missions. In addition to carrier-based UAVs (both fixed-wing and rotary), the navy is developing Unmanned Surface Vehicles and Unmanned Undersea Vehicles. Most of these drones would swim but some might crawl along the ocean floor like crabs. They could perform such difficult missions as antisubmarine warfare, mine clearance, undersea mapping, and surveillance in coastal waters.
All drones, whether operating on soil, sea, or sky, offer major advantages over traditional manned vehicles. They can be deployed for longer periods because robots don?t need to eat or sleep; they can undertake maneuvers that might put too much stress on the human frame; they can be made much smaller and cheaper because they don?t need all sorts of expensive redundancies and life-support systems (no oxygen tanks! no ejection seats!); and they can be much more readily sent on high-risk missions because, should anything go wrong, nobody has to worry about notifying the next of kin. These advantages have persuaded Congress to ratchet up spending on unmanned programs. Lawmakers have mandated that one-third of all U.S. deep-strike aircraft be unmanned by 2010 and that one-third of all ground combat vehicles be unmanned by 2015.
There are two chief limitations on the use of robots at the moment. First, computers and sensors are not yet smart enough to deliver anything close to the ?situational awareness? of a human being. Second, a shortage of bandwidth limits the number of drones that can be remotely controlled at any one time. Both problems will become less acute with improvements in computer and communications technology, but there is still little reason to think that robots will be alone on the battlefield of the future. It is doubtful that machines will ever be smart enough to do all of the fighting, even if they can perform some of the dullest, dirtiest, or most dangerous work.
The Limits of Technological Supremacy
Taken together, the changes in military power wrought by the information revolution are still in their early stages, and they still have serious limitations. Even the best surveillance systems can be stymied by simple countermeasures like camouflage, smoke, and decoys, by bad weather, or by terrain like the deep sea, mountains, or jungles. Sensors have limited ability to penetrate solid objects, so that they cannot tell what is happening in underground bunkers such as those that North Korea and Iran likely use to hide their nuclear weapons programs. Urban areas present a particularly difficult challenge: There are far more things to track (individuals) and far more obstructions (buildings, vehicles, trees, signs) than at sea or in the sky. Figuring out whether a person is a civilian or an insurgent is a lot harder than figuring out whether an unidentified aircraft is a civilian airliner or an enemy fighter. It is harder still to figure out how many enemy soldiers will resist or what stratagems they will employ. No machine has yet been invented that can penetrate human thought processes. Even with the best equipment in the world, U.S. forces frequently have been surprised by their adversaries.
Some strategists expect that advances in information technology will greatly diminish if not altogether obliterate some of these difficulties. The Pentagon is creating a Global Information Grid that will pool data from all U.S. assets, whether an infantryman on the ground or a satellite in space. The ultimate goal: to provide a perfect operational picture?a ?God?s-eye view? of the battlespace.
This ambitious objective could be furthered by the development of better microwave radars that could see through walls, foliage, or soil; cheaper, more pervasive sensors that could provide 24/7 coverage of the battlefield; better data compression and transmission techniques that could allow more bytes to be sent much faster; and more powerful computers that might make it possible to create, for example, a real-time, three-dimensional model of a city showing all the people who reside in it.
Yet no matter how far information technology advances, it is doubtful that the Pentagon will ever succeed, as some utopians dream, in ?lifting the fog of war.? The fallibility of American soldiers and the cunning of their enemies will surely continue to frustrate the best-laid plans. Moreover, America?s growing reliance on high-tech systems creates new vulnerabilities of its own: Future enemies have strong incentives to attack U.S. computer and communication nodes. Strikes on military information networks could blind or paralyze the armed forces, while strikes on civilian infrastructure, such as banking or air control systems, could cause chaos on the home front. Adversaries will almost certainly figure out ways to blunt the U.S. informational advantage. From Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan to numerous misadventures in Iraq, they already have. Whether fighting in the mountains of eastern Afghanistan or in the alleys of Ramadi and Fallujah, U.S. soldiers have been ambushed by insurgents who managed to elude their sensor networks through such simple expedients as communicating via messengers, not cell phones.
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Asymmetric Warfare
Given the size and scope of America?s military advantage, it is doubtful that any country will mount a full-spectrum challenge to U.S. military capabilities in the foreseeable future. The entry barriers are simply too high, especially for air, sea, and space systems. Virginia-class nuclear submarines cost $2.4 billion, Nimitz-class aircraft carriers go for $6 billion, and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program will cost at least $245 billion. The U.S. spends around $500 billion a year on its military, almost as much as the rest of the world combined. In fact, the U.S. spends more simply on the research, development, testing, and evaluation of new weapons?$71 billion in 2006?than any other country spends on its entire armed forces. (By way of comparison, the top three spenders after the U.S. are Russia, whose defense budget in 2003 was estimated at $65 billion; China, at $56 billion; France, at $45 billion; and Japan and the United Kingdom, at $42 billion. These are only estimates; the figures for Russia and China may be considerably higher.)
It is not only U.S. hardware that?s hard to replicate; so is the all-volunteer force that makes it work. Operating high-tech military equipment requires long-service professionals, not short-term conscripts. Countries as diverse as Vietnam, China, Germany, and Russia are emulating the Anglo-American model by downsizing their forces and relying less on draftees; many other nations have abolished the draft altogether. The U.S. military?s edge lies not simply in recruiting high-quality personnel but in its methods for training and organizing them. Initiatives undertaken in earlier decades, such as setting up realistic training centers to simulate combat conditions and forcing the services to work more closely together (the Goldwater-Nichols Act), continue to bear fruit. Few other armed forces have made comparable reforms.
But a potential adversary does not need to duplicate the U.S. force structure in order to challenge it. The United States faces a growing ?asymmetric? threat both from other states and from sub-state groups. As the National Intelligence Council concluded in its recent report ?Mapping the Global Future?: ?While no single country looks within striking distance of rivaling U.S. military power by 2020, more countries will be in a position to make the United States pay a heavy price for any military action they oppose.? As we have seen, a variety of off-the-shelf missiles can threaten U.S. tanks, surface ships, and aircraft, especially when they get close to hostile territory. The power of smart munitions is outstripping the protection afforded by speed or armor. After 2010, write defense analysts Michael Vickers and Robert Martinage, ?the survivability of aircraft carriers, high-structure surface combatants [e.g., tanks], and non-stealthy aircraft of all types could increasingly be called into question as maritime, over-the-horizon ?area denial? capabilities and extended-range air defense systems continue to mature.? In a similar vein, George and Meredith Friedman contend that ?the ability of conventional weapons platforms?tanks and aircraft carriers?to survive in a world of precision-guided munitions is dubious.?
Also vulnerable are the ports, airfields, and bases which the U.S. uses to project its power overseas. Imagine how much damage Saddam Hussein could have done in 2003 if he had been able to annihilate the one port in Kuwait that was being used to disembark coalition troops or the large desert bases in Kuwait where over 100,000 British and American troops gathered prior to the invasion of Iraq. The Pentagon?s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review warned that ?future adversaries could have the means to render ineffective much of our current ability to project military power overseas.?
If the U.S. armed forces could not count on safe, assured access to overseas bases they would need to change radically the way they do business. It would no longer be practical to rely on large land armies or lots of short-range combat aircraft operating out of vulnerable forward bases supplied by equally vulnerable cargo ships, trucks, and aircraft. The U.S. Army might be forced to rely on small numbers of commandos supported by long-range aircraft and missiles?as it did in Afghanistan. The Navy might have to depend more on submarines and the Air Force on stealth aircraft. All the services might have to make greater use of unmanned vehicles. The battlefield, which has been becoming less crowded for centuries, might empty out even further as small units try to conceal themselves from ubiquitous sensor networks, emerging only briefly to launch lightning strikes before they go back into hiding.
This has become known as the ?swarming? scenario, and it has attracted support from the likes of military historian Alexander Bevin. ?Large concentrations of troops and weapons are targets for destruction, not marks of power,? he writes, ?and [in the future] they no longer will exist.... Military units, to survive, must not only be small, but highly mobile, self-contained, and autonomous.? Even if these predictions are accurate, however, it isn?t clear when they would become reality, and timing matters tremendously. The key to winning future wars is knowing when to move from one form of military to another: A premature decision to change (such as the U.S. Army?s flawed Pentomic design in the 1950s) can leave one unprepared to fight and win the wars that actually occur, Vietnam being the classic example.
In any case, it is doubtful that a complete switchover to ?swarming? will ever occur. Winning wars, as opposed to winning battles, will continue to require controlling territory, which in turn will require a substantial presence of ground troops, as the U.S. has learned in Afghanistan and Iraq. No wonder-weapon will alter this fundamental reality, which means even the most high-tech military force will always remain vulnerable to the less sophisticated but still deadly technology of its adversaries on the ground.
American Hiroshima?
Even as strategists look to the future, armed forces must not lose sight of the threats of the moment, and they do not come for the most part from traditional militaries. They come largely from terrorist groups?some with state sponsorship, others without?that use the fruits of modern military technology to their perverse advantage.
?Irregular? attacks carried out by tribes, clans, or other non-state actors are as old as warfare itself; they long predate the development of modern armed forces and the nation-state. The religious fanaticism which animates so many of today?s terrorists and guerrillas is equally ancient. But technological advances have made such attacks far more potent than in the distant past. The progeny of the second industrial revolution?assault rifles, machine guns, mortars, rocket launchers, landmines, explosives?long ago spread to the remotest corners of the globe. Fighters who a century ago might have made do with swords and muskets now have access to cheap and reliable weapons such as the AK-47 capable of spewing out 100 bullets a minute. More advanced technologies, from handheld missiles to chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, give even a small group of insurgents the ability or potential ability to mete out far more destruction than entire armies could unleash just a century ago. And thanks to modern transportation and communications infrastructure?such as jumbo jets, the Internet, and cell phones?insurgents have the capability to carry out their attacks virtually anywhere in the world.
September 11 showed the terrifying possibilities of such unconventional warfare. It is easy to imagine that in the future super-terrorists will be able to kill hundreds of thousands, even millions, with effective weapons of mass destruction. All of the materials, as well as the know-how needed to craft such devices, are all too readily available.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons has the greatest ability to trump U.S. military hegemony. The atomic bomb is more than sixty years old. It belongs to an age of rotary-dial telephones and fin-winged cars. It is a miracle that it has not been used by maniac dictators or political radicals since 1945, but that streak won?t last forever. And while information age technology offers a reasonable chance of stopping a nuclear-tipped missile, there is much less probability of stopping a terrorist with a nuclear suitcase. There is little in theory to prevent al Qaeda from carrying out its oft-expressed desire to create an ?American Hiroshima.? In the words of Eugene Habiger, a retired four-star general who once ran antinuclear terror programs for the Department of Energy, ?it is not a matter of if; it?s a matter of when.?
The most important challenge for the U.S. armed forces and their allies in the post-9/11 world is to ?leverage? their advantage in conventional weaponry to deal with today?s unconventional threats. Information technology can be an important part of this task. Embedded microchips can track the 18 million cargo containers moving around the world and help prevent terrorists from using them to smuggle weapons. Computerized cameras scanning a crowd may be able to pick out a terrorist based on facial recognition patterns. Dog-like sniffing machines may be able to recognize suspects by their body odor. Powerful computers utilizing artificial intelligence programs can sift vast reams of Internet data to pick out information about terrorist plots?if concerns about violating the privacy of innocent people do not get in the way. A variety of unobtrusive sensors can detect the presence of explosives or chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Handheld computer translating devices such as the Phraselator, already in use by U.S. troops, can bridge some of the language gap between Western operatives and the regions where they operate.
But in the final analysis, having the best technology is not enough to defeat the most committed terrorists armed with the deadliest weapons. Some of the most expensive weapons systems being purchased by the United States and its allies are irrelevant to fighting and winning the war against terrorism. And the combination of moral restraint and bureaucratic sluggishness that defines America?s military culture may leave the U.S. at a comparative disadvantage against nimble, networked, nihilistic enemies like al Qaeda, who will deploy whatever weapons they have with urgent brutality. To deal with the essential paradox of the information age?that the march of advanced technology may decrease our security in some areas while increasing it in others?we need not just better machines but also the right organizations, training, and leadership to take advantage of them. That?s where the U.S. has lagged badly behind; its industrial-age military bureaucracy remains configured primarily for fighting other conventional militaries, rather than the terrorist foes we increasingly confront. Changing the culture and structure of our armed forces?to say nothing of the CIA or State Department?is a far more daunting task than simply figuring out which weapons systems to buy. Yet even if we rise to that bureaucratic and political challenge, there will likely be times, tragically, when our military supremacy is no match for the technology-enhanced savagery of our inferior enemies.
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Max Boot is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, a columnist for the Los Angeles Times, and a contributing editor to The Weekly Standard. This article is adapted from his new book War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of Modern History, 1500 to Today, published by Gotham Books (October 2006).
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A B-1 Bomber lands wheels up.
http://www.zianet.com/tedmorris/dg/bombers4.html
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Geopolitical Diary: Maintaining U.S. Space Dominance
Robert Joseph, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, publicly insisted on Wednesday that the United States opposes any ban on the weaponization of space. He was careful, however, to say that the United States will continue to abide "scrupulously" by the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which bans the placement of nuclear weapons in space.
This comes as no surprise as it has been the position of the U.S. military for years. In 1957, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas D. White forecast that, "Whereas those who have the capacity to control the air control the land and sea beneath it, so in the future it is likely that those who have the capability to control space will likewise control the Earth's surface." The 2004 Air Force Counterspace Operations doctrine lays out the "five Ds" of targeting an adversary's space system: deception, disruption, denial, degradation and destruction.
Maintaining the high ground has always been the foundational principle of military strategy. Space is the ultimate high ground. The U.S. military advantage rests heavily on space -- from navigation and communication to intelligence (including MASINT) and the detection of a nuclear attack. Space assets guide the most accurate munitions in the inventory and allow bombing missions to be re-tasked mid-flight. The importance of space to the U.S. military's overwhelming advantage cannot be overstated.
As such, official U.S. policy states in no uncertain terms that, "Purposeful interference with U.S. space systems will be viewed as an infringement on our sovereign rights" and could warrant a retaliatory use of force.
In the coming years, U.S. dominance of space will be challenged, and the United States intends to maintain its advantage. During Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, Russian-built jamming systems attempted to locally disrupt the United States' global positioning system (GPS). They failed -- and were destroyed by GPS-guided bombs. This was one of the earliest attempts to challenge the United States in space warfare.
The Chinese reportedly have tried to blind or disable U.S. satellites with ground-based lasers. The United States has not officially recognized any Chinese attempt to interfere with its satellites in orbit. But, while targeting a fast-moving satellite and hitting it with a focused laser beam through the varying layers of the atmosphere is a difficult proposition to say the least, even the prospect of such an incident has not gone unnoticed.
The U.S. Air Force -- which controls the majority of U.S. space assets -- takes these potential threats seriously and views them as an indication of things to come. The Air Force has already adjusted the design architecture of its next-generation satellites in an attempt to counter such interference.
There is no doubt that the United States will vigorously defend its advantage in space -- and it will not hesitate for even a moment to use offensive force against an adversary's space assets.
stratfor.com
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A Pentagon Agency
Is Looking at Brains --
And Raising Eyebrows
December 15, 2006; Page B1
In a request issued in October, a government agency asked researchers for "innovative" ways to monitor the brain as it learns and acquires skills, such as by tracking when brain waves flip from those characteristic of novices to those of experts, and noninvasive ways to speed up the process.
In February, the agency said it was interested in ways to use EEGs to detect when a brain had found what it was looking for in a photograph, such as a familiar face in a crowd.
As part of the same program, the agency awarded Lockheed Martin $650,000 in August to develop technology to monitor a brain's cognitive activity in real time and, if the device senses overload, make changes such as slowing the flow of data the brain is receiving.
In a progress report to the agency's "Augmented Cognition" program, a company said in September that it had completed development of a portable, wearable system of sensors that assess cognitive function, producing a readout showing how a brain's pattern of thought-related activity deviates "from that of the normal population."
The requests came from, and the report went to, the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Established in 1958, Darpa is best known for inventing the forerunner of the Internet. For decades it lavished most of its support on physics. But lately, as part of its mission to maintain U.S. military superiority "by sponsoring revolutionary, high-payoff research," the agency has expanded into neuroscience.
Can the folks who brought you the Internet also bring you ways to look into brains -- and do you want them to?
Darpa has good reason to fund neuroscience. Discoveries and new technologies such as noninvasive imaging to detect what the mind is doing might help analysts, pilots and grunts process and react better to barrages of data, and allow real-time assessment of head injuries on the battlefield. Brain-computer interfaces in which thoughts are electronically translated into signals that operate a computer or prosthetic limb might improve rehab for soldiers suffering grievous injuries.
As with other "dual use" technologies, however, the findings and gizmos born of Darpa's brain research may well find their way into civilian life, and in ways that trouble some ethicists. Darpa's interest in neuroscience is "extensive and growing," says Jonathan Moreno of the University of Virginia, a former adviser on biodefense to the Department of Homeland Security. "There are reasons to be concerned about what uses these discoveries might be put to."
The Augmented Cognition program, for instance, seeks technologies that will "measure and track a subject's cognitive state in real time." The agency is partway there. One prototype helmet monitors brain states, which may include those associated with anger, aggression, anxiety, fatigue, deception -- in principle, any mental state -- and transmit the data wirelessly to a command center.
In battle, that would let commanders redeploy soldiers who are in no state to fight or carry out certain missions; you might not want a soldier who is boiling over with rage to search civilians. How an office supervisor, airport screener or job interviewer might make use of the technology is left to the reader's imagination.
A Darpa project using fMRI imaging of brain activity applies the discovery that recognizing a face or place you've seen before triggers a characteristic pattern of cortical activity. Do you recognize this terrorist training camp? This terrorist? The benefits could be huge. As with polygraphs and fingerprint analysis, however, technologies can be widely deployed without a solid scientific foundation about their rate of false positives, with the result that they send the innocent to prison.
In a new book, "Mind Wars," Prof. Moreno describes a Darpa project on a drug called CX717, which enables sleep-deprived people to maintain memory and cognitive function. In a world where students take Ritalin to give them a boost on the SAT and Provigil to pull all-nighters, there is no reason to think CX717, if it passes more tests, will be confined to military pilots on long-haul flights. If the drug doesn't succeed in keeping a sleep-deprived brain sharp, maybe Darpa-funded research on neurostimulation -- little zaps of electricity to improve cognitive performance -- will.
Presumably, workers and students will have the legal right to reject such "enhancements," Prof. Moreno says. Soldiers might not. Should they? Will employers or others pressure people to accept better thinking through technology? Will the use of such "augmented cognition" by business competitors have the same effect as steroids in baseball, where the perception that everyone is using them exerts pressure to do the same, to keep the playing field level? There has been virtually no debate on the ethical questions raised by the brave new brain technologies.
Ever since the atomic bomb, physicists have known that their work has potential military uses, and have spoken up about it. But on the morality of sending orders directly to the brain (of a soldier, employee, child, prisoner ...), or of devices that read thoughts and intentions from afar, neuroscientists have been strangely silent. The time to speak up is before the genie is out of the bottle.
• You can email me at sciencejournal@wsj.com.
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GETTING COUNTERINSURGENCY RIGHT
By RALPH PETERS
December 20, 2006 -- IF a prize were awarded for the most-improved government publication of the decade, we could choose the winner now: "Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency" (MCWP 3-33.5 for the Marine Corps). Rising above abysmal earlier drafts, the Army and Marines have come through with doctrine that will truly help our troops.
Doctrine matters. It doesn't provide leaders with a detailed blueprint, but offers a common foundation on which to build strategies and refine tactics. Start with a weak foundation, and the wartime house can easily collapse.
This new field manual is a solid base. Earlier drafts were dominated by theorists locked into 20th-century thinking - approaches that failed us so dismally in Iraq. But the final document offers a far greater sense of an insurgency's reality.
It doesn't have all the answers. No doctrine does. But it provides our battlefield leaders with a genuinely useful tool to help them understand insurgencies.
Yes, there's still a little too much "peace, love and understanding" silliness, but it's counterbalanced with blunt honesty that acknowledges that not all of our enemies can be persuaded to adore us. While non-lethal techniques and non-military means certainly have roles to play, the manual now states clearly that there are some foes - primarily religious or ethnic fanatics - who need to be killed.
This is a huge step forward for the Army, whose senior leadership has suffered from a Clinton-era hangover in the political-correctness department (many of the manual's tough-minded changes were made to satisfy the Marines - the Corps never lost its grip on warfare's fundamentals).
This embrace of unpleasant realities is a step that the rest of our government needs to take. Our politicians need to read "Counterinsurgency."
Earlier drafts cautiously ignored faith-fueled insurgencies and even the phenomenon of the suicide bomber; now both topics get intelligent treatment. The academic theorists continue to fight a rear-guard action (there's still too much emphasis on Maoist models), but the acceptance that there's more to many insurgencies than political ideology was a great leap forward (if not a cultural revolution).
The absolutes of the draft versions are tempered in the final product, leaving room for the complexity of conflict. There's a genuine acceptance that counterinsurgency warfare has no silver bullets - such conflicts are just plain tough and attempts to simplify them lead to failure.
We owe a debt of thanks to the officers (most of them Iraq or Afghanistan veterans) involved in the revision of this manual - which involved a lot of long hours, exasperation and soul-searching.
Coming up fast from behind (as one hopes we'll be able to do in Iraq), the doctrine writers shook off much of the spell of the last century's bogus theorizing and began to come to grips with the real enemies we face today and will continue to face in various guises for decades to come.
I wrote "began" because, while this document reflects valuable progress in our thinking about the dominant form of conflict in our time, it's nonetheless an interim manual for a military in transition between the failed "wisdom" of the past and the tactics and techniques demanded by a new century. As "Counterinsurgency" is revised based on our experience of conflict, the next set of drafters will need to face critical issues neither the Army nor the Marines have gotten to yet.
In the spirit of constructive criticism, here are a few of the gaps remaining:
While the sometimes-you-just-have-to-fight realists are in the ascendant at last, the military's academic side still has too much influence. You see it plainly in the illustrative vignettes chosen to accompany the text: They emphasize soft power (doesn't work - sorry) over the need to kill implacable murderers to provide security for the innocent.
The bias in the case-study selection still favors the hand-holding efforts that helped create the current mess in Iraq (military academics, like all academics, won't give up on their theses just because mere facts contradict them). The drafters cite the anomalous example of Malaya (while downplaying that campaign's violence), but ignore the same-decade example of the Mau-Mau revolt, in which the British won a complete victory - thanks to concentration camps, hanging courts and aggressive military operations.
The vignettes concentrate on ideological insurgencies (the easy stuff), neglecting 3,000 years of ferocious religious and ethnic revolts.
On the first page of the introduction, we get the solemn statement that "The tactics used to successfully defeat [insurgencies] are likewise similar in most cases." That's true, but not in the way the drafters intended. They were referring to the hearts-and-minds efforts that defused a minuscule number of insurgencies over the past six decades - while the "similar tactics" that historically worked with remarkable consistency were uncompromising military responses.
A huge gap remaining in the doctrine is that, except for a few careful mentions, it ignores the role of the media. Generals have told me frankly that it was just too loaded an issue - any suggestion that the media are complicit in shaping outcomes excites punitive media outrage.
To be fair, the generals are right. Had the manual described the media's irresponsible, partisan and too-often-destructive roles, it would have ignited a firestorm. Yet, in an age when media lies and partisan spin can overturn the verdict of the battlefield, embolden our enemies and decide the outcome of an entire war, pretending the media aren't active participants in a conflict cripples any efforts that we make.
The media are now combatants - even if we're not allowed to shoot back. Our enemies are explicit in describing the importance of winning through the media. Without factoring in media effects, any counterinsurgency plan will go forward at a limp.
Finally, the new manual fails to ask a question that no one in our military or government has yet had the common sense to ask about insurgencies: What if they just don't want what we want? That, indeed, has become the crucial question in Iraq.
Despite these criticisms, our latest cut at shaping a counterinsurgency doctrine looks like a noteworthy success. It's overwhelmingly honest, honorable and useful.
Now we need to put that doctrine to use.
Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."
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Since the start of the Iraq war, tens of thousands of heavily-armed military contractors have been roaming the country -- without any law, or any court to control them. That may be about to change, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow P.W. Singer notes in a Defense Tech exclusive. Five words, slipped into a Pentagon budget bill, could make all the difference. With them, "contractors 'get out of jail free' cards may have been torn to shreds," he writes. They're now subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the same set of laws that governs soldiers. But here's the catch: embedded reporters are now under those regulations, too.
Over the last few years, tales of private military contractors run amuck in Iraq -- from the CACI interrogators at Abu Ghraib to the Aegis company's Elvis-themed internet "trophy video" —- have continually popped up in the headlines. Unfortunately, when it came to actually doing something about these episodes of Outsourcing Gone Wild, Hollywood took more action than Washington. The TV series Law and Order punished fictional contractor crimes, while our courts ignored the actual ones. Leonardo Dicaprio acted in a movie featuring the private military industry, while our government enacted no actual policy on it. But those carefree days of military contractors romping across the hills and dales of the Iraqi countryside, without legal status or accountability, may be over. The Congress has struck back.
Amidst all the add-ins, pork spending, and excitement of the budget process, it has now come out that a tiny clause was slipped into the Pentagon's fiscal year 2007 budget legislation. The one sentence section (number 552 of a total 3510 sections) states that "Paragraph (10) of section 802(a) of title 10, United States Code (article 2(a) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice), is amended by striking `war' and inserting `declared war or a contingency operation'." The measure passed without much notice or any debate. And then, as they might sing on School House Rock, that bill became a law (P.L.109-364).
The addition of five little words to a massive US legal code that fills entire shelves at law libraries wouldn't normally matter for much. But with this change, contractors' 'get out of jail free' card may have been torn to shreds. Previously, contractors would only fall under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, better known as the court martial system, if Congress declared war. This is something that has not happened in over 65 years and out of sorts with the most likely operations in the 21st century. The result is that whenever our military officers came across episodes of suspected contractor crimes in missions like Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, or Afghanistan, they had no tools to resolve them. As long as Congress had not formally declared war, civilians -- even those working for the US armed forces, carrying out military missions in a conflict zone -- fell outside their jurisdiction. The military's relationship with the contractor was, well, merely contractual. At most, the local officer in charge could request to the employing firm that the individual be demoted or fired. If he thought a felony occurred, the officer might be able to report them on to civilian authorities.
Getting tattled on to the boss is certainly fine for some incidents. But, clearly, it's not how one deals with suspected crimes. And it's nowhere near the proper response to the amazing, awful stories that have made the headlines (the most recent being the contractors who sprung a former Iraqi government minister, imprisoned on corruption charges, from a Green Zone jail).
And for every story that has been deemed newsworthy, there are dozens that never see the spotlight. One US army officer recently told me of an incident he witnessed, where a contractor shot a young Iraqi who got too close to his vehicle while in line at the Green Zone entrance. The boy was waiting there to apply for a job. Not merely a tragedy, but one more nail in the coffin for any US effort at winning hearts and minds.
But when such incidents happen, officers like him have had no recourse other than to file reports that are supposed to be sent on either to the local government or the US Department of Justice, neither of which had traditionally done much. The local government is often failed or too weak to act - the very reason we are still in Iraq. And our Department of Justice has treated contractor crimes in a more Shakespearean than Hollywood way, as in Much Ado About Nothing. Last month, DOJ reported to Congress that it has sat on over 20 investigations of suspected contractor crimes without action in the last year.
The problem is not merely one of a lack of political will on the part of the Administration to deal with such crimes. Contractors have also fallen through a gap in the law. The roles and numbers of military contractors are far greater than in the past, but the legal system hasn't caught up. Even in situations when US civilian law could potentially have been applied to contractor crimes (through the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act), it wasn't. Underlying the previous laws like MEJA was the assumption that civilian prosecutors back in the US would be able to make determinations of what is proper and improper behavior in conflicts, go gather evidence, carry out depositions in the middle of warzones, and then be willing and able to prosecute them to juries back home. The reality is that no US Attorney likes to waste limited budgets on such messy, complex cases 9,000 miles outside their district, even if they were fortunate enough to have the evidence at hand. The only time MEJA has been successfully applied was against the wife of a soldier, who stabbed him during a domestic dispute at a US base in Turkey. Not one contractor of the entire military industry in Iraq has been charged with any crime over the last 3 and a half years, let alone prosecuted or punished. Given the raw numbers of contractors, let alone the incidents we know about, it boggles the mind.
The situation perhaps hit its low-point this fall, when the Under Secretary of the Army testified to Congress that the Army had never authorized Halliburton or any of its subcontractors (essentially the entire industry) to carry weapons or guard convoys. He even denied the US had firms handling these jobs. Never mind the thousands of newspaper, magazine, and TV news stories about the industry. Never mind Google's 1,350,000 web mentions. Never mind the official report from U.S. Central Command that there were over 100,000 contractors in Iraq carrying out these and other military roles. In a sense, the Bush Administration was using a cop-out that all but the worst Hollywood script writers avoid. Just like the end of the TV series Dallas, Congress was somehow supposed to accept that the private military industry in Iraq and all that had happened with it was somehow 'just a dream.'
But Congress didn't bite, it now seems. With the addition of just five words in the law, contractors now can fall under the purview of the military justice system. This means that if contractors violate the rules of engagement in a warzone or commit crimes during a contingency operation like Iraq, they can now be court-martialed (as in, Corporate Warriors, meet A Few Good Men). On face value, this appears to be a step forward for realistic accountability. Military contractor conduct can now be checked by the military investigation and court system, which unlike civilian courts, is actually ready and able both to understand the peculiarities of life and work in a warzone and kick into action when things go wrong.
The amazing thing is that the change in the legal code is so succinct and easy to miss (one sentence in a 439-page bill, sandwiched between a discussion on timely notice of deployments and a section ordering that the next of kin of medal of honor winners get flags) that it has so far gone completely unnoticed in the few weeks since it became the law of the land. Not only has the media not yet reported on it. Neither have military officers or even the lobbyists paid by the military industry to stay on top of these things.
So what happens next? In all likelihood, many firms, who have so far thrived in the unregulated marketplace, will now lobby hard to try to strike down the change. We will perhaps even soon enjoy the sight of CEOs of military firms, preening about their loss of rights and how the new definition of warzone will keep them from rescuing kittens caught in trees.
But, ironically, the contractual nature of the military industry serves as an effective mechanism to prevent loss of rights. The legal change only applies to the section in the existing law dealing with those civilians "serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field," i.e. only those contractors on operations in conflict zones like Iraq or Afghanistan. It would apply not to the broader public in the US, not to local civilians, and not even to military contractors working in places where civilian law is stood up. Indeed, it even wouldn't apply to our foes, upholding recent rulings on the scope of military law and the detainees at Gitmo.
In many ways, the new law is the 21st century business version of the rights contract: If a private individual wants to travel to a warzone and do military jobs for profit, on behalf of the US government, then that individual agrees to fall under the same codes of law and consequence that American soldiers, in the same zones, doing the same sorts of jobs, have to live and work by. If a contractor doesn't agree to these regulations, that's fine, don't contract. Unlike soldiers, they are still civilians with no obligation to serve. The new regulation also seems to pass the fairness test. That is, a lance corporal or a specialist earns less than $20,000 a year for service in Iraq, while a contractor can earn upwards of $100,000-200,000 a year (tax free) for doing the same job and can quit whenever they want. It doesn't seem that unreasonable then to expect the contractor to abide by the same laws as their military counterpart while in the combat theatre.
Given that the vast majority of private military employees are upstanding men and women -- and mostly former soldiers, to boot -- living under the new system will not mean much change at all. All it does is now give military investigators a way finally to stop the bad apples from filling the headlines and getting away free.
The change in the law is long overdue. But in being so brief, it needs clarity on exactly how it will be realized. For example, how will it be applied to ongoing contracts and operations? Given that the firm executives and their lobbyists back in DC have completely dropped the ball, someone ought to tell the contractors in Iraq that they can now be court martialed.
Likewise, the scope of the new law could made more clear; it could be either too limited or too wide, depending on the interpretation. While it is apparent that any military contractor working directly or indirectly for the US military falls under the change, it is unclear whether those doing similar jobs for other US government agencies in the same warzone would fall under it as well (recalling that the contractors at Abu Ghraib were technically employed by the US Department of Interior, sublet out to DOD).
On the opposite side, what about civilians who have agreed to be embedded, but not contracted? The Iraq war is the first that journalists could formally embed in units, so there is not much experience with its legal side in contingency operations. The lack of any legal precedent, combined with the new law, could mean that an overly aggressive
interpretation might now also include journalists who have embedded.
Given that journalists are not armed, not contracted (so not paid directly or indirectly from public monies) and most important, not there to serve the mission objectives, this would probably be too extensive an interpretation. It would also likely mean less embeds. But given the current lack of satisfaction with the embed program in the media, any effect here may be a tempest in a tea pot. As of Fall 2006, there were only nine embedded reporters in all of Iraq. Of the nine, four were from military media (three from Stars and Stripes, one from Armed Forces Network), two not even with US units (one Polish radio reporter with Polish troops, one Italian reporter with Italian troops), and one was an American writing a book. Moreover, we should remember that embeds already make a rights tradeoff when they agree to the military's reporting rules. That is, they have already given up some of their 1st Amendment protections (something at the heart of their professional ethic) in exchange for access, so agreeing to potentially fall under UCMJ when deployed may not be a deal breaker.
The ultimate point is that the change gives the military and the civilians courts a new tool to use in better managing and overseeing contractors, but leaves it to the Pentagon and DOJ to decide when and where to use it. Given their recent track record on legal issues in the context of Iraq and the war on terror, many won't be that reassured.
Congress is to be applauded for finally taking action to reign in the industry and aid military officers in their duties, but the job is not done. While there may be an inclination to let such questions of scope and implementation be figured out through test cases in the courts, our elected public representatives should request DoD to answer the questions above in a report to Congress. Moreover, while the change may help close one accountability loophole, in no way should it be read as a panacea for the rest of the private military industry's ills. The new Congress still has much to deal with when it comes to the still unregulated industry, including getting enough eyes and ears to actually oversee and manage our contracts effectively, create reporting structures, and forcing the Pentagon to develop better fiscal controls and market sanctions, to actually save money than spend it out.
A change of a few words in a legislative bill certainly isn't the stuff of a blockbuster movie. So don't expect to see Angelina Jolie starring in "Paragraph (10) of Section 802(a)" in a theatre near you anytime soon. But the legal changes in it are a sign that Congress is finally catching up to Hollywood on the private military industry. And that is the stuff of good governance.
-- P.W. Singer is Senior Fellow and Director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at The Brookings Institution. He is the author of Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell University Press) and the upcoming book Wired for War (Houghton Mifflin).
January 3, 2007 05:37 PM
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Additional info here: http://www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Noshir_Gowadia_Case.htm
Below from:
http://www.afa.org/magazine/jan2007/0107world.asp
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China, Israel Get B-2 Secrets
A former Northrop Grumman B-2 engineer arrested in October 2005 for spying is now under indictment for passing secrets to as many as eight countries—including China and Israel.
According to the primary allegations revealed in an indictment unsealed in November, Noshir S. Gowadia, a US citizen and resident of Hawaii, regularly transmitted data and documents filled with classified information to foreigners. He also went overseas to teach courses on stealth technology such as that used to hide aircraft exhausts from infrared seekers.
Gowadia did it for money, not political reasons, according to the FBI.
Earlier last year, prosecutors indicated the charges would expand in another indictment against Gowadia that details his sharing of information with Chinese officials and business sources in Israel. The identities of the Israelis have not been disclosed, nor has it been revealed whether they were private individuals or representatives of companies.
The indictment reveals that Gowadia received approximately $2 million from China for his services.
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Below from:
http://starbulletin.com/2005/10/28/news/story01.html
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'Father' of the B-2
A just-released affidavit provides some insight into the mind of an admitted spy living on Maui
» 'Father' of the B-2
» Excerpt from the affidavit
» Maui man was up for DOD contract
» How to build B-2 is secret
» Rural Maui site of FBI search
By Mary Vorsino
mvorsino@starbulletin.com
As far back as 1999, when he moved to Maui from New Mexico, Noshir S. Gowadia was marketing himself to foreign countries as the "father" of the classified technology that helps protect B-2 stealth bombers from heat-seeking missiles, according to an affidavit unsealed yesterday.
"I wanted to help this (sic) countries to further their self aircraft protection systems. My personal gain would be business," Gowadia said in a statement given to the FBI on Oct. 14, in which he admitted to knowingly disclosing top-secret information. "At that time, I knew it was wrong and I did it for the money."
In all, the 61-year-old Haiku resident -- who helped design the stealth bomber as a defense contractor for Northrop Corp. for 18 years -- is accused of disclosing the stealth's infrared-suppression secrets to representatives from eight foreign governments.
He told the FBI that he shared classified information "both verbally and in papers, computer presentations, letters and other methods ... to establish the technological credibility with the potential customers for future business."
Gowadia was charged Wednesday with one count of willfully communicating national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it, which falls under federal espionage statutes. He is in federal custody in Honolulu and is set to make an appearance at a detention hearing today in federal court.
According to prosecutors, Gowadia faces up to 10 years in prison if convicted. Officials said he could face more charges in the future.
At a news conference yesterday, FBI Special Agent in Charge Charles Goodwin read from a written statement and declined to answer questions on the investigation. "This is a very sensitive, ongoing investigation," he said.
Neither the affidavit nor Goodwin revealed which countries Gowadia allegedly sold secrets to, or whether they were allied or enemy nations. Goodwin did say that Gowadia was born in India and is a naturalized U.S. citizen.
Gowadia's wife, Cheryl, declined comment yesterday at the couple's home in Haiku.
The FBI searched Gowadia's home on Oct. 13, finding several classified documents from the engineer's days at Northrop and when he was a contract engineer in the 1990s at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
During the search, according to the affidavit, Gowadia denied having any classified material and "displayed a full understanding of his responsibilities with respect to the maintenance" of military secrets.
But a day later, when asked about the documents marked classified that were allegedly taken from his home, Gowadia submitted a written statement to the FBI in which he admitted to selling or disclosing classified information.
The FBI alleges that:
» On Oct. 23, 2002, Gowadia faxed a proposal to develop infrared-suppression technology on military aircraft to a representative in an unspecified foreign country. The information included in the document was classified at the "top secret" level and made specific mention of the classified defense system in the United States.
» In December 1999, Gowadia taught a course to foreigners in a second unspecified country, including information deemed "secret" that he had access to while working for Northrop and as a subcontractor for Los Alamos. Northrop representatives declined comment yesterday.
» On several other occasions, Gowadia provided "extensive amounts of classified information" to individuals in a third unspecified country while teaching a course on "low observable technology."
The affidavit did not say how classified information was allegedly disclosed to representatives from five other foreign countries. And it is unclear if Gowadia's course material for classes at U.S. universities was drawn from classified resources.
As recently as this spring, Gowadia co-taught a course at Purdue University as a visiting professor. He has also taught at the University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa.
The FBI said in the affidavit that it used documents and computers taken from Gowadia's home, along with electronic surveillance, to piece together the extent of the engineer's alleged criminal activity.
Gowadia "has marketed and disclosed United States military technology secrets related to the B-2 to foreign governments in order to 'assist' them in obtaining a higher level of military technology," wrote FBI Special Agent Thatcher Mohajerin in the affidavit.
The investigation "has also revealed that Gowadia has been rewarded financially for his efforts."
Gowadia's engineering contract business, N.S. Gowadia Inc., took in nearly $750,000 in gross receipts between 1999 and 2003. But prosecutors believe Gowadia's actual income was much higher. The investigation, according to the affidavit, showed Gowadia "likely" maintains several offshore bank accounts.
Defense analysts say the allegations against Gowadia are serious, but they cautioned against rushing to conclusions, given the government's problematic record in prosecuting these kinds of national security cases.
Philip Coyle, a senior advisor for the Center for Defense Information and a former assistant secretary of defense, cited the Wen Ho Lee case at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 1999. Lee was accused of stealing military secrets from the lab and funneling them to China.
But the government ended up dropping 59 felony counts of espionage against Lee, who pleaded guilty to a single count of improperly handling restricted data.
"He (Wen Ho Lee) did a stupid thing," Coyle said, "but it turns out what he actually did was nowhere near what the government first asserted."
There is also the high-profile case of Katrina Leung.
The California woman was accused of spying for China, but a federal judge dropped all charges against her in December after prosecutors admitted to illegally blocking a primary defense witness.
For years, Leung had gathered intelligence on the Chinese government for the FBI.
Gowadia, meanwhile, appeared to be open about the technology he is accused of peddling. A 2004 article in Jane's International Defense Review identified Gowadia as developing a system that would make military and civilian aircraft "virtually invulnerable to attack" from infrared-guided air defense systems.
Publicity like that could have turned the government on to him, said John Pike, director of Globalsecurity.org, a private defense policy group. But it also raises the question about why he was not caught sooner, he said.
Noshir Sheriarji Gowadia
Age: 61
Background: Gowadia helped develop the B-2 stealth bomber while he was an engineer at Northrop Corp., and was instrumental in the creation of a defense system for heat-seeking missiles. After 18 years at Northrop, he went on to become a contract engineer at Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico.
Accusation: One count of "willfully communicating national defense information to a person not entitled to receive it," which falls under federal espionage statutes.
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Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(c)
An excerpt from the affidavit released yesterday, quoting the federal law Noshir S. Gowadia is accused of breaking:
"(W)hoever, having unauthorized possession of, access to, or control over any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument appliance, or note relating to the national defense, or information relating to the national defense which information the possessor has reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, willfully communicates, delivers, transmits or causes to be communicated, delivered, or transmitted or attempts to communicate, deliver, transmit or cause to be communicated, delivered or transmitted the same to any person not entitled to receive it, or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it ... shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both."
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Fox News
Pentagon Warns Contractors About 'Canadian' Spy Coins
Thursday, January 11, 2007
This photo released by the Central Intelligence Agency shows a hollow container, fashioned to look like an Eisenhower silver dollar.
WASHINGTON — Money talks, but can it also follow your movements?
In a U.S. government warning high on the creepiness scale, the Defense Department cautioned its American contractors over what it described as a new espionage threat: Canadian coins with tiny radio frequency transmitters hidden inside.
The government said the mysterious coins were found planted on U.S. contractors with classified security clearances on at least three separate occasions between October 2005 and January 2006 as the contractors traveled through Canada.
Intelligence and technology experts said such transmitters, if they exist, could be used to surreptitiously track the movements of people carrying the spy coins.
The U.S. report doesn't suggest who might be tracking American defense contractors or why. It also doesn't describe how the Pentagon discovered the ruse, how the transmitters might function or even which Canadian currency contained them.
Further details were secret, according to the U.S. Defense Security Service, which issued the warning to the Pentagon's classified contractors. The government insists the incidents happened, and the risk was genuine.
(Story continues below)
"What's in the report is true," said Martha Deutscher, a spokeswoman for the security service. "This is indeed a sanitized version, which leaves a lot of questions."
Top suspects, according to outside experts: China, Russia or even France — all said to actively run espionage operations inside Canada with enough sophistication to produce such technology.
The Canadian Security Intelligence Service said it knew nothing about the coins.
"This issue has just come to our attention," CSIS spokeswoman Barbara Campion said. "At this point, we don't know of any basis for these claims."
She said Canada's intelligence service works closely with its U.S. counterparts and will seek more information if necessary.
Experts were astonished about the disclosure and the novel tracking technique, but they rejected suggestions Canada's government might be spying on American contractors. The intelligence services of the two countries are extraordinarily close and routinely share sensitive secrets.
"It would seem unthinkable," said David Harris, former chief of strategic planning for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service. "I wouldn't expect to see any offensive operation against the Americans."
Harris said likely candidates include foreign spies who targeted Americans abroad or businesses engaged in corporate espionage.
"There are certainly a lot of mysterious aspects to this," Harris said.
Experts said such tiny transmitters would almost certainly have limited range to communicate with sensors no more than a few feet away, such as ones hidden inside a doorway. The metal in the coins also could interfere with any signals emitted.
"I'm not aware of any [transmitter] that would fit inside a coin and broadcast for kilometers," said Katherine Albrecht, an activist who believes such technology — known as radio-frequency identification, and in common usage as "no-swipe" credit cards and gas-station key fobs — carries serious privacy risks. "Whoever did this obviously has access to some pretty advanced technology."
Experts said hiding tracking technology inside coins is fraught with risks because the spy's target might inadvertently give away the coin or spend it buying coffee or a newspaper. They agreed, however, that a coin with a hidden tracking device might not arouse suspicion if it were discovered in a pocket or briefcase.
"It wouldn't seem to be the best place to put something like that; you'd want to put it in something that wouldn't be left behind or spent," said Jeff Richelson, a researcher and author of books about the CIA and its gadgets. "It doesn't seem to make a whole lot of sense."
Canada's largest coins include its $2 "Toonie," which is more than 1 inch across and thick enough to hide a tiny transmitter. The CIA has acknowledged its own spies have used hollow, U.S. silver-dollar coins to hide messages and film.
The government's 29-page report was filled with other espionage warnings. It described unrelated hacker attacks, eavesdropping with miniature pen recorders and the case of a female foreign spy who seduced her American boyfriend to steal his computer passwords.
In another case, a film processing company called the FBI after it developed pictures for a contractor that contained classified images of U.S. satellites and their blueprints. The photo was taken from an adjoining office window.
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U.S. Navy: What the USS John C. Stennis' Deployment Does Not Mean
January 31, 2007 23 28 GMT
Summary
The Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis departed San Diego on Jan. 20 after joining up with its carrier air wing in preparation for its deployment in the Persian Gulf. The timing of the deployment has led to speculation that the United States is putting the carrier and its strike group in the Gulf with the USS Eisenhower, which is currently deployed to the region, in order to increase pressure on Iran. However, this deployment is business as usual for the U.S. Navy as it moves the strike group in to support various military operations in the Middle East.
Analysis
The aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis left San Diego on Jan. 20 for its scheduled cruise in the Persian Gulf in support of the U.S. Navy's 5th Fleet operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and the Horn of Africa. This deployment has received attention from the media, which say the deployment is meant to increase pressure on Iran. However, the Nimitz-class, nuclear-powered Stennis' main purpose will be to replace the USS Eisenhower when it concludes its cruise in April 2007. The Stennis' deployment is nothing unusual.
The process culminating in the Stennis' deployment to the Middle East began when the carrier arrived in its home port of Bremerton, Wash., on Jan. 8, 2005. Soon after that, she went into dry-docked planned incremental availability (DPIA), an 11-month overhaul and recertification process at the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Usually after completing a cruise, a U.S. aircraft carrier will return to its homeport and restart the maintenance and operations cycles. In the Stennis' case, however, it went into DPIA before restarting the operations cycle.
(click to enlarge)
After the DPIA was complete in December 2005, the Stennis underwent three months of routine sea trials in the East Pacific, followed by an inspection survey in April to certify the carrier's suitability for operations. Since the inspection's completion in May, the Stennis has been on a typical operations cycle for the U.S. Navy's nuclear-powered aircraft carriers.
The length of any operation or cruise is limited not by the ship, but by the crew's endurance. The high tempo of operations on a carrier takes a toll on the crew; cruises end when the crew has been deployed for six months with continuous 24-hour operations. When the cruise ends, the ship is checked over and any necessary repairs and refitting will be done. This gives the crew the chance to go on leave before returning to the ship at port and working routine maintenance, attending training schools or being reassigned. During this period, follow-on exercises and sustainment training will keep the carrier employable for an 18-month period until it is actually deployed. This is what the USS Ronald Reagan is doing from its home base of San Diego.
The carrier will then take part in several two- to three-week exercises that allow the crew to practice mission areas and integrate skill sets, essentially maintaining their qualifications. Before being deployed again, the carrier typically goes through a composite training unit exercise (COMPTUEX) followed by a joint task force exercise (JTFEX). The JTFEX serves primarily as a method of validation and can be cut short or eliminated if the carrier is rushed into deployment. The Stennis completed its COMPTUEX in mid-October 2006 and its JTFEX in the following month. During these exercises, the carrier's air wing is assigned and its personnel participate in training and certification for carrier operation in preparation for deployment.
Normally, a carrier is deployed for six months and then in home port for 18 months, during which it participates in any number of short operations. The one notable exception to this standard occurred when U.S. President Jimmy Carter kept the USS Nimitz on deployment for 11 months straight, going from one hot spot to another.
For decades, a U.S. carrier has generally been on station in the Persian Gulf or the 5th Fleet area of operations. In 2003 the Navy adopted the Fleet Response Plan (FRP), which favors having multiple carriers in a general state of readiness instead of maintaining a single carrier in the Gulf. Though six-month deployments to the Middle East are still common -- and require a great deal of planning and preparation -- the FRP has changed the carrier fleet's overall readiness posture. The FRP was designed to make the Navy more responsive to Washington's maritime needs. And with the massive strike capability a carrier air wing brings to bear, a carrier deployment is often more of a political weapon than a military one.
The FRP calls for six carriers out of the total fleet of 12 to be "surge capable" -- able to be under way in 30 days or fewer, with a follow-on surge of two more carriers within 90 days -- at any time. Thus, instead of using the deployment date to schedule training, proficiency training begins as soon as a carrier emerges from its maintenance cycles. Less than six months after coming out of dry dock -- and as soon as three months in an emergency -- a carrier should be employable, or surge ready.
However, in the case of the 5th Fleet's current operations, developments in Somalia and the Eisenhower's shift in that direction are reminders of the military purpose of the current carrier rotations through the Gulf -- continued support of operations in Iraq, including regular close air support sorties, and potential support for African Union peacekeeping operations in Somalia.
The Stennis will likely arrive in the Persian Gulf region in mid- to late February. This will give it about a two-month overlap with the Eisenhower which, since its arrival in the region in late October, has been moving between the Gulf, the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean.
The Stennis' deployment to the Persian Gulf has been scheduled for months, so its movement there is not in response to anything Iran has recently done. The timing just happens to coincide with the recent U.S. decision to increase its force in Iraq and with statements from U.S. diplomats about increasing pressure on Tehran.
If the United States does decide to surge its naval capacity in the region and intensify its military pressure on Iran, the Eisenhower could remain in the Gulf past April. Meanwhile, the USS Harry S. Truman, which recently finished a round of flight deck certifications in the Atlantic in preparation for its 2007 deployment, could deploy as early as April. This could put the Truman in the Persian Gulf with the Stennis and the Eisenhower, should it stay over, placing three U.S. carrier strike groups in the region.
Even if the Eisenhower returns and the Truman moves into the region, the United States would demonstrate its ability to maintain two carriers in one place for an extended period of time. However, if this potential surge goes beyond three carrier strike groups, the USS Nimitz and the USS Roosevelt -- like the Reagan -- are at stages in their operational cycles at which they could be deployed on relatively short notice if needed.
The United States could have six carriers deployed to the Persian Gulf relatively quickly if it wanted to. If that were to occur, Tehran would certainly have reason to be concerned. In times of heightened geopolitical tension, the normal rotation of one carrier to replace another can set observers off. This is certainly not the first time; only a few months ago, similar speculation followed the Eisenhower across the Atlantic as it sailed to replace the USS Enterprise. However, the Stennis' movement into the Persian Gulf is not abnormal.
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Geopolitical Diary: Helicopter Losses and New Questions in the War
Over the past two weeks, four U.S. helicopters have been shot down in Iraq -- one of them a Blackhawk carrying 12 people. Maj. Gen. William Caldwell, a senior military spokesman, confirmed on Sunday that all four were shot down as a result of ground fire. He went on to say, "Obviously, based on what we have seen, we are already making adjustments to our tactics and techniques, as to how we employ our helicopters." The announcement was accompanied by speculation that Iraqi insurgents have acquired new weapons that have made helicopters vulnerable.
There have been dozens of other shoot-downs of helicopters in Iraq, but the sudden surge in crashes of late raises some significant strategic issues for the United States. Iraqi insurgents using improvised explosive devices and other ambush tactics have imposed penalties on U.S. troops moving on the roads. They have not been able to shut down the roads entirely, as happened in Vietnam, but they have been able to impose significant costs in terms of delays, the quantities of vehicles and manpower needed to move things around on the roads, and casualties inflicted on a casualty-averse force.
The movement of men and materiel by helicopter has been a safer alternative. Certainly the roads have to be used, and the helicopter fleet is limited, but it has been utilized heavily as a low-friction alternative. It also is the preferred mode of transport for high-ranking officers and VIPs. If the friction is building up and helicopter travel becomes increasingly hazardous, it will increase the pressures related to road travel. In other words, the insurgents are not so much shutting down transport as increasing the cost of transport in terms of effort, time and casualties -- and they now are extending those costs to air transports.
It is not clear what sorts of weapons the insurgents might have that were not in their possession previously. Helicopters traditionally have been vulnerable to small-arms fire, but contemporary U.S. helicopters have sufficient armor to withstand smaller caliber rounds, at least in limited volume. Insurgents have used rocket-propelled grenades, but these weapons are effective in close engagements with helicopters moving rather slowly, not against helicopters in rapid flight. There are a number of missiles and radar-guided heavy caliber guns that are extremely effective against helicopters, but it is not clear that the insurgents possess these.
At this point, it is necessary to distinguish between Sunni and Shiite fighters. The Iranians might well be moving advanced anti-helicopter weaponry into Iraq, but it is unlikely they would be giving this to the Sunnis. It is possible that insurgents or militia groups have better weapons, but it is also possible that there are simply more sorties being flown and, therefore, more choppers at risk. Indeed, with larger numbers of forces moving into Baghdad and troops being shifted around the country, roads and air space are both being utilized more intensely. That creates a more target-rich environment.
But still, the possibility that the various insurgents and militias have acquired advanced anti-air systems that can increase the attrition of helicopters opens new questions about the war. Who could be supplying these to the Sunnis? What other weapons systems are being supplied? Who is training the insurgents in their use, since more advanced systems require greater expertise to be utilized? It is not so much the attacks on these helicopters that matters as the geopolitical significance of more advanced weapon systems starting to show up on the battlefield. If this is the case -- and it is not at all certain that it is -- it would mean someone has made a strategic decision to take on the United States head-on. It could be the Iranians, but if the Sunni insurgents have improved weapons as well, then it likely would be someone else.
It is pure speculation, but we note that the Russians have been selling anti-air systems in the region. Someone might be reshipping them to Sunni insurgents. Alternatively, there might just be more U.S. choppers in the air, and the insurgents have gotten lucky.
stratfor.com
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The Snake Eater
Give our troops the tools our cops have.
BY DANIEL HENNINGER
Thursday, February 8, 2007 12:01 a.m. EST
Subject: A case study of how the U.S. got bogged down in Iraq.
Problem: If a cop in Anytown, USA, pulls over a suspect, he checks the person's ID remotely from the squad car. He's linked to databases filled with Who's Who in the world of crime, killing and mayhem. In Iraq, there is nothing like that. When our troops and the Iraqi army enter a town, village or street, what they know about the local bad guys is pretty much in their heads, at best.
Solution: Give our troops what our cops have. The Pentagon knows this. For reasons you can imagine, it hasn't happened.
This is a story of can-do in a no-can-do world, a story of how a Marine officer in Iraq, a small network-design company in California, a nonprofit troop-support group, a blogger and other undeterrable folk designed a handheld insurgent-identification device, built it, shipped it and deployed it in Anbar province. They did this in 30 days, from Dec. 15 to Jan. 15. Compared to standard operating procedure for Iraq, this is a nanosecond.
Before fastening our seatbelts, let's check the status quo. As a high Defense Department official told the Journal's editorial page, "We're trying to fight a major war with peacetime procurement rules." The department knows this is awful. Indeed, a program exists, the Automated Biometric Identification System: retina scans, facial matching and the like. The reality: This war is in year four, and the troops don't have it. Beyond Baghdad, the U.S. role has become less about killing insurgents than arresting the worst and isolating them from the population. Obviously it would help to have an electronic database of who the bad guys are, their friends, where they live, tribal affiliation--in short the insurgency's networks.
The Marine and Army officers who patrol Iraq's dangerous places know they need an identification system similar to cops back home. The troops now write down suspects' names and addresses. Some, like Marine Maj. Owen West in Anbar, have created their own spreadsheets and PowerPoint programs, or use digital cameras to input the details of suspected insurgents. But no Iraq-wide software architecture exists.
Operating around the town of Khalidiya, north of Baghdad, Maj. West has been the leader of a team of nine U.S. soldiers advising an Iraqi brigade. This has been his second tour of duty in Iraq. When not fighting the Iraq war, he's an energy trader for Goldman Sachs in New York City.
It had become clear to him last fall that the Iraqi soldiers were becoming the area's cops. And that they needed modern police surveillance tools. To help the Iraqi army in Khalidiya do its job right, Maj. West needed that technology yesterday: He was scheduled to rotate back stateside in February--this month.
Since arriving in Iraq last year, Maj. West had worked with Spirit of America (SoA), the civilian troop-support group founded by Jim Hake. In early December, SoA's project director, Michele Redmond, asked Maj. West if there was any out-of-the-ordinary project they could help him with. And Maj. West said, Why yes, there is. He described to them the basic concept for a mobile, handheld fingerprinting device which Iraqi soldiers would use to assemble an insurgent database. Mr. Hake said his organization would contribute $30,000 to build a prototype and get it to Khalidiya. In New York, Goldman Sachs contributed $14,000 to the project.
Two problems. They needed to find someone who could assemble the device, and the unit had to be in Khalidiya by Jan. 15 to give Maj. West time to field-test it before he left in February.
To build the device, they approached a small California company, Computer Deductions Inc., which makes electronic systems for law-enforcement agencies. Over the Dec. 15 weekend, CDI went to work building a machine for Iraq.
Tom Calabro, a CDI vice president, assembled a team of six technicians. Its basic platform would be a handheld fingerprint workstation called the MV 100, made by Cross Match Technologies, a maker of biometric identity applications. The data collected by the MV 100 would be stored via Bluetooth in a hardened laptop made by GETAC, a California manufacturer. From Knowledge Computing Corp. of Arizona they used the COPLINK program, which creates a linked "map" of events. The laptop would sit in the troops' Humvee and the data sent from there to a laptop at outpost headquarters.
Meanwhile, SoA began to think about how they'd get the package to Maj. West by Jan. 15. They likely would have less than seven days transit time after CDI finished. SoA normally used FedEx to ship time-sensitive equipment into Iraq. But given the unusual nature of the shipment, they were concerned about customs and clearance: This wasn't a case of soccer balls. Jim Hake thought of an alternative: Find someone who would hand-carry it, like a diplomatic courier, on a flight to Kuwait and from there to Taqaddum air base in central Iraq. This meant finding someone who could get into Iraq quickly.
The someone was Bill Roggio. Mr. Roggio is a former army signalman and infantryman who now embeds with the troops and writes about it on his blog, the Fourth Rail, or for the SoA Web site. He was at home in New Jersey, about to celebrate his birthday with his family. He agreed to fly the MV 100 to Iraq as soon as it was ready, in conjunction with an embed trip. With SoA's Michele Redmond, he started working out the logistics for getting to Iraq ASAP.
On Jan. 8, CDI's Tom Calabro emailed the group, including Maj. West in Iraq: "Things are progressing at a furious pace. I may be able to ship by end of day tomorrow. Worst case is Thursday or Friday."
Four days later, a glitch. Mr. Calabro said a vendor mistakenly shipped via the U.S. postal service and a crucial part arrived late, on Jan. 12. "My guys are going to work through the night to finish testing," he said. They shipped the kit via UPS to Bill Roggio for Monday arrival; later that day, he boarded a Lufthansa flight from Newark to Kuwait City. After an overnight hotel stay, he took a C130 military transport to Taqaddum, 45 miles north of Baghdad. Maj. West's Marines drove him to their outpost 15 minutes away.
And so, a month from inception, Bill Roggio handed the electronic identification kit to Maj. West.
On the night of Jan. 20, Maj. West, his Marine squad and the "jundi" (Iraq army soldiers) took the MV 100 and laptop on patrol. Their term of endearment for the insurgents is "snakes." So of course the MV 100 became the Snake Eater. The next day Maj. West emailed the U.S. team digital photos of Iraqi soldiers fingerprinting suspects with the Snake Eater. "It's one night old and the town is abuzz," he said. "I think we have a chance to tip this city over now." A rumor quickly spread that the Iraqi army was implanting GPS chips in insurgents' thumbs.
Over the past 10 days, Maj. West has had chance encounters with two Marine superiors--Maj. Gen. Richard Zilmer, who commands the 30,000 joint forces in Anbar, and Brig. Gen. Robert Neller, deputy commanding general of operations in Iraq. He showed them the mobile ID database device.
I asked Gen. Neller by email on Tuesday what the status of these technologies is now. He replied that they're receiving advanced biometric equipment, "like the device being employed by Maj. West." He said "in the near future" they will begin to network such devices to share databases more broadly: "Bottom line: The requirement for networking our biometric capability is a priority of this organization."
As he departs, Maj. West reflected on winning at street level: "We're fixated on the enemy, but the enemy is fixated on the people. They know which families are apostates, which houses are safe for the night, which boys are vulnerable to corruption or kidnapping. The enemy's population collection effort far outstrips ours. The Snake Eater will change that, and fast." You have to believe he's got this right. It will only happen, though, if someone above his pay grade blows away the killing habits of peacetime procurement.
Mr. Henninger is deputy editor of The Wall Street Journal's editorial page. His column appears Thursdays in the Journal and on OpinionJournal.com.
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U.S. Army granting more waivers for criminal backgrounds
By Lizette Alvarez
Wednesday, February 14, 2007
The number of waivers granted to U.S. Army recruits with criminal backgrounds has grown nearly 65 percent in the last three years, increasing to 8,129 in 2006 from 4,918 in 2003, Defense Department records show.
During that time the army has employed a range of tactics to expand its diminishing pool of recruits. It has offered larger enlistment cash bonuses, allowed more high school dropouts and applicants with low scores on its aptitude test to join and loosened weight and age restrictions.
It has also increased the number of so-called "moral waivers" to recruits with criminal pasts, even as the total number of recruits dropped slightly.
The sharpest increase was in waivers issued for serious misdemeanors, which make up the bulk of all the army's moral waivers. These include aggravated assault, burglary, robbery and vehicular homicide.
The number of waivers issued for felony convictions also increased, from 8 percent to 11 percent of the 8,129 moral waivers granted in 2006.
Waivers for less-serious crimes, including traffic offenses and drug use, have dropped or remained stable.
The army enlisted 69,395 men and women last year.
While soldiers with criminal histories made up only 11.7 percent of the army recruits in 2006, the spike in waivers raises concerns about whether the military is making too many exceptions to try to meet its recruitment demands in a time of war. Most felons, for example, are not permitted to carry firearms, and many criminals have at some point exhibited serious lapses in discipline and judgment, traits that are far from ideal on the battlefield.
The military automatically excludes people who have committed certain crimes. They include drug traffickers, recruits who have more than one felony on their record or people who have committed sexually violent crimes.
Bill Carr, under secretary of defense for military personnel policy, said the military granted waivers selectively and scrutinized a recruit's full record, the nature of the crime, when it was committed, the degree of rehabilitation and references from teachers, employers, coaches and clergy members.
In many cases, Carr said, the applicant may have committed the crime at a young age and then stayed out of trouble. To his knowledge, Carr said, recruits who are issued moral waivers are not tracked once in the military.
"If the community backs them, we are willing to take a hard look," Carr said, referring to the waiver process, which includes local, state and federal records checks. The majority of moral waivers are for serious misdemeanors, most often committed by juveniles.
Douglas Smith, the public information officer for the army's recruiting command, said, "We understand that people make mistakes in their lives and they can overcome those mistakes."
Fewer than 3 in 10 people between ages 17 and 24 are fully qualified to join the army; that means they have a high school degree, have met aptitude test score requirements and fitness levels and would not be barred for medical reasons, their sexual orientation or their criminal histories.
The Defense Department has also expanded its applicant pool by accepting soldiers with medical problems like asthma, high blood pressure and attention deficit disorder, situations that require waivers. Medical waivers have increased 4 percent, totaling 12,313 in 2006.
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One wishes it might have occured to President Bush to begin expanding the size of the military (thus overruling Secy Rumbo) 3-4 years ago. Even candidate Kerry was calling for an increase of 50,000 so it would have been easy for Bush to make the call. Now that he has thrashed our troops and led , , , as he has, now the President sacks Rumbo and asks for 90,000. It is going to be a lot harder now to build up the numbers than if he had not listened to Rumbo's huibris.
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Iran: Sounding Off on its Latest Rocket Test
Summary
Iran launched a sounding rocket for educational and research purposes Feb. 25, Mohsen Bahrami and Ali Akbar Golrou of Iran's Space Research Center said. Though unconfirmed, the launch offers insight into both Iranian politics and the pace of the country's missile program.
Analysis
An Iranian sounding rocket capable of flinging its payload to an altitude above 90 miles was reportedly launched Feb. 25 for educational and research purposes, Ali Akbar Golrou, deputy head of Iran's Space Research Center, said. Earlier that day, Mohsen Bahrami, head of the research center, described the missile as a "space rocket." Though official Russian statements and an anonymous U.S. military source cited by Agence France-Presse on Feb. 26 questioned the launch, the events of Feb. 25 illustrate two dynamics within Iran's government -- portions of which are quick to tout any new weapon or scientific advance even if they do not understand it.
In January, the chairman of the Iranian parliament's National Security and Foreign Policy Commission leaked to Aviation Week & Space Technology that an Iranian satellite launch vehicle had been assembled and was being prepared for launch. Though this is very possible, it now appears that he could have been touting the sounding rocket.
Sounding rockets can serve many purposes and are commonly used for atmospheric tests or experiments that require several minutes of weightlessness. Sounding rockets do not insert their payload into orbit. Sounding rockets undergo less acceleration and release their payloads earlier than satellite launch vehicles (SLVs). The payload -- be it an experiment or a test object -- travels in a parabolic arc as gravity drags it back to Earth. Most experimental payloads deploy a parachute on the downward flight so they can be recovered.
A sounding rocket does not necessarily represent a new degree of technical prowess for Iran. Even some of the country's older surface-to-air missiles and much of its ballistic missile arsenal could have been rewired to perform this very mission. However, the possibility that this was a more substantive test should not be ruled out. Whatever the truth, Iran's primary concern of late is not the molecular makeup of the rarified upper atmosphere. This sounding rocket could have carried a new re-entry vehicle for a ballistic missile (although Golrou said a parachute brought the rocket's payload back to Earth) or a second stage for a new two-stage missile or SLV.
South Korea's quick progression of three Korean Sounding Rockets (KSR-I, KSR-II and KSR-III) in the last 15 years has provided the foundation for its SLV program, still in development. The KSR-III was particularly useful in the areas of propulsion, guidance, control and mission design. Similarly, whatever Iran might have learned Feb. 25 is certainly a step forward for Tehran's ballistic missile and SLV programs.
Though information about the events of Feb. 25 is limited, two other aspects of Iran became apparent with the announcement of the launch. First, certain elements in the Iranian government have a penchant for touting Iran's latest scientific achievements without knowing exactly what they might be. Second, the launch revealed the deliberate nature of Iran's missile program.
Iran's program -- despite the common Scud design heritage and shared development efforts -- is not like North Korea's. North Korean missile tests are so rare that, after a single-stage Nodong test and years of quiet, the world was stunned by the 1998 launch of the three-stage Taepodong-1 SLV, which very nearly succeeded. In contrast, Iran regularly tests even its already proven Scud and Zelzal rockets. The latest Shahab-3 was test-launched several times in 2006.
In other words, barring the launch of a North Korean-designed and manufactured SLV with an Iranian flag painted on it, Feb. 25's sounding rocket seems to suggest that any indigenous Iranian SLV launch will proceed via a more conventional development program that could include more sounding rocket launches. But given certain Iranian leaders' apparent inability to hold their tongues, it will be more difficult for Iran to proceed with the same discretion North Korea did leading up to its 1998 Taepodong-1 launch. Iran also intends to be more certain that its SLV will work the first time.
stratfor.com
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The New Logic for Ballistic Missile Defense
By Peter Zeihan
The commander of Russia's strategic bomber force, Lt. Gen. Igor Khvorov, said March 5 that his forces could easily disrupt or destroy any missile defense infrastructure in Poland and the Czech Republic -- where the United States is preparing to set up parts of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Khvorov was hardly the first Russian official to make such a threat: On Feb. 19, statements by Strategic Rocket Forces commander Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov left little doubt that Moscow would target U.S. BMD sites with its nuclear arsenal if Washington pushes ahead with its plans.
Exactly why missile defense -- a technology that has received little publicity since the Cold War -- should be a source of increasingly obvious tension between the United States and Russia is an interesting question. An equally interesting question: Why are the Russians threatening once again to target NATO countries -- a tactic Moscow abandoned 15 years ago?
The answer is rooted not only in the history of BMD, but in the myriad ways the European theater has changed -- from both the U.S. and European points of view -- since the end of the Cold War.
BMD and the Cold War
When Ronald Reagan introduced the Star Wars system in the 1980s, his logic was much more political than military. It was apparent that, even with extremely aggressive funding, the United States was decades away from being able to establish a missile shield capable of deflecting a significant Soviet nuclear strike. Rhetoric aside, the argument for a BMD system was not really about establishing an impregnable bubble around the United States, but rather about shifting the strategic balance away from mutually assured destruction and into a venue that catered to the Americans' economic advantage.
In the minds of Politburo members, the United States not only was moving into a realm in which the Americans already enjoyed substantial technological and economic advantages, but in which the costs of development also threatened to overturn Soviet military doctrine. As of the early 1980s, the United States was spending only 6 percent of its gross domestic product on defense, whereas the Soviets are thought to have been expending more than one-quarter of theirs. The Soviets recognized that they could not win a space race involving defensive weaponry. Reagan's insistence on keeping the BMD issue on the table, therefore, gave him enormous bargaining power against the Soviets and contributed heavily to the subsequent arms-control and disarmament treaties that ultimately heralded the Cold War's end.
European leaders, however, viewed BMD issues in much the same light as the Soviets did. Though few Europeans were comfortable with the idea of the Americans and Soviets being locked into a Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) structure that would consume their homelands if anything should go awry, it was impossible to ignore the fact that MAD had brought about 50 years of relatively stable Great Power relations. Reagan's BMD was viewed as an extremely aggressive effort to overturn that system and disrupt the stability that went with it. European states were terrified of BMD at both the political and strategic levels.
But the arguments and alignments in favor of BMD have changed drastically in the post-Cold War era.
The New American Logic
As the Russian missile arsenal has declined in quantity and quality, U.S. desires for a BMD protective net have only strengthened. Though most American strategic planners in the 1980s were well aware that the system being envisioned was merely drawing-board material, strategic and technological realities today are starkly different. U.S. strategic thought now is fixating on two ideas.
First and most obvious is that, though it would not be foolproof by any stretch, it is possible that within a few years, an American-installed BMD network in certain parts of the world could protect against secondary threats such as Iran and North Korea. Given that the human and financial costs involved in rebuilding a major U.S. city (should one be hit by a nuclear weapon) are well above even the most aggressive price estimates for a global BMD network, the original vision of BMD as an effective defensive weapon now could be within reach.
The second idea dovetails with long-standing U.S. strategic doctrine -- a philosophy that long predates the Cold War. That doctrine has always aimed to push threats away from the continental United States -- initially by securing U.S. sovereignty over the North American land mass, achieving strategic depth and controlling sea approaches. Ultimately, the doctrine calls for the United States to project power into Eurasia itself, establishing as much stand-off distance as possible. In the early 20th century, naval power allowed the United States to do this just fine. But in the early 21st century, with the proliferation of intercontinental ballistic missile technology, naval power is only one leg of such a strategy.
Having forward-based BMD facilities not only is becoming important for Washington, but is moving to the core of U.S. defense logic.
From Washington's perspective, establishing a BMD system is not about taking advantage of Russia's relative military weakness, but instead about adapting to a new strategic reality. The foes and threats facing the United States have changed. No one is pretending that Russia's decline as a global power has not opened the door to a U.S. BMD system in the first place, or that the system could not be expanded and upgraded in the future as a potential counter to Russia's nuclear arsenal. Rather, it means simply that in the current strategic picture, the Russians really are not at the heart of U.S. defense planning -- and certainly not so far as BMD is concerned.
(click to enlarge)
The technological considerations are not unimportant here. With current technology, any system would be twitchy at best -- so for best results, the United States is seeking a layered network. The first layer of defense -- which most likely would include airborne lasers at some point -- would be sited as close to the launching states as possible, allowing the system to target any missile launches during the boost phase. The second layer would involve missile interceptors or AEGIS systems to strike during the midcourse of the missile's flight, followed by terminal phase engagement with anti-missile systems, such as the PAC-3 (the newest incarnation of the Patriot).
The polar projection of an ICBM is also key to understanding Washington's logic. Any missile launched from Iran and bound for the continental United States would have to fly over Central Europe -- which is why the United States has pending agreements to set up an interceptor base in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic. Similarly, any North Korean missile would have to fly over Alaska, the other major BMD interceptor locale. A nuclear strike out of Russia, however, would travel over the North Pole. BMD installations in Europe and Alaska would cover only the peripheries of that attack corridor -- and with vastly insufficient numbers of interceptors.
In short, the U.S. rationale for BMD has evolved. In the 1980s, it was about breaking out of the MAD impasse and wringing concessions out of the Soviets. Today, BMD has the potential to be something that was never seriously considered in the 1980s: a viable defensive weapon. Put another way, BMD once was wielded as a political tool to avoid a future war; now, it is coming to be viewed as a defensive weapon to be used in a future conflict.
The New European Logic
The Czech Republic and Poland are not the only European states to have changed their thinking about BMD either. A number of countries not only are responding warmly to U.S. overtures regarding facilities, but in some cases actually are initiating the siting requests.
For central European states, the benefits of such deals are obvious. Most of the political elites in these states fear a future conflict with the Russians, and anything they can do to solidify a military arrangement with Washington is, to their thinking, a benefit in and of itself. But even in Western Europe, further removed from the Russian periphery, opposition to the United States' BMD programs seems to have relaxed considerably. The United Kingdom has specifically requested inclusion in the system (though Washington so far has declined), and the German government has called for the United States to address the issue of BMD in the context of NATO.
There are several reasons for this change.
First and foremost, BMD technology -- while still unproven -- has advanced considerably since the Reagan era, and thus is now far more likely to work. When BMD was only a political tool and could offer no real protection, the Europeans were understandably squeamish about participating in the system. But if the system is actually functional, the calculus shifts.
Second, a weak BMD system designed to guard against Iran theoretically could evolve into a stronger system that helps to protect Europeans against Russia in the future. Of course, the system is not designed to target Russia at the present time, but if Russia's military capabilities should decay further over time, the technological argument -- that the system might actually work -- weighs heavily in the European mind. And at a time when Moscow is growing more aggressive in economic and political terms, laying the groundwork for a military hedge makes sense.
Third, it is becoming increasingly difficult for Europeans to define their security interests as separate from Washington's. Moscow's new energy strategy is a tool for exerting influence over Europe, making European states more willing to view Russia through American goggles. Moreover, Iran regularly bites its thumb at the United Nations and its nuclear watchdog, inducing the Europeans (little by little) to morph from being apologists for Tehran to quiet, if still primarily unofficial, enforcers of sanctions. BMD fits into the U.S. strategic doctrine, and that logic, by association, is now taking hold in Europe.
Fourth, there is a desire to rope the United States into a multilateral defense stratagem. Many Western Europeans begrudge U.S. efforts to dominate the NATO alliance and regularly try to persuade Washington to more seriously consider European points of view. But the United States' ability to make bilateral defense deals cuts the Europeans out completely. For countries like Germany, which considers itself a key driver of European policy, the only way to counter unilateral American moves is to make it worth Washington's while to discuss issues like BMD within the framework of NATO -- which means taking BMD well beyond committee meetings and talk shops. It means actually deploying assets. To do otherwise would only encourage Washington to impose a security policy upon Europe without consulting the Europeans.
Finally, there is the "If you can't beat 'em, join 'em" logic: Bilateral U.S. security agreements with Central European states are forging BMD into reality. If is going to happen anyway, the logic goes, you might as well jump on the bandwagon and reap some of the benefits.
Russian Repercussions
The Russians, of course, are not blind to the emergence of a potential threat near their borders -- even recognizing the limitations of the BMD system as currently envisioned.
The United States certainly does not want to trigger a war with Moscow, but that does not mean that Washington is oozing with warm feelings toward all things Russian. Throughout American history, only three countries have seriously threatened the United States: Britain, which ultimately was forced into the role of ally; Mexico, which was occupied and half its territory annexed; and Russia/Soviet Union -- the only foe still remaining. Traditionally, the United States does not defeat its enemies so much as crush them until either they switch sides or are incapable of posing more than a negligible threat.
Though the days of Russian-American military parity are long past, the United States is not yet finished with Moscow from a strategic perspective. Washington wants to pressure Russia until its will, as well as its ability, to pose a viable threat completely disintegrates. Therefore, while it is true that Russia is not an explicit target of the BMD system being established in the Czech Republic and Poland, it would be ridiculous to believe that BMD facilities in Europe would not trigger evolutions in Russian policy. Washington realizes that. In fact, the Americans are betting on it.
Establishing a BMD system on Russia's doorstep would indeed pose a potential long-term threat for Moscow -- but more importantly, it creates a political irritant that will generate a steady stream of bellicose Russian rhetoric. And that serves American purposes. The more aggressive Russia sounds, the more willing Europeans will be to see strategic U.S. policy in general -- and BMD policy specifically -- from Washington's point of view.
Which brings us back to the recent statements by the men who manage Russia's warheads. Their direct threats against European targets must have thrilled American strategic planners. With but a few words, the Russian generals not only supplied a fresh rationale for the BMD system, but also tilted the debate in Europe over the entire system toward the Americans' logic.
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Museum Review | U.S.S. Monitor Center
A Celebrity Warship Gets a Hall of Fame to Call Its Own
By EDWARD ROTHSTEIN
Published: March 10, 2007
NEWPORT NEWS, Va. — As sacred relics go, it doesn’t seem too inspiring. In appearance, Nathaniel Hawthorne said, it “looked like a gigantic rat-trap.” In life, it had little more than a single day of major achievement, and in that it was less than triumphant. In death, it was even less grand, sinking into the Atlantic during a storm, not even a year after it first lumbered onto the scene.
So why, after 145 years, $15 million in oceanic explorations and more than a decade of dives and excavation, is the Civil War battleship the Monitor being given a second life at a cost of $30 million, with its artifacts, history and accounts of its career displayed in a 63,500-square-foot space? That’s precisely what is happening at the U.S.S. Monitor Center, which opened March 9 at the Mariners’ Museum here.
Something seems off kilter about the entire scale: why this kind of attention and expense? It is much easier to see why the Mariners’ Museum itself was interested. Rich in land (a 550-acre park) and endowment ($110 million) and founded in 1930 by Archer M. Huntington (of the railroad Huntingtons) to explore what he called the “culture of the sea,” this museum features a collection of about 150 boats, a major research library, world-class navigation equipment and exhibitions about the history of navigation. But it has been drawing only about 60,000 visitors a year in a region where American history is a major tourist attraction, shipbuilding a local industry and the United States Navy a nearby presence.
Now that may change with the opening of its U.S.S. Monitor Center, in conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. (The government owns the wreck and oversaw its excavation.) While the scale and attention can be a little disorienting to a visitor without sea legs, by the time you have passed through the well-annotated, smartly presented exhibits, watched the widescreen re-creations of historic battles and read something about what this ship meant to its contemporaries and devotees, the Monitor starts to loom large.
The center’s galleries are meant, in current museum style, to be evocative re-creations of times and places — turning points of experience. (The exhibits were overseen by the museum’s chief curator, Anna Gibson Holloway, and designed by DMCD Inc.) The history begins on a gun deck of a 1798 warship, where the vulnerabilities of the age of sail could be sensed in the evolution of ever more powerful guns. The early 19th century sounded the death knell for that age; the Civil War allowed it a final breath; the Monitor and the Confederate ironclad Virginia buried it.
Then comes a room evoking the Gosport Navy Yard in Virginia in 1862: the Union had tried to destroy the yard and remove its warships, but only half-managed to burn the Merrimack and leave it in the mud. Lacking the North’s industrial facilities but not ingenuity, the Confederates took the burned hull of the Merrimack, built on it and layered on four inches of iron, renamed it the Virginia and, with this strange contraption, emulated the armored ships that were transforming European navies. A 50-foot-long replica of the Virginia’s bow here is a monstrosity that understandably inspired fear and bewilderment among those used to wooden vessels with billowing sails.
Then a visitor enters the board room of 1862, where Navy officials discussed what kind of armored warship the Union could hastily construct. A Confederate ironclad ship, it was justifiably feared, could wipe out the entire Union Navy. A brilliant Swedish engineer, John Ericsson, had fruitlessly peddled an ironclad design to Napoleon III, but the urgency of war now won him American approval. Abraham Lincoln saw Ericsson’s model and famously declared: “All I have to say is what the girl said when she stuck her foot into the stocking. It strikes me there’s something in it.”
The catch: Ericsson was given 100 days.
One hundred days! This was to be a revolutionary vessel in which the crew and engine were to be entirely housed below the water line. If naval weaponry had traditionally been aimed at targets by turning the ship, here a gun turret would rotate on enormous gears, allowing shots in almost any direction. Everything about the Monitor was experimental, but there was no time for experiments. It was built in the Brooklyn Navy Yard, with numerous contractors bringing the ship in on time.
This technological marvel then took on mythic dimensions. On March 8, 1862, the Virginia had steamed into Hampton Roads, not far from its birthplace, and almost effortlessly destroyed two Union ships, the Cumberland and the Congress, mauling them with its iron ram. With 121 men dead on the first and 240 on the second, it was the worst naval defeat for the United States until Pearl Harbor. What would come next? The Confederacy’s triumphal river journey to Washington? The Union Navy had become obsolete — until the next day, when the Monitor met the Virginia in battle.
In the museum a 13-minute wide-screen show, intriguingly composed of animated paintings and maps and aided by lighting and sound effects, recounts the great battle that followed, as these behemoths tested out their gear, each side claiming victory.
This battle is in every elementary-school textbook. About 20,000 people stood on the banks, watching. The clash — chronicled by letters of participants and witnesses — apparently ended in a draw. But the age of sail definitively lost. The Times of London declared that the British Royal Navy had 149 first-class warships before the battle, but “we now have two.” Jules Verne, inspired by the Monitor, wrote “20,000 Leagues Under the Sea,” published in 1870.
As a drama, the encounter could not have been more skillfully plotted: the Union disaster, the last-minute rescue, the celebration. There were Monitor playing cards, hats, scrimshaw and sheet music.
And there were also complaints, because what was ending was not just the technology of sail. The seaman’s center of gravity had changed — which may be why the vessel’s living quarters below the water, reproduced here, were given unusual attention. An entire culture had evolved around sailing and naval warfare, complete with manners and strategies, uniforms and training. Now the action was below the water line. And in combat, there was no more hand-to-hand confrontation or urgent need to know the ropes. This wasn’t really life at sea; it was life in the engine room.
“All the pomp and splendor of naval warfare are gone by,” Hawthorne mournfully wrote. “Henceforth there must come up a race of enginemen and smoke-blackened commoners who will hammer away at their enemies under the direction of a single pair of eyes.”
In his recent book “Ironclad,” Paul Clancy points out that Melville wrote poems about the Monitor, referring to the turret as the seaman’s “welded tomb,” and noting that warriors
Are now but operatives; War’s made
Less grand than Peace.
After their major battle, the deaths of the Virginia and the Monitor seemed to prove Melville’s point. Within days the Virginia, cornered, was run aground and set on fire by the Confederates: a suicide avoiding capture. By the next winter, the Monitor too, in less than glorious circumstances, came to its accidental death in a storm. The Union produced another generation of ironclads, but the Civil War stumbled along its bloody course, undeterred.
A good portion of the museum is devoted to the recent rescue of the Monitor from the sea floor, itself done at great risk. There is a full-size reproduction of the rusted, lichen-
encrusted gun turret, just as it was found sunk off the coast of Cape Hatteras, N.C. Outside the museum’s glass wall, a full-scale exterior deck of the Monitor is recreated; inside a replica of the turret’s mechanism is also reproduced. It will take 15 years to rehabilitate the original turret in tanks filled with 90,000 gallons of water.
So what are these relics, then, that so attract a visitor’s gaze? Here, not far from where the Monitor fought its main battle, the rusted machinery, silver forks, glass bottles, the human-size propeller and interlocking turret gears all seem to offer testimony to a moment when the world changed, when, as with the Civil War itself, something had come to an end, and something else — which could either turn out horrifying or magnificent — had not yet begun.
The U.S.S. Monitor Center is at 100 Museum Drive, Newport News, Va; (757) 596-2222 or monitorcenter.org
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Washington Post
July 11, 1862
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New Type of Ship Fights for North
By Elizabeth
HAMPTON ROADS, Va.--Officers of the U.S.S. Monitor displayed their new type of battleship as it lay anchored in the James River in Virginia on July 9, 1862. Four months ago it fought a battle that could change the course of naval warfare forever.
The twelve officers are posing in front of the ship's turret, one of the many new features of this vessel. It can turn allowing the ship's two cannons to be pointed in any direction. It gave the ship its nickname, "a tin can on a shingle."
Unlike the traditional battleship, which is made of wood, the Monitor is covered with iron. This kind of ship is called an ironclad. That makes it harder for cannon balls to sink the ship.
The ship fought a famous battle just four months ago, in March 1862, against the Merrimac. Both ships were ironclads.
The Merrimac was a Union ship at the beginning of the Civil War. But the Confederates captured it and turned it into an ironclad renamed the C.S.S. Virginia. But in common usage it was still called the Merrimac.
On March 8, 1862, the Merrimac won a victory at Hampton Roads, Va., against Union ships who were blockading the Confederate coast.
A Union officer watching the one-sided battle between the Merrimac and one of the Union ships, the Congress, said that the Merrimac "fired shot and shell into her with terrific effect, while the shot from the Congress glanced from her sloping sides without doing any apparent effect."
But the next day, March 9, the Union ironclad, the Monitor, arrived on the scene. The Merrimac and the Monitor fought each other for almost five hours.
Describing the first exchange of gunfire, Lt. Samuel Dana Greene, an officer on the Merrimac said, "The turrets and other parts of the ship were heavily struck, but the shots did not penetrate; the tower was intact and it continued to revolve. A look of confidence passed over the men's faces and we believed the Merrimac would not repeat the work she had accomplished the day before."
Neither ship was able to do much damage to the other ship. The battle was considered a draw.
Although there was no winner, the battle will be likely to change the course of naval warfare forever. It has brought worldwide attention to the importance of ironclad ships.
The Monitor was built in less than four months according to the design of a man who is not in the picture. His name was John Ericsson, a Swedish immigrant.
Ericsson's design was unusual and not everyone liked it. But when it was shown to President Lincoln, he said, "All I have to say is what the girl said when she put her foot into the stocking. 'It strikes me there may be something in it.'"
The Union has plans to build other ships designed by John Ericsson called "monitors." They will be ironclad, easy to maneuver, and will have revolving turrets.
The officers of the Monitor include Captain John Lorimer Worden, a young man of 24 with a long beard. He was blinded permanently in one eye by an explosion in the battle.
Lt. Samuel Dana Green, the second in command, is 22. He took over after Worden was wounded. Another officer was Lt. Thomas Oliver Selfridge Jr.
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Iraq: The Fear Factor in Chlorine Bombs
Insurgents detonated three vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) packed with chlorine in Iraq's Anbar province west of Baghdad on March 16. The initial blasts, which U.S. officials blamed on al Qaeda in Iraq, killed at least six people, while at least 350 Iraqi civilians and six U.S. troops fell ill as a result of chlorine exposure.
Although the deaths were caused by the blasts rather than the chlorine -- as in similar attacks involving chlorine bombs earlier in the year -- these latest attacks clearly demonstrate al Qaeda's fascination with combining chlorine and explosives to create crude chemical weapons. Causing mass casualties with chemical VBIEDs is extremely difficult, though the fear incited by such attacks makes these kinds of bombs increasingly popular among insurgents. Moreover, as the insurgents gain experience with the devices -- and increase their lethality -- the tactic likely will spread beyond Iraq.
Chlorine bombs are relatively easy weapons for the Iraqi insurgents to make. The devices used in the latest attacks involved a pickup truck and two dump trucks loaded with chlorine tanks and rigged with explosives. One of the dump trucks reportedly carried a 200-gallon chlorine tank. One truck detonated at a checkpoint near Ar Ramadi, while another killed two Iraqi policemen in Al Amiriyah. The most devastating attack occurred three miles south of Al Fallujah when a dump truck targeted the reception center of a tribal sheikh who had denounced al Qaeda.
The use of chlorine in chemical VBIEDs is attractive to militants because the chemical is widely available in Iraq and around the world. The problem, as Iraqi militants are finding, however, is dispersing the chemical with a VBIED while maintaining an effective concentration of the gas. As a result, the chlorine bombs seen to date in Iraq have been tremendously ineffective in inflicting mass casualties, especially when compared with traditional car bombs, which do kill large numbers of people when detonated in populous areas.
Regardless of these bombs' effectiveness as mass killers, however, insurgents like them because the immediate chlorine odor incites fear. Witnesses of the Iraqi attacks, for example, reported nasty smells and a white plume of smoke that turned black and blue. Furthermore, these attacks are valuable to insurgents as tests for future operations elsewhere. Whether this method of attack is the fixation of a particular insurgent leader or it represents an emerging doctrine by al Qaeda in Iraq, the attacks will allow the insurgents to gain tactical expertise and learn to construct more effective chemical bombs. The attackers also could be conducting these attacks to gauge security weaknesses or to divert attention from a different location where an operation is planned.
Chemical VBIED attacks are likely to continue in Iraq and to spread as those responsible for them export the knowledge gained throughout the region and beyond. Al Qaeda units in other locations followed the lead of al Qaeda in Iraq as it increased its use of tactics such as employing roadside bombs and conducting beheadings -- and the use of chlorine bombs could be next.
The Iraqi insurgency has proven to be an effective training ground for foreign jihadists, much as the Afghan resistance was two decades earlier. Al Qaeda sprang from the Afghan conflict, and today foreigners from Saudi Arabia, Syria, North Africa and elsewhere are honing their insurgent skills on the battlegrounds of Iraq -- and are then returning home to spread jihadist tactics. This has been seen most recently in the Maghreb, where the regional al Qaeda arm is increasingly employing improvised explosive devices in attacks, especially against foreign energy workers.
Because chlorine is so common, movement of the chemical cannot be severely restricted. This is especially true in areas where the state already has a weak hold on the security situation. Therefore, Iraqi insurgents are likely to continue refining their technique -- and their allies and sympathizers beyond the state will start to adopt the tactic themselves.
stratfor.com
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Who Needs Nukes
Why the U.S. and other Western powers need to modernize their arsenals.
BY BRET STEPHENS
Tuesday, March 20, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
The problem with nuclear weapons today can be summed up as follows: They are going out of fashion where they are needed most and coming into fashion where they are needed least.
British Prime Minister Tony Blair eked out what is likely to be the last significant legislative victory of his government on Thursday when parliament approved funds, over the objections of 88 Labour MPs, to begin design work on the next generation of ballistic missile nuclear submarines. Whether the subs and their missiles will actually be built remains a question for a future parliament to answer.
At nearly the same time, the Bush administration awarded a contract to the Lawrence Livermore Lab to design something called the Reliable Replacement Warhead--basically a retinkered version of the previously tested but never-deployed W89 warhead--to replace the current mainstays of the U.S. arsenal, particularly the 100-kiloton W76. But with Democrats in control of Congress, the RRW will surely face funding hurdles of its own. The New York Times has already chimed in with an editorial denouncing RRW as a make-work scheme for nuclear scientists based on the supposedly bogus rationale of " 'aging' warheads."
Too bad the Times didn't rely on its own fine reporting of the issue: "As warheads age," noted the paper's William J. Broad in a 2005 exposé, "the risk of internal rusting, material degradation, corrosion, decay and the embrittling of critical parts increases." Too bad, too, that British anti-nuclear activists fail to consider the dire consequences for their collective poodledom should they relinquish their independent deterrent.
Still, these ironies are of small account and at least the left maintains its scruples. No similar scruples inhibit the nuclear ambitions of other nations. Russia is fielding a new land-based missile called the Topol-M and building a new generation of ballistic-missile submarines. The Chinese are upgrading their land- and sea-based nuclear forces with multiple warheads and solid-fuel propulsion technology. Pakistan last month successfully tested its Shaheen-II ballistic missile, capable of lifting a nuclear payload to a range of 1,250 miles. Iran is reportedly within months of developing an industrial-scale uranium enrichment capacity of about 3,000 centrifuges, which in turn puts it on track to acquire a bomb's worth of fissile uranium by the end of 2008. The progress of North Korean arms is well known.
Why are the world's responsible powers in such doubt about the necessity of nuclear deterrence when the irresponsible are seeking as never before to enlarge or improve their store of weapons? One answer was offered in these pages in January by former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, who noted that the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty committed non-nuclear powers not to develop weapons in exchange for a promise by the nuclear powers to "reduce and eventually abolish their arsenals." "If this reciprocity is not observed," he wrote, "then the entire structure of the treaty will collapse."
As a matter of rhetoric, Mr. Gorbachev is surely right, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be clever to press the point when he makes an appearance before the U.N. Security Council later this month. As a matter of reality, the argument is wrong on facts and dangerously solipsistic: Messrs. Kim and Ahmadinejad have better reasons to seek nuclear weapons than pique at American (or British) "hypocrisy." As it is, both Russia and the U.S. have reduced their arsenals from Cold War peaks by as much as 80%--much of the reduction being achieved by the current administration--yet that has done little to incent rogue actors not to seek their own weapons of mass destruction.
A more serious objection to the American and British modernization plans is that they offer no realistic security against terrorism. Suppose al Qaeda detonates a nuclear bomb in Times Square. Suppose that the weapon was stolen from an old Soviet depot, meaning no "return address" for purposes of retaliation. Suppose, also, that al Qaeda threatens to detonate five other bombs if the U.S. does not meet a list of its demands. What use would deterrence be then? Against whom would we retaliate, and where?
This scenario does not invalidate the need for a nuclear deterrent: There would still be conventional opponents to deter, and it's odd that the people who tell us we can "contain" a nuclear Iran are often the same ones who insist we can forgo the means of containment. But the question of what to do after a nuclear 9/11 is something to which not enough thought has been given. We urgently need a nuclear doctrine--and the weapons to go with it--for the terrorist age. The RRW, which simply prolongs a Cold War nuclear posture through the year 2050, amounts to a partial solution at best.
What would a sensible deterrence strategy look like? "Even nihilists have something they hold dear that can be threatened with deterrence," says Max Singer, a collaborator of the great Cold War theorist Herman Kahn. "You need to know what it is, communicate it and be serious about it."
Would it hinder Islamist terrorists if the U.S.'s declared policy in the event of a nuclear 9/11 was the immediate destruction of Mecca, Medina and the Iranian religious center of Qom? Would our deterrent be more or less effective if we deployed a range of weapons, such as the maligned "bunker buster," the use of which a potential adversary might think us capable? How would the deployment of a comprehensive anti-ballistic missile shield alter the composition of a credible deterrent? Does it make sense to adhere to the NPT regime when that regime is clearly broken?
One needn't have answers to these questions to know it requires something more than pat moralizing about the terribleness of nuclear weapons or declaring the whole matter "unthinkable." Nothing is unthinkable. But whether the unthinkable remains the undoable depends entirely on our willingness to think clearly about it, and to act on our conclusions.
Mr. Stephens is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His column appears in the Journal Tuesdays.
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U.S.: A joint Northrop Grumman/ European Aeronautic Defense and Space Co. team announced March 28 -- as expected -- that it will formally submit its KC-30 tanker design to the Pentagon on April 12 for the $40 billion competition to replace the U.S. Air Force's aging KC-130 tanker fleet with 179 new aerial refueling planes. The KC-30 (a militarized version of the Airbus A330) will compete against Boeing's KC-767, which is based on the civilian 767 airframe. The replacement program is a top priority for the U.S. Air Force. As such, the Pentagon is expected to award the contract during this calendar year. Northrop-Grumman maintains that more than 50 percent of the production would take place in the United States, despite the Airbus frame. Boeing, of course, estimates 85 percent domestic production. The A330 is also a larger plane than the 767, and its commercial counterpart runs $160 million per plane -- $30 million more than the commercial 767. Both are two-engine aircraft with seating in the two-aisle 200-300 range.
stratfor.com
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Its no secret I think a lot of www.stratfor . That said, the following piece makes some points with which I disagree-- specifically in its analysis of the possibility of blockading Iran.
IMHO the decision not to embargo was less a military one (and the piece is a discussion of military theory) than a political one-- and again IMHO naval power may well be quite necessary if we are to stop Iran from going nuke.
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The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power
By George Friedman
It has now been four years since the fall of Baghdad concluded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. We have said much about the Iraq war, and for the moment there is little left to say. The question is whether the United States will withdraw forces from Iraq or whether it will be able to craft some sort of political resolution to the war, both within Iraq and in the region. Military victory, in the sense of the unfettered imposition of U.S. will in Iraq, does not appear to us a possibility. Therefore, over the next few months, against the background of the U.S. offensive in Baghdad, the political equation will play out. The action continues. The analysis must pause and await results.
During this pause, we have been thinking about some of the broader questions involved in Iraq -- and about the nature and limits of American military power in particular. We recently considered the purpose of U.S. wars since World War II in our discussion of U.S. warfare as strategic spoiling attack. Now we turn to another dimension of U.S. military power -- the U.S. Navy -- and consider what role, if any, it plays in national security at this point.
Recent events have directed our attention to the role and limits of naval power. During the detention of the 15 British sailors and marines, an idea floated by many people was that the United States should impose a blockade against Iran. The argument was driven partly by a lack of other options: Neither an invasion nor an extended air campaign seemed a viable alternative. Moreover, the United States' experience in erecting blockades is rich with decisive examples: the Cuban missile crisis, barring Germany's ability to trade during World War II or that of the American South during the Civil War. The one unquestionable military asset the United States has is its Navy, which can impose sea-lane control anywhere in the world. Finally, Iran -- which is rich in oil (all of which is exported by sea) but lacks sufficient refinery capacity of its own -- relies on imported gasoline. Therefore, the argument went, imposing a naval blockade would cripple Iran's economy and bring the leadership to the negotiating table.
Washington never seriously considered the option. This was partly because of diplomatic discussions that indicated that the British detainees would be released under any circumstances. And it was partly because of the difficulties involved in blockading Iran at this time:
1. Iran could mount strategic counters to a blockade, either by increasing anti-U.S. operations by its Shiite allies in Iraq or by inciting Shiite communities in the Arabian Peninsula to unrest. The United States didn't have appetite for the risk.
2. Blockades always involve the interdiction of vessels operated by third countries -- countries that might not appreciate being interdicted. The potential repercussions of interdicting merchant vessels belonging to powers that did not accept the blockade was a price the United States would not pay at this time.
A blockade was not selected because it was not needed, because Iran could retaliate in other ways and because a blockade might damage countries other than Iran that the United States didn't want to damage. It was, therefore, not in the cards. Not imposing a blockade made sense.
The Value of Naval Power
This raises a more fundamental question: What is the value of naval power in a world in which naval battles are not fought? To frame the question more clearly, let us begin by noting that the United States has maintained global maritime hegemony since the end of World War II. Except for the failed Soviet attempt to partially challenge the United States, the most important geopolitical fact since World War II was that the world's oceans were effectively under the control of the U.S. Navy. Prior to World War II, there were multiple contenders for maritime power, such as Britain, Japan and most major powers. No one power, not even Britain, had global maritime hegemony. The United States now does. The question is whether this hegemony has any real value at this time -- a question made relevant by the issue of whether to blockade Iran.
The United States controls the blue water. To be a little more precise, the U.S. Navy can assert direct and overwhelming control over any portion of the blue water it wishes, and it can do so in multiple places. It cannot directly control all of the oceans at the same time. However, the total available naval force that can be deployed by non-U.S. powers (friendly and other) is so limited that they lack the ability, even taken together, to assert control anywhere should the United States challenge their presence. This is an unprecedented situation historically.
The current situation is, of course, invaluable to the United States. It means that a seaborne invasion of the United States by any power is completely impractical. Given the geopolitical condition of the United States, the homeland is secure from conventional military attack but vulnerable to terrorist strikes and nuclear attacks. At the same time, the United States is in a position to project forces at will to any part of the globe. Such power projection might not be wise at times, but even failure does not lead to reciprocation. For instance, no matter how badly U.S. forces fare in Iraq, the Iraqis will not invade the United States if the Americans are defeated there.
This is not a trivial fact. Control of the seas means that military or political failure in Eurasia will not result in a direct conventional threat to the United States. Nor does such failure necessarily preclude future U.S. intervention in that region. It also means that no other state can choose to invade the United States. Control of the seas allows the United States to intervene where it wants, survive the consequences of failure and be immune to occupation itself. It was the most important geopolitical consequence of World War II, and one that still defines the world.
The issue for the United States is not whether it should abandon control of the seas -- that would be irrational in the extreme. Rather, the question is whether it has to exert itself at all in order to retain that control. Other powers either have abandoned attempts to challenge the United States, have fallen short of challenging the United States or have confined their efforts to building navies for extremely limited uses, or for uses aligned with the United States. No one has a shipbuilding program under way that could challenge the United States for several generations.
One argument, then, is that the United States should cut its naval forces radically -- since they have, in effect, done their job. Mothballing a good portion of the fleet would free up resources for other military requirements without threatening U.S. ability to control the sea-lanes. Should other powers attempt to build fleets to challenge the United States, the lead time involved in naval construction is such that the United States would have plenty of opportunities for re-commissioning ships or building new generations of vessels to thwart the potential challenge.
The counterargument normally given is that the U.S. Navy provides a critical service in what is called littoral warfare. In other words, while the Navy might not be needed immediately to control sea-lanes, it carries out critical functions in securing access to those lanes and projecting rapid power into countries where the United States might want to intervene. Thus, U.S. aircraft carriers can bring tactical airpower to bear relatively quickly in any intervention. Moreover, the Navy's amphibious capabilities -- particularly those of deploying and supplying the U.S. Marines -- make for a rapid deployment force that, when coupled with Naval airpower, can secure hostile areas of interest for the United States.
That argument is persuasive, but it poses this problem: The Navy provides a powerful option for war initiation by the United States, but it cannot by itself sustain the war. In any sustained conflict, the Army must be brought in to occupy territory -- or, as in Iraq, the Marines must be diverted from the amphibious specialty to serve essentially as Army units. Naval air by itself is a powerful opening move, but greater infusions of airpower are needed for a longer conflict. Naval transport might well be critically important in the opening stages, but commercial transport sustains the operation.
If one accepts this argument, the case for a Navy of the current size and shape is not proven. How many carrier battle groups are needed and, given the threat to the carriers, is an entire battle group needed to protect them?
If we consider the Iraq war in isolation, for example, it is apparent that the Navy served a function in the defeat of Iraq's conventional forces. It is not clear, however, that the Navy has served an important role in the attempt to occupy and pacify Iraq. And, as we have seen in the case of Iran, a blockade is such a complex politico-military matter that the option not to blockade tends to emerge as the obvious choice.
The Risk Not Taken
The argument for slashing the Navy can be tempting. But consider the counterargument. First, and most important, we must consider the crises the United States has not experienced. The presence of the U.S. Navy has shaped the ambitions of primary and secondary powers. The threshold for challenging the Navy has been so high that few have even initiated serious challenges. Those that might be trying to do so, like the Chinese, understand that it requires a substantial diversion of resources. Therefore, the mere existence of U.S. naval power has been effective in averting crises that likely would have occurred otherwise. Reducing the power of the U.S. Navy, or fine-tuning it, would not only open the door to challenges but also eliminate a useful, if not essential, element in U.S. strategy -- the ability to bring relatively rapid force to bear.
There are times when the Navy's use is tactical, and times when it is strategic. At this moment in U.S. history, the role of naval power is highly strategic. The domination of the world's oceans represents the foundation stone of U.S. grand strategy. It allows the United States to take risks while minimizing consequences. It facilitates risk-taking. Above all, it eliminates the threat of sustained conventional attack against the homeland. U.S. grand strategy has worked so well that this risk appears to be a phantom. The dispersal of U.S. forces around the world attests to what naval power can achieve. It is illusory to believe that this situation cannot be reversed, but it is ultimately a generational threat. Just as U.S. maritime hegemony is measured in generations, the threat to that hegemony will emerge over generations. The apparent lack of utility of naval forces in secondary campaigns, like Iraq, masks the fundamentally indispensable role the Navy plays in U.S. national security.
That does not mean that the Navy as currently structured is sacrosanct -- far from it. Peer powers will be able to challenge the U.S. fleet, but not by building their own fleets. Rather, the construction of effective anti-ship missile systems -- which can destroy merchant ships as well as overwhelm U.S. naval anti-missile systems -- represents a low-cost challenge to U.S. naval power. This is particularly true when these anti-ship missiles are tied to space-based, real-time reconnaissance systems. A major power such as China need not be able to mirror the U.S. Navy in order to challenge it.
Whatever happens in Iraq -- or Iran -- the centrality of naval power is unchanging. But the threat to naval power evolves. The fact that there is no threat to U.S. control of the sea-lanes at this moment does not mean one will not emerge. Whether with simple threats like mines or the most sophisticated anti-ship system, the ability to keep the U.S. Navy from an area or to close off strategic chokepoints for shipping remains the major threat to the United States -- which is, first and foremost, a maritime power.
One of the dangers of wars like those in Iraq and Afghanistan is that they soak up resources and intellectual bandwidth. It is said that generals always fight the last war. Another way of stating that is to say they believe the war they are fighting now will go on forever in some form. That belief leads to neglect of capabilities that appear superfluous for the current conflict. That is the true hollowing-out that extended warfare creates. It is an intellectual hollowing-out.
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Sorry, no URL for this one, but it seems sound and comes from a sound person:
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- The military's controversial V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft will head to Iraq for its first combat tour later this year, Marine officials announced Friday.
After 18 years and $20 billion in development, the plane will deploy to western Iraq in September to support Marine Corps combat operations for seven months, Marine officials said.
The plane, which is intended to replace the Corps' 40-year-old fleet of CH-46 helicopters by 2018, can fly like a plane and land like a helicopter, giving the Marines more flexibility in the field, officials said.
The V-22 can carry troops three times as far, twice as fast and has six to seven times more survivability than the CH-46 widely used now in Iraq, the military says.
The Osprey's performance has also been noticed by the Air Force, which has plans to use it as a special operations aircraft.
The aircraft has been redesigned after two fatal accidents in 2000 that killed 23 Marines. Accidents in 1991 and 1992 killed seven other people, but Marines say the plane's problems are in the past.
"It's been through extensive operational testing and evaluation, and it is our fervent feeling that this aircraft is the most capable, survivable aircraft that we carry our most important weapon system in, which is the Marine or rifleman, and that we will successfully introduce this aircraft in combat," said Lt. Gen. John G. Castellaw, deputy commandant for aviation.
Critics say the tilt-rotor design may still be too unsafe for the complexities of flying in combat operations.
The Marine Corps maintains it is a much more controllable aircraft in those situations.
Since 2003, the Marines have lost seven aircraft in combat operations. The Marine Corps says the V-22 can better avoid being shot down because it can fly higher than the missiles that have been targeting helicopters. In addition, people on the ground cannot hear the aircraft approaching, giving insurgents less time to prepare to shoot as it flies at low altitude.
"I flown the V-22, and I have taken it and used it in a tactical manner," Castellaw said. "The ability to maneuver this aircraft is far in excess of what we have with the existing helicopters."
CNN's Mike Mount contributed to this report.
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The Pilotless Plane That Only Looks Like Child’s Play
By CHARLES DUHIGG
Published: April 15, 2007
IF you’re the type of shopper who spends billions of dollars on lethal military gadgets, and you’re ever invited to visit General Atomics Aeronautical Systems — the small, privately held San Diego company that has quickly become one of the military industry’s most celebrated businesses — take a bit of advice: accept a ride on the corporate jet.
Thomas J. Cassidy Jr., left, president of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, prepares for takeoff. He was commander of the Navy station that housed the “Top Gun” school. He even had a bit part in the movie.
The plane isn’t fancy. The cabin is cramped and the seats a little threadbare. (Want a beverage? Open the cooler, help yourself and quit whining about the heat.) Still, such bare-bones accoutrements haven’t stopped a parade of top military officials and politicians from clamoring for their own seats on General Atomics flights.
If you’re lucky, after the jet lands at the company’s airstrip in the high desert east of Los Angeles, you’ll tour one of the room-sized shipping containers clustered near the runway. Inside is a video-game addict’s idea of a cockpit, with joysticks, gauges and high-tech screens sprouting everywhere and a cushy chair that has improbably become one of the sexiest seats in the military. From that perch you can guide an unmanned airplane, known as the Predator, that is potentially thousands of miles away and can hover over suspected enemies for dozens of hours before raining down missiles.
For years, such planes — known as U.A.V.’s, for unmanned aerial vehicles — were pariahs within the military industry, scorned by commanders who saw them as threats to the status quo. But during the last several years, U.A.V.’s have amassed unusual political firepower. “For a long time, the only thing most generals could agree on was that they didn’t want any unmanned vehicles,” says Senator John W. Warner, the Virginia Republican who is a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. “Now everyone wants as many as they can get.”
In fact, only a decade ago, crucial Air Force commanders were lobbying to prevent battlefield deployment of U.A.V.’s, according to Congressional staff members. By 2005, however, John P. Jumper, then the Air Force chief of staff, had sufficiently about-faced to tell Congress that “we’re going to tell General Atomics to build every Predator they can possibly build.”
This transformation is, in many ways, a reflection of how the military’s priorities and goals have changed over the last decade. It is also a testament to how much clout General Atomics has amassed in a short period of time.
All of which raises another bit of advice if you’re visiting General Atomics: Don’t be late.
More than one official has learned the hard way that when the pilot of the General Atomics corporate jet says he’s flying back at noon, he means it. And that pilot is likely to be Thomas J. Cassidy Jr., a 34-year Navy veteran, former rear admiral, onetime commander of the station where the “Top Gun” flight school is based and now the president of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. Mr. Cassidy’s belly may hang a bit over his belt now, but he’s so authentic that when the producers of the film “Top Gun” needed someone for a bit part who oozed power, they cast him.
Which is only fitting, for while General Atomics boasts elaborate technological gizmos and martial splendor, its authority also derives from its political savvy. In the last decade, the company has outgunned some of the nation’s biggest corporate heavyweights in the battle for prized military contracts. Soon, analysts say, Americans may rely on a host of General Atomics military devices, including magnetic cannons that use pulses of electricity to drop ammunition on distant targets, radar systems that can see through even the densest clouds and guns that shoot laser beams.
“Everyone talks about how the world has changed,” Mr. Cassidy says. “We’re building the technology for where it’s going.”
NO single moment marks the ascent of General Atomics. But to understand its rise and what that says about changes in military contracting, it helps to go way back, to a point before a pair of wealthy, intensely private brothers bought it, before General Dynamics spun it off, and before it even existed — to the 1930s and a group of angry German commanders plotting revenge.
After World War I, while France and other Allies were building military defenses modeled on trench warfare, German commanders were shaping a nimble fighting force. Using new technologies — like radio and fast-moving armored vehicles — they created the blitzkrieg, or “lightning war,” a strategy that allowed them to end-run their enemies’ trenches by using panzerdivizions — small, sprightly forces that revolutionized how battles were fought. In 1940, Germany toppled France in 20 days and the panzerdivizion symbolized war’s shift from drawn-out conflicts using massive fortifications to rapid-fire engagements built around manned, motorized armor.
Nearly 70 years later, the Predator and General Atomics reflect the military’s transformation from conflicts built around manned armor to strategies organized around surveillance. U.A.V.’s embody the potential for quick, relatively effortless wars fought by drones controlled from great distances, and thus have become lightning rods for battles over the military’s direction.
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General Atomics, the progenitor of General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, started life in 1955 when a major military contractor, General Dynamics, feared that the military hardware market might dry up. It began exploring peacetime uses of atomic energy, but abandoned the effort when cold-war military spending took off. General Atomics eventually passed through the hands of a number of energy companies before landing in the lap of two Denver real estate moguls, Neal and Linden Blue, who bought it in 1986 for about $50 million.
At the time, a big part of the company’s revenue came from contracts focused on fusion experiments. (General Atomics, today a sister company to General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, still runs one of the world’s largest fusion programs.) But the Blue brothers wanted to pursue the fascination with airplanes and national security they had carried since they were students at Yale in the 1950s, Neal Blue said in an interview.
While still in college, they persuaded Life magazine to finance a trip around South America on a propeller-driven Tri-Pacer, in exchange for sending back photographs. After graduation, the brothers moved to Nicaragua to found a cocoa and banana plantation with the family of Luis Somoza Debayle, then Nicaragua’s president. (They were “enthusiastic supporters” of the United States-backed fight against Communism in Nicaragua during the 1980s, Mr. Blue said, though, he added, not formally involved.)
After serving in the Air Force, the brothers expanded their business holdings to include petroleum mines in Australia, natural gas wells in Canada, manufacturing concerns in the former East Germany and hundreds of acres of ranches in Arkansas, Colorado and California. Neal Blue, now the chairman of the company, said that both brothers have top-secret clearance with the United States government, but declined to discuss if they have worked for the Central Intelligence Agency.
All the while, they remained flying enthusiasts. Linden Blue served as president of Beech Aircraft from 1982 to 1984 and was briefly imprisoned by Fidel Castro after his private plane skirted Cuban airspace a few weeks before the Bay of Pigs incursion.
Soon after the brothers gained control of General Atomics in 1986, they unleashed their passion for advanced aviation by turning the company into a leading pioneer in drone warfare.
Military efforts to develop unmanned planes had existed for decades, but unreliable technology and shifting priorities had killed most of the programs. The Blues, however, were convinced that technological advances in microprocessing and global positioning systems had made it possible to build inexpensive, technologically reliable and ultralight unmanned airplanes that could stay aloft for days. They poured tens of millions of dollars into the project, eventually establishing a separate company, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Neal Blue said.
At the time, the Defense Department was less enthusiastic.
“The military can react to new threats and new enemies very quickly, but there is a very high bar to shifting how forces are deployed, because a mistake can be catastrophic to national security,” said Andrew L. Ross, a professor of political science at the University of New Mexico. “Commanders are skeptical about machines that remove soldiers from the field.”
The Predator itself has offered critics some ammunition. One analyst estimates that 20 percent of all Predators sold to the United States military have crashed, because of errors by pilots controlling them from the ground. Another analyst, who has flown the aircraft but asked not to be identified to maintain his relationship with General Atomics, says they offer significantly less maneuverability than manned jets.
Another analyst who has studied the history of U.A.V.’s says the Predator has failed at some crucial tests.
“It has never done everything the military originally wanted it to do,” said Tom P. Ehrhard, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a nonpartisan research organization. “It still fails on flight reliability, flight worthiness, the camera’s accuracy, the ability to fly through clouds. There are a whole series of operational limitations that normally would prevent a device like this from getting military adoption.”
Officials at General Atomics declined to discuss those and other criticisms in detail. An Air Force spokesman said that the number of Predator crashes had declined, and that the plane’s limitations had not prevented its combat use.
Another obstacle to military adoption of U.A.V.’s, say the Blues and others, is a dynamic even older than the panzerdivizion: resistance to innovations that threaten entrenched power structures.
“There is a very strong tendency to reward commanders for figuring out how to win the last war,” says Neal Blue. “The fiefdoms within the Department of Defense were built upon putting more people into airplanes or into the battlefield. Technologies that didn’t include cockpit pilots or moving soldiers were seen as unattractive.”
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For its part, the Air Force disputes that turf wars ever impeded the Predator’s deployment. “It is hard to name any other aircraft that has accomplished so much in so little time, or that has had such an immediate impact on how we conduct combat operations,” it said in a statement. “It was the Air Force that gave birth to the concept that Predator could both find and attack fleeting targets, a concept that has paid huge dividends.”
The Blue brothers bought General Atomics in 1986 for $50 million. Neal Blue is now chairman.
Nonetheless, the Blues’ early attempts to find military supporters of U.A.V.’s during the 1980s and early ’90s met with little success.
“No fighter pilot is ever going to pick up a girl at a bar by saying he flies a U.A.V.,” says Andrew F. Krepinevich, a former Defense Department analyst who is executive director of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. “When defense contractors initially talked about U.A.V.’s, they advertised them as replacements for fighter pilots. Fighter pilots don’t want to be replaced.”
BUT, ultimately, fighter pilots don’t run the military. Politicians do. And when Bill Clinton entered the White House in 1993, there was already a sense among some elected officials that the military was stuck in cold-war thinking, according to members of Congress at the time.
Those politicians, however, were increasingly butting heads with Pentagon officials. And the military industry, which collected billions of dollars a year selling expensive jets and submarines, was in no rush to tell customers that they needed smaller, cheaper equipment.
So the politicians used stealth tactics. In 1993, John M. Deutch, a deputy defense secretary under President Clinton, invited Neal Blue to the Pentagon under the pretense of discussing fusion reactors. Mr. Blue said in an interview that when he walked in, he discovered an array of high-ranking officials waiting to hear about the Predator. Mr. Deutch asked how long it would take to deliver a flight-ready aircraft. Six months, Mr. Blue promised.
“We were looking for technologies that were sufficiently path-breaking that they offered justification for changing military doctrine,” Mr. Deutch recalled.
Flashy images helped, too. The live video feeds from cameras attached to Predators were transmitted to commanders and politicians back home.
“There was a lot of work to make sure that G.A.’s product made it to the battlefield before the bureaucracy could stop it,” said Representative Duncan L. Hunter of California, the ranking Republican on the House Armed Services Committee. “We knew that once we sent all those pictures to Washington, D.C., the debate would be over.”
After the Predators’ deployment in the Balkans conflict in the 1990s, the military’s support for them began to grow. Although many analysts were already suggesting that Predators could easily carry weapons — cruise missiles use similar technologies — General Atomics avoided even mentioning such possibilities until clients requested them.
“There was an unspoken deal. It was obvious the technology existed to make the Predator into more than just a surveillance platform,” said Daniel Goure, a defense analyst at the Lexington Institute, a military policy research group in northern Virginia. “But fighter pilots shoot the missiles, and fighter pilots have a lot of power within the Air Force. So G.A. made it clear pilots didn’t have to worry about Predators doing something they hadn’t asked for.”
(In the late 1990s, armed Predators were rolling off the assembly line two months after they were requested by Air Force commanders, according to company executives.)
After taking office in 2001, President George W. Bush gave his defense secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, a mandate to remake the military into a more technologically advanced organization, and U.A.V.’s became a top priority, say former department officials. The Sept. 11 attacks and the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan heightened the push.
By the time a Predator-launched missile killed a suspected Al Qaeda leader in 2002, even the public was accustomed to hearing about unmanned planes’ successes. Voicing enthusiasm for U.A.V.’s became an easy way for the military brass to show that it had signed on to Mr. Rumsfeld’s program.
“Predators became emblematic of what Rumsfeld wanted,” said Loren B. Thompson, a military analyst at the Lexington Institute. “Suddenly, everyone was saying they were ordering Predators, whether they actually wanted them or not.”
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That shift has been profitable for General Atomics Aeronautical Systems. The company, which remains privately held, refuses to disclose its revenue or profits. But it now employs more than 2,400 workers and has sold more than 200 unmanned planes since 1993, according to a spokesman.
In 2005, the Air Force announced that it was ordering enough Predators to equip 15 squadrons over five years, at a price of $5.7 billion. The Department of Homeland Security has bought two Predators for border control, and Italy and Turkey have also bought planes.
A research firm, the Teal Group, predicts that the handful of U.A.V. manufacturers will collect about $55 billion worldwide over the next 10 years. General Atomics is expected to dominate a large portion of that market, said Philip Finnegan, an analyst at Teal.
When Mr. Rumsfeld stepped down last year, one of the mandates that had bolstered the Predator for so long also disappeared.
“Transformation is dead as a political idea,” Mr. Thompson said. “Rumsfeld was discredited by Iraq, and when he left, his priorities left with him.”
That presents a challenge for General Atomics, which is also confronting a flurry of competition. The major military contractors, including Northrop Grumman, Boeing and Lockheed Martin, have all jumped into the U.A.V. game. With billions of dollars at their disposal and deep military relationships, those companies can outspend smaller rivals.
“This is an exploding marketplace, and we intend to claim a larger market share as it grows bigger and bigger,” said Gemma Loochkartt, a spokeswoman for Northrop Grumman. “Being a leader in this sector is important to maintaining leadership within the defense industry.”
So General Atomics is aggressively building on its existing clout. Unlike many other military contractors, which wait for a guaranteed contract to build new products, General Atomics has set aside what some analysts estimate at $50 million to build the next generation of Predators.
“We can move faster because we’re smaller, and we make sure people know that,” says Mr. Blue, who, at 72, still actively guides the company’s strategic direction. General Atomics has upgraded its manufacturing with a diverse range of automated and laser-guided tools that allow it to quickly change design specifications and produce custom-built planes, a flexibility that analysts say is almost unrivaled within the military industry.
Despite a demand for its products that far outpaces supply, the company has kept the Predator relatively cheap — about $19.2 million a plane, according to a study that the Government Accountability Office released last year. “For the military, $19 million is almost an impulse buy,” said John E. Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a defense research firm in Washington.
YET however much General Atomics competes on price, some of its most dexterous strategies have involved overtly political tactics.
In 2006, a study conducted by the nonpartisan Center for Public Integrity and other watchdog groups said that General Atomics had spent $660,000, more than any other company, sending Congressional staff members on trips. Company executives said the jaunts allowed staffers to help educate foreign governments about the Predator’s successes, although they acknowledge that they also improved the company’s relationships in Washington.
“Everyone else was doing it, so we did, too,” says Mr. Cassidy at General Atomics. After the study was released, General Atomics decided to sponsor less than $10,000 worth of Congressional trips a year.
General Atomics has also hired scores of former military commanders and has partnered with Lockheed Martin to pursue a $2 billion Navy program, one of its first such joint projects.
Equally important, the company has begun whispering to lawmakers about the importance of diversifying the military marketplace, say lobbyists who requested anonymity because they were not authorized to speak about the company. In part to preserve that selling point, General Atomics has spurned acquisition offers from major military contractors, Mr. Blue says.
Analysts say the trends that have kept General Atomics’ fortunes aloft are likely to persist for decades.
“It took 30 years for the world’s militaries to completely absorb and implement the technologies that started with panzerdivizions,” says Mr. Goure, the defense analyst. Although military strategists talk about organizing war-making around information and intelligence, the truth is that it will take decades for that transformation to be complete. In the meantime, leaders are likely to latch onto emblems of transformation — like the Predator — as symbols of progress.
“Once you prove that something works, a flurry of activity starts that builds the infrastructure for more innovations, and fights over who controls the new technologies emerge,” Mr. Goure says. “That’s when things become permanent.”
Such fights have already broken out over Predators. This year, the Air Force told Congress that it, rather than other branches of the military, should control the deployment of unmanned planes. Commanders in other military branches have voiced disagreement.
“The Predator has become a very durable and powerful symbol in a very short time,” says Mr. Thompson, the defense analyst.
That transition is even more impressive, considering what the Predator cannot do.
“It is unclear if this plane will ever meet some of the key suitability tests the Air Force applies to most aircraft,” said Mr. Ehrhard, the military analyst. “But no one seems to care that much.”
WHICH brings us to a final bit of advice for visiting General Atomics: Don’t count on leisurely send-offs. When its corporate jet lands back in San Diego, the company’s president is likely to bound out, make a dash for his BMW — the one with the license plate reading “UAV S”) — and shout out a hasty goodbye.
“I gotta run,” said Mr. Cassidy, the pilot and executive, after a recent flight. “We’ve got planes to sell.”
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U.S./SAUDI ARABIA: The United States plans to sell Joint Direct Attack Munition smart bombs to Saudi Arabia, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates said while he was in Israel. Israel had expressed its opposition to the sale, citing concerns that the systems could fall into militant hands and undermine Israel's defense strategy.
stratfor.com
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Ballistic Missile Submarines: The Only Way to Go
Summary
Russia and China are both in the process of fielding a new class of ballistic missile submarines. These submarines, longtime prudent investments for states with nuclear weapons, are becoming an essential -- and ultimately, the only -- option for a survivable nuclear deterrent.
Analysis
For the better part of a decade, four nations have maintained a regularly patrolling strategic deterrent at sea: the United States, France, the United Kingdom and Israel (whose use of nuclear warheads mounted on cruise missiles aboard its three Dolphin-class submarines is an open secret). However, that decade also has seen China and Russia complete nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) programs. This is particularly important because diving beneath the ocean's surface is quickly becoming the only way to hide.
Russia
At its peak, the Soviet navy operated more than 60 SSBNs. The fleet is now one-quarter that size, and most of the boats are in poor condition. In 2002, the Russian navy did not conduct a single strategic deterrence patrol. The current fleet of aging SSBNs can barely hold the line. Not only is Russia investing in the future of its SSBN program, but it also is essentially starting from scratch.
The Yuri Dolgoruky, the lead boat of Russia's newest Borei-class SSBN, has a troubled past. Laid down in 1996, the Yuri Dolgoruky was neglected and construction was held up because of economic troubles after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The parallel development of the SS-NX-28 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) failed, and the design had to be adjusted during construction to accommodate a different missile, the SS-NX-30 Bulava.
Although the Bulava has had several successful launches, three failures in the fourth quarter of 2006 demonstrated the missile was far from ready. Nevertheless, the Yuri Dolgoruky was launched April 15. (It will spend at least a year being fitted out.) Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Alexei Moskovsky has promised seven more by 2017.
Of course, Moskovsky's statements are nothing if not ambitious. A series of successful Bulava tests will be necessary. But the ultimate success of the Borei class is essential for Russia's ability to maintain its nuclear deterrent. It is perhaps the top defense priority, along with the continued fielding of the land-based Topol-M intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). And it is something Russia can afford.
In recent years, Russia has politically and economically consolidated and has been fiscally conservative enough to keep a balanced budget. Russian President Vladimir Putin's policies, and a hefty windfall from high energy prices, have turned Russia's $160 billion debt in 2000 into $400 billion in currency reserves and surplus funds. In March, the Kremlin shed its fiscal conservatism with a new budget for 2007-2010 that dramatically increases spending in many sectors, including defense. The budget and economic conditions are reminiscent of the Soviet budgets of the 1970s, during which Moscow launched its last dramatic increase in defense spending.
China
For the Chinese People's Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN), nuclear-powered submarines have been a challenge. At times, the PLAN was an understudy of a less-than-perfect master: the Russian navy. Though the PLAN has made incremental improvements, its nuclear submarines reportedly have yet to attain modern standards of performance.
The PLAN's older Xia-class SSBN, though able to launch missiles, never made an official deterrence patrol. However, the new Jin-class SSBN (Type 094) reportedly is undergoing sea trials. It spent some five years under construction and sources indicate it was launched in mid-2004. It reportedly is not up to modern SSBN standards, and there are rumors of nuclear propulsion problems. However, the shift to sea trials suggests it will ultimately deploy. The JL-2 SLBM with which it is to be fitted appears to have had several successful trial launches. If the Jin class is deployable, the bulk of the continental United States -- now only vulnerable to a small arsenal of China's longest-range land-based missiles -- would be within reach of the JL-2 SLBM.
Though dozens of funding priorities compete for the money, China's military spending has continued to rise. China has a small nuclear deterrent, so it must ensure that the deterrent it has is mobile and survivable; thus, while Beijing's pocketbook is not bottomless, the SSBN program should continue receiving the funding it needs.
Implications
Both the Russian Borei and the Chinese Jin are still at least a year from operational capability, and their sister boats -- still under construction -- will need to be completed in the next few years in order to build to a constantly patrolling rotation. But in five to 10 years, Russia and China both intend to have such a rotation in place.
While the significance of a new SSBN is greater for China, which has yet to field a functioning sea-based deterrent, the decay of Russia's SSBN fleet is such that the Borei marks a new beginning there.
India could be working toward a missile submarine as well, but that development is 10-20 years away. Countries like Pakistan could one day follow the Israeli example -- diesel submarines armed with cruise missiles. Diesel boats lack the endurance of their nuclear-powered brethren, but can run even quieter for short periods. The cruise missiles have a shorter range than SLBMs, but are technically easier to launch and require no major modifications to a standard hull, since they can be launched horizontally like torpedoes.
While none of these developments fundamentally alters the strategic balance of a unipolar world, advances in Russia and China's SSBN programs mark the first time in a decade that nations other than traditional U.S. allies are building sea-based deterrents.
The Increasing Importance of the Sea-based Deterrent
Early in the Cold War, ICBMs were almost prohibitively large and expensive. The submarine was a way to move shorter-range missiles closer to one's adversary. But as missile accuracy improved (the dramatically increasing potential yield of strategic warheads did not hurt, either), the prospect of a successful "first strike" began to alter the role of the SSBN. It became a valuable "first strike" platform because it could move close to an adversary's coast, giving the enemy less time to react to a missile launch.
But its greatest value as the most survivable leg of a nuclear triad is its capacity for a "second," or retaliatory, strike. Much harder to keep track of than platforms in fixed positions, an SSBN lurking at sea is the ultimate wild card. Land-mobile missile systems (as opposed to fixed, silo-based missiles) are another way of accomplishing this, but technological advances will make them increasingly vulnerable.
A joint U.S. program between the defense and intelligence communities is working to test space-based radar. Destined to succeed in one form or another, space-based radar will one day be able to track objects across the face of the Earth -- objects such as land-mobile launch vehicles -- and keep close enough tabs on them that their locations can be effectively targeted by strategic warheads.
In a unipolar world -- in which the United States will have the best intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities and weapons of increasing speed and accuracy -- the nuclear weapon is the only true guarantor of national independence. Even a minimal deterrent allows nations to focus on and confront regional disputes, as well as protect their interests abroad. An SSBN fleet is, of course, not absolutely necessary -- whether mounted on a land-based missile or a submarine, a nuclear weapon is a substantial bargaining chip -- but it is becoming increasingly difficult to hide anything from the United States. The U.S. military has a technological edge beneath the waves as well, but even a modestly well-built submarine traveling below 5 knots is hard to track, and it certainly has a better chance than a fixed concrete silo. Consequently, the sea-based leg of a nation's nuclear triad is evolving from a prudent choice for survivability to the most essential element of a meaningful nuclear deterrent.
stratfor.com
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WSJ
Missile Defense Mischief
April 27, 2007; Page A16
One of the Bush Administration's quiet successes has been missile defense -- from the negotiated demise of the Cold War ABM Treaty to initial ground-based deployments. But that progress is suddenly in jeopardy from opposition in Russia and Congress, and just when we might really begin to need it against the likes of Iran.
The immediate dispute concerns the U.S. offer to extend missile defenses to Europe. The Czech Republic has expressed interest in providing a site for a tracking radar, while Poland is considering whether to host the interceptors that would destroy incoming missiles.
Linked to upgraded radars in Britain and Greenland and a command-and-control system in Colorado, the Polish and Czech sites could protect Europe from long-range missiles launched from Iran. It would also provide an additional layer of defense for America's East Coast. Tehran is expected to have long-range missiles by 2015 or sooner, and since the world can't seem to muster the resolve to halt its nuclear program, missile defense would seem a logical -- and urgent -- priority.
If only. After Warsaw and Prague announced negotiations with the U.S., some Europeans, notably the French and the Germans, accused the U.S. of acting unilaterally. Moscow has called it "destabilizing," and Democrats in Congress have vowed to kill it. Representative Ellen Tauscher, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, is opposing the Pentagon's $310 million request to begin construction next year.
The arguments against the "third site," as the Polish-Czech contribution is known, are updated versions of the anti-Star Wars rhetoric of the Reagan years. Ms. Tauscher claims the missile defense system isn't "fully tested," but the initial system the Bush Administration has fielded in Alaska and California and now wants to extend to Europe isn't the final architecture. The idea is to follow the models provided by the JSTAR military surveillance plane and Predator spy plane. Both were still in the experimental phase when they were called into service in the Gulf War and Afghanistan, respectively. The missile defense system is constantly being tested and upgraded.
Critics also argue that the third site wouldn't protect all of Europe from Iranian missiles because the Southern flank would remain exposed. But the site is designed to defend against missiles with ranges of more than 1,500 kilometers, which means Greece, Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria aren't at risk from this specific threat. The Iranian threat against Southern Europe is from medium- and short-range missiles, which require different kinds of defenses, and the U.S. is prepared to work with individual countries as well as NATO to install Patriots or other systems against those missiles.
Moscow's objection is that the third site is somehow intended for use against Russian missiles. This is untrue -- as the Russians well know because U.S. officials have briefed them repeatedly on how the system would operate and have even offered to bring Russia under the missile-defense umbrella, an offer Moscow has so far rejected.
No one believes 10 interceptors based in Poland could deter the thousands of missiles in Russia's arsenal, and it's unclear what game Moscow is playing here. Perhaps it hopes to forestall U.S. missile defenses for Georgia or other former Soviet republics, or maybe it sees an opportunity to drive a wedge between Washington and Warsaw, where the government is already facing heat over Poland's role in Iraq.
Democrats claim that the third site creates "divisions" among our European allies and should therefore be subject to NATO's multilateral seal of approval -- and a consensus process that would mean the kiss of death. But why should bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the sovereign nations of Poland and the Czech Republic be subject to NATO approval any more than U.S. agreements with Denmark and Britain over the radars located in their territories? Or agreements with Germany, the Netherlands or Italy on other kinds of missile defenses? In any case, NATO may acquire theater missile defenses, which could be deployed to protect against medium- and short-range missiles.
Iran's not the only potential missile threat. More than 20 nations, including North Korea and Syria, have ballistic missiles and their proliferation is sure to continue. The third site is part of the Bush Administration's vision of missile defense with a global reach. Since the U.S. withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002, nations have been lining up to get under the new missile defense umbrella. The U.S. and its allies are safer for it.
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Second post of the day:
WSJ
Certified Madness
By BRUCE BERKOWITZ
April 27, 2007; Page A17
One of the more interesting sections of the war funding bill Congress will soon send President Bush is its provision for "readiness." The bill prohibits spending funds "to deploy any unit of the Armed Forces to Iraq unless the chief of the military department concerned has certified in writing . . . that the unit is fully mission capable."
John Murtha (D., Pa.), chairman of the House subcommittee on defense appropriations, is mainly responsible for the clause. Mr. Murtha is a Marine Vietnam combat veteran and he's concerned that U.S. forces don't have all the resources they need to complete their missions.
U.S. Navy Ensign George Gay would have been bemused.
Ensign Gay became famous in World War II as the sole survivor of Torpedo Eight, a squadron flying off of the USS Hornet in the pivotal Battle of Midway. If ever there was a unit of the armed forces that wasn't "mission capable," it was Torpedo Eight.
In June 1942, the Navy's new torpedo bomber, the Grumman TBF Avenger, wasn't ready. So Ensign Gay and the other Americans had to fly old Douglas TBD Devastators, an aircraft that was inadequate for the task of taking on Japanese fighters.
A Devastator's top speed was about 200 mph. The Japanese interceptors -- Zeros -- could do around 350 mph. That's correct, the Japanese pilots had an advantage of about 150 miles per hour.
But Ensign Gay's bigger problem was training. "When we finally got up to the Battle of Midway it was the first time I had ever carried a torpedo on an aircraft," he later told a Navy interviewer, "and was the first time I had ever taken a torpedo off of a ship, had never even seen it done. None of the other ensigns in the squadron had either."
Ensign Gay and the others got the attack plan in "chalk talks" and then rehearsed the attack by walking through the steps on the flight deck.
Not a single TBD flying that day from the Hornet made it back. Ensign Gay was the only one of the 30 men in his squadron who survived the attack and he had to be fished from the sea a day after the battle. The TBDs from the other two American carriers suffered similar losses.
But by drawing the Zeros to themselves, the slow, low-flying Devastators gave U.S. dive bombers a clear shot to strike from above. The dive bombers sank three of the four Japanese carriers, a loss that decided the outcome of a battle that proved to be turning point in the war in the Pacific.
Which gets us back to Mr. Murtha's readiness provision.
Lieutenant Gay (he was promoted) later briefed the events to a Navy interviewer. He described the situation, succinctly, as "a difficult problem."
"We had old planes and we were new," the pilot recalled. "We had a dual job of not only training a squadron of boot Ensigns," he said, "we also had to fight the war at the same time."
In fact, training and fighting became one and the same. Ensign Gay's squadron leader told him and the others to follow him to the target, and then they figured out a way to get through the flack when they got there.
Ensign Gay and the other pilots knew they were ill-equipped and under-trained. But they flew the mission anyway because they also knew that something larger was at stake -- like losing the war if they waited until someone was willing to "certify in writing" that they met official readiness standards.
It's unfortunate, and often tragic, but that's what happens in war, or at least one that you are serious about. And that's the issue. Are we serious about the war? Can anyone imagine Congress in 1942 passing a provision like the one in the current bill? Would they constrain Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower the way they propose to constrain Gen. David H. Petraeus?
Mr. Murtha has good intentions, but he's got it exactly wrong. If U.S. forces lack the equipment or training they need, it's his job, as the chairman of the one subcommittee specifically responsible for originating defense appropriations, to make sure they get it.
If legislators really don't believe we should continue in Iraq, they need to come clean, shut down the war -- and accept the risks, and take responsibility for the consequences. Otherwise, they need to provide U.S. forces the means to carry out their missions.
Mr. Berkowitz is a research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University.
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Top general: U.S. needs a bigger Army faster
SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii (AP) -- The Army's new chief of staff said he wants to accelerate by two years a plan to increase the nation's active-duty soldiers by 65,000.
The Army has set 2012 as its target date for a force expansion to 547,000 troops, but Gen. George Casey said he told his staff to have the soldiers ready earlier.
"I said that's too long. Go back and tell me what it would take to get it done faster," he said in an interview Saturday with The Associated Press during a stop in Hawaii.
Casey became the Army chief of staff April 12 after serving as the top U.S. commander in Iraq for more than two years. He visited Hawaii for a few days in a Pacific region tour to talk with soldiers and their families. He next heads to Japan, South Korea and Alaska.
Casey said his staff has submitted a proposal for the accelerated timeline but that he has yet to approve the plan. He said the Army was stretched and would remain that way until the additional troops were trained and equipped.
Casey told a group of soldiers' spouses that one of his tasks is to try to limit the impact of the strain on soldiers and their families.
"We live in a difficult period for the Army because the demand for our forces exceeds the supply," he said.
A woman in the group asked Casey if her husband's deployments would stop getting longer. She said they used to last for six months in the 1990s but then started lasting nine months and 12 months. Two weeks ago, she heard the Army's announcement that deployments would be extended as long as 15 months.
"Do you honestly foresee this spiral, in effect, stopping?" she asked.
Casey said the Army wants to keep deployments to 15 months, but "I cannot look at you in the eye and guarantee that it would not go beyond."
Defense Secretary Robert Gates in January said he was recommending to the president that the Army boost its active-duty soldiers by 65,000 to 547,000. Casey said about 35,000 of those additional soldiers are already in place.
Gates also recommended that the Marine Corps increase its active-duty force by 27,000 to 202,000.
Copyright 2007 The Associated Press. All rights reserved.This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.
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Armored Vehicles for Iraq Delayed
Associated Press | April 30, 2007
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq - The armored carrier has a grim black slash across its side, burn marks on the door and a web of cracks along the window.
Like most of the Mine Resistant, Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles in Anbar province, this one has been hit as many as three times by enemy fire and bomb blasts. Yet, to date, no American troops have died while riding in one.
But efforts to buy thousands more carriers - each costing about $1 million - could be delayed if the White House and Congress do not resolve their deadlock over a $124.2 billion war spending bill.
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About $3 billion for the vehicles is tied up in the legislation. The spending plan has stalled because of a dispute over provisions that would set a timetable for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq.
At a hearing last month, lawmakers urged the Army to get more of the carriers to the battlefront as quickly as possible. The vehicles, with their unique V-shaped hull that deflects blasts outward and away from passengers, are considered lifesavers against the No. 1 killer in Iraq - roadside bombs.
Military leaders say the carriers have reduced roadside bomb casualties in Iraq by as much as two-thirds. But they are not effective against the enemy's latest weapon - explosively formed penetrators, which hurl a fist-sized lump of molten copper capable of piercing armored vehicles.
Right now, there are at least 1,100 of the armored carriers on the battlefront in Iraq, including the 100 or so that rumble through Anbar province carrying troops and clearing roads of explosives.
The Army, Marines, Navy, Air Force and Special Operations forces want thousands more. The goal is more than 7,700, at a cost of about $8.4 billion.
The Army wants 2,500, at a cost of about $2.7 billion. The Marines are planning to buy 3,700 and would send about 3,000 to Iraq. There will be 525 in the country by the end of the year, said Brig. Gen. Mark Gurganus, ground combat commander for U.S. forces in western Iraq.
As the Pentagon scrapes to find the money to run the war in the midst of the budget impasse, the Pentagon says there is not enough cash to buy as many as commanders say they need.
"We can build what we can get the funds to build. It's strictly an issue of money," Gen. Peter Schoomaker, former Army chief of staff, told a Senate committee last month.
At the time, he said the Army had an unfunded requirement of about $2 billion. Lawmakers added some additional money to the bill, so that number would now be about $1.5 billion.
He said the Army believes "that not only do we need the MRAP immediately to give us better protection, but that we need to stay on a path to get an even better vehicle than the MRAP for the long haul, because the enemy is going to continue to adapt."
Senators pressed for more. "We're buying far too few of them," said Sen. Byron Dorgan, D-N.D. "If we have that capability, why would we not do everything to mobilize, to move as many of them into the field as is possible?
In January, the military approved contracts to buy 4,100 of the armored carriers, using nine different companies to fill the order. Although the Pentagon is shifting money around to cover war costs until the spending bill is signed, the Army said dollars already approved and in the pipeline for the vehicles will not be affected.
Additional orders cannot be placed until the disagreement over the war spending legislation is settled. That bill would give the Army ($1.2 billion), the Marines ($1.25 billion), the Navy ($154 million), the Air Force ($139 million) and special operations forces ($259 million) money to buy their own versions of the carriers, according to Bill Johnson-Miles, spokesman for the Marine Corps Systems Command.
The Defense Department has requested about $4.4 billion in the 2008 budget to buy more of the vehicles.
Out on the dusty roads in Anbar province, Marines say the carriers have proved their worth.
This month, Marine Staff Sgt. Tim Kessler said, Marines were riding in one and took a hit from a small roadside bomb. The blast blew a tire, and it took them more than 90 minutes to limp back to base, but no one was hurt. Days earlier, a carrier with six Marines was hit by two blasts; two Marines had broken bones, but they all survived.
"It's an extremely survivable vehicle. I guarantee it saves lives," said Kessler. Pointing to the scars on the side of the MRAP, he added that had they been riding in a Humvee or something else, "they would all be dead."
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http://www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,133962,00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
Senator Tells Army to Reconsider M4
Military.com | By Christian Lowe | April 30, 2007
The debate over the Army's choice to purchase hundreds of thousands of M4 carbines for its new brigade combat teams is facing stiff opposition from a small group of senators who say the rifle may be inferior to others already in the field.
In an April 12 letter to acting Army Secretary Pete Geren, Oklahoma Republican Sen. Tom Coburn said purchase of the M4 - a shortened version of the Vietnam-era M16 - was based on requirements from the early 1990s and that better, more reliable weapons exist that could give Army troops a more effective weapon.
Coburn asked the Army to hold a "free and open competition" before inking sole-source contracts worth about $375 million to M4 manufacturer, West Hartford, Conn.-based Colt Defense - which just received a $50 million Army contract for M4s on April 20.
"I am concerned with the Army's plans to procure nearly half a million new rifles outside of any competitive process," Coburn wrote in the mid-April letter obtained by Military.com.
A Geren spokesman said the secretary's office is putting together a reply to Coburn's letter, but provided no further details.
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Coburn has banded together with a small group of like-minded senators to push the Army into a competition to determine whether the M4 is the best choice to equip newly-forming brigade combat teams, a top Coburn aide said.
The senator's concerns grew out of media coverage that showed the M4's design fails in critical situations and that special operations forces prefer other designs.
"Considering the long standing reliability and lethality problems with the M16 design, of which the M4 is based, I am afraid that our troops in combat might not have the best weapon," Coburn wrote. "A number of manufacturers have researched, tested and fielded weapons which, by all accounts, appear to provide significantly improved reliability."
Related Article: Army Won't Field Rifle Deemed Superior to M4
Special operations forces, including "tier one" units such as the Army's Delta Force and the Navy's SEAL Development Group - or SEAL Team Six - have used their own funds to purchase the Heckler & Koch-built 416, which uses a gas-piston operating system less susceptible to failure than Colt's gas-operated design.
"That's significant, because these guys don't screw around," the aide said.
In fact, Colt included four different weapons in the competition to build the Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle, or SCAR, none of which used the M4s gas system, the aide said.
In a routine acquisition notice March 23, a U.S. Special Forces battalion based in Okinawa announced that it is buying 84 upper receiver assemblies for the HK416 to modify their M4 carbines. The M4 fires using a system that redirects gas from the expended round to eject it and reload another. The 416 and SCAR use a gas-operated piston that physically pushes the bolt back to eject the round and load another.
Carbon buildup from the M4's gas system has plagued the rifle for years, resulting in some close calls with Soldiers in combat whose rifles jammed at critical moments.
According to the solicitation for the new upper receiver assemblies, the 416 "allows Soldiers to replace the existing M4 upper receiver with an HK proprietary gas system that does not introduce propellant gases and the associated carbon fouling back into the weapon's interior. This reduces operator cleaning time, and increases the reliability of the M4 Carbine, particularly in an environment in which sand and dust are prevalent."
Yet the Army has still declined to buy anything other than the M4 for its regular troops, requesting about $100 million in the 2007 wartime supplemental to buy M4s for its Soldiers.
The office in charge of equipping Soldiers said in a March 30 statement the service has no plans to purchase the HK416.
"I am certain we can all agree that America's Soldiers should have the best technology in their hands," Coburn wrote. "And there is simply no excuse for not providing our soldiers the best weapon - not just a weapon that is 'good enough.' "
The Army has not yet responded to Coburn's letter, but his aide said if the senator doesn't receive a response to the letter by Monday, Coburn plans to call Geren personally to address the issue.
"Our feeling is once people see the facts on the face of it they're going to say that this is ridiculous and demand that the Army does it right and competes the contract," the aide said.
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North Korea: A New Missile and Regional Politics
Summary
North Korea has tested in Iran a new intermediate-range missile dubbed the Musudan-1, according to Japanese and South Korean media reports. The news follows word that North Korea displayed the new missile in an April 25 parade, though reportedly only satellite photos of the missile exist. The attention being paid to the Musudan is not really about the changes in North Korean capability, though the missile could represent a substantive improvement over the Scud-based Nodong and Taepodong systems. The focus on the missile is more about the politics surrounding the six-party nuclear talks, South Korean presidential elections, and Japan's constitutional and defense evolution.
Analysis
North Korea and Iran are celebrating a so-called week of friendship with social and cultural exchanges in each country following a visit by North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Kim Hyong Jun to Tehran. During Kim's visit, the two countries called for closer ties, though Iranian officials suggested obstacles to closer cooperation remain, including outstanding North Korean debt to Iran. But as the two remaining "Axis of Evil" member states discuss closer ties, South Korean and Japanese media have reported that North Korea recently tested its newest intermediate-range ballistic missile in Iran.
The missile, dubbed "Musudan-1" by overseas observers, is based on the Soviet-era SS-N-6, a submarine-launched ballistic missile. It reportedly was displayed during North Korea's April 25 military parade. Photos and video of at least three mobile missile systems shown off during the parade were later published, including the AG-1 anti-ship missile (a knockoff of the Silkworm and Seersucker missiles), the Hwasong (a Scud missile derivative) and the KN-02 (North Korea's latest short-range ballistic missile, a prime candidate for the export market, based on the SS-21 Scarab). While most reports suggested four missiles were shown, no images of the fourth were released.
Three days after the parade, South Korea's Chosun Ilbo reported that U.S. satellite imagery revealed the fourth missile was a new intermediate-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 to 4,000 kilometers (1,500 to 2,500 miles) that in subsequent reports would be identified as the "Musudan-1." The missile is shorter and wider than the Scud-based designs, as it traces its lineage to early Russian submarine-launched missiles. As such, it is a more stable missile. Coupled with a dual-chamber control engine, rather than steering vanes, this makes the missile substantially more maneuverable -- and accurate -- than current North Korean missiles like the Hwasong, Nodong and Taepodong, all of which are based on Scud technology. Pyongyang has stretched the Scud-based systems to their extreme limits. To their credit, North Korean engineers very nearly put a satellite into orbit based on Scud technology in 1998 -- no small achievement. But the failure of the Taepodong-2 in 2006 (whatever the actual cause) is symptomatic of a generation of engineering pushed too far.
(click to enlarge)
The SS-21 Scarab and SS-N-6 Serb essentially represent a badly needed influx of fresh blood into the North Korean missile program. With the display of North Korean versions of both the KN-02 and Musudan-1 at the April parade, new life has been injected into Pyongyang's missile program. The KN-02 marks a production-level solid-fuel missile system, which can serve as a basis for North Korean understanding of solid propellant. It is worth remembering that the SS-21 remains the mainstay of Russian short-range ballistic missile regiments to this day (though they are slowly being upgraded to the SS-26), and the Russian guidance package is reportedly capable of 95 meters Circle of Equal Probability (a measure of accuracy) -- a huge step up for Pyongyang.
The SS-N-6 is even more significant. Aside from a much more compact design, the dual-chamber control engine is a big advance from the steering vanes of Scud missiles. What will be especially interesting is watching North Korean engineers stretch what was necessarily a compact Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile as they did the Scud. Without the space constraints placed on Soviet designers (e.g., the missile tubes on Soviet submarines), the Musudan-1 can be expanded; it reportedly has already gotten 10 feet longer. Combined with parallel improvements in gyroscopic guidance, the Musudan-1 promises a generational leap for Pyongyang.
North Korea's work on the SS-N-6 variant has been known for quite a while, and there is little surprise that Pyongyang finally decided to roll out the missile for display. As early as 2000 there were reports Pyongyang had completed improvements on the SS-N-6. By 2003 there were expectations North Korea would display the missile during military parades that year, though this did not come to pass. The missile, called the Nodong-B or the Mirim (after an airbase near which it was spotted in 2003), is now apparently called the Musudan-1, though North Korea's own designation is unknown. There were initial suspicions that Pyongyang even tested one of the Musudan (or Mirim) missiles in July 2006.
Despite its substantially enhanced capability versus the existing Scud-based systems, the missile does not represent a major shift in the balance of regional power. Pyongyang has had the Musudan since at least 2000, and deployed it in 2003.
Somewhat more interesting is the potential that North Korea tested the new system in Iran, though even this is not entirely unusual. North Korea has long worked with Iran, Pakistan and others (including Yemen and Saudi Arabia), either exporting missiles to these countries or jointly developing missile systems. North Korean technicians work with the local technicians on the ballistic missiles, and learn from the more frequent test launches in Pakistan and Iran. (Pyongyang is very sparing with its test launches at home, both to mask its real capabilities and because any such launches inevitably pass over or near one of its neighbors, causing additional complications for the government.)
If the Musudan was tested in Iran, perhaps during a series of missile tests earlier this year, it could indicate either a sales demonstration by Pyongyang or the testing of a system already sold to Tehran. The first is more likely, as there are no other signs that Pyongyang has successfully tested the Musudan to date. Either way, it would appear the new missile is intended not only to enhance the domestic security of North Korea, but also to create additional sources of cash -- which fits with previous North Korean missile sales and the renting out of its technicians, with all the implications of proliferation that brings.
Beyond the technical considerations, reports of the new missile and its potential test in Iran reveal political battles in South Korea and Japan as much as they do any military improvements in North Korea or Iran. South Korea's Chosun Ilbo, a conservative paper, has been the first to reveal new North Korean missile developments; South Korean defense officials leak this information to the paper to shape perception and debate over North Korean issues.
In South Korea, there are widely differing views on the best way to deal with North Korea, and the current government's policy of "peace and prosperity" is not universally accepted. By revealing "new" threats from the North, even as Pyongyang and Seoul engage in dialogue, various South Korean factions can show that the government's programs are ineffective or need to at least be tempered and paired with a stronger focus on South Korean security. With presidential elections fast approaching, and outgoing President Roh Moo Hyun accelerating inter-Korean cooperation to solidify his policies and legacy, there is an equal push by the more conservative or cautious elements in the government and military to restrain Roh's initiatives and tread more carefully when dealing with Pyongyang.
Outside of South Korea, the Japanese press and government officials are playing up the Musudan missile issue the most. Tokyo is seeking support for changes to the Japanese Constitution and in Japan's defense posture and relations with other countries (particularly the United States). Tokyo is strongly backing the joint development of new anti-missile technology with the United States, but remains legally constrained in this matter due to regulations regarding the transfer of military technology.
By highlighting the "new" North Korean missile threat, Japanese Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma has suggested that Tokyo's current missile-defense plans -- using a combination of the sea-based Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptor and the Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) missile system -- are insufficient to deal with a longer-range North Korean system like the Musudan. The argument is that Japan needs to modify its defense rules to allow the development of a more robust and longer-range system to supplement the SM-3 and PAC-3 duo. (Ideal supplements could include the U.S. Theater High Altitude Air Defense system and the Airborne Laser).
Raising the specter of a significantly improved North Korean offensive capability also assists Tokyo in its broader moves to rewrite the Japanese Constitution to remove restrictions on collective self-defense, a standing military and missile defense. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has gained points in the polls for talking a stronger stance on North Korea, and will continue to build up the political capital for general elections later this year and for the constitutional change battle. And Washington is helping the process along by supplying the satellite images necessary to highlight North Korea's continued military developments.
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I posted this in the Libertarian thread as well:
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Of course I hungry bird could mess up the best laid plans....
Scientist: Military Working on Cyborg Spy Moths
Tuesday , May 29, 2007
By Jonathan Richards
At some point in the not-too-distant future, a moth may take flight in the hills of northern Pakistan, and flap towards a suspected terrorist training camp.
But this will be no ordinary moth.
Inside it will be a computer chip that was implanted when the creature was still a pupa, in the cocoon, meaning that the moth's entire nervous system can be controlled remotely.
The moth will thus be capable of landing in the camp without arousing suspicion, all the while beaming video and other information back to its masters via what its developers refer to as a "reliable tissue-machine interface."
The creation of insects whose flesh grows around computer parts — known from science fiction as cyborgs — has been described as one of the most ambitious robotics projects ever conceived by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the research and development arm of the U.S. Department of Defense.
Rod Brooks, director of the Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which is involved with the research, said in a speech last week at the University of Southampton in England that robotics was increasingly at the forefront of U.S. military research.
Brooks said that the remote-controlled moths, described by DARPA as just part of its overall research into microelectromechanical systems, or MEMS, were one of a number of technologies soon to be deployed in combat zones.
"This is going to happen," said Brooks. "It's not science like developing the nuclear bomb, which costs billions of dollars. It can be done relatively cheaply."
"Moths are creatures that need little food and can fly all kinds of places," he continued. "A bunch of experiments have been done over the past couple of years where simple animals, such as rats and cockroaches, have been operated on and driven by joysticks, but this is the first time where the chip has been injected in the pupa stage and 'grown' inside it."
"Once the moth hatches," Brooks said, "machine learning is used to control it."
Brooks has worked on robotic technology for more than 30 years and is a founder of iRobot, the MIT-derived manufacturer of both Roomba robot floor cleaners and PackBots, military robots used by the Pentagon to defuse explosive devices laid by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Brooks said that the military would be increasingly reliant on "semi-autonomous" devices, including ones which could fire.
"The DoD has said it wants one-third of all missions to be unmanned by 2015, and there's no doubt their things will become weaponized, so the question comes: Should they be given targeting authority?"
"The prevailing view in the army at the moment seems to be that they shouldn't," he said, "but perhaps it's time to consider updating treaties like the Geneva Convention to include clauses which regulate their use."
Debates such as those over stem-cell research would "pale in comparison" to the increasingly blurred distinction between creatures — including humans — and machines, Brooks told the Southampton audience.
"Biological engineering is coming," Brooks said. "There are already more than 100,000 people with cochlear implants, which have a direct neural connection, and chips are being inserted in people's retinas to combat macular degeneration. By the 2012 Olympics, we're going to be dealing with systems which can aid the oxygen uptake of athletes."
"There's going to be more and more technology in our bodies, and to stomp on all this technology and try to prevent it happening is just ... well, there's going to be a lot of moral debates," he said.
Another iRobot project being developed as part of the U.S. military's "Future Combat Systems" program, Brooks said, was a small, unmanned vehicle known as a SUGV (pronounced "sug-vee"), basically the next generation of the PackBot, one which could be dispatched in front of troops to gauge the threat in an urban environment.
The 30-pound device, which can survive a drop of 30 feet onto concrete, has a small "head" with infra-red and regular cameras which send information back to a command unit, as well as an audio-sensing feature called "Red Owl" which can determine the direction from which enemy fire originates.
"It's designed to be the troop's eyes and ears and, unlike one of its predecessors, this one can swim, too," Mr Brooks said.
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U.S.: The Real Reason Behind Ballistic Missile Defense
June 18, 2007 14 45 GMT
Summary
The U.S. ballistic missile defense system slated for Poland and the Czech Republic has been continually touted as intended to counter long-range Iranian missiles -- which is true -- but it is also entirely consistent with long-term U.S. strategy.
Analysis
Washington has spent the last six months trying to convince the world that the expansion of the nascent U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system into Europe poses no threat to Russia's strategic deterrent, but rather is only intended to counter Iran and other Middle Eastern threats. The U.S. claims are accurate -- for now.
In 1998, the world was stunned when North Korea launched a Taepodong-1 that very nearly put its payload into orbit. Through force of willpower, persistence and innovation, North Korean engineers effectively built an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with little more than Scud missile technology (which essentially is little more than World War II-era German V-2 technology). That launch provided a signpost for the future of strategic security since, if North Korea could do it in 1998, almost any nation in the world might be in a position to threaten the continental United States in the next 50 years.
Washington has now placed a rudimentary ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system in Alaska to counter the North Korean threat. The same system is slated for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic to counter a similar threat from Iran in the near future.
Such a BMD system accomplishes three things:
1. It protects the United States from a small-scale rogue missile launch from very specific regions of the world.
2. It undermines the use of a yet-to-exist Iranian or North Korean ICBM as a negotiating tool.
3. It deters the development of such systems (which represent a huge national investment for countries like Iran and North Korea).
While the U.S. plan is all well and good, is it worth the price? There is certainly an economic argument in favor of BMD. If the system stopped a nuclear missile from striking a large U.S. city, then the costs of development (already at some $110 billion since former President Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative) would pale in comparison to post-nuclear-strike reconstruction costs.
But building a crude nuclear device is difficult enough. The specialized materials and technical skill required to miniaturize a weapon and harden it against the strain of launch, the cold of space and the heat of re-entry is prohibitive for all but a handful of nations. If BMD is to be understood as a defense against nuclear terrorism, then there are far more likely scenarios to be considered, and the massive investment would be better spent elsewhere -- such as on port security, where a much more rudimentary device could be slipped into the United States.
The true utility of BMD is measured by its congruence with the five imperatives that have dominated U.S. strategy for the better part of two centuries:
1. maintaining control over North America
2. securing strategic depth for the continental United States
3. controlling sea approaches to North America
4. dominating the oceans
5. keeping Eurasia divided
BMD is not just consistent with one of these themes; it is the logical outgrowth of three of them, and has contributed incidentally to a fourth (e.g., rivalries within Eurasia). At the end of the 19th century, Rear Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan advocated the foundational importance to U.S. geopolitical security of a strong Navy. Now as in Mahan's time, the U.S. Navy provides North America the buffer that has been the foundation of U.S. geopolitical security and stability since the mid-1900s. BMD will help secure the same strategic depth for the continental U.S. and extend control of the sea approaches and dominance of the ocean into space.
So while Iran tries to cobble together a few more centrifuges and Russia rattles its saber, Washington is extending its technological military dominance across and above the same oceans that have protected it for the better part of two centuries -- and building the foundations for a far more capable BMD system. Follow-on technology will dramatically improve what is now a barely-functional system. It can become more robust, flexible and mobile. Specific land-based sites will eventually become more or less irrelevant.
The current debate therefore is extremely shortsighted. In the long term, BMD is about one thing: space. Poland and the Czech Republic are about to be equipped with the rudimentary technological precursor to a series of systems that are truly the technological beginnings of the full-fledged national missile defense shield Reagan once envisioned. These incremental steps -- of which nascent BMD systems extending across both the Atlantic and Pacific are only an early instance -- will attempt to solidify for the U.S. military the same dominance of space that it now enjoys on the planet's blue water, and in so doing extend Mahan's vision of North American continental security from the steam-powered warship to the anti-satellite weapon.
And therein lies the true leap. BMD is not just about missiles; it is about the technology and sensors necessary to dominate space. The U.S. Air Force already has a claim to that dominance of space. But it is currently a fragile dominance -- perhaps less fragile than open sources would suggest, but far more fragile than most realize. Space-based assets are a keystone of the Pentagon's technological superiority. The United States has been so successful in this realm, in fact, that it is becoming a cornerstone of U.S. economic prosperity. This dependence creates a potentially significant vulnerability, however, meaning the ability to counter an anti-satellite weapon launched via missile is of direct relevance to the next generation of BMD technology.
BMD is also about the capability to deny the utility of space to adversaries (in accordance with the official 2004 Air Force Counterspace Operations doctrine). The difference between intercepting a ballistic missile warhead 500 miles above the earth and hitting a satellite at the same altitude is simple: It is harder to hit the ballistic missile warhead.
Thus, the debate about placing a BMD radar in the Czech Republic, and the distinction between Poland and Azerbaijan, is immaterial in the long run. The United States is pushing ahead with the technological development and operational deployment necessary to build the knowledge base and technical capacity to take these next steps toward not only defending itself in space, but also fighting there
stratfor.com
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http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,141012,00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
Interesting piece on the use of aerial gunships in Iraq.
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WSJ
China's Space Weapons
By ASHLEY J. TELLIS
July 23, 2007; Page A15
On Jan. 11, 2007, a Chinese medium-range ballistic missile slammed into an aging weather satellite in space. The resulting collision not only marked Beijing's first successful anti-satellite (ASAT) test but, in the eyes of many, also a head-on collision with the Bush administration's space policies.
As one analyst phrased it, U.S. policy has compelled China's leaders to conclude "that only a display of Beijing's power to launch . . . an arms race would bring Washington to the table to hear their concerns." This view, which is widespread in the U.S. and elsewhere, misses the point: China's ASAT demonstration was not a protest against the Bush administration, but rather part of a maturing strategy designed to counter the overall military superiority of the U.S.
Since the end of the Cold War, Chinese strategists have been cognizant of the fact that the U.S. is the only country in the world with the capacity -- and possibly the intention -- to thwart China's rise to great power status. They also recognize that Beijing will be weak militarily for some time to come, yet must be prepared for a possible war with America over Taiwan or, in the longer term, over what Aaron Friedberg once called "the struggle for mastery in Asia." How the weaker can defeat the stronger, therefore, becomes the central problem facing China's military strategy.
Chinese strategists have struggled to find ways of solving this conundrum ever since the dramatic demonstration of American prowess in Operation Desert Storm. And after carefully analyzing U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf, Kosovo and Afghanistan, they believe they have uncovered a significant weakness.
The advanced military might of the U.S. is inordinately dependent on a complex network of space-based command, control, communications, and computer-driven intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities that enables American forces to detect different kinds of targets and exchange militarily relevant information. This network is key to the success of American combat operations. These assets, however, are soft and defenseless; while they bestow on the American military definite asymmetric advantages, they are also the source of deep vulnerability. Consequently, Chinese strategists concluded that any effort to defeat the U.S. should aim not at its fundamental strength -- its capacity to deliver overwhelming conventional firepower precisely from long distances -- but rather at its Achilles' heel, namely, its satellites and their related ground installations.
Consistent with this calculus, China has pursued, for over a decade now, a variety of space warfare programs, which include direct attack and directed-energy weapons, electronic attack, and computer-network and ground-attack systems. These efforts are aimed at giving China the capacity to attack U.S. space systems comprehensively because, in Chinese calculations, this represents the best way of "leveling the playing field" in the event of a future conflict.
The importance of space denial for China's operational success implies that its counterspace investments, far from being bargaining chips aimed at creating a peaceful space regime, in fact represent its best hope for prevailing against superior American military power. Because having this capacity is critical to Chinese security, Beijing will not entertain any arms-control regime that requires it to trade away its space-denial capabilities. This would only further accentuate the military advantages of its competitors. For China to do otherwise would be to condemn its armed forces to inevitable defeat in any encounter with American power.
This is why arms-control advocates are wrong even when they are right. Any "weaponization" of space will indeed be costly and especially dangerous to the U.S., which relies heavily on space for military superiority, economic growth and strategic stability. Space arms-control advocates are correct when they emphasize that advanced powers stand to gain disproportionately from any global regime that protects their space assets. Yet they are wrong when they insist that such a regime is attainable and, therefore, ought to be pursued.
Weaker but significant challengers, like China, simply cannot permit the creation of such a space sanctuary because of its deleterious consequences for their particular interests. Consequently, even though a treaty protecting space assets would be beneficial to Washington, its specific costs to Beijing -- in the context of executing China's national military strategy -- would be remarkably high.
Beijing's attitude toward space arms control will change only given a few particular developments. China might acquire the capacity to defeat the U.S. despite America's privileged access to space. Or China's investments in counterspace technology might begin to yield diminishing returns because the U.S. consistently nullifies these capabilities through superior technology and operational practices. Or China's own dependence on space for strategic and economic reasons might intensify to the point where the threat posed by any American offensive counterspace programs exceed the benefits accruing to Beijing's own comparable efforts. Or the risk of conflict between a weaker China and any other superior military power, such as the U.S., disappears entirely.
Since these conditions will not be realized anytime soon, Washington should certainly discuss space security with Beijing, but, for now, it should not expect that negotiation will yield any successful agreements. Instead, the U.S. should accelerate investments in solutions that enhance the security of its space assets, in addition to developing its own offensive counterspace capabilities. These avenues -- as the Bush administration has correctly recognized -- offer the promise of protecting American interests in space and averting more serious threats to its global primacy.
Mr. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
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On His Armor
A refugee to our shores finds a way to protect our soldiers.
BY BRENDAN MINITER
Friday, August 3, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
It's not every day that you get to take a heavy armor panel into the family backyard and blast away at it with a shotgun. But on this occasion, I was doing my brother-in-law David Warren a favor. We were testing a new kind of armor he developed that he hoped would protect American soldiers. That day three years ago was among the first of many tests--bringing him from a workshop in his garage to the Pentagon and eventually to the front lines in Iraq.
Something of an American success story, David arrived in this country in 1975, an 8-year-old refugee from Vietnam. His father, a U.S. soldier, disappeared and was likely killed in action during the war. His mother couldn't manage to fend for her family when the communists took control of the country; so David lived on the streets in Saigon for a while before, thanks to a little divine intervention, he ended up on a flight that eventually took him to New York. He was adopted by an American family and grew up on a farm in the Hudson Valley. When he graduated from high school, he joined the Marines. And during his four-year stint, he served very briefly in the Persian Gulf just before the liberation of Kuwait.
David always liked to tinker. He used to make a good living at a security company that designed surveillance systems, and he held nearly a half-dozen patents. But none for armor.
After reading a story I had published on this Web site and a later one in The Wall Street Journal about U.S. soldiers in Iraq not receiving all the armor they needed to shield themselves from insurgent attacks, he changed course. Why, he asked me, was the U.S. military unable to move armor to the front lines fast enough? I explained that it wasn't just the bureaucratic snafus in Washington that held up the armor plating. It was also the manufacturing bottlenecks that made it difficult to quickly fabricate and ship hardened steel and other materials used for armor.
And so David decided to design a new kind of armor that would be lighter than steel and easier to produce. Part of him, he tells me, was drawn to the difficulty of it. "You challenged me to stop a bullet," he'd say on several occasions over the next few years.
But there was another reason as well. As a refugee and a former Marine, he empathized with both the American soldiers and the Iraqi civilians caught in the crossfire. He saw the fight in Iraq as more than toppling a dictator. He saw it as a return of the U.S. to the kind of war that it had abandoned in Southeast Asia. And this was his opportunity to turn his talents to the aid of a country that had taken him in.
"It all really leads up to this," he told me. So David took a steep cut in pay and pulled away from his security business--though the company kept him on the payroll to support his venture. He played around with several different types of metals and other substances. He found a financial backer and a plastics manufacturer, Wayne Schaeffer, who helped him work on the armor designs. And, within a few months, I found myself in David's backyard about to test his home-made product.
To my amazement, and maybe David's too, the panel withstood the shotgun blast. It also withstood a shot from a high-powered rifle. Seeing his armor's success, David sold the rights to one of his patents to raise more funds. Eventually, he got to show his armor to the folks at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa), who put it through several rounds of tests, including a few bomb explosions. After David made more improvements, he was contacted by some soldiers in Iraq who had heard about his armor and wanted to put it on their vehicles.
Late last year, David went to Baghdad. He spent several days with soldiers to see, firsthand, what they needed. In the coming months he expects to send large panels of his armor to Iraq, where they will be bolted onto military vehicles. If all goes according to plan, he'll get orders for more panels, which he and his partners will build in a factory they're setting up in Kingston, N.Y.
During the course of the past three years, as David worked his way through several prototypes, he received plenty of help. Nearly every manufacturer he approached--about a dozen--has donated time or materials; sometimes they moved him to the top of their order lists. Each, it seems, feels he owes it to the men and women fighting to protect our way of life. But maybe David feels it a little more.
Mr. Miniter is assistant editor of OpinionJournal.com.
WSJ
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China: The Deceptive Logic for a Carrier Fleet
Summary
The Chinese People's Liberation Army Navy continues to push for aircraft carrier capability, despite ongoing internal debate and dissent. While a carrier is a valuable naval asset, China's pursuit must be understood as an expensive choice that entails considerable opportunity costs.
Analysis
China appears committed to deploying the Soviet-built Varyag aircraft carrier in at least a training role around or after 2010, with the potential for further pursuits, despite contradictory claims in recent weeks. The People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) will have to sacrifice much to continue this costly endeavor.
The Chinese Logic
A carrier fleet substantially expands a country's naval capability, so it is easy to understand China's ambition. The British, for example, would never have been able to take back the Falkland Islands in 1982 without the HMS Invincible and the HMS Hermes. Furthermore, the Chinese have carefully noted the decisive role the U.S. Navy's carrier fleet has played in Washington's global naval dominance.
For the Chinese, a carrier fleet means several things. It is a mark of status as a great power, a massive and ambitious national undertaking, a way to alter the current dynamics of air power in the region, a tool to project force beyond the East and South China seas and a means of expanding China's ability to protect ever-expanding import and export routes.
There is logic to China's view of carrier capability as a mark of great power, and the British operation to retake the Falklands is a perfect example: To have global influence, you must have global reach, which becomes a tool of foreign policy and affects the perception of a nation's naval power. China is quite aware that it is the only permanent member of the U.N. Security Council to never deploy an operational carrier.
China also is the nation that built the Great Wall. More recently, China built the Three Gorges Dam to supply a full 10 percent of domestic electricity supply and now has plans to land on the moon. The Chinese have a certain penchant for massively ambitious projects, and the construction of a carrier fleet certainly falls into that category. But such plans have often been pursued with a consequences-be-damned determination -- one that accepts enormous inefficiencies and the commitment of huge resources also needed elsewhere. The opportunity costs of this particular attempt at a great leap forward cannot be underestimated.
A desire for international recognition as a great power and a tendency to bite off more than one can chew hardly make for a prudent investment, and as much as 50 percent of China's motivation to develop a carrier capability could fall into one of these categories.
Global Vulnerability
From a more strategic perspective, the Chinese are aware of their great vulnerability due to exposed import and export routes. With exports that reach nearly every corner of the globe and an already heavy reliance on Africa for energy resources (and ongoing pursuits of Latin American energy resources), China has the global vulnerabilities of an empire but not the naval ability to protect them. This is the core geopolitical weakness Beijing hopes a carrier fleet might solve. As Beijing becomes increasingly reliant on other countries for raw materials and trade endeavors, it faces a continued shift away from long traditions of being a land power to participating -- and competing -- in the maritime world.
The Situation Close to Home
This competition is a big part of the problem. Beijing is facing a serious expansion of military power in the region. All branches of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) already face technologically superior competition from some of China's closest neighbors. The South Korean navy and the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces are now both equipped with domestic variants of the highly capable U.S. Arleigh Burke design (including the Aegis weapon system) in service. In 2004, Japan shifted F-15C fighter jets to Xaidi Island (Shimoji), uncomfortably close to Taiwan, adding to the complexity of any offensive across the Formosa Strait.
Because of this game of catch-up, Beijing has no shortage of military projects -- especially naval projects -- it could get more economical, near-term and effective results from. Consider the amphibious warfare pursuits of South Korea, Japan and Australia, which are much more manageable and realistic steps for each country. China has instead persisted along the carrier route, and is consequently behind the curve in its amphibious capability.
The PLAN, along with the other branches of the PLA, has made admirable improvements in the last decade. There has been progress in areas such as missile technology and nuclear submarine propulsion -- progress more realistically within China's technological grasp than a meaningful carrier fleet -- and it is precisely these more realistic, near-term pursuits and improvements that will suffer.
Carriers do not come cheap. The Varyag was originally purchased with more than $500 million in work still required. Carrier aircraft must then be acquired (talks are under way for the purchase of 50 Russian Su-33 navalized "Flankers" for something in the ballpark of $2.5 billion) and appropriate escorts and auxiliary ships dedicated or built. Even without start-up costs, the United States spends more than a $1 billion annually simply to deploy, operate and maintain a single carrier strike group -- and a meaningful carrier fleet requires not just one carrier, but three.
And for what?
Effective and meaningful carrier aviation is the product of decades of extensive first-hand experience at sea. The establishment of a trained cadre of naval aviators, efficient flight-deck operations and naval doctrine cannot be reverse engineered, and further investment will be necessary for China to even begin to adequately explore these core competencies. China is in effect neglecting its own current weaknesses in order to attempt to compete in one of the most technically demanding and certainly the most expensive naval pursuits there is -- carrier aviation.
The deployment of a carrier will be seen as an unmistakable sign of Chinese ambitions and will draw even closer attention and more intense competition from not only the U.S. Navy, but also from Beijing's regional competitors -- something the PLAN simply does not need right now.
In other words, China will be stretching itself to build a rudimentary carrier fleet -- a pursuit that will necessarily involve costly sacrifices elsewhere within the navy. Of all the things Beijing hopes to gain from that carrier fleet, more will be lost in the process of attaining it. It might be seen as a great leap forward, but it will ultimately represent movement in the opposite direction.
stratfor.com
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Draft Numbers
If we want to take on the world's problems, we may need the draft. Still want to?
By Fred Kaplan
Posted Tuesday, Aug. 14, 2007, at 3:40 PM ET
Until last week, we hadn't heard much from Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, President Bush's "war czar," and I suspect that, after his recent remarks on National Public Radio, we won't be hearing from him again anytime soon.
On Aug. 10, Lute told NPR that reactivating the military draft has "always been an option on the table" and that it "makes sense to certainly consider it."
The notion of bringing back conscription has no real political support in this country—and not much support from the ranks of military officers either. (In a less-quoted part of the NPR interview, even Lute said that "we have not yet reached" the point where a draft needs to be seriously discussed.)
And yet the question is tacitly raised or evaded every time the issue of troop shortages in Iraq comes up. Adm. Michael Mullen, the new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified at his confirmation hearings this month that the surge in Iraq could not be sustained beyond next April without a change in the Army's "force structure"—that is, without more troops or a change in the way they're deployed or organized.
Two weeks ago, Gen. Richard Cody, the Army's vice chief of staff, was asked, during a Q&A session at the Captains' Career Course at Fort Knox, Ky., whether the U.S. armed forces could deal with another conventional military threat, should one suddenly arise. Gen. Cody said, "No, not a big one."
Most serious military analysts, regardless of their views on the Iraq war, think the Army needs more troops. But from where? An alluring array of incentives and bonuses has kept recruitment drives afloat but hardly soaring.
The draft ended in 1973, just before the Vietnam War did. But its demise was foretold four years earlier, on March 27, 1969, when Richard Nixon—just two months into his presidency—announced the creation of a "commission on an all-volunteer armed force."
It was well understood that the purpose of the commission was to sanctify the abolition of the draft. The panel was chaired by Thomas Gates, a former secretary of defense in the Eisenhower administration. But more to the point, it was set up by Martin Anderson, Nixon's campaign chairman and a free-market economist who opposed conscription on philosophical grounds. And among the commissioners that Anderson appointed were two of the nation's most renowned libertarian economists, who shared Anderson's view on the matter: Milton Friedman and Alan Greenspan.
The report, released on Feb. 20, 1970, concluded—no surprise—that the nation would be secure enough without a draft.
However, even these panelists noted that conscription might be necessary under some circumstances. For that reason, they urged that mandatory registration be continued for all draft-age males. (The recommendation was adopted and remains in effect.) This "standby draft," as they called it, might be activated in case of "an emergency requiring a major increase in force over an extended period."
In the event of war, the report noted, the nation would deploy volunteer forces. In the first stage of expansion, it would call on the National Guard and Reserves. But if the war were to go on for a while, the "standby draft" might have to be mobilized, in order "to provide manpower resources for the second stage of expansion in effective forces."
Judging from the recent statements by the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Army's vice chief of staff, we seem to be approaching that stage in Iraq today.
The 1970 commission report assumed that the all-volunteer armed forces would attract 2 million to 3 million troops, with 40 percent of them—or 800,000 to 1.2 million of them—in the Army.
The real-life, present-day all-volunteer force consists of 1.4 million troops, 35 percent of them—or 489,000—in the Army.
Of course, in 1970, the Cold War was still on; NATO and Warsaw Pact troops faced each other along the East-West German border. Maybe a million soldiers are no longer necessary. Then again, in 2003, the Army chief of staff, Gen. Eric Shinseki, told Congress that "several hundred thousand" troops would be needed to stabilize postwar Iraq.
In any case, regardless of scenarios, the all-volunteer forces and especially the all-volunteer Army are much smaller than the commissioners assumed they would be.
Size, of course, is not everything. In the past few years, I have asked many officers, of varying ranks, whether they would like to see the revival of a draft. Almost all of them have said they would not. Two captains that I asked recently gave succinct renditions of the most typical replies: "I'd rather be fighting with soldiers who want to be there," and "With a draft, there'd be too much riff-raff."
The latter response might surprise those, like Michael Moore and Rep. Charles Rangel, who claim the all-volunteer force draws mainly on poor, uneducated minorities. The stereotype was true in the first decade or so of the all-volunteer force, in the wake of Vietnam. But, according to official data, members of the armed forces today are better-educated than civilians in their age group; they score higher on aptitude tests; African-Americans are only slightly overrepresented in the enlisted ranks, and Hispanics are underrepresented.
Still, if political leaders want to send the troops to solve a vast range of the world's problems—if they want a military that's far-flung, deployed on many fronts, and fighting in multiple theaters—then, at some point, numbers do matter. Or, rather, numbers and missions matter. If we want to maintain all these military missions, then the numbers have to go up. If we don't want to do everything necessary to push the numbers up, then the missions have to be cut back.
So, should we continue to send troops overseas to fight wars, keep peace, settle conflicts, impose order, and build nations? How do we get the extra troops—pay them a lot more (and where do we get that money?), mobilize all the reserves, reactivate the draft?
Or should we handle international affairs in a different way, relying much more on military alliances and diplomacy—not because (or not just because) that's often regarded as preferable to unilateral military force, but simply because there is no practical alternative?
The authors of the 1970 commission report emphasized that if the standby draft is ever activated, it should not be ordered into effect by the president; rather, it should be authorized by Congress. Before such a momentous step is taken, the panelists wrote, there must first be a "public discussion."
It's getting very near time for that public discussion now.
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This could have been posted several places, but ultimately is a piece about practicing military science poorly.
August 15, 2007
Why the Brits are Losing Basra
By James Lewis
Why is the most best European fighting army, the British, losing the battle for Basra in southern Iraq? Because the UK Ministry of Defense supplied its soldiers with the wrong equipment, having invested its shrinking budget in long-term European Ego Projects to keep the military bureaucracy happy.
Given soft vehicles that are terrifyingly vulnerable to IEDs and car bombs, the Brits initially claimed that "soft power" would do the job -- just as the Dutch boasted that having tea with the Taliban would ensure peace and love in their area of Afghanistan. But the British MOD was just rationalizing its own weakness, especially in equipment. British soldiers were sacrificed to politics.
All that is not my conclusion: It comes from close analysis over the last several years by the excellent British blog Eureferendum, which has its own sources in the UK Ministry of Defense. Building blast-resistant military vehicles starts with ancient knowledge: To deal with bombs and shells, you need armored walls that deflect the blast, positioned diagonally to the incoming force. That is why fortifications were built centuries ago with massive, slanted sides.
Blast-resistant vehicles are basically trucks with slanted, V-shaped body hulls. They are very effective in deflecting car bombs and IED explosions, the major killers in Iraq and Afghanistan. In addition, as Euroreferendum constantly points out, armored vehicles must be designed so that soldiers are never seated over the front wheels, which are most likely to set off mines. The US Marines, always fast to adapt, are bringing bomb-deflecting vehicles into the Iraq battle as fast as possible, in preference to vulnerable Humvees. So is the US Army. In Afghanistan, the Aussies and Canadians are also using properly-built combat trucks. Only the British are lagging behind, inexplicably.
After yet another group of British soldiers died in thin-skinned "Snatch" Land Rovers, Euroreferendum just wrote,
"So, while the MoD (UK MInistry of Defense) fritters away its money on "toys" for the RAF and new carriers for the Royal Navy, and while the Army brass wet their knickers in excitement over the prospect of buying expensive new APCs, all under the name of FRES, our troops die, and they die and they die. Hundreds more are horribly mutilated, their lives wrecked forever.
"All this is because these vainglorious, useless organisations elevate their own ambitions and concerns above their primary duty of safeguarding their own people. For their collective failure, which includes the media, they really, really should rot in Hell."
The British media are just beginning to catch on. From the Telegraph,
"Dozens of British troops have been killed inside the lightly armoured Snatch vehicles which are being replaced by the more robust Mastiff trucks."
But if Eureferendum is to be believed, the death rate isn't just dozens of soldiers but scores. And the Mastiffs are not being supplied in nearly high enough numbers even several years into the war. It's a terrifying tale of incompetence and mismanagement, high in the chain of command.
Soft-skinned rectangular vehicles are not the only equipment failure that Eureferendum has called attention to, time and time again. In Afghanistan, British soldiers live in tents rather than fortified housing, while taking regular mortar attacks. They have not had anti-artillery radar, to pinpoint and strike back at attackers before they run off. Air support has been dismal, helicopters almost non-existent.
Just read Eureferendum's careful tracking of the story and thank your lucky stars for former SecDef Donald Rumsfeld, who forced our military establishment to adapt, adapt, and adapt again. The political losers in the US DOD are still screaming, of course, but without ruthless reshaping of our military we would have lost every war in history. Abraham Lincoln reshaped the US Army, and FDR did too. Ronald Reagan forced reorganization in the DOD and CIA. Rummy did it for the WOT, because our military career structure was still tailored for massive army-to-army warfare against the Soviets in Europe.
What we are facing today is the opposite of conventional large-scale war, and much of the career incentive structure in the military has had to change. Special Forces have been elevated to their own command. We've seen scores of hostile leaks from the Pentagon in the New York Times and WaPo, as officers find their careers threatened. The payoff comes in saved lives and vastly improved fighting effectiveness. We overthrew the Taliban in Afghanistan using three hundred CIA and Special Forces on the ground, plus precision USAF bombing and a lot of bribe money.
As a result of tough military reorganization we are now much better equipped to apply General Petraeus' newly formalized counter-insurgency doctrine. Yes, the Brits are admirable soldiers, smart and tough on the ground, but their defense careerists back home have been a disaster.
The Basra failure is a mirror image of the Concorde Supersonic Ego-jet, which never made any financial sense, but simply allowed European aerospace to parade around the world, claiming it had the only civilian supersonic passenger jet. Well, that was true. Meanwhile, other airplanes were winning in the market because the Concorde was much too small and expensive for the average air passenger. The Concorde ultimately had to go. It was a pure prestige investment, like all those African palaces that were built by kleptocrat dictators. Post-colonial African governments suffered from a gaping inferiority complex, and so does contemporary Europe. The response is similar.
Instead of preparing for clearly visible dangers today, Europe's military investments are going into giant prestige projects for the future European Army, expensive multinational investments like aircraft carriers and the Eurofighter jet, none of which are ready for combat, while cheaper and more effective weapons systems are ignored. Europe is not facing the Soviet Army; but it is pretending to, so the EU can buy off as many countries as possible with "defense" moneys. (We do the same thing in the US Congress, except that our military actually fights wars. Our voters also have some control over who goes to Congress, while the EU is unelected. So our military must keep their noses to the grindstone. Since Europe is always happy to let Uncle Sam do the hard work in Kosovo and the Middle East, they can get away with a pretend military. But what will happen when Uncle Sam walks away?)
Instead of preparing for counterinsurgency warfare, the most predictable ground war for the near future, the EU wants the biggest, flashiest and most gold-plated toys. The EU Galileo satellite navigation system is soaking up billions of euros just to duplicate the free American GPS system, because Europe must have its own high-tech toys. Compared to the European Union, the US Congress looks like a congregation of virgins.
British soldiers are paying in blood for the decisions of their political masters. Since the UK is being steadily seduced into the EU, the military bureaucracy is being rewarded for all the wrong things. So is every other UK ministry. And the average citizen is asleep in front of the telly.
You can call it poetic justice: While Europe went mad with anti-American rage during the Bush years, the Europeans also sabotaged themselves. Europe has been in massive denial of the terror threat, of Islamic fascism, and of nuclear proliferation to rogue regimes in the Middle East. Instead, they have been marching around like a cock with barnyard matter on its feet, blissfully ignorant of mounting dangers.
Meanwhile a flock of black vultures are circling the fat cities of Europe. We need another Winston Churchill, but all we see today is hordes of political hacks.
James Lewis blogs at http://www.dangeroustimes.wordpress.com/
http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/08/why_the_brits_are_losing_basra.html
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http://www.military.com/forums/0,15240,145944,00.html?ESRC=dod.nl
Chinese Missiles Could Target U.S. Satellites
Popular Mechanics | Carl Hoffman | August 15, 2007
At 5:28 PM EST on Jan. 11, 2007, a satellite arced over southern China. It was small -- just 6 ft. long -- a tiny object in the heavens, steadily bleeping its location to ground stations below, just as it had every day for the past seven years. And then it was gone, transformed into a cloud of debris hurtling at nearly 16,000 mph along the main thoroughfare used by orbiting spacecraft.
It was not the start of the world's first war in space, but it could have been. It was just a test: The satellite was a defunct Chinese weather spacecraft. And the country that destroyed it was China. According to reports, a mobile launcher at the Songlin test facility near Xichang, in Sichuan province, lofted a multistage solid-fuel missile topped with a kinetic kill vehicle. Traveling nearly 18,000 mph, the kill vehicle intercepted the sat and -- boom -- obliterated it. "It was almost just a dead-reckoning flight with little control over the intercept path," says Phillip S. Clark, an independent British authority who has written widely on the Chinese and Russian space programs.
For China, a nation that has already sent humans into space and developed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the technology involved in the test was hardly remarkable. But as a demonstration of a rising military posture, it was a surprisingly aggressive act, especially since China has long pushed for an international treaty banning space weapons. "The move was a dangerous step toward the abyss of weaponizing space," says Theresa Hitchens, director of the Center for Defense Information, an independent defense research group in Washington, D.C. "China held the moral high ground about space, and that test re-energized the China hawks in Congress. If we're not careful, space could become the new Wild West. You don't just go and blow things up there." In fact, after the Chinese test, India publicly stepped up its development of antisatellite technology. And some Israeli officials have argued that, given China's record of selling missile technology to Iran, Israel should develop its own program.
International Threat
For many countries, the most disturbing aspect of the test was not the potentially destabilizing sat kill, but the resulting debris, which poses a serious threat to every satellite in orbit, as well as to the International Space Station. "Space debris is a huge problem," says Laura Grego, staff scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists. "A 1-centimeter object is very hard to track but can do considerable damage if it collides with any spacecraft at a high rate of speed." Think of a shotgun pellet traveling at 10 times the speed of a bullet, smashing into a device built to be as light as possible. And then consider that China's antisatellite (ASAT) test produced as many as 35,000 of these pellets, or pieces of debris, in the 1-cm range. Nearly 1500 pieces were 10 cm and larger.
Although the United States knew that China was planning to test ASAT technology, administration officials -- reluctant to disclose the level of U.S. surveillance -- chose to say nothing. China failed two or three times before successfully launching the missile in January. All the attempts were observed by the U.S. Air Force satellite system known as the Defense Support Program. Infrared telescopes on these 33-ft.-high defense satellites can spot the plumes from rockets launched anywhere on Earth.
America's Own Sat Kills
Every industrialized country relies on satellites every day, for everything from computer networking technology to telecommunications, navigation, weather prediction, television and radio. This makes satellites especially vulnerable targets. Imagine the U.S. military suddenly without guidance for its soldiers and weapons systems, and its civilians without storm warnings or telephones.
Some satellites, however, are at greater risk than others. Most spacecraft -- including spy sats -- are in low Earth orbit, which stretches 1240 miles into space. As the Chinese test proved, such targets could be hit with medium-range missiles tipped with crude kill devices. GPS satellites are far higher, orbiting at about 12,600 miles. Many communications sats are in the 22,000-mile range. Destroying them requires a much more powerful and sophisticated long-range ballistic missile -- yet it can be done. "You'd need a sky-sweeping capability to comprehensively negate a space support system that is scattered all over," says John Pike, a space analyst at GlobalSecurity.org. "You'd need ICBM-size boosters -- hundreds of them."
Such an all-out satellite war would render space useless for decades to come. "There'd be so much debris up there," Clark says, "that it wouldn't be safe to put anything up in space."
The United States and Russia, the two countries with proven ASAT capabilities, have long steered clear of satellites as military targets. Even during the Cold War spy sats were hands-off; the consequences of destroying them were greater than those of unwelcome surveillance. "The consensus," Clark says, "was that anybody could look at anybody else."
Nevertheless, the U.S. military has spent decades designing weapons capable of killing other countries' satellites. The crudest American ASAT test, code-named Starfish Prime, took place in 1962, when the U.S. Air Force detonated a 1.4-megaton nuclear weapon at an altitude of 250 miles. The explosion, which occurred about 800 miles west of Hawaii, disabled at least six U.S. and foreign satellites -- roughly a third of the world's low Earth orbit total. The resulting electromagnetic pulse knocked out 300 streetlights in Oahu. Clearly, nukes worked as ASAT weapons, but far too indiscriminately.
To develop a more surgical capability, the Air Force launched Project Mudflap, which was designed to destroy individual Soviet satellites with missiles. But inaccurate space-guidance systems plagued early tests. Then, on May 23, 1963, the Air Force pulled off a successful intercept with a modified Nike-Zeus ballistic missile launched from Kwajalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands. It took out a rendezvous and docking target for NASA's Gemini missions at an altitude of 150 miles.
Over the next several decades the Air Force graduated to more sophisticated air-launched missiles that could hit targets with far better accuracy. In 1985 the United States destroyed an American solar observation satellite using a three-stage, heat-seeking miniature vehicle fired from an F-15 fighter jet. That test, like the Chinese one earlier this year, used a kinetic kill vehicle that spewed debris into space. Funding for the program was cancelled before the air-launched system could be perfected.
That same year, at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, the Air Force began operating the powerful Mid-Infrared Chemical Laser. In 1997, it was used to temporarily blind sensors on an Air Force missile-launch and tracking satellite. The sat remained intact; no debris was created. And no laser tests have been conducted since. However, the current federal budget includes funding for a laser to be fired at a low Earth orbit sat from the Starfire Optical Range at Kirtland Air Force Base, in New Mexico, later this year.
Some $400 million has been spent in recent years to develop another sophisticated kill vehicle -- a three-stage missile that smacks an enemy's craft with a sheet of Mylar plastic, disabling it without producing any debris. It has yet to be fully tested, and would only work on satellites in low Earth orbit; communication and GPS sats are too high.
Destroying an adversary's satellites has far-reaching implications. Do you take out only military sats or so-called civilian ones, too? Nearly every satellite has dual uses: A civilian weather satellite used for tracking hurricanes also could watch military movements. Many satellites are used by multiple nations. And once a nation disables an adversary's satellites, it puts its own in peril. As Charles Vick, a senior analyst at GlobalSecurity says, "It's an act of war."
Sending A Message
So why did China risk provoking international hostility? The country's government has been opaque. "The experiment is not targeted at any other country," said a foreign ministry spokeswoman in Beijing.
Some experts think at least part of China's motivation lies in an unclassified 2006 U.S. report on the future of military activities in space. The document reaffirms that "The United States considers space capabilities ... vital to its national interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will: preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space; dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or developing capabilities intended to do so ... and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests."
The United States "basically said it has the right to restrict the use of space to only its allies," Clark says. Adds Jeffrey G. Lewis, an arms control expert at the New America Foundation: "Much of the world was appalled at the tone of the policy. One British newspaper columnist basically said it made space the 51st state."
In that context, some experts say, the Chinese test was an effort to force the issue, to show the United States the potential consequences of refusing to negotiate a favorable treaty on the military use of space. "The U.S. was restricting all these arms treaties," says Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow in security studies at the Brookings Institution, a Washington, D.C., think tank. "For the Chinese, [the test] was an effort to deal from a position of strength."
Pike believes China may have another rationale for flexing its space muscle: Taiwan. China has long yearned to reabsorb the breakaway island state, which the United States has pledged to defend. In the short term, Pike says, China has only two strategies that could lead to a Taiwan takeover. It could bluff the U.S. in a nuclear confrontation, or it could try something altogether different: Fire medium-range missiles from mobile launchers, just as it did in the January test, and take out America's low-flying imaging satellites. Doing so might blind U.S. military planners long enough for Chinese military forces to gain a foothold on the island.
"The Chinese stage these big amphibious exercises off Taiwan all the time. One day, maybe it'll be real," Pike says. "Either the U.S. will get there quickly enough to stop them or the Chinese will win the race and there won't be the American political resolve to kick them out. All the Chinese would need is time." A half-dozen sats, Pike says -- that's all it would take. "Those satellites are low-hanging fruit. It's a no-brainer."
In that scenario, the ASAT test was not really about China showing the United States its capability. It was about China confirming that its own war plan is feasible.
America's Trump Card
The long-term ramifications of the test will take years to play out, but, for now, few observers think China scored any gains. "It was a mistake," O'Hanlon says. It fueled American hard-liners who want to restrict American technological cooperation with China. And, "It doesn't help China's case saying it isn't a threatening military power," Vick says. "It is a threat, and the test showed that." Whether the United States suddenly accelerates its ASAT capability beyond the testing phase remains to be seen. The country is in the midst of a war; budgets are already tight. Russia is not perceived as a threat and China has only 60 satellites -- few of these are worth shooting down.
America's most robust ASAT weapons were not designed for destroying satellites at all -- they are missiles developed and operated by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), formerly known as the Strategic Defense Initiative. All U.S. ballistic missiles are actually dual-use, and while their ability to shoot down incoming rockets has been proven only in tests, it would be easy to direct them against any low Earth orbit satellite. Twenty-four MDA missiles are operational in Alaska and California, far more than would be needed, Pike says, to handle any immediate ASAT needs. There is, he says, "just nothing to shoot at."
For now, that is. The militarization of space has long been debated. With one blown-up old weather satellite, China has made the prospect of a new arms race far more likely. It showed the world that it is willing to go toe-to-toe up in the final frontier.
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Drama of a Tough Marine
By Ralph Peters
The New York Post | 8/24/2007
CAMP FALLUJAH, Iraq - A Marine appeared in the doorway of the battalion commander's office. "Sir, we've got an ident on a mortar team."
Marine Lt. Col. Nate Nastase stood up behind his desk. He'd been briefing me on his area of operations just east of Fallujah, where the sheiks recently flipped to our side and a fading, but still lethal, al Qaeda struggled to stay in the game.
Nastase moves with a purpose. He led the way through the smack-down heat to the operations center next door. Adrenaline laced the air. The ops staff of the 3rd Battalion, 3rd Marines, believed they had a fix on a target they'd been hunting, a terrorist hit-and-run mortar crew determined to announce that al Qaeda was still around.
But there was a problem. Ordinarily, Marine artillery would've shot counter-fire as soon as their radars picked up the incoming round. But there had been a line-of-fire issue. Fortunately, a well planned surveillance mission was in the air at just the right spot. The system didn't catch the round being fired, but quickly spotted a vehicle at the shooter's location.
It didn't seem like a coincidence. The area was a scrub waste, with no one else in evidence. There was no good reason for anybody to be there.
Lt. Col. Nastase would have to make the decision to green-light an airstrike.
Sounds clear-cut. But few things are straightforward in Iraq. Since no one saw a concealed mortar actually fire from the truck or beside it, it was impossible to be 100 percent certain.
What if it was a coincidence? The Marines had spent months building a crucial partnership with local tribes who had been our enemies for years. Now the local Sunni Arabs are on board in the fight against al Qaeda (and al Qaeda doesn't like it - earlier in the week, a mortar round killed a key sheik's daughter and one of his bodyguards).
Everyone in the room and the adjacent bay felt the same longing to pull the trigger, to take out that mortar crew. But Nastase would have to decide. And the vehicle was already on the move, headed toward another unit's sector, jumping a boundary - the military equivalent of a state line.
Nastase remained a study in self-control, reining in the emotions in the room simply by giving clear instructions and asking short, sharp questions. Appearing no older than a captain, Nastase looks like a combination of Tom Cruise and a Sicilian boxer.
A ground-attack aircraft was on station, but would soon need to refuel. What did the battalion commander want to do?
Suddenly, the target vehicle stopped in the middle of nowhere. Another vehicle, pointed in the opposite direction, pulled up beside it. Was the mortar crew switching rides, letting an unsuspecting driver take the hit if the Americans were on to them? Was evidence being transferred?
What if there was an innocent explanation for the vehicles' behavior? A misguided attack could alienate the locals again.
The vehicles broke apart, with the main suspect taking off toward the sister unit's sector. That meant checking to ensure that no friendlies were in the area and coordinating all fires - if the decision were made to shoot.
The vehicle pulled up beside a house. Just inside the other unit's boundary.
What if al Qaeda were setting the entire thing up to get us to attack a home where women and children were present? What if they were playing all of our technical advantages against us and springing a political trap? Contrary to the myths of the left, no Americans leaders want to harm the innocent. And the local repercussions of bad targeting could set back reconciliation efforts by months.
Still, everybody in that room wanted to shoot. Hitting back is the natural impulse for Marines or soldiers - get the enemy, any time you can. Nail that mortar team while we've got them.
Everything was in place for the attack.
The commander looked over the incoming data one last time. A decisive man, Nastase still had to be the one perfectly clear thinker in the room. Everyone else was doing his job, and doing it well. But unleashing the power of the U.S. military was up to one lieutenant colonel.
He chose not to shoot. If a surveillance system had actually spotted a mortar round coming out of the vehicle or from a position near it, the decision would have gone the other way. But there was just enough uncertainty to convince the battalion commander that protecting the vital, new alliance with the local sheiks was the priority.
Everyone must've been disappointed. But they didn't show it. They're Marines. They just carry on with the mission.
Nastase must've felt the letdown, too. But he was comfortable with his decision. And the mission wasn't a complete failure, not by any means: Two suspect vehicles had been ID'd and the Marines could be on the look-out for them. A house had been pinpointed as a potential terrorist safe haven or staging area - the adjacent unit could raid it, maybe grabbing key terrorists and making an intelligence score.
All of the work by the troops out in the outposts and on patrol and by the staff was paying off: The Marines had narrowed down the possibilities and had known approximately where to watch for the terrorists this time. Next time might well be their last time. That mortar team wasn't going to live long.
But the round had gone to the terrorists. Even though they shot wild - almost as if they'd really been nothing but bait.
Everyone yearns to do the satisfying thing. But a leader has to do the wise thing. The battalion commander hadn't held back from a lack of guts, but because he knew that, this time, restraint was a better fit for his mission.
But it was a hard decision to make.
Lt. Col. Nastase gave a few final orders and walked back out into the heat. Alone.
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Russia: The Fundamentals of Russian Air Defense Exports
August 24, 2007 16 04 GMT
Summary
Russia displayed the new S-400 surface-to-air missile system at the MAKS 2007 air show in Moscow that began Aug. 21. Although Belarusian Defense Minister Col. Gen. Leonid Maltsev expressed interest in acquiring it, Moscow is not ready to export the S-400.
Analysis
Russia displayed its latest surface-to-air missile system, the S-400 Triumf, at the Aug. 21-26 MAKS 2007 air show in Moscow. The system was tested successfully in July and is now slowly being deployed around Moscow. Other countries, including Belarus, are keenly interested in the latest air defense technology. However, Igor Ashurbeily, CEO of S-400 producer Almaz Central Design Bureau, made it clear Aug. 23 that the system will not be exported until 2009. Russian air defense considerations, financial prudence and foreign policy all tend to argue for even longer delays in export.
History
Air defense is hardwired into the Russian military psyche. For much of the Cold War, Russia was at an extreme disadvantage in terms of intercontinental reach -- especially in terms of aerial reconnaissance and strategic bombers. To put it simply, Russia was more vulnerable to U.S. reconnaissance planes and strategic bombers than the United States was to Soviet planes.
Part of this is geography, part is history. The United States began designing an intercontinental bomber to reach Tokyo the moment the Japanese fleet bombed Pearl Harbor. The Russians, on the other hand, were fighting a massive and devastating land war against the seasoned German army. They had little time or patience for the niceties of long-range aviation. That disparity defined how each emerged from World War II to wage the Cold War. Air defense -- particularly surface-to-air missiles -- was consequently a major strategic consideration for the Soviets.
Today
At the apex of this tradition are the late models of the S-300 series, especially the S-300PMU2, which are renowned as some of the best air defense hardware money can buy. Their range and capability make them coveted strategic defensive assets. With exceptionally long ranges, they can reportedly engage stealth aircraft and low-flying cruise missiles, and even intercept shorter-range ballistic missiles.
The S-400 is the most recent variant. Despite the new designation, at one point the program was known as the S-300PMU3. The S-400 is quite similar to its older cousins, especially in outward appearance.
If the nomenclature here is beginning to get a bit dense, that is no accident. The Soviets became quite adept at clouding their military capabilities by using confusing basic distinctions. Two "variants" of the same system could bear little apparent and even less actual resemblance to one another.
This also cuts the other way. Moscow can use changes in nomenclature to make two quite similar systems appear to be very different. These skills are not lost on today's Kremlin.
Export
This is where export considerations begin to come into play. The ruse works only while no one else knows the finer points of the system. As long as the latest missiles remain sealed in their launch canisters and the electronic emissions of their engagement radars remain more or less out of the reach of American hands, the unknown remains unknown.
Widespread proliferation of S-400 batteries would make them increasingly accessible to study -- clandestine or otherwise -- by the U.S. military. (The Department of Defense acquired several components of various older versions of the S-300 from former Soviet Union states in the 1990s.) Such study would allow a concrete picture of the system's capabilities to emerge. A concrete picture defines the parameters of a problem, and a problem with parameters allows for the creation of concrete solutions.
Resale Value
The second reason Moscow is unlikely to let the S-400 slip out the door any time soon is that the Russian military-industrial complex has become particularly adept at refurbishing and upgrading old equipment and turning it around at a profit. Indeed, it is still selling variants of air defense systems with roots in the late 1950s. The Kremlin can then use this money to finance production and upgrades of the latest systems for itself. Meanwhile, it locks in a returning customer, who keeps coming back for upgrades and replacements for hardware that is much closer to slipping into obsolescence. This kind of thinking has an economic logic to it.
Foreign Policy
More than anything else, the export of strategic weapon systems is a tool of foreign policy. Such sales can help facilitate military cooperation or simply aid the enemy of one's enemy. Moscow certainly was not playing nice when it delivered shorter-range Tor-M1 surface-to-air missile systems to Iran. But Russia thus far appears to have refrained from selling more serious systems -- such as late-model S-300 systems -- to either Iran or Syria, despite sincere efforts on the part of both Tehran and Damascus. That is a line Moscow has decided not to cross with Washington.
Moscow has not widely sold the latest models of the S-300 system, and the Russians are hardly likely to begin exporting the S-400 before they expand production of its predecessor systems. Circumstances can change, however, especially as the United States continues to push toward a pair of ballistic missile defense bases in Europe, and Moscow is taking this potential shift into consideration.
Russia Holds its Ground
Ultimately, the S-400 builds on its predecessor. It is almost certainly an incremental improvement over the S-300PMU2. Those improvements, however, largely appear to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary. However, even if the S-400 is little more than the S-300PMU2 with a new paint job, it is still one of the best strategic air defense assets money can buy. And Russia gains little from the system's capabilities being distributed internationally and pinpointed any further.
Although the deployment of the S-400 around Moscow hardly equates to Russia's readiness to put the system on the export market, the fielding of this "next generation" will lead almost inexorably to the increased export of later-model S-300s. That alone will facilitate a qualitative leap in air defense for a number of buyers.
Though the only true test for such systems is a shooting war, Russian air defense technology appears to be, at the very least, holding its ground in the face of generational advances by the U.S. Air Force -- and that technology will become increasingly available for the right price.
stratfor.com
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second post of the morning:
Russia: The Unveiling of the Skat
August 24, 2007 16 06 GMT
Summary
A new Russian unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) called the Skat was on display Aug. 24 at Russia's MAKS 2007 air show. Though the UCAV is still under development and details about its capabilities remain unknown, the Skat should not be underestimated.
Analysis
A mock-up of a Russian unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) being developed by the MiG Aircraft Corp. was displayed Aug. 24 at the MAKS 2007 air show near Moscow. This UCAV, dubbed the Skat, is not to be underestimated, though much about its development and capabilities remains to be seen.
Vaguely similar in appearance to the U.S. Navy’s Northrop Grumman X-47B, the Skat is hardly a new product on the world arms market. UCAVs, which are designed to deploy weapons, are under development in a number of locations around the globe, particularly in Europe. Hence, it is no surprise that Russia, one of the world's chief arms suppliers, also is pursuing them.
Though the unveiling of a wooden UCAV mock-up should not be taken too seriously, it also should not be dismissed offhand. MiG reportedly has been working on the Skat for more than two years, and Russia claims to have committed substantial funds to the country's ongoing unmanned aerial vehicle development.
However, many details about the Skat's development and capabilities are still unknown. The tailless flying wing configuration is a delicate design and requires fly-by-wire technology. Further software development is necessary to allow such a plane to operate autonomously -- an important step up from a more rudimentary remote-control configuration. And indigenous software development capacity is limited in Russia. The Soviets have historically regarded computers solely as a military technology; consequently, software development remains a very underdeveloped sector of the country's economy, and workers with these kinds of skills are aggressively courted by foreign firms.
Reports that the first of two functional Skat test beds will actually have a built-in cockpit for a human pilot -- a substantial design change at a substantial additional cost -- suggest that Russia still has much to do to perfect its unmanned technology.
Furthermore, the development of stealth technology requires a lot of work. The Russians have never believed in such technology, and they have refused to invest in it since the 1970s because of their belief that radar technology would improve faster. (Moscow does not share Washington's faith in small numbers of complex, advanced systems.)
The Skat will not be the best UCAV on the market, and it certainly will not be the stealthiest. But the Russians will build it from the ground up with production efficiency in mind. If they succeed, they will deploy the Skat in numbers and formations larger than those envisioned by the Pentagon for comparable missions. They might suffer a higher rate of attrition, but one should not assume the Skat will not get the job done.
stratfor.com
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A nice piece on tactics. Lays out in good detail the lay of the land and how our troops are moving ahead.
The Weekly Standard
Operation Phantom Strike
How the U.S. military is demolishing al Qaeda in Iraq.
by Mario Loyola
09/03/2007, Volume 012, Issue 47
Falluja, Iraq
On August 15, several hours after night fell over Baghdad, an air assault squadron of the 3rd Infantry Division launched the first attack of Operation Marne Husky. A dozen darkened transport and attack helicopters took off and headed south along the Tigris River, carrying a full company of infantry--about 120 young riflemen with night goggles and weapons loaded. Their objective was a hamlet several dozen miles away. At about 11 P.M., the force landed and rapidly surrounded several small structures. The occupants were taken by surprise. Five suspected insurgents were captured. By 4 A.M., the entire team was airborne again.
Every night since then similar scenes have unfolded at dozens of locations in and around Baghdad--all part of a larger operation named Phantom Strike. The attacks involve units of all sizes and configurations, coming in by air and land. In some cases, the units get out quickly. In others, they pitch tents for an extended stay. The idea is to keep the enemy--al Qaeda and its affiliates--on the defense and constantly guessing, thereby turning formerly "safe" insurgent areas into areas of prohibitive risk for them.
Time and space
The impetus for Phantom Strike was, in a way, born in Washington, where Congress created a series of benchmarks for progress in Iraq by mid-September, at which point an "interim report" is required from Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander. The legislation inadvertently (perhaps "negligently" is a better word) created a "Tet" opportunity for al Qaeda here. If it can dominate headlines with spectacular mass-casualty suicide attacks in the days and weeks leading up to the report, the political climate in Washington might turn irretrievably against the military effort, thereby snatching a victory for the terrorists that they have failed to win on the ground. (Just as the Viet Cong's Tet offensive in 1968, while a military debacle for them, convinced U.S. media and political elites that that war was lost.) With this in mind, operational planners earlier this year began laying out a strategy to disrupt al Qaeda's ability to carry out the expected attacks.
Learning from past mistakes, commanders of the "surge" forces now take territory only if they can hold it. But for certain elements of Phantom Strike, they are making an exception to that rule. Divisional commands across Iraq have been instructed to cash in their accumulated intel and attack insurgents where they are most likely to be hiding--whether it makes sense to hold the territory or not. In planning rooms across the central third of Iraq, commanders looked at their target wish-lists--places where they had taken fire in the past, or tracked possible insurgents, or gotten credible tips from the population--and chose the most enticing ones.
The Joint Campaign Plan, a document that operationalizes the surge in accordance with Petraeus's counterinsurgency strategy, calls for coalition forces to give the government of Iraq "the time and space that it needs to succeed," according to military officers. The practical emphasis has been on "space." By pushing coalition forces out from their bases and into neighborhoods across Baghdad and other major urban centers in Iraq, commanders have sought to establish "area security" through "clear, control, and retain" operations. Key to retaining these areas is the participation of Iraqi Security Forces and other nonmilitary Iraqi government support.
The success enjoyed in places like Anbar province has come because security forces convinced people that they were there to stay. Those populations have shown their appreciation by joining the fight against al Qaeda in their neighborhoods, joining the police, and establishing neighborhood watch systems. Purely disruptive raids in which neither control nor retention is sought have thus fallen somewhat into disfavor.
But there is one good reason not to abandon them altogether. Disruption is a way to seize and maintain the initiative. Disruptive attacks keep the enemy off-balance, guessing as to your next move. That makes him concentrate on defense, and put off his own attacks. It's like a boxer keeping his opponent on the ropes with a flurry of jabs until the right moment for a knock-out blow.
Operation Marne Husky is just such a disruptive operation. Most of General Rick Lynch's 3rd Infantry forces are committed to massive "clear control and retain" (CCR) operations in his area. He was therefore somewhat short of troops to contribute to Phantom Strike activities. But he wasn't short on targets. His operations have produced a steady stream of al Qaeda and other insurgents fleeing further south for safety, mostly to an area on the Tigris known as the Samarrah jungle. Flushed from their safe havens, and tracked by intel, the insurgents were now vulnerable--in some cases, sitting ducks. Once the Phantom Strike guidance gave Lynch the order to attack, all he needed was a little ingenuity to come up with the right assets.
The 3rd Infantry Division headquarters has a combat air brigade with more than a hundred helicopters. Marshalling other support services, and mustering a company of crack infantry freed up by the dramatically reduced tempo of operations in Anbar, Lynch put together an ad hoc unit for targeted strike operations, rather like a special forces contingent. In the first week of operations, this small force killed seven fighters and detained 64 suspects including 14 high-value targets, clearing nearly 120 structures in the process.
Such results are an early return on investment for the doctrines developed by Petraeus. The Counterinsurgency Field Manual, formulated under his command and released last December, chews through a lot of theory to arrive at one basic practical tenet: "Intelligence drives operations." The counterinsurgency manual specifies that being able to distinguish between insurgents and civilians is the key to victory.
The only way to do that is to provide protection for the population, enfranchise them, and enlist their help in identifying the insurgents. This creates a virtuous circle--security operations produce good intel which produces better security operations and in turn better intel. The CCR operations in and around Baghdad have produced a trove of actionable intelligence on al Qaeda--its movements, its senior leaders, and the sources and locations of its weapons, explosives, and bomb-making equipment. Phantom Strike has capitalized on that intel, further reducing al Qaeda's capacity to attack, which has improved security and increases the population's confidence in the Coalition and in the Iraqi Security Forces.
Of course, al Qaeda has not taken all of this lying down. All the good news coming out of Iraq recently is even more depressing for al Qaeda than it is for Harry Reid, if that is possible, and al Qaeda could smell that something like Phantom Strike might be coming. It had to pull off a spectacular attack--and it did. On August 14, four near-simultaneous car bombs destroyed whole rows of mud-brick houses in a pair of small farming villages in Yazidi, killing on the order of 400 Iraqis, and wounding many more--a horrifying toll even for today's Iraq.
But the site of the terror attack--in the far northwest of Iraq, 75 miles west of Mosul beyond the upper Tigris--was very interesting.
Lay of the land
To understand why, it is necessary to know something of the human geography of Iraq. Baghdad sits at the confluence of the Tigris River and its main tributary, the Diyala; these both flow from the north. The Euphrates River travels across Iraq from west to east, curving sharply south in the southwest suburbs of Baghdad. From there, the Euphrates and the Tigris converge gently, finally issuing, far to the south, into the Persian Gulf. Because Iraq's populated areas hug its great rivers, the human geography of the country lies along five corridors all connected to a central hub--Baghdad.
Outside those fertile corridors lies a scorching, lifeless desert--in many places no further than three miles from the nearest river. Because the desert has no water, it favors the army that can most easily maneuver over long distances with its own water. The Americans are thus masters of the desert in Iraq.
The insurgents, by contrast, don't do so well there. Even when they disguise themselves as Bedouins, their patterns of congregation and movement are easily detected by the scores of unmanned aerial vehicles constantly on the prowl overhead. And they can't move around readily, because the desert is largely impassable and in any case totally exposed, its few roads easily monitored. This means both the insurgency and the counter-insurgency center on Iraq's five river corridors.
Of these, the one where al Qaeda has suffered its clearest and most humiliating defeat is along the western Euphrates--the corridor stretching from Baghdad to Falluja, Ramadi, Haditha, and on to Al Qaim near the Syrian border. Not too long ago the heart of the Sunni insurgency, the entire corridor has fallen to coalition forces. Insurgents are finding that they can't get past the outer checkpoints far enough to approach any of the main cities, and even crossing from one side of the Euphrates to the other has become extremely difficult. Indeed the situation in Anbar has advanced to the point where the Marine Expeditionary Force has hit all of its major "intel targets" and had virtually none to nominate for the Phantom Strike campaign.
Moving counterclockwise, the corridors formed by the southern Euphrates and Tigris rivers, and the irrigated land between them, are mainly Iraq's Shiite heartland. But this twin corridor is dominated at its northern end by a belt of Sunni settlements, running along the outer perimeter of southern Baghdad. Saddam Hussein contrived this as a defense-in-depth of his precious capital. In this Baghdad belt, Lynch's division has been conducting a series of enormous CCR operations. Insurgents are fleeing south, but will soon start running into the Shiite wall, where (after years--indeed decades--of abusing the Shiites) they are likely to suffer a fate far worse than getting captured by coalition forces.
The next river corridor to the north is the Diyala valley, which leads from Baghdad to Baquba, Muqtadiya, and Mansuriyah, finally hitting the Kurdish region where the terrain becomes mountainous. Starting in mid-June with Operation Arrowhead Ripper, which focused on Baquba, this area has seen the heaviest fighting in Iraq since the start of the surge last February. It is also the site of the most complex and interesting of the Phantom Strike operations--Lightning Hammer--which focuses on the upper Diyala River valley from Baquba to the Kurdish region.
These four corridors, which only a year ago were wide open to the insurgents, have become increasingly nettlesome and dangerous for them since the start of the surge. The large areas shown on intel maps as "safe" for the insurgents only last year have been whittled down to small pockets here and there. Al Qaeda and its affiliates are increasingly desperate for safe havens from which to operate and lines of communication they can rely on.
Increasingly the insurgents' only option is the fifth corridor, the northern Tigris River valley stretching from Baghdad to Samarrah, Tikrit, and Mosul in the far north. This is why the location of al Qaeda's August 16 attack, 75 miles west of Mosul, was so telling. The car-bombs were likely assembled near Mosul because of the increased risk of trying to assemble them anywhere else in Iraq. And they were "delivered" locally because al Qaeda probably decided that the long journey down the Tikrit-Samarrah-Baghdad highway was too dangerous.
Al Qaeda understands how to manipulate western media well enough to know that they don't always need to attack in Baghdad. Indeed, the bombing dominated the headlines in the United States in the dramatic opening days of Operation Phantom Strike. But because of where it occurred, it told the coalition's planners that they have been effective, too.
Hammer and anvil
No current fighting shows the ingenuity of U.S. planners better than the Lightning Hammer operations in the Diyala River valley. The focus of Lightning Hammer at the moment is an elegant and dramatic attack on the suspected havens of the al Qaeda elements that were forced north out of Baquba earlier this summer.
The attack unfolded in two phases, the first of which was the rapid concentration of forces at several different points along the upper Diyala River valley. Two air assault squadrons, one from the the 25th Infantry Division out of Kirkuk, and another of the 82nd Airborne out of Tikrit, took off for the western side of the valley. Consisting of several dozen helicopters and some 240 soldiers, the two squadrons converged on five locations among the maze of canals and broken farmland that runs along the western edge of the valley. Their purpose was to establish a screen to block the most likely escape routes for the insurgents who were about to be flushed out of the valley.
Meanwhile, snatching helicopters from other units in the area, another air assault squadron was attached to a battalion of the armor-heavy 1st Cavalry Division at Forward Operating Base Normandy, in the northern Diyala River valley. The entire force then headed south out of the FOB, some 300 soldiers in a column of tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, Humvees and helicopters. They pushed through Moqdadiyah and plunged towards the valley.
Simultaneously, another battalion of the 1st Cav pushed northeast from Baquba in a small operation dubbed Pericles (also part of Lightning Hammer and Phantom Strike) meant to attack specific intel targets within one of the few remaining pockets of safety for insurgents in the area. The operation had the secondary effect of putting a full battalion of heavy infantry in the field at the bottom of the Diyala River valley just above Baquba, to act as an anvil for the coming operation.
The two battalions wasted no time in launching the second phase of the battle, moving towards each other from opposite ends of the valley, in a simultaneous, massive, and rapid CCR operation. In six days, the two battalions flooded 28 specific targets--including whole villages--in a fast-moving combination of ground and air assaults.
Many al Qaeda fighters appear to have had just enough warning to make good their escape. But in so doing, they were forced to abandon their new "operations center" north of Baghdad--a command post, medical clinic, scores of rockets and mortars, dozens of IEDs, and even their personal weapons.
The prospects for these fighters are not good. The north and south end of the valleys are blocked, as is the valley's western border. The eastern escape from the valley is open for them, but that leads them into a bowl of farmland that is regularly scoured by patrols from FOB Caldwell, and is ringed to the northeast by the Kurdish "wall," to the south by the Shiite "wall," and to the southwest by coalition forces operating in strength between Baghdad and Baquba. Their only solution is to travel without their weapons and explosives--the things that make them dangerous.
Meanwhile, not beset by the force limitations that constrain General Lynch south of Baghdad, General Benjamin Mixon's Multi-National Division-North has orchestrated the Lightning Hammer attack as a CCR on the pattern developed by the Marines in Anbar. Close behind the American units came units of the Iraqi Security Forces, aiming to stay, and behind them, government officials and technical advisers meant to levee the population into the organized neighborhood watch programs that have proven fatal to al Qaeda in Anbar. Planners told me that the coalition forces were greeted warmly, and locals pledged to help, as the Sunni tribes have in Anbar.
The way forward
Al Qaeda in Iraq had many initial advantages--including a message that, though false, was superficially appealing. But they never achieved national scope. They have never looked to anyone like they could actually govern a country. They never gained the open support of any foreign army. And now, after giving the people of Iraq a taste of their brutal sadism--after executing children for playing with American-donated soccer balls, after chopping the fingers off young men for smoking, after murdering entire families in front of the youngest son, so he would live to tell the tale--Al Qaeda in Iraq is more widely hated than feared.
In the words of one soft-spoken coalition planner in Baghdad, "We are demolishing them." After four long years, the coalition has finally grasped the keys to victory. Al Qaeda has begun to lose the staging areas it needs for attacks in Baghdad. Just staying alive and avoiding capture is becoming a full-time occupation for them. As security envelops Baghdad, and calm spreads along the river corridors that extend out from the capital to the furthest reaches of the country, what is already clear to many people here in Iraq will become increasingly impossible for the rest of the world to ignore.
Because they have finally learned how to protect the people of Iraq--and help them to protect themselves--the United States and its allies are winning this war.
Mario Loyola, a fellow at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, is embedded with the Marine Expeditionary Force in western Iraq.
© Copyright 2007, News Corporation, Weekly Standard, All Rights Reserved.
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http://www.amconmag.com/2007/2007_08_27/article3.html
August 27, 2007 Issue
Copyright © 2007 The American Conservative
The Chips Are Down
With our computers frozen, would the U.S. still be a superpower? China intends to find out.
byClaude Salhani
In this galaxy, in the not too distant future . . .
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan demanded that the U.S. military focus its attention—and much of its research and development—on how best to respond to low-tech threats such as primitive improvised explosive devices. While the IEDs proved to be deadly for the troops of the U.S.-led coalition in Iraq—the majority of casualties suffered were from exploding roadside bombs—the long-term effect they had on the American military was far more consequential. The real impact was felt only a few years later when the United States became involved in its next major conflict—with China.
The two wars in the Middle East were, from a scientific perspective, low-tech engagements in which conventional military forces fought urban guerrillas. Following a sweeping victory that brought the U.S. military from the Kuwaiti border right up to Baghdad and beyond in record time, the administration believed that victory had been attained and prematurely declared the end of major combat operations. As we were to find out, this was far from the case. American soldiers and Marines—and the 60,000-odd contract workers supporting the U.S. military—soon had to grapple with a new problem: roadside bombs detonated by remote control. Lethal as they were, these homemade gadgets were rudimentary. They were relatively easy to assemble, hide, transport, place along the roads where coalition troops were bound to pass by, and detonate remotely. At one point, U.S. soldiers found that a simple remote control sold with $50 battery-operated toy cars at Radio Shack allowed American troops to preempt the IEDs by detonating the insurgents’ bombs ahead of American convoys.
As the casualty toll from the IEDs began to grow, the military focused on countermeasures. Resources from the military’s own research groups and defense contractors across the country became absorbed by the problem. As could be expected, the resistance and the jihadi fighters answered by creating more sophisticated bombs, for example, building the casing out of plastic to avoid detection by mine sweepers. This only prompted the military to keep looking for ways to thwart newer generations of IEDs. And the deadly cycle continued until the end of the war in October 2017—or at least the end of the war for the United States.
American engagement in Iraq officially ended when a detachment of Navy Seals—the last group of U.S. Special Forces—were extracted out of Anbar Province in the middle of the night. Al-Qaeda fighters, having learned from an informer of the U.S. evacuation plan, attempted to ambush them. They began firing on the 16 Seals—divided into two teams of eight—as they hooked harnesses onto cables attached to the underbellies of two large CH-47 Sea Knight Marine helicopters. The gunmen missed the Seals for the most part. Three Marine Cobra attack helicopters providing cover fire quickly silenced the attackers.
Between the time the first American soldier set foot on Iraqi soil in 2003 and the last of the Navy Seals commandos left the country in 2017, and while the U.S. military remained preoccupied in countering threats emanating from low-tech devices in an asymmetrical war, halfway around the globe the Chinese did not remain idle. Aware that the day would come when the People’s Liberation Army might have to face the American Army in battle, China began looking toward the place that conflict might be conducted. Their conclusion: the one who controlled space was guaranteed victory.
The Chinese leadership was fully aware that the PLA could never stand up to the U.S. military in a conventional war, despite China’s superior number of troops—one million under arms. The U.S. war machine is made up of the most fantastic pieces of armament ever incorporated into any fighting force in the history of man.
From the main battle tank, the Abrams M1A1, to Cobra attack helicopters, to Marine vertical take-off and landing Harrier jump jets, to the U.S. Air Force’s crown jewel, the B1 stealth bomber, to the magnificent armadas that the U.S. Navy can deploy with its nuclear powered aircraft carriers, attack submarines, and destroyers anywhere on the face of the globe, the Chinese military leadership had reason to worry.
Its war planners projected that the day would come when they would have to face America’s military in a standoff, most likely over the island of Taiwan, seen by China as a breakaway province and considered by the United States to be a friend and ally. They began to plan accordingly.
While the U.S. military was occupied developing simple solutions to counter low-tech threats in the Middle East, Beijing quietly went about developing high-tech systems to place aboard dozens of “communication” satellites that were developed, tested, and launched into space. Today, the Chinese have 56 satellites in space.
On Jan. 11, 2007, a missile was launched from the Chinese mainland to an altitude of 537 miles, slamming straight into its target—an obsolete Chinese weather satellite. The target was instantly destroyed, reportedly producing almost 900 trackable pieces of space debris. At that time, the U.S. military was far too preoccupied with what was happening in Iraq to worry about Chinese missiles. It proved to be an oversight—a major one.
China made good use of this oblivion. Along with its space-launched missile defense initiative, the Chinese busied themselves with finding ways to immobilize America’s far superior tanks, warplanes, and battleships and render the U.S. military’s computers and their communication and command-and-control systems useless. The Chinese knew that time was limited and that once the U.S. began to disengage from Iraq and Afghanistan, its military would regroup and reassess new threats and move to counter them.
The conflict began pretty much like most conflicts do: gradual escalation and exchanges of strongly worded communiqués, culminating with threats, followed by military action.
Beijing announced that if the newly elected government in Taiwan declared independence, China would intervene militarily. The United States responded by dispatching two carrier task forces attached to the USS Abraham Lincoln and the USS Ronald Reagan. Besides the usual high-tech armament, including ship-to-shore missiles, ship-to-air missiles, and ship-to-ship missiles, and 400-odd warplanes aboard the carriers, the combined task force also included two Battalion Landing Teams, some 4,000 Marines.
The Chinese had nowhere near as many warships, planes, or tanks, but they had 350,000 men aboard transport ships—and they had a secret weapon in orbit.
As the Chinese expeditionary force approached Taiwan, they crossed an imaginary red line drawn across a Pentagon map, breaching the point American generals estimated would be one from which the Chinese would not turn back.
From his command post aboard the USS Ronald Reagan, Adm. Anthony S. Samuelson picked up a secure telephone connecting him directly to the Pentagon and to the office of the secretary of defense. The secretary picked up on the first ring.
“Tell me it’s good news, admiral.”
“Wish I could, sir. They are now in firing range and are not about to turn around. It looks like this is it.”
The secretary of defense asked the admiral to stand by. He picked up a burgundy phone on his desk.
The president answered instantly. “Madame President,” said the secretary, “You must order the attack. If we are to proceed, it must be now.”
The president scanned the room, moving her eyes around the Oval Office where her national security advisers were gathered. Each in turn nodded his head, indicating a silent “yes.” The president of the United States put the phone to her ear and told her secretary of defense to proceed. With a heavy heart, Chelsea Clinton placed the receiver back in its cradle.
As the first Chinese soldier set foot on the beaches of Taiwan, the order was received from Adm. Samuelson’s headquarters to open fire.
Minutes before the order was given, some 300 miles up in space, a Chinese scientific satellite released a burst of electro-magnetic energy aimed at American and Taiwanese forces. Other similar satellites positioned strategically around the Earth released a number of similar bursts directed at strategic U.S. missile silos in the continental United States, Korea, and Australia.
Total confusion followed. Not one order issued electronically by U.S. command-and-control centers reached its target. Missiles fired from the ships of the Seventh Fleet went straight into space and exploded harmlessly above the earth. The Abrams M1A1 tanks started to turn around in circles like demented prehistoric dogs trying to bite their tails. The few planes that managed to take off from the carriers crashed into the South China Sea. Search-and-rescue helicopters were unable to even start their engines.
The Chinese were able to walk ashore and take Taiwan without firing a single shot.
Thankfully, the battle for Taiwan unfolded only in this author’s imagination. But the scenario is not entirely outside the realm of possibility. It is time to finish the war in Iraq and hand the Iraqis responsibility for their land and their own future. It is also time to look ahead. Our competitors are.
________________________________________________
Claude Salhani is International Editor and a political analyst with United Press International in Washington, D.C.
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Counterinsurgency Comeback
By MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS
September 6, 2007; Page A17
Events have vindicated the claims of those who argued that President Bush's "surge" strategy in Iraq could work. Security, the sine qua non for ultimate success, has improved. This is especially true in Anbar and other Sunni-dominated provinces where the Sunni sheiks, who may have previously supported al Qaeda, have concluded that the Americans are now the "strongest tribe" in the region and have turned against their erstwhile allies.
Gen. Creighton Abrams watches during ceremonies transferring U.S. river patrol boats to the South Vietnamese Navy, Oct. 10, 1969.
This is an important development. Of course, success also depends on the actions of the U.S. Congress and the behavior of the Iraqi government. But the military element is important. Advocates of the surge argued that militarily, success would depend less on the number of U.S. troops in Iraq than on how they were used. Under Gen. David Petraeus, they have been used correctly to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. What perhaps is not fully appreciated is the significant cultural change that his approach represents.
Some years ago, the late Carl Builder of Rand wrote a book called "The Masks of War," in which he demonstrated the importance of the organizational cultures of the various military services. His point was that each service possesses a preferred way of fighting that is not easily changed. Since the 1930s, the culture of the U.S. Army has emphasized "big wars." But this has not always been the case.
Throughout the 19th century, the U.S. Army was a constabulary force that, with the exception of the Mexican and Civil Wars, specialized in irregular warfare. Most of this constabulary work was domestic, the Indian Wars representing the most important case. But the U.S. Army also successfully executed constabulary operations in the Philippines after the Spanish-American War, which involved both nation-building and counterinsurgency.
The seeds of a conceptual transformation of the Army were sown after the Civil War by Emory Upton, an innovative officer with an outstanding Civil War record. Graduating from West Point in 1861, he was a brevet brigadier general by the end of the war. He later became a protégé of William Tecumseh Sherman and when Sherman became general in chief of the Army, he sent Upton around the world as a military observer.
Upton believed the constabulary focus was outdated. He was especially impressed by Prussia's ability to conduct war against the armies of other military powers and its emphasis on professionalism. Certainly Prussia's overwhelming successes against Denmark, Austria and France in the Wars of German Unification (1864-71) made the Prussian army the new exemplar of military excellence in Europe.
Upon his return to the U.S., Upton proposed a number of radical reforms, including abandoning the citizen-soldier model and relying on professional soldiers, reducing civilian interference in military affairs, and abandoning the emphasis on the constabulary operations in favor of preparing for a conflict with a potential foreign enemy. Given the tenor of the time, all of his proposals were rejected. In ill health, Upton resigned from the Army and, in 1881, committed suicide.
But the triumph in the U.S. of progressivism, a political program that placed a great deal of reliance on scientific expertise and professionalism, the closing of the Western frontier, and the problems associated with mobilizing for and fighting the Spanish American War made Upton's proposed reforms more attractive, especially to the Army's officer corps. In 1904, Secretary of War Elihu Root published Upton's "Military Policy of the United States." While many of Upton's more radical proposals remained unacceptable to republican America, the idea of reorienting the Army away from constabulary duties to a mission focused on defeating the conventional forces of other states caught on.
While the Army returned to constabulary duties after World War I, Upton's spirit now permeated the professional Army culture. World War II vindicated Upton's vision, and his view continued to govern U.S. Army thinking throughout the Cold War. It is still dominant in the Army today, with the possible exception of its small and elite Special Forces. The American Army that entered Iraq in 2003 was still Emory Upton's Army. But Gen. Petraeus's strategic adjustment suggests that the Army might be undergoing a significant cultural change.
Focused as it has been on state-versus-state warfare, Upton's Army has not cared much for counterinsurgency. This is illustrated by Vietnam, especially during the tenure of Gen. William Westmoreland as commander of U.S. troops from 1965 to 1968.
Westmoreland's operational strategy emphasized the attrition of the forces of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) forces in a "war of the big battalions": multi-battalion, and sometimes even multi-division sweeps intended to find and destroy the enemy with superior firepower. In so doing, he emphasized the destruction of enemy forces instead of controlling key areas in order to protect the South Vietnamese population.
Unfortunately, such search-and-destroy operations were often unsuccessful, since the enemy could usually avoid battle unless it was advantageous for him to accept it. But they were costly both to the American soldiers who conducted them and the Vietnamese civilians who were in the area. In addition, Gen. Westmoreland ignored the insurgency and pushed the South Vietnamese aside.
The Marine approach in Vietnam was different. It was based on the Corps' experiences stabilizing governments and combating guerrilla forces in the Caribbean during the early 20th century. This experience was distilled in Marine Corps Schools lectures beginning in 1920 and was the basis of the "Small Wars Manual" published in 1940.
This approach comprised three elements: pacifying the coastal areas in which 80% of the people lived; degrading the ability of the North Vietnamese to fight by cutting off supplies before they left Northern ports of entry; and engaging PAVN and Viet Cong main force units on terms favorable to American forces. Gen. Westmoreland focused on the third element at the expense of the other two.
Westmoreland was critical of the Marine Corps approach, which unlike his own, took counterinsurgency seriously. He believed, as he wrote in his memoir, that the Marines "should have been trying to find the enemy's main forces and bring them to battle, thereby putting them on the run and reducing the threat they posed to the population."
When Gen. Creighton Abrams replaced Gen. Westmoreland as overall U.S. commander shortly after the Tet offensive, he adopted a new approach -- one similar to that of the Marines -- that came close to winning the war. He emphasized protection of the South Vietnamese population by controlling key areas rather than the destruction of enemy forces per se. He then concentrated on attacking the enemy's pre-positioned supplies, which disrupted PAVN offensive timetables and bought more time for Vietnamization. Finally, rather than ignoring the insurgency and pushing the South Vietnamese aside as Gen. Westmoreland had done, Gen. Abrams followed a policy of "one war," integrating all aspects of the struggle against the communists.
But despite an improved security situation from 1969 to 1974, Congress ended support for South Vietnam, Saigon fell, and the Army, badly hurt by the war, concluded that it should avoid such irregular conflicts in the future. In the 1970s, the Army discarded what doctrine for small wars and counterinsurgency it had developed in Vietnam, choosing to focus on big wars.
But Iraq proves that we don't always get to fight the wars we want. While the Army must continue to plan to fight conventional wars, given the likelihood that future adversaries will seek to avoid our conventional advantage, it must be able to fight irregular wars as well. Gen. Petraeus's success in Iraq so far indicates that the Army has begun the necessary transformation. Let us hope that the Army will internalize these lessons, something Emory Upton's Army has not done in the past.
Mr. Owens is professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. He is writing a history of American civil-military relations.
WSJ
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September 12, 2007
Iraq as Qaeda Bait
By James Lewis
The Left thinks Iraq is a killing field for Americans. Actually, it is a killing field for our enemies, at a very great but vitally important sacrifice. That reflects a grand strategy, tailored to the peculiar nature of the global terror threat.
You don't shoot poisonous fire-ants with a BB gun; you just set an ant trap. Ant colonies are highly "distributed" biological societies, much like the world-wide web. They can't be killed with a BB or a pressure hose; even pouring flaming gasoline on an ant hill won't work.
Instead, you destroy ant colonies by attracting hungry ants to a chemical bait, and then kill them all in one small place. Ant traps work.
That's the Bush strategy in Iraq. Al Qaeda isn't centralized, with big cities or steel industries like Nazi Germany. So you can't destroy the enemy by hunting them one by one. Rather, you bait a trap -- provoke them to come to you, and make sure they don't get out alive.
Iraq is a trap for Al Qaeda. Our mere presence in the heart of the Osama's Caliphate-To-Be draws them like ants to sugar. General Petraeus just reported that
"...in the past 8 months, we have considerably reduced the areas in which Al Qaeda enjoyed sanctuary. We have also neutralized 5 media cells, detained the senior Iraqi leader of Al Qaeda-Iraq, and killed or captured nearly 100 other key leaders and some 2,500 rank-and-file fighters. Al Qaeda is certainly not defeated; however, it is off balance and we are pursuing its leaders and operators aggressively."
Most of the Qaeda fighters come from Saudi Arabia and other breeding grounds. Now that the Sunni tribes are turning against them, they are more exposed and hunted than ever before. Wars are fluid and unpredictable, but no one can imagine that Al Qaeda is happy with its victories since 9/11.
In Afghanistan, they have been on the run since 2003, although the Pakistan border regions continue to supply new recruits. But in Afghanistan they are being destroyed before ever reaching the cities. Add that to a sizable numbers neutralized in Pakistan, Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and more. Add to that the cells pinpointed in Europe and America, the Philippines and Indonesia. We are wiping out the fire ants wherever they can be found.
At that attrition rate, every single year we stay in Iraq, we could get rid of another couple of thousand AQ fighters. Yes, we pay a high price -- but nothing like the price that baddies running loose and attacking us at home would exact.
We are demonstrating who is the strong horse, and who is the weak horse. When the message is finally driven home, the enemy will come to his own conclusions.
In addition to Al Qaeda, other jihadi militants, like Iranian Quds officers and Shiite militants, are being caught in Iraq. A top Hezb'allah operative was just captured there -- and Hezb'allah has been killing Americans ever since they blew up the Marine barracks in Lebanon. As the President said when our perverse press pointed out that the terrorists might hit us in Iraq: Bring them on. That was not an idle boast, but just a statement of the bait and kill strategy. The many critics of that statement simply do not understand or do not want to understand the strategy.
Now take a look at the map of Iran, http://www.iranmap.com/ and notice where our military are today. To the west is Iraq, where American forces move and attack freely. To the east is Afghanistan, where the same is true. South and south-west are Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and the Gulf itself; those Sunni countries now consider Iran to be their biggest threat.
We therefore have hundreds of thousands of military surrounding the next biggest problem, Tehran: to the east and west, and on naval vessels in the Gulf, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean. We just had joint maneuvers with the Indian Navy, the Japanese and the Aussies. In Qatar we have major bases. We just sold another 20 billion dollars worth of military equipment to Saudi and Oman, including anti-missile defenses. Farther away, Egypt and Jordan are American clients -- within limits. So, of course, is Israel. In sum, Tehran can be struck from most points of the compass by our air and missile forces. The Israeli Air Force just struck Iranian weapons located in the eastern corner of Syria, right next to Iran.
Iran is a rising threat, and no one knows how that scenario will play out. But would you really want to be Ahmadi-Nejad today? Every time he makes another wild boast, more people become convinced that he cannot be allowed to get nukes. The German government has just been reported as giving up on the European negotiation effort to stop Iranian nukes. Instead, German officials
"gave the distinct impression that they would privately welcome, while publicly protesting, an American bombing campaign against Iran's nuclear facilities."
It can't be comfortable to be a regime supporter in Tehran today.
Or would you want to be a Baathist general? A few years ago they were at the top of the heap.
The fact is that we are drastically weakening or destroying our terror-supporting enemies: Saddam is dead, Al Qaeda is being degraded, the Taliban are hemorrhaging, and the Mullahs are surrounded.
Yet all the know-nothings think there is no strategy for Iraq.
There's even a clever ironic twist in terms of domestic politics, because our liberals are constantly screaming Defeat! Defeat! Defeat! That message of weakness and vulnerability inspires more and more of our enemies to come to Iraq and join in the bloody slaughter of Americans.
But when they get there, they discover they've been suckered. It's not the Americans who are taking a beating, but the jihadis who fell for the headlines and who listen to the American Left. So even our malicious liberals end up encouraging the enemy to go to Iraq to die.
As President Harry Truman did, George W. Bush recognized the stakes, set in place the right strategy, and was vilified by critics as stupid. But good poker players like Harry S. Truman and George W. Bush know that you don't show your cards too soon, just to make people think you're smart.
James Lewis blogs at dangeroustimes.wordpress.com/
http://www.americanthinker.com/2007/09/iraq_as_qaeda_bait.html
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Nice post Buz. Changing subjects abruptly, the following seems to me to be highly significant. This much power without the consequences of radiation-- this seems to me to be huge.
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http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5j...mEEv9JMABhXmVw
Russia Tests Powerful 'Dad of All Bombs'
By VLADIMIR ISACHENKOV – 14 hours ago
MOSCOW (AP) — The Russian military has successfully tested what it described as the world's most powerful non-nuclear air-delivered bomb, Russia's state television reported Tuesday.
It was the latest show of Russia's military muscle amid chilly relations with the United States.
Channel One television said the new weapon, nicknamed the "dad of all bombs" is four times more powerful than the U.S. "mother of all bombs."
"The tests have shown that the new air-delivered ordnance is comparable to a nuclear weapon in its efficiency and capability," said Col.-Gen. Alexander Rukshin, a deputy chief of the Russian military's General Staff, said in televised remarks.
Unlike a nuclear weapon, the bomb doesn't hurt the environment, he added.
The statement reflected the Kremlin's efforts to restore Russia's global clout and rebuild the nation's military might while the ties with Washington have been strained over U.S. criticism of Russia's backsliding on democracy, Moscow's vociferous protests of U.S. missile defense plans, and rifts over global crises.
The U.S. Massive Ordnance Air Blast, nicknamed the Mother Of All Bombs, is a large-yield satellite-guided, air-delivered bomb described as the most powerful non-nuclear weapon in history.
Channel One said that while the Russian bomb contains 7.8 tons of high explosives compared to more than 8 tons of explosives in the U.S. bomb, it's four times more powerful because it uses a new, highly efficient type of explosives that the report didn't identify.
While the U.S. bomb is equivalent to 11 tons of TNT, the Russian one is equivalent to 44 tons of regular explosives. The Russian weapon's blast radius is 990 feet, twice as big as that of the U.S. design, the report said.
Like its U.S. predecessor, first tested in 2003, the Russian bomb is a "thermobaric" weapon that explodes in an intense fireball combined with a devastating blast. It explodes in a terrifying nuclear bomb-like mushroom cloud and wreaks destruction through a massive shock wave created by the air burst and high temperature.
Thermobaric weapons work on the same principle that causes blasts in grain elevators and other dusty places — clouds of fine particles are highly explosive. Such explosions produce shock waves that can be directed and amplified in enclosed spaces such as buildings, caves or tunnels.
Channel One said that the temperature in the epicenter of the Russian bomb's explosion is twice as high as that of the U.S. bomb.
The report showed the bomb dropped by parachute from a Tu-160 strategic bomber and exploding in a massive fireball. It featured the debris of apartment buildings and armored vehicles at a test range, as well as the scorched ground from a massive blast.
It didn't give the bomb's military name or say when it was tested.
Rukshin said the new bomb would allow the military to "protect the nation's security and confront international terrorism in any situation and any region."
"We have got a relatively cheap ordnance with a high strike power," Yuri Balyko, head of the Defense Ministry's institute in charge of weapons design, told Channel One.
Booming oil prices have allowed Russia to steadily increase military spending in recent years, and the Kremlin has taken a more assertive posture in global affairs.
Last month, President Vladimir Putin said he ordered the resumption of regular patrols of strategic bombers, which were suspended after the 1991 Soviet breakup.
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While we're on the subject of thermobaric armaments
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...hermobaric.htm
Thermobaric Explosive
Volumetric weapons include thermobaric and fuel-air explosives (FAE). Both thermobaric and FAE operate on similar technical principles. In the case of FAE, when a shell or projectile containing a fuel in the form of gas, liquid or dustexplodes, the fuel or dust like material is introduced into the air to form acloud. This cloud is then detonated to create a shock wave of extended duration that produces overpressure and expands in all directions. In a thermobaric weapon, the fuel consists of a monopropellant and energetic particles. The monopropellant detonates in a manner simular to TNT while the particles burn rapidly in the surrounding air later in time, resulting an intense fireball and high blast overpressure. The term "thermobaric" is derived from the effects of temperature (the Greek word "therme" means "heat") and pressure (the Greek word "baros" means "pressure") on the target.
Thermobaric munitions have been used by many nations of the world and their proliferation is an indication of how effectively these weapons can be used in urban and complex terrain. The ability of thermobaric weapons to provide massed heat and pressure effects at a single point in time cannot be reproduced by conventional weapons without massive collateral destruction. Thermobaric weapon technologies provide the commander a new choice in protecting the force, and a new offensive weapon that can be used in a mounted or dismounted mode against complex environments.
The USAF and USN are actively pursuing conventional weapons technology to destroy Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) and support/storage facilities while retaining or destroying the agents within the structure and minimizing collateral damage including fatalities. Thermobaric weapons use high-temperature incendiaries against chemical and biological facilities. The USN is working on an Inter-Halogen Oxidizer weapon while the USAF is pursuing a solid fuel-air explosive using aluminum particles. Both of these weapons use an incineration technique to defeat and destroy the CB agents within the blast area.
The Thermobaric Weapon Demonstration is a proposed Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD). Under this program, prototype weapons are to be tested under operational conditions for their performance, and leave-behinds are to be delivered to the customer. The program aims to develop a validated means of delivery to/into a tunnel adit [entrance]. Technical risks include the extent to which candidate thermobaric payloads do not perform substantially better than existing high explosives in tunnels.
The Thermobaric [TB] Weapon Demonstration will develop a weapon concept that is based on a new class of solid fuel-air explosive thermobarics.The weapon could be used against a certain type of tunnel targets for a maximum functional kill of the tunnels.
Most of the Hard and/or Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs), namely tunnels in rock, are so deep that the developmental and current inventory weapons cannot penetrate to sufficient depths to directly destroy critical assets. One of the warfighter's options is to attack the tunnel portals with weapons that penetrate the thinner layer of rock above the portal, or though the exterior doors, resulting in a detonation within the tunnel system. Penetrations through the door systems have the potential to place the warheads deep within the facility. Detonations within a tunnel, even only in a few diameters, have a significant increase in airblast propagation into the facility compared to external detonations. Tunnel layouts range from long, straight tunnels to various types of intersections, expansions, constrictions, chambers, rooms, alcoves, and multiple levels. All of these configurations affect the propagation of airblast.
Air blast propagation within a tunnel system has the potential to cause significant damage to critical equipment and systems. If the critical equipment within a facility can be damaged or destroyed, then the function of the facility can be degraded or destroyed, resulting in a functional kill. Depending on the purpose of the facility and the level of damage, a functional kill can be as permanent as a "structural kill," in which the facility is destroyed in a more traditional manner.
Functional kill from air blast loads is predicated on the ability to accurately determine the blast environment from an internal detonation. The response of critical equipment cannot be calculated without accurate blast loads. Unlike free-field blast loads, a detonation within a tunnel system can have a significant dynamic pressure component. This dynamic pressure component, in conjunction with the overpressure component, makes up the entire pressure-loading history necessary to predict component response.
Thermobaric compositions are fuel rich high explosives that are enhanced through aerobic combustion in the third detonation event. Performance enhancement is primarily achieved by addition of excess metals to the explosive composition. Aluminum and Magnesium are the primary metals of choice. The detonation of Composite Explosives can be viewed as three discrete events merged together. All three explosive events can be tailored to meet system performance needs:
1. The initial anaerobic detonation reaction, microseconds in duration, is primarily a redox reaction of molecular species. The initial detonation reaction defines the system’s high pressure performance characteristics: armor penetrating ability.
2. The post detonation anaerobic combustion reaction, hundreds of microseconds in duration, is primarily a combustion of fuel particles too large for combustion in the initial detonation wave. The post detonation anaerobic reaction define the system’s intermediate pressure performance characteristics: Wall/Bunker Breaching Capability.
3. The post detonation aerobic combustion reaction, milliseconds in duration, is the combustion of fuel rich species as the shock wave mixes with surrounding air. The post detonation aerobic reaction characteristics define the system’s personnel / material defeat capability: Impulse and Thermal Delivery. Aerobic combustion requires mixing with sufficient air to combust excess fuels. The shock wave pressures are less than 10 atmospheres. The majority of aerobic combustion energy is available as heat. Some low pressure shock wave enhancement can also be expected for personnel defeat. Personnel / material defeat with minimum collateral structure damage requires maximum aerobic enhancement and the highest energy practical fuel additives: Boron, Aluminum, Silicon, Titanium, Magnesium, Zirconium, Carbon, or Hydrocarbons.
Thermobaric materials can provide significantly higher total energy output than conventional high explosives. The majority of the additional energy is available as low pressure impulse and heat.
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Russia: A New Development in Naval Propulsion
Summary
An "accidental" news story on a local Russian municipality's Web site that has now been removed offers some intriguing possibilities for the future of Russian submarines.
Analysis
Details of a potential new "top-secret" Russian submarine were "accidentally" released by the municipal government of Sarov on Sept. 6. The story, published on the municipality's Web site, was removed Sept. 11, the day before Russian daily Kommersant (a paper friendly to the Kremlin) published the story. The Russian navy has denied any knowledge of the Project 20120 submarine. Politics and media faux pas aside, if true, the details of this new submarine could indicate an advance in Russian air-independent propulsion (AIP).
AIP is actually a series of technologies that seek to extend the submerged endurance of conventionally powered patrol submarines. From World War I to the present, conventional submarines have relied on a diesel-electric power plant. The diesel engine allows the boat to move efficiently on the surface or near the surface with a "snorkel" that cycles fresh air through the engine compartment. But to function quietly and without a snorkel running to the surface, the submarine switches to electrical power provided by a large bank of batteries. At slow speeds, a well-built and well-run patrol sub can be exceptionally quiet -- but its submerged endurance also is generally limited to less than a week.
Having seen two world wars and one Cold War, the diesel-electric system has been stretched more or less to its limits. Countries that have the technology and know-how have replaced it with nuclear propulsion. Some refinements continue to be made (for example, with Russia's latest -- and much more public -- conventional submarine, the St. Petersburg), but the limits of the method are apparent.
Both Germany and Sweden have already fielded combined diesel-electric and AIP systems. The German system uses hydrogen fuel cells while the Swedish Stirling design uses a closed-cycle diesel engine fed with liquid oxygen. These systems can be used to either run at a slow cruise of 5 to 6 knots or to charge the batteries. Both systems have more than doubled submerged endurance without the need for snorkeling; the German Bundeswehr U32 conducted a two-week transit using AIP in April 2006, and the Stirling system could have even longer endurance.
Russia has long been exploring AIP, and Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms export monopoly, has advertised "electrochemical" AIP as available for "follow-on installation" on its latest subs. But the mysterious Sarov news release could indicate that Russia has progressed further than many thought -- and in a different direction entirely -- with its own AIP system.
Sarov was once the secretive closed city Arzamas-16, also known as the Russian Los Alamos for its role in the Soviet nuclear weapons program. Though nuclear submarine construction is well-established at the Sevmash shipyards in Severodvinsk, Sarov could be a site for further research into the use of radioisotope thermoelectric generators (RTGs).
RTGs use the heat of radioactive decay from radioisotopes like plutonium-238 and strontium-90 to generate electricity. They are much simpler than full-fledged naval reactors and have been used to power remote lighthouses and weather stations as well as deep space probes unable to rely on solar energy.
However, there are technological hurdles that must be overcome. RTGs have been used predominantly in situations where wattage was not the limiting factor. Modern RTGs used on NASA probes produce hundreds of watts and are about the size and weight of a 120-pound person. But to use both German and Swedish systems as a benchmark, a magnitude of 200 to 300 kilowatts is necessary for AIP. Though much of this distance can be overcome by designing an RTG specifically for this purpose and then fitting multiple RTGs to the submarine, there is still a technological gap the Russians would have had to overcome.
The point is not how an RTG-based AIP would stack up against the German or Swedish methods; rather, the point is that an RTG is rather uniquely fitted to the Russian knowledge base -- and the Sarov locale.
Though not earth-shattering, a successful AIP uniquely suited to the Russian defense industry is a potentially significant development for the next generation of Russian patrol subs -- both for domestic coastal defense and export abroad.
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The Geopolitical Foundations of Blackwater
By George Friedman
For the past three weeks, Blackwater, a private security firm under contract to the U.S. State Department, has been under intense scrutiny over its operations in Iraq. The Blackwater controversy has highlighted the use of civilians for what appears to be combat or near-combat missions in Iraq. Moreover, it has raised two important questions: Who controls these private forces and to whom are they accountable?
The issue is neither unique to Blackwater nor to matters of combat. There have long been questions about the role of Halliburton and its former subsidiary, KBR, in providing support services to the military. The Iraq war has been fought with fewer active-duty troops than might have been expected, and a larger number of contractors relative to the number of troops. But how was the decision made in the first place to use U.S. nongovernmental personnel in a war zone? More important, how has that decision been implemented?
The United States has a long tradition of using private contractors in times of war. For example, it augmented its naval power in the early 19th century by contracting with privateers -- nongovernmental ships -- to carry out missions at sea. During the battle for Wake Island in 1941, U.S. contractors building an airstrip there were trapped by the Japanese fleet, and many fought alongside Marines and naval personnel. During the Civil War, civilians who accompanied the Union and Confederate armies carried out many of the supply functions. So, on one level, there is absolutely nothing new here. This has always been how the United States fights war.
Nevertheless, since before the fall of the Soviet Union, a systematic shift has been taking place in the way the U.S. force structure is designed. This shift, which is rooted both in military policy and in the geopolitical perception that future wars will be fought on a number of levels, made private security contractors such as KBR and Blackwater inevitable. The current situation is the result of three unique processes: the introduction of the professional volunteer military, the change in force structure after the Cold War, and finally the rethinking and redefinition of the term "noncombatant" following the decision to include women in the military, but bar them from direct combat roles.
The introduction of the professional volunteer military caused a rethinking of the role of the soldier, sailor, airman or Marine in the armed forces. Volunteers were part of the military because they chose to be. Unlike draftees, they had other options. During World War II and the first half of the Cold War, the military was built around draftees who were going to serve their required hitch and return to civilian life. Although many were not highly trained, they were quite suited for support roles, from KP to policing the grounds. After all, they already were on the payroll, and new hires were always possible.
In a volunteer army, the troops are expected to remain in the military much longer. Their training is more expensive -- thus their value is higher. Taking trained specialists who are serving at their own pleasure and forcing them to do menial labor over an extended period of time makes little sense either from a utilization or morale point of view. The concept emerged that the military's maintenance work should shift to civilians, and that in many cases the work should be outsourced to contractors. This tendency was reinforced during the Reagan administration, which, given its ideology, supported privatization as a way to make the volunteer army work. The result was a growth in the number of contractors taking over many of the duties that had been performed by soldiers during the years of conscription.
The second impetus was the end of the Cold War and a review carried out by then-Secretary of Defense Les Aspin under then-President Bill Clinton. The core argument was that it was irrational to maintain a standing military as large as had existed during the Cold War. Aspin argued for a more intensely technological military, one that would be less dependent on ground troops. The Air Force was key to this, while the Navy was downsized. The main consideration, however, was the structure of the standing Army -- especially when large-scale, high-intensity, long-term warfare no longer seemed a likely scenario.
The U.S. Army's active-duty component, in particular, was reduced. It was assumed that in time of war, components of the Reserves and National Guard would be mobilized, not so much to augment the standing military, but to carry out a range of specialized roles. For example, Civil Affairs, which has proven to be a critical specialization in Iraq and Afghanistan, was made a primary responsibility of the Reserves and National Guard, as were many engineering, military-intelligence and other specializations.
This plan was built around certain geopolitical assumptions. The first was that the United States would not be fighting peer powers. The second was that it had learned from Vietnam not to get involved in open-ended counterinsurgency operations, but to focus, as it did in Kuwait, on missions that were clearly defined and executable with a main force. The last was that wars would be short, use relatively few troops and be carried out in conjunction with allies. From this it followed that regular forces, augmented by Reserve/National Guard specialists called up for short terms, could carry out national strategic requirements.
The third impetus was the struggle to define military combat and noncombat roles. Given the nature of the volunteer force, women were badly needed, yet they were included in the armed forces under the assumption that they could carry out any function apart from direct combat assignments. This caused a forced -- and strained -- redefinition of these two roles. Intelligence officers called to interrogate a prisoner on the battlefield were thought not to be in a combat position. The same bomb, mortar or rocket fire that killed a soldier might hit them too, but since they technically were not charged with shooting back, they were not combat arms. Ironically, in Iraq, one of the most dangerous tasks is traveling on the roads, though moving supplies is not considered a combat mission.
Under the privatization concept, civilians could be hired to carry out noncombat functions. Under the redefinition of noncombat, the area open to contractors covered a lot of territory. Moreover, under the redefinition of the military in the 1990s, the size and structure of the Army in particular was changed so dramatically that it could not carry out most of its functions without the Reserve/Guard component -- and even with that component, the Army was not large enough. Contractors were needed.
Let us now add a fourth push: the CIA. During Vietnam, and again in Afghanistan and Iraq, a good part of the war was prosecuted by CIA personnel not in uniform and not answerable to the military chain of command. There are arguments on both sides for this, but the fact is that U.S. wars -- particularly highly politicized wars such as counterinsurgencies -- are fought with parallel armies, some reporting to the Defense Department, others to the CIA and other intelligence agencies. The battlefield is, if not flooded, at least full of civilians operating outside of the chain of command, and these civilian government employees are encouraged to hire Iraqi or other nationals, as well as to augment their own capabilities with private U.S. contractors.
Blackwater works for the State Department in a capacity defined as noncombat, protecting diplomats and other high-value personnel from assassination. The Army, bogged down in its own operations, lacks the manpower to perform this obviously valuable work. That means that Blackwater and other contract workers are charged with carrying weapons and moving around the battlefield, which is everywhere. They are heavily armed private soldiers carrying out missions that are combat in all but name -- and they are completely outside of the chain of command.
Moreover, in order to be effective, they have to engage in protective intelligence, looking for surveillance by enemy combatants and trying to foresee potential threats. We suspect the CIA could be helpful in this regard, but it would want information in return. In order to perform its job, then, Blackwater entered the economy of intelligence -- information as a commodity to be exchanged. It had to gather some intelligence in order to trade some. As a result, the distinction between combat and support completely broke down.
The important point is that the U.S. military went to war with the Army the country gave it. We recall no great objections to the downsizing of the military in the 1990s, and no criticisms of the concepts that lay behind the new force structure. The volunteer force, downsized because long-term conflicts were not going to occur, supported by the Reserve/Guard and backfilled by civilian contractors, was not a controversial issue. Only tiresome cranks made waves, challenging the idea that wars would be sparse and short. They objected to the redefinition of noncombat roles and said the downsized force would be insufficient for the 21st century.
Blackwater, KBR and all the rest are the direct result of the faulty geopolitical assumptions and the force structure decisions that followed. The primary responsibility rests with the American public, which made best-case assumptions in a worst-case world. Even without Iraq, civilian contractors would have proliferated on the battlefield. With Iraq, they became an enormous force. Perhaps the single greatest strategic error of the Bush administration was not fundamentally re-examining the assumptions about the U.S. Army on Sept. 12, 2001. Clearly Donald Rumsfeld was of the view that the Army was the problem, not the solution. He was not going to push for a larger force and, therefore, as the war expanded, for fewer civilian contractors.
The central problem regarding private security contractors on the battlefield is that their place in the chain of command is not defined. They report to the State Department, not to the Army and Marines that own the battlefield. But who do they take orders from and who defines their mission? Do they operate under the Uniform Code of Military Justice or under some other rule? They are warriors -- it is foolish to think otherwise -- but they do not wear the uniform. The problem with Blackwater stems from having multiple forces fighting for the same side on the same battlefield, with completely different chains of command. Indeed, it is not clear the extent to which the State Department has created a command structure for its contractors, whether it is capable of doing so, or whether the contractors have created their own chain of command.
Blackwater is the logical outcome of a set of erroneous geopolitical conclusions that predate these wars by more than a decade. The United States will be fighting multidivisional, open-ended wars in multiple theaters, and there will be counterinsurgencies. The force created in the 1990s is insufficient, and thus the definition of noncombat specialty has become meaningless. The Reserve/Guard component cannot fill the gap created by strategic errors. The hiring of contractors makes sense and has precedence. But the use of CIA personnel outside the military chain of command creates enough stress. To have private contractors reporting outside the chain of command to government entities not able to command them is the real problem.
A failure that is rooted in the national consensus of the 1990s was compounded by the Bush administration's failure to reshape the military for the realities of the wars it wished to fight. But the final failure was to follow the logic of the civilian contractors through to its end, but not include them in the unified chain of command. In war, the key question must be this: Who gives orders and who takes them? The battlefield is dangerous enough without that question left hanging.
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CHINA, ISRAEL, RUSSIA: China will sell Iran 24 J-10 fighters that are based on Israeli technology, RIA Novosti reported Oct. 23. The aircraft have Russian-made engines and are based on components and technology Israel gave China after the cancellation of the Lavi project in the mid-1980s. The total cost of the planes, which are expected to be delivered between 2008 and 2010, is an estimated $1 billion.
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Geopolitical Diary: The Russo-Japanese NMD Dispute
For several months, the Russian government has focused its propaganda machine on combating U.S. efforts to develop an anti-ballistic missile network around the Russian periphery. Moscow views such systems at their core as an effort by Washington to nullify the Russian nuclear deterrent and therefore to sweep Russia to the very edge of strategic relevance.
In the past few days, however, Russia's attention has come to rest on Japan -- the state that is most consistent in its effort to participate in national missile defense (NMD) -- and on Tuesday, the Japanese government flatly, officially and firmly rebuffed Russian calls to abandon the system. The core Russian concern is that the system ultimately will be fine-tuned and expanded so that it can hedge in Moscow -- something that may well be lurking about in the depths of U.S. strategic planning. But Japan wants NMD for its own reasons.
While Japan's imperial past gives the country some influence throughout East Asia, it mostly has earned Japan enmity. Particularly vitriolic is the contempt in which Japan is held by the Koreans -- who resent Japanese cultural influence, economic domination and attempts to forcibly redefine Korean identity during the Japanese occupation. North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan in 1998 in a show of force, and in 2006, Pyongyang tested a nuclear device. Marry those two technologies and Japan clearly has a pressing need for NMD -- and this is even before the economic might of South Korea is combined with North Korean military technology in a reunification that is crawling ever closer.
China, of course, offers a more direct and immediate challenge. As big as Asia is, it probably does not have room for both a land-based and a sea-based regional superpower. Japan's technological edge combined with China's existing nuclear arsenal leaves Japan pushing for NMD, no matter what the Russians do.
But even without the more pressing concern of Asia pushing Japan toward NMD cooperation with the United States, Russia is on Tokyo's radar. The two hardly have a friendly history: Japan has served as Washington's proxy in East Asia, blocking Soviet access to the Pacific. Russia still has not reached a peace accord with Japan -- for World War II. And before that, Japan defeated Moscow in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War, becoming the only Asian state to defeat a European power and inflicting the geopolitical equivalent of a root canal.
The Kremlin is attempting to put pins in a number of potential conflicts in order to focus on its own immediate concerns. But so far as Japan is concerned, Russia remains firmly on the "future trouble" list.
Situation Reports
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Insurgent Sniping In Iraq
A look at how the insurgents are operating and their weapons
By David Fortier
It was only a matter of time before the insurgents in Iraq began to realize the potential of properly employed snipers.
Although U.S. troops have faced snipers in Iraq for years, as of late the danger posed by Jihadist snipers has been growing. Photo by Emily K. Fortier
In stark contrast to merely rattling away with a Kalashnikov in the direction of the infidels—in the belief that “If Allah wills it,” the bullets will fly true”—in recent months insurgent snipers have been more successful at dropping American troops with carefully aimed rifle fire.
In doing so, they have made the lives of our fighting men much more dangerous and stressful. While not classically trained in the Western sense, this new crop of insurgent snipers has nonetheless proven to be adept at firing one well-aimed shot and then displacing before they are located. News of the growing threat of insurgent snipers first spread on the Internet and eventually became a feature story on the front page of the New York Times. As the threat is indeed very real, I felt that it is an appropriate time to share some information I have collected over the past few years, along with my own thoughts on the matter.
As Americans, we have our own opinions on what constitutes both a sniper and sniping. Our Western view demands that a real sniper be school trained in the classical sense. Equipped with a heavy-barreled, bolt-action precision rifle topped with a high-magnification optic, he has the ability to reach 1,000 yards or more. He is trained to estimate distances, read wind/mirage and drills hitting targets far beyond the range of an ordinary rifleman. In addition, his stealth and fieldcraft skills are carefully honed to the point that, properly “ghillied up,” he can move virtually unseen. The end result is a warrior with the ability to spot and engage targets at astonishing distances while remaining undetected. In the Western mind, the longer the successful shot, the more impressive the sniper.
One sniper rifle very commonly employed by insurgent snipers is the Romanian PSL. A simple design, it is capable of acceptable accuracy. Photo by Emily K. Fortier
While there is nothing wrong with this now-traditional Western view, in reality it is just one take on sniping. Keep in mind, the nuts and bolts of sniping is to merely eliminate key targets and/or demoralize and drive fear into the enemy through the use of a rifle. While sniping equipment has changed drastically over the years, the art itself is the same as it was 100 years ago. Its crux is to locate a target without being seen, eliminate it with a single well-placed shot that seems to come from nowhere, then disappear, leaving a frustrated enemy behind who does not know where/when you will strike next. The insurgents in Iraq, despite their deficiencies in equipment and training, have learned to do just that.
How have they managed to accomplish this? Simply put, they have decided not to play by our rules, and in doing so they have turned their weakness into strength. Rather than trying to snipe at our troops at long range, they have instead elected to dramatically close the distance. Through stealth and subterfuge, the Jihadists are often closing with their targets to increase the probability of a successful shot. This allows them to ensure a hit on their chosen target, place their round to bypass our troops’ body-armor hardplates and film the shooting for propaganda purposes.
Spotted while attempting to collect information, an insurgent sniper team using this car was killed by Marine snipers. Note the video camera and captured M40A1 sniper rifle. Photo courtesy of the USMC
One method they have been employing successfully in urban areas is to use a vehicle as a mobile hide. This allows them to move undetected into position to take a shot, then immediately afterward disappear unnoticed into traffic. Typically, a car is modified to both hide the shooter and provide him with a firing/observation port. As an example, in one case a vehicle was disguised to look like it was simply transporting rolled-up blankets. Loaded with these, it could pass through a checkpoint after a quick once-over, as the soldiers/police wouldn’t make the driver unload his entire cargo.
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However, beneath the blanket cargo was a hidden space containing a sniper with his weapon. A string allowed him to lower/raise one side of the rear bumper. With the bumper lowered, a hole cut in the car’s bodywork provided a port for the sniper to observe and fire from. In another instance a car was modified by having a hidden compartment added beneath the floor/trunk, between the frame rails.
Another sniper rifle fielded by the insurgents is the 7.62x39mm Tabuk. Built in Iraq with Serb assistance, it is a simple DMR based upon the RPK. Photo courtesy of LTC Kendrick McCormick
This was just large enough to allow a sniper to lie in it with his rifle. Sometimes a tail light will be removed or modified to provide an observation/firing port for a hidden sniper.
When using this method, the driver, who also acts as the spotter, plays an important role. As the sniper has a very limited field of view/fire, the driver must locate the target and then maneuver the car, without being noticed, to provide a clear shot for the sniper. In some instances, once the car is parked the driver will exit the vehicle and stand next to the trunk, where he can observe the area while speaking to the sniper hidden in the vehicle.
There have been occasions in which a third insurgent is used to bring a soldier into the kill zone. As an example, an insurgent posing as a good Samaritan may point out an IED to a patrol to funnel them into the kill zone. Shots of this type are usually taken at very close range with substantial traffic and civilians in the area. This makes it very difficult to locate where the shot came from or to return fire.
Marine Cpl. Daniel M. Greenwald survived being shot in the head thanks to his Kevlar helmet. Photo courtesy of the USMC
The insurgents then choose a specific target. These include, in order of importance to the enemy:
Our snipers. The main threat to a sniper is always another sniper.
Humvee gunners. They can lay down a lot of hate and discontent in a very short amount of time.
Medics. If they shoot the medic, there is no one to treat him or anyone else they shoot.
Chaplains. The insurgents offer a $10,000 bounty for killing a U.S. military religious leader.
Interpreters. This hinders the unit’s ability to interact and gain information from the locals.
Radiomen. This hinders the unit’s ability to communicate, pass on information and request medical assistance.
Leaders. This degrades the unit’s performance and ability to react by removing the men in charge.
All of these targets are easily identified. If a head shot is required, such as on a Humvee gunner sitting behind an armored gunshield, the insurgents will often attempt to get within 50 meters. This allows them to place the shot, even with a 7.62x39mm Tabuk, with surgical accuracy, ensuring a kill. If a body shot is chosen the sniper will aim to by-pass his target’s body armor SAPI hardplates, as these are capable of stopping his round.
Insurgents also improvise sniper rifles and sound suppressors. In this case a Mauser M98 has been fitted with a PSO-1 scope and a home-made suppressor. Photo courtesy of the USMC
To do this, he will shoot a man standing sideways to him in the upper arm. The round will perforate the arm before entering the torso in the region of the armpit. Such a shot will bypass body armor while hitting one or both lungs and possibly the heart. If making such a shot is not possible, the sniper will aim at the center of mass. If the target’s hardplate is not struck, his round will easily penetrate the surrounding Level IIIA soft body armor.
However, if the round is stopped by his target’s hardplate, the sniper hopes the shock of getting shot will at least cause his target to fall down. Insurgent snipers normally videotape their shots for propaganda purposes. So if an American soldier falls down after being shot in his SAPI plate, even if he gets back up it is still useful for propaganda purposes on the Internet.
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As an example, Marine L/Cpl Edward Knuth was hit in his SAPI plate while his squad searched a market. Although the bullet was stopped, the impact knocked him to his knees. Another Marine dragged him to cover, then his unit rushed a line of cars, but the sniper had escaped.
Three common 7.62x54R sniper rifles seen in the hands of insurgent snipers in Iraq are, left to right, the Soviet SVD, Iraqi Al Kadesih and Romanian PSL. Photo by Emily K. Fortier
After the shot is taken the sniper team’s vehicle will casually pull out into traffic. In doing so, it will disappear before the target’s comrades even realize what just happened. A spotter, often riding on a Moped to enable him to move easily through traffic, then searches for a new target. When he locates one, he contacts the sniper team and the cycle begins again.
A Jihadist sniper operating in such a manner was recently killed in Baghdad. Luckily, he aroused the suspicion of an American sniper team he was preparing to engage. In the ensuing exchange, the Muslim got off the first shot but missed at a range of 225 yards. The American sniper put an end to the Jihadist’s career by punching a 175-grain Sierra MatchKing through the rear quarterpanel of the car, killing him.
Another Jihadist sniper operating in the Baghdad area plied his trade shooting from overpasses at oncoming military vehicles. An above-average rifleman, he was quite successful for a time in this fashion. His method was fairly simple. He would note what route a convoy or patrol would use in a particular area and pick his position accordingly.
Insurgent snipers try to carefully choose their targets for maximum effect. High on their list are medics, chaplains, interpreters, radiomen, leaders and heavy-weapon operators. Photo courtesy of the USMC
He would choose an overpass that the convoy/patrol would travel directly beneath. Then, as the convoy/patrol approached he would pick out a specific vehicle and fire a single shot at the driver at a range of approximately 150 meters. Considering the angle, speed of the target and deflection from the windshield, this particular sniper was fairly skilled with a rifle. I was told he killed 10 of our soldiers, including four headshots in a single-day, using this method. Equipped with a commercial Remington 700 hunting rifle in .308 Winchester, he was subsequently killed by U.S. forces.
On November 3, 2006, northwest of Baghdad in Karma, Iraq, a Jihadist sniper struck a patrol from the Second Battalion, Eighth Marines. After letting one fire team pass through his kill zone, he placed his scope’s aiming chevron on the right biceps of L/Cpl Juan Valdez-Castillo, the unit’s radio operator. At the shot, Valdez-Castillo fell heavily against a stone wall. The 7.62mm round passed through his right upper arm; entered his side, collapsing his lung; and exited his back.
Upon seeing one of his men down, the unit’s squad leader, Sgt. Jesse E. Leach, sprang forward. Disregarding his own safety, he entered the kill zone, grabbed Valdez-Castillo’s drag handle and hauled him through ankle-deep mud to safety.
With some concealment between them and the sniper, Sgt. Leach administered first aid, and Valdez-Castillo was safely evacuated. The insurgent fired from a distance of not less than 150 meters from an area with numerous civilians in it. He fired a single round, hit exactly at his point of aim and refused to compromise his position by firing more than one shot. After firing, he displaced to a different location and was not found.
A Marine sniper team hunts terrorists in Iraq. Although insurgent snipers are growing more effective, our boys continue to hunt them down and kill them. Photo courtesy of the USMC
The vast majority of shots taken by insurgent snipers in Iraq are at targets within 400 meters. While this may seem relatively short, it is actually in line with sniper actions during both world wars. The shorter ranges also favor the sniper rifles and optics commonly available to the insurgents.
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They have fielded a wide array of rifles, including Russian SVDs, Romanian PSLs, domestic Al Kadesihs and Tabuks along with commercial sporting rifles and captured American sniper rifles. For the most part, the SVD, PSL, Al Kadesih and 7.62x39mm Tabuk are not noted for their sterling accuracy. However, inside 400 meters they can be quite deadly.
Items captured from a Jihadist sniper team’s vehicle included a Bushnell laser rangefinder, P35 pistol, grenade and video camera used for intelligence gathering and propaganda. Photo courtesy of the USMC
Optics usually consist of Romanian I.O.R., Yugoslavian Zrak and Chinese PSO-1s with a magnification of 4X. Offering the same magnification as our ACOG, these scopes work quite well at this distance. Indexing a man’s head with their chevron reticle is easily accomplished at 300 meters. So, considering the equipment they have, the urban terrain they are operating in and our troops’ body armor, it makes no sense for the insurgents not to close the distance if they are able.
The insurgents have used an array of 7.62x54R ammunition against our troops. Loads identified as currently being used by insurgent snipers against our troops in Iraq include:
7N1 sniper ammunition. This is a dedicated sniper load developed by the Soviets for their SVD sniper rifle. Loaded with a 152-grain bullet, it has a muzzle velocity of 2,723 fps. This ammunition can only be identified by its packaging, which is clearly marked “SNIPER.”
Jihadist snipers will often choose firing positions shielded by civilians/children to prevent our troops from returning fire. Photo courtesy of the 3/7th Cav.
7N13. This is a steel-core ball round capable of penetrating a 10mm-thick grade-2P steel plate 90 percent of the time at 250 meters and 25 percent of the time at 300 meters.
7B-Z-3 (B-32) API. This is a 165-grain Armor Piercing Incendiary round with a muzzle velocity of 2,673 fps. It is claimed to be cable of penetrating a 10mm-thick grade-2P armor plate 80 percent of the time at 200 meters. B-32 cartridges are identified by a color code consisting of a red band beneath a black bullet tip.
7T2M (T-46) Tracer. This is a 152-grain Tracer load with a muzzle velocity of 2,642 fps. It can be identified by a green color code on the bullet tip.
To provide a higher probability of defeating our troops’ body armor, insurgent snipers often use 7.62x54R Armor Piercing and Armor Piercing Incendiary ammunition. A Special Forces friend commented that every PSL magazine they had captured had been loaded with straight API. I noted that one such captured cartridge he gave me was loaded by Russia’s Factory 17 (Barnaul) in 1981. On November 2, 2006, an insurgent sniper used a 7.62x54R AP round to knock L/Cpl Colin Smith from behind his machine-gun turret.
Although everything appears peaceful here, an insurgent sniper could be lurking in one of the cars, behind a window or on a rooftop. Photo courtesy of Dillard Johnson
Smith’s unit was leaving a rural settlement on the edge of Karma, near Fallujah in Iraq’s Anbar Province. They were climbing back into their vehicles after searching several houses when a single shot rang out. Smith, who was peering from behind a gun shield, was hit in the head. The 7.62mm AP round penetrated his Kevlar, passed through his skull and was recovered. Although Smith survived, he fell into a coma. The sniper took the shot from a minimum of 150 yards away using a canal as an obstacle. After firing the shot, he disappeared.
In addition to the 7.62x54R sniper rifles, the insurgents also field 7.62x39mm Tabuks. A domestically produced long-barreled Kalashnikov DMR, the Tabuk was manufactured with assistance from the Serb arms manufacturer Zastava. A friend, LTC Kendrick McCormick, while training Iraqi forces in Iraq, tested an example in unfired condition and shared his results with me.
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Firing prone off sandbags at 100 meters using a Russian 6x42mm scope and Chinese-produced steel-core ball ammunition manufactured by Factory 9141 in 1979, he found the weapon capable of posting consistent two-inch groups. He felt that hitting a man-size target at 400 meters would be well within the capabilities of the weapon in the hands of an experienced shooter. This is quite acceptable accuracy for a weapon of this type. Ammunition in this caliber commonly used by insurgent snipers is standard M43-type steel-core ball. Exterior ballistics of this round are fairly poor, so it is best deployed at relatively short ranges.
Despite making a good shot, a sniper failed to kill Marine Pfc. Joshua Hanson when his 7.62mm bullet was stopped by Hanson’s SAPI plate. Photo courtesy of the USMC
In addition to the common Iraqi, there are also experienced foreign snipers operating with the insurgents, some of whom are quite good. The most talked about are the Chechens. Highly regarded due to their experience fighting the Federal Russian Army, they are a dangerous foe. Remember, a Jihad is being waged against the West by radical Muslims, so Jihadists may be of any nationality. As an example, SFC Dillard Johnson and SSG Jared Kennedy of C Troop 3/7 Cav engaged in a duel with an enemy sniper in Salman Pak on December 14, 2005.
At a range of 852 meters, the insurgent put a 7.62x54R round within six inches of SFC Johnson’s head. Smacking on the wall behind him, the round forced him to crawl to another position. Luckily, Johnson was able to locate the insurgent’s position and replied with an M14-based DMR. Adjusting his fire, Johnson hit him with his second shot, while SSG Kennedy killed the insurgent’s spotter with a bigbore Barrett rifle. The insurgent sniper SFC Johnson killed was not Iraqi but rather Syrian. Equipped with a Romanian PSL topped with a commercial German scope, he was suspected of killing more than 20 coalition soldiers.
One important aspect of the Jihadist sniping strategy that should not be overlooked is their value for propaganda purposes. It is the norm for Jihadist snipers in Iraq to videotape their operations for propaganda use on the Internet. Their desire is to arouse coverage by the international media. A friend currently working in Iraq made the comment, “They don’t care about killing soldiers as much as they want the publicity. They want their five minutes of fame to get their message out. Remember, propaganda is the terrorist’s friend.”
(Left) Insurgents often use API ammunition, identified with a black-and-red tip, to enhance their chance of defeating our troops’ body armor. (Right) The 7.62x54R round, in its various loadings, is the workhorse cartridge for insurgent snipers in Iraq. The cartridge shown is a 7N1 sniper load. Photos by Emily K. Fortier
That they are indeed starting to get their message out can be seen by the article “Sniper Attacks Adding Peril to U.S. Troops in Iraq” on the front page of the New York Times published just three days before the November 2006 election. Most of the world believes Americans have a very short attention span and no stomach for body bags. The Jihadists believe that if, having survived the initial U.S. military onslaught, they can successfully play the Vietnam card by keeping U.S. casualties in the news, the American public will cave and they will win. Snipers, especially with the recent Democrat victory, are becoming an important part of this strategy.
Gunners on armored vehicles are favorite targets of insurgent snipers, who attempt to get close enough to take a head shot. Photo courtesy of the U.S. Army
Although our enemy is using snipers to a larger and more effective extent then previously, the problem is not something our military cannot handle. In actuality, our troops have been doggedly hunting them down and killing them. Just today I spoke via telephone with one of our snipers in Iraq. He had recently engaged in a duel with three Islamic snipers and killed all of them. Although his story is not one you will see in the liberal media, you can be proud to know our troops are quietly going about their work, making the world a better place for all of us, 175 grains at a time.
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The uninvited guest: Chinese sub pops up in middle of U.S. Navy exercise, leaving military chiefs red-faced
The forum where I found this had one poster say that this happend last year. If so, I missed it at that time.
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By MATTHEW HICKLEY - More by this author » Last updated at 00:13am on 10th November 2007
When the U.S. Navy deploys a battle fleet on exercises, it takes the security of its aircraft carriers very seriously indeed.
At least a dozen warships provide a physical guard while the technical wizardry of the world's only military superpower offers an invisible shield to detect and deter any intruders.
That is the theory. Or, rather, was the theory.
American military chiefs have been left dumbstruck by an undetected Chinese submarine popping up at the heart of a recent Pacific exercise and close to the vast U.S.S. Kitty Hawk - a 1,000ft supercarrier with 4,500 personnel on board.
By the time it surfaced the 160ft Song Class diesel-electric attack submarine is understood to have sailed within viable range for launching torpedoes or missiles at the carrier.
According to senior Nato officials the incident caused consternation in the U.S. Navy.
The Americans had no idea China's fast-growing submarine fleet had reached such a level of sophistication, or that it posed such a threat.
One Nato figure said the effect was "as big a shock as the Russians launching Sputnik" - a reference to the Soviet Union's first orbiting satellite in 1957 which marked the start of the space age.
The incident, which took place in the ocean between southern Japan and Taiwan, is a major embarrassment for the Pentagon.
The lone Chinese vessel slipped past at least a dozen other American warships which were supposed to protect the carrier from hostile aircraft or submarines.
And the rest of the costly defensive screen, which usually includes at least two U.S. submarines, was also apparently unable to detect it.
According to the Nato source, the encounter has forced a serious re-think of American and Nato naval strategy as commanders reconsider the level of threat from potentially hostile Chinese submarines.
It also led to tense diplomatic exchanges, with shaken American diplomats demanding to know why the submarine was "shadowing" the U.S. fleet while Beijing pleaded ignorance and dismissed the affair as coincidence.
Analysts believe Beijing was sending a message to America and the West demonstrating its rapidly-growing military capability to threaten foreign powers which try to interfere in its "backyard".
The People's Liberation Army Navy's submarine fleet includes at least two nuclear-missile launching vessels.
Its 13 Song Class submarines are extremely quiet and difficult to detect when running on electric motors.
Commodore Stephen Saunders, editor of Jane's Fighting Ships, and a former Royal Navy anti-submarine specialist, said the U.S. had paid relatively little attention to this form of warfare since the end of the Cold War.
He said: "It was certainly a wake-up call for the Americans.
"It would tie in with what we see the Chinese trying to do, which appears to be to deter the Americans from interfering or operating in their backyard, particularly in relation to Taiwan."
In January China carried a successful missile test, shooting down a satellite in orbit for the first time.
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http://blog.wired.com/defense/2007/11/video-fix-super.html
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Why TR Claimed the Seas
WSJ
December 18, 2007; Page A20
On Dec. 16, 1907, the 16 battleships of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet sailed from Hampton Roads, Va., on a 43,000-mile journey around the world. The occasion was immediately understood as Teddy Roosevelt's way of declaring that the United States, already an economic superpower, was also a military one. Unnoticed by most Americans, this past Sunday marked its centennial.
There is an enduring, bipartisan strain in American politics (think Ron Paul and Dennis Kucinich) that wishes to forgo the military role. As wonderfully recounted by Jim Rasenberger in "America 1908," the voyage of the Great White Fleet, as it was popularly known, was energetically opposed by members of Congress, who sought to cut off its funding when it was halfway around the world. Sound familiar? Mark Twain considered the venture as further evidence that TR was "clearly insane . . . and insanest upon war and its supreme glories."
Teddy Roosevelt addresses sailors of the Great White Fleet, February 1909.
In fact, Roosevelt had sound strategic reasons for putting the fleet to sea. A year earlier, the British had commissioned their revolutionary Dreadnought battleship, setting off an arms race with Germany that helped set Europe on a course to World War I. Labor riots against Japanese immigrants in California had strained relations with Japan, whose dramatic naval victory over Russia at the battle of Tsushima had made the rest of the world keenly aware of this rising Asian power.
"Nearly every day fresh bulletins of sinister Japanese maneuvers appeared in the European and American press," writes Mr. Rasenberger, including rumors of thousands of Japanese troops disguised as Mexican peasants, "preparing to attack America." Roosevelt himself later explained that he had "become uncomfortably conscious of a very, very slight undertone of veiled truculence" from the Japanese. "It was time for a show down."
The voyage itself was fraught with risk. By shifting the bulk of America's naval might to the Pacific, Roosevelt left the Eastern seaboard largely undefended. Slight miscalculations on the first leg of the journey nearly left the fleet without enough coal to reach South America. The transit through the Straits of Magellan (the Panama Canal would not open until 1914) could have crippled any one of the ships and sunk the entire enterprise. There were serious worries the Japanese would sink the fleet at anchor in Yokohama. The fear was compounded by the discovery that the armor belt of the battleships, fully laden with men and stores, dropped several inches below the waterline.
The fears turned out to be misplaced. Journalists embedded in the fleet used primitive wireless devices to report rapturous public receptions everywhere from Rio de Janeiro to Sydney to Marseilles. The fleet crowned itself in further glory when it provided disaster relief in Messina, Sicily, after a devastating earthquake. The tradition would live on in U.S. Navy relief operations, most recently in Indonesia and Bangladesh.
Perhaps the greatest surprise were the supposedly hostile Japanese, who greeted the visiting fleet with an honor guard of 16 companion battleships and crowds of Japanese waving American flags. "The Japanese nation," the mayor of Tokyo told Rear Adm. Charles Sperry, "asks you to convey the message that the Japanese believe that war between Japan and America would be a crime against the past, present and future of the two countries."
From the perspective of a half-century, the mayor's assurances may have seemed bitterly hollow, but the arrival of the American fleet was followed four years later by Japan's first real experience of democracy and two years after that with Japan's entry into World War I on the Allied side. Plainly, no similar impression was made by the fleet on the Europeans, and one wonders what might have been if Germany, which so consistently underrated American power, had had a closer look at it. A prewar "entangling alliance" between the U.S., Britain and France might also have dissuaded Berlin from marching toward the Marne.
Yet if there was a lesson here, it was lost to the U.S. during the interwar period. Just 13 years after the Great White Fleet returned to the U.S., it was physically scrapped under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, which set strict limits on the number and size of battleships the major powers could build and deploy. Only after Pearl Harbor and World War II did Americans really seem to learn the lesson that their position as a maritime power could not be wished away, and that their maritime interests could only be defended by a powerful Navy.
That remains no less true today, even as the Navy goes through something of an identity crisis. America's wars have become up-country affairs, and the big ships of our blue-water Navy are not quite adapted to brown-green waters where today's conflicts are likely to take place. John McCain, whose grandfather sailed with the fleet (and was among the officers pictured here listening to Roosevelt), recently complained to The Wall Street Journal about the huge cost overruns in the development of a new generation of so-called Littoral Combat Ships.
Whatever the procurement problems or tactical issues, a supremely powerful Navy is not a luxury the U.S. can safely dispense with. In September, ships of the People's Liberation Army Navy made their first-ever port calls in Germany, France, Britain and Italy, and Chinese admirals are frequent guests on American warships. "The Chinese Great White Fleet is not too far off on the horizon," says a senior Navy official in a recent conversation.
China's current rise, like America's a century ago, is not something anyone can stop. It can be steered. Making sure our vision for the Navy stays true to Teddy Roosevelt's is one way of ensuring the Chinese don't make the mistake of steering it our way.
• Write to bstephens@wsj.com
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http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/1...sttest_071217/
news/2007/12/army_carbine_dusttest_071217
Newer carbines outperform M4 in dust test
By Matthew Cox - Staff writer
Posted : Monday Dec 17, 2007 9:25:16 EST
The M4 carbine, the weapon soldiers depend on in combat, finished last in a recent “extreme dust test” to demonstrate the M4’s reliability compared to three newer carbines.
Weapons officials at the Army Test and Evaluation Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., exposed Colt Defense LLC’s M4, along with the Heckler & Koch XM8, FNH USA’s Special Operations Forces Combat Assault Rifle and the H&K 416 to sandstorm conditions from late September to late November, firing 6,000 rounds through each test weapon.
When the test was completed, ATEC officials found that the M4 performed “significantly worse” than the other three weapons, sources told Army Times.
Officials tested 10 each of the four carbine models, firing a total of 60,000 rounds per model. Here’s how they ranked, according to the total number of times each model stopped firing:
• XM8: 127 stoppages.
• MK16 SCAR Light: 226 stoppages.
• 416: 233 stoppages.
• M4: 882 stoppages.
the results of the test were “a wake-up call,” but Army officials continue to stand by the current carbine, said Brig. Gen. Mark Brown, commander of Program Executive Office Soldier, the command that is responsible for equipping soldiers.
“We take the results of this test with a great deal of interest and seriousness,” Brown said, expressing his determination to outfit soldiers with the best equipment possible.
The test results did not sway the Army’s faith in the M4, he said.
“Everybody in the Army has high confidence in this weapon,” Brown said.
Lighter and more compact than the M16 rifle, the M4 is more effective for the close confines of urban combat. The Army began fielding the M4 in the mid-1990s.
Army weapons officials agreed to perform the test at the request of Sen. Tom Coburn, R-Okla., in July. Coburn took up the issue following a Feb. 26 Army Times report on moves by elite Army combat forces to ditch the M4 in favor of carbines they consider more reliable. Coburn is questioning the Army’s plans to spend $375 million to purchase M4s through fiscal 2009.
Coburn raised concerns over the M4’s “long-standing reliability” problems in an April 12 letter and asked if the Army had considered newer, possibly better weapons available on the commercial market.
John Hart, a spokesman for Coburn, who was traveling, said the senator was reviewing the test results and had yet to discuss it with the Army.
The M4, like its predecessor, the M16, uses a gas tube system, which relies on the gas created when a bullet is fired to cycle the weapon. Some weapons experts maintain the M4’s system of blowing gas directly into the firing mechanism of the weapon spews carbon residue that can lead to fouling and heat that dries up lubrication, causing excessive wear on parts.
The other contenders in the dust test — the XM8, SCAR and 416 — use a piston-style operating system, which relies on a gas-driven piston rod to cycle the weapon during firing. The gas is vented without funneling through the firing mechanism.
The Army’s Delta Force replaced its M4s with the H&K 416 in 2004 after tests revealed that the piston operating system significantly reduces malfunctions while increasing the life of parts. The elite unit collaborated with the German arms maker to develop the new carbine.
U.S. Special Operations Command has also revised its small-arms requirements. In November 2004, SOCom awarded a developmental contract to FN Herstal to develop its new SCAR to replace its weapons from the M16 family.
And from 2002 to 2005, the Army developed the XM8 as a replacement for the Army’s M16 family. The program led to infighting within the service’s weapons community and eventually died after failing to win approval at the Defense Department level.
How they were tested
The recent Aberdeen dust test used 10 sample models of each weapon. Before going into the dust chamber, testers applied a heavy coat of lubrication to each weapon. Each weapon’s muzzle was capped and ejection port cover closed.
Testers exposed the weapons to a heavy dust environment for 30 minutes before firing 120 rounds from each.
The weapons were then put back in the dust chamber for another 30 minutes and fired another 120 rounds. This sequence was repeated until each weapon had fired 600 rounds.
Testers then wiped down each weapon and applied another heavy application of lubrication.
The weapons were put back through the same sequence of 30 minutes in the dust chamber followed by firing 120 rounds from each weapon until another 600 rounds were fired.
Testers then thoroughly cleaned each weapon, re-lubricated each, and began the dusting and fire sequencing again.
This process was repeated until testers fired 6,000 rounds through each weapon.
The dust test exposed the weapons to the same extreme dust and sand conditions that Army weapons officials subjected the M4 and M16 to during a “systems assessment” at Aberdeen last year and again this summer. The results of the second round of ATEC tests showed that the performance of the M4s dramatically improved when testers increased the amount of lubrication used.
Out of the 60,000 rounds fired in the tests earlier in the summer, the 10 M4s tested had 307 stoppages, test results show, far fewer than the 882 in the most recent test.
in the recent tests, the M4 suffered 643 weapon-related stoppages, such as failure to eject or failure to extract fired casings, and 239 magazine-related stoppages.
Colt officials had not seen the test report and would not comment for this story, said James Battaglini, executive vice president for Colt Defense LLC, on Dec. 14.
Army officials are concerned about the gap between the two tests becaus the “test conditions for test two and three were ostensibly the same,” Brown said.
There were, however, minor differences in the two tests because they were conducted at different times of the year with different test officials, Brown said. Test community officials are analyzing the data to try to explain why the M4 performed worse during this test.
Weapons officials pointed out that these tests were conducted in extreme conditions that did not address “reliability in typical operational conditions,” the test report states.
Despite the last-place showing, Army officials say there is no movement toward replacing the M4.
The Army wants its next soldier weapon to be a true leap ahead, rather than a series of small improvements, Brown said.
“That is what the intent is,” he said, “to give our soldiers the very best and we are not going to rest until we do that.”
Col. Robert Radcliffe, head of the Directorate of Combat Developments for the Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Ga., said the test results will be considered as the Army continues to search for ways to improve soldier weapons.
For now, he said the Army will stick with the M4, because soldier surveys from Iraq and Afghanistan continue to highlight the weapon’s popularity among troops in the combat zone.
“The M4 is performing for them in combat, and it does what they needed to do in combat,” Radcliffe said.
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Marx wrote of the last capitalist selling the rope to the executioner who would hang him, or something to that effect. :x
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Eased Rules on Tech Sales to China Questioned
NY Times
By STEVEN R. WEISMAN
Published: January 2, 2008
WASHINGTON — Six months ago, the Bush administration quietly eased some restrictions on the export of politically delicate technologies to China. The new approach was intended to help American companies increase sales of high-tech equipment to China despite tight curbs on sharing technology that might have military applications.
But today the administration is facing questions from weapons experts about whether some equipment — newly authorized for export to Chinese companies deemed trustworthy by Washington — could instead end up helping China modernize its military. Equally worrisome, the weapons experts say, is the possibility that China could share the technology with Iran or Syria.
The technologies include advanced aircraft engine parts, navigation systems, telecommunications equipment and sophisticated composite materials.
The questions raised about the new policy are in a report to be released this week by the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, an independent research foundation that opposes the spread of arms technologies.
The administration’s new approach is part of an overall drive to require licenses for the export of an expanded list of technologies in aircraft engines, lasers, telecommunications, aircraft materials and other fields of interest to China’s military.
But while imposing license requirements for the transfer of these technologies, the administration is also validating certain Chinese companies that may import these technologies without licenses.
Five such companies were designated in October, but as many as a dozen others are in the pipeline for possible future designation.
Mario Mancuso, under secretary of Commerce for industry and security, said the new system of broadening the list of technologies that require licenses, but exempting some trustworthy companies from the license requirement, results in more effective protections.
“We believe that the system we have set up ensures that we are protecting our national security consistent with our goal of promoting legitimate exports for civilian use,” he said in an interview. “We have adopted a consistent, broad-based approach to hedging against helping China’s military modernization.”
But the Wisconsin Project report, made available to The New York Times, asserts that two nonmilitary Chinese companies designated as trustworthy are in fact high risk because of links to the Chinese government, the People’s Liberation Army and other Chinese entities accused in the past of ties to Syria and Iran.
One of the Chinese companies, the BHA Aero Composites Company, is partly owned by two American companies — 40 percent by the American aircraft manufacturer Boeing and 40 percent by the aerospace materials maker Hexcel. The remaining 20 percent is owned by a Chinese government-owned company, AVIC I, or the China Aviation Industry Corporation I.
“In principle, you could find companies that would be above suspicion, but in this case they haven’t done it,” said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project. “If you just look at the relations these companies have, rather than be above suspicion, they are highly suspicious.”
The Wisconsin Project report also charges that both Boeing and Hexcel have been cited for past lapses in obtaining proper licenses for exports.
Spokesmen for Boeing and Hexcel said in interviews that they are fully confident that BHA has no ties to the Chinese military and that its use of aircraft parts and materials were strictly for commercial and civilian ends.
“Boeing is not involved in any defense activities in China,” said Douglas Kennett, a company spokesman. “All our activities in China are in compliance with U.S. export laws and regulations.”
Both companies also say that the past failure to get proper licenses has led to tighter controls and, in any case, was the result of improper paperwork affecting products that continue to be exported as licensed.
Mr. Milhollin said that research by his staff had uncovered several links with the Chinese military establishment involving both BHA and another of the five companies, the Shanghai Hua Hong NEC Electronics Company.
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AVIC I, the Chinese government entity that owns a minority share of BHA, also produces fighters, nuclear-capable bombers and aviation weapons systems for the People’s Liberation Army, the report says. The State Department has cited another AVIC subsidiary, the China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation, for links to arms sales to Iran and Syria.
The report also says that Shanghai Hua Hong NEC Electronics is majority owned “through a corporate chain” by the China Electronics Corporation, which the report says is a government conglomerate that produces military equipment along with consumer electronics. It has a unit, the report says, that procures arms for the military.
Mr. Milhollin said that the new policy granting companies the right to import some technologies without prior licenses was adopted quietly as “a stealth attack on export controls.”
But Mr. Mancuso, the Commerce Department official who oversees the program, noted that the department proposed it publicly in mid-2006 and adopted it a year later after lengthy public comment by interested parties and members of Congress.
In addition, he said, no Chinese company can receive certain technologies — as part of a category known as “validated end-users” — without a vetting of its record by the State, Energy and Defense Departments and by relevant intelligence agencies. The five companies designated in October, he said, were approved without dissent by these units of the government.
In general, the Commerce Department tries to make it easier for American companies to export to markets overseas, and there has been a particular emphasis on selling to China. The United States is expected to show a trade deficit with China of nearly $300 billion in 2007.
At the same time, at least since the 1990s, Democratic and Republican Congressional leaders have called on the Bush administration, and the administration of President Bill Clinton, to exercise more vigilance toward China as it seeks to modernize its aerospace defense network.
“China is a huge market for our commercial technology exports,” said Mr. Mancuso. “Yet there are real security risks we are mindful of. We take that concern very, very seriously.” Only those companies that have “a demonstrable record of using sensitive technologies responsibly” are approved, he said.
Beyond that, he said companies for which licensing rules have been lifted are subject to additional disclosure obligations, including on-site visits by American government personnel.
Groups that advocate greater technology-sharing with China in civilian aeronautics and other areas say the administration has been cautious in its policy, choosing Chinese companies with American partners or owners.
The three other Chinese companies named “validated end-users” in October are Applied Materials China, a subsidiary of Applied Materials, a maker of semiconductors based in California; Chinese facilities operated by the National Semiconductor Corporation, another American company; and the Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation, based in Shanghai.
William A. Reinsch, head of the National Foreign Trade Council, which promotes international trade, said the administration over all had tightened controls on China and called the lifting of license requirements on only five firms “a spoonful of sugar to make the medicine go down.”
Mr. Reinsch administered export controls as an official in the Clinton administration.
A House Republican staff member had a similar view. “We were told by Commerce that they were going to make some very safe choices,” he said, speaking anonymously because of the delicacy of the subject.
The Commerce Department says that, out of $55 billion in American exports to China in 2006, only $308 million were items requiring licenses to make sure the Chinese military could not use them. The five companies named as “validated” accounted for $54 million of those goods.
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James T. Conway
First to the Fight
By BRENDAN MINITER
January 12, 2008; Page A9
The Pentagon
When James T. Conway went down to see the draft board at the height of the Vietnam War in 1969, he was told "we're not going to draft you. You've got a great number and you don't have to worry about military service." He responded, "You don't understand, I actually want to go."
Today, as Commandant of the Marine Corps, he's one of the nation's leading military commanders. He's led tens of thousands of Marines on two significant campaigns in Iraq. The first was the drive on Baghdad in 2003; the second was what turned out to be an aborted assault on Fallujah in April 2004. In 2006 he became the steward of a fighting force with a history that stretches all the way back to 1775, before there was a United States of America.
But it's the future of the Corps, not its past, that dominates Gen. Conway's thoughts and our conversation. We met at the Pentagon earlier this week -- just a few days before the one-year anniversary of President Bush's decision to "surge" more troops into Iraq. He was dressed in cammies, combat boots and an open collar. He's lean and tall and he seemed to envelop the table we were seated at. He's also a man who gives the appearance of someone who would much rather be with his Marines in Anbar province than in an office on the outskirts of Washington.
Two related concerns about the war occupy his mind: That in order to fight this war, his Corps could be transformed into just another "land army"; and, if that should happen, that it would lose the flexibility and expeditionary culture that has made it a powerful military force.
The Corps was built originally to live aboard ships and wade ashore to confront emerging threats far from home. It has long prided itself in being "first to the fight" relying on speed, agility and tenacity to win battles. It's a small, offensive outfit that has its own attack aircraft, but not its own medics, preferring to rely on Navy corpsmen to care for its wounded.
For more than a decade, the size of the active-duty Marine Corps has been 175,000. The Army, by comparison, has more than 500,000 soldiers on active duty.
Now, however, the Corps is being expanded to 202,000 over the next couple of years. And what's more, the Marines are being asked to conduct patrols and perform other non-offensive operations in Iraq that are forcing the Corps to become a more stationary force than it traditionally has been.
It's a "static environment where there is no forward movement," Gen. Conway says. And "that gets more to an occupational role, and that's what the Army historically does and the Marine Corps has previously seen very little of."
One way the Marines are clearly changing is in the vehicles troops use to patrol in Iraq. "If you look at the table of equipment that a Marine battalion is operating with right now in Iraq," Gen. Conway explains, "it is dramatically different than the table of equipment the battalion used when it went over the berm in Kuwait in '03, and it is remarkably heavier. Heavier, particularly in terms of vehicles.
"I mean the Humvees were canvas at that point for the most part. Today they are up-armored and we're looking at vehicles even heavier than that. We've got a whole new type of vehicle that we're patrolling in, conducting operations in, that's the MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected], a 48,000 pound vehicle. . . . these type of things, make us look more like a land army than it does a fast, hard-hitting expeditionary force."
Gen. Conway commends the MRAP's performance: "[W]e had over 300 attacks against the MRAP without losing a Marine or sailor." And, he says, "We always have to be concerned about protecting our Marines. We owe that to the parents of America."
"But," he adds, "first we have to be able to accomplish our mission. And I think there are a lot of instances where a lighter, faster, harder-hitting force that gets to a scene quickly is more effective than a heavier, more armored force that gets there weeks or months later."
It is clear that the MRAP can make it more difficult to maneuver in a battle zone. "We saw some problems with the vehicle once it went off of the roadways," Gen. Conway says. "Its cross-country mobility, particularly in western Iraq where you have wadis [dry riverbeds] and small bridges and that type of thing was not what we hoped it would be."
And it is something Gen. Conway has decided to have fewer of. He recently announced that the Marines are halting orders for these vehicles. The Corps will take delivery of a total of 2,300 new MRAPs by the end of the year, which it will use to conduct missions in Iraq. But Gen. Conway is canceling orders for 1,400 additional MRAPs that he and his advisors believe they will not need in the coming years. In the process, Gen. Conway is saving Uncle Sam $1.7 billion. "Yeah. I mean, that to me was a common sense kind of determination."
In short, wars have a tendency to change the culture of the militaries that fight them. For the Marines, the cultural change they fear most is losing their connection to the sea while fighting in the desert.
Today there are about 26,000 Marines in Iraq, many of them on their second or third tour, and tens of thousands of others who have either recently returned or who are preparing to go in the coming months and years. Keeping a force that size in Iraq has made it difficult for the Marines to give mid-level officers assignments that would hone the skills necessary to conduct what has always been a central component of Marine warfighting -- landing troops on a beach head.
"If you accept a generation of officers is four years," Gen. Conway says, "that's what an officer signs on for, we now have that generation of officers -- and arguably troops -- that have come and gone, that are combat hardened, but that will never have stepped foot aboard ship. . . . an amphibious operation is by its very nature the most complicated of military operations; and that we have junior officers and senior officers who understand the planning dimensions associated with something like that, that have sufficient number of exercises over time to really have sharpened their skills to work with other services to accomplish a common goal -- these are the things that concern me with the atrophying of those skills and the ability to go out and do those things."
Gen. Conway graduated from Southeast Missouri State University in 1969, got married, and volunteered for the Marines at a time when the Vietnam War was still raging. He had friends -- fraternity brothers -- who hadn't kept their grades up and who got drafted.
Not that he regrets signing up. "I thought about trying to contact [that recruiter] and thank him for the way he kind of reeled me in," he says.
As a young officer, Gen. Conway didn't end up in Vietnam. But he did get a front row seat in watching the Marine Corps rebuild itself after the war in Southeast Asia ended. And now, looking back through history, he has a clear perspective on the turning points in the development of the modern Marine Corps.
The first turning point came in World War I at the Battle of Belleau Wood, where a few thousand Marines helped stop a German advance that otherwise might have taken Paris and knocked France out of the war. Marines fought so ferociously in hand-to-hand combat in dense French forest in that battle, that the Germans nicknamed them "Devil Dogs." Afterward, Congress expanded the size of the Marines to more than 70,000, up from about 14,000 at the start of the war.
The second turning point brings Gen. Conway back to his concern for protecting the Marines' institutional culture. "Others will cite other battles," he said, but he sees the Battle of Guadalcanal in World War II, a six-month campaign in the Pacific starting in August 1942, as a turning point.
It was there that Marines, later reinforced by Army units, dealt the Japanese their first significant land defeat. "It was only our expeditionary ability to get out there rapidly, as rapidly as we could . . . to put the force out there, smack in the path of the Japanese [that] was a major capability and one we're still very proud of."
So is the Marine Corps the right force to be fighting in Iraq now? It's a loaded question because in recent months Gen. Conway made headlines by airing a plan that would have had the Marines rotate out of Iraq and, with a somewhat smaller force, into Afghanistan. The plan was a nonstarter with Defense Secretary Robert Gates and has been shelved.
"Yeah, I think we are," Gen. Conway said. "For what the nation is now engaged in, it is a major insurgency. From our perspective a counterinsurgency. And when the nation is as hotly engaged as we are in Iraq, I think that's exactly where the Marine Corps needs to be.
"Now, it has necessitated that we undergo these changes to the way we are constituted. But that's OK. We made those adjustments. We'll adjust back when the threat is different. But that's adaptability . . . . You create a force that you have to have at the time. But you don't accept that as the new norm and you do the necessary draw-down at a time when you can."
As for now, he sees the expansion of the Corps to 202,000 "as good . . . We need a Marine Corps that's larger. We need an Army that's larger until we get through what probably is going to be, I think will be, a generational struggle. I think it is absolutely necessary. . . . our military today, all the services all uniforms, is still less than 1% of our great country."
Has the country already forgotten the lessons of 9/11?
Not all of us, Gen. Conway says. "I still hear that a lot, you know, we saw [a] surge [in enlistments] after 9/11, but if you talk to a young Marine out there, even people who were, I don't know, 12, 13, 14 at that point, [they] are still saying that, you know, that they are offended by that, are still incensed by that and they realize that those are still essentially the people out there that we're fighting, so it continues to reverberate. . . . When I visit Gen. Odierno in Baghdad, he's got a picture, a very large picture of one [World Trade Center] tower burning and the other plane about to hit. And I think that our country would do well to remember how we got to where we are today."
Mr. Miniter is an assistant features editor for The Wall Street Journal.
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Tough Calls, Good Calls
By J.D. CROUCH II and ROBERT JOSEPH
January 22, 2008; Page A19
One of the most difficult and consequential decisions of the Bush presidency took place in January of last year: the decision to fundamentally change our strategy by "surging" more U.S. forces to Iraq.
This decision was taken against the backdrop of escalating violence in Iraq, calls for immediate or "phased" withdrawal, prognostications of imminent defeat, and an abundance of political blame directed at the White House. The president's move was met with skepticism and outright vilification, except for a few principled politicians like John McCain and Joe Lieberman. Today, people are getting in line to claim credit for the "surge."
Mr. Bush's decision was guided by a clear strategic principle. The president wanted the U.S. to win, and refashioning our strategy was the best opportunity to succeed in this goal, as well as to leave Iraq policy on a sounder basis for his successor. Whoever wins the presidency in 2008 will be pleased that he did. What a difference a year makes.
The surge may turn out to be Mr. Bush's most important decision. But he has made other such decisions since 9/11, including to commit ground forces to Afghanistan, to eradicate the regime of Saddam Hussein, to use the CIA to conduct strategic interrogation of high-level terrorists, and to conduct strategic surveillance of terrorists communications.
Mr. Bush has faced so many tough choices over the last seven years that his decision to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been at least partially forgotten. Yet this decision, announced in December 2001, was no less consequential. It also defied the critics who argued that it would lead to a new arms race, increase nuclear proliferation and ruin cooperation with Russia on nuclear arms control and terrorism.
None of these things have happened as a result of the ABM Treaty withdrawal. But the decision will enable us to counter a still-growing 21st century threat.
In the summer of 2006, when Kim Jong Il was again seeking to intimidate America and its allies with medium and long-range missiles, the president had no real options short of pre-emptive attack or retaliation. And yet here, as with the surge, our next president will have tools at his or her disposal because Mr. Bush did not hesitate to do what was necessary for U.S. security.
Mr. Bush has assigned direction of our missile-defense capabilities and their integration into our overall defense strategy to the United States Strategic Command, part of whose mission is the responsibility for defending the nation from strategic missile attack. A global command and control system is being built, and is already functioning, to network our existing sensors and weapons. This can exercise real forces against current and emerging threats.
Meanwhile, a test bed has been built in the Pacific that includes operational assets -- sensors and shooters -- from California to Alaska, from the Aleutian Islands to Hawaii. Despite critics' claims to the contrary, test after test of kinetic kill interceptors has demonstrated the effectiveness of our defenses.
The first strategic missile interceptors since 1975 are deployed in Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg AFB, Calif. They stand guard against an attack on the entire country. Sea-based interceptors that have far greater capability than the Patriots of Iraq are being deployed, using the SM-3 missile and Aegis radars.
Cooperation with key allies on missile defense is at an all-time high, and we are finally able to cooperate in ways that protect both American and allied territory. In Japan, we have deployed a radar capable of providing data for protecting both Japanese and U.S. territory. We are also co-developing a new version of the SM-3 that will have greater capability against long-range threats.
None of this could have happened if President Bush had not decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. What are the next steps that the country should take to capitalize fully on this strategic choice?
First, the president's call for a third strategic missile defense site in Europe must be carried out. This site provides additional capability to protect the U.S., and to protect as well our European allies from a growing Iranian missile threat. The site would further cement the development of a global sensor-and-interceptor network necessary for effective missile defense. Failure to follow through would have implications for our alliances both inside and out of Europe.
Second, we can expect that rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are already looking at ways to counter our existing defenses. One way they might do this is to deploy decoys or other countermeasures on their existing offensive missiles that must be attacked, and could thus exhaust our limited supply of interceptors. Fortunately, we can now explore cost-effective solutions to this threat.
One solution is to develop interceptors with multiple kill vehicles -- something that was explicitly banned by the ABM Treaty. Another solution is to develop advanced discrimination techniques to tell the decoys from the real threats. These techniques include using radars, space-based sensors, or a new concept that uses dozens of miniature interceptors that can literally sweep away an entire threat cloud of decoys, allowing the missile interceptor to hone in on the real warhead.
None of these techniques is fully proven, but neither was the hit-to-kill technology begun by President Reagan and later successfully deployed by President Bush. We must focus investment in the discrimination problem and improve our existing systems with these new capabilities.
Third, we can do more to increase the capabilities of existing assets. We can, for example, improve our sea-based capabilities -- both our performance against long-range missiles and the number of assets deployed. Under the ABM Treaty, we had to "dumb down" our so-called theater systems to ensure that they could not be used to defend the U.S. from attack. Free from this restraint, as well as from the Treaty's prohibition on mobile-launch platforms, we can now do much more to integrate our defense with that of our allies and make the most of the assets we have deployed.
Finally, we must look again at space as a place to deploy interceptors.
There is no question that space provides the highest leverage against the missile threat: Targets are more visible, more accessible and more vulnerable when attacked from space. While there are concerns about "weaponizing space," these pale in comparison to the increasing vulnerability of U.S. space-based satellites by weapons from the ground traversing space. The recent Chinese anti-satellite test was a wake-up call.
Space-based interceptors, like those proposed by former President George H. W. Bush in 1991, have the potential to strengthen missile defense, and to provide protection for key intelligence and communications assets in space that are now vulnerable from ground-based attack.
The progress of the past six years stems from one tough decision. That very same decision will allow us to stay ahead of the 21st century ballistic-missile threat.
Messrs. Crouch and Joseph are senior scholars at the National Institute for Public Policy. Mr. Crouch was formerly deputy national security adviser and Mr. Joseph was formerly undersecretary of State in the George W. Bush administration.
WSJ
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New Stryker Faring Poorly in Field
Military.com | By Christian Lowe | January 30, 2008
BAQUBAH, Iraq - The newest version of the Army’s popular Stryker combat vehicle is garnering poor reviews here from Soldiers assigned to man its tank-like hull.
The General Dynamics Corp.-built Mobile Gun System looks like a typical eight-wheeled Stryker, except for a massive 105mm gun mounted on its roof. The gun fires three different types of projectiles, including explosive rounds, tank-busters and a "canister round" that ejects hundreds of steel pellets similar to a shotgun shell.
But while the system looks good on paper and the Army’s all for it, Soldiers with the 4th Battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment -- one of the first units to receive the new vehicle for their deployment to Iraq -- don’t have a lot of good things to say about it.
More news from our man in Iraq .
"I wish [the enemy] would just blow mine up so I could be done with it," said Spec. Kyle Handrahan, 22, of Anaheim, Calif., a tanker assigned to Alpha Company, 4/9’s MGS platoon.
"It’s a piece," another MGS platoon member chimed in. "Nothing works on it."
The gripes stem from a litany of problems, including a computer system that constantly locks up, extremely high heat in the crew compartment and a shortage of spare parts. In one case, a key part was held up in customs on its way to Iraq, a problem one Soldier recognizes is a result of a new system being pushed into service before it’s ready.
"The concept is good, but they still have a lot of issues to work out on it," said Sgt. 1st Class Nathan Teimeier, Alpha, 4/9’s MGS platoon sergeant and a tanker by trade.
According to a Jan. 28 report by Bloomberg News, the 2008 Pentagon Authorization bill included language limiting funds for the MGS pending an Army report on fixes to the vehicle’s growing list of problems. The Pentagon’s director of Operational Test and Evaluation said in his annual report the vehicle was "not operationally effective," Bloomberg reported.
Soldiers here say the searing heat in the vehicles -- especially during Iraq’s blazing summer -- forces them to wear a complicated cooling suit that circulates cold water through tubing under their armor. Ironically, Soldiers often complain the suit makes them cold, Teimeier said, adding to their vehicular woes.
Despite the poor review from DoD auditors, the Army is standing by its vehicle, Bloomberg reported.
"The Army has determined that the MGS is suitable and operationally effective," Army spokesman, Lt. Col. Martin Downie, told the financial news service.
Where there is no debate is in the lethality of the vehicle’s firepower.
But Soldiers in the middle of a tough counterinsurgency fight here in Diyala province say commanders are reluctant to use the vehicle’s lethal gun on enemy strongholds out of concern of killing or wounding civilians. As a result, many of the dozens of MGS vehicles go unused while precision air strikes have become increasingly prevalent -- along with the usual Soldier-driven raids.
That’s got MGS drivers here frustrated. Not only do they have to deal with a complex system that gives them fits, but when it is working, they’re not allowed to employ the vehicle in combat.
"You can kick down doors and risk losing our guys," Handrahan said. "Or I can just knock down the building from a [kilometer] away and call it a day."
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DoD Cover-Up Alleged Over Helmet Fine
New York Post | February 04, 2008
Two whistleblowers claim that a $1.9 million fine leveled against their former bosses - who allegedly underweighted the bulletproof material in combat helmets to save money - is too measly and part of a Pentagon cover-up.
Jeff Kenner and Tamara Elshaug, who worked at the Sioux Manufacturing Corp. in North Dakota, had charged that their company was involved in the "underweaving" of the bulletproof fabric in more than 2 million "P.A.S.G.T." helmets handed out to National Guardsmen, Army Soldiers and Navy Sailors across the country.
With the help of Long Island lawyer Andrew Campanelli, the pair sued on behalf of the government, and each received $200,000. The company - which has denied the allegations and said no U.S. Soldier was ever injured or killed as a result of the alleged underweaving - also was fined $1.9 million.
"The Department of Justice really did a good job, but I feel the Department of Defense is trying to cover up things," Kenner said, charging that the $1.9 million fine was less than the company had saved on shorting the Kevlar bulletproofing material in the helmets.
"Any time there's less Kevlar, there's less protection. The American people should know about this. It's just greedy people - it's all about money to them [the company]," Kenner said.
Despite the problems with shorting the lifesaving material, the Pentagon awarded a new $16 million to $72 million Kevlar helmet contract to the same firm, before the lawsuit was settled, said an incredulous Campanelli. Campanelli said that, before the settlement last month, someone fired three bullets into Elshaug's mobile home. One bullet pierced her stall shower but no one was injured. No arrest was made.
"It has the earmarks of a cover-up," the lawyer said of the shooting.
U.S. Attorney David Peterson said, "The matter was looked into, and a settlement was ultimately reached."
He declined to comment further.
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Geopolitical Diary: A Military Choice and Challenge for India?
February 27, 2008
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates is visiting India. The most public issue between the two countries is the U.S. offer of civilian nuclear technology for India, despite the fact that New Delhi has declined to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. While this is not trivial, the most significant geopolitical dimension of the visit is the rumor that Gates plans to offer India the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, to be delivered when it is retired from the U.S. fleet in 2012. This rumor is persistent and widespread, though the Defense Department has strongly denied it. However, if the reports turn out to be true, such an offer would be an interesting and potentially effective U.S. move.
Related Link
India: Aircraft Carrier Dynamics
This would place the United States and Russia in competition with each other over India. In 2004, the Russians and Indians signed a deal under which New Delhi would acquire the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov for $1.5 billion. But in 2007, the Russians surprised the Indians by raising their asking price. After intense negotiations, the Indians agreed to pay approximately $800 million extra. In return, the Russians agreed to improve the modernization package they had offered the Indians to include a new ski jump facility that would allow for the use of the Russian MiG-29. Given the potential aircraft sale, the Russians are ahead on the deal. However, as of Gates visit, the new agreement had not been signed.
If the rumors about a U.S. decision to offer the Kitty Hawk to India are true, the move clearly is designed to block the sale of the Gorshkov. An American and a Russian carrier in one fleet would create substantial problems for the Indians. Operating an aircraft carrier is one of the most complex military and engineering functions in the world. Having two different carriers made by two different countries housing two different sets of equipment separated not only by age but also by fundamentally different engineering cultures would create a hurdle that probably would be beyond anyone’s capability to manage — and certainly beyond India’s. If India wanted both carriers, it would have to sequence the acquisitions and have the second one rest on the lessons learned from the first.
So, Gates could be offering the Indians a choice and a challenge. The choice would be between U.S. carrier technology — which, even when obsolete by American standards, is the result of several generations of battle-tested systems — and a Soviet-era system that challenged the Soviet ship and aircraft designers. On that level, the choice would be easy.
But the potential U.S. offer also poses a challenge. India once was a historic ally of the Soviet Union and hostile toward the United States. After 9/11, U.S. and Indian interests converged. The United States offered India military technology, and the Indians bought a great deal of it. But as good as U.S. military technology is, each purchase increases Indian dependence on the United States for spare parts and support. It has not been easy shifting away from the Soviet weapons culture; years of training and a substantial Indian knowledge base rest on those weapons. If the Indians continue adopting American weapon systems, not only will they have to retrain and restructure their knowledge base, they also will get locked into American systems. And that locks them into dependence on the United States. If the United States were to cut the flow of weapons, parts and support, the Indians could be systematically weakened.
Buying the Gorshkov rather than the Kitty Hawk would give the Indians second-rank technology with fewer potential political strings. Since the Indians are not going to be challenging the American fleet, the Gorshkov might well suit their purposes and keep their non-American options open. This is where the Russian decision to renegotiate the Gorshkov’s price could hurt Moscow. The only reason to buy the Gorshkov instead of the Kitty Hawk is the perception of Russian reliability. But the Russians badly damaged this perception by renegotiating.
The Russians assumed that the Indians had no choice but to rework the deal. But the purpose of Gates’ visit could be to let India know that it does have a choice and that the Kitty Hawk is the safer option. If so, he will tell New Delhi that the Russians can’t be trusted. They have shown India how they will behave if they think it has no options. The United States isn’t going to be less trustworthy than that. And India doesn’t have to go with Russian carrier technology and aircraft; it can have U.S. carrier technology, an upgrade of the Kitty Hawk and F/A-18 battle-tested aircraft, trainers and advisers, rather than MiG-29s.
If Gates does make this case, the issue then will be whether the United States will permit some or all of the F/A-18s to be produced in India — something the Russians have permitted with other aircraft purchases. We suspect something could be worked out and U.S.-Indian relations will continue to develop if the Indian fear of being completely dependent on the United States can be overcome.
stratfor
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From Gertz,
Shut down GPS and the US military is stymied.
http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/InsidetheRing.html
Article:
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Return to
The Gertz File
March 28, 2008
Notes from the Pentagon
Denial and deception
China's military is using "denial" and "deception" to mislead the United States and other governments about its military strategy and buildup, according to Pentagon officials.
The topic is discussed in the latest Pentagon report on China's military power, which defines Chinese disinformation as "[luring] the other side into developing misperceptions ... and [establishing for oneself] a strategically advantageous position by producing various kinds of false phenomena in an organized and planned manner with the smallest cost in manpower and materials."
A Pentagon official, elaborating on the report, said "denial" by the Chinese is excessive secrecy "surrounding almost every part of the PLA," or People's Liberation Army, as the military is known.
Evidence of denial is difficult to pinpoint because, the official said, "we don't know what we don't know."
Deception often is discussed in Chinese military writings, including those based on ancient writings that discuss its use in helping weaker powers defeat stronger ones. The analogy is used by China to discuss how it would defeat the United States in a conflict.
Strategic deception is "producing or portraying something that is false as being true in an effort to confuse the adversary or set the conditions for surprise," the official said.
"Denial and secrecy is used to prevent outside observers from gaining real insights into investment priorities, capabilities and intentions which can serve to hide either weakness or strength," the official said.
China's tactical denial and deception include using electronic decoys, infrared decoys, false-target generators and angle reflectors during electronic warfare. They also include the use of traditional concealment, camouflage and deception by military forces.
Some senior U.S. intelligence officials dispute the Pentagon's assertion that China employs strategic and tactical denial and deception, arguing that Chinese communist-style disinformation is no different from what non-communist governments use. The issue is being debated internally.
GPS threat
U.S. military and intelligence officials say one reason China's anti-satellite missile test of January 2007 was so alarming is that it highlighted a major strategic vulnerability: the reliance of the U.S. military on Global Position System satellites.
If China used its ground-based mobile ASAT missiles to destroy GPS satellites, it would cripple the ability of the U.S. military to use some of its most important weapons, like satellite-guided precision missiles. Additionally, navigation of ground-, air- and sea-based forces would be almost completely halted.
"Shut down GPS and we're basically left with throwing rocks," said one U.S. military official.
Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Hamel, commander of the Space and Missile Systems Center, told reporters earlier this month that GPS also is vulnerable to electronic jamming.
"The Global Positioning System is literally ubiquitous," Gen. Hamel said. "I would argue that precise positioning and timing is the fundamental enabler of the information age. Being able to synchronize everything around the globe from timing and positioning is absolutely critical. Yet the only way that really functions is for user receivers to be able to collect the signal. Well, it is a very, very weak signal and it's very, it's relatively easy for commercial kind of devices and uses to be able to get disrupted."
Gen. Hamel said the military is considering how to protect GPS users. "We both want to improve the signals from the satellite, but you also have to improve the user equipment to be less susceptible and vulnerable," he said.
"Literally Radio Shack parts, together with a modicum of electrical engineering education, you can actually generate jamming and disruptive wave forms to particular types of GPS signals and user equipment," Gen. Hamel said.
Gen. Hamel said his command is building equipment for military users "that has greater protection and anti-jam capability to be able to deal with some of those kinds of threats," noting that it is not only satellites that need protection but user equipment as well.
Correction
A February 29 item entitled "Fight Over China" erroneously reported that Lonnie Henley, Deputy National Intelligence Officer for East Asia, indirectly supported the unauthorized disclosure of intelligence to China by writing a letter to the sentencing judge in the criminal case of former DIA analyst Ron Montaperto. Mr. Henley sent a letter to the court attesting to Mr. Montaperto's character during the sentencing phase of the proceeding, a common procedure in criminal cases that does not suggest support for the underlying crime. Additionally, Mr. Montaperto pleaded guilty to a charge of mishandling classified documents -- not espionage.
# Bill Gertz covers national security affairs. He can be reached at 202-636-3274, or at InsidetheRing@washingtontimes.com.
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If you haven't yet read "Unrestricted Warfare", shame on you. Every American needs to grasp the concept. That doctrine is being used against us around the globe.
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CCP's posted piece is on a very important matter. If, as has been known to happen before, the Pentagon is asleep at the switch on this, a lot of what we have is a giant Maginot Line for them.
GM: Care to share the author, and give us a paragraph or two on what the book is about?
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Continuing with this theme, , , ,
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stratfor
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Summary
The new U.S. Air Force Cyber Command released its first statement of Strategic Vision on March 4. The document indicates the United States’ preparations for the challenges that lie ahead in cyberspace.
Analysis
Now six months old, the provisional U.S. Air Force Cyber Command — which will stand up formally Oct. 1 — released its first Strategic Vision document March 4. It partially appears like something of a marketing document, but it offers important insights into the future structure of the new command.
Though the United States has been working under the radar to deal with cyber threats for more than a decade, and far longer in related fields such as signals intelligence and network warfare, the new Air Force command has been part of an increasingly public government and military acknowledgment of the challenges in this new arena. The Cyber Command is partially about consolidating the disparate specialties relevant to this field, which currently are spread across the Air Force.
Related Links
Cyber Command: The New Face of Warfare?
MEMBERS-ONLY PODCAST
Hezbollah: The Deadly Cell Phone Ping?
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Related Special Topic Page
U.S. Military Dominance
External Link
U.S. Air Force Cyber Command Strategic Vision Statement
Stratfor is not responsible for the content of other Web sites.
Highlighting the significance of this emerging issue, the U.S. intelligence community’s 2008 Annual Threat Assessment prominently featured cyber threats for the first time. The Pentagon’s 2008 Annual Report to Congress on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China also placed an increased emphasis on the threat posed by Beijing in this area in particular.
Fundamental to understanding this issue is grasping the cyber challenges ahead. The United States has a very impressive ability to function in and command cyberspace. But by no means does it enjoy the unquestioned military dominance it enjoys in so many other domains. The Pentagon’s systems come under attack on a daily basis. Furthermore, the United States is particularly reliant on the Internet (and thus vulnerable to cyber threats) for everything from personal banking to the functioning of the financial systems that manage the nation’s wealth.
The Cyber Command’s Strategic Vision statement shows the Air Force is making more than an overdue organizational shift. The statement is reflective of an intellectual and conceptual grasp of the challenges that lay ahead. Particularly relevant passages include:
“Controlling cyberspace is the prerequisite to effective operations across all strategic and operational domains -– securing freedom from attack and freedom to attack.”
“Successfully controlling cyberspace creates the potential to achieve victory before a kinetic shot is fired. Our cyberspace capabilities will dissuade and deter potential aggressors, but if deterrence fails, our mastery of it will help to ensure that we prevail.”
“Cyberspace favors offensive operations.”
Despite the Air Force’s preparations, challenges lie ahead. Cyber warfare inherently entails operations on both sides of the traditional boundaries that have separated military functions from police functions. Though much has been done in the legal realm to accommodate this new reality since 9/11, cyberspace will continue to be a very difficult arena for the military to fight in legally, especially since some of the operations involved in cyber warfare must inherently be directed against civilian targets to be effective. Furthermore, establishing dominance in cyberspace is not a simple measure of troops, computers and the latest technology.
The most exceptionally skilled personnel — hackers — exist primarily outside traditional demographics for government and military service, and more likely than not have a strong distaste for authority and a distrust of government. There have been — and will continue to be — instances where the hacker community has been rallied in the interest of a nation, but they mostly do so out of their own inclination and interests. Harnessing these personnel and achieving the legal space to function without undue hindrance will be just two of the problems that still await Cyber Command.
Editor’s note: Stratfor is currently developing a featured series of analyses on cyberspace as battlespace. Look for it soon.
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China's stealth war on the U.S.
By Max Boot
http://www.JewishWorldReview.com | Maj. Gen. Zhu Chenghu of the Chinese People's Liberation Army caused quite a stir last week when he threatened to nuke "hundreds" of American cities if the U.S. dared to interfere with a Chinese attempt to conquer Taiwan.
This saber-rattling comes while China is building a lot of sabers. Although its defense budget, estimated to be as much as $90 billion, remains a fraction of the United States', it is enough to make China the world's third-biggest weapons buyer (behind Russia) and the biggest in Asia. Moreover, China's spending has been increasing rapidly, and it is investing in the kind of systems — especially missiles and submarines — needed to challenge U.S. naval power in the Pacific.
The Pentagon on Tuesday released a study of Chinese military capabilities. In a preview, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld told a Singapore audience last month that China's arms buildup was an "area of concern." It should be. But we shouldn't get overly fixated on such traditional indices of military power as ships and bombs — not even atomic bombs. Chinese strategists, in the best tradition of Sun Tzu, are working on craftier schemes to topple the American hegemon.
In 1998, an official People's Liberation Army publishing house brought out a treatise called "Unrestricted Warfare," written by two senior army colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui. This book, which is available in English translation, is well known to the U.S. national security establishment but remains practically unheard of among the general public.
"Unrestricted Warfare" recognizes that it is practically impossible to challenge the U.S. on its own terms. No one else can afford to build mega-expensive weapons systems like the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which will cost more than $200 billion to develop. "The way to extricate oneself from this predicament," the authors write, "is to develop a different approach."
Their different approaches include financial warfare (subverting banking systems and stock markets), drug warfare (attacking the fabric of society by flooding it with illicit drugs), psychological and media warfare (manipulating perceptions to break down enemy will), international law warfare (blocking enemy actions using multinational organizations), resource warfare (seizing control of vital natural resources), even ecological warfare (creating man-made earthquakes or other natural disasters).
Cols. Qiao and Wang write approvingly of Al Qaeda, Colombian drug lords and computer hackers who operate outside the "bandwidths understood by the American military." They envision a scenario in which a "network attack against the enemy" — clearly a red, white and blue enemy — would be carried out "so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications network and mass media network are completely paralyzed," leading to "social panic, street riots and a political crisis." Only then would conventional military force be deployed "until the enemy is forced to sign a dishonorable peace treaty."
This isn't just loose talk. There are signs of this strategy being implemented. The anti-Japanese riots that swept China in April? That would be psychological warfare against a major Asian rival. The stage-managed protests in 1999, after the U.S. accidentally bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, fall into the same category.
The bid by the state-owned China National Offshore Oil Co., to acquire Unocal? Resource warfare. Attempts by China's spy apparatus to infiltrate U.S. high-tech firms and defense contractors? Technological warfare. China siding against the U.S. in the U.N. Security Council over the invasion of Iraq? International law warfare. Gen. Zhu's threat to nuke the U.S.? Media warfare.
And so on. Once you know what to look for, the pieces fall into place with disturbing ease. Of course, most of these events have alternative, more benign explanations: Maybe Gen. Zhu is an eccentric old coot who's seen "Dr. Strangelove" a few too many times.
The deliberate ambiguity makes it hard to craft a response to "unrestricted warfare." If Beijing sticks to building nuclear weapons, we know how to deal with that — use the deterrence doctrine that worked against the Soviets. But how do we respond to what may or may not be indirect aggression by a major trading partner? Battling terrorist groups like Al Qaeda seems like a cinch by comparison.
This is not a challenge the Pentagon is set up to address, but it's an urgent issue for the years ahead.
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http://www.terrorism.com/documents/TRC-Analysis/unrestricted.pdf
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/unresw1.htm
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/doctrine/unresw2.htm
http://shop.newsmax.com/shop/index.cfm?page=products&productid=165
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Thanks GM
Interesting stuff.
My understanding from a career military person is the US military sees China as our number *one enemy*. The remains of the former Soviet Union is no longer considered a serious threat.
My general undestanding is military electronic hardware is protected by three layers of defense. If one layer is penetrated without authorization the other two automatically change configuration. Assuming this is even remotely the case this still may not protect against a succesful intrusion by the patient, well placed spy who is on the "inside".
Who amongst us is our enemy pretending to be our friend? Apparantly many more than we think.
It is what my wife and I deal with on a daily basis with regards to her music lyrics that get stolen over and over again. There is simply no limit to who money can buy. This is a fact I have learned the hard way.
How about celebrities who keep having their medical records stolen right out of the hospital only to show up in the National Enquirer? As a doctor I could get fined or go to jail for such a breach. Yet nothing happens to the Enquirer. Why are not these people sent to jail for such an invasion to privacy. So should the hospital employees for such unistakably deliberate acts IMO. Not just lose their jobs. Anyway I digress.
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Summary
The proliferation of a new generation of supersonic anti-ship missiles is on the rise, and questions remain about the U.S. Navy’s capability to confront the threat.
Analysis
The supersonic anti-ship missile was a product of the Soviet Union’s need to challenge the U.S. Navy at sea. That speed was a brute-force way to punch through more technologically sophisticated U.S. shipboard defenses. In the years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, a few of these missiles and their platforms — essentially holdouts from the Soviet days — have begun to turn up in China. But a new generation of supersonic anti-ship missiles has begun appearing on the market, and their proliferation is on the rise.
The Threat
Anti-ship missiles have repeatedly proven their value. The HMS Sheffield (D80) was hit by a French-built Argentine Exocet in 1982 during the Falkland Islands War and later sank. The USS Stark (FFG-31) was crippled by a pair of Iraqi Exocets in 1987. And in 2006, the Israeli INS Hanit was struck by a Chinese-built C-802 (a design similar to the Exocet) during the Israeli conflict with Hezbollah. Both the Stark and the Hanit survived, but the missiles achieved what is known as a “mission kill.” In each case, though the crew was able to keep the ship afloat and limp back to port, the ship’s ability to effectively execute its missions was lost.
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Modern warships are no longer armored as they once were. In the cases above, the Exocet’s 360-pound warhead did not tear the ship apart. But it easily penetrated the steel hull and wreaked havoc on the ship’s internal spaces. Not all hits like this will be mission kills, but the odds of one are high — and increase if multiple missiles impact the hull.
This is where the new supersonics come in. Their capabilities vary, but they bring two things to this dynamic. First, by significantly reducing the reaction time for shipboard defenses, they increase the likelihood of a successful hit, especially in their sea-skimming variations. Second, their increased speed translates into increased kinetic destructiveness. Even if a missile is destroyed, its fragments can pepper the side of a ship.
The New Market
Three missiles in particular are poised to proliferate more widely:
The BrahMos: Taking its name from a combination of the names of India’s Brahmaputra River and Russia’s Moscow River, the BrahMos is the product of an Indian-Russian venture. Its design work can be traced to the Soviet Union’s fledgling SS-N-26. Begun in 1985, the design had already been through substantial testing by the time India joined the project. Probably neither the most technologically advanced nor the most maneuverable among the supersonic anti-ship missiles, the BrahMos is principally noteworthy for its availability. It is currently being inducted into service with the Indian military and could soon see a surge in proliferation, with Malaysia as the likely first export customer.
The AS-17 “Krypton”: A late-model air-launched missile with a number of air-to-air and air-to-surface roles, this ramjet-powered missile has already been copied by the Chinese, and the Kh-31A series is being used in an anti-ship role. Despite its significantly smaller warhead, the Krypton is noteworthy for its compact size. Su-30 “Flanker” fighter jets can carry four.
The SS-N-27 “Sizzler”: Another late Soviet design, the Sizzler family (known to the Russians as the “Club”) actually encompasses a series of anti-ship, ground attack and anti-submarine missiles. Occasionally known as the SS-N-27B, the anti-ship 3M54 version is of principal interest here, as it includes a sea-skimming supersonic terminal stage that travels at Mach 3 only some 20 feet above the ocean. It covers the last 10 miles of its flight in just over 20 seconds. The guidance systems of this particular missile may be more advanced, and it is thought to have considerable maneuverability in the terminal stage, making it harder to bring down. Its capability was highlighted by the Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, Adm. Timothy J. Keating, when he admitted in testimony before Congress on March 12 that this missile is “a very sophisticated piece of hardware and we are currently not as capable of defending against that missile as I would like.” Though it is not always clear that it is the supersonic variant being deployed, the Sizzler family of missiles has begun seeing significant levels of deployment aboard Russian-built Kilo-class submarines purchased by China and India and could be used on more of the Russian fleet as well. Rosoboronexport, the Russian arms-export monopoly, is increasingly marketing the missile as a package with these subs. Venezuela, Algeria and Libya could even find themselves in possession of this capability down the road.
The Defense
Armoring against this threat has not been a design choice for decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviets began to field supersonic anti-ship missiles with 2,050-pound warheads. This was not a problem to be solved with armor; in addition to the dramatic increase in shipbuilding costs, power plant capability requirements and fuel consumption involved, there was no way to harden a ship — including the superstructure — against such kinetic and explosive destructiveness.
Thus, the United States has long relied upon technology to prevent anti-ship missiles from impacting in the first place. The vaunted Aegis battle management system was designed to coordinate these defenses, which by all measures are quite good. But defenses must continually be cultivated, tested and refined.
For more than five years, voices in the Pentagon have been clamoring that this is not being done. The problem is targets. After the Soviet Union fell, a variation of the Krypton known as the MA-31 was sold to the United States as a supersonic target. However, the MA-31 never went into mass production, and the small inventory — which is almost depleted — is generally used in a high-altitude powered-dive role, rather than a sea-skimming role.
The GQM-163A “Coyote” supersonic sea-skimming target vehicle is currently in production, and the U.S. Navy plans to purchase nearly 40 of them by 2009. While the Coyote might be a near-term acquisition solution, it does not entirely approximate the Sizzler’s subsonic approach and supersonic terminal profile (the Defense Department calls this profile “Threat-D”), and the Pentagon has not had a good supersonic target for some time. Keating’s candor before Congress seems to reinforce the apparent fact that shipboard defenses are not being refined as highly as they could be.
The Problem
This is troubling on two fronts. First, the U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding plan, which calls for a 313-ship fleet, remains in serious near-term question. Ship numbers are dropping, and the next-generation DDG-1000 guided-missile destroyer and Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) are both over budget and behind schedule, while the number of attack submarines in the inventory continues to decline. This makes each individual hull more valuable.
But second, and more importantly, the U.S. Navy has long worked under the assumption that technologically advanced air defenses can provide sufficient protection from these threats. While it is clear that armor probably is not the solution for a navy already struggling to make ends meet in shipbuilding, the inability to prove upgraded shipboard defenses in representative live testing should be a matter of grave concern, especially since these threats may necessitate alterations to tracking software and engagement profiles.
The U.S. Navy retains its global maritime supremacy, and no other nation is in a position to even think about competing in the near term. But modern navies have repeatedly been stung by anti-ship missiles launched by lesser military powers. And this proliferation of a new generation of supersonic anti-ship missiles promises that technologically advanced shipboard defenses have not been tested for the last time.
stratfor
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http://www.military.com/forums/0,152...l?ESRC=army.nl
Demise of the Green Berets?
Soldier of Fortune | Maj. Gen. James Guest, USA | April 16, 2008
For a glimpse into the future of Special Forces, read the Capstone Concept for Special Operations on the USSOCOM web site. Read through it carefully. Can you find the words "Special Forces" anywhere? Or "Special Forces group?" Can you find "ODA" (operational detachment - alpha)? Or "ODB" (operational detachment - bravo)? Or "Special Forces battalion?"
You can't find these words. We can read that as a strong signal that you won't be able to find Special Forces anywhere before very long. Many other signals suggest that the senior leadership in both United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Department of the Army (DA) are working to do away with the Green Berets. The generals at USSOCOM and in the Pentagon have been blurring the distinctions between Special Forces and special operations forces (SOF) units (Rangers, JSOC, SEALs, Delta, et al.) for some time. We now see references to "Air Force special forces," "Navy special forces," and "Marine special forces" but we rarely see the term "U. S. Army Special Forces." We do see "Army SOF," which only describes a grouping of forces, not a capability. We do see SF ODAs referred to as "special operations detachments," another sad precursor of the future.
The Capstone Concept for Special Operations being developed for USSOCOM includes the concept "global expeditionary forces," and all indications point to the intent to replace the SF groups with this new concept. The organizational charts are changing, too, and the plans are for these global expeditionary forces to work directly for USSOCOM worldwide in a Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC)-like configuration. Although the security assistance force (SAF) concept is a much more streamlined and effective mechanism for utilizing U. S. Army Special Forces-the SAF is regionally oriented and works directly for the combatant commander-it has been discarded. Is USA SF Being Eviscerated?
Is this a ploy to be able to take the ODAs and use them operationally without going through the group headquarters (HQ), including the group Special Forces operating bases (SFOB)? Since 1952, conventional force headquarters have attempted to neutralize Special Forces command and control by treating the group and battalion HQ as non-operational administrative units, the purpose of which is to maintain ODAs in order that conventional units, such as JSOC, can cherry-pick them to use as support for their own missions. Reportedly, SF troops are already under the operational control of JSOC. JSOC is using the Green Berets for JSOC's own ends, whether to gather intelligence for JSOC missions or to carry out "special missions" that, if successful, JSOC can take the credit for. You can imagine who will suck up the blame if such a "special mission" goes south.
How can Special Forces be neutralized in this way? If those who want to do away with the Green Berets are successful, they will need the full support of the senior leadership of the U. S. Army. Will they do away with the Special Forces officer branch? The Special Forces warrant officer branch? The Special Forces NCO career management fields (CMF)? To date, we merely have the unusual spectacle of a relatively small unit (USSOCOM)-however joint they may be-taking control of an entire United States Army branch.
The Army transferred control of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center (SWC) and School from Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to the United States Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) in 1990. USASOC has since taken the combat developments capability out of SWC and made it a staff section of USASOC HQ. Bear in mind that this office is the heartbeat (perhaps also the brain) of the force developments and requirements process, and therefore has a major, if not controlling voice in all future concept development, acquisitions, organization, and support doctrine for Special Forces. This, in turn, impacts recruitment, promotions, training, and equipping the force; doctrinal studies and publications; and concept developments to support Special Forces. This also impacts U. S. Army psychological operations and civil affairs concepts and developments. Since this power node was moved from SWC to USASOC, SWC is now a pygmy in the lineup of U.S. Army schools. A harbinger of the future is the recent cut of 13 million dollars from the SWC budget.
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Marine Specops Intrude
Another indication that SWC's leadership position in the unconventional warfare (UW) arena is disappearing is that on 27 June 2007, the USMC formally activated the Marine Special Operations School. The stated intent of the USMC senior leadership is that it will become "the premier FID [foreign internal defense] and Unconventional Warfare University in the entire SOF community."
Approval from USSOCOM was required for this duplication of effort, as well as for the above-quoted statement. There can be no true duplication for many years, if ever. The culture of the USMC will be even less amenable to the necessities of working with, through, and by indigenous people than the culture of the conventional Army. The Marines are a world-class service and a superb fighting force, but they are new to FID and new to unconventional warfare. Many a harsh lesson awaits them if they are going to try to replace the Green Berets. U. S. Army Special Forces has been increasing in proficiency and experience in counterinsurgency (COIN), FID, UW, and international security assistance missions for more than a half century.
Are the Marines willing to take the slots out of their own hide and form up more than 300 Special Forces-type operational detachments? Why would USSOCOM leaders be willing for the USMC to start this effort from scratch, when time is of the essence? Is USSOCOM willing to hand over U. S. Army Special Forces personnel authorizations to the USMC so they can become the premier FID and UW warriors of the future? Is somebody selling wolf tickets?
Specops Tactics Turned Upside Down
In the USSOCOM Capstone Concept, the TTP for conducting Special Forces operations are turned on their heads. This developing concept speaks in terms of pulling everything back to the continental United States (CONUS) and of deploying JSOC units in the same way as carrier battle groups (CBG) and Marine expeditionary units (MEU), instead of doing what has worked so well for so long for Special Forces. Look on pages 9 and 10 of the Capstone Concept, under "Global Expeditionary Force." While this concept would work for raids and other direct actions (such as JSOC, Rangers, SEALs, and USAF Special Tactics Teams are trained to conduct), if USSOCOM attempts to steal the mission of Special Forces by using this model, they will merely create a "roving gnome," who will soon be calling for backup. In short, the USSOCOM Capstone Concept totally ignores the demonstrated and historically successful Special Forces operational concept of working by, with, and through those we are helping.
As a result of more than fifty years of fine tuning, each Special Forces group now operates in its assigned region. Group HQ deploy joint combined exchange training (JCET) teams to enhance bilateral relations and interoperability with regional nations through military-to-military contact. These U. S. Special Forces JCET teams establish long-term relationships with indigenous personnel. They work to improve regional unit combat skills and observance of humanitarian requirements. They develop trust between host nations and the USA, with a program tailored to meet specific needs as identified by Green Berets on the ground. This capability will disappear with the Green Berets, and no SOF "shock-and awe" can replace it.
Armchair Specops
Compared to the lean organization of Special Forces, the USSOCOM model creates a bureaucracy with too many supervisors for too few workers, with the supervisors far away from the action. Money that would be better spent on the mission will be used for funding extra layers of chair-borne supervisors. Worse, an unwieldy organization will get in the way of accomplishing the mission. The men on the ground have a much better feel for what they need to do and how best to do it, while the top-down bureaucratic rigidity frustrates more than it facilitates.
Will these newly created bureaucratic slots be filled with Special Forces officers and NCOs? What do you think? The conventional officers who have risen to the highest ranks through their connections with JSOC, Delta, the Rangers, 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment, and the SEALs will be in charge. There is only one Special Forces officer (newly promoted) above the rank of major general, so, once again, Special Forces are being decapitated and will be under the ultimate command of those who have never gone through selection and assessment, never attended the SFOC, never served a tour on an ODA, and never served repeated assignments in a SFG(A).
The 2006 version of the USSOCOM Capstone Concept that we can access online does not show the new organizational charts that are presently proposed for the global expeditionary forces in the 2007 Capstone Concept. They are classified, but in the end there may be more than a dozen staff officers and NCOs for every soldier who will be assigned the mission on the ground. Reliable sources state that, even now, there are more than 130 (perhaps as many as 160) U. S. Army E-9s in Army special mission units assigned to JSOC. When that is compared with the 13 to15 E-9s in a Special Forces group, it does tend to raise eyebrows. What are they doing? According to the reports, thirteen of them are packing parachutes.
SOF DVD w/o SF
In April 2007, USSOCOM put out a 20-minute DVD celebrating its twentieth anniversary. Even though Special Forces personnel make up the greatest part of the USSOCOM forces, the U. S. Army Special Forces are never once mentioned in this DVD. Although Special Forces is the oldest force in USSOCOM and has been the USSOCOM workhorse since its inception, not one Green Beret is seen in the montage of photographs.
Colonel Banks is not mentioned in the historical overview, or General Yarborough, or General Healy. There is no reference to Colonel Bull Simons, to Colonel Charlie Beckwith, nor to General Joe Lutz. Yet without these men, the path to the present day in United States "special operations" would be difficult to imagine. Most amazingly, the DVD makes no reference to President John F. Kennedy, who supported the establishment of Special Forces in 1961.
Will Special Forces exist ten or twenty years down the road? What can we do to ensure the continuing existence and contribution of the Green Berets?
It is time to fight again, this time for the preservation of the force. If we do not protest the poor stewardship of the U. S. Army and USSOCOM leaders concerning U. S. Army Special Forces and its unique capability, we will certainly see this capability diminish.
__________________
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OPINION
Air Combat by Remote Control
By BRIAN M. CARNEY
May 12, 2008; Page A13
Indian Springs, Nev.
The sniper never knew what hit him. The Marines patrolling the street below were taking fire, but did not have a clear shot at the third-story window that the sniper was shooting from. They were pinned down and called for reinforcements.
Help came from a Predator drone circling the skies 20 miles away. As the unmanned plane closed in, the infrared camera underneath its nose picked up the muzzle flashes from the window. The sniper was still firing when the Predator's 100-pound Hellfire missile came through the window and eliminated the threat.
The airman who fired that missile was 8,000 miles away, here at Creech Air Force Base, home of the 432nd air wing. The 432nd officially "stood up," in the jargon of the Air Force, on May 1, 2007. One year later, two dozen of its drones patrol the skies over Iraq and Afghanistan every hour of every day. And almost all of them are flown by two-man crews sitting in the air-conditioned comfort of a "ground control station" (GCS) in the Nevada desert.
The Predator.
Col. Chris Chambliss, 49, was an F-16 pilot for 20 years before being tapped as the 432nd's first wing commander. He can tell you -- to the day -- the last time he flew an F-16 (March 29, 2007), but he insists he has no regrets about giving up his cockpit for the earthbound GCS of the Predator and its big sibling, the Reaper. "It's much more fun," Col. Chambliss admits, "to climb up a ladder and strap on an airplane than it is to walk into a GCS and sit down." But the payoff comes, he contends, in far greater effectiveness "in the fight."
"In that F-16 squadron that I was in," he says, "you'd come into that squadron for three years, and you might deploy once or twice for 120 days into the theater," but after 120 days, normal military rotations would require you to come back, rest and retrain. So in a three-year tour, an airman might be deployed for eight months or a year.
Col. Chambliss's Predator and Reaper squadrons don't have that problem. Out of 250 aviators, they might deploy eight of them to Iraq or Afghanistan at any given time to take off and land the planes -- a task that still has to be done locally. The rest of the pilots and crew men work shifts at Creech, flying for eight hours before handing the plane off to the next shift. This means that at any given moment a squadron of drones is using 80% of its assets in combat, compared to perhaps 30% for an F-16 squadron.
It's this effectiveness multiplier that led Secretary of Defense Robert Gates recently to call on the Air Force to put every available Predator into the air in Iraq. But how we got here is itself a story of innovation and creative thinking going back more than a decade. It's a story that shows how even the military can do more with less, starting with the modestly priced $4.2 million airframe originally designed as a reconnaissance vehicle.
Predators were first deployed in Bosnia in 1996. At the time, they were limited to the line of sight of their base stations. But in 2003, two things happened to expand the range of possibilities by an order of magnitude. For one, the Air Force routed the signal from the satellite downlink via fiber-optics. This allowed them to put the ground control stations -- the cockpits -- anywhere in the world that a fiber connection was available. Also that year, as the Iraq invasion was gearing up, the Air Force decided to try strapping a Hellfire missile on the Predator, transforming it from a reconnaissance role into a multipurpose weapon.
Today, the Reaper, which went into service in Afghanistan last September (a year ahead of schedule), can carry nearly the same payload as an F-16 -- typically two 500-pound laser-guided bombs and four Hellfires.
These are early days for unmanned aerial warfare. The 432nd is only one year old, and its mission continues to evolve. The 42nd Attack Squadron -- the Reaper squadron -- is still young, and still small, with only enough men and equipment to keep two planes at a time in the skies over Afghanistan.
Col. Chambliss compares the situation to the early decades of manned flight. "You know how fast things went from the end of the First World War to the end of the Second World War, how aviation, the capabilities vastly increased. That's where we're sitting right now. . . . I have no doubt when I'm sitting in my rocking chair, a retired old guy, I will be sitting there going, 'You've got to be kidding me.'"
Mr. Carney is a member of The Wall Street Journal editorial board.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion
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We Still Need a Larger Army
By THOMAS DONNELLY and FREDERICK W. KAGAN
May 23, 2008
"That is the war we are in.
That is the war we must win."
Defense Secretary Robert Gates is a plainspoken man, as befits his Texas roots. His words, quoted above, were about the war in Iraq. But as a remarkable series of recent speeches indicates, he intends to do what he can during the final months of his tenure to reorient the American military for the tasks of the "Long War."
This is long overdue. Donald Rumsfeld, Mr. Gates' predecessor, famously lamented that you went to war with the force you had, not the one you'd like to have. Yet in the years since 9/11, the U.S. military still hasn't developed into the force that we need. To be sure, our soldiers have transformed themselves radically, painstakingly acquiring the arts of modern irregular warfare. But success in Baghdad and Kabul will be hard to sustain unless it is matched in Washington.
As Mr. Gates recognizes, the first order of business is to expand, restructure and modernize U.S. land forces. Unfortunately, the Bush administration's program – to grow the active Army and Marine Corps from the current 700,000 to about 750,000 in the next five years – is a Rumsfeld legacy and entirely inadequate. Regardless of the number of troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, we will need a total active land force of something like one million soldiers and Marines.
The active duty portion of the U.S. Army needs to grow to about 800,000 soldiers. That's the size maintained during the 1980s and into the early 1990s, and it is a bare minimum for success in the many and varied missions that will be required in the future – missions that have ranged from "building partnership capacity" in West Africa to tracking down terrorists in Southeast Asia, as well as large-scale invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Those who believe that the need for such a force size will abate as troops are drawn down in Iraq should consider the larger pattern of American operations over the past generation. Since its creation in 1983, the U.S. Central Command, which is responsible for operations in East Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, has demanded an ever-increasing American presence, a presence which has changed from being largely air and maritime to boots on the ground. That's the war we are in.
Repairing and reshaping the active Army is also key to restoring the Marine Corps to its traditional and still essential role as a sea-based contingency force. And it is critical in order to return the Army National Guard to a proper place as a national strategic reserve, and an operational force with state responsibilities. The Army is the keystone in the arch of America's land-force structure.
The Army brigade also needs to be reworked. Under a plan initiated in the late 1990s – and embraced by Mr. Rumsfeld as part of his program of defense transformation to "lighten" the Army by creating a larger number of smaller, "modularized" brigades – the personnel strength of an Army brigade was reduced to about 3,500. Yet in practice in Iraq and Afghanistan, as units scramble to secure additional mission-enabling capabilities, the total climbs to about 5,000 – roughly the strength of a premodularized unit. The current Bush expansion plan will not remedy the problem of having more but weaker units.
More important, the concept of the "tooth-to-tail ratio" needs to be revisited. For the past generation, military reformers looked at the support, headquarters and institutional base of the armed services, especially the Army, as overhead fat to be trimmed ruthlessly. But in an irregular warfare environment, the old tail – military police, engineers, civil affairs units, intelligence analysts, command-and-control nodes, military education and so on – is the new tooth.
Finally, the failure to modernize U.S. land-force equipment has stunted the ability of the Marines and Army to meet their new missions. The Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected vehicle provides a case in point. The Army also has not expanded its planned procurement of wheeled Stryker vehicles, nor accelerated the pace at which it is "networking" the force under the Future Combat Systems project.
There have been extraordinarily successful experiments suggesting that the effectiveness and survivability of dismounted infantry can be exponentially multiplied, even in a complex, urban environment. But the so-called Land Warrior program has been managed with peacetime lethargy rather than wartime urgency.
While there is a general bipartisan consensus that America's land forces are too small, there are big differences among the candidates about the size of the problem. Sen. John McCain, for example, has suggested that the active Army and Marine Corps should be increased to about 900,000. Sen. Barack Obama, by contrast, believes the Bush expansion plan is sufficient.
The limitations of America's land forces remain the most fundamental constraint on U.S. military strategy. Unless we begin now to restore and reshape the services to do what we have asked them to do, there will be tragic consequences: not that our Army and Marine Corps will be "broken," but that our nation will not win the war that it is in.
Messrs. Donnelly and Kagan are co-authors of "Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power," just published by AEI Press.
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GEOPOLITICAL WEEKLY: THE U.S. AIR FORCE AND THE NEXT WAR
By George Friedman
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has fired the secretary of the Air Force and
the Air Force chief of staff. The official reason given for the firings was the
mishandling of nuclear weapons and equipment related to nuclear weapons, which
included allowing an aircraft to fly within the United States with six armed nuclear
weapons on board and accidentally shipping nuclear triggers to Taiwan. An
investigation conducted by a Navy admiral concluded that Air Force expertise in
handling nuclear weapons had declined.
Focusing on Present Conflicts
While Gates insisted that this was the immediate reason for the firings, he has
sharply criticized the Air Force for failing to reorient itself to the types of
conflict in which the United States is currently engaged. Where the Air Force
leadership wanted to focus on deploying a new generation of fighter aircraft, Gates
wanted them deploying additional unmanned aircraft able to provide reconnaissance
and carry out airstrikes in Iraq and Afghanistan.
These are not trivial issues, but they are the tip of the iceberg in a much more
fundamental strategic debate going on in the U.S. defense community. Gates put the
issue succinctly when he recently said that "I have noticed too much of a tendency
toward what might be called 'next-war-itis' -- the propensity of much of the defense
establishment to be in favor of what might be needed in a future conflict." This is
what the firings were about.
Naturally, as soon as the firings were announced, there were people who assumed they
occurred because these two were unwilling to go along with plans to bomb Iran. At
this point, the urban legend of an imminent war with Iran has permeated the culture.
But the Air Force is the one place where calls for an air attack would find little
resistance, particularly at the top, because it would give the Air Force the kind of
mission it really knows how to do and is good at. The whole issue in these firings
is whether what the Air Force is good at is what the United States needs.
There is a neat alignment of the issues involved in the firings. Nuclear arms were
the quintessential weapons of the Cold War, the last generation. Predators and
similar unmanned aircraft are part of this generation's warfare. The Air Force sees
F-22s and other conventional technology as the key weapons of the next generation.
The Air Force leadership, facing decades-long timelines in fielding new weapons
systems, feels it must focus on the next war now. Gates, responsible for fighting
this generation's war, sees the Air Force as neglecting current requirements. He
also views it as essentially having lost interest and expertise in the last
generation's weapons, which are still important -- not to mention extremely
dangerous.
Fighting the Last War
The classic charge against generals is that they always want to fight the last war
again. In charging the Air Force with wanting to fight the next war now, Gates is
saying the Air Force has replaced the old problem with a new one. The Air Force's
view of the situation is that if all resources are poured into fighting this war,
the United States will emerge from it unprepared to fight the next war. Underneath
this discussion of past and future wars is a more important and defining set of
questions. First, can the United States afford to fight this war while
simultaneously preparing for the next one? Second, what will the next war look like;
will it be different from this one?
There is a school of thought in the military that argues that we have now entered
the fourth generation of warfare. The first generation of war, according to this
theory, involved columns and lines of troops firing muzzle-loaded weapons in
volleys. The second generation consisted of warfare involving indirect fire
(artillery) and massed movement, as seen in World War I. Third-generation warfare
comprised mobile warfare, focused on outmaneuvering the enemy, penetrating enemy
lines and encircling them, as was done with armor during World War II. The first
three generations of warfare involved large numbers of troops, equipment and
logistics. Large territorial organizations -- namely, nation-states -- were required
to carry them out.
Fourth-generation warfare is warfare carried out by nonstate actors using small,
decentralized units and individuals to strike at enemy forces and, more important,
create political support among the population. The classic example of
fourth-generation warfare would be the intifadas carried out by Palestinians against
Israel. They involved everything from rioters throwing rocks to kidnappings to
suicide bombings. The Palestinians could not defeat the Israel Defense Forces (IDF),
a classic third-generation force, in any conventional sense -- but neither could the
IDF vanquish the intifadas, since the battlefield was the Palestinians themselves.
So long as the Palestinians were prepared to support their fourth-generation
warriors, they could extract an ongoing price against Israeli civilians and
soldiers. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict thus became one of morale rather than
materiel. This was the model, of course, the United States encountered in Iraq.
Fourth-generation warfare has always existed. Imperial Britain faced it in
Afghanistan. The United States faced it at the turn of the last century in the
Philippines. King David waged fourth-generation warfare in Galilee. It has been a
constant mode of warfare. The theorists of fourth-generational warfare are not
arguing that the United States will face this type of war along with others, but
that going forward, this type of warfare will dominate -- that the wars of the
future will be fourth-generation wars.
Nation-States and Fourth-Generation Warfare
Implicit in this argument is the view that the nation-state, which has dominated
warfare since the invention of firearms, is no longer the primary agent of wars.
Each of the previous three generations of warfare required manpower and resources on
a very large scale that only a nation-state could provide. Fidel Castro in the Cuban
mountains, for example, could not field an armored division, an infantry brigade or
a rifle regiment; it took a nation to fight the first three generations of warfare.
The argument now is that nations are not the agents of wars but its victims. Wars
will not be fought between nations, but between nations and subnational groups that
are decentralized, sparse, dispersed and primarily conducting war to attack their
target's morale. The very size of the forces dispersed by a nation-state makes them
vulnerable to subnational groups by providing a target-rich environment. Being
sparse and politically capable, the insurgent groups blend into the population and
are difficult to ferret out and defeat.
In such a war, the nation-state's primary mission is to identify the enemy, separate
him from the population and destroy him. It is critical to be surgical in attacking
the enemy, since the enemy wins whenever an attack by the nation-state hits the
noncombatant population, even if its own forces are destroyed -- this is political
warfare. Therefore, the key to success -- if success is possible -- is intelligence.
It is necessary to know the enemy's whereabouts, and strike him when he is not near
the noncombatant population.
The Air Force and UAVs
In fourth-generation warfare, therefore, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are one of
the keys to defeating the substate actor. They gather intelligence, wait until the
target is not surrounded by noncombatants and strike suddenly and without warning.
It is the quintessential warfare for a technologically advanced nation fighting a
subnational insurgent group embedded in the population. It is not surprising that
Gates, charged with prosecuting a fourth-generation war, is furious at the Air Force
for focusing on fighter planes when what it needs are more and better UAVs.
The Air Force, which was built around the concept of air superiority and strategic
bombing, has a visceral objection to unmanned aircraft. From its inception, the Air
Force (and the Army Air Corps before it) argued that modern warfare would be fought
between nation-states, and that the defining weapon in this kind of war would be the
manned bomber attacking targets with precision. When it became apparent that the
manned bomber was highly vulnerable to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft systems, the
doctrine was modified with the argument that the Air Force's task was to establish
air superiority using fighter aircraft to sweep the skies of the enemy and strike
aircraft to take out anti-aircraft systems -- clearing the way for bombers or,
later, the attack aircraft.
The response to the Air Force position is that the United States is no longer
fighting the first three types of war, and that the only wars the United States will
fight now will be fourth-generation wars where command of the air is both a given
and irrelevant. The Air Force's mission would thus be obsolete. Only nation-states
have the resources to resist U.S. airpower, and the United States isn't going to be
fighting one of them again.
This should be the key point of contention for the Air Force, which should argue
that there is no such thing as fourth-generation warfare. There have always been
guerrillas, assassins and other forms of politico-military operatives. With the
invention of explosives, they have been able to kill more people than before, but
there is nothing new in this. What is called fourth-generation warfare is simply a
type of war faced by everyone from Alexander to Hitler. It is just resistance. This
has not superseded third-generation warfare; it merely happens to be the type of
warfare the United States has faced recently.
Wars between nation-states, such as World War I and World War II, are rare in the
sense that the United States fought many more wars like the Huk rising in the
Philippines or the Vietnam War in its guerrilla phase than it did world wars.
Nevertheless, it was the two world wars that determined the future of the world and
threatened fundamental U.S. interests. The United States can lose a dozen Vietnams
or Iraqs and not have its interests harmed. But losing a war with a nation-state
could be catastrophic.
The Next War vs. the War That Matters
The response to Gates, therefore, is that the Air Force is not preparing for the
next war. It is preparing for the war that really matters rather than focusing on an
insurgency that ultimately cannot threaten fundamental U.S. interests. Gates, of
course, would answer that the Air Force is cavalier with the lives of troops who are
fighting the current war as it prepares to fight some notional war. The Air Force
would counter that the notional war it is preparing to fight could decide the
survival of the United States, while the war being fought by Gates won't. At this
point, the argument would deadlock, and the president and Congress would decide
where to place their bets.
But the argument is not quite over at this point. The Air Force's point about
preparing for the decisive wars is, in our mind, well-taken. It is hard for us to
accept the idea that the nation-state is helpless in front of determined subnational
groups. More important, it is hard for us to accept the idea that international
warfare is at an end. There have been long periods in the past of relative
tranquility between nation-states -- such as, for example, the period between the
fall of Napoleon and World War I. Wars between nations were sparse, and the European
powers focused on fourth-generational resistance in their colonies. But when war
came in 1914, it came with a vengeance.
Our question regards the weapons the Air Force wants to procure. It wants to build
the F-22 fighter at enormous cost, which is designed to penetrate enemy airspace,
defeat enemy fighter aircraft and deliver ordnance with precision to a particular
point on the map. Why would one use a manned aircraft for that mission? The
evolution of cruise missiles with greater range and speed permits the delivery of
the same ordnance to the same target without having a pilot in the cockpit. Indeed,
cruise missiles can engage in evasive maneuvers at g-forces that would kill a pilot.
And cruise missiles exist that could serve as unmanned aircraft, flying to the
target, releasing submunitions and returning home. The combination of space-based
reconnaissance and the unmanned cruise missile -- in particular, next-generation
systems able to move at hypersonic speeds (in excess of five times the speed of
sound) -- would appear a much more efficient and effective solution to the problem
of the next generation of warfare.
We could argue that both Gates and the Air Force are missing the point. Gates is
right that the Air Force should focus on unmanned aircraft; technology has simply
moved beyond the piloted aircraft as a model. But this does not mean the Air Force
should not be preparing for the next war. Just as the military should have been
preparing for the U.S.-jihadist war while also waging the Cold War, so too, the
military should be preparing for the next conflict while fighting this war. For a
country that spends as much time in wars as the United States (about 17 percent of
the 20th century in major wars, almost all of the 21st century), Gates' wish to
focus so narrowly on this war seems reckless.
At the same time, building a new and fiendishly expensive version of the last
generation's weapons does not necessarily constitute preparing for the next war. The
Air Force was built around the piloted combat aircraft. The Navy was built around
sailing ships. Those who flew and those who sailed were necessary and courageous.
But sailing ships don't fit into the modern fleet, and it is not clear to us that
manned aircraft will fit into high-intensity peer conflict in the future.
We do not agree that preparing for the next war is pathological. We should always be
fighting this war and preparing for the next. But we don't believe the Air Force is
preparing for the next war. There will be wars between nations, fought with all the
chips on the table. Gates is right that the Air Force should focus on unmanned
aircraft. But not because of this war alone.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to
www.stratfor.com.
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U.S.: To Kill a Carrier
Stratfor Today » July 2, 2008 | 1951 GMT
Patrick M. Bonafede/U.S. Navy via Getty Images
The Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72)Summary
The Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier is perhaps the greatest symbol of American military power. But this titan among ships possesses vulnerabilities.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Pages
Tracking U.S. Naval Power
U.S. Military Dominance
Related Links
United States: The Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile Threat
The Limitations and Necessity of Naval Power
U.S.: Naval Dominance and the SSN
BAMS’ Role in Furthering U.S. Naval Dominance
Print Version
To download a PDF of this piece that was suggested by Stratfor Member Michael Kuzik, Click here.
If there is a single symbol of the military power of the United States and its global reach, it is the Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Although capable of projecting immense striking power, these warships also possess inherent vulnerabilities.
The lead ship of the class, the USS Nimitz (CVN-68), was laid down in 1968. The 10th and last of its class, the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77), will not be commissioned until 2009, more than four decades after the USS Nimitz. Built around a massive 4.5-acre flight deck and displacing more than 100,000 tons, the class represents the largest warships ever constructed.
This size allows the Nimitz-class to embark an air wing with more than 60 combat aircraft, comparable to the number of such aircraft in a small NATO member state’s entire air force. Even today, refinements in the composition of the carrier air wing and the maturation of precision-guided munitions now allow a single carrier air wing to hit the same target set that would have required more than six such wings at the end of the Cold War. In more than three decades of operational service, they have proven themselves again and again an invaluable tool of U.S. foreign policy and military operations.
Yet part and parcel of this immense size and impressive strike capacity is the inherent vulnerability of the modern U.S. aircraft carrier.
The Problem
The much-vaunted battleship was eclipsed by carrier-based airpower during World War II. The battleship’s vulnerability was inextricably tied to its design, which incorporated immense armor and massive guns. Such battleship designs were excellent for tasks like sinking the HMS Hood, but were poorly tailored to the era of torpedo bombers.
It is not that the battleship was obsolete — the final Iowa-class battleships were only finally stricken from the U.S. Naval Vessel Register in 2006 — but rather, the apex and decline of one era crossing the emergence and rise of the next era. The proof of this transition was provided by the massive naval battles of World War II.
No similar opportunity to observe carriers taking on the latest anti-ship technologies has emerged, though one loomed for most of the latter half of the 20th century in the prospect of a massive naval competition for the North Atlantic if war broke out in Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
Nevertheless, the rise of the latest generation of supersonic anti-ship missiles is unmistakably under way. Since the advent of the first anti-ship missiles, the United States has fought to defend its carriers. This was the proximate motivation for Aegis — the battle control system of Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile destroyers. Designed to coordinate the defenses of a carrier battle group and defeat dozens and dozens of incoming Soviet anti-ship missiles (a mission for which it has never been tested in combat), Aegis is the embodiment of the fundamental vulnerability of the aircraft carrier.
One of the great technological achievements of the Cold War, Aegis symbolized the cutting edge of naval technology. To this day, it stands as perhaps the essential link in the U.S. Navy’s competitive technological advantage in battle. Nevertheless, it took this revolutionary development to attempt to defend against the already-extant threat of Soviet anti-ship missiles. Such technology has been around for decades now, and will only continue to proliferate and improve.
The Kill
More simply, the cost — both financial and technological — to defend the carrier from the threat is at least an order of magnitude more than the cost of threatening the carrier. This is particularly true in scenarios when numerous less-advanced anti-ship missiles are used in a bid to overwhelm qualitatively superior defenses.
The danger is not necessarily that enough missiles might get through to actually sink the carrier. Certainly, if just some of the 3,000 tons of aviation ordnance or the more than 2.5 million gallons of aviation fuel aboard a carrier were ignited, they might facilitate just that. Instead, the danger is that the missiles would achieve a “mission kill.” Sinking a warship and denying it the capacity to carry out its function — especially in wartime — is not the same thing. Good damage control may keep a crippled ship afloat, or even allow it to limp back to port. But this, by no means, suggests that the ship would be likely to stay in the fight. This is the mission kill.
In some ways, these considerations are especially critical in the case of an aircraft carrier. A carrier must be able to steer into the wind and maintain a steady course and speed to launch — and especially to recover — aircraft. A list to port or starboard that would be an annoyance to a surface combatant could quickly pose a much more significant problem for flight operations. The hangar deck and flight deck can be incredibly crowded with a full air wing embarked and flight operations under way. Taking any portion of the flight deck or even a single elevator out of commission could have a very real impact on the efficiency of those operations. Certain systems, such as the catapults and arresting gear, are absolute necessities. A strike that disables either of these systems makes the carrier a very expensive parking lot with a handful of helicopters able to enter the fight.
The Threat
A fully alert carrier strike group (CSG) with airborne early warning, combat air patrols and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) surveillance under way has the highest situational awareness one could hope to achieve on the high seas today, possessing an immense defensive capability at its highest state of readiness. It would be extremely difficult for a flight of aircraft armed with anti-ship missiles to penetrate that air cover, and even surface formations should be monitored from a great distance. (Indeed, in the open ocean, a CSG is not necessarily even easy to find in the first place, given the maritime intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities of most nations in the world.)
And yet this is not a posture that can be sustained efficiently or indefinitely. U.S. CSGs rarely are surrounded by open water in operations in the 21st century. Transiting the world’s narrow shipping lanes — from the straits of Malacca and Hormuz to the Suez Canal — and supporting missions from the comparatively cramped waters of the Persian Gulf or off the coast of Pakistan, the CSG necessarily opens itself to challenges for which it was not designed.
There is little room for these ships to maneuver in some of these choke points, and exercises have reportedly shown that swarming by large numbers of small craft might prove an effective means of overwhelming and penetrating shipboard defenses. Mining also is a potential concern. Meanwhile, the clutter of air and littoral traffic along the shore vastly complicates the security the open ocean affords, opening up opportunities for the use of shore-based anti-ship missiles or aircraft operating — until the last moment — inside foreign airspace. But even more important, these choke points and the complexities of anti-submarine warfare in the littoral environment open up opportunities for conventional diesel-electric submarines.
Such submarines do not have the endurance to hunt down a CSG in the open ocean, nor the ability to keep up if the CSG moves at speed. But they can be exceptionally quiet at a few knots while running on battery power and can loiter around sea lanes and choke points. Methods of attack available to them range from traditional mines and torpedoes to some of the most advanced anti-ship missiles in the world, all capable of being launched from below the surface. In October 2006, just such a submarine — in this case a Chinese People’s Liberation Army-Navy Song class (Type 039) — surfaced within 5 miles of the USS Kitty Hawk, well within range of both anti-ship missiles and torpedoes.
The utility of the carrier as an anti-submarine warfare (ASW) platform was once meaningful, although defending the carrier itself necessitated most of the ASW assets it carried. But the S-3 Viking, the last carrier-based fixed-wing ASW platform, was then “upgraded” to the S-3B — from which mission-specific ASW equipment was stripped at the turn of the century — and is being withdrawn from service. The MH-60R Seahawk is slated to become the only ship-based airborne ASW asset in the fleet, and it will count ASW among half a dozen other primary missions.
The U.S. Navy’s ASW capability has deteriorated in the face of more pressing missions relevant to the U.S.-jihadist war. Today, a P-3 Orion maritime surveillance aircraft crew can deploy to the 5th Fleet and conduct few if any ASW exercises or patrols, focusing instead on supporting operations ashore in Iraq. Whether that was the right choice or not is irrelevant to this discussion. The fact of the matter is that ASW is a particularly delicate art that requires careful drilling — drilling that is not happening anywhere close to the scale of that during the Cold War years.
Meanwhile, China is reportedly refining an anti-ship ballistic missile especially tailored to target carriers off its coast. This change of aspect could present new challenges for shipboard defenses.
Conclusion
The claim that because a military asset is at risk, it is therefore obsolete is obviously false, and is certainly not the claim we are making here. One cannot argue that because the world’s surface warships can be shot at, they are obsolete. The immense power projection capability that the aircraft carrier brings to bear is undeniable. As a tool of global military dominance, it is invaluable. Like the battleship, its utility will extend far into the future beyond the apex of its era. However, its offensive value must be weighed against defensive requirements. What we are asking, instead, is this: In the age of proliferating supersonic anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles and broad area maritime surveillance, has the long, slow decline of the age of the aircraft carrier already begun?
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Qatar, U.S.: A Strategic Aircraft Purchase
Stratfor Today » July 22, 2008 | 1824 GMT
Photo by USAF
The Boeing C-17 Globemaster IIISummary
Qatar inked a deal with Boeing Corp. for an unspecified number of C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters July 21 with deliveries expected to begin in 2009. This purchase of a tool of global reach is noteworthy, and likely reflects both Boeing’s intense effort to keep its C-17 production line open and Qatar’s strategic thinking.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Page
U.S. Military Dominance
Boeing Corp. announced the sale of an unspecified number of C-17 Globemaster III strategic airlifters to Qatar on July 21. Deliveries are reportedly expected in 2009. Though few details were given, the acquisition of such a platform — a tool of global reach — warrants closer examination.
The C-17 first became operational with the U.S. Air Force (USAF) in 1995, though its design heritage dates back to the 1980s and the Cold War. Though its development was troubled, delayed and over budget, the C-17 is now considered a very capable transport aircraft. (Its maximum payload weight is four times that of the venerable C-130 Hercules.) With only just over a decade in Air Force service, some airframes have already exceeded their initial service life, racking up in excess of 90,000 hours.
The increased strain of global operations since 9/11, including Iraq and especially Afghanistan, has thrown the metrics of the late 1990s in terms of expected military airlift requirements out the window (something further compounded by the expansion now under way of the U.S. Army and Marines by 90,000 members).
But though the Air Force has ordered some additional airframes, Boeing still faces the closure of its C-17 production line in Long Beach, Calif., in the next few years. Boeing thus has been pitching the C-17 not only to the U.S. Congress bypassing the Air Force), but to allies abroad.
Deliveries of a handful of C-17s already have taken place or are under way to the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and NATO (all not coincidentally feeling the strain of sustaining forces in Afghanistan). But Qatar — a country with fewer citizens than the United States has active duty military personnel — obviously represents a sale to a U.S. ally of a different caliber.
Yet strangely, the move makes a bit of sense. The sprawling Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar is no stranger to U.S. C-17s. According to Boeing, Qatar also will sign a contractor logistics support agreement with the Air Force — meaning the Pentagon can place a fairly high degree of confidence in the state of maintenance of Qatar’s C-17s.
This is no small point. Compared to the other U.S. allies that have invested in the C-17, Qatar’s global military footprint is minuscule. Qatar is not about to become a global player militarily; its might beyond the Middle East is economic in nature.
Though Qatar Airways is making massive investments in civilian airliners (both passenger and freight models), the C-17 deal was signed with Doha directly and explained in terms of the Qatar Armed Forces. The C-17 is optimized for military considerations like landing at austere, basic airfields and for carrying heavy armored vehicles. Freight variants of civilian designs like the Boeing 777 are generally better suited for commercial air freight, especially palletized freight. Even so, it would not necessarily be surprising to see Qatar occasionally contract its C-17s for outsized custom air transport needs, perhaps even orchestrated through Qatar Airways.
But the real underlying attraction is geopolitical. By choosing to invest in the C-17, Qatar will hold a military capability that can be incredibly valuable to the Pentagon in a crisis. This gives Doha an additional card to play, and maybe a modicum of influence (just as allowing major U.S. basing from its territory does) in potential U.S. operations in which Qatar feels it has a national interest.
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GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: U.S. TROOP ALLOCATIONS AND FUTURE PRIORITIES
U.S. President George W. Bush said on Monday that he will withdraw up to 8,000
troops from Iraq before he leaves office. At the same time, he intends to increase
the number of troops in Afghanistan. The reduction in forces will begin in November.
A Marine battalion will be withdrawn and its replacement will be sent to Afghanistan
instead. Then an Army brigade plus support troops will be withdrawn and not
replaced, bringing the total withdrawn to about 8,000 troops. That means that the
number of troops in Iraq when Bush leaves office will be slightly higher than when
the surge began.
There are two reasons for the withdrawal. First, there is clearly the need for
additional troops in Afghanistan. The situation there is deteriorating because the
Taliban have gained strength over recent years and because the number of troops
there is insufficient to defeat them or even to guarantee that at some point the
Taliban won't be able to inflict substantial regional defeats on U.S. and NATO
forces. Reinforcements have to be sent, and the primary pool of available forces is
either in Iraq or scheduled to go there.
Secondly -- and this is an objective and not partisan observation -- there is an
election going on in the United States, and the president wants John McCain to win.
That means that he must reinforce McCain's assertion that the surge has worked by
withdrawing at least some forces. The argument that the surge has succeeded is not
compatible with the argument that force levels can't be reduced. So between
Afghanistan and the election, some reduction was necessary.
What is interesting is that only an 8,000-troop reduction is being proposed. Bush
is following the recommendation of Gen. David Petraeus, who commanded U.S. forces in
Iraq and who, as U.S. Central Command chief, is now responsible for both Iraq and
Afghanistan. Petraeus is clearly uncomfortable with the state of things in Iraq. He
has said as much. The tensions within the Iraqi government are substantial, and if
they are not resolved, some of the factions may choose to resume the civil war.
Relations with Iran remain unclear, and in spite of some assurances that the
Iranians no longer have the kind of clout they used to with Iraqi Shiite militias,
that is a hypothesis that might be true but no one wants to see tested. Iraq remains
a priority over Afghanistan; its status is improved but uncertain, and the bulk of
U.S. forces remain committed to Iraq.
The problem the next president will face is that the U.S. military will be dealing
with more than reinforcing Afghanistan while maintaining stability in Iraq. U.S.
forces are also facing the much larger question, as we have discussed, of how to
deal with Russia after Georgia. This administration continues to discuss including
Georgia and Ukraine in NATO. We do not think this will happen, as European members
will block it, but NATO has already included the Baltic countries at a time when
NATO couldn't imagine an assertive Russia. Now, the United States and others have
made military guarantees to defend the Baltics but have not allocated the forces
needed to deter hypothetical Russian moves. We do not know that the Russians will do
anything there, but the point of deploying forces is to deter such an action. Put
simply, the United States cannot put the forces on the ground in the Baltics to act
as that deterrent.
There is a broader issue, however. The Russians and the Venezuelans are talking
about naval maneuvers in the Caribbean while U.S. warships are in the Black Sea.
The Russo-Venezuelan exercises cannot be taken seriously militarily, and it is
unlikely that the United States will try to get aggressive in the closed waters of
the Black Sea. That said, it is unclear what Russian capabilities and intentions
will be in five to 10 years, and it takes at least that long to enhance naval power
for the United States. If there is to be a competition with the Russians at sea,
Washington will need to budget more money for anti-submarine warfare systems,
enhanced anti-missile systems on more vessels and so on. These are systems that the
United States has and is funding, but not with a sense of urgency.
It will be for the next administration to determine how serious the Russians are
going to be in a decade. But the U.S. Navy is certainly going to try to lay claim to
a greater budget share, while NATO and U.S. troops in Europe may no longer appear to
be an anachronism. Keeping substantial forces in Iraq, building up forces in
Afghanistan, reinforcing NATO and funding faster and deeper naval development are
not possible within the current Defense Department budget. Something has to give,
and that is either some of these commitments or the budget. President Obama or
President McCain will have an interesting opening act.
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Army to Test Air Burst Weapon for Joes
September 26, 2008
Military.com|by Christian Lowe
For once it seems the Army is actually turning fiction into science.
After nearly a decade in the shadows -- with billions spent on earlier versions long since abandoned -- the Army is moving quickly to field a revolutionary new weapon to Joes a lot sooner than anyone had ever imagined.
It's a weapon that can take out a bad guy behind a wall, beyond a hill or below a trench, and do it more accurately and with less collateral damage than anything on the battlefield today, officials say. It's called the XM25 Individual Air Burst Weapon, and by next month the service will have three prototypes of the precision-guided 25mm rifle ready for testing.
A 'leap ahead' in lethality
"We've done a lot of testing with this, and what we're seeing is the estimated increase in effectiveness is six times what we'd be getting with a 5.56mm carbine or a grenade launcher," said Rich Audette, Army Deputy Project Manager for Soldier weapons.
"What we're talking about is a true 'leap ahead' in lethality, here. This is a huge step," Audette added during a phone interview with Military.com from his office at Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey.
Born of the much-maligned and highly-controversial Objective Individual Combat Weapon -- a 1990s program that sought a "leap ahead" battle rifle that combined a counter-defilade weapon with a carbine -- the XM25 only recently gained new momentum after the Army formalized a requirement and released a contract in June for a series of test weapons.
Infantry weapons to date have permitted fighters to shoot at or through an obstacle concealing enemy threats, but the Army for years has been trying to come up with a weapon to engage targets behind barriers without resorting to mortars, rockets or grenades -- all of which risk collateral damage. After fits and starts using a 20mm rifle housed in a bulky, overweight, complicated shell, technology finally caught up to shave the XM25 from 21 pounds to a little more than 12 pounds.
If the XM25 does what its developers hope, it will be able to fire an air-bursting round at a target from 16 meters away out to 600 meters with a highly accurate, 360-degree explosive radius.
"This should have the same impact as the incorporation of the machine gun" into infantry units, said Andy Cline, product director for the XM25.
The XM25 is about as long as a collapsed M4, weighs about as much as an M16 with an M203 grenade launcher attached and has about as much kick as a 12-gauge shotgun, said Barb Muldowney, Army deputy program manager for infantry combat weapons.
The semi-auto XM25 comes with a four-round magazine, though testers are looking at whether to increase the capacity to as much as 10 rounds.
A 'smart' weapon
Brains are what really makes this Buck Rogers gun work -- it has them. The weapon combines a thermal optic, day sight, laser range finder, compass and IR illuminator with a fire-control system that wirelessly transmits the exact range of the target into the 25mm round's fuse before firing.
A Soldier can aim the XM25 at a wall concealing a sniper, for example, but "dial in" or adjust the distance by an additional meter above the target. When fired, the Alliant Teksystems-built round will explode above the enemy's position, essentially going around the obstruction, Muldowney said.
"It's so accurate, that when I laze to that target I'm going to be able to explode that round close enough that I'm going to get it," Audette added.
The service hopes to field several other types of 25mm rounds for the XM25, including ones for breaching doors, piercing vehicle armor and non-lethal air-bursting and blunt-impact rounds.
Testers at Picatinny plan to put the XM25 through its paces over the next several months, certifying it as safe for a Soldier to operate and tinkering with the weapon's effectiveness and durability.
The weapon costs about $25,000 each, but experts were quick to point out that a fully-loaded M4 for optics and pointers costs pretty close to $30,000. Each ATK-made 25mm round costs about $25.
Testing next year
As Heckler and Koch, makers of the weapon itself, and L3 Communications -- which makes the fire control system -- crank out more weapons, the Army plans to push an initial batch of test weapons out to the field beginning in March 2009. That could include the first use of such a weapon in combat, Cline said.
If all goes according to plan, the first fully-equipped infantry units could have their first XM25s in hand by 2014, far sooner than the Army's small arms community had predicted even last year.
The program "came very close to ending," Audette explained. "But the Army took a look at all the work that was done -- and the testing that projected the kind of lethality increase that we could get -- and they said 'we've got to do this.' "
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A top national-security adviser to Barack Obama said he expects military spending during a Democratic administration wouldn't drop, a key concern for a defense industry that is accustomed to growing Pentagon budgets and anxious about potential cutbacks.
Getty Images
Democratic presidential candidate Sen. Barack Obama arrives at a rally at Michigan State University in East Lansing on Thursday.
Richard Danzig, a U.S. Navy secretary during the Clinton administration and a leading contender to be the secretary of Defense in an Obama administration, said he doesn't "see defense spending declining in the first years of an Obama administration. There are a set of demands there that are very severe, very important to our national well-being." U.S. defense spending has risen at a steady clip throughout the Bush administration.
Regardless of whether Sen. Obama or his Republican rival, John McCain, is elected, the winner will have little time to tweak details in the fiscal 2010 budget between assuming office in late January and submitting the budget in February. A new administration normally takes months to get new appointees in key jobs, and the Pentagon budget is among the most complex and politically contentious in the federal government.
Mr. Danzig, speaking at a Defense Writers Group breakfast Thursday in Washington, said that Sen. Obama would make sure that the Pentagon doesn't become overly focused on fighting guerrillas and terrorists at the expense of traditional air and sea power. "I think the temptation is to invest in the issue du jour or the cause du jour and to overlook a lot of basics," Mr. Danzig said. At the same time, there will be a focus on "cyber warfare" and unmanned aerial vehicles, he said.
With the election just over a month away, defense-industry executives are hungry for information from either camp. "There is less detail and specifics than there has been in some past elections," said one defense-industry official. While Sen. McCain has a long track record of being tough on defense contractors' waste as a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee -- which he highlighted in the debate Sept. 26 -- Sen. Obama hasn't dealt with those issues.
Randy Scheunemann, a top foreign-policy adviser to Sen. McCain, said in an email that "Sen. Obama has no credibility on defense, while Sen. McCain has firsthand familiarity with national-security issues for decades."
Generally, Mr. Danzig was critical of the weapons-buying process during the past eight years. "The record of this administration in the acquisition area in terms of overruns and the like has been quite poor," said Mr. Danzig. "You need to come to grips with affordability issues and the requirements process."
He also singled out the Army's $160 billion-plus Future Combat Systems modernization plan led by Boeing Co. and SAIC Inc., as well as a program to develop a missile-defense system that includes Boeing, Lockheed Martin Corp. and Northrop Grumman Corp., as efforts that are worthy but in need of a "serious scrub."
Mr. Danzig said that controlling costs is crucial. One way to do that may be to shift the Pentagon's focus to buying greater numbers of less-sophisticated weapons systems. "I think industry can live with this, even embrace it," he said.
One of the thorniest weapons-buying issues awaiting either presidential nominee is the award of a more than $40 billion contract to replace the nation's fleet of aging aerial-refueling tankers. Last month, the Defense Department abandoned plans to award the work to either Northrop or Boeing after a political and legal fight. Mr. Danzig said the companies need a level playing field when dealing with the Air Force, as well as on issues such as a dispute between the U.S. and Europe over commercial-aircraft-development subsidies. As a candidate, Sen. Obama doesn't have a view about which company should win, Mr. Danzig said.
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Washington
For years, the military has been roiled by a heated internal debate over what kind of wars it should prepare to fight.
One faction, led by a host of senior officers, favors buying state-of-the-art weapons systems that would be useful in a traditional conflict with a nation like Russia or China. The other side, which includes Defense Secretary Robert Gates, believes the military should prepare for grinding insurgencies that closely resemble the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan.
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SFC Thomas Wright scans the hills for signs of Taliban insurgents in eastern Afghanistan.
The dispute has long been largely academic, since the soaring defense budgets in the years since the September 2001 terror attacks left plenty of money for each side's main priorities.
That is beginning to change, a casualty of the widening global financial crisis. With the economy slowing and the tab for the government's bailout of the private sector spiraling higher, Democratic lawmakers are signaling that Pentagon officials will soon have to choose which programs to keep and which to cut. In the long and unresolved debate about the military's future, a clearer vision of how best to defend America will emerge -- but not without one side ceding hard-fought ground.
"The services are used to the old approach, with everyone getting everything. But there's not enough money," says Rep. Neil Abercrombie, the Hawaii Democrat who heads the Air and Land Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. "The due bill is finally coming in."
The two competing schools of thought each warn that making the wrong decisions now could imperil U.S. national security down the road. The military officials who favor buying advanced weapons believe that failing to invest in those systems today could leave U.S. forces ill-equipped to fight a modernized Russian or Chinese military in the future. Conversely, advocates of expanding the size of the ground forces argue that the military will be unable to meet the troop demands of the ground wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to say nothing of conflicts elsewhere in the world, unless the Army and Marines recruit tens of thousands of additional troops.
The final decision will ultimately fall to the next administration, which will have to prioritize how to divvy up what may be a significantly smaller defense budget. Neither the Obama nor the McCain campaign has tipped its hand on whether to focus on asymmetric conflicts like Iraq or possible large-scale conventional wars.
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Lockheed Martin
Lockheed Martin's F-22 Raptor during flight tests
In Congress, however, the wheels are already in motion. Pennsylvania Democratic Rep. John Murtha, who controls the congressional purse strings for defense issues, startled Pentagon officials recently when he said that longstanding plans to recruit more soldiers and Marines would need to be scaled back or canceled.
Mr. Abercrombie, meanwhile, has fought to cut funding from the Army's flagship weapons program, the $160 billion Future Combat Systems initiative, and says he hopes to pare it back next year, even after the program recently received full funding.
"I think we should focus on the troops who are in the field today, not on some Star Wars technology that may never work," he says.
U.S. policy makers have generally preferred to buy advanced weapons, believing that the American technological edge contributed to the U.S. victory in the Cold War and to the speedy defeat of Saddam Hussein's military in the first and second Iraq wars. The approach continues to attract enthusiastic adherents, particularly within the ranks of the various armed services themselves.
Despite terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and insurgency warfare abroad, supporters argue that it is far too soon to conclude that U.S. forces will never fight a conventional war again. They note that China, which has been dramatically expanding its military, still could target Taiwan, a close U.S. ally, if the island declares independence. They also note that Russia's recent invasion of Georgia showed that the U.S. might one day have to fight Moscow on behalf of American allies like Poland and Ukraine.
"Should we simply wish away China's increasing muscle, or a resurgent Russia's plans for a fifth-generation fighter that would surpass our top-of-the-line jet, the F-22 stealth fighter?" Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles Dunlap wrote in an op-ed piece this year.
The other side in the debate argues that the enthusiasm for advanced weapons systems is misplaced. This faction, which includes Mr. Gates and many lawmakers, argues that a battery of expensive weapons are useless in counterinsurgency conflicts like Iraq, which pit U.S. forces against lightly armed but dogged foes. They say history is replete with examples of powerful militaries that were ultimately defeated by guerrilla fighters.
"The Chinese, Vietnamese, Sandinistas, Hezbollah, Palestinians and Chechnyans all triumphed over forces with superior military power," retired Marine officer Thomas X. Hammes wrote in "The Sling and the Stone," a 2006 book widely read in military circles. "The superior technology of the losers did not prove to be a magic solution."
The two sides have traded muffled potshots at each other for months. In a speech in May, Mr. Gates accused some military officials of "next-war-itis," which shortchanges current needs in favor of advanced weapons that might never be needed. The comment prompted some in the defense community, especially in the Air Force, to quietly chide Mr. Gates for "this-war-itis," a short-sighted focus on the present that could leave the armed forces dangerously unprepared down the road.
For the most part, soaring defense budgets have long kept Pentagon officials from having to settle the debate. For 2009, the Pentagon's base budget is $512 billion, which is up almost 7% from 2008 and at a historic level. Last year, supplemental spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan added more than $100 billion to the Pentagon's coffers.
With lawmakers talking openly of cutting back the defense budget, however, policy makers may soon have to make some difficult trade-offs.
"A lot of the key problems and questions that were already there had been kicked down the road, and they can't be kicked down the road any further," said Peter Singer, director of the 21st Century Defense Initiative at the Brookings Institution.
One of the thorniest issues is how many ground forces the U.S. military should have. Mr. Gates said last year that he wants to add 65,000 soldiers and 27,000 Marines by 2012. President George W. Bush has endorsed the idea and regularly champions it in public remarks about the military.
But the idea is running into growing resistance on Capitol Hill. Mr. Murtha says the Pentagon won't be able to afford more soldiers and Marines, and needs to take better care of the troops it has.
"This is not academic anymore," he says. "This is the direction the budget is going to have to go."
Mr. Murtha believes that the military needs to focus instead on getting U.S. ground forces back in fighting shape for possible future operations against strategic threats like China and Russia.
"If you want to deter a war, you've got to be prepared," he says.
Replacing the weapons and vehicles that have been worn down after years of service in Iraq and Afghanistan will be expensive. Mr. Murtha, a supporter of some of the military's most advanced weapons, estimates the "reset" cost for the armed forces at $100 billion or more.
Mr. Gates, for his part, believes that curtailing the growth of the ground forces would be a "mistake," according to Pentagon spokesman Greg Morrell.
"Secretary Gates firmly believes that growing the Army and Marine Corps is essential to our national security," Mr. Morrell says. He adds that defense officials acknowledge that the Pentagon has "probably hit our high-water mark" in terms of defense spending, and that some cutbacks are inevitable.
One X-factor is the fate of Mr. Gates himself, who is being actively courted by advisers to both presidential candidates. Mr. Gates, who has a stopwatch in his suitcase ticking down to the end of the Bush administration's tenure, has said he is unlikely to stay on. But the defense chief is always careful to leave himself some wriggle room.
"Well, let me just say that I'm getting a lot more career advice and counseling than I might have anticipated," he told reporters earlier this month, laughing. "I think I'll leave it at that."
If Mr. Gates remains in his job for at least a year, that would leave him in a position to help settle, once and for all, the military's internal debate about its priorities.
Write to August Cole at august.cole@dowjones.com and Yochi J. Dreazen at yochi.dreazen@wsj.com
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Apart from kittying out on the missile defense in Poland and Czech, this is not what I would have expected from the NY Times , , ,
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A Military for a Dangerous New World
Published: November 15, 2008
NY Times editorial
As president, Barack Obama will face the most daunting and complicated national security challenges in more than a generation — and he will inherit a military that is critically ill-equipped for the task.
Troops and equipment are so overtaxed by President Bush’s disastrous Iraq war that the Pentagon does not have enough of either for the fight in Afghanistan, the war on terror’s front line, let alone to confront the next threats.
This is intolerable, especially when the Pentagon’s budget, including spending on the two wars, reached $685 billion in 2008. That is an increase of 85 percent in real dollars since 2000 and nearly equal to all of the rest of the world’s defense budgets combined. It is also the highest level in real dollars since World War II.
To protect the nation, the Obama administration will have to rebuild and significantly reshape the military. We do not minimize the difficulty of this task. Even if money were limitless, planning is extraordinarily difficult in a world with no single enemy and many dangers.
The United States and its NATO allies must be able to defeat the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan — and keep pursuing Al Qaeda forces around the world. Pentagon planners must weigh the potential threats posed by Iran’s nuclear ambitions, an erratic North Korea, a rising China, an assertive Russia and a raft of unstable countries like Somalia and nuclear-armed Pakistan. And they must have sufficient troops, ships and planes to reassure allies in Asia, the Middle East and Europe.
The goal is a military that is large enough and mobile enough to deter enemies. There must be no more ill-founded wars of choice like the one in Iraq. The next president must be far more willing to solve problems with creative and sustained diplomacy.
But this country must also be prepared to fight if needed. To build an effective military the next president must make some fundamental changes.
More ground forces: We believe the military needs the 65,000 additional Army troops and the 27,000 additional marines that Congress finally pushed President Bush into seeking. That buildup is projected to take at least two years; by the end the United States will have 759,000 active-duty ground troops.
That sounds like a lot, especially with the prospect of significant withdrawals from Iraq. But it would still be about 200,000 fewer ground forces than the United States had 20 years ago, during the final stages of the cold war. Less than a third of that expanded ground force would be available for deployment at any given moment.
Military experts agree that for every year active-duty troops spend in the field, they need two years at home recovering, retraining and reconnecting with their families, especially in an all-volunteer force. (The older, part-time soldiers of the National Guard and the Reserves need even more).
The Army has been so badly stretched, mainly by the Iraq war, that it has been unable to honor this one-year-out-of-three rule. Brigades have been rotated back in for second and even third combat tours with barely one year’s rest in between. Even then, the Pentagon has still had to rely far too heavily on National Guard and Reserve units to supplement the force. The long-term cost in morale, recruit quality and readiness will persist for years. Nearly one-fifth of the troops — some 300,000 men and women — have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan reporting post-traumatic stress disorders.
The most responsible prescription for overcoming these problems is a significantly larger ground force. If the country is lucky enough to need fewer troops in the field over the next few years, improving rotation ratios will still help create a higher quality military force.
New skills: America still may have to fight traditional wars against hostile regimes, but future conflicts are at least as likely to involve guerrilla insurgencies wielding terror tactics or possibly weapons of mass destruction. The Pentagon easily defeated Saddam Hussein’s army. It was clearly unprepared to handle the insurgency and then the fierce sectarian civil war that followed.
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Page 2 of 2)
The Army has made strides in training troops for “irregular warfare.” Gen. David Petraeus has rewritten American counterinsurgency doctrine to make protecting the civilian population and legitimizing the indigenous government central tasks for American soldiers.
The new doctrine gives as much priority to dealing with civilians in conflict zones (shaping attitudes, restoring security, minimizing casualties, restoring basic services and engaging in other “stability operations”) as to combat operations.
Every soldier and marine who has served in Iraq or Afghanistan has had real world experience. But the Army’s structure and institutional bias are still weighted toward conventional war-fighting. Some experts fear that, as happened after Vietnam, the Army will in time reject the recent lessons and innovations.
For the foreseeable future, troops must be schooled in counterinsurgency and stability operations as well as more traditional fighting. And they must be prepared to sustain long-term operations.
The military also must field more specialized units, including more trainers to help friendly countries develop their own armies to supplement or replace American troops in conflict zones. It means hiring more linguists, training more special forces, and building expertise in civil affairs and cultural awareness.
Maintain mobility: In an unpredictable world with no clear battle lines, the country must ensure its ability — so-called lift capacity — to move enormous quantities of men and matériel quickly around the world and to supply them when necessary by sea.
Except in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon has reduced its number of permanent overseas bases as a way to lower America’s profile. Between 2004 and 2014, American bases abroad are expected to decline from 850 to 550. The number of troops permanently based overseas will drop to 180,000, down from 450,000 in the 1980s.
Much of the transport equipment is old and wearing out. The Pentagon will need to invest more in unglamorous but essential aircraft like long-haul cargo planes and refueling tankers. The KC-X aerial tanker got caught up in a messy contracting controversy. The new administration must move forward on plans to buy 179 new planes in a fair and open competition.
China is expanding its deep-water navy, much to the anxiety of many of its neighbors. The United States should not try to block China’s re-emergence as a great power. Neither can it cede the seas. Nor can it allow any country to interfere with vital maritime lanes.
America should maintain its investment in sealift, including Maritime Prepositioning Force ships that carry everything marines need for initial military operations (helicopter landing decks, food, water pumping equipment). It must also restock ships’ supplies that have been depleted for use in Iraq. One 2006 study predicted replenishment would cost $12 billion plus $5 billion for every additional year the marines stayed in Iraq.
The Pentagon needs to spend more on capable, smaller coastal warcraft — the littoral combat ship deserves support — and less on blue-water fighting ships.
More rational spending: What we are calling for will be expensive. Adding 92,000 ground troops will cost more than $100 billion over the next six years, and maintaining lift capacity will cost billions more. Much of the savings from withdrawing troops from Iraq will have to be devoted to repairing and rebuilding the force.
Money must be spent more wisely. If the Pentagon continues buying expensive weapons systems more suited for the cold war, it will be impossible to invest in the armaments and talents needed to prevail in the future.
There are savings to be found — by slowing or eliminating production of hugely expensive aerial combat fighters (like the F-22, which has not been used in the two current wars) and mid-ocean fighting ships with no likely near-term use. The Pentagon plans to spend $10 billion next year on an untested missile defense system in Alaska and Europe. Mr. Obama should halt deployment and devote a fraction of that budget to continued research until there is a guarantee that the system will work.
The Pentagon’s procurement system must be fixed. Dozens of the most costly weapons program are billions of dollars over budget and years behind schedule.
Killing a weapons program, starting a new one or carrying out new doctrine — all this takes time and political leadership. President Obama will need to quickly lay out his vision of the military this country needs to keep safe and to prevail over 21st-century threats.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPFj8kGXnwk&eurl=http://www.thirdeyeconcept.com/news/index.php?page=336
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oPFj8kGXnwk&eurl=http://www.thirdeyeconcept.com/news/index.php?page=336[/youtube]
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2008/12/killing_robot_b.html
" The frightening, but fascinatingly cool hovering robot - MKV (Multiple Kill Vehicle), is designed to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles.
A video released by the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) shows the MKV being tested at the National Hover Test Facility at Edwards Air Force Base, in California.
Inside a large steel cage, Lockheed's MKV lifts off the ground, moves left and right, rapidly firing as flames shoot out of its bottom and sides. This description doesn't do it any justice really, you have to see the video yourself.
During the test, the MKV is shown to lift off under its own propulsion, and remains stationary, using it’s on board retro-rockets. The potential of this drone is nothing short of science-fiction.
When watching the video, you can’t help but be reminded of post-apocalyptic killing machines, seen in such films as The Terminator and The Matrix.
Okay, people. Now is the time to start discussing the rules of war for autonomous robots. Now, when it's still theoretical."
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"Terminator vs. haji"
I love it!
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Department of Military Readiness: Barack Obama, space cadet
Ever since one man picked up a rock and hurled it in anger at another, the strategic value of controlling the high ground has been obvious. Well, obvious to those who think instead of feel. Yet we are less than two weeks into the Obama regime, and noises are already being made that U.S. access to and control of space, the ultimate high ground, are open to negotiation with our enemies. Just moments after Obama took the oath of office last week, the official White House Web site was updated with an "Ensure Freedom of Space" policy statement, which included a generic pledge to restore U.S. space leadership (when did we lose it?) while also seeking that leftist nirvana of a universal ban on space weapons. How, then, do we lead?
As U.S. military forces, and many civilians, are dependent upon U.S. space assets, the proposed ban on space weapons raises some critical questions. First and foremost, can we trust the word of our enemies without our critical space assets? History indicates that the answer is a resounding no. And what is a "space weapon," anyway? Is it only a satellite designed to attack another satellite? Or could weather satellites, used to plan military strikes, or GPS satellites, used to guide bombs to the target, be considered space weapons and, therefore, fall under a ban? Are we willing to leave that interpretation up to some anti-U.S. World Court? For the sake of national security, the Obama regime needs to get over its kumbaya view of the world and realize that, if it wants to "Ensure Freedom of Space," the only thing that has ever ensured freedom anywhere is superior weaponry in the right hands, at the right place, at the right time.
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US military develops anti-aircraft laser
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US military develops anti-aircraft laser
The latest weapon developed by US engineers is a Humvee jeep mounted with a giant laser capable of shooting down aircraft.
By Murray Wardrop
Last Updated: 1:41AM GMT 09 Feb 2009
The Laser Avenger successfully shot down a series of unmanned aerial vehicles during recent tests and is being hailed as a revolutionary weapon for future warfare.
The experiment was the first time that a ground vehicle has used a laser to destroy moving aircraft and marks a watershed moment in the development of lasers for battlefield use.
Invented by Boeing, the laser is fitted to a Humvee off-road vehicle, allowing it to be moved into the most remote locations to shoot down enemy planes.
It is hoped that the Laser Avenger will be used to help US forces tackle small unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which often carry explosives or surveillance equipment. Such devices are difficult for conventional air defence systems to shoot down.
The complex testing at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico, required the laser to track three UAVs against a backdrop of mountains and desert. When the targets were sighted, the Laser Avenger successfully shot down three UAVs with its high-powered directed energy beam.
Gary Fitzmire, vice president and program director of Boeing Directed Energy Systems, said: "Small UAVs armed with explosives or equipped with surveillance sensors are a growing threat on the battlefield. Laser Avenger, unlike a conventional weapon, can fire its laser beam without creating missile exhaust or gun flashes that would reveal its position. As a result, Laser Avenger can neutralize these UAV threats while keeping our troops safe."
The test firing was observed by representatives of the US Army's Cruise Missile Defense Systems project office.
The experiment follows a previous test in 2007 of a prototype Laser Avenger which obliterated improvised explosive devices and unexploded ordnance on the ground.
Lee Gutheinz, Boeing's program director for High-Energy Laser/Electro-Optical Systems, said: "We doubled the laser power; added sophisticated acquisition, tracking and pointing capability; and simplified the design. Boeing developed and integrated these upgrades in less than a year, underscoring our ability to rapidly respond to war-fighters' needs."
The Laser Avenger is an infrared laser with power levels in the range of tens of kilowatts. It is a modified version of an existing US Army air defence weapon that uses two Stinger missile launchers and a heavy machine gun, with one missile pod swapped for the laser and its target tracker.
Existing weapons struggle to shoot down small, light UAVs, which are often made of plastic rather than metal, because surface to air missiles designed to target normal-sized aircraft cannot lock onto them.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/news...aft-laser.html
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NYT so caveat lector:
WASHINGTON — Army officials have suspended most research involving dangerous germs at the biodefense laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md., which the F.B.I. has linked to the anthrax attacks of 2001, after discovering that some pathogens stored there were not listed in a laboratory database.
The suspension, which began Friday and could last three months, is intended to allow a complete inventory of hazardous bacteria, viruses and toxins stored in refrigerators, freezers and cabinets in the facility, the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
The inventory was ordered by the institute’s commander, Col. John P. Skvorak, after officials found that the database of specimens was incomplete. In a memorandum to employees last week, Colonel Skvorak said there was a high probability that some germs and toxins in storage were not in the database.
Rules for keeping track of pathogens were tightened after the 2001 anthrax letters, which killed five people. But pressure to improve recordkeeping and security at the Army institute intensified six months ago after the suicide of Bruce E. Ivins, a veteran anthrax researcher, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s announcement that prosecutors had been preparing to charge Dr. Ivins with making the deadly anthrax powder in his laboratory there.
A spokesman for the institute, Caree Vander Linden, said an earlier review had located all the germ samples listed in the database. But she said some “historical samples” in institute freezers were not in the database, and the new inventory was intended to identify them so they could be recorded and preserved, or destroyed if they no longer had scientific value.
One scientist, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to comment, said samples from completed projects were not always destroyed, and departing scientists sometimes left behind vials whose contents were unknown to colleagues. He said the Army’s recordkeeping and security were imperfect but better than procedures at most universities, where research on biological pathogens has expanded rapidly since 2001.
The suspension will interrupt dozens of research projects at the institute, whose task is to develop vaccines, drugs and other measures to protect American troops from germ attacks and disease outbreaks. Ms. Vander Linden said some critical experiments involving animals — often used to test vaccines and drugs — would not be halted.
News of the suspension, first reported Monday by the Science magazine blog ScienceInsider, comes as the Justice Department has been interviewing scientists at the Army institute to prepare the government’s legal defense against a lawsuit filed by the family of Robert Stevens, the Florida tabloid photography editor who was the first to die in the 2001 letter attacks.
That lawsuit, filed in 2003 and delayed by the government’s unsuccessful efforts to have it dismissed, accuses officials of failing to assure that anthrax bacteria at Fort Detrick and other government laboratories were securely stored. Dr. Ivins was not suspected in the attacks at that time, but the F.B.I.’s conclusion last year added new weight to the lawsuit’s claims.
The F.B.I. has released evidence of Dr. Ivins’s mental problems and of a genetic link between the mailed anthrax and a supply of the bacteria in his laboratory. But many of Dr. Ivins’s former colleagues at the Army institute have said they are not convinced that he mailed the letters.
The F.B.I. has asked the National Academy of Sciences to convene a panel of experts to review its scientific work on the case, and the bureau and academy are completing a contract for the review, said an academy spokesman, William Kearney.
The anthrax case has underscored the threat of biological attack by biodefense insiders like Dr. Ivins, who have access to pathogens and the expertise to work with them.
The number of such researchers has grown rapidly since 2001, when the anthrax letters set off a spending boom on biodefense that led to a rapid addition of laboratories working on potential bioweapons, notably anthrax.
Before 2001, only a few dozen such facilities worked with anthrax. Today, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has registered 219 laboratories to do so, said an agency spokesman, Von Roebuck. He said 10,474 people had been cleared to work with dangerous pathogens and toxins nationwide after background checks by the Justice Department.
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http://www.washingtonpost.com/...35.html?hpid=topnews
Short '06 Lebanon War Stokes Pentagon Debate
-Leaders Divided on Whether to Focus On Conventional or Irregular Combat
By Greg Jaffe
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, April 6, 2009; Page A01
A war that ended three years ago and involved not a single U.S. soldier has become the subject of an increasingly heated debate inside the Pentagon, one that could alter how the U.S. military fights in the future.
When Israel and Hezbollah battled for more than a month in Lebanon in the summer of 2006, the result was widely seen as a disaster for the Israeli military. Soon after the fighting ended, some military officers began to warn that the short, bloody and relatively conventional battle foreshadowed how future enemies of the United States might fight.
Since then, the Defense Department has dispatched as many as a dozen teams to interview Israeli officers who fought against Hezbollah. The Army and Marine Corps have sponsored a series of multimillion-dollar war games to test how U.S. forces might fare against a similar foe. "I've organized five major games in the last two years, and all of them have focused on Hezbollah," said Frank Hoffman, a research fellow at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico.
A big reason that the 34-day war is drawing such fevered attention is that it highlights a rift among military leaders: Some want to change the U.S. military so that it is better prepared for wars like the ones it is fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, while others worry that such a shift would leave the United States vulnerable to a more conventional foe.
"The Lebanon war has become a bellwether," said Stephen Biddle, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has advised Gen. David H. Petraeus, head of the U.S. Central Command. "If you are opposed to transforming the military to fight low-intensity wars, it is your bloody sheet. It's discussed in almost coded communication to indicate which side of the argument you are on."
U.S. military experts were stunned by the destruction that Hezbollah forces, using sophisticated antitank guided missiles, were able to wreak on Israeli armor columns. Unlike the guerrilla forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, who employed mostly hit-and-run tactics, the Hezbollah fighters held their ground against Israeli forces in battles that stretched as long as 12 hours. They were able to eavesdrop on Israeli communications and even struck an Israeli ship with a cruise missile.
"From 2000 to 2006 Hezbollah embraced a new doctrine, transforming itself from a predominantly guerrilla force into a quasi-conventional fighting force," a study by the Army's Combat Studies Institute concluded last year. Another Pentagon report warned that Hezbollah forces were "extremely well trained, especially in the uses of antitank weapons and rockets" and added: "They well understood the vulnerabilities of Israeli armor."
Many top Army officials refer to the short battle almost as a morality play that illustrates the price of focusing too much on counterinsurgency wars at the expense of conventional combat. These officers note that, before the Lebanon war, Israeli forces had been heavily involved in occupation duty in the Palestinian territories.
"The real takeaway is that you have to find the time to train for major combat operations, even if you are fighting counterinsurgency wars," said one senior military analyst who studied the Lebanon war for the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Currently, the deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan have prevented Army units from conducting such training.
Army generals have also latched on to the Lebanon war to build support for multibillion-dollar weapons programs that are largely irrelevant to low-intensity wars such as those fought in Iraq and Afghanistan. A 30-page internal Army briefing, prepared for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and senior Pentagon civilians, recently sought to highlight how the $159 billion Future Combat Systems, a network of ground vehicles and sensors, could have been used to dispatch Hezbollah's forces quickly and with few American casualties.
"Hezbollah relies on low visibility and prepared defenses," one slide in the briefing reads. "FCS counters with sensors and robotics to maneuver out of contact."
Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates is expected to stake out a firm position in this debate as soon as today, when he announces the 2010 defense budget. That document is expected to cut or sharply curtail weapons systems designed for conventional wars, and to bolster intelligence and surveillance programs designed to help track down shadowy insurgents.
"This budget moves the needle closer to irregular warfare and counterinsurgency," Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said. "It is not an abandonment of the need to prepare for conventional conflicts. But even moving that needle is a revolutionary thing in this building."
The changes reflect the growing prominence of the military's counterinsurgency camp -- the most prominent member of which is Petraeus -- in the Pentagon. President Obama, whose strategy in Afghanistan is focused on protecting the local population and denying the Islamist radicals a safe haven, has largely backed this group.
The question facing defense leaders is whether they can afford to build a force that can prevail in a counterinsurgency fight, where the focus is on protecting the civilian population and building indigenous army and police forces, as well as a more conventional battle.
Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the Army's top officer in the Pentagon, has said it is essential that the military be able to do both simultaneously. New Army doctrine, meanwhile, calls for a "full spectrum" service that is as good at rebuilding countries as it is at destroying opposing armies.
But other experts remain skeptical. "The idea that you can do it all is just wrong," said Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations. Soldiers, who are home for as little as 12 months between deployments, do not have enough time to prepare adequately for both types of wars, he said.
Biddle and other counterinsurgency advocates argue that the military should focus on winning the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and only then worry about what the next war will look like. Some in this camp say that the threat posed by Hezbollah is being inflated by officers who are determined to return the Army to a more familiar past, built around preparing for conventional warfare.
Another question is whether the U.S. military is taking the proper lessons from the Israel-Hezbollah war. Its studies have focused almost exclusively on the battle in southern Lebanon and ignored Hezbollah's ongoing role in Lebanese society as a political party and humanitarian aid group. After the battle, Hezbollah forces moved in quickly with aid and reconstruction assistance.
"Even if the Israelis had done better operationally, I don't think they would have been victorious in the long run," said Andrew Exum, a former Army officer who has studied the battle from southern Lebanon. "For the Israelis, the war lasted for 34 days. We tend to forget that for Hezbollah, it is infinite."
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Second post of the morning.
Part 2: The 2010 U.S. Defense Budget and BMD
Stratfor Today » April 8, 2009 | 1213 GMT
Summary
When U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates unveiled his department’s proposed 2010 defense budget on April 6, one of the changes — not unexpected — was a realignment of funding for ballistic missile defense (BMD). Gates wants to focus on more mature BMD technologies that can deal with missile launches from “rogue” countries like Iran and North Korea.
Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a four-part special report on the U.S. defense budget for 2010.
Among U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates’ proposed changes to the 2010 U.S. defense budget, announced on April 6, were a series of increases and cuts in ballistic missile defense (BMD) programs. Taken as a whole, these adjustments mark a significant shift in the nature of BMD deployment, including an overall cut of $1.4 billion from the Missile Defense Agency. These cuts are consistent with President Barack Obama’s platform of being committed to “proven, cost-effective” BMD, and are being touted as enabling the programs to focus on the threat of missile launches from “rogue” countries like Iran and North Korea.
BMD is essentially a defensive weapons system designed to intercept ballistic missiles. Ballistic missile interception can theoretically be done at three periods of the missile’s flight: in the terminal phase (as it descends towards the earth), in midcourse, and in the boost phase (right after launch). Current technology permits the interception at the midcourse and terminal phases, but boost-phase interception has proved to be much more difficult, mainly because of the extremely short period of time it allows to detect, acquire and track the missile and plot an intercept before it enters the later phases of flight (more about this below).
In laying out Gates’ funding priorities, the budget favors the more mature technologies of terminal-phase and midcourse interception, which are either already fielded or in the process of being fielded. But this comes at the cost of boost-phase and other more ambitious technological development programs — including space-based assets — which would require longer-term funding and support before tangible results could be achieved.
For Gates, these more long-range programs have been pushed forward too aggressively, before the technology could mature. They are more high-risk by nature and, for Gates, an inefficient and an inappropriate allocation of funds given the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. While there are technical reasons for these choices, Gates has more in mind than just a sheet of specifications and test results.
(click image to enlarge)
There are four mature BMD systems that are operational or in the process of being made operational: Aegis/Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) and Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD).
The Aegis/SM-3 system is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles during parts of the ascent and descent phases. This system has already been deployed on 18 American guided-missile cruisers and destroyers, and two Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces warships and is operationally proven (though as an anti-satellite weapon rather than a BMD interceptor). The Aegis/SM-3 has been one of the most successful BMD programs in the U.S. inventory, and Gates’ proposal would increase funding for the SM-3 program and upgrade an additional six warships with the system (double the three announced earlier this year for the Atlantic fleet).
The THAAD system is mobile (designed to be deployed anywhere in the world) and is capable of intercepting a ballistic missile in its final midcourse descent and in its terminal phase, both inside and outside the atmosphere. The first THAAD battery — Alpha Battery of the 4th Air Defense Artillery Regiment at Fort Bliss in Texas — was activated last year and is in the process of being fully equipped. Meanwhile, testing continues at the Pacific Missile Range in Hawaii (a test there in March marked the system’s latest success). After poor test performance in the 1990s, the program restarted testing in 2005 and has shown marked improvement. It is now considered technologically mature.
Lockheed Martin
A THAAD launcherThe Patriot Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3) system is a terminal-phase intercept system that was operationally deployed and successfully used in Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system is also currently operational at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California, and is slated for deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic, although deployment of the system is encumbered by the requirement for fixed facilities, including concrete silos.
Gates curtailed funding for additional GMD interceptors in Alaska but made no comment on the much more politically complicated issue of deploying them to Europe. With his 2010 budget, of course, Gates has entered into a domestic battle with Congress over the future shape and orientation of the entire Department of Defense, not just BMD. Although part of that reorientation, the European GMD effort will be decided in the context of larger negotiations with Russia and policy choices made by the Obama Cabinet as a whole.
But taken as a whole (and even without a GMD deployment in Europe), this combination of technologies offers a tiered BMD capability in the later phases of ballistic flight. It is this sort of layered, overlapping combination of capabilities that is considered necessary to provide a truly reliable BMD shield. In addition, for the most part, these are the programs on which other countries like Japan and Israel have been cooperating with the United States.
The impetus for pursuing boost-phase intercept capability is by no means gone, however. Midcourse and terminal phase interceptions are fraught with their own challenges, including the possibility of having to deal with decoys in the latter part of the midcourse phase and multiple independently targetable or maneuverable re-entry vehicles. Additionally, debris from a successful intercept in the terminal phase may still hit the area being targeted by those who launched the missile.
Thus, it remains desirable for the Pentagon to seek technology that will push the intercept point closer to the time and place of launch, if not on the actual territory of the country launching the missile. The boost phase is when the missile is both at its slowest in the trajectory and the most visible, given the unmistakable infrared signature of the engine plume. Also, if the missile is intercepted in this phase, the debris falls far from the intended target.
As alluded to earlier, however, intercepting a missile during its boost phase is extremely difficult. At most, the boost phase lasts only a few minutes, and terrestrial-based interceptors also need time to boost to altitude as well (acceleration is a key design consideration). Additionally, interceptors and sensors must be based relatively close to the area from which the missile is launched, so their positioning is highly dependent on the accessibility of territory or waters nearby.
U.S. Air Force
An artist’s rendering of two Airborne LasersThe problem of reaction speed in the boost phase is so challenging that it has been one of the principal drivers for directed energy weapons — lasers — dating all the way back to the Reagan administration’s Strategic Defense Initiative. In its latest incarnation, the Airborne Laser (ABL) has only now — after a quarter century of experimentation — begun to show potential for operational utility. In Gates’ 2010 budget, however, funding for a second ABL airframe was cut and the program was reduced to more of a long-term research and development effort.
These technical challenges will still be explored, but if Gates has his way, operational fielding of a boost-phase interceptor will be delayed — perhaps significantly — and some programs previously under consideration may never see the light of day as a weapons system. After all, if the concern is the current “rogue” threat from North Korea and Iran, then the ballistic missiles targeted would be highly vulnerable to air strikes while still on the launch pad.
In a larger sense, Gates does not see the more advanced challenges of BMD as near-term problems. They are all desirable capabilities in the long run, but Gates has made his tenure about choices and priorities. His funding proposals for BMD reflect choices to field only mature programs while taking $1.4 billion from the Missile Defense Agency budget to put toward the current fight in Iraq and Afghanistan. And this is a fight that Gates considers not only the current one but also the kind in which American forces will be engaged in the foreseeable future.
Next: The 2010 defense budget and the fighter mix
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Third post of the day:
By THOMAS DONNELLY and GARY SCHMITT
On Monday, Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced a significant reordering of U.S. defense programs. His recommendations should not go unchallenged.
In the 1990s, defense cuts helped pay for increased domestic spending, and that is true today. Though Mr. Gates said that his decisions were "almost exclusively influenced by factors other than simply finding a way to balance the books," the broad list of program reductions and terminations suggest otherwise. In fact, he tacitly acknowledged as much by saying the budget plan represented "one of those rare chances to match virtue to necessity" -- the "necessity" of course being the administration's decision to reorder the government's spending priorities.
However, warfare is not a human activity that directly awards virtue. Nor is it a perfectly calculable endeavor that permits a delicate "balancing" of risk. More often it rewards those who arrive on the battlefield "the fustest with the mostest," as Civil War Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest once put it. If Mr. Gates has his way, U.S. forces will find it increasingly hard to meet the Forrest standard. Consider a few of the details of the Gates proposals:
- The termination of the F-22 Raptor program at just 187 aircraft inevitably will call U.S. air supremacy -- the salient feature, since World War II, of the American way of war -- into question.
The need for these sophisticated, stealthy, radar-evading planes is already apparent. During Russia's invasion of Georgia, U.S. commanders wanted to fly unmanned surveillance aircraft over the region, and requested that F-22s sanitize the skies so that the slow-moving drones would be protected from Russian fighters or air defenses. When the F-22s were not made available, likely for fear of provoking Moscow, the reconnaissance flights were cancelled.
As the air-defense and air-combat capabilities of other nations, most notably China, increase, the demand for F-22s would likewise rise. And the Air Force will have to manage this small fleet of Raptors over 30 years. Compare that number with the 660 F-15s flying today, but which are literally falling apart at the seams from age and use. The F-22 is not merely a replacement for the F-15; it also performs the functions of electronic warfare and other support aircraft. Meanwhile, Mr. Gates is further postponing the already decades-long search for a replacement for the existing handful of B-2 bombers.
- The U.S. Navy will continue to shrink below the fleet size of 313 ships it set only a few years ago. Although Mr. Gates has rightly decided to end the massive and expensive DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer program, there will be additional reductions to the surface fleet. The number of aircraft carriers will drop eventually to 10. The next generation of cruisers will be delayed, and support-ship projects stretched out. Older Arleigh Burke destroyers will be upgraded and modernized, but at less-than-needed rates.
The good news is that Mr. Gates will not to reduce the purchases of the Littoral Combat Ship, which can be configured for missions from antipiracy to antisubmarine warfare. But neither will he buy more than the 55 planned for by the previous Bush administration. And the size and structure of the submarine fleet was studiously not mentioned. The Navy's plan to begin at last to procure two attack submarines per year -- absolutely vital considering the pace at which China is deploying new, quieter subs -- is uncertain, at best.
- Mr. Gates has promised to "restructure" the Army's Future Combat Systems (FCS) program, arguing that the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan have called into question the need for new ground combat vehicles. The secretary noted that the Army's modernization plan does not take into account the $25 billion investment in the giant Mine Resistant Ambush-Protected (MRAP) vehicles. But it's hard to think of a more specialized and less versatile vehicle.
The MRAP was ideal for dealing with the proliferation of IEDs (improvised explosive devices) in Iraq. But the FCS vehicle -- with a lightweight yet better-protected chassis, greater fuel efficiency and superior off-road capacity -- is far more flexible and useful for irregular warfare. Further, the ability to form battlefield "networks" will make FCS units more effective than the sum of their individual parts. Delaying modernization means that future generations of soldiers will conduct mounted operations in the M1 tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles designed in the 1970s. Finally, Mr. Gates capped the size of the U.S. ground force, ignoring all evidence that it is too small to handle current and future major contingencies.
- The proposed cuts in space and missile defense programs reflect a retreat in emerging environments that are increasingly critical in modern warfare. The termination of the Airborne Laser and Transformational Satellite programs is especially discouraging.
The Airborne Laser is the most promising form of defense against ballistic missiles in the "boost phase," the moments immediately after launch when the missiles are most vulnerable. This project was also the military's first operational foray into directed energy, which will be as revolutionary in the future as "stealth" technology has been in recent decades. The Transformational Satellite program employs laser technology for communications purposes, providing not only enhanced bandwidth -- essential to fulfill the value of all kinds of information networks -- but increased security.
Mr. Gates justifies these cuts as a matter of "hard choices" and "budget discipline," saying that "[E]very defense dollar spent to over-insure against a remote or diminishing risk . . . is a dollar not available to take care of our people, reset the force, win the wars we are in." But this calculus is true only because the Obama administration has chosen to cut defense, while increasing domestic entitlements and debt so dramatically.
The budget cuts Mr. Gates is recommending are not a temporary measure to get us over a fiscal bump in the road. Rather, they are the opening bid in what, if the Obama administration has its way, will be a future U.S. military that is smaller and packs less wallop. But what is true for the wars we're in -- that numbers matter -- is also true for the wars that we aren't yet in, or that we simply wish to deter.
Mr. Donnelly is a resident fellow and Mr. Schmitt is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute. They are co-editors of "Of Men and Materiel: the Crisis in Military Resources" (AEI, 2007).
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Who needs a military? Obama is gonna make sure everyone wuuuuuvs us!
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Israel Steps It Up
By INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted Wednesday, April 08, 2009 4:20 PM PT
Defense: On the same day a plot to supply Iran with nuclear materials is revealed, Israel conducts a missile defense test. Nothing concentrates the mind quite so wonderfully as the threat of imminent extinction.
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On Tuesday, word came that the Manhattan district attorney's office had smashed a plot to smuggle nuclear weapons materials to Iran through unwitting New York banks. A 118-count indictment accuses Chinese financier Lei Feng Wei of setting up fake companies to hide that he was selling millions of dollars in potential nuclear materials to Tehran.
As the New York Daily News reports, among the materials involved were 33,000 pounds of a specialized aluminum alloy used almost exclusively in long-range missile production, 66,000 pounds of tungsten copper plate used in missile guidance systems, and 53,900 pounds of maraging steel rods, a super-hard metal used in uranium enrichment and to make the casings for nuclear bombs.
We have commented on Iran's cooperation with North Korea on missile technology. The pledge by Iran's mad Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to wipe Israel off the map remains in full force.
Unlike the U.S., Israel is moving full speed ahead on missile defense, and even if Iran's missile threat went away tomorrow, Israel's determination to defend itself would not.
The Israelis aren't waiting for missile defense to be proven "cost-effective." They know the cost of defending themselves against nuclear missile attack pales in comparison to the cost of losing a nation.
As Lei's indictment was announced, the Israeli air force conducted its 17th test, a successful one, of its newly upgraded Arrow 2 missile defense system. It hit a Blue Sparrow missile, modified to mimic an incoming Iranian Shahab-3 missile, fired from an F-15.
The test was conducted jointly by the IAF and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency. It was the first Arrow test in conjunction with a high-powered American X-band radar deployed in Israel's Negev desert. X-band was a parting gift to Israel from President Bush.
The Jerusalem Post reports that an Arrow interceptor was launched from the Palmahim air base after the target missile was detected. The target missile carried a multiple warhead with radar-evading capabilities that Iran does not possess.
Iran is working hard to improve its missile capabilities. In November, it successfully test-fired the Sajjil, a solid-fueled high-speed missile with a range of 1,250 miles. It recently showed its global reach with the launching of its Omid satellite.
In January 2007, Germany's Bild magazine reported that Iran had bought 18 BM-25 land-mobile missiles from North Korea. The BM-25 is a variation of the Russian SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile, with a range of 1,800 miles.
According to Uzi Rubin, former head of the Arrow anti-missile program, the BM-25 "is a nuclear missile. . . . There is no other warhead for this other than a nuclear warhead."
The Arrow project is being jointly developed by Israel Aerospace Industries and Chicago-based Boeing, which recently saw its airborne laser missile-defense system put on hold. Several operational Arrow missile batteries have already been deployed.
"This was the most advanced version of the Arrow weapons system in terms of the ability to perform the type of intercept that would be necessary to destroy a ballistic missile target," said Rick Lehner, a spokesman for the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.
Israel has now "deployed a layered defense," he added. This is something the U.S. needs but which recent budget cuts prevent.
Israel is also developing a defense against short-range Katyusha and Qassam rockets called Iron Dome, which uses an early-warning system known as Red Dawn.
While the U.S. dawdles on its own missile defense, Israel isn't waiting until its enemies' missiles are proven and cost-effective.
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Part 4: The 2010 U.S. Defense Budget and The Future of the Fleet
Stratfor Today » April 9, 2009 | 1010 GMT
Summary
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates unveiled his department’s proposed 2010 defense budget on April 6. His additions and cuts from the budget included a series of decisions on the focus of shipbuilding in the years ahead. Gates has emphasized the U.S. Navy’s long-recognized need to improve its mission and functionality in the littoral regions of the world. As a result, Gates is pushing the acceleration of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program — ships that have a multi-mission functionality and are particularly attractive to the current Pentagon leadership. Overall, the shifts will help define the shape of the future U.S. surface combatant fleet.
Among the proposed changes to the Pentagon’s 2010 budget that U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates laid out April 6 was a series of significant decisions that will affect U.S. shipbuilding and the shape of the surface fleet in the years ahead.
If there was a theme to these changes, it was prioritizing the littoral, near-shore environment over the ‘blue water’ — the open ocean — and proven, affordable ship designs over ambitious, new and long-term designs. The shifts include:
Slowing the rate at which an aircraft carrier is built by one year, to five years. This build cycle will ultimately reduce the size of the U.S. carrier fleet from 11 to a still-impressive 10.
Delaying the next-generation guided missile cruiser, a long-range program to replace a mainstay of the blue-water fleet.
Pushing forward with the already-planned truncation of the enormously over budget and delayed DDG-1000 Zumwalt-class destroyer, which will be limited to three very expensive hulls or less — effectively making the ships technology demonstrators.
Restarting Arleigh Burke-class (DDG-51) guided missile destroyer production. Widely considered one of the most capable and successful warship designs in the world today, the last units are still being completed.
Accelerating the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program, which consists of two designs (the Pentagon has yet to select one) intended to employ interchangeable “mission modules,” so that one hull can support a variety of missions — from anti-submarine warfare to hunting mines or supporting special forces. These smaller, faster, more agile ships, as their name implies, will often be used closer to shore, freeing larger, more expensive ships designed to operate in the blue water from the potentially treacherous near-shore environment.
The first three are consistent with Gates’ priorities for the Pentagon as a whole. Some of the high-end technology for the next-generation Ford-class aircraft carrier is already creating concerns about the program’s timeline, and though the aircraft carrier continues to be a critical element of U.S. power projection, it is difficult to overstate the extent to which America already has utter dominance in carrier-based aviation.
The DDG-1000 is, in part, now acting as a technology demonstrator for the next-generation cruiser. Both are high-end, expensive warships expanding American naval capability largely in areas where the U.S. already enjoys a considerable lead. Delaying or slowing the next-generation cruiser program does not kill research and development, but it shifts resources and attention to more immediate needs — ones that address the slowly emerging refocus of the U.S. Navy.
The United States remains the undisputed dominant power in the world’s oceans, and while potential regional competitors from China to India to Russia are enhancing their own naval capability and working on systems to counter or at least lessen the U.S. lead, the U.S. Navy still remains the dominant force in the blue-water realm. The department has long recognized the need to push into the littorals and better function there, though many of its initiatives — like LCS and what ultimately became the DDG-1000, faltered.
The proposed defense budget would put the department’s money back into LCS and the Arleigh Burke restart. Not only are the additional Arleigh Burke hulls attractive because they are upgradeable to ballistic missile defense capability capable of addressing the new anti-ship ballistic missile threat from China, but the fabrication process is now highly refined (with some 60 hulls) and the ships have a multi-mission functionality that is particularly attractive to the current Pentagon leadership.
Photo by U.S. Navy courtesy of Lockheed-Martin
The USS Freedom (LCS-1)But the more important shift in terms of the shape of the fleet is the LCS. By accelerating acquisition in 2010, Gates is clearly committing to the program. LCS promises to expand the Navy’s global presence — with more ships in more places — as LCS will be one tool in allowing more dispersed operations. (The LCS program is expected to eventually entail 55 hulls.) Indeed, such lower-tier efforts like expanding international cooperation on maritime security could see further improvements in the overall security of the environment.
The LCS is also one of the first ships designed from the start to integrate unmanned systems into its operations, from unmanned helicopters to unmanned surface and underwater vessels, designed to carry out reconnaissance and assist in operations at sea — providing new types of functionality for the Navy in much the same way that unmanned aerial vehicles have revolutionized intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance over combat zones in Iraq and Afghanistan.
(click image to enlarge)
Overall, the shifts in priorities will hardly endanger U.S. naval dominance in the near-term. But naval dominance is of absolutely fundamental importance for American geographic and geopolitical security. And as STRATFOR has noted in this series, such dominance does not maintain itself. Though they will not be a threat tomorrow, countries like China are seeking to expand their sphere of influence on the high seas, and the world’s oceans are too valuable for too many countries to think that the current American lead — even in blue water — cannot be eroded.
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Defense Secretary Robert Gates, a man not known for having his head in the stars, announced his strategic Pentagon blueprint this week, saying his proposals "will profoundly reform how this department does business." We hope he informed Congress, home to 535 procurers in chief.
AFP/Getty Images
Robert Gates.
The Defense procurement system is a mess, and previous Pentagon reforms have faltered thanks mostly to the micromanagers on Capitol Hill who are often more interested in funneling money to their home states than in spending dollars most effectively. Democrats and Republicans both belly up to this bar, usually while castigating the executive branch for failing to make "tough choices."
So give the Defense Secretary an A for optimistic effort, even if we have our disagreements with some of his strategic choices. In announcing his spending priorities, Mr. Gates said he wants to focus on the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, rather than on the unknown wars of the future. Among his cuts are the Army's Future Combat Systems and a gold-plated new Presidential helicopter that is late and way over budget. Meanwhile, he added money for unmanned aerial vehicles, increased the number of special forces and announced plans to recruit more cyberwarfare experts.
These seem like reasonable judgment calls, and the focus on combating asymmetrical threats will help the U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan. But it's worth remembering that the reason our enemies have resorted to terrorism and insurgency is because U.S. conventional forces overwhelmingly dominate on the ground, in the sea and in the air.
That's not an advantage we can take for granted as the Clinton Administration did in the 1990s, when it slashed defense spending to 3% from nearly 5% of GDP. China and Russia are upgrading their conventional forces, and China in particular is aiming to build a navy that can neutralize U.S. forces in the Western Pacific.
Mr. Gates's strategy implies a shrinking Navy with fewer ships and perhaps one fewer carrier group. It's good that he wants to build more Littoral Combat Ships, which are handy for operations such as tracking pirates. Even so, the Navy is left with a fleet of fewer than 300 ships, which strikes us as perilously small. When a U.S.-flagged container ship was briefly taken by pirates off Somalia this week, the Navy's nearest vessel was hours away.
Mr. Gates's decision to kill the stealthy F-22 fighter jet, which outclasses everything in the sky, is also troubling. We already have 183 F-22s -- original plans called for 750 -- and Mr. Gates wants to order just four more before shutting down the production line. His proposal to double the number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters the Pentagon buys next year -- to 30 from 14 in 2009 -- is no quid pro quo. The F-35 is a cheaper, more multipurpose plane but it can't begin to compete with the F-22 as a fighter jet.
Pentagon spending is now about 4% of GDP and is expected to decline, which means too little investment against potential threats. In particular, Mr. Gates's budget priorities give no indication of how the Pentagon will ensure that U.S. military dominance extends to the battlefield of the future, outer space. President Obama has said he opposes the "militarization of space," but space is already a crucial area of operations and China is looking for advantages there.
The $1.4 billion in cuts to missile defense are especially worrisome, with losers including the Airborne Laser, designed to shoot down ballistic missiles in the boost phase, and additional interceptors planned for the ground-based system in Alaska. Instead, Mr. Gates favors theater defenses for soldiers on the battlefield with $700 million more in funding, arguing that this will address the near-term threat of short-range missiles. But as North Korea's weekend launch showed, rogue regimes aren't far away from securing long-range missiles that could reach the U.S.
Mr. Gates shrewdly made no budget recommendations on nuclear forces, except to say that he'll defer judgment until after the forthcoming Nuclear Posture Review. Perhaps he's counting on being able to change President Obama's mind on the need for updating U.S. strategic weapons and going forward with the Reliable Replacement Warhead for America's aging nuclear arsenal.
Mr. Gates's budget proposals now go to Congress. Since the end of World War II there have been more than 130 studies on procurement reform. Good luck.
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New Concerns Over Chinese 'Carrier-Killer'
April 01, 2009
U.S. Naval Institute
With tensions already rising due to the Chinese navy becoming more aggressive in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea, the U.S. Navy seems to have yet another reason to be deeply concerned.
After years of conjecture, details have begun to emerge of a "kill weapon" developed by the Chinese to target and destroy U.S. aircraft carriers.
First posted on a Chinese blog viewed as credible by military analysts and then translated by the naval affairs blog Information Dissemination, a recent report provides a description of an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) that can strike carriers and other U.S. vessels at a range of 2000km.
The range of the modified Dong Feng 21 missile is significant in that it covers the areas that are likely hot zones for future confrontations between U.S. and Chinese surface forces.
The size of the missile enables it to carry a warhead big enough to inflict significant damage on a large vessel, providing the Chinese the capability of destroying a U.S. supercarrier in one strike.
Because the missile employs a complex guidance system, low radar signature and a maneuverability that makes its flight path unpredictable, the odds that it can evade tracking systems to reach its target are increased. It is estimated that the missile can travel at mach 10 and reach its maximum range of 2000km in less than 12 minutes.
Supporting the missile is a network of satellites, radar and unmanned aerial vehicles that can locate U.S. ships and then guide the weapon, enabling it to hit moving targets.
While the ASBM has been a topic of discussion within national defense circles for quite some time, the fact that information is now coming from Chinese sources indicates that the weapon system is operational. The Chinese rarely mention weapons projects unless they are well beyond the test stages.
If operational as is believed, the system marks the first time a ballistic missile has been successfully developed to attack vessels at sea. Ships currently have no defense against a ballistic missile attack.
Along with the Chinese naval build-up, U.S. Navy officials appear to view the development of the anti-ship ballistic missile as a tangible threat.
After spending the last decade placing an emphasis on building a fleet that could operate in shallow waters near coastlines, the U.S. Navy seems to have quickly changed its strategy over the past several months to focus on improving the capabilities of its deep sea fleet and developing anti-ballistic defenses.
As analyst Raymond Pritchett notes in a post on the U.S. Naval Institute blog:
"The Navy's reaction is telling, because it essentially equals a radical change in direction based on information that has created a panic inside the bubble. For a major military service to panic due to a new weapon system, clearly a mission kill weapon system, either suggests the threat is legitimate or the leadership of the Navy is legitimately unqualified. There really aren't many gray spaces in evaluating the reaction by the Navy…the data tends to support the legitimacy of the threat."
In recent years, China has been expanding its navy to presumably better exert itself in disputed maritime regions. A recent show of strength in early March led to a confrontation with an unarmed U.S. ship in international waters.
© Copyright 2009 U.S. Naval Institute. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed
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I guarantee that the current pirate hostage scenario will hold the seeds of future wars within it, if Obama acts the way I expect him to.
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Never has Ronald Reagan's dream of layered missile defenses—Star Wars, for short—been as politically out of favor as in the Age of Obama. Nor as close, at least technologically, to becoming realized.
The latest encouraging news came Thursday courtesy of the Misssile Defense Agency. The Airborne Laser prototype aircraft this week found, tracked, engaged and simulated an intercept with a missile seconds after liftoff. It was the first time the Agency used an "instrumented" missile to confirm the laser works as expected. Next up this fall will be the first live attempt to bring down a ballistic missile, but this test confirms how far along this innovative effort has come.
Along with space-based weapons, the Airborne Laser is the next defense frontier. The modified Boeing 747 is supposed to send an intense beam of light over hundreds of miles to destroy missiles in the "boost phase," before they can release decoys and at a point in their trajectory when they would fall back down on enemy territory. It's a pioneering use of directed energy in defense. The laser complements the sea- and ground-based missile defenses that keep proving themselves in tests.
Yet the Obama Administration isn't buying it. Funding for missile defense was cut in the 2010 budget by some 15%—$1.2 billion to $1.6 billion, depending on how you calculate it. The number of ground-based interceptors was reduced. The Missile Defense Agency's budget for the Airborne Laser is to be slashed in half, and Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pulled the plug on buying a second plane. The Pentagon says the program will have three tries to hit a live missile, or be killed altogether.
As the Administration keeps defense spending growth flat, while breaking the bank on its domestic priorities, Secretary Gates has to make hard choices. But he might try harder to convince his boss at the White House that Star Wars isn't a sci-fi fantasy. That's what critics used to say about stealth aircraft as well.
With time, and inevitable setbacks, the technology to make layered missile defenses a reality is being proven to work. The Airborne Laser could be—unless prematurely vaporized—an important part of a system to protect America and its allies from rogue states and their nuclear missiles.
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I am excited about this vehicle. It is now being developed as an unmanned remote controlled vehicle for the military.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZsixJuErVWc[/youtube]
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-IDb14DZ1J4[/youtube]
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By ILAN BERMAN AND CLIFFORD D. MAY
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said recently in Thailand that if Iran acquires a nuclear weapon, the U.S. will offer allies in the Middle East a "defense umbrella" to prevent Iranian intimidation. That's a fine sentiment, but it raises the question: Are we capable of doing so?
The answer is more complicated than most people think.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and associated delivery systems since the collapse of the Soviet Union means that any "defense umbrella" will require the deployment of missile defense technologies capable of neutralizing a potential salvo of nuclear-tipped missiles—whether from Iran or another rogue such as North Korea.
Yet America's missile-defense efforts are being scaled back. Congress is contemplating a $1.4 billion reduction to the Pentagon's budget for antimissile capabilities.
Advocates of missile defense are seriously concerned that this is just the beginning, and that the Obama administration seeks to kill the system with a thousand cuts. During the presidential campaign last year, Barack Obama promised to strip $10 billion from the Pentagon's budget for missile defense. (Actually, the U.S. currently spends only $9 billion in this area.)
The Bush administration began work on a linked network of individual missile-defense systems capable of intercepting ballistic missiles in all stages of flight. But it built only the capabilities necessary to counter simple rogue-state threats, such as a single missile launched from North Korea and aimed at the West Coast. The administration's efforts stopped short of a comprehensive architecture that would include antimissile systems on land, on the seas, and in space.
The Obama administration wants to scale back from Bush's modest beginnings. In addition to slashing the overall budget for missile defense, it has terminated promising projects such as the multiple-kill vehicle (MKV) program—in which multiple interceptors on a carrier vehicle (essentially a satellite) would improve our chances of hitting enemy missiles. Another project terminated is the airborne laser (ABL), an aircraft-based high energy laser that could be flown near potential enemy ballistic-missile hotspots.
Mr. Obama has also targeted the Bush administration's premier missile-defense venture, the deployment of ground-based interceptors and radars in Poland and the Czech Republic to defend against the growing ballistic missile threat from Iran. Instead, because of the Kremlin's objections, the Obama team is preparing to sacrifice this planned deployment as part of a "reset" of U.S. relations with Russia.
Space-based missile defense likewise has been met with a cold shoulder from the Obama administration. Opponents of missile defense charge that a space layer would somehow "militarize" space. This is dead wrong. A space-based missile defense capability would instead block and destroy weapons that enter the Earth's orbit on their way to their targets.
The most promising idea would be to develop a program for the deployment of space-based kinetic interceptors capable of targeting intercontinental ballistic missiles in their boost, midcourse and terminal phases of flight. In other words, let's revive the useful idea of building a system that gives us multiple chances to knock out every enemy missile.
Sadly, in the current political atmosphere, missile defense has become an ideological football. Republicans and Democrats alike ought to be united in the effort to develop a serious system capable of protecting the American people, our armed forces and our allies abroad from ballistic missile attack. A half-hearted missile defense effort only encourages investments in missile technologies on the part of our adversaries, making them believe that with additional resources they will be capable of overwhelming American defenses.
U.S. missile-defense policy should be designed to elicit the opposite response. Our enemies and competitors should be forced to conclude that energy and funds spent developing nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them will be wasted because Americans have the know-how and hardware to prevent them from reaching their intended targets.
During the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, the U.S. government made major investments in the types of technologies (space-based sensors, interceptors and propulsion) necessary to field a robust defense against foreign ballistic missile arsenals, irrespective of origin. The capability to make Iranian, North Korean and other foreign missiles useless has already been developed and field-tested. Only America has it, and we should deploy it.
Mrs. Clinton has the right idea. The U.S. should offer a comprehensive and impenetrable "defense umbrella" to protect itself and its allies. But first we need to match rhetoric with concrete action and get the job done.
Mr. Berman is vice president for policy of the American Foreign Policy Council. Mr. May is the president of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
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Some game changing abilities mentioned here. The ability to rewind an event and isolate its precursors will ruin a lot of days for our enemies.
Coming Soon: An Unblinking "Gorgon Stare" For Air Force Drones
The next-generation surveillance package for the Air Force's MQ-9 Reaper drones, named for Medusa's stony glare, will provide an unprecedentedly broad view of the battlefield spanning time and space
By Eric HagermanPosted 08.26.2009 at 2:21 pm7 Comments
(http://www.popsci.com/files/imagecache/article_image_large/files/articles/drone-takeoff-525.jpg)
MQ-9 Reaper: USAF
The military’s unblinking eye in the sky, which keeps watch over operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, is about to get even beadier. A new multi-camera sensor the U.S. Air Force is adding to its killer spy drones will exponentially broaden the area troops can monitor, and the technology lets a dozen users simultaneously grab different slices of the image. Called the Gorgon Stare, it represents the next big step in unmanned combat aircraft.
Two MQ-9 Reapers retrofitted with the new $15 million wide-area aerial surveillance sensors, or WAAS, will fly test missions later this year, and the Air Force plans to have ten such planes in battle by next spring, in rotation on a 24/7 patrol. “It’s an incredible force enhancer,” said Colonel Eric Mathewson, Director of the service’s Unmanned Aircraft Systems Task Force at the Pentagon. Sierra Nevada Corporation, makers of the WAAS, chose the name, a spooky reference to the cursed sisters from Greek mythology—Medusa being the Beyoncé of the trio—whose gaze turned men to stone.
(http://www.popsci.com/files/imagecache/article_image_large/files/articles/gorgonstare-howitworks.png)
The Gorgon Stare: Using multiple infrared and conventional cameras, the Gorgon Stare sensor package will provide a significantly larger area view of the battlefield than the single-camera view on of today's drones USAF
The system uses an array of five electro-optical and four infrared cameras to capture day and night images from different angles, which are stitched together in a single mosaic scene much broader than what any single lens could deliver. At command central, tiled screens will display the composite picture, so that if an insurgent runs out of view on one, he’ll simply pop up on the next. Field commanders can pull a piece of the picture encompassing their surroundings, and pan, tilt or zoom if they see something suspicious.
Military, Aviation & Space, Feature, Eric Hagerman, air force, aviation, drones, gorgon stare, military, sensors, uav, unmanned aerial vehiclesThe cameras are fitted into a pod under one wing, with the communications gear on the other. The entire package weighs 1,100 pounds, which will still allow the Reaper to carry weapons. (It will work in addition to the Multispectral Targeting System, or MTS ball, which is mounted on the chin of the plane and provides more traditional real-time tracking. See the current sensor package in action in our annotated gun-camera attack video from a Predator strike in Afghanistan.)
“This would have been relatively easy on a manned platform,” said Mike Meermans, Sierra’s vice president of strategic planning. “But with the size and weight limitations, I would almost say we were trying to beat up on the laws of physics with this one.” Still, the package came together in less than 18 months.
To deliver the high data rates the Air Force wanted, the Gorgon’s cameras transmit images at just two frames per second, rather than the 30 fps of full motion video delivered by the MTS. According to Mathewson, that utility is enough to notice if anything changes in a given environment. He says the strategy is to park a Reaper over an area and monitor anything that moves within a four-kilometer square zone, versus the less-than-one-square-kilometer covered by the MTS ball.
The existing cameras obviously work, judging by stories such as the unsuspecting fate of Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed by a UAV-launched Hellfire in Pakistan as his wife administered his final rubdown. Yet the MTS alone is taxing to use. Zooming in for positive identification creates a “soda straw” view, forcing sensor operators to visually sweep a town along the street grid. But that same operator can use the Gorgon Stare’s image to direct the MTS’ full motion video cameras to a particular spot. “I put a WAAS on, and I can see it all now” said Mathewson.“All of it.”
And because all the digital imagery is stored, the Gorgon Stare allows for what you might call forensic surveillance—looking back to reconstruct an event after the fact, à la the time-folding surveillance system seen in the film Déjà Vu. If an IED goes off in a certain quadrant within the Gorgon’s gaze, analysts could re-examine the rest of the footage to see if anyone had visited that site, and where he had gone. Perhaps for a backrub on the roof of his apartment? If a Gorgon-Stare-equipped drone is on the scene, there’s no happy ending in sight.
For more on the Air Force's frantic unmanned reinvention, see our September 2009 issue cover story here, also by Hagerman.
http://www.popsci.com/military-aviation-amp-space/article/2009-08/coming-soon-unblinking-gorgon-stare-air-force-drones?page=#
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"Now more than ever it is vital that the United States not back down from its efforts to develop and deploy strategic defenses. It is technologically feasible, strategically necessary and morally imperative. For if our nation and our precious freedoms are worth defending with the threat of annihilation, we are surely worth defending by defensive means that ensure our survival." --Ronald Reagan
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http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,513295,00.html
Portable 'E-Bombs' Could Take Down Jetliners
Wednesday, April 08, 2009
Weapons experts and techno-thriller fans are familiar with the concept of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) — a supermassive blast of electricity, usually from a nuclear blast high above ground, that fries electronic circuits for miles around, crippling computers, cars and most other modern gadgets.
Now comes word that a much smaller EMP device, or "e-bomb," could be carried in a car, or even on someone's person — and be used to take down an airliner.
"Once it is known that aircraft are vulnerable to particular types of disruption, it isn't too much of a leap to build a device that can produce that sort of disruption," Israeli counter-terrorism expert Yael Shahar tells New Scientist magazine. "And much of this could be built from off-the-shelf components or dual-use technologies."
Shahar says she's especially worried about two devices — one called a Marx generator, which beams an EMP at a target, and the other with the "Back to the Future"-like name of flux-compression generator.
The latter was developed by the Soviets during the 1950s when Marx generators proved too expensive. Basically, an explosive charge is set off at one end of a cylinder of charged copper coils, and the resulting shock wave sends out a powerful electric pulse as it travels down the tube.
It might take a big flux-compression generator to darken a city neighborhood. But a smaller one could take out the steering, navigation and communication systems of a jetliner, especially if pointed at the cockpit.
As for Marx generators, which are used by power companies, medical researchers and labs, you can buy the plans to build one online for $10, or a fully assembled commercial unit for several hundred dollars.
Shahar adds that as aircraft manufacturers switch to lighter, stronger composite materials in place of aluminum, they're actually making the planes more vulnerable.
"What is needed is extensive shielding of electronic components and the vast amount of cables running down the length of the aircraft," she tells New Scientist.
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http://www.rense.com/general64/fore.htm
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From Doug's favorite theorist/educator. Mr. Hanson outlines quite well the problems with modern Western approach to war to a large extent.
He outlines the problems.
But I am not clear what he prescribes to do about them. Now what do we do about it?
My Rx:
I say this - I agree with the premise that war will always be with us - unless one subscribes to a single "world government" with total control over all of us around the world by one single entity (with of course the Chosen One in charge leading mankind to Eden) . I don't beleive or want a single government controlling the world.
So instead, like the Roman general said, "you want peace we will give you peace, you want war we will give you war, it makes no difference to us", I say we do everything possible to destroy all of Irans nuclear sites even using nuclear weapons if needed to do the job right. IF we don't do this it seems evident we will be sorry when we do have a nuclear armed Iran and the situation will be far worse.
Yes we will likely make generations of US hating Muslim radicals. But these people are never going to love us anyway so I say we stop them now and the sooner the better.
The only other two alternatives though neither any good when one thinks them through:
1) We somehow promote regime change in Iran. There is clearly some seeds of that already but I don't know how we can speed it up or if we can. I suspect Nationalism will trump the desire for Western materialism.
2) Only other thing I can envision is that we go all out to become *energy self sufficient* so we don't keep funding Iran's regime with free dollars. The two problems with this is it would take a decade and it is already too late for this. Second thing is other countries like China, India, and the rest of the Stans would simply fill the void and send money to the Tollahs of Iran and are aleready doing this.
So really, we either accept a nuclear Iran - which to me is NOT acceptable - or we make their military/nuclear capabilities parking lots.
Yes it will cause financial turmoil. Yes the horror of the carnage to those on the receiving end. But sitting back and letting Iran have nucs would in my opinion (I am a world class genius here in arm chair) be far worse. We either deal with it now or pay a higher price later.
As for Israel there really is NO choice. Either deal with it militarily or expect to be annhilated. The Iranian regime is quite explicit in their goals. They are saying it up front. AND their actions *prove* they mean what they say.
If anyone has any other solutions please chime in. Rachel how about you for starters. You are clearly, like me a supporter of Israel, and (not like me) Obama. As O'Reilly would ask, "what say you?"
****November 2009
Victor Davis Hanson
Distinguished Fellow in History
Hillsdale College
The Future of Western War
VICTOR DAVIS HANSON, the Wayne and Marcia Buske Distinguished Fellow in History at Hillsdale College, is also a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution and a professor of classics emeritus at California State University, Fresno. He earned his B.A. at the University of California, Santa Cruz, and his Ph.D. in Classics from Stanford University. He is a columnist for National Review Online and for Tribune Media Services, and has published in several journals and newspapers, including Commentary, the Claremont Review of Books, The New Criterion, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal. Dr. Hanson has written or edited numerous books, including The Soul of Battle, Carnage and Culture, and A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War.
The following is adapted from a lecture delivered at Hillsdale College on October 1, 2009, during the author's four-week teaching residency.
I want to talk about the Western way of war and about the particular challenges that face the West today. But the first point I want to make is that war is a human enterprise that will always be with us. Unless we submit to genetic engineering, or unless video games have somehow reprogrammed our brains, or unless we are fundamentally changed by eating different nutrients—these are possibilities brought up by so-called peace and conflict resolution theorists—human nature will not change. And if human nature will not change—and I submit to you that human nature is a constant—then war will always be with us. Its methods or delivery systems—which can be traced through time from clubs to catapults and from flintlocks to nuclear weapons—will of course change. In this sense war is like water. You can pump water at 60 gallons per minute with a small gasoline engine or at 5000 gallons per minute with a gigantic turbine pump. But water is water—the same today as in 1880 or 500 B.C. Likewise war, because the essence of war is human nature.
Second, in talking about the Western way of war, what do we mean by the West? Roughly speaking, we refer to the culture that originated in Greece, spread to Rome, permeated Northern Europe, was incorporated by the Anglo-Saxon tradition, spread through British expansionism, and is associated today primarily with Europe, the United States, and the former commonwealth countries of Britain—as well as, to some extent, nations like Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea, which have incorporated some Western ideas. And what are Western ideas? This question is disputed, but I think we know them when we see them. They include a commitment to constitutional or limited government, freedom of the individual, religious freedom in a sense that precludes religious tyranny, respect for property rights, faith in free markets, and an openness to rationalism or to the explanation of natural phenomena through reason. These ideas were combined in various ways through Western history, and eventually brought us to where we are today. The resultant system creates more prosperity and affluence than any other. And of course, I don't mean to suggest that there was Jeffersonian democracy in 13th century England or in the Swiss cantons. But the blueprint for free government always existed in the West, in a way that it didn't elsewhere.
Just as this system afforded more prosperity in times of peace, it led to a superior fighting and defense capability in times of war. This is what I call the Western way of war, and there are several factors at play.
First, constitutional government was conducive to civilian input when it came to war. We see this in ancient Athens, where civilians oversaw a board of generals, and we see it in civilian control of the military in the United States. And at crucial times in Western history, civilian overseers have enriched military planning.
Second, Western culture gave birth to a new definition of courage. In Hellenic culture, the prowess of a hero was not recognized by the number of heads on his belt. As Aristotle noted in the Politics, Greek warriors didn't wear trophies of individual killings. Likewise, Victoria Crosses and Medals of Honor are awarded today for deeds such as staying in rank, protecting the integrity of the line, advancing and retreating on orders, or rescuing a comrade. This reflects a quite different understanding of heroism.
A third factor underlies our association of Western war with advanced technology. When reason and capitalism are applied to the battlefield, powerful innovations come about. Flints, percussion caps, rifle barrels and mini balls, to cite just a few examples, were all Western inventions. Related to this, Western armies—going back to Alexander the Great's army at the Indus—have a better logistics capability. A recent example is that the Americans invading Iraq were better supplied with water than the native Iraqis. This results from the application of capitalism to military affairs—uniting private self-interest and patriotism to provide armies with food, supplies, and munitions in a way that is much more efficient than the state-run command-and-control alternatives.
Yet another factor is that Western armies are impatient. They tend to want to seek out and destroy the enemy quickly and then go home. Of course, this can be both an advantage and a disadvantage, as we see today in Afghanistan, where the enemy is not so eager for decisive battle. And connected to this tradition is dissent. Today the U.S. military is a completely volunteer force, and its members' behavior on the battlefield largely reflects how they conduct themselves in civil society. One can trace this characteristic of Western armies back to Xenophon's ten thousand, who marched from Northern Iraq to the Black Sea and behaved essentially as a traveling city-state, voting and arguing in a constitutional manner. And their ability to do that is what saved them, not just their traditional discipline.
Now, I would not want to suggest that the West has always been victorious in war. It hasn't. But consider the fact that Europe had a very small population and territory, and yet by 1870 the British Empire controlled 75 percent of the world. What the Western way of war achieved, on any given day, was to give its practitioners—whether Cortez in the Americas, the British in Zululand, or the Greeks in Thrace—a greater advantage over their enemies. There are occasional defeats such as the battles of Cannae, Isandlwana, and Little Big Horn. Over a long period of time, however, the Western way of war will lead us to where we are today.
But where exactly are we today? There have been two developments over the last 20 years that have placed the West in a new cycle. They have not marked the end of the Western way of war, but they have brought about a significant change. The first is the rapid electronic dissemination of knowledge—such that someone in the Hindu Kush tonight can download a sophisticated article on how to make an IED. And the second is that non-Western nations now have leverage, given how global economies work today, through large quantities of strategic materials that Western societies need, such as natural gas, oil, uranium, and bauxite. Correspondingly, these materials produce tremendous amounts of unearned capital in non-Western countries—and by "unearned," I mean that the long process of civilization required to create, for example, a petroleum engineer has not occurred in these countries, yet they find themselves in possession of the monetary fruits of this process. So the West's enemies now have instant access to knowledge and tremendous capital.
In addition to these new developments, there are five traditional checks on the Western way of war that are intensified today. One of these checks is the Western tendency to limit the ferocity of war through rules and regulations. The Greeks tried to outlaw arrows and catapults. Romans had restrictions on the export of breast plates. In World War II, we had regulations against poison gas. Continuing this tradition today, we are trying to achieve nuclear non-proliferation. Unfortunately, the idea that Western countries can adjudicate how the rest of the world makes war isn't applicable anymore. As we see clearly in Iran, we are dealing with countries that have the wealth of Western nations (for the reasons just mentioned), but are anything but constitutional democracies. In fact, these nations find the idea of limiting their war-making capabilities laughable. Even more importantly, they know that many in the West sympathize with them—that many Westerners feel guilty about their wealth, prosperity, and leisure, and take psychological comfort in letting tyrants like Ahmadinejad provoke them.
The second check on the Western way of war is the fact that there is no monolithic West. For one thing, Western countries have frequently fought one another. Most people killed in war have been Europeans killing other Europeans, due to religious differences and political rivalries. And consider, in this light, how fractured the West is today. The U.S. and its allies can't even agree on sanctions against Iran. Everyone knows that once Iran obtains nuclear weapons—in addition to its intention to threaten Israel and to support terrorists—it will begin to aim its rockets at Frankfurt, Munich, and Paris, and to ask for further trade concessions and seek regional hegemony. And in this case, unlike when we deterred Soviet leaders during the Cold War, Westerners will be dealing with theocratic zealots who claim that they do not care about living, making them all the more dangerous. Yet despite all this, to repeat, the Western democracies can't agree on sanctions or even on a prohibition against selling technology and arms.
The third check is what I call "parasitism." It is very difficult to invent and fabricate weapons, but it is very easy to use them. Looking back in history, we have examples of Aztecs killing Conquistadors using steel breast plates and crossbows and of Native Americans using rifles against the U.S. Cavalry. Similarly today, nobody in Hezbollah can manufacture an AK-47—which is built by Russians and made possible by Western design principles—but its members can make deadly use of them. Nor is there anything in the tradition of Shiite Islam that would allow a Shiite nation to create centrifuges, which require Western physics. Yet centrifuges are hard at work in Iran. And this parasitism has real consequences. When the Israelis went into Lebanon in 2006, they were surprised that young Hezbollah fighters had laptop computers with sophisticated intelligence programs; that Hezbollah intelligence agents were sending out doctored photos, making it seem as if Israel was targeting civilians, to Reuters and the AP; and that Hezbollah had obtained sophisticated anti-tank weapons on the international market using Iranian funds. At that point it didn't matter that the Israelis had a sophisticated Western culture, and so it could not win the war.
A fourth check is the ever-present anti-war movement in the West, stemming from the fact that Westerners are free to dissent. And by "ever-present" I mean that long before Michael Moore appeared on the scene, we had Euripides' Trojan Women and Aristophanes' Lysistrata. Of course, today's anti-war movement is much more virulent than in Euripides' and Aristophanes' time. This is in part because people like Michael Moore do not feel they are in any real danger from their countries' enemies. They know that if push comes to shove, the 101st Airborne will ultimately ensure their safety. That is why Moore can say right after 9/11 that Osama Bin Laden should have attacked a red state rather than a blue state. And since Western wars tend to be fought far from home, rather than as a defense against invasions, there is always the possibility that anti-war sentiment will win out and that armies will be called home. Our enemies know this, and often their words and actions are aimed at encouraging and aiding Western anti-war forces.
Finally and most seriously, I think, there is what I call, for want of a better term, "asymmetry." Western culture creates citizens who are affluent, leisured, free, and protected. Human nature being what it is, we citizens of the West often want to enjoy our bounty and retreat into private lives—to go home, eat pizza, and watch television. This is nothing new. I would refer you to Petronius's Satyricon, a banquet scene written around 60 A.D. about affluent Romans who make fun of the soldiers who are up on the Rhine protecting them. This is what Rome had become. And it's not easy to convince someone who has the good life to fight against someone who doesn't.
To put this in contemporary terms, what we are asking today is for a young man with a $250,000 education from West Point to climb into an Apache helicopter—after emailing back and forth with his wife and kids about what went on at a PTA meeting back in Bethesda, Maryland—and fly over Anbar province or up to the Hindu Kush and risk being shot down by a young man from a family of 15, none of whom will ever live nearly as well as the poorest citizens of the United States, using a weapon whose design he doesn't even understand. In a moral sense, the lives of these two young men are of equal value. But in reality, our society values the lives of our young men much more than Afghan societies value the lives of theirs. And it is very difficult to sustain a protracted war with asymmetrical losses under those conditions.
My point here is that all of the usual checks on the tradition of Western warfare are magnified in our time. And I will end with this disturbing thought: We who created the Western way of war are very reluctant to resort to it due to post-modern cynicism, while those who didn't create it are very eager to apply it due to pre-modern zealotry. And that's a very lethal combination.****
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CCP,
I certainly voted for Obama though he is currently off the New Year's Card list. I wouldn't get your hopes up about my redemption though I would still prefer Clinton to McCain let alone Palin.
I don't have a good solution for the Iranian problem. Regime change would be great. Iran voluntary giving up nuclear capability would be great. However the best solution we are possible going to get is is a military attack on Iran. Best solution as is amputation is the best solution when your other option is death by gangrene. If the US or Israel attaches Iran barring miracles there will be a very high price to pay economically and in the lives of our troops, Jewish populations around the world and Iranian civilians.
I don't always or even usually agree with him but I actually like VDH's writing. He is intelligent, eloquent , has a panoramic view, and makes classical allusions. What more could you want. I mean other than the whole conservative problem. From 2002-2004 I actually read a lot of conservative sites because they were the only ones consistently talking about Israel in a way that made sense to me. I use to regularly read LGF and NRO and I was on Richard Baehr's mailing list before he started American thinker. Richard use to lecture in Chicago pretty regularly and I have heard him speak a few times. I either moved to the left or they moved to the right or both but we are no longer on the same wave length.
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Hi Rachel,
thanks for the response.
I guess one could argue that war is NOT an inevitable outcome of mankind's flaws.
Fareed Zakharia admits that Obama is taking a "risk" with his policies. I don't see how Israel, or we, can do the same with regards to Iran. Obama seems to bet the farm in several ways. What if he is wrong (as I believe) on all counts? Or even one?
I don't know about Afgan-pakistan. That situation seems less clear cut to me with regard to what we should do.
"I certainly voted for Obama though he is currently off the New Year's Card list"
Just curious. Is this because of his domestic or / and foreign policy?
You certainly sound open minded and I gotta like the evidence that shows you study BOTH sides of the political spectrum.
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CCP
Mostly Israel because that is core for me.
There is a long list of other things that I'm sorry that I'm not really interested in discussing. There are some issues that I won't be discussing and other issues that I don't feel that I have thought or read enough on the topic to feel comfortable discussing it. In general picking my topics carefully has worked best for me lately.
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126102247889095011.html
DECEMBER 17, 2009
Insurgents Hack U.S. Drones
$26 Software Is Used to Breach Key Weapons in Iraq; Iranian Backing Suspected
By SIOBHAN GORMAN, YOCHI J. DREAZEN and AUGUST COLE
WASHINGTON -- Militants in Iraq have used $26 off-the-shelf software to intercept live video feeds from U.S. Predator drones, potentially providing them with information they need to evade or monitor U.S. military operations.
Senior defense and intelligence officials said Iranian-backed insurgents intercepted the video feeds by taking advantage of an unprotected communications link in some of the remotely flown planes' systems. Shiite fighters in Iraq used software programs such as SkyGrabber -- available for as little as $25.95 on the Internet -- to regularly capture drone video feeds, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter.
U.S. officials say there is no evidence that militants were able to take control of the drones or otherwise interfere with their flights. Still, the intercepts could give America's enemies battlefield advantages by removing the element of surprise from certain missions and making it easier for insurgents to determine which roads and buildings are under U.S. surveillance.
The drone intercepts mark the emergence of a shadow cyber war within the U.S.-led conflicts overseas. They also point to a potentially serious vulnerability in Washington's growing network of unmanned drones, which have become the American weapon of choice in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The Obama administration has come to rely heavily on the unmanned drones because they allow the U.S. to safely monitor and stalk insurgent targets in areas where sending American troops would be either politically untenable or too risky.
The stolen video feeds also indicate that U.S. adversaries continue to find simple ways of counteracting sophisticated American military technologies.
U.S. military personnel in Iraq discovered the problem late last year when they apprehended a Shiite militant whose laptop contained files of intercepted drone video feeds. In July, the U.S. military found pirated drone video feeds on other militant laptops, leading some officials to conclude that militant groups trained and funded by Iran were regularly intercepting feeds.
In the summer 2009 incident, the military found "days and days and hours and hours of proof" that the feeds were being intercepted and shared with multiple extremist groups, the person said. "It is part of their kit now."
A senior defense official said that James Clapper, the Pentagon's intelligence chief, assessed the Iraq intercepts at the direction of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and concluded they represented a shortcoming to the security of the drone network.
"There did appear to be a vulnerability," the defense official said. "There's been no harm done to troops or missions compromised as a result of it, but there's an issue that we can take care of and we're doing so."
Senior military and intelligence officials said the U.S. was working to encrypt all of its drone video feeds from Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, but said it wasn't yet clear if the problem had been completely resolved.
Some of the most detailed evidence of intercepted feeds has been discovered in Iraq, but adversaries have also intercepted drone video feeds in Afghanistan, according to people briefed on the matter. These intercept techniques could be employed in other locations where the U.S. is using pilotless planes, such as Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, they said.
The Pentagon is deploying record numbers of drones to Afghanistan as part of the Obama administration's troop surge there. Lt. Gen. David Deptula, who oversees the Air Force's unmanned aviation program, said some of the drones would employ a sophisticated new camera system called "Gorgon Stare," which allows a single aerial vehicle to transmit back at least 10 separate video feeds simultaneously.
Gen. Deptula, speaking to reporters Wednesday, said there were inherent risks to using drones since they are remotely controlled and need to send and receive video and other data over great distances. "Those kinds of things are subject to listening and exploitation," he said, adding the military was trying to solve the problems by better encrypting the drones' feeds.
The potential drone vulnerability lies in an unencrypted downlink between the unmanned craft and ground control. The U.S. government has known about the flaw since the U.S. campaign in Bosnia in the 1990s, current and former officials said. But the Pentagon assumed local adversaries wouldn't know how to exploit it, the officials said.
Last December, U.S. military personnel in Iraq discovered copies of Predator drone feeds on a laptop belonging to a Shiite militant, according to a person familiar with reports on the matter. "There was evidence this was not a one-time deal," this person said. The U.S. accuses Iran of providing weapons, money and training to Shiite fighters in Iraq, a charge that Tehran has long denied.
The militants use programs such as SkyGrabber, from Russian company SkySoftware. Andrew Solonikov, one of the software's developers, said he was unaware that his software could be used to intercept drone feeds. "It was developed to intercept music, photos, video, programs and other content that other users download from the Internet -- no military data or other commercial data, only free legal content," he said by email from Russia.
Officials stepped up efforts to prevent insurgents from intercepting video feeds after the July incident. The difficulty, officials said, is that adding encryption to a network that is more than a decade old involves more than placing a new piece of equipment on individual drones. Instead, many components of the network linking the drones to their operators in the U.S., Afghanistan or Pakistan have to be upgraded to handle the changes. Additional concerns remain about the vulnerability of the communications signals to electronic jamming, though there's no evidence that has occurred, said people familiar with reports on the matter.
Predator drones are built by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems Inc. of San Diego. Some of its communications technology is proprietary, so widely used encryption systems aren't readily compatible, said people familiar with the matter.
In an email, a spokeswoman said that for security reasons, the company couldn't comment on "specific data link capabilities and limitations."
Fixing the security gap would have caused delays, according to current and former military officials. It would have added to the Predator's price. Some officials worried that adding encryption would make it harder to quickly share time-sensitive data within the U.S. military, and with allies.
"There's a balance between pragmatics and sophistication," said Mike Wynne, Air Force Secretary from 2005 to 2008.
The Air Force has staked its future on unmanned aerial vehicles. Drones account for 36% of the planes in the service's proposed 2010 budget.
Today, the Air Force is buying hundreds of Reaper drones, a newer model, whose video feeds could be intercepted in much the same way as with the Predators, according to people familiar with the matter. A Reaper costs between $10 million and $12 million each and is faster and better armed than the Predator. General Atomics expects the Air Force to buy as many as 375 Reapers.
Write to Siobhan Gorman at siobhan.gorman@wsj.com, Yochi J. Dreazen at yochi.dreazen@wsj.com and August Cole at august.cole@dowjones.com
Printed in The Wall Street Journal, page A1
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second post
NOTE the UAV capability upgrades: "By next spring, a single pod on a UAV could track 13 separate people as they leave a meeting place. The capability will expand to 65 people by 2012 and eventually to perhaps as many as 150 image feeds from a single UAV combat air patrol."
Black UAV Performs In Afghanistan
Dec 11, 2009
David A. Fulghum and Bill Sweetman
The U.S. has been flying a classified, stealthy, remotely piloted aircraft in Afghanistan. That single fact reveals the continued development of low-observable UAVs, hidden aspects of the surveillance buildup in Afghanistan, the footprint of an active “black aircraft world” that stretches to Southwest Asia, and links into the Pentagon’s next-generation recce bomber.
The mystery aircraft—once referred to as the Beast of Kandahar and now identified by the U.S. Air Force as a Lockheed Martin Skunk Works RQ-170 Sentinel—flew from Kandahar’s airport, where it was photographed at least twice in 2007. It shared a hangar with Predator and Reaper UAVs being used in combat operations. On Dec. 4, three days after declassification was requested, Aviation Week revealed the program on its web site. Like Predator and Reaper, the Sentinel is remotely piloted by aircrews—in this case the 30th Reconnaissance Sqdn. (RS) at Tonopah Test Range Airport in the northwest corner of the Nevada Test and Training Range.
The confirmation came the same week as the Air Force’s top intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) officer called for a new, stealth, jet-powered strike-reconnaissance aircraft that can meet the requirements of both irregular and conventional conflicts and strategic, peacetime information-gathering.
The demands of fighting an irregular war do not change the critical operational need for a stealthier, strategic-range, higher-payload, strike-reconnaissance aircraft, says Air Force Lt. Gen. Dave Deptula, deputy chief of staff for ISR.
The battle will be to balance the way the military wants to fight in Afghanistan now against how it wants to fight elsewhere in the future. Air Force officials want to keep those two needs from becoming widely divergent points in geography, technology and operational techniques. For the next 18 months, about 150,000 U.S. and allied troops will try to break the offensive capabilities of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghan istan, and new technologies will be brought into play.
“Don’t get enamored with current conditions,” Deptula cautions. “We don’t know what the future will bring.” While operations in Afghanistan will be “more complex than ever,” the future is “not only going to be about irregular warfare.”
Beyond 2011, the Air Force’s first priority and the destination of the next dollar to be spent “if I were king for a day,” Deptula says, “would be for long-range [reconnaissance and] precision strike. That’s the number-one need.
“We cannot move into a future without a platform that allows [us] to project power long distances and to meet advanced threats in a fashion that gives us an advantage that no other nation has,” he notes. “We can’t walk away from that capability.”
A next-generation design would be equally important as a stealthy ISR platform to greatly extend—through speed, endurance and stealth—the capability produced by putting electro-optical and infrared sensor packets on the B-1 and B-52 bombers for precise attacks on fleeting targets in Southwest Asia.
Surveillance aircraft can see a lot more (farther and better) with long-wave infrared if the platform can operate at 50,000 ft. or higher. The RC-135S Cobra Ball, RC-135W Rivet Joint and E-8C Joint Stars are all limited to flying lower than 30,000 ft. Moreover, the multispectral technology to examine the chemical content of rocket plumes has been miniaturized to fit easily on a much smaller aircraft. Other sensors of interest are electronically scanned array radars, low-probability-of-intercept synthetic aperture radars and signals intelligence.
In fact, combat in Afghanistan could have—if well planned—direct benefits for conventional wars. The target set for the new surge campaign includes “cohesive units without chains of command” that the U.S. and its allies need to “dominate and win [against] across the spectrum” of conflict, Deptula says.
That then brings the focus back to what has been going on at Tonopah.
The 30th RS falls under Air Combat Command’s 432nd Wing at Creech AFB, Nev., home of the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 training and remote operations facilities. Tonopah is where classified projects—such as the F-117 fighter—are kept when they are still secret but have grown to a point where they cannot be easily accommodated at the Air Force’s “black” flight-test center at Groom Lake. Its operations are restricted by the need to prevent personnel cleared into any one program from observing other “sight-sensitive” test aircraft. The squadron was activated as part of the 57th Operations Group on Sept. 1, 2005, and a squadron patch was approved on July 17, 2007. The activation—although not the full meaning of the event—was noted among those who watch for signs of activity in the classified world.
The RQ-170 is a tailless flying wing design from Lockheed Martin’s Advanced Development Programs. It has a single engine and pronounced compound sweep on the leading and trailing edges. It is difficult to estimate the aircraft’s size, but one report suggests that the wingspan is similar to that of the Reaper at 66 ft. The high degree of blending and center-body depth would suggest a greater takeoff weight and thrust than the RQ-3 DarkStar, Lockheed Martin’s earlier stealth UAV, which was powered by a 1,900-lb.-thrust Williams FJ44 engine and weighed 8,500 lb.
A number of features suggest that the RQ-170 is a moderately stealthy design, without the DarkStar’s or Northrop Grumman X-47B’s extreme emphasis on low radar cross section (RCS). The leading edges do not appear to be sharp—normally considered essential for avoiding strong RCS glints—and it appears that the main landing gear door’s front and rear edges are squared off rather than being notched or aligned with the wing edges.
In addition, the exhaust is not shielded by the wing, and the wing is curved rather than angular. That suggests the Sentinel has been designed to avoid the use of highly sensitive technologies. As a single-engine UAV, vehicle losses are a statistical certainty. Ultra-stealthy UAVs—such as the never-completed Lockheed-Boeing Quartz for which DarkStar was originally a demonstrator—were criticized on the grounds they were “pearls too precious to wear”—because their use would be too restricted by the risk of compromising technology in the event of a loss.
The medium-gray color, similar to the Reaper’s, is a clue to performance. At extreme altitudes (above 60,000 ft.), very dark tones provide the best concealment even in daylight because there is little lighting behind the vehicle while it is illuminated by light scattered from moisture and particles in the air below it. The RQ-170 is therefore a mid-altitude platform, unlikely to operate much above 50,000 ft. This altitude also would have simplified the use of an off-the-shelf engine. General Electric has been working on a classified variant of its TF34 engine that appears to fit the thrust range of the RQ-170.
The overwing housings for sensors or antennas are also significant. One could accommodate a satcom antenna; but if both housed sensors, they would cover the entire hemisphere above the aircraft.
An Air Force official tells Aviation Week that the service has been “developing a stealthy, unmanned aircraft system [UAS] to provide reconnaissance and surveillance support to forward-deployed combat forces.
“The fielding of the RQ-170 aligns with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’s request for increased . . . ISR support to the Combatant Commanders and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz’s vision for an increased USAF reliance on unmanned aircraft,” says the memorandum prepared for Aviation Week by the Air Force.
The RQ-170 designation is a correct prefix but numerically out of sequence to avoid obvious guesses of the program’s existence. Technically, “RQ” denotes an unarmed aircraft rather than the MQ prefix applied to the armed Predator and Reaper. A phrase in the memorandum, “support to forward-deployed combat forces,” when combined with visible details that suggest a moderate degree of stealth (including a blunt leading edge, simple nozzle and overwing sensor pods), suggests that the Sentinel is a tactical, operations-oriented platform and not a strategic intelligence-gathering design.
With its moderately low-observable design, the aircraft would be useful for flying along the borders of Iran and peering into China, India and Pakistan to gather useful information about missile tests and telemetry, as well as garnering signals and multispectral intelligence.
The RQ-170 has links to earlier Skunk Works designs such as the experimental DarkStar and Polecat. “DarkStar didn’t die when Lockheed Martin [retired the airframe],” said a former company executive last week. “It just got classified.”
Following the landing of a damaged Navy EP-3E in China in early 2001, then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld called a classified, all-day session of those with responsibilities for “sensitive reconnaissance operations” (AW&ST June 4, 2001, p. 30). They discussed how to avoid embarrassing and damaging losses of classified equipment, documents or aircrews without losing the ability to monitor the military forces and capabilities of important nations such as China. Their leading option was to start a new stealthy, unmanned reconnaissance program that would field 12-24 aircraft. Air Combat Command, which was then led by Gen. John Jumper, wanted a very-low-observable, high-altitude UAV that could penetrate air defense, fly 1,000 nm. to a target, loiter for 8 hr. and return to base.
During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a UAV described as a derivative of DarkStar was being prepared and was said by several officials to have been used operationally in prototype form (AW&ST Mar. 15, 2004, p. 35; July 7, 2003, p. 20).
“It’s the same concept as DarkStar; it’s stealthy and it uses the same apertures and data links,” said an Air Force official at the time. “Only it’s bigger,” said a Navy official. “It’s still far from a production aircraft, but the Air Force wanted to go ahead and get it out there.” The classified UAV’s operation caused consternation among U-2 pilots who noticed high-flying aircraft operating within several miles of their routes over Iraq. Flights of the mysterious aircraft were not coordinated with those of other manned and unmanned surveillance units.
There is great interest in how the U.S. now leverages its black- and white-world UAVs and remotely piloted aircraft to maintain a watch over the vast and rugged areas of Afghanistan that NATO’s force of about 100,000 troops will be unable to patrol. The revitalized conflict in Afghanistan will be largely a ground war with airpower serving as flying artillery and as a wide-ranging reconnaissance force.
Emphasis will be attached to manned MC-12W and unmanned surveillance and light-attack aircraft. New technologies such as the Gorgon Stare ISR pod will address ground commanders’ insatiable desire for full-motion video. By next spring, a single pod on a UAV could track 13 separate people as they leave a meeting place. The capability will expand to 65 people by 2012 and eventually to perhaps as many as 150 image feeds from a single UAV combat air patrol.
Along with its new ISR products, the U.S. will be providing close air support and helicopter airlift to its allies.
“I don’t know exactly when the NATO forces or non-U.S. forces will be flowing,” says Gates. “We do have some private commitments. There will be some additional announcements, I expect, [after the] London conference in January on Afghanistan.”
The rough plan so far is to divide operational responsibilities between the allies in the north and west and the U.S. in the east and south. The allies are expected to total “a brigade or two” comprising about 3,500-4,000 troops each, says Gates. Training of the Afghan troops will focus on partnering in combat with international personnel, rather than on basic training.
With Guy Norris in Los Angeles.
Illustration by Gregory Lewis/AW&ST
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Woof All:
I see that our CinC has proposed ending "Don't ask, don't tell" and allowing open gays in the military.
Although I am opinionated, as a lifelong civilian I must be humble here. Thoughts from our military friends especially appreciated.
Lets kick things off with this:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Bkt1vAX0MRM
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Woof,
I was in the Marines before don't ask don't tell came to be and during my service I knew of a few guys and gals that were openly gay at least to the folks they worked with and there were no problems that I was aware of. No one turned them in or harassed them and part of that was due to the fact that these obviously gay folks behaved with respect and dignity toward themselves and others. They were not flaming, in your face, radical gay activist, trying to shock and awe the masses, these Marines showed restraint. My problem with the services becoming openly gay is that without that level of restraint keeping people respectful of eachother, is that the in your face crowd and the don't rub it in my face crowd, are going to cause a disruption that our military doesn't need.
P.C.
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Question: Contrasting a base at home or a safe base abroad; does the balance change the closer one gets to combat zones/the front lines? Would you want to have a NCO who thought you had a cute butt and wanted you to polish his rifle deciding whether you had to take extra risky missions?
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Woof,
That is where the restraint of not being openly gay without repercussions comes into play. If you know that your going to face charges for just being identified as gay then that prevents a lot of untoward behavior by people. If it's just a he said, he said, kind of deal then there would be plenty of that going on the same as with women in the military.
P.C.
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So, the answer to my question is "Yes" or "No"? :-)
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Yes, but having said that, who could blame someone for admiring my cute butt? :lol: However, I would not want someone with authority over me doing things to get it shot off, just because I told them hands off.
P.C.
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So, therefore , , , you disagree with BO's new policy?
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Ummm , , , "polishing the rifle" was intended as a euphemism for fellatio.
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http://www.sptimes.com/2007/01/08/news_pf/Worldandnation/Israeli_experience_ma.shtml
Israeli experience may sway Army policy on gays
In U.S., "don't ask, don't tell" is losing ground.
By SUSAN TAYLOR MARTIN
Published January 8, 2007
In 1993, Congress banned known homosexuals from the military, convinced their presence could undermine morale and discipline. That year, Israel took exactly the opposite approach.
All restrictions on gay and lesbian soldiers were dropped. Homosexuals in the Israel Defense Forces could join close-knit combat units or serve in sensitive intelligence posts. They were eligible for promotion to the highest ranks.
Fourteen years later, Israelis are convinced they made the right decision.
"It's a non-issue," said David Saranga, a former IDF officer and now Israel's consul for media and public affairs in New York. "There is not a problem with your sexual tendency. You can be a very good officer, a creative one, a brave one and be gay at the same time."
Israel is among 24 countries that permit known gays to serve in the military, and its experience is giving fodder to opponents of the United States' controversial "Don't ask, don't tell" policy.
In a recent opinion piece in the New York Times, Gen. John Shalikashvili, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that admitting gays had not hurt the IDF or any of the 23 other foreign militaries. With troops stretched thin by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States should drop its ban on known gay service members after the new Congress has time to seriously consider the issue, Shalikashvili wrote.
The retired general's view has drawn wide attention because he supported "don't ask, don't tell" when President Clinton devised it in 1993 as a compromise to the tough law Congress passed that year. Acknowledging that the issue still stirs "passionate feelings" on both sides, Shalikashvili said the debate about gays in the military "must also consider the evidence that has emerged over the last 14 years" - including that in Israel.
As a country almost continuously at war, the Jewish state has always had mandatory conscription although known homosexuals were usually discharged before 1980. The IDF's first official statement on the matter, in 1983, allowed gays to serve but banned them from intelligence and top-secret positions.
Opposition to the policy came to a head 10 years later when the chairman of the Tel Aviv University's chemistry department revealed the IDF had stripped him of his officer rank and barred him from sensitive research solely because he was gay. His testimony before a parliamentary committee created a public storm and forced the IDF to drop all restrictions on homosexuals.
Since then, researchers have found, Israel's armed forces have seen no decline in morale, performance, readiness or cohesion.
"In this security-conscious country, where the military is considered to be essential to the continued existence of the nation, the decision to include sexual minorities has not harmed IDF effectiveness," wrote Aaron Belkin and Melissa Levitt of the University of California, Santa Barbara.
A brigadier general quoted in the pair's study said Israelis show a "great tolerance" for homosexual soldiers. One lesbian soldier said she was amazed that "people either thought my sexual orientation was cool or were indifferent to it."
The California study also cited a survey of 17 heterosexual soldiers, two of whom said they would have a problem serving under a gay commander and three expressing concern about showering with a gay colleague. None, though, objected to gay soldiers in general, and as one officer put it, "They're citizens of Israel, like you and me. The sexual orientation of the workers around me doesn't bother me."
As in the United States, though, many Israeli gays, including those in the military, are reluctant to come out of the closet until they think it is safe to do so.
"All available evidence suggests that the IDF continues to be a place where many homosexual soldiers choose not to disclose their sexual orientation," the researchers found, noting that a psychiatrist said soldiers in her care still "suspect that if they come out they won't get a good position."
Publicly, the IDF says that gay soldiers - estimated to be about 2 percent of the force - are screened the same as heterosexuals for promotions and sensitive positions. One officer said she had no problems rising through the ranks as an open lesbian.
Despite obvious differences between the two countries, Israel's experience provides a relevant and encouraging lesson in what might happen if the United States lifted its ban on known gays in the services, the California researchers concluded. Not everyone agrees.
Elaine Donnelly, president of the Michigan-based Center for Military Readiness, notes that American troops, unlike Israelis, are often deployed for long periods thousands of miles from home.
"People who live in conditions of forced intimacy should not have to expose themselves to persons who might be sexually attracted to them," Donnelly said. "We respect that desire for human modesty and we respect the power of human sexuality."
However, a recent poll of U.S. soldiers who served in Iraq and Afghanistan found that 75 percent said they would feel comfortable serving with gays. Of those who knew they had a gay colleague, two-thirds said it had no impact on their unit or personal morale.
Americans in general are far more amenable to gays in the military since "don't ask, don't tell" was adopted in 1993. Polls in the last few years have shown at least 58 percent and as much as 70 percent favor repealing the ban on known homosexuals.
"Of the minority of the public that still support the policy, that support is not about anything other than simple moral discomfort," said Belkin, director of Santa Barbara's Michael D. Palm Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military.
"It's really about morality and religion and politics, and it's not about what's good for the military at this point."
Susan Martin can be contacted at susan@sptimes.com.
Policy worldwide
Countries that allow gays to serve in the military:
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Britain, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland
Countries that ban gays from the military:
Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Croatia, Greece, Poland, Peru, Portugal, Russia, Turkey, United States and Venezuela.
The list does not include those countries in which homosexuality is banned outright, such as Iran, Saudi Arabia and several other nations in the Middle East. These countries generally have no stated policy on gays in the military because they do not allow or acknowledge the presence of gays at all.
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Ummm , , , "polishing the rifle" was intended as a euphemism for fellatio.
Exactly, the price for polishing the rifle has dire consequences if it is a same sex issue tied to promotion......... some time different sex too. While the incident I had contact with was during peace time, it did cost at least 3 carreers that I know of. During wartime and availability of non-traceable enemy weapons I am sure the outcome would have been more extreme.
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I'm not sure yet if we are understanding each other.
The question I seek to raise is of a gay NCO or officer exerting sexual pressure (subtle or not) in an environment where he/she is in a position to put those who resist that pressure more in harm's way.
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Ah, now I get it, fragging.
So if I understand correctly (and given our conversation on this point that may well be a first :lol: ) you argument is that not to worry about the issue because those endangered by rejected advances can always frag?!?
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Any concerns over the creation of a new "protected class"? IMHO the history of PC (see e.g. the Fort Hood affair where tons of people knew the jihadi killer was exactly that yet said nothing) gives me concerns.
Separate question: How would you feel to share a foxhole with someone who got a woodie for you or was flashing a soaped up butt at you in the showers?
Separate question: What if there are a coupled pair of gay soldiers in the same unit? Do "coupled gays" get housing for married couples?
Separate question: What happens if a unit becomes a predominantly gay unit? What happens to military discipline if the barracks become a SF bath house or a branch of the YMCA? How does the straight soldier handle that?
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Hat tip to BBG-- pasting this here from the WMD thread.
U.S. successfully tests airborne laser on missile
6:52am EST
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A U.S. high-powered airborne laser weapon shot down a ballistic missile in the first successful test of a futuristic directed energy weapon, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said on Friday.
The agency said in a statement the test took place at 8:44 p.m. PST (11:44 p.m. EST) on Thursday /0444 GMT on Friday) at Point Mugu's Naval Air Warfare Center-Weapons Division Sea Range off Ventura in central California.
"The Missile Defense Agency demonstrated the potential use of directed energy to defend against ballistic missiles when the Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB) successfully destroyed a boosting ballistic missile" the agency said.
The high-powered Airborne Laser system is being developed by Boeing Co., the prime contractor, and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.
Boeing produces the airframe, a modified 747 jumbo jet, while Northrop Grumman supplies the higher-energy laser and Lockheed Martin is developing the beam and fire control systems.
"This was the first directed energy lethal intercept demonstration against a liquid-fuel boosting ballistic missile target from an airborne platform," the agency added.
The airborne laser weapon successfully underwent its first in-flight test against a target missile back in August. During that test, Boeing said the modified 747-400F aircraft took off from Edwards Air Force Base and used its infrared sensors to find a target missile launched from San Nicolas Island, California.
The plane's battle management system issued engagement and target location instructions to the laser's fire control system, which tracked the target and fired a test laser at the missile. Instruments on the missile verified the system had hit its mark, Boeing said.
The airborne laser weapon is aimed at deterring enemy missile attacks and providing the U.S. military with the ability to engage all classes of ballistic missiles at the speed of light while they are in the boost phase of flight.
"The revolutionary use of directed energy is very attractive for missile defense, with the potential to attack multiple targets at the speed of light, at a range of hundreds of kilometers (miles), and at a low cost per intercept attempt compared to current technologies," the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said.
(Reporting by Jim Wolf and David Alexander, Editing by Sandra Maler)
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61B18C20100212?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20reuters%2FtopNews%20%28News%20%2F%20US%20%2F%20Top%20News%29
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My understanding is that our military capabilities are heavily dependent upon our dominance in space , , , and that the Chinese are hard at work at satellite killer capabilities. If our satellites are blinded/destroyed, things could go badly for us quite quickly. There are also the closely related matters of lasers in/from space and solar panels in space (where they just might be economically logical) For a full discussion of all this, see George Friedman's (he of Stratfor) new book "The Next 100 Years".
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U.S. Surrenders New Frontier Without Fight
By CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER
Posted 02/12/2010 05:52 PM ET
'We have an agreement until 2012 that Russia will be responsible for this," says Anatoly Perminov, head of the Russian space agency, about ferrying astronauts from other countries into low-Earth orbit.
"But after that? Excuse me, but the prices should be absolutely different then!"
The Russians may be new at capitalism, but they know how it works. When you have a monopoly, you charge monopoly prices. Within months, Russia will have a monopoly on rides into space.
By the end of this year, there will be no shuttle, no U.S. manned space program, no way for us to get into space.
We're not talking about Mars or the moon here. We're talking about low-Earth orbit, which the U.S. has dominated for nearly half a century and from which it is now retiring with nary a whimper.
Our absence from low-Earth orbit was meant to last a few years, the interval between the retirement of the fatally fragile space shuttle and its replacement with the Constellation program (Ares booster, Orion capsule, Altair lunar lander) to take astronauts more cheaply and safely back to space.
But the Obama 2011 budget kills Constellation. Instead, we shall have nothing. For the first time since John Glenn flew in 1962, the U.S. will have no access of its own for humans into space — and no prospect of getting there in the foreseeable future.
Of course, the administration presents the abdication as a great leap forward: Launching humans will now be turned over to the private sector, while NASA's efforts will be directed toward landing on Mars.
This is nonsense. It would be swell for private companies to take over launching astronauts. But they cannot do it. It's too expensive. It's too experimental. And the safety standards for actually getting people up and down reliably are just unreachably high.
Sure, decades from now there will be a robust private space-travel industry. But that is a long time. In the interim, space will be owned by Russia and then China. The president waxes seriously nationalist at the thought of China or India surpassing us in speculative "clean energy." Yet he is quite prepared to gratuitously give up our spectacular lead in human space exploration.
As for Mars, more nonsense. Mars is just too far away. And how do you get there without the stepping stones of Ares and Orion? If we can't afford an Ares rocket to get us into orbit and to the moon, how long will it take to develop a revolutionary new propulsion system that will take us not a quarter-million miles but 35 million miles?
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BTW, where are the Republicans on all this? Silent.
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Corps to use more lethal ammo in Afghanistan
Navy Times
By Dan Lamothe - Staff writer
Posted : Tuesday Feb 16, 2010 9:29:10 EST
The Marine Corps is dropping its conventional 5.56mm ammunition in Afghanistan in favor of new deadlier, more accurate rifle rounds, and could field them at any time.
The open-tipped rounds until now have been available only to Special Operations Command troops. The first 200,000 5.56mm Special Operations Science and Technology rounds are already downrange with Marine Expeditionary Brigade-Afghanistan, said Brig. Gen. Michael Brogan, commander of Marine Corps Systems Command. Commonly known as “SOST” rounds, they were legally cleared for Marine use by the Pentagon in late January, according to Navy Department documents obtained by Marine Corps Times.
SOCom developed the new rounds for use with the Special Operations Force Combat Assault Rifle, or SCAR, which needed a more accurate bullet because its short barrel, at 13.8 inches, is less than an inch shorter than the M4 carbine’s. Using an open-tip match round design common with some sniper ammunition, SOST rounds are designed to be “barrier blind,” meaning they stay on target better than existing M855 rounds after penetrating windshields, car doors and other objects.
Compared to the M855, SOST rounds also stay on target longer in open air and have increased stopping power through “consistent, rapid fragmentation which shortens the time required to cause incapacitation of enemy combatants,” according to Navy Department documents. At 62 grains, they weigh about the same as most NATO rounds, have a typical lead core with a solid copper shank and are considered a variation of Federal Cartridge Co.’s Federal Trophy Bonded Bear Claw round, which was developed for big-game hunting and is touted in a company news release for its ability to crush bone.
The Corps purchased a “couple million” SOST rounds as part of a joint $6 million, 10.4-million-round buy in September — enough to last the service several months in Afghanistan, Brogan said. Navy Department documents say the Pentagon will launch a competition worth up to $400 million this spring for more SOST ammunition.
“This round was really intended to be used in a weapon with a shorter barrel, their SCAR carbines,” Brogan said. “But because of its blind-to-barrier performance, its accuracy improvements and its reduced muzzle flash, those are attractive things that make it also useful to general purpose forces like the Marine Corps and Army.”
M855 problems
The standard Marine round, the M855, was developed in the 1970s and approved as an official NATO round in 1980. In recent years, however, it has been the subject of widespread criticism from troops, who question whether it has enough punch to stop oncoming enemies.
In 2002, shortcomings in the M855’s performance were detailed in a report by Naval Surface Warfare Center Crane, Ind., according to Navy Department documents. Additional testing in 2005 showed shortcomings. The Pentagon issued a request to industry for improved ammunition the following year. Federal Cartridge was the only company to respond.
Brogan said the Corps has no plans to remove the M855 from the service’s inventory at this time. However, the service has determined it “does not meet USMC performance requirements” in an operational environment in which insurgents often lack personal body armor, but engage troops through “intermediate barriers” such as windshields and car doors at security checkpoints, according to a Jan. 25 Navy Department document clearing Marines to use the SOST round.
The document, signed by J.R. Crisfield, director of the Navy Department International and Operational Law Division, is clear on the recommended course of action for the 5.56mm SOST round, formally known as MK318 MOD 0 enhanced 5.56mm ammunition.
“Based on the significantly improved performance of the MK318 MOD 0 over the M855 against virtually every anticipated target array in Afghanistan and similar combat environments where increased accuracy, better effects behind automobile glass and doors, consistent terminal performance and reduced muzzle flash are critical to mission accomplishment, USMC would treat the MK318 MOD 0 as its new 5.56mm standard issue cartridge,” Crisfield wrote.
The original plan called for the SOST round to be used specifically within the M4 carbine, which has a 14½-inch barrel and is used by tens of thousands of Marines in military occupational specialties such as motor vehicle operator where the M16A4’s longer barrel can be cumbersome. Given its benefits, however, Marine officials decided also to adopt SOST for the M16A4, which has a 20-inch barrel and is used by most of the infantry.
Incorporating SOST
In addition to operational benefits, SOST rounds have similar ballistics to the M855 round, meaning Marines will not have to adjust to using the new ammo, even though it is more accurate.
“It does not require us to change our training,” Brogan said. “We don’t have to change our aim points or modify our training curriculum. We can train just as we have always trained with the 855 round, so right now, there is no plan to completely remove the 855 from inventory.”
Marine officials in Afghanistan could not be reached for comment, but Brogan said commanders with MEB-A are authorized to issue SOST ammo to any subordinate command. Only one major Marine 5.56mm weapon system downrange will not use SOST: the M249 squad automatic weapon. Though the new rounds fit the SAW, they are not currently produced in the linked fashion commonly employed with the light machine gun, Brogan said.
SOCom first fielded the SOST round in April, said Air Force Maj. Wesley Ticer, a spokesman for the command. It also fielded a cousin — MK319 MOD 0 enhanced 7.62mm SOST ammo — designed for use with the SCAR-Heavy, a powerful 7.62mm battle rifle. SOCom uses both kinds of ammunition in all of its geographic combatant commands, Ticer said.
The Corps has no plans to buy 7.62mm SOST ammunition, but that could change if operational commanders or infantry requirements officers call for it in the future, Brogan said.
It is uncertain how long the Corps will field the SOST round. Marine officials said last summer that they took interest in it after the M855A1 lead-free slug in development by the Army experienced problems during testing, but Brogan said the service is still interested in the environmentally friendly round if it is effective. Marine officials also want to see if the price of the SOST round drops once in mass production. The price of an individual round was not available, but Brogan said SOST ammo is more expensive than current M855 rounds.
“We have to wait and see what happens with the Army’s 855LFS round,” he said. “We also have to get very good cost estimates of where these [SOST] rounds end up in full-rate, or serial production. Because if it truly is going to remain more expensive, then we would not want to buy that round for all of our training applications.”
Legal concerns
Before the SOST round could be fielded by the Corps, it had to clear a legal hurdle: approval that it met international law of war standards.
The process is standard for new weapons and weapons systems, but it took on added significance because of the bullet’s design. Open-tip bullets have been approved for use by U.S. forces for decades, but are sometimes confused with hollow-point rounds, which expand in human tissue after impact, causing unnecessary suffering, according to widely accepted international treaties signed following the Hague peace conventions held in the Netherlands in 1899 and 1907.
“We need to be very clear in drawing this distinction: This is not a hollow-point round, which is not permitted,” Brogan said. “It has been through law of land warfare review and has passed that review so that it meets the criteria of not causing unnecessary pain and suffering.”
The open-tip/hollow-point dilemma has been addressed several times by the military, including in 1990, when the chief of the Judge Advocate General International Law Branch, now-retired Marine Col. W. Hays Parks, advised that the open-tip M852 Sierra MatchKing round preferred by snipers met international law requirements. The round was kept in the field.
In a 3,000-word memorandum to Army Special Operations Command, Parks said “unnecessary suffering” and “superfluous injury” have not been formally defined, leaving the U.S. with a “balancing test” it must conduct to assess whether the usage of each kind of rifle round is justified.
“The test is not easily applied,” Parks said. “For this reason, the degree of ‘superfluous injury’ must … outweigh substantially the military necessity for the weapon system or projectile.”
John Cerone, an expert in the law of armed conflict and professor at the New England School of Law, said the military’s interpretation of international law is widely accepted. It is understood that weapons cause pain in war, and as long as there is a strategic military reason for their employment, they typically meet international guidelines, he said.
“In order to fall within the prohibition, a weapon has to be designed to cause unnecessary suffering,” he said.
Sixteen years after Parks issued his memo, an Army unit in Iraq temporarily banned the open-tip M118 long-range used by snipers after a JAG officer mistook it for hollow-tip ammunition, according to a 2006 Washington Times report. The decision was overturned when other Army officials were alerted.
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/7632543/A-cruise-missile-in-a-shipping-box-on-sale-to-rogue-bidders.html
A cruise missile in a shipping box on sale to rogue bidders
Defence experts are warning of a new danger of ballistic weapons proliferation after a Russian company started marketing a cruise missile that can be launched from a shipping container.
By Thomas Harding, Defence Correspondent
Published: 6:30PM BST 25 Apr 2010
Club - K container missile system. Stills from an animated film being used to market a missile system that allows cruise missles to be launched from a freight container. this can be loaded onto a lorry, ship, or train as desired tomove into position before launching missiles
It is feared that the covert Club-K missile attack system could prove "game-changing" in fighting wars with small countries, which would gain a remote capacity to mount multiple missiles on boats, trucks or railways.
Iran and Venezuela have already shown an interest in the Club-K Container Missile System which could allow them to carry out pre-emptive strikes from behind an enemy's missile defences.
Defence experts say the system is designed to be concealed as a standard 40ft shipping container that cannot be identified until it is activated. Priced at an estimated £10 million, each container is fitted with four cruise anti-ship or land attack missiles. The system represents an affordable "strategic level weapon". Some experts believe that if Iraq had the Club-K system in 2003 it would have made it impossible for America to invade with any container ship in the Gulf a potential threat.
Club-K is being marketed at the Defence Services Asia exhibition in Malaysia this week. Novator, the manufacturer, is an advanced missile specialist that would not have marketed the system without Moscow's approval. It has released an emotive marketing film complete with dramatic background music. It shows Club-K containers stowed on ships, trucks and trains as a neighbouring country prepares to invade with American style military equipment. The enemy force is wiped out by the cruise missile counter attack. Russia has already prompted concern in Washington by selling Iran the sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missile system that would make targeting of Iranian nuclear facilities very difficult.
"This Club-K is game changing with the ability to wipe out an aircraft carrier 200 miles away. The threat is immense in that no one can tell how far deployed your missiles could be," said Robert Hewson, editor of Jane's Air-Launched Weapons, who first reported on the Club-K developments.
"What alerted me to this was that the Russians were advertising it at specific international defence event and they have marketed it very squarely at anyone under threat of action from the US."
Reuben Johnson, a Pentagon defence consultant, said the system would be a "real maritime fear for anyone with a waterfront".
"This is ballistic missile proliferation on a scale we have not seen before because now you cannot readily identify what's being used as a launcher because it's very carefully disguised. Someone could sail off your shore looking innocuous then the next minute big explosions are going off at your military installations."
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rqwMzQiXlK0
See entry number 169 from July 2008
http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1002.msg19722;topicseen#msg19722
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By NATHAN HODGE
WASHINGTON—This summer, the Navy expects to choose between two competing designs for the Littoral Combat Ship, a fast, shore-hugging warship that will take on 21st century missions like chasing pirates and intercepting drug smugglers.
Associated Press
The Littoral Combat Ship, produced by General Dynamics, underway during builder's trials.
.At issue is more than a shipbuilding contract. The contest underscores a broad discussion taking place inside and outside the Navy about the future size and shape of the service's fleet.
U.S. naval power is built in large part around carrier strike groups, a costly armada of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and escort ships that project American power around the globe. Littoral Combat Ships are pint-size in comparison. They will be roughly the size of a frigate—smaller than a destroyer, larger than a patrol boat—but with more automation.
Fully loaded for combat, they will have about 75 people aboard, about a third a frigate's crew. In often outsize Pentagon terms, the craft will be relatively cheap: roughly half a billion dollars each. A new carrier is projected to cost around $10 billion.
The Navy is choosing between designs offered by Lockheed Martin Corp. and the U.S. unit of Australia's Austal Ltd., which has teamed with General Dynamics Corp. Both models have innovative features. The Lockheed variant, 378 feet long and built at Fincantieri Marine Group LLC's Marinette Marine Corp. shipyard in Marinette, Wis., has a high-speed steel hull that lets it travel at over 40 knots (about 50 miles an hour).
The Austal/General Dynamics ship is built around an aluminum trimaran design, a configuration never before used in a U.S. warship. Derived from a high-speed commercial ferry, the 419-foot ship features a 7,300-square-foot flight deck and a spacious mission bay for combat equipment.
One of each ship design is already in service, and the Navy expects to award a fixed-price contract to a single winner for 10 of the new warships. Another order of five ships is to be awarded to a competing shipyard sometime in 2012.
The Littoral Combat Ship award comes at a crucial time for the sea service. An austerity drive at the Pentagon, fueled in part by slowing growth in the Defense Department's budget, is placing new pressure on Navy spending and raising questions about whether the service will have to scale back an ambitious long-term shipbuilding plan.
In a recent speech, Adm. Gary Roughead, the Navy's top admiral, pointed to the "potential for a procurement squeeze," saying that operations, maintenance and manpower costs had the potential to cut into money available for equipment purchases.
Further adding pressure, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has publicly asked whether the Navy needs to stick with plans to keep 11 aircraft carrier strike groups for the next three decades, saying the U.S. already enjoyed "massive overmatch" against any other navy.
And in a recent analysis of the Navy's current 30-year shipbuilding plan, the Congressional Budget Office warned that the Navy wouldn't be able to afford all the ships on its wish list, even if it continues to receive the same amount of funding for ship construction—an average of about $15 billion a year in 2010 dollars.
Maren Leed, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank in Washington, says the Navy faces a much tighter budget in coming years, which may force it to make choices, trading purchases of expensive ships like carriers for more investment in ships like the Littoral Combat Ship.
The smaller and cheaper Littoral Combat Ship may help the Navy stick to a goal important to its top officials. For several years, they have argued publicly for a shipbuilding program that would allow them to build out to a 313-ship fleet, up from 288 ships today.
Lawmakers involved in the defense spending process are also keen to boost ship numbers. Rep. Ike Skelton (D., Mo.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, recently told reporters that "numbers make a difference" when it comes to maintaining a global naval presence, and the current fiscal year 2011 budget request includes nine new ships that count toward that 313-ship goal. But Rep. Gene Taylor (D., Miss.), chairman of the seapower subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, said the Navy was retiring older ships more quickly than it was buying new ones.
"This is the third CNO [chief of naval operations] I've dealt with who's said the 313 ship is a floor, not a ceiling," he said in an interview. "And yet they send over a ship retention plan that goes the wrong way."
The service also canceled two earlier shipbuilding contracts for Littoral Combat Ships, because the prices had become too high. The Navy's decision to pare down the Littoral Combat Ship to a single design is supposed to yield a more affordable ship.
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Hat tip to PC who posted this in the China thread:
By ERIC TALMADGE, Associated Press Writer Eric Talmadge, Associated Press Writer – Thu Aug 5, 5:43 pm ET
ABOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON – Nothing projects U.S. global air and sea power more vividly than supercarriers. Bristling with fighter jets that can reach deep into even landlocked trouble zones, America's virtually invincible carrier fleet has long enforced its dominance of the high seas.
China may soon put an end to that.
U.S. naval planners are scrambling to deal with what analysts say is a game-changing weapon being developed by China — an unprecedented carrier-killing missile called the Dong Feng 21D that could be launched from land with enough accuracy to penetrate the defenses of even the most advanced moving aircraft carrier at a distance of more than 1,500 kilometers (900 miles).
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EDITOR'S NOTE — The USS George Washington supercarrier recently deployed off North Korea in a high-profile show of U.S. sea power. AP Tokyo News Editor Eric Talmadge was aboard the carrier, and filed this report.
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Analysts say final testing of the missile could come as soon as the end of this year, though questions remain about how fast China will be able to perfect its accuracy to the level needed to threaten a moving carrier at sea.
The weapon, a version of which was displayed last year in a Chinese military parade, could revolutionize China's role in the Pacific balance of power, seriously weakening Washington's ability to intervene in any potential conflict over Taiwan or North Korea. It could also deny U.S. ships safe access to international waters near China's 11,200-mile (18,000-kilometer) -long coastline.
While a nuclear bomb could theoretically sink a carrier, assuming its user was willing to raise the stakes to atomic levels, the conventionally-armed Dong Feng 21D's uniqueness is in its ability to hit a powerfully defended moving target with pin-point precision.
The Chinese Defense Ministry did not immediately respond to the AP's request for a comment.
Funded by annual double-digit increases in the defense budget for almost every year of the past two decades, the Chinese navy has become Asia's largest and has expanded beyond its traditional mission of retaking Taiwan to push its sphere of influence deeper into the Pacific and protect vital maritime trade routes.
"The Navy has long had to fear carrier-killing capabilities," said Patrick Cronin, senior director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the nonpartisan, Washington-based Center for a New American Security. "The emerging Chinese antiship missile capability, and in particular the DF 21D, represents the first post-Cold War capability that is both potentially capable of stopping our naval power projection and deliberately designed for that purpose."
Setting the stage for a possible conflict, Beijing has grown increasingly vocal in its demands for the U.S. to stay away from the wide swaths of ocean — covering much of the Yellow, East and South China seas — where it claims exclusivity.
It strongly opposed plans to hold U.S.-South Korean war games in the Yellow Sea off the northeastern Chinese coast, saying the participation of the USS George Washington supercarrier, with its 1,092-foot (333-meter) flight deck and 6,250 personnel, would be a provocation because it put Beijing within striking range of U.S. F-18 warplanes.
The carrier instead took part in maneuvers held farther away in the Sea of Japan.
U.S. officials deny Chinese pressure kept it away, and say they will not be told by Beijing where they can operate.
"We reserve the right to exercise in international waters anywhere in the world," Rear Adm. Daniel Cloyd, who headed the U.S. side of the exercises, said aboard the carrier during the maneuvers, which ended last week.
But the new missile, if able to evade the defenses of a carrier and of the vessels sailing with it, could undermine that policy.
"China can reach out and hit the U.S. well before the U.S. can get close enough to the mainland to hit back," said Toshi Yoshihara, an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College. He said U.S. ships have only twice been that vulnerable — against Japan in World War II and against Soviet bombers in the Cold War.
Carrier-killing missiles "could have an enduring psychological effect on U.S. policymakers," he e-mailed to The AP. "It underscores more broadly that the U.S. Navy no longer rules the waves as it has since the end of World War II. The stark reality is that sea control cannot be taken for granted anymore."
Yoshihara said the weapon is causing considerable consternation in Washington, though — with attention focused on land wars in Afghanistan and Iraq — its implications haven't been widely discussed in public.
Analysts note that while much has been made of China's efforts to ready a carrier fleet of its own, it would likely take decades to catch U.S. carrier crews' level of expertise, training and experience.
But Beijing does not need to match the U.S. carrier for carrier. The Dong Feng 21D, smarter, and vastly cheaper, could successfully attack a U.S. carrier, or at least deter it from getting too close.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates warned of the threat in a speech last September at the Air Force Association Convention.
"When considering the military-modernization programs of countries like China, we should be concerned less with their potential ability to challenge the U.S. symmetrically — fighter to fighter or ship to ship — and more with their ability to disrupt our freedom of movement and narrow our strategic options," he said.
Gates said China's investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, along with ballistic missiles, "could threaten America's primary way to project power" through its forward air bases and carrier strike groups.
The Pentagon has been worried for years about China getting an anti-ship ballistic missile. The Pentagon considers such a missile an "anti-access," weapon, meaning that it could deny others access to certain areas.
The Air Force's top surveillance and intelligence officer, Lt. Gen. David Deptula, told reporters this week that China's effort to increase anti-access capability is part of a worrisome trend.
He did not single out the DF 21D, but said: "While we might not fight the Chinese, we may end up in situations where we'll certainly be opposing the equipment that they build and sell around the world."
Questions remain over when — and if — China will perfect the technology; hitting a moving carrier is no mean feat, requiring state-of-the-art guidance systems, and some experts believe it will take China a decade or so to field a reliable threat. Others, however, say final tests of the missile could come in the next year or two.
Former Navy commander James Kraska, a professor of international law and sea power at the U.S. Naval War College, recently wrote a controversial article in the magazine Orbis outlining a hypothetical scenario set just five years from now in which a Deng Feng 21D missile with a penetrator warhead sinks the USS George Washington.
That would usher in a "new epoch of international order in which Beijing emerges to displace the United States."
While China's Defense Ministry never comments on new weapons before they become operational, the DF 21D — which would travel at 10 times the speed of sound and carry conventional payloads — has been much discussed by military buffs online.
A pseudonymous article posted on Xinhuanet, website of China's official news agency, imagines the U.S. dispatching the George Washington to aid Taiwan against a Chinese attack.
The Chinese would respond with three salvos of DF 21D, the first of which would pierce the hull, start fires and shut down flight operations, the article says. The second would knock out its engines and be accompanied by air attacks. The third wave, the article says, would "send the George Washington to the bottom of the ocean."
Comments on the article were mostly positive.
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Remember this story?
Clinton and Chinese Missiles
Charles R. Smith
Tuesday, Jan. 14, 2003
Chinese Army Gets U.S. Missile Technology for Money
A newly released document from the U.S. State Department reveals that the most successful Chinese espionage operation in recent history occurred during the Clinton administration.
The document accuses Hughes Space and Communications Company of violating U.S. national security 123 times by knowingly sending detailed missile and space technology directly to the Chinese army.
According to the State Department, the most serious violations occurred when Hughes gave the Chinese army information that supported its analyses of the investigation of the January 1995 failure of the launch of a China Long March 2E (LM-2E) rocket carrying the Hughes-manufactured ASTAR II commercial communications satellite.
On Jan. 26, 1995, approximately 52 seconds into flight, a Chinese LM-2E carrying the Hughes APSTAR II communications satellite failed. This was the LM-2E's second failure. The first failure of the LM-2E in December 1992 involved an attempted launch of the Hughes OPTUS B-2 commercial communications satellite.
"Respondents decided to form and direct a launch failure investigation beginning in January 1995 and continuing throughout much of that year. The investigation involved the formation of several groups of leading technical experts from China and the U.S., which throughout the investigation engaged in an extensive exchange of technical data and analysis, producing a wide range of unauthorized technology transfers," noted the State Department charge document.
"At no time did the Respondents seek or receive a license or other written approval concerning the conduct of their APSTAR II failure investigation with PRC authorities," states the charge document.
According to the State Department, "this strategy was further influenced by Respondents' business interests in securing future contracts with the PRC and with Asian satellite companies in which PRC influence figured prominently, and concern that U.S. Government policy constraints on technology transfer as administered by ODTC were an impediment to achieving these interests."
Chinese Rocket Failure Blamed on U.S.
According to a 1998 Defense Department investigation, the reason for Hughes passing the technical information to China was because the Chinese army blamed Hughes for the rocket failure.
"Following the APSTAR II failure, there was disagreement between Hughes and the Chinese about whether the principal cause of the failure was the launch vehicle or the satellite. The subsequent joint Hughes-Chinese failure investigation was apparently intended, at least in part, to resolve this dispute," states the 1998 Defense Department report.
"According to the Hughes/Apstar materials, the disagreement between Hughes and the Chinese focused on two views of the cause of the launch failure: (1) the Chinese claim that the satellite was defective as evidenced by satellite fuel igniting; and (2) Hughes' claim that the satellite was a contributing factor only after the launch vehicle fairing had failed which exposed the satellite to catastrophic conditions."
"DoD believes that the scope and content of the launch failure investigation conducted by Hughes with the Chinese following the January 1995 APSTAR II failure raises national security concerns both with regard to violating those standards and to potentially contributing to China's missile capabilities," states the Defense Department report.
PLA General Shen Rongjun
Chinese General Shen Rongjun led the penetration of U.S. missile and space technology during the Clinton administration. The 2002 State Department letter makes it clear that they believe Gen. Shen led the successful penetration of the Clinton administration and Hughes.
In 1994, Gen. Shen was second in command of a Chinese army unit known as COSTIND, or the Commission On Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. Shen, and his COSTIND operatives in front companies, secured a wide range of advanced missile and space technology from Hughes after a 1994 meeting with Commerce Secretary Ron Brown.
Commerce documents obtained using the Freedom of Information Act show that Brown met with Gen. Shen in 1994 during a trade trip to Beijing. President Clinton personally authorized the meeting between the Chinese general and Brown.
Before moving to Commerce, Brown headed the Democratic National Committee. The Federal Election Commission fined the DNC in 2002 for "knowingly and willingly" accepting donations from Chinese army sources.
Gen. Shen did obtain help from the White House by pressuring Hughes with satellite contracts. Hughes CEO Michael Armstrong wrote President Clinton in 1993 threatening to pull support for Clinton if he did not allow the space technology transfers to China. In 1994, Clinton approved a waiver for Hughes to transfer advanced satellite encryption systems to China.
According to a Sept. 20, 1995, memorandum, Hughes regarded Gen. Shen Rongjun as "the most important Chinese space official."
The Chinese army penetration of Hughes was so successful that Gen. Shen managed to get his son, Shen Jun, a job at Hughes as the lead software engineer for all Chinese satellites. According to Hughes, Shen Jun had access to "proprietary" satellite source code.
"On July 9, 1996, Respondents submitted a munitions export license application to ODTC seeking authorization for one of its employees, Shen Jun, described as a dual Canadian Chinese national, in order to provide Chinese-English language translation and interpretation support for the preliminary design phase of the APMT satellite project," states the 2002 charge letter.
"In no place in that submission nor otherwise did HUGHES SPACE AND COMMUNICATIONS COMPANY inform ODTC that this individual was, in fact, the son of PLA General and COSTIND Deputy Director Shen Rongjun, which fact was material to the U.S. Government's consideration of whether the license application should be approved or denied."
"The record indicates that Shen Jun's role for Respondents went well beyond that of an interpreter/translator and more closely resembled that of an intermediary with his father, General Shen, and other PRC space authorities, in order to cultivate their support in various matters of interest to Hughes, including the handling of the APSTAR II launch failure investigation and the APMT contract," noted the State Department 2002 charge letter.
According to the State Department, Hughes contends that it followed the law with regard to hiring Gen. Shen's son.
"Respondents have maintained as of December 3, 2002, that this information was not material and that its omission was proper because there is no place in the munitions license application for them to disclose father-son relationships between General officers at the People's Liberation Army who are overseeing a project they are working on and their foreign national employees working in U.S. facilities on the same project."
Clinton Overrules Secretary of State
The alleged improper export by Hughes of satellite technology was cited as a key reason when Clinton's secretary of state, Warren Christopher, rejected a plan to give the Commerce Department full authority to control satellite exports.
According to a Sept. 22, 1995, memorandum, Christopher rejected plans to give Commerce the authority to approve satellite exports after an interagency study noted that "significant" military and intelligence capabilities could be lost.
The memorandum stated the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies strongly opposed the policy change because Hughes exported two satellites with sensitive cryptographic technology without first getting a State Department munitions license. Cryptographic technology is used to scramble communications sent to satellites to prevent unauthorized access.
President Clinton, who transferred the power to regulate sensitive satellites to Commerce, under Commerce Secretary Ron Brown, ultimately overruled Christopher.
Clinton's transfer allowed the Chinese army to acquire advanced U.S. technology for military purposes. Hughes satellites currently provide the Chinese army with secure communications that are invulnerable to earth combat and highly accurate all-weather navigation for strike bombers and missiles.
Hughes satellites purchased by Shen also provide direct TV and cable TV broadcasts to most of Asia. Thus, cable and pay-per-view services help pay for the Chinese army satellite communications. The brilliant planning and logistics mean that Chinese military communications pay for themselves.
Clinton Legacy – A New Arms Race
The satellite and missile technology obtained from Hughes by the Chinese army is critical for the design and manufacture of missile nose cones and electronic missile control systems. The technology clearly helped the Chinese army field a new generation of ICBMS, including the Dong Feng 31 missile, which can drop three nuclear warheads on any city in the U.S.
The success of Shen is a story of missiles, politics and greed. Gen. Shen succeeded in using Hughes and President Clinton as valuable tools to obtain weapons that are now pointed at the United States.
China won and the U.S. lost what may very well be the first round of World War III. Gen. Shen led that victory and he did it with a checkbook. The Clinton legacy for the 21st century is a new arms race.
Read more on this subject in related Hot Topics:
China/Taiwan
Clinton Scandals
Missile Defense
Editor's note:
Chinese Military Manual Calls for "Unrestricted" War Against America
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Freki:
Outstanding recall on your part! The article you post has many details that I did not know.
Please refresh my memory if you can: wasn't this the same cluster that had Bernie Schwartz of Loral Satellites donating $345,000 to President Clinton (perhaps a personal meeting was involved?)
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Wish I knew more about it. I was the only one in my circles to pick up on this when it happened. It was just a blip on the news for about one day. It was washed away in the ebb and flow of meaningless news. I thought then and still do think it smacks of treason, aid and comfort to our enemies. When I read your posting about the accuracy of the Chinese missiles I flashed back to this story. A little googling and came up with this old article. If anyone else can flesh this out I for one would be appreciative.
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Woof,
Here's a timeline of articles: www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/special/missile/keystories.htm
Does this help, Freki? :-)
And then to the clueless out there; YOUR VOTE HAS CONSEQUENCES! AND CHARACTER MATTERS!
P.C.
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Nice find P.C. .....thanks
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The site wanted to run something on my computer but I wouldn't let it do so. Coincidentally, the page is coming up blank for me. May I ask for a summary of the material at p. 12 et seq?
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Thank you very much for taking the time to put that post together.
I note that one of the legs of Stratfor's analysis of the US's geopolitical position in the world includes the ability to project serious force anywhere in the world with impunity via our aircraft carrier groups.
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China going for a big stick on the high seas.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20100818/wl_csm/320261 (http://news.yahoo.com/s/csm/20100818/wl_csm/320261)
P.C.
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COMBAT BY CAMERA
The changing face of aerial reconnaissance
Aerial spying is 'now the centerpiece of our global war on terrorism.' And that has meant a growing and potentially huge business even as the Pentagon looks at cutting back on big-ticket items.
A Global Hawk robotic plane, hovering more than 11 miles above Afghanistan, can snap images of Taliban hide-outs so crystal clear that U.S. intelligence officials can make out the pickup trucks parked nearby — and how long they've been there.
Halfway around the globe in a underground laboratory in El Segundo, Raytheon Co. engineers who helped develop the cameras and sensors for the pilotless spy plane are now working on even more powerful devices that are revolutionizing the way the military gathers intelligence.
The new sensors enable flying drones to "listen in" on cellphone conversations and pinpoint the location of the caller on the ground. Some can even "smell" the air and sniff out chemical plumes emanating from a potential underground nuclear laboratory.
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Reconnaissance is "now the centerpiece of our global war on terrorism," said David L. Rockwell, an electronics analyst with aerospace research firm the Teal Group Corp. "The military wants to have an unblinking eye over the war zone."
And that has meant a growing and potentially huge business for the defense industry at a time when the Pentagon is looking at cutting back on big-ticket purchases such as fighter jets and Navy ships.
The drone electronics industry now generates about $3 billion in revenue, but that's expected to double to $6 billion in the next eight years, Teal Group estimates.
The industry's projected growth has fueled a surge in mergers and acquisitions of companies that develop and make the parts for the sensor systems, many of them in Southern California.
"There has been an explosion in the reconnaissance market," said Jon B. Kutler, founder of Admiralty Partners, a Century City private investment firm that buys and sells small defense firms."It's one of the few remaining growth areas."
Kutler's company recently acquired Torrance-based Trident Space & Defense, which manufactures hard drives that enable drones to store high-resolution images.
Trident, which has about 70 employees, has seen its sales more than double to about $40 million over the last five years.
The demand for sensors is growing as the Pentagon steps up use of drones for intelligence gathering.
More than 7,000 drones — ranging from the small, hand-launched Raven to the massive Global Hawk — are currently deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan. Though some have been outfitted with laser-guided bombs or missiles — grabbing most of the news headlines — all are equipped with sensors for reconnaissance and surveillance work.
The most advanced cameras and sensors are on the Global Hawk, a long-endurance, high-altitude drone that can fly for 30 hours at a time at more than 60,000 feet, out of range of most antiaircraft missiles and undetectable to the human eye.
Peter W. Singer, author of "Wired for War," a book about robotic warfare, compares the technology to the popular "Where's Waldo" children's books, in which readers are challenged to find one person hidden in a mass of people.
The latest detectors not only can pick out Waldo from a crowd, but know when Waldo may have fired a rifle. Such sensors can detect the heat from the barrel of a gun and estimate when it was fired.
Many of the sensors have been developed by Raytheon engineers in El Segundo, where the company has had a long history of developing spy equipment, including those found on the famed U-2 spy plane.
Some of the more advanced cameras can cost more than $15 million and take 18 months to make. Raytheon develops the cameras in a humidity-controlled, dust-free laboratory to ensure that they are free of blemishes.
Each basketball-sized camera "must be perfect," said Oscar Fragoso, a Raytheon optical engineer. "If it isn't, we know we're putting lives at risk."
Raytheon has begun to face stiff competition as other aerospace contractors vie for its business.
Sparks, Nev.-based Sierra Nevada Corp., which is known for its work on developing parts for spy satellites, has developed a sensor system, named the Gorgon Stare, that widens the area that drones can monitor from 1 mile to nearly 3 miles.
Named for the creature in Greek mythology whose gaze turns victims to stone, the sensor system features 12 small cameras — instead of one large one. It is to be affixed to Reaper drones before the end of the year.
With the multiple cameras, the operator can follow numerous vehicles instead of just one, said Brig. Gen. Robert P. Otto, the U.S. Air Force's director of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. "By the end of the year, we're going to be fielding capabilities that are unlike anything we've used before."
But with an increase in the number of drone patrols and new sensor technology, the Air Force will be "drowning in data," Otto said. "That means we're going to need a lot more people looking at computer screens."
The Pentagon has said that drones last year took so much video footage that it would take someone 24 years to watch it all.
By this time next year, the Air Force expects to have almost 5,000 people trawling through the images for intelligence information. That's up from little more than 1,200 nine years ago.
"The reconnaissance work that's being done now takes seconds, where it used to take days," Otto said. "We're pushing the edge of technology."
william.hennigan@latimes.com
Copyright © 2010, Los Angeles Times
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This is a great idea not just for front line but civilian use as well. I would like to know the costs involved.
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vv3SII568v0[/youtube]
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CRF965uZI1Q[/youtube]
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHJJQ0zNNOM&feature=player_embedded#!
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http://www.themoneytimes.com/featured/20101122/us-military-launches-world039s-largest-satellite-id-10142445.html
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) released a press note saying that the Air Force has launched its spy satellite from Cape Canaveral station on Sunday at 5:58 p.m.
The satellite is being dubbed as the largest satellite in the world. More details were not given as it is a classified mission.
The unmanned 23-story rocket carried the classified spy satellite.
Brig. Gen. Ed Wilson, commander 45th Space Wing of the Air Force, said that this mission will help them in strengthening the national defense.
“Experts believe that the secret payload is a satellite capable of listening to a variety of transmissions from around the world. Such a satellite would have giant antennas stretching up to the size of a football field.
”Rocket launch faced many delays
The satellite, called NROL-32, had to face a series of delays due to technical problems.
The latest was a fault in the pair of temperature sensors, which delayed the Nov. 19 launch.
The 235 feet Delta 4 rocket is actually made up of three boosters, providing 2 million pounds of thrust and making it the most powerful rocket in service.
The rocket is made by United Launch Alliance, which is a partnership between Boeing and Lockheed. It made its first flight in 2004.
The rocket is capable of carrying payloads up to 24 tons in to low Earth orbit and 11 tons in geosynchronous orbits, which is used by communication satellites.
Experts believe that the secret payload is a satellite capable of listening to a variety of transmissions from around the world. Such a satellite would have giant antennas stretching up to the size of a football field.
Cloudy skies denied the spectacular show to the observers that could have been made more splendid by the rising moon.
But Florida residents doesn't need to be disappointed as they may be able to see space shuttle Discovery blast off on its final flight on Dec. 3, this year.
Satellite termed crucial for national defense
NRO Director Bruce Carlson said in press release that this is the most aggressive launch NRO had in the last 20 years.
He added that the new satellites are necessary for the new missions of NRO and will replace the existing ones before they fail.
“Now when I buy something people complain about how expensive it is, but nobody ever complains when it’s time to die and keep right on ticking,” Carlson a former general of the Air Force added. “We bought most of our satellites for three, five or eight years and we keep them in orbit for ten, twelve and up to twenty years.”
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The much-maligned combat helmet worn by U.S. soldiers and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan sustained another blow Monday as engineers from MIT reported that the headgear, as currently designed, did little to protect troops from blast-related brain injury.
But the research team identified a design change that could substantially improve the helmet's ability to reduce the risk of concussion: a face shield capable of deflecting the rippling force of an explosion away from the soft tissues of the face.
With a shield in place, "you actually do mitigate the effects of the blast quite significantly," said Raul Radovitzky, lead author of a study published Monday in the online version of Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences.
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The report is not the first to identify the shortcomings of the military's so-called advanced combat helmet. A study published in August used computer simulations to determine that when blast waves roll over the helmet, the internal pads that are designed to cushion the wearer's head actually stiffen and transfer concussive energy to the skull and brain, increasing the likelihood of injury.
The new Massachusetts Institute of Technology study contradicted those findings, reporting instead that the helmet doesn't contribute to brain injury when it is hit by the concussive blast waves of an improvised explosive device.
Radovitzky and colleagues from the MIT Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies in Cambridge, Mass., and the Defense and Veterans Brain Injury Center at Walter Reed Army Medical Center in Washington, D.C., also relied on computer simulations to gauge the effect of a blast directly in front of a soldier on the "intracranial contents" of a helmet-encased head.
Radovitzky said that in fashioning a computer model of the brain, his team used assumptions about the brain's structure, density and position within the skull that were more refined and realistic than those used by the authors of the August study.
One of the authors of that report, physicist Eric G. Blackman of the University of Rochester, called the new finding "important."
"I think it will turn out to be a consideration in the future redesign of helmets," Blackman said.
Traumatic brain injury, often called TBI or concussion, has become one of the most distinctive and intractable wounds sustained by troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The armed services have diagnosed more than 188,000 cases among troops who have served in the Middle East.
Many experts think the true toll is far higher, because the effects of brain injury can be easy to miss. The Rand Corp. has estimated that as many as 320,000 service members may have suffered brain injuries in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Brain injuries from explosions during combat appear similar to those that occur in car accidents, falls and sporting events. In most cases, a soldier close to an explosion is thrown against a wall or to the floor, causing "brain whiplash," said neurosurgeon Jam Ghajar, president of the Brain Trauma Foundation.
But for many troops, brain trauma appears to occur without a direct blow to the head. That mystery has left most experts guessing how, exactly, the damage occurs.
Some speculate that concussive waves of energy pass through the skull and knock the brain around within its cavity. Others suggest an explosion hits the chest with a powerful jolt, setting off sudden changes of blood flow and pressure that harm the brain. An explosion's light, heat, chemical byproducts or even a sudden surge of electromagnetic energy could possibly disturb and damage the brain.
Running experiments on humans is impractical — hence the need for sophisticated computer simulations. Until medical experts understand how bombs hurt brains, though, the value of those simulations is limited.
"While the work of Radovitzky and others is compelling, these computational models are just that — models," said Dr. Kenneth C. Curley, director of neurotrauma research for the U.S. Army's Medical Research and Materiel Command at Ft. Detrick, Md. "Models are only as precise as the data available to drive them."
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http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/27/us/ROBOT.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=ab1
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It appears that not only the Chinese are working on this:
http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/2010-11/russia-invests-2-billion-clean-space-debris
Worth noting is that BO has virtually eliminated our space efforts, including military. Although this has not gathered any attention, IMHO this is a huge error. We are going to wake up one morning with our satellite capabilities neutered by the Chinese, just as Iran had its nuke program disrupted by Stuxnet, and our military very seriously exposed e.g. our navy in the western Pacific.
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The looming real budget cuts about to hit the Defense Department would be unfortunate in any setting but are likely to present especially acute problems for U.S. forces five or 10 years down the road due to growth in both quantity and quality of Chinese military systems over that time. While U.S. forces are looking at cuts across the board, and already find it difficult to field meaningful numbers of best-in-the-world systems such as the F-22, China is beginning to hit its stride in the production of military systems that compete with U.S. quality.
Chinese fighter aircraft in particular are beginning to encroach on the dominance of American F-15s and F-16s in technical sophistication and flight performance -- not surprising, considering the F-15 entered active service with the U.S. Air Force in 1976 and the F-16 in 1980. China's new F-11B, an improved and entirely Chinese-made upgrade of the Russian SU-27, poses a particular threat to older U.S. aircraft. With the F-22 program capped at 187 aircraft, and with any fight to defend Taiwan requiring U.S. aircraft to fly from distant bases, it is becoming a real possibility that U.S. forces could lose air superiority.
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Well, we better ask China for more money so we can buy more F-22 fighters.....
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Navy Sets World Record With Incredible, Sci-Fi Weapon
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A theoretical dream for decades, the railgun is unlike any other weapon used in warfare. And it's quite real too, as the U.S. Navy has proven in a record-setting test today in Dahlgren, VA.
Rather than relying on a explosion to fire a projectile, the technology uses an electomagnetic current to accelerate a non-explosive bullet at several times the speed of sound. The conductive projectile zips along a set of electrically charged parallel rails and out of the barrel at speeds up to Mach 7.
The result: a weapon that can hit a target 100 miles or more away within minutes.
"It's an over-used term, but it really changes several games," Rear Admiral Nevin P. Carr, Jr., the chief of Naval Research, told FoxNews.com prior to the test.
For a generation raised on shoot-'em-up video games, the word "railgun" invokes sci-fi images of an impossibly destructive weapon annihilating monsters and aliens. But the railgun is nonetheless very real.
An electromagnetic railgun offers a velocity previously unattainable in a conventional weapon, speeds that are incredibly powerful on their own. In fact, since the projectile doesn't have any explosives itself, it relies upon that kinetic energy to do damage. And at 11 a.m. today, the Navy produced a 33-megajoule firing -- more than three times the previous record set by the Navy in 2008.
"It bursts radially, but it's hard to quantify," said Roger Ellis, electromagnetic railgun program manager with the Office of Naval Research. To convey a sense of just how much damage, Ellis told FoxNews.com that the big guns on the deck of a warship are measured by their muzzle energy in megajoules. A single megajoule is roughly equivalent to a 1-ton car traveling at 100 mph. Multiple that by 33 and you get a picture of what would happen when such a weapon hits a target.
Ellis says the Navy has invested about $211 million in the program since 2005, since the railgun provides many significant advantages over convention weapons. For one thing, a railgun offers 2 to 3 times the velocity of a conventional big gun, so that it can hit its target within 6 minutes. By contrast, a guided cruise missile travels at subsonic speeds, meaning that the intended target could be gone by the time it reaches its destination.
Furthermore, current U.S. Navy guns can only reach targets about 13 miles away. The railgun being tested today could reach an enemy 100 miles away. And with current GPS guidance systems it could do so with pinpoint accuracy. The Navy hopes to eventually extend the range beyond 200 miles.
"We're also eliminating explosives from the ship, which brings significant safety benefits and logistical benefits," Ellis said. In other words, there is less danger of an unintended explosion onboard, particularly should such a vessel come under attack.
Indeed, a railgun could be used to inflict just such harm on another vessel.
Admiral Carr, who calls the railgun a "disruptive technology," said that not only would a railgun-equipped ship have to carry few if any large explosive warheads, but it could use its enemies own warheads against them. He envisions being able to aim a railgun directly at a magazine on an enemy ship and "let his explosives be your explosives."
There's also a cost and logistical benefit associated with railguns. For example, a single Tomahawk cruise missile costs roughly $600,000. A non-explosive guided railgun projectile could cost much less. And a ship could carry many more, reducing the logistical problems of delivering more weapons to a ship in battle. For these reasons, Admiral Carr sees the railgun as even changing the strategic and tactical assumptions of warfare in the future.
The Navy still has a distance to go, however, before the railgun test becomes a working onboard weapon. Technically, Ellis says they've already overcome several hurdles. The guns themselves generate a terrific amount of heat -- enough to melt the rails inside the barrel -- and power -- enough to force the rails apart, destroying the gun and the barrel in the process.
The projectile is no cannon ball, either. At speeds well above the sound barrier, aerodynamics and special materials must be considered so that it isn't destroyed coming out of the barrel or by heat as it travels at such terrific speeds.
Then there's question of electrical requirements. Up until recently, those requirements simply weren't practical. However, the naval researchers believe they can solve that issue using newer Navy ships and capacitors to build up the charge necessary to blast a railgun projectile out at supersonic speeds. Ellis says they hope to be able to shoot 6 to 12 rounds per minute, "but we're not there yet."
So when will the railgun become a working weapon? Both Ellis and Carr expect fully functional railguns on the decks of U.S. Navy ships in the 2025 time frame.
http://www.foxnews.com/scitech/2010/12/10/navy-railgun-shoots-bullets-electromagnet/#ixzz17mWbrtS6
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Doubling BigDog's post from the US-China thread here so as to faciliatate research:
http://www.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/asiapcf/01/05/china.us.fighter.jets/index.html?hpt=T1
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Pentagon Seeks Biggest Military Cuts Since Before 9/11
By THOM SHANKER and CHRISTOPHER DREW
Published: January 6, 2011
WASHINGTON — Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said Thursday that the nation’s “extreme fiscal duress” now required him to call for cuts in the size of the Army and Marine Corps, reversing the significant growth in military spending that followed the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.
The White House has told the Pentagon to squeeze that growth over the next five years, Mr. Gates said, reducing by $78 billion the amount available for the Pentagon, not counting the costs of its combat operations.
The decision to go after the Pentagon budget, even while troops remain locked in combat overseas, is the clearest indication yet that President Obama will be cutting spending broadly across the government as he seeks to reduce the deficit — and stave off attacks from Republicans in Congress who want to shrink the government even more.
Republicans have for the most part resisted including military spending as they search for quick reductions in federal spending.
To make ends meet, Mr. Gates also announced that he would seek to recoup billions of dollars by increasing fees paid by retired veterans under 65 for Defense Department health insurance, even though Congress has rejected such proposals in the past. And he outlined extensive cuts in new weapons.
Cutting up to 47,000 troops from the Army and Marine Corps forces — roughly 6 percent — would be made easier by the withdrawal under way from Iraq, and the reductions would not begin until 2015, just as Afghan forces are to take over the security mission there. But Mr. Gates said the cuts in Pentagon spending were hardly a peace dividend, and were forced by a global economic recession and domestic pressures to find ways to throttle back federal spending.
“This department simply cannot risk continuing down the same path where our investment priorities, bureaucratic habits and lax attitudes toward costs are increasingly divorced from the real threats of today, the growing perils of tomorrow and the nation’s grim financial outlook,” Mr. Gates said at an afternoon news conference.
The president’s budget for the 2012 fiscal year, which is due by mid-February, would freeze discretionary spending, but that would not apply to military, veterans and Homeland Security programs. Last fall, a majority of the members of Mr. Obama’s bipartisan National Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform, including three Republican senators, said military spending also should be reduced as part of a long-term debt-reduction plan.
The Pentagon’s proposed operating budget for 2012 is expected to be about $553 billion, which would still reflect real growth, even though it is $13 billion less than expected. The Pentagon budget will then begin a decline in its rate of growth for two years, and stay flat — growing only to match inflation — for the 2015 and 2016 fiscal years. (The Pentagon operating budget is separate from a fund that finances the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.)
“This plan represents, in my view, the minimum level of defense spending that is necessary, given the complex and unpredictable array of security challenges the United States faces around the globe: global terrorist networks, rising military powers, nuclear-armed rogue states and much, much more,” Mr. Gates said.
To be sure, the actual size and shape of future military budgets will continue to be reset by annual spending proposals from the president, and those in turn will be based on shifting economic factors — decline or growth — and threats around the world, as well as by Congressional action.
But for now, the Army is expected in 2015 to begin cutting its active-duty troop levels by 27,000, and the Marine Corps by up to 20,000. Together, those force reductions would save $6 billion in 2015 and 2016.
Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that all four service chiefs supported the proposals, and that the military would still be able to manage global risks. “We can’t hold ourselves exempt from the belt-tightening,” he said. “Neither can we allow ourselves to contribute to the very debt that puts our long-term security at risk.”
The Army’s ranks number 569,600, and the Marine Corps has just over 202,000 members; both would remain larger than when Mr. Gates became defense secretary four years ago.
Mr. Gates already had instructed the armed services and the Pentagon bureaucracy to find ways to operate more efficiently, with the savings plowed back into the budget to make up for anticipated shortfalls; otherwise the cuts in troops and weapons would have been even steeper.
The armed services have identified about $100 billion in savings over five years.
Separately, the Defense Department bureaucracy had identified about $54 billion more, from things like reducing contractor hiring, freezing personnel rolls, reducing the number of generals and admirals and closing or consolidating headquarters.
Many of those changes can be carried out unilaterally by the Pentagon or the armed services.
But some — especially increases in fees for the military’s health-care system, called Tricare — require Congressional approval, and have been rejected before.
Proposals to increase Tricare fees will pit Mr. Gates against those in Congress — and veterans’ groups — who say retired military personnel already have paid up front with service in uniform. Ten years ago, health care cost the Pentagon $19 billion; today, it tops $50 billion; five years from now it is projected to cost $65 billion.
But Tricare fees have not increased since 1995.
Mr. Gates was expected to press for increasing the cost of health insurance premiums and spot fees only for working-age retirees and their families, not for those on active duty or those 65 and older, to save $7 billion over five years.
Mr. Gates also announced cuts in several weapons systems, led by the cancellation of the Marines’ $14.4 billion Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, a combined landing craft and tank for amphibious assaults.
Mr. Gates said the Pentagon would add $4.6 billion to the cost of developing the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, made by Lockheed Martin, and would cover much of that expense by delaying purchases of 124 of the planes.
He said that one of the three versions of the aircraft might need to be redesigned, and that he was placing that model, made for the Marines, “on the equivalent of a two-year probation.”
Federal officials said Mr. Gates had been seeking to increase the basic Pentagon budget, excluding war costs, to $566 billion for the 2012 fiscal year, but had to push the White House to approve $553 billion.
Gordon Adams, a Clinton administration budget official who served on Mr. Obama’s transition team, said he understood that White House budget officials initially wanted to shave the Pentagon’s original, larger request by at least $20 billion for 2012.
Mr. Adams said Mr. Gates met with Mr. Obama three times before Christmas to get at least $7 billion restored. Mr. Gates was also able to persuade the White House to reduce its demands for cuts over the next five years to $78 billion from $150 billion. Even so, Mr. Adams said, “I think the floor under defense spending has now gone soft.”
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By NATHAN HODGE And JULIAN E. BARNES
In an early salvo in Washington's battle over the deficit, the White House ordered the Pentagon to rein in its budget, a move that will force a sizable cut in overall troop numbers for the first time in two decades.
The surprise decision, which is designed to cut a total of $78 billion from the military budget in the next five years, shows how even the military isn't immune from the political heat brought on by worsening U.S. fiscal woes. It also represents a setback for Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who had fought to stave off such an outcome.
"We are having to tighten our belts," Mr. Gates said Thursday.
The projected five-year budget outlined by Mr. Gates doesn't include an actual decrease in the military budget. But it will stop growing by 2015. With salaries, health-care and fuel costs climbing every year, the Pentagon needs a 2% to 3% annual budget increase to avoid making cuts in programs.
Under Mr. Gates's proposal, the Army and Marine Corps will shrink by up to 47,000 people, a reduction that comes on top of a 22,000 decrease already planned for the Army. Currently, the two services have about 772,000 members, with the last cuts to the Army and Marines coming after the 1991 Gulf War.
View Full Image
Associated Press
The Slamraam surface-to-air missile
.No new head-count cuts are planned for the Navy or Air Force, which recently underwent reductions.
By seeking long-term cuts in the Pentagon budget, the White House is taking on a Republican bastion and hoping to put the GOP on the defensive, especially tea-party-backed lawmakers who campaigned on slashing government spending.
Republicans reacted negatively to Mr. Gates's proposals. Rep. Howard "Buck" McKeon (R., Calif.), chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said he was unhappy with the proposed $78 billion in cuts.
At the same time, the relatively modest nature of the White House proposal irked liberals, some of whom said Thursday the cuts didn't go far enough. The proposal could backfire more broadly if it feeds the notion that Democrats are weak on defense.
Pentagon officials outlined measures proposed for the next five years. The Pentagon had previously called for $100 billion in cuts over five years, hoping to fend off further trims. Instead, Mr. Gates was required to find the additional $78 billion.
The White House announced Thursday evening that President Barack Obama accepted Mr. Gates' recommendation to shut down Joint Forces Command, an organization charged with fostering closer cooperation between the various military services, based in Norfolk, Va. Mr. Gates made the recommendation last year as part of his cost-saving initiative.
Mr. Gates's proposed base defense budget for next year is $553 billion, a modest increase over the Pentagon's budget request for the current fiscal year of $549 billion. The new proposal is smaller than the Pentagon had planned for. In February, the administration projected it would be $566 billion.
Since taking office in 2006, the defense secretary has spoken many times about the problems caused by seeking a "peace dividend" after wars end. Substantial cuts during the 1990s saved money initially, but the Pentagon had to spend billions to rapidly build up the Army and Marine Corps when commanders realized they lacked enough forces to effectively fight the Iraq war.
Mr. Gates said the troop cuts proposed Thursday were modest, and that the overall size of the armed forces would still be bigger than when he had taken office. He emphasized the troop cuts wouldn't occur until 2015, when a withdrawal from Afghanistan is expected to be well under way.
Tightening the Belt
The Pentagon's five-year plan includes a new set of cuts to the Pentagon's forecasted budget totaling $78 billion, and about $100 billion in already announced 'efficiency savings,' most of which will be reinvested in the military.
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..Nevertheless, Mr. Gates's proposals are likely to be attacked by some as too timid, and by others as irresponsible, an outcome the secretary himself predicted.
"No doubt these budget forecasts and related program decisions will provoke criticism on two fronts—that we are either gutting defenses or we have not cut nearly enough," Mr. Gates said.
The GOP's Mr. McKeon said, "These cuts are being made without any commitment to restore modest future growth, which is the only way to prevent deep reductions in force structure that will leave our military less capable and less ready to fight." He added: "This is a dramatic shift for a nation at war and a dangerous signal from the commander in chief."
The openness of some GOP lawmakers to military cuts in the campaign suggested the White House might have a chance to divide the party on an issue central to its identity, defense.
Moira Bagley, a spokeswoman for Sen. Rand Paul (R., Ky.), said he would consider Mr. Gates's proposed cuts. "As Sen. Paul has said repeatedly, everything is on the table when it comes to spending cuts—including defense," she said. "It's good to see Secretary Gates take the initiative to suggest certain defense programs don't need funding."
Critics of defense spending said Thursday that Mr. Gates's cuts were illusory and didn't go far enough. "What Secretary Gates is really saying is that to exist in peacetime, the Pentagon requires ever-growing amounts of money—forever," said Winslow Wheeler, a former congressional budget aide and defense analyst at the left-leaning Center for Defense Information.
Some of the cuts proposed by Mr. Gates will face particular scrutiny on Capitol Hill and from veterans groups. He seeks to increase health-care fees for some working-age military retirees, a potential savings of nearly $7 billion over five years. Earlier proposals to raise such fees have been rejected by Congress.
Defense contractors will likely feel the pain from the procurement cuts unveiled by Mr. Gates. The Pentagon intends to cut some troubled programs like the Marine Corps Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle. Mr. Gates also said he intended to restructure the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, delaying production of one variant of the plane and saving $3.8 billion.
Nevertheless, stocks of defense companies rose in trading Thursday, after the news appeared to end uncertainty over future spending levels.
Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the liberal Center for American Progress who served as an assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration, said the procurement cuts were a step toward greater fiscal responsibility, but showed a reluctance to tackle hard issues like skyrocketing military pay and health care.
"Gates is trying to get ahead of what he thinks will be cuts by saying, 'I'm cutting,' but he's not," Mr. Korb said. "He wants to take it from one area and give it to another. And I think he feels it will provide some political cover."
It is unclear how long Mr. Gates will be around to fight for his proposed budget. He has indicated he intends to leave office this year. On Thursday, he said he hadn't altered his plans.
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January 8, 2011
After Decade of War, Top Officer Directs the Military to Take Stock of Itself
By THOM SHANKER
WASHINGTON — Adm. Mike Mullen, who will almost certainly be the final chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to have served in the Vietnam War, still carries the scars of how that polarizing era damaged the military and its relationship with the American people.
As he enters his last year as the nation’s top-ranking officer and as the military enters its 10th year of war since the Sept. 11 attacks, Admiral Mullen is openly voicing concerns that professionalism and ethical standards across the armed forces are being severely challenged by the longest period of sustained combat in the nation’s history.
He is responsible for convening a National Defense University conference here on Monday that will open an intensive assessment by the military of its professional behavior.
“We’ve learned a lot about ourselves in the last decade; some of it’s been pretty unpleasant stuff,” Admiral Mullen said in an interview. “I want us to understand what we’ve seen, to a depth that we can ensure that our moral compass stays true, our ethical compass stays true.”
The conference is the first such introspective session into “military ethos” organized specifically at the request of a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It will examine a subtle set of political and social challenges to military integrity, like a potential slide toward partisanship among the officer corps, especially retired generals and admirals acting as television commentators, and whether the behavior of up-and-coming leaders fits with the image the military as an institution wants to exhibit to the nation.
A particularly relevant topic on the agenda is how the next generation’s generals and admirals should express their best, unvarnished military advice to the nation’s civilian leadership, and what to do when they disagree with the eventual policy. Admiral Mullen has said there are just two choices: an officer obeys the policy and follows it with enthusiasm or resigns.
Hovering over that discussion will be memories of the bruising, closed-door debate about shaping a strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan that many at the Pentagon and the White House said soured civilian-military relations.
But other issues are expected to include an assessment of the retired generals who openly called for Donald H. Rumsfeld, the former defense secretary, to resign, as well as of retired admirals and generals who endorse political candidates or appear at party conventions.
The discussion is also expected to touch on whether service members have the right to a different persona online, like on Facebook or in a blog, than they do in uniform.
Admiral Mullen, who is scheduled to retire on Oct. 1, acknowledged that his motivations for the conference dated to his service in a war that ended more than three decades ago. “These are Vietnam scars for me,” he said.
And just as the Vietnam War shaped his professional outlook, Admiral Mullen said, the intense combat experiences during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq will shape the military for decades to come. “How they lead, how they retain, how they recruit, what they talk about — I want to examine as much of that as we can, in stride, to prepare for the future,” he said.
A conscious decision was made not to focus at this session on the most egregious acts of military misconduct that seized global attention and prompted worldwide outrage, like detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, because such actions are clearly prohibited by long-standing laws of armed conflict and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Admiral Mullen noted that the Army, in particular, was moving ahead with its own effort to evaluate military professionalism, and he cited the work done by Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, who leads the Army Training and Doctrine Command.
General Dempsey said his efforts had been inspired by two trends since the Sept. 11 attacks: how counterinsurgency warfare and efforts to create more deployable brigade combat teams had placed increasing responsibilities in the hands of junior leaders, and how the Army’s system for generating forces created a deliberate cycle in which combat units were built, trained, deployed — and then brought home to be rebuilt with fresh troops.
“This is very different from an Army that had been relatively stable, relatively hierarchical, relatively centralized,” General Dempsey said in a telephone interview.
General Dempsey, who is Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates’s candidate to be the next Army chief of staff, said the Army had not paused for an institutional, top-to-bottom review of its professional conduct in two decades.
“This is another one of those times in our history when we want to encourage ourselves to look at ourselves as professionals and ask whether we are living up to our standards — and where our policies for training, education and promotion enhance these standards or rub against them,” General Dempsey said.
To manage the conference, National Defense University turned to Albert C. Pierce, director of the Institute for National Security Ethics and Leadership, which examines and teaches professional behavior in the national security arena.
“Our distinctive concept of operations,” Mr. Pierce said, “comes from the chairman, introspection and reflection by the members of the profession on what its basic principles and touchstones are, and how to apply them to specific issues such as providing professional military advice and handling disagreements over policy.”
He added, “More broadly, we hope our deliberations that day will help define or describe where and how to draw the lines between appropriate and inappropriate behavior by military professionals, active-duty and retired.”
Admiral Mullen will give the keynote address, and all of the panelists are active-duty or retired military personnel, with one exception; John J. Hamre, a former deputy defense secretary who is president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan policy institute here, will offer perspectives on how senior civilian policy makers view the behavior of military professionals.
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Department of Military Readiness: China's Not-So-Stealthy Move
This week China unveiled its version of the F-22 Raptor -- America's stealthy front-line air superiority fighter -- via "leaked" (i.e., well-staged) Internet releases. Designated the J-20, the aircraft completed its first test flight only hours before U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates met with Chinese President Hu Jintao. The purpose of the meeting was supposedly to mend frayed relations between the two nations, but the test flight didn't help further that end much.
The calculated disclosure of the J-20 also is not the big news. Nor is the news that the J-20 looks a lot like the F-22. Nor even that China has apparently been "mining" data from super-secret U.S. computers to be able to build a "J-20" in the first place. No, the news is that President Hu and the rest of China's civilian leadership apparently had no clue about the J-20 and its test program. This revelation comes from senior U.S. defense sources in the wake of the meeting, noting Hu's reactions to Gates' questions about the new weapon system.
Those reactions highlight the growing disconnect between China's military and its civilian leadership. In a nation comprising roughly one-fifth of the world's population, the issue has at least regional, if not global, implications. Although China's civilian leadership ostensibly has control over its military, this event and others like it -- including China's anti-satellite test -- call into question the practical application of China's claim that its civilian leadership controls its military arm.
It's also a wake-up call to America's Pollyanna doves, who believe the U.S. no longer needs a strong force-on-force defense and that all future wars will simply be door-to-door counterinsurgency operations. Among this group, sadly, is the SecDef himself, who advocated vehemently for limiting F-22s and against fighting "tomorrow's wars."
The U.S. has only 187 F-22s in total to replace roughly 650 aging F-15s. With the makings of "tomorrow's wars" now on America's doorstep courtesy of the J-20, Russia's T-50 and other as-yet-to-be-announced fifth-generation weapons systems, we invite Secretary Gates to reconsider his position -- especially in light of the looming numbers-fight over the F-35 Lightning II, the fifth-generation replacement for the venerable-but-aging F-16.
Finally, with respect to U.S. national defense concerns, we believe: Yes the Army is important. Yes the Navy is important. Yes the Marines are important. But give up air superiority, and in any war -- let alone "tomorrow's war" -- you've just given up the ballgame.
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A PLA that has so little control over it is a scary thing indeed.
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http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/01/why-our-best-officers-are-leaving/8346/1/
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Bigdog, Excellent article with specific and realistic recommendations/solutions. (Same type of thinking at a much simpler level could be applied to education.)
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Last night I visited the UPS central hub for
Europe in Cologne. On the tour through the huge
distributen complex I spotted 3 packages with a
label saying:
FOR US MILITARY USE ONLY
INSTRUCTION MATERIAL
On the paperboard container itself I read the
following imprint:
Made in China
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[US military instructions, paperboard made in China]
Labeling on China's newest SuperComputer: Intel Inside :-)
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Ugh. :x
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By NATHAN HODGE
For the first time in almost 50 years, the U.S. Army wants to replace the
standard rifle shouldered by hundreds of thousands of frontline troops
around the world.
The service this week advertised its interest in a new weapon that would
incorporate futuristic sights and other advances in rifle design and be able
to handle improved ammunition.
The gun would potentially supplant the M4 carbine, a shorter-barrel version
of the M16, the Army's main infantry weapon for decades.
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US Army
A soldier with an XM25 weapon system, an advanced grenade launcher being
tested by the Army.
Operations in Afghanistan—where troops often engage the enemy over long
distances—have rekindled debate over the quality of the Army's
standard-issue rifles and their reliability in dusty, primitive conditions.
An Army report on a 2008 battle in Wanat, Afghanistan, cited soldier
complaints about jamming and overheating M4s, in particular. Nine servicemen
died in that fight.
Critics have also raised concerns about the range and lethality of the 5.56
mm cartridge of the M16/M4.
Col. Doug Tamilio, the service's project manager for soldier weapons, said
in a statement the Army sought to find "the most effective, accurate, and
reliable" weapon for its soldiers. "We're challenging industry to develop
the next-generation carbine and we're looking forward to the results."
An "industry day" for small-arms manufacturers is planned for March 30. The
Army said it would pick a winner after two years of rigorous evaluation.
Gerald Dinkel, the president and CEO of Colt Defense LLC, said the Army has
"held out the M4 as a high standard, and somebody is going have to come out
and really beat it."
The M16, made by both Colt and FN Manufacturing LLC, a unit of FN Herstal SA
of Belgium, along with the M4, have long enjoyed the loyalty of Army leaders
who say the weapons are "combat proven." The M4 has slightly less range than
the M16, but is easier to handle, particularly in urban combat.
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Alamy
The M1 Garand entered service in the 1930s. The .30-calibre rifle weighed
about 10 pounds and had a range of around 500 meters.
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Colt
The M16 Rifle entered service in the 1960s. The 5.56-mm rifle weighed about
8.8 pounds and had a range of approximately 550-800 meters.
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Colt
The M4 Carbine entered service in the 1990s. The 5.56-mm rifle weighs about
7.5 pounds and has a range of 500-600 meters.
But Army commanders have also long faced questions about the rifles' design:
Both are built around a gas-operated system that cuts down on moving parts,
but requires consistent cleaning.
Experts have often noted that the M16/M4 also fares poorly in terms of
ruggedness and reliability compared with Soviet-designed Kalashnikov assault
rifles, which are a favorite weapon of insurgents around the world.
In 2007, the M4 fared worse than three other weapons—the Heckler & Koch
HK416, the FN Herstal Mk16 Special Operations Combat Assault Rifle and the
Heckler & Koch XM8—in comparative reliability testing conducted by the Army.
The current M16 and M4 in many respects bear little resemblance to
Vietnam-era antecedents: They are usually have advanced optics, and can be
fitted with accessories such as flashlights. But critics on Capitol Hill,
including Sen. Tom Coburn (R., Okla.), have in the past questioned why the
service chose to stick with upgrades instead of seeking a replacement.
In Afghanistan, the Army has introduced the M14 Enhanced Battle Rifle, an
upgraded version of the M14 rifle, which is chambered for a full-power rifle
round that has a longer effective range than the M4 or M16. The Army is also
experimenting with more futuristic infantry weapons in Afghanistan.
In parallel with the contest for a new rifles, the Army is considering
additional improvements to the M4, including ambidextrous controls. The Army
may also study alternatives to the rifle's gas operating system, according
to an official fact sheet.
Last year, the service began field trials of the XM25 Counter Defilade
Target Engagement System, an advanced grenade launcher equipped with a laser
range finder and onboard computer.
It fires a programmable 25mm round that is designed to go off just above—or
just behind — its target. The concept is to create a lethal weapon that can
hit enemies behind cover.
James Carafano, a retired Army officer who is a senior fellow at the
Heritage Foundation, predicted in a recent interview that more of these
weapons would soon be in the hands of the individual soldier.
"Precision weaponry is going to get really personal," Mr. Carafano said.
"You're eventually going to see an individual soldier dropping a round down
a chimney."
Write to Nathan Hodge at nathan.hodge@wsj.com
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http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/02/navys-killer-drone-takes-off-targets-2013-carrier-test/
America’s fleet of 11 big-deck aircraft carriers just got a lot closer to becoming a lot more dangerous. On Friday afternoon, Northrop Grumman’s X-47B, a prototype for the Navy’s first carrier-capable killer drone, flew for the first time from Edwards Air Force Base in California.
“Taking off under hazy skies, the X-47B climbed to an altitude of 5,000 feet, flew several racetrack-type patterns, and landed safely at 2:38 PM PST,” Northrop crowed in a press release. “The flight provided test data to verify and validate system software for guidance and navigation, and the aerodynamic control of the tailless design.”
“Designing a tailless, fighter-sized unmanned aircraft from a clean sheet is no small feat,” Northrop veep Janis Pamiljans added. While omitting a plane’s tail makes it way more stealthy, it also makes it harder to control.
If Northrop and the Navy can prove the X-47 works over the planned, three-year demonstration program, combat-ready X-47s could begin flying off carrier decks before the end of the decade.
The benefits are clear. With far greater range than the Navy’s existing F/A-18 strike fighters, the X-47 would allow Navy carrier groups to sail farther from shore when launching air strikes, helping protect the priceless vessels from the increasingly dangerous anti-ship missiles being fielded by nations such as China. The X-47 would also be able to sneak through the defensive umbrella of today’s “Triple-Digit” anti-aircraft missiles.
For these reasons, the X-47 could prove “among the most fungible and useful platforms in America’s future defense portfolio,” Navy undersecretary Bob Work wrote in 2007, back when he was still a lowly analyst at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.
Despite its enormous potential, the X-47 almost didn’t make it this far. The triangular drone was originally designed back in the early 2000s for the Joint Unmanned Combat Air System competition, which pitted the Northrop bot versus Boeing’s similar X-45. The winner would have joined the Navy and the Air Force. But in 2005, the Air Force abandoned the contest, and the X-47 and X-45 both wound up orphaned.
Thanks in part to Work’s lobbying, the Navy agreed to continue work on the X-47. (The X-45 survived, too, as a Boeing-funded effort.) As confidence in the new killer drone increased, so did the scope of — and funding for — its test program. In January, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates singled out the X-47 and other Navy drones as beneficiaries of billions of dollars in budgetary shifts.
Which isn’t to say the whole Navy is on board. Last month, Navy Vice Adm. Mark Fox told reporters he was skeptical that drones would be ready for carrier operations anytime soon. “Anything that takes off and lands on an aircraft carrier has to be pretty robust,” he said. “You test something in the desert and it works great. But the maritime world is a harsh and unforgiving environment.”
Plus, Fox added, “there’s still an enormous amount of merit in having somebody in the cockpit making decisions about whether you employ ordnance or not.”
But Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Gary Roughead, Fox’s boss, calls the shots — and he said last fall that he wanted the X-47 or a similar drone on carriers before 2018. That’s probably just do-able under the current schedule, which sees the X-47 fly off a carrier and refuel mid-air by 2013.
Even so, Roughead agrees with Fox on one key point: the Navy still needs old-school manned fighters, too — specifically, the F-35C variant of the Joint Strike Fighter. “As rapidly as we want to engage with the unmanned system on carriers,” Roughead said, “we’re also moving forward with JSF.”
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Stratfor
Summary
The Russian Defense Ministry made a deal with German private defense company Rheinmetall for the construction of a combat training center for Russian troops. The deal does not necessarily indicate further military cooperation between Germany and Russia, though it does highlight the existing close ties between Berlin and Moscow. Although few concrete details of the deal are known, it is likely to draw close scrutiny from several of Germany’s NATO allies, particularly those that lie between Germany and Russia.
Analysis
German private defense company Rheinmetall signed a deal Feb. 9 with the Russian Defense Ministry to build a combat training center for the Russian military. The center, which would be built at an existing Russian military installation at Mulino, near the city of Nizhny Novgorod, is designed for the comprehensive training of brigade-size units (thousands of soldiers) and would improve modeling and simulation of tactical combat situations. Russia’s Defense Ministry has also invited Rheinmetall to handle the “support, repair and modernization of military equipment,” and Rheinmetall’s mobile ammunition disposal systems would be available for Russia to buy.
It remains unclear what the exact financial and technical aspects of the deal will be, such as the specific costs of the project or the extent to which German expertise and personnel will be involved in the center’s training functions. However, the agreement reflects the value Russia sees in more closely understanding and potentially learning from Western military training methodologies. Also, the Russian military’s preferring to sign such a deal with a German defense company is another example of increasingly robust ties between Berlin and Moscow. Regardless of the specific details, this agreement will be cause for concern to Germany’s NATO allies, particularly the Central Europeans and the Baltic states.
It is important to note that Rheinmetall is not an arm of the German government; it is a private defense and automotive company. The defense arm of the company is, however, Europe’s top supplier of defense technology and security equipment for ground forces. It specializes in armor, gunnery, propellants and munitions manufacturing but has a fairly broad defense portfolio comprising training and simulation solutions as well as command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, target acquisition and reconnaissance (C4ISTAR) — all of which are of particular interest for Moscow. Rheinmetall training systems reportedly are used across the world, with countries like India and Norway employing naval and armored vehicle simulators. Rheinmetall is the first foreign firm to build such a training center in Russia.
From a technical standpoint, a training facility designed and built by Germany could, in and of itself, be an important improvement for Russian ground combat training, simulations and exercises. Also, any additional or more advanced and expanded partnerships with Rheinmetall could be a significant boost to Russia’s ongoing military reform and modernization efforts. While Russia swiftly defeated Georgian forces in the August 2008 war, it did so with notable tactical and operational shortcomings and deficiencies. Improving training regimes and technology, particularly with an emphasis on more modern Western simulators, information technology and updated approaches to training, could be significant in the long run. For the Germans, it is an opportunity to profit from Russia’s modernization drive and to potentially lay the groundwork for further military or political deals.
From a political standpoint, the deal does not necessarily indicate growing military ties between Berlin and Moscow. In order to infuse some fresh thinking, specifically a Western military perspective, into its own armed forces, Russia chose to go with a German company. The choice therefore indicates already close ties. Also, there are other areas in which Russian-German military cooperation is evident; according to STRATFOR sources, the Germans are going to help the Russians train border guards in Tajikistan on the Tajik-Uzbek border.
Furthermore, the Russian military could be using the training center, for which Rhienmetall’s training and simulation expertise will be potentially significant in their own right, both to test-drive broader doctrinal experimentation and integration of foreign concepts and to lay the foundation for future ties and exchanges with the German defense industry. The scope of and intent for the training center remain unclear, as precious few details of the agreement have been announced. It is possible that this is a generic training center through which troops from all over the country will pass, but it is also possible that the center and its training will be tailored for a more specific unit, operating environment or mission.
Either way, this deal is bound to make the states located between Russia and Germany — particularly Poland and the Baltic states — nervous. To these countries, Russian-German military cooperation of any kind will have the undertones of inter-war cooperation between the German Weimar Republic and the Soviet Union, which allowed Germany to secretly build up its military despite limitations imposed by the Versailles Treaty. These sort of deals are not forgotten in Central Europe, and any deal — no matter how profit-driven or innocuous it may be — will invite careful scrutiny from Germany’s eastern NATO allies and could further weaken the binds holding the alliance together.
Read more: The Significance of Russia's Deal with Germany's Rheinmetall | STRATFOR
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Posted on behalf of Crafty Dog...
How air attacks were detected before radar...Old time acoustic hearing aids
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ACOUSTIC "EARS" BEFORE RADAR - ON A SWIVEL
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ACOUSTIC "EARS" BEFORE RADAR - GERMAN
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ACOUSTIC "EARS" BEFORE RADAR - ON WHEELS
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ACOUSTIC "EARS" BEFORE RADAR - ENGLAND
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Never Fight a Land War in Asia
March 1, 2011
By George Friedman
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speaking at West Point, said last week that “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should have his head examined.” In saying this, Gates was repeating a dictum laid down by Douglas MacArthur after the Korean War, who urged the United States to avoid land wars in Asia. Given that the United States has fought four major land wars in Asia since World War II — Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq — none of which had ideal outcomes, it is useful to ask three questions: First, why is fighting a land war in Asia a bad idea? Second, why does the United States seem compelled to fight these wars? And third, what is the alternative that protects U.S. interests in Asia without large-scale military land wars?
The Hindrances of Overseas Wars
Let’s begin with the first question, the answer to which is rooted in demographics and space. The population of Iraq is currently about 32 million. Afghanistan has a population of less than 30 million. The U.S. military, all told, consists of about 1.5 million active-duty personnel (plus 980,000 in the reserves), of whom more than 550,000 belong to the Army and about 200,000 are part of the Marine Corps. Given this, it is important to note that the United States strains to deploy about 200,000 troops at any one time in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that many of these troops are in support rather than combat roles. The same was true in Vietnam, where the United States was challenged to field a maximum of about 550,000 troops (in a country much more populous than Iraq or Afghanistan) despite conscription and a larger standing army. Indeed, the same problem existed in World War II.
When the United States fights in the Eastern Hemisphere, it fights at great distances, and the greater the distance, the greater the logistical cost. More ships are needed to deliver the same amount of materiel, for example. That absorbs many troops. The logistical cost of fighting at a distance is that it diverts numbers of troops (or requires numbers of civilian personnel) disproportionate to the size of the combat force.
Regardless of the number of troops deployed, the U.S. military is always vastly outnumbered by the populations of the countries to which it is deployed. If parts of these populations resist as light-infantry guerrilla forces or employ terrorist tactics, the enemy rapidly swells to a size that can outnumber U.S. forces, as in Vietnam and Korea. At the same time, the enemy adopts strategies to take advantage of the core weakness of the United States — tactical intelligence. The resistance is fighting at home. It understands the terrain and the culture. The United States is fighting in an alien environment. It is constantly at an intelligence disadvantage. That means that the effectiveness of the native forces is multiplied by excellent intelligence, while the effectiveness of U.S. forces is divided by lack of intelligence.
The United States compensates with technology, from space-based reconnaissance and air power to counter-battery systems and advanced communications. This can make up the deficit but only by massive diversions of manpower from ground-combat operations. Maintaining a helicopter requires dozens of ground-crew personnel. Where the enemy operates with minimal technology multiplied by intelligence, the United States compensates for lack of intelligence with massive technology that further reduces available combat personnel. Between logistics and technological force multipliers, the U.S. “point of the spear” shrinks. If you add the need to train, relieve, rest and recuperate the ground-combat forces, you are left with a small percentage available to fight.
The paradox of this is that American forces will win the engagements but may still lose the war. Having identified the enemy, the United States can overwhelm it with firepower. The problem the United States has is finding the enemy and distinguishing it from the general population. As a result, the United States is well-suited for the initial phases of combat, when the task is to defeat a conventional force. But after the conventional force has been defeated, the resistance can switch to methods difficult for American intelligence to deal with. The enemy can then control the tempo of operations by declining combat where it is at a disadvantage and initiating combat when it chooses.
The example of the capitulation of Germany and Japan in World War II is frequently cited as a model of U.S. forces defeating and pacifying an opposing nation. But the Germans were not defeated primarily by U.S. ground troops. The back of the Wehrmacht was broken by the Soviets on their own soil with the logistical advantages of short supply lines. And, of course, Britain and numerous other countries were involved. It is doubtful that the Germans would have capitulated to the Americans alone. The force the United States deployed was insufficient to defeat Germany. The Germans had no appetite for continuing a resistance against the Russians and saw surrendering to the Americans and British as sanctuary from the Russians. They weren’t going to resist them. As for Japan, it was not ground forces but air power, submarine warfare and atomic bombs that finished them — and the emperor’s willingness to order a surrender. It was not land power that prevented resistance but air and sea power, plus a political compromise by MacArthur in retaining and using the emperor. Had the Japanese emperor been removed, I suspect that the occupation of Japan would have been much more costly. Neither Germany nor Japan are examples in which U.S. land forces compelled capitulation and suppressed resistance.
The problem the United States has in the Eastern Hemisphere is that the size of the force needed to occupy a country initially is much smaller than the force needed to pacify the country. The force available for pacification is much smaller than needed because the force the United States can deploy demographically without committing to total war is simply too small to do the job — and the size needed to do the job is unknown.
U.S. Global Interests
The deeper problem is this: The United States has global interests. While the Soviet Union was the primary focus of the United States during the Cold War, no power threatens to dominate Eurasia now, and therefore no threat justifies the singular focus of the United States. In time of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States must still retain a strategic reserve for other unanticipated contingencies. This further reduces the available force for combat.
Some people argue that the United States is insufficiently ruthless in prosecuting war, as if it would be more successful without political restraints at home. The Soviets and the Nazis, neither noted for gentleness, were unable to destroy the partisans behind German lines or the Yugoslav resistance, in spite of brutal tactics. The guerrilla has built-in advantages in warfare for which brutality cannot compensate.
Given all this, the question is why the United States has gotten involved in wars in Eurasia four times since World War II. In each case it is obvious: for political reasons. In Korea and Vietnam, it was to demonstrate to doubting allies that the United States had the will to resist the Soviets. In Afghanistan, it was to uproot al Qaeda. In Iraq, the reasons are murkier, more complex and less convincing, but the United States ultimately went in, in my opinion, to convince the Islamic world of American will.
The United States has tried to shape events in the Eastern Hemisphere by the direct application of land power. In Korea and Vietnam, it was trying to demonstrate resolve against Soviet and Chinese power. In Afghanistan and Iraq, it was trying to shape the politics of the Muslim world. The goal was understandable but the amount of ground force available was not. In Korea, it resulted in stalemate; in Vietnam, defeat. We await the outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan, but given Gates’ statement, the situation for the United States is not necessarily hopeful.
In each case, the military was given an ambiguous mission. This was because a clear outcome — defeating the enemy — was unattainable. At the same time, there were political interests in each. Having engaged, simply leaving did not seem an option. Therefore, Korea turned into an extended presence in a near-combat posture, Vietnam ended in defeat for the American side, and Iraq and Afghanistan have turned, for the time being, into an uncertain muddle that no reasonable person expects to end with the declared goals of a freed and democratic pair of countries.
Problems of Strategy
There are two problems with American strategy. The first is using the appropriate force for the political mission. This is not a question so much of the force as it is of the mission. The use of military force requires clarity of purpose; otherwise, a coherent strategy cannot emerge. Moreover, it requires an offensive mission. Defensive missions (such as Vietnam and Korea) by definition have no terminal point or any criteria for victory. Given the limited availability of ground combat forces, defensive missions allow the enemy’s level of effort to determine the size of the force inserted, and if the force is insufficient to achieve the mission, the result is indefinite deployment of scarce forces.
Then there are missions with clear goals initially but without an understanding of how to deal with Act II. Iraq suffered from an offensive intention ill suited to the enemy’s response. Having destroyed the conventional forces of Iraq, the United States was unprepared for the Iraqi response, which was guerrilla resistance on a wide scale. The same was true in Afghanistan. Counterinsurgency is occupation warfare. It is the need to render a population — rather than an army — unwilling and incapable of resisting. It requires vast resources and large numbers of troops that outstrip the interest. Low-cost counter-insurgency with insufficient forces will always fail. Since the United States uses limited forces because it has to, counterinsurgency is the most dangerous kind of war for the United States. The idea has always been that the people prefer the U.S. occupation to the threats posed by their fellow countrymen and that the United States can protect those who genuinely do prefer the former. That may be the idea, but there is never enough U.S. force available.
Another model for dealing with the problem of shaping political realities can be seen in the Iran-Iraq war. In that war, the United States allowed the mutual distrust of the two countries to eliminate the threats posed by both. When the Iraqis responded by invading Kuwait, the United States responded with a massive counter with very limited ends — the reconquest of Kuwait and the withdrawal of forces. It was a land war in Asia designed to defeat a known and finite enemy army without any attempt at occupation.
The problem with all four wars is that they were not wars in a conventional sense and did not use the military as militaries are supposed to be used. The purpose of a military is to defeat enemy conventional forces. As an army of occupation against a hostile population, military forces are relatively weak. The problem for the United States is that such an army must occupy a country for a long time, and the U.S. military simply lacks the ground forces needed to occupy countries and still be available to deal with other threats.
By having an unclear mission, you have an uncertain terminal point. When does it end? You then wind up with a political problem internationally — having engaged in the war, you have allies inside and outside of the country that have fought with you and taken risks with you. Withdrawal leaves them exposed, and potential allies will be cautious in joining with you in another war. The political costs spiral and the decision to disengage is postponed. The United States winds up in the worst of all worlds. It terminates not on its own but when its position becomes untenable, as in Vietnam. This pyramids the political costs dramatically.
Wars need to be fought with ends that can be achieved by the forces available. Donald Rumsfeld once said, “You go to war with the Army you have. They’re not the Army you might want or wish to have at a later time.” I think that is a fundamental misunderstanding of war. You do not engage in war if the army you have is insufficient. When you understand the foundations of American military capability and its limits in Eurasia, Gates’ view on war in the Eastern Hemisphere is far more sound than Rumsfeld’s.
The Diplomatic Alternative
The alternative is diplomacy, not understood as an alternative to war but as another tool in statecraft alongside war. Diplomacy can find the common ground between nations. It can also be used to identify the hostility of nations and use that hostility to insulate the United States by diverting the attention of other nations from challenging the United States. That is what happened during the Iran-Iraq war. It wasn’t pretty, but neither was the alternative.
Diplomacy for the United States is about maintaining the balance of power and using and diverting conflict to manage the international system. Force is the last resort, and when it is used, it must be devastating. The argument I have made, and which I think Gates is asserting, is that at a distance, the United States cannot be devastating in wars dependent on land power. That is the weakest aspect of American international power and the one the United States has resorted to all too often since World War II, with unacceptable results. Using U.S. land power as part of a combined arms strategy is occasionally effective in defeating conventional forces, as it was with North Korea (and not China) but is inadequate to the demands of occupation warfare. It makes too few troops available for success, and it does not know how many troops might be needed.
This is not a policy failure of any particular U.S. president. George W. Bush and Barack Obama have encountered precisely the same problem, which is that the forces that have existed in Eurasia, from the Chinese People’s Liberation Army in Korea to the Taliban in Afghanistan, have either been too numerous or too agile (or both) for U.S. ground forces to deal with. In any war, the primary goal is not to be defeated. An elective war in which the criteria for success are unclear and for which the amount of land force is insufficient must be avoided. That is Gates’ message. It is the same one MacArthur delivered, and the one Dwight Eisenhower exercised when he refused to intervene in Vietnam on France’s behalf. As with the Monroe Doctrine, it should be elevated to a principle of U.S. foreign policy, not because it is a moral principle but because it is a very practical one.
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Dispatch: Israel's Iron Dome
April 12, 2011 | 1923 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
Military analyst Nathan Hughes examines Israel’s new defense against rockets fired from Gaza and its political significance for both the Israelis and Palestinians.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Iron Dome is a new evolving dynamic in the struggle between Hamas, other Palestinian militant factions and Israel in the Gaza Strip. Iron Dome is intended to intercept and shoot down Palestinian rockets — larger, longer-range rockets, from the Qassam to the larger Grad and Fajr threats. Though it is only a preliminary, essentially preoperational deployment, it is already taking on both current and future potential significance.
Currently, two Iron Dome batteries are deployed near larger population centers in southern Israel. But as currently conceived, it would take over 20 batteries to defend against rockets fired from the Gaza Strip alone. Offensive rockets tend to be inherently cheaper than more sophisticated defensive interceptors to protect against them. And this is certainly the case in Gaza, where on the lower end of the spectrum Qassam rockets that are essentially homemade in garages can cost as little as several hundred dollars to assemble, while the new interceptors used with Iron Dome are thought to cost as much as $50,000 apiece. This sort of dynamic allows for cheaper rockets fired in mass to overwhelm the limited magazines of defensive batteries, though this is not traditionally how Hamas or Hezbollah have deployed their artillery rockets, and there’s not a whole lot of sign yet that Hamas is adjusting its tactics accordingly.
The precise details of Iron Dome’s recent performance and its engagement parameters are unlikely to be discussed in the public domain in too much detail. But the bottom line is that any weapon system, when it’s first deployed on the battlefield, is confronted almost invariably with operational realities and unforeseen circumstances for which it wasn’t originally designed. So while you’re unlikely to see perfect or even near-perfect performance out of a weapon system, these are exactly the experiences that allow engineers to further refine and improve the weapon system as its deployed more fully. In the meantime, Israel certainly has an incentive to talk up the effectiveness and performance of the limited Iron Dome batteries that are currently deployed, while Hamas at the same time has the opposite incentive — to reject its performance, and as we’ve already seen out of Hamas, to sort of mock the price disparity between the rockets that Hamas fires and what Israel is spending to attempt to defend against them.
Ultimately, Hamas continues to fear ongoing isolation behind an Israeli blockade supported by an Egyptian regime in Cairo. The prospect of that continued isolation combined with an even moderately effective system to defend against Hamas’ larger, longer-range rockets, which remain its most effective way to continue to hit back at the Israelis, has got to be a matter of concern for Hamas, even if the prospect for more full fielding of the system is still years down the road.
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Hi, I’m Fred Burton with STRATFOR, and in this week’s Above the Tearline we are going to take a look at the stealth helicopter that crashed at the safe house hiding Osama bin Laden.
Numerous media sources have reported that the stealth helicopter was a modified Blackhawk. Having said that, we have no independent confirmation as to whether or not it was a Blackhawk. Our sources are indicating that the stealth helicopter has been operational for a good four years, predominantly flying special operations missions only at night.
In looking at the design of the helicopter wreckage from the bin Laden safe house, it carries many of the characteristics that you would typically see on the stealth bomber and aircraft that is flying today. The design of the helicopter is one that is masked to reduce its radar signature as well as dampen the noise from the rotors. And it’s our understanding that the aircraft was designed for that specific purpose, meaning special operations missions to be handled at night behind enemy lines for the sole purpose of masking its approach to an attack site. From a person I talked to who has flown in one of these stealth helicopters, the helicopter has been described as amazingly quiet in the air, and the noise is much like an outdoor air conditioner next to your house in the dead of the summer.
The helicopter was flown out of the 160th at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and certainly explains why President Obama made the visit to personally recognize the flight crews.
Our aviation sources close to the operation advise that the stealth helicopter crashed due to a brown out. In essence, as the helicopter approached, with the pilot utilizing night vision goggles, the dust and the dirt of the compound created an atmosphere which caused the pilot to set down the helicopter on the wall. After the helicopter crashed, a front portion, the cockpit area, was blown up by special operations SEALS while they were departing with bin Laden’s body.
Having done a lot of aircraft investigations in my past, one of the things you will notice is, the Pakistanis lost control of the crash site. At this point it’s unclear how much of the wreckage has already been lost that potentially could show up on the black market or in the hands of a nation-state that would be fascinated to learn the technology used in order to enter and exit Pakistani airspace without getting caught.
The “Above the Tearline” aspect of this video is the fact that we have been flying this stealth helicopter for four years is a remarkable achievement, and the fact that there had been no leaks until the pictures of the helicopter next to safe house surfaced.
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Robert Gates, who steps down next month after four-plus years at the Pentagon, is making his retirement lap a tutorial on America's defense spending and security needs. His message is welcome, especially on Memorial Day, and even if he couldn't always heed it in his time as Secretary of Defense.
In a series of farewell speeches, Mr. Gates has warned against cuts to weapon programs and troop levels that would make America vulnerable in "a complex and unpredictable security environment," as he said Sunday at Notre Dame. On Tuesday at the American Enterprise Institute, Mr. Gates noted that the U.S. went on "a procurement holiday" in the 1990s, when the Clinton Administration decided to cash in the Cold War peace dividend. The past decade showed that history (and war) didn't end in 1989.
"It is vitally important to protect the military modernization accounts," he said, and push ahead with new capabilities, from an air refueling tanker fleet to ballistic missile submarines.
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America's role as a global leader depends on its ability to project power. In historical terms, the U.S. spends relatively little on defense today, even after the post-9/11 buildup. This year's $530 billion budget accounts for 3.5% of GDP, 4.5% when the costs of the Afghan and Iraq wars are included. The U.S. spent, on average, 7.5% of GDP on defense throughout the Cold War, and 6.2% at the height of the Reagan buildup in 1986.
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Associated Press
In a series of farewell speeches, Mr. Gates has warned against cuts to weapon programs and troop levels.
.But on coming into office, the Obama Administration put the Pentagon on a fiscal diet—even as it foisted new European-sized entitlements on America, starting with $2.6 trillion for ObamaCare. The White House proposed a $553 billion defense budget for 2012, $13 billion below what it projected last year. Through 2016, the Pentagon will see virtually zero growth in spending and will have to whittle down the Army and Marine Corps by 47,000 troops. The White House originally wanted deeper savings of up to $150 billion.
Mr. Gates deserves credit for fighting off the worst White House instincts, but his biggest defeat was not getting a share of the stimulus. Instead he has cut or killed some $350 billion worth of weapon programs. He told his four service chiefs last August to find $100 billion in savings. The White House pocketed that and asked for another $78 billion. Last year, Mr. Gates said that the Pentagon needs 2%-3% real budget growth merely to sustain what it's doing now, but it could make do with 1%. The White House gave him 0%.
In the Gates term, resources were focused on the demands of today's wars over hypothetical conflicts of tomorrow. This approach made sense at the start of his tenure in 2007, when the U.S. was in a hard fight in Iraq. Yet this has distracted from budgeting to address the rise of China and perhaps of regional powers like a nuclear Iran that will shape the security future. The decision to stop producing the F-22 fighter and to kill several promising missile defense programs may come back to haunt the U.S.
Mr. Gates knows well that America won't balance its budget by squeezing the Pentagon. "If you cut the defense budget by 10%, which would be catastrophic in terms of force structure, that's $55 billion out of a $1.4 trillion deficit," he told the Journal's CEO Council conference last November. "We are not the problem."
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...So what is? Mr. Gates acknowledged it only in passing this week, but the reality is that the entitlement state is crowding out national defense. Over two decades ago, liberal historian Paul Kennedy claimed that "imperial overstretch" had brought first the Romans, then the British and now Americans down to size. He was wrong then, but what's really happening now is "entitlement overstretch," to quote military analyst Andrew Krepinevich.
The American entitlement state was born with the New Deal, got fat with the Great Society of the 1960s and hit another growth spurt in the first two years of the Obama era. The big three entitlements—Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare, plus other retirement and disability expenses—accounted for 4.9% of GDP by 1970, eclipsed defense spending in 1976 and stood at 9.8% as of last year. Under current projections, entitlements will eat up 10.8% of GDP by 2020, while defense spending goes down to 2.7%. On current trends, those entitlements will consume all tax revenues by 2052, estimates Mackenzie Eaglen of the Heritage Foundation.
Europe went down this yellow brick road decades ago and today spends just 1.7% of GDP on defense. The Europeans get a free security ride from America, but who will the U.S. turn to for protection—China?
As Reagan knew, America's global power begins at home, with a strong economy able to generate wealth. The push for defense cuts reflects the reality of a weak recovery and a national debt that has doubled in the last two years. But the Obama Administration made a conscious decision to squeeze defense while pouring money on everything else.
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"More perhaps than any other Secretary of Defense, I have been a strong advocate of soft power—of the critical importance of diplomacy and development as fundamental components of our foreign policy and national security," Mr. Gates said at Notre Dame. "But make no mistake, the ultimate guarantee against the success of aggressors, dictators and terrorists in the 21st century, as in the 20th, is hard power—the size, strength and global reach of the United States military."
That's a crucial message for Republican deficit hawks, and especially for a Commander in Chief who inherited the capability to capture Osama bin Laden half way around the world but is on track to leave America militarily weaker than he found it.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gfD67xGszZc&feature=player_embedded
8-)
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Another reason to see every movie Mila Kunis makes:
http://blog.movies.yahoo.com/blog/1693-mila-kunis-accepts-marines-invite-to-corps-ball
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Another reason to see every movie Mila Kunis makes:
http://blog.movies.yahoo.com/blog/1693-mila-kunis-accepts-marines-invite-to-corps-ball
Very cool! I kind of knew who she was, now I'm a fan.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/this-is-the-new-stealth-boat-that-floats-using-gas/
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AMERICA’S fiscal woes are placing the country on a path of growing strategic risk in Asia.
With Democrats eager to protect social spending and Republicans anxious to avoid tax hikes, and both saying the national debt must be brought under control, we can expect sustained efforts to slash the defense budget. Over the next 10 years, cuts in planned spending could total half a trillion dollars. Even as the Pentagon saves money by pulling back from Afghanistan and Iraq, there will be fewer dollars with which to buy weapons or develop new ones.
Unfortunately, those constraints are being imposed just as America faces a growing strategic challenge. Fueled by economic growth of nearly 10 percent a year, China has been engaged for nearly two decades in a rapid and wide-ranging military buildup. China is secretive about its intentions, and American strategists have had to focus on other concerns since 9/11. Still, the dimensions, direction and likely implications of China’s buildup have become increasingly clear.
When the cold war ended, the Pacific Ocean became, in effect, an American lake. With its air and naval forces operating through bases in friendly countries like Japan and South Korea, the United States could defend and reassure its allies, deter potential aggressors and insure safe passage for commercial shipping throughout the Western Pacific and into the Indian Ocean. Its forces could operate everywhere with impunity.
But that has begun to change. In the mid-1990s, China started to put into place the pieces of what Pentagon planners refer to as an “anti-access capability.” In other words, rather than trying to match American power plane for plane and ship for ship, Beijing has sought more cost-effective ways to neutralize it. It has been building large numbers of relatively inexpensive but highly accurate non-nuclear ballistic missiles, as well as sea- and air-launched cruise missiles. Those weapons could destroy or disable the handful of ports and airfields from which American air and naval forces operate in the Western Pacific and sink warships whose weapons could reach the area from hundreds of miles out to sea, including American aircraft carriers.
The Chinese military has also been testing techniques for disabling American satellites and cybernetworks, and it is adding to its small arsenal of long-range nuclear missiles that can reach the United States.
Although a direct confrontation seems unlikely, China appears to seek the option of dealing a knockout blow to America’s forward forces, leaving Washington with difficult choices about how to respond.
Those preparations do not mean that China wants war with the United States. To the contrary, they seem intended mostly to overawe its neighbors while dissuading Washington from coming to their aid if there is ever a clash. Uncertain of whether they can rely on American support, and unable to match China’s power on their own, other countries may decide they must accommodate China’s wishes.
In the words of the ancient military theorist Sun Tzu, China is acquiring the means to “win without fighting” — to establish itself as Asia’s dominant power by eroding the credibility of America’s security guarantees, hollowing out its alliances and eventually easing it out of the region.
If the United States and its Asian friends look to their own defenses and coordinate their efforts, there is no reason they cannot maintain a favorable balance of power, even as China’s strength grows. But if they fail to respond to China’s buildup, there is a danger that Beijing could miscalculate, throw its weight around and increase the risk of confrontation and even armed conflict. Indeed, China’s recent behavior in disputes over resources and maritime boundaries with Japan and the smaller states that ring the South China Sea suggest that this already may be starting to happen.
This is a problem that cannot simply be smoothed away by dialogue. China’s military policies are not the product of a misunderstanding; they are part of a deliberate strategy that other nations must now find ways to meet. Strength deters aggression; weakness tempts it. Beijing will denounce such moves as provocative, but it is China’s actions that currently threaten to upset the stability of Asia.
Many of China’s neighbors are more willing than they were in the past to ignore Beijing’s complaints, increase their own defense spending and work more closely with one another and the United States.
They are unlikely, however, to do those things unless they are convinced that America remains committed. Washington does not have to shoulder the entire burden of preserving the Asian power balance, but it must lead.
The Pentagon needs to put a top priority on finding ways to counter China’s burgeoning anti-access capabilities, thereby reducing the likelihood that they will ever be used. This will cost money. To justify the necessary spending in an era of austerity, our leaders will have to be clearer in explaining the nation’s interests and commitments in Asia and blunter in describing the challenge posed by China’s relentless military buildup.
Aaron L. Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, is the author of “A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia.”
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Pay-for-Play: WH pressured general to change testimony to benefit Democrat donor
Posted by The Right Scoop on Sep 15, 2011 in Politics | 14 Comments
With the Solyndra scandal just getting going, a new pay-for-play scandal is breaking today that involves the White House pressuring an Air Force general to change his testimony to the benefit of a Democrat donor about a wireless project (owned by Democrat donor) interfering with the military’s GPS system:
DAILY BEAST – The four-star Air Force general who oversees U.S. Space Command walked into a highly secured room on Capitol Hill a week ago to give a classified briefing to lawmakers and staff, and dropped a surprise. Pressed by members, Gen. William Shelton said the White House tried to pressure him to change his testimony to make it more favorable to a company tied to a large Democratic donor.
The episode—confirmed by The Daily Beast in interviews with administration officials and the chairman of a congressional oversight committee—is the latest in a string of incidents that have given Republicans sudden fodder for questions about whether the Obama administration is politically interfering in routine government matters that affect donors or fundraisers. …
Now the Pentagon has been raising concerns about a new wireless project by a satellite broadband company in Virginia called LightSquared, whose majority owner is an investment fund run by Democratic donor Philip Falcone. Gen. Shelton was originally scheduled to testify Aug. 3 to a House committee that the project would interfere with the military’s sensitive Global Positioning Satellite capabilities, which control automated driving directions and missile targeting, among other things.
According to officials familiar with the situation, Shelton’s prepared testimony was leaked in advance to the company. And the White House asked the general to alter the testimony to add two points: that the general supported the White House policy to add more broadband for commercial use; and that the Pentagon would try to resolve the questions around LightSquared with testing in just 90 days. Shelton chafed at the intervention, which seemed to soften the Pentagon’s position and might be viewed as helping the company as it tries to get the project launched, the officials said.
“There was an attempt to influence the text of the testimony and to engage LightSquared in the process in order to bias his testimony,” Rep. Mike Turner (R-OH) said in an interview. “The only people who were involved in the process in preparation for the hearing included the Department of Defense, the White House, and the Office Management and Budget.”
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We are in a long war against radical Islamic terrorism. The struggle seems almost similar to the on-again/off-again ordeals of the past -- like the French-English Hundred Years War of the 14th and 15th centuries, or the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants in the 17th century.
In these kinds of drawn-out conflicts, victory finally goes to the side that responds best to constant new challenges. And we've seen a lot of those since 9/11, when the United States was caught unaware and apparently ill-equipped to face the threat of radical Islamic terrorists hijacking our passenger jets.
But even when we adjusted well to the 9/11 tactics, there were new threats like suicide bombers and roadside improvised explosive devices that seemed to nullify American technology and material advantages.
But now America is once again getting the upper hand in this long war against Middle Eastern terrorists with the use of Predator drone targeted assassinations that the terrorists have not yet an answer to. In systematically deadly fashion, Predators are picking off the top echelon of al-Qaeda and its affiliates from the Hindu Kush to Yemen to the Horn of Africa.
New models of drones seem almost unstoppable. They are uncannily accurate in delivering missiles in a way even precision aircraft bombing cannot. Compared to the cost of a new jet or infantry division, Predators are incredibly cheap. And they do not endanger American lives -- at least as long as terrorists cannot get at hidden runaways abroad or video control consoles at home.
The pilotless aircraft are nearly invisible and without warning can deliver instant death from thousands of feet away in the airspace above. Foreign governments often give us permission to cross borders with Predators in a way they would not with loud, manned aircraft.
Moreover, drones are constantly evolving. They now stay in the air far longer and are far more accurate and far more deadly than when they first appeared in force shortly after 9/11. Suddenly it is a lot harder for a terrorist to bomb a train station in the West than it is for a Predator to target that same would-be terrorist's home in South Waziristan.
All those advantages explain why President Obama has exponentially expanded the program. After five years of use under George W. Bush, such drones had killed around 400 suspected terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, under President Obama, Predators have taken out more than 2,200 in less than three years.
The program apparently is uniquely suited for the Obama "leading from behind" way of war: killing far out of sight, and therefore out of mind -- and the news. Indeed, so comfortable is Obama with this new way of war that at a White House correspondents dinner, the president joked about using Predators on would-be suitors of his daughters: "But boys, don't get any ideas. Two words for you: Predator drones. You will never see it coming."
For President Barack Obama, the Predator drone avoids former candidate Obama's past legal objections by simply blowing apart suspected terrorists without having to capture them -- and then ponder how and where they should be tried. With a dead, rather than a detained, terrorist, civil libertarians cannot demand that Obama honor his campaign pledge to treat suspects like American criminals, while conservatives cannot pounce on any perceived softness in extending Miranda rights to captured al-Qaeda killers.
Antiwar protestors demonstrate in response to American soldiers getting killed, but rarely about robotic aircraft quietly obliterating distant terrorists. American fatalities can make war unpopular; a crashed drone is a "who cares?" statistic.
Still, there are lots of questions that arise from this latest American advantage. Waterboarding, which once sparked liberal furor, is now a dead issue. How can anyone object to harshly interrogating a few known terrorists when routinely blowing apart more that 2,000 suspected ones -- and anyone in their vicinity?
Predators both depersonalize and personalize war in a fashion quite unknown in the past. In one sense, killing a terrorist is akin to playing an amoral video game thousands of miles away. But in another, we often know the name and even recognize the face of each victim, in a way unknown in the anonymous carnage of, for example, the battles of Verdun and Hue. Does that make war more or less humane?
Once the most prominent critic of the war on terror, Obama has now become its greatest adherent -- and in the process is turning the tide against al-Qaeda. And so far, the American people of all political stripes -- for vastly different reasons -- seem more relieved than worried over Obama's most unexpected incarnation as Predator in Chief.
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By BUCK MCKEON
What principles should guide the congressional super committee as it prepares to cut over $1 trillion from the federal budget by Thanksgiving? Priority No. 1 should be: not a penny more out of defense. A staggering level of defense spending is already on the butcher's block.
Since then-Defense Secretary Robert Gates launched an "efficiency" campaign in 2009, we have cut over half a trillion dollars from our armed forces. Although defense spending accounts for less than 20% of our federal budget, it has absorbed approximately half of our deficit-reduction efforts since 2009.
Now the super committee is operating under a mandate that holds our military hostage. If the 12 members don't agree on $1 trillion in cuts from the vast federal budget, an automatic "trigger" will cut $500 million from defense along with $500 million from elsewhere.
Such a drastic cut would force the Navy to mothball over 60 ships, including two of our precious 11 carrier battle groups, according to analysis by the Republican staff of the House Armed Services Committee. It would also force us to shed one-third of our Army maneuver battalions and Air Force fighter jets.
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.The Marine Corps, meanwhile, would have to rewrite its warfighting doctrine and re-evaluate its core mission. The Corps already has too few ships to keep Marines at sea. Cuts would likely cancel production of several Marine aircraft lines and prevent the long-overdue replacement of the Marine amphibious assault vehicle. In short, the Marines would no longer be the service that is "most ready when the nation is least ready."
These radical changes would significantly degrade, if not eliminate, our ability to fulfill our commitments to allies like Taiwan and Israel. When asked by a Senate committee if the super committee's trigger would be "shooting ourselves in the foot," newly minted Defense Secretary Leon Panetta quipped: "We'd be shooting ourselves in the head."
What's more, cutting our military—either by eliminating programs or laying off soldiers—brings grave economic costs. The U.S. military is the principal guardian of our globalized economy's avenues of commerce. We protect the realms where business occurs and prosperity is born, including space, the skies, cyberspace and the world's oceans.
We live in a world where violence on the Korean peninsula, or in the South China Sea, or around the Mediterranean can ripple across the world economy, damaging markets that have a historically low tolerance for uncertainty and doubt. The U.S. military is the benevolent power jealously guarding the stability that makes global, and domestic, fiscal health possible.
And on the economic front, if the super committee fails to reach an agreement, its automatic cuts would kill upwards of 800,000 active-duty, civilian and industrial American jobs. This would inflate our unemployment rate by a full percentage point, close shipyards and assembly lines, and damage the industrial base that our warfighters need to stay fully supplied and equipped.
Armchair budgeteers often point out that the U.S. spends more on defense than the next several nations combined. This clumsy argument lacks critical nuance. It costs exponentially more money to sustain a U.S. service member than to keep a Chinese, Iranian or North Korean soldier under arms. And it costs money to sustain an all-volunteer force, which must compete with the private sector to attract quality recruits.
We rightly insist that our armed forces have the best training, equipment and leadership in the world. This is why personnel costs account for over half of our overall defense budget.
Other nations that can simply press their citizens into service have no such fiscal or moral obligations to their force, nor do they share America's unique role in sustaining global stability.
This highlights the real danger inherent in the temptation to target the Pentagon for even more cuts: If we violate the sacred trust of our service members—some on their sixth and seventh war zone deployments—we risk breaking the back of our all-volunteer force. Who then, will have our backs?
American safety and economic security rest on the shoulders of the U.S. military. Lately it seems we have taken their sacrifices for granted. From here forward, Washington—the super committee, Congress generally, and the president—must focus on the real drivers of our debt, namely entitlements and social welfare, not on the protector of our prosperity.
Mr. McKeon, a California Republican, is chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
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http://www.baen.com/beatingdecline1.asp
BEATING DECLINE: Miltech and the Survival of the U.S.
by J.R. Dunn
Part I
Dangerous times await the United States in the international arena. We are facing a period of relative decline in respect to other nations and the global community as a whole. Many are aggressive states with little reason to be friendly to us or to defer to our interests. Our status as leading nation will be challenged, imperiled, and disregarded. This circumstance is locked in and we cannot avoid it. Debt, inflation, overextension, and defense cuts, not to mention a strange national diffidence toward acting as world leader, guarantee this state of affairs.
On the occasion of his retirement in June, defense secretary Robert Gates warned against further defense cuts. “Frankly,” he was quoted as saying, ”I can’t imagine being part of a nation, part of a government … that’s being forced to dramatically scale back our engagement with the rest of the world.” Extraordinary words from a man who initiated more cuts than any previous secretary: over 30 programs, including the F-22 Raptor, the Army's Future Combat System, and the AF-1 airborne laser. In other words, some of the programs most crucial to maintaining American military capability in the 21st century.
Even as Gates made his departure, the Obama administration was ordering cuts of $400 billion over a period of twelve years. Leading liberal politicians such as Rep. Barney Frank have gone even further, calling for up to $1 trillion in cuts. And this is not to overlook the recent debt ceiling deal, in which automatic cuts to defense, amounting to $500 billion over and above the amounts already mentioned, will occur if a formal bipartisan budget agreement is not achieved.
At risk is the USAF’s B-3 bomber, the Navy's CG(X) cruiser and EPX intelligence plane, the Marine’s Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle, the Army's Ground Combat Vehicle, and the Navy’s new TAOX tanker and the next generation ballistic missile submarine. Talk has also been heard of cutting Army battalions, reducing the number of fleet aircraft carriers, basing fleet units in the continental U.S. rather than at forward bases, dismantling most of our nuclear arsenal, and axing that perennial target, abandoning U.S. Marine Corps aviation.
The reasons for this impasse, while interesting in themselves, do not really concern us as much as the simple reality of what we face. It’s in the cards and we will have to deal with it. How do we go about doing that?
Other dominant states have undergone the same ordeal. The United Kingdom and the Soviet Union can serve as examples. Following its magnificent WW II stand against fascism, the UK suffered a lengthy period of political decline in which its global empire, one of the best-ordered and in many ways admirable of all imperial systems, was stripped away in less than twenty years. The Soviet Union, a much less admirable state, suffered an explosive collapse in the early 1990s following its failure to implement socialism on a national scale while simultaneously challenging the West in the Cold War. Both nations benefited from the existence of an even more powerful national entity that ensured global stability while they adapted to their new status—the United States itself. Countries that might have contemplated taking advantage of the suddenly weakened superstates were held off by the American presence, allowing the UK and USSR to make their transition in relative security. (Only one nation attempted to throw the dice—Argentina in the 1983 Falklands conflict A shrunken Royal Navy succeeded in straightening out the Argentines with assistance from the U.S.)
No guarantor of international stability exists today. The United States will go through its period of readjustment very much on its own. As for challenges from lawless and predatory powers, the question is not if but when. What is in store for us is not conquest, not humiliation, not even necessarily defeat, but a slow erosion of influence and power that will limit our ability to meet crises and make our national will felt. We are already experiencing that erosion, and it will continue for some time to come.
Emerging Threats
Expansionist states on the cusp of becoming major regional powers will wish to exercise their newfound capabilities. Most see the U.S. as an obstacle. There can be little doubt that each of them views America’s current difficulties as a clear opportunity.
•China—Looks forward to taking back the rogue “province” of Taiwan while at the same time extending its control over the Western Pacific. An internal faction of unknown size and influence involving senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would not at all mind giving the U.S. a black eye in the process.
•Iran—Wishes to gain control over the Persian Gulf and the surrounding states in hopes of establishing something on the order of a Shi’ite caliphate. Its current nuclear weapons program is troubled (it suffered a serious setback as the target of the first tailored cyberweapon), but continuing. Further concern arises over extensive governmental influence from a Shi’ite apocalyptic cult comprised of believers in the imminent return of an Islamic messiah, the Twelfth Imam.
•North Korea—After nearly seventy years, still the personal domain of the world’s sole communist dynasty. Unstable and run by a family of doubtful sanity, North Korea is a perpetual irritant. With its arsenal of crude atomic weapons, it is in the peculiar position of being too weak to fully assert itself yet too well-armed to be ignored. Eventually this conundrum will be resolved through some kind of action.
•Russia—Interested in reestablishing military dominance over Eurasia while also clawing back a few strayed remnants of the old USSR. Important sections of the military and security organs are subject to feelings of anti-American revanchism over the results of the Cold War.
•Venezuela—Has eagerly adapted the mantle of spearhead of Latin Marxism from Cuba, with some success among neighboring states. Has also established close military ties with China and Iran, which include agreements for basing rights and emplacement of advanced strategic weapons systems.
•Pakistan—About to explode thanks to an evil synergy involving a totally corrupt military, an effectively unrestrained Islamist element, and seething ethnic rivalries. The problem lies in its possession of up to 110 nuclear weapons. (Nearly as many as the UK.) 1
•There also exist wild cards—threats that while perhaps unlikely, are within the realm of possibility.
•Europe—Union has not proven as easy or as popular as anticipated. It has long been pointed out that the EU has all the trappings of a neofascist state without the controlling ideology. That could change, and not necessarily for the better. Consider the UK or Ireland attempting to secede from the EU under such circumstances. The technical name for this is “civil war.” (Interestingly, one of the few novels to deal with the concept of European union, Angus Wilson’s satirical SF novel The Old Men at the Zoo, climaxes with exactly such a scenario.)
•Mexico—A potential government takeover by one of the cartels, or alternately a front politician under their control, would turn our southern border into even more of a war zone than it is already. We have been ignoring the Mexican drug war for several years now. We may not have this luxury for much longer.
•A Revived United Arab Republic—The “Arab Spring” has not turned out to be as happy an event as many of us hoped. The most powerful political group in the Arab states is the Muslim Brotherhood, a secret society with fascist antecedents considered to be the grandfather of all Islamic terrorist and Jihadi organizations. Any or all of the “liberated” Arab nations could fall prey to this outfit. (It appears that Egypt is doing so now.) The ramifications will be nothing but ugly.
•And let’s not forget the jihadis while we’re at it. That’s a fifty-year war and we are only one-fifth of the way through it.
Beyond these, we have the “unknown unknowns”—potential threats that we simply cannot foresee. An informed European of 1910 would never have guessed at fascism, Nazism, or communism, which dominated much of the 20th century and came close to destroying Europe. What awaits us in the next half-century is anybody’s guess. (How about a combination of the Singularity and neofascism?) Keeping in mind the words of a great statesman (Calvin Coolidge): “If you see ten troubles comin’ down the road, you can be sure that nine will run into a ditch before they get to you,” one or more of these will confront the U.S. while we are at the same time repairing the ravages of recent excesses, maintaining our standing in the international community, and fulfilling our obligations to our allies and treaty partners. There have been easier periods for this country.
We are no longer a hyperpower, and the status of superpower is slipping from our grasp. Within a decade, the U.S. will be merely one great power among a rising cohort of powers. We no longer possess the forces that defeated the Soviet Union, twice humiliated the armies of Saddam Hussein, and that for decades have guaranteed peaceful commerce across the oceans of the world. While much can be accomplished through diplomacy and alliances with other powers, situations will arise in which military force is the sole option. We must find alternatives to the vast resources that are no longer available to us.
We will not, for the foreseeable future, have access to the traditional American method of spending more money to buy more guns than anyone else on earth can afford. What does that leave us? With yet another traditional American method, one that used to be called “Yankee ingenuity”: using technology to solve problems that cannot be addressed in any other way.
The RMA and the American Dilemma
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)2 is the formal name for changes in warfare brought about by technological innovation in the post-Vietnam period. Originally a Soviet concept, the RMA involves advances in such fields as computers, sensor technology, guidance systems, and communications which together hold the potential to increase the destructive capabilities of weaponry by an order of magnitude. Examples include precision-guided munitions (PGMs), stealth aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Considerable debate has occurred concerning the RMA’s effect on operations, strategy, tactics, and doctrine.
The RMA fell into disrepute after defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld utilized it as the basis of his “transformational” doctrine for the U.S. military. It was the source of the infamous “light footprint,” in which small, technologically advanced forces would destroy much larger conventional armies, requireing reduced outlay in time, resources, and finances. Rumsfeld was not completely mistaken—the forces that defeated Saddam Hussein in 2003 were much smaller than those dispatched to the Gulf in 1990. Technology made up the difference. What Rumsfeld overlooked was the fact that occupation and combat are two different things. Occupation requires large numbers of boots on the ground to assure security, control, and a smooth transition of power. The failure to meet those requirements in the wake of the Second Gulf War resulted in a lengthy guerilla conflict which sapped American resolve and nearly cost us the victory.
Over the past few years, military thinkers have begun to acknowledge that the RMA, far from being discredited, will continue to influence military affairs for the foreseeable future. Technology remains a major driver of military innovation and despite everything the United States remains the forerunner in technology. A 2008 RAND study, “U.S. Competitiveness in Science and Technology”3 found that the U.S. spends 40 percent of the world’s budget for research, produces 38 percent of new patents, and 63 percent of cited research papers. We also lead in application. The U.S. is the sole nation to have fielded a fleet of stealth fighters and bombers, the sole nation to have made the transition to combat drones, the first adaptor of battlefield robotics, and is very likely the first nation (along with its junior partner Israel) to have created and utilized a cyberwarhead. Technology will enable the United States to endure the challenges to come, and to put the fear of Uncle Sam anew into the world’s bandits, fanatics, and would-be Napoleons.
Maritime Power
Naval power is the most important aspect of American military strength. The seapower thesis of Alfred Thayer Mahan4— that the United States comprises a “continental island” closer in nature to maritime states such as Japan and the UK than to the continental powers of Eurasia—has proven far more durable than most 19th-century geopolitical theories.
Since the destruction of the Japanese Imperial Fleet in 1944, the U.S. Navy has had no serious rival for control of the seas. For a short period in the 1980s the development of a Soviet blue-water navy caused some worries, but those ended along with the USSR. It is no coincidence that international trade based on maritime shipping underwent a boom during the postwar period. Security provided by U.S. naval dominance of the world’s oceans was a major factor in economic globalization. The vast amounts spent on America’s fleets have repaid themselves many times over.
In the early 21st century, U.S. maritime power faces its first major challenge in nearly seventy years. The fleet is steadily shrinking. In August 2011 it stood at 284 ships, less than half the 575 in commission twenty years ago. At the same time, several foreign fleets are in the process of establishing themselves as serious competitors. The Indian Navy is friendly. The Chinese and Iranian navies, not so much. In addition, piracy has undergone a dramatic rebirth, in Somalia in particular but also in areas such as the Indonesian archipelago. The 21st century sailor will have his hands full.
The Navy’s plan to meet these challenges is embodied in a doctrine called “AirSea Battle.” While little is known about this new strategy, it can be assumed to be a maritime version of AirLand Battle, the U.S. Army’s extremely effective late 20th century ground-combat strategy. AirLand Battle was based on the theories of the eccentric but brilliant USAF officer Col. John Boyd5, who spent a lifetime attempting to create a universal theory of warfare. AirLand Battle is a complex strategy of maneuver utilizing Boyd’s “decision cycle” (also known as the “OODA Cycle”)6, in which actions carried out at an accelerated pace deny the enemy any opportunity to respond. Large-scale disruptive aerial attacks are followed with swift flank attacks by mechanized units, assaulting not fixed geographic targets such as cities or bases, or even distinct military formations, but any enemy force within reach. The goal is to confuse and disrupt the enemy until utter collapse ensues. AirLand Battle is a strategy by which small, outnumbered forces can defeat much larger opponents through speed, maneuver, and initiative.
AirLand Battle never saw action against the Warsaw Pact, its original target, but found its moment in the two campaigns against the Iraqi Army. These were virtual textbook operations, with the U.S.-led Coalition dominating the battlespace from the start and swiftly subduing the Iraqis with very few direct engagements.
AirSea Battle7 is a combined-services strategy in which the USAF and Navy will act as a single offensive force. Working from the AirLand Battle template, we can assume that USAF long-range air assets will strike first, disrupting and demoralizing enemy maritime forces. They will be followed by naval air, surface, and submarine elements, striking with PGMs, cruise missiles, and long-range torpedoes. If carried out with the same ferocity as AirLand Battle, this strategy would climax with surviving enemy units fleeing the battlespace, leaving it dominated by U.S. naval forces.
Two major questions arise: can such a strategy be carried out by a steadily shrinking Navy? And can a strategy so dependent on the ever more vulnerable aircraft carrier remain viable into the 21st century?
Fleet carriers are among the most impressive warships ever to take to sea. But all things move toward their end, and carriers of the Nimitz and Ford class may have seen their day. The Chinese, the most serious maritime challenge facing our Navy, are doing their best to make the carrier obsolete. China considers the South China Sea as its territory, going so far as to refer to it as “blue soil,” an inherent part of the Chinese heritage. It has laid claim to the Spratleys, the Paracels, and other small island chains in defiance of Vietnam, Taiwan, Japan, and the Philippines. It has never given up its claim to Taiwan. It has suggested that other states—specifically the U.S.—abandon all interest in the area, in clear disregard of current treaties and the traditional law of the sea. (The U.S. is responding by sending its first three operational Littoral Combat Ships8 into the South China Sea. This is a carefully calibrated riposte: while not strategic assets, these shallow-water vessels—which the media have taken to calling “stealth ships”—are capable of a variety of missions including shore assault, reconnaissance and surveillance, special warfare, and deep-water combat. The message is easily read: we’re ready for anything.)
Whatever Chinese plans may be, one element that can upset them is the aircraft carrier. Each possesses the combat power of a medium-sized nation, unmatched versatility, and the moral force of a weapon that has never been adequately countered. The Chinese have worried about them for a long time, and have put a lot of work into countermeasures. These include:
•Cruise Missiles—Entire families of sea-launched cruise missiles are deployed on both surface ships—including fast patrol craft—and submarines.
•Song Class Diesel Submarines, —quite capable and very difficult to detect9. In 2006, a Song-class sub surfaced without warning only a short distance from the USS Kitty Hawk.
•The J-20 Stealth Fighter——from its size clearly not an air-superiority aircraft, but most likely intended as a strike aircraft10. It would be surprising if it wasn’t used against carriers.
•The DF-21D Ballistic Missile—over the past year, a new version of the DF-21 MRBM with anti-ship capabilities has been fielded11. The Chinese can deploy hundreds of these missiles in a short time frame.
•Electromagnetic Pulse Weapons (EMP)—China has apparently modified a number of nuclear warheads to trigger a high-altitude EMP pulse capable of damaging or destroying nearby electronic equipment12. While some are intended for use against Taiwan, others may target aircraft carriers. The code names of these weapons are “Assassin’s Mace” for older warheads and “Trump Card” for warheads using newer technology. (This is a good opportunity to kill the “EMP as national threat” myth. There’s been a lot of rhetoric expended claiming that the pulse from a single nuclear warhead set off 200 miles above the U.S. could fry all electronics gear across the country and plunge us into a new dark age. Well maybe, under perfect laboratory conditions, but even that’s doubtful. As a physicist pointed out to me, for this to work, you need to have more energy coming out than the original explosion put in. A little thing called the First Law of Thermodynamics forbids this.)
It would be a difficult trick to carry out a warfighting strategy with one of its central elements at the bottom of the briny deep. Potential defenses exist, chief among them directed-energy weapons. High-energy lasers would defeat most anti-ship threats, in particular missiles of all varieties. Unfortunately, the free-electron laser (FEL), the most well-adapted for naval use (FELs are tunable and can be fired at the best wavelengths to cut through sea haze, salt spray, fog, and other maritime commonplaces), was canceled by Congress last June13. (The Navy’s primary new offensive weapon, the electromagnetic railgun, was canceled at the same time.) Nothing less than such a universal defense will do. The Kamikaze campaign of 1945 clearly demonstrated how difficult it is to defend ships from determined attack. It won’t require the loss of very many $15 billion carriers along with their air wings to drive the U.S. out of the South China Sea or the Persian Gulf more or less permanently.
While the Chinese launched their first carrier—formerly the Ukrainian Varyag—this past summer, and are constructing at least two domestic carriers, they possess no support craft or escorts to sail with them. They’re unlikely to play a major role in the time-span we’re considering here.
But the fleet carrier is by no means the ultimate evolution of the aircraft carrier. The Navy has already studied the feasibility of smaller carriers14. In fact, future carriers may not resemble our current models, with their vast and crowded flight decks, in any fashion at all.
The key to this development is the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle—the combat drone. The Navy came late to the drone revolution, but in recent years has gone all out to catch up. Last February marked the debut of the Northrop Grumman X-47B, a drone designed to take off and land on a carrier15. The Navy wants drones operating with carrier forces by 2018. Subsequent development of drones is likely to transform the carrier itself. There is no reason why drones need to operate exactly like manned aircraft, requiring a flight deck, arrestor gear, and the entire panoply of traditional naval aviation. Properly designed drones could be launched from any type of surface ship, or, for that matter, from submarines running underwater. It’s possible to foresee a time when every naval vessel, including support ships, operates a unit of drones, from a dozen aboard a support vessel such as a tanker to fifty or more aboard a guided missile cruiser.
Such drones would be very different birds from today’s pioneer models—nearly autonomous, cheap, and far more capable. They could well be expendable, with no recovery necessary. (The USAF has already fielded such a design, the MALD. See below.) It’s possible that they wouldn’t even be armed, instead destroying their targets by kinetic kill. Consider a swarm of hundreds of small, fast, maneuverable drones suddenly appearing out of nowhere, with no obvious source (and target) like a conventional aircraft carrier in sight. Such a capability would complicate enemy strategy immeasurably. It would also go a long way toward lowering the cost of a fleet and increasing the number of available combat vessels.
The drone revolution is by no means limited to aerial platforms. Application of drone technology to both surface and submersible craft is in process. Former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead initiated development of a long-range UUV (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle), a robot submarine capable of operating independently for long periods on missions covering thousands of miles16. Roughead envisioned a basic guidance system and power plant module that can be reconfigured with weapon and sensor suites tailored for each particular mission. Such UUVs would patrol independently, report in by satellite linkage, and return to port on their own. Smaller versions could act as drone torpedoes, maintaining station on a semi-permanent basis and launching themselves at enemy shipping when the war signal arrives.
Necessary technology such as advanced AI algorithms and compact power plants remains enticingly out of reach. But less complex versions of such UUVs could very likely be launched today. These drones could accompany a fleet, acting as a first line of defense against enemy subs, be monitored constantly and rendezvous with surface vessels for maintenance and refueling. Such drones would be relatively cheap and expendable where manned submarines would not be.
Preliminary work has also been done on surface drones by the Navy in cooperation with the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), the DoD’s in-house research department, particularly involving an unmanned frigate, the Anti-submarine warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV)17. An ACTUV could patrol vast areas of ocean for months with no human input. On encountering a sub, it would notify its naval HQ, and perhaps also latch onto the sub’s signal and follow it wherever it went, rendering the crew’s life incredibly nerve-wracking. One interesting development involves the Navy’s creation of an online game, ACTUV Tactics, where outside players compete as ACTUV’s or sub skippers, in order to work out the best tactics to encode as operational algorithms18. (What’s that you say? Potential enemy sub skippers can log on too, and learn all the tricks? I guess nothing’s perfect.)
Another weapon overdue for technological enhancement is the sea mine, an often underrated asset. During the last months of WW II, mines dropped from USAAF B-29 Superfortresses into the Inland Sea and coastal areas brought Japanese maritime activity to a standstill, completely isolating the Home Islands.
The 21st century mine will be a far cry from the anchored “dumb” mines of WW II. They will have limited autonomous capability, be able to detect and target individual ships, avoid minesweepers, and maneuver into optimal attack positions. Several warheads could be fitted with programmable fuses to suit the targets. Networks of these mines would communicate and coordinate their attacks. Enemy fleets and merchant marine vessels might well be locked into their ports, unable to emerge for fear of hordes of “smart mines.” When hostilities end, the mines would be signaled to surface and wait for pickup.
A picture of the fleet to come begins to take form, surrounded by a cloud of undetectable drones, preceded by a shield of small unmanned submarines, with robot frigates patrolling the fringes, and the manned ships on the center. Small in numbers, and nowhere near as impressive as a Nimitz-class carrier and its escorts, but with a potential combat power orders of magnitude greater than any current fleet. Stealthed, laser and railgun armed (we can assume that these programs are on “zombie” status, with current work carefully preserved and waiting for funding), integrated into satellite weather, detection, and communication systems, capable of tracking targets at the other side of the ocean and engaging them at half that distance. Such a fleet would possess capabilities unknown up to this point in time, and perhaps unguessable even today.
Maintaining Air Superiority
For several decades, the U.S. Air Force has carried the banner of military technological innovation. Working with DARPA, the “Pentagon’s mad scientists,” the USAF has been responsible for the most spectacular and effective technological breakthroughs of recent years, including stealth aircraft and the combat drone. Can this partnership prevail into the 21st century?
Since WW II, the U.S. has possessed effective air superiority over other combatants. Except for short periods over Korea in 1950-51 and Vietnam in 1966-67, American superiority was so overwhelming that at times opponents didn’t even dare challenge it. During the First Gulf War (1991), Iraqi Air Force units defected en masse to Iran to avoid destruction by Coalition air assets. After the Hussein regime was overthrown in 2003, pathetic little monuments were found in the desert where Iraqi MiGs had been buried in sand to protect them.
Technology was the leading reason for American superiority in the air. Following the Korean War, John Boyd discovered that the USAF had gained ascendancy over Communist air forces when the F-86E Sabre was introduced to combat in 1952. Unlike earlier models, the E Sabre featured hydraulic controls, enabling it to shift from one maneuver to the next before enemy MiG-15s could react. This created an extraordinary situation in which the USAF was provided with the winning edge without even realizing it. (This insight formed the basis of Boyd’s “decision cycle” thesis.)
While the U.S. currently retains this edge, there’s no guarantee it will keep it. Aviation technology is a fast-changing field, sensitive to breakthroughs in many technical disciplines. Both Russia and China have tested stealth fighters, with the Russians claiming their Sukhoi PAK TA T-50 as fully equal to the USAF’s F-22 Raptor, the premier U.S. air superiority aircraft19. Production of the Raptor was capped at 187 planes by Secretary Gates over the protests of Air Force staff. While Gates claimed that the less-capable F-35 Lightning II would take up the slack, questions about program costs and delays have arisen over the past year. (Both the F-22 and F-35 have experienced serious systemic flaws over the past year that led to some aircraft being grounded. These should be viewed as shakedown problems not uncommon among new high-performance aircraft. The B-29, the bomber that defeated Japan, had numerous failings including uncontrollable engine fires and windows popping out at high altitude. The F-86 killed so many pilots that it was called the “lieutenant eater.” The B-47, the first strategic jet bomber, had a particularly stark drawback—in the early models, the wings tended to fall off during sharp turns.) The Marine Corps S/VTOL version is currently “on probation” and may well be cancelled. We could end up with far fewer than the 2,400 F-35s planned.
Another threat lies in advances in radar. It is possible to design a radar system that can detect, if not track, stealth aircraft. Australia’s JORN (Jindalee Operational Radar Network) system detects the turbulence created by an aircraft’s passage and is claimed to have a range of several thousand miles20. The Chinese are known to be working on an ultra-high frequency radar for the purpose of defeating stealth. It is easily possible that further advances could negate the stealth advantage, leaving the U.S. without air superiority for the first time since 1944.
The answer to this dilemma may well lie in the UAV. It’s remarkable to consider that the drone revolution that has transformed so many aspects of warfare was a matter of pure inadvertence. The original MQ-1 Predator drones were unarmed and were retrofitted with AGM-114 Hellfire missiles only after it was realized that the time lag between drones detecting a target and a fighter-bomber response was unnecessary. Since that time, drones such as the MQ-9 Reaper have been designed for weapons carriage from the first. We can assume that all drones from this point on will possess at least the capability of being armed.
It has been understood since 1972, when a Ryan Firebee operated by remote control easily outmaneuvered an F-4 Phantom in a series of dogfights, that drones could operate in the air-superiority role. It would be a simple matter to fit Predators or Reapers with AIM-9 Sidewinder or AIM-120 AMRAAM missile kits to enable them to operate as fighters. But both lack necessary speed and maneuverability, although the RQ-170 “Beast of Kandahar” drone, with its stealthy features and swept wings, appears to be approaching that level.
There’s little reason to doubt that DARPA, in its thorough way, is working on such aircraft and that prototypes may be flying at this moment at Groom Lake or a similar test base.
On the other hand, the future may already have arrived in the form of the Miniature Air-Launched Decoy (MALD), a small, expendable drone designed to confuse and overwhelm air defense radars21. MALDs can be programmed to maneuver precisely like manned aircraft, and can be launched by the hundreds from transports, hopelessly saturating any current air-defense system. Raytheon has begun developing versions of the MALD fitted with sensors and warheads, transforming them into armed fighter drones.
A MALD air-superiority system could be deployed in a number of ways. They could be launched from transports or AWACs (launch racks have been developed for this purpose), goading an opponent into sending up his aircraft, which would then be downed en masse by the drones. Range could be extended by shutting off the engine and gliding, or alternately by zooming up to high altitude, deploying a balloon or parachute, and drifting until a threat appears. (A USAF anti-radiation missile, the AGM-136 Tacit Rainbow, operates on this principle.)
Manned fighters carrying MALDs in lieu of bombs or external fuel tanks could launch them just before coming into enemy radar range. After the first wave of drones engaged the enemy, the F-15s and F-22s would fly in to mop up.
Whatever the technique (and experienced pilots and weapons officers will no doubt come up with far more intricate and effective tactics), it is clear that cheap drones can make up for shortfalls in manned air-superiority aircraft. With its current head start in UAV technology, the U.S. need not drop into second place (and in air combat, anything below number one is the loser) anytime soon. It’s also clear that drones will not “replace” so much as supplement manned fighter aircraft for the foreseeable future. There will always be a need for conscious mentalities, if only to figure out when the battle’s over.
A Bomber Revival?
The USAF has traditionally been a bomber service, its major mission that of strategic bombing, its legendary figures—Mitchell, Arnold, Spaatz, LeMay—bomber pilots and commanders. It was only in recent years that fighter pilots were granted the same lofty status as the bomber aristocracy.
But the manned bomber has had a rough time in recent decades, squeezed between improved air defenses and the titanic expense required to overcome them. Of the last three proposed strategic bombers, the B-70 Valkyrie was cancelled outright in the early 1960s, the B-1 Lancer was cancelled and then resurrected in the 1980s, and the B-2 Spirit, the storied “stealth bomber,” was limited by its cost of over $1 billion apiece to only 21 aircraft (20 of which are still flying, one having crashed at Guam in February 2008). The Air Force currently possesses under 200 strategic bombers, a derisory number compared the thousands deployed during the Cold War, much less the tens of thousands that fought WW II.
But drone technology may, paradoxically, rescue the manned bomber. Secretary Gates cancelled a bomber scheduled to be fielded by 2018. Apparently having second thoughts, Gates green-lighted a new bomber project just before his retirement. This Deep Strike Aircraft will be a stealth model that can fly either manned or unmanned, depending on mission requirements. While little is known about the B-3’s actual configuration, the bomber would possess both conventional and nuclear capability, carrying PGMs, bunker-busters, or air-to-ground rockets. Defense could be provided by high-energy lasers and also by versions of the MALD with the B-3 in effect carrying its own escort force, deployed upon entering hostile airspace and accompanying the bomber on its run against a target. (Aviation buffs will recognize this as the millennial version of the XF-85 Goblin, a late 1940s fighter designed for carriage by the B-36 as an escort plane. If you wait long enough, every technical gimmick comes around for a second run.) Over $4 billion has been budgeted for strike aircraft development. If all goes according to schedule, 80 to 100 B-3s will join the inventory sometime in the mid 2020s22.
Another revival is the Prompt Global Strike system, a weapon that could hit targets at intercontinental distances from CONUS (the Continental United States) within two hours. This weapon could strike high-value targets of temporary nature (say, a conference of terrorist leaders) without the diplomatic complications that might arise from launching an attack from a third-party state.
Several attempts have been made to develop such an asset, including a proposal to utilize surplus ICBMs or submarine-launched missiles in the role that was abandoned after it became apparent that there was no plausible way to assure bystander nations that they weren’t packed full of nuclear warheads. Attention shifted to hypersonic aircraft, with several projects initiated, including the Falcon (Force Application and Launch from CONUS), a reusable hypersonic cruise vehicle launched by rocket and capable of carrying a 12,000 lb. payload up to 9,000 miles, and the Blackswift, a Mach 6 multimission aircraft developed by DARPA for use as a spy plane, bomber, or satellite launcher23. Although funding of $1 billion was authorized, the Blackswift was cancelled in 2009.
But the hypersonic aircraft concept proved too tough to kill. The past year has seen some promising developments, including a successful test of the USAF’s X-51 hypersonic missile and flights by the Falcon HTV-2 which, though not flawless (the Falcons lost telemetry links with the ground and shut themselves down), produced valuable data. It was further revealed that yet another hypersonic bomber project, dubbed “Son of Blackswift” is under development. It appears that the U.S. will have an intercontinental fist to add to its conventional arsenal.
The United States need not relinquish its superiority as regards air power. The crucial question involves funding. Aerospace technology is expensive and often the first to be cut, as shown by the B-70, the B-1, and the Blackswift. But such cuts often represent false economies. Early in WW II, American pilots were forced to fight in sturdy but obsolescent aircraft such as the Bell P-39 and the Curtiss P-40 that simply could not stand up to the Luftwaffe’s Me-109s and Fw-190s, much less the superb Mitsubishi A6M Zero. It required two years for adequate American designs to appear. It would take far longer today, and wars in the millennial era simply don’t last that long. (The UK, on the other hand, spent large amounts during the mid-1930s developing fast, maneuverable eight-gun fighters, the Hawker Hurricane and the Supermarine Spitfire. These aircraft saved the country during the Battle of Britain.)
End Notes for Part One:
1.http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/01/world/asia/01policy.html?pagewanted=all Calling all Seals!
2.http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/2011.06.02-Maturing-Revolution-In-Military-Affairs1.pdf
3.http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG674.html
4.http://www.historynet.com/alfred-thayer-mahan-the-reluctant-seaman.htm
5.http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/59/pilot.html
6.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/6-0/appa.htm
7.http://www.airforce-magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2010/August percent202010/0810battle.aspx
8.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ship/lcs.htm
9.http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/song.htm
10.http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/01/19/chinas-j-20-fighter-stealthy-or-just-stealthy-looking/
11.http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2009-05/verge-game-changer
12.http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jul/21/beijing-develops-radiation-weapons/print
13.www.wired.com/dangerroom/tag/free-electron-laser/
14.http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011-05/twilight-uperfluous-carrier
15.http://www.as.northropgrumman.com/products/nucasx47b/index.html
16.http://www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/n87/usw/issue_26/uuv.html
17.http://www.darpa.mil/Our_Work/TTO/Programs/Anti-Submarine_Warfare_(ASW)_Continuous_Trail_Unmanned_Vessel_(ACTUV).aspx
18.https://actuv.darpa.mil/
19.http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blogScript&plckElementId=blogDest&plckBlogPage=BlogViewPost&plckPostId=Blog percent3A27ec4a53-dcc8-42d0-bd3a-01329aef79a7Post percent3A021e786e-04be-426b-ad32-dcbb54b90d00
20.http://www.defence.gov.au/dmo/esd/jp2025/jp2025.cfm
21.http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/products/mald/
22.http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=586
23.http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/01/blackswift-swoo/
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From the Economist - war without blood shed?
*****Electromagnetic weapons
Frying tonight
Warfare is changing as weapons that destroy electronics, not people, are deployed on the field of battle
Oct 15th 2011 | from the print edition
BULLETS and bombs are so 20th-century. The wars of the 21st will be dominated by ray guns. That, at least, is the vision of a band of military technologists who are building weapons that work by zapping the enemy’s electronics, rather than blowing him to bits. The result could be conflict that is less bloody, yet more effective, than what is now seen as conventional battle.
Electromagnetic weapons, to give these ray guns their proper name, are inspired by the cold-war idea of using the radio-frequency energy released by an atom bomb exploded high in the atmosphere to burn out an enemy’s electrical grid, telephone network and possibly even the wiring of his motor vehicles, by inducing a sudden surge of electricity in the cables that run these things.
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That idea, fortunately, was never tried in earnest (though some tests were carried out). But, by thinking smaller, military planners have developed weapons that use a similar principle, without the need for a nuclear explosion. Instead, they create their electromagnetic pulses with magnetrons, the microwave generators at the hearts of radar sets (and also of microwave ovens). The result is kit that can take down enemy missiles and aircraft, stop tanks in their tracks and bring speedboats to a halt. It can also scare away soldiers without actually killing them.
Many electromagnetic weapons do, indeed, look like radars, at least to non-expert eyes. America’s air force is developing a range of them based on a type of radar called an active electronically scanned array (AESA). When acting as a normal radar, an AESA broadcasts its microwaves over a wide area. At the touch of a button, however, all of its energy can be focused onto a single point. If that point coincides with an incoming missile or aircraft, the target’s electronics will be zapped.
Small AESAs—those light enough to fit on a plane such as a joint strike fighter (F-35)—are probably restricted to zapping air-to-air and surface-to-air missiles (the air force is understandably reticent about supplying details of their capabilities). Ground- or ship-based kit can draw more power. This will be able to attack both ballistic missiles and aircraft, whose electronics tend to be better shielded.
In the case of the F-35, then, this sort of electromagnetic artillery is mainly defensive. But another plane, the Boeing Growler, uses electromagnetics as offensive weapons. The Growler, which first saw action in Iraq in 2010 and has been extensively (though discreetly) deployed during the NATO air war against Colonel Qaddafi’s forces in Libya, is a souped-up version of the Super Hornet. It is fitted with five pods: two under each wing and one under the fuselage. Some pods contain AESAs or similar electromagnetic weapons. Others have eavesdropping equipment inside them. In combination, the pods can be used either to spy on enemy communications or to destroy them; to suppress anti-aircraft fire; to disable the electronics of ground vehicles; and to make life so hazardous for enemy aircraft that they dare not fly (and probably to shoot them down electronically, too, though no one will confirm this). The Growler is able to keep its weapons charged up and humming by lowering special turbines into the airstream that rushes past the plane when it is flying. America has ordered 114 of the planes, and has taken delivery of 53.
By land, sea and air
Nor are aircraft the only vehicles from which destructive electromagnetic pulses can be launched. BAE Systems, a British defence firm, is building a ship-mounted electromagnetic gun. The High-Powered Microwave, as it is called, is reported by Aviation Week to be powerful enough to disable all of the motors in a swarm of up to 30 speedboats. Ships fitted with such devices would never be subject to the sort of attack that damaged USS Cole in 2000, when an al-Qaeda boat loaded with explosives rammed it. A gun like this would also be useful for stopping pirate attacks against commercial shipping.
Land vehicles, too, will soon be fitted with electromagnetic cannon. In 2013 America hopes to deploy the Radio-Frequency Vehicle Stopper. This device, developed at the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate in Quantico, Virginia, is a microwave transmitter the size and shape of a small satellite dish that pivots on top of an armoured car. When aimed at another vehicle, it causes that vehicle’s engine to stall.
This gentle way of handling the enemy—stopping his speedboats, stalling his tanks—has surprising advantages. For example, it expands the range of targets that can be attacked. Some favourite tricks of modern warfare, such as building communications centres in hospitals, or protecting sites with civilian “human shields”, cease to be effective if it is simply the electronics of the equipment being attacked that are destroyed. Though disabling an aircraft’s avionics will obviously cause it to crash, in many other cases, no direct harm is done to people at all.
The logical conclusion of all this is a so-called “human-safe” missile, which carries an electromagnetic gun instead of an explosive warhead. Such a missile is being developed at Kirtland Air Force Base in New Mexico, and will soon be tested at the White Sands Missile Range.
There is, however, at least one electromagnetic weapon that is designed to attack enemy soldiers directly—though with the intention of driving them off, rather than killing them. This weapon, which is called the Active Denial System, has been developed by the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Directorate, in collaboration with Raytheon. It works by heating the moisture in a person’s skin to the point where it feels, according to Kelley Hughes, an official at the directorate who volunteered to act as a guinea pig, like opening a hot oven. People’s reaction, when hit by the beam, is usually to flee. The beam’s range is several hundred metres.
Such anti-personnel weapons are controversial. Tests on monkeys, including ones in which the animals’ eyes were held open to check that the beam does not blind, suggest it causes no permanent damage. But when a vehicle-mounted Active Denial System was sent to Afghanistan in May 2010, it was eventually shipped back home without being used. The defence department will not say exactly why. The suspicion, though, is that weapons like the Active Denial System really are reminiscent in many minds of the ray guns of science fiction, and that using them in combat would be a PR mistake. Disabling communications and destroying missiles is one thing. Using heat-rays on the enemy might look bad in the newspapers, and put civilians off their breakfast.
Cold showers are good for you
To every action there is, of course, an equal and opposite reaction, and researchers are just as busy designing ways of foiling electromagnetic weapons as they are developing them. Most such foils are types of Faraday cage—named after the 19th-century investigator who did much of the fundamental research on electromagnetism.
A Faraday cage is a shield of conductive material that stops electromagnetic radiation penetrating. Such shields need not be heavy. Nickel- and copper-coated polyester mesh is a good starting point. Metallised textiles—chemically treated for greater conductivity—are also used. But Faraday cages can be costly. EMP-tronic, a firm based in Morarp, Sweden, has developed such shielding, initially for the Gripen, a Swedish fighter jet. It will shield buildings too, though, for a suitable consideration. To cover one a mere 20 metres square with a copper-mesh Faraday cage the firm charges €300,000 ($400,000).
Shielding buildings may soon become less expensive than that. At least two groups of scientists—one at the National Research Council Canada and the other at Global Contour, a firm in Texas—are developing electrically conductive cement that will block electromagnetic pulses. Global Contour’s mixture, which includes fibres of steel and carbon, as well as a special ingredient that the firm will not disclose, would add only $20 to the $150 per cubic metre, or thereabouts, which ordinary concrete costs.
The arms race to protect small vehicles and buildings against electromagnetic warfare, then, has already begun. Protecting ships, however, requires lateral thinking. For obvious reasons, they cannot be encased in concrete. And building a conventional Faraday cage round a naval vessel would be horribly expensive.
Daniel Tam, of the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command in San Diego, thinks he has a way to get round that. He proposes to use the electrical conductivity of the sodium and chloride ions in seawater to create a novel type of Faraday cage. A shroud of seawater around a ship, thrown up by special pumps and hoses if the vessel came under electromagnetic attack, would do the trick, he reckons.
It is an ambitious idea. Whether it works or not, it shows how much the nature of modern belligerency is changing. Bombs and bullets will always have their place, of course. But the thought that a cold shower could protect a ship from attack is almost surreal.
from the print edition | Science and technology
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"We had been told, on leaving our native soil, that we were going to defend the sacred rights conferred on us by so many of our citizens settled overseas, so many years of our presence, so many benefits brought by us to populations in need of our assistance and our civilization.
We were able to verify that all this was true, and, because it was true, we did not hesitate to shed our quota of blood, to sacrifice our youth and our hopes. We regretted nothing, but whereas we over here are inspired by this frame of mind, I am told that in Rome factions and conspiracies are rife, that treachery flourishes and that many people in their uncertainty and confusion lend a ready ear to the dire temptations of relinquishment and vilify our action.
I cannot believe that all this is true and yet recent wars have shown how pernicious such a state of mind could be and to where it could lead.
Make haste to reassure me, I beg you, and tell me that our fellow citizens understand us, support us and protect us as we ourselves are protecting the glory of the Republic.
If it should be otherwise, if we should have to leave our bleached bones in these desert sands in vain, then beware of the anger of the Legions."
Marcus Flavinius
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I'm not real wild about the WSJ putting this out there for millions of eyeballs , , ,
===================================================
By ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH
Nearly 60 years ago the classic television documentary series "Victory at Sea" first recounted the U.S. Navy's exploits during World War II. Several episodes highlighted the Battle of the Atlantic against German submarines that were waging guerrilla war at sea. Their objective: destroy allied cargo ships providing an economic lifeline from America to Britain.
The German submarines pursued a form of warfare known as commerce raiding, attacking the enemy's economic assets at sea. The U.S., British and Canadian navies won the Battle of the Atlantic, thanks to their use of convoys and exploitation of advances in antisubmarine warfare technology and tactics—but only after suffering horrendous losses in blood and treasure.
At war's end, the United States emerged as far and away the world's predominant naval power. Since then the U.S. commitment to providing unfettered access to the world's seas to all nations has enabled an era of economic globalization and growth.
Memories of a time when access to the seas was not guaranteed have faded. Yet much has changed in the past 60 years. Two developments in particular suggest a growing need for the United States and other peaceful nations to begin thinking anew about how to defend their maritime commerce, albeit under very different circumstances.
The first development is the emergence of an undersea economy. Two years after World War II, in 1947, the first offshore discovery of oil out of sight of land occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. Today nearly 30% of U.S. oil production and 15% of gas production is produced from wells on the Outer Continental Shelf. Globally, some 30% of the world's oil output comes from offshore production.
An enormous amount of capital investment has gone into creating this undersea energy infrastructure. This includes the oil platforms that drill, extract and temporarily store oil and gas, as well as the oil and gas wellheads, pipelines and pumps required to transfer the product from its undersea location to shore.
This vast infrastructure was built with the assumption that while it would have to weather natural disasters, it would not be a target in war. In military parlance, much of the infrastructure comprises "soft" targets that would not require much in the way of explosives to cause significant, and perhaps catastrophic, damage. Fortunately many of these targets have not been easy to reach—until now.
This brings us to the second development: the diffusion of military technology and weaponry that can threaten the undersea economy with a new form of commerce raiding.
In recent years, Latin-American narco-cartels have begun moving their cargo by submarine. While not even remotely in a class with the U.S. Navy's submarines, these simple boats are nevertheless capable of operating undersea in littoral waters while moving tons of cocaine. They have a range of up to 2,000 miles and cost but a few million dollars to build. These submarines can submerge to depths of a few dozen feet, which is sufficient to make detection difficult, allowing them to approach offshore oil platforms with little or no warning.
Even more disturbing is the proliferation of unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs, which were once almost exclusively operated by Western militaries. With the growth of the undersea economy, civilian development and production took off in the 1980s. UUVs are now widely used for a variety of commercial and scientific purposes.
These UUVs are perhaps best known for their role in locating sunken ships. Unlike the small submarines operated by narco-cartels, UUVs can descend to the ocean floor. If adapted for military purposes, they could carry mines and other explosives, as well as cameras and electronic sensors. They are also becoming cheaper, with a wide variety of systems available for sale in the private sector.
Then there are naval mines, now manufactured in more than 30 countries. Some producers, like Russia, are developing mines with better sensors, target-recognition systems, stealthy coatings, and self-propulsion systems to enable them to move about. But mines don't need to be sophisticated to be effective, especially against the thousands of soft targets populating the continental shelf.
While narco-cartels are interested in making money, not war, this is not the case with radical nonstate entities or their state sponsors. Some groups, including al Qaeda, seek to achieve victory not by defeating their enemies on the battlefield but by inflicting unacceptable pain or damage, either against defenseless civilians or economic infrastructure. Toward this end, radical Islamists have undertaken attacks, employing far less sophisticated means and with minimal success, on an oil tanker in the Gulf of Aden in October 2002 and Saudi oil production facilities in February 2006. Should the U.S. find itself in a confrontation with Iran, it might employ proxies to achieve similar ends.
For a relatively small effort on their part, in short, America's enemies could potentially impose enormous costs on its undersea economy, including loss of energy resources, damaged infrastructure and environmental degradation.
This nascent threat to America's undersea energy assets demands attention before it arrives on the nation's doorstep. The Department of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Defense Department, should explore the cost and feasibility of options for defending the undersea energy economy, so they can move quickly to build a defensive shield if the need arises. The intelligence community should monitor the threat by focusing on the proliferation of undersea means of attack, especially as it pertains to radical nonstate entities. On the diplomatic front, efforts should be made to engage in this effort friendly states that have significant undersea energy assets of their own, such as Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway and the United Kingdom.
Given the stakes involved, just as the U.S. and its allies developed the forces, capabilities and methods needed to defend their economic assets at sea during the Battle of the Atlantic, a similar effort is needed now with respect to America's undersea economic interests. The alternative is to hope for the best—and hope is not a strategy.
Mr. Krepinevich is president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
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GM, the article I meant was the one about the stuff visible from outer space-Marc
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GM, the article I meant was the one about the stuff visible from outer space-Marc
I thought that was a strange place for the economic article.....
http://gizmodo.com/5859081/why-is-china-building-these-gigantic-structures-in-the-middle-of-the-desert
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/8927580/China-hiding-up-to-3000-nuclear-warheads-in-secret-tunnels.html
China 'hiding up to 3,000 nuclear warheads in secret tunnels'
An unconventional project by US university students has concluded that China's nuclear arsenal could be many times larger than current estimates, drawing the attention of Pentagon analysts.
9:23AM GMT 01 Dec 2011
The Washington Post reported on Tuesday that Georgetown University students under the instruction of a former Pentagon official have assembled the largest body of public knowledge yet about a vast network of secret tunnels dug by China's secretive Second Artillery Corps, responsible for nuclear warheads.
The 363-page study has not yet been published, but has already sparked a congressional hearing and been circulated among top US defence officials, including the Air Force vice chief of staff, the Post reported.
"It's not quite a bombshell, but those thoughts and estimates are being checked against what people think they know based on classified information," it quoted an unnamed Defense Department strategist as saying.
The newspaper said critics of the report had questioned the students methods, which included using internet-based sources like Google Earth, blogs, military journals and even a fictionalised Chinese TV show.
But the Post also said the students were able to obtain a 400-page manual produced by the Second Artillery and usually only available to Chinese military personnel.
The students' professor, Phillip Karber, 65, spent the Cold War as a top strategist reporting directly to the secretary of defence and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Post said.
Karber said that – based on the study of the tunnels – China could have up to 3,000 nuclear warheads, far higher than the current estimates, which range from 80 to 400, according to the Post.
US officials could not immediately be reached to comment on the report.
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I'm sure we've all seen the reports about one of our very best drones being captured by Iran. Apparently this is VERY bad, the reverse engineering possibilities (to be shared with the Chinese no doubt and perhaps the Russians too) are terrible.
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Dispatch: The Chinese Navy's Possible Port of Call in the Seychelles
December 12, 2011 | 2304 GMT
Click on image below to watch video:
Vice President of Strategic Analysis Rodger Baker discusses the Chinese dilemma over the use of a port in the Seychelles.
VIDEO TRANSCRIPT:
Related Links
• China Prepares for the U.S. Re-Engagement in Asia
China’s Ministry of National Defense said Dec. 12 that the Chinese navy may use ports in the Seychelles, or other countries, as ports of call for ongoing counter-piracy missions and for future deployments. The comments follow an invitation from the Seychelles for China to use the island nation’s ports and to establish a military presence on the main island of Mahe, already a regular port of call for the United States and other nation’s warships and military aircraft such as U.S. UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] and French maritime surveillance aircraft.
China’s response highlights a continuing debate inside the PLA [People’s Liberation Army] regarding overseas basing. The PLAN [People’s Liberation Army Navy] has been participating in counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the east coast of Africa since December 2008. Supplying and maintaining these ships at a distance has been a test of the Chinese navy’s capacity for extended deployment. As part of the resupply, China has used several ports in the region, primarily Salalah in Oman, but also Aden, Djibouti and Karachi. Resupplying from the Seychelles would mark a further expansion of the range of China’s PLAN deployments, and would be the furthest of the resupply ports from the current anti-piracy operations.
Beijing arranges what are essentially ad hoc agreements to use friendly ports and facilities, avoiding the diplomatic agreements necessary to allow more established and enduring access to the facilities for the Chinese navy. This is largely due to the Chinese government’s stated non-interference policies and its attempts to shape the international image of Chinese overseas military operations as purely defensive and cooperative and thus non-threatening.
But this can bring China’s public image in contention with military necessity. The ad hoc arrangements have been effective thus far, but it leaves Chinese long-distance maritime operations without the means to establish more robust and reliable access and facilities, particularly in terms of forward maintenance and rearmament. For now, this appears to be a risk China is willing to take, using its political and economic leverage to ensure basic access for refueling without the formal diplomatic agreements for extended port use by the PLAN and particularly the facilities that a sustained forward presence requires. But as China continues to expand the range and role of its naval forces, this question of overseas basing agreements will intensify.
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Exclusive: Iran hijacked US drone, says Iranian engineer
In an exclusive interview, an engineer working to unlock the secrets of the captured RQ-170 Sentinel says they exploited a known vulnerability and tricked the US drone into landing in Iran.
By Scott Peterson, Payam Faramarzi* | Christian Science Monitor – 11 hrs agoEmail
Iran guided the CIA's "lost" stealth drone to an intact landing inside hostile territory by exploiting a navigational weakness long-known to the US military, according to an Iranian engineer now working on the captured drone's systems inside Iran.
Iranian electronic warfare specialists were able to cut off communications links of the American bat-wing RQ-170 Sentinel, says the engineer, who works for one of many Iranian military and civilian teams currently trying to unravel the drone’s stealth and intelligence secrets, and who could not be named for his safety.
Using knowledge gleaned from previous downed American drones and a technique proudly claimed by Iranian commanders in September, the Iranian specialists then reconfigured the drone's GPS coordinates to make it land in Iran at what the drone thought was its actual home base in Afghanistan.
"The GPS navigation is the weakest point," the Iranian engineer told the Monitor, giving the most detailed description yet published of Iran's "electronic ambush" of the highly classified US drone. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain."
The “spoofing” technique that the Iranians used – which took into account precise landing altitudes, as well as latitudinal and longitudinal data – made the drone “land on its own where we wanted it to, without having to crack the remote-control signals and communications” from the US control center, says the engineer.
The revelations about Iran's apparent electronic prowess come as the US, Israel, and some European nations appear to be engaged in an ever-widening covert war with Iran, which has seen assassinations of Iranian nuclear scientists, explosions at Iran's missile and industrial facilities, and the Stuxnet computer virus that set back Iran’s nuclear program.
Now this engineer’s account of how Iran took over one of America’s most sophisticated drones suggests Tehran has found a way to hit back. The techniques were developed from reverse-engineering several less sophisticated American drones captured or shot down in recent years, the engineer says, and by taking advantage of weak, easily manipulated GPS signals, which calculate location and speed from multiple satellites.
Western military experts and a number of published papers on GPS spoofing indicate that the scenario described by the Iranian engineer is plausible.
"Even modern combat-grade GPS [is] very susceptible” to manipulation, says former US Navy electronic warfare specialist Robert Densmore, adding that it is “certainly possible” to recalibrate the GPS on a drone so that it flies on a different course. “I wouldn't say it's easy, but the technology is there.”
In 2009, Iran-backed Shiite militants in Iraq were found to have downloaded live, unencrypted video streams from American Predator drones with inexpensive, off-the-shelf software. But Iran’s apparent ability now to actually take control of a drone is far more significant.
Iran asserted its ability to do this in September, as pressure mounted over its nuclear program.
Gen. Moharam Gholizadeh, the deputy for electronic warfare at the air defense headquarters of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), described to Fars News how Iran could alter the path of a GPS-guided missile – a tactic more easily applied to a slower-moving drone.
“We have a project on hand that is one step ahead of jamming, meaning ‘deception’ of the aggressive systems,” said Gholizadeh, such that “we can define our own desired information for it so the path of the missile would change to our desired destination.”
Gholizadeh said that “all the movements of these [enemy drones]” were being watched, and “obstructing” their work was “always on our agenda.”
That interview has since been pulled from Fars’ Persian-language website. And last month, the relatively young Gholizadeh died of a heart attack, which some Iranian news sites called suspicious – suggesting the electronic warfare expert may have been a casualty in the covert war against Iran.
Iran's growing electronic capabilities
Iranian lawmakers say the drone capture is a "great epic" and claim to be "in the final steps of breaking into the aircraft's secret code."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta told Fox News on Dec. 13 that the US will "absolutely" continue the drone campaign over Iran, looking for evidence of any nuclear weapons work. But the stakes are higher for such surveillance, now that Iran can apparently disrupt the work of US drones.
US officials skeptical of Iran’s capabilities blame a malfunction, but so far can't explain how Iran acquired the drone intact. One American analyst ridiculed Iran’s capability, telling Defense News that the loss was “like dropping a Ferrari into an ox-cart technology culture.”
Yet Iran’s claims to the contrary resonate more in light of new details about how it brought down the drone – and other markers that signal growing electronic expertise.
A former senior Iranian official who asked not to be named said: "There are a lot of human resources in Iran.... Iran is not like Pakistan."
“Technologically, our distance from the Americans, the Zionists, and other advanced countries is not so far to make the downing of this plane seem like a dream for us … but it could be amazing for others,” deputy IRGC commander Gen. Hossein Salami said this week.
According to a European intelligence source, Iran shocked Western intelligence agencies in a previously unreported incident that took place sometime in the past two years, when it managed to “blind” a CIA spy satellite by “aiming a laser burst quite accurately.”
More recently, Iran was able to hack Google security certificates, says the engineer. In September, the Google accounts of 300,000 Iranians were made accessible by hackers. The targeted company said "circumstantial evidence" pointed to a "state-driven attack" coming from Iran, meant to snoop on users.
Cracking the protected GPS coordinates on the Sentinel drone was no more difficult, asserts the engineer.
US knew of GPS systems' vulnerability
Use of drones has become more risky as adversaries like Iran hone countermeasures. The US military has reportedly been aware of vulnerabilities with pirating unencrypted drone data streams since the Bosnia campaign in the mid-1990s.
Top US officials said in 2009 that they were working to encrypt all drone data streams in Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan – after finding militant laptops loaded with days' worth of data in Iraq – and acknowledged that they were "subject to listening and exploitation."
Perhaps as easily exploited are the GPS navigational systems upon which so much of the modern military depends.
"GPS signals are weak and can be easily outpunched [overridden] by poorly controlled signals from television towers, devices such as laptops and MP3 players, or even mobile satellite services," Andrew Dempster, a professor from the University of New South Wales School of Surveying and Spatial Information Systems, told a March conference on GPS vulnerability in Australia.
"This is not only a significant hazard for military, industrial, and civilian transport and communication systems, but criminals have worked out how they can jam GPS," he says.
The US military has sought for years to fortify or find alternatives to the GPS system of satellites, which are used for both military and civilian purposes. In 2003, a “Vulnerability Assessment Team” at Los Alamos National Laboratory published research explaining how weak GPS signals were easily overwhelmed with a stronger local signal.
“A more pernicious attack involves feeding the GPS receiver fake GPS signals so that it believes it is located somewhere in space and time that it is not,” reads the Los Alamos report. “In a sophisticated spoofing attack, the adversary would send a false signal reporting the moving target’s true position and then gradually walk the target to a false position.”
The vulnerability remains unresolved, and a paper presented at a Chicago communications security conference in October laid out parameters for successful spoofing of both civilian and military GPS units to allow a "seamless takeover" of drones or other targets.
To “better cope with hostile electronic attacks,” the US Air Force in late September awarded two $47 million contracts to develop a "navigation warfare" system to replace GPS on aircraft and missiles, according to the Defense Update website.
Official US data on GPS describes "the ongoing GPS modernization program" for the Air Force, which "will enhance the jam resistance of the military GPS service, making it more robust."
Why the drone's underbelly was damaged
Iran's drone-watching project began in 2007, says the Iranian engineer, and then was stepped up and became public in 2009 – the same year that the RQ-170 was first deployed in Afghanistan with what were then state-of-the-art surveillance systems.
In January, Iran said it had shot down two conventional (nonstealth) drones, and in July, Iran showed Russian experts several US drones – including one that had been watching over the underground uranium enrichment facility at Fordo, near the holy city of Qom.
In capturing the stealth drone this month at Kashmar, 140 miles inside northeast Iran, the Islamic Republic appears to have learned from two years of close observation.
Iran displayed the drone on state-run TV last week, with a dent in the left wing and the undercarriage and landing gear hidden by anti-American banners.
The Iranian engineer explains why: "If you look at the location where we made it land and the bird's home base, they both have [almost] the same altitude," says the Iranian engineer. "There was a problem [of a few meters] with the exact altitude so the bird's underbelly was damaged in landing; that's why it was covered in the broadcast footage."
Prior to the disappearance of the stealth drone earlier this month, Iran’s electronic warfare capabilities were largely unknown – and often dismissed.
"We all feel drunk [with happiness] now," says the Iranian engineer. "Have you ever had a new laptop? Imagine that excitement multiplied many-fold." When the Revolutionary Guard first recovered the drone, they were aware it might be rigged to self-destruct, but they "were so excited they could not stay away."
* Scott Peterson, the Monitor's Middle East correspondent, wrote this story with an Iranian journalist who publishes under the pen name Payam Faramarzi and cannot be further identified for security reasons.
P.C.
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I repeat my accusation of vaginitis in the Commander in Chief's failure to destroy or retrieve the drone. :x :x :x
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THE SQUARE AXIS: CUBA//IRAN/IRAQ/CHINA
By Manuel Cereijo
IRAN
Dr. Miyar Barruecos, El Chomi. Dr. Luis Herrera. Cuba and Iran.
Since 1990, Cuba and Iran have cooperated in the development of weapons of massive destruction. Dr. Miyar Barruecos, physician, very close to Castro, has been the force behind the throne in this alliance. Dr. Luis Herrera, from the CIGB, and one of the main scientists in the development of the CIGB and the biological weapon programs in Cuba, has been the operator, the facilitator, in the massive and huge cooperation between Cuba and Iran.
Cuba just finished, May 2001, the construction of a Biotechnology Center in Teheran. Cuba served as the source of technology, selling of equipment, and project management for the Center.
Iran has bought the best fruits of the CIGB, recombinant protein production technologies in yeast and Escherichia coli, as well as the large scale purification protocols for both soluble and insoluble proteins synthesized in or excreted by them.Iran can use these technologies to create bioweapons of massive destruction.
Iran, with Cuba's assistance, is capable of producing the bacteria known as Pseudomonas. The pathogen is not usually lethal to humans, however, produces partial paralysis for a period of time, and therefore but is an excellent battlefield weapon.
Sprayed from a single airplane flying over enemy lines, it can immobilized an entire division or incapacitate special forces hiding in rugged terrain otherwise inaccessible to regular army troops-precisely the kind of terrain in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and similar terrorist regions.
Besides Cuban scientists, at least there are about ten scientists from the Biopreparat Russian Center working in Iran. The New York Times reported in December 1998 that the Iranian government dispatched a few scientific advisors attached to the office of the presidency in Moscow to recruit former scientists from the Russian program.
In May, 1997, more than one hundred scientists from Russian laboratories, including Vector and Obolensk, attended a Biotechnology Trade Fair in Teheran. Iranians visited Vector, In Russia, a number of times, and had been actively promoting exchanges. A vial of freeze-dried powder takes up less space than a pack of cigarettes and is easy to smuggle past an inattentive security guard.
The Soviet Union spent decades building institutes and training centers in Iran and Cuba. For many years, the Soviet Union organized courses in genetic engineering and molecular biology for scientists from Cuba and Iran. Some forty scientists from both countries were trained annually.
In 1997 Russia was reported to be negotiating a lucrative deal with Iran and Cuba for the sale of cultivation equipment including fermenters, reactors, and air purifying machinery.
A report submitted by the U.S. Office of Technological Assessment to hearings at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in late 1995 identified 17 countries believed to possess biological weapons. Among them: Cuba and Iran.
The Cuba/Iran alliance posses a real threat to the national security of the United States.
IRAQ
Dr. Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra. The main coordinator of the alliance.
Viruses and bacteria can be obtained from more than fifteen hundred microbe banks around the world. The international scientific community depends on this network for medical research and for the exchange of information vital to the fight against disease.
According to American biowarfare experts, Iraq obtained some of its most lethal strains of anthrax from the American Type Culture Collection in Rockville, Maryland, one of the world's largest libraries of microorganisms. For $35 they also pick up strains of tularemia and Venezuelan equine encephalitis, once targeted for weaponization at Fort Detrick, United States.
Iraq was also given by the CDC the West Nile virus in the late 1980s. At the same type, the CDC gave Cuba the St. Louis encephalitis virus, very similar to the West Nile virus. Since the 1980s, Cuba and Iraq established very close relations. This was partially due to Dr. Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra, a well known orthopedic surgeon, who has operated on Hussein's knee, and also has treated other members of his family, including one of his sons.
By early 1990s, Iraq had provided Cuba with anthrax, for its further development. A report submitted by the U.S. Office of Technological Assessment to hearings at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in late 1995 identified seventeen countries believed to posses biological weapons-Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Iraq, Taiwan, Syria, Israel, China, Egypt, Vietnam, Laos Bulgaria, India, South Africa, Russia, and Cuba.
At the time Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, defected in 1995, he not only denounced Iraq activities in these weapons of massive destruction, but also the close relationship of Iraq, first with the former Soviet Union, and presently with Cuba. Yury Kalinin , one of the most important persons in Russia's biological development, visited Cuba in 1990 to establish in Cuba the Biocen, a Center very similar to Russia's Biopreparat. He acknowledged at the time, the involvement of Cuba in biological weapon development. Some 25 Cuban scientists were periodically trained in the Soviet Union from 1986 to 1992.
Furthermore, Cuba has advanced tremendously in the area of nano-technology, an essential tool in the development of bio-weapons, and computer related technology. Fidel Castro Diaz Balart, Castro's oldest son, and former head of Cuba's nuclear program, visited India and Iraq to strengthen collaboration on this vital area.
Castro visited the Jawaharlal Nehru Center for Advanced Scientific Research (JNCASSR) in October, 2000. Cuba and India agreed in collaboration on areas like biotechnology, tropical medicine, nano technology and computational technology.
Prof. V. Krishnan, JNCASR President said Cuba had tremendous advancement in biotechnology and nanotechnology. After his visit to India. Castro Diaz Balart visited Iraq and Iran.
The Cuba/Iraq cooperation is the most important threat faced by the United States in this fight against terrorism.
CHINA
The fall of communism has not reduced the level or amount of espionage and other serious intelligence activity conducted against the United States. The targets have not changed at all: there is still a deadly serious foreign interest, and mainly from the new China/Cuba consortium, in traditional intelligence activities such as penetrating the U.S. intelligence community, collecting classified information on U.S. military defense systems, and purloining the latest advances in the nation's science and technology sector.
There is also a growing importance in maintaining the integrity of the country;s information infrastructure. Our growing dependence on computer networks and telecommunications has made the U.S. increasingly vulnerable to possible cyber attacks against such targets as military war rooms, power plants, telephone networks, air traffic control centers and banks. China and Cuba have increased their cooperation in this area through the Bejucal base in Cuba, as well as in Wajay (near Bejucal), and Santiago de Cuba. On these bases they use technologically sophisticated equipment, as well as new intelligence methodologies that makes it more difficult, or impossible for U.S. intelligence agencies to monitor or detect.
The international terrorism threat can be divided into three general categories. Each poses a serious and distinct threat, and each has a presence already in the United States. The most important category is the state sponsored threat. This category, according to the FBI, includes the following countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Lybia, Cuba, North Korea. Put simply, these nations view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. In view of this list, we need to evaluate the recent trip made by Fidel Castro.
There are three main areas of concern for us in the new and dangerous axis formed by China and Cuba: radio frequency weapons, computer technology, missile capabilities. The problem with the Chinese Cuban rapprochement is that it is driven by by mutual hostility towards the United States.
Radio frequency weapons are a new radical class of weapons. Radio frequency weapons can utilize either high energy radio frequency (HERF), or low energy radio frequency(LERF) technology. HERF is advanced technology. It is based on concentrating large amounts of RF EM energy in within a small space, narrow frequency range, and a very short period of time. The result is an overpowering RF EM impulse capable of causing substantial damage to electronic components.
LERF utilizes relatively low energy, which is spread over a wide frequency spectrum. It can be no less effective in disrupting normal functioning of computers as HERF due to the wider range of frequencies it occupies. LERF does not require time compression neither high tech components. LERF impact on computers and computer networks could be devastating. The computer would go into a random output mode, that is, it is impossible to predict what the computer would do. A back up computer will not solve the problem either. One example of LERF use was the KGB's manipulation of the United States Embassy security system in Moscow in the late 80s.
Worldwide proliferation in RF weapons has increased dramatically in the last five years. The collapse of the Soviet Union is probably the most significant factor contributing to this increase in attention and concern about proliferation. The KGB has split into independent parts. One of them is referred to as FAPSI. It has been partially privatized. Spin-off companies have been created, with very attractive golden parachutes for the high officers. FAPSI, or its spin-off companies have been heavily involved in China and Cuba in RF technology, as well as computer technology.
China, PRC, has stolen design information on the United States most advanced thermonuclear weapons. The stolen information includes classified information on:
Seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal
Classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb), which neither the USA , nor any other country has yet deployed
Classified information on state of the art reentry vehicles, and warheads, such as the W-88, a miniaturized, tapered warhead, which is the most sophisticated nuclear weapon the United States has ever built.
These and other classified information have been obtained in the last 20 years. However, the now presence in Cuba, with the use of the Bejucal base, and the proximity to the United States, makes the China/Cuba new axis a very serious threat to this nation. In 1993, a Cuban nuclear engineer, and high officer of the Cuban Intelligence military apparatus, was awarded a one year stance at Sandia National Labs, Albuquerque, doing research on Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. The officer is, since 1999, in exile in the United States.
The PRC has acquired also technology on high performance computers(HPC). HPCs are needed for the design and testing of advanced nuclear weapons. The PRC has targeted the U.S. nuclear test data for espionage collection. This can be accomplished through the facilities in Cuba.
China'new venture in Cuba will:
Enhance China's military capability
Jeopardize U.S. national security interests
Pose a direct threat to the United States
END
Manuel Cereijo
INGMCA@aol.com
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P.C.
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Newt Gingrich's rise in the polls has brought attention to his various "big ideas," and plenty of derision from other GOP Presidential hopefuls and the media. Among the most undeserved targets is the former Speaker's concern about an electromagnetic pulse (or EMP) attack.
In speeches and articles over many years, Mr. Gingrich has sounded the alarm about this vulnerability. A single nuclear explosion high in the Earth's atmosphere would create an electromagnetic pulse that could do enormous harm by destroying electronic circuits on the ground. "Such an event would destroy our complex, delicate high tech digital society in an instant and throw all our lives back to an existence equal to that of the Middle Ages," he wrote in an introduction to "One Second After," a 2009 science-fiction novel by William Forstchen. He has returned to this theme during the campaign.
The usual media suspects have recently run skeptical stories on his "doomsday vision" and "silly science." They claim that terrorists aren't close to getting a nuclear weapon and that no country would dare try an EMP attack. But then few imagined a terror attack using airplanes against the twin towers or anthrax in letters.
A single nuclear weapon detonated above the U.S. might not kill anyone immediately. But in the worst case millions could subsequently die from a lack of modern medical care or possibly food, since farmers couldn't harvest crops nor distributors get food to market. Access to drinking water could be cut if many of America's dams, reservoirs and water-treatment facilities were shut down. The U.S. would also then be more exposed to a secondary attack by conventional weapons.
These scenarios aren't Mr. Gingrich's inventions. They come from a commission created by Congress in 2000. In a 2008 report, the commission called EMP "one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at risk of catastrophic consequences."
Mr. Gingrich deserves credit for bringing EMP to public attention. The commission recommended better intelligence, especially in coastal waters from which a Scud missile with a nuke could be launched, robust missile defenses, and hardened protection for the civilian electrical power grid. Denial of EMP, or scorn for the messenger, offers no protection.
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http://www.cnn.com/2011/12/15/tech/innovation/darpa-future-war/index.html
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Pasting here BBG's post for purposes of future reference:
First time I've encountered this source; his CV is certainly interesting. I'm no slouch when it comes to making a desktop computer do my bidding, but my kids multitask digitally in manners that amaze me: they keep a lot of different balls in the air while still working on a primary task, often gaming. This gent thinks they might have what it takes to be a next generation war fighter:
The Future of Drone Warfare
Over half of Air Force UPT (undergraduate pilot training) grads are now assigned to pilot drones rather than a real aircraft.* The big question is why are drone pilots, guys that fly robots remotely from a computer terminal, going to a very expensive year of pilot training? I can understand why the Air Force has chosen to send drone jockeys to pilot training:
A shift to piloting drones rather than real aircraft is an assault on organizational culture of the Air Force. In the Air Force, pilots do the fighting and as a result take most of the leadership positions.
A transition to robotics upends that arrangement, and is why the USAF has strenuously resisted taking control of the drone mission until recently.
In this light, sending these drone jockeys to a very expensive year of UPT is an attempt to ease the cultural transition.
However, culture aside, is it the best training?
Drone Pilots Today
I suspect it isn't. Here's why. The assumption that combat with drones is going to be the same as combat without them is flawed. It's going to be VERY different. So far, it's hard to see that. Most engagements today involve:
a drone flying leisurely over a village in Pakistan controlled by a pilot at a terminal in Las Vegas/Nellis,
waiting for five or more armed men to assemble in a single house (which is a terrorist "signature" that green lights authorization to eliminate the threat), and
then pushing a button and holding a cursor over the house until it disappears.
That's not going to last long.
Drone Combat
How does the addition of drones change the nature of combat/conflict? Why? The tech is moving too fast. Here are some of the characteristics we'll see in the near future:
Swarms. The cost and size of drones will shrink. Nearly everyone will have access to drone tech (autopilots already cost less than $30). Further, the software to enable drones to employ swarm behavior will improve. So, don't think in terms of a single drone. Think in terms of a single person controlling hundreds and thousands.
Intelligence. Drones will be smarter than they are today. The average commercial chip passed the level of insect intelligence a little less than a decade ago (which "magically" resulted in an explosion of drone/bot tech). Chips will cross rat intelligence in 2018 or so. Think in terms of each drone being smart enough to follow tactical instructions.
Dynamism. The combination of massive swarms with individual elements being highly intelligent puts combat on an entirely new level. It requires a warrior that can provide tactical guidance and situational awareness in real time at a level that is beyond current training paradigms.
Training Drone Bonjwas
Based on the above requirements, the best training for drones (in the air and on land) isn't real world training, it's tactical games (not first person shooters). Think in terms of the classic military scifi book, "Ender's Game" by Orson Scott Card. Of the games currently on the market, the best example of the type of expertise required is Blizzard's StarCraft, a scifi tactical management game that has amazing multiplayer tactical balance/dynamism. The game is extremely popular worldwide, but in South Korea, it has reached cult status. The best players, called Bonjwas, are treated like rock stars, and for good reason:
Training of hand/eye/mind. Speeds of up to 400 keyboard mouse (macro/micro) tactical commands per minute have been attained. Think about that for a second. That's nearly 7 commands a second.
Fight multi-player combat simulations for 10-12 hours a day. They live the game for a decade and then burn out. Mind vs. mind competition continously.
To become a bonjwa, you have to defeat millions of opponents to reach the tournament rank, and then dominate the tournament rank for many years. The ranking system/ladder that farms new talent is global (Korea, China, SEA, North America, and Europe), huge (millions of players), and continuous (24x7x365).
Currently, the best Starcraft bonjwa in the world is Flash. Here's his ELO rating.
Nearly all of the above would likely apply to cyber warfare too.
http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/globalguerrillas/2011/12/drone-bonjwas.html
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Russia test-fires two new nuclear missiles
Reuters – 12 hrs ago
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia successfully tested on Friday its two new Bulava intercontinental missiles, which experienced several failures in the past.
The Defence Ministry said the 12-meter-long Bulava, or Mace, which Moscow aims to make the cornerstone of its nuclear arsenal, was fired from a submarine in the Arctic White Sea and hit the target, a designated polygon, on Kamchatka peninsula in Russia's far east.
"The launch was carried out from (the submarine in) submerged position in the White Sea," ministry spokesman Igor Konashenkov was quoted by state-run RIA news agency as saying. "Its warheads reached the polygon (target) on time."
The missiles carry dummies rather than nuclear warheads as Russia is a signatory of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which bans all nuclear explosions.
The Bulava had failed half of its previous trials, calling into question the expensive missile program. The previous launch in June from the same submarine was a success though.
A Bulava missile weighs 36.8 tonnes and can travel a distance of 8,000 km (5,000) miles carrying 6-10 nuclear warheads, which would deliver an impact of up to 100 times the atomic blast that devastated Hiroshima in 1945.
(Reporting by Alexei Anishchuk; Editing by Matthew Jones)
P.C.
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Report: Russian spy chief joins nuclear missile firm
General ran secretive military intelligence service which boasts agents across the globe
By Guy Faulconbridge
MOSCOW — Russia's military intelligence chief has left his post at the helm of the country's biggest spying agency to join a company that develops nuclear missiles, Kommersant newspaper reported on Saturday.
Citing sources, Kommersant said General Alexander Shlyakhturov, who was appointed by President Dmitry Medvedev in April 2009, had left his role as head of GRU military intelligence service to head the board of OAO Korporatsiya MIT.
Known by its Russian acronym GRU, the military intelligence service has agents spread across the globe. It is so secretive that it does not have a spokesman or website. The Defense Ministry declined to comment.
Story: Who owns 69 Patriot missiles seized in Finland?
Kommersant did not give a reason for Shlyakhturov's departure from GRU and it was not immediately clear if he had resigned or was merely being moved to keep a closer eye on the development of Russia's nuclear missiles, the cornerstone of Russia's defense capability.
Quality concerns
The failed launch of a military satellite which crashed into Siberia on Friday and a host of failures with a new generation, submarine-launched Bulava missile, has stoked concerns within the military about the quality of Russia's strategic missiles.
OAO Korporatsiya MIT develops missiles including the Bulava, which Russia test-fired successfully on Friday . Half of previous trials have failed.
The top brass of GRU has opposed Kremlin-backed military reforms in the past, leading to the dismissal of Shlyakhturov's predecessor, General Valentin Korabelnikov. However, Shlyakhturov is seen as an ally of Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who has cut servicemen and reorganized the command structure of the armed forces. The spy service, created in 1918 under revolutionary leader Leon Trotsky, answers to the chief of the general staff, one of the three people who control Russia's portable nuclear arsenal. Unlike the Soviet-era KGB secret police, GRU was not split up when the Soviet Union collapsed.
P.C.
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By JOSHUA FLYNN-BROWN
AND KYNDRA MILLER ROTUNDA
During the holiday season, Americans especially remember our servicemen and women deployed to faraway lands, serving in harm's way. We send packages abroad, light candles in their honor, and donate toys for military tots. However, what really matters is how we treat them when they come home. Sadly, we don't always treat them well.
A case in point: This holiday season, the Air Force has "separated" (that is, fired) 157 officers on the eve of their retirement, including pilots flying dangerous missions, to avoid paying their pensions. According to Department of Defense Instructions, those within six years of their 20-year retirement (with no disciplinary blemishes on their record) have the option to remain in service. Nevertheless, the Air Force is committing terminations of airmen a few years away from retirement en masse, citing budget constraints.
While budget constraints affect the entire Department of Defense, the other services have found other ways to pinch pennies. Air Force Secretary Michael Donley stands alone on this one. We represent many of these airmen, all of them with stellar records.
Maj. Kale Mosley is one example. He is an Air Force Academy graduate and a pilot who has flown more than 250 combat missions. He deployed to Libya this summer with 30 hours notice. When he returned, the military immediately sent him to Iraq. Just as he was boarding the plane for Iraq, the Air Force gave him his walking papers, effective Nov. 30. Maj. Mosley will not receive a pension or long-term health-care benefits for his family. He is the father of a toddler and a newborn.
In a speech before Congress urging it to pass his American Jobs Act, President Obama spoke of tax credits for companies to hire America's veterans, saying, "We ask these men and women to leave their careers, leave their families, risk their lives to fight for our country. The last thing they should have to do is fight for a job when they come home."
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta recently testified before Congress about potential changes to the Military Retirement System. He said: "We've made a promise to people who are on duty that we're going to provide a certain level of retirement. . . . These people have been deployed time and time again. They've put their lives on the line on the battlefield. And we're not going to pull the rug out from under them. We're going to stand by the promise that was made for them."
But the Air Force is pulling the rug out from under these airmen.
In fairness, the blame for this unjust situation partially rests with Congress. In the 1990s, when the military was drawing down, Congress authorized an early retirement program that allowed service members to retire with a prorated pension and benefits. But it allowed the law to expire in 2001.
Congress has proposed reinstating a similar early-retirement program within the National Defense Authorization Act, and the authorization bill is on Mr. Obama's desk. But even if the president signs the bill, it will do nothing to resolve the problem of the 157 officers who were terminated on Nov. 30.
The Air Force should reinstate the 157 airmen so that they can finish their military careers. Or Congress should simply enact a law to cover these 157 airmen.
America's heroes have our backs. Who has theirs?
Mr. Flynn-Brown is a clinical fellow in the Chapman University AMVETS Legal Clinic. Ms. Rotunda is a professor at Chapman and executive director of the university's Military Law Institute, which represents, pro bono, several of the 157 terminated airmen.
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U.S. Navy SEAL Teams from Establishment through Operation Urgent Fury: 1962-1983
To augment present naval capabilities in restricted waters and rivers with particular reference to the conduct and support of paramilitary operations, it is desirable to establish Special Operations teams as a separate component within Underwater Demolition Units One and Two. An appropriate cover name for such units is ‘SEAL’ being a contraction of SEA, AIR, LAND.” – Vice Adm. Wallace M. Beakley, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, June 5, 1961
In January 1962, a new chapter in the history of special operations opened with the establishment of the U.S. Navy’s SEAL Teams ONE and TWO. The 21-year stretch from 1962 to 1983 was a profound one for the new force, one that would see it created from the Navy’s Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) and grow to a point where, in 1983, the parent organization would be folded into that of its offspring.
Throughout this period, SEALs suffered repeated crises of perception by outsiders who controlled their institutional fate. The force labored under the contradiction of being a specialized elite force with “. an all-around universal capability.” This phrase, an excerpt from the U.S. Director, Strategic Plans Division memo dated March 13, 1961, was necessary because, as part of the U.S. Navy, SEALs had to work closely with the Navy’s surface, aviation, and submarine forces. A further complication was the fact that the SEAL program itself was caught squarely in the philosophical cross fire between naval traditionalists and advocates of change during the post-Vietnam War drawdown of the military, with all the budgetary consequences thereof. During their formative years, the Navy leadership seemed perplexed by the SEALs and/or didn’t know what to do with them, a situation that would not change until the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 that reorganized the military and put the U.S. Special Operations Command at the same level as the other unified and specified commands at the time.
On May 25, 1961, President John F. Kennedy, addressing a joint session of Congress, delivered a speech that most people remember as his challenge to the country to put an American on the moon before the end of the decade. Since forgotten by the public at large was the president’s mandate to the military: “I am directing the secretary of defense to expand rapidly and substantially . the orientation of existing forces for the conduct of . unconventional wars. . In addition, our special forces and unconventional warfare units will be increased and reoriented. .” Read more...
Written by: Dwight Jon Zimmerman on December 28, 2011
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By JULIAN E. BARNES
WASHINGTON—The U.S. military left Iraq in December with new technologies that are likely to change the shape of future wars. But some of the skills developed alongside are in danger of falling away, several people throughout the ranks worry.
Ten years ago, the U.S. military was firmly under the control of the generals. It was steeply hierarchical, slow to evolve and squarely focused on "big wars" between armies of opposing nations.
A decade of painstaking, often painful lessons resulted in a military that is in many ways fleeter and more adaptable. It is also flatter: The generals are still in charge, but Iraq and Afghanistan showed that independent thinking by low-level captains and lieutenants is also critical to success.
In any inventory of changes, the most obvious may be equipment. To protect soldiers from roadside bombs, the Pentagon built $45 billion worth of mine-resistant, armor-protected vehicles, the V-hulled trucks known as MRAPs. Military officials say MRAPs have saved hundreds of lives, though the hulking vehicles' utility remains unclear for future arenas.
The Pentagon also built sophisticated jammers to foil radio-detonated roadside bombs, which are likely to become standard issue against improvised explosive devices, a probable the weapon of choice in future land wars. The unmanned drones it acquired to battle insurgents have transformed how the U.S. fights wars and now is also used extensively by the Central Intelligence Agency.
View Interactive
.But the two wars have also helped push the military strategy from a playbook of offense and defense, to one that includes a third class of operations—strategies that include so-called counterterrorism and counterinsurgency, aimed at maintaining stability for populations in often-hostile zones and turning potential allies into enemies.
"It is not good enough to be proficient on the traditional military tasks we have tended to focus on in the post-Vietnam era," Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in 2007 and 2008 and now the CIA director, said in an interview earlier this month. "Very likely, conflict in the future will include a requirement for stability tasks."
Stability operations aren't popular in parts of the White House. Some administration officials see them as overly costly missions that threaten to tie down the U.S. military in long-term occupations that do little to improve American security.
Such hostility in some quarters has caused some officers to fear some of the counterinsurgency skills honed in Iraq will be lost—including running detainee operations, conducting interrogations and collecting intelligence with aerial drones, areas of high expertise that support efforts to cripple insurgent networks and head off spectacular attacks.
Others worry that the skills learned through hard years of fighting—how to react quickly to ambushes and spot IEDs before they explode—will fade. The military remade its training centers to teach such skills, but instilling the knowledge into the next generation of soldiers will require retaining senior non-commissioned officers who spent the most time hunting insurgents in Iraq.
"Those wars are going to be lost arts," said Staff Sgt. Maxwell Davis, who spent 62 months in Iraq across five tours. "The people who stay in try to teach it. But guys are getting out. So it is going to be a battle to teach what you need to do in combat to keep yourself safe."
Historians may ultimately conclude the Iraq war—some 4,500 lives lost, upwards of 30,000 wounded, more than $800 billion spent—was unacceptably costly.
With the end of the Iraq war, and beginning of the end in Afghanistan, the Pentagon has entered an era of cost cutting. The Defense Department is currently trimming some $450 billion in planned spending over the next decades with many in the military predicting more cuts to come.
Officers say they understand the need for some cuts, and to reduce the size of the military. But they say spending can be trimmed even as skills are preserved.
These people say the broader question is what sort of war the military's masters in Washington want to prepare for. They point to the years following the unconventional, anti-insurgency-style war in Vietnam. Then, the military began preparing for the kind of war it wanted to fight: a big one, possibly in Europe, with bombers, tanks and artillery.
"We came out of Vietnam and vowed never to do that again," said Marine Lt. Gen. John Kelly, who served three tours in Iraq and is now the senior military assistant to the defense secretary. "We re-armed to fight the kind of wars we liked to fight, the kind of wars we were good at—conventional, high tech. And now, here we are, with 10 years of a Vietnam-like war."
Also enticing to Washington is the other skill honed by the military in Iraq: lean, special-operations commands capable of hunting militant networks, such as the hunter-killer operation that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan earlier this year.
But there is a danger in relying only on commando raids, current and former special-operation officers say. In Iraq, it wasn't until Gen. Petraeus overhauled U.S. strategy that special-operations raids began to have a significant impact.
"We had taken an awful lot of insurgent leaders off the battlefield, but it was not enough," Gen. Petraeus said in the interview. "It was not until we also focused on securing the population by living with them, conducting major clear-hold-and-build operations and then also pursued reconciliation, that security improved."
The Petraeus strategy pushed soldiers like Sgt. Davis off the big bases and in to tiny outposts inside Iraq neighborhoods, which slowly improved security enough that Iraqi citizens began to turn their back on militias and insurgent groups. But it required large numbers of personnel, outlays of cash for development projects, and skilled troops whose first instinct when fired upon was not, necessarily, to shoot back.
It also took lower-ranking officers who were creative and adaptable. In 2003, it hardly seemed like traditional military work when Gen. Petraeus ordered the military to restart industrial sites in the city of Mosul. Maj. Gen. Ben Hodges was a colonel when he approved that plan, sending three lieutenants to restart an asphalt plant, a sulfur works and a concrete plant. He said he figures the three officers won't likely be asked to restart a factory again, but such problem-solving will serve the Army into the future.
"The war showed the need for leaders at all levels who can adapt," Gen. Hodges said.
The latest turn away from counterinsurgency already may have started. The Pentagon is focusing its attention on Asia, where any war is likely to rely on the Air Force and Navy. The Libyan war showed that airpower can be used in combination with ill-trained local forces to topple a dictator.
Current and former officers say it doesn't take a great leap of imagination to think the U.S. could get involved in another conflict requiring a large number of troops to keep the peace and warn that the U.S. can't turn its back on counter-insurgency. To some extent, that may influence the decisions that lie ahead.
"We, as a nation," said Gen. Kelly, "have to be ready to fight every kind of war."
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By JULIAN E. BARNES in Washington, NATHAN HODGE in Newport News, Va., and JEREMY PAGE in Beijing
The USS Gerald R. Ford was supposed to help secure another half century of American naval supremacy. The hulking aircraft carrier taking shape in a dry dock in Newport News, Va., is designed to carry a crew of 4,660 and a formidable arsenal of aircraft and weapons.
But an unforeseen problem cropped up between blueprint and expected delivery in 2015: China is building a new class of ballistic missiles designed to arc through the stratosphere and explode onto the deck of a U.S. carrier, killing sailors and crippling its flight deck.
Since 1945, the U.S. has ruled the waters of the western Pacific, thanks in large part to a fleet of 97,000-ton carriers—each one "4.5 acres of mobile, sovereign U.S. territory," as the Navy puts it. For nearly all of those years, China had little choice but to watch American vessels ply the waters off its coast with impunity.
Now China is engaged in a major military buildup. Part of its plan is to force U.S. carriers to stay farther away from its shores, Chinese military analysts say. So the U.S. is adjusting its own game plan. Without either nation saying so, both are quietly engaged in a tit-for-tat military-technology race. At stake is the balance of power in a corner of the seas that its growing rapidly in importance.
Pentagon officials are reluctant to talk publicly about potential conflict with China. Unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Beijing isn't an explicit enemy. During a visit to China last month, Michele Flournoy, the U.S. undersecretary of defense for policy, told a top general in the People's Liberation Army that "the U.S. does not seek to contain China," and that "we do not view China as an adversary," she recalled in a later briefing.
Nevertheless, U.S. military officials often talk about preparing for a conflict in the Pacific—without mentioning who they might be fighting. The situation resembles a Harry Potter novel in which the characters refuse to utter the name of their adversary, says Andrew Krepinevich, president of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think tank with close ties to the Pentagon. "You can't say China's a threat," he says. "You can't say China's a competitor."
China's state media has said its new missile, called the DF-21D, was built to strike a moving ship up to about 1,700 miles away. U.S. defense analysts say the missile is designed to come in at an angle too high for U.S. defenses against sea-skimming cruise missiles and too low for defenses against other ballistic missiles.
Even if U.S. systems were able to shoot down one or two, some experts say, China could overwhelm the defenses by targeting a carrier with several missiles at the same time.
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Close.As such, the new missile—China says it isn't currently deployed—could push U.S. carriers farther from Chinese shores, making it more difficult for American fighter jets to penetrate its airspace or to establish air superiority in a conflict near China's borders.
In response, the Navy is developing pilotless, long-range drone aircraft that could take off from aircraft carriers far out at sea and remain aloft longer than a human pilot could do safely. In addition, the Air Force wants a fleet of pilotless bombers capable of cruising over vast stretches of the Pacific.
The gamesmanship extends into cyberspace. U.S. officials worry that, in the event of a conflict, China would try to attack the satellite networks that control drones, as well as military networks within the U.S. The outcome of any conflict, they believe, could turn in part on who can jam the other's electronics or hack their computer networks more quickly and effectively.
Throughout history, control of the seas has been a prerequisite for any country that wants to be considered a world power. China's military buildup has included a significant naval expansion. China now has 29 submarines armed with antiship cruise missiles, compared with just eight in 2002, according to Rand Corp., another think tank with ties to the military. In August, China conducted a sea trial of its first aircraft carrier—a vessel that isn't yet fully operational.
Opinion
Michael Auslin: Defense Boost Ends Tokyo Drift
.At one time, military planners saw Taiwan as the main point of potential friction between China and the U.S. Today, there are more possible flash points. Tensions have grown between Japan and China over islands each nation claims in the East China Sea. Large quantities of oil and gas are believed to lie under the South China Sea, and China, Vietnam, the Philippines and other nations have been asserting conflicting territorial claims on it. Last year, Vietnam claimed China had harassed one of its research vessels, and China demanded that Vietnam halt oil-exploration activities in disputed waters.
A few years ago, the U.S. military might have responded to any flare-up by sending one or more of its 11 aircraft carriers to calm allies and deter Beijing. Now, the People's Liberation Army, in additional to the missiles it has under development, has submarines capable of attacking the most visible instrument of U.S. military power.
"This is a rapidly emerging development," says Eric Heginbotham, who specializes in East Asian security at Rand. "As late as 1995 or 2000, the threat to carriers was really minimal. Now, it is fairly significant. There is a whole complex of new threats emerging."
Beijing's interest in developing anticarrier missiles is believed to date to the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. The Chinese government, hoping to dissuade voters in Taiwan from re-electing a president considered pro-independence, conducted a series of missile tests, firing weapons into the waters off the island. President Bill Clinton sent two carrier battle groups, signaling that Washington was ready to defend Taiwan—a strategic setback for China.
The Chinese military embarked on a military modernization effort designed to blunt U.S. power in the Pacific by developing what U.S. military strategists dubbed "anti-access, area denial" technologies.
"Warfare is about anti-access," said Adm. Gary Roughead, the recently retired U.S. chief of naval operations, last year. "You could go back and look at the Pacific campaigns in World War II, [when] the Japanese were trying to deny us access into the western Pacific."
In 2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao unveiled a new military doctrine calling for the armed forces to undertake "new historic missions" to safeguard China's "national interests." Chinese military officers and experts said those interests included securing international shipping lanes and access to foreign oil and safeguarding Chinese citizens working overseas.
At first, China's buildup was slow. Then some headline-grabbing advances set off alarms in Washington. In a 2007 test, China shot down one of its older weather satellites, demonstrating its ability to potentially destroy U.S. military satellites that enable warships and aircraft to communicate and to target bases on the Chinese mainland.
The Pentagon responded with a largely classified effort to protect U.S. satellites from weapons such as missiles or lasers. A year after China's antisatellite test, the U.S. demonstrated its own capabilities by blowing up a dead spy satellite with a modified ballistic-missile interceptor.
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Close.Last year, the arms race accelerated. In January, just hours before then U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates sat down with Chinese President Hu to mend frayed relations, China conducted the first test flight of a new, radar-evading fighter jet. The plane, called the J-20, might allow China to launch air attacks much farther afield—possibly as far as U.S. military bases in Japan and Guam.
The aircraft carrier China launched in August was built from a hull bought from Ukraine. The Pentagon expects China to begin working on its own version, which could become operational after 2015—not long after the USS Gerald R. Ford enters service.
American military planners are even more worried about the modernization of China's submarine fleet. The newer vessels can stay submerged longer and operate more quietly than China's earlier versions. In 2006, a Chinese sub appeared in the midst of a group of American ships, undetected until it rose to the surface.
Sizing up China's electronic-warfare capabilities is more difficult. China has invested heavily in cybertechnologies, and U.S. defense officials have said Chinese hackers, potentially working with some state support, have attacked American defense networks. China has repeatedly denied any state involvement.
China's technological advances have been accompanied by a shift in rhetoric by parts of its military. Hawkish Chinese military officers and analysts have long accused the U.S. of trying to contain China within the "first island chain" that includes Japan and the Philippines, both of which have mutual defense treaties with the U.S., and Taiwan, which the U.S. is bound by law to help defend. They now talk about pushing the U.S. back as far as Hawaii and enabling China's navy to operate freely in the western Pacific, the Indian Ocean and beyond.
"The U.S. has four major allies within the first island chain, and is trying to starve the Chinese dragon into a Chinese worm," Maj. Gen. Luo Yuan, one of China's most outspoken military commentators, told a conference in September.
China's beefed up military still is a long way from having the muscle to defeat the U.S. Navy head-to-head. For now, U.S. officials say, the Chinese strategy is to delay the arrival of U.S. military forces long enough to take control of contested islands or waters.
Publicly, Pentagon leaders such as Mr. Gates and Adm. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have said the U.S. would like to cultivate closer military-to-military ties with China.
Privately, China has been the focus of planning. In 2008, the U.S. military held a series of war games, called Pacific Vision, which tested its ability to counter a "near-peer competitor" in the Pacific. That phrase is widely understood within the military to be shorthand for China.
"My whole impetus was to look at the whole western Pacific," says retired Air Force Gen. Carrol "Howie" Chandler, who helped conduct the war games. "And it was no secret that the Chinese were making investments to overcome our advantages in the Pacific."
Those games tested the ability of the U.S. to exercise air power in the region, both from land bases and from aircraft carriers. People familiar with the exercises say they informed strategic thinking about potential conflict with China. A formal game plan, called AirSea Battle, now is in the works to develop better ways to fight in the Pacific and to counter China's new weapons, Pentagon officials say.
The Navy is developing new weapons for its aircraft carriers and new aircraft to fly off them. On the new Ford carrier, the catapult that launches jets off the deck will be electromagnetic, not steam-powered, allowing for quicker takeoffs.
The carrier-capable drones under development, which will allow U.S. carriers to be effective when farther offshore, are considered a breakthrough. Rear Adm. William Shannon, who heads the Navy's office for unmanned aircraft and strike weapons, compared the drone's debut flight last year to a pioneering flight by Eugene Ely, who made the first successful landing on a naval vessel in 1911. "I look at this demonstration flight…as ushering us into the second 100 years of naval aviation," he said.
The Air Force wants a longer-range bomber for use over the Pacific. Navy and Air Force fighter jets have relatively short ranges. Without midair refueling, today's carrier planes have an effective range of about 575 miles.
China's subs, fighter planes and guided missiles will likely force carriers to stay farther than that from its coast, U.S. military strategists say.
"The ability to operate from long distances will be fundamental to our future strategy in the Pacific," says Andrew Hoehn, a vice president at Rand. "You have to have a long-range bomber. In terms of Air Force priorities, I cannot think of a larger one."
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CloseRicky Thompson
The USS Gerald R. Ford, designed to serve for the next 50 years, under construction in Newport News, Va.
.The U.S. also is considering new land bases to disperse its forces throughout the region. President Barack Obama recently announced the U.S. would use new bases in Australia, including a major port in Darwin. Many of the bases aren't expected to have a permanent American presence, but in the event of a conflict, the U.S. would be able to base aircraft there.
In light of China's military advances and shrinking U.S. defense budgets, some U.S. military officers have begun wondering whether the time has come to rethink the nation's strategic reliance on aircraft carriers like the USS Ford. A successful attack on a carrier could jeopardize the lives of as many as 5,000 sailors—more than all the troops killed in action in Iraq.
"The Gerald R. Ford is just the first of her class," wrote Navy Captain Henry Hendrix and retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Noel Williams in an article in the naval journal Proceedings last year. "She should also be the last."
Write to Jeremy Page at jeremy.page@wsj.com and Nathan Hodge at Nathan.Hodge@wsj.com and Julian E. Barnes at Julian.Barnes@wsj.com
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"U.S. defense analysts say the missile is designed to come in at an angle too high for U.S. defenses against sea-skimming cruise missiles and too low for defenses against other ballistic missiles."
Sound like Sun Tzu to me.
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http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/202465-obama-to-unveil-defense-strategy-review-at-pentagon
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:cry:
This needs to be seen in the context of the recent posts here http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=2123.0
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By MACKUBIN THOMAS OWENS
The president has now outlined a strategy to guide the substantial cuts to the defense budget that will occur over the next decade. Those cuts are significant: at least $487 billion over the next decade, and twice that amount if the automatic spending reduction triggered by the failure of the deficit reduction super committee to reach an agreement goes into effect.
The new strategy envisions a regional focus on the Asia-Pacific and a shift from a two-war capability to a "win-spoil" plan that maintains the capability to fight and win one regional war while spoiling the military aspirations of another adversary in a different theater. The Army will be reduced to 490,000 troops from 570,000 and the Marines to 175,000 from 202,000 over the next few years while air and naval assets will be maintained in order to optimize operations in Asia-Pacific, primarily a maritime theater.
Critics argue that the budget cuts undermine the ability of the United States to defend itself. That's not altogether true. The cuts are necessary for economic reasons and the U.S. will still spend a great deal of money on defense. The real danger is that the administration's new strategy to guide the cuts undermines strategic flexibility, leading the country down a dangerous path it has traversed before: a primary reliance on a single military capability or a focus on a single region.
The administration's focus on Asia-Pacific and reduction of ground forces in favor of air and naval forces are both manifestations of what the late political scientist Samuel P. Huntington called "strategic monism," the domination of defense policy by a single strategic concept or regional focus. This approach presupposes an ability to predict and control the actions of possible enemies, discounting the commonsense view that the world is dynamic and characterized by uncertainty. Instead it seeks to impose a single vision on the U.S. defense establishment. If this vision is correct, things will be fine. If not, the U.S. may lack the ability to respond adequately to an unexpected event.
There is an old saying that "any war plan that depends on the cooperation of the enemy is likely to fail." This is the fatal flaw of strategic monism. The record reveals that defense planners have not been particularly successful in predicting the future. The U.S. has suffered a significant strategic surprise once a decade since 1940: Pearl Harbor, the North Korean invasion of South Korea, the Soviet H-bomb test, the Soviet reaction to the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the fall of the Shah of Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Union and, most recently, 9/11.
The risks of the administration's new strategy are illustrated by the "New Look" strategy pursued by the Eisenhower administration of the 1950s. Its focus on long-range strategic air power resulted in strategic inflexibility: The U.S. largely lacked the ability to respond to threats at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Realizing this, our adversaries responded by moving away from conventional confrontation toward insurgencies and "peoples' wars." This deficiency led to the replacement of the New Look by the strategy of Flexible Response in the 1960s.
Ironically, after the Gulf War of 1991, some defense analysts resurrected the idea that a nearly exclusive reliance on air power could solve the defense dilemmas the U.S. faced. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan disabused us of this notion.
The administration's new strategy stands in contrast to "strategic pluralism," an approach that calls for a wide variety of military forces and weapons to meet a diversity of potential threats. Given the geopolitical position of the U.S. requiring that it plan to respond to threats around the globe, strategic pluralism seems more appropriate.
This more balanced approach presupposes an uncertain security environment. Despite our desires, there is much in this world that we do not and cannot know in advance, and threats to our interests are not necessarily predictable.
For instance, an assumption underlying the reduction of ground forces is the expectation that the U.S. will not be undertaking expensive, troop-intensive counterinsurgency campaigns such as those waged in Afghanistan and Iraq. Force planners made a similar assumption after Vietnam. The assumption was wrong then and most likely is wrong now.
A more balanced approach would hedge against uncertainty by maintaining a force capable of responding across the entire spectrum of conflict, building on the existing capabilities of a variety of forces—air, space, naval, land and cyber—to meet challenges to U.S. interests that may arise across the globe.
At the same time, retaining multiple capabilities complicates planning by potential adversaries. The smaller the number of options a force structure can generate, the easier it is for an enemy to develop a low-cost counter. That is what our enemies have done in the past, and it is what they will do in the future, especially if we make it easy for them.
Mr. Owens is professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College, editor of Orbis, the quarterly journal of the Foreign Policy Research Institute, and author of "US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain" (Continuum, 2011).
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http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/budget-approriations/203729-lawmakers-geared-up-for-battle-over-military-spending-strategy
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One of the most iconic images of the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan -- as well as global U.S. counterterrorism efforts -- has been the armed unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), specifically the MQ-1 "Predator" and the MQ-9 "Reaper." Unarmed RQ-1 Predators (which first flew in 1994) were flying over Afghanistan well before the 9/11 attacks. Less than a month after the attacks, an armed variant already in development was deployed for the first time.
In the decade since, the Predator has clocked more than a million flight hours. And while U.S. Air Force procurement ceased in early 2011 -- with more than 250 airframes purchased -- the follow-on MQ-9 Reaper has already been procured in numbers and production continues. Predators and Reapers continue to be employed in a broad spectrum of roles, including close air support (CAS), when forward air controllers communicate with UAV operators to release ordnance with friendly troops in the vicinity (CAS is one of the more challenging missions even for manned aircraft because of the heightened risk of friendly casualties). Officially designated "armed, multi-mission, medium-altitude, long endurance, remotely piloted aircraft," the second to last distinction is the Predator and Reaper's principal value: the ability to loiter for extended periods, in some cases for more than 24 hours.
This ability affords unprecedented situational awareness and physical presence over the battlefield. The implications of this are still being understood, but it is clear that it allows, for example, the sustained and constant monitoring of main supply routes for attempts to emplace improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or the ability to establish a more sophisticated understanding of high-value targets' living patterns. In addition, live, full-motion video for ground controllers is available to lower and lower echelons to an unprecedented degree.
As the procurement of Predators and Reapers and the training of operators accelerated -- particularly under the tenure of former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, beginning in 2006 -- the number of UAV "orbits" skyrocketed (an orbit is a single, continuous presence requiring more than one UAV airframe per orbit). There are now more than 50 such orbits in the U.S. Central Command area of operations alone (counting several maintained by the larger, unarmed RQ-4 "Global Hawk"). The U.S. Air Force expects to be capable of maintaining 65 orbits globally by 2013, with the combined total of flight hours for Predator and Reaper operations reaching about 2 million around the same time. In 2005, UAVs made up about 5 percent of the military aircraft fleet. They have since grown to 30 percent, though most are small, hand-launched and unarmed tactical UAVs.
The Counterterrorism Value
One of the most notable uses of the Predator and Reaper has been in the counterterrorism role, both as an intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) platform and as an on-call strike platform. These armed UAVs are operated both by the U.S. Air Force and, in some cases (as with operations conducted over Pakistan), the CIA. Even before the 9/11 attacks, the armed Predator then in development was being considered as a means not only of keeping tabs on Osama bin Laden but also of killing him. Since then, armed UAVs have proved their worth both in the offensive strike role against specific targets and as a means of maintaining a constant level of threat.
The value of the counterterrorism ISR that can be collected by large UAVs alone is limited since so much depends on how and where they are deployed and what they are looking for. This mission requires not only sophisticated signals but also actionable human intelligence. But as a front-line element of a larger, integrated collection strategy, the armed UAV has proved to be a viable and enduring element of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy worldwide.
The ability to loiter is central and has a value far beyond the physical capabilities of a single airframe in a specific orbit. Operating higher than helicopters and with a lower signature than manned, jet-powered fighter aircraft, the UAV is neither visibly or audibly obvious (though the degree of inconspicuousness depends on, among other things, weather and altitude). Because UAVs are so discreet, potential targets must work under the assumption that an armed UAV is orbiting within striking distance at all times.
Such a constant threat can place considerable psychological pressure on the prey, even when the predator is large and loud. During the two battles of Fallujah, Iraq, in April and November of 2004, AC-130 gunships proved particularly devastating for insurgents pinned in certain quadrants of the city, but AC-130s were limited in number and availability. When it was not possible to keep an AC-130 on station at night (in order to keep the insurgents' heads down), unarmed C-130 transports were flown in the same orbits at altitudes where the distinctive sound of a C-130 could be clearly discerned on the ground, thus maintaining the perception of a possible AC-130 reprisal against any insurgent offensive.
Indeed, it is difficult to overstate the psychological and operational impact of this tactic on a group that experiences successful strikes on its members, even if the strikes are conducted only rarely. Counterterrorism targets in areas where UAVs are known to operate must work under tight communications discipline and constraints, since having their cellular or satellite phone conversations tapped risks not only penetration of communications but immediate and potentially lethal attacks.
The UAV threat was hardly the only factor, but consider how Osama bin Laden's communiques declined from comparatively regular and timely videos to rare audiotapes. In 2001, bin Laden was operating with immense freedom of maneuver and impunity despite the manhunt already under way for him. That situation changed even as he fled to Pakistan, and the combination of aggressive signals as well as UAV- and space-based ISR efforts further constrained his operational bandwidth and relevance as he was forced to focus more and more on his own personal survival.
The UAV threat affects not only the targeted individuals themselves but also their entire organizations. When the failure to adhere to security protocols can immediately yield lethal results, the natural response is to constrict communications and cease contact with untrusted allies, affiliates and subordinates. When the minutiae of security protocols start to matter, the standard for having full faith, trust and confidence among those belonging to or connected with a terrorist organization become much higher. And the more that organization's survival is at stake, the more it must focus on survival, thereby reducing its capacity to engage in ambitious operations. On a deeper level, there is also the value of sowing distrust and paranoia within an organization. This has the same ultimate effect of increasing internal distrust and thereby undermining the spare capacity for the pursuit of larger, external objectives.
The Evolving Geography
While armed Predators first operated in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theater, it was the darkest days of the Iraq War, at the height of the violence there from 2005 to 2007, that saw the strongest demand for them. As the main effort shifted from Iraq to Afghanistan, UAV operations began to shift with them. While UAVs will remain in high demand in Afghanistan even as the drawdown of forces continues there in 2012, the end of armed UAV operations in Iraq and the continued expansion of the U.S. Air Force's Reaper fleet mean that considerable bandwidth is being freed up for operations in other parts of the world. (In Iraq, some UAVs may continue to be operated over northern Kurdish areas in coordination with Turkey, and some private security contractors are operating a small fleet of unarmed UAVs as part of protection efforts in coordination with the U.S. State Department's Diplomatic Security Service.)
There are obvious diplomatic and operational limitations to the employment of armed UAVs. Diplomatically, however, they also have demonstrated some value as an intermediate step between purely clandestine operations run by the CIA and the overt deployment of uniformed personnel and manned aircraft. Operationally, while Predators and Reapers lack the sort of low-observability profile of the RQ-170 (one of which was lost over Iran in 2011), UAVs lack pilots and pose no risk of human personnel being taken captive. A UAV that crashes in Iran has far fewer political ramifications than a piloted aircraft, making its deployment an easier decision for political leaders.
Indeed, the last decade has seen the maturation of the armed UAV, including its underlying architecture and doctrines. And while more than 50 Predators and Reapers have been lost in Iraq and Afghanistan and in training over the past decade, the aircraft are now essentially as safe and reliable as a manned F-16C/D but far cheaper to procure, maintain and operate. And over the next 10 years, the Pentagon plans to grow its UAV fleet about 35 percent. The U.S. Air Force plans to buy 288 more Reapers -- 48 per year from now through 2016 -- and money for UAVs has remained largely untouched even as budget cuts intensify at the Pentagon.
So while armed UAVs are merely one tool of a much broader and more sophisticated counterterrorism strategy, they can be expected to be valuable for the foreseeable future, and employed in areas of the world beyond Pakistan, Somalia and Yemen (even along the U.S.-Mexico border in an unarmed role for border patrol and counternarcotics missions). And despite an enormous breach in U.S.-Pakistani relations following the deaths of two dozen Pakistani military personnel in a cross-border incident in November and the consequent ejection of the CIA from Shamsi airfield in Pakistan (from which it had operated armed UAVs since October 2001), existing UAV orbits have been largely maintained. On Jan. 10, the first strike on Pakistani territory since November took place in North Waziristan agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.
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*****Nationwide Warning*****
A friend sent this to me.....It goes right along with pediatricians
asking children if there are guns in their home.
Concealed Carry - IMPORTANT
I didn't have this happen, but then I wasn't at a V.A. doctors office.
A friend did run into a little of this when he had to visit a doctor
other than his regular doctor when his doctor was on vacation. One of
the questions on the form he had to fill out was: Do you have any guns
in your house?? His answer was "None of your damn business!!" So it is
out there! It is either an insurance issue or government intervention.
Either way, it is out there and the second the government gets into
your medical records (as they want to under Obama care) it will become
a major issue and will ultimately result in lock and load!!
Please pass this on to all the other retired guys and gun owners...Thanks
From a Vietnam Vet and retired Police Officer:
I had a doctor’s appointment at the local V.A. clinic yesterday and
found out something very interesting that I would like to pass along.
While going through triage before seeing the doctor, I was asked at
the end of the exam, three questions:
1. Did I feel stressed?
2. Did I feel threatened?
3. Did I feel like doing harm to someone?
The nurse then informed me, that if I had answered yes to any of the
questions, I would have lost my concealed carry permit as it would
have gone into my medical records and the VA would have reported it to
Homeland Security.
Looks like they are going after the vets first. Other gun people like
retired law enforcement will probably be next. Then when they go after
the civilians, what argument will they have? Be forewarned and be
aware.
The Obama administration has gone on record as considering veterans
and gun owners potential terrorists. Whether you are a gun owner
veteran or not, YOU'VE BEEN WARNED !
If you know veterans and gun owners, please pass this on to them.
Be very cautious about what you say and to whom.
I already have concern for those that have followed legal procedure and are now on
record with a permit.
as for me and mine and most I know around south central Texas...what permits? and
everyone knows someone set up to selfload ammo.
Please!!! When Sending This Vital Information To Friends and Family DO NOT Use The
"To: Address Line!!! It Shows Every Name and The Email Associated With Each Name In
The Body of Any Email Sent Using This Line!
Instead Enter The Email Address of Those You Are Sending This Important Warning To
on The "Bcc: Line"!! This Will Show Only Names and Not Email Addresses!!!
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it's my understanding, maybe I'm wrong, but nearly all concealed weapons permits are issued on the state/local level.
For example if I want one I need to apply with the Chief of Police; LAPD.
So how can Homeland Security take away my CCW? For that matter, what do I care if Homeland Security is
aware that I have a gun? I have nothing to hide.
And finally, if some answers YES to the question, "Did I feel like doing harm to someone?", on a medical questionnaire,
well maybe they shouldn't have a Concealed Weapon Permit.
And what's wrong with a Pediatrician asking his patient (children) if there is a gun in their home? He's
worried about their safety - that's his job. I presume if the gun is locked up and out of reach, that would
be the end of it.
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By MACKENZIE EAGLEN
On Thursday, the Pentagon will begin detailing its plans to cut $500 billion from the military's budget over the next decade. The reason, insists President Barack Obama, is that "since 9/11, our defense budget grew at an extraordinary pace." That's true in top-line numbers—but it's anything but true when examined strategically.
Between budget cuts, cost overruns, overweight bureaucracy, ever-growing red tape, and changing requirements, the arsenal of democracy has become a bureaucratic nightmare. In spite of itself, our military cannot build new programs anymore. Old programs might win wars, but with much higher human and financial costs.
After 9/11, defense budgets grew because they had to. The U.S. military's budget, size and force structure had been too deeply cut in the 1990s, after the anticipated post-Soviet "peace dividend" failed to materialize. So the Pentagon began quickly and inefficiently dumping dollars into the military to fund the missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.
This made budgets grow steadily, but the money did little to increase cutting-edge capabilities for the future. Our war-related investments came at the expense of tomorrow's military capabilities. As a new American Enterprise Institute study concludes, the military over the past decade didn't modernize but rather embraced the equivalent of buying new apps for its old, clunky cellphone.
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CloseAssociated Press
The Air Force wanted 750 F-22s to replace the F15, above, but they ultimately only received 187.
.From 2000-2010, the Air Force spent $38 billion on 220 fighters—as compared to $68 billion for 2,063 fighters from 1981-1990. Air Force leaders wanted 750 F-22s to replace their F-15s, but successive administrations cut that number—to 648, then 438, 339, 270 and finally 187—before President Obama terminated production. That wasn't a coherent acquisition strategy but budget-driven politics, plain and simple.
The Navy fared little better than the Air Force in terms of true modernization over the past decade. Sure, there are three Navy programs touted as "new"—the Virginia-class attack submarine, the DDG-51 destroyer and the F/A-18 Hornet. Problem is, those programs are already the Pentagon's "Plan B."
The Virginia-class sub was designed as a cheaper alternative to the truly dominant Seawolf-class attack submarine (and the Navy has bought less than half of the Virginia class, with the majority of funding still to come). The DDG-51 destroyer was a fall-back alternative to the now-canceled DDG-1000. And the F/A-18 Hornet and Super Hornets are only stopgap purchases until the Navy can put the F-35C Joint Strike Fighter on its carrier decks. Thus the Navy's recent spending has gone to programs that are increasingly out of date and ill-prepared to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
The Marine Corps and Army fared better on modernization over the last decade. Though the Marine Corps saw its Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle canceled under President Obama, it successfully completed most of its ambitious amphibious docking platform.
The Army, meanwhile, completed several programs over the past decade, buying older platforms like the Abrams tank and the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, as well as the newer Stryker and even the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) armored vehicles. The problem is that all these vehicles are effective in land-based operations but would probably sit out during any conflict in the Western Pacific. And few of them have so-called next-generation capabilities—meaning brand-new platforms and technologies, not simply upgrades to existing tools. Almost every truly next-generation Army program has been canceled.
The common denominator among the services since 2001 is that their investment choices were geared toward lower-end conflict. Weapons systems designed for high-end future warfare suffered as a result (notwithstanding the evolving capabilities of drones over the past decade).
Compounding the problem is the reality that the services seem to be getting worse at acquiring high-tech systems and have used upgraded legacy programs as temporary band-aids. While it's often important to get weapons out the door during a war, the unmistakable reality is that the momentum for innovative research and development seems nonexistent across the U.S. military.
What the Obama Pentagon will lay out this week is the final nail in the coffin of our national contract with our all-volunteer military—that if they fight, they'll have the very best to win. It marks the beginning of the end of America's unquestioned international military dominance. Our soldiers will increasingly go into combat with aged equipment, lacking assurance that they'll prevail against any enemy.
Ms. Eaglen, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, has worked on defense issues at the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill.
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The Pentagon plans to expand its global network of drones and special-operations bases in a fundamental realignment meant to project U.S. power even as it cuts back conventional forces.
The plan, to be unveiled by Defense Secretary Leon Panetta on Thursday and in budget documents next month, calls for a 30% increase in the U.S. fleet of armed unmanned aircraft in the coming years, defense officials said. It also foresees the deployment of more special-operations teams at a growing number of small "lily pad" bases across the globe where they can mentor local allies and launch missions.
The utility of such tools was evident on Wednesday after an elite team—including members of Navy SEAL Team Six, the unit that killed Osama bin Laden—parachuted into Somalia and freed an American woman and Danish man held hostage for months.
The strategy reflects the Obama administration's increasing focus on small, secret operations in place of larger wars. The shift follows the U.S. troop pullout from Iraq in December, and comes alongside the gradual U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, where a troop-intensive strategy is giving way to an emphasis on training Afghan forces and on hunt-and-kill missions.
Defense officials said the U.S. Army plans to eliminate at least eight brigades while reducing the size of the active duty Army from 570,000 to 490,000, cuts that are likely to hit armored and heavy infantry units the hardest. But drone and special-operations deployments would continue to grow as they have in recent years.
At the same time, the Army aims to accentuate the importance of special operations by preserving light, rapidly deployable units such as the 82nd and the 101st Airborne divisions.
"What we really want is to see the Army adopt the mentality of special forces," said a military officer who advises Pentagon leaders.
The new strategy would assign specific U.S.-based Army brigades and Marine Expeditionary units to different regions of the world, where they would travel regularly for joint exercises and other missions, using permanent facilities and the forward-staging bases that some advisers call lily pads.
Marines, for example, will use a new base in Darwin, Australia, as a launch pad for Southeast Asia, while the U.S. is in talks to expand the U.S. presence in the Philippines—potential signals to China that the U.S. has quick-response capability in its backyard, defense officials said.
Yet many of the proposed bases will be secret and could temporarily house small commando teams, the officials said.
"There are going to be times when action is called upon, like Tuesday night, when it will be clearly advantageous to be forward deployed," a military official said, referring to the Somalia operation. "On the other hand, most of the time it will help you to be there to develop host nation or regional security."
Republican presidential contenders have seized on planned cuts to accuse President Barack Obama of weakening the U.S. military. While national-security issues aren't seen as a weakness for Mr. Obama in the coming presidential campaign, lawmakers could try to block his proposals on Capitol Hill.
Mr. Obama often emphasizes the value of special-operations raids like the one that killed bin Laden to fend off criticism.
The Pentagon, meanwhile, sees the bases and drones as part of an effort to offset cutbacks that some critics say will undercut the U.S.'s global dominance. The Pentagon says it will have more than enough force to fight at least one major troop-intensive ground war.
The Pentagon still will invest in some big-ticket items, including the F-35 stealth fighter, as a counterweight to rising powers, including China—although the department is poised to announce this week that it is going to slow procurement of the new plane, said defense officials.
Many Obama administration officials see last year's international military intervention in Libya as a model for future conflicts, with the U.S. using its air power up front while also relying on its allies, and on local forces to fight on the ground.
"You are looking at the military try to find new ways to stay globally engaged. When you are smaller, you have to be smarter," said a U.S. official.
Mr. Panetta alluded in a speech on Friday to plans to invest more heavily in drones and special forces, saying the U.S. wanted to develop an "innovative rotational presence" in Latin America, Africa and elsewhere.
Mr. Panetta is scheduled to outline elements of the department's $525 billion budget for fiscal 2013, including the first of $487 billion in cuts over 10 years, at the Pentagon Thursday.
The plan, however, envisions a 10% increase in special-operations forces over the next four years, from 63,750 this year to 70,000 by 2015, U.S. officials said. Mr. Panetta also will announce a buildup in the drone fleet in the coming years, U.S. officials said, following growth under predecessor Robert Gates.
The Air Force now operates 61 drone combat air patrols around the clock, with up to four drones in each patrol. Mr. Panetta's plan calls for the military to have enough drones to comfortably operate 65 combat air patrols constantly with the ability to temporarily surge to 85 combat air patrols, officials said.
The new emphasis represents a victory for Vice President Joe Biden and others in the White House who argued for reducing troops in Afghanistan and relying more on special-operations forces and local allies.
The strategy is similar to ideas that circulated through the military in the years before the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and were championed by former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Mr. Rumsfeld advocated building facilities in Eastern Europe and other locations as he pushed to remake the Army into a lighter, more expeditionary force. Mr. Rumsfeld declined a request for an interview.
The use of secretive commando teams and small, low-profile bases is appealing to the Obama administration because of the reduced costs, said a U.S. official briefed on the plans. They also risk less apprehension by host governments.
Military leaders are looking into the creation of new special-operations bases in Turkey and eastern Jordan, near the border with Iraq. U.S. officials said. Those will supplement a network of airstrips and other facilities in the region that house drones and operatives used for missions in Yemen, Somalia and beyond.
Write to Adam Entous at adam.entous@wsj.com and Siobhan Gorman at siobhan.gorman@wsj.com
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Obama, "We are going to be using fewer of you more often, so get your boots on, because you are going to be standing in a lot of blood."
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President Obama plans to cut the Pentagon budget by half a trillion dollars or more in the next decade. He also wants the military to take on new missions, principally for the Navy to lead an American strategic "pivot" to the Asia-Pacific.
Something has to give. Care to guess what?
The Administration's record to date is undeniable. Defense was targeted from day one in office, and Mr. Obama disguised his latest, steepest retrenchment as part of a new "strategic review" earlier this month. The Pentagon on Thursday previewed the cuts, announcing that the 2013 defense budget due next month will decline for the first time since 1998. As spending on entitlements rises, budget cuts disproportionately hit the Pentagon, which accounts for a fifth of federal spending but over half the deficit reduction.
A closer look at the Navy reveals the damage. The Pentagon announced that seven cruisers will be decommissioned sooner than planned. Plans to purchase new Virginia-class submarines, a large-deck amphibious ship and smaller attack vessels will be delayed or reduced. Mr. Obama vetoed the Navy's offer to drop one of 11 aircraft carriers, but that decision may be revisited if he is re-elected. As Chief of Naval Operations Jonathan Greenert wrote last month, the service in 2025 "may be smaller than today."
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Close...This is not good news. The Navy's fleet is already too small and its ships too old to perform its multiple missions. The fleet has shrunk by half in two decades and currently stands at 285. At the height of the Reagan Cold War buildup in 1987, the Navy had 568 carriers, destroyers, submarines and other ships.
Five years ago, the Navy pledged to get back to a floor of 313 ships sometime in the next decade. But even that shipbuilding plan was stingy in ambition and funding, favoring smaller, relatively inexpensive combat and supply ships. An update last year cut the number of ballistic missile submarines to 12 from 14. The Pentagon's latest budget plan makes it virtually impossible for the Navy to meet the 313 ship goal. And as Defense Secretary Leon Panetta wrote in a letter to Congress in November, if it cuts another $500 billion next January under "sequestration," the U.S. may be looking at a "fleet of fewer than 230 ships."
Administration officials have little choice but to talk down the usefulness of a larger fleet. "We have the 600-ship Navy [now]," in terms of overall capabilities, Navy Undersecretary Bob Work said at an industry conference this month. "The numbers don't [matter]. We span the globe."
He has a point that the weapons and technologies on today's ships have improved greatly since the Reagan era. The Pentagon has rightly focused as well on developing unmanned vessels and electronic warfare to ensure "access," in military speak, to any potential hot spot. "We will have a Navy that maintains a forward presence and is able to penetrate enemy defenses," says Mr. Panetta.
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A U.S. Navy serviceman on the flight deck of the USS Carl Vinson.
.But there's a catch: The planet isn't smaller. A ship can only be in one place at one time. So numbers do matter if the Navy is asked to chase pirates in Somalia, ferry humanitarian aid to Haiti, protect the Strait of Hormuz and keep a muscular presence in the South China Sea—to name a few of the recent and growing demands on the fleet. To cite another, the Obama Administration has also pivoted from ground- to sea-based missile defenses. This means that Aegis class cruisers must be parked in the Mediterranean to guard against an Iranian attack.
An independent bipartisan panel that went over the Pentagon's last Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 said that the U.S. needed a larger Navy. It recommended 346 ships, including 11 aircraft carrier groups and 55 attack submarines (compared to only 48 in current plans), which it justified by invoking—as President Obama implicitly did earlier this month—the rise of China.
"To preserve our interests, the United States will need to retain the ability to transit freely the areas of the Western Pacific for security and economic reason," the panel wrote. A 313-or-fewer ship Navy doesn't look imposing from Beijing.
Doves these days say that the U.S. is in an arms race only with itself, and that it spends nearly half of the world's defense dollars, so why not cut spending to 2.7% of GDP, a level last reached before Pearl Harbor? Yet the Chinese certainly behave as if they are in an arms race. China is building dozens of new ships, plus cheap and quiet diesel-electric submarines and antiship missiles that pose a threat to U.S carriers.
China's strategic goal is to undercut America's naval preeminence in the Pacific. Analysts estimate that Beijing's defense budget, which isn't exactly transparent, may be as high as $300 billion in purchasing power parity terms due to the lower cost of running a military in China. The base Pentagon budget for fiscal year 2013, which doesn't include war costs, will be $525 billion, and future budgets will further narrow the gap with China.
The U.S. needs 11 aircraft carriers, even when no other country has more than one, because no other country does what it does. American military power has ensured global peace and prosperity since World War II. The Navy is the symbol and instrument of America's ability to project power. Its deterioration would hasten the end of the Pax Americana, carrying a high and dangerous price for the world.
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China's strategic goal is to undercut America's naval preeminence in the Pacific. Analysts estimate that Beijing's defense budget, which isn't exactly transparent, may be as high as $300 billion in purchasing power parity terms due to the lower cost of running a military in China. The base Pentagon budget for fiscal year 2013, which doesn't include war costs, will be $525 billion, and future budgets will further narrow the gap with China.
Our defense budget is larger than the next 10 countries combined. Trim the deficit seems to be our mantra; why not start with the bloated military?
The U.S. needs 11 aircraft carriers, even when no other country has more than one, because no other country does what it does.
:? Maybe it's time to re-evaluate....
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"Trim the deficit seems to be our mantra; why not start with the bloated military?"
1) As a % of GDP, military spending is rather low right now when measured against long term averages. Furthermore even were we to wipe out the military completely, we would be still be in serious debt crisis mode.
2) The tremendous inefficiencies of the procurement process are in not insignificant part due to Congressional pork barreling as well as the inherent nature of the military way of doing things-- but it is more than a little worth noting that there have been A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY OVERWORKED SINCE 2001 AND WHO HAVE PERFORMED HEROICALLY.
3) My political prediction should the military cuts envisioned by the Paulites and the Progressives be made, the support for entitlements cuts will be nowhere to be found.
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By LEIF BABIN
America's premier Special Operations force is once again in the headlines after a team of Navy SEALs rescued two hostages from captivity in Somalia last week. Elite U.S. forces have carried out such operations periodically over the past decade, always with skill and bravery. The difference in recent months is that the details of their work haven't remained secret. On the contrary, government officials have revealed them for political gain—endangering our forces in the process.
The floodgates opened after the raid that killed Osama bin Laden last May, and the Obama administration's lack of discretion was on display again at last week's State of the Union address. As President Obama entered the House chamber, in full view of the cameras, he pointed to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta and exclaimed: "Good job tonight, good job tonight." Clearly something had happened that he wanted the world to know about.
After delivering his speech, which included multiple references to the bin Laden raid, the president again thanked Mr. Panetta. "That was a good thing tonight," he said as if to ensure that the viewing public, if they missed it initially, would get it a second time around.
Sure enough, shortly thereafter, the White House announced the successful rescue of the hostages in Somalia by U.S. Special Operations forces. Vice President Biden appeared on ABC's "Good Morning America" to highlight the success the next morning, and Mr. Panetta also publicly praised it. Then came the "anonymous U.S. officials" to provide extensive details of who conducted the raid and how. As with the bin Laden operation, the top-secret unit that carried it out was again front-page news, as were its methods and tactics.
Our special operators do not welcome this publicity. In fact, from conversations I've had in recent days, it's clear they are dismayed by it.
Adm. William H. McRaven, America's top special-operations commander, wrote in his 1996 book "Spec Ops" that there are six key principles of success in special operations. Of paramount importance—especially given the risk and sensitivity of the missions and the small units involved—is what the military calls "operational security," or maintaining secrecy. If the enemy learns details and can anticipate the manner and timing of an attack, the likelihood of success is significantly reduced and the risk to our forces is significantly increased.
Enlarge Image
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President Obama and Defense Secretary Leon Panetta before the State of the Union address in Washington on Tuesday.
.This is why much of what our special-operators do is highly classified, and why military personnel cannot legally divulge it to the public. Yet virtually every detail of the bin Laden raid has appeared in news outlets across the globe—from the name of the highly classified unit to how the U.S. gathered intelligence, how many raiders were involved, how they entered the grounds, what aircraft they used, and how they moved through the compound. Such details were highly contained within the military and not shared even through classified channels. Yet now they are available to anyone with the click of a mouse.
It's difficult for military leaders to enforce strict standards of operational security on their personnel while the most senior political leadership is flooding the airwaves with secrets. The release of classified information has also opened a Pandora's box of former and retired SEALs, special operators, and military personnel who have chosen to violate their non-disclosure agreements and discuss intricate details of how such operations are planned and executed.
We've already begun seeing specific examples of strategic harm from the post-bin Laden leaks. In June, Pakistan arrested several individuals who allegedly provided information to the CIA in advance of the raid. One of those charged with treason was a Pakistani doctor, Shakil Afridi. This Sunday, Mr. Panetta confirmed to "60 Minutes" that Dr. Afridi had provided "very helpful" intelligence to the CIA. That may have condemned Dr. Afridi to death or life imprisonment.
Such disclosures are catastrophic to U.S. intelligence networks, which often take years to develop. Recklessness not only puts lives at risk but could set U.S. intelligence-collection efforts back decades. Our ability to carry out future operations is significantly degraded—something not lost on Pakistan.
A week after the bin Laden raid, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed dismay about Washington's loose lips, telling a town hall meeting of U.S. Marines at Camp Lejeune: "Frankly, a week ago Sunday, in the Situation Room, we all agreed that we would not release any operational details from the effort to take out bin Laden. That all fell apart on Monday—the next day."
Do the president and his top political advisers understand what's at stake for the special-operations forces who carry out these dangerous operations, or the long-term strategic consequences of divulging information about our most highly classified military assets and intelligence capabilities? It is infuriating to see political gain put above the safety and security of our brave warriors and our long-term strategic goals. Loose lips sink ships.
Mr. Babin is a former Navy SEAL officer who served three tours in Iraq, earning a Silver Star, two Bronze Stars and a Purple Heart. He left active duty six months ago.
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WASHINGTON — As the United States turns increasingly to Special Operations forces to confront developing threats scattered around the world, the nation’s top Special Operations officer, a member of the Navy Seals who oversaw the raid that killed Osama bin Laden, is seeking new authority to move his forces faster and outside of normal Pentagon deployment channels.
The officer, Adm. William H. McRaven, who leads the Special Operations Command, is pushing for a larger role for his elite units who have traditionally operated in the dark corners of American foreign policy. The plan would give him more autonomy to position his forces and their war-fighting equipment where intelligence and global events indicate they are most needed.
It would also allow the Special Operations forces to expand their presence in regions where they have not operated in large numbers for the past decade, especially in Asia, Africa and Latin America.
While President Obama and his Pentagon’s leadership have increasingly made Special Operations forces their military tool of choice, similar plans in the past have foundered because of opposition from regional commanders and the State Department. The military’s regional combatant commanders have feared a decrease of their authority, and some ambassadors in crisis zones have voiced concerns that commandos may carry out missions that are perceived to tread on a host country’s sovereignty, like the rift in ties with Pakistan after the Bin Laden raid.
Administration, military and Congressional officials say that the Special Operations Command has embarked on a quiet lobbying campaign to push through the initiative. Pentagon and administration officials note that while the Special Operations Command is certain to see a growth in its budget and personnel when the new Defense Department spending plan is released Monday — in contrast to many other parts of the military that are being cut — no decisions have been made on whether to expand Admiral McRaven’s authorities.
The White House and State Department declined to comment on the proposal on Sunday.
The proposals are put forward as a new model for warfare in an age of diminishing Pentagon budgets, shrinking numbers of troops and declining public appetite for large wars of occupation, according to Pentagon officials, military officers and civilian contractors briefed on the plan. They spoke on the condition of anonymity because no decisions have been made.
Under the new concepts, a significant number of Special Operations forces — projected at 12,000 — would remain deployed around the world. While commando teams would be on call for striking terrorist targets and rescuing hostages, just as significant would be the increased number of these personnel deployed on training and liaison assignments and to gather information to help the command better predict approaching national security risks.
Officials stressed that in almost all cases, Special Operations forces would still only be ordered on specific missions by the regional four-star commander.
“It’s not really about Socom running the global war on terrorism,” Admiral McRaven said in a brief interview last week, referring to the Special Operations Command. “I don’t think we’re ready to do that. What it’s about is how do I better support” the regional combatant commanders.
For the past decade, more than 80 percent of the United States’ Special Operations forces have been deployed to the Middle East. With the military’s conventional forces coming home after the full withdrawal from Iraq, Admiral McRaven wants the authority to spread his commando teams into regions where they had been thinned out to provide forces for wars after the Sept. 11 attacks.
Even more, Admiral McRaven wants the authority to quickly move his units to potential hot spots without going through the standard Pentagon process governing overseas deployments. Historically, the deployment of American forces overseas began with a request from a global combatant commander that was processed through the military’s Joint Staff and placed before the defense secretary for approval, in a cautious and deliberate process.
Shifting national security threats may argue for Admiral McRaven’s plans. With Special Operations forces concentrated in the Middle East and Southwest Asia over the last decade, commanders in other regions are seeking more of these units in their areas.
State Department officials say they have not yet been briefed on the proposals. In the past, some ambassadors in crisis zones have opposed increased deployments of Special Operations teams, and they have demanded assurances that diplomatic chiefs of missions will be fully involved in their plans and missions.
Senior Special Operations commanders pledged that their efforts would be coordinated with the senior diplomatic representative in each country. These officers also describe how the new authorities would stress working with local security forces whenever possible. The exception would be when a local government was unable or unwilling to cooperate with an authorized American mission, or if there was no responsible government in power with whom to work.
Admiral McRaven’s plans have raised concerns even within the Special Operations community. Two Pentagon consultants said they have spoken with senior Special Operations officers who worry about their troops being stretched too thin. They are also concerned that Special Operations forces — still less than 2 percent of the entire military — will become so much the “go to” force of choice that they are asked to carry out missions beyond their capacity.
“Sure, we’re worried about that,” said one senior Special Operations officer with several command tours overseas. “But we also think we can manage that.”
The Special Operations Command now numbers just under 66,000 people — including both military personnel and Defense Department civilians — a doubling since 2001. Its budget has reached $10.5 billion, up from $4.2 billion in 2001 (after adjusting for inflation).
Over the past decade, Special Operations Command personnel have been deployed for combat operations, exercises, training and other liaison missions in more than 70 countries. Since the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Special Operations Command sustained overseas deployments of more than 12,000 troops a day, with four-fifths committed to the broader Middle East.
Even as the Pentagon trims its conventional force, with a refocus on the Asia-Pacific region and reductions in Europe, the Special Operations Command says it needs to permanently sustain that overseas force of 12,000 deployed around the world — with troops that came out of Iraq being distributed across regions that had not had many over the past decade.
Under Admiral McRaven’s evolving plans — what he calls the Global SOF Alliance — Special Operations forces would be moved around the globe at his direction, to bolster the forces available to the top Special Operations officer assigned to each theater of operation. Thickening the Special Operations deployments in these other regions would allow the United States to be ready to respond more rapidly to a broader range of threats.
Current guidelines allow the Special Operations Command to carry out missions on its own for very specific types of operations, although that has rarely been done and officials involved in the current debate say that would remain a rare event.
“He’s trying to provide global agility,” said one former military official who has been briefed on the planning. “If your network is not elastic, it’s not as agile as the enemy.”
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http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/socom/factbook-2012.pdf
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BG interesting fact book.
It is ironic we now have the most liberal President in history, making the most of speical operation forces overseas.
I remember not too long ago every liberal from Hollywood to MSM decrying out loud the CIA and special ops (IranContra) as
an evil segment of the Unites States overseas policy.
Sort of like Reagan's space based anti ballistic initiative as being ridiculed as Star Wars. Now I can guarantee you Brock wishes he had antiballistic weapons that could shoot down nuclear warheads. It would make Iran seem like less of a threat.
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BG interesting fact book.
It is ironic we now have the most liberal President in history, making the most of speical operation forces overseas.
I remember not too long ago every liberal from Hollywood to MSM decrying out loud the CIA and special ops (IranContra) as
an evil segment of the Unites States overseas policy.
Just before the change in administrations, the military entity known as JSOC was blasted by the left as "Dick Cheyney's personal hit squad" until Obozo used them to kill Bin Laden. Of course, that was when the left screamed about how terrible Gitmo was and now it's fine by them.
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Assasination is quite acceptable so long as it makes a liberal politician look good.
Question, who lies more Nixon or Obama?
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Assasination is quite acceptable so long as it makes a liberal politician look good.
Question, who lies more Nixon or Obama?
Well, no one died from Watergate, and we are still counting the hundreds, if not thousands of deaths from "Fast and Furious". By that standard, Obozo is way ahead of anyone.
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Agreed.
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The United States Navy launched an advanced tactical satellite today (Feb. 24), lofting to orbit the first spacecraft in a new communications constellation that should provide a big upgrade for American troops.
The Mobile User Objective System-1 (MUOS-1) satellite blasted off at 5:15 p.m. EST (2215 GMT) today, riding an Atlas 5 rocket into the skies above Florida's Cape Canaveral Air Force Station after an eight-day delay. The satellite was supposed to launch last week, but strong upper-level winds and thick clouds caused scrubs on both Feb. 16 and Feb. 17.
MUOS-1 will settle into a geostationary orbit above the Pacific Ocean, then undergo about six months of checkouts and tests before becoming operational, Navy officials have said.
The four-satellite MUOS constellation is designed to augment and eventually replace the current network that helps American warfighters around the globe communicate and coordinate. [Photos: Launch of Navy's MUOS-1 Satellite]
"MUOS will greatly enhance the capabilities of the warfighter to communicate on the move," said Mark Pasquale, vice president and MUOS program manager at Lockheed Martin, in a statement. Lockheed Martin is building the MUOS satellites for the U.S. military.
"The system will provide military users 16 times the communications capacity of existing satellites, including simultaneous voice, video and data capability enhancements, and we look forward to achieving mission success for our customer," Pasquale added.
Today's liftoff marked the 200th launch for the Centaur upper stage, which is part of the Atlas 5 rocket. The Centaur first lifted off the pad back in 1962; in the years since, it has helped launch many spacecraft, including NASA's Voyager and Viking probes in the 1970s and the Curiosity Mars rover this past November.
A big communications boost
The U.S. military currently relies on a constellation of satellites called UHF Follow-On, or UFO, for much of its communications needs. However, this network is aging, and two of the satellites stopped working several years ago, bringing the number of functional spacecraft down to eight.
Further, the military's demand for communications capacity is on the rise, due largely to a sharp increase in the use of unmanned aircraft. The MUOS network is an attempt to boost that capacity, and to shift the burden away from the deteriorating UFO system.
When it's complete, the MUOS constellation will consist of four active satellites, plus one orbiting spare. Each MUOS satellite will carry two payloads — one similar to the UFO payload (to provide links to currently deployed user terminals), and a new digital payload that will boost communications capacity significantly.
"Utilizing commercial 3G cell phone and satellite technology, MUOS will provide mobile warfighters point-to-point and netted communications services at enhanced data rates and priority-based access to on-demand voice, video and data transfers," Lockheed Martin officials wrote in a recent statement.
A few years away
It will be a few years before American warfighters can take full advantage of the MUOS network.
For starters, MUOS-1 has to undergo that six-month checkout period. And engineers still haven't finished the software that will allow users to communicate with MUOS-1's digital payload, so the satellite will likely use its UFO-like payload exclusively for a spell after coming online.
Further, it will take a while to complete the MUOS constellation. MUOS-2 is scheduled for launch in July 2013, with MUOS-3, 4 and the spare perhaps following at roughly one-year intervals, officials have said.
Lockheed Martin won a $2.1 billion Navy contract to build MUOS-1, MUOS-2 and associated ground control architecture back in September 2004. The Navy later exercised an option to build three more MUOS spacecraft.
P.C.
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This sounds like very good news!
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"An Israeli start up has developed a portable device that generates large amounts of water from desert air. The company says the system will offer troops in conflict zones a cheap and safe way to stay hydrated."
http://www.scientificamerican.com/video.cfm?id=israeli-device-takes-the-2012-03-07&WT.mc_id=SA_DD_20120307
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"An Israeli start up has developed a portable device that generates large amounts of water from desert air. The company says the system will offer troops in conflict zones a cheap and safe way to stay hydrated."
http://www.scientificamerican.com/video.cfm?id=israeli-device-takes-the-2012-03-07&WT.mc_id=SA_DD_20120307
Now if the "palestinians" get ahold of it, they'll figure out a way to make it into an IED, make it emit poison or break it into pieces and use the sharp ones to cut out clitorises.
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The Geopolitics of Shifting Defense Expenditures
March 9, 2012
The shift in global defense spending associated with the global economic crisis is accompanied by a deeper and more fundamental geographic change. A market report published Thursday remarked upon the shift from defense spending in the developed world (particularly Europe) to the developing world as fiscal austerity in the West takes hold. Indeed, upon returning from a trip to China, Indonesia’s defense minister announced Wednesday that his country might soon begin domestic licensed production of modern Chinese anti-ship missiles, once the purview of much more developed military powers. This comes close on the heels of the publication Wednesday of the annual edition of the Military Balance by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, which suggests that cumulative defense spending by Europe may, for the first time, be overtaken by such spending in the Asia-Pacific region (it has already converged in recent years).
It is now commplace to refer to the Asia-Pacific as "the future." The value of trans-Pacific trade has outstripped trans-Atlantic trade for decades now. The only remaining global superpower is also -- not coincidentally -- uniquely native to both oceans compared with both traditional European and emerging Asian powers. Stratfor has long noted that the events of two decades ago marked not only the end of the Soviet Union and the Cold War but also the European era of nearly half a millennia in which Europe was the center of the global system.
This reflects a geographic shift and necessarily has military implications, but defense spending is merely a symptom.
War has always been expensive. But from the Peloponnesian Wars of antiquity to Afghanistan today, ground combat has found a way of returning again and again to infantry engagements. Taken as a whole, there is no argument that large-scale ground combat has proven devastatingly expensive. But the contrast is the expense of naval power from the Peloponnesian Wars to today; engaging in meaningful naval power has consistently represented an enormous expenditure of national resources.
European conflict in the last 500 years and conflict in the Asia Pacific since World War II have both been characterized largely by ground combat. Naval power was essential for the United States to maintain a credible capability to reinforce Europe in the event of the outbreak of hostilities during the Cold War. But at its heart, it was a conflict over territory fought on land. Similarly, China has long been the quintessential land power, struggling against itself to secure buffer territories along its long and often rugged land borders. The Korean and Vietnam Wars, despite the naval aspects required by those countries' long coastlines, were essentially land wars.
But recent history is deceptive. The Asian Pacific is a fundamentally maritime theater, as World War II teaches us. Today it includes the busiest maritime chokepoint in the world -- the Strait of Malacca -- and an increasing number of countries reliant on the import of energy and raw materials and their participation in the global economy through maritime shipping. Shipping lanes matter, and the Pacific is not simply a place for competition between the United States and China. Despite its pacifist constitution, Japan fields one of the most modern and capable militaries in the world. South Korea has unique challenges but is not far behind. But perhaps even more fascinating is the emergence of the other countries native to the South China Sea -- namely Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia. Each country is strengthening itself militarily, not by bulking up existing land forces but investing in high-end, late-model naval hardware.
In contrast, Europe is not only spending less on defense, its military capability is becoming less important given its portfolio of national power and resources (save for the Russian periphery, which is perhaps underappreciated as a military domain of enduring relevance).
By comparison, military power is not only becoming more important in the Asian Pacific but many of these countries are shifting from communist-inspired massive land armies to building up capable naval and air forces. This represents not simply a diversion of resources from the army to the navy and air force but also requires considerable additional investment to establish and maintain forces capable of operating effectively in a more complex and high-end operational environment. The term "arms race" comes from the Cold War competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union to outmatch each other. Unlike that example of classic bipolarity, the Asian Pacific is much more multipolar than it is given credit for, given its focus on the U.S.-Chinese dynamic. Both the increasing multipolarity of and mounting investment in the region combine with the inherent expense of naval and air forces capable of competing there.
The result is not simply an environment where defense spending is rising and is likely to continue to do so. The Asian Pacific is a domain that demands investment in higher-end capabilities, and this is taking place within an increasingly broad spectrum of countries. For a world that has not fought major naval engagements on a World War II scale since that war and where aerial battles have become increasingly one-sided, the point about military competition in the Asian Pacific is not that it will be expensive. Instead, the cost reflects a long-term investment in high-end, expensive military resources that have increasingly limited operational experience to temper and check not just technology but also conceptual doctrinal development.
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OUTER space has become the next frontier for American national security and business. From space, we follow terrorists and intercept their communications, detect foreign military deployments, and monitor a proliferation of unconventional weapons. Our Global Positioning System gives us targeting and tactical advantages, spacecraft create image-rich maps, and satellites beam data around the world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=john%20yoo&st=Search
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OUTER space has become the next frontier for American national security and business. From space, we follow terrorists and intercept their communications, detect foreign military deployments, and monitor a proliferation of unconventional weapons. Our Global Positioning System gives us targeting and tactical advantages, spacecraft create image-rich maps, and satellites beam data around the world.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/09/opinion/hands-off-the-heavens.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=john%20yoo&st=Search
But abusing presidential prerogatives in order to abide by a European code of conduct that erodes American sovereignty eliminates the Senate’s important constitutional role. That does not make America safer; it weakens it.
That's a key element of the Obozo administration's conduct.
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As noted in the Outer Space thread, thanks to Baraq, we now have to rent a ride from the Russians to get anyone up there. The Chinese have correctly identified the importance of our present dominance in space as an Achilles heel for us and are working quite sedulously to change that. The general imporession I have is that Baraq et al are asleep at the switch and this will have devastating consequences.
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The general imporession I have is that Baraq et al are asleep at the switch and this will have devastating consequences.
It's not a matter of being asleep. It's very deliberate. It's unfair for the US to have any technological/military advantages over other countries. Buraq is fixing that.
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http://www.usatoday.com/news/military/story/2012-03-19/holly-petraeus-wife-protect-military/53657242/1
"When 18,000 members of the Army's 101st Airborne Division flew back to Fort Campbell, Ky., in 2004 after a year in Iraq, Holly Petraeus was there to meet them, no matter the hour, the weather or her other duties.
As wife of the division commander, Maj. Gen. David Petraeus, she had to attend some of the scores of arrivals. But she was almost always there — often in hat, scarf, and boots, stamping her feet against the cold and hugging the soldiers like they were her children."
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First I had heard this, but I can't say I'm surprised. Character is what you do when no one is looking.
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http://www.dickmorris.com/obama-tells-secrets-to-russia/
Published on TheHill.com on March 20, 2012
President Obama and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton are increasingly moving to strip America of vital defense capabilities through a web of international treaties and agreements. Already, Clinton is negotiating a code of conduct in outer space that would effectively ban our capacity to destroy satellites and put interceptor missiles in space.
Last week, the president announced that he was going to provide the Russians with detailed technical information about the anti-missile systems he plans to base in Eastern Europe, in the hopes of lessening Russian opposition to their deployment. He is exacting no reciprocal sharing of intelligence, nor can he be sure that Vladimir Putin will not just turn around and forward the gift package to North Korea or Iran.
Reuters noted that “the Obama administration is leaving open the possibility of giving Moscow certain secret data on U.S. interceptor missiles due to help protect Europe from any Iranian missile strike. A deal is being sought by Washington that could include classified data exchange because it is in the U.S. interest to enlist Russia and its radar stations in the missile-defense effort, a Pentagon spokeswoman said Tuesday.”
Defense advocates are especially fearful that these negotiations could lead to a side agreement to limit the velocity of our missile interceptors or place other limits on our anti-missile capability. In the 1990s, the Clinton administration agreed to limit velocity to 3 kilometers per second.
Hank Cooper, who was President Reagan’s ambassador in charge of defending the Strategic Defense Initiative in the Geneva Defense and Space Talks with the Soviet Union and later served as director of the SDI program, said he is worried that “these negotiations might turn into some ‘executive’ agreement that limits the velocity of future improvements to the SM-3 — or other missile defense interceptors.”
He said this would be a “very bad idea — as was demonstrated by the Clinton administration’s side agreement on the margins of the U.N. that limited the velocity of our theater missile defense interceptors. … We got rid of this [agreement] as a byproduct of withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in 2002 — it would be a very bad idea to bring it back in any form.”
Cooper and others argue that Russia already knows our missile velocity from having observed our tests, and that Moscow is seeking these negotiations to tie our hands by prohibiting improvements in our anti-missile technology.
Cooper said “the Russians are not likely to be interested in such an empty concession as sharing our current [velocity at burnout of our anti-missile]. On the other hand, there are other things they would be very interested in and I am not impressed that our current negotiating team can be trusted to keep them secret — or not to trade them away.”
He worries, in particular, that in its zest to “reset” relations with Russia, our negotiators will give away or agree to limit the ability of our interceptors to “track, discriminate and maneuver toward [their] targeted attacking weapon and associated decoys and other countermeasures. I would be very concerned about preserving the confidentiality of our capabilities in that area, and worry about possible ill-advised executive agreements on the associated so-called ‘transparency’ front — especially if they limit potential technological improvements in our defensive systems.”
It is these interceptors that the Obama administration has selected to cope with potential nuclear-armed missiles that might be launched by Iran in the near future to attack the United States or our overseas troops, friends and allies. The close nexus between the Kremlin and Tehran and Pyongyang raises the serious possibility that Russia could compromise our ability to stop their missiles.
Coming on the heels of his New START Treaty that cut our strategic forces while permitting Russia to deploy additional ones, and on top of his proposal to cut our nuclear arsenal by 80 percent with no reciprocity from any of our adversaries, Obama seems intent on disarming our nation.
Sometimes I wonder if Obama knows he is going to be defeated and is embarking on a “scorched-earth” policy to weaken our nation and to hogtie us through international agreements before he leaves office, thus fulfilling the fondest desires of his friends like former terrorist Bill Ayers.
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Yes. Next question.
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Perhaps I am missing something, but this surprises me. The Russians are squeezing Ukraine over gas, yet this is going on? What of Baraq's "reset" with the Russians? Is there leverage over us declining with our impending exit from Afpakia? (i.e. we won't need the Russkis for the northern supply route?)
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NATO and Ukraine are holding talks regarding Kiev's participation in the planned NATO missile defense system in Europe, the head of the NATO Liaison office in Ukraine said, RT News reported March 30, citing Rosbalt. NATO is considering Ukraine because of its ballistic missiles, technology and experience, the official said. Informal consultations are being held on political and technical levels, the official added.
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Read more: Ukraine: Kiev Could Participate In NATO Missile Defense System | Stratfor
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From another thread - my thinking was suppose the military let them have a drone with phoney or misleading construction or hardware/software/codes etc. Let Iran think they can crack our codes when in fact this will lead them off base. Perhaps we are not that smart.......
Also I wondered if this was some sort of show for the Israeli's that "you see we are serious about watching your back we are actually sending drones over Iran....."
OTOH it could be a total screw up and we lost a drone to Iran because it was defective, they did hack into its control mechanism, or something like that.
I would like to think it is a brilliant feint.
******Drone "captured" intact?
« Reply #533 on: Today at 12:14:50 PM »
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Just a thought. Suppose the US military LET Iran have the drone? For political and military reasons.
*****Iran capture US drone by hacking its GPS signal?
16:04 16 December 2011
AerospaceHackingPoliticsJeff Hecht, consultant
(Image: ABACA/Press Association Images)
How did Iran manage to capture a US robotic surveillance plane, which looks remarkably undamaged in an Iranian video? The US initially claimed the drone went astray over Afghanistan and blamed a malfunction, but Iran said it had brought the craft down 200 kilometres inside its border earlier this month.
Now the Christian Science Monitor reports that Iran jammed GPS signals and fooled the drone into landing at an Iranian base. "The GPS navigation is the weakest point," an unnamed Iranian engineer analysing the captured drone told a Monitor correspondent inside Iran. "By putting noise [jamming] on the communications, you force the bird into autopilot. This is where the bird loses its brain."
Once the drone lost its bearings, the engineer said, Iranians were able to reprogram its internal mapping system to think that its home base was an Iranian site at almost the same altitude. He added that the slight mismatch in altitude caused a rough landing that damaged the robot plane's landing gear and underside.
GPS signals are broadcast by satellites, so they are weak near the ground. That makes them vulnerable to interference from stronger nearby signals. Even military versions of GPS are vulnerable to electronic warfare, which usually seeks to disable key systems to bring down a plane. The Iranians claim to have taken that one step further by electronically capturing control of the remotely controlled robot craft. A former Navy specialist told the Monitor that hostilely reprogramming a GPS to fly to a different home is "certainly possible".
Built by defense contractor Lockheed Martin, the RQ-170 Sentinel craft is a high-flying surveillance craft, which uses stealth technology to elude detection. Although details are classified, some information has leaked, including photos which match those shown by Iran.
At the time the US lost control, it was operated by the CIA. With no US controller operating it, the unmanned aircraft should have crashed - yet the one Iran displayed showed only a dent, although its landing gear was hidden.
If that's what happened to the CIA's Sentinel, it's going to prompt some serious rethinking of how to wage robotic warfare. You don't want the enemy to be able to capture and reprogram your robots so they fight you.*****
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By MARK GUNZINGER AND ANDREW KREPINEVICH
For 20 years, from the first Gulf War to the recent bombardment of Libya, the U.S. military has had few difficulties deploying and supplying its forces. Rivals and would-be enemies—from China to Hezbollah—have taken note, and they're moving to acquire long-range, precision-guided weapons that would threaten our forces by creating mass "kill zones" around airfields, ports and supply depots. This threat is far more formidable than the roadside bombs encountered by our forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.
The Pentagon is aware of this threat, but its approach to addressing it is old-fashioned and expensive. Despite looming budget cuts, it continues emphasizing multimillion-dollar interceptors to shoot down missiles and rockets that enemies can field at a small fraction of that cost. This places our military at the wrong end of a cost competition that our enemies will be only too happy to continue.
There are ways for the U.S. military to defend itself more effectively from such attacks while imposing costs on our enemies. Part of the solution is to attack enemies' rocket and missile launchers on the ground, destroying their weapons before they can be used. Yet such "suppression" attacks require finding and destroying highly mobile missile launchers, artillery and mortar units, which is a difficult challenge.
A better, complementary approach would exploit technologies that can dramatically reduce the cost of this work—specifically, a new generation of high-power lasers.
Previous high-power laser weapon prototypes had insufficient power, were too bulky, or both. The recently cancelled Airborne Laser, a chemical laser carried on a Boeing 747 aircraft modified for military use, is but the most recent example of a laser weapon that failed to realize its promise.
Yet like submarines and torpedoes—which for decades in the late 19th century were considered little more than interesting toys, only to quickly emerge as powerful weapons in World War I—lasers may finally be coming into their own.
Recent dramatic advances in solid-state laser technology (meaning lasers that create a lethal beam of light using solids or fibers, not liquids or gases) have yielded impressive power levels at a very low cost-per-shot, especially when compared to traditional missile interceptors that can cost over $10 million each. Experts in the U.S. Navy state that within six years, using technologies already developed and demonstrated in test firings, they could field solid-state lasers on warships with sufficient power to counter anti-ship cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft, and fast-attack "swarm" craft like those of Iran. These lasers could reduce the need for warships to carry bulky—and expensive—defensive munitions, while freeing space for other weaponry.
Like solid-state lasers, new chemical lasers can generate much greater power outputs than their predecessors, enabling them to engage a wide range of air and missile threats, including long-range ballistic missiles. Also within six years, and using technologies developed for the Airborne Laser, the Air Force and the Army could field ground-based, megawatt-class chemical lasers to help protect key bases in the Persian Gulf and Western Pacific.
To be sure, laser weapons have limitations. Bad weather reduces their effectiveness (as it does many other weapons), and killing very hard targets such as ballistic missile warheads will require multiple megawatts of laser power. But combined with suppression attacks and traditional defenses, high-power lasers could provide a major boost to our military's defenses and at a reduced cost, while also complicating an enemy's planning.
Other states—especially Russia and China—see the game-changing potential of these weapons and are investing aggressively in them. Yet the Pentagon plans to cut research funding in this area, even though it currently invests a little over $500 million in it annually, compared to well over $10 billion in traditional air and missile defenses. This imbalance is particularly worrisome considering the need to impose costs on our competitors while reducing our own costs.
The Defense Department has said that it is serious about retaining its technological edge, declaring in its new strategic guidance the "imperative to sustain key streams of innovation that may provide significant long-term payoffs." Unfortunately, absent a push from Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta or from Congress, it appears unlikely that high-power lasers will make the jump from the laboratory to the field anytime soon. If not, as in Afghanistan and Iraq, American forces will find themselves again reacting to a threat rather than anticipating it.
Mr. Gunzinger, a retired Air Force colonel and former deputy assistant secretary of defense, is a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Mr. Krepinevich, the center's president, is a retired Army colonel.
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Robot Soldiers Will Be a Reality—and a Threat
Given the obvious dangers, fully autonomous offensive lethal weapons should never be permitted
By JONATHAN D. MORENO
Much controversy has surrounded the use of remote-controlled drone aircraft or "unmanned aerial vehicles" in the war on terror. But another, still more awe-inducing possibility has emerged: taking human beings out of the decision loop altogether. Emerging brain science could take us there.
Today drone pilots operate thousands of miles away from the battlefield. They must manage vast amounts of data and video images during exceptionally intense workdays. They are scrutinized by superiors for signs of stress, and to reduce such stress the Air Force is attempting shift changes, less physical isolation on the job, and more opportunities for rest.
Yet even as this remarkable new form of war fighting is becoming more widely recognized, there are at least two more possible technological transitions on the horizon that have garnered far less public attention. One is using brain-machine interface technologies to give the remote pilot instantaneous control of the drone through his or her thoughts alone. The technology is not science fiction: Brain-machine interface systems are already being used to help patients with paralytic conditions interact with their environments, like controlling a cursor on a computer screen.
In a military context, a well-trained operator, instead of using a joystick for very complicated equipment, may be able to process and transmit a command much more rapidly and accurately through a veritable mind-meld with the machine.
There are enormous technical challenges to overcome. For example, how sure can we be that the system is not interpreting a fantasy as an intention? Even if such an error were rare it could be deadly and not worth the risk.
Yet there is a way to avoid the errors of brain-machine interface that could change warfare in still more fundamental and unpredictable ways: autonomous weapons systems combining the qualities of human intelligence that neuroscience has helped us understand with burgeoning information and communications technologies.
Even now there are defensive weapons systems on U.S. naval ships that routinely operate on their own, but with human monitoring. A new automated weapons system has been deployed at the demilitarized zone between North and South Korea. This robot sentry is said to be the first that has integrated systems for surveillance, tracking, firing and voice-recognition. Reportedly it has an "automatic" mode that would allow it to fire without a human command, but that mode is not being used.
Robot warriors, proponents argue, would not be subject to the fatigue, fear and fury that often accompany the chaos of combat—emotions can result in accidental injuries to friends or even barbaric cruelties motivated by a thirst for revenge and a sense of power. Others say the proponents of robot warriors are naive: What would inhibit dictators or nonstate actors from developing robotic programs that ignored the laws of war?
Moreover, some security analysts already worry that remote control unacceptably lowers the bar for a technologically superior force to engage in conflict. And will their adversaries, frustrated by their lack of opportunity to confront an enemy in person, be more likely employ robotic terror attacks on soft targets in that enemy's territory? Will this be the death knell of whatever ethos of honor remains in modern military conflict?
Another technology is even more radical. Neuroscientists and philosophers are exploring the parameters of "whole brain emulation," which would involve uploading a mind from a brain into a non-biological substrate. It might be that Moore's Law (the idea that computing capacity doubles about every two years) would have to persist for decades in order for a computer to be sufficiently powerful to receive an uploaded mind. Then again, the leap might come by means of the new science of quantum computing—machines that use atomic mechanical phenomena instead of transistors to manage vast amounts of information. Experiments with quantum computing are already being performed at a number of universities and national laboratories in the United States and elsewhere.
Robotic warriors whose computers are based on whole brain emulation raise a stark question: Would these devices even need human minders? Perhaps, if we're not careful, these creatures could indeed inherit the Earth.
National security planners and arms-control experts have already begun to have conversations about the ethical and legal implications of neurotechnologies and robotics in armed conflict. For it is inevitable that breakthroughs will be incorporated into security and intelligence assets.
The various international agreements about weapons and warfare do not cover the convergence of neuroscience and robotic engineering. Thus new treaties will have to be negotiated, specifying the conditions under which research and deployment may proceed, what kinds of programming rules must be in place, verification procedures, and how human beings will be part of the decision loop.
Given the obvious dangers to human society, fully autonomous offensive lethal weapons should never be permitted. And though the technical possibilities and operational practicalities may take decades to emerge, there is no excuse for not starting to develop new international conventions, which themselves require many years to craft and negotiate before they may be ratified by sovereign states. The next presidential administration should lead the world in taking up this complex but important task.
Mr. Moreno is a professor of medical ethics and health policy at the University of Pennsylvania and a senior fellow of the Center for American Progress. He is the author of "Mind Wars: Brain Research and the Military in the 21st Century" (Bellevue, 2012).
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http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/13/11683248-report-al-qaida-doctors-trained-to-implant-bombs-in-humans?lite
Western intelligence agencies believe that al-Qaida doctors have been trained to implant bombs inside the bodies of suicide bombers, Britain's Sunday Times reported.
The doctors, thought to have been trained by a man who worked with the top bomb-maker for al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have the ability to put explosive compounds in breasts and abdomens of suicide bombers, the newspaper reported without citing its sources.
The lead doctor was thought to have been killed in a drone attack earlier this year and likely worked with the master bomber-maker, Ibrahim al-Asiri, according to the newspaper.
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!!!
A scary development that goes beyond the case (in SA?) where the killer put the bomb up his butt.
What is the solution? Rectal exams? Patting down Muslim women's breasts? or maybe all women's breasts to prove that no profiling is involved , , , These seem , , , invasivie, impractical and politically unpalatable.
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[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=LLCF7vPanrY[/youtube]
This is interesting, cool and scary all at the same time.
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In 2011, the U.S. government spent $76 billion on military research and development. As history has shown, sometimes that investment pays off. And sometimes you end up running from a flaming pig.
http://www.mentalfloss.com/blogs/archives/126647
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/world/special-ops-leader-seeks-new-authority-and-is-denied.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120605
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/grueling-course-for-marine-officers-will-open-its-doors-to-women.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120709
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Special Operations Forces in the Western Pacific
July 17, 2012 | 1059 GMT
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Editor's note: Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a multinational maritime exercise conducted every two years around the Hawaiian Islands, is being held June 27-Aug. 7. This year's exercises mark an important step in the projection of power and interoperability between participating nations as the United States begins its strategic shift toward the Pacific region, particularly with regard to China, the region's rising power, which was not among the 21 nations invited by Washington to participate. This series analyzes the naval capabilities displayed during the exercises and weighs them in the context of regional relationships. Click here for part one, part two and part three.
The Western Pacific's geography, where multiple states continually struggle to balance each other, limits the rapidity and flexibility of significant land forces. As a predominantly maritime environment, most of the states in the region are relatively isolated islands or archipelagos. Even China is much more dependent on the sea than it might seem. Projecting military power across this environment is difficult and requires a large military infrastructure dedicated to air and naval power.
The movement and projection of sizeable, conventional land forces is constrained by a state's ability to either ship or fly them into a battle space and maintain supply lines through secure sea-lanes or airspace. Few states can do this for a large force, and even those with the capability cannot seize or clear every bit of enemy territory. Waging a successful conflict requires good intelligence and a focused strategy as well as a careful allocation of resources.
Special operations forces are highly valuable due to their adaptability to a wide variety of missions and contingencies, the limited resources they require, and their mobility through multiple environments. In the restrictive terrain of the Western Pacific, such advantages can be potentially decisive in any conflict. The region's terrain, combined with differing military imperatives of regional countries, requires the special operations forces of each state to possess distinct characteristics.
The Value of Special Operations
Special operations can be defined as operations conducted in hostile, denied or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives by employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These units require large amounts of time and resources per capita to be effective. Selection of special operations soldiers involves an array of methods designed to detect a potent mixture of intelligence, physical fitness, perseverance, loyalty, and stability under stress. The forces typically operate in small elements (relative to conventional forces) to conduct missions independently. Given their wide mission spectrum, special operations forces require a wide range of skill sets and, thus, a large amount of training.
Special operations units usually have specialized equipment that serve as force multipliers. The forces can be inserted into the battle space through a variety of sea, air and land platforms, providing much of their flexibility, stealth and rapid response capabilities. The relatively small footprint of the forces requires little to no logistical support, which can be the Achilles' heel of larger forces.
Special operation forces can provide intelligence to help direct where conventional resources should be deployed, and they can execute various strategic direct action missions such as raids behind enemy lines, sabotage, targeted assassinations or harassment attacks. They can be designed to handle specific contingencies such as the seizing of weapons of mass destruction in failed-state scenarios, combat search and rescue situations, or the training and coordination of foreign military personnel. The forces also can be trained to operate clandestinely and rapidly in several types of terrain where larger conventional forces would struggle for mobility.
.States decide how to use their special operations forces assets, like any other asset, through a combination of threat assessments, military imperatives and available resources. This means that different special operations forces have unique focuses and missions. Many Western Pacific countries, such as the Philippines and Indonesia, have suffered protracted insurgencies, so their security concerns focus inward. Such countries design their special operations forces for counterterrorism, which requires precision work and highly trained units but limits use in external military operations. For example, Vietnam's Dac Cong unit was established to counter U.S. special operations forces during the Vietnam War, but it has since been used predominantly for counterterrorism and urban defense operations. The unit, as with others like it in the region, rarely considers force projection beyond Vietnamese borders.
To assess a state's ability to project force with special operations units, it is important to consider its selection and training methods, equipment, and manpower. It is equally important to understand how the deployment of such forces aligns with the state's military imperatives and ability to physically move forces into battle spaces in a clandestine and timely manner. Several countries in the Western Pacific -- primarily China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea and Australia -- have focused heavily on developing these forces and emphasized their use in multiple contingencies.
China
Before the 1980s, the war doctrine of China's People's Liberation Army focused on defending the home territory using the military's considerable mass. This doctrine has since evolved into what the Chinese refer to as "winning local wars under conditions of informatization." China's goal is to use flexible forces with technologically advanced weaponry to fight within the immediate region while preventing any intervention by an outside third party such as the United States.
The new doctrine emphasized the development of multiple special operations units attached to regional commands. One common scenario for their use involves a Taiwanese declaration of independence to which Beijing would feel compelled to respond militarily. Under this scenario, mainland units would rapidly infiltrate Taiwanese territories through various air and sea routes to conduct reconnaissance and provide intelligence to commanders about potential strike locations, battle damage assessments and enemy force movements. Chinese special operations forces are also trained to quickly execute direct action engagements aimed at decapitating essential military or political leadership, sabotaging key infrastructure, or creating confusion through harassment attacks. China has not deployed these forces in combat, but their intended use is implied by training and established doctrine.
Japan
The Japan Self-Defense Force operates under a "defense only" doctrine as dictated by Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Since the 1950s, Japan has trained heavily with the U.S. military, which maintains a permanent presence in the country. The U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group is forward deployed in Torii Station, Okinawa, providing a direct working relationship with Japanese special operations forces.
With 6,852 islands spread across a large area, protecting the entirety of Japanese territory is difficult. North Korean infiltrations into these areas, usually comprised of small teams on vessels disguised as fishing boats, and territorial disputes with China that could potentially lead to seizures of disputed islands have shaped a force designed to counter such threats. In 2007, Japan created the 3,200-troop Central Readiness Force for counterterrorism and counter-guerrilla operations. The Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force has a Special Boarding Unit specifically designed to interdict maritime infiltration attempts. Meanwhile, ranger platoons have been integrated into the country's Western Army Infantry Regiment and tasked with the reconnaissance of 180 isolated islands and rapid response responsibilities to deter guerilla actions.
Japan plans to use its special operations forces to detect and repel any territorial infiltration or seizure by hostile actors. Its special operations forces would likely be used to rapidly respond, reconnoiter and then guide Japan's 1st Airborne Brigade and the Japan Self-Defense Force's robust naval and air assets into the disputed area. Japan's challenge is that the country cannot occupy all of its territory in the face of outside threats. Rather than spreading its forces thin, Japan has developed a strategy of relying on special operations response units to rapidly thwart violations. The country rarely operates outside its own territory due to constitutional constraints, but it has the capability to do so.
The Koreas
The special operations forces of both North Korea and South Korea are designed primarily for use against each other. The Koreas have maintained an uneasy armistice since the July 1953 cease-fire that halted the Korean War. Resumption of conflict has remained an ever-present possibility requiring both sides to continually plan for military contingences. The variety of these contingencies and the constant rebalancing of forces has motivated both sides to heavily rely on special operations forces.
The most striking characteristic of North Korea's special operations force is its purported size, estimated to be around 200,000 members. The North does not have the logistical assets to project a majority of this force beyond the Korean Peninsula. Small elements of its force have been quite active and are known for kidnappings, assassinations and infiltrations throughout South Korea, Japan and China. The North Koreans can also conduct other special operations such as sabotage and reconnaissance. However, the force's primary task -- and the probable reasoning for its size and majority stationing along the Demilitarized Zone -- is to move behind South Korean lines at any outbreak of hostilities and open a second front. This would generally serve to harass and tie down South Korean forces.
The South's special operations forces are designed similarly to those of the United States in that each branch of its armed forces has a designated special operations force that helps to enable its branch's mission set. This is an outgrowth of the South Korean military's close cooperation and training with the U.S. military for the decades following the Korean War. These units work for Special Operations Command Korea, which reports directly to the commander of the combined U.S./U.N. forces. Any usage of these forces would be coordinated with all U.S. regional assets, including those in Japan.
One tasking is to be prepared for any number of wildcard scenarios that North Korea is potentially capable of executing and mitigating their effects, whether through kidnapping attempts, terrorist attacks or even the securing of weapons of mass destruction in the event of the collapse of the North. Due to the nature of the ongoing tensions, South Korea's special operations forces also generally stay focused on the peninsula.
Australia
Australia is one of the most geographically isolated countries in the world and, as such, relies heavily on its sea-lanes. This requires the country to seek the assistance of the dominant naval power in the world to help secure its sea-lanes, since it cannot do so itself. This alliance imperative has compelled the Australian military to be consistently involved in conflict throughout the 20th and 21st centuries. The institutional knowledge gained through such vast experience has created a highly professional special operations forces community that has consistently worked in conjunction with U.S. and British units.
Australia's special operations forces are very similar in form and function to the British model. While considered small in comparison to similar units in the region, they are well-equipped and well-trained, and Australia has the necessary transportation infrastructure to project its forces quickly and clandestinely throughout the world. Australian forces have also garnered the most combat experience by far compared to any other country in the region given their participation in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan over the past decade.
In any conflict in the Western Pacific, it is likely that the United States will be involved in some capacity, along with Australia. Being regional experts, Australian special operations forces would be relied upon even more heavily to support and work within a coalition similar to that seen in other regions over the past decade.
Special operations forces should be viewed like any other military asset that can be designed to operate in a specific environment and have a desired effect on the battlefield. The nature of these forces allows them to be quite flexible in missions and highly mobile. Their ability to insert clandestinely into a given battle space on a variety of land, sea or air platforms makes them well-suited for the unique geography of the Western Pacific. This has led to the formation of many unique units specifically tailored to the countries for which they operate. Any state engaged in hostilities within this region will need the unrivalled capabilities that these units provide.
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The Coming Defense Crack-Up
The Commander in Chief smiles into a damaging sequester..Article Comments (76) more in Opinion | Find New $LINKTEXTFIND$ ».smaller Larger facebooktwittergoogle pluslinked ininShare.0EmailPrintSave ↓ More .
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Some policy train wrecks in Washington are sudden. Then there's the catastrophe playing out in slow motion known as defense sequestration.
Barring Presidential leadership soon, the Pentagon will be walloped with another deep and disproportionate funding cut—around 9% across the board, or nearly $50 billion a year for a decade. Under last year's Budget Control Act, President Obama and Congress need to agree on new federal savings to stop these cuts from hitting on January 2.
Like an audience at a horror movie, nearly everyone paying attention is yelling "watch out!" into a political and media void. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey calls sequestration "an unacceptable risk" that will "increase the likelihood of conflict" in a world with a weaker America. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta says it's "unworkable" and "a disaster" that will "hollow out the force and inflict severe damage to our national defense."
The Commander in Chief? Preoccupied by his re-election campaign since, oh, last summer, Mr. Obama is missing in action. Led by California's Buck McKeon, the House of Representatives in May adopted a plan to offset the defense and other cuts due next year with reductions elsewhere in the budget. The White House promised a veto, and Majority Leader Harry Reid won't schedule a Senate vote.
Democrat Carl Levin and Republicans John McCain and Kelly Ayotte are floating ideas to spare the Pentagon, but they can't overcome Presidential obstruction. Despite bipartisan pleas, the White House budget office has refused even to answer questions from Congress about how the cuts would be applied across federal agencies.
Democratic leaders say sequestration hits defense and other programs equally by splitting the $1.2 trillion down the middle. Senator Reid says he "is not going to move off" this defense cliff, adding that "It's a balanced approach to reduce the deficit that shares the pain as well as the responsibility."
Not quite. If implemented, the Pentagon budget would be cut by another 9% (or $492 billion) over the next decade, on top of the $487 billion in cuts that are already planned. Defense accounts for the largest share of total sequestration, or 42.6%, according to the Congressional Budget Office.
A mere 14.8% would come from entitlement programs, which would be cut by $171 billion—or less than 1%. Social Security and Medicare are exempt, and cuts to Medicaid would be capped at 2%. Spending on entitlements is five times larger than defense, and growing. The rest of the cuts would be taken out of nondefense discretionary programs.
The Pentagon is the one part of the federal government that Mr. Obama has consistently tried to shrink. Coming into office, he squeezed $350 billion out of weapons programs, and he followed this year with $487 billion more over the next decade. The Administration's proposed fiscal 2013 Pentagon budget is the first in 15 years to decline in nominal terms. The sequestration cuts would leave the defense budget some 30% smaller in 10 years.
Defense shouldn't be immune from cuts, but Mr. Obama's policy choices are turning America into an entitlement state with a shrinking military—in other words, Europe. The U.S. would be left with the smallest Navy since World War I, the smallest ground forces in 70 years, and at just over 2.5% of GDP the smallest defense budget since Pearl Harbor.
Sequestration compounds the damage because the cuts would be automatic and indiscriminate. The Pentagon now concedes that funding for the war in Afghanistan would be hit, contrary to past assurances. So would current operations in the Persian Gulf. Training programs, equipment maintenance and military benefits are affected too. Defense contractor Lockheed Martin says the law obliges it to send layoff warnings as soon as October to most of its 123,000 workers—the kind of manufacturing jobs Democrats claim to love.
After a decade of hard wars, the military has worn down its equipment and delayed upgrades and important maintenance. The end of the Iraq deployment and the withdrawal from Afghanistan offer an opportunity to modernize forces, which the Obama cuts will prevent. With China spending lavishly on its military and the Middle East unsettled, Americans may come to regret this as much as we did the rash cuts after previous wars.
Mr. Obama knows all this from his own Pentagon's warnings, so why is he inviting a crack-up? The answer is that he wants to use GOP concerns about defense to bludgeon Republicans into accepting a huge tax increase. Republicans were unwise to accept the sequestration deal while leaving entitlements off the table, thus handing Mr. Obama more leverage.
But perhaps they never expected that a Commander in Chief who swore an oath to safeguard America's national security would play such a dangerous game. It's not the first time this President's political cynicism has been underestimated.
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The Enduring Importance of Anti-Submarine Warfare
July 24, 2012 | 1036 GMT
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Editor's note: Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC), a multinational maritime exercise conducted every two years around the Hawaiian Islands, is being held June 27-Aug. 7. This year's exercises mark an important step in the projection of power and interoperability between participating nations as the United States begins its strategic shift toward the Pacific region, particularly with regard to China, the region's rising power, which was not among the 21 nations invited by Washington to participate. This series analyzes the naval capabilities displayed during the exercises and weighs them in the context of regional relationships. Click here for parts one, two, three and four.
As the United States allocates additional resources to support its new strategy in the Western Pacific, the U.S. military will need to contend with operational dynamics beyond those pertaining to counterinsurgency, which has been the focus of its efforts for the past decade. Extended sea lanes dominate the maritime geography, requiring air and naval assets to play a major role in the projection of force.
Among the most important of these assets are submarines, which are increasingly crowding the waters of the Western Pacific. Well aware of the regional proliferation of submarines, the U.S. Navy and other navies in the region are developing and focusing on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The United States and Japan maintain the strongest such capabilities in the Western Pacific, but the Chinese have been strengthening their own anti-submarine forces. ASW capabilities are difficult and expensive to develop, but regional navies will remain vulnerable to threats posed by submarines without such investments.
Modern Anti-Submarine Warfare
World War I marked the advent of anti-submarine warfare. Threatened by Germany's unrestricted submarine warfare campaign, the United Kingdom developed an effective means of finding and destroying the boats. Anti-submarine warfare expanded in World War II, when new tactics and equipment such as patrol aircraft, radar and sonar systems and escorted convoys enabled Allied forces to subdue the German submarine threat. Modern anti-submarine warfare is complex and difficult, involving multitudes of disparate sensors and platforms ranging from aircraft to sonobuoys (expendable sonar systems) to other submarines.
.The difficulty of modern anti-submarine warfare is apparent in the Western Pacific, which consists of a mix of shallow, littoral waters and deeper waters. Anti-submarine warfare is far more difficult to wage in the noisy and contact-dense littoral environments typical of the South China Sea and the East China Sea. In these areas, acoustic energy from passive and active sonar propagation is more likely to reflect off the seabed than in deeper waters, such as in the Philippine Sea. Thus, U.S., Japanese and Chinese submarines operating in shallow waters will be better able to operate undetected, but they will also lie within closer range of land-based ASW aircraft. Chokepoints are also a major consideration in a Western Pacific ASW campaign, with the Ryukyu Islands passageway and the Luzon Strait providing the main access points for Chinese vessels into the Philippine Sea.
The United States
The United States improved its anti-submarine capabilities during the Cold War to contend with the large Soviet submarine fleet. Washington developed versatile helicopters that could easily take off from medium and large ships, as well as long-range weapons, such as anti-submarine torpedoes. It also deployed advanced detection sensors in strategic naval chokepoints such as the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap.
Threats posed by submarines decreased markedly after the end of the Cold War, but the need for ASW capabilities re-emerged recently due to the spread of diesel-electric submarines. The emphasis on supporting land wars in Asia over the past decade has led the U.S. Navy to neglect the continuous development of its ASW skills. According to the Navy, P-3 Orion aircraft, which are well suited to anti-submarine warfare, have spent three to four times as much time conducting intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance over land since 2001 as practicing ASW operations. Prior to 2001, the Orion fleet spent twice as much time training in anti-submarine warfare than in general intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations.
However, the U.S. nuclear-powered attack submarine fleet remains particularly deadly in an ASW capacity. During the Cold War, U.S. attack submarines were charged primarily with tracking and hunting down Soviet nuclear attack and ballistic missile submarines. Thus, the U.S. navy gained a substantial amount of ASW institutional knowledge and, unlike the P-3 Orion fleet, U.S. attack submarines did not suspend their ASW training over the past decade.
The United States had hoped to deploy littoral combat ships, which are particularly adept at shallow-water operations. The diesel-electric submarines currently produced en masse by China mostly operate in littoral zones. However, there have been developmental delays in the littoral combat ships' ASW module, which is not expected to enter service until 2016.
China
Still, the United States is in a markedly better position to conduct anti-submarine warfare than China, which has only limited ASW capabilities, particularly against a force like the U.S. Navy. During their attempts to bolster their anti-access/area-denial capabilities, the Chinese have recognized the need for enhanced ASW operations. However, China is merely entering this stage of naval development, and it lacks the assets and institutional knowledge of the United States.
Currently, there are no major surface vessels in the Chinese navy optimized for anti-submarine warfare. China also lacks anti-submarine aviation platforms. Cognizant of these deficiencies, the Chinese have been strengthening their capabilities by intensifying ASW exercises and developing new maritime patrol/ASW aircraft based on the Y-8 platform. But these measures will take years before making a noticeable impact. In the meantime, Beijing will continue to prioritize the use of naval mines to combat submarines. While potentially effective, this approach is cumbersome and inflexible.
The Chinese have made some advances in the construction of maritime enforcement vessels, some of which could be upgraded with anti-submarine equipment. Given the large number of these vessels, such upgrades could provide Beijing with a large, if less-efficient and less-trained, anti-submarine force.
Moreover, China has developed improved sonar array technology for submarine detection. The Chinese have also expanded their investments in sea floor mapping, which will provide them with better situational awareness about the conduct of submarine and anti-submarine operations. But despite these efforts, anti-submarine warfare will continue to be the weakest aspect in China's anti-access/area-denial arsenal for the foreseeable future.
Japan
As an island nation, Japan is fully dependent on sea access for its imports and exports. Having suffered heavily from an effective U.S. anti-submarine campaign during World War II, Japan understands the gravity of a submarine threat. Indeed, Tokyo has been prioritizing development of ASW capabilities since before the Chinese and others began expanding their Western Pacific submarine fleets.
As early as 1977, Japan purchased and subsequently produced the P-3 Orion aircraft. Currently, Japan boasts the second largest fleet of maritime patrol/ASW aircraft in the world (behind only the United States), and the bulk of Japan's naval aviation is committed to ASW operations. Japan also possesses several modern ASW surface combatants, such as the Takanami class destroyers, and is developing the Kawasaki P-1 aircraft to replace the slower and older P-3 Orions.
China's advances in fielding modern submarines over the past decade has prompted Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force to devote much of its training to anti-submarine warfare, particularly in exercises combining surface vessels, aircraft and submarines. Anti-submarine warfare remains one of the core competencies of the Japanese navy. In the future, the Japanese are set to invest even more resources and training in maintaining and enhancing this capability.
Given the large numbers of advanced submarines being developed by most Western Pacific countries, enhancing and developing ASW capabilities is critical -- especially for the United States as it bolsters its presence the region. The United States and Japan are particularly concerned with China's growing undersea threat, and China increasingly is seeking to improve its ability to deter threats posed by U.S. submarine in counterintervention scenarios. All sides will ensure that their anti-submarine capabilities endure.
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Read more: The Enduring Importance of Anti-Submarine Warfare | Stratfor
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http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2012/08/more-effective-and-more-efficient-increasing-military-power-with-less-money-.html#more
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http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2012/08/the-deficit-of-strategic-thinking-and-the-ryan-plan-.html#more
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Former SEAL Writes a Book; Cue Indignation
'No Easy Day,' about the bin Laden raid, joins a multimedia tradition
By OWEN WEST
AND BING WEST
Tuesday brought the news that "No Easy Day," a firsthand account of the 2011 raid on the Osama bin Laden compound written by a former Navy SEAL and due to be published on Sept. 11, had been discovered already on sale in a bookshop. Its contents are being widely discussed, the publisher has moved up publication to Sept. 4—and the brouhaha over the appropriateness of Matt Bissonnette's writing the book is only going to increase.
Please, spare us the outrage, or at least most of it. The U.S. Special Operations Command has expressed indignation about "No Easy Day," which will be published under the nom de plume Mark Owen, even though Mr. Bissonnette's bid for anonymity has been foiled. If the author violated his classified nondisclosure agreement, he must accept the consequences. Submitting the book for pre-approval would have avoided investigation by the Pentagon, which is currently checking the manuscript.
But to label this book as an unprecedented breach of security reflects a confused understanding of an equally confused policy. Mr. Bissonnette has joined a tradition of SEAL best sellers. While the U.S. Army Delta force remains the silent service, over a decade of war the SEALs have garnered extraordinary publicity.
.During World War II, President Truman complained that the Marines had a public relations man in every squad. But even we Marines had to rely on John Wayne for our Hollywood fame. Earlier this year saw the release of the action movie "Act of Valor," a box-office success ($80 million so far) starring active-duty SEALs and developed with the organization's thorough input.
The indignation about "No Easy Day" was stirred because the author violated the supposed SEAL code of secrecy. Mr. Bissonnette will have to straighten out his personal relationship with his former comrades, many of whom are no doubt disappointed by his project. But that code of silence has not prevented a flood of SEAL books over the past two decades. The dozen best-selling SEAL-written books on Amazon.com, including "Lone Survivor" and "American Sniper," along with the film "Act of Valor," may have given our enemies a detailed understanding of SEAL procedures, but also a healthy respect for their skills.
Mr. Bissonnette's critics in the armed forces and media would do well to distinguish between one warrior who was on the front lines, writing about what he experienced, and the leaks about military matters that have been coming from the top of our government. The written law and the moral burden of protecting the nation have been violated in a much more extreme fashion by the inner council of President Obama, resulting in the severe compromise of methods and sources.
One American official provided exquisite details about how the U.S. collaborated with Israel to launch cyber attacks that destroyed Iranian centrifuges. Iran later arrested several technicians, accusing them of collaboration with the Americans.
In the case of Osama bin Laden, the White House leaked so many details of the raid that a Pakistani doctor was later sentenced to 33 years in prison for helping to locate the al Qaeda leader. The administration even allowed a Hollywood crew to visit the White House to replicate details for an upcoming movie. Early reports indicate that Mr. Bissonnette's version of events contradicts some of those details, including when exactly bin Laden was first shot and whether he was armed.
We may never know which version is true. What's certain is that the leaks from the top caused grave harm to sensitive programs and adversely affected the lives of foreign nationals who worked with us. The leaks damaged U.S. relations with other countries and individuals who have put their faith in us but may be wary of doing so in the future. Worst of all, the leaks undermined American trust in our top officials.
Owen West is the author of "The Snake Eaters: Counterinsurgency Advisors in Combat" (Free Press, 2012); Bing West is the co-author, with Medal of Honor recipient Sgt. Dakota Meyer, of "Into the Fire: A Firsthand Account of the Most Extraordinary Battle in the Afghan War" (Random House, 2012). The Wests both served in Marine Corps combat infantry.
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NYT
WASHINGTON — Three times so far this year, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the regional war-fighting commanders have assembled at a military base south of the capital, where a giant map of the world, larger than a basketball court, was laid out on the ground, giving the sessions an appearance of a lethally earnest game of Risk.
The generals and admirals walked the world and worked their way through a series of potential national security crises, locked in debate over what kind of military — its size, its capability — the nation will require in the next five years.
“Strategic seminar” is the name Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has chosen for these daylong sessions, which were not exactly a war game more than a tabletop military exercise, and unlike anything the Pentagon has done to plan its future.
Shortly after being sworn in as chairman last October, a decade after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, General Dempsey said the military was confronting “a strategic inflection point, where the institution fundamentally re-examines itself.” The seminar project he started fits his goal: to try to build the right military force for five years from now — and not be driven by the budget cycle into a series of year-by-year decisions.
The overarching question is whether the Pentagon’s war plans need to be rewritten to take into account how the military has been affected by a decade of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now by orders to shrink to fit mandated budget cuts. While the list of potential adversaries and the rising threats remain classified, the assessments from the sessions already are reshaping military planning. Initial findings have been presented to President Obama by General Dempsey, officials said.
One realization is that under any situation in which the United States is in an armed conflict within five years, American territory most likely would be attacked as part of an adversary’s actions, regardless of where the major fighting was focused overseas. That attack might be direct, by missile, or more asymmetrical, as in terrorism or via a computer-network cyberattack.
“In the future, our homeland will not be the sanctuary it has been,” General Dempsey told a recent military conference, during which he pulled back the curtain — a bit — on the strategic seminar project.
As a result of that seminar, General Dempsey said, the military’s Northern Command, responsible for defending United States territory, has begun work with the Department of Homeland Security, the F.B.I. and other domestic agencies to assess how potential demands for military forces overseas might affect security at home, and how any shortfalls could be resolved.
Another lesson from the seminars is that the Pentagon might have to organize and deploy forces in a different way than war plans now dictate if there is another major conflict overseas and simultaneously a significant attack at home, or the need to manage a catastrophic, domestic natural disaster.
“We assumed a conflict someplace, and we flowed the forces required to that conflict,” General Dempsey said. “We created a scenario where the homeland was attacked — or even if it wasn’t attacked, where there might have been some natural disaster. And it was remarkable.”
General Dempsey acknowledged that the Pentagon had long believed “there’s always enough at home to deal with whatever happens, even while we’re fighting conflict elsewhere,” especially if the National Guard or reserves were used. After the seminar, he noted, “We might have to challenge that assumption.”
Gen. Ray Odierno, the Army chief of staff, told a public forum sponsored by the magazine Foreign Affairs that the seminars reshaped his thinking on the number of troops needed over the coming years.
“We are, as the Joint Chiefs and the combatant commanders, going through a series of strategic exercises now run by the chairman that helps us continue to sort through this and to make sure we are identifying all the issues that are out there,” General Odierno said. At each of the sessions, the civilian leadership is represented by Ashton B. Carter, the deputy defense secretary.
Officials said the seminars, held at Marine Corps Base Quantico, in Virginia, are built around realistic scenarios for 2017. Like a traditional war game, they are chock-full of specifics about available troops and weapons, and with specific challenges to account for the tyranny of time, distance, weather and unexpected actions by the adversary.
But they also have aspects of a more academic seminar, in that the daylong events, the fourth of which is set for this month, invite differences of opinion — even disruptive thinking, participants say — while forcing the armed service chiefs who provide the personnel and weapons to work alongside the commanders who will use them in war.
The seminars, according to one senior participant, are “designed for us to ask uncomfortable questions about potential U.S. national military vulnerabilities in future conflicts” over the next five years.
“Given what we think potential adversaries can do, given what we think potential allies can do and given what we think we can do — do we need to make some changes?” said the senior official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to give a sense of the intellectual and practical themes under discussion. “Let’s try to anticipate the future, to answer questions like, ‘How can we fight better? How could we fight differently? What new partners should we be seeking? How serious are the threats that we’re facing?’ ”
General Dempsey described the new era through a medium that seemed to also define it — his Facebook page.
Discussing the first seminar, he wrote that it would “challenge our assumptions about the future security environment in 2017 and assess both the capability and the capacity of the Joint Force: that is, what can it do, how quickly, and for how long. I expect this seminar will produce a broad set of questions that will inform future seminars and eventually assist us in revising operational plans in execution of our strategy.”
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"That is why I took up the gun — not to shoot, not to kill, not to destroy, but to stop those who would do evil, to protect the vulnerable, to defend democratic values, to stand up for the freedom we have to talk … about how we can make the world a better place.”
http://www.ted.com/talks/peter_van_uhm_why_i_chose_a_gun.html
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http://www.democracyarsenal.org/2012/09/analyzing-romneys-f-22-suggestion-.html
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/09/18/the_seven_deadly_sins_of_john_brennan
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http://m.military.com/daily-news/2012/09/21/xm25-punisher-finds-home-in-infantry-squads.html?ESRC=dod_A.nl
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http://www.businessinsider.com/after-wasting-5-billion-dollars-the-army-is-eyeing-these-brand-new-camoflauge-patterns-2012-9
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second post
http://www.businessinsider.com/sergei-skorobogatov-defends-backdoor-claims-2012-5
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Curious U.S. and French Military Deployments
September 28, 2012 | 2008 GMT
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Summary
IAN HITCHCOCK/Getty Images
Four F/A-18 Super Hornets from U.S. Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 314
Stratfor has received multiple reports of U.S. and French military movements that we would like to highlight to our readers. These movements could have multiple explanations and might not be linked. But given the numerous ongoing crises specifically centered in North Africa and the Middle East, we consider these developments to be worth following.
Analysis
According to a worldwide network of aircraft spotters and trackers, at least a dozen MC-130H, HC-130N, HC-130P and AC-130U military transport planes and gunships crossed the Atlantic Ocean on Sept. 13 heading eastbound. These aircraft are typically used for a variety of special tasks, including in close cooperation with special operations forces. The last reported stop for the aircraft was Souda Bay, Crete. It is unclear whether the aircraft have left Crete, but we are working on tracking them down.
VIDEO: Taliban Attack on NATO Base (Dispatch)
.A week and a half later, on Sept. 24, the same network of aircraft spotters noted 12 U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 Hornet fighter jets arriving in two waves at Moron air base in Spain. It is not known where the squadron is heading, though it could be en route to Afghanistan to reinforce elements there. The Harrier squadron that suffered heavy losses in the Sept. 14 attack on Camp Bastion has already been replaced by another Harrier unit, so it is unlikely that the squadron's deployment is directly linked to that event. It is also possible that the F/A-18s are heading to the Gulf Cooperation Council region. A number of air superiority squadrons, including an F-22 Raptor squadron, have already deployed to the region. If that is the case, the squadron is intended simply as reinforcements or replacements for assets currently deployed there.
Also on Sept. 24, The New York Times published an article stating that Iraq and the United States were negotiating an agreement that could result in the return of small units of U.S. soldiers to Iraq on training missions. At the request of the Iraqi government, according to U.S. Gen. Robert Caslen, a unit of Army special operations soldiers was recently deployed to Iraq to advise on counterterrorism and to help with intelligence. It is possible that at least some of the MC-130 aircraft previously mentioned were delivering these special operations troops to Iraq.
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Another report on Sept. 24, this one by the Le Figaro French-language newspaper, said some 100 French special operations troops had been deployed in the sub-Saharan region to counteract militants in northern Mali. Le Figaro also reported that maritime patrol aircraft that can be used to collect intelligence will be deployed to the region and that commandos of the French navy will reinforce the French special operations troops.
Finally, Italian journalist Guido Olimpio reported in September that U.S. unmanned aerial vehicles are currently tracking militants in Cyrenaica, the historical name for eastern Libya. He also said "reliable sources" had confirmed that U.S. special operations forces were planning to carry out intelligence operations that could be in preparation for surgical strikes in North Africa, including in Libya and in Mali.
All these deployments could be previously scheduled movements for training or part of ongoing operations. They also do not necessarily mean any one mission is imminent. The United States and France could simply be positioning military assets in a region that is rife with conflict and that may eventually require rapid military intervention or action.
Whatever the intent, these deployments, taken together, are too compelling to ignore. Given the fluid conflicts in North Africa, Syria and Afghanistan, as well as the current tensions with Iran, these movements and reports are important to highlight to our readers.
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Read more: Curious U.S. and French Military Deployments | Stratfor
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http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/10/13/14421340-navy-nuclear-cruiser-submarine-collide-off-east-coast-no-injuries-reported?lite
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http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/10/17/first-women-fail-marine-infantry-officer-course.html?ESRC=marine-a.nl
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http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/10/navy-robot-gangnam-style/#more-94720
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This seems epochal to me:
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/today-we-turned-science-fiction-into-science-fact-latest-on-the-new-missile-that-can-fry-electronics/
What a perfect "We insist" tool for Iran's nuke program!!!
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A Game of Battleship?
Obama would need Romney's Navy to fulfill his own military strategy. .
'And so the question is not a game of Battleship, where we're counting ships. It's what are our capabilities.
That was President Obama at Monday night's debate, rebuking Mitt Romney for noting that the U.S.Navy is the smallest it's been in nearly a century and may soon get smaller. It would be nice to think the President has been up late reading Alfred Thayer Mahan. To judge by the rest of his remarks on the subject, he hasn't.
We mean Mr. Obama's well-rehearsed jibe that "we also have fewer horses and bayonets" than we did during World War I. This was followed by the observation that "we have these things called aircraft carriers, where planes land on them. We have these ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines."
Yes, Mr. President. And we have fewer of all of those things, too.
When the Soviet Union fell in 1991, the Navy counted 529 ships in the fleet, including 15 aircraft carriers and 121 nuclear submarines. In 2001 the Navy was down to 316 ships, with 12 carriers and 73 subs. In 2011 the numbers were 285, 11 and 71, respectively. On current trajectory, Mr. Romney said, "we're headed down to the low 200s," a figure Mr. Obama did not dispute.
The President is right that the ships the U.S. puts to sea today are, for the most part, much more capable than they were 20 or 30 years ago. But that's true only up to a point. Aegis cruisers and destroyers responsible for defending their immediate battle space are now taking on the additional role of providing ballistic missile defense. The tasks multiply, but the ships aren't getting any additional missile tubes.
A smaller fleet is also more stressed. The usual model for ship rotations—one-third deployed, one-third preparing for deployment, and one-third in overhaul—has given way to a reality in which 40% of the fleet is deployed and another 19% is underway for training operations. As one Naval friend with recent command experience tells us, "we are crushing our sailors."
A smaller fleet is also more vulnerable for the simple reason that the loss of even a single ship removes a proportionately larger share of total capability.
Today's ships can see and shoot farther than ever. But defensive technologies haven't kept pace. In 2006, a high-tech Israeli corvette built by Northrop Grumman NOC -0.42%was badly damaged by an antiship missile of Chinese design fired by Hezbollah. In 2007, a Chinese diesel-electric sub surfaced within torpedo range of the USS Kitty Hawk, having gone undetected by the aircraft carrier or battle group.
Then there is the Strait of Hormuz, through which flows much of the world's oil. When the U.S. last confronted Iranian mines in the tanker wars of the 1980s, the Navy could deploy 22 minesweepers. Today it has 14.
For years, Navy brass pushed 313 ships as the number needed to fulfill their core tasks. In fairness to President Obama, he has slightly increased the size of the fleet, to 287 ships today, since it reached a historic low of 278 in 2007. But even the 313 goal is insufficient, mainly because it would include 55 Littoral Combat Ships that are fast and sleek but have limited capabilities and are highly vulnerable in the shallow coastal waters in which they are intended to operate.
A larger irony is that Mr. Obama has ordered the so-called pivot to Asia, where America is primarily a maritime power. Last we checked the Pacific had gotten no smaller. China is rapidly modernizing and expanding its fleet while staking out maritime claims in the South and East China Seas. When the Administration announced its new defense strategy in January, the Navy was supposed to be spared the brunt of defense cuts precisely for that reason.
Concerns about ship numbers may seem passé. They also seemed passé to many in the late 19th century, which is exactly why Mahan wrote "The Influence of Sea Power Upon History." If we've again become cavalier about maintaining the freedom of the seas, it's because a powerful U.S. Navy has accustomed us to indifference. Weaken the Navy further, and that's a luxury we'll lose.
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My Line on Defense—No More Cuts
When Congress meets after the election, it should reduce the debt without taking a dollar more from the military..
By JOE LIEBERMAN
There is broad consensus that when Congress reconvenes in November, it must act to prevent sequestration. That is the $500 billion cut in defense spending scheduled to go into effect on Jan. 2, which all parties agree would be catastrophic for our national security.
But as we contemplate proposals to ward off sequestration, we must not lose sight of a larger truth: Our armed forces are already under unprecedented strain because of the $487 billion in defense cuts imposed by the Budget Control Act last year. This budget reduction is delaying critical modernization programs and forcing our military to slash manpower and force structure.
That is why, in the post-election session of Congress, I won't support any debt-reduction package that requires our military to accept further cuts.
The reductions in military spending that we have already accepted weren't driven by improvements in the strategic climate facing our country. Contrary to claims that the "tide of war is receding," our national-security threats are becoming more complex and no less demanding or urgent.
We have made significant progress in recent years against al Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan. But the group's Islamist extremist affiliates and allies have made inroads elsewhere—including Yemen, Syria and Mali, where al Qaeda's North African branch has established a haven in a vast swath of territory. In the Persian Gulf, Iran's pursuit of asymmetric capabilities (including missiles, mines and submarines) is compelling us to expand our naval and air presences there, not draw them down. Then there is the Asia-Pacific region, where China's double-digit growth in military spending and assertive behavior against neighbors (including U.S. treaty allies) is unsettling the regional balance of power.
To address these challenges, the Obama administration's "Defense Strategic Guidance" rightly pledges more rotational deployments across the globe to reassure our friends, deter our adversaries, and protect our national interests. But the truth is that our military is simply too small to do everything that is being asked of it. While our forces' high operational tempo is less visible than it was at the height of the Iraq War, it is no less stressful on our servicemembers and their families.
Consider that the Navy's 285-ship fleet is already slated to decline by nine ships by 2015. That means longer cruises with less time between deployments for ships to receive needed maintenance and for sailors to recuperate. Thus the USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group completed a seven-month deployment to the Persian Gulf in March, spent five months at home, then began an eight-month deployment in August. The USS Enterprise and USS Carl Vinson strike groups have faced similar schedules in the past two years—a pace that senior Navy officials have said is wearing out ships and straining crews.
The cuts already enacted are similarly causing the Air Force to buy fewer planes despite persistent demands on its declining force, which increasingly relies on aging aircraft produced during the Cold War. Under its budget for the coming fiscal year, the Air Force will procure the fewest aircraft since becoming an independent service 65 years ago.
For the Army and Marine Corps, last year's cuts mean 92,000 troops forced out over the next five years, including tens of thousands of involuntary separations—layoffs, effectively.
Some people attempt to justify these cuts by arguing that our military won't face the same demands that it has over the past decade. But it is unwise to assume away dangers. One of the clearest lessons I draw from my 24 years in the Senate is that, despite our best efforts, events will inevitably take us by surprise—as did the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the 9/11 attacks, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring. The only thing we can know about the decade ahead is that further strategic surprises lie in store.
That is why it is so critical for our military to be modernized and manned for the full range of missions that it may be called upon to carry out in defense of our security, liberty and values. I fear that is not where America's armed forces are headed if we cut more from the defense budget.
We must put our country's fiscal house in order—but not at the expense of our security. Sequestration of both defense and nondefense accounts can and must be avoided by a bipartisan debt-reduction package that deals with the real drivers of our fiscal problem: entitlement spending and insufficient revenue.
Protecting the American people is the most important responsibility that the Constitution gives the federal government, and our defense budget's trajectory signals to the American people—and to our friends and enemies around the world—how strongly committed we are to that responsibility.
That is why, when Congress reconvenes after the election, I will do everything I can to stop the additional $500 billion in defense cuts. Because so much has already been taken from the U.S. military, I will oppose any deal that cuts one dollar more from our national defense. America's security cannot afford it.
Mr. Lieberman is an Independent senator from Connecticut.
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second post
Digest • October 26, 2012
A National Security Strategy for a Strong America
"Whatever enables us to go to war, secures our peace." --Thomas Jefferson
Foreign policy is by no means the number-one issue for voters in this election, but national defense is, as John Adams put it, "one of the cardinal duties of a statesman." Taking a look around the world, particularly at continually emerging details about the embassy attack in Benghazi and the way Iran is applying Obama's campaign slogan, "Forward," to its nuclear program, it was a bad time for the president to have a debate on foreign policy.
Before we even get into the details, we'll just let former CIA chief and retired Air Force four-star Michael Hayden sum it up: "You had two men on stage. One was president. The other was presidential."
Indeed, Mitt Romney's goal Monday night was simply to be presidential. Unfortunately, that led to a few too many agreements with and pats on the back for Barack Obama, whether it was agreeing with the ready-or-not 2014 withdrawal deadline for Afghanistan or praising Obama that "it's wonderful that Libya seems to be making some progress." It was good that Romney followed our advice on Libya and didn't get bogged down debating the minutia -- that's for surrogates and others to handle -- but he should have made the larger point that the deception on Benghazi surely means Obama can't be trusted.
From a strategic perspective, Obama couldn't be more misguided, wrong and, in many ways, dangerous. For example, the president would like Americans to believe that al-Qa'ida died when he (actually the Navy SEALs) killed Osama bin Laden, though the murderous 9/11 terrorist attack in Libya proved this a farce. And he continues to conflate quitting the war in Afghanistan with winning it.
When it came to the military budget -- one of the precious few federal expenditures actually authorized by the Constitution -- Obama employed his usual strategy of deflecting blame. Massive automatic cuts are scheduled to hit the military budget come January through sequestration, but he said, "First of all, the sequester is not something that I proposed. It's something that Congress has proposed." And, he promised, "It will not happen." Well, the president does know a thing or two about skirting Congress to "get things done." Let the record show, however, that sequestration originated in the White House, and Obama signed the cuts into law.
He continued to distort the record, saying, "The budget that we're talking about is not reducing our military spending, it's maintaining it." In normal budget parlance, he might be correct. Politicians frequently speak of "cuts" that are in reality only reductions in the growth rate. However, his assertion in this case simply isn't true. As the Heritage Foundation notes, "Here are the numbers from his Office of Management and Budget from this year's budget request. In fiscal year 2010, defense spending was $721.3 billion in budget authority. Under the President's proposal, defense spending will fall to $566.3 billion in fiscal year 2014. This is a 21 percent reduction in just four years."
The president repeatedly accuses his challenger of wanting "to spend another $2 trillion on military spending that our military's not asking for," but Romney merely wants to stop Obama's cuts. Obama likes to claim that we'll save $800 billion by winding down the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, but rather than "investing" that money in bankrupt solar panel companies, perhaps we should upgrade our military capability. We're not of the opinion that every dollar spent on the military is sacred, but after two wars, our military's equipment could use some repair and replacement.
A prime example of needed spending is the Navy, which Romney pointed out "is smaller now than any time since 1917. The Navy said they needed 313 ships to carry out their mission. We're now down to 285." And if sequestration goes through, that number will shrink further. It was here that Obama struck back with his most childish, petulant response of the evening: "Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses and bayonets because the nature of our military's changed. We have these things called aircraft carriers where planes land on them. We have these ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines. And so the question is not a game of Battleship where we're counting ships. It's what are our capabilities."
While technology has changed quite a bit since Ronald Reagan's tenure, the fundamentals are the same. Reagan left us with a 600-ship Navy, because he understood that no matter the capabilities, a ship can be in only one location at a time, and peace in the world depends on the U.S. Navy being in many locations. Nimitz-class aircraft carriers remain the workhorses of the Navy, and Ohio-class submarines still serve as a nuclear deterrent, but we have fewer of both since Reagan left office. And the carrier Enterprise is being decommissioned in a month, and the Gerald R. Ford won't enter service until at least 2015 -- pending budget figures, of course. If the president wishes us to "pivot to Asia," we will need ships to patrol the Pacific.
Bottom line: To maintain our status as the world's lone superpower, we must have ships, and we shouldn't settle for parity with potential enemies.
Oh, and by the way, the military actually has more bayonets now than in 1917, but who's counting? They're quite useful, too. Just ask our Marines.
Foreign policy is certainly about more than ships and bayonets -- and as much as we hate to break it to the president, it's about more than putting more teachers in the classroom, too -- but President Reagan achieved "peace through strength." If there are indeed enough adults in the country to defeat Barack Obama on Nov. 6, Mitt Romney must restore fiscal sanity at home, in part so that we can cultivate relations with our allies and deter our adversaries with the sure military might of the United States. We've had enough of blaming the military for America's debt woes, and blaming America for the world's dysfunction.
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Interesting images:
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/map_of_the_week/2012/10/drone_strikes_map_shows_pakistan_drone_strikes.html
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Mark Helprin: America's Capsizing Naval Policy
China's maritime power and aggressive posture is rising while the size of the U.S. Navy continues to shrink..
By MARK HELPRIN
During the recent foreign policy debate, the president presumed to instruct his opponent: "Governor Romney maybe hasn't spent enough time looking at how our military works. You mentioned the Navy, for example, and that we have fewer ships than we did in 1916. Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses and bayonets, because the nature of our military's changed. We have these things called aircraft carriers, where planes land on them. We have these ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines. And so the question is not a game of Battleship, where we're counting ships. It's what are our capabilities."
Yes, the Army's horses have been superseded by tanks and helicopters, and its bayonets rendered mainly ceremonial by armor and long-range, automatic fire, but what, precisely, has superseded ships in the Navy? The commander in chief patronizingly shared his epiphany that the ships of today could beat the hell out of those of 1916. To which one could say, like Neil Kinnock, "I know that, Prime Minister," and go on to add that we must configure the Navy to face not the dreadnoughts of 1916 but "things called aircraft carriers, where planes land on them," and "ships that go underwater," and also ballistic missiles, land-based aviation, and electronic warfare.
To hold that numbers and mass in war are unnecessary is as dangerous as believing that they are sufficient. Defense contractor Norman Augustine famously observed that at the rate fighter planes are becoming complex and expensive, soon we will be able to build just one. Neither a plane nor a ship, no matter how capable, can be in more than one place at once. And if one ship that is in some ways equivalent to 100 is damaged or lost, we have lost the equivalent of 100. But, in fact, except for advances in situational awareness, missile defense, and the effect of precision-guided munitions in greatly multiplying the target coverage of carrier-launched aircraft, the Navy is significantly less capable than it was a relatively short time ago in antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, the ability to return ships to battle, and the numbers required to accomplish the tasks of deterrence or war.
For example, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's diplomacy in the South China Sea is doomed to impotence because it consists entirely of declarations without the backing of sufficient naval potential, even now when China's navy is not half of what it will be in a decade. China's claims, equivalent to American expropriation of Caribbean waters all the way to the coast of Venezuela, are much like Hitler's annexations. But we no longer have bases in the area, our supply lines are attenuated across the vastness of the Pacific, we have much more than decimated our long-range aircraft, and even with a maximum carrier surge we would have to battle at least twice as many Chinese fighters.
Not until recently would China have been so aggressive in the South China Sea, but it has a plan, which is to grow; we have a plan, which is to shrink; and you get what you pay for. To wit, China is purposefully, efficiently, and successfully modernizing its forces and often accepting reductions in favor of quality. And yet, to touch upon just a few examples, whereas 20 years ago it possessed one ballistic-missile submarine and the U.S. 34, now it has three (with two more coming) and the U.S. 14. Over the same span, China has gone from 94 to 71 submarines in total, while the U.S. has gone from 121 to 71. As our numbers decrease at a faster pace, China is also closing the gap in quality.
The effect in principal surface warships is yet more pronounced. While China has risen from 56 to 78, the U.S. has descended from 207 to 114. In addition to parities, China is successfully focusing on exactly what it needs—terminal ballistic missile guidance, superfast torpedoes and wave-skimming missiles, swarms of oceangoing missile craft, battle-picture blinding—to address American vulnerabilities, while our counters are insufficient or nonexistent.
Nor is China our only potential naval adversary, and with aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles and over-the-horizon radars, the littoral countries need not have navies to assert themselves over millions of square miles of sea. Even the Somali pirates, with only outboard motors, skiffs, RPGs, and Kalashnikovs, have taxed the maritime forces of the leading naval states.
What, then, is a relatively safe number of highly capable ships appropriate for the world's richest country and leading naval power? Not the less than 300 at present, or the 200 to which we are headed, and not 330 or 350 either, but 600, as in the 1980s. Then, we were facing the Soviet Union; but now China, better suited as a maritime power, is rising faster than this country at present is willing to face.
The trend lines are obvious and alarming, but in addition we face a potentially explosive accelerant of which the president is probably blissfully unaware, as is perhaps even his secretary of the Navy, who—as he dutifully guts his force—travels with an entourage befitting Kublai Khan, or at least Kublai Khan Jr. That is that whereas the American Shipbuilding Association (now dissolved) counted six major yards, China has more than 100. Whenever China becomes confident of the maturation of its naval weapons systems, it can surge production and leave us as far behind as once we left the Axis and Japan. Its navy will be able to dominate the oceans and cruise in strength off our coasts, reversing roles to its pleasure and our peril—unless we attend to the Navy, in quality, numbers, and without delay.
This will demand a president who, like Reagan, will damn the political torpedoes and back a secretary of the Navy who, like John Lehman, will unashamedly and with every power of rhetoric and persistence rebuild the fleets. The military balance, the poise of the international system, and the peace of the world require no less. Nor does America deserve less.
Mr. Helprin, a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, is the author of, among other works, the novels "Winter's Tale" (Harcourt) and "A Soldier of the Great War" (Harcourt). His most recent novel, "In Sunlight and In Shadow," was published earlier this month by Harcourt.
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Israel's Iron Dome
A breakout performance for missile defense..
However Israel's latest war with Hamas ends, the Gaza conflict will long be remembered for images of a military feat in the skies above Israel. Israeli interceptors have eviscerated the Iranian-supplied Hamas missiles heading for population centers. Chalk up an important strategic and technological win for missile defense.
The Jewish state's Iron Dome system was conceived after the 2006 war with Lebanon, when nearly 4,000 Hezbollah missiles killed 44 civilians in northern Israel; it was deployed only last year. Missile defenses have had vocal doubters since Ronald Reagan championed them in the 1980s, and Israeli critics focused on the price—around $50,000 for each Tamir interceptor—and supposedly dubious reliability. The last week ends that debate.
Iron Dome is designed to protect crowded civilian areas from short-range missiles. A radar attached to each battery determines whether an incoming volley threatens a population center to ensure that interceptors aren't wasted on unthreatening missiles.
Israel's system is modest, with five batteries deployed so far. Yet in only six years they've managed to make Tel Aviv and other cities nearly impregnable to missile attacks. The hit rate approaches 90%. About a thousand missiles have come from Gaza so far, and according to an official cited by Time magazine, 300 or so were deemed worth intercepting.
The engineering achievement has saved countless lives, but the strategic benefits are also significant. By limiting civilian casualties, missile defenses provide more options and more time for military and political leaders to decide how to respond. If missiles were landing willy-nilly in Israeli cities, the pressure would be great either for a ground incursion into Gaza, or a possibly humiliating accommodation with Hamas. Much as the late strategist Albert Wohlstetter predicted, defenses can deter aggressors and offer the chance to make war less destructive.
There's a lesson here as well for the U.S. In an overlooked study in September, the National Research Council pointed out shortcomings in current American missile-defense strategy, saying the U.S. needs to do more to protect the homeland against long-range attacks from Iran, North Korea and other countries. The report specifically recommended an additional defense site on the U.S. East Coast to augment interceptors in California and Alaska.
Three years ago, the Obama Administration pulled the plug on a site in Poland and the Czech Republic, bending to Russian pressure. In its place, the White House decided to protect Europe from a short- and medium-range Iranian missile with Aegis interceptors initially based at sea and later on land.
The revised plan's last, fourth stage would eventually address the long-range threat by putting interceptors in Central Europe. But that's the issue that President Obama famously promised Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev that he'd have "more flexibility" on in a second term. Missile defense could also suffer from budget cuts.
With missiles proliferating and the world unprepared to stop Iran's nuclear program, missile defenses are becoming more urgent than ever for the U.S. The Israelis are showing the importance of being protected in an era of rogue missiles.
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Man-Portable Air Defense Systems: A Persistent and Potent Threat
February 1, 2010 | 1311 GMT
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Summary
Photo courtesy of U.S. Government
For more than three decades, shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles have been used to attack civilian as well as military aircraft. While counterproliferation efforts worldwide have focused attention on the threat -- and managed to contain it to some extent -- these "man-portable air defense systems" remain highly prized and sought-after by militant groups. This is because they provide a cheap, simple and reasonably effective way to bring down an airplane full of people. And while missile technology continues to be refined, counterproliferation efforts are being offset by arms transfers on the black and gray markets.
Analysis
On Dec. 11, 2009, authorities seized an Ilyushin-76 cargo plane in Bangkok that contained 35 tons of North Korean-produced military weapons, including North Korean variants of the Chinese HN-5 "man-portable air defense system," or MANPADS, which were being shipped to Iran. The HN-5 -- a copy of the Soviet SA-7 (a first-generation MANPADS) -- is less advanced than the MANPADS Iran produces on its own, which are based on later Chinese designs. So, the question was: Why would Iran be importing less advanced missiles? Or was Iran planning to provide North Korean missiles to proxy militant groups, thereby gaining plausible deniability in case the missiles were ever used or seized?
Iran has reportedly supplied MANPADS from a variety of sources to Hezbollah, the Islamic Courts Union of Somalia (forerunner of al Shabaab) and the Taliban. It is possible that the North Korean MANPADS were also bound for Iranian proxies Hezbollah and Hamas or to other hostile actors as a way to retaliate against Western powers operating in the region who are opposed to Iran's nuclear program.
In any case, it is clear that the shipment of MANPADS, which have been used by militants to attack civilian airliners and are high on the list of counterproliferation efforts worldwide, was not an encouraging sign for the traveling public. Since 1973, at least 30 civilian aircraft have been brought down and approximately 920 civilians killed by MANPADS. While the number of such attempts declined in the last decade, militant groups are still trying hard to get their hands on the weapons, which are relatively cheap, easy to operate and provide a considerable amount of bang for the buck.
What They Are and How They Work
MANPADS are shoulder-fired, surface-to-air anti-aircraft missiles that come in a variety of models. They were developed after the end of World War II, when U.S. military planners realized the need for a weapon that could provide better defense against attacks by aircraft flying at high speeds low to the ground. Machine guns simply did not have the effective range, accuracy or velocity to address such threats. In 1948, the U.S. Army began researching and developing a weapon that could be more effectively used by infantrymen against aircraft, but it was not until 1967 that the first shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missile was fielded.
This was the U.S.-manufactured FIM-43 Redeye tactical missile. The Soviets soon followed with their SA-7 Grail (Strela-2) missiles, introduced in 1968, which borrowed heavily from the Redeye design. In 1972, the improved U.S.-manufactured Redeye II gave rise to the FIM-92 Stinger missile, which, like the Soviet SA-7s, has been updated many times over the years. The British introduced their Blowpipe MANPAD in 1972. In the years since, many more versions of the weapon have been developed by other countries.
By definition, MANPADS are designed to be man-portable. This means that the systems usually weigh about 40 pounds and are balanced on and fired from the shooter's shoulder. The missile is generally stored in and launched from a narrow tube that averages roughly five feet in length and about three inches in diameter. The system generally includes a battery and often an ejection motor. While the guidance mechanism within the missile itself can be quite complex, MANPADS are designed to be operated in the field from the front lines, so durability is an important part of the design. A simple targeting interface makes most MANPADS relatively easy to operate.
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MANPADS use a variety of guidance systems. The most common, perhaps, is infrared (IR) guidance, in which the missile seeks the hot exhaust from an aircraft's engine. Older models are relatively easy to decoy if the target is aware and equipped with flares. Newer IR models are more difficult to decoy. In the design of the original MANPADS, such as the SA-7 and the Redeye, the IR seeker had to have a relatively clear line of sight to the rear aspect of an aircraft and its exhaust, limiting the missile's engagement envelope considerably. Newer models have far more sophisticated and sensitive seekers, allowing them to be targeted and fired from a much wider area. Other guidance methods include command line-of-sight guidance, in which the operator uses a radio control to fly the missile into the target. A third type is laser-beam guidance, in which the operator guides the missile by pointing a laser at the target.
The warheads themselves weigh only a few pounds. Most are armed with a proximity fuse and employ both explosives and fragmentation to puncture the soft skin of an aircraft. Generally, the later the design the more lethal the warhead.
Usefulness as a Weapon
MANPADS are also very cost-effective. They can be bought on the black market for prices as low as $5,000 (for an old SA-7). A new third-generation missile, like the Russian SA-16, can cost anywhere from $40,000 to several hundred thousand dollars. Performance varies considerably by type. The SA-7 has a kill zone with an upper limit of 4,290 feet, while some newer models can reach altitudes of over 12,000 feet. The average range of MANPADS is about three miles. As for the vulnerability of large commercial aircraft, which generally cruise at around 30,000 feet, the weapon is most effective during the takeoff and landing portions of a flight, or when aircraft are operating at lower altitudes.
MANPADS are not without limitations. Some research suggests that battery life makes the weapon obsolete after about 22 years. Missiles treated roughly, stored poorly and not maintained well may not last anywhere close to that long. Nevertheless, the two SA-7s al Qaeda used to target an Israeli civilian flight over Mombasa, Kenya, in 2002 were 28 years old and fully functional (despite the fact that they did not hit their target). Since replacement batteries can be found on the black market, battery life is not necessarily a key limiting factor.
Perhaps the most limiting factor has to do with the kind of aircraft being targeted. As MANPADS were developed and refined for military use, so were countermeasures for military aircraft. Due to budget constraints, however, most commercial airliners do not have these defensive military systems, which can alert a pilot that a missile has been launched so proper action can be taken, including evasive maneuvers and the deployment of IR flares to decoy the missile or lasers to blind the seeker. Industry estimates indicate that outfitting and maintaining the entire U.S. airline fleet with countermeasures that could foil missiles would cost $40 billion.
One airline company that does have countermeasures on all of its aircraft is Israel's small state-owned airline El Al. Similar countermeasures were likely responsible for thwarting the previously mentioned al Qaeda attempt in 2002 to down the Israeli airliner (owned and operated by a different Israeli carrier) taking off from Mombasa. The missiles missed their target, and neither the plane nor its passengers were harmed. Because of the high cost of such defensive systems, however, the bulk of the civilian aviation fleet worldwide remains undefended and vulnerable to MANPADS.
Use in War Zones
During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were very generous in providing MANPADS to their allies and proxies. The Soviets armed the North Vietnamese with SA-7s, and the United States gave about 900 Stingers to Afghan mujahideen fighters who, between 1986 and 1989, used them against the Soviets. MANPADS alone are credited with downing an estimated 269 Soviet aircraft in Afghanistan during that period.
Since their introduction in the late 1960s, MANPADS have most often been used against military targets in active war zones, especially in Vietnam in the early 1970s, Afghanistan in the 1980s, Angola during its civil war from 1975 to 2002 and in the Persian Gulf War in the early 1990s. In fact, 80 percent of U.S. aircraft lost in Operation Desert Storm were reportedly downed by MANPADS. In May 2002, al Qaeda operatives tried unsuccessfully to shoot down a U.S. fighter jet with an SA-7 as the jet took off from Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia. More recently, coalition aircraft in Iraq have come under fire from insurgents armed with shoulder-fired missiles, including a C-130 cargo plane in 2006 that was carrying four members of the U.S. House of Representatives. Onboard countermeasures enabled the military aircraft to successfully evade what was thought to have been an SA-18 missile. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam also used shoulder-fired missiles in their war against the Sri Lankan government, and Chechen rebels have successfully employed them in the Caucasus against Russian military aircraft.
Civilian Attack History
The first known cases of attempted MANPADS attacks against civilian aircraft were in 1973 in Rome. In both January and September of that year, Black September militants attempted to strike Israeli flights, one of which was carrying then-Prime Minister Golda Meir. Both attempts were thwarted in their final minutes. In the January case involving Meir's plane, the militants were positioned around the airport with the weapons but were caught before her plane touched down. In the second attempt, police raided the militants' apartment as the militants, who had positioned themselves outside on the balcony, prepared to shoot at the plane as it taxied down the runway.
Two years later, the first successful MANPADS attack against a civilian aircraft came in the form of an SA-7 missile launched by North Vietnamese forces against a Douglas C-54D Air Vietnam flight, resulting in the deaths of all 26 passengers and crew members. One of the most famous civilian MANPADS attacks was in 1994, when two SA-16s were used to shoot down a Rwandan government flight whose passengers (and victims) included the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi. This event sparked the Rwandan genocide, which resulted in approximately 800,000 deaths in 100 days. (The identity of those responsible for this attack remains a matter of debate.) Over the years, MANPADS attacks have been plotted and actively attempted in at least 20 countries, resulting in more than 900 civilian fatalities.
Not a Magic Weapon
A MANPADS attack does not necessarily mean certain death for an air crew and passengers. In fact, some civilian airliners hit by MANPADS have made emergency landings without loss of human life. In November 2004, a DHL Airbus 300 on a mail delivery flight had just departed Baghdad International Airport. At about 8,000 feet in altitude, the aircraft was struck in the left wing by a shoulder-fired missile. With the aircraft badly damaged and one engine on fire, the pilot was able to maneuver the plane by engine thrust alone and land it safely.
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Indeed, it is important to remember that the nature of MANPADS severely limits the size of the warhead that the weapon can carry. Designed to destroy low-flying military aircraft menacing troops in the field and densely packed with small amounts of fuel and ordnance, MANPADS are not ideally suited for bringing down large civilian aircraft. Though airliners are hardly designed to absorb a missile strike, the damage a single MANPADS can inflict may not be catastrophic. Nearly 30 percent of planes struck by MANPADS have managed to make some sort of emergency or crash landing without loss of life, despite (in many cases) sustaining significant structural damage to the aircraft.
Still, the threat is not insignificant. The other 70 percent of civilian planes that have been hit by MANPADS have crashed, and with considerable loss of life. Indeed, on departure from or approach to an airport, airliners do have to traverse predictable airspace at low altitudes -- well within the engagement envelope of MANPADS. These lower level phases of flight also occur over large swaths of built-up urban terrain that would be impossible to search and secure -- even temporarily. And with these flight paths so well established, even casual observers generally have a sense of when and where large, low-flying aircraft can be found at any given time over their city.
MANPADS Proliferation
It is estimated that more than one million MANPADS have been produced by at least 25 countries since the weapon was introduced in the late 1960s. According to a 2004 estimate by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, 500,000 to 750,000 of these weapons are still in existence today, some 6,000 of which are believed to be in the hands of hostile non-state actors.
Indeed, militants will always try to illegally acquire weapons of all kinds, and MANPADS are no different. As early as 1974, the Irish Republican Army received Russian SA-7s, said to have been smuggled in by the Libyans in diplomatic pouches. The old SA-7, believed to be the most widely proliferated and copied of the MANPADS, has shown up in Taliban caves and al Qaeda safe houses in Afghanistan. Russian international arms trafficker Viktor Bout (aka the "Merchant of Death") was arrested in March 2008 for attempting to sell 100 MANPADS to undercover agents whom he mistakenly believed were representatives of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). He had previously supplied arms to such diverse groups as the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, Hezbollah and various militant groups in Africa.
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The cargo plane seized in Bangkok in December 2009 exemplifies the murky maze of the international arms trade through which MANPADS make their way from governments to militants. Reports indicate that it was a very complex arms-laundering scheme, involving dealers in five countries. The main player behind the scheme was allegedly a Kazakh arms dealer named Alexander Zykov, who claimed that the five crewmen on the cargo plane -- four Kazakhs and a Belarusian -- usually worked for him but were under the employ of someone else for this particular flight.
The plane took off from Baku, Azerbaijan, and made stops in Al Fujairah in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and in Bangkok before reaching Pyongyang, where it acquired its cargo of weapons on Dec. 10 before returning to Bangkok. The weapons, destined for Mehrabad Airport in Tehran, were listed on the cargo manifest as "oil industry spare parts." If the airplane had not been seized in Bangkok, it would have continued on to Sri Lanka, the UAE, Ukraine and then to Iran, where it would have off-loaded the weapons. The United Nations has banned North Korea from exporting weapons, and the United States reportedly tipped off Thai authorities about the questionable cargo on the flight.
The trail of MANPADS through the gray and black arms markets is very difficult to trace. Many of these weapons are sold, traded or given away several times over, for ideological or financial reasons, often ending up in the hands of militants. In the case of the two SA-7s used in the attack over Mombasa in 2002, the launchers were produced in Russia in 1978; the missiles themselves were made in Bulgaria in 1993 and sold to Yemen in 1994. From there, they made their way to Somalia, possibly via Eritrea, and on to Kenya where they were used unsuccessfully against the Israeli airliner. The SA-18 missile used to down a Belarusian cargo plane over Somalia in 2007 was manufactured in Russia in 1995. It was one of a batch of SA-18s sent from Russia to Eritrea, some of which were "turned over" to al Shabaab militants in Somalia. Al Shabaab then used the SA-18 against the cargo plane as it departed Mogadishu, killing 11 people.
At least nine currently active non-state militant groups, based on credible media reports, are believed to possess MANPADS. There are more than a dozen other groups, such as FARC, that have been working hard to obtain them and probably have, though there is no evidence that they now have them in their arsenals. It is difficult to know if a group really possesses MANPADS unless they use them and the remnants are recovered and linked to the group. Also, given the nature of the black and gray arms market and the roughness with which the weapons are often handled and stored by non-state actors, the functionality of the missiles reportedly in a group's possession is impossible to assess. The following militant groups are reported to possess MANPADS:
■Al Qaeda
■Al Shabaab
■Chechen rebels
■Hezbollah
■Iraqi insurgents
■The Irish Republican Army (IRA)
■Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)
■The Taliban
■The United Wa State Army in Myanmar
Many militant groups have used MANPADS against civilian aircraft since the first attempt in 1973. Some of these groups, such as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Baader Meinhof, are no longer active while other groups, such as al Qaeda and al Shabaab, currently pose a threat. Al Qaeda's unsuccessful use of MANPADS in 2002 against the Israeli airliner over Mombasa was a failure likely caused by countermeasures on the targeted aircraft rather than shooter error or technical malfunction. The most recent MANPADS attack that resulted in loss of life was the strike by al Shabaab over Somalia in 2007 against the Belarusian cargo plane.
Counterproliferation Efforts
The threat from MANPADS has not been ignored. In December 2000, 33 countries (the number currently stands at 40) signed the Wassenaar Arrangement, a non-binding agreement to sell or transfer MANPADS only to other governments (who may not necessarily be a party to the agreement) and only after determining that the buying country would use the weapons only for legitimate military purposes.
The United States has made a concerted effort to secure, buy back or destroy MANPADS that lie in loosely guarded arsenals of various countries. In Afghanistan, after the Soviet-mujahideen conflict, the United States deceptively shipped replacement batteries to the mujahideen that were, in fact, designed not only to not work but also to short out the weapons' electronics system and render them ineffective. In Afghanistan in the 1990s and later in Iraq, the United States bought MANPADS from anyone who would turn them in.
The U.S. institutions most actively involved in MANPADS counterproliferation efforts are the State Department's Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement and Office of Conventional Arms Threat Reduction, along with the various offices at the Defense Department that administer the Golden Sentry program. This program monitors international sales of MANPADS to ensure that they do not fall into the hands of non-state actors.
Multilateral counterproliferation efforts also have been undertaken, including an agreement by G-8 members at the Evian Summit in 2003 to ban all transfers of MANPADS to non-governmental entities and to assist other countries as needed in the securing or destroying of their MANPADS arsenals. Other international organizations that have taken multilateral steps to counter the MANPADS threat are the Organization of American States, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Since 2001, with assistance from other countries, the United States has destroyed 30,000 MANPADS in more than 25 countries that have asked for assistance in counterproliferation efforts. These countries include Afghanistan, Cambodia, Chad, Cyprus, Liberia, Nicaragua, Sudan, Ukraine and various countries in the Balkans where there was thought to be an excess number of weapons that were poorly controlled or in danger of being sent elsewhere. For fiscal year 2009, the United States appropriated $47 million for use in destroying "at-risk" weapons (those that are in excess, are not adequately guarded or are obsolete), including MANPADS. The 2010 budget proposal called for nearly twice that amount.
Of course, not all of the remaining 6,000 loose MANPADS are likely to be functional, which depends on when they were made and how well they have been stored and maintained. However, MANPADS are designed to be used and stored in rough conditions, so many of the loose weapons probably do still work. Moreover, even as some of the older MANPADS become dysfunctional, various MANPADS-producing countries are still distributing them to hostile actors through illegal transfers and the gray market (MANPADS-producing countries noticeably absent from the Wassenaar Arrangement are China, Egypt, Iran, North Korea, Pakistan, Singapore and Vietnam).
The Current Threat
From 2000 through 2009, attempts to use MANPADS against civilian airliners were down about 66 percent compared to the previous decade. Despite the decline in the number of attacks, however, the proliferation of MANPADS among non-state actors remains a problem, as shown by the following incidents:
■May 2009: Four men in New York were arrested for plotting to shoot down a U.S. military cargo plane with a fake Stinger they had acquired from undercover agents.
■June 2009: The U.S. Department of Homeland Security canceled Delta's inaugural flight from Atlanta to Nairobi over concerns of a MANPADS attack.
■July 2009: It was revealed that a FARC commander was negotiating with Venezuelan contacts to obtain Russian SA-24s that Caracas had recently acquired from Moscow.
■August 2009: A Syrian arms trafficker was extradited to the United States for selling SA-7s to undercover agents posing as FARC representatives. The missiles were being housed in a Hezbollah warehouse in Mexico.
■September 2009: During national elections in Germany, German airports were on heightened alert after intelligence information raised concerns of an al Qaeda-linked MANPADS attack against civilian aircraft.
■October 2009: An unconfirmed press report indicated that Hezbollah was in possession of Iranian-produced MANPADS (though, as noted previously, Hezbollah has had MANPADS in its arsenal for some time).
■November 2009: A U.S. indictment charged several people with conspiring to send Stingers from Philadelphia to Syria and Hezbollah.
■December 2009: Another unconfirmed press report stated that Hezbollah was buying MANPADS from Albania.
■January 2010: A Spanish judge revealed that the Basque separatist militant group ETA had unsuccessfully tried to shoot down the Spanish prime minister's plane with a shoulder-fired missile in 2001.
Nevertheless, it is important to remember that MANPADS in the hands of a militant group do not necessarily mean the weapons will be used against civilian airliners. FARC, for example, which reportedly possesses MANPADS, does occasionally shoot down government anti-drug airplanes flying low over the jungle canopy. But FARC, like certain other militant groups, has no vested interest in shooting down a civilian airliner and dealing with the international fallout, especially as it works to strengthen its international ties. FARC has the capability but not the intent.
Other groups like al Qaeda, which has used MANPADS before, have the capability and the intent, if not often the opportunity. Since 9/11, al Qaeda prime has been relegated to the tribal areas along the Afghan-Pakistani border, far removed from the lower-altitude approach and departure paths that put Western airliners within MANPADS range. Although al Qaeda's last known MANPADS attack against a civilian aircraft was unsuccessful (over Mombasa in 2002), a MANPADS in the hands of a lone-wolf jihadist or a grass-roots al Qaeda franchise group such as al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula remains a significant concern. The 50 attempts and successful attacks that have occurred since 1973 testify to this ongoing threat.
Thus, while the international community has made strides in its counterproliferation efforts, civilian aircraft will remain vulnerable to MANPADS as long as some nations continue to export the weapons to hostile actors and as long as the weapons can be obtained from arms traffickers or on the gray and black markets. And although certain defensive measures are being taken by the airlines, nearly all civilian carriers have not sufficiently equipped their airplanes to effectively evade anti-aircraft missiles. It is important to keep in mind that, once successful, terrorist tactics are usually refined and employed again. Although the first successful MANPADS strike against an airliner was conducted by units of the uniformed North Vietnamese Army and not a non-state actor, the lessons from that strike and the many that have followed are not lost on militants, who are nothing if not adaptive. The MANPADS threat may have lessened over the last 10 years, but it will undoubtedly continue into the foreseeable future.
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Read more: Man-Portable Air Defense Systems: A Persistent and Potent Threat | Stratfor
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Marines Change Physical Fitness Test
CHANGE TO THE PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST
Date Signed: 11/27/2012
ALMARS Active Number:
R 271120Z NOV 12
UNCLASSIFIED/
ALMAR
MSGID/GENADMIN/CMC WASHINGTON DC DMCS //
SUBJ/CHANGE TO THE PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST//
REF/A/MSGID:DOC/CMC WASHINGTON DC MCCDC C461TP/08AUG2008//
AMPN/REF A IS MCO 6100.13 W CH1, MARINE CORPS PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAM//
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. THIS ALMAR ANNOUNCES A CHANGE TO THE FEMALE PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST (PFT). EFFECTIVE 1 JANUARY 2014, PULL-UPS WILL REPLACE THE FLEXED ARM HANG (FAH).
2. THIS CHANGE WILL TAKE PLACE IN TWO PHASES WITH PHASE ONE BEGINNING 1 JANUARY 2013. PHASE ONE WILL SERVE AS A TRANSITION PERIOD AND IS INTENDED TO ALLOW COMMANDERS AND INDIVIDUAL FEMALE MARINES TO ADJUST INDIVIDUAL AND UNIT TRAINING ROUTINES TO PREPARE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW REQUIREMENTS. THE FAH WILL REMAIN AS PART OF THE INITIAL STRENGTH TEST (IST) CONDUCTED IN RECRUITING AND UPON ARRIVAL AT MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT PARRIS ISLAND (MCRDPI) AND DURING PFT'S CONDUCTED AT RECRUIT TRAINING. THE FAH WILL ALSO REMAIN AS PART OF THE PFT FOR OFFICER CANDIDATES IN THE SELECTION PROCESS AS WELL AS IN PFT'S TAKEN DURING OFFICER CANDIDATES SCHOOL (OCS). DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2013, FEMALE MARINES WILL HAVE THE OPTION TO CHOOSE PULL-UPS OR THE FAH ON THE PFT; THE SCORE FROM THE CHOSEN EVENT WILL BE USED IN CALCULATION OF THE OFFICIAL PFT SCORE FOR ALL PURPOSES.
3. PHASE TWO WILL COMMENCE ON 1 JANUARY 2014. PULL-UPS WILL REPLACE THE FAH PORTION OF THE PFT. THE FAH WILL, HOWEVER, REMAIN AS PART OF THE IST CONDUCTED IN RECRUITING AND AT MCRDPI. PFT'S CONDUCTED IN THE OFFICER SELECTION PROCESS AND DURING THE INVENTORY PFT AT OCS WILL ALSO INCLUDE THE FAH. PASSING THE PFT WITH PULL-UPS INSTEAD OF THE FAH WILL BE A GRADUATION REQUIREMENT FOR RECRUITS AND OFFICER CANDIDATES BEGINNING 1 JANUARY 2014. SCORING TABLES MAY BE ADJUSTED AS DATA IS GATHERED AND ASSESSED. MARINE CORPS RECRUITING COMMAND, MCRDPI AND OCS WILL REMAIN CRITICAL PARTICIPANTS IN THIS DATA COLLECTION PROCESS.
4. THE PHASE ONE SCORING TABLE FOR FEMALE MARINES IS AS FOLLOWS:
A. THE FAH WILL BE SCORED PER THE REFERENCE.
B. PULL-UP SCORING FOR FEMALE MARINES:
EIGHT (8) PULL-UPS EQUAL 100 POINTS
SEVEN (7) PULL-UPS EQUAL 95 POINTS
SIX (6) PULL-UPS EQUAL 85 POINTS
FIVE (5) PULL-UPS EQUAL 75 POINTS
FOUR (4) PULL-UPS EQUAL 65 POINTS
THREE (3) PULL-UPS EQUAL 40 POINTS
C. TO PASS THE PULL-UP PORTION OF THIS EVENT, FEMALES WILL BE REQUIRED TO EXECUTE AT LEAST THREE (3) PULL-UPS.
5. I HAVE DIRECTED THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND TO DEVELOP A PFT CHANGE SUPPORT WEBSITE WHICH IS LOCATED AT HTTPS:(SLASH)(SLASH)FITNESS.USMC.MIL/FPFT. IT CONTAINS A DETAILED, PROGRESSIVE WORKOUT PLAN WITH EXERCISES DESIGNED TO ENHANCE PULL-UP PERFORMANCE AND OVERALL UPPER BODY STRENGTH, VIDEO DEMONSTRATIONS AND OTHER RESOURCES. COMMANDERS ARE REQUIRED TO INCLUDE PULL-UP TRAINING AS A PART OF THEIR UNIT'S PHYSICAL FITNESS PROGRAM FOR ALL MARINES.
6. ADDITIONAL COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS WILL FOLLOW IN SEPARATE CORRESPONDENCE.
7. THIS ALMAR IS APPLICABLE TO THE TOTAL FORCE MARINE CORPS.
8. SEMPER FIDELIS, JAMES F. AMOS, GENERAL, U.S. MARINE CORPS, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS.//
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http://m.military.com/daily-news/2012/11/27/socom-faces-scrutiny-after-body-armor-recall.html?ESRC=dod.nl
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/30/deceitful-debate-over-women-in-combat/?page=all#pagebreak
Oblivious to important differences between men and women, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is suing the Department of Defense to lift all combat exemptions for women.
Not putting women into combat deprives them of their constitutional rights, the ACLU is arguing on behalf of four servicewomen in a complaint filed Tuesday in a federal court in San Francisco.
“It’s harming women in the field now,” said Elizabeth Gill, a staff attorney with ACLU Northern California, to U.S. News & World Report. “Significant numbers of women have fought alongside their male counterparts in the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and, in fact, are fighting in combat situations.”
Talk about harm. Women are coming home maimed or in body bags. A saner course would be to suggest that the military rethink its decision to put women closer to combat.
In the ACLU’s parallel universe, women are just as aggressive, strong, fast and warlike as men. You know, like in the National Football League, where female linebackers strike terror in the hearts of Tom Brady and Aaron Rodgers.
Much of the pressure for this march toward barbarism is coming from career feminist military personnel, who argue that lack of combat experience hurts their chances for advancement. In other words, because a few women want to climb the ladder of rank, all women in the military should be put at risk for combat duty, whether they want it or not.
Hundreds of thousands of women have served and do serve honorably in the military and perform crucial jobs. They deserve every American’s gratitude and respect. Some have been killed or wounded while serving bravely in very difficult conditions.
The military has kept women out of direct ground combat for a moral reason: Deliberately putting women in harm’s way is not right; and for practical reasons: Women are not as physically strong, and they have an impact on the men around them. In a civilized society, men are raised to protect women. Now some of America’s elite warrior units train men to be indifferent to women’s screams. That’s what passes for “progress” in a “progressive” military.
It’s not primarily about individual capability but military necessity. Anything that detracts from the military’s mission to win wars and bring troops back alive is not worth it, no matter how fashionable.
In a summary of 30 years of research on women’s suitability for combat and heavy work duty, professor William J. Gregor of the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., concludes, “Few if any women possess the physical capacity to perform in combat or heavy military occupational specialties and none will outperform well-trained men. Training women with men to the same physical occupational standards dramatically increases the skeletal-muscular injury rate among women.”
Recently, the U.S. Marines opened its Infantry Officer Course to women.
“Only two of about 80 eligible female Marines have volunteered for the course — a grueling, three-month advanced regimen conducted at Quantico, Va., that was opened to women to research their performance,” The Washington Times reported. “Of the two female volunteers, one washed out on the first day, along with 26 of the 107 men, and the other dropped out two weeks later for medical reasons, a Marine Corps spokesman said.”
Like it or not, women are far more likely to be injured than men, even in basic training. They are 100 percent more likely to become pregnant.
Under feminist pressure, the military academies have relaxed their physical requirements, despite denials from leaders who also are having to deal with inconvenient love trysts between Cpl. Fred and Sgt. Tom.
Like virtually all other major institutions in America today, the armed forces are operating under the tyrannical fist of political correctness, with truth sacrificed to ideology. Back in October 1992, when the George H.W. Bush administration’s Justice Department went to war with the Virginia Military Institute over VMI’s exclusion of women, the PC veil was lifted for a moment.
Col. Patrick Toffler, head of West Point’s Office of Institutional Research, testified as to whether the U.S. Military Academy had lowered its training standards to accommodate female cadets. After much resistance, Col. Toffler admitted under cross-examination that women were taught self-defense while men were taught boxing and wrestling. Pull-ups, peer ratings, rifle runs and certain obstacle-course elements were scrapped.
The point here is not so much about physical allowances made for women but about the military’s denial of the truth. Smart military men and women learn to pretend or kiss their careers goodbye.
In 2007, Gen. Peter Pace, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, answered honestly and affirmatively as to whether he thought homosexuality was immoral and incompatible with military service. Shortly thereafter, George W. Bush’s secretary of defense, Robert Gates, announced that he would recommend that Gen. Pace not be reappointed. Sexual politics trumped honesty, which is why we’re even talking about ending the common-sense combat exemption for women.
Even conservative lawmakers seem too terrified to ask such questions as:
What happens to women who are captured? Should we care?
If women achieve equal opportunity (and exposure) on the battlefield, do they have an equal ability to survive?
Why is there an alarming increase in sexual assaults against women in the armed services?
Do people realize that their daughters almost certainly will be subject to any future draft if combat exemptions are lifted?
Is it really no more harmful for servicewomen who are mothers to be separated from their infants than when fathers are sent overseas? Should we care?
The left wins by default when political correctness strangles honest inquiry.
In the ACLU lawsuit, the four plaintiffs are joined by the Servicewomen’s Action Network (SWAN).
“This is ironic, since SWAN is the same group pushing the Department of Defense to stop sexual assaults in the military,” notes Elaine Donnelly, president of the pro-exemption Center for Military Readiness. “The organization is against violence against women, unless it happens at the hands of the enemy.”
Robert Knight is senior fellow for the American Civil Rights Union and a columnist for The Washington Times.
Read more: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/30/deceitful-debate-over-women-in-combat/#ixzz2E0B2IncU
Follow us: @washtimes on Twitter
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"Not putting women into combat deprives them of their constitutional rights, the ACLU is arguing on behalf of four servicewomen in a complaint filed Tuesday in a federal court in San Francisco."
If I recall correctly, the courts long ago ruled there is no constitutional right to military service. Although I'd say that any female who can meet the male physical standards (whithout them being watered down) can try for a combat arms job. It's my understanding that certain HSLD entities have used females for certain, unpublicized roles in the GWOT.
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As a civilian, my participation in this conversation need be humble, but in my humble opinion, there is more to it than maintaining physical standards. Many healthy young men and women are going to fuk and that is detrimental to unit discipline. IMHO similar issues are going to arise with gays now out of the closet. There is also the matter of women deliberately getting pregnant to get out of harm's way. This was seen in the Gulf War wherein one ship lost over 30% (working from memory here) of its women to pregancy and some 4% of women in the Yugoslav theater (which had very low US casualty rates) back in the 1990s. Losing skilled members of the team in such circumstances in quite counter-productive.
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A Soldier's-Eye View of Chuck Hagel
His record on Iraq alone should disqualify the former senator from leading U.S. troops in time of war..
By TOM COTTON
Chuck Hagel, who is reportedly on the White House's shortlist of nominees for secretary of defense, served our country admirably in Vietnam. But he is not the right person for the Pentagon.
Our fighting men and women deserve a leader who will not only honor their service, but also advocate for them and honor their accomplishments. Regrettably, the former senator's dismal record on Iraq suggests that he will do none of those things—for he abandoned the very troops he once voted to send to war. I would know, because I was one of them.
Over Thanksgiving weekend in 2006, two years before his retirement as the Republican senator from Nebraska, Mr. Hagel penned a column for the Washington Post entitled "Leaving Iraq, Honorably." He asserted that "there will be no victory or defeat for the United States in Iraq," and "the time for more U.S. troops in Iraq has passed." Rather, Mr. Hagel argued, we "must begin planning for a phased troop withdrawal."
Imagine my surprise at the senator's assertions, having just returned that week from combat in Baghdad as an infantry platoon leader with the 101st Airborne Division. My soldiers had fought bravely to stabilize that city, protect innocent civilians and defeat al Qaeda. Those soldiers were proud of their accomplishments.
No one had told us during our time in Baghdad that we would achieve "no victory." Readers might have shared my surprise at Mr. Hagel's words if he had mentioned his earlier vote supporting the war.
The troops recognized the folly of Mr. Hagel's proposed withdrawal. The fighting in Baghdad that year had certainly been hard, with progress slow and frustrating. Yet the solution to those of us on the front lines was plain. We needed more troops and a new strategy focused on securing the civilian population. That counterinsurgency strategy would help win the support of Iraqis, who would then help flush out terrorists and militias and allow for political reconciliation.
We needed, in other words, the "surge." In his lowest political moment, President George W. Bush had his finest hour. He kept faith with the troops he had sent to war. Mr. Hagel, on the other hand, called the surge "the most dangerous foreign policy blunder in this country since Vietnam" and broke faith with those troops. In the Senate, he helped in early 2007 to delay emergency funding for the war. He then voted for a measure to force withdrawal from Iraq.
Perhaps most astonishing, Mr. Hagel voted in 2007 against designating Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps a terrorist organization. The IRGC was directly responsible for the deaths of numerous American soldiers in Iraq. In addition to its terrorist attacks around the world, the IRGC smuggled a particularly lethal kind of roadside bomb into Iraq known as an explosively formed projectile, or EFP.
An EFP consists of a tube packed with explosives and topped by a metal plate. The heat from the explosion inside the tube turns the plate into a molten slug, which could penetrate not just the Humvees in which my soldiers and I rode, but even an M1A1 Abrams tank.
The use of EFPs in Iraq more than doubled in 2006, making them among the most feared enemy weapon during our tour. For example, two new soldiers arrived in my platoon and received the usual on-boarding brief. One soldier asked about roadside bombs. I told the two new men to stay alert for indicators and to trust their armor; my platoon had hit numerous bombs, but we had all survived to that point. The other soldier then asked, "What about EFPs?" I paused and could only respond: "Just hope it's not your day."
The Iranians continued smuggling explosively formed projectiles into Iraq well after my platoon departed in 2006, but apparently Mr. Hagel deemed these acts of war insufficient to call the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps exactly what it is—a terrorist organization. (Though his vote, it must be said, is of a piece with his long-standing dovish views toward Iran.)
Even after the surge had succeeded, Mr. Hagel could not bring himself to celebrate our military's accomplishment. In late 2008, with casualties down by 85%, Mr. Hagel still questioned the surge's success. He credited the Anbar Awakening of Sunni tribal leaders against al Qaeda (as if the surge didn't encourage them), Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's stand-down (as if the surge didn't scare him) and improved intelligence systems (as if the surge didn't introduce them).
Though his record on Iraq alone should disqualify Mr. Hagel from leading our troops in a time of war, his views on current issues are no less alarming and show he has not learned from his errors. Unlike the current secretary of defense, Mr. Hagel seems willing to accept devastating cuts to defense spending, calling the U.S. military "bloated" and in need of being "pared down." He also has expressed a desire to accelerate the troop withdrawal from Afghanistan (a war for which he also voted).
This is not the record of a leader who can be counted on to stand by our armed forces. While Mr. Obama has every right to choose his secretary of defense, I urge him not to nominate Mr. Hagel. If he is nominated, I urge the Senate not to confirm him. Our fighting men and women deserve so much better.
Mr. Cotton, a Republican, is congressman-elect from Arkansas's Fourth District. He was an infantry officer in Iraq in 2006 and Afghanistan in 2008-09
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Pentagon Readying 800,000 for Rolling Layoffs .
By DION NISSENBAUM And DAMIAN PALETTA
WASHINGTON—The Pentagon is preparing to notify its entire civilian workforce to prepare for furloughs if Congress and President Barack Obama are unable to reach a deal before Jan. 2 to avert automatic spending cuts.
A senior defense official said Sunday that the Pentagon would notify 800,000 civilian workers to brace for furloughs in the new year, meaning the workers would be ordered to take mandatory leave without pay for a certain period. The warning is much gloomier than the agency recently offered employees, as it had said there wouldn't be an immediate impact on personnel or operations if a deal wasn't reached by January.
But the senior official said that notices would go out soon after sequestration took effect. The official didn't know when the first layoffs would take place, but said they weren't likely to happen immediately.
The Pentagon must notify Congress of the possible layoffs because of labor laws requiring advance notice, the official said.
In a letter to employees before the December holidays, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta promised that other options for cutting costs would be examined before officials resort to layoffs and that sequestration "would not necessarily require immediate reductions in spending."
Make Your Own Deficit-Reduction Plan
Try your hand at balancing the budget and share the results.
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The automatic spending cuts were put in place by the 2011 Budget Control Act and require $110 billion in spending reductions, split between defense programs and other domestic agencies. The cuts must take place in the first nine months of 2013, and then $110 billion in cuts will take place for eight additional years, under the conditions of the 2011 law. Democrats and Republicans have been working to replace or postpone the cuts but they have been unable to reach an agreement.
The Pentagon will be forced to cut $55 billion in spending in the first nine months of 2013, a roughly 10% reduction in many of its programs. The cuts would affect more than just the agency's workforce, as the White House has said the military's budgets for purchasing aircraft, ammunition, missiles and other items will be cut sharply.
Looking Over the Fiscal Cliff
The federal government faces a rolling series of deadlines over the next few months in its continuing budget battle. Take a look ahead.
View Interactive
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Falling Over the Fiscal Cliff
See some scenarios for how different groups of people may be affected by the tax changes that will take place if the fiscal cliff isn't resolved by the Jan. 1., 2013, deadline.
View Interactive
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More photos and interactive graphics
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Other agencies will also have to issue furloughs or begin layoffs if the cuts aren't reversed, and some lawmakers have said companies that do business with the government will also have to lay off workers because of the impact of the cuts.
Sen. Lindsey Graham (R., S.C.) said Mr. Panetta has told him there "will be nothing" in the fiscal cliff deal to avoid sequestration.
"I called Leon Panetta last night during dinner," Mr. Graham said on Fox News Sunday, "and he said, 'Lindsey, I have been told there will be nothing in the bill to avoid sequestration going into effect.' "
Mr. Panetta says "if we do it, it will be shooting the Defense Department in the head, and we have to send out 800,000 layoff notices at the beginning of the year. He is worried to death that if we don't fix sequestration, we will destroy the finest military in the world at a time we need it the most and this bill doesn't cover defense cuts, on top of the ones we already have," Mr. Graham said.
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http://myweb.fsu.edu/bbc09/Crisher-Souva%20-%20Power%20At%20Sea%20v2.0%20full.pdf
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http://weaselzippers.us/2013/01/20/obama-ousts-another-general-this-time-the-head-of-central-command/
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jan/25/gen-dempsey-hints-bar-likely-lowered-female-combat/
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Kenneth Johnson, Marine Corps veteran of three combat tours, argues:
What kind of a man is it who can send women off to kill and maim? What kind of society does that?
What kind of men sharing a fire-team foxhole with a woman and two other men don't treat the woman more gently?
What kind of society bemoaning that men don't seem to respect women can't see that part of the respect they demand is predicated on the specialness of the other?
Perhaps it is possible in a firefight to distinguish between how one treats women and men, but I doubt that I could do it. And if I am trained to treat men and women the same throughout my career, can this have no significant effect on how I treat women otherwise?
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323539804578262013186376352.html
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Good points there Doug.
Here's another variable to consider:
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http://www.volokh.com/posts/1197050445.shtml
[Kingsley Browne, guest-blogging,December 7, 2007 at 1:00pm] Trackbacks
Co-ed Combat -- Pregnancy and Single Motherhood
I’ve discussed so far a variety of differences between men and women that affect their relative aptitude for combat roles. Another distinction between men and women that has significant effects on military readiness is that only women can become pregnant.
Approximately ten percent of military women are pregnant at any one time. During the Gulf War, pregnancy was the leading cause of women’s being shipped back early to the United States. When the destroyer tender USS Acadia returned from an eight-month deployment during the Gulf War, thirty-six of the 360 women on board had been transferred off the ship because of pregnancy. The Acadia was the ship most prominently called “the Love Boat,” but it is just one of many that have had that label attached to them.
A comprehensive study for the Navy of female shipboard personnel found an overall pregnancy rate of 19 percent per year. The highest pregnancy rate (27 percent) was on submarine tenders, the class of ships with the largest percentage of women.
With the unprecedented use of female personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, one would think that the services would like to know what their losses are from pregnancy. According to a spokesman for Central Command, however, “We’re definitely not tracking it.” A Pentagon spokeswoman said that the Army does release information on how many women choose to leave the service because of pregnancy but not information on those who leave the war theater, implying that the information is tracked, simply not released. Only “general numbers” are released, she said, “to protect the rights of women, soldiers and the organization,” although it is not clear how anyone’s “rights” would be infringed by release of statistical information about pregnancy losses.
When it comes time to deploy, women fail to do so at three to four times the rate for men, the difference being largely due to pregnancy. Once a soldier is confirmed to be pregnant she becomes ‘non-deployable’ and will remain so for up to a year. After deployment, many women must be sent back home because of pregnancy.
A Navy study found that a quarter of women (compared with a tenth of men) were lost from ships for unplanned reasons. Large numbers of military pregnancies that are carried to term are unplanned (over 60 percent of those among junior enlisted personnel).
Pregnancy in the later stages means total absence of the woman – who may or may not be replaced – but even in the earlier stages it results in substantial limitations on a woman’s ability to contribute to her unit. One Army MOS in which there are many women is “fueler.” Fuelers are responsible for fueling vehicles and are critical to their units. Unfortunately, however, female fuelers are medically restricted from working in that job because of chemical exposure from the date their pregnancy is diagnosed. As the Army was preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it had to impose a cap on the number of deployed women who could be allocated to that MOS, and it had to move men from other specialties into the fueler job, creating shortages elsewhere.
Women cannot serve at sea after their twentieth week of pregnancy, and even before that they must be removed from ships unless they are within six hours of a facility “capable of evaluating and stabilizing obstetric emergencies.” After giving birth, mothers are excused from sea duty for a year.
Women’s ability to avoid deployment by becoming pregnant is a constant source of resentment among men. Intentionally injuring oneself to avoid deployment is a court-martial offense; intentionally becoming pregnant to avoid deployment brings no penalty at all, nor does becoming pregnant to avoid deployment, missing the deployment, and then aborting the pregnancy – a pattern that creates even intensified resentment. This latter phenomenon is almost certainly something that the military does not track, so it is hard to know how widespread it is, but while I was researching my book, several people (all Navy officers) spontaneously mentioned it to me.
Single parenthood is also a much greater problem among women than men. Although in raw numbers there are more single fathers than single mothers (because of the overwhelming disproportion of men in the military), the proportion of women who are single parents is much higher.
Comparison of the numbers of single mothers and fathers is meaningful only if “single parenthood” means the same thing for mothers and fathers, whereas it clearly does not. A Navy survey that inquired into the nature of custody arrangements found that 76 percent of single mothers had sole custody of the child, whereas only 16 percent of men did. While only 8 percent of single mothers had “joint custody (less than half the time),” 63 percent of fathers did. These are very different parental patterns, and they have substantially different effects on deployability – differences that are obscured by simply labeling the involved personnel “single parents.”
The military recognizes the incompatibility of single parenthood and military service. Army regulations, for example, bar single parents from enlisting, stating that “the Army’s mission and unit readiness are not consistent with being a sole parent.” The problem comes about when individuals already in the service become single parents. Single parents are required to file “Family Care Plans,” identifying someone who will be able to take over parental responsibilities in the event of deployment, but if that arrangement falls through — or if the requirement is not complied with — then there can be a significant problem.
During the Gulf War, a number of military women with young children were transferred back to the United States because of the stress of being away from their children. Because of the longer deployments involved in the current conflicts, one doubts that this is a lesser problem today. Reliable data are not available (and perhaps do not exist), however, as the military has an obviously strong interest in not widely advertising the possibility of the return home for parents who miss their children.
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http://www.mercatornet.com/Newsletterv0810/view_txt/why_men_fight
Why men fight
Robert R. Reilly | 26 January 2013
Men fight to protect their women. Or, at least, that’s the way it used to be.
On Thursday, however, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said, "Today Gen. Dempsey and I are pleased to announce that we are eliminating the ground combat exclusion rule for women and moving forward with a plan to eliminate all gender-based barriers to service." This, in effect, voids the 1994 rule that mostly excludes women from units below the brigade level when the primary mission is direct ground combat.
Gen. Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, proclaimed that, "The time has come to rescind the direct combat exclusion rule for women and eliminate all unnecessary gender-based barriers to service,"
Why is this necessary? How did such a “time” arrive upon us? According to the Wall Street Journal, “last February, Mr. Panetta ordered US military service chiefs to find ways to expand the role of women.” In other words, the military chiefs did not go to the Secretary of Defense and say, “we need to place women in combat units in order to fulfill our military mission.”
Had they said this, it could have been for two possible reasons. One is that there are not enough men willing to serve in combat. Or two, women are demonstrably better in combat than men. The first is clearly not the case, as the military is cutting back on personnel. The Armed Forces have more men in combat units than, according to President Obama, they need. Two, there are no studies demonstrating women’s superiority or even equivalence to men in combat. In other words, this came from the top – the political top. It is ideological pressure that created this requirement, not military necessity.
The rationalizations for it are almost amusing in the distance they have achieved from reality. One of the women who filed a lawsuit to challenge the combat ban, Army Staff Sgt. Jennifer Hunt, who was injured in 2007 by a roadside bomb in Iraq, said, "Right before the IED went off, it didn't ask me how many push-ups or sit-ups I could do." Yes, indeed, an explosive can rip right through a woman as well as a man. It does not discriminate. Death is an equal opportunity killer. Usually, that would be a reason to keep women out of harm’s way, not put them in it.
Rep. Tammy Duckworth (D. Ill), a former Army pilot who lost both her legs in Iraq when her helicopter was hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, said the decision will allow the "best man or woman on the front line." Absolutely, if a woman can kill men more effectively than a man can, why not let them? Women killing men is an essential part of equal opportunity.
Sen. Jack Reed (D, RI) said that on the current battlefield "all who serve are in combat." Absolutely, the person who cuts his or her finger at the company mess hall slicing bread should get a purple heart just like the infantry man who is shot by an enemy soldier. All wounds are equal. If we define everything as combat, then there are no obstacles to women in combat.
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney said that President Obama thinks that the end of the combat exclusion is "appropriate." Appropriate to what? Apparently to removing "unnecessary gender-based barriers," as Mr Carney said.
Here is evidence of the barrier. Since 2001, 152 women have been killed in combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, with 946 wounded. Considering that women make up some 14 percent of the active duty military, the killing is obviously not proportional to their participation. It only represents .019 of US fatalities in these two wars. Clearly, this must be the result of discrimination. To make sure women are given a fair shake in their new roles as front-line fighters, perhaps the fatality figure could be brought up 14 percent. In fact, this might be the new metric of success for the integration of women into ground combat.
There is another serious problem that requires no sarcasm. According to John Luddy, in a 1994 backgrounder for the Heritage Foundation, “History shows that the presence of women has had a devastating impact on the effectiveness of men in battle.” Why? For example, “a review of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War… revealed that men tried to protect and assist women rather than continue their attack. As a result, they not only put their own lives in greater danger, but also jeopardized the survival of the entire unit. The study further revealed that unit morale was damaged when men saw women killed and maimed on the battlefield.”
According to the late Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, women reduced the combat effectiveness of Haganah units because men took steps to protect them out of “fear of what the Arabs would do to [the] women if they captured them.” In other words, men will behave like men, nowhere more so than in the presence of women. This is why Israel barred women from direct combat until 2000, when the so far only mixed gender infantry battalion was organized to patrol the relatively quiet borders with Jordan and Egypt.
There is another less appetizing way in which men will be men in the presence of women. General Dempsey, apparently with a straight face, suggested that allowing women into combat units may alleviate the military's serious problem with sexual harassment: "I have to believe, the more we can treat people equally, the more likely they are to treat each other equally." In other words, if we pretend that women are just smaller men, sexual harassment will go away.
Here is the political program: Inject sexual tension into combat units by mixing genders, which results in an explosion of sexual harassment; then blame the military and insist that it transform itself – not to fight the enemy and win wars – but to fight sexual harassment.
A rare voice of sanity was heard when Rep. Duncan Hunter (R, Calif) said, "The focus of our military needs to be maximizing combat effectiveness… The question here is whether this change will actually make our military better at operating in combat and killing the enemy, since that will be their job, too."
Should it be their job to kill or to be killed? Retired four-star general Volney Warner said that, “I remain convinced that women are better at giving life than taking it.” What kind of society seeks to put its women, it’s life givers, directly in harm’s way – to endanger that which is most precious to it? The answer is a society that no longer knows what women are or why men fight to protect them. In turn, it asks men not to be men – not to be protectors. What is there left to defend in such a society?
President Obama said, "Today, every American can be proud that our military will grow even stronger with our mothers, wives, sisters and daughters playing a greater role in protecting this country we love." Instinctively, one feels that this sentence should say the opposite – that we can be proud that our military is protecting “our mothers, wives, sisters and daughters” by keeping them from harm, not by placing them in it. One reason this is a “country we love” is that we can keep our women safe here. Obama brings us only one step away from the idea that “our mothers, wives, sisters and daughters” should be the ones protecting our military. This is a proposal that the ancient Greek playwright and satirist Aristophanes could have had great fun with. “Honey, tell the kids that mommy will be late tonight. I’ve still got some killing to do.”
If you want men to have nothing to fight for, this is the way to proceed.
Robert R. Reilly is a member of the board of the Middle East Media Research Institute and the author of The Closing of the Muslim Mind.
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second post
http://www.pjtv.com/?cmd=mpg&mpid=517&load=7967
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What Cutting Defense Really Means
The Obama administration's current plan scales down the active-duty military to the pre-9/ll level..
By MICHAEL O'HANLON
How much more, if at all, should the U.S. cut its military budget as part of comprehensive deficit-reduction efforts?
A typical observer can be forgiven some confusion on this issue. Even the recent history of defense spending isn't clear. Some say that the 2011 Budget Control Act cut $487 billion from the military over the next 10 years, while others claim that the armed forces will lose nothing from their core budget because the budget was bloated before 2011 anyway. In fact, the most accurate figure for cuts under current law is $350 billion over 10 years, as measured relative to a standard Congressional Budget Office baseline that assumes modest growth for inflation.
Further confusing the issue are competing arguments over how damaging additional cuts may be. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta has voiced adamant opposition to any further reductions that would take annual defense spending much below $550 billion. Yet as a White House official in the 1990s he was content with a $400 billion annual budget (all figures are adjusted for inflation).
Meanwhile Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has questioned whether the U.S. could remain a superpower if the military loses another $500 billion (or 8% of its budget) over the next 10 years. Yet in 2010 the bipartisan Simpson-Bowles and Rivlin-Domenici commissions endorsed cuts of that very magnitude.
Given all this, many doves will favor more cuts, arguing that the U.S. still outspends China 3-to-1, accounts for more than 40% of all global military expenditures, and spends more than it did during the Cold War. By contrast, hawks will tend to emphasize that the world remains dangerous and the U.S. will soon spend just 3% of GDP on its military, when Cold War norms were two to three times that amount. Rather than resolve the impasse by such sweeping arguments, however, it would be better to link budget numbers to strategies and capabilities.
The starting point for doing so is the Obama administration's current military plan, which incorporates only the $350 billion in cuts from the Budget Control Act. The plan scales down the military from about 1.5 million active-duty uniformed personnel to 1.4 million, the pre-9/11 level that is two-thirds the Cold War norm. The plan also chips away at modernization programs but preserves most major ones (with one or two notable exceptions), and it levels off various forms of military pay and benefits. Still, most troops will continue to be compensated better than private-sector cohorts of similar age, education and technical skill.
Building on this plan, there are two basic ways to proceed now: a tactical approach and a strategic one.
Tactical cuts would stay with the basic national-security strategy of the Obama administration but look for additional economies within it. This is the thinking that Sen. Carl Levin (D., Mich.), Rep. Chris van Hollen (D., Md.) and some others have espoused of late. Additional cuts might take defense spending down another $100 billion to $200 billion over a decade (though some savings might be counterbalanced by higher-than-expected costs elsewhere in the Pentagon budget). For example, in addition to another necessary round of base closures:
• The active-duty Army and Marine Corps could shrink somewhat below their 1990s levels, rather than staying slightly above those levels as current plans dictate.
• To get by with its current 286-ship fleet (or less) rather than increase its numbers, the Navy could employ innovative approaches such as "sea swap," by which some crews are rotated via airplane while ships stay forward-deployed longer.
• The military could scale back its intended purchases of F-35 joint strike fighters—good but expensive planes—by roughly half from its current intended buy of nearly 2,500 airframes.
• Rather than design a new submarine to carry ballistic missiles, the Navy might simply refurbish the existing Trident submarine or reopen that production line.
• The military could further streamline compensation, close some stateside commissaries and exchanges, and modestly increase military health-care premiums while scaling back pensions.
The other approach—necessary if big cuts like those proposed by the Simpson-Bowles commission are to happen—would require a more profound strategic shift. This wouldn't emasculate the country, deprive it of superpower status or force the abandonment of any allies, but it would mean accepting substantially greater risk. I would oppose these larger cuts but can imagine three scenarios for carrying them out:
• Cut the active-duty Army and Marine Corps by 25%, depriving the U.S. of the capacity to conduct anything much more than one large ground operation at a time.
• Gradually return military compensation—now $25,000 greater per person than at the start of the Bush administration—to 2001 levels, including considerable cuts in both benefits and base pay.
• Finally, eliminate the F-35 program rather than cut it in half.
Together with the more modest economies described above, these initiatives could produce $500 billion in 10-year savings—the same amount that would be dictated if "sequestration" goes into effect in the absence of a budget deal in Congress.
Others may see different ways to realize these kinds of savings, but it is time we stopped tossing around big budget numbers like chips in a poker game or pretending that magical reforms in Pentagon operations can yield huge savings quickly and painlessly. Possible savings mean changes in American military capability and, quite possibly, changes to U.S. national security.
Mr. O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is author of "Right-Sizing Defense Cuts" in the new Brookings briefing book "Big Bets and Black Swans."
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America has no enemies, just friends we haven't appeased yet.
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http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2013/01/ted-cruz-shows-that-hagel-slandered-both-israel-and-the-u-s.php?ModPagespeed=noscript
Posted on January 31, 2013 by Paul Mirengoff in Barack Obama, Chuck Hagel, Israel
Ted Cruz shows that Hagel slandered both Israel and the U.S.
I had thought that Lindsey Graham would be the most effective questioner of Chuck Hagel at today’s hearing, and Graham did his usual fine job of “cross-examination.” But for my money, Ted Cruz topped Graham and everyone else with questions that exposed not just Hagel’s contempt for Israel, but his contempt for the United States. You can view the tape of Cruz’s devastating round with Hagel here.
First, Cruz played excerpts from a tape of Hagel’s 2009 appearance on al Jazeera, in which a caller suggested that Israel had committed war crimes. In responding to the question, Hagel did not dispute the caller’’s statement. Cruz also pointed to statement by Hagel that Israel had engaged in “the sickening slaughter” of Hezbollah, which sounds a bit like war crimes.
Taken together, these pieces of information show that Hagel regards Israel as a criminal state, or at least is comfortable with that characterization. Hagel tried, with the same lameness he displayed most of the day, to talk away around this conclusion. He stated that both sides — Israelis and Hezbollah — had slaughtered each other. Perhaps Hagel will produce a tape in which he accused the Palestinians of engaging in a “sickening slaughter” of Israelis. Perhaps he will produce a tape (from the period before he was in the running for a cabinet job under President Obama) in which he took exception to the claim that Israel has committed war crimes. Perhaps, but don’t hold your breath.
Next, Cruz played an excerpt from the same interview in which the al Jazeera host read a reader e-mail claiming that the United States has served as the world’’s “bully.” This time Hagel not only failed to take exception and stick up for his country, he said on al Jazeera he found some merit in the claim, calling it “a good observation” (the Washington Post report linked to above fails to report this fact).
Pressed by Cruz, Hagel tried to squirm his way out of this bit of anti-Americanism by misrepresenting both the email and his response. But Cruz brought him back to the text, which makes it quite clear that Hagel endorsed the view that America is the world’s bully.
Chairman Levin saw the problem these excerpts pose for Hagel, and suggested that Cruz should have presented the entire interview transcript, not just video excerpts. Cruz agreed to transcribe the interview clips in their entirety and post them on his Senate webpage.
If, as is likely, Hagel is confirmed, President Obama will have in place a Secretary of State who (albeit decades ago) called the U.S. military “the Army of Genghis Khan” and a Secretary of Defense who (a few short years ago) found merit in the view that the U.S. is the world’s bully.
This state of affairs is altogether fitting for a president who, himself, holds America in contempt. At least Hagel and Kerry can point to their experiences in Vietnam as the source of their disillusionment with America. What can Obama point to, his days in Rev. Wright’s church?
JOHN adds: Here are the al-Jazeera clips that Sen. Cruz played today:
Already, after just a month in office, it seems clear that two new superstars have emerged in the Republican Party and the conservative movement: Tom Cotton in the House, and Ted Cruz in the Senate.
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Well, he sounds like a perfect representative of our Commander in Chief. :cry:
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Mark Steyn: Easy to see why Tehran endorses Hagel
By MARK STEYN / Syndicated columnist
You don't have to be that good to fend off a committee of showboating senatorial blowhards. Hillary Clinton demonstrated that a week or so back when she unleashed what's apparently the last word in withering putdowns: What difference does it make?
Quite a bit of difference, it seems. This week, an oversedated Elmer Fudd showed up at the Senate claiming to be the president's nominee for Secretary of Defense, and even the kindliest interrogators on the committee couldn't prevent the poor chap shooting himself in the foot.
Twenty minutes in, Chuck Hagel was all out of appendages.
He warmed up with a little light "misspeaking" on Iran. "I support the president's strong position on containment," he declared. Breaking news!
Obama comes clean on Iran! According to Hagel, the administration favors "containment." I could barely "contain" my excitement! Despite official denials, many of us had long suspected that, lacking any stomach for preventing a nuclear Tehran, Washington would settle for "containing" them. Hagel has been a containment man for years: It worked with the Soviets, so why not with apocalyptic ayatollahs? As he said in a 2007 speech, "The core tenets of George Kennan's 'The Long Telegram' and the strategy of containment remain relevant today." Recent history of pre-nuclear Iran – authorizing successful mob hits on Salman Rushdie's publishers and translators, bombing Jewish community centers in Buenos Aires, seeding client regimes in Lebanon and Gaza – suggests that these are fellows disinclined to be "contained" even at the best of times. But, even if Iran can be "contained" from nuking Tel Aviv, how do you "contain" Iran's exercise of its nuclear status to advance its interests more discreetly, or "contain" the mullahs' generosity to states and non-state actors less squeamish about using the technology? How do you "contain" a nuclear Iran from de facto control of Persian Gulf oil, including setting the price and determining the customers?
All fascinating questions, and now that Hagel has announced "containment" as the official administration position, we can all discuss them.
Unfortunately, as Hillary said the other day, "our policy is prevention, not containment". So five minutes later the handlers discreetly swung into action to "contain" Hagel. "I was just handed a note that I misspoke," he announced, "that I said I supported the President's position on containment. If I said that, I meant to say that we don't have a position on containment." Hagel's revised position is that there is no position on containment for him to have a position on.
Carl Levin, the Democrat chair, stepped in to contain further damage. "We do have a position on containment, and that is we do not favor containment," he clarified. "I just wanted to clarify the clarify."
Containment? Prevention? What difference does it make? Could happen to anyone. I well remember when Neville Chamberlain landed at Heston Aerodrome in 1938 and announced the latest breakthrough in appeasement: "I have here a piece of paper from Herr Hitler." Two minutes later, he announced, "I have here a second piece of paper from my staffer saying that I misspoke." Who can forget Churchill's stirring words in the House of Commons? "If, indeed, it is the case that I said, 'We shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall never surrender!,' then I misspoke. I meant to say that we're keeping the situation under review and remain committed to exploring all options."
It's easy to make mistakes when you're as expert in all the nuances of Iranian affairs as Chuck Hagel. After he'd hailed Iran's "elected, legitimate government," it fell to another Democrat, Kirsten Gillibrand, to prompt Hagel to walk it back. Okay, delete "elected" and "legitimate": "What I meant to say, should have said, is that it's recognizable."
"Recognizable"? In the sense that, if you wake up one morning to a big mushroom cloud on the horizon, you'd recognize it as the work of the Iranian government? No, by "recognizable," he meant that the Iranian government is "recognized" as the government of Iran.
"I don't understand Iranian politics," he announced in perhaps his least-misspoken statement of the day. But the Iranians understand ours, which is why, in an amusing touch, the Foreign Ministry in Tehran has enthusiastically endorsed Hagel.
Fortunately, Iran is entirely peripheral to global affairs – it's not like Chad or the Solomon Islands or the other burning questions the great powers are currently wrestling with – so it would be entirely unreasonable to expect Hagel to understand anything much about what's going on over there. So what of his other, non-Iranian interests?
"There are a lot of things I don't know about," said Hagel. "If confirmed, I intend to know a lot more than I do."
He then denied that "I will be running anything." Don't let the fact that the Secretary of Defense presides over 40 percent of the entire planet's military spending confuse you. He's not really "running" a thing – or, as he was anxious to assure us, "I won't be in a policy-making position."
Really? So what's the job for, then? Just showing up at the office and the occasional black-tie NATO banquet? Most misspeakers loose off one round and then have to re-load, but Chuck Hagel is a big scary "military-style assault weapon" of a misspeaker, effortlessly peppering the Senate wainscoting for hours on end. Late in the day, after five o'clock, he pronounced definitively: "It doesn't matter what I think."
"It does matter what you think," insisted New Hampshire Republican Kelly Ayotte.
With respect to my own senator, I think it matters that he seems incapable of thinking – or at least of thinking through his own Great Thoughts.
There are over 300 million Americans, and another 20 million Undocumented-Americans about to be fast-tracked down the soi-disant "path to citizenship." Surely, from this vast talent pool, it should be possible to find someone who's sufficiently interested in running the planet's biggest military not to present himself on the world stage as a woozy, unfocused stumblebum. In an exquisite touch, responding to reports that Hagel was "ill-prepared," someone in the White House leaked that he had been thoroughly "coached." In other words, don't blame us: We put him through the federally mandated Confirmation Hearing For Dummies course. He doesn't have to be a competent Defense Secretary; he just has to play one on TV for a couple of hours. But even that's too much to ask of an increasingly dysfunctional political system: The Senate disdains to pass a budget, 70 percent of U.S. Treasury debt is bought by the Federal Reserve, month-long negotiations to cut spending turn out in the final deal to increase spending ... and the president's choice of Defense Secretary tells the world he has no idea what our policy on Iran is.
Hagel may know nothing about Iran, but he's an incisive expert on America.
During an appearance on al-Jazeera in 2009, a caller asked him about "the perception and the reality" that America is "the world's bully" – and Hagel told viewers that he agreed. Confronted with this exchange by Sen. Ted Cruz, Hagel floundered. There was no aide to slip him a note explaining that the incoming SecDef takes no formal position on whether or not his own nation is "the world's bully."
Ah, if only. In the chancelleries of Moscow, Beijing, Tehran, Cairo, Pyongyang, the world's bullied are laughing their heads off.
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WASHINGTON — How many pull-ups does it take to make a female Marine?
Related
Pentagon Is Set to Lift Combat Ban for Women (January 24, 2013)
The answer, starting next January: a minimum of three, the same number required of male Marines.
If anyone thought the military’s decision to allow women into combat units would lead to exceptions for women when it came to fitness and physical strength, this is one service’s “gender neutral” answer — or at least part of the answer.
Like the men, women will have to perform the exercises on the Marine Corps’s annual physical fitness test as “dead hang” pull-ups, without the benefit of the momentum from a lower-body swing. Like the men, women can do the pull-ups underhanded or overhanded, as long as their chins break the plane of the bar.
The new requirement replaces the old “flexed arm hang” for women, in place since 1975, which had to be held for a minimum of 15 seconds.
“The physical requirements of female Marines, commensurate with their roles, have increased greatly since 1975,” said Col. Sean D. Gibson, a spokesman for the Marine Corps Combat Development Command in Quantico, Va. “The pull-up is a better test of muscular strength.”
But the new Marine Corps regulations are just part of a sweeping re-examination of fitness standards in the military that Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta’s announcement last week ending the ban on women in combat only accelerated.
As it stands now, service members face a gantlet of overlapping fitness tests throughout the vast sprawl of the American military, from initial ones that recruits have to pass to annual fitness (and weight) tests to specific physical requirements that must be met for combat jobs.
The Pentagon says it will not lower standards for women, but is nonetheless reviewing the requirements for hundreds of what are called military occupational specialties to see if they actually match up with the demands of each job.
Some combat jobs that might open to women may require them to meet only specific requirements rather than a wide range of fitness standards.
“We’re going to ensure that our tank crewmen are fully capable of removing 50-pound projectiles from the ammunition rack and loading them into the main gun in a sustained manner in a combat situation,” said George Wright, an Army spokesman.
But for now, the Army has no immediate plans to change its sex-adjusted recruitment and annual fitness tests, even though the Marine Corps, which tenaciously promotes itself as the most hard-bodied service, has started to toughen up its standards for women.
But even for the pull-ups, the Marines are still making some exceptions. To get a perfect grade, women will have to do only 8, compared with the 20 required for men.
“I don’t think it’s a very high bar,” said Capt. Ann G. Fox, a Marine Reserve officer who during her first deployment in 2004 worked with the Iraqi Army and who thinks women could do better if it was required of them. “I think the test should be the same as the men 20 pull-ups. People train to what they’re tested on.”
That was the experience of Greg Jacob, who was a commander at the combat training school for enlisted Marines at Camp Geiger, N.C., and said that he asked his female trainers to do the same number of pull-ups as their male students, even though women were not required at the time to do pull-ups at all.
“I saw women who could only do one or two pull-ups be able to bust out, over the course of four or five months, eight pull-ups,” he said. “And that was because they were training to that standard.”
Mr. Jacob, now the policy director for the Service Women’s Action Network, an advocacy group that worked to end the female combat ban, acknowledged the physiological differences between men and women, but said they were overstated. “There are lots of men who don’t have the same muscle mass as other men,” he said. “There is physical diversity regardless of gender.”
Many jobs in the military, he said, have nonnegotiable physical demands. “Whether you were a man or a woman, you had to throw a live grenade 15 meters,” he said. “If a woman throws the hand grenade 10 meters, it’s going to blow up in her face and kill her.”
In the Army, no pull-ups are required of either men or women on the annual fitness test, but like the Marines, there are different standards for each sex. A 17- to 26-year-old man in the Army has to run two miles in 15 minutes, 54 seconds or less and do at least 42 push-ups; a woman in the same age group has to run two miles in 18 minutes, 54 seconds or less and do at least 19 push-ups.
The requirements decrease as service members age, although a woman who is 62 or older in the Army still has to run two miles in 25 minutes or less.
Marines, typically, raise the bar. A 17- to 26-year-old male Marine has to run three miles in 28 minutes or less on his annual fitness test; compared with 31 minutes or less for a female Marine of the same age.
The Marines also require all men and women to pass an annual combat fitness test, even though until now women were not officially permitted in combat. The sex-adjusted test drills Marines in how to respond under fire.
All of the tests pale in comparison with one of the most brutal male preserves in the military, the Marines’ 86-day Infantry Officer Course at Quantico, Va., which is intended to screen and train potential infantry officers. The test makes extraordinary physical and mental demands on its participants.
Last fall, two female officers went through the course as an experiment and failed, inviting questions — even though large numbers of men fail — of whether women were up to it.
Gen. James F. Amos, the commandant of the Marine Corps, held out the possibility that they are. In comments to reporters in San Diego on Thursday, he said he had met with two more female officers who had signed up for the next Infantry Officer Course, starting in March. “It looks like they’re in great shape and they’re excited about it,” he said.
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The Right Way to Cut Pentagon Spending
The U.S. has an abysmal record of postwar drawdowns that undermine military readiness and modernization..
By MICHÈLE A. FLOURNOY
Whether or not Congress avoids sequestration by March 1, defense spending will likely be cut by at least 10% over the next decade. As 20% of the federal budget and 50% of discretionary spending, it will be part of any longer-term budget deal.
Unfortunately, the United States has an abysmal record of managing postwar drawdowns of defense spending. Almost all have resulted in a "hollow force"—too much force structure with too little investment in people, readiness and modernization.
Why? Because the easiest way to reduce Defense Department spending quickly is to enact across-the-board cuts in military end-strength, operations and maintenance, and procurement—solving the budget problem on the back of the force rather than on the department writ large.
In past drawdowns after World War II, Vietnam and the Cold War, American planners assumed a period of peace. But as the U.S. transitions in Afghanistan, no such calm appears on the horizon. From instability in the Middle East to al Qaeda's resurgence in northern Africa, North Korea's continued provocations and Iran's dogged pursuit of nuclear weapons, the global security environment remains dangerous and volatile.
In this context, the U.S. must take care to preserve the military capabilities it needs to protect America's interests now and in the future. The armed forces must retain the ability and agility to respond rapidly and effectively to a broad range of contingencies. Deep cuts to force structure, readiness and modernization should be the last resort, not the default course of action.
So where should policy makers reduce spending?
• First, eliminate unnecessary overhead in the Pentagon, defense agencies and headquarters staffs. Since 2001, these have grown like weeds. Over the past decade, the number of DOD civilians increased by more than 100,000, to roughly 778,000 in 2010, while the number of contractors also ballooned.
When I served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in the mid-1990s, the policy organization had fewer than 600 people. When I returned as undersecretary for policy in 2009, the office had grown to nearly 1,000. While I found efficiencies to reduce my budget by 20%, I did not have the authorities needed to reshape my workforce.
In the private sector, delayering a headquarters typically results in cost savings of 15%-20% and improved organizational effectiveness. Imagine the savings and enhanced performance that could result from delayering the Pentagon. DOD needs Congress to provide additional authorities, such as allowing a reduction in the civilian workforce, to reduce unnecessary costs and reshape its personnel for the 21st century.
• Second, take steps to reduce the costs of military health care without sacrificing quality of care. The current trajectory of the Pentagon's health-care spending is unsustainable. DOD's medical costs have more than doubled since 2001,((Well, DUH!!! We've had two big wars!!!) to more than 10% of the defense budget from roughly 6%, and they are growing faster than any other federal health-care program: 10.6% per year, compared with 9% for the Veterans Administration and 8.5% for Medicare. Overall, U.S. health-care costs are rising 6.3% per year.
Tricare—the suite of insurance programs that cover service members, their families and military retirees—now covers nearly 10 million Americans. But DOD is bearing a disproportionate share of this burden. For example, 52% of the working-age military retirees who are eligible for private health insurance instead choose Tricare as their primary payer, shifting the costs from private companies to DOD.
Out-of-pocket expenses for Tricare beneficiaries haven't changed since the program's inception in 1996, but as costs have skyrocketed the government's share has grown to 88% from 73%. The Defense Department's proposals to increase some copays for non-active-duty beneficiaries have been repeatedly rejected by Congress.
Something has to give. The Pentagon needs to manage these health-care programs more aggressively, and Congress needs to provide the authorities and permission to do so. Otherwise, this critical benefit for service members and their families will become unsustainable and will undermine investment in the capabilities the military needs to accomplish its mission.
• Third, cut excess infrastructure. Since the last Base Realignment and Closure Commission in the late 1990s, Congress has prevented the Defense Department from closing bases it no longer needs or consolidating infrastructure to better support evolving missions. This inability to shed or realign facilities hangs like an albatross around the department's neck, consuming billions of dollars that could otherwise go to readiness and modernization. Congress should grant DOD's request for another Base Realignment and Closure Commission round this year.
• Finally, reform acquisition. While the current administration has made some important progress (the "Better Buying Power" initiative to promote greater efficiency and productivity), far more needs to be done. DOD is still operating with procurement timelines unresponsive to need, perverse incentives for program managers, inadequate numbers of trained acquisition professionals, and insufficient dialogue with industry. Affordable systems and reasonable shareholder return need not be at odds.
No doubt restructuring the defense enterprise will be hard, politically and bureaucratically, but failure is not an option. Failure to find substantial savings in these areas could result in some very unpalatable and dangerous trade-offs, from reducing the military's capacity to prevail in more than one theater at a time to cutting its readiness to deter adversaries or respond effectively in crises.
Although the Senate Armed Services Committee missed an opportunity to address these critical issues during defense secretary nominee Chuck Hagel's confirmation hearing last week, the choice is clear: Either the government cuts costs by fundamentally transforming how DOD does business, or the U.S. risks cutting capabilities critical to national defense and global leadership.
Ms. Flournoy, who served as undersecretary of defense for policy from 2009-12, is a senior adviser to the Boston Consulting Group and co-founder of the Center for a New American Security.
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second post of morning
Hagel's Hruska Defense Will America's next defense secretary vindicate the cause of the mediocre man?
By BRET STEPHENS
Once upon a time, a Republican senator from Nebraska spoke up for the right of mediocrities to occupy eminent positions of public trust.
"Even if he were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and people and lawyers," said Sen. Roman Hruska in 1970 as a defense of G. Harrold Carswell, Richard Nixon's ill-fated nominee to the Supreme Court. "They are entitled to a little representation, aren't they, and a little chance? We can't have all Brandeises, Frankfurters and Cardozos."
Right. And at the Pentagon, we can't have all Stimsons, Forrestals and Marshalls. Which is why America needs another senator from Nebraska to vindicate the cause of the mediocre man.
That man is Chuck Hagel.
Until his confirmation hearing last week, Mr. Hagel was touted as a courageous tribune of the hard but necessary truth. His nomination, according to one sycophant, "may prove to be the most consequential foreign-policy appointment of [ Barack Obama's] presidency." He was hailed as a latter-day Dwight Eisenhower, a military hero mindful of the appropriate limits of U.S. power, a real American bold enough to tell the chicken-hawk neocon pretenders where they could stick it.
As for his claim about the Jewish lobby intimidating people, it was no more than a gaffe in the sense of accidentally telling the naked truth. "I am certain," said another prominent Hagel defender, "that the vast majority of U.S. senators and policy makers quietly believe exactly what Hagel believes on Israel." To take offense at the suggestion that a nefarious assortment of Jews plays the Congress like a marionette was to risk accusations of McCarthyism.
After the hearings, what's left of that defense?
Courageous Chuck is done for. He simply folded in the face of questions about his previous positions on Israel, Iran, nuclear Global Zero, Pentagon overspending and so on. If his repentance is sincere, then the ideological iconoclasm that was supposed to be his great recommendation as secretary of defense is no more. If he's insincere, then he's little more than a dissembler trying to advance his career.
Deep-thinking Chuck is no more, either. His befuddlement on Obama administration policy toward Iran—the flubbed remark about containment, the passed note, the re-flub, the coaching from committee Chairman Carl Levin—was almost the least of it. He didn't even seem to grasp the details of the 2011 Budget Control Act that contains the infamous sequester and will be the very thing he'll need to wrestle with immediately if confirmed.
Chuck-in-Charge is also not in the cards. "I won't be in a policy-making position," he said, astonishingly, to a question from West Virginia Democrat Joe Manchin. To be the secretary of defense, you see, is a bit like being the grand marshal at an Independence Day parade: You wear a sash, you hold a baton, you say a few words, you smile, wave and walk the route.
It says something about the political state of play that Mr. Hagel's defenders are now whispering that he just won't matter all that much. Serious defense policy will be run by the grown-ups in the White House, people like Ben Rhodes, Valerie Jarrett, Denis McDonough and, of course, the president. That's reassuring.
It also says something about the political moment that Republicans seem prepared to let Mr. Hagel through now that they have drawn a bit of blood. Nebraska's Mike Johanns and Mississippi's Thad Cochran have declared their support for Mr. Hagel. John McCain opposes a filibuster on the grounds that the president deserves an up-or-down vote on his nominee. In theory that's right and, in a sense, honorable. But a political party that can't press a political advantage when it has one is a loser. And who wants an opposition that thinks its honor lies in losing honorably?
In the meantime, it will come as a comfort to America's enemies to know what they'll be getting in a second Obama term.
One is a cabinet without a single hawk or even semi-hawk, whereas only a year ago there were three: Leon Panetta, David Petraeus and even Hillary Clinton. Another is a secretary of defense with an unsteady grasp of a department that may, within a month, be facing a historic and blunt reduction in its budgets. A third is a vice president who has just agreed to yet another round of negotiations with Tehran. And finally there's a president whose second inaugural address was entirely devoted to calling America home for the collective tasks he believes lie ahead.
Ask yourself how Vladimir Putin, Ali Khamenei and Bashar Assad are likely to feel about all of that. Shouldn't America have at least one officer of cabinet rank who scares the daylights out of these people?
If Mr. Hagel had a sense of the seriousness of the office he is now likely to enter, he would withdraw his name from consideration. But the essential characteristic of mediocre people is that they are the last to recognize mediocrity, either in themselves or in others. That our legislators in their wisdom may soon make this man secretary of defense says as much about them as it does about him. Truly, it's a Roman Senate.
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http://news.usni.org/2013/02/08/navy-lincoln-refueling-delayed-will-hurt-carrier-readiness
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http://www.michaelyon-online.com/air-force-crashing.htm
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Good thing this won't embolden our enemies.
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Mr. July, Your Drone Is Ready
The Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar is a grim but quirky reminder of the times we live in..
By BRUCE FEIRSTEIN
WSJ
As Washington continues to be roiled by controversy over America's drone-strike program—more specifically, the legality of targeting U.S. citizens overseas—you may be tempted to ask: "So who's on the kill list? Anybody I know?"
Sure, you could probably ask someone at the CIA to put you on the media distribution list for the next round of classified document leaks.
But the answer may already be available on the interactive Web pages of the official 2013 Counterterrorism Calendar put out by the National Counterterrorism Center. In this compendium of horrifics recording the specific dates when a terrorist event occurred, only six days of the year are left untouched. Each month in the calendar features at least one illustrated profile of someone who is presumably worthy of a drone-launched missile.
The monthly profiles are sort of like the al Qaeda version of the Sports Illustrated Swimsuit Calendar—only instead of finding out that Kate Upton was born in Michigan and enjoys riding horses, we learn that Abdul Rahman Yasin was born in Indiana, helped to carry out the 1993 World Trade Center attack, and has a $5 million bounty on his head.
As for the on-this-date terror notes, I'll answer the most obvious questions before you ask: Yes, the Sept. 11 entry includes the assault on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi—so that's final: it was a terrorist attack—but, no, the Nov. 5 entry doesn't mention Nidal Hasan's 2009 shooting spree at Fort Hood. ("Workplace violence" didn't make the cut.)
Clicking around the website is a grim reminder of the times we live in. But it also evokes a more mordant response: It feels like what you'd get if George Orwell had gone into the Web-design business with Dr. Strangelove.
Among other things, you'll find an illustrated chart of the suggested safe stand-off distances from bomb threats, delineating everything from an outdoor explosion of a run-of-the-mill pipe bomb (70 feet) to a tractor-trailer truck packed with TNT (860 feet).
Then there is the field spotter's guide to terrorist-group logos. I can only imagine a corporate branding meeting, with the art director pitching a new logo to his Mad Men clients: "We're using a darker shade of red this time, with the scimitar leaning forward to better communicate your vision for 2013."
There are sections in the calendar for identifying counterfeit ID cards and money-laundering schemes (which could double as instruction manuals), and even a handy link about what to do if you spot some suspicious activity nearby. (Hint: Don't use your GPS-enabled smartphone to text-message the FBI: "Target drone here.")
The oddest section of all on the site is the "Kids Zone," with links to preschool games and activities (a coloring book featuring "Beaker" the patriotic eagle) but not, alas, something useful, like "Pin the laser target on the terrorist."
Truly, I don't mean to disparage the National Counterterrorism Center. Over the past decade, I've met with some of the smart and dedicated people who work there. I know that we all owe them a debt of gratitude for keeping us safe.
But at the same time, I'm reminded of an interview I did in the summer of 1999 with a B-2 Stealth bomber pilot at Whiteman Air Force Base near Knob Noster, Mo. Noting the seeming invincibility of the B-2, I asked what he thought would be the Air Force's greatest challenge in the future.
Well before the age of drones, the bomber pilot's answer was prescient. "I worry about antiseptic warfare, when you remove the blood component and can wage war without fear of taking any casualties. I'm concerned that our leaders won't fully understand the consequences of what they're doing, because what seems cheap and clean is anything but."
Our enemies are real. But so are the moral questions and long-term political implications of drone strikes.
You can download the Counterterrorism 2013 Calendar at www.nctc.gov. It lends a whole new meaning to the phrase "Save the date."
Mr. Feirstein is a contributing editor at Vanity Fair and the screenwriter of three James Bond movies.
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Posting here a intriguing piece referenced in the Foreign Affairs thread.
Asking for defense cuts
Defense Department’s dirty deals
By RALPH PETERS
Last Updated: 10:45 PM, February 14, 2013
Posted: 10:38 PM, February 14, 2013
Ralph Peters
The looming budget sequestration imposes almost $50 billion in cuts on the Defense budget this year. It’s a terrible idea — and I’m for it.
This hatchet job trims not just fat, but muscle and bone, too. It’s going to be ugly. But as I’ve watched the Defense Department pull shameful stunts and listened to congressional blather attempting to block sequestration, this defense hawk has become one irate taxpayer.
The last straw came earlier this month when our Navy ostentatiously cancelled the deployment of the supercarrier USS Harry S Truman to the Persian Gulf, crying poverty. That’s like Donald Trump claiming he can’t afford a cab.
The Navy could have cut back other, less-sensitive deployments or acquisition programs. But the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chose to embarrass the White House and pressure Congress. He should have been fired.
Did the admiral even think of the message he sent to Iran?
Dear admirals and generals: It’s your job to protect our country, not just your budgets.
As for Congress, its members agreed to this sequestration. The terms weren’t secret. Now panicked members act as if they’ve been innocent dupes.
Won’t wash. You voted for it. Now suck up the consequences.
To get a sense of the scare tactics rampant on the Hill, consider “What Sequestration Really Means,” from the House Armed Services Committee. It has all the integrity of a drunken teenager in a backseat with a cheerleader.
The paper makes four bogus claims about what “reductions at this level would mean”:
The smallest ground force since before World War II. We’re going to have that anyway, because our troops’ real friends on the Hill would fit in an aircraft lavatory. Congressmen love photo ops with soldiers, but when it comes budget time they’ll always sacrifice grunts to preserve home-district defense-contractor jobs, no matter how wasteful. Congress is going to slash troops whatever happens.
The smallest Navy since before World War II. It’s also a much more expensive Navy, with ships costing up to $4.5-billion raw from the shipyard. The Navy decided that fewer, more-expensive ships are better, with supercarriers our maritime-strategy centerpiece.
In fact, our Navy is too small. Want a bigger one? Buy cheaper, smaller, faster ships. The next revolutionary shock in naval warfare is going to come when a second-rate power, such as Iran or North Korea, sinks one of our supercarriers.
The smallest tactical fighter force in the history of the Air Force. Again, this is a choice. Despite possessing incontestable air dominance over every other air force on earth, the “fighter pilot mafia” within our Air Force keeps pushing for extravagant hi-tech fighters. That means fewer airplanes.
Do some basic math. During the Korean War, our top fighter was the F-86D Sabre. It cost under $400,000 per plane. In 2013 dollars, that’s under $4 million. Our second-newest fighter, the F-22 — so troubled it hasn’t been sent on one combat mission — costs $200 million a copy (with R&D and downstream costs included, $350 million). So: For one F-22, you could buy 50 F-86Ds.
It gets worse: The F-22 requires 60 hours of maintenance for every flight hour; the F-86D needed five or fewer. So those 50 F-86Ds could fly 600 sorties to that single F-22’s one. Is the problem-plagued F-22 really 600 times better than the old Sabre?
And our newest fighter, the equally troubled F-35, has an estimated life-cycle cost of up to $1.5 trillion. Want to guess where to start saving?
Of course, we don’t want our pilots flying 1950s aircraft (Oops: We are still flying the B-52s, which actually work).
The fat years are over. Our military needs to make hard choices, but refuses. Leaner really could be meaner — if Congress stopped protecting incompetent contractors.
The smallest civilian workforce in the history of the Defense Department. Why is it smaller? Because Congress went in for an orgy of outsourcing that raped the defense budget—while providing inferior services (the waste during the Iraq War was stomach-turning).
The true problem is that Congress has been giving the defense industry an endless supply of blank checks, with no real accountability — while CEOs wrap themselves in the flag on Capitol Hill. Patriots? In our recent wars, not one defense-industry CEO volunteered to be a dollar-a-year man as captains of industry did in World War II.
Sequestration will do serious harm. But our corrupt system has already done far worse. It’s time for a reckoning.
Ralph Peters is a retired Army officer and former enlisted man
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It appears I may have been bamboozled by the deceits of baseline budgeting. Am I correct to now understand that even with the sequester cuts, that acatual spending will be increasing?
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http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/02/11/military-cutbacks-drone-programs/1910463/
From the article:
The Pentagon for the first time is considering scaling back the massive buildup of drones it has overseen in the past few years, both to save money and to adapt to changing security threats and an increased focus on Asia as the Afghanistan war winds down.
Air Force leaders are saying the military may already have enough unmanned aircraft systems to wage the wars of the future. And the Pentagon's shift to Asia will require a new mix of drones and other aircraft because countries in that region are better able to detect unmanned versions and shoot them down.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/25/real_genius?page=0,0
"Nowhere in his work did Clausewitz see conflict as primarily posing a design challenge -- a puzzle to be solved about what kind of force to build."
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http://hotair.com/archives/2013/02/26/random-man-confirmed-by-senate-to-lead-worlds-greatest-military/
Random man confirmed by Senate to lead world’s greatest military
posted at 6:41 pm on February 26, 2013 by Allahpundit
He’s not random, though. A truly random man wouldn’t have earned the sturdy liberal support that Hagel’s Israel-focused Jew-baiting and left-of-Obama foreign policy brought him. In the end, despite weeks of dirt being dug up, not a single Democrat voted against him at any stage of the process. (That’s not including Reid’s no vote last week, as that was purely procedural.)
Which is not to say he’s a bad guy. It may be, as Chuck Schumer believes, that he’s just … slow. Congrats, America.
The final vote: 58-41, which is a bit closer than the 71-27 margin on cloture earlier today. There are 15 Republicans who think voters are too dumb to realize that the cloture vote is the one that assured Hagel’s confirmation and that, by voting yes on that and no on the meaningless final vote, they can pretend that they “opposed” Hagel. And in fairness, they’re probably right; most voters likely are that dumb. But let’s name those 15 anyway:
Alexander
Ayotte
Blunt
Burr
Chambliss
Coburn
Collins
Corker
Flake
Graham
Hatch
McCain
Murkowski
Sessions
Thune
The usual reason to vote yes on cloture and no on the final vote is out of deference to the president’s right, within limits, to pick the cabinet he wants. You don’t filibuster a guy just because his policy preferences tilt liberal; I wouldn’t even filibuster him for his musings on Israel, as objectionable as they are. If Obama wants a SecDef who thinks that way, that’s what America gets for reelecting him. Where the filibuster comes in is when the nominee simply isn’t qualified to do the job for which he’s been nominated. I can’t believe a single one of those 15, let alone the scores of Democrats who voted for this guy, seriously believes he’s prepared to run the Defense Department. They’re sticking the military with someone who, at best, will be an empty Republican suit while advisors who know what they’re doing, like Michele Flournoy, make the hard decisions. The next time McCain and Graham pound the table about defense cuts or O’s foreign policy, remember that they both voted to send Chuck Hagel on to the final vote. That’s how serious they are.
As for Republicans voting yes, there were four: Cochran, Johanns, Shelby, and … Rand Paul, who voted no twice on cloture. That’s the most bizarre vote array on a nominee I could imagine. You could vote yes on cloture and on confirmation if you thought Hagel was a meritorious nominee. You could vote no on both if you thought he wasn’t qualified. You could vote yes on cloture and no on confirmation if you thought Obama deserved enough deference as president to have his nominee face a final up-or-down vote. You could vote no on cloture and yes on the final vote, as Rand Paul did, if … why? Here’s Paul’s reasoning:
“I voted no because I wanted more information and I think that part of what the Senate does is try to get information about the nominees,” Paul told reporters in the basement of the Capitol after Hagel’s confirmation Tuesday. “I’ve said all along that I give the president some prerogative in choosing his political appointees.”
“There are many things I disagree with Chuck Hagel on, there are many things I disagree with John Kerry on, there are very few things I agree with the president on, but the president gets to choose political appointees,” Paul said.
Asked if he ever got the information he wanted about Hagel, Paul said that he hadn’t.
If “the president gets to choose political appointees” is sufficient reason to vote yes, then (a) we should get rid of the Senate’s advise-and-consent responsibility and (b) at the very least we should not be filibustering nominees, as Rand Paul voted to do twice. Even if he did that purely to squeeze the White House for more information, why would he vote yes on the final vote when they never gave him that information? And if the president’s entitled to his nominee of choice, why would Paul demand more info about Hagel in the first place? Just rubber-stamp him. Vote yes on every vote, no questions asked.
If you want to know the real reason Paul voted yes, read this. He overplayed his hand earlier today by voting no on cloture; he’s trying to walk a line between mainstream conservatives and his dad’s supporters and casting two votes for filibustering Hagel was, at a minimum, one too many for the latter group. So he did to the libertarians what McCain and Graham tried to do to conservatives — he voted the wrong way on the important vote, which was cloture, and then tried to appease them by voting their way on the meaningless final vote whose outcome was assured. Doubt it’ll work for him. He’ll have to make it up to them somehow.
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"On the eve of the Second World War, the United States had the 16th largest army in the world, right behind Portugal. ... American soldiers went on maneuvers using trucks with 'tank' painted on their sides, since there were not enough real tanks to go around. American warplanes were not updated to match the latest warplanes of Nazi Germany or imperial Japan. After World War II broke out, American soldiers stationed in the Philippines were fighting for their lives using rifles left over from the Spanish-American war, decades earlier. The hand grenades they threw at the Japanese invaders were so old that they often failed to explode. At the battle of Midway, of 82 Americans who flew into combat in obsolete torpedo planes, only 12 returned alive. In Europe, our best tanks were never as good as the Germans' best tanks, which destroyed several times as many American tanks as the Germans lost in tank battles. Fortunately, the quality of American warplanes eventually caught up with and surpassed the best that the Germans and Japanese had. But a lot of American pilots lost their lives needlessly in outdated planes before that happened. These were among the many prices paid for skimping on military spending in the years leading up to World War II. But, politically, the path of least resistance is to cut military spending in the short run and let the long run take care of itself. In a nuclear age, we may not have time to recover from our short-sighted policies, as we did in World War II." --economist Thomas Sowell
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Trying this one once again:
"It appears I may have been bamboozled by the deceits of baseline budgeting. Am I correct to now understand that even with the sequester cuts, that actual spending will be increasing?"
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Trying this one once again:
"It appears I may have been bamboozled by the deceits of baseline budgeting. Am I correct to now understand that even with the sequester cuts, that actual spending will be increasing?"
As I understand it, the cut is in the rate of growth.
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I have heard that too, yet I have also heard that the sequester cuts are something like 8% and that this number is on top of previous cuts. Also, what of now former SecDef Panetta and others saying that the cuts over time will have our navy to the size of pre WW1 (or something like that) and other scary things?
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I have heard that too, yet I have also heard that the sequester cuts are something like 8% and that this number is on top of previous cuts. Also, what of now former SecDef Panetta and others saying that the cuts over time will have our navy to the size of pre WW1 (or something like that) and other scary things?
It's part of Buraq's fundamental transformation of America into a 3rd world country with a 3rd world military.
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I have heard that too, yet I have also heard that the sequester cuts are something like 8% and that this number is on top of previous cuts. Also, what of now former SecDef Panetta and others saying that the cuts over time will have our navy to the size of pre WW1 (or something like that) and other scary things?
It's part of Buraq's fundamental transformation of America into a 3rd world country with a 3rd world military.
Let me begin by saying I agree that President Obama deserves much of the blame on the sequester. To lay all of it at his feet, however, is untrue and too forgiving to Congress, and its members of both parties.
"The Congress shall have Power To... provide for the common Defence;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years; To provide and maintain a Navy."
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Obama is using the sequester, as I predicted as an opportunity to gut the US military. "I mean, I do think at a certain point you've had enough geopolitical power".
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Good thing there arn't any looming threats out there..... :roll:
http://www.aei-ideas.org/2012/02/u-s-navy-readiness-continues-its-decline-amidst-the-pivot-to-asia/
U.S. Navy readiness continues its decline amid the ‘pivot’ to Asia
Mackenzie Eaglen | February 3, 2012, 9:30 am
At the same time as the Obama administration is heralding a strategic “pivot” towards Asia and the growing threat of Chinese military modernization, the U.S. Navy continues to put on a brave face in the middle of a growing readiness crisis. While not new, this alarming trend was highlighted again this week when Navy officials announced that, for the second time in seven months, the USS Essex, a Marine Corps amphibious assault ship, has failed to meet a commitment at sea due to equipment failure or maintenance issues.
The Navy’s No. 2 wasn’t understating the problem when he told Congress last year: “The stress on the force is real. And it has been relentless.”
This is not an isolated occurrence. A high operational tempo over the past decade has put an incredible strain upon all of America’s military. As fewer ships spend less time at home making repairs, regular wear and tear takes a heavy toll. In fact, in 2011, nearly one-quarter of the entire surface fleet failed inspection. The Navy has 22 cruisers in service and every one of them has cracks in the aluminum superstructure. Meanwhile, half of the Navy’s deployable aircraft are not combat ready and engines aboard two F/A-18s have caught fire aboard ships underway.
While the Navy has shrunk by 15 percent since 1998, it has deployed a relatively constant number of ships at sea at any given time. Between two major wars in the Middle East, a third in Libya, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, disaster relief in Asia, and maritime deterrence in the Western Pacific, the U.S. military has increasingly been asked to do more with less.
The USS Essex was supposed to take part in Cobra Gold—a joint exercise with Thailand—before it had to back out due to mechanical problems. In many ways, this incident can be seen as a metaphor for the entire shift to Asia. On paper, it sounds like a smart and forward-thinking policy—it even involves allies and burden-sharing. What’s not to love?
But without the proper resources, Cobra Gold, as well as the larger “pivot” and its supposed emphasis on air and naval power, is just a paper tiger.
If the administration is serious about properly resourcing an American military emphasis in the Pacific while not taking our eye off the ball everywhere else, the president must send over a budget that proposes to reverse the decline of the Navy’s size, fleet, and readiness. Anything less should be called out for what it really is: a strategy that says one thing and a budget that does another.
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http://blog.heritage.org/2013/02/27/obama-states-the-obvious-sequestration-will-harm-u-s-navy/
Obama Suddenly Cares About the Military When It Serves His Interest
Brian Slattery
February 27, 2013 at 11:55 am
(1)
Joe Fudge/ABACAUSA.COM/Newscom
President Obama visited Newport News Shipyard yesterday—the largest naval shipbuilding facility in the world—to warn of sequestration’s effects on the U.S. Navy. Yet throughout his first term as Commander in Chief, he did nothing to stop the shrinking fleet.
While the Administration has recently attempted to sound the alarm on the USS Harry S. Truman’s canceled deployment to the Middle East, it was just a few months ago that the President disparaged such fleet concerns during a national debate. When Mitt Romney argued that we are facing the smallest U.S. fleet in nearly a century, Obama retorted:
We have these things called aircraft carriers where planes land on them. We have these ships that go underwater, nuclear submarines. And so the question is not a game of Battleship where we’re counting ships. It’s—it’s what are our capabilities.
In addition to the Truman’s cancellation, it was recently announced that the USS Abraham Lincoln will delay its midlife refueling and maintenance due to budget concerns. This means the carrier fleet will fall below its minimum ship requirement for at least a few years. It also sends a message to both allies and adversaries that U.S. naval presence and commitment is declining.
The President’s nuclear submarine policy is also weaker than he declares. Even without sequestration, the Obama Administration delayed the development of the Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines’ replacement. These subs serve as the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad for years, but they are old and wearing out. The delay will reduce the Ohio fleet below acceptable levels for 14 years.
Make no mistake: President Obama’s sudden interest in military readiness is too little too late. He has been cheerleading the hollowing out of our military for the past four years, and his renewed interest comes with a dangerous caveat: He wants to raise taxes.
We agree that the sequester is far from perfect, which is why the House of Representatives voted and twice passed cuts to reprogram the sequester to avoid these kinds of cuts to the military. They presented alternatives that would restore America’s commitment to national defense—without raising taxes—and address national debt in a responsible manner. Neither the President nor the U.S. Senate gave these proposals serious consideration.
The Navy and other services are already suffering serious readiness concerns. With the world certainly not safer than a few years ago, the President should not hold the defense budget hostage. The ship has already sailed on $800 billion in cuts to defense while entitlement spending continues to grow. The Administration must work with Congress to make a commitment to national security as well as fiscal responsibility before it is too late.
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"The Administration must work with Congress to make a commitment to national security as well as fiscal responsibility before it is too late."
I completely agree that the president and Congress must work together. I am glad we agree, GM.
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Unfortunately, the president isn't interested in military assets unless they are jetting him or Moochelle off to another vacation.
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Obama is using the sequester, as I predicted as an opportunity to gut the US military. "I mean, I do think at a certain point you've had enough geopolitical power".
Re: Tax Policy
« Reply #424 on: December 03, 2012, 05:34:05 PM »
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Buraq wants the 'pubs to "make" him take us over the cliff. That's his best scenario. Defense gets gutted and taxes go up and republicans get all the blame.
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Unfortunately, the president isn't interested in military assets unless they are jetting him or Moochelle off to another vacation.
You forget SpecOps.
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Unfortunately, the president isn't interested in military assets unless they are jetting him or Moochelle off to another vacation.
You forget SpecOps.
You are referring to Buraq using them as campaign props? Sure.
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If he isn't interested in military might, he'll be pretty bad at being the dictator you accuse him of being.
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If he isn't interested in military might, he'll be pretty bad at being the dictator you accuse him of being.
It doesn't take much of a military to dominate a disarmed and impoverished population, does it?
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Who's going to take the guns, GM?
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Who's going to take the guns, GM?
Who is going to, or who is trying to disarm the America people are two different questions, are they not?
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a) Yes Rep stupidity (Exhibit A: Boener) has much responsibility in this clusterfcuk, but unlike Baraq/Hagel/Kerry/Pelsoi/Reed the Reps' INTENTION is not to gut our military. China (and Iran, and Russia, and and and) are getting a very clear message from all this and the weakness it projects bodes poorly for a stable and peaceful world.
b) As for the tangent about the fascistic tendencies within American progressivism, I most certainly include its most fervent desire and current feverish campaign, vigorously abetted by its running dogs that are our Pravdas, to disarm the American people as much as it can. Of course the process will intend to stop short of triggering an insurrection bigger than it can oppress with overwhelming force-- indeed such may be precisely the intention of some of them :x :x :x
That said, lets take any further discussion of this particular point over to the gun thread.
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Who's going to take the guns, GM?
Who is going to, or who is trying to disarm the America people are two different questions, are they not?
I mean it literally. If Obama wants to confiscate, he can't do it himself. If he wants a "third world military" there won't be the power to confiscate.
As for the want, I believe we three are in agreement.
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If those who seek to disarm we the people try to the point of provoking initial resistance there will be serious temptiation to think the State has more than enough capability to slam it down AND not let the crisis go to waste into scaring the sheeple.
Look at what Sandy Hook has been used to do even though over the last 20 years, the number of guns has gone up 35% and the number of gun crimes has declined 50%. Imagine how they will use the beginnings of armed resistance!!! Indeed, this might be the plan of a Manchurian president , , , were we to ever have one , , ,
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The PLA was a 3rd world military in 1989. They were pretty darn effective against the protesters in Tiananmen square, were they not? All political power comes from the barrel of a gun, doesn't it?
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The PLA was a 3rd world military in 1989. They were pretty darn effective against the protesters in Tiananmen square, were they not? All political power comes from the barrel of a gun, doesn't it?
But this was an unarmed protest. I still don't see either GM or Guro explaining the actual, physical, literal taking of the guns.
If GM is correct (that Obama wants a third world military, and assuming of course, he would be able to devolve it to that level in four years), is the "serious temptiation to think the State has more than enough capability to slam it down" still true?
What I am trying to say, is that there is a literal, logical disconnect (as I see it) between the claims of Obama is a dictator, wants to literally take guns AND wants to lead the world's finest military down the path to subpar military.
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His methodology is piece by piece while distracting and deluding with his loyal media engaging in mass propaganda operations.
State gun Laws, all which are currently being pushed by the white house work towards disarming the people and marginalizing those who disagree. Not at all an accident
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"What I am trying to say, is that there is a literal, logical disconnect (as I see it) between the claims of Obama is a dictator, wants to literally take guns AND wants to lead the world's finest military down the path to subpar military."
Disagree. Not having the navy necessary to defend the freedom of the seas in the South China Sea (where, if I am not mistaken, some 40% of the world's trade travels?) or not having the means to prevent the Chinese from taking out our satellite communication network (the neurological system of our military) or not having the means to prevent the Chinese from hacking US infrastructure has very little to do with what happens when universal background becomes what it is meant to become, universal registration, which becomes what it is meant to become-- the government knocking on your door saying "Give us all your guns any more capable than a revolver, a double barrelled shotgun, and a bolt action rifle."
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Is that the definition of third world military? :? :?
Do the French, Russians, Israelis, Brits have the ability to "defend the freedom of the seas in the South China Sea" AND "hav[e] the means to prevent the Chinese from hacking [their] infrastructure"? Are they the working definition of Third World?
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I confess to be rather surprised at how long this point is being belabored.
My point is that a military is usually evaluated by its ability to deal with external threats, going after its own people requires far less. Our military could be considerably diminished and still be capable of going after intial resistance to disarmament.
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Apologies, I didn't think of trying to get strict definitions of what was meant/intended was belaboring.
My point is that it becomes logically impossible for Obama to do everything he is accused of doing or wanting to do.
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How so?
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Before we close the argument...
a) Suppose we substitute the imprecise term 'third world military' with just a US military unable to address the threats we face.
b) The political movement of unilateral disarmament currently led by Pres. Barack Obama is not a 4 year proposition. The LBJ programs for poverty, for example, lived on far beyond his Presidency. The Carter disarmament lasted beyond his years and could have lasted permanently.
The Obama approach of apologizing and bowing has not had the success that peace through strength and deterrence once had. The time to oppose all bad policies is early and often.
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Re-define away, but that hardly makes it a "third world military" which is the original claim.
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Re-define away, but that hardly makes it a "third world military" which is the original claim.
I used the PLA in 1989 as an example, which had little ability to project force beyond China's boders, but plenty of ability to use force to maintain party control over the population.
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So, the PLA in 1989 is the working example of world world army?
And, even though the example, which I asked you about, was the successful crackdown of a peaceful protest that took place in a closed in square?
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Apologies, I didn't think of trying to get strict definitions of what was meant/intended was belaboring.
My point is that it becomes logically impossible for Obama to do everything he is accused of doing or wanting to do.
Gutting America's economy-check! (Cloward-Pivenomics)
Disarm the "Bitter-clingers-in progress
Gutting America's Military-Check!
Empowering America's enemies-Check!
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So, the PLA in 1989 is the working example of world world army?
And, even though the example, which I asked you about, was the successful crackdown of a peaceful protest that took place in a closed in square?
Yes, in 1989, the PLA, although it was huge was very much a 3rd. world army with little ability to do much with it's forces outside China's borders.
Tianenmen Square is hardly closed in. It's massive in scale.
(http://cdn.theatlantic.com/static/infocus/china060412/s_t04_52017200.jpg)
(http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/6/66/200401-beijing-tianan-square-overview.jpg/800px-200401-beijing-tianan-square-overview.jpg)
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But it is but one location, and the protest wasn't widespread. And it is pretty closed, GM. Massive does not mean it is not closed.
And, the protest was peaceful.
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Actually the protests did spread to other cities, though Beijing was the center of it all.
Xinjiang has had both peaceful and non peaceful protests, both tend to get shut down with automatic weapons fired by the PLA and PAP.
Unarmed populations are easily dominated.
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Again, lets take this to the gun rights thread please gents.
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Administration debates stretching 9/11 law to go after new al-Qaeda offshoots
By Greg Miller and Karen DeYoung, Published: March 6
A new generation of al-Qaeda offshoots is forcing the Obama administration to examine whether the legal basis for its targeted killing program can be extended to militant groups with little or no connection to the organization responsible for the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, U.S. officials said.
The Authorization for Use of Military Force, a joint resolution passed by Congress three days after the strikes on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, has served as the legal foundation for U.S. counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda over the past decade, including ongoing drone campaigns in Pakistan and Yemen that have killed thousands of people.
But U.S. officials said administration lawyers are increasingly concerned that the law is being stretched to its legal breaking point, just as new threats are emerging in countries including Syria, Libya and Mali.
“The farther we get away from 9/11 and what this legislation was initially focused upon,” a senior Obama administration official said, “we can see from both a theoretical but also a practical standpoint that groups that have arisen or morphed become more difficult to fit in.”
The waning relevance of the 2001 law, the official said, is “requiring a whole policy and legal look.” The official, like most others interviewed for this article, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal administration deliberations.
The authorization law has already been expanded by federal courts beyond its original scope to apply to “associated forces” of al-Qaeda. But officials said legal advisers at the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon and intelligence agencies are now weighing whether the law can be stretched to cover what one former official called “associates of associates.”
The debate has been driven by the emergence of groups in North Africa and the Middle East that may embrace aspects of al-Qaeda’s agenda but have no meaningful ties to its crumbling leadership base in Pakistan. Among them are the al-Nusra Front in Syria and Ansar al-Sharia, which was linked to the September attack on a U.S. diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya. They could be exposed to drone strikes and kill-or-capture missions involving U.S. troops.
Officials said they have not ruled out seeking an updated authorization from Congress or relying on the president’s constitutional powers to protect the country. But they said those are unappealing alternatives.
AUMF and the war on terror
The debate comes as the administration seeks to turn counterterrorism policies adopted as emergency measures after the 2001 attacks into more permanent procedures that can sustain the campaign against al-Qaeda and its affiliates, as well as other current and future threats.
The AUMF, as the 2001 measure is known, has been so central to U.S. efforts that counterterrorism officials said deliberations over whom to put on the list for drone strikes routinely start with the question of whether a proposed target is “AUMF-able.”
The outcome of the debate could determine when and how the war on terrorism — at least as defined by Congress after the Sept. 11 attacks — comes to a close.
“You can’t end the war if you keep adding people to the enemy who are not actually part of the original enemy,” said a person who participated in the administration’s deliberations on the issue.
Administration officials acknowledged that they could be forced to seek new legal cover if the president decides that strikes are necessary against nascent groups that don’t have direct al-Qaeda links. Some outside legal experts said that step is all but inevitable because the authorization has already been stretched to the limit of its intended scope.
“The AUMF is becoming increasingly obsolete because the groups that are threatening us are harder and harder to tie to the original A.Q. organization,” said Jack Goldsmith, an expert on national security law at Harvard University and a former senior Justice Department official.
He said extending the AUMF to groups more loosely tied to al-Qaeda would be “a major interpretive leap” that could eliminate the need for a link between the targeted organization and core al-Qaeda.
The United States has not launched strikes against any of the new groups, and U.S. officials have not indicated that there is any immediate plan to do so. In Libya, for example, the United States has sought to work with the new government to apprehend suspects in the Benghazi attack.
Still, the administration has taken recent steps — including building a drone base in the African country of Niger — that have moved the United States closer to being able to launch lethal strikes if regional allies are unable to contain emerging threats.
The administration official cited Ansar al-Sharia as an example of the “conundrum” that counterterrorism officials face.
The group has little if any established connection to al-Qaeda’s leadership core in Pakistan. But intercepted communications during and after the attack in Benghazi indicated that some members have ties to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the terrorist network’s main associate in North Africa.
“Certainly there are individuals who have an affiliation from a policy, if not legal, perspective,” the official said. “But does that mean the whole group?”
Other groups of concern include the al-Nusra Front, which is backed by al-Qaeda in Iraq and has used suicide bombings to emerge as a potent force in the Syrian civil war, and a splinter group in North Africa that carried out a deadly assault in January on a natural-gas complex in Algeria.
A focus on Sept. 11
The debate centers on a piece of legislation that spans a single page and was drafted in a few days to give President George W. Bush authority to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against al-Qaeda.
The law placed no geographic limits on that power but did not envision a drawn-out conflict that would eventually encompass groups with no ties to the Sept. 11 strikes. Instead, it authorized the president to take action “against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.”
The authorization makes no mention of “associated forces,” a term that emerged only in subsequent interpretations of the text. But even that elastic phrase has become increasingly difficult to employ.
In a speech last year at Yale University, Jeh Johnson, who served as general counsel at the Defense Department during Obama’s first term, outlined the limits of the AUMF.
“An ‘associated force’ is not any terrorist group in the world that merely embraces the al-Qaeda ideology,” Johnson said. Instead, it has to be both “an organized, armed group that has entered the fight alongside al-Qaeda” and a “co-belligerent with al-Qaeda in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.”
U.S. officials said evaluating whether a proposed target is eligible under the AUMF is only one step. Names aren’t added to kill or capture lists, officials said, unless they also meet more elaborate policy criteria set by Obama.
If a proposed a target doesn’t clear the legal hurdle, the senior administration official said, one option is to collect additional intelligence to try to meet the threshhold.
Officials stressed that the stakes of the debate go beyond the drone program. The same authorities are required for capture operations, which have been far less frequent. The AUMF is also the legal basis for the CIA’s drone campaign in Pakistan, although the agency compiles its own kill list in that operation with little involvement from other agencies.
The uncertainty surrounding the AUMF has already shaped the U.S. response to problems in North Africa and the Middle East. Counterterrorism officials concluded last year that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a militant leader in Algeria and Mali, could not be targeted under the AUMF, in part because he had had a falling out with al-Qaeda’s leadership and was no longer regarded as part of an associated group.
Belmokhtar was later identified as the orchestrator of the gas-plant attack in Algeria in which dozens of workers, including three Americans, were killed.
Obama’s decision to provide limited assistance to French air attacks against Islamist militants in Mali this year was delayed for weeks, officials said, amid questions over whether doing so would require compliance with the AUMF rules.
Some options beyond the 2001 authorization are problematic for Obama. For instance, he has been reluctant to rely on his constitutional authority to use military force to protect the country, which bypasses Congress and might expose him to criticism for abuse of executive power.
Working with Congress to update the AUMF is another option. The Senate Intelligence Committee has already begun considering ways to accomplish that. But Obama, who has claimed credit for winding down two wars, is seen as reluctant to have the legislative expansion of another be added to his legacy.
“This is an ongoing discussion, which we’ll probably continue to engage on the Hill,” the senior administration official said. “But I don’t know that there’s a giant desire to have ‘Son of AUMF’ now.”
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BD, please post this in the Legal Issues in the War with Islamic Fascism thread as well.
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Summary
Alex Wong/Getty Images
U.S. President Barack Obama speaks at a Newport News Shipbuilding facility in Virginia on Feb. 26
Sequestration, the automatic spending reductions scheduled to take effect March 1, will affect the U.S. military's ability to project force around the world. The current continuing resolution that Congress is using to fund the entire government until March 27 has already affected U.S. forces. The longer these funding cuts continue, the more degradation the U.S. military will incur, with longer-lasting effects.
Analysis
Although Stratfor typically does not examine domestic U.S. issues, this one is geopolitically significant. The U.S. military, and particularly the Navy, is the most powerful force projection instrument in the world. When the sequester takes effect, it will immediately reduce military spending by 8 percent, with more than $500 billion in cuts to defense spending over 10 years divided equally among the military branches. The continuing resolution is already affecting the military since it has locked the military budget into 2011 spending levels and prevented spending increases or reallocations among various budgets. On March 27, Congress will have to have a new budget in place, extend the continuing resolution or force a government shutdown; the most likely decision will be to maintain the continuing resolution.
It is not the overall amount of the reductions that is damaging, necessarily; it is the way in which the cuts will be implemented. The across-the-board cuts required by the sequestration coupled with the limits set by the continuing resolution are constraining budget planners' options in how to absorb the spending reductions and thus are damaging all the military branches, programs, training, deployments and procurement.
Funding Cuts and Force Readiness
Just the threat of continued budget reductions has had an immediate effect on the military's readiness. The Navy decided not to deploy a second carrier to the Persian Gulf, backing down from its standard of two carriers in the region. Instead, the second carrier will serve in a surge capacity for the immediate future. The other branches have extended the deployments of units already in theaters and delayed others from rotating in as replacements since it is relatively less expensive to have units stay in place than move them and their equipment intercontinentally.
Maintenance budgets across the forces have been reduced or suspended in anticipation of cuts. Training of all non-deploying forces who are not critical to the national strategic forces is also being heavily curtailed. These options were chosen because they are immediate cost-saving measures that can be reversed quickly as opposed to the big-budget procurement programs, in which changes can cause delays for years. In many cases, the Department of Defense would have to pay massive fines for withdrawing from binding contracts, and renegotiations are often very costly. The Defense Department hopes that the cuts will be short-lived, but the longer the spending constraints continue, the more the military's platforms and personnel units degrade in readiness.
The medium- to long-term effects can be even more serious. Any given military platform, from a Stryker armored vehicle to an aircraft carrier, requires a lot of money in order to be ready for use at any time at its intended level of performance. These platforms require consistent use to maintain a certain readiness level because machines cannot sit idle for months to years and then operate effectively, if at all, especially if called on for immediate action. Moreover, the people that operate this equipment need to maintain their working knowledge and operational skill through continued use. This use causes wear and tear on the platform and requires consistent maintenance. All of this is necessary just to maintain the status quo. In the end, there must be a balance between a platform's readiness level and the amount of funding required for operations and maintenance, but if the money is no longer available there is no choice but to reduce readiness.
Also, upgrades are needed so platforms can stay up to date and useable within the system the military is using to move, shoot and communicate. This is a constant cycle that, when interrupted, has very long-lasting consequences. For example, the Navy has said it is considering suspending operations of four of its nine carrier air wings while shutting down four of its carriers in various stages of the operations and maintenance process. This would essentially give the United States one carrier deployed with one on call for years. This will be sufficient if the world remains relatively quiet, but one large emergency or multiple small ones would leave the United States able to project limited force compared to previous levels.
In the longer term, procurement programs for new equipment will either be delayed or cut altogether. This will put more pressure on existing platforms, requiring them to operate past their intended life spans, and will preclude or delay the introduction of better abilities into the military. Procurement cycles are very slow and take decades to implement; for instance, the Navy that the United States wants to have in 20 years is being planned now. An extreme example of the damage that a military force can incur because of a lack of procurement, operations, maintenance and upgrades is the current state of the Russian military. Russian forces still feel the effects of the Soviet Union's collapse and the subsequent decade of neglect.
A Smaller Presence Around the World
The U.S. military has a global presence, and sequestration would have appreciable effects on this in certain areas. Potentially, the hardest hit region will be the Pacific, which has been the focus of the United States' new strategy. If the United States wants to continue pivoting its focus toward the Pacific, the military would have to draw more resources than originally planned. No specific mention has been made of changing the U.S. military footprint in Japan, other than possibly curtailing combat air patrols, and U.S. forces are already consolidating their presence in South Korea to fewer bases south of Seoul and diminishing their role in relation to the South Korean military. The Navy's reduction in ship deployments to the region will just reinforce the current trend.
The U.S. military's footprint is being reduced in a few other areas. The combat zone in Afghanistan has 66,000 troops, with 34,000 scheduled to come home by the end of the year. All but around 8,000 will return home by the end of 2014. The 5th Fleet headquartered in Bahrain is being affected by the Navy's decision to have only one carrier in the Persian Gulf. Europe is seeing a reduction from four brigade combat teams to two, which was already planned and is another reinforced trend. The U.S. ground presence in Africa and South America should be relatively unchanged, since these predominantly involve special operations forces -- the kind of deployment that is already being emphasized over larger conventional forces.
The single biggest capability gap that will develop will be the U.S. military's surge capacity. If the Syria-Iraq-Lebanon corridor were to become more unstable, the United States will not be able to respond with the same force structure it had in the past. The U.S. military can still shift its assets to different regions to attain its strategic goals, but those assets will come from a smaller resource pool, and shifting them will lessen the presence in some other region. The military's ability to use one of its softer political tools -- joint military exercises -- will also be at risk.
Reduced Relative Dominance
This is not to say that the U.S. military will be wrecked immediately or that its condition is anywhere near that of the Russian military in the 1990s. A military's effectiveness is measured against its potential opponents, and the United States has enjoyed a large gap for decades. However, if a military is not growing in capabilities and other militaries or groups are, then its relative power is decreasing. This means that after sequestration is implemented or the continuing resolution is maintained, the U.S. military will remain dominant for years to come, but not as dominant as it has been relative to other forces.
There are many ways the effects of funding cuts can be mitigated. Congress can continue to delay addressing budget issues and the military's concerns indefinitely, or it can make some changes, such as allowing the Department of Defense more discretion in how it implements these cuts. However, the budget cuts are already having preliminary effects, and the longer the cuts continue, the greater the potential for degradation of the U.S. military's force projection capabilities. Funding cuts are not necessarily abnormal for the United States while winding down into a postwar stance. Historically, the pattern has been a reduction in spending and retrenchment of a large volume of forces from abroad. However, Pentagon planners typically go into a postwar period with the stated goal of not damaging the force through these cuts and reductions.
Read more: U.S.: What the Sequester Will Do to the Military | Stratfor
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Description from the author:
"My report on US defense strategy and budget during a period of limited means, i.e. how to maintain sufficient military power to deter the Chinese from acting a fool while also reducing the defense budget."
http://nsnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/Reshaping-Pentagon-Spending-and-Capabilities_Future-Priorities_FINAL-0313132.pdf
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http://rt.com/usa/climate-change-threat-locklear-225/
From the article:
The head of the US Navy’s Pacific fleet has declared climate change as the biggest long-term security threat in the region. Anticipating severe typhoons and rising sea levels that will displace nations, he emphasized a weather crisis few had foreseen.
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http://rt.com/usa/climate-change-threat-locklear-225/
From the article:
The head of the US Navy’s Pacific fleet has declared climate change as the biggest long-term security threat in the region. Anticipating severe typhoons and rising sea levels that will displace nations, he emphasized a weather crisis few had foreseen.
And we wonder why the Chinese laugh at us.
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In Obama's third term maybe he will look to a Keystone pipeline protestor to head the Pacific fleet, or someone with a meteorology or IPCC background instead of military.
Admiral Locklear: “It is not just about China and everybody else, because there are disputes between other partners down there, too. Sometimes I think the Chinese get handled a little too roughly on this.”
I wonder if our friends and allies in the region agree with him:
http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/article/1096687/china-naval-build-major-concern-india
http://chinadailymail.com/2013/01/05/chinese-navy-buildup-no-threat-to-us-but-a-possible-threat-to-japan/
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/strengthening-of-chinese-navy-sparks-worries-in-region-and-beyond-a-855622.html
http://thediplomat.com/2010/09/29/china%E2%80%99s-naval-build-up-not-over/
http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130209000029&cid=1703
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http://www.michaelyon-online.com/seven-myths-about-women-in-combat.htm
Myth #1 – “It’s about women in combat.”
No, it’s not. Women are already in combat, and are serving well and professionally. The issue should be more clearly entitled, “Women in the infantry.” And this is a decidedly different proposition.
Myth #2 – “Combat has changed” (often accompanied by “There are no front lines anymore”).
This convenient misconception requires several counters. First, any serious study of military history will reveal numerous historical examples about how successive generations (over millennia) believed that warfare had changed forever, only to find that technology may change platforms, but not its harsh essence. To hope that conflicts over the last 20 years are models of a new, antiseptic form of warfare is delusional.
The second point is that the enemy gets a vote – time, place, and style. For example, war on the Korean Peninsula would be a brutal, costly, no-holds-barred nightmare of mayhem in close combat with casualties in a week that could surpass the annual total of recent conflict.
The final point on this myth reinforces the Korea example and it bears examination — Fallujah, Iraq in 2004, where warfare was reduced to a horrific, costly, and exhausting scrap in a destroyed city between two foes that fought to the death.
The standard for ground combat unit composition should be whether social experimentation would have amplified our opportunity for success in that crucible, or diminished it. We gamble with our future security when we set standards for warfare based on the best case, instead of the harshest one.
Myth #3 – “If they pass the physical standards, why not?”
Physical standards are important, but not nearly all of the story. Napoleon – “The moral (spirit) is to the physical as three is to one.”
Unit cohesion is the essence of combat power, and while it may be convenient to dismiss human nature for political expediency, the facts are that sexual dynamics will exist and can affect morale. That may be manageable in other environments, but not in close combat.
Any study of sexual harassment statistics in this age cohort – in the military, academia, or the civilian workplace — are evidence enough that despite best efforts to by sincere leaders to control the issue, human instincts remain strong. Perceptions of favoritism or harassment will be corrosive, and cohesion will be the victim.
Myth #4 – “Standards won’t be lowered.”
This is the cruelest myth of all. The statements of the current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are telling.
They essentially declare “guilty until proven innocent” on anyone attempting to maintain the standards which produced the finest fighting force in the world. There are already accommodations (note that unit cohesion won’t be a metric), there will be many more, and we will pay a bloody price for it someday.
Pity the truthful leader who attempts to hold to standards based on realistic combat factors, and tells truth to power. Most won’t, and the others won’t survive.
Myth #5 – “Opening the infantry will provide a better pathway to senior rank for the talented women.”
Not so. What will happen is that we will take very talented females with unlimited potential and change their peer norm when we inject them into the infantry.
Those who might meet the infantry physical standard will find that their peers are expected, as leaders, to far exceed it (and most of their subordinates will, as well).
So instead of advancing to a level appropriate to their potential, they may well be left out.
Myth #6 – “It’s a civil rights issue, much like the integration of the armed forces and allowing gays to serve openly.”
Those who parrot this either hope to scare honest and frank discussion, or confuse national security with utopian ideas.
In the process, they demean initiatives that were to provide equally skilled individuals the opportunity to contribute equally. In each of the other issues, lowered standards were not the consequence.
Myth #7 – “It’s just fair.”
Allow me two points.
First, this is ground warfare we’re discussing, so realism is important.
“Fair” is not part of the direct ground combat lexicon.
Direct ground combat, such as experienced in the frozen tundra of Korea, the rubble of Stalingrad, or the endless 30-day jungle patrols against a grim foe in Viet Nam, is the harshest meritocracy — with the greatest consequences — there is.
And psychology in warfare is germane – the force that is respected (and, yes, feared) has a distinct advantage.
Will women in our infantry enhance a psychological advantage, or hinder it?
Second, if it’s about fairness, why do women get a choice of whether to serve in the infantry (when men do not), and why aren’t they required to register for the draft (as men are)?
It may be that we live in a society in which honest discussion of this issue, relying on facts instead of volume, is not possible. If so, our national security will fall victim to hope instead of reality. And myths be damned.
Gregory S. Newbold served 32 years as a Marine infantryman, commanding units from platoon to the 1st Marine Division. His final assignment before retiring in 2002 was as director of operations for the Pentagon’s Joint Staff.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/this_is_not_the_drone_debate_were_looking_for?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
From the article:
During his 13-hour filibuster, Senator Rand Paul repeatedly asked if President Obama believed he had the constitutional authority to target U.S. citizens within the United States. He specifically mentioned the hypothetical scenario in which Jane Fonda, Kent State protestors, or someone in a café (mentioned 34 times!) could be targeted under the Obama administration's legal framework. While Paul raised several important questions about targeted killings, his focus on such implausible examples obscured the full scope of the drone wars. Of the 3,500 to 4,700 victims, only four were U.S. citizens -- and only one was targeted intentionally. In short, the longest congressional discussion held on targeted killings concentrated on one one-thousandth of the issue.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/19/silicon_iron_and_shadow?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
From the article:
The wars of the 21st century will be dominated by three overlapping types of conflict: Wars of Silicon, Wars of Iron, and Wars in the Shadows. The United States must design a new readiness and investment strategy in order to effectively deal with all three. Yet today it continues to pour scarce resources chiefly into its sphere of long-held dominance -- Wars of Iron. This is a potentially disastrous mistake, but one that can be corrected if we act now.
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Not the drone debate:
I understood Paul to be focusing on the area where the Obama administration is clearly out of line. Good for him.
Silicon, Iron, and Shadow:
Agreed.
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http://www.geek.com/articles/geek-cetera/micro-drones-are-real-heres-the-horror-inducing-video-to-prove-it-20130220/
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/26/can_the_marines_survive?print=yes&hidecomments=yes&page=full
From the article:
The Marines are a door-kicking service, designed to breach enemy territory and establish an entry point for the Army's strategic land capability. But the U.S. military's development of unmanned aircraft, combined with stealth technology and unmatched ISR capability, makes it almost impossible for an enemy today to significantly impede the landing of U.S. forces on a beach or at a port. Forcible entry no longer requires landing forces -- it takes precision strikes, coordinated by special operations forces as needed. But if the door is going to be kicked in by a cruise missile, an unmanned aircraft, or other platform delivering precision munitions, why does the Marine Corps insist on maintaining such a large amphibious forcible entry capability based around the same Marine who stormed ashore at Tarawa? Because to argue that the United States does not need a forcible-entry force would be to question the very necessity of having a Marine Corps. Unfortunately, that is the question the Corps must now answer.
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323646604578400640274392064.html?mod=politics_newsreel
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second post of the morning
Narratives of war
Michael Howard
Emile Simpson
WAR FROM THE GROUND UP
Twenty-first-century combat as politics
285pp. Hurst. £25.
978 1 84904 255 0
US: Columbia University Press. $32.50.
978 0 231 70406 9
Published: 3 April 2013
Some four decades ago, the Times Literary Supplement sent me a book to review by a young lecturer at Sandhurst entitled The Face of Battle. It impressed me so much that I described it as “one of the best half-dozen books on warfare to have appeared since the Second World War”. I wondered at the time if I had made a total fool of myself, but I need not have worried. The author, the late Sir John Keegan, proved to be one of the greatest military historians of his generation. It would be rash to put my money on such a dark horse again, but I shall. Emile Simpson’s War From the Ground Up is a work of such importance that it should be compulsory reading at every level in the military; from the most recently enlisted cadet to the Chief of the Defence Staff and, even more important, the members of the National Security Council who guide him.
Emile Simpson does not presume to show us how to conduct war, but he tells us how to think about it. He saw service in Afghanistan as a young officer in the Gurkhas, and his thinking is solidly rooted in that experience. Like Clausewitz 200 years earlier, Simpson found himself caught up in a campaign for whose conduct nothing in his training had prepared him; and like Clausewitz he realized that to understand why this was so he had to analyse the whole nature of war, from the top down as well as from the ground up. Afghanistan, he concluded, was only an extreme example of the transformation that war has undergone during his lifetime; and that itself is due to the transformation of the societies that fight it.
Clausewitz saw that the limited wars of the eighteenth century on which he had been brought up had been transformed into the total wars of the Napoleonic era – and all subsequent eras – not by any change in the nature of weaponry, but by the enlistment of “the people”; people whose emotions would distort the rational calculations of governments and the professional expertise of the military, but could never again be left out of account. Now there has been a further change. The paradigm (still largely accepted by Clausewitz) of “bipolar” wars fought between discrete states enjoying the support of their peoples has now been shattered by globalization. Popular support can no longer be taken for granted. “The people” are no longer homogeneous and the enemy is no longer a single entity. Further, “the enemy” is no longer the only actor to be taken into account. The information revolution means that every aspect, every incident of the conflict can be instantly broadcast throughout the world in width and in depth, and received by anyone with access to the internet; including the men in foxholes fighting it.
All this is common knowledge. It has been treated in dozens of studies based on the unhappy experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan, and has been absorbed into the teaching of staff colleges on both sides of the Atlantic and elsewhere. But no one to the best of my knowledge has previously propounded a theory that explains so clearly the full implications of this transformation, and provides a guide to strategic thinking for the future. Simpson follows Clausewitz in seeing war as “a continuation of politics with an admixture of other means”, but he divides wars into two categories: not the “total” and “limited” wars of Clausewitzian analysis, but those fought “to establish military conditions for a political solution” and those that “directly seek political, as opposed to military, outcomes”. The first are the traditional bipolar conflicts in which all operations are directed to defeating the enemy armed forces and compelling his government to accept our political terms. The second – those in which the British armed forces have been largely engaged for the past half-century – are those where operations themselves are intended to create the necessary political conditions, usually through what are known as counterinsurgency techniques. In the former, strategy, though still directed to an ultimate political objective, is largely driven by the operational needs of “bi-polar” warfare which anyhow come naturally to those engaged in battle. (“For a protagonist to understand combat as anything other than an intensely polarised confrontation”, remarks Simpson with splendid understatement, “is very difficult.”) But in the latter, operations are themselves political tools, used to undermine the adversary, deprive him of political support and if possible to convert him. The people firing on you today may be vital associates tomorrow. But in both, the ultimate object of combat is to convey a message; and to ensure that the message is understood, one has to understand the audience for which it is intended.
In traditional “bipolar” war between nation states, the ultimate “audience” was the enemy population, which was assumed to be united behind their government and armed forces and therefore only likely to listen to reason once the latter had been defeated – or clearly would be defeated if they were brought to battle. In contemporary conflicts the audience is far more diverse. The adversary is no longer homogeneous, one’s own people may be puzzled and divided, and a significant element in the audience will be spread throughout the world.
Under such circumstances a military operation intended to convey a message to one audience may mean something quite different to another. Simpson shows how this was so in Afghanistan, where the audience was kaleidoscopic, but one can see its effect in all contemporary operations. The operations of the United States and her allies in the Middle East have been intended to convey to their own peoples and to the international community that they intend to liberate the indigenous populations from their oppressive regimes and bring to them the blessings of “freedom” as the West understands it. But to many on the receiving end (especially those who saw their homes destroyed and their families slaughtered), and to observers elsewhere in the world, it appeared as a neo-imperialist attempt to impose Western hegemony. More recently, the Israeli bombardment of Gaza was intended to show, both to Hamas and to the Israeli electorate, that the Israeli people would tolerate no further aggression against their own population; but to others in the Arab world it has been seen as further evidence that Israel is a cruel and implacable enemy with whom no peace is possible short of her total destruction.
None of this is new or surprising. No responsible government now uses armed force without calculating the global impact of doing so; deciding, that is, which is “the strategic audience”. But in addressing a strategic audience, Simpson explains, a “strategic narrative” is all-important. This is a public explanation of why one is at war at all, and how the military operations are devised to serve the strategy that will lead to the desired political outcome. Without such a narrative, no government can command the support of its people, nor, indeed, ensure effective planning by its armed forces – to say nothing of gaining the sympathy of “the strategic audience” beyond its own frontiers. The narrative must not only be persuasive in rational terms. It also needs drama to appeal to the emotions. Above all, it needs an ethical foundation. Not only one’s own people, but the wider “strategic audience” must believe that one is fighting a “good” war. The genius of Winston Churchill in 1940 was to devise a strategic narrative that not only inspired his own people, but enlisted the support of the United States: indeed, most of British military operations in the early years of the war were planned with an eye on that strategic audience. The great shortcoming of Hitler’s strategy was his failure to create a strategic narrative that appealed to anyone apart from his own people – and a rapidly decreasing number of them.
It is impossible to summarize Emile Simpson’s ideas without distorting them. His own style is so muscular and aphoristic that he can concentrate complex arguments into memorable sentences that will have a life of their own. His familiarity with the work of Aristotle and the history of the English Reformation enables him to explain the requirements of a strategic narrative as effectively as his experiences in Afghanistan illuminate his understanding of the relationship between operational requirements and political objectives. In short (and here I shall really go overboard) War From the Ground Up deserves to be seen as a coda to Clausewitz’s On War. But it has the advantage of being considerably shorter.
Michael Howard’s books include Strategic Deception in the Second World War and A Short History of the First World War. He is the co-editor and translator of Clausewitz On War.
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From the Netherlands: US 82nd Airborne Unwelcome
(Given the history of the 82nd in Holland, this is strange news.)
"Veterans and representatives of the 82d Airborne Division are not welcome at the royal inauguration of King Alexander and Queen Maxima on April 30."
"For their heroic fighting during operation market garden 1944 the 82d Airborne Division was awarded the Dutch Military Order of William(Medal of Honor). LTC James "Maggie" Megellas the most decorated officer in the history of the 82d Airborne Division who in 1945 was appointed by general James Gavin to receive the award on behalf on the division."
"It's unbelievable that soldiers who fought and died for the liberation and democracy of the Netherlands are treated this way by the Dutch government who is organizing this."
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This could belong in the China-China Sea thread, but I place it here for the military science dimension:
Summary
China is rapidly expanding its research into and production, deployments and sales of unmanned aerial vehicles, colloquially known as drones. The primary role of this growing program is to help Beijing control and monitor disputed territories in the Asia-Pacific region.
Analysis
Beijing has decided to prioritize its drone program for security and economic reasons. In the security sphere, these machines are very useful for patrolling the East and South China seas, allowing Beijing to maintain a presence in the disputed waters, and play a role in China's anti-access/area denial strategy.
China is developing multiple types of drones, ranging from high-altitude, long-endurance designs like the U.S. Global Hawk to small, hand-launched designs similar to the U.S. Raven. Typically, new Chinese designs are revealed at the Zhuhai Airshow. Chinese companies also have used Zhuhai to demonstrate drones with increased stealth capabilities.
China's equivalent to a Global Hawk, the Soar Eagle, was introduced at Zhuhai in 2006. China already has drones that are comparable to the U.S. Predator and Reaper known as the Yilong/Wing Loong, or "Pterodactyl," and the CH-4. Like the United States, China also has many smaller drones, the most common being the ASN-15.
The United States and Israel are currently the leaders in this technology. While China's drones are not as advanced, tested or capable of the same ranges, they do allow Beijing to monitor its borders and waters more effectively due to extended loiter time. They also help China deter countries from intervening in the area by helping detect and target potential violators of the area they are trying to deny. This is at the heart of the anti-access/area denial strategy and China's motivation for devoting resources to the program. Beijing has plans to build 11 coastal drone bases by 2015 to increase its ability to survey the region for possible intrusions or threats.
Beijing's increased deployment of drones near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has impacted Sino-Japanese relations, prompting Tokyo to expand its own program. Japan is investigating building its own drones and purchasing some from the United States, which Tokyo insists will be unarmed. Reports say the Japanese Defense Ministry hopes to introduce Global Hawks near the disputed islands by 2015 in an attempt to counter Beijing's increasingly assertive naval activity in the area.
Economically, more Chinese drones mean more export opportunities for Beijing. According to some reports, Chinese drones similar to U.S. models are cheaper. China has exported several types to countries including Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates, although Pakistan has also purchased some from the United States. China's best potential markets are countries to which the United States will not sell drones, though such sales would be of concern to Washington -- especially because China has started to sell armed unmanned aircraft. At present, however, the primary role of China's growing program is still to help Beijing monitor territorial waters and control disputed territories in the Asia-Pacific region.
Read more: China's Expanding Drone Program | Stratfor
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http://pjmedia.com/blog/obamas-strategic-guidance-calls-for-more-defense-gutting/?singlepage=true
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I see that Baraq's budget intends to decrease military spending to less than 3% of GDP. :x :x :x This percentage is the lowest it will have been since before WW2. :cry: :cry: :cry:
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I see that Baraq's budget intends to decrease military spending to less than 3% of GDP. :x :x :x This percentage is the lowest it will have been since before WW2. :cry: :cry: :cry:
Hey, his bows are free! Isn't it great to live in this new era of peace and prosperity?
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/14/us/militarys-top-officers-face-review-of-their-character.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130414
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Women Warriors Need Their Own Combat Units
Female-only platoons might be good first step amid worries about unit cohesion.
By BEN LUXENBERG
Writing about the Amazons in "The Iliad," Homer refers to them as antianeirai or "those who fight like men." Legend says they were a tribe of fierce warrior-women who struck fear into the hearts of their enemies and who would not suffer men in their company, let alone trust men to fight alongside them. Is it time for the U.S. military to test that strategy?
As American forces were opened to women in recent decades, a line was drawn in 1994 with a rule barring them from infantry and other combat units. In January, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta formally lifted the rule. He gave the military services three years to seek exemptions if they wanted to keep some positions off-limits to women.
The military has begun researching how best to integrate women into these units. And as with any new initiative, there have been some hiccups. In late March, two female Marine Corps officers failed to complete the Corps' Infantry Officer Course, as did the two pioneering women who last year became the first to attempt the grueling course.
While the branches research the initiative further, many male soldiers and Marines remain vehemently opposed to the integration. Many cite physical and physiological challenges that come with serving in the infantry. Carrying full combat loads, which often exceed 100 pounds, for 16 hours a day for an entire deployment wears down the hardiest men and will do worse damage to women.
Others believe that the presence of women will cause a rift in the traditional male bonding of combat-arms units and damage the cohesion that is a key element in the success of any battlefield unit. Many worry that men will have to pick up the slack if women cannot perform at the same level—or that floundering women will endanger themselves and their comrades.
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Getty Images
Female Marine recruits are disciplined with some unscheduled physical training in the sand pit outside their barracks during boot camp at MCRD Parris Island, South Carolina in February.
Yet the tides of history seem to be turning against these sentiments and the questions of whether women can handle sustained combat operations. The issue is often framed now in terms of patriotism and human rights.
The service branches say that endurance and other standards won't be lowered, and perhaps there will be special training programs to prepare women who wish to become infantry. Yet there may be a better way to bring them into combat units—one that could serve as a test and steppingstone toward tighter integration.
In professional sports and in the Olympics, men and women perform separately. In boot camp and officer-candidate schools—the entry points for all service members—men and women also are separated, with placement into different platoons within the same company.
So why not mirror what society at large and the military already do: put men and women into their own teams, with female infantry platoons on one side and male platoons on the other?
An all-female infantry platoon would not suffer from many of the problems that detractors cite, such as a lack of unit cohesion caused by mixing the sexes. Like the Amazons, female-only platoons could build their own brand of cohesion, which may prove superior to the men's. The arrangement would also avoid putting male soldiers in the position of feeling obliged to compensate for an underperforming female.
While the all-female platoon solution would not compensate for physical and physiological differences and how they affect performance on the battlefield, it would be a good way to test that line of argument. If the female platoons showed that their combat performance equaled that of men, then the separated-platoon arrangement would merely be a step on the road to full integration. If the female platoons underperformed, then the idea of women in the infantry might need to be scrapped or the women-only platoons would be the final compromise, with their deployment based on battlefield needs.
A staged approach rather than rushing headlong into full integration in combat units may be the best approach. Once the right (or privilege) to serve in any military specialty is passed to women, it would be virtually impossible to change course, no matter the consequence or effect on combat effectiveness.
But who knows? Women running toward the sound of the guns may very well prefer fighting alongside other women—and their effectiveness may surprise even the most pessimistic. The Amazons certainly made an impression on the Greeks.
Mr. Luxenberg is a first lieutenant in the U.S. Marine Corps. His views do not represent those of the Defense Department or the Corps.
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False reports outpace sex assaults in the military
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/12/false-reports-outpace-sex-assaults-in-the-military/?page=all#pagebreak
By Rowan Scarborough
The Washington Times
Sunday, May 12, 2013
False complaints of sexual abuse in the military are rising at a faster rate than overall reports of sexual assault, a trend that could harm combat readiness, analysts say.
Virtually all media attention on a Pentagon report last week focused on an increase in service members’ claims of sexual abuse in an anonymous survey, but unmentioned were statistics showing that a significant percentage of such actually investigated cases were baseless.
From 2009 to 2012, the number of sexual abuse reports rose from 3,244 to 3,374 — a 4 percent increase.
During the same period, the number of what the Pentagon calls “unfounded allegations” based on completed investigations of those reports rose from 331 to 444 — a 35 percent increase.
In 2012, there were 2,661 completed investigations, meaning that the 444 false complaints accounted for about 17 percent of all closed cases last year. False reports accounted for about 13 percent of closed cases in 2009.
Robert Maginnis, a retired Army officer and analyst at the Family Research Council, is writing a book for Regnery Publishing Inc. about the Pentagon’s push to put women in direct ground combat in the infantry, armor and special operations.
“In the course of conducting interviews with commanders, I heard time and again complaints about female service members making sex-related allegations which proved unfounded,” Mr. Maginnis said. “Not only do some women abuse the truth, but it also robs their commanders from more important, mission-related tasks.
“Female service members told me that some women invite problems which lead men on and then result in advances the woman can’t turn off. Too often, such female culpability leads to allegations of sexual contact, assault and then the women feign innocence.”
The annual Pentagon report on sexual assault noted the numbers of false complaints but included no analysis. The Pentagon did not respond to a request for comment.
Elaine Donnelly, who runs the Center for Military Readiness, said the Pentagon's Sexual Assault Response and Prevention Office (SAPRO) is ignoring the problem of false reports.
“Unsubstantiated accusations remain a significant problem, but the SAPRO is doing nothing about it,” Mrs. Donnelly said. “I went through both volumes and found no evidence of concern about the significant 17 percent of ‘unfounded accusations.’ Something should be done to reduce the numbers of false accusations, the first step being an admission that the problem exists.”
The number of sex abuse reports has risen from 1,700 a decade ago to 3,374 last year.
The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have pushed male and female personnel into close living conditions at a sprawling network of bases.
The existence of unwanted and wanted sexual contact in the war zone is not disputed.
For example, a group of Army physicians in 2010 studied one brigade combat team deployed to Iraq in 2007.
The physicians’ study, published in the Military Medicine journal, examined the number of soldiers who sustained disease or noncombat injuries. Of 4,122 soldiers, including 325 women in support roles, 1,324 had diseases or injuries that forced them to miss time or be evacuated.
“Females, compared with males, had a significantly increased incident-rate ratio for becoming a [disease or noncombat] casualty,” the doctors found.
Of 47 female soldiers evacuated from the brigade and sent home, 35 — or 74 percent — were for “pregnancy-related issues.”
Even before the wars, the Pentagon removed barriers across the board to women and took action to mix the sexes more closely. Men and women share dorms and barracks in boot camp and at the service academies, and deploy in close quarters on ships.
The integration promises to become even more intimate in coming years as the Pentagon places women into training for direct ground combat jobs.
“The latest SAPRO report confirms that problems of sexual assault against both men and women are getting worse, not better,” Mrs. Donnelly said. “Pentagon leaders nevertheless are planning to extend these problems into the combat arms. Congress and the Pentagon first must do no harm. At a minimum, the Obama administration must not be allowed to extend complicated issues of sexual assault, which have increased by 129 percent since 2004, into direct ground combat infantry battalions.”
Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel last week announced several steps to eliminate assaults, including ordering commanders to conduct “visual inspections” of all workplaces to ensure they are “free from materials that create a degrading or offensive work environment.”
The Air Force completed such an inspection last year after a female service member complained of persistent harassment.
In January, the Air Force reported the “health and welfare” inspection results:
“The Air Force found 631 instances of pornography (magazines, calendars, pictures, videos that intentionally displayed nudity or depicted acts of sexual activity); 3,987 instances of unprofessional material (discrimination, professional appearance, items specific to local military history such as patches, coins, heritage rooms, log books, song books, etc.); and 27,598 instances of inappropriate or offensive items (suggestive items, magazines, posters, pictures, calendars, vulgarity, graffiti). In total, 32,216 items were reported. Identified items were documented and either removed or destroyed.”
Said Mr. Hagel: “We need cultural change where every service member is treated with dignity and respect, where all allegations of inappropriate behavior are treated with seriousness, where victims’ privacy is protected, where bystanders are motivated to intervene, and where offenders know that they will be held accountable by strong and effective systems of justice.”
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/may/20/victims-of-sex-assaults-in-military-are-mostly-sil/?page=all#pagebreak
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http://www.whiteoliphaunt.com/duckofminerva/2013/05/obama-drones-and-the-matter-of-definitions.html
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http://www.washingtonian.com/projects/admiral/index.html
From the article:
Dorsey never flew a plane for the Navy again. But he began a new line of work, as an intelligence officer. He joined the Navy Reserve and rose through the ranks. And after a succession of increasingly prestigious Navy jobs, the personnel file of one Captain Timothy Dorsey, age 50, came before a promotion-selection board, composed of seven admirals. In a dimly lit room, they scrutinized his record. They saw a blistering report of the shootdown, signed by a Navy captain, practically calling Dorsey a damn robotic idiot. They saw the evidence of what Dorsey had done to that plane and the men inside it. And like the inquisitors 25 years before them, they were at a loss to explain it. But they also decided that he’d done it a long time ago and had overcome it. Not only that—they judged that a young, irrational aviator had grown into one of the finest officers in the Navy.
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http://www.wnd.com/2013/06/guess-whos-coming-to-military-exercises/
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WSJ
China's Growing Challenge to U.S. Naval Power
Beijing builds while America's fleet shrinks. No wonder our Western Pacific allies are nervous.
By SETH CROPSEY
On his recent trip to Asia, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel tried to allay fears that the 7% cut to the Pentagon's budget due to the sequester will diminish America's protective influence in the region. Referring to President Obama's pledge to "rebalance" U.S. forces in favor of Asia, Mr. Hagel told reporters that America is carrying forward "every measurement of our commitment to that 'rebalance.' "
He also spoke of U.S. efforts to improve military-to-military relations with China. His aides pointed to plans for increasing the U.S. Marine contingent based in Darwin on Australia's north coast to 1,100 from 250.
The defense secretary's message was unlikely to reassure America's allies in the region. The U.S. Marine contingent in Darwin, even if it reaches its long-term goal of 2,500 personnel, might be useful in a conflict over control of the narrow sea passages (the Strait of Malacca, Sunda Strait and Lombok Strait) through which shipping between Asia and Europe must pass. But the Marines would be of limited use if China directly threatened Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines or Vietnam. Darwin is roughly as far from the northern reaches of the South China Sea as New York is from San Francisco.
China will be participating in U.S.-led naval exercises near Hawaii, part of an effort to improve military relations with China. The exercises include Australia, Canada, South Korea and Japan. That's all well and good, but it is ludicrous to imagine that any of this will moderate Beijing's vaulting ambitions in the Western Pacific. In addition to China's long-standing threat to Taiwan, Beijing has made no secret of its desire for hegemony in the South and East China seas. It already has engaged in provocative incidents over territorial disputes with Japan and the Philippines.
These ambitions are backed by an extensive program of Chinese military modernization. According to a report last month by the U.S. Defense Department, Beijing continues to build up its medium-range and long-distance missile arsenal, antiship cruise missiles, space weapons and military cyberspace capabilities. China is also improving its fighters, building three classes of attack submarines, and has commissioned its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. It is, in short, building an advanced system of weaponry capable of striking Asian states from afar.
Facing this growing military might in the Western Pacific is a U.S. fleet less than half the size it was at the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s. The plan to build the 306-ship fleet that the Navy says is necessary to accomplish all its missions rests on assumptions about shipbuilding costs that the Congressional Budget Office and Congressional Research Service agree are unrealistic. The current situation is also troubling. On Tuesday, Rep. Randy Forbes (R., Va.), chairman of the House Armed Services subcommittee on sea power, told a group at Washington's Hudson Institute that "In 2007, the Navy was able to meet about 90% of America's combatant commanders' need [for ships]. This year that figure will fall to 51%."
The growing disparity between Chinese and U.S. military investment will eventually alter the balance of power in the Western Pacific. This shift will likely lead either to military conflict or to tacit American acknowledgment of Chinese dominance. A war would be disastrous, but Chinese dominance would not bode well either: The U.S. ability to shape the international order would end with Chinese supremacy in the most populous and economically vigorous part of the world.
The budgets needed to achieve the Navy's goals were unlikely even before sequestration. The defense budget since 9/11 has averaged 4.1% of GDP. Under the budgets projected by the Obama administration, the figure is projected to drop to 2.5% in less than a decade.
If America's unilateral disarmament occurs and the Pentagon leadership clings to a more or less equal division of dollars among the military services, the U.S. sea power available in the Western Pacific will decline significantly. Alternatively, to maintain strong forces in the Pacific, the U.S. would be forced to abandon its naval presence in such areas of strategic concern as the Caribbean or the Persian Gulf.
Such a shell game is not in the best interest of U.S. strategy. Neither is it in the interest of the international order that America has helped to establish and maintain in the decades since World War II. What ultimately matters for the U.S. and for a stable world order is America's ability to maintain a distributed and powerful presence across the globe.
Yes, the U.S. needs to pay greater attention to the security situation in Asia. But "rebalancing" requires weight, and America is losing this weight. Japan's plan to increase its submarine fleet to 24 from 16 demonstrates that Asia's leaders know it.
Mr. Cropsey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and the author of "Mayday" (Overlook, 2013). He served as a naval officer from 1985 to 2004 and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy in the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.
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In Debate Over Military Sexual Assault, Men Are Overlooked Victims
Daniel Acker for The New York Times
A scrapbook made by Gregory Helle, who says he was raped by another soldier in Vietnam.
By JAMES DAO
Published: June 23, 2013 151 Comments
Sexual assault has emerged as one of the defining issues for the military this year. Reports of assaults are up, as are questions about whether commanders have taken the problem seriously. Bills to toughen penalties and prosecution have been introduced in Congress.
Video: The Legacy of Tailhook
Retro Report: Military sexual assault is not a new phenomenon. A second look at the Tailhook scandal in 1991 reveals what happened then. And what it all means now.
Richard H. Ruffert in Fort Worth. He said a female boss in an Army reserve unit forced him to have sex with her.
But in a debate that has focused largely on women, this fact is often overlooked: the majority of service members who are sexually assaulted each year are men.
In its latest report on sexual assault, the Pentagon estimated that 26,000 service members experienced unwanted sexual contact in 2012, up from 19,000 in 2010. Of those cases, the Pentagon says, 53 percent involved attacks on men, mostly by other men.
“It’s easy for some people to single out women and say: ‘There’s a small percentage of the force having this problem,’ ” said First Lt. Adam Cohen, who said he was raped by a superior officer. “No one wants to admit this problem affects everyone. Both genders, of all ranks. It’s a cultural problem.”
Though women, who represent about 15 percent of the force, are significantly more likely to be sexually assaulted in the military than men, experts say assaults against men have been vastly underreported. For that reason, the majority of formal complaints of military sexual assault have been filed by women, even though the majority of victims are thought to be men.
“Men don’t acknowledge being victims of sexual assault,” said Dr. Carol O’Brien, the chief of post-traumatic stress disorder programs at the Bay Pines Veterans Affairs Health Care System in Florida, which has a residential treatment program for sexually abused veterans. “Men tend to feel a great deal of shame, embarrassment and fear that others will respond negatively.”
But in recent months, intense efforts on Capitol Hill to curb military sexual assault, and the release of a new documentary about male sexual assault victims in the military, “Justice Denied,” have brought new attention to male victims. Advocates say their plight shows that sexual assault has risen not because there are more women in the ranks but because sexual violence is often tolerated.
“I think telling the story about male victims is the key to changing the culture of the military,” said Anuradha K. Bhagwati, executive director of the Service Women’s Action Network, an advocacy group that has sharply criticized the Pentagon’s handling of sexual assault. “I think it places the onus on the institution when people realize it’s also men who are victims.”
The Department of Defense says it is developing plans to encourage more men to report the crime. “A focus of our prevention efforts over the next several months is specifically geared towards male survivors and will include why male survivors report at much lower rates than female survivors, and determining the unique support and assistance male survivors need,” Cynthia O. Smith, a department spokeswoman, said in a statement.
In interviews, nearly a dozen current and former service members who said they were sexually assaulted in the military described fearing that they would be punished, ignored or ridiculed if they reported the attacks. Most said that before 2011, when the ban on openly gay service members was repealed, they believed they would have been discharged if they admitted having sexual contact — even unwanted contact — with other men.
“Back in 1969, you didn’t dare say a word,” said Gregory Helle, an author who says he was raped in his barracks by another soldier in Vietnam. “They wouldn’t have believed me. Homophobia was big back then.”
Thomas F. Drapac says he was raped on three occasions by higher-ranking enlisted sailors in Norfolk in 1966. He said he had been drinking each time and feared that if he told prosecutors they would assume it was consensual sex. Parts of his story are corroborated in Department of Veterans Affairs records.
“If you made a complaint, then you are gay and you’re out and that’s it,” he said.
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Mr. Drapac, 66, said that over the coming decades he kept the rapes to himself, combating recurring nightmares and doubts about his sexuality with alcohol and drugs. But he began seeing a Department of Veterans Affairs therapist several years ago, and decided to tell his story recently after seeing accounts of female sexual assault victims.
“The best thing going on right now is that the women’s issue is coming to the fore and you see some mention about male rapes,” he said.
Many sexual assaults on men in the military seem to be a form of violent hazing or bullying, said Roger Canaff, a former New York State prosecutor who helped train prosecutors on the subject of military sexual assault for the Pentagon. “The acts seemed less sexually motivated than humiliation or torture-motivated,” he said.
But such attacks can be deeply traumatizing, causing men to question their sexuality or view themselves as weak. Some said their own families seemed ashamed of them.
“Being a male victim is horrible,” said Theodore James Skovranek II, who said he was sexually hazed in the Army in 2003. Some people told him the attack, in which another soldier shoved his genitals in his face after they had been drinking with friends, was not a big deal. But it made him question his manhood.
“I walked around for a long time thinking: I don’t feel like a man,” said Mr. Skovranek, who left the Army in 2005. “But I don’t feel like a woman either. So there’s just this void.”
Rick Lawson said that while he was in the Army National Guard in Washington in 2003 and 2004, he was repeatedly sexually bullied by a group of soldiers, including a sergeant who rubbed his groin into Mr. Lawson’s buttocks and jumped into his bunk and pretended to cuddle with him. Later, during preparations for deployment to Iraq, one sergeant handcuffed him and put him in a headlock while another pretended to sodomize him, Mr. Lawson said.
Several months after his unit arrived in Iraq in 2004, Mr. Lawson decided to report the bullying. His assailants were punished with reduced rank, Army records show, but he had to finish his deployment while living near them on the same base.
After he returned to Washington, he received a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder and was discharged from the Army in 2006. He struggled with depression and lost a job, then decided to start an advocacy group for veterans.
“A lot of people say this problem exists because we are allowing women into the military or because of the repeal of ‘don’t ask, don’t tell,’ ” he said, referring to the ban on openly gay service members. “But that is absurd. The people who perpetrated these crimes on me identify as heterosexual males.”
Although the vast majority of military sexual assaults are by men, a small number of men have reported being raped by women.
Richard H. Ruffert, 50, said his boss in an Army reserve unit in Texas forced him to have sex with her by threatening to give him poor reviews. He said the sex continued for about two months in the late 1990s, until he attempted suicide. He then told a commander and, after a lengthy investigation, his boss was transferred. But he believes that she was never punished.
He retired from the military in 2004 and spent several years struggling with nightmares, drug addiction and homelessness, which he blames on the sexual assault. Therapy and working with veterans have helped him, he said.
But he does not feel comfortable dating women anymore. “This has completely changed my life,” said Mr. Ruffert, who appears in the film “Justice Denied.”
Many experts believe that the repeal of “don’t ask, don’t tell” will cause many more men to report sexual assault. That was the case with Lieutenant Cohen, who says he was raped in 2007 by an Army officer he had met in graduate school. At the time, Lieutenant Cohen was preparing to join the Air Force.
After initially remaining silent about the episode, he filed a complaint with Air Force investigators in late 2011, after the ban was rescinded. But the investigation took a surprising turn: after Lieutenant Cohen returned from a five-month tour in Afghanistan, he learned that he had become the subject of the investigation and was no longer viewed as a victim.
The lieutenant, 29, now faces a court-martial trial on multiple charges, including conduct unbecoming an officer. Lieutenant Cohen’s special victims counsel, Maj. John Bellflower, said the Air Force investigators apparently used information provided voluntarily by the lieutenant in bringing the charges against him, a possible violation of his rights.
The military recently told Lieutenant Cohen that it was reopening the sexual assault case. In the meantime, he faces a trial in July that he views as punishment for filing a criminal complaint against a superior officer. The Air Force denies that.
“I think the attention to this issue is absolutely needed,” Lieutenant Cohen said. “But it’s a little bit late. We still have attacks, and we still have retaliation.”
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http://pjmedia.com/eddriscoll/2013/06/25/vdh-savior-generals/
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China's Space Program Tries to Catch Up
Analysis
June 26, 2013 | 0600 Print Text Size
China's Space Program Tries to Catch Up
The rocket carrying the Shenzhou 10 spacecraft blasts off June 11. (ChinaFotoPress/Getty Images)
Summary
China's strategic focus on space is less about national pride than about the importance of space for both the military and economic progress of the country. The Chinese space program has developed rapidly over the past decade, illustrating the importance of the program to Beijing. Shenzhou 10, a 15-day mission that began June 11 and returned to Earth the morning of June 26 marked China's fifth manned mission to space. An increasing, ongoing presence in space is essential for civilian and military communications. Satellites' functions include navigation systems such as GPS, weather data and communications relays. But the significance of space goes beyond satellites. Technological advancement and development is required for countries such as China that want to participate in future resource development in space.
Analysis
The Chinese space program officially began in 1958. Beijing launched its first earth-orbiting satellite in 1970, and while there were a series of launch failures in the 1990s, China carried out its first manned mission -- Shenzhou 5, which put a man in orbit -- in 2003. More manned missions would follow in 2005, 2008 and 2012. A major uptick in activity began in 2010, when China successfully completed 15 unmanned launches, including a lunar orbiting probe. Nineteen more launches would follow in 2011 and 2012. China is now one of only two countries -- Russia being the other -- actively putting people into space and plans to land an unmanned craft on the moon in late 2013.
The latest mission, Shenzhou 10, was launched as part of the testing process for docking capabilities with Tiangong 1, the small space module that is part of the program that will eventually culminate in China's own full-sized space station, planned for the 2020s. The mission, which reached completion June 26, also set out to advance flying abilities; demonstrate adaptability and efficiency while completing objectives on the complex; and test coordination of various systems.
Benefits of Space Exploration
Continued advancements in space-related technology will enable China to compete on the commercial and military fronts as more activity becomes dependent on space-based infrastructure. Prior to satellite communications, surveillance and detection abilities and communication were limited by line of sight and by the atmosphere, which can reflect signals and can distort and dilute their strength. Space-based infrastructure also enables more efficient communication over time.
Satellites are also essential to the coordination of a global military presence. Modern global warfare requires the acquisition of data and ability to move and utilize data in real time. This need is highly dependent on satellites, which provide the necessary sensors to "see" what is happening and the transmission capabilities to distribute this data.
However, the defense of satellites remains difficult. In addition to anti-satellite missiles, it is also possible to blind and jam satellites. Given the imbalance between the United States and the nearest competitors when it comes to space-based technologies (and reliance on these technologies), the disabling or destruction of U.S. satellites would be a bigger blow than a similar retaliatory response. But as China becomes more reliant on satellites for communications, military or otherwise, it is less likely to interfere with U.S. satellites for fear of retaliation (and vice versa), an effect similar to the nuclear standoff in the Cold War.
The Future of Space Exploration
While the current motivation for an increased space presence is satellite technology, continued progress in space is vital for future strategy as well. Resource acquisition will likely be a priority for future space exploration. The United States, Russia and Europe are all continuing efforts to expand space activity (though the United States is increasingly looking toward the private sector for further space development). Beijing cannot afford to be left behind in the ongoing pursuit to establish a greater presence in space. As the world's most populous country, China will continually have to seek out new resources in order to support and sustain itself. Space cannot be ignored as a potential, critical future source.
For example, asteroid mining may seem farfetched, but it could be a real possibility in the coming decades. NASA's strategy that seeks to find, capture and explore asteroids that may threaten Earth is currently competing for room in the budget with, among other things, exploration of Mars and lunar missions. There are also a few private asteroid-mining companies seeking to develop the necessary technology. There are likely many overlaps between the technology necessary to capture or divert an asteroid and that needed to exploit an asteroid for its resources.
Asteroids are a potential source of many substances, including nickel, iron and even water -- essential starting materials for constructing infrastructure in space or on the moon. The ability to extract resources in space could be instrumental in making space-based construction economical. Currently, lifting costs (the cost to get a material into space) are a limiting factor in the economics of space development.
While the returns on programs aimed at the future development of space are limited at the moment, the infrastructure, once built, can take several forms, including possible bases or colonies on the moon and Mars. Once space-based construction does become economically viable, only the countries that have established programs and research will able to take advantage of the new frontier. Much like the naval powers of history were able to colonize on other continents, it will be the space powers that will have the advantage on the moon or Mars.
As these pursuits move forward, it is important to remember that throughout history, research done to advance space exploration has found a way into everyday life, from something as simple as Velcro to advanced composite materials that can withstand immense heat. Research currently targeted for space also has the potential to improve earth-based technologies. Ongoing development in space has already had tangible benefits, including increased cellphone coverage (and ease of international calls), improved weather and GPS coverage and improved mapping technology.
While the path of ongoing development of space is unknown, the earlier a country enters this new space race, the better. Even so, establishing a strategic presence in space requires an ongoing and active development of space programs. It is for this reason that China, while starting later than the United States and Russia, is quickly and urgently expanding its technological capabilities in space.
Read more: China's Space Program Tries to Catch Up | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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second post:
http://www.armytimes.com/article/20130625/NEWS/306250042/Army-announces-10-brigade-combat-teams-cut
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This could go on about half a dozen threads: http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/recent
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BD:
Your posting here of SWJ reminds me I need to bring this site onto my semi-regular reading screen.
Are you posting about a particular piece here or of SWJ in general?
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In general, which I why I placed it here. SWJ is general, "low intensity" stuff. There are individual essays that would be better on the immigration or war on drugs threads, for example, but generally I think it is better here.
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Not quite sure what to make of this , , ,
http://www.ijreview.com/2013/06/62053-president-obamas-purge-military-officers-replaced-by-the-commander-in-chief/
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I guess if I was younger and wanted to meet girls and get laid I could join the military..... new military recruiting ad can go like:
you need dates come and serve. We have a huge selection of boys and girls gay straight you name it.
****The Pentagon's Surrender to Feminism
Pat Buchanan June 25, 2013 Society
"The Pentagon unveiled plans Tuesday for fully integrating women into front-line and special combat roles, including elite forces such as Army Rangers and Navy SEALs."
So ran the lead on the CNN story. And why are we doing this?
Did the young officers leading troops in battle in Afghanistan and Iraq, returning with casualties, say they needed women to enhance the fighting efficiency of their combat units and the survival rate of their soldiers?
Did men from the 101st and 82nd airborne, the Marines, the SEALs and Delta Force petition the Joint Chiefs to put women alongside them in future engagements to make them an even superior force?
No. This decision to put women in combat represents a capitulation of the military brass, a surrender to the spirit of our age, the Pentagon's salute to feminist ideology.
This is not a decision at which soldiers arrived when they studied after-action reports, but the product of an ideology that contradicts human nature, human experience and human history, and declares as dogma that women are just as good at soldiering as men.
But if this were true, rather than merely asserted, would it have taken mankind the thousands of years from Thermopylae to discover it?
In the history of civilization, men have fought the wars. In civilized societies, attacks on women have always been regarded as contemptible and cowardly. Even the Third Reich in its dying hours did not send women into battle, but old men and boys.
"You don't hit a girl!" was something every American boy had drilled into him from childhood. It was part of our culture, the way we were raised. A Marine friend told me he would have resigned from the Corps rather than fight women with the pugil sticks used for bayonet practice at Parris Island.
Sending women into combat on equal terms seems also to violate common sense. When they reach maturity, men are bigger, stronger, more aggressive. Thus they commit many times the number of violent crimes and outnumber women in prisons 10 to 1.
For every Bonnie Parker, there are 10 Clyde Barrows.
Is it a coincidence that every massacre discussed in our gun debate — from the Texas Tower to the Long Island Railroad, from Columbine to Ft. Hood, from Virginia Tech to Tucson, from Aurora to Newtown — was the work of a crazed male?
Nothing matches mortal combat where soldiers fight and kill, and are wounded, maimed and die for cause or country. Domestically, the closest approximations are combat training, ultimate fighting, boxing and that most physical of team sports, the NFL.
Yet no women compete against men in individual or team sports. They are absent from boys' and men's teams in high school and college, be it football, basketball, baseball, hockey or lacrosse.
Even in the non-contact sports of golf, tennis and volleyball, men compete with men, women against women. In the Olympics, to which nations send their best athletes, women and men compete separately in track and field, swimming and gymnastics.
Consider our own history. Would any U.S. admiral say that in any of America's great naval battles — Mobile Bay, Manila Bay, Midway, the Coral Sea — we would done better with some women manning the guns?
In the revolutionary and civil wars, World Wars I and II, Korea and Vietnam, women were not in combat. Was it invidious discrimination of which we should all be ashamed that women were not fighting alongside the men at Gettysburg, in the Argonne, at Normandy or with "Chesty" Puller's Marines in the retreat from the Chosin Reservoir?
Undeniably, some women might handle combat as well as some men. But that is true of some 13-, 14- and 15-year-old boys, and some 50- and 60-year old men. Yet we do not draft boys or men that age or send them into combat. Is this invidious discrimination based on age, or ageism?
Carry this feminist-egalitarian ideology to its logical conclusion, and half of those storming the Omaha and Utah beaches should have been girls and women. Is this not an absurdity?
We have had Navy ships become "love boats," with female sailors returning pregnant. At the Naval Academy, three midshipmen, football players, allegedly raped an intoxicated classmate. For months, she was too ashamed and frightened to report it.
An estimated 26,000 personnel of the armed forces were sexually assaulted in 2011, up from 19,000 in 2010. Obama and the Congress are understandably outraged. Such assaults are appalling. But is not the practice of forcing young men and women together in close quarters a contributory factor here?
Among the primary reasons the Equal Rights Amendment, the ERA, went down to defeat three decades ago was the realization it could mean, in a future war, women could be drafted equally with men, and sent in equal numbers into combat.
But what appalled the Reaganites is social progress in the age of Obama. This is another country from the one we grew up in.
Patrick J. Buchanan is the author of "Suicide of a Superpower: Will America Survive to 2025?" To find out more about Patrick Buchanan and read features by other Creators writers and cartoonists, visit the Creators webpage at www.creators.com.
COPYRIGHT 2013 CREATORS.COM****
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/26/dont_call_it_isolationism?page=full
From the article:
Some principles, like not providing military assistance to militaries that violate human rights (the "Leahy Amendment") may need to be pushed aside to make stealthy military globalism work out the way the services would like.
And the new tools of "warfare" available to the military are compatible with this level of engagement. Retiring Adm. James Stavridis made this intention clear in FP last week. The triad of nuclear weapons (missiles, subs, and bombers), even large conventional forces, are a thing of the past, he argues. Instead, the weapons of the future will combine Special Forces with drones that can operate at a distance and offensive cyber operations, which can be done virtually from home.
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/27/special-operations-forces-are-worried-about-adding/?page=all#pagebreak
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http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/090712-624998-obama-ignores-military-absentee-voting-problems.htm?ven=OutBrainCP
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http://www.businessinsider.com/2-more-women-fail-marine-infantry-test-2013-7
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/5/china-russia-partner-largest-ever-joint-naval-dril/
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Interesting charts/graphs in original at http://nation.time.com/2013/07/09/female-troops-medevaced-from-afghanistan-at-higher-rate-than-male-comrades/#ixzz2YfDn5VgT
Female Troops Medevaced from Afghanistan at Higher Rate Than Male Comrades
By Mark Thompson @MarkThompson_DCJuly 09
As the U.S. military prepares to send women into the toughest combat billets for the first time, Pentagon medical officers have just released data showing that while “battle injuries” were the leading reason male troops were flown outside Afghanistan for medical care, “mental disorders” topped the list for female troops.
That shouldn’t come as a complete surprise. After all, women remain technically barred from the infantry and other units where close-in combat is the norm. But the data also show that despite the ban, women were medically evacuated from Afghanistan at a rate 22% higher than their male comrades.
evac by gender
DOD
The report, which limits itself to a recitation of data, draws no conclusions about why the female evacuation rate was greater, or how that might change as women move closer to the front lines.
But that didn’t stop some from drawing their own conclusions.
“Women in combat zones are enormously valued and respected by their comrades in both Afghanistan and Iraq for physical courage, discipline, personal initiative, and smarts,” says Barry McCaffrey, a retired four-star Army general who commanded a division in 1991′s Persian Gulf War and is father of a Army-major daughter. But, he adds, there are key differences. “In general, women soldiers in good physical condition have much less upper body strength than male soldiers—and are more prone to impact injuries and stress fractures,” he says. “Women soldiers are challenged by some field combat duties such as carrying five-gallon cans of fuel and water, changing armor vehicle track and heavy truck tires, carrying 100-plus-pound loads of ammunition and fighting gear on extended dismounted operations, carrying stretchers of wounded soldiers, and the brute labor required to dig in fighting positions.”
“Women are, on average, less well-suited to the lifestyle of infantry and direct infantry support units,” says William Treseder, who deployed to both Afghanistan and Iraq as a Marine sergeant. At least one female Marine agrees. No woman has been able to pass recent physical-qualification tests for Marine officers.
But others view the findings as a given, in light of the training provided some women. “There is a disgusting and dangerous gap in the type of pre-deployment training afforded males and females in the Marine Corps,” says Lydia Davey, who spent much of 2006-07 in Afghanistan during eight years of service in the corps that ended in 2011 as a sergeant. “I wonder if women fail to adapt to situations they’ve never been trained for….this report can, and probably will, be easily spun to support the conservative agenda against women in combat.”
Medical teams inside Afghanistan handle most wounds, injuries and ailments. “Medical air transports (`medical evacuations’) are costly and generally indicative of serious medical conditions” that cannot be handled in the war zone, the report adds. “Some serious conditions (e.g., battle wounds) are directly related to participation in or support of combat operations; however, many others are unrelated to combat and may be preventable.”
The study, contained in the June issue of the Pentagon’s Medical Surveillance Monthly Report, tracked the 23,719 medical evacuations from the theater among the 1.7 million U.S. deployments between Oct. 7, 2001, the day the U.S. invaded Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 terror attacks, and Dec. 31, 2012.
“During every month of the 11-year period, medical evacuations for disease and non-battle injuries exceeded those for battle-related injuries,” the Pentagon analysis found. “Overall during the period, the rate of evacuations for disease and non-battle injuries was more than triple that of battle-related injuries.”
Battle wounds (5,570 men, 77 women) represented the single largest cause of medical evacuations, followed by musculoskeletal problems (3,074 men, 353 women), non-battle injuries and poisonings (3,159 men, 239 women), and mental disorders (2,408 men, 442 women):
Overall, nearly eight times as many males (n=21,046) as females (n=2,673) were medically evacuated; however, the rate of medical evacuations was 22.0 percent higher among females (46.0 per 1,000 dp-yrs [deployed person-years]) than males (37.7 per 1,000 dp-yrs). Of all medical evacuations of males throughout the period (n=21,046), the most frequent associated diagnoses were battle injuries (26.5%), non-battle injuries (15.0%), musculoskeletal disorders (14.6%), and mental disorders (11.4%). In contrast, the most frequent diagnoses among evacuated females during the period (n=2,673) were mental disorders (16.5%), “signs, symptoms, and ill-defined conditions” (15.3%), musculoskeletal disorders (13.2%), and non-battle injuries (8.9%).
The report says 4% of Army personnel, 2% of Marines, and 1% of Air Force and Navy personnel required medical evacuation from Afghanistan.
“The relatively low likelihood of medical evacuation suggests that most deployers were sufficiently healthy and fit, and most received the necessary medical care in theater to complete their Operation Enduring Freedom assignments successfully,” the analysis concludes. “The findings enforce the need to tailor force health protection policies, training, supplies, equipment, and practices based on characteristics of the deployed force (e.g., combat versus support; male versus female) and the nature of the military operations (e.g., combat versus humanitarian assistance).”
afg evacs
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Bring the boys home. Send in the terminators:
http://games.yahoo.com/blogs/plugged-in/afraid-darpa-unveils-terminator-atlas-robot-005030043.html
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/obama-remark-is-complicating-military-trials.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130714
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How We Lost the Seas
What will happen should American sea power wane and China replace the U.S. as the guarantor of maritime security?
By GARY ROUGHEAD
The American strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) characterized naval power as "more silent than the clash of arms." His emphasis on the centrality of this "silent" power in world affairs captured the interest of a young visiting lecturer at the Naval War College in the late 1880s. That lecturer, Theodore Roosevelt, would go on to be president and transform the U.S. Navy into the global force that has underpinned international security and prosperity for a century.
The sort of thinking about naval power that informed Mahan's and Roosevelt's work now appears anachronistic. When the U.S. Navy is discussed today, the conversation leaps immediately over strategy to commentary on budgets and the number of ships. Those are aspects of sea power, to be sure, but the ability to command the seas is much more than comparisons with other navies and much more complexly tied to our place in the world. Sea power sets conditions for stable world trade, as some 90% of commerce moves on the oceans. The Navy's persistent presence far from our shores enables effective diplomacy and provides regional influence without the burdens and sensitivity of deploying ground troops on foreign lands.
In "Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy," Seth Cropsey, a former deputy undersecretary of the Navy, argues that the end of unchallenged U.S. supremacy at sea may be closer than American policy makers would like to think. In a well-structured narrative, Mr. Cropsey provides a concise and compelling summary of the evolution of American and other great powers' application of and dependence on sea power. He chronicles the waxing and waning of that power and the global order that has come with our nation's ability to command the seas.
Navies aren't just a whimsical investment of national treasure. Rather, they are an outgrowth of trade and man's desire to extract resources from the sea, be they fish or natural gas. The relationship of commercial success and naval might is evident in the rise of great powers throughout history—Spain in the 16th century, Holland in the 17th, France in 18th and Great Britain in the 19th. It is likely that today Mahan finds a more devout audience among China's strategic thinkers than our own. Chinese naval deployments to areas important economically, such as the Southeast Asian sea lanes and the pirate-plagued trade routes in the vicinity of Africa, reinforce Chinese diplomatic and commercial activities. With Beijing so dependent on faraway markets and imports of natural resources, naval power weighs heavily in all its considerations.
By Seth Cropsey
(Overlook, 336 pages, $29.95)
China, Mr. Cropsey argues, is on the path to overtake U.S. naval power, with little deliberation in this country about the consequences of such a development. As Mr. Cropsey warns, reducing the number of U.S. ships "accelerates the decline of American sea power, unintentionally adding strategic weight to Beijing's naval buildup, and more important, to China's rise to dominance in Asia. Politicians have not faced this basic question of strategy."
The last transfer of sea power was between nations, Great Britain and the U.S., that shared political values and commercial philosophies and saw eye-to-eye on freedom of navigation in international waters. It was a seamless transition for the international order at the time. What will be the effect among our allies and like-minded partners should U.S. sea power wane, our global naval presence diminish and China replace the U.S. as the guarantor of international commerce and maritime security? As Mr. Cropsey says, "the signs point to a change in power in the western Pacific," a region of great importance to our future prosperity.
With its 286 ships, the U.S. Navy is now smaller than it was in 1917, when it boasted 342. The number is stuck, and the trend spans the administrations of both parties. We have spent heavily on our wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the U.S. Navy, which is central to our long-term strategic interests, languishes. Navies, unlike armies, take time to build—why the framers of our Constitution wrote of the imperative to "provide and maintain a Navy," as opposed to the need to "raise and support an Army."
"Mayday" provides an insider's view into the many ills of the Navy's planning and budgeting system. These range from low and unsteady quantities of ship orders; to the trade-offs between building a few cutting-edge ships and more ships less technologically complex; to the ever increasing "contractual, statutory and regulatory" burdens on the Navy. The latter include a requirement for new paints that emit fewer toxins in shipbuilding; compliance adds an estimated $16 million to the price of an aircraft carrier. But "Mayday" doesn't address forcefully enough how diminishing procurement budgets will be further eroded by rapidly rising personnel costs and inefficiencies within the procurement process itself.
Mr. Cropsey offers some good recommendations to adjust the size and makeup of the Navy. He wisely advocates that "the most advanced technology should bow to numbers" and argues for pursuing unmanned systems to achieve "decreased cost and increased surveillance and combat power." Yet some of his suggestions fall short, in that they assume a linear relationship between cost and reduced ship size. The inconvenient truth is that a ship that is half the size doesn't cost half as much. Deploying more small ships is appealing, but to get to areas of interest such as the Middle East, the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean we must cross vast waters and remain present for extended periods. Size, speed, endurance and lethality matter greatly, especially when forward bases can't be assured at a time when foreign populations are prickly about sovereignty.
But "Mayday" is extremely timely, reminding us that security and prosperity are inextricably linked to sea power. As John F. Kennedy said half a century ago: "Control of the sea means security. Control of the sea means peace. Control of the sea can mean victory."
Adm. Roughead, a former chief of naval operations, is a fellow at the Hoover Institution.
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http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20130718/CAREERS03/307180027/Commander-22nd-Marine-Expeditionary-Unit-relieved-command
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/19/navy-chief-surge-capability-were-not-where-we-need/
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Just to be clear, I've no opinion on this.
=======================
Military Entitlements Are Killing Readiness
The Pentagon and President Obama understand this. So why doesn't Congress?
By MACKENZIE EAGLEN AND MICHAEL O'HANLON
Members of Congress rarely miss an opportunity to trumpet their support for the troops, and the 2014 Defense Appropriations bill passed Wednesday by the House trumpeted away. Health coverage for life with minimal cost sharing? Check. Retiree pensions? Check. Generous housing allowances, grocery discounts, tuition assistance, tax breaks and more? Check. That's just a small recompense to the men and women who risk their lives for us, right? Not exactly.
America has arrived at a moment when the honorable instinct to keep boosting military compensation risks harming the very men and women Congress claims to be helping. The reality is that the U.S. doesn't have one sacred contract with our troops: It has two.
In addition to generous care and compensation, we owe them the best possible preparation for combat—weapons and other technologies that outmatch the enemy, excellent intelligence, training and logistics support. When they fight, our troops should prevail quickly and decisively.
These two noble promises are now in direct conflict. Defense entitlements are well on their way to crowding out military readiness and capacity, a fact even the Pentagon has acknowledged. But lawmakers refuse to address this challenge. Unless Congress reverses budget sequestration and restores three years' worth of additional cuts, the Pentagon is in for more belt tightening.
The Navy will retire more ships over the next five years than it will build. The fleet now stands at about 285. (At the height of the post-Soviet "peace dividend" era, it was 375.)
The Air Force is even worse off. The U.S. has fewer than one-third the number of bombers it had during the Vietnam era. Most of the Air Force's planes are B-1s and B-52s that predate modern stealth technology, and even the stealthy B-2s are nearly two decades old.
Troop numbers are also declining. By the end of fiscal year 2014, active duty Army and Marine Corps personnel are set to decrease by about 13% and 10%, respectively, from 2010 levels.
Some of these cuts may be acceptable, even necessary, but sequestration will soon make the situation much worse. Mandatory and arbitrary cuts are already forcing many service members to "take the summer off," forgoing crucial training time. Additional automatic cuts looming for 2014 will mean more downtime.
Now consider the realities of Defense Department entitlements: Between fiscal year 2001 and 2012, the inflation-adjusted compensation cost per active-duty service member grew by 56%. From 2000 to 2010, defense health-care costs skyrocketed nearly 180%, to $49.8 billion from $17.8 billion—more than double the rate of the national increase. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office projects that military health-care costs will nearly double again by 2030.
Some benefits should remain unassailable. Solid salaries, world-class health care for our service members and their families, educational benefits through the GI Bill for those returning to civilian life, and Veterans Administration services for the disabled (which are resourced outside the defense budget) must not be threatened.
But it is time to reconsider other benefits. Doing so will not make sequestration a good idea, though it may lead to fewer cuts elsewhere that harm readiness.
The Tricare program, highly subsidized health care for military retirees, supposedly honors a promise made many years ago by some military recruiters to provide service members free health care for life. Setting aside that such a promise was never officially made, Tricare is incentivizing overuse of the health-care system.
In 2004, for example, the rate at which Tricare recipients used outpatient services was 44% higher than in civilian plans; the inpatient rate was 60% higher. That is unsustainable, and it is the main reason President Obama has promised to veto the House appropriations bill unless Tricare fees for military retirees are raised.
Military retirees receive an extremely generous pension. For example, under the "High-3" retirement system—one option available for troops who entered the military after Sept. 8, 1980—retired active-duty forces receive 50% of an average of their three highest years of basic pay after 20 years of service, up to a maximum of 75% of their "High-3" pay after 30 years of service, along with an annual cost of living adjustment determined by the Consumer Price Index.
Begun in an era when those leaving the military often struggled in the workforce, the military retirement system is long overdue for an overhaul. It cost the Pentagon nearly $20 billion in 2011 and does nothing to address the fact that the vast majority of combat veterans (who are officially "veterans" but not "retirees") don't serve a full 20 years—and therefore get zero pension. In other words, those who deploy overseas and fight are often getting nothing while those who may well have stayed stateside for two decades before leaving the military get a very generous post-service pension.
Conveniences like commissaries also need rethinking in the era of Wal-Mart and Home Depot. So does military pay, which should generally track the rate of inflation but need not increase faster (as it often has of late), given the solid and generous compensation packages already provided to service members.
There is plenty more to consider, including addressing the 20% excess capacity in military bases and the bloat in the roughly 760,000-strong civilian workforce, which has grown even as the uniformed military has shrunk. A 10% cut to that bureaucracy, implemented intelligently and without furloughs, is sensible and fair.
This sort of prioritizing—something every American family does in hard times—apparently hasn't occurred to Congress. The fact that the two pacts with Americans in uniform are on a collision course has been shrugged off. Even the Pentagon's own requests for base closures, increases in health-care premiums, and a slowdown in the growth of military pay were ignored in the appropriations bill just passed by the House.
It is important that the U.S. maintains its contract with those who serve by providing them generous pay and benefits. But it is unfair to those very same troops to undercut the other sacred contract we have with them, which demands they have access to the best weapons and training so they are ready for whatever the nation asks of them next.
Ms. Eaglen is a resident fellow and defense analyst at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. O'Hanlon, a scholar at the Brookings Institution, is the author of "Healing the Wounded Giant: Maintaining Military Preeminence While Cutting the Defense Budget" (Brookings Institution Press, 2013).
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second post
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/25/pentagon-mulling-separate-combat-training-men-wome/
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http://www.ammoland.com/2013/07/army-giving-up-traditional-ammo-stopping-power-for-green-bullets/#axzz2aZCeE2uK
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http://www.ammoland.com/2013/07/army-giving-up-traditional-ammo-stopping-power-for-green-bullets/#axzz2aZCeE2uK
Silly. Lead in bullets was for back in the old days when the US military was supposed to win wars. We've moved beyond that now.
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http://www.ammoland.com/2013/07/army-giving-up-traditional-ammo-stopping-power-for-green-bullets/#axzz2aZCeE2uK
Silly. Lead in bullets was for back in the old days when the US military was supposed to win wars. We've moved beyond that now.
http://www.leatherneck.com/forums/showthread.php?97288-Marine-Corps-Takes-A-New-Look-At-Green-Bullet&s=ece9795fef73e5c1f1c366bdcc1473cc
Marine Corps Takes A New Look At Green Bullet
By Dan Lamothe and Matthew Cox - Staff writers
Posted : Monday Jul 12, 2010 9:10:56 EDT
The Marine Corps intends to purchase 1.8 million rounds of the Army’s new green bullet in addition to the millions of U.S. Special Operations Command cartridges already downrange as the service looks to find the best replacement for its Cold War-era ammo.
The new environmentally friendly M855A1 Enhanced Performance Round is on the way to U.S. soldiers in Afghanistan, Army officials said, with about 1 million rounds arriving soon. The updated 5.56mm round is touted as more effective than old M855 ammunition and, in some cases, 7.62mm rounds currently in use.
The new M855A1 will be used by the Army to replace the Cold War-era M855 round, which was developed in the 1970s and approved as an official NATO round in 1980. In recent years, troops have widely criticized it, saying it is ineffective against barriers such as car windshields and often travels right through unarmored insurgents, with less-than-lethal effects.
The Army plans to buy about 200 million rounds of the new ammunition over the next 12 to 15 months, Army officials said late last month. The announcement came 11 months after the service had to halt the program when the M855A1 lead-free slug failed to perform under high temperatures.
The lead-free M855A1 is more dependable than the current M855 and delivers consistent performance at all distances, Army officials said. It performed better than the current-issue 7.62mm round against hardened steel targets in testing, penetrating æ-inch-thick steel at ranges approaching 400 meters, tripling the performance of the M855, Army officials said.
“For hardened steel, it is definitely better than the 7.62mm round,” said Chris Grassano, who runs the Army’s Project Manager Maneuver Ammunition Systems.
The Corps had planned to field the Army’s M855A1 until the program suffered a major setback in August 2009, when testing revealed that some of the bullets did not follow their trajectory or intended flight path. The bismuth-tin slug proved to be sensitive to heat, prompting Marine officials to choose the enhanced Special Operations Science and Technology round developed by U.S. Special Operations Command instead. Commonly known as SOST ammo, the bullet isn’t environmentally friendly, but it offered the Corps a better bullet after the Army’s M855A1 round failed.
Marine infantrymen began using it in Afghanistan this spring.
The Army has replaced the bismuth-tin slug in its new round with a copper one, solving the bullet’s problems, Army officials said. More than 500,000 rounds have been fired in testing.
With the improvements to the lead-free round, the Corps is again considering it as a long-term replacement for the old M855 bullet, said Capt. Geraldine Carey, a spokeswoman for Marine Corps Systems Command, based at Quantico, Va. The Corps already has bought 4.5 million cartridges of SOST ammo as “interim enhanced capability,” but also will receive 1.8 million rounds of the new Army bullet in July, she said. A decision to field the new M855A1 bullet will be based on how well it does in additional testing. Either way, the Corps plans to continue replacing the older M855 round.
The SOST bullet weighs 62 grains and has a lead core with a solid copper shank. It is considered a variation of Federal Cartridge Co.’s Federal Trophy Bonded Bear Claw round, which was developed for big-game hunting and is touted in a company news release for its ability to crush bone. It uses an open-tip match round design common with sniper ammunition, provides Marines deadlier ammunition with more stopping power, and stays on target through windshields and car doors better than conventional M855 ammo.
The new Army round also weighs 62 grains and has a 19-grain steel penetrator tip, 9 grains heavier than the tip on old M855 ammo. Seated behind the penetrator is a solid copper slug.
Unlike the old M855 round, the M855A1 is designed for use in the M4 carbine, which has a 14.5-inch barrel, compared with the M16’s 20-inch barrel. The propellant has been tailored to reduce the muzzle flash of the M4, but it also works in the M16A4 and other rifles chambered for 5.56mm ammunition.
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/29/todays-youth-not-ready-todays-army-gen-odierno-say/
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http://www.e-ir.info/2013/08/03/counterinsurgency-the-graduate-level-of-war-or-pure-hokum/
From the article:
The authors of the American Army’s Counterinsurgency field manual, FM 3-24, tell their readers that counterinsurgency is the “graduate level of war.”[1] Implicit in this bombast is that conventional war—wars such as World War II, the American Civil War, and the Russo-Japanese War—is the undergraduate level of war and therefore easier to conduct. American Army Colonel Robert Cassidy summed up the mindset of many counterinsurgency (COIN) experts when he stated, quite bluntly, that counterinsurgency warfare is “more difficult than operations against enemies who fight according to the conventional paradigm.”[2]
With Cassidy’s and FM 3-24’s logic, the World War I Battle of the Somme in 1916 was easy, as compared to COIN, despite the deaths of 7,000 British infantrymen who went over the top in the first hour of the attack, and the fact that as many as 20,000 British men had lost their lives by the end of the day. In other words, Somme was the undergraduate level of war. But Iraq in 2007, according to the logic of COIN experts, with General David Petraeus and the Surge, that was more difficult because it was counterinsurgency, or the graduate level of war.
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/5/pentagon-hints-at-changes-to-allow-more-women-in-g/
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http://joemiller.us/2013/08/air-force-base-hosts-drag-queens/
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http://www.military.com/daily-news/2013/08/01/hagel-forecasts-massive-cuts-to-troop-numbers.html?comp=7000023435630&rank=3
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/12/army-colonel-physical-strength-not-end-all-be-all/
From the article:
The Pentagon has lifted its ban on women serving in the infantry, tanks and special operations, and the branches are examining all their physical standards in preparation for introducing women into these units in 2015.
Some military analysts fear the Pentagon will discard some standards to ensure that a significant number of women qualify.
“Perhaps it is time to take a hard look at what really makes a competent combat soldier and not rely on traditional notions of masculine brawn that celebrate strength over other qualities,” Col. Haring says in the current issue of Armed Forces Journal.
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"“Perhaps it is time to take a hard look at what really makes a competent combat soldier and not rely on traditional notions of masculine brawn that celebrate strength over other qualities,” Col. Haring says in the current issue of Armed Forces Journal."
True. It is not like the days when weapons were swords, shields, pickaxes, long bows, or bayonets. How strong does one have to be to pull a trigger, or right click on a toggle switch that sends in a drone? I guess one could have a dispenser for tampons inside the tank alongside the gov. paid for BCP.
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Speaking only as a lowly civilian, my understanding here is that we are talking about the standards for combat units. I've been put in full battle rattle on a couple of occasions and I'm thinking strength is a real fg important issue.
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http://blogs.fas.org/secrecy/2013/08/warrior-ethos/
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Anthony Principi: Wounded Vets Deserve Better
Terribly injured in war but forced to wait in line with those who just got old. That's not right.
By
ANTHONY J. PRINCIPI
"To care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan."
Abraham Lincoln's words light the path of America's eternal responsibility to those who have served in uniform. But we have lost our focus on Lincoln's command: Veterans and their families wait far too long for the benefits they have earned. Too often, this is because those who have been injured in military service—including our most recent vets—must wait in line with those who served but were not wounded.
On Aug. 22, Secretary of Veterans Affairs Eric Shinseki said that the department has reduced a backlog of disability claims by 20% to some 773,000 cases, including about 480,000 that have been pending for more than 125 days. Yet no number of new claims processors will be skilled enough, no computer fast enough or shortcut quick enough to deal with the ever-rising tide of claims unless the VA refocuses on the kind of care the system was designed to deliver. The enumeration of benefits has evolved far beyond the nation's obligation to those who became ill or injured while in service. It is time to return to original principles.
Twelve years ago, America went to war. Since then, about 6,000 service members have been killed in action and some 50,000 wounded. Their claims for disability compensation are not choking the Veterans Affairs benefits system. They are the victims of the sclerosis now overwhelming the veterans-benefits program—a system that often puts the most needy in line behind everyone else.
Every year more than a million veterans file claims for "service-connected" disability compensation; that is, for any disability or disease arising while on active duty, regardless of how the disability or disease was incurred. Nearly 80% of those claims are from veterans whose service predates Sept. 11, 2001. According to the Department of Veterans Affairs website, 37% are filed by my fellow Vietnam War veterans. More than 100,000 claims were filed last year by veterans who served during peacetime.
The price for allowing veterans to file claims throughout their lives is paid by the veteran who has lost a leg to a land mine in Afghanistan; whose ability to think clearly was clouded by the explosion of an improvised explosive device in Iraq; or by the grieving widow of a newly deceased young corporal. Every claim for compensation must fend for itself in a bureaucracy for which every veteran is the first priority—which means, of course, that no veteran is the first priority.
When everyone applies for disability compensation, those who embody the reason that Veterans Affairs exists must lose out. Their claims are one more folder in an ever-higher pile. Restoring Lincoln's focus will require rethinking what VA benefits are intended to achieve. Benefits and services should respond to disabilities incurred by veterans while in service, especially disabilities incurred in combat or while training for combat.
This is not always the case today. One example: A Vietnam veteran need provide no evidence beyond a discharge showing in-country service and a diagnosis for diseases presumed to be the result of exposure to Agent Orange to get automatic service-connection. That presumption is based on tenuous medical science described by the Institute of Medicine as only "weak" or "suggestive."
Today, veterans who spent just one day in Vietnam are automatically service-connected for Type II diabetes (irrespective of other lifestyle or heredity factors); Parkinson's disease; prostate cancer; lung cancer (irrespective of smoking history) and ischemic heart disease. All of these are among the most common diseases of older men, veteran or non-veteran. Veterans Affairs examines veterans not just for the primary disease they may have, but also for conditions that may flow from it. Because these diseases get worse as veterans age, they have every incentive to regularly reopen their claims.
As a Vietnam veteran, I will be able to file a claim if I get sick at age 92, or 102. If any of those diseases contributes to my death, my widow will get the same compensation as the spouse of a service member killed in Afghanistan. My widow's claim will contribute to the pile of claims that must be processed along with the Afghanistan spouse's claim.
As the Republican chief counsel to the Senate Veterans Affairs Committee, and later as George W. Bush's secretary of Veterans Affairs, I was part of the process that created these presumptions. I make no apology for my actions. But our obligation to future veterans calls for refocusing the benefits we provide. Clear thinking can restore balance to the system while retaining its fairness.
Shouldn't there be a cutoff date—either in age or years since service in Vietnam—for disabilities that may be related to Agent Orange? At some point, the system now goes far beyond what the law requires—resolving reasonable doubt about the degree of disability in favor of the veteran, after careful consideration of all available data—as Veterans Affairs is required to do. This makes no sense when older veterans are compensated for the expected and ordinary effects of aging.
Another source of claims crowding the line for VA benefits is the concept of "individual unemployability." Veterans Affairs can pay disability compensation at a 100% rate to veterans with lesser disabilities—evaluated as little as 60% disabled—if their disability prevents them from working. That makes sense for working-age veterans. But does it make sense when a veteran files his first claim when he is 80 or 90 years old?
Veterans Affairs is compelled to devote the same resources to deciding these claims as it does to the claims of veterans just back from Afghanistan. And these older veterans receive 100% disability compensation—as retirees, in effect—while Afghanistan veterans with below-the-knee amputations get only 40% (the degree to which the VA believes such an impairment affects a veteran's ability to work). That's just wrong.
Some have called for Secretary Shinseki's resignation. I do not. Instead, Washington—from Congress to the Pentagon—must reassess what laws, regulations and rules can be changed to ensure that benefits and other decisions Veterans Affairs makes are beyond reproach and based on the best facts available.
Let's ensure that the department's limited resources are focused on its core mission rather than dispersed in an effort to remedy every possible problem for every veteran. Remember, when everyone is first priority, no one is.
Mr. Principi served as secretary of Veterans Affairs from 2001-05.
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http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2013/08/22.aspx
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http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/09/a-quick-primer-on-aumfs/
From the article:
An article that I wrote with Curt Bradley, which examined AUMFs throughout American history, provides a framework for understanding AUMFs. (And the Lawfare Wiki collects many historical AUMFs and declarations of war, here.) AUMFs can (as Bradley and I argued on pp. 2072 ff.) be broken down into five analytical components:
(1) the authorized military resources;
(2) the authorized methods of force;
(3) the authorized targets;
(4) the purpose of the use of force; and
(5) the timing and procedural restrictions on the use of force
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Conservative Enemies of the State
Posted By Matthew Vadum On September 2, 2013 @ frontpagemag.com
Conservative organizations are “hate groups” and Tea Party supporters are potentially dangerous extremists, according to educational materials the Obama administration is using to indoctrinate members of the nation’s armed forces.
In response to a Freedom of Information Act request made by good-government group Judicial Watch, the Pentagon recently released 133 pages of lesson plans and PowerPoint slides provided by the Air Force from a January 2013 Defense Department diversity training center “student guide” entitled “Extremism.”
Judicial Watch president Tom Fitton slammed the Department of Defense documents for what he described as their bias against conservatives.
“The Obama administration has a nasty habit of equating basic conservative values with terrorism. And now, in a document full of claptrap, its Defense Department suggests that the Founding Fathers, and many conservative Americans, would not be welcome in today’s military,” said Fitton.
And it is striking that some of the language in this new document echoes the IRS targeting language of conservative and Tea Party investigations. After reviewing this document, one can’t help but worry for the future and morale of our nation’s armed forces.
The DoD materials not only take aim at modern conservative groups but label America’s Founding Fathers as extremists who would be unfit to serve in today’s military.
The teaching guide advises that instead of “dressing in sheets,” radicals today “will talk of individual liberties, states’ rights, and how to make the world a better place.” American patriots who fought for Independence from the United Kingdom in the 1700s are identified as adhering to “extremist ideologies.”
“In U.S. history, there are many examples of extremist ideologies and movements,” the document states. “The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule and the Confederate states who sought to secede from the Northern states are just two examples.”
This language mirrors what the public is now being fed by the mainstream media. The term “neo-Confederate” is increasingly used by journalists and leftists as an epithet to smear anyone who doesn’t long for an all-powerful federal government unconstrained by the Constitution.
For example, MSNBC contributor Joy Reid said a few days ago that supporters of the Second Amendment draw their inspiration from the antebellum, slave-holding South. “There’s this sort of neo-Confederate thread that runs through this pro-gun movement and NRA movement,” she said in a discussion about gun control.
The DoD teaching guide treats Islamic terrorism as insignificant, ignoring, for example, the murder spree committed by self-described “soldier of Allah,” U.S. Army Major Nidal Malik Hasan, at Fort Hood in 2009. The guide references Islamic extremism only in passing and doesn’t provide a precise definition for extremism. “[W]hile not all extremist groups are hate groups, all hate groups are extremist groups,” it states.
Curiously, at times the materials blather on almost incomprehensibly, using psychobabble to alert soldiers to the supposed perils posed by extremists.
The materials repeatedly refer to extremists as “haters,” an urban colloquialism that appears in hip hop music and in humorous graphic art posted on the Internet. The pseudoscientific materials also discuss the “seven stages that hate groups go through.”
It is as if the authors are winking at each other, acknowledging that what they’re writing is nonsense.
But the tone elsewhere in the teaching guide is deadly serious. It advises soldiers to rely on the Alabama-based Southern Poverty Law Center as a resource in identifying hate groups.
A 2006 report from the SPLC claimed –improbably– that “large numbers of potentially violent neo-Nazis, skinheads, and other white supremacists are now learning the art of warfare in the [U.S.] armed forces.”
The SPLC is a leftist attack machine funded by George Soros. After it labeled the conservative Family Research Council a “hate group,” a gay rights activist shot up FRC headquarters in Washington, D.C. in a terrorist attack in 2011. FRC president Tony Perkins blamed the “hate group” designation for the attack, saying the gunman “was given a license to shoot … by organizations like the Southern Poverty Law Center.”
The Southern Poverty Law Center has been at this game a long time, making money by sliming conservatives. It is so fabulously wealthy that it stashes cash in Bermuda and the Cayman Islands, two of those tax haven countries the Left keeps complaining about. In addition to those foreign accounts, in its most recent publicly available tax return (for the year ended Oct. 31, 2012), the SPLC discloses gross receipts of $46.8 million that year and an absolutely astounding $256.5 million in net assets.
Many hardcore left-wingers don’t take the SPLC seriously. It was mocked by the far-left Nation magazine’s JoAnn Wypijewski who described its founder, Morris Dees, as a “millionaire huckster.”
The SPLC lumps all sorts of groups on America’s political Right together, labeling them enemies of the Republic. Conservative, libertarian, anti-tax, immigration reductionist and other groups are all viewed as legitimate targets for vilification. To the SPLC, you practice “hate” whenever you fail to genuflect with politically correct reverence before every human difference.
According to Mark Potok of the SPLC, even everyday symbols are secret amulets of hate. He describes the Gadsden flag, a yellow-colored flag that bears the phrase “Don’t tread on me” and features a coiled rattlesnake ready to strike placed above the phrase “Don’t tread on me,” is a symbol of hate that in “contemporary society [is] the flag of the militia movement.” The flag says “Don’t mess with us,” and implies, “Don’t mess with us at the point of a gun,” says Potok.
In fact the Gadsden flag, a favorite of Tea Party supporters, has been used by the U.S. Marines and Navy since 1775. In 2002 the secretary of the Navy ordered that a variation of it, the rattlesnake jack, be flown on all U.S. Navy ships for the duration of the Global War on Terror. The order has not been rescinded by the Obama administration. Perhaps Potok didn’t get the memo from his leftist friends in the White House.
Since taking office in 2009, the Obama administration has been on a relentless drive to stigmatize and delegitimize opposing points of view. The latest assault on American values comes from the same administration that instructed Department of Homeland Security officials to treat conservatives and libertarians as potential terrorists.
It’s also the same rogue regime that goes out of its way not to label actual Islamic terrorists as terrorists, that calls terrorist attacks “man-caused disasters,” and refers to the Global War on Terror as the “Overseas Contingency Operation.”
The Obama administration refuses to disavow Saudi-style blasphemy laws and issued the FBI report, “Guiding Principles: Touchstone Document on Training,” which forbids FBI agents from treating individuals associated with terrorist groups as potential threats to the nation.
Americans ought to be concerned that the newly discovered Defense Department teaching guide attempts to spread the Obama administration’s venomous hatred of conservatives to heavily armed individuals charged with defending the nation from enemies both foreign and domestic.
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http://breakingdefense.com/2013/08/28/people-skills-killing-skills-the-armys-new-case-for-relevance/
From the article:
Strategically, peacetime engagement around the world may not always prevent war, but it can give us better intelligence and local contacts if war breaks out. Training friendly militaries can make them more capable of helping us when and if the shooting starts — and those foreign forces want to work with and learn from us in the first place because they know that we’re very good at shooting.
Now it looks as if that argument is getting traction not only in the Army but in the civilian policy elite as well. “I’m not persuaded that understanding the human [factor] is going to make land forces more capable of preventing conflicts,” said Kori Schake, a senior official in George W. Bush’s National Security Council who’s now at the Hoover Institution, “but you guys actually have persuaded me that a better understanding of this will actually make our combat force more effective and more resilient.”
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62Bi3RPz_2E&noredirect=1
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second post of the day:
Hat tip to GM on this-- from January! but due to a brain fart I noticed it only now:
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1197050445.shtml
[Kingsley Browne, guest-blogging,December 7, 2007 at 1:00pm] Trackbacks
Co-ed Combat -- Pregnancy and Single Motherhood
I’ve discussed so far a variety of differences between men and women that affect their relative aptitude for combat roles. Another distinction between men and women that has significant effects on military readiness is that only women can become pregnant.
Approximately ten percent of military women are pregnant at any one time. During the Gulf War, pregnancy was the leading cause of women’s being shipped back early to the United States. When the destroyer tender USS Acadia returned from an eight-month deployment during the Gulf War, thirty-six of the 360 women on board had been transferred off the ship because of pregnancy. The Acadia was the ship most prominently called “the Love Boat,” but it is just one of many that have had that label attached to them.
A comprehensive study for the Navy of female shipboard personnel found an overall pregnancy rate of 19 percent per year. The highest pregnancy rate (27 percent) was on submarine tenders, the class of ships with the largest percentage of women.
With the unprecedented use of female personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, one would think that the services would like to know what their losses are from pregnancy. According to a spokesman for Central Command, however, “We’re definitely not tracking it.” A Pentagon spokeswoman said that the Army does release information on how many women choose to leave the service because of pregnancy but not information on those who leave the war theater, implying that the information is tracked, simply not released. Only “general numbers” are released, she said, “to protect the rights of women, soldiers and the organization,” although it is not clear how anyone’s “rights” would be infringed by release of statistical information about pregnancy losses.
When it comes time to deploy, women fail to do so at three to four times the rate for men, the difference being largely due to pregnancy. Once a soldier is confirmed to be pregnant she becomes ‘non-deployable’ and will remain so for up to a year. After deployment, many women must be sent back home because of pregnancy.
A Navy study found that a quarter of women (compared with a tenth of men) were lost from ships for unplanned reasons. Large numbers of military pregnancies that are carried to term are unplanned (over 60 percent of those among junior enlisted personnel).
Pregnancy in the later stages means total absence of the woman – who may or may not be replaced – but even in the earlier stages it results in substantial limitations on a woman’s ability to contribute to her unit. One Army MOS in which there are many women is “fueler.” Fuelers are responsible for fueling vehicles and are critical to their units. Unfortunately, however, female fuelers are medically restricted from working in that job because of chemical exposure from the date their pregnancy is diagnosed. As the Army was preparing for Operation Iraqi Freedom, it had to impose a cap on the number of deployed women who could be allocated to that MOS, and it had to move men from other specialties into the fueler job, creating shortages elsewhere.
Women cannot serve at sea after their twentieth week of pregnancy, and even before that they must be removed from ships unless they are within six hours of a facility “capable of evaluating and stabilizing obstetric emergencies.” After giving birth, mothers are excused from sea duty for a year.
Women’s ability to avoid deployment by becoming pregnant is a constant source of resentment among men. Intentionally injuring oneself to avoid deployment is a court-martial offense; intentionally becoming pregnant to avoid deployment brings no penalty at all, nor does becoming pregnant to avoid deployment, missing the deployment, and then aborting the pregnancy – a pattern that creates even intensified resentment. This latter phenomenon is almost certainly something that the military does not track, so it is hard to know how widespread it is, but while I was researching my book, several people (all Navy officers) spontaneously mentioned it to me.
Single parenthood is also a much greater problem among women than men. Although in raw numbers there are more single fathers than single mothers (because of the overwhelming disproportion of men in the military), the proportion of women who are single parents is much higher.
Comparison of the numbers of single mothers and fathers is meaningful only if “single parenthood” means the same thing for mothers and fathers, whereas it clearly does not. A Navy survey that inquired into the nature of custody arrangements found that 76 percent of single mothers had sole custody of the child, whereas only 16 percent of men did. While only 8 percent of single mothers had “joint custody (less than half the time),” 63 percent of fathers did. These are very different parental patterns, and they have substantially different effects on deployability – differences that are obscured by simply labeling the involved personnel “single parents.”
The military recognizes the incompatibility of single parenthood and military service. Army regulations, for example, bar single parents from enlisting, stating that “the Army’s mission and unit readiness are not consistent with being a sole parent.” The problem comes about when individuals already in the service become single parents. Single parents are required to file “Family Care Plans,” identifying someone who will be able to take over parental responsibilities in the event of deployment, but if that arrangement falls through — or if the requirement is not complied with — then there can be a significant problem.
During the Gulf War, a number of military women with young children were transferred back to the United States because of the stress of being away from their children. Because of the longer deployments involved in the current conflicts, one doubts that this is a lesser problem today. Reliable data are not available (and perhaps do not exist), however, as the military has an obviously strong interest in not widely advertising the possibility of the return home for parents who miss their children.
My next post will be my last, and I will provide a few closing thoughts.
Related Posts (on one page):
1. Co-ed Combat – Closing Thoughts:
2. Co-ed Combat – Responses to Comments:
3. Co-ed Combat -- Pregnancy and Single Motherhood
4. Co-ed Combat – Cohesion and Trust:
5. Co-ed Combat -- Combat Motivation:
6. Co-ed Combat – Some Responses to Comments:
7. Co-ed Combat - Psychological Sex Differences:
8. Co-ed Combat – Physical Sex Differences and Their Continued Importance:
9. Co-ed Combat – Overview:
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http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-23991769
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http://breakingdefense.com/2013/09/13/vcjcs-winnefeld-tells-army-to-forget-long-land-wars-congress-get-out-of-our-way/
From the article:
"A candid Vice-Chairman of the Joint Staff delivered some tough messages to the Army yesterday and got in a few swipes at Congress and 'the political leadership' in general."
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The Marines Need Funding for Today's Threats, Not a Pre-9/11 World
he Corps faces budget cuts even as its responsibilities expand in an age of cyber terror and embassy attacks.
By
JAMES F. AMOS
In discussions in Washington about the sequester and defense strategy and resources, a basic question is often asked: "With the war in Iraq over and the war in Afghanistan winding down, why doesn't the U.S. military simply reset to its pre-Sept. 11, 2001, capabilities?" The underlying assumption behind this question is that we, as a nation, had funding mostly right then. I'm not sure I agree. In any event, what sense would it make to plan for future challenges and requirements by arbitrarily looking back to how things were done more than 12 years ago?
Consider what had happened to the Marine Corps by 2001. From 1990 to 2001, defense and security spending was cut by $100 billion on average each year. The focus on technology, and calls for cuts in manpower and procurement, assumed the U.S. would not need to commit ground troops to a major conflict for the foreseeable future. During that decade, the Defense Department reduced total active-duty strength by 32%. In 2001, the Corps totaled roughly 172,000 Marines, down from 197,000 in the 1990 Gulf War.
Even at that time, manning levels consistently fell below target and equipment readiness suffered. At one point in 2000, one-third of the Marine aviation fleet was grounded due to maintenance issues. While assigned missions were expanding and crises were multiplying—for instance, in relation to developments in Iraq and terrorist threats in the wider Middle East—Marine capabilities were stretched thin. Then came 9/11.
Over the past 12 years, fighting in some of the toughest corners of Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marine Corps has learned a lot about the force it went to war with—what worked and what did not. In many cases, our prewar focus on the "Three Block War"—which assumed that a modern Marine in the field might be called upon to fight, conduct peacekeeping operations and deliver humanitarian aid—was spot on (although we didn't have the money and facilities to train all Marines to that very high standard). Over time, though, we found that as the conflicts evolved, we needed some adjustments—and needed them quickly.
For instance, Marines found themselves short of critical capabilities in intelligence collection and analysis, in communication and in mobility on land, sea and in the air. Marines didn't have enough light attack and utility aviation helicopters, for example. They also didn't have all the training teams needed to advise and assist other countries in enhancing their own security.
Furthermore, Marine logistics structure was not well-designed for our new, more spread-out style of fighting, which required supplying many small, autonomous units distributed across a large area. Unforeseen long-term conflict ashore meant that the Corps had to add not only personnel, but more skills and equipment.
The new challenges of the 21st century also meant rooting out technologically savvy enemies who blended into the urban terrain and populace that sheltered them. Marines played their part in this effort by adding a Marine component to the U.S. Special Operations Command. This and other expanded demands led Congress in 2007 to authorize a Corps expansion to 202,000 personnel.
Yet demands for these hybrid war capabilities—requiring highly adaptable Marines, able to shift rapidly between, say, a close-quarters firefight and a humanitarian mission—has not removed the need for more traditional capabilities. The suggestion that in an era of sequestration Marines simply "go back to sea" ignores the fact that Marines never left the sea. While most of our deployed force fought ashore, where the demand was, Marines continued to deploy Marine Expeditionary Units on amphibious ships.
Despite the withdrawal from Iraq and the continuing drawdown in Afghanistan, the relatively new threat of cyber terror, and the traditional areas of embassy security and crisis response require uniquely skilled servicemen and women. Marines now provide a contribution to U.S. Cyber Command. They also provide increased support for embassy security, and currently provide a Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force in order to increase U.S. crisis response capabilities in North Africa.
While fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Corps—along with the Navy—continued to answer calls to respond to natural disasters and skirmishes in the rest of the world. Marines also provided training and assistance that underpinned America's commitment to build partnerships and stability within the broader security environment. In our post-9/11 world, more of our people must remain ready to deploy on short notice, which demands increased readiness levels compared with the force of 2001.
These and many other commitments mean that even if you eliminate the requirements of Iraq and Afghanistan, commitments and requirements in other areas have vastly expanded since 2001. Today, the Marine Corps has planned for significant budget and personnel reductions, even before U.S. forces are withdrawn from Afghanistan. Yet this doesn't mean the Marines will ignore the lessons learned from the past decade of combat operations.
The world is a different place than it was on Sept. 10, 2001—it's more dangerous. We continue to witness violent extremism, regional competition and increased sophistication and lethality among nonstate actors at unprecedented levels. As former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates pointed out, since we cannot predict where and when we will respond to crises we have to plan for multiple scenarios.
The readiness and responsiveness of Marine Corps forces should not be anchored to a pre-2001 model of the Corps, because the world on which it was based no longer exists.
Gen. Amos is commandant of the Marine Corps.
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http://freebeacon.com/chinese-military-capable-of-jamming-u-s-communications-system/
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http://m.smh.com.au/technology/sci-tech/laserguided-smart-bomb-crushes-tinnie-20130919-2u13g.html
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http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2013/09/19/enlisted-marine-women-to-try-infantry-course/tab/print/?KEYWORDS=wsj+wire
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http://search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt=AuWr_xZpRnBMpMO1KKgGkUObvZx4?p=artillery+weapons&toggle=1&cop=mss&ei=UTF-8&fr=yfp-t-900
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http://en.rian.ru/military_news/20130405/180451358.html
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Click on link below then click on box that is subtitled "firepower metal" and then hit on video start:
http://search.yahoo.com/search;_ylt=A0oG7j0Ruz9SzHYAiFFXNyoA;_ylc=X1MDMjc2NjY3OQRfcgMyBGJjawM4ZmJoMG1sOTN2ZGZuJTI2YiUzRDMlMjZzJTNEZ2kEY3NyY3B2aWQDX25HbU9FZ2V1ckNIcmlDMVVqLjE5d2EwUk1BeEQxSV91eEVBQjVoZARmcgN5ZnAtdC05MDAEZnIyA3NiLXRvcARncHJpZAM3STNDVWVvaFNDU3lvTU55ak50S0FBBG5fcnNsdAMxMARuX3N1Z2cDMTAEb3JpZ2luA3NlYXJjaC55YWhvby5jb20EcG9zAzAEcHFzdHIDBHBxc3RybAMEcXN0cmwDMTEEcXVlcnkDbWV0YWwgc3Rvcm0EdF9zdG1wAzEzNzk5MDgzNzYwNjUEdnRlc3RpZANWSVAyODY-?p=metal+storm&fr2=sb-top&fr=yfp-t-900
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/09/25/the_soldier_and_the_state_go_public
From the article:
Every administration has its share of disputes with the Pentagon, but when it comes to where and how U.S. armed forces will be used, civil-military relations have not been this tense and precarious since the end of the Cold War. Military officers are increasingly willing to express their personal opinions about interventions, while civilian policymakers are increasingly willing to disregard professional military advice. Worse, a growing number of individuals from both "sides" seem unaware of the appropriate civilian and military roles and relationships, and their conflicts play out in public more prominently and immediately than ever before.
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I read the article and while yes the dynamic is describes is real and serious I found its description of what happened on 911 in Benghazi pathetically imbalanced.
We now have a CiC who not only threw away everything that had been finally achieved in Iraq, but he also abandoned our people under fire. Things like this matter to our people who serve!!!
His blathering incompetence with regard to Syria and elsewhere only adds fuel to the fire.
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Separately, here's this:
http://www.businessinsider.com/navy-seal-us-special-ops-are-starting-to-look-a-lot-less-special-2013-9
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http://www.businessinsider.com/navy-seal-us-special-ops-are-starting-to-look-a-lot-less-special-2013-9
From the article:
McRaven should look to ensure that US SOCOM gets off the path to conventionalization that is all about conventional rules, shiny boots, starched uniforms, online sensitivity training, and loss of cultural innovation. It’s ok to break the right rules every now and then but the wrong rules are being broken (failed drug tests, broken NDAs, and violent crime etc.). Unconventional warfare needs to remain the heart and soul of US Special Operations Command, and component commands. Small unit autonomy, breaking the right rules, cultural influence, and relationship building has always been the heart Special Operations. Something must be done to ensure these are not lost to the big machine of SOCOM.
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Ummm BD, you might want to read my previous post all the way through :-)
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Yeah: sorry about that. Great minds think alike??? Apologies for my oversight.
Ummm BD, you might want to read my previous post all the way through :-)
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No worries :lol:
FWIW I knew of it because you recommended the source and I signed up for it. :-)
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Not all that important, but still pretty cool: http://www.businessinsider.com/walker-greentree-ninjas-seals-mcraven-jsoc-2013-10
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http://www.khou.com/news/world/226450581.html
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Three women who fought in the Civil War:
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2285841/The-women-fought-men-Rare-Civil-War-pictures-female-soldiers-dressed-males-fight.html
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http://theaviationist.com/2013/10/14/apache-clone/#.UlyV5RC8Cts
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Warrior and hero: http://guardianofvalor.com/salute-seen-around-world-wounded-ranger-salutes-commander-despite-injuries/
From the article:
Despite being in intense pain and mental duress, Josh remained alert and compassionate to the limited Rangers that were allowed to visit his bedside. Prior to Josh being moved to Germany for his eventual flight to America, we conducted a ceremony to award him with the Purple Heart for wounds received in action.
A simple ceremony, you can picture a room full of Rangers, leaders, doctors, and nurses surrounding his bedside while the Ranger Regimental Commander pinned the Purple Heart to his blanket. During the presentation the Commander publishes the official orders verbally and leaned over Josh to thank him for his sacrifice.
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http://marines.dodlive.mil/2013/10/22/30th-anniversary-of-beirut-bombing-survivor-shares-his-story/
From the article:
Oct. 23, 2013, marks the 30th anniversary of the Beirut Bombing. 241 American and 58 French service members were killed when two trucks filled with explosives crashed into the two barracks buildings. One of the 300 service members who lived in the building shares the story of the attack, his survival and how he lives with the memories.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/23/military-sources-obama-administration-purging-commanders/
Note that three of them are Benghazi related
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/10/23/military-sources-obama-administration-purging-commanders/
Note that three of them are Benghazi related
http://www.sodahead.com/united-states/is-obama-purging-our-military-of-supreme-loyal-leaders-already-firing-11-generals-why/question-3985587/?link=ibaf&q=officer+purge+obama
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https://medium.com/war-is-boring/751f5ccd091
From the article:
The spread of advanced guided weapons, especially to non-state forces such as Hezbollah, has made the battlefield more dangerous than ever. Which is why RAND analyst David E. Johnson, who has written several papers on the future of armor, believes that tanks are more necessary than ever. “My sense is that ATGMs have made the battlefield — be it irregular, hybrid or high-end war — too deadly for anything but tanks and similarly armored vehicles. As an Israeli told me when I was doing research on Hard Fighting: Israel in Lebanon and Gaza, nothing else can survive on the battlefield.”
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http://www.stripes.com/straight-shooter-swenson-not-done-fighting-1.248659
From the article:
But Will Swenson doesn’t have a job.
He has been out of the Army and unemployed since 2011. Last week, his hair way past regulation length, he put on his dress-blue captain’s uniform long enough for President Barack Obama to drape the Medal of Honor around his neck. He has a college degree. He has the Medal of Honor. But he doesn’t have a job.
Support our troops.
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http://www.conservativeactionalerts.com/2013/10/general-says-u-s-army-dysfunctional/
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http://news.yahoo.com/pentagons-top-three-threats-deep-future-191019205.html
Pentagon's top three threats in the 'deep future'
What sorts of threats will the US military face in the “deep future"?That was the topic of a panel at the Association of the US Army (AUSA) conference this week, the heavily attended annual trade show that draws top Pentagon officials and defense contractors.It's a tricky proposition for the Pentagon, since making the wrong predictions means squandering scarce funds in a time of intense budget pressure. The Pentagon was forced to cancel the Future Combat System in 2009, for example, when the military tried to predict where the future was headed "more than a few years out," said Gen. Robert Cone, head of the US training and doctrine command. As a result, he told the panel, "We're a little gun-shy."Still, in a standing-room-only session, the discussion endeavored to come up with the most likely risks to the stability of the world – and most likely to challenge the US military – in 2030 and beyond. Here are their top three picks.
.
That was the topic of a panel at the Association of the US Army (AUSA) conference this week, the heavily attended annual trade show that draws top Pentagon officials and defense contractors.
It's a tricky proposition for the Pentagon, since making the wrong predictions means squandering scarce funds in a time of intense budget pressure. The Pentagon was forced to cancel the Future Combat System in 2009, for example, when the military tried to predict where the future was headed "more than a few years out," said Gen. Robert Cone, head of the US training and doctrine command. As a result, he told the panel, "We're a little gun-shy."
Still, in a standing-room-only session, the discussion endeavored to come up with the most likely risks to the stability of the world – and most likely to challenge the US military – in 2030 and beyond. Here are their top three picks.
1. The growth of cities – and of slums
By 2040, an estimated 65 percent of the world’s population will be in cities. That’s 6 billion people. While overall poverty will decline, an estimated one-third of those people – or 2 billion – will be living in a “slumlike situation,” says Kathleen Hicks, who was until August the Pentagon’s principal deputy undersecretary of Defense for policy.
This in turn will result in a “very high potential for lack of governance.”
With cities growing quickly, “You just don’t have the governance structures to keep up with that,” she adds, noting that services like sanitation and local trash collection could fall by the wayside and create grievances.
Such a “hyper-pressurized, compact environment” could fuel criminal organizations, much like the narco-gangs of Central America.
It could also create alternative means of governance, such as Hamas-like organizations, to meet the daily needs of the people.
2. A 'significant and lengthy' period of Sunni-Shiite violence in the Middle East
The big question in the years after 2020 is what the Arab world will resemble “after a good 20 years of shakeout,” Dr. Hicks says.
In the next decade, the Arab Awakening “will have effects in every part of that region.”
Iraq continues to experience violence, and demonstrations are rampant in Bahrain. It remains to be seen how longstanding regimes like the Saudi royals will weather the violence going on around them, and how they will adapt to the demands of the populace, she adds.
“I think you’ll see the beginnings of what will hopefully not be an incredibly violent – but it will be a tumultuous –10 years.”
Many of these countries, including Egypt, will be “shaking out what it means to be a democracy,” Hicks says.
The end result will be “a reshuffled, new Middle East,” she predicts.
For the US military, that will mean developing language skills and cultural expertise.
It may also mean trying to interest Gulf nations in growing their maritime capabilities, Hicks says – not traditionally a strength among countries of the region.
3. The revolution in personal communications, combined with cheap drones and robotics
There is an “incredible ability for people to network themselves,” enabled by an information revolution that “is so rapid that I think it’s even more frightening than we realize,” Hicks says.
The use of Twitter in the Middle East, for example, has illustrated “how powerful – often for the good – the technology is,” she adds. “What we don’t really know exactly yet is how it could be leveraged in ways that challenge us.”
Hicks recalls that she and her colleagues used to pass one another news stories about the different uses of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), from a proprietor delivering burritos to a man in San Francisco proposing to his fiancée.
While the uses were innocent, it got them thinking about the militarization of technology.
It’s possible to imagine urban environments where US troops are sent into battle against adversaries able to tweet the location of US soldiers they see, or use unmanned systems to broadcast movements. Another scenario: loading small, cheap drones with munitions to use against the troops.
“We’ve spent a tremendous amount of money developing [UAV] technology, and we’ve done it in a way to make sure it’s secure and that it can’t be easily corrupted,” Hicks says. But that could "put our forces at risk in a way we have assumed they wouldn’t be.”
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http://news.yahoo.com/pentagons-top-three-threats-deep-future-191019205.html
Pentagon's top three threats in the 'deep future'
Very interesting. Surprising that Russia and especially China are not mentioned in the top 3 threats.
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http://news.yahoo.com/pentagons-top-three-threats-deep-future-191019205.html
Pentagon's top three threats in the 'deep future'
Very interesting. Surprising that Russia and especially China are not mentioned in the top 3 threats.
That may be in the non-public version.
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Reliability of this site completely unknown, but I've been seeing a lot of reports about this , , ,
http://downtrend.com/jrc410/obama-changes-direction-of-us-military-command-fires-9th-general-in-his-purge/
and this from WND, a known dubious site:
http://www.wnd.com/2013/10/obama-gutting-military-by-purging-generals/#TSb7ZIZbIS4QoWHb.99
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Not a terribly reliable source , , , but , , ,
http://www.wnd.com/2013/10/top-generals-obama-is-purging-the-military/
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http://www.stripes.com/news/camp-zama-commander-relieved-of-duty-1.250472
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/us/politics/2-democrats-split-on-tactics-to-fight-military-sex-assaults.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20131102&_r=0
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second post
https://medium.com/war-is-boring/dfad249c4dfc
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SEAL's Navy Jack Flak
The First Navy Jack with the words "Don't Tread On Me" has flown on naval ships since the time of the American Revolutionary War. However, according to our colleagues at NavySeals.com, "Senior personnel from within WARCOM and Naval Special Warfare are putting out instructions and memos stating that Navy SEALs are no longer authorized to wear the 'Don't Tread on Me' patch on their combat uniforms." Of course, those words also appear on the Gadsden Flag, which is associated with the Tea Party movement. Indeed, we confirmed this order from NSW: "All personnel are only authorized to wear the matching 'AOR' American Flag patch on the right shoulder. You are no longer authorized to wear the 'Don't Tread On Me' patch."
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Purging and Transforming Our Military
Posted By Matthew Vadum On November 8, 2013 @ frontpagemag.com
President Obama hasn’t just been hollowing out the military since taking office, he’s been gutting it, purging it of ideologically hostile personnel, and fundamentally transforming it into something other than a war-fighting force, military experts say.
Although few with military ties are willing to say it openly, it seems the administration is leading an orchestrated effort to seriously undermine the readiness of the military. Some reports indicate that Obama has purged 197 senior military officers since moving into the White House and that many of the retired officers have been harassed at their new civilian jobs for criticizing the president’s policies. The effects of these purges will be felt long after Obama leaves office.
This is, of course, the same through-the-looking-glass administration that goes out of its way not to label actual Islamic terrorists as terrorists, that calls terrorist attacks “man-caused disasters,” and refers to the Global War on Terror as the “Overseas Contingency Operation.”
A retired senior military officer and combat veteran who remains involved in national security affairs, told FrontPage in an interview that President Obama is involved in social engineering of the United States military.
“Having women in combat is bad,” he said. “It is changing the social complexion of the infantry and we now have this epidemic of sexual assaults.”
Soldiers are told not to be mean to gays, he said. “Do you really think the individuals who are joining the all-volunteer force will be joining to pull triggers or to get sensitivity training?”
The former officer said that President Obama is getting rid of experienced war fighters for no apparent reason.
The “poster child” for such firings is James Mattis, a real soldier’s soldier and four-star general in the Marine Corps who retired unexpectedly this past May at age 63. As a brigadier general Mattis led a brigade into Kandahar in fall of 2001 and a Marines division into Iraq during the invasion in 2003.
“Mattis should have been the next chairman of the joint chiefs of staff but mysteriously he gets retired,” the officer said. Mattis had been asking questions about Obama’s policy toward, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran, that the powers that be didn’t want asked, he said.
In early 2009 Obama cashiered David McKiernan, the general in charge of the Afghanistan war. He was replaced by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, whom he also fired. Obama canned his intelligence chief, Gen. David Petraeus. Gen. John Allen, another key figure in the Afghanistan war, resigned unexpectedly, according to an analysis by the “Vernuccio/Allison Report,” a radio show carried by WVOX 1460 AM in New Rochelle, N.Y.
Gen. Carter Ham fell on his sword soon after the White House denied permission for a rescue mission to save officials trapped at the besieged U.S. mission in Benghazi, Libya. Admiral David Gaurette, who oversaw an aircraft carrier group in the Middle East, also had retirement thrust upon him, as did Marine Gen. James Cartwright.
Vice Admiral Tim Giardina and Major Gen. Michael Carey, military commanders involved with the nation’s nuclear defenses, have also been shown the door by the president.
Retired Army Maj. Gen. Patrick Brady told WND that President Obama has forced out so many military leaders who have doubts about his policies that the nation’s armed forces no longer feel prepared to fight or to try to win armed conflicts.
“There is no doubt he is intent on emasculating the military and will fire anyone who disagrees with him” over such issues as “homosexuals, women in foxholes, the Obama sequester,” said Brady, a recipient of the military’s highest decoration, the Medal of Honor.
“They are purging everyone, and if you want to keep your job, just keep your mouth shut,” another top retired officer told WND.
“Not only are military service members being demoralized and the ranks’ overall readiness being reduced by the Obama administration’s purge of key leaders, colonels – those lined up in rank to replace outgoing generals – are quietly taking their careers in other directions,” the media outlet reports.
Retired Army Lt. Gen. William G. “Jerry” Boykin said four-star generals are being retired at an alarming rate under Obama. “Over the past three years, it is unprecedented for the number of four-star generals to be relieved of duty, and not necessarily relieved for cause.”
“I believe there is a purging of the military,” he said. “The problem is worse than we have ever seen.”
Retired Marine Corps Lt. Col. Oliver North weighed in on the issue on Mark Levin’s radio show last night.
Although “there’s a lot of dead wood wearing flags and stars … [who] wouldn’t know how to fight their way out of a paper bag,” a suspicious number of flag officers have been given walking papers by the Obama administration, he said. He continued:
There’s a group of people, and I don’t think it’s anything close to a hundred, but there’s probably several dozen who tried to do the right thing and they weren’t promoted by this administration because it was contrary to their policy whether it was the administration’s stated narrative that we’ve ended al-Qaeda, therefore we’re safe in the world, or whether it’s the stated narrative that we’re doing a pivot toward Asia which is total baloney because there’s no money to do it with, or it’s the people who want to defend America with a real serious ballistic missile defense and they were fired because they said, “hey gosh, we’re not doing what we need to do to protect the American people.”
Generals and admirals who “feel strongly that something has gone wrong and something isn’t being done right, you have a moral obligation to know, first of all, your career is probably over anyway, so have the courage to stand up at a podium, take off your stars, throw ‘em down [on] the podium, and tell the truth to the American people on your way out the door.”
This “has not happened yet and it should have happened a long time ago,” North said, adding:
The military is being turned into a laboratory for radical social engineering experiments. They’re wrecking the finest military force the world has ever known — brighter, better educated, trained, led, and now the most combat-experienced military force in the history of the world. And they’re not standing up and saying, “stop wrecking it.” This administration is intent on wrecking it.
The president has also taken some steps that seem aimed only at harming morale. Obama plans to force Marines of both sexes to don unisex headwear that critics mock as “girly hats.”
According to former Navy SEAL Carl Higbie, ranking SEAL commanders have banned their subordinates from wearing the Navy’s traditional “don’t tread on me” insignia. The patch depicting a coiled rattlesnake ready to strike is typically worn by SEALs and is a variation of the Gadsden flag, a Revolutionary era vexillological device that has been used by the U.S. Marines and Navy since 1775. In 2002 the secretary of the Navy ordered that a variation of the flag, the Navy Jack, be flown on all U.S. Navy ships for the duration of the Global War on Terror.
The Left abhors the Gadsden because it is carried at Tea Party rallies and has been used as a symbol of resistance to Obama’s authoritarianism.
Leftist influencer and all-purpose crackpot Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center describes the Gadsden flag as a symbol of hate that in “contemporary society [is] the flag of the militia movement.” The flag says “Don’t mess with us,” and implies, “Don’t mess with us at the point of a gun,” says Potok.
Since taking office in 2009, the Obama administration has been on a relentless drive to stigmatize and delegitimize opposing points of view. The administration has instructed Department of Homeland Security (DHS) officials to treat conservatives and libertarians as potential terrorists. Obama’s IRS targets conservative and Tea Party groups for harassment and special investigations.
Americans ought to be alarmed that the administration is now using the same heavy-handed, un-American tactics to turn members of the nation’s armed forces against its domestic political adversaries.
We know, for example, that a January 2013 Department of Defense (DoD) diversity training center “student guide” entitled “Extremism” instructs soldiers that conservative organizations are “hate groups” and Tea Party supporters are potentially dangerous extremists.
The DoD materials not only take aim at modern conservative groups but label America’s Founding Fathers as extremists who would be unfit to serve in today’s military. The teaching guide advises that instead of “dressing in sheets,” radicals today “will talk of individual liberties, states’ rights, and how to make the world a better place.” American patriots who fought for Independence from the United Kingdom in the 1700s are identified as adhering to “extremist ideologies.”
“In U.S. history, there are many examples of extremist ideologies and movements,” the document states. “The colonists who sought to free themselves from British rule and the Confederate states who sought to secede from the Northern states are just two examples.”
The materials advise soldiers to rely on the Alabama-based neo-Marxist Southern Poverty Law Center as a resource in identifying hate groups. A 2006 report from the SPLC, essentially an anti-conservative attack machine funded by George Soros, claimed improbably that “large numbers of potentially violent neo-Nazis, skinheads, and other white supremacists are now learning the art of warfare in the [U.S.] armed forces.”
This is what happens when you make a radical left-wing community organizer Commander-in-Chief of America’s armed forces.
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Navy Ship Plan Faces Pentagon Budget Cutters
Littoral Combat Ship, Troubled in Early Tests, May Have Scaled-Back Future
By Dion Nissenbaum
WSJ
Nov. 12, 2013 10:31 p.m. ET
The LCS was supposed to be the U.S. Navy's battleship of the future. But the prototypes have been plagued with problems.
SAN DIEGO—When the USS Freedom's report card came in last week from Singapore, it didn't provide great news for Navy brass trying to keep Pentagon budget cutters away from the experimental warship.
The U.S. Navy had sent the vessel to Asia this spring, hoping the innovative Littoral Combat Ship would prove its detractors wrong and live up to the Navy's belief that it can be the backbone of America's future fleet. Instead, the narrative was marred by generator meltdowns, burst pipes and propulsion troubles that delayed the Freedom's participation in international war games.
When Navy leaders were given an expedited assessment on the ship's performance last week, they found the scope of those problems to be "a little stunning," says Rear Adm. Tom Rowden, the Navy's director of surface warfare.
It was an unwelcome review for the Navy, at a particularly bad time. The service is running into mounting high-level Defense Department resistance to the Navy's plan for a ship that Navy Secretary Ray Mabus says "represents the future of the Navy—and the future of warfare."
The littoral-combat ship was supposed to be a sure sell: a fast-moving, high-tech and low-budget vessel with a lean crew, which the Navy could quickly reconfigure for missions such as fighting pirates or nimbly plying coastal, or "littoral," waters. Instead, Navy leaders now find themselves waging a campaign to protect the ship from within the Pentagon itself. Defense Department budget planners in recent weeks have suggested that the Navy buy as few as 32 of the vessels instead of the 52 it plans to buy for $40 billion, Pentagon officials say. The idea of scaling back is gaining interest at high levels in the department, these officials say. "We're not canceling the LCS," says one senior defense official familiar with the discussions. "We're looking to reduce the numbers."
The Pentagon's primary motivation is a military budget that is shrinking faster than in any era since the Korean War. Military planners, looking for ways to cut budget billions without undermining national security, have identified potential cuts in major weapons programs in all services.
A ripe target at the Navy in recent months has been the evolving littoral-ship class.
They join skeptical lawmakers who had already urged the Pentagon to slow construction of the ships until the Navy can demonstrate that they will live up to their promise. "We need to slow down a little bit until the Navy truly figures out what its needs are," says Rep. Duncan Hunter (R., Calif.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee.
Enlarge Image
The USS Freedom at Changi Naval Base in Singapore in May. Reuters
Next week, the Navy could face more political flak when the Senate is expected to take up the National Defense Authorization Act, during which Sen. John McCain (R., Ariz.) is looking at proposing tighter controls for the program, an aide to Mr. McCain says.
Navy officials are looking to insulate the ships from budget cuts that would undermine the Navy's plans to make them the single biggest class in the fleet.
From the outset, the Navy has said the littoral ships will revolutionize the way the military neutralizes minefields, detects submarines and battles swarms of small boats like those Iran uses in the Persian Gulf.
The ships promise two unusual traits: an ability to quickly swap major parts—something like a "Transformer" toy—to change missions, and a reliance on small, unmanned submarines and helicopter drones to carry out missions.
They also sport an advanced propulsion-and-steering system that uses water jets rather than propellers and rudders. The hulls are lightweight steel or aluminum, designed for speed and nimbleness. One variation has an angular shape that evokes Klingon warships from "Star Trek."
Cost is a big selling point. Navy officials say they are confident they will be able to buy each basic model for no more than $440 million—twice the original cost estimates, but far less than the price of a new destroyer (about $1.9 billion) or carrier (about $13 billion).
The Navy's current plan would make the littoral ship a third of the Navy surface-combat force by 2028.
The Navy has begun testing the first four ships, but they won't be able to do all they are designed to do for years, Navy officials say—a result of an approach that involves building them while testing continues, as a way to get them into the fleet quickly.
The ships faced intense scrutiny almost from the beginning of the program a decade ago. Early critics said the Navy's specifications sacrificed combat power for cost-effectiveness. Internal Navy reports over the past two years raised concerns that the ships needed more weapons and better protection, Navy officials say.
Lawmakers began questioning the value of the new ship as costs rose and expectations wavered.
When the Freedom sailed for Singapore this March, the Navy hoped to use the trip to damp congressional criticism. Vice President Joe Biden and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel paid visits to the ship in Singapore.
But the Freedom's continued troubles have provided more fodder for skepticism. In July, the Government Accountability Office urged lawmakers to scale back plans for the littoral fleet until more testing assured that it would meet expectations. "There are still many, many questions about their capabilities," says Michele Mackin, director of Acquisition and Sourcing Management at the GAO. "They continue to build, but at what cost?"
The Freedom's test in Asia was important because the Pentagon envisions the littoral ships at the forefront of the U.S. military's greater emphasis on the region. The Navy has said it plans to station four of them in Singapore by 2016.
News of the Freedom's troubles in Asia began dribbling in over the summer. But Navy leaders got a much clearer picture last week.
The Navy had requested an expedited assessment of the Freedom's performance. The results, about which top Navy leaders were briefed last week, surprised officers like Rear Adm. Rowden.
He says he was taken aback by persistent maintenance problems that forced the ship to delay its participation in international war games, created temporary blackouts that left it dead in the water and undermined crew morale.
"That is an unsatisfactory situation," says Rear Adm. Rowden, who concludes that "there were some errors made in the execution of maintenance."
Despite the maintenance problems, he says, the Freedom has been performing well in Asia. The breakdowns haven't fundamentally altered the Navy's support for the ships, Navy officials say.
More problems hit in recent weeks. A propulsion-system breakdown hobbled the ship in late October. And the Freedom was delayed earlier this month because of a steering malfunction as it made plans to join exercises with Brunei, Navy officials say.
The mechanical problems have exposed weaknesses in the Navy's attempts to establish a new way of taking care of the ship, Navy officials say.
The Navy is funding two versions: the Freedom line, built by Lockheed Martin Corp. LMT +0.06% in Wisconsin, and the Independence version—the "Star Trek" variation—built by Australia's Austal Ltd. ASB.AU -0.41% in Alabama in partnership with General Dynamics Corp. GD -0.50%
While other ships typically carry sailors with maintenance expertise and immediate access to spare parts, the littoral ship is designed to rely more heavily on private contractors on shore to handle many problems.
That model has faced strains during the Freedom's current deployment, Navy officials say. Along with the Navy crew, the Freedom has had as many as four Lockheed contractors on board to help troubleshoot problems, according to a report earlier this year by the House Appropriations Committee, which warned that long-term reliance on contractors was "inefficient and uneconomical."
Joe North, vice president of Lockheed's littoral-ship program, says the company has kept pace with Freedom's maintenance issues and that small "speed bumps" in development haven't hurt the ship's central attributes.
"This deployment model is brand new to the Navy and this was an opportunity to learn the best process," he says. "We will use these lessons learned going forward and will incorporate for future deployments."
The Navy says it has made more than 150 design changes to the Freedom class, in part to address problems that have emerged since testing began. Lockheed added nine feet to the length of the second ship in the class, for example, to make room for more ballast.
Austal has also incorporated design changes but says it has kept overall costs within budget. "We believe this benefits the Navy and taxpayers by providing an extremely capable warship at relatively low cost," the company says.
The Navy also found that the Freedom's lean crew sometimes needed help. The Navy initially set the core crew size at 40. But in war games, Navy officers who participated in the exercises say, the lean crew was sometimes unable to juggle responsibilities.
In war games last year, the Freedom seemed to struggle with multiple tasks and appeared overwhelmed, says Petty Officer Manuel Navarro, a combat leader aboard the USS Sampson, a 500-foot destroyer that took part in the exercises. "From a combat perspective, from what I can see, they did horribly," he says.
A Navy official says the sailor's pessimistic perspective wasn't widely shared, but says the Navy is working to address concerns that the ships need more people on board.
The sometimes overwhelming demands on the crew are one reason the Navy is moving toward boosting the core crew size to as many as 50, say Rear Adm. Rowden and other Navy officials.
Aside from the Freedom's disappointing Singapore record, some of its other pioneering features are facing delays.
Among the original design goals was an ability to quickly swap weapons systems. If sailors needed to shift from repelling small enemy boats to clearing minefields, they could replace some equipment with unmanned submarines and helicopters. To hunt submarines, they could unload mine-hunting drones and install sub-searching drones.
"This is the direction we're going: not to put battleships on the line and slug it out with each other, but to put these kinds of vehicles that can be mother ships, to some degree, for the autonomous, the unmanned vehicles," says Capt. Ken Coleman, the littoral-ship requirements officer for the U.S. Pacific Fleet's Naval Surface Force.
But the submarine-hunting concept won't be ready for years, and Navy drones have had difficulty detecting mines, Navy officials say. And, three years after the original missile system for the surface-warfare version was canceled, the Navy is still searching for a better alternative to help defend the lightly armed ships.
Some Navy officials have distanced themselves from one original selling point: the ability to shift between missions in 72 hours. "I'm not sure that I ever bought into that concept at all," says Vice Adm. Richard Hunt, who led a council created last year to review the littoral-ship program.
The Navy is still trying to define how to use the ships. Vice Adm. Hunt says one option would be to prepare each ship for specific missions and operate them in groups. "The jury is out until we experiment," he says.
The U.S. Marines and elite special-operations forces are considering ways to use the ships as transports, says Mr. Mabus, the Navy Secretary.
The littoral ships do have believers. Sailors leading the Navy's testing rave about the propulsion system and boast that they cruise much faster than most other Navy ships.
"I'm pretty well convinced that either version is going to be more efficient than throwing a billion-dollar destroyer out there to shoot pirates in open-hulled speed boats," says Cmdr. Dave Back, commanding officer of the Independence.
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http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2013/10/31/pentagon-training-manual-white-males-have-unfair-advantages/
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http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/16954-communist-chinese-troops-on-u-s-soil-for-exchange-mission
Arguably there is some hyperventilating here, but given our current CiC and the vast firings of many of our generals and admirals, this bears watching.
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second post
http://allenbwest.com/2013/11/bonuses-cant-keep-air-force-pilots-stay/
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http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303755504579204141223865178?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTTopStories
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http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/foreign-policy/item/16954-communist-chinese-troops-on-u-s-soil-for-exchange-mission
Arguably there is some hyperventilating here, but given our current CiC and the vast firings of many of our generals and admirals, this bears watching.
The New American is a John Birch society magazine if I recall correctly. Apply a 50 pound bag of rock salt.
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Ah, I did not know that. Thank you.
Anyway, here's my second post of the morning in this thread. Not really sure where to put it, but here seems reasonable:
Blackwater's Founder Blames U.S. for Its Troubles
Erik Prince Releases Memoir as He Writes His Next Chapter as Investor
By Dion Nissenbaum
Nov. 17, 2013 8:13 p.m. ET
After years of controversy, Erik Prince feels betrayed by the Obama administration – and he's looking to start a new chapter.
MIDDLEBURG, Va.—Blackwater founder Erik Prince personifies the hidden hand in America's terror wars. His company secretly armed and maintained drones in Pakistan, trained CIA hit teams, and collected $2 billion as a government security contractor.
Mr. Prince said he looks back on that adventure as "13 lost years." The billions of dollars are gone now, and he blames the U.S. government.
After a series of federal investigations, government contract battles and critical congressional hearings, Mr. Prince sold Blackwater in 2010. Following continued controversy over his most recent pursuits while based in Abu Dhabi, Mr. Prince has returned to Virginia to write a new chapter of his life—as an entrepreneur buying oil, land and minerals in Africa
On Monday, he is also releasing a memoir, "Civilian Warriors: The Inside Story of Blackwater and the Unsung Heroes of the War on Terror." It is his attempt to defend his work, challenge public perceptions of Blackwater and settle scores with a government he says made him a scapegoat when things went badly overseas.
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After founder Erik Prince sold Blackwater in 2010, he served as an adviser on efforts to set up security forces in Somalia and Abu Dhabi. Melissa Golden for The Wall Street Journal
Mr. Prince's rise-and-fall became emblematic of the shifting political currents since the attacks on Sept. 11, 2001.
When al Qaeda struck the U.S. in 2001, Mr. Prince was a 32-year-old former Navy SEAL running a modest security training business he had built with family money in Moyock, N.C.
In his memoir, published by Penguin Random House's Portfolio Penguin, Mr. Prince says he provided the Central Intelligence Agency with links to Afghan warlords who helped the U.S. topple the Taliban and drive al Qaeda fighters into hiding. From there, Blackwater's business grew exponentially.
In interviews, Mr. Prince and former Blackwater officials provided previously unreported details of the company's dealings with the CIA and its former director, Leon Panetta. Blackwater's fortunes, which dimmed as the Iraq war dragged on, sank markedly when President Barack Obama took office in 2009 and sought distance from President George W. Bush's war policies.
A chief target of Mr. Prince's ire is Mr. Panetta, who in 2009 shut down the covert training operation for CIA "hit teams" that former Blackwater officials said took place on Mr. Prince's Virginia property.
The CIA had been sending officers for training at Blackwater's North Carolina training facility. But it wanted something closer to its Langley, Va., headquarters, former company officials said. So they asked Mr. Prince to build a small shooting range on his rural Virginia land.
"They needed a place that was only 35 minutes away from work," said Gary Jackson, the former Blackwater president. "Erik was OK with that, and he has the property, and we had the money." The trainings, including live-fire exercises, drew some complaints over the years from neighbors, Mr. Jackson said.
The CIA declined to comment on Mr. Prince's work for the agency.
At the time, former Blackwater officials said, the company also was working on America's clandestine drone program. Former company officials said that a few dozen Blackwater employees, taking the place of American military forces, maintained drones armed with Hellfire missiles in Pakistan. The company didn't fly them, but prepared them to launch attacks.
"I didn't have any drone pilots," said Mr. Jackson, in his most detailed comments yet on the company's covert work. "We loaded them, we protected them in secret bases, and we were hanging Hellfires on them."
When that information became public in 2009, right after Mr. Panetta canceled the Blackwater hit-team training, the CIA director ended the company's role in maintaining the drones.
Mr. Prince said he is convinced that Mr. Panetta outed him as a CIA "asset" at a closed congressional hearing that year, adding that it was unthinkable for a CIA director to reveal the real name of a covert operative to lawmakers.
A representative for Mr. Panetta said the former CIA director was required to brief Congress on covert operations and wasn't responsible for how others handled that information.
Last month, Mr. Prince said, he finally had a chance to confront Mr. Panetta when the two unexpectedly met at a small dinner in Washington. "He was unapologetic," Mr. Prince said. "He said, 'Well, we were taking a lot of guff for you guys.' That was the best he could come up with. At that point [in 2009], the company was doing everything his organization was asking for. Exactly everything."
"No one was out to scapegoat anyone in the relationship with Blackwater, but there were some issues that arose that prompted a serious look at contracts with the company," said one former CIA official involved in the discussions. "There was a perception that they were trying to run some of their own operations untethered from agency oversight."
Mr. Prince disputed allegations that Blackwater ever had "gone rogue." Indeed, he said two of his men might be alive if they had disobeyed the CIA in December 2009 at a base in Khost, Afghanistan. At Camp Chapman, Two Blackwater guards were among 10 killed when a Jordanian posing as a valued informant was able to get on the base without being searched and detonated a suicide vest.
"I wish our guys at Khost had gone rogue, because the Khost bombing probably wouldn't have occurred," he said. "They followed instructions, unfortunately, and didn't search the asset in violation of all those agency protocols. I wish they had."
Along with its clandestine work, Blackwater had a much more public role providing security for American diplomats and CIA spies in Iraq and Afghanistan. Blackwater guards were caricatured as war-zone cowboys. Blackwater convoys were feared in Iraq. The drivers were under State Department orders to do everything necessary to protect the agency's workers—directives that Mr. Prince alleges forced Blackwater to use aggressive tactics.
The State Department didn't comment on the allegation.
The company's first high-profile client in Iraq was Paul Bremer, the American diplomat who oversaw the U.S. government's early reconstruction efforts in Iraq. "Their job was to keep me alive," said Mr. Bremer. "I can say they never fired a shot in my presence, so they weren't a bunch of cowboys running around shooting at people."
Blackwater guards were involved in a series of deadly shooting incidents that alienated Iraqi citizens and the government. In September 2007, they killed 17 Iraqis in Baghdad's Nisour Square while protecting a State Department employee.
Last month, the Justice Department renewed the prosecution of four Blackwater guards involved in the shooting. A federal grand jury returned voluntary manslaughter charges in the case, which still generates anger in Iraq.
"On balance, I think [Blackwater] operated in irresponsible ways which led to a lot of hostility toward our country," said Rep. Henry Waxman, a California Democrat and former chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, who grilled Mr. Prince during a 2007 hearing. "They were overpaid for their work, and there was little, if any, accountability to the U.S. or the Iraqi governments."
Following the Nisour Square shooting, the U.S. tightened its oversight and training of contractors to try to prevent another such incident, said Alex Gerlach, a State Department spokesman.
Mr. Prince faulted the State Department for canceling its work with Blackwater in 2009. And he argued that Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other Americans killed in Benghazi, Libya, two years ago would be alive if the State Department still used Blackwater guards.
"If we had been doing security in Benghazi, it wouldn't have happened," he said. "I mean, there would be four Americans alive. Having done almost 100,000 movements in different areas over a period of nine years in Iraq and Afghanistan, I can say with pretty high assurance that that wouldn't have happened to us."
After the Obama administration cut most ties with Blackwater, Mr. Prince sold the company and moved to Abu Dhabi, where he quickly became embroiled in further controversy. Mr. Prince said he served as an adviser in setting up a privately trained antipiracy security force in Somalia that was accused of violating a U.N. arms embargo. And he was a consultant on a failed effort to set up a security force in Abu Dhabi made up largely of former Colombian soldiers.
Now, Mr. Prince says, he is done working for t he U.S. government. He has invested millions in setting up Frontier Resource Group, a private-equity firm that operates in more than a dozen African countries. The firm is building an oil refinery in South Sudan, owns a cement factory in the Democratic Republic of Congo, conducts aerial gas and oil surveys across the continent, and is looking at taking over idle oil wells damaged by insurgents in Nigeria, he said.
Mr. Prince says he knows he won't persuade many Americans that Blackwater wasn't an evil war profiteer. The people who matter, he says, are those Blackwater saved around the world.
"The people we helped in the field, they know what the legacy is," he said. "The 40% or so of Americans that really can't stand the name of Blackwater, that's fine, I'll never really win them over anyway. And I really don't care."
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http://www.westernjournalism.com/the-problems-of-women-in-combat-from-a-female-combat-vet/
The Problems of Women in Combat – From a Female Combat Vet
Jan 26th, 2013 @ 04:19 pm › Jude Eden
For public releaseCol. Robert M Olivier USMCIMEFDM G-3 Information Operations
It’s not all about qualification. I’m speaking as a female Marine Iraq war vet who did serve in the combat zone doing entry checkpoint duty in Fallujah, and we worked with the grunts daily for that time. All the branches still have different standards for females and males. Why? Because most women wouldn’t even qualify to be in the military if they didn’t have separate standards. Men and women are different, but those pushing women into combat don’t want to admit that truth. They huff and puff about how women can do whatever men can do, but it just ain’t so. We’re built differently, and it doesn’t matter that one particular woman could best one particular man. The best woman is still no match for the best man, and most of the men she’d be fireman-carrying off the battlefield will be at least 100 lbs heavier than her with their gear on.
Women are often great shooters but can’t run in 50-80 lbs of gear as long, hard, or fast as men. Military training is hard enough on men’s bodies; it’s harder on women’s. And until women stop menstruating, there will always be an uphill battle for staying level and strong at all times. No one wants to talk about the fact that in the days before a woman’s cycle, she loses half her strength, to say nothing of the emotional ups and downs that affect judgment. And how would you like fighting through PMS symptoms while clearing a town or going through a firefight? Then there are the logistics of making all the accommodations for women in the field, from stopping the convoy to pee or because her cycle started to stripping down to get hosed off after having to go into combat with full MOP gear when there’s a biological threat.
This is to say nothing of unit cohesion, which is imperative and paramount, especially in the combat fields. When preparing for battle, the last thing on your mind should be sex; but you put men and women in close quarters together, and human nature is what it is (this is also why the repeal of DADT is so damaging). It doesn’t matter what the rules are. The Navy proved that when they started allowing women on ship. What happened? They were having sex and getting pregnant, ruining unit cohesion (not to mention derailing the operations because they’d have to change course to get them off ship.)
When I deployed, we’d hardly been in the country a few weeks before one of our females had to be sent home because she’d gotten pregnant (nice waste of training, not to mention taxpayer money that paid for it). That’s your military readiness? Our enemies are laughing – “Thanks for giving us another vulnerability, USA!”
Then there are relationships. Whether it’s a consensual relationship, unwanted advances, or sexual assault, they all destroy unit cohesion. No one is talking about the physical and emotional stuff that goes along with men and women together. A good relationship can foment jealousy and the perception of favoritism. A relationship goes sour, and suddenly one loses faith in the very person who may need to drag one off the field of battle. A sexual assault happens, and a woman not only loses faith in her fellows, but may fear them. A vindictive man paints a woman as easy, and she loses the respect of her peers. A vindictive woman wants to destroy a man’s career with a false accusation (yes, folks, this happens too); and it’s poison to the unit. All this happens before the fighting even begins.
Yet another little-discussed issue is that some female military members are leaving their kids behind to advance their careers by deploying. I know of one divorced Marine who left her two sons, one of them autistic, with their grandparents while she deployed. She was wounded on base (not on the front lines) and is a purple heart recipient. What if she’d been killed, leaving behind her special needs child? Glory was more important than motherhood. Another case in my own unit was a married female who became angry when they wouldn’t let both her and her husband deploy at the same time. Career advancement was the greater concern.
I understand the will to fight. I joined the Marines in the hopes of deploying because I believe that fighting jihadists is right. And I care about the women and children in Islamic countries where they are denied their rights, subjugated, mutilated, and murdered with impunity; and where children are molested and raped with impunity (not to mention defending our own freedom against these hate-filled terrorists who want to destroy freedom-loving countries like America.) Joining the Marines was one of the best things I’ve ever done in my life, and I’m glad I got to deploy. It not only allowed me to witness the war, but to witness the problems with women in combat.
Women have many wonderful strengths, and there is certainly a lot of work for women to do in the military. But all the problems that come with men and women working together are compounded in the war zone, destroying the cohesion necessary to fight bloody, hellish war. We are at war; and if we want to win, we have to separate the wheat from the chaff. And the top priority should be military readiness and WINNING wars, not political correctness and artificially imposed “equality” on the military.
Read more at http://www.westernjournalism.com/the-problems-of-women-in-combat-from-a-female-combat-vet/#6RXGO4rAS7XMKvML.99
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The Problems of Women in Combat – Part 2
January 31, 2013 by Jude Eden 13
For public releaseCol. Robert M Olivier USMCIMEFDM G-3 Information Operations
(Editor’s note: read part 1 here. The views expressed in this column are strictly those of the author and do not necessarily reflect our views as an organization.)
In continuing the discussion of opening combat roles to women, we have the argument that women are already there, deploying and fighting in hot zones. This is true, and it gives us a record of the problems we are already experiencing as a result.
Wasted: Valuable Time, Training, and Resources
I talk about several of the female-only issues for which extra accommodations have to be made in my previous article. We are not equal except in our rights under Constitutional Law. Nature has no regard for equality, and each one of us is born differently from each other. We are diverse and dissimilar in our talents, physical aspects, intellect, and emotions; and the sexes are inherently different. We know, for example, that women are much more prone to certain types of infections. For a woman on patrol, setting up an ambush (or, as the infantry do, living in abandoned buildings with no running water), hygiene is a constant problem. A urinary tract infection can quickly become a kidney infection (debilitating in itself) and then kidney failure if left unchecked. Suddenly, a woman needs to be evacuated for a problem that has nothing to do with combat and to which men are not susceptible.
Then there’s pregnancy. Margaret Wente writes: “One study of a brigade operating in Iraq found that female soldiers were evacuated at three times the rate of male soldiers – and that 74 percent of them were evacuated for pregnancy-related issues.”
It costs approximately a million dollars per individual to get trained through bootcamp and to be made ready for deployment. Those are taxpayer dollars spent on someone who has to turn around and leave the combat zone to have a baby (for which our tax dollars also pay), having nothing to do with combat.
Changing Our Best Instincts: Protecting Women, Mothering Children
We know that rape is a tool of torture for the already savage enemy we’re fighting. In one TV interview, a woman suggested that if women are willing to take that risk, we should let them. She also absurdly claimed that men are raped as much as women when captured, which is patently false. But the idea that men shouldn’t worry any more about women in battle goes against the very best primal male instinct. In every country from Canada to Israel where women are in combat (and in American units where women are in theater), the men will tell you they are more protective of the women. It’s different from men’s protection of each other, and it distracts from mission completion. The pro-WICs would have men thwart this wonderful and thoroughly ingrained instinct. A world in which men don’t feel a strong need to protect women when they’re in the most dangerous and hostile of environments would be a nightmare. We would rightly call those men brutes.
We’re also thwarting mothers’ nurturing instincts. Women are already training to kill and leaving their children to deploy, even when they are the sole caregiver (turning care over namely to grandparents). This sets a bad precedent and hurts children. There will always be war, and it’s bad enough for fathers to leave their children to fight necessarily; but to allow mothers to choose this path over motherhood is bad for everyone. There are many noble capacities in which women with children can fight for this country, such as administrative jobs stateside. We don’t need to deploy mothers to battle; we shouldn’t.
The Career-Hungry
A small handful of high-ranking females have instigated this policy change in order to advance their own careers. In this interview, Anu Bhagwati, a former Captain, complains about women not being able to be promoted to certain ranks, claims that women aren’t getting proper recognition for action in combat (a claim also made here), and claims that it’s harder for them to get combat-injury-related benefits from the VA. Regarding the latter, I know females who are receiving combat-injury-related benefits; so if there are some who are not receiving them but should, the bureaucratic, inefficient, fraud-riddled VA should be confronted. Administrative changes could certainly be considered to take care of veterans as we should – regardless of sex – for injuries sustained in battle thus far. As for recognition of action, this is also a bureaucratic aspect that can be addressed through the chain of command without changing the policies on women in combat units. And finally, as to rank, cry me a river. The military is about preparing for and executing war, not advancing your career at the cost of readiness for war.
The careerists are also on the hook for the double standard that we currently have for the sexes, which inherently lowers the standards overall. Even if one standard is imposed, it’s likely it will be an overall lower standard. As the Center for Military Readiness points out, “The same advocates who demand ‘equal opportunities’ in combat are the first to demand unequal, gender-normed standards to make it ‘fair.’” Enormous pressure from Washington is already on the military brass to fill quotas of race and sex; and the higher they get, the more politically motivated the brass’ decisions. Whereas imposing one higher standard would in fact result in fewer women serving in these roles, the political pressure to prove diversity will result in more unqualified women (and men) attaining positions for which men are more qualified. But go against the diversity status quo dictated by Washington, and you can kiss your rank and career goodbye. The purges have already begun.
The word “discriminate” has several meanings, including “to distinguish particular features, to be discerning; showing insight and understanding.” We should absolutely be discriminating in our criteria for war preparation, and the lives of our men in uniform depend on us taking an honest, discerning look at who adds to military readiness and who detracts from it. We should absolutely not open the combat units to the myriad problems we face already with women deploying to the theatre of war.
Read more at http://www.westernjournalism.com/the-problems-of-women-in-combat-part-2/#bfdmU74JhMZECzIt.99
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Politicize and destroy institutions is what the left does.
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/nov/20/donnelly-ordering-women-into-the-combat-grinder/
DONNELLY: Why would Obama send American girls into combat?
‘Gender-normed’ fitness standards put women on the front lines
By Elaine Donnelly
Wednesday, November 20, 2013
In a recent editorial cartoon, President Obama is portrayed as a football coach telling a suited-up female player, “Good news! We want you on the front lines.” Don’t laugh. “Coach Obama” really does intend to send unwilling women into ground combat infantry teams, which face far more violence than pro football.
Under Defense Department mandates, the armed forces are implementing incremental plans to order (not “allow”) women into Army and Marine infantry and special operations forces that attack the enemy. Acquiescent generals insist that training standards will be “the same” for men and women, but the fine-print “catch” is hidden in plain sight.
Footnotes in a June Marine Corps report to Congress stated that physical fitness and combat fitness Test standards would be “gender-neutral” with “gender-normed” scores that “account for physiological differences between the genders.” In the Marines’ new physical fitness test — recently postponed owing to “potential risks” — women will have to complete three pull-ups. Five more will earn 100 points, but men will have to do 20 to get the same score.
An NFL team could achieve “gender diversity” in the same way — training energetic, football-savvy female cheerleaders on linebackers’ training-facility machines that are adjusted for “physiological differences between genders.” Cheerleaders would succeed in the gender-normed gym, but on the gridiron “battlefield,” none would last beyond the referee’s first whistle.
Ten spirited female volunteers have attempted the grueling Infantry Officer Course at Quantico, Va., since 2012. Nine women (and some men) washed out on the first day. A few women reportedly will succeed in a similar experiment at the less-demanding enlisted Marine Infantry Training Battalion at Camp Geiger, N.C., but an information brief stated that gender-normed physical fitness and combat fitness tests would be part of the “baseline” research.
In January, Joint Chiefs Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey admitted that high standards beyond the abilities of women will be questioned and modified to achieve a “critical mass” of women in the combat arms. Servicewomen historically have been promoted at rates equal to or faster than men, but this hasn’t dissuaded feminists from attacking high, male-oriented standards as “barriers” to women’s careers.
The military can justify gender-specific allowances to improve fitness in basic and entry-level exercises, but not in training for infantry combat, where lives and missions depend on individual strength, endurance, team cohesion and trust for survival. The same elements are needed in Navy riverine units, which engage in land combat from small boats. Navy officials are “validating” coed riverine training with physical readiness tests that are gender- and age-normed with a “sliding scale” of easier requirements. Media-conscious instructors effusively praise female trainees, but women are being set up for debilitating injuries both in training and violent combat.
In 2011, a Marine official admitted that on average, women have 47 percent less lifting strength, 40 percent less muscle strength, and 20 percent less endurance capacity. Female attrition, injury and discharge rates are twice those of men. Generals who ignore these facts are dissembling shamelessly.
Enter Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno, who wants women in elite Ranger training, field artillery and armor units by July 2014, and infantry positions by July 2015. To achieve “gender-neutral standards” and “gender diversity metrics” (quotas), a few exceptional women might be retained in the combat arms along with marginal men. This is a surefire way to drive resentment up and tough standards down.
Courageous military women have served in contingent combat, coming under fire “in harm’s way.” However, requirements are different in “tip of the spear” infantry fighting teams that seek out and attack the enemy. Thirty years of studies have confirmed that in this environment, women do not have an equal opportunity to survive, or to help fellow soldiers and Marines survive.
When unsuitable assignments increase female injuries, necessary career changes will drain morale and shrinking military funds. Exceptions are unlikely, since Mr. Obama soon will appoint new leaders who will enforce the quotas. Promoting group rights over individual merit will not improve military combat effectiveness.
Congress, unfortunately, is AWOL on oversight. The pending defense authorization bill contains two-dozen measures focused on sexual harassment and assault, but nothing to prevent extension of those problems into the combat arms. No one noticed a recent Defense Department study finding that women who were exposed to combat reported twice as many sexual assaults.
To truly honor and respect military women, Congress should codify women’s exemptions from direct ground combat, stipulating that the policy may not change without an affirmative vote of Congress. If military standards are degraded for political reasons, national security will be endangered, and there will be no going back.
Elaine Donnelly is president of the Center for Military Readiness and a former member of the 1992 Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces.
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http://spectator.org/articles/56698/kirsten-curses-commanders
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/11/20/no_more_easy_wars_army_strategy
From the article:
In the acolytes' telling, overcoming anti-access can only be accomplished by the technical services -- that, is the Air Force and the Navy -- fighting through sophisticated defenses, which requires massive investments. They then assume away any chance of ground operations. Precision strikes and distant blockades will spare us the mess of combat. The conclusion is to slash the Army, freeing up money for Big Navy and Air Force. Risk is minimal since the Army is easily expandable.
The story is tight and marketable and has just one shortfall: It does not work. Shock and Awe substitutes problems that can be solved by a target list for the thorny questions that U.S. global security interests naturally pose. It appeals to our natural desire for a quick-fix solution that keeps us arm's length from strategic entanglement. It makes us feel good, even if it is totally inadequate and unaffordable in the long run.
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http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20131130/NEWS/311300008/Army-drops-number-paratroopers
FORT CAMPBELL, KY. — The legendary Pathfinders have taken their final jump and the Red Devils aren’t too far behind.
The two paratrooper units — formally known as the 5th Battalion, 101st Combat Aviation Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the 508th Infantry Regiment — are closing out long histories as a result of the U.S. Army’s reconfiguration and budget cutting. Among the changes being made is a reduction in the number of parachute positions across the service.
“You have to make the best use of resources across the Army to make sure we’re using tax dollars as best we can,” said Jim Hinnant, a former 1st lieutenant and paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg and spokesman for U.S. Army Forces Command.
The military is capping parachute positions at 49,000 as part of the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, a plan detailing the development of military forces through 2020. The plan calls for some units, including paratrooper units, to change their focus.
Lt. Col. Don Peters, the team chief for Operations, Intelligence and Logistics with Army Public Affairs, told The Associated Press the reductions are being made in part because of reduced budgets and to reach the mandated maximum number of paratrooper slots 49,000. Peters said 24 units accounting for 2,600 soldiers across the country were removed from jump status. That includes 12 units with the 18th Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, N.C., and the Company F (Pathfinder), 4th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 159th Aviation Brigade at Fort Campbell, Ky.
“However, paratroopers continue to train and maintain readiness to execute airborne operations should a mission arise, and the impact on the reduction of paid parachute positions will not degrade the capability of the Army,” Peters said.
The Army kept three standing pathfinder companies: Company F (Pathfinder), 5th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 101st Aviation Brigade, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault); and Company F (Pathfinder), 4th Battalion, 101st Aviation Regiment, 159th Aviation Brigade, both at Fort Campbell, Ky.; and Company F (Pathfinder), 2nd Battalion, 82d Aviation Regiment at Fort Bragg, N.C.
The Pathfinder units are dropped into place in order to set up and operate drop zones, pickup zones, and helicopter landing sites for airborne operations, air resupply operations, or other air operations in support of the ground unit commander. They also handle rescues of downed pilots and helicopters.
In the case of the Pathfinders at Fort Campbell and the Red Devils at Fort Bragg, their units trace their history back to being among the first to drop into Nazi-occupied France at Normandy on D-Day during World War II, helping set the stage for the allied siege that eventually drove the Germans out of the country.
Current soldiers are aware of that history and what the loss of jump status means to their roles in the Army’s future. Some are dismayed by the changes, but generally believe the units can still carry out the missions.
“History is history. Being on jump status is history. It’s out of my control,” said Sgt. 1st Class Bryan Beville of Cheyenne, Wyo., a member of the Pathfinders. “We’ll continue to fine-tune what we do.”
Staff Sgt. Ryan Savage, an Elk Rapids, Mich., native and Pathfinder member, said soldiers prepare for every scenario imaginable and while no longer jumping in ahead of ground troops, they’ll be ready to tackle their duties without helicopters.
“It’s a real fancy and pretty way to do it,” Savage said of jumping from helicopters. “But, for every soldier, you still have to train and prepare to do the same mission.”
The cutbacks have some airborne alumni worried about the future of paratroopers at various posts. Kenneth “Rock” Merritt, a retired command master sergeant major with the 18th Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, N.C., said the military’s focus on special forces could be detrimental to units such as the one he served with until retiring in 1977.
“My big concern is ... I just wonder how long they’re going to keep the 82nd Airborne on airborne status,” Merritt said. “I’m wondering if some day, somebody’s going to get the bright idea and the 82nd Airborne is going to go back to the 82nd Infantry.”
Army officials haven’t publicly spoken about pulling units from airborne status. Current soldiers hope one day they’ll be allowed to return to making air jumps.
“We’re ready for anything,” said Sgt. Shea Goodnature of Clarksville, Tenn.
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https://medium.com/war-is-boring/2a5cd0edf210
From the article:
Russian engineers have devised what could be the world’s deadliest air-to-air missile. And the U.S. military doesn’t have anything like it … or adequate defenses.
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:-o :-o :-o
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John Lehman: More Bureaucrats, Fewer Jets and Ships
More than half of our active-duty servicemen and women serve in offices on staffs.
By John Lehman
Dec. 9, 2013 6:31 p.m. ET
As we lament the lack of strategic direction in American foreign policy, it is useful to remember the classic aphorism that diplomatic power is the shadow cast by military power. The many failures and disappointments of American policy in recent years, in Iraq, Afghanistan, Egypt, Libya, North Korea, Syria, Russia and Iran are symptoms of the steady shrinkage of the shadow cast by American military power and the fading credibility and deterrence that depends on it.
Although current U.S. spending on defense adjusted for inflation has been higher than at the height of the Reagan administration, it has been producing less than half of the forces and capabilities of those years. Instead of a 600-ship Navy, we now have a 280-ship Navy, although the world's seas have not shrunk and our global dependence has grown. Instead of Reagan's 20-division Army, we have only 10-division equivalents. The Air Force has fewer than half the number of fighters and bombers it had 30 years ago.
Apologists for the shrinkage argue that today's ships and aircraft are far more capable than those of the '80s and '90s. That is as true as "you can keep your health insurance."
While today's LCSs—the littoral-class ships that operate close to shore—have their uses, they are far less capable than the Perry-class frigates that they replace. Our newest Aegis ships have been upgraded to keep pace with the newest potential missile threats, but their capability against modern submarines has slipped.
Air Force fighter planes today average 28 years old. Although they have been upgraded to keep pace with the latest aircraft of their potential adversaries, they have no greater relative advantage than they had when they were new. There are merely far fewer of them in relation to the potential threat. In deterrence, quantity has a quality all its own.
There is one great numerical advantage the U.S. has against potential adversaries, however. That is the size of our defense bureaucracy. While the fighting forces have steadily shrunk by more than half since the early 1990s, the civilian and uniformed bureaucracy has more than doubled. According to the latest figures, there are currently more than 1,500,000 full-time civilian employees in the Defense Department—800,000 civil servants and 700,000 contract employees. Today, more than half of our active-duty servicemen and women serve in offices on staffs. The number of various Joint Task Force staffs, for instance, has grown since 1987 from seven to more than 250, according to the Defense Business Board.
The constant growth of the bureaucracy has resulted from reform initiatives from Congress and by executive order, each of which established a new office or expanded an existing one. These new layers have accumulated every year since the founding of the Department of Defense in 1947. Unlike private businesses—disciplined by the market—which require constant pruning and overhead reduction to stay profitable, each expansion of the bureaucracy is, to paraphrase President Reagan, the nearest thing to eternal life to be found on earth.
The Pentagon, like Marley's ghost, must drag this ever-growing burden of chains without relief. As a result something close to paralysis is approaching. The suffocating bloat of overstaffing in an overly centralized web of bureaucracies drives runaway cost growth in weapons systems great and small. Whereas the immensely complex Polaris missile and submarine system took four years from a draft requirement until its first operational patrol in February 1960, today the average time for all weapons procured under Defense Department acquisition regulations is 22 years.
The latest Government Accountability Office report, released in October, estimates that there is $411 billion of unfunded cost growth in current Pentagon programs, almost as much as the entire 10 years of sequester cuts if they continue. The result has been unilateral disarmament.
What is to be done? As with most great issues, the solution is simple, the execution difficult. First, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel must be supported in his announced intention to cut the bureaucracy of uniformed and civilian by at least 20%. Each 7,000 civilian reductions saves at least $5 billion over five years. Second, clear lines of authority and accountability, now dissipated through many bureaucratic entities, must be restored to a defined hierarchy of human beings with names. Third, real competition for production contracts must be re-established as the rule not the exception. Fourth, weapons programs must be designed to meet an established cost and canceled if they begin to exceed it.
While sequester is an act of desperation that adds more uncertainty to an already dysfunctional system, it does seem to be acting as a spur to focus Congress on the urgent need to stop our unilateral disarmament by making deep cuts in bureaucratic overhead throughout the Pentagon, uniformed and civilian.
The way forward for Republicans is not to default to their traditional solution, which is simply to fight sequester cuts and increase the defense budget. Instead, Republicans should concentrate on slashing and restructuring our dysfunctional and bloated defense bureaucracy. With strong defense chairmen on House and Senate committees already sympathetic to the overhead issue, and a willing secretary of defense, this Congress can do it. That will place the blame for the consequences of sequester and the earlier $500 billion Obama cuts squarely where it belongs, on the president and the Democrats.
The way will thereby be prepared for Republican victory in the 2016 elections based on a Reagan-like rebuilding mandate that can actually be carried out by a newly streamlined and more agile Defense Department.
Mr. Lehman was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration and a member of the 9/11 Commission.
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http://www.michaelyon-online.com/air-force-being-downgraded-to-air-persuasion-task-force.htm
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http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/12/12/probe-launched-over-500m-spent-on-afghanistan-planes/
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http://www.michaelyon-online.com/us-embassy-bangkok-us-soldier-running-rogue-operation.htm
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http://townhall.com/tipsheet/christinerousselle/2013/12/31/marines-delay-pullup-requirement-for-women-n1770393
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http://www.westernjournalism.com/the-problems-of-women-in-combat-from-a-female-combat-vet/
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Israel, US conduct successful joint test of Arrow 3
Click here to watch: Israel, US conduct successful joint test of Arrow 3
A successful test flight of the Arrow 3 interceptor missile was conducted Friday in a joint operation by the Israel Missile Defense Organization and the US Missile Defense Agency. According to a statement released by the Ministry of Defense, the missile was launched over the Mediterranean Sea, and flew in an exo-atmospheric trajectory, reaching space The successful test flight, the missile’s second, was said to be a major milestone in the joint American-Israeli development of the advanced weapon system.
The Arrow 3 is able to target incoming nuclear or conventional missiles at a higher altitude than its shorter-ranged predecessor, the Arrow 2, Col. Aviram Hasson told reporters several months ago. “We’re thinking mostly about the nuclear threat,” he said. The Arrow 3′s high-altitude capability makes it an ideal counter to nuclear missiles, since the altitude minimizes the threat of fallout from the missile’s destruction. Hasson described Israel’s four-layered missile defense strategy: Iron Dome, which protects against smaller, short-range threats up to 70 kilometers; David’s Sling, covering mid-range threats from 70-200 kilometers; Arrow 2, for long-range attacks; and Arrow 3, for incoming missiles from up to 2,500 kilometers away. The shorter-range systems are mostly meant to counter attacks from the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Syria.
The shorter-range systems are mostly meant to counter attacks from the Gaza Strip, Lebanon and Syria. In November 2013, Israel conducted its first successful interception of a target missile by the new David’s Sling missile defense system, which is expected to come online in 2014. On the offensive end, Israel has reportedly also been testing the Jericho 3, an intercontinental ballistic missile said to have a range of over 10,000 kilometers. In November 2011, the Defense Ministry test-fired a ballistic missile at the Palmachim air base, the site of Friday’s launch.
WATCH HERE
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Congress Handcuffs Pentagon Cost-Cutters
Bases that can't be closed, weapons that can't be retired, benefits that can't be touched. What's left? The essentials.
By Todd Harrison And Mark Gunzinger
Jan. 26, 2014 5:20 p.m. ET
While the budget battles in recent years have been difficult for many parts of the federal government, they have forced the Pentagon into a perpetual state of crisis management, limping from one budget showdown to the next. This fiscal chaos is not conducive to carrying out the nation's defense.
If military spending must decline as part of an overall reduction in federal spending, Congress should abide by three simple rules: (1) a gradual decline in military spending rather than a sharp drop; (2) a greater degree of budgetary certainty for the coming years; and (3) the flexibility necessary for the Pentagon to make smart, strategically informed reductions.
The Ryan-Murray budget agreement, passed by Congress late last year, conforms to two of these rules. It reduces the cuts required in 2014-15 so that spending reductions are phased in gradually. It also gives the Defense Department more certainty in its future funding because both the House and Senate passed the two-year deal in a bipartisan manner. While Congress must still pass appropriations bills that conform to the budget caps, Ryan-Murray allows Pentagon planners to do something they haven't done in several years—prepare a realistic defense budget that has a chance of passing.
One important task remains. Congress needs to give the Pentagon greater flexibility to make smart reductions informed by strategy. This requires more than passing an annual appropriations bill and avoiding sequestration. It means Congress must set aside parochial political interests and allow the Pentagon to make tough decisions that are likely to be unpopular with some constituencies.
For example, the Defense Department has repeatedly asked Congress for another Base Realignment and Closure Commission so it can shed excess bases and facilities, which the military estimates is about 20% of its existing infrastructure. Yet current law prohibits the Pentagon from closing these unneeded bases and facilities, forcing it to waste billions of dollars every year. While no private company would tolerate such waste, key members of Congress have blocked efforts to close bases because this wasteful spending supports jobs in their districts.
The Pentagon has also asked for sensible reforms to rein in its growing personnel costs, such as raising the fee working-age military retirees pay for health insurance by a few dollars per month. Congress has repeatedly blocked these reforms, and as a result the cost per service member for pay and benefits grew by 57% from 2001 to 2012 when adjusted for inflation and excluding war-related costs. This growth was due to a number of factors, including rising health-care costs, higher than requested pay raises, and new and expanded benefits such as Tricare for Life, a Medicare supplemental policy provided free of charge to military retirees 65 and older.
If Congress will not allow the Pentagon to change military compensation to slow this growth, it will have little choice but to cut the number of military personnel. And if compensation costs continue growing while the overall budget declines, the Pentagon will have to continue cutting people to the point where the military may be too small to protect all of our nation's global security interests.
The Pentagon also needs greater freedom to retire legacy weapons. The Air Force has said it needs to retire some older aircraft—including the A-10 ground-attack aircraft and the KC-10 aerial refueler—to fit within Congress's budget constraints. Both planes have been incredibly valuable in the past, and the A-10 in particular has proven its worth in Iraq and Afghanistan. If resources weren't constrained both aircraft would be worth keeping. But the budget is constrained, and the Air Force has determined it has other aircraft that can do the same jobs. Because the Defense Department is now more focused on countering threats in the Asian-Pacific region than preparing for major ground wars, the A-10, whose primary mission is providing close air support for ground forces, is understandably a lower priority.
Yet some members of Congress are already working to prevent the Air Force from making financially smart and strategically informed reductions. The other military services have similar issues, with Congress repeatedly blocking the Navy from retiring older ships and forcing the military to keep production lines open for legacy weapons it no longer wants to buy.
With all of these constraints layered on top of one another—not being able to close bases, reform compensation or retire legacy weapons—the Pentagon has few degrees of freedom left. If the nation wants effective and efficient government, it has to start making smart decisions. It is time for Congress to set aside politics and give the Defense Department the flexibility to do what is best for the nation, both fiscally and strategically.
Messrs. Harrison and Gunzinger are senior fellows at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments in Washington, D.C.
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Politicians Endanger Military Readiness
Although providing for the common defense is a task explicitly assigned to the federal government by the Constitution, the Department of Defense continues to suffer from the Obama regime's inability to connect ends, ways and means and implement a coherent national security strategy. In particular, our service men and women and veterans have become a favorite bill-payer for Democrats' other, unconstitutional priorities. Take for example Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) stating that maintaining various income redistribution schemes is more important to him than cost-of-living increases for veterans. That's why he isn't keen on Sen. Kelly Ayotte's (R-NH) effort to offset $6 billion for veterans by preventing illegal aliens from claiming a child tax credit.
Compounding the top line cuts, the White House and Congress ignore the Pentagon's requests and place scoring political points ahead of operational requirements, particularly when it comes to weapons procurement. From buying tanks the Army says it doesn't need to keeping planes the Air Force says it can't afford, politicians' pursuit of self interest over national interest puts strategic priorities, and ultimately our national security, at risk.
Although the demand for aircraft carriers has rarely been stronger, the politicians' re-election driven budget decisions will preclude maintaining the number recommended by most strategic analysts. As then-acting Secretary of the Air Force Eric Fanning noted, "This will entail a budget with cuts that none of us likes and each of these cuts will have a constituency both in [the Pentagon] and on Capitol Hill. If something's restored to the budget we present to the Hill, something else will have to go." Given the way Barack Obama flaunts the Constitution on domestic issues, it shouldn't come as a big surprise that he ignores the Heritage Foundations' warning that he "should remember his constitutional responsibility as commander-in-chief."
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WASHINGTON—The Pentagon has dropped a plan to retire one of its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers after the White House intervened to head off a brewing political fight.
The military had proposed an early retirement of the USS George Washington, reducing the U.S. carrier fleet to 10, as part of plan to deal with cost cuts imposed by Congress. That touched a nerve among a bipartisan group of lawmakers, who called on Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel in a letter last week to block the move and preserve what they argued is a potent symbol of American power.
The behind-the-scenes battle illustrates how politics often complicates the task of wringing savings from the U.S. military budget. Lawmakers, facing pressures from defense contractors and local communities, often oppose proposed cuts to military bases, aircraft and shipbuilding programs and weapons systems.
Last year, a strategic review by Mr. Hagel on the impact of the mandated across-the-board spending cuts found the U.S. could reduce the carrier fleet to eight or nine—still enough to equal the number of carriers operated world-wide by seven other nations.
But as the controversy began to build about taking the first step in that process, it became clear that any proposal endorsed by the White House to retire an aircraft carrier likely would have been blocked by Congress, opening Democrats to election-year criticism, officials familiar with the discussions said.
White House officials headed off the issue by telling defense officials in recent days that they would provide extra money—in effect raising the military's proposed budget—to allow the Navy to extend the life of the George Washington, commissioned on July 4, 1992. While actual spending levels are set by Congress, requests such as these from the White House generally are backed by lawmakers.
Nuclear-powered aircraft carriers can have a 50-year life span, but require midlife refueling and refurbishing that can take three to five years. The George Washington—whose flight deck is 1,092 feet long and 275 feet wide, covering 4.5 acres—is due for its midlife refueling and overhaul in 2016, at a cost of about $4.7 billion, according to Navy officials.
Defense Department officials currently are negotiating final elements of the Pentagon budget with the White House Office of Management and Budget, ahead of next month's release of the administration's budget proposal for fiscal 2015. The offer of additional money to pay for the refueling in 2016 came as part of those discussions, though it wasn't clear where White House officials planned to get the extra funds. Caitlin Hayden, the National Security Council spokeswoman, declined to comment.
The Budget Control Act of 2011, which included a provision for across-the-board spending cuts known as sequestration that went into effect last year, called for the Pentagon to cut nearly $1 trillion from its budget over a decade. Last year's budget deal reduced this year's portion of the cuts by about $30 billion, but the relentless search for military cost savings continues.
That makes the cost of maintaining and operating aircraft carriers and their sizable strike groups—consisting of support vessels and warships—a tempting target for cuts to Pentagon officials. Retiring older carriers and reducing operating costs would free up money to invest in modernized weapons and ships, officials said.
Four Washington think tanks that examined the Pentagon budget recommended reducing the size of the carrier fleet, arguing at a briefing this week that money would be better spent modernizing the U.S. submarine fleet. Both the conservative American Enterprise Institute and more liberal Center for a New American Security backed carrier reductions.
Bryan Clark, a defense analyst at the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, said it makes sense to reduce the fleet by one or two carriers and invest in new submarines or stealthy aircraft and bombers. But he said far more money could be saved by slowing procurement of new Ford-class carriers, which require fewer crew members and can launch planes more quickly, rather than retiring the George Washington 25 years early.
Current plans call for the Navy to build one of these new carriers every five years, at a cost of about $13 billion each.
The first, the USS Gerald Ford is being built in Newport News, Va., by Huntington Ingalls Industries Inc., HII +0.29% the only company building nuclear-powered carriers. Its costs have risen about 22% over original estimates. Initial work has begun on a second, the USS John F. Kennedy.
Other defense analysts believe the Pentagon should allow the overall size of the fleet to shrink through the retirement of older carriers, but continue to build more modernized carriers. "Once you break the production of carriers, you will not have a carrier industrial base," said David Berteau, a defense analyst with the nonpartisan Center for Strategic and International Studies.
The George Washington differs in one key respect from other weapons programs slated by the Pentagon for cuts but defended by Congress: Some in the Pentagon wanted to keep the George Washington in service. One military official said the carrier could have been placed into dry-dock under the original Navy proposal with the hope that Congress would ease some of the spending cuts, eventually allowing it back into service.
In Congress, carriers have fierce defenders on both sides of the political aisle—especially in Virginia, where carriers are built.
"The aircraft carrier remains the centerpiece of American sea power and is fundamental to a national security policy based on forward deployed presence and power," said Rep. Randy Forbes (R., Va.). Added Democratic Sen. Tim Kaine, also from Virginia: "A decision to go from an 11 to 10 carrier Navy would be seen by our allies and potential opponents around the globe as a kind of retrenchment that would not be helpful."
During the Reagan administration's defense buildup, the Navy grew to 15 aircraft carriers. The number of carriers was reduced to 14 in 1992 and stood at 12 between 1994 and 2007. In 2007, the number of ships was reduced to 11 with the decommissioning of the first USS John F. Kennedy.
Currently, the Navy carrier fleet technically stands at 10 ships, because the USS Enterprise was retired in 2012 and the Gerald Ford won't begin operations until next year.
Retiring the George Washington also would be expensive—about $1.2 billion. But the Navy would still have saved $3.5 billion in refueling and overhaul costs and would have saved millions more in operating costs.
According to the Navy, operating an older Nimitz-class aircraft carrier costs $402 million a year, not including its air wing or escort ships. Much of the expense, $250 million, is the cost of staffing the ships.
Some defense officials have argued that carriers aren't nearly as important as they once were. The development of antiship missiles has made aircraft carriers more vulnerable, and reduced their utility.
At the same time a new generation of big-deck amphibious ships, the America class, function much like medium-size carriers. While they can't do everything that the nuclear-powered supercarriers can do, the development of new unmanned aircraft and tilt-rotor aircraft has the promise of making the smaller ships more versatile.
"We can project power from smaller ships," said Nora Bensahel, a defense analyst at the Center for a New American Security.
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WSJ
By
Michelle Obama
connect
Feb. 9, 2014 5:57 p.m. ET
On Monday, more than 100 construction companies—many of whom are direct competitors—are coming together to announce that they plan to hire more than 100,000 veterans within the next five years. They made this commitment not just because it's the patriotic thing to do, and not just because they want to repay our veterans for their service to our country, but because these companies know that it's the smart thing to do for their businesses.
As one construction industry executive put it, "Veterans are invaluable to the construction industry. Men and women who serve in the military often have the traits that are so critical to our success: agility, discipline, integrity and the drive to get the job done right."
This is a sentiment I have heard again and again since Dr. Jill Biden and I first launched Joining Forces—a nationwide initiative to honor and support our veterans, troops and military families—in 2011. Back then, we issued a simple challenge to American businesses: Hire as many of these American heroes as you can.
Since then, we have been overwhelmed by the response. From household names like Disney, DIS +1.80% Starbucks, SBUX +1.20% UPS, Wal-Mart WMT -0.35% and the Blackstone Group BX +0.51% ; to coalitions like Veterans on Wall Street and 100K Jobs Mission; to regional businesses and mom-and-pop shops and restaurants in tiny towns, American businesses have hired nearly 400,000 veterans and military spouses.
The CEOs we've spoken to have been consistently impressed with their hires, reporting that veterans are some of the highest-skilled, hardest-working employees they've ever had. Current research supports these claims: A report from the Institute for Veterans and Military Families at Syracuse University states that veterans are resilient, adept at building and leading teams, comfortable with diversity, and able to handle uncertainty.
These traits come as no surprise given the training and experience the members of our Armed Forces get during their time in uniform. They master some of the most advanced information, medical and communications technologies in the world. They run complex operations, from distributing supplies to hundreds of locations to moving tons of equipment across the globe. They oversee dozens, even hundreds of their colleagues, inspiring servicemembers from diverse backgrounds to succeed.
Yet their qualifications aren't always obvious from their résumés. Take the example of Glenn Tussing, who currently works at Disney. Glenn is an Air Force veteran who served as chief of future joint manpower requirements. In that role, he was responsible for figuring out the exact numbers and types of troops—from the pilots, to the engineers, to the medical personnel—needed for a mission to succeed. He would then locate those troops and help send them where they needed to go.
When Disney was looking for someone to oversee the menus at Disney properties around the world, it would have been easy for them to overlook Glenn since the link between manpower planning and menu management isn't exactly intuitive. But Disney has trained its HR specialists to translate military experience into civilian qualifications. So when they were looking for someone who could determine the exact quantities and types of ingredients for every meal they served—and get that information anywhere in the world it needed to go—they knew Glenn was their guy. In fact, today at Disney, Glenn uses the same types of databases and programs he used in the military.
There are so many veterans just like him. There are medics who've saved lives on the battlefield and could save lives as EMTs in their communities. There are tank commanders who've driven armored vehicles through combat zones and are more than capable of driving semis down our highways. There are engineers, welders, technicians and others who have skills that our businesses desperately need here at home, particularly in fast-growing industries like construction and health care. And with the Iraq war over and the war in Afghanistan winding down, hundreds of thousands of these qualified veterans are returning home, hanging up their uniforms and looking for good civilian careers.
My husband's administration is working hard to connect these veterans to good jobs by creating an online veterans jobs bank; by streamlining credentialing processes so veterans can apply their military training toward civilian certifications; by providing extensive career and education counseling for veterans; by allowing veterans to use their Post 9/11 GI Bill benefits to pay for training and apprenticeship programs, and more.
And while we've made some progress on veterans' unemployment, my husband and I won't be satisfied until every single veteran in this country who wants a job has one. So in the coming years, I hope that more businesses will go the extra mile to hire veterans. To get started, businesses can turn to one of the Labor Department's 2,600 American Job Centers across the country where trained staff can provide plenty of resources and expertise.
By hiring veterans, businesses won't just be giving American heroes the chances they deserve to keep serving our country. And they won't just be giving veterans' families the security that comes with a steady paycheck. These businesses will also be ensuring that they have the qualified employees they need to keep growing and creating new jobs and strengthening our economy for decades to come. And they will be sending a clear message that we honor those who've sacrificed for us, and are determined to serve them as well as they have served our country. America's veterans deserve no less.
Mrs. Obama is the first lady of the United States.
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As I have been pushing for quite some time and as we have discussed on the Foreign Affairs thread, America lacks a sense of what our strategy is. Bush's incoherence and substantial errors in execution have been compounded by Baraq incompetence and/or anti-Americanism. People rightly doubt the competence of our government.
The cuts proposed by Hagel look to be quite terrible. Will the Reps and honorable Dems do anything about them?
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As I have been pushing for quite some time and as we have discussed on the Foreign Affairs thread, America lacks a sense of what our strategy is. Bush's incoherence and substantial errors in execution have been compounded by Baraq incompetence and/or anti-Americanism. People rightly doubt the competence of our government.
The cuts proposed by Hagel look to be quite terrible. Will the Reps and honorable Dems do anything about them?
Doubtful. Lots of high fives in Beijing right now. Australia better double down on the Americans it's recruiting for their military.
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This is a "Profile in Courage" moment for those who believe that Peace comes through Strength. Let's see who speaks up , , , and who does not.
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"The cuts proposed by Hagel look to be quite terrible."
Peace through weakness, when did that work? Hagel showing why he was chosen.
Unilateral disarmament, even if you believed in it, why wouldn't you try to get reduction commitments from your adversaries as you risk the consequences?
"This is a "Profile in Courage" moment for those who believe that Peace comes through Strength. Let's see who speaks up , , , and who does not."
Two predictions: Marco Rubio will rise up and oppose this. Rand Paul will embrace the strategy.
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RP's strategy or MR's?
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Clarifying, I hope:
Two predictions: Marco Rubio will rise up and oppose this [Obama and Hagel gutting the military]. Rand Paul will embrace [Hagel's cuts] and perhaps want to cut further.
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http://us5.campaign-archive1.com/?u=3872bad904308135ca41de823&id=284052f258&e=a2a99480ae
Obama’s Dangerous Defense Cuts
Obama’s gutting of our armed forces could make us vulnerable to the greatest
disaster for the U.S. military in half a century.
The Obama administration announced this week that it would shrink the Army to its
smallest size since before World War II. This is a dangerous decision that projects
weakness to our enemies and our friends alike.
We should not be fooled into thinking there is some great savings in this reduction.
We may cut spending by a modest amount in the short term (money which will surely be
wasted elsewhere), but we risk a long term cost that is much greater--one counted in
lives as well as in dollars.
Indeed, as Americans we know too well the cost of unpreparedness. More than 2,300
Americans died at Pearl Harbor. Another 12,000 Americans and more than 60,000
Filipinos were immediately taken prisoner in Bataan following that attack, and an
estimated 10,000 ended up dying.
We paid the price of weakness again nine years later in 1950, when 75,000 North
Koreans came barreling over the 38th parallel unexpectedly and killed tens of
thousands of South Koreans who were unprepared and poorly armed). More than 36,000
Americans lost their lives in that war.
The advocates of decline believe we cannot afford our current armed forces. But what
we really cannot afford is weakness. Our struggles in Iraq and Afghanistan proved
that the need to sustain two wars at once is not a crazy hypothetical.
For half a century, American defense policy has been based on the principle that
being strong is safer than being week.
American strength has produced a much safer and more stable world. With the
exception of the September 11 attacks (which were conducted by zealots determined to
die for their cause), the threat of overwhelming force has worked to keep Americans
safe--not to mention the hundreds of millions of people in allied countries around
the world whose safety is guaranteed by our strength.
But to be effective, the threat of deterrence must be credible. Obama's plan to cut
the Army signals American weakness virtually everywhere. Obama is setting the stage
for potential defeats on a scale America has never seen before.
And make no mistake. We will be tested. Our enemies will probe us to see what they
can get away with. Our men and women in the military will be put at risk.
President Obama’s decision to shrink the military is rooted in naiveté and a
delusion about the world--that all the big military threats disappeared with the
Soviet Union. That is wishful thinking. If anything, the world today is more chaotic
and less predictable. Today we have less understanding of the threats against us
than we did during the Cold War.
We do know that the unexpected can happen. Watch Ukraine and Russia this weekend.
Ask yourself. Do you really want America to be as weak as President Obama has
proposed? If not, call your Congressman and Senators and let them know.
Your Friend,
Newt
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Wait, I thought Obama's election guaranteed a new era of peace...
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I have no words for how cool this is:
http://www.buzzfeed.com/bennyjohnson/inside-the-armys-spectacular-hidden-treasure-room
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I have no words for how cool this is:
http://www.buzzfeed.com/bennyjohnson/inside-the-armys-spectacular-hidden-treasure-room
Very cool indeed.
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http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/dgreenfield/obama-hiring-military-chaplains-from-muslim-brotherhood-group-committed-to-grand-jihad/
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http://www.frontpagemag.com/2014/dgreenfield/obama-hiring-military-chaplains-from-muslim-brotherhood-group-committed-to-grand-jihad/
What could go wrong?
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Consider the source when reading the following
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/13/us/how-a-military-sexual-assault-case-foundered.html?emc=edit_th_20140313&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
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A long time ago I had a patient who had a daughter who was raped by a Navy-man. He threatened her not to "mess with the Navy". She was not military. He stated he sent letters all over demanding justice. He said he was taken seriously. The last time I spoke to him he said his daughter decided she couldn't go through with all the continuing psychological trauma to pursue justice and decided it was simply less stressful to just move on. He was very disappointed and felt like he failed to protect his daughter. I couldn't convince him otherwise.
Apparently there were at least some in the Navy who were willing to cover for this guy. But I don't know details beyond this.
I don't know if rape is more frequent among military personnel than the general population or if it is harder to obtain justice when it occurs.
I don't think it wrong for the civilian justice system to at least review what is going on though I would prefer they fix any problems within the military system then let the politicians make political fodder for this.
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Bottom line, if in the case covered by the slimes, if your victim loses credibility, your case is done.
In the case CCP mentioned, if the victim isn't interested in going through the lengthy and traumatic legal process, nothing can be done.
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http://www.oafnation.com/the-op/2014/3/17/women-in-the-infantry-a-common-sense-analysis
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http://pjmedia.com/tatler/2014/03/24/obama-moves-to-kill-tomahawk-hellfire-missiles/
Also see NATO's military decline:
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303802104579449571957045910?mod=Opinion_newsreel_1
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If obama was trying to destroy us, what would he be doing differently?
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Don't Slay the 'Dragon Lady'
The U-2 spy plane has unparalleled capabilities, but it's endangered by Pentagon cost-cutting.
By Michael Auslin
April 28, 2014 7:03 p.m. ET
Congress this week may kill one of America's most iconic, and still vital, airplanes. First introduced in the mid-1950s, the U-2 high-altitude intelligence-gathering plane has played a pivotal role since the Cold War. Now, it is on the chopping block, slated to become another casualty in Washington's defense-budget Kabuki. Recent congressional testimony and number-crunching make the case that Congress should preserve the U-2, and with it America's continuing dominance of aerial reconnaissance.
The U-2 has survived nearly six decades of service. Designed by legendary Lockheed LMT +0.17% engineer Clarence " Kelly " Johnson —who founded the company's equally legendary "Skunk Works" advanced aircraft-development division—the first U-2s were delivered by Lockheed in July 1955, just eight months after the final approval of the project.
The technological feat of creating a single-engine glider-like aircraft that could fly at 70,000 feet, nearly half-again as high as any existing airplane, remains one of the most impressive accomplishments in U.S. aeronautical engineering. Today's budget hawks, however, would be even more impressed to know that Lockheed delivered the original batch of U-2s for 15% less than the agreed-upon price of $22.5 million for the first 20 planes.
Operated by the CIA, the U-2 flew with impunity over the Soviet Union and China until May 1, 1960, when on the very last planned overflight of the U.S.S.R. Francis Gary Powers was shot down and captured, provoking a crisis in U.S.-Soviet relations. Two years later, Air Force Maj. Rudolph Anderson was shot down and killed over Cuba during the missile crisis.
While it easily could have become obsolete in an era of spy satellites, the U-2 over the decades has evolved to remain one of the most precise intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance platforms in the U.S. arsenal. Now operated by the Air Force, the 27 operational U-2s maintain unparalleled cameras and optical sensors. The Air Force has also modernized the U-2's electronic-warfare capabilities and data links since 2001, as well as other imagery systems. Its airframe is expected to be usable until 2040. The "Dragon Lady," as it is nicknamed, is able to reach transcontinental targets on short notice, unlike satellites, which is why it remains a favorite of the intelligence service and combatant commanders alike.
In the current round of budget cuts, the Air Force initially favored keeping the U-2 and instead retiring 18 of its mid-level RQ-4 Global Hawks, given that those highly touted drones did not have as powerful an optical sensor, cost more than the U-2 to fly, and cannot be flown in adverse weather. This year, however, under congressional pressure, the Air Force did an about-face, offering up all the U-2s in exchange for upgrading the Global Hawks.
It is time to go back to the original plan. From a strategic perspective, the U-2 wins out over Global Hawk. The Dragon Lady still can fly at least 10,000 feet higher than the drone and maintains superior cameras and optical systems. That is why Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, commander of U.S. Forces Korea, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month that the U-2 provides better early warning of a potential North Korean threat. So if it is a matter of avoiding strategic surprise during tense crisis situations, such as in Ukraine or North Korea, the U-2 comes out on top.
What about cost savings? It will take at least $1.77 billion over 10 years, under current plans, to convert all the Global Hawks to carrying current U-2 sensors. Since the cost savings of mothballing the U-2 fleet is estimated at $2.2 billion, that's a savings of only $430 million.
The Global Hawk's base flying cost may have come down and it may be able to fly longer than the U-2, but it cannot fly better. If Ukraine has reinforced any lesson, it is to be as prepared as possible to mitigate risk around the globe and avoid surprise. Undoubtedly, one day the U-2 will no longer be able to do its mission better than remotely piloted drones. But that day is not here yet, and it is more cost effective and operationally wise to use the best airplane for the job.
Mr. Auslin is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C., and a columnist for WSJ.com.
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Long, detailed article. Read it all.
Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/five-chinese-weapons-war-america-should-fear-10388
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DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile
The most dangerous weapon to U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region is the Dong Feng-21D anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). Somewhat prematurely dubbed “the Carrier Killer”, the DF-21D is a medium-range ballistic missile specifically designed to attack American aircraft carriers, skirting the defenses of a U.S. naval task force to attack ships from above at hypersonic speeds.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/recentreports/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=40962&tx_ttnews[backPid]=63&cHash=58a1431157b7cdaf1fa05e53957cbcf7#.U2uc3VOJVld
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Chengdu J-20 Fighter
China’s first fifth-generation fighter, the J-20 is a large, twin-engine aircraft currently in the demonstrator phase. The J-20’s mission set is unknown, but the aircraft’s robust design seems to support it going in a number of different directions. The aircraft promises to be long-range, fast- and low-observable—if not outright stealthy. China has built three prototypes, the latest flew in early March 2014. The aircraft is projected to enter service some time around 2020.
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Anti-Satellite Weaponry
For decades, American space-based military assets have given U.S. forces a considerable advantage on the battlefield. Satellites are essential to the American way of war. This is especially true in the Asia-Pacific, where distances from the continental United States are measured in thousands of miles. China has at least an operational weapon, the SC-19. A derivative of the DF-21, the SC-19 ballistic missile is equipped with the KT-2 (a kinetic kill vehicle). Launched into space, the KT-2 is guided to target by infrared sensors. The KT-2 does not have an explosive warhead but destroys enemy satellites by colliding with them. ...
Chinese ASAT weapons could target a variety of American satellites, including intelligence collection, communications, and navigation satellites. The loss of such satellites would make it difficult to perform reconnaissance missions over China. It would also interfere with air, land and sea navigation, slow communications, and prevent the use of GPS-guided weapons.
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Type 071 Landing Platform Dock
Power projection is becoming increasingly important to China, particularly to enforce territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. China’s ability to land amphibious troops on some island chains such as the Senkaku, Paracel and Spratly islands could embolden the leadership to do exactly that.
China has three amphibious assault ships of the Type 071 class, Kunlunshan, Jinggangshan and Changbaishan. The three ships are what western naval observers would call China’s “Gator Navy”: ships designed to transport and land marines on hostile shores. Three more Type 071s are expected, as well as six amphibious ships with full-length flight decks like the American Wasp-class.
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Offensive Cyber Operations
The People’s Liberation Army believes establishing “electronic dominance” early on is critical to their success in a future conflict. Of the five Chinese weapons that America fears the most, the most enigmatic is China’s ability to mount offensive cyber operations.
(Much more at link)
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Also from National Interest, and may be of interest here:
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/bad-move-further-nato-expansion-10350
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With the recent announcement of the new multibillion dollar Presidential helicopter program the question remains will it even remain within the budget. Answer is almost certainly no.
http://gizmodo.com/5637188/is-this-the-reason-why-most-military-projects-go-over-budget/all
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BD's post on NATO expansion raises important questions. Let's discuss in US-Russia or Russia-Europe or US Foreign Policy thread
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/13/ctrl_alt_delete_how_to_redesign_the_military_from_scratch
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http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/chinese-special-forces-take-1st-2nd-and-4th-place-%E2%80%9Colympics%E2%80%9D-elite?src=SOC&dom=fb
From the article:
Since 2010, Chinese delegations have rocketed to the top of international special operations, police and military sniper competitions, benefiting from increased training and better weapons. It is important to note, however, that many top special operations units were not present at this training competition (including notable US and Russian forces presently active on operations) and that the kind of skills tested in the Warrior Competition form only part of special operations and counterterrorism capabilities.
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http://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eastern-arsenal/chinese-special-forces-take-1st-2nd-and-4th-place-%E2%80%9Colympics%E2%80%9D-elite?src=SOC&dom=fb
From the article:
Since 2010, Chinese delegations have rocketed to the top of international special operations, police and military sniper competitions, benefiting from increased training and better weapons. It is important to note, however, that many top special operations units were not present at this training competition (including notable US and Russian forces presently active on operations) and that the kind of skills tested in the Warrior Competition form only part of special operations and counterterrorism capabilities.
This is not good news for Taiwan. It's anticipated that special ops will play a big role in China's move to end it's independence.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/magazine/can-general-linders-special-operations-forces-stop-the-next-terrorist-threat.html?&_r=0
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I don't see a precise answer here, but an interesting question:
http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140612/NEWS08/306120062/How-did-800-ISIS-fighters-rout-2-Iraqi-divisions-
How did 800 ISIS fighters rout 2 Iraqi divisions?
Jun. 12, 2014
An image from a video posted by a group supporting the al-Qaida breakaway Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has been verified and is consistent with other AP reporting, shows a militant in front of a burning Iraqi army Humvee in Tikrit, Iraq. (The Associated Press)
By Andrew Tilghman and Jeff Schogol
=
But the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, apparently has routed an estimated 30,000 Iraqi Army soldiers who were trained by the U.S. military and given billions in sophisticated American military equipment.
The stunning outcome reflects widespread desertions among the Iraqi units in the north as well as the Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions that underlie the military battles, experts say.
“It’s a relativity small force that managed to take the city [of Mosul], and it’s shocking that they were able to do that,” said Charlie Cooper, who studies Islamic extremism for the Quilliam Foundation in London.
“To me, that suggests there is collusion or at least deliberate capitulation on the part of Sunni tribes in western and northern Iraq,” Cooper said. “It’s likely that this happened because Sunni tribes in the area let it happen.”
Check this ISIS slideshow. Contains pics of US made military material taken from #Iraq army: http://t.co/zng3UAKRCY pic.twitter.com/w15NFrBrg6
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/4/china-invests-in-nuclear-submarines/
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http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/digging-our-own-grave-the-results-of-ct-coin-and-regime-change
From the article:
In the 1990s, the US Department of Defence pioneered the theory of warfare that came to be called network-centric warfare. This involves taking advantage of the innovations taking place in information communication technology within the sphere of military operations. Publications, such as, Understanding Information Age Warfare by David Alberts and others (2001) outline the basic tenets of the theory, of which there are four. 1) Thoroughly networked force improves information sharing; 2) by sharing information, shared situational awareness and the quality of information is enhanced; the effects of shared situational awareness includes enabling collaboration and self-synchronisation, bettering sustainability and speed of command; which greatly improve mission effectiveness.
...
Although these forms of warfare theory have been developed in the West, they seem to have been co-opted by the radical Islamist insurgent and terrorist movements. The current style of prosecuting war seems to be more in line with third generation warfare principles, where information plays a supporting role to military operations.
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I don't see a precise answer here, but an interesting question:
http://www.militarytimes.com/article/20140612/NEWS08/306120062/How-did-800-ISIS-fighters-rout-2-Iraqi-divisions-
How did 800 ISIS fighters rout 2 Iraqi divisions?
Jun. 12, 2014
An image from a video posted by a group supporting the al-Qaida breakaway Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), which has been verified and is consistent with other AP reporting, shows a militant in front of a burning Iraqi army Humvee in Tikrit, Iraq. (The Associated Press)
By Andrew Tilghman and Jeff Schogol
=
But the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, apparently has routed an estimated 30,000 Iraqi Army soldiers who were trained by the U.S. military and given billions in sophisticated American military equipment.
The stunning outcome reflects widespread desertions among the Iraqi units in the north as well as the Sunni-Shiite sectarian tensions that underlie the military battles, experts say.
“It’s a relativity small force that managed to take the city [of Mosul], and it’s shocking that they were able to do that,” said Charlie Cooper, who studies Islamic extremism for the Quilliam Foundation in London.
“To me, that suggests there is collusion or at least deliberate capitulation on the part of Sunni tribes in western and northern Iraq,” Cooper said. “It’s likely that this happened because Sunni tribes in the area let it happen.”
Check this ISIS slideshow. Contains pics of US made military material taken from #Iraq army: http://t.co/zng3UAKRCY pic.twitter.com/w15NFrBrg6
There was a soap opera when I was a kid. They called it "As The World Turns." Never been much on soap operas, but I wouldn't mind watching one called "As The World Burns." It has a little more zest and fervor. Training the Iraqi military, so they can have their asses handed to them... a bit reminiscent of what happened with the USSR, Mujahideen and CIA and company... better to just stay out of it and let it implode.
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http://armymagazine.org/2014/08/14/8-unique-values-why-america-needs-the-army/
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or the Lusitania it will be remember Foley?
What till it is fully mature and then come out all over the airwaves that this is something the world has never seen. I guess the General has to get out in front of his (and Obama's) blunders:
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/americas-top-military-officer-explained-141448358.html
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http://www.radioislam.org/islam/english/jewishp/greece/greece_helped_israel.htm
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Remarks from former SMA Preston to US Congress. It is amazing when you really consider the applicant pool.
"statistics from the U.S. Army Recruiting Command – in the 17-24 age male category, only 3 out 10 young men are qualified to join the Army. Three out of 10.
What is wrong with the other seven? Four do not have the education qualifications – a high school diploma, or a GED equivalent – or score so low on the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery test, the entrance exam for the Armed Forces they cannot join the team. Two are physically or morally unqualified, they have a disqualifying physical limitation or have disqualifying law violations. And one is in the ‘all others’ category – in prison, etc.
Of the three that are qualified, 1.5 will go to college. So as an Army, we are competing for the other 1.5 with corporate America and with the other services, a population of about 2 to 3.5 million young men.
Despite all of the challenges, the active component achieved its mission of 80,000, the Army Reserve ended the year at 99.5%, a few points short of their mission of 25,500, but exceeded last years numbers by almost 6-thousand. The Army National Guard made 98.6% of their mission of 70,000 and exceeded last years enlistments by almost 19-thousand. Those are incredible numbers for an Army"
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Israel and the US Missile Defense Agency tested an improved Arrow 2 anti-ballistic missile at an Israeli test range over the Mediterranean Sea Tuesday, the Defense Ministry said in a statement. “An Arrow 2 missile was launched and performed its flight sequence as planned. The results are being analyzed by program engineers,” the statement read. Defense Ministry spokesperson Jonathan Mosery said that the Arrow 2 system, which has been operational for years and is intended for use against long-range threats, “like Iron Dome, undergoes ongoing improvements” to software and hardware and other components. Israel is in the process of developing a five-tiered system of air defense, offering protection against projectiles ranging from mortars to ballistic weapons.
Watch Here
Of the two operational systems, only Iron Dome has been used in combat. Defending against short-to-mid-range rockets, it intercepted roughly 90 percent of its targeted projectiles during Operation Protective Edge, according to figures released by the army. The other three systems – Iron Beam, David’s Sling, and Arrow 3 – are expected to become operational within the coming two years. The Arrow 2 was rolled out in March 2000. “This is a great day for the Air Defense Forces, for the Air Force, the defense establishment and, I would say, for the State of Israel,” Maj. Gen. Eitan Ben Eliyahu said at the time. He called the Arrow 2 “the only weapon system of its kind in the entire world,” adding that Israel is the first country to “succeed in developing, building and operating a defense system against ballistic missiles.” Tuesday’s test, the Defense Ministry said, has no bearing “on the Israeli operational systems’ capability to cope with the existing threats in the region” and is merely “intended to counter future threats.” The Arrow 3, still incomplete, is designed to intercept missiles at a higher altitude, in space and above the earth’s atmosphere, minimizing the threat of fallout from weapons of mass destruction and increasing the likelihood of a successful interception of incoming missiles.
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The ISIS Way Of War Is One We Know Well
Like Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam and Mao in Korea, the enemy is brutal, elusive and armed with good-enough weapons.
By Robert H. Scales
WSJ
Sept. 14, 2014 5:06 p.m. ET
The images are frightening and the consequences dispiriting as the Islamic State rapes, tortures and murders its way across Syria and Iraq in some twisted version of black-clad blitzkrieg. President Obama was clearly caught off guard by this unexpectedly horrific enemy. Now he is trying to conduct a war against the Islamic State, or ISIS, by striking the terrorists with air power and seeking regional allies to do the dying for us.
Sadly, ISIS is the latest example of a behavior in wars against Western powers that has proven remarkably consistent regardless of region, intensity or level of conflict. From Mao in Korea to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam to Saddam Hussein and now Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in Iraq, all act in fundamentally the same predictable manner.
The strategic ambitions of all our enemies have been the same. They have sought to exclude the West from interfering in their regional ambitions and have aimed to confront Western militaries below the nuclear threshold.
Enlarge Image
An image grab taken from a video released by the Islamic State (IS) and identified by private terrorism monitor SITE Intelligence Group on September 13, 2014 Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Their methods are much the same as well, often killing more for the psychological effect than military advantage. Western armies go into villages to win hearts and minds. ISIS storms villages intent on killing—local leaders, teachers, captured government officials and soldiers, the unbelievers, anyone who would oppose their ideological or religious ambitions. It's a method that has been used by guerrillas the world over for decades; the ISIS terrorists just seem more fanatical and better at it. They also murder Americans and amplify the acts on social media, hoping that the sight of our dead will wear us down and diminish our willingness to fight.
ISIS and other terrorists know that Western militaries fight short wars well and long wars poorly. Thus they employ a patient method of fighting that engages only when the odds are in their favor. When it goes badly, they look to any well-meaning international body to interfere long enough to regenerate their forces and return to the fight.
Seventy years of experience has taught them the folly of fighting using Western ways. Instead, they have adapted a way of war that avoids the killing effects of Western technology and firepower. They "spot" us control of the air, sea and space. They disperse, hide, dig in and go to ground. They seek shelter among the innocents and amplify any Western transgression with cameras thrust into the dead faces of women and children.
They fight with secondhand technology that's good enough. The Chinese and North Vietnamese did most of their killing with mortars and automatic rifles. Hezbollah and Hamas, in various clashes with Israel, have knocked out Israeli tanks with simple handheld anti-tank missiles. Command and control is by cell phone and courier. Americans died by the hundreds in Iraq and Afghanistan from the crude technology of shells and explosives buried along roads and trails.
A worrisome survey of contemporary history reveals that the enemy's strategies and tactics are both consistent and effective—and getting better. It will take more than a few bloody beheadings before we see American "boots on the ground" again. Secretary of State John Kerry said Wednesday that no U.S. combat troops would be deployed to Iraq "unless, obviously, something very, very dramatic changes." ISIS has already begun to disperse and dig in to obviate the effects of airstrikes. They will continue to brutalize the region and eventually threaten the American homeland. And, as always, ultimately we will confront them.
The enemy knows that while we may have the most sophisticated military in the world, it is a military that remains ill-suited to defeat them. The truth is that missiles, ships and planes are mostly irrelevant when not used against a traditional military foe. It was true in Vietnam, and in Afghanistan.
This kind of enemy truly fears us only when we meet them on their ground, with the will and conviction to kill them in large numbers.
Some day the brutality and successes of ISIS in Iraq and Syria will demand that we meet them on the ground; no other force in the region, and none likely to be convened, will have the capacity to vanquish them, even with U.S. air support.
When we do, the responsibility for defeating this foe will rest exactly where it has in the past: On the shoulders of men and women who are willing to kill in close. We have too few of them, and they are getting scarcer by the day. If the past is prologue—and I believe it is—then a combat force consisting of less than 4% of those in uniform and costing less than 2% of the national budget will be asked to do the job again. I suspect that the outcome, again, will be problematic.
Maj. Gen. Scales retired from active duty in 2000 as commandant of the Army War College.
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Excellent article. Unfortunately, just as with the Soviet/Afghani war, the best way to counter high tech, is low tech, and to the great disadvantage of any major power, they have governments (and the public behind them), that lack the stomach to win, - in this case, eradicate someone from existence due to the school of thought that is instilled since birth.
Barring that, there is no winning this war because the cost of failure in the afterlife, outweighs that of any earthly suffering.
I do disagree with one point presented. Western powers have never fought these wars in their own land, and while a ground force would certainly win any foreign conflict, one fought daily in one's own streets, with one's own family members being the casulties, that is something that I can't remember happening in any western country, barring Mexico's northern border, south to Bolivia. It changes the way things are done is a persistent problem.
The best strategy perhaps would be to remove all western presence from their countries, allow the crushing weight of their own economic failures to drown them into a state of reasonableness, and answer any aggression on western soil with complete annihilation, letting them know that in advance.
My two cents.
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We Don’t Need to Ally with Terrorists to Defeat ISIS
Posted By Daniel Greenfield On September 26, 2014 @ frontpagemag.com
The big foreign policy debate now is whether we should ally with Sunni or Shiite Jihadists to defeat ISIS.
The pro-Iranian camp wants us to coordinate with Iran and Assad. The pro-Saudi camp wants us to arm the Free Syrian Army and its assorted Jihadists to overthrow Assad.
Both sides are not only wrong, they are traitors.
Iran and the Sunni Gulfies are leading sponsors of international terrorism that has killed Americans. Picking either side means siding with the terrorists.
It makes no sense to join with Islamic terrorists to defeat Islamic terrorists. Both Sunni and Shiite Jihadists are our enemies. And this is not even a “the enemy of my enemy” scenario because despite their mutual hatred for each other, they hate us even more.
The 1998 indictment of bin Laden accused him of allying with Iran. (Not to mention Iraq, long before such claims could be blamed on Dick Cheney.) The 9/11 Commission documented that Al Qaeda terrorists, including the 9/11 hijackers, freely moved through Iran. Testimony by one of bin Laden’s lieutenants showed that he had met with a top Hezbollah terrorist. Court findings concluded that Iran was liable for Al Qaeda’s bombing of US embassies. Al Qaeda terrorists were trained by Hezbollah.
While Shiite and Sunni Jihadists may be deadly enemies to each other, they have more in common with each other than they do with us. Our relationship to them is not that of “the enemy of my enemy is my friend.” That’s their relationship to each other when it comes to us. In these scenarios we are the enemy.
The pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian factions in our foreign policy complex agree that we have to help one side win in Syria. They’re wrong. We have no interest in helping either side win because whether the Sunnis or Shiites win, Syria will remain a state sponsor of terror.
It’s only a question of whether it will be Shiite or Sunni terror.
Our interest is in not allowing Al Qaeda, or any of its subgroups, to control Syria or Iraq because it has a history of carrying out devastating attacks against the United States. We don’t, however, need to ally with either side to accomplish that. We can back the Kurds and the Iraqi government (despite its own problematic ties) in their push against ISIS in Iraq and use strategic strikes to hit ISIS concentrations in Syria. We should not, however, ally, arm or coordinate strikes with either side in the Syrian Civil War.
Both the pro-Saudi and pro-Iranian sides insist that ISIS can’t be defeated without stabilizing Syria. But it doesn’t appear that Syria can be stabilized without either genocide or partition. Its conflict is not based on resistance to a dictator as the Arab Springers have falsely claimed, but on religious differences.
Helping one side commit genocide against the other is an ugly project, but that would be the outcome of allying with either side.
Stabilizing Syria is a myth. The advocates of the FSA claimed that helping the Libyan Jihadists win would stabilize Libya. Instead the country is on fire as Jihadists continue to fight it out in its major cities.
Even if the FSA existed as an actual fighting force, which it doesn’t, even if it could win, which it can’t, there is every reason to believe that Syria would be worse than Libya and an even bigger playground for ISIS. The FSA enthusiasts were wrong in Egypt and Libya and everywhere else. They have no credibility.
The pro-Iranians claim that helping the Syrian government will subdue ISIS, but Assad hasn’t been able to defeat the Sunni Jihadists even with Russian help. The Syrian army and its Hezbollah allies are still struggling despite having an air force, heavy artillery and WMDs. Not only shouldn’t we be allying with Shiite terrorists who have killed plenty of Americans over the years, but it would be extremely stupid to ally with incompetent terrorists. Allying with the FSA or Assad makes as much sense as allying with ISIS.
The difference is that ISIS at least seems to be able to win battles.
Some pro-Iranian wonks claim that if we don’t get Assad’s approval for air strikes, he will shoot down Americans planes. That’s about as likely as Saddam Hussein returning from the dead to audition for American Idol. Assad didn’t even dare shoot down Israeli planes who were buzzing his palace. The odds of him picking a fight with the United States Air Force are somewhere between zero, nil and zilch.
We don’t need Assad’s permission to hit ISIS targets in Syria and, in one of the few things that this administration is doing right, we aren’t asking for it. Unless Assad experiences a bout of severe mental illness, he isn’t going to fight us for the privilege of losing to ISIS. Not even Saddam was that crazy.
The big potential problem in this war is mission creep. That’s why we should avoid committing to any overarching objectives such as stabilizing Syria. Unfortunately that is exactly what Obama has done.
It’s not our job to stabilize Syria and short of dividing it into a couple of majority states in which the Sunni and Shiite Arabs, the Kurds, the Christians and maybe even the Turkmen get their own countries, it’s not a feasible project. We have the equipment and power to pound ISIS into the dirt when its forces concentrate in any area. We can send drones to target their leaders. If Assad or the FSA want to provide us with intel, we can use it as long as we don’t begin working to help them fulfill their own objectives.
We need to remember that we are not there for the Syrians or Iraqis; we’re there for ourselves.
After September 11 we learned the hard way the costs of letting enemy terrorists set up enclaves and bases. But we also learned the hard way the costs of trying to stabilize unstable Muslim countries.
Al Qaeda, in its various forms, will always find sanctuaries and conflicts because the Muslim world is unstable and widely supportive of terrorism. For now this is a low intensity conflict that denies the next bin Laden the territory, time and manpower to stage the next September 11. We can do this cheaply and with few casualties if we keep this goal in mind.
This isn’t nation building. It’s not the fight for democracy. All we’re doing is terrorizing the terrorists by using our superior reach and firepower to smash their sandcastle emirates anywhere they pop up.
Allying with terrorists to defeat terrorists is counterproductive. The Muslim world will always have its Jihadists, at least until we make a serious effort to break them which we won’t be doing any time soon. But we can at least stop making the problem worse by arming and training our own enemies.
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The War on Military Readiness
Having taken away the option of “boots on the ground” to eradicate the murderous cutthroats of the Islamic State -- yet placing 3,000 U.S. troops in harm's way to fight Ebola in Liberia -- Barack Obama reluctantly gave the go-ahead to a series of airstrikes and missile assaults on ISIL targets in Iraq and Syria, with "coalition" forces deploying aircraft, drones and dozens of Tomahawk missiles.
Despite the presence of coalition members Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Jordan and the United Arab Emirates, with Qatar “in a supporting role,” the vast majority of the armaments and strikes were provided and conducted by American forces. Moreover, the 47 Tomahawk missiles used in initial strikes comprised almost half the number Obama was planning on acquiring next year. In fact, he wants to eliminate that program by 2016. With our current stockpile of Tomahawks, we could maintain the current pace of strikes for only a matter of weeks, since Obama wasn't planning to replace them. The Pentagon estimates our efforts in Iraq and Syria will cost between $7 million and $10 million per day.
Beyond that, officials at the Pentagon concede that wiping out ISIL could take a while. Lt. Gen. Bill Mayville called recent airstrikes “only the beginning” and warned that, to be successful, the operation would have a timeline “in terms of years.” One airstrike may bump up those all-important approval numbers and help Democrat senators in the polls. Yet to actually do long-term damage would require more diligence than Obama has exhibited thus far in the Long War.
Indeed, "in terms of years" is a far cry from “shifting away from a perpetual war footing” as Obama proclaimed to the UN last year. Having killed Osama bin Laden and "decimated" al-Qaida, Obama foolishly figured he could simply remove American forces and cede our influence in that volatile region of the world.
Given that thought process, it's no surprise Obama's latest defense budget signals a further retreat from military readiness at less than $500 billion, with corresponding manpower limits reducing the size of our military. According to Wall Street Journal foreign-affairs columnist Bret Stephens, "By 2017, the U.S. military will be an increasingly hollow force, with the Army as small as it was in 1940, before conscription; a Navy the size it was in 1917, before our entry into World War I; an Air Force flying the oldest -- and smallest -- fleet of planes in its history; and a nuclear arsenal no larger than it was during the Truman administration." That's not the sort of military that would suggest we're ready for a prolonged fight against radical and resolute Islamist forces.
It's worth asking a few questions: If our various coalition members were truly willing to eradicate ISIL, why did they not come together to do the job themselves? Those five allies who helped with this mission, along with France, certainly signed on knowing it was America's fight, however reluctantly, to wipe out Islamist terror cells acting under the banner they call the Islamic State. So when -- or if -- we decide ground troops are necessary, will they lend a hand in that respect? Furthermore, can we really trust these Islamic allies? A favorite tactic of Islamist terrorists is the “blue-on-green” attack such as the one that killed Maj. Gen. Harold J. Greene in Afghanistan recently. So who's to say ISIL operatives won't try to likewise infiltrate our allied forces?
We've spent years arguing that the Long War will indeed take years. If Obama finally comes to that realization as well, that's a good thing. But he's also making drastic cuts to our military while at the same time deploying our forces for such things as a humanitarian mission (read: campaign distraction) against an Ebola outbreak in Africa. It's high time Obama began taking the job of commander in chief seriously.
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The Obama-Military Divide
What should senior officers do if experience tells them that the president's plan to defeat ISIS is unworkable without U.S. combat troops?
By
Seth Cropsey
Sept. 29, 2014
In President Obama's "60 Minutes" interview on Sunday, he reiterated his vow not to involve U.S. combat troops in the fight against Islamic State jihadists. He would avoid "the mistake of simply sending U.S. troops back" into Iraq, Mr. Obama said, noting that "there's a difference between them advising and assisting Iraqis who are fighting versus a situation in which we got our Marines and our soldiers out there taking shots and shooting back."
Yet many Americans are skeptical, judging by the new NBC/Wall Street Journal/Annenberg poll showing that 72% of registered voters believe that U.S. troops will eventually be deployed. Perhaps Americans have been listening to some of the president's senior military advisers and several retired senior officers and have decided that their expert opinions sound more realistic.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey told the Senate Armed Services Committee on Sept. 16 that if necessary he would recommend that the president order U.S. military advisers to "accompany Iraq troops on attacks" against Islamic State, also known as ISIS. A day later Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno said that "you've got to have ground forces that are capable of going in and rooting [ISIS] out." Gen. Odierno did not specify that the ground forces needed to be American, but he said an air campaign alone cannot defeat the jihadists occupying large parts of Iraq and Syria.
Retired senior officers speak with greater candor. James Mattis, the retired Marine general and former commander of the U.S. Central Command, told the House Intelligence Committee on Sept. 18 that it would be a mistake to rule out U.S. ground forces against ISIS. A couple of days earlier, retired Army Gen. Dan McNeill, who commanded coalition forces in Afghanistan, said in a TV interview that ground troops will be needed to defeat ISIS. If the jihadists' threat "is as serious as some people say," the general asked, "then why aren't we applying all elements of American power to it?"
ENLARGE
Getty Images/iStockphoto
Then there is Gen. Lloyd Austin, who leads Central Command and is thus the senior commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East. Gen. Dempsey told Congress in his Sept. 16 testimony that Gen. Austin recommended committing U.S. special-operations forces to the fight against ISIS. Special-operations forces could reconnoiter and identify targets, assist aircraft that deliver ordnance on targets, kill enemy commanders and, most important, by their very presence stiffen the spine of coalition partners who might agree to send ground forces. President Obama rejected this recommendation.
It is clear that these active and retired senior officers are as doubtful about the U.S.'s ability to achieve its war aims from the air as they are convinced that ground forces—and if necessary, U.S. ground forces—will be needed either to spearhead or assume major responsibility for defeating ISIS.
The political landscape is cleared for a contest between the president's pledge not to use combat troops and the military's professional opinion that defeating the enemy requires the use of well-trained and -equipped and disciplined forces on the ground. The president will win. According to the Constitution he should. There is no question about this.
But what should an officer do who knows from years of training and combat experience that the coalition the president is assembling cannot accomplish its goals without U.S. combat troops? Does the officer swallow his reservations?
Lacking an American ground presence, a U.S. pilot forced to eject by a mechanical failure or ground fire would have to wait hours to be rescued. Do senior U.S. military officers banish the thought of what would happen were ISIS to capture a female American pilot who landed safely after ejecting over enemy-held territory?
ISIS possesses man-portable air-defense systems, or manpads. They can hit planes that provide close air support—for instance, planes flying below 10,000 feet in a pilot-rescue operation. Search-and-rescue is difficult enough when the distance between downed pilot and help is small. When a helicopter must fly hundreds of miles to the rescue—the current situation—the chances of success rapidly diminish.
Will the administration admit a mistake if it realizes that U.S. ground troops are necessary? Or will the White House blame the military for insufficient warning, as the president blamed the intelligence community on "60 Minutes" for insufficient warning about ISIS? Senior officers face the possibility of being blamed for not having recommended what they in fact have.
President Obama may not like it, but those who spoke after 9/11 about a "long war" against Islamic jihadists got it right. The killing of Osama bin Laden ended neither al Qaeda nor its metastasizing into other terrorist groups. The terrorists will not emerge into formations on plains where they can be destroyed from the air. Rather, as in Gaza, they will hide in houses, hospitals, workshops and schools in the cities and towns that ISIS occupies. Attacking the enemy from the air is useful, but it won't succeed without ground forces that can take and hold contested positions.
Senior officers must accept their commander in chief's judgment and carry out orders. But they and like-minded advisers have another option: resigning. Not to embarrass the administration or cause a constitutional crisis, but to indicate the gravity of the ISIS threat. Until stopped, ISIS or its collaborators are likely to mount an attack against the U.S. homeland with the aim of equaling or surpassing al Qaeda's 9/11 success. A military commander's resignation, accompanied by a clear and respectful explanation, would prompt a needed debate over U.S. strategy to achieve the president's goal "to degrade and ultimately destroy" ISIS.
Resigning on principle is not a strong tradition in the U.S. military. The so-called Revolt of the Admirals in the late 1940s began with the resignation of Navy Secretary John L. Sullivan following Defense Secretary Louis Johnson's cancellation of the carrier U.S.S. United States. The argument over the carrier was a dispute over budget cuts and the combat roles of the Navy and Air Force. And the naval officers whose careers ended in the wake of Sullivan's principled resignation did not jump. They were pushed. But the Truman administration's defense cuts came with a price that was realized when the president learned that reductions in naval power prevented an effective blockade of North Korea.
Politics is, by human nature and design, complex and messy. It exists in the military no less than in other large organizations. But the stakes are particularly high where the nation's security is at risk—as it now is. Clarity of purpose is essential and where it is lacking—as in how to defeat ISIS—senior military officers can make an important difference with their actions.
Mr. Cropsey is director of the Center for American Seapower at the Hudson Institute, where he is a senior fellow. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy in the Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations.
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The U.S. Military Improves Its Crisis Response Capabilities
Analysis
October 14, 2014 | 0422 Print Text Size
The U.S. Military Improves Its Crisis Response Capabilities
Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response soldiers load into a MV-22 Osprey during a joint training mission with the French military in 2014. (PASCAL GUYOT/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
The United States is proceeding with the establishment of another Special-Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response (SP-MAGTF) unit in Kuwait to support operations in the U.S. Central Command's area of responsibility, which spans the Middle East and Central Asia. SP-MAGTF units were originally created as a response to the 2012 attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, which resulted in the deaths of U.S. Ambassador Christopher Stevens and three other U.S. citizens. An additional unit will cover the U.S. Southern Command in the future.
Analysis
Normally, U.S. Marine Expeditionary Units embarked on amphibious ships would be charged with responding to attacks like the one on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, but they are not always available or located at the right place at the right time. The 2012 attack exposed this lack of coverage and revealed the need for a pre-positioned and mobile response force that could rapidly deploy during crisis situations.
To address this gap, the U.S. Marines created flexible SP-MAGTF units that are land-based but air-deployable and able to support U.S. interests ranging from embassy reinforcement to disaster relief. The first of these units was set up in Spain and is principally geared towards supporting crisis situations in Africa. The unit, which began its deployment in 2013, has reached a full operational capability of about 1,400 Marines. It can deploy two crisis response teams with MV-22 Osprey aircraft and support them with combat aviation units.
As U.S. Marine Gen. John Paxton highlighted in an Oct. 1 discussion at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the SP-MAGTF units are "sub-optimal" when compared to an entire Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is supported by amphibious vessels. While Marine Expeditionary Units are more capable and robust, they must commit a fixed amount of power to a specific area. These units are also limited by the speed of their ships and the range of their supporting aircraft, which constrains unit mobility and makes it difficult for a commander to prepare for an array of potential threats throughout the world. They must prioritize and commit the limited number of Marine Expeditionary Units deployed to a few specific regions, which hardly covers the full geographic spectrum of threats.
This is where the SP-MAGTF concept steps in and fills the coverage gap. The units are land-based and can be broken up and parceled out as needed. More important, they can be pre-positioned to numerous places within the command theater in response to potential threats. Elements of the U.S. Africa Command units have been temporarily stationed out of Sicily because of ongoing unrest in North Africa, predominantly in Libya. The move only requires 200 Marines to serve as a tailored response force, making the element more versatile. It is combat capable enough to protect and extract threatened U.S. personnel, and it requires much less of an overall force commitment than adjusting a Marine Expeditionary Unit to a new theater.
There are also ancillary advantages to having a ground-based Marine unit as opposed to a ship-borne one. A ground-based unit can tie in with either local forces (in military-to-military exchanges) or the community in its theater of operations, while concurrently standing by to execute its mission. Indeed, the SP-MAGTF unit covering Africa has already been utilized heavily in bilateral training with partner nations, and it evacuated U.S. personnel from South Sudan after a rise in hostilities.
The newest SP-MAGTF unit going to U.S. Central Command is the next evolution of this effort to expand coverage. Consisting of some 2,000 Marines, the unit will be headquartered in Kuwait, with various elements tasked out and positioned throughout the theater. This unit has more personnel than U.S. Africa Command's SP-MAGTF unit because U.S. Central Command covers a greater number of U.S. interests and has personnel scattered throughout a tumultuous theater. Overall, SP-MAGTF units simply repackage existing forces to better meet the needs of the Marine Corps' mission. Adaptability is an important trait for any military, and SP-MAGTF units are being created as a solution to the coverage problem highlighted by the Benghazi attack.
Read more: The U.S. Military Improves Its Crisis Response Capabilities | Stratfor
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Not familiar with this website and thus I have no idea as to its reliability;
http://www.voltairenet.org/article185860.html
but with Russia's world-wide cockiness (Ukraine, deals with Iran, bombers in the Carribean and much more) and the rapidity with which we are losing our lead (Chinese now have stealth fighters with tech stolen from us, Iranians now have advanced drone tech reversed engineered from drone they hacked/captured from us and Obama failed to seize back or destroy) I can't say that this strikes me as implausible , , ,
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http://blogs.cfr.org/davidson/2014/11/18/the-warrior-ethos-at-risk-h-r-mcmasters-remarkable-veterans-day-speech/
From the article:
There is a tendency in the United States to confuse the study of war and warfare with militarism. Thinking clearly about the problem of war and warfare, however, is both an unfortunate necessity and the best way to prevent it. As the English theologian, writer, and philosopher G.K. Chesterton observed, “War is not the best way of settling differences, but it is the only way of preventing them being settled for you.”
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Should Women be Navy SEALs?
[Ray "Cash" Care]
Ray "Cash" CareWarrior
As the Department of Defense considers the question, former Navy SEAL Ray “Cash” Care says he has an answer: Hell no.
A few weeks ago, it was reported in Navy Times that the Department of Defense will make a decision on opening the SEAL and SWCC ranks to women in January of 2016.
If the DoD decides in favor of allowing women, the Navy would then notify Congress by July 1, and Congress would then have 30 working days to respond with any concerns.
I'd like to jump ahead of Congress, save them some trouble and tell them right here, right now that this is a terrible idea. Concerns? I have many.
Now before anyone gets too bent out of shape, understand that this doesn't come from a "women should stay home and be housewives" mentality. From Navy divers to Explosive Ordinance Disposal up to fighter pilots, women's role in the military is crucial to the success and duration of America. I have nothing but admiration for the contributions women make to the defense of our great nation.
But I do not think the SEAL teams should allow women. BUD/S, which stands for Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL training, is the most physically and psychologically grueling schooling a man can go through. My class began with over 120 men. Of that, 16 originals graduated, with some additional guys who were in from other classes who were delayed due to injuries. There's an 80% attrition rate at BUD/S, and that is rounding down.
Put bluntly, the shit you have to do in training and as a SEAL is nearly impossible. I can't give you specifics, but trust me ladies, think of the most hellish situation you can imagine, then double it, triple it—hell, times it by 100. It's that physically brutal.
If a woman could beat Mike Tyson in his prime, she has maybe a 1% chance of making it in BUD/S. Look, I know there are one or two women on the planet who could possibly graduate (and I mean possibly—trust me on this), but I don't think that kind of graduation rate warrants the complete overhaul they would need to make at great tax payer expense.
The BUD/S facility is not set up for coed habitation. Men walk around naked, change on the go. They would need to build separate facilities to avoid situations that could offend and put people in compromising positions. They'd have to have separate barracks, separate showers, more medical personnel. In cold weather survival training, we're taught to sit "nuts to butts". That's where guys basically sit up top of each other to keep warm. How is that going to work with a woman in the middle?
My fear is that the standards would drop to allow for a higher graduation rate and that is not what the SEAL teams are about. BUD/S is about producing the best warriors on the planet—they don’t lower the standards for anyone. It might not be PC to say, but there would be no other way to graduate enough women to justify the expense of new facilities without lowering the standards. And lower standards would lead to utter disaster.
Training aside, SEALs are inserted into the most dangerous places on the planet. What happens when a woman SEAL gets captured? The horrors would be unimaginable. We're fighting in countries whose cultures do not value the lives of women in the slightest. A man can chop up a woman because he didn't like the way she looked at him, or because she dared get an education, without fearing any kind of punishment. If the enemy were to capture a female SEAL, again, the horrors she would face are unspeakable.
Again, it might not be the politically correct thing to say, but my opinion has been formed from the world events that have taken place in my life. I've seen and experienced awful thing up close and personal, things I do not believe a woman should be subjected to.
I am sure as hell that every SEAL brother, past and present would agree with me 100%. Do you? Let me know what you think here.
God bless America!
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5 Things You Don't Know About: Body Armor
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H2L21QByGHs
P.C.
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Shortchanging Missile Defense
The need is urgent as nuclear threats proliferate.
Updated Feb. 16, 2015 10:30 p.m. ET
Within days of President Obama releasing his fiscal 2016 defense budget this month, Pakistan tested a nuclear-capable Ra’ad short-range missile, Russia announced plans to test a new RS-26 intercontinental ballistic missile, Iran launched a satellite into space and North Korea blasted five antiship missiles into the Sea of Japan. Each volley underscored the bad news that Mr. Obama’s budget again shortchanges U.S. missile defenses.
Of $4 trillion for the federal government overall and $612 billion for defense, Mr. Obama wants $8.1 billion for the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Agency. That’s up from $7.5 billion last year—the first real-dollar increase since 2011—but the overall trend remains downward. Funding is set to drop again after fiscal 2016, leaving missile defense slashed 25% in real dollars over the Obama Presidency.
In 2009 Mr. Obama scrapped U.S. plans to place missile interceptors in Poland and sophisticated X-Band radar in the Czech Republic, a decision announced without warning to Warsaw or Prague. Instead he proposed a new four-phase plan for European missile defense. For the home front, he said he would install only 30 interceptors in Alaska and California, down from the 44 planned by the Bush Administration.
Development of a so-called Multiple Kill Vehicle, intended to overcome decoy missiles by placing many warheads on a single interceptor, was killed in 2009. The Administration then stripped funding from the Airborne Weapon Laser and the Kinetic Energy Interceptor, the two programs aimed at destroying missiles in early-flight “boost” phase, when they are slowest and most vulnerable. Space-based interceptors never got to the drawing board.
Mr. Obama partially changed course in 2013, expanding defenses in Asia and committing to install the 14 additional West Coast interceptors he had scrapped in 2009. Yet he simultaneously cancelled the final phase of the program he had promised for Europe, which would have placed high-speed interceptors in Poland capable of targeting intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Administration began reviewing possible sites for new antimissile systems on the U.S. East Coast, but only after years of Congressional pressure.
“I don’t support a missile defense system,” Mr. Obama said in 2001, when he was old enough to know better but not yet a prominent politician. Many Democrats have held that view since dismissing Ronald Reagan ’s Strategic Defense Initiative. But engineers have proved they can hit a bullet with a bullet: 65 of 81 U.S. antimissile tests have succeeded since 2001, while Israel’s Iron Dome has excelled (aided by U.S. funding).
So Democrats today rarely denounce missile defense outright. Instead they treat it as a bargaining chip with adversaries such as Vladimir Putin . Mr. Putin complained in 2010 that antimissile systems “undermine our nuclear capabilities.” In other words, they hamper Russia’s ability to play the bully with its nukes and missiles. That’s a reason for Washington to invest more in missile defense, yet Team Obama has repeatedly sought to appease Mr. Putin’s objections.
The Administration abandoned the Polish and Czech sites amid its “reset” with the Kremlin and talks over the New Start arms-control treaty. The new U.S. approach was “less threatening” to Russia, a senior Administration official told the Washington Post at the time. Four years later the U.S. again weakened its European antimissile posture because, as another senior official told author David Rothkopf, “it had become an impediment to every area of important cooperation” with Russia, “including both Iran and Syria.”
While the wages of Russian non-cooperation have accumulated from Syria to Ukraine, other threats have advanced. U.S. intelligence officials fear that North Korea may now be able to fit a nuclear warhead on a missile, and the U.S. Navy says China has the world’s “most active and diverse” ballistic-missile program, with increasing ability to target U.S. military assets and cities.
All of this is an opportunity for the new Republican Congress, which could force progress on building an East Coast interceptor site, developing defenses against boost-phase missiles, and deepening cooperation with NATO, Japan, South Korea and Australia. As the forces of disorder spread, missile defense becomes more urgent.
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http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/02/17/glock-19-pistols-approved-for-marsoc-operators/23548847/
Glock pistols approved for special operations Marines
By James K. Sanborn, Staff writer 1:51 p.m. EST February 17, 2015
In a Marine Corps first, the service recently added a Glock pistol to its list of authorized individual weapons, optics and modular attachments.
However, the 9mm semi-automatic Glock 19 pistol is officially approved for use only by personnel assigned to Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command, according to a force-wide message issued in mid-February. In fact, the pistol will carry a non-Marine inventory number because it is a U.S. Special Operations Command asset, according to the message.
It is not immediately clear if MARSOC has used the pistols unofficially before now, but they are popular throughout the special operations community. More broadly, they are standard issue for armies on several continents, a staple among international and domestic law enforcement, including the FBI and many local police departments. Glocks are ubiquitous among civilian gun enthusiasts. And they are even seen in the hands of some al-Qaida fighters.
Glock's dominance of the modern semi-automatic pistol market is owed to their relative low cost and reputation for AK47-like reliability. That is a particular advantage for those who operate in austere conditions where sand, mud, dirt, water or snow make pistols prone to malfunction. Additionally, their polymer frame is corrosion resistant, which meets the needs of a maritime force working around salt water. Finally, the Austrian pistol's worldwide popularity among good and bad guys alike makes it easy to find accessories and spare parts when needed.
It is unclear why the pistols were only now approved for MARSOC. Marine Corps officials could not immediately address questions from Marine Corps Times.
Marine operators have at times used 9mm Beretta M9 or M9A1 pistols, but more often the service's .45-caliber M45A1 Close Quarter Battle Pistol which is based on the iconic M1911 platform.
Army special forces have often used Glock pistols while training foreign police and military personnel. Iraq, for example, purchased more than 100,000 G19s for issue to their security forces. It was considered best practice for U.S. instructors to use the same firearm as their students.
MARSOC has not yet determined which holster it will use with the G19.
"Standard holsters for this item are pending source selection," the force-wide message states. "Command approved holsters are authorized for this item until source selection is complete."
The service's current standard issue holster for use with Beretta M9s, the SERPA Level 2 Tactical Holster by Blackhawk, is available on the civilian market for the G19 as well.
Also unclear is whether all G19s are authorized, or only certain generations. With four generations of Glock pistols, Gen3 Glocks incorporated a short rail system for attaching light and laser accessories. Gen4 Glocks also added a rougher texture to the frame for better grip in moist conditions; a modular back strap system to easily customize grip size for individual shooters; a larger and reversible magazine catch making the pistol friendlier for left-handed shooters; and an updated recoil spring assembly to reduce felt recoil.
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I have carried and currently carry the G19 as my duty weapon. I think the USMC should approve the G19 for all Marines.
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My primary pistol too, though as a subject of Los Angeles I am not allowed to carry here.
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My primary pistol too, though as a subject of Los Angeles I am not allowed to carry here.
Southern Nevada is nice.
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http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/02/20/check-out-these-homemade-hell-cannons-syrian-rebels-are-using-to-fight-back/
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The Pentagon has a nuclear weapons problem. Nukes are expensive to maintain, and DoD expects to have a hard time finding the billions of dollars needed to keep them in shape over the next decade. FP’s Kate Brannen: The Pentagon’s top weapons buyer “Frank Kendall said that starting in 2021, it’s going to be a challenge to identify money within the defense budget to pay for the military’s nuclear modernization plans.”
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http://www.addictinginfo.org/2015/03/07/us-navy-sunk/
and remember this from 2007?
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-492804/The-uninvited-guest-Chinese-sub-pops-middle-U-S-Navy-exercise-leaving-military-chiefs-red-faced.html
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Summary
Despite making significant progress in developing their submarine arm, the Chinese nuclear submarine force is still far behind the full reach and capabilities of the United States silent service. It will take decades to even reach parity with the U.S. Navy, and even with advanced technology, China lacks the institutional knowledge, skills and expertise of a more venerable, seasoned force.
Analysis
Beijing said on March 5 that its official military budget would increase by 10.1 percent in 2015, continuing a decades old trend of double digit funding increases for Beijing's armed forces, year-on-year. Alongside the other branches of the Chinese military, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force stands to benefit from continued significant investment going forward.
The Chinese announcement follows remarks made by Vice Adm. Joseph Mulloy, deputy chief of Naval operations, integration of capabilities and resources, on Feb. 25 to the U.S. House Seapower and Projections Forces subcommittee on the status of the Chinese navy. Admiral Mulloy highlighted what he referred to as a tremendous growth rate in the Chinese submarine arm, indicating that the Chinese are now producing some "fairly amazing" submarines. Following the remarks, a number of Chinese analysts retorted that the United States military was once again exaggerating the Chinese threat in an attempt to secure increased Congressional funding at a time of budget uncertainty in Washington.
Though the Pentagon is right to point out continued and impressive Chinese headway in modernizing their armed forces, the Chinese nuclear submarine fleet is not nearly as capable as official remarks may suggest. As an entity, the People's Liberation Army Navy lacks the expertise and institutional knowledge possessed by navies with a centuries-long heritage, like the United States Navy or the British Royal Navy.
Late Bloomers
It is true that the Chinese submarine force has made tremendous progress over the last decade. It is also true that the number of overall Chinese attack submarines, both diesel and nuclear powered, has grown rapidly, surpassing the number of commissioned U.S. nuclear attack submarines — craft designed specifically to engage other submarines or surface vessels. Critically, the Chinese are also spending large amounts of time at sea building up their expertise in training and patrols. The number of PLAN submarine sorties has approximately quadrupled over the last five years or so. As Admiral Mulloy stated, Beijing's nuclear ballistic missile submarines — distinct from their hunter-killer brethren in that they can launch intercontinental ballistic missiles from beneath the ocean surface — are almost ready for deterrence patrols, with one of these submarines having spent more than three months at sea during a trial patrol.
However, the Chinese are without a doubt still far behind the U.S. Navy's submarine service, especially in terms of fielding a nuclear submarine force capable of global reach and sustained operations. With a number of advanced diesel-electric Yuan-class submarines already in service, and improved models under construction, the Chinese are increasingly well positioned to utilize their diesel submarines in the sea denial role around China's coastal waters.
U.S., China: Exploring the Undersea Balance
Click to Enlarge
The Chinese doctrine in regard to its periphery is what can be referred to as a counter intervention strategy based on preventing or limiting U.S. and allied access into the Chinese near seas. From Beijing's point of view, these include the Yellow, East China and South China seas. Chinese conventional submarines would be used to interdict enemy vessels as they approach the Chinese near seas by conducting operations in the larger sea space between what China calls the first and second island chains — roughly speaking, the Philippine Sea.
Future Aspirations
The long-term Chinese ambition is, however, to develop a strong force of nuclear powered submarines for global force projection and the escort of carrier task groups and nuclear ballistic submarines. In this respect, China is still far behind the United States. In terms of the development of critical nuclear propulsion and quieting technology, the latest Chinese commissioned nuclear attack submarine, the Type-93 Shang-class, is broadly equivalent to the U.S. Sturgeon-class of late 1960s vintage. Even taking into account improved Chinese Type-93B submarines undergoing sea trials, the Chinese have not surpassed the capabilities displayed by early versions of the U.S. Los Angeles-class submarines of late 1970s vintage.
Furthermore, China has only started to seriously invest in anti-submarine warfare capabilities, an area in which they are sorely lacking. Even with its limited capability, Beijing is still much better prepared for anti-submarine operations in its peripheral waters than in the global commons. The introduction into service of the Shaanxi Y-8Q maritime patrol aircraft — with its seven-meter-long Magnetic Anomaly Detector boom designed to identify submarines — is a welcome addition. Yet, it will take almost a decade to produce the required number of anti-submarine aircraft and associated surface corvettes to seriously contend with the threat of U.S. submarine operations in the East and South China Seas. For anti-submarine warfare operations far from home, the Chinese are even less prepared.
In his statement, Admiral Mulloy acknowledged that U.S. submarines remain superior to Chinese ones. But, his remark about China producing some "fairly amazing" submarines mischaracterizes and overplays the Chinese underwater force, particularly its nuclear submarines. Relatively speaking, and given the qualitative difference between the U.S. and Chinese nuclear submarine force in particular, if the latest Chinese submarines are "fairly amazing" then the latest U.S. Virginia class submarines could only be described as "phenomenal."
It is worth reiterating that the Chinese have made and continue to make remarkable advances in submarine development. They are particularly innovative in fielding increasingly capable diesel-electric boats suited for the primary mission of sea denial close to home. Even in terms of nuclear boats, the large technological gap between the U.S. and Chinese submarine force is closing rapidly, with the next generation Chinese Type-95 submarines already under construction. It will take decades, however, for China to reach technological parity with the United States, internalize global operational procedures and operate an equivalent number of nuclear attack submarines.
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America’s Dangerous Defense Cuts
Threats are rising around the globe, yet the U.S. is poised to cut $1 trillion from the Pentagon over 10 years.
ENLARGE
Photo: Getty Images
By
John McCain And
Mac Thornberry
March 9, 2015 7:21 p.m. ET
52 COMMENTS
Providing for national defense is the highest constitutional responsibility of the federal government, which congressional Republicans now share in equal measure with President Obama. We believe that the country cannot meet this responsibility within the caps on defense spending imposed by the 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) and sequestration. If Washington does not change course now, Republicans will share the blame for the national-security failures that will inevitably result.
There is no national-security basis for sequestration. In the past year Russia has challenged core principles of the postwar order in Europe by invading and annexing the territory of another sovereign nation. A terrorist army that has proclaimed its desire to attack the United States and its allies now controls a vast swath of territory in the heart of the Middle East.
Iran continues its pursuit of nuclear weapons while expanding its malign influence across the region. And China has stepped up its coercive behavior in Asia, backed by its rapid military modernization. Every year since the Budget Control Act was passed, the world has become more dangerous, and the threats to the nation and to American interests have grown. We do not think this is a coincidence.
And yet, under the BCA with sequestration, the U.S. must cut defense by nearly $1 trillion over 10 years. These cuts are seriously undermining the capabilities, readiness, morale and modernization of the armed forces. The senior military leaders of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps have all testified to our committees that, with defense spending at sequestration levels, they cannot execute the National Military Strategy. These military leaders warned in January that sequestration is putting American lives at risk. This is a crisis of Washington’s own making.
Some advocates of the BCA are willing to overlook its damage to national security because, they claim, at least it cuts the debt. But it doesn’t even do that in a meaningful way.
Military spending is not to blame for out-of-control deficits and debt—it is now 16% of federal spending, the lowest share since before World War II. By 2020, it will be 13%. Interest on the debt soon will consume a larger portion of the federal budget than will military spending. Yet national defense took 50% of the cuts under the Budget Control Act and sequestration. The true drivers of the nation’s long-term debt—entitlement programs like Social Security, Medicaid and Medicare—took none.
Heaping nearly $1 trillion in cuts on the U.S. military while ignoring entitlements is not conservative fiscal policy and will not solve the problems of deficits and debt.
There is widespread concern that Defense Department spending is too wasteful. Of course there is waste in the Pentagon—as everywhere in the federal government—and efforts to eliminate it must continue. But sequestration does not target Pentagon waste. It cuts spending recklessly across the board, good programs and bad. Eliminating waste, fraud and abuse is accomplished through vigorous oversight in Congress and at the Pentagon, not through blind, automatic spending cuts.
Some also believe that the impact of sequestration has been exaggerated. But when it comes to national security, “it isn’t that bad” is a dangerously low standard for government policy.
We and our fellow Republicans must also think about the future of the party we love, and from this standpoint as well, sequestration is a disaster. At a time the American people are dissatisfied with the president’s foreign-policy weakness, Republicans cannot offer themselves as the responsible national-security alternative so long as they are complicit in gutting national defense.
President Obama’s recent budget request proposed the largest budget—$534 billion—for the Defense Department in the post-9/11 era. Heeding military commanders’ warning that the military cannot execute national military strategy at sequestration levels, the president’s budget exceeds spending limits set by the Budget Control Act by $36 billion in the coming fiscal year.
America faces what Henry Kissinger has called the most “diverse and complex array of crises since the end of the Second World War.” How can Republicans—the party of Ronald Reagan and “peace through strength”—possibly justify a lower defense budget than that of President Obama?
We must aim higher by adopting a budget worthy of our party’s best traditions of strong national defense. Given the severity of the challenges facing the nation, we recommend eliminating sequestration entirely with a defense budget of $577 billion, the level set by the Budget Control Act before the debilitating effects of sequestration.
There is nothing conservative or Republican about pretending that Washington can balance the budget by cutting defense spending. The new Republican majorities in Congress should not allow such reckless policy.
Continuing to slash defense invites greater danger to national security while shamefully asking the country’s military men and women to do their jobs with shrinking resources. Without a course change, history’s judgment will be harsh, and rightfully so.
Mr. McCain is a Republican senator from Arizona. Mr. Thornberry is a Republican congressman from Texas. They are, respectively, chairmen of the Senate and House Armed Services Committees.
Popular on WSJ
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http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2015/04/07/last-ioc-in-marine-experiment-drops-two-officers/25418867/
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If memory serves, we posted about this technology a couple of years ago.
Enemy Cruise Missile, Meet the U.S. Rail Gun
Using electricity to fire high-speed projectiles is a relative bargain at $35,000 per shot.
AP Photo/U.S. Navy, John F. Williams
By
Mike Conaway
April 19, 2015 5:40 p.m. ET
324 COMMENTS
As Congress meets this month to mark up the fiscal year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act and appropriations bill, members will debate how to best meet tomorrow’s security challenges with today’s finite amount of money. The U.S. built history’s most powerful military through technological innovation. Yet our military advantage is quickly diminishing as other countries acquire comparable capabilities.
China has developed a large and growing ballistic and cruise-missile inventory capable of accurately striking targets on land and at sea over long ranges. Iran has fielded multiple antiship cruise missiles and has an arsenal of ballistic missiles that can reach targets across the Middle East and Europe. Russia has long had sophisticated ballistic and cruise missiles and has increasingly shown a willingness to use them. Other state and nonstate actors possess theater ballistic missiles and rockets that threaten the U.S. military and could be used to terrorize the civilian populations of U.S. allies.
Building and fielding these weapons comes at a fraction of the price it costs the U.S. to design, purchase and deploy defensive weapons systems. But thanks to innovations within the U.S. scientific community and the Pentagon, there is a way to maintain America’s military advantage. Directed energy weapons systems—such as electromagnetic “rail” guns, high-energy lasers and high-power microwave systems—have the potential to deliver effective offensive and defensive capabilities at a fraction of the cost of current systems.
Currently, the U.S. defends against enemy missiles with traditional missile-boosted interceptors. These long-range interceptors require complex systems to find incoming missile threats, and intercept and destroy them before they hit the U.S. or our allies. They are also large and expensive, with some interceptor missiles costing $10 million each. Weapon size is a particular problem for Navy ships, where limited storage space restricts the number of projectiles that can be carried.
At this point, we don’t have enough defense interceptors to defeat large salvos of guided weapons, and our overseas bases have very few defenses against low-flying cruise missiles, which are more difficult to intercept and destroy using traditional missiles. But even if they were 100% effective, the calculus is not in our favor. Using million-dollar weapon systems to combat thousand-dollar threats is economically unsustainable.
Yet by using electricity rather than expensive jet fuels and complicated propulsion methods, directed energy weapons could be game-changers, due to their enormous capabilities and cost effectiveness. And if adequately funded, some of these weapons could be fully operational in a few years.
The U.S. Navy has developed a working prototype of a rail gun that uses electricity to fire projectiles at high speeds with great precision at incoming enemy missiles and aircraft. Already, the Navy can accurately launch projectiles at distances over 100 miles at speeds over 3,000 miles an hour.
Last year the Navy launched a trial deployment of a solid-state Laser Weapon System on board the USS Ponce in the Persian Gulf—the first effective deployment of a laser weapons system by any of the services. High-power microwave weapons that disrupt or destroy internal electronic components of enemy weapon systems are also a near-term possibility.
Within a few years, the Pentagon could field rail guns and powerful lasers to defend U.S. forces against aircraft, cruise missiles, guided rockets, artillery and mortar threats, alleviating some of the need for our current more expensive defense systems. Laser systems will be used to combat swarm attacks by weaponized small boats that act to overwhelm our sea defenses through sheer numbers of inexpensive, expendable and deadly platforms.
Instead of millions of dollars per shot, a rail gun projectile will cost around $35,000, or even less with further development. Conservatively, solid-state lasers and high-power microwave “shots” will cost less than $10 each, with some estimates lower than $1. Rail-gun projectiles are small, and laser and microwave shots are unlimited, freeing valuable storage space and greatly reducing the need to rearm while under way.
The global proliferation of guided-missile technologies and the cost of defending against them suggests we need to re-evaluate our air and missile-defense strategy. Fielding rail guns, lasers and high-power microwave weapons alongside traditional, kinetic interceptors will create a more balanced air and missile-defense architecture.
An enduring pillar of the U.S. military’s planning has been its ability to exploit cutting edge technologies to maintain an advantage over our nation’s adversaries. Directed energy weapons are another opportunity to stay ahead of the competition and put the United States on the right side of the missile-defense cost equation.
Mr. Conaway, a Republican from Texas, serves on the U.S. House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
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http://www.popsci.com/chinese-shipyard-looks-build-giant-floating-islands?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=*Situation%20Report&utm_campaign=SitRep0421
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Anti-Tank Guided Missiles Pose a Serious Threat
Security Weekly
April 30, 2015 | 08:00 GMT
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By Scott Stewart
Working with my Stratfor colleagues to analyze the rebel offensive in Syria's Idlib governorate, we have been impressed by the rebels' use of high terrain to gain an advantage over Syrian government forces. The operation has Syrian loyalists trapped in valleys along which the main highways in the region run and in which many of the cities and towns are located.
Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) such as the U.S.-manufactured BGM-71E TOW system have been one of the weapons effectively employed from this high ground against loyalist targets. Dozens of videos featuring rebel ATGM attacks have been posted to the Internet, showing the destruction of scores of government vehicles and fighting positions. It appears that the United States wants the groups receiving TOW missiles to provide video documentation of the weapons' use, considering that there are a proportionately higher number of videos of TOW attacks than those involving other ATGMs.
In addition to the TOWs, however, there are also European-made Milan missiles in use, along with Russian 9M113 Konkurs, 9K115-2M Metis-M and 9M133 Kornet systems — also known by their respective NATO designation; AT-5, AT-13 and AT-14. External supporters such as the United States, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have provided the TOW system and Chinese made Hongjian-8 missiles to the Syrian rebel groups while the Russian systems have been captured from the Syrian military. Indeed, there have been a number of rebel videos showing large ATGM caches being captured.
Some of the missile shots featured in these videos are impressive. The rebel TOW gunners have been able to hit targets, sometimes moving targets, at considerable distances. The TOW is wired guided, meaning that the operator can make in-flight corrections to the missile, but the projectile must be guided all the way to the target, unlike fire-and-forget systems. From an unscientific method of watching the attack videos and counting the seconds from launch to impact, it is clear that some of the shots are out near the TOW's maximum range of 3,750 meters (2.3 miles). The TOW projectile travels at 278 meters per second.
In fact, from these videos it becomes clear that over the past few months, some of the Syrian rebel TOW gunners have fired more rounds in combat and scored more kills with the weapon than any dismounted U.S. TOW gunner ever has. There is a parallel here with the use of FIM-92 Stinger surface-to-air missiles in Afghanistan: Afghan rebels fired far more live Stingers and shot down more aircraft than any U.S. soldier to date.
And the parallels between TOW and Stinger missiles go further. Both have provided decisive advantages in battle to rebel forces that deployed them effectively on the battlefield. Also, like Stingers, ATGMs pose a risk of proliferation outside of the war zone, and could be used quite effectively in a terrorist attack.
Arms Flows
As we've discussed in the past, arms have been flowing into Syria from a variety of sources, including the legal, black and gray arms markets. Russia, for example, is providing arms to the Syrian government through legal channels, while Iran — a country under an arms embargo — is doing so illegally through the black arms market. On the other side of the battle, the United States, Turkey and Gulf Cooperation Council member countries have been providing Syrian rebel groups with weapons through gray and black arms transactions. Indeed, the Swiss government has been quite upset that hand grenades and other weapons it sold to the United Arab Emirates have shown up in the hands of Syrian rebels.
Arming rebel groups can be a risky proposition on a chaotic battlefield that is constantly changing. As noted above, weapons provided by Russia and Iran have been captured from Syrian government stores by a range of rebel groups, and U.S.-made TOW missiles have been captured by Jabhat al-Nusra, al Qaeda's franchise in Syria. Certainly, such incidents have reinforced the conviction of those who opposed supplying man-portable air defense systems to the Syria rebels.
One problem with providing arms is that they are durable goods. While certain types of weapons and weapons components have a limited shelf life — such as battery-coolant units for a Stinger missile — numerous other weapons remain functional for many decades. It is not unusual to find a militant or a soldier carrying a Lee Enfield rifle manufactured before his great-grandfather was born. M-40 recoilless rifles provided by the United States to the government of Libya before Moammar Gadhafi's 1969 coup proved an effective weapons system in the battle of Misrata, and have even been shipped from Libya to the rebels in Syria.
Weapons are also interchangeable. An AK-47-style rifle manufactured in Russia is essentially the same as one manufactured in Pakistan or Egypt, and an M16-style rifle manufactured in China can easily replace an M16 manufactured in the United States. In a place like Syria, it is not unusual to find a rebel group carrying rifles manufactured in different countries and even different eras.
Another problem is that weapons tend to retain their value and are easily converted to cash. Buying weapons from a place where there is an oversupply and then selling them in a place where there is a heavy demand can be highly lucrative, explaining why weapons so readily flow to conflict zones.
And this brings us back to the many ATGM systems — and highly experienced ATGM gunners — floating around Syria. The thought that the systems alongside seasoned gunners could pour out of Syria into other countries in the region is troubling, especially if they make their way into to the hands of an organization that seeks to use them for terrorist attacks.
Terrorist Applications
From the early days of the modern terrorism era, a wide array of actors have attempted to use anti-tank weapons such as LAW rockets, rocket-propelled grenade systems and bazooka rockets to attack diplomatic missions, Western businesses, business executives and government officials. Many of these assaults failed because inexperienced attackers missed their targets, chose inappropriate targets to use the weapons against, or otherwise botched the attack. I know of two cases in Latin America in which attacks with M72 LAW rockets failed because the attackers did not realize that the rocket's warhead has a minimum arming distance of 10 meters and the rockets were launched too close to the intended target.
As a security practitioner, the thought of 17 November members running around Greece armed with an M20 bazooka launcher is scary. But the thought of an al Qaeda or Islamic State operative who is an accomplished ATGM gunner running around Turkey, Iraq or Jordan with a TOW or Kornet is absolutely terrifying.
A light anti-tank rocket like an RPG-7 or M20 bazooka is vastly and qualitatively different than a modern ATGM. Not only does a guided missile have a larger warhead capable of causing far more destruction, but ATGMs also have a much longer range (up to 5,500 meters for a Kornet). Since ATGMs are guided, they are far more accurate and can maneuver in flight, so they are more capable of engaging moving targets than anti-tank rocket systems that cannot be adjusted once launched. These systems also come with sophisticated optics that can acquire targets from thousands of meters away. Under the right conditions, these systems can even be used to effectively engage low, slow-moving aircraft
If a TOW or Kornet can defeat the armor on a main battle tank equipped with reactive armor, it is more than capable of destroying even the heaviest armored limousine. Missiles variants designed with thermobaric warheads for engaging bunkers would also pose a considerable threat to a government building, embassy or office building — especially if the office of the minister, ambassador or CEO could be identified and targeted.
The U.S. government has gone through the nightmare of attempting to track down and buy back Stinger missiles provided to rebels in Afghanistan, after the Soviet withdrawal. They have also spent millions of dollars to buy and destroy thousands of surface-to-air missiles following the revolution in Libya. With this history, it is certain that the United States has concerns over furnishing powerful ATGMs to Syrian rebels, and has undoubtedly employed technology to aid in tracking the missiles — and perhaps something capable of disabling them if they fall into the wrong hands.
The United States has also been careful to only gradually increase the allotment of TOW missiles per shipment, as each Syrian group proved its reliability over time. It appears that some groups were only given one missile to start, then batches of two or three, and now it appears some of the more credible groups are receiving up to 10 per shipment. Hopefully, the Europeans and Gulf countries have taken similar precautions, though that is less likely. The problem of ATGM proliferation is perhaps most acute regarding the Russian systems that have been captured from government stockpiles rather than those provided by external donors. These systems are highly capable — indeed, the laser-guided Kornet is arguably superior to the wire-guided TOW — and there are no external controls on them.
The sheer size of these ATGM systems, however, will make it difficult for a group like al Qaeda or the Islamic State to smuggle them transnationally. There is little chance of them being taken to the United States or Western Europe. However, there are thriving smuggling routes going in and out of Syria and Iraq from nearly every direction, and items larger than an ATGM system are smuggled out of Syria and Iraq to neighboring countries regularly. It is not unreasonable to assume that an ATGM system could be smuggled out of the country along with an experienced gunner.
Drawbacks to Guided Missile Systems
Despite their deadliness, range and accuracy, ATGM systems do have some disadvantages when used as a terrorist weapon. They are somewhat large and hard to camouflage — especially in a city where there are many potential onlookers. These systems must also have line of sight to engage a target. Consequently, monitoring activity at possible ATGM launch sites can help protect stationary targets like buildings.
Engaging a specific mobile target with an ATGM requires the attackers to identify the travel patterns of the target and then find a suitable kill zone. Such an engagement requires a great deal of surveillance, a process that would make the attackers vulnerable to detection. Also, like anti-tank rockets, ATGMs have a minimum arming range (65 meters for a TOW and 100 meters for Kornet), limiting potential attack sites, especially in a congested urban environment. In such cases, the long standoff distances the U.S. government has been trying to achieve to protect its embassies from large truck bombs could actually prove to be a liability.
With al Qaeda seeking to hit U.S. interests in the region and beyond, and the Islamic State also threatening attacks, the danger posed by the proliferation of ATGMs and trained gunners in Syria and Iraq cannot be ignored by those responsible for protecting people and facilities.
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At least on the Republican side, candidates will be questioned on their views of defense budgets, readiness needs and priorities. The electorate needs a certain level of readiness too. Comments please!
Top 5 Weapons the U.S. Navy Needs Now
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2015/05/05/top_5_weapons_the_navy_needs_now_107917.html
By James R. Holmes (Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College)
As weaponeers, budgeteers, and lawmakers wage their annual death match over the defense budget ... It’s tough to winnow the U.S. Navy’s priorities list down to five weapon systems. However, I applied a secret method to come up with the definitive, incontrovertible list of the Top 5 Weapons the U.S. Navy Needs Now. The list employs such metrics as a system’s national-level importance, its capacity to multiply the fleet’s offensive and defensive fighting power, and its ability to exploit enduring enemy weaknesses at manageable cost to the United States. This is science, remember. Don’t be a science denier!!!
One caveat: exotic weaponry like lasers and railguns is conspicuously absent from this list. These prospective game-changers will doubtless qualify—once they stop hovering along the frontiers of science fiction and start fulfilling their promise at fleet air and missile defense. It feels a wee bit premature to jump on that bandwagon—the potential of ray guns and other golly-gee armaments notwithstanding. Now, onward. In reverse order:
5. Offensive minelayers. We make much of the U.S. Navy’s vulnerability to sea mines, but rivals are acutely vulnerable as well. As mine-warfare expert Scott Truver aptly notes, mine countermeasures is an orphan in want of a champion. Offensive mine warfare is an orphan of an orphan. That’s a shame, as the option of closing straits, harbors, and other narrow seas at low cost could come in handy in a host of contingencies. Manifold airborne, surface, and subsurface platforms can lay mines. Mine warfare should find its champion soonest—and provide that champion with the implements to make life tough for prospective foes.
4. Long-range combat aircraft. We may exaggerate the range problem, whereby shore-based aircraft can smite aircraft-carrier strike groups long before these groups close within reach of enemy shores. No one assumed carrier task forces would pound away at the Japanese home islands during World War II while remaining safely out of harm’s way. U.S. forces had to fight their way into the theater, wresting control of sea and sky from Japan before exploiting that control to strike at the island empire.
Still, long range opens up new tactical and operational vistas for American commanders while attenuating the effectiveness of enemy counterbattery fire. Maximum effective firing range isn’t the same as maximum firing range. Weapons typically start to lose accuracy at extreme range. The capacity to operate around the outer limits of, say, Chinese anti-access weaponry would buttress deterrence in peacetime and combat power in wartime—a net bonus for U.S. commanders.
Long range also lets airmen turn geography to advantage. If U.S. Navy and Marine warbirds can operate from temporary “lilypad” airfields erected on islands around the Asian periphery, they can convert these islands into unsinkable—though also immobile—aircraft carriers. Let’s harness maritime geography for operational gain.
3. More attack submarines. This one may seem like a cop-out, but the undersea fleet desperately needs more attack boats. Joseph Stalin isn’t one of my go-to sources of strategic wisdom, but he was correct to note that quantity boasts a quality all its own. A simple differential equation tells the tale: Cold War-era Los Angeles-class subs are being retired faster than new-build Virginia-class boats replace them. As a result the submarine fleet may dwindle to as few as 41 boats in the coming years. That may sound like a lot, but under the prevailing maintenance and training cycle, it means commanders can count on something like 28 boats at any time…to police the entire globe and face down aggression.
That’s a serious shortfall. Like mine countermeasures, antisubmarine warfare is an enduring weakness of potential antagonists like China’s navy. By all means let’s build more Virginias. Or, let’s go back to the U.S. Navy’s conventional submarining past. Japan’s navy operates a fleet of diesel boats acclaimed the world’s finest. They’re eminently suitable for patrol grounds in crucial theaters like, well, Asia. To add numbers of hulls, why not buy some of these relatively inexpensive craft and use them to constitute a permanent, forward-deployed allied squadron alongside Japanese boats. Let’s buy American—and Japanese.
2. Modern anti-ship cruise missiles. Our navy suffers from a severe deficit of cruise-missile firepower. Cruise missiles of the anti-ship variety, I mean. The navy ditched an anti-ship variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile two decades ago, going all-in on land attack, while the elderly Harpoon missile finds itself outranged by virtually every serious foe out there. That means missile-armed enemy ships, subs, and planes can lob missiles at U.S. naval task forces long before American units can reply. U.S. forces will have to close to missile range under fire, in all likelihood taking losses as they do. That’s a perilous position for any fleet—and one that demands to be remedied.
Surface-fleet chieftains are saying the right things. They’ve started talking about “distributed lethality,” meaning arming as many ships as possible—not just cruisers and destroyers but amphibious transports, and even logistics vessels—for defensive and offensive purposes. A fine aspiration—provided we have something to arm surface vessels, subs, aircraft and even bodies of Marines ashore with. Distributed lethality is a worthy concept. Whether it’s a neo-Tomahawk anti-ship missile, a newfangled long-range anti-ship missile, or something else, fielding a new “bird”—and thus righting the range imbalance—must top fleet designers’ tactical to-do list.
1. Replacement ballistic-missile subs. Which leaves top honors on this list to a replacement for navy’s aging Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs). Nuclear deterrence is a matter of national survival, and the undersea component of the U.S. “second-strike” capability remains its most survivable—and thus credible—component. SSBNs are strategic assets of utmost importance.
Small wonder top navy leaders have designated the replacement “boomer” now on the drawing board the nation’s foremost shipbuilding priority. They have warned, moreover, that all other procurements may have to yield to submarine construction unless Congress funds the new SSBNs through a special account outside the normal shipbuilding budget. Yet anchoring the nuclear deterrent is that critical. That makes the Ohio successor #1 on my—and probably anyone’s—list of U.S. Navy acquisitions.
James Holmes is Professor of Strategy at the Naval War College and coauthor of Red Star over the Pacific, an Atlantic Monthly Best Book of 2010. He is RCD’s new national security columnist. The views voiced here are his alone.
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http://www.theblaze.com/blog/2015/05/08/u-s-military-dominance-no-longer-assured-says-house-committee/
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second post
https://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/57jqhg.htm
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second post
http://www.wsj.com/articles/gen-stanley-mcchrystals-lessons-learned-1431122717?utm_content=bufferf9e1e&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer
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Somehow is seems to happen pretty fg often that the arms that we sell wind up in the wrong hands , , , ,
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By Paul McLeary and Ariel Robinson
Bring in the drones. In January 2014, the United States sent 14 unarmed ScanEagle drones to Iraq as a part of a larger weapons deal to assist then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki in quelling what was then seen as a rekindled Sunni rebellion in western Iraq.
We haven’t heard much about those birds since the initial announcement was made, but last week, on May 7, the Defense Department said that Iraq had completed the $10 million deal with the Washington-state based ScanEagle maker Insitu Inc. to operate the drones, along with providing enough maintenance personnel to support the “intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance services program and force protection services for the government of Iraq,” at Camp Taji, just north of Baghdad.
The ScanEagle has been a workhorse for U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. The five-foot long, 30-40 lb. drone is capable of staying aloft for 24 hours at a time.
In other ScanEagle news, does anyone else wonder what happened to the 12 ScanEagle and NightEagle drones that the Yemeni government bought in September 2014? Some $500 million worth of U.S. military equipment was lost earlier this year when Houthi rebels took over a series of military bases there, but we haven’t heard many details.
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Presidents do not often veto defense budget bills, which annually set spending levels for the huge military structure intended to keep the country safe. But President Obama has threatened to do just that this year, and he should follow through if Congress doesn’t make significant changes in the legislation now under consideration.
There are many problems with how the military spending plan for 2016 is shaping up, including budget gimmickry, political chicanery and a refusal to make the right choices. Republicans and Democratic hawks are determined to pour billions of additional dollars into the Pentagon (the House passed a nearly $612 billion defense authorization bill this month), but Republicans also want to pretend they are being fiscally careful. So lawmakers are using any trick to make it look as if both goals are being accomplished.
President Obama began the military budget discussion by proposing a $39 billion increase over the spending cap. That seems high, but Republican leaders did not confront the question of fiscal imprudence. Instead, they took roughly the same amount and stuffed it into a special $89 billion war-fighting account that is off-budget, is not subject to mandatory caps and essentially functions as a Pentagon slush fund.
This shell game dates to the compromise in 2011 that was supposed to force lawmakers to negotiate deficit reduction measures by threatening them with draconian across-the-board cuts in military and nonmilitary programs. The cuts were never supposed to take effect, especially in military programs; it was assumed that members of Congress would be forced to negotiate smarter deficit reductions. They never did, so in 2013 a sequester went into effect, with cuts that have taken a toll on programs that assist the most vulnerable Americans, including the elderly, the disabled and impoverished families with children.
The Pentagon says it has been hurt by the sequester, too. But military hawks from both parties did not want to actually cut military spending. And Republicans did not want to invest in domestic programs or consider new taxes to cover costs, so the taxpayers were left with a charade.
After the White House said Mr. Obama “will not support a budget that locks in sequestration and he will not fix defense without fixing nondefense spending,” 143 Democrats and eight Republicans voted against the House Pentagon bill. Speaker John Boehner then played the phony patriotism card, suggesting that Democrats don’t support American troops.
The truth is that some Republicans are uncomfortable with their leaders’ tactics, but they know their party has no intention of repealing the budget caps, so they agreed to stuff the “war-fighting fund” with money for basic Pentagon expenses, as well as money for waging war.
That is not the only budgetary sleight of hand. The measure passed by the House tries to protect the new Ohio-class nuclear submarines, estimated at $8 billion each, by shifting the funding from the Navy’s regular shipbuilding account to another. Not only is that bad budgeting practice, but it avoids the hard choices that the military should be making about what military equipment is needed and what is not. The plan to build 12 more Ohio-class subs is excessive; the number could be cut by at least two.
Under the House bill, the overinvestment in modernizing the country’s nuclear weapons, which is expected to cost $348 billion over the next decade, would continue. That would make it harder to pay for the conventional weapons that America actually uses. The bill would supply more military equipment than the administration has requested — including the over-budget and technically challenged F-35 jet fighters.
The House bill invests millions of extra dollars in a questionable missile defense program. It continues to prohibit Mr. Obama from shutting down the Guantánamo Bay military prison in Cuba. And it fails to address some of the sensible reforms pushed by a diverse group of defense experts, like reducing the number of private contractors working for the Pentagon and closing excess military bases in the United States. These could save billions of dollars.
The country faces daunting security challenges — from the Islamic State to Russia in Ukraine and China in the South China Sea. But throwing money at the military doesn’t guarantee security, especially when it is spent on programs that don’t make the country safer and is denied to programs that enhance security.
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http://www.thefederalistpapers.org/us/russia-builds-new-tanks-as-us-military-focuses-on-climate-change
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http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/careers/navy/2015/05/27/navy-secretary-ray-mabus-women-female-seal-navy-combat-exclusion/27653965/
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http://www.navytimes.com/story/military/careers/navy/2015/05/27/navy-secretary-ray-mabus-women-female-seal-navy-combat-exclusion/27653965/
Of course.
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The first thing to notice is how rapidly Elon Musk’s SpaceX is altering the market for government-sponsored rocket launches.
Witness how frequently the words “to compete with SpaceX” appear in industry statements and press coverage. To compete with SpaceX, say multiple reports, the United Launch Alliance, the Pentagon’s traditional supplier, is developing a new Vulcan rocket powered by a reusable engine designed by Jeff Bezos’s Blue Origin.
Because of SpaceX, says Aviation Week magazine, Japan’s government has instructed Mitsubishi to cut in half the cost of the Japanese workhorse rocket, and China is planning a new family of kerosene-fueled Long March rockets. “Stimulated by SpaceX’s work on reusable rockets,” reports SpaceNews.com, Airbus is developing a reusable first stage for Europe’s venerable Ariane rocket.
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Business World Columnist Holman Jenkins Jr. on how the private rocket market is changing the economics of space exploration. Photo: Getty Images
All this comes amid one of those Washington battles ferocious in inverse relation to the certainties involved. Should Congress, however bad the precedent, climb down from sanctions enacted last December curtailing the Pentagon’s reliance on a Russian-made engine to put U.S. military satellites in orbit?
Yes, say the Pentagon, the national intelligence leadership and the White House, because avoiding disruption to crucial military launches is more important than any symbolic weakening of sanctions against Russia.
No, says Sen. John McCain, who criticizes “$300 million of precious U.S. defense resources subsidizing Vladimir Putin and the Russian military industrial base,” never mind that Pentagon dollars are not different from private dollars, which flow in abundance to Russia under a loopy sanction that does nothing to curb Russia’s booming engine sales to U.S. private commercial customers and even NASA.
Mr. McCain’s awkward ally is SpaceX, whose Mr. Musk did not get in business to tell the U.S. how to conduct relations with Mr. Putin. Nonetheless SpaceX would like a piece of the Pentagon launch business, for which its Falcon 9 rocket was finally certified last month. SpaceX supporters also argue that the Pentagon’s fear of being bereft of lift capacity is a tad overstated. SpaceX’s own Falcon 9, which has proved itself on NASA and private payloads, is capable of handling 60% of Pentagon payloads. Meanwhile, a heavier-lift version is coming, plus ULA’s proven if expensive Delta IV remains in the inventory.
Some SpaceX partisans, taking advantage of a meme-du-jour, accuse the Pentagon of “crony capitalism” for backing Lockheed and Boeing, owners of the United Launch Alliance joint venture, in their desire to keep using Russian motors for their Atlas V lifter. Such slurs are unnecessary. In fact, the Air Force has become a doughty cheerleader for competition, its Gen. John Hyten recently even calling for ending the $1 billion annual retainer to ULA in order to create a more level playing field for Mr. Musk and other bidders on a per-launch basis.
Another trope designed for journalistic ears accuses the ULA partners of “extortion” because its chief suggested its diversified parents might abandon the launch business altogether if forced out of business for several years by government fiat.
In fact, this could be a prudent business calculation. United Launch Alliance, an unnatural beast created by rivals Lockheed and Boeing to maintain the Pentagon’s access to 1970s-era rocketry, actually has been rather forward-leaning under its new CEO Tory Bruno, slashing costs and seeking private launch opportunities to counter the SpaceX challenge. But it’s not automatically obvious why ULA’s unlikely parents would pour fresh capital into a crippled joint venture.
So where do we come down? Let’s face it, the Pentagon argument trumps if national security is seriously being jeopardized. But the government appears to have decent options, existing and prospective, and could always revisit the question of Russian motors if other alternatives aren’t developing at a satisfactory rate.
And a distorting factor is the U.S. budget system. Using the sanctions opportunity to accelerate a competitive commercial lift market might actually be the pound-wise option in the long run if accounted for properly.
Unmentioned so far is the possibility that Mr. Putin down the road would use our continued dependence on Russian rockets against us. How big a threat to peace the Russian kleptocrat may prove is an open question; some of us suspect the worst is yet to come. That’s another reason why bearing slightly higher risks and costs now to develop a robust domestic launch capability might be the right choice even given Air Force and intelligence agency trepidation.
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http://www.businessinsider.com/more-navy-seals-than-army-rangers-2015-8
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Not sure where to put this one so I put it here:
Saudi Arabia and Egypt Covet New Assault Ships
Analysis
August 17, 2015 | 09:15 GMT
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A Mistral-class warship under construction in Saint-Azaire, France, in December 2014. (JEAN-SEBASTIEN EVRARD/AFP Photo)
Summary
Saudi Arabia and Egypt want to buy the Mistral vessels France originally agreed to sell to Russia. Stratfor sources in the region have largely confirmed French media reports, indicating that there is at least a preliminary interest in acquiring the vessels. Despite the considerable obstacles that Riyadh and Cairo would have to surmount before they could effectively utilize Mistral-class ships, the vessels could eventually offer these Arab countries increased capability to respond to varying threats in the region.
Analysis
Saudi Arabia is making considerable efforts to bolster its air and land force capabilities, and now Riyadh appears increasingly focused on investing in its naval forces. The acquisition of potent new ships easily fits within the envisaged Saudi maritime upgrade. Mistrals are flexible amphibious assault platforms that are ideal for the projection of force in littoral waters. In missions of short duration, a battalion — approximately 400-900 troops — can deploy from the Mistral, using landing craft or helicopters. In addition to carrying an infantry-based force, the vessels can be configured to lift significant numbers of vehicles (armored or otherwise) that can deploy by landing craft to a designated landing zone. The helicopter air wing aboard the Mistral can also be configured to the task at hand, with the ability to deploy large numbers of anti-submarine warfare helicopters for sub-hunting missions. However, the vessels have little self-defense capacity and rely on other surface warships to escort them and to provide protection.
There is definitely a requirement for Mistral-type ships in Riyadh's arsenal. The vessels, if correctly manned and equipped, would have been very useful in the Saudi-led coalition's operations in Yemen. It often takes offensive action for an armed force to understand that a capability gap exists, and the ability to project force from sea to shore is critical for a modern military. The Saudis could also benefit from using the vessels in and around the Persian Gulf, especially close to the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands. These islands are disputed by Iran as well as the United Arab Emirates, but Riyadh could very rapidly deploy forces from a Mistral to capture terrain.
As Stratfor has noted in the past, Saudi Arabia has a strong desire to set up a joint Arab intervention force to counter threats to individual and collective interests in the region. The U.S. rapprochement with Iran and increased Turkish assertiveness mean that the Saudis are looking to their Arab brethren to reinforce their own military alliance system. As alluded to in the French reports, the Saudis may be interested in procuring the Mistrals as part of the greater joint Arab force project.
Military capabilities alone are not enough to create a viable and effective joint force — that requires strong political will. Indeed, there are several obstacles that work against the success of a joint Arab intervention force, especially one where Riyadh is vying for leadership. The Sunni Arab states, though willing to work closely on occasion, have disparate goals and interests that will continue to undermine their unity. Egypt would likely host the envisaged joint Arab force, and it would make considerable sense to base the Mistrals in Egypt. In this case, one or both of the Mistrals would be docked in Egypt close to the headquarters of the Arab force. Alternatively, one could be stationed in Egypt while the other would be deployed with the Saudi navy. This raises the question, would Cairo be willing to foot the bill for one or both of the Mistrals?
Financing the Purchase
The Egyptians lack money and are principally concerned with countering threats in their immediate locale. Therefore, Cairo would be unlikely to go ahead with any purchase without Saudi financial backing. Assuming the Saudis fund the purchase, the Egyptians would benefit from the considerable prestige of maintaining one or both Mistral vessels within their own fleet. Furthermore, Egypt is involved in a number of regional conflicts where the deployment of a Mistral vessel might be useful, the Libyan conflict being the most obvious example.
While Saudi Arabia may be willing to finance the acquisition of the Mistrals, there are several obstacles that will continue to hamper the Saudis and the Egyptians when it comes to using the equipment. The biggest obstacle is the absence of trained crews to operate the vessels, and even more important, well-trained forces to deploy from the Mistrals. While both Egypt and Saudi Arabia maintain small marine forces, neither nation has previously operated large amphibious assault vessels and will need considerable time and investment to build up the necessary institutional knowledge to use the Mistrals effectively.
Furthermore, procuring the Mistrals is only the first step. The Saudis and Egyptians would still need to purchase the associated specialized helicopters and landing craft that would operate from each Mistral. Additionally, the Mistral vessels in question were specifically built for the Russians, and Riyadh and Cairo will undoubtedly have to refurbish the ships and modify them to suit their own particular command, control, communications and climate requirements.
Despite these constraints, there is a high likelihood that Egypt and Saudi Arabia will purchase the Mistrals. Assuming Riyadh is willing to fund their purchase and associated costs, in time the Egyptians and the Saudis could have a considerable rapid response force ready to deploy from these vessels for missions across the Arab world. That would fit in neatly with the current Saudi-led efforts to create a potent unified Arab force that would help safeguard shared interests across the region.
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Prepping for the great (nuclear) Sunni-shia war. Obama's legacy.
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Prepping for the great (nuclear) Sunni-shia war. Obama's legacy.
In the post-Obama world we might need to add a nuclear fallout protection shield to the ammo and canned goods in the bunker.
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Some interesting forward thinking:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/terrorist-and-insurgent-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-use-potentials-and-military-implication
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Some interesting forward thinking:
http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/terrorist-and-insurgent-unmanned-aerial-vehicles-use-potentials-and-military-implication
No doubt that lots of people in the national security field are worried about this. Not hard to create a flying claymore mine with current technology.
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It would appear we are rapidly closing in on the opening scenes of The Terminator.
In a related vein:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=1932&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign
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By Paul McLeary with Adam Rawnsley
#flex? Defense Secretary Ash Carter is back in Silicon Valley to sell his vision for a collaboration between fast-moving tech giants and the more “traditional” Pentagon bureaucracy. In his second trip there in four months, Carter will use a speech Friday afternoon to unveil the $171 million FlexTech Alliance award, a collaboration between a consortium of tech companies and the Pentagon whose goal is to produce flexible sensors that can be stretched over clothing or fitted on ships and airplanes.
Backed by 162 companies, universities, and research labs, the alliance includes names like Apple and Lockheed Martin and will be managed by the Air Force Research laboratory. Overall, it’ll receive $75 million in Defense Department funding over the next five years, along with $96 million from the civilian sector.
Carter has been pushing the nascent partnership with the tech world hard since assuming office in February. He last visited Silicon Valley in April, and addressed a conference of tech CEOs in Idaho in early July at The Allen & Co. conference, where he pitched a greater collaboration between the two. He has also put some roots down in the valley, having opened the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUX) at Moffet Field in San Jose, right next to a building owned by Google.
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RARE EARTHS:
1. What is US government policy on strategic resources – the
dozens of arcane metals and minerals from antimony to
zirconium that we use in smart-phones, hybrid batteries, and
sophisticated military equipment? According to the US
Geological Survey, the US is completely import-dependent for
19 different minerals, counting the rare earths group of 17
elements as one.
The Government Accounting Office says a
score or more major US weapons systems are dependent on rare
earths coming from China. If this sounds like a growing
consensus that critical minerals supply is a matter of national
security risk, someone in the US Government forgot to send the
Pentagon the memo.
A new study by the legislative branch’s
Congressional Research Service (CRS) Rare Earths Elements in
National Defense documents in dispassionate detail a reality
entirely at odds with the Pentagon report. The report finds that
10 of the 17 rare earth elements are used in five functional areas
that cover every major war-fighting capability used to project power
via ground, sea, air and space: Guidance & Control, Electronic
Motors and Battlefield Communications. All told, CRS identified 24
specific weapons systems or cross-platform capabilities with critical
rare earths components, including: JDAMS smart bomb converter
kits, the Tomahawk cruise missile and Predator unmanned aircraft.
The Resource Wars is one conflict the American military machine
seemingly wants no part of. We are truly a nation at risk.
Daniel McGroarty, President, American Resources Policy Network
Ed: China has been dumping its Rare Earths on world markets to
depress prices and put its competitors out of business – classic
predator pricing. If America and China get into a military conflict,
and the US gets cut off, what would the Pentagon do? Where do we
get Rare Earths to build critical armaments? They will then typically
declare “Nobody foresaw it.”
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http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/09/10/marine-study-finds-all-male-infantry-units-outperformed-teams-women/71971416/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2015/09/10/marine-experiment-finds-women-get-injured-more-frequently-shoot-less-accurately-than-men/
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pentagon-loses-sight-of-500-million-in-counterterrorism-aid-given-to-yemen/2015/03/17/f4ca25ce-cbf9-11e4-8a46-b1dc9be5a8ff_story.html
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By
Julie Pulley
Sept. 14, 2015 7:03 p.m. ET
WSJ:
With Capt. Kristen Griest and First Lt. Shaye Haver recently becoming the first female soldiers to complete Army Ranger School, demands for the complete integration of women in the U.S. military are growing. In 2013 then-Defense Secretary Leon Panetta officially lifted the ban on women serving in ground-combat roles. On Jan. 1, 2016, all branches of the military must either open all positions to women or request exceptions.
As a former captain and airborne soldier in the Army’s Second Infantry Division Support Command, I say be careful what you wish for. Overturning a long-standing tradition in a martial organization like the U.S. military will undoubtedly have unintended consequences. I am particularly concerned with demands that the Army permit women to join its Infantry Branch.
Don’t misunderstand, I was thrilled when Capt. Griest and First Lt. Haver earned their Ranger tabs. I was especially pleased when Army cadre and peers assured me that the Ranger School’s high standards were maintained. As a woman, I support equal rights to a sensible point. At the same time, women must acknowledge that equality does not mean selective equality. I wish it did. I want to see those hard-charging, superwomen sisters of mine pursue every career opportunity the military offers men. No doubt they can do it—and do it well. But Ranger School for these two exceptional individuals is not the same as allowing women to serve in the infantry.
First, opening the infantry to women necessitates revisiting Rostker v. Goldberg, the 1981 Supreme Court ruling that only men are required to register for the draft. If the infantry is compelled to include women, the argument against women registering for the draft will be invalidated. If women are to be treated “equally” and serve in the infantry, shouldn’t they be drafted into the infantry at an equal rate?
The unlikely event of a draft aside, should women in an all-volunteer Army serve in infantry positions in equal numbers alongside men? If so, how would this affect American military families and morale? Would such changes dissuade women from voluntarily joining the Army? And most important, would significant numbers of women in the infantry serve to strengthen or weaken national defense?
From a practical standpoint, I believe the impact would be negative. Many civilians, veterans and active-duty service members will disagree. Many will view me as disloyal to women in arms. I respect and understand opposing perspectives. I also appreciate the sacrifices of women before me who suffered and overcame countless barriers so that I could live big dreams, choose to attend the United States Military Academy at West Point, and serve my country without feeling professionally inhibited, marginalized or disrespected.
But questions persist. Can the general population of fighting-age American women be expected to perform equally with their male counterparts? According to a U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center study released in 2004, the average fighting load carried by an infantry rifleman operating in Afghanistan was 63 pounds before adding a rucksack. The average approach-march load in combat, which includes a light rucksack, was 96 pounds. The average emergency-approach-march load, which includes a larger rucksack, was 127 pounds.
Would the infantry have performed as well in past wars had half the billets been filled by women instead of men?
Can fighting-age American women be counted upon to fulfill their duties without causing an increased administrative burden in time of national emergency? Around the time my company received orders to deploy to Afghanistan in 2002, a number of women in my unit became pregnant. My company, stationed at Fort Bragg, N.C., attached soldiers from two other Army posts to fill the vacancies caused by the inability of these female service members to deploy.
Will women serving in the infantry be injured more frequently or more seriously? In a 2011 article, the Seattle Times estimated the Department of Veterans Affairs paid over $500 million in benefits annually for degenerative arthritis, cervical strains and other musculoskeletal injuries. Will disability payouts increase with women serving in the infantry? I believe the defense leadership must conduct an objective study of basic training and military-school injury rates by gender to more accurately predict answers to such questions.
I don’t raise these questions because I am a “hater” or a naysayer. I ask because I am a mother of both a son and a daughter. As a former service member, I wouldn’t have wanted to be forced into a job in which I was severely disadvantaged. I do not want my daughter mandated to fill a position in which she will have to put forth significantly greater effort than her peers just to survive in a time of war. I do not want my son forced into a job where he is at greater risk because those serving alongside him are disproportionately taxed physically.
My hope is that the dialogue regarding the opening of all military branches will be thoughtful and realistic, unclouded by agenda and emotion.
Ms. Pulley, a 2000 graduate of West Point, is a former captain in the U.S. Army.
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Mario Bacalla
Mario Bacalla just now
It is amazing that in these forums when you ask a specific question as part of a post or response, what you get back are usually opinions all over the place that are not even close to the specific response that you were looking for. It seems that few responders bother to read or comprehend what you are asking or talking about. It is as if they are so desperate to show the “world” their knowledge or opinion, that the subject matter be damned.
You ask why 2+2=4 and you are going to get back responses that go from; “you are too dumb to figure it out, you are using the wrong formula, because the sun rises in the east, to it is Obama’s fault”. Needless to say, frustrating but also revealing to the current state of affairs.
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william pogue
william pogue just now
Ms Pulley says what 100% of people who have been in Infantry combat say and believe. However, it is so Politically Incorrect, it goes unsaid and unheard! You go girl!!!
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Doug Schomberg
Doug Schomberg 5 minutes ago
There is a reason why women do not play football with men nor make the men's basketball team.
If you want a winning team, you need the best players on it...the infantry is no different.
If women can make the cut, put them on the field. But if they cannot, keep them off of it.
When the infantry team loses, people die.
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Charles Pierce
Charles Pierce 5 minutes ago
We have women in combat today and have always had women in combat. But putting women into combat positions, Armor, Infantry, Cavalry is a mistake. Do we need women in combat units, do we have a shortage of people wanting to serve in combat units? The answer is no we do not. The Marines have looked at mix infantry squads and found them to be lacking and less efficient than all male squads. Has anyone looked at the logistics of having women in combat units. If I go three or four weeks with out a shower or bath I do not have a problem, women do. We need to stop using the military in social experiments that do not increase the efficient of the force. I am a Retired Armor officer who was an Airborne/Ranger qualified individual.
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Julie Keene
Julie Keene 5 minutes ago
The Israeli military has had women in its infantry divisions for decades--since 1948--and it seems to work out.
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Charles Pierce
Charles Pierce 4 minutes ago
@Julie Keene but not in direct combat roles since the war for independence in 1947/1948.
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Julie Keene
Julie Keene 2 minutes ago
@Charles Pierce @Julie Keene
According to Wikipedia (I know, I know) "The 2000 Equality amendment to the Military Service law states that "The right of women to serve in any role in the IDF is equal to the right of men.""
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Skobelev’s Principle
SEPTEMBER 15, 2015 BY MICHAEL DEVOLIN
“I hold it as a principle that the duration of peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict on the enemy.” –Gen. Mikhail Skobelev, 1881
General Mikhail Skobelev’s words above were in reference to his defeat of the walled citadel of Geok-Tepe and his army’s complete depredation of the Tekke Turkmen, “a fierce, slave-taking people…” of Central Asia. “The Emperor’s orders were explicit,” writes Karl Meyer and Shareen Brysac in their book Tournament of Shadows: “Under no circumstances was Skobelev to take a single step backwards, ‘for this would be for Europe and Asia a sign of our weakness, would inspire still greater boldness on the part of our adversaries’.”
The Russians have always been known to upstage the West in regards to dealing with enemies. There is the story of two KGB agents kidnapped by a gang of quite imprudent Islamic Liberation Organization (ILO) operatives in Beirut. The story goes that the ILO kidnappers, after hiding the hostages away, then sent a message to the Russian embassy in Beirut demanding the release of certain ILO members (if I remember correctly) at that time incarcerated by the Lebanese government of the day.
Unbeknownst to the impulsive terrorists was the fact that the KGB was aware not only of where the two Russian citizens were being held captive, but also of the identities of the kidnappers. As a response to their demands the Russians sent to the safe house a box with the head of the leader of that particular ILO unit inside and the warning that if the two KGB agents were not released in a matter of hours, the next box they received would contain the heads of the kidnapper’s mothers. Needless to say, the KGB agents were released posthaste and the ILO never again harmed or threatened Soviet citizens anywhere.
There are also recent accounts about the Russian Navy mercilessly dispatching Somali pirates on the high seas. As a result, Somali pirates steer clear of all vessels flying the Russian flag. The lesson is obvious: deal harshly with your enemies and they will avoid you like the plague. “An angry countenance turns away a back-biting tongue.”
My point here is about dispassionate Russian wisdom being so broadly and ultimately contrary to Western liberalism and the insane and constrictive notion that we have no choice but to lay down our weapons, suspend punitive sanctions, and propose peace initiatives to enemies whose religiously cultivated arrogance has continually induced their leaders to mock Western peace initiatives, no matter how compromising.
The contradistinction between the two extremes—the wisdom of the former and the foolishness of the latter—seems to go unnoticed these days. President Obama plays nice with the Republic of Iran; Justin Trudeau, leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and vying to become the next Prime Minister of Canada promises that, if elected, he will call off Canada’s participation in air strikes against ISIS targets and restore diplomatic relations with Iran. Tom Mulcair, leader of the NDP Party of Canada, promises near the same.
There seems to be an extremely imprudent, oscillating duality infecting Western political leaders these days (with the notable exception of Canada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper). I see traditional political parties—Liberal, NDP, and Conservative in Canada, Republican and Democrats in the United States—exhibiting harmful traits eerily similar to those that brought down the mighty Spartans long ago; a duality, as pointed out in Paul Cartledge’s historical work The Spartans, that “led inevitably to divided counsels—dynastic rivalries, succession anxieties, faction fighting.” Three paragraphs later Cartledge writes, “The adage of Lord Acton—absolute power corrupts absolutely—applied vigorously in this case.” And isn’t this so in the case of Western democracies?
We have the leaders of European democracies condoning the influx of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees, many of whom leave a trail of trash and excrement (and damaged iPads) in their wake; many of whom have probably little or no interest in assimilating the traditions of their host countries; some of whom may likely turn out to be ISIS operatives. The so-called “opposition parties” applaud this gross imprudence from the other side of their respective parliament floors like a hired audience for a game show.
Compare these flabbergasted political sycophants with Putin and his answer to a question posed him by a Le Monde reporter about the war in Chechnya, “If you are a Christian, you are in danger. Even if you are an atheist, you are in danger, and if you decide to convert to Islam, this will not save you, either, because traditional Islam is inimical to the conditions and objectives set by the terrorists. If you are prepared to become a most radical Islamist and are prepared to circumcise yourself, I invite you to come to Moscow. I will recommend having the operation done in such a way that nothing will grow for you there anymore.”
When another reporter suggested that Putin negotiate with Chechen terrorist leaders following the Beslan massacre, he replied, “”Why don’t you meet Osama bin Laden, invite him to Brussels or to the White House and engage in talks, ask him what he wants and give it to him so he leaves you in peace? You find it possible to set some limitations in your dealings with these bastards, so why should we talk to people who are child-killers? No one has a moral right to tell us to talk to childkillers.”
I am in no way espousing Russia’s expansionist behaviour of late. I am suggesting that the West begin dealing with our terrorist enemies in similar fashion as the Russians have been dealing with theirs. Justin Trudeau’s suggestion that the “refugee problem” would be mitigated by calling off airstrikes against ISIS is a prime example of a tendentious Leftist politician choosing the exact opposite course of action as that which mere reason would implore, regardless the injurious ingredients those choices (like allowing Syrian refugees into Canada without security restrictions) would obtrude upon what would become by then a victimized, albeit self-deceived, Canadian populace.
The “refugee problem” facing Western democracies in Europe and North America is a catastrophe that should be dealt with by Middle Eastern Islamic countries instead of Western democracies.
That these Muslim refugees are seeking safe haven in an infidel-ruled Western Europe instead of the oil-rich countries of their fellow religious says everything about the finer points of Islam and those nation-states where it has long ago gained preponderance. Where is the love? The one sure way—the stratagem invoked by mere reason—to obviate this refugee crisis emanating out of Syria and beyond is the total elimination, from the air and on the ground, of ISIS and their supporters.
The fact that ISIS has, by violently brutal conquest, been continually gaining new territory should be profiled by so-called “experts” not as a failure of Western military forces in halting their advance but rather a failure on the part of Middle Eastern Islamic states and their armed forces to deal with a danger that has, from the very beginning of this human tragedy, been far more approximate to their existence, both politically and religiously, than it has ever been to Western democracies.
So why are we fighting their war? And if we are forced to fight their war simply because they refuse to fight it themselves, let us be efficient and militarily laconic in disposing of this enemy.
Let us acquire a “duration of peace,” its anticipated longevity measured only by the level of destruction we inflict upon this enemy of all humanity. And afterward, after we dispose of ISIS, let us hold these Islamic nations to account for turning their backs on their fellow Muslims, on a humanitarian crisis that was always theirs, not ours; that was spawned out of the bowels of the religion of Islam and the imperialism it advocates and from nowhere else.
Let us point this out to them, just as they are so ever wont to point out our sins. Let us apply Skobelev’s principle to our enemies in the same way they apply Islamic jihad to us.
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Gender Integration of Marines Brings Out Unusually Public Discord
By DAVE PHILIPPSSEPT. 18, 2015
The Marine Corps and its civilian leadership at the Pentagon are squaring off in an unusually public dispute over whether integrating women into the corps’s all-male combat units will undermine the units’ effectiveness, or whether the male-dominated Marine leadership is cherry-picking justifications to keep women out.
The military is facing a deadline set by the Obama administration to integrate women into all combat jobs by 2016 or ask for specific exemptions. The Marines, with a 93 percent male force dominated by infantry, are widely seen as the branch with the hardest integration task. The Marine Corps has the most units closed to women and still trains male and female recruits separately.
The tension began last week when the Marine Corps released a summary of a nine-month, $36 million study that found that integrated combat units were slower, had more injuries and were less accurate when firing weapons.
The commandant of the Marine Corps, Gen. Joseph F. Dunford Jr., submitted the corps’s recommendation on gender integration to the secretary of the Navy, Ray Mabus, on Thursday. Pentagon officials said the corps was expected to request an exemption for at least some front-line combat units.
Mr. Mabus, the civilian head of the Marine Corps, has steadfastly said in public statements that the Marine Corps study is flawed and that its summary findings were picked from a much larger study in a manner that was biased toward keeping women out of combat roles.
In an interview Thursday, Mr. Mabus said he planned to push ahead with integration despite the study. “My belief is you set gender-neutral standards related to the job Marines have to do, and you adhere to them,” he said. “It doesn’t matter whether the Marines who meet those standards are male or female.”
Further complicating the dispute is the fact that General Dunford, who will take over next week as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will be responsible for submitting recommendations to the secretary of defense for all the armed services, including the United States Special Operations Command. Officials in the Army, Navy and Air Force have suggested they are not likely to seek exemptions on integration.
On the surface, the debate within the Marine Corps has centered on the physical abilities of men and women. But critics say the dispute is also driven by a male-dominated culture that encourages Marines to believe that their esprit de corps will be undermined by the presence of women.
“The Marines have a climate of non-inclusivity and justify it by talking about combat effectiveness, but a lot of it is based on emotion and not fact,” said Lt. Col. Kate Germano, who was removed as the commander of female Marine recruits this summer after she pushed for integration and clashed with male superiors. “A lot of them, especially the older generation, believe integrating women will be disastrous in war.”
A recent op-ed by retired Lt. Gen. Gregory Newbold of the Marines laid out the concerns about integration, saying women posed a threat to the “alchemy that produces an effective infantry unit.”
“The characteristics that produce uncommon valor as a common virtue are not physical at all,” Mr. Newbold wrote in the piece, published in the online magazine War on the Rocks, “but are derived from the mysterious chemistry that forms in an infantry unit that revels in the most crude and profane existence so that they may be more effective killers than their foe.”
He asked rhetorically how mixing men and women of “the most libido-laden age cohort in humans, in the basest of environs, will not degrade the nearly spiritual glue that enables the infantry to achieve the illogical and endure the unendurable.”
Mr. Newbold could not be reached for comment.
Mr. Mabus dismissed the idea that women would erode unit cohesion and lower morale.
“That is almost exactly the same argument made against ending racial segregation in the military, and the ban on gays — that it will ruin morale,” he said in the interview. “And it just isn’t true. We’ve seen that.”
A senior Pentagon official briefed on the Marine Corps study, who was not authorized to speak publicly, said a separate, unreleased study on the same group of Marines, by the Naval Health Research Center, showed that while women scored lower in many physical tasks and had higher injury rates, they scored higher in mental resilience and had fewer mental health problems. The study also found that integrated units rated their unit cohesion at the same levels as all-male units and outperformed male units at making complex decisions, the official said.
The disagreement between the Marine Corps and the Pentagon is a rare public display of tension in a culture that generally values silent professionals.
“I’m struck by how much they aired their dirty laundry in public,” said Michael E. O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution specializing in defense issues. “The Marine leadership is definitely dubious and reluctant about this. I think they know they will have to integrate, but they have real concerns about what it will mean to the force.”
Mr. Mabus will make his recommendation to Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter by January. Mr. Carter recently echoed Mr. Mabus’s belief that women should be able to enter all military careers if they can meet standards set for their tasks.
Some Marines familiar with the corps’s integration study are concerned that changes to current operations could threaten lives. Sgt. Maj. Justin D. LeHew, a decorated Iraq war veteran who oversaw the integration tests, said in a post on his personal Facebook page this week that lowering standards to allow women into combat teams would endanger other Marines. The post was soon taken down, but was published by Marine Corps Times.
“In regards to the infantry... there is no trophy for second place. You perform or die,” Sergeant LeHew wrote. “Make no mistake. In this realm, you want your fastest, most fit, most physical and most lethal person you can possibly put on the battlefield to overwhelm the enemy’s ability to counter what you are throwing at them, and in every test case, that person has turned out to be a man. There is nothing gender biased about this; it is what it is.”
The Pentagon will announce final decisions on integrating the remaining closed positions and occupations and on any approved exceptions around Jan. 1, Capt. Jeff Davis, a spokesman, said.
Captain Davis said that since 2013, some 111,000 jobs that women were previously excluded from had opened up to them, with 220,000 still closed. Presumably, the bulk of those will open come January.
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http://sputniknews.com/europe/20150924/1027457868/germany-laser-gun.html
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http://www.people.com/article/female-ranger-school-graduation-planned-advance
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http://www.people.com/article/female-ranger-school-graduation-planned-advance
This is my shocked face.
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I remember reading long ago Lt Gen McMasters when he was a major. What I read was about what he did in Desert Storm. He had very interesting insights into military matters then. The last I heard of him was probably around 1998, when he was a Lt Col. He is now head of Training Doctrine and Command (TRADOC) when seeks to plot the needs and strategy of future wars.
(Gen Fred Franks ran TRADOC after Desert Storm. He commanded the Ground Forces in Desert Storm. Interestingly, he lost a leg below the knee in Vietnam, and was eventually allowed to return to duty then, an unheard of event. Worth reading his book on Desert Storm done with Tom Clancy.)
See, I do know a bit about a bit of different things..... :lol:
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Damn...forgot to link....
http://m.military.com/daily-news/2015/09/16/us-army-wants-more-firepower-across-formations-general-says.html?ESRC=army_150921.nl (http://m.military.com/daily-news/2015/09/16/us-army-wants-more-firepower-across-formations-general-says.html?ESRC=army_150921.nl)
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This would be fun in a fire fight......
http://www.military.com/equipment/xm25-counter-defilade-target-engagement-system (http://www.military.com/equipment/xm25-counter-defilade-target-engagement-system)
25mm grenade launcher with airburst capacity. Puts my old M201a - M16 with 4omm grenade launcher to shame. (First time I ever fired the 40mm, it went about 50 yards before hitting the ground and exploding. Range Instructor was not happy with me.)
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http://www.wsj.com/articles/obama-takes-the-military-hostage-1445297057
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http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/10/20/ballistic-missile-defense-bmd-navy-destroyer-ross-sullivans-frigate-provincien-lezo-hebrides-scotland-test-exercise-target/74299016/
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http://www.11bravos.com/blog/being-separated-from-the-army-is-as-easy-as-stopping-a-rape/
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This is a rather lengthy read about the USAF gender actions and harassment. This Tech Sgt appears to being railroaded in the military quest to eliminate any "gender bias" or harassment. He could face 130 years in prison. In fact, he is facing charges far greater that the traitor Bergdahl. Even the level at which the trial will occur is greater than that of the traitor. His crime, touching a female airman, being crass, etc.
Hell, when I was in the AF, the worst offense would have been an Article 15, and more likely, a letter of reprimand.
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/5/aaron-allmon-case-makes-minot-air-force-base-groun/ (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/nov/5/aaron-allmon-case-makes-minot-air-force-base-groun/)
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It is like there has been a fundamental transformation of this country.
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How a New Bomber Will Shape U.S. Military Strategy
Analysis
November 5, 2015 | 09:15 GMT Print
Text Size
A concept drawing of the next-generation long-range strike bomber. (Northrop Grumman)
Forecast
The United States' new long-range strike bomber aircraft will combine existing technologies in one model to make the U.S. bomber fleet more effective and versatile.
The move to bring all U.S. bombers under a single, separate command will raise their status and make them a key component of the U.S. strategy to project power worldwide.
The networking technology used in contemporary fighter aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles will ease the integration of the latest bombers with the rest of the U.S. Air Force's network-centric warfare capabilities.
Analysis
The U.S. Air Force is developing a new bomber that promises to secure the U.S. advantage in modern warfare. The next-generation long-range strike bomber, recently awarded to Northrop Grumman Corp. for development, will not be designed to rely on as yet undeveloped technologies, as is so often the case with new aircraft and weaponry. Instead, the aircraft will combine and fully exploit existing advanced stealth technology, integrated software, ordnance and countermeasures. In effect, the military is consolidating the best of its technology in one package. At the same time, the U.S. Air Force has decided to aggregate all of its bombers under a single, unified command, clearing the way to making bombers a more central part of its operations. Thus the new long-range strike bomber is poised to become a central pillar of the U.S. strategy to project its power throughout the globe.
Maintaining an Edge in Conventional Warfare
The B-2, the latest bomber model currently in use by the U.S. Air Force, was developed nearly 20 years ago. Since that time, newer aircraft have incorporated the significant technological advancements that have been made since the B-2's inception. Some of this technology has made its way into the United States' B-52, B-1B and B-2 bomber fleets, but the new bomber model will bring all of these technologies together in one comprehensive design, making fuller use of each to better meet modern strategic and tactical needs. At the same time, the new bomber is designed to be especially easy to upgrade as more advanced technology emerges.
The next-generation bomber comes not a moment too soon. Although the United States' current bombers will last for some time, they are rapidly losing their competitive edge against the aircraft developed by rapidly strengthening military powers such as China and Russia. And while the bulk of the current U.S. bomber force will have to be replaced by 2037, the U.S. Air Force expects Chinese technological advances to overtake the most modern B-2 bomber much sooner, perhaps as early as 2020. The introduction of the new long-range strike bomber — and in particular, its more advanced stealth technology — will therefore be critical to maintaining the U.S. advantage in conventional combat operations.
The Network-Centric Approach
Apart from stealth technology, the new bomber also features modern sensor packages that provide a clearer picture of the battlefield. Sensors of this type have already been installed in several other U.S. military aircraft, and a range of tests by the U.S. Air Force have shown they can help accurately and independently identify and engage targets. During Operation Resultant Fury in 2004, perhaps one of the most significant of these tests, B-52 and B-1 bombers were able to sink multiple moving maritime targets. These demonstrations suggest that in an actual combat situation, aircraft could detect, engage and destroy enemy vessels with precision-guided munitions. And the advanced sensor packages that make this possible are an important part of the design for the new U.S. long-range strike bomber. They give the United States a technological edge that could become even more important in future conflicts. If, for instance, conflict arises with China in the Pacific someday, technology that allows the U.S. military to effectively strike maritime targets will become a powerful tool for the United States.
Operation Resultant Fury also publicly tested the U.S. ability to conduct "network-centric warfare," an important concept in modern warfare dictating that countries should attempt to translate their information advantage into a competitive edge on the battlefield. To do so often requires broad task forces comprising several different moving parts that work in concert with each other, connected by an advanced and reliable network. The new bomber's sensor packages could help make that happen. In the 2004 test, bombers coordinated with intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance planes, command and control aircraft, refueling tankers and fighter jets. Though it was the bombers that ultimately delivered the decisive blow that completed the mission, the real feat of the exercise was the fact that the military was able to successfully integrate information collected from sensors on such a broad array of platforms. Pulling all this information together allowed surveillance and command platforms to identify and track numerous mobile maritime targets and lead the striking aircraft directly to them.
The advanced sensor packages on the new long-range strike bomber, then, will likely enable effective coordination with other vehicles during joint operations. The new bomber's network will be integrated with already existing platforms, including a wide variety of unmanned aerial vehicles, which will make cooperation even smoother. Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force's broader objective is to develop its network-centric warfare capabilities in its other aircraft, including the F-35 fighter jet, effectively creating a wider web of sensors for the new bomber to integrate into. The easier it is for all these platforms to interact, the more effective each one becomes in the long run.
An Asymmetric Advantage
The latest bomber model could also create significant gains for the United States in asymmetric warfare. Bombers can spend a great deal of time flying over potential targets while carrying substantial amounts of ordnance. This offers a distinct advantage in conflicts against insurgencies and actors such as the Islamic State, which are often weaker than states in terms of traditional military power. For example, in the final months of 2014 and at the start of 2015, U.S. B-1B bombers played an important role in the battle to retake the Syrian city of Kobani from the Islamic State. With the help of refueling tankers, the bombers spent eight hours over the city expending their munitions in individual, precision-guided strikes against Islamic State fighters as they emerged. The long-range strike bomber will seek to improve upon these capabilities, both with its advanced sensor packages and with its potential to develop further into an unmanned platform. The aircraft would essentially be able to go anywhere in the world and remain in the air for as long as its ample ordnance lasts.
With its various advantages in assymetric and maritime warfare, the new long-range srike bomber will play a central role in the United States' projection of power abroad. Indeed, this has already been partially reflected in the recent restructuring of the U.S. Air Force. Since April, the United States has drawn all of its bomber aircraft under a single umbrella: the Global Strike Command. Prior to the reorganization, the Global Strike Command controlled nuclear-armed bomber aircraft and nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles. The remaining bombers reported to the Air Combat Command. Now, the Global Strike Command will be able to move beyond its nuclear role by assuming control over all long-range striking capability. The move to place all strategic bombers under their own separate command will likely raise the profile of the U.S. bomber force, paving the way for it to emerge as a distinct pillar of U.S. military might.
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http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/us-military-tries-halt-brain-drain/413965/
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Here's some thinking on how warfare will change over the next twenty years.
Fast forward 20 years (about the age of the WWW). An aging, schlerotic EU has become the destination for over a hundred million refugees and migrants fleeing the densely populated killing fields of Africa and SW Asia.
The rapidity of influx has led the EU to take extreme measures. Tens of millions of these migrants/refugees are roughly housed in relocation camps all across Europe.
Violence within these camps has risen steadily, leading to an EU-wide Islamic insurgency.
The soldiers sent to counter this insurgency are outfitted with autonomous weapons. These weapons combine deep learning (making them very smart) and cloud robotics (allowing the military to rapidly share advances in training and technique) to provide these soldiers with capabilities far beyond what we've seen in previous wars.
Here's an idealized example so you can get the idea. A human/robot team advances down a street in an urban environment.
Big Data: The autonomous weapons used by the team continuously scans the street in all directions. These weapons can visually ID everyone on the street from a database of 3.5 billion people in under a second. It also continuously analyzes the people, windows, etc. down the street looking for the visual signatures of concealed weapons and IEDs. i.e. A car at the end of the street is resting a bit too heavily on its springs, indicating there may be explosives in it. These weapons learned to do this based on billions of hours of combat and police training images/footage (aka Big Data).
Customized Training: The human members of the team have trained the weapons to alert the team when it sees any electric vehicles demonstrating even the slightest bit of irregular behavior -- the rapid acceleration possible with autonomously driven electric vehicles can make them dangerous kinetic threats in three seconds.
Cloud training: The autonomous weapons with the soldiers with connections to military's cloud. Fortunately, this connection to the cloud gave these weapons access to the certified methodologies for identifying and neutralizing a new DIED (drone IED) used by Islamic insurgents only yesterday. This paid off. The new DIED entered the street behind the team, and the systems new how to ID it, engage it, and neutralize its countermeasures flawlessly. During the engagement, the human team member noticed a slight change in the behavior of the DIED -- it released its homemade cluster bomblets earlier than anticipated. The data/footage of the engagement is tagged with a note to this effect and it is uploaded to the cloud in order to add to the approved methods for countering it.
Of course, much of this capability might become open source and available to anyone smart enough to employ it.
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Europe existing in 20 years is quite optimistic.
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http://www.allenbwest.com/2015/12/as-obama-orders-women-in-combat-look-what-we-discovered-about-female-army-rangers/
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http://www.allenbwest.com/2015/12/as-obama-orders-women-in-combat-look-what-we-discovered-about-female-army-rangers/
Wow.... three cases proving the Left's agenda of equality and the competence of women, and they shred the records?
Why on earth would they do that, unless those three "Ranger" women had the standards lowered?
:-o
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http://weaponsman.com/?p=27569
Nothing to worry about.
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http://weaponsman.com/?p=27569
Nothing to worry about.
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/12/05/us-air-force-will-need-more-bombs-for-isis.html?intcmp=hpbt3
Running on empty.
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WASHINGTON — As American intelligence agencies grapple with the expansion of the Islamic State beyond its headquarters in Syria, the Pentagon has proposed a new plan to the White House to build up a string of military bases in Africa, Southwest Asia and the Middle East.
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The bases could be used for collecting intelligence and carrying out strikes against the terrorist group’s far-flung affiliates.
The growth of the Islamic State’s franchises — at least eight militant groups have pledged loyalty to the network’s leaders so far — has forced a debate within the Obama administration about how to distinguish between the affiliates that pose the most immediate threat to the United States and Europe and others that are more regionally focused. The regional groups, some officials say, may have opportunistically adopted the Islamic State’s brand to bolster their local clout and global stature.
In the midst of that debate, senior military officials have told the White House that the network of bases would serve as hubs for Special Operations troops and intelligence operatives who would conduct counterterrorism missions for the foreseeable future. The plan would all but ensure what Pentagon officials call an “enduring” American military presence in some of the world’s most volatile regions.
Administration officials said that the proposal for the new basing system, presented to the White House this fall by Gen. Martin E. Dempsey during his final days as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was not intended to be a specific Pentagon proposal to combat the affiliates of the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. The officials said that it was meant primarily as a re-examination of how the military positions itself for future counterterrorism missions, but that the growing concern about a metastasizing Islamic State threat has lent new urgency to the discussions.
The White House declined to comment about continuing internal deliberations. The plan has met with some resistance from State Department officials concerned about a more permanent military presence across Africa and the Middle East, according to American officials familiar with the discussion. Career diplomats have long warned about the creeping militarization of American foreign policy as the Pentagon has forged new relationships with foreign governments eager for military aid.
Officials said the proposal has been under discussion for some time, including this week during a White House meeting with some members of President Obama’s cabinet. Shortly after General Dempsey retired in September, Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter referred to the plan in a little-noticed speech in Washington. “Because we cannot predict the future, these regional nodes — from Morón, Spain, to Jalalabad, Afghanistan — will provide forward presence to respond to a range of crises, terrorist and other kinds,” Mr. Carter said. “These will enable unilateral crisis response, counterterror operations, or strikes on high-value targets.”
Pentagon planners do not see the new approach as particularly costly by military standards. One official estimated it could be in the “low millions of dollars,” mainly to pay for military personnel, equipment and some base improvements.
For the approach to have any chance of success, analysts said, regional American commanders, diplomats and spies will have to work closely together and with Washington — something that does not always happen now — to combat threats that honor no borders. “You can’t just leave this on cruise control,” said Vikram J. Singh, a former official at the Pentagon and State Department who is now vice president for national security and international policy at the Center for American Progress.
Officials said that the Pentagon’s proposed new architecture of bases would include four “hubs” — including expanding existing bases in Djibouti and Afghanistan — and smaller “spokes,” or more basic installations, in countries that could include Niger and Cameroon, where the United States now carries out unarmed surveillance drone missions, or will soon.
The hubs would range in size from about 500 American troops to 5,000 personnel, and the likely cost would be “several million dollars” a year, mostly in personnel expenses, Pentagon officials said. They would also require the approval of the host nation.
The military already has much of the basing in place to carry out an expansion. Over the past dozen years, the Pentagon has turned what was once a decrepit French Foreign Legion base in Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, into a sprawling headquarters housing 2,000 American troops for military operations in East Africa and Yemen.
Similarly, the American military has been using a constellation of airstrips in Africa, including Ethiopia and Burkina Faso, for surveillance missions flown by drones or turboprop planes designed to look like civilian aircraft, to collect intelligence about militant groups across the northern part of the continent.
The Pentagon plan also calls for a hub in the Middle East, possibly Erbil, in northern Iraq, where many of the 3,500 American troops in Iraq are based.
The Islamic State emerged from a group of militants in Iraq to take over large portions of Iraq and Syria, and now threatens other countries in Europe and elsewhere.
The new approach would try to bring an ad hoc series of existing bases into one coherent system that would be able to confront regional threats from the Islamic State, Al Qaeda or other terrorist groups — including possible attacks against American embassies, like the assault on the diplomatic compound in Benghazi, Libya, in 2012. It would also ensure that the bases would receive regular financing in the annual Pentagon budget and it could lengthen — and make more predictable — troop deployments, especially among Special Operations forces who often rotate assignments every several months.
A senior Pentagon official said the proposal was still very much in its early stages, with some officials advocating a larger string of new bases in West Africa, and others, mindful of African fears about a large American military footprint on the continent, saying the main hub for West Africa would actually be located in southern Europe. Any American bases in Africa, American officials said, might have approximately 500 soldiers.
For instance, American officials said that the intelligence agencies were generally unanimous in their view that the Islamic State affiliate in Libya and some of the other franchises had strong ties to the group’s leaders in the Islamic State’s self-declared caliphate in Syria and Iraq, and that they had a desire to carry out its agenda of attacking the West.
But there is greater uncertainty about groups like Boko Haram, a Nigerian-based Islamic militancy responsible for years of destruction in north-central Africa. The group announced its allegiance to the Islamic State this year, but American officials have given conflicting statements about the strength of Boko Haram’s bonds to the Islamic State’s top leadership.
Gen. Joseph E. Dunford Jr., who took over in October from General Dempsey as chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told Congress this month that he saw little to distinguish among the Islamic State affiliates. He said that the Islamic State’s inclusion of Boko Haram and other militant groups into its fold was part of a “global dynamic.”
“These threats are difficult to confine to one place,” he said, adding that was why the United States needed to strike at the Islamic State not only in Iraq and Syria but also in “other places where it is.”
But Gen. David M. Rodriguez, commander of the Pentagon’s Africa Command, said around the same time that he did not see strong ties between the Islamic State and Boko Haram, which he indicated still saw itself as a regionally focused group.
One American intelligence official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was discussing classified assessments about the various groups, said that the Islamic State “does not vet the new affiliates” with the same scrutiny that Al Qaeda does, and generally welcomes any opportunities to build its global brand.
The affiliates, the official said, are a mélange of different identities and agendas — and some might not be “completely subsumed” into the Islamic State.
While he said that some groups were the result of active efforts by the Islamic State to expand its global presence, others like Boko Haram and the Islamic State branch in the Sinai Peninsula were products of local circumstances and were seeking to exploit the group’s resources and prominence.
They are flying the Islamic State flag, he said, “in an attempt to elevate their cause.”
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A good video on the Roman legion and how it is believed to have been used at least for a time in Roman history. Includes the scene out of the Douglas/Kubrick Spartacus' movie showing the approaching Roman juggernaut.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ndh3b9wC-A0
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3068216/Pentagon-spend-2billion-shield-War-Games-mountain-bunker-EMP-attack-North-Korea-Iran.html
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xR6CLFQt7VI
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Hat tip to our Doug:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2016/01/06/us-navy-fleet-ship-size-aircraft-carriers-pournelle-column/78238004/
http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2015-07/deadly-future-littoral-sea-control
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http://nypost.com/2016/01/16/the-rape-of-the-us-marine-corps-a-lunatic-drive-for-fairness/
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http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-air-supremacy-fading-fast-15458
Fundamental change.
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:cry: :cry: :cry: :x :x :x :x :x :x
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Skunk works
Russia and China may be giving the U.S. a run for its money in the military modernization race, but the head of Lockheed Martin's famed Skunk Works is still pretty confident in America's edge in fifth generation fighter jets. Skunk Works has been home to some of the world's most innovative -- and classified -- development of military aviation projects, like the iconic SR-71 Blackbird and the F-117, America's first stealth fighter jet. Rob Weiss, Lockheed's Skunk Works boss, tells Defense One that the U.S. F-22 and F-35 have little to sweat from rivals and that the U.S. may not need to replace them for another 30 years. Rivals have nonetheless tried to catch up to America's lead in fifth generation jets, with China working hard on the Chengdu J-20 and Russia developing the Sukhoi PAK-FA.
Air Force
The U.S. Air Force has taken a look at the way the Navy wants to fund its submarine modernization program, and wants a piece of the action. Air Force Secretary Deborah Lee James told a congressional panel Wednesday they should really think about funding a joint service "strategic deterrence" account that would pay for the Air Force’s B-21 bomber as well as refitting the Navy’s Ohio-class ballistic submarines. "If [there] is a strategic deterrence fund that would help or benefit one leg of the triad, I would ask for consideration that all legs of the triad be included in such an approach."
Army
Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley told the House Armed Services Committee on Wednesday that he'd have "grave concerns about the readiness of our force" in a major conventional throwdown with a country like China, Russia, Iran or North Korea. Milley told the lawmakers that the past decade or so of focus on wars like Iraq and Afghanistan have prepared the service well for combat in counterinsurgencies and small wars, but at the expense of preparedness against larger conventional adversaries
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Share
What the Next Arms Race Will Look Like
Analysis
March 21, 2016 | 09:30 GMT Print
Text Size
An artist's illustration of DARPA's Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2. (DARPA)
Forecast
The design, production and fielding of hypersonic missiles — though expensive and technologically complicated — is becoming more feasible.
The United States and China will likely incorporate the first operational long-range hypersonic missiles into their arsenals by 2025, with Russia lagging a few years behind.
Once they are deployed, hypersonic missiles will revolutionize warfighting in certain conventional and nuclear settings.
Analysis
A new arms race is unfolding between the world's great powers. Hypersonic missiles, which are both accurate and extremely fast, stand to change the face of modern warfare by rendering the current generation of missile defense systems ineffective. As competition heats up among Russia, China and the United States to be the first to deploy hypersonic missiles, each will become more vulnerable to attack by the others. If tensions rise, so will the risk of pre-emptive strikes among the longtime rivals.
Hypersonic missiles travel at least five times the speed of sound. Only a few other manmade devices are capable of reaching hypersonic speeds, including ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles and unmanned spacecraft such as the Boeing X-37. The only manned aircraft to achieve hypersonic speed is the rocket-powered North American X-15, which broke speed and altitude records when it was introduced in the 1960s.
The rocket-powered North American X-15 in flight. (NASA/Wikimedia Commons)
Recently, the focus of research in hypersonic technologies has shifted toward missile development, but several challenges must be overcome to make hypersonic missiles a reality. First, it is difficult to create a weapon that can reach hypersonic speeds while enduring the stress and extreme temperatures of hypersonic flight. It is harder still to ensure that the weapon can maintain those speeds for an extended period — enough time to reach its target. Second, high velocities can make a hypersonic vehicle sensitive to changes in flight conditions, resulting in instability in the missile's airframe during flight. Coupled with the fact that high speeds leave less time to course correct, this instability can make guidance of hypersonic missiles problematic. Finally, hypersonic vehicles' actual flight paths often do not match the predictions researchers derive from ground tests and theoretical models, lengthening the process of development.
Despite these obstacles, hypersonic missiles have some considerable advantages. Their speed enables them to reach their targets much more quickly than other missiles and to better penetrate enemy defense systems. Those with gliding capabilities can also cover great distances, enabling one country to strike at another from farther away. Guided hypersonic missiles would be more accurate than traditional ballistic missiles, and they could conceivably be armed with nuclear warheads, becoming a strike asset or a deterrent in nuclear warfare.
From Theory to Reality
It will not be long before hypersonic missiles find their way out of the lab and onto the battlefield. In late February, U.S. Maj. Gen. Thomas Masiello announced that the U.S. Air Force plans to have operational prototypes ready for testing by 2020. The U.S. Air Force already conducted four flights of the experimental X-51 hypersonic cruise missile from 2010 to 2013, two of which were considered successes. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin has made substantial progress on its Hypersonic Air-breathing Weapon Concept and Tactical Boost Glide vehicle.
The X-51 WaveRider hypersonic flight test vehicle uploaded onto a B-52 bomber. (U.S. Air Force/Wikimedia Commons)
China is close behind, and it appears to be on track for deployment by 2020 as well. In 2014, China conducted three tests of its DF-ZF hypersonic strike vehicle, followed by three more in 2015. The U.S. military deemed all but one of the tests successful. Russia is developing its own hypersonic glide vehicle, the Yu-71, though its ambitions of fielding the vehicle in the next four years may be overly optimistic. (Moscow's sole test of the Yu-71, in 2015, was a failure.) But one of Russia's relatively short-range hypersonic missiles, the 3M22 Zircon, underwent its first test on March 18, and a second model (the BrahMos-II) will be ready for testing around 2017.
A scaled down model of the BrahMos-II hypersonic missile. (Wikimedia Commons)
As the world's biggest powers race to build up their hypersonic arsenals, the nature of battle will fundamentally change. Missile defense systems will struggle to counter hypersonic flight, making targets — especially large naval warships — more vulnerable to attack. In time, this could drive the development of directed-energy weapons (such as high-powered lasers or microwaves) as a possible way of countering hypersonic missiles. But as has been the case for revolutionary military technologies in the past, the best defense will be to destroy the missiles before they can launch, increasing war planners' emphasis on offensive action.
Countries will have an incentive to launch pre-emptive strikes against their enemies to knock out hypersonic missile caches before the missiles can be deployed. Moreover, guidance systems, along with command, control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance networks — the weakest components of hypersonic missile capabilities — will become critical targets. At the same time, states with hypersonic missiles (and the bigger offensive advantage they bring) will have less need for stealth technology to penetrate enemy defenses.
Nuclear warfare — and strategies to deter nuclear conflict — will be altered as well. Though increasingly effective anti-ballistic missile technologies will continue to be important against opponents that lack hypersonic weapons, they will be of little use in countering hypersonic missiles equipped with nuclear warheads. Because hypersonic missiles are so difficult to detect and counter, countries could be motivated to pre-emptively strike at an enemy developing a hypersonic capability. As hypersonic missiles undermine the fragile balance among global nuclear powers more and more, many countries will be forced to re-examine their deterrence and national security strategies, potentially contributing to greater uncertainty and instability in the long run.
Lead Analyst: Omar Lamrani
Send us your thoughts on this report.
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http://breakingdefense.com/2016/03/marines-scrounge-yorktown-museum-f-18-for-spare-parts-how-bad-is-it/
Got to love the Obama era.
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http://www.cnet.com/pictures/meet-the-navys-new-13-billion-aircraft-carrier/?ftag=ACQ9265a8a&vndid=1846635544&ttag=cnet-fb-528&nan_pid=1846635544
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http://sputniknews.com/military/20160605/1040814482/russia-leader-class-destroyer.html#ixzz4Al1MxSUf
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https://www.conservativereview.com/commentary/2016/06/gop-congressman-urges-congress-to-say-no-to-illegal-aliens-serving-in-the-military
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http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3701727/Navy-s-12-9-billion-USS-Gerald-R-Ford-delayed-dogged-reliability-issues.html
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:-o :-o :-o :x :x :x
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https://news.usni.org/2016/07/28/navy-name-ship-gay-rights-activist-harvey-milk
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http://sputniknews.com/military/20160605/1040814482/russia-leader-class-destroyer.html#ixzz4Al1MxSUf
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http://myemail.constantcontact.com/U-S--Army-Special-Operations-Command-Primer-on-Russian-Unconventional-Warfare-in-Ukraine-2013-2014.html?soid=1114009586911&aid=HmpsJxbGGlM
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http://www.nationalreview.com/article/438622/muslim-soldiers-attack-troops?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20Trending%20Email%20Reoccurring-%20Monday%20to%20Thursday%202016-08-03&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
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http://usdefensewatch.com/2016/08/ray-mabus-social-experiment-navy-is-steaming-ahead-to-disaster/
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http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a19199/pentagon-reports-puts-hard-limits-on-f-35s-combat-utility/
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tail wags the dog:
http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-iraq-mosul-20160921-snap-story.html
Why announce this before an offensive , right before an election? :wink:
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https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-rosa-brooks-how-everything-became-war-and-military-became-everything
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Any chance there is a transcript of this Big Dog? I read faster than people talk :-D
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Rather superficial, but raises some interesting questions:
http://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/heres-who-would-win-if-russia-china-and-america-went-to-war-right-now
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The zumwalt which has had 3 breakdowns is more expensive than an aircraft carrier . The 4 billion for air force one was a close second:
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443165/zumwalt-class-navy-stealth-destroyer-program-failure
The revolving door of the military industrial complex is the exact same as the lobbyist politician revolving door of greed.
Sure we all want a strong military and the most advanced weapons systems but not with open check books.
Trump is absolutely correct in questioning the cost of air force one. And he needs to start cleaning the swamp of our military government political complex people.
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His new rules blocking government employees from lobbying for 5 years after leaving government are simply brilliant.
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http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443165/zumwalt-class-navy-stealth-destroyer-program-failure?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Daily%20Trending%20Email%20Reoccurring-%20Monday%20to%20Thursday%202016-12-19&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
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From this article it is clear that 56 years after Eisenhower's warning - no one listened to him
Yeah let's get ripper off spending trillions while china and russia rip off the designs for peanuts on the dollar to copy them for stuff that doesn't work
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443612/f-35-donald-trump-should-cancel-failed-f-35-fighter-jet-program
It is one tiger tank vs 100 T 34s.
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Any chance there is a transcript of this Big Dog? I read faster than people talk :-D
Brooks has a highly regarded book of the same name.
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From this article it is clear that 56 years after Eisenhower's warning - no one listened to him
Yeah let's get ripper off spending trillions while china and russia rip off the designs for peanuts on the dollar to copy them for stuff that doesn't work
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443612/f-35-donald-trump-should-cancel-failed-f-35-fighter-jet-program
It is one tiger tank vs 100 T 34s.
http://nsnetwork.org/cms/assets/uploads/2015/08/F-35_FINAL.pdf
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From this article it is clear that 56 years after Eisenhower's warning - no one listened to him
Yeah let's get ripper off spending trillions while china and russia rip off the designs for peanuts on the dollar to copy them for stuff that doesn't work
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/443612/f-35-donald-trump-should-cancel-failed-f-35-fighter-jet-program
It is one tiger tank vs 100 T 34s.
http://nsnetwork.org/cms/assets/uploads/2015/08/F-35_FINAL.pdf
Well, it's provided China with low cost R&D for their much less costly fighters that they produce at much greater numbers.
So, we got that going for us.
http://www.atimes.com/article/chinas-spies-gain-valuable-us-defense-technology-report/
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http://dailycaller.com/2017/01/27/mattiss-first-big-move-is-likely-to-rankle-military-elites/
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http://dailycaller.com/2017/01/27/mattiss-first-big-move-is-likely-to-rankle-military-elites/
My very non-expert opinion is that the F-35 is gold plated junk.
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I share similar and equally non-expert suspicions that it is too complex and hard to keep flying under less than ideal conditions and wonder about the range of problems it solves.
Fortunately it is not left to me-- in Sec Def Mattis we have someone whose judgment I trust.
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http://www.nationalreview.com/article/444387/f-35-replacement-upgrades-new-designs-replace-joint-strike-fighter
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Who knows into whose hands these weapons could fall?
http://www.investigativeproject.org/5777/sunni-states-military-spending-sprees-could-fall#
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https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/emergence-the-changing-character-of-competition-and-conflict/
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second post
Previously posted, but worth posting again:
http://cco.ndu.edu/PRISM-6-3/Article/1020271/an-interview-with-stanley-mcchrystal/
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Third post
Are We at the Start of a Tech World War?
It’s a battle unlike any we’ve ever seen before
Nick Bilton
06 July 2016
During this past year, various theories have been posited to suggest that our current political mood might foretell a reckoning so dark that it could eventually spiral into a veritable international crisis—some terrifying World War III doomsday scenario. Some of these hypotheses have been undeniably hysterical, for sure. But others have been remarkably, even eerily, sober. And now, with a world on edge, they have gone mainstream.
In the weeks preceding the Brexit vote, outgoing prime minister David Cameron admonished listeners that the United Kingdom’s divorce from the European Union could cause instability in the region that might indeed lead to a significant geopolitical conflict. Various members of the media echoed this sentiment, and offered up a theory that other countries might subsequently exit the E.U. (Sweden, Holland, Hungary, and Greece are on the short list to try to walk first), potentially setting off a battle of influence between Russia and the United States, a Cold War 2.0.
Three-thousand-plus miles away, in America, politicians, the media, and most reasonable humans have been agonizing that Donald Trump’s foreign policy (if you can dignify a plan as sophisticated as putting the world in a vice grip and giving it a noogie, while calling it names) would lead to another martial crisis. And then there’s the other side of the coin. Trump himself has argued that if he is not voted in as president, a populist uprising might ensue and we could end up in the midst of just such a violent battle. (Personally, I’d prefer to take my chances.)
It doesn’t take a political scientist to see that the world is on edge. And technology, we often forget, undergirds this political reality. The Internet and innovation have made cultures around the globe collide with historically unprecedented force. With the exception of perhaps a handful of rogue states, like North Korea, we all now eat at the same McDonald’s, use the same iPhones and discuss the same hot-button topics on the same social networks. Every corporation on the planet can do this thanks to—not in large part, but in all parts—technology.
And it’s that same technology that has helped oversee an extraordinary re-distribution of wealth that has tilted American society off its axis. Since 1979, when Steve Jobs was first visiting Xerox Parc and learning about the computer mouse—a moment that would change computing, and hence society, forever—the bottom 80 percent of American families has had their share of the country’s income fall, while the top 20 percent has enjoyed modest gains. The top 1 percent, of course, has coincidentally seen their income rise stratospherically. To borrow from Bernie Sanders’s stump speech, the richest 1 percent in America have almost 40 percent of our country’s wealth, while the bottom 90 percent have 73 percent of the debt. This is largely the result of technology. And just wait until our work force is truly affected by the rise of robots and automation.
You don’t have to look too far back into history to see that when the marginalized have had it with the system, it doesn’t take a lot to set flame to tinder. World War I didn’t begin with two countries invading each other. It was inaugurated by a tense global climate, a matrix-like alliance system, and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, an heir to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, by a passionate 19-year-old in Sarajevo. It was only one spark that blew up the world.
Technology is also likely to be at the center of the next major geopolitical battle. The anti-immigration, anti-one percent, anti-capitalism and anti-everything else we’re seeing right now isn’t just going to go away in a society where people feel their voices are not being heard. They’re going to continue to try to affect change, and increasingly, they will rely on technology. And it’s that same technology that is likely to ensure that all future wars bear little resemblance to previous ones.
I learned this terrifying lesson a few years ago, when I attended a small conference in Canada focused, in large part, on futuristic tech—robots, cyborgs and artificial intelligence, usual stuff like that. But at some point, an older man calmly made his way to the lectern, and placed on the projector a crude illustration of America with three concentric circles emanating from the center. The man introduced himself as a former government spy, offered up some impressive credentials, and said that he had seen some dark things in his lifetime, but the darkest was still to come.
The next major war, he said, wouldn’t be fought with bombs, men, or even robots. It wouldn’t be waged on a battlefield or in the sky. Instead, it would be a silent war. He explained that during the past couple of decades, most of the world’s private and public infrastructure had become predominantly digital. And that the next major war could decimate that infrastructure. Water-treatment facilities, oil pipelines, dams, electrical grids, telecommunications platforms, food shipments, public and private transportation, traffic lights, prisons, every single drip of media—and a long, long list of other things we need for survival but take for granted—would all be vulnerable.
What could happen in such a scenario? According to this man’s prophecy, at first people wouldn’t know what had happened. The lights would simply go out. Our smartphones and computers would be black rectangles. The Internet: poof! Water infrastructure would stop working, power plants would go offline. Cars that were built after the 1970s, when manufacturers started adding integrated circuits, would never start again. Crops, which are now operated by digital irrigation systems, would die. And that would all be in the first few hours. Imagine what would happen in the coming days, weeks, and months.
How could such a terrifying thing happen? There are several scenarios. The concentric circles on the man’s slides were meant to illustrate the fallout from an E.M.P., or an electromagnetic pulse bomb, which can fry computer circuits hundreds of miles away. A silent flash later and we would essentially be sent back centuries, he told the audience. He noted that it might sound hyperbolic, but when you think about just how dependent we are on all of those little computer chips, it’s actually rather terrifying. Another theory for such a catastrophic event, and perhaps a much more likely scenario, is the prospect of computer hackers—possibly from an adversarial country—taking down power plants, water systems, the Internet, or private infrastructure. (America has been trying to retrofit its infrastructure to avoid this, but it’s still unclear if it’s avoidable at all.)
It’s important to understand that the right hackers, with the right tools, wouldn’t just crash our computer systems, forcing us to hit the power button and restart them. Real cyber warfare could destroy actual machines. We saw this happen with the Stuxnet virus, in 2010, where security experts had identified a malicious computer worm (nicknamed “the world’s first digital weapon”) which was built to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program by making its centrifuges spin so fast that that they tore themselves apart. (Numerous reports claim that the worm was built by the United States and Israel.) Then there are the endless data breaches that have occurred with regularity over the past few years. Maybe there’s a worm already sitting somewhere inside our computers, waiting to be prodded awake.
Over the years, I’ve learned that these predictions weren’t simply the doomsday prophecies of older government agents who attend conferences. A report this year from the The Gatestone Institute, a not-for-profit policy council and think tank, noted that “an EMP attack on the U.S. would leave the country with no electricity, no communications, no transportation, no fuel, no food, and no running water,” and that such a situation “could be far more deadly and dangerous to the United States than the most powerful H-Bomb ever built.” The same, it appears, could be true for hackers able to penetrate systems that govern our infrastructure. Just watch this staged cyberattack, which shows how some code can destroy the power grid.
It's also important to remember, of course, that technology facilitates democracy in many ways. Unlike previous turmoil and wars, where coups took place with guns or pitchforks, the stepping stones that could lead us into a worldwide tumult today seem to be taking place with voters at the ballot boxes. Whatever you make of the events in Britain or Austria, where the far-right anti-immigration candidate Norbert Hofer lost the presidency there by a mere 0.6 percent (Hofer may still end up as president as Austria threw the last election out plans host a re-vote), the demonstrations were largely bloodless. (The tragic murder of M.P. Jo Cox is, of course, a heinous exception.)
But it’s also important to recall that unstable government, and disaffected polities, can lead to mass unrest. And the consequences of that unrest could be more terrifying, and indefensible, than we have ever seen before. When you look at the ease with which North Korea (as the F.B.I. claims) broke into Sony, or Guccifer, the Romanian hacker, who has claimed responsibility for dozens of high-level breaches in the U.S., including penetrating Hillary Clinton’s server, or how easily the Chinese have popped in and out of our government systems, we shouldn’t scoff at the warnings that something like this could happen one day.All it took during World War I was one shot. Maybe all it will take for World War III is one line of code.
Nick Bilton is a special correspondent for Vanity Fair.
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https://www.rt.com/news/377440-china-military-technology-parity/
Do note the source here-- Russia Today
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:-o :-o :-o
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https://www.yahoo.com/news/indonesian-accused-kim-half-brothers-murder-duped-officials-170102235.html
A 1964 VX gas test on animals . Caution as this shows an animal suffering from the gas:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_oouhWBdYf0
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http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/stealth-killer-how-russia-or-china-could-crush-americas-f-35-19511
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https://www.cnet.com/pictures/russias-deadliest-new-war-machines/?ftag=ACQ9265a8a&vndid=1858567936&nan_pid=1858567936&ad_id=4578855
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second post
http://dailycaller.com/2017/03/01/exclusive-deployed-us-navy-has-a-pregnancy-problem-and-its-getting-worse/?utm_campaign=thedcmainpage&utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=Social
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https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/an-active-duty-national-security-advisor-myths-and-concerns/
"Concern #4: An active-duty national security advisor will not have enough Washington experience to successfully navigate the intricacies of the West Wing. This could be a problem for many active-duty officers, but not for McMaster. A regular speaker for years at Washington think tanks and well-known among the policy establishment and on Capitol Hill, he is not simply a muddy-boots soldier thrust into the byzantine world of national politics. Frequently described as a warrior scholar, he not only knows many of the key Washington players but has also spent a great deal of time studying, thinking, and writing about both the use of force and the policy-making process."
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Nice find, BD. This President seems to make great appointment picks.
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http://www.sfgate.com/technology/businessinsider/article/Trump-s-cutting-1-billion-from-the-Coast-Guard-10975671.php
As noted in the Arctic thread, we are bigly outnumbered in ice breakers and other means of establishing presence in the Arctic.
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I tried to find the total CG budget and this is the best that come up. Around 10 billion so a 10 % cut is big . Especially when already strained.
https://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/02/24/bigger-budget-more-troops-ahead-coast-guard/80846656/
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I tried to find the total CG budget and this is the best that come up. Around 10 billion so a 10 % cut is big . Especially when already strained.
https://www.navytimes.com/story/military/2016/02/24/bigger-budget-more-troops-ahead-coast-guard/80846656/
The Coast Guard is often ignored, but very important to national security.
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http://thehill.com/policy/defense/324595-russia-china-making-gains-on-us-military-power
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https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the-Russians-shoot-down-any-Tomahawks-given-their-sophisticated-AA-equipment-in-Syria/answer/Igor-Markov
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/24/opinion/donald-trump-americas-dangerous-love-for-special-forces-ops.html?_r=2
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America's love for special forces.
Well what else are we going to do? We can no longer blast the enemy off the face of the Earth with conventional weaponry because the NY slimes will show photos of collateral
damage.
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http://popularmilitary.com/nearly-half-females-failed-graduate-army-infantry-training-standards-also-lowered/
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http://popularmilitary.com/nearly-half-females-failed-graduate-army-infantry-training-standards-also-lowered/
I'm sure our current and future enemies will be sure to take it easy on them.
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Hat tip to BD for these two:
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/05/trump-administration-just-missed-its-best-shot-military-buildup/138254/?oref=d-river
https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/is-trumps-350-ship-navy-on-the-rocks-the-politics-promise-and-perils-of-shipbuilding/
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http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-special-operations-20170525-story.html
"With special operations forces now posted in more than 80 countries, the ever-increasing set of missions and uptick in casualties give pause even to some military experts and veterans who support the expanding role.
“'You talk about mission creep — this is strategic mission creep all over the world,' said retired Lt. Gen. Mark Hertling, a 37-year Army veteran. 'Special operations just isn’t sized to do that.'”
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https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/the-future-of-war-is-fast-approaching-in-the-pacific-are-the-u-s-military-services-ready/
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https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/the-future-of-war-is-fast-approaching-in-the-pacific-are-the-u-s-military-services-ready/
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2017-01-23-0000/barack-obama-military-administration
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Excellent and timely piece BD. Coincidentally I have been in some interesting conversations recently about exactly this. Let's continue to follow this!
Hearty agreement with that piece GM-- It does a nice job summarizing the extent of Obama's devastation and I will be using it elsewhere to that end.
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http://thehill.com/policy/defense/336555-pentagon-cant-square-trump-comments-on-qatar
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Excellent and timely piece BD. Coincidentally I have been in some interesting conversations recently about exactly this. Let's continue to follow this!
Hearty agreement with that piece GM-- It does a nice job summarizing the extent of Obama's devastation and I will be using it elsewhere to that end.
China has a tolerance for casualties we don't, and that figures into their doctrine. They are willing to take 100,000 to inflict a loss of 10,000 for us. The left is a force multiplier for America's enemies.
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BD-- "Trump on Qatar" is probably better in the "Articulating our Strategy" thread-- I'm thinking in the aftermath of Trump's Riyadh speech, this could be a good moment to re-assess that.
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Isn't there Qatar money behind Brookings now? Anyway, caveat lector:
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2017/06/05/the-110-billion-arms-deal-to-saudi-arabia-is-fake-news/
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http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/06/20/five_signs_the_f-35_fighter_is_a_smashing_success_111621.html
F-35 has emerged as the global gold standard of next-gen air power
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Not so fast:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/beltway/2011/06/03/spacex-loren-thompsons-deceit/#44064927740a
Maybe it IS worth the astronomical price tag, or maybe it isn't. I don't know who to believe or trust.
To know if this guy is part of the "military industrial complex" Eisenhower warned us of , vs a true independent objective observer analyst is impossible to know. But when a ton of money is involved all bets are off. in mho.
Would a team of pilots who are not connected to special interests be the best judge? I don't know.
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OTOH I'm a fan of the Warthog :-D
https://www.facebook.com/MilitaryInsider/videos/1100653713368960/?hc_ref=NEWSFEED
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http://www.scout.com/military/warrior/story/1670801-how-different-is-it-to-fly-the-stealth-f-35
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https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/23/world/asia/destroyer-fitzgerald-collision.html?emc=edit_ta_20170623&nl=top-stories&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
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Articles
Regions & Countries
Themes
Forecast Highlights
A limited defense budget will force the Kremlin to make difficult decisions to prioritize its most critical defense needs.
The Russian military will temper its maritime ambitions as it reinforces its continental capabilities.
Russia will not entirely abandon the seas, however, as its greatest security concern will remain its nuclear deterrent, comprising land, air and maritime components.
Russia's military modernization efforts are entering a critical stage. The state armaments program (GPV), covering 2018-2025, is due to be finalized in September. The plan will determine not only the country's weaponry capabilities well into the 2030s, but also the strategic direction of the Russian military at large. Early indications point toward a significant downgrade in Russia's maritime ambitions as Moscow amps up its focus on continental power.
As Russia evaluates where its military will be heading over the next several years, the Kremlin's primary constraint will be financial. After almost two decades of explosive growth, Russia's defense budget has started to face considerable headwinds in recent years, since a sharp decline in oil prices in 2014 curtailed the country's financial freedom. Its fiscal challenges culminated this year, when the Kremlin cut the defense budget by 5 percent. The reduction, the first since the 1990s, means Russia won't be able to achieve its official goal of modernizing 70 percent of its forces by 2020. The total funds in the 2018-2025 GPV are expected to be just half of what the Defense Ministry was hoping for. Consequently, the Kremlin will have to make tough decisions about how the Russian military prioritizes its investments. Economic turbulence and industrial issues have already delayed finalizing the GPV by two years, and Russia can no longer afford to postpone decisions on matters of its military future.
A Sinking Ship
Key parts of the Russian navy, meanwhile, are in desperate need of funding. Though the navy has undergone some notable modernization programs over the last decade, for the most part it still relies on small or aging warships. The Russians have not built a new type of surface warship larger than a frigate since the end of the Cold War, and the country's sole aircraft carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, was first launched in 1985. If Moscow wants a powerful oceangoing navy with large surface warships and carrier aviation, it has no choice but to allocate substantial funds to its navy as part of the 2018-2025 GPV.
But it's already becoming clear that the necessary funding won't materialize. The Russian Ministry of Defense appears to be prioritizing established — and less risky — weapons programs over new ones. That puts Russia's navy at a disadvantage because the force has not undertaken a large surface combatant program since the Soviet Union collapsed. Furthermore, the limited defense budget will focus on cost-effective weapons systems rather than on pricey flagship programs, leaving no room for the enormous expense of building large warships. Dimming Moscow's maritime prospects all the more, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin, a key figure overseeing the defense industry, said in May that unlike the United States, Russia is not a maritime power. Instead, he emphasized, it is a continental power. (In the same vein, Rogozin questioned the need for Russia to field an aircraft carrier.) A meeting in mid-May between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Kremlin military leaders confirmed these statements, and Russian media later announced that the development of destroyer warships and a new aircraft carrier would be indefinitely postponed.
Putting the Money Where It Matters
Still, at least one part of Russia's naval dreams will avoid the chopping block: nuclear submarines. The country's top defense consideration has long been its nuclear deterrent, which involves a troika of land-based missiles, nuclear-capable bombers and nuclear ballistic missile submarines. During the Cold War, nuclear submarines were so prized that the Soviet surface navy became more or less an auxiliary arm of its submarine force tasked with protecting the underwater craft using a bastion strategy. Russia's military will continue to value its nuclear deterrent above much else in the years ahead.
Aside from ample funding for nuclear submarines in the upcoming GPV, early signs suggest Russia is further strengthening its air force. The Kremlin will put money into more strategic transport aircraft and advanced combat jets, with a focus on upgrading fourth-generation jets as opposed to pursuing newer, more cutting-edge models such as the T-50 stealth fighter. Russia will also home in on investments to make its air and ground forces more nimble, flexible and lethal, including precision-guided munitions; enhanced electronic warfare capabilities; upgraded command and control equipment; space assets; and improved intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance gear, namely drones.
As for the regions that are set to benefit most from the 2018-2025 GPV, the expectation is that Russia will keep focusing on its Southern and Western military districts. The zones are responsible for important operational areas including the Baltics, Ukraine and the Caucasus. The Kremlin will also prioritize the Arctic Joint Strategic Command — which will receive military district status by 2020 — because it involves a key portion of Russia's nuclear forces and aligns with the military's strategic focus.
Russia's defense priorities reflect what the government perceives as its greatest security threats. From Moscow's perspective, the No. 1 risk remains the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's encroachment on its western flank, which calls for a powerful nuclear deterrent reinforced by dependable and lethal ground and air forces. Russia is increasingly embracing missions that involve projecting power into distant regions — from the Arctic to Syria — as well, so long as the areas have a friendly ground base from which to operate. With these considerations in mind, the Kremlin will place high value on building up a light and flexible ground force with an enhanced strategic air transport fleet. Moscow recognizes, after all, that it cannot be a great maritime power and a great continental power at once.
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http://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/this-is-what-happens-when-the-army-puts-a-laser-on-an-apache-attack-helicopter
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http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/07/07/transgender-men-womens-showers-must-get-dignity-respect-u-s-army/
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http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2017/07/07/transgender-men-womens-showers-must-get-dignity-respect-u-s-army/
Everyone involved in this garbage needs to be removed from the military ASAP!
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FwIU3YkrLM4&feature=youtu.be&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=daily-brief-WLXHKAPFXH37&utm_content=daily-brief-WLXHKAPFXH37&utm_source=daily-brief&utm_term=Tucker+Carlson+suggests+James+Mattis+should+resign
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WSJ
By The Editorial Board
July 12, 2017 7:14 p.m. ET
80 COMMENTS
On Monday 15 Marines and one Navy sailor died when a Marine KC-130 crashed, with debris covering a field in Mississippi. It’s too early to draw conclusions about what caused the transport plane to suffer a catastrophic failure on its flight from North Carolina to California, reportedly at cruising altitude. But such tragedies are becoming more routine and deserve some attention.
It is unknown what led to the crash, and it could be anything from equipment malfunction to human error. The plane appears to have been loaded with munitions that might have caused or contributed to the crash. The names of the service members on board still weren’t public by our deadline.
One reality is that Marine aviation has recently experienced a rise in “Class A Mishaps,” which are incidents that carry a body count or result in more than $2 million in aircraft damage. House Armed Services Chairman Mac Thornberry pointed out at a hearing last year that the rate for the Marine aviation community has “been increasing significantly.”
Over the past decade the rate has hovered around 2.15 events for every 100,000 hours flown, Mr. Thornberry noted. But in 2015 the figure increased to 3.29 and 3.39 in 2016; that year 12 Marines died when two helicopters crashed into each other off the coast of Hawaii. The rate so far for 2017 is 4.47, including Monday’s crash.
One hypothesis that deserves to be examined is a combination of old equipment and the fact that pilot hours have been reduced in recent years because of funding cuts. Planes like the F/A-18 are stretching past their lifetimes. Earlier this year Navy officials testified to Congress about a number of pilot “physiological episodes”—e.g. oxygen deprivation—that compound the risk of human error.
None of this will come as news to Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, who has made addressing readiness problems a central part of his agenda. But Marines and other service members sign up for duty knowing the risks of combat, and they shouldn’t have to endure an increasing threat to their safety from routine training or transport.
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http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/new-book-zero-footprint-reveals-ex-soldiers-hired-kill-article-1.2491345
Hired to kill: New book ‘Zero Footprint’ tells of ex-soldiers paid top dollar for jobs too dirty and dangerous for U.S. military
This book actually ties lots of things together, especially Benghazi. There is a line in the book about the author's work in Syria that still haunts me.
"Just when I thought we'd seen the worst image of devastation, another greeted us from around the corner. This time it was the sad eyes of a girl of four or five standing by the road and clutching a battered teddy bear with one arm. The other ended at the wrist, a bloody stump covered with dirty bandages. I felt something clutch in my chest as her mother ran out of a nearby shack to pull her away."
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http://dailysignal.com/2017/07/26/5-good-reasons-transgender-accommodations-arent-compatible-military-realities/?utm_source=TDS_Email&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MorningBell&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWlRJNVpEWmhZakE1WlRKaCIsInQiOiJRc0ZwOXkrWE1wbFVYVlJDekpIeWpGSVdZb2ptVXhpRFQ0NW4wNUxlQVpRdU5randCMVV5MDIyR1NWcGt6R0tGNVd3K2J3eXZxeXc4TVwvVjJNamUrcW8rSm9GOXpWejBpYWo4ZzlZa1ZYY2VXTFp0Zk5mRDMrRHNiTStOXC95K3ZCIn0%3D
http://www.dailywire.com/news/19054/combat-vet-gives-powerful-testimony-against-trans-amanda-prestigiacomo
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https://patriotpost.us/posts/50404
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http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27511/russia-drone-thermite-grenade-ukraine-ammo/
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second post
OAN reported last night that this technology is good to go-- what I got out of the piece was that this is basically a missile delivered EMP sans nuclear blast.
http://defense-update.com/20150516_champ.html
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http://nypost.com/2017/08/02/special-forces-test-out-boba-fett-combat-helmet/
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https://qz.com/499618/the-us-marines-tested-all-male-squads-against-mixed-gender-ones-and-the-men-came-out-ahead/
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https://qz.com/499618/the-us-marines-tested-all-male-squads-against-mixed-gender-ones-and-the-men-came-out-ahead/
I thought that trannies were the key to military dominance.
Pretty sure that was the meme that was being pushed last week.
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I thought that trannies were the key to military dominance.
Is winning wars still the objective of the US military? Or is it a social spending program with an emphasis on social and cultural transformation?
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I thought that trannies were the key to military dominance.
Is winning wars still the objective of the US military? Or is it a social spending program with an emphasis on social and cultural transformation?
Anyone remember the last war we won?
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Let's see, not Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. Outside of ccp and Reagan winning in Grenada, Japan 72 years ago was our last victory?
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Let's see, not Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan. Outside of ccp and Reagan winning in Grenada, Japan 72 years ago was our last victory?
We must have had a bunch of LGTBQPWTF troops back then. It is the key to effective warfighting!
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It was great to see the US military get the credit they deserved from Grenada and the Lebenon bombing.
After the LEFTish news media tried to maul the reputation of our men who were is the miltary during and after Vietnam the majority of people gave the media a big "shove it" when they tried to pull the same crap with Reagan at Grenada
The LEftist pricks in the media are still doing the same to 'America' but pretend they are for the military now.
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http://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-guam-shielded-north-korean-missiles-high-tech-defenses/
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http://freebeacon.com/national-security/average-transgender-soldier-unable-deploy-238-days/
Average Transgender Soldier Unable to Deploy for 238 Days
White House military ban to be based on deployability
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http://www.atimes.com/ship-collisions-raise-specter-chinese-electronic-warfare/
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This is an exceedingly important issue. Apparent force advantages can prove to be illusory. Bush 43 was not great but Obama sat back while the Chinese stole us blind.
IMHO we are vulnerable to blitzkrieg defeat due to these factors.
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I've read China has a long range low to the ground missile that can take out the ships and aircraft carriers.
https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/07/01/chinas-new-destroyer-the-u-s-navys-anti-ship-missile-failure-and-preemption/#609d8210638f
Of course The Leftist Business Insider which has been out to get Trump mentions Trump's name here without mention of Brock:
http://www.businessinsider.com/china-long-range-missile-muscle-us-out-south-china-sea-2017-1
Or their new MIRVs that can be fitted with conventional or nuclear warheads:
http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/china-tests-long-range-missile-with-10-warheads-amid-te-1791843658
China is clearly at war with us. One could say they are clearly preparing for war with us but what is the difference?
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Too bad we don't have the capability to position assault satellites into position over NK that could use a laser in the high altitude low cloud atmosphere that could lock onto a missile :
http://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2017/09/no-we-cannot-shoot-down-north-koreas-missiles/141070/
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Good article!
BUT
"There is no need to rely on the word of missile defense boosters, or, for that matter, trust the analysis of jaded missile defense critics. We could stop testing for success and begin testing for actual performance, with “red team – blue team” tests, for example, to simulate a determined foe"
I get the point of course, but it misses another point-- our need to put uncertainty in the adversary's mind. If we do "red team blue team" tests, our capabilities become known. If things are as bad as this writer says, then the adversary will become emboldened.
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I like *my* idea of a satellite defense system
better but this is high altitude "lite"
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/451420/north-korea-missile-thr4eat-answers-exist
Do we really want to take war to outer space? Short answer => if not us then someone else will.
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http://www.nationalreview.com/article/451619/end-defense-budget-sequester-rebuild-american-military?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202017-09-22&utm_term=NR5PM%20Actives
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What should the military do with someone like this? He is a traitor even before he finishes military school
And of course CommunistNews week thinks this is hysterical to see "conservatives " outraged.
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/09/27/newsweek-writer-conservatives-mad-hell-commie-cadet/
Dishonorable DC?
and force him to pay for education?
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What should the military do with someone like this? He is a traitor even before he finishes military school
And of course CommunistNews week thinks this is hysterical to see "conservatives " outraged.
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/09/27/newsweek-writer-conservatives-mad-hell-commie-cadet/
Dishonorable DC?
and force him to pay for education?
If his is not charged under the UCMJ and dishonorably discharged from the military, this country really is done.
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http://www.scmp.com/news/china/society/article/2113113/china-powers-new-radar-tech-unmask-stealth-fighters
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http://ace.mu.nu/archives/371787.php
Uh-Oh: "Communism Will Win" West Point Grad "Inspired by" Bradley Manning, Mentored by Muslim Studies Guy
This is painting a picture of what Obama did to our military and intelligence services.
Once you have enough security risks in an organization -- communists, Islamists, traitors-in-waiting -- they will begin actively recruiting other security risks, because that's their tribe.
Those are the people They trust -- the very people America cannot trust.
Speaking of, Reality Winner, given a security clearance by Obama's secret police, says that "America is the worst thing to ever happen to the world."
The woman suspected of leaking U.S. secrets to a news organization claimed she stuffed a classified report into her pantyhose and walked out of a National Security Agency office in Georgia, mainly because she hates America "like three times a day."
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In their latest filing Wednesday, prosecutors also included a partial transcript of a Facebook chat between Winner and her sister in February.
"Look, I only say I hate America like 3 times a day," Winner wrote. “I'm no radical. It's mostly just about Americans obsession with air conditioning.”
Her sister asked: "But you don’t actually hate America, right?"
Winner replied: "I mean yeah I do it’s literally the worst thing to happen on the planet. We invented capitalism the downfall of the environment."
She had other good reasons to hate America: Like that the NSA played Fox News on some of their TVs. Guess which "news" channel she would have preferred?
Reality Winner, the former National Security Agency contractor accused of leaking a classified report, apparently complained to her bosses that Fox News was playing in her office – suggesting Al Jazeera would have been a more appropriate choice.
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The transcripts offer additional insight into both her political leanings and media preferences.
"I've filed formal complaints about them having Fox News on,” she told FBI agents. “… Uh, at least, for God's sake put Al Jazeera on, or a slideshow with people's pets. I've tried everything to get that changed."
It's not an accident Obama granted people like her access to top secret information -- it's deliberate.
And meanwhile, McMasters fires people loyal to Trump and retains Obama loyalists.
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https://pjmedia.com/lifestyle/2017/10/08/xbox-360-controllers-save-u-s-navy-boatloads-cash/
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/51824
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(but they are politically correct so what is the big deal compared to that ? :x - thanks Brock)
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/452768/us-navy-355-ships-needed
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Beyond a love of the waves, surprisingly little unites the surfers of the world. Last year, when the International Olympic Committee unanimously approved surfing as a sport in the 2020 Tokyo Games, much of the debate that followed was predictable: Was surfing finally receiving the legitimacy it deserved, or was this yet another regrettable push toward the mainstreaming and watering down of a proud subculture? Variants of this argument have played out among surfers for over 100 years, having become something of a tedious cliche in the extreme sports era of the 21st century.
But there was also a second, more interesting conversation to emerge from the creation of Olympic surfing that concerned the venue for the sport. Some observers wondered if its Olympic debut would take place in a cutting-edge wave pool, taking advantage of recent technological advances that have rapidly legitimized artificial waves in a sport decidedly obsessed with nature. Organizers eventually decided that the 2020 competition would be more traditional, taking place at Shidashita beach in Japan's Chiba prefecture. If surfing is to stay afloat across diverse Olympic locales, though, the acceptance of fake waves is inevitable.
Last month, in fact, the World Surfing League held a somewhat clandestine event at legendary surfer Kelly Slater's artificial Surf Ranch in Lemoore, California, testing the waters for high-level surf contests without a sea gull in sight. With the excitement surrounding the event and anticipation building for Olympic surfing, it seems like a good moment to depart from some of our traditional topics and reflect on the history of a sport that is surprisingly geopolitical and linked, perhaps unexpectedly, to war.
Tourism and Tension Turn the Tides
While new to the Olympic program, surfing is predated in human history only by the most ancient of competitions, such as wrestling and track and field. Even the sport's modern history stretches back over a thousand years in the Hawaiian Islands, still very much the spiritual home of surfing. The now-global sport was nearly eradicated in the early 19th century when Calvinist missionaries arrived en masse and promptly banned surfing as an affront to God's laws. Though Hawaiians never completely abandoned the waves, the sport experienced a steep decline throughout the 1800s, and it was all but dead by the time the 20th century approached.
Somewhat ironically, another generation of Westerners helped to revive the sport in the 1890s. American entrepreneurs embraced the novel activity as a form of beachside entertainment for tourists at nascent resorts in Waikiki and beyond. In short order, surfing's newfound popularity propelled it across the Pacific, first to California and then around the world. In 1907, Alexander Hume Ford, a South Carolina plantation heir and the head of a private interest called the Hawaiian Promotion Committee, sponsored Waikiki surfer George Freeth's travel to Los Angeles to drum up interest in the island lifestyle. Though Freeth's direct impact on Hawaiian tourism is tough to gauge, his presence inspired enough locals to take up the sport that California is known as the birthplace of surfing today.
By the second half of the 20th century, as incomes became disposable and air travel shrank the globe, Western surfers began conquering waves around the world. Because some of the best waves were located in politically unstable places, the international surfer's path to the beach wasn't always easy. Athletes often had to navigate tense geopolitical environments on the ground, such as apartheid in South Africa or civil war in Central America. Nor was surfing immune to the effects of the Cold War, as Scott Laderman argues in his excellent political history of surfing, Empire in Waves. Laderman's chronicle of Indonesia offers a compelling cast study: Australian and American surfers discovered the archipelago's phenomenal waves in the years before and after the nation's transition from a policy of non-alignment to an alliance with the United States under President Suharto. In no time, the Indonesian government was sponsoring surf contests and junkets to promote tourism abroad while brutally repressing broad swaths of its population at home.
War on the Waves
"I've admired your nose-riding for years! I like your cutback, too." So says Robert Duvall's Lt. Col. William Kilgore to surfing serviceman Lance Johnson in Francis Ford Coppola's Vietnam War epic, "Apocalypse Now." It's a famously shocking scene: A village is summarily destroyed so that Kilgore can score a few excellent waves. Part of the shock is surely due to surfing's stereotypical ethos of peaceful communion with nature, which seems at odds with war. But if war was ever good for anything, it was surfing.
In The World in the Curl, Peter Westwick and Peter Neushul write,
"Surfing, that escapist pleasure, would seem to have little to do with warfare. But from surf forecasting to surfboard production to wetsuits, almost every surfer who paddles out today is using military technology."
World War II and its immediate aftermath were particularly fruitful for surfers the world over. Military-industrial complex advances in materials technology proved especially important for postwar surfboard makers who turned fiberglass, polyester resins and various foams into boards that were better and more accessible to consumers than ever before. These materials allowed for the creation of boards that were lighter than the heavy, wooden variants popular before the war, enabling women and children to ride the waves with ease. The gears of war also provided training and inspiration to intrepid surfboard designers, including the now-legendary Bob Simmons, an Army machinist during the conflict and a mathematician for Douglas Aircraft Co. after it. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Simmons combined a deep understanding of materials science and hydrodynamics to produce revolutionary board designs that are still championed for their speed and performance.
The technological relationship between the military and surfing has also worked in the other direction. Such was the case of the motorized "warboard," a military design that never made it into action. Westwick and Neushul write that the U.S. Navy had developed prototypes of the board in anticipation of a potential coastal assault on Japan. A less fanciful innovation came in the form of the wetsuit. Pioneered by University of California, Berkeley physicist Hugh Bradner in the early 1950s, the earliest wetsuits were envisioned for military applications; Bradner offered his own design to the U.S. Navy. At the time the Navy passed on Bradner's innovation, for fear that the gasses trapped in the suit's neoprene material would make divers and swimmers easily detectable by sonar. Unconcerned about sonar, surfers quickly embraced wetsuits as a solution to a cruel reality of the sport: The best waves often emerge in the dead of winter. Surfers Jack O'Neill (of the eponymous O'Neill brand) and the Meistrell brothers (of the renowned Body Glove brand) refined Bradner's design throughout the 1950s. Today, boardriders and frogmen alike wear their legacy in the water.
Given the innovative power of the world's militaries, the symbiotic technological relationship between war and surfing shouldn't be too jarring. Despite the sport's traditional emphasis on good vibes and hippie values, it has always been about pushing the limits of what's possible in the water. While the time for exploring motorized warboards is probably over, it seems likely that surfers and soldiers will continue to benefit from each other's cutting-edge designs and novel solutions. Somewhere at this very moment, there is a surfer lamenting the rise of artificial waves. But I imagine he has a counterpart in uniform, thinking that the same waves are the perfect laboratory for the next phase of naval innovation.
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https://www.airforce.com/mission/vision
INTEGRITY FIRST
An Airman is a person of integrity, courage and conviction. They must be willing to control their impulses and exercise courage, honesty and accountability in order to do what is right even when no one is looking.
http://dailycaller.com/2017/11/15/air-force-accepts-adl-award-for-combating-racism-at-academy-buries-fact-that-racism-was-a-total-hoax/?utm_source=site-share
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Evaluating the State of the US Navy
Dec 7, 2017
Summary
On the morning of Dec. 7, 1941, a Japanese naval fleet consisting of six aircraft carriers, two battleships, a dozen other wartime vessels and 360 planes launched a barrage of bombs and torpedoes at the U.S. naval base in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The base was caught completely off guard, as sailors and soldiers scrambled to their battle stations to defend against the attack. In a speech in Washington the next day, President Franklin D. Roosevelt said Dec. 7 was “a date which will live in infamy.”
The objective of Japan’s surprise attack was to destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and in a matter of two hours, it nearly did just that. None of the eight U.S. battleships stationed at the harbor that day survived unscathed. One was destroyed, one capsized, three sank in shallow waters and three more suffered severe damage. In addition, three of eight cruisers were damaged, as were three of 30 destroyers. Over 180 aircraft were destroyed and roughly 150 sustained damage. (Three aircraft carriers stationed at the base were out on missions and therefore saved from the attack.) Over 2,300 U.S. military members were killed and 1,000 were wounded.
The attack severely crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet and put in question the Navy’s combat capabilities. Japan controlled Pacific waters for three months after the attack. But Pearl Harbor was ultimately only a temporary setback. Strong U.S. rebuilding efforts revived the Pacific Fleet, and in less than six months, it won a decisive victory against the Japanese at the Battle of Midway. Since then, the U.S. Navy has dominated the world’s oceans, largely uncontested.
But 76 years after Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Navy is once again under scrutiny, this time because of a series of collisions involving Navy warships, all part of the Pacific Fleet.
In May, the USS Lake Champlain guided-missile cruiser collided with a fishing boat in the Sea of Japan. A month later, the USS Fitzgerald destroyer collided with a cargo ship off the coast of Japan. Then in August, another destroyer, the USS John S. McCain, was hit by an oil tanker east of the Strait of Malacca. The latter two collisions resulted in the deaths of 17 American sailors. The Navy concluded that human error was the cause of both of those collisions.
These incidents sparked a massive internal investigation, not to mention a media frenzy. Some have interpreted the collisions as a sign that the Navy is headed toward disrepair and is unable to fulfill its growing global responsibilities. Much of the focus has centered on whether too much is being asked of the fleet. But these conclusions are an oversimplification. In this report, we evaluate the state of the U.S. Navy and consider whether the recent incidents merit this level of concern.
Comparing Past and Present Performance
U.S. dominance of the world’s oceans is a critical component of the country’s position as a global superpower. It is also a key element of the United States’ power projection capability. If U.S. naval power were to decline, it could threaten the United States’ position in the world and change the balance of power in the oceans. To evaluate whether the recent incidents indicate a decline in naval capabilities, we need to begin with a simple question: How does the number of collisions involving U.S. ships this year compare to previous years?
(click to enlarge)
First, we should define what we mean by a collision. Naval accidents can involve a number of circumstances, not all of which are classified as collisions. A 1998 report by the Institute for Policy Studies identified 12 types of accidents related to naval vessels that range from fires to weather-related incidents to collisions. The nature and severity of these accidents vary greatly. This report will focus on incidents where one U.S. naval ship comes in contact with another ship or a permanently fixed object.
In the past 20 years, ships from the U.S. Navy have been involved in at least 24 collisions, according to open-source information, putting the average at just over one collision per year. Though the number of incidents in 2017 exceeds the annual average, having multiple collisions in a year is not unprecedented. There were three collisions in 2002 and 2005, and two in 2009.
(click to enlarge)
From this comparison, we can draw several conclusions. First, the number of collisions this year is not significantly higher than in previous years over the past two decades. Second, the collisions themselves are not an indicator of diminished U.S. naval capabilities, which are defined as the ability to wage war and carry out missions. Both the McCain and the Fitzgerald have been removed from service for repairs, but the U.S. has a total of 62 destroyers. Though there are two fewer in theater, many more are available if needed.
It’s also worth noting that collisions have not stopped the Navy from engaging in operations, which have in fact increased over the past 20 years. From 2001 to 2014, the U.S. Navy was engaged in Operation Enduring Freedom as well as three Combined Maritime Forces operations: Combined Task Force 150 (to promote maritime security and counterterrorism), CTF 151 (to counter piracy) and CTF 152 (to support Arabian Gulf security and cooperation). Since 2014, the CTF operations have continued, and Operation Enduring Freedom was replaced by Operation Inherent Resolve. From 2002 to 2017, the U.S. Navy also engaged in Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Unified Response and Operation New Dawn.
There is thus no evidence that the U.S. Navy’s capabilities are shrinking. In fact, the accidents occurred in areas that are popular trade routes, not in the open seas. The sheer number of vessels operating in these areas increases the chances of an accident occurring.
Why, then, have these incidents received so much attention? This can be explained a couple of different ways. The Navy, like all institutions and agencies dependent on federal funds, wants more funding. It can use these collisions to make a compelling case that the government should allocate more resources to it. But more important is that American sailors were killed in these incidents. The 2002 and 2005 collisions did not result in any fatalities.
The loss of life is tragic and warrants media coverage, but we should not draw sweeping conclusions about the state of the Navy based on this one factor. It may explain the media, government and military response to this year’s collisions, but it does not make these events geopolitically relevant. If there were a major increase in accidents that forced the Navy to concentrate on critical theaters and thus reduce its global operations, then they would be geopolitically relevant. The comprehensive review of naval readiness triggered by the recent collisions indicates there are some concerns, but they do not rise to a crisis level.
The Navy’s Challenges
Though its ability to conduct war and security operations is still strong, the Navy is not without its challenges. The 2010 Balisle Report, an internal review of the Navy’s surface force from 1999 to 2009, concluded that readiness levels had declined because of a series of systemic changes and problems. A framework introduced in 2001 to manage shipboard personnel resulted in a reduction in personnel requirements. It was called the optimum manning initiative, but it failed to take into consideration the personnel required for maintenance and the loss of personnel due to illness, legal obligations, pregnancy, etc. There were blurred lines of responsibility for material readiness, and the number of related inspections and reviews were cut roughly in half. The time allotted for a ship to go through maintenance was reduced from 15 weeks to nine weeks, and the length of time between board extension visits, which are part of the inspection process, was expanded from 44 months to 60 months.
The review following the recent collisions also indicated some shortcomings in terms of the operational readiness of the entire Navy. The report focused primarily on training and concluded that surface warfare officers, quartermasters and operational specialists do not receive enough training. They are overly dependent on on-the-job training, which is not uniform across the Navy. There is a deficiency in navigation skills due to poor training and a lack of consistency in equipment on each ship. A decrease in classroom education has also caused a general decline in the knowledge base of the surface force, particularly when it comes to understanding and applying international rules on navigation. These findings have raised concerns over readiness levels and the long-term consequences of these issues should they persist.
The Navy’s main strategic challenges relate to two issues: the number of international commitments and the stationing of forces in overseas homeports. From 1998 to 2015, the number of vessels in the U.S. Navy declined by 20 percent, from 333 ships to 271. Fewer ships does not necessarily mean a decline in capabilities. Not all ships are equal; an aircraft carrier provides capabilities a frigate never could. But over this period, the number of ships deployed overseas has remained the same at about 100, and yet, U.S. military commitments have increased. The 5th Fleet is heavily engaged in the Middle East, and the 6th Fleet and the 7th Fleet are permanently based in Europe and in the Western Pacific, respectively.
Deployment times – the number of days a ship spends away from port – have also increased. In 1998, only 4 percent of deployments lasted more than six months, but in 2015, all deployments lasted more than six months. Navy officials today advocate deployment times of six to seven months. This could lead to overextension, which is a problem not only for the Navy but for the U.S. military as a whole.
Current U.S. maritime strategy relies heavily on forward naval presence: the ability to station ships and sailors overseas and maintain naval bases in locations like Guam, Japan, Spain and Bahrain. The Navy measures a ship’s ability to provide forward presence based on the amount of time the ship spends in an area of operation, the amount of time it is available for tasking, and the amount of time it is actually underway (i.e., not in its homeport). Navy officials look at all three criteria together and note that there are intangible benefits to having a ship in an overseas port even if it is not operationally available. The purpose of forward deployment is to have ships available in every corner of the planet at any given time, maximizing the Navy’s ability to project power. It can respond to threats quicker by cutting down transit time to hot zones. This also helps protect shipping lanes, deter conflicts, build regional partnerships and prevent enemies from gaining an upper hand in maritime disputes or sea routes.
There are two commonly cited criticisms of forward deployment: Underway times are too long, and maintenance times are too short. Over the past two decades, the percentage of ships underway has fluctuated. From 1998 to 2009, it increased from 62 percent of the total fleet to 86 percent. But by 2015, it decreased to 75 percent. From 2003 to 2012, forward deployed ships spent on average 42 more days underway than ships that had a homeport in the United States. The 7th Fleet’s cruisers and destroyers spent an average of 116 days underway in 2015 and 162 days in 2016. But underway times don’t provide the full picture; you also need to look at the types of missions a fleet is involved in to determine whether it is in danger of exhaustion. A month of friendly port calls is different from a month of joint exercises, and both are different from a month of actual combat. A more nuanced view of how this time is spent is necessary.
By design, forward deployed ships, particularly cruisers and destroyers, have significantly reduced maintenance and training times compared to ships with homeports in the United States. Of the forward deployed naval forces, the Pacific Command’s 7th Fleet faces the most wear and tear. Forward deployed ships leave their ports more frequently and for shorter deployments. As a result, dedicated training and certification time is often postponed or skipped to deal with more immediate operational concerns. The number of days underway compounds this problem. A surface ship must be certified in 22 different areas: 10 warfare mission areas, like anti-submarine warfare and ballistic missile defense, and 12 basic function areas, like communications and, importantly, mobility and seamanship. The latest Government Accountability Office report on the matter noted that expired training certifications for the Navy’s 11 cruisers and destroyers based in Japan increased from 7 percent in January 2015 to 37 percent in June 2017. Two-thirds of the certifications had been expired for at least five months. None of these ships have all their necessary certifications.
(click to enlarge)
Reduced maintenance times do not necessarily reduce the Navy’s ability to effectively wage war, but they do raise concerns over how long these ships can operate before needing to be replaced. The average age of the cruisers based in Japan is 28 years, and the average age of the destroyers is 21 years. The expected lifespan of these ships is 25-30 years, though this can be increased to up to 40 years with modernization and maintenance. But the amount of time needed to modernize and maintain these ships has also increased – just as the time allotted for maintenance has decreased – which affects their overall operational availability.
The U.S. Navy has four options to help mitigate these challenges while maintaining its current level of overseas presence. The first option is to simply increase the number of ships it has. The Navy’s 2016 Force Structure Assessment called for a total fleet of 355 ships; the same assessment in 2015 called for 308. (The Navy currently has 271.) Another option is to allot more funding for maintenance and personnel to compensate for an increase in underway times. The third option is to increase the number of forward deployed ships to reduce transit times to critical regions. And finally, the Navy could restructure the fleet to make it more efficient. Right now, the first two options are the most frequently pursued, but they will also incur higher costs over an extended period.
(click to enlarge)
Putting the Debate in Context
A core obstacle in assessing readiness and determining the extent of the readiness challenges facing the military is the lack of a universally accepted definition of “readiness.” The Department of Defense defines it as “the ability of military forces to fight and meet the demands of assigned missions.” But this definition is fairly broad. An evaluation of readiness can focus on near-term or long-term objectives, or measurements at the strategic level down or the operational level. The lack of a consistent definition allows both sides in the debate to cherry pick relevant data to demonstrate the need for either higher or lower levels of funding. This runs the risk of politicizing the debate over readiness, which, at its core, is about assessing U.S. forces’ ability to carry out missions.
The debate over the state of the Navy should also be put into context. Despite the shortcomings mentioned in this report, the U.S. Navy has no challenger that comes close to its capabilities. The United States’ main naval rival today is China. The U.S. spent just over $600 billion on defense this year, while China spent a quarter of that amount. The U.S. has a robust fleet that includes 10 aircraft carriers, 68 submarines, 23 cruisers, 62 destroyers and 31 principal amphibious vessels stationed across the world. China’s navy consists of only one aircraft carrier, 57 submarines, 21 destroyers and four principal amphibious vessels.
(MARC: But Chinese focus is South China Sea i.e. really close to home, ours is world wide.)
China has naval ports outside of the country, but these facilities provide primarily logistical support; they do not function as forward deployment facilities. In addition, U.S. sailors not only outnumber Chinese sailors (the U.S. has 327,750 and China has 235,000) but they also – despite the criticism over the past year – have much more combat and operational experience due to the U.S. Navy’s global reach. China has very limited experience in sailing a carrier battle group, and its pilots might be trained but they lack experience. China has plans to build more ships, but this takes time. The power of the U.S. Navy, therefore, still outstrips that of the Chinese navy.
After the attack at Pearl Harbor, the U.S. Pacific Fleet was badly damaged and unable to wage war. Today’s Pacific Fleet has its challenges, but it can still wage war if called upon, and its capabilities far exceed those of any other navy. U.S. naval power is not in decline.
The post Evaluating the State of the US Navy appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
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https://www.cnet.com/pictures/russias-deadliest-new-war-machines/12/
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China: Hypersonic Weapons Programs Punch Through Technological Barriers
(Stratfor)
Stratfor has previously highlighted how hypersonic weapons will figure prominently in the years and decades ahead as the technology behind the missiles becomes more accessible and feasible. We've also noted that the United States and China were at the forefront of the technology, and that we expect both to field mature designs by 2025. The appearance of China's DF-17, the first missile with a hypersonic glide vehicle slated for operational deployment, confirms this analysis.
See Decade Forecast: 2015-2025
China is further along in developing hypersonic weapons than previously expected. According to reports in The Diplomat on Dec. 28, China conducted two tests in November of a new ballistic missile, designated as the DF-17, which is equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle. U.S. sources said the missile tests were successful and that the DF-17 is expected to reach initial operational capability around 2020. Previous hypersonic glide vehicle tests, such as the Chinese DF-ZF and the U.S. Hypersonic Test Vehicle, focused on experimental designs and prototyping. The DF-17 is now the first missile slated for operational deployment to be equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle.
A number of countries — particularly major military powers such as the United States, China and Russia — are investing in hypersonic missile technology. For the United States, hypersonic missiles offer a means by which it can gain its desired capability of striking anywhere in the world in less than an hour, an effort known as Prompt Global Strike. While intercontinental ballistic missiles (which are themselves hypersonic missiles) can technically already fulfill such a mission, their primary role is as a nuclear deterrent. Using them in a conventional military capacity is too risky, as foreign states may interpret their flight as an incoming nuclear strike. For China and Russia, hypersonic missiles could provide a tool to overcome well-developed U.S. anti-ballistic missile defense systems and a potent way to threaten U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups and other force projection assets in their regions of influence.
China's successful step forward with the DF-17 will further galvanize voices in the U.S. national security establishment that have called for increased spending on the military. The United States, however, isn’t far behind China. As recently as Oct. 30, the United States successfully tested a submarine launched missile equipped with a new glide vehicle. And, like China, the United States is also on the cusp of being able to deploy operational hypersonic weapons. These latest tests, as well as Russian progress with hypersonic missiles using airbreathing propulsion, highlight how hypersonic weapons are both coveted and within reach as scientific advances overcome technological constraints to make them work.
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Where Hypersonic Weapons Fit in the Future of War
By George Friedman
The South China Morning Post published an article on Jan. 7 that claimed China was “in the lead” of the development of hypersonic weapons technology. The article points out an important evolution in modern warfare, one that could have a major effect on how wars are fought. It is one of the rare technical matters that are actually strategically important.
War: A Matter of Math
In laymen’s terms, a hypersonic missile is a missile that can travel extremely fast. It is what’s known as an air-breathing weapon, which differs from an intercontinental ballistic missile in that it is externally fueled. It is the descendent of early cruise missiles such as the German V-1 and the U.S. Matador. These forebears were powered by jet engines and could fly to a target (occasionally) without a pilot. Later subsonic cruise missiles could go faster, powered as they were by ramjets, which compress incoming air and mix it with fuel to increase speed.
The Tomahawk had an even more important characteristic: It was a precision-guided munition, a technology whose importance is difficult to overstate. Firearms – everything from pistols to artillery – are traditionally ballistic weapons. Once they are fired, the trajectory of their projectiles is set in stone, determined by the hand-eye coordination of the shooter, math, physics and a good deal of hope. Manned bombers also used ballistic weapons. Once a bomb was dropped, it would go where it would go.
Ballistic weapons are, unsurprisingly, inaccurate. Early in World War II, for example, the British bombed Germany. The bombs were so far off target that German intelligence could not figure out what they were bombing. The British recognized this weakness, as well as the vulnerability of the aircraft dropping the bombs, so they began to bomb at night – indiscriminately, with incendiary weapons. They accepted their inability to hit military targets and opted for the destruction of cities.
Muskets and rifles were similarly afflicted. The average soldier wielding one was unable to hit a moving target, especially when he was under fire. In the 18th century, armies compensated by placing soldiers in three lines. Each line would fire in turn, creating a barrage of bullets that would offset the inaccuracy of any one round. There was a certain logic to it; warfare is statistical. The low probability of hitting a target with ballistic weapons was improved by increasing the number of rounds fired.
And so the mathematics of war required large armies, vast industrial plants and a great deal of time. But three things changed the equation. In 1967, Egypt sank an Israeli destroyer using Soviet-made precision-guided missiles. In 1972, the United States destroyed the Thanh Hoa bridge in North Vietnam using bombs guided by television and directional controls. (The bridge was critical; many American lives were lost to bring it down.) In 1973, the Egyptians destroyed an Israeli armored brigade with AT-3
Saggers, anti-tank missiles guided by a man who looked through an eyepiece and adjusted the course of the missile as needed.
The introduction of the precision-guided munitions revolutionized tactical warfare. War ceased to be masses of men using inaccurate weapons to kill each other. Fewer men were needed to destroy enemy personnel and equipment. In fact, now that they were at greater risk of being destroyed, traditional weapons had to be upgraded. The tank was fitted with various exotic armors. The manned bomber adopted stealth technology. Carriers adopted anti-missile systems such as the Aegis. This decreased the number of platforms but sent the price of each soaring.
The Wartime Needs of the U.S. and China
Improvements to defensive systems, in turn, led to improvements in offensive systems, which naturally became faster and deadlier. Hence, the creation of hypersonic weapons powered by what’s known as scramjet engines, which enable hypersonic missiles to travel much faster than their subsonic counterparts – more than 4-5 times the speed of sound, in fact – and are relatively accurate. Given China’s military doctrine, which currently focuses on sea lane control, Beijing’s interest in tactical hypersonic cruise missiles makes sense. Its ship-to-ship combat capability is limited, and so it has a problem engaging tactically with an enemy naval force. What the Chinese need are relatively short-range missiles to force the U.S. Navy to retreat from the South China Sea. Precision-guided cruise missiles might be able to saturate, and then penetrate, U.S. ship defense systems. Warfare would then become a matter of intercepting high-speed missiles or destroying the platforms from which they are launched, assuming the intelligence is available.
The United States has a different strategic problem. Most of its wars are fought in the Eastern Hemisphere, where it takes months to deploy armor, aircraft, personnel and the vast supplies needed to support them. Accurate weapons that travel incredibly fast, then, are extremely attractive to the Americans. Sending thousands of tanks to fire 100-pound shells three miles is not an elegant solution to the battle problem. It takes months. The ability to deliver precision munitions to the target area at Mach 20 within a half an hour delivers the same explosive with precision and without a monthlong buildup.
Precision-guided munitions ended the era that began with tube-fired projectiles (guns, if you prefer). In their place are munitions that can maneuver to the target after they are fired, either guided by the shooter or guided autonomously by its own sensors and guidance system.
Hypersonic missiles increase the speed of precision-guided munitions dramatically. One change they introduce is tactical, making it hard to defend a target. The other change is shifting the tempo of war by eliminating some of the delays imposed by the weight and quantity of weapons and supplies.
The Chinese strategic situation requires relatively short-range hypersonic weapons to threaten the American fleet. The United States needs to defend itself from these weapons, but what it needs strategically is long-range, extremely fast hypersonics to close the window of vulnerability it faces in any war in the Eastern Hemisphere.
It is of course unclear what either country actually has. There are those who argue authoritatively of Chinese or American capabilities or lack of them. Those who know don’t talk. Those who talk don’t know. I don’t know what China or the United States is working on or has. What I do know is the geopolitical problem each country faces, and the type of weapon that might fix it. I would bet that both countries are building the weapons they need, and likely already have them.
I might add that in trying to patrol Baghdad or maintain control of Xinjiang, such weapons are of little use. The kinds of war that have been fought in recent years are very different from the wars that might require these. But the wars that will urgently require these are the wars that nations must win.
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https://www.michaelyon-online.com/morgan-freeman-exposed.htm
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http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/navy-ship-montreal-stuck-1.4497416
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http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/navy-ship-montreal-stuck-1.4497416
Al Gore: The world will be free of all ice-caps by 2014.
Snopes: Partly true.
US Navy: Should have double checked.
https://www.snopes.com/ice-caps-melt-gore-2014/
2014: Harsh Winter Causes Greatest Great Lakes Ice Coverage Since 1979
https://www.accuweather.com/en/weather-news/nearly-frozen-lake-superior-ma/23439393
2017-2018 Here we go again:
The winters of '13-'14 and '14-'15 [and '17-'18] were basically Arctic,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation-now/2017/12/29/great-lakes-ice/989619001/
It's hard to dummy up the old records on major shipping lanes.
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2018/jan/28/women-packed-court-gets-coast-guard-rape-convictio/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiWmpobE9HSXdPR0k1TW1ObCIsInQiOiJxZ2hQNHMydGdXSSsyTFpLK0EwdVhsN1wvcVhqSXBcL3JpeUltVzB6TldxNVZMTGRuVXhVaEJLc290ZmtBRGNEcjBvb0hSZVg0YTdnOFVBbTUrUmlOT1puSWptOGwrQ3NVWUc3K0NcL0dIUXBmUXY1R1FialVTbUZBdmJmckZyTmJLbCJ9
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http://thehill.com/policy/defense/374329-pentagon-budget-euphoria-could-be-short-lived?userid=188403
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https://www.ausa.org/articles/new-eastern-front-what-us-army-must-learn-war-ukraine
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/meet-the-new-robot-army-1523455200?Paid&nan_pid=1863905825&ad_id=7946620
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http://cimsec.org/little-black-men-frogman-threat-maritime-hybrid-warfare/36373
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https://www.popsci.com/china-drone-planes-aircraft-carrier?CMPID=ene051018&utm_source=battelle-enews-aerospace
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• Middling powers in Europe, Asia and the Middle East will face increasing pressure from Washington on their ties with Russia because of the United States' new sanctions legislation.
• Germany, Vietnam and Turkey are some of the major states most likely to defy U.S. pressure on their Russia relations.
• In Asia, India may struggle to cope with the U.S. sanctions, while Indonesia could go either way.
• Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates will find it easier to comply thanks to their limited links to Russia and deep defense relationships with Washington.
• Measures such as the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act will encourage U.S. partners to adopt a more multilateral strategy in an emerging world of great power competition.
Yesterday was Tehran and today it's Moscow. As the United States, Russia and China engage in a great power competition, growing tensions between Washington and Moscow could soon have a major effect on U.S. relations with other countries. Upset by the Kremlin's actions around the world, U.S. lawmakers are hoping to hit Russia where it hurts most, its defense and energy business, through the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which applies secondary sanctions to countries engaging in business with Moscow in these fields. CAATSA has faced some resistance — not least from the commander in chief himself — but its gradual implementation promises to have far-reaching effects on all concerned.
The Big Picture
In its second-quarter forecast for 2018, Stratfor noted that the United States would turn its attention toward its competition with Russia and China. Washington already has targeted Beijing with trade tariffs, and now it is finally starting to implement measures that could change Russia's strategic ties around the world under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
See 2018 Second-Quarter Forecast
A Potent New Process
Secondary sanctions are hardly new to U.S. foreign policy. Washington used them extensively against Tehran in an effort to force the Islamic republic to modify its behavior before the Iranian nuclear deal's signing in 2015. But Russia occupies a different position from Iran in the international system as a great power that boasts robust energy relationships with Europe and China, as well as diverse defense ties with many states, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. CAATSA also targets Iran, along with North Korea, yet it is the secondary sanctions against Russia — especially those stipulated in sections 231 and 232 of the act — that could affect the United States' partnerships the most.
Under Section 231 of CAATSA, any third-country firm or individual that engages in a "significant transaction" with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors will face a penalty. Companies and individuals can apply for an exemption from the sanctions. Getting one, however, would require U.S. authorities to certify not only that the exemption would not harm the United States' national security interests but also that Russia had made "significant efforts to reduce the number and intensity of cyber intrusions."
Given that the Kremlin is unlikely to meet the second condition anytime soon, countries wishing to continue trade with Russia's defense or intelligence sectors could opt for a waiver under Section 231. The waiver, which has a maximum length of 180 days, requires U.S. officials to certify that the applicant is "substantially reducing the number of significant transactions" with targeted Russian interests. (The U.S. Congress is also currently considering the 2019 National Defense Authorization Bill, legislation that would replace the waiver process with an upfront certification that determines whether the entity in question is taking "significant and verifiable steps" or "has agreed to reduce reliance" on Russia over a "specified period.") But the waiver could draw unwanted attention to countries engaged in trade with Russia and give Washington leverage to try to exact concessions from them.
Section 232, meanwhile, focuses on energy, targeting investments of $1 million or more in Russian pipelines or support for building or operating pipelines — in goods, services, technology and information — worth an annual total of at least $5 million. Unlike those prescribed under Section 231, Section 232 sanctions are discretionary rather than mandatory.
The waiver could draw unwanted attention to countries engaged in trade with Russia and give Washington leverage to try to exact concessions from them.
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Off to a Slow Start
U.S. President Donald Trump opposed CAATSA (the act largely stems from a unilateral initiative by Congress, which took action out of concern that the U.S. leader could become too conciliatory toward Russia). Nevertheless, it passed by veto-proof majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives alike. The president then delayed its implementation beyond the Jan. 29 congressional deadline, arguing that the date signified the start, rather than the end, of the process.
Facing growing pressure from Congress, Trump has signaled that he will begin applying the law. The State Department has tried to define "significant transaction" and is already engaged in conversations with many countries on their relationships with Russia. At the same time, U.S. diplomats also tried to entice countries to expand their defense ties with Washington to compensate for the loss of Russian supplies. The overtures suggest that CAATSA's aim is not simply to penalize Russia for its perceived bad behavior but also to expand U.S. arms sales wherever possible. Still, some prominent members of the U.S. Congress are dissatisfied with the progress toward implementing the act. Key Democrats, such as Sen. Robert Menendez, and some Republicans, in fact, recently requested a rare multiagency investigation into the delays in the law's application. But regardless of the snags in its implementation, CAATSA demonstrates that the United States is more strident than ever in pushing other countries to reduce their defense and energy ties with Russia.
Addressing Russia's Worldwide Influence
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is the world's second-largest arms exporter. From 2013 to 2017, the country accounted for 22 percent of the globe's weapons exports, lagging behind only the United States at 34 percent. (All other exporters' contributions, by contrast, are in the single digits.) Russia also has numerous clients in diverse fields that purchase its air defense systems, aircraft, missiles, ships, armored vehicles and aircraft engines. Nearly two-thirds of Russia's exports go to Asia, though the Middle East and Africa also receive a significant portion of the country's arms.
Regardless of the snags in its implementation, CAATSA demonstrates that the United States is more strident than ever in pushing other countries to reduce their defense and energy ties with Russia.
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Russia's deepest defense relationships are with China, India and Vietnam, which together account for 58 percent of Russian exports. China has received top-of-the-line Russian equipment of late, including the S-400 air defense system and Su-35 aircraft, while India and Vietnam have been purchasing and using Russian equipment since Soviet times. Farther afield, Russia has signed major arms deals with Indonesia and Turkey, and it's in talks with Saudi Arabia and Qatar over the sale of the S-400 system. The United Arab Emirates, too, is considering the purchase of Su-35 aircraft. Although these countries are some of Russia's biggest customers — or prospective customers — they aren't the only ones that could run afoul of CAATSA. States such as Algeria, Myanmar, Malaysia, Kazakhstan and Ethiopia also could soon find themselves in hot water with the United States because of their "significant" defense relationships with Russia.
Mulling a Response
China
As one of the biggest purchasers of Russian arms, China will likely have the most difficulty scaling down its ties with Russia — all the more so since Washington has already targeted Beijing in separate trade disputes. Its connections with Russia are so deep and strategic that China will be unlikely to make more than token concessions on its core defense purchases from Moscow. (But even without the threat of U.S. sanctions, China is destined to purchase less Russian military hardware as it develops technology that would allow it to manufacture its own arms.) Similarly, major energy projects such as the Power of Siberia gas pipeline from Russia to the Far East are more or less irreversible.
As one of the biggest purchasers of Russian arms, China will likely have the most difficulty scaling down its ties with Russia — all the more so since Washington has already targeted Beijing in separate trade disputes.
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India
Russia also has deep relations with China's rival over the Himalayas, India. Moscow supplies most of the arms for the Indian military, including combat aircraft, naval destroyers, battle tanks and a lone nuclear submarine. The BrahMos missile — the product of Russian-Indian cooperation — is a signature success for New Delhi's defense establishment that also has great export potential. Furthermore, Russian arms deals offer generous terms, such as technology transfers and opportunities for joint production, that are important to India's strategic autonomy doctrine.
If push comes to shove, India will not sacrifice its relationship with Russia. Instead, it will try to compromise with the United States by purchasing more U.S. arms or by signing the two outstanding foundational defense agreements with the country. Despite its historical links with Moscow, New Delhi has expanded its security and economic relationship with the United States over the past two decades to try to increase its clout in the global system. Their ties are now strong, and India increasingly relies on the United States to balance China's rise in Asia. As a result, Washington has greater leverage over New Delhi, which, in turn, is more vulnerable to CAATSA's stipulations than Beijing is. In the longer run, however, the CAATSA process could rekindle anti-American sentiment in the Indian defense bureaucracy and the political class, two decades after a reset in U.S.-Indian relations consigned such nationalism to the margins.
Vietnam
In Southeast Asia, Vietnam — whose military gets nearly all its equipment from Russia — also has been more open to U.S. defense ties since the United States lifted an embargo on lethal arms sales to Hanoi in 2016. The United States has sold patrol boats to Vietnam, and a U.S. aircraft carrier even docked at the country's Cam Ranh naval base. Even so, Vietnam's connections to the United States remain limited at this nascent stage of their rapprochement. That means Vietnam will be in a stronger position than India in negotiations with Washington over CAATSA — even though it has deeper ties with Russia. In fact, the CAATSA process could discourage Vietnam from further building its defense relationship with the United States, if only to avoid future compromises to its strategic autonomy.
Indonesia
Indonesia could go either way in its ties with Russia. Its military has long relied on suppliers from multiple countries, including Russia, with which it is drafting a strategic partnership agreement. Indonesia reportedly defied U.S. pressure in February when it proceeded with a new order for 11 Su-35 jets in a deal with Moscow. At the same time, though, the Southeast Asian country counts the United States as a major export destination and tends to be less assertive than Vietnam.
Turkey
Toward the other end of Eurasia, Turkey would seem to be an unexpected target for CAATSA as a member of NATO, the gold standard for U.S. alliances. But Ankara has been moving to engage in more transactional relationships with all powers, including putative ally the United States. In a symbolic departure from the practices of alliance behavior, Turkey inked an agreement to acquire the S-400 air defense system from Russia, a NATO adversary.
The Trump administration has demanded that Ankara scuttle the deal, only to trigger a hostile response from the Turkish government. Now the U.S. Congress appears to
be upping the ante with a draft defense bill that would include provisions to suspend the sale of 100 F-35s to Turkey until U.S. authorities provide a report assessing the effects of Washington and Ankara's strained relations on U.S. operations in Turkey. And as in military matters, so in energy: Ankara is expected to defy Washington on the Turk Stream natural gas pipeline between Russia and Turkey, which could become a target of sanctions. If the United States becomes insistent in its demands, Ankara could use its cooperation in Syria as further leverage against Washington.
The Gulf States
Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates, meanwhile, have far fewer defense ties with Russia than with the United States, meaning they will find it easier to demonstrate a reduction in defense transactions with Moscow.
Germany
In terms of energy, another of the United States' most enduring allies, Germany, will find itself in the CAATSA crosshairs. Large European energy firms such as Royal Dutch/Shell, Uniper, OMV and Engie could all suffer U.S. sanctions because of their financial involvement in Nord Stream 2, a controversial pipeline that will bring natural gas directly to Germany from Russia. Germany, which has publicly condemned CAATSA's provision regarding Nord Stream 2, is well-placed to resist U.S. demands, thanks to its position as a major global player. Yet its strong economic ties with the United States will also make it vulnerable to punitive U.S. action.
Risks and Rewards
Secondary sanctions are part of the United States' broader strategy to achieve a set of objectives with regard to an adversary by imposing its laws on other countries. Washington has applied extraterritoriality in this way several times in the post-Cold War era, to Cuba, Iran and Libya in the 1990s, and once again to Iran in the 2000s.
If CATSAA succeeds, the rewards for Washington will be nothing less than altering Russia's behavior or curtailing its influence in the international system.
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Most countries view energy and defense as delicate areas in which market dynamics compete with strategic considerations. Defense relations, however, naturally involve sensitivities that exceed those of energy ties. Price negotiations are often protracted, and it might take years to complete an order. Any major weapons system, moreover, requires contracts for maintenance, spare parts and potential upgrades. Supplier reliability is a huge concern — as are technology transfers and joint production, which importers value. Consequently, reorienting core defense relationships can be quite disruptive for the importer.
The CAATSA process is full of lofty ambitions. If it succeeds, the rewards for Washington will be nothing less than altering Russia's behavior or curtailing its influence in the international system. But it also carries risks. In today's world, middle powers are increasingly assertive and refuse to tie themselves to any single great power. The United States' reliance on the blunt tool of extraterritoriality could eventually backfire if it's not careful.
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https://mic.com/articles/189638/advocacy-groups-sue-department-of-defense-over-their-policies-toward-hiv-positive-service-members#.1LqyQx17t
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https://mic.com/articles/189638/advocacy-groups-sue-department-of-defense-over-their-policies-toward-hiv-positive-service-members#.1LqyQx17t
There is no right to serve in the military.
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http://coldfury.com/2018/07/07/as-god-is-my-witness-i-thought-turkeys-could-fly/
A steaming pile of Obama.
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https://www.popsci.com/army-updated-physical-fitness-test?CMPID=ENE072418
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https://popularmilitary.com/instructors-claim-first-female-enlisted-earn-ranger-tab-actually-quit-given-special-treatment/
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https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/the-coming-swarm-might-be-dead-on-arrival/
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https://taskandpurpose.com/russia-fancy-armata-tanks-broke/
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The Risks of Failing to See the Sea
The West suffers from a dangerous general ignorance of maritime and naval affairs.
17 Comments
By Elisabeth Braw
Oct. 21, 2018 2:42 p.m. ET
On their way to Norway for NATO exercise Trident Juncture 18, British troops arrive in Hook of Holland, Netherlands, Oct. 10.
On their way to Norway for NATO exercise Trident Juncture 18, British troops arrive in Hook of Holland, Netherlands, Oct. 10. Photo: vincent jannink/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
This week some 50,000 men and women from 31 countries will conduct an enormous military exercise in and around Norway. Called Trident Juncture 18, it will be one of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s largest exercises since the end of the Cold War. Europe’s roads have seen a procession of military convoys in recent weeks, but few Europeans have noticed the journey of 65 naval vessels, including an aircraft carrier, to Norwegian waters.
To its detriment, the West suffers from what is sometimes called “sea blindness”—a general ignorance of maritime and naval affairs. Even the United Kingdom’s famous Royal Navy needs a team to travel the country illuminating the public about what it does. “I always thought sea blindness particularly bad in Germany, so it was painful to discover that it exists even in a seafaring nation like Britain,” retired Vice Adm. Hans-Joachim Stricker, a former commander of the German fleet, told me.
The public-awareness tours are in the Royal Navy’s interest. It’s been decades since a Western country has been embroiled in an all-out naval battle on the open ocean. This has bred complacency. Many Britons question whether the Royal Navy needs the two aircraft carriers it recently acquired at a cost of some £6.2 billion ($8.1 billion), when Britain could easily piggyback on the U.S. Navy’s capabilities.
Though the general public may have a hard time imagining it, the risk of naval warfare remains real. This year the Chinese navy was disinvited from the U.S.-hosted Rim of the Pacific Exercise due to Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea. Earlier this month, a U.S. ship conducting a freedom-of-navigation operation near the Spratlys had what the Navy called “an unsafe encounter” with a Chinese warship.
The Royal Navy itself received a stern warning from Beijing in September after one of its ships approached an island China now labels its own. In May the French navy sent an assault ship to patrol the Spratly reefs that China has surreptitiously turned into islands and is outfitting with missiles. The stakes are high, but most of us don’t take any notice.
Intense commercial activity—80% of the world’s trade volume travels by sea—makes waterways into targets. The Baltic Sea, which connects Russia with several NATO member states as well as Sweden and Finland, could be another flashpoint. “During the Cold War, the Baltic Sea was an area of confrontation, with about half the countries with Baltic Sea shorelines belonging to the Warsaw Pact,” Adm. Stricker noted. In the Baltic Sea today, hundreds of daily voyages transport goods such as Swedish iron and Finnish gas. A Russian-led consortium has just begun construction of its Nordstream 2 pipeline, which will cross the Baltic Sea and come ashore in Germany.
“Most Swedes are blissfully unaware of what happens in the Baltic Sea,” retired Gen. Sverker Göranson, supreme commander of Sweden’s armed forces from 2009 to 2015, told me. “The Swedish economy is completely dependent on trade, including the Baltic Sea’s enormous flow of goods. But in the past four years, our security environment has changed.”
That’s putting it diplomatically. Russia, joined by the Chinese navy, this April carried out a major exercise in the Baltic Sea. Part of it, including live-fire missile testing, took place within Latvia’s exclusive economic zone. Sweden had to restrict civilian air traffic. Two months later, 22 NATO countries and partners conducted their own Baltic Sea exercise.
It’s possible that Russia could disrupt NATO in the Baltic Sea, without any of its soldiers setting foot on NATO soil. “It’s vital to a country to have a strong navy and air force, because that’s where the action begins,” Gen. Göranson said. All the ships transporting our daily necessities need protection, too.
Despite the risks, there’s an obvious reason for Western sea blindness: While most people have seen soldiers or perhaps some army jeeps, few have encountered frigates. Out of sight, navies are out of mind. But we indulge our sea blindness at our own risk. Precisely because we depend on the oceans, we should pay closer attention to their security.
Ms. Braw directs the Modern Deterrence program at the U.K.’s Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies.
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Like hitting a bullet with a bullet (in space). The U.S. military conducted its second successful test in as many months of the new SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor on Tuesday, shooting down an intermediate-range ballistic missile from an Aegis Ashore battery in Hawaii. Two previous tests in 2017 and 2018 failed, and the SM-3 Block IIA could substantially bolster U.S. missile shields in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. (The interceptor is being jointly developed with Japan.) But the implications of advancements in missile defense are difficult to gauge for two reasons: One, missile defense is expensive and extremely difficult, especially against longer-range missiles, and these tests are typically conducted in conditions optimized for success. Two, missile defense systems don’t always lead to stability, and they certainly don’t put an end to costly arms races. Rather, they’re just as likely to convince the countries they’re intended to contain (such as China, North Korea and Russia) to double down on developing missiles that are harder to shoot down. Moscow, for example, is citing U.S. missile defense installations on its periphery as justification for its continued testing of new missiles that violate the beleaguered Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
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Why Logistics Will Be Key to Any U.S. Conflict With Russia and China
Sailors attached to Navy Cargo Handling Battalion 1 with Detachment Guam move supplies from a naval base in Guam to the fast transport ship USNS Brunswick on Sept. 1, 2018.
(LT. MARY SMITH/U.S. Navy)
The geographic distance that helps protect the United States will impinge upon its ability to project force across the Eurasian landmass unless it can improve its logistical supply chain.
The emergence of new technologies, a weakening merchant marine fleet and many diplomatic issues such as national borders will all hinder Washington's ability to deploy in Eurasia.
Aware of the challenges, the United States will continue its efforts to solve these problems through the establishment of new NATO commands, the purchase of new vessels and the harnessing of new AI technology.
Whether it's the development of new weaponry, the competition to sway middle powers, the collapse of arms control treaties or more, a number of issues have come to dominate the headlines in regard to the nascent great power competition among the United States, Russia and China. But there's another critical topic that has attracted far less attention but is of great concern for Washington: logistics. As it faces the prospect of conflict with Russia or China in Eurasia, the United States has no choice but to get its organizational house in order if it is to wage an effective battle.
The Big Picture
Competition between great powers is a defining theme of our times. As the United States gears up to challenge China and Russia in a number of domains, logistics and — more specifically — the ability to project and sustain its military forces in Eurasia will be a critical component of that competition.
The United States is blessed with a geography that has given it two wide oceans to guard its flanks, insulating it from many direct challenges to the homeland. But the same isolation that helps protect the United States also becomes a tyranny of distance when it comes to the U.S. military's ability to project force on the Eurasian landmass. During both World War II and the Cold War, the United States had to account for (and, in the case of World War II, battle across) the Atlantic Ocean to deploy forces in Europe. Similarly, the United States has created a vast logistics chain to ensure its ability to project forces across the Pacific Ocean to East Asia, Australasia and beyond.
Today, the United States benefits greatly from supply chains and transportation infrastructure that allow it to trade and deploy its forces across large distances in peacetime. Nevertheless, the United States must prepare for the real possibility that it will not enjoy such unencumbered access to maritime routes if its competition with either China or Russia escalates into open hostilities. And compounding the issue for Washington is the emergence of new disruptive technologies, the weakening strength of the United States' merchant marine fleet and the myriad diplomatic issues that Washington must consider every time it crosses national boundaries.
Washington's Transport Woes
If it faces its great power competitors in any armed conflict, the United States would have to move its forces rapidly across huge distances, since forward-deployed U.S. forces in Europe and the western Pacific would not be sufficient on their own to address Russia and China, respectively. Naturally, reinforcements in the form of troops and munitions would have to reach these forces as quickly as possible, yet their route would more likely be by ship than by plane, since there are limits to how much the United States can send by air to a conflict region — even with Washington's large inventory of transport aircraft. As the former head of the U.S. Transportation Command noted last year, the United States only has enough strategic transport aircraft to lift one armored brigade combat team (amounting to 5,000 troops and several hundred vehicles) to a theater of operations. It is thus the Navy that would have to shoulder most of the responsibility for transporting material to sustain a major conflict in Eurasia; in fact, the force has calculated that it would need to transport about 90 percent of the Marine Corps and Army equipment necessary to fight such a battle.
In so doing, Russia and China would naturally attempt to intercept U.S. forces on the high seas, long before American forces arrive at their destination. Russian submarines are, once more, displaying increasing activity in the North Atlantic, while the Chinese navy is dispatching vessels further into the Pacific as it grows in strength each year. Furthermore, emerging technologies could make the slow-going U.S. transport ships even more vulnerable to attack. The development of cruise missiles with ever-longer ranges, anti-ship ballistic missiles and hypersonic weapons could allow Russian and Chinese forces to engage U.S. transport ships from huge distances, especially when enabled by sophisticated satellite constellations such as China's BeiDou navigational satellite network.
An aging sealift roster and a lack of sufficient escorts would also challenge the U.S. logistical effort. According to Defense News, the U.S. Navy has been warning the U.S. Military Sealift Command that there are simply too few warships to adequately escort the slow transports, as the former will be too busy fighting at the front during a major conflict. And according to a U.S. Navy report on the issue from March, Sealift Command itself will seriously lack enough transport vessels, especially come the end of the 2020s.
The U.S. military requirement is for 15.3 million square feet (1.4 million square meters) of government-owned sealift capacity, along with an additional 4.3 million square feet (399,000 square meters) of capacity to be supplied by U.S. flagged commercial ships. But according to the study, this capacity is rapidly declining and will likely fall as far as 12 million square feet (1.11 million square meters) by 2030. What's more, many of the vessels currently in service require extensive maintenance because of their advanced age; the fact that a significant number of these ships still use obsolete, steam-based propulsion will only compound Washington's headaches.
It does not matter how capable, how well-trained or how advanced a nation's forces are if they can't get to the front in time.
And even if the United States were to successfully run a Russian and Chinese gauntlet at sea, it would encounter plenty of problems once it arrives at its destination, including political, infrastructure and even bureaucratic issues. During its recent deployment of rotational forces to Europe following Russia's takeover of Crimea, U.S. forces often found themselves bedeviled by long delays in their overland journeys to Eastern Europe, as they had to wait at borders for permission to cross and cope with infrastructure that was ill-suited for heavy military vehicles. While a conflict in the western Pacific would be a largely maritime and air affair, thereby necessitating fewer bureaucratic hassles at borders, Washington would still face political issues, as it would have to acquire permission to operate from airbases and ports across Japan and, potentially, South Korea, Australia and the Philippines at a time when some of these countries may be loath to provoke China.
The Search for Solutions
With these array of problems to consider, the United States is seeking solutions to ensure its forces and their equipment arrive in Eurasia during a crisis. To ensure greater coordination and unity of effort, NATO is establishing two new commands. The U.S.-based Atlantic Command will focus on coordinating allied efforts to facilitate access across the North Atlantic, while the Germany-based Logistics Command will ensure that U.S. troops arriving in Europe, as well as allied troops already stationed there, will experience no difficulty in rapidly deploying to the front. In addition, the United States also re-established the 2nd Fleet in July to guarantee U.S. naval dominance in the North Atlantic.
And to mitigate the lack of sufficient warships as escorts, military authorities are encouraging transport ships to learn how to reduce their visibility to potential enemies by reducing their electronic emissions. The United States is also exploring the potential of purchasing more transport ships on the commercial market to reduce its growing sealift shortfall, even if such a solution is not straightforward due to the expense and the need to retrofit them for military transport. But perhaps most promising in the long run for Washington is the advent of new technology such as logistics chains that are managed by artificial intelligence, as these can increase the efficiency and responsiveness of U.S. strategic logistics.
The questions surrounding the United States' ability to deploy to the far-flung corners of the globe provide a timely reminder of the primacy of logistics in war planning. After all, it does not matter how capable, how well-trained or how advanced a nation's forces are if they can't get to the front in time. As the United States gears up for its looming battle with Russia and China, logistical concerns will naturally be front and center in the minds of the country's military planners.
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Silicon, Not Steel, Will Win the Next War
America needs a domestic supply of military technology.
46 Comments
By Henry Kressel and
David P. Goldman
Dec. 23, 2018 3:57 p.m. ET
Silicon, Not Steel, Will Win the Next War
Photo: iStock/Getty Images
The Trump administration this year imposed tariffs on steel, claiming that imports “threaten to impair the national security of the United States.” But the age is long past when steel was the most important input in a nation’s military arsenal. The modern military depends more on digital technology—semiconductor chips, sensors and software—than it does on steel.
The U.S. pioneered the technology that made today’s advanced weapon systems possible. But America’s competitive advantage in the digital economy is eroding at an alarming pace, along with its domestic high-tech manufacturing capacity. The majority of electronic systems first invented in the U.S. now are designed and made overseas, mainly in Asia. With few and dwindling exceptions, the U.S. no longer makes things like flat-panel displays, memory devices, light-emitting devices, lasers, imaging chips for digital cameras, and computer system packaging software.
As the manufacture of these component technologies has migrated offshore, so have many key systems suppliers. Intel is the only remaining U.S. company capable of fabricating high-density, high-performance computer chips in America. International Business Strategies estimates that investors are pouring $50 billion a year into advanced chip production facilities in Asia, more than 10 times the level of domestic spending. A state-of-the-art chip-fabrication plant can cost $20 billion to build and must be continuously upgraded.
The national-security implications of this industrial migration are dire. Without a domestic capability in critical electronic technologies, the U.S. may find itself unable to translate innovation into effective weaponry. Overseas supply chains are inherently insecure. Unless the manufacture of critical technology remains under domestic control, American systems are vulnerable to espionage and sabotage.
To be sure, critical defense technologies can be manufactured much more cheaply in Asia than they can in the U.S. But those cost savings come at the expense of American security. China, Japan and South Korea subsidize capital investment to encourage manufacturing facilities to move to their economies. If the U.S. loses all of its most advanced chip-fabrication capacity, it will be like a country without a steel industry in the age of artillery—at the mercy of its enemies.
America’s urgent national-security needs require a reversal of the great migration of manufacturing capacity. That would be costly and in some cases disruptive, and it requires bold and decisive steps:
• Domestic sourcing of the most sensitive defense technologies, which in turn necessitates returning important parts of the supply chain to domestic industry. American industry will require tax breaks and subsidies to do so in some cases.
• Ensuring that skilled professionals and workers are available to fill these high-tech jobs will require government incentives for science, technology and math education comparable to the Eisenhower administration’s response to the 1957 launch of Sputnik, as well as private-public partnerships for apprenticeship programs in manufacturing.
• Tax credits for research and development will be necessary to encourage U.S. corporations to re-establish in-house laboratories like the ones that produced digital-age breakthroughs.
• More direct federal funding of basic research and development. Such spending by the Defense Advanced Research Products Agency, National Aeronautic and Space Administration, and other government agencies reached 1.25% of gross domestic product in 1977 but has fallen to only 0.7% of GDP today. This must be restored, though it won’t help if America lacks the facilities to turn ideas into robust technology.
Bringing high-tech manufacturing back to American shores is an expensive proposition. Part of the cost can be defrayed by reducing funding for aging weapons systems and changing priorities. In the long term, defense R&D will generate profitable civilian spinoffs. But national security is the overriding priority.
Mr. Kressel is a technologist, inventor and private equity investor. Mr. Goldman, a columnist for the Asia Times, formerly headed research groups at Wall Street firms.
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http://www.aei.org/publication/dirty-waters-civilian-military-relations-are-growing-toxic/?mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTkRGak1qSTFNV0kyT1RFMyIsInQiOiJWQWtoYkE4QXhBd1JoekZrVFdPaUF1bU5SWktwTFI4WWdjMUNOcWlRN0JQMFFZN2dBQnhoN29lbFFTdlwvRFhtVm1CVFwvMWJrT1BEXC81ekRGXC9tNVV5ZUduZVJtbVp6SjJ3YUN1NGM2S0ZHWG1FOGhHUEJDOWVtNGE4dFwvZ3ozSVAxIn0%3D
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Mattis lasted longer than Obama's last 3 Secretaries of Defense. It was probably good for Trump to have these Generals in close counsel during his earliest times in the White House. Two years ago he thought nuclear triad was a trick question. Most of his turnover has led to improvement in the positions. Mattis' positive contributions in arming the US will have lasting effects - until they are reversed by the Left.
Some of these Generals were better in combat than in politics. There is a difference between military and former military. Wesley Clarke not mentioned in the piece but some show no more wisdom or discipline than ordinary politicians. Being a Commander where no one answers back to you may not be good preparation for politics.
Hear them out and take in all their advice, but after all is said and done, thank God we have civilian leadership over our military.
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https://www.westernjournal.com/court-allows-transgender-military-ban-stand/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=westernjournalism&utm_content=2019-01-04&utm_campaign=manualpost
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https://www.westernjournal.com/court-allows-transgender-military-ban-stand/?utm_source=push&utm_medium=westernjournalism&utm_content=2019-01-04&utm_campaign=manualpost
"According to USA Today, dozens of transgender recruits have signed up to serve since Jan 1, 2018, when they became eligible and there are several thousand active-duty transgender troops."
I call BS on those numbers.
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Maybe they were looking for Uncle Sam to pick up the bill for the surgeries?
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Maybe they were looking for Uncle Sam to pick up the bill for the surgeries?
The VA and Tricare struggle to provide baseline medical services.
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Hat tip Big Dog
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/612421/us-china-quantum-arms-race/
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second post
https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/01/pentagon-seeks-list-ethical-principles-using-ai-war/153940/?oref=weekly-wrap&utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=D1_Best%20Of%20The%20Week_011119&utm_term=defense_one_hybrid
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Women Don’t Belong in Combat Units
The military is watering down fitness standards because most female recruits can’t meet them.
1212 Comments
By Heather Mac Donald
Updated Jan. 16, 2019 1:38 p.m. ET
Female Marine recruits in boot camp in Parris Island, S.C., Feb. 27, 2013.
Female Marine recruits in boot camp in Parris Island, S.C., Feb. 27, 2013. Photo: Scott Olson/Getty Images
The Obama-era policy of integrating women into ground combat units is a misguided social experiment that threatens military readiness and wastes resources in the service of a political agenda. The next defense secretary should end it.
In September 2015 the Marine Corps released a study comparing the performance of gender-integrated and male-only infantry units in simulated combat. The all-male teams greatly outperformed the integrated teams, whether on shooting, surmounting obstacles or evacuating casualties. Female Marines were injured at more than six times the rate of men during preliminary training—unsurprising, since men’s higher testosterone levels produce stronger bones and muscles. Even the fittest women (which the study participants were) must work at maximal physical capacity when carrying a 100-pound pack or repeatedly loading heavy shells into a cannon.
Ignoring the Marine study, then-Defense Secretary Ash Carter opened all combat roles to women in December 2015. Rather than requiring new female combat recruits to meet the same physical standards as men, the military began crafting “gender neutral” standards in the hope that more women would qualify. Previously, women had been admitted to noncombat specialties under lower strength and endurance requirements.
Only two women have passed the Marine Corps’s fabled infantry-officer training course out of the three dozen who have tried. Most wash out in the combat endurance test, administered on day one. Participants hike miles while carrying combat loads of 80 pounds or more, climb 20-foot ropes multiple times, and scale an 8-foot barrier. The purpose of the test is to ensure that officers can hump their own equipment and still arrive at a battleground mentally and physically capable of leading troops. Most female aspirants couldn’t pass the test, so the Marines changed it from a pass/fail requirement to an unscored exercise with no bearing on the candidate’s ultimate evaluation. The weapons-company hike during the IOC is now “gender neutral,” meaning that officers can hand their pack to a buddy if they get tired, rather than carrying it for the course’s full 10 miles.
Lowering these physical requirements risks reducing the American military’s lethality. A more serious effect of sex integration has become taboo to mention: the inevitable introduction of eros into combat units. Putting young, hormonally charged men and women into stressful close quarters for extended periods guarantees sexual liaisons, rivalries and breakups, all of which undermine the bonding essential to a unified fighting force.
A Marine commander who served in Afghanistan described to me how the arrival of an all-female team tasked with reaching out to local women affected discipline on his forward operating base. Until that point, rigorous discipline had been the norm. But when four women—three service members and a translator—arrived, the post’s atmosphere changed overnight from a “stern, businesslike place to that of an eighth-grade dance.” The officer walked into a common room one day to find the women clustered in the center. They were surrounded by eager male Marines, one of whom was doing a handstand.
Another Marine officer, who was stationed on a Navy ship after 9/11, told me that a female officer had regular trysts with an enlisted sailor in the engine room. Marine Cpl. Remedios Cruz, one of the first women to join the infantry, was discharged late last year after admitting to a sexual relationship with a male subordinate. Army Sgt. First Class Chase Usher was relieved of his leadership position for a consensual relationship with a female soldier that began almost immediately after she arrived at his newly gender-integrated unit in Fort Bragg, N.C.
Long before infantry integration became a feminist imperative, evidence was clear that a coed military was a sexually active one. In 1988 then-Navy Secretary Jim Webb reported that of the unmarried enlisted Navy and Air Force women stationed in Iceland, half were pregnant.
President Trump’s first defense secretary, Jim Mattis, had seemed a good candidate for reversing the integration of women in combat units. A retired Marine general, Mr. Mattis had previously addressed the incompatibility of eros and military discipline. New York Sen. Kirsten Gillibrand challenged him about these politically incorrect views during his confirmation hearings, but he left enough wiggle room to preserve his options.
Unfortunately, Mr. Trump chose to ban transgender people from serving in the military rather than tackling gender integration. Mr. Trump cited the cost to taxpayers of sex-reassignment surgery for soldiers, but those costs are minute compared with the future medical bills for women’s combat-battered bodies. And women pose a far greater challenge to combat-unit cohesion than do transgender troops, because of their numbers and the nature of sexual attraction.
The argument for putting women into combat roles has always been nonmilitary: Combat experience qualifies soldiers for high-ranking Pentagon jobs. But war isn’t about promoting equality. Its objective is to break the enemy’s will through precise lethal engagement, with the lowest possible loss of American life. The claim that female combat soldiers will perform as lethally as men over an extended deployment entails a denial of biological reality as great as the one underlying the transgender crusade.
Female engineers and others did return fire when attacked in Iraq and Afghanistan. But performing well in incident-related combat is a far cry from serving in a dedicated ground-combat unit, with its months of punishing physical demands.
The incoming Pentagon chief can expect an aggressive grilling on gender integration from the Senate Armed Services Committee. He should promise to resolve the claim that, when it comes to combat, there are no significant physical differences between men and women. He could do it by pitting an all-female infantry unit against an all-male unit and seeing how they measure up.
Ms. Mac Donald is a fellow at the Manhattan Institute and author of “The Diversity Delusion: How Race and Gender Pandering Corrupt the University and Undermine Our Culture.”
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I was thinking no men should sign up for the military ,
Let the military have all the women they want and lets see how it goes.
I mean the military is all about experimentation these days.....
if the world would be a better place if only women were in charge lets start here.
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https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/sinking-feeling-us-navy-losing-its-submarine-advantage-china-44502
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https://www.lawfareblog.com/trial-judge-declares-male-only-selective-service-system-unconstitutional
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I saw this. I get the logic I suppose, but I'm thinking the military should be deciding these things, not judges.
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https://www.lawfareblog.com/trial-judge-declares-male-only-selective-service-system-unconstitutional
Funny, I don't see lots of joy expressed by the usual suspects.
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Batteries Make the World Go Round
Sep 27, 2018
By Xander Snyder
Summary
Some innovations disrupt industries. Others disrupt the world. Gunpowder, the internal combustion engine, the microchip, the internet – these are all innovations that changed what it meant for a state to be secure and, therefore, what interests the state must pursue. Many have guessed, but it’s impossible to know what the next revolutionary, world-disrupting technology will be. But we can nevertheless look at how advancements in existing technologies are creating new industries and doing things like modifying states’ military capabilities. As technology progresses, and as costs come down, new applications emerge that can generate demand for inputs that were previously mostly ignored.
One technology that is progressing with global implications is energy storage, specifically electrochemical batteries, which store energy chemically and transform it into electricity via chemical reactions. The increasing energy density of new batteries, greater lifecycles and ability to recharge mean that batteries can be used to power new devices and for longer periods. Lithium-ion batteries, for example, have become the industry standard for consumer electronics of all types and are being adopted by the electric vehicle industry. Better batteries also enable the wider adoption of new types of energy generation, such as wind and solar, by providing a way for round-the-clock use of electricity that is generated only at certain times of the day.
The states with the best batteries will have a comparative advantage in commerce and on the battlefield. Securing supply chains critical to the production of batteries, therefore, will become an increasingly strategic concern for countries in the years to come – much like oil supplies today. And that means ensuring that all inputs of production are available in sufficient quantities to produce enough batteries to meet a state’s strategic needs.
This Deep Dive will investigate the current state of one of the most promising battery types right now, lithium-ion batteries, and how the need for cobalt in those batteries’ production in the coming years is increasing foreign powers’ strategic focus on the country with the most cobalt reserves and greatest production, the Democratic Republic of Congo. China has a sizable advantage right now in the cultivation of links to the DRC’s mines, while the U.S. is gradually turning its attention to the search for alternatives. More broadly, we will lay out a framework for thinking about technological advancement in geopolitical terms: By focusing on critical components and where they are located, we can get a sense for where future zones of competition can emerge and which technologies governments will focus their investment on.
Not Just Your Smartphone Battery
Lithium-ion batteries are being used in more and more ways because they solve a lot of energy storage problems. They can store and discharge more energy per mass than other older batteries like lead-acid or nickel metal hydride, and they have a slower self-discharge rate (i.e., how much of its charge the battery loses on its own without usage). These properties have made lithium-ion batteries ubiquitous in smartphones and other small consumer electronic devices that require frequent charging and are intended to have a relatively long life expectancy.
Lithium-ion batteries are also becoming the standard battery in electric vehicles. Though lithium-ion-powered EVs still cannot quite match the range of gas-powered vehicles, they are getting close – a Tesla Model S with an upgraded battery can travel 335 miles (540 kilometers) on a single charge, among the longest travel ranges for any electric vehicle – even if EVs with the longest mileage are far more expensive than their gas-fueled equivalents. As the EV market pushes demand for lithium-ion batteries higher, their energy density has been increasing while the cost of production has been falling. The University of California, Berkeley estimates that the price for an EV-designed lithium-ion battery in 2016 was about $150 per kilowatt-hour – compared to over $400 a decade ago. And as the cost of lithium-ion batteries falls, they become more competitive with similar batteries and thus become viable alternatives. Advancements that lead to smaller lithium-ion batteries will also increase their potential use cases.
(click to enlarge)
Broader adoption, however, has implications well beyond the world of consumer electronics and electric vehicles and into national defense. In his 2009 book “The Next 100 Years,” GPF founder George Friedman pointed out that as infantry becomes increasingly mechanized and reliant on portable electronic devices, there will develop a growing strategic need to deliver electricity to the battlefield and forward bases. This trend is already developing: In 2004, a typical NATO soldier deployed in Iraq consumed approximately 500 watt-hours during a 72-hour mission. Today, that same dismounted soldier would consume twice as much electricity. Here, too, the effect of innovation in lithium-ion battery technology is being felt. In this case, lithium-ion batteries have three major advantages over existing battery tech used by soldiers in the field. First, they are rechargeable. (In 2015, NATO said dismounted soldiers needed to carry seven different batteries, which weren’t rechargeable and therefore needed to be replaced.) Second, they last longer than traditional lead-acid batteries. And third, they are lighter than other battery types that can deliver the same quantity of energy.
Another immediate application for lithium-ion batteries is enabling longer periods of what’s called “silent watch.” Often soldiers will be stationed for long periods in a vehicle with its engine turned off to keep watch over an area. Silent watch requires vehicles to power sensors and communication suites without the engine running. Lead-acid batteries, which have been standard, provide for only about four hours of silent watch, at which point the outpost must turn its engine on to power the generator, revealing its position. Lithium-ion batteries could extend this time to 12 hours, providing for all-night silent watches.
Reducing the strain on mechanized infantry and enabling longer silent watches may not seem like huge leaps in capabilities, but in war, supply and logistics are everything, and these advantages would reduce the logistical burden and improve forward operating capabilities. Efficient lithium-ion batteries can decrease the need for constant resupply of other types of batteries and of fuel needed for generators, since independent units could use solar and wind systems in conjunction with rechargeable batteries to provide for their electricity needs. Given that fuel often costs more than 10 times its purchase price to deliver safely to forward operating bases, this has meaningful financial benefits. It would also make it easier to station ground forces farther forward for longer periods.
There are other military use cases for more efficient batteries that go beyond minimizing supply constraints – for example, signal targeting, which is when a deployed unit uses a portable electronic system to detect and jam all frequency signaling in a given area by an adversary. The ability to disrupt an enemy’s command and control is a substantial tactical advantage. Signal targeting requires batteries, and if it’s a long mission – say, 10 or more hours – a highly efficient and, preferably, lightweight battery is needed.
Pulsed power supplies are another such use for efficient batteries. These use electricity to power applications like high-powered microwaves, electromagnetic launchers, lasers, railguns and similar devices that require a quick burst of electricity. A study by the University of Texas showed that lithium-ion batteries can make these pulsed power supplies substantially more compact, mobile and efficient. Right now, most pulse powered applications continue to rely on power supplied from the grid, which clearly limits their usefulness on a battlefield.
Democratic Republic of Cobalt
Though lithium-ion batteries are by no means the only new, efficient, rechargeable battery, they are one of the most promising, offering high energy density, minimal recharging memory effect (i.e., reduced longevity over time) and lower unintended discharge rates (lost charge while not in use). Among the category of lithium-ion batteries, one of the preferred types requires cobalt to be used in the cathode. (The cathode is the positively charged side of the battery; the anode is the negatively charged side. As lithium-ions flow from one side, or electrode, to the other, they emit electrons to an external circuit that powers devices.)
The problem with cobalt, however, is where it comes from. The Democratic Republic of Congo – a country not known for its political stability or ease of doing business – holds 50 percent of all cobalt reserves and provides nearly 60 percent of the global supply. From 1996 to 2003, the DRC experienced two extremely bloody civil wars, but the violence never really stopped. The second war – sometimes referred to as the Great African War because many other African countries were pulled into the fighting – is believed to have caused nearly 5.5 million deaths, making it the world’s deadliest conflict since World War II.
There are alternatives to producing lithium-ion battery cathodes with cobalt, but each has its drawbacks. For example, Daniel Abraham, a senior scientist at Argonne National Laboratory, described how cobalt can be substituted with nickel, which is cheaper. But using nickel increases the risk of a large release of oxygen – a significant fire hazard. Adding aluminum can increase the stability of a nickel cathode, but not without decreasing the cell’s capacity. To balance between these, some batteries use a combination of nickel, cobalt and aluminum, but regardless of the combination, cobalt is still the best solution for making high-capacity, efficient and stable lithium-ion batteries.
Similarly, there’s no good single substitute for the DRC when it comes to cobalt production. Though other countries have cobalt reserves, they are much smaller and more widely scattered. The remaining roughly 40 percent of production is split across several countries, with Russia, Australia, Canada and Cuba ranking as the second- through fifth-largest producers in 2017. But each of these countries produced only between about 4,000 and 5,500 metric tons of cobalt each, compared to the DRC’s nearly 65,000 metric tons.
(click to enlarge)
As cobalt use has grown in consumer electronics, companies like Samsung and Apple have begun seeking out agreements directly with large cobalt miners, which have more oversight than smaller operations, as opposed to purchasing it on the market. This is motivated in part by companies’ desires to distance themselves from the high incidence of child labor used in mining cobalt in the DRC, especially among smaller mining companies.
But the bigger risk for these companies is that the growth in electric vehicle production could take so much cobalt off the market that it becomes difficult to source a key component of their own products. For example, though a smartphone requires only about 8 grams of cobalt, an EV battery requires 10 kilograms – more than 1,000 times as much. Research initiatives have sought to reduce the amount of cobalt needed in lithium-ion batteries, such as the nickel-cobalt-aluminum cathode, but demand for cobalt in the next 10 years is still forecast to increase significantly.
(click to enlarge)
All of this means that, until comparable technologies can be invented to decrease the need for cobalt, the DRC will take on a more strategic role for companies and countries that depend on cobalt-based lithium-ion batteries – which is to say, every major country in the world. This is especially true as the increased production of lithium-ion batteries drives their cost down, thus increasing the number of use cases for them.
The China Factor
As it turns out, though, China currently controls 80 percent of the global cobalt sulfates and oxides market – the refined products needed to produce lithium-ion cathodes. China is also the largest producer of lithium-ion batteries, and Chinese battery makers have cut large deals with cobalt mining companies. Earlier this year, for instance, Chinese battery producer GEM signed a deal with Glencore to purchase one-third of its mined cobalt from 2018 through 2020. Glencore, for its part, is responsible for mining about a third of the world’s annual supply of cobalt.
The DRC is a major recipient of Chinese investment in Africa. In early 2017, China Molybdenum purchased a majority stake in the DRC’s Tenke Fungurume Mine, one of the largest deposits of cobalt and copper in the world, from a U.S.-based company for $3.8 billion. In June, China’s Citic Metal spent $560 million on a 20 percent stake in Ivanhoe Mines, which operates the Kamoa-Kakula copper mine. (Currently, about 98 percent of cobalt is mined as a byproduct of nickel and copper.) China has also invested heavily in the Sicomines copper project, a joint venture between Sinohydro, China Railway Construction Corp. and the Congolese state. The Sicomines project is perhaps the best known of the resources-for-infrastructure deals that China has made on the African continent. In exchange for a guaranteed quantity of copper and cobalt, Beijing has agreed to build transport infrastructure that would allow for easier production and export of those resources, as well as other projects such as hospitals.
There are two reasons China is spending so much money on developing mines in central Africa. The first is economic: China is hoping to become a leader in electric vehicles and, by extension, lithium-ion batteries. This accomplishes several things for China. For one, more clean vehicles work toward Beijing’s goal of reducing pollution, which it has already begun to combat with regulations restricting the number and type of cars on its roads, especially in big cities. Persistent and increasingly toxic pollution has become a political issue in China, and Beijing is aware that reducing pollution at this point would eliminate one more motivation for social unrest. China is also hoping to move up the value chain, and electric vehicles are one product it is focusing heavily on in hopes of becoming a global leader. Developing a comparative advantage – or, if it can corner the cobalt market, an exclusive advantage – would provide China with higher-paying manufacturing jobs, which would help grow its domestic consumer base. In the long run, a robust domestic EV industry could also decrease China’s dependence on imported oil.
(click to enlarge)
The second reason for China’s focus on central African mines is strategic. Because modern military technology requires an increasing supply of dependable, portable electricity, the development of exclusive or near-exclusive control of one commodity required to build that power supply would be no small advantage. This is especially true given that the U.S. imports almost all of its cobalt – approximately 70 percent of all cobalt consumed in the U.S. in 2017 was imported. Economically, this makes sense, since a lot of products with lithium-ion batteries that are sold to U.S. consumers are assembled not in the U.S. but in China. Nevertheless, the demand for cobalt is growing, and the U.S. currently has little direct access to where most of it is being mined or refined. This is why the U.S. Department of the Interior in February designated cobalt, along with 34 other minerals, as critical to the economy and national security of the United States.
In terms of securing more cobalt, however, the charge in the U.S. has mainly been led by companies like Apple and Samsung. Whether the U.S. government becomes more directly involved in the competition – a race against China, where the DRC’s cobalt reserves are the prize – will depend on a few factors: whether stable, cobalt-free batteries are invented and at what cost they can be produced, and how high the price of cobalt goes.
(click to enlarge)
The price will to some extent determine whether there will be more investment in mines outside the DRC. Australia, as an example, has 17 percent of global cobalt reserves but currently produces only less than 8 percent of what the DRC does. Because most cobalt is mined as a byproduct of nickel and copper, the supply of cobalt has hitherto been determined less by its own price than by the price of these two primary metals. Should the price of cobalt go high enough, more mines may open and focus exclusively on cobalt production, which could lead countries like Australia or Russia to produce at greater levels. Still, with as much cobalt reserves as the rest of the world combined, the DRC will remain an invaluable part of the supply.
Being in a position where it is reliant on a large and dependable supply of cobalt, then, may not be a realistic proposition for the United States. Given the national security aspect of energy storage and China’s head start in controlling the cobalt market, the U.S. government in the coming years will need to invest more money in battery technologies that are not reliant on cobalt. Lithium iron phosphate, which does not utilize cobalt in cathodes, is one such example. In 2015, the U.S. Navy awarded an $80 million contract to K2 Energy Solutions to design a battery that would be “capable of powering a large modular capacitor bank for [an] electromagnetic railgun.” The U.S. Naval Research Laboratory is also researching ways to successfully and repeatedly recharge zinc batteries, which are widely used but only as single-use batteries.
Advances in technology fundamentally alter how states project power and, therefore, dictate where they must focus to secure their interests. This, in turn, can magnify the geopolitical relevance of places in the world that may not have had as much global influence as before. The Middle East and oil is just one example of this: Saudi Arabia became a focus for countries all over the world after it discovered oil in an age when all countries’ military capacities heavily depended on it.
As the world researches and discovers alternative sources of energy, storing that energy will become critical. Researching and developing alternatives to fossil fuels, delivering electricity to the battlefield and storing electricity produced by distributed generation sources such as wind or solar will become new arenas of technological, economic and military competition between states.
The post Batteries Make the World Go Round appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-03-09/us-gets-its-ass-handed-it-world-war-iii-simulation-rand
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https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2019-03-09/us-gets-its-ass-handed-it-world-war-iii-simulation-rand
Our troops totally dominate in the area of LGBTQ sensitivity hours! So we have that going for us.
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Big Dog:
What is your take on what you posted?
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Hat tip to BD
https://warontherocks.com/2018/09/the-coming-swarm-might-be-dead-on-arrival/
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Big Dog:
What is your take on what you posted?
I wonder that also. The results surprise me. The study seems to have credibility: "a former deputy secretary of defense with years of wargaming experience". True that the US is unwilling to take casualties in other people's wars, Vietnam, Iraq, etc., but does our will in a real, inside-the-US war?
I wonder what scenarios they are considering. I don't see the potential real world conflicts as being all out war. In previous 'world wars' the outcome depended on who is on whose side. If it was Russia versus the world, how would they win? With China it is more complicated. Aren't we roughly their number one customer and isn't their internal governance based on provided security and growing prosperity to the people, both that would be lost in an all-out conflict.
The US does not want to occupy either of these powers. Other than people pouring in across our southern border, who would want to occupy us? Once you get past our aircraft carriers and nuclear triad, don't we still have 400 million guns - widely dispersed?
The idea that a country or power can only gain by conquering and occupying others is so last century, IMHO.
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China's cyber capabilities, aided and abetted by its having snatched to security clearance applications of some 2.5 million Americans means that a lot of our capabilities may be a Maginot Line.
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second post
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-02-22/china-working-on-non-lethal-microwave-radar-weapon-global-times?fbclid=IwAR1XtMGHWeRM8p-aNi6F0BfyuJ_UBv2dBzA2prgkcvr8VZOTFvF2KmwaoA0
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https://special-ops.org/49500/these-5-reasons-prove-nothing-can-stop-the-u-s-army/
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https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/27/magazine/airstrikes-somalia-glide-bombs.html?emc=edit_NN_p_20190329&nl=morning-briefing&nlid=49641193ion%3DlongRead§ion=longRead&te=1
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/62120-how-a-sub-shortage-happened?fbclid=IwAR0nRIWnGsyRsB8hiX2P1z0SPAfvzPis55I7ukjhrfasUszymJdtxdm8n5Q
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/04/16/heres-the-new-helmet-that-socom-operators-will-take-into-battle/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2004-16-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.defenseone.com/business/2019/04/army-secretary-reveals-weapons-wishlist-war-china-russia/156347/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/04/17/the-army-wants-to-give-soldiers-new-suicide-drones-to-take-out-enemy-and-light-vehicles/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2004-17-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/04/remembering-andrew-marshall/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202019-04-17&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/04/air-force-begin-shifting-research-funds-these-kinds-next-gen-weapons/156387/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/04/all-innovation-wont-save-pentagon/156487/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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The U.S. Military: Like the French at Agincourt?
America risks a catastrophic defeat if it doesn’t radically change the way it thinks about war.
Bret Stephens
By Bret Stephens
Opinion Columnist
April 25, 2019
United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images
Image
United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditCreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images
Early on a Sunday morning in 1932, a fleet of some 150 fighters, dive-bombers and torpedo planes struck the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The ships lying at anchor on Battleship Row sustained direct hits. Also hit were the base’s fuel storage tanks and the Army Air Corps planes parked nearby at Hickam Field.
The surprise was as complete as it was devastating. Only this was an Army-Navy war game, the attackers were American pilots operating from the carriers Saratoga and Lexington, and the bombs they dropped were sacks of flour.
The lesson of “Grand Joint Exercise 4,” as it was called, is that forewarned is not always forearmed. It took the actual sinking of much of the U.S. battle fleet nearly a decade later to bring the lesson home to U.S. military planners that the age of the carrier had arrived.
Fast forward to 2006, when a small Chinese diesel-electric submarine surfaced well within torpedo-firing range from the 80,000-ton Kitty Hawk, having gone undetected by the carrier and her escorts. That incident ought to have been a loud wake-up call to the Navy that the age of the super-carrier is drawing to a close just as surely as the age of the battleship was coming to an end by the 1930s.
The only question is whether we will learn the lesson for ourselves, or — as we did on Dec. 7, 1941 — have an adversary teach it to us.
The question is also at the heart of an incisive and important essay in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs by Christian Brose, the former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“The traditional model of U.S. military power is being disrupted, the way Blockbuster’s business model was amid the rise of Amazon and Netflix,” Brose writes. “A military made up of small numbers of large, expensive, heavily manned, and hard-to-replace systems will not survive on future battlefields, where swarms of intelligent machines will deliver violence at a greater volume and higher velocity than ever before.”
The logic here is the same as the one that decided the Battle of Agincourt, where the humble and effective English longbow made short work of the expensive and vulnerable French cavalry. Today’s version of that cavalry consists of aircraft carriers priced at $13 billion apiece and fighter jets that go for $90 million (and cost $30,000 an hour to fly).
These systems are all beset by the usual technological hurdles, cost overruns and bureaucratic pitfalls. Still, they’d be worth their enormous price if they conferred a long-term, decisive edge over our adversaries, as U.S. technological superiority over the Soviets did during the Cold War.
The problem is that they no longer do. On the one hand, we are burning through billions of dollars by deploying state-of-the-art resources against technologically primitive enemies in the Middle East and Africa. Why? Because, for example, an Air Force obsessed with acquiring fifth-generation stealth fighters still can’t bring itself to purchase a squadron of cheap turboprop planes to patrol, say, the skies of northern Iraq.
On the other hand, we are burning through trillions in order to build a relatively small number of ultra-sophisticated platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to detection and destruction by near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. “Put simply,” Brose writes, “U.S. rivals are fielding large quantities of multimillion-dollar weapons to destroy the United States’ multibillion-dollar military systems.”
That’s a recipe for strategic failure on budgetary grounds alone. The coming of technologies like hypersonic propulsion, space-based weapons and quantum sensors (able to detect minute disruptions of air or water) makes it a recipe for rapid military defeat as well — at least if nothing changes.
The answer, Brose argues, is to radically increase the numbers of military platforms, lower their costs, and — within ethical limits — enhance their autonomy. This puts fewer war fighters in harm’s way, creates more (and more difficult) targets for an enemy to track, and makes the loss of any one of them far easier to bear. Right now the Navy is straining to reach a target of 355 ships. It should be aiming for a significantly higher number, much of it unmanned.
So what stops it? The answer is what Brose’s old boss, the late John McCain, called the military-industrial-congressional complex.
“Military pilots and ship drivers are no more eager to lose their jobs to intelligent machines than factory workers are,” Brose writes. “Defense companies that make billions selling traditional systems are as welcoming of disruptions to their business model as the taxi cab industry has been of Uber and Lyft. And as all this resistance inevitably translates into disgruntled constituents, members of Congress will have enormous incentives to stymie change.”
It doesn’t have to be this way. A Pentagon with a visionary and independent leader, a Congress ruled by a non-parochial and bipartisan spirit, and a
serious president capable of long-term thinking could change the way America prepares for the next war — to prevent it if possible, to win it if necessary.
For that, we’ll have to wait for a future administration. In the meantime, the risk of being on the losing side of our own Agincourt grows.
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https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/war-china-the-us-could-lose
The U.S. Military: Like the French at Agincourt?
America risks a catastrophic defeat if it doesn’t radically change the way it thinks about war.
Bret Stephens
By Bret Stephens
Opinion Columnist
April 25, 2019
United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images
Image
United States Navy carrier strike groups on Wednesday in the Mediterranean Sea.CreditCreditU.S. Navy/U.S. Navy, via Getty Images
Early on a Sunday morning in 1932, a fleet of some 150 fighters, dive-bombers and torpedo planes struck the naval base at Pearl Harbor. The ships lying at anchor on Battleship Row sustained direct hits. Also hit were the base’s fuel storage tanks and the Army Air Corps planes parked nearby at Hickam Field.
The surprise was as complete as it was devastating. Only this was an Army-Navy war game, the attackers were American pilots operating from the carriers Saratoga and Lexington, and the bombs they dropped were sacks of flour.
The lesson of “Grand Joint Exercise 4,” as it was called, is that forewarned is not always forearmed. It took the actual sinking of much of the U.S. battle fleet nearly a decade later to bring the lesson home to U.S. military planners that the age of the carrier had arrived.
Fast forward to 2006, when a small Chinese diesel-electric submarine surfaced well within torpedo-firing range from the 80,000-ton Kitty Hawk, having gone undetected by the carrier and her escorts. That incident ought to have been a loud wake-up call to the Navy that the age of the super-carrier is drawing to a close just as surely as the age of the battleship was coming to an end by the 1930s.
The only question is whether we will learn the lesson for ourselves, or — as we did on Dec. 7, 1941 — have an adversary teach it to us.
The question is also at the heart of an incisive and important essay in the forthcoming issue of Foreign Affairs by Christian Brose, the former staff director of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
“The traditional model of U.S. military power is being disrupted, the way Blockbuster’s business model was amid the rise of Amazon and Netflix,” Brose writes. “A military made up of small numbers of large, expensive, heavily manned, and hard-to-replace systems will not survive on future battlefields, where swarms of intelligent machines will deliver violence at a greater volume and higher velocity than ever before.”
The logic here is the same as the one that decided the Battle of Agincourt, where the humble and effective English longbow made short work of the expensive and vulnerable French cavalry. Today’s version of that cavalry consists of aircraft carriers priced at $13 billion apiece and fighter jets that go for $90 million (and cost $30,000 an hour to fly).
These systems are all beset by the usual technological hurdles, cost overruns and bureaucratic pitfalls. Still, they’d be worth their enormous price if they conferred a long-term, decisive edge over our adversaries, as U.S. technological superiority over the Soviets did during the Cold War.
The problem is that they no longer do. On the one hand, we are burning through billions of dollars by deploying state-of-the-art resources against technologically primitive enemies in the Middle East and Africa. Why? Because, for example, an Air Force obsessed with acquiring fifth-generation stealth fighters still can’t bring itself to purchase a squadron of cheap turboprop planes to patrol, say, the skies of northern Iraq.
On the other hand, we are burning through trillions in order to build a relatively small number of ultra-sophisticated platforms that are increasingly vulnerable to detection and destruction by near-peer adversaries like China and Russia. “Put simply,” Brose writes, “U.S. rivals are fielding large quantities of multimillion-dollar weapons to destroy the United States’ multibillion-dollar military systems.”
That’s a recipe for strategic failure on budgetary grounds alone. The coming of technologies like hypersonic propulsion, space-based weapons and quantum sensors (able to detect minute disruptions of air or water) makes it a recipe for rapid military defeat as well — at least if nothing changes.
The answer, Brose argues, is to radically increase the numbers of military platforms, lower their costs, and — within ethical limits — enhance their autonomy. This puts fewer war fighters in harm’s way, creates more (and more difficult) targets for an enemy to track, and makes the loss of any one of them far easier to bear. Right now the Navy is straining to reach a target of 355 ships. It should be aiming for a significantly higher number, much of it unmanned.
So what stops it? The answer is what Brose’s old boss, the late John McCain, called the military-industrial-congressional complex.
“Military pilots and ship drivers are no more eager to lose their jobs to intelligent machines than factory workers are,” Brose writes. “Defense companies that make billions selling traditional systems are as welcoming of disruptions to their business model as the taxi cab industry has been of Uber and Lyft. And as all this resistance inevitably translates into disgruntled constituents, members of Congress will have enormous incentives to stymie change.”
It doesn’t have to be this way. A Pentagon with a visionary and independent leader, a Congress ruled by a non-parochial and bipartisan spirit, and a
serious president capable of long-term thinking could change the way America prepares for the next war — to prevent it if possible, to win it if necessary.
For that, we’ll have to wait for a future administration. In the meantime, the risk of being on the losing side of our own Agincourt grows.
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05/brain-pentagon/156843/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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Well the Pentagon brain also apparently also helped Chinese military thinkers . From Wikipedia:
"In an interview in 2012, Major General Chen Zhou, the main author of four Chinese defence white papers, stated that Marshall was one of the most important figures in changing Chinese defence thinking in the 1990s and 2000s.[14]"
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/pentagon-congress/2019/05/16/a-matter-of-life-and-death-for-afghan-allies-advocates-push-for-fixes-to-special-visa-program/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2005-16-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=586&v=7bgaoM6qSV0
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/05/us-army-pacific-must-be-running-back-who-blocks/157136/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/22/its-not-about-units-the-future-fight-will-be-systems-vs-systems-says-army-3-star/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2005-22-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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second post
https://www.lawfareblog.com/war-crimes-pardons-and-attorney-general?fbclid=IwAR2zJepEN9_Qv--pku3FpBVj-0SNlQEyQ5o60W9FTzNz4s9MwjNobh8D3_E
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/06/05/raiders-seals-planned-sexual-assault-in-green-beret-hazing-that-led-to-homicide/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2006-05-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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second post
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/06/05/soldiers-will-soon-test-army-hypersonics-missiles/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2006-05-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/whoops-%E2%80%94-us-army-owns-potentially-hundreds-thousands-faulty-guns-63032
In 1992 while at a shooting range in Florida the borrowed Beretta slide cracked in half and a piece came back and lacerated me mouth under the nose.
One second I am aiming at a target the next blood is all over the place
Humana the health insurance company refused to pay for me to see a local surgeon to get my faced stitched so I had to drive an hr to their preferred surgeon holding a rag with ice to my face.
good thing i was wearing goggles . :-o
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You are in good company!
“You’re not a SEAL until you taste Italian steel”
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/whoops-%E2%80%94-us-army-owns-potentially-hundreds-thousands-faulty-guns-63032
In 1992 while at a shooting range in Florida the borrowed Beretta slide cracked in half and a piece came back and lacerated me mouth under the nose.
One second I am aiming at a target the next blood is all over the place
Humana the health insurance company refused to pay for me to see a local surgeon to get my faced stitched so I had to drive an hr to their preferred surgeon holding a rag with ice to my face.
good thing i was wearing goggles . :-o
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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/28729/docs-show-navy-got-ufo-patent-granted-by-warning-of-similar-chinese-tech-advances?utm_source=fark&utm_medium=website&utm_content=link&ICID=ref_fark
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https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2019/07/fishermen-witnessed-nuclear-submarine-drama?fbclid=IwAR3-9WizhyfPqCgxYc5krB-o3t8hJv3n_nAKD0_RVbuwXxtlUFiPor2cZLo
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Why the S-400 Missile is Highly Effective -- If Used Correctly
An S-400 surface-to-air missile launcher is seen in Moscow, Russia.
(SEFA KARACAN/Anadolu Agency/Getty Images)
Highlights
Modern long-range surface-to-air missile systems provide some of the most effective air defense in existence.
However, extended-range SAMs are also inherently vulnerable to standoff and saturation attacks if not properly supported.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of long-range SAMs depends on the country where they are deployed and how that country uses them.
Russian surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) continue to dominate the headlines. The country's long-range S-400 SAM systems recently made landfall in Turkey, much to the consternation of the West, while its older S-300 variants have been exported to a variety of countries, including Syria. Public discussions persist over whether Gulf states should buy long-range Russian air defense platforms — as opposed to American ones — or whether Iran could acquire S-400s to bolster its air defenses. Given the system's power, it's no wonder that such sales are dominating the news. But the reality remains that the value of long-range SAMs does not directly equal their theoretical capabilities, depending far more on who is using the system — and how.
The Big Picture
Layered air defense is critical for any country seeking to protect its landmass and airspace. Given the heightened state of tensions in the Middle East — and beyond — countries seeking to acquire the most capable protective measures are weighing the options. However, beyond cost and capability, deeper factors prevail — such as whether to align with one great power or another.
The Value of Air Defense
Long-range SAM systems, including the Russian S-300 and S-400, are profoundly capable weapons. The Russian S-400 is arguably one of the best all-around strategic SAM systems in operation today. (And there is an even better replacement in development, in the form of the S-500.) Particular strengths of the S-300 and the follow-on S-400 series are their extended reach, their flexible ability to strike at different targets (primarily aircraft, but also cruise and ballistic missiles to a degree) and their sophisticated sensors, which Russia claims include some anti-stealth capability.
The S-400 Triumph surface-to-air missile systems, as an anti-aircraft military unit of the Russian Air Force and the Russian Southern Military District, enters combat duty in Crimea.
In the hands of competent and well-trained crews, modern long-range SAMs such as the S-400 can inflict significant damage on an adversary. Their ranges allow them to target key enemy enabler aircraft, such as valuable aerial refueling tankers and airborne early warning and control aircraft. Their flexible targeting capabilities mean they can defend against multiple different types of threats and attacks. And their — albeit limited — anti-stealth capabilities offer the potential to bring down some of the best combat aircraft currently in operation.
The Limitations of SAM Capabilities
Yet, even with these impressive theoretical capabilities, modern long-range SAMs such as the S-400 are only as good as the context within which they exist; that is, the systems can be more or less effective depending on the type of adversary they face. An S-400, for instance, could be a formidable threat to a limited enemy incursion, but even a full S-400 battalion only has around eight missile launchers, typically with four missiles each. 32 missiles are certainly enough to cause serious harm to a limited attack. But if an S-400 battalion is acting in isolation or is not backed up by other modern air defenses, it likely doesn't have enough missiles to withstand a determined onslaught. This is especially true in the Middle East, where numerous customers deploy expensive systems in batteries rather than battalions — a battery being the smallest unit composition — meaning they might only have 16 total missiles at the ready.
And despite their impressive theoretical reach — the advanced Russian 40N6E missile has a supposed range of 400 kilometers (250 miles) — long-range SAMs like the S-400 are still vulnerable to standoff missile attacks. Furthermore, geographical factors weigh heavily on a system's usefulness, with mountainous features able to block the systems' sensors. A low-flying target can take advantage of geographical features and the curvature of the earth to avoid an S-400 interception for far longer than a high-flying target. So, against a low-flying cruise missile, an S-400 will more likely find success at a distance in the tens of kilometers rather than in the hundreds. Ultimately, an isolated S-400 battery or even battalion will, therefore, be vulnerable to a saturation standoff attack and may even be destroyed without destroying a single enemy aircraft.
Designed to Be Team Players
These factors reinforce a key fact about SAM systems like the S-300 and the S-400, which is that they were never designed to operate as stand-alone systems and are most effective as part of a much wider integrated air defense system (IADS). An effective IADS consists of layers of different types of SAMs — from the very short range to the very long range. It also incorporates many different radars and other sensors for the detection of different types of enemy targets. The larger (in geographic scope), the denser (in terms of numbers of different systems within) and the more technologically advanced the IADS, the greater its ability to protect a given airspace.
Models of components of the S-400 Triumph air defense missile system are on display at the 12th edition of Aero India Show, Aero India 2019.
Long-range SAMs, while a cornerstone of any modern and effective IADS, are just a part of the wider network. In fact, long-range SAMs in a modern and effective IADS are even assigned their own guard of short-range SAMs, which are designed to be particularly effective at shooting down enemy munitions at short range using a combination of guns and highly maneuverable short-range missiles. Fundamentally, the aim of an effective IADS is to combine the many different strengths of multiple systems into an umbrella of layered and redundant defenses with considerable staying power even under sustained attack. In such a network, the long-range SAM may play the starring role, but it is ultimately a team effort.
Some Current Examples
So, what does this context actually mean for how long-range SAM systems are being bought and implemented currently? The answer depends on the nation in possession of the system.
Even accounting for their expansive geography, Russia and China are undoubtedly the most effective users of the S-300 and S-400; in both countries, the missile systems are integrated into very dense and sophisticated IADS that are also backed up by large numbers of fighter interceptors.
Countries that are middlingly successful in using SAMs include Turkey, where the S-400 is not backed up by significant numbers of effective SAM systems but still proves very beneficial because Turkey's primary air defense — like that of many other NATO countries — is actually centered on its fighter aircraft. The S-400 is essentially there to fill a critical capability gap, since Turkey was completely unable to perform anti-ballistic missile defense missions before it purchased the system.
Finally, there are countries like Syria, who's recently acquired S-300 batteries are isolated and limited in capability. The Syrian civil war has crippled Syria's wider IADS, Syria's crews are of questionable training and its available air defenses are technologically obsolescent. Moreover, Syria's fighter fleet is paltry compared to other regional air forces. While Syria's S-300s could theoretically cause some damage to the Israeli aircraft that constantly raid the country, they wouldn't survive for long after firing their first missile.
Ultimately, long-range SAMs like the S-400 are no miracle weapons; even the most effective IADS is liable to be overwhelmed if under constant attack without reinforcement. But if properly supported, they can certainly play a decisive role, especially against more limited attacks.
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https://www.newsmax.com/headline/republicans-amazon-pentagon-cloud/2019/07/19/id/925262/
anyone think of any problems with this?
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/07/19/pentagon-scientists-are-making-talking-plasma-laser-balls-for-use-as-non-lethal-weapons/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ARM%2007.19.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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Last Thursday, nearly a month after Iran shot a $220 million US drone out of the sky, the US Marine Corps took down an Iranian UAV of its own. The strike marks the first reported successful use of the Light Marine Air Defense Integrated System, an energy weapon that blasts not artillery or lasers but radio signals.
https://www.wired.com/story/iran-drone-marines-energy-weapon-lmadis/?verso=true
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/arms-racing-with-china-low-cost-jet-fighters_3011646.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=b3ef5a181f-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_07_22_09_19&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-b3ef5a181f-239065853
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(https://strategypage.com/gallery/images/f-22-07-26-2019.png)
An F-22 Raptor from Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, flies in formation over the Joint Pacific Alaska Range Complex, July 18, 2019. The JPARC is a 67,000-plus square mile area providing a realistic training environment commanders leverage for full spectrum engagements, ranging from individual skills to complex, large-scale joint engagements.
https://strategypage.com/military_photos/military_photos_20190726185935.aspx
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/09/does-your-combat-experience-even-matter-against-chinese-and-russian-troops/
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/05/09/does-your-combat-experience-even-matter-against-chinese-and-russian-troops/
I would expect that China will fight a cyberwar that will leave many of our "force multiplier" weapon system offline. I do wonder about various blackouts recently in the US and elsewhere. Shots across our bows?
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/08/chinas-military-pursuing-biotech/159167/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.spectator.co.uk/2019/08/germanys-military-has-become-a-complete-joke/?fbclid=IwAR18efbSypCM3RAMnEb68ajSJY-ideDvExMoyG0814F8X-YuAL57rtC_6oQ
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https://www.spectator.co.uk/2019/08/germanys-military-has-become-a-complete-joke/?fbclid=IwAR18efbSypCM3RAMnEb68ajSJY-ideDvExMoyG0814F8X-YuAL57rtC_6oQ
I believe I was saying this about our "allies" and why NATO needs to be dissolved.
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https://dailycaller.com/2019/08/28/female-rangers-us-army-ranger-school/?fbclid=IwAR3ie42TplfM1IwlpssJrLmoWItXbA_cTbM8UEvD5d3Pz-77srXKXQaRf5E
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comparisons of ancient Greece and Rome strategies in dealing with enemies apply today .
Part 4 is particularly ominous for the United States as some of the factors that led to Rome's downfall are clearly the exact same as what is happening today.
populations demanding more money , less for the military , less feeling as "Roman " like today less feeling of American (we are an evil country, etc)
spreading thin around the world,
etc .
The US as we know it is likely on the down ward spiral . I guess just a matter of how fast and just a matter of what form we wind up with - it appears:
Part 1:
https://audioboom.com/posts/7350812-1-4-makers-of-ancient-strategy-from-the-persian-wars-to-the-fall-of-rome-ed-victor-davis-hanson
Part 2:
https://audioboom.com/posts/7350809-2-4-makers-of-ancient-strategy-from-the-persian-wars-to-the-fall-of-rome-ed-victor-davis-hanson
Part 3 :
https://audioboom.com/posts/7350807-3-4-makers-of-ancient-strategy-from-the-persian-wars-to-the-fall-of-rome-ed-victor-davis-hanson
Part 4:
https://audioboom.com/posts/7350806-4-4-makers-of-ancient-strategy-from-the-persian-wars-to-the-fall-of-rome-ed-victor-davis-hanson
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Pentagon Should Take the Lead on Tech
U.S. military systems lag behind rivals’, and defense leaders depend on Silicon Valley to try to keep up.
By Mackenzie Eaglen
Sept. 4, 2019 6:38 pm ET
Two F-22 Raptors fly during an aerial refueling mission, July 29. Photo: Chris Drzazgowsk/U.S. Air Force/handout/Reuters
In the global arms race, a moment’s hesitation is enough to lose your lead. The Pentagon pioneered research 15 years ago into hypersonic missiles that can cruise at Mach 5. The U.S. then chose not to develop the technology—but China and Russia developed it. Now Beijing and Moscow have hypersonics at the ready and, according to Pentagon research chief Michael D. Griffin, no number of current U.S. ships or ground-based antimissile systems would be enough to counter a massive attack.
The problem stems in part from the Pentagon’s increasing dependence on outside firms. For decades after World War II, the Defense Department was a producer of cutting-edge research and technology, but today it contracts more and more out to Silicon Valley. No longer setting its own course for development, the Pentagon is unable to take the major leaps that once kept U.S. military technology racing ahead.
The Pentagon still acquires its systems in accordance with decades-old protocols that value compliance over nimbleness and usefulness. It has doubled down on unreasonable demands to own intellectual property in perpetuity, a nonstarter for many software companies with which it contracts. Now defense leaders are stuck having to sort out which software systems might pose a security risk because the developers often also sell to America’s rivals.
This shift from calling the shots to negotiating with ever-more-private interests is new for the defense bureaucracy. For generations, influence flowed in the other direction. The buildup in defense research-and-development spending that began in the late 1940s and continued through the ’80s was responsible for propelling many of the tech breakthroughs of the past century: cellphones, jet engines, integrated circuits, weather satellites and the Global Positioning System. A recent example is Apple ’s Siri artificial-intelligence system, which it purchased from the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Today the Pentagon spends more on systems and operations than on equipment, and does so poorly and slowly. The software in the F-22, America’s most advanced air-superiority jet fighter, was out of date by the time the first plane was airborne.
As a consequence, the Pentagon’s list of systems that need improvement now bears an unfortunate resemblance to a list of China and Russia’s strengths. Both nations excel at directed energy, hypersonics and cyber and information operations. China has already developed quantum satellites that are purportedly hack-proof. Many U.S. satellites are susceptible to data breaches as well as “spoofing”—co-opting a satellite to send false information.
One solution is for the Pentagon to bring more technology development in-house and design systems using a software-first approach. A generation ago, the U.S. military had a large enough advantage over its peers that it could take 20 years to design and build a system and then stick software in it. Today, the speed of innovation makes that impossible. It creates the harmful incentive for the military to contract its services out to big tech firms, which are abreast of the latest trends.
The Pentagon must also improve its R&D planning process to translate basic research into action sooner, before the systems have become irrelevant or overmatched. Technology researchers need to think especially about how to deploy more quickly weapons and security systems that require tech specifications like advanced algorithms, precision guidance and reliable connectivity.
A renaissance in military-led innovation is overdue. Defense R&D in past generations was prestigious enough to draw the brightest young people to study science. It created lucrative employment opportunities while tackling tough national problems. Just over a decade ago, defense-related jobs employed about 1 in 10 of the nation’s software and electrical engineers, 1 in 5 physicists, 1 in 4 astronomers and mathematicians and 1 in 3 aerospace engineers.
Today the Pentagon is behind on generating innovation and is becoming a mere customer in the technology sector. As Mr. Griffin says, the military is “struggling to become the flea on the tail of the telecoms’ dog.” A reinvigorated military technology portfolio and more-aggressive use of agile purchasing rules would help regain some of the nation’s lost innovative edge. But there’s no time to waste. Perhaps being in second place will be enough to instill urgency and drive reforms in a bureaucracy accustomed to always being on top.
Ms. Eaglen is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
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https://www.dailysignal.com/2019/09/10/how-the-obama-administration-made-the-military-more-politically-correct/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=how-the-obama-administration-made-the-military-more-politically-correct&mkt_tok=eyJpIjoiTm1Fd01qWXhabUUyWWpNNCIsInQiOiJSY2NcL1ZFZVZTdjc3NDZVYWpGVnc0aHdWWlpsbDE1eVNMSHhFcjJMZk5CSVRpNVJWRjBZUmZVRklnUmh1ZWFydG1ER2FMaUt1UW1aNEFhM255aGJ2ZGgwWXlGWGdQOFwvMitCVGdzaEdTZ2FVeDFRVURNWVlFVkVOYkJzeVB4MDJFIn0%3D
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/09/12/army-secretary-nominee-talks-priorities-more-artillery-troops-missiles-that-will-change-the-geometry-in-se-asia/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%2009-12-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/10/future-marines-smaller-more-robotic-more-naval/160362/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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George Friedman’s Thoughts: Command of Space, Command of the Sea
By
George Friedman -
October 10, 2019
In order to begin thinking about space-based warfare, we need to think about sea-based warfare. The best place to do that is in World War II with the U.S.-Japanese war. When the United States forced its way into Japan, Japan lacked any powered instruments of production. It was a muscle-driven society. When they saw American warships, already having intelligence on British operations in China, the Japanese rapidly understood that their country could not be secure without a modern navy and that it could not have a modern navy without modern industrial plants. Japan surged from being a muscle-based economy to being one driven by petrochemical power. It was an enormous achievement.
But it also made Japan vulnerable in a way that it had never been before. Because of Japan’s peculiar geography, it lacked almost all industrial minerals. Japan had to import massive amounts of metal ores and, above all, oil. All of those imports had to traverse sea lanes. That meant that Japan’s economic development was vulnerable to foreign, hostile powers interdicting those sea lanes. Japan had to assume that at some point it would face this sort of challenge. So, the first edition Japanese navy, built by the British, was to be a defensive power that could protect the homeland from invasion. But that defensiveness also had to extend to assuring that Japan’s supplies of minerals from today’s Indonesia and Southeast Asia were secure. For that reason, its defensive mission appeared to other powers as offensive.
At that time, there were two rising powers in the Pacific: Japan and the United States. They first dueled over a coaling station. In the age of coal-powered vessels, ships had to refuel, as one load of coal gave them only limited range. For the United States, Hawaii was the key refueling point. There was no land between Hawaii and the West Coast, so if the U.S. held Hawaii, it was secure from attack. For Japan, it was the small islands of the Western Pacific. Japan took control of many of these islands after World War I. The U.S. held the Philippines, Guam and some other minor islands. But neither country could be secure while the other could choose to attack.
And, indeed, the Japanese attacked China, looking for raw materials and markets. The U.S. saw this as a threat; if Japan held China, it could build a fleet that could dwarf the Americans’. And since the U.S. had to have fleets in two oceans, it did what it could to thwart Japan. In the end, the U.S. tried to control Japan by interdicting access to oil from Indonesia and placing an embargo on steel and oil shipments from the United States. The U.S. believed that Japan would have to subordinate itself to the U.S., as the U.S. fleet was believed to be more powerful than the Japanese. Japan could not survive without oil, rubber, bauxite and all the rest, and the U.S. could cut off its supply.
The Japanese saw what the Americans were seeing, but they drew a different conclusion. They believed that the Americans were trying to break their economy. They also believed that engaging the U.S. at sea was uncertain at best. But where the U.S. had concluded that it had backed Japan into an inescapable corner, the Japanese concluded that they had to redefine the variables. A surface battle with the U.S. fleet could be disastrous. Therefore, they conceived of a war based on an air-sea battle.
Both the Japanese and Americans had aircraft carriers. The U.S. regarded them as an adjunct to surface warfare, but the Japanese saw them as an alternative to surface warfare. In their desperation, the Japanese innovated. They did not innovate technically; aircraft carriers existed along with torpedo planes, bombers and fighter aircraft. Where they innovated was in grasping the advantage that aircraft held against surface vessels and, believing what they saw, building operations and a strategy around the carriers.
The result was Pearl Harbor, where the U.S. Pacific Fleet was shattered because the U.S. Navy had underestimated the possibilities inherent in carrier-based warfare. The U.S. response was to use its own carriers to block the Japanese at the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. The U.S. then seized a series of small islands to extend its land-based air control, until it could attack Japan proper.
(click to enlarge)
In all of this the battleship, which had been seen as the key to control of the sea, was marginalized. Now, control of the sea did not depend on surface ships but on command of the air. The aircraft carrier was a tool in delivering aircraft, but land-based aircraft were of similar value. The first American offensive on Guadalcanal pivoted on the question of who would control a small airfield there from which to launch aircraft.
The Japanese naval force was smashed at Midway. U.S. aircraft moved closer until they reached Saipan and Tinian, bringing U.S. bombers into range of Japan. This, supplemented by submarines, isolated Japan from its supply of minerals, and, where aircraft supported by amphibious forces broke the back of the Japanese navy, the submarines broke the back of the economy, which was what the war was about from the Japanese point of view.
The point here is that the presence of a new technology, and accompanying assumption of its significance, is often extraordinarily wrong. The Japanese, for all their brilliance, spent their national treasure on the Yamato, the largest battleship in the world. They believed, despite seeing all the possibilities of the aircraft carrier, that the war would be won by battleships. The U.S. evolved more quickly after disaster but still insisted on building battleships for the inevitable decisive surface battle.
The air-sea dynamic changed the rules of warfare. For the first time, command of the sea depended not on surface vessels but on aircraft launched from any base and on submarines. It was not the technology that was lacking. It was an understanding of what the technology meant. The more desperate a power is, the more it grasps the possibilities of technology. The Japanese were desperate when the U.S. placed sanctions on their country; the Americans when their fleet in Hawaii was destroyed.
In every revolution in warfare, the assumption by the more powerful power is that the technology being introduced is an adjunct to existing technology. The recognition that existing technology is no longer relevant is brought to bear only by desperation and defeat. The Japanese saw the possibility of air-based command of the sea but failed to appreciate how rapidly the U.S. would grasp the lesson and how quickly it would turn the lesson into carriers. The Americans failed to appreciate that putting Japan in a desperate position would cause it to attack based on completely different principles of warfare.
The dependency on space in warfare is far more radical than the dependency on air. The technology and the environment are orders of magnitude greater than what they were with aircraft. The United States, however, is treating space as an adjunct to the existing system made up of armored fighting vehicles, manned bombers and aircraft carriers. It sees the value of space. It does not see that space means the decline in value of many systems the U.S. treats as sacred.
The constant discussion of new technologies is important, but it is merely a preface. The real issue is the generation of new concepts and doctrines of war-fighting that arise from the new technology. The battle is won by the side that has resources but also the ability to understand that what was once the foundation of military power is now a drain on resources, and that the center of gravity of war is now something that seems to be a minor addition, like carrier-based torpedo planes.
The country least likely to grasp this is the one that feels most confident and, therefore, complacent. Desperation and fear drive military innovation. What is happening in space will cause all that is solid to melt into the air. It has to. We should bear Pearl Harbor in mind during the rest of our discussion on space.
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/10/11/data-showing-160th-soars-pilot-shortage-is-a-snapshot-in-time-command-cautions/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ARM%2010.11.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BVQltGtMIho
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10/30/61
https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/tsar-bomba
10 times more power detonated than all the bombs in WW2
25 % of Krakatoa
shock wave travelled around the world 3 times
bomb weighed 59 ,000 pounds or about twice that of a typical naval cruiser
look at the size of the mushroom in the photo and compare to Hiroshima and Nagasaki which look more like hand grenade explosions next to it.
If one wants to know the population damage of any size nuc in your area can see it here:
https://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
Russia covers up the accidental underwater nuclear detonation - size unknown :
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2019/oct/20/skyfall-nuclear-cruise-missile-explosion-covered-r/
List of nuclear tests by country and total size :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nuclear_weapons_tests
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/10/pentagons-ai-ethics-draft-actually-pretty-good/161005/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/army-publishes-16-year-modernization-plan-to-outpace-china-with-new-battle-concept_3135355.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=1a16d0527d-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_05_11_47&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-1a16d0527d-239065853
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-army-should-assess-security-risks-of-using-tiktok-for-recruitment-sen-schumer_3144127.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=f9b20bd90a-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_13_12_28&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-f9b20bd90a-239065853
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https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3037972/will-hypersonic-df-17-missile-transform-beijings-taiwan
Will hypersonic DF-17 missile transform Beijing’s Taiwan strategy?
If hypersonic boost-glide missiles can penetrate US shields in Indo-Pacific region, they could prevent warships coming to island’s aid.
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https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3037972/will-hypersonic-df-17-missile-transform-beijings-taiwan
Will hypersonic DF-17 missile transform Beijing’s Taiwan strategy?
If hypersonic boost-glide missiles can penetrate US shields in Indo-Pacific region, they could prevent warships coming to island’s aid.
The Republic of China is running a covert nuclear program right now if it wishes to remain free.
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/11/20/how-the-long-term-effect-of-trumps-recent-war-crimes-pardons-could-play-out/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%20112119&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/11/20/how-the-long-term-effect-of-trumps-recent-war-crimes-pardons-could-play-out/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Army%20DNR%20112119&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
We start winning wars again?
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/11/nanotechnology-shaping-hypersonics-race/161377/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/11/us-navy-needs-offensive-undersea-drones/161548/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.newsmax.com/t/newsmax/article/943494/16
Gallagher acquitted of murder and other charges and *convicted of posing with dead Isis guy in a photo"
Yes bad taste , like posing with dead human is NOT like posing with hunted deer etc.
but was that worth throwing him out of Navy Seals?
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https://www.newsmax.com/t/newsmax/article/943494/16
Gallagher acquitted of murder and other charges and *convicted of posing with dead Isis guy in a photo"
Yes bad taste , like posing with dead human is NOT like posing with hunted deer etc.
but was that worth throwing him out of Navy Seals?
No.
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a) A very good friend who served in combat in Afghanistan once showed me a few pictures of him in the field posing with the corpse of a man he had killed. There was a certain macabre humor to it, with the corpse propped up as though the two of them conversing.
b) I asked a friend of illustrious combat record in both Afghanistan and Iraq what he thought of the President's actions in all this. He was very much a fan, and began telling me a series of stories about times where the brass was unfair to men of action in the field.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/youre-gonna-need-a-smaller-boat-marines-revamp-strategy-to-counter-china_3157735.html?utm_source=Epoch+Times+Newsletters&utm_campaign=9723e886ee-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_11_29_01_25&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_4fba358ecf-9723e886ee-239065853
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second post
The Revolution in Military Affairs
By: Jacek Bartosiak
The notion of a “revolution in military affairs” has created a sensation in recent years, as it could create a new phase in the way wars are conducted. RMA's importance is likely to grow over the coming decades of great power competition and proxy wars across Eurasia and its neighbors. It is, therefore, worth spending some time on this concept.
The Dawn of RMA
In 1992, the U.S. Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment published a report on the coming military-technical revolution – what it called the Revolution in Military Affairs. The concept wasn’t a new one. By the 1970s, Soviet military theoreticians were heralding the arrival of what they described as the 20th century’s third wave of the military-technical revolution. The first wave was the motorization of war – namely, the use of aviation and chemical weapons in World War I. As this phase matured in World War II, it came to incorporate the German concept of “blitzkrieg” (armored warfare operations with an air tactical support component), the British-American concept of strategic bombing, and the concept of replacing battleships with onboard aircraft taking off from aircraft carriers, as envisaged by both Japan and the United States.
The second wave came with the development of ballistic missiles and atomic weapons. It matured in the 1970s with the achievement of nuclear balance between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The third wave of the technical revolution combined reconnaissance and long-range impact into one coherent and comprehensive reconnaissance-strike system that comprised precision ammunition, sensors and long-range radar, a computerized communication system, and situational control.
Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who served as the Soviet Union’s chief of the General Staff from 1977 to 1984, noticed that the development of precise, non-nuclear destruction systems opened the possibility of a drastic increase in strike potential, bringing these systems’ efficacy closer to that of nuclear weapons. It was on this notion that the Soviets introduced the term “reconnaissance-strike complex.” In 1997, Andrew Marshall, the longtime head of the Office of Net Assessment, said the Soviets were right in thinking that these capabilities would revolutionize the way war was waged.
The U.S. Armed Forces and Technical Innovation
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise in asymmetric wars, RMA fell by the wayside for the U.S. in the 1990s and early 21st century. But the technological revolution continued. Marshall and the ONA compared U.S. operations in the Gulf War to the introduction of a British tank at Cambrai in November 1917, explaining that the U.S. had combined a new technology with a new mode of action – though the innovation remained in its infancy. Marshall also said, among other things, that the U.S. Armed Forces’ ability to use and conceptualize new military capabilities was at a starting point, just as it had been in 1922. In effect, Marshall was discussing the concept of RMA as it pertained to the innovations and opportunities that had arisen during and immediately following World War I.
In March 2008, however, Marshall stated that the U.S. Armed Forces were still very immature when it came to using a coherent reconnaissance-strike system as envisaged by RMA, and (again comparing the conceptualization of the tank and plane capabilities of the first revolution in military affairs) that they were at pre-1930 levels. He pointed out, for example, that the Americans had been using a new way of waging war against the Taliban, or against a demoralized Iraqi army, or against terrorists, insurgents and jihadists, rather than against peer opponents with their own extensive, durable and resilient reconnaissance-strike complexes.
Meanwhile, potential opponents of the U.S., such as China, were working on their own more mature reconnaissance-strike complexes, and therefore on their own capabilities provided in the RMA. The U.S. still did not yet have its own complex that would provide a significant advantage over peer or near-peer opponents.
RMA Revived
Seminars exploring the development of the American RMA run before 2015 have shown that American reliance solely on space for observation and communication is a serious weakness. There are no more safe sanctuaries for the U.S. Armed Forces – surface ships can be destroyed from ever-greater distances, even while in motion, and aircraft carriers will have less and less chance of survival on the modern battlefield. Manned aircraft, including stealth aircraft, will lose their operational advantages as militaries develop sensors, radars and integrated modern anti-aircraft defense. Bases in Eurasia and its neighbors will be subject to intense enemy fire action from long distances, and will use their own reconnaissance-strike complexes over long distances. Traditional U.S. strength projection may therefore be ineffective and too expensive to continue practicing in the same way. These seminars also showed that the way warfare is conducted may change much more between 2015 and 2050 than it did, for example, between 1990 and 2015.
Some analysts compare the situation of the U.S. Armed Forces to the German army’s alleged invincibility from 1870 to 1914. The combination of a German modern railway system (enabling large-scale transport), a dense telegram network (allowing Germany to centralize war management), modern weapons systems and the conceptual and operational productivity of the German General Staff enabled the relatively easy defeat of opponents such as Austria and France, who could not yet fight modern industrial wars. The alleged superiority of the German army throughout Europe was considered to be indisputable in this period. A test of new times came in 1914, when the German offensive was halted at the gates of Paris. Symmetrical armed forces emerged that had learned to wage a modern industrial war, depriving Germany of its earlier advantage.
(click to enlarge)
In the RMA combat system, the most important thing will be the ability to maintain one’s own reconnaissance-strike system – that is, the ability to conduct and win a modern scouting battle, manifesting itself in the ability to “roll” or “turn off” the enemy’s situational awareness system and to effectively and permanently protect one’s own. We have yet to see how the situation will unfold in the 21st century for the U.S. Armed Forces in the face of the powers of China and Russia, which are openly pushing out the free power projection of U.S. forces in Eurasia with their modern anti-access/area denial systems. The training ground for system competition under the RMA will be vast – Poland, the Baltic States, possibly Ukraine, Romania, the Black Sea, the South China Sea, the East China Sea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan and Korea will all play a part. The big game begins.
To learn more, please visit strategyandfuture.org.
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Third post
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/11/22/soldiers-soon-to-see-robotic-mules-and-tougher-bomb-bots-in-the-field/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ARM%2011.22.19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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fourth post
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2019/11/27/cyborg-warriors-could-be-here-by-2050-dod-study-group-says/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=AT%2011-29-19&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp54adamsky.pdf
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https://news.yahoo.com/trumps-intervention-seal-case-tests-165534632.html
Sadly reminds me of Sergeant Barnes :
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tlLSqeVA_no
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Sources not cited, but a reputable poster on another forum full of military, retired military, and LEOs:
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Gallagher is only a free man because the Navy fucked up his prosecution. Murder charges aside, he is a shit bird of a senior NCO. He was rifling through care packages and stealing shit from his SEALs and is not well liked or respected on the Teams. He was placed in pre trial confinement for threatening to kill the sailors who turned him in and their families, stalked dudes that had moved on to other commands and tried to derail their careers, among other things. To be fair, he is a SEAL, so it's not like dumb shit isn't the norm for them, but he certainly showed he was head and shoulders above the normal shenanigans of his people.
Clint Lorrance deserved every day of his prison sentence. He ordered his men to kill three unarmed dudes on a motorcycle that displayed zero hostile intent. His own men testified against him at his court martial. He was a substandard officer looking to be a war hero. After his men killed those two Afghani's he tried to get his radio operator to call in a troops in contact report stating that they took fire from a nearby village to justify killing those dudes. Before that he was threatening villagers, telling them he was going to have the ANA kill their families and ordered his DMR to shoot at farmers in the fields to "scare" them. That dude was out of control and had no business running a rifle platoon. When your NCO's testify against you, that's a pretty damning fact. War is a fucked up thing. Everyday you are forced to make judgments that have lasting effects on you, the people you are responsible for and the noncombatants in your area of operations. I know, I did it more times that I can count.
There are decisions I made in microseconds that still haunt me a decade plus later. Some of those decisions I still can't decide if I was right or wrong. I do know that I never regretted not having to kill someone that didn't need killing. I never ordered my people to do something that I thought they would have trouble living with. When those situations arose, I did that hard things that needed done, so some teenager didn't end up eating a gun years later.
He knew what he was getting into as a combat arms officer. If he couldn't play by the rules of armed conflict, then he should have never put the fucking uniform on. Were they Taliban or Anti Coalition Militia ? Maybe, hell maybe even probably. However, the rules of engagement exist for a reason. War is simply the continuation of politics by other means. When you are fighting a counter insurgency, indiscriminate killing does nothing to further your cause and plays right into the propaganda put out by the other side. We turned plenty of neutral people into bad guys because we can't to this day, understand that. If Lt Lorrance couldn't live with that, he should have stayed at home. But he didn't, and fucked up. Then he doubled down on his fuckup and tried to rope his men into backing his play and lying to cover it up. He can go fuck himself.
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/12/us-forces-cant-hide-ubiquitous-satellites-they-need-learn-fool-them/161913/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.businessinsider.com/air-force-rods-from-god-kinetic-weapon-hit-with-nuclear-weapon-force-2017-9?utm_content=bufferc0a69&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer-defense
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/01/us-aims-intimidate-china-hypersonics-once-it-solves-physics/162408/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/01/esper-attempting-biggest-defense-reforms-generation/162457/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/01/us-navys-three-great-intellectual-challenges/162543/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/01/great-powers-must-talk-each-other-about-ai/162686/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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NASA's experimental X-59 supersonic jet could be built by the end of 2020
The team behind the plane is confident that the craft will be ultrafast and ultraquiet.
https://www.space.com/nasa-x-59-supersonic-plane-cleared-for-assembly.html
(https://cdn.mos.cms.futurecdn.net/TgEFkQVrJgscCHLu2zSasY-1024-80.jpg)
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https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/historic-stars-and-stripes-newspaper-in-the-crosshairs-as-pentagon-aims-to-end-funding
A friend of serious military background comments:
"This is a good move. Stars and Stripes decided a long time ago that trending left was the right move. It was never clear how that was a service to the troops. Kill the subsidy now."
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second post
defense budget. The Pentagon released its proposed budget for fiscal year 2021 on Monday. Budgets are policy in Washington, and especially given how long it takes for new arms systems to be developed and procured, the Pentagon’s annual wish list can tell us quite a bit about what it thinks will and won’t be important several years down the line. The main takeaway: The Pentagon wants a leaner, more sophisticated fighting force. The $705 billion proposal includes cuts to the Navy’s and the Army’s overall budgets, Marine Corps personnel and shipbuilding. The Army's trusty A-10 Warthog, the Navy's F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and Virginia-class submarines, an Air Force hypersonic weapons program, and several other programs are all on the chopping block. But research and development spending would generally increase (though civilian R&D spending would drop), as would outlays for modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal, and the new Space Force would get $15 billion. One of the most interesting and important fights is over the future of the U.S. Navy. U.S. Defense Secretary Mark Esper is calling for a 355-ship fleet by 2030, but the 2021 budget cuts funding for shipbuilding to $16.4 billion to cover eight new vessels in 2021, down from $22 billion last year for 12 new ships. This reflects an ongoing debate over the future value of surface fleets, particularly manned ships, in an era when the range and sophistication of precision-guided anti-ship missiles are progressing by leaps and bounds.
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third post
https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2020/02/100-us-soldiers-transfer-space-force-2021/163043/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/02/heres-what-special-operators-want-their-new-light-attack-plane/163088/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/feb/13/trump-revamps-nuclear-arsenal-respond-russia-tacti/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=evening&utm_term=evening&utm_content=evening&bt_ee=BfphNieaxOFmMxrUsDVgEah%2F%2Fuj0ZIVGATMsDn4d5pXwG4rmk8F0RCMr7HdlbgM3&bt_ts=1581714673892
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/feb/13/trump-revamps-nuclear-arsenal-respond-russia-tacti/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=evening&utm_term=evening&utm_content=evening&bt_ee=BfphNieaxOFmMxrUsDVgEah%2F%2Fuj0ZIVGATMsDn4d5pXwG4rmk8F0RCMr7HdlbgM3&bt_ts=1581714673892
Weird how Putin's puppet keeps doing all the things Putin hates.
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/02/13/war-with-robots-how-battle-bots-will-define-the-future-of-ground-combat/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ARM%20DNR%202.13.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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February 18, 2020 View On Website
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New US Strategy and Technology
By: George Friedman
The world is facing a fundamental strategic and technical shift in both the geopolitics of war and its dynamic. The shift is being driven by the United States’ decision to change its global strategic posture and the maturation of new classes of weaponry that change how wars will be fought.
U.S. Posture
The U.S. has publicly announced a change in American strategy consisting of two parts. The first is abandoning the focus on jihadists that began with al-Qaida’s attack on the U.S. in 2001. The second is reshaping and redefining forces to confront China and Russia. For a while, it had been assumed that there would no longer be peer-to-peer conflicts but rather extended combat against light infantry and covert forces such as was taking place in Afghanistan. After every international confrontation, including the Cold War, the absence of immediate peer threats leads strategists to assume that none will emerge, and that the future engagements will involve managing instability rather than defeating peers. This illusion is the reward of comfort to the victorious powers. Immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, the belief was that the only issue facing the world was economic, and that military strategy was archaic. The events of 9/11 changed that, but the idea of national conflicts was still seen as farfetched.
The United States is now shifting its strategy to focus on peer-to-peer conflict. Peer-to-peer conflict is not about two equal powers fighting; it’s about two powers that field similar forces. So the war in Afghanistan was between a combined arms force and a totally different, light infantry force. As we saw in Vietnam, the latter can defeat a far more advanced force by understanding the political dimension more clearly than its opponent. Peer-to-peer conflict involves two forces conceiving of war in the same way. Germany invaded Poland and was by far the more powerful force, but Poland conceived of war the same way the Germans did. In this sense, they were peers.
The United States is a global power. Russia cannot wage war in the Atlantic or Pacific. China cannot project decisive power into Europe. The United States can do both. It is not nearly as geographically limited in its warfighting as the other two are. But were the United States to confront them within the areas where they can operate, the question then is the quality of forces, in terms of command and technology.
China’s national interest pivots on its ability to use sea lanes to sustain international trade. Its ability to project land power is limited by terrain; to its south are hills, jungles and the Himalayas, and to its north is Siberia. It could attack westward through Kazakhstan, but the logistical challenges are enormous and the benefits dubious. For China, then, the fundamental problem is naval, deriving from the threat that the U.S. could use its forces to blockade and cripple China.
Russia’s strategic interest rests in regaining the buffer zone from Latvia to Romania. The loss of these states in 1991 eroded the main defense line of an attack from the west. Russia’s primary goal, therefore, is to recover these buffers. Of secondary but still significant importance is holding the North Caucasus south of the Russian agricultural heartland. The threat to this region is insurgency in areas like Chechnya and Dagestan, or an American move from the South Caucasus.
Neither a U.S. naval blockade of China nor an attack on Russia proper from the west are likely scenarios. But national strategy must take into account implausible but catastrophic scenarios, because common sense can evaporate rapidly. Thus the Russians must maintain sustained pressure primarily to the west but also to the south. China must press eastward, in the South and East China seas, to demonstrate the costs a blockade would impose.
The focus for each is not necessarily action but creating the possibility of action and thereby shaping the political relationship. The danger is that the gesture will trigger what had been seen as an unreasonable response. The problem for the United States is that it cannot be sure of Russia’s or China’s reading of American intentions, and therefore, it must be prepared to counter both. War is rarely about hunger for conquest; it is about the fear of being conquered. For Russia, it is fear that the U.S. will try to achieve what Napoleon and Hitler failed to achieve, given the loss of its buffers. For China, it is a fear of strangulation by American naval forces. For the United States, it is fear that Russia will return with force to Central Europe, or that China will surge into the Western Pacific. All such fears are preposterous until they mount to such a point that doing nothing appears imprudent.
A New Class of Weapons
World War II was first waged between German armor and Soviet infantry, and then it became a war of armor against armor. In the Pacific, the decisive war was not of battleships against battleships, but of aircraft against naval vessels and, toward the end, airpower. Much of the battles on islands like Saipan and Guadalcanal were intended by both sides to secure them for air bases. The Cold War, had it turned hot, was conceived of as an upgraded World War II, of armor and air power against armor and air power.
From World War II until the end of the Cold War, peer-to-peer conflict focused on three classes of weapons: armored vehicles, aircraft carriers and manned bombers. After 1967 and the introduction of precision-guided weapons, the survivability of these weapons declined, and massive resources had to be allocated to allow them to survive. Armor had to be constantly upgraded to defeat far cheaper projectiles that were unlikely to miss. Aircraft carriers had to be surrounded by carrier battle groups consisting of anti-air cruisers, anti-submarine destroyers and attack submarines, all integrated into complex computer systems that could counter attacks by precision-guided weapons. Manned bombers flying into enemy airspace could be confronted by sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. The solution was to try to build bombers invisible to enemy radar. The cost of defending these systems that emerged in World War II surged as the cost of destroying them began to decline.
Counters to precision-guided weapons inevitably emerged, and we have reached the threshold of a new class of weapons: hypersonic missiles. These munitions, which can travel at five to 10 times the speed of sound, maneuver in flight and carry sufficient explosives, including sub munitions (smaller projectiles designed to hit multiple targets), make the survival of tanks, surface vessels and manned bombers increasingly problematic. Their speed, maneuverability and defenses against detection decrease the probability that all incoming hypersonic missiles can be destroyed, while they retain the precision of previous generations of weapons.
(click to enlarge)
Russia, China and the U.S. are all working on these weapons. Sometimes they exaggerate their limited capabilities; sometimes they minimize their substantial capabilities. But all have them and are developing better ones if they can. And this changes war from the way it was conceived in World War II and the Cold War. A new system of weapons is beginning to emerge.
The key to the development of hypersonics is range. The shorter their range, the closer the attacker must come. The longer the range, the more uncertainty there is over its location and the more likely it is to survive and be fired, maneuvering in excess of the ability of defending system. So in the South China Sea, it will not be carriers facing carriers. They will be neutralized by hypersonic missiles. Nor will it be armored brigades engaging. The tanks will be neutralized long before they engage. The goal will be to locate and destroy an enemy’s missiles before they are launched and before they can approach their target.
The key will be the ability to locate and track hypersonic missiles and then destroy them. The solution to this is systems in space. The Chinese will not engage the U.S. Navy with its carriers. It will try to destroy them with well camouflaged missiles from land bases. To do this, they must locate the target, which is mobile. Its own platforms being vulnerable, they will rely on space-based reconnaissance. The United States’ primary mission therefore will be to destroy Chinese satellites, find the location of Chinese launchers and launch saturated attacks on them, likely from space.
Modern war, like all war, depends on intelligence and targeting information. Precision-guided munitions move older platforms toward obsolescence, and hypersonics closes the door. The battle must be at a longer range than most missiles have now, and will be dependent on a space-based system for targeting. This means that victory in war will depend on command of space.
Note that the U.S. has now established the U.S. Space Force, which integrated the space fighting capabilities of other services into one. This represents the realization that dealing with peer powers now depends on the command of space. Therefore, the United States’ strategic turn away from jihadists toward Russia and China also constitutes a shift away from the primacy of older platforms. A new strategy and the recognition of the importance of space mean that the decisive battle will not be fought on Earth’s surface.
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China’s missile force is growing at an unprecedented rate
The nation appears to have introduced 11 new missile brigades since May 2017.
P.W. Singer and Ma Xiu
February 25, 2020
missile
Vehicles with long-range DF-26 missiles during a military parade in Beijing, China, in September 2015.Ge jinfh
China’s long-range missiles play a central role in the country’s military plans. And, in the event of armed conflict between that nation and the US, they’re the weapon the American military worries the most about.
Despite their pivotal role in Chinese war-fighting strategy, the service responsible for those missiles, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), remains perhaps the most opaque branch of Beijing’s military. While its new fleet of expanded-range missile systems—from the DF-31 and DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to the hypersonic DF-17—have debuted in parades, there are still a number of profound changes happening in the PLARF that are relatively undisclosed.
But by tracking more subtle public announcements and news stories, it appears the number of missile brigades in the PLA has jumped from 29 to 40, an increase of more than 35 percent, in just three years.
To understand this expansion, a bit of context is necessary: The PLARF’s predecessor, the Second Artillery Force, officially formed in 1966, and by the end of the decade, it fielded roughly eight strategic missile regiments, which were later upgraded to brigades. Three more were added in the 1970s. Beginning in the late 1980s, the Second Artillery Force began fielding new short- and medium-range missile types, requiring the addition of new brigades. Four new brigades stood up between 1980 and 2001, three of which were equipped with these new missiles.
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The first decade of the 2000s saw faster growth: Eleven new units stood up between 2001 and 2010, at least eight of which were equipped with the latest missiles, including the DF-31 (the PLA’s first road-mobile ICBM), the CJ-10 (its first land-attack cruise missile), and the DF-16 SRBM, as well as the improved DF-21C. Similarly, when the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile began to come online in the late 2010s, two of the next three brigades may have been equipped with it.
China missile brigades
New brigades are usually equipped with the PLA’s most advanced missiles.BluePath Labs
Why build so quickly recently? A review of available information on Chinese news and web sources about the 11 new brigades offers some hints as to the direction and reasons behind this expansion.
Chinese missile brigades
Recent brigades by date.BluePath Labs
Of these, the 644 Brigade, established in July 2017, is perhaps the most intriguing because it offers a glimpse into the kinds of new weapons that these brigades will likely carry. This unit test-fired a new missile in April 2016, and again at some point in late 2017, prior to it officially entering service. Both the DF-41 (the newest ICBM) and the DF-17 (which carries a hypersonic glide vehicle called the DF-ZF) were tested in April 2016 and late 2017. Given this timeline, and the previous pattern of new brigades being created to accommodate new missiles, this unit is likely one of the first equipped with those two new missiles.
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Further, this unit was reported to have been given the unit title “New Generation 1st Dongfeng Brigade.” Such honorifics are occasionally conferred upon units that are the first to achieve a major milestone: The 1st Dongfeng Brigade was the first unit equipped with a Dongfeng missile, the 1st Conventional Brigade was the first equipped with a conventional missile, and the 1st Cruise Missile Brigade was the first to deploy a cruise missile. The deployment of the PLA’s first hypersonic missile would certainly qualify for such an honorific. On the other hand, the brigade’s location in Hanzhong, close to existing ICBM formations, may indicate a DF-41 or DF-31AG unit.
These units are likely important developments for the PLARF, and as such the public information on these brigades is limited, especially compared to the amount of information about American equivalents. However, we can say that the new units appear to be evenly distributed geographically, indicating that it is modernizing across the board, as opposed to a singular focus on a specific region.
China missile brigades
Location of new brigades established since 2017.BluePath Labs
Further, it appears that these brigades are continuing the trend of being equipped with the latest missile systems; there is at least one DF-26 brigade, as well as three brigades with unidentified new model missiles. Most interestingly, at least one of them appears to be equipped with a missile system that came online in the last two years, likely the DF-41, DF-17, or DF-31AG. This would indicate that the PLARF is not only growing new units rapidly but is equipping these new brigades with its most advanced weapons.
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What’s more, two of the brigades are equipped with dual-use weapons systems (DF-26, DF-21C) that have both nuclear and conventional war applications, with the others likely equipped with the DF-41, DF-31AG, and DF-17, all of which are nuclear or nuclear-capable.
This fits within what China laid out in its 2019 Defense White Paper, which noted that the strategic requirements of the PLARF include “enhancing...nuclear deterrence and counterattack [and] strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces.”
The new units and the evidence on the ground tells the tale of a growing force, with growing capability well beyond what is glimpsed in parades.
Ma Xiu is an analyst with BluePath Labs, a DC-based consulting company that focuses on research, analysis, disruptive technologies, and wargaming.
P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and author of multiple best-selling and award-winning books on national security.
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/02/america-must-shape-worlds-ai-norms-or-dictators-will/163392/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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Israel's Iran Confrontation Is Pointing the Way to the Future of War
by Seth Frantzman
The Hill
February 26, 2020
https://www.meforum.org/60482/israel-is-pointing-the-way-to-the-future-of-war
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/02/28/army-wont-follow-marine-corps-lead-and-rename-confederate-bases/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=ARM%20DNR%202.28.20&utm_term=Editorial%20-%20Army%20-%20Daily%20News%20Roundup
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https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2020/03/05/to-combat-the-china-threat-us-marine-corps-declares-ship-killing-missile-systems-its-top-priority/
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https://www.popsci.com/story/technology/french-f21-smart-torpedo/?utm_source=internal&utm_medium=email
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COVID-19: How Pandemics Disrupt Military Operations
Sim Tack
Sim Tack
Global Analyst , Stratfor
9 MINS READ
Mar 25, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
Fully protected members of the Spanish Army's Nuclear Bacteriological and Chemical Regiment (RNBQ) prepare to disinfect a train station in San Sebastian to prevent the spread of the coronavirus on March 24, 2020.
Soldiers prepare to disinfect a train station in San Sebastian, Spain, to prevent the spread of the coronavirus on March 24, 2020. As of Tuesday, Spain had reported 39,673 confirmed cases of the virus.
HIGHLIGHTS
Measures to contain and respond to the COVID-19 pandemic could significantly impact global military readiness for at least the next several months.
Even though immediate disruptions to military operations will be temporary, the economic stress resulting from the pandemic could yield long-term setbacks in development programs.
The potential impact from COVID-19 provides a general template of how future pandemics could affect military capabilities and activites, albeit with different timelines and severity of impact depending on the disease.
Amid the escalating COVID-19 pandemic, countries around the world are facing widespread disruptions to not only the health of their populations and economies, but their militaries. Even if the virus itself doesn't leave key personnel severely ill (or worse), quarantine measures can still severely thwart military operations. Meanwhile, military powers such as the United States may increasingly be forced to deploy additional forces to the frontlines of unfolding COVID-19 outbreaks at home. The resulting fallout could, in turn, result in setbacks in the fight against multiple non-state actors abroad, and potentially even the long-term development of military capabilities.
The Big Picture
For many states, the military serves as a critical instrument of policymaking and national security, and is thus often vital in mitigating widespread crises such as the COVID-19 outbreak. But military forces are also by no means immune to the direct health impacts or the indirect financial fallout of pandemics, which risk disrupting military operations and the development of new capabilities.
Operational Limitations
The requirement to isolate forces — and possibly even their families when living on base — to contain the virus will have the most direct impact on military readiness. This first became apparent in South Korea, when an infection was identified within a U.S. military base. Even if the disease itself does not spread too widely through a country’s military itself (and leave personnel severely ill or worse), precautionary quarantine and social distancing measures can rapidly disrupt a significant portion of military activities that normally depend on operations in larger numbers and direct interaction. The first disruptions of this kind are already notable in operational theaters such as Iraq, where the United States recently repositioned its troops into a smaller number of bases (in part to limit their exposure to COVID-19), and where Dutch and British forces also suspending training activities with local Iraqi forces for similar reasons. U.S. forces also recently limited their engagement in the long-planned Defender Europe exercise, which had been intended to be the largest simultaneous deployment of U.S. forces to Europe in over 25 years.
In addition to isolation efforts, the potential for substantial COVID-19 outbreak within military formations in the field presents complex consequences as well. Such an outbreak could incapacitate not only the ability to conduct active operations, but the ability of affected units to continue operating. It could also prompt a medical response requirement that they cannot locally meet. This is especially true for smaller and remote deployments, of which there are many still operating under the "global war on terror." With troops falling ill and others engaged in caring for them, it may become infeasible for even deployed units to guarantee their own security at a reliable degree. Although most military personnel less likely to fall severely ill due to their youth and fitness level, serious cases of COVID-19 would still be statistically expected to occur within the military, making containment efforts necessary.
Even if COVID-19 doesn't leave personnel severely ill (or worse), measures to contain and respond to the outbreak can still leave militaries less equipped to manage emerging security threats elsewhere.
For some military operations, such as those of naval forces, quarantine efforts may be easier than for others. Italy, for example, was quick to quarantine two of its naval vessels early on in the development of the COVID-19 crisis, and the U.S. Navy also recently adopted the practice of limiting port calls and leaving at least 14 days of self-quarantine between port visits. By avoiding port calls and self-quarantining at sea, the chance of external infections is radically lowered but not entirely removed, as illustrated by the recent diagnosis of three sailors on board the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt after a port visit to Vietnam.
In the case of infections in the close quarters of a naval vessel, however, the disease could spread rapidly, as evidenced by the COVID-19 infections reported on cruise ships. And medical facilities onboard may not be able to sufficiently treat the number of patients requiring intensive care. This again will raise logistical challenges in the form of outside assistance or evacuations. Crews of operational vessels also can’t simply be swapped out, or would at least require thorough disinfection that may not be feasible to carry out at sea (this is particularly true for nuclear submarine fleets, which, while relatively isolated, can’t be considered entirely immune to outbreaks). Vessels affected by an outbreak would likely become operationally unavailable as a result, potentially temporarily reducing maritime capabilities in certain areas of operations.
Similar disruptions could also arise from highly specialized but limited military assets. In addition to medical units, the ranks of fighter pilots, special operations forces, specialized technical support staff and contractors will also not be invulnerable to infection or quarantine efforts. A loss in operational readiness from these units will have very direct consequences on the overall capabilities for the U.S. military and its allies, in particular, in the short term. These units are not only critical to U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts, but also in providing response capacity in various international hotspots around the world, including North Korea, Iran, Syria and regions near Russia's border.
The COVID-19 outbreak also appears to be moving across the globe in sequence, beginning first with those countries closest to China (the initial epicenter). North Korea, for example, is already starting to revive its military exercises in March, after largely being on lock-down during January and February. The United States, meanwhile, has just begun implementing widespread lockdown measures. The difference in timing and impact — with signs that China is now getting over the peak of the crisis, just as the United States is gearing up for an expected surge of COVID-19 cases — could also create temporary windows of opportunity for some countries in their own regional theaters. If military response capacity becomes severely limited, even if only in a particular theater, the calculations of policymakers on both sides will be significantly restricted by the reduction in available means or potential unintended consequences in terms of spreading infections or exposing troops.
Risks Beyond Warfighting
The potential impact from COVID-19, however, will not be limited to immediate operational deployments. In aiding states to ramp up their capacity to quickly respond to the disease's spread and the medical consequences, military formations are increasingly becoming mobilized to assist first responders and to enforce quarantine measures. Italy, Germany, and France, for example, have started to lean on military personnel to set up additional medical facilities and transport the infected, among a long list of other responsibilities. As the crisis worsens, large formations will become unavailable for the defense of the homeland or potential deployments. This may not necessarily alter the military balance between states, as it appears that the COVID-19 crisis hasn't so far spared any military power. Russia, for example, has halted its exercises in border regions as a precaution against COVID-19 exposure, despite suffering from many fewer identified cases than NATO countries.
In addition to military capacity geared toward balancing against other states, operations against insurgent groups and terrorist cells will be severely disrupted. Due to their asymmetric nature, these militant organizations will also not be facing the same kind of burden and responsibility of the state due to the pandemic. As troops are deployed in a COVID-19 response capacity, or have to cancel training exercises or operational preparations, the ability to rotate forces into the relevant theaters could temporarily grind to a halt. Even where capacity isn’t an issue, deploying forces overseas and returning others carries a great risk of spreading infections (either from their home bases to combat theaters or vice versa). The West African Ebola crisis of 2014-16 illustrated this risk, as peacekeepers became unable to rotate in and out of unaffected regions in Africa for fear of spreading the disease.
Long-Term Implications
The economic impact of the pandemic will also affect the defense industry and military budgets long after the immediate COVID-19 outbreak subsides. Particularly the military aerospace sector, which overlaps significantly with the civilian aerospace industry, could face a significant setback due to the accruing damage to the global airline industry. Other aspects of the defense industry will be affected as well, as social distancing prevents travel, collaboration and even testing of new developments. This will impose delays and cost overruns on ongoing projects. The U.S. Air Force's Advanced Battle Management System, for one, has already postponed testing from April until June due to COVID-19. Naval shipyards have also suspended work in countries such as Italy and Canada, which could delay deliveries of new naval vessels and disrupt the maintenance of existing ones for the duration of the outbreak.
The financial risk resulting from these disruptions will be further increased by the potential for economies to contract in the wake of measures to contain the outbreak, which will likely also impact defense spending in many countries. This does not mean that defense budgets will necessarily contract, though depending on the particular spending priorities of individual countries, such an outcome can not be ruled out. Constricted budgets will also lead to internal shifting of resources, and potential accelerations of plans to reduce or withdraw forces from overseas locations.
Between these long-term impacts on the development of military capabilities (such as budgetary trends or disruptions of development efforts), as well as short-term disruptions to operational theaters, pandemics such as COVID-19 carry a risk of granting a temporary free pass to the activities of non-state actors across the world, and possibly even a permanent setback in many active theaters. The essential nature of military forces in conducting foreign and domestic security policies, as well as their role in directly supporting humanitarian response efforts, make them one of the key vulnerabilities of modern states at a time of pandemics.
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https://www.military.com/daily-news/2020/03/23/marines-shut-down-all-tank-units-cut-infantry-battalions-major-overhaul.html?ESRC=eb_200324.nl
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/04/exclusive-us-army-wants-train-hundreds-soldiers-coronavirus-safety-bubbles/164326/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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second
https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/april/unleash-privateers
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https://americanmilitarynews.com/2020/04/marine-corps-head-explains-confederate-flag-ban-heres-what-he-said/?utm_campaign=DailyEmails&utm_source=AM_Email&utm_medium=email
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/05/us-navy-fremm-frigate-design-selection-signals-engagement/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-05-06&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart
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https://www.foxcarolina.com/the-us-successfully-tested-a-laser-weapon-that-can-destroy-aircraft-mid-flight/article_6a37ecd9-9a37-5b9d-be66-a5be615c7f28.html
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2020/06/navy-punish-fired-uss-roosevelt-captain/166300/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-chris-brose-kill-chain
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2020/07/09/army-inclusion-email-claims-saying-make-america-great-again-evidence-white-supremacy/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_term=daily&utm_campaign=20200709
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Three Urgent Questions for the Air Force’s New Chief of Staff
The service has too long delayed the hard choices that would prepare it to deter China.
By MARA E. KARLIN and JIM MITRE
JULY 28, 2020 01:31 PM ET
COMMENTARY
AIR FORCE
When Gen. Charles “CQ” Brown becomes the U.S. Air Force’s 22nd Chief of Staff later this summer, he will take charge of a force at a precarious time.
The service is grappling with its own racial prejudice, systemic discrimination, and unconscious bias; Brown, the first African American to lead a service branch, has already issued a powerful statement on racial issues. He must also navigate the Air Force through a pandemic whose infections and economic disruptions are complicating recruitment, training, acquisition, and operations. And though either of these towering challenges might consume any leader, General Brown must not squander the opportunity to make progress on the primary geopolitical problem confronting the U.S. military: China.
The Defense Department has identified geopolitical rivalry with China as its principal challenge for nearly a decade; Beijing’s military modernization and propensity for coercing regional states puts in jeopardy the Asia-Pacific balance of power. But the Department has made only slow progress toward a more modern and capable military that can meet this threat. Its strategy execution is chronically hampered by near-term events, from budget sequestration to Middle East instability to domestic policy dynamics that, for example, place military forces on the southern border; COVID-19 is just the latest crisis to draw attention and resources to today’s challenges at the expense of tomorrow’s. The problem is that China is no longer a future challenge; the future has arrived, and already come to pass even as the rivalry is set to grow more intense over the coming decades. The military, and the Air Force in particular, must change to credibly deter Chinese aggression and keep the geopolitical competition from escalating into war.
To do so most effectively, we recommend General Brown first look to the Marine Corps as a model. Those who haven’t followed the service’s transformation since General David Berger became Commandant last summer are missing a sea change in the making. Just days into the job, General Berger released new planning guidance that declared, “We cannot afford to continue to admire problems or fail to take the necessary decisive actions.” He has followed it up with implementation guidance, including details of the new force design that explicitly highlights areas of investment and divestment. And he has communicated his priorities in a masterfully strategic communications campaign — reiterating his priorities in podcasts, around Washington and in the field, and even listing them on Twitter. Simply put, General Berger has offered a justifiably stark diagnosis of the Marine Corps’ challenges and is pitching thoughtful, serious prescriptions to solve them. While his provocative ideas are sparking numerous debates about the future contours of the Marine Corps, General Berger is right to press for a sharp shift that better positions the Corps for the China challenge.
General Brown would do well to follow General Berger’s lead. The Air Force is in need of a similarly fundamental recalibration. As Chief, General Goldfein made important progress in a wide range of issues. He spearheaded development of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or JADC2, an innovative approach that could alter the character of warfare by establishing interoperability between any sensor and any shooter. He prioritized readiness, which had plummeted across the force. He also pushed difficult decisions on leadership, including dramatic changes to the promotion system to make it both more transparent and more bespoke, although its ultimate impact is not yet clear. He stood up the Air Force Integrated Warfighting Capability, or AFWIC, to push the Air Force’s focus and resources in increasingly innovative and sophisticated ways that prioritize future fights—which, as the latest budget proposal shows, has made some important, albeit incomplete, improvements. He further surged AFWIC’s work by naming its deputy director as the new deputy chief of staff for strategy, integration, and requirements—and by promoting him from one to three stars within days. And perhaps above all, his extraordinary leadership in tandem with Chief Wright has reminded the force that issues of racism and inclusion are not political—they are instead critical to righting social injustices that undercut the vision we must aspire to.
But several trends that long predate the current chief have the Air Force in a dire position. Even more than its sister services, whose operations tempo in the Middle East surged in the post-9/11 wars, the Air Force’s inventory is worn by regional combat operations that began a decade earlier in the 1991 Persian Gulf War. That inventory has shrunk considerably over the ensuing decades, yet taking a page out of the Navy’s book to focus on regrowing the number of squadrons is misguided and will be similarly ineffectual. While Air Force leaders publicly praise the creation of the Space Force, they surely must also recognize that the bureaucratic and resource competition has just gotten fiercer. As Todd Harrison wrote last October, the Air Force is in a historically anomalous position with “a budget that is near an all-time high and a force structure that is near an all-time low.” Yet the service is not clearly equipped to make the necessary political arguments; at least, it has long failed to tell a compelling and realistic story about what it brings to the Joint Force. Nor has it made the hard choices to prepare itself for an inescapable characteristic of future battlefields: with challenges to air dominance growing and indeed worsening, the Air Force will only find it harder and harder to “own the air” against a sophisticated adversary and will need to increasingly accept air contestation.
Such a dire situation requires serious leadership to tackle a new set of problems that move beyond admiration and toward necessary decisive actions.
Three Key Decisions
Air Force initiatives to sustain the U.S. military advantage over China hinge on three foundational questions that remain unanswered. If General Brown resolves these, he would be well on his way to making the meaningful and lasting change the Air Force sorely needs. Coming from Pacific Air Forces, General Brown is already seized with the China challenge; the dilemma now is how to push the rest of the Air Force accordingly.
First, whether to prioritize China and Russia equally. The National Defense Strategy prioritizes China and Russia as a class above North Korea, Iran, terrorism, and other security challenges. Following the strategy, the Air Force has harvested resources from lower priorities to accelerate development of the force for great power rivals. The Air Force had to make some hard choices in doing so, such as cutting older aerial refuelers to free up resources for new ones. However, its hard choices are about to get harder. The Air Force, along with the rest of the Department, is likely to see its budget flatline or dip in the wake of the COVID-19 stimulus spending. The growing costs of personnel and operations and maintenance may crowd out funding for modernization. Having already shifted resources to face China and Russia, future tradeoffs may increasingly be between China and Russia.
If faced with this choice, the Air Force should ensure it is pacing off of the China challenge—even if that accretes risk relative to Russia. The stakes in the China competition are simply higher, given China’s greater geopolitical standing and the larger economic interests at play. The Air Force needs to recognize that Chinese and Russian contested environments vary, so how and in what ways it penetrates Chinese and Russian air defenses must as well. And making this recommendation a reality will require smarter decisions for sustainably dealing with the other threats. For example, investing in light attack aircraft for counterterrorism and stability operations in the Middle East and South Asia is long overdue. While it cannot ultimately extract itself from long-term operational requirements, the Air Force can take a smarter approach in doing so.
Second, how to posture forces to fight China within a contested environment. Any plausible war against China will confront the Air Force with China’s anti-access / area-denial capability and put in question the operational viability of its Western Pacific bases and forces. The Defense Department has publicly recognized this since 2012, when it started calling for a more operationally resilient posture in the Asia-Pacific. Despite reiterating the importance of resilience in its basing network ever since, the Air Force has not committed the funds to sufficiently do so. The Air Force’s hesitance is largely driven by the cost. Its force structure and operations were designed for efficiency, massing numerous fighters at a few main operating bases to benefit from economies of scale in maintenance and logistics. It would cost tens of billions to shift from efficiency to resilience by investing in deployable airfields, better regional infrastructure, and combat-capable fuel and logistics supplies. For years, INDOPACOM leaders and multiple chairmen of the Congressional Armed Services Committees have registered their concerns with this lack of resourcing but have been unable to redress it, although the Pacific Deterrence Initiative is a step in the right direction.
The longer the Air Force waits to invest in an operationally resilient forward posture, the more aggravated the problem becomes. This is because the service continues to orient its force structure around fighter planes, and fighter planes depend on operationally viable forward bases or extremely long and tenuous chains of aerial refueling tankers to reach their targets during conflict. There are ways for the Air Force to fight in a contested environment without heavy reliance on fighters, such as using relatively low-cost and attritable unmanned systems. Alternatively, the Air Force can plan to lean more heavily on long-range bombers and standoff missiles to strike inside Chinese air defenses. The answer is unlikely to be one option exclusively over the others but in finding the right balance among them. The Air Force should define this balance, describe the basing network it requires, and commit the resources to build it.
Third, whether to embrace the fact that the future character of warfare is uncertain. Of course it is, thanks to emerging technologies — artificial intelligence, quantum computing, advanced materials, hypersonic missiles — and an economically powerful rival that is at least as good as the United States at turning them into military capabilities. Yet the Air Force is of two minds on whether to accept this fact. One school of thought does so by channeling capability development through rapid prototyping, rapid fielding, and open system design. This allows the Air Force to experiment and fail fast before committing to a set of capabilities to develop, while also keeping those capabilities open for subsequent spirals in design changes and technological upgrades. Another essentially ignores this uncertainty by adhering to a singular prediction of the future, one with a clear vision of not only the capabilities the Air Force requires but in what quantity: 386 operational squadrons as the “Air Force We Need.”
Putting forth an inflexible number may help protect the Air Force’s budget; it may not. More to the point, it is analytically bunk. What might make good politics makes for bad policy. The Air Force’s analysis is at times muddled as it aims to substantiate the need for exactly 386 squadrons while also trying to explore novel concepts and capabilities to defeat China in war. In his confirmation hearing, General Brown reiterated the squadron target but started to deemphasize it, noting that “if we do not achieve 386, we may be a little bit smaller than 386, but we will be more capable.” He should continue this approach and, given the Air Force’s inability to foresee the future, completely abandon the hard target.
The time has come to make the hard decisions that will reorient the Air Force for a new era of competition with China, but so far, calls for change lack the sense of urgency that make many complex and controversial decisions feasible. Those leaders and entities inside the Air Force who want to answer these three foundational questions will need the vocal support of the new chief of staff. Absent such backing, they will fall to pressure from the Air Force’s old guard. General Brown’s mandate is a difficult one, yet he understands it better than most. If he can fulfill it, the United States may retain the upper hand over China.
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/08/ai-just-beat-human-f-16-pilot-dogfight-again/167872/
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/08/ai-just-beat-human-f-16-pilot-dogfight-again/167872/
As Insty like to say: Skynet smiles.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2020/10/esper-plans-fewer-large-carriers-more-subs-500-ship-navy/169064/
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2020/10/chief-naval-operations-outlines-future-drones-minicarriers/169204/
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https://www.defenseone.com/business/2020/11/would-biden-wh-gop-senate-prevent-defense-spending-dip/169792/
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Hypersonics development. The U.S. and Australia announced plans to jointly develop hypersonic cruise missiles. The development of hypersonics is a big deal – and an area where the U.S. is believed to be lagging somewhat behind China and Russia. China, meanwhile, says it tested a jet engine capable of reaching Mach 16 flight. And Germany has joined an EU project aimed at developing systems to shoot down hypersonics.
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/11/soldiers-dont-trust-robot-battle-buddies-can-virtual-training-fix/170378/
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2020/11/are-ai-professionals-actually-unwilling-work-pentagon/170359/
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... and Alaska, Guam, Pacific.
https://strategypage.com/on_point/20201201203736.aspx
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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/37923/the-army-is-training-specialized-companies-of-green-berets-to-crack-hard-targets?fbclid=IwAR3ASvXMey9Gy9zM3wpljb_b8lmozHdlwatAf5KxvIw3r2KwfP2nlfd-7eA
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/12/artificial-skin-may-one-day-make-troops-invisible-even-heat-sensors/170523/
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https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reorganization-is-imperative-to-fixing-special-forces%E2%80%99-bent-unconventional-culture
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second
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/dec/22/armys-long-range-cannon-hits-target-43-miles-away/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=FuBo8QooYUC9%2Bg2KNiv76BH3Y7TwafsTIr09cwFtxwD9KtIVK%2B48F%2F8Aaf%2BTNr8Q&bt_ts=1608653496111
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https://havokjournal.com/culture/the-difference-between-special-operations-and-special-forces/?fbclid=IwAR3V152U2EaS1fb-zbaHX7TUEo8ZzHxfM4s4CIJrpJ4k8PosDDF246S8LK8
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6C7nGzZ4EUE&fbclid=IwAR2J_81h4Jxy0dOuE8swlM4y-AQPphLzOJGGBDqG_f1UZSu4m69AWSogLnI
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rxu2Uw4Cbo&feature=youtu.be&ab_channel=gutterfightingsecrets&fbclid=IwAR2avDUwy0loaHKRSPrLcizW6hy_PuY2UqfGa0De5MJKKhNzvNBK5ivADuI
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I was wondering how Fang Fang left the country
so easily if the FBI knew about her
did they let her to see where she goes and follow her?
did they want to avoid a Chinese - US incident?
did she like all Chinese spies simply outsmart us?
wanted to protect Eric the democrat?
other?
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Indeed.
Similarly I wonder if Smallwell tipped her off.
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2020/09/inside-armys-fearless-messy-networked-warfare-experiment/168770/
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https://webmail.earthlink.net/wam/index.jsp?x=546604495
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/confederate-military-base-names-just-met-their-gettysburg/172045/
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/02/confederate-military-base-names-just-met-their-gettysburg/172045/
Why post Dick1 here?
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In this case because it contains factual information on an issue of interest to us.
Agreed they are what they are- the woke folks of the Pentagon-- but they address issues of interest to us which are lightly covered elsewhere. Also, good to know how the powerful factions for whom they write think. Occasionally we might learn something--- it is not like anyone on our side is be followed blindly.
The world is shattering assumptions left and right.
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http://ace.mu.nu/archives/392716.php
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:-o :-o :-o :x :x :x :x :x :x
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:-o :-o :-o :x :x :x :x :x :x
Yeah, we are fcuked.
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Obviously genuine nazi types are not who we want in our military, but OTOH for the Woken Dead of the White House and the Pentagon all traditional Americans are Nazis.
https://www.rollcall.com/2021/02/16/pentagon-report-reveals-inroads-white-supremacists-have-made-in-military/?fbclid=IwAR3pjQ-AqE5BBilIQOi1f2p_V7BFUKy-jrnGkUKO0lsOTcnoqwh708tlNQ0
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:roll:
Remember when an US Army officer was obviously a jihadist and his superiors were too scared to do anything about it?
And after the "workplace violence" the biggest concern was diversity?
http://blogs.reuters.com/talesfromthetrail/2009/11/08/general-casey-diversity-shouldnt-be-casualty-of-fort-hood/
Obviously genuine nazi types are not who we want in our military, but OTOH for the Woken Dead of the White House and the Pentagon all traditional Americans are Nazis.
https://www.rollcall.com/2021/02/16/pentagon-report-reveals-inroads-white-supremacists-have-made-in-military/?fbclid=IwAR3pjQ-AqE5BBilIQOi1f2p_V7BFUKy-jrnGkUKO0lsOTcnoqwh708tlNQ0
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http://ace.mu.nu/archives/392826.php
We totally outclass our near-peers on trans-acceptance!
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https://futurism.com/the-byte/us-army-testing-machine-gun-laser-weapon-vaporizes-targets
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second post
https://link.govexec.com/view/5f73565a310c0c35225d2a5bdpk0l.vym/623c19e8
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/03/pentagon-officials-uniformed-leaders-slam-foxs-carlson-over-female-troop-comments/172616/
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/03/how-special-ops-became-solution-everything/172638/
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https://www.revolver.news/2021/03/the-pentagons-fight-with-tucker-carlson-proves-it-doesnt-even-exist-to-win-wars-anymore/
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https://www.revolver.news/2021/03/the-pentagons-fight-with-tucker-carlson-proves-it-doesnt-even-exist-to-win-wars-anymore/
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1371120070093533190.html
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/mar/14/ted-cruz-rips-military-attacks-tucker-carlson/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=9L5XCwEj8YImAS3xgtx5nr1CVqh4qabo7%2B0TPKfoSixLMgrgzu2A1nPtdNfIPeTC&bt_ts=1615776824992
https://www.theepochtimes.com/marine-corps-command-walks-back-twitter-jabs-at-tucker-carlson-another-civilian_3732932.html?utm_source=morningbrief&utm_medium=email&email=craftydog@earthlink.net&utm_campaign=mb-2021-03-15
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/03/what-do-we-know-about-chinas-newest-missiles/172782/
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https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/03/30/the-us-military-must-plan-for-encounters-with-private-military-companies/
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/04/lets-get-real-about-us-military-dominance/173062/
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https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9591775/Pentagon-trawl-military-personnels-social-media-extremist-activity.html
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/05/socoms-wish-list-competing-china-and-russia/174208/
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/05/space-forces-first-battle-us-army/174174/
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https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=87f17e3f707cbdba1acc40e9b510343a_60ae49c3_6d25b5f&selDate=20210526&goTo=A01&artid=0&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=washingtontimes-E-Editions&utm_source=washingtontimes&utm_content=Read-Button
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/05/us-planning-evacuate-afghan-interpreters-top-us-general-says/174337/
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https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9629829/Soldiers-accidentally-reveal-nuclear-weapons-stored-using-publicly-visible-flashcard-apps.html
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https://townhall.com/tipsheet/rebeccadowns/2021/05/31/dan-crenshaw-and-tom-cotton-have-had-it-with-the-dangers-of-woke-ideology-coming-to-the-military-n2590249
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second post
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=5f8a54c4d53220144bd9141f810b50aa_60b4e22c_6d25b5f&selDate=20210531&goTo=A09&artid=1&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=washingtontimes-E-Editions&utm_source=washingtontimes&utm_content=Read-Button
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/06/03/fighting-the-last-war-that-never-happened/
Some good points in here IMHO.
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/06/03/fighting-the-last-war-that-never-happened/
Some good points in here IMHO.
China already won. Zero shots fired.
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https://thefederalistpapers.org/us/army-runs-astrology-based-recruitment-posts-links-zodiac-sign-job-selection?utm_source=Email&utm_medium=brief-FP&utm_campaign=dailyam&utm_content=2021-06-05&ats_es=639c4dfcf4902e5be56a6038ef508105
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/mach-30-wind-tunnel-propels-china-decades-ahead-global-hypersonic-race?utm_campaign=&utm_content=Zerohedge%3A+The+Durden+Dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_source=zh_newsletter
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/jun/11/pentagon-whistleblowers-troops-segregated-privileg/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=smlZRlOfI1mwDX6z0gvTKyuRc%2FkaCkQx6CFN%2FcbW8%2BsF1Sb9AO2Argl%2BTbG9aMhp&bt_ts=1623632065944
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President Biden is telling the world in Europe this week that “America is back” as the leader of global democracies. Sounds good. But China, Iran and Vladimir Putin would be more impressed if Mr. Biden wasn’t cutting America’s defense even as he rightly stresses the challenge from the world’s authoritarians.
Unremarked in the White House spending deluge is that its trillions for “infrastructure” include little new for defense. Mr. Biden’s $715 billion Pentagon budget for fiscal 2022 is a 1.6% increase over last year. Adjusted for inflation, this is a cut. The bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission and other experts say the Pentagon needs steady 3% to 5% real increases annually to address threats from “near peers” such as China and Russia.
President Trump increased defense spending modestly, but that fillip has passed and spending is still at its modern norm of about 3% of GDP. America is rapidly piling up debt past 100% of GDP while shrinking its defenses.
***
The brightest budget spots are places where the Administration declined to make matters worse: The Administration didn’t slash the Army; active-duty end strength holds at about 485,000. But the service requested about $3.5 billion less than last year’s enacted budget, in part due to a drawdown in Afghanistan.
The Biden Team also overruled progressive critics and asked to fund upgrades to an aging nuclear deterrent. The anachronism known as the “overseas contingency operations” fund will be folded in the normal budget, a more honest accounting.
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But nowhere is underinvestment clearer than in the stormy forecasts for the U.S.Navy. At roughly 300 ships the Navy soon won’t have the size or capability to compete with the more than 350-ship fleet China is minting. In April China reportedly commissioned three warships in a day.
The Navy’s 2022 proposal would hasten the retirement of two cruisers to save money. The Navy would procure eight ships; only four are combatants. The request for the shipbuilding account is down about 3% from last year’s level. The Navy is worried about readiness, particularly overworked carriers, and that a larger fleet won’t be properly manned or maintained, which are real concerns. But that is a case for more investment.
A consensus in Congress agrees the Navy should grow to 355 ships, but the officer briefing reporters on the defense budget conceded that with “a 300-ship navy and a 30-year life, you have to recapitalize at 10 per year and so eight is not going to do it.”
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The 355 number is not holy writ, and Pentagon press secretary John Kirby weighed in with the obvious that “a fleet of 355 tugboats” wouldn’t mean much for American defenses. But as many naval experts have noted, what a carrier and a frigate have in common is that they can only defend one sea at a time, and quantity has a quality all its own. There is a narrow window to turn around the decline. Building ships takes years, and the U.S. is deciding today the fleet the country will have if China provokes a maritime conflict in 10 or even 20 years.
The Biden team says it will “divest to invest,” or send about $2.8 billion in old stuff to the bone yard to free up dollars for more modern equipment. As ships and planes age, they become expensive and time consuming to maintain, draining readiness accounts. And the military does need to spend more on innovations like hypersonic missiles.
But new equipment seldom arrives on time or as promised. In any event, proposals like the Air Force plan to retire more than 40 workhorse A-10 bombers are unlikely to survive impact with Congress. The Biden Administration also undercuts its tut-tutting about “hard choices” on spending by marking $617 million for climate change. This money will inevitably be spent in ways that make the F-35 fighter program look cost-efficient.
***
The responsibility for these budget shortfalls doesn’t fall only on civilian leaders. The case for more resources is tougher to sell to the public when flag officers take shots at cable news hosts over the culture wars or promote progressive books about “anti-racism.” The brass need to be honest about actual threats rather than indulge in woke politics. It took a decade for the military to rebuild after the damage from Vietnam, and decline can come again as Hemingway described bankruptcy—gradually, then suddenly.
Congress will massage the Biden request, and members should level with the American public: A military that is large, modern and ready to fight is expensive. We’ll be the first to endorse military health-care changes or civil-service reform to reduce ballooning personnel costs.
But the choice America is facing is not whether to buy more ships instead of tanks. It is whether to defend itself adequately or pretend to do so while shrinking defense to fund an ever-growing social-welfare state. Adversaries can see the trend even if the White House would rather not acknowledge it.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/06/bidens-hair-should-be-fire-over-afghan-translators-being-left-behind-senator-says/174735/
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/06/20/socom-reinstates-diversity-inclusion-adviser-compared-trump-hitler/
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about 41 minutes
long but interesting:
https://omny.fm/shows/america-first-with-sebastian-gorka/the-subversion-of-the-us-military-victor-davis-han
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/06/20/socom-reinstates-diversity-inclusion-adviser-compared-trump-hitler/
https://michaelyon.locals.com/post/797555/godwins-law-and-general-mark-milley
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/06/20/socom-reinstates-diversity-inclusion-adviser-compared-trump-hitler/
https://michaelyon.locals.com/post/797555/godwins-law-and-general-mark-milley
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2021/06/27/the-decline-and-fall-of-americas-military-the-last-sacred-institution-is-collapsing/
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2021/06/20/socom-reinstates-diversity-inclusion-adviser-compared-trump-hitler/
https://michaelyon.locals.com/post/797555/godwins-law-and-general-mark-milley
https://www.theburningplatform.com/2021/06/27/the-decline-and-fall-of-americas-military-the-last-sacred-institution-is-collapsing/
https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2021/06/23/years-of-watching-general-mark-milley-finally-make-sense-the-chairman-of-the-joint-chiefs-is-a-political-operative/
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One last thing about small drones: For at least the past year, CENTCOM's Gen. Frank McKenzie has been sounding the alarm bells over the disruptive and dangerous threat from unmanned aerial systems and armed small drones—not that there are a whole lot of countermeasures widely available, as we've reviewed in our podcast as recently as this past October:
"The UAS threat, the small drone threat, the quadcopter less than the arms length of a human being, is what really probably concerns me the most in the theater," he told reporters April 22. "I would note, those things concern me greatly because our air defense system and our patriots and our other radars, they're very good at seeing the larger objects, be it ballistic missiles or be it larger land-attack cruise missiles or larger drones. The smaller drone is a problem, and [the] smaller drone is the future of warfare, and we need to get ahead of that right now."
"I argue all the time with my Air Force friends that the future of flight is vertical and it's unmanned, and I believe we are seeing it now," he said on June 10, 2020, at the Middle East Institute in Washington, D.C. "And I'm not talking about the large unmanned platforms which are the size of a conventional fighter jet that we can see and deal with as we would any other platform. I'm talking about one that you can go out and buy at Costco right now in the United States for a thousand dollars, you know a four-quad rotorcraft or something like that that can be launched and flown and with very simple modifications it can be made into something that can drop a weapon—a hand grenade or something else. Right now, the fact of the matter is we're on the wrong side of that equation."
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WSJ:
Is the U.S. Navy ready for war? A new report prepared by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, both retired, for members of Congress paints a portrait of the Navy as an institution adrift. The report, reviewed exclusively by the Journal, concludes that the surface Navy is not focused on preparing for war and is weathering a crisis in leadership and culture.
The impetus for the report was a series of recent catastrophes—a ship burning in San Diego last year; two destroyer collisions in the Pacific in 2017. Were these isolated events? Or did they indicate “larger institutional issues that are degrading the performance of the entire naval surface force”? The report surveyed active and recently retired service members of various ranks, conducting 77 candid hourlong interviews. A key finding: “Many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions” rather than core competencies of war.
“I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training,” said one recently retired senior enlisted leader. “I’m sorry that I can’t say the same of their ship-handling training.”
Adm. Montgomery told me in an interview over the weekend that when he was a junior officer in the 1980s there was “an intense focus” on a likely confrontation with the Soviet navy—learning about classes of ships or the missiles aboard. After decades without a peer adversary at sea, “the same focus is not permeating the Navy today.”
The Navy has improved its pipeline for surface-warfare officers since the 2017 collisions, reversing a 2003 money-saving mistake of training junior officers by giving them 23 compact discs loaded with reading material. But the Navy doesn’t spend the money and time training surface warfare officers that it does submariners or aviators, and has revamped training so many times, usually in an effort to spend even less money, that commanding officers are left with “inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms.”
Civilian Pentagon appointees of both parties have been poor stewards of the surface Navy’s capabilities. The report estimates that 20 ships a year are extended on deployment, and keeping them at sea creates “a host of problems.” The ship is late to postdeployment maintenance, which can mess up the yard’s schedule for work on other ships. Longer deployments tend to mean more repairs, and delays can cut into training time.
The report also details a deep culture of risk aversion: If the missiles start flying, will a destroyer captain be ready to make quick decisions and take calculated risks, even if his communications are jammed and he can’t reach his superiors?
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https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/079/309/430/original/dbb6f107f93aa399.png
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/079/309/430/original/dbb6f107f93aa399.png)
WSJ:
Is the U.S. Navy ready for war? A new report prepared by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, both retired, for members of Congress paints a portrait of the Navy as an institution adrift. The report, reviewed exclusively by the Journal, concludes that the surface Navy is not focused on preparing for war and is weathering a crisis in leadership and culture.
The impetus for the report was a series of recent catastrophes—a ship burning in San Diego last year; two destroyer collisions in the Pacific in 2017. Were these isolated events? Or did they indicate “larger institutional issues that are degrading the performance of the entire naval surface force”? The report surveyed active and recently retired service members of various ranks, conducting 77 candid hourlong interviews. A key finding: “Many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions” rather than core competencies of war.
“I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training,” said one recently retired senior enlisted leader. “I’m sorry that I can’t say the same of their ship-handling training.”
Adm. Montgomery told me in an interview over the weekend that when he was a junior officer in the 1980s there was “an intense focus” on a likely confrontation with the Soviet navy—learning about classes of ships or the missiles aboard. After decades without a peer adversary at sea, “the same focus is not permeating the Navy today.”
The Navy has improved its pipeline for surface-warfare officers since the 2017 collisions, reversing a 2003 money-saving mistake of training junior officers by giving them 23 compact discs loaded with reading material. But the Navy doesn’t spend the money and time training surface warfare officers that it does submariners or aviators, and has revamped training so many times, usually in an effort to spend even less money, that commanding officers are left with “inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms.”
Civilian Pentagon appointees of both parties have been poor stewards of the surface Navy’s capabilities. The report estimates that 20 ships a year are extended on deployment, and keeping them at sea creates “a host of problems.” The ship is late to postdeployment maintenance, which can mess up the yard’s schedule for work on other ships. Longer deployments tend to mean more repairs, and delays can cut into training time.
The report also details a deep culture of risk aversion: If the missiles start flying, will a destroyer captain be ready to make quick decisions and take calculated risks, even if his communications are jammed and he can’t reach his superiors?
-
https://www.9news.com.au/world/navy-says-its-charting-a-new-course-after-rash-of-problems/71506cd7-4f02-4dfb-b161-85109b28d636
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/079/309/430/original/dbb6f107f93aa399.png
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/079/309/430/original/dbb6f107f93aa399.png)
WSJ:
Is the U.S. Navy ready for war? A new report prepared by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, both retired, for members of Congress paints a portrait of the Navy as an institution adrift. The report, reviewed exclusively by the Journal, concludes that the surface Navy is not focused on preparing for war and is weathering a crisis in leadership and culture.
The impetus for the report was a series of recent catastrophes—a ship burning in San Diego last year; two destroyer collisions in the Pacific in 2017. Were these isolated events? Or did they indicate “larger institutional issues that are degrading the performance of the entire naval surface force”? The report surveyed active and recently retired service members of various ranks, conducting 77 candid hourlong interviews. A key finding: “Many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions” rather than core competencies of war.
“I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training,” said one recently retired senior enlisted leader. “I’m sorry that I can’t say the same of their ship-handling training.”
Adm. Montgomery told me in an interview over the weekend that when he was a junior officer in the 1980s there was “an intense focus” on a likely confrontation with the Soviet navy—learning about classes of ships or the missiles aboard. After decades without a peer adversary at sea, “the same focus is not permeating the Navy today.”
The Navy has improved its pipeline for surface-warfare officers since the 2017 collisions, reversing a 2003 money-saving mistake of training junior officers by giving them 23 compact discs loaded with reading material. But the Navy doesn’t spend the money and time training surface warfare officers that it does submariners or aviators, and has revamped training so many times, usually in an effort to spend even less money, that commanding officers are left with “inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms.”
Civilian Pentagon appointees of both parties have been poor stewards of the surface Navy’s capabilities. The report estimates that 20 ships a year are extended on deployment, and keeping them at sea creates “a host of problems.” The ship is late to postdeployment maintenance, which can mess up the yard’s schedule for work on other ships. Longer deployments tend to mean more repairs, and delays can cut into training time.
The report also details a deep culture of risk aversion: If the missiles start flying, will a destroyer captain be ready to make quick decisions and take calculated risks, even if his communications are jammed and he can’t reach his superiors?
-
https://cdrsalamander.blogspot.com/2021/07/culture-is-upstream-of-everything.html
https://www.9news.com.au/world/navy-says-its-charting-a-new-course-after-rash-of-problems/71506cd7-4f02-4dfb-b161-85109b28d636
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/079/309/430/original/dbb6f107f93aa399.png
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/079/309/430/original/dbb6f107f93aa399.png)
WSJ:
Is the U.S. Navy ready for war? A new report prepared by Marine Lt. Gen. Robert Schmidle and Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery, both retired, for members of Congress paints a portrait of the Navy as an institution adrift. The report, reviewed exclusively by the Journal, concludes that the surface Navy is not focused on preparing for war and is weathering a crisis in leadership and culture.
The impetus for the report was a series of recent catastrophes—a ship burning in San Diego last year; two destroyer collisions in the Pacific in 2017. Were these isolated events? Or did they indicate “larger institutional issues that are degrading the performance of the entire naval surface force”? The report surveyed active and recently retired service members of various ranks, conducting 77 candid hourlong interviews. A key finding: “Many sailors found their leadership distracted, captive to bureaucratic excess, and rewarded for the successful execution of administrative functions” rather than core competencies of war.
“I guarantee you every unit in the Navy is up to speed on their diversity training,” said one recently retired senior enlisted leader. “I’m sorry that I can’t say the same of their ship-handling training.”
Adm. Montgomery told me in an interview over the weekend that when he was a junior officer in the 1980s there was “an intense focus” on a likely confrontation with the Soviet navy—learning about classes of ships or the missiles aboard. After decades without a peer adversary at sea, “the same focus is not permeating the Navy today.”
The Navy has improved its pipeline for surface-warfare officers since the 2017 collisions, reversing a 2003 money-saving mistake of training junior officers by giving them 23 compact discs loaded with reading material. But the Navy doesn’t spend the money and time training surface warfare officers that it does submariners or aviators, and has revamped training so many times, usually in an effort to spend even less money, that commanding officers are left with “inconsistent, often ill-prepared wardrooms.”
Civilian Pentagon appointees of both parties have been poor stewards of the surface Navy’s capabilities. The report estimates that 20 ships a year are extended on deployment, and keeping them at sea creates “a host of problems.” The ship is late to postdeployment maintenance, which can mess up the yard’s schedule for work on other ships. Longer deployments tend to mean more repairs, and delays can cut into training time.
The report also details a deep culture of risk aversion: If the missiles start flying, will a destroyer captain be ready to make quick decisions and take calculated risks, even if his communications are jammed and he can’t reach his superiors?
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https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/2021/07/how-air-force-academy-makes-disloyal-military-daniel-greenfield/
Us.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/political/pentagon-reportedly-tracking-extremist-web-searches-including-truth-about-black-lives?utm_campaign=&utm_content=Zerohedge%3A+The+Durden+Dispatch&utm_medium=email&utm_source=zh_newsletter
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https://patriotpost.us/alexander/81499?mailing_id=6004&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.6004&utm_campaign=alexander&utm_content=body
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July 23, 2021
View On Website
Open as PDF
The Geopolitics of Heartbreak
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
The U.S. military presence in Afghanistan is winding down, just as it had in Iraq and Vietnam. There are always those who believe wars must be fought, and when they are fought, they are fought by those out in the shit, where lives are lived in the dirt and in the foul smells that feed the battlefield, from unclean bodies to exploded munitions. Later, these soldiers will speak of duty and honor, and they will mean it, but while in the shit, they usually think of the condition of their weapons, the likelihood of a warm meal, and the profound fear of death competing with the profound fear of fear itself.
The life of a soldier in combat is lived with a strange love for what has archaically been called brothers in arms, and if there is honor, it rests in the respect of those he loves and the urgent need not to think of that love or even express it. His brethren share everything with an intimacy even the best marriage can’t imagine. Everything belongs to everyone, from the last drop of water in your canteen to the last drop of your blood. And when a brother or sister dies, the feeling is one of not only loss but also shame. The fear is that there is something you could have done but didn’t do, or more bearably that it was a result of failure to be alert. In fact, death is simply something that happens in war. An artillery shell or a sniper round happened to hit home, and someone died accordingly. The soldier’s soul revolts at the thought that it is mere accident. If it were mere accident, then the death would have no meaning. There is a desire to believe that death can be defeated by vigilance and caring. This is untrue, but when a soldier’s friend dies, the soldier often feels responsible. They call it PTSD now, but this medical condition fails to capture its real name – heartbreak – made all the more agonizing because there’s no time to mourn in the heat of battle and little appetite among the public to let them mourn when they return to civilian life. The deployed must live a life in which loved ones – even the most unlovable – are their responsibility, their death, their shame.
Wars are waged from faraway headquarters often with shocking carelessness. The planners don’t know the enemy, and they don’t really know the terrain. They don’t know the smells that are endured, and they don’t know the name of the soldier who just died. This is as it should be. Presidents and generals cannot afford to love the men they send to war. They must treat war as impersonal, a balance sheet containing available artillery, airstrikes and the latest intelligence about the intention of the enemy.
Much of the balance sheet is wrong. The war is far away, and the soldiers who know the answers are too busy defending their unit. War is the sphere of uncertainty, and the farther from the battlefield you are, the more uncertain it is. The experts on war hold forth with power points. Those living wars understand that the reality is the unknown thing lurking behind the tree line.
The reality of Afghanistan was simple. Al-Qaida planned its attack on the United States from Afghanistan, so Afghanistan had to be attacked in order to destroy al-Qaida. After Washington failed to destroy the group, a second objective arose: to pacify Afghanistan and cleanse it of its radical Islamists so they would not threaten the United States again. The logic would have been impeccable had it been connected to reality. Radical Islam is the dominant religion of Afghanistan; cleansing Afghanistan of radical Islamists can’t happen. The Russians, British and countless others failed to, so why would the U.S. succeed? To war planners, the answer was probably air power or better intelligence or some other form of illusion. Thus, in clean rooms with lunch served on china and no tears shed, a tough mission that failed was replaced by an impossible mission that had to fail.
The United States also repeatedly failed to admit the obvious. There were good reasons to remain in Afghanistan: proving to the Muslim world that America would ruthlessly pursue its enemies, convincing allies that the U.S. would not cut and run, and so on. So the war went on, far beyond the point where anyone seriously thought the U.S. could achieve its goals. It went on because it was easier to continue the war than to end it.
And so a generation of American soldiers went to the shit with the pseudo-brave uncertainty that welcomes newcomers to the battlefield, to the sorrow that is its true meaning. Soldiers quickly learn that they want badly to leave, though they never admit as much to the soldiers they will come to depend on and then love in that strange and twisted way they have done since Troy and Jericho.
Eventually, reality sets in, and it is time to go. And then that realization comes to those who are in theater, and the remembrance of those who were there and the recollection of all that was lost strikes. It is not only those lost but also the youth of those who survived that was surrendered. The careless frivolity of the young is gone, and all that is left is a grim anger and an inability to live the life that others live.
The withdrawal from Afghanistan is necessary. Bringing over the translators to the United States is a moral obligation. Thinking of the Afghans who died innocently or fighting for their beliefs is needed. A thought should be given to the war planners who didn’t intend the war to end this way. It is easy to believe that you would have chosen differently under the same circumstances, when you never would face that moment. All of these things have to be remembered. But when the withdrawal was called, my thoughts were for the soldiers who fought in Afghanistan long after good reasons had evaporated. This was another war lost because it could never have been won. Do not mourn the geopolitics of failure; mourn what geopolitics has done to their souls. They have to live with their failures, real and imagined, and now with the thought that it was all for nothing.
The soldiers’ hearts will be broken less by war than by the peace that revealed the indifference with which their courage and brotherhood were used and discarded. To fight and be told defeat didn’t matter is heartbreaking. There is no redemption for them but love, but it is hard to love the brokenhearted.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/07/it-failed-miserably-after-wargaming-loss-joint-chiefs-are-overhauling-how-us-military-will-fight/184050/
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/07/it-failed-miserably-after-wargaming-loss-joint-chiefs-are-overhauling-how-us-military-will-fight/184050/
MOAR Trannies! Lower standards! Purge all the conservatives!
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https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2021/07/27/the-generals-new-clothes-transgender-policy-and-the-willful-demoralization-of-the-american-military-n2593166
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/08/hypersonic-missile-defense-may-depend-low-earth-orbit-satellites/184397/
Question: If the Chinese (or Russians) can blind/destroy the satellites, then what? Do we launch if they do so?
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/08/globe-spanning-exercises-puts-new-naval-concepts-test/184406/
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https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2021/08/16/our-military-is-a-woke-joke-n2594151
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/08/27/marine-commander-relieved-of-duties-after-demanding-accountability-from-military-leaders-in-viral-video/
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https://rumble.com/vlrxsa-our-department-of-defense-is-failing-americans.html
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second
https://web.archive.org/web/20201228223247/https://www.nationalsecurityleaders4biden.com/
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From nine years ago
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/general-failure/309148/?fbclid=IwAR1GioD2Ih6XsZ3QGRz5dQlkEZk6BjRn8K5cp8sggKSltUAxZNpCm8QXp8k
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https://starvingthemonkeys.com/2021/08/30/wet-paper-tiger/
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Painful to read.
I would add that it makes the point about our capabilities being a Maginot Line far, far more eloquently and knowledgeably that I ever have here.
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China tests new missiles in simulated Taiwan hit
U.S. suspects use of hypersonic weapons
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China’s recent test of reported new missiles appears to have been a simulated attack on a Taiwanese airfield and a possible test launch of a new hypersonic weapon, according to a U.S. Air Force research center analysis.
The missiles were launched Aug. 13 from a training site in Jilantai in western China and traveled 870 miles west before hitting two targets in an airfield.
“This missile launch event almost certainly featured a new system of some kind and indicates that the [People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force] has modernized yet another missile brigade with a Taiwan-centric mission set,” states an open-source analysis by the China Aerospace Studies Institute, a think tank at the Air Force’s Air University in Alabama.
The report concludes that China’s official accounts of the missile tests were intended for deterrence and amounted to little more than an “overblown show put on by the PLA.” Beijing has stepped up its intimidation campaign against the island democracy in recent months. Officials say Taiwan is an integral part of China and eventually must be reunited with the mainland.
Chinese state media described the missile tests as the firings of two “new-type missiles.” Reporting on the tests triggered a large trending response on Chinese social media. The Chinese reports identified the two missiles as short-range DF-15s from the 613 Brigade that are deployed within range of Taiwan in the hundreds.
However, the Pentagon lists the range for the DF-15 as 500 miles, suggesting an extended-range version of the missile or a
possible hypersonic missile test disguised as a short-range test.
The report said the longerrange flight means the missiles are unlikely to be standard shortrange weapons currently in the Chinese rocket forces’ inventory.
The range difference between DF-15 and the 870-mile flight could indicate that the Chinese military has equipped its former DF-15 force with longer-range DF-21 or DF-26 missiles, or CJ-10 cruise missiles. Alternatively, the tests could reveal that the 613 Brigade is now armed with DF-17 hypersonic missiles. These missiles are designed to evade advanced missile defenses by traveling more than five times the speed of sound.
“Previous assessed DF-17 test launches have demonstrated a range of at least [870 miles], which is commensurate with the assessed flight path” of the Aug. 13 launch, the Air Force report said. “These systems are also relatively new to the [Chinese rocket force] and would fit the definition of a ‘new-type missile.’” A third option is that the two missiles are an entirely new class not observed before. However, China’s military in the past has not deployed new missiles into its forces in that way.
China also may have extended the range of the DF-15 to about 870 miles. The report said that is unlikely unless the missiles contained a “glide vehicle” like that used on the DF-17 hypersonic missile.
The report said additional data is needed to determine which new missile was tested.
“The implication remains that 613 Brigade may now field a missile system that has a substantially longer range than the DF-15s with which it is currently equipped,” the report said.
Chinese state media also said the missile features a new warhead that is hardened against jamming and thus can attack defended information systems. China’s military defines jamming broadly; thus, the new warheads could include electro-optical, infrared or radar-based guidance capable of defeating jammers.
Military writings by officials linked to the 613 Brigade have said some warheads the unit uses are radar-guided.
Commercial satellite images showed that the missile tests did not demonstrate improved warhead accuracy or increased explosive power.
According to the U.S. analysis, China’s military frequently uses advanced weapons tests and military exercises to deter or coerce adversaries.
“With each deterrent activity, the PLA emphasizes the need for there to be some real capability behind the activity, demonstrated resolve, and for the information on the activity to be transmitted to the adversary’s population,” said the report, noting that state-run media report in both Chinese and English. “In this instance, there is some limited capability behind the activity, in that the weapon system in question is real and marginally improves the [rocket force’s] overall capabilities.”
China tested the missiles while stepping up provocations against Taiwan. Near-daily incursions of Taiwanese airspace have included flights of nuclearcapable bombers.
The Jilantai missile training site is also the location of China’s large-scale expansion of nuclear missile forces, where several hundred silos for DF-41 long-range missiles are being built. It is one of three new missile fields for as many as 350 new DF-41s.
Rick Fisher, a China military affairs expert, said the analysis by the China Aerospace Studies Institute indicates that China has an extended-range version of DF-15 or is getting ready for a short-range missile to replace it.
“The DF-15B arsenal, introduced about 2007, could be ending its service life, causing the PLA to exercise with them more and to find ways to exploit them for propaganda impact,” said Mr. Fisher, now an analyst with the International Assessment and Strategy Center.
“This may also indicate a replacement missile is on the way,” he said. “Both the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corp. and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corp. have developed modular second-generation [short-range ballistic missiles] that could vastly increase the number of missiles aimed at Taiwan.”
China has more than 1,200 DF15s and DF-16 short-range missiles deployed within range of Taiwan, whose main island is just 100 miles off the Chinese coastline.
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1032825/afghans-could-become-britains-new-gurkhas
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https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2021/09/incompetent-woke-military-three-star-general-posts-photo-thinks-u-s-troops-leaving-afghanistan-turns-british/
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https://edmarsh.substack.com/p/the-chimera-of-ethical-probity-in
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Forget where I found this, hope I am not duplicating it. Very strong analysis of naval issues.
https://starvingthemonkeys.com/2021/08/30/wet-paper-tiger/
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Forget where I found this, hope I am not duplicating it. Very strong analysis of naval issues.
https://starvingthemonkeys.com/2021/08/30/wet-paper-tiger/
#912
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https://nypost.com/2021/09/07/us-troops-rage-at-their-leaders-will-grow-unless-theres-deep-reform/
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Indeed.
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1034704/americans-abandoned-by-us-government-incl-generals-admirals
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second
https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/09/how-equipment-left-afghanistan-will-expose-us-secrets/185264/
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https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/israel-and-us-develop-new-arrow-4-missile-defeat-hypersonic-weapons-192669?fbclid=IwAR0NAlaSPebQp0vPp8WNBYMs2W_WUXh8I3f5njZgAmcsAlfo8agpTK6bKs8
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https://thefederalist.com/2021/09/10/biden-administration-orders-ideological-purge-of-u-s-military-academies/
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/09/how-equipment-left-afghanistan-will-expose-us-secrets/185264/
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https://www.defenseone.com/business/2021/09/five-ways-911-changed-defense-industry/185347/
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https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2021/08/20/this-navy-captain-is-now-the-first-woman-commanding-a-nuclear-aircraft-carrier/
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Oqa6liGT1aI&t=13s
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/09/hypersonics-test-shows-us-catching-new-missile-race/185759/
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/10/us-army-scrutinizing-itself-must-change-swiftly-face-china-secretary-says/186009/
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"US Army Is Scrutinizing Itself, Must Change Swiftly to Face China, Secretary Says"
funny .
if one of us was in charge this would have been done 20 yrs ago
glad to see our leaders have now seen what has been obvious to people who read the or watch the news for decades.
will any of these people admit "Trump was right all along"
:roll:
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Yes, doesn't it seem that nothing they have done since inauguration is about winning wars or deterring adversaries. Sure enough, China is emboldened and now real war is foreseeable.
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The looming national defense crisis no one is talking about T
here is no lack of U.S. national defense challenges.
China continues to modernize and expand its military, routinely using its burgeoning might to intimidate its neighbors — most recently with massive aircraft incursions into Taiwan’s air defense zone.
Meanwhile, President Biden has proposed a defense budget that doesn’t even keep pace with inflation and cuts the military by 5,000 people.
Analysts worry the U.S. is falling behind in such key military technologies as hypersonic missiles, quantum computing and artificial intelligence. Additionally, the disastrous departure from Afghanistan has raised concerns that the country may once more become a hothouse for global terrorism.
But the biggest challenge might be the one that nobody is talking about: The Pentagon’s difficulty in attracting enough qualified volunteers to serve in the armed forces.
If you thought it would be easy for a nation of 330 million people to attract 160,000 volunteers annually, you would be wrong.
The Army missed its recruiting goal in 2018 and has since struggled, and other services are experiencing difficulties too. And odds are that recruiting will get even more difficult in the coming years, to the point where the military may consistently fail to meet its goals.
To get a sense of future recruiting difficulty, analysts look at trends pertaining to demographics, the economy, disqualifying factors, veteran influence, future value of incentives and the public’s view of military service.
Spoiler alert: Every one of these indicators is either trending negatively or remains stagnant.
The key age bracket for recruits — 18-24 years old — is projected to remain constant, hovering around 31 million through 2040, while the overall U.S. population grows, mostly in older age segments. As America ages, the opportunities for young people will make military service less attractive.
Increased unemployment normally leads to greater recruiting success, but economists forecast a gradual return to historic low unemployment, offering no relief for recruiting efforts.
Exposure to veterans has been linked to a greater propensity for individuals to volunteer, but the number of veterans in the U.S. population is projected to decrease by 1.7% per year, declining 17% from now to 2030.
As for disqualifying factors, youth obesity is projected to hit 24.2% by 2030, and the mental illness rate among youth hit 26.3% in 2018 and is expected to climb further. This further diminishes the pool of individuals qualified to serve in the military.
But there’s more.
The public’s confidence in the military — usually very high — has been slipping, dropping nine percentage points in the last decade. The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan will probably accelerate that trend.
Every year, more high school students go directly to college. Assuming that trend continues, fewer individuals will be available to join the military after high school.
Finally, one of the main incentives used to motivate individuals to join the military, the GI Bill, which provides tuition for college, will be diminished in value if progressives in Congress get their wishes to make community college free and to forgive student debt.
Thus far, the Defense Department has chosen to view this issue through a narrow year-to-year lens, furiously manipulating bonuses, incentive programs, and the number of recruiters to achieve annual goals while failing to recognize the problem is getting harder each year.
Further, because each military service is expected to solve, on its own, what is legitimately an all-service, national problem, progress is slow and fragmented.
Fortunately, there are solutions if America approaches this issue seriously. By acting to reverse trends that are disqualifying youth from serving, reimagining existing recruiting tools, and engaging America’s youth earlier and in a more comprehensive manner, we can avoid this problem and preserve America’s national security.
Congress and the executive branch can choose to do nothing and wait till this is a full-blown crisis, or they can begin now to prepare America for what promises to be an increasingly dangerous and challenging future.
• A retired Army lieutenant general, Thomas W. Spoehr is the director of The Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense.
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second post
General Milley must go
He acts more like a politician than general
By James S. Gilmore III
The recent investigations and hearings surrounding the activities of General Mark Milley, including his testimony before the Senate and House Armed Service Committees, make it clear that Gen. Milley must resign or be removed from his office as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. One of the most inviolate rules of our American republic is that the military of the United States will not participate in the politics of our country. Since the beginnings of our republic, the U.S. military has been subordinated to civilian authority. This is how America addresses the simple reality that a coup d’etat is possible only with the initiative or complicity of the military. History is replete with examples of military take-overs by military leaders who believe only they can protect their country from internal threats. The American military defends our country. It is also the only institution that can extinguish our republic.
Gen. Milley has behaved persistently as a frustrated politician in uniform, going beyond his role as advisor to the President in military matters. He has expressed himself on political issues in numerous private meetings, book interviews, and public discussions. He has opined that his Commander in Chief, the elected President of the United States, might misuse his powers to attack Iran. The rising nuclear power of Iran and what to do about it is the business of elected and duly appointed civilian officials. The military ascribing improper motives to elected officials is exactly what Americans should not tolerate. Civil war history has become a political debate in America today. Gen. Milley has chosen to engage in this discussion. He identifi es “white rage” in America and states a need to address it in our military. Gen. Milley entered into this discussion, urging the creation of a commission to change the names of military bases while contradicting his commander in chief. Gen. Milley at the time recognized the nature of this issue when he said: “I personally think the original decision to name bases after Confederate Generals were political decisions, and they’re going to be political decisions today.” Indeed he is right. This debate is political.
On the subject of the January 6 protests in Washington, D.C., Gen. Milley engaged in that discussion, claiming that the protests amounted to a “Reichstag moment,” harkening back to Hitler’s imposition of dictatorial authority in 1933. He described the protests as “The gospel of the Fuhrer.” He equated protesters with “brownshirts in the streets.” In a meeting, he said, ‘We’re going to “put a ring of steel around this city, and the Nazis aren’t getting in.” Gen. Milley should remember the United States law of Posse Comitatus, which prohibits the use of the regular military in domestic settings unless called upon under strict circumstances by the elected President of the United States or at the request of an elected Governor of a state.
Gen. Milley also confronted Presidential Chief of Staff Mark Meadows and questioned the motives of our elected officials. When Mr. Meadows suggested he not worry about such fantasies, the General told Meadows “just be careful,” which could be taken as a warning if not an implied threat. This is not proper coming from a man who purports to speak for our country’s military power. As Gen. Milley said in a meeting, “we have the guns.” Indeed they do.
Speaker Nancy Pelosi called Gen. Milley and sought to intervene in the military chain of command. Speaker Pelosi described the commander in chief as “crazy.” Gen. Milley should have reminded Speaker Pelosi of the constitutional provisions to address her opinions instead of giving her reassurances. Gen. Milley made no secret of his political leanings when he spoke to former first lady Michelle Obama at President Biden’s inauguration and told her “no one has a bigger smile today than I do.”
Much has been made of Gen. Milley advising the President that he should not completely withdraw from Afghanistan. This confirms that the blame for the Afghanistan catastrophe is directly on the shoulders of President Biden. Gen. Milley has explained his call to his Chinese military counterpart. He asserts that his call was at the direction of civilian authority. None of this is objectionable, except that he is contradicted by former Acting Secretary of Defense Christopher Miller and by former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, both of whom stated that Gen. Milley never briefed them on the call as he said he did. All of this is a distraction from the main point. Gen. Milley has repeatedly and persistently engaged in the politics of this nation while in uniform. One might even agree with the political positions he has taken while still believing he should not be engaging in politics in the first place. Another General may come along tomorrow who might likewise think he and the military are the only saviors of the republic. Maybe the next General won’t be so wise and just as General Milley. The damage has been done. The precedent has been established. Maintaining Gen. Milley in his office is a bad object lesson for every present and future commissioned offi cer. We must start on the road to restoring the principle of military-political separation.
President Truman acted decisively and discharged General Douglas McArthur when he believed Gen. McArthur did not respect civilian authority. President Biden should have done the same with Gen. Milley. Failure to dismiss Gen. Milley is a failure of presidential leadership.
Either by resignation or removal, Gen. Milley must go.
James S. Gilmore III is the immediate past U.S. Ambassador to the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe and was the 68th Governor of Virginia.
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https://www.resilience.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/2208493/celebrating-diversity-june-is-lgbtq-pride-month/
Who wants to join a fake, gay military that can’t win wars?
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we could send a division of gays lesbians trans other genders
to fight the Iranians
they would run in terror? :-P
this gives the phrase "gender warriors " new meaning
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we could send a division of gays lesbians trans other genders
to fight the Iranians
they would run in terror? :-P
this gives the phrase "gender warriors " new meaning
The US military is now a global joke.
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1173762/far-more-active-soldiers-committing-suicide-than-dying-with-ccp-bioweapon-virus
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1173762/far-more-active-soldiers-committing-suicide-than-dying-with-ccp-bioweapon-virus
If Biden and his handlers were working for Beijing, what would be different than what we are seeing now?
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https://www.reuters.com/world/china-surprises-us-with-hypersonic-missile-test-ft-reports-2021-10-17/?fbclid=IwAR1DE8qk1Zsfz4TR3ni2uQMWXwv1AnA_PrvuMZFRIzaBub7MaY2fe52Y2_s
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I am thinking the CCP has orders in for
~. 40
https://worldpopulationreview.com/country-rankings/aircraft-carriers-by-country
most advance carrier cost:
https://news.yahoo.com/true-cost-most-advanced-aircraft-213707136.html
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https://www.reuters.com/world/china-surprises-us-with-hypersonic-missile-test-ft-reports-2021-10-17/?fbclid=IwAR1DE8qk1Zsfz4TR3ni2uQMWXwv1AnA_PrvuMZFRIzaBub7MaY2fe52Y2_s
Our generals have much better taste in nails!
https://pjmedia.com/instapundit/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/sean_davis_jo_clyborne_manicure_10-17-2021.jpg
(https://pjmedia.com/instapundit/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/sean_davis_jo_clyborne_manicure_10-17-2021.jpg)
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https://www.innovationhub-act.org/sites/default/files/2021-01/20210122_CW%20Final.pdf
HAVE NOT READ THE NEXT TWO YET BUT AM TOLD THEY ARE IN A SIMILAR VEIN posting them now so as to have the URLs here for my reference
https://thegrayzone.com/2021/10/08/nato-cognitive-warfare-brain/
https://www.innovationhub-act.org/content/cw-documents
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https://www.heritage.org/military-strength/executive-summary
Woke and broken.
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/25/china-launches-suspected-anti-satellite-weapon/
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/25/china-launches-suspected-anti-satellite-weapon/
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2021/09/house-democrats-introduce-bill-to-abolish-the-space-force/
We can't fight China until we destroy the enemy within.
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just another faux fear play by the military industrial complex:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/real-reason-pentagon-sounding-alarm-194138685.html
we can sleep well
[because we have ICBMs]
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So, what do we think of the article's hypothesis?
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/10/28/enemies-foreign-and-domestic/
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good article
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Navy weakens as China, Russia bolster fleets
U.S. urged to accelerate growth, modernization
BY MIKE GLENN THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China and Russia have dramatically accelerated their naval shipbuilding and modernization programs in recent years while the U.S. has struggled to improve its capacity for war-fighting missions and been tagged with a poor readiness rating from national security analysts.
The Chinese have made particularly notable strides. Their maritime buildup made global headlines a year ago when Pentagon officials sounded the alarm that Beijing’s total fleet of about 350 warships had surpassed the roughly 300 maintained by Washington.
The American force still vastly outstrips China’s in terms of power projection. The U.S. has 11 active aircraft carriers, and China has brought just two online since 2012.
The Chinese Communist Party, however, makes no secret of its goal to build a “world-class” military by 2050. U.S. analysts are increasingly wary that Washington will struggle to keep pace with China’s rapidly expanding shipbuilding operations.
“They’ve got a lot of shipyards and a lot of capacity,” said Brent Sadler, a retired U.S. naval officer and analyst with the Heritage Foundation. “They’re building lots of ships.”
Mr. Sadler authored the U.S. Navy section of The Heritage Foundation’s 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength, an analysis updated annually.
For the second year in a row, the index gave the
U.S. sea service overall scores of “marginal” and “trending toward weak,” with a specific naval capacity score of “weak.”
“A battle force consisting of 400 manned ships is required for the U.S. Navy to do what is expected of it today,” the index concluded. “The Navy’s current battle force fleet of 297 ships and intensified operational tempo combine to reveal a Navy that is much too small relative to its tasks.”
With regard to capability, the index said the Navy’s technological edge is “narrow[ing] against peer competitors China and Russia.”
“The combination of a fleet that is aging faster than old ships are being replaced and the rapid growth of competitor navies with modern technologies does not bode well for U.S. naval power,” the index said.
Mr. Sadler told The Washington Times that a lack of ships is the most obvious reason for the poor rating. He suggested that the U.S. can reverse downward trends in capacity and capability, but not without costs.
“If you put the demand out to build more ships quicker, that will force capital investment in the shipyards to have a larger workforce and a larger capacity, which we will need,” Mr. Sadler said. “If you don’t have enough ships, you overwork your crews.”
Although debates about Pentagon budgets are already biting, the bottom line, Mr. Sadler said, is that U.S. political leaders need to get serious about “making significant investments” in Navy capacity over the coming years.
The 2022 Index of U.S. Military Strength put it more bluntly. “Depending on the Navy’s ability to fund more aggressive growth options and service life extensions, its capacity score could be lower in the next edition,” Mr. Sadler wrote in the index.
A Navy spokesman declined to comment on specifics of The Heritage Foundation analysis, although Pentagon offi cials have acknowledged that funding is the obvious problem.
During an Oct. 27 online briefing sponsored by the Navy League, Rear Adm. John Gumbleton, deputy assistant Navy secretary for budget, said officials are juggling multiple issues on the budget and modernization.
He said the development of Columbia-class ballistic missile submarines is soaking up research dollars. At the same time, he added, officials are trying to prioritize investments in a next-generation, large surface combatant ship while recapitalizing century-old dry dock facilities.
“All these are Navy challenges and our cross to bear, so to speak,” Adm. Gumbleton said. “But in a capital-intensive service where you’re trying to keep production of destroyers, frigates and aircraft carriers, it just speaks to the enormous challenge of trying to do this in a smart fashion.”
Republicans have said the Biden administration’s $753 billion request for the Pentagon’s fiscal 2022 budget is inadequate in the face of growing threats from China and Russia. Although the figure represents an increase from the Trump administration’s last defense budget of $740 billion, Republican lawmakers said it amounts to a cut when accounting for inflation.
Concern about the Navy budget has been bipartisan in the Democratic-controlled House. In September, the House Armed Services Committee secured a $24 billion increase to the Navy’s $163 billion budget.
“The president’s defense budget fails to adequately address the rising threats of China, Iran and Russia, and I will not hesitate to break with my party if it’s in the best interest of our national security,” said Rep. Elaine Luria, Virginia Democrat and retired naval officer.
The Heritage Foundation index, meanwhile, outlined how the Navy’s challenges are not merely tied to matching potential adversaries ship for ship.
At the height of the Cold War in the 1980s, the Navy had nearly 600 ships and kept about 100 deployed. By July this year, the fleet had dwindled to 297 warships, of which 83 were at sea or otherwise deployed, according to the index.
“The commanding officer’s discretionary time for training and crew familiarization is a precious commodity that is made ever scarcer by the increasing operational demands on fewer ships,” the index said.
Mr. Sadler said that reality adds strain to the entire service and increases the risk of mishaps.
In 2017, the USS John S. McCain and the USS Fitzgerald were involved in collisions that resulted in the deaths of 17 sailors. Investigators said a lack of adequate seamanship and navigation skills played critical roles in both incidents.
The Heritage Foundation index said the incidents highlighted the importance of unit readiness and what can happen when combatant commanders focus more on immediate demands.
“If you don’t have enough ships and you don’t give the commanding officer enough [time] to get the crews proficient on fighting the ship, you have problems like the Fitzgerald and the McCain,” Mr. Sadler told The Times. “You need more numbers — not just to meet some potential war with the Chinese and the Russians — but also [to] provide commanders with enough discretionary time so they can go out, qualify their sailors and officers, and practice together.”
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second post
MILITARY
Navy Memorial statue will honor faithful war dogs
BY SEAN SALAI THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The U.S. Navy Memorial will unveil a sculpture on Veterans Day in honor of war dogs, the first of its kind in the nation’s capital.
The statue will join permanent exhibits at the memorial’s visitors center in recognition of all “men and women of the sea services” and “the canines who fought and died for our country,” sculptor Susan Bahary told The Washington Times.
“Let’s face it: They are part of the military as well,” Ms. Bahary said.
The bronze statue depicts Navy sailor John Douangdara and his Belgian Malinois, Bart. Both died in Afghanistan when Taliban fighters shot down their helicopter in August 2011. The attack killed all 29 service members aboard, including 17 Navy SEALs. Modeled on a photograph taken in Afghanistan, the larger-than-life statue depicts the sailor seated with his right hand holding a gun and his left hand on the dog.
Douangdara, the lead dog handler for Seal Team 6, had prepared Bart as a “force multiplier” to assist with a rescue operation on the day they died.
“The Navy Memorial is proud that we will host the statue honoring Petty Officer Douangdara and Military Working Dog Bart, both of whom gave their lives for the United States,” said retired Rear Adm. Frank Thorp, president and CEO of the memorial, which is near the National Mall on Pennsylvania Avenue Northwest between Seventh and Ninth streets.
Ms. Bahary designed the nation’s first official war dog memorial, a life-sized bronze statue of a Doberman titled “Always Faithful.” That statue was
unveiled at the Pentagon and installed in the National War Dog Cemetery at Naval Base Guam in 1994.
The U.S. War Dogs Association commissioned Ms. Bahary last year to create the statue of Douangdara and Bart.
Chris Willingham, the president of the nonprofit association, said the petty officer and his dog died “three months after Osama bin Laden was killed, during a dangerous time in Afghanistan.”
“There were several candidates worthy of recognition and honor, but John and Bart just kept coming up. You have to be at the top of your game as a well-developed dog team to work with SEALs,” he said.
Mr. Willingham, who worked with a war dog during his 20 years in the Marine Corps, said the statue complements the association’s work of covering prescription medications for 1,100 retired war dogs.
Ms. Bahary, who lives in the San Francisco Bay Area, has sculpted animals for 30 years. She said it took about a year to finish the Navy Memorial statue.
The Belgian Malinois, similar to the German shepherd, is the most common breed in the U.S. military because of its ability to “go into small places and carry complex equipment with cameras and radio devices,” she said.
“They are just very eager to work, a little lighter than a German shepherd, easier to carry and a little faster. They can do things with their keen sense of smell, hearing, size and agility to get ahold of the enemy and save lives in the process,” she said.
War dogs rarely get publicity when they die on the battlefield or “retire” from the military and join adoptive families.
“We’re trying to get official medals for the dogs, but that has not happened yet,” Ms. Bahary said.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/11/marine-corps-seeks-fundamental-redesign-recruiting-retention-careers/186600/
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2021/11/marine-corps-seeks-fundamental-redesign-recruiting-retention-careers/186600/
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10159949/Royal-Marines-commandos-force-troops-humiliating-surrender-training-exercise.html
Must not have enough trannies.
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/11/whos-blame-navy-reviewing-investigation-grounded-sub-secretary-says/186628/
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/11/whos-blame-navy-reviewing-investigation-grounded-sub-secretary-says/186628/
Systemic racism was the cause!
And white rage!
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https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2021/11/iranian-gunboats-point-machine-guns-swarm-us-warship-ln-sea-oman-video/?utm_source=Gab&utm_campaign=websitesharingbuttons
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2021/11/03/navy-faces-prospect-that-sub-crash-will-force-uss-connecticut-out-of-service/?sh=1f3628ec4f3c
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59196462
does the bow have a figure head of an erect male genital?
how does robert kennedy fit in - he along with his brothers were serial women abusers.
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https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59196462
does the bow have a figure head of an erect male genital?
how does robert kennedy fit in - he along with his brothers were serial women abusers.
The really smart people will be perplexed why enlistment rates plummeted.
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www.huffpost.com/entry/harvey-milk-stamp-matt-barber-_n_4117311/amp
Remember, a cabal of rich and powerful child predators is just an Alex Jones fever dream!
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-59196462
does the bow have a figure head of an erect male genital?
how does robert kennedy fit in - he along with his brothers were serial women abusers.
The really smart people will be perplexed why enlistment rates plummeted.
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"the really smart people will be perplexed why enlistment rates plummeted."
what a source of American pride to serve you country on a ship named after a person solely because he was homosexual
is one of the ships named after George Floyd
how about the USS Joe Biden or USS Kamala Harris being next
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"the really smart people will be perplexed why enlistment rates plummeted."
what a source of American pride to serve you country on a ship named after a person solely because he was homosexual
is one of the ships named after George Floyd
how about the USS Joe Biden or USS Kamala Harris being next
I’m sure Floyd is next
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https://jonestown.sdsu.edu/?page_id=16566
USS The People’s Temple ?
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https://www.hqmc.marines.mil/News/News-Article-Display/Article/552966/uss-jason-dunham-commissioned-legacy-lives-on/
Now we name ships after creeps that jump on teenage boys.
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/089/921/396/original/9d297ffad5cdae23.jpeg
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/089/921/396/original/9d297ffad5cdae23.jpeg)
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https://www.freethink.com/technology/laser-gun?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=BigThinkScience&fbclid=IwAR0t3XqthOzInoW0Eq-OfZUN6agPoWsvmPLG0dKwvwFqxrIi6XqLegxU5BY
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https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dsei/2019/09/12/the-us-navy-says-its-doing-its-best-to-avoid-a-terminator-scenario-in-its-quest-for-autonomous-weapons/?fbclid=IwAR1V-LSyc4X2WjZMNr-Xqv6K-7TK14DXY76dGq4zg27wGKLtW7OX_HMchFA
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I am sure the US military has impressive recruitment videos, but the examples in the article are weak. The fact that they exist might be worrisome ?.
https://www.zerohedge.com/military/poll-finds-public-confidence-woke-military-free-fall
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A U.S. Navy sailor runs across the flight deck of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt in the Philippine Sea, May 22, 2020.
PHOTO: MCS ERIK MELGAR/U.S. NAVY/ZUMA PRESS
The House passed the annual National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) this week, 363-70, and the press is focusing on cultural issues like tweaks to the military’s justice system and the defeated proposal to draft women. But the bigger story is that Congress delivered a bipartisan rebuke to the utterly unrealistic defense budget the Biden Administration released earlier this year.
President Biden in May proposed $715 billion for the Department of Defense in 2022. That was a 1.6% increase from 2021, an inflation-adjusted cut to America’s national security in a world of growing threats. The $740 billion NDAA passed by the House and likely headed to the President’s desk authorizes a 5.2% increase.
The NDAA followed the White House proposal on military pay, authorizing a 2.7% increase for soldiers, sailors, airmen and other Pentagon employees. That means much of Congress’s $25 billion plus-up goes to more and better weaponry, especially for the Navy.
The House bill authorizes 13 new ships, up from the Biden budget’s request for eight. That includes three destroyers, compared to one sought by the Pentagon. The bill also invests $330 million in U.S. submarine-building capacity in the hopes of accelerating production to three attack subs per year.
America’s military advantage is declining, especially in East Asia, and House lawmakers earmarked $7.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. That’s $2 billion more than Mr. Biden sought. The Pentagon should use the funds to put hardware in the Pacific such as long-range missiles that can alter China’s calculus now, rather than investing in weapons systems that may not arrive for decades.
Full funding for these programs still depends on a separate appropriations bill. And the increase is a pittance compared to this Congress’s multi-trillion domestic spending tear. To maintain its military edge against great-power rivals, the Pentagon likely needs 3% to 5% annual above-inflation increases.
Yet the 2022 authorization at least reflects a growing bipartisan acknowledgment of geopolitical reality. China and Russia are threatening shooting wars against their U.S.-aligned neighbors, and Iran is accelerating its bid for nuclear weapons, as international institutions flail and weaken.
For the President to propose shrinking American defense in those circumstances was astonishing. This week’s House vote suggests the American public is not prepared to abandon its global interests, especially in Asia, as easily as the White House thought and the world’s rogues hoped.
Joe Biden came to office promising he'd take a tough stance with Vladimir Putin, but his foreign policy decisions to date haven't deterred Russia amassing thousands of troops in readiness to invade Ukraine. Images: Getty Images/Maxar Composite: Mark Kelly
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/12/14/biden-nominee-for-vice-chairman-of-joint-chiefs-supports-gender-advisers-for-military/
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"We are so fuct"
yup
the company I work for has gone full "woke"
not clear what that has to do with delivery of healthy care
they use it as marketing gimmick
though some are "true believers"
terms such as racism , transgenderism, gender choice (very scientific indeed - what the heck)
inclusiveness, gay issues, George Floyd are constantly being brought up .
Admittedly, I dare not speak up or suggest I ain't woke or think the whole thing a farce . I like my job.
Company otherwise has been great .
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/12/how-loitering-munitions-can-help-counter-china/359975/
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2021/12/click-get-punished-under-pentagons-new-anti-extremism-policy/359999/
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/12/22/the-poison-fruits-of-identity-politics-in-the-military/
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Crypto has been many things in its short history. 2021 was the year it became part of the mainstream.
Elon Musk tweeted about it, often. It was parodied on “Saturday Night Live.” Collins Dictionary dubbed “NFT,” the acronym for nonfungible tokens, its word of the year.
July 2021
Dec.
-25
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Bitcoin
CoinbaseGlobal
Institutional investors looked for ways to get in, and the first bitcoin ETF started trading. Individual traders bought crypto on their phones when they weren’t snapping up GameStop Corp. GME -1.21%
About 16% of the U.S. population holds or has held cryptocurrencies, according to Pew Research Center. In 2015, Pew found that only 1% of Americans held or had held cryptocurrencies. The number of people holding cryptocurrencies globally doubled this year to about 220 million, according to crypto.com.
Crypto prices remained as volatile as ever. From January to April, the price of bitcoin doubled. From April to July, it fell more than 50%. It doubled again a few months later, hitting a record of nearly $70,000 in November. It is now trading around $50,000, still up some 70% from its price of roughly $29,000 at the start of the year.
In percentage terms, bitcoin’s gains actually represent one of its weaker years. In 2020, the digital currency rose more than 300%. In dollar terms, however, 2021 was by far the cryptocurrency’s biggest year.
Coinbase Global, which operates the second-largest crypto exchange, went public in April.
PHOTO: MICHAEL NAGLE/BLOOMBERG NEWS
The total value of cryptocurrencies more than tripled at its peak this year, rising to as high as $2.98 trillion from less than $1 trillion in January, according to CoinMarketCap. (It has fallen to about $2.4 trillion recently.)
Coinbase Global Inc. , which operates the second-largest crypto exchange, went public with much fanfare in April. It became the most prominent in a crop of publicly traded crypto-focused companies, including Galaxy Digital Holdings Ltd. , Marathon Digital Holdings Inc. and Riot Blockchain Inc.
Ethereum
Bitcoin
S&P 500
2021
Dec.
-100
0
100
200
300
400
500
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%
Coinbase’s stock, however, has been as volatile as the assets that trade on its exchange. After closing at a high of $357.39 in November, it closed Thursday at $268.15, down 25% from that record.
Two notable new uses of crypto technology drove up interest in crypto.
The first was NFTs, which are digital tokens like bitcoin but different in that each one is unique. The artist Beeple caught the art world’s attention with the $69 million sale of a digital image and associated NFT in March. Artists, musicians, celebrities like Martha Stewart and companies like PepsiCo Inc. all created nonfungible tokens.
NFT sales recently totaled about $14.1 billion over the past year, according to nonfungible.com, up from only $65 million the year before.
2011
'15
'20
-2,000
0
2,000
4,000
6,000
%
The other popular use was “decentralized finance,” or DeFi for short. DeFi is a broad, catchall phrase for what are essentially banking services—mainly borrowing or lending cryptocurrencies—offered on blockchain-based platforms. The total amount of money on DeFi platforms, a figure called total value locked, recently rose to $259 billion from $19 billion at the start of the year, according to the website DeFi Llama.
Those two uses have given a big boost to the Ethereum network, which operates like an open version of an app platform like Android or iOS. Numerous DeFi and NFT services operate on top of Ethereum. The network processed more than $2 trillion worth of transactions in every quarter of 2021, according to research firm Into The Block. That is triple the amount in the fourth quarter of 2020.
All this activity has attracted venture capital. VCs, which first invested in bitcoin in 2013, plowed more money into the sector in 2021 than in every other year combined. In the U.S. alone, venture funds invested $7.2 billion into the crypto space in 2021, according to data from PitchBook. Globally, venture capital invested $29.4 billion.
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Anti-extremism push from top brass extends past social media
BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Pentagon’s new anti-extremism crackdown on troops’ social media activity is also targeting what the brass considers unacceptable elsewhere in a service member’s life — such as the T-shirts a soldier wears, the bumper stickers plastered on a car and the tattooed slogans and symbols inked on one’s body.
Defense Department guidance released last week offers new definitions for what constitutes “active participation” by military personnel in a hate group or extremist organization. The most noteworthy updates to the Pentagon policies center on social media, with troops now potentially facing consequences if they share, like or otherwise amplify hateful messages on Facebook, Twitter or elsewhere.
But the internet is just one avenue. “Knowingly displaying paraphernalia, words, or symbols in support of extremist activities or in support of groups or organizations that support extremist activities, such as flags, clothing, tattoos,
and bumper stickers, whether on or off a military installation” is a violation of the policy, the Pentagon guidance says.
The updated guidelines are sure to be controversial. Some critics have argued the Defense Department’s extremism initiative represents a slippery slope,potentially opening the door for conservatives and Christians to be dubbed “extreme” because of their views on abortion, for example.
The Pentagon has pushed back against those criticisms. Military offi cials have stressed the anti-extremism effort has nothing to do with politics and is instead aimed at identifying service members who might be willing to take part in violent uprisings, such as the Jan. 6 attack on the U.S. Capitol, in which numerous active-duty troops and veterans participated.
Launching the anti-extremism push was one of Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s first acts after taking office in February, just weeks after the Jan. 6 assault. The Pentagon chief has framed the fight against extremism as a military readiness issue.
“We believe only a very few violate this oath by participating in extremist activities, but even the actions of a few can have an outsized impact on unit cohesion, morale and readiness — and the physical harm some of these activities can engender can undermine the safety of our people,” Mr. Austin said in a memo last week.
The anti-extremism guidance doesn’t outright ban membership in a hate group, but instead zeroes in on participation. Simply belonging to a White supremacist organization, for example, wouldn’t violate military rules, but wearing a T-shirt with that group’s logo would be a violation, as would having a tattoo of its symbol.
Liking and sharing such a group’s social media content, attending meetings or handing out written materials also would violate military rules. Under the new policies, commanders bear much of the responsibility for policing their own units and flagging any extremist behavior among the people they lead.
As for what constitutes an extremist ideology, the Pentagon directive lays out six broad categories, many of which appear to apply to the Jan. 6 attack. They include: advocating or engaging in unlawful force or violence to deprive others of their constitutional rights; advocating or engaging in unlawful force or violence to achieve a political or ideological goal; advocating or supporting terrorism; advocating or supporting the overthrow of the government; encouraging military or civilian personnel to violate U.S. laws; and advocating discrimination based on, race, color, religion, and other factors.
In all of 2021, officials said they identifi ed about 100 cases of extremism among active-duty military personnel, up from the “low double digits” across each of the services in prior years, senior defense officials said last week when rolling out the new guidelines.
Among both active-duty troops and veterans, the number of criminal acts shot up dramatically in 2021 due largely to the Jan. 6 attack, according to data compiled by the University of Maryland’s National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. From 1990 through 2021, at least 458 individuals with military backgrounds committed a criminal act driven by their political, economic, social or religious goals, the consortium said in a recent study.
At least 118 of those individuals have been charged for their actions on Jan. 6.
In 2020, there were just 40 such offenses, and throughout most of the previous decade there were fewer than 20 per year.
Under the Pentagon’s new guidance on anti-extremism, having a tattoo of a White supremacist group’s symbol would be a violation of military rules. This lance corporal’s back tattoo, however, is about his service in the Marines. It wouldn’t violate the new rules. ASSOCIATED PRESS
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second post
Pentagon’s vaccine battle heading to court
Legal fight centers on if Defense Department overstepped authority
BY BEN WOLFGANG THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Pentagon’s battle against COVID-19 vaccine holdouts is headed for the courtroom.
While the big question centers on whether the U.S. military has overstepped its legal authority by ordering all service members to be vaccinated, the battle is expected to play out across several fronts over the coming weeks and months.
The Defense Department is facing multiple high-stakes legal fights rife with national security implications. This includes clashes with Republican governors who claim full control over National Guard forces and the Pentagon’s hard line against troops seeking COVID-19 vaccine waivers on religious grounds.
The cases will encompass matters of federalism, First Amendment rights, and other key questions forming the backdrop for what has emerged over the past year as the most controversial military health initiative in U.S. history.
Active-duty coronavirus vaccination deadlines for each military service went by weeks ago. With thousands of service members still refusing immunization and seemingly willing to lose their careers over the matter, the Marine Corps, Army, Navy and Air Force are now faced with kicking out the unvaccinated.
Army Public Affairs has indicated the Pentagon will start removing unvaccinated soldiers “beginning in January.”
Powerful Republican lawmakers are throwing their legal weight behind troops who say they have deep religious or moral objections to the vaccine.
In mid-December, eight GOP senators and nearly 40 members of the House filed an amicus brief in federal court backing more than two dozen Navy SEALs who have lodged religious objections against Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s vaccine mandate.
The group of SEALs has a lawsuit pending against the Biden administration over the vaccine
mandate in U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
The amicus brief signed by such prominent Republicans as Sens. Ted Cruz of Texas and Mike Lee of Utah asserts the SEALs, with other military personnel, deserve the freedom to choose whether or not to be vaccinated.
“Our men and women in uniform have fought to protect the freedoms that every American, regardless of belief, enjoys,” the brief states. “Now they ask this court to protect their religious freedom from encroachment by the very government they have sworn to protect with their lives.”
The Pentagon has not approved any religious waivers relating to the vaccine, despite thousands of requests that have been lodged by forces across the services.
The most intriguing legal battle may stem from the Pentagon’s clash with Republican governors over vaccine requirements for National Guard personnel.
Led by Oklahoma Gov. Kevin Stitt, at least a half-dozen GOP-led states argue that Guard forces remain under the state’s control until they’re called up for federal duty, asserting that the forces are not currently subject to Mr. Austin’s mandate.
Mr. Stitt and Oklahoma’s attorney general filed a federal lawsuit in early December challenging the Pentagon’s vaccination mandate. In a statement at the time, Mr. Stitt argued that Mr. Austin has overstepped his constitutional authority.
For his part, the defense secretary has warned that any Guard troops not vaccinated by their service’s respective deadline can’t participate in drills and subsequently won’t be paid.
Legal scholars say the governors face an uphill battle against the Pentagon chief’s mandate.
“The governors are certainly free to request Secretary Austin to withdraw his directive, but the law doesn’t compel him to do so. The fact is that he has the legal authority to require members of the National Guard to meet certain vaccination standards,” said retired Air Force Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr., executive director of Duke University’s Center on Law, Ethics and National Security.
“If a governor wants a ‘militia’ force free from all federal requirements, they can establish — and fund — their own state defense force separate from the Guard, but no federal money or equipment would flow to it,” Gen. Dunlap told The Washington Times.
Mr. Stitt’s actions in Oklahoma, meanwhile, have inspired other Republican governors around the country.
Following Mr. Stitt’s assertion that he will not enforce the vaccine mandate on Oklahoma National Guard forces, the governors of Iowa, Alaska, Wyoming, Mississippi and Nebraska have all said they too will not enforce the mandate on forces in their own states.
The group of governors also wrote a collective letter to Mr. Austin, arguing that they retain control of Guard forces unless and until the forces are activated for federal duty.
‘Their pledge to serve’
The Republican governors have made a broader case about the potential fallout for America’s armed forces if the vaccine mandate remains in place as currently constructed.
“It’s unconscionable to think the government will go so far as to strip these honorable men and women of the nation’s top duties if they don’t comply,” Iowa Gov. Kim Reynolds said in a statement accompanying the mid-December letter she and the other Republican governors sent to Mr. Austin.
The Pentagon has argued that military readiness — even at the National Guard level — could suffer as a result of unvaccinated personnel.
“As I’ve said before, vaccination of the force will save lives and is essential to our readiness,” Mr. Austin wrote in a November memo laying out the new vaccination policy for National Guard forces.
While governors have a great deal of authority over Guard troops, legal scholars generally agree the authority does not mean Guard troops can be exempted from federal regulations, such as health standards.
Some specialists also argue there is a clear precedent for federal guidelines overriding a governor’s wishes.
“There is no good authority for this muscular conception of a state governor’s commander-in-chief power over the National Guard,” according to Michel Paradis, a senior attorney with the Defense Department’s Military Commissions Defense Organization, and Emily Eslinger, a research fellow for the National Institute of Military Justice.
The two wrote in a recent analysis for the website Lawfare that “governors have made similar arguments [in the past] for residual power over National Guard members of their respective states in the past and lost.”
On the specific question of authority over vaccinations, Mr. Paradis and Ms. Eslinger argued that “federal regulations of the militia supplant any residual commander-in-chief power a governor might retain.”
“If a state governor issues an order contrary to federal law,” they wrote, “that order is unlawful and subordinates follow it in violation of federal law at their peril.”
UP IN ARMS: The Pentagon is facing multiple high-stakes legal fights that are rife with national security implications. Not only that, but the cases with troops and governors will encompass matters of federalism, First Amendment rights and other key questions over what has become a controversial military h
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-pursues-brain-control-weaponry-in-bid-to-command-future-of-warfare_4186003.html?utm_source=uschinanoe&utm_campaign=uschina-2021-12-31&utm_medium=email
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1484480/to-win-without-fighting-is-the-highest-art
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Which defense contractors are bankrolling election objectors in Congress? Boeing leads the way (with $346,500 in 2021), and not just among defense contractors, but among all 717 corporations and industry groups who have donated money to the 147 Republican lawmakers who cited baseless claims of fraud and refused to certify the 2020 presidential election results, according to a new report from the government monitoring group Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics. Donations to these election objectors (CREW uses the term "Sedition Caucus") totaled more $18 million. Other findings include:
General Dynamics ranked fourth overall, behind Koch Industries and American Crystal Sugar, with $161,000 in donations to 51 of the lawmakers.
Lockheed Martin sent $145,000 to 72 of them.
And Raytheon gave $120,500 to 47 of them.
FWIW: "Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon had all pledged to not donate to members who didn't support democracy or publicly 'paused' their giving," CREW says in its report, "but together, their donations have exceeded half a million dollars." Read over the full report, here.
Still, corporate donations to election objectors are way down. "A complete review of Federal Election Commission filings in 2021 and 2019 by Popular Information reveals that, since January 6, corporate PAC contributions to Republican objectors have plummeted by nearly two-thirds," reports Judd Legum. Read on, here (it's on Substack; click "Let me read it first").
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https://warriorpoetsupplyco.com/blog/why-wokism-is-causing-decay-in-americas-defenses/?utm_medium=email&_hsmi=200270100&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8fMGLRZRk14X49hmVJ91izkc0RwEoL0A75NMg-SO0AByZrMqYd3__MWrCvuPV1Y74DCXwPC-rLGU5OS8aPT3drAlT8xg&utm_content=200270100&utm_source=hs_email
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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43943/navy-sends-a-message-by-publicizing-guided-missile-submarines-mediterranean-presence?fbclid=IwAR0aZzq5cFV4G63M8E6BiaNSa4rQu99E0VUEgt3eP1RtIckAYR2WoLdff2M
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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/43943/navy-sends-a-message-by-publicizing-guided-missile-submarines-mediterranean-presence?fbclid=IwAR0aZzq5cFV4G63M8E6BiaNSa4rQu99E0VUEgt3eP1RtIckAYR2WoLdff2M
Message: Navagation hazard!
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"US Navy sends a message"
blinks flexes ! :wink:
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Biden’s Gray-Zone Gaffe Highlights a Real Dilemma
It’s high time for NATO and its member governments to define what kinds of aggression short of war require a unified response.
Elisabeth Braw
BY ELISABETH BRAW
SENIOR FELLOW, AEI
JANUARY 20, 2022 04:29 PM ET
This week, President Biden inadvertently highlighted a defender’s dilemma: no country or alliance has yet mustered an effective strategy for responding to gray-zone aggression, which can range from disinformation campaigns to weaponization of migrants to tools aggressors might yet think up. Yes, drawing attention to this dilemma was unnecessary—but its existence requires urgent attention.
It was one day short of the celebratory first anniversary of his presidency that Biden was asked yet again about a potential Russian attack on Ukraine. Ordinarily, politicians answer such questions with vague threats of serious repercussions; indeed, Biden has done so many times. This time, too, he vowed that Putin would pay a "serious and dear price" for invading Ukraine. Then he went on: "What you're going to see is that Russia will be held accountable if it invades and it depends on what it does. It's one thing if it's a minor incursion, and then we end up having to fight about what to do and not do etc."
Biden alone knows why he decided to lay bare NATO’s weakness in such eye-catching fashion, and White House spokeswoman Jen Psaki hurriedly sent out a statement to “clarify” the U.S. stance. If any Russian military forces move across the border to Ukraine, Psaki said, America and allies will respond swiftly and severely. She added: “The Russians have an extensive playbook of aggression short of military action, including cyberattacks and paramilitary tactics. And [Biden] affirmed today that those acts of Russian aggression will be met with a decisive, reciprocal, and united response.”
That’s not exactly what the president said, of course. On the contrary, he said that in cases of aggression below the threshold of armed conflict, NATO’s member states disagree about how to respond. Indeed, many of the individual governments of NATO member states would be internally divided on the matter.
To be sure, it may seem common sense that a “minor incursion”—featuring, say, a few people dressed as Ukrainian police officers who take possession of a police station in the border area—should somehow be countered. But by whom? Would it be a task for law enforcement? The Ukrainian armed forces? The U.S. military and other NATO forces? And if Ukraine and its international friends decided that such an activity warranted a military response, what about other activities below the threshold of armed conflict? Is moving a border just a tiny bit, what Georgians call borderization, a casus belli, or is the loss of a few meters of land simply an annoyance? China, meanwhile, can keep punishing countries it wishes to harm by surreptitiously suspending imports, and no military arsenal can frighten it into refraining from such outrageous behavior.
It would be ridiculous to punish economic coercion with military means, you say. If one decides, though, that some activities below the threshold of war warrant a military response, that involves setting a new threshold. In my book The Defender’s Dilemma, I propose that loss of life could be such a threshold; remember that cyber attacks on hospitals, for example, can claim lives. (In 2019, NATO added “serious cyber attacks” to its causes to invoke Article 5, but what constitutes a serious cyber attack? An attack on an assisted-living facility that claims the lives of 10 extremely elderly residents? 100? A knockout of a country’s grid?)
Today, though, no alternative threshold exists. Some NATO member states such as Latvia are developing partial total-defense models that prepare the public for troubles below the threshold of war. Were mysterious police officers to turn up in a remote Latvian location, it’s likely that high-schoolers recently trained in societal resilience would spot something unusual and report the coordinates to the government. But for unified NATO action to take place in response to gray-zone aggression, member states have to agree in advance on what constitutes the threshold that will trigger a response. They would then be able to communicate their agreement to the outside world so that Russia, China, and any other hostile-minded regimes would know to expect a coordinated response. Ideally, such deterrence messaging would change their cost-benefit calculus and they’d refrain from the aggression.
Telling the world that no such agreement exists was an unwise move by Biden, but nobody would suggest it’s news to Russia. The answer can only be for NATO member states and their partners to decide what’s going to constitute their threshold. If it’s not going to be an armed attack, including a serious cyber attack, what’s it going to be? Then they need to keep reminding the world what the new threshold is and the magnitude of the response it’s going to trigger. If they do so, it may just convince attack-minded countries that an attack will bring more cost than benefit. Deterrence begins long before the prospective punishment.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/news/2022-01-21/too-many-women-wrong-places
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JOSEPH TREVITHICK View Joseph Trevithick's Articles
@FranticGoat
Asenior U.S. Navy officer says that his service no longer considers the East Coast of the United States as an "uncontested" area or an automatic "safe haven" for its ships and submarines. This is a product of steadily increased Russian submarine activity in the Atlantic Ocean, including the deployment of more advanced and quieter types that can better evade detection.
U.S. Navy Vice Admiral Andrew "Woody" Lewis made these comments at a gathering the U.S. Naval Institute and the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank jointly hosted on Feb. 4, 2020. Lewis is the commander of the Navy's 2nd Fleet, which the service reactivated in 2018 specifically to address the surge in Russia's submarine operations in the Atlantic. This fleet, headquartered at Naval Support Activity Hampton Roads in Virginia, reached full operational capability in December 2019.
RUSSIA SENDS TEN SUBS INTO NORTH ATLANTIC IN DRILL UNPRECEDENTED IN SIZE SINCE COLD WAR
By Tyler Rogoway
Posted in THE WAR ZONE
THE SCOPE, NOT THE SCALE OF RUSSIAN AND CHINESE NAVAL OPS IN THE ATLANTIC IS WORRISOME
By Joseph Trevithick
Posted in THE WAR ZONE
NATO UNFAZED BY RUSSIA PLANS TO FIRE MISSILES NEAR ITS MASSIVE EXERCISE OFF NORWAY (UPDATED)
By Joseph Trevithick
Posted in THE WAR ZONE
VIDEO TAKES YOU INSIDE RUSSIA'S 'BEAST' DIVISION OF AKULA CLASS NUCLEAR FAST ATTACK SUBS
By Tyler Rogoway
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/32087/admiral-warns-americas-east-coast-is-no-longer-a-safe-haven-thanks-to-russian-subs
Posted in THE WAR ZONE
ANALYZING THE FIRST IMAGES OF RUSSIA'S HUGE DOOMSDAY TORPEDO CARRYING SPECIAL MISSIONS SUB
By Joseph Trevithick and Tyler Rogoway
Posted in THE WAR ZONE
"Our new reality is that when our sailors toss the lines over and set sail, they can expect to be operating in a contested space once they leave Norfolk," Lewis said. "Our ships can no longer expect to operate in a safe haven on the East Coast or merely cross the Atlantic unhindered to operate in another location."
"We have seen an ever-increasing number of Russian submarines deployed in the Atlantic, and these submarines are more capable than ever, deploying for longer periods of time, with more lethal weapons systems," he continued. "Our sailors have the mindset that they are no longer uncontested and to expect to operate alongside our competitors each and every underway."
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https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10440323/Seven-sailors-board-USS-Carl-Vinson-South-China-Sea-injured-94-million-F-35C-fighter-jet-crashes-trying-land-deck.html
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or a way to avoid re assignment to place not desired?
I have no idea:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/many-members-color-turning-down-212638900.html
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or a way to avoid re assignment to place not desired?
I have no idea:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/many-members-color-turning-down-212638900.html
Endless victimhood. :roll:
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/02/11/pentagons-national-defense-university-host-lecture-case-democratic-socialism/
:x
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I remember our dissecting Picketty here when his book came out.
But more to the point in this moment is the Woken Dead capture of the Pentagon. This is a genuine threat to our Republic.
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But more to the point in this moment is the Woken Dead capture of the Pentagon. This is a genuine threat to our Republic.
it would be check mate
and they know it.
and we have Karl Rove missing in action still playing some sort of anti Trump game
time to really full out purge from the Party functions
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Pentagon Says Extreme Consolidation in Arms Industry Threatens National Security
By Tom Ozimek February 15, 2022 Updated: February 15, 2022biggersmaller Print
The Pentagon has released a report saying that extreme levels of mergers and consolidation among defense contractors have reduced competition and elevated risks to U.S. national security, while recommending a series of actions to spur increased competition in America’s Defense Industrial Base (DIB).
The State of Competition in the Defense Industrial Base report (pdf), released Feb. 15, notes that, since the 1990s, there has been a substantial level of defense sector consolidation, with the number of aerospace and defense prime contractors dwindling from 51 to just five. It also indicates that just three sources account for 90 percent of U.S. missiles.
“As a result, DoD is increasingly reliant on a small number of contractors for critical defense capabilities,” the report says. “Consolidations that reduce required capability and capacity and the depth of competition would have serious consequences for national security.”
The report outlines the current state of competition in the DIB while recommending a series of actions to promote competition in the DoD’s small business vendor base and to shore up supply chain resilience in five priority industrial base sectors: microelectronics, missiles and munitions, high-capacity batteries, castings and forgings, and critical minerals and materials.
the pentagon department of defense
The Pentagon logo is seen behind the podium in the briefing room at the Pentagon in Arlington, Va., on Jan. 8, 2020. (Al Drago/Reuters)
The document lays out steps to block mergers that run contrary to Pentagon interests and reduce barriers to entry for new contractors. It also seeks to ensure that a company’s intellectual property protections are not anti-competitive.
The report calls for strengthening merger oversight, with the Pentagon to support the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in carrying out anti-trust probes and implementing recommendations with regard to the DIB.
It also recommends the implementation of sector-specific supply chain resiliency plans for the five priority sectors.
Epoch Times Photo
Flight crew with Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 112 (VMFA-112) conducts pre-flight checks and prepares an F/A-18 Hornet for launch, on Sept. 23, 2021. (Sgt. Booker T. Thomas/U.S. Marine Corps)
The Department of Defense (DoD) said in a Feb. 15 statement that the report recommendations will help the Pentagon better meet current and future security needs.
“As DoD works to innovate, bring new technologies into our supplier base, and develop the workforce of the future, American small businesses and our U.S. industrial base must expand not only to improve resiliency, but to ensure we are able to meet the needs of our warfighters for tomorrow’s high-tech challenges,” Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks said in a statement.
The report is part of a broader government effort under President Joe Biden to promote competition in the U.S. economy, with an executive order Biden signed in July 2021 saying that too much market concentration “threatens basic economic liberties, democratic accountability, and the welfare of workers, farmers, small businesses, startups, and consumers.”
The White House said in a Feb. 15 statement that the report’s recommendations will help the Pentagon “rebuild its competitive bench, lower costs for taxpayers, and safeguard our national security.”
In a possible sign of the Biden administration’s get-tough approach on DIB mergers and consolidations, Lockheed Martin dropped its $4.4 billion bid to buy the rocket engine maker Aerojet Rocketdyne over the weekend after the FTC sued to block the deal.
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https://smallwarsjournal.com/index.php/jrnl/art/us-not-ready-peer-peer-fight-europe
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https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/2022/02/air-force-went-woke-its-planes-wont-fly-daniel-greenfield/
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https://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/2022/02/air-force-went-woke-its-planes-wont-fly-daniel-greenfield/
https://taskandpurpose.com/news/nellis-air-force-base-drag-show/
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"Air Farce"
diversity is a "core mission". :roll:
what is the point of spending for new equipment when we can't even keep the equipment we have in working order?
I am still not clear why the F 35 was worth billions
I have not read anything yet that sounds like it is.
But I am open to expert opinion.
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John Boyd warred with the Pentagon over such things
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https://dogbrothers.com/my-day-of-larping-in-pineland/
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I have questions about the vulnerabilities of ships e.g. an aircraft carrier and its support ships can be taken out by Chinese land based missiles, etc. but this article deserves consideration nonetheless:
America Needs a Bigger Navy
The disconnect between U.S. commitments and the current fleet is huge.
By The Editorial Board
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Feb. 23, 2022 6:48 pm ET
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U.S. Navy Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Essex during routine operations with the 5th Fleet in the Gulf of Oman, Nov. 9, 2021.
PHOTO: MC2 JOHN MCGOVERN/U.S. NAVY/ZUMA PRESS
Storm clouds are gathering as authoritarians reach for global power, and the U.S. is going to have to decide if it wants to spend what it takes to defend itself. On that score it is good to see fresh focus on the need for a larger, more lethal Navy—which is more urgent and will be more costly than the public understands.
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At a conference last week the Navy’s top officer, Admiral Mike Gilday, said the country needs “a naval force of over 500 ships,” a figure informed by exercises and Pentagon analysis. The Navy, Adm. Gilday said, is “thinking about how would we fight differently” across “a wide vast ocean like the Pacific?”
The ship count includes a more diversified mix of expensive and cheaper stuff: 70 attack submarines that can operate undetected and take out targets; 150 unmanned or lightly manned vessels; 12 aircraft carriers; 60 workhorse destroyers; 50 frigates, and so on.
One certainty is that today’s 296-ship Navy is listing even under peacetime demands. Last summer the Navy had to divert its only Pacific aircraft carrier to deal with the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Congress made the goal of a 355-ship Navy—in the rough ballpark of Adm. Gilday’s sketch when excluding unmanned vessels—official policy in the 2018 defense authorization, but the Navy hasn’t grown.
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Force plans are no more real than a Battleship board game without money. The Biden Administrationhas been leaking that its 2023 budget request will focus on shipbuilding, but last year’s pathetic budget proposal trimmed the account and would have put the fleet on track to shrink had Congress not intervened.
The truth is the Navy will need tens of billions of dollars a year to expand and maintain the force. Only roughly 30% of a ship’s lifetime cost is acquisition; the rest is operations and sustainment. More pricey than ships are proficient sailors, and the Navy is short more than 5,000 for crucial billets at sea. The possible return of land wars in Europe should disabuse policy makers of the fiction that this money can be sucked out of the U.S. Army.
The Navy deals in shipbuilding plans over 30-year time horizons, and Adm. Gilday is describing a force for the 2040s. But China may strike Taiwan in the near term, before Beijing must cope with demographic problems in the mid-2030s.
This combustible decade arrives as many Navy assets are reaching their expiration date without replacements. Congress has forced the Navy to keep two of seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers it asked to retire—a compromise to retain some of the fleet’s missile power while conceding that some of these antiques struggle to get off the pier.
Adm. Gilday nonetheless deserves some credit for pressing the issue, and too few flag officers are educating Americans on the threat of Russia and China. Tedious argot like “distributed maritime operations” has been a substitute for clear articulation of a strategy.
It’s up to the Biden Administration to devote the money and political capital to protect the country, and so far it has been willing to spend on every priority except defense. Americans born since World War II have no frame of reference for the magnitude of casualties and damage that would accompany a Pacific conflict with a peer military like China. The way to avoid this is to prepare for it without delay.
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https://freebeacon.com/biden-administration/army-mandates-pronoun-training-for-all-levels-of-service/
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we have a choice in my work
F M or O
"O" for "other"
Sometimes I have to look hard to determine if I am speaking to a genetic male or female
I am not even sure if it is a microagression if I ask.
I think it ok to ask , "how would you like to be addressed?"
if the ) says as the Empire State Building I then wonder if it is polite and ok to ask "can I call you ESB for short.
:-o
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HT to our GM
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/your-tank-toast-why-americas-javelin-missiles-are-so-powerful-142697
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1500546275455995904
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March 11, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF
The Tank and I
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
In 1972, I was wandering aimlessly around a U.S. Army facility in Pennsylvania called Fort Indiantown Gap. Eventually, I passed two M-60 armored fighting vehicles – the Army’s longhand for tanks. The sounds they made nearly tore my head off. An NCO, whose rank I couldn’t make out, arrived to complete the job on my head. Had I been able to think, I would have pointed out I outranked him (a meaningless rank given to civilians and held in utter contempt by anyone who was actually a soldier).
It was a pivotal moment in my life. I heard the voice of God as the 105 reverberated between tanks. I learned that I had used up my quarter of His mercy, and I learned what Gen. George Patton knew – that the armored warrior now sat in a tank and ruled the battlefield.
Thus began my love of tanks. I have since traveled often to Aberdeen Proving Ground, which had a superb armor museum, including Soviet T-34s and 54s, German Panthers and a Cromwell French AMX. I taught myself about anti-tank weapons. Many years later, I returned to Fort Indiantown Gap with my not-yet wife. She brought a picnic. Two A-10s came in low and fast. A-10s were tank killers. They carried armor-piercing rounds, and they were built to kill. I told my future wife to watch one jink to the right and release a flare, designed to deflect infrared-guided missiles. I thought my knowledge would impress her, but alas I was offered mustard instead.
In the late 1970s, I went to the SHAPE Technical Center in The Hague, where advanced lunacy was funded by NATO. I was there to help design an early computerized wargame for the central front of NATO. What we had to model above all else was the tank. Tank formations were to be the Russian spearhead, we learned from their exercises. A-10s were to slow them down, but sadly, they were not, as it was put, survivable. So we had to model an armor-on-armor wargame. The idea was to move tanks forward into blocking positions. We discovered the obvious: Tanks need fuel, and the battle of the central gap was going to be won not by killing tanks but by hitting fuel dumps. This was not my discovery, but I learned to repeat the obvious as if it were my own.
The armor war would be won by intelligence – on the location of Soviet fuel storage facilities, for example – and by fighter planes able to deliver missiles and explosives to destroy them. I’m proud to say I discovered that if NATO did nothing, the Soviets would bog down near Hanover, Germany, due to road problems and limits on fuel deliveries. In this scenario, we did not need fighters, we did not need intelligence, we didn’t even have to be there. The Soviets would screw themselves. I added this point: If the Soviets could attack, they would. That argument was dismissed by my superiors. In retrospect, the likelihood of anyone listening to a 25-year-old was, understandably, zero. Here was a man too stupid not to wander on an armored firing range. And they were right. But none of it diminished my love of tanks.
In 1973, my love was challenged, as loves always are. I had forgiven the A-10 for killing tanks because it was such a fine aircraft. But that year, Egypt crossed the Suez Canal armed with a Soviet weapon called the AT-3 Sagger (a NATO designation). It was a mobile, crew-operated, optically guided anti-tank missile. One guy mounted the weapon, one guy squatted at a sight and guided the missile almost unerringly to its target, with the ability to penetrate existing armor, or at least make the tank crew's ears bleed. It devastated the Israeli armor force, the pride of Israel. Armored forces now needed infantrymen to sweep an area for Sagger crews before the tank could move forward. And just like that, the tank went from the knight of the battlefield, the shield of the infantry, to a pathetic has-been.
It was an instructive moment in the history of warfare: The tank could be destroyed by some infantrymen hiding in the bushes. It could be saved only by our own infantry sweeping the bushes to get rid of them. It was a lesson that the advocates of armor had trouble believing. They kept trying to find armor that could not be penetrated. Their enemies kept finding new explosives to penetrate it. What the A-10 started, the AT-3 Saggar finished. Armor was heavy, guzzled staggering amounts of fuel, had to be loaded with incredibly heavy munitions, and had to constantly be modified at great expense – only for new kinds of anti-tank systems to follow in kind.
The British and Americans have sent Ukraine Javelin missile systems to fend off the Russian invasion. This nasty thing is a tank killer that when fired pops up, finds the thinnest part of the armor on top of the tank, and destroys it. Almost anyone can use it so long as they learn some basic tactics. When I see the sights of Russian T-72s stalled on the road to Kyiv, I am pretty sure a Javelin took out the first few tanks and last few. It’s ironic that in Egypt the Soviets introduced the first infantry-delivered precision-guided anti-tank weapon, and the Russians chose to structure their invasion of Ukraine with three tank groups to fight infantry. For God's sake, they introduced the weapon to the battlefield. Did they forget?
For Russia, the only solution is to go find the infantry that is killing their tanks, and until then, not use tanks. That seems to be their choice, and strategically I can’t blame them. President Vladimir Putin and I are about the same age. He was a KGB agent stationed in Germany. I was a sad loser on the other side of the divide. But both of us grew up getting ready for the war we knew was coming, and we both grew up hearing about Patton and Zhukov. Of course, we had heard of precision-guided munitions and infantry-mounted anti-tank missiles. We heard of top attack drones and satellite-based sighting. But in the end, I think he couldn’t imagine a war in which the spearhead was something other than a tank. It is to the greatness of my country that no one would let me plan a war. It is the pity of Russia that Putin still thought of war as he had been taught to think of it, and apparently no one told him things had changed.
Then again, I understand how hard it is to outgrow the awe of seeing 50 tons of sheer power moving and shooting on two treads. In that sense, I envy Putin's power to order three battlegroups of T-72s to button up and move out. I guess we are both crazy, but I can’t cause any damage with my fantasies. Putin can. He is fighting the war our generation always expected, hundreds of tanks rolling forward to engage. It’s like using the cavalry to win World War I. Nostalgia can be dangerous.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/03/heres-list-87-potential-new-names-confederate-named-army-posts/363306/
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Ru-Paul Air Force Base sounds nice.
Perhaps bases named in memory of allies we abandoned to horrific fates.
https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/03/heres-list-87-potential-new-names-confederate-named-army-posts/363306/
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chelsea manning
and any of these :
https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/list-police-related-deaths-usa-1.4438618
or any prominent Democrat. or Democrat general .....
do even but a few people even know who the Civil War generals after whom these bases are named are?
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https://news.yahoo.com/sh-tshow-russian-troops-now-112804337.html
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America’s Declining Military
Biden’s budget widens a window of vulnerability for at least a decade.
By The Editorial Board
Follow
March 29, 2022 6:42 pm ET
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has alerted most Americans that the world is becoming a far more dangerous place. Count it as a befuddling failure, then, that the military budget President Biden unveiled Monday doesn’t meet the moment. It treads water amid inflation and invites autocrats to exploit a widening window of American weakness.
The Pentagon is seeking $773 billion for fiscal 2023, and spending on national defense reaches $813 billion when other accounts are included. This sounds large, and Mr. Biden is pitching it as a big increase over his request last year. But even defense officials say the Pentagon would see only a 1.5% real increase over last year’s funding after inflation. Defense spending will still be about 3.1% of the economy, close to post-Cold War lows and heading lower over the next decade. (See the nearby chart.)
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The Administration calls China a “pacing challenge,” and Russia an “acute threat,” and it touts $130 billion for research and development, including crucial efforts on artificial intelligence and 5G applications. Also welcome is $24.7 billion for missile defense, including a badly needed $892 million to defend Guam from Chinese missiles, and $27.6 billion for space capabilities. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative would get $6.1 billion.
But the overall budget picture is that the Biden team is betting on weapons that don’t yet exist for a war they hope arrives on someone else’s watch. They want to save money now in order to spend on what they say will be a more modern force in a decade.
To this end, the 298-ship U.S. Navy would buy only nine ships next year while retiring 24. The fleet would shrink to 280 ships in 2027, even as the Navy says it needs a fleet of 500 to defeat China in a conflict. That trend won’t impress Xi Jinping as he eyes Taiwan.
As for the Army, Mr. Putin’s revanchism will require more forward deployments by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The alliance will need more troops and hardware in the Baltics, and much of this will have to come from the land branch. But the Army is seeking $177.5 billion, barely up from $174.7 billion last year and a cut after inflation.
End strength would fall to 473,000 from the 485,000 authorized last year. The Army shrugs because it hasn’t been able to fill all its spots in a hot labor market. This may relieve a recruiting headache for some general, but it won’t reduce the threats the Army may have to address in multiple theaters.
The Air Force “is now the smallest, oldest, and least ready it has ever been in its 75-year history,” as the Air Force Association put it this week, but the Pentagon plans to cut its buy of F-35 fighter jets this year.
The Air Force wants 33 F-35s, down from 48 requested in years past, which was still too few to upgrade the fleet in any reasonable time. In a future conflict, the U.S. will need these advanced aircraft to survive against sophisticated air defenses. Reducing purchases will put pressure on the supply chain and raise the per copy cost of the aircraft.
These hard-power priorities were squeezed in order to request, with great self-congratulation, $3.1 billion for climate change. This is consistent with a White House that wants to create a Civilian Climate Corps with more personnel than the Marine Corps. This $3.1 billion could be spent on weapons. The Navy’s ship retirements save $3.6 billion over five years, and the country needs that offensive power more than it does electric vans.
A couple more questionable decisions: The Administration appears to have canceled a program to develop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, precisely the kind of weapon designed to deter Mr. Putin from using tactical nukes in Europe. The Air Force also wants to retire much of its aging airborne warning and control fleet (Awacs) without a replacement in hand, but this capability is essential to air dominance in any conflict.
***
A decades-long decline in American military power is an under-appreciated reason the world’s authoritarians are on the march. We never thought we’d write this given its penchant for military pork, but Congress can do a lot to improve the Pentagon request, which should be a baseline. Republicans are suggesting the military budget needs to grow 5% in real terms. Congress should set a goal of returning the U.S. to its deterrent strength of the Cold War years, when defense spending was 5% or more of the economy.
If lawmakers don’t intervene, the U.S. might not be ready for the next war until a decade after we lose it.
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It’s almost like the people running things are paid off by China.
America’s Declining Military
Biden’s budget widens a window of vulnerability for at least a decade.
By The Editorial Board
Follow
March 29, 2022 6:42 pm ET
Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has alerted most Americans that the world is becoming a far more dangerous place. Count it as a befuddling failure, then, that the military budget President Biden unveiled Monday doesn’t meet the moment. It treads water amid inflation and invites autocrats to exploit a widening window of American weakness.
The Pentagon is seeking $773 billion for fiscal 2023, and spending on national defense reaches $813 billion when other accounts are included. This sounds large, and Mr. Biden is pitching it as a big increase over his request last year. But even defense officials say the Pentagon would see only a 1.5% real increase over last year’s funding after inflation. Defense spending will still be about 3.1% of the economy, close to post-Cold War lows and heading lower over the next decade. (See the nearby chart.)
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The Administration calls China a “pacing challenge,” and Russia an “acute threat,” and it touts $130 billion for research and development, including crucial efforts on artificial intelligence and 5G applications. Also welcome is $24.7 billion for missile defense, including a badly needed $892 million to defend Guam from Chinese missiles, and $27.6 billion for space capabilities. The Pacific Deterrence Initiative would get $6.1 billion.
But the overall budget picture is that the Biden team is betting on weapons that don’t yet exist for a war they hope arrives on someone else’s watch. They want to save money now in order to spend on what they say will be a more modern force in a decade.
To this end, the 298-ship U.S. Navy would buy only nine ships next year while retiring 24. The fleet would shrink to 280 ships in 2027, even as the Navy says it needs a fleet of 500 to defeat China in a conflict. That trend won’t impress Xi Jinping as he eyes Taiwan.
As for the Army, Mr. Putin’s revanchism will require more forward deployments by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The alliance will need more troops and hardware in the Baltics, and much of this will have to come from the land branch. But the Army is seeking $177.5 billion, barely up from $174.7 billion last year and a cut after inflation.
End strength would fall to 473,000 from the 485,000 authorized last year. The Army shrugs because it hasn’t been able to fill all its spots in a hot labor market. This may relieve a recruiting headache for some general, but it won’t reduce the threats the Army may have to address in multiple theaters.
The Air Force “is now the smallest, oldest, and least ready it has ever been in its 75-year history,” as the Air Force Association put it this week, but the Pentagon plans to cut its buy of F-35 fighter jets this year.
The Air Force wants 33 F-35s, down from 48 requested in years past, which was still too few to upgrade the fleet in any reasonable time. In a future conflict, the U.S. will need these advanced aircraft to survive against sophisticated air defenses. Reducing purchases will put pressure on the supply chain and raise the per copy cost of the aircraft.
These hard-power priorities were squeezed in order to request, with great self-congratulation, $3.1 billion for climate change. This is consistent with a White House that wants to create a Civilian Climate Corps with more personnel than the Marine Corps. This $3.1 billion could be spent on weapons. The Navy’s ship retirements save $3.6 billion over five years, and the country needs that offensive power more than it does electric vans.
A couple more questionable decisions: The Administration appears to have canceled a program to develop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, precisely the kind of weapon designed to deter Mr. Putin from using tactical nukes in Europe. The Air Force also wants to retire much of its aging airborne warning and control fleet (Awacs) without a replacement in hand, but this capability is essential to air dominance in any conflict.
***
A decades-long decline in American military power is an under-appreciated reason the world’s authoritarians are on the march. We never thought we’d write this given its penchant for military pork, but Congress can do a lot to improve the Pentagon request, which should be a baseline. Republicans are suggesting the military budget needs to grow 5% in real terms. Congress should set a goal of returning the U.S. to its deterrent strength of the Cold War years, when defense spending was 5% or more of the economy.
If lawmakers don’t intervene, the U.S. might not be ready for the next war until a decade after we lose it.
-
was this a problem prior to having "diversity"
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2022/03/31/marine-corps-body-composition-standards-may-be-leading-to-eating-disorders/
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https://twitter.com/usairforce/status/1509580161376731144
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https://newrepublic.com/article/165910/maxar-ukraine-russia-satellite-images-war-propaganda
funny
we keep hearing how people would not trust anything Putin says
but I also don't trust anything our own government or big tech says just the same.
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What Lessons is China Taking from the Ukraine War?
From battlefield concepts to geopolitics, Beijing is sure to be watching with avid interest—and some chagrin.
By THOMAS CORBETT, MA XIU and PETER W. SINGER
APRIL 3, 2022 08:00 AM ET
COMMENTARY
THE CHINA INTELLIGENCE
CHINA
EUROPE
STRATEGY
Operation Desert Storm was a turning point in modern Chinese military history. As military planners with the People’s Liberation Army watched U.S. and allied forces make short work of the world’s fourth-largest military (on paper), equipped with many of the same systems as the PLA, it became obvious that China’s quantitatively superior but qualitatively lacking massed infantry would stand no chance against the combination of modern weaponry, C4ISR, and joint operations seen in Iraq. The result was new military concepts and over two decades of often-difficult reforms, which produced the modern, far more capable, “informationized” PLA of today.
Today, the PLA is no doubt closely observing its Russian contemporaries in Ukraine as they under-perform in multiple areas, from failing to take key targets or claim air supremacy to running low on fuel and supplies and possibly experiencing morale collapse, and surely taking away lessons that will shape its own future. Of note, Russia’s experience appears to have confirmed many of China’s recent assumptions behind its investments, such as the utility of unmanned aerial systems in high-intensity conflict, as well as the necessity for the PLA’s 2015 reforms, which aim to fix many of the issues driving Russian failure that the PLA recognizes in itself.
Of the many issues that have contributed to Russia’s physical battlefield woes in Ukraine, one of the most important has been the lack of effective joint or combined arms operations, widely considered essential to any effective modern fighting force. Russia’s poor level of coordination between its various services and branches can only be generously described as incompetent. For example, it has repeatedly failed to provide effective air support to its ground forces or deconflict its air and air-defense forces to avoid friendly fire.
The PLA has long had its own serious issues with joint operations. Traditionally dominated by the Army, the PLA had little success developing a truly joint force until a series of sweeping reforms in 2015 that replaced the former Army-dominated system with a series of joint theater commands. The PLA is thus aware of its own shortcomings and taking steps to fix it, but likely remains far off from being able to conduct truly effective, seamless joint operations. Efforts to conduct joint exercises are becoming more common, but most senior PLA leaders are still relatively inexperienced with joint operations, and even new officers typically do not receive joint education below the corps level. Further, it remains to be seen how far these reforms will go or to what extent they will “stick;” indeed, one reason the PLA did not attempt these reforms until 2015 was because of strong institutional pushback from the Army, whose leaders wished to retain their dominant status.
To China, the Ukraine invasion will reinforce the importance of joint and combined arms operations, while also making clear that such operations are highly difficult to conduct in practice. Russia’s stumbles may give the PLA pause as to whether it is truly ready for all the joint elements that a successful Taiwan seizure would require, including close coordination between sea, air, and land forces.
Another issue which has contributed to Russia’s military woes is the low quality of its conscript force. Indeed, Ukraine has even turned images of Russian POW conscripts being allowed to call their mothers into a weapon in its information warfare. While some militaries, such as Israel, have managed to maintain a high-quality conscript force, a full-time professional force is generally considered to hold numerous substantial advantages, which is why most of the Western world now uses a voluntary recruitment model. Despite the copious hyper-masculine recruiting videos which so excited certain Western politicians, Russia has struggled to attract enough voluntary recruits to move away from its current system of 12-month conscription.
Despite some recent success in recruiting a higher-quality, more-educated voluntary force, the PLA has likewise failed to move away from conscription. It presently requires about 660,000 two-year conscripts, many lacking even partial high-school education, to fill out its ranks. While this does not bode well for the PLA’s ability to conduct complex operations, one area where the PLA may have an advantage over its Russian counterparts is in the area of motivation. The Russian conscripts are not just poorly trained, but also suffer from low morale. Many among the invasion force did not know why they were going to Ukraine, or even that they were going to Ukraine at all. By contrast, the PLA places heavy emphasis on personnel political education, and Chinese conscripts have been raised from an early age to believe in the necessity of “liberating” Taiwan. Still, the PLA is surely watching with concern as a conscript force with at least some similarities to its own fares so poorly, and will likely redouble their campaign to attract more, and preferably higher-quality, voluntary recruits.
Russia also allowed its adversary to dominate the information environment. Due to a combination of overly optimistic assumptions about the political weakness of its foe and logistical reliance on its target’s own communications networks, Russia never launched the long-feared effort to take down Ukrainian communications networks. Putin’s strategists wrongly believed that its own messaging and rapid military advances would go viral across these networks and aid in collapsing the Ukrainian state. As well, many of Russia’s units turned out to need access to Ukrainian civilian networks for their own operations.
Instead, the Zelenskyy regime turned the tables on Russia, winning the information war inside both Ukraine and the West, and in so doing, transforming the greater war. Deft Ukrainian government messaging and a mobilized civilian populace created a new sense of domestic unity, as well as mobilizing essential military aid and historic economic sanctions from a widened network of global allies. In turn, Russian use of civilian networks made it susceptible to intercepts and geolocated targeting of its units. The PLA has streamlined coordination between its cyber, electronic warfare, space, and information warfare efforts through the recent creation of the Strategic Support Force, indicating it recognizes the importance of information dominance. It can be expected to redouble its efforts at cyber/information warfare, as well as encrypted communications, to ensure its own operations don’t suffer the same flaws.
Another ongoing issue has been Russia’s serious problems with poor logistics. The sight of broken-down or abandoned vehicles has become common as Russian forces run out of fuel and other vital supplies. To its credit, the PLA has also been rapidly reforming and modernizing its logistical system as part of the same broad set of 2015 reforms. As part of these reforms, the PLA has emphasized its logistics organizations and created the Joint Logistics Support Force. This force’s training has focused on cooperation with other branches of the PLA, and it has cut its teeth training to establish supply lines during natural disasters. In 2018, the JLSF launched its first major exercise, dubbed “Joint Logistics Support Mission 2018,” featuring medical drones, helicopter-dropped refueling depots, and operations in harsh and remote terrain.
However, while the outward manifestation of many of the issues faced by the Russian military appear to be logistical in nature, the true heart of the issue may be corruption. There are reports that before the invasion Russian military officers sold off their fuel and food supplies, and that these corrupt practices may be responsible for the stalling of a Russian tank column outside Kyiv. In this regard, the PLA has much to fear. Corruption has plagued the PLA for decades, with some PLA officers bluntly stating in 2015 that it could undermine China’s ability to wage war. Reportedly, more than 13,000 PLA officers have been punished in some capacity for corruption since Xi Jinping took power, including more than a hundred generals. This was a particular problem in the logistics sector, where there are more opportunities for corruption and links to the civilian economy.
Yet, despite the reorganization of the PLA and widespread prosecution of corruption cases, it still appears to be a major issue. Anti-corruption efforts are ongoing, with Chinese Gen. Zhang Youxia recently calling for innovative measures to keep up the fight. But the fact that Fu Zhenghua, the man brought in to take down the corrupt former security chief Zhou Yongkang, is himself now under investigation for corruption does not bode well for the long-term effectiveness of China’s efforts. The troubled invasion of Ukraine provides a stark real-world example to Xi, the CCP, and PLA about the impact corruption can have on military effectiveness, and will no doubt cause them to redouble their anti-corruption efforts with a newfound urgency. However given its similar authoritarian system and emphasis on career advancement through patronage, systemic corruption may be baked into the system.
Finally, there is the strategic issue of Beijing’s reaction to the global sanctions that have hit the Russian ruble and economy. The swift and severe economic retaliation of the U.S., EU, and others took Moscow by surprise. Even more unexpected was the rapid withdrawal of almost 500 global corporations, pushed on by an effective effort at naming and shaming them into acting to protect their own brands. A longer-term effort targeting essential elements of Russia’s defense industry will hamstring it for years.
While China will benefit from Russia’s increasing reliance on its goods and services, Beijing can be expected to retool its geo-economic strategy to reduce its vulnerability to a similar nightmare scenario. For example, it will likely redouble its efforts to promote its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System—an alternative to the SWIFT international banking system—among its strategic partners and foreign aid recipients in the developing world.
Likewise, China’s recent “Dual Circulation” economic strategy appears to be aimed at countering a decoupling from China’s trade partners. Further, Beijing has surely observed how easy it was for corporations to withdraw from Moscow. If China is to be exposed to the risk of global sanctions and corporate withdrawal, so too are countries and corporations exposed to dependence on the world’s second-largest economy, and thus the government will likely take efforts to make any sanctions or corporate turn against China as painful a prospect as possible. Either way, policymakers in Washington need to understand that the sanctions being used today against Russia are unlikely be as effective the next time around, as China is not just a different economy, but also will learn from the current conflict and adjust accordingly.
For all these valuable lessons, there is little doubt that China has been watching the ongoing conflict with no small amount of chagrin. Chinese leaders are reportedly surprised and unsettled by the poor military performance of its Russian partners, Ukraine’s resistance, and the level of solidarity from the international community. The image of a much smaller state, against all odds, successfully resisting a larger neighbor surely sits uneasily in the psyches of CCP apparatchiks and PLA officials. It also counters the narrative of overwhelming force and grim inevitability Beijing has sought to instill in the psyches of the Taiwanese people. It is notable that early attempts by Chinese state media to capitalize on the Ukraine invasion in precisely this fashion, illustrating how the United States will surely abandon Taiwan when the chips are down, quietly ceased after the initial days of the war, when it became apparent that the U.S. was not, in fact, abandoning Ukraine. Beyond purely psychological factors, Ukraine also offers a blueprint for successful resistance via asymmetric warfare very similar to Taiwan’s proposed Overall Defense Concept, perhaps giving a jolt to a plan that most analysts agree offers Taiwan its best chance of success against the PLA but has stalled out in the face of bureaucratic resistance.
While China and the PLA will surely watch Ukraine closely and try to take away the correct lessons, there is one uncomfortable parallel which China may be unable to avoid by the very nature of its authoritarian system. The runup to the Ukraine invasion featured multiple strategic miscalculations by Putin, driven at least in part by him surrounding himself with the yes-men who inevitably cling to authoritarian leaders, eager to please and afraid to speak truth to power. This was obvious in the visibly uncomfortable reaction of Russia’s SVR (foreign intelligence) chief as he was publicly pressured to agree with Putin in the days leading up to the war, as well as in the sackings and arrests of multiple military and intelligence officials after the war turned poorly. Authoritarian leaders have systemic problems in gaining reliable intelligence, oftentimes magnified by their overconfidence in their own singular understanding of a situation. As China continues its slide away from a system of intra-Party consensus toward a one-man cult of personality in which dissenting views are increasingly unwelcome, Xi is bound to encounter the same problem. It is unclear whether Xi will learn this lesson from Putin, or make his own similar miscalculations in the future towards China’s own neighbors.
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Likewise, what lessons is Taiwan taking from the Ukraine defense.
On the first part, I would say China can ill-afford to either have the world isolate it economically or to have a billion and a half people turn against the handful that brutally rule them.
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The Shrinking U.S. Navy
The Biden budget would build nine ships next year but retire 24.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Updated April 4, 2022 7:16 pm ET
President Biden says he’ll boost defense spending next year because the world is more dangerous. But the budget details don’t match his rhetoric, and Exhibit A is the bleak outlook for the Navy. The bill for decades of complacency and neglect is coming due at a dangerous moment, as China ramps up its fleet.
The Navy’s 2023 budget released last week asks to purchase nine ships while retiring 24, and you don’t need an advanced math degree to understand that will shrink the 298-ship fleet. The Navy’s estimates show the fleet contracting to 280 ships in 2027. A congressional aide tells us the Navy is essentially double-counting a ship Congress already authorized, so at eight new ships the Navy adds one for every three it would scrap.
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Meanwhile, the Navy’s top officer has said that a Navy capable of defeating peer adversaries like China needs about 350 ships and another 150 unmanned or lightly manned vessels, for a total of 500. A reasonable observer may wonder how the Navy plans to grow by getting smaller.
The truth is the Navy finds itself without the resources to expand its fleet or sustain its current ships, and some of its inventory is ill-suited for the next fight. The Navy wants to retire nine littoral combat ships, arguably the service’s biggest acquisition failure of all time in a crowded field. As usual with these Pentagon disasters, the admirals and civilians responsible have long since left the building.
The littoral ship designed to operate in shallow waters has struggled to carry out any useful mission. One marked for retirement was commissioned less than two years ago. The USS Detroit and USS Little Rock, slated for early retirement, “both experienced major propulsion issues to their engines in 2020, which rendered both ships inoperable,” the Government Accountability Office reported in February. “The Navy terminated both deployments early to perform repairs on these ships.”
It is tempting to stop throwing money down this hole, but the Navy’s replacement, a new frigate, is still in development and years away from entering the fleet. Meanwhile, the Navy wants to retire five cruisers that each pack more than 120 missile tubes—serious offensive firepower—arguing that the 30-plus-year-old ships are so rundown they’re unsafe.
As the U.S. debates its least-bad options for managed decline, China is laying hulls. The chart nearby illustrates how China’s fleet will soon dwarf the U.S. Navy. No matter, some say, since U.S. ships are more capable. But quantity is underrated in preventing wars and surviving them if they start. The Pacific isn’t the world’s only water to police. The U.S. Navy has been spending less time in the Black Sea in recent years, according to one analysis, and Vladimir Putin may have priced that into his Ukraine invasion calculation.
Congress last year intervened to buy more ships, and it will need to come to the rescue again. Promising ideas for making the most out of ships in the water: Outfitting the littoral combat ships with the long-range Naval Strike Missile, or tying up the poor old cruisers to do air defense over Guam.
But the Navy’s proposal to retire two dozen ships to save $3.6 billion over five years—a tiny fraction of the service’s budget, as Democratic Rep. Elaine Luria has pointed out—suggests the institution lacks a strategy as well as money. Americans have grown accustomed to peaceful seas over the past 70 years, but that luxury will fade if the U.S. Navy does.
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Russia’s Military Troubles in Ukraine Could Be America’s in the Pacific
If the U.S. doesn’t improve its logistics, a defense of Taiwan against China is likely to fail.
By Seth Cropsey
April 6, 2022 12:32 pm ET
Western observers of Russia’s failure in Ukraine likely will soon begin arguing that Moscow’s inefficiencies diminish Washington’s need to rebuild the U.S. military. But Russian failure has stemmed from logistical issues, and the U.S. military’s capabilities, like Russia’s, aren’t prepared for major combat with a global power.
The Russian military didn’t invest enough in logistics, despite spending lavishly on the polished hardware that appears in military parades. The Russian military, like its Soviet predecessor, remains a conscript force and has neither enough professional noncommissioned officers to maintain equipment nor enough officers trained in logistics. In combat, there is a major difference between a military driver with three years of training and an 18-year-old conscript with a driver’s license. The Russians expected a Ukrainian collapse, but logistical incompetence prevented Russia from supporting multiple fronts simultaneously. Russia has now withdrawn its bloodied units from northeastern Ukraine toward the Donbas region and has abandoned a significant amount of armor and artillery in the process.
It is tempting to ascribe this failure to authoritarian conditions and assume that American and allied armed forces would be immune to such incompetence. But the U.S. military may encounter logistical problems at a similar scale to Russia if the U.S. defends Taiwan against an assault by China. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) isn’t the Russian military, nor does it face the same operational difficulties.
The U.S. has one crucial advantage over Russia: American forces designated for immediate engagement have more resources and are more capable than their Russian counterparts. The U.S. Navy’s carrier strike groups and submarines operate constantly in the Indo-Pacific, with two strike groups and some two dozen submarines deployed. These forces could defend Taiwan during a week of intense combat around the Taiwan Strait and West Philippine Sea. But after a week American advantages would decline.
Unlike Russia, China wouldn’t need to operate at a major scale in enemy territory. Taiwan is 14,000 square miles, compared with Ukraine at 233,000 square miles. The Taiwan Strait is about 110 miles wide. The PLA’s current difficulty is on land. It doesn’t have the amphibious capacity to sustain a beachhead from which ground operations on Taiwan can be launched. But it has built a navy capable of high-end combat, with a large, diverse missile arsenal that can bombard any target within the First Island Chain and provide cover for warships moving into the West Philippine Sea.
Because of Taiwan’s limited antiship missile arsenal and restricted naval capabilities, Chinese aircraft and warships could return to the mainland to rearm, defended by a comprehensive ground-based antiair network. China would need to project power only 300 miles from its coast using long-range missiles and submarines to keep U.S. forces at arm’s length as it assaults Taiwan after disabling the island’s air defenses.
In contrast, the U.S. would need to sustain forces across thousands of miles of open ocean sparsely dotted with islands. The most important is Guam, America’s crucial Indo-Pacific logistics hub, which is vulnerable to Chinese missile attack. Improved missile defenses, and a permanent offensive U.S. military presence on Guam and throughout the Marianas archipelago, would improve the island’s defensibility. Currently, Joint Region Marianas has five home-ported submarines, no permanent fighters or bombers, and a seasonally rotated surveillance drone unit. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has yet to deploy a permanent missile defense system on the island.
U.S. military equipment and support would need to be transported to Guam or further to U.S. forces operating in theater. American warships have more experience than any other nation’s with the refuel and resupply of warships at sea. But replenishment in an active combat theater is dramatically different than in peacetime, and the U.S. has had few logistical obstacles in conflicts since World War II.
The U.S. can’t sustain the flow of men and materiel to a combat zone for longer than a few months. The U.S. Military Sealift Command is designed for peacetime sustainment, not wartime support. The Chinese military would target MSC ships with missiles and perhaps with submarines. There are far too few American-flagged tankers to fill the logistical gap, and the U.S. can’t depend on foreign-flagged shipping.
Even if a vessel is “friendly” flagged, international maritime transport is a fluid business, and actors fair and foul often use shell companies to maximize transport consistency and flexibility. An allied-flagged merchant vessel could be under indirect Chinese or Russian ownership and refuse to transport American goods or be compromised for intelligence purposes. Of the U.S.-flagged fleet, a significant portion would need to remain dedicated to domestic transport between American ports during wartime.
The U.S. could turn to its National Defense Reserve Fleet, a group of mothballed merchant and transport ships kept floating for reactivation in a crisis. Allegedly, this fleet’s Ready Reserve Force of 41 ships could be activated within five to 10 days, and ideally in under 48 hours. During a 2019 test, however, only 60% of these ships were seaworthy within that time, and only 40% could leave port.
Ready Reserve Force ships would need to be manned by merchant mariners. But the U.S. Merchant Marine is shrinking: Poor pay, long hours, low funding, and outsourcing have created an aging workforce. This restricted labor pool would be exhausted in months. Then the U.S. would face a logistical crisis on par with Russia’s, though likely without the collapse of morale and command that have occurred in Ukraine.
A long war carries obvious risks for China, but Russia’s experience in Ukraine provides reasons for Chinese strategists to consider a long war and its costs if they try to seize Taiwan. Given America’s logistical issues, a long war may be China’s best bet. A year of economic brutality and sustained combat might wear the U.S. down and force capitulation.
Americans shouldn’t feel encouraged by Russian missteps in Ukraine. But Moscow’s mistakes should cause the U.S. to consider its own difficulties in defending its interests and values in the Pacific.
Mr. Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy. His books include “Mayday: The Decline of American Naval Supremacy” and “Seablindness: How Political Neglect Is Choking American Seapower and What to Do About It.”
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Hat tip to our GM:
https://twitter.com/naftalibennett/status/1514661060011245571?cxt=HHwWhoCy0bCNlIUqAAAA
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https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2018/05/22/the-us-is-running-out-of-bombs-and-it-may-soon-struggle-to-make-more/
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https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2022/04/another-top-pentagon-official-resigns-warns-pentagon-falling-behind-technology-battle-u-s-rivals/
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-underestimation-of-pla-capabilities-once-again-aids-chinese-hegemony_4418318.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-04-22&utm_medium=email&est=aPD2CgDRWJcHEnhIepiB%2FpxmHTzYHPYKMYEJnKuwHwLx7x%2FwJLHbNHJ3pvZIFfbIuXxC
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what morons:
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/04/22/earth-day-joe-biden-promises-to-spend-billions-to-make-every-u-s-military-vehicle-climate-friendly/
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what morons:
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/04/22/earth-day-joe-biden-promises-to-spend-billions-to-make-every-u-s-military-vehicle-climate-friendly/
We are being set up to lose WWIII.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-would-support-russia-even-if-it-used-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-war-former-defense-official_4421153.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-04-23&utm_medium=email&est=8KauzQOtuX9AHptLa6BJupZ4bEj9urylE8jOUlwfQi1dfR32y%2BK6kucjIONjCRH%2BQHmA
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/apr/12/chinas-orbiting-hypersonic-missile-part-of-growing/
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/triumph-of-the-missiles_4418479.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-04-25&utm_medium=email&est=sNLnG8UjywZVQrRhLQpNYTDkXxmLSMRuJhd7VE4Zd8KXyUSJSgD7y9ZGibyaGs0h5J4a
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Hope we do not need them in the meantime , , ,
https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/04/it-will-be-years-raytheon-can-build-new-stinger-missiles/366105/
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Hope we do not need them in the meantime , , ,
https://www.defenseone.com/business/2022/04/it-will-be-years-raytheon-can-build-new-stinger-missiles/366105/
We are being set up to lose.
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https://www.npr.org/2022/04/29/1095549251/russia-dolphins-black-sea-naval-base?fbclid=IwAR3iAvEoQmI5bsMORgeM8rN0CUKDOVe25i1nyXE7o3WKjvoxG64ZrtAauLg
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if a Ukrainian can knock out advance tanks
and navy vessels
with a missile
what is the take away for our spending trillions on such technology?
I tried a search but do not see anything come up.
should not our own military be looking at this with fecal urgency?
presumable they are :|
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Navy pulls racist "antiracist" books from reading list: Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Gilday recently released an updated list of books for the U.S. Navy's Professional Reading Program. The latest list is noteworthy not for what it includes but rather for what has been omitted. Last year's list sparked controversy over the inclusion of leftist books that several Republican lawmakers rightly contended were "explicitly anti-American." Gone are several of these books including How to Be an Antiracist by Ibram X. Kendi, The New Jim Crow by Michelle Alexander, and Sexual Minorities and Politics by Jason Pierceson. Last year, Gilday defended the controversial list and specifically the inclusion of Kendi's book by arguing that "it evokes the author's own personal journal in understanding barriers to true inclusion, the deep nuances of racism and racial inequalities." Regarding this year's less controversial list, Gilday stated: "We are driving a fleet-wide campaign of self-improvement. We must foster an organization that supports and empowers Sailors to have an independent quest for knowledge through reading and information sharing."
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Russia and China are planning on destroying our carrier groups (Among other things) with hypersonic missiles.
if a Ukrainian can knock out advance tanks
and navy vessels
with a missile
what is the take away for our spending trillions on such technology?
I tried a search but do not see anything come up.
should not our own military be looking at this with fecal urgency?
presumable they are :|
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Hence if we don't arm Taiwan BEFORE the Chinese bust a move it will be too late.
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Hence if we don't arm Taiwan BEFORE the Chinese bust a move it will be too late.
Taiwan can become a nuclear power all on it's own.
That's when we will know they are serious about remaining free.
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Not enough time for that-- indeed the effort would likely accelerate Chinese invasion.
But agree they need to show serious intent.
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Not enough time for that-- indeed the effort would likely accelerate Chinese invasion.
But agree they need to show serious intent.
They have nuclear power plants. It would take them a week.
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My understanding is that it would be far more complicated than that:
Making the bomb
Testing the bomb-- where?
Making the bomb small enough to fit on a missile
Making the missiles to carry it
From where would the missiles be fired?
Extreme disparity of nuke force
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My understanding is that it would be far more complicated than that:
Making the bomb
Testing the bomb-- where?
Making the bomb small enough to fit on a missile
Making the missiles to carry it
From where would the missiles be fired?
Extreme disparity of nuke force
We have many more nukes the the NorKs, but them having any seriously impairs our ability to act against them, the same applies to the PRC and Taiwan.
I'd borrow from what SA and Israel did decades ago.
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/how-south-africa-built-nuclear-weapons-and-then-gave-them-27066
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We need ability to surge munitions!
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/05/four-lessons-should-upend-pentagons-five-year-strategy/366695/
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Interesting points made. If Taiwan could develop nuclear weapons in a week, figuratively, that would mean they already have the know-how, and the materials. Possible. But still, Crafty's point, that wouldn't give them the numbers they need and the delivery systems - unless they already secretly have them.
The only way Taiwan can order a nuclear strike right now on Chinese targets is to call on the United States to do it. The only situation where that comes into play is if China strikes first. At that point, isn't it too late?
With Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we showed a capability the enemy didn't have. How does Taiwan build an arsenal, or Navy, or air force China can't match?
Taiwan can never make a first strike on China. Crafty pointed out, they can't even conduct testing.
And a secret weapon isn't a deterrent.
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If the NorKs, who can’t manage to feed their population, and Pakistan, who doesn’t have a single city with a functioning sewer system have nukes, it’s not a challenge for Taiwan.
They don’t need 50,000, they just need a few.
Once the test one, they send Beijing the footage.
Interesting points made. If Taiwan could develop nuclear weapons in a week, figuratively, that would mean they already have the know-how, and the materials. Possible. But still, Crafty's point, that wouldn't give them the numbers they need and the delivery systems - unless they already secretly have them.
The only way Taiwan can order a nuclear strike right now on Chinese targets is to call on the United States to do it. The only situation where that comes into play is if China strikes first. At that point, isn't it too late?
With Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we showed a capability the enemy didn't have. How does Taiwan build an arsenal, or Navy, or air force China can't match?
Taiwan can never make a first strike on China. Crafty pointed out, they can't even conduct testing.
And a secret weapon isn't a deterrent.
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While we empty our inventory arming the Ukes to fight the Russians for the Obama-Clinton Cabal in order to persuade the Chinese to not take Taiwan, the Chinese prepare to take out the supply chain that would need to sail the Pacific to supply Taiwan and allies in the region:ds
=============================================================
China Testing Missiles to Strike Ships in Port, New Images Reveal
By Andrew Thornebrooke May 12, 2022 Updated: May 12, 2022biggersmaller Print
Analysis of new satellite images suggests that the Chinese military is testing its ability to target ships in port with long-range ballistic missiles. The discovery may shed light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to develop a military capable of decapitating U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific.
The new images, taken by a Maxar Technologies satellite and first reported by the U.S. Naval Institute, document a “great wall” of missile testing facilities, some of which were previously used to test missiles on elaborate replicas of U.S. naval vessels.
Likely constructed in 2018, the newly discovered missile test site is located some 190 miles away from where mock-ups of a U.S. aircraft carrier and destroyer were discovered last year, before being destroyed by missile tests in February.
USNI described the test sites as “a string of large-scale target ranges” located in western China’s Takmalakan Desert, and suggested that their usage was the testing of new hypersonic missiles for use in an early military strike.
“The nature, location and strikes on these sites all suggest the targets are meant for testing ballistic missiles,” USNI reported. “These hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are an increasingly significant threat to warships.”
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has been developing both its ASBM and nuclear missile capabilities across the triad of its land, sea, and air forces for the last several years. Notably, however, the complexity of the newly revealed test site may suggest that the PLA is developing advanced ASBM capable of making precision strikes by changing their trajectory in flight.
USNI reported that the new site was nearly identical to one destroyed in February, and made of a number of differing materials apparently intended to distinguish target ships from target piers, possibly highlighting the complexity with which China is gathering heat and radar information
Traditional ballistic missiles are often considered ill-suited to attacking harbors, as they can easily stray off target and do not achieve the intended effect if they strike in the water. The PLA’s gathering of such targeting information could help them to construct much more accurate weapons systems, worthy of being used in an opening salvo against an enemy port.
“ASBMs, if they are able to discern a ship from a pier, could inflict a killer opening blow against an enemy navy,” USNI reported. “The fear is fleets could be decapitated before they can escape to open water or disperse.”
U.S. intelligence leaders have described the risk of China initiating a war over Taiwan before 2030 as “acute,” and the United States would likely be drawn into such a conflict. To that end, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said earlier in May that the PLA was explicitly researching and developing weapons capable of overcoming the United States’ military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
“They are studying how we fight… and designing systems that are intended to defeat us,” Kendall said.
“They’re not waiting to see what we do.”
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https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2022/05/14/western-weapons-in-ukraine-being-sold-on-via-encrypted-messaging-app-report/
While we empty our inventory arming the Ukes to fight the Russians for the Obama-Clinton Cabal in order to persuade the Chinese to not take Taiwan, the Chinese prepare to take out the supply chain that would need to sail the Pacific to supply Taiwan and allies in the region:ds
=============================================================
China Testing Missiles to Strike Ships in Port, New Images Reveal
By Andrew Thornebrooke May 12, 2022 Updated: May 12, 2022biggersmaller Print
Analysis of new satellite images suggests that the Chinese military is testing its ability to target ships in port with long-range ballistic missiles. The discovery may shed light on the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) efforts to develop a military capable of decapitating U.S. forces in the Indo-Pacific.
The new images, taken by a Maxar Technologies satellite and first reported by the U.S. Naval Institute, document a “great wall” of missile testing facilities, some of which were previously used to test missiles on elaborate replicas of U.S. naval vessels.
Likely constructed in 2018, the newly discovered missile test site is located some 190 miles away from where mock-ups of a U.S. aircraft carrier and destroyer were discovered last year, before being destroyed by missile tests in February.
USNI described the test sites as “a string of large-scale target ranges” located in western China’s Takmalakan Desert, and suggested that their usage was the testing of new hypersonic missiles for use in an early military strike.
“The nature, location and strikes on these sites all suggest the targets are meant for testing ballistic missiles,” USNI reported. “These hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) are an increasingly significant threat to warships.”
China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), has been developing both its ASBM and nuclear missile capabilities across the triad of its land, sea, and air forces for the last several years. Notably, however, the complexity of the newly revealed test site may suggest that the PLA is developing advanced ASBM capable of making precision strikes by changing their trajectory in flight.
USNI reported that the new site was nearly identical to one destroyed in February, and made of a number of differing materials apparently intended to distinguish target ships from target piers, possibly highlighting the complexity with which China is gathering heat and radar information
Traditional ballistic missiles are often considered ill-suited to attacking harbors, as they can easily stray off target and do not achieve the intended effect if they strike in the water. The PLA’s gathering of such targeting information could help them to construct much more accurate weapons systems, worthy of being used in an opening salvo against an enemy port.
“ASBMs, if they are able to discern a ship from a pier, could inflict a killer opening blow against an enemy navy,” USNI reported. “The fear is fleets could be decapitated before they can escape to open water or disperse.”
U.S. intelligence leaders have described the risk of China initiating a war over Taiwan before 2030 as “acute,” and the United States would likely be drawn into such a conflict. To that end, Air Force Secretary Frank Kendall said earlier in May that the PLA was explicitly researching and developing weapons capable of overcoming the United States’ military presence in the Indo-Pacific.
“They are studying how we fight… and designing systems that are intended to defeat us,” Kendall said.
“They’re not waiting to see what we do.”
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https://twitter.com/JackPosobiec/status/1531133665085902849
This is fine.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18512/pentagon-losing-to-china
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personally I have a problem with this leftist slime ball:
https://www.vox.com/recode/2022/6/9/23160588/eric-schmidt-americas-frontier-fund-google-alphabet-tech-government-revolving-door
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Please post in the Corruption and/or Goolag thread.
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https://www.businessinsider.com/china-launches-worlds-first-ai-unmanned-drone-aircraft-carrier-2022-6?fbclid=IwAR1633Y4s3W3b6B2BL2l6ry0w5U4KjLJfdGLDDIsL5_bJ7EKxUZSFqYcceY
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https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3178495/new-marine-species-chinas-world-first-drone-carrying-ship-capable-operating-its
seems like everything the CCP does has a military application
everything
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https://www.scmp.com/video/china/3178495/new-marine-species-chinas-world-first-drone-carrying-ship-capable-operating-its
seems like everything the CCP does has a military application
everything
Not an accident.
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June 21, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF
The Evolution of Great Powers
By: George Friedman
The evolution of military power is one of the most important if underrated geopolitical changes happening in the world today. Throughout the 20th century, military power was the province of large nations. Machines dominated the battlefield, and the production of these machines, the materials that fueled them and the ordnance they used required access to complex factories and massive amounts of raw materials. This, in turn, required vast numbers of workers – and the housing and food the workers needed to function. An economy of this scale needed to produce large numbers of ships, planes, tanks and all other manners of wartime materiel, even as they required functioning economies outside the wartime economy, providing the basic necessities of life and, ideally, maintaining national morale.
Battlefields are black holes of consumption. Any nation can build a plane or tank or send a man to his death, but wars were won by nations that could build enormous numbers of planes and tanks and replace the ones that had been destroyed by the enemy – not to mention replenish the steady stream of dead soldiers.
Small nations could not engage in high-intensity war because they lacked the resources to do so. The definition of a great power, then, was a country with a large population, the agricultural system that fed it and the mineral base that could arm it. Given the deaths and damage the enemy could inflict, the key to military power was the size of the population and its resources. It also ideally had to be vast, with resources dispersed such that an enemy victory in one region would not mean a victory in all regions.
As important, successful wartime nations needed technical expertise. Aircraft, warships and tanks needed to be planned and built, and the designs needed constant upgrading in response to the technical evolutions of the enemy. This meant that great powers had large numbers of inherently scarce technicians.
After World War II, only the United States and the Soviet Union had the potential to wage war as great powers. (They were later joined by China.) Before the war, smaller powers, like Germany, the United Kingdom, France or Japan could be considered great powers too, but in the end, they either lost or participated in an alliance.
In the intervening years, there has been a vast evolution of martial technology. It was once necessary to bring a 40-ton tank 2,000 miles away to deliver 40 or 50 pounds of explosives on an enemy position. The first British bomber attack was so inaccurate that the Germans couldn’t figure out what the British target was. Ships could not see farther than the horizon, where an enemy fleet could be lurking. Special aircraft had to be launched simply to see deep. Paradoxically, the more primitive the system, the more resources were required to sustain it. The more aware of its environment and the more accurate the guidance, the lower the drain. For example, a satellite can provide an enemy’s location, and automated internal guidance systems on munitions can strike precisely. There are new satellites that belong in a new class. As a result of accuracy, a force requires fewer munitions. The concentration of manpower shifts from the active battlefield to managing intelligence and rapidly innovating technologies. War no longer required a massive population, nor does it require massive consumption of raw material.
This has significant geopolitical consequences. Small and even very small countries can wage war, particularly against older model militaries that lack the precision and range of the new class of countries. These small countries shift from a dependence on depth to time. The more room a country had, the more room it had to disperse. In the emerging model of war, the more time they have in which to react to dangers, the more effective they are. It is not a single evolution so much as a set of evolutions, from space-based intelligence to long-range autotargeted weapons to automated anti-missile systems.
We can see this evolution most clearly in Israel. Founded first on French and then American weapons, the Israeli military now has homegrown capabilities that it (ironically) can sell to others. They are designed around the principle that putting troops at risk is a possible but rare event, while using unmanned force as the dominant element of strategy. Israel has come the furthest with this strategy, but it can be seen also in places such as the United Arab Emirates and Singapore. As a result, each wields international political power far beyond what might have been expected from it during the prior era. New technologies enable small powers to engage much larger powers. The core of the force is the technologists who maintain and upgrade systems – a fraction of the manpower needed by the old definition of great powers.
Of course, manned militaries remain indispensable. But the conversion to a new mode of thought is well underway. Israel has a striking amount of regional influence, but its technology cannot fully defend against a massive force from the last era’s great power. Maintaining one culture while creating new ones sparks crises between cultures – and within budgets. The new technology is ready for operation, but by itself it is not yet proven.
Still, the evolution is underway, and that means that the definition of great power will have to change. Russia expected to defeat Ukraine with older weapons. That has not happened, at least not yet. Russia has to evolve its military. So will other large great powers if they wish to have effective forces. There is no inherent reason they can’t evolve, but their size is no longer decisive. Smaller nations can become great powers, decisive and dangerous.
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https://www.military.com/daily-news/2022/06/24/army-drops-requirement-high-school-diploma-amid-recruiting-crisis.html
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https://thefederalist.com/2022/06/29/thanks-to-leftist-corruption-u-s-military-recruiting-is-in-total-freefall/
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Fk . . .
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https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/110/041/097/original/ef756233d58a45bb.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/110/041/097/original/ef756233d58a45bb.jpg)
Can't recruit, but let's purge the freethinkers!
They might not shoot Americans.
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russia-reacts-to-u-s-hypersonic-missile-failure/ar-AAZ4Twn?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=8c58eaca6c794a9b8d1f8d30320ef340
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Concerned Graduates of West Point Challenge Leadership of Military Academy: Letter
By Enrico Trigoso June 26, 2022 Updated: June 27, 2022biggersmaller Print
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Three retired U.S. military officers—LTG Thomas McInerney, USAF; MG Paul Vallely, U.S. Army; and Colonel Andrew O’Meara Jr., U.S. Army—signed a letter authored by “Concerned Graduates of West Point and The Long Gray Line,” protesting against mandatory vaccinations, CRT classes, sanitary conditions, progressive political activism, and other “woke actions,” in the military academy.
“The Long Gray Line” refers to the continuum of graduates United States Military Academy at West Point, New York.
“We wanted to challenge the leadership of the Academy and the Defense Dept on their WOKE actions, CRT, Diversity training and the other discrepancies in the Academy. We found it pervasive at the Naval and Air Force Academies so we knew it was directed from the highest levels of our Military Leadership,” Vallely told The Epoch Times.
Epoch Times Photo
Paul E Vallely MG US Army (Ret) (Courtesy of Paul E Vallely)
“We all want the Military to get back on track to training and leading our Armed Forces to secure America and its Citizens,” Vallely, who has been sounding the alarm against a socialist takeover of the United States, added.
The letter, titled “Declaration of Betrayal of West Point And the Long Gray Line,” asks for the following information:
An explanation for the irregularities in the enforcement of the Honor Code.
A justification for the mandatory vaccinations of cadets with the COVID Virus despite widespread adverse reactions to the inoculation, as well as provisions for exceptions for cadets with religious objections.
An explanation for teaching Critical Race Theory at the Academy that constitutes an attack upon the Constitution and our constitutional Republic. This is behavior that constitutes unconstitutional conduct, if not sedition.
An explanation of reported mismanagement of the cadet dining facility resulting in unsanitary conditions, inadequate food prepared for the meal, and food served that was reportedly unfit for consumption.
Political activism on the part of civilian faculty members constituting political activity violating the long-standing policy of the Academy and Army Regulations.
The practice of exclusive reliance upon radical progressive guest speakers to address the Corps of Cadets. This practice results in prejudiced political activism on the part of the Staff and Faculty in violation of Army Regulations.
An explanation for the failure of the Superintendent to respond to correspondence inquiring about problems identified at the Academy.
Endangering the Mission
They believe that there is a rejection of the principles of the military academy which could endanger its original mission “to educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets so that each graduate is a commissioned leader of character committed to the values of Duty, Honor, Country and prepared for a career of professional excellence and service to the Nation as an officer in the United States Army.”
They sent the letter in the hopes that authorities take heed of their advice regarding the problems that they have spotted.
The letter was sent to the Superintendent of the Academy as well as the President and Directors of the Association of Graduates (AOG), alleging that the West Point Academy is “conducting business in a manner that ignores time-honored principles of the Academy, Constitutional Law, and our sworn oath of office.”
“When you take away to teach a critical race theory and communist ideology, you’re taking away from the time that could be used for learning how to shoot better, how to operate airplanes better, take care of airplanes through maintenance; and even within the medical corps of the armed forces, it has affected many the doctors and nurses. So it’s a terrible thing. They need to stop it right now. They need to stop enforcing the mandates,” Vallely recently told The Epoch Times.
Vaccine Mandate Deadline
As the June 30 deadline nears for compliance with the U.S. military’s COVID-19 vaccine mandate, U.S. Army officials publicly claim a very small percentage of its members are unvaccinated, reporting 96 percent or more of its members are fully vaccinated.
However, the Army’s vaccination rate could be far lower than 96 percent, an anonymous active-duty senior Army official told The Defender.
The Epoch Times reached out to West Point Public Affairs for comment.
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https://www.yahoo.com/news/army-bases-honor-confederate-traitors-115801444.html
wokism, is clearly a big part in the calculations
as it is for everything now
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2402289/enemies-purging-us-military
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2402289/enemies-purging-us-military
The US military can't recruit now, how does this make any kind of sense?
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https://www.realclearpolitics.com/epolls/2024/president/us/general-election-trump-vs-biden-7383.html
why can't we put a stop to this?
:-(
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https://nypost.com/2022/07/08/cameron-holt-warns-china-is-acquiring-new-weapons-five-times-faster-than-us/?fbclid=IwAR2BIzLR96umgR8adweRce-I1q4M25t2xdF5Ofy_VS-nRJROff9HCClrfag
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https://archive.ph/sUdr5
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https://archive.ph/sUdr5
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/110/997/558/original/794bdf8ed8415fd9.png
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/110/997/558/original/794bdf8ed8415fd9.png)
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https://www.propublica.org/article/bayraktar-tb2-drone-turkey-exports?utm_source=sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=majorinvestigations&utm_content=feature
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2022/07/13/more-260000-troops-not-fully-vaccinated-many-face-discharge-under-biden-administration-mandate/
https://archive.ph/sUdr5
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/110/997/558/original/794bdf8ed8415fd9.png
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/110/997/558/original/794bdf8ed8415fd9.png)
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https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/111/072/775/original/c1bb8fd57b87cdb7.png
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/111/072/775/original/c1bb8fd57b87cdb7.png)
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2021/07/06/ufos-plasma-lasers-and-the-pentagons-voice-of-god-weapon/?sh=7e2ae608722d
https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2019/07/19/pentagon-scientists-are-making-talking-plasma-laser-balls-for-use-as-non-lethal-weapons/
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"A sufficiently intense laser pulse can ionize producing a burst of glowing plasma. The Laser Induced Plasma Effects program uses single plasma bursts as flash-bang stun grenades; a rapid series of such pluses can even be modulated to transmit a spoken message (video here). In 2011 Japanese company Burton Inc demonstrated a rudimentary system that created moving 3D images in mid-air with a series of rapidly-generated plasma dots (video here)."
This pops up in rapid Google search:
"Plasma physics is the study of charged particles and fluids interacting with self-consistent electric and magnetic fields. It is a basic research discipline that has many different areas of application — space and astrophysics, controlled fusion, accelerator physics and beam storage."
the military knows this so what was the big secret?
till now
So is CCP testing this against our military?
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MILITARY
US Military Can’t Fulfill National Defense Strategy Because of Force Cuts: Experts
By Andrew Thornebrooke July 14, 2022 Updated: July 14, 2022biggersmaller Print
ET
The U.S. military isn’t able to fully realize the demands of the National Defense Strategy because of years of force cuts and a failure to modernize its arsenal, according to experts.
“There’s a huge gap between what the national defense strategy requires that the Navy, the Air Force, the Army, and the Marine Corps [provide] and what they can actually provide today,” said Mark Gunzinger, director of future concepts and capability assessments at the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies. “That’s the product of three decades worth of force cuts and delayed modernization.”
To make up for that fact and to prepare for a possible conflict with China, the United States may need to consider increasing its use of cheaper, unmanned systems in an effort to augment its more expensive assets, Gunzinger said. Particularly so, given that U.S. officials have warned that China’s communist regime could launch an invasion of Taiwan by 2027.
“How do you make up that gap and in the time frame we’re talking about?” he said. “A big part of the answer in unmanned systems.”
Many US Systems Not Mission Capable
Gunzinger delivered the remarks during a July 12 roundtable on the issue of U.S. air and naval forces development hosted by the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank.
The group of experts discussed how unmanned systems could boost the survivability and warfighting capacity of U.S. military units in the Pacific, even as the military contends with sluggish readiness levels.
One such sign of dwindling military readiness discussed is a decade-long decrease in mission-capable systems, a trend most pronounced in the Navy and Marine Corps, which would be responsible for most of the fighting in the event of a conflict with China.
In perhaps the most jarring example of decreasing readiness, roughly 50 percent of the military’s F-18 Super Hornet fighter jets were considered to not be mission capable, according to Diana Maurer, director of defense capabilities and management at the Government Accountability Office.
“When half of your aircraft are not able to get up in the air to perform a single mission, that really blunts the ability to carry out some of the operations that the Navy and others would like to perform,” she said. “That’s a concern.”
Maurer said there were similar concerns with a number of vessels typically used to launch such aircraft and that the backlog and delays for routine maintenance on naval vessels were negatively affecting the military in profound ways.
To that end, she said the various service branches would need to do more to overcome “institutional bias” and integrate with one another in order to be capable of seizing the advantage in a Pacific conflict.
“They’re going to have to work together in a much more integrated, much more seamless way to make that possible,” Maurer said.
US Forces Not Ready for China Conflict
Overall, the United States would need to do much to regain the high ground against China in the Pacific, according to Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute.
“The main challenge we’re facing is the missile threat posed by China,” Clark said. “Fundamentally, China has the ability to reach out thousands of miles away from its coast and threaten carrier strike groups … with a large number of precision strike weapons.”
As such, he said, U.S. forces would likely need to operate in a highly constrained environment, 1,000 to 1,500 nautical miles away from the Chinese coastline in order to be effective. Even then, however, it would face its biggest challenge in Chinese aircraft with large salvos of cruise missiles and bombs.
Clark and his Hudson Institute colleague, Timothy Walton, co-authored a report (pdf) on the issue earlier in the year. In that document, they made the case that the Navy and Marine Corps should opt to field more F-18s and fewer costly F-35s.
The F-35’s operational advantages would be effectively nullified given the distance they would have to be stationed away from Chinese forces, the authors said. The United States could make up the difference much more efficiently through distributed counter-air operations that relied on more drones and layered short-range air defenses, they said.
Such may not be the direction the Navy has in mind, however.
“Our engagement with the Navy showed that they were thinking of getting longer-range weapons to try to deal with the challenge,” Clark said. “Fundamentally, they’re constrained by the fact that their future attack aircraft portfolio is F-35s and F-18s, they don’t have a more penetrating aircraft on the horizon.”
To that end, Clark said physically larger missiles also meant reducing salvo sizes and that the strategy might not be affordable at scale. As such, his and Walton’s report suggested overhauling U.S. aircraft carriers to focus solely on strike capabilities while transferring other operation capacities to land and space assets.
==============
Even D1:
https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/07/fewer-military-families-would-recommend-uniformed-service-survey-finds/374481/
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdtF4ntndW0&t=91s
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/jul/20/senators-flag-pentagon-excessive-spending-looking-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=morning&utm_term=newsletter&utm_content=morning&bt_ee=qVEC3KdOrUDp6spUwOi5Ukj3Pl8rih10snJyKyKi8XCz5UKojcrAal7PihkYVZlF&bt_ts=1658396719825
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How Covid May Have Crushed Military Recruitment
A U.S. Navy officer from the amphibious ship USS San Diego (LPD 22) receives a coronavirus vaccine at the navy port in Manama, Bahrain, February 26, 2021. (Brandon Woods/U.S. Navy/Handout via Reuters)
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By LUTHER RAY ABEL
July 23, 2022 6:30 AM
Allow me to offer the simplest explanation.
Word on the street is that military recruits are more and more difficult to come by. National Review’s Isaac Schorr and the New York Times have both valuably reported the recruiting shortfalls of late. They are an unfortunate but predictable outcome of a panoply of factors.
Perhaps not surprisingly, commentators have their pet reasons for why the Army might have secured only 40 percent of the 57,000 they hope to enlist by the end of the fiscal year and why even the Air Force — long considered the most desirable branch to join — is 4,000 short. The Left prefers to cite extremism in the enlisted ranks along with economic factors; the Right posits that woke-ism detrimental to the cause has proliferated under Biden’s administration while obesity has rendered many Americans physically unfit to serve. Naturally, there’s a tad more to the story; please allow me to apply Occam’s razor, even if it puts me in partisan-pundit territory.
The simplest and best explanation for the recruitment shortage is that potential recruits are disinclined to join because of vaccination requirements, limited exposure to recruiters stemming from lockdowns, and the dire warnings of family members and others who have served and abhor the direction some parts of the military have gone.
Three years ago, the Army met its goal of 68,000 recruits. Today, it struggles to hit a mark 11,000 below that. The economy was hot in 2019, with a solid 3.6 unemployment rate, so I’m not buying the economic argument as a primary reason. Further, the military was composed of a wide array of political nonsense of all stripes in the same year and long before. During my time in, we received absurd lectures along progressive lines on the regular; Obama or Trump, it didn’t matter. We grumblingly signed the muster sheet, departed our consciousnesses for the presentation, and looked for an opportunity to disappear from the lecture hall during the head breaks. The average shop aboard a carrier has pseudo-Marxists next to Trumpists next to social democrats next to neocons: They all talk s*** and don’t vote. What changed was Covid.
Our reaction to Covid did a few things simultaneously, all stymieing recruitment. Recruiters went from readily accessing schools, social institutions, and public events to having prolonged removal from all of the above. Recruiters are salesmen, and if MM2 (SW) Abel can’t shake hands with a young man or woman and fervently extol the many virtues of living in a press of sweat-stained coveralls eating reheated chicken for months at a time, then the sale becomes much more difficult. As a former recruit, I can attest that you build a relationship with your recruiters. I remember mine fondly. One was round; the other had a creepy mustache and worked part-time as a barista at Starbucks. But man, were they hilarious. A comedy duo, with the former playing the straight man and the other the gonzo funnyman. It was these exhibitions of camaraderie that made the Navy attractive.
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But with Covid, the military became a good deal less fun and increasingly antagonistic. While rarely a click-your-heels-with-joy adventure, deployments have provided young sailors the opportunity to experience countries they would never otherwise have known. Ask any servicemember about his or her enlistment, and foreign travel tops the list nigh-always. But bases locked down, deployed ships pulled into port, and masking was mandated. Imagine day after day in hot, humid climates with your breath recycling into your face. That whole thing about required vaccination didn’t help either.
The military’s recruitment comes as much or more from personal recommendation as it does from recruiters’ efforts. If you’re a rising high-school senior and considering enlistment, you reach out to a graduate who has since enlisted to hear how it is. If one receives a response detailing the misery that military service was during the lockdown period, who of sound mind would want to volunteer?
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/07/navy-fleet-plan-needs-3-5-annual-budget-increases-next-two-decades/375038/
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https://www.defensenews.com/air/2022/08/01/us-special-operations-command-chooses-l3harris-sky-warden-for-armed-overwatch-effort/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=fb_defensenews&fbclid=IwAR265nWikJCToYzRERPlOC9bXOg1EnGpYfD-kpLNuxYcnLx1YByyKvGSaTo
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https://summit.news/2022/08/05/us-military-hosts-drag-show-encouraged-children-to-attend-with-bouncy-castles-and-face-painting/
The Russian Army and PLA don't even do this!
We own this spectrum of warfare!
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https://www.revolver.news/2022/08/reports-military-is-taking-equipment-from-us-soldiers-sending-it-to-ukraine/
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https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/rick-moran/2022/07/30/is-a-woke-military-to-blame-for-lagging-recruitment-n1617053?fbclid=IwAR3a1NIaWFUPzOYnWxm395gN75uktSf-j8rLHUYJOJ0e6yQw0V23bwvWRQQ
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/in-5-charts-factors-affecting-chinas-military-future_4685846.html?utm_source=Opinion&utm_campaign=opinion-2022-08-24&utm_medium=email&est=BuodUAbDKKzlL3c%2FvliGWLKX6VWBsXOXbd2lKEIQ6TVo5ybwm7%2FprlfqUU7lSt%2B%2BEPf9
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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Pentagon’s Vaccine Mandate Is Illegal, Military Whistleblowers Allege in Memo to Members of Congress
By J.M. Phelps August 24, 2022 Updated: August 24, 2022biggersmaller Print
In opposition to the continued military vaccine mandate, a group of military whistleblowers delivered a 41-page memorandum to members of Congress on Aug. 16.
Captain Joshua “Hippity” Hoppe, a Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey pilot, wrote to various Congressmen, explaining that he and other signatories of the memo had attempted to bring their concerns about the military vaccine mandate to their commanders, but their efforts had “fallen on deaf ears.” In June, a 12-page report titled the Congressional Survey of Accountability, Truth, and Freedom (ATAF) began a public attempt to call attention to the difficulties of service members who refuse the vaccine mandate typically for religious reasons.
According to the whistleblower memo, Emergency Use Authorized (EUA) vaccines, as opposed to vaccines that received full Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, have been unlawfully administered by the Department of Defense (DoD) since August 2021.
The argument rests on the claim that the Pentagon’s Aug. 24, 2021, vaccine mandate applied to “COVID-19 vaccines that receive full licensure from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in accordance with FDA-approved labeling and guidance.” And therefore EUA vaccines cannot be forced upon service members.
“Americans never lose the right to legally refuse an EUA product,” the memo stated.
The document further argued that “the DoD cannot claim ignorance with regard to the legal differences between an EUA product and a licensed product.”
The memo’s signatories also alleged that the new Comirnaty-labeled vials, which ostensibly have full FDA-approval, carry lot numbers associated with EUA vaccines, noting that “misrepresenting an EUA manufactured lot of vaccine product as a fully licensed product is a violation of labeling.”
Hoppe and his colleagues are now calling upon recipients of the current memo to publish the report on their Congressional websites, call for Austin to cease enforcing the vaccine mandate, begin a Congressional investigation into this issue and potential fraudulent actions, and hold any responsible parties to account. He hopes constituents in their home states will also encourage members of Congress to act.
The Epoch Times spoke to Navy Lt. Commander Patrick Wier, a second signatory on the memo. The 12-year veteran of the Navy currently serves a Reserve Judge Advocate General (JAG). His concern about the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on members of the nation’s military existed prior to Defense Secretary Llyod Austin’s announcement of a vaccine mandate. In March 2021, he said, he submitted a paper to his command explaining why he would oppose “the eventual vaccine mandate.”
Around the same time, he also sent a copy to several congressmen and senators in hopes of “getting them on board.” This initial effort garnered a “mixed response,” he said. Some remained advocates for the vaccine and others offered support for his decision to reject the vaccine.
Four months later, Wier’s instinct became reality. Austin directed the DoD to mandate the vaccine for service members. And despite there not being an FDA-approved vaccine available at the time, and while there is still not one today, Wier said, he chose to “remain committed to military service” while requesting religious accommodation.
Although the Pentagon has issued a policy (pdf) saying the FDA-approved Comirnaty and EUA Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines are interchangeable, the legality of this policy continues to be contested by service members, like Wier.
With an appeal pending, his religious accommodation request was denied on Feb. 26.
In the interim, Wier said he was given a report of misconduct for failing to get the vaccine during the time period between receiving his denial letter and submitting his appeal. While he seeks to have the report of misconduct removed from his record, a misconduct investigation is still pending.
These incidents compelled Wier to gladly participate in the memorandum to Congress. He hopes the memo will “bring awareness to Congress.” He considers the governing body “to be the stewards of, and oversight for, the military which is being discriminatorily treated in an unlawful manner.”
In response to the whistleblower allegations, on Aug. 18, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis. ) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, FDA Commissioner Robert Califf and CDC Director Rochelle Walensky asking them address multiple issues with the vaccine options. The senator questioned why some Comirnaty-labeled lot numbers correspond with EUA vaccine lots.
The Constitution Protects Service Members
Laws enacted by Congress offer protections to all service members, Wier said. These come in the form of requirements for informed consent, protections against clinical trials and testing on military members, and through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, he explained. “Each of those protections are there because Congress has the job of controlling and overseeing the protection of service members,” he added.
The American public and members of the military have been lied to about the COVID-19 vaccines, according to Wier. “There’s an entire web of lies out there and no one understands the truth,” he said. The vaccine has been proven to be ineffective and presents dangers to those who have received it, he argued. In a recent report by substack The Dossier, service members are coming forward with allegations of vaccine-related injuries throughout the Air Force.
“Enemies within the military structure are not supporting the laws of the United States, whether that’s the Constitution or other statutory regulations,” Wier said. “Taxpayer dollars, used to fund the military, should be funding the military’s mission which protects the American way of life,” he said.
“First and foremost, in accordance with the Constitution, the military defends America against foreign and domestic enemies,” Wier said. “Unfortunately, some of those enemies are now within,” and many undermining the Constitutional rights of all service members, he said.
“I’ve heard throughout my career that I gave up my rights when I joined the military,” Wier said. “I challenge anyone to find me where I’ve agreed to give up any Constitutional right.” As a Navy JAG, he is very familiar with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and many statutes of the country.
“While there are restrictions under the UCMJ that control my behavior and appropriate courses of action,” he said, “none of them impede Constitutional rights.” He pointed out that Article 92 of the UCMJ states that “orders have to be Constitutional in order to be followed.” According to Wier, the military vaccine mandate is unlawful, and this sentiment is fully expressed in the memo recently sent to Congress.
Further explaining his rights, Wier admitted that when he joined the Navy, he proudly donned a Navy uniform. “And while, theoretically, I may have given up the ability to wear jeans and a T-shirt to work, I haven’t lost any Constitutional rights,” he said.
However, the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional and “must be ended,” Wier said. “In my opinion,” he said, “there’s no legal authority for the current vaccine mandate as outlined in the memorandum provided to members of Congress.” FDA-approved vaccines are not available and there is no justification for their use or enforcement, he said.
Wier maintains that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional because it does not provide exceptions to support every servicemember’s rights to the free exercise of religion. According to the lawyer, it also violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which ensures that interests in religious freedom are protected against interference from the government.
“Other than through its own self-serving conclusions,” Wier said, “the DoD and the Navy have been unable to substantiate that the vaccine mandate is necessary, and the least restrictive means, to serve a compelling government interest.”
According to Wier, the vaccine mandate has not ensured mission readiness, as evidenced by the continued COVID-19 transmission of vaccinated servicemembers.
“Instead, mission readiness has been degraded by the vaccine mandate, because it has prevented many valuable and courageous servicemembers—those most willing to publicly embrace honor, courage, and commitment—from performing their responsibilities,” he said.
“By continuing to enforce it, military readiness is suffering because there are thousands of good, strong warriors who believe in the Constitution that are currently being separated from the military or sidelined from their jobs, unable to do what the taxpayers are paying them to do.”
The damage being done to military readiness is “irresponsible and dangerous,” he added.
Wier expressed that his views were his own and not that of the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy.
The Pentagon did not return an inquiry from The Epoch Times.
-
The narrative is collapsing.
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Pentagon’s Vaccine Mandate Is Illegal, Military Whistleblowers Allege in Memo to Members of Congress
By J.M. Phelps August 24, 2022 Updated: August 24, 2022biggersmaller Print
In opposition to the continued military vaccine mandate, a group of military whistleblowers delivered a 41-page memorandum to members of Congress on Aug. 16.
Captain Joshua “Hippity” Hoppe, a Marine Corps MV-22B Osprey pilot, wrote to various Congressmen, explaining that he and other signatories of the memo had attempted to bring their concerns about the military vaccine mandate to their commanders, but their efforts had “fallen on deaf ears.” In June, a 12-page report titled the Congressional Survey of Accountability, Truth, and Freedom (ATAF) began a public attempt to call attention to the difficulties of service members who refuse the vaccine mandate typically for religious reasons.
According to the whistleblower memo, Emergency Use Authorized (EUA) vaccines, as opposed to vaccines that received full Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval, have been unlawfully administered by the Department of Defense (DoD) since August 2021.
The argument rests on the claim that the Pentagon’s Aug. 24, 2021, vaccine mandate applied to “COVID-19 vaccines that receive full licensure from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), in accordance with FDA-approved labeling and guidance.” And therefore EUA vaccines cannot be forced upon service members.
“Americans never lose the right to legally refuse an EUA product,” the memo stated.
The document further argued that “the DoD cannot claim ignorance with regard to the legal differences between an EUA product and a licensed product.”
The memo’s signatories also alleged that the new Comirnaty-labeled vials, which ostensibly have full FDA-approval, carry lot numbers associated with EUA vaccines, noting that “misrepresenting an EUA manufactured lot of vaccine product as a fully licensed product is a violation of labeling.”
Hoppe and his colleagues are now calling upon recipients of the current memo to publish the report on their Congressional websites, call for Austin to cease enforcing the vaccine mandate, begin a Congressional investigation into this issue and potential fraudulent actions, and hold any responsible parties to account. He hopes constituents in their home states will also encourage members of Congress to act.
The Epoch Times spoke to Navy Lt. Commander Patrick Wier, a second signatory on the memo. The 12-year veteran of the Navy currently serves a Reserve Judge Advocate General (JAG). His concern about the implications of the COVID-19 pandemic on members of the nation’s military existed prior to Defense Secretary Llyod Austin’s announcement of a vaccine mandate. In March 2021, he said, he submitted a paper to his command explaining why he would oppose “the eventual vaccine mandate.”
Around the same time, he also sent a copy to several congressmen and senators in hopes of “getting them on board.” This initial effort garnered a “mixed response,” he said. Some remained advocates for the vaccine and others offered support for his decision to reject the vaccine.
Four months later, Wier’s instinct became reality. Austin directed the DoD to mandate the vaccine for service members. And despite there not being an FDA-approved vaccine available at the time, and while there is still not one today, Wier said, he chose to “remain committed to military service” while requesting religious accommodation.
Although the Pentagon has issued a policy (pdf) saying the FDA-approved Comirnaty and EUA Pfizer-BioNTech vaccines are interchangeable, the legality of this policy continues to be contested by service members, like Wier.
With an appeal pending, his religious accommodation request was denied on Feb. 26.
In the interim, Wier said he was given a report of misconduct for failing to get the vaccine during the time period between receiving his denial letter and submitting his appeal. While he seeks to have the report of misconduct removed from his record, a misconduct investigation is still pending.
These incidents compelled Wier to gladly participate in the memorandum to Congress. He hopes the memo will “bring awareness to Congress.” He considers the governing body “to be the stewards of, and oversight for, the military which is being discriminatorily treated in an unlawful manner.”
In response to the whistleblower allegations, on Aug. 18, Sen. Ron Johnson (R-Wis. ) sent a letter to Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin, FDA Commissioner Robert Califf and CDC Director Rochelle Walensky asking them address multiple issues with the vaccine options. The senator questioned why some Comirnaty-labeled lot numbers correspond with EUA vaccine lots.
The Constitution Protects Service Members
Laws enacted by Congress offer protections to all service members, Wier said. These come in the form of requirements for informed consent, protections against clinical trials and testing on military members, and through the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, he explained. “Each of those protections are there because Congress has the job of controlling and overseeing the protection of service members,” he added.
The American public and members of the military have been lied to about the COVID-19 vaccines, according to Wier. “There’s an entire web of lies out there and no one understands the truth,” he said. The vaccine has been proven to be ineffective and presents dangers to those who have received it, he argued. In a recent report by substack The Dossier, service members are coming forward with allegations of vaccine-related injuries throughout the Air Force.
“Enemies within the military structure are not supporting the laws of the United States, whether that’s the Constitution or other statutory regulations,” Wier said. “Taxpayer dollars, used to fund the military, should be funding the military’s mission which protects the American way of life,” he said.
“First and foremost, in accordance with the Constitution, the military defends America against foreign and domestic enemies,” Wier said. “Unfortunately, some of those enemies are now within,” and many undermining the Constitutional rights of all service members, he said.
“I’ve heard throughout my career that I gave up my rights when I joined the military,” Wier said. “I challenge anyone to find me where I’ve agreed to give up any Constitutional right.” As a Navy JAG, he is very familiar with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and many statutes of the country.
“While there are restrictions under the UCMJ that control my behavior and appropriate courses of action,” he said, “none of them impede Constitutional rights.” He pointed out that Article 92 of the UCMJ states that “orders have to be Constitutional in order to be followed.” According to Wier, the military vaccine mandate is unlawful, and this sentiment is fully expressed in the memo recently sent to Congress.
Further explaining his rights, Wier admitted that when he joined the Navy, he proudly donned a Navy uniform. “And while, theoretically, I may have given up the ability to wear jeans and a T-shirt to work, I haven’t lost any Constitutional rights,” he said.
However, the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional and “must be ended,” Wier said. “In my opinion,” he said, “there’s no legal authority for the current vaccine mandate as outlined in the memorandum provided to members of Congress.” FDA-approved vaccines are not available and there is no justification for their use or enforcement, he said.
Wier maintains that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional because it does not provide exceptions to support every servicemember’s rights to the free exercise of religion. According to the lawyer, it also violates the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which ensures that interests in religious freedom are protected against interference from the government.
“Other than through its own self-serving conclusions,” Wier said, “the DoD and the Navy have been unable to substantiate that the vaccine mandate is necessary, and the least restrictive means, to serve a compelling government interest.”
According to Wier, the vaccine mandate has not ensured mission readiness, as evidenced by the continued COVID-19 transmission of vaccinated servicemembers.
“Instead, mission readiness has been degraded by the vaccine mandate, because it has prevented many valuable and courageous servicemembers—those most willing to publicly embrace honor, courage, and commitment—from performing their responsibilities,” he said.
“By continuing to enforce it, military readiness is suffering because there are thousands of good, strong warriors who believe in the Constitution that are currently being separated from the military or sidelined from their jobs, unable to do what the taxpayers are paying them to do.”
The damage being done to military readiness is “irresponsible and dangerous,” he added.
Wier expressed that his views were his own and not that of the Department of Defense or Department of the Navy.
The Pentagon did not return an inquiry from The Epoch Times.
-
https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/08/a-10-warthogs-for-ukraine-we-asked-an-expert-for-the-pros-and-cons/?fbclid=IwAR1Wqm4YjNrN9Vltn7oUoZWLGLTn5w_JFsZ99h9fIVhJRo92pELZiIgiC9o
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https://freebeacon.com/national-security/u-s-forces-ordered-to-stop-using-gender-pronouns-to-improve-lethality/
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Delayed Repairs Shrink the U.S Navy Submarine Fleet
Amid China’s threats to Taiwan, maintenance woes hobble a key weapon in the Indo-Pacific.
By Seth Cropsey
Sept. 14, 2022 2:44 pm ET
The U.S. Navy’s submarine fleet, America’s essential war-fighting instrument in the Indo-Pacific, is about three-fifths the size it should be, chiefly because of maintenance and production delays. This comes amid stepped-up threats to Taiwan by China.
Contesting such an assault would require a submarine force at maximum strength. Congress and the White House should act swiftly to integrate private shipyards that repair submarines into the Navy’s maintenance plans.
American strategists rarely concern themselves with the material issues that determine victory or defeat. They tend to regard international strategy as a question of will, not means. This takes for granted the traditional and outsize U.S. economic-material advantage.
America’s objective in a struggle over Taiwan would be to deny China a rapid victory. The war must become a slog, one that China labors to sustain in a geographically limited form. Generating this situation requires contesting China’s ability to stage an amphibious assault on Taiwan. Submarines would be crucial in such a contest.
The U.S. military today lacks the air forces, air defenses, and surface combatants with sufficient range to contest Chinese air control over Taiwan indefinitely, absent an interdiction campaign against the Chinese mainland that the U.S. has signaled it doesn’t wish to wage. Chinese anti-ship and ground-attack missiles, moreover, would cause damage. Recent war games suggest that in defending Taiwan, the U.S. would lose half its active air force and at least one carrier strike group—a collection of warships defending the aircraft carrier and its air wing. In such a scenario, China would lose 150 to 200 warships and tens of thousands of men.
Given Chinese force structure and military objectives, U.S. submarines are the most effective tool to counter an assault on Taiwan. China lacks ground-based aviation with robust antisubmarine capabilities, leaving its military and civilian transports vulnerable to submarine attack. The U.S. has a world-leading attack submarine force of 49 nuclear-powered boats, along with four guided-missile submarines each packed with 154 cruise missiles. In theory, around 42 of these boats should be deployable at a given time, with some 25 to 30 in the Pacific and 10 to 15 in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Middle East. Normal schedules dictate that at any point 10% of the fleet is in dry dock, under repair or in overhaul.
A major submarine surge to the Indo-Pacific, keeping in mind the U.S. forward-support facilities in Guam, could number about 35 subs. A handful of Japanese and Australian subs could be added to the mix, and perhaps one from Taiwan. Taiwan currently has two aging operational submarines, but its Indigenous Defense Submarine program is promising. That means the PLA would face a 40-plus strong submarine force that can sink transports as they move men and materiel across the Taiwan Strait. That could erode a naval blockade enough to enable an American counterattack. China’s 53 attack submarines, roughly 40 to 45 of them deployable, may have numerical parity, but several are aging, and few have the advanced capabilities of U.S. subs. For China, that would make a Taiwan war a close-run thing.
Rear Adm. Jeffrey Jablon, the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s submarine commander, said at a conference this year that maintenance delays hamstring the submarine force. As of fiscal 2022, the U.S. submarine fleet spent about 1,500 days waiting for maintenance or repair. That is equivalent to losing four submarines in the fleet. In the past year, the Navy lost the equivalent of another 3.5 submarines to maintenance that took longer than expected. The Navy’s submarine force is eight boats under strength on average. Combined with standard maintenance expectations of one-tenth of the fleet, this brings the U.S. submarine force down to about 30 deployable attack boats.
The U.S. can’t build its way out. On average, it takes American shipyards two years to deliver three subs. Meanwhile, the Navy retires two older Los Angeles-class subs a year owing to wear and tear. The fleet will shrink on average by one submarine every two years until the 2040s, when new subs are delivered in greater numbers than retiring ones.
Even with faster delivery and better production capacity, combat damage must be considered. More construction won’t overcome the repair delays at shipyards. In wartime, when those yards are overworked—and possibly targeted—the U.S. submarine fleet likely will shrink even more, and faster, than anticipated. All the while, China will be relying on massive yards with civilian and military production capabilities. These large facilities can repair ships at a pace that gives China an advantage.
More resources are necessary for shipyards to bring the U.S. submarine force to the level of preparedness that China’s provocations in the Western Pacific demand. The U.S. should invest in maintenance, extend the life of older submarines, and regularize maintenance so shipyards are ready to work on many subs.
The Navy should integrate private shipyards into its repair and maintenance plans. It takes at least a year, more likely several, for a yard to prepare to overhaul several ships at the same time. It is more efficient, financially and temporally, to turn to shipyards that can expand maintenance today, rather than scaling up public yards exclusively.
A nation goes to war with the military it has, not the one it will have in five, 10, or 20 years. The executive and legislative branches face a choice between continued inaction and a conflict that calls on the military we wish we had.
Mr. Cropsey is founder and president of the Yorktown Institute. He served as a naval officer and as deputy undersecretary of the Navy and is author of “Mayday” and “Seablindness.”
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Jack Posobiec Retweeted
Darren J. Beattie:
I don't know about you but I want to join the United States Military and fight for the drag queen empire
Hooo Rah!
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/vax-refusal-poised-deepen-national-guards-end-strength-shortage/377437/
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/09/vax-refusal-poised-deepen-national-guards-end-strength-shortage/377437/
White males from the SE US and the Intermountain West are the ones who actually fight. If they refuse, better be ready to draft the LGBTQPedos from the coasts.
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Jack Posobiec Retweeted
Darren J. Beattie:
I don't know about you but I want to join the United States Military and fight for the drag queen empire
Hooo Rah!
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1572939759311282176.html
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https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FG2LaAdVgAEHbNH?format=jpg&name=900x900
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FG2LaAdVgAEHbNH?format=jpg&name=900x900)
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Funny they didn't mention winning wars as the objective.
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Funny they didn't mention winning wars as the objective.
The American military isn't about winning wars, it's about making the MIC wealthy.
Extra points for being fake and gay!
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The American Military Needs More Ammo
Delay in delivering Himars to Ukraine reflects U.S. shortfalls.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Sept. 29, 2022 6:35 pm ET
Vladimir Putin is claiming to annex pieces of Ukraine his troops now occupy, while threatening to use nuclear weapons if the war doesn’t go his way, so this is no time for Western democracies to go wobbly. The Biden Administration deserves credit for announcing another $1.1 billion in security assistance this week, but buried in the details is a warning about America’s ability to sustain a long war.
The Pentagon announced “the beginning of a contracting process” that will eventually deliver Ukraine more multi-mission radars, counter-unmanned aerial systems, tactical vehicles that tow weapons, and other gear. The U.S. will also procure 18 high mobility artillery rocket systems, known as Himars, to complement the 16 Ukraine is now using to excellent battlefield effect, particularly on Russian ammunition depots and logistics lines.
Yet the rocket systems and the associated ammunition won’t reach Ukraine for “a few years,” a senior defense official said. The package “underscores the U.S. commitment to supporting Ukraine over the long term.” Telling friends we won’t cut and run as the fight drags on is welcome reassurance. It’s worth planning for a stronger and more modern Ukrainian military that may have to deter Russia even after Mr. Putin is gone.
But the Ukrainians need more rocket systems now, and the fastest route is for President Biden to draw down more from U.S. stocks. The defense official told reporters this package “in no way rules out us continuing to invest in their current force.”
But the U.S. has so far declined to offer the longest-range rockets that would pack the most battlefield punch, and by some press reports is slow rolling more modern tanks. This is a recipe for a stagnant winter of fighting, and looks driven not by a theory of victory but a perceived risk of escalation.
That it will take “a few years” for less than two dozen new Himars to reach Ukraine should be a wake-up call. Fickle demand from Congress and a byzantine procurement process has discouraged capital investment in building ships and weapons, and the result is a fragile industrial base without the agility to surge production when a crisis emerges. A protracted skilled labor shortage and supply-chain hiccups have added to the troubles.
Take antitank weapons. The U.S. has sent Ukraine more than 8,500 Javelins, according to a Pentagon fact sheet. Lockheed Martin’s CEO Jim Taiclet told CBS News in May that the company is ramping up to produce 4,000 Javelins a year, up from its current capacity of 2,100, but that it would take “a number of months, maybe even a couple years” to reach that output.
Fighting a war and running low on bombs is a bad place to be, as the Russians are learning, and the lessons from Ukraine are worth absorbing before China makes a play to seize Taiwan. A paper last year from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies estimated that the Air Force could run out of its best precision-guided munitions (e.g., long-range air-to-ground missiles) “about a week” into a war with China. Buy more while you can.
The Senate on Thursday voted for another $12 billion in assistance for Ukraine, including $1.5 billion for replenishing U.S. weapons stocks. Republican Leader Mitch McConnell was right when he said on the floor that if the Administration can’t move faster on rocket systems, “it will be an indictment of their persistent unwillingness to invest in our own military stockpiles and our defense industrial base.” After all, “it is not true strength and resolve that provoke the bully. It is delay and weakness.”
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A big win for the MIC!
The American Military Needs More Ammo
Delay in delivering Himars to Ukraine reflects U.S. shortfalls.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Sept. 29, 2022 6:35 pm ET
Vladimir Putin is claiming to annex pieces of Ukraine his troops now occupy, while threatening to use nuclear weapons if the war doesn’t go his way, so this is no time for Western democracies to go wobbly. The Biden Administration deserves credit for announcing another $1.1 billion in security assistance this week, but buried in the details is a warning about America’s ability to sustain a long war.
The Pentagon announced “the beginning of a contracting process” that will eventually deliver Ukraine more multi-mission radars, counter-unmanned aerial systems, tactical vehicles that tow weapons, and other gear. The U.S. will also procure 18 high mobility artillery rocket systems, known as Himars, to complement the 16 Ukraine is now using to excellent battlefield effect, particularly on Russian ammunition depots and logistics lines.
Yet the rocket systems and the associated ammunition won’t reach Ukraine for “a few years,” a senior defense official said. The package “underscores the U.S. commitment to supporting Ukraine over the long term.” Telling friends we won’t cut and run as the fight drags on is welcome reassurance. It’s worth planning for a stronger and more modern Ukrainian military that may have to deter Russia even after Mr. Putin is gone.
But the Ukrainians need more rocket systems now, and the fastest route is for President Biden to draw down more from U.S. stocks. The defense official told reporters this package “in no way rules out us continuing to invest in their current force.”
But the U.S. has so far declined to offer the longest-range rockets that would pack the most battlefield punch, and by some press reports is slow rolling more modern tanks. This is a recipe for a stagnant winter of fighting, and looks driven not by a theory of victory but a perceived risk of escalation.
That it will take “a few years” for less than two dozen new Himars to reach Ukraine should be a wake-up call. Fickle demand from Congress and a byzantine procurement process has discouraged capital investment in building ships and weapons, and the result is a fragile industrial base without the agility to surge production when a crisis emerges. A protracted skilled labor shortage and supply-chain hiccups have added to the troubles.
Take antitank weapons. The U.S. has sent Ukraine more than 8,500 Javelins, according to a Pentagon fact sheet. Lockheed Martin’s CEO Jim Taiclet told CBS News in May that the company is ramping up to produce 4,000 Javelins a year, up from its current capacity of 2,100, but that it would take “a number of months, maybe even a couple years” to reach that output.
Fighting a war and running low on bombs is a bad place to be, as the Russians are learning, and the lessons from Ukraine are worth absorbing before China makes a play to seize Taiwan. A paper last year from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies estimated that the Air Force could run out of its best precision-guided munitions (e.g., long-range air-to-ground missiles) “about a week” into a war with China. Buy more while you can.
The Senate on Thursday voted for another $12 billion in assistance for Ukraine, including $1.5 billion for replenishing U.S. weapons stocks. Republican Leader Mitch McConnell was right when he said on the floor that if the Administration can’t move faster on rocket systems, “it will be an indictment of their persistent unwillingness to invest in our own military stockpiles and our defense industrial base.” After all, “it is not true strength and resolve that provoke the bully. It is delay and weakness.”
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US Defense and Intelligence Must Prepare for ‘Contested Operational Environment’: Experts
By Andrew Thornebrooke October 4, 2022
Intelligence experts have warned that the United States’ defense and intelligence apparatus will need to relearn how to operate in contested environments as it transitions away from counter-terrorism and moves toward competition between great powers.
The Department of Defense and U.S. intelligence agencies will need to rapidly focus on combating threats from state actors that fall somewhere below an outright war, according to former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Kari Bingen.
“The intelligence community and the Department of Defense need to be thinking about that conflict below the threshold of armed conflict: Gray zone activities,” Bingen said during an Oct. 4 talk at the Atlantic Council, a D.C.-based think tank.
“The Department of Defense does order of battle well: [things like] how many tanks [or] how many aircraft, but in this more competitive and economic space, what are the implications for national security?”
Bingen said that reorienting from the types of operating environments that the United States enjoyed throughout the Global War on Terror would be difficult, as the nation would now face a “contested operational environment.”
Whereas the United States previously operated in the Middle East or Africa with relatively unchallenged superiority in intelligence, surveillance, and communication, competing with an adversarial nation such as China would be much more difficult.
The United States now faces the uphill battle of learning to fight and compete in cities filled with adversarial surveillance systems, under threat of enemy drones, and with its communications jammed, Bingen said. The prospect is made all the more difficult as the nation has not consistently engaged in such operations for over 20 years.
“I would encourage the [intelligence] committee to be focused on China and that peer [or] near-peer competition, and technology,” Bingen said.
That contested environment has come to the homefront as well. This is especially true in the battle for information and influence, according to Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), who serves as ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee and also spoke at the Atlantic Council event.
Turner said that “outside influences” were working to undermine the United States and its democratic systems.
“There are foreign actors that attempt to, through malign intent, influence the outcomes of our democracy,” Turner said.
“It’s both a threat by foreign actors and it’s also an internal domestic threat.”
Turner’s comments follow claims by tech giant Meta Platforms last month that it dismantled Chinese and Russian influence operations aimed at influencing the upcoming U.S. midterm elections by increasing polarization.
That polarization presented a direct threat to the nation, Turner said, both for everyday Americans and also for those wielding power in Washington.
“There are people who are overstepping in the intelligence community in areas where it’s [become] a partisan effort and perhaps it squelches debate when debate needs to happen,” Turner said.
To that end, Turner said that steps would need to be taken to counter domestic threats from radicalized individuals and groups, but that extreme caution would be needed to ensure that such efforts did not weaponize the government against the American people.
“There is a significant danger of us turning the intelligence community on our citizens, and I think it can thwart democracy and thwart the debate that we need to have to support democracy,” Turner said.
“There [are] always going to be those elements that we have to make sure do not harm society, but we have to be careful.”
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US Defense and Intelligence Must Prepare for ‘Contested Operational Environment’: Experts
By Andrew Thornebrooke October 4, 2022
Intelligence experts have warned that the United States’ defense and intelligence apparatus will need to relearn how to operate in contested environments as it transitions away from counter-terrorism and moves toward competition between great powers.
The Department of Defense and U.S. intelligence agencies will need to rapidly focus on combating threats from state actors that fall somewhere below an outright war, according to former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Kari Bingen.
“The intelligence community and the Department of Defense need to be thinking about that conflict below the threshold of armed conflict: Gray zone activities,” Bingen said during an Oct. 4 talk at the Atlantic Council, a D.C.-based think tank.
“The Department of Defense does order of battle well: [things like] how many tanks [or] how many aircraft, but in this more competitive and economic space, what are the implications for national security?”
Bingen said that reorienting from the types of operating environments that the United States enjoyed throughout the Global War on Terror would be difficult, as the nation would now face a “contested operational environment.”
Whereas the United States previously operated in the Middle East or Africa with relatively unchallenged superiority in intelligence, surveillance, and communication, competing with an adversarial nation such as China would be much more difficult.
The United States now faces the uphill battle of learning to fight and compete in cities filled with adversarial surveillance systems, under threat of enemy drones, and with its communications jammed, Bingen said. The prospect is made all the more difficult as the nation has not consistently engaged in such operations for over 20 years.
“I would encourage the [intelligence] committee to be focused on China and that peer [or] near-peer competition, and technology,” Bingen said.
That contested environment has come to the homefront as well. This is especially true in the battle for information and influence, according to Rep. Michael Turner (R-Ohio), who serves as ranking member of the House Intelligence Committee and also spoke at the Atlantic Council event.
Turner said that “outside influences” were working to undermine the United States and its democratic systems.
“There are foreign actors that attempt to, through malign intent, influence the outcomes of our democracy,” Turner said.
“It’s both a threat by foreign actors and it’s also an internal domestic threat.”
Turner’s comments follow claims by tech giant Meta Platforms last month that it dismantled Chinese and Russian influence operations aimed at influencing the upcoming U.S. midterm elections by increasing polarization.
That polarization presented a direct threat to the nation, Turner said, both for everyday Americans and also for those wielding power in Washington.
“There are people who are overstepping in the intelligence community in areas where it’s [become] a partisan effort and perhaps it squelches debate when debate needs to happen,” Turner said.
To that end, Turner said that steps would need to be taken to counter domestic threats from radicalized individuals and groups, but that extreme caution would be needed to ensure that such efforts did not weaponize the government against the American people.
“There is a significant danger of us turning the intelligence community on our citizens, and I think it can thwart democracy and thwart the debate that we need to have to support democracy,” Turner said.
“There [are] always going to be those elements that we have to make sure do not harm society, but we have to be careful.”
Too late.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/covid-19/national-guard-gives-service-members-covid-19-vaccine-instead-influenza-shot
If you trust the government in any way, be prepared to be fucked over.
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Barely a ripple in this moment, to be forgotten in a nanosecond , , , except by the fuct and those whom they tell.
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The U.S. Military’s Growing Weakness
A new Heritage Foundation report warns about declining U.S. naval and air power.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Updated Oct. 17, 2022 5:51 pm ET
U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan participates with other U.S. and South Korean navy ships during the joint naval exercises between the United States and South Korea in waters off South Korea's eastern coast on Sept. 29, 2022.
PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS
Americans like to think their military is unbeatable if politicians wouldn’t get in the way. The truth is that U.S. hard power isn’t what it used to be. That’s the message of the Heritage Foundation’s 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, which is reported here for the first time and describes a worrisome trend.
Heritage rates the U.S. military as “weak” and “at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.” The weak rating, down from “marginal” a year earlier, is the first in the index’s nine-year history.
***
The index measures the military’s ability to prevail in two major regional conflicts at once—say, a conflict in the Middle East and a fight on the Korean peninsula. Americans might wish “that the world be a simpler, less threatening place,” as the report notes. But these commitments are part of U.S. national-security strategy.
Heritage says the U.S. military risks being unable to handle even “a single major regional conflict” as it also tries to deter rogues elsewhere. The Trump Administration’s one-time cash infusion has dried up. Pentagon budgets aren’t keeping up with inflation, and the branches are having to make trade-offs about whether to be modern, large, or ready to fight tonight. The decline is especially acute in the Navy and Air Force.
The Navy has been saying for years it needs to grow to at least 350 ships, plus more unmanned platforms. Yet the Navy has shown a “persistent inability to arrest and reverse the continued diminution of its fleet,” the report says. By one analysis it has under-delivered on shipbuilding plans by 10 ships a year on average over the past five years.
From 2005 to 2020, the U.S. fleet grew to 296 warships from 291, while China’s navy grew to 360 from 216. War isn’t won on numbers alone, but China is also narrowing the U.S. technological advantage in every area from aircraft carrier catapults to long-range missiles.
The Navy wants to build three Virginia-class submarines a year, and the U.S. still has an edge over Beijing in these fast-attack boats. But the shipbuilding industry has shrunk amid waning demand, and the Navy’s maintenance yards are overwhelmed. Maintenance delays and backlogs are the result of running the fleet too hard: On a typical day in June, roughly one-third of the 298-ship fleet was deployed, double the average of the Cold War.
It’s worse in the Air Force, which gets a “very weak” rating. Aging “aircraft and very poor pilot training and retention” have produced an Air Force that “would struggle greatly against a peer competitor,” Heritage says.
The fighter and bomber forces are contracting to about 40% of what America had in the 1980s. The service has been slowing its F-35 buys even as it needs modern planes to compensate for the smaller fleet. Aircraft have low mission-capable rates, roughly 50% for the F-22. Heritage says the Air Force has “abandoned even the illusion” that it is working toward an 80% aircraft readiness goal. Munitions inventories “probably would not support a peer-level fight that lasted more than a few weeks,” and replacements can take 24 to 36 months to arrive.
A pilot shortage “continues to plague the service,” and the “current generation of fighter pilots, those who have been actively flying for the past seven years, has never experienced a healthy rate of operational flying.” Fighter pilots flew a meager 10 hours a month on average in 2021, up from 8.7 in 2020 but still far below the 200 hours a year minimum needed to be proficient against a formidable opponent.
The story isn’t much better for the Army, which has lost $59 billion in buying power since 2018 due to flat budgets and inflation. The Army is shrinking not as a choice about priorities but because it can’t recruit enough soldiers—nearly 20,000 short in fiscal 2022.
The Marines scored better in the index as the only branch articulating and executing a plan to change, reorganizing for a war in the Pacific in a concept known as Force Design 2030. But the Marines are slimming down to a bare-bones 21 infantry battalions, from 27 as recently as 2011. Mission success for the Marines depends on a new amphibious ship that the Navy may not be able to deliver.
***
Some will call all this alarmist and ask why the Pentagon can’t do better on an $800 billion budget. The latter is a fair question and the answer requires procurement and other changes. But the U.S. will also have to spend more on defense if it wants to protect its interests and the homeland. The U.S. is spending about 3% of GDP now compared to 5%-6% in the 1980s. The Heritage report is a warning that you can’t deter war, much less win one, on the cheap
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The US military is about revenue to the MIC, not defending America or winning wars.
The U.S. Military’s Growing Weakness
A new Heritage Foundation report warns about declining U.S. naval and air power.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Updated Oct. 17, 2022 5:51 pm ET
U.S. aircraft carrier USS Ronald Reagan participates with other U.S. and South Korean navy ships during the joint naval exercises between the United States and South Korea in waters off South Korea's eastern coast on Sept. 29, 2022.
PHOTO: /ASSOCIATED PRESS
Americans like to think their military is unbeatable if politicians wouldn’t get in the way. The truth is that U.S. hard power isn’t what it used to be. That’s the message of the Heritage Foundation’s 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, which is reported here for the first time and describes a worrisome trend.
Heritage rates the U.S. military as “weak” and “at growing risk of not being able to meet the demands of defending America’s vital national interests.” The weak rating, down from “marginal” a year earlier, is the first in the index’s nine-year history.
***
The index measures the military’s ability to prevail in two major regional conflicts at once—say, a conflict in the Middle East and a fight on the Korean peninsula. Americans might wish “that the world be a simpler, less threatening place,” as the report notes. But these commitments are part of U.S. national-security strategy.
Heritage says the U.S. military risks being unable to handle even “a single major regional conflict” as it also tries to deter rogues elsewhere. The Trump Administration’s one-time cash infusion has dried up. Pentagon budgets aren’t keeping up with inflation, and the branches are having to make trade-offs about whether to be modern, large, or ready to fight tonight. The decline is especially acute in the Navy and Air Force.
The Navy has been saying for years it needs to grow to at least 350 ships, plus more unmanned platforms. Yet the Navy has shown a “persistent inability to arrest and reverse the continued diminution of its fleet,” the report says. By one analysis it has under-delivered on shipbuilding plans by 10 ships a year on average over the past five years.
From 2005 to 2020, the U.S. fleet grew to 296 warships from 291, while China’s navy grew to 360 from 216. War isn’t won on numbers alone, but China is also narrowing the U.S. technological advantage in every area from aircraft carrier catapults to long-range missiles.
The Navy wants to build three Virginia-class submarines a year, and the U.S. still has an edge over Beijing in these fast-attack boats. But the shipbuilding industry has shrunk amid waning demand, and the Navy’s maintenance yards are overwhelmed. Maintenance delays and backlogs are the result of running the fleet too hard: On a typical day in June, roughly one-third of the 298-ship fleet was deployed, double the average of the Cold War.
It’s worse in the Air Force, which gets a “very weak” rating. Aging “aircraft and very poor pilot training and retention” have produced an Air Force that “would struggle greatly against a peer competitor,” Heritage says.
The fighter and bomber forces are contracting to about 40% of what America had in the 1980s. The service has been slowing its F-35 buys even as it needs modern planes to compensate for the smaller fleet. Aircraft have low mission-capable rates, roughly 50% for the F-22. Heritage says the Air Force has “abandoned even the illusion” that it is working toward an 80% aircraft readiness goal. Munitions inventories “probably would not support a peer-level fight that lasted more than a few weeks,” and replacements can take 24 to 36 months to arrive.
A pilot shortage “continues to plague the service,” and the “current generation of fighter pilots, those who have been actively flying for the past seven years, has never experienced a healthy rate of operational flying.” Fighter pilots flew a meager 10 hours a month on average in 2021, up from 8.7 in 2020 but still far below the 200 hours a year minimum needed to be proficient against a formidable opponent.
The story isn’t much better for the Army, which has lost $59 billion in buying power since 2018 due to flat budgets and inflation. The Army is shrinking not as a choice about priorities but because it can’t recruit enough soldiers—nearly 20,000 short in fiscal 2022.
The Marines scored better in the index as the only branch articulating and executing a plan to change, reorganizing for a war in the Pacific in a concept known as Force Design 2030. But the Marines are slimming down to a bare-bones 21 infantry battalions, from 27 as recently as 2011. Mission success for the Marines depends on a new amphibious ship that the Navy may not be able to deliver.
***
Some will call all this alarmist and ask why the Pentagon can’t do better on an $800 billion budget. The latter is a fair question and the answer requires procurement and other changes. But the U.S. will also have to spend more on defense if it wants to protect its interests and the homeland. The U.S. is spending about 3% of GDP now compared to 5%-6% in the 1980s. The Heritage report is a warning that you can’t deter war, much less win one, on the cheap
-
https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-features/war-or-terror-africa-sahel-niger-pentagon-1234612083/
But the MIC gets PAID!
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Gallagher: U.S. must prepare to support defense of Taiwan
Warns China poised to invade island nation
BY MIKE GLENN THE WASHINGTON TIMES
There isn’t enough time for the U.S. to build a fleet of warships large enough to fend off a Chinese invasion of Taiwan by the end of the decade but that doesn’t mean there aren’t any options to protect American interests and allies, a key Republican on the House Armed Services Committee said Tuesday.
Rep. Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin told a Heritage Foundation audience that the Pentagon needs to use the resources it has more creatively to deter a Chinese cross-strait invasion. He noted that retired Adm. Philip S. Davidson, a former commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, assessed that Beijing may make a move on Taiwan by the end of the decade — a period that has come to be known as the “Davidson Window.”
President Biden’s defense budget will force the Navy to reduce its fleet size to 280 ships and leave the Air Force forced to cut more than 100 airplanes by 2027, just in time for the 100th anniversary of the People’s Liberation Army and the target date for China having the capability to take Taiwan, Mr. Gallagher said.
“Most of the transformative technology [the Pentagon] is investing in with its much-hyped 9.5% increase in research and development dollars, from hypersonic weapons to ‘Joint All Domain Command and Control,’ may not be fielded until the 2030s, if at all,” he said. “Making matters worse, we’re running low on the munitions that are essential to both Ukraine and Taiwan.”
The U.S. won’t be able to rebuild the Navy to where it needs to be within the next five years, Mr. Gallagher said.
“What we can do, however, is build an ‘anti-Navy,’” he said. “By anti-Navy, I mean asymmetric forces and weapons designed to target the Chinese navy, deny control of the seas surrounding Taiwan, and prevent [People’s Liberation Army] amphibious forces from gaining a lodgment on the island.”
The first step would be surging long-range conventional precision fires in concentric rings across the Pacific — ranging from the so-called “First Island Chain” on China’s coastline, which would include the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, and the Philippines, all the way out to Alaska, Hawaii, and Australia. Army and Marine Corps troops would operate the short-range anti-ship missiles to secure the zone.
The second step would be stockpiling munitions in the region before the shooting starts, Mr. Gallagher said.
“At current production rates, for example, it will take at least two years to boost Javelin production from 2,100 to 4,000 missiles annually. In many cases, Chinese companies are the sole source or a primary supplier for the ... materials used in our missiles,” Mr. Gallagher said.
The third step would be arming Taiwan “to the teeth.” That would mean moving them to the front of the Foreign Military Sales line and clearing the backlog of $14 billion worth of foreign military sales items that have been approved but not delivered, he said.
“Congress can go further by providing direct financial assistance to Taiwan and by giving the Pentagon the same drawdown authority to directly provide defense articles to Taiwan that it already has with Ukraine,” he said.
The Pentagon should also send Taiwan the U.S. Harpoon missiles that are now destined for the scrap yard or long-term storage — similar to the drawdown authority that has boosted Ukraine’s military stockpile.
The GOP lawmaker faulted the Biden administration for not doing more to reassure a critical ally.
“We don’t lack options, we lack leadership,” he said. “We lack leadership in the Pentagon capable of bending the bureaucracy to their will, in service of a defense strategy that prioritizes hard power,” Mr. Gallagher said. “We lack leadership in the White House that understands the paradox of deterrence: that to avoid war, you must convince your adversary that you are both capable and willing to wage war.”
Mr. Gallagher, a former Marine Corps intelligence officer who deployed twice to Iraq, will likely get a subcommittee chairmanship if the Republicans take control of the House of Representatives after the midterm elections. He said the GOP will have a “very productive agenda” if that happens, including taking an ax to a Pentagon civilian bureaucracy that is larger than the size of the Army.
“The military has two purposes — to fight wars and train to fight wars,” Mr. Gallagher said, paraphrasing Marine Corps doctrine. “Anything that does not contribute to our war fighting ability should not be funded.
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From the article:
"Mr. Gallagher, a former Marine Corps intelligence officer who deployed twice to Iraq, will likely get a subcommittee chairmanship if the Republicans take control of the House of Representatives after the midterm elections. He said the GOP will have a “very productive agenda” if that happens, including taking an ax to a Pentagon civilian bureaucracy that is larger than the size of the Army.
“The military has two purposes — to fight wars and train to fight wars,” Mr. Gallagher said, paraphrasing Marine Corps doctrine. “Anything that does not contribute to our war fighting ability should not be funded."
[Doug] Rep Mike Gallagher of Wisconsin is one of the good guys on national security. Cutting bureaucracy and social programs in the military and building ships and weapons systems should be priorities.
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Could America Win a New World War?
What It Would Take to Defeat Both China and Russia
By Thomas G. Mahnken
October 27, 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/could-america-win-new-world-war
When it comes to international relations, 2022 has been an exceptionally dangerous year. During the first two months, Russia massed thousands of troops along Ukraine’s borders. At the end of the second one, Moscow sent them marching into Ukraine. China, meanwhile, has grown increasingly belligerent toward Washington, particularly over Taiwan. After U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi visited Taipei in August, Beijing carried out a furious set of military exercises designed to show how it would blockade and attack the island. Washington, in turn, has explored how it can more quickly arm and support the Taiwanese government.
The United States is aware that China and Russia pose a significant threat to the global order. In its recent National Security Strategy, the White House wrote that “the [People’s Republic of China] and Russia are increasingly aligned with each other,” and the Biden administration dedicated multiple pages to explaining how the United States can constrain both countries going forward. Washington knows that the conflict in Ukraine is likely to be protracted, thanks to the ability of Kyiv and Moscow to keep fighting and the irreconcilability of their aims, and could escalate in ways that bring the United States more directly into the war (a fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber rattling makes readily apparent). Washington also knows that Chinese leader Xi Jinping, emboldened by his appointment at the 20th National Party Congress in October to an unprecedented third term, could try to seize Taiwan as the war in Ukraine rages on. The United States, then, could conceivably be drawn into simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia.
But despite Washington’s professed focus on both Beijing and Moscow, U.S. defense planning is not commensurate with the challenge at hand. In 2015, the Department of Defense abandoned its long-standing policy of being prepared to fight and win two major wars in favor of focusing on acquiring the means to fight and win just one. This policy shift, which has remained in place ever since, shows. Large quantities of the United States’ military equipment are aging, with many aircraft, ships, and tanks that date back to the Reagan administration’s defense buildup in the 1980s. The country also has limited supplies of important equipment and munitions, so much so that it has had to draw a large portion of its own stocks down to support Ukraine. These problems would prove particularly vexing in simultaneous conflicts. If the United States found itself in a two-war situation in eastern Europe and the Pacific, the commitment would likely be lengthy in both cases. China’s expanding interests and global footprint suggest that a war with Beijing would not be confined neatly to Taiwan and the western Pacific but instead stretch across multiple theaters, from the Indian Ocean to the United States itself. (China might launch cyberattacks, or even missile strikes, on the U.S. mainland in an attempt to blunt U.S. military power.) The United States needs to create deep munitions reserves, stockpile high-quality gear, and come up with creative battlefield techniques if it hopes to win such fights.
Washington should get started now. U.S. policymakers must begin working to expand and deepen the United States’ defense industrial base. They need to develop new joint operational concepts: ways of employing the armed forces to solve pressing military problems, such as how to sustain forces in the face of increasingly capable Chinese military capabilities and defend U.S. space and cyber networks from attack. They should think seriously about the strategic contours of a war in multiple theaters, including where they would focus most of the United States’ military attention, and when. And Washington can do a better job of coordinating and planning with U.S. allies, who will be indispensable—and quite possibly decisive—to the successful outcome of a worldwide military conflict.
REBUILDING THE ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY
In some ways, the United States and its allies will have an advantage in any simultaneous war in Asia and Europe. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated that modern precision weapons are highly effective, and most of these weapons are made by the United States. When it comes to quality, Western systems and munitions remain the best in class.
But the United States must supply these weapons to both its own armed forces and those of its allies and friends. Unfortunately, weapons stockpiles in the United States are limited, as is its industrial base. It will likely take years to replenish many of the munitions that the United States has provided to Ukraine. This should not come as a surprise. In 2018, the congressionally mandated National Defense Strategy Commission warned that the United States didn’t possess enough munitions to prevail in a high-intensity conflict and argued that the country needed to expand production. The report also found that Washington would need to modernize its defense manufacturing to create munitions and other weaponry at a faster pace. For example, the United States has not produced Stinger antiaircraft missiles in 18 years, and restarting production will take time and money. So far, the United States has given Ukraine over 1,400 of these munitions.
The Department of Defense must also look beyond Ukraine. Russia’s ongoing war offers a valuable set of data, but if China initiated a military operation to take Taiwan, forcing the United States and its allies to respond, the conflict would likely take place mostly at sea and have very different requirements. It would demand lots of long-range weapons and antiship missiles, and right now, the United States has meager supplies of both. There are, for instance, fewer Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles-Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASM) in storage than there are on the Ukrainian battlefield.
The United States clearly needs to increase its defense manufacturing capacity and speed. In the short term, that involves adding shifts to existing factories. With more time, it involves expanding factories and opening new production lines. To do both, Congress will have to act now to allocate more money to increase manufacturing.
A war across multiple regions could break out in any number of ways and proceed in a messy fashion.
But to keep U.S. stockpiles from falling too low, the country will need to do more than make ad hoc investments. Congress should also pass legislation that establishes minimum supply levels for munitions, with money automatically allocated for topping off stockpiles as the United States and its friends draw them down. Creating such a system would do much more than just guarantee consistent munitions supplies. To innovate, the United States also needs new firms that can complement existing manufacturers, and having near-guaranteed demand will give venture capitalists and entrepreneurs new incentives to invest in the defense industry.
Of course, the United States cannot rapidly expand all parts of its defense industrial base; it does not have unlimited resources and financing. That means the country will need to think creatively about how it can use the manufacturing it does have to best bolster its forces. The U.S. Navy, for instance, cannot easily hasten the production of aircraft carriers, yet it can think about how to expand these ships’ effectiveness by equipping them with better aircraft. The U.S. Air Force, for its part, will not always be able to rapidly scale up aircraft manufacturing. But it can multiply the effectiveness of its most advanced fighters and bombers by matching them with increasingly capable, low-cost, and easier-to-make unmanned systems that can sense and strike enemy planes while protecting their manned counterparts. By pairing manned systems with unmanned ones, the United States can multiply the effectiveness of the U.S. air fleet, preventing it from being stretched thin in a future conflict.
Finally, the United States should work with its allies to increase their military production and the size of their weapons and munitions stockpiles. Washington will need to be able to backstop its partners, but as the war in Ukraine clearly illustrates, it is good if frontline states have enough munitions to fight without the United States drawing down its own stocks. Some U.S. allies, such as Australia, are making considerable investments to build up their own munitions industry, while others, such as Japan, face considerable barriers to doing so. (Japan’s constitution, for instance, severely restricts the size and scope of its military.) They will need to do more if the West is going to create a munitions base robust enough for an era of protracted warfare.
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Weapons and munitions are just one part of war. To win a conflict against both China and Russia, Washington also needs to come up with new fighting techniques. As the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission put it, “The United States needs more than just new capabilities; it urgently requires new operational concepts that expand U.S. options and constrain those of China, Russia, and other actors.”
Washington has not ignored this call. In response to the 2018 report, the Department of Defense produced a “Joint Warfighting Concept” to shape future doctrine and establish funding priorities. Much of this report is classified, but progress has been patchy. It is unclear whether the department’s document—or the process that produced it—has influenced the size and shape of the U.S. armed forces or the composition of the defense budget. Moreover, efforts by the U.S. armed services to solve pressing operational challenges have come under attack from traditionalists. The Marine Corps’s new Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations doctrine and Marine Littoral Regiment, for example, would devote Marine forces to complementing the navy in countering the Chinese fleet in the western Pacific. But it would divest the Marine Corps of some of its tanks and reduce its complement of artillery, something that traditionalists—steeped in 20 years of warfare in the Middle East—bemoan.
To improve how it fights, the Department of Defense needs a vigorous contest of ideas spurred, supervised, and supported by its senior leadership. The Pentagon needs to develop new concepts to project and sustain forces against an enemy’s precision-strike systems, to resupply forces under fire, and to protect critical bases of operations at home and abroad against attack. The United States also needs to collaborate with its partners on new approaches to deterrence. The Biden administration, for instance, should make good on what it calls for in the Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness: working with its allies to harness the power of unmanned systems to detect, and therefore deter, acts of aggression.
As it develops new combat techniques, the United States also needs to think seriously about strategy more broadly—specifically how to structure the military and construct its operations. This will likely require breaking from the military designs of recent decades. Today’s theater command structure, for example, is an artifact of the 1990s and the following decade. It features a series of six geographic fiefdoms presided over by powerful geographic combatant commanders. This structure made sense when the United States was mostly interested in discrete, local conflicts with Iran or North Korea, for example, and terrorist organizations such as insurgents in Somalia. But the threats the United States faces today do not conform to carefully drawn geographic boundaries, nor do the strategies needed to counter them. A war with China could easily spill from east Asia into the Indian Ocean, which connects China with its sources of energy in the Middle East, and even to the Persian Gulf and Djibouti in the Horn of Africa, which hosts a Chinese base. In such a war, it might be better to have a command structure that’s not so geographically constrained.
ORDER OF OPERATIONS
That said, as defense strategists game out simultaneous conflicts with China and Russia, they will need to figure out how to prioritize U.S. military action based on the relative threats in Asia and Europe, the geography of the theaters, and the allies Washington has in each region. This isn’t a simple business. A war across multiple regions could break out in any number of ways and proceed in a messy fashion. Xi, seeing the United States preoccupied with Europe, might decide it’s time to move against Taiwan, something he believes is necessary to “rejuvenate” China. Such an attack could take many forms, from a blockade to a missile campaign to a full-fledged amphibious invasion. If things go well for Beijing, the United States might face the need to assist the Taiwanese in resisting Chinese occupation. But even if things go well for Washington, and a Chinese missile campaign or amphibious invasion ends in failure, Beijing would likely fight on. The United States, Taiwan, and their friends would then face a protracted conflict that could spread to other theaters. Moscow, meanwhile, could decide that with the United States bogged down in the western Pacific, it could get away with invading more of Europe.
Planning for such a conflagration would require careful sequencing. In World War II, the United States emphasized one theater of conflict over the other at different moments, depending on which theater had the greatest and most urgent needs. At the outset, the United States followed a Europe-first strategy focused on beating Nazi Germany because it posed the gravest threat to the United States and its allies. Today, however, the United States would need to initially focus on Asia. Although the war in Ukraine has required great U.S. support, it has exposed the limits of Russian military power as well as the effectiveness of concerted NATO action. As it stretches on, the war will continue to diminish Russia’s conventional military in ways that Moscow cannot quickly repair. NATO, meanwhile, will grow more capable, particularly with the additions of Sweden and Finland. The United States would still have a key role to play in the European side of the war, particularly in maintaining nuclear and other forms of deterrence. Ideally, Washington’s capacities would stop Russia from attacking a NATO country. But the United States’ European allies would be able to take the lead in many areas, such as supplying ground forces. They would not need U.S. aid and direction for every element of combat.
The situation in the western Pacific is different. China has a stronger military than does Russia, and it poses a graver danger to the prevailing regional order. The United States has capable local allies in Australia, Japan, and South Korea, but there is no NATO equivalent. There are many capabilities that only the United States can bring to the table, including nuclear deterrence; key naval, air, and space capabilities; as well as vital logistical support such as munitions. Washington would need to work with Taiwan, and potentially others, to help Taipei resist Chinese attacks and to augment Taiwanese military power. Such an effort would involve forces operating out of U.S. territory, such as Guam, as well as from the territory of allies such as Japan. It would require that the United States protect its territory and allies in the western Pacific and beyond, including the continental United States, as well as its computer networks and satellites. Such a campaign might last months.
This type of war would be frightening, in no small part because it would occur under the shadow of the Chinese, Russian, and U.S. nuclear arsenals. These three powers would have to communicate redlines to one another—for example, attacks on U.S. and allied territory—to avoid the use of weapons of mass destruction. These redlines would likely constrain each state’s military operations. In doing so, the war might simmer longer, but it would likely cause less damage. But the presence of nuclear arsenals would also significantly raise the stakes of escalation. It’s not impossible that the war could produce the world’s first nuclear attacks since 1945.
RUN IT BACK
The more one outlines a conflict between China, Russia, and the United States and its allies, the more it starts to resemble World War II. Analysts don’t even need to look into the future to see the similarities; there’s much about the present day that resembles the international order in 1939. Two authoritarian powers—China and Russia—have formed a loose alliance based on shared goals of redrawing the political map, just as Germany, Japan, and Italy did in the 1930s. Russia is trying to conquer land in Europe, and its violent quest risks spiraling outward, bringing other parts of the continent into combat. China’s increasing belligerence toward Taiwan means that conquest could also return to Asia. The United States and its allies must plan for how to simultaneously win wars in Asia and Europe, as unpalatable as the prospect may seem.
As they do so, they can study the Allied victory in World War II. At first, this comparison may not be encouraging. The ingredients of American success included the mobilization of U.S. science, technology, and industry, as well as the development of new ways of war, and measured by this yardstick, there is much to be done. When it comes to mobilizing industry in support of national security, it is China that most closely resembles the United States in 1940. But the United States has vast reserves of untapped energy in both its defense sector and in the economy more broadly. It can regain the industrial upper hand. And the U.S. armed forces are staffed by dedicated and intelligent officers and soldiers—they have the skills to solve pressing operational challenges.
There is also one advantage the United States has from World War II that it never forfeited: its alliances. Unlike China or Russia, the United States has close ties with many of the world’s strongest militaries. The United States is also interlinked with most of the world’s vibrant economies. Washington needs to collaborate more closely with its partners on everything from defense research to operational planning. It needs to work with them to increase their reserves of munitions and weapons. But the United States has done all this before. There is no reason why it cannot do so again.
THOMAS G. MAHNKEN is President and CEO of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and a Senior Research Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. From 2006 to 2009, he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning.
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/nov/5/terror-weapon-with-starring-role-in-ukraine-irans-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=rnS%2BDi2qv4rgxYAH8XYu182tK60jp3HZt6C9pw%2Br0zztyIIW8VtEo4aecNP5JIFQ&bt_ts=1667674134816
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‘The Big One Is Coming’ and the U.S. Military Isn’t Ready
A U.S. flag officer talks candidly about the fading U.S. deterrent.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Updated Nov. 4, 2022 6:50 pm ET
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine revealed the fading power of America’s military deterrent, a fact that too few of our leaders seem willing to admit in public. So it is encouraging to hear a senior flag officer acknowledge the danger in a way that we hope is the start of a campaign to educate the American public.
“This Ukraine crisis that we’re in right now, this is just the warmup,” Navy Admiral Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said this week at a conference. “The big one is coming. And it isn’t going to be very long before we’re going to get tested in ways that we haven’t been tested” for “a long time.”
How bad is it? Well, the admiral said, “As I assess our level of deterrence against China, the ship is slowly sinking. It is sinking slowly, but it is sinking, as fundamentally they are putting capability in the field faster than we are.” Sinking slowly is hardly a consolation. As “those curves keep going,” it won’t matter “how good our commanders are, or how good our horses are—we’re not going to have enough of them. And that is a very near-term problem.”
Note that modifier “near-term.” This is a more urgent vulnerability than most of the political class cares to recognize.
Adm. Richard noted that America retains an advantage in submarines—“maybe the only true asymmetric advantage we still have”—but even that may erode unless America picks up the pace “getting our maintenance problems fixed, getting new construction going.” Building three Virginia-class fast-attack submarines a year would be a good place to start.
The news last year that China tested a hypersonic missile that flew around the world and landed at home should have raised more alarms than it did. It means China can put any U.S. city or facility at risk and perhaps without being detected. The fact that the test took the U.S. by surprise and that it surpassed America’s hypersonic capabilities makes it worse. How we lost the hypersonic race to China and Russia deserves hearings in Congress.
“We used to know how to move fast, and we have lost the art of that,” the admiral added. The military talks “about how we are going to mitigate our assumed eventual failure” to field new ballistic submarines, bombers or long-range weapons, instead of flipping the question to ask: “What’s it going to take? Is it money? Is it people? Do you need authorities?” That’s “how we got to the Moon by 1969.”
Educating the public about U.S. military weaknesses runs the risk of encouraging adversaries to exploit them. But the greater risk today is slouching ahead in blind complacency until China invades Taiwan or takes some other action that damages U.S. interests or allies because Bejiing thinks the U.S. can do nothing about it.
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" "A decade later, the Air Force’s new bomber means America is the only country in the world that can hold targets at risk inside mainland China—a capability essential to deterrence and avoiding conflict."
and on time, not over budget , running smoothly :-D
https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/robert-spencer/2022/11/09/there-would-have-been-a-red-wave-but-one-group-saved-the-left-from-being-completely-obliterated-n1644558
"A decade later, the Air Force’s new bomber means America is the only country in the world that can hold targets at risk inside mainland China—a capability essential to deterrence and avoiding conflict."
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https://www.foxnews.com/media/woke-department-defense-equity-chief-writes-anti-white-posts-exhausted-white-folx?fbclid=IwAR2_FDcQXoRCRnJuRO4KRmYUuADZjUPjmsVQWEqAW5w22ePazURHFBQvDlg
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/11/special-operators-lack-seat-table-post-counterterror-pentagon-sof-leaders-say/379954/
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2022/12/b-2-bomber-fleet-grounded-indefinitely/381106/
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December 20, 2022
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The Effectiveness of an Air War
By: George Friedman
The Russians have initiated a concentrated air attack on Ukraine focused on the use of drones. The target is civilian and industrial infrastructure, primarily electrical and related systems. The intent of the attack is to undermine survivability in cities by limiting the transport of food, heating and so on, in order to compel the Ukrainians to surrender or to so weaken their defenses that a ground attack can successfully penetrate and seize territory. Failing that, the attack can also have a psychological dimension, inflicting significant civilian casualties, creating intense hardship and causing individual cities or even the country as a whole to surrender. It's intended to be a lower-cost and more efficient strategy than the use of massed infantry.
The problem with this strategy, however, is that it has been tried before and consistently failed. The Germans sought to force British capitulation through the concentrated bombing of London early in World War II. The damage and casualties were substantial, but the British did not surrender. Later in the war, the Americans and the British launched combined air attacks intended to break civilian morale and destroy German infrastructure. They failed. Indeed, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey conducted after the war showed that German production actually rose during and after air assaults.
In Vietnam, the United States conducted air campaigns designed to damage North Vietnam’s industrial strength. Toward the end, Hanoi was attacked by devastating
B-52 assaults, which were less precise with far more civilian casualties. North Vietnam did not capitulate.
Each of these attacks was carried out by trained and motivated pilots in excellent (for that time) aircraft. The reasons for the failures had some consistency. Attacks on cities focused on the use of aircraft, making them vulnerable to air defenses. Intelligence on the location of factories and other infrastructure was imprecise, and therefore air attacks failed to hit their targets. Aircraft and munitions were periodically unavailable, which gave the enemy some breathing room. Perhaps most important, the attacks bred a spirit of resistance among the population, which meant that the causalities caused by effective attacks reduced the pressure on the government to capitulate. The population calculated that ruthless air attacks would mean a more ruthless peace. Some have even said that the Blitz saved Churchill. All of this is against the recuperative power of the enemy. Damage can be repaired, and total destruction from the air is difficult.
Concentrated air attacks were infrequently used against ground forces. The planes that were deployed were mostly fighter aircraft, which could practice more precision. This made necessary the dispersal of ground forces, which made carpet bombing only marginally effective and attack aircraft vulnerable to ground fire.
Russia's air assault on Ukrainian infrastructure and urban concentrations has one advantage over prior attacks: Drones have a degree of precision. The problem, however, is that their identification of targets relies on intelligence, which can become obsolete in the course of a flight. Moreover, intelligence is collected in an urban environment with a great deal of clutter. And in the current technological environment, drones are more likely to be shot down than aircraft in prior wars.
The most important point is that airpower, under the best circumstances, cannot take and hold ground. Ground forces must be deployed to do that. Drones can support ground campaigns, as airpower did in WWII and Vietnam, but the gap between intelligence and action makes support for ground attacks more difficult.
The Russians are therefore depending on a follow-up ground assault, combining artillery and infantry and confronting the same. The problem is that infantry can be widely dispersed and dug in, as it is today. Urban fighting against an enemy familiar with the ground conditions is challenging. The chances that airpower can ease this problem are as slim as they were in WWII or Vietnam. Ground forces will have to go in, and a good deal of the defending force will not have been knocked out by the air attack. They will be in the classic situation of infantry on the attack: facing counterfire from a well-dug-in enemy. It can be done, but I would argue that the newly trained Russian infantry will not be a match for the bloodied Ukrainian forces. Air power, save for nuclear, is a necessary but insufficient dimension of war.
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https://dailycaller.com/2022/12/25/congress-pentagon-defense-massive-contractors/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=7Ls2EjlcNqEbhuaavWWsHYCVuA6tColxNeK4mfY4tQNmiIC_B4BVTmr.wUPcgGpTLHynEF3O
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o584WXqnh1E&t=12s
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F-15EX: The U.S. Air Force Now Has a Real ‘Missile Truck’
that means china has it too
:-P
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Navy Secretary Warns: If Defense Industry Can’t Boost Production, Arming Both Ukraine and the US May Become ‘Challenging’
Carlos Del Toro’s comments come as an admiral accuses weapons makers of using the pandemic as an excuse for not delivering arms on time.
Marcus Weisgerber
BY MARCUS WEISGERBER
GLOBAL BUSINESS EDITOR
JANUARY 11, 2023 03:58 PM ET
If weapons makers can’t boost production in the next six to 12 months, the United States may find it “challenging” to continue arming itself and helping Ukraine, the Navy secretary said Wednesday.
Carlos Del Toro was speaking to a group of reporters on the sidelines of a Surface Navy Association conference in Arlington, Virginia, just days after the Biden administration announced it would send armored fighting vehicles to Ukraine. Some Republicans are pushing for the U.S. to stop giving weapons to Kyiv.
The secretary was asked to respond to comments made at the conference by Adm. Daryl Caudle, commander of U.S. Fleet Forces Command. Caudle, the reporter said, worried that “the Navy might get to the point where it has to make the decision whether it needs to arm itself or arm Ukraine, and has the Navy gotten to that point yet?”
Del Toro replied, “With regards to deliveries of weapons systems for the fight in Ukraine…Yeah, that's always a concern for us. And we monitor that very, very closely. I wouldn't say we're quite there yet, but if the conflict does go on for another six months, for another year, it certainly continues to stress the supply chain in ways that are challenging.”
The Navy secretary said that Deputy Defense Secretary Kathleen Hicks has been working “very closely with [the defense] industry, to motivate them to find out what their challenges or obstacles are to be able to increase their own production rates.”
“It's obvious that you know, these companies have a substantial pipeline for the future,” Del Toro said. “They now need to invest in their workforce, as well as the capital investments that they have to make within their own companies to get their production rates up.”
Most U.S. weapons sent to Ukraine are coming from Army, not Navy stockpiles. Still, U.S. officials recently announced they would start sending Sea Sparrow missiles to Ukraine. Last year, Denmark gave Ukraine U.S.-made Harpoon missiles.
Speaking earlier at the SNA conference, Caudle said that the timeliness of weapons deliveries have real implications both for the Ukrainian and U.S. militaries.
“I'm not...talking about what it’s doing to me, I'm talking about of course, we're going to help a country—deliver the stuff we need—so they can win that conflict against Russia and it's not going to destroy and set me back into the dark ages,” he said.
Over the past three years, companies have blamed weapons production delays on the supply chain issues and worker shortages stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic.
Still, Caudle accused defense companies of using the pandemic as an excuse for missing weapons delivery deadlines.
“I’m not as forgiving of the defense industrial base. I’m just not,” he said. “I am not forgiving of the fact that you’re not delivering the ordnance we need. All this stuff about COVID this, parts, supply chain this, I just don’t really care. We’ve all got tough jobs.”
Caudle specifically mentioned torpedoes and Standard Missile-6 interceptors being late. Deliveries of the SM-6, which are made by Raytheon Technologies, have been slowed, in part, due to problems getting the rocket motors from Aerojet Rocketdyne, a key supplier.
“We’re talking about war fighting and nation security and going against a competitor here and a potential adversary that is like nothing we’ve ever seen and we keep dilly dallying around with these deliveries,” the admiral said. “I don't see good accountability and I don't get to see good return on investment from the government [side], I really don't.”
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Revamp. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the armed forces will make several significant changes over the next three years. They include an increase in the number of military personnel to 1.5 million (a move that was initially discussed in December); the creation of two new inter-service strategic territorial associations; the reorganization of motorized rifle divisions in the Western, Central and Eastern military districts and in the Northern Fleet; and the strengthening of the combat component of the navy, aerospace and strategic missile forces. The ministry said the changes were necessary to ensure the “military security of the state.”
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https://www.theblaze.com/news/pentagon-can-t-account-for-220-billion-in-gov-t-property-fails-fifth-audit?fbclid=IwAR3pVUMh9Hr4LYo8Zxwj0DHZKAAyZLy8mBVqjFqgp-KuTwug9zhag3Ng5zc
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/01/22/replenish-weapons-stocks-ammunition-ukraine/?utm_medium=email&pnespid=5uF8EyUYMKAc3_iYrzjsTZWIvB6lWJx9LLS9yuVz90Nm4b9lnAXd6q_zHao9yxjTkxIzySxu
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/94404-the-biden-pentagon-still-doesnt-get-it-2023-01-24?mailing_id=7249&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.7249&utm_campaign=digest&utm_content=body
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https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/01/expect-big-replenishment-orders-soon-army-tells-industry/382217/
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/02/we-dont-have-missiles-stop-china-time-drone-swarms/382423/
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https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20170425-were-entering-the-next-era-of-drones
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https://bayourenaissanceman.blogspot.com/2023/02/us-military-pilots-may-be-in-world-of.html?m=1
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKjFyq938TA&t=214s
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKjFyq938TA&t=214s
When US Forces cut through Iraqi Forces like a hot knife through butter in the Gulf War, it scared the hell out of the PRC's leadership. They have spent decades building a military machine to destroy us, with or money funding it and our stolen technology.
20 years playing whack-a-mole with Haji is very different from fighting "Near peers" who might have air superiority.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fKjFyq938TA&t=214s
When US Forces cut through Iraqi Forces like a hot knife through butter in the Gulf War, it scared the hell out of the PRC's leadership. They have spent decades building a military machine to destroy us, with or money funding it and our stolen technology.
20 years playing whack-a-mole with Haji is very different from fighting "Near peers" who might have air superiority.
Quick translation: The young man is saying "I am here".
Volunteering. The message is give up your old life and focus your entire being on serving in the PLA.
Nothing about college or "Gender Affirming Surgery".
We totally own the LGBTQMAP battlespace!
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LGBTQMAP
what does MAP stand for?
we could have LBGTQ brigades
who attack while their twirking asses face the enemy
shock troops ! :-o; the woke version of "shock and awe".
we could defeat the enemy in this way by making them laugh so hysterically
they cannot return fire .
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China Gears Up To Shoot Down US Drones
Its military-industrial complex is already working on a list of technologies needed to fight off swarms of UAS.
By DANIEL SHATS and PETER W. SINGER
FEBRUARY 8, 2023
Drones continue to move toward the center of U.S. warfare, emerging as a major spending priority and a go-to solution for almost every defense challenge—most especially in a conflict with China.
Networked drone swarms proved decisive in a recent Air Force simulation of a Taiwan Strait conflict: they broke through China’s anti-access/area denial efforts and ensured U.S. victory, according to RAND’s David Ochmanek, a former deputy assistant defense secretary for strategy. In turn, Hudson Institute’s Bryan Clark, a former special assistant to the chief of naval operations, has identified drones as the only means to fill in for an expected gap in American missile production. It is not surprising, then, that China has begun to develop countermeasures.
A highlight of November’s Zhuhai Airshow was the LW-30 laser defense system, a vehicle-mounted “drone killer” developed by China Space Sanjiang Group. An “optimized” version of a weapon that debuted at the 2018 show, the LW-30 closely resembles the “Silent Hunter” system produced by China’s Poly Technologies and deployed by Saudi Arabia in September.
China Sanjiang and state media claim that the LW-30 can down small drones several kilometers away, taking just a few seconds to swivel, fire, and move on to the next target. Using electricity to down a drone is far cheaper than physical munitions; China Sanjiang estimates it costs about a dozen Chinese yuan (roughly $1.75) per kill.
If the claims are true, the Chinese company has conquered an enduring engineering challenge: maintaining laser fire on a small moving target long enough to damage it. And a spokesman said the company is working to upgrade the LW-30’s 30-kilowatt beam to higher energy, reducing the time needed to destroy its targets.
China’s development of the LW-30 and other anti-drone weapons builds upon an increased interest in drone and counter-drone warfare in PLA military writings. The 2020 Science of Military Strategy, a theoretical military teaching text published by the PLA’s Academy of Military Sciences, noted that “intelligent unmanned systems have become an indispensable force on the [21st-century] battlefield,” with countries such as the U.S., Israel, and Russia using them to great effect. More recently, Chinese media have written about the critical role of UASs in the 2020 Armenia-Azerbaijan war and today’s Russia-Ukraine war. In both conflicts, defenders have struggled to stop drones used as a relatively cheap yet highly effective alternative to manned aircraft for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and combat missions.
A June article in PLA Daily admitted that advancements in UAS technology have severely strained traditional air defenses; “low, slow, and small” UASs in particular are very difficult to detect with radar, track with guided munitions, and strike with aerial or anti-air guns. What’s needed, the article said, are three-dimensional, multi-domain networks of detection equipment and counter-drone weapons to maximize the range and speed of early-warning and interception—specifically, networked anti-air guns; electronic interference to disrupt navigation and communications; directed-energy beams (i.e., laser weapons like the LW-30); high-power microwave weapons; and autonomous counter-drone systems such as drone swarms.
China’s military-industrial complex is already working on the list. Most efforts are led by the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), the giant state-owned aerospace corporation that is the parent company of China Space Sanjiang Group. Many other entities have also played prominent roles, including Poly Technologies, China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC), and China Academy of Engineering Physics (CAEP).
Besides the LW-30 laser, the 2022 Zhuhai Airshow also featured an anti-drone system produced by CASIC’s Second Academy, which exemplifies the “three-dimensional network” design philosophy. The system is built around the HQ-17AE short-range air-defense system, which can guide four missiles to intercept up to four airborne targets simultaneously at a slant range of 1.5 to 20 kilometers. The Second Academy claims it is effective against UASs, fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, and tactical air-to-ground missiles. The network also incorporates the man-portable QW-12 anti-air missile system and the unmanned ZR-1500 smart defense system, which can be equipped with micro-missiles, small missiles, loitering munitions, and machine guns. Its sensors include an electro-optic radar and a DK-1 low-altitude detection radar working in tandem. The 3D system’s brain is the ZK-K20 ground missile anti-air control system, which processes the detection data and quickly deploys the appropriate weapons. The system is also armed with “soft” anti-drone measures such as electronic interference and deception.
In short, the arms race for UAS and counter-UAS technologies is in full swing. As drones both thwart traditional defenses in conflicts like Ukraine and feature more and more in U.S. defense plans, the multifaceted countermeasures displayed at the Zhuhai Airshow demonstrate that Beijing too is making its own preparations for this key part of the future of war.
Daniel Shats is a research analyst with BluePath Labs, a D.C. defense and tech-focused consulting firm.
P.W. Singer is Strategist at New America and the author of multiple books on technology and security.
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LGBTQMAP
what does MAP stand for? Minor Attracted Persons
The left's new term for pedos as part of their mainstreaming sexual deviance.
we could have LBGTQ brigades
who attack while their twirking asses face the enemy
shock troops ! :-o; the woke version of "shock and awe".
we could defeat the enemy in this way by making them laugh so hysterically
they cannot return fire .
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What You Need to Know about China’s Unmanned Aircraft Research
On the menu today: The U.S. military is now on a surprisingly regular schedule of shooting down one unidentified flying object over North America per day. Yesterday, Senate majority leader Chuck Schumer said that the government believes the second and third objects shot down by U.S. jets were also balloons, but smaller than the first one. A few years back, private-sector military news writers looked at open-source satellite photos and spotted a massive hangar in the western Xinjiang province of China, a site that they concluded “clearly has to do with the development of lighter-than-air craft, which could include large unmanned airship designs capable of operating in the upper reaches of the atmosphere.” No one knows exactly where these spy balloons are coming from — but there’s a good chance the trail leads back to that mysterious massive hangar and secretive research base out in the middle of the Chinese desert.
China’s Spy-Balloon Factory?
Back in July 2021, Tyler Rogoway and Joseph Trevithick, the editor and deputy editor of the military-news site The War Zone, offered some little-noticed insight into a massive hangar operated by the Chinese government, and likely the country’s military, in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region:
One particularly interesting facility that appears to have largely escaped public attention, features, among other things, an absolutely massive hangar — you could fit a Nimitz class supercarrier inside with 100 feet to spare on either side—and is situated near other sites associated with missile defense and anti-satellite activities. The hangar clearly has to do with the development of lighter-than-air craft, which could include large unmanned airship designs capable of operating in the upper reaches of the atmosphere. . . .
The hangar is approximately 1,150 feet long and 450 feet wide. It is also extremely tall, as is made clear in satellite images where there are ground vehicles or shadows present.
That would make the hangar 517,500 square feet — roughly the third-largest hangar in the world. Covered hangars are a good spot to assemble something that you don’t want overhead spy satellites to see. The gigantic hangar site is also not far from the People’s Liberation Army Malan Air Base, where China develops its unmanned drones.
Rogoway and Trevithick added:
A satellite image of the site from Planet Labs, dated Nov. 25, 2020, offers additional evidence of an airship connection in that it shows the hangar’s huge door open and a big rectangular cradle positioned in front of it on the “runway.” Lighter-than-air craft cannot be moved in and out of a hangar-like regular aircraft and this piece of equipment looks like what one might expect to see for use in maneuvering a very large airship around, as opposed to more typical options, such as some sort of mobile mooring mast or mooring lines lashed to ground vehicles. The rectangle shape of the cradle could point to a non-traditional airship configuration without a largely cylindrical center structure, as well. With all this in mind, it seems highly probable that the nearby tower is a mooring mast.
The satellite-photo analysis revealed “a runway-like area, which appears to be paved or otherwise partially improved, extends some 3,000 feet to the west of the hangar.” One of the reasons this is not likely to be an airplane-research-and-development facility is that most modern planes require significantly longer runways for takeoff and landing, although there are exceptions.
That enormous hangar is about 60 miles east of Korla, Xinjiang’s second-largest city. Back in 2020, Tom Patrick Jarvis examined less-detailed images of the area and found that during the previous year, Chinese atmospheric scientists had conducted detailed research into the wind patterns over Korla and concluded that, “The atmospheric wind field near the stratospheric QZWL is an important factor affecting the flight altitude and dynamic control of stratospheric airships.”
Where are all these Chinese spy balloons coming from? There’s a good chance that they were developed at that facility.
And the giant, spherical, white balloon are likely only one of several varieties of lighter-than-air craft developed by China. In December, someone in the Philippines posted pictures of a teardrop-shaped airship with four tail fins flying at a high altitude, not too far from Subic Bay, formerly the site of a major U.S. Naval base that was closed in 1992. Earlier this month, the U.S. and the Philippines announced a major upgrade to their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, expanding the number of bases in the Philippines where U.S. military forces could train and operate.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PuGLQZ646o8&t=7s
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kLspeIuVo0A
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February 14, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF
Mysterious Balloons
By: George Friedman
The relationship between nations is always complex and sometimes difficult to understand. Sometimes it enters the realm of the bizarre. And then, at the most extreme level, it enters the world of balloons, unidentified objects and F-22 fighters – all converging on, as they say in Washington, lies, damn lies and press briefings. This is compounded by the fact that the likely villain, China, claims that the U.S. has intruded on Chinese territory with balloons (their word) at least 10 times. This is possible but also raises the question of why Beijing permitted so many intrusions without a whisper of rage.
According to the Pentagon, China’s spy balloons have entered the airspace of more than 40 nations in recent years. Given that these flying objects are somewhat visible from the ground, it is strange that no one noted them at least loudly enough to be noticed. The question is what the Chinese were looking for – and the Americans too, if Beijing’s counteraccusations are correct. Both countries have many spy satellites, conceived of and used to map out the locations of nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles and deployed in constellations that would detect an enemy launch. These satellites evolved into systems that can detect a wide variety of objects on the ground as well as some that can detect electronic signals.
The satellites certainly appear to be helpful in their primary mission: There has been no nuclear exchange. But as many commentators said, satellites cannot detect everything effectively. The U.S. government has not described everything the suspected Chinese balloons spied on, which is reasonable, but it leads me to wonder what additional objects China was looking for and why slow-moving high-altitude systems were needed. Obviously, they were not tasked with detecting a range of objects in real time. To provide broad coverage, large numbers of these objects – they ought to be called objects rather than balloons, since they are at least partially steered – would have to blanket the sky, remaining relatively immobile (and utterly defenseless), broadcasting data to their home base, and therefore visually and electronically detectable.
They could have been taking a closer look at objects on the ground detected by satellites. Their targets would have to be static for an extended time, since the craft are slow moving. In addition, they would have to be outdoors. Most such things are better surveyed by humans in cars or, better yet, riding bicycles and changing a tire at a strategic place.
The problem I have is imagining the mission these objects could carry out, one that would be invisible, allow loitering if needed and be able to avoid detection. There could be some highly specialized targets, but the fleet that the Chinese appear to have, and that they claim the U.S. has, seems excessive to the task. One Chinese craft was over a U.S. Air Force base that is doubtless loaded with secrets, but how many of the secrets would be visible or broadcasting in the clear?
One theoretical mission would be to divert attention. Russia is much closer to Alaska than is China. It is engaged in a war where the United States has a role, to understate it. Having large, weird craft flying over the continental United States could, in this thinking, generate panic, with the public demanding that the government focus on national defense and not Ukraine. There are a hundred diversionary functions these objects could serve for a limited time, although the result of this episode is low panic and high confusion.
The fundamental question is how objects this large, at altitudes allowing enhanced visibility, could go unnoticed if U.S. and Chinese charges are even close to true. From available information, the craft move with the grace of an elephant and could be shot down by aircraft, missile or a well-aimed slingshot. They must be stunningly advanced, which would explain why the U.S. government is withholding answers. If national security requires it, then it should be. But the price is that the U.S. government is shooting down aircraft and, knowing from the beginning that they are Chinese, is unable to tell us what it found in the wreckage.
I don’t believe these questions can be answered by assuming the relevant actors are stupid or treasonous. The objects need explaining and thus far are incomprehensible. Those favoring explanations based on stupidity or treason are welcome to. I prefer to think I am simply not capable of understanding the complex truth.
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second
Chinese Balloon ‘Did a Lot of Damage,’ Says House Foreign Affairs Chair McCaul
Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) speaks as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken testifies before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on The Biden Administration's Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy on Capitol Hill in Washington on March 10, 2021. (Ken Cedeno-Pool/Getty Images)
Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas) speaks as U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken testifies before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on The Biden Administration's Priorities for U.S. Foreign Policy on Capitol Hill in Washington on March 10, 2021. (Ken Cedeno-Pool/Getty Images)
By Ryan Morgan
February 13, 2023
The Chinese high-altitude balloon that passed over the United States at the start of February “did a lot of damage,” according to Rep. Michael McCaul (R-Texas), the chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
In an interview on CBS’s “Face The Nation” program, McCaul said the Chinese balloon was a “sophisticated spy balloon” that “went across three nuclear sites” as it floated over the United States from Jan. 28 to Feb. 4. McCaul specifically noted the balloon passed over nuclear bases in Montana, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and a base that hosts nuclear bombers in Missouri.
Specifically, the balloon passed over Malmstrom Air Force Base, Montana and Offutt Air Force Base. Malmstrom is home to U.S. nuclear missile forces. Offutt is home to STRATCOM, which is tasked with detecting and deterring attacks against the United States and its allies, including nuclear strikes. The balloon also flew near Whiteman Air Force Base, which hosts the nuclear-capable B-2 Spirit stealth bombers.
“It did a lot of damage,” McCaul said of the high-altitude balloon’s flight path. The balloon passed over the various U.S. military sites before it was shot down off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4
“The fact is, whether it be the hypersonic weapon they’ve made that circled the world and landed with precision, to the spy balloon, we have to stop selling them the very technology that they use in their most advanced weapon systems that they can turn against us,” McCaul added.
Recent reports have indicated the Chinese government has bought U.S.-produced software products for use in its hypersonic missile programs. In recent years, U.S. officials have accused Chinese spies of stealing key technologies, and lawmakers have been considering laws to curb China’s access to sensitive U.S. defense programs.
US Military Says it ‘Mitigated’ Balloon’s Surveillance
U.S. defense officials have said they “mitigated” the balloon’s intelligence-gathering capabilities during its transit over the U.S., though they did not specify what means were used to block or reduce the balloon’s ability to transmit sensitive data back to China.
Officials in President Joe Biden’s administration have also said they took measures to mitigate the balloon’s ability to gather data. On Feb. 9, White House Press Secretary Karine Jean-Pierre said the military was able “to protect any national security, sensitive information, that was on the ground as [the balloon] was moving on its path.”
McCaul shared his doubts about those mitigation efforts during the CBS interview.
“They say they mitigated it but my assessment, and I can’t get into the detail of the intelligence document, is that if it’s still transmitting going over these three very sensitive nuclear sites, I think if you look at the flight pattern of the balloon it tells the story as to what the Chinese were up to as they controlled this aircraft throughout the United States going over those sites,” McCaul said. “In my judgement it would cause great damage. Remember, a balloon can see a lot more on the ground than a satellite.”
The Biden administration has said he elected to wait until after the balloon was passing over open water before shooting it down in order to avoid endangering people with falling debris and maximize the chances of collecting information from the downed balloon.
“Shooting the balloon down over water wasn’t just the safest option, it maximized the chance of recovering the payload, giving us a better chance to get information from the Chinese surveillance balloon payload,” Jean-Pierre said on Feb. 6.
Other ‘Unidentified’ Objects
After shooting down the Chinese high-altitude balloon off the coast of South Carolina on Feb. 4, the U.S. military has observed other objects passing through U.S. air spaces.
One of the “unidentified” objects, described as being the size of a car, was flying at about 40,000 feet before it was shot down over Alaska on Friday. Additional unidentified objects were either shot down or observed over North America over the weekend.
“It’s unclear to me what these other three unidentified objects are. It could be space debris could be really quite frankly anything,” McCaul said.
McCaul said the U.S. may have a “keener” awareness after the recent Chinese surveillance balloon incident.
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https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/china-learned-hypersonic-weapons-twice-135000351.html
hard to tell if BS or real
Certainly CCP can be trusted no more then US government
wonder what Pentagon really thinks about their missiles being able to destroy AC carriers
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I'm confused. Why aren't ordinary missiles capable of sinking an aircraft carrier that is in range of the carriers aircraft to hit China?
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speed
and perhaps unpredictable flight path of hypersonic missiles
https://theconversation.com/how-hypersonic-missiles-work-and-the-unique-threats-they-pose-an-aerospace-engineer-explains-180836#:~:text=The%20hypersonic%20speed%20of%20these,the%20greatest%20risk%20they%20pose.
have not read this yet but Table of Contents suggests it will help define the problem:
https://sgp.fas.org/crs/weapons/R45811.pdf
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I get that hypersonics are a far more hideous threat-- very much to the American homeland, but as far as our carriers are concerned, are they not already vulnerable to existing missiles?
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2019/05/21/ten-reasons-a-u-s-navy-aircraft-carrier-is-one-of-the-safest-places-to-be-in-a-war/?sh=344bb6022f7a
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That was very interesting and informative.
That said, I confess to doubting its conclusion. I'm thinking a carrier within reach of Chinese land-based missiles is fuct should they decide to launch.
In a not dissimilar vein:
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China Builds for South Polar Nuclear Strikes
A Long March 5B rocket lifts off from the Wenchang launch site on China's southern Hainan island on May 5, 2020. Another variant of the Long March rocket was used to get China's hypersonic missile into orbit in July 2021. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)
A Long March 5B rocket lifts off from the Wenchang launch site on China's southern Hainan island on May 5, 2020. Another variant of the Long March rocket was used to get China's hypersonic missile into orbit in July 2021. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)
Rick Fisher
By Rick Fisher
February 11, 2023Updated: February 15, 2023
biggersmaller Print
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Commentary
When China tested its fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS) nuclear delivery weapon in July 2021 and August 2021, it said nothing about its plans for developing this weapon.
First produced by the former Soviet Union in the late 1960s to better evade the U.S. early warning radar, China’s FOBS can do that but could also evolve into a potent space weapon.
Two recent Chinese revelations may indicate that China intends to build a robust FOBS capability that could include various liquid- and solid-fueled launchers, large and small warhead dispensing “buses,” and exploitation of launch opportunities from multiple axes on the globe.
Early in the U.S.–Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) competition, the Soviets decided that they needed to evade early U.S. and Canadian ballistic missile early warning (BMEW) radar that, despite the curvature of the Earth over the Arctic, could provide useful warning of Soviet ICBMs that could fly at altitudes of more than 1,000 miles over their ballistic arcs.
But in the mid to late 1960s, Soviet designers such as Sergei Korolev and Mikhail Yangel had developed ICBMs that would place a warhead bus into low Earth orbit (125 to 300 miles), but go the opposite direction and strike U.S. targets with southern approaches not defended by BMEW radar. The bus would then use thrusters to decelerate to allow strikes with nuclear warheads.
For its July 2021 and August 2021 test flights, China used a 1980s vintage workhorse satellite-lofting China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) Long March-2C space launch vehicle but equipped with a new final stage “bus” that also circled the Earth on a South Polar trajectory over Antarctica.
It’s very likely that the Chinese FOBS bus decelerated before launching a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) warhead at a target in China. HGVs are maneuverable and can exploit long and low trajectories to “sneak up on” a target.
Older, reliable liquid-fuel launchers such as the Long March-2C can loft warhead-dispensing FOBS buses that can circle the Earth for months before a conflict. This gives the Chinese regime the option of multi-axis, devastating nuclear first strikes or surprise nonnuclear attacks against targets on land or at sea.
But Chinese rocket companies such as CASC and the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), in addition to new “private” space launch vehicle (SLV) companies, offer great potential for developing more mobile solid-fuel FOBS platforms.
Epoch Times Photo
A security guard stands next to models of Chinese rockets on display in Beijing on Sept. 24, 2013. The Chinese regime is testing weapons that could soon endanger satellites in all orbits. (Mark Ralston/AFP/Getty Images)
These range from the massive CASIC solid fuel Kuaizhou-31, which can loft 70-ton payloads into orbit, to the smaller CASC Jielong-3—based on the DF-41 ICBM—which can loft 1.5 tons to a 300-mile orbit.
The Jielong-3 has been used to launch surveillance satellites of the new Hong Kong Aerospace Technology Group (HKATG), which on Jan. 9 announced, with Djibouti’s President Ismail Omar Guelleh, their initialing of a $1 billion deal to build a space launch facility with up to seven space launch platforms by 2028. This would be China’s first foreign-deployed space launch base.
But just to be sure the world didn’t conclude that Djibouti would be allowing China to launch nuclear weapons, on the very same day, the authoritarian Guelleh government signed the U.N. Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.
Now China doesn’t adhere to this treaty, and even as a “private” company, HKATG would have to obey Chinese “civil-military fusion” regulations that would oblige it to follow Chinese government and military orders.
As it has never before conducted space launches, perhaps HKATG will rely heavily on help from the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force, which controls China’s five other space launch bases and the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) manned and unmanned space assets and is likely the lead PLA service for space warfare—perhaps to include bombing the Earth from space.
Since 2017, China has maintained naval and air facilities in Djibouti, stationing about 2,000 troops there, armed with the potent ZTL-11 wheeled tank; the United States maintains more than 4,000 troops nearby in Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.
It’s unlikely that increasingly China-dependent Guelleh will raise a real fuss if Beijing wants to launch “civilian” Jielong-3 SLVs that are covertly armed with a FOBS bus that could carry at least one hypersonic glide vehicle weapon.
From Djibouti, a South Polar trajectory over Antarctica sets up a FOBS bus for strikes against U.S. bases in Alaska or U.S. ICBM bases in North Dakota, Montana, and Wyoming.
That China’s FOBS buses have the most accurate guidance information will now be better ensured by Beijing’s second revelation, made in a Feb. 2 article in the Chinese publication China Space News, that CASIC will build a space tracking and control (STC) facility at China’s Zhongshan Research Station in Antarctica.
The United States, Norway, and Germany also maintain STC facilities in Antarctica. Still, they don’t have FOBS weapons as China does, and the CASIC STC in Antarctica is also likely to be directly controlled by the Strategic Support Force (SSF).
China’s Zhongshan STC likely won’t just be helping guide FOBS strikes against the United States; it’s also ideally placed to support SSF-controlled expansion of China’s manned presence on the moon.
The Zhongshan STC will also help the SSF to conduct space warfare. In a Feb. 19, 2021, article, Chinese state-run media outlet Xinhua reported that Chinese researchers had installed a “fluorescence doppler lidar system” at Zhongshan for atmospheric research; lidar is laser radar.
Many of the low Earth orbit surveillance satellites of the United States, the UK, France, Japan, and Taiwan are polar orbiters that pass over Antarctica multiple times per day.
There’s a good chance that since 2021, China’s research lidar at Zhongshan has grown larger—into the kind of laser weapon that the regime began using about 20 years ago to harass and damage U.S. satellites.
As the ozone is much thinner over Antarctica, a laser weapon based there will be able to do much more damage to overhead satellites, which also tend to fly closer to the Earth over the poles.
All of this points to the necessity for the United States to consider the rapid development of its own FOBS weapons to deter the Chinese regime, which, for decades, has rejected all arms control approaches that would limit its nuclear weapons.
It also points to the need for the United States to engage Australia and New Zealand to consider how the ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States) allies can better ensure that they can stop Chinese military usage of Antarctica, either by non-kinetic or kinetic means.
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spoke to Navy person who specializes in missile weapons, defense , hypersonics
stated that the position is that AC carriers are very well protected
and that the usual missiles would not reach them
but hypersonics are a big problem
because they are so fast and can be launched from submarines
reducing time to target so much that AC carrier defenses may not be able to respond fast enough
stated many many missiles are already programmed to have unpredictable flight paths
or be low flying
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"stated that the position is that AC carriers are very well protected
and that the usual missiles would not reach them"
If they are were they usually are, then I agree.
OTOH if they are close enough to Taiwan for their aircraft to be relevant to defending Taiwan, then count me as doubtful.
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I am thinking battle of Midway
4 Japanese carriers sunk in two days ! :-o
I hate to say our military's predictions lately have not been spot on ......
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I am thinking battle of Midway
4 Japanese carriers sunk in two days ! :-o
I hate to say our military's predictions lately have not been spot on ......
The French Generals were very confident in the Maginot Line.
Our fake and gay navy can’t win it’s war against rust.
https://amp.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/aug/21/some-fear-navy-losing-battle-against-rusty-ships/
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then release the news to the AP
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-says-commander-killed-troops-165825941.html
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https://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2023/02/19/u-s-navy-announces-reset-of-physical-fitness-test-failures-dod-offers-to-cover-abortion-travel-expenses/
Male Navy standards age 17 to 19 :
https://www.navy-prt.com/us-navy-overall-fitness-standards/navy-pt-standards-for-men/pt-standards-males-17-19/
Female Navy standards age 17 to 19:
https://www.navy-prt.com/us-navy-overall-fitness-standards/navy-pt-standards-for-woman/pt-standards-females-17-19/
requirements decrease with age
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https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1627751208067731459.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwA3Vmjps1g
Weird how the Chinese PLAN seems to be recruiting people to fight a war.
Ignore all the military equipment in the video that resembles ours, pure coincidence!
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https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-is-the-army-running-out-of-ammunition/a-64710592?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20230225_Weekend_Jolt&utm_term=Jolt-Smart&fbclid=IwAR3v-i6X263a4glq0sfdf199n46QSvmtwsPjHub6y8IE8yAyRFG-DjqYQFY
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https://americanmind.org/salvo/a-few-broken-men/?utm_campaign=American%20Mind%20Email%20Warm%20Up&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=247557316&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-8d0uojz6Lwua7j8EGF_cjqZa0vxMbxGvMBqtGkNkgYsdk2-lxDbW25rXSEdJv6gbetga1dMXIwhl9_3585FwAV8tVqHA&utm_content=247557315&utm_source=hs_email
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" But to America’s ruling class, broken men are a chance for “systemic” change. Since G.I. Jane’s brother is in jail for smuggling opioids from Ohio to Virginia, recruiters now have an opening to add a female to the platoon. For the young man, the recruiter can point him to the local rehab center. Or maybe there is a minimum-security prison where he can take coding classes. Perhaps he can finally earn his degree there. But when he gets out, he won’t be joining the Marine Corps. Experts haven’t yet determined that criminal conviction is the type of diversity they are looking for.*
"We estimate that 3 % of the total U.S. adult population and 15 % of the African American adult male population has ever been to prison; people with felony convictions account for 8 % of all adults and 33 % of the African American adult male population."
astounding
we have an. intersectionality feminism class we can take for work .
it is optional . I have no idea what this even means or why it could be relevant.
something like 2/3 of the doctors are already women (his/her!)
a whole industry of this stuff will never go away because like all industries it makes up stuff to drive further business.
And the corporates think thye need to be on board with Dems or more likely see this as a good sales and recruitment .
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Ukraine’s Software Warrior Brigade
They are bringing tech innovation to the battlefield faster and more effectively than Russia is.
By Shyam Sankar
March 8, 2023 6:00 pm ET
image A Ukrainian serviceman flies a drone near Bakhmut, Ukraine, March 3.PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Ukraine is learning what happens when you conscript 300,000 of the world’s most capable software engineers, product managers and technologists and send them into battle.
The story usually goes something like this: An employee of a small information-technology outsourcing company becomes a unit commander on the frontlines. He sends his battle-born ideas back to his former colleagues in the tech-company lab. They rapidly build prototypes to show to Defense Ministry officials responsible for military technology procurement. The government then buys these prototypes and asks for more.
It’s a virtuous circle of innovation and entrepreneurship that has led to a proliferation of startups in Ukraine, including dozens of drone companies since the beginning of the war. Among other things, Ukraine’s wartime tech community has developed 3D-printed fins that can attach to Soviet-era grenades to maximize accuracy when dropped from greater heights. This innovation has turned consumer drones into remote bombers with a payload of up to six grenades that can deliver precision strikes on Russian lines.
In February, I traveled to Ukraine to see firsthand how defense and intelligence agencies are using technology. I also wanted to get a sense of what we could be doing to help Ukrainian forces increase their situational awareness on the battlefield.
What I saw was that Ukrainian conscripts are connoisseurs of software. They have a visceral knowledge of how it is built. Crucially, they have the vocabulary to provide feedback that can help developers improve the product. Their knowledge and experience has laid the foundation for collaboration among allied international software developers looking to help.
In other circumstances, I’d be trying to hire them as engineers.
So many of the most common defense-tech problems I’ve seen over the past 15 years—including the difficulty of adopting and rapidly deploying new technologies to the field—have melted away in Ukraine during this war. The urgency is simply overwhelming.
Militaries generally don’t understand software. They have a process, a mental mode and a funding model to buy tanks, weapons and other hardware. Software is largely considered an afterthought, or a piece of the hardware itself. This is changing in the U.S. but remains a challenge for every Western country.
In Ukraine, the military became discerning consumers of software practically overnight. Perhaps more important, they became discerning consumers of software talent. Highly technical Ukrainian war fighters are able to identify and work with world-class software engineers, allowing them to rush advanced technological solutions to the battlefield. Ukraine’s 300,000 computer-science conscripts are quick to try new things, challenge sacred programs that aren’t delivering, and fund multiple competing efforts. They understand that software requires constant innovation, iteration and updates. You don’t just set it and forget it.
Even though it would be easy for Kyiv to bestow special monopoly status on a handful of programs during wartime, Ukrainian officials continue to see value in funding multiple overlapping efforts. They are willing to trade bureaucratic orderliness for increased innovation, lethality and capability on the battlefield.
As American venture capitalist Ben Horowitz pointed out in a famous 2011 essay, there is a difference between a wartime CEO and a peacetime CEO. Each takes a different view on what is necessary for success. There’s an analogous difference between a peacetime defense program and a wartime defense program. The peacetime view is that you invest in military innovation before war begins and be ready to fight with the technology your investment produces. You fight with the hardware you have. The wartime view is that you get the software you need for the fight you find yourself in.
Ukraine is showing the world how the wartime view can produce the software necessary to win the fight. After Ukraine wins, there will be 300,000 war heroes who happen to be computer scientists. They will be as comfortable wielding Javelins as Jupyter notebooks. I can’t wait to see what they build.
Slava Ukraini.
Mr. Sankar is Palantir’s chief technology officer.
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About That ‘Record’ Defense Budget
Biden’s 3.2% increase is a cut in real terms despite rising threats.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
March 9, 2023 6:42 pm ET
The White House is touting President Biden’s U.S. military budget for fiscal 2024 as a record, and Mr. Biden is betting busy Americans won’t look past the headlines. The truth is that he’s asking for a real defense cut, even as the U.S. is waking up late to a world of new threats.
The Pentagon’s budget request may seem large at $842 billion. But the figure is only a 3.2% increase over last year, and with inflation at 6% it means a decline in buying power. Compare the 3.2% growth with the double-digit increases for domestic accounts: 19% for the Environmental Protection Agency; 13.6% for both the Education and Energy Departments; 11.5% for Health and Human Services.
For all the talk about a bloated Pentagon, defense in 2022 was only about 13% of the federal budget. It’s about 3% of GDP, down from 5% to 6% during the Cold War, even though America’s challenges today are arguably more numerous and acute.
China is building a world-class military to drive America out of the Pacific. Russia is committed to grinding down Ukraine and then moving its military to the Polish border; Iran may soon have a nuclear bomb; North Korea is lobbing missiles toward Japan. Hypersonics and missiles threaten the U.S. homeland.
The Pentagon isn’t releasing the finer points of the budget until Monday, but a hefty portion of any increase will be absorbed by a 5.2% pay increase for troops and civilians, needed in part to offset Mr. Biden’s inflationary policies. The White House includes bromides about America’s “long-term commitment to the Indo-Pacific” and highlights $9.1 billion for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative.
But Pacific deterrence depends on a U.S. Navy large enough to discourage bad behavior, and the goal of a 355-ship service remains a fantasy. The document promises “executable and responsible” investments in the fleet, which is a euphemism for cutting ships without adequate replacements.
The budget commits to “ongoing nuclear modernization,” but recapitalizing all three parts of the triad is a generational challenge that is straining budgets. The document nods at expanding “the production capacity of the industrial base to ensure the Army can meet strategic demands for critical munitions,” and Congress last year authorized multiyear contracts that should help. But the U.S. still isn’t procuring its best precision weapons in sufficient quantities to last more than a few weeks in a fight for Taiwan.
Mr. Biden’s largest failure is promising his budget will keep “America safe,” instead of leveling with the public about the threats and what will be required to meet them. The reality is that U.S. military power is “slowly sinking,” as a Navy admiral put it last year, and Congress will have to start plugging the hole.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/03/let-us-bulk-buy-missiles-fighting-china-pentagon-asks-congress/383889/
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https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2023/03/naval-research-lab-launches-first-space-laser-energy-experiment/384024/
I hate to be so cynical but China will be testing theirs next week
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https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2023/03/naval-research-lab-launches-first-space-laser-energy-experiment/384024/
I hate to be so cynical but China will be testing theirs next week
The fact that it looks just like ours is pure coincidence, you Sinophobe!
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it will look just like ours
but a small fraction of the cost since they don't have to pay much for research
only bribes to their operatives
which they deduct under cost of doing business. :-P
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it will look just like ours
but a small fraction of the cost since they don't have to pay much for research
only bribes to their operatives
which they deduct under cost of doing business. :-P
Well, they double billed us for Fauci’s bio weapon production at Wuhan.
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https://www.foxnews.com/politics/navy-secretary-cites-climate-change-top-priority-biden-proposes-shrinking-fleet
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https://www.foxnews.com/politics/navy-secretary-cites-climate-change-top-priority-biden-proposes-shrinking-fleet
https://gcaptain.com/us-navy-released-worst-rust-photo-to-date/
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https://www.theburningplatform.com/2023/03/20/how-an-army-commercial-shows-were-rapidly-falling-apart/#more-297434
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ItEHJc330Q
Read the comments.
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https://www.revolver.news/2023/03/guess-his-iq-four-star-general-gives-bizarre-answer-when-asked-about-coups-in-africa/
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https://indianbronson.substack.com/p/how-to-enlist-the-right-way
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interesting:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-woos-silicon-valley-to-join-ranks-of-arms-makers-38b1d4c0
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interesting:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/pentagon-woos-silicon-valley-to-join-ranks-of-arms-makers-38b1d4c0
Good thing China won't steal any of that!
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https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2023/03/26/army-pulls-be-all-you-can-be-ads-after-on-screen-narrator-arrested/
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https://www.danielgreenfield.org/2023/03/as-china-war-looms-navys-priority-is.html
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/03/us-sextuple-155mm-artillery-shell-production-replenish-stocks-sent-ukraine/384542/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2023/03/27/americans-have-stopped-trusting-the-pentagon-with-their-lives-n2621099
Americans Have Stopped Trusting the Pentagon With Their Lives
Kurt Schlichter
Mar 27, 2023
Right now, many of us vets are looking back on our years of service and wondering what the hell we did it all for. We used to know – for the USA. Yet you look at the disaster that is our country, our culture, and our beloved military, and you just want to go find a wall and pound your head against it. But a lot fewer folks are going to have this problem in the future because a lot fewer young people are joining our military. The Pentagon can't meet its recruiting goals, and, of course, the fault is our young people, our potential soldiers, for being unwilling to sacrifice their time, and sometimes their lives, in support of the bizarre social pathologies that our garbage ruling class embraces.
The military lost our trust, and it seems uninterested in earning it back. Time for the normals to go on strike until the military becomes a military again instead of a camouflaged faculty lounge.
Why the hell should anybody join the military right now? Don't tell me that it is "to defend the United States" because that's not what the military's primary occupation appears to be anymore. Let's review. We just had former admiral and current Biden Baghdad Bob, smarmy State Department Spokesperson John Kirby, announce that a "core part" of United States foreign policy is "LGBTQ+ rights." You know, not a lot of normal people particularly want to suffer and bleed for that blue coastal fetish. Maybe they do in the rich liberal neighborhoods where Kirby's masters live – actually, they are happy for your kids to suffer and bleed for it, not their own. Oh, and you know what else is a strategic priority? The weather. Who is up to enlist in service of it not being slightly hotter in 200 years? And don't forget Ukraine – yeah, I know they promise we are just advising and will never get sucked into a war in the Mekong Delta. Oops, I mean the Donbas.
Combine all that with the fact that we aren't even allowed to protect our border from illegal aliens and the drug smugglers who are killing over 70,000 Americans a year with fentanyl, and normal people are going to shake their heads at the priorities of the ruling class and count themselves out of being its enforcers. Our national interest seems to be anything but protecting our own people. Young folks have noticed, and they are not signing on the line which is dotted.
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So, That's How NBC News Covered Police Confronting the Nashville Mass Shooter
Matt Vespa
Our military, which, not coincidentally, has failed to unequivocally win a war in 30 years, did what it always does when it faces a problem. It makes the problem worse by hiring contractors to help them solve it. They hired people to go out and poll young people to find out why young people were not willing to commit their lives to the hands of people whose gross incompetence and total corruption have been on display for the last several decades. And here's a surprise. You're gonna be shocked. The answer was exactly what the brass wanted it to be, exculpatory. Turns out the answer the contractors delivered is nothing that challenges the ruling class's established prejudices or preferences. No, the answer is that American kids are too fat and too sick and mostly too scared to man up and die in the service of our trash, ruling caste fantasies. Phew! No change or reform required by our military. What a relief, and how convenient! And how disgraceful.
Go tell the dead in Kabul that they were "scared," forced by the gross negligence of senior leadership to mingle in close proximity to unvetted Afghans so that a bomber could get close and blow 13 of them apart. They didn't hesitate. They didn't falter. They deserved better.
Here's what's missing from the polls – the reality. Even in the past, the vast majority of Americans can't or don't want to serve. They have their reasons. Mostly, the reason is that it's hard, and you can make more money doing much easier things out on the outside. Service is not for everyone or even most people. So really, when you poll about recruiting, you should be polling just the target audience, the segment of people who might actually ever join the military, to find out why those select folks now refuse to.
And a big reason might be that our ruling caste believes – and the military teaches – that these select folks are bad people. The majority of potential recruits are traditional and conservative rural kids, poor kids, and suburban kids, mostly looking to serve their country, maybe make some money for college, and have a life adventure. That's the reality. And a huge number of them are family members of vets since the military has become a family business in America. So it's these people you should be polling if you want to find out why these people aren't showing up anymore.
Here's what you won't find in the poll results. You won't find any reports of potential recruits' concerns about incompetent military leadership. Kabul, anyone? That part about not winning a war in 30 years? That's important. I was there the last time we unequivocally won a war. I highly recommend it. It's much preferable to these long conflicts with inevitably disgraceful exits under the leadership of those medal-be-decked losers in the Pentagon. Nobody wants to be part of a losing team, but that's what we are right now. You flag officers can tell each other that we are still the most lethal powerful fighting force ever and watch the Chinese laugh.
The potential recruits are particularly disgusted by the gross betrayal of our soldiers over COVID. These idiots threw out thousands of dedicated military personnel because they wouldn't take an unproven vaccine that actually doesn't stop transmission and doesn't prevent you from getting the disease. They were lied to by the generals and admirals and betrayed by the generals and admirals, and now the generals and admirals are scratching their close-cropped heads, wondering why young people won't commit their lives to their care.
Don't even get me started on how the military abandoned Navy Lt. Ridge Alkonis to the Japanese "justice" system. When I trained in Japan 20 years ago, our allies had far too much respect for us to reject a request to return an unjustly imprisoned American. Now they just laugh at us. And our military nearly cut off his family's pay! But hey, recruits, totally put your life in the Pentagon's hands! It's got your back!
And let's talk about wokeness. Supposedly wokeness isn't even a consideration among the recruiting base. Baloney. It's a huge problem because it's the conservative Americans who actually serve who are being denigrated and insulted by this DEI crap. Normal people take one look at what is happening – they hear about it from vets and the currently serving – and say, "Hell no, I am not going to devote four years of my life to sitting around being indoctrinated into trans awareness." The fact that we have a military so essentially frivolous that it allows men pretending to be women to share close quarters with females is proof plenty to the recruiting base that the American military is no longer receptive to normal people.
Here's how bad it is and how thoroughly this idiotic ideological mind virus has penetrated the leadership. Let me share with you a recent email sent by an active-duty command sergeant major to his/her/xir troops. You need to understand something about a command sergeant major. That's the guy who stands beside a colonel or a general and has the respect and gravitas to take that officer behind closed doors and say, "Listen up, sir, you're being stupid." And a good officer listens. A CSM was once a legend, but the "C" now stands for "clown." This is an actual email sent by a US Army CSM to American soldiers:
Spread the word.
Tell the ENTIRE formation.
Emma Watson’s HeForShe campaign invites men to join the conversations. “Gender equality is your issue too… Both men and women should feel free to be sensitive. Both men and women should feel free to be strong.” We should all feel empowered to “take action against all form of violence and discrimination faced by women and girls.” (Emma Watson UN speech)
When all of us gain traction on this first step we will all inherently afford this alienable right to all people that raise their right hand, and serve.
Take that, People's Liberation Army!
R. Lee Ermey himself (unbelievably NSFW) did not possess adequate reserves of profanity to adequately describe this woke nonsense. Now, who is the young man who dreams not of tough training and camaraderie in a band of brothers but of being lectured about the perfidy of his penis for the duration of a four-year hitch? Not the kind you want in your infantry company. Perhaps the military should be spending its time studying Hannibal instead of Hermione.
Now, I've got 20 bucks that say half of these brass buffoons don't even know who the hell Hannibal is. And half of those don't think Hannibal is worth studying because he was cis, though some may get past that because he was also African.
And let's not even get into the rest of the racial garbage and the political garbage where you get told you are trash and a traitor because of your race and your politics, particularly conservative, traditional politics. No wonder most vets are telling young people not to go where they are not welcome. You won't get that from the talking head generals on CNN. You will get it from us retired colonels, majors, captains, and senior noncommissioned officers. When young people come up to us and ask, "Hey, what do you think of me joining?" we tell them that if they join, we will support them, but we don't recommend it because you can't trust this military leadership.
Congratulations on losing our trust, generals and admirals and woke E9s – just like you lost the wars you ran. This strike does not make us happy, but sometimes people only learn the hard way, and maybe if the generals and admirals don't get their fresh meat, they might change course.
As for the rest of you, support our troops. You can best do that by electing someone who will ruthlessly fire most of the generals and admirals and make America's military great again.
Follow Kurt on Twitter @KurtSchlichter. Get Inferno, the seventh book in the Kelly Turnbull People's Republic series of conservative action novels set in America after a notional national divorce, as well as his non-fiction book We'll Be Back: The Fall and Rise of America.
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https://www.popsci.com/technology/air-force-venom-project-fighter-jet-autonomy/
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https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2023/04/07/washington_and_ikes_warning_on_foreign_policy_greed_892638.html
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The Military Recruitment Crisis Is a Symptom of Cultural Rot
We need new leaders to cultivate the American spirit and restore the integrity of institutions.
By David McCormick and James Cunningham
April 14, 2023 1:50 pm ET
WSJ
America’s cultural cancer manifests itself in many ways, but no symptom is more telling than our low military recruitment. Last year the Army hit only 75% of its recruiting target, while other services had to scramble to meet theirs. This year looks to be worse. The all-volunteer force, formed 50 years ago, is in peril and threatens our ability to defend ourselves in a dangerous world. What does this say about America?
It says we have a national health crisis. A volunteer military requires able-bodied recruits, but 77% of young Americans would be unfit to serve for health reasons. Behind that statistic lies a mountain of concerning data. Every year, fentanyl and other drugs take more than 106,000 lives and affect millions more, reducing the pool of recruits.
It says that partisan politics have infected America’s core institutions. Civilian leaders have used the uniformed services as political pawns and directed them to push progressive priorities. This makes it harder for military leaders to accomplish their central mission—fighting and winning the nation’s wars. It also explains why less than half of Americans (48%) express a great deal of confidence in the U.S. military, a 22-point drop in five years. The politicization of institutions, whether the military, schools or professional sports, divides our country where it should be most unified.
Those divisions contribute to the atomization of American society, which the U.S. military hasn’t escaped. In the late 1980s, when a young Lt. McCormick looked at his platoon in the 82nd Airborne Division—with a Southern Baptist from Alabama, a black man from Newark, and a Puerto Rican platoon sergeant—he saw a strong, diverse and confident America. Now the military draws from a shrinking pool, most with parents or close relatives who served. The rest of society has few family ties to the military. This is only one of the thousands of small fractures subdividing our society, stoked by social media, the left’s obsession with race, sex and identity, and extreme figures on the right as well.
These factors fuel the greatest cultural ailment of all: waning confidence in American exceptionalism. Members of the military carry on a proud tradition, and the nation owes them our gratitude. But their willingness to wear the uniform stands out in a country where only 9% of those eligible to serve wish to do so.
How did it come to this? Americans have been fed a narrative of victimhood. Our society treats veterans as victims or, worse, charity cases, not as warrior-citizens taught leadership, discipline and camaraderie. On campus, in the media and across popular culture, grievance is the new currency of the realm.
Children are taught to doubt, not love, America, and leaders on both sides of the aisle question its goodness. Perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that only 38% of Americans highly value patriotism and an equal share say they is “extremely proud” to be American.
The same forces that threaten the all-volunteer force endanger American society at large. These concerns animate our new book, “Superpower in Peril,” in which we chart a path to national renewal. But policy alone can’t heal a spiritual problem. The American spirit fills our national character with courage, ambition and creativity. It is our source of strength when times get bad, and the defining feature of American exceptionalism. That spirit has been neglected—or worse, suppressed—by the forces laid out here. The military recruiting crisis is a direct result of its decline.
We need new leaders to cultivate the American spirit and restore institutional integrity: in the Pentagon, to put war fighting and deterrence first; in schools, to teach civics and America’s exceptional story; in business, to reaffirm the principles of merit and capitalism; and across society, to create a new national commitment to citizenship.
William F. Buckley Jr. defined citizenship as the union of privilege (because to be an American is to be blessed with liberty and opportunity) and responsibility (because as Americans we have a duty to preserve the republic and serve our nation). Today, we have the balance wrong, emphasizing privilege and too often forgetting responsibility.
Perhaps the military recruiting crisis is the lagging indicator of America’s cultural collapse. Or maybe it’s the canary in the coal mine, an early warning that it is time to rescue American exceptionalism. What we do next as citizens will decide.
Mr. McCormick, a combat veteran and former CEO of Bridgewater Associates, was a candidate for the Republican U.S. Senate nomination in Pennsylvania in 2022. He is author, with Mr. Cunningham, of “Superpower in Peril: A Battle Plan to Renew America.”
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second
Pentagon Gives Aerojet Rocketdyne $216M to Boost Production of Weapons Used in Ukraine
By Marcus Weisgerber
The Pentagon will invest $216 million to expand and modernize Aerojet Rocketdyne manufacturing facilities in Arkansas, Alabama, and Virginia in an attempt to boost production of rocket motors used in a host of missiles given to Ukraine.
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Third
https://www.investors.com/politics/editorials/197-military-officers-purged-by-obama/
What the president calls "my military" is being cleansed of any officer suspected of disloyalty to or disagreement with the administration on matters of policy or force structure, leaving the compliant and fearful.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/sep/18/president-obama-wary-of-generals-admirals-commandi/
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2013/11/obama-vs-the-generals-099379
https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2016/09/obama_purged_military_of_those_who_sought_victory.html
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https://www.yahoo.com/news/pentagon-sounds-alarm-over-biden-113008189.html
I would be surprised if Susan Rice et al. take heed to this and do not ignore it.
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April 18, 2023
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Open as PDF
The Logic of American Strategy and War
By: George Friedman
In recent weeks I have focused on the social and economic evolution of the United States. Obviously, we also need to discuss U.S. strategic policy. Domestic policy tends to be more dynamic than strategic policy, which follows from more persistent things like imperatives. The United States is secure from an attack on land. Neither Canada nor Mexico has the ability to wage or interest in waging a land war against the United States. Therefore, the fundamental threat to American national security must come from the sea. Still, American strategy has within it a logic. It lacks the cyclical logic of domestic politics but is shaped by the necessities imposed by place and enemies.
America’s entry into World War I was triggered by a German attack on U.S. shipping. In World War II, Washington’s key motive was the same. If Germany cut off lines of supply between the U.S. and Britain, it could isolate Britain and attack it at will. Having secured the Atlantic and a base of operations in Britain, Germany could threaten the East Coast. In the Pacific, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, if fought sensibly, could have secured sea lanes from Hawaii to the West Coast and possibly enabled Japan to impose its will there. Even the Cold War was primarily naval. Germany was indeed the line of contact with the Soviet Union, but the vital supply lines ran from the U.S. to Europe, and NATO could be crippled by cutting off those supplies. Toward that end, the Russians deployed submarines and supersonic anti-ship systems.
The Germans (twice), the Soviets and the Japanese each saw the defense of their nations as rooted in maritime war against the United States. The German failure permitted D-Day to take place, the Soviet failure made a Soviet ground offensive in Europe impossible, and the Japanese failure led to Hiroshima and the U.S. occupation of Japan. In each case, the ability of the U.S. to maintain lines of supply and block enemy attacks was the key to the defense of the United States and its economy, and in each case, American strategy was built on deterrence. In the event that U.S. security was not entirely at risk at sea, Washington created barriers to block enemy powers from moving assets toward Atlantic or Pacific ports. It was understood that the immediate threat might be trivial compared to the long-term threat. Therefore, it was essential to engage Germany as early as possible – to contain the long-term threat while it still entailed combating ground forces and before the sea threat had fully materialized. This was also critical in the Pacific against Japan. It should be noted that in Vietnam, where the U.S. had no land-sea strategy, matters ended badly.
In Ukraine, there is an element of this strategy. Russia, if it were to defeat Ukraine, would be at NATO’s border and could attack westward. The U.S. is practicing a strategy of preemption at a relatively low cost in terms of U.S. casualties to prevent the very unlikely move of Russia to the Atlantic coast. Maritime action is used to drive back land forces. This was the strategy used against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and it is now being used against Russian forces in Ukraine. In this use of sea power, there is significant indirectness designed to impose an element of risk on ground forces deep in their own territory. It is a strategy normally too subtle to easily see.
Therefore, U.S. naval strategy in Ukraine is designed primarily to block waterways that could facilitate Russian movement – namely the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. It is not the heart of the broader U.S. strategy.
It is with respect to China that this strategy is being most seriously tested. The primary strategy of the U.S. must be to maintain control of the Pacific and maintain lines of supply to allies to prevent an opening for China. The heart of the strategy is to apply varying pressures on China so that it is forced to balance and rebalance its forces. As an example, China’s seizing Taiwan is not possible given the time needed for a task force to reach the Taiwan coast, during which it would be open to attack by the United States. This limits the ultimate Chinese threat to the U.S. coasts. Naval warfare (and here I include naval air power, as has been normal since World War II) combines two strategies, one limiting Chinese movement at sea and the other opening the possibility of threatening the Chinese homeland.
The Chinese constantly threaten Taiwan, but until now they have never acted because of the likely intervention of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. has a far inferior ground force – primarily to be transported by naval power, which would be a challenge – to pose a threat to a Chinese invasion. It is naval power that prevents Chinese action. There is a logic between the United States and China, a logic of geography, technology and fear that is in its way consistent and ties us in an internal cycle that naval war generates.
Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote the book on this strategy more than a century ago. It is a strategy that is still in place, replete with subtle interaction with land power. When U.S. military action was unsuccessful, as in Vietnam, it failed either because the terrain was not susceptible to naval power or because naval power was not used. However, as I have tried to show, U.S. warfighting strategy, particularly on the strategic level, has never changed. China is constrained by that power, Russia is blocked from effective use of waters on its periphery, and other hostile powers seek to avoid U.S. naval power, whereas the U.S. uses it as a central force.
The idea of a consistent domestic model is more difficult to grasp than that of a consistent military strategy. But the latter has a persistent reality of geography and a persistent solution of naval power aligned with technology and strategy. Even when the connection between naval power and a war deep on land seems to make that strategy pointless, there is constant pressure for the enemy to go to sea. The Soviet Union was forced to enter the North Atlantic as was Germany in spite of their focus on land operations. It is vital to understand the naval dimension of all American wars.
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The US Navy's ships are rusty and filled with Sailors competent only in LGBTpedo ideology.
April 18, 2023
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The Logic of American Strategy and War
By: George Friedman
In recent weeks I have focused on the social and economic evolution of the United States. Obviously, we also need to discuss U.S. strategic policy. Domestic policy tends to be more dynamic than strategic policy, which follows from more persistent things like imperatives. The United States is secure from an attack on land. Neither Canada nor Mexico has the ability to wage or interest in waging a land war against the United States. Therefore, the fundamental threat to American national security must come from the sea. Still, American strategy has within it a logic. It lacks the cyclical logic of domestic politics but is shaped by the necessities imposed by place and enemies.
America’s entry into World War I was triggered by a German attack on U.S. shipping. In World War II, Washington’s key motive was the same. If Germany cut off lines of supply between the U.S. and Britain, it could isolate Britain and attack it at will. Having secured the Atlantic and a base of operations in Britain, Germany could threaten the East Coast. In the Pacific, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, if fought sensibly, could have secured sea lanes from Hawaii to the West Coast and possibly enabled Japan to impose its will there. Even the Cold War was primarily naval. Germany was indeed the line of contact with the Soviet Union, but the vital supply lines ran from the U.S. to Europe, and NATO could be crippled by cutting off those supplies. Toward that end, the Russians deployed submarines and supersonic anti-ship systems.
The Germans (twice), the Soviets and the Japanese each saw the defense of their nations as rooted in maritime war against the United States. The German failure permitted D-Day to take place, the Soviet failure made a Soviet ground offensive in Europe impossible, and the Japanese failure led to Hiroshima and the U.S. occupation of Japan. In each case, the ability of the U.S. to maintain lines of supply and block enemy attacks was the key to the defense of the United States and its economy, and in each case, American strategy was built on deterrence. In the event that U.S. security was not entirely at risk at sea, Washington created barriers to block enemy powers from moving assets toward Atlantic or Pacific ports. It was understood that the immediate threat might be trivial compared to the long-term threat. Therefore, it was essential to engage Germany as early as possible – to contain the long-term threat while it still entailed combating ground forces and before the sea threat had fully materialized. This was also critical in the Pacific against Japan. It should be noted that in Vietnam, where the U.S. had no land-sea strategy, matters ended badly.
In Ukraine, there is an element of this strategy. Russia, if it were to defeat Ukraine, would be at NATO’s border and could attack westward. The U.S. is practicing a strategy of preemption at a relatively low cost in terms of U.S. casualties to prevent the very unlikely move of Russia to the Atlantic coast. Maritime action is used to drive back land forces. This was the strategy used against the Soviet Union in the Cold War, and it is now being used against Russian forces in Ukraine. In this use of sea power, there is significant indirectness designed to impose an element of risk on ground forces deep in their own territory. It is a strategy normally too subtle to easily see.
Therefore, U.S. naval strategy in Ukraine is designed primarily to block waterways that could facilitate Russian movement – namely the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea. It is not the heart of the broader U.S. strategy.
It is with respect to China that this strategy is being most seriously tested. The primary strategy of the U.S. must be to maintain control of the Pacific and maintain lines of supply to allies to prevent an opening for China. The heart of the strategy is to apply varying pressures on China so that it is forced to balance and rebalance its forces. As an example, China’s seizing Taiwan is not possible given the time needed for a task force to reach the Taiwan coast, during which it would be open to attack by the United States. This limits the ultimate Chinese threat to the U.S. coasts. Naval warfare (and here I include naval air power, as has been normal since World War II) combines two strategies, one limiting Chinese movement at sea and the other opening the possibility of threatening the Chinese homeland.
The Chinese constantly threaten Taiwan, but until now they have never acted because of the likely intervention of the U.S. Navy. The U.S. has a far inferior ground force – primarily to be transported by naval power, which would be a challenge – to pose a threat to a Chinese invasion. It is naval power that prevents Chinese action. There is a logic between the United States and China, a logic of geography, technology and fear that is in its way consistent and ties us in an internal cycle that naval war generates.
Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan wrote the book on this strategy more than a century ago. It is a strategy that is still in place, replete with subtle interaction with land power. When U.S. military action was unsuccessful, as in Vietnam, it failed either because the terrain was not susceptible to naval power or because naval power was not used. However, as I have tried to show, U.S. warfighting strategy, particularly on the strategic level, has never changed. China is constrained by that power, Russia is blocked from effective use of waters on its periphery, and other hostile powers seek to avoid U.S. naval power, whereas the U.S. uses it as a central force.
The idea of a consistent domestic model is more difficult to grasp than that of a consistent military strategy. But the latter has a persistent reality of geography and a persistent solution of naval power aligned with technology and strategy. Even when the connection between naval power and a war deep on land seems to make that strategy pointless, there is constant pressure for the enemy to go to sea. The Soviet Union was forced to enter the North Atlantic as was Germany in spite of their focus on land operations. It is vital to understand the naval dimension of all American wars.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/04/navys-new-shipbuilding-plan-draws-lawmakers-ire-anew/385358/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/uss-cleveland-damaged-after-crashing-into-tug-during-launch-navy-admits
As PLAN Admirals laugh...
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wait
is that a white woman who christened the ship?
sounds racist to me. :wink:
could have been a great Kamala image to further her career
the tugboat crash was much louder then the bottle being smashed on the stern
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https://www.navy.mil/Press-Office/Press-Releases/display-pressreleases/Article/3015987/leading-the-way-into-the-future-navifor-hosts-diversity-equity-and-inclusion-su/
wait
is that a white woman who christened the ship?
sounds racist to me. :wink:
could have been a great Kamala image to further her career
the tugboat crash was much louder then the bottle being smashed on the stern
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The U.S. Military Relies on One Louisiana Factory. It Blew Up.
Decades of consolidation has left the Pentagon vulnerable to mishaps—including when the sole maker of a crucial type of gunpowder went offline
Nonexplosive testing materials were loaded into a press at the black powder factory in Minden, La., in February amid its preparations to resume production.
Nonexplosive testing materials were loaded into a press at the black powder factory in Minden, La., in February amid its preparations to resume production.
By Gordon LuboldFollow
| Photographs by Cooper Neill for The Wall Street Journal
April 26, 2023 9:34 am ET
MINDEN, La.—Nearly two years ago, an errant spark inside a mill caused an explosion so big it destroyed all the building’s equipment and blew a corrugated fiberglass wall 100 feet.
It also shut down the sole domestic source of an explosive the Department of Defense relies on to produce bullets, mortar shells, artillery rounds and Tomahawk missiles.
The ramshackle facility makes the original form of gunpowder, known today as black powder, a highly combustible material with hundreds of military applications. The product, for which there is no substitute, is used in small quantities in munitions to ignite more powerful explosives.
No one was hurt in the June 2021 blast. But the factory remains offline, unable to deliver its single vital component to either commercial or Pentagon customers.
Military suppliers consolidated at the Cold War’s end, under pressure to reduce defense costs and streamline the nation’s industrial base. Over the past three decades, the number of fixed wing aircraft suppliers in the U.S. has declined from eight to three. During the same period, major surface ship producers fell from eight to two, and today, only three American companies supply over 90% of the Pentagon’s missile stockpile.
Lower-tier defense firms are often the sole maker of vital parts—such as black powder—and a single crisis can bring production to a standstill.
The mill is being rebuilt after an explosion in June 2021 shut down production.
Conveyor belts are used to move materials into a separate room to be packed by remotely operated equipment.
Today that’s emerging as a gnawing problem for the U.S., whether in supplying weapons and ammunition to Ukraine or in restocking reserves to prepare for a potential confrontation with China in the new era of great-power competition, according to U.S. military officials, defense experts and congressional staffers.
After months of supplying Ukraine with Stingers, howitzers, anti-armor systems and artillery ammunition, stocks are low in both the U.S. and its NATO allies, especially in 155mm howitzer shells, an ammunition that has been crucial to pushing back Russian forces.
“Can you imagine what would happen to these supply chains if the U.S. were in an actual state of active war, or NATO was?” said Jeff Rhoads, executive director of the Purdue Institute for National Security, a defense-research institute at Purdue University. “They could be in trouble very quickly.”
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The U.S. Military Relies on One Louisiana Factory. It Blew Up.
The U.S. Military Relies on One Louisiana Factory. It Blew Up.
In use for a millennium
The “incident,” as the Minden explosion has become known, is a pointed example of the risks facing America’s military. The blast that wrecked a World War II era building in a remote compound 30 miles from Shreveport has extinguished all production of black powder in North America.
The accident was part of what Labor Department records show is the mill’s history of explosions and fatalities under various owners in recent decades. The mill traces its origins to the 19th-century DuPont chemicals empire, and at the time of the blast was owned by Hodgdon Powder Co.
For a millennium, black powder was a crucial material for both military and commercial uses. Today, it is a specialty commodity with few commercial applications—mostly for rocket hobbyists—but it’s still used in more than 300 munitions, from cruise missiles, to bullets for M16 rifles, to the vital 155mm shells.
In each case, a small amount of black powder is used to detonate a more powerful explosive packed in the same bullet or missile. A 155mm shell for a howitzer, for example, will use half an ounce of black powder, lodged next to 26 pounds of a more powerful explosive.
Sales volume is limited and that means profits can be too thin to support more than a single production facility. This type of vulnerability is so common, the Pentagon describes it as the “single source” problem. Only one foundry in the U.S. makes the titanium castings used in howitzers, and only one company makes the rocket motor used in the Javelin antitank weapon widely used in Ukraine.
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U.S. Army soldiers worked on a M777 howitzer during a joint military drill between South Korea and the U.S. in South Korea in March. PHOTO: AHN YOUNG-JOON/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Part of the problem is that the Pentagon can be a fickle customer. Orders can surge or plummet depending on inventory levels, the state of U.S. military engagements or budget priorities. This posed a challenge for the operators of the black powder mill, who also faced costly regulations.
Hodgdon, which bought the Minden powder mill in 2009, said military purchases at that time represented significant sales. But over time, they “slowed in both frequency and volume,” said Aaron Oelger, spokesman for Hodgdon. He said no one with the company now was there at the time of the explosion.
Hodgdon decided to get out of the business after the explosion, and sold the mill last year to one of its shortlist of commercial customers, a model-rocket maker in Penrose, Colo., named Estes Industries. The Pentagon helped the transition with a $3.5 million investment in mill upgrades under the Defense Production Act, which provides funding for national defense, part of a larger program designed to alleviate the problem of having critical resources produced in far-flung, sometimes unreliable places.
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U.S. defense contractors’ inability to quickly replenish weaponry such as missiles and munitions for Ukraine has led Pentagon officials to argue that industry consolidation has gone too far and raised questions about how prepared America is for conflict. Illustration: Adele Morgan
After refurbishing the mill, Estes Energetics, spun off from Estes Industries, is scheduled to relaunch production and restart supplies to military contractors by this summer. Estes Industries also supplies students and hobbyists with model rockets, kits and accessories, and the small quantities of black powder used in old-fashioned weapons for re-enactors and hunters.
In the meantime, U.S. military contractors who use black powder have been drawing on stockpiles, according to people familiar with the matter and U.S. officials. Other producers of black powder exist in Germany, Poland, Switzerland, Brazil and China.
Chokepoints are one of a number of weaknesses in the U.S. military’s supply chains. Others include a lack of skilled workers in casting and forging, shortages of infrastructure for battery technology and periodic shortages of advanced microchips.
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Some domestic suppliers have quit unprofitable businesses altogether, leaving it to both allies and adversaries to supply commodities such as the rare earth minerals used in state-of-the-art technology. The Pentagon has invested more than $100 million in the mining and processing of such minerals in the U.S. after American companies ceded production to China.
Charcoal is stored for production at the Minden factory.
The factory makes an effort to reduce sparks, the cause of the 2021 explosion.
The result is that the military is “increasingly reliant on a smaller number of contractors for these critical capabilities,” said Halimah Najieb-Locke, deputy assistant secretary of defense in charge of the industrial base, at a recent seminar. “That impacts everybody’s ability to ramp production.”
‘Last Supper’
The roots of the current crisis can be traced back three decades, to a 1993 dinner at the Pentagon often referred to as the “last supper,” when Secretary of Defense Les Aspin invited the CEOs of the top 15 defense companies and warned that the Pentagon couldn’t sustain them all. They would need to consolidate.
The number of major arms suppliers for the Pentagon went from dozens in the 1990s, down to just five, known as primes, who typically bid for major weapons programs today. A similar contraction took place among lower-tier suppliers.
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Overall, the defense industrial base shrank to 55,000 vendors in 2021, down from 69,000 in 2016.
Despite consolidation, the networks of companies remain large. The average American aerospace company relies on hundreds of first-tier subcontractors, according to Defense Department statistics, and thousands in the second and third tiers below that.
That scope presents its own problems. The network is so vast, the military has limited visibility, according to a Pentagon report, and “does not track these vulnerabilities as they impact weapons programs.” A failure down the supply chain can go unnoticed for months by prime contractors such as Boeing Co. or Lockheed Martin Corp., let alone the Pentagon.
The Minden mill, as a fifth-tier supplier, was deep down the defense supply chain. Given black powder’s importance, the Army in this instance noticed right away, according to people familiar with the matter. It still took months for the new owner to take over, and by the time Estes began refurbishing the mill, yellow wildflowers had sprouted in the factory yard.
Black powder is made essentially the same way it was 200 years ago. Some of that rusticity, using huge 6-ton metal and wooden wheels and grinders and sifters, is by design. The parts minimize the sparks that caused the accident in 2021 in the mill, where the fine powder is compressed into cakes and crushed into various sizes, and shut down the plant.
Nonexplosive testing materials are mixed at the Minden factory.
There are few computers near production areas at the Minden facility because electronics pose sparking dangers. Workers wear special shoes and floors are covered in paint that prevents the accumulation of static electricity. Cotton clothes also help mitigate the risk of sparks. Employees operate machinery much like a dentist takes an X-ray, standing outside the production room to stay safe.
The explosive properties of black powder, a simple mixture of sulfur, charcoal and potassium nitrate, were first discovered in 9th-century China, and it was widely used for centuries.
In the 20th century, smokeless gunpowder, made with different materials, became the preferred propellant—the explosive pushing a projectile out of a gun or cannon barrel—because it was more powerful, produced less smoke and left less residue. It was also somewhat safer to produce.
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After World War II, the black powder business declined, and the main customers used black powder in fireworks, model rockets or muzzleloading historic guns. The DuPont conglomerate sold its last remaining black powder mill in Pennsylvania in 1971.
After an explosion killed two employees, its new owners moved it to Minden in 1997, in part because Louisiana’s humid weather could reduce sparks. “Humidity is a powder man’s best friend,” Anita Vincenti, a Minden mill worker who moved with the plant from Pennsylvania, said this fall.
The Pentagon’s $3.5 million investment in mill upgrades after the recent shutdown is part of an effort by the Biden administration to strengthen the industrial base. It is working with suppliers to address similar weaknesses in munitions, forging and casting, batteries and microelectronics.
Karl Kulling, chief operating officer of Estes Energetics, at the Minden plant.
An emergency escape slide on a production building.
Late last year, the Defense Department identified 27 critical chemicals that have no U.S. production and are sourced from places, including Russia and China, considered adversaries of the U.S. The Pentagon expects to spend more than $207 million to bring production of materials back to the U.S. as soon as possible.
A handful of critical materials used by the U.S. are only produced inside war-torn Ukraine, said Anthony Di Stasio, a senior Pentagon official in charge of prioritizing and investing in defense production.
Stimulating the marketplace to bring production to the U.S. is doable, he said. “I’d be really surprised if we couldn’t get this done within the next three years,” Mr. Di Stasio said, of the overall effort.
In February, Estes company officials touring the facility pointed to upgrades to the mill. It now has a new, state-of-the-art fire suppression system, a shiny network of metal pipes and water guns aimed at the points of production vulnerable to the sparks that caused the 2021 accident.
The previous month Estes had restarted production of an inert black powder substitute as a safety test, before it resumes production of the real thing. The launch has been delayed a number of times, once recently when a water main broke in the middle of the factory grounds.
“Whenever you turn on old machinery that has stood for a while, [there] tends to be something that breaks,” said Karl Kulling, chief operating officer of Estes Energetics. “So we’ve gone through basically each machine and fixed up things here, there and everywhere.”
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/04/chinas-secretive-quest-heavier-artillery/385709/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
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"At 94 years old, Gregg is the only living person in the Army’s history to have a base named after him, according to the U.S. Army. Gregg gave more than three decades of his life to the military and became a three-star general during his service."
"The base will be jointly named for Adams, who was the first Black officer in the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (later the Women’s Army Corps)."
https://www.yahoo.com/news/removing-the-legacy-of-slavery-fort-lee-gets-renamed-over-150-years-after-the-civil-war-191431863.html
indeed. :wink:
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https://archive.fo/jZu4c
U.S. Push to Restock Howitzer Shells, Rockets Sent to Ukraine Bogs Down
War in Europe drains U.S. stockpiles while Pentagon, defense industry look to deter China
Arms makers have added factory shifts to increase output of artillery shells and other munitions.
PHOTO: MATT ROURKE/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By Doug Cameron
April 29, 2023 5:30 am ET
More than a year after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, U.S. plans to increase production of key munitions have fallen short due to shortages of chips, machinery and skilled workers.
Arms makers have added factory shifts, ordered new equipment and streamlined supply chains to boost output of Javelin antitank missiles, artillery shells, guided rockets and much more, which Ukrainian forces are firing by the thousands at the Russian invaders.
Years of stop-start Pentagon funding for munitions led companies to close production lines or quit the industry, while output of many components and raw materials moved overseas. Defense department chiefs estimate the decline will take five or six years to reverse.
“We want to get the fragility out of the system, so if this ever happens again, it’s six months instead of three years to get a meaningful improvement in capacity,” said Jim Taiclet, chief executive officer of Lockheed Martin Corp.
The U.S. has committed to giving Kyiv more than $36 billion in arms to fight the Russians, including hundreds of thousands of rounds of munitions for howitzers, tanks, portable rocket launchers and advanced guided missile systems. The U.S. arms—and weapons provided by European allies—have kept Ukraine in the fight, enabling it to push Russian forces back to a swath of ground along the Black Sea and in the eastern Donbas region.
U.S. defense contractors’ inability to quickly replenish weaponry such as missiles and munitions for Ukraine has led Pentagon officials to argue that industry consolidation has gone too far and raised questions about how prepared America is for conflict. Illustration: Adele Morgan
The Ukrainians have been firing as many as 3,000 shells a day at Russian positions, and stocks are low in both the U.S. and its NATO allies, especially in 155mm howitzer shells, an ammunition that has been crucial to repelling Russian forces.
Meanwhile, the Pentagon and the defense industry are looking at the next major national security challenge: deterring, and if necessary, fighting, China in the Indo-Pacific region.
Howitzer shells are a big focus of the defense industry’s push: The major manufacturers plan to boost production sixfold by 2028. The munitions are mainly made in aging, government-owned facilities run by private companies, including General Dynamics Corp. and American Ordnance, a unit of Day & Zimmermann.
The U.S. Army has committed $18 billion over the next several years, adding $3 billion over the past year, to revamp bomb-making factories and the facilities that service military equipment, which Army Secretary Christine Wormuth described as “vintage” in a congressional hearing on April 19.
A Ukrainian serviceman beside a truck loaded with howitzer shells, a big focus of the U.S. defense industry’s push to restock munitions.
PHOTO: ARIS MESSINIS/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
The Army investments include $1.1 billion this year and $2 billion the following for new machinery and tooling at a plant in Scranton, Pa., that makes shell casings, another in Radford, Va., that adds propellant, and the Iowa Army Ammunition Plant near Middletown, where workers pack explosives and prepare the finished munition for distribution.
General Dynamics is outfitting its plant in Garland, Texas, with new machinery to support three shifts producing 155mm shells.
Under pressure from lawmakers and Pentagon leaders, the Army and defense companies hatched broad plans last summer to double output of some of the most widely used munitions over the next two years. Production is rising, but at a slower pace than originally hoped.
Lockheed Martin and Raytheon Technologies Corp. aim to boost annual production of their Javelin antitank missile to 3,500 in 2026 from around 2,000 currently. For the advanced Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System, or GMLRS, credited with enabling Ukrainian forces to bog down Russia’s advances with its long range and accuracy, Lockheed Martin and the Army have raised its targeted annual output to 14,000 in 2026, from 10,000 currently. The company this week secured a $4.8 billion deal to produce more over the next three years, by far the largest contract for the munition.
Artillery projectiles are manufactured at an Army ammunition plant in Scranton, Pa.
PHOTO: MATT ROURKE/ASSOCIATED PRESS
The Pentagon is also awarding contracts for items such as steel, alongside efforts to bring back production of raw materials used to make explosives and batteries.
Funding alone isn’t sufficient to boost production, said defense executives. Precision weapons such as the GMLRS are more complex to manufacture than artillery shells and require solid fuel rocket motors that have been in short supply.
Making even basic artillery shells is a complex, multistage process carried out in far-flung locations with aging machinery. Casings aren’t just lumps of steel, but highly engineered objects to ensure shells are the same size and can be fired reliably. Some also have sensors and electronic systems to improve range and accuracy.
It takes around a month from ordering the steel to make shell casings for the metal to arrive. The Army facility in Scranton takes about three days to machine the parts. The finished casings are shipped to Iowa, where it takes another three days to load and pack them with propellant and explosives.
Douglas Bush, the Army’s acquisition chief, attributes the slower-than-expected rise in production to issues of capacity rather than a shortage of materials.
The Pentagon last year launched its Munitions Industrial Base Deep Dive to analyze production levels and capacity, as well as weaknesses in the supply chain. And last month, the Defense Department established a new office called the Joint Production Accelerator Cell to help identify better production methods, including the use of 3-D printing to speed making parts that have become obsolete.
These efforts are giving the Pentagon fresh eyes on what it needs to wage and deter future conflicts, more closely tying military strategy with the ability of industry to support defense planning.
“We’re going back and we’re reviewing all of our estimates for logistic lessons for all of the key munitions, or munitions that are required for various contingency plans,” said Gen. Mark Milley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at a congressional hearing this month.
Defense companies said they still need more clarity on future demand, even with the promise of multiyear contracts to encourage more investment and hiring.
“We have more than doubled the capacity with the investments we’ve laid in or plan to make,” Northrop Grumman Corp. CEO Kathy Warden said this week. “For the government to go even further than that, we are suggesting that we can support that, but would look for government funding to complement it.”
Write to Doug Cameron at Doug.Cameron@wsj.com
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"At 94 years old, Gregg is the only living person in the Army’s history to have a base named after him, according to the U.S. Army. Gregg gave more than three decades of his life to the military and became a three-star general during his service."
"The base will be jointly named for Adams, who was the first Black officer in the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps (later the Women’s Army Corps)."
https://www.yahoo.com/news/removing-the-legacy-of-slavery-fort-lee-gets-renamed-over-150-years-after-the-civil-war-191431863.html
indeed. :wink:
“It is embarrassing that our country ever had military bases named after men who waged war against the United States to maintain slavery and white supremacy,” Rivka Maizlish, senior research analyst for the SPLC’s Intelligence Project
It is a disgrace we let people like Rivka subvert this country.
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/05/lessons-ukraine-us-special-forces-reinvents-itself-fight-china/385822/
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/05/01/us-navy-drag-queen-recruitment/
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https://nypost.com/2023/05/03/us-navy-appointed-active-duty-drag-queen-as-ambassador/
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https://www.breitbart.com/pre-viral/2023/05/02/bar-patrons-standing-national-anthem-sparks-outrage-dangerous-situation/
so pretty clear why military cannot fill their ranks...
nice job libs ....
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/97010-navy-recruiting-its-a-drag?mailing_id=7468&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.7468&utm_campaign=digest&utm_content=body
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-army-will-again-fall-short-of-recruitment-goals-secretary-wormuth_5236672.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-05-03&src_cmp=uschina-2023-05-03&utm_medium=email&est=G2qhoMvPTtkuDdYSCuwN7B7YONBAG86%2F%2BoeXgHRddYHKcD4ntmz5xIF11UWQn6UtEvd8
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2023/05/tomorrows-hyper-enabled-special-operator-will-be-less-iron-man-more-007/386162/
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/97010-navy-recruiting-its-a-drag?mailing_id=7468&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.7468&utm_campaign=digest&utm_content=body
https://chrisbray.substack.com/p/sexy-battlefield-selfies
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Very well written!
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https://warriormaven.com/air/is-the-f-35-the-best-stealth-fighter-in-the-world-what-do-pilots-think
[I think the conclusion is they do ]
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/depletion-of-us-munitions-stockpile-due-to-ukraine-war-will-benefit-china-former-military-officials_5281556.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-05-22&src_cmp=uschina-2023-05-22&utm_medium=email&est=vG%2Bm8Zkg8GeOfmBS5lXwsWnqEQoj3j1m7YCWAehkFYJf6LQfOkz1D7IuJDkrBdrZLHjO
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https://www.arthursido.com/2023/05/from-citizen-soldiers-to-global-mercenaries.html
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/05/army-mulls-10-20-cut-special-operations-forces/386639/
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https://eurasiantimes.com/new-chinese-pla-sink-uss-gerald-r-ford-aircraft/
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/craighooper/2023/01/25/americas-new-aircraft-carrier-struggled-to-certify-pilots-before-2022-deployment/?sh=7f448adf14d5
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/06/06/biden-climate-cabal-economic-growth-pentagon/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=breaking&pnespid=v6Y.DntWNaAb0PvcqiulTY7VuB_rTIErdLimkPQ59ARmGfDzruQsRz15KiTauPSuQTbDFvfA
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/8/navy-risk-losing-submarine-edge-advanced-undersea-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=G8bqdOwRCIO%2Bz5iu1O7gCyTQ0rgteK5boZmw5twDWqIxfC1GaDUuQrmV7XdWDL52&bt_ts=1686332345296
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The Military Recruitment Crisis Is a Symptom of Cultural Rot
We need new leaders to cultivate the American spirit and restore the integrity of institutions.
By David McCormick and James Cunningham
April 14, 2023 1:50 pm ET
WSJ
America’s cultural cancer manifests itself in many ways, but no symptom is more telling than our low military recruitment. Last year the Army hit only 75% of its recruiting target, while other services had to scramble to meet theirs. This year looks to be worse. The all-volunteer force, formed 50 years ago, is in peril and threatens our ability to defend ourselves in a dangerous world. What does this say about America?
It says we have a national health crisis. A volunteer military requires able-bodied recruits, but 77% of young Americans would be unfit to serve for health reasons. Behind that statistic lies a mountain of concerning data. Every year, fentanyl and other drugs take more than 106,000 lives and affect millions more, reducing the pool of recruits.
It says that partisan politics have infected America’s core institutions. Civilian leaders have used the uniformed services as political pawns and directed them to push progressive priorities. This makes it harder for military leaders to accomplish their central mission—fighting and winning the nation’s wars. It also explains why less than half of Americans (48%) express a great deal of confidence in the U.S. military, a 22-point drop in five years. The politicization of institutions, whether the military, schools or professional sports, divides our country where it should be most unified.
Those divisions contribute to the atomization of American society, which the U.S. military hasn’t escaped. In the late 1980s, when a young Lt. McCormick looked at his platoon in the 82nd Airborne Division—with a Southern Baptist from Alabama, a black man from Newark, and a Puerto Rican platoon sergeant—he saw a strong, diverse and confident America. Now the military draws from a shrinking pool, most with parents or close relatives who served. The rest of society has few family ties to the military. This is only one of the thousands of small fractures subdividing our society, stoked by social media, the left’s obsession with race, sex and identity, and extreme figures on the right as well.
These factors fuel the greatest cultural ailment of all: waning confidence in American exceptionalism. Members of the military carry on a proud tradition, and the nation owes them our gratitude. But their willingness to wear the uniform stands out in a country where only 9% of those eligible to serve wish to do so.
How did it come to this? Americans have been fed a narrative of victimhood. Our society treats veterans as victims or, worse, charity cases, not as warrior-citizens taught leadership, discipline and camaraderie. On campus, in the media and across popular culture, grievance is the new currency of the realm.
Children are taught to doubt, not love, America, and leaders on both sides of the aisle question its goodness. Perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised that only 38% of Americans highly value patriotism and an equal share say they is “extremely proud” to be American.
The same forces that threaten the all-volunteer force endanger American society at large. These concerns animate our new book, “Superpower in Peril,” in which we chart a path to national renewal. But policy alone can’t heal a spiritual problem. The American spirit fills our national character with courage, ambition and creativity. It is our source of strength when times get bad, and the defining feature of American exceptionalism. That spirit has been neglected—or worse, suppressed—by the forces laid out here. The military recruiting crisis is a direct result of its decline.
We need new leaders to cultivate the American spirit and restore institutional integrity: in the Pentagon, to put war fighting and deterrence first; in schools, to teach civics and America’s exceptional story; in business, to reaffirm the principles of merit and capitalism; and across society, to create a new national commitment to citizenship.
William F. Buckley Jr. defined citizenship as the union of privilege (because to be an American is to be blessed with liberty and opportunity) and responsibility (because as Americans we have a duty to preserve the republic and serve our nation). Today, we have the balance wrong, emphasizing privilege and too often forgetting responsibility.
Perhaps the military recruiting crisis is the lagging indicator of America’s cultural collapse. Or maybe it’s the canary in the coal mine, an early warning that it is time to rescue American exceptionalism. What we do next as citizens will decide.
Mr. McCormick, a combat veteran and former CEO of Bridgewater Associates, was a candidate for the Republican U.S. Senate nomination in Pennsylvania in 2022. He is author, with Mr. Cunningham, of “Superpower in Peril: A Battle Plan to Renew America.”
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About Jane Harman:
Married Dick Harman of Harman Electronices.
She was my Dem opponent for Congress in 1992.
When I met Dick at one of the town hall debates as an older Jew, he took exception to my describing Dem economics as fascist. He was MUCH older than her and during the conversation I innocently said something along the lines of "You must be very proud of your daughter." Coming on the heels of our interaction over my use of the term fascist, this was not well received.
She won. Dick Harman, her husband, lent the campaign $900K, debt which was retired by lobbyists after she won.
Though a Dem, due to all the defense contractors in our district, she became known as GI Jane. Since leaving Congress she has done the chattering class circuit with an emphasis on defense issues.
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/06/spend-more-defense-lets-focus-spending-better/387383/
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second
https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/06/09/america-weapons-china-00100373
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https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/latest-f-35s-will-go-directly-into-storage-until-upgrade-woes-ironed-out
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-marines-to-integrate-tech-amphibious-power-against-china_5330996.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-06-14&src_cmp=uschina-2023-06-14&utm_medium=email
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The Ukraine War Accelerates Russia's Decline as a Global Arms Exporter
10 MIN READJun 16, 2023 | 18:35 GMT
Russia's dominance as a global arms exporter will likely continue to fall as a result of the Ukraine war, weakening a key element of Moscow's foreign policy and creating opportunities for other states to bolster their arms industries. The need to backfill its own losses in Ukraine, doubts about its weapons' performance, and declining Indian sales have seen Russia's arms exports plummet over the years. And recent signs suggest this trend will only continue. On June 5, India and the United States finalized a landmark roadmap for defense industry cooperation in the coming years that will significantly boost India's incentive to ramp up its domestic arms production and, in turn, further reduce its reliance on Russian weapons. This follows a report published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) earlier this year that revealed Russia's share of global arms sales (in terms of actual deliveries of major arms as opposed to announced deals) dropped from 22% in 2013-17 to 16% in 2018-22 — largely because India, the largest purchaser of Russian arms, imported 37% fewer weapons over the past five years. On June 5, Nikkei Asia also reported that Russia is buying back components (including tank optics) that it previously shipped to India and other key partners like Myanmar, instead of fulfilling new arms deliveries to those countries, as Moscow struggles to replace the equipment it has lost in Ukraine.
The SIPRI report, which was published on March 13, found that Russia remained the world's second-largest arms exporter behind the United States between 2018 and 2022, but that its gap with the United States widened.
Since the start of the Ukraine war in February 2022, Russia has been relying on weapon deliveries from nearby partners to overcome its arms deficit. Belarus, for example, reportedly sent over 100,000 tons of munitions to Russia in the first year of the invasion. Russian troops in Ukraine have also become increasingly dependent on Iranian drones and loitering munitions — further highlighting the Russian arms industry's failure to meet Russia's needs amid the ongoing war.
In March, Indian military officials indicated they expect delays in Russian arms deliveries, including S-400 Triumf missile systems, Mi-17 military transport helicopters, Grigorovich-class stealth frigates, and even Kalashnikov AK assault rifles.
Russia's need to backfill its own losses in Ukraine, along with several other factors both related and unrelated to the war, are fueling its decline as a global arms exporter. According to an open-source analysis conducted by the Dutch website Oryx, Russia has lost an estimated 10,600 pieces of military equipment, including over 2,000 tanks, since launching its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Indeed, modern equipment deficits are likely a major reason Russia has so far not declared another large-scale mobilization, despite Putin recently threatening to do so. But while major, Russia's need to replace that destroyed equipment is just one of many factors likely contributing to the country's declining share of the global arms market. For one, the Russian military's struggle to defeat Ukraine, despite having a significant size and manpower advantage over the country, has fueled the perception that some equipment and systems Moscow makes have underperformed on the battlefield, which is likely hurting demand for those Russian products, and could even hurt demand for systems not accused of poor performance. But Russia's dominance as a global weapons producer began eroding long before Moscow decided to invade Ukraine, due largely to reduced demand from Russia's two top arms buyers: China and India. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia's arms exports started falling in 2019 and were already down nearly 20 percent relative to 2011, the best year for Russia's arms industry. The largest reason for this was India and China's longstanding efforts to reduce their militaries' reliance on foreign equipment by building more robust domestic defense industries — a trend that is only likely to continue (if not accelerate) in the coming decades. The loss of these two key markets means that Russia is losing market share it will likely never be able to replace, even under the best circumstances. In 2017, the United States also began imposing financial sanctions on any country that makes a ''significant transaction'' with Russian arms manufacturers under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which has helped fuel the decline in Russian arms sales in recent years as well.
Russia has preferred deploying and producing modernized versions of older T-90 tanks over its new T-14 Armata battle tanks. This signals that Moscow has doubts over its ability to mass produce newer tanks, as well as over the T-14 tank's effectiveness and performance in combat in Ukraine, which could alarm Moscow's weapons buyers.
India alone has accounted for around 35% of Russia's overseas arms shipments over the past decade. But under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the country has sought to reduce Russian imports and increase domestic production.
Serbia, a staunch Russian supporter and buyer of its arms, is reportedly in talks with the French aircraft manufacturer Dassault Aviation SA about replacing its Russian jet fleet, which U.S. sanctions have made difficult and expensive to maintain.
Russia's declining arms exports will impact Moscow's geopolitical strategy and damage its foreign policy. Arms sales have long enabled Russia to develop close military-to-military and government-to-government relationships in far-flung regions in Africa, Latin America and Asia, where Moscow's interests and influence would otherwise be scant. Countries in these regions are particularly important to Russia's efforts to foster support for its actions in Ukraine among international bodies such as the United Nations, as well as supporting global efforts to build coalitions of countries opposed to Western influence. Russia's relationships with African, Latin American and Asian countries can also serve as springboards for commercial deals, in particular in the energy sphere. And like Russia's energy sales, arms sales are a crucial source of hard cash for Moscow, increasingly important as the heavily- sanctioned country runs a deficit to finance its war in Ukraine. For these reasons, Moscow will seek to counteract the fallout from its declining arms sales by not announcing delays to weapon shipments, and by not commenting on or downplaying reports that highlight its defense industry's struggles, in order to put the risk and onus on foreign buyers to either quietly accept the delays or make the decision to curtail cooperation with Moscow. Moreover, to diversify its customer base, Moscow will likely seek out new relationships with countries increasingly in line with its geopolitical vision such as Saudi Arabia, which has expressed increased interest in Russian arms since the Ukraine invasion and faced political headwinds to its previous reliance on U.S. arms.
On May 29-30, representatives of sanctioned Russian arms makers attended a first-of-its-kind trade event in Saudi Arabia. The wealthy Arab Gulf state's investment ministry is also exploring the possibility of opening an office in Moscow. Other countries in the region also remain interested in Russian arms.
Russia is reportedly exploring new opportunities for ''military-technical cooperation''— which is Russian jargon for arms sales — with Southeast Asian, African, and South American countries as well.
But even if its global market share continues to shrink in the coming years and decades, Russia will likely remain a significant arms exporter due to several reasons:
Russia's arms production will likely grow in the coming years amid the necessity to expand production for the Ukraine war and the associated political pressures on the Russian officials in charge. President Vladimir Putin and former President Dmitry Medvedev, currently in charge of military production, have both thrown out large but likely exaggerated figures regarding how much Russia is increasing its military production. On June 13, Putin claimed military production of Russia's ''main'' weapons systems increased 2.7 times, and by 10 times for the ''most needed'' weapons, though he also admitted to shortages of drones and tanks. The need to replace its losses in Ukraine means that, even using the upper bound of Russian military production estimates, Russia's arms export market position will not normalize for at least three to five years — depending on Western sanctions and the speed of Russian industry domestication and import replacement programs, which often depend on unpredictable flows of illicit components and stole technology.
Russia's arms industry, just like its civilian industries, will eventually adapt to and find ways around the limitations placed on its access to key assets and the willingness of foreign buyers to cooperate with sanctioned entities. Russia, for example, is currently facing significant challenges in sourcing key components — particularly crucial electronics — for defense production. But over time, Russia will likely find new ways to skirt Western sanctions on electronics exports, including by simply convincing Chinese exporters to provide components.
The intensity of the Ukraine war will likely decrease in the coming years, which will enable Moscow to begin to reconstitute its losses in Ukraine while maintaining exports.
Russia will likely still prioritize maintaining arms exports to some extent rather than more quickly rebuilding its armed forces, calculating that a land war with NATO is not imminent and it can rely on its nuclear arsenal as an effective deterrent.
Institutional inertia and longstanding relationships will make it hard for many of Moscow's minor partners to reduce their reliance on Russian arms, particularly those where Russia has always been the overwhelmingly dominant supplier and domestic industries are minimal (such as Algeria or Vietnam). These countries may tolerate significant delays with Russia as deals with new Chinese or Western producers or domestic production prove intractable.
Demand will remain strong for products where Russia retains a large competitive advantage. Russia, for example, is one of only a few major producers of 5th-generation fighters, air defense systems and anti-drone systems — all for which global demand will remain strong.
Russia's decline as an arms exporter will create opportunities for other states, including China and Western arms producers, to capture Russia's market share and boost their industries' profitability in the mid-to-long term. Large arms producers — including China, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and South Korea — are most poised to benefit from Russia's declining sales in the near term. The extent to which these countries can capture pieces of Russia's market share will be crucial in determining Moscow's future ability to regain some of its dominance as a global weapons supplier. China, in particular, stands the most to gain because, unlike the other aforementioned weapons producers, it isn't already devoting a significant proportion of its budget and its arms industry's future capacity to orders related to the Ukraine war. Moreover, China's systems are more interoperable with the legacy Russian systems used by Russia's clients compared to Western systems, and, outside of a few exceptions, former buyers of Russian equipment are more predisposed to increased Chinese influence compared with Western influence that would come with new deals. A potential arrestor to this trend is China's need to stockpile key systems for contingencies in the Taiwan Strait, which may limit the amount of equipment it sells. But China remains unlikely to invade Taiwan anytime soon. Japan and Israel could also benefit from Russia's dropping arms sales, as both countries have large domestic arms industries that will find significant demand for their products — especially if Israel and Japan each continue their trends of steadily relaxing previously stringent rules and restrictions on exports.
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/16/space-force-general-shows-pentagon-pride-blasting-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=%2BCx%2F%2FPaesGRxb9lUOIDlDeDp8LSCTDpeoakiNoGqRzY7q2lXexv%2FHrQrVqJYKuKi&bt_ts=1686957898502
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https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jun/16/space-force-general-shows-pentagon-pride-blasting-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=%2BCx%2F%2FPaesGRxb9lUOIDlDeDp8LSCTDpeoakiNoGqRzY7q2lXexv%2FHrQrVqJYKuKi&bt_ts=1686957898502
At some point, the fact that the American Republic is gone will sink in.
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https://townhall.com/columnists/jaredwhitley/2023/06/24/the-pentagon-staying-the-course-on-the-f-35-isnt-feasible-or-affordable-n2624859
now they want to replace the F35s engines?
what is going on with these astronomical costs
that we spend on R & D and CCP walks in and steals the design for free.
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https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/dissecting-west-point-think-tanks
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https://www.defenseone.com/business/2023/06/raytheon-calls-retirees-help-restart-stinger-missile-production/388067/
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The Military Recruiting Crisis: Even Veterans Don’t Want Their Children to Join
Pentagon scrambles to retain the main pipeline for new service members as disillusioned families steer young people away
WALL STREET JOURNAL
By Ben KeslingFollow
June 30, 2023 12:01 am ET
Sky Nisperos’s grandfather came to the U.S. from Mexico, and became an American citizen by serving in the U.S. Navy. Her father, Ernest Nisperos, is an active-duty officer in the Air Force with two decades of service. For years, Sky planned to follow a similar path.
“I wanted to be a fighter pilot,” the 22-year-old said. “It was stuck in my head.”
Now, one of the most influential people in her life—her father—is telling her that a military career may not be the right thing.
The children of military families make up the majority of new recruits in the U.S. military. That pipeline is now under threat, which is bad news for the Pentagon’s already acute recruitment problems, as well as America’s military readiness.
“Influencers are not telling them to go into the military,” said Adm. Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. “Moms and dads, uncles, coaches and pastors don’t see it as a good choice.”
After the patriotic boost to recruiting that followed 9/11, the U.S. military has endured 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan with no decisive victories, scandals over shoddy military housing and healthcare, poor pay for lower ranks that forces many military families to turn to food stamps, and rising rates of post-traumatic stress disorder and suicide.
At the same time, the labor market is the tightest it has been in decades, meaning plenty of other options exist for young people right out of school.
U.S. recruiting shortfalls represent a long-term problem that, if not resolved, would compel the military to reduce its force size. With America embarking on a new era of great-power competition with China and Russia, that problem has become more serious.
China, which has around two million serving personnel, versus a little under 1.4 million in the U.S., has steadily expanded its military capabilities in recent decades, especially in the South China Sea. The most immediate threat is a possible conflict with China over Taiwan, which would require a rapid and sustained response from all parts of the U.S. armed forces.
“I’ve been studying the recruiting market for about 15 years, and we’ve never seen a condition quite like this,” said a senior Defense Department official.
Toughest year
The U.S. Army in 2022 had its toughest recruiting year since the advent of the all-volunteer military in 1973 and missed its goal by 25%. This year, it expects to end up about 15,000 short of its target of 65,000 recruits.
The Navy expects to fall short by as many as 10,000 of its goal of nearly 38,000 recruits this year, and the Air Force has said it is anticipating coming in at 3,000 below its goal of nearly 27,000. The Marine Corps met its target last year of sending 33,000 to boot camp, and expects to meet its goals this year, but its leaders described recruitment as challenging.
Only 9% of young people ages 16-21 said last year they would consider military service, down from 13% before the pandemic, according to Pentagon data.
Pentagon officials see recruitment shortfalls as a crisis and pledge to hit their targets in the future to stave off making changes to the force structure.
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said she expects within weeks to begin drafting a proposal for a recruiting overhaul so sweeping that Congress might need to pass legislation to enact all of it.
She declined to provide details but said a key element will be to coordinate with veterans’ groups. “Right now we are not in a comprehensive, structured way leveraging our relationships with veterans organizations,” Wormuth said.
The Army has stepped up and modernized its marketing, launched remedial courses to bring unqualified young people to a level where they can join and revised some benefits.
Army recruiters spoke with members of the National FFA Organization, formerly called Future Farmers of America, at an FFA convention in Indianapolis, Ind., in October. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Defense officials said they aren’t doing a good job of battling what they call misperceptions. They said many families want their children to go on to higher education after high school, considering the military a stumbling block instead of a steppingstone. Once a young person is on a path to a career, they aren’t as likely to put on a uniform, they said.
When the draft ended at the close of the Vietnam War, the military fostered recruitment with the promise of a good career with retirement benefits and healthcare, as well as education benefits to prepare soldiers for life after the military. That strategy worked, and the Army typically met its overall needs.
It did so by relying heavily on veterans and military families to develop the next generation of recruits, especially in the region known in the military as the “Southern Smile,” a curving region from the mid-Atlantic and down across the southern U.S.
Today, nearly 80% of all new Army recruits have a family member who has served in uniform, according to the service. That can be a good thing, said Col. Mark Crow, director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at West Point, because “people who know the most about it stick around.”
Depending too much on military families could create a “warrior caste,” Wormuth said. Her plans seek to draw in people who have no real connection to the military and to broaden the appeal of service.
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Sky Nisperos, who moved around the world as a military brat, said that as a teen she began to see the effect of her father’s nearly dozen deployments and tours away from his family. Ernest Nisperos said he remembers being asleep when one of his kids jabbed him in the ribs to wake him. He put Sky’s sister in a wrestling ankle lock before he realized he was back home.
“My sister and I would say, ‘It’s just drill sergeant-dad mode,’ especially for the month he came back,” Sky said.
Ernest Nisperos realized his deployments, which involved battle planning and top secret intelligence, were taking a toll. In 2019, after he returned from Afghanistan, he took the family to Disneyland. During the nightly fireworks extravaganza, he cowered in the fetal position while his family and “Toy Story” characters looked on.
Sky worried her father would end up like her grandfather, the military patriarch, who in the years since he retired from the Navy started to have what the family describes as flashbacks to his time in Ramadi, Iraq, in 2005, sometimes yelling that he needed to take cover from a nonexistent attack.
Her father decided he didn’t want that life for Sky and her two siblings.
‘What was it all for?’
Some on the left see the military as a redoubt of fringe conservatism. Oath Keepers, the militia group involved in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol whose leaders were found guilty of seditious conspiracy, and other extremists have touted their veteran credentials. Those on the right have expressed concerns about the military focusing on progressive issues, or in the terms of some Republican lawmakers, being too “woke.”
The sudden and unpopular conclusion to the war in Afghanistan in 2021 added to the disenchantment of some veterans, including Catalina Gasper, who served in the Navy. Gasper said she and her husband, who spent more than two decades in the Army, used to talk to their boys, now 7 and 10, about their future service, asking them if they wanted to be Navy SEALs.
In July 2019, on her last combat deployment to Afghanistan, she was stationed at a base in Kabul when the Taliban launched an attack. The blast battered Gasper’s body and she was transported back to the U.S. for treatment and recovery.
She was left with lingering damage from a traumatic brain injury. She is sensitive to loud sounds and bright lights. She has recurrent dizziness and forgets words. She also has bad knees and herniated discs in her back.
The U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, precipitating Kabul’s fall to the Taliban. “We’re left with the gut-wrenching feeling of, ‘What was it all for?’ ” she said.
She said she was a patriot but decided she would do everything she could to make sure her kids never enter the military. “I just don’t see how it’s sustainable if the machine keeps chewing up and spitting out” our young people, she said.
Katherine Kuzminski, head of the Military, Veterans and Society Program at Center for a New American Security, a bipartisan security think tank, said the pandemic exacerbated the military’s long-term recruiting problems. “You can’t underestimate the fact we didn’t have recruiters on college and high school campuses for two years,” she said. “Recruiters are the only military access point for many people” without family or friends in the military.
Potential Army recruits at the FFA convention used virtual reality headsets. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Wormuth, the Army secretary, said she is working with the Department of Education to streamline access to schools. Even with federal laws in place that guarantee military recruiters access to high school and college students, school administrators can limit the scope of visits and restrict recruiters’ movements and activities in schools.
Recruiters are competing with some of the lowest unemployment numbers in decades, and entry-level jobs in the service industry that can promise quick paychecks, no commitments and no wait times to start.
“To be honest with you it’s Wendy’s, it’s Carl’s Jr., it’s every single job that a young person can go up against because now they are offering the same incentives that we are offering, so that’s our competition right now,” said Sgt. Maj. Marco Irenze, of the Nevada Army National Guard.
Defense officials said the military pay scale was designed for single teenage men content to live in barracks and who joined to seek adventure, among other reasons. But the military has seen a shift from teens to people in their 20s, who come in later in life with greater expectations for benefits, pay and marketable skills and who pay more attention to the job market.
The lowest-ranking troops make less than $2,000 a month, although pay is bolstered by benefits including healthcare, food and housing, leaving them few out-of-pocket expenses.
Families or those who live off base can find expenses outstrip income. More than 20,000 active-duty troops are on SNAP benefits, otherwise known as food stamps, according to federal data.
When service members move to a new base they often have to spend money out of pocket—even though the Army is supposed to cover all costs, according to Kathy Roth-Douquet, CEO of Blue Star Families, a military-family advocacy group that is currently asking Congress to mandate more funding for troops’ housing.
“If it’s too expensive to serve in the military, families won’t recommend service,” she said. “This hurts the main pipeline of recruitment.”
The promise of a pension down the line isn’t as attractive as it once was, said West Point’s Crow. Only 19% of active-duty troops stayed until retirement age in 2017, according to the Pentagon. To tackle that problem, the military started a system in 2018 that allows troops to invest in what is essentially a 401(k) program, so if they leave the military before full retirement they can still benefit.
Prep courses
The Department of Defense said 77% of American youth are disqualified from military service due to a lack of physical fitness, low test scores, criminal records including drug use or other problems. In 2013, about 71% of youth were ineligible.
The Army estimates that pandemic pressures on education including remote learning, illness, lack of internet access and social isolation lowered scores on the ASVAB, the military’s standardized test for potential recruits, by as much as 9%. Those who score below a certain level on the test and on physical readiness tests can’t join without improving their scores.
Lt. Col. Dan Hayes, a Green Beret who once taught Special Forces captains, some of the highest-performing soldiers in the Army, took charge of the Future Soldier Prep Course in Fort Jackson, S.C. The course takes Army recruits who can’t perform academically or physically and gets them up to standards that allow them to join the service. Other programs help new soldiers raise scores.
“We’re looking at the problems in society and recruiting and realizing we have to meet people half way,” said Hayes.
The Army is adapting marketing techniques from the private sector. One early lesson: The Cold War-era slogan, “Be All You Can Be,” performed better than a recent one, “Army of One,” which didn’t reflect the teamwork the service thinks appeals to current teenagers. The slogan also emphasizes that the military offers career development and a broader sense of purpose, some of its strongest selling points.
Maj. Gen. Deborah Kotulich, the director of the Army’s recruiting and retention task force, a unit convened to address recent shortfalls, said potential recruits should know the Army has more than 150 different job fields available.
Maj. General Alex Fink is just as likely to wear a business suit as camouflage fatigues at the Army Enterprise Marketing Office based in Chicago. The Army put Fink, a reservist with a marketing background, in Chicago so he can be in the heart of one of the nation’s advertising and marketing hubs.
“It hadn’t evolved for the last 15 or 20 years,” he said in an interview. “We really couldn’t measure the effectiveness of marketing.”
Fink’s office is now gathering data on every potential recruit. If an Army ad runs on Facebook and a link gets clicked, the service can follow that anonymous user digitally.
“We don’t know your name, but we can start serving you ads,” he said.
And if that user eventually fills out an Army questionnaire, the service has a name to go with that data and can know what kinds of ads work best. “Literally we can track this all the way until a kid signs a contract,” he said.
Restructuring units
Deeper problems soldiers report include moldy barracks, harassment, lack of adequate child care and not enough support for mental health issues such as suicide.
“Parents have concerns about, hey, if my kid joins the military are they going to have good places to live?” Wormuth said. “If my kid joins the military are they going to be sexually harassed, or are they going to be more prone to suicidal ideations?”
She said the Army has encouraged recruiters to be forthright about addressing what might have once been taboo issues in order to dispel those concerns. The service says it has worked to encourage troops to report abuse and harassment and cracked down on such behavior, and has also expanded parental-leave benefits.
Department of Defense officials have said they will have to address the total combat power of the military if the recruiting crisis continues, but that they aren’t ready to yet talk about whether strength will ultimately be affected.
Readiness shortfalls can be masked when units aren’t headed into war, but a full-scale response, such as what would be needed in the Pacific, could expose undermanned units that can’t be deployed or aren’t effective, and ships and aircraft that aren’t combat ready due to a lack of personnel to maintain them.
The military faces decisions on either cutting the size of units or reconfiguring them, or making choices that could hurt the quality of the current forces.
Working to retain existing soldiers is an option. But retention can mean low performers aren’t let go, said Gil Barndollar, a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship at Catholic University of America. “If you’re not cutting your bottom 10% after their initial contracts it’s going to have a long-term effect on high performers,” he said.
Last year, the Army’s top officer, Gen. James McConville, told reporters the service was prepared to eliminate redundancies in the Army’s key fighting units, which are called brigade combat teams. The Army would maintain the number of the units by reducing the personnel in each of them, a restructuring that was prompted by the recruiting crunch, according to one defense official.
Potential recruits at the FFA convention tried a fitness challenge. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan think tank, said the Army might end up making cuts that leave too few soldiers in platoons and other units. During peacetime and training this may go unnoticed, but if those units have to deploy, the Army would have to take troops from other units to fill in gaps.
Undermanned units aren’t ready to respond quickly, Cancian said, and units with fill-in soldiers don’t have the same effectiveness as a unit whose members trained together for months or years. “What you’re going to see in the Army are hollow units,” he said.
Wormuth, the Army secretary, has said units will get cuts but hasn’t made public her plan. She has for months hinted at broader force reductions.
“If you look at us over the course of the last 50 years of history, the Army is a little bit like an accordion. We tend to expand in times of war,” Wormuth said. “Frankly that’s how the Founding Fathers thought about the military, they didn’t want a large standing militia.”
Still, she said, the Army is “very, very focused” on turning around the recruiting numbers.
Changes may come too late for those about to graduate from high school or college. Sky Nisperos, who once dreamed of becoming an Air Force pilot, graduated from the University of Oklahoma in May. Her plan now, she said, is to become a graphic designer.
Michael R. Gordon contributed to this article.
Design by Andrew Levinson.
Write to Ben Kesling at ben.kesling@wsj.com
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The Military Recruiting Crisis: Even Veterans Don’t Want Their Children to Join
Pentagon scrambles to retain the main pipeline for new service members as disillusioned families steer young people away
WALL STREET JOURNAL
By Ben KeslingFollow
June 30, 2023 12:01 am ET
Sky Nisperos’s grandfather came to the U.S. from Mexico, and became an American citizen by serving in the U.S. Navy. Her father, Ernest Nisperos, is an active-duty officer in the Air Force with two decades of service. For years, Sky planned to follow a similar path.
“I wanted to be a fighter pilot,” the 22-year-old said. “It was stuck in my head.”
Now, one of the most influential people in her life—her father—is telling her that a military career may not be the right thing.
The children of military families make up the majority of new recruits in the U.S. military. That pipeline is now under threat, which is bad news for the Pentagon’s already acute recruitment problems, as well as America’s military readiness.
“Influencers are not telling them to go into the military,” said Adm. Mike Mullen, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in an interview. “Moms and dads, uncles, coaches and pastors don’t see it as a good choice.”
After the patriotic boost to recruiting that followed 9/11, the U.S. military has endured 20 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan with no decisive victories, scandals over shoddy military housing and healthcare, poor pay for lower ranks that forces many military families to turn to food stamps, and rising rates of post-traumatic stress disorder and suicide.
At the same time, the labor market is the tightest it has been in decades, meaning plenty of other options exist for young people right out of school.
U.S. recruiting shortfalls represent a long-term problem that, if not resolved, would compel the military to reduce its force size. With America embarking on a new era of great-power competition with China and Russia, that problem has become more serious.
China, which has around two million serving personnel, versus a little under 1.4 million in the U.S., has steadily expanded its military capabilities in recent decades, especially in the South China Sea. The most immediate threat is a possible conflict with China over Taiwan, which would require a rapid and sustained response from all parts of the U.S. armed forces.
“I’ve been studying the recruiting market for about 15 years, and we’ve never seen a condition quite like this,” said a senior Defense Department official.
Toughest year
The U.S. Army in 2022 had its toughest recruiting year since the advent of the all-volunteer military in 1973 and missed its goal by 25%. This year, it expects to end up about 15,000 short of its target of 65,000 recruits.
The Navy expects to fall short by as many as 10,000 of its goal of nearly 38,000 recruits this year, and the Air Force has said it is anticipating coming in at 3,000 below its goal of nearly 27,000. The Marine Corps met its target last year of sending 33,000 to boot camp, and expects to meet its goals this year, but its leaders described recruitment as challenging.
Only 9% of young people ages 16-21 said last year they would consider military service, down from 13% before the pandemic, according to Pentagon data.
Pentagon officials see recruitment shortfalls as a crisis and pledge to hit their targets in the future to stave off making changes to the force structure.
Army Secretary Christine Wormuth said she expects within weeks to begin drafting a proposal for a recruiting overhaul so sweeping that Congress might need to pass legislation to enact all of it.
She declined to provide details but said a key element will be to coordinate with veterans’ groups. “Right now we are not in a comprehensive, structured way leveraging our relationships with veterans organizations,” Wormuth said.
The Army has stepped up and modernized its marketing, launched remedial courses to bring unqualified young people to a level where they can join and revised some benefits.
Army recruiters spoke with members of the National FFA Organization, formerly called Future Farmers of America, at an FFA convention in Indianapolis, Ind., in October. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Defense officials said they aren’t doing a good job of battling what they call misperceptions. They said many families want their children to go on to higher education after high school, considering the military a stumbling block instead of a steppingstone. Once a young person is on a path to a career, they aren’t as likely to put on a uniform, they said.
When the draft ended at the close of the Vietnam War, the military fostered recruitment with the promise of a good career with retirement benefits and healthcare, as well as education benefits to prepare soldiers for life after the military. That strategy worked, and the Army typically met its overall needs.
It did so by relying heavily on veterans and military families to develop the next generation of recruits, especially in the region known in the military as the “Southern Smile,” a curving region from the mid-Atlantic and down across the southern U.S.
Today, nearly 80% of all new Army recruits have a family member who has served in uniform, according to the service. That can be a good thing, said Col. Mark Crow, director of the Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis at West Point, because “people who know the most about it stick around.”
Depending too much on military families could create a “warrior caste,” Wormuth said. Her plans seek to draw in people who have no real connection to the military and to broaden the appeal of service.
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Sky Nisperos, who moved around the world as a military brat, said that as a teen she began to see the effect of her father’s nearly dozen deployments and tours away from his family. Ernest Nisperos said he remembers being asleep when one of his kids jabbed him in the ribs to wake him. He put Sky’s sister in a wrestling ankle lock before he realized he was back home.
“My sister and I would say, ‘It’s just drill sergeant-dad mode,’ especially for the month he came back,” Sky said.
Ernest Nisperos realized his deployments, which involved battle planning and top secret intelligence, were taking a toll. In 2019, after he returned from Afghanistan, he took the family to Disneyland. During the nightly fireworks extravaganza, he cowered in the fetal position while his family and “Toy Story” characters looked on.
Sky worried her father would end up like her grandfather, the military patriarch, who in the years since he retired from the Navy started to have what the family describes as flashbacks to his time in Ramadi, Iraq, in 2005, sometimes yelling that he needed to take cover from a nonexistent attack.
Her father decided he didn’t want that life for Sky and her two siblings.
‘What was it all for?’
Some on the left see the military as a redoubt of fringe conservatism. Oath Keepers, the militia group involved in the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol whose leaders were found guilty of seditious conspiracy, and other extremists have touted their veteran credentials. Those on the right have expressed concerns about the military focusing on progressive issues, or in the terms of some Republican lawmakers, being too “woke.”
The sudden and unpopular conclusion to the war in Afghanistan in 2021 added to the disenchantment of some veterans, including Catalina Gasper, who served in the Navy. Gasper said she and her husband, who spent more than two decades in the Army, used to talk to their boys, now 7 and 10, about their future service, asking them if they wanted to be Navy SEALs.
In July 2019, on her last combat deployment to Afghanistan, she was stationed at a base in Kabul when the Taliban launched an attack. The blast battered Gasper’s body and she was transported back to the U.S. for treatment and recovery.
She was left with lingering damage from a traumatic brain injury. She is sensitive to loud sounds and bright lights. She has recurrent dizziness and forgets words. She also has bad knees and herniated discs in her back.
The U.S. pulled out of Afghanistan in the summer of 2021, precipitating Kabul’s fall to the Taliban. “We’re left with the gut-wrenching feeling of, ‘What was it all for?’ ” she said.
She said she was a patriot but decided she would do everything she could to make sure her kids never enter the military. “I just don’t see how it’s sustainable if the machine keeps chewing up and spitting out” our young people, she said.
Katherine Kuzminski, head of the Military, Veterans and Society Program at Center for a New American Security, a bipartisan security think tank, said the pandemic exacerbated the military’s long-term recruiting problems. “You can’t underestimate the fact we didn’t have recruiters on college and high school campuses for two years,” she said. “Recruiters are the only military access point for many people” without family or friends in the military.
Potential Army recruits at the FFA convention used virtual reality headsets. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Wormuth, the Army secretary, said she is working with the Department of Education to streamline access to schools. Even with federal laws in place that guarantee military recruiters access to high school and college students, school administrators can limit the scope of visits and restrict recruiters’ movements and activities in schools.
Recruiters are competing with some of the lowest unemployment numbers in decades, and entry-level jobs in the service industry that can promise quick paychecks, no commitments and no wait times to start.
“To be honest with you it’s Wendy’s, it’s Carl’s Jr., it’s every single job that a young person can go up against because now they are offering the same incentives that we are offering, so that’s our competition right now,” said Sgt. Maj. Marco Irenze, of the Nevada Army National Guard.
Defense officials said the military pay scale was designed for single teenage men content to live in barracks and who joined to seek adventure, among other reasons. But the military has seen a shift from teens to people in their 20s, who come in later in life with greater expectations for benefits, pay and marketable skills and who pay more attention to the job market.
The lowest-ranking troops make less than $2,000 a month, although pay is bolstered by benefits including healthcare, food and housing, leaving them few out-of-pocket expenses.
Families or those who live off base can find expenses outstrip income. More than 20,000 active-duty troops are on SNAP benefits, otherwise known as food stamps, according to federal data.
When service members move to a new base they often have to spend money out of pocket—even though the Army is supposed to cover all costs, according to Kathy Roth-Douquet, CEO of Blue Star Families, a military-family advocacy group that is currently asking Congress to mandate more funding for troops’ housing.
“If it’s too expensive to serve in the military, families won’t recommend service,” she said. “This hurts the main pipeline of recruitment.”
The promise of a pension down the line isn’t as attractive as it once was, said West Point’s Crow. Only 19% of active-duty troops stayed until retirement age in 2017, according to the Pentagon. To tackle that problem, the military started a system in 2018 that allows troops to invest in what is essentially a 401(k) program, so if they leave the military before full retirement they can still benefit.
Prep courses
The Department of Defense said 77% of American youth are disqualified from military service due to a lack of physical fitness, low test scores, criminal records including drug use or other problems. In 2013, about 71% of youth were ineligible.
The Army estimates that pandemic pressures on education including remote learning, illness, lack of internet access and social isolation lowered scores on the ASVAB, the military’s standardized test for potential recruits, by as much as 9%. Those who score below a certain level on the test and on physical readiness tests can’t join without improving their scores.
Lt. Col. Dan Hayes, a Green Beret who once taught Special Forces captains, some of the highest-performing soldiers in the Army, took charge of the Future Soldier Prep Course in Fort Jackson, S.C. The course takes Army recruits who can’t perform academically or physically and gets them up to standards that allow them to join the service. Other programs help new soldiers raise scores.
“We’re looking at the problems in society and recruiting and realizing we have to meet people half way,” said Hayes.
The Army is adapting marketing techniques from the private sector. One early lesson: The Cold War-era slogan, “Be All You Can Be,” performed better than a recent one, “Army of One,” which didn’t reflect the teamwork the service thinks appeals to current teenagers. The slogan also emphasizes that the military offers career development and a broader sense of purpose, some of its strongest selling points.
Maj. Gen. Deborah Kotulich, the director of the Army’s recruiting and retention task force, a unit convened to address recent shortfalls, said potential recruits should know the Army has more than 150 different job fields available.
Maj. General Alex Fink is just as likely to wear a business suit as camouflage fatigues at the Army Enterprise Marketing Office based in Chicago. The Army put Fink, a reservist with a marketing background, in Chicago so he can be in the heart of one of the nation’s advertising and marketing hubs.
“It hadn’t evolved for the last 15 or 20 years,” he said in an interview. “We really couldn’t measure the effectiveness of marketing.”
Fink’s office is now gathering data on every potential recruit. If an Army ad runs on Facebook and a link gets clicked, the service can follow that anonymous user digitally.
“We don’t know your name, but we can start serving you ads,” he said.
And if that user eventually fills out an Army questionnaire, the service has a name to go with that data and can know what kinds of ads work best. “Literally we can track this all the way until a kid signs a contract,” he said.
Restructuring units
Deeper problems soldiers report include moldy barracks, harassment, lack of adequate child care and not enough support for mental health issues such as suicide.
“Parents have concerns about, hey, if my kid joins the military are they going to have good places to live?” Wormuth said. “If my kid joins the military are they going to be sexually harassed, or are they going to be more prone to suicidal ideations?”
She said the Army has encouraged recruiters to be forthright about addressing what might have once been taboo issues in order to dispel those concerns. The service says it has worked to encourage troops to report abuse and harassment and cracked down on such behavior, and has also expanded parental-leave benefits.
Department of Defense officials have said they will have to address the total combat power of the military if the recruiting crisis continues, but that they aren’t ready to yet talk about whether strength will ultimately be affected.
Readiness shortfalls can be masked when units aren’t headed into war, but a full-scale response, such as what would be needed in the Pacific, could expose undermanned units that can’t be deployed or aren’t effective, and ships and aircraft that aren’t combat ready due to a lack of personnel to maintain them.
The military faces decisions on either cutting the size of units or reconfiguring them, or making choices that could hurt the quality of the current forces.
Working to retain existing soldiers is an option. But retention can mean low performers aren’t let go, said Gil Barndollar, a senior research fellow at the Center for the Study of Statesmanship at Catholic University of America. “If you’re not cutting your bottom 10% after their initial contracts it’s going to have a long-term effect on high performers,” he said.
Last year, the Army’s top officer, Gen. James McConville, told reporters the service was prepared to eliminate redundancies in the Army’s key fighting units, which are called brigade combat teams. The Army would maintain the number of the units by reducing the personnel in each of them, a restructuring that was prompted by the recruiting crunch, according to one defense official.
Potential recruits at the FFA convention tried a fitness challenge. PHOTO: KAITI SULLIVAN FOR THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
Mark Cancian, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a nonpartisan think tank, said the Army might end up making cuts that leave too few soldiers in platoons and other units. During peacetime and training this may go unnoticed, but if those units have to deploy, the Army would have to take troops from other units to fill in gaps.
Undermanned units aren’t ready to respond quickly, Cancian said, and units with fill-in soldiers don’t have the same effectiveness as a unit whose members trained together for months or years. “What you’re going to see in the Army are hollow units,” he said.
Wormuth, the Army secretary, has said units will get cuts but hasn’t made public her plan. She has for months hinted at broader force reductions.
“If you look at us over the course of the last 50 years of history, the Army is a little bit like an accordion. We tend to expand in times of war,” Wormuth said. “Frankly that’s how the Founding Fathers thought about the military, they didn’t want a large standing militia.”
Still, she said, the Army is “very, very focused” on turning around the recruiting numbers.
Changes may come too late for those about to graduate from high school or college. Sky Nisperos, who once dreamed of becoming an Air Force pilot, graduated from the University of Oklahoma in May. Her plan now, she said, is to become a graphic designer.
Michael R. Gordon contributed to this article.
Design by Andrew Levinson.
Write to Ben Kesling at ben.kesling@wsj.com
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https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/07/you-cant-make-this-up-u-s-army/
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OMG , , ,
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=53SM7SEiCTw&t=146s
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/4251924/the-organizational-structure-of-current-military-selects-for-sycophants-and-other-losers-who-can-be
The organizational structure of current military selects for sycophants and other losers who can be controlled. The next war involving significant fighting from US military against significant adversaries likely will shatter the U.S. military. And that makes things extremely dangerous. Drug addicts and insane males pretending they are women having menstrual pains cannot be trusted with the sort of weapons OGUS has.
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From the prior post by MY:
https://dl2022.substack.com/p/in-praise-of-prigozhin
In Praise of Prigozhin
Some day our American Prigozhin will come
JASON M. MORGAN
JUL 6, 2023
In late June of 2023, a furious Yevgeny Prigozhin commenced a march on Moscow. He got a lot farther than many expected. Waylaid at Rostov-on-Don, on the Sea of Azov, Prigozhin entered into heated negotiations with the object of his fury, Russian president Vladimir Putin. A day after Prigozhin’s gambit started, it was over. Belarussian president Alexander Lukashenko, an old friend of Prigozhin’s and also a trusted junior partner of Putin’s, had negotiated a truce of sorts. Prigozhin went on what might best be called a hiatus in Belarus. Prigozhin’s marchers, the A-Team mercenary group of Russian misfits known as Wagner, went back to the meat grinder in Ukraine.
The history of Wagner, and of its wily originator Yevgeny Prigozhin, is available for anyone to read if interested. I recommend it. It’s fascinating, especially in the wider context of Russian history.
But while news reports of Prigozhin’s salient against Putin—and not really Putin so much as those serving him whom Prigozhin thought insufficiently devoted to the war in Ukraine—have focused on the implications for the Russian state in the fallout of the daylong Wagner hole-up in Rostov-on-Don, I want to think about Prigozhin and America. Namely, why don’t we have a Prigozhin of our own?
What I think many readers who take the trouble to examine the details will find striking is that Prigozhin’s criticisms of the Russian military commanders and political elite, whom Prigozhin accuses of being indifferent to the suffering of his men in the Ukrainian hellscape, could be applied almost exactly to men and women in similar positions in Washington, DC.
“Shoigu! Gerasimov!,” Prigozhin recently raged, calling out by name Sergei Shoigu and Valery Gerasimov, the Minister of Defense and Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, respectively. “Where is the [expletive] ammunition? They [i.e., Wagner troops] came here as volunteers and die for you to fatten yourselves in your mahogany offices.”
Prigozhin took the fight against his superiors in Moscow to another level by personally attacking Shoigu’s son-in-law online. Shoigu’s family member avoided service in the Ukraine war while regular Russian boys died in droves.
The premise of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine was a lie, Prizoghin claims.
Regular Russian troops are cowards, Prigozhin says, and their leaders are “stupid.”
Prigozhin has long been vilified in the American and European press. This is not surprising, given the endless fake news about Ukraine. But even the fake-news reports are useful in thinking about Prigozhin in an American context. Whatever one thinks about Russia or the Ukraine war, one has to admit, I think, that Prigozhin raises very good points about how the decisions (and indecision) of faraway elites adversely affect men in trenches. Whether one wants Russia to win, lose, or draw in Ukraine, Prigozhin’s direct pointing to what appear to be the usual problems of wartime—idiotic commanders, inept supply officers, chronic bureaucratic lying, elite avoidance of war’s horrors, the indifference of politicians to dead and wounded nobodies—is in itself worth praising.
Prigozhin may be a bad man. But he is, for all that, a man. He stands up for those under him. He goes to war—with Kiev and with Moscow—for his boys. He calls bullshit as needed. He doesn’t play sycophantic games. He drives a hard bargain and shows real thymotic vigor in defending his own. He is punctilious on points of honor. He repays slights with extreme prejudice. He will gamble everything to stare down just one mealy-mouthed pencil-pusher in a distant capital. Bad man or not, Yevgeny Prigozhin is a certified badass. He steps up and kicks in. His men, as is clear by their willingness to risk their own skins in his June, 2023 mutiny, adore him. Wagner’s ragtag ruffians pay Prigozhin the highest compliment by following him, at their own great peril, wherever he leads.
I ask again, then. Why is there no American Prigozhin?
In the summer of 2021, the United States executed a disgraceful and dishonorable rabbit run from Kabul. The United States military followed orders, turned tail, and left people behind. It was, through and through, a self-inflicted catastrophe.
Only one person in the ranks, Lt. Col. Stuart Scheller, Jr., of the United States Marines, spoke out publicly against the ignominious 2021 retreat. He was thrown in the brig, and eventually cut a path clear of his notoriety with a timely offering of Never-Trumpism.
The Afghanistan retreat was tailor-made for someone like Yevgeny Prigozhin to excoriate. Bureaucratic ineptitude and military lily-liveredness abounded.
But only one person in uniform said a word. One. And that was mainly limited to some videos posted to social media. It was hardly, in retrospect, a ringing endorsement of the quality of American soldiery. In fact, it was a tacit indictment of the American military’s careerism, at best, and probably plain cowardice more generally. Any man who can stomach running up the white flag to the Taliban and leaving Americans behind to be raped and butchered by barbarians doesn’t deserve to wear the American uniform. Or, sadly, maybe he does.
Either way, what was needed after the implosion in Afghanistan was just what Lt. Col. Scheller called for at one point: a revolution. At the bare minimum, someone with command of a lot of men and weapons needed to march on Washington to put a fine point on the heartbreak that millions of warfighters, veterans, and their families felt when that city cut and run in Afghanistan. At the bare minimum, some generals needed to go Roman Empire and turn around mid-campaign to make war on the criminals at home for a change, instead of the foreign enemy.
There needed to be a Prigozhin long before that, too, when Americans were dying in Afghanistan and Iraq due to the failures of their higher-ups. Michael Yon, a veteran journalist who covered those conflicts, pointed out flagrant abuses by American brass. The brass turned on Yon. Who in the ranks made the honorable decision to put God and country before promotion and hold Washington hostage so that Americans in the field would stop dying?
There needed to be a Prigozhin when Americans went off to fight in Korea under a United Nations flag. There was a Prigozhin, named Smedley Butler, when Washington betrayed fighting men after World War I. But he was the last of that line. Everyone since has been a ladder-climber. And we are infinitely the worse for it as a civilization.
The news coming out of eastern Europe and Russia about Yevgeny Prigozhin is not palatable. It could portend even more upheaval in that part of the world than we already have. That is all well worth our attention. We ought to keep a close eye on what Prigozhin does now, and does next.
But in the mirror darkly in all this news chatter is a commentary, if we will only choose to see it, on our own ruined country. We may look down on the Russians for their warlordism. If only we in America had even that. Yevgeny Prigozhin, rough and rude man that he surely is, had the balls to stand up and fight for honor and demand to be told the truth. Nobody in Washington or in the entire United States military today—nobody, despite having much more reason to do so than Prigozhin ever did—is capable of such a thing. To the careerists in the American military today, such honor and bravery, such manliness, are unthinkable.
--Jason Morgan is associate professor at Reitaku University in Kashiwa, Japan
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Addressing U.S. military preparedness
A Lusitania-type wake-up call
By Rep. French Hill
Just over a century ago, America’s military was in disarray. Our focus on defense was declining. When the RMS Lusitania was sunk off the coast of Ireland by a German U-boat in 1915, this tragic event was a wake-up call to President Woodrow Wilson and many Americans who had been reluctant to support the defense of Britain and France against the invasion by the Germans.
Former President Theodore Roosevelt, one of the most persuasive patriarchs of a strong and welltrained U.S. Navy, was one of Wilson’s most outspoken critics of his lack of military preparedness.
Rep. Nicholas Longworth of Ohio, Roosevelt’s son-in-law, had a similar view.
A member of the House Ways and Means Committee and a future speaker of the House, Longworth was a strong voice for defense industrial investment and aggressive military preparation.
Today, we face an eerily similar confluence of events. Americans have grown weary of foreign conflict, given 20 years of the global war on terrorism.
There is a growing feeling of isolationism brought about by Russian President Vladimir Putin’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and the billions of U.S. taxpayer dollars for military, humanitarian and financial support of this sovereign nation.
These growing voices of isolation are appearing precisely at a new and more challenging time with the rising threats from Russia’s allies China, Iran and North Korea.
In addition, the strong military aid for Ukraine provided by the United States and Europe has exposed the weak underbelly of our nation and our allies’ defense industrial capacity to produce critical materials such as ammunition, artillery shells and missiles.
Likewise, we are depleting key stockpiles of these components here at home and among our allies.
As Longworth noted after the Lusitania sank, the United States learned that we cannot neglect the importance of “true preparedness” where we are “free from the industrial domination of any other nation” and that our defense base is “the very foundation of military efficiency … in a time of war.”
His words hold true today, both as they relate to lessons of Ukraine and freeing ourselves from reliance on foreign nations in key areas such as strategic minerals, semiconductor chips, and pharmaceutical compounds and supplies.
As Congress considers our nation’s 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, we must focus on true preparedness.
While making critical investments in space, artificial intelligence and future technology, we must also enhance our military’s preparedness.
Congress should find the necessary ways and means to create a more effective defense industrial base for our urgent production of these elements. Likewise, the Department of Defense’s Foreign Military Sales, known as FMS, and Foreign Military Financing, or FMF, programs must be reformed to be more responsive.
Subject to the same constraints on the defense industrial base, the United States has offered many different weapons systems to Taiwan, which Taiwan has fully funded. Yet the expected delivery of these weapons systems extends years from now.
This is unacceptable given the growing aggression of the Chinese Communist Party in the region.
To address this, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recently created the FMS Technical, Industrial and Governmental Engagement for Readiness Task Force, of which I am a member.
The task force will study the U.S. government’s foreign military sales process and issue recommendations for enhancing the arms transfer to Taiwan, which is a critical step in analyzing the scope of challenges our nation faces in our assistance to ensure Taiwan can successfully defend itself.
Recently, Doug Cameron argued in The Wall Street Journal that “years of stop-start Pentagon funding for munitions led companies to close production lines or quit the industry, while output of many components and raw materials moved overseas. Defense Department chiefs estimate the decline will take five or six years to reverse.”
This should be our own Lusitania-type wake-up call.
The clear and present danger of our own weakness in producing routine military supplies to defend our interests and those of our allies around the world who are dedicated to defend democracy must be top of mind and prioritized.
As Congress works to find a bipartisan consensus that will correct our deficiencies in America’s preparedness, we must keep our nation’s history in mind.
In a time where the threats of our foreign adversaries are ever-increasing, we cannot afford to be unprepared militarily.
Only we can learn from our past to ensure history does not repeat itself.
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The Future of War Has Come in Ukraine: Drone Swarms
The innovations that have led to Kyiv’s remarkable successes against Russia will change combat dramatically.
By Eric Schmidt
July 7, 2023 3:25 pm ET
My most recent trip to Ukraine revealed a burgeoning military reality: The future of war will be dictated and waged by drones.
Amid a front line covering 600 miles, the Ukrainian counteroffensive faces a formidable Russian force, as it tries to break through to the Azov Sea and stop the Russian overland supply line to Crimea. Between the two armies, there are at least 3 miles of heavily mined territory followed by rows of concrete antitank obstacles, with artillery pieces hidden in nearby forests. The Russian military has amassed so much artillery and ammunition that it can afford to fire 50,000 rounds a day—an order of magnitude more than Ukraine.
Traditional military doctrine suggests that an advancing force should have air superiority and a 3-to-1 advantage in soldiers to make steady progress against a dug-in opponent. Ukrainians have neither. That they’ve succeeded anyway is owing to their ability to adopt and adapt new technologies such as drones.
Drones extend the Ukrainian infantry’s limited reach. Reconnaissance drones keep soldiers safe, constantly monitoring Russian attacks and providing feedback to correct artillery targeting. During the daytime, they fly over enemy lines to identify targets; at night, they return with payloads.
Unfortunately, Russia has picked up these tactics, too. Behind the initial minefields and trenches blocking Kyiv’s advance, there’s a more heavily defended line. If courageous Ukrainians make it there, Russian soldiers will send in drones and artillery. All the while Russia’s army—which excels at jamming and GPS spoofing—is working to take out Ukrainian drones. A May report from the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies estimated that Ukraine was losing as many as 10,000 a month even before the start of the counteroffensive.
Yet Ukraine has continually out-innovated the enemy. Its latest drone models can prevent jamming, operate without GPS guidance and drop guided bombs on moving targets. Ukrainian command centers use personal computers and open-source software to classify targets and execute operations.
Ukraine has also pioneered a more effective model of decentralized military operations that makes its tech use varied and quickly evolving. In the war’s early stages, Ukraine’s government put the new Digital Ministry in charge of drone procurement but left important decision making to smaller units. While the ministry sets standards and purchases drones, the brigades are empowered to choose and operate them. Ten programmers can change the way thousands of soldiers operate. One brigade I visited independently designed its own multilayered visual planning system, which coordinates units’ actions.
To win this war, Ukraine needs to rethink 100 years of traditional military tactics focused on trenches, mortars and artillery. But the innovations it and Russia make will carry on far beyond this particular conflict.
Perhaps the most important is the kamikaze drone. Deployed in volume, this first-person-view drone—invented for the sport of drone racing—is cheaper than a mortar round and more accurate than artillery fire. Kamikaze drones cost around $400 and can carry up to 3 pounds of explosives. In the hands of a skilled operator with several months of training, these drones fly so fast they are nearly impossible to shoot down.
Costly materiel, such as combat aircraft that are vulnerable to missile attacks, will be replaced by cheaper drones—operating on land, sea and air. In the future, like murmurations of starlings, ruthless swarms of AI-empowered kamikaze drones will track mobile targets and algorithmically collaborate to strike past an enemy’s electronic countermeasures. Naval drones will take the same concepts into the sea, converging like a shoal of small torpedoes at the waterline of targeted ships. Land-based drones will clear obstacles, demine fields and eventually act as remote machine guns and other weapons.
As I departed Ukraine, what stuck with me were the rolling fields along the Dnipro River, with cinnabar-colored flowers covering the gentle landscape. In the 1930s, Stalin enforced the Holodomor, the forced starvation of about four million Ukrainians in the middle of the breadbasket of Europe. The industry of the tractors cultivating fields only miles from the front line was a powerful reminder of how human civilization can withstand unbelievable hardship—and emerge stronger.
The war in Ukraine shows us the best and worst humanity can offer, from the ruthlessness of the invasion to the bravery of the defenders. It’s also a stark warning of the future wars to come. Just as drones can be deployed to protect soldiers, they can be used to hunt civilians.
The world needs to learn and innovate from the lessons of this emerging form of fighting to be ready to deter and prevent such conflict from ever happening again.
Mr. Schmidt was CEO of Google, 2001-11, and executive chairman of Google and its successor, Alphabet Inc., 2011-17. He is the chairman of the Special Competitive Studies Project and a co-author of “The Age of AI: And Our Human Future.”
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SECURITY
China crafting weapons to alter brain function
Report finds technology meant to influence government leaders
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China’s People’s Liberation Army is developing high-technology weapons designed to disrupt brain functions and influence government leaders or entire populations, according to a report by three open-source intelligence analysts.
The weapons can be used to directly attack or control brains using microwave or other directed energy weapons in handheld guns or larger weapons firing electromagnetic beams, adding that the danger of China’s brain warfare weapons prior to or during a conflict is no longer theoretical.
“Unknown to many, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and its People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have established themselves as world leaders in the development of neurostrike weapons,” according to the 12-page report, “Enumerating, Targeting and Collapsing the Chinese Communist Party’s Neurostrike Program.” The Washington Times obtained a copy of the study.
The U.S. Commerce Department in December 2021 imposed sanctions on China’s Academy of Military Medical Sciences and 11 related entities the department said were using “biotechnology processes to support Chinese military end-uses and end-users, to include purported brain-control weaponry.”
Few public studies or discussions, however, have been held
regarding the new advanced military capability.
Neurostrike is a military term defi ned as the engineered targeting of the brains of military personnel or civilians using nonkinetic technology. The goal is to impair thinking, reduce situational awareness, inflict long-term neurological damage and cloud normal cognitive functions.
The study was written by Ryan Clarke, a senior fellow at the East Asian Institute of the National University of Singapore; Xiaoxu Sean Lin, a former Army microbiologist now with Feitan College; and L.J. Eads, a former Air Force intelligence officer and current specialist in artificial intelligence for the U.S. intelligence community. The three authors write that China’s leadership “views neurostrike and psychological warfare as a core component of its asymmetric warfare strategy against the United States and its allies in the Indo-Pacific.”
According to the report, neurostrike capabilities are part of standard military capabilities and should not be viewed as an unconventional weapon limited to use in extreme circumstances.
Likely areas of use for the weapons included Taiwan, the South China Sea, East China Sea and the disputed Sino-Indian border.
The threat is not limited to the use of microwave weapons: “[China’s] new landscape of neurostrike development includes using massively distributed human-computer interfaces to control entire populations as well as a range of weapons designed to cause cognitive damage,” the report said.
Research is focused on using brain warfare weapons in the near term, and possibly during a Chinese military assault on Taiwan — a target for future Chinese military operations that U.S. military leaders have said could be carried out in the next four years.
“Any breakthrough in this research would provide unprecedented tools for the CCP to forcibly establish a new world order, which has been [Chinese President] Xi Jinping’s lifelong goal,” the report said.
Militarily, brain warfare can be used in what the Pentagon has called China’s “anti-access, area-denial” military strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
“Imagine (at least partially) immunized PLA troops being inserted into a geography where a specific weaponized bacterial strain has been released prior to their entry to prepare the ground and eliminate points of resistance,” the report states. “Any remaining sources of resistance on the ground are then dealt with through [Chinese] neurostrike weaponry that instill intense fear and/ or other forms of cognitive incoherence resulting in inaction.”
That scenario would allow the PLA to establish absolute control over a nation like Taiwan, while at the same time blunting any American strategic options to intervene and send troops in to support Taiwan. The PLA could thus negate U.S. conventional military superiority with few near-term remedies for the United States, the report said.
“This scenario is based on known existing CCP research programs and what the clear strategic aims of those programs are,” the report said.
The report said placing China’s Academy of Military Medical Science the Commerce Department’s blacklist of companies barred from access to U.S. goods was the result of its leading role in developing brain warfare capabilities. A special branch of the Chinese military known as the Strategic Support Force (SSF) is likely the main unit charged with conducting brain warfare.
The SSF is the leader in what the PLA calls a “three warfares” strategy of using nonkinetic weapons in war. The three warfares were disclosed in 2014 by China’s National Defense University and call for employing psychological warfare, media warfare and legal warfare.
Little is known about the SSF but available information indicates the force would be used to shape information environments on the ground and provide the PLA with better battlefield information than its adversaries.
“With additional neurostrike capabilities that can either damage, disorient or even control perceived adversary cognition at the population level, the PLA SSF would represent an exponential escalation in [China’s] aggression in the Indo-Pacific,” the report said.
“Three warfares” operations are underway against Taiwan, Hong Kong, the South China Sea and along the Indian-Chinese border, and the authors warn that the risk of the new brain warfare capabilities being used is increasing.
The SSF “now operates as a type of superstructure on top of a growing and increasingly active platform of Chinese military assets (land, sea, air, cyber, and space) across multiple theaters in the Indo-Pacific while simultaneously serving as the primary deployment platform for new neurostrike weaponry,” the report said.
To counter brain warfare capabilities, the report urges the U.S. military to first expose the threat of neurostrike weapons and call for international talks and policy remedies, such as ethics reviews for neuroscience and cognitive science studies. Proactively, the United States should sabotage critical supply chains of specific institutions or companies engaged in brain warfare research.
Cyber capabilities also should be used to target and disrupt Chinese neurostrike programs. Sanctions against all Chinese civilian and military programs linked to brain warfare also should be increased.
The objective of all counter-brain warfare efforts should be to dissuade China’s leadership from deploying the new technology, the report said.
“Like all of the CCP’s asymmetric warfare programs, neurostrike depends entirely on presenting a massively decentralized and fragmented network structure,” the report said. “This renders it nearly impossible to map using traditional investigative or intelligence approaches.”
China currently does not have the defense-industrial base needed to produce the technologies for a neurostrike program that can match Beijing’s military ambitions, the report said, presenting a window of opportunity for the U.S. and its allies.
“This fundamental gap presents a massive vulnerability for decapitating strikes against the neurostrike program provided that these gaps can be surfaced, and precision-targeted,” the report said.
U.S. and allied nations must locate key weaknesses in the networks involved in the brain warfare program. Covert military action can “make involvement in this weapons program a high-risk venture where technical failure and negative international attention are the most likely outcomes,” the report said
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China's threatening "neurostrike" weapons program: The Chinese military has been developing brain-disrupting weaponry, according to a recent report. Known as China's Neurostrike Program, the aim would be to attack both military and civililian personnel with a brain-disrupting weapon that would "impair thinking, reduce situational awareness, inflict long-term neurological damage and cloud normal cognitive functions," reports The Washington Times. (No, they don't mean TikTok, though if the shoe fits...) The authors of the report contend that China's "new landscape of neurostrike development includes using massively distributed human-computer interfaces to control entire populations as well as a range of weapons designed to cause cognitive damage" and that "any breakthrough in this research would provide unprecedented tools for the CCP to forcibly establish a new world order, which has been [Chinese President] Xi Jinping's lifelong goal."
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https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2022/10/13/is-the-military-too-woke-to-recruit/?fbclid=IwAR2xIV_Ob398E8ktnvg4QBwO5ILFMJ3HqYQKOZTamM8KUAPrph1N_eFeBpc
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https://www.foxnews.com/politics/recruitment-flounders-small-change-gi-bill-make-kids-flock-military-teen-says
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https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=1351313038808783
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CBsG5qjZ5Js&t=91s
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https://dailycaller.com/2023/09/10/chuck-schumer-overriding-gop-hold-military-promotions/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=29912&pnespid=qL44Uz0ZPfwK1PPSpyqzCJiQuUq.WId5K_Gjxvtl.hRmbJjxgqrAgB2KbItXqrQYaMiEY3Nc
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2023/09/china-russia-taking-batting-practice-air-intercepts-aging-us-aircraft-general-says/390249/
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https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/the-mystery-of-the-missing-f-35
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September 27, 2023
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Russia’s Defense Industry at a Crossroads
The sector is facing numerous hurdles in the long term.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
A year and a half since Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, Russian forces still have not achieved their main objectives and are now fighting yet another Ukrainian counteroffensive. Such a protracted campaign requires substantial military equipment and artillery, not to mention funding, for all parties involved. A major advantage for Ukraine is that it can depend on external sources for military and financial support. Russia, however, must rely on its own ability to supply its war effort. And given that the Russian economy is under ever-increasing sanctions pressure, Moscow has to face the possibility that it may experience a shortage of weapons in the future, limiting its ability to continue to wage war and possibly pushing it into negotiations to settle the conflict earlier than it would like. Russia’s defense industry therefore finds itself at a crossroads, pushing to scale up production while struggling to develop more modern weapons systems for the country’s long-term needs.
Ramping Up Production
Speculation has been mounting for months about whether Russia is facing a weapons and equipment shortage. It began after Russian private military company the Wagner Group started gaining ground in Ukraine. Beginning in May, when the battle for Bakhmut was at its peak, Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin repeatedly complained about diminishing supplies of ammunition for his troops. There have also been reports that Russian officials have met with their North Korean counterparts to try to secure more ammunition – though neither side has confirmed as much so far. Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu’s trip to North Korea in July and Kim Jong Un’s visit to Russia’s Far East region in September were believed to be part of this effort. For the Kremlin, the benefit of going to the North Koreans is that Western sanctions have no impact on trade with Pyongyang and North Korean arms are mainly Soviet-designed or similar systems that will be compatible with Russian supplies. The downside, however, is that North Korea has limited weapons stocks and a narrow ability to replenish its supplies.
But it’s becoming increasingly clear that Moscow is concerned about an ammunition shortage, in part because of its own recent statements in Russian media boasting about sharp increases in defense production. There have been reports in the Russian press that defense firms have added shifts to their production lines and increased production volumes, sometimes by as much as 10 times over previous rates.
Despite the apparent boost, Russia hasn’t seen any significant gains in Ukraine. This discrepancy reflects the fact that the war isn’t the only reason for the ramp-up in production. On some level, the war is just the impetus for the current defense development push – which has much broader, long-term objectives. On the security front, Moscow needs to protect its borders and maintain its standing as one of the biggest military powers in the world. On the economic front, Russia’s defense industry is a network of research organizations and roughly 2,000 industrial enterprises, which are often merged into large holding companies. It employs more than 2 million people and contributes to the budget through overseas sales. Despite Western sanctions, Russia still accounts for about 16 percent of global arms supplies, with its top buyers being India, China, Algeria, Egypt and Vietnam.
Indeed, the Kremlin set out two decades ago to bolster its weakened but once powerful military-industrial complex, which had been in decline since the collapse of the Soviet Union and a sharp reduction in state defense orders in the early 1990s. The war in Ukraine has certainly introduced a new sense of urgency, however. Russia has employed in Ukraine every branch of its armed forces and practically every weapon at its disposal, except of course its nuclear triad. It has, for example, deployed for the first time MiG-31K fighter-interceptors, which carry hypersonic air-launched ballistic missiles.
At the end of 2022, Shoigu announced a 50 percent increase in funding for state defense orders in 2023. Russia also last year began mass production of a whole line of products, including the Tornado-S multiple-launch rocket systems and the S-500 Prometheus anti-aircraft missile system. In March, President Vladimir Putin said Russia would produce three times more ammunition than the West will give to Kyiv. To maintain its position on the international arms market, Moscow also needs to be able to fulfill existing contracts and accept new orders, which it has continued to do throughout the Ukraine war. At an expo this year called the Army Forum, Russia’s Rosoboronexport signed several arms export contracts worth about $600 million.
The boost has ultimately helped offset downturns in other industries, brought on by Western sanctions and isolation efforts. Indeed, thanks in large part to growth in the defense sector, Russia’s manufacturing industry declined by just 0.7 percent in 2022, according to Bloomberg. It’s expected to grow by 2 percent in 2023, again due to gains in the defense industry.
Focus on Quality
But supplying Russia’s war machine in Ukraine isn’t just about producing more. It’s also about developing modern, effective weapons that will help Russia sustain the fight for as long as possible and defend the homeland in the long term. While it appears to have sufficient raw materials to supply the current level of production, its capacity for further expansion and development of more advanced weapons systems is questionable. This will require substantial modernization, restructuring and replacement of imports that are no longer accessible due to the Western sanctions regime. So far at least, Moscow hasn’t been able to achieve these goals.
This is in part an issue of financing. In its draft 2024 federal budget, Moscow plans to spend more on national defense than any other category – 10.7 trillion rubles ($112 billion), equivalent to 29.3 percent of the total budget and 6 percent of gross domestic product. But the boost will come at the expense of support for other key expenditures. Spending will be the lowest on the national economy since 2007 and on social policy since 2011. The Kremlin can divert funds from its economy and social spending for only so long. And considering the state of the Russian economy, it’s unlikely that organic economic growth will be able to support the substantial investments that are required to modernize and restructure a defense industry like Russia’s.
Russia's Military Expenditures, 2000-2022
(click to enlarge)
It’s also an issue of technology. Russia’s technological self-reliance remains limited, despite the fact that there has been a push within Russia for two decades to achieve self-sufficiency, including by using only domestic materials and components in defense production. The opening up of Russia’s economy following the Cold War led to increasing use of high-tech goods from other nations and, in turn, dependence on foreign technologies. Russian industry relies on imports for about 40 percent of inputs, and certain sectors, including the automotive industry and pharmaceuticals, are still highly dependent on foreign goods. The Kremlin doesn’t release official figures on the defense industry’s import dependency, but more than 800 types of Russian military equipment use U.S. and European parts. In addition, the severance of relations with Ukraine in 2014 was a serious blow to the industry, considering that until then some of Russia’s ship and plane engines, as well as other aviation equipment, were produced by Ukrainian firms.
Without access to Western technology, producing advanced, effective weapons will be exceedingly difficult. Officials have repeatedly stressed that Russia has arms but not enough modern weapons. So far, it has developed upgraded versions of the Ka-52M helicopter, BTR-82AM armored personnel carriers and T-80 and T-72 main battle tanks. It still has a couple of avenues through which it could access critical technology, including parallel imports and its few remaining foreign partners, including China, which a recent U.S. intelligence report accused of “probably” supplying Moscow with key dual-use technologies like drones and fighter jet parts.
Still, the share of high-tech and knowledge-intensive industries in Russia’s GDP has remained virtually unchanged over the past 10 years at around 20 percent. Spending on research and development has decreased to less than 1 percent of the budget. According to a report released by Russia’s Ministry of Education and Science, achieving technological sovereignty by 2030 would require a 45 percent increase in funding for R&D. The report also says a transition to innovation-oriented economic growth requires a doubling in innovation activity in industry and other areas, with a 50 percent increase in associated costs. By 2030, the number of innovative goods and services and patent applications should roughly double. In 2022, however, patent applications actually declined, though increased filings were seen in some high-tech areas, including aircraft (2.1 percent), iron production and processing (6.4 percent), and computer programs, databases and integrated circuit topologies (16.3 percent).
Russia's Research and Technology Spending, 2011-2022
(click to enlarge)
Russian Patent Applications, 2018-2022
(click to enlarge)
Another major hurdle for Russian innovation is personnel. Qualified workers are in short supply in the defense industry. According to the Ministry of Industry and Trade, in 2023, more than 16,000 highly qualified workers were needed for manufacturing of the most popular weapons and equipment.
Russia’s defense industry has made progress in ramping up production. In July, the country’s minister of industry and trade said more munitions were being delivered in one month than all of last year. But import substitution takes time, and the Kremlin wants to avoid investing in high-tech products that may not have sufficient demand to warrant the cost. Thus, it has implemented changes slowly, prioritizing development of a sustainable defense industry that will remain competitive after the Ukraine conflict is over. The question remains, however, whether it will be able to supply its defense needs outside of Ukraine and whether it can continue to innovate if the war continues to drain its financial and human resources.
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2023/09/lawmakers-army-headed-fight-over-special-operations-forces-cuts/390771/
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Lessons from Ukraine: U.S. Army using conflict in Europe to prepare soldiers for the next war
Chief concerns are drones, electronic surveillance, and artificial intelligence.
Sam Skove
BY SAM SKOVE
STAFF WRITER
SEPTEMBER 28, 2023 05:48 PM ET
ARMY
UKRAINE
RUSSIA
DRONES
In the foxholes of World War II, lighting a cigarette at night could mean death by a sniper’s bullet.
In the battlefield of the future, the equivalent may be a soldier's phone connecting to a cell tower.
“The thing we struggle the most with is this business of a transparent battlefield,” said Brig. Gen. Curtis Taylor, head of National Training Center, or NTC, in California. “We've all got to learn how to operate in that context.”
This lesson is among the many the NTC and its counterpart, the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), are learning from watching Ukraine and fielding their own experiments, the commanders of the two centers said.
One of the top problems is concealment, said Taylor and his counterpart at the JRTC, Brig. Gen. David Gardner. The NTC and JRTC both provide realistic training lasting around a month to troops about to deploy.
Drones, electronic surveillance, and satellites allow adversaries to easily identify U.S. formations, Taylor said—and combining that data with artillery or missiles means the enemy can strike anywhere, anytime.
At JRTC, forces playing the “opposing force,” called OPFOR, have learned to fly drones that use apps to scan for Bluetooth or WiFi signals, Gardner said.
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The OPFOR can then order satellite imagery to confirm if the signal comes from a military unit, or even just look at the network name for clues. If a signal is the only one for miles, the OPFOR can quickly deduce it’s the Army unit they’re meant to be targeting.
The NTC has mulled taking it a step further, Taylor said: using commercially available software that uses the apps on a user’s phone to identify their geographical position.
The OPFOR can also use the electromagnetic signature of military communication equipment to identify the Army formation and rain down simulated artillery strikes, Taylor and Gardner said.
Both the NTC and JRTC also make frequent use of commercial satellite photos as well as drones, including the small commercial drones seen throughout Ukraine. Between 30 and 50% of all artillery strikes at NTC are launched and observed via drone, said Taylor.
In turn, Army formations are learning to adjust, including by using their communications equipment as little as possible. “In the past, it was only scouts that would go into radio silence, ” Gardner said. “Now we're seeing that across entire formations.”
Formations are also adapting by changing up their communications—using parabolic antennas to direct radio waves, using fiber-optic cables, and trying to match the pattern of other signals traffic in the area so as to not stand out, Taylor said.
“Transmitting on high power with an antenna that transmits in 350 degrees—that’s equivalent to putting a light bulb on a stand and holding it up in the dark valley,” Taylor said.
Despite the adaptations, Gardner said the training centers need new equipment to keep up.
“Our communications are very specific, they're easily detected and therefore easily targeted. They're very complex to establish, to maintain,” Gardner said. “If you need a person for each of your ten systems, you now need ten people at your command post.”
Units are also learning to hide or run. Taylor encourages soldiers to use buildings to hide themselves from the eyes of drones. Gardner has pushed units to make their command posts as easy to set up and take down as possible.
“We're not going to dictate the size of a command post per se, but we're going to tell them, ‘You can be as big as you want, but you better be out of that area in 30 minutes,’” Gardner said. To be successful, units must cut down their list of tasks and learn to do without some creature comforts, he said.
“If task 27, is ‘set up your coffee pot,’ you might never get to the coffee pot,” thanks to the OPFOR simulated artillery strike, Gardner said.
In the deserts of Fort Irwin, California, where concealment can be hard to find, Taylor said they teach another critical lesson: look unimportant. If the enemy can’t tell if a vehicle is a supply truck or part of the command team, they’re less likely to strike it.
As news from Ukraine comes in, the Army is also stepping up the use of artillery and drones. At Taylor’s NTC, the OPFOR now calls in roughly 100 artillery attacks a day, amounting to simulations of several thousands rounds being fired. The NTC uses computer simulations to model the strikes and their impact.
Both the NTC and JRTC also use commercial drones that operate in swarms. Some can even drop bombs, much like those used on both sides of the Ukraine war. Loitering munitions, or suicide drones that act like cruise missiles, are out of bounds though, Taylor said, because using them would pose a safety risk.
Amid the heavy focus on drones, the centers are even working on new ways the Army might use them. At JRTC, one unit used drones to fake an assault from one direction, before coming from another.
At NTC, Taylor has formed a whole OPFOR drone unit, which operates everything from larger, winged drones, to smaller quadcopters. The unit is unusual. The Army typically spreads out its smaller drones among units, and does not provide as much training to quadcopter operators compared to the training it gives to operators of winged drones.
Taylor said he took the step to bring a greater level of professionalism to the quadcopter operators. Russia and Ukraine similarly operate dedicated drone units.
The increased use of artillery, rockets, and surveillance at the training centers has meant higher simulated casualties, mirroring the losses faced by troops in Ukraine.
For Taylor, that means artillery now accounts for around 40 percent of casualties. Gardner, meanwhile, is looking at how to evacuate soldiers from a battlefield where evacuation routes can be cut off easily, and considering how long a unit can keep fighting after taking casualties.
“Do we really understand how many casualties makes a unit combat ineffective?” said Gardner.
He’s also considering a grim consequence of higher casualties—how to integrate new units that are replacing those decimated in combat. Right now, a platoon that suffers simulated casualties will simply return to their same company. In the future, it may return to a different company, learning how to operate under new commanders just like real replacements would.
The lessons are not only for combat soldiers, Gardner and Taylor said, but also for those who work in public affairs and psychological operations, with one eye on how Russia and Ukraine have advanced their causes through the media.
In one recent exercise, Taylor’s OPFOR troops used AI-language model ChatGPT to create enemy speakers on the artificial social media site the training ground uses. The AI enemy defense minister got into a tweet-war with the Army unit.
Gardner, meanwhile, recounted how his OPFOR unit withdrew from a town, simulated shelling it, and then spread disinformation saying the shelling was done by American troops. The Army unit public affairs officer quickly countered the claim by making public the artillery radar data that showed incoming rounds were not fired from the U.S. side.
But reflecting on the many problems Ukraine’s army has faced in trying to breach Russian defensive lines, both commanders emphasized how much combat still boils down to coordination and training.
“The things that Ukrainians are doing are very, very hard,” Taylor said. “It requires generations of practice. And so, if anything, it reaffirmed our commitment to the combined arms maneuver,” he said, referring to coordinating between different combat branches.
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https://thedailybs.com/2023/10/05/pentagon-plans-to-slash-thousands-of-troops-from-army-special-ops-amid-recruiting-woes-china-threat-report/?utm_campaign=james&utm_content=10%2F6%2F23%20SOE%20AM&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_source=Get%20response&utm_term=email
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amazing technology
how they can zero in on single buildings
and do their best NOT to hit mosques hospitals schools
I wonder if they have robots that can scour the tunnels
this one too big for tunnels
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-unveils-armed-robotic-vehicle-for-forward-reconnaissance-missions/
these could fit:
https://www.bing.com/images/search?view=detailV2&ccid=W0JdIpzW&id=3449E751C16D8E1FC759CFA4B416975E48DAC797&thid=OIP.W0JdIpzWwXjkg6wt-qGPTwHaE8&mediaurl=https%3A%2F%2Fth.bing.com%2Fth%2Fid%2FR.5b425d229cd6c178e483ac2dfaa18f4f%3Frik%3Dl8faSF6XFrSkzw%26riu%3Dhttp%253a%252f%252fwww.technocrazed.com%252fwp-content%252fuploads%252f2014%252f08%252fMicro-Tactical-Ground-Robots-Of-Israeli-Army-Explore-Tunnels-In-Gaza-14.jpg%26ehk%3DGoM8B4kPL2b41%252bejBS3x5uRmk7N6MrRNt4GXic%252bGLHA%253d%26risl%3D%26pid%3DImgRaw%26r%3D0%26sres%3D1%26sresct%3D1&exph=407&expw=610&q=israel+military+robots&simid=608011634196567309&form=IRPRST&ck=C175D1A1D324EC2409D07E2C4406FB92&selectedindex=25&ajaxhist=0&ajaxserp=0&vt=0&sim=11
Israeli tunnel warefare capability:
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/underground-nightmare-hamas-tunnels-and-the-wicked-problem-facing-the-idf/
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Israel-Hamas War Revives Interest in U.S. Production of Iron Dome Missiles
U.S. invested in homegrown system better suited for potential conflict in Pacific than in Middle East
By
Doug Cameron
Follow
Updated Oct. 23, 2023 12:03 am ET
The Iron Dome defense system has blocked thousands of missiles since 2011. Here’s how it works. Menahem Kahana/AFP/Getty Images
Israel’s war with Hamas has revived dormant U.S. interest in producing munitions for Israel’s Iron Dome missile defense system, U.S. Army and industry officials said, a development that would help a U.S. regional ally resupply for future conflicts.
Any U.S. manufacturer of Tamir interceptors would take months to get moving. But with Hamas and Hezbollah firing hundreds of rockets at Israeli military sites and cities every day, Israel’s stockpile of interceptor missiles is dwindling.
The new interest in production of Tamir interceptor missiles for the Iron Dome system comes two years after the Army passed over the Israeli hardware in favor of a U.S.-made system it deemed better suited for conflict in the Pacific.
Israel’s Iron Dome missile-defense system is one of the most battle-tested in the world, successfully destroying thousands of shells and rockets since its 2011 deployment and preventing mass civilian casualties.
Lights show Israel’s Iron Dome system launched to intercept missiles from Gaza. PHOTO: MOHAMMED SABER/SHUTTERSTOCK
“Iron Dome has proven itself over the years,” said Tom Karako, a missile defense researcher at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “It’s no slight that it can’t contend with an overwhelming number of threats.”
To help out, the U.S. Army is now sending back to Israel two Iron Dome units it acquired three years ago, alongside more than 200 Tamir missiles the U.S. had stored in its arsenal. The two units had been deployed after being tested in Guam.
The mobile Iron Dome is Israel’s last layer of air defense and can intercept targets up to 40 miles away. Each of the 10 batteries covers an area of about 60 square miles, and includes a radar and control system to identify incoming threats and fire only on those expected to reach populated or vulnerable areas, limiting how many missiles are required.
‘Affordable mass’
The Tamirs use a home-produced rocket motor that hasn’t suffered the level of supply-chain disruption that limited production of Javelins and the advanced guided missiles the U.S. has sent to Ukraine.
“They have a very capable military and they have their own stockpiles,” Army acquisition chief Doug Bush said earlier this month of Israel.
Meanwhile, militaries around the world, including the Pentagon and Israel, are moving to secure additional production of munitions. The vast consumption of artillery shells and guided missiles in Ukraine and of Tamir interceptors in Israel recently has honed defense officials’ focus on building “affordable mass”—a reliable arsenal of heavily used munitions.
How Israel’s Iron Dome works
1
4
Interception
Radar
The missile destroys the incoming rocket by exploding near it.
Identifies rocket shell.
Mobile control unit
2
Analyzes trajectory, estimates impact point and commands launch of interceptor missile.
Launcher
Each has 20 interceptor missiles
with a built-in radar seeker.
3
Source: Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
In 2020, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and RTX Corp. announced plans to build a factory in the U.S. to assemble Tamirs.
But the following year, the Army passed over Iron Dome in favor of the Enduring Shield system made by U.S.-based Leidos, following a shoot-off in the New Mexico desert. Rafael and RTX’s new Tamir factory didn’t materialize.
The Pentagon’s push for more-sophisticated weapons and equipment to deter the perceived threat from China led the Army to favor the new U.S.-developed system seen as better able to tackle faster-moving cruise missiles over the bigger distances of the Pacific.
The Army called Iron Dome an interim solution and didn’t buy more than two, opting for the different capabilities of Enduring Shield, even though it has yet to be fielded.
“These are some of the growing pains of neglecting air defense for way too long,” said Karako.
Rafael and RTX declined to comment on Tamir production rates or on any new U.S. facility.
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The Pentagon already funds much of Israel’s Iron Dome production and expenses under an existing agreement between the countries, which lawmakers have said was another catalyst for U.S. production.
RTX already makes around 70% of the Tamir, according to the companies, and has been investing heavily in expanding its missile facilities around Tucson, Ariz., which analysts said was one possible site for a Tamir line.
The Iron Dome defense system is known for reducing the number of civilian casualties of warfare. PHOTO: ILAN ASSAYAG/JINI/ZUMA PRESS
The Marine Corps is also looking to acquire some Iron Dome systems as well as around 1,800 Tamir missiles, according to budget documents.
Enduring Shield can be adapted to use other interceptors, including a version of the Tamir called SkyHunter.
Write to Doug Cameron at Doug.Cameron@wsj.com
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At a loss on where to post this, but it argues Russia, China, and Iran are colluding at the moment, a test of US defenses against incoming hypersonic and other missiles looms, and that clueless NeoCons have opened up too many conflict fronts, inspiring these disparate elements to coalesce:
https://johnhelmer.org/the-existential-trap-the-pentagon-has-just-fallen-into-it-as-biden-tries-to-avoid-carters-hostage-rescue-disaster/#more-71116
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BBG: The Geopolitics thread is the place for it.
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https://taskandpurpose.com/news/millenium-challenge-2002-stacked-deck/
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Both Parties Can Agree on America’s Nuclear Peril
To deter threats from China and Russia, the U.S. needs to modernize and recapitalize its arsenal.
By John Bolton
Oct. 25, 2023 12:52 pm ET
‘Unanimous” and “bipartisan” outcomes are rare in today’s Washington. “America’s Strategic Posture,” the recent report from the congressional commission on U.S. nuclear capabilities and defense strategies, merits those laurels. Led by Madelyn Creedon, a senior Clinton and Obama administration official, and former Sen. Jon Kyl, a Republican, the commissioners prepared a 145-page report that warrants urgent review by anyone seeking a safe future for America.
The bottom line is that the U.S. faces “two nuclear peer adversaries for the first time” in a rapidly expanding threat environment. Maintaining and improving our nuclear-deterrence force against China and Russia will require significant effort. Since the nuclear era began, Washington’s thinking, strategizing and budgeting have assumed only one significant nuclear threat. Rogue-state capabilities weren’t insignificant, and nuclear-capable allies were a plus, but the bipolar standoff with Moscow always mattered most. With China now forming a tripolar nuclear world, bipolar deterrence calculations, strategy and nuclear hardware are simply inapposite.
Days after the paper’s release, the Pentagon published its own finding that a tripolar nuclear scenario effectively exists, well ahead of our predictions. This reality raises questions that demand strategic responses. Will the U.S. face entirely separate Chinese and Russian threats, or will Moscow and Beijing act in coordination? What do two peer nuclear foes mean for U.S. pre-emptive or second-strike capabilities? How many new targets in China—or elsewhere—must we now put at risk?
Precise estimates of force requirements and budget levels are currently impracticable, although significant growth in nuclear weapons and delivery systems is inevitable. Our capabilities and the entire nuclear-enterprise infrastructure needs modernization, upgrading and recapitalization to meet the Sino-Russian threat. In Oct. 19 Senate testimony, Mr. Kyl estimated total new costs for such a project to be 5% of the Pentagon and Energy Department budgets, in large part because of political leaders’ sustained failure to modernize nuclear capabilities.
“America’s Strategic Posture” reaffirms the logic of maintaining the nuclear triad of delivery systems: ground-based missiles, long-range bombers and ballistic-missile submarines. The triad undergirds deterrence by “presenting an intractable targeting problem for adversaries.”
Nuclear-force resilience is more crucial when facing threats from two adversaries, not one. To help fashion the structure and size of the future nuclear force, the report identifies strategic principles from which to derive military requirements. That includes maintaining an assured second-strike capability and directing nuclear strategy at what Moscow and Beijing prize most: their leaders and the security institutions keeping them in power. The commission emphasizes that America “should continue the practice and policy of not directly targeting civilian populations.”
Naive isolationist elements in both parties will argue that the U.S. can address the new nuclear environment through arms-control agreements. That is a distant dream. Further strategic-arms treaties are essentially irrelevant and dangerous unless and until the U.S. has “a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment” and its “related force requirements are established,” the commission says. Without knowing what we need, we can hardly start negotiating it away.
While the U.S. modernizes, upgrades and enlarges its capabilities, the commission encourages interim improvements, such as potentially and swiftly reconverting B-52s rendered incapable of carrying nuclear weapons under the New Start Treaty, to sustain the deterrent force during this vulnerable transition. We must hedge against delays due to unpredictable, incrementally funded appropriations, particularly the common—and harmful—practice of using continuing resolutions.
America’s aging nuclear weapons and inadequate life-extension programs cast doubt on the stockpile’s reliability and safety. To be credible, a deterrent must satisfy the “always/never rule”: “Nuclear weapons must always work when they are supposed to, and never detonate when they are not supposed to.” At some point within a few years, the U.S. will need to conduct underground nuclear tests. Even highly sophisticated simulations aren’t enough.
Finally, the commissioners emphasize nonnuclear capabilities, particularly “integrated air-and-missile defense systems” for homeland and theater-focused protection. The report may at last end the debate on “deterrence by denial,” the core purpose of strategic and tactical missile defenses. The commission recommends national missile-defense systems “that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China,” Ronald Reagan’s seminal vision.
“America’s Strategic Posture” covers many other issues, but mark these words: unanimous and bipartisan. This isn’t congressional performance art; it’s a fire bell in the night.
Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.
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the only gun taken for the Lewis and Clark expedition.
would pump up to 800 lbs of pressure, and could load 22 balls.
was used by Austrian army.
very revolutionary for late 18th through early 19th century:
https://www.bing.com/videos/riverview/relatedvideo?q=Girandoni%20air%20rifle%20youtbue&mid=DB491C06B0B038F434C1DB491C06B0B038F434C1&ajaxhist=0
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https://twitchy.com/brettt/2023/11/11/air-force-giving-instructions-on-adding-pronouns-to-your-signature-n2389683
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With WW3 in the air and enlistment numbers for the Army falling far short, several hundred NCOs have received PCS (Permanent Change of Station) orders to get trained in becoming enlisters and taking up new stations upon completion of training.
I saw this morning an enlistment meme that led with "Covid Vax not required".
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https://www.oann.com/newsroom/data-only-43-of-over-8000-discharged-from-u-s-military-for-refusing-covid-19-vaccine-re-enlisted/
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Is Israel’s war with Hamas a war crime? At a recent (entirely civil and non-confrontational) event at Bard College, a student suggested that this was the case. After all, there have been at least 11,000 casualties since the Oct. 7 terror attack that launched the war, and the majority dead have been civilians. Thousands were children. How, the Bard students and many of their peers around the country and the world ask, could all this not be a war crime? And even if Hamas’s initial attack was itself a war crime and not a “legitimate act of resistance against an occupying power,” isn’t the larger loss of civilian life in Israel’s subsequent attacks just as bad?
I could have turned the session into a debate about the underlying merits of the Palestinian and Israeli causes or a technical discussion of the laws of war. Instead, being a professor, I turned the discussion to the history of war. One night in March 1945, U.S. planes dropped incendiary bombs over Tokyo killing tens of thousands of Japanese civilians. Incomplete estimates from Japan put the total death toll from allied bombing raids as high as 500,000. All told, there were an estimated 38 million civilian deaths in World War II, more than twice the approximately 15 million deaths of soldiers in combat.
As for the treatment of enemy civilians, at the 1945 Potsdam Conference the U.S. agreed to the forcible removal of about 12 million Germans, again largely civilian and many children and elderly, from lands their ancestors had inhabited for centuries. Many of the expulsions took place in winter amid terrible scenes of hunger and deprivation, all while mass rapes of German women slowly subsided across the Soviet zone of Germany.
Lawyers and legislators can debate whether these actions constitute war crimes, but as Cicero put it more than two thousand years ago, “inter arma enim silent leges.” Roughly, that translates as the “laws go silent when armies clash.” Or as William Tecumseh Sherman put it more succinctly, “War is hell.”
One reason the news from Gaza has so massively affected the younger generation is that they have grown up considering peace to be normal and natural. The war in Gaza hasn’t merely introduced young Americans to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also has shown them the face of war.
After the horrors of World War II, Americans did everything to build a stable and at least relatively peaceful world order. This order was far from perfect. It tolerated and, in some cases, protected gross economic, social, racial and national injustices. And some of the little wars Americans fought to defend it, as policy makers at the time believed, were as brutal as the world wars of the 20th century.
But the world order prevented the eruption of global conflicts on the scale of the great wars with casualties reckoned by the tens of millions. It also permitted generations of Americans to grow up in a bubble. For younger generations, war was passé. Foreign policy henceforth would involve promoting equitable development in poor countries, extending the definition of human rights, promoting global public health, fighting climate change and perfecting the body of international law.
War has other ideas. The American-led world order is under attack abroad, even as Americans have increasingly abandoned their commitment to preserving it. The result, inevitably, is a gradual and perhaps sudden return to the lawlessness and violence that marks a world at war.
Israelis and Palestinians don’t live in the post-historical bubble. More than 300,000 Syrian civilians are believed to have been killed during a decade of civil war, and millions more have been driven from their homes. Elsewhere, an estimated 100,000 Armenians fled their homes in terror this year. Roughly six million Sudanese have done so in the current civil war. Industrial-scale slaughters of the innocent, and the flight of millions of refugees are the new normal in their neighborhood. Jihadi bands and Wagner mercenaries are sowing chaos and death across the Sahel. About 370,000 have died in the Yemen war.
Gaza introduced Gen Z to the true horror of war. In the short run, Hamas’s propaganda machine is enlisting images of suffering Palestinians to foil Israeli efforts to break its power in Gaza.
The real question, though, for the future of America and the world isn’t whether hot-headed college students will march for Hamas. It’s whether as they mature, they come to understand how fragile and important peace is and take up the task of defending it. If not, war won’t be something they see on cellphones and spout slogans about. It will be the force that shapes and determines their lives.
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"After 1,600 auditors combed through DOD’s $3.5 trillion in assets and $3.7 trillion in liabilities, officials found that the department couldn’t account for about 61 percent of its assets, Pentagon Comptroller Mike McCord told reporters on Tuesday."
:-o
https://americanmilitarynews.com/2023/11/pentagon-fails-6th-straight-audit-of-trillions/
how often did we hear about cutting waste and fraud in government when a candidate runs to save money?
:cry:
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https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=7acc226117746df4e552f734fabde0ad_6564afca_6d25b5f&selDate=20231127
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This thread shows the dilapidated state of US military ammunition manufacturing (unless its a fake)
https://twitter.com/ArmchairW/status/1730482490920620503
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https://www.theguardian.com/business/2023/dec/04/sellafield-nuclear-site-hacked-groups-russia-china
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https://www.newsweek.com/us-military-went-woke-time-make-some-changes-top-opinion-1849290?utm_campaign=Claremont%20Institute%20News%20Emails&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=285537287&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_tz43mdx1tLS4LFg1lXfrhZz8rVOvPlImQILuNtczO1pH0mAuDkOAAEEQ9QMrCDrzh9fBp27bTs1uO7rMhOQD1Vhsxyg&utm_content=285537287&utm_source=hs_email
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https://www.newsweek.com/us-military-went-woke-time-make-some-changes-top-opinion-1849290?utm_campaign=Claremont%20Institute%20News%20Emails&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=285537287&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_tz43mdx1tLS4LFg1lXfrhZz8rVOvPlImQILuNtczO1pH0mAuDkOAAEEQ9QMrCDrzh9fBp27bTs1uO7rMhOQD1Vhsxyg&utm_content=285537287&utm_source=hs_email
Can't happen soon enough. Indeed, those that would risk the nation's security by inserting woke torch bearers into positions hard charging strategists and empiricists are needed in should be held to account when to all too predictable results do occur.
Alas, I expect they see their clown show as a win/win: in times of putative peace the military is cast as an institutional engine of "Progressive" propaganda inculcation and societal change while, should a war break out, the inevitable defeats arising when a leadership caste selected for its adherence to rote asshattery rather than its ability to effectively employ force to protect US citizens and interests can be lauded as comeuppance imperialist pigs richly deserve. What's not to like about that arrangement?
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https://www.americanthinker.com/articles/2023/12/inside_the_woke_air_force.html?fbclid=IwAR2s1WnSNV5_Y6m-VNL_vfKdZ43IX7vmGiSMLOyf-qKcep6IwG-5P0cKM50
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https://truebattle.org/global-conflicts/how-drones-are-changing-war/
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The vulnerability of our undersea cables
China’s Newnew Polar Bear reveals the problem
By David Keene
Within hours of the outbreak of World War I in August 1914, the British navy cut five German undersea cables, making it impossible for Berlin to communicate with its embassies or others outside Europe. This meant that most news from Belgium, France and the Eastern Front with Russia reached the outside world through Britain.
Military historians call this a brilliant stroke. The British took advantage of Germany’s crippled communications to persuade the United States to accept their narrative as they lobbied the reluctant Americans to join them in their effort to defeat Germany.
Today, the vast array of cables running not just between Europe and North America but linking every country on every continent in ways undreamed of at the time of the Great War are just as vulnerable as the cables the British navy targeted more than a century ago.
There are today more than three-quarters of a million miles of public and private cables crisscrossing the world’s oceans and carrying, among other things, most of the world’s internet traffi c. They are largely unprotected. Although the complexity of today’s cables would make it more difficult to catastrophically interrupt communications, defense experts believe it could be done.
Finland joined NATO last spring in the
aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine amid threats from the Kremlin. Then, in early October, a gas pipeline supplying natural gas that runs under the Baltic Sea was damaged, disrupting gas flow to the country. As Finnish authorities began an investigation to determine what caused the damage, suspicion naturally focused on the Kremlin, which predictably denied any involvement.
After determining that the damage was caused externally and may well have been deliberate, the Finns located a 6-ton anchor not far from the pipeline where it had been damaged along with three undersea cables providing internet and communications services to nearby Estonia. They raised the anchor and determined that it was Chinese rather than Russian.
A Chinese container ship, the Newnew Polar Bear, had dragged the anchor across the seabed and lost it when it snagged the pipeline and cables. It was photographed missing its front anchor when it docked later at Vladivostok, Russia.
Numerous attempts to communicate with the vessel or its owners failed, and it is reportedly back in China. NATO leaders claim that if it was a deliberate attack on the pipeline and cable, there would have to be a response, but since no one really wants a confrontation with Beijing, everyone is saying that it might have been an accident.
That’s not likely. Evidence suggests for it to have been an accident, the vessel would have had to have dragged the 6-ton anchor along the seabed for more than 112 miles until it snagged the cables and pipeline. An accident would require that no one on board noticed. That seems virtually impossible given the warning systems on vessels such as the Newnew Polar Bear and the effect dragging the anchor had to have had on the vessel’s performance.
When I asked if the damage could have been accidental, a former U.S. merchant mariner and ship’s captain responded, “The negligence (or stupidity) required to achieve such an accomplishment is incomprehensible to any professional marine.”
He said that modern vessels like the Newnew Polar Bear are constructed with three or four redundant warning systems that would have to be overcome to allow the anchor to be dragged as it was.
In addition, he said doing so would seriously affect the handling of the vessel and would have been noticed quickly even if all the warning systems had failed simultaneously. It had to have been intentional. He concluded that the Chinese must have been doing Moscow’s dirty work so that Russian President Vladimir Putin could profess his innocence.
It’s going to take four to five months to repair the pipeline and cables, but the real meaning of what happened is chilling and goes well beyond the inconvenience of this one incident.
As Jack Sharpies of the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies told CNN, what happened was probably “less about disrupting European gas supply and more about raising bigger questions about the safety and security of offshore infrastructure, not just gas pipelines.”
If that is the case, the world is being put on notice that the sinews of the modern world are as vulnerable to bad actors today as the old cables connecting North America and Europe were in 1914.
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OPINION
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Follow
Amid Two Wars, Is Washington Awake?
A bipartisan defense bill has some victories but remains inadequate to meet rising threats.
By The Editorial Board
Dec. 12, 2023 6:37 pm ET
Congress is whipping through bills before skipping town for Christmas, and on the docket this week is the annual defense policy measure. President Biden is presiding over the managed decline of U.S. military power, and some Republicans seem to care more about firing salvos in the culture wars than deterring real wars.
The bill authorizes about $886 billion for defense in 2024, and the broad funding outlines were fixed in former Speaker Kevin McCarthy’s debt ceiling deal with Mr. Biden this year. Republicans in Congress have improved the product at the margins, adding funding for an amphibious ship for the Marines and blocking the Navy from decommissioning several ships. The Air Force won’t be allowed to retire perfectly good F-22s.
A rare and useful consensus in Congress has also emerged on deterring China from seizing Taiwan. New authorities for multiyear contracts for munitions such as torpedoes and Tomahawk cruise missiles would help the Pentagon move faster and offer more investment certainty to weapons manufacturers.
The U.S. will also work more closely with Taiwan on training and cyber. One disappointment: House-Senate negotiators appear to have watered down provisions aimed at forcing the Pentagon to move faster in delivering Harpoon antiship missiles to the island.
The plan to sell Australia nuclear-powered submarines, a check on China, also moves forward in the bill. But on the current output of 1.2 attack submarines a year, there won’t be any hulls to sell Down Under. The hope is that Congress will approve $3.4 billion more for submarine production in a supplemental bill for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan.
There are other discrete victories, particularly restoring a sea-launched nuclear cruise missile the Biden Administration tried to scuttle. That weapon is important to deterring Russia’s Vladimir Putin from exploiting his large numerical advantage in tactical nuclear weapons.
Despite this modest progress, the larger story is that the U.S. will still spend only about 3% of its economy on defense, a modern low during the most dangerous period since World War II. What’s bizarre is how little attention this defense deficit commands, even amid two wars on two continents started by U.S. adversaries against our allies.
Some Republicans are opposing the bill over cultural issues. They’re upset that the final product doesn’t include a House provision that blocked the Pentagon’s policy underwriting expenses and time off for troops traveling for abortions.
This Biden policy diktat is legally and politically offensive, as it violates the long bipartisan consensus that taxpayers shouldn’t pay for abortions. But Alabama Sen. Tommy Tuberville spent months trying and failing to force the Pentagon to drop the abortion travel rules. Republicans can’t run the table with a single-digit majority in one-half of one branch of government. Yet some conservative groups are whipping Republicans against the defense bill, even as Republicans claim to be the party of a strong national defense.
The demands for total victory are obscuring cultural wins for Republicans. The bill caps pay for Defense Department diversity, equity and inclusion officials at about $70,000 a year. These perches will almost certainly lose power and influence as a result.
The bill is expected to pass, but voters might note: Mr. Biden isn’t fighting for the U.S. hard power needed to deter threats from China to Russia to Iran. A few dozen lawmakers in Congress understand the dangerous moment and are working to shore up American defenses with what money they have.
Yet much of Washington, including the Commander in Chief, still hasn’t reckoned with the urgent U.S. need to rebuild its military power. This means more security trouble ahead.
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https://www.pgpf.org/budget-basics/budget-explainer-national-defense
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DeSantis has been very strong on this:
U.S. Naval Deterrence Is Going, Going, Maybe Even Gone
A new report expounds on the clear lesson of recent Houthi attacks: America isn’t very scary anymore.
By Jerry Hendrix
Dec. 19, 2023 6:29 pm ET
Recently the news broke that the U.S. Navy destroyer USS Carney had fended off several missile and drone attacks in the Red Sea. While Biden administration officials tried to frame the battle, for a battle it surely was, as the Carney’s defending nearby merchant ships, it seems clear that Iranian-supplied Houthis were targeting the Carney directly as well as the commercial ships it was accompanying.
This was only one of several recent assaults on American naval assets in the region. They have happened despite the presence of the Ford carrier strike group in the eastern Mediterranean and the Eisenhower strike group in the Gulf of Aden—a conventional level of naval deterrence that should have reduced aggressive activities by U.S. enemies. Instead, Iran attacked American ships and allies.
These events show that American naval deterrence is failing, and a recent report from the Sagamore Institute concludes that it could soon evaporate.
The report, “Measuring and Modeling Naval Presence,” models the effect of various ships and combinations of ships across a mix of maritime regions. The model pitted an Arleigh Burke-class destroyer, the U.S. Navy’s current utility platform of choice, against a People’s Liberation Army Navy Luyang III destroyer in several locations ranging from the high seas to the waters approaching the Taiwan Strait. It suggested that the deterrent value of American Navy ships operating in close proximity to a determined adversary has recently declined.
While the report said the American Navy currently maintains “presence dominance,” the ability to maintain its values and interests upon the high seas, it also indicates that the U.S. margin of naval leadership is shrinking and America could swiftly lose its ability to maintain mare liberum, the free sea. This would have huge negative implications for the global economic system, which depends on open seas to move 80% of the volume of the world’s $100 trillion global domestic product.
The causes of this sudden decline lie not in the physical characteristics of individual American warships. The Burke-class destroyers, which include the USS Carney, remain the best destroyers currently in active service worldwide. But the shrinking American fleet—down from a Reagan administration high of 594 ships in 1987 to 291 ships today—and the rapid expansion of the Chinese navy—composed of 340 warships today and expected to rise to 400 ships by 2025—has placed the value of American presence in question.
Noncorporeal factors keep the U.S. fleet competitive in conventional deterrence—namely the global perception that Americans are willing to defend their interests and that their military is manned, equipped and trained to go to war at a minute’s notice. Peace through strength requires more than numbers. But the Biden administration’s numerous foreign-policy setbacks in Afghanistan, Ukraine and the Middle East have undercut Americans’ will to fight and displayed a weakness of leadership and strategy to the country’s enemies. It is also becoming obvious that Washington hasn’t maintained its existing battle force. Even replacement weapons for ship’s magazines are in short supply. The world can see this, which might explain Iran’s boldness in the face of U.S. naval patrols.
America’s failure to expand and maintain its fleet, or stand by its word, may have already entirely eroded U.S. naval deterrence. The Navy’s budget, size and force architecture all need urgent attention from Congress if the U.S. is to preserve its ability to deter its enemies. Failure to do so imperils global trade as well as America’s place in the world and the safety of its people.
Mr. Hendrix, a retired U.S. Navy captain, is a senior fellow at the Sagamore Institute.
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https://patriotpost.us/articles/98555?mailing_id=8031&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.8031&utm_campaign=all_subscribers&utm_content=body
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https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-changing-face-of-war-future-of?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-107/Article/Article/3197193/countering-swarms-strategic-considerations-and-opportunities-in-drone-warfare/
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loved this image:
https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/the-changing-face-of-war-future-of?utm_source=substack&utm_medium=email
it is like talking to libs
they don't hear anything we say.
even with making them use this.
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The Army is trying to narrow a recruiting gap by reviving its “Be All You Can Be” campaign and employing a Future Soldier Preparatory Course to ensure its soldiers are fit. ASSOCIATED PRESS
PENTAGON
New, time-tested strategies give military hope on recruitment
Waning talent, enthusiasm pose 2024 challenges
BY MIKE GLENN THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Attracting a few good men — and women — won’t cut it for the nation’s armed services.
The Pentagon is scrambling to fill a growing chasm in the recruitment ranks that will result in the smallest U.S. military since before World War II.
The situation was dire in 2023, and senior military officials say they are “cautiously optimistic” at best about 2024.
“I’m going to say we’re optimistic,” said Air Force Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, Pentagon spokesman. “But, you know, we know that this continues to be a challenge for a multitude of reasons.”
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin “has said we didn’t get into this problem overnight and it’s not going to be solved overnight,” Gen. Ryder said. It put more of an onus on the military branches to be “very active and creative in looking at how we can communicate with the public that we serve.”
The Defense Department said only the Marine Corps and the Space Force — by far the smallest of the U.S. military services — met their recruiting goals in the past fiscal year. Surveys find that just 23% of Americans ages 17 to 24 even qualify to join the military. The majority have weight issues, past drug use, or mental or physical health problems. Few have expressed a genuine enthusiasm to serve.
Under the 2024 National
Defense Authorization Act that President Biden signed on Dec. 21, the number of active-duty military troops will shrink to just over 1.2 million. It’s anyone’s guess whether the Defense Department will find enough military recruits next year to fill even those more modest targets.
“There is strong bipartisan concern that the military services continue to struggle to meet their recruiting goals,” Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Massachusetts Democrat, told senior recruiting chiefs from the various military branches at a Dec. 6 hearing of the Senate Armed Services personnel subcommittee.
It’s certainly not a matter of money. The 2024 NDAA authorizes some $886.3 billion for national defense, an increase of $28 billion over 2023 levels.
Even with plenty of money and “bipartisan concern” from lawmakers on Capitol Hill, the Army, Navy and Air Force failed to accomplish their recruiting missions in the fiscal year that ended in September. One big challenge is hitting the target numbers without diluting the qualification standards to wear the uniform.
“I’m mindful of how challenging an environment this is and want to publicly give credit to our professional recruiters and all our Marines who uphold our rigorous stands 24/7,” Gen. Eric M. Smith, the Marine Corps commandant, said on social media after the numbers were released.
Even so, the services have stepped up some tried-and-true methods for attracting recruits, including the Navy’s financial incentive package worth a recordhigh $140,000. Policies on tattoos and facial hair have been relaxed for some services, and the Army resurrected its “Be All You Can Be” marketing campaign from 40 years ago, hoping to reach a Generation Z demographic.
The Pentagon told the House Armed Services Committee in December that the services fell more than 40,000 recruits short of their annual goal. It was the largest gap since the end of the draft more than 50 years ago.
The thinning goes beyond active-duty ranks. The Air Force Reserve attracted just 5,288 of the 7,765 newly enlisted airmen it needed, Military.com reported , some 30% below the goal.
A relatively strong economy and low unemployment figures mean young adults have more options to consider, Ashish Vazirani, the Defense Department’s acting undersecretary for personnel and readiness, told House lawmakers.
“And the impact of the [COVID19] pandemic on our recruiting model — which relies heavily on in-person recruiter access to high schools — and communication engagement was significant,” Mr. Vazirani said.
He pointed out that more than 75% of American youths do not qualify for military service without some form of waiver. More than 1 in 10 don’t make the grade because they are overweight.
“While these factors explain part of our deficit in recruiting, they do not explain all of it,” Mr. Vazirani said. “We believe that our recruiting challenge is more profound, more structural and longer-term than any of us would like.”
The American public generally holds the armed forces in high esteem compared with other major institutions. Still, the admiration is wavering, partly because of the chaotic ending to the failed war in Afghanistan, increased polarization of the public and concerns about heightened politicization in the military, according to a recent study by the Rand Corp. think tank.
More than 50% of Americans say they would discourage a young person close to them from enlisting in the military, but more than 60% said they would support a young person’s decision to become an officer by attending a service academy or signing up for ROTC in college, the Rand researchers found.
Some Republican lawmakers blamed the Pentagon’s anemic recruiting numbers on what they say is the Biden administration’s politicization of the Pentagon, in particular, a misplaced focus on divisive identity politics within the ranks.
“The Department of Defense must put at least as much effort into solving the recruiting crisis as it has into other initiatives like extremism, diversity, equity, inclusion, and abortion,” said Sen. Roger Wicker of Mississippi, the top Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee. “At worst, they dissuade young people from enlisting. They suggest to the American people that the military has a problem with diversity and extremism.”
Service members and military veterans on the Reddit news and discussion site said reasons for low recruitment include poor living conditions in the barracks and toxic unit-level leadership.
“The military can’t hide behind its censorship anymore. Sweeping the bad stuff under the rug and reeling in unsuspecting 17- and 18-year-olds isn’t as feasible now as it was before social media and the internet,” a Reddit poster said.
Another commentator said unskilled laborers in the private sector are offered higher wages and better benefits packages than those in the military. “There’s a huge shortage of guys in the trades right now, and companies are shelling out to get workers,” he said. “It’s better than getting yelled at in the middle of Oklahoma.”
Maj. Gen. Johnny K. Davis, head of Army Recruiting Command, said the recruiting crisis didn’t appear overnight and won’t be resolved quickly.
“We will not lower standards. We will not sacrifice quality for the sake of quantity,” Gen. Davis said.
Some Army recruiting initiatives are showing promise, Gen. Davis said. That includes the Future Soldier Preparatory Course, which helps potential recruits meet the physical fitness and academic standards required to begin basic training. He said 14,000 people have graduated from the course and 95% have gone on to finish boot camp and become soldiers.
“We’re seeing momentum, and we’ll continue to build upon it,” Gen. Davis said.
The military isn’t the only institution at cross purposes with young Americans. Undergraduate college enrollment declined by 15% from 2010 to 2021, mostly before COVID-19, and national service programs such as the Peace Corps have not recovered to pre-pandemic staffing levels, Mr. Vazirani said.
“While the military is not alone in navigating these difficult trends, we have some unique considerations,” he said. “In 1995, 40% of U.S. youth ages 16 to 24 had a parent who served in the military. But by 2022, only 12% had a parent who served, and that has led to a disconnect between the military and a large share of society.”
Rear Adm. Alexis T. Walker, the Navy’s top recruiter, expects another challenging environment in 2024. The Navy is placing more recruiters in the field and has borrowed an idea from the Army by instituting a Future Sailor Preparatory Course at its Recruit Training Command near Chicago.
The Navy is also launching a marketing campaign to target adult influencers in the lives of young people.
“Today, our advertising remains near 100% digital, resulting in a 30% increase in national leads in taking the message to where our future sailors are operating, which is online,” Adm. Walker said.
Gen. Ryder, the Defense Department spokesman, said recruiters can conduct face-to-face negotiations with their target audience now that COVID-19 restrictions have been lifted.
“The services continue to be very active and creative in looking at how we can communicate with the public that we serve,” Gen. Ryder said. “We didn’t get into this problem overnight, and it’s not going to be solved overnight.”
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By Alistair MacDonaldFollow
, Doug CameronFollow
and Dasl YoonFollow
Jan. 3, 2024 12:01 am ET
Explore Audio Center
KONGSBERG, Norway—A factory here west of Oslo produces a missile-defense system that can shoot down drones, helicopters and other airborne threats from almost 25 miles away.
Capable of launching 72 missiles into the sky at once, the National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System, or Nasams, is what protects the airspace over the White House. When first deployed in Ukraine in 2022, it recorded a 100% success rate shooting down cruise missiles and drones in its first few months.
With the West confronting a rising number of potential threats, including Russia and China, orders are piling up for the Nasams from Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace.
“I’ve never seen anywhere near so much demand,” said Eirik Lie, a 30-year Kongsberg veteran who is president of the company’s defense unit, on a November tour of the factory.
New customers, though, will have to wait: It takes two years to make one Nasams, and there is already a multiyear backlog.
The Ukraine war has highlighted the West’s deficiencies in quickly producing more weapons at a time of need. The Gaza conflict may tighten supplies for certain armaments.
The constraint is particularly acute for missiles and the systems that defend against them, and also guard against the swarms of drones that have become a central element of modern warfare.
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To ramp up, Kongsberg, which also makes products including ship-based missiles and parts of F-35 fighter jets, has moved to 24-hour, seven-day shifts and has workers in for some holidays when the factory would typically have been idled for maintenance. That still may not be enough.
The problem is that modern weapons are hugely complex, often requiring thousands of parts. Kongsberg, like most Western defense firms, designs and assembles its weapons systems but doesn’t manufacture most of the components. Over 1,500 suppliers contribute to the products at this factory. The Nasams supply chain alone consists of over a thousand companies and is built across two continents, with the U.S. defense contractor RTX, formerly known as Raytheon Technologies, supplying the radar and the actual missiles.
Pointing at a partially assembled Nasams, Lie said: “We are supplied by companies with their own supply chains, which in turn have their own supply chains, which have their supply chains, till it gets right down to the mine that digs up the basic resources.”
The defense industry is also grappling with a prolonged labor crunch, as it scrambles to find workers with niche skills, from software development to welding, and who are willing to endure lengthy security checks.
The Norwegian Army fired a Nasams in Andoya, Norway, in an exercise in May. PHOTO: ROYAL NORWEGIAN NAVY/U.S. NAVY
While flush with higher defense budgets, the West hasn’t faced the same supply constraints since perhaps the Korean War, some military analysts say. Ten of the West’s largest defense companies alone are currently sitting on order books worth over $730 billion, up around 57% from the end of 2017, when demand started ramping up.
“We all have to increase our production,” said Pentagon acquisition chief Bill LaPlante at a November conference. He held one hand high and the other low and said: “The worldwide demand is here, the ability to supply is about here.”
2017
2021
2023
Lockheed Martin
Northrop Grumman
BAE Systems (U.K.)
General Dynamics
RTX
Boeing
HII
Leonardo (Italy)
Rheinmetall (Germany)
Thales (France)
$0 billion
$20
$40
$60
$80
$100
$120
$140
Leading U.S. and NATO officials are increasingly raising concerns that the shortages will affect their ability to fight.
In a wargame simulation published in early 2023 of how the U.S. would respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, the Center for Strategic & International Studies estimated America would run out of all-important long-range antiship missiles within the first week.
The U.S. wouldn’t be able to replenish its stock quickly: As with the Nasams, each missile takes about two years to make.
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Other missile categories have similar issues. Lockheed Martin and RTX said in 2023 it will take four years to double production of Javelin and Stinger surface-to-air missiles, twice as long as expected, as supply-chain challenges continue. While companies have blamed shortages of solid rocket motors for the issue, Pentagon officials said the problems were more widespread, with everything from chips to springs and ball bearings running short.
The U.S. Department of Defense tried to track the global supply chains for the two missiles with the goal of finding workarounds for bottlenecks, said Michael Vaccaro, who oversees industrial base strategy for the Pentagon, at a recent industry conference. His conclusion was sobering: “We do not have that ability.”
There are also long delays for delivery of other weapons, including the F-35 fighter jet, new training and refueling aircraft, and the latest U.S. aircraft carriers.
A spokesman for the Pentagon said the U.S. defense industrial base can continue to support Ukraine and Israel while ensuring the country’s readiness in the Indo-Pacific region, all of which have different weapon requirements.
A bomb squad member worked next to debris from a Russian missile attack in Kharkiv, Ukraine, on Tuesday. PHOTO: SOFIIA GATILOVA/REUTERS
Mini fighter jets
Much of the West’s ability to make weapons, particularly in Europe, has been eroded as defense budgets fell after the Cold War and by gradual deindustrialization.
German companies could churn out up to 400 tanks a year at the height of the Cold War, but can now build only up to 50 a year, according to Nicholas Drummond, a defense consultant.
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Modern weapons also just take longer to make and cost more money, which can keep a cap on inventories and extend the time it takes to replace them.
Missiles are like mini fighter jets, with complex electronics and guidance systems, said BAE Systems Chief Executive Charles Woodburn in a November interview.
Missiles have been used since World War II but became a key part of warfare in more recent combat, such as the first Gulf War and NATO’s intervention into conflicts that followed the breakup of Yugoslavia. Recent wars began with a barrage of missiles and rockets, including in the Middle East, where Hamas fired 3,500 rockets into Israel as its soldiers piled into the country on Oct. 7.
How a Nasams works:
Detection
Radar searches the sky for missile and aircraft threats. Radar provides 360 degree coverage up to 74.6 miles.
Interception
The launcher fires missiles to intercept the threat. One launcher permits rapid launch of up to six missiles against single or multiple airborne targets.
1
3
Target
Interceptor
Launcher
Radar
Electro-Optical and Infra-Red Sensor
These sensors provide data to the FDC.
FDC
Evaluation
The Fire Distribution Center receives data from the radar. It evaluates threats, coordinates engagement and initiates the firing of missiles.
2
AIM-120 AMRAAM interceptor
The missile was first deployed in 1991, initially for air-to-air combat by fighter jets.
A ground-launched version followed. It is now made by RTX and has been purchased by customers in more than 40 countries.
Range: 25 miles
Length: 12 feet
Diameter: 7 inches
Launch weight: 335 pounds
Wingspan: 21 inches
Unit cost: $1.37 million
Deployed: 1991
Origin: U.S.
Rocket motor
Warhead
Rear data link antenna
Guidance and target detector
Six-foot
soldier
Note: Diagrams not to scale
Sources: RTX; Air Force
Jemal R. Brinson/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The threat from the sky has expanded due to the prevalence of drones—both the remotely piloted aircraft that can deliver Hellfire and other missiles as well as hobbyist-type drones with smaller explosives—and the development of hypersonic missiles that can fly more than five times the speed of sound and maneuver to their target, making them harder to shoot down. Russia and China have outpaced the U.S. and Europe on some missile and defense systems.
Those countries have hypersonic missiles, said Pentagon officials, while the introduction of the first by the U.S. has been pushed into 2024 following a test failure. U.S. and European systems to defend against hypersonic missiles won’t enter service for at least 10 years.
Russia and China together have around 5,020 land-based air-defense missile systems, compared with around 3,200 fielded by the U.S., Europe and Japan combined, according to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a defense think tank. The report didn’t assess quality or count shoulder-fired or naval-based systems.
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Defense companies in China and Russia are mainly state owned so are less prone to the commercial pressures of those in the West. China’s giant manufacturing sector means it has a large domestic supply chain and plenty of graduates trained for the industry.
Predictions that Russia would soon run out of missiles in Ukraine were incorrect. In November, Ukrainian intelligence estimated that Russia is able to produce about 100 total of two different types of cruise missile, four Kinzhal hypersonic ballistic missiles and five ballistic missiles every month.
U.S. and South Korean officials said North Korea has also been supplying missiles, rocket launchers and shells to Russia to support its war in Ukraine.
China’s inventory has gone up from what analysts said was a handful of nonnuclear ballistic missiles in 1996, to what the U.S. now estimates is more than 3,000 ballistic and cruise missiles.
A Chinese missile system at an airshow in Zhuhai, China, in 2022. PHOTO: CFOTO/ZUMA PRESS
In a report to Congress, the Defense Department concluded that most of China’s missile systems are comparable in quality to other global “top tier” producers and that the country possesses one of the world’s largest forces of advanced long-range missile systems.
For the West, the challenge of supporting allies engaged in separate global conflicts is pinching supplies further, boosting demand for some weapons systems, notably artillery shells and missile defense, said Pentagon officials.
Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky told Western ministers in October that his country needs missile-defense systems most. Currently, the West doesn’t have large inventories to share, and these weapons are the main overlap with what Israel needs.
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The U.S. has sent its two Israeli-made Iron Dome defense systems and the interceptors used to down missiles back to Israel.
In November, Zelensky told reporters that the war in Gaza had already slowed deliveries of artillery shells to Kyiv.
Israel’s Iron Dome antimissile system intercepted rockets launched from the Gaza Strip in October. PHOTO: AMIR COHEN/REUTERS
Orders after Ukraine
Lie said the uptick in orders for Nasams began in the years after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea. Missile orders jumped after 2022’s full scale Ukraine invasion, and concerns over China are starting to show in order books as the U.S. Navy and others buy ship-based missiles, he said.
Kongsberg’s defense order book, at around $5.5 billion, is around six times the size of levels before 2018.
Hungary ordered six Nasams in 2020. The first two only arrived in October. Since Hungary’s order, the U.S. Army has ordered six more for Ukraine, which started arriving there in the summer, and five other countries, including Taiwan, have gone public with interest in buying the system.
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Faced with increased tensions with China, Asian nations are developing their own missile capabilities “because of limited U.S. production,” said Bang Jong-kwan, a former South Korean Army Major General.
In 2022, Taiwanese officials publicly complained of U.S. delays on deliveries of Stinger antiaircraft missiles, alluding to supplies for Ukraine as being behind the holdup. In October, the chairmen of two separate U.S. congressional committees sent a letter to Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, questioning him over “alarming delays” to weapons deliveries to Taiwan, including antiship missiles. They were ordered in 2019, with the first batch finally arriving in spring 2023.
The Navy declined to comment.
Taiwan began mass producing a new domestic long-range land-based missile in 2021, and the country has three other types of long-range missiles in development, Taiwanese officials say.
Most Western defense companies say they are expanding capacity, particularly in shells and missiles. The U.S. government is investing in its domestic production base and bringing production of vulnerable components such as microchips home.
The Pentagon is set to roll out in coming weeks a new industrial-base strategy to help clear supply-chain logjams. Vaccaro, the industrial strategist at the Pentagon, said it will aim to map global supply chains for 100 weapons systems in production, down to part number and country of origin. The move is intended to identify pinch points early, and mitigate them through, for example, finding alternative suppliers.
U.S. defense giants are also increasingly building abroad with foreign partners, including for missiles, as a way to expand capacity for systems.
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A Reaper drone and its munitions in Kandahar, Afghanistan, in 2009. PHOTO: RICK LOOMIS/LOS ANGELES TIMES/GETTY IMAGES
On a recent visit at Kongsberg, workers lowered parts for the Nasams from a ceiling crane onto a factory floor already filled with large castings of green metal. Shelves lined one of the walls, crammed with thousands of small parts.
In the 1980s, Kongsberg would make computer hardware for its weapons; now this is bought off the shelf. Around 15 years ago, the 200-year-old company did its own welding, now other companies do it.
When all its supplies of components are in place, Kongsberg can put together the mobile command center of a Nasams—the complex decision-making hub at the center of the system—in a month.
To manage the risk of its supply chain being broken, the Norwegian company has been building up stockpiles of essential components while holding spare Nasams to be sent to customers quickly if needed.
The company is also increasingly trying to find alternative sources for as many supplies as possible, giving it an option should one part not show. It said it will open a new factory at its site next June that will use a more-efficient assembly line. The company expects the method will increase its production of missiles by up to 10 times.
Noemie Bisserbe contributed to this article.
Write to Alistair MacDonald at Alistair.Macdonald@wsj.com, Doug Cameron at Doug.Cameron@wsj.com and Dasl Yoon at dasl.yoon@wsj.com
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As artillery supplies dwindle, Ukraine is turning frequently to its aging Mi-24 “Hind” attack helicopters. Although obsolete and often older than the pilots, these helicopters will continue to be important as Ukrainian forces wait for delayed weapons. Photo Illustration: Preston Jessee
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I’m not a fan on this site as they strike me as lawfare advocates and haven’t met an anti-Trump boondoggle that doesn’t make their nipples hard, but think they have ID’d a salient point here where funding for American wars are concerned:
https://www.justsecurity.org/90907/the-ghost-budget-how-america-pays-for-endless-war/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=the-ghost-budget-how-america-pays-for-endless-war
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https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2024/01/04/billionaire-doomsday-prepping-what-is-zuckerberg-hiding/
:evil:
[kidding of course]
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https://www.breitbart.com/europe/2024/01/06/tanks-for-nothing-majority-of-german-leopard-2-tanks-not-working-in-ukraine/
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/pushing-back-russia-how-american-m777-howitzers-are-falling-apart-after-intense-use-in-ukraine/ar-AA1myHJv?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=b46565adabc245d1b3b33eff049778df&ei=68
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wow!
Leopard tanks don't work
reminds me of the tiger tanks had similar problems
compared to the Shermans and T - 37 's which with large numbers won the war.
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https://warontherocks.com/2024/01/strengthen-the-military-rhetorical-complex/
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https://www.bizpacreview.com/2024/01/10/army-struggles-for-white-recruits-amid-recruiting-crisis-and-diversity-push-1426553/?utm_campaign=bizpac&utm_content=Newsletter&utm_medium=Newsletter&utm_source=Get%20Response&utm_term=EMAIL
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So now the US is supporting multiple wars:
- Ukr
- Gaza
- Syria
- Houthis,
Just need one more war in Taiwan and we should be good for 2024. In the meantime the Sec of Defense is getting serious surgeries and the Prez was not even informed.
Good to point out that much of this is interrelated and there are many circles within circles with offshoots of cause and effect. So the US decided to bring down Russia by supporting Ukraine (US proxy) and froze their funds. Russian response was to support Gaza, who launched an attack on Israel (US proxy). Israel bombed Gaza to smithereens, and Russia/Iran activated the Houthis.
End result is that Russia is a commodity exporter, they are doing reasonably well considering the entire west is against them. The problem is that Europe has been destroyed, the economy of their star performer Germany is in recession, the US is not doing great either, debt is 34 T $, with the blockage of the red sea, inflation will rise world wide and in the USA and its only Jan.
Elections in Russia, by May 2024, Putin needs to show some action...
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ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=43axCkGrrN4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vn8nKcioRK8
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJfDKlnWYuA
I found his final point about a world without Russian commodity exports to be quite wide of the mark-- shutting them off would not be in our interest (witness the Uke war!) AND they now have China as a market so their navy is of diminished relevance.
Nonetheless, a lot of interest here-- his concept of Russia having four navies that cannot interact with each other was new to mean and intrigues me quite a bit.
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Discussion of a significant munition few outside the military understand:
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/first-rule-cluster-munitions-dont-talk-about-cluster-munitions
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2Ee-oHgd0Cs&t=53s
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https://www.ammoland.com/2024/01/attorney-generals-calls-on-biden-administration-to-protect-ammunition-plant/?ct=t(RSS_EMAIL_CAMPAIGN)#axzz8Q1oYQZFq
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https://dailycaller.com/2024/01/26/helium-reserves-sold-off/?utm_source=piano&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=29912&pnespid=qqJtAj9eMLwX3aDLoiTtGZ2QpQKlVsNpK7Ouwu9jvxZmaYFauFb88eUIAKIdeDeUxDY2ARZ1
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Woke administration policies the military has adopted has led to lower recruitment. The fix? Lower standards:
https://legalinsurrection.com/2024/01/u-s-navy-faced-with-recruiting-nightmare-begins-accepting-high-school-dropouts/?utm_source=feedly&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=u-s-navy-faced-with-recruiting-nightmare-begins-accepting-high-school-dropouts
As a high school dropout now swimming among lettered tam wearers I'm off the opinion a degree doesn't confer common sense or every day problem solving for that matter, but given the tech needed to function within the military these days being able to prove you've learned how to learn would likely come in handy. And hey, with remedial math, English, and science needs being common among college freshnon-gender-specfic-bipeds these days one imagines similar needs will appear within these new recruits.
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As I rub elbows with some of America's finest in the Fort Bragg area, this is quite congruent with conversations I have with them.
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This piece contains references to LOTS of scary prescience, noting predictions of current entanglements made earlier. Indeed, allow me to pile on: if Biden is reelected or some other “Progressive” torchbearer replaces the ambulatory corpse he appears to have become, the partially executed four front World War III will be fully realized as our enemies know Biden and his “Progressive” handlers don’t have the aptitude or stomach for a world war, that the US is currently as politically fractured (and intentionally made so) as it has been since the 1860s, and that in our environmental and Ukraine munition supply zeal we’ve demonstrated that we are unable to arm ourselves to the degree needed to engage on the scale imagined here:
https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2024/01/27/the_geopolitics_of_world_war_iii_1007840.html
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-sends-machine-gun-mounted-robots-to-frontline-to-wipe-out-russian-cannon-fodder/ar-BB1htjNx?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=de9b3eb06d2c4e2187e8fcd9f26ecb35&ei=22
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/us/struggling-for-recruits-us-navy-lowers-education-standard-5575175?fbclid=IwAR2En8e8U_m4gq3qhachGlfDHkR-5CaYC8imfZO-_-IHnEvwa4OslokApCQ
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Third post
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/the-red-sea-fighting-shows-the-humiliating-difference-between-the-us-and-royal-navies/ar-BB1hq1Nn?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=c2fe5a40d5bb477088c29fe0c3f934e7&ei=40
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https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=56988ef2a35f158944f618fd528ebd1e_65ba60ea_6d25b5f&selDate=20240131
Off the top of my head some consideration is not unreasonable.
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second
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=56988ef2a35f158944f618fd528ebd1e_65ba60ea_6d25b5f&selDate=20240131
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This gets my annoyed
Our press is always pushing for the exact military plans to be announced to 8 billion people ahead of time
Yes, the specific targets not announced but element of surprise is diminished greatly.
https://www.yahoo.com/news/plans-approved-u-strikes-against-141341826.html
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I'm reading some RumInt that says private phone calls to the Iranians asking to do a token hit on Iran to save face was blown off by the Iranians. I'll see if I can post it later.
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Posted previously, but posting this again with an eye to making it easy to find
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Posting this here as an example of how drones are turning quite a bit of military armament into a Maginot line.
Ukraine appears to be attacking Russia's oil-and-gas industry with small, cheap drones that can bypass its air defenses (msn.com)
Witness too how a proxy drone got past our defenses in Jordan simply by following one of ours back in. How much did that cost them? How much is our retalitation costing us? And will it work? If not, are we revealed to be a giant swatting at flies and mosquitoes?
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Regarding "giant swatting at flies", that's where the concept 'disproportionate response' comes in, and the fear of one.
While the Biden team can't think of what a disprortionate response might entail, they criticize Israel and try to stop theirs.
A Biden official hinted more is coming against Iran. We'll see.
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40% of Asia-Europe trade goes through the Red Sea.
https://www.ttnews.com/articles/red-sea-conflict-global-trade#:~:text=Red%20Sea's%20Importance&text=In%20fact%2C%2040%25%20of%20Asia,of%20the%20world's%20manufactured%20products.
Who knew Yemen would be strategic...
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https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12997173/Death-Ukraines-new-suicide-drones-start-terrifying-arms-race-British-military-chiefs-fear-create-weapon-mass-destruction.html
BTW, the Chinese are WAY ahead of us in drone swarm technology AND drone production.
Thought experiment:
Discussions of Taiwan often are based upon an image of the challenges of a D-Day type assault. What if the assault were killer drone swarms instead? Supplemented by mines floating up from the bottom to sink our ships, all while we are hit with massive cyber attacks and fifth column attacks here in America launched from safe houses already well prepared here by the tens of thousands of military age Chinese illegals?
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reminds me a little of this,
the flying ball of death in the nightmarish movie 'Phatasm' 1979:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7p4ZsYYU5Cc
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https://amgreatness.com/2024/02/11/the-operational-impact-of-americas-greatest-strategic-failure/
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ukraine-s-drone-war-spells-the-end-for-the-us-army-helicopter-force/ar-BB1igK6P?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=c159ee03ee5a4925b2208136e33e6213&ei=117
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same question of tanks:
https://www.quora.com/Are-tanks-becoming-outdated-and-obsolete-in-warfare#:~:text=The%20usefulness%20of%20tanks%20has,ways%20a%20%E2%80%9Cwonder%20weapon%E2%80%9D.
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-warships-are-shooting-down-weapons-no-one-s-ever-faced-in-combat-before-and-a-navy-commander-says-it-s-a-great-opportunity/ar-BB1iqhZZ?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=U531&cvid=c764099256404552a18b6f68d988d937&ei=10
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" US warships are shooting down weapons no one's ever faced in combat before, and a Navy commander says it's a 'great opportunity'
Sort of like the killing fields in Ukraine testing our equipment.
Modern Guernica.
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Yes.
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https://amgreatness.com/2024/02/18/vance-we-dont-make-enough-munitions-to-support-a-war-in-eastern-europe-a-war-in-the-middle-east-and-potentially-a-contingency-in-east-asia/
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=144&v=LJ8FRHJq69U&embeds_referring_euri=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.paragonpride.com%2F&source_ve_path=Mjg2NjY&feature=emb_logo
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https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/in-the-spirit-of-russian-total-war
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This could be filed under gender issues too, and certainly will cause egalitarian purists to clutch their skirts. Be that as it may, if operational effectiveness of tip of the spear forces is the goal, then there is no justification for including females in those forces merely to assuage egalitarian sensibilities:
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/reconsideration-womens-role-special-operations-critical-questions-mooted-decade-after-fact
*Females do add value in roles that ONLY females can fill (it would be illustrative to have a transgender soldier try to fill one of these search-Muslim-women roles).
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I'm posting this one around. Be interesting to see the responses.
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I'm posting this one around. Be interesting to see the responses.
Anticipate autistic screeching from some quarters.
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https://www.foxnews.com/us/us-military-not-ready-low-tech-war-crisis
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It is the age of paradox in warfare: where de rigueur total dispersion of forces appears to make high casualty densities obsolete, yet the entire length of the battlefield is overwatched by the most unprecedentedly powerful and accurate systems in history, like Iskanders, Kinzhals, Zircons, HIMARs, etc., which allow the carrying out of near-instantaneous kill-chains—from detection to transmit/distribution, to fire order within moments.
This is why the only way to fight and advance has come down to dispersing your strategic operations over the widest possible scale, so that the end goal becomes the totality of victory rather than specific operational objectives like: “Capture this area of cities.” Such a task requires the concentration of forces, from divisions, brigades, battalions, whose every staging action is monitored with almost total transparency by the enemy.
This ‘war of the future’ will be won by the most flexible, resilient, and adaptable force—the force which can pull punches, use feints, and reorientations all along the entire combat line in the most expedient manner. Russia is showing this today by utilizing a confounding rotation of active fronts to not only unbalance the AFU, but to stress their mobility and logistics to the extreme. When you have the advantage in logistical infrastructure and facility, you can ‘daze’ your opponent by conducting small operations across a scattered range of fronts, causing them great stress in trying to keep up.
In the Avdeevka battle, we saw Ukraine being forced to pull significant amounts of elite units from several fronts like Zaporozhye and Bakhmut to reinforce the crumbling Avdeevka lines. When that finished, Russia launched a Zaporozhye attack, overrunning depleted AFU positions there as a result, with AFU unable to reinstate reserves fast enough. The same goes for the Kupyansk and Kremennaya regions: reports spoke of AFU’s desperate troop pulls from Kupyansk to bolster defenses in northwest Bakhmut, where Russia has likewise started a series of attacks.
It’s like pricking a spinning drunk with a needle from every side—he hardly knows where he’s being hit, nor has time to orient himself correctly. Lacking logistical mobility—in the form of physical haulers like HETs, transports, etc.—Ukraine gets the worst of it in being forced to constantly run around plugging leaks in the flooding deck.
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When I was an attorney I worked on a case that was Jones Act related: Shipping between US and Puerto Rico had to be US ships which gave the Federal Maritime Commission rate setting power. I still remember the torpor I experienced walking into the FMC to pick up some papers.
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Protectionism Kills U.S. Merchant Shipping
Competition can revive an industry stuck in the 18th century.
By Colin Grabow and Scott Lincicome
Feb. 26, 2024 6:37 pm ET
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Journal Editorial Report: The week's best and worst from: Kim Strassel, Kyle Peterson, Jillian Melchior and Dan Henninger. Images: AP/Zuma Press/Intuitive Machines Composite: Mark Kelly
Washington is waking up to the perilous state of U.S. commercial shipping. Rep. Mike Gallagher (R., Wis.), chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, recently lamented the U.S. merchant fleet’s dwindling numbers and lack of mariners, while Sen. Mark Kelly (D., Ariz.) and Adm. Samuel Paparo, commander of the U.S. Pacific fleet, cited the fleet’s diminutive size as a national-security vulnerability. Mr. Kelly was one of 19 congressional signatories of a January letter to President Biden calling for improvements to the U.S. shipping and shipbuilding industries.
We’re heartened that policymakers are finally paying attention to the U.S. commercial fleet’s long-term decline and its dire national-security implications. But for the most part they’ve ignored the sector’s heaviest policy anchor—protectionism. Almost since America’s founding, the federal government has relied on subsidies and protectionist laws to develop the maritime industry. Numerous such measures remain in place, including both the 1920 Jones Act’s prohibition on using foreign-built vessels to transport goods within the U.S. and a 50% tariff on foreign repair and maintenance.
These and related policies have failed to create a vibrant maritime sector and have instead degraded it by handing U.S. shipping and shipbuilding industries a captive domestic market and discouraging scale, efficiency, innovation and specialization. After more than two centuries of protectionism, the U.S. maritime sector has gone from being one of the world’s most competitive to one of the least.
U.S.-built tankers cost about four times as much as those constructed abroad. The commercial fleet has lost hundreds of oceangoing vessels since the 1950s, and the few that remain are on average significantly older than their international counterparts.
While U.S. allies churn out scores of ships each year, you can count U.S. shipyards’ annual deliveries on one hand. Last year they collectively delivered one large oceangoing merchant ship, and the next won’t arrive until 2026. A recent Journal article described the country’s shipbuilding industry as being in “disarray.”
The government protections U.S. shipyards and the broader maritime sector enjoy have proved far more effective at funneling money to special interests than fostering a healthy industry. Adversaries would be hard-pressed to come up with a more effective formula for sabotaging the U.S. fleet.
Subsidies alone can’t fix these problems, and they’ve been tried. Massive “construction differential subsidies” in the 1970s and early 1980s yielded underwhelming results. Given the gaping price differences between U.S. and foreign-built ships today, more subsidies would cost taxpayers a fortune at a time of record budget deficits.
Instead of more industry coddling, systemic reform is needed, and this means tackling protectionism, injecting competition into the U.S. market, and engaging allies’ impressive shipbuilding capabilities. Congress should move away from a maritime policy rooted in 18th-century norms.
The starting point is reforming the Jones Act. To encourage the fleet’s growth and modernization, American firms need to be able to purchase new oceangoing ships from allied shipyards. Japan and South Korea are among the world’s foremost shipbuilders. Letting Americans use their advanced shipyards would generate an influx of new ships, boost U.S. mariner employment, motivate U.S. shipbuilders to innovate, and increase U.S. supply-chain efficiency.
Congress should also scrap the 50% tariff, which U.S. shippers pay because repairs at domestic shipyards are so expensive, or at least exempt allied shipyards. Both reforms are hardly radical, particularly given the U.S. Navy’s reliance on foreign-built sea-lift ships and recent attempts to expand its use of allied shipyards for maintenance needs.
For too long Washington has ignored the decline of the country’s maritime sector. Mounting international challenges have brought much-needed scrutiny and should prompt an overhaul of the country’s antiquated shipping policies. Any such effort must include the removal of protectionist measures that have long held the U.S. fleet back.
Mr. Grabow is a research fellow at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies. Mr. Lincicome is Cato’s vice president of general economics and trade.
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https://www.oann.com/newsroom/u-s-army-axing-thousands-of-jobs-nearly-5-of-force/
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If you ever have a need to lay awake at night I’ve got your piece right here. Thank goodness all our federal agencies are focused on pronouns and DEI rather than the trivial matters discussed here:
“Crippled At The Starting Gate”
America’s Achilles Heel In Future Conflict
By Martin Stanton
INTRODUCTION
I recently finished Kurt Schlicter’s excellent book THE ATTACK which is written as a retrospective on a massed October 7th style terrorist attack on the United States that occurs in the late summer of 2024. Schlicter’s book is a page turner, both easy to read and compelling. The premise of THE ATTACK is simple: Large numbers of terrorists’ infiltrate across our open southern border (past our distracted, improperly focused, and politically hamstrung law enforcement and intelligence agencies) amidst the current flood of illegal aliens. They assume hiding positions within the US and wait for the “GO” order. Their attacks happen over several days and cause mass casualties and crippling economic damage. THE ATTACK captures the savagery of Oct 7, 2023, and transfers it to an American setting on a far broader scale. Schlicter’s descriptions of the atrocities committed by the attackers are not for the faint of heart but are basically taken directly from both testimony of Israelis who survived the Hamas attack on October 7 and the captured Hamas footage of what happened to those who did not. The balance of the book is about the various reactions to the attack across America.
Schlicter makes no secret of his political leanings, but no one can deny the plausibility of his scenario. THE ATTACK is a well written and thought-provoking book. It certainly caused me to freshly consider my own community and how it would react to such an event. It also got me thinking about how vulnerable the US is; not just to non-state actor “terrorist” attacks, but to attacks by conventional and special operations forces of enemy nations in the event of hostilities with the US.
IT NOT WW2 ANYMORE – THE OCEANS NO LONGER PROTECT US
The United States has almost no living memory of an attack by the forces of an enemy nation on our mainland. The closest we have left are the few 90–100-year-olds, who can recall the handful of Japanese submarine gun attacks on the Pacific coast and the ferocious U-boat campaign off our Atlantic shores in early 1942. The last time we faced an enemy capable of stopping our maritime traffic and projecting power into the continental United States was in the war of 1812. None of our modern enemies in the 20th century had the capability to conventionally attack military targets on the US mainland in any meaningful way. America was too far and their ability to project power too limited.
In the 21st century this is no longer the case. We have long lived under the “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) deterrent when it comes to nuclear threats to the US; but MAD has no counterpart in conventional war. There’s no “Cosmic Law” against conventionally attacking the continental United States. In almost every plausible major war scenario the US faces today WE will be bombing potential enemies on their respective mainland’s. It’s only reasonable to assume they will look at ways to respond (or to pre-empt). The combined impacts of vastly improved and expanded international transportation, massive amounts of commerce that defy comprehensive inspection, the miniaturization of weapons, emergent military drone technologies, cruise and ballistic missile proliferation and launch system diversification, unchecked mass migration and open borders makes the US vulnerable in ways we have not previously seen in our history. Our adversaries are starting to wake up to this.
AMERICA’S POWER LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO PROJECT ITS FORCES
Excluding its considerable arsenal of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, what makes America powerful is not only it’s highly trained conventional forces but its ability to project those forces rapidly (relatively speaking – more quickly than our adversaries) anywhere in the world. We maintain some forces in certain theaters (CENTCOM, EUCOM, PACOM) but even there, were war to break out these would have to be reinforced by considerable forces from CONUS. All the ground forces will deploy from a relative handful of ports of embarkation (air and sea) on either coast. The air forces are more flexible but depend heavily on static air bases and the tanker fleet for quick strategic mobility. Naval forces too rely on a small number of large bases on each coast.
Putting my “Red Team” hat on, if you’re going to fight America, attacking our ability to project forces and sustainment is job # 1. This will especially be true in scenarios such as Taiwan or Korea where even a delay of a few days or weeks in America’s force flow can tip the scales in the outcome of a campaign.
A SMORGASBORD OF POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR ENEMIES
An enemy nation that wishes to attack our power projection capabilities and facilities in the continental US can avail themselves of an embarrassingly diverse set of options when it comes to striking us. We’re vulnerable to just about anything. To keep this essay small, I will focus merely on kinetic options and not include the dazzling array of cyber and information operations options available to our enemies. Here’s a few of the bigger ones.
Direct Special Operations attack against key facilities/ assets:
Kurt Schlicter’s book THE ATTACK outlines in agonizing detail how our open borders and inadequate immigration and customs enforcement made the US vulnerable to a massed Oct 7th terrorist attack. This same open border and lack of immigration enforcement / accountability makes us extremely vulnerable to the infiltration of special operations teams from other countries. Unlike the terrorists described in Schlicter’s book they wouldn’t have to come in huge numbers. A high three digit or low four-digit number broken into smaller teams with specific assignments is all they’d really need. These special operations soldiers would join the millions of illegal aliens that have flooded across our border since early 2021 – perhaps they’re already here. They would live as individuals and keep a low profile but would assemble and arm at the appropriate signal (being careful to don the uniform of their country and mark their vehicles appropriately) and conduct attacks designated targets.
Those targets would be the primary APOEs and SPOEs in our deployment infrastructure as well as key assets such as airlift (C5’s and C-17s) Air refuelers (Tankers) and Fast sealift ships. Platoon sized groups could easily defeat the gate guards at most installations in early morning attacks (likely through some Trojan horse subterfuge – I.E a mini-van weaving up to the gate at 2 AM with its music blasting like a drunk driver). If they can secure the gate and the barrier system without raising the alarm, other vehicles can be quickly called forward. Within a few minutes they’ll be destroying aircraft on the flightline or sabotaging key facilities before any additional security forces could likely react. Then, having accomplished their various missions, they could simply surrender. This is the big difference between enemy nation soldiers and terrorists. Except for those special operations teams with missions to assassinate key leaders or attack C2 facilities, the number of casualties they inflict is incidental to the mission. Unlike terrorists they’re not out to cause civilian mass casualties. They are instead uniformed soldiers who have used a valid ruse of war to attack legitimate military targets. They’re squeaky clean as legal combatants under the Geneva Convention and will be repatriated to their country at the end of hostilities. In the meantime, we’re down critical force projection assets that either cannot be replaced during the conflict (KC-135s, C-17s, Key sealift ships) or have suffered debilitating damage to key installations.
Drone Attacks
It gets even worse. With many targets – particularly key aircraft on a flightline-there isn’t even a need to penetrate the perimeter of an installation. As both the Ukraine war and the ongoing conflict with the Houthis in Yemen have shown us, drone technology is revolutionizing warfare. Look at any of the aircraft parked closely on the flight line at any AFB. A commercial drone carrying an incendiary device (like a thermite grenade) landing near the wing root would be sufficient to either outright destroy the AC or make it NMC for an extended period. Middle of the night drone attacks at the outset of hostilities could cost us whole squadrons of critical aircraft.
Nor do drone attacks have to be short range commercial drones flown from relative proximity to their targets. The Houthis have shown the world that they can strike Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE from Yemen with drones. The Russians are using the same drones for long-range strikes in Ukraine. The Iranian model drones they use are low tech, easily assembled and pretty accurate. A dozen disassembled drones of this nature could easily fit in a shipping container. When you take the range fans of the Houthi drone strikes on Israel and superimpose them on the West Coast you find that pretty much every APOE and SPOE on the west coast is within range of the Sonoran Desert in Mexico. Smuggling shipping containers into Mexico is easily doable. Northern Mexico is effectively a Narco-state where Chinese money already wields significant influence. Many parts of it are sparsely populated and no one asks questions if they know what’s good for them. It’s one big launch basket.
Cruise and Ballistic Missile attacks
US bases in the Pacific as far as Guam are within range of conventionally armed ballistic missiles launched from China and North Korea. The Chinese and North Koreans also possess submarines that can fire ballistic missiles that can attack Hawaii or CONUS. The sub launched ballistic missile threat is not huge because it would require retrofitting a primary nuclear deliver system for a conventional attack, but it is possible. Of course, they could always shoot the nukes at us. But that makes it a different kind of war.
The cruise missile threat, however, is huge. Unlike ballistic missiles, almost any seagoing vessel can be outfitted to launch cruise missiles. Cruise missiles launch cannisters can fit easily into modified shipping containers and it is not hard to envision a massive containership leaving a Chinese port with the entire top level of containers carrying cruise missiles in a new and devastating twist on the old WW2 armed merchant cruiser theme. Cruise missiles can also be launched from modified commercial aircraft. At the outset of hostilities, a strike of several hundred cruise missiles on key US facilities could eliminate a good portion of our already too small Navy as well as have devastating consequences for our ability to project power. In terms of impact on our war effort the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 would pale in comparison. This threat will only get worse over time as cruise missile technology further extends range and increases accuracy. Intercontinental cruise missiles will likely become a thing.
Naval Special Operations Threat
If the Ukraine war and the Houthis in Yemen have shown us anything in the past year its that you don’t need a Navy to project power in littoral warfare. Their successful use of drone attack boats is re-writing tactical doctrine for the Navy in real time. These attack drones are small, long-range, easily transported and pack a ship disabling wallop. Imagine dozens being launched from a mother ship (or a beach in Mexico) hundreds of miles from a US port or naval base. These drones have been successful against warships at sea defending themselves. Their PH/PK during a surprise attack in port will be much higher. Add to this the old stand-by of Block-ships (merchantmen deliberately scuttled to impede traffic in key channels) and naval special operators who have infiltrated the US attaching limpet mines to vessels in ports and its easy to conclude the threat to the maritime aspect of US power projection is as bad (or worse) than that enjoyed by the air components.
THE IMPACT OF SUCH AN ATTACK
An initiation of hostilities that began with attacks on US installations and organizations in CONUS using some or all, of the methods described here would have a major impact on a short duration campaign (less than 6 months) such as Taiwan and Korea and a significant one on a longer war. Every Tanker, C-17, C5 or maritime deployment platform destroyed or badly damaged would not be replaced during the duration of the conflict. This isn’t the 1940’s anymore, our Air Force transports, and sealift platform aren’t as replaceable as C-47s and Liberty Ships. Neither are our Naval vessels, fighters, or bombers for that matter. Gone are the shipyards and factories that churned out the mass that gave us victory 80 years ago. In fact, an enemy envisioning a long war with the US (vice one to establish a quick “fait-accompli” on the ground) would probably attack our few key production facilities as well as our SPOEs, APOEs and existing deployment assets.
SO, WHAT CAN WE DO?
The only good news in this essay is that, as late as it is, we still have time to fix or mitigate quite a few of these vulnerabilities. It will take political will though and shifting priorities. Here are a few things we can be doing.
Recognize that illegal immigration is a Strategic Threat to US security: No nation can long survive with a border situation such as the one that exists today in the US. Unfortunately, the failure of our political leadership has moved us past the point where this issue can be resolved easily. Fixing this is going to be ugly but it’s got to be done. The solution has two broad components:
Illegal Immigration - Plug the leaks: Our nation needs to build a border wall with Mexico that looks like the one between Gaza and Egypt. It needs to man the border with soldiers until this is accomplished. Zero people come in through anything that is not an authorized point of entry. Next build something less draconian but just as effective on the Canadian border (less volume there). Adequately resource and staff border patrol customs and immigration officials. Make provisions to reinforce with federal Marshals and federal troops as required.
Illegal immigration – Bail the boat: Deporting the millions of illegal aliens that have poured across our border since 2021 will be a massive undertaking, but it must be done. Declare a national state of emergency and suspend immigration law that pertains to asylum or allows illegal aliens to remain in-country. Task the military to set up deportation camps and control the logistics of deportation. Use federal law enforcement to roundup illegal aliens and prosecute anyone who employs them. Deny federal funding to states or municipalities who declare themselves “sanctuaries” and defund / prosecute NGO that facilitate illegal immigration. Lincoln suspended Habeas Corpus during the Civil War citing national emergency; such extreme measures are equally warranted here to combat the illegal alien invasion and the potential deadly threat they pose from both a terrorist and a conventional war perspective.
Refocus the Intelligence Community and Federal Law Enforcement: The Intelligence Community and Federal law enforcement need to re-focus their internal security priorities towards terrorist and foreign agent infiltration amongst the millions of illegal aliens who have crossed our border. We have wasted too much time and too many assets chasing cos-play white supremacists and other politically correct bugbears while real threats pass unnoticed under our nose. We have no idea who has entered our country. We need to start getting a handle on it. Start with the immediate environs (30-mile radius) of priority bases and installations – working closely with military counterintelligence.
Similarly, we need to refocus intelligence collection on the areas immediately outside our borders and on the shipping lanes that come within strike proximity of our key bases and installations. In particular, we need to recognize that northern Mexico is essentially an ungoverned space where anyone with money and imagination can operate freely. This refocusing of collection priorities is going to mean hard choices at the national level in the dedication of ISR assets until more assets can be acquired.
It also means that there needs to be a quick clearing house for the cross leveling of information and reports and algorithms for data analysis so that no key report is lost in the volume. Much of the Homeland Security apparatus will have to be repurposed and many of its performative (but expensive) functions – such as TSA will have to be either discontinued or significantly downsized to pay for the necessary changes.
Establish defenses at key SPOEs, APOEs and high value target installations: The massive coastal artillery forts of the Endicott Period of 1890-1920 (whose ruins still overlook key harbors in CONUS) and the Nike Hercules Batteries around major installations and population centers from the late 1950s to the early 1970s never fired a shot in anger. I doubt we will be so fortunate in the future. The US needs to establish defenses at our key installations in CONUS.
What’s a key installation? This is a hard question because virtually everything in the US is vulnerable to the threats I’ve described. Currently we exist in a topsy turvy situation where the first things we should protect are installations and assets that have direct OPERATIONAL impact on the execution of an overseas campaign – APOEs, SPOEs, Air and Maritime mobility assets as well as major naval and air combatants that cannot be replaced. STRATEGIC ASSETS (production facilities, refineries, key internal transportation nodes...etc.) will have to be a secondary priority. If we can’t get the forces we have to theater without disruption, in most cases what we can produce for a long conflict won’t matter – because it won’t be a long conflict.
Force structure and acquisition implications: The force structure of the Army in WW2 gives a hint as to the scope of the issue. While most popular histories dwell on the expanded number of maneuver divisions in the Army, what’s often neglected is the role the Army units played in defending key SPOEs in CONUS and bases along the LOCs as well as SPODs in theater. The unit and manpower intensive defense of Antwerp as an SPOD from German cruise missiles (V-1s) in the fall-winter of 1944/45 is a good example of how costly this kind of effort can be. The potential for attack against our CONUS Bases/SPOE/APOE, Theater Service Area, Communications Zone (COMZ), and LOCs is even greater now than it was in WW2 and in potential conflict against peer competitors / regional threats we won’t have the luxury of years to build the necessary force structure (the units that defended Antwerp in 1944 didn’t exist in 1942).
We will have to build a military now that can fulfill its role in defending our power projection from day-1 of any conflict. For the Army this means developing hybrid air defense units that can protect assets across the spectrum of air threat from small drones to ballistic missiles. For the Air Force it means increasing base security and developing hardened dispersal sites to avoid the close parked “Wheeler-Field-1941” syndrome so prevalent on many of today’s Air Force Bases. For the Naval forces and Coast Guard it means re-evaluating naval bases and SPOEs for updated Naval Special operations threats and acquiring/ configuring their defenses accordingly. This is going to be a big bill. It’s an uncomfortable thought to consider having to defend places like San Diego SPOE and Travis AFB in California or Hickam AFB in Hawaii from conventional enemy cruise/ballistic missile, drone or UW attacks over three dimensions (land, sea and air), but that’s the world we live in now.
SUMMARY
Due to the decisions of our elected leadership America of 2024 is more vulnerable to outside conventional and unconventional attack than it has been in over 200 years. We’re also in a position where the possibility of conflict with nations who can conventionally and unconventionally attack us grows greater with each passing year. Our open borders, inattention to the illegal alien invasion and inability to monitor our own Western Hemisphere neighbors effectively could cost us hugely, both as open highway for terrorists to attack us and an open flank for enemy nations to exploit. We (the US) need to fix this, fast.
About the Author(s)
Martin Stanton
Martin Stanton is a retired Army officer currently residing in Florida. The opinions expressed are his own and do not reflect any official DOD or USG position.
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/crippled-starting-gate-americas-achilles-heel-future-conflict
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Powerful find BBG!!!
In that vein:
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=6940531bc9814e332de083cf2666fdaa_65df4ad2_6d25b5f&selDate=20240228
https://amgreatness.com/2024/02/28/army-cutting-thousands-of-jobs-in-preparation-for-possible-future-war/
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Since we are reading Russian criteria for use "leaked" somehow now by coincidence:
vs strategic nuclear devices :
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tactical_nuclear_weapon#:~:text=Tactical%20nuclear%20weapons%20include%20gravity%20bombs%2C%20short-range%20missiles%2C,or%20shipborne%20surface-to-air%20missiles%20%28SAMs%29%20and%20air-to-air%20missiles.\
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Fascinating piece out of West Point examining a number of emergent factors divisional commanders need to consider to make sure their commands survive the next war:
https://mwi.westpoint.edu/preparing-to-win-the-first-fight-of-the-next-war/
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https://mwi.westpoint.edu/preparing-to-win-the-first-fight-of-the-next-war/
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https://mwi.westpoint.edu/preparing-to-win-the-first-fight-of-the-next-war/
The deja vu is strong with this one.
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" Israel’s failure to correctly identify Egypt’s intentions in 1973 was a maelstrom of faulty judgments—a result of cultural, organizational, and cognitive biases."
Interestingly the American Intelligence at the time fell into the same trap of closed door thinking.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-fog-of-certainty-learning-from-the-intelligence-failures-of-the-1973-war/
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This one ought not be filed under a "military" header as it's not about the military, it's about beating back "Progressive" efforts to inculcate a "Progressive" ethos in organizations meant to unceremoniously smoke America's enemies, a notion "Progressive" can't abide unless those getting smoked are those those that stand between "Progressives" and their regressive goals.
The Good News About Our Failing Military – Trump Can Fix It
Kurt Schlichter
Mar 07, 2024
We need to elect President Trump if only to unscrew our screwed-up military – and he can. The situation is getting worse. The other day, Twitter came alive when a video dropped of a male Space Force colonel pretending to be a female lecturing at the Air Force Academy, and you look at this and realize that our military has become ridiculous under the current crop of generals and admirals. Not content with not having a single unequivocal major military victory in the last 30 years, they have presided over the descent of America’s once most respected institution into a laughingstock. No matter how hard they order troops to believe in the power of trans transformation, the troops will not believe. In the words of Austin Powers, a ridiculous fictional character who has won as many wars in the last 30 years as our generals and admirals have, it’s a man, baby. And our troops know it.
You cannot lie to a soldier’s face and expect him to follow you. That used to be Officer 101. Now just saying it is probably a hate crime.
And the results of this transformation speak for themselves. Recruiting is at rock bottom. Veterans like me now refuse to recommend military service, which is heartbreaking but necessary. To tell young people that they should join the military and be subjected to the indignity of having to call someone with beard stubble “ma’am” is a bridge too far – a reference that most of our generals probably wouldn’t get, judging from their track record of failure. And another recent disgrace involves forcing female urinalysis drug test observers to watch men pretending to be women whip it out to fill their cups. Disgusting.
Who the hell wants to sign up for that? If you want to be exposed to indecent exposure you can avoid the inconvenience of military life and just walk through a Democrat city, though you’ll probably get shot at there too.
Now, some young people still join the military, and they deserve our respect. They are, as always, fantastic. They are the best of America. I’m always humbled by the fact that our country allowed me to lead them, and I’m outraged that our country allows the platoon of failures at the Pentagon to lead them.
Some people may scoff that a few men pretending to be women and women pretending to be men within the fighting force is no big deal, and that to object is a manifestation of some repressed hangup. But it is a big deal. It’s a symptom of a rot at the heart of our military that has rendered what was once the world’s most formidable fighting force, a force that achieved a victory three decades ago in Operation Desert Storm on the level of Hannibal and Julius Caesar – again, historical references our present military leadership probably won’t recognize. Today’s military is about promoting social pathologies, not winning wars. Today, we get pushed around by freaking Houthis, whatever they are. We don’t avenge our murdered troops in Jordan, instead flattening a few desert huts after giving the local terrorists several days’ warning to get clear. We got run out of Kabul, carrying 13 caskets, by a bunch of pedophile tribesmen. And now our airmen are subjected to the indignity of having to airdrop supplies on the same people who just murdered 30 Americans and are holding nearly a dozen more hostage.
Oh yeah, give me those enlistment papers!
The American military is a lot of things, but it should never be a joke. Yet, when you have a grown man made up – badly – like a grown woman lecturing future officers, it is a joke. This frivolous nonsense would be a little more tolerable, barely, if the military were doing its job. But today, we have a Navy that sets fire to its own ships when it isn’t running them into other boats, an Army with officers dressed up as Doberman pinschers canoodling with subordinate officers, and now a Space Force that channels Bangkok after dark.
It’s an embarrassment. But more than that, it’s a total abdication of the military’s responsibility to be a lethal fighting force that deters our enemies and destroys them when deterrence fails. No, diversity is not our greatest strength. Strength is our greatest strength.
Beyond the fact that our political generals and admirals are conforming to the mores of the Wellesley faculty lounge is the fact that they learned a lot of bad lessons from the global war on terrorism. They are over-lawyered, over-bureaucratized, over-briefed, and under-effective. They’re not swashbuckling warriors. They’re craven bureaucrats who would fit in at the local university, having proven their willingness to submit to whatever bizarre cultural fads the local activists are demanding.
What’s the name of the general or admiral who publicly resigned in protest against this nonsense? For that matter, name one fired for incompetence. I’ll wait.
These perfumed princes, princesses, and non-binary royal scions (Hat Tip: Colonel David Hackworth) are certainly are not ready for war in 2024. Skirmishing with scruffy bands of guerillas in the desert and the mountains from inside relatively luxurious bases is not good training for the kind of high OPTEMPO killing that will happen in a contemporary peer-to-peer battlespace. What’s going on in Ukraine demonstrates that many things we used to think were true no longer are. Drones have changed the battlefield. Cyber has changed the battlefield. Electronic warfare has changed the battlefield. The tanks and airplanes that used to dominate are now highly vulnerable. But have our tactics changed? Who cares about tactics? Everybody, fall into the auditorium because we have another mandatory transgender awareness seminar!
The military won’t fix itself. The current leadership is all in on this failure, and that’s by design. Right now, the purpose of the war colleges is not to teach strategy but to make senior military officers socially acceptable to the limousine leftists in our ruling class. True story from not too long ago – a bunch of colonels assembled for a pretty routine war college exercise where, on Day One, they identify America’s greatest strategic threat, and on Day Two, they brief on courses of action to address that threat. So far, so good. Except half of these colonels identified climate change as America’s greatest strategic threat. When you have a bunch of military officers who think that America’s biggest threat is the weather, you don’t have a real military. You have a woke joke.
No wonder so many young people won’t join. And that’s especially true of the kind of young people who traditionally formed the backbone of the American military, the cold-blooded killers who won our wars back when we won wars. A lot of them were country boys. A lot of them were farmers. Very few of them have weird pronouns. All of them are considered bad people by the uniformed MSNBC viewers wearing stars and their civilian overlords.
No, those young people wanted to fight and win for their country. That’s who you want in your military. But that’s not who the current leadership wants in their military. These young people won’t conform. These young people won’t comply. All they will do is kill the enemy, but that’s not important. What’s important is submission and obedience to the woke agenda, except the guys who are the best combat arms soldiers aren’t the kind of guys who are good at pretending men who are pretending to be women are actually women.
Oh, and they also aren’t the kind of folks who would fulfill the current commander-in-chief’s sick fantasies about turning our soldiers on dissident Americans.
It’s a disaster, but it can be fixed. We just need a president committed to doing it. See, the military is a hierarchical organization. It takes on the tenor of its commander. We have a chance to get President Trump back in 2025. He’s been burned bad by our current crop of generals and admirals before, so this is personal. If he devotes the time, the effort, and the political capital to do it, he can change the current pseudo-military back into a real military very quickly. He can fire the failed generals and admirals, ban the wokeness, reject the transsexual insanity, and reconfigure the United States military into the deadly killing machine that it should be. But right now, our military leadership is more likely to get its own soldiers killed than to kill our enemies. And that’s a disgrace.
For those of you who don’t like Donald Trump and don’t want to vote for him, remember that your failure to support him means leaving our troops in the hands of these incompetent bureaucrats. Pull the lever for Trump for their sakes.
https://townhall.com/columnists/kurtschlichter/2024/03/07/the-good-news-about-our-failing-military-trump-can-fix-it-n2636179
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/ai-piloted-ghost-bat-could-be-us-secret-weapon-in-potential-conflicts-with-russia-and-china/ar-BB1jvxZB?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=5b37c56671554f69b40d7137cf1b97c4&ei=213
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/politics/trump-and-obama-s-white-house-physician-was-quietly-demoted-by-the-navy-for-misconduct-on-the-job-report/ar-BB1jzC4H?ocid=msedgdhp&pc=DCTS&cvid=c8c7a50fcce34487a6b4c432b88d4267&ei=65
hmmmm......
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I fear that if Dems can’t find enough votes to mail in and hence overcome all the voters they are alienating they will opt instead to involve us in a European war merely to introduce a variable to the electoral equation and see what shakes out:
https://weapons.substack.com/p/biden-and-macron-threaten-ukraine?r=1qo1e&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=email&fbclid=IwAR0Jvqfglam4u7znRMkrKHPVbV5l-2_gMiTdWZTPzghc6L0TssVx3plqKOU&triedRedirect=true
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This gent devastatingly dissects Biden’s Palestinian harbor plans. Indeed, do we really want the same administration that brought us the ignominious Afghan retreat to demonstrate it’s forgotten the lessons on the Marine barracks in Lebanon and the lack of armor in Somalia to place a bunch of logistics troops in Gaza? Are they even unable to grasp the basest self-interest: they will be entering the home stretch of an ugly election season where they will be a single VBIED away from the mother of all October surprise? In exchange for what, Michigan’s Electoral College votes?
I know! Let’s raise needing to fill an inside straight … and blame Trump if it doesn’t pan out.
Idiot(s):
Cynical Publius
@CynicalPublius
I have been trying to explain the folly of the Gaza humanitarian aid port mission in several prior piecemeal Tweets, but I think I owe it to my followers to put all the issues in one place, so that is what I am doing in this Tweet.
First of all, please know that I have a ton of lifetime experience with expeditionary military logistics, in terms of establishing lodgments as part of 82nd Airborne operations, establishing sea ports of debarkation for moving heavy US equipment into areas of operations and linking them up with their soldiers, and working with the 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) through various operations (although I never served in that unit directly). I rarely call myself an expert on anything, but I am an expert on Army and Joint expeditionary logistics, so I speak here with some authority.
Here are some facts you need to know:
1. The 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary) (“7th Trans”) is a unique strategic capability in the US military’s inventory. Think the Mulberries on D-Day in WWII—these guys have the ability to establish functioning seaports in austere areas, bringing supplies and equipment across the shore in undeveloped areas, and they are very, very good at it. Despite their incredible skill at building floating ports and bringing supplies ashore, they lack the organic capability to defend themselves against high intensity attacks by enemies. They need and rely on external security elements, both in the form of Navy or Coast Guard patrol boats, but also in the form of ground combat arms forces (Army or USMC) securing the beachhead across which supplies will be delivered.
2. The port that 7th Trans will develop has a doctrinal name: Joint Logistics Over the Shore, or “JLOTS.” JLOTS has its own doctrinal publication for all services, called Joint Publication 4-01.6, the cover of which is shown below.
3. JLOTS potentially brings all of the military services into play depending on the scenario. Joint Pub 4-01.6 does a good job of highlighting each service’s role, and if you are really interested in this, the pub is available online.
4. Alarmingly, the news coming out of the White House and the Pentagon suggests that no U.S. beach security will be present. Today, the Pentagon Press Spokesman, USAF Maj. Gen. Patrick S. Ryder, stated that the current U.S. plan will "avoid U.S. forces from having to be on the coast” and that "partners will be on the shore to receive the causeway and anchor it.”
5. Having read that, I want to point out a section of Joint Pub: 4-01.6, from Appendix J, Section 3: "Beach Security: The provision and execution of beach area security is completely scenario-dependent. In the early post-assault phase of an amphibious operation, security of the beach reception area may be carried out by air, ground, and naval combat forces. At the other end of the spectrum, as would normally be expected in a JLOTS operation, security in a nonhostile overseas environment may be provided largely by the host nation.”
6. What I just posted above is super important. The US military is a slave to its own doctrine, and it is clear that we are choosing to believe that this operation is in a "nonhostile overseas environment” so beach security protecting our troops as they deliver supplies across the shore will "be provided largely by the host nation.” It is abundantly clear that the Biden Administration wishes to characterize this operation as purely humanitarian in nature, hence the constant refrain of “we won’t have boots on the ground” (tell that to the 7th Trans soldiers whose boots will hit those Gaza beaches, BTW), which leaves us only with the doctrinal idea of such security being "provided largely by the host nation.” What does that mean here? Will Hamas be the beach security? Or maybe the IDF? (Who will be constantly under fire from Hamas, BTW.)
7. Both of these “host nation” beach security concepts spell disaster for US troops. If Hamas is security, supplies will be stolen and the Iranian-backed Hamas will figure out how that “security” can be turned into a way to kill massive numbers of Americans. IDF security will be only slightly less problematic, as Americans will come under the same fire as the IDF, and the linkage between IDF and US forces will be used for all kinds of Pallywood propaganda, linking the US to every fake, staged killing of a Gaza child.
8. IMO, the only way to do this AND protect American lives is to deploy an Army or USMC infantry battalion task force to secure the beachhead, equipped with robust air defense, military intelligence, indirect fire, combat engineer and medical capabilities. Anything less puts American lives at grossly unnecessary risk, but POTUS won’t do this as he needs to pretend there are “no boots on the ground.”
So those are kind of the underlying, key facts I want you all to know, but some other high level issues/thoughts are important I thinkalso:
-Biden is doing this solely to win 100,000 Muslim votes in Michigan, and the troops are purely political pawns in this wretched game. This is despicable.
-The idea of minimizing combat unit footprint for political reasons in what is ostensibly a “humanitarian aid” mission is exactly what happened in Somalia, with disastrous results.
-7th Trans is a unique, one-of-a-kind, strategic combat capability of the U.S. military. Why are we squandering this essential unit in a mission that does nothing to promote U.S. national security? While 7th Trans is doing this mission, it is unavailable for deployment to actually strategically important areas like the South China Sea or elsewhere.
-If this mission goes in, we will be supplying Hamas AND Israel. What sort of malevolent nation supplies both sides of a bloody war?
My final thoughts are this:
(a) There is no way we should be doing this JLOTS deployment.
(b) But if we INSIST on doing this mission, beach security needs to be provided by US combat forces, or a lot of our troops will die.
I encourage you to call your Senator or Congressperson and tell them you are against spilling more American blood in this hapless, witless, half-brained, purely political boondoggle, and offer the solutions (a) or (b) above.
Thank you.
https://x.com/CynicalPublius/status/1766622447112016233?s=20
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U.S. Dominates Foreign Weapons Market as Russian Exports Plummet
American arms sales abroad total three times that of second-place France, annual report says
By
Brett Forrest
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Michael R. Gordon
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Updated March 11, 2024 11:38 am ET
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The U.S. is shipping Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bombs to Ukraine, according to a U.S. defense official. While analysts say the GLSDBs won’t be Kyiv’s most powerful or longest-range weapon, here’s how they could add significant flexibility and capacity to military operations against Russia. Photo illustration: Mia Hariz
The U.S. bolstered its position as the world’s dominant arms exporter, accounting for more than 40% of the global trade in weapons over a recent five-year period, while Russia saw its sales abroad drop by more than half because of the war in Ukraine, according to a new report.
The latest data, released Sunday by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI, reflects, in part, the global conflict in Ukraine. Russia has reoriented its defense industry to support its war there, while the U.S. has sent weapons in large quantities to Kyiv. Concerns over China’s military ambitions are also fueling U.S. sales to its partners and allies in Asia.
SIPRI, a global authority on arms trade and production, releases data annually in five-year blocks, since arms deals between states run on multiyear cycles of ordering, production and shipment. Sunday’s figures cover the five-year period ending in January and are based on weapons deliveries.
“The U.S.A. has increased its global role as an arms supplier—an important aspect of its foreign policy,” said Mathew George, the director of Sipri’s arms transfers program. “This comes at a time when the U.S.A.’s economic and geopolitical dominance is being challenged by emerging powers.”
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Russia, at one point a U.S. peer in arms exports, has fallen to third place, while France leapfrogged to second place in the rankings. China was fourth, Germany fifth. The five top countries on the SIPRI list accounted for 75% of all arms exports.
U.S. exports grew 17%, with the American share of global exports expanding to 42% from 34%. The U.S. sent arms to 107 countries, more than the total for the next two largest exporters combined.
Amid expanding global conflict and instability, and a resultant hunger for weapons, the U.S. has used domestic defense production to strengthen alliances and partnerships.
Ukraine, until recently a limited importer of U.S. arms, accounted for 4.7% of U.S. weapons exports in the study’s time period and 17% of those that the U.S. sent to Europe.
In the past two years, according to SIPRI figures, Ukraine was the world’s fourth-largest arms importer, receiving transfers of major arms from more than 30 countries.
As has been the case in recent years, the largest share of U.S. arms exports—38%—went to countries in the Middle East; 28% went to European countries. For the first time in 25 years, the U.S. was the largest arms supplier to Asia and Oceania, reflecting Washington’s rising concern over China’s designs on Taiwan and the region broadly.
The Scranton Army Ammunition Plant in Scranton, Pa. PHOTO: MATT ROURKE/ASSOCIATED PRESS
India, Saudi Arabia and Qatar were the top three weapons importers.
Russia’s war with Ukraine—principally the expansion of that war two years ago—has withered Moscow’s defense-export business. Russian export volume plummeted 52% from 2022 to last year.
Russia’s arms sales have fallen from the Soviet Union’s Cold War highs, and “the internal needs of the war against Ukraine has contributed, more recently, to the decline in Russian weapons available for transfer,” said Richard Grimmett, an expert on arms sales who served for decades as an analyst at the Congressional Research Service.
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In 2019, Russia shipped major weapons to 31 countries. Last year, that number fell to just a dozen, as Russia exploits its production capacity for use by its own forces.
China’s arms exports decreased, as did its weapons imports, the figures reflecting a squeeze in the availability of Russian arms and Beijing’s need to replace them with domestic systems and munitions. China, which accounted for nearly 6% of global arms exports, sent major arms to 40 states, although 61% of these exports went to Pakistan.
“China is making a great effort to improve the technological sophistication and capabilities of its systems but items such as the J-20 aircraft are not ready for export,” said Trevor Taylor, a director at the Royal United Services Institute, a London defense and security think tank.
China’s growing military power appears to be driving U.S. arms sales to allies and partners, particularly Japan, South Korea and Australia. Over the past five years, according to the report, U.S. arms exports to Japan increased by 161%.
SIPRI figures show that for the first time, France is the world’s second-largest arms exporter. Its exports nearly doubled because of a sharp increase in transfers of Rafale combat aircraft, mostly to countries in the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia, which have sought to avoid dependence on either the U.S. or Russia.
Write to Brett Forrest at brett.forrest@wsj.com and Michael R. Gordon at michael.gordon@wsj.com
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https://americanmind.org/salvo/extremism-on-duty/
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https://amgreatness.com/2024/03/13/vance-introduces-bill-to-re-mobilize-american-defense-production/
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BYAE2jmD-bE&t=126s
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second
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/duty-honor-outrage-change-to-west-point-s-mission-statement-sparks-controversy/ar-BB1jTXHP?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=ec63eeff1b654d558c42a72095e8dc57&ei=25
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Biden’s Budget Neglects the Military
Sequestration and chronic underfunding have opened a yawning gap in American strength and readiness.
By Michael J. Boskin and Kiran Sridhar
March 14, 2024 5:41 pm ET
President Biden has again proposed a vastly inadequate Defense Department budget. His proposal for 2025 is a mere 1% increase from this year’s agreed level. Adjusted for inflation, it’s about $140 billion below the 2010 budget that many analysts, including these pages, deemed insufficient in far less challenging times. While America’s military remains the strongest and most capable in the world, our advantage over potential adversaries has been shrinking rapidly. We must do better if we are to deter our enemies.
For decades, the nation expected the military to be able to fight and win two wars simultaneously. That expectation has been gradually reduced to winning one war while deterring “opportunistic aggression” elsewhere. The Biden administration has placed less emphasis on military capability and more on tools such as sanctions. Yet at a Hoover Institution conference we convened in early 2023, a bipartisan group of three dozen former top leaders from the Pentagon, Congress, think tanks and academia agreed that insufficient and inflexible budgeting ensures the military will struggle to meet even this diminished standard. As Colin Powell once put it, “Show me your budget and I’ll show you my strategy.”
The Navy can’t send ships it doesn’t have to keep sea lanes open. The Army can’t deploy troops it has been unable to recruit and train. The budget is the basis for modernizing technology, replacing old equipment and restoring the defense industrial base with capacity to supply needed stockpiles.
Following mandatory sequestration cuts and endless continuing resolutions, U.S. defense spending has never returned to that 2010 level. Even sizable supplemental aid for Ukraine and Israel wouldn’t get it close this year. The cumulative funding gap since 2010 totals about $2 trillion in today’s dollars (and Mr. Biden’s 10-year plan fails even to keep up with inflation). While only some of that money would have enhanced current readiness, the shortfall has still battered the military’s capabilities. With an average age of 28 years, only 70% of combat aircraft are mission-ready. The Navy is retiring a submarine every two years, while China, which already has the world’s largest navy, recently deployed advanced subs that can run silent.
What’s necessary to catch up? Sustained yearly increases of $100 billion or more—about 0.4% to 0.5% of gross domestic product. The Reagan-era buildup that helped win the Cold War peaked at 6% of GDP, about twice the current level, which is near a historically low point.
Among the most urgent priorities: a larger Navy with greater sea-lift capacity and advanced submarines; modern air- and missile-defense systems; a larger Army; expanded forward-basing capabilities, especially in the Pacific; modernized nuclear deterrence; upgraded fighters and bombers in a portfolio matched to mission needs; a rebuilt defense industrial base; and increased capabilities in cyber and space, where Russia threatens to disable our satellite communications.
Fiscal constraints from excessive deficit spending in recent decades, and a deteriorating outlook driven by Social Security and Medicare, mean the defense buildup will need more bang for the buck as well as more bucks. Some allies must step up their spending and integrate their forces better with ours, as Japan is doing. But there is no substitute for American military supremacy.
The public and lawmakers will justifiably demand accountability. The Pentagon is hardly a paragon of efficiency. Despite progress, the Defense Department recently failed its sixth straight audit. Three reforms, among many possibilities, would make the Pentagon much more efficient.
First, around $100 billion of the defense budget funds activities not closely related to national security—including environmental, educational and healthcare programs. Many of those programs should be shifted to different agencies, with some of the current funding reallocated to core military capabilities. Second, the military should buy more up-to-date and less expensive commercial technology. Third, we should trim congressional micromanagement, which hamstrings the Pentagon from operating more efficiently. In 1970 the National Defense Authorization Act was 10 pages long and passed in one day by voice vote; today, it is 100 times as long and filled with onerous requirements. Pentagon leaders should have more flexibility, with appropriate accountability.
Congress also should separate the investment account from the rest of the budget, the better to highlight new capital investment, depreciation and inventory depletion. Borrowing to acquire assets, as a family does with a mortgage or car loan, is far more sensible than borrowing to finance regular continuing expenses. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s huge military investment for World War II and Ronald Reagan’s buildup that convinced the Soviets they couldn’t win the Cold War are historic examples of wise debt financing.
We see reasons for optimism. Over the past three years, bipartisan majorities in a Congress with growing numbers of recent veterans added billions of dollars to Mr. Biden’s inadequate requests. The 2024 NDAA enables the Pentagon to employ some multiyear contracts for critical munitions and missiles. Polling suggests that while the public greatly overestimates the defense share of the budget, it wants more information and backs increased spending.
But episodic supplemental appropriations are no substitute for a consistently adequate budget. And as Reagan showed, only a determined president can persuade a war-weary public and wary Congress to support the sustained investment in national security that is the foundation of freedom, peace and prosperity. The next president will have a lot on his plate, but rebuilding the nation’s military must be job No. 1.
Mr. Boskin is a Hoover Institution senior fellow and economics professor at Stanford. He served as chairman of the president’s council of economic advisers, 1989-93. Mr. Sridhar is an investment affiliate at Shield Capital and a senior fellow at the McCrary Institute for Cybersecurity. They are co-editors, with John Rader, of “Defense Budgeting for a Safer World: The Experts Speak.”
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Drone Swarms Are About to Change the Balance of Military Power
On today’s battlefields, drones are a manageable threat. When hundreds of them can be harnessed to AI technology, they will become a tool of conquest.
By Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis
March 14, 2024 10:00 am ET
The Shahed-model drone that killed three U.S. service members at a remote base in Jordan on Jan. 28 cost around $20,000. It was part of a family of drones built by Shahed Aviation Industries Research Center, an Iranian company run by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. A thousand miles away and three days later, on the night of Jan. 31 into the morning of Feb. 1, unmanned maritime drones deployed by Ukraine’s secretive Unit 13 sunk the $70 million Russian warship Ivanovets in the Black Sea. And for the past several months, Houthi proxies have shut down billions of dollars of trade through the Gulf of Aden through similarly inexpensive drone attacks on maritime shipping. Drones have become suddenly ubiquitous on the battlefield—but we are only at the dawn of this new age in warfare.
This would not be the first time that a low-cost technology and a new conception of warfare combined to supplant high-cost technologies based on old ways. History is littered with similar stories. A favorite comes from the time of Alexander the Great. His conquests are as much a technological story as a political one. When Alexander’s army stepped onto the battlefield it was not only with a new technology—the sarissa, a 16-foot spear—but also with a new conception of how to use that weapon in tight, impregnable phalanxes. These heavily armed formations allowed Alexander to repel Persian armored chariots and Indian war elephants and to march deep into the subcontinent.
The most formidable element of American power-projection has long been the warship. After the Oct. 7 attacks against Israel, the Biden administration sent two carrier battle groups to the region to deter Iranian aggression. One of those carriers, the USS Gerald R. Ford, was on its maiden voyage, having recently been completed at a price tag of $13 billion. This makes it the most expensive warship in history.
For that same sum, a nation could purchase 650,000 Shahed drones. It would only take a few of those drones finding their target to cripple and perhaps sink the Ford. Fortunately, the Ford and other U.S. warships possess ample missile defense systems that make it highly improbable that a few, or even a few dozen, Shahed drones could land direct hits. But rapid developments in AI are changing that.
Drones are simple, cheap and available to militaries the world over—they’re the sarissas of today. But what those militaries have yet to achieve is the conception of war that will fulfill the potential of these unmanned systems. Much as the sarissa changed the face of warfare 2,000 years ago when employed in a phalanx of well-trained soldiers, the drone will change the face of warfare when employed in swarms directed by AI. This moment hasn’t yet arrived, but it is rushing to meet us. If we’re not prepared, these new technologies deployed at scale could shift the global balance of military power.
The future of warfare won’t be decided by weapons systems but by systems of weapons, and those systems will cost less. Many of them already exist, whether they’re the Shahed drones attacking shipping in the Gulf of Aden or the Switchblade drones destroying Russian tanks in the Donbas or smart seaborne mines around Taiwan. What doesn’t yet exist are the AI-directed systems that will allow a nation to take unmanned warfare to scale. But they’re coming.
A few Shahed drones are mostly a hassle, easily swatted from the sky except in the rare case when they score a lucky hit. They are best at blinding radars, disrupting communications and attacking small numbers of troops, as they did tragically in Jordan. But dozens or hundreds of drones in AI-directed swarms will have the capacity to overwhelm defenses and destroy even advanced platforms. Nations that depend on large, expensive systems like aircraft carriers, stealth aircraft or even battle tanks could find themselves vulnerable against an adversary who deploys a variety of low-cost, easily dispersed and long-range unmanned weapons.
Small inexpensive “off the shelf” drones like those Ukraine is using against Russia, and Hamas is deploying against Israel, are transforming modern warfare. To train American soldiers to counter this threat, the U.S. military recently opened a specialized drone warfare school. Photo: Christopher Wilson/Fort Sill Public AffairsAt its core, AI is a technology based on pattern recognition. In military theory, the interplay between pattern recognition and decision-making is known as the OODA loop—observe, orient, decide, act. The OODA loop theory, developed in the 1950s by Air Force fighter pilot John Boyd, contends that the side in a conflict that can move through its OODA loop fastest will possess a decisive battlefield advantage.
For example, of the more than 150 drone attacks on U.S. forces since the Oct. 7 attacks, in all but one case the OODA loop used by our forces was sufficient to subvert the attack. Our warships and bases were able to observe the incoming drones, orient against the threat, decide to launch countermeasures and then act. Deployed in AI-directed swarms, however, the same drones could overwhelm any human-directed OODA loop. It’s impossible to launch thousands of autonomous drones piloted by individuals, but the computational capacity of AI makes such swarms a possibility.
This will transform warfare. The race won’t be for the best platforms but for the best AI directing those platforms. It’s a war of OODA loops, swarm versus swarm. The winning side will be the one that’s developed the AI-based decision-making that can outpace their adversary. Warfare is headed toward a brain-on-brain conflict.
The Department of Defense is already researching a “brain-computer interface,” which is a direct communications pathway between the brain and an AI. A recent study by the RAND Corporation examining how such an interface could “support human-machine decision-making” raised the myriad ethical concerns that exist when humans become the weakest link in the wartime decision-making chain. To avoid a nightmare future with battlefields populated by fully autonomous killer robots, the U.S. has insisted that a human decision maker must always remain in the loop before any AI-based system might conduct a lethal strike.
But will our adversaries show similar restraint? Or would they be willing to remove the human to gain an edge on the battlefield? The first battles in this new age of warfare are only now being fought. It’s easy to imagine a future, however, where navies will cease to operate as fleets and will become schools of unmanned surface and submersible vessels, where air forces will stand down their squadrons and stand up their swarms, and where a conquering army will appear less like Alexander’s soldiers and more like a robotic infestation.
Much like the nuclear arms race of the last century, the AI arms race will define this current one. Whoever wins will possess a profound military advantage. Make no mistake, if placed in authoritarian hands, AI dominance will become a tool of conquest, just as Alexander expanded his empire with the new weapons and tactics of his age. The ancient historian Plutarch reminds us how that campaign ended: “When Alexander saw the breadth of his domain, he wept, for there were no more worlds to conquer.”
Elliot Ackerman and James Stavridis are the authors of “2054,” a novel that speculates about the role of AI in future conflicts, just published by Penguin Press. Ackerman, a Marine veteran, is the author of numerous books and a senior fellow at Yale’s Jackson School of Global Affairs. Admiral Stavridis, U.S. Navy (ret.), was the 16th Supreme Allied Commander of NATO and is a partner at the Carlyle Group.
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of course unless it is politically correct @ air force academy:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/to-combat-bullying-and-extremism-air-force-academy-turns-to-social-media-sleuthing/ar-BB1kl831?ocid=msedgntphdr&cvid=9d56a4d5d4404088de18f6d1b6118a3d&ei=23\\
VDH has pointed out that the deficit in military recruitment is primarily due to decrease in white males signing up.
Well white males have been the predominant members of the military and of those who died defending this nation.
Wokesters:
US enemy -China, Russia, N Korea, Iran, Jihadis, and white males.
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My suspicion is that creeping PC/DEI foolishness was behind this change, not that anyone involved would cop to it:
Tue, 03/19/2024 - 9:32am
Tone Deaf at West Point
Once again, the Army fails to “read the room.”'
By Martin Stanton
I wasn’t commissioned out of the United States Military Academy / USMA (given my habitual truancy and dismal academic record in high school, I wouldn’t have been accepted even if I’d applied) but I have a lot of respect for West Point as an institution. Sadly, it’s gotten to the point that whenever I see that the USMA is in the news, I inwardly cringe before I even read the story. Watching West Point step on rake after rake these past few years has been painful. Nobody likes to see an old friend fallen on hard times.
The latest public relations debacle is taking “Duty, Honor, Country” out of the school’s mission statement.
Granted, “Duty, Honor, Country” is still the motto of West Point and it’s carved into all sorts of edifices up there and on uniform patches and for all I know it’s embroidered on each cadet’s underwear. “Duty, Honor, Country” isn’t going away.
So why take it out of the school’s mission statement and replace it with “Army Values”? Sure, mission statements get re-written from time to time, but why drop the school’s motto from the mission statement? It’s three words and two comma’s – they couldn’t have been that hard up for space on the document. Here’s the change:
“To build, educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets to be commissioned leaders of character committed to the Army Values and ready for a lifetime of service to the Army and Nation”.
Could the authors of the updated mission statement not have embraced the healing power of “and”? for example:
“To build, educate, train, and inspire the Corps of Cadets to be commissioned leaders of character committed to Duty, Honor, Country and the Army Values, ready for a lifetime of service to the Army and Nation”.
More importantly, why change the mission statement now at all? Why was it necessary? Day to day nobody looks at the mission statement. I doubt anyone is doing a thing different at West Point because of this change to mission statement. Why did they pick this moment to change it? Did somebody need the OER bullet that bad?
It’s hard to imagine the leadership at West Point (or on the Army staff) is so out of touch as to not be aware of the mood of the nation. West Point is a touchstone to the American people. An increasingly large segment of the population is becoming convinced that the government and its institutions no longer share their values. A story about “Duty, Honor, Country” being removed from the school’s mission statement at this particular moment just adds to this sense. The fact that the Superintendent felt it necessary to send out a letter explaining the change to the community of West Point graduates (but not the public at large) only adds to the impression of haughty, elite, insularity.
In baseball terms – It was an unforced error. It was a 1962 NY Mets kind of move.
You have to feel sorry for General Randy George. He’s a good man playing the bad hand that’s been dealt to him. His people failed him on this one. With collapsing recruiting, overextended forces, multiple potential conflicts, diminishing resources and obtuse civilian leadership the Army needs all the friends it can get. In this election year where the entire country is dialed up to 11 on the rage meter, removing the words “Duty, Honor, Country” from any policy document at West Point was bound to be incendiary. Holding off on changing the mission statement until next year would not have impacted any aspect of USMA operations. Now he has this needless distraction to deal with.
He’s probably looking at West Point and channeling Casey Stengall right about now…
You look up and down the bench and you have to say to yourself, "Can't anybody here play this game?"
(Editor's Note: Also consider the Superintendent's letter at this link: https://sallyport.westpointaog.org/news/1923295)
https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/tone-deaf-west-point-once-again-army-fails-read-room
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/what-the-us-army-should-learn-from-ukraine-s-hasty-retreat-from-a-russian-assault/ar-BB1kr0sn?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=a1eab20c1b8f4dca80abd117e5afc417&ei=21
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Current admin screwing the pooch re military & intelligence issues worldwide:
Is Biden listening to any of his military or intelligence advisors?
The Hill News / by Jonathan Sweet and Mark Toth / Mar 28, 2024 at 7:28 AM
There is a pattern to the series of bad decisions coming from President Joe Biden’s Oval Office. They are increasingly putting the nation’s security at heightened risk by naively playing into the hands of Russian President Vladimir Putin, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Military setbacks in Ukraine, Chinese provocations in the Indo-Pacific and the placating of Iran with the release of frozen and sanctioned funds are all combining to put Americans and our allies in harm’s way. Given the totality of these unforced errors, it is difficult to believe that Biden is listening to the advice of his top military and intelligence advisers.
The Three Horsemen are coming for the U.S. and our allies. Yet Washington seems to be crassly predicating its national security moves based on election-year politics. That may work in a time of peace, but we are in global war right now against totalitarian regimes that reject our way of life and are intent on undermining, if not destroying, our democratic institutions. Hence Russia and China’s multipolar world concept and the formation of BRICS.
Biden is the chief executive now. He is no longer a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, where he once served as both ranking minority member and as chairman. Political calculus is no longer an option. Rather, the nation’s security must be his one and only guiding star if the U.S. is to thwart our enemies’ ambitions.
To the extent that Biden needs to factor in politics, he needs to do so by overcoming what Obama-era Secretary of Defense Robert Gates penned about him in 2014: "I think he [then-Vice President Biden] has been wrong on nearly every major foreign policy and national security issue over the past four decades.”
Fast-forward to today, and Biden is arguably adding to that from a narrow national security perspective. He has created a permissive environment for our adversaries to operate in.
The most damaging of his mistakes have been a tolerance for open borders, surges in fentanyl overdoses and deaths due to Chinese drug trafficking, and the multi-faceted disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, followed by Moscow-backed coup d'états in Sudan and Niger, and Hamas's attack on Israel have put him squarely on his back foot.
Meanwhile, Tehran’s nuclear ambitions continue unabated. Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-backed proxy militias are attacking U.S bases throughout the Middle East, and Iran-backed Houthi rebels are attacking commercial and naval shipping lanes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.
China continues to threaten Taiwan and is actively harassing Filipino commercial vessels in the South China Sea. North Korea persists with its gamesmanship and provocations against South Korea and Japan. Yesterday, after hinting at peace talks, North Korean Leader Kim Jong-Un’s powerful sister, Kim Yo Jong, ruled out any contact or negotiation with Tokyo.
Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are dictating the conditions; Biden's Washington is constantly in reaction mode, and as a result, unacceptably failing, which makes the world a much more dangerous place. And election-year politics is making it more perilous still.
This may read as a political take. It is not. Rather, this is a call for Biden and Congress to take the politics out of national security. The letters D and R are secondary to "U.S.A." Our messaging applies equally to Republicans and Democrats and as much to Biden as it does to House Speaker Mike Johnson (R-La.).
Politics simply cannot dictate national security. Nor will politics deliver us from the peril our country currently faces.
As crafted, Biden’s National Security Strategy does not provide a solution either. Biden is absolutely correct in his opening statement: “How we respond to the tremendous challenges and the unprecedented opportunities we face today will determine the direction of our world and impact the security and prosperity of the American people for generations to come.”
It is past time to get on with responding. It is time Washington started setting conditions. As they say in the military, “move out and draw fire.”
As retired Army Lt. General Ben Hodges, the former U.S. Army Commander Europe, recently argued, “We spend too much time worrying about what the Russians might do. Instead, we should make them worry about what we're capable of." The same line of reasoning must also apply to the Chinese, Iranians and North Koreans.
NATO’s newest member has a plan. While focused on Putin and his war of aggression against Ukraine, its core principles are globally germane. Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billström said in an interview with Euractiv, “We have to create more strategic difficulties for Russia.” Billström is right, as is French President Emmanuel Macron, with his stated willingness to place French troops in Ukraine, if needed, as a redline.
Biden needs to heed the advice and counsel of the career professionals, as his political appointees have clearly taken him down the wrong path. Ice cream cones and "root cause" discussions will solve nothing. Biden needs to leverage his combatant commanders, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the retired Army four-star general serving as his secretary of Defense, as well as retired generals sitting on the bench.
The restoration of America's influence and image in the world begins with a plan, not with a strategy to win a political election. That means playing well with others — and for Biden, that means Republicans. For the Speaker, that means Democrats.
Ukraine does not have the luxury of waiting until November. Nor, quite frankly, do the border states, sanctuary cities and neighborhoods now under siege by criminal gangs. It is that bad, and past time to do something about it.
Col. (ret.) Jonathan Sweet served 30 years as a military intelligence officer. Mark Toth writes on national security and foreign policy\
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/4559925-is-biden-listening-to-any-of-his-military-or-intelligence-advisors/
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but with design problems
single engine no durable
too much heat emitted
high cost overruns - not reliable or durable
this sums it up:
"“The F-35 has pretty good range for a single-engine fighter. It is stealth, and so you could obviously get closer to Russian air space before being effectively targeted than you could, let’s say, with an F-15,” noting that with 600 to 700 F-35s in U.S. and allied air forces, “we have hundreds of them, and at any given time, some of them are probably capable of flying.”
You have to be kidding me! :-o
https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/americas-controversial-stealth-fighter-jet-can-now-carry-nukes-5606846?utm_source=Morningbrief&src_src=Morningbrief&utm_campaign=mb-2024-04-01&src_cmp=mb-2024-04-01&utm_medium=email&est=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAYuw4IktV6djJ5LwB8GZWBu1axachNqyXsy29F2zjSh8%3D
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https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=98e91b52b183630bc253e84fb345f1c7_660c0207_6d25b5f&selDate=20240402
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(5) NAVY SAYS ALL MAJOR SHIPBUILDING PROGRAMS DELAYED FOR YEARS:
According to a new report from the U.S. Navy, multiple capital ship programs are now facing 12- to 36-month delays after Secretary of the Navy Carlos del Toro ordered a 45-day comprehensive shipbuilding review in January.
“The supply chain is different now,” and workforce attrition in the defense industrial base and supply chain has doubled since the COVID pandemic in some areas, Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) commander Vice Adm. James Downey said.
Why It Matters: This is another sign that the U.S. defense industrial base is depleted, and it will likely be difficult for the U.S. to turn economic power into military power ahead of a conflict with China as soon as 2027. – R.C.
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Israel has something that appears to have a targeted/focused EMP capability among other features:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/pauliddon/2021/11/11/israel-unveils-revolutionary-new-scorpius-electronic-warfare-system/?sh=38b7bb332fdd&fbclid=IwAR2Lt9FapYDJRStcmsRKxr6pz_KQP2X9Kb_RKJKcU5HjAQoGYZodVsAJJ-Y_aem_AYv5Q2uItvgVPsyHri2hu5B09msQ8ffET4_QO5uczMHGeUziRuilkWFhakY1Kg09HTjdz4vK2iTHTwy6Ztv-GwIS
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Good thing the Biden admin is picking a fight in Eastern Europe and roiling the Mid-East while its “readiness” policies reduces US military readiness. Perhaps they see the inevitable consequences of doing so to be a feature rather than a bug?
https://thefederalist.com/2024/03/29/if-diversity-is-our-strength-why-is-our-military-so-weak/
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https://thefederalist.com/2024/03/29/if-diversity-is-our-strength-why-is-our-military-so-weak/
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The Lessons of Israeli Missile Defense
Biden hails what he once opposed, but the aerial threat is escalating.
By
The Editorial Board
Follow
Updated April 15, 2024 6:22 pm ET
The performance of Israeli air defenses, combined with assistance from U.S. jets and interceptors, saved countless lives on the weekend. But Iran, Russia and other adversaries are learning from each engagement and probing for weaknesses to exploit. The U.S. needs to do more to deter and protect Americans from future assaults.
It’s no small irony that President Biden is hailing the success of missile and drone defenses over Israel. In the 1980s there was no more dedicated foe of missile defense than Sen. Joe Biden. Democrats have resisted or under-financed missile defenses for decades on grounds that they’re too expensive and too easily defeated by new technology.
Progressives oppose defenses because they think vulnerability somehow makes war less likely. On nuclear arms, the Union of Concerned Scientists and others prefer the doctrine of mutual-assured destruction to being able to shoot down enemy ICBMs.
Israel’s defenses proved how wrong this view is, displaying their practical and strategic value. If the more than 300 drones and ballistic and cruise missiles had reached their targets, Mr. Biden wouldn’t be able to say, as he told Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Saturday night, “take the win.” The mass casualties would have all but guaranteed a large-scale military escalation.
The weekend success of air defenses is a tribute to Israeli strategy and decades of investment in defense technology. U.S. assistance was also crucial—an example of alliance cooperation paying off in both directions. The U.S. helped to finance Israel’s Iron Dome defense system, which evolved into a co-production agreement that also covers gaps in U.S. missile defenses. The weekend exchange shows that Israel’s defense capability is far superior to Iran’s—at least for now.
But enemies never stand still, and the West’s adversaries are adapting their methods and technology to defeat aerial defenses. One threat is overwhelming defenses with sheer numbers. Israel stood up well against Saturday’s large attack, but it had U.S. and other help. It isn’t clear that Israel could have similar success if Hezbollah unleashed its missile arsenal from Lebanon and Syria while Iran attacked from the west and the Houthis from Yemen.
There is also the question of asymmetric cost. Drones are cheap to produce and easy to transport, but they can be expensive to shoot down. They can also arrive in swarms. That’s why a middling power like Iran specializes in drone production. Iran has been a crucial drone supplier to Russia, which deploys them to deadly effect in Ukraine. Azerbaijan’s drone swarms made the difference last year in its war with Armenia.
Kyiv has built its own drone production line and has bought Turkish drones. But the West will need to innovate to counter the problem of having to shoot down drones with interceptors that are a hundred times more expensive. The U.S. military is experimenting with promising technologies such as high-powered microwave weapons.
Iran’s attack also puts into focus, or at least it should, the shortfall in U.S. interceptor production. The U.S. stockpile is thin, and the Biden Administration had to ask Japan to transfer some of its Patriots so the U.S. could maintain enough for its defenses.
The Senate aid bill for Ukraine, Israel and the Pacific includes money to grow production of the most advanced Patriot interceptor to 650 a year from 550 now. But only 650? The U.S. could exhaust a year’s worth of production in mere weeks of intense fighting, and that figure is insufficient for the growing missile threats around the world.
The U.S. military needs to field new technology rapidly while also shifting closer to a wartime footing to produce more current munitions, including the Standard Missile that handles air defense on U.S. Navy destroyers. That means U.S. defense budgets will have to increase. Saturday night’s events are a lesson in why the U.S. never wants to be low on ammunition to defend itself.
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In that this is about Fort Bragg (Liberty) it is of particular interest to me. Obviously a heavy prop slant to this article.
I wonder what the banned symbols actually were , , ,
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/us/3rd-special-forces-group-s-prior-use-of-nazi-symbol-comes-to-light-after-social-media-post/ar-AA1nqDu8?ocid=msedgntp&pc=DCTS&cvid=71e3eecb5c07487bbd7e86f9a7a8f756&ei=6
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The Ongoing Rise of U.S. Debt Amid Geopolitical, Financial and Economic Constraints
Apr 3, 2024 | 18:10 GMT
Political, financial and economic constraints will continue to limit the U.S. government's flexibility in adjusting spending in view of rising defense spending requirements, likely resulting in rising debt levels. In its most recent update of its long-term projections released in March, the Congressional Budget Office projected large fiscal deficits and a continued increase of the debt-to-GDP ratio in the United States driven by increasing entitlement and net interest expenditures. It is unlikely that the projected increase in government spending over the next two decades will cause any financing difficulties, let alone a financial crisis. This is because of the pivotal role of the dollar in the global financial system, the relative attractiveness of U.S. assets and a more favorable growth outlook than in most other advanced economies. Continued large deficits could, of course, lead to higher long-term interest rates, which might then lead the government to rein in the fiscal deficit to prevent too rapid an increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. The current trend of more modest economic growth, at least compared to two decades ago, and large fiscal deficits will, however, translate into greater constraints on defense spending.
U.S. federal government debt stands at $35 trillion, which translates into more than $100,000 per citizen. U.S. federal government debt has more than tripled since the beginning of the century, increasing from 32% of gross domestic product in 2001 to 96% of GDP in 2023. The CBO currently projects the debt-to-GDP ratio will reach 116% of GDP by 2034 and 166% of GDP in 2054. Federal budget deficits will average about 6% of GDP.
Mandatory spending will increase from 13.9% of GDP to 15.1% of GDP over the next 10 years, while discretionary spending is projected to decrease from 6.4% of GDP to 5.1% of GDP, which would represent a substantial squeeze should it come to pass. If the decline in discretionary defense and nondefense spending were to be evenly split, U.S. defense spending would fall to less than 3% of GDP by the middle of the next decade — close to a post-World War II low.
A fiscal adjustment involving reforms to Social Security would help create more space for significant defense expenditure increases, but such reforms are highly unlikely in the short or medium term. Mandatory spending covers expenditures on entitlement and other programs, including Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and several other programs related to health care or the elderly, which require Congress to approve separate legislation and cannot be modified as part of the annual budget process. Discretionary spending, on the other hand, is controlled by the annual budget process and pays for the operations of most federal agencies and national defense. It requires annual authorization. Discretionary spending as a share of GDP has declined gradually over time, while nondiscretionary (or mandatory) spending has continued to increase. An aging population makes it more difficult to substantially reduce entitlement spending, as the elderly account for a more substantial share of the electorate each year. Moreover, U.S. voters regard Social Security as almost on par with constitutionally guaranteed rights, making it very difficult to cut benefits or otherwise reform the entitlement program. At a minimum, this will require any entitlement reform to phase in a reduction of expenditure (relative to the baseline) very gradually so as not to upset actual and potential beneficiaries in terms of their accrued welfare benefits — and even this will prove politically difficult. That neither party supports reforming social security and other programs is evidence of these political constraints, with the last significant entitlement reform that sought to balance the books having taken place in 1983.
In FY 2023, the U.S. federal government spent $6.1 trillion. The U.S. federal government spends more than what the Japanese economy, the world's third-largest, produces.
Mandatory spending accounts for 60% of federal spending, discretionary spending for 30% and interest on debt 10%. Discretionary spending includes defense and nondefense spending with defense spending accounting for 13-15% of federal spending (or roughly half of discretionary spending).
As per the 2020 census, 17% of Americans were aged 65 or older. This share will increase to 23% by 2050. In absolute terms, this age group will increase from 58 million to 82 million.
The political, financial and economic constraints on U.S. defense spending will strengthen over time. Economically, high levels of defense spending are detrimental to long-term growth if spending reduces the availability of national savings and investment, which is typically the case. Even if investment represents a significant share of defense spending, it tends not to have much of an impact on civilian economic productivity. In the short run, however, a sharp increase in defense expenditure can help boost economic growth, particularly in the presence of ample spare capacity. Increased defense expenditures need to be financed through higher debt, increased revenues or budget cuts in other areas. With more resources allocated to consumptive defense spending and no offsets elsewhere, savings and investment will fall, and economic growth will suffer over the medium to long term. Faced with increased geopolitical competition, the need for increased defense spending will make for painful economic, financial and political choices, while increased defense spending (as a share of GDP) will weigh on the longer-term growth outlook. While none of this means that the United States will not be able to increase defense expenditure, it does mean that the economic, financial and political trade-offs and constraints will become more important over time.
In the short run, the government can almost always mobilize massive resources to support defense spending if flanked by appropriate economic and financial measures, such as capital controls, central bank purchases of additional debt issuance, increased taxes or reduced expenditures elsewhere. In 2023, U.S. defense spending (including Department of Energy spending on nuclear weapons) was 3.5% of GDP. In 1953 (during the Korean War), U.S. defense spending reached 11.3% of GDP; in 1968 (during the Vietnam War), 8.6% of GDP. In 1999, it fell to a post-1940 low of 2.7% of GDP before increasing again to reach 4.5% of GDP in 2010 (during the Afghanistan and Iraq wars). Defense spending exceeded 40% of GDP during World War II.
In the long term, however, there are economic limits to defense spending. The reduction of defense spending following the end of the Cold War led to the so-called "peace dividend" that allowed for lower government spending, higher national savings and lower interest rates. Unsustainable defense spending meanwhile drove the USSR into economic stagnation, financial failure and ultimately political collapse.
The United States remains the world's top military spender by a wide margin, but Chinese defense spending has been increasing rapidly on the back of rapid economic growth, which, in turn, is putting increased pressure on U.S. military spending. A decade or so ago, the United States spent more on defense than the rest of the world combined. Today, measured in current dollar terms, U.S. expenditure continues to account for nearly 40% of global spending, while China accounts for less than half of U.S. spending. The size of defense spending matters, but it is not everything. Several caveats apply. First, comparing military spending — even if adjusted for purchasing power parity to capture the effective spending power — is difficult, as different countries include and exclude different defense-related spending categories and items, and some countries' defense expenditure figures lack transparency. Second, even with a purchasing power parity adjustment, it is not obvious that one dollar of defense spending buys an equivalent amount of security. Leaving aside that security is a relative concept, even purchasing power parity is an imperfect metric to compare spending, both in quantitative and qualitative terms, even when adjusted for purchasing power. This is due to differences in terms of what the money is spent on as well as what adjusted dollars can buy, given that advanced military technology is not necessarily traded on international markets and local production costs differ, and sometimes certain defense-related technologies are unavailable for comparison. Moreover, not only what the money is spent on matters, but how it is spent, as well as the ultimate strategic value one gets. For example, directing funds to procurement and development rather than spending them on veterans' pensions or outdated platforms is likely to increase security, particularly in the longer term, and translate to greater military effectiveness.
The United States accounts for almost 40% of global military spending. China and Russia account for a combined 17%, with China accounting for 13% and Russia for 4%. The so-called Big Four European countries account for 9.5%, compared to Russia's 3.9%.
In 2023, U.S. defense expenditure accounted for 3.5% of GDP and China's official defense expenditure for less than half at 1.6% of GDP. Due to much more rapid underlying economic growth, Chinese defense expenditure has been growing much more rapidly in dollar terms without translating into higher expenditure as a share of GDP.
When comparing U.S. and Chinese defense expenditures, it is important to take into consideration differences in terms of force structure and military posture. The U.S. has worldwide commitments and a costly and extensive global security footprint. China does not, and its military forces are geographically much more concentrated. Military spending should therefore at best be seen as a proxy for defense capabilities. In this sense, the political and economic costs the United States faces to increasing defense expenditure act as a constraint. Yet this constraint can be alleviated, at least partly, via means other than increasing defense spending, including better resource allocation. In the long term, however, significant differences in spending will affect the military balance, especially in East Asia.
In current dollar terms, the United States spent a little less than $900 billion and China $300 billion on defense. In 2010, the United States spent $740 billion, compared to Chinese spending of $100 billion. In purchasing power parity terms, Chinese defense spending was about two-thirds of U.S. spending.
In addition to faster economic growth, China has also greater scope to increase defense spending as a share of GDP without jeopardizing its long-term economic outlook because it has excess savings and limited profitable investment opportunities. This should allow it to convert its excess savings into military consumption without unduly undermining the long-term growth outlook; the United States is far more constrained in this respect.