Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on February 13, 2007, 11:39:47 PM
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All:
Once again, Stratfor/Geroge Friedman lay down some deep thinking. Comments?
Marc
PS: I am a lifetime subscriber to Stratfor. What you see here is only a fraction of what they produce.
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Russia's Great-Power Strategy
By George Friedman
Most speeches at diplomatic gatherings aren't worth the time it takes to listen to them. On rare occasion, a speech is delivered that needs to be listened to carefully. Russian President Vladimir Putin gave such a speech over the weekend in Munich, at a meeting on international security. The speech did not break new ground; it repeated things that the Russians have been saying for quite a while. But the venue in which it was given and the confidence with which it was asserted signify a new point in Russian history. The Cold War has not returned, but Russia is now officially asserting itself as a great power, and behaving accordingly.
At Munich, Putin launched a systematic attack on the role the United States is playing in the world. He said: "One state, the United States, has overstepped its national borders in every way ... This is nourishing an arms race with the desire of countries to get nuclear weapons." In other words, the United States has gone beyond its legitimate reach and is therefore responsible for attempts by other countries -- an obvious reference to Iran -- to acquire nuclear weapons.
Russia for some time has been in confrontation with the United States over U.S. actions in the former Soviet Union (FSU). What the Russians perceive as an American attempt to create a pro-U.S. regime in Ukraine triggered the confrontation. But now, the issue goes beyond U.S. actions in the FSU. The Russians are arguing that the unipolar world -- meaning that the United States is the only global power and is surrounded by lesser, regional powers -- is itself unacceptable. In other words, the United States sees itself as the solution when it is, actually, the problem.
In his speech, Putin reached out to European states -- particularly Germany, pointing out that it has close, but blunt, relations with Russia. The Central Europeans showed themselves to be extremely wary about Putin's speech, recognizing it for what it was -- a new level of assertiveness from an historical enemy. Some German leaders appeared more understanding, however: Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier made no mention of Putin's speech in his own presentation to the conference, while Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, praised Putin's stance on Iran. He also noted that the U.S. plans to deploy an anti-missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic was cause for concern -- and not only to Russia.
Putin now clearly wants to escalate the confrontations with the United States and likely wants to build a coalition to limit American power. The gross imbalance of global power in the current system makes such coalition-building inevitable -- and it makes sense that the Russians should be taking the lead. The Europeans are risk-averse, and the Chinese do not have much at risk in their dealings with the United States at the moment. The Russians, however, have everything at risk. The United States is intruding in the FSU, and an ideological success for the Americans in Ukraine would leave the Russians permanently on the defensive.
The Russians need allies but are not likely to find them among other great-power states. Fortunately for Moscow, the U.S. obsession with Iraq creates alternative opportunities. First, the focus on Iraq prevents the Americans from countering Russia elsewhere. Second, it gives the Russians serious leverage against the United States -- for example, by shipping weapons to key players in the region. Finally, there are Middle Eastern states that seek great-power patronage. It is therefore no accident that Putin's next stop, following the Munich conference, was in Saudi Arabia. Having stabilized the situation in the former Soviet region, the Russians now are constructing their follow-on strategy, and that concerns the Middle East.
The Russian Interests
The Middle East is the pressure point to which the United States is most sensitive. Its military commitment in Iraq, the confrontation with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and oil in the Arabian Peninsula create a situation such that pain in the region affects the United States intensely. Therefore, it makes sense for the Russians to use all available means of pressure in the Middle East in efforts to control U.S. behavior elsewhere, particularly in the former Soviet Union.
Like the Americans, the Russians also have direct interests in the Middle East. Energy is a primary one: Russia is not only a major exporter of energy supplies, it is currently the world's top oil producer. The Russians have a need to maintain robust energy prices, and working with the Iranians and Saudis in some way to achieve this is directly in line with Moscow's interest. To be more specific, the Russians do not want the Saudis increasing oil production.
There are strategic interests in the Middle East as well. For example, the Russians are still bogged down in Chechnya. It is Moscow's belief that if Chechnya were to secede from the Russian Federation, a precedent would be set that could lead to the dissolution of the Federation. Moscow will not allow this. The Russians consistently have claimed that the Chechen rebellion has been funded by "Wahhabis," by which they mean Saudis. Reaching an accommodation with the Saudis, therefore, would have not only economic, but also strategic, implications for the Russians.
On a broader level, the Russians retain important interests in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. In both cases, their needs intersect with forces originating in the Muslim world and trace, to some extent, back to the Middle East. If the Russian strategy is to reassert a sphere of influence in the former Soviet region, it follows that these regions must be secured. That, in turn, inevitably involves the Russians in the Middle East.
Therefore, even if Russia is not in a position to pursue some of the strategic goals that date back to the Soviet era and before -- such as control of the Bosporus and projection of naval power into the Mediterranean -- it nevertheless has a basic, ongoing interest in the region. Russia has a need both to limit American power and to achieve direct goals of its own. So it makes perfect sense for Putin to leave Munich and embark on a tour of Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf countries.
The Complexities
But the Russians also have a problem. The strategic interests of Middle Eastern states diverge, to say the least. The two main Islamic powers between the Levant and the Hindu Kush are Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Russians have things they want from each, but the Saudis and Iranians have dramatically different interests. Saudi Arabia -- an Arab and primarily Sunni kingdom -- is rich but militarily weak. The government's reliance on outside help for national defense generates intense opposition within the kingdom. Desert Storm, which established a basing arrangement for Western troops within Saudi Arabia, was one of the driving forces behind the creation of al Qaeda. Iran -- a predominantly Persian and Shiite power -- is not nearly as rich as Saudi Arabia but militarily much more powerful. Iran seeks to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf -- out of both its need to defend itself against aggression, and for controlling and exploiting the oil wealth of the region.
Putting the split between Sunni and Shiite aside for the moment, there is tremendous geopolitical asymmetry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia wants to limit Iranian power, while keeping its own dependence on foreign powers at a minimum. That means that, though keeping energy prices high might make financial sense for the kingdom, the fact that high energy prices also strengthen the Iranians actually can be a more important consideration, depending on circumstances. There is some evidence that recent declines in oil prices are linked to decisions in Riyadh that are aimed at increasing production, reducing prices and hurting the Iranians.
This creates a problem for Russia. While Moscow has substantial room for maneuver, the fact is that lowered oil prices impact energy prices overall, and therefore hurt the Russians. The Saudis, moreover, need the Iranians blocked -- but without going so far as to permit foreign troops to be based in Saudi Arabia itself. In other words, they want to see the United States remain in Iraq, since the Americans serve as the perfect shield against the Iranians so long as they remain there. Putin's criticisms of the United States, as delivered in Munich, would have been applauded by Saudi Arabia prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But in 2007, the results of that invasion are exactly what the Saudis feared -- a collapsed Iraq and a relatively powerful Iran. The Saudis now need the Americans to stay put in the region.
The interests of Russia and Iran align more closely, but there are points of divergence there as well. Both benefit from having the United States tied up, militarily and politically, in wars, but Tehran would be delighted to see a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq that leaves a power vacuum for Iran to fill. The Russians would rather not see this outcome. First, they are quite happy to have the United States bogged down in Iraq and would prefer that to having the U.S. military freed for operations elsewhere. Second, they are interested in a relationship with Iran but are not eager to drive the United States and Saudi Arabia into closer relations. Third, the Russians do not want to see Iran become the dominant power in the region. They want to use Iran, but within certain manageable limits.
Russia has been supplying Iran with weapons. Of particular significance is the supply of surface-to-air missiles that would raise the cost of U.S. air operations against Iran. It is not clear whether the advanced S300PMU surface-to-air missile has yet been delivered, although there has been some discussion of this lately. If it were delivered, this would present significant challenges for U.S. air operation over Iran. The Russians would find this particularly advantageous, as the Iranians would absorb U.S. attentions and, as in Vietnam, the Russians would benefit from extended, fruitless commitments of U.S. military forces in regions not vital to Russia.
Meanwhile, there are energy matters: The Russians, as we have said, are interested in working with Iran to manage world oil prices. But at the same time, they would not be averse to a U.S. attack that takes Iran's oil off the market, spikes prices and enriches Russia.
Finally, it must be remembered that behind this complex relationship with Iran, there historically has been animosity and rivalry between the two countries. The Caucasus has been their battleground. For the moment, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, there is a buffer there, but it is a buffer in which Russians and Iranians are already dueling. So long as both states are relatively weak, the buffer will maintain itself. But as they get stronger, the Caucasus will become a battleground again. When Russian and Iranian territories border each other, the two powers are rarely at peace. Indeed, Iran frequently needs outside help to contain the Russians.
A Complicated Strategy
In sum, the Russian position in the Middle East is at least as complex as the American one. Or perhaps even more so, since the Americans can leave and the Russians always will live on the doorstep of the Middle East. Historically, once the Russians start fishing in Middle Eastern waters, they find themselves in a greater trap than the Americans. The opening moves are easy. The duel between Saudi Arabia and Iran seems manageable. But as time goes on, Putin's Soviet predecessors learned, the Middle East is a graveyard of ambitions -- and not just American ambitions.
Russia wants to contain U.S. power, and manipulating the situation in the Middle East certainly will cause the Americans substantial pain. But whatever short-term advantages the Russians may be able to find and exploit in the region, there is an order of complexity in Putin's maneuver that might transcend any advantage they gain from boxing the Americans in.
In returning to "great power" status, Russia is using an obvious opening gambit. But being obvious does not make it optimal.
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I had hoped for some commentary, but , , , oh well , , ,
Here's another big picture piece on Russia:
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Putin and Progress
By PADMA DESAI
February 16, 2007; Page A14
Whatever the West's grave misgivings about Vladimir Putin, they are not widely shared by the Russian people, who consistently give their president 70% approval ratings in opinion polls. Even former Presidents Gorbachev and Yeltsin, much admired in the U.S., have given a nod of approval to Mr. Putin's "strategic" direction, even though they express reservations about his moves to consolidate federal authority.
Nonetheless, there are two pertinent issues to face. First, would any Russian president succeeding Mr. Putin act differently in foreign policy? Second, is Russia regressing irretrievably into authoritarianism, or is she likely to embrace Western democratic norms despite the zigzags?
The Kremlin's pursuit of national interests in foreign policy, whether we like it or not, reflects a broad agreement among Russians. Indeed, on a whole range of issues ranging from NATO's eastward expansion to Mr. Putin's hardball tactics with the independent states in Russia's neighborhood, the majority of Russians support his decisions. Even Russia's leading reformers regard the neighborhood as Russia's area of interest.
Former Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov, who successfully carried out a series of reforms during his 2000-2004 tenure, insists that Russians "have special interests and responsibilities" in their immediate neighborhood. "We have a long history of shared problems and common tradition, although the former Soviet republics are now independent states," Mr. Kasyanov told me in a December 2004 interview.
Anatoly Chubais, the legendary privatizer of Russian industry, was even more explicit in his pronouncements, suggesting that Russia should become a "liberal empire." In an interview on Vremya TV, he added, "We must be frank and straightforward and assume this mission of leadership, not just as a slogan but as a Russian state policy. I believe this mission of leadership means that Russia is obliged to support in every way the expansion of its business outside Russia."
In short, unlike Europe and Japan, which share U.S. concerns despite occasional differences, Russia always will have geopolitical interests in its immediate neighborhood, extending its decision-making periphery as far as the Middle East and China. This does not imply that the West should uncritically accept specific decisions in pursuit of these interests, such as the expulsion of Georgians from Russia. But even if Russians were to subscribe to liberal Western values as President Bush desires, their future leaders still might choose to define their interests independently. Moscow would continue to engage the U.S. leadership in win-lose dialogues over Russia's determined foreign policy.
But never mind the likelihood that a liberal, democratic Russia might change its foreign-policy style: What are the prospects of such a Russia emerging in the first place? If it's correct to say that a prospering middle class -- dare one call it a bourgeoisie? -- inevitably leads to the rise of democracy, then Russia fits the bill admirably. The transformative changes in Russia, a remarkable development since Mr. Gorbachev's glasnost, are phenomenal. Russians are acquiring private housing, automobiles and fixed and mobile telephones at a dizzying speed. The overall poverty rate has declined from around 35% in the mid-1990s to about 10% today, and 70% of college-age youngsters receive a higher education.
There has been much angst over Russian muscle-flexing on the pricing and supply of oil and gas. However ham-handed, Moscow has simply used its bargaining power to extract better economic terms in situations of bilateral monopoly. Gazprom, the Russian gas supplier, has sought maximum possible terms from its European customers before they switch to alternative energy sources. At the same time, Ukraine and Belarus have bargained with Gazprom over transit charges because Russian gas must pass en route to Europe via pipelines located in their territories.
Russian industry and energy sectors will increasingly adopt market-economy rules and practices as they learn to interact and integrate with Western business. Recognizing this, German Chancellor Angela Merkel signed with Mr. Putin a 2006 agreement in which Wintershall, the energy unit of German chemical giant BASF, and Gazprom exchanged equivalent stakes in early 2006. More contracts are proliferating with French and Italian partners. Russia's giant power company is poised to raise $10 billion in the next two years and to invite Western companies to supply power generating units, technology and management know-how. Gazprom, according to some reports, is set to raise $75 billion in the next decade for financing a variety of projects. Will American businesses be sidelined from lucrative contracts and a liberalizing, market-oriented mission in a fast growing and diversifying Russian economy?
"There is a definite consensus among Russian society and the elite that Russia needs a market economy," Yegor Gaidar, Mr. Yeltsin's young reforming prime minister told me in October 2004. "By contrast, our struggle to form a robust, functioning democracy has not brought decisive results. . . . I do not think that the educated, urban populations in large countries such as Russia can put up with undemocratic regimes for long."
Ms. Desai, Harriman professor of comparative economic systems and director of the Center for Transition Economies at Columbia, is the author of "Conversations on Russia: Reform from Yeltsin to Putin" (Oxford, 2006).
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All:
Although this piece is principally about Poland, I have decided to put it here in this thread about Russia. Stratfor has been very big for a couple of years ago on the subject of Russia and its interpretation of and reaction to US influence in its "near abroad" especially the Ukraine.
I've seen some mention in the news in the last few days about the Russians making noises about pulling out of some sort of missile treaty with the US because of the missile defense missiles that the US is seeking to put in eastern Europe to defend Iranian capabilities (referenced in this article here)
Marc
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stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Trying to Redefine Poland
Polish President Lech Kaczynski on Feb. 17 released a 374-page report on the workings of the recently liquidated Military Intelligence Service (WSI). The report betrays the country's intelligence apparatus of the past 15 years, outing its practices, people, connections and expertise. Opposition leaders have said the report is a guidebook to Poland's national security. Kaczynski dissolved the WSI in October 2006, saying the agency had overstepped its jurisdiction and infiltrated every aspect of Polish life with agents in political parties, media and businesses. The report is intended to make public the problems that led to the WSI's demise; instead, its opponents are calling it one of the largest breaches of Polish national security.
Uproar over the report is increasing, and former Polish President Lech Walesa has called the move political suicide for the president and his identical twin brother, Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski. However, the move fits into their proclaimed agenda of rooting out all old (communist) institutions, protecting Poland against Russia, solidifying Poland on the international stage and becoming the key European ally for the United States.
But this all assumes that the Kaczynski twins do in fact have such an agenda in mind and have not completely fallen off the wagon, as many of their opponents like to believe. The Kaczynskis are internationally known for making brash choices. Since late 2005, the Kaczynskis have gone through myriad Cabinet ministers, collapsed the government and gone head-to-head with the European Union on many substantial policies. Though these moves have given them an unpredictable reputation, they control enough of the government to ensure they cannot be ousted by a vote of no confidence. The twins are clearly consolidating their power in order to reshape the very definition of what Poland is today.
What the Polish fear most is a Russian resurgence as a great power -- an assertion that has recently become more apparent. Russia has been consolidating power at home, expanding its influence through its energy infrastructure and getting involved in international disputes, such as that with Iran. If the Polish are going to consolidate their power, effectively purge Soviet influence and become weighty enough to be the front line against Russia, then this is the time to do it -- not after Russia fully awakens. And the new government has been swift to both restructure itself and gain influence.
In reshaping Poland, Lech Kaczynski is not only purging the old members of government, but also is ensuring that they can never return. Like his predecessors, Kaczynski vowed to root out communists and their collaborators from the government. But unlike his predecessors, he has actually taken the drastic moves to do so, turning the purge into a virtual communist witch-hunt. The move both rids Soviet influence and consolidates the twins' power in the government. The release of the WSI report is one of the largest and most decisive moves along these lines. By naming people in the WSI who are connected to Soviet intelligence, Kaczynski ensures their names will forever be known for -- alleged or true -- Soviet-ties. The move undermines the entire structure of the WSI and all of its former personnel, ensuring that it and those attached to it can never recover.
Now Poland must create a new, and inevitably non-Russian, model of government and security. This will take years to accomplish and leaves Poland highly vulnerable in the short term. In the meantime, Poland is counting on the United States for protection. However, if this plan is executed, then Poland will be a key -- if not the key -- U.S. ally in continental Europe to counterbalance the Russians. In recent decades this role has been Germany. This is not to say that Poland will replace Germany as the U.S. partner against Russia, especially not in the next few years. However, Poland could become the core of those countries once on the "wrong" side of the Iron Curtain and increase its influence in Europe. And though this would protect Germany, Berlin would still loathe Poland's regional influence.
This all said, it is still just the Kaczynskis' agenda in a government that could be consolidating, but that is still shaky and unpredictable. A shakeup to this degree is very difficult to pull off even under a stable government. And Poland is keeping with its traditional tactic of looking to a power that is not geographically nearby to deal with those near. The last time Poland did this was in World War II, when it looked to the French to help prevent the Germans from invading, which did not work out too well. This time it is looking to the United States. And though it has promised protection to many of its NATO allies, Washington has never had to prove itself. Poland certainly is pushing for a U.S. guarantee since it is inking the deal for a U.S. national missile defense interceptor base to move in as soon as possible.
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Second post of the day:
The INF Treaty: Implications of a Russian Withdrawal
By Nathan Hughes and Peter Zeihan
Russia is poised to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) signed by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President Ronald Reagan in December 1987. The treaty prohibits development and deployment of all land-based short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with ranges of 300 to 3,400 miles, as well as all ground-launched cruise missiles. Inspections verifying the treaty were completed in 2001, although elimination was effectively concluded nearly a decade earlier.
Moscow has been dropping hints that it might withdraw from the INF since at least late August. However, two looming developments make this appear to be more of a certainy than rhetoric. First, U.S. basing agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic for ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations now look quite likely to be approved. Second, the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or START 1, is set to expire in 2009, and Washington has failed to respond to Moscow's numerous offers to launch negotiations on a replacement treaty. Having benefited from the decay in Russia's military strength since the end of the Cold War, the United States clearly has no interest in such a treaty.
As the odds of having a basic U.S. BMD system in Europe increase, Russian statements alluding to a withdrawal from the INF have become more frequent. For example, speaking before the Duma on Feb. 8, First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov (who at the time was defense minister) characterized Russian signing of the treaty in 1987 as a mistake. On Feb. 19, Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, commander of Russian Strategic Rocket Forces, went even further, threatening that Russian nuclear missiles could be targeted any U.S. BMD installation in Europe. He stopped short of actually threatening to load targeting data into Russia's missile guidance systems, but his meaning was clear.
In a certain sense, Solovtov's implicit threats are meaningless. Russia has no leverage to actually prevent the construction of BMD facilities in Europe, and it would not benefit from mounting a direct military challenge to the United States. But that does not mean the general's statements are completely without sense: If Moscow has a means to legitimately threaten European states -- likely using intermediate-reach ballistic missiles, as during the Cold War -- it retains influence within the region and can leverage that against the United States, as Russia attempts to reassert itself as a great power.
With that in mind, then, let's consider the escape clause that is written into the INF: To withdraw, a signatory must provide six months' notice along with a statement explaining "extraordinary events" that endanger the withdrawing party's "supreme interests." Though there is no defined threshold for "extraordinary events," Moscow has been laying the groundwork for withdrawal by characterizing the emplacement of U.S. BMD installations in Europe as just that.
The Purpose of a Treaty
The 1987 INF treaty was implemented to remove a direct, overwhelming threat to the NATO and Warsaw Pact allies in Europe, drastically reducing the chances and consequences of a conflict between NATO and Warsaw Pact states -- but that was hardly the only reason it was negotiated, signed, ratified and implemented.
For the Soviets, the INF was not to be viewed as simply a stand-alone treaty by either negotiating team. Behind the Iron Curtain, it represented a fundamental break with past ideology. Before 1982, the leadership had been convinced of the Soviet Union's permanence. But with the rise of Yuri Andropov and, later, Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet leadership realized it was losing the Cold War and needed to reach out to the West in a way that would achieve understanding as well as pave the way for future collaboration. The INF treaty was the first crowbar used to pry open the door for Western-Soviet negotiations on everything from troop levels to energy deals to, of course, more arms control treaties.
In the West, the rationale for the treaty was more complex. The conventional military balance in Europe always favored the Soviets; it must be remembered that it was NATO, not the Soviet Union, that maintained a nuclear first-strike doctrine. So on the surface, removing intermediate nuclear weapons seemed to be a self-defeating move. But most of NATO's weapons, then and now, were of American origin -- and for the Americans, the INF served a number of purposes. Removing nuclear weapons with short flight times from hair-trigger alert was a no-brainer for the United States' European allies, but the corresponding calculus in the United States went much deeper.
First, Soviet propaganda in the 1970s had proved quite successful in stirring up European public opinion against the presence of U.S. nuclear forces on the Continent. Because the United States possessed a robust ICBM capability, eliminating intermediate forces not only raised the level of European security but also removed an irritant in trans-Atlantic relations.
For Washington, the second purpose behind the treaty built upon the first. When U.S. weapons systems were stored on allies' territory, those allies often wanted to have a say in how or when those weapons were used. Removing the intermediate missiles from service left the United States fully reliant on its home- and submarine-based ICBMs -- weapons over which no one but Washington could claim influence. The INF treaty technically might have limited U.S. options, but a more holistic evaluation reveals that it actually laid the foundation for a truly unfettered U.S. strategic policy. It is noteworthy that officials who were instrumental in shaping sovereignty-maximizing U.S. strategic policy in recent years, such as Donald Rumsfeld and Paul Wolfowitz, served in the Reagan administration's diplomatic service at the time the INF treaty was being patched together.
Third, ICBMs were expensive. Ironically, the Americans saw this as a good thing. The United States possessed the economic gravitas to maintain an ICBM arms race if it needed to; it was an open question at the time whether the Soviets could do the same. In hindsight, of course, the answer was "no." Nor did this come as a shock in Moscow: During the Khrushchev era, in the early 1960s, the Soviets had sought to avoid bearing the cost burden of an ICBM capability. Instead, the Kremlin stationed intermediate-range missiles in Cuba in order to achieve strategic parity with Washington on the cheap. Only after the Cuban missile crisis ended, with the Soviet climb-down, did the Soviets begin making the appropriations necessary to fund a full ICBM program. Now fast-forward to the 1980s: in implementing INF, the Americans locked the Soviets into the most expensive weapons regime available at the time.
Strategic Rocket Forces and Decay
Ultimately, the Russian decision to leave the INF is grounded in these last two factors in American thinking -- as well as the simple fact that the rest of the world has pushed past the Cold War mentality.
For Washington, the war against jihadists has become an overwhelming priority. But even outside of that context, the United States, its NATO allies and indeed, the rest of the world, have already plunged into a pervasive post-Cold War restructuring that is indicative of a shift in defense priorities.
Western European states are far more concerned with domestic matters -- many of them with the rising Arab Muslim demographic in the populace -- than with anything Russians might do. The United States and the Chinese are watching each other warily and taking steps to prepare for what both fear will be a new clash of titans down the road. Only the Central Europeans remain preoccupied with Moscow. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that it is Central European states that have been inordinately willing to cooperate with the United States on a missile defense system. Though the system ostensibly is designed to protect the United States against a theoretical missile strike from a state like Iran, the system could target Russian ballistic missile launches -- though only a tiny fraction of any nuclear barrage.
For the Central Europeans, that is reason enough in and of itself to participate in the BMD system; for the Americans, this is merely a side benefit.
Because it anticipates a strategic competition with China eventually, the United States sees limitations on its nuclear arsenal as impractical. Washington almost certainly will walk away from the START I treaty -- which places specific limits on the size and type of nuclear forces the United States and Russia are permitted to possess -- when it comes up for renegotiation in 2009. This would leave it free to force China into the same sort of crushing arms race that so damaged the Soviet Union.
And that means Russia is doing the only thing it realistically can: rattling its nuclear saber.
Russia's problem is that its nuclear arsenal is precisely the problem. Despite its best efforts, Russia's aging nuclear deterrent has continued to crumble, without adequate maintenance. Nor are replacements being made at anything close to a sufficient rate. The fielding of the new SS-27 Topol-M ICBM -- the only fundamentally new missile system that Russia has operationalized since the Cold War's end -- has been excruciatingly slow, with only 45 fielded in nearly a decade and a mere seven new missiles slated for deployment in 2007. The Topol's submarine-launched equivalent, the Bulava, has been so plagued by technical difficulties and delays that it still has not been deployed.
The one thing in all of this that has softened the blow for Russia has been START I. With this treaty in force, Moscow could cling to the hope of one day again achieving some semblance of parity with Washington -- indeed, the treaty was the very embodiment of the Cold War balance of power. But the only way to perpetuate that balance today would be to implement a replacement treaty for START I that allows Russia to retire even more of its expensive, aging arsenal while still maintaining the psychological high-ground of "equality" with the United States. Moscow now understands that this option is not in the cards.
We expect START I to fall by the wayside, discarded in the face of U.S. strategic needs. In order to mitigate the damage, Russia will have no choice but to abandon the INF treaty in response.
The Nuclear Saber and Marginalization
Yet nuclear weapons remain Russia's one trump card. The scale and reach of its Soviet-era Strategic Rocket Forces -- the very heart of Russia's strategic nuclear missile forces -- give Moscow entry to the premier class of world powers (meaning those possessing nukes on the world-smashing level). The nuclear deterrent remains Russia's best means of guaranteeing is territorial integrity (which, given its vast land mass and longest border in the world, cannot be done with conventional ground forces alone).
In the last 16 years, Russia has watched helplessly as the Strategic Rocket Forces eroded, along with Moscow's control over the states of Eastern Europe and along its periphery in the Caucasus. Moscow has attempted to wield its energy supplies as a means of control and to reassert itself diplomatically on the world stage, and it will continue to do so. However, these steps have not been sufficient to prevent U.S. encroachment into Russia's traditional sphere of influence. In fact, some of the countries along its periphery have been quite blunt in citing such tactics as reasons for their decisions to join the U.S. missile shield.
And now, the United States is poised to deploy BMD assets on Russia's doorstep.
From Russia's perspective, the establishment of the new BMD system in Europe would represent the worst of all possible worlds. Its very existence not only would spotlight Moscow's declining diplomatic prowess, but also would testify to Russia's marginalization in the international system.
It is true that any BMD base would not pose a challenge to a Strategic Rocket Forces strike against the West in the near term. The system, assuming it works, at best would be able to shoot down only a handful of missiles at a time, and Russia (despite its many problems) still has hundreds of ICBMs in working order. The long-term picture is rather different: Russian military technological advancements have slowed to a crawl since 1992, while the United State continues to incrementally improve. Therefore, it is entirely possible that the BMD system of 2020 might pose a realistic threat to Russia's strategic ICBM deterrent.
The IRBM Option
Having withdrawn from the INF, Russia would be free to once again begin construction of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) as a means of leveling the playing field. With Russia unable to challenge the United States directly, the establishment of a new Missile Army made up of IRBMs would threaten NATO in a way it has not known since the Cold War.
Russia pioneered "cold launch" technology -- an advanced launch technique -- and has fielded several land-based solid-fuel IRBMs since the 1970s. Though these systems date back 20 years or more, it makes little difference to the populations of the cities within their range whether the nuclear warhead that hits them was designed in 1960 or in 2005. Most important, these IRBMs are much cheaper than the ICBMs of the Strategic Rocket Forces. Intercontinental strike capability is priced at a premium.
Though a direct arms race with the United States remains out of the question, a lopsided race in which the Russians focus on IRBMs could change the game entirely. A barrage of several dozen IRBMs easily could overwhelm a small squadron of BMD interceptors based in Europe -- as well as any system that the United States conceivably might field in the next 20 years.
To be clear, this is not an option that would buy Russia parity with the United States. But it would be a stout reminder to Europe -- and to the United States by extension -- that even a weakened Moscow is not to be trifled with. Unable to reclaim the global power it wielded during the Soviet era, Russia nevertheless could use a new IRBM force to threaten Europe and, in so doing, resurrect a host of diplomatic options that served Kremlin interests very well in the past.
Such a step might not mark Russia as a resurgent world power, but it certainly would reforge perceptions of Russia as a power that is impossible to ignore.
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Doesn't sound like the Russians can be counted on to help our efforts to stop Iran from going nuclear , , ,
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stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Syria's Russian Connection
The Israeli daily Haaretz reported Thursday that Syria is strengthening its army "in an unprecedented way" and massing troops near the border with Israel along the Golan Heights. Syrian lawmaker Mohammed Hasbah denied the report, saying Syria has not redeployed its troops to the front lines but is prepared for any situation. Hasbah warned that Israel would "pay a heavy price" if it should "decide to do something stupid."
This heated war of words between Israel and Syria likely was sparked by the Israelis catching wind of a Russian arms transfer to Damascus; Haaretz also reported that Syria is close to sealing a deal with Russia to procure thousands of advanced anti-tank missiles.
Russia currently sees a prime opportunity to return to its Cold War policies in the Middle East. From the mid-1950s to the fall of the Soviet empire, Moscow's principal clients in the Arab world included Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Algeria and Yemen. Supplying these regional allies with military assistance and training under long-term loan arrangements that were unlikely to be paid back -- or even, in some cases, for free -- bought the Soviet Union leverage against the United States in the region. Eventually, Moscow's financial constraints caught up with its geopolitical ambitions, and military expenditures in the Middle East dropped low on its list of priorities.
Now, with the United States trapped in a thorny standoff with Iran over the future of Iraq, Russia has a chance to edge itself back into the sandbox. Moscow once again is trying to make friends in the region, with a particular focus on the two countries with the greatest ability to aggravate Washington and undermine U.S. policies: Iran and Syria.
While there have been some rumors about shipments of modern Russian air defense equipment to Syria, many reports are unconfirmed and are, at best, being debated in defense establishment circles. Of major concern is the S-300 long-range air defense system, considered to be among the most capable air defense asset in the world. The latest version of this system, the S-300PMU2, is unlikely to be in Syrian hands -- but the mere discussion of such a sale would be enough to put Israeli and U.S. policymakers on edge.
That said, there are plenty of other Russian military goodies that could be used to add some muscle to Syria's air defense. The summer 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah was a major gut check for the Syrian defense establishment. As Israel Defense Forces (IDF) engaged Syria's militant proxy in Lebanon, the Syrian regime had little choice but to play nice and stay out of the fray for fear of a devastating strike by the Israeli air force (IAF) -- which used two F-16s to buzz Syrian President Bashar al Assad's Latakia palace in June 2006. The relative ease with which the IAF penetrated Syrian airspace -- without fearing a response -- reinforced the need for Syria to improve on its Soviet-era air defense capabilities. Syria knows that the denial of airspace to Israel or the United States is a key strategic priority.
A likely Russian sale of upgraded SA-9 and SA-13 Strela surface-to-air missiles to Syria would fit into this strategy. New acquisitions and deployment of Iranian-built Chinese C-802 anti-ship missiles also are rumored to be under way. The Syrian navy has badly decayed in the last 10 years, and the acquisition of significant quantities of these missiles would be a serious improvement.
But while it makes perfect sense that Syria is taking advantage of the regional dynamic to rebuild its military capabilities, the Syrian regime is not looking for a fight with Israel. Rather, the acquisitions are meant to signal to Israel and the United States that the cost of engaging Syria militarily would be too high. Damascus would much rather work through its militant proxies as it remains focused on re-establishing itself in Lebanon.
Hezbollah, meanwhile, is busily evading U.N. troops in southern Lebanon and rebuilding its own military capabilities -- with Iranian and Syrian assistance -- in preparation for round two of the summer's conflict with Israel. Recent Syrian imports of AT-14 Kornet-E and AT-13 Metis-M anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) likely are making their way into Hezbollah arsenals in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley. Hezbollah employed these advanced missiles against Israeli tanks during the 2006 conflict, when it successfully delayed an IDF advance near the Saluki River. The guerrilla tactics Hezbollah used against Israeli armor were not lost on Syria, which almost certainly will be deploying any new ATGMs it acquires near the Israeli border -- except for the ones that slip across the Lebanese border to Hezbollah.
Sources in Lebanon also say Hezbollah fighters in the Bekaa have been sighted at least twice carrying what appear to be SA-18s. The SA-18 is a shoulder-launched, infrared-guided missile akin to the U.S. FIM-92A Stinger (which was used to great effect against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). While it will not stop the IAF, it will be especially useful in the Bekaa against low-flying close-air-support sorties and IDF helicopters.
Hezbollah has an interest in demonstrating that it possesses these weapons in order to dissuade Israel from launching commando raids against its forces in their Bekaa stronghold. After the 2006 summer conflict, Israel knows it will have little chance of crippling Hezbollah's militant arm unless it thrusts into the Bekaa; but the transfer of these weapons from Syria will make such an offensive more costly.
A concerted effort by Russia and Iran is clearly under way to exploit the U.S. position in the region and upset the regional balance in their favor -- which falls directly in line with Syrian interests. As long as Russia can take advantage of this geopolitical opening, it can stir up enough regional cyclones to make money for the Russian defense establishment, and more important, win back influence to barter with the United States. In the end, lesser powers like Syria stand to gain a great deal.
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VLAD'S NEW BAD
By RALPH PETERS
March 14, 2007 -- AN old joke runs that even paranoids have enemies. But what can we make of the quasi-dictator of a middleweight state who insists on making enemies of those who'd hoped to be his country's friends?
Russian President Vladimir Putin reminds me of the old Soviet Inturist organization: Instead of figuring out how to make a thousand bucks from happy tourists tomorrow, Inturist went to absurd extremes to squeeze an extra fiver out of disgruntled visitors immediately.
Putin just can't wait to restore Russia's great power status. Good luck. Great powers don't exist in isolation. Rather than building useful alliances, Putin has frightened his neighbors into closer relations with NATO and the West, alienated Europeans who longed to hug him - and made even the most gullible Americans wary.
Putin is a classic bully who aches to beat the pocket money out of the class wimp, who judges the entire world by the size of its biceps. He just can't get beyond his KGB past. To him, strategy is a zero-sum game and everybody secretly wants to harm Russia.
In fact, no country in recent history enjoyed as much foreign good will as Russia did after the Soviet Union dissolved. And no country has made more stupid decisions that appalled those who sincerely wanted to help.
If he sees enemies everywhere (and he does), Putin's also impatient and clumsy, though he thinks he's wonderfully clever. For all his icy exterior, he's a calculating, short-sighted peasant out of Gogol. His recent rant at a defense symposium in Germany only reminded the Europeans that the United States really isn't all that bad.
Instead of waiting to completely addict Europe to Russia's natural-gas supplies, he turned off the flow to Ukraine and then Georgia in fits of political pique - interrupting European supplies in the first instance. And leftist posturing is one thing, but no French café philosopher or German professor wants his heat turned off in mid-winter.
Oh, and Russia's selling arms to Iran's mullahs, Syria's Baathists and Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.
Brilliant move, Vlad. You're really betting on the all-stars.
The Kremlin's also encouraging Serbia to take a hard line against formal independence for Kosovo. Belgrade's been there and done that, but Serbs, like Russian bureacrats, tend to be slow learners.
Thanks for getting the Balkans stirred up again, Vlad. Maybe Russian troops can replay the atrocity-riddled Chechnya war?
The only bright spot is that Russia has stopped supplying nuclear fuel for Iran's reactors. Officially, it's about Tehran's failure to make on-time payments, but it appears that somebody finally showed Vlad a map and pointed out that Russian territory lies within slingshot range of Iran. And Persians and Russians haven't always been pals.
Domestically, Putin has censored the media, staged purge trials of businessmen whose politics he didn't like, hounded out western investors, murdered journalists and dissidents (abroad, as well), done his best to turn the new Russia into a besotted, AIDS-ridden mockery of an Arab oil sheikhdom, moved to stifle academic freedom and generally made a joke of his country's fledgling democracy.
The latest phase in the Kremlin's campaign to restrict political freedom came in the build-up to last Sunday's regional elections. In an Orwellian move, Putin's henchmen built a tame opposition party, Fair Russia, that's allowed to politely criticize certain policies, but whose real purpose is to draw off votes from the old political left, especially the Communists, and to hasten the demise of the half-strangled liberal parties.
Putin does want a two-party system - with his cabal controlling both parties.
Conditioned to do what the czar desires, Russians went for it. Preliminary results show that Putin's United Russia garnered almost two-thirds of the vote, while Putin's Fair Russia finished about even with the Communists, undercutting their base.
Putin isn't a Communist - but, then, neither were any of his predecessors: Russia has always been ruled by autocrats, and one starts to suspect it always will be.
The dream of a free Russia is over. Vladimir Putin destroyed it as we watched, sucking our thumbs (to put it politely). The best for which we now can hope is that, once the Kremlin's done killing democracy, it won't start killing masses of human beings again.
Ralph Peters' latest book is "Never Quit The Fight."
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Little Sweaty Fist
Why is Putin now getting tough on Iran?
BY BRET STEPHENS
WSJ
Tuesday, March 27, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
"This is very easy to understand," said Russian President Vladimir Putin last year, explaining his idea of an energy policy. "Just think back to childhood when you go into the street with a sweet in your hand and another kid says, Give it to me. And you clutch your little sweaty fist tight around it and say, What do I get then?"
So why, when it comes to the Iranian nuclear file, has Mr. Putin finally opened his little sweaty fist, signing on--with no apparent compensations--to additional U.N. sanctions on the Islamic Republic while calling a halt to Russia's construction of the nuclear reactor at Bushehr?
That's the $64,000 question to which nobody seems to have anything better than a partial answer. Nearly from day one of his presidency, Mr. Putin has been Iran's best friend at the U.N. and, not so coincidentally, the leading supplier of its advanced conventional weapons. In 2000, the Kremlin tore up the so-called Chernomyrdin Agreement, a secret protocol negotiated by then Vice President Al Gore, in which Russia pledged to stop selling arms to Iran within five years. In 2002, deputy foreign minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov went out of his way to state that "Russia does not accept President George W. Bush's view that Iran is part of an 'axis of evil.'"
Since then, Russia has openly supplied Iran with sophisticated surface-to-air missiles. There are reliable reports that Russia has also assisted Iran covertly with its ballistic-missile technology. The Bushehr deal, itself valued at $1 billion, was intended as just the first of five planned reactors, worth $10 billion. Russian diplomats have diluted to near-insignificance the sanctions imposed so far by the U.N. In January, Russian Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov paid a call on Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. It seems the meeting went well: "The Islamic Republic," said the Ayatollah, "welcomes all-out promotion of relations with Russia, believing the capacity for expansion between the two sides is higher than expected."
And then, on March 19, Iranian, European and U.S. sources reported that Russia had informed Iran that it would not supply the reactor with the uranium it needs to function unless Iran complied with U.N. resolutions calling on it to suspend its enrichment program. And citing a payment dispute, the Russians also began pulling some of their 2,000 personnel from the site, while officially claiming it was a routine staff rotation. At the Security Council, U.S. diplomatic sources confirmed that Russia had been remarkably cooperative in negotiating Saturday's unanimous resolution on Iran, going so far as to blunt an attempt by some of the nonpermanent members to insert language calling for a nuclear-free Middle East--code for disarming Israel.
What gives? Past experience suggests the answer may yet turn out to be not much at all. At the 2003 G-8 summit in Evian, France, Mr. Putin reportedly assured other leaders that Russia would not supply the Iranians with nuclear fuel unless they agreed to snap U.N. inspections of their nuclear facilities. A later "clarification" from Russia's atomic energy minister indicated that Russia would provide the fuel no matter what Iran chose to do about the inspections. Similarly, Vitaly Churkin, Russia's ambassador to the U.N., has recently insisted that "there has been no Russian ultimatum to Iran of any kind," while adding that the deal with the Iranians "was on track." Put simply, the (easily resolved) payment dispute may be all the "fire" there is here, and not smoke to cover a sweeping change in Russian policy.
For their part, U.S. diplomats are sticking to their story that the Russian-Iranian split is real--as do the Iranians, who in the last week have publicly accused Russia of being an "unreliable partner" practicing "double-standard stances." The words are carefully chosen. As Victor Yasmann of Radio Free Europe writes, "Russia cares about its commercial supplier . . . [and] in preserving its political reputation within the Islamic world." That's especially the case now that Russia's once-failing military exporters are doing a thriving business selling bottom-of-the-shelf weapons to Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Yemen, Algeria and other bottom-of-the-shelf states. If Russia is seen to succumb to international pressure on Iran, other dubious regimes may be less inclined to attach themselves to it as clients.
Yet another reading of events suggests the mixed signals coming from Russia reflect policy schizophrenia within the Kremlin itself. "There is clearly an active pro-Iranian lobby in Moscow," says Pavel Felgenhauer, defense correspondent for Novaya Gazeta. He adds, however, that Moscow's change of policy is "the result of an assessment that a nuclear Iran is a major danger to Russia and its national interests." Among other indicators, Mr. Felgenhauer points to Russia's naval buildup in the oil- and gas-rich Caspian Sea.
The Russian leadership may also have started to notice that it is increasingly in bad odor with a West that, at some level, it longs to be considered a part of. "There is a compact pro-Western group who think that cooperation with the major industrial states, primarily the United States, could benefit Russia much more than murky dealings with questionable partners like China, Iran, Iraq or Libya," writes former Russian diplomat Victor Mizin in a perceptive analysis in the Middle East Review of International Affairs.
Finally, there is the "little sweaty fist" hypothesis. Critics of the Putin government were dismayed last year when the Bush administration agreed to Russian membership in the World Trade Organization, apparently for nothing in return. The Bushehr volte face may be the delayed (and disguised) payoff. Alternatively, Russia may expect that its sudden pliancy on the Iranian file may yield dividends on the things it cares about most, particularly in what it considers its rightful sphere of influence. In a recent Los Angeles Times op-ed that may have also served as a trial balloon, the Nixon Center's Dimitri Simes proposes two prospective giveaways: The breakaway Georgian "republics" of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which Mr. Putin has long regarded as rightfully Russian, and the looming question of Kosovo's independence, to which Russia is vehemently opposed.
In the meantime, the Kremlin preserves all its options, a reminder, as Glen Howard of the Jamestown Foundation observes, of an old KGB maxim: First create a problem, and then offer to be part of the solution. On that score, at least, Mr. Putin is nothing if not true to type.
Mr. Stephens is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His column appears in the Journal Tuesdays.
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Ukraine: A Gathering Storm
Summary
Ukraine appeared to be heading toward another crossroads April 3 as some 100,000 people from opposing political camps gathered outside the Rada in the wake of President Viktor Yushchenko's April 2 dissolution of parliament and call for early elections. With rumors of imminent troop deployments swirling, attention now turns to the most critical of players in Ukrainian politics: Russia.
Analysis
Some 100,000 people supporting either Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko or Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich were gathered outside the Ukrainian parliament in Kiev on April 3, as tensions flared again in the country in the wake of the pro-Western Yushchenko's dissolution of parliament and call for new elections a day earlier. Although no violence has been reported, rumors surfaced in Kiev that the military would arrive by evening.
The two sides, evenly divided with about 50,000 supporters each, have set up opposing tent cities outside the parliament, and the pro-Yanukovich supporters are vowing to "protect parliament and the parliamentarians from the Orange forces." In a reversal of the 2004 Orange Revolution, supporters of pro-Russian Yanukovich are calling for Yushchenko to bend to the prime minister and end threats of early elections.
Defense Minister Anatoly Gritsenko seemed to confirm the rumors of an imminent troop arrival when he said April 3 that Ukrainian military forces would carry out Yushchenko's orders to dissolve parliament. Members of the National Unity coalition are expected to protect the road leading to the Supreme Rada in Kiev from Orange Coalition forces to allow parliament members to enter the Rada. The Pora youth movement also announced plans to mobilize members to patrol areas around administrative buildings to prevent attacks.
Yanukovich, meanwhile, has said that he does not accept the dissolution of parliament or the call for early elections, and that parliament will block this move by "interrupting the powers of the Central Electoral Commission," suggesting he will ensure there is no money for new elections. Yanukovich also said he will hold a referendum in parliament to overturn the president's decree. The referendum also could remove the president if passed, though Yanukovich would need 300 votes in parliament to pass it -- and at most he currently has 262 votes.
The issue now goes to the Constitutional Court -- which is split almost evenly between Yanukovich and Yushchenko supporters -- though the court has not yet ruled whether it will even hear the case.
Yanukovich has been steadily whittling away at Yushchenko's power, both institutionally and in the public mind, for months. Yushchenko believed that his choice was simple: either become a figurehead with no real power or risk new elections in hopes of shaking up the system. (His party is doing badly in the polls and performed dismally in the last elections.)
This move put the ball into the hands of Yanukovich, who faced several, more complex choices: He could go to elections and likely trounce Yushchenko again, but this would essentially put him back where he was April 1. He also could take a risk and ignore the order, to see whether that would succeed in getting Yushchenko either to back down or be forced down -- thus putting Yushchenko prematurely into a purely ceremonial role. It appears Yanukovich has taken the latter option.
And not to be left out, opposition leader Yulia Timoshenko -- the country’s most famous oligarch-turned-political-power-broker -- has her own plans. She allied with Yushchenko during the Orange Revolution, then again in government and now once more in opposition to Yanukovich. In fact, she has been urging -- to the point of breathing new life into the tools of protest that made the Orange Revolution possible -- Yushchenko to dissolve parliament. However, now that it has been done and people are starting to pour onto the streets, she has told her masses to stay home and has instead called for a meeting of all the opposition members of parliament to discuss the situation. This raises the possibility that she has struck a deal with Yanukovich to get rid of Yushchenko as a power player once and for all, which would allow her to be the sole voice at the national level for pro-Westernism.
What is certain is that Yushchenko is playing a weak hand and Yanukovich is acting boldly and confidently. If Yanukovich's gambit at marginalizing or even ousting Yushchenko succeeds, then the pro-Western impulse in Ukraine will have been wholly reduced to Timoshenko. Yes, Yushchenko technically holds the constitutional right to dissolve parliament and, yes, the European Union supports him -- and he will meet with their ambassadors shortly to ask for support. And yes, he holds full legal command over the intelligence and military apparatus. But Ukraine's legal institutions are of questionable use, the European Union is not ready for a bruising fight with the Russians, and Ukraine's security apparatus is shot through by the final -- and critical -- player in this equation: Russia.
Ukraine's path is of paramount importance to Moscow. During the election campaign that ultimately led to the 2004 Orange Revolution, Russian President Vladimir Putin personally campaigned for Yanukovich and still informally supports the man who is now prime minister. So it should come as no surprise that immediately after a, shall we say, heated meeting between Yushchenko and Yanukovich the evening of April 3, Yanukovich's next move was to call Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to discuss options.
stratfor.com
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More from Stratfor on this-- is Russia's apparent new firm attitude on Iran's nukes the quid pro quo of which Strat speaks?
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Geopolitical Diary: The Grab for Ukraine
The last time Ukraine was in play was in 2004, when there was an electoral fight between would-be presidents Viktor Yanukovich and Viktor Yushchenko that featured Russian President Vladimir Putin campaigning directly for the former -- with the entire West backing the latter. By the time the dust settled, Yushchenko had grabbed the presidency, while subsequent elections landed Yanukovich in the prime minister's chair.
Yanukovich has managed to use his more powerful position as head of government to steadily whittle down Yushchenko's institutional power and popularity. Unwilling to be sidelined, Yushchenko on Monday invoked his most powerful constitutional ability, dissolving the Yanukovich-dominated parliament and ordering fresh elections.
But unlike in 2004, when Yushchenko could count on the West to provide him with financial and technical assistance, this time he might be on his own.
For Moscow, Ukraine is the single most valuable territory in the former Soviet empire. It is more than the homeland of the Russian ethnicity or the home of more than 10 million ethnic compatriots; it was one of Soviet Russia's few warmwater ports, the location of its bulk of infrastructure links to the West, a breadbasket integrated into the Russian heartland and 1,000 miles of buffer. With Ukraine in Russia's sphere of influence, a Russian resurgence is possible. Without Ukraine, the idea of Russia as a global power is ridiculous, and its role as even a regional power is no longer guaranteed. Hence, now that Kiev's perennial political instability has provided an opening, the Russians undoubtedly will make what they can of it.
And they will probably get exactly what they want. The Russians have a lot of power in Ukraine -- whether due to plants in the Ukrainian government, infrastructure links or cultural ties -- but it really all comes down to one fact: The United States does not want a fight with the Russians right now.
It is not simply that the Americans are bogged down in Iraq and lack the bandwidth or appetite for a fight. It is that the Russians wield considerable influence in the Middle East -- specifically in Iran and Syria -- and have demonstrated time and again that unless the United States is in tip-top shape, Moscow retains the ability to sabotage most U.S. efforts in the region. The one thing the United States certainly does not need right now is a Russian monkey wrench in its negotiations with Iran over the future of Iraq.
Other sponsors of Ukraine's Orange Revolution are similarly occupied. For example, the United Kingdom and France are both up to their necks in domestic transfers of power and lack the time to attempt to influence Kiev.
That really only leaves two powers with the motive and opportunity to make a meaningful difference: Poland and Germany. For both, prying Ukraine out of the Russian sphere of influence is an unabashed goal that would turn Russia's buffer into their buffer. And, now more than ever, both would love to act. Under the Russophobic Kaczynski twins, Poland is likely to fall over itself in its enthusiasm to deal Russia a defeat, while Germany -- under Chancellor Angela Merkel -- is determined to rediscover its voice on the international stage after 60 years of absence.
But neither will do so, and the reason again goes back to Washington.
The United States is ultimately Poland's only noteworthy security guarantor, so no matter how desperately Warsaw wants to act, it cannot do so in the face of a red light from Washington. And that is exactly the order the Bush administration will give, since it knows that if the Russians perceived Polish interference in Ukraine, Russia would hold the United States responsible.
Germany under Merkel has steadily been pushing the envelope of German actions that will be tolerated -- expected, even -- in Europe, and Berlin cares little about what ultimately happens in Iran and Iraq. But Germany too will stay its hand, simply because no matter how far Berlin has come in the past few months and years, it is not yet prepared to stand up to both Russian and American pressure.
In essence, the Russians have delivered a message to Washington: Control your people, and we will control ours -- and the Ukrainians are our people.
Yushchenko and his camp are on their own. This means their thin reed of hope lies in making Ukraine's institutions -- the constitutional court and civilian control of the security and intelligence services -- work as they are supposed to -- not the way they traditionally do in a former Soviet republic.
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Pentagon Invites Kremlin to Link Missile Systems
by THOM SHANKER
Published: April 21, 2007
NY Times
WASHINGTON, April 20 — The Bush administration is offering Russia a new package of incentives to drop its strong opposition to American missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, including an invitation to begin linking some American and Russian antimissile systems, according to senior administration and military officials.
The package includes American offers to cooperate on developing defense technology and to share intelligence about common threats, as well as to permit Russian officials to inspect the future missile bases.
American officials said the initiatives were proposed at least in part at the urging of European allies, and reflected an acknowledgment at the highest levels of the Bush administration that it had not been agile in dealing with Russia — and with some NATO allies — on its plan to place defensive missiles and radar in Poland and the Czech Republic.
The initiatives include offers that are “deeper, more specific and concrete” than any previous proposal for cooperation from the Bush administration to the Kremlin, according to one senior official involved in planning talks with the Russians.
In military terms, the American initiative to the Russians on missile defense will include an invitation “toward fundamental integration of our systems,” said a senior military officer involved in the discussions. This concept of linking some American and Russian military systems for common missile defense would be at a level that exists in no other area of United States-Russia military relations.
The offers of cooperation will be laid out for Russian officials in the coming weeks in a series of high-level meetings being scheduled by senior American officials, in particular Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. If those talks go well, they will continue over the summer and fall between President Bush and President Vladimir V. Putin.
Despite a series of bilateral sessions and meetings under NATO sponsorship to explain the American missile defense plan, Mr. Putin and his inner circle have expressed deep resentment about it, voicing their anger in caustic public comments that have greatly worried some close American allies in Europe.
The German government, in particular, has urged the administration to pull together the exact sort of initiative on missile defense cooperation and transparency that will be presented to Russia. The administration has also heard complaints from other allies, including France, that it must do better at managing the relationship with Russia if the United States wants allied support for the missile defense effort, American officials said.
“In the past, the Russians have not taken our offers of cooperation seriously, whether because they view them as insufficient or because they are obstinate on missile defense,” said another senior administration official involved in planning the initiatives.
“So Gates and then Rice will put their weight behind this new offer,” the official added. “We will not give Russia a veto over our program, but this goes well beyond ‘passive’ cooperation to new and active ways we can work together against common threats.”
Another senior administration official, explaining the accelerated effort to reach out to Russia on the issue, conceded: “We were a little late to the game. We should have been out there making these arguments, making the case more forcefully before people began framing the debate for us — and in false terms.”
The offer would include an invitation to open a joint effort at “research and technical development” of future missile defenses that could protect the territories of the United States and Russia, and their allies, the senior military officer said.
Beyond that, with the permission of the Polish and Czech governments, any eventual American missile defense bases on their territories would be open to Russian inspection, akin to the guarantees that Washington and Moscow negotiated to inspect each other’s missile silos to assure compliance with past arms control treaties, officials said.
“We are committed to the maximum level of transparency, not only with our citizens but with our neighbors,” said Karel Schwarzenberg, the Czech foreign minister, who was in Washington this week for talks with American officials on missile defense.
Details about the new package of invitations for Russia to cooperate on missile defense were described by civilian administration officials and military officers who said they believed that the initiative was a major step forward in calming Russian objections to the American plans.
In its proposals on missile defense, the Bush administration is asking Poland to base 10 antimissile interceptors on its territory and the Czech Republic to be host to a tracking radar. Both systems are designed to defend European territory from missile attack by Iran, but have threatened to rupture ties with Moscow and have upset some NATO allies.
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Nevertheless, the Bush administration and the military are showing unusual unanimity about proceeding with missile defense, in sharp contrast to bitter internal disagreements over issues like Iraq strategy and rules for detaining and interrogating terrorism suspects.
The groundwork for upcoming talks with Russia by Mr. Gates and Ms. Rice has been laid over recent weeks by quiet but intensive travels to Moscow and NATO capitals by a group of civilian and military officials. They include the under secretary of defense for policy, Eric Edelman; two assistant secretaries of state, Daniel Fried and John Rood; Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III, director of the Missile Defense Agency, and his deputy, Brig. Gen. Patrick O’Reilly; and the American ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland.
American officials hold no illusions that the new incentives will guarantee Russia’s assent to the missile defense bases in Poland and the Czech Republic, as the Kremlin’s opposition to missile bases is wrapped up in domestic politics as well as its view of national security policy in Washington and its NATO allies.
To date, Russian officials have scoffed at any suggestion that Moscow’s objections to American missile defense bases in former Soviet states would be eased by offers of cooperation.
“As for possible cooperation in strategic antimissile defense, honestly speaking, I see no reasons for that,” said Sergei B. Ivanov, a first deputy prime minister who previously served as Russia’s minister of defense, in remarks quoted by the Interfax news agency.
American officials have sought to counter Russian rebukes by pointing out that the limited missile defense system envisioned for Europe — 10 interceptors whose warheads are designed to collide with approaching missiles, and do not even carry an explosive — is numerically no threat to Moscow’s vast strategic rocket force.
The proposed system, Americans say, is a prudent deterrent against a potential Iranian attack on American allies in Europe and on American forces based there.
American officials concede that part of the Russian motivation to block American missile defense is a fear that the United States, over time, might develop a bold, new “breakout” technology that could some day neuter the Russian strategic arsenal.
The concept of sharing antimissile technology with the Russians is hardly new. In fact, even when President Ronald Reagan proposed his grand plan for a leakproof missile shield under the so-called Star Wars program, he pledged that the new technology could be shared with the Kremlin in order to assure Russia that it had nothing to fear from American defenses.
The missile defense proposals for central Europe also have become a proxy issue for Russian officials who still rankle at American and NATO expansion east after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Yet even among some officials in Poland and the Czech Republic, support for the two missile defense bases has more to do with binding the United States closer to their capitals against a future Russian threat than about deterring a future Iranian missile threat.
American officials have not announced the timetable for the coming talks. But in Moscow, Igor Ivanov, the secretary of Russia’s Security Council, said that Mr. Gates was due there for Kremlin meetings on Monday and that Ms. Rice would visit in May.
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April 22, 2007
50% Good News Is the Bad News in Russian Radio
By ANDREW E. KRAMER
NY Times
MOSCOW, April 21 — At their first meeting with journalists since taking over Russia’s largest independent radio news network, the managers had startling news of their own: from now on, they said, at least 50 percent of the reports about Russia must be “positive.”
In addition, opposition leaders could not be mentioned on the air and the United States was to be portrayed as an enemy, journalists employed by the network, Russian News Service, say they were told by the new managers, who are allies of the Kremlin.
How would they know what constituted positive news?
“When we talk of death, violence or poverty, for example, this is not positive,” said one editor at the station who did not want to be identified for fear of retribution. “If the stock market is up, that is positive. The weather can also be positive.”
In a darkening media landscape, radio news had been a rare bright spot. Now, the implementation of the “50 percent positive” rule at the Russian News Service leaves an increasingly small number of news outlets that are not managed by the Kremlin, directly or through the state national gas company, Gazprom, a major owner of media assets.
The three national television networks are already state controlled, though small-circulation newspapers generally remain independent.
This month alone, a bank loyal to President Vladimir V. Putin tightened its control of an independent television station, Parliament passed a measure banning “extremism” in politics and prosecutors have gone after individuals who post critical comments on Web chat rooms.
Parliament is also considering extending state control to Internet sites that report news, reflecting the growing importance of Web news as the country becomes more affluent and growing numbers of middle-class Russians acquire computers.
On Tuesday, the police raided the Educated Media Foundation, a nongovernmental group sponsored by United States and European donors that helps foster an independent news media. The police carried away documents and computers that were used as servers for the Web sites of similar groups. That brought down a Web site run by the Glasnost Defense Foundation, a media rights group, which published bulletins on violations of press freedoms.
“Russia is dropping off the list of countries that respect press freedoms,” said Boris Timoshenko, a spokesman for the foundation. “We have propaganda, not information.”
With this new campaign, seemingly aimed at tying up the loose ends before a parliamentary election in the fall that is being carefully stage-managed by the Kremlin, censorship rules in Russia have reached their most restrictive since the breakup of the Soviet Union, media watchdog groups say.
“This is not the U.S.S.R., when every print or broadcasting outlet was preliminarily censored,” Masha Lipman, a researcher at the Carnegie Moscow Center, said in a telephone interview.
Instead, the tactic has been to impose state ownership on media companies and replace editors with those who are supporters of Mr. Putin — or offer a generally more upbeat report on developments in Russia these days.
The new censorship rules are often passed in vaguely worded measures and decrees that are ostensibly intended to protect the public.
Late last year, for example, the prosecutor general and the interior minister appeared before Parliament to ask deputies to draft legislation banning the distribution on the Web of “extremist” content — a catch phrase, critics say, for information about opponents of Mr. Putin.
On Friday, the Federal Security Service, a successor agency to the K.G.B., questioned Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion and opposition politician, for four hours regarding an interview he had given on the Echo of Moscow radio station. Prosecutors have accused Mr. Kasparov of expressing extremist views.
Parliament on Wednesday passed a law allowing for prison sentences of as long as three years for “vandalism” motivated by politics or ideology. Once again, vandalism is interpreted broadly, human rights groups say, including acts of civil disobedience. In a test case, Moscow prosecutors are pursuing a criminal case against a political advocate accused of posting critical remarks about a member of Parliament on a Web site, the newspaper Kommersant reported Friday.
State television news, meanwhile, typically offers only bland fare of official meetings. Last weekend, the state channels mostly ignored the violent dispersal of opposition protests in Moscow and St. Petersburg.
Rossiya TV, for example, led its newscast last Saturday with Mr. Putin attending a martial arts competition, with the Belgian actor Jean-Claude Van Damme as his guest. On the streets of the capital that day, 54 people were beaten badly enough by the police that they sought medical care, Human Rights Watch said.
Rossiya and Channel One are owned by the state, while NTV was taken from a Kremlin critic in 2001 and now belongs to Gazprom. Last week, a St. Petersburg bank with ties to Mr. Putin increased its ownership stake in REN-TV, a channel that sometimes broadcasts critical reports, raising questions about that outlet’s continued independence.
The Russian News Service is owned by businesses loyal to the Kremlin, including Lukoil, though its exact ownership structure is not public. The owners had not meddled in editorial matters before, said Mikhail G. Baklanov, the former news editor, in a telephone interview.
The service provides news updates for a network of music-formatted radio stations, called Russian Radio, with seven million listeners, according to TNS Gallup, a ratings company.
Two weeks ago, the shareholders asked for the resignation of Mr. Baklanov. They appointed two new managers, Aleksandr Y. Shkolnik, director of children’s programming on state-owned Channel One, and Svevolod V. Neroznak, an announcer on Channel One. Both retained their positions at state television.
Mr. Shkolnik articulated the rule that 50 percent of the news must be positive, regardless of what cataclysm might befall Russia on any given day, according to the editor who was present at the April 10 meeting.
When in doubt about the positive or negative quality of a development, the editor said, “we should ask the new leadership.”
“We are having trouble with the positive part, believe me,” the editor said.
Mr. Shkolnik did not respond to a request for an interview. In an interview with Kommersant, he denied an on-air ban of opposition figures. He said Mr. Kasparov might be interviewed, but only if he agreed to refrain from extremist statements.
The editor at the news service said that the change had been explained as an effort to attract a larger, younger audience, but that many editorial employees had interpreted it as a tightening of political control ahead of the elections.
The station’s news report on Thursday noted the 75th anniversary of the opening of the Moscow metro. It closed with an upbeat item on how Russian trains are introducing a six-person sleeping compartment, instead of the usual four.
Already, listeners are grumbling about the “positive news” policy.
“I want fresh morning broadcasts and not to fall asleep,” one listener, who signed a posting on the station’s Web site as Sergei from Vladivostok, complained. “Maybe you’ve tortured RNS’s audience enough? There are just a few of us left. Down with the boring nonintellectual broadcasts!”
The change leaves Echo of Moscow, an irreverent and edgy news station that often provides a forum for opposition voices, as the only independent radio news outlet in Russia with a national reach.
And what does Aleksei Venediktov, the editor in chief of Echo of Moscow, think of the latest news from Russia?
“For Echo of Moscow, this is positive news,” Mr. Venediktov said. “We are a monopoly now. From the point of view of the country, it is negative news.”
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Estonia: Baiting the Bear
Summary
The Estonian government arrested some 300 protesters April 27 during the removal of a Soviet monument commemorating the end of World War II. For the most vulnerable member of the NATO alliance, the action is not so much waving the flag as it is testing the winds.
Analysis
A Soviet-era monument called the Bronze Soldier, located in downtown Tallinn, Estonia, was dismantled the night of April 26-27, despite the protests by some 500 ethnic Russians. The Russian Duma and Foreign Ministry immediately responded, calling the action "blasphemy" and "disgusting." The Duma recommended Russian President Vladimir Putin immediately sever all economic and diplomatic contact with Estonia. The Estonian government plans to exhume and remove the remains of Soviet soldiers interred under the monument as well for reburial in a cemetery.
Estonia sees the monument, constructed during what Estonians call the "Soviet occupation," as a lingering sign of Russia's overbearance. Yet, of the three Baltic states, Estonia is the one that tends to have the best relationship with Moscow and prefers to keep the lowest profile. This raises a question: Why dismantle the Bronze Solider now?
Controversy over the statue is nothing new; it has been simmering ever since Estonia achieved independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. Russia's biggest holiday -- the celebration of the anniversary of victory in World War II, a conflict in which at least 20 million Russians died -- is just around the corner on May 9. After 15 years of relatively harmless sniping, it seems the Estonians have chosen this precise moment to step on the Kremlin's most sensitive nerve.
That might be precisely the case.
On April 26, Putin gave his state of the union address, in which he essentially lambasted everything the United States stands for. For Estonia, such a speech is the equivalent of an air raid siren. Aside from Luxembourg, Estonia is the smallest NATO member, and none is more strategically exposed. If Russia is about to go on a strategic tear, no one faces the prospect of more suffering -- and more quickly -- than does Estonia.
But rather than cowering in silence, the Estonians might have struck upon a rather interesting strategy: Test the waters to see just how real this Russian change of tune is. After all, if it is real, it is best to know soon. And if it is just rhetoric for public consumption, it is best to continue with business as usual without developing an ulcer.
By this logic, no matter how much Estonia's actions annoyed the Russians, those actions are not of a magnitude to make Moscow rapidly shift its entire military strategic and foreign doctrines. But dismantling the monument will force the Russians to show at least some of their cards.
Whether or not the Estonian strategy is truly to tell the Russians to "Put up or shut up," the world will know the Russian mind very soon. Estonia provoked the Duma and the Russian Foreign Ministry into their expected responses and, in doing so, placed the issue squarely on Putin's desk. His response will be Russia's policy.
It is a response Putin will weigh very carefully. While the Kremlin thinks of Estonia as an ungrateful, malcontented speck on its western border, it is an ungrateful, malcontented speck that also happens to be a full member of the NATO alliance and the European Union. The former grants Estonia the nuclear umbrella, and the latter means any economic sanctions against Estonia would immediately draw retaliation from all of Europe. If Putin is going to call Estonia's bluff, it will not be a simple overreaction -- it will be a calculated move that will have repercussions far beyond a mere stump of broken rock in a Tallinn traffic circle.
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Russia's Succession Crisis
By LEON ARON
May 15, 2007; Page A17
After Boris Yeltsin died on April 23, all Russian television networks waited for almost three hours to break the news. They were afraid to say anything before the Kremlin did. Three days later, in the state-of-Russia address to the Duma, Vladimir Putin announced the unilateral "suspension" by Russia of the 1990 treaty governing the size and positioning of conventional forces in Europe. A few days before, an estimated 4,000 policemen set upon a few hundred protesters in Moscow with a ferocity that shocked even some government officials and legislators.
Even by the standards of Mr. Putin's Russia, these episodes stand apart in the shrillness of their authoritarian insolence and disregard for public opinion inside and outside the country. While Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is in Moscow for talks, she might see for herself the reason for the increasingly tense relations between the two countries, and the increasingly harsh climate inside: the jitters that next year's presidential succession is already generating in the Kremlin.
Despite an official propaganda barrage daily proclaiming orderly change after the presidential election in March 2008, the succession is far from a done deal. The erosion or outright eradication of what might be called shock-absorbers of democracy that endow the process and the result of a transition with legitimacy -- elected local authorities, independent parliament and mass media, and genuine opposition -- has ushered in uncertainty and risk. The foundation of the much-touted "vertical of power," as the new system of the Kremlin's dominance over the country's politics and key sectors of the economy is known, is shallow. The stairs going down are gnarled and perhaps unable to bear much weight.
To these generic handicaps to succession in an authoritarian regime, today's Russia adds two serious complications. The first is the tradition of Russian and Soviet political culture -- which Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin tried so hard to overcome, but which Mr. Putin (who has bemoaned the collapse of the Soviet Union as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century") seems to admire and emulate. Successions were hardly smooth even under the tsars, with quite a few legitimate claimants to the throne (or even those already sitting on it by right) strangled, drowned, stabbed or forced to retire into monasteries. In the Soviet era, not one putative heir apparent came to power. Lenin never wished for Stalin to succeed him; Stalin would not have wanted Khrushchev; Khrushchev, ousted by a coup, did not anoint Brezhnev; Brezhnev, Andropov; Andropov, Chernenko; and Chernenko, Gorbachev.
The other obstacle to a smooth transition is the sheer enormity of the stakes. Even after the centuries of the patrimonial state, in which political power has translated into ownership or control of much of the country's natural wealth, never has the jackpot been so huge: Every day more than 19,000 barrels of oil flow through the pipeline for sale abroad, bringing $500 billion a year.
No matter how many promises are being made to presidential hopefuls and their salivating retinues about sharing in the riches, the vertical of power is a sparse, even austere piece of political architecture. There are simply not enough top rent-generating offices in Russian politics, and in the daily expanding state-controlled sector of the economy, to be handed over to all current claimants: not enough Duma committee chairmanships (where the going rate for introducing a law reportedly is $1 million), regional governorships, top positions in the extremely lucrative tax police and customs, company chairmanships and directorships in the oil, gas, metals, armaments, automotive and aviation industries.
In the winner-take-all regime Mr. Putin has forged, his probable decision to hand over the power hardly presages a period of certainty and tranquility. In the words of one of the most astute Russian political observers, Mark Urnov, "those who have failed to become heirs will have nothing to lose. The bets have been placed, the only thing to do is to fight."
There are no lame ducks in Putin's Russia -- only dead ones. Thus, the appointment of the successor must be withheld for as long as possible, to prevent those passed over from coalescing and perhaps even reaching out to the pro-democracy opposition. Such an alliance would be the Kremlin's worst nightmare: a potentially escalating popular movement for unmanaged, free and fair elections, akin to the Ukrainian "Orange Revolution" of 2004-05. The succession games may last well into this fall, and one could do worse, investment-wise, than betting a modest amount in rubles, steadily appreciating against the dollar, that neither of the current front-runners, First Deputy Prime Ministers Dmitry Medvedev and Sergei Ivanov, will get the nod.
Yet managing the succession by keeping the elites off balance is only one source of the Kremlin's nervousness. The other is a slew of potential economic and social crises stemming from subverted, frozen or entirely abandoned structural reforms to redress the commodity dependence, the neglect of "human capital" and the disrepair of the worn-out industrial infrastructure. Camouflaged by the oil wealth and passed over in silence by the re-nationalized or intimidated mass media, these political time bombs are ticking louder and louder.
Despite regular, almost-ritual official calls to shift away from commodity exports to a knowledge-based, high-tech modern economy, the goal has been subverted by the ideologically-motivated turn toward greater state control and the fear of private initiative and wealth-creation. Instead, Russia's expanding economy (and thus the "stability" on which Putin's popularity is founded) remains extremely vulnerable to oil-price fluctuations. At least one-third of the Russian state budget today comes from oil revenues. A World Bank study has concluded that the GDP growth of 5% or higher was "realized in Russia only at times when the oil price has increased." It is widely assumed among independent Russian experts that a precipitous decline to $40 a barrel (not to mention, below) will have immediate and profoundly negative consequences for economy and the standard of living.
Apart from much-needed salary increases for teachers and doctors, the "national projects" on health and education, unveiled by the government with great fanfare in 2005, have done very little to reform the state-based, impoverished, rigid and backward health-care and education systems inherited from the Soviet Union. Amid the oil price boom, Russia spent less on health-care as percentage of GDP in 2005 (the most recent year for which data are available) than in the first year of the fragile post-Soviet economic recovery in 1997. In an August 2006 national survey, 70% of respondents said that they and their families could not count on getting "good" medical care.
The hydrocarbon windfall has done nothing to increase life expectancy, which at 65 years is still below that of China or India. Russia also is a world leader in industrial, aviation and traffic accidents. Crime is rising; over the past six years, there has been a 10% increase in the number of murders and a 73% rise in drug-related crimes.
With the number of working adults, especially males, diminishing precipitously, the worker-to-retiree ratio is estimated by Russia's leading economists to drop to 1 to 1 "in the very near future." Yet already today, the average pension is 25% of the average salary -- the lowest proportion in Europe. Such a pension is 3,000 rubles ($115), whereas the minimal food expenditures ("just not to starve" as a Russian newspaper puts it) is 1,500 rubles. Some in the government have already begun to talk about raising the pension age as the only solution -- something that the estimated 17 million men and women who expect to retire in the next 10 years are most likely to resent and protest, perhaps violently.
Yet the dwindling number of Russians who want to work and make a go of it are daily disheartened and handicapped by corruption. Both in its reach and the amount of money involved, the bribery and sleaze today makes the graft of the 1990s look like the child's play. In the ranking by Transparency International Russia is 121st out of 163 countries, behind Albania, Kazakhstan and Zambia, and on a par with Benin, Gambia, Honduras and Rwanda. The growing independence of courts, one of the most promising achievements of the 1990s, has been reversed by the travesty of the Yukos-Khodorkovsky and spy trials. Not just entrepreneurs, who are now fair game for shakedowns, but even ordinary Russians, are less and less capable of seeking protection in courts against rapacious and incompetent bureaucrats at every level.
Nor is the Russian state capable of providing broad and effective protection in a more immediate sense. While Chechnya is for now "pacified" by the former Islamic guerillas who switched sides, the multi-ethnic North Caucasus is virtually ungovernable, especially its largest "autonomous republic," Dagestan. The conventional armed forces are utterly incapable of dealing with new threats. A dysfunctional relic of the tsarist and Soviet past, for today's conscripts the Russian army is a combination of a prison and torture chamber.
With every family doing everything they can to shield their boys from the army, increasingly it is the bottom of the barrel that the army gets: the functionally illiterate and those with criminal records or a history of drug addiction. There is more than enough money to effect a transition to a modern, lean, mobile, well-equipped, well-trained and motivated force, supported by millions of Russians. President Putin himself promised in the beginning of his first term, but the reform has been abandoned.
Each of these simmering crises may quickly boil over. The prospect of several unfolding in concert is troubling. In combination with falling oil prices, they may cause a political equivalent of a "perfect storm." Yet with the deliberate weakening of the mediating institutions of democracy, the center of political gravity in Putin's Russia has shifted to the very top, making the Kremlin responsible for anything that goes wrong anywhere in the country.
Everything that the Russian authorities do in the next 12 months will be informed by this sense of vulnerability, and aimed at making sure that vagaries of succession are not multiplied or even made unmanageable by the corrupt state's obsessive quest for control in pursuit of ever greater share of the country's oil wealth.
Mr. Aron, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Russia's Revolution: Essays 1989-2006," released by AEI Press on April 25.
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From The Sunday Times
May 20, 2007
Putin spy war on the West
Mark Franchetti, Moscow, and Sarah Baxter, Washington
IT IS time to send for George Smiley. Russia’s covert foreign intelligence operations against America have reached cold war levels under President Vladimir Putin, according to Washington officials.
White House intelligence advisers believe no other country is as aggressive as Russia in trying to obtain US secrets, with the possible exception of China.
In particular the SVR, as the former KGB’s foreign intelligence arm is now known, is using a network of undercover agents in America to gather classified information about sensitive technologies, including military projects under development and high-tech research.
Yuri Shvets, a former KGB agent, said: “In the days of the Soviet Union, the number of spies was limited because they had to be based at the foreign ministry, the trade mission or the news agencies like Tass. Right now, virtually every successful private company in Russia is being used as a cover for Russian intelligence operations.” Related Links
Intelligence experts believe that since Putin became president in 2000, the Russians have rebuilt a network of agents in the United States that had been depleted during the country’s transition from communism.
Putin served 16 years in the KGB, including a spell in foreign intelligence in East Germany. He became head of the FSB, the domestic security service. According to Shvets, the FSB has been operating widely in America because of its favoured status with Putin. Agents, some acting under diplomatic cover, are said to be trying to recruit specialists in American facilities with access to sensitive information.
A rare insight into the SVR’s methods was gained six months ago when the authorities in Canada deported a Russian man who had been masquerading as a Canadian citizen.
The alleged SVR agent had been living under a false identity as Paul William Hampel and was detained carrying a fake birth certificate, £3,000 in five currencies and several encrypted pre-paid mobile phone cards.
He claimed to be a lifeguard and travel consultant but counter-intelligence officers believe he based himself in Montreal because the city is the centre of the Canadian aerospace industry. Carrying a Canadian passport, he would have been able to travel freely to the United States.
In another incident last year, the Americans arrested Ariel Weinmann, a former US navy submariner, on charges of spying for the Russians. Weinmann was accused of making electronic copies of classified information which he sought to pass on to his handlers. He was sentenced to 12 years in jail.
John Pike, a military and security analyst who runs GlobalSecurity.org, said a surge in recruitment of US intelligence operatives since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had presented great opportunities for the Russians to penetrate the CIA and other agencies. Shvets believes Russian agents are also entering America legally as immigrants, a rarity in the strictly controlled Soviet era.
The increase in Russian intelligence activity abroad is in step with Moscow’s more aggressive stance since Putin came to power and turned the country’s lagging economy around on the back of record high oil prices.
Putin’s abrasive style has frustrated Washington. Relations between Russia and the United States are worse than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Comparisons with the tension of the cold war years have become commonplace.
“President Putin thinks the United States has been weakened by Iraq,” said Richard Holbrooke, a former US ambassador to the United Nations. “He thinks he has been strengthened by recent events and high-priced oil and he is trying to put Russia back on the international map.”
Estonia, the Baltic state, appeared last week to have become the target of a cyber attack after a row with Moscow over its decision to relocate a Soviet-era military monument. The Estonians claim professional hackers from Russia targeted the internet sites of ministries, parliament, banks, the media and large companies, causing their systems to crash.
The attack followed Russian calls to impose sanctions on Estonia, cuts in Moscow’s oil and gas deliveries and a campaign of intimidation by a Kremlin-backed youth group against the Estonian ambassador. Nato has sent a cyber-crime expert to help the Estonians, fearing that it could be next.
These concerns were raised last week at a European summit attended by Putin and Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, at Samara in southern Russia. Merkel traded barbs with Putin over Russia’s human rights record and complained that critics of the Kremlin, including Garry Kasparov, the former chess champion, were prevented from attending a protest march.
Moscow and Brussels are due to start talks on an agreement to cover trade, energy and foreign policy but Poland has been blocking the negotiations as a result of a Russian ban on its meat exports. The Kremlin’s relations with Lithuania are also tense following Moscow’s decision to cut oil supplies to the Baltic state.
In February Putin accused America of imposing its will on the rest of the world. He said that Washington’s plans to install 10 interceptor missiles in Poland and a radar station in the Czech Republic — part of an anti-missile shield bitterly opposed by the Russians — “could provoke nothing less than the beginning of a nuclear era”.
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stratfor.com
Geopolitical Diary: Understanding Putin's Missile-Defense Offer
Russia and the United States have had some tense exchanges this week regarding a U.S. plan to create a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system based in Central Europe -- with Russian President Vladimir Putin at one point even threatening to point missiles at Europe if such a system were built. But on Thursday, Putin offered U.S. President George W. Bush what, on the surface, would appear to be a mutually beneficial alternative: Moscow and Washington could cooperate on the project, but base it in Azerbaijan instead.
The U.S. plan -- to construct BMD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic in order to defend against a potential Iranian missile strike -- has run into many complications. Within NATO there are concerns that the system will not protect all of Europe, and that it unnecessarily provokes the Russians. Moscow, meanwhile, certainly does not want any system in Europe that at all impedes delivery of its own nuclear deterrent, even obliquely.
At first glance, a system based in Azerbaijan would appear to remove all of these problems. Its location on Iran's northern border would enable earlier warning of launches, and would provide a bigger arc of protection that could shield all of Europe and most of Russia. And, since Azerbaijan is not located between Russia and the West, such a system would not threaten the Russian deterrent.
Sounds like a great deal, right?
That's what we thought until we took a closer look at U.S. BMD technology.
The U.S. missile-defense system uses specially equipped ground-based radar stations to identify a missile launch, track it and coordinate an intercept. Getting an interceptor to the target takes time, so the sooner a BMD radar can pick up the missile and start tracking it, the more time the system as a whole has to spin up and engage it. In practice, this means that any Polish/Czech system would really be intended to guard the mainland United States and maybe the United Kingdom, but certainly not mainland Europe.
It's true that pushing the system closer to the Middle East would give interceptor sites in Europe more time to react -- but Azerbaijan is actually too close to Iran to be a base for interceptors. It is much easier to predict where a missile will go once it establishes its ballistic path -- that is, after its final booster cuts out. If Iran could launch from its northwest, the missile would already be ahead of the Azerbaijan site before Azerbaijan-based interceptors could engage it or even plot its course. Even for the most advanced interceptors, it would be a tail-chase from the start, which would require essentially near-instantaneous response time to the initial launch for any chance of success at all.
Think of a BMD system like a baseball field. In essence, the Polish/Czech facility would serve as an outfielder trying to "catch" a missile after watching to see where it is going. The Russians want the outfielder to stand in Azerbaijan, which would be essentially right next to home plate. Catching anything at such short range is difficult -- and, while the United States does have systems in development to operate at such distances, even when they are deployed they would only work as one component of a larger system. That means a functional BMD system would have to be based in Central Europe, where it could engage any missiles in mid-flight, not in Azerbaijan where it would have to target the missile's boost phase. It also means that Tehran can rest easy -- there is no U.S. military facility coming to Iran's northern border.
Thus, Putin's offer is really about shifting the European BMD system's coverage toward central Asia and into irrelevance. It is a political offer that -- though it will play well in international media as a show of friendliness -- has little real value. An Azerbaijani-hosted BMD radar would certainly have its uses, but only as a complement to a larger BMD system in Europe. It cannot function alone.
Besides all this, Putin's offer will come with strings attached that will make this deal a non-starter for the United States:
Moscow's specific offer is for the United States to use Russia's own radar base at Qabala, Azerbaijan. The problem here is that Russia knows a thing or two about espionage. Closely guarded American technological developments will be at risk, as will communication signals with any larger BMD system.
These communications and the site itself will remain exceptionally vulnerable to Russian interference -- anything from toying with locally obtained supplies to physically destroying key facilities. And a BMD system is just the sort of thing that must be at its best at the height of a crisis.
While Iran's military capabilities are a pale shadow compared to those of a first-world power, even Tehran could probably jam signals in and out of southern Azerbaijan -- making the whole exercise useless.
Washington certainly realizes all this. So why would Putin make the offer if he knows it will be practically useless to the United States?
The real goal is to turn Washington's BMD plan into a wedge issue for NATO. Many European states are concerned about BMD for myriad reasons, but the one commonality is a fear that the plan will unnecessarily provoke Moscow into being more aggressive with Europe. By being "reasonable" and "offering" to "cooperate" with BMD, Moscow can snarl Washington's European policy in a way that has not been done since the Cold War.
We do not make that comparison lightly. In the Cold War days, the Soviets regularly made offers that seemed quite reasonable at first glance, but would have gutted Western defense capabilities in practice. For example, while working fervently to develop nuclear weapons, Josef Stalin proposed putting all nuclear weapons -- which at the time meant Washington's -- under U.N. control. It sounded nice in a speech, but in reality would have opened up Europe to the Soviet Union's overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities.
Such Soviet positioning was regularly effective at hurling intra-Western relations into the thresher -- and that was back when there were only a dozen NATO members.
Now there are 26.
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Summary
Russia plans to upgrade its Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and eventually to build a small fleet of new aircraft carriers, the chief of the Russian navy said July 27. Russia has slowly been turning its military fortunes back from the decay and decline of the 1990s, and may now be reaching the point at which such plans, while ambitious, could be attainable.
Analysis
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Editor’s Note: This is the first of a two-part series on the Russian navy.
Russia plans to begin upgrading its Borei-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), starting with the next hull to be laid down, which will be the fourth, Russian senior naval officer Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky said at the opening of the annual Navy Day parade July 27. Vysotsky also promised a new concept for Russia’s next generation of aircraft carrier groups, calling for half a dozen carriers to be constructed beginning in 2012.
Vysotsky’s statements in some ways smack of the ambitions of the Soviet old guard (among whom talk of a return to the glory days with large fleets of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers is common). His vision is more restrained and realistic in other important ways, however — he is, for example, calling not for 12 carriers, but for six. In his comments, he also focused on pointing out that a fundamental re-evaluation of the functions and composition of carrier task forces is under way and that questions of actual carrier design are further down the road.
Many scholars and military officers continue to dismiss the Russian military offhand, based on its decay in the 1990s and its decrepit state at the turn of the century. Russia’s armed forces after the fall of the Soviet Union suffered a comprehensive decline that is difficult to overstate — ranging from widespread inefficiency and bloating of the officers’ ranks, to poor maintenance and neglect of equipment, to a lack of proper training and deployment — culminating in the at-sea accident that led to the loss of the Kursk, the pride of the Russian Northern Fleet. Indeed, U.S. intelligence has said that in 2007, Russia’s ballistic missile submarines conducted only three strategic deterrent patrols, even fewer than the year before. But changes are afoot under the leadership of Prime Minister (and former President) Vladimir Putin.
To begin with, Russia has been working to replenish its fleet. Corruption and incompetence at Russian naval shipyards remain problems, but ones that are recognized and are being addressed. Managers are now being held responsible (and fired when appropriate), while new umbrella entities are being formed to consolidate the defense sector — such as the United Shipbuilding Corp., whose objective is to fashion a competent, efficient shipbuilding industry. Though it seems ambitious now, the goal of a Russian shipbuilding industry able to crank out ships at a reasonable rate — and of a passable quality — is not without precedent in Soviet times. The need to contain costs is another challenge, but recent construction of surface combatants has suggested a remarkable pragmatism in terms of focusing on obtainable and affordable designs.
This is not to say that a few new hulls will solve all of Russia’s problems. The navy’s deteriorating institutional knowledge — especially in areas like carrier operations and anti-submarine warfare — is a valuable commodity, and one that will be difficult and time-consuming to reconstitute. The first step in this direction is simply getting ships and sailors back to sea on a sustained basis, where they can hone their skills. Though this is hardly being done across the board (especially in the submarine corps), there has been some increase in deployments — and newer ships and submarines would at least facilitate this change.
Yet a crucial time for Russia is at hand. Putin, as a former intelligence officer, is well aware of the value of military might (though he has often favored economic and political means of coercion in his foreign policy). During his two terms as president, Putin worked to consolidate the Kremlin’s control over the military (along with most other strategic sectors). A key part of this process has consisted of reining in the military and preventing it from overreaching with too-ambitious plans and, at the same time, halting the decline of the 1990s. These dual imperatives for Putin have been compounded by the continued leadership of old-guard Soviet officers, stubbornly committed to a return to the glory of the Red Army — many of whom Putin has forced out.
Guiding the navy now is Vysotsky, who was personally appointed by Putin. He is as much the prime minister’s man as a military man can be. Under him, a focus on Russia’s nuclear submarine fleet will continue, and incremental upgrades are under way for ship and boat classes already under construction. Many obstacles still remain, but the potential foundation for a revitalized Russian navy is beginning to emerge.
As the Kremlin further solidifies its grip over the military, it will accelerate its reforms of both the military and the defense industry, expanding the recent moves toward professionalization, continuing to trim the fat (especially in the officer ranks) and quickening the pace of construction and delivery of new equipment to the armed forces. None of these moves are necessarily new, but their pace thus far has been halting and their effectiveness uneven. Now, however, they may be reaching a critical mass at which their effectiveness might begin to improve.
If these changes can be maintained, it appears likely that the next few years will see more hulls coming on line: new ships and submarines that have not suffered badly under the neglect and wear of the 1990s. Though Russian naval doctrine has not traditionally favored the comparatively high deployment pace of the U.S. Navy, Moscow will soon potentially have that option, should it choose to use it.
Significant challenges remain, but Putin’s careful and impressive reversal of fortunes for the Russian military cannot be denied. At the same time, there are no guarantees that it will last. In a larger geopolitical sense, Moscow now needs to consolidate its gains and begin to build a military that can demonstrate to the world that Russia remains a global power.
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Solzhenitsyn and the Struggle for Russia's Soul
August 5, 2008
By George Friedman
The Russian Resurgence
There are many people who write history. There are very few who make history through their writings. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, who died this week at the age of 89, was one of them. In many ways, Solzhenitsyn laid the intellectual foundations for the fall of Soviet communism. That is well known. But Solzhenitsyn also laid the intellectual foundation for the Russia that is now emerging. That is less well known, and in some ways more important.
Solzhenitsyn’s role in the Soviet Union was simple. His writings, and in particular his book “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich,” laid bare the nature of the Soviet regime. The book described a day in the life of a prisoner in a Soviet concentration camp, where the guilty and innocent alike were sent to have their lives squeezed out of them in endless and hopeless labor. It was a topic Solzhenitsyn knew well, having been a prisoner in such a camp following service in World War II.
The book was published in the Soviet Union during the reign of Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev had turned on his patron, Joseph Stalin, after taking control of the Communist Party apparatus following Stalin’s death. In a famous secret speech delivered to the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Khrushchev denounced Stalin for his murderous ways. Allowing Solzhenitsyn’s book to be published suited Khrushchev. Khrushchev wanted to detail Stalin’s crimes graphically, and Solzhenitsyn’s portrayal of life in a labor camp served his purposes.
It also served a dramatic purpose in the West when it was translated and distributed there. Ever since its founding, the Soviet Union had been mythologized. This was particularly true among Western intellectuals, who had been taken by not only the romance of socialism, but also by the image of intellectuals staging a revolution. Vladimir Lenin, after all, had been the author of works such as “Materialism and Empirio-Criticism.” The vision of intellectuals as revolutionaries gripped many European and American intellectuals.
These intellectuals had missed not only that the Soviet Union was a social catastrophe, but that, far from being ruled by intellectuals, it was being ruled by thugs. For an extraordinarily long time, in spite of ample testimony by emigres from the Soviet regime, Western intellectuals simply denied this reality. When Western intellectuals wrote that they had “seen the future and it worked,” they were writing at a time when the Soviet terror was already well under way. They simply couldn’t see it.
One of the most important things about “One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich” was not only that it was so powerful, but that it had been released under the aegis of the Soviet state, meaning it could not simply be ignored. Solzhenitsyn was critical in breaking the intellectual and moral logjam among intellectuals in the West. You had to be extraordinarily dense or dishonest to continue denying the obvious, which was that the state that Lenin and Stalin had created was a moral monstrosity.
Khrushchev’s intentions were not Solzhenitsyn’s. Khrushchev wanted to demonstrate the evils of Stalinism while demonstrating that the regime could reform itself and, more important, that communism was not invalidated by Stalin’s crimes. Solzhenitsyn, on the other hand, held the view that the labor camps were not incidental to communism, but at its heart. He argued in his “Gulag Archipelago” that the systemic exploitation of labor was essential to the regime not only because it provided a pool of free labor, but because it imposed a systematic terror on those not in the gulag that stabilized the regime. His most telling point was that while Khrushchev had condemned Stalin, he did not dismantle the gulag; the gulag remained in operation until the end.
Though Solzhenitsyn served the regime’s purposes in the 1960s, his usefulness had waned by the 1970s. By then, Solzhenitsyn was properly perceived by the Soviet regime as a threat. In the West, he was seen as a hero by all parties. Conservatives saw him as an enemy of communism. Liberals saw him as a champion of human rights. Each invented Solzhenitsyn in their own image. He was given the Noble Prize for Literature, which immunized him against arrest and certified him as a great writer. Instead of arresting him, the Soviets expelled him, sending him into exile in the United States.
When he reached Vermont, the reality of who Solzhenitsyn was slowly sank in. Conservatives realized that while he certainly was an enemy of communism and despised Western liberals who made apologies for the Soviets, he also despised Western capitalism just as much. Liberals realized that Solzhenitsyn hated Soviet oppression, but that he also despised their obsession with individual rights, such as the right to unlimited free expression. Solzhenitsyn was nothing like anyone had thought, and he went from being the heroic intellectual to a tiresome crank in no time. Solzhenitsyn attacked the idea that the alternative to communism had to be secular, individualist humanism. He had a much different alternative in mind.
Solzhenitsyn saw the basic problem that humanity faced as being rooted in the French Enlightenment and modern science. Both identify the world with nature, and nature with matter. If humans are part of nature, they themselves are material. If humans are material, then what is the realm of God and of spirit? And if there is no room for God and spirituality, then what keeps humans from sinking into bestiality? For Solzhenitsyn, Stalin was impossible without Lenin’s praise of materialism, and Lenin was impossible without the Enlightenment.
From Solzhenitsyn’s point of view, Western capitalism and liberalism are in their own way as horrible as Stalinism. Adam Smith saw man as primarily pursuing economic ends. Economic man seeks to maximize his wealth. Solzhenitsyn tried to make the case that this is the most pointless life conceivable. He was not objecting to either property or wealth, but to the idea that the pursuit of wealth is the primary purpose of a human being, and that the purpose of society is to free humans to this end.
Solzhenitsyn made the case — hardly unique to him — that the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself left humans empty shells. He once noted Blaise Pascal’s aphorism that humans are so endlessly busy so that they can forget that they are going to die — the point being that we all die, and that how we die is determined by how we live. For Solzhenitsyn, the American pursuit of economic well being was a disease destroying the Western soul.
He viewed freedom of expression in the same way. For Americans, the right to express oneself transcends the content of the expression. That you speak matters more than what you say. To Solzhenitsyn, the same principle that turned humans into obsessive pursuers of wealth turned them into vapid purveyors of shallow ideas. Materialism led to individualism, and individualism led to a culture devoid of spirit. The freedom of the West, according to Solzhenitsyn, produced a horrifying culture of intellectual self-indulgence, licentiousness and spiritual poverty. In a contemporary context, the hedge fund coupled with The Daily Show constituted the bankruptcy of the West.
To have been present when he once addressed a Harvard commencement! On the one side, Harvard Law and Business School graduates — the embodiment of economic man. On the other side, the School of Arts and Sciences, the embodiment of free expression. Both greeted their heroic resister, only to have him reveal himself to be religious, patriotic and totally contemptuous of the Vatican of self-esteem, Harvard.
Solzhenitsyn had no real home in the United States, and with the fall of the Soviets, he could return to Russia — where he witnessed what was undoubtedly the ultimate nightmare for him: thugs not only running the country, but running it as if they were Americans. Now, Russians were pursuing wealth as an end in itself and pleasure as a natural right. In all of this, Solzhenitsyn had not changed at all.
Solzhenitsyn believed there was an authentic Russia that would emerge from this disaster. It would be a Russia that first and foremost celebrated the motherland, a Russia that accepted and enjoyed its uniqueness. This Russia would take its bearings from no one else. At the heart of this Russia would be the Russian Orthodox Church, with not only its spirituality, but its traditions, rituals and art.
The state’s mission would be to defend the motherland, create the conditions for cultural renaissance, and — not unimportantly — assure a decent economic life for its citizens. Russia would be built on two pillars: the state and the church. It was within this context that Russians would make a living. The goal would not be to create the wealthiest state in the world, nor radical equality. Nor would it be a place where anyone could say whatever they wanted, not because they would be arrested necessarily, but because they would be socially ostracized for saying certain things.
Most important, it would be a state not ruled by the market, but a market ruled by a state. Economic strength was not trivial to Solzhenitsyn, either for individuals or for societies, but it was never to be an end in itself and must always be tempered by other considerations. As for foreigners, Russia must always guard itself, as any nation must, against foreigners seeking its wealth or wanting to invade. Solzhenitsyn wrote a book called “August 1914,” in which he argues that the czarist regime had failed the nation by not being prepared for war.
Think now of the Russia that Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and President Dmitri Medvedev are shaping. The Russian Orthodox Church is undergoing a massive resurgence, the market is submitting to the state, free expression is being tempered and so on. We doubt Putin was reading Solzhenitsyn when reshaping Russia. But we do believe that Solzhenitsyn had an understanding of Russia that towered over most of his contemporaries. And we believe that the traditional Russia that Solzhenitsyn celebrated is emerging, more from its own force than by political decisions.
Solzhenitsyn served Western purposes when he undermined the Soviet state. But that was not his purpose. His purpose was to destroy the Soviet state so that his vision of Russia could re-emerge. When his interests and the West’s coincided, he won the Noble Prize. When they diverged, he became a joke. But Solzhenitsyn never really cared what Americans or the French thought of him and his ideas. He wasn’t speaking to them and had no interest or hope of remaking them. Solzhenitsyn was totally alien to American culture. He was speaking to Russia and the vision he had was a resurrection of Mother Russia, if not with the czar, then certainly with the church and state. That did not mean liberalism; Mother Russia was dramatically oppressive. But it was neither a country of mass murder nor of vulgar materialism.
It must also be remembered that when Solzhenitsyn spoke of Russia, he meant imperial Russia at its height, and imperial Russia’s borders at its height looked more like the Soviet Union than they looked like Russia today. “August 1914” is a book that addresses geopolitics. Russian greatness did not have to express itself via empire, but logically it should — something to which Solzhenitsyn would not have objected.
Solzhenitsyn could not teach Americans, whose intellectual genes were incompatible with his. But it is hard to think of anyone who spoke to the Russian soul as deeply as he did. He first ripped Russia apart with his indictment. He was later ignored by a Russia out of control under former President Boris Yeltsin. But today’s Russia is very slowly moving in the direction that Solzhenitsyn wanted. And that could make Russia extraordinarily powerful. Imagine a Soviet Union not ruled by thugs and incompetents. Imagine Russia ruled by people resembling Solzhenitsyn’s vision of a decent man.
Solzhenitsyn was far more prophetic about the future of the Soviet Union than almost all of the Ph.D.s in Russian studies. Entertain the possibility that the rest of Solzhenitsyn’s vision will come to pass. It is an idea that ought to cause the world to be very thoughtful.
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Georgia May Not Be Last To Fall If Dominoes Tip Back Other Way
By DANIEL McGROARTY | Posted Thursday, August 14, 2008 4:20 PM PT
In a week when we have been dusting off the old Cold War phrase book to characterize Russia's rapid-fire roll across tiny Georgia, make room for one more: the domino theory.
It's back, with a vengeance.
In the mid-1950s version, the domino theory warned that failure to contain any given communist insurgency would lead to the toppling of anti-communist governments elsewhere, in a kind of chain-reaction regime change.
By 1992, when the Soviet Union imploded, freeing the captive nations of the Warsaw Pact and the non-Russian "Soviet Republics" — Georgia among them — the domino theory seemed to be working in reverse.
Indeed, as the first President Bush put it in his Naval Academy commencement address in 1992: "Today the dominoes fall in democracy's direction."
That was then.
View larger image
Russia, prostrate for much of the 1990s — an era in which oil prices sank as low as $11 per barrel — had little power to resist the Westward-rush of its former vassal states in Eastern Europe, or even the return of the Baltic nations to their European roots.
Then came Russia's revival. Emerging as an energy superpower — with oil surging to $140 per barrel — a more muscular Russia was eager to reassert its foreign policy presence, particularly among the nations it lovingly calls its near-abroad.
Early events in 2008 set the stage for the Georgian guns of August. First came a re-interpretation of the "Kosovo precedent": Initially insisting that Kosovo's independent ambitions must be denied, Russia drew a line in the sand. Kosovo declared independence, knowing that what Russia decried the U.S. and Europe would bless.
Faced with this fact, Russia came to see Kosovo as a glass half-full: If Russia must live with Kosovo's break-away desires in the center of Europe, then Europe and the U.S. will have to learn to live with Russia's embrace of break-away regions along its border.
Second came the April NATO Summit in Romania, at which the U.S. and former Warsaw Pact nations backed a NATO invitation for Georgia and Ukraine, over the go-slow position of France and Germany. No invitation was issued; NATO's red light to Georgia was a green light for the Russians.
Beyond Georgia, who is vulnerable? Start with Ukraine, which has its own simmering South Ossetia, only far larger: Crimea, with more than 20 times the population of Georgia's breakaway region, a strategic peninsula sitting atop the Black Sea.
Crimea itself is merely a portion of the eastern swath of Ukraine that has millions of ethnic Russians only too happy to look to Moscow for deliverance.
Expect pressure to mount on Ukraine's Western-minded president to walk back his often-expressed desire to be the next nation to join NATO.
Warning signs are already evident. Even as the Russians rolled into Georgia, a leading Communist Party politician in Ukraine declared that, should his country be "dragged into NATO," Crimea will secede.
Consider also the Baltic nations — Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. While the trio, unlike Georgia and Ukraine, enjoy NATO and European Union membership, ethnic Russians comprise one-quarter to one-third of the populations of Latvia and Estonia.
Elsewhere among the nations of the former Soviet Bloc, some of NATO's newest members are intent on staying off the domino list. With images of smoldering apartment blocks in Georgian cities playing on TV screens, Poland, for instance, intensified talks with the U.S. to obtain a security guarantee in the form of permanent Patriot anti-missile installations.
Romania's president laid down a rhetorical marker that "Transnistria is not Ossetia" — a reference obscure to American ears but clear in regional context that Romania will not countenance a Georgian-style putsch in the heavily Russian-ethnic enclave in eastern Moldova.
As for Georgia, America's early responses — shuttle diplomacy by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, humanitarian aid air convoys and talk of "sanctions" including a U.S. boycott of the 2014 Winter Games in Sochi, Russia, a short fighter-bomber flight from Abkhazia — serve only to underscore the West's limited repertoire when a military response is off the table.
For now, the geopolitical game shifts to other Eastern European nations, which will seek stronger assurances from the U.S. and Europe that they will not fall prey to a resurgent Russia. Meanwhile, Georgia's Rose Revolution goes the way of Prague Spring.
After decades in which the dominoes fell democracy's way, Georgia has fallen. Will the U.S. and Europe take steps to shore up security relationships among the former nations of the Warsaw Pact — even as we ready for the next domino scenario in Kiev, Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius?
McGroarty, a former White House speechwriter, is principal of Carmot Strategic Group, a Washington-based international business advisory firm.
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A friend whom I have found to be an intelligent student of these matters writes me as follows-- I find the article to be very interesting a worthy of considerable reflection:
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Incidentally, last weekend in NY I had a chance to spend time with some politically
"kulturny" people, including a lady who is Georgian - and is involved in that
countrie's politics. She thought that the very worst possible scenario for the
Georgian people would be if Russia and NATO would decide to fight out this issue on
Georgian soil. That would cause devastation.
Found this article by "Spengler". Along with Stratfor analyses, I think this is one
of the more insightful essays on this subject. If the graphs do not show up, use
the link.
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Central AsiaAug 19, 2008Americans play Monopoly, Russians chessBy SpenglerOn the
night of November 22, 2004, then-Russian president - now premier - Vladimir Putin
watched the television news in his dacha near Moscow. People who were with Putin
that night report his anger and disbelief at the unfolding "Orange" revolution in
Ukraine. "They lied to me," Putin said bitterly of the United States. "I'll never
trust them again." The Russians still can't fathom why the West threw over a
potential strategic alliance for Ukraine. They underestimate the stupidity of the
West.American hardliners are the first to say that they feel stupid next to Putin.
Victor Davis Hanson wrote on August 12 [1] of Moscow's "sheer diabolic brilliance"
in Georgia, while Colonel Ralph Peters, a columnist and television commentator,
marveled on August 14 [2], "The Russians are alcohol-sodden barbarians, but now and
then they vomit up a genius ... the empire of the czars hasn't produced such a
frightening genius since [Joseph] Stalin." The superlatives recall an old
observation about why the plots of American comic books need clever super-villains
and stupid super-heroes to even the playing field. Evidently the same thing applies
to superpowers.The fact is that all Russian politicians are clever. The stupid ones
are all dead. By contrast, America in its complacency promotes dullards. A deadly
miscommunication arises from this asymmetry. The Russians cannot believe that the
Americans are as stupid as they look, and conclude that Washington wants to destroy
them. That is what the informed Russian public believes, judging from last week's
postings on web forums, including this writer's own.These perceptions are dangerous
because they do not stem from propaganda, but from a difference in existential
vantage point. Russia is fighting for its survival, against a catastrophic decline
in population and the likelihood of a Muslim majority by mid-century. The Russian
Federation's scarcest resource is people. It cannot ignore the 22 million Russians
stranded outside its borders after the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union, nor, for
that matter, small but loyal ethnicities such as the Ossetians. Strategic
encirclement, in Russian eyes, prefigures the ethnic disintegration of Russia, which
was a political and cultural entity, not an ethnic state, from its first origins.The
Russians know (as every newspaper reader does) that Georgia's President Mikheil
Saakashvili is not a model democrat, but a nasty piece of work who deployed riot
police against protesters and shut down opposition media when it suited him - in
short, a politician in Putin's mold. America's interest in Georgia, the Russians
believe, has nothing more to do with promoting democracy than its support for the
gangsters to whom it handed the Serbian province of Kosovo in February.Again, the
Russians misjudge American stupidity. Former president Ronald Reagan used to say
that if there was a pile of manure, it must mean there was a pony around somewhere.
His epigones have trouble distinguishing the pony from the manure pile. The
ideological reflex for promoting democracy dominates the George W Bush
administration to the point that some of its senior people hold their noses and
pretend that Kosovo, Ukraine and Georgia are the genuine article.Think of it this
way: Russia is playing chess, while the Americans are playing Monopoly. What
Americans understand by "war games" is exactly what occurs on the board of the
Parker Brothers' pastime. The board game Monopoly is won by placing as many hotels
as possible on squares of the playing board. Substitute military bases, and you have
the sum of American strategic thinking.America's idea of winning a strategic game is
to accumulate the most chips on the board: bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, a
pipeline in Georgia, a "moderate Muslim" government with a big North Atlantic Treaty
Organization base in Kosovo, missile installations in Poland and the Czech Republic,
and so forth. But this is not a strategy; it is only a game score.Chess players
think in terms of interaction of pieces: everything on the periphery combines to
control the center of the board and prepare an eventual attack against the
opponent's king. The Russians simply cannot absorb the fact that America has no
strategic intentions: it simply adds up the value of the individual pieces on the
board. It is as stupid as that. But there is another difference: the Americans are
playing chess for career and perceived advantage. Russia is playing for its life,
like Ingmar Bergman's crusader in The Seventh Seal.Dull people know that clever
people are cleverer than they are, but they do not know why. The nekulturny Colonel
Ralph Peters, a former US military intelligence analyst, is impressed by the
tactical success of Russian arms in Georgia, but cannot fathom the end-game to which
these tactics contribute. He writes, "The new reality is that a nuclear, cash-rich
and energy-blessed Russia doesn't really worry too much whether its long-term future
is bleak, given problems with Muslim minorities, poor life-expectancy rates, and a
declining population. Instead, in the here and now, it has a window of opportunity
to reclaim prestige and weaken its adversaries."Precisely the opposite is true: like
a good chess player, Putin has the end-game in mind as he fights for control of the
board in the early stages of the game. Demographics stand at the center of Putin's
calculation, and Russians are the principal interest that the Russian Federation has
in its so-called near abroad. The desire of a few hundred thousand Abkhazians and
South Ossetians to remain in the Russian Federation rather than Georgia may seem
trivial, but Moscow is setting a precedent that will apply to tens of millions of
prospective citizens of the Federation - most controversially in Ukraine.Before
turning to the demographics of the near abroad, a few observations about Russia's
demographic predicament are pertinent. The United Nations publishes population
projections for Russia up to 2050, and I have extended these to 2100. If the UN
demographers are correct, Russia's adult population will fall from about 90 million
today to only 20 million by the end of the century. Russia is the only country where
abortions are more numerous than live births, a devastating gauge of national
despair.Under Putin, the Russian government introduced an ambitious natalist program
to encourage Russian women to have children. As he warned in his 2006 state of the
union address, "You know that our country's population is declining by an average of
almost 700,000 people a year. We have raised this issue on many occasions but have
for the most part done very little to address it ... First, we need to lower the
death rate. Second, we need an effective migration policy. And third, we need to
increase the birth rate."Russia's birth rate has risen slightly during the past
several years, perhaps in response to Putin's natalism, but demographers observe
that the number of Russian women of childbearing age is about to fall off a cliff.
No matter how much the birth rate improves, the sharp fall in the number of
prospective mothers will depress the number of births. UN forecasts show the number
of Russians aged 20-29 falling from 25 million today to only 10 million by
2040.Russia, in other words, has passed the point of no return in terms of
fertility. Although roughly four-fifths of the population of the Russian Federation
is considered ethnic Russians, fertility is much higher among the Muslim minorities
in Central Asia. Some demographers predict a Muslim majority in Russia by 2040, and
by mid-century at the latest.Part of Russia's response is to encourage migration of
Russians left outside the borders of the federation after the collapse of communism
in 1991. An estimated 6.5 million Russians from the former Soviet Union now work in
Russia as undocumented aliens, and a new law will regularize their status. Only
20,000 Russian "compatriots" living abroad, however, have applied for immigration to
the federation under a new law designed to draw Russians back.That leaves the 9.5
million citizens of Belarus, a relic of the Soviet era that persists in a
semi-formal union with the Russian Federation, as well as the Russians of the
Western Ukraine and Kazakhstan. More than 15 million ethnic Russians reside in those
three countries, and they represent a critical strategic resource. Paul Goble in his
Window on Eurasia website reported on August 16:..............Moscow retreated after
encountering fierce opposition from other countries, but semi-legal practices of
obtaining Russian citizenship that began in former Soviet republics in the early
1990s continue unabated. There is plenty of evidence that there are one to two
million people living in the territory of the former Soviet Union who have de facto
dual citizenship and are reluctant to report it to the authorities. Russia did
little to stop the process. Moreover, starting in 1997, it encouraged de facto dual
citizenship................Russia has an existential interest in absorbing Belarus
and the Western Ukraine. No one cares about Byelorus. It has never had an
independent national existence or a national culture; the first grammar in the
Belorussian language was not printed until 1918, and little over a third of the
population of Belarus speaks the language at home. Never has a territory with 10
million people had a sillier case for independence. Given that summary, it seems
natural to ask why anyone should care about Ukraine. That question is controversial;
for the moment, I will offer the assertion that partition is the destiny of
Ukraine.Even with migration and annexation of former Russian territory that was lost
in the fracture of the USSR, however, Russia will not win its end-game against
demographic decline and the relative growth of Muslim populations. The key to
Russian survival is Russification, that is, the imposition of Russian culture
andRussian law on ethnicities at the periphery of the federation. That might sound
harsh, but that has been Russian nature from its origins.Russia is not an ethnicity
but an empire, the outcome of hundreds of years of Russification. That Russification
has been brutal is an understatement, but it is what created Russia out of the
ethnic morass around the Volga river basin. One of the best accounts of Russia's
character comes from Eugene Rosenstock-Huessey (Franz Rosenzweig's cousin and
sometime collaborator) in his 1938 book Out of Revolution. Russia's territory
tripled between the 16th and 18th centuries, he observes, and the agency of its
expansion was a unique Russian type. The Russian peasant, Rosenstock-Huessey
observed, "was no stable freeholder of the Western type but much more a nomad, a
pedlar, a craftsman and a soldier. His capacity for expansion was tremendous."In
1581 Asiatic Russia was opened. Russian expansion, extending even in the eighteenth
century as far as the Russian River in Northern California, was by no means
Czaristic only. The "Moujik", the Russian peasant, because he is not a "Bauer" or a
"farmer", or a "laborer", but a "Moujik", wanders and stays, ready to migrate again
eventually year after year.Russia was never a multi-ethnic state, but rather what I
call a supra-ethnic state, that is, a state whose national principle transcends
ethnicity. A reader has called my attention to an account of the most Russian of all
writers, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, of his own Russo-Lithuanian-Ukrainian
background:..........I suppose that one of my Lithuanian ancestors, having emigrated
to the Ukraine, changed his religion in order to marry an Orthodox Ukrainian, and
became a priest. When his wife died he probably entered a monastery, and later, rose
to be an archbishop. This would explain how the Archbishop Stepan may have founded
our Orthodox family, in spite of his being a monk. It is somewhat surprising to see
the Dostoyevsky, who had been warriors in Lithuania, become priests in Ukraine. But
this is quite in accordance with Lithuanian custom. I may quote the learned
Lithuanian W St Vidunas in this connection: "Formerly many well-to-do Lithuanians
had but one desire: to see one or more of their sons enter upon an ecclesiastical
career." ............................Dostoyevsky's mixed background was typically
Russian, as was the Georgian origin of Joseph Stalin.Russia intervened in Georgia to
uphold the principle that anyone who holds a Russian passport - Ossetian, Akhbaz,
Belorussian or Ukrainian - is a Russian. Russia's survival depends not so much on
its birth rate, nor on immigration, nor even on prospective annexation, but on the
survival of the principle by which Russia was built in the first place. That is why
Putin could not abandon the pockets of Russian passport holders in the Caucusus.
That Russia history has been tragic, and its nation-building principle brutal and
sometimes inhuman, is a different matter. Russia is sufficiently important that its
tragedy will be our tragedy, unless averted.The place to avert tragedy is in
Ukraine. Russia will not permit Ukraine to drift to the West. Whether a country that
never had an independent national existence prior to the collapse of communism
should become the poster-child for national self-determination is a different
question. The West has two choices: draw a line in the sand around Ukraine, or trade
it to the Russians for something more important.My proposal is simple: Russia's help
in containing nuclear proliferation and terrorism in the Middle East is of
infinitely greater import to the West than the dubious self-determination of
Ukraine. The West should do its best to pretend that the "Orange" revolution of 2004
and 2005 never happened, and secure Russia's assistance in the Iranian nuclear issue
as well as energy security in return for an understanding of Russia's existential
requirements in the near abroad. Anyone who thinks this sounds cynical should spend
a week in Kiev.Russia has more to fear from a nuclear-armed Iran than the United
States, for an aggressive Muslim state on its borders could ruin its attempt to
Russify Central Asia. Russia's strategic interests do not conflict with those of the
United States, China or India in this matter. There is a certain degree of rivalry
over energy resources, but commercial rivalry does not have to turn into strategic
enmity.If Washington chooses to demonize Russia, the likelihood is that Russia will
become a spoiler with respect to American strategic interests in general, and use
the Iranian problem to twist America's tail. That is a serious risk indeed, for
nuclear proliferation is the one means by which outlaw regimes can pose a serious
threat to great powers. Russia confronts questions not of expediency, but of
existence, and it will do whatever it can to gain maneuvering room should the West
seek to "punish" it for its actions in Georgia.One irony of the present crisis is
that Washington's neo-conservatives, by demanding a tough stance against Russia, may
have harmed Israel's security interests more profoundly than any of Israel's
detractors in American politics. The neo-conservatives are not as a rule Jewish, but
many of them are Jews who have a deep concern for Israel's security - as does this
writer. If America turns Russia into a strategic adversary, the probability of
Israel's survival will drop by a big
notch.http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/JH19Ag05.html
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Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
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GEOPOLITICAL DIARY: THE IMPLICATIONS OF A RUSSO-SYRIAN PARTNERSHIP
Syrian President Bashar al Assad arrived in Moscow on Wednesday for a two-day visit
during which he will meet with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev. Al Assad's
invitation to Moscow was announced shortly after Russia began its military offensive
against Georgia. The timing was no coincidence, and Damascus fully intends to ride
Russia's wave of resurgence into regional prominence.
Russia and Syria had a close defense relationship during the Cold War, when the
Soviet Union maintained a naval presence in the Mediterranean Sea off the Syrian
coast and facilities at Syrian ports. In those days, Syria used its relationship
with Russia to protect itself from the threat of Israel. But that patronage dried up
even before the collapse of the Soviet Union, and Syrian defense structures -- its
air defense network, for example -- began falling into disrepair.
Syria's relationship to Russia under former President Vladimir Putin was not nearly
as accommodating as it was during the Cold War, and the Syrians have spent a great
deal of energy chasing armament deals with Russia, with no luck. For years -- but
especially after the September 2007 Israeli air raid that essentially sidestepped
the entire Syrian air defense network -- Damascus has grown more desperate for a
comprehensive upgrade to its air defense network. But talks with Russia have failed
to gain traction, and the Syrians have grown weary of being strung along. With
Russia's assertion of power in the Caucasus, however, Syria sees a chance to break
out of its diplomatic isolation.
Given U.S. sensitivity to developments in the Middle East, Syria is well positioned
to give Russia ways to meddle in Washington's affairs. The threat of increased
Russian weapons sales to Iran and Syria, coupled with Wednesday's hints of a Russian
carrier returning to the Mediterranean, are all useful tactics in sending Washington
a very clear message: Russia is a great power capable of influencing matters well
beyond its own borders.
For Damascus, Russia's resurgence is a great opportunity to strengthen its security
relationship with Moscow. Primarily, by reviving its ties with Russia, Syria could
compel Israel, the United States and Turkey to accelerate efforts to pull Damascus
out of the diplomatic cold. This would give Syria the political recognition and
influence that it has long craved; more importantly, Syria would gain physical
security.
Thus far, there have been no concrete reports of any major deals struck during al
Assad's trip to Moscow. However, Newsru.com, a subsidiary of Russia's NTV news
group, reported that al Assad has said he is ready to host a Russian base off the
Syrian coast again. Though the establishment of such a base of operations so far
beyond Russia's periphery would certainly be dramatic, there are limits to how far
Russia can go in the Middle East. Tactically speaking, a Russian fleet based in the
Mediterranean would essentially be surrounded by NATO allies, and hemmed in by
Turkish territory. The sheer superiority of U.S., Turkish, NATO and Israeli naval
assets in the region puts any small deployment at a severe disadvantage.
Furthermore, any extension of Russian influence in the Middle East must balance the
needs of several actors -- all of whom are in delicate negotiations with one
another. For instance, the Russians and the Israelis have their own ongoing
negotiations in which Israel has reportedly appealed to Moscow to continue
restricting weapons sales to Syria and Iran in exchange for Israel's restraint in
providing military assistance to Georgia. This is a significant barrier to a real
Damascus-Moscow security deal, as Russia is heavily invested in maintaining control
in Georgia.
But Syria's hopes for a real alignment with Russia are only part of the cascade of
reactions as nations internalize Russia's renewed assertiveness. First and foremost,
of course, are the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Iran over the
future of Iraq. Iran is currently calculating its options; obviously, it must
carefully balance its relations with Russia and its talks with the United States.
And Iran would like to expand its arms deals with Russia dramatically, but fears
Russia's resurgence in the Caucasus. Turkey is also in play. As a NATO member and
neighbor of Georgia, Turkey finds itself right in the middle of the U.S.-Russian
rivalry and must seek a balance.
More than anything else, Syria's ability to exploit the Russian comeback in the
Caucasus will depend on just how drastically Russia plans to upset U.S. foreign
policy at this stage in the game. Syria certainly has assets to offer Moscow, but
Russia will be considering much more than just Syria as it moves forward from this
point.
Copyright 2008 Strategic Forecasting, Inc.
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Geopolitical Diary: The Medvedev Doctrine
September 2, 2008 | 0202 GMT
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev gave an extraordinary interview on Russian television’s Channel One over the weekend. In the course of the interview, Medvedev unveiled a five-point doctrine that would govern Russia’s foreign policy going forward. It came in the course of an interviewer’s questions, but the statement was obviously well thought out and planned. It is to be seen as a statement of Russian national policy and is worth presenting here verbatim in translation by the Kremlin:
“I will make five principles the foundation for my work in carrying out Russia’s foreign policy.
First, Russia recognizes the primacy of the fundamental principles of international law, which define the relations between civilized peoples. We will build our relations with other countries within the framework of these principles and this concept of international law.
Second, the world should be multipolar. A single-pole world is unacceptable. Domination is something we cannot allow. We cannot accept a world order in which one country makes all the decisions, even as serious and influential a country as the United States of America. Such a world is unstable and threatened by conflict.
Third, Russia does not want confrontation with any other country. Russia has no intention of isolating itself. We will develop friendly relations with Europe, the United States, and other countries, as much as is possible.
Fourth, protecting the lives and dignity of our citizens, wherever they may be, is an unquestionable priority for our country. Our foreign policy decisions will be based on this need. We will also protect the interests of our business community abroad. It should be clear to all that we will respond to any aggressive acts committed against us.
Finally, fifth, as is the case of other countries, there are regions in which Russia has privileged interests. These regions are home to countries with which we share special historical relations and are bound together as friends and good neighbors. We will pay particular attention to our work in these regions and build friendly ties with these countries, our close neighbors. These are the principles I will follow in carrying out our foreign policy.
As for the future, it depends not only on us but also on our friends and partners in the international community. They have a choice.”
The interviewer then asked for greater definition of the Russian areas of interest. Medvedev replied, “The countries on our borders are priorities, of course, but our priorities do not end there.”
The most important points to take away from this, from our point of view, are as follows. First, the events in Georgia are not to be seen as isolated, but as part of a general shift in Russian policy. Second, the Russians are claiming responsibility for Russian citizens anywhere. This is particularly important in the Baltics, where Russian citizens constitute substantial minorities, and in Ukraine. Russia is making it clear that the treatment of Russians in other regions is a fundamental interest in its foreign policy. Third, the Russians are declaring a sphere of interest in the former Soviet Union, and saying that friendly relations with these countries is essential to Russia. This also means that these countries may not have the option of pursuing policies that Russia regards as unfriendly. Finally, Russian interests are not confined to the former Soviet Union. That obviously means that they extend to Eastern Europe and, in all likelihood, the Middle East as well.
We see this interview as not quite a formal doctrine, but a clear indication of Russian thinking. It is clear that the Russians have now publicly announced what is obvious: Russia has a new foreign policy, and it is ambitious and will unfold quickly rather than slowly.
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Russia's Next Target
Could Be Ukraine
By LEON ARON
September 10, 2008; Page A15
WSJ
Perhaps the most urgent question in the world affairs today is whether Russia's invasion and continuing occupation of Georgia was a singular event. Or was it the onset of a distinct, and profoundly disturbing, national security and foreign policy agenda?
Much as one would like to cling to the former theory, the evidence favors the latter. A European delegation led by French President Nicolas Sarkozy did manage this week to get assurances that Russian troops would withdraw from Georgia (excepting Abkhazia and South Ossetia, whose independence Moscow says is "irrevocable"). But ultimately, this short war is likely to be remembered as the beginning of a decisive shift in Russia's national priorities. The most compelling of these new priorities today seems to be recovery of the assets lost in the Soviet Union's collapse in 1991, which Vladimir Putin has called the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."
How does Russia achieve this goal? By dominating the domestic politics and, more importantly, economic- and foreign-policy orientation, of the former Soviet republics. Anything considered antithetical to Russia's interests, as interpreted by the current Kremlin leadership, must be discarded -- be it democratization, oil and gas exports that bypass Russia, and, especially, the membership in the Western organizations such as the European Union and NATO. And if, in the process, Russia must sacrifice most or even all of the fruits of the post-Soviet rapprochement with the West -- including membership in the G-8, entry to the World Trade Organization or ties to the EU -- so be it.
Russia's "targets of opportunity" include simmering border disputes (and virtually all Russia's borders with newly independent states could be disputed, since they are but the very badly demarcated internal borders of the Soviet Union), and the presence of the ethnic Russian or Russian-speaking minorities in neighboring countries.
Apart from Estonia and Latvia -- where ethnic Russians constitute over a quarter of the population, but where NATO membership raises the risk for the Kremlin -- by far the most likely target is Ukraine. Kiev has repeatedly defied and angered Russia by the domestic politics of democratization, a decidedly pro-Western orientation, and the eagerness of its leadership to join NATO. Nearly one in five Ukraine citizens are ethnically Russian (a total of almost eight million) and live mostly in the country's northeast, adjacent to the Russian border.
Mr. Putin has made his contempt for Ukrainian sovereignty clear, most notably at the NATO summit in Bucharest last April when, according to numerous reports in the Russian and Ukrainian press, he told President Bush that the Ukraine is "not even a real state," that much of its territory was "given away" by Russia, and that it would "cease to exist as a state" if it dared join NATO. Clearly, Vice President Cheney's trip to Ukraine this past weekend, where he expressed America's "deep commitment" to this "democratic nation" and its "right" to join NATO, was intended as a message to Moscow.
Still, there is no better place to cause a political crisis in Ukraine and force a change in the country's leadership, already locked in a bitter internecine struggle, than the Crimean peninsula. It was wrestled by Catherine the Great from the Ottoman Turks at the end of the 18th century. Less than a quarter of the Crimeans are ethnic Ukrainians, while Russians make up over half the inhabitants (the pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars, one-fifth).
Ever since the 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Russia and Ukraine, signed by President Boris Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma, a solid majority of the Russian parliament has opposed the recognition of the Crimea as Ukrainian territory. Russian nationalists have been especially adamant about the city of Sevastopol, the base for Russia's Black Sea fleet and the site of some of the most spectacular feats of Russian military valor and sacrifice in World War II and the Crimean War of 1854-55.
Nationalist politicians, including Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, have repeatedly traveled to Crimea to show the flag and support the Russian irredentists -- many of them retired Russian military officers who periodically mount raucous demonstrations. In 2006, their protests forced the cancellation of the joint Ukraine-NATO Sea Breeze military exercises. Sevastopol was and should again be a Russian city," Mr. Luzhkov declared this past May, and the Moscow City Hall has appropriated $34 million for "the support of compatriots abroad" over the next three years. On Sept. 5, Ukraine's Foreign Minister Vladimir Ogryzko accused the Russian consulate in the Crimean capital of Simferopol of distributing Russian passports to the inhabitants of the peninsula.
With almost three-quarters of Sevastopol's 340,000 residents ethnically Russian, and 14,000 Russian Navy personnel already "on the inside" (they've been known to don civilian clothes and participate in demonstrations by Russian Crimean irredentists), an early morning operation in which the Ukrainian mayor and officials are deposed and arrested and the Russian flag hoisted over the city should not be especially hard to accomplish. Once established, Russian sovereignty over Sevastopol would be impossible to reverse without a large-scale war, which Ukraine will be most reluctant to initiate and its Western supporters would strongly discourage.
A potentially bolder (and likely bloodier) scenario might involve a provocation by the Moscow-funded, and perhaps armed, Russian nationalists (or the Russian special forces, spetznaz, posing as irredentists). They could declare Russian sovereignty over a smaller city (Alushta, Evpatoria, Anapa) or a stretch of inland territory. In response, Ukrainian armed forces based in the Crimea outside Sevastopol would likely counterattack. The ensuing bloodshed would provide Moscow with the interventionist excuse of protecting its compatriots -- this time, unlike in South Ossetia, ethnic Russians.
Whatever the operational specifics, the Russian political barometer seems to augur storms ahead.
Mr. Aron, director of Russian studies and resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author, most recently, of "Russia's Revolution: Essays 1989-2006" (AEI Press, 2007).
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Russia: More Central Asian Energy Under the Kremlin's Thumb
Stratfor Today » November 5, 2008 | 1950 GMT
ALEXEY DRUZHININ/AFP/Getty Images
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin (L) and Kazakh President Nursultan NazarbayevSummary
Russia increased its share in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) to 31 percent after buying a 7 percent stake from Oman, Russian daily Kommersant reported Nov. 5. The Kremlin has now reached its objective in controlling a key east-west oil pipeline in Central Asia, giving Russia even greater leverage in tampering with Caspian crude exports to the West in accordance with the Russian geopolitical agenda. With CPC under its belt, Moscow’s eyes will now turn to the only remaining Central Asian pipeline outside its control: the Kazakhstan-China pipeline.
Analysis
The Russian government bought a 7 percent stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) from Oman, raising its share in the project to 31 percent, Russian daily Kommersant reported Nov. 5, citing sources from Russia’s Transneft, which operates the CPC. The deal is believed to have been struck during an Oct. 30 meeting between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. Kommersant sources claim that Russia bought the stake from Oman for around $350 million — about half the starting price that Hungarian energy group MOL had offered. The hefty discount that Russia apparently got on this deal was in all likelihood thanks to a number of political and energy levers Moscow used to gain the approval of Nazarbayev and the other consortium members.
Related Special Topic Pages
Russian Energy and Foreign Policy
Central Asian Energy: Circumventing Russia
Russia’s acquisition of the Omani stake in CPC is no ordinary business deal. The negotiations with Oman over this stake were rooted in Russia’s core geopolitical interest in monopolizing Kazakhstan’s export routes and bullying Astana’s energy clients, in yet another move to consolidate Russia’s control in its Central Asian periphery. The 935-mile CPC pipeline runs from the Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk, carrying around 700,000 barrels per day (bpd) of oil from the Caspian Sea region across the Caucasus to the global crude market. There are plans for the pipeline’s capacity to be expanded to 1.3 million bpd by 2010.
The CPC pipeline has been a challenge for the Russians since it was first commissioned in 2001. Prior to the deal with Oman, the consortium was run by three governments (Russia, Kazakhstan and Oman) and 10 companies representing seven countries, including U.S. energy giant Chevron.
The Russians previously tried a number of heavy-handed tactics to cripple the consortium so they could then swoop in and take full possession of the largely U.S.-funded and privately owned pipeline. Those tactics included having Transneft try to drive the consortium into bankruptcy by charging millions of dollars in transit fees and back taxes, halting Russian crude shipments to the pipeline and delaying the CPC’s expansion plans for years.
All these moves backfired, however, and pushed Astana closer to entertaining energy deals with the West and especially the Chinese, who have long been yearning to get a strong energy foothold in Central Asia. The more Russia bullied, the less Kazakhstan felt compelled to maintain a commitment to Soviet-era pipelines and railroads to ship its crude, and the more interested it became in trying to strike a balance among Russia, China and the West.
Though Kazakhstan has notably increased its energy independence in recent years, it still has not been able to break free from Moscow, particularly when it has much to fear from the Russian Federal Security Service’s strong presence in the country. Now that Oman and Russia have struck this deal over CPC, Russia has a lot more leverage in influencing how Astana manages its future energy relations.
Russia previously held a 24 percent stake in the consortium, which was not enough for the Kremlin to use the pipeline as a tool in its foreign policy arsenal. According to Russian law, a stake of at least 25 percent is required to veto management decisions of any company or consortium. Now that it holds a 31 percent stake, the Kremlin can control the CPC’s actions and block any decisions made by the consortium that go against Russian interests. This means Russia can raise transit fees and block crude shipments at will in accordance with its political preference while consolidating control over Western-extracted oil from Kazakh oilfields.
In addition, Russia now has more leverage over Russian oil producers who have opted to load more of their crude into the CPC pipeline as opposed to the Atyrau-Samara pipeline, which is linked to Russia’s state-owned oil transport monopoly Transneft to save on transit fees. Transneft will be much relieved to see Russia gain a bigger chunk of the CPC, and thus more control over the pipeline’s pricing to direct which way Kazakh crude will flow.
With the CPC locked down, Russia will now be freed up to target the last remaining Central Asian pipeline that has escaped the Kremlin’s grip: the Kazakhstan-China pipeline. China has watched carefully as Kazakh-Russian ties have eroded since the fall of the Soviet Union. Planning its moves into Central Asia carefully, China has built up a strong relationship with Astana and has signed a series of deals to fund new roads, railroads, and oil extraction and production. Most importantly, energy-hungry China is in the process of building a 200,000 bpd pipeline that runs across the entire width of Kazakhstan, and it also plans to construct a natural gas pipeline from Kazakhstan to Turkmenistan.
The last thing Russia wants to see is some 2 million bpd of crude and 70 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year diverted away from Russian-controlled energy networks. Not only would such an outcome deal a heavy blow to the Russian economy, it would also constrain Russia in supplying European energy contracts — an area key to Russia’s ability to bully Europe on political matters — and seriously undermine Russia’s influence in Central Asia.
The Chinese, therefore, have much to be concerned about. They can expect to be hit with all the usual Russian pressure tactics, including delays on construction, monopolizing consortiums and pressure on Astana to hike expenses. Many of these tactics are already in play, but the geopolitical balance is now tilting more strongly in Moscow’s favor. With the CPC deal, Russia has taken care of a huge obstacle in monopolizing Kazakhstan’s energy export options to the West. Russia’s attention can now be expected to turn eastward to China’s energy networks in Central Asia.
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Geopolitical Diary: Medvedev's Carefully Timed Address
November 6, 2008
On Wednesday, as the entire world took in the idea of having Barack Obama as the next U.S. president, one of the greatest challengers to American power, Russia, decided to make itself immediately clear on its views of the current U.S. administration, Obama’s election and the global U.S. agenda.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev gave his long-awaited first State of the State address (the equivalent of the U.S. president’s State of the Union address) on Nov. 5. The speech was much more than a nationalist appeal liberally sprinkled with Soviet-era rhetoric; it was a declaration of Russia’s return to the ranks of the world’s great powers. In effect, Medvedev not only tossed the gauntlet for Russia’s rivals in the West, but he also is not waiting around to see how they respond.
It must be understood that Medvedev — while he is certainly coming into his own under the sponsorship of his mentor, former president and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin –- did not write this speech himself. The author is the Kremlin’s gray cardinal, Vladislav Surkov, who has played the role of backroom dealer, enforcer, planner and puppet master for Putin for most of the past eight years. Surkov does not control Putin — far from it -– but in many ways is the brains behind much of what happens in the Kremlin these days.
It was Surkov who recommended that Medvedev’s speech, originally scheduled for Oct. 23, be postponed. Ostensibly, the delay was meant to allow Russia more time to deal with its deepening financial crisis, but in reality, Surkov wanted to know which presidential candidate the Americans were going to elect. The speech was already written. In fact, according to Stratfor sources, two speeches had been written — one for each possible outcome of the U.S. election. In waiting for a clear picture on whom Moscow would be dealing with in Washington, Russia underscored the central role the United States plays in the international system, and that Moscow views Washington as its main counterweight.
Unlike many previous State of the State addresses, Medvedev’s Nov. 5 speech contained few veiled threats or simple proclamations. Instead, it announced hard actions, including the following statements:
Russia will deploy Iskander short-range ballistic missiles to Kaliningrad, a Russian enclave sandwiched between NATO and EU states Lithuania and Poland, in order to directly target the fledgling U.S. ballistic missile defense installations slated for Poland and the Czech Republic. (The Iskanders’ limited range will allow them to put only the Polish site at risk.)
Russia will return to a more Soviet-style system of term limits in order to more firmly entrench the power of the Putin team.
Moscow will not even consider negotiations with the lame-duck administration of President George W. Bush, preferring instead to wait for President-elect Barack Obama’s team, which Moscow thinks will be easier to manipulate (whether or not this proves true).
The United States is to blame not only for Russia’s war with Georgia, but also for the global financial crisis.
Russia will not make any concessions on its international position; the United States can take it or leave it.
All in all, these statements bear a degree of boldness that has long been present in Russian propaganda, though not necessarily backed up by any particular actions. Russia’s goal is simple: Use the three-month U.S. presidential transition period to impose a reality on the regions Moscow considers of core interest, presenting soon-to-be President Obama with a fait accompli. Most of Russia’s efforts will focus on Ukraine, but attention also will be spread throughout the Caucasus and Central Asia, as well as the Baltics, Belarus, Poland and the Czech Republic.
These states are already nervous about Obama’s ability to stand up to Russia’s new swagger, especially since he has never outlined a firm stance against Moscow and will be embroiled in other critical affairs, like Iraq and Iran. Now, Medvedev has told these states outright that Russia is about to act while the Americans can’t. He is playing on the states’ fears to push them into making a choice: Continue to depend on the United States (whether its support comes through or not), work with Moscow, or get crushed in the process.
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Russia to build nuclear reactor for Chávez
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev expected to sign a nuclear agreement next week
Rory Carroll in Caracas
Luke Harding in Moscow
guardian.co.uk, Tuesday November 18 2008 20.55 GMT
Russia's deepening strategic partnership with Venezuela took a dramatic step forward today when it emerged that Moscow has agreed to build Venezuela's first ever nuclear reactor.
President Dmitry Medvedev is expected to sign a nuclear cooperation agreement with his Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chávez, during a visit to Latin America next week, part of a determined Russian push into the region.
The reactor is to be named after Humberto Fernandez Moran, a late Venezuelan research scientist and former science minister, Chávez has announced. It is one of many accords he hopes to sign while hosting Medvedev in Caracas next week.
The prospect of a nuclear deal between Moscow and Caracas, following a surge in Russian economic, military, political and intelligence activity in Latin America, is likely to alarm the US and present an early challenge to the Obama administration.
"Hugo Chávez joins the nuclear club," Russian's Vedomosti newspaper trumpeted today.
Venezuela's socialist leader said the reactor may be based in the eastern state of Zulia. He stressed that the project would be for peaceful purposes. As if to underline that point, four Japanese survivors from the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs visited Venezuela this week at the government's invitation.
The energy ministry, which is scouting locations, said the project was at a very early stage. A report which mooted a nuclear reactor long before Chávez came to power has been dusted off.
Despite abundant oil reserves, Venezuela's energy infrastructure is creaking and prone to blackouts. A nuclear reactor would enable the country to utilise its rich uranium deposits and allay criticism that the government has neglected energy investment.
More importantly for Moscow and Caracas, a nuclear deal will showcase a partnership which advocates creating new "poles" of power to check American hegemony.
Nick Day, a Latin American specialist, said the nuclear deal was deliberately timed to pile pressure on the US administration during a moment of transition and weakness.
"Russia is manoeuvring hard in the time between Obama's election and his inauguration. What the Russians are trying to do is to set up a chessboard that gives them greater mobility in negotiations when he [Obama] comes to power," Day said.
He added: "Russia's message is: 'We can exert influence in your backyard if you continue to exert influence in our backyard. If you don't take your missiles out of Poland and end Nato expansion we're going to increase our influence in Latin America and do things to provoke you.'"
According to Sergei Novikov, spokesman for Russia's federal nuclear agency, no reactor can be built until both countries have signed a preliminary agreement on nuclear cooperation. This will be signed next week, Novikov told Vedomosti.
Both presidents are also expected to firm up details of a Russian-Venezuelan energy consortium to jointly produce and sell oil and gas.
Russian companies which are already exploring oilfields in Venezuela could then extend their reach to fields in Ecuador and Bolivia.
Venezuela has bought $4bn of Russian arms, including Sukhoi fighter jets, making it one of Moscow's best clients. Chávez has spoken of also buying Project 636 diesel submarines, Mi-28 combat helicopters, T72 tanks and air-defence systems.
Despite the spending spree, Venezuela's military has not tipped the regional balance of power.
Chávez's armed forces lag behind that of Brazil, Chile and Colombia and analysts question Venezuelan effectiveness.
For Russia's president, however, Caracas is a valuable springboard into Latin America. In addition to Venezuela, Medvedev will visit Peru, Brazil and Cuba — the first trip by a Russian leader to Havana in eight years.
Moscow has spoken of reviving Soviet-era intelligence cooperation with the communist island and in a sign of dramatically improved ties, President Raul Castro last month attended the opening of a Russian Orthodox cathedral in Havana.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008...ssia-venezuela
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By GARRY KASPAROV
Those looking for a bright side in the global economic meltdown are fond of invoking the old line about finding opportunity in a crisis. But also keep in mind that there are those who will incite a new crisis to escape or distract from the current one. This is the scenario looming in Russia as the Kremlin faces increasing pressure on multiple fronts.
APRussia and its fellow petrodictatorships are in dire need of a way to ratchet up global tensions to inflate the sagging price of oil. Petrodictators, after all, need petrodollars to stay in power. The war in Gaza and the otherwise inexplicable skirmish with Ukraine over natural gas have helped the Kremlin in this regard, but $50 a barrel isn't going to be nearly enough. It will have to reach at least $100 and it will have to happen soon.
The effects of the financial crisis are rapidly reaching every level of Russian society. With no avenue for political expression left open to us, Russians are ready to take to the streets. Vladimir Putin has reacted true to form, ramming through new "anti-extremism" laws, building up the interior ministry's paramilitary police forces, and increasing the volume of the xenophobic propaganda in state-controlled media.
The natural place for the Kremlin to find its new crisis is the Middle East. Open hostilities between Iran and Israel would lift the price of oil back to a level that would allow Mr. Putin and his gang to keep funding the crackdown. Israel's anxiety over Iran's nuclear-weapon ambitions is the most vulnerable link in a very weak chain.
There persists a very damaging myth in the West, spouted by politicians and the press, that says Russia's assistance is needed with Iran and other rogue states. In fact, the Kremlin has been stirring this pot for years and has a vested interest in further increasing turmoil in the region. The Hamas/Hezbollah rockets, based on the Russian Katyusha and Grad, are not delivered via DHL from Allah. It doesn't require the guile of a KGB man like Mr. Putin to imagine a way to accelerate Iran's nuclear program, which has been aided by Russian technology and protected by the Kremlin from meaningful international action.
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So the question for Western leaders is whether they doubt Mr. Putin would hesitate to provoke a war in the Middle East. If his regime falls, he and his cronies will face the loss of their immense fortunes and criminal prosecution when their looting is exposed. What are thousands of lives in the Middle East to a Kremlin mob that is openly preparing for the day when they will have to open fire on their own citizens to stay in power?
This "mad bear" theory is even more plausible when you consider how tolerant the current cohort of Western leaders has been regarding the destruction of democratic rights around the world. There appears to be no line the world's despots -- and would-be despots -- cannot cross with impunity.
It is time to bury the failed model of dealing with the world's antidemocratic and bloodthirsty regimes. The real change we must effect in 2009 is toward a new global emphasis on the value of human life. Anything less confirms to the enemies of democratic civilization that everything is negotiable. For Mr. Putin that means democracy; for Hamas it means Israel's existence. The Free World must take those chips off the table.
Israel has the capability to annihilate Gaza to secure the safety of its people, but it chooses not to do so because the Israelis value human life. Does anyone doubt for a moment what Hamas would do if it had the power to wipe out every one of the five-and-a-half million Jews in Israel? Hamas should not be considered less a villain simply because it does not as yet possess the means to fulfill its genocidal agenda.
Terror suspects such as the United Kingdom's "liquid-bomb" plotters and the recently convicted group plotting to kill U.S. soldiers at the Fort Dix military base were arrested before they were able to carry out their lethal plans. Those who call Israel's assault on Gaza disproportionate should write down on a piece of paper exactly how many Israelis should die before the Israeli Defense Forces respond.
The leaders of Europe and the U.S. are hoping that the tyrants and autocrats of the world will just disappear. But dinosaurs like Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chávez and Iran's ayatollahs are not going to fade away by natural causes. They survive because the leaders of the Free World are afraid to take a stand.
Years from now, when Zimbabwe's Robert Mugabe is either dead or deposed, his legacy will lead to another genocide trial in The Hague. Why don't Western powers, many of whom are condemning Israel's action in Gaza, take action now to stop the extermination in Zimbabwe instead of waiting a decade for a trial? Criticizing Israel is easy while rescuing Zimbabwe is hard. Choosing the path of least resistance is moral cowardice. It does not avoid difficult decisions, it only postpones them.
Mr. Putin's Russia has invaded one neighbor and is threatening to freeze much of Europe by shutting down natural gas pipelines that flow through Ukraine. But since confronting Mr. Putin would take courage, Western leaders pretend his help is needed. This policy of self-deception will have disastrous consequences.
The futile pursuit of balance and neutrality by Western leaders and the media has become nothing more than a cover-up for the gravest of crimes. No doubt they would have judiciously considered the "legitimate grievances" of Stalin, Hitler and bin Laden. The time to stand up to such monsters is before they have achieved their horrific goals, not after.
Mr. Kasparov, leader of The Other Russia coalition, is a contributing editor of The Wall Street Journal.
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Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s office released a letter Monday revealing Russia’s readiness to provide “broad” military assistance to Afghanistan. The letter, written by Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, was Moscow’s response to a request for aid that Karzai had reportedly made in November 2008.
Medvedev’s letter was intentionally vague, simply stating that defense cooperation between Moscow and Kabul would be “effective for both countries” and “for establishing peace in the region.” The letter also calls for Moscow and Kabul to specify the grounds for cooperation moving forward. Though the letter itself didn’t say much, the timing of its release is absolutely critical.
Russia was sending a very deliberate message to U.S. President-elect Barack Obama on the eve of his inauguration. The top issues on Obama’s foreign policy agenda will involve turning the war around in Afghanistan and dealing with a resurgent Russia. The Russians are essentially signaling to Obama that if he expects any progress on the former, he is going to have to concede quite a lot on the latter.
Whether Russia is working to tear down a pro-Western government in Ukraine or sabotage Europe’s alternative energy projects, trying to reduce the United States’ military presence in Central Asia or finding new ways to damage NATO’s credibility, Moscow would much rather Washington stay out of its way — or better yet, facilitate Moscow’s moves — as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin methodically works to tighten the Kremlin’s grip on the former Soviet sphere of influence. The Russians recognize that the war in Afghanistan is not going well for the Americans, and that the United States is prepared to invest considerable time and resources for a revised military campaign led by Central Command chief Gen. David Petraeus. If the Russians can insert themselves into the Afghanistan equation, where U.S. military interests are currently concentrated, the more leverage Moscow will gain relative to the United States on issues deemed vital to Moscow’s interests.
The Russians already have a number of options in Afghanistan. For a variety of reasons, Pakistan has become more and more difficult for the United States to rely on as a military supply route into Afghanistan. Consequently, the U.S. military has little choice but to develop an alternative. While there are several variations on the theme, the alternative route likely would traverse Central Asian territory that is under Moscow’s control — if not Russian territory itself. Petraeus is currently on a tour through Central Asia to work out details on this alternate supply line, but if the White House wants Petraeus’ Afghanistan strategy to bear fruit, it will need Russian cooperation, which will not come for free.
But Putin isn’t stopping at the Afghan border. Afghanistan is familiar territory for the Russians – territory that they have viewed as part of their geopolitical cordon. Even after Russia fought its own bloody war with the Afghans, Moscow developed close ties with members of the Northern Alliance — an ethnic Tajik-dominated coalition that Russia and Iran have supported against the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. The Russians, who have a strong interest in containing the Taliban and preventing the spread of radical Islamist doctrine into the Muslim-populated regions of Russia, relied heavily on the Northern Alliance to retain a foothold in this region while the Taliban was still in power. Moreover, Russia has expanded its influence in Afghanistan to include links to some Pashtun tribes between Kabul and Kandahar that belonged to the secular Communist movement, which ruled Afghanistan for 14 years before Islamist forces took over in 1992.
It was not too long ago that the United States was forced to recognize Russian influence in Afghanistan. During preparations for the U.S. invasion in 2001, Washington relied on Moscow and the Russian-supported Northern Alliance to facilitate the invasion and topple the Taliban. But at that time, Putin’s resurgence strategy was still in its infancy. More importantly, Putin believed that the Americans would turn a blind eye to Moscow’s strategy in the former Soviet Union in return for its help in Afghanistan. Eight years later, Russia is more unified, stronger, determined and better positioned to demand much more from the Americans in return for its cooperation.
Through Medvedev’s letter to Karzai — which, not by coincidence, comes as the United States and NATO are publicly criticizing Karzai for not doing enough to support the war effort against the Taliban — Russia is showcasing its influence in Afghanistan, as well as its goal of increasing cooperation with a regime in Kabul that is on shaky ground with the West. Russia has enough of a foothold in Afghanistan to make things difficult for Washington should the need arise. And the last thing the United States needs is for a hostile power like Russia, upon which it must rely for supply lines into Afghanistan, to cause more friction in a critical region at a time when Washington is desperately trying to reduce friction.
Russia has issued a veiled threat for Obama to ponder in the early days of his presidency. It is a threat that deliberately lacks details about what the Russians can or plan to do in Afghanistan, but it will make Washington think twice about moves that would impede Moscow’s resurgent path. For the moment, that is probably enough for Moscow to make its point in Washington.
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What follows is quite a bit different from our usual fare here-- but then our mission is to Search for Truth. Not saying this piece doesn't have deception, misdirection, and outright lies too, but I do find it interesting. Comments?
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http://www.russiatoday.com/guests/detail/1801
Dmitry Rogozin
American missiles to be deployed in Poland are capable of hitting Moscow in just four minutes, which makes them totally provocative weapons, says Russia’s envoy to NATO Dmitry Rogozin.
Dmitry Rogozin: I was a State Duma deputy for 11 years. I know very well the work of parliamentarians in the West. In the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, I was the leader of a political group. What is going on in the Parliamentary Assembly of NATO is something quite uncommon and not customary for western parliamentarianism. Usually, they try to invite both sides to discussions, even if it’s just for the sake of appearances. They might have concealed some aspects while emphasizing others, but flatly declining the presence of an official Russian representative at a discussion with Saakashvili on a matter they call the “Russian-Georgian conflict” is just plain wrong. This is why I considered it impossible to accept the invitation to attend the NATO Parliamentary Assembly in Valencia. In turn, I invited leaders of national delegations to the Assembly to our mission in Brussels. We’ll talk there.
Sometimes I get the impression that we and they live on different planets. At first, even before the dust had settled after the bombing of Tskhinval, we heard “It does not matter who attacked whom”. I wish they had tried to tell the same to the U.S. after 9/11.
A while later, when human rights activists such as Human Rights Watch started reporting military crimes, our Western counterparts slowly began to change their point of view. But even that is admitted only in their internal discussions, while they keep telling us that Russia’s intrusion in Georgia is unacceptable, as is Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
It’s a Biblical situation: they are looking at a splinter in our eye while refusing to notice the log in theirs.
Frankly, I don’t believe it. We’ve discussed it repeatedly with many influential European politicians, and the picture looks as follows: Europe is a neighbor of Ukraine, Russia, and Georgia. Imagine that you live in an apartment next to a Ukrainian flat, where a girl called Yulia is running back and forth, yelling and shouting, between two men named Viktor. It’s a Brazilian soap opera, the several-hundredth episode of it.
In another apartment, an insane maniac is running around with a knife, threatening to stab everyone he sees. That’s the Georgian apartment. Hearing all this racket from behind a wall is one thing; breaking down the wall between apartments and inviting everyone to your place is quite different. There are different people in Europe, but they are not crazy, especially the politicians. I doubt they will take any such steps.
It is clear that neither Albania, nor Croatia, nor Macedonia, nor Bosnia and Herzegovina, nor Ukraine, nor Georgia can be considered powers in a military sense. Their military potential is zero. It’s even lower than that, I would say. So it’s not about acquiring valuable military allies, it’s purely a political matter. As the westerners themselves admit, it’s a matter of a new political identity for the newly admitted countries. And this is the anti-Russian thing. This is why, when anybody in the Ukraine tries to change identity, to change Ukraine’s historical choice, or, to put it simply, to tear Ukraine away from Russia, we are anxious. How else should we feel when there are so many ties with Russia? 40% of Russian families have immediate relatives in Ukraine, and 80% of Ukrainian families have relatives in Russia. This connection is impossible to break up. This is why such plans should be viewed as breakaway and aimed against Russia.
The same is true about Georgia. You see, guys like Saakashvili come and go, but there is still a history of relationships between our two countries, and it is far richer than what has happened over the last few years. Again, this breaking away from Russia is a strange attempt to legalise Georgia’s territorial gains in the form of Abkhazia and Ossetia, which were never part of the state of Georgia. I think that all this is just an attempt to isolate the Russian bear, to force it into its lair. There is one problem, though, and every hunter knows that. You can hunt a bear down, you can badger it, but it’s dangerous to come close to it. Therefore, NATO closing in on Russia is dangerous: any hunter can tell you that.
The chances are pretty low so far. It’s due to the inertia of the Cold War mentality. In general, what Russia is suggesting is very good. We suggest principles that are really hard to object to. Who is going to deny that security should be equal, indispensable and indivisible for all? Who could be against demilitarizing the entire centre of the European continent using military force solely to defend our common borders in the Pacific area? Who could be against ruling out military planning, especially nuclear planning, against each other? These things are totally reasonable; it’s a new world outlook. It’s a new vision of collective security for everyone. Therefore, what Medvedev is offering is hardly questionable.
The problem is a different matter altogether. The problem is that employees of all international organizations think, “What’s going to happen to me personally?” I refer to employees of the NATO Secretariat, employees of the European Commission, and employees of the OSCE headquarters in Vienna - they all think this. “Will I keep getting my several-thousand-euro paycheck if that Medvedev guy realizes his concept?” They are afraid that a moment will come when people will simply sweep those lardy European bureaucrats out of their cozy seats. It’s that selfish, small-minded, paltry psychology of Euro-Atlantic bureaucrats that can ruin such a great initiative. Well, I still believe this concept will win through sooner or later.
For example, what they are discussing now is the unacceptability of Russia’s plan to deploy its Iskander missile systems in the Kaliningrad Region. As for the fact that the U.S. has already began deploying its launch systems in Poland and is about to press the Czechs into approving the deployment of a radar station there, nobody in Europe seems to care about that. Everybody would rather believe the fairy-tales of bad Iranian guys or some Bin Laden having snatched a missile somewhere and running around with it, preparing to fire it at the civilized European world. This is rubbish. Nobody can steal a strategic missile. No Bin Laden can do that. But nevertheless, since this myth is being touted by America, Europe prefers to stay silent. That flaccid, spineless reaction of Europe to America’s actions and to Russia’s responses to them only proves one thing: Europe still doesn’t have its own political face. It’s wealthy, but politically spineless. It’s like a big, thick, but very flexible, pencil.
Let’s just hope Russia’s deployment of Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad will influence Europe’s attitude towards America’s missile defence plans. For us, it is important to have the military means to counterbalance those plans, which indeed threaten our security. You see, the thing is that the American missiles to be deployed in Poland can be used in several ways. They can not only shoot down descending ballistic missiles, but they can also engage surface targets. That is, they can be fired at Moscow from Poland, and they are so quick and accurate that a missile can get to Moscow in just four minutes and fly into Russian Prime Minister’s office through the window! I am not joking! This is a destabilising, misbalancing, and totally provocative weapon.
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How can we stand for that? Of course, we will find an adequate military response. That is, unless we find a political response first. Well, we so hope that they are sensible enough to realise that we are not like we used to be. If we are offended, we can hit back, and do it more than once.
Until things get really tough, they are going to keep pretending that Russia is their opponent. I think that in the XXI century, the real threat is posed by a certain bunch of people who think that you and I are second-class people. Those close-minded people simply don’t recognize our right to live. They don’t care who they are dealing with - Russians, Jews, Tatars, French, or British, or whoever, - they are all the same to them. To them, we are just a worthless civilization that must be destroyed. Let’s hope our Western counterparts realise that those guys threaten us all in equal measure and that this plague advancing on the European continent will engulf us while we are all arguing. Today, we talk about existing threats such as terrorism, extremism (political or religious), drug trafficking, and piracy.
As for piracy, there are pirates rampant in Somalia, and tomorrow, I think, the entire African coast will be swarming with pirates, and there will not be enough warships to keep them at bay. There is an enormous distance between Europe and the Third World. There is a new civilization emerging in the Third World that thinks that the white, northern hemisphere has always oppressed it and must therefore fall at its feet now. This is very serious
If the northern civilization wants to protect itself, it must be united: America, the European Union, and Russia. If they are not together, they will be defeated one by one.
Of course, the resumption of the work of the Russia-NATO council is possible. It will surely happen, because there are too many bureaucrats in NATO who are responsible for contact with Russia. They are afraid of losing their jobs after the freezing of the Russia-NATO council, so they are among the most zealous lobbyists for resuming our good relationship. Well, kidding aside, the scope of strategic matters that unites us is so vast that we can pretend as long as we want that we don’t communicate, but we can’t help communicating. In Brussels, I have regular meetings with the leaders of the NATO secretariat, political leaders, ambassadors, and so on. It’s just that they are afraid of meeting with me in what is called the Russia-NATO council. It will happen this December at the earliest, or next March at the latest. This is my forecast, and you will see that I am right.
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The Financial Crisis and the Six Pillars of Russian Strength
March 3, 2009
By Lauren Goodrich and Peter Zeihan
Related Link
The Russian Resurgence
Putin’s Consolidation of Power
Russian Energy and Foreign Policy
Russia’s Military
Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has been re-establishing much of its lost Soviet-era strength. This has given rise to the possibility — and even the probability — that Russia again will become a potent adversary of the Western world. But now, Russia is yet again on the cusp of a set of massive currency devaluations that could destroy much of the country’s financial system. With a crashing currency, the disappearance of foreign capital, greatly decreased energy revenues and currency reserves flying out of the bank, the Western perception is that Russia is on the verge of collapsing once again. Consequently, many Western countries have started to grow complacent about Russia’s ability to further project power abroad.
But this is Russia. And Russia rarely follows anyone else’s rulebook.
The State of the Russian State
Russia has faced a slew of economic problems in the past six months. Incoming foreign direct investment, which reached a record high of $28 billion in 2007, has reportedly dried up to just a few billion. Russia’s two stock markets, the Russian Trading System (RTS) and the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX), have fallen 78 and 67 percent respectively since their highs in May 2008. And Russians have withdrawn $290 billion from the country’s banks in fear of a financial collapse.
One of Moscow’s sharpest financial pains came in the form of a slumping Russian ruble, which has dropped by about one-third against the dollar since August 2008. Thus far, the Kremlin has spent $200 billion defending its currency, a startling number given that the currency still dropped by 35 percent. The Russian government has allowed dozens of mini-devaluations to occur since August; the ruble’s fall has pushed the currency past its lowest point in the 1998 ruble crash.
The Kremlin now faces three options. First, it can continue defending the ruble by pouring more money into what looks like a black hole. Realistically, this can last only another six months or so, as Russia’s combined reserves of $750 billion in August 2008 have dropped to just less than $400 billion due to various recession-battling measures (of which currency defense is only one). This option would also limit Russia’s future anti-recession measures to currency defense alone. In essence, this option relies on merely hoping the global recession ends before the till runs dry.
The second option would be to abandon any defense of the ruble and just let the currency crash. This option will not hurt Moscow or its prized industries (like those in the energy and metals sectors) too much, as the Kremlin, its institutions and most large Russian companies hold their reserves in dollars and euros. Smaller businesses and the Russian people would lose everything, however, just as in the August 1998 ruble crash. This may sound harsh, but the Kremlin has proved repeatedly — during the Imperial, Soviet and present eras — that it is willing to put the survival of the Russian state before the welfare and survival of the people.
The third option is much like the second. It involves sealing the currency system off completely from international trade, relegating it only to use in purely domestic exchanges. But turning to a closed system would make the ruble absolutely worthless abroad, and probably within Russia as well — the black market and small businesses would be forced to follow the government’s example and switch to the euro, or more likely, the U.S. dollar. (Russians tend to trust the dollar more than the euro.)
According to the predominant rumor in Moscow, the Kremlin will opt for combining the first and second options, allowing a series of small devaluations, but continuing a partial defense of the currency to avoid a single 1998-style collapse. Such a hybrid approach would reflect internal politicking.
The lack of angst within the government over the disappearance of the ruble as a symbol of Russian strength is most intriguing. Instead of discussing how to preserve Russian financial power, the debate is now over how to let the currency crash. The destruction of this particular symbol of Russian strength over the past ten years has now become a given in the Kremlin’s thinking, as has the end of the growth and economic strength seen in recent years.
Washington is interpreting the Russian acceptance of economic failure as a sort of surrender. It is not difficult to see why. For most states — powerful or not — a deep recession coupled with a currency collapse would indicate an evisceration of the ability to project power, or even the end of the road. After all, similar economic collapses in 1992 and 1998 heralded periods in which Russian power simply evaporated, allowing the Americans free rein across the Russian sphere of influence. Russia has been using its economic strength to revive its influence as of late, so — as the American thinking goes — the destruction of that strength should lead to a new period of Russian weakness.
Geography and Development
But before one can truly understand the roots of Russian power, the reality and role of the Russian economy must be examined. From this perspective, the past several years are most certainly an aberration — and we are not simply speaking of the post-Soviet collapse.
All states economies’ to a great degree reflect their geographies. In the United States, the presence of large, interconnected river systems in the central third of the country, the intracoastal waterway along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, the vastness of San Francisco Bay, the numerous rivers flowing to the sea from the eastern slopes of the Appalachian Mountains and the abundance of ideal port locations made the country easy to develop. The cost of transporting goods was nil, and scarce capital could be dedicated to other pursuits. The result was a massive economy with an equally massive leg up on any competition.
Russia’s geography is the polar opposite. Hardly any of Russia’s rivers are interconnected. The country has several massive ones — the Pechora, the Ob, the Yenisei, the Lena and the Kolyma — but they drain the nearly unpopulated Siberia to the Arctic Ocean, making them useless for commerce. The only river that cuts through Russia’s core, the Volga, drains not to the ocean but to the landlocked and sparsely populated Caspian Sea, the center of a sparsely populated region. Also unlike the United States, Russia has few useful ports. Kaliningrad is not connected to the main body of Russia. The Gulf of Finland freezes in winter, isolating St. Petersburg. The only true deepwater and warm-water ocean ports, Vladivostok and Murmansk, are simply too far from Russia’s core to be useful. So while geography handed the United States the perfect transport network free of charge, Russia has had to use every available kopek to link its country together with an expensive road, rail and canal network.
One of the many side effects of this geography situation is that the United States had extra capital that it could dedicate to finance in a relatively democratic manner, while Russia’s chronic capital deficit prompted it to concentrate what little capital resources it had into a single set of hands — Moscow’s hands. So while the United States became the poster child for the free market, Russia (whether the Russian Empire, Soviet Union or Russian Federation) has always tended toward central planning.
Russian industrialization and militarization began in earnest under Josef Stalin in the 1930s. Under centralized planning, all industry and services were nationalized, while industrial leaders were given predetermined output quotas.
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference between the Western and Russian development paths was the different use of finance. At the start of Stalin’s massive economic undertaking, international loans to build the economy were unavailable, both because the new government had repudiated the czarist regime’s international debts and because industrialized countries — the potential lenders — were coping with the onset of their own economic crisis (e.g., the Great Depression).
With loans and bonds unavailable, Stalin turned to another centrally controlled resource to “fund” Russian development: labor. Trade unions were converted into mechanisms for capturing all available labor as well as for increasing worker productivity. Russia essentially substitutes labor for capital, so it is no surprise that Stalin — like all Russian leaders before him — ran his population into the ground. Stalin called this his “revolution from above.”
Over the long term, the centralized system is highly inefficient, as it does not take the basic economic drivers of supply and demand into account — to say nothing of how it crushes the common worker. But for a country as geographically massive as Russia, it was (and remains) questionable whether Western finance-driven development is even feasible, due to the lack of cheap transit options and the massive distances involved. Development driven by the crushing of the labor pool was probably the best Russia could hope for, and the same holds true today.
In stark contrast to ages past, for the past five years foreign money has underwritten Russian development. Russian banks did not depend upon government funding — which was accumulated into vast reserves — but instead tapped foreign lenders and bondholders. Russian banks took this money and used it to lend to Russian firms. Meanwhile, as the Russian government asserted control over the country’s energy industries during the last several years, it created a completely separate economy that only rarely intersected with other aspects of Russian economic life. So when the current global recession helped lead to the evaporation of foreign credit, the core of the government/energy economy was broadly unaffected, even as the rest of the Russian economy ingloriously crashed to earth.
Since Putin’s rise, the Kremlin has sought to project an image of a strong, stable and financially powerful Russia. This vision of strength has been the cornerstone of Russian confidence for years. Note that STRATFOR is saying “vision,” not “reality.” For in reality, Russian financial confidence is solely the result of cash brought in from strong oil and natural gas prices — something largely beyond the Russians’ ability to manipulate — not the result of any restructuring of the Russian system. As such, the revelation that the emperor has no clothes — that Russia is still a complete financial mess — is more a blow to Moscow’s ego than a signal of a fundamental change in the reality of Russian power.
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The Reality of Russian Power
So while Russia might be losing its financial security and capabilities, which in the West tend to boil down to economic wealth, the global recession has not affected the reality of Russian power much at all. Russia has not, currently or historically, worked off of anyone else’s cash or used economic stability as a foundation for political might or social stability. Instead, Russia relies on many other tools in its kit. Some of the following six pillars of Russian power are more powerful and appropriate than ever:
Geography: Unlike its main geopolitical rival, the United States, Russia borders most of the regions it wishes to project power into, and few geographic barriers separate it from its targets. Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic states have zero geographic insulation from Russia. Central Asia is sheltered by distance, but not by mountains or rivers. The Caucasus provide a bit of a speed bump to Russia, but pro-Russian enclaves in Georgia give the Kremlin a secure foothold south of the mountain range (putting the August Russian-Georgian war in perspective). Even if U.S. forces were not tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States would face potentially insurmountable difficulties in countering Russian actions in Moscow’s so-called “Near Abroad.” Russia can project all manner of influence and intimidation there on the cheap, while even symbolic counters are quite costly for the United States. In contrast, places such as Latin America, Southeast Asia or Africa do not capture much more than the Russian imagination; the Kremlin realizes it can do little more there than stir the occasional pot, and resources are allotted (centrally, of course) accordingly.
Politics: It is no secret that the Kremlin uses an iron fist to maintain domestic control. There are few domestic forces the government cannot control or balance. The Kremlin understands the revolutions (1917 in particular) and collapses (1991 in particular) of the past, and it has control mechanisms in place to prevent a repeat. This control is seen in every aspect of Russian life, from one main political party ruling the country to the lack of diversified media, limits on public demonstrations and the infiltration of the security services into nearly every aspect of the Russian system. This domination was fortified under Stalin and has been re-established under the reign of former President and now-Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. This political strength is based on neither financial nor economic foundations. Instead, it is based within the political institutions and parties, on the lack of a meaningful opposition, and with the backing of the military and security services. Russia’s neighbors, especially in Europe, cannot count on the same political strength because their systems are simply not set up the same way. The stability of the Russian government and lack of stability in the former Soviet states and much of Central Europe have also allowed the Kremlin to reach beyond Russia and influence its neighbors to the east. Now as before, when some of its former Soviet subjects — such as Ukraine — become destabilized, Russia sweeps in as a source of stability and authority, regardless of whether this benefits the recipient of Moscow’s attention.
Social System: As a consequence of Moscow’s political control and the economic situation, the Russian system is socially crushing, and has had long-term effects on the Russian psyche. As mentioned above, during the Soviet-era process of industrialization and militarization, workers operated under the direst of conditions for the good of the state. The Russian state has made it very clear that the productivity and survival of the state is far more important than the welfare of the people. This made Russia politically and economically strong, not in the sense that the people have had a voice, but in that they have not challenged the state since the beginning of the Soviet period. The Russian people, regardless of whether they admit it, continue to work to keep the state intact even when it does not benefit them. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Russia kept operating — though a bit haphazardly. Russians still went to work, even if they were not being paid. The same was seen in 1998, when the country collapsed financially. This is a very different mentality than that found in the West. Most Russians would not even consider the mass protests seen in Europe in response to the economic crisis. The Russian government, by contrast, can count on its people to continue to support the state and keep the country going with little protest over the conditions. Though there have been a few sporadic and meager protests in Russia, these protests mainly have been in opposition to the financial situation, not to the government’s hand in it. In some of these demonstrations, protesters have carried signs reading, “In government we trust, in the economic system we don’t.” This means Moscow can count on a stable population.
Natural Resources: Modern Russia enjoys a wealth of natural resources in everything from food and metals to gold and timber. The markets may take a roller-coaster ride and the currency may collapse, but the Russian economy has access to the core necessities of life. Many of these resources serve a double purpose, for in addition to making Russia independent of the outside world, they also give Moscow the ability to project power effectively. Russian energy — especially natural gas — is particularly key: Europe is dependent on Russian natural gas for a quarter of its demand. This relationship guarantees Russia a steady supply of now-scarce capital even as it forces the Europeans to take any Russian concerns seriously. The energy tie is something Russia has very publicly used as a political weapon, either by raising prices or by cutting off supplies. In a recession, this lever’s effectiveness has only grown.
Military: The Russian military is in the midst of a broad modernization and restructuring, and is reconstituting its basic warfighting capability. While many challenges remain, Moscow already has imposed a new reality through military force in Georgia. While Tbilisi was certainly an easy target, the Russian military looks very different to Kiev — or even Warsaw and Prague — than it does to the Pentagon. And even in this case, Russia has come to rely increasingly heavily on its nuclear arsenal to rebalance the military equation and ensure its territorial integrity, and is looking to establish long-term nuclear parity with the Americans. Like the energy tool, Russia’s military has become more useful in times of economic duress, as potential targets have suffered far more than the Russians.
Intelligence: Russia has one of the world’s most sophisticated and powerful intelligence services. Historically, its only rival has been the United States (though today the Chinese arguably could be seen as rivaling the Americans and Russians). The KGB (now the FSB) instills fear into hearts around the world, let alone inside Russia. Infiltration and intimidation kept the Soviet Union and its sphere under control. No matter the condition of the Russian state, Moscow’s intelligence foundation has been its strongest pillar. The FSB and other Russian intelligence agencies have infiltrated most former Soviet republics and satellite states, and they also have infiltrated as far as Latin America and the United States. Russian intelligence has infiltrated political, security, military and business realms worldwide, and has boasted of infiltrating many former Soviet satellite governments, militaries and companies up to the highest level. All facets of the Russian government have backed this infiltration since Putin (a former KGB man) came to power and filled the Kremlin with his cohorts. This domestic and international infiltration has been built up for half a century. It is not something that requires much cash to maintain, but rather know-how — and the Russians wrote the book on the subject. One of the reasons Moscow can run this system inexpensively relative to what it gets in return is because Russia’s intelligence services have long been human-based, though they do have some highly advanced technology to wield. Russia also has incorporated other social networks in its intelligence services, such as organized crime or the Russian Orthodox Church, creating an intricate system at a low price. Russia’s intelligence services are much larger than most other countries’ services and cover most of the world. But the intelligence apparatus’ most intense focus is on the Russian periphery, rather than on the more expensive “far abroad.”
Thus, while Russia’s financial sector may be getting torn apart, the state does not really count on that sector for domestic cohesion or stability, or for projecting power abroad. Russia knows it lacks a good track record financially, so it depends on — and has shored up where it can — six other pillars to maintain its (self-proclaimed) place as a major international player. The current financial crisis would crush the last five pillars for any other state, but in Russia, it has only served to strengthen these bases. Over the past few years, there was a certain window of opportunity for Russia to resurge while Washington was preoccupied with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This window has been kept open longer by the West’s lack of worry over the Russian resurgence given the financial crisis. But others closer to the Russian border understand that Moscow has many tools more potent than finance with which to continue reasserting itself.
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Geopolitical Diary: Russia's Sleight of Hand
March 4, 2009
Speaking at a press conference in Madrid on Tuesday, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev said that it was “not productive” to link talks over a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system in Europe with the perceived security threat from Iran, as proposed by Washington.
The topic came up as Medvedev spoke alongside Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero at a press conference about a number of unrelated topics. The question he was responding to seemed to come out of left field, suggesting that the Kremlin planted the question, and perhaps the journalist. The question concerned a secret letter exchange between U.S. President Barack Obama and Medvedev — an exchange that was made public on Tuesday after a leak to The New York Times.
For the Russians, a quid pro quo on BMD and Iran is simply unacceptable. It isn’t because the Russians have heightened sensibilities — they are the masters of linking otherwise unrelated topics together for discussion and action — but because they are thinking much bigger these days. They want a grand bargain with the Americans, and they want it now.
Ever since it became clear in late 2003 that the war in Iraq would serve as more of a sandbag than a springboard for U.S. policy, the Russians have enjoyed the light streaming through a window of opportunity. Pretty much all U.S. ground forces are spoken for by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if both wars were declared over today, it would be more than two years before all forces could be withdrawn, rested and re-equipped for future deployments. U.S. expeditionary capability is currently limited to the Air Force and naval aviation – tools that are hardly small fry, especially when you are on the receiving end, but which are not particularly useful for blocking Russian moves in states that were part of the Soviet Union, like Ukraine or Georgia. Blocking such actions can be done only with ground forces, and those forces simply are not available right now.
Thus, from the Russian perspective, the time to negotiate with the Americans about the broad spectrum of relations is now. They do not want a short list of quid pro quo arrangements that will let the Americans push off the bigger issues until another day. They want everything — and they mean everything — settled now, when their power is at a relative high compared to that of the United States.
The Russians do not want a simple rejiggering of existing disarmament treaties; they want fundamentally new ones that extend the current nuclear parity with the United States, codifying it to the finest detail possible. They want to shoot down the plans for BMD, a technology that one day could render the Russian nuclear deterrent obsolete. They want the United States to publicly recognize Russian dominance throughout the former Soviet Union, and — again, publicly — put an end to Western military, political and economic encroachment into Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Central Asia.
Part of the ability to get such a grand bargain at such a fortuitous time, of course, rests in the ability to convince the other side that your own tools are even more robust than they may seem. You must convince the other side your rise to power is inevitable. It comes to shaping perceptions, and in this the Russians are peerless.
Remember Cold War propaganda? It was certainly on parade in Spain, not just in the shaping of a press conference where the quid pro quo comments garnered such attention, but in a phalanx of “deals” that the Russian delegation signed.
Most notable was a supposedly ironclad natural gas swap deal between state energy firm Gazprom and Spain’s Repsol. Under the deal, Repsol would gain access to Russian production sites in exchange for Russian access to the Spanish retail market. The centerpiece of the agreement involves liquefied natural gas (LNG), which would come from the offshore Shtokman field. Again the message was dramatic: Even European states that do not currently receive Russian energy are lining up to get access! There is one glitch: Shtokman is a pipe dream. Gazprom possesses neither offshore nor LNG expertise. Shtokman will be realized only if Gazprom pays someone to develop it — and that certainly isn’t going to happen during a global credit crunch.
Not to be outdone, the Russian state press had its own response to the New York Times leak on the quid pro quo of BMD for Iran. Editorials expounded that there was no deal to be had because the Russians had already suspended their plans to deploy nuclear-tipped Iskander missiles to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. Since the Russians had unilaterally declared this, there was no need for BMD.
This issue is primarily one of fine print. While the Iskanders have been tested, there is no evidence that any have actually been deployed — to Kaliningrad or elsewhere — and even less evidence that the Russians have figured out how to mate a nuclear warhead to the missiles. Put simply, the Russian “concession” sounds great to the untrained ear — no nukes in Europe — but the Iskanders are not yet a reality, let alone a bargaining chip.
Propaganda and disinformation are as much part of Russia’s negotiating package as its nuclear capabilities and Latin American populist movements. Russia never really abandoned the tool, but we haven’t seen such aggressive message-planting for quite some time. Then again, the stakes haven’t been this high in a while.
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March 18, 2009
Russia Is Planning a ‘Large-Scale Rearming’
By CLIFFORD J. LEVY
MOSCOW —
President Dmitri A. Medvedev said on Tuesday that Russia would begin a “large-scale rearming” in 2011 in response to what he described as threats to the country’s security.
In a speech before generals in Moscow, Mr. Medvedev cited encroachment by NATO as a primary reason for bolstering the armed and nuclear forces.
Mr. Medvedev did not offer specifics on how much the budget would grow for the military, whose capabilities deteriorated significantly after the fall of Soviet Union.
Russia has increased military spending sharply in recent years, but with the financial crisis and the drop in the price of oil, the country’s finances are under pressure, suggesting that it would be hard to lift these expenditures further.
Even so, Mr. Medvedev’s timing was notable. He is expected to hold his first meeting with President Obama in early April in London on the sidelines of the summit of the Group of 20 industrialized and developing countries.
In recent weeks, he has said he is looking forward to the meeting, and both he and Russia’s paramount leader, Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, have been expressing some optimism about improving relations with the United States under the new administration.
Mr. Medvedev’s comments on Tuesday, though, indicated that Kremlin did not want the United States and its NATO allies to presume that Russia was coming to the table from a position of weakness.
“An analysis of the military-political situation in the world shows that there are a range of regions where there remain serious potential for conflicts,” Mr. Medvedev said. “Threats remain that can bring about local crises and international terrorism. NATO is not halting its efforts to widen its military infrastructure near the borders of our country. All of this demands a quality modernization of our armed forces.”
Mr. Medvedev emphasized that Russia would not be deterred in this plan by the financial crisis.
His announcement comes as the Kremlin has already begun an effort to overhaul the operations of the armed forces, which are still run largely according to Soviet-style dictates.
While Russia’s far larger military easily triumphed over Georgia’s in the conflict in August, the fighting exposed what many experts described as flaws in training, weapons and equipment.
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/wo...dvedev.html?hp
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Stratfor
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TWENTY YEARS AFTER THE FALL
By George Friedman
We are now at the 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the beginning
of the collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. We are also nearing the 18th
anniversary of the fall of the Soviet Union itself. This is more than simply a
moment for reflection -- it is a moment to consider the current state of the region
and of Russia versus that whose passing we are now commemorating. To do that, we
must re-examine why the Soviet empire collapsed, and the current status of the same
forces that caused that collapse.
Russia's Two-Part Foundation
The Russian empire -- both the Czarist and Communist versions -- was a vast,
multinational entity. At its greatest extent, it stretched into the heart of Central
Europe; at other times, it was smaller. But it was always an empire whose
constituent parts were diverse, hostile to each other and restless. Two things tied
the empire together.
One was economic backwardness. Economic backwardness gave the constituent parts a
single common characteristic and interest. None of them could effectively compete
with the more dynamic economies of Western Europe and the rest of the world, but
each could find a niche within the empire. Economic interests thus bound each part
to the rest: They needed a wall to protect themselves from Western interests, and an
arena in which their own economic interests, however stunted, could be protected.
The empire provided that space and that opportunity.
The second thing tying the empire together was the power of the security apparatus.
Where economic interest was insufficient to hold the constituent parts together, the
apparatus held the structure together. In a vast empire with poor transportation and
communication, the security apparatus -- from Czarist times to the Soviet period --
was the single unifying institution. It unified in the sense that it could compel
what economic interest couldn't motivate. The most sophisticated part of the Russian
state was the security services. They were provided with the resources they needed
to control the empire, report status to the center and impose the center's decisions
through terror, or more frequently, through the mere knowledge that terror would be
the consequence of disobedience.
It was therefore no surprise that it was the security apparatus of the Soviet Union
-- the KGB under Yuri Andropov -- which first recognized in the early 1980s that the
Soviet Union's economy not only was slipping further and further behind the West,
but that its internal cohesion was threatened because the economy was performing so
poorly that the minimal needs of the constituent parts were no longer being
fulfilled. In Andropov's mind, the imposition of even greater terror, like Josef
Stalin had applied, would not solve the underlying problem. Thus, the two elements
holding the Soviet Union together were no longer working. The self-enclosed economy
was failing and the security apparatus could not hold the system together.
It is vital to remember that in Russia, domestic economic health and national power
do not go hand in hand. Russia historically has had a dysfunctional economy. By
contrast, its military power has always been disproportionately strong. During World
War II, the Soviets crushed the Wehrmacht in spite of their extraordinary economic
weakness. Later, during the Cold War, they challenged and sometimes even beat the
United States despite an incomparably weaker economy. The Russian security apparatus
made this possible. Russia could devote far more of its economy to military power
than other countries could because Moscow could control its population successfully.
It could impose far greater austerities than other countries could. Therefore,
Russia was a major power in spite of its economic weakness. And this gave it room to
maneuver in an unexpected way.
Andropov's Gamble
Andropov proposed a strategy he knew was risky, but which he saw as unavoidable. One
element involved a dramatic restructuring of the Soviet economy and society to
enhance efficiency. The second involved increased openness, not just domestically to
facilitate innovation, but also in foreign affairs. Enclosure was no longer working:
The Soviet Union needed foreign capital and investment to make restructuring work.
Andropov knew that the West, and particularly the United States, would not provide
help so long as the Soviet Union threatened its geopolitical interests even if doing
so would be economically profitable. For this opening to the West to work, the
Soviet Union needed to reduce Cold War tensions dramatically. In effect, the Soviets
needed to trade geopolitical interests to secure their economic interests. Since
securing economic interests was essential for Communist Party survival, Andropov was
proposing to follow the lead of Vladimir Lenin, another leader who sacrificed space
for time. In the Brest-Litovsk Treaty that ended Russian participation in World War
I, Lenin had conceded vast amounts of territory to Germany to buy time for the
regime to consolidate itself. Andropov was suggesting the same thing.
It is essential to understand that Andropov was a Party man and a Chekist -- a
Communist and KGBer -- through and through. He was not proposing the dismantling of
the Party; rather, he sought to preserve the Party by executing a strategic retreat
on the geopolitical front while the Soviet Union regained its economic balance.
Undoubtedly he understood the risk that restructuring and openness would create
enormous pressures at a time of economic hardship, possibly causing regime collapse
under the strain. Andropov clearly thought the risk was worth running.
After Leonid Brezhnev died, Andropov took his place. He became ill almost
immediately and died. He was replaced by Konstantin Chernenko, who died within a
year. Then came Mikhail Gorbachev -- the true heir to Andropov's thinking -- who
implemented Andropov's two principles. He pursued openness, or glasnost. He also
pursued restructuring, or perestroika. He traded geopolitical interests, hard-won by
the Red Army, for economic benefits. Contrary to his reputation in the West,
Gorbachev was no liberal. He actually sought to preserve the Communist Party, and
was prepared to restructure and open the system to do so.
As the security apparatus loosened its grip to facilitate openness and
restructuring, the empire's underlying tensions quickly went on display. When unrest
in East Germany threatened to undermine Soviet control, Gorbachev had to make a
strategic decision. If he used military force to suppress the uprising, probably
restructuring and certainly openness would be dead, and the crisis Andropov foresaw
would be upon him. Following Lenin's principle, Gorbachev decided to trade space for
time, and he accepted retreat from East Germany to maintain and strengthen his
economic relations with the West.
After Gorbachev made that decision, the rest followed. If Germany were not to be
defended, what would be defended? Applying his strategy rigorously, Gorbachev
allowed the unwinding of the Eastern European empire without intervention. The
decision he had made about Germany amounted to relinquishing most of Moscow's World
War II gains. But if regime survival required it, the price had to be paid.
The Crisis
The crisis came very simply. The degree of restructuring required to prevent the
Soviet Union's constituent republics from having an overarching interest in economic
relations with the West rather than with Russia was enormous. There was no way to
achieve it quickly. Given that the Soviet Union now had an official policy of ending
its self-imposed enclosure, the apparent advantages to the constituent parts of
protecting their economies from Western competition declined -- and with them, the
rationale for the Soviet Union. The security apparatus, the KGB, had been the engine
driving glasnost and perestroika from the beginning; the advocates of the plan were
not going to shift into reverse and suppress glasnost. But glasnost overwhelmed the
system. The Soviet Union, unable to buy the time it needed to protect the Party,
imploded. It broke apart into its constituent republics, and even parts of the
Russian Federation seemed likely to break away.
What followed was liberalization only in the eyes of Westerners. It is easy to
confuse liberalism with collapse, since both provide openness. But the former Soviet
Union (FSU) wasn't liberalizing, it was collapsing in every sense. What remained
administratively was the KGB, now without a mission. The KGB was the most
sophisticated part of the Soviet apparatus, and its members were the best and
brightest. As privatization went into action, absent clear rules or principles, KGB
members had the knowledge and sophistication to take advantage of it. As individuals
and in factions, they built structures and relationships to take advantage of
privatization, forming the factions that dominated the FSU throughout the 1990s
until today. It is not reasonable to refer to organized crime in Russia, because
Russia was lawless. In fact, the law enforcement apparatus was at the forefront of
exploiting the chaos. Organized crime, business and the KGB became interconnected,
and frequently identical.
The 1990s were a catastrophic period for most Russians. The economy collapsed.
Property was appropriated in a systematic looting of all of the former Russian
republics, with Western interests also rushing in to do quick deals on tremendously
favorable terms. The new economic interests crossed the new national borders. (It is
important to bear in mind that the boundaries that had separated Soviet republics
were very real.) The financial cartels, named for the oligarchs who putatively
controlled them (control was much more complex; many oligarchs were front men for
more powerful and discreet figures), spread beyond the borders of the countries in
which they originated, although the Russian cartels spread the most effectively.
Had the West -- more specifically the United States -- wanted to finish Russia off,
this was the time. Russia had no effective government, poverty was extraordinary,
the army was broken and the KGB was in a civil war over property. Very little
pressure could well have finished off the Russian Federation.
The Bush and Clinton administrations made a strategic decision to treat Russia as
the successor regime of the FSU, however, and refused to destabilize it further.
Washington played an aggressive role in expanding NATO, but it did not try to break
up the Russian Federation for several reasons. First, it feared nuclear weapons
would fall into the hands of dangerous factions. Second, it did not imagine that
Russia could ever be a viable country again. And third, it believed that if Russia
did become viable, it would be a liberal democracy. (The idea that liberal
democracies never threaten other liberal democracies was implanted in American
minds.) What later became known as a neoconservative doctrine actually lay at the
heart of the Clinton administration's thinking.
Russia Regroups -- and Faces the Same Crisis
Russia's heart was the security apparatus. Whether holding it together or tearing it
apart, the KGB -- renamed the FSB after the Soviet collapse -- remained the single
viable part of the Russian state. It was therefore logical that when it became
essential to end the chaos, the FSB would be the one to end it. Vladimir Putin, whom
the KGB trained during Andropov's tenure and who participated in the privatization
frenzy in St. Petersburg, emerged as the force to recentralize Russia. The FSB
realized that the Russian Federation itself faced collapse, and that excessive power
had fallen out of its hands as FSB operatives had fought one another during the
period of privatization.
Putin sought to restore the center in two ways. First, he worked to restore the
central apparatus of the state. Second, he worked to strip power from oligarchs
unaligned with the apparatus. It was a slow process, requiring infinite care so that
the FSB not start tearing itself apart again, but Putin is a patient and careful
man.
Putin realized that Andropov's gamble had failed catastrophically. He also knew that
the process could not simply be reversed; there was no going back to the Soviet
Union. At the same time, it was possible to go back to the basic principles of the
Soviet Union. First, there could be a union of the region, bound together by both
economic weakness and the advantage of natural resource collaboration. Second, there
was the reality of a transnational intelligence apparatus that could both stabilize
the region and create the infrastructure for military power. And third, there was
the reversal of the policy of trading geopolitical interests for financial benefits
from the West. Putin's view -- and the average Russian's view -- was that the
financial benefits of the West were more harmful than beneficial.
By 2008, when Russia defeated America's ally, Georgia, in a war, the process of
reassertion was well under way. Then, the financial crisis struck along with
fluctuations in energy prices. The disparity between Russia's politico-military
aspirations, its military capability and its economic structure re-emerged. The
Russians once again faced their classic situation: If they abandoned geopolitical
interests, they would be physically at risk. But if they pursued their geopolitical
interests, they would need a military force capable of assuming the task. Expanding
the military would make the public unhappy as it would see resources diverted from
public consumption to military production, and this could only be managed by
increasing the power of the state and the security apparatus to manage the
unhappiness. But this still left the risk of a massive divergence between military
and economic power that could not be bridged by repression. This risk re-created the
situation that emerged in the 1970s, had to be dealt with in the 1980s and turned
into chaos in the 1990s.
The current decisions the Russians face can only be understood in the context of
events that transpired 20 years ago. The same issues are being played out, and the
generation that now governs Russia was forged in that crucible. The Russian
leadership is trying to balance the possible outcomes to find a solution. They
cannot trade national security for promised economic benefits that may not
materialize or may not be usable. And they cannot simply use the security apparatus
to manage increased military spending -- there are limits to that.
As a generation ago, Russia is caught between the things that it must do to survive
in the short run and the things it cannot do if they are to survive in the long run.
There is no permanent solution for Russia, and that is what makes it such an
unpredictable player in the international system. The closest Russia has come to a
stable solution to its strategic problem was under Ivan the Terrible and Stalin, and
even those could not hold for more than a generation.
The West must understand that Russia is never at peace with itself internally, and
is therefore constantly shifting its external relationships in an endless, spasmodic
cycle. Things go along for awhile, and then suddenly change. We saw a massive change
20 years ago, but the forces that generated that change had built up quietly in the
generation before. The generation since has been trying to pull the pieces back
together. But in Russia, every solution is merely the preface to the next problem --
something built into the Russian reality.
This report may be forwarded or republished on your website with attribution to
www.stratfor.com.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
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Ukraine's Election and the Russian Resurgence
January 26, 2010
By Peter Zeihan
Ukrainians go to the polls Feb. 7 to choose their next president. The last time they did this, in November 2004, the result was the prolonged international incident that became known as the Orange Revolution. That event saw Ukraine cleaved off from the Russian sphere of influence, triggering a chain of events that rekindled the Russian-Western Cold War. Next week’s runoff election seals the Orange Revolution’s reversal. Russia owns the first candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, outright and has a workable agreement with the other, Yulia Timoshenko. The next few months will therefore see the de facto folding of Ukraine back into the Russian sphere of influence; discussion in Ukraine now consists of debate over the speed and depth of that reintegration.
The Centrality of Ukraine
Russia has been working to arrest its slide for several years. Next week’s election in Ukraine marks not so much the end of the post-Cold War period of Russian retreat as the beginning of a new era of Russian aggressiveness. To understand why, one must first absorb the Russian view of Ukraine.
Related Special Topic Page
The Russian Resurgence
Since the break-up of the Soviet Union, most of the former Soviet republics and satellites found themselves cast adrift, not part of the Russian orbit and not really part of any other grouping. Moscow still held links to all of them, but it exercised few of its levers of control over them during Russia’s internal meltdown during the 1990s. During that period, a number of these states — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and the former Czechoslovakia to be exact — managed to spin themselves out of the Russian orbit and attach themselves to the European Union and NATO. Others — Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine — attempted to follow the path Westward, but have not succeeded at this point. Of these six, Ukraine is by far the most critical. It is not simply the most populous of Russia’s former possessions or the birthplace of the Russian ethnicity, it is the most important province of the former Russian Empire and holds the key to the future of Eurasia.
First, the incidental reasons. Ukraine is the Russian Empire’s breadbasket. It is also the location of nearly all of Russia’s infrastructure links not only to Europe, but also to the Caucasus, making it critical for both trade and internal coherence; it is central to the existence of a state as multiethnic and chronically poor as Russia. The Ukrainian port of Sevastopol is home to Russia’s Black Sea fleet, and Ukrainian ports are the only well-developed warm-water ports Russia has ever had. Belarus’ only waterborne exports traverse the Dnieper River, which empties into the Black Sea via Ukraine. Therefore, as goes Ukraine, so goes Belarus. Not only is Ukraine home to some 15 million ethnic Russians — the largest concentration of Russians outside Russia proper — they reside in a zone geographically identical and contiguous to Russia itself. That zone is also the Ukrainian agricultural and industrial heartland, which again is integrated tightly into the Russian core.
These are all important factors for Moscow, but ultimately they pale before the only rationale that really matters: Ukraine is the only former Russian imperial territory that is both useful and has a natural barrier protecting it. Belarus is on the Northern European Plain, aka the invasion highway of Europe. The Baltics are all easily accessible by sea. The Caucasian states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are on the wrong side of the Caucasus Mountains (and Russia’s northern Caucasus republics — remember Chechnya? — aren’t exactly the cream of the crop of Russian possessions). It is true that Central Asia is anchored in mountains to the south, but the region is so large and boasts so few Slavs that it cannot be controlled reliably or cheaply. And Siberia is too huge to be useful.
Without Ukraine, Russia is a desperately defensive power, lacking any natural defenses aside from sheer distance. Moscow and Volgograd, two of Russia’s critically strategic cities, are within 300 miles of Ukraine’s eastern border. Russia lacks any natural internal transport options — its rivers neither interconnect nor flow anywhere useful, and are frozen much of the year — so it must preposition defensive forces everywhere, a burden that has been beyond Russia’s capacity to sustain even in the best of times. The (quite realistic) Russian fear is that without Ukraine, the Europeans will pressure Russia along its entire western periphery, the Islamic world will pressure Russia along its entire southern periphery, the Chinese will pressure Russia along its southeastern periphery, and the Americans will pressure Russia wherever opportunity presents itself.
Ukraine by contrast has the Carpathians to its west, a handy little barrier that has deflected invaders of all stripes for millennia. These mountains defend Ukraine against tanks coming from the west as effectively as they protected the Balkans against Mongols attacking from the east. Having the Carpathians as a western border reduces Russia’s massive defensive burden. Most important, if Russia can redirect the resources it would have used for defensive purposes on the Ukrainian frontier — whether those resources be economic, intelligence, industrial, diplomatic or military — then Russia retains at least a modicum of offensive capability. And that modicum of offensive ability is more than enough to overmatch any of Russia’s neighbors (with the exception of China).
When Retreat Ends, the Neighbors Get Nervous
This view of Ukraine is not alien to countries in Russia’s neighborhood. They fully understand the difference between a Russia with Ukraine and a Russia without Ukraine, and understand that so long as Ukraine remains independent they have a great deal of maneuvering room. Now that all that remains is the result of an election with no strategic choice at stake, the former Soviet states and satellites realize that their world has just changed.
Georgia traditionally has been the most resistant to Russian influence regardless of its leadership, so defiant that Moscow felt it necessary to trounce Georgia in a brief war in August 2008. Georgia’s poor strategic position is nothing new, but a Russia that can redirect efforts from Ukraine is one that can crush Georgia as an afterthought. That is turning the normally rambunctious Georgians pensive, and nudging them toward pragmatism. An opposition group, the Conservative Party, is launching a movement to moderate policy toward Russia, which among other things would mean abandoning Georgia’s bid for NATO membership and re-establishing formal political ties with Moscow.
A recent Lithuanian power struggle has resulted in the forced resignation of Foreign Minister Minister Vygaudas. The main public point of contention was the foreign minister’s previous participation in facilitating U.S. renditions. Vygaudas, like most in the Lithuanian leadership, saw such participation as critical to maintaining the tiny country’s alliance with the United States. President Dalia Grybauskaite, however, saw the writing on the wall in Ukraine, and feels the need to foster a more conciliatory view of Russia. Part of that meant offering up a sacrificial lamb in the form of the foreign minister.
Poland is in a unique position. It knows that should the Russians turn seriously aggressive, its position on the Northern European Plain makes it the focal point of Russian attention. Its location and vulnerability makes Warsaw very sensitive to Russian moves, so it has been watching Ukraine with alarm for several months.
As a result, the Poles have come up with some (admittedly small) olive branches, including an offer for Putin to visit Gdansk last September in an attempt to foster warmer (read: slightly less overtly hostile) relations. Putin not only seized upon the offer, but issued a public letter denouncing the World War II-era Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty, long considered by Poles as the most outrageous Russian offense to Poland. Warsaw has since replied with invitations for future visits. As with Georgia, Poland will never be pro-Russian — Poland is not only a NATO member but also hopes to host an American Patriot battery and participate in Washington’s developing ballistic missile defense program. But if Warsaw cannot hold Washington’s attention — and it has pulled out all the stops in trying to — it fears the writing might already be on the wall, and it must plan accordingly.
Azerbaijan has always attempted to walk a fine line between Russia and the West, knowing that any serious bid for membership in something like the European Union or NATO was contingent upon Georgia’s first succeeding in joining up. Baku would prefer a more independent arrangement, but it knows that it is too far from Russia’s western frontier to achieve such unless the stars are somewhat aligned. As Georgia’s plans have met with what can best be described as abject failure, and with Ukraine now appearing headed toward Russian suzerainty, Azerbaijan has in essence resigned itself to the inevitable. Baku is well into negotiations that would redirect much of its natural gas output north to Russia rather than west to Turkey and Europe. And Azerbaijan simply has little else to bargain with.
Other states that have long been closer to Russia, but have attempted to balance Russia against other powers in hopes of preserving some measure of sovereignty, are giving up. Of the remaining former Soviet republics Belarus has the most educated workforce and even a functioning information technology industry, while Kazakhstan has a booming energy industry; both are reasonable candidates for integration into Western systems. But both have this month agreed instead to throw their lots in with Russia. The specific method is an economic agreement that is more akin to shackles than a customs union. The deal effectively will gut both countries’ industries in favor of Russian producers. Moscow hopes the union in time will form the foundation of a true successor to the Soviet Union.
Other places continue to show resistance. The new Moldovan prime minister, Vlad Filat, is speaking with the Americans about energy security and is even flirting with the Romanians about reunification. The Latvians are as defiant as ever. The Estonians, too, are holding fast, although they are quietly polling regional powers to at least assess where the next Russian hammer might fall. But for every state that decides it had best accede to Russia’s wishes, Russia has that much more bandwidth to dedicate to the poorly positioned holdouts.
Russia also has the opportunity. The United States is bogged down in its economic and health care debates, two wars and the Iran question — all of which mean Washington’s attention is occupied well away from the former Soviet sphere. With the United States distracted, Russia has a freer hand in re-establishing control over states that would like to be under the American security umbrella.
There is one final factor that is pushing Russia to resurge: It feels the pressure of time. The post-Cold War collapse may well have mortally wounded the Russian nation. The collapse in Russian births has halved the size of the 0-20 age group in comparison to their predecessors born in the 1970s and 1980s. Consequently, Russian demographics are among the worst in the world.
Even if Russia manages an economic renaissance, in a decade its population will have aged and shrunk to the point that the Russians will find holding together Russia proper a huge challenge. Moscow’s plan, therefore, is simple: entrench its influence while it is in a position of relative strength in preparation for when it must trade that influence for additional time. Ultimately, Russia is indeed going into that good night. But not gently. And not today.
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Summary
The United States’ involvement in the Middle East — wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a standoff with Iran over its nuclear program — has given Russia an opportunity to expand its influence in the former Soviet Union. Moscow has already had some success in consolidating control over what it considers the four most crucial countries, but it would like to push back against the West in several other countries if it has time to do so before Washington’s attention returns to Eurasia.
Editor’s note: This introduction launches a four-part series in which STRATFOR will examine Russia’s efforts to exert influence beyond its borders.
Analysis
U.S. Weakness and Russia’s Window of Opportunity
Russia today is vastly different from the Russia of 10 or 20 years ago. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the West began a geopolitical offensive in Russia’s near abroad, and met with some success. However, the past two months have seen a drastic rollback of Western influence in the former Soviet Union, with Russia forming unions with Kazakhstan and Belarus and a pro-Russian government returning to Ukraine. Moscow is making progress in its grand scheme to solidify its position as a regional power in Eurasia once again, reversing what it sees as Western infiltration. The question now is how far Russia wants to go — or how far it feels it must and can go — in this quest.
The Inherent Russian Struggle
Russia’s defining problem stems from its geographic indefensibility. Russia has no rivers, oceans, swamps, mountains or other natural features truly protecting it. To compensate for these vulnerabilities, Russia historically has had to do two things: Consolidate forces at home while purging outside influences, and expand in order to create buffers around its borders. At times, Russia reached out too far and collapsed, which forced it to start over. But Russia has only been a stable, strong power — regionally and globally — when it had a buffer zone surrounding its core. The best example of this was the Soviet Union, in which Russia surrounded itself with a sphere of countries under its control, from Central Asia to the Caucasus and Eastern Europe. This gave Moscow the insulation it needed to project influence far beyond its borders.
(click here to enlarge image)
But in 1989, the Soviet Union lost control of Eastern Europe and had disintegrated by 1991, returning Russia essentially to its 17th century borders (except for Siberia). Russia was broken, vulnerable and weak.
The United States, on the other hand, emerged from the Cold War with a huge opportunity to contain Russia and prevent its re-emergence as a great power in Eurasia. The Soviet disintegration did not in any way guarantee that Moscow would not resurge eventually in another form, so the West had to neuter Russia both internally and externally. First the United States nudged the pro-democratic and capitalist forces inside Russia to try to change the nature of the Kremlin. Theoretically, this led to the democratic experiment of the 1990s that ended in bitter chaos, rather than democracy, within Russia. Yet it did prevent the Russian government from becoming a consolidated (let alone powerful) entity.
The United States also began working to contain Russia’s influence inside its borders and pick away at its best defense: its buffer. The United States and Western Europe carried out this strategy in several ways. The West used its influence and money quickly after the fall of the Soviet Union to create connections with each former Soviet state. It also fomented a series of color revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Kyrgyzstan that solidified Western influence in those countries. NATO and the European Union also expanded into former Soviet territory to include Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Washington and NATO even opened military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan to facilitate moving supplies into Afghanistan.
Moscow saw this as a direct and deliberate challenge to Russian national security. But before it could even consider reaching across its borders to counter the West’s geopolitical encroachment, Russia had to clean house. Under former Russian President (and current Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin, Russia’s internal consolidation began with the Kremlin regaining control over the country politically, economically and socially while re-establishing its control over Russia’s wealth of energy reserves. The Kremlin also put an end to the internal volatility created by the oligarchs, organized crime and wars in the Caucasus. The recentralization of the Russian state under Putin’s rule, coupled with high energy prices bringing in exorbitant amounts of money, made Russia strong again, but it still needed to reclaim its buffer zone.
The Window of Opportunity
While Russia reconsolidated, the United States became preoccupied with the Islamic world. As the U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have developed, they have absorbed Washington’s focus, presenting Russia with an opportunity to push back against the West’s increased influence in Eurasia. It remains unclear whether Russia would have been able to counter the Western infiltration of the former Soviet states if the United States had not been looking elsewhere. But Russia has taken advantage of Washington’s preoccupation to attempt to re-establish its sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union.
The U.S. absorption on Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan has not occurred without Russian involvement. Russia has used its connections in the Middle East and Afghanistan as leverage in its negotiations with the United States for years, demanding that Washington outright abandon moves to solidify Western influence in the former Soviet states. Furthermore, Moscow’s plan to expand its influence into the former Soviet sphere depends on Washington’s preoccupation. Thus, Russia has openly supported Iran with political, nuclear and military deals, and has made negotiations for military supply routes into Afghanistan more difficult for the United States and NATO.
The geopolitical tug-of-war between Washington and Moscow has not been easy. But while Washington has been preoccupied with its wars, Russia has been able to reconsolidate its influence in countries that never strayed far from Moscow’s hand, such as Belarus and Kazakhstan. Russia proved that the West could not stop it from militarily rolling back into its former territory during the 2008 Russo-Georgian war. Russia’s most crucial victory to date has been in Ukraine, where the top four candidates in the country’s January presidential election were all pro-Russian, thus ensuring the end of the pro-Western Orange movement.
The question now is: What does Russia feel it must accomplish before the United States is freed up from its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan or its standoff with Iran?
The Russian Plan
The Kremlin is not looking to re-establish the Soviet Union. Rather, Moscow has stepped back and looked at its former Soviet sphere and determined what is imperative to the future of Russia’s regional power and stability. Essentially, Russia has placed the countries of its former sphere of influence and other regional powers into four categories:
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First are four countries where Russia feels it must fully reconsolidate its influence: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Georgia. These countries protect Russia from Asia and Europe and give Moscow access to the Black and Caspian seas. They are also the key points integrated with Russia’s industrial and agricultural heartland. Without all four of them, Russia is essentially impotent. So far, Russia has reconsolidated power in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and part of Georgia is militarily occupied. In 2010, Russia will focus on strengthening its grasp on these countries.
Next are six countries where Moscow would like to reconsolidate its influence if it has the opportunity to do so before Washington’s attention turns back to Eurasia: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Russia does not need these countries in order to remain strong, but without them the West is too close to the Russian core for comfort. These countries have either strategic geographic locations, links to Russia or valuable assets. Estonia could almost be put into the first category, as some forces inside Moscow consider it more important because of location near Russia’s second-largest city, St. Petersburg, and on the Baltic Sea. Russia will attempt to deal with these countries only after its four top priorities are met.
The third group on Russia’s list consists of countries that are not critical to the Kremlin, but Moscow feels could easily be controlled because of their own inherent vulnerabilities. These countries — Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Armenia — are not geographically, politically or economically important and are so unstable that Moscow could consolidate control over them rather quickly. Some of these countries are already under Russian control, through no concerted effort on Moscow’s part, but their natural instability and weakness can make them more trouble than they are worth.
The final group on Russia’s list consists of countries that are not former Soviet states or countries Russia thinks it can pull in under its influence. These last countries — Germany, Turkey, France and Poland — are regional powers (or future powers) in Eurasia that could complicate Russia’s efforts. Moscow feels it needs to form a strong relationship, or at least an understanding, with these countries about Russia’s dominance in the former Soviet sphere. These countries are all NATO members, and each has its own complex relationship with the United States. But Moscow again is taking advantage of the United States’ distraction to leverage its own relationship with these countries. Moscow will have to play a very delicate game with these regional heavyweights to make sure it does not turn them into enemies.
A Closing Window
Russia has had some success in meeting its goals while the United States has been preoccupied, but it also knows Washington is attempting to wrap up its affairs in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan and have a freer hand in other areas. For Russia, the clock is ticking.
Russia does have the advantage, in that it is easier for the United States to prevent the emergence of a regional hegemon than to control one that has already emerged. The United States’ focus will return to Eurasia after Russia has already made significant progress on its to-do list. But this is not to say that Russia is the definite winner. Russia’s geopolitical imperatives remain: The country must expand, hold together and defend the empire, even though expansion can create difficulties in the Russian core. This is already a difficult task; it will be made even harder when the United States is free to counter Russia.
In this series, STRATFOR will break down exactly how Russia will be tackling its to-do list of countries, examining the different levers Moscow holds over each country and what bumps it may experience along the way.
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Part Two of this series from Stratfor:
Summary
After Russia consolidates control over the countries it has deemed necessary to its national security, it will turn its focus to a handful of countries that are not as important but still have strategic value. These countries — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — are not necessary to Russia’s survival but are of some importance and can keep the West from moving too close to Russia’s core.
Editor’s note: This is part two of a four-part series in which STRATFOR examines Russia’s efforts to exert influence beyond its borders.
After years of work, Moscow has made significant progress in regaining control over the former Soviet states that are crucial to Russia’s security. Russia’s window of opportunity to exert control in its near abroad is a narrow one, however, and so Moscow has prioritized its list of countries where it is trying to consolidate influence. After reining in the four countries imperative to Moscow’s interests — Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia — Moscow will turn its attention to a group of countries where it would like to have more influence.
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There are six countries — Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan — where Moscow would like to reconsolidate its influence if it has the opportunity. Although these countries are not crucial to Russia’s survival, as long as they remain outside Moscow’s control, the West has the ability to get too close to the Russian core for comfort. All these countries know how serious Russia is about its grand plan of expansionism. The 2008 Russo-Georgian war revealed Moscow’s willingness to militarily intervene on its former Soviet turf and sent the message to these countries that they must obey or cut a deal with Moscow, or else risk being crushed. Since then, these countries have watched Russia consolidate Kazakhstan and Belarus into a customs union (with the promise of becoming a formal union) and have seen a pro-Russian wave engulf Ukraine.
The Baltics
Out of the six countries on this shopping list, the Baltics (particularly Estonia and Latvia) are the most critical to Russia’s plan. Estonia and Latvia are a stone’s throw from Russia’s most important cities, with Tallinn just 200 miles from St. Petersburg and eastern Latvia just 350 miles from Moscow. The Baltics lie on the North European Plain, Europe’s easiest route for marching into Russia — something Moscow knows all too well.
Each Baltic state has its own importance to Russia. Whoever controls Estonia also controls the approach to the Gulf of Finland, Russia’s main access to the Baltic Sea. Estonia is also mainly ethnically Ugro-Finnish, which means that Russians are surrounded by Ugro-Finns on both sides of the Gulf of Finland. Latvia has the largest Russian population in the Baltics and the port of Riga, which Russia covets. Lithuania is different from its Baltic brothers since it does not border Russia proper, although it does border Kaliningrad, Russia’s exclave, which is home to half of Russia’s Baltic Fleet and more than 23,000 troops. Lithuania is the largest of the Baltic states, both in terms of territory and population. It also had been a key industrial center under the Soviet Union.
The Baltic states were the only countries in the former Soviet Union to be shuffled into the Western set of alliances, being admitted into the European Union and NATO in 2004. This put the Western alliances right on Russia’s doorstep. Estonia and Latvia are fervently anti-Russian, while Lithuania is more pragmatic, feeling less threatened by Moscow since it does not actually border mainland Russia.
The Russian administration is split over whether the Baltics belong on Russia’s “must have” or “would like to have” list. The Kremlin is especially torn over how aggressively to go after Estonia, which is geographically isolated sharing land borders only with Russia and Latvia, and thus in a particularly sensitive position.
Russia’s Levers
Russia holds many levers within the Baltic states, making their future highly uncertain.
Geography: The Baltics are virtually indefensible, lying on the North European Plain. Their small size also makes them incredibly vulnerable. Furthermore, they are bordered by Russia to the east, Kaliningrad to the west and Russian ally Belarus to the south.
Population: Each Baltic state has a sizable Russian population: Russians or Russian speakers make up 30 percent of the population in Estonia, 40 percent in Latvia and nearly 10 percent of Lithuania. Roughly 15 percent of Estonians and 30 percent of Latvians are Orthodox, with many loyal to the Moscow Patriarchy.
Economic: The most critical economic lever for Russia in the Baltics is energy. The Baltics rely on Russia for 90-99 percent of their natural gas supplies and most of their oil. Russia has proven in the past that it is willing to cut these supplies (for example, through the breaking of the Druzhba pipeline). Russia also owns a third of Estonia’s natural gas company and has been in talks to purchase Lithuania’s main refinery. Russia’s economic levers are mainly in Latvia, which relies on Russia for one-third of its energy imports
Military: Russia has 23,000 troops in Kaliningrad and recently moved 8,000 troops to just outside St. Petersburg, near the Estonian border. Russia has also regularly held military exercises in Belarus and Kaliningrad under the guise of contingency planning for an invasion of the Baltics (should one ever be necessary).
Security: Russia’s nationalist youth movements, like Nashi, have continually crossed the border into Estonia and Latvia in order to commit vandalism or stir up pro-Russian sentiments. Estonia has also been one of the prime targets for cyber attacks from Russia, especially at politically heated times.
Political: This is the weakest link for Russia in the Baltics, since each country is pro-Western and a member of the European Union and NATO. However Russia does have some small footholds in Latvia and Lithuania. In 2009, the Harmony Center coalition — comprising parties that mainly represent Latvia’s Russian population — placed second in the country’s European Parliament elections and was as recently as January ranked as the most popular Latvian party, with 16.5 percent approval. There has also been a tradition of pro-Russian parties in Lithuania, though this has tapered off in recent years. The Labor Party, funded by Russian-born billionaire Viktor Uspaskich, was the strongest party in Lithuania in the mid-2000s. However, Uspaskich’s fortunes turned when he was charged with corruption and tax evasion, forcing him to flee to Russia in 2006 to avoid arrest. He has since returned to Lithuania and assumed leadership of the Labor Party, which came fifth in the October 2008 elections.
Russia’s Success and Roadblocks
Moscow has not yet made much progress in consolidating its influence in the Baltics. Estonia and Latvia are still vehemently anti-Russian. They have taken refuge in Western alliances, but after watching what happened to NATO ally Georgia in 2008, both countries — particularly Estonia — are unsure about the West’s ability to come to their aid should Russia actively target them. Instead, Estonia and Latvia tend to look to Sweden and Finland as patrons. These countries hold unique relationships with Russia that could help them curb any Russian action in Latvia and Estonia.
Lithuania has been more pragmatic about its relationship with Russia, counting on its location away from the Russian border to protect it but not wanting to test Moscow’s patience. In recent weeks, Lithuania has been more open to NATO discussions with Russia and negotiations on Russian involvement in the country’s energy sector.
Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan is important to Russia for many reasons. The Caucasus state does not border Russia and historically has been rather independently minded. However, it could be drawn in not only by the West but by other regional powers, like Turkey and Iran (Azerbaijan borders Iran, which has a sizeable Azerbaijani population). For Russia, controlling Azerbaijan is about preventing other powers from gaining a foothold in the Caucasus.
Azerbaijan also has access to vast amounts of energy wealth — not only because of its own oil and natural gas resources but also because of its geographic location between Central Asia and the West. Many countries want to tap into Azerbaijan’s energy potential. The West has developed Azerbaijan’s resources in order to have an alternative to Russian energy supplies, while Russia wants to control the flow of Azerbaijan’s oil and natural gas supplies.
Russia’s Levers
Geographic: Azerbaijan’s location is a blessing and a curse. It is near many regional powers, but is torn between them. Russia is skilled in playing the regional powers off each other in order to gain more leverage in Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan’s main energy route also transits Georgia — and Russia proved its willingness to cut that route during the 2008 war.
Political: Azerbaijan and its neighbor Armenia have been locked in a political conflict over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh since a war over the region from 1988-1994. Russia is the key power influencing all parties involved in the negotiations and can easily complicate or keep calm this complex standoff.
Security: Besides the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, Azerbaijan is also highly concerned with militants from Russia’s Muslim regions coming into the country. Baku has complained that Moscow could easily send down militants from Dagestan or Chechnya to destabilize the country if needed.
Military: Russia has 5,000 troops stationed inside Armenia and has an agreement with Yerevan that it can move the troops to the borders as it pleases. Russia also has a military radar base in Gabala, Azerbaijan, but this is in the process of being shut down.
Economic: Azerbaijan is in the process of reviving its energy ties to Russia with deals for natural gas purchases to start this year. Russia has also offered to purchase all of Azerbaijan’s natural gas. Baku has attempted to diversify where it sends its energy, with links to Europe, Iran and now Russia. But as Russia has proven, it is willing to cut some of these links for its own needs.
Russia’s Success and Roadblocks
Russia has been quite successful in the past year in re-establishing its influence over Azerbaijan. Though it traditionally has sought to balance itself among the region’s three powers, Azerbaijan is now reconsidering its relationship with Turkey and becoming more worried about keeping ties with Iran due to Western pressure. This is beginning to leave Russia as Baku’s only option, and Moscow knows it. Furthermore, as the political dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia heated up due to a proposed political deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan’s traditional ally Turkey, Baku felt abandoned by Ankara, and Russia stepped in to console Azerbaijan. Russia has skillfully played each party in this disagreement — Azerbaijan, Armenia and Turkey — off each other, and gained leverage to use on each one.
Azerbaijan is still very wary of Russian control, but understands it must deal carefully with Moscow. Unfortunately for Baku, besides other powers’ interest in the country and its geographic location, Azerbaijan has few tools at its disposal to counter Russian pressure.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan acts as a buffer for Russia between the critical state of Kazakhstan and the regional power of Iran. It also stands between the former Soviet sphere and the highly unstable South Asian countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. But Turkmenistan is strategically important to Russia for two other reasons: energy and Uzbekistan.
Turkmenistan holds the world’s fourth-largest natural gas supplies and sizable oil supplies —something sought by the West, the Far East and the Middle East. Russia wants to ensure that these supplies only go where it wants and do not become competition for Russia’s supplies.
Turkmenistan also flanks most of the southern portion of Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s natural leader and a country Russia wants to control. Russia has been able to use the long-standing tensions between Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to its advantage.
Russia’s Levers
Turkmenistan’s sparse population and economy makes it difficult to influence, but Russia has some very specific levers in the country.
Geography and population: Turkmenistan does not border Russia, but its geography and lack of consolidation give Russia easy access. Turkmenistan lacks any geographic protective features, except for its size and the large desert that crosses most of the country. Furthermore, its population is split between the Caspian coast and its border with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. Russia holds influence over the population in the southeast mainly because the clan that runs that area allegedly is involved in the drug trade, and Russia is said to oversee exports from Turkmenistan through Russia and on to Europe.
Political and security: As mentioned above, Russia holds great political leverage over the southern Turkmen population because of its control over this area’s main economic staple: drugs. This population, led by the Mary Clan, does not run the country politically but could easily challenge the government if it wanted, since it comprises a large percentage of the population. Russia has yet to play this card, but it would not be difficult to do so.
Military: Russian military influence in Turkmenistan has increased. The country cannot defend itself, especially from its neighbor Uzbekistan, so Russia has supplied the Turkmen military and security forces with arms and training. Russia has placed a small contingent of troops inside Turkmenistan as well in order to deter Uzbekistan.
Economic: Fifty percent of Turkmenistan’s gross domestic product comes from energy, with 90 percent of Turkmen energy supplies transiting Russia. Moscow has proven in the past that it is willing to cut these energy supply routes if politically necessary and knows that doing so would crush Turkmenistan economically.
Russia’s Success and Roadblocks
Russia has been able to keep Turkmenistan under its thumb via energy and security. The country understands that it is beholden to Russia for the bulk of its economy and for protection from Uzbekistan. However, part of this equation is changing, since Turkmenistan has expanded its energy infrastructure into China — a major energy consumer. These links depend on the transit of supplies via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan but are the start of a diversification of energy shipments and funding for Turkmenistan.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistan is the heart of Central Asia, holding a large bulk of its population and many of its resources. Uzbekistan’s population, 27 million, dwarfs that of its neighbors. It holds the world’s 11th-largest natural gas reserves and is Central Asia’s major electricity exporter. Uzbekistan is self-sufficient in food as well, controlling the fertile Fergana Valley. Its size, resources and location grant Uzbekistan a greater degree of independence than the other Central Asian states.
This independence is something Russia wants to curb. Russia is not so concerned with other powers influencing Uzbekistan — though the West, China, Turkey and Iran have tried. Instead Moscow is worried about Uzbekistan becoming a regional leader in its own right, commanding the other Central Asian states. Such a move would shift the whole of Central Asia away from Russian control. Losing Uzbekistan would mean losing half of Kazakhstan (including the critical southern region around Almaty), Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and half of Kyrgyzstan. These areas would end up isolated from Russia.
Russia’s Levers
Geographic: Uzbekistan is surrounded by former Soviet states. It has no borders with the non-Soviet world, save a very small border with Afghanistan. As long as Russia controls the other states it can influence Uzbekistan to some extent.
Security: Uzbekistan has faced a great number of security concerns, from its own militant movements in the Fergana Valley to the insurgency in Afghanistan crossing the border. Russia has placed its troops in neighboring countries to counter these militants and can help mold their movements. Moscow also has deep connections with many militant movements in Afghanistan left over from the war in the 1980s.
Economic: Roughly 21 percent of all Uzbek exports — mainly energy, cotton and cars — go to Russia. Natural gas accounts for nearly 32 percent of Uzbekistan’s exports, and 75 percent of that goes to Russia. Uzbekistan may be self-sufficient in energy and food, but all refined energy products (like lubricants) and most processed foods come from Russia. Russia also controls much of the drug flow out of Central Asia and Afghanistan into Russia and Europe. This drug flow is key to the Uzbek economy and many of the power circles in the country.
Military: Russia currently has troops near the Uzbek border in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan and has trained Turkmen troops that are stationed on the Turkmen-Uzbek border.
Russia’s Success and Roadblocks
Russia was briefly successful in pulling Uzbekistan back into the Russian fold in 2005, pushing Tashkent to evict the United States from a military base it was using to get supplies to troops in Afghanistan.
But as Tashkent has seen its neighbors and other former Soviet states grow closer to Russia, it has moved in the opposite direction. Uzbekistan’s reaction to the Russian resurgence has been to become increasingly independent and hostile toward Russia. Tashkent feels it should be the natural and independent leader of Central Asia and does not want Russia ruling the region. Uzbekistan has continued to buck Russia’s demands on energy supplies and military locations, and has joined the trend of building pipelines heading to China. In Central Asia, Uzbekistan is Moscow’s biggest and most important challenge.
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Summary
Russia is working to form an understanding with regional powers outside the former Soviet sphere in order to facilitate its plans to expand its influence in key former Soviet states. These regional powers — Germany, France, Turkey and Poland — could halt Russia’s consolidation of control if they chose to, so Moscow is working to make neutrality, if not cooperation, worth their while.
Editor’s note: This is part four of a four-part series in which STRATFOR examines Russia’s efforts to exert influence beyond its borders.
Today’s Russia cannot simply roll tanks over the territories it wants included in its sphere of influence. Its consolidation of control in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and Central Asia would be difficult, if not impossible, if Moscow faced opposition from an array of forces. Moscow’s resurgence in its old Soviet turf is possible because the United States is distracted with issues in the Islamic world, but also because regional powers surrounding Russia are not unified in opposition to the Kremlin.
Moscow is working to cultivate an understanding with regional powers outside the former Soviet Union that are critical to its expansion: Germany, France, Turkey and Poland. If these countries committed to halting Russia’s resurgence, Moscow would be stymied. This is why Russia is determined to develop an understanding — if not also a close cooperative relationship — with each of these countries that will clearly delineate the Russian sphere of influence, give each country incentive to cooperate and warn each country about opposing Moscow openly.
This is not a new policy for Russia. Especially before the Cold War with the West, Moscow traditionally had a nuanced policy of alliances and understandings. Germany and Russia have cooperated many times; Russia was one of the German Empire’s first true allies, through the Dreikaiserbund, and was the only country to cooperate with post-Versailles Germany with the 1922 Treaty of Rapallo. Russia was also France’s first ally after the 1870 Franco-Prussian war — an alliance whose main purpose was to isolate Germany.
Russia’s history with modern Turkey (and its ancestor the Ottoman Empire) and Poland admittedly has far fewer examples of cooperation. Russia throughout the 19th century coveted territory held by the crumbling Ottoman Empire — especially around the Black Sea and in the Balkans — and had plans for dominating Poland. Currently, however, Moscow understands that the two regional powers with most opportunities to subvert its resurgence are Poland (in Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic states) and Turkey (in the Caucasus).
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Germany
Germany is the most important regional power with which Russia wants to create an understanding. Berlin is the largest European economy, an economic and political leader within the European Union and a key market for Russian energy exports — with Russian natural gas exports filling 47 percent of Germany’s natural gas needs. German opposition to Russian consolidation in Eastern Europe would create problems, especially since Berlin could rally Central Europeans wary of Moscow to oppose Russia’s resurgence. However, Germany has offered little resistance to Russia’s increasing influence in Eastern Europe. In fact, it has primarily been Germany’s opposition to NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia that stymied Washington’s plans to push NATO’s boundaries further eastward.
If it chose to, Germany could become Russia’s greatest roadblock. It is geographically more of a threat than the United States, due to its position on the North European Plain and the Baltic Sea, and it is a leader in the European Union and could offer Ukraine and Belarus substantial political and economic alternatives to their ties to Russia. With this in mind, Russia has decided to make cooperation worthwhile for Berlin.
Russia’s Levers
Russia’s obvious lever in Germany is natural gas exports. Germany wants a reliable flow of energy, and it is not willing to suffer blackouts or freezing temperatures for the sake of a Western-oriented Ukraine or Georgia. Germany initially fumed in 2005 over Russian gas cutoffs to Ukraine, but later realized that it was much easier to make an arrangement with Russia and back off from supporting Ukraine’s Western ambitions. Moscow carefully managed subsequent Russian gas disputes with Ukraine to limit German exposure, and Berlin has since fully turned against Kiev, which it now sees as an unreliable transit route.
Germany is expanding its energy relationship with Russia, since the upcoming Nord Stream pipeline will not only make more natural gas available to German consumers and industry, it will also make Germany a key transit route for Russian gas. The Nord Stream pipeline project also suggests that Germany does not just want Russia’s gas; it wants to be Russia’s main distributor to Central Europe, which would give Berlin even more political power over its neighbors.
Russia has also very directly offered Germany a key role in the upcoming privatizations in Russia. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin personally has invited German businesses to invest in Russia. Putin also personally intervened in the General Motors Corp.-Opel dispute in 2009, offering to save Opel and German jobs — a move designed to curry favor with German Chancellor Angela Merkel before Germany’s September 2009 general elections.
Another prominent example of the budding economic relationship between Berlin and Moscow is German industrial giant Siemens’ decision to end its partnership with French nuclear giant Areva, to which it felt it would always be a junior partner, and begin cooperating with Russia’s Atomenergoprom. Siemens and Atomenergoprom will work together to develop nuclear power plants in Russia, Germany and other countries.
France
France and Germany are important partners for Russia because Moscow needs guarantees that its resurgence in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus will not face opposition from a united EU front. Initiatives such as the Swedish-Polish “Eastern Partnership” — which seeks to upgrade relations between the EU states and most former Soviet Union states — are seen as a threat to Moscow’s sphere of influence. The Kremlin feels it can keep these Central European initiatives from gaining steam by setting up informal understandings with Paris and Berlin.
France is a key part of this effort because Russia considers it — rightfully so — as the political leader of the European Union. Moscow therefore wants to secure a mutually beneficial relationship with Paris.
Russia’s Levers
Russia has less leverage over France than over any of the other regional powers discussed. In fact, Russia and France have few overlapping geopolitical interests. Historically, they have intersected occasionally in North Africa, Southeast Asia and the Middle East, but contemporary Moscow is concentrating on its near abroad, not global dominance. France does not depend on trade with Russia for export revenue and is one of the few continental European powers not to depend on Russia for energy; 76 percent of France’s energy comes from nuclear power.
This is why Moscow is making every effort to offer Paris the appropriate “sweeteners,” many of which were agreed upon during Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s visit to France on March 2. One of the most recent — and most notable — is a deal to purchase the $700 million French Mistral-class helicopter carrier. This would be the Russian military’s first major purchase of non-Russian technology and would give Russia a useful offensive weapon to put pressure on the Baltic states and the Caucasus (via the Black Sea). Russia has suggested that it may want to purchase four vessels in total for $2.2 billion — something that recession-hit Paris would be hard pressed to decline.
Russia has worked hard on getting energy-independent France involved in its energy projects. French energy behemoth Total owns a quarter of the enormous Barents Sea Shtokman gas field and on Feb. 5 reiterated its commitment to the project despite announced delays in production from 2013 to 2016. French energy company EDF is also negotiating entry into the South Stream natural gas pipeline, while energy company GDF Suez signed an agreement with Gazprom for a 9 percent stake in Nord Stream on March 2. Furthermore, France’s Societe Generale and Renault both have interests in Russia through ownership of Russian enterprises, and French train manufacturer Alstom has agreed to invest in Russia’s Transmashholding.
Finally, Russia knows how to play to France’s — particularly French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s — need to be the diplomatic center of attention. Russia gives France and Sarkozy the respect reserved for Europe’s leader, for example by allowing Sarkozy to negotiate and take credit for the peace deal that ended the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008. This is no small gesture from Paris’ perspective since France is constantly under pressure to prove its leadership mettle compared to the richer and more powerful Germany.
Turkey
Turkey is a rising regional power looking to expand its influence mainly along the lines of the former Ottoman Empire. Like an adolescent testing his or her own strengths and limitations, Turkey is not focused on any one area, but rather surveying the playing field. Moscow has allowed Turkey to become focused, however, on the negotiations with Armenia, presenting itself as a facilitator but in reality managing the negotiations behind the scenes.
Russia wants to manage its relationship with Turkey for two main reasons: to guarantee its dominance of the Caucasus and assure that Turkey remains committed to transporting Russia’s — rather than someone else’s — energy to Europe. Russia also wants to make sure that Turkey does not use its control of the Bosporus to close off the Black Sea to Russian trade, particularly oil exports from Novorossiysk.
Russia’s Levers
Moscow’s main lever with Ankara is energy. Turkey depends on Russia for 65 percent of its natural gas and 40 percent of its oil imports. Russia is also looking to expand its investments in Turkey, with refineries and nuclear power plants under discussion.
The second key lever is political. Moscow has encouraged Russian-dominated Armenia to entertain Turkish offers of negotiations. However, this has caused a rift between Turkey and its traditional ally Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan does not want to see Armenia and Turkey conclude their negotiations without first winning concessions from Armenia over the de facto Armenian controlled Nagorno-Karabakh region. The negotiation process — openly encouraged by Moscow — therefore has forced energy-rich Azerbaijan into Russia’s arms and strained the relationship between Ankara and Baku.
Russia has plenty of other levers on Turkey, trade being the most obvious. Turkey’s exports to Russia are considerable; 5 percent of its total exports in 2008 went to Russia (though that number dipped in 2009 due to the recession). Russia has cut this trade off before — like in August 2008, when Turkey and NATO held maneuvers in the Black Sea — as a warning to Ankara. Russia is also considering selling Turkey its advanced air defense system, the S-400.
Poland
The final regional power with which Russia wants an understanding is Poland. Poland may not be as powerful as the other three — either economically or politically — but it has considerable influence in Ukraine and Belarus and has taken it upon itself to champion expansion of the European Union eastward. Furthermore, the U.S. military could eventually use Poland as a base from which to threaten the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad along with Belarus, Ukraine and the Baltic Sea. Moscow thus sees the U.S. plan to position a Patriot air defense battery — or any part of the BMD system — in Poland as a key threat.
Russia does not want to see the U.S.-Polish alliance blossom, allowing the United States — once it extricates itself from the Middle East — to reposition itself on Russia’s borders.
Russia’s Levers
The most obvious lever Russia has in Poland is energy. Poland imports around 57 percent of its natural gas from Russia, a number that is set to rise to more than 70 percent with the new Polish-Russian natural gas deal signed in January. Poland is also planning on switching a considerable part of its electricity production from coal to natural gas — in order to meet EU greenhouse gas emission standards — thus making Russian natural gas imports a key source of energy. Poland also imports more than 90 percent of its oil from Russia.
Poland, as a NATO member state, is under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, as Polish politicians often point out, NATO has offered very few real guarantees to Poland’s security. Russia maintains a considerable military presence in nearby Kaliningrad, with more than 200 aircraft, 23,000 troops and half of Russia’s Baltic fleet stationed between Poland and Lithuania. Russia has often used military exercises — such as the massive Zapad military maneuvers with Belarus in September 2009 — to put pressure on Poland and the Baltic states.
But despite a tense relationship, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has launched something of a charm offensive on Warsaw, and particularly on Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who is seen as much more pragmatic than the anti-Russian President Lech Kaczynski. Putin made a highly symbolic gesture by being present at the September 2009 ceremonies in Gdansk marking the 70th anniversary of the German invasion of Poland. He also addressed the Polish people in a letter published by Polish daily Gazeta Wyborcza in which he condemned the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, a nonaggression treaty between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union. Putin has also made a point to smooth relations between Poland and Russia on the issue of the Katyn massacre of Polish officers by Soviet troops in World War II, inviting Tusk to attend the first ever Russian-organized ceremonies marking the event.
The charm offensive is intended to outmaneuver the knee-jerk anti-Russians among the Polish elites and to make sure that Poland does not create problems for Russia in its efforts to expand influence in its near abroad. It is similar to the charm offensives the Soviet Union used that intended to illustrate to the European left and center-left that the Kremlin’s intentions were benign and that the right-wing “obsessions” about the Kremlin were irrational.
Ultimately, Moscow’s strategy is to assure that Germany, France, Turkey and Poland stay out of — or actively support — Russia’s consolidation efforts in the former Soviet sphere. Russia does not need the four powers to be its allies — although it certainly is moving in that direction with Germany (and possibly France). Rather, it hopes to reach an understanding with them on where the Russian sphere ends, and establish a border that is compatible with Russian interests.
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Russia is perhaps racing against time- they have an exposed southern and eastern border. Maybe they want to secure the Europeon area with trade agreements that provide economic strength to handle the other threats? Maybe the eastern border has the largest threat, while the southren one is more problematic? That is China making a land/ resource grab, Vs. a Islamist Insurgency in the south.
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by Lauren Goodrich
This past week saw another key success in Russia’s resurgence in former Soviet territory when pro-Russian forces took control of Kyrgyzstan.
The Kyrgyz revolution was quick and intense. Within 24 hours, protests that had been simmering for months spun into countrywide riots as the president fled and a replacement government took control. The manner in which every piece necessary to exchange one government for another fell into place in such a short period discredits arguments that this was a spontaneous uprising of the people in response to unsatisfactory economic conditions. Instead, this revolution appears prearranged.
A Prearranged Revolution
Opposition forces in Kyrgyzstan have long held protests, especially since the Tulip Revolution in 2005 that brought recently ousted President Kurmanbek Bakiyev to power. But various opposition groupings never were capable of pulling off such a full revolution — until Russia became involved.
In the weeks before the revolution, select Kyrgyz opposition members visited Moscow to meet with Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. STRATFOR sources in Kyrgyzstan reported the pervasive, noticeable presence of Russia’s Federal Security Service on the ground during the crisis, and Moscow readied 150 elite Russian paratroopers the day after the revolution to fly into Russian bases in Kyrgyzstan. As the dust began to settle, Russia endorsed the still-coalescing government.
There are quite a few reasons why Russia would target a country nearly 600 miles from its borders (and nearly 1,900 miles from capital to capital), though Kyrgyzstan itself is not much of a prize. The country has no economy or strategic resources to speak of and is highly dependent on all its neighbors for foodstuffs and energy. But it does have a valuable geographic location.
Central Asia largely comprises a massive steppe of more than a million square miles, making the region easy to invade. The one major geographic feature other than the steppe are the Tien Shan mountains, a range that divides Central Asia from South Asia and China. Nestled within these mountains is the Fergana Valley, home to most of Central Asia’s population due to its arable land and the protection afforded by the mountains. The Fergana Valley is the core of Central Asia.
Click image to enlarge
To prevent this core from consolidating into the power center of the region, the Soviets sliced up the Fergana Valley between three countries. Uzbekistan holds the valley floor, Tajikistan the entrance to the valley and Kyrgyzstan the highlands surrounding the valley. Kyrgyzstan lacks the economically valuable parts of the valley, but it does benefit from encircling it. Control of Kyrgyzstan equals control of the valley, and hence of Central Asia’s core.
Moreover, the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek is only 120 miles from Kazakhstan’s largest city (and historic and economic capital), Almaty. The Kyrgyz location in the Tien Shan also gives Kyrgyzstan the ability to monitor Chinese moves in the region. And its highlands also overlook China’s Tarim Basin, part of the contentious Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
Given its strategic location, control of Kyrgyzstan offers the ability to pressure Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and China. Kyrgyzstan is thus a critical piece in Russia’s overall plan to resurge into its former Soviet sphere.
The Russian Resurgence
Russia’s resurgence is a function of its extreme geographic vulnerability. Russia lacks definable geographic barriers between it and other regional powers. The Russian core is the swath of land from Moscow down into the breadbasket of the Volga region. In medieval days, this area was known as Muscovy. It has no rivers, oceans or mountains demarcating its borders. Its only real domestic defenses are its inhospitable weather and dense forests. This led to a history of endless invasions, including depredations by everyone from Mongol hordes to Teutonic knights to the Nazis.
To counter this inherent indefensibility, Russia historically has adopted the principle of expansion. Russia thus has continually sought to expand far enough to anchor its power in a definable geographic barrier — like a mountain chain — or to expand far enough to create a buffer between itself and other regional powers. This objective of expansion has been the key to Russia’s national security and its ability to survive. Each Russian leader has understood this. Ivan the Terrible expanded southwest into the Ukrainian marshlands, Catherine the Great into the Central Asian steppe and the Tien Shan and the Soviet Union into much of Eastern and Central Europe.
Russia’s expansion has been in four strategic directions. The first is to the north and northeast to hold the protection offered by the Ural Mountains. This strategy is more of a “just-in-case” expansion. Thus, in the event Moscow should ever fall, Russia can take refuge in the Urals and prepare for a future resurgence. Stalin used this strategy in World War II when he relocated many of Russia’s industrial towns to Ural territory to protect them from the Nazi invasion.
The second is to the west toward the Carpathians and across the North European Plain. Holding the land up to the Carpathians — traditionally including Ukraine, Moldova and parts of Romania — creates an anchor in Europe with which to protect Russia from the southwest. Meanwhile, the North European Plain is the one of the most indefensible routes into Russia, offering Russia no buffer. Russia’s objective has been to penetrate as deep into the plain as possible, making the sheer distance needed to travel across it toward Russia a challenge for potential invaders.
The third direction is south to the Caucasus. This involves holding both the Greater and Lesser Caucasus mountain ranges, creating a tough geographic barrier between Russia and regional powers Turkey and Iran. It also means controlling Russia’s Muslim regions (like Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan), as well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The fourth is to the east and southeast into Siberia and Central Asia. The Tien Shan mountains are the only geographic barrier between the Russian core and Asia; the Central Asian steppe is, as its name implies, flat until it hits Kyrgyzstan’s mountains.
With the exception of the North European Plain, Russia’s expansion strategy focuses on the importance of mountains — the Carpathians, the Caucasus and Tien Shan — as geographic barriers. Holding the land up to these definable barriers is part of Russia’s greater strategy, without which Russia is vulnerable and weak.
The Russia of the Soviet era attained these goals. It held the lands up to these mountain barriers and controlled the North European Plain all the way to the West German border. But its hold on these anchors faltered with the fall of the Soviet Union. This collapse began when Moscow lost control over the fourteen other states of the Soviet Union. The Soviet disintegration did not guarantee, of course, that Russia would not re-emerge in another form. The West — and the United States in particular — thus saw the end of the Cold War as an opportunity to ensure that Russia would never re-emerge as the great Eurasian hegemon.
To do this, the United States began poaching among the states between Russia and its geographic barriers, taking them out of the Russian sphere in a process that ultimately would see Russian influence contained inside the borders of Russia proper. To this end, Washington sought to expand its influence in the countries surrounding Russia. This began with the expansion of the U.S. military club, NATO, into the Baltic states in 2004. This literally put the West on Russia’s doorstep (at their nearest point, the Baltics are less than 100 miles from St. Petersburg) on one of Russia’s weakest points on the North European Plain.
Washington next encouraged pro-American and pro-Western democratic movements in the former Soviet republics. These were the so-called “color revolutions,” which began in Georgia in 2003 and moved on to Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2005. This amputated Russia’s three mountain anchors.
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine proved a breaking point in U.S.-Russian relations, however. At that point, Moscow recognized that the United States was seeking to cripple Russia permanently. After Ukraine turned orange, Russia began to organize a response.
The Window of Opportunity
Russia received a golden opportunity to push back on U.S. influence in the former Soviet republics and redefine the region thanks to the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and the crisis with Iran. Its focus on the Islamic world has left Washington with a limited ability to continue picking away at the former Soviet space or to counter any Russian responses to Western influence. Moscow knows Washington won’t stay fixated on the Islamic world for much longer, which is why Russia has accelerated its efforts to reverse Western influence in the former Soviet sphere and guarantee Russian national security.
In the past few years, Russia has worked to roll back Western influence in the former Soviet sphere country by country. Moscow has scored a number of major successes in 2010. In January, Moscow signed a customs union agreement to economically reintegrate Russia with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Also in January, a pro-Russian government was elected in Ukraine. And now, a pro-Russian government has taken power in Kyrgyzstan.
The last of these countries is an important milestone for Moscow, given that Russia does not even border Kyrgyzstan. This indicates Moscow must be secure in its control of territory from the Russian core across the Central Asian Steppe.
As it seeks to roll back Western influence, Russia has tested a handful of tools in each of the former Soviet republics. These have included political pressure, social instability, economic weight, energy connections, security services and direct military intervention. Thus far, the pressure brought on by its energy connections — as seen in Ukraine and Lithuania — has proved most useful. Russia has used the cutoffs of supplies to hurt the countries and garner a reaction from Europe against these states. The use of direct military intervention — as seen in Georgia — also has proved successful, with Russia now holding a third of that country’s land. Political pressure in Belarus and Kazakhstan has pushed the countries into signing the aforementioned customs union. And now with Kyrgyzstan, Russia has proved willing to take a page from the U.S. playbook and spark a revolution along the lines of the pro-Western color revolutions. Russian strategy has been tailor-made for each country, taking into account their differences to put them into Moscow’s pocket — or at least make them more pragmatic toward Russia.
Thus far, Russia has nearly returned to its mountain anchors on each side, though it has yet to sew up the North European Plain. And this leaves a much stronger Russia for the United States to contend with when Washington does return its gaze to Eurasia.
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Some inconvenient truths in here , , ,
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Russia: The ICJ's Kosovo Opinion
July 19, 2010 | 2100 GMT
VALERIE KUYPERS/AFP/Getty Images
International Court of Justice President Hisashi Owada (C) opens the Dec. 9, 2009, hearing on Kosovo’s secession from SerbiaSummary
The U.N. International Court of Justice is set to present its opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia. While Russia is publicly siding with the Serbs against Kosovo’s independence, Moscow stands to gain — at least rhetorically — no matter how the court rules.
Analysis
At 3 p.m. local time July 22 in The Hague, the U.N. International Court of Justice (ICJ) will present its advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s February 2008 unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) from Serbia. The opinion will not be legally binding — it is an advisory opinion requested by the U.N. General Assembly at the behest of Belgrade — but will in essence determine whether, according to international law, Kosovo’s declaration of independence was legal.
Regardless of the ICJ opinion, the circumstances surrounding Kosovo’s UDI remain unchanged. Kosovo is still a de facto Western protectorate with explicit security guarantees from NATO, and Serbia has neither the military capacity to change the status quo nor the desire to try to do so, in light of its efforts to become an EU member state.
Russia, Serbia’s main ally on the Kosovo matter, has stated that it hopes the ICJ ruling will force new talks between Serbs and Kosovars. Vitaly Churkin, Russia’s ambassador to the United Nations, said July 15 that Russia continues to oppose Kosovo’s independence and supports Belgrade’s position that Kosovo is a sovereign part of Serbia. But Moscow stands to benefit no matter the outcome of the ICJ deliberations.
The Intertwined Crisis of Kosovo and Georgia
Kosovo’s UDI came 9 years after NATO’s 1999 war against what was then known as Yugoslavia forced Belgrade to relinquish its physical control over the province. The stated reasons for NATO’s military campaign in 1999 were atrocities committed by Yugoslav military and paramilitary forces against the Albanian population of Kosovo. Serbia had waged a number of military conflicts throughout the 1990s, the purpose of which were to expand Belgrade’s influence in the Balkans. Thus, the West wanted to eliminate Serbia — and its leader, Slobodan Milosevic — as a regional threat and rival.
(click here to enlarge image)
But the underlying geopolitical context was also NATO’s evolution from a regional security grouping with no mandate to act outside of its membership’s immediate defense to an organization with a mandate to keep order in Europe, and, eventually, beyond. NATO took action in Kosovo without U.N. Security Council (UNSC) approval and despite strong Russian and Chinese opposition. The precedent was set for the U.S. and its allies to act without addressing the interests of other fellow UNSC permanent members (as the U.S. would later repeat in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion).
For Russia, NATO’s actions in Kosovo were untenable. Since Russia is not part of NATO — in fact, the alliance had been created to defend Europe against Soviet invasion — Moscow realized that Kosovo established an extraordinary precedent. NATO determined that an intervention was necessary in a matter of European security, intervened militarily and then resolved the post-conflict environment according to its interests. It did so against a stated Moscow ally, with dubious evidence and reasoning. The West did not stop there either; Kosovo was followed by NATO expansion into the former Soviet sphere in Eastern Europe and the defeat of a pro-Kremlin Ukrainian government.
In this context, the 2008 Kosovo UDI was just another in a line of decisions on European security taken by the West in which Moscow’s protests were ignored. Russia, therefore, formulated a response to the West.
On Feb. 15, 2008, two days before the Kosovo UDI, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with the presidents of Georgian breakaway republics South Ossetia and Abkhazia. After the meeting, the Russian foreign ministry released a statement stating, “The declaration of sovereignty by Kosovo and its recognition will doubtlessly be taken into account in [Russia’s] relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia.” The West did not heed the warning, doubting Russia’s resolve to respond, and Russia used supposed Georgian atrocities against South Ossetians in August 2008 to parallel the West’s actions against Serbia and justify a military intervention that led to Moscow-supported independence for the two breakaway republics.
Russia and the ICJ Opinion
Moscow now stands to benefit, at least rhetorically, no matter what opinion the ICJ supports. A ruling that the UDI was legal also legitimizes Russia’s support for the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. While the West has made the legal argument that the Kosovo case is unique and sets no precedent, the non-Western opinion on the matter (with very few exceptions) is that it does. In theory, it also opens the possibility that more countries will recognize the two republics, as Moscow would have a case that Kosovo and the two Georgian territories are not different.
However, Moscow does not need South Ossetia and Abkhazia to gain international recognition for its control of the two provinces to pay dividends. Moscow already controls the two provinces economically, politically and militarily and can use them to pressure Georgia — still a U.S. ally — if need be. Therefore, if the ICJ rules that the UDI was illegal, Moscow will not fret much about the legal implications. Instead, it will be able to show that its support for Belgrade has, from the beginning, been justified and that the West, led by the United States, broke international law by encouraging Kosovo to declare independence unilaterally and without recourse to the UNSC. Moscow will use the ICJ opinion in that case to show that it has been a supporter of international law and sanctity of sovereignty.
Kosovo was a redline issue for Moscow in 2008 because it set a precedent that allowed the West to intervene militarily and redraw European borders without asking Russia for its opinion. Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia was the response Moscow used to counter the West’s perceived belligerence. The ICJ opinion, whichever way it goes, will be an added boon for Moscow.
Read more: Russia: The ICJ's Kosovo Opinion | STRATFOR
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Russia and its Foreign Policy Dance
The Kremlin announced Wednesday that Russian President Dmitri Medvedev is going to visit the Palestinian territories in a few weeks, just as Medvedev’s trip to Israel has been canceled. Medvedev had planned to go to Israel on Jan. 17-19, but his trip was postponed due to a strike at the Israeli Foreign Ministry. While this may just seem like a logistical and technical issue, there is a shifting Russian foreign policy strategy, giving Moscow freer capability to act against the Israelis and increase support for the Palestinians.
Russia and Israel have had ongoing tense and complex relations. After a post-World War II alliance in the late 1940s, Soviet-era Moscow was a patron of Israel’s enemies — Egypt and Syria. At the time, this was not really about Russia siding against Israel as much as it was about pressuring the United States’ interests in the Middle East.
After the Cold War, Israeli and Russian relations were tolerable. Moscow had to pull its support from the Middle East as its empire crumbled and it fought to keep the Russian state together. All this changed in the past decade when Russia began to consolidate, and announced that Russia was on its way back and would soon return as a major player on the international stage.
During this time, Moscow accused Israel of meddling in Russia’s interests by financially and politically backing the anti-Kremlin oligarchs, and militarily supporting Georgia and Russian Muslim republics of Dagestan and Chechnya. Since then, it has been a tit-for-tat between Russia and Israel with Moscow countering those Israeli moves by supporting Iran and Syria in recent years.
“…Russia is working with all players in the region — keeping everyone dizzy and guessing what it will do next.”
This was part of Russia’s overall foreign policy at the time to unilaterally retaliate for moves made against its interests. One of the larger examples of this was the West’s recognition of an independent Kosovo, followed by Russia’s recognition of independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia — after its war with Georgia. But Russia’s resurgence has now entered a new stage, in which Moscow feels comfortable in its sphere of influence. Naturally, Moscow is still mindful of foreign moves in its surrounding regions, but is confident such moves do not threaten its overall control in the region. Moscow is not only secure enough in its power over Georgia that the issue isn’t a red line in Russian-Israeli relations; Moscow retains options for escalation in Israel’s neighborhood that can deter Israeli actions in Georgia.
This new shift has allowed Russia to be able to play more ambiguously than unilaterally in all its foreign policy issues. With Russia in a comfortable status, it feels it can make bolder moves outside of Eurasia. Such alterations have been seen in Russia’s policies in the Middle East, where Moscow has been striking military deals with anyone it can — Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Israel.
This time, increased Russian activity around the world could go beyond theatrics and translate into further support for the Palestinians. There are rumors that Russia is considering actually recognizing an independent Palestinian state. There has already been a change in some weightier countries, like Brazil, supporting Palestine. The Russians could be the next in line. The difference is the Russians have a history of not just diplomatically supporting the Palestinians, but through military, financial and intelligence support.
Moscow’s motivations behind supporting the Palestinians at this time are not clear, since it has been making so many deals with so many countries in the region. Russia could be attempting to make a show against one of Washington’s closest allies — Israel — and the timing of the cancellation of Medvedev’s trip to Israel is suspicious. Russia could be choosing to make this move because of increased discussion of Palestinian support in the European Union — and Russia is looking for agenda issues in which to align. Russia could be in coordination with Brazil, as both countries are strangely side-by-side on myriad foreign policy issues. Additionally, it could be Russia simply wanting to make a global statement that it isn’t worried about repercussions for taking sides on such a controversial issue.
Even if Moscow’s reasoning or endgame is unknown at this time, it’s plain that Russia is working with all players in the region — keeping everyone dizzy and guessing what it will do next.
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Russia Rises Amid Geopolitical Events
The first three months of 2011 have had a steady flow of geopolitically relevant events. A youth named Mohamed Bouazizi, protesting corruption and government harassment in Tunisia, set more than himself alight on Dec. 17: He set an entire region on fire. Soon after, Tunisia and Egypt saw their long-time rulers fall. Libya essentially descended into civil war, and exit is uncertain. On Monday, almost exactly three months after Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the Saudi-led Gulf Cooperation Council’s forces entered the tiny island nation of Bahrain to prevent Iran from exploiting the anti-government protests there. The region’s unrest continues with almost daily action in North Africa and the Middle East. Around the globe, the March 11 Japan Tohoku earthquake rocked the world’s third largest economy and has caused the most serious nuclear accident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster.
Among all this global consternation, Russia is the one power that has the luxury to take stock of it all in relative comfort. Russia has no reason to fear Middle East-style revolutionary activity. Its leadership is genuinely popular at home and safe from populist uprisings, at least for the time being. Russia is not embroiled in any war in the Middle East — unlike the United States, which is involved in two wars and trying hard to avoid a third one in Libya. Russia fears no migration exodus of North African refugees on its borders, as do the Europeans. Even the nuclear accident in Japan seems to be without negative effect for Russia, as the prevailing winds are blowing the radiation toward the Pacific Ocean and away from Russia’s eastern city of Vladivostok.
“Among all this global consternation, Russia is the one power that has the luxury to take stock of it all in relative comfort.”
In fact, Russia may be the one country that stands to gain from the various calamities in 2011. First, the general unrest in the Middle East has increased the price of oil by 18.5 percent. As the second largest oil exporter — and one not bound by OPEC production quotas — the increase in price goes directly into the Kremlin’s swelling coffers and is a welcome addition after the severe economic recession in 2009. Second, the Libyan unrest has cut off the 11 billion cubic-meter natural gas (bcm) Greenstream pipeline to Italy, causing Europe’s third largest consumer of natural gas to turn to Russia to make up the difference. Similarly, Japan’s nuclear imbroglio has forced Tokyo to turn to Russian emergency shipments of liquefied natural gas (LNG) to fuel its natural gas-burning power plants.
But the most beneficial of all events for Russia may be the psychological effect that the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant crisis is having on Western Europe. Germany’s government announced on Tuesday that it would close seven nuclear reactors during a three-month period, reassessing the future of Germany’s nuclear power industry. A looming Italian referendum on the government’s decision to unfreeze nuclear reactor construction now seems all but guaranteed to fail. Criticism of nuclear power has swept throughout the Continent with the European Union energy ministers deciding on Tuesday to subject the bloc’s nuclear reactors to a number of stress tests.
Europe’s hydropower capabilities are at capacity, while coal-burning power plants are perceived as incompatible with the bloc’s drive to reduce greenhouse emissions. The only alternatives left are renewable energy, which is slowly inching up in terms of overall electricity generation; nuclear power; and natural gas, which is seen as the much cleaner fossil fuel option to coal and oil. With fears about nuclear power returning to the Continent, it seems natural gas will be favored to fill the gap until renewable energy can become a larger part of the electricity generating mix.
As the world’s number one exporter of natural gas — and with the world’s largest reserves — this is very welcome news for the Kremlin. But for Russia, natural gas exports are about a lot more than just added revenue. For Russia, the natural gas exports are about control and political influence. Luring Western Europe toward greater energy dependency on Russia is ultimately about wrestling the region away from its post-WWII alliance with the United States. As the Middle East and North Africa continue to wrestle with unrest — again reminding Europe of the region’s political uncertainty and fallibility as an energy exporter — and as Europe’s populations are reminded of their fears of nuclear power, Moscow is taking stock of it all.
But Moscow is also interested in how the crises around the world are politically beneficial outside of the energy realm. First, the devastation in Japan has allowed Moscow and Tokyo to have a rare conversation about cooperation after years (if not more) of declining relations over an island dispute. Russia is magnanimously trying to show that it isn’t such a bad neighbor to have, and is sending some of the larger amounts of aid, energy and rescue assistance.
The crises could also give Russia something it holds very precious — time. One of the reasons Russia grew so strong over the past decade is that its rival, the United States, was focused elsewhere. Moscow has been growing nervous in the past year knowing that Washington is starting to wrap up its commitments in the Middle East and South Asia. There is a discussion now rumbling through the Kremlin whether the events in the Middle East may keep the United States focused there a while longer, giving Russia even more time to cement its nearly dominant position in Eurasia. Thus far, the Kremlin must be satisfied with what the first three months of 2011 have brought in terms of its own strategic interests.
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"Stratfor: Russia's Great Power Strategy"
- Imagine if AMERICA had a great power strategy...
"Russia may be the one country that stands to gain from the various calamities in 2011. First, the general unrest in the Middle East has increased the price of oil by 18.5 percent. As the second largest oil exporter..."
- If the US strove to be the world's number one in oil (and natural gas) from now until the end of the brief fossil fuel era, a number of things would happen, energy prices would drop and stabilize, America's standard of living would actually increase, employment would improve, the global economy would improve, poverty would decline, reliance on Saudi would decrease, Russia would drop to 3rd and have to increase production to a fall in revenues and experience a decrease in 'power' over its trading partners and bullied neighbors. Who would want any of that?
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A re-emerging Russia is restoring its global influence without taking on the burden of an empire. In the second of his series on global pressure points, STRATFOR CEO Dr. George Friedman applauds Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s achievements and examines the Russian-U.S. relationship.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Colin: Ronald Reagan used to call the Soviet Union, as it then was, “the evil empire.” Today, modern Russia presents differently. No longer an empire of course, but a huge country regaining a powerful influence.
Welcome to Agenda with George Friedman. George, last year the premiership of Vladimir Putin was characterized by various attempts — some effective, some less so —to claw back under Russia’s influence, some parts of the old Soviet empire.
George: Let’s begin by trying to explain what it was that Putin in particular created. What he recognized was the problem of the Soviet empire, the problem with the czarist empire, was that they totally controlled surrounding territories. As such, they benefited from them, but they were responsible for them as well, and so that wealth was transferred into them to maintain them, to sustain the regimes, and so on and so forth. Putin came up with a new structure in which he had limited desires from countries like Ukraine. These were irreducible, that is to say, they could not be part of NATO, could not have hostile forces there, they had to cooperate on a bunch of issues. But Russia was not responsible for their future, and it was really a brilliant maneuver because it gave them the benefit of the Russian empire, of the Soviet Union, without the responsibilities, without the drain on the Russian treasury.
And what he has created in Ukraine, in Kazakhstan, in Belarus, is sovereignty for these nations and yet alignment with Russia. And this has made Russia a very powerful player because its house is in order at the same time that, for example, as the European house is in massive disorder. And a country like Germany, for example, living in a very disorderly house now, begins to question whether or not that’s the house it wants to live in, and given the dependence they have on Russian natural gas, given the opportunities they have for investment and technology transfer in Russia, when they look at their relationship with Greece, for example, and they look at the opportunities available within the Russian sphere, they’re attracted to it. But what you’ve really seen the Russians do is a brilliant re-thinking of what it means to have an empire: how to get rid of the liabilities, maintain the benefits and then from a position of strength, deal with countries like Germany and the United States.
Colin: So, STRATFOR was perhaps a little unkind in its forecast for 2011 when it said that Russia would play a double game, ensuring it can reap benefits from having warm relations with countries, such as investment and economic ties, while keeping the pressure up on them. It’s been a clever game, hasn’t it?
George: Well, a double game is a clever game, particularly when no one realizes you’re playing a double game. I have to say that I don’t regard duplicity among nations as a critique of nations, it’s the lifeblood of international affairs. The Russians have said many things in many ways. Right now, they have moved out of the period of confrontation. Until really the Georgian invasion, which thoroughly startled the region and shocked Washington that Moscow would act in such a way, they have been very busy trying to reassert the level of control that they want, to reassert their rights in their sphere of influence and to confront the West. They’ve become much more accommodating because they’ve achieved, within the former Soviet Union, the goals they wanted to achieve by and large. They have become more than just first among equals, they have become the dominant political force in the region, worrying about countries like Tajikistan, worrying about Kyrgyzstan. This has been a transformation and so now they don’t have to be confrontational. Now they’re operating from a position of strength and therefore they don’t have to assert their strength. Now they’re being courted by the Americans, they’re being courted by the Germans and this is the position that Putin wanted to get them into, and he did.
Colin: Now the next president — Putin seems very much in charge and probably wouldn’t bother too much about regaining the presidency this time around anyway.
George: Well, we just spoke about duplicity and double games and I suspect that Medvedev and Putin are playing a double game. I’ve never doubted for a moment that Putin was in charge. He’s the man who masterminded it. But I will also say this: had Putin been hit by a car in 2000, another Putin would have emerged. The direction in which Putin took Russia, rebuilding the security apparatus to control the state, rebuilding the state to control Russia, rebuilding Russia to dominate the former Soviet Union — this was a natural course for any Russian president to follow. This Russian empire, the Soviet Union, were not accidents of history. They didn’t just happen. They were structures that grew naturally from the underlying economic and political relationships.
So as much as I admire Putin for doing what is necessary, I don’t think that Putin as an individual defined what was going to happen. And I don’t think that if Medvedev comes to power, and the White House may like Medvedev more than they like Putin, I don’t think it will change very much. Russia is far too vast to simply be the whim of a given personality. In my view even Stalin represented the vast czarist and Leninist tradition, to an extreme perhaps, but still the idea of the personalization of rule.
Colin: Do we think that relations between the United States and Russia are trending better and if so, is this likely to continue?
George: The media tends to think of better and worse relations — I don’t think of that. Russia has its interests; the United States has its interests. There are times when these interests coincide; there are times when these interests diverge. There are times when one country or the other is too preoccupied with other things to be worried about the other. At the moment, the truth of the matter is that the United States remains deeply concerned with Iraq and Afghanistan and the uprising in the Arab world. The United States doesn’t have that much time to worry about Russia and so you can say that relations have become better. But you can equally say that when they come worse, it’s not so much that a decision was made to make them worse, it’s just natural tensions arising.
Colin: George, thank you. And in next week’s Agenda, George will look at China.
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Good analysis IMO. I see that I already wrote my reaction to it from the last Strat on Russia: America artificially drives up the power and influence of Putin and Russia with our own declinist policies of refusing to produce sufficient energy.
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The Next Stage of Russia's Resurgence: Introduction
February 7, 2012
Stratfor has long followed and chronicled Russia's resurgence, which has included bolder foreign policy moves and resuming the role of regional power. In particular, Moscow has focused its energy in its former Soviet periphery: the Eastern European states of Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova; the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania; the Caucasus states of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan; and the Central Asian states of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
In recent years, Russia has increased its influence in many of these states politically, economically, militarily and in the area of security, with the most obvious sign of its return to power coming in the August 2008 war with Georgia. Now, Moscow is preparing for the next stage of its resurgence. This new phase will include the institutionalization of Russia's position as the regional hub, but will also include the use of more subtle levers and influence in areas Moscow wants to bring into its fold -- though not all of these efforts will go unchallenged.
The Geopolitics of the Russian Resurgence
In many ways, Russia's geopolitical strength is derived from its inherent geographic weaknesses. There are few natural barriers protecting Russia's core, and this has required Russia to expand into and consolidate territories around its core to acquire buffers from external powers. With the Arctic Ocean serving as the only natural barrier for Russia to the north, this expansion historically has required Russia to push to the west toward Europe (consolidating Eastern Europe and the Baltics), to the south toward the Islamic world (consolidating the Caucasus), and to the east toward Asia (consolidating Central Asia and Siberia). As Russia absorbed peoples and resources, it grew from a small Eastern European principality in the 13th century to the Grand Duchy of Moscow, which became the Russian Empire and then grew to become the Soviet Union, one of the largest contiguous states in history.
However, this expansion created two fundamental problems for any Russian state: It brought Moscow into conflict with numerous external powers and gave it the difficult task of ruling over conquered peoples (who were not necessarily happy to be ruled by Russia). Russia's geography requires it to expand to stay strong, but paradoxically, the more Russia pushes outward the more difficult and costly it becomes to rule its immense territory. Meanwhile, Russia's lack of access to the wider oceans has cemented its position as a land power but doomed it economically and weakened its position compared to other powers that have ready access to the world's oceans. Such factors have created a cycle in which Russia's power rises and collapses. When Russia is on the rise, it becomes a major regional if not global player, and when it falls it is only a matter of time before it rises again.
So when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 at the end of the Cold War and Moscow lost control of its constituent republics and fell into internal chaos, those circumstances did not guarantee that Russia was permanently removed from the international scene and that a unipolar world dominated by the United States would last forever. Certainly by the end of the 1990s, Russia was severely weakened as a geopolitical power; its economy was in chaos and it faced a military defeat in Chechnya, which gained de facto independence and threatened to spur similar movements within Russia proper.
But things began to change with the beginning of the new millennium. Starting with Vladimir Putin's presidency in 2000, Russia was able to reverse its losses in another more successful war in Chechnya, and Russia's position in its former Soviet periphery began to rise steadily. Numerous factors play into this, including the internal consolidation led by Putin to overcome the chaos of the 1990s, high global energy prices and the U.S. involvement in the Islamic world. In the past few years, most of the pro-Western color revolutions that swept the former Soviet Union in the early 2000s have been reversed. Russia has increased its military footprint in many of these states and is in the process of creating economic institutions to match (most notably its customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan that is set to become the Eurasian Union). In short, Russia has returned to its traditional status of legitimate regional power, and its influence is increasing in its historic geographic buffer zones, which are currently made up of more than a dozen independent states.
Gauging Russia's Resurgence and Looking Ahead
In the context of its resurgence, Russia's broad imperative has been to prevent foreign influence while building and ingraining its own. Of course, Russia's plans for carrying out this imperative differ in each sub-region of the former Soviet Union -- Eastern Europe, the Baltics, the Caucasus and Central Asia -- and in each state.
Russia's resurgence has not been seamless. Since gaining independence, each former Soviet state has developed its own imperatives: consolidating power internally and maintaining some sort of sovereignty. Also, different external powers are competing with Russia for influence in each former Soviet country. Therefore, the imperatives of Russia and the other former Soviet states often clash, which sometimes leads to dynamic and occasionally volatile relations, even with some of Moscow's most loyal allies.
But power is a relative concept, and right now most former Soviet states are too weak to independently stand up to Russia and most external powers cannot match the strength Russia wields in its periphery. And with Putin set to return to the presidency and begin a new chapter for the Russian state, it is important to gauge the progress Moscow has made in its resurgence in the former Soviet Union and what this projection of Russian power will mean in the future.
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Summary
STR/AFP/GettyImages
A Collective Security Treaty Organization summit in Moscow on May 15
Russia is expanding its efforts to solidify and institutionalize its influence in the former Soviet states that are most politically aligned with Moscow. On Dec. 4, Russian military chief Col. Gen. Valery Gerasimov said that the Collective Security Treaty Organization military alliance has plans to construct an integrated air and missile defense system among security bloc members. His announcement came a day after Kyrgyz Economy Minister Temir Sariev said that Kyrgyzstan would join the Moscow-led Customs Union in 2014.
Increasing economic and security integration with these countries will be key to Russia's goal of forming a Eurasian Union by 2015 and, more important, bolstering the country's presence in its periphery as its regional neighborhood evolves and becomes more unpredictable.
Analysis
The Collective Security Treaty Organization and Customs Union have been important institutions for gauging Russian power since Moscow re-emerged as a formidable regional player in the mid-2000s. The military alliance -- which has consisted of Russia, Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and, until recently, Uzbekistan -- is responsible for security integration and cooperation, while the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan deals with economic integration.
The military alliance saw substantial activity in the late 2000s, when it began to hold more frequent training exercises and expanded its size and scope to include the military alliance's Rapid Reaction Force. In 2010, Russia established the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan with the aim of gradually phasing out customs duties and increasing trade among member states. In November 2011, Russia announced that it would seek to form the Eurasian Union by 2015, which would essentially merge the security and economic blocs and possibly expand membership in the unified organization to other states.
However, challenges and setbacks faced by each bloc in recent years have impeded the formation of the Eurasian Union. According to its charter, the Collective Security Treaty Organization could have deployed peacekeepers to defend the security of its member states on several occasions, including the ethnic violence between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2011 and the instability in the Gorno-Badakhshan region of Tajikistan in 2012. But Russia opted against intervention in such cases, raising questions about the intent and capabilities of the bloc. Moreover, Uzbekistan suspended its membership in the security alliance in June and officially left soon thereafter over what it says was politicization of the group by Russia. This dealt a blow to the bloc's image and caused concern in Moscow that Tashkent might be considering strengthening security ties with other powers, including some in the West.
The Customs Union has also produced mixed results. While trade among Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan has grown since the union was established, it is behind schedule in phasing out some duties, and disagreements persist regarding what to do about existing duties on energy and certain key goods, particularly between Russia and Belarus. The anticipated expansion of the Customs Union to include countries such as Ukraine also has not materialized, despite Russia's persistent attempts to convince Kiev to join. Kyrgyzstan had officially expressed interest in joining the Customs Union, but the time frame for its accession was until recently unclear.
In addition to the operational challenges each bloc has experienced, Russia's attempts to expand the Customs Union and Collective Security Treaty Organization into other former Soviet states have also run into problems. Regional divisions have been so rife that Uzbekistan -- long the region's most independent-minded country -- decided to act out against Russia's integration plans and leave the bloc. Ukraine, another country with which Russia is trying to integrate economically, was alarmed by Moscow's attempt to take control of Ukrainian state energy firm Naftogaz, and Kiev has consequently grown resistant to joining the Customs Union.
In this context, the announcements about the joint anti-aircraft/anti-missile shield and Kyrgyzstan's Customs Union timetable are notable. Russia appears to be shifting its focus from expanding the membership of these blocs to cementing its ties with the existing members that have proven most willing to work with Moscow. With 2015 approaching rapidly, Russia wants to make sure it is as integrated as possible with these states in both the economic and security realms. In addition, Russia's push for an integrated air and missile defense system is intended to send a message to NATO and the United States, which are trying to secure partners for NATO's Central European missile defense system over Russia's objections.
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Member states in each bloc are the most obvious candidates for the Eurasian Union. Kyrgyzstan's membership in the Customs Union in 2014 would open the door for Tajikistan shortly thereafter. The only outlier would be Armenia -- a complicated case given that the country does not share a border with Russia or any other Customs Union member. However, this is more of a technical question, since Armenia's economy is already dominated by Russia and the country is closely aligned with Moscow on security and military matters, even hosting 5,000 Russian troops.
This is not to say that Russia is content with its institutionalized influence being limited to these countries. Indeed, Moscow has officially laid out an ambitious agenda for its Eurasian Union. However, due to the changing regional dynamics surrounding many of these member states -- such as China's increased economic presence and influence in Central Asia and Europe's efforts to diversify its energy sources away from Russian energy -- it has become imperative for Moscow to try to lock down these states now.
Even these countries occasionally pose challenges for Russia -- a consequence of internal instability in some cases and bilateral disputes with Moscow in others. But Russia knows that without a solid foundation for economic and security collaboration with countries already in the Customs Union or the military alliance, attracting other regional powers would become even more difficult.
Read more: Russia Moves to Reinforce its Alliances | Stratfor
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Editor's note: This is part one of a four-part series that examines Russia's efforts to exert influence beyond its borders.
Summary
As Russia seeks to expand its influence outside its borders, it has identified four countries that are crucial to its plan to become a major power again. Of those four countries -- Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Georgia -- the first three are already under Russian control. The last one, Georgia, will be the center of Russia's very focused attention until it too is back in the Russian fold.
Analysis
Russia has been working on consolidating its affairs at home and re-establishing the former Soviet sphere for many years now and has recently made solid progress toward pulling the most critical countries back into its fold. For Russia, this consolidation of control is not about expansionism or imperial designs; it is about national security and the survival of the geographically vulnerable Russian heartland, which has no natural features protecting it.
Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, most of Russia's buffer (made up mainly of former Soviet states) fell under pro-Western influence and drifted away from Moscow. But the past few years have seen a shift in global dynamics in which much of the West -- particularly the United States -- has been preoccupied by events in the Middle East and Afghanistan, leaving little time and energy to devote to increasing its influence in the former Soviet sphere. Russia has used this time to begin rolling back such influence. But Moscow knows that this opportunity will not last forever, so it has prioritized the countries involved. This essentially has created four tiers: countries Russia has to consolidate, countries it wants to consolidate, countries it can consolidate but are not high priority and regional powers with which Russia must create an understanding about the new reality in Eurasia.
The countries in the first category -- Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Georgia -- are the most critical to Moscow's overall plan to return as a Eurasian power. For Russia, these countries became a major focus even before the Kremlin was done consolidating power at home. These countries give Russia access to the Black and Caspian seas and serve as a buffer between Russia and Asia, Europe and the Islamic world. So far, Russia has consolidated its influence in three of the four countries; Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine all have pro-Russian leaders, and the last country -- Georgia -- is partially occupied by Russia. Solidifying plans for these countries will be Moscow's main focus in 2010.
Ukraine
Ukraine is the cornerstone to Russia's defense and survival as any sort of power. The former Soviet state hosts the largest Russian community in the world outside of Russia, and is tightly integrated into Russia's industrial and agricultural heartland. Ukraine is the transit point for 80 percent of the natural gas shipped from Russia to Europe and is the connection point for most infrastructure -- whether pipeline, road, power or rail -- running between Russia and the West.
Ukraine gives Russia the ability to project political, military and economic power into Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Ukrainian territory also pushes deep into Russia's sphere, with only a mere 300 miles from Ukraine to either Volgograd or Moscow. To put it simply, without Ukraine, Russia would have fewer ways to become a regional power and would have trouble maintaining stability within itself. This is why Ukraine's pro-Western 2004 Orange Revolution was a nightmare for Russia. The change in government in Kiev during the revolution brought a president that was hostile to Russian interests, and with him a slew of possibilities that would harm Russia, including Ukraine's integration into the European Union or even NATO.
Russia's Levers
After 2004, Russia was content to merely meddle in and destabilize Ukraine in order to ensure it never fully fell into the West's orbit. However, the West's distraction outside of Eurasia has given Russia a limited amount of time to decisively break Ukraine's pro-Western ties. Ukraine is one of the countries where Russia has the most leverage to increase its influence.
■Population: Russia's greatest tool inside of Ukraine is that the population is split dramatically, and half the population has pro-Russian leanings. A large Russian minority comprises about 17 percent of the total population, more than 30 percent of all Ukrainians speak Russian as a native language, and more than half of the country belongs to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church under the Moscow patriarch. Ukrainians living east of the Dnieper River tend to identify more with Russia than the West, and most of those in the Crimean peninsula consider themselves Russian. This divide is something Russia has used not only to keep the country unstable, but to turn the country back toward the Russian fold.
■Politics: Russia has been the very public sponsor of a pro-Russian political movement in Ukraine mainly under newly elected President Viktor Yanukovich and his Party of Regions. But Russia has also supported a slew of other political movements, including outgoing Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko and her eponymous party. According to polls, Ukraine's only outwardly pro-Western political party -- that of outgoing President Viktor Yushchenko -- has support in the single digits.
■Energy: Russia currently supplies 80 percent of Ukraine's natural gas, and 2-3 percent of Ukraine's gross domestic product (GDP) comes from transiting natural gas from Russia to the West. This has been one of Moscow's favorite levers to use against Kiev; it has not shied away from turning off natural gas supplies at the height of winter. Such moves have created chaos in Ukraine's relations with both Russia and Europe, forcing Kiev to negotiate on everyone else's terms.
■Economics: Russia controls quite a bit of Ukraine's strategic sectors other than energy. Most important, Russia controls a large portion of Ukraine's metal industry, owning factories across the eastern part of the country while influencing many Ukrainian steel barons. The steel industry makes up about 40 percent of Ukrainian exports and 30 percent of its GDP. Russia also owns a substantial portion of Ukrainian ports in the south.
■Oligarchs: Ukraine's oligarchs are much like Russia's in the 1990s in that they wield enormous power and wealth. Quite a few of these oligarchs pledge allegiance to Russia based on relationships left over from the Soviet era. These oligarchs allow the Kremlin to shape their business ventures and have a say in how the oligarchs influence Ukrainian politics. The most influential of this class is Ukraine's richest man, Rinat Akhmetov, who not only does the Kremlin's bidding inside Ukraine, but also has aided the Kremlin during the recent financial crisis. Other notable pro-Russian Ukrainian oligarchs include Viktor Pinchuk, Igor Kolomoisky, Sergei Taruta and Dmitri Firtash.
■Military: One of Russia's most important military bases is in Ukraine, at the Black Sea port of Sevastopol -- the Russian military's only deep-water port. Russia's Black Sea naval fleet in Crimea is many times larger than Kiev's small fleet. The Russian Black Sea Fleet also contributes to the majority of Crimea's regional economy -- something that keeps this region loyal to Russia.
■Intelligence: Ukraine's intelligence services are still heavily influenced by Russia; not only did they originate from Moscow's KGB and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), but most of the officials were trained by the Russian services. The descendant of the KGB, Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), has a heavy presence within Ukraine's intelligence agencies, making the organization a major tool for Russia's interests.
■Organized crime: Russian and Ukrainian organized crime have a deep connection that has lasted more than a century. Russia has been especially successful in Ukraine's illegal natural gas deals, arms trade, drug and human trafficking, and other illicit business.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
The tide of Western influence in Ukraine was officially reversed in early 2010, when Ukraine's presidential elections brought the return of a pro-Russian government to Kiev. Furthermore, all the top candidates in the election were pro-Russian or at least had accommodating attitudes toward Russia. This was not Russia taking hold of Ukraine via some revolution or by force, but the Ukrainian people choosing a pro-Russian government, with the majority of independent and European observers calling the election free and fair. Ukraine chose to return to Russia, proving that all the levers Moscow used to influence the country were effective.
Russia still has work to do, in that half of Ukraine still believes the country can still be tied to the West. Also, Ukraine's inherent instability -- mainly due to its demographic split -- can make controlling Kiev problematic. Furthermore, the West's ties to Ukraine grew stronger after the Orange Revolution. The West has infiltrated Ukraine's banking, agricultural, transportation and energy sectors. Russia may have had solid success in Ukraine recently, but it will have to keep focusing on the critical state to keep Western influence from pulling Kiev away from Moscow again.
Belarus
Belarus is the former Soviet state that has stayed closest to Russia. The Belarusian identity has strong ties to Russia; most Belarusians are Russian Orthodox, and Russian is one of the country's official languages (the other being Belarusian). Belarus, along with Ukraine, links Russia to Europe, and the distance between Minsk and Moscow is merely 400 miles. Belarus lies in one of Russia's most vulnerable areas, in that it is on the North European Plain -- the main invasion route from the west, used by both the Nazis in World War II and by Napoleon in 1812.
Belarus is different from the other former Soviet states in that it did not flirt too much with the West after the fall of the Soviet Union, creating a Commonwealth of Russia and Belarus in 1996 -- an alliance that transformed into the present-day vague partnership of the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Belarus rushed to strengthen ties with Russia because Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko believed that if the two countries integrated, he would naturally become vice president -- and next in line for the Russian presidency.
Instead, Russia used Lukashenko's ambition to keep Belarus tied to Russia without providing any real integration between the countries. Russia and Belarus have independent governments, militaries, foreign policies, economies (for the most part) and national symbols. Belarus has never been reintegrated into Russia because Russian Prime Minister (and former President) Vladimir Putin, like most Russians, believes Belarusians to be naturally inferior. Moreover, Putin openly loathes Lukashenko on a personal level.
But this does not mean that Russia does not want to secure Belarus as a buffer between it and the European Union, or risk allowing Belarus to become seduced by the West. Russia simply wants Minsk to know that in any formal alliance between the countries, Belarus will not be an equal partner.
Russia's Levers
■Population: Belarus' demographic makeup is Russia's greatest lever. Russians make up roughly 11 percent of Belarus' population. More than 70 percent of the population speaks Russian, and some 60 percent of the population belongs to the Russian Orthodox Church.
■Political: Belarus is politically consolidated under the authoritarian Lukashenko. Though he has regular spats with Moscow, Lukashenko is manifestly pro-Russian and even aspires to be part of the Kremlin's leadership. Russia and Belarus have their own union state, though the definition of this alliance is extremely vague. The countries have discussed sharing a common foreign and defense policy, monetary union and even a single citizenship.
■Economic: Belarus is heavily tied to Russia economically, with the latter providing more than 60 percent of Belarus's imports, 85 percent of its oil and nearly all of its natural gas. Belarus also transports 20 percent of Russia's natural gas to Europe. Russia is deeply integrated into Belarus' industrial sector, which makes up 40 percent of the country's GDP. During the financial crisis, Russia has also supplied Belarus with loans totaling more than $1 billion.
■Military: During the Soviet era, the Russian and Belarusian military and industrial sectors were fully integrated. Those ties still exist; the Belarusian military is armed exclusively with Russian or Soviet-era equipment. Belarus is a member of the Russian-led military alliance of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which allows Russian soldiers access to Belarus at Moscow's will. Russia and Belarus also share a unified air defense system, something that has led Russia to consider stationing its Iskander missile system along Belarus' European borders.
■Intelligence: The Russian and Belarusian intelligence services are nearly indivisible. The Russian KGB is parent to the Belarusian KGB, and today's Russian FSB and SVR are still deeply entrenched in Belarus.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia has long kept Belarus close, but ties grew even stronger on Jan. 1 when the two countries, along with Kazakhstan, launched an official customs union. This is the first step in creating a single economic space. The union is also beginning to consider expanding to include security issues, like border control. Such a move would nearly completely integrate Belarus with Russia politically, economically and in security matters. Russia is formally reassimilating Belarus, preventing Minsk from having any meaningful relationship with the West.
But Russia will have to watch out for Lukashenko's argumentative tendencies. Belarus' erratic behavior hardly ever creates real breaks between the two countries, but does allow a very public display of Russia's lack of control over Minsk's theatrics. The second thing for which Russia must account is increased attention from the European Union; trade with the union accounts for one-third of Belarus' total trade. Many EU states have pushed for closer ties to Belarus through the union's Eastern Partnership program, though there is hardly a consensus in Europe or any agreement from Minsk as to what the EU partnership deal should mean. Belarus wants expertise and funding, while the European Union wants concrete political changes -- and neither is likely to get any significant portion of what it wants. Belarus has never worried Russia too much, but Russia is taking precautions to keep Belarus pro-Russian, if not part of Russia.
Kazakhstan
Kazakhstan protects Russia from the Islamic and Asian worlds. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan has been the most important of the Central Asian states. It is the largest and most resource-rich of the region's five countries and tends to serve as a bellwether for the region's politics. Kazakhstan is strategically and geographically the middleman between its fellow Central Asian states (all of which it borders except Tajikistan) and Russia.
Moscow intentionally made Kazakhstan the center of the Central Asian universe during the Soviet era. The reason for this was twofold. First, Russia did not want Central Asia's natural regional leader, Uzbekistan, continuing in this role since it rarely followed orders from Moscow. Second, Russia knew Kazakhstan would be much easier to keep handle than the other Central Asian states, since Kazakhstan is the only Central Asian state Russia borders. Ease of control aside, Kazakhstan is critical to the Russian sphere for myriad reasons. Kazakhstan possesses plentiful oil and natural gas resources, and is a key access route for Russia to the rest of Central Asia and Asia proper. Furthermore, Kazakhstan abuts Russia's transportation links to the rest of Siberia and Russia's Far East. Essentially, losing Kazakhstan could split Russia in two.
Russia's Levers
■Geography and population: Kazakhstan's size -- nearly one third the size of the continental United States, but with 5 percent of the population -- makes it a difficult country to consolidate. Kazakhstan and Russia share a nearly 5,000-mile border that is almost completely unguarded. The population is split between the north and south with vast barren stretches in between. Russians make up nearly 20 percent of the Kazakh population. Around 25 percent of all Kazakhs work abroad, mostly in Russia, and 6 percent of Kazakh GDP comes from remittances.
■Politics: Kazakhstan has been ruled by a single dynasty under Nursultan Nazarbayev since before the fall of the Soviet Union. Of all the leaders of non-Russian former Soviet states, Nazarbayev was the most vocal about not wanting the Soviet Union to disintegrate. Since then, Kazakhstan has flirted with the possibility of forming a political union state with Russia as Belarus has done.
■Economics: Most of Kazakhstan's economic infrastructure -- pipelines, rails and roads -- is linked into Russia. Ninety-five percent of all natural gas and 79 percent of all oil from Kazakhstan is sent to Russia for export. Kazakhstan's exports to China are increasing and it sends a few sporadic shipments to Europe via Azerbaijan, but Russia still controls most of Kazakhstan's energy exports. During the recent financial crisis, Russia penetrated Kazakh business, buying up banks and industrial assets.
■Military and security: Kazakhstan and Russia are heavily militarily integrated; Kazakhstan is a member of the CSTO, and nearly all of the Kazakh military uses Russian or Soviet-era equipment. Roughly 70 percent of Kazakhstan's military officers are ethnically Russian and trained by Russia. Kazakhstan's largest security concern is from its regional rival, Uzbekistan. Russia is Kazakhstan's main protector.
■Intelligence: The Kazakh security apparatus KNB was born out of the Soviet KGB and is closely linked into Russia's present day FSB and SVR. Most Kazakh security chiefs were trained by and are loyal to Moscow.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Though Russia and Kazakhstan have shared a close relationship since the fall of the Soviet Union, Moscow solidified its hold on its southern neighbor by creating the aforementioned customs union with Kazakhstan and Belarus on Jan. 1. For Kazakhstan, this union makes it generally more expensive to purchase non-Russian goods and weakens the indigenous Kazakh economy. It essentially starts the re-creation of a single economic sphere for the three states under Moscow, which they have pledged to complete by 2012. As mentioned before, the customs union is also considering expanding into security.
But unlike Belarus, Kazakhstan has yet to agree to any political union with Russia. There are two large problems that Russia must watch in order to keep Kazakhstan in its fold. The first is China. Kazakhstan has flirted with the West, but Western infiltration has been limited to energy projects and has not entered the political realm. However, this is not true for Chinese influence. China has been slowly and quietly building ties with Kazakhstan on energy, politics and economics and on the social level. Russia will have to keep the Chinese in check just as it must with the West in the other former Soviet states. The other potential problem for Russia's plan would arise if there were a leadership change in Astana. It is not clear what the result of a succession crisis would be in Kazakhstan or if it would change the country's willingness to work with Russia. Such an unknown is something Moscow must consider.
Georgia
Of the four countries Russia believes it has to pull back into its orbit, Georgia is the one with which Russia has the most problems and is the least consolidated. Georgia borders Russia on the strip of land known as the Caucasus -- a region between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. The Caucasus is critical for Russia to protect itself from all those regions. Georgia, as the northernmost country in the Caucasus (besides the Russian republics), is an Achilles' heel for Russia. Georgia also flanks Russia's southern Caucasus republics -- including Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan -- and acts as a Christian buffer between Islamic influences from the south and Russia's Muslim regions.
Though Russia and Georgia share many social attributes, such as the Orthodox religion, this state was one of the first former Soviet states -- after the Baltics -- to formally move toward the West. In 2003, the first of the pro-Western color revolutions swept into the former Soviet states with Georgia's Rose Revolution. Since then, Georgia has sought formal membership in several Western institutions like NATO and the European Union.
Because of the decisive break from Russia, Georgia and Russia do not formally share official diplomatic ties; the countries' leaders are not even on speaking terms.
Russia's Levers
■Geography: Russia formally occupies the two main secessionist regions of Georgia: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The two regions, which make up a third of Georgian territory, have declared their independence with Russian recognition. Russia also heavily influences Georgia's southern secessionist regions of Adjara and Samtskhe-Javakheti.
■Population: Though there is no sizable Russian population in Georgia, nearly 80 percent of the Georgian population is Orthodox with close ties to the Moscow Patriarch. The Russian Orthodox Church does not formally preside over the Georgian Orthodox Church, unlike in Ukraine and Belarus, but the ties between the two groups have long helped Russia to push into Georgia socially.
■Politics: The Georgian government is led by vehemently anti-Russian President Mikhail Saakashvili, but more than a dozen opposition groups have tried to destabilize the Rose Revolution president -- something that Russia has sought to take advantage of in the past year. Moreover, Russia is just now starting to organize a formally pro-Russian opposition movement in Georgia.
■Military: This is the main lever Russia holds in Georgia mainly due to the large Russian military presence inside of Georgia and flanking the country's southern border. Russia proved in its 2008 war with Georgia that it can quickly invade the country should the need arise.
Russia's Success and Roadblocks
Russia may have many levers in Georgia, but none has allowed Russia to consolidate control over the country. Instead, Russia has had to prove to Georgia (and the West) that it would never be allowed to stray from its former master. Essentially, Russia had to very publicly break the country. In 2008, Russia carried out a five-day war with Georgia, pushing the Russian military nearly to the capital of Tbilisi. Though Georgia was an ally of the United States and NATO, the West did not involve itself in the conflict. Georgia ended up having a third of its territory split from the country and declared "independent," with Russian forces formally stationed in the regions.
This war has had enormous repercussions not only for Georgia, but for the entire Soviet sphere and the West. Russia proved that it could do more than use its political, economic or energy levers in former Soviet states to influence their return to the Russian fold; it could force them back into submission.
But Russia has a long way to go in getting Georgia under control. Tbilisi still openly defies Moscow and has asked the West for any kind of support possible, especially military support.
With the other three imperative countries falling back into Russia's orbit, Georgia will have Russia's most focused attention. Russia must have all four countries under its control in order to succeed with any other part of its plan to become a major power in Eurasia once again.
Introduction: The Targets
Part 2: The Desirables
Part 3: The Extras
Part 4: The Major Players
Read more: Russia's Expanding Influence, Part 1: The Necessities | Stratfor
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Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered a massive series of surprise military exercises in the Black Sea on Thursday, only the second time in 20 years Russia has ever conducted unscheduled drills. Putin ordered the snap war games before boarding his plane to return to Moscow from South Africa. The order was delivered by letter at 4 a.m. to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who then alerted the approximately 7,000 Russian troops in Crimea, Ukraine, to be woken and rushed to the drills. Those troops are reportedly engaged in operations with hundreds of armored vehicles, dozens of fighter jets and helicopters and approximately 30 warships.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman explains.
It is a common axiom of warfare that training should be as close to actual combat as possible to facilitate a military's ability to practice what they would actually be asked to do in combat. This realistic practice should theoretically require the multiple actors in the process to coordinate and perform as seamlessly as possible. Ideally, this will make a military more successful in war. Militaries routinely accomplish this practice through large exercises that encompass multiple branches, command levels and weapons platforms.
But not all military exercises are created equal. The larger, more impromptu and complex an exercise is, the more dangerous, potentially embarrassing and expensive that exercise becomes. Exercises also cause wear and tear on equipment and can give away valuable intelligence to potential enemies. Therefore, many countries hedge the reality of these exercises. This can be done in many ways, but the most common is to plan the exercises months or years in advance. Doing so allows for scheduling and rehearsing tasks that amount to a performance rather than a realistic assessment of an actual military drill. Compromises exist between reality and the potential negatives associated with practicing actual capabilities.
Russia's decision to start launching snap exercises -- as with the Black Sea Fleet on Thursday and a drill in February that involved ground forces in the Russian Caucasus -- shows a new seriousness in military preparedness. A state commits to such public exercises on this scale for only two reasons. First, because it is serious about qualitatively improving its forces for combat, and second, because it anticipates a threat. Both are relatively true for Russia at this time.
Russia is undergoing a substantial restructuring and re-arming of its military. In recent months, the Russian Defense Ministry conducted a series of inspections, which have shown abysmal results, ranging from inadequate training to decaying supplies. For example, it was reported that two-thirds of the Black Sea Fleet's ships will not be fit for service by 2015 since most are more than 30 years old. Russia will start to replace ships and other equipment in 2013, but Putin went further and ordered an "urgent" improvement of the quality of the armed forces, which sparked the first unscheduled exercise in the Russian Caucasus. Russia understands that its military won't be made effective by simply replacing equipment; it knows it must increase its realistic training for a more qualitative improvement.
The second reason for a state to hold snap wargames is if it sees an imminent threat, which is why the location of these two unscheduled exercises in Russia is important. The first exercise was held in the Russian Caucasus, and the second was just to its west, in the Black Sea. This neighborhood is one of Russia's most sensitive, volatile and vulnerable regions. The Russian Caucasus continue to be volatile even with the war in Chechnya over. The region will also host the world's delegations at the 2014 Sochi Olympics in just 10 months.
The Russian Caucasus and Black Sea also border Georgia, with whom Russia went to war in 2008. The Black Sea is Russia's only warm water port, making it highly strategic. It is also open to a host of players, including Turkey, NATO-members Romania and Bulgaria, and Ukraine, which is engaged in a series of disputes with Russia. Russia does not see war as imminent with any of these players, though it does not exclude the growing competition amongst them.
Overall, for Russia to undergo such public and potentially dangerous or humiliating exercises shows a shift in Moscow's thinking. The Kremlin is serious about improving the quality of its military in both a functional and a realistic way. It is beginning with its most sensitive geographic military zone, though the Kremlin has hinted that this is just the start of a new series of drills for the entire military. Holding such snap exercises won't fix all of Russia's problems. The Russian military has issues rooted deeply in its demographic decline, massive corruption, competence and capacity in the military-industrial sector and more. This is just one component of many improvements that must take place.
These exercises obviously will not go unnoticed in the region. Since Russia has so far limited the number of troops taking part in the drills, it did not have to notify its neighbors that the exercises would be taking place. Already, the Ukrainian government has requested an explanation from the Russian Foreign Ministry. Ministers are expected to talk by phone Friday. Countries like Turkey will also take notice, particularly since it has been in contention with Russia (the most recent spat stemming from the 2008 Russia-Georgia war) over who gets to use the Black Sea for military purposes. The message that Russia is conveying to the region with these exercises is that it is willing to undergo such a risk in order to prepare its military for the future.
Read more: Russia's Surprise War Games | Stratfor
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Analysis
Editor's Note: This is the second part of a three-part series on Russia's leadership after President Vladimir Putin eventually leaves office. Part 1 revisited Putin's rise to power; Part 2 will examine Russia's demographics, energy sector and Putin's political changes; and Part 3 will explore whether the political systems Putin has built will survive him.
Russia is experiencing major changes affecting its demographics and its energy sector. To address these and other challenges, Russian President Vladimir Putin is instituting changes to Russia's political system.
Demographic Shifts
Russia's population of 143 million is expected to decline by nearly 10 percent by 2030, according to most estimates. The drop is mainly among ethnic Russians. By contrast, the population of Muslims, both indigenous and immigrant, is actually increasing. The decline of ethnic Russians and the increase in the Muslim population means Muslims will comprise 16 percent of the population by 2030. Some estimates put this figure at more than 20 percent due to illegal immigration.
The increasing Muslim share of the Russian population has spawned an ultranationalist backlash. Over the past three years, large nationwide protests have demanded immigration reform and an end to subsidies for Muslim parts of the North Caucasus. A rise in ultra-Orthodoxy played into this, with religious-based vigilante groups trying to take responsibility for Russian security. The decline in the population of ethnic Russians has also put the Russian military under pressure. Moscow is having to downgrade its ambitions of maintaining a 1 million-man army to maintaining an 800,000-strong military. The country's demographic changes have also prompted debate inside the Kremlin regarding whether and how Muslims should be integrated into the army.
In another major demographic change, the first generation born after the fall of the Soviet Union is coming of age. Approximately 21 percent of Russians were born after the fall of the Soviet Union. This shift has changed the mind-set of the population. The new generation never knew a world dominated by Russia and the United States during the Cold War, and they were too young to understand much of the chaos of the Yeltsin era. Most of this generation's experiences occurred under a stable and relatively strong Russia under Putin. Thanks to the Internet, the younger generation also has had many more opportunities for exposure to the outside world than were previously possible. Russia's Levada polling unit estimates that more than 50 percent of Russians now use the Internet, up from less than 10 percent in 2006.
Because of these changes, political discourse has become much more varied inside Russia -- something that has put extraordinary pressure on the Kremlin. Anti-Muslim sentiment, the generational changes and the expanded political consciousness all came to a head in 2011 and 2012, when large anti-Kremlin protests swept the country. The protests seemingly caught the Kremlin off guard. Moscow scrambled to respond, instituting a series of sweeping changes to government policy, demoting or purging key government members, and then cracking down on the protesters. In light of the new situation, the Kremlin has reconsidered how best to maintain control.
Energy Shifts
At the same time as these demographic changes, global energy fluctuations deeply affected Russia's stability. The Russian economy is mostly based on energy, with half of government revenues coming from oil and natural gas. And one of the primary sources of the Russian government's political leverage abroad is via energy relationships with other countries.
Energy as an economic base and revenue mainstay has served the current Russian government well. One of the reasons Putin was able to consolidate the country so effectively in the 2000s is because global oil prices were so high, giving the Kremlin plenty of cash to implement its plans. Meanwhile, Russian dominance of the natural gas market in Europe gave Moscow the wherewithal to re-expand its influence into the former Soviet sphere, rolling back Western influence in many cases.
But when energy prices or demand drops, the Kremlin loses government revenues and much of its influence on its western neighbors. This occurred in 2009, when the global financial crisis was underway and the price of oil fell to approximately $60 a barrel. The Russian economy slumped, with gross domestic product dropping 8 percent, and Kremlin finances were saved only because the government tapped into its massive reserve funds. Currently, the Russian budget is based on the assumption that oil will remain above $90 a barrel. The Kremlin has essentially decided to gamble the future stability of the country on that assumption, though its currency reserves still stand at approximately $530 billion and it has various rainy day funds of approximately $171 billion.
Another uncertainty on top of oil prices is whether Europe will remain Russia's primary consumer of natural gas. After years of seeing Moscow use its natural gas supplies to manipulate them politically, many European states have created ways to diversify away from Russian supplies, such as by building liquefied natural gas import terminals. The possibility of a glut of liquefied natural gas on the market and further developments in shale gas technology threaten Russia's position, particularly in Europe. Because of this, Russia is altering its aggressive stance on energy in Europe in favor of more consumer-friendly arrangements. Russia is also trying to buffer falling European demand by finding customers in Asia, where Moscow is striking deals with China and Japan. Historically, it has not succeeded in this regard, however.
Many challenges remain that threaten the Russian energy sector, which in turn could destabilize the government and country. Many reforms must be considered, such as the liberalization of the natural gas sector, ending Gazprom's present monopoly. In addition, Russia must continue its consumer-friendly policies to maintain its customers. All of this will require changes to the Kremlin's strategy, something that is creating ripples throughout Russia's political elite.
A 'New' Political System
With so many fundamental changes impacting Russia, the old arrangement of government decision-making has fallen apart. Putin is revamping the system with four main goals. First, he wants to create a system in which personalities can be interchanged more easily so he is not reliant on specific people to keep the system afloat. Second, he wants a system that is not vertically built of two clans, but instead be defined in collective sectors. This is so that should one person fail, then other sectors will not be affected. Third, the system should have neutral players popular with the Russian people, or at least to whom the Russian people can relate. And fourth, the system must have a method by which a new generation can rise to the top, creating a succession plan for the elite.
This new system has been dubbed the Politburo 2.0, a title initially used by a Russian consulting group called Minchenko but now common in the Russian media. Politburo 2.0 has some similarities to the Soviet Politburos of old, specifically during the Stalin era. At that time, Politburos were rarely formal entities, but more a collection of Stalin's most trusted elites able to make decisions and policy in their respective fields. Acting as decision-maker over this elite, Stalin ultimately shaped Soviet strategy.
Currently, the Politburo 2.0 system is bifurcated into an internal elite that serves as the primary decision-maker inside the country and an outside tier of technocrats. Including Putin as arbitrator, the Politburo has 10 members, though this number is not fixed.
Russia's Kremlin Politburo
As under Stalin, this Politburo is not a formal organization. Its members' roles can be shifted to deal with changes in Russia. Currently, the 10 people on the Politburo are not technocrats, but overall strategists for Russia's social, political, economic, military, security and business interests. The technocrats under the Politburo do not hold true power or play roles in decision-making. In place of two clans with their own hierarchy, Putin is creating an overarching group of people, each of whom has his own portfolio where they make their decisions, creating a balancing effect, but none of whom is competing with each other.
The current Politburo is made up of those Putin trusts most who have proven themselves to be competent strategists, though the personalities can be interchanged by Putin as needed. Each Politburo member has a base of power to draw on. For example, Igor Sechin oversees the oil sector, Sergei Shoigu the military and Sergei Ivanov the security circles. The one exception is Dmitri Medvedev, who is more of a representative of a series of second- and third-tier reformers (such as Arkady Dvorkovich, Igor Shuvalov, and at one time Alexei Kudrin) who are not powerful enough on their own, but under Medvedev collectively hold weight.
Power Players Outside of Politburo
Three Politburo members oversee decision-making in energy: Igor Sechin, Dmitri Medvedev and Gennady Timchenko. Sechin mainly oversees the oil sector, but is attempting to expand into natural gas; Medvedev's loyalists (such as Alexei Miller) head up Gazprom, which is expanding into oil; and Timchenko is an oil and natural gas trader with interests in private natural gas firm Novatek. These three men see the energy sector in very different ways, with Putin as top decision-maker and arbiter.
There are a few outliers within the Politburo: Chief of the Presidential Staff Sergei Ivanov, who keeps the intelligence sectors in check, and current Moscow Mayor Sergei Sobyanin who oversees the running of Moscow. Ivanov has long been one of Putin's most trusted loyalists, and has been willing to step back when needed. Sobyanin is currently jockeying to succeed Putin and is attempting to remain neutral among all the circles.
Politburo Power Balances
Unlike the clan system, there are potential replacements outside the Politburo keeping pressure on those within. Under the 10 within the Politburo are a series of second-tier main players who are all vying to move up. As mentioned, the existence of these people pressures the elite to keep to Putin's agenda and perform their jobs competently. Putin can swap out the Politburo members with those from the second tier as needed. For example, Medvedev's power is currently diminishing and his loyalists have been falling away. Medvedev could be swapped out by someone like former Finance Minister Alexei Kudrin, who could make decisions as a prime minister and in the financial and energy sectors. Alternatively, Medvedev's roles in the political sector could be filled by someone like Vladislav Surkov, who once was a civiliki leader before falling out of favor.
As other people in Russia prove themselves as competent technocrats or strategists, they can move up into the second tier, meaning that this group is constantly changing and shifting, especially as a new generation begins to be groomed for the future.
Read more: Russia After Putin: The Demographic Challenge | Stratfor
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Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal
Analysis
November 14, 2013 | 0528 Print Text Size
Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (R) and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Oct. 7. (SONNY TUMBELAKA/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Russia is concerned that a U.S.-Iranian accord could alter the regional balance of power at Moscow's expense. Even before the possible entente, the Kremlin was worried that the U.S. military withdrawal from much of the Islamic world would give the United States more freedom of action elsewhere. An agreement with Iran could undermine Moscow's influence in the Middle East and open the door to U.S.-Iranian cooperation along Russia's southern borderlands. Like many other global and regional players with a stake in the outcome of the talks, Russia will have to contemplate a world in which Iran and the United States are not at odds.
Analysis
Over the past two decades, Russia has been one of Iran's primary supporters at a time when Tehran was relatively isolated in the international community and had hostile relations with many Western powers. However, Moscow and Tehran never shared any particular affinity. In fact, Russia and Iran have historically competed for influence in Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. During the imperial periods, Persia and Russia fought several large wars from 1722 to 1828. While the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize the Islamic republic in 1979, relations between the two were cool, in part because Tehran condemned Moscow's restrictions on religion and the Soviets were already allied with Iraq.
Russia and Iran: Competing Spheres of Influence
Following the fall of the Soviet Union, relations between Tehran and Moscow began to warm while Iran's international isolation was growing. Russia committed to take over construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant and became a source of military hardware for Iran. Russia has also provided Iran with intelligence on a range of matters, including Israeli networks in Lebanon and U.S. and British plans to destabilize the Iranian government by, for example, taking advantage of the 2009 "Green Revolution" protests.
For much of the 2000s, U.S. attention (military and otherwise) was focused on the Islamic world, from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to the standoff with Iran. Moscow took advantage of Washington's preoccupation to start rolling back Western influence in Russia's borderlands. In addition, Russia could leverage its ties with Iran in negotiations with Washington on other matters, such as U.S. support for anti-Russian governments in Ukraine and Georgia. The relationship with Iran was also a way for Russia to secure its southern flank and limit Iranian-Russian competition in the region.
George Friedman and Robert D. Kaplan on U.S.-Iran Relations
Indeed, Moscow has found the standoff between Iran and the United States to be a particularly useful foreign policy tool. For example, during Moscow's negotiations with Washington over U.S. missile defense installations in Central Europe, Russia threatened to counter by selling S-300 missile defense systems to Iran. But Russia has been careful not to support Iran too much, both because a strengthened Iran would threaten Russia's southern flank and because it could provoke the United States and its allies into taking action against Moscow.
From Leverage to Liability
Russia is comfortable and familiar with partnering with a U.S. foe, though in the past such relationships have not proved durable. During the Cold War, Moscow assumed that the United States and China would remain adversaries because there were too many constraints on either side to ever reach a compromise. Following the Sino-American entente in 1971, the United States became a swing player in Sino-Soviet relations, and China became the same in Soviet-American relations. A similar phenomenon is now taking place with Iran. Russia knows that any agreement between Iran and the United States does not mean the two will become allies, and a change would not necessarily affect Russia immediately. But Russia's leaders past and present have had to be long-term strategists, and the Kremlin is weighing the ramifications of an U.S.-Iran entente well into the future.
First, should there be a true rapprochement with Iran, it could free Washington to focus more on other parts of the world. Moscow is worried that Washington would expand its attention both in Russia's periphery, where it has been attempting to boost its influence, and inside Russia itself, where the United States has actively supported anti-Kremlin groups. Russia would not be able to use Iran to counter any U.S. activities against Moscow's interests, and it has little else that is comparably effective in negotiations with Washington.
The second concern is how much the U.S.-Iranian relationship warms in the long term. Iran alone cannot threaten Russia in the region, since the Islamic republic is much smaller economically and militarily. However, U.S. backing could allow Iran to weaken Russia's regional position. Moscow cannot be certain that improved U.S.-Iranian ties would not eventually lead to increased military cooperation and support similar to Washington's relationship with Tehran in the decades before Iran's Islamic Revolution in 1979.
Moscow's Areas of Concern
A U.S.-backed Iran increases the vulnerability of Russia's southern flank. Specifically, there are three regions that Russia is concerned could once again fall away from its influence: Turkey, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Namely, Iran has the potential to be a regional energy competitor to Russia, and it can act as a land bridge for Eurasian transit through the Russian borderlands to the Persian Gulf.
Turkey is Russia's second-largest energy consumer, as well as another regional rival to Moscow's influence in its borderlands. Ankara has been looking for alternative suppliers for energy in order to reduce its dependence on Russia. Though there are minor alternatives such as Azerbaijan, Iran has the potential to seriously compete with Russia on the energy production front. Iran is already a minor energy exporter to Turkey, but with increased foreign investment and support in Iran's energy sector -- particularly from U.S. firms -- the country could increase its production on a scale that might challenge Russian energy dominance in the region. In addition, the historical geopolitical competition that saw Russia spar with Ottoman Turkey and Persian Iran -- with the countries alternately aligning with and against one another -- could resume.
The second region where Russia's sway could be undermined is the Caucasus, where Russia relatively successfully increased its influence this year. Currently, Armenia is isolated and reliant on its relationship with Russia in nearly every respect. Georgia has ushered in a government that is more cooperative with Russia, and Russian troops are still stationed in the country's breakaway territories. Azerbaijan has become more accommodating to Russian interests to avoid isolation as the rest of the region moves closer to Moscow. Russia will want to solidify its position in the Caucasus in the short term in case Iran (possibly with U.S. backing) attempts to undermine Russia's position. For example, Iran could offer Azerbaijan an alternative land route for transporting energy to Turkey and Europe or the Persian Gulf. Iran could also boost trade and energy exports to Armenia or Georgia, challenging Russian influence there.
Lastly, Moscow's grip on Central Asia -- a region already seeing increased Sino-Russian competition -- could be jeopardized. The current struggle between Moscow and Beijing has centered on the flow of energy out of Central Asia. Russia has strengthened its control over the pipelines that run between Turkmenistan and China through Kazakhstan. However, Turkmenistan's largest natural gas fields are on the border with Iran, making Iran an option for increasing Turkmen energy exports to the Persian Gulf or the West. Iran could become a transit corridor for Kazakh and Uzbek energy as well. For Central Asian states concerned about possible instability in Afghanistan, Iran could also prove to be a useful security partner on intelligence or even military cooperation in the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal.
The Kremlin understands these vulnerabilities, but it also sees that there is little it can do to interrupt the trajectory of U.S.-Iran negotiations. Instead, Russia has to be thinking of how to protect its position in a changing world. If Iran is no longer an option, finding a new tool to counter U.S. actions and shoring up the southern borderlands will be at the top of Moscow's list of priorities.
Read more: Russia Warily Eyes a U.S.-Iran Deal | Stratfor
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Russia is facing a confluence of strategic challenges in the former Soviet periphery, an area where the Kremlin has worked hard to expand Russian influence over the past decade. An emerging financial crisis in Kazakhstan and the political crisis in Ukraine are threatening Russia's economic and strategic interests. At the same time, progress in Georgia and Moldova's path toward European integration is eroding Russia's leverage in the region.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman explains.
These challenges to Russia's status as a resurgent regional power come at a delicate time because the country faces a growing host of domestic difficulties. Demographic decline, ethnic tensions and a continued dependency on an unreformed extractive industry are looming dark clouds on the horizon for the Kremlin. While not yet threatening Russia's dominance, the current crises in the former Soviet space are a challenge to Moscow's long-term strategy for the region.
Yesterday, the National Bank of Kazakhstan devalued the country's currency, the tenge, by nearly 20 percent in the aftermath of the emerging markets crisis that has been rocking developing economies over the past few weeks. The impact of the devaluation was immediate, with some currency exchanges and shops throughout Kazakhstan shutting down. More important, the devaluation has raised fears of contagion to other regional economies. A financial crisis in the Moscow-led Customs Union -- currently comprising Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus -- would hamper the expansion efforts of the bloc and perhaps even threaten the cohesion of what has been a cornerstone of Russia's strategy to secure its Central Asian hinterland.
The Kazakh move has also placed additional pressure on the already volatile economic and political situation in Ukraine, where Russia faces yet another strategic threat. Constrained in part by its need to maintain its international image during the Sochi Winter Olympics, Russia has been unsuccessful in helping President Viktor Yanukovich to end the political standoff and defuse the protests that have been reinvigorated by support from the West as well as from independent domestic actors. The ongoing political stalemate in Ukraine has demonstrated that although Russia has significant levers of influence in the country, it is for now unable to unilaterally shape political outcomes.
Farther west and south, Russia faces growing pressure in maintaining its influence in another two traditional strategic focal points: Georgia and Moldova. While those countries are not as essential to Russia's security as Ukraine, they are the key for the Kremlin's strategy of consolidating its southwestern flank. European incentives have contributed to the development of Moldova and Georgia's Western-leaning trajectory in recent years.
While Georgia's current ruling Georgian Dream coalition has been more open to engagement with Russia than the previous administration of President Mikhail Saakashvili, Georgia is developing a strong partnership with NATO and is pursuing a path to European integration that threatens Russia's policy. However, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili has balanced Wednesday's announcement that the United States would finance his country's participation in the NATO Response Force with a public statement that he would be willing to meet with Russian leaders. Similarly, Moldova is building stronger ties to Western institutions.
Also on Wednesday, the European Parliament took a step toward visa liberalization for Moldovans, further incentivizing Moldovan leaders to strengthen cooperation with the European Union. Russia's support for breakaway regions, as well as its past economic pressures on Georgia and Moldova, have not been effective in dissuading the countries from pursuing integration with the West.
Much of Moscow's current assertive foreign policy in its periphery has been driven by concerns that its relatively strong position in the region will come under threat, especially when the United States is able to pay serious attention to the former Soviet periphery. The Putin administration is in the process of addressing the delicate question of restructuring the country's energy sector -- the lifeline of the country's economy -- while also managing the country's looming demographic crisis and growing ethnic tensions, which have the potential to spiral into violence.
The confluence of crises in its periphery may not necessarily signify a definite weakening of Russia's global and regional position -- the European Union, for all its rhetoric, remains weak and internally divided while the United States remains relatively distant -- but it adds to Moscow's growing burden.
Read more: Russia Suddenly Feeling Under Siege | Stratfor
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Very interesting piece
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/16/world/europe/foes-of-america-in-russia-crave-rupture-in-ties.html?emc=edit_th_20140316&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193&_r=0
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By
Ruchir Sharma
March 23, 2014 5:55 p.m. ET
Vladimir Putin had been named the "world's most powerful person" last year by Forbes magazine well before he annexed Crimea. The land grab added to the string of geopolitical victories credited to the Russian leader—including his rescue of Syria's Bashar Assad in the chemical-weapons standoff and the safe harbor he gave to the American secrets-spiller Edward Snowden. But Mr. Putin's real power base, the economy, is crumbling.
Russia's economic growth rate has plummeted from the 7% average annual pace of the last decade to 1.3% last year. Now the brokerage arm of the country's largest state bank, Sberbank, SBER.MZ -0.23% expects zero growth in 2014.
Sensing trouble, wealthy Russians have been moving money out of the country at one of the fastest rates in two decades—$60 billion a year since 2012—and now foreign investors are pulling out too. The ruble has fallen by 22% against the U.S. dollar since 2011, and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation has been fighting to prevent a ruble collapse since the Crimean crisis began.
The situation is especially revealing because oil—the mainstay of the Russian state—has stayed relatively stable, hovering at $110 per barrel for three years. Yet the Russian economy is stagnating. This suggests deep-seated problems.
After Mr. Putin became president in 2000, he began working to end the political turmoil and inflation that gripped Russia under Boris Yeltsin. He managed the economy responsibly, getting control of the government budget and retiring debts. Rising global oil prices and easy money did the rest. Between 2000 and 2010, growth and per capita income rose to $10,000 from $1,500. Mr. Putin started this decade with an approval rating of 70%.
But he grew complacent and cocky. Former KGB allies replaced economic reformers in his inner circle. As former President George W. Bush told me in an interview, Mr. Putin in private conversations morphed from a leader who worried about Russia's debt to one who by 2008 taunted the U.S. for having too much debt. He went from saving oil profits in a rainy-day fund to spending them to cement his power.
Before 2008, Russia was putting back to work the oil fields, factories and labor force that were idled by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Even so, Mr. Putin built little that was new. While Russia has a relatively high rate of investment, 26% of GDP, much of the money gets funneled into dubious projects by the state. Now the spare capacity is shrinking, and the old Soviet roads and railways are deteriorating, as any regular visitors to Russia can attest.
The inflation rate now stands at 6.3%, fourth highest among the major emerging markets, and well above the emerging world average of 3.8%. Russia has become a classic weak-investment, high-inflation economy.
Despite his growing reputation as a geostrategic mastermind, Mr. Putin's economic strategy is increasingly self-defeating, focused on extending Kremlin control. While countries like Mexico are moving to open up the state oil industry, Russia is closing it off, tossing out foreign partners. Rosneft, the large state oil company, is buying out private companies and now controls 40% of the country's oil production. It is launching its own oil field-services company, bringing in-house a service that multinational oil companies have been hiring out to efficient private contractors for years.
Russia grew richer during the last decade but did not develop in the normal sense of building up more sophisticated manufacturing industries. In a vibrant developing economy such as Korea or the Czech Republic, manufacturing accounts for at least 20% of GDP. Manufacturing in Russia accounts for just 15% of GDP, down from 18% in 2005. Small and medium-size companies of any kind, including banks, struggle to gain a foothold alongside state behemoths.
The result is that the Russian state has few new sources of income outside of oil and gas, at a time when it is taking on more dependents. Demographics are putting a squeeze on public finances, as roughly a million Russians are retiring each year, and too few young people are replacing them in a workforce of about 100 million. The situation leaves fewer taxpayers to fund pensions, after a five-year period in which the Kremlin raised pension payouts by an average of 25% a year.
This is a medium-term threat to the federal budget, which is in surplus now but shows a dangerous deficit if oil revenues—$222 billion or around 10% of GDP last year, according to IMF figures—are left out of the equation. Because of slowing growth and deteriorating terms of trade, the non-oil government deficit is now 11% of GDP. The current account is in a similar position: an apparent surplus, dependent on oil. The non-oil current-account deficit is currently running at a whopping 10% of GDP.
To keep its federal budget in balance, Russia requires an oil price of $110 barrel, so it is tiptoeing on the edge. Yet because other commodity prices have fallen, the price of oil, now $107 per barrel, is at a 30-year high compared with industrial metals. This suggests that oil, too, may be poised for a downshift—which would have a crippling impact on the Russian economy.
For now Russians are applauding their president's confident portrayal of the great power player. But that may change if the economy keeps deteriorating. Remember that by late 2011, as the scale of Russia's slowdown was becoming clear, Mr. Putin's approval ratings tanked and he faced protests in Moscow.
Mr. Putin's approval rating has bounced back following the Sochi Olympics and the invasion of Crimea. But the rest of the world should not be fooled. The world's "most powerful man" is scoring his geopolitical victories from an increasingly vulnerable economic position.
Mr. Sharma is head of emerging markets at Morgan Stanley Investment Management and author of "Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles" (Norton, 2012).
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Noonan: Mr. Putin's Revealing Speech
At the Kremlin, he makes the case for an increasingly aggressive Russia.
By Peggy Noonan
March 27, 2014 7:35 p.m. ET
It is not fully remembered or appreciated—to some degree it's been forced down the memory hole—that a primary reason the American people opposed the Soviet Union and were able to sustain that opposition (and bear its costs) was that the Soviets were not only expansionist but atheistic, and aggressively so. It was part of what communism was about—God is a farce and must be removed as a force. They closed the churches, killed and imprisoned priests and nuns. Wherever communism went there was an attempt to suppress belief.
Americans, more then than now a churchgoing and believing people, knew this and recoiled. That recoil added energy, heft and moral seriousness to America's long opposition. Americans wouldn't mind if Russia merely operated under an eccentric economic system—that was their business. They wouldn't mind if it had dictators—one way or another Russia always had dictators. But that it was expansionist and atheistic—that was different. That was a threat to humanity.
One of the strategically interesting things about Vladimir Putin is that he has been careful not to set himself against religious belief but attempted to align himself with it. He has taken domestic actions that he believes reflect the assumptions of religious conservatives. He has positioned himself so that he can make a claim on a part of the Russian soul, as they used to say, that his forbears could not: He is not anti-God, he is pro-God, pro the old church of the older, great Russia.
That is only one way in which Putinism is different. The Soviets had an overarching world-ideology, Mr. Putin does not. The Soviets had an army of global reach, Mr. Putin has an army of local reach. The Soviet premiers of old, as Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, noted in an interview, operated within "a certain sense of bureaucracy, of restraints." Mr. Putin's Russia is "so concentrated economically and politically that we don't know what constraints there are on his autonomy." There is cronyism, crackdowns on the press. Mr. Putin has weakened formal institutions—and "institutions are inherently conservative" because "they provide checks and balances." Mr. Haass added that "Putin's ambitions and limits are not clear."
I think we got a deep look at Mr. Putin's attitudes and goals in his speech last week at the Kremlin, telling the world his reasons for annexing Crimea. It is a remarkable document and deserves more attention. It was a full-throated appeal to Russian nationalism, and an unapologetic expression of Russian grievance. (The translation is from the Prague Post.)
At the top, religious references. Crimea is "where Prince Vladimir was baptized. His spiritual feat of adopting Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and human values that unite the people of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus."
Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia. Yes, in 1954 "the Communist Party head, Nikita Khrushchev" decided to transfer it to Ukraine. "What stood behind this decision of his—a desire to win the support of the Ukrainian political establishment or to atone for the mass oppressions of the 1930s in Ukraine—is for historians to figure out." But Khrushchev headed "a totalitarian state" and never asked the Crimeans for their views. Decades later, "what seemed impossible became a reality. The U.S.S.R. fell apart. . . . The big country was gone." Things moved swiftly. Crimeans and others "went to bed in one country and awoke in other ones, overnight becoming ethnic minorities in former [Soviet] republics." Russia "was not simply robbed, it was plundered." Crimeans in 1991 felt "they were handed over like a sack of potatoes."
Russia "humbly accepted the situation." It was rocked, "incapable of protecting its interests." Russians knew they'd been treated unjustly, but they chose to "build our good-neighborly relations with independent Ukraine on a new basis." Russia was accommodating, respectful. But Ukraine was led by successive bad leaders who "milked the country, fought among themselves for power."
"I understand those who came out on Maidan with peaceful slogans against corruption," Mr. Putin said. But forces that "stood behind the latest events in Ukraine" had "a different agenda." They "resorted to terror, murder and riots." They are "Nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites." "They continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day." They have "foreign sponsors" and "mentors."
He declared that "there is no legitimate executive authority in Ukraine now," that government agencies are controlled by "imposters," often "controlled by radicals." In that atmosphere residents of Crimea turned to Russia for protection. Russia could not abandon them. It helped them hold a referendum.
"Western Europe and North America" now say Moscow has violated international law. "It's a good thing that they at least remember that there exists such a thing as international law—better late than never." And Russia has violated nothing: Its military "never entered Crimea" but was already there, in line with international agreements. Russia chose merely to "enhance" its forces there, within limits previously set. There was not a single armed confrontation, and no casualties. Why? Because Crimeans wanted them there. If it had been an armed intervention, he said, surely a shot would have been fired.
In the decades since the Soviet Union's fall—or, as Mr. Putin called it, since "the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet"—the world has become less stable. The U.S. is guided not by international law but by "the rule of the gun." Americans think they are exceptional and can "decide the destinies of the world," building coalitions on the basis of "if you are not with us, you are against us"—Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya. The "color revolutions" have produced "chaos" instead of freedom, and "the Arab Spring turned into the Arab Winter."
Mr. Putin cleverly knocked down the idea of European integration. The real problem, he said, is that the West has been moving against "Eurasian integration." Russia over the years has tried to be cooperative, but the U.S. and its allies have repeatedly lied and "made decisions behind our backs." NATO expanded to the east; a missile-defense system is "moving forward." The "infamous policy of containment" continues against Russia today. "They are constantly trying to sweep us into a corner. . . . But there is a limit to everything."
Russia does not want to harm Ukraine. "We do not want to divide Ukraine; we do not need that." But Kiev had best not join NATO, and Ukrainians should "put their own house in order."
What does this remarkable speech tell us? It presents a rationale for moving further. Ukraine, for instance, is a government full of schemers controlled by others—it may require further attention. It expresses a stark sense of historical grievance and assumes it is shared by its immediate audience. It makes clear a formal animus toward the U.S. It shows Mr. Putin has grown comfortable in confrontation. His speech posits the presence of a new Russia, one that is "an independent, active participant in international affairs." It suggests a new era, one that doesn't have a name yet. But the decades following the collapse of the Soviet Union were one thing, and this is something else—something rougher, darker and more aggressive.
It tells us this isn't about Crimea.
It tells us this isn't over.
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http://www.theweek.co.uk/europe/ukraine/57830/why-are-polish-men-london-getting-military-call-papers
No worries. Wars never start in Poland.
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http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-04-29/isolated-russia-makes-friends-hold-military-drill-china-strikes-multi-billion-deals-
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Copying Ambassador Basora's piece into this thread by request:
This looks about right to me, "Unless and until the West takes a seriously strong stand against Putin’s undeclared war against Kiev and commits to keeping Ukraine united and independent, Putin will continue on his present path of stealth conquest."
Foreign Policy Research Institute
http://www.fpri.org/articles/2014/05/putins-greater-novorossiya-dismemberment-ukraine
Putin’s “Greater Novorossiya” - The Dismemberment of Ukraine
Adrian A. Basora, Aleksandr Fisher
About the Author: http://www.fpri.org/contributors/adrian-basora
(more at the link, sources, footnotes) May 2014
On April 17, Vladimir Putin introduced a dangerously expansive new concept into the Ukraine crisis. During his four-hour question and answer session on Russian TV that day he pointedly mentioned “Novorossiya” – a large swath of territory conquered by Imperial Russia during the 18th century from a declining Ottoman Empire. This historic Novorossiya covered roughly a third of what is now Ukraine (including Crimea).
Subsequent comments and actions by Putin and his surrogates have made it clear that the Kremlin’s goal is once again to establish its dominance over the lands once called Novorossiya. Furthermore, it is clear that Putin hopes to push his control well beyond this region’s historic boundaries to include other contiguous provinces with large Russian-speaking populations.
Most commentators and media are still focusing on Putin’s annexation of Crimea and on the threatened Russian takeover of the eastern Ukraine provinces (oblasts) of Donetsk and Luhansk. But the far more ominous reality, both in Moscow’ rhetoric and on the ground, is that Putin has already begun laying the groundwork for removing not only these, but several additional provincesfrom Kiev’s control and bringing them under Russian domination, either by annexation or by creating a nominally independent Federation of Novorossiya.
Unless the U.S. and its European allies take far more decisive countermeasures than they have to date, Putin’s plan[1] will continue to unfold slowly but steadily and, within a matter of months, Ukraine will either be dismembered or brought back into the Russian sphere of influence.
Putin’s convenient and expansive (though historically inaccurate) ‘rediscovery’ of Novorossiya now appears to include the following provinces in addition to Crimea: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mikolaiv and Odessa. If he can turn this vision into a reality, Moscow would dominate the entire northern littoral of the Black Sea and control a wide band of contiguous territory stretching all the way from Russia’s current western boundaries to the borders of Romania and Moldova (conveniently including the latter’s already self-declared breakaway province of Transdnistria).
(http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_1-400x275.png)
If all of these provinces are either annexed by Russia or form a nominally independent federation of ‘Greater Novorossiya’, the population of Ukraine would drop from 46 million to 25 million. This would not only subtract nearly 45% of Ukraine’s 2013 population but also roughly two thirds of its GDP, given that the country’s eastern and southern provinces are far more industrialized than those of the center and west.[2]
So far, neither financial sanctions nor international condemnation of Russia’s aggressions against Ukraine have had the slightest deterrent effect against Putin’s strategy. Instead, he is now steadily undermining Kiev’s control of the country’s eastern oblasts in small slices – currently at the rate of two or three strategic centers per day – the same pace and playbook that enabled Russia to establish total control of Crimea within a matter of weeks.
Given its track record so far, the weak government in Kiev and its even weaker military and security forces are obviously powerless to put a stop to Putin’s Novorossiya strategy. Meanwhile, the western powers continue to talk but take actions that are patently having no deterrent value. Unless the U.S. and its European allies can manage a quantum leap in their sanctions and counter-measures, Putin’s strategy seems likely to continue to unfold, slowly but steadily, likely without need for any overt large-scale Russian military intervention other than menacing moves on Ukraine’s borders.
If this happens, not only will the map of Ukraine be dramatically redrawn, but the entire geopolitical balance of Europe will be decisively altered. And, needless to say, the fate of democracy in the region, which has already suffered worrisome erosion in several post-communist countries over the past few years, will be severely compromised.
And, beyond Europe, Putin will have taken a giant step towards creating his new Moscow-dominated Eurasian Union. This is a potentially massive geopolitical and economic bloc stretching through the Caucasus into post-Soviet Central Asia – with obvious negative global repercussions.
Putin’s Vision of “Greater Novorossiya”
Novorossiya (literally, New Russia) refers historically to a very large section of present-day Ukraine lying north of the Black Sea and stretching from Luhansk and Donetsk in the east to Odessa in the west. Russia, and subsequently the USSR, controlled this region from the 18th century until the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. But in the Soviet period it was part of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic rather than directly part of Russia.
Ominously, however, on April 17, when Putin evoked the memory of historic Novorossiya, he also exclaimed that only “God knows” why Russia surrendered this region in 1922 to Ukraine.
Just a few weeks earlier, Putin had described Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to incorporate Crimea into Ukraine in 1954 in a remarkably similar vein. The analogy seems all too obvious.
Furthermore, as if Putin’s concept of correcting historic anomalies were not sufficiently threatening, he quickly expanded his description of Novorossiya to include territories that lie well beyond its actual historical boundaries, most notably by explicitly including Kharkiv – a major city and important oblast that was never part of that historic region.
Furthermore, Putin and his hard-line Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, along with the Kremlin’s prolific propaganda machine, also regularly attempt to legitimize Russian intervention by focusing on the high number of “Russians” in Ukraine overall. Lavrov has also repeatedly claimed that Moscow has a right to protect Russian “citizens” in Ukraine – thus adding a further argument in favor of defining the new version of Novorossiya quite expansively.
http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_2-400x307.png
Putin’s Motives and Russian Grand Strategy
Vladimir Putin’s Ukraine strategy is driven by three goals: survival, empire and legacy.
First and foremost, Putin sees the fate of Ukraine as an existential issue both for himself and for the authoritarian regime that he and his inner circle have gradually rebuilt over the past fifteen years. The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a deep shock to Putin because of the echoes it created in Russia and because Ukraine seemed to be on the brink of becoming a major source of longer-term “democratic diffusion” right on Russia’s long southwestern border. Fortunately for Putin, however, the luster of this revolution quickly wore off once its leaders gained office and failed to live up to their reformist promises. From the start there was infighting between Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko; reforms were postponed; the Ukrainian economy spiraled downward and corruption remained rampant.
By the time Yushchenko’s presidency ended in 2010, many voters had come to see Viktor Yanukovych as a preferable alternative. Yanukovich also reportedly benefited from substantial financial and “political technology” support from Moscow. For Putin, Yanukovych was a promising alternative to the western-oriented “Orange” leaders, since he seemed likely to maintain strong trade and financial ties with Russia, show proper deference towards Moscow and, above all, keep Ukraine out of NATO. But it turned out that too many Ukrainians were unwilling to follow the Putin/Yanukovich script.
When Yanukovich fled Kiev on February 21, it must have seemed to the Kremlin that a second wave of the Orange Revolution had taken control of Ukraine. Putin no doubt trembled with fury – but also with fear.
Putin’s second driving motive for going all out to reassert as much dominance as possible in Ukraine combines his goals of restoring a Russian empire and of burnishing his personal legacy. It is abundantly clear that Putin seeks to restore Russia to its former imperial glory, and in so doing to secure for himself a place in history as one of the greatest Russian leaders of all time. In a 2005 speech, Putin famously stated that “the breakup of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century.”[3]
Putin’s comments on the Soviet Union, taken together with his current vision of Novorossiya, should make it crystal clear to the West that the crisis in Ukraine is not a small-scale conflict, nor simply an internal political problem between eastern and western Ukraine. Rather, a de facto war for control of Ukraine has begun – and Ukraine, in turn, is only a part (though a very important one) of Putin’s strategic plan to re-establish Russian hegemony over as much as possible of the former Soviet Union, and thus to reassert Russia’s role as a major global power.
Repeating the Crimea Playbook, Province by Province
Although his strategy in Ukraine is highly ambitious, Putin is clearly convinced that the most effective tactic is to proceed one stealthy step at a time. He will avoid overt military intervention if at all possible so as not to shock the western powers into genuinely painful countermeasures. Putin is clearly repeating the Crimea pattern in eastern Ukraine, having already established de facto control of over a dozen key locations in its most important eastern province, Donetsk. This is Ukraine’s most industrialized oblast[4], with a population of 74.9 percent Russian speakers and very strong industrial ties to Russia.
(http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_3-400x234.png)
The next three oblasts most immediately threatened by Russian stealth takeovers are Luhansk with 68.6 percent Russian speakers, Zaporizhia with 48.2 percent. Kherson with 24.9 percent also belongs on the immediately endangered list, despite its lower percentage of Russian-speakers, because Russia needs to control it along with Donetsk in order to create a “land bridge” between Russia and Crimea. A further “favorable” factor from Moscow’s viewpoint is that Kherson – along with Donetsk, Zaporizhia and part of Luhansk – falls largely within the boundaries of historic Novorossiya.
Beyond these four provinces, there have already been major Russian incursions into the two contiguous provinces of Luhansk and Kharkiv (which has a 44.3 percent Russian speaking population). And, as mentioned earlier, Putin has also proclaimed publically, even though inaccurately, that Kharkiv is part of Novorossiya.
To the west of the six oblasts mentioned above are Mykolaiv and Odessa, which have 29.4 percent and 41.9 percent Russian speakers, respectively. The strategic port city of Odessa has already seen the same type anti-Kiev agitation and organization of a secessionist movement that are the hallmarks of the Crimea playbook. Christian Caryl, an American journalist and editor of Foreign Policy’s Democracy Lab, has recently interviewed Odessans who are excited about the prospect of an autonomous Novorossiya state. He quotes one citizen as exclaiming, "A population of 20 million, with industry, resources. With advantages like that, who needs to become a part of Russia? By European standards that's already a good-sized country.”[5]
Language, Ethnicity and Attitudes
(http://www.fpri.org/docs/resize/image_4-400x240.png)
In claiming a Russian right to intervene in these eastern and southern provinces, it is clear that Moscow will use a maximalist definition of “Russians”. This means counting the number of Russian speakers rather than the number of ethnic Russians.[6] This is to Putin’s advantage, since the number of ethnic Russians in these provinces is much lower than the number of Russian speakers. Furthermore, not only do many Ukrainians living in the east and south acknowledge Russian as their native tongue, but an additional significant percentage speak the language fluently, which Moscow could well use as a further rationale either for the annexation of these provinces or to create an enlarged version of Novorossiya that would in fact be subservient to Moscow.
Beyond fueling ethnic and linguistic differences to justify Russia’s incursions into Ukraine, Putin is working systematically to create a permanent rift between eastern and western Ukrainians based on pre-existing differences of perspective and attitude, and by building upon manufactured confrontations and grievances.
Recent public opinion polls conducted by the Baltic Surveys/The Gallup Organization show that the linguistic and ethnic divisions between western and eastern Ukraine also correlate with the two regions’ viewpoints on a variety of issues including: Russia’s military excursion in Crimea, the EuroMaidan protests that ousted Yanukovich, and the upcoming presidential election on May 25.[7] According to the poll, over 94 percent of western Ukrainians believed Putin’s actions in Crimea constituted an invasion, while only 44 percent of eastern Ukrainians believed the same. In fact, 45 percent of eastern Ukrainians believed that the referendum in Crimea on joining Russia is a legitimate right of the residents of Crimea to express their opinion about the future of Crimea.
Sixty-six percent of citizens in western Ukraine said they viewed the Euromaidan events positively while only 7 percent of citizens in eastern Ukraine said the same. While 34 percent of citizens in western Ukraine said they would vote for Petro Poroshenko, the “chocolate oligarch”, in the upcoming presidential election, only 7 percent of eastern Ukrainians agreed, and 11 percent said they would vote for Serhiy Tihipko, a former member of Yanukovich’s Party of Regions who has taken a pro-federalization stance.
Perhaps most importantly, 59 percent of citizens in eastern Ukraine are already in favor of joining Russia’s Customs Union as opposed to 20 percent who are in favor of joining the European Union.
The total population of Putin’s ideal Greater Novorossiya (Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Dnepropetrovsk, Mykolaiv, Odessa, and Crimea), would be approximately 21 million. This would be a sizable potential addition to the Customs Union with Russia, Belarus, Armenia and Kazakhstan, which would give Putin’s Russia even stronger economic leverage against the European Union.
Russian journalist Yulia Latynina views Putin’s tactics in Crimea and eastern Ukraine as a new military strategy, in which the government controls and distorts information to cast Russia and the pro-Russian separatists as the victims. She argues that this “is far more important than achieving a military victory. To come out the winner in this scenario, you don't have to shoot your enemy. All you have to do is either kill your own men — or provoke others into killing them — and then portray it as an act of aggression by the enemy with all of the attendant media spin.”[8] Due to this media spin, all of the Ukrainian government’s attempts at diffusing the situation in the eastern provinces have horribly backfired.
Implications for Moldova and Beyond
Even assuming that Putin achieves his ambitious vision of a Greater Novorossiya, there is no guarantee that Putin will stop at Odessa. In fact, the contrary seems likely. Moldova would also be directly threatened. In March, the separatist de facto government in Transdniestria asked to be incorporated into the Russian federation.[9] Putin could thus easily repeat the same tactics that were successful in Crimea and are working in eastern Ukraine, in Transdniestria. This breakaway region would become independent from Moldova and possibly join the Novorossiya federation.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the potential impact of this scenario on the weak remainder state of Moldova or, for that matter of the putative rump state of central and western Ukraine. Suffice it to say that, if Ukraine and the West do not act decisively against Russian “irredentism” in eastern Ukraine, any state in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, or Central Asia with a Russian speaking minority could well be at risk of either dismemberment or of de facto Russian domination as the price of avoiding it.
Can Putin be Stopped?
It is hard to envision any realistic scenario whereby the current Ukrainian government in Kiev might stop this slow and steady dismemberment of the country. Given pro-Russian separatists’ success in seizing government buildings all across eastern Ukraine with impunity, what options does the current Ukrainian government have?
If Ukraine can manage to make serious military efforts to counteract the gradual slicing off of its provinces, Moscow will blame the resultant bloodshed on Western-instigated “fascists” in Kiev and would likely intervene militarily to assure the victory of the pro-Russian separatists whom they are currently instigating and assisting with semi-covert military support. Putin has already expressed indignation towards Ukraine’s miniscule “anti-terrorist operations” in the east and has called these actions a “grave crime.”[10]
Given Ukraine’s likely ineffectiveness in dealing with Russia’s incursions into its territory, what options does the West have in dealing with Russia’s increased aggression and imperialistic ambitions?
The U.S., its NATO allies and the European Union are left with two basic options. The first is to continue the current pattern of de facto acquiescence. The West can continue its current course of public condemnation and minor punitive economic and financial sanctions that stop short of really serious pain on either side. If so, Putin will almost certainly ignore the West’s sanctions, despite their toll on the Russian economy. He will thus move steadily ahead with his plan to either separate and federalize eastern and southern Ukraine, or incorporate it into Russia.
The alternative is for the West to undertake truly deep and thus mutually painful economic sanctions that would sharply reduce Russia’s oil and gas exports and revenues, decimate foreign investment and wreak havoc with that country’s economy. This would require going very far beyond the half-hearted European support for intensified sanctions against Russia that we have seen so far, especially among European countries with strong trade ties to Russia.[11]
And, given the insulation of Putin and his ruling elite from economic pain, there would also need to be a strong show of military resolve. The U.S. would need to at least double the number of its forces stationed in Europe (currently only 66,000 vs. 400,000 during the Cold War) and NATO would have to move several thousand European, Canadian and American troops to the eastern borders of Poland and the Baltic republics, and to northeastern Romania.
As of now, the West has not committed a substantial number of troops to the defense of Eastern Europe, despite its treaty obligations to defend these NATO members. On April 23rd, the U.S. sent 150 American troops, with 450 more expected to join them, to Poland as part of a military exercise.[12] However, these 150 troops are dwarfed by Russia’s 40,000 men stationed at the Ukrainian border.[13] From Putin’s expansive perspective, these micro-exercises are derisory at a time when he has held military exercises near Ukraine involving troops in the tens of thousands.
Putin will not be deterred by anything short of a commensurate show of resolve by the Western powers.
Unless and until the West takes a seriously strong stand against Putin’s undeclared war against Kiev and commits to keeping Ukraine united and independent, Putin will continue on his present path of stealth conquest. He will implement his own vision of Novorossiya as a step towards re-establishing a “Greater Russia” – one that continues its aggressive expansionism well beyond Ukraine and in which he plays a major role on the world stage dedicated to undercutting the West and its democratic values.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/21/opinion/russias-anti-west-isolationism.html?emc=edit_th_20140721&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
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By Robert D. Kaplan and Eugene Chausovsky
Editor's Note: With Russia, Europe and Ukraine continuing negotiations over natural gas supplies this week, Stratfor is republishing this Global Affairs column from November 2013. In addition to detailing the web of energy pipelines that connects the two landmasses, Chief Geopolitical Analyst Robert D. Kaplan and Senior Eurasia Analyst Eugene Chausovsky make the case that the relationship between Russia and Europe revolves around hydrocarbons -- and that Moscow's best option is to preserve as much of its European market share as possible.
At this juncture in history, the fate of Europe is wound up not in ideas but in geopolitics. For millennia, eruptions from Asia have determined the fate of Europe, including invasions and migrations by Russians, Turkic tribes and Byzantine Greeks. Central and Eastern Europe, with their geographical proximity to the Asian steppe and the Anatolian land bridge, have borne the brunt of these cataclysms. Today is no different, only it is far subtler. Armies are not marching; rather, hydrocarbons are flowing. For that is the modern face of Russian influence in Europe. To understand the current pressures upon Europe from the east it is necessary to draw a map of energy pipelines.
Russian-European Natural Gas Networks
Click to Enlarge
One-quarter of all energy for Europe comes from Russia, but that statistic is an average for the whole continent; thus, as one moves successively from Western Europe to Central Europe to Eastern Europe that percentage rises dramatically. Natural gas is more important than oil in this story, but let us consider oil first.
Russia is among the top oil producers worldwide and has among the largest reserves, with vast deposits in both western and eastern Siberia. Crucially, Russia is now investing in the technology necessary to preserve its position as a major energy hub for years and decades to come, though it is an open question whether current production levels can be maintained in the long term. Russia's primary gateway to Europe for oil (and natural gas) is Belarus in the north and Ukraine in the south. The Druzhba pipeline network takes Russian oil through Belarus to Poland and Germany in the north and in the south through Ukraine to Central Europe and the Balkans, as well as to Italy. Russia certainly has influence in Europe on account of its oil, and has occasionally used its oil as a means of political pressure on Belarus and Ukraine. But moving westward into Europe, negotiations over Russian oil are generally about supply and pricing, not political factors. It is really with natural gas that energy becomes a useful political tool for Russia.
Russia is, after the United States, simply the largest producer of natural gas worldwide, with trillions of cubic meters of reserves. Europe gets 25 percent of its natural gas from Russia, though, again, that figure rises dramatically in Central and Eastern Europe; generally, the closer a country is to Russia, the more dependent it is on Russian natural gas. Central Europe (with the exception of Romania, which has its own reserves) draws roughly 70 percent of the natural gas it consumes from Russia. Belarus, Bulgaria and the Baltic states depend on Russia for 90-100 percent of their natural gas needs. Russia has used this dependence to influence these states' decision-making, offering beneficial terms to states that cooperate with Moscow, while charging higher prices and occasionally cutting off supplies altogether to those that don't. This translates into real geopolitical power, even if the Warsaw Pact no longer exists.
The Yamal pipeline system brings Russian natural gas to Poland and Germany via Belarus. The Blue Stream pipeline network brings Russian natural gas to Turkey. Nord Stream, which was completed in 2011, brings Russian natural gas directly to Germany via the Baltic Sea, cutting out the need for a Belarus-Poland land route. Thus, Belarus and Poland now have less leverage over Russia, even as they are mainly dependent on Russia for their own natural gas supplies by way of separate pipelines.
The next major geopolitical piece in this massive network is the proposed South Stream pipeline. South Stream would transport Russian natural gas across the Black Sea to Bulgaria, Serbia, Hungary and Austria, with another line running to Italy via the Balkans and the Adriatic. South Stream could make Central Europe and the Balkans more dependent on Russia, even as Russia does not require Ukraine for the project. This, combined with Nord Stream, helps Russia tighten its grip on Ukraine.
But there is also Caspian Sea oil and natural gas to consider, particularly from Azerbaijan, which inhibits Russia's monopoly. Oil and natural gas pipelines built with the help of Western energy companies in the 2000s bring energy from the Azerbaijani capital of Baku through Georgia to Turkey and onwards to Europe. Furthermore, the Nabucco pipeline network has the potential to bring Caspian Sea natural gas across the Caucasus and Turkey all the way to Austria, with spur lines coming from Iraq and Iran. Obviously, this is a complex and politically fraught project that has not materialized. Winning out over Nabucco has been the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), a far less ambitious network that will bring Azerbaijani natural gas across Turkey to Greece and Italy. Because TAP avoids Central Europe and the Balkans, its selection over Nabucco constitutes a clear victory for Russia, which wants Central and Eastern Europe dependent on it and not on Azerbaijan for energy. In fact, Russian political pressure was a factor in TAP's victory over Nabucco.
The real long-term threat to Russian influence in Europe comes less from Azerbaijan than from the building of liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminals. These are facilities located on coastlines that convert LNG back to natural gas after it has been liquefied to enable transport across seas and oceans. With an LNG terminal, a country is less dependent on pipelines emanating from Russia. Poland and Lithuania are building such terminals on the Baltic Sea and Croatia wants to build one on the Adriatic. The Visegrad countries of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia have been building pipeline interconnectors, in part to integrate with -- and take advantage of -- these Baltic terminals. This LNG comes from many sources, including North Africa, the Middle East and North America. That is why Russia is deeply concerned about vast shale gas discoveries in the United States and elsewhere in Europe -- natural gas that could eventually be exported with the help of LNG terminals to Central and Eastern Europe.
Russia is also worried about the European Union's attempt to break its energy monopoly through legal means. According to new legislation known as the Third Energy Package, which is still in the process of being implemented, one energy company cannot be responsible for production, distribution and sales, because the European Union defines that as a monopoly. And such monopolistic practices actually describe Russian energy companies like Gazprom. If the European Union gets its way, Russian corporate control will be unbundled.
Therefore, we forecast that Russia's use of energy to extract political concessions will weaken over time, but will nevertheless remain formidable in parts of Central and Eastern Europe. While energy has served as an effective tool for Russia to wield political influence in Europe, Moscow is first and foremost concerned about maintaining the revenue from energy exports that has become so crucial for Russia's own budget and economic stability. In this sense, maintaining European market share (and further developing market share in Asia) takes precedence over political manipulation for Moscow.
Consequently, Russia will have to become even more subtle and sophisticated in the way that it deals with its former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact satellites.
Read more: Pipelines of Empire | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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In the context of Putin running Russia, this seems quite plausible to me:
Russia’s Next Land Grab
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/opinion/russias-next-land-grab.html?_r=1
WASHINGTON — UKRAINE isn’t the only place where Russia is stirring up trouble. Since the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, Moscow has routinely supported secessionists in bordering states, to coerce those states into accepting its dictates. Its latest such effort is unfolding in the South Caucasus.
In recent weeks, Moscow seems to have been aggravating a longstanding conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan while playing peacemaking overlord to both. In the first week of August, as many as 40 Armenian and Azerbaijani soldiers were reported killed in heavy fighting near their border, just before a summit meeting convened by Russia’s president, Vladimir V. Putin.
The South Caucasus may seem remote, but the region borders Russia, Iran and Turkey, and commands a vital pipeline route for oil and natural gas to flow from Central Asia to Europe without passing through Russia. Western officials cannot afford to let another part of the region be digested by Moscow — as they did when Russia separated South Ossetia and Abkhazia from Georgia, just to the north, in a brief war in 2008, and when it seized Crimea from Ukraine this year.
Conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan is not new. From 1992 to 1994, war raged over which former Soviet republic would control the autonomous area of Nagorno-Karabakh, a mountainous region with a large Christian Armenian population of about 90,000 within the borders of largely Muslim Azerbaijan. The conflict has often been framed as “ethnic,” but Moscow has fed the antagonisms. That war ended with an Armenian military force, highly integrated with Russia’s military, in charge of the zone. The war had killed 30,000 people and made another million refugees.
Even today, Armenia controls nearly 20 percent of Azerbaijan’s territory, comprising most of Nagorno-Karabakh and several surrounding regions. Despite a cease-fire agreement since 1994, hostilities occasionally flare, and Russian troops run Armenia’s air defenses. Moscow also controls key elements of Armenia’s economy and infrastructure.
More to the point, Russia has found ways to keep the conflict alive. Three times in the 1990s, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed peace agreements, but Russia found ways to derail Armenia’s participation. (In 1999, for example, a disgruntled journalist suspected of having been aided by Moscow assassinated Armenia’s prime minister, speaker of Parliament and other government officials.)
An unresolved conflict — a “frozen conflict,” Russia calls it — gives Russian forces an excuse to enter the region and coerce both sides. Once Russian forces are in place, neither side can cooperate closely with the West without fear of retribution from Moscow.
The latest violence preceded a summit meeting on Aug. 10 in Sochi, Russia, at which Mr. Putin sought an agreement on deploying additional Russian “peacekeepers” between Armenia and Azerbaijan. On July 31, Armenians began a coordinated, surprise attack in three locations. Azerbaijan’s president, Ilham H. Aliyev, and defense minister were outside their country during the attack and Mr. Aliyev had not yet agreed to attend the summit meeting. But the Armenian president, Serzh A. Sargsyan, had agreed to; it’s unlikely that his military would have initiated such a provocation without coordinating with Russia. (The meeting went on, without concrete results.)
Before the meeting, Moscow had been tightening its grip on the South Caucasus, with Armenia’s tacit support. Last fall, Armenia’s government gave up its ambitions to sign a partnership agreement with the European Union and announced that it would join Moscow’s customs union instead.
Renewed open warfare would give Russia an excuse to send in more troops, under the guise of peacekeeping. Destabilizing the South Caucasus could also derail a huge gas pipeline project, agreed to last December, that might lighten Europe’s dependence on Russian fuel.
But astonishingly, American officials reacted to the current fighting by saying they “welcome” the Russian-sponsored summit meeting. Has Washington learned nothing from Georgia and Ukraine? To prevent escalation of the Caucasus conflict, and deny Mr. Putin the pretext for a new land grab, President Obama should invite the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia to Washington and show that America has not abandoned the South Caucasus. This would encourage the leaders to resist Russia’s pressure. The United Nations General Assembly session, which opens next week, seems like an excellent moment for such a demonstration of support.
Washington should put the blame on Russia and resist any so-called conflict resolution that leads to deployment of additional Russian troops in the region.
Finally, the West needs a strategy to prevent Moscow from grabbing another bordering region. Nagorno-Karabakh, however remote, is the next front in Russia’s efforts to rebuild its lost empire. Letting the South Caucasus lose its sovereignty to Russia would strike a deadly blow to America’s already diminished ability to seek and maintain alliances in the former Soviet Union and beyond.
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Excellent find.
Please post here as well: http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1673.0
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Russia Refocuses on the Middle East
Geopolitical Diary
December 11, 2014 | 02:49 GMT Text Size Print
Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has maintained an active travel schedule in the Middle East recently. Bogdanov, a career Russian diplomat with decades of experience in the Middle East, coordinates closely with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and is considered a serious behind-the-scenes player in terms of Russia's diplomatic efforts in the region. (Putin named him as his special envoy to the Middle East on Nov. 1.) This is why we took note of Wednesday's announcement by the Russians that they are ready to host a meeting between the United States and Syrian President Bashar al Assad's government in Moscow if both sides request it, although serious impediments to such a scenario remain.
The announcement comes on the heels of high-level Russian moves in Turkey and Iran. Moscow's announced plans to abandon the South Stream natural gas project in favor of a pipeline running directly though Turkey, along with Russia's involvement in the P-5+1 nuclear talks with Tehran in recent weeks, reflect a resurgence of Russian diplomatic activity in the Middle East.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Russia's complicated relationship with Iran limits the role Moscow can play in Iranian diplomatic efforts — a reality reinforced by Tehran's announcement on Wednesday that it would not be entering an oil bartering deal with Moscow, despite a recent flurry of Russian media reports claiming that such a deal is imminent.
Moscow understands the limits of reaching a lasting strategic accord with Iran, but Russia's primary goals in its Middle East strategy are not necessarily better bilateral relations with individual states such as Iran, Egypt or Syria. Rather, Russian activities in the Middle East are meant to augment its global strategies, especially with regard to directing U.S. attention away from areas that the Kremlin considers threatened by Washington's actions, such as Ukraine. Russia has been successful in its Middle East activities, most notably in negotiating a chemical weapons destruction plan that deterred direct U.S. military strikes against Syria in 2013.
Russia also aims to limit U.S. opportunities for building more stable relationships in the Middle East. Moscow has been successful in this regard, as illustrated most recently by Turkey and Russia's plans to transit natural gas to Europe, circumventing Ukraine, and in a more limited sense with Moscow's relationship with Tehran. A meeting between the United States and al Assad also risks alienating the United States from regional allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia, which strongly oppose any policy that could result in the al Assad government staying in place as part of a negotiated settlement.
Over the past month traveling across the Middle East, Bogdanov has hosted representatives from Syria in Moscow and met with the Qataris in Bahrain. Amid mounting domestic economic difficulties and ongoing tensions with the West over Ukraine, Moscow is reverting to what has become a familiar and successful tactic in recent years.
Russia's intentions in the Middle East are hardly altruistic. If Russia wants to mediate for the motley crew of combatants and foreign nations playing supporting roles in the Syrian conflict, the primary goal is unlikely to be peace. However, by refusing to be sidelined in global discussions and by continuing to draw U.S. attention and effort into the traditional quagmire of Middle Eastern conflict, Russia hopes to better secure its own interests in its strategic periphery. Moscow has faced a strong challenge to its position in Ukraine, and its energy-dependent economy will struggle to adjust to the current downtown in global oil prices. Russia is far from down for the count, however, and recent diplomatic moves in the Middle East show that Moscow is still a formidable geopolitical player.
Read more: Russia Refocuses on the Middle East | Stratfor
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http://20committee.com/
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http://www.glennbeck.com/2015/01/12/glenn-delivers-a-truly-horrifying-look-at-the-origins-of-the-russian-threat/
Is he crazy or on to something?
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Second post-- but please remember to comment on the first one:
How Foreigners Can Help the Russian Military
Analysis
January 14, 2015 | 10:00 GMT Print Text Size
Russian soldiers march in Moscow's Red Square on May 9, 2014, during a Victory Day parade. (KIRILL KUDRYAVTSEV/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree Jan. 3 that will allow foreign nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 to serve in the military. The decree came with several stipulations: Foreigners must speak Russian, have no criminal record and sign contracts obligating them to serve for at least five years. This new initiative seeks to solve Moscow's difficulties in reaching its goal of maintaining a million-strong military and transitioning from a conscript-dominated system to one staffed by professional soldiers. Adding foreign troops to the mix will also help Russia tie itself more closely to the former Soviet periphery while also allowing it to engage in conflicts with less impact on the Russian public. Ultimately, however, Russia's military problems are tied to the nation's demographic challenge, which is far too great to be solved by a simple change in policy. But while including foreign servicemen in its military cannot fully resolve the major demographic constraints the Russian military is facing, the decree does provide certain benefits to Moscow.
Analysis
This initiative is not a complete departure from Russian military tradition. The armed forces have a long history of including fighters who are not ethnic Russians, providing it with the expertise necessary to incorporate and deploy foreign troops. During World War II, for example, the Soviet Union used Polish fighters. In recent history, ethnic minorities from Russia's borderlands and citizens of the former Soviet states have fought for the country. Moscow has relied on the 40,000 members of the Chechen Brigades to carry out military and policing operations in key hotspots, particularly in the Caucasus region. Russia has even established specialized Chechen units directly subordinate to the Main Intelligence Directorate, including the Vostok and Zapad units, which saw active service in the 2008 war with Georgia. Russia's new initiative, however, will expand regulations to include troops from outside Russia proper. It will also be the first time the military has institutionalized such a policy since the establishment of the Russian Federation.
Russia's military primarily relies on a nationwide draft, but Moscow has found maintaining adequate troop numbers difficult using this system. During the 1990s, Russia's birthrate dropped precipitously, and now the nation's demographics are entering a period of decline in which the number of military-age men will continue to shrink. This has already begun to have an impact. In the latest autumn draft, the government was only able to call up 154,000 men — far short of the 300,000 needed to sustain the level of 1 million service members Moscow has set. Broadening the pool of recruits will help alleviate this problem, but cannot fully resolve it.
Moscow's decision to allow foreigners to join the Russian armed forces goes beyond the drop in conscription numbers. In recent years, Russia has made considerable efforts to transition its force away from one that is reliant on conscripts toward a force with a majority of contracted soldiers. Russian conscripts only serve a one-year term — barely enough time to train to an effective level — before their service ends. Contracted soldiers, by contrast, serve multiple years as stipulated by their agreement and are, in effect, professional soldiers. Russia can rely on these more experienced soldiers to operate complex military systems such as nuclear missile launch units and to man elite paratrooper regiments.
Moscow has already stepped up efforts to recruit contracted soldiers from the Russian population, but the stigma associated with service hazing, competition from the civilian job market and underlying health problems that disqualify a large number of potential recruits have limited this initiative's success. By requiring a five-year commitment, Putin's decree allowing foreign servicemen to enter the military aims to further improve the ratio of contracted soldiers to conscripts.
But the push to recruit foreign nationals transcends demographic considerations and the desire to improve the military's ratio of professional soldiers to volunteers. Their status as foreigners — and thus not members of the Russian public as a whole — makes them useful to Moscow. For any nation, dispatching forces to achieve foreign policy objectives carries the risk of creating a public outcry. Because of this, France and Spain established their own foreign legions — France in 1831 and Spain in 1920. For Russia specifically, decreasing the number of Russian nationals in its forces will help to ease public pressure when Moscow deploys forces for dangerous missions along its periphery, helping it avoid backlash in cases of high casualty numbers. Russian action in Ukraine has already come up against this hurdle. Moscow has had to deal with embarrassing complaints from its citizens over the loss of loved ones in Ukraine — even as it continues to deny any significant involvement in the conflict.
Including foreigners in its military will also have the added benefit of forwarding Russia's continued attempts to foster links with neighboring states. Because of their proximity and the requirement that the new soldiers speak Russian, foreign-born contract soldiers will likely come disproportionately from the former Soviet periphery. These states all have considerable ethnic Russian populations, and the Russian language is widely spoken, even among the general population. Russia will see Belarusians, Armenians and Kyrgyz as prime candidates because of Russia's continued military presence and close ties to the countries. The breakaway territories that Moscow recognizes as independent — including Transdniestria and Abkhazia — will also be optimal sources of foreign nationals. Eventually, this could even extend to the large and diverse set of foreigners already present and fighting in eastern Ukraine's Donbas region.
By opening up recruitment to foreign nationals, the Russian Armed Forces can provide considerable benefits to Russia as it seeks to continue improving its military. The total number of foreign servicemen that meet Russia's specific requirements, however, is limited. Foreigners will neither dominate nor significantly alter the underlying force structure of the Russian military — they will remain a controllable minority. The decree, however, does highlight continued attempts by the Russian military to enhance its power through conventional and unconventional means despite major funding and demographic constraints.
Read more: How Foreigners Can Help the Russian Military | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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Third post. Hope people are giving this some attention.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KuRmiXjAgg
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/01/13/truly-terrifying-beck-introduces-viewers-to-the-man-he-believes-is-the-architect-of-russias-geopolitical-strategy/
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Third post. Hope people are giving this some attention.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5KuRmiXjAgg
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/01/13/truly-terrifying-beck-introduces-viewers-to-the-man-he-believes-is-the-architect-of-russias-geopolitical-strategy/
Not on my radar until now.
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http://www.glennbeck.com/2015/01/14/will-putin-plunge-the-globe-into-world-war-3-the-past-gives-us-a-look-at-the-future/
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Second post
http://www.glennbeck.com/2015/01/13/the-root-of-the-problem-russia-part-1-2/
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http://www.armytimes.com/story/military/2015/01/20/russia-iran-sign-military-cooperation-deal/22037329/
Russia-India nuke plants
http://rt.com/business/213411-going-nuclear-russia-india/
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20committee.com
Russia’s Emerging Holy War
At the beginning of this week, President Barack Obama explained that Russia, hit hard by Western sanctions, is losing in its confrontation with the West and NATO caused by Vladimir Putin’s aggression in Ukraine. In his State of the Union address, Obama displayed similar swag and bluster against both the Kremlin and Congressional Republicans, seemingly without regard for any recent events. As the President explained:
We’re upholding the principle that bigger nations can’t bully the small — by opposing Russian aggression, supporting Ukraine’s democracy and reassuring our NATO allies. Last year, as we were doing the hard work of imposing sanctions along with our allies, some suggested that Mr. Putin’s aggression was a masterful display of strategy and strength. Well, today, it is America that stands strong and united with our allies, while Russia is isolated, with its economy in tatters. That’s how America leads — not with bluster, but with persistent, steady resolve.
“Every one of these sentences is, to put it mildly, a stretch,” explained one seasoned Kremlin-watcher, and the news this week from Ukraine has been grim, contra Obama’s hopeful pose. While Russia’s economy remains seriously hurt from sanctions and, even more, the sharp drop in oil prices, the notion that this is taming Putin’s baser urges is not only untrue, it’s more likely the opposite of the truth, as I cautioned a month ago.
Facts have increasingly been getting in the way of this White House’s messaging, on many fronts, so just as Obama now calls for political bipartisanship, after six years of doing the opposite, all the while ignoring the massive blowout of his own party by the Republicans in Congress that just happened again, for the second time in his presidency, Obama likewise seems to think that a bit of swag, plus a public taunt, aimed at Putin when the former KGB man is down on his luck will have the desired geopolitical effect. This White House does not seem to dwell on the fact that, while the domestic enemy may be politically obstructionist, the foreign enemy has all sorts of Special War unpleasantness in his arsenal, not to mention thousands of nuclear weapons.
If nothing else, the current crisis has demonstrated to Russians, with Kremlin prodding, that the United States remains their Main Enemy that it was for decades, now led by the arrogant and weak Obama, who is hated by the Russian public. The Chekists who run Putin’s Russia, who protested for years that America wanted to defeat Russia’s post-Cold War resurgence, that the U.S. will stop at nothing to bring Russia to heel while humiliating it, have been proved right, at least as far as most Russians are concerned.
To the shock and dismay of hopeful Westerners, including nearly all NATO leaders, the hard hit of sanctions has caused Russians to hate the West, not Putin. Most Russians view their war in Ukraine as a legitimate defense of Russians and Russian interests, certainly nothing like America’s aggressive wars of choice halfway around the world, and they are backing the Kremlin now.
Word of this defiance has even crept into The New York Times, which otherwise is a pitch-perfect expression of the WEIRD worldview. As Russian troops are advancing deeper into Ukraine, fresh from victory at Donetsk, NYT asked what on earth is going on here, why would Russians want more war now that the cost of it all to their economy is becoming obvious? The explanation was proffered by a Moscow economist: “The influence of economists as a whole has completely vanished,” he opined about the Kremlin: “The country is on a holy mission. It’s at war with the United States, so why would you bother about the small battleground, the economy?”
Once again, Westerners have imagined Putin is just like one of their leaders — cautious, timid even, obsessed with Wall Street and finely tuned to what big donors care about — when our Chekist-in-Charge is nothing of the sort. With perfect timing, Patriarch Kirill, the head of the powerful Russian Orthodox Church, addressed the Duma this week, for the very first time, delivering a speech long on social conservatism, including a plea to ban abortions to help Russian demographics, as well as a caution to ignore the West’s dangerous “pseudo-values.” Putin’s Russia is inching ever closer to Byzantine-style symphonia, and in the war against America and the West that is coming — and, according to many Russians, is already here — the Kremlin wants its people to be spiritually fortified for a long fight.
Bankers and oligarchs, who get much attention from the Western media, have become peripheral figures in Moscow. Months before the Ukraine crisis broke with Russia’s seizure of Crimea, Putin privately warned wealthy men whom he deemed friends and supporters to start getting their money out of the West, as tough times were coming. In the Kremlin’s view, oligarchs who failed to do this, and are now facing ruin, have nobody to blame but themselves. Any billionaires who criticize Putin too freely will meet with prison or worse.
It’s increasingly clear that the security sector, what Russians term the special services, are running the show. They are Putin’s natural powerbase, his “comfort zone” in Western parlance, plus they are the guarantor of his maintaining power as the economic crisis worsens. Current reports indicate that Putin’s inner circle now is made up entirely of siloviki, to use the Russian term, men from the special services: National Security Council head Nikolai Patrushev, Federal Security Service (FSB) head Aleksandr Bortnikov, Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) head Mikhail Fradkov, and Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu.
Patrushev headed the FSB from 1999, the beginning of Putin’s presidency, to 2008, and was a previously a career KGB officer, serving in Leningrad counterintelligence just like Putin: and just like Putin, he is a Chekist to his core. Current FSB director Bortnikov, who took over from Patrushev in 2008, is another career Chekist who joined the KGB after college and, yet again, comes out of the Leningrad office. Fradkov is not officially a Chekist by background, having spent the early years of his Kremlin career in foreign trade matters, but he was “close” to the KGB during that time, and he has headed the SVR, the successor to the KGB’s elite First Chief Directorate, since 2007; it says something about Putin’s confidence in him that Fradkov survived the 2010 debacle of the exposure of the SVR’s Illegals network in the United States, which was nearly as demoralizing to the SVR as the Snowden Operation has been for U.S. intelligence. The last, Shoygu, who has headed the powerful defense ministry since 2012, is not a military man by background, yet has longstanding ties to military intelligence (GRU).
As Russia’s economic crisis has mounted, Putin has unsurprisingly turned to fellow Chekists, some of them very like himself by background. They share a worldview which is conspiratorial and deeply anti-Western; they view America as their Main Enemy and now believe Obama is on a mission to destroy Russia. That they will not allow, and they will stop at nothing to halt what prominent Orthodox clerics recently have termed the “American project” that wants to destroy Holy Russia. This volatile combination of Chekist conspiracy-thinking and Orthodox Third Rome mysticism, plus Russian xenophobia and a genuine economic crisis, means that 2015 promises to be a dangerous year for the world. The Kremlin now believes they are at war with the United States, an Orthodox Holy War in the eyes of many Russians, and that struggle is defensive and legitimate. It would be good if Obama and his staff paid attention. This is about much more than Ukraine.
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https://www.facebook.com/video.php?v=10154038553947588&fref=nf
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http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-03-23/russia-is-weak-punching-above-its-weight-friedman
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Stratfor Video
Conversation: Russia's Perfect Economic Storm — Stratfor Senior Managing Editor Ben Sheen and Senior Eurasia Analyst Lauren Goodrich discuss the economic factors that are putting pressure on the Kremlin's control over Russia.
"It seems that the media has really been focusing on the really big picture of the recession inside of Russia. However, there is a growing, even more dangerous issue economically, in that the Russian regions are really getting further and further into crisis. The Russian regions were already in crisis even before 2014. Their debts since 2010 keep on doubling and doubling and doubling, and now we've had close to 100 to 150 percent rise in debts within the Russian regions, just over the past few years. That's astonishing when you think of Russia having 83 regions. Now, the Russian economic minister has suggested that possibly 60 of those 83 regions are in crisis mode at this time, and there's even speculation that 20 of them are already defaulting on their debt, even though the government itself doesn’t want to make it really public yet.
Video: Conversation: Russia's Perfect Economic Storm
Remember that Russia is a country that is not a united country. It is a very regionalized, localized country, in which it's almost like 83 different countries that are all put together. That's why it is a true federation. And having dissent within the regions has always been one of the root causes that collapses Russia eventually. And Putin of everyone knows this. So he's going to ensure that those specific regions that are the most resistant to rule from Moscow are going to be taken care of first. And then those regions that are a little bit more Russified are the ones that he's going to allow to fester within their economic crisis.
Putin is trying to prove a point. He's trying to prove a point to the West that he can isolate Russia from the West, from Western foods, and keep Russia Russia. The problem is that in doing this, he is actually hurting the Russian people. Putin came into power with a social contract with the Russian people, on "you will always receive your paychecks; I will keep the economy growing; I will quadruple — pretty much — standard of living; you will have Western-style foods and goods inside of Russia." And now we're seeing Putin having to step back from that social contract that has kept his popularity so high for the past 15 years, just in order to counter what is happening with the standoff with the West. So Putin is pretty much struggling between two crises: Does he want to counter the West, or does he want to ensure that his social contract with the Russian people remains intact?"
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http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/193990/putins-great-crime-syria
In these grim times, I am afforded light relief by CNN—the only news channel offered by the treadmill of my Tokyo apartment house—as its presenters and pundits gravely debate the motives behind Putin’s investment in Syria. His own version is that he is fighting “extremism,” which oddly enough is the same dark threat that President Barack Obama also recognizes while rigorously avoiding the qualifiers Islamic, Islamist, or Muslim—although he will refer to Isol, prompting the thought that it is impossible to defeat an enemy one is afraid to name. There is no Isol or even Isis anymore, because the good old ad-Dawlah al-Islamiyah fi’l-ʿIraq wa-sh-Sham—the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria—has long since become the Islamic State of everywhere from Nigeria to Afghanistan, no doubt also including the British Isles and Michigan. Ignoring earnest declarations of its un-Islamic character solemnly issued by non-Muslim presidents, premiers, and prelates, volunteers who recognize the authenticity of the Islamic State keep pouring into its still-expanding borders, easily offsetting the casualties inflicted by the very expensive U.S. bombing campaign, now joined by the British, French, … and Putin, whose air force already claims dozens of air strikes against the common foe.
Putin’s enthusiasm for the great cause might be expected to earn him some gratitude. Instead, the Russian leader is criticized by wise CNN pundits—and by the Obama Administration—for seeking to defend his client Assad by bombing his other enemies as well, i.e., the dozens of quarreling Islamist bands that grandly call themselves Jaysh al-Fatah, “the army of conquest,” the several quarreling factions of Syrian Army defectors that call themselves al-Jaysh as-Suri al-Ḥurr, “the free Syrian army,” the unabashedly extremist al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat an-Nuṣrah, which is much stronger than both, and, above all, the brave “pro-democracy” warriors armed and trained by the United States itself, under a $500 million program.
In reality Putin’s young bombing campaign has hit very few Islamic State targets. Yes, aircraft have flown and bombs have been dropped, but the Russians have no ground intelligence in place to identify targets any more than the United States has, except in those rare occasions when black-flagged vehicles are actually seen driving around in broad daylight—which is why the Islamic State has expanded ever since the U.S. bombing started. But Putin must certainly be innocent of the accusation that his air force has bombed the U.S.-trained “pro-democracy” freedom fighters, because the trainers themselves have admitted that the first lot on which one-tenth of the budget has been spent, i.e., $50 million, are exactly five in number, the rest having deserted after receiving their big family-support signing bonus and first paycheck, or after they were first issued with weapons (which they sold), or after first entering Syria in groups, when they promptly joined the anti-American Jabhat an-Nuṣrah, whose Sunni Islam they understand, unlike talk of democracy. That guarantees Putin’s innocence: All five extant U.S.-made freedom fighters are reportedly alive and well, though one may have defected since the last count. (It would really be much cheaper to hire Salvadoran contract gunmen and fit them out in Arab head-dresses.)
On the other hand Putin is certainly guilty of defending Assad’s regime and indeed of wanting to preserve it in the capital-city area of Damascus if possible, or at least in the natural redoubt of the coastal strip from Lebanon to Turkey where Assad’s fellow Alawites outnumber the Sunni Muslims ranged against him, and which also has room for Syria’s Christians, Ismaili, Twelver Shia, and urban Druze who suffer persecution and sometimes outright massacre wherever Sunni insurgents of any kind advance (the only difference is that the Islamic State documents its killings in vivid color), and that happens to include the city of Tartus, home of a Russian ex-Soviet naval base since 1971, which happens to be the one and only overseas base of the Russian Federation anywhere in the world, and which greatly adds to the naval value of Putin’s conquest of Crimea, where his Sevastopol naval base is on the wrong side of the Dardanelles. With refueling and light repairs in Tartus, the Russian navy can operate continuously in the Mediterranean, and prevail in the eastern Mediterranean, especially now that the historic U.S. Sixth Fleet is down to a ship or two, the rest of the shrinking U.S. Navy having long since gone to the Indian Ocean or the Pacific.
So, yes, Ladies and Gentlemen, the aforementioned accused, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin is guilty of a very great crime: He defends his allies and attacks his enemies—conduct particularly reprehensible in the eyes of the Obama Administration, which does the exact opposite. Obama’s America dislikes Japan’s staunchly pro-American Prime Minister Abe (deemed “insufficiently apologetic”), it spurns the calls for action of Britain’s Cameron and Hollande of France, and has missed no opportunity to denigrate Benjamin Netanyahu, even as it eagerly embraces the bleak dictators of Cuba and of course Hassan Fereydoun a.k.a. Rouhani, president of the “death to America” Islamic republic of Iran and de facto chief nuclear negotiator—for the second time. The first time, from Oct. 6, 2003 to Aug. 15, 2005, when Rouhani was the official negotiator, under the equally mellifluous President Mohammad Khatami, he boasted that he had used the talks “to buy time to advance Iran’s nuclear program”—but that is not something that would dissuade an American administration that is intensely suspicious, but only of its allies.
Side with the Americans and you will be promptly abandoned if troublemakers force the police to shoot. Side with Putin’s Russia and you will be supported no matter what.
Putin is a very peculiar character who believes that the president of a country should give a very high priority to the enhancement of its own power, which is admittedly an old-fashioned pursuit as compared to the hundreds of initiatives that the Obama Administration has deemed more important than the upkeep of American power and credibility on the global scene. The administration has a growing list of disastrous failures to show for its preoccuptions, from the Ukraine to Afghanistan. In each case, there has been neither an effective engagement nor a clean disengagement but only vapid assurances, agonizing indecision, gross policy errors by visibly incompetent officials (who keep embarrassing Obama without being re-assigned to parking duties) and really appalling execution—as in the Iran negotiation, which ended with Secretary of State John Kerry camped in Geneva, and very visibly unwilling to leave without his agreement, for which he made the most embarrassing last-minute concessions (including the amazing 24-day advance warning of inspections), acting no differently than first-time bazaar customers who buy ancient, historic, unique, imperial Persian palace carpet for a mere (“only for you”) 10,000, a nice mark-up over the 49.99 charged by its Pakistani manufacturer. When it comes to execution, even that shameful silliness is exceeded by the botched Syria operation of that Obama favorite, CIA director John O. Brennan, who thinks of himself as a great Middle East expert, yet cannot read Arabic, Hebrew, Persian, or Turkish.
Putin is different. He has two aims in Syria, both utterly realistic: Keep his Tartus base that makes Russia a Mediterranean Great Power (look at the competition) at very low cost, and demonstrate that it really pays to serve Russia. The Americans abruptly dropped Hosni Mubarak like a rotten apple after decades of obedient service because his police shot at some demonstrators: Russia still supports Assad vigorously no matter what. The message resonates with potentates across the region, none of whom happens to be democratically elected (with the exception of Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan who is doing his best to undo his country’s democracy). Side with the Americans and you will be promptly abandoned if troublemakers force the police to shoot. Side with Putin’s Russia and you will be supported no matter what. So it little matters what happens to Assad in the end: Putin has already won the credibility competition, which earns him and Russia real gains.
***
Putin is also different in his understanding of the business of diplomacy. The Obama version is that the practicalities of any actual transaction are much less important than their decoration with fashionably modish principles and procedures, including genuflections to the forever useless United Nations. Hence none can expect to exchange X for Y in dealing with the Obama White House and Administration—it all has to go through its indecision machine that delays everything inordinately, at the very least.
By contrast, when Netanyahu heard that Putin was sending fighter-bombers to Syria, over which Israeli fight-bombers must operate from time to time to destroy trucks carrying Iran-supplied missiles to Hezbollah, thus opening the very real possibility of deadly aerial encounters, there were no lengthy pre-negotiation palavers to arrange for preparatory meetings that might one day lead to a meeting of the principals, in the manner of the Obama Administration. Instead Netanyahu asked for a quick meeting, Putin responded by inviting him to come to Moscow right away, where the two right away agreed that the Russians would telephone Cohen before taking off to bomb—that being Yossi Cohen, Bibi’s National Security Advisor and ex Deputy Director of the Mossad and its likely future director, yet known as “the model” as in fashion, not as “Cohen the spy” as per the very old joke (he might be the other Cohen, David S. is now Deputy Director of CIA). Israeli flights would be announced to Nikolai Patrushev, Putin’s national security adviser, and former head of the FSB foreign intelligence service—Cohen’s colleague as well as counterpart. As for verification, there will be no 24-day inspection delays for the Israelis because even if none of their airborne command centers are aloft, their mountaintop radar can see aircraft from the moment they take off from the Russian base—the operating rule being that when one side does any bombing, the other side must stay on the ground.
Important in itself, the Putin-Netanyahu agreement also illustrates a contemporary reality that continues to elude the Obama Administration. Its policies toward Israel are by no means malevolent—there may be an intense personal hostility on the part of some officials but they cannot act on it. On the other hand, from the president down, the Obama Administration obviously retains a particular vision of Israel that is not at all hostile, indeed it is even protective, but which is also thoroughly obsolete: They still imagine a small country surrounded by enemies in its own region, isolated globally as well, and utterly dependent on the United States.
That was all true enough in the 1970s, but hardly depicts current reality—except in the hollow ceremonials at the United Nations. Today’s Israel has genuine Arab allies on two of its four borders, with which it cooperates every day, and other Arab allies beyond them ready to act jointly against Iran, and not only secretly. Israel has broad relations with both China and Russia (with which it is connected by ten non-stop flights a day), and has very active strategic relations with the major European countries that would have been unimaginable in the 1970s. In other words, in treating Netanyahu so contemptuously the Obama Administration was also revealing its misreading of the balance of power, an unsurprising error in a group that seems bereft of strategic understanding in many other directions as well.
Putin by contrast may understand nothing else but he does understand strategy, and the balance of power. That is why he played no games with Netanyahu, and simply conceded Israel’s right to bomb in Syria—no small thing in the circumstances, given that Russian personnel and aircraft will be on the ground when that happens, within a total geography that is very small indeed at 500 miles per hour.
Many Americans view Putin simply as a thug but public opinion polls show that Russians disagree. His popularity is bound to decline as Putin’s own counter-sanctions are needlessly intensifying the shortages caused by Western sanctions, and by the fall in the value of the ruble, yet a majority of Russians are likely to remains responsive to his fundamental message: “You are Russian. Sanctions or no sanctions, you will never eat as well as the Italians nor dress as elegantly as the French, and you will never be rich as the Americans—but you Russians are an imperial people, masters of the largest state in the world, equally ready to rule benevolently two dozen obedient nationalities and to punish the lawless. I, Putin, for my part, will not give away parts of your empire as my feckless predecessors Gorbachev and Yeltsin did, and I will strive to recover what I can, not just Crimea but as much of the Ukraine as possible, with more gains to come elsewhere.”
Such primitive notions are no doubt incomprehensible to Obama and his officials, as well as to their intellectual milieu, for which empire can only be an embarrassment, power cannot be purposeful, peace is obtained by good will and not by assured security, war is purposeless destruction (and all warriors are merely future PTSD cases), and diplomacy should be a multilateral pursuit, having to do with Global Warming if at all possible. These are all useful stances for rank-and-file Obama officials as they prepare their future with Bill and Melinda, Bill and Chelsea, and the rest of the PC foundation universe with its light lifting and ceaseless conferencing travel to yammy destinations, but to conduct the foreign policy of the United States they are hopelessly off-target. Putin and Netanyahu, by contrast, are determined to hit their targets hard.
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http://www.nationalreview.com/article/218533/russian-footprints-ion-mihai-pacepa
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By Holman W. Jenkins, Jr.
Nov. 24, 2015 6:00 p.m. ET
182 COMMENTS
Vladimir Putin is not the master strategist some make him out to be. He’s a gambler and maneuverer whose bold moves are not testaments to vision or cojones but to the unhealthiness of his domestic political situation.
His choice of words in reaction to Turkey’s downing over Syria of a Russian jet—he called it “a stab in the back”—was redolent of another leader who spoke of stabs in the back, and not one whose regime broke any records for longevity.
Mr. Putin presumably has two immediate goals: Remove sanctions so Russian companies can start rolling over their debts again, without which many may collapse. He also needs higher oil prices to stave off the eventual insolvency of his state.
The Putin regime, let’s recall, arose to loot the benefits of Russian integration in the world economy, not as a reaction against it, despite claims by some today that Russia is motivated by eternal geopolitical insecurities prompted by (largely mythical) Western expansionism.
He needs conflict with the West to justify his people’s privation and his failure to allow the diversification and modernization of the Russian economy under a rule of law. He also needs the West’s complicity, which he has mostly gotten. It’s hard to fathom, for instance, why his cheating athletes were allowed at the London Olympics, much less why he was allowed to host the Sochi Olympics. Both would have been unthinkable if the West had publicly recognized his regime’s likely complicity in nuclear terrorism on British soil in the polonium murder of Russian dissident Alexander Litvinenko.
His salvation, though he would not phrase it this way, is to become the West’s client regime, while masquerading as a superpower-equal.
Truth be told, there are Westerners who would like to accommodate him, but Western politics is not likely to allow it, especially the politics of a post-Obama America.
A related problem likely guarantees failure in any case: There is quite probably nothing that U.S. or Western appeasement can do to save the Putin regime from itself in the long run.
Which brings us to the shootdown. Whatever he woke up thinking on Tuesday morning, Mr. Putin now appears to be contemplating playing the victim of NATO aggression (Turkey is a NATO member). Where he goes from here is hard to forecast. Pathological gamblers who get themselves in holes tend to double down. KGB colleagues recall that as a youthful agent Mr. Putin was sidelined to an East German backwater because his recklessness and propensity for miscalculation were unwelcome at a time when the Soviet Union was weak and the KGB had become risk averse.
Otto Dietrich, Hitler’s press aide, noted the Fuhrer’s own devolution from “domestic reformer” into a “foreign-policy desperado and gambler in international politics,” who “began to hate objections to his views and doubts on their infallibility. . . . He wanted to speak, but not to listen.”
It’s not exactly reassuring that Mr. Putin’s reaction to Turkey’s defense of its airspace seems to have emerged almost instantly, unlike the shilly-shallying that proceeded his reaction to the blowup of a Russian airliner over Sinai (perhaps partly because Mr. Putin was trying to figure out if his own security apparatus was involved).
If he’s paying attention, Mr. Putin should by now have learned his leverage is much less than he imagines. At least while Angela Merkel is around, he has only managed to turn his important German friend into a quasi-enemy. He has turned a formidable Turkish friend into an actual enemy.
On Friday the Turkish government called in the Russian ambassador for a tongue lashing over Russia’s bombing of ethnic Turks in northern Syria. Tuesday’s downing was clearly not an accident. The Turkish government doesn’t seem to find Mr. Putin quite as impressive as some of his American admirers do.
Then again, only the misguided ever did. By March of this year, Russian economist Sergei Guriev estimated that Russia had already spent half its 2015 military budget. Russia’s spending plan was premised on $100 oil. This year’s budget hopes for $50 oil. Meanwhile, capital flight is running at perhaps $100 billion a year. Meanwhile, some of Russia’s biggest companies are verging on default. The Russian army has had to cease recruiting in the fertile Caucasus region due to a worrisome overreliance on Muslim troops. Moscow also faces a growing liability in economically failing Crimea and eastern Ukraine, complicated this week by partisan sabotage of Crimea’s electricity supply.
Global stock markets dipped only modestly on the Turkish shootdown. Oil jumped a buck. This muted reaction should not be seen as a testament that Mr. Putin or his regime have much of a future.
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Forecast
As it curbs spending, the Kremlin plans to limit loans to foreign countries, hindering its ability to influence countries to support its agendas.
Russia will continue granting small loans, or large loans in small tranches over a period of time, to its critical allies.
Moscow will be more selective in choosing recipients of large, lump-sum loans, targeting recipients based on strategic need.
Analysis
Russia's limited financial resources continue to hurt the Kremlin's ability to operate as it has over the past decade. High oil prices, and resulting energy revenues, were largely responsible for skyrocketing economic growth since Russian President Vladimir Putin's government took over in 2000 — with the exception of the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. Prosperity enabled Moscow to spend liberally on its military, its economic development and, more subtly, its loans to countries in exchange for influence. But oil prices have fallen, domestic industry has slowed and the West has placed sanctions on the country that have soured investor sentiment, together creating an economic crisis for Russia. The Kremlin must now make painful decisions to keep its economy afloat, and everything is open to cuts, including foreign loans.
Last year, Russia slipped into its second recession in six years, and there is little optimism that it will end anytime soon. The Russian federal budget will certainly remain strapped this year, as the government uses its National Reserve Fund to cover any deficit more than 3.5 percent. To avoid bailing out large Russian firms and banks, the Kremlin is considering a privatization scheme, but it will likely have little success under the current investor sentiment toward Russia because of its position on Ukraine. Meanwhile, the government has slashed spending in 2016 for every ministry and portfolio except pensions, forcing all sectors to be selective in how to spend their resources. For example, defense spending cuts have left enough funds for Russia's operations in Ukraine and Syria but not for the large-scale military rearmament program Russia needs to maintain a robust and modern military. The Kremlin hinted that it might cut the budget further in the weeks ahead.
Of course, Russia still has reserve funds. Currently, the central bank holds $371.5 billion in currency reserves. The rainy day funds, which overlay with the currency reserves, stand at $49.72 billion in the Reserve Fund and $71.15 billion in the Wealth Fund. But the Kremlin has already blown through half the Reserve Fund in the past year, and in the last recession it saw how quickly currency reserves were spent.
Now the Kremlin is looking at another opportunity for belt-tightening: foreign loans. Over the past decade, it has used foreign loans from government coffers to press its agenda with and in other countries. These are loans directly from the government's VTB bank, though there are many loans from Russian companies (such as Rosoboronexport, Gazprom and Rosneft) along the same lines. In recent years, these loans were many times not investments at all but incentives to induce the countries to make foreign policy decisions in line with Russia's needs. In addition, the Kremlin often either wrote off the loans, or the terms of the agreement were skewed to become more like a bailout than a loan.
Past Financing
A primary example of this exchange of finances for influence was in Ukraine. In December 2013, Russia offered to purchase $15 billion of Ukraine's debt and give the country a 33 percent discount in natural gas prices. Kiev simultaneously froze negotiations with the European Union over its association agreement. Russia went through with a $3 billion purchase of that debt, though protests soon broke out in Ukraine, leading to the Euromaidan uprising and the collapse of the pro-Russia government. Now, Moscow and a pro-West Kiev are locked in a bitter legal battle over repayment of the $3 billion debt purchase, which Moscow would have likely ignored with the previous government. Kiev argues that the debt purchase was an outright bribe to the previous government to remain in Moscow's camp.
Russia regularly assists its closest allies in the former Soviet region with loans and postponements of repayments. In 2014, Russia granted Belarus a $2 billion loan to keep Minsk close as NATO increased its operations in the region. And in 2015, Russia aided Belarus with its debt repayments ($860 million) as the country weathered its own economic slump. Armenia, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan continually receive smaller financial aid packages (in the hundreds of millions of dollars) to stimulate their economies, modernize their militaries and overhaul industry. Kyrgyzstan received a loan of $1 billion in May 2014 in return for joining Russia's then-Customs Union.
Outside of the former Soviet states, Russia offered loans in 2013-2014 to Bulgarian, Greek and Serbian energy and construction firms in exchange for their governments agreeing to Russia's then-proposed South Stream and TurkStream pipeline projects meant to bypass Ukraine to transit natural gas. When both Cyprus and Greece were in search of financial bailouts in recent years, Moscow offered to provide funds. Russia wanted to protect Russian money being held in Cypriot banks and to persuade Greece to break rank with the Europeans and Americans on sanctions over Ukraine. But Germany and other EU countries convinced them otherwise, preventing Russia from doing more than restructuring Cyprus' past loans and giving Greece minor financial assurances through the BRICS bank.
Current Problems
But Russia's increasingly restricted cash supply will curb its previous strategy of throwing money at countries to compel their cooperation. Since mid-2015, Russia slowed doling out smaller loans to foreign countries and has pledged only a few large loans.
Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev announced that Russia would likely not provide the remaining $1.7 billion loan for its Kambarata hydroelectric plant. Atambayev nullified the 2012 agreement with Russia on Jan. 22 on the grounds that Russia had disbursed only a $300 million tranche of the loan. Nearby Uzbekistan also opposed the project because it would reduce the country's water supply. Since Kyrgyzstan already depends on Russia financially, Moscow will accept the collapse of this agreement. What Moscow will have to watch for is another country — such as China, which is steadily building clout in the region — trying to fill the financial vacuum it leaves.
The Kremlin is also reconsidering its loan to Iran. In November, Moscow and Tehran agreed to a $5 billion loan and a $2.2 billion line of credit. Though the Iranian government confirmed the agreement, Russian Deputy Finance Minister Sergei Storchak indicated in January that the $5 billion loan was not yet finalized. The deal was seen as Russia's attempt to maintain influence with Iran as Tehran begins to open to the West. Previously, Iran had few options for alternative funding, but as Iran and Europe (and eventually the United States) begin to interact once again, Moscow's waning financial influence will diminish even more.
Furthermore, in November 2015, Russia agreed to loan Egypt $25 billion to construct the country's Dabaa nuclear power plant, covering 85 percent of the building costs. Russia set the terms for Egypt to begin repaying the loan in 2029 and spread the payments over the subsequent 22 years — a favor to financially strapped Cairo. It was taken as a signal Egypt was trying to diversify its relationships with the United States, all while Russia increased its footprint in the Middle East after entering the Syria conflict. The large price tag and upfront costs will burden the Russian government if it fulfills the agreement, though Cairo may become a crucial partner as Moscow tries to play various regional actors and Washington for its own gain.
Finally, Russia looks intent to fulfill a large loan with Hungary. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban visited Moscow on Feb. 17, where Putin confirmed that his country would fulfill their previous agreement for a $10.8 billion loan for the expansion of Hungary's Soviet-era Paks nuclear plant. The agreement had stalled for two years, but Russia's continued commitment looks to be used to persuade Hungary to help Russia build a coalition to end crippling sanctions. Orban said at the news conference with Putin that he did not believe EU sanctions against Russia would automatically renew after they expire in July and that EU countries were beginning to see the need for cooperation. Russia would likely trade the large sum of money for Paks if Hungary would vote against extending sanctions. A statement from General Electric proposing its involvement in the Paks project should Russia step out is probably motivating Moscow to act quickly as well as block further U.S. influence in the region.
One way to help mitigate the financial costs of these large loans could be to give them out in smaller and longer-term tranches instead of lump sums. Russia implied as much with Iran, offering the $2.2 billion credit over two years, while reconsidering the lump $5 billion loan. Russia will continue its policy of smaller loans to its key allies, such as the $200 million loan agreed to with Armenia on Feb. 19. It is unclear if the Kremlin's tradition of writing off many of these loans in gestures of goodwill can continue, but the Kremlin can always restructure the debts of the loans already issued instead of writing off the debts completely.
If Russia neglects these allied states it risks a detrimental breakdown in relations or another country replacing its influence. However, its years of wild spending have forced the Kremlin to pick and choose the countries it assists and how much the Kremlin can spend without breaking its finances.
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Why Putin Wants Syria
by Jiri Valenta and Leni Friedman Valenta
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2016 (view PDF)
http://www.meforum.org/5876/why-putin-wants-syria
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Russia has been largely landlocked for most of its history, and Moscow has always valued the Crimean peninsula for its coastline (see above). Catherine the Great took the Crimea, founding the port of Sevastopol, home to Russia's Black Sea fleet, and established a commercial port in Odessa. But, the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in an independent Ukraine, and Moscow lost not only the port of Odessa but its prized naval port of Sevastopol.
Russia's military intervention in Syria that began on September 30, 2015, is its first major intrusion into the Levant since June 1772 when "Russian forces bombarded, stormed, and captured Beirut, a fortress on the coast of Ottoman Syria."[1] Then as now, the Russians backed a ruthless local client; then as now, they found themselves in "a boiling cauldron of factional-ethnic strife, which they tried to simplify with cannonades and gunpowder."[2]
But why? Why did President Vladimir Putin intervene in a faraway country, hundreds of miles away from Russia proper while in the midst of his temporarily frozen proxy war with Ukraine? So far there has been no serious effort to probe the underlying causes of the Kremlin's surprise move, let alone in conjunction with Putin's three other military interventions along Russia's periphery: Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and southeastern Ukraine in 2014-15. Yet it is only by filling in these connecting dots that the key questions concerning the intervention can be addressed: Did Moscow seek confrontation with a view to dismembering NATO and weakening Europe, or did it pursue the much narrower goals of regaining the great power status lost during the Gorbachev-Yeltsin eras and protecting national security and commercial interests? And can the West engage Russia in Syria in a limited partnership against radical Islam as it did in World War II against Nazi Germany, or is any collaboration with the wily Putin simply out of the question?
Landlocked Heartland and Strategic Interests in Crimea
Henry Kissinger has eloquently posited Russia's historical expansion as pursuance of a
special rhythm of its own over the centuries, expanding over land mass ... interrupted occasionally over time ... only to return again, like a tide crossing the beach. From Peter the Great to Vladimir Putin circumstances have changed, but the rhythm has remained extraordinarily consistent.[3]
Winston Churchill had a different explanation:
The Russians will try all the rooms in the house, enter those that are not locked, and when they come to one that cannot be broken into, they will withdraw and invite you to dine genially that same evening.[4]
Both Kissinger's sophisticated discourse and Churchill's analogue, however, need an important qualifier. Russia's expansion has also been the result of a major geopolitical handicap. Except for the Baltic coast, conquered by Peter the Great in the eighteenth century, Russia has been largely landlocked for most of history. In the north, its Arctic Ocean was frozen. In the east, the Pacific was also ice-covered for most of the year. In the south, its Caspian Sea was closed. The Black Sea was open but only through those tiniest of bottlenecks, the Straits of Bosporus and the Dardanelles (or the Turkish Straits), jealously guarded by its Ottoman masters. Small wonder that Russia continually lusted to possess both them and the Crimean peninsula. As early as the seventeenth century, Peter the Great tried to conquer the Crimea, then an Ottoman vassal, but failed.[5]
Putin repeatedly invokes Russia's "strategic interests" in the Crimea.
Only in the late eighteenth century did the Empress Catherine the Great and her paramour, Count Grigory Potemkin, succeed in taking the Crimea, founding the port of Sevastopol, home to Russia's Black Sea fleet, and a commercial port in Odessa. Yet despite continual wars with the Ottomans, the Turkish Straits remained beyond Russia's grasp as Britain—and to a lesser extent France and the Kingdom of Sardinia (Italy)—repeatedly came to Turkey's rescue. This culminated in the 1853-56 Crimean war and the attendant Treaty of Paris that kept Russia caged in the Black Sea. It is hardly to be surprised that Putin, an avid student of history, repeatedly invokes Russia's "strategic interests" in the Crimea.
Today, Russia is not as militarily dependent on the Turkish Straits as in the past. But throughout the twentieth century to the present day, and despite the technological revolution and Moscow's formidable air forces, the Turkish Straits have remained a factor for the Russian navy.
The Fall of the USSR
The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union was an even larger setback than the Crimean war. Analysts have long focused on the loss to the empire of vast pieces of real estate with the newly-won freedom of the non-Russian republics in the Baltics and the Caucasus as well as the second largest republic, Ukraine. Yet they have not given due consideration to what else Russia lost: waterways, coastlines, and ports, in short—the power of the Russian navy.
Hafez Assad, Bashar's father, signed an agreement permitting Moscow to use the port of Tartus (pictured above) in return for advanced weapons for Syria, thus turning the port into a facility for maintenance of smaller ships in the Black Sea fleet. Then in 2005, Bashar succeeded in having Russia write off three-fourths of Syria's debt for arms sales. Increased Russia-Syrian military cooperation followed with upgrading of the Tartus port for larger ships.
In Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Moscow lost cold water ports acquired by Peter the Great in the eighteenth century for its Baltic fleet. In Ukraine, it lost not only its ownership of the coastline but also the commercial port of Odessa. Most of all, the Russians lost their prized warm water naval port of Sevastopol, home to Russia's Black Sea fleet for more than two centuries. Moscow was now forced to rent it from the newly independent Ukraine.
The economic collapse that followed only made things worse. Lack of resources and two bloody wars in Chechnya brought government cuts to the Black Sea fleet. Russian ships only rarely appeared in the Mediterranean. Then in 2004, Ukraine and Georgia underwent their color revolutions, bringing to their helms two pro-Western leaders—Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine and Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia—who hoped that their nascent states would join, not only the European Union, but eventually the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Worse yet for Russia, Yushchenko wanted the Russian fleet out of Sevastopol at the expiration of the lease in 2017.
Catherine the Great, Putin's most admired Romanov ruler, was shaking in her grave. One need not speculate about Putin. In 2005, who could be sure that NATO ships would not be eventually deployed in Russia's formerly principal, if not sacred, Black Sea port? If Russia lost Sevastopol, where could it go? Another port was needed, but where? Novorossiysk on the Black Sea Coast could be of help, but it is principally a commercial port.
Masters of Military Deception
Flashback to 1971, when President Hafez Assad, father of the present Syrian dictator, signed an agreement permitting Moscow to use Tartus in return for selling advanced weapons to Syria, thus turning the quiet fishing port into a logistical facility for materiel and technical maintenance of smaller ships in Russia's Black Sea fleet. Two years later, Hafez, a Soviet-trained pilot, joined Egypt in preparing an attack on U.S. ally Israel with the help of Russian advisors and arms.
What happened next explodes a decades' long interpretation that the July 1972 expulsion of Soviet advisors from Egypt by Anwar Sadat due to Moscow's refusal to provide the necessary arms for his planned war against Israel generated an unbridgeable schism between the two states.[6] As revealed in the declassified diary of Gorbachev's foreign policy advisor Anatoly Chernyaev, unbeknown to the outside world, Moscow quickly patched relations with Cairo thus turning its temporary setback into a ruse that would help lull the Israelis into the 1973 Yom Kippur surprise. As Chernyaev, then a senior official of the International Department of the Communist Party's CentralCommittee, recorded in his diary on July 15, 1972:
This [Sadat's demand for Soviet advisors withdrawal] began a turmoil. Egypt's premier Sidki was persuaded to come to Moscow, and, I think, they have settled it ... they must have given much to him, if not all he wanted. President of Syria Assad, too, a week ago ... has forced us to practically approve the "military solution" and received a lot from us.[7]
This version was reaffirmed on the first anniversary of the war by the Egyptian government-controlled Ruz al-Yusuf magazine:
The various government agencies spread rumors and stories that were exaggerated, to say the least, about deficiencies, both quantitative and qualitative, regarding the weapons required to begin the battle against Israel, at the very time that ... the two parties—Egypt and the USSR—had reached agreement [on weapons that] in fact, were beginning to arrive.[8]
The concept of military deception is a permanent feature of Russian interventionism.
Last but not least, Egyptian president Sadat himself claimed two years after the war that his 1972-73 tiff with the Soviets had been "a strategic cover—a splendid strategic distraction for our going to war."[9]
The concept of military deception, or maskirovka, is a permanent feature of Russian interventionism. But, it encompasses a broader definition than the Western one. Deception may include camouflage, disinformation, traps, blackmail, and diplomatic cunning. As such it enables strategic surprise and/or timing that will stun the enemy, thus ensuring the success of the mission.[10]
Abkhazia and Tartus
Along both its pre- and post-1991 borders, Russia has continually sought to effect regime change whenever the leaders of the non-Russian republics within Russia (e.g. Chechnya) or at its new periphery (Ukraine and Georgia) tilted toward the West. In 2005, having decisively won the second Chechen war with the complete destruction of its capital Grozny, Putin was able to focus on possible regime change in Tbilisi (Saakashvili) and Kiev (Yushchenko). Unlike with landlocked Chechnya, both Ukraine and Georgia were littoral states of the Black Sea. A main geopolitical concern of the Kremlin was regaining ports and access for its navy. But the primary issue was Sevastopol—the traditional site of the Black Sea fleet. Getting rid of Ukraine's Yushchenko and Georgia's Saakashvili, thus meant regaining essential coastlines for the Russian navy. Its lease was up in 2017, and Moscow needed to find another suitable warm water port.
Russia has sought to effect regime change whenever the leaders of the non-Russian republics within Russia tilted toward the West.
Hafez Assad's successor, son Bashar, was quick to seize the opportunity. He visited Moscow in 2005 and succeeded in having three-fourths of Syria's external debt to Russia for arms sales written off.[11] The move became an impetus for renewed Russian-Syrian military cooperation in upgrading the port of Tartus for larger ships.
At around the same time, Putin began to seriously consider plans for the invasion of Georgia with particular interest in the province of Abkhazia, occupying half of Georgia's eastern Black Sea coastline. Analysts have mistakenly viewed Georgia as just another Caucasus country, but from the Russian navy's point of view, it is precious real estate on the Black Sea littoral.
Georgia not only contained a former Russian port, Ochampchire, but an airbase, Bombura—once the largest in the Caucasus. As an ethnic enclave with Orthodox believers and many Russian speakers, the Abkhazians had not been thrilled when Georgia obtained independence, correctly fearing the loss of their special status as an autonomous republic. Like South Ossetia, another ethnic enclave in the Caucasus Mountains, Abkhazians were in repeated conflict with Georgia and sought support from Russia. Furious residents had even undertaken ethnic cleansing of Georgians.
All of this fitted snugly with Putin's plans. In 2006, the Russian army began building a railroad in Abkhazia, traditional transportation for Russian armed forces. As the Russian consulate began to distribute passports, Putin added additional "peace-keeping" troops to Abkhazia, alleging a Georgian planned attack.
The Russian Navy Invades Georgia
On August 7, 2008, President George W. Bush met Putin at the Olympic Games in Beijing where he was told about the fighting in South Ossetia: "There are lots of volunteers being gathered in the region [South Ossetia], and it's very hard to withhold them from taking part. A real war is going on."[12] What Putin did not tell his peer, however, was that he had set a trap for the Georgian army in South Ossetia, that the Russian navy would soon invade Abkhazia, and that he had ordered a cyber-attack on the Georgian government.
Within twenty-four hours, Putin had already appeared in Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia's fortress, to oversee the invasion. When the Georgian army arrived to put down (supposed) riots in the South Ossetian capital, the Russian army poured through a tunnel on the Georgian military highway into South Ossetia and beyond. A classic trap was sprung. Simultaneously came the amphibious landing in Abkhazia's port of Ochampchire by 4,000 navy and army commandos under commander-in-chief of the Black Sea fleet, Adm. Vladimir Vysotsky. On August 10, a naval encounter between Georgian and Russian ships took place, and within days, Georgia's entire fleet of coast guard patrol vessels had been destroyed.[13] The Russian navy was back. Ochampchire, once restored, would provide control of Georgian waters all the way to the Turkish border.
On September 12, 2008, a month after Abkhazia's conquest, the Kremlin announced the speeding up of the Tartus port renovation and expansion as Vysotsky met with his Syrian counterpart Gen. Taleb Bari, to set the process in motion. In 2009, the value of Russian military contracts reached $19.4 billion as floating docks and coastal infrastructure facilities were repaired in Tartus. Eventually, the Russian navy deployed mobile coastal missile systems, anti-ship missiles, and boats, and built warehouse barracks. As an unnamed Kremlin official remarked in the Russian media, "Everything has changed since the war on Georgia—what seemed impossible before when our friends became our enemies and our enemies became our friends ... A number of possibilities are being considered, including hitting America where it hurts most—Iran and Syria."[14]
The Crimea Is Next
"The Crimea is next," predicted Za Za Gachechiladze, the prominent editor-in-chief of Tbilisi's The Messenger.[15] In an editorial, he wrote, "Now it is the Ukraine's turn ... all this is happening while Western countries are hesitating about creating a clear-cut strategy to stop Russia, whose appetite ... is increasing."[16]
Georgia had indeed marked a change in the Kremlin's strategic thinking, and Putin would strike in Crimea when the time was ripe. Nor did he believe that Washington would greatly protest. The U.S. administration was clearly willing to forgive him for attacking sovereign Georgia. Earlier that year, U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton had pushed a big red reset button with Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, and Russian decision-making on a new intervention always considers the U.S. response to the last one. Also overlooked was the Russian legislature's amending of the constitution. This permitted Putin to take military action abroad anywhere to protect Russian speakers and Russian military (e.g., in Crimea or Syria). During the Yeltsin era, they could only do so to combat terrorism or participate in U.N.-sponsored international operations. Now the government could take military action against any foreign country without authorization from the Duma.[17]
But the time was not yet ripe to strike in the Crimea. In 2010, came a new Ukraine election, and the winner was Viktor Yanukovych. Coming from the eastern Ukraine, he was staunchly pro-Kremlin, so Putin could relax. In return for discounted Russian gas, Yanukovych gladly extended the lease on Sevastopol to 2046.
Follow the Russian Pipelines
In 2011, however, a problem arose with Tartus. Syria erupted in a bloody civil war and ethnic ferment that threatened more than just Russian military assets. Syria is a major energy hub of the Middle East. As Russian analyst Alexei Sarabeyev put it,
The peculiarity of the port of Tartus ... is that the major Syrian pipeline originating from the northeastern areas of the country feeds in this port. Besides, oil storage facilities are located in neighboring Banias.[18]
Syria is not just a transfer state but also has large gas deposits in its Homs field.
Bashar Assad decides whose pipelines go through Syria, another reason Putin supports him.
Seventy percent of Russia's foreign income comes from oil and gas exports. Sixty percent of the state budget is from energy export revenues. As a vacationing official economist in Sochi told these authors, "Don't follow just our navy; follow our pipelines."[19] The pipelines, of course, passed through energy transfer states Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine on their way to European markets—all states no longer under Putin's control.
Bashar Assad decides which and whose pipelines go through Syria, another reason Putin supports him. In 2009, the Syrian president refused to sign a gas agreement with Qatar—a major producer of liquefied gas (LNG)—which wanted to run a pipeline from Iran through Turkey and Syria. But the deal would have bypassed Russia, and Assad turned it down.
The Kremlin's Lessons from Libya
A number of events conditioned Russia's decision to deter a U.S. attack on Assad in 2013 and also to stage a military operation in Syria in 2015. One of these was the lesson of Libya. In 2011, Washington persuaded Moscow not to veto a Security Council resolution against Libyan dictator Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi, which launched what Secretary of State Clinton described as a "humanitarian mission" to prevent the killing of Libyan civilians by the dictator's forces. But as NATO intensified its bombing air campaign, it became clear that the international intervention was mainly focused on getting rid of Qaddafi with a view to nation building—something that had miserably failed in Iraq under the George W. Bush administration.[20]
The 2003 Iraq war, though, had a positive side. Reluctant to follow in Saddam Hussein's unfortunate path, Qaddafi abandoned his quest for a nuclear program and began working with Washington against the rising tide of Islamist terrorism. Paradoxically, the Western-supported rebels who toppled and killed the long-reigning Libyan dictator included many Islamists. To Putin, however, Qaddafi had clearly been a stabilizing force.
Putin may have also learned from Hillary Clinton's unsecured e-mail communications that U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens had met with the Turkish consul general hours before he was killed. The two were working on an arms transfer from Libya to Syria—for the purpose of overthrowing yet another dictator, Assad.[21]
The lesson of Libya for the Russians was that they should not have approved the U.N. resolution that helped the U.S.-backed NATO intervention. Convinced that they had been deliberately misled,[22] they would subsequently block any future U.N. resolution proposing military action against Assad.
Then-president Dmitri Medvedev expressed his concern about the rise of Islamic terrorism in Libya to U.S. officials.
But the situation in Libya attending Qaddafi's overthrow was worrisome to the Kremlin for other reasons. In 2011, then-president Dmitri Medvedev expressed to U.S. defense secretary Robert Gates and vice president Joe Biden his great concern about the rise of Islamic terrorism in Libya. "If Libya breaks up, and al-Qaida takes root there, no one will benefit, including us, because the extremists will end up in the North Caucasus."[23]
Medvedev could have added that extremists from the North Caucasus were also traveling to Syria with the help of Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB). Novaia Gazeta journalist Elena Milashina documented that the FSB had helped Chechen and Dagestan rebels to reach Syria on safe routes via Turkey.[24] Indeed, the number of terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus was halved from 2014 to 2015, from 525 to an estimated 260.[25] Russian special services, however, were and still are worried about returning jihadists.[26]
Obama's Red Line and Putin's Preemptive Diplomacy
In August 2013, the Syrian regime was reported to have used chemical weapons on rebel enclaves, killing some 1,300 civilians. Assad appeared to have crossed President Obama's "red line" on use of such weapons. Washington deployed four destroyers near the Syrian coast equipped with missiles, threatening the Syrian regime. But Putin helped to defuse the crisis by brokering a deal for Assad to get rid of his chemical weapons.
Another event conditioning Putin's decision-making regarding further interventions was a major crisis over Assad's reported use of chemical weapons. On August 21, 2013, the Syrian regime was reported to have used chemical warfare on rebel enclaves, killing some 1,300 civilians. With this atrocity, Assad appeared to have crossed President Obama's "red line" on chemical weapons and risked a strong U.S. response.[27] Putin and even some U.S allies, however, claimed that the attacks were carried out by anti-Assad guerillas as a "premeditated provocation."[28] In any event, on August 27, Washington deployed four destroyers near the Syrian coast equipped with Tomahawk Cruise missiles whose initial mission was to punish the Syrian regime.[29]
By then, Putin was heavily invested in the largely completed renovation of Tartus for which Russia had a 50-year lease and was also planning future pipelines for Syria. With U.S. forces so close, Putin decided not to permit regime change in Damascus as he had in Tripoli. Still, he must have understood that direct confrontation between his navy and the superior U.S. forces was not a smart choice for Russia. Rear Adm. Vladimir Komoyedov, chairman of the Russian legislature's Defense Committee and former commander-in-chief of the Black Sea fleet, confirmed this and warned that the Russian navy could not match the U.S. Navy in the eastern Mediterranean:
Unfortunately, the force we've assembled there is made up of pretty aged ships built 30 years ago. To compete with the United States, we need a fresh horse.[30]
Putin, however, also wagered that Obama would not opt for a direct confrontation with Russia. Thus, sailing to the fray were some aged Russian navy ships. But equipped with modern rocket systems and nuclear torpedoes, even an old ship can be formidable. Russia also mobilized its armed forces, as did Iran's Revolutionary Guards, while Moscow's foreign ministry warned that U.S. intervention in Syria could have "catastrophic consequences."[31]
One Russian analyst suggested that in the event of a U.S. attack on Syria, Russia should invade the Baltic states.
On August 27, as Obama met with the three leaders of the Baltic republics, Putin had one of his senior analysts, Mikhail Aleksandrov, publish an especially provocative article, which could not have appeared without Kremlin approval. Head of the Baltics section of the Moscow Institute, CIS, funded by the Russian ministry of foreign affairs, Aleksandrov suggested that in the event of a U.S. attack on Syria, Russia should invade the Baltic states, claiming that "half of the population of Latvia and Estonia will meet the Russian troops with flowers as it was in 1940."[32]
Putin's deterrence, pressures, and public diplomacy—he even went so far as to write a New York Times op-ed—must have ultimately worked. Obama backed down, as Putin foresaw. The Russian president then helped his counterpart to defuse the crisis by brokering a deal to help Assad get rid of his chemical weapons.
Regaining the Crimea
Having rescued his Syrian client, Putin now sought to save his Ukrainian protégé Yanukovych, who had narrowly won the 2010 elections with the Kremlin's support. While a kleptocratic leader could be tolerated in moderation, Yanukovych, who had been jailed twice for corruption in 2004, was a major leaguer. Eventually, the Ukrainian people could not tolerate his disregard of their inclination toward the European Union.[33] In January 2014, someone fired into a large crowd of peaceful protestors igniting an armed revolution. A further turning point came on February 22 as the Ukrainian parliament voted to remove Yanukovych. But what few in the West understood was that the future of Sevastopol was not secure if the pro-Western revolution in Kiev won. Having saved Yanukovych's life, Putin turned to the strategic Crimean peninsula telling his presidential council, "We will have to start work to return the Crimea to Russia."[34]
As in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, most Crimeans are Russian speakers with 60 percent ethnically Russian. Yet the peninsula's large Tartar minority of about 30 percent have never cared for Russian rule, hence their mass deportation by Stalin to Central Asia in WWII. The Ukrainian army was rag-tag, but Putin feared that the Muslim Tartars might resist the Crimea's annexation as they had Catherine's in 1784.
Once again, Putin's attendance at the winter Olympic Games in Sochi turned into perfect maskirovka. Despite large scale, nonstop Russian troop maneuvers near the Crimea, U.S. intelligence failed to anticipate the February 28, 2014 invasion. Once the Olympics ended, the invasion began, followed in short order by annexation.
What is particularly significant is how Putin justified this bold and illegal act—not only on strategic but also on historical and religious grounds. In December 2014, for example, he stretched the historical account of St. Vladimir, founder of the ancient Kievan Rus federation, by placing the saint's christening in the Crimea rather than in Kiev, saying that it gives us every reason to state that for Russia, the Crimea, ancient Korsun, the Chersonese, Sevastopol have an enormous civilizational and sacral meaning—in the same way as the Temple Mount in Jerusalem is meaningful for those who confess Islam or Judaism.[35]
Whether or not Putin's evolution from a servant of atheistic communism to defender of the faith is genuine is irrelevant. After the fall of the Soviet empire, Russia returned to its Orthodox roots, and so did Putin. Hence, while authorizing a selective crackdown on human rights activists throughout Russia, Putin has been an ardent supporter of the Orthodox Church at home and of Christian minorities in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. He also met with the pope on June 10, 2015, who asked him to help the cause of peace in Ukraine and Syria.
Intervention in Southeastern Ukraine
On April 18, 2014, by way of consolidating his Crimean conquest, Putin set his sights on yet another target. He explained that the southeastern Ukrainian lands of Novorossiya ("New Russia"), also conquered by Catherine the Great, were not part of Ukraine in her time. However, Putin did not admit that his primary reason was geopolitical—a littoral corridor from Russia to the Crimea through the strategic Black Sea port of Mariupol to Odessa.
Emboldened by the passive Western response to his Crimean venture, Putin launched a new intervention by proxy through Russian eastern separatists, "volunteers," Cossacks, "vacationing soldiers," even paid criminals, as well as Russian special forces. Residents of the Russia-friendly southeastern Ukraine were propagandized into fury against Kiev. Seeking to rejoin Russia, as did the Crimeans, they declared two new people's republics: Donetsk and Lugansk. Weeks thereafter, violence erupted in Odessa.
A firm U.S. response was required, yet the Obama administration would not provide arms to Kiev because of its perceived need to have Russia's support for the Iran nuclear deal. This weak reaction, however, only added to Moscow's eventual commitment of 10,000 regular troops in the Ukraine, augmented by 40,000 at the borders. But then came Putin's miscalculation. The Ukrainian army vigorously defended important routes, strategic railroad hubs, and airports, denying Russia essential strategic surprise. With the support of Western intelligence and economic aid, this solid resistance paid a high cost in blood, but Kiev did not succumb. In July 2014, Washington finally applied tougher energy sanctions which, together with sharp declines in oil prices, halved Russia's oil and gas revenues.[36]
Charging into Syria
In the summer of 2015, Assad, like Yanukovich earlier, was fighting for his survival. Various groups of rebels, supported by the Sunni regimes of Turkey and Saudi Arabia as well as the United States, were advancing. Assad and his Alawite-based regime were on the ropes with the military losing ground by the day. In July, the regime asked for Russia's direct military intervention.[37] Using Brezhnev's 1973 Yom Kippur play book and his own Georgia and Ukraine maskirovka, Putin was giving different signals—even that of replacing Assad.[38] Whatever Putin intended, he decided to stick with the Syrian dictator at this juncture.
Though U.S. observers questioned Putin's motives, his secondary objective in Syria was fighting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). While terrorist attacks in the North Caucasus had declined in 2015, ISIS was metastasizing in northern Afghanistan and could, over the long run, affect Russia's Central Asian allies. Putin surely worried about North Caucasians returning to fight in Russia.
By early 2015, the term "New Russia" had virtually vanished from Putin's vocabulary. He viewed the growing, armed resistance to the Assad regime as an immediate threat to Russia's national interests. Traditionally Moscow does not fight simultaneously on two fronts. In the meantime, a Russian Defense Ministry official, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said that, beginning in September or earlier, the "special forces were pulled out of Ukraine and sent to Syria."[39]
Assam Soleimani, head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, is much respected in Moscow for his military prowess. Arriving secretly in the Russian capital, the general confirmed that the Assad regime was in serious difficulties but could be rescued through a joint Russian-Iranian-Hezbollah intervention.
Putin must have calculated that if Syria could be won and Western sanctions lifted without significant concessions, it would strengthen the eventual return to his New Russia policy and Black Sea littoral corridor, unless, of course, Washington linked resolution of both the Syrian and Ukraine conflicts. He reportedly told a visiting Iranian senior official in late July 2015, "Okay, we will intervene. Send Assam Soleimani." Gen. Soleimani, head of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, is much respected in Moscow for his military prowess. Arriving secretly in the Russian capital, the general confirmed that the Assad regime was in serious difficulties but could be rescued through a joint Russian-Iranian-Hezbollah intervention.[40]
Iran is an important strategic ally for Russia. Like Syria, it has been buying Russian weapons systems, engaging in cooperative pipeline projects, and buying nuclear power plants. The conclusion of the U.S.-Iran nuclear deal on July 14, 2015, in Vienna was also a game-changer. Putin, having helped Obama broker the deal, had waited to make any Syria decision until the agreement was concluded. Now, with the deal done and Iran sanctions soon to be lifted, Tehran could readily pay for Russia's long-range S-300 anti-aircraft system. Putin also hoped that, now, Iran-U.S. relations would improve, making it easier for Russia to work with Iran and Hezbollah to protect Assad.
Airmen inspect a Russian airplane at Syria's Latakia airfield. In September 2015, U.S. satellite pictures showed a rapid buildup of equipment at the Russian air force and naval bases in Syria, including advanced fighter jets. On November 24, 2015, a Russian fighter was downed by Turkish forces after allegedly violating Turkish air space. The plane crashed in the mountainous Jabal Turkmen area of the Syrian province of Latakia, an area contested by Assad's government and rebel forces.
Mulling his options, in September Putin invited his old friend, former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi, to the annexed Crimea to discuss Ukraine and Syria. Prior to the visit, Italian news sources revealed that Berlusconi planned "to include Putin in an anti-terrorist campaign, promoting a diplomatic initiative that could lift the anti-Russian sanctions and defrost relations with the U.S."[41]
Putin's diplomacy was now moving into high gear. The final piece of the puzzle fell into place for him, however, with the dramatic turnaround of de facto EU leader, Germany's Angela Merkel. The immigration crisis, including the massive exodus of migrants fleeing war torn Syria, became the final game-changer. By now, with hundreds of thousands of Muslim immigrants flooding Germany and thousands of others charging across Europe, Merkel was seeking to somehow put the lid on Pandora's box. To her, the United States under Obama had ceased to be the indispensable power. As she put it:
We have to speak with many actors, this includes Assad, but others as well. Not only with the United States of America, Russia, but with important regional partners, Iran, and Sunni countries such as Saudi Arabia.[42]
Like the CIA, Germany's intelligence agency knew about the military buildup in Tartus and Syria's Latakia airfield. However, the CIA could not divine Putin's intentions. Merkel's remarkable turnaround did not get much notice in Washington with Obama focusing on Iran and Cuba. But getting Merkel's blessing was the final green light for Putin. The U.S. president was heading for a big surprise.
Fortune Favors the Bold
In the concluding phases of the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the Egyptian third army corps was surrounded by Israeli forces and faced imminent annihilation unless an immediate ceasefire was reached. Soviet leaders, with their proposed joint superpower mission to save Egypt having been declined, sent a strongly-worded message to the White House warning that they would act alone. As a result, U.S. armed forces were put on combat alert as they had been during the 1962 Cuban missile crisis.
However, Russia did not go it alone. In the words of eye-witness Washington ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin,
In spite of the blunt message of [Soviet leader Leonid] Brezhnev, the Kremlin ... did not have any intention of intervening in the Middle East ... it would have been reckless both politically and militarily.[43]
In 2015, however, the man in the White House was not Richard Nixon, an experienced master of statecraft, brilliant, tough, and cunning, with his sidekick Henry Kissinger, even amidst his Watergate inferno. This time Putin's counterpart was a former community organizer-turned-junior senator-turned president, a well-meaning proponent of the "leading from behind" strategy, a man whose "strategic patience" to his critics, was a euphemism for cluelessness.
For most of September 2015, U.S satellite pictures showed a rapid buildup of equipment in the Russian air force and naval bases in Syria, including advanced Sukhoi Flanker fighter jets. Now the renovation of Tartus paid off as had the railroad built in Abkhazia.
On September 21, Putin consulted with Tehran's nemesis, Israeli prime minister Binyamin Netanyahu in the Kremlin, along with top Israeli military and security officials. Afterward, the Israeli leader reported that both countries had agreed to a joint mechanism for preventing military mishaps.[44]
Putin's battle against terrorism may be one of the reasons he sympathizes with and has established mutually beneficial relations with Israel.
Putin is the only Russian leader to have twice visited the holy city of Jerusalem. His own merciless battle against terrorism may be one of the reasons he sympathizes with the Jews and has established mutually beneficial relations with Israel. Small wonder that Israel abstained from arms deliveries to Georgia after the 2008 Russian invasion and to Ukraine after the Crimea incursion.
In August 2008, Putin had met with President Bush on the eve of the Georgia invasion. Seven years later, on September 28, 2015, it was Obama's turn to meet with the Russian president, this time at the U.N. Although the full details of their conversation were not disclosed, Putin apparently did not reveal the timing of the coming intervention. His contemptuous message to Obama, delivered to the U.S. embassy in Baghdad on August 29 by a Russian military attaché, said it all: Moscow was launching air strikes in one hour. Washington was to stay out of the way.[45]
Putin's Strategic Challenge
Putin did not charge into Syria without thinking through the endgame. The intervention was the culmination of a chain of events that began with the 1991 fall of the Soviet empire, and Putin concentrated on only a few options. His aim seemed clear: reestablishing Russia's presence in the Black Sea and through the Turkish Straits to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean and Middle East in littoral Russian Azov and Black Sea coastal areas. Unlike his Soviet predecessors, he has avoided large invasions and long occupations of landlocked countries (e.g., Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Afghanistan).
The perception of Obama as a leader unwilling to use force undoubtedly whetted Putin's appetite to do just that, albeit in a limited way. In particular, the 2013 Russian deterrence of Obama's strike against Assad may have emboldened Putin to stage the almost flawless (and bloodless) 2014 Crimean invasion. That in turn likely strengthened his resolve for his unprecedented moves in eastern Ukraine and now in Syria.
Rather than seeking to dismember NATO, Russia sought to protect its national security and commercial and religious interests. The weakening of NATO became Putin's objective as he lost Kiev and finally faced tough Western energy sanctions and as NATO furnished non-lethal aid to Kiev.
Fighting Islamism Together?
A limited partnership with Russia against Islamism is feasible just as it was in World War II against the Nazis. Both Washington and Moscow have powerful incentives and common interests in stability as ISIS continues to metastasize globally.
A limited partnership with Russia against Islamism is feasible just as it was in World War II against the Nazis.
Achieving this goal, however, requires shedding the Cold War axiom that Russia cannot have naval facilities in the Middle East. Instead, Washington must do its utmost to reassert its own presence in the Middle East in collaboration with those allies alienated by the Obama administration. Clearly, any alliance with Russia will not be easy, and the West must not be starry-eyed about a new relationship with Putin and in a hurry to reduce Ukrainian sanctions in the wake of the Muslim invasion of Europe. Putin is notoriously deceptive, giving with one hand and taking with the other. He is also allied with Tehran, whose hegemonic ambitions and terror sponsorship are certain to rise following the lifting of the international sanctions. Yet U.S. policymakers can surely make the case that, in the final account, Moscow's long-term interest is more closely aligned to Washington's and America's Judeo-Christian tradition than to the Islamist regime in Tehran with its regional, and beyond, hegemonic ambitions.
Putin is right to support the sustenance of Alawite governing structures, particularly in the western part of Syria, as the only viable alternative to the country's takeover by the Islamists. But keeping Assad in power will not ease the situation. Bashar must clearly step down in favor of another Alawite ruler and any such future agreement has to be underwritten by the U.S. administration, the EU, Russia, and the leading Arab states.
The nascent partnership with Russia can be jeopardized by further internationalization of the Syrian conflict. One problem is Sunni support for the insurgents, such as the Turkish tribes in northern Syria. Another is Iran's proxy Hezbollah, which is heavily involved in the fighting. Moreover, increasing military aid to various parties can escalate the conflict and implicate other actors. Recent Russian transfers of sophisticated weapons to Hezbollah are the most palpable examples.[46] Though intended for defense of the Assad regime, they can also be used against Israel at a later stage.
Finally, the tensions between Putin and Turkey's president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan following the shooting down of a Russian plane that strayed into Turkish territory are indicative of the precariousness of the situation. As prominent Russian analyst Andrey Kortunov warned the Kremlin, the attempt of "any exalted politicians" to punish Turkey is fraught with danger:
Ankara has many ways to make life harder for Moscow, ranging from changing its energy import preferences to the Gulf to utilizing its influence over the numerous communities of Crimean Tatar descendants in Turkey in ways detrimental to Russia's interests.[47]
Meanwhile Turkey, an unreliable U.S. ally at best, is more interested in containing the Kurds, faithful U.S. allies, both in Syria and Iraq, than in going after ISIS. In short, the Syrian situation is evocative of the Spanish civil war of the 1930s when the internationalization of a domestic conflict helped pave the road to a global war.
As the past is often prologue to the future, it remains to be seen whether Putin's bold Syrian venture will help to transform the Middle East inferno into a more peaceful region. One decisive factor is the dramatic decline of oil prices, very injurious to Russia. A second factor will be the statecraft of the new U.S. president, ideally, one who does not lead from behind and who possesses the proper alchemy of toughness, creativity, and patience to help accomplish the deed.
Jiri Valenta is president of the Institute of Post-Communist Studies and Terrorism, and the author, among other books, of Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968, Anatomy of a Decision (Johns Hopkins University, 1991). He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Leni Friedman Valenta is a contributor to many national and international newspapers and magazines, including The National Interest, Aspen Review, and Kiev Post. She is editor-in-chief of the couple's website at jvlv.net.
________________________________________
[1] Simon Sebag Montefiore, "Putin's Imperial Adventure in Syria," The New York Times, Oct. 9, 2015.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Henry Kissinger, World Order (New York: Penguin Publishing Group, 2015), p. 52.
[4] Walter Issacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1997), p. 364.
[5] For a similar geopolitical interpretation, see Efraim Karsh, The Tail Wags the Dog: International Politics and the Middle East (London and New York: Bloomsbury, 2015), chap. 5.
[6] See, for example, Efraim Karsh, "Moscow and the Yom Kippur War: A Reappraisal," Soviet Jewish Affairs, Feb. 1986, pp. 3 19.
[7] Spyridon Mitsotakis, "Forty Years Later: Soviet/Arab Secret of Yom Kippur War," P.J. Media, Oct. 5, 2013.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Michele A. Berdy, "Russia's 'Maskirovka' Keeps Us Guessing," The Moscow Times, July 31, 2-14; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Use of Surprise and Deception," Survival (London), 1982, pp. 50-61.
[11] The Daily Star (Beirut), Jan. 26, 2005.
[12] CNN, Aug. 8, 2008.
[13] Wired (San Francisco), Aug. 15, 2008; Deborah Sanders, Maritime Power in the Black Sea (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Co., 2014), p. 126.
[14] "Russia lines up with Syria, Iran against America and the West," Second Light Forums, Sept. 16, 2008.
[15] Interview with authors, Sept. 19, 2009, Tbilsi.
[16] Za Za Gachechiladze, "Russia Will Increase Its Pressure on Ukraine," The Messenger (Tbilisi), Sept. 18, 2009.
[17] "Legalizing Aggression," Geopolitics, quoted in The Messenger, Sept. 11, 2009.
[18] Alexei Sarabeyev, "Russia-Syrian, 'Present-Future': Naval Aspect," Russian International Affairs Council, Moscow, Oct. 31, 2011.
[19] Authors interview, Sochi, Russia, Aug. 14, 2010.
[20] Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2014), p. 530.
[21] Fox News, Oct. 25, 2012.
[22] Gates, Duty, p. 530.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Novaya Gazeta (Moscow), July 29, 2015; see also, Paul Goble, "FSB Helps Islamists from Russia Go to Syria, Only Worried When They Come Back, 'Novaya Gazeta' Says," Window on Eurasia Blog, July 30, 2015.
[25] Eurasia Daily Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington, D.C., Jan. 7, 2016.
[26] The New York Times, Nov. 20, 2015.
[27] Bloomberg News Service (New York), Aug. 21, 2012; The Guardian (London), Feb. 8, 2013; Haaretz (Tel Aviv), May 4, 2013; Los Angeles Times, May 16, 2013.
[28] ABC News, Aug. 22, Sept. 6, 2013.
[29] The Washington Free Beacon, Aug. 27, 2013.
[30] The Guardian, Sept. 12, 2013.
[31] ABC News, Aug. 27, 2013.
[32] Lithuania Tribune (online), Aug. 29, 2013, accessed Jan. 25, 2016.
[33] Ukraine Today TV (Kiev), Dec. 20, 2015.
[34] The Guardian, Mar. 9, 2015.
[35] Pravoslavie (Moscow), Dec. 5, 2014.
[36] The Washington Post, July 16, 2014.
[37] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 14, 2015.
[38] The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 25, 2015; Bloomberg News, Sept. 13, 2015.
[39] Headlines & Global News (New York), Oct. 25, 2014; The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 23, 2015.
[40] Reuters, Oct. 6, 2015.
[41] Russia beyond the Headlines (Moscow), Sept. 9, 2015; Freeworld and Friends World, Sept. 16, 2015.
[42] The Washington Post, Sept. 24, 2015.
[43] Anatoly Dobrynin, In Confidence, Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents, 1962-1986 (New York: Time Books, 1995), p. 301.
[44] Defense News (Springfield, Va.), Dec. 1, 2015.
[45] The Washington Post, Sept. 30, 2015; The Telegraph (London), Sept. 30, 2015.
[46] YNet News (Tel Aviv), Jan. 15, 2016.
[47] Andrey Kortunov, "The Russian-Turkish Crisis: a Deficit of Strategic Depth," Russian International Affairs Council, Jan. 4, 2016.
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Hat tip to Big Dog for this one:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2016-04-18/revival-russian-military
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian military rotted away. In one of the most dramatic campaigns of peacetime demilitarization in world history, from 1988 to 1994, Moscow’s armed forces shrank from five million to one million personnel. As the Kremlin’s defense expenditures plunged from around $246 billion in 1988 to $14 billion in 1994, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the government withdrew some 700,000 servicemen from Afghanistan, Germany, Mongolia, and eastern Europe. So much had the prestige of the military profession evaporated during the 1990s that when the nuclear submarine Kursk sank in the Barents Sea in 2000, its captain was earning the equivalent of $200 per month.
From 1991 to 2008, during the presidency of Boris Yeltsin and the first presidential term of Vladimir Putin, Russia used its scaled-down military within the borders of the former Soviet Union, largely to contain, end, or freeze conflicts there. Over the course of the 1990s, Russian units intervened in ethnic conflicts in Georgia and Moldova and in the civil war in Tajikistan—all minor engagements. Even for the operation in Chechnya, where Yeltsin sent the Russian military in 1994 in an attempt to crush a separatist rebellion, the Russian General Staff was able to muster only 65,000 troops out of a force that had, in theory, a million men under arms.
Russia is back as a serious military force in Eurasia.
Beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union, Russia acted meekly. It sought a partnership with the United States and at times cooperated with NATO, joining the peacekeeping operation led by that alliance in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1996. To be sure, after realizing in the mid-1990s that NATO membership was off the table, Moscow protested vehemently against the alliance’s eastern expansion, its 1999 bombing campaign in Yugoslavia, and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, but Russia was too weak to block any of these moves. The Kremlin’s top priority for military development remained its nuclear deterrent, which it considered the ultimate guarantor of Russia’s security and sovereignty.
Those days of decay and docility are now gone. Beginning in 2008, Putin ushered in military reforms and a massive increase in defense spending to upgrade Russia’s creaky military. Thanks to that project, Russia has recently evinced a newfound willingness to use force to get what it wants. First, in February 2014, Moscow sent soldiers in unmarked uniforms to wrest control of Crimea from Ukraine, implicitly threatening Kiev with a wider invasion. It then provided weaponry, intelligence, and command-and-control support to the pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine’s Donbas region, checking Kiev’s attempts to defeat them. And then, in the fall of 2015, Russia ordered its air and naval forces to bomb militants in Syria fighting President Bashar al-Assad, intervening directly in the Middle East for the first time in history.
These recent interventions are a far cry from the massive campaigns the Soviet Union used to undertake. But the fact is, Russia is once again capable of deterring any other great power, defending itself if necessary, and effectively projecting force along its periphery and beyond. After a quarter century of military weakness, Russia is back as a serious military force in Eurasia.
MAXIM SHEMETOV / REUTERS Russian President Vladimir Putin at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier in Moscow, June 2012.
GEORGIA ON ITS MIND
The story of Russia’s military modernization begins with its 2008 war in Georgia. In August of that year, Russian forces routed troops loyal to the pro-Western president, Mikheil Saakashvili, and secured the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as Russian protectorates. The five-day campaign was a clear success: Moscow prevented NATO from expanding into a former Soviet state that was flirting with membership, confirmed its strategic supremacy in its immediate southern and western neighborhood, and marked the limits of Western military involvement in the region. By increasing its military footprint in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia also bolstered its control of two strategically important areas in Transcaucasia—securing the approach to Sochi, the location of the Russian president’s southern residence and Russia’s informal third capital, in the former, and placing Russian forces within striking distance of Tbilisi in the latter.
Yet for all these gains, Russia fought its brief war against Georgia with unreformed, bulky remnants of the Soviet military. Russian soldiers were forced to use outdated weaponry, and Russian officers, overseeing troops who were insufficiently prepared for combat, even had to give orders using civilian cell phones after their military radios failed. By the end of the conflict, Russia had lost five military aircraft, including a strategic bomber. Moscow won the war against a much weaker enemy, but the flaws in its own military were too glaring to ignore.
And so two months after its war with Georgia, the Kremlin embarked on an ambitious program of defense modernization and military restructuring. These efforts, which Russian officials have projected will cost some $700 billion by 2020, are intended to transform the Russian military from a massive standing force designed for global great-power war into a lighter, more mobile force suited for local and regional conflicts. Moscow has pledged to streamline its command-and-control system, improve the combat readiness of its troops, and reform procurement. And in a radical break from a model that had been in place since the 1870s, Russia adopted a flexible force structure that will allow it to quickly deploy troops along the country’s periphery without undertaking mass mobilization.
Russia’s defense industry, meanwhile, began to provide this changing force with modern weapons systems and equipment. In 2009, after a hiatus of about two decades, during which the Kremlin cut off funding for all but company- or battalion-level exercises, Russian forces began to undertake large-scale military exercises, often without prior warning, to improve their combat readiness. Perhaps most important, Russian soldiers, sailors, and airmen came to be paid more or less decently. By the time the Ukraine crisis broke out, Russia’s military was far stronger than the disorganized and poorly equipped force that had lumbered into Georgia just five and a half years before.
EUROPE GOES BIPOLAR
The Russian military executed the Crimea operation brilliantly, rapidly seizing the peninsula with minimal casualties. Blueprints for the takeover must have existed for years, at least since Ukraine expressed interest in joining NATO in 2008. But it took a reformed military, plus a remarkable degree of coordination among Russia’s various services and agencies, to pull it off.
The operation in Crimea was not a shooting war, but actual fighting followed a few weeks later in the Donbas. Instead of ordering a massive cross-border invasion of eastern Ukraine, which Moscow had implicitly threatened and Kiev feared, the Putin government resorted to a tactic known in the West as “hybrid warfare”: providing logistical and intelligence support for the pro-Russian separatists in the Donbas while undertaking military exercises near the Ukrainian border to keep Kiev off balance. Moscow did send active-duty Russian officers to eastern Ukraine, some of whom were ostensibly on leave. But the bulk of the Russian-provided manpower in the country was made up of volunteers, and regular Russian units operated there only intermittently.
The story of Russia’s military modernization begins with its 2008 war in Georgia.
At the same time, Russia put NATO countries on notice: stay out of the conflict, or it may affect you, too. Russian warplanes—which in 2007 had resumed Cold War–era patrols around the world—skirted the borders of the United Kingdom, the United States, and several Scandinavian countries and got close to Western planes over the Baltic and Black Seas. Putin later admitted on Russian television that he had even considered putting Russia’s nuclear forces on high alert to defend its interests in Ukraine.
Russia benefited from its Ukraine campaign in several ways. The gambit allowed Moscow to incorporate Crimea, and it kept Kiev fearful of a full-scale invasion, which made the new Ukrainian leadership abandon the idea of using all of the country’s available forces to suppress the separatist rebellion in the Donbas. It also directly challenged U.S. dominance in the region, terrifying some of Russia’s neighbors, especially the Baltic states, which feared that Moscow might pull off similar operations in support of their own minority Russian populations. By provoking even deeper hostility toward Russia not only among Ukraine’s elites but also among its broader population, however, Russia’s military actions in Ukraine have also had a major downside.
Moscow’s use of force to change borders and annex territory did not so much mark the reappearance of realpolitik in Europe—the Balkans and the Caucasus saw that strategic logic in spades in the 1990s and the early years of this century—as indicate Russia’s willingness and capacity to compete militarily with NATO. The year 2014 was when European security again became bipolar.
PUTIN BREAKS THE MOLD
For all its novelties, the Russian offensive in Ukraine did not end Moscow’s tendency to project force only within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Russia broke that trend last year, when it dove into Syria’s civil war. It dispatched several dozen aircraft to Syria to strike the self-proclaimed Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and other anti-Assad forces, established advanced air defense systems within Syria, sent strategic bombers on sorties over the country from bases in central Russia, and ordered the Russian navy to fire missiles at Syrian targets from positions in the Caspian and Mediterranean Seas. By doing so, Russia undermined the de facto monopoly on the global use of force that the United States has held since the collapse of the Soviet Union.
MAXIM SHEMETOV / REUTERS Russian military vehicles before a rehearsal for a Victory Day parade in central Moscow, April 2015.
Moscow’s immediate military objective in Syria has been to prevent the defeat of Assad’s army and a subsequent takeover of Damascus by ISIS, a goal it has sought to achieve primarily through the empowerment of Syrian government forces and their Hezbollah and Iranian allies. Its political objective, meanwhile, has been to engineer a peace settlement that protects Russian interests in the country and the wider region—above all, by ensuring that Syria’s postwar, post-Assad government remains friendly to Russia; that Moscow is able to retain a military presence in Syria; and that Russia’s wartime partnerships with Iran, Iraq, and Kurdish forces produce lasting political and economic ties.
Even more important, Putin seeks to confirm Russia’s status as a great power, in part by working alongside the United States as a main cosponsor of a diplomatic process to end the war and as a guarantor of the ensuing settlement. Putin’s historic mission, as he sees it, is to keep Russia in one piece and return it to its rightful place among the world’s powers; Russia’s intervention in Syria has demonstrated the importance of military force in reaching that goal. By acting boldly despite its limited resources, Russia has helped shift the strategic balance in Syria and staged a spectacular comeback in a region where its relevance was written off 25 years ago.
The operation in Syria has had its disadvantages for Moscow. In November 2015, a Turkish fighter jet downed a Russian bomber near the Syrian-Turkish border, the first such incident between Russia and a NATO country in more than half a century. Russia refrained from military retaliation, but its relations with Turkey, a major economic partner, suffered a crushing blow when Moscow imposed sanctions that could cost the Turkish economy billions of dollars. By siding with the Shiite regimes in Iran, Iraq, and Syria, Russia could also alienate its own population of some 16 million Muslims, most of whom are Sunni. Faced with this risk, Moscow has attempted to improve ties with some of the Middle East’s Sunni players, such as Egypt; it has also wagered that keeping Assad’s military afloat will ensure that the thousands of Russian and Central Asian jihadists fighting for ISIS in Iraq and Syria will never return to stir up trouble at home. Thus, Moscow’s war in support of Assad and against ISIS has also been an effort to kill individuals who might threaten Russia’s own stability.
NOT IN MY BACKYARD
Where will the Russian military go next? Moscow is looking to the Arctic, where the hastening retreat of sea ice is exposing rich energy deposits and making commercial navigation more viable. The Arctic littoral countries, all of which are NATO members except for Russia, are competing for access to resources there; Russia, for its part, hopes to extend its exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean so that it can lay claim to valuable mineral deposits and protect the Northern Sea Route, a passage for maritime traffic between Europe and Asia that winds along the Siberian coast. To bolster its position in the High North, Russia is reactivating some of the military bases there that were abandoned after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It is also building six new military installations in the region. Tensions in the Arctic remain mild, but that could change if there is a major standoff between NATO and Russia elsewhere or if Finland and Sweden, the two historically neutral Nordic countries, apply for NATO membership.
In the coming years, Russia’s military will continue to focus on the country’s vast neighborhood in greater Eurasia.
More likely, Russia will take military action near its southern border, particularly if ISIS, which has established a foothold in Afghanistan, manages to expand into the Central Asian states, all of which are relatively fragile. The countries with the region’s largest economies, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, will soon face leadership transitions as their septuagenarian presidents step down or die. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where Russia keeps small army and air force garrisons, will not prove stable in the long term; like Turkmenistan, they are home to high unemployment, official corruption, ethnic tension, and religious radicalism—the same sort of problems that triggered the Arab Spring.
The memory of the Soviet quagmire in Afghanistan is still too fresh for the Kremlin to seriously contemplate invading the country again to put down ISIS there; instead, it will continue to support the Afghan government and the Taliban’s efforts to take on the group. But that is not the case in Central Asia, which Russia considers a vital security buffer. If the government of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan faces a major challenge from Islamist extremists, Russia will likely intervene politically and militarily, perhaps under the mandate of the Collective Security Treaty Organization, an alliance to which all four states belong.
In the coming years, then, Russia’s military will continue to focus on the country’s vast neighborhood in greater Eurasia, where Moscow believes using force constitutes strategic defense. If Russia’s venture in Syria fails to achieve Moscow’s political objectives there, or if Russia’s economy significantly deteriorates, that instance of intervention beyond the country’s near abroad may prove to be an exception. If not, Russia might learn to efficiently use its military force around the world, backing up its claim to be one of the world’s great powers, alongside China and the United States.
A NEW STANDOFF?
Even as Moscow has reformed its military to deal with new threats, Russian defense planning has remained consistently focused on the United States and NATO, which the Kremlin still considers its primary challenges. Russia’s National Security Strategy for 2016 describes U.S. policy toward Russia as containment; it also makes clear that Russia considers the buildup of NATO’s military capabilities a threat, as it does the development of U.S. ballistic missile defenses and the Pentagon’s ongoing project to gain the ability to strike anywhere on earth with conventional weapons within an hour. To counter these moves, Russia is modernizing its nuclear arsenal and its own air and missile defenses. Moscow is also revising the deployment pattern of its forces, particularly along Russia’s western border, and it will likely deepen its military footprint in the Baltic exclave of Kaliningrad. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland are safe, however, even if they do not feel that way: the Kremlin has no interest in risking nuclear war by attacking a NATO member state, and the sphere of Russian control to which Putin aspires certainly excludes these countries.
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At the same time that Russia is rebuilding its military, NATO is ramping up its own military presence in eastern Europe. The result will likely be a new and open-ended military standoff. Unlike during the Cold War, however, there is little prospect for arms control agreements between Russia and the West anytime soon because of the many disparities in their conventional military capabilities. Indeed, the Russian armed forces are unlikely to become as powerful as the U.S. military or threaten a NATO member state with a massive invasion even in the long term. Although Moscow seeks to remain a major player on the international stage, Russian leaders have abandoned Soviet-era ambitions of global domination and retain bad memories of the Cold War–era arms race, which fatally weakened the Soviet Union.
What is more, Russia’s resources are far more limited than those of the United States: its struggling economy is nowhere near the size of the U.S. economy, and its aging population is less than half as large as the U.S. population. The Russian defense industry, having barely survived two decades of neglect and decay, faces a shrinking work force, weaknesses in key areas such as electronics, and the loss of traditional suppliers such as Ukraine. Although Russia’s military expenditures equaled 4.2 percent of GDP in 2015, the country cannot bear such high costs much longer without cutting back on essential domestic needs, particularly in the absence of robust economic growth. For now, even under the constraints of low energy prices and Western sanctions, Russian officials have pledged to continue the military modernization, albeit at a slightly slower pace than was originally planned.
Putin and other Russian officials understand that Russia’s future, and their own, depends mostly on how ordinary citizens feel. Just as the annexation of Crimea was an exercise in historic justice for most of the Russian public, high defense spending will be popular so long as Russian citizens believe that it is warranted by their country’s international position. So far, that seems to be the case. The modernization program could become a problem, however, if it demands major cuts to social spending and produces a sharp drop in living standards. The Russian people are famously resilient, but unless the Kremlin finds a way to rebuild the economy and provide better governance in the next four or five years, the social contract at the foundation of the country’s political system could unravel. Public sentiment is not a trivial matter in this respect: Russia is an autocracy, but it is an autocracy with the consent of the governed.
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From Red to Silver: The 25th Anniversary of the Fall of the Soviet Union
Analysis
December 25, 2016 | 14:01 GMT Print
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A crowd watches as a statue of KGB founder Felix Dzerzhinsky is lowered in Moscow's Lubyanka Square on Aug. 22, 1991. (ANATOLY SAPRONENKOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Analysis
Russian President Vladimir Putin once remarked that anyone who "does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart," while anyone who "wants it back has no brain." For nearly 70 years, the Soviet Union's founding communist ideology held the disparate peoples of its constituent socialist republics together. This ideology, antithetical as it was to the tenets of U.S. capitalism, also set the stage for the decadeslong war of worldviews that the United States and Soviet Union waged against each other through the latter half of the 20th century. The Cold War was a conflict unlike any other in history, an indirect battle between two superpowers in which the rest of the world was caught and maneuvered in for nearly half a century. On Dec. 26, 1991, the United States claimed its victory at last when the Kremlin lowered the iconic red flag that had flown over the Soviet Union. Twenty-five years later, the anniversary of the Soviet Union's collapse invites a reflection on the Cold War, its history and its legacy.
Laying the Foundation
No sooner had World War II ended than the preparations for the Cold War began. Before the ink had even dried on the various peace treaties that concluded the Second World War, the Soviet Union and the United States were already shoring up their positions, and their opposition, in Europe. As the Soviets, battered and nearly broken by the war, consolidated control over the so-called Eastern Bloc states, U.S. President Harry Truman said the United States and its allies needed to "show [them] how to behave." Just 25 years into its existence at the time, the Soviet Union was, after all, a young country. What Truman failed to understand, however, was that Moscow was following a strategy that had served it well for centuries under the Russian Empire, seeking security through expansionism. The United States and Western European nations quickly caught on to the Soviet agenda and formed their containment strategy, which evolved in time from the 1947 Truman Doctrine into the NATO military alliance. Even before the United States and Soviet Union formally drew their line between East and West in Europe, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill pronounced that an "iron curtain ha[d] descended across the Continent."
The two nations spent the ensuing decades embroiled in war. But they managed it without ever fighting each other directly. Instead, the conflict played out in proxy battles across nearly every continent; through trade wars; in the perpetual worries of leaders and citizens in each country over the looming threat of nuclear war; and, of course, in an ideological war.
The Soviet Union's Collapse, 25 Years Later
The Soviet system was built on the socialist concept of equality — legal, social and economic — for all people (beginning with workers), a strategic move by the Union's founders more than a reflection of their convictions. The Communist Party presided over this system, directly overseeing the Soviet Union's political apparatuses, economies, industries, press and societies. In its principles and functions, the Soviet model stood in direct opposition to that of the United States, which espoused self-determination, democracy and capitalism. Neither belief system was as ironclad as its champions in Washington and Moscow perhaps imagined, and some ideals inevitably fell by the wayside, unrealized. War, moreover, makes for strange bedfellows; in the course of their conflict, the United States and Russia each supported states that held diverging — if not contradictory — views. Still, the United States saw the Soviets as godless oppressors of freedom and hope, depriving their citizenry of the right to pursue a better life. The Soviet Union, in turn, considered the United States an imperialist superpower trying to become a global hegemon. The Cold War struggle became a moral contest to determine which worldview was correct.
The Beginning of the End
Toward the end of the 1970s, after proxy conflicts and threats of nuclear war by the dozen, it seemed to Washington that Moscow would prevail. In its estimation of the apparently unstoppable Soviet Union, though, the United States failed to appreciate just how unwieldy an entity it was. Whether governing the Russian Empire or today's Russian Federation, Moscow has faced the same geographic constraints and vulnerabilities throughout its long history. With an economy dependent on oil (and, at times, grain), a highly diverse population and competitors beyond its indefensible borders, each variation of Russia behaves at its strongest and weakest much as its predecessor did. The question, then, was never whether the Soviet Union would fall to the West but rather when it would inevitably collapse under its own weight.
The Soviet Union had already shown signs of faltering. When Nikita Khrushchev assumed the Soviet premiership a few years after longtime leader Josef Stalin's death, he proclaimed a "thaw" throughout the Soviet Union. Khrushchev proceeded to relax censorship somewhat, liberalize political and economic policies, and release political prisoners, all the while decrying Stalin's often brutal tactics. (Even the nearly ubiquitous likenesses of the late leader were destroyed or cached away during Khrushchev's de-Stalinization campaign.) He and the rest of the Party elite knew the Soviet Union would fall apart if it did not evolve. In the decades that followed Khrushchev's shake-up, the country moldered in a cycle of alternating consolidation and liberalization schemes under a string of leaders.
Not With a Bang, but a Whimper
By the 1980s, a perfect storm of political pressures had converged on the Soviet Union. The Soviet political system was atrophying. Three elderly leaders — Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko — died in office in a span of three years as the country fought a bloody and expensive war in Afghanistan. Independent labor unions were sprouting up and gaining political traction across the Eastern Bloc. Meanwhile, oil prices — which made up more than half the country's revenues — plummeted, plunging the mostly hollow Soviet economy into ruin. The Soviet Union was starting to give under the weight of its own problems, a process the United States helped speed along. Washington set off an arms race in the early 1980s with its decision to take an active military position against the Soviets. Between 1980 and 1989, the United States nearly doubled its defense spending, armed mujahideen forces against the Soviets in Afghanistan and flaunted its advanced military capabilities by launching the Strategic Defense Initiative, or "Star Wars." The Soviets' efforts to keep up only exacerbated the pressures on their country.
Former U.S. President Ronald Reagan, commemorating the 750th anniversary of Berlin, addresses on June 12, 1987 the people of West Berlin at the base of the Brandenburg Gate, near the Berlin wall. (MIKE SARGENT/AFP/Getty Images)
Mikhail Gorbachev tried to stave off the Soviet Union's demise when he came to power in 1985 by bringing a younger generation of leaders to the Kremlin and introducing a series of liberal political and economic reforms. Gorbachev permitted the countries of the Eastern Bloc to establish independent political systems and struck an arms control agreement with the United States. But the measures were not enough to save the Soviet Union; the seeds of dissolution had already been sown. Just a few days shy of its 69th anniversary, the Soviet Union dissolved, ending the Cold War without so much as a bang. Instead, the Kremlin quietly lowered the Soviet flag — the symbol of one of history's most formidable forces.
In the Wake of the Soviet Union
The Soviet Union's collapse was hailed in the West as a victory for the United States and its allies, proof that the American system and its governing ideology were morally, ethically and technically superior. Perhaps the clearest illustration of Western views toward the end of the Cold War was the Berlin Freedom Concert, which commemorated the opening of the border between East and West Germany in 1989. Televised in more than 20 countries around the world, the concert brought orchestral musicians from both sides of the Berlin Wall together to play Beethoven's 9th Symphony. But instead of "ode to joy," the choir sang "ode to freedom." As the West saw it, the end of the German Democratic Republic represented a triumph for freedom, and the demise of the Soviet Union liberated the world from the so-called Evil Empire.
Without an equal adversary, the United States became a global hegemon, just as the Soviets had feared, and the Western institutional, economic and democratic models spread across many parts of the world. But the fall of the Soviet Union yielded some more unexpected outcomes as well. Despite the proxy wars that had raged throughout the Cold War, the U.S.-Soviet dichotomy kept other conflicts in check. In the waning years of the Soviet Union and for decades after its collapse, wars broke out across the Balkans, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia and the former Soviet states. Many of these conflicts tested the United States' hegemony. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War facilitated the rise of regional powers such as China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Germany and France — some of which diverge from the United States' worldview. Alternative regional coalitions formed or expanded in the wake of the binary alliance system that the Cold War had built, creating competition for the United States.
Though the Soviet Union's dissolution seemed to suggest that Moscow could never again challenge Washington, Russia eventually regained its footing. Now, the Russian Federation is following the same strategy, however flawed, that its Soviet and imperial forerunners pursued. Much as it did in previous eras, Moscow is once again resorting to authoritarian and expansionist tactics to overcome its inherent fragility — this time under the guise of a democratic system and a market-driven (albeit state-influenced) economy. This resurgence has in some ways echoed the rise of the Soviet Union, but having learned from its mistakes, Moscow will not attempt to match the Soviets' global reach. Nonetheless, Russia's comeback has proved that 25 years after the Cold War's end, a stable world order is as elusive as ever.
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http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/putins-real-long-game-214589
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/439060/vladimir-putin-1999-russian-apartment-house-bombings-was-putin-responsible
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http://www.hoover.org/research/russias-borders-thirty-years-vision-not-certainty
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Trump-Putin Will Talk Against Backdrop of Broader Russian Mischief
Debate over Russia’s role in 2016 election blurs larger picture
Four Things to Watch for During Trump-Putin Meeting
The biggest event on the international stage this week will be the meeting between President Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin. WSJ's Gerald F. Seib sees four things to watch out for: their personal interactions, sanctions, Syria and Ukraine. Photo: AP
By Gerald F. Seib
July 3, 2017 10:59 a.m. ET
647 COMMENTS
When President Donald Trump meets Russian leader Vladimir Putin late this week, many will be watching to see whether they discuss alleged Russian interference in the 2016 election.
That much is obvious. Less obvious, but more important, is how any Russian meddling in the American presidential-election season—whatever form it may have taken—fits into a much larger tale. This is the tale of a systematic Russian effort to disrupt democratic and capitalist systems internationally, using an updated version of tactics Mr. Putin learned in the bad old days of the Soviet KGB.
In fact, one of the dangers in the current hyperpartisan American debate over Russia’s role in the 2016 presidential election is that it is blurring this larger picture. If the 2016 election was the tip of an iceberg, the rest of the iceberg warrants serious attention.
A useful reminder of the breadth of the problem comes in the form of “The Kremlin Playbook,” a publication released last October by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a centrist American think tank, and the Center for the Study of Democracy, a European public-policy institute. In retrospect, it was a remarkably prescient look at the controversies that have mushroomed since the American election that came a month later.
The Playbook is an in-depth study of Russian efforts to use overt and covert tactics over a period of a decade to expand its economic and political influence in five Central and East European nations. A group of regional leaders from such nations warned President Barack Obama in a 2009 letter—which also looks prescient now—that Russia was conducting “overt and covert means of economic warfare, ranging from energy blockades and politically motivated investments to bribery and media manipulation in order to advance its interests….”
The Russian strategy, the study finds, isn’t ad hoc. Rather, it is the implementation of a doctrine developed by Russian Gen. Valery Gerasimov called “new generation warfare.” One European analyst called that “primarily a strategy of influence, not of brute force” aimed at “breaking the internal coherence of the enemy system.”
The strategy, as it has unfolded in Central and Eastern Europe, proceeds along two parallel tracks, the study found. The first track is economic. Russia seeks to find business partners and investments that allow it to establish an economic foothold, which in turn produces economically influential patrons and partners who have a vested interest in policies friendly to the Kremlin. That is a particularly fruitful endeavor in Europe, where many nations depend on Russian energy supplies.
The goal on this track is to cultivate “a network of local affiliates and power-brokers who are capable of advocating on Russia’s behalf.”
The second track, perhaps more relevant to the U.S., is designed to disrupt prevailing democratic political patterns. The goal, the Playbook says, is “to corrode democracy from within by deepening political divides and cultivating relationships with aspiring autocrats, political parties (notably nationalists, populists and Euroskeptic groups), and Russian sympathizers.”
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On this track, the effort is designed in part to advance parties and figures sympathetic to Russia. But the broader goal is simply to disrupt the process, create confusion and discord, and discredit democratic systems both in targeted countries and in the eyes of Russian citizens, who are told the chaos to their West shows they shouldn’t long for a Western-styled democratic system at home.
A key tool in this effort, the report says, is a “war on information” campaign that uses disinformation and propaganda to disable opponents and foment nationalist and anti-Western sentiment. “Toward this end, Russia exploits existing political pressure points such as migration and economic stagnation, blames Western and U.S. operations for all negative international dynamics (such as the attempted July 2016 coup in Turkey), and discredits the current state of Western democracy,” the report says.
Remember that this was written before Mr. Trump won the American presidency and the investigations into Russian influence went into high gear. The findings are about a broader pattern of Russian behavior, not about what it might have done in the U.S. political system.
Yet these findings present a backdrop for both the current debate over Russia’s 2016 U.S. activities, as well as Mr. Trump’s meeting with Mr. Putin on the sidelines of the G-20 meeting in Germany this week.
Heather A. Conley, a senior vice president of CSIS and one of the authors of The Kremlin Playbook, says the months since its publication have brought “an acceleration” of Russian influence-seeking, ranging from a plot against the prime minister of Montenegro to interference in the French election to cyberattacks in Ukraine.
The goal, she says, “is disruption, to create governmental policies that accommodate Russian interests,” first in ending Western economic sanctions and then in building a broader sphere of influence. She adds: “We continue to be unprepared.”
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What Russia’s Middle East Strategy Is Really About
Oct 11, 2017
By Xander Snyder
A new balance of power is solidifying in Syria. Iran, Turkey and Russia have all played a role in the conflict there – jockeying for position and even agreeing in September to set up zones of control. But Russia in particular has deftly managed the game up to this point, and it is emerging from the Syrian civil war with a strong hand. Ultimately, Russia’s goal is to parlay its position in the Middle East into advantages in areas that matter more to Moscow. To some degree, it has achieved this, but it’s still unclear whether its strategy will be successful enough to score Russia an advantage in the area it cares about the most: Ukraine.
Russia intervened in Syria for two reasons: to gain enough clout in the region that the U.S. would offer some concessions in negotiations elsewhere in exchange for cooperation in Syria, and to show its public that Russia is still a strong power. Russia’s support for Bashar Assad was instrumental in preventing the regime’s demise. Now, the Islamic State is in retreat, and some version of the Syrian regime, led by Assad, will remain in power. Russia’s role in this outcome gives the Kremlin influence with the Assad regime. The regime’s biggest challenge now is eliminating what remains of the Sunni insurgency, including groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which took control of much of Idlib province from the Turkish proxy Ahrar al-Sham in July.
Turkish soldiers stand during a demonstration in support of the Turkish army’s Idlib operation near the Turkey-Syria border on Oct. 10, 2017. ILYAS AKENGIN/AFP/Getty Images
Over the past week, we’ve seen two seemingly anomalous events that are part of a strategy to eliminate the Sunni insurgency. First, King Salman of Saudi Arabia visited Moscow and signed multibillion-dollar energy deals with Russia that will involve both Russian investment in Saudi Arabia and Saudi investment in Russia. Then, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – a group that the Saudis have been accused of backing and that, as of a few months ago, was an enemy of one of Turkey’s proxy groups – reportedly escorted Turkish officers into Idlib as Turkish reconnaissance forces surveyed the territory in preparation for a greater deployment of forces. Both these events indicate that the Saudis may be willing to work with Russia in Syria by applying pressure on radical Sunni insurgent groups. In exchange, the Saudis will get some much-needed financial help in the form of investment deals. They will also get reassurance that Iranian influence in Syria will be limited. Turkey’s deployment in Idlib is one way of achieving this.
Russia needed to isolate Hayat Tahrir al-Sham in Idlib so that Turkey could establish control of the territory as part of the de-escalation agreement that Russia, Turkey and Iran reached in September. Idlib, which is close to the Turkish border as well as Aleppo and Latakia – two key provinces for the Syrian government – is not the only territory still held by rebels, but it is the last major rebel bastion. Russia is hoping that investment deals like the one it made last week will compel the Saudis to put more pressure on the group. The Saudi regime hasn’t directly funded Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, but it has looked the other way as individual Saudis gave it financial support.
Russia is cooperating with Saudi Arabia, Iran and Turkey to gain ground in the region in the short term, even though its interests don’t align with these countries’ interests in the long term. Moscow is, therefore, establishing a balance that lets Russia play one country off the other so that no single power gains too much influence in the region.
Turkey has historically been a potential threat to Russia because Ankara controls the Bosporus, a narrow passage that, if blocked, would obstruct Moscow’s access to the Mediterranean. Iran is less dangerous to Moscow, but Russia still wants to limit Tehran’s influence in the Caucasus and prevent it from gaining too much control in Syria. Russia will thus work with both countries to make sure that they can counterbalance each other. An additional benefit of working with Turkey is that it can help isolate the remaining radical Sunni groups and prevent any interference from Saudi Arabia.
Russia’s strategy in the Middle East is to stay closer to all other players in the region than they are to one another. Russia, however, is pursuing this strategy not because it wants to be a major leader in the Middle East, but because it wants to accumulate as much influence as possible. This would allow it to offer to cooperate with the U.S. in the Middle East in exchange for concessions elsewhere. If the U.S. declines this offer, Russia will have at least made the situation more difficult for the U.S. and kept it bogged down and distracted. Russia’s main priority is Ukraine, and it perceives U.S. involvement there over the past several years as a threat. Moscow hopes that, as long as the U.S. is focused on the Middle East, it will be more willing to budge on the Ukraine issue.
Signs that a short-term alignment is emerging between Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia plays into Russia’s strategy. All three of these countries have an interest in cooperating to a degree in Syria. Turkey needs to expand into Syria to eliminate radical Sunni insurgent threats on its border, to check Iran’s power in Syria and to keep the Syrian Kurds weak in the north. Iran wants to further limit the threat of Sunni groups in Syria and consolidate its power in Syria and Iraq. And Saudi Arabia has a financial incentive to cooperate, as it needs all the money it can get. For Russia, however, its main focus is not in the Middle East but in Ukraine. It has so far seen success in one part of its Middle East strategy – gaining influence in an area the U.S. cares deeply about – but it remains to be seen whether this will translate into concessions on Ukraine.
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Forecast Update
In Stratfor's 2017 Fourth-Quarter Forecast, we said Russia and Iran would work in tandem through the Syrian peace talks and in negotiations with other regional players. We are currently seeing that cooperation occur not only in Syria, but other areas as well.
The relationship between Russia and Iran is reigniting. Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Iran on Nov. 1 to meet with his Azerbaijani and Iranian counterparts in the second summit between the three countries. The trilateral format was set up last year by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to discuss shared concerns and projects in the region. But increasing alignment between Russia and Iran over the last year will give the two countries plenty to discuss.
Moscow and Tehran found themselves aligned in the mid 2000s as the United States and Western powers were increasing pressure on Iran for its nuclear program and on Russia through the Western containment strategy. Russia spearheaded construction on Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor and supplied it with fuel, enabling Moscow to use the so-called "Iran card" in negotiations with Washington over issues such as NATO expansion, missile defense, and support for Russia's political opposition. Tehran reveled in the rivalry between Russia and the United States, not only because it helped Iran's nuclear program, but also because Moscow regularly interfered with the broader coalition against Iran. The usefulness of their relations, however, dwindled after Iran, Russia, the United States and other countries finalized the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), better known as the Iranian nuclear deal.
Yet Tehran and Moscow have rekindled their alignment in recent years. Increased pressure on Russia from Western sanctions in 2014 and the looming threat of expanded sanctions against Iran from U.S. President Donald Trump's administration have given both countries cause to deepen their relationship. Russia's entrance into the Syrian conflict in 2015 also helped solidify their alignment. Recent developments in Syria favor loyalist forces backed by Iran and Russia, helping both countries preserve their influence in the region. Moscow and Tehran have ensured that negotiations with outside parties — including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Israel and Lebanon — over the next phase of the Syrian conflict largely exclude the United States.
Meanwhile, Russian companies are actively looking for opportunities to invest in Iran's energy sector. Lukoil, Rosneft and Gazprom Neft — along with several other Russian energy companies — are in talks to invest an estimated $1.5 billion in the country through oil and natural gas projects. Iran and Russia are also still finalizing their oil-for-goods barter scheme to allow Iranian crude oil to be traded for Russian equipment and goods. The deal was pared down from 500,000 to 100,000 barrels per day, but both countries may be open to increasing that number to counter looming U.S. sanctions.
Russia and Iran have flirted with greater cooperation on defense as well. Russia transferred its S-300 air defense missile system to Iran last year, and is negotiating the sale of $10 billion worth of weapons, including T-90 tanks and Sukhoi Su-30SM fighter jets. The United Nations holds a memorandum on Iranian weapons acquisitions — slated to be lifted in 2020 with any weapons transfers requiring U.N. approval — and the United States has vowed to stop any weapons transfers from Russia to Iran. The demand gives Moscow another point it can use in talks with Washington, and another reason to maintain its partnership with Iran despite U.S. pressure.
Both Russia and Iran seem to have been lumped in with North Korea as primary foes in the eyes of the Trump administration. The current U.S. foreign policy posture gives Moscow and Tehran cause to cooperate not only so they can advance their objectives, but also so they can counter Washington's.
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Nov. 16, 2017 Iran has been quiet about Moscow and Riyadh’s newfound friendship – and the weapons that friendship has procured.
By Jacob L. Shapiro
Last month, well before Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman purged the government of potential rivals, his father, King Salman, did something unprecedented as well: He visited Russia, Saudi Arabia’s erstwhile enemy. After the visit came the usual slew of announced business deals that promise a lot but deliver little. On Nov. 13, however, Russia’s Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation announced that it would provide Saudi Arabia with its sophisticated S-400 air defense missiles. King Salman’s visit appears to have delivered real cooperation.
A Relationship Redefined
That Saudi Arabia and Russia would redefine the nature of their relationship is surprising in its own right. These were two countries firmly on opposite ends of the Cold War. But even more jarring is that Iran, Saudi Arabia’s regional rival, has been silent. Iran and Russia have a complicated relationship in their own right, one marked for centuries by suspicion and distrust. But in recent years they had set aside their differences, becoming military allies to save Bashar Assad and destroy the Islamic State. Now, Russia is promising to supply Iran’s biggest enemy with air defense missiles – and Iran hasn’t made a peep. Something doesn’t add up.
Consider Russia’s position in the Middle East. Most observers claim that by partnering with Iran to save the Assad regime, Russia enhanced its influence in the region at the expense of the United States. This is a misunderstanding. Russia’s intervention was actually pretty limited. At the height of its involvement, it had only 30-75 fighter jets and helicopters operating in the country. Its commitment was small but successful, insofar as it prevented the Syrian government from falling and the Islamic State from rising.
But it did not undermine U.S. strategic goals in the Middle East. If anything, it enhanced them. When the Syrian civil war started, the U.S. was determined to remove Assad. Yet there weren’t enough moderates for it to train and arm, and in any case, the Islamic State looked as though it may take Damascus for itself. And so the United States prioritized its fight against IS over its fight against Assad. Russia was, in effect, helping the U.S. do its dirty work. For all the bluster surrounding their relations, the U.S. and Russia have been coordinating their efforts in Syria in pursuit of a common goal for years.
Russian S-400 Triumph medium-range and long-range surface-to-air missile systems ride through Red Square during the Victory Day military parade in Moscow on May 9, 2017. NATALIA KOLESNIKOVA/AFP/Getty Images
Now that Assad has been saved and the Islamic State’s caliphate vanquished, the question is: What comes next? With IS out of the picture, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Israel, Russia, Turkey and Iran – which had if nothing else a common enemy – no longer have a reason to cooperate with one another. Life after IS is actually more difficult for Russia than life with it. Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia are all competing to fill the power vacuum left by the group’s departure, and Russia’s long-term interests don’t align with any of theirs.
Unlike the Islamic State, all three countries have the power to threaten Russian interests directly. Take Turkey, for example. It can cut off Russia’s access to the Mediterranean by closing the Bosporus. It competes with Russia in the Caucasus. And as it strengthens, it will begin to project power into the Balkans, another region in Russia’s sphere of influence.
Iran, like Turkey, has interests in the Caucasus. It also shares a border with Central Asia and Afghanistan – another Russian sphere of influence where Iran can cause serious problems for Moscow.
And Saudi Arabia, for its part, poses two challenges of its own. First, Saudi Arabia can still influence global oil prices, where even small fluctuations can hurt the Russian economy. Second, Saudi Arabia is the worldwide leader in exporting jihadism, a threat to a country like Russia, which has a large minority Muslim population that is fast increasing.
Russia has met these challenges not by choosing one country to align with but by trying to forge better relationships with all of them. Its relationship with Turkey is rocky but sustainable. (In fact, in September, Turkey signed its own agreement to receive S-400s from Russia.) Its relationship with Iran is solid but not without drama. A Russian announcement in August 2016 that it was using an Iranian air base for attacks in Syria set off a short-lived political controversy in Iran, sparking backlash from Iranian politicians who felt Russia’s use of the base violated Iran’s Constitution. Now Russia is reaching out to Saudi Arabia, and besides the agreements on military cooperation, Moscow secured a promise from King Salman during his visit last month to stop Saudi proselytizing to Muslims in Russia.
Russia is cultivating other ties too. Officials from Moscow have met with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu several times this year and have kept lines of communication open over Hezbollah’s potential acquisition of advanced weaponry. Russia has also expressed some support for various Kurdish groups vying for independence in the region. Moscow has, for example, kept open its embassy in Irbil, the capital of Iraqi Kurdistan, throughout the contentious independence referendum.
And while Russia has said it does not support the PYD, the Kurdish political party in northern Syria, in its push for independence, it nonetheless invited the group to a congress comprising all relevant parties to discuss Syria’s future – much to the chagrin of Turkey, Iran and anti-Assad Syrian opposition groups.
Silence and Blindness
Russian foreign policy can be disruptive, but it would be a mistake to think of it as monolithic or unchanging. The Cold War, for all its faults, simplified foreign policy. (Simple doesn’t mean easy.) It was unclear whether the U.S. or USSR was more powerful. Regions like the Middle East became battlegrounds to see which one was. The U.S. had its allies (Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey) and the USSR had its allies (Egypt, Syria, Iraq). Sometimes countries switched sides, but ultimately it was a zero-sum game, with each side trying to weaken the other.
But the Cold War has been over for more than two decades. Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. The U.S. and Russia actually share some long-term interests in the Middle East. Neither wants to see any one country dominate the entire region. Washington and Moscow want parity; they prefer that the region’s countries compete with one another rather than cause problems for them. In a perfect world, the U.S. would be embroiled in the Middle East and Russia would be free. But theirs is not a perfect world, so Moscow’s primary objective is to make sure the problems and ambitions of the Middle East stay in the Middle East.
This altogether different strategy of containment brings us back to Iran – and its silence on the budding Saudi-Russia friendship. Iran does not think it needs to attack Saudi Arabia head on. The government in Tehran believes Saudi Arabia will eventually collapse under the weight of its own problems, and that, in the meantime, the best thing Iran can do is engage Saudi Arabia in expensive and time-consuming proxy wars. Iran may not particularly like Russia’s providing Saudi Arabia with S-400s, but it can look past this particular issue because none of its red lines have been crossed. Russia is, after all, still playing an important role in helping the Assad regime – a key Iranian ally – retake the parts of Syria it has lost in the war. That is worth more right now than a public denunciation of some missile acquisitions.
But just because Iran is silent doesn’t mean it is blind to what’s happening. And just because Iran and Russia have cooperated in recent years doesn’t mean their relationship is ironclad. Russia cannot be everything to everyone in the region, and at some point it will be forced to make difficult decisions. In the meantime, pragmatism reigns. By improving relations with Saudi Arabia, Russia is hedging the bets it placed on Iran. By keeping quiet, Iran continues to reap what benefits it can from Russia’s moves. News about the S-400s doesn’t change much, but it underscores just how quickly change can come
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Will Putin Ever Leave? Could He if He Wanted?
A Stalin biographer contemplates Russia’s weakness today, which makes its current ruler such a threat to the West.
By Tunku Varadarajan
March 9, 2018 5:37 p.m. ET
29 COMMENTS
Russia votes on March 18 in a presidential election that is, let’s agree, lacking in any competitive tension. In fact, says Stephen Kotkin, Vladimir Putin’s re-election is “preordained, a superfluous, if vivid, additional signal of Russia’s debilitating stagnation.”
Few Americans understand Russia better than Mr. Kotkin, who late last year published “ Stalin : Waiting for Hitler, 1929-1941,” the second of an intended three-volume biography of the Soviet dictator Mr. Kotkin describes as “the person in world history who accumulated more power than anyone else.”
President Putin, by comparison, is a dictatorial lightweight. “We wouldn’t want to equate Putin with Stalin,” Mr. Kotkin says. The Soviet Union—which Stalin ruled for three hair-raising decades, until his death in 1953—had “one-sixth of the world’s land mass under its control, plus satellites in Eastern Europe and Northeast Asia.” There were also communist parties in scores of countries, which did Russia’s bidding. “We talk about how Russia interferes in our elections today,” says Mr. Kotkin, “but Stalin had a substantial Communist Party in France, and in Italy, inside the Parliament. And when Stalin gave instructions to them, they followed his orders.”
The Soviet economy, at its peak in the 1980s, reached about a third of the size of the U.S. economy. Russia’s economy today, Mr. Kotkin points out, “is one-15th the size of America’s. Russia is very weak, and getting weaker.” Not long ago, Russia was the eighth-largest economy in the world. Today, Mr. Kotkin says, “you’re lucky to get it at 12th or 13th, depending on how you measure things. Another two terms of Putin, and Russia will be out of the top 20.”
But don’t be reassured by Russia’s feebleness. Mr. Kotkin says this weakness is what makes Mr. Putin such a threat to the West.
Mr. Kotkin, a professor at Princeton and a fellow at Stanford’s Hoover Institution, is the sort of historian who’s gone out of fashion at American universities. He readily admits that the subject that interests him most is power: “Where does power come from, how does it work, how does it accumulate and dissipate?” He is a historian of politics and international relations at a time when history faculties everywhere are recoiling from big themes and grand strategy, embracing instead an increasingly narrow social and cultural historiography.
“We have more than 60 professors in the history department at Princeton,” Mr. Kotkin says. “I consider that a very substantial number. We don’t have a single one whose specialty is U.S. diplomatic history.” He stresses that he’s not against the other types of history being taught at universities, just that he’s saying that there “should be room for straightforward, old-fashioned, political-diplomatic history, about foreign policy and current events.”
Will Putin Ever Leave? Could He if He Wanted?
Illustration: Ken Fallin
Mr. Kotkin became a historian by messy accident. He was a pre-med student at the University of Rochester, in upstate New York, where he boasts that he had “the highest average in organic chemistry, the most difficult course.” He was in the operating room one day with a professor—“a bit of a showman”—who’d opened a carotid artery in a way that made blood spurt. “I’d never seen anything like this,” says Mr. Kotkin—his face faintly green even in the remembering—“and I began to feel woozy.” The callow Mr. Kotkin threw up and passed out. “That ended my medical career.”
A switch to English literature followed, with a minor in history, which put Mr. Kotkin into contact with the legendary Christopher Lasch. A moralist as well as a historian, Lasch was writing “The Culture of Narcissism” at the time. “He was a kind of Midwestern, prairie populist,” Mr. Kotkin says, “and his critique of American progressivism was something you cannot now hear on American campuses.”
Attracted to history, and away from literature, Mr. Kotkin ended up at the University of California, Berkeley for his doctorate, specializing in Russia. “I started learning the Russian language in the third year of my Ph.D., and then four years later I was assistant professor of Russian history at Princeton.” That was 1988, Mr. Kotkin was 29, and the Soviet state was withering away. There couldn’t have been a better time, one imagines, for a historian of Russia to find a wide and hungry audience.
Mr. Kotkin was drawn to Stalin because “the history of Stalin was a history of the world.” He was also “the gold standard of dictatorship.” With Soviet nostalgia sweeping Russia today alongside a revival of Stalin as a paragon, Mr. Kotkin welcomes my asking him how much of Stalin we should see in Mr. Putin today—and how much of Stalin Mr. Putin sees in himself.
Old-school historian that he is, Mr. Kotkin responds with a narrative. “The way you have to begin with this is with Russia’s place in the world. How do you get a figure like Stalin or Putin in the first place?” The answer lies in Russia’s aspiration “to have a special mission in the world—something that most people attribute to its Byzantine heritage.” Russia, in Russian eyes, is “not a regular country, it’s a providential power that’s ordained by God.”
This is where the threat from Mr. Putin springs. It’s very difficult to manage the proposition of Russian power in the world, says Mr. Kotkin, when the “capacities of the Russian state today, like the Soviet state before, are not always of the first rank.” They’re economically modest and technologically mediocre, so they “look for ways to compensate,” and subversion of competitors is an obvious, low-cost strategy.
Mr. Kotkin invites us to ponder Mr. Putin’s options. “We have a situation where a desire for a special mission in the world is the overriding organizational framework of Russian national culture, and the Putin regime is the inheritor of this.” Mr. Putin couldn’t possibly abandon Russia’s self-image and decide that his is going to be “just another country,” the way France and Britain did, and Germany and Japan were forced to do. Among major world powers today, Mr. Kotkin says, “those countries that feel they’re destined under God to be special are really only the U.S., China and Russia.”
Russia, it would seem, is providential yet impotent. “That’s why the Russians love the U.N.,” Mr. Kotkin says. “They have a veto on the Security Council.” It is also why Russia today retains a state-led economy: “You use the state to beat your people up, and the state also picks the winners and losers in the marketplace.” Russia is beggaring itself, Mr. Kotkin believes, in relation to China, but it’s staying afloat strategically “vis-à-vis the West because the West itself is in disarray in a way that China is not. The United States is in a period you can describe any way you wish, but it’s not one of vigorous global leadership.”
Russia appears to have resigned itself to China’s inexorable rise. It has therefore turned its competitive focus entirely on the West. “Russia’s grand strategy,” says Mr. Kotkin, “is Western collapse. Just wait it out. If the European Union breaks up, if the U.S. withdraws into itself and gives up all of its alliances around the world, Russia has many fewer problems, and its relative-power gap can narrow substantially.”
Mr. Putin’s modus operandi, Mr. Kotkin suggests, is to “enhance the process of Western collapse. You can try to interfere in Western elections and support disarray in the West, but ultimately only the West can destroy itself.”
Mr. Putin did not “hijack the U.S. election,” Mr. Kotkin says. “He hijacked American public discourse.” Moscow conducted an intelligence operation to discredit Hillary Clinton and U.S. democracy by obtaining compromising material, “of which there was plenty.” This evolved into “an operation to obtain compromising material on Donald Trump as well, with the aim of getting sanctions lifted and a whole lot more.”
Mrs. Clinton and her campaign were, says Mr. Kotkin, “unwilling victims; Trump and his campaign were willing ones.” As a result, “America’s counterintelligence investigation of Russia’s intelligence activities morphed into a criminal investigation of the Trump campaign. And then, sadly, into an attempted manipulation to derail that investigation.” Russia’s actions, Mr. Kotkin says, “failed to decide the election, or to have the sanctions against Russia removed, but succeeded in stealing America’s attention.”
As Mr. Putin bets on Russia’s survival at the expense of the West, one wonders what his own ideology is beyond an obvious belief in Russian exceptionalism. “He is a Russian patriot in his own way,” says Mr. Kotkin, “but I don’t think his version of Russian patriotism is enhancing the long-term interests of that country.” Like other authoritarian rulers, Mr. Putin believes that “the survival of his personal regime and the survival of his country as a great power in the world are the same question.”
That conflation has put Russia “in a downward spiral,” and Mr. Kotkin lists several measures that show how poorly Russia has fared under Mr. Putin. Most striking is the “hemorrhage” of Russia’s human capital. “It’s hard to measure,” as “there’s no census,” says Mr. Kotkin, “but anywhere between five and 10 million Russians are now living beyond the borders of the former Soviet Union.” The brain-drained Russians average about 20% above the mean income in the countries where they live, “which tells you that they’re a talented group, an educated, entrepreneurial, dynamic population. We have them at Princeton University—in our laboratories, our math department. You name it, they’re all over the place.”
With Mr. Putin a shoo-in for re-election, one wonders if he may, like Stalin, have a job for life in the Kremlin. Mr. Kotkin says he has “self-assigned tenure, meaning he can be there as long as he wants unless he’s assassinated in a palace coup.”
He may not have any choice in the matter: “It’s not clear he can leave if he wants to leave, because of the fact that he has narrowed the regime so considerably.” Authoritarian regimes tend to become victims of their own success. “The better they get at surveillance and suppression of dissent,” Mr. Kotkin says, “the less they know about their own society and what the people really think.” When authoritarian rulers first come to power, “they’re kind of like umpires. There are many different powerful groups that have disputes among themselves, and they turn to the leader to adjudicate.”
About to enter his fourth term as president, Mr. Putin is no longer the arbiter over a “scrum of competing interests, but is, instead, the leader of a single faction that controls all the power and all the wealth,” Mr. Kotkin says. This faction needs its protector to stick around so it can stay rich—and stay alive. “There’s really no way for Putin to retire peacefully.”
Mr. Varadarajan is a fellow at Stanford University’s Hoover Institution.
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Though Russian President Vladimir Putin is assured an election win on March 18, his fourth term will usher in a period of deep challenges for Russia and his continued rule.
Putin's pledge to maintain stability is facing economic and demographic shifts that will ripple throughout society and test compliance with Putin's government.
Thinking of the longer term, the Kremlin is considering a spate of reforms and has allowed political discourse to return to Russia, though each maneuver is not without its risks.
Putin, his cultlike government and the Russian people are starting to consider what life in Russia will look like after he leaves the political stage.
The predictable re-election of Vladimir Putin on March 18 will usher in an unpredictable fourth term for the longtime Russian president. All but assured a victory, Putin could remain in office through 2024, which would make him the longest-serving leader since Josef Stalin. In the West, Putin is labeled a narcissist, despot and would-be king for holding onto power for 18 years. But rebuilding an empire out of the wreckage of the Soviet Union took time, and now he faces a string of pressing challenges that threaten his legacy and the future stability of Russia. His next term will look qualitatively different from his previous terms, as he maneuvers varying chess pieces for Russia's long game.
The Big Picture
The 2018 Annual and Second-Quarter forecasts covered a number of the domestic and international challenges facing Russia, from Moscow's standoff with the West to growing Russian discontent over corruption and the economy. President Vladimir Putin's ongoing moves to insulate Russia from the West and bring social and economic reforms to the forefront will mark his fourth term after his expected re-election on March 18.
At his core, Putin is a patriot. He understands Russia's strengths and pitfalls, and its historic cycles and likely future. A former KGB agent, Putin rose to power after the Soviet collapse and chaotic 1990s under former President Boris Yeltsin. Backed by a savvy, though brutal network in St. Petersburg and the Federal Security Services (the KGB's successor), Putin officially claimed power in 2000, inheriting a politically divided country plagued by a broken economy and rampant regionalism, and bloodied by war in the Caucasus. His first and second terms in office were focused on containing and reversing the anarchy. He dismantled regional dissent, cracked down on the oligarchs, nationalized strategic assets, weeded out political challenges and rallied nationalism. By establishing an authoritarian-based system, Putin micromanaged and mediated the consolidation of the country under his rule.
By the end of his second term in 2008, Russia was relatively stable financially and unified socially and politically, and it was surging back onto the global stage. Putin benefited from high global energy prices, which enabled him to stuff the Kremlin's coffers and allowed his government to finance Russia's restabilization. Putin's system owed its success to more than cash though. It also succeeded because he exercised a gritty craftiness that stemmed from a deep knowledge of the constraints to Russian cohesion and of the challenges that befall every strong Russian leader. Despite certain re-election on March 18, he is thinking of a world and a Russia post-Putin.
Looming Challenges
Even at its most bellicose, Russia is an inherently weak country. Geographically, it is the largest state in the world, and transporting energy, food and resources across it is daunting. Throughout its history, the country has maintained a dependency on commodity exports. Russia is home to 160 distinct ethnic groups and indigenous peoples. And strong rival powers sit on or near its long borders. For these combined reasons, Russian leaders, like Putin, are forced to hold onto stability with an iron fist. Going into his fourth term, two large shifts — economic and demographic — threaten Putin's ability to maintain stability and his hold on power.
Even at its most bellicose, Russia is an inherently weak country.
Putin's Social Contract. When he came to power, Putin brokered an informal social contract with the Russian people to maintain financial and economic stability. The contract includes dependable paychecks, secure pensions, a reliable banking system, state backing of strategic assets, and opportunities for the next generation. Russia's economic position shapes the loyalty (or at least the compliance) of the elites, the general population, and the military and security services. Under Putin, Russia has bounced back relatively well from economic hiccups; however, the country currently is settling into a prolonged period of post-recession stagnation that is reverberating across the country.
Russia's poverty level is rising at its fastest pace in two decades, and its minimum wage is below subsistence levels. Average Russians are spending half of their paychecks on food, and more than 25 percent report regular interruptions or cuts to their salaries. The Kremlin blew through its Reserve Fund at the start of the year, and it is now dipping into the National Welfare Fund, which is intended to secure pensions. The Russian banking system also is rapidly shrinking, with the Central Bank having closed one-third (or 300) of the country's struggling banks over the past three years.
The economy is overwhelmingly the top concern among Russians. Of the more than 1,100 protests in 2017, two-thirds were related to the economy. Signs held by protesters during widespread demonstrations in June 2017 called on the Kremlin to pay for bread, not bombs — a jab at Moscow's high-profile military interventions in Syria and Ukraine.
Corruption also is driving disaffection in Russia, which ranks in the bottom 45 countries on Transparency International's corruption index. The Russian people largely ignored the rampant corruption of Putin and his cronies while the country thrived, but calls for an anti-corruption campaign against the Kremlin have grown, helped along by the popularity of opposition heavyweight Alexei Navalny and his anti-corruption exposes.
2018 Russian presidential candidates
A similar discontent is developing among the Russian elites, both within the Kremlin and among the oligarchy. The elites supported Putin as long as their fiefdoms were protected and growing. But now their business and financial opportunities are shrinking because of the stagnant economy and because of increased pressure from Western sanctions stemming from Moscow's foreign activities. Many elites have lost or fear losing their financial support systems (personal banks at home or the safety of cash abroad), and the Kremlin is increasingly taking on responsibility for those systems.
This has sparked increased competition among the elites and diminished Putin's ability to curb or intervene in the battles. The most prominent example is Rosneft chief Igor Sechin's takedown of Economic Development Minister Alexei Ulyukayev last year for attempting to prevent the oil czar from snatching up assets — a move Putin forbade without effect. Other examples are the revived battles for the control of assets by the metals oligarchs and the unchecked transformation of Chechnya into a mini-fiefdom based on conservative Islamic values under Ramzan Kadyrov. Additionally, the large security services are flexing their muscles over key assets and portfolios, leading to a likely challenge in Putin's fourth term over the power to target other elites.
Demographics. Putin's fraying contract with his people and elites comes as he faces another distinct challenge: demographics. The country's ethnic Russian population is in steep decline, with United Nations estimates predicting an overall decline of 10 percent by 2030. The decline is despite a sharply rising ethnic Muslim population, from 13 million in 1990 to a projected total of more than 20 million in 2030. This trend exacerbates social tensions between ethnic groups, particularly because many Russian Muslim regions, such as Chechnya and Dagestan, are heavily subsidized by the Kremlin, and many Russian Muslims are flooding the more ethnically Russian cities for jobs. This demographic shift also heightens the prominence of Muslim leaders, such as Kadyrov, and their ability to wield power.
A generational change is gripping Russia as well, with nearly one-third of the country's population born after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991. This demographic class has largely known only Putin as the country's leader, and it holds nearly no memory of the chaotic 1990s. The Russians currently coming of age are not anti-Putin per se, though they largely want leadership options instead of a blanket expectation of continued rule by Putin. A recent survey by independent pollster Levada found that only 15 percent of Russians ages 18-24 believe Putin serves the interests of the Russian people, and 74 percent believe Putin is responsible for Russia's problems. This new generation is social-media savvy, diluting the Kremlin's messaging to its people. Young faces have overwhelmingly populated protests in recent years, compared with the more middle-aged appearance of the 2011-12 protests. Demonstrations are increasingly organized on social media, making them difficult for the Kremlin to curb or disrupt.
External Challenges. The deepening internal challenges facing Russia are juxtaposed with its efforts to maintain its position in the greater world. Russia faces an enduring standoff with the West, which only exacerbates the economic situation at home brought by U.S. sanctions. Russia is expanding its ambitious rearmament program, as a new arms race speeds up and existing arms control treaties are undermined. The country's national defense is an issue Putin repeatedly has refused to bend on, and he is injecting even more capital into the defense sector, despite a tight budget at home. The state is taking over responsibility for many of the defense firms so it can easily surge cash into their programs.
As relations with the West continue to sour, Russia is shoring up ties with China and many Middle Eastern countries. Besides arms, Russia is investing in expensive energy links with Turkey, China and others to give it flexibility when depending on the Western energy market. Putin is attempting to position Russia strongly abroad to insulate the country from shocks at home. However, greater exposure on the world stage increases the attention of foreign players who can meddle in Russia in return. The Kremlin has tried to crack down on foreign attempts to reach into Russia via media and social media, but the government's heavy hand risks further inflaming discontent at home.
Politics and Putin
The longer a leader stays in power, the more resourceful he or she must be to retain such power. One strategy that Putin is employing allows a degree of political debate to return to Russia after a decade in which debate was stifled by the censure of independent and foreign media, the assassinations and arrests of journalists and opponents, and the spread of state-controlled messaging. Questioning and dissenting points of view have started to surface over the past few years, even in state-backed media.
The Kremlin understands that the Russian people — at all levels — require an outlet to voice their discontent and to promote their agendas. Relatively progressive political discourse can be heard from the protesters, the media, think tanks, business leaders and politicians, spreading across class and faction. This dialogue comes with a risk, and Putin's regime is tinkering with how far it allows these voices and views to resonate without backlash. The Kremlin is also toying with a plan to include various opposition leaders in government debates on both domestic and foreign policies to create a less antagonistic and more constructive opposition scheme.
The longer a leader stays in power, the more resourceful he or she must be to retain such power.
Discourse with opposition and independent factions comes as the government faces difficult decisions about how to address a spate of Russian woes. The Kremlin is considering a series of difficult reforms to the state budget, energy sector, security services and banking system. Which direction such wide-ranging reforms will go is not clear, but the Kremlin appears to be taking conflicting views into account.
The return of political debate does not mean Putin faces a real challenger or formidable opposition yet. Instead, his true rivals are the challenges facing the country and the cultlike system he has built around himself. This has Putin — and much of the country — thinking of the future of Russia without him — a topic previously barred from most Russian media. Over the past year, a string of Putin-picked officials in their 30s and 40s have churned through key posts, from governors to ministers, in what is seen as Putin's tests for future leadership and higher office. Some notable standouts are Economic Development Minister Maxim Oreshkin, 35; presidential chief of staff Anton Vaino, 40; and Russian Agricultural Bank CEO Dmitry Patrushev, 40, whose father is also head of the Russian Security Council.
In the Soviet period, Kremlin watchers studied the order of seating in the Politburo's boxes at the Bolshoi Ballet to gauge prominence and favor among the elites. Today, Kremlinologists watch Putin's hockey matches on Red Square or video of the elites' macho antics, such as footage from October that showed regional officials diving from cliffs. The appointments and exhibitions are Putin's way of tutoring this next generation for fitness for office and public appeal. It's unlikely Putin will choose a sole successor, but he may attempt to turn the personalized system into more of a collective, much like a latter-day Soviet Politburo.
Attempting to create a post-Putin system with Russia facing so many domestic and international challenges looks to become Putin's greatest test. Aware of Russia's recent history, Putin will attempt to succeed where other Russian leaders such as Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Gorbachev failed. The extent of his success will become clearer in the coming years, which will show the viability of Russia's continued stability and ability to maintain its place in the world.
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Sent to me by someone of background for whom I have high regard:
PS: Note the references to "uni-polar" and "multi-polar".
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https://warontherocks.com/2018/06/raiding-and-international-brigandry-russias-strategy-for-great-power-competition/
Raiding and International Brigandry: Russia’s Strategy for Great Power Competition
No one knows if the next six years of Vladimir Putin’s reign will be his last, but signs suggest they will be the most difficult for Washington to navigate in what is now widely acknowledged on both sides as a long-term confrontation between Russia and the West. Moscow has weathered an economic crisis brought on by low oil prices and Western sanctions, domestic political scandals, and international setbacks. More importantly, just as America’s own national security documents begin to frame great power competition as the defining challenge to U.S. power, Russia is yet again adapting its approach based on the experience of the past three years. Russian leaders may not have something that would satisfy the Western academic strategy community as a deliberate “grand strategy,” but they nonetheless possess a strategic outlook and a theory of victory for this competition. That theory is based less on direct competition and more on raiding, a stratagem that holds promise for revisionist ambitions and the weaker side in the conflict.
Raiding is the way by which Russia seeks to coerce the United States through a series of operations or campaigns that integrate indirect and direct approaches. Modern great power competition will thus return to forms of coercion and imposition reminiscent of the Middle Ages, but enacted with the technologies of today. Although raiding will be Moscow’s principal approach to competition, international brigandry may be the best term to describe elements of Russian behavior that the West considers to be “bad” or “malign.” These are acts of indirect warfare, both centrally planned and enacted on initiative by entities within the Russian state empowered to shape policy – often in competition with each other. Brigandry may come with negative legalistic connotations, a byword for outlaw, but here the term is meant to define a form of irregular or skirmish warfare in the international system conducted by a partisan.
Russia is, at times, miscast as a global spoiler or retrograde delinquent. Delinquents commit minor offenses and have no plan. Spoilers react to plans, but have little strategy of their own. Raiders, by contrast, launch operations with a strategic outlook and objectives in mind. And while often weaker than their opponents, raiders can be successful. The structure of the international system and the nature of the confrontation lends itself to the use of raiding, which increasingly appears to be the chosen Russian strategy. By focusing on deterring the high-end conventional fight and restoring nuclear coercive credibility, both important in and of themselves, the United States national security establishment may be fundamentally overlooking what will prove the defining Russian approach to competition.
Raiding as a tactic is not a new experience for the United States, but considered in a strategic context, the concept may lend itself more useful than the hodgepodge of gray zone, and other neologisms the community is often stuck referencing to explain the modern character of war. More importantly, raiding is a long established concept at the operational and strategic level of warfare, unlike “Russian hybrid warfare,” which has devolved into a kitchen sink discussion about Russian bad behavior. Indeed, raiding was once the principal form of warfare throughout Europe. Raiding is new in the sense that it is actually quite old as a strategy for competition between powers before the prominence of industrial scale warfare. Today, in our manuals, a raid is viewed as an operational tool rather than strategic concept, as can be seen in Joint Operations (JP 3-0), which describes a raid as “an operation to temporarily seize an area in order to secure information, confuse an adversary, capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability culminating in a planned withdrawal.”
Raids are often conducted over phases, including infiltration, denying the enemy the opportunity to reinforce, followed by surprise attack and withdrawal. Raiding plays much more to Russian strengths, leveraging agility and a simplified chain of command ( i.e. deinstitutionalized decision making, and a strong desire to achieve political ends, but not to get stuck with the costs of holding terrain). This is a strategy of limited means and it is also lucrative. Thus, raiding is not about territorial expansion or global domination. We should consider this term when seeking to understand how classical great powers like Russia use their toolkits in strategic competition.
Great Power Spoiler or Great Power Raider?
Once the Cold War ended, Washington became accustomed to seeing Russia as a largely irrelevant power, unable to contest American foreign policy and too weak to effectively pursue its own interests. However, the 1990s and early 2000s were an anomalous period of time, with Russia missing as an actor in European politics, and taciturn on the international stage. In truth, it was not simply Russia’s absence from international politics, but the dearth of other powers in general that made this a period of unipolarity and the primacy of one state in international affairs well above and beyond the power of others. Denizens of Washington tended to forget or ignore the second word in the term Charles Krauthammer coined in 1990 to describe American primacy in the post-Cold War period: the “unipolar moment.”
He wrote:
The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. In perhaps another generation or so there will be great powers coequal with the United States, and the world will, in structure, resemble the pre-World War I era. But we are not there yet, nor will we be for decades. Now is the unipolar moment.
That moment lasted longer than many had expected, but the decades did pass, and great power competition has reemerged.
The Russo-Georgian War in 2008 led to a turning point in bilateral relations. There was a sense in Washington that somewhere things had gone awry in Russia policy, and a desire emerged to reset relations with Moscow, in the hope that successful cooperation on areas of mutual interest would demonstrate the benefits of integration with the West, and into a U.S.-led international order. Suffice it to say that dream did not come to fruition.
Around 2015, after its intervention in Syria, Russia became increasingly seen as a global spoiler. Still the view prevailed that Moscow was resurgent, but brittle in terms of the foundations of power. This is a hubristic and overly optimistic interpretation. Such a vision is borne of the consistent mythos in America’s outlook that Russia is dangerous, but no more than a paper tiger that will eventually fade from the global stage. The endless trope that Russia doesn’t have a long game is a self-serving delusion. As Russia seeks to navigate through mounting international challenges posed by its confrontation with the United States it is increasingly forcing Washington and its allies to respond to a series of operations, campaigns, and calculated and not so calculated gambits.
Effective nuclear and conventional deterrence has long resulted in what Glenn Snyder described as a stability-instability paradox. This holds that the more stable the nuclear balance, the more likely powers will engage in conflicts below the threshold of war. If war is not an option and direct competition is foolish in light of U.S. advantages, raiding is a viable alternative that could succeed over time. Therefore, Russia has become the guerrilla in the international system, not seeking territorial dominion but raiding to achieve its political objectives. And these raids are having an effect. If Moscow can remain a strategic thorn in Washington’s side long enough for Beijing to become a global challenge to American leadership, Washington may have no choice but to negotiate a new great power condominium that ends the confrontation , or so Moscow hopes.
At the heart of a raid is the desire to achieve a coercive effect on the enemy. Even if unsuccessful, a raid can positively shape the environment for the raider by the damage and chaos it can inflict. At the tactical level, it is about military gains, but large raiding campaigns in the past sought political and economic impact on the adversary, typically ending with a withdrawal. The French word for this form of warfare was chevauchee, or mounted raid, describing an approach to conflict that eschewed siege warfare. The chevauchee was prominent in the 14th century, and the quintessential raider of that time was the English Black Prince, Edward III’s son. The Black Prince led two extensive raiding campaigns in 1355 and 1356 during the Hundred Years War, looting, burning and pillaging the French countryside. He was forced to adopt this form of warfare in part because the English lacked the means to siege French cities. Thus, the goal became to destabilize France to convince its feudal sovereigns that they were on their own. He did this with raids that targeted economic resources and thereby destroyed the political credibility of the French monarchy.
In Spain, the term for this form of warfare was cabalgadas, prolonged raiding operations conducted by infantry, a common feature of the War of the Two Pedros (1356 to 1379). In North Africa, raids were called razzia. America’s martial traditions are also rooted in raiding, from Roger’s Rangers during the French and Indian War, to the Revolutionary War, or the famous cavalry raids of the Civil War.
Russia has extensive experience in raiding as a form of warfare. The Russian term for raiding is nabeg. Long before the Mongol invasion in 1237 to 1240 and the formation of the Russian Empire, the first raids by the Rus began in 860 against the Byzantine Empire. These raids went on until 1043. Peter the Great was also no stranger to raiding operations in wartime. Hundreds of years later, during the latter years of the Great Northern War, Russian galley fleets with thousands of raiders successfully attacked Sweden, including Gotland, Uppland, and the Stockholm archipelago. The Red Army had its armored raids of World War II, like the 24th Tank Corps raid on Tatsinskaya during the last stages of the Battle of Stalingrad in December 1942.
Raiding is an effective riposte to a strong but distracted opponent, and becomes popular when the technologies of the time create a rift between the political objectives sought and the means available to attain them. This makes traditional forms of warfare too costly, too risky, or unsuitable to the goals desired. Raiding proved prevalent before the modern nation-state system was formed in 1648 and subsequently exported by Europeans to the rest of the world. However, today the modern nation-state construct is weak. Do states truly have economic, information, or cyber borders? How do you demark these borders, defend them, and deter adversaries from crossing them? Much of the infrastructure for this digital age lives in exposed global domains, lies under the sea in international waters, in space, and cyberspace. All of it is vulnerable and ripe for exploitation.
The Modern Chevauchee
Russia will continue to use other instruments of national power to raid the West as part of a coercive campaign intended to at minimum weaken and distract Washington and, at maximum, coerce it into concessions on Russian interests. This is not a short-term strategy for victory, and it would be wrong to assume that these raids are centrally directed given the diverging security factions, clans, and personalities seeking to shape Russian foreign policy. Mark Galeotti cleverly coined “adhocracy” to describe this system. The image of Putin sitting in the Kremlin pulling knobs and levers, or the mythical Gerasimov Doctrine (a linguistic invention that its author has forsworn), have become tragic caricatures in the current zeitgeist. On the contrary, raiding has historically been conducted by detachments with a simplified chain of command, pre-delegated authority, and substantial leeway in how to prosecute their campaign. Raiding is not for deliberate strategists, but for those able to capitalize on leaner, fail fast, and fail cheap approaches.
Russia is not raiding to erode the liberal international order, at least not intentionally. That is the inevitable consequence of Russian behavior from a Western perspective, but not its objective. Such evaluations are frankly expressions of Anglo-Saxon political ideology more so than astute analysis of how Moscow actually tries to influence the international system. Russia does not believe there is any such thing as a liberal international order, nor does it see NATO as anything other than America’s Warsaw Pact, an organization structured around the projection of U.S. military power. As such, what the Kremlin understands the current international order to be is simply a system built around American unipolarity, and the best way to change this construct is to accelerate a transition from unipolarity to multipolarity (or what their policy establishment now calls a “polycentric” world).
Suffice it to say this transition will take a long time because, as William Wohlforth argued in 1999, unipolarity is more stable than it seems. Before 2014, many in Moscow thought they could just wait for this shift in power to happen. It’s important to understand that Russian elites too believe time is on their side. Many misread the 2007-2008 financial crisis as the beginning of rapid decline in the West. The confrontation has now forced Russian leadership to become active in pursuing the long-stated objectives of its own foreign policy, and they won’t stop until a settlement is made.
The center of gravity, in Russian military thought, is the adversary’s will to fight and a country’s ability to engage in war or confrontation as a system. Therefore, the purpose of operations, particularly at a time of nominal peace, is to shape adversary decision-making by targeting their economic, information, and political infrastructure. Senior Russian officers see the modern character of war (correlation of forms and methods) as placing greater emphasis on non-kinetic means, particularly when compared to warfare in the 20th century. Russia’s chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, famously had this posited as a 4:1 non-military to military ratio in one article. Another important trend in Russian military thought identifies the decisive period of conflict as the confrontation or crisis preceding the outbreak of force-on-force violence and the initial period of war. Much of this Russian discourse focuses on non-contact warfare, the ability of long range precision weapons, paired with non-kinetic capabilities in global domains to inflict damage throughout the enemy’s system.
This vision seeks to reconcile the natural proclivities of a General Staff (i.e. planning for high-end warfare, buying expensive capabilities, and seeking larger conventional formations) with an understanding that modern conflicts will play out without set battle lines and meeting engagements. Russia seeks to shape the environment prior to the onset of conflict, and immediately thereafter, imposing costs and inflicting damage to coerce the adversary, in the hope that an inherent asymmetry of interests at stake will force the other side to yield. Russian officers are certainly not partisans, nor do they vocally advocate for raiding, but it is hard to escape the fact that the central tenets of current Russian military thought resemble more the coercive theory of victory of a chevauchee than they do of industrial scale warfare.
Raiding should not be confused with hybrid warfare. Raiding is an established historical approach to warfare, with discernible phasing, objectives, ways, and an overall strategy. The application of hybrid warfare to describe Russian operations has usually been confusing and disjointed in practice. Today, the term is increasingly relegated to European conversations about Russian information warfare and political chicanery.
The Strategic Terrain of Great Power Competition
Moscow is constrained by the structural realities of its competition with Washington. There is no way for Russia to fundamentally alter a balance of power that dramatically favors the United States. America’s GDP is more than five times that of Russia’s adjusted for purchasing power parity and ten times greater in raw terms. Washington sits at the head of the world’s most powerful network of allies in Europe, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. And U.S. conventional military superiority is underwritten by a defense budget that is many times the size of Russia’s.
This is why Stephen Walt was right when he argued in March that the current competition is dissimilar to the Cold War (China, however, might prove a different story). It is not borne of a bipolar system, has no universalist ideological conflict behind it, and will not shape international politics as that period of confrontation did. Despite shrill cries by Max Boot, this is also no war, and the United States should do its best to keep it that way. We are still in what can broadly be described as a great power peace. Ever since the great powers built nuclear weapons, large-scale warfare has proven too risky and costly, thereby displacing competition into a host of proxy conflicts or actions short of warfare. Occasional conflicts do occur, such as the Sino-Soviet border conflict 1969, or Kargil War in 1999, but these have tended to be among young, and relatively minor nuclear powers, during the early stages of their nuclear arsenal development. Major nuclear powers, with established nuclear deterrents, eschew conventional wars because they understand that no one wins a nuclear war.
International orders historically have been created from the ashes of a great power war. As such, powers that want to create a multipolar world order have no quick or easy way of realizing such a vision. Therefore, Russia is stuck playing on a largely fixed strategic board, where the rules and institutions created by the West both favor the United States and constrain revisionism. That’s the end of the good news.
However, not all is well with the U.S.-led liberal international order. One need only to look to Russia’s war with Ukraine, successful projection of power in Syria, and sustained efforts at political subversion. Russia’s strategy is aimed at pursuing a great power condominium, seeking to secure former Soviet space as a de facto sphere of influence and its status as one of the principal players in the international system. The approach is rooted in convincing the United States that Russia is a great power with special rights, including the primacy of its security over the sovereignty of its neighbors and a prominent role in organizations governing world affairs. The Russian dream is to return to a status and recognition the Soviet Union held during a very particular time of its history, the détente of 1969 to 1979, when Washington saw Moscow, albeit reluctantly, as a co-equal superpower. In the face of structural constraints, Russia has found a viable path to getting what it wants from the United States via a strategy of coercion, leveraging raids and a wider campaign of international brigandry to impose outsized costs and retain Western attention.
In the early 2000s, when Russia was weak, Putin hoped to make a deal, trading Russian support for the U.S. so-called War on Terror in exchange for certain prerogatives: being treated as a great power, a free hand in its near abroad, and a U.S. ‘hands off’ approach in the former Soviet space. Back then, Moscow sought to explain why Russia deserves a seat at the table, but it was judged in Washington as too weak and irrelevant. When that approach didn’t work, Russia sought to demonstrate that its power and influence was grossly underestimated. Starting with the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, Moscow began using force to prevent NATO expansion. In Ukraine and Syria, Russia illustrated to what at times seems an overly post-modern Western political establishment that military power is still the trump card in international relations, despite what then-Secretary of State John Kerry had to say about 19th century behavior.
Russia’s successful use of force got the West to rethink Moscow’s capabilities and intentions, but it did not lead to a recognition of Russian interests, or a renegotiation of the post-Cold War order and Russia’s place in it, as the Kremlin had hoped. In place of a great power condominium, Russian leaders earned a lasting confrontation. Russia may have the power to filch Crimea from Ukraine, but it is still judged too weak to force a renegotiation of the security framework in Europe or attain major concessions from the United States. After Congress passed sanctions in the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act in July 2017 and the executive branch closed ranks to prevent any rapprochement, it became clear that no deal was in the offing between the Kremlin and the White House.
Russia still seeks recognition of its great power status in the international system, believing that with it will come privilege, security, and a privileged sphere of influence over its neighbors. The Russian leadership’s strategic outlook has not changed, but demonstrating renewed military strength and resolve has proven insufficient for their country to get a deal with the United States. Washington is still full of policymakers who see Russian power as brittle, believing Moscow doesn’t have a long game. The Russian leadership has no alternative but to settle in for a prolonged geopolitical confrontation, banking on their own resilience, and the ability to impose costs on the basis of an old and familiar strategy of raiding.
Goodbye Nation-State, Hello Raiding
Ironically, as the driver of globalization and the growth of global interdependence, it is the West that has done the most to make raiding against itself so lucrative. Global connectivity, labor flows, migration both legal and illegal, proliferation of information technologies such as social media, together with the creation of supranational entities like the European Union are all enabling factors. Great powers like China and Russia often strive for autarky, seeking to fence off their kingdoms from influences that might create interdependence and allow uncontrolled outside influence. Beijing built the ”great firewall of China,” while Russia has also sought to wall itself off and impose statist control over the invisible ties that connect it to the rest of the international community.
Moscow’s latest battle that sparked protests was its attempt to censor Telegram, a popular messaging app, a contest which has escalated into millions of IPs blocked. These countries seek to create advantage in the great power competition by securing themselves from those technological trends which make modern states borderless. They are building forts. At the same time, they have come to recognize that liberal democracies are open plains ripe for raiding. The 21st century, with all its technological advancements and global interconnectedness, is naturally reviving forms of warfare that shaped Europe in 13th and 14th centuries.
Cyber operations are perhaps the most obvious instrument for modern day raiding. Both Russia and China have made good use of it to raid the U.S. politically and economically, pillaging and looting like in the days of yore. Those Russian attacks not intended to damage are perhaps even more worrisome intrusions designed to gain access and lay the groundwork for future strikes against critical infrastructure such as “energy, nuclear, commercial facilities, water, aviation and manufacturing.” Russia’s recently closed San Francisco consulate was reportedly an intelligence hub for physically mapping fiber optic networks, and a host of activities described as “extraordinarily aggressive intelligence-collection efforts” considered to be “at the very forefront of innovation.”
However, military raiding is back as well. The Russian campaign in Ukraine’s Donbass region is only posing as a form of industrialized warfare. In reality, this was meant to be a raid. It began with infiltration, and its strategic centerpiece is a low-cost effort to coerce Ukraine into federalization in a bid to retain control over Kyiv’s strategic orientation. Moscow never wanted to hold on to the Donbass and still does not. If anything, it long sought to return it to Ukraine in exchange for federalization, though, at minimum, Russia is happy at the destabilizing effect that this conflict has on Ukraine’s policy and economy. Put aside cyber and political warfare campaigns, the four-year conflict in Ukraine is at face value a sustained raid that Moscow had hoped to close out with the Minsk I and Minsk II agreements. Russia empirically lacks the manpower to take over Ukraine, nor did it want to own and pay for parts of the country either. At its core the war in the Donbass is the modern equivalent of the Black Prince’s great chevauchee campaigns in France.
Raiding is not a direct imposition by conquest, nor is it a fait accompli. Behind a raid lies neither the desire for domination nor for limited territorial gains. From the outset, the adversary seeks to withdraw. This is why Crimea does not fit this model, although there is much evidence to suggest that Russia initially seized Crimea without the intent to annex it ( i.e. it was first meant as part of a game of coercive diplomacy). That said, Ukraine illustrates the fundamental problems with raiding: Raids are easier to launch than they are to manage. The fitful and messy escalation in Ukraine is a hallmark of raiding, when the character of war is not defined by two armies meeting in the field, or a militarily superior power seeking to simply impose its will on a weaker adversary via large-scale industrial warfare. If Russia wanted to crush the Ukrainian military, it could do it, but instead it wants to raid. Since 2015, the conflict has evolved to unconventional warfare throughout Ukraine’s territory, with state-sponsored assassinations, acts of terror, and industrial sabotage becoming the norm.
As Russia grows more confident, and the confrontation intensifies, raiding may become more military in nature. Moscow’s position in Syria is ideal for campaigns elsewhere in the Middle East where it can establish itself as a power broker on the cheap, with countries in the region already choosing to hedge and deleverage from their dependency on relations with the United States. This is ultimately an iterative experience: Some raids or acts of brigandage have clearly backfired. The best recent example of blowback was the failed Russian mercenary attack on February 7 east of Deir Ezzor. That night in the desert was the brainchild of one of Russia’s “mini-garchs” and infamous backers of the Wagner mercenary group, together with the internet troll factory, Yevgeny Prigozhin. While not exactly the brightest horseman, he has been closely linked to Russian efforts in information, political, and other forms of indirect warfare.
The Middle East is a flanking theater in the competition, one where the United States is visibly weak, and its allies are interested in any alternative external power to reduce their own dependency on Washington. Russia will look for ways to raid America’s influence there without taking ownership, security responsibilities, or otherwise over extending itself. The military campaign in Syria came cheaply, taught Russia that it can indeed project power outside its region, and challengeds America’s monopoly on use of force in the international system.
The Black Prince’s Strategy
Forget the decisive Mahanian battle. The typical conventional wars, which the United States frequently wargames, but probably will never get to fight (thanks to nuclear deterrence), are poorly aligned with how adversaries intend to pursue their objectives. Avoiding disadvantages in direct competition is undoubtedly important, as Russia and China have equally invested in conventional and nuclear capabilities, but it is precisely because of our investments in these realms that we have made raiding lucrative. The surest way to spot a raid is when the initiating power doesn’t actually want to possess the object in contest but is instead seeking to inflict economic and political pain to coerce a more important strategic concession out of their opponent. This is not to say that limited land grabs or conventional warfare will disappear from the international arena, but raiding poses a more probable challenge to the United States and its extended network of allies.
Great power raiding is not meant to represent a unified field theory of adversary behavior in the current competition. Not everything aligns neatly with this concept, nor can the actions of a country with numerous instruments of national power be reduced so simply. Nonetheless, raiding for cost imposition and outright pillage, together with other behaviors by intelligence services and elites that may be summed up as in international brigandry, do encapsulate much of the problem. The Russian long game is to raid and impose painful costs on the United States, and its allies, until such time as China becomes a stronger and more active contender in the international system. This theory of victory stems from the Russian assumption that the structural balance of power will eventually shift away from the United States towards China and other powers in the international system, resulting in a steady transition to multipolarity. This strategy is emergent, but the hope is that a successful campaign of raiding, together with the greater threat from China, will force Washington to compromise and renegotiate the post-Cold War settlement.
Can Russia win? If winning is defined as Moscow attaining influence and securing interests in the international system not commensurate with the relative balance of power, but rather based the amount of damage they have inflicted by raiding – quite possibly. If the raider has staying power, and makes a prolonged strategic burden of itself, it can get a favorable settlement even though it is weaker, especially if its opponent has bigger enemies to deal with. Throughout history, leading empires, the superpowers of their time, have had to deal and negotiate settlements with raiders.
Here, conventional military might and alliances count for a lot less than you might hope. Today, you don’t need mounted riders for a raiding campaign or for acts of international brigandry. Moscow successfully rode past NATO, all of America’s carrier strike groups, and struck Washington with a campaign of political subversion. The technology involved may be innovative or new, but this form of warfare is decidedly old. To deal with it, Washington will not require panel discussions, new acronyms, and the construction of a center of excellence, but instead to revisit the history of conflict, international politics, and strategy.
Michael Kofman is a Senior Research Scientist at CNA Corporation and a Fellow at the Wilson Center’s Kennan Institute. Previously he served as program manager at National Defense University. The views expressed here are his own.
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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/looking-back-russian-georgian-war-10-years-later
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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/looking-back-russian-georgian-war-10-years-later
Another article today on same topic:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/when-russia-invaded-georgia-1533682576
The Georgia invasion was another episode skipped in the article contending that Putin's Russia is not the Soviet Union.
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Highlights
The Russia-West standoff is likely to intensify in the coming year, as Moscow will be largely unwilling to make the kinds of concessions that the United States and European Union are seeking in order to end their sanctions and military buildups.
Russia's ties with China have strengthened and will continue to grow, but any sustainable Moscow-Beijing alignment will ultimately face limits due to the Kremlin's deep-seated concerns about China's rise as a major power.
Russian President Vladimir Putin will face growing economic and political challenges on the home front, but these challenges will be manageable for the leader in the coming year.
It was October 1939, and Winston Churchill was on BBC radio, describing Russia: "It is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma." Of course, World War II had just begun, and the question regarding the intentions of the Soviet Union — and particularly its relations with Nazi Germany — was of paramount importance to the United Kingdom, Europe and the world at large.
Bookending Churchill's characterization of Russia was the following: "I cannot forecast to you the action of Russia … but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest." This quote has unique relevance to the work that we do at Stratfor. We produce forecasts, and driving our forecasts is a geopolitical methodology that considers first and foremost the broader national interest above the subjective considerations of individual leaders, decision-makers and ordinary citizens. But that does not mean that such people and their subjective considerations don't matter at all. Driven by geography and a state's geopolitical imperatives, the national interest provides the framework in which the trajectory of the nation plays out over the long term. But in the short term, people — from politicians to business leaders to blue-collar workers — do have an impact on shaping the policy and trajectory of their nation.
The Big Picture
In its 2019 Annual Forecast, Stratfor outlined the key trends that will shape Russia and the Eurasian region in the coming year, from the Russia-West standoff to Moscow's growing ties with China to Russia's internal challenges. A recent trip to Russia offered an opportunity to test these forecasts against the realities on the ground and the perspectives of Russian citizens themselves.
See 2019 Annual Forecast
See Eurasia section of the 2019 Annual Forecast
With these principles in mind, I recently set off for a visit to Russia. Having just completed work on Stratfor's 2019 Annual Forecast, I wanted to test our forecast at ground level and see how it stacks up against the perspectives of Russian citizens themselves. Of course, Russia is a big and diverse place, and it's impossible to capture a comprehensive picture in a country as vast and complex as Russia. But my visit — which included stops in my birthplace of Moscow, as well as St. Petersburg, Kazan and some small towns in between — and discussions with citizens from a diverse array of backgrounds and professions provided an excellent opportunity to test our forecast against realities and views on the ground.
A Russian Take on the Russia-West Standoff
Headlining our Eurasia forecast is the enduring standoff between Russia and the West. Ever since Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution in 2014 — along with Russia's resulting annexation of Crimea and provision of support to separatists in eastern Ukraine — Moscow and the West have been locked in a confrontation that has run the gamut from military buildups to economic sanctions, cyberattacks, propaganda dissemination and political meddling. Russia's strategic interest in keeping Ukraine and the rest of the former Soviet periphery within its sphere of influence, in contrast to the West's desire to deny Russia this sphere of influence, has provided a backdrop for this standoff, which has now spread from the European borderlands to Syria and North Korea. In 2019, this standoff is only likely to intensify, as arms control treaties collapse and sanctions expand.
Rightly or wrongly, Russians view their country as a great power that deserves a major voice on the world stage, and many citizens believe the West, especially the United States, is actively trying to undermine Russia.
According to the prevailing view among the Russians I spoke with, the tensions between Moscow and the West are here to stay. Rightly or wrongly, Russians view their country as a great power that deserves a major voice on the world stage. Many citizens believe the West, especially the United States, is actively trying to undermine Russia, both in terms of its role in the world and its domestic stability and cohesiveness. On several occasions, people described Russia as a country that does not respond well to pressure from the outside; many also depicted it as a "besieged fortress." The more Moscow faces this pressure — again, especially from the United States — the more it will double down on its position and strive to protect what it deems to be its rightful strategic interests.
The Ukrainian conflict is a case in point. Russia's standard line is that the Euromaidan uprising was a Western-backed (if not organized) affair whose primary goal was to weaken Russia at the most strategic and sensitive point in its immediate periphery. To many Russians, Moscow merely acted defensively in annexing Crimea and supporting pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine. For them, Ukraine was simply the West's latest move in a decades-old campaign of encirclement and containment that has previously included such actions as NATO's expansion into Central and Eastern Europe, as well as U.S. support for color revolutions across the former Soviet periphery. After Russia extracted itself from the chaos and instability of the 1990s, it could scarcely stand idly by as these events unfolded, as it was not clear how far the West would go in its ostensible campaign against Russia.
Because of this, I was told that Russia is not in the business of making major concessions to the West, even when it faces significant pressure in the form of military buildups or economic sanctions. And while the West may have imposed sanctions only in response to Russia's actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, Moscow's foes have now broadened the measures to encompass many more aspects of Russian behavior, including everything from meddling in Western elections to North Korea and Syria. This expansion in scope has convinced Russian decision-makers that the West will not ease the sanctions or pressure in any significant manner, even if Moscow did offer concessions. As a result, more Western sanctions will likely only prompt greater resistance and greater retaliation from Moscow.
Although this confrontation now appears lasting, its start was not inevitable, according to Moscow. Indeed, Russian officials and foreign policy experts emphasized to me that during President Vladimir Putin's first term as president in the early 2000s, Moscow made serious efforts to integrate with the West — going so far as to consider joining the European Union and NATO, albeit on equal terms. This, obviously, never occurred, and by the end of Putin's second term — by which time the European Union and NATO had expanded into Central Europe and the Baltic states and disregarded Russia's position on Kosovo — it was clear to the Kremlin that Russia had to go it alone, even if that entailed direct conflict with the West and its allies. Confrontations duly ensued, first in the Russia-Georgia war (2008), and later in the battle over Crimea and eastern Ukraine (2014).
The Ukrainian conflict has reinforced the Russian perception that it is impossible to cooperate with the West on equal terms, resulting in Moscow's quest for partners and influential roles elsewhere in the world.
The Ukrainian conflict has reinforced the Russian perception that it is impossible to cooperate with the West on equal terms, resulting in Moscow's quest for partners and influential roles elsewhere in the world. One such role has been Russia's involvement in the Syrian conflict in support of Bashar al Assad's regime against the Islamic State and Western-backed rebels. My interlocutors told me that Russia doesn't really care about al Assad per se, but that Moscow felt it had to draw a red line on regime change imposed from abroad (that is, the United States). Russia was uniquely positioned to delve into Syria given its historical ties to the country and its strategic location, while Moscow also wanted to send the message that it, too, could be a major player in the Middle East — as well as in other theaters like Afghanistan and Africa — both militarily and diplomatically.
The Russia-China Alignment and Its Limits
Another key aspect of our annual forecast for Eurasia touches on Russia's aforementioned quest to expand its ties around the world to scale back Western hegemony and challenge the U.S.-led world order. The key to this is China, which also has its own interest in challenging the U.S.-dominated world order in the context of great power competition. Moscow and Beijing have enjoyed burgeoning ties in recent years, just as Russia's relations with the West have frayed. The two countries have bolstered their cooperation on trade and military drills, as well as their political coordination on issues such as North Korea.
Most Russians I spoke with acknowledged that ties between Moscow and Beijing have grown, particularly on security. Nevertheless, many cautioned that a sincere alliance is not emerging between Moscow and Beijing. Deeply mistrustful of China's rising clout and intentions, many Russians fear — justifiably or not — that Beijing has designs on Russian land in the Far East and the Arctic. China may not challenge Russia's political model in the way that the West does, I was told, but it may one day challenge its survival. It's perhaps an exaggeration, but it's a fear that gnaws at the back of the mind for many Russians. At the same time, many told me that Chinese investment in Russia isn't all it's cracked up to be, and one businessman who frequents Russia's large investment forums in St. Petersburg and Vladivostok told me that only around 5-10 percent of the multibillion-dollar deals between the countries actually come to fruition, mostly in the energy sector.
The Challenges From Within
On the domestic front, our forecast also pointed to a number of economic and political challenges for Putin, including a sanctions-weakened economy, public discontent over unpopular pension reforms and pressure to reform the country's powerful security organs. Our forecast noted that these challenges will test Putin as he enters his fourth — and perhaps final — term, although the long-serving leader will ultimately succeed in managing them this year.
Within Russia, the views on Putin himself are decidedly mixed, with those against the leader citing everything from corruption to unpopular plans to raise the retirement age as reasons for their opposition, while those in favor base their support on the president's track record of fostering stability, as well as the dearth of credible alternatives to his rule. But whether for or against Putin, nearly everyone agreed that there will be no significant changes or upheavals to Russia's political system so as long as the president remains at the helm. The more the Kremlin feels pressured — whether externally or from within — the more Moscow will centralize control, meaning security organs like the National Guard will only accumulate greater power.
Whether for or against Putin, nearly every Russian agrees that there will be no significant changes or upheavals to the country's political system so as long as the president remains at the helm.
From a macroeconomic perspective, most finance and business professionals believe that the Kremlin has the tools to cope with the economic challenges posed by sanctions, as the government has padded its foreign exchange reserves and wealth funds and taken measures to prevent currency volatility by decoupling the ruble from the price of oil. On the ground, however, it is clear that sanctions have taken their toll. Almost everyone lamented rising prices and stagnant wages, while foreign travel has become more expensive and difficult for some — and virtually impossible for others. Overall, however, my impression is that Russia is not on the verge of a major economic crisis.
But when it comes to Russia's longer-term outlook, there may be more cause for concern. According to one financial journalist, Moscow can manage economic shocks for 2019 or for a few years, but the long-term economic prognosis, particularly in regards to Russia's continued dependence on oil and natural gas and the brain drain of young professionals, is poor. Russia's anticipated demographic decline (the country is projected to lose 10 percent of its population by 2050) and looming social changes as a post-Soviet generation emerges could one day create more acute pressure and increasingly test the Kremlin's ability to maintain stability across the vast country.
The viewpoints that Russians from all walks of life expressed to me aligned, in many ways, with our forecast; in other certain respects, they added nuance to our thoughts for the year to come. Nearly 80 years on from Churchill's speech, Russia may still be "mysterious and enigmatic," but the combination of studying its national interests from afar and listening to the perspectives of its people from up close certainly offers important clues as to what to expect for the country moving forward.
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January 29, 2019
By George Friedman
The Russian Crisis
Vladimir Putin failed to keep his promise to create a modern economy. Now he has to pay the price.
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s trust rating has fallen to its lowest point in 13 years. According to a poll conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center, only 33 percent of Russians said they trusted the president. Polls can be unreliable and opinions fickle, but a survey like this in a country like Russia can be an indicator of deep discontent arising from significant social and economic problems.
Hope Fades
Over a quarter of a century ago, the Soviet Union fell because things stopped working. The state was the center of society and managed the economy. After Josef Stalin died, there was a sense of hope in Russian society about the economy – and that hope sustained the government, even when it failed to meet expectations. But by the 1980s, ordinary Russians’ belief that they could provide for their families and that the gulf between them and the nomenklatura (or bureaucratic elite) would diminish had faded. What changed their minds was not envy or anger – Russians had grown to expect a certain level of inequality – but a lack of hope. They had little and were not going to get more. Worst of all, they lacked hope for their children.
This situation was a result of four factors. First, the inherent inefficiency of the Soviet apparatus, which could not build a modern economy. Second, the divergence of available goods, not only to the elite but also to a thriving black market that frequently operated in foreign currencies, which most Russians lacked. Third, the decline of oil prices, which shattered the state budget. And finally, a surge in defense spending, designed to both match U.S. spending and convince Russians that although they might be poor, they still lived in a powerful country. This was not trivial for a nation that had lived through the German invasion.
In 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, there was no revolution. There was simply exhaustion. The elite were exhausted from trying to push the boulder of the Soviet economy and society up a steep hill. And the people were exhausted from standing in lines for hours to buy basic necessities. The general sense of failure was apparent not only in faraway capitals but in Russians’ own lives.
The Politburo selected Mikhail Gorbachev to solve these problems. He promised openness and restructuring. But the openness only revealed the catastrophic condition of the economy, and the restructuring, carried out by those who had created the disaster in the first place, didn’t work. All Gorbachev did was legitimize the fears and fatigue that had festered in the Soviet Union and allow them to eat away at what was left.
Boris Yeltsin replaced him but did nothing to solve the lingering economic problems. The Soviet Union was gone, and many took advantage – from Western financiers, consultants and hustlers, to Russians who figured out, frequently with Western advisers, how to divert and appropriate what little wealth Russia had. Privatization requires some concept of the private. In a country that had lived for generations by the old socialist principle “money is theft,” the oligarchs embraced the concept with a vengeance. Russia’s nomenklatura was just as inefficient as the Soviet Union’s, and, as shown in Kosovo, other nations held it in contempt.
Yeltsin couldn’t last. His replacement was Vladimir Putin, who had roots in the old Soviet Union and in the new Russia. He had been an agent of the KGB, the Soviets’ main security service. (For a country as vast and poorly connected as Russia, a strong central government and secret police have always been key to holding the nation together.) And through his time as deputy to the mayor of St. Petersburg, he was enmeshed with the oligarchs who became the holders of Russia’s wealth.
Putin came to power because of these connections. After Yeltsin, Russians craved a strong leader, and they drew comfort from the fact that Putin had ties to the KGB. They accepted his links to the oligarchs as simply part of how the world works.
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Putin’s Promises
Putin promised to make Russia prosperous and respected in the world. To do so, he had to build a modern economy. Russia was highly dependent on the export of raw materials, particularly oil and natural gas. Putin couldn’t control the price of these commodities, so Russia was always vulnerable to fluctuations in global supply and demand. Putin had a choice: allow the economy to deteriorate and the country to descend into chaos, or centralize governance once more. He chose recentralization, concentrating power in Moscow and distributing funds from the state budget to the regions. When oil prices were over $100 per barrel, Putin had an opportunity to make massive investments in new industries. But he was beholden to the oligarchs, and they to him. Any economic reforms could have jeopardized this relationship. It’s not so much that Putin missed the chance to modernize but rather that his path to power prevented it.
Then, in 2014, oil prices plunged. Though they have recovered somewhat from their lowest point, they remain low. Western sanctions have also taken a toll. Until 2018, Russia had two reserve funds, stocked with profits from the oil boom. But following the collapse in energy prices, one fund was depleted, and since January 2018, only the National Wealth Fund remains. To try to replenish the state budget, Putin decided to reform the pension system. Just seven months after his re-election in March, he signed an unpopular bill into law that will gradually raise the age of retirement for women from 55 to 60 and for men from 60 to 65.
Hence the 33 percent trust rating. That rating is more socially significant in Russia than it would be elsewhere. Putin promised to make Russia a modern, powerful nation. He has failed to deliver on the first point, and his forays in Syria and elsewhere haven’t compensated for deteriorating economic conditions. Older Russians are reminded of what was and what had been abolished; younger Russians are encountering conditions similar to those their grandparents told them of.
There are two possible paths forward. One is the old Russian solution of empowering the secret police to crush the opposition, though it isn’t clear that today’s Federal Security Service, or FSB, has the same power its predecessor organizations had. I suspect that the poisoning of a former Russian spy in Britain is intended in part as a message to the FSB, not only to frighten it but also to tell its agents that they need to uphold the integrity of the Russian nation.
The other path is a re-enactment of the fall of the Soviet Union. Few are eager to relive the 1990s, but collapse is not always the result of a vote. If oil prices remain low, sanctions remain in place, reserves continue to dwindle, and the FSB is more interested in doing business than in sacrificing for the Russian state, then it’s hard to see an alternative scenario.
No foreign power can come to Russia’s aid. Each one demands too much and offers too little. There’s a fantasy in Russia about an alliance with China, but Moscow is far away from Beijing, and China’s problems at the moment are even more intense. The Kremlin could try engaging in a war to boost morale, but there’s the risk it could lose or that the conflict would last longer than those at the top anticipate.
Russia now faces conditions similar to those it faced in the 1980s: low oil prices and high defense costs. The people aren’t angry, but they are resentful, and in due course they may become simply exhausted, as they were in the 1980s. Russia is vast and needs a strong central government to hold it together, but central governments are not good at managing economies. Thus, the secret police must hold the country together. If it can’t or won’t, then a Gorbachev-type leader may rise up to reform the economy, and a Yeltsin-type leader may follow to preside over the nation’s revolutionizing.
Karl Marx once wrote that history repeats itself, first as tragedy and then as farce. How this maxim may play out in Russia is becoming clearer by the day.
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Ukraine Provides a Test Case of Russia's Hybrid Warfare Strategy
By Eugene Chausovsky
Senior Eurasia Analyst, Stratfor
Passersby walk past a giant electoral poster of Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko displayed on a building in central Kiev on March 22, 2019.
(SERGEI SUPINSKY/AFP/Getty Images)
Ukraine will provide a laboratory for the evolution of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy as Moscow adjusts its tactics and expands the scope of such actions around the world.
The competition over Ukraine will factor heavily into the broader Russia-West standoff, which is only likely to intensify in the coming years.
But regardless of who wins Ukraine's presidential elections on March 31, the country will maintain its orientation to the West, thereby highlighting the limitations of Russia's hybrid strategy.
On March 31, Ukrainians will head to the polls for one of the most pivotal and unusual elections in the country's post-Soviet history. This will be the first presidential election since the immediate aftermath of the country's Western-backed Euromaidan uprising in 2014, in which large-scale protests overthrew pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovich, clearing a path for the pro-Western Petro Poroshenko to capture the post in May 2014. But five years after Euromaidan, Ukraine has yet to find its political footing, as evidenced by the fact that Poroshenko and former Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko — two familiar faces in Ukraine's political scene — are trailing Volodymyr Zelenskiy, a 41-year-old TV star and comedian with no previous political experience, by a wide margin. But regardless of who wins the election, one thing is clear: Ukraine's pro-Western orientation is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future. Following Euromaidan, Ukraine became ground zero for Moscow's expansion of its hybrid warfare strategy, but the country's decisive break from its powerful eastern neighbor has laid bare some of the limitations of such Russian activity.
The Big Picture
Ukraine has long been a battleground between Russia and the West. The consequences of its 2014 Euromaidan uprising have rippled far and wide over the past half-decade. As Ukraine prepares for a presidential election — and the future beyond — it will be a vital test case for the evolution of Russia's hybrid warfare strategy, since it showcases both the impact of the strategy and its ultimate limitations.
The Comedian Who Could be President
The latest opinion polls released by the Kiev International Institute of Sociology on March 25 show Zelenskiy with 32.1 percent of support, far ahead of Poroshenko's 17.1 percent and Timoshenko's 12.5 percent. It is worth noting that pre-election polls in Ukraine can prove unreliable, but Zelenskiy's substantial lead over his two main opponents (as well as a field of nearly 40 other presidential candidates) shows that the star of the popular TV comedy series "Servant of the People," in which he plays the president, has a good chance of joining the ranks of U.S. President Donald Trump and Brazil's Jair Bolsonaro as anti-establishment candidates who unexpectedly upended the political status quo in their countries.
Zelenskiy's rapid rise is contextualized by Ukraine's post-Euromaidan political climate, in which lofty expectations of significant change remain largely unfulfilled. In terms of foreign policy, Ukraine has made important strides in its bid to integrate with the West under Poroshenko, as Kiev has concluded a free trade and visa-free agreement with Brussels, while the United States and NATO have increased security support for the country. Still, membership in either the European Union or NATO remains a distant dream despite Poroshenko's initiative to enshrine Ukraine's desire to join these blocs in the country's constitution. Such aspirations have come at a high cost, including a prolonged conflict with Russia that has led to the loss of Crimea and Donbas — as well as over 10,000 lives.
A map showing Ukraine and the disputed areas of Donbas and Crimea.
On the domestic front, there has also been a mix of progress and setbacks over the past five years. Reforms in the energy sector, while lessening Ukraine's dependence on Russia, have raised utility costs substantially. In the meantime, wages have not kept pace with inflation, while efforts to tackle corruption through judicial and legal reform have largely stalled. Against this backdrop, Zelenskiy is a protest candidate against the powers that be; in such a situation, his fresh face and dearth of political experience is not a weakness for many voters, but rather a positive sign that he can shake things up.
Ukraine and the Russia-West Standoff
The impact of Euromaidan has also traveled well beyond Ukraine's borders, sending ripple effects throughout Eurasia and the West. While the revolution was not the first Western-supported uprising to occur in Russia's backyard (a wave of color revolutions, including one in Ukraine, preceded it earlier in the century), it was by far the most violent and most enduring in terms of its implications. For Russia, Euromaidan posed a major threat to its strategic interests and represented the biggest breach between Moscow and the West since the Cold War, fundamentally altering the way Russia interacts with the West.
Russia's initial reaction to the uprising serves as a case in point. Rather than pursue a formal military invasion of Ukraine, Russia sent in "little green men," or unmarked military personnel, to Crimea and, later, eastern Ukraine in a bid to spawn counter-Euromaidan political movements and forces to oppose the new government in Kiev. At the time, Russia's actions seemed like a thinly veiled effort to cover its tracks and avoid blame for a direct military intervention. In retrospect, however, these were the baby steps in a profound shift in Russian strategy to something different: hybrid warfare.
To be sure, hybrid warfare is not a new concept to either Russia or other states all the way back to antiquity. However, the manner in which Moscow waged hybrid warfare underwent a significant evolution and expansion after Euromaidan. While Russia had previously used hybrid tactics in a restricted manner to achieve limited objectives, such as during the Russia-Georgia War in 2008, Moscow expanded the tactics tremendously in both scope and breadth after Euromaidan in 2014. Russia's techniques grew to encompass everything from targeted assassinations and other covert security operations to cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns. All of these were designed — with varying degrees of intensity and effectiveness — to weaken the Ukrainian state and undermine its efforts to align and integrate with the West.
Using Ukraine as a test case, Russia applied some or all of these expanded hybrid warfare techniques to other pro-Western countries in the former Soviet periphery, such as Moldova and Georgia, so as to undermine their efforts to integrate with the West. Russia expanded its political and economic backing for pro-Moscow parties like the Socialists in Moldova and boosted security support for contested territories like Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russia also looked further afield to wield its enhanced tools, supporting Euroskeptic parties in Germany and Italy or establishing entire bot armies on social media platforms with the ultimate aim of fomenting divisions and sowing chaos in the West. Naturally, the scope of Russia's tools varied based on the country it was targeting: Moscow was not willing to challenge countries like the United States or France in a direct military sense, but it was willing to conduct cyberattacks and meddle in their political systems during critical elections.
Euromaidan's Global Reverberations
Russia's prolonged standoff with the West has also had a significant impact on the manner in which Moscow interacts with the rest of the world. Just a year after the Euromaidan uprising, Russia intervened in the Syrian conflict, deploying military forces to back the government of Bashar al Assad against U.S.- and Western-backed rebels. As in Ukraine, Russia's military involvement in Syria began with a small and unofficial presence to test the waters before growing to include a much larger and more powerful force. Russia's intervention also demonstrated that the country was ready and willing to challenge the West not only in the post-Soviet space but also in areas further afield like the Middle East.
Today, signs are emerging that Moscow could go even more global in its use of hybrid warfare. Russia's use of covert or mercenary forces has spread to regions like Africa, including in Libya and the Central Asian Republic, and even as far as Venezuela. What's more, Russia could bolster its military presence in Venezuela, especially after Russian military planes recently landed in Caracas with more than 100 troops and advisers. If so, Russia's forays into Venezuela would share important similarities with previous hybrid interventions in Ukraine or Syria, both in terms of tactics and its goals of enhancing its standing and leverage in its broader negotiations with the United States.
Euromaidan not only reoriented Ukraine's foreign policy toward the West, the decisiveness with which it occurred means the shift will likely endure long beyond this election.
Russia's Hybrid Strategy Hits a Wall
The West, however, has not been completely silent in the face of Russia's hybrid warfare activities. The United States and the European Union have ramped up sanctions against Russia, while NATO has bolstered its military presence in European border areas to protect front-line countries and reinforce defenses against Russia. In addition to conventional buildups, NATO members and countries like Ukraine have redoubled their efforts to enhance and integrate cybersecurity defenses and defend against online propaganda and disinformation tactics. Such efforts have led to diminishing returns for Russia, as the West has worked to both increase the cost of Russia's hybrid tactics and reduce their effectiveness.
Which brings us back to Ukraine. Despite public frustration over the uneven progress of reforms and the persistence of day-to-day difficulties for many citizens, the country has nevertheless undergone a major transformation over the past five years that is hard to ignore from a strategic perspective. Euromaidan not only reoriented Ukraine's foreign policy away from Russia and toward the West, the decisiveness with which it occurred means the shift will likely endure long beyond this election. Regardless of who wins on March 31, all leading candidates support the continuation of Ukraine's Western integration efforts; in fact, not a single pro-Russian candidate has a realistic chance of qualifying for the second round. That, in the end, is a major departure from Ukraine's polarized politics before Euromaidan, when the country was split roughly evenly between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. More than that, it is also a testament to the limitations of Russia's hybrid tactics.
Ultimately, the motivation for Russia's hybrid warfare strategy goes deeper than the Euromaidan uprising to reflect Moscow's difficulties in competing with the United States and the West in a direct manner. Even as Russia's standoff with the West has been intensifying for half a decade, Moscow suffers from a number of inherent weaknesses, including a resource-dependent economy that can't keep up with the likes of the United States or China, as well as increasingly pressing demographic challenges at home. As a result, Russia has resorted ever more to a continuously evolving and spreading hybrid strategy to attain its strategic ends. Perhaps more than any other country, Ukraine has showcased both the effectiveness and limitations of this strategy for Russia — and that is unlikely to change, even as Moscow refines its strategy and deploys it much further afield.
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December 23, 2019 Open as PDF
The Russian Military: Forging a Foreign Policy Tool
By: Jacek Bartosiak
Of all the military reforms Russia underwent as an empire, a Soviet Union and then a federation, none were as revolutionary as those of the late 2000s, when Anatoly Serdyukov ushered the armed forces out of the 20th century and into the era of modern warfare.
The scale of the changes is undeniable. The Russian military currently boasts some 800,000 personnel. In 1985, that number was about 5.3 million. It fell to between 3 million and 4 million in various stages of the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which retained just over half of its available equipment. The reduction owed not just to reduced state finances but to the urgent need to modernize and enhance combat readiness in the face of new threats to its new border – as well as to the fact that the population of the country had been more or less halved.
As a result, unnecessary units were to be dissolved. The old, motionless structure that sported as many as 203 divisions, some of which were just 10 percent complete, was reduced to about 83 mobile divisions. They were now fully staffed brigades, unburdened by the glut of officers that had long plagued the Russian military. The plan was to reduce the number of officers from 350,000 to 150,000, but Moscow ultimately settled on about 220,000 as a concession to those who bucked the reforms, sometimes violently.
New emphasis was to be placed on the training of non-commissioned professional officers – the basis of every Western army – and on the training of cadets at schools, where they would also be mentally prepared for service. The target date for implementing the changes was 2017, when land forces were to reach 450,000 professional and contract soldiers, and the total number of all personnel of the armed forces was to be less than 1 million. In addition, it was planned that by 2020, new equipment would constitute about 70 percent of all Russian armaments. All told, the number of commands and intermediate command levels has been drastically reduced, and four strategic commands have been established for permanent operation, with a fifth – the Arctic – introduced in 2015.
Serdyukov, the face of the reform, drastically reduced the rear administration of the entire armed forces and command posts to improve the line of command and expedite decision making. The structures have been shrunk vertically and horizontally to make the system clearer, faster, more efficient and more flexible. In 2014, a modern National Defense Management Center was established in Moscow – as a C2 (command & control) for the modern scouting battle.
Despite how revolutionary the reforms were – or perhaps because of how revolutionary they were – they have yet to be completed. The armed services have yet to be fully professionalized, and there are still a lot of vestiges of the old system left by demographic decline and the low quality of servicemembers. The reforms were, moreover, unpopular among the military. Serdyukov had been the buffer between the military and the government, but by 2012, he was so unpopular that he had to be replaced by Sergei Shoigu, who conceded the most unpopular elements of the reforms but left them essentially intact. For example, after 2012 the army received substantial salary increases, restoring in the eyes of Russian society the integrity of the institution, while also implementing random inspections of the combat readiness of units throughout the state as well as sudden training and checking their time of exit from the barracks. Indeed, these have become the hallmark of Shoigu’s tenure, resulting in high strategic mobility on the internal lines of the world’s largest country.
In this way, the military was able to conduct decisive combat operations in regional conflicts, as evidenced by the actions in Crimea and eastern Ukraine in 2014, during which the Russian army deployed more than 40,000 troops to the Ukrainian border in just a few days. (In 1999, it took Russia three weeks to transfer that many troops to Chechnya.) That’s because Russia now has a generally stronger but smaller and more nimble army than it had the 1990s. It is also better balanced, able to operate in its near abroad and, in the case of Syria, the Middle East.
Russia’s recent equipment procurement, meanwhile, complements its newfound capabilities. In 2010, Moscow announced an ambitious modernization plan worth $700 billion over 15 years. Its goal was not to match the U.S. armed forces, or even develop a similar ability to project power in Eurasia. The goal was to gain an advantage over any opponents on its periphery, including all the armies of the NATO countries bordering Russia, especially the most important frontline state of the alliance: Poland. (Notably, Russia can hold its own against the U.S. in certain capabilities such as integrated air defense systems, electronic warfare systems, barrel and rocket artillery and infantry fighting vehicles.) Strategically, this makes sense for Russia, which has reshaped its military not to fight invasions from, say, Europe or China, but to wage new generation war on its periphery. Hence why the army, as with the Zapad exercises, trains in the places where these campaigns would take place.
It also comports with an important policy introduced in 2013 by Gen. Valery Gerasimov, chief of the General Staff. The Gerasimov doctrine applies virtually all aspects of the state – military, political, diplomatic, economic and so on – to achieving strategic goals without engaging in open conflict, especially on Russian borders. (In Europe, this is often called hybrid war.) It is central to Russia’s desire to be a dominant regional power in a multipolar world, a role that Moscow is keen to regain.
(click to enlarge)
To that end, land forces of the new Russian army will be organized into 40 brigades and eight maneuvering divisions. (While the 2008 reforms abolished the regiments and replaced them with brigades, it was also supposed to eliminate the vast majority of divisions.) Interestingly, the Soviets had in place similar structure comprising Afghanistan brigades and battalion tactical groups that worked pretty well, operationally speaking. In the new Russian army, the battalion tactical groups operating within the brigades are composed of professional and contracted soldiers, while the rest of the brigade consists of recruit-based structures. Both components train separately. This, of course, increases the efficiency of the brigades' combat component, but overall it proves that Russia’s great weakness is largely demographic – that is, in stark contrast to most of Russian history, where there seemed to be an inexhaustible supply of soldiers, there are simply not enough people to fully staff the military.
Even so, after Serdyukov was dismissed in 2013, military planners decided several significant divisions would remain in place. In 2016, after studying the results of the Ukraine war, they decided that four new divisions would be added in the Western and Southern Military Districts, in addition to the formation of the 1st Guards Tank Army just behind the Smolensk Gate and another army in the Central Military District. This is because they realized that larger units, despite being slow and heavy, were nonetheless necessary for breaking the enemy’s forces. It follows that in the European theater, where large spaces and maneuverability are paramount, the “old” will need to meet the “new.” As for the U.S., it’s unclear how its land forces – which currently have weaker structures for symmetrical war with Russia in Eastern Europe and the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium – respond. What is clear is that the Russian military is better positioned now than before to be what Moscow wants it to be: a foreign policy tool in an increasingly multipolar world.
To learn more, please visit strategyandfuture.org.
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December 30, 2019 Open as PDF
The Russian Military: By the Numbers
By: Jacek Bartosiak
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia transformed its military from a sluggish, archaic institution to a fighting force better able to wage modern warfare, an essential function of which is to serve as a foreign policy tool for the government in Moscow. This is perhaps best illustrated by the composition of the armed forces itself.
The Pride of Russia
The great pride of Russia, and the basis of its regional power projection, is its soldiers. They are divided into four divisions (98 and 106 Guardian descent, 7th Guards), four brigades (11, 31, 56 and 83) and one Spetsnaz brigade (45), though, notably, Spetsnaz is supported by 20,000-30,000 personnel. There are also airborne troops capable of rapid invasion or quick response, albeit intended to operate in post-Soviet areas. Unlike in Western armies, including the U.S. Army, Russian units are very “heavy,” supported by tanks, heavy infantry fighting vehicles and tracked vehicles required in the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium.
The Russians do not have a modern air force by Western standards, but it is good enough to defeat opponents on the periphery. Russia’s integrated air defense system, on the other hand, is very modern – it was one of the few things Moscow never stopped developing, even after the Soviet Union collapsed.
The Russian navy, which is headquartered in St. Petersburg, boasts four regional fleets: the Northern Fleet, the Pacific Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and the Black Sea Fleet. Together they have between 15 percent and 25 percent of the number of ships they had during the Soviet era. The average age of their ships is 20-25 years. (These numbers exclude the Caspian Flotilla, which operates in closed waters.) Traditionally, submarines were the backbone of the Russian navy, but 75 percent of the 61 submarines in service are already over 20 years old.
(click to enlarge)
The base of the most powerful Russian fleet – the Northern Fleet – is located in Severomorsk in Kola Bay, the only ice-free place with access from the Atlantic. It consists of seven or eight nuclear submarine carriers armed with intercontinental ballistic missiles (depending on your source), Russia’s only atomic cruiser and its only Russian aircraft carrier. Nuclear ballistic missile carriers can reach targets in the U.S., theoretically even from their own wharf. They are protected by submarine-hunting impact vessels and submarines with maneuvering rockets, of which there are 16 in the Northern Fleet, and by conventional submarines, of which there are six in the Northern Fleet.
The Pacific Fleet, with its bases in Vladivostok and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky, includes nuclear submarines carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles and conventional diesel-powered submarines (nine pieces) intended for the coastal waters of the North Pacific. A new class of Kalina conventional submarines with air-independent propulsion, which allows for a long-lasting immersion of quieter and smaller conventional ships, is expected to enter service after 2020. The Pacific Fleet also has a large number of Udaloy-class destroyers sailing on patrols throughout the Western Pacific.
The Baltic Fleet has degraded since the end of the Soviet Union, which lost several ports when the Baltic states regained independence. The largest war port is now Baltiysk in Kaliningrad region. It controls the actions of the Polish navy right at its main approach to the Gulf of Gdansk, and the port of St. Petersburg.
The Black Sea Fleet is similarly afflicted, having lost its ports in Ukraine and Crimea after 1991. But now that Crimea has been annexed and restrictions have been placed on Ukraine’s sea access, Moscow is implementing plans to strengthen naval forces in this basin.
The Caspian Flotilla completely dominates the drainage basin, equipped as it is with modern Kalibr long-range maneuvering rockets with striking capabilities against all of Central Asia, the Middle East and Eastern Europe. (It demonstrated as much in October 2015 by striking Syria.) The value of the Kalibr system is that it can be fired from relatively small mobile platforms such as corvettes and that it has a range of 2,500 kilometers (1,500 miles) – with relatively low rocket detection to boot. Most of the Caspian Flotilla is stationed at the base in Makhachkala, which has better access to water than Astrakhan, its traditional port.
Nuclear Weapons and Deterrence
The Soviet Union became a nuclear power in 1949. The Cold War arms race with the U.S. resulted in high numbers of warheads and their means of delivery, the number of warheads in the rockets, the direction of possible attacks, and homing locations – especially land-based near the enemy's borders (Cuba, West Germany and Turkey). Russia’s comparative weakness after the fall of the Soviet Union, and the United States’ comparative strength, made nuclear weapons all the more valuable to Moscow. They allowed Russia to maintain its status as a superpower and gave the Kremlin a ton of leverage as it pursued its interests.
In 2010, the “NEW START” treaty curbed the number of nuclear warheads to 1,735, but in practice, it applied only to strategic warheads, not tactical warheads. Russia now has somewhere between 2,000 and 2,700 tactical nuclear warheads, depending on which source you use. NEW START allows Russia to modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal and in fact has almost completely replaced its Soviet-era arsenal. By 2021, Soviet-era munitions are expected to constitute only 2 percent of Russia’s total nuclear force.
Of the three means of strategic nuclear delivery – intercontinental missiles, submarines and strategic bombers – ballistic ground-to-ground missiles from the Soviet era make up only half of the current number and are to leave service in 2022. They have largely been replaced by SS-27 Topol-M missiles, with the new RS-24 Yars and RS-26 Rubezh also joining the line. The SS-28 missiles with maneuvering warheads that are currently under development are expected to be able to avoid U.S. missile defenses, according to Russia. FR nuclear missiles are divided equally between above ground silos and rail launchers on land. In March 2018, President Vladimir Putin announced that Russia had new rockets with completely new capabilities, including allegedly nuclear-powered maneuvering rockets with virtually unlimited range, as well as a hypersonic missile, though it’s unclear if this is true.
The second means of delivery consists of 10 Dolgorukiy-class ballistic missile carrier submarines. Russia plans to complete the launch of new missiles for SS-N-32 Bulava submarines, each with six warheads separately maneuvering (reentry vehicles).
Moscow is also modernizing the third means of delivery: the strategic bomb fleet of Tu-160s and Tu-95MSs. The first bomber is to be reopened on the production line, and the second will introduce new versions to the line. Works on the new PAK DA bomber are also underway.
Given such a vast nuclear arsenal, and given the disproportionate value of the munitions that comprise it, Moscow abandoned the Soviet policy of no first use. Officially, Russia seems prepared to use nuclear weapons not just in response to a nuclear threat but in response to conventional threats as well, especially if it “threatens Russia's survival in a nuclear or conventional war.” The notion of “survival” in the context of Russia – with its geography, disintegrative tendencies and historically labile power systems – is dangerously fluid. Strategic games and simulations suggest that if Russian forces face destruction in a theater or operational direction that endangers the state apparatus, then Moscow would use nuclear weapons under the so-called “escalate to deescalate theory.”
First floated in the 1990s, the general idea behind the theory is that a low-power tactical warhead could, in fact, stabilize a potential conflict because it produces the psychological effect of “escalating dominance” – that is, creating the impression of strength that confers to Russia the ability to control the escalation process. Russia can then count on achieving victory in the conflict by using low-power nuclear weapons on an operational scale, or to intimidate a state that has no nuclear weapons or is a member of a broader alliance. The interests of the other countries of the alliance are then separated from the interests of the country against which nuclear weapons would be used. Most often, the remaining countries of the alliance then tend to sacrifice the interests of the member at risk in exchange for a promise to stop escalating, thereby resolving the conflict on terms favorable to Russia and altering the balance of power in the region. In other words, Moscow escalates to deescalate.
By this logic, if conflict broke out between Russia and China or NATO, Moscow would opt for nuclear strikes to end a conventional war, assuming that the opponent would accept a loss or concession to Russia instead of risking further nuclear escalation. However, the most recent versions of Russia’s defense doctrines make no mention of deescalation through nuclear attack. The National Security Strategy issued in December 2015 is especially antagonistic, in that it directly accuses the United States of “instigating instability” and threatening Russia's interests and mentions the never-ending role of force as a factor in international relations. But it elides nuclear deterrence. Some believe this is merely a feint to trick the U.S. into not modernizing its own nuclear arsenal.
Either way, it’s important to note that in Russian military parlance, the notion of “deterrence” differs fundamentally from the understanding in the West, which sees it as a steady state of affairs. For Russia, it is dynamic, an active action, which is in opposition to a fixed passive state, which is active before the conflict, throughout the course of geopolitical rivalry, and even during open conflict. It is then expressed in a coordinated package of political, diplomatic, military, scientific, technological and all other undertakings aimed at ensuring the desired “stability” in competition. Put differently, Russian deterrence is to provide strategic stability favorable to Russia and its geopolitical interests. It is when Russia’s opponent cannot gain an advantage that Moscow cannot contest.
These notions of deterrence and stability are expressed almost exclusively in the context of Russia’s rivalry with the U.S. – and specifically Washington’s ability to project power into Eurasia, including the Baltic-Black Sea Intermarium. This may change as China’s military power grows.
But even then, it’s unclear what action would trigger Russia’s use of nuclear weapons. The military holds nuclear strike drills, sure, but has never publicly defined its threshold. This is very likely a “calculated ambiguity” meant to throw off the planning of potential enemies. In this way, Russia creates a lot of room for political and military maneuvering, especially toward neighboring countries that do not have nuclear weapons.
To learn more, please visit strategyandfuture.org.
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January 21, 2020 Open as PDF
Russia’s Puzzling Moves
By: George Friedman
Over the past few weeks, two odd things have happened in Russia. The first is that Russian President Vladimir Putin has restructured the government. During his state of the nation address last week, he announced constitutional changes that could lay a path for him to hold on to power beyond 2024, when his current term ends. He also shook up the Russian security command about a month ago and has been moving governors around like chess pieces. Such changes take place in many governments, but the moves are usually understated to increase power without creating a sense of urgency. Putin’s changes were not all that radical given the circumstances, but he went out of his way to make them look radical by removing longtime senior officials like Dmitry Medvedev, who will now serve as deputy chairman of the Security Council.
The second thing that has happened has less substance but is much stranger. Putin has made a series of statements that Poland started World War II, and that the Hitler-Stalin pact was forced on Russia by British and French deals with Germany. The substance of the statements is not worth debating; the Hitler-Stalin pact was no ordinary alliance, but a treaty by which Germany and the Soviet Union would together invade and divide Poland, which they proceeded to do. The claim that Poland started the war mirrors Hitler’s claim that Poland was invaded to protect Germans from Polish brutality.
It is revealing, however, that Putin felt it necessary to reopen the question of who started World War II at this time. Putin is not a casual man, so he didn’t do this carelessly. After announcing the shakeup of the Russian regime, he decided to charge Poland, France and the U.K. with responsibility for World War II, cleansing Russia of any wrongdoing in allying with Hitler.
At the very least, this is going to make France’s stated intentions of getting much closer to Russia more difficult.
For the French, the claim that they caused the war by reaching agreements with Nazi Germany will strike a chord. It will also make it harder for the Germans to get closer to Russia. For the Germans, whose primary historical goal is to allow World War II to slink into the past, the last thing they want to do is engage in a discussion of who caused the war.
To try to make sense of this we must remember that the Great Patriotic War, as World War II is called in Russia, is seared into the Russian national conscience. In making this charge, Putin is trying to cleanse Russia of responsibility for the war. By claiming that Poland, in some way, forced the Russians and Germans to invade Poland, he portrays Russia as an unqualified victim. In doing so, he reaches out to far-right forces in Europe who have argued that Hitler was forced into war. This is politically important. The European right has risen, and a segment of it wants to rewrite history. The Russians have toyed with supporting a rising right wing for years, and this places Russia in that position. Putin is claiming that it was not the totalitarians but the liberal democracies that started World War II, and that therefore the liberal democracies’ claim to moral superiority is false.
The problem is that by stating this so bluntly, Putin alienates France and makes Germany uneasy. It will be harder now for the Germans and French to collaborate with the Russians, although not impossible. Nearly all NATO members have condemned Putin for his view of the origins of World War II – something that he knew was coming; so why did he make this charge now?
The key, I think, was the charge against Poland. Putin is not expecting a war against France or Germany, but he is worried about Poland, and that has to do with Belarus, which shares borders with Poland to its west and Russia to its east. Belarus is sandwiched between the Baltic states and Ukraine. The Baltics are in NATO, and Ukraine, though shifting a bit, is still hostile to Russia. For Russia, these western buffers were indispensable, and losing them poses a threat to its national security.
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Belarus is key here. If Belarus were to be integrated into Russia, the West’s defense of Poland, which houses U.S. troops, becomes much more difficult. But if Belarus were to switch to the West and NATO troops were deployed, the defense of Smolensk and even Moscow would be difficult. The Russians have an initiative underway to integrate Belarus with Russia, but in recent weeks, Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has been signaling an interest in maintaining good relations with the West.
Belarus is a flashpoint on this frontier. Lukashenko wants to maintain its free movement, Russia wants to lock it in, and Poland does not want to see more Russian troops on its eastern border. For Russia, settling the Belarus question is a vital matter. For Poland, even with more limited, though quite good, forces, this would cause a fundamental crisis and involve the United States. And this issue is moving to some sort of decision. The West does not want a shift, but Russia doesn’t trust the West and claims that its absorption of the Baltics into NATO already violated Moscow’s understanding with the West.
So there has been significant tension between Poland and Russia over Belarus. Belarus is important enough to Russia to consider military action – and the two countries have staged huge war games near Poland’s border in the past. Poland may see any such move as indicating war, if not now then later.
If a conflict were to break out, Russia would want it blamed on Poland. By raising the question of how World War II started, Russia is trying to change the perception of Poland from a victim nation to a historical aggressor. And by so doing, Putin may also be warning the Poles, and the Americans as well, not to believe for one minute that war is out of the question.
In this sense Putin’s restructuring of the Russian government makes sense. It was an unwieldy bureaucracy that would have difficulty aligning its economy with military action. Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder whether Putin’s attempts to redefine history and the government were designed as preparations for war, or for victory by intimidation.
Readers will recall our ongoing concern with Belarus and Poland. The best bet is that this is primarily signaling that Putin will not bend on Belarus, and not that he intends or expects war. But the actions meant to signal and the actions meant to prepare for war are easy to confuse. Reshaping the government and reshaping history inevitably open the door for conflict.
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Russia Leans on Mercenary Forces to Regain Global Clout
Campaigns in Africa and the Middle East involve private security contractors and business interests with ties to Kremlin
By Benoit Faucon and James Marson
Feb. 23, 2020 1:29 pm ET
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In October, dozens of armed Russian mercenaries fanned out across two Libyan oil ports. Brought in by a renegade Libyan general, they helped rebel forces wrest control of the oil-rich region from the Libyan government.
After the fighting ended, a delegation of mining and oil executives from former Soviet states arrived seeking business with the rebels who now controlled the ports, Libyan immigration records show.
Almost three decades after the collapse of the Soviet empire, Russian President Vladimir Putin is on a mission to rebuild Moscow’s international influence in the Middle East and Africa. The campaign relies partly on building alliances with developing countries outside official channels, often through proxies such as private security contractors, businesses and advisers, according to people involved and European security officials.
Russian activity in the Middle East and Africa coincides with a pulling back in those regions by the U.S. and its European allies. During a three-country tour of Africa last week, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo reiterated that the Trump administration is considering reducing military forces in Western Africa.
The Russian campaign has drawn the attention of U.S. and European officials who worry about the impact of growing Russian influence in the regions.
Earlier this month, the top American envoy to Syria said Russian military contractors are engaging in tense encounters with U.S. troops in Syria.
Gen. Stephen Townsend, head of the U.S. Africa Command, warned recently about Russia’s involvement in a region that is growing in prominence as a source of natural resources.
“Russian private military companies have a highly destabilizing influence in Africa, as they are frequently employed to secure Russian investments at the expense of Africans, to prop up corrupt regimes and establish a broader Russian military footprint globally,” he wrote in a statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The Kremlin has said its aims in Africa and the Middle East are to help fight extremism and develop regional economies. It has denied any connection to private security contractors.
Once marginalized in Libya because of its association with toppled strongman Moammar Gadhafi, Russia has become, in just a few months, a pivotal player there. In January, Mr. Putin hosted talks in Moscow between the renegade general and the head of the internationally recognized Libyan government, then followed up with a summit in Berlin. The two sides have yet to agree to a cease-fire.
Gen. Khalifa Haftar, left, who heads a rebel faction called the Libyan National Army, met Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Moscow in January.
PHOTO: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS PRES/SHUTTERSTOCK
The Libya foray could give Russia a foothold in a failed state that is a significant energy exporter and a main route for illegal trafficking in people, drugs and weapons to Europe. European officials are concerned about the precarious state of Libyan security, in part because regions to its south are war zones and terrorist breeding grounds.
European Union foreign-policy chief Josep Borrell said in January that the Russian intervention could have undermined its efforts to broker a deal between Libya’s warring parties without using military force.
“Libya is a big gate to Africa” for Russia, said Libyan Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha. “It’s also the entrance to Southern Europe.”
Mr. Putin has denied the Russian government is behind any private contractors in Libya. “If there are Russian citizens there,” he said in January, “they don’t represent the interests of the Russian state and don’t receive funding from the Russian state.”
Mr. Bashagha said the mercenaries are in Libya with the Kremlin’s approval, citing a meeting held in Moscow between the renegade Libyan general, the Russian defense ministry and the private soldiers’ recruiter.
During the Cold War, the Soviet Union spent billions of dollars on military aid to African allies. Then the collapse of communist rule in the early 1990s forced a retreat from the global stage.
Now, at a time of diminished Russian economic and military power, its efforts to exert political influence involve private security companies and businesses seeking access to oil, gold and diamonds, according to European security officials who monitor the groups. The private companies answer to the Kremlin, these people said.
A Russian company won a gold-mining contract in Sudan, where affiliated contractors have also been training forces, according to Russia’s foreign ministry and European security officials.
Moscow's Long Reach
Some of the African countries where Russian government or private interests have established a presence or are discussing deals.
RUSSIA
Sudan
Mining
interests
Central African Republic
Libya
Military
presence
Madagascar
Oil
interests
Eritrea
Algeria
Political
influence
Burkina Faso
Egypt
Naval
logistics
Rwanda
South Africa
Nuclear
power
Zimbabwe
Angola
Sources: reports by the United Nations’s panel on Central African sanctions; Central African government; Russian ministry of foreign affairs; Libyan ministry of interior; Libyan National Army; Ukrainian and Western intelligence agencies
In October, 43 African heads of state flew to the Russian resort Sochi for the first Russia-Africa summit. The leaders mingled with Russian state companies involved in defense and oil and gas, buying $12.5 billion worth of Russian agricultural goods and equipment and services for refineries and railroads.
Moscow’s tactics emerged with its interventions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, where the Kremlin worked with armed groups fielded by politically connected Russian businessmen. Companies owned by former restaurateur Yevgeny Prigozhin won multimillion-dollar catering and construction contracts for the Russian armed forces. Mr. Prigozhin then created Wagner Group, a private military company, according to European security officials.
Russian businessman Yevgeny Prigozhin created a private military company called Wagner Group, according to European security officials.
PHOTO: METZEL MIKHAIL/TASS/ZUMA PRESS
Mr. Prigozhin also built a political consulting firm, the Internet Research Group, that the Justice Department says was behind Russian efforts to sow discord among Americans in the 2016 presidential election.
Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said the Wagner Group “has nothing to do with Russian state, with the Russian government, with the Russian defense ministry, with Russian special services or with the Kremlin.”
As fighting in Ukraine ebbed in 2015, Wagner turned to Syria, where it fought on behalf of President Bashar al-Assad, and Mr. Prigozhin’s companies won oil and gas concessions.
Mr. Prigozhin’s company and his lawyers didn’t respond to requests for comment.
The Kremlin’s first major foray into Africa since Soviet days came two years ago in the Central African Republic, a mineral-rich former French colony. Africa was drawing foreign governments and companies hungry for resources. It also had become a source of terrorism and migration problems.
In late 2017, Moscow persuaded the United Nations to allow Russia to undertake a mission to train the Central African Republic’s army, which was fighting rebel forces, and support its weakened president, Faustin-Archange Touadera.
The first deployment—several dozen Russian mercenaries—arrived in January 2018 on a Russian military plane with crates of automatic weapons. Most weren’t members of Russia’s armed forces and wore neither standard uniforms nor insignia, according to officials who saw them arrive.
Russian bodyguards, in baseball caps, helped protect Central African Republic President Faustin-Archange Touadera last July.
PHOTO: BENOIT FAUCON/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
When the U.N. approved the mission, Moscow hadn’t specified it would be sending private contractors rather than soldiers—something that surprised U.N. officials, according to people familiar with the matter.
A spokesman for the U.N. mission there said the Russian forces were coordinating with others to help revamp the nation’s security sector.
Russia now has more than 235 security personnel in the country, according to a European security official, giving it greater clout there than any foreigners since France left in 1960. The senior Russian in the country appears to be Valery Zakharov, a retired Russian security-service officer who landed several months before the troops and became President Touadera’s top security adviser.
In an interview, Mr. Zakharov said that he isn’t part of the official U.N. mission and that he works for and is paid by Mr. Touadera, not Russia. He described his relationship with the Russian government by saying: “There’s no such thing as former” security-service officers.
The Kremlin spokesman said Mr. Zakharov “has nothing to do with the Russian government or our embassy or with Russian intelligence.” He said Russia is interested in developing its relationship with the Central African Republic.
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On a dusty field near the capital, Bangui, last summer, Russian instructors drilled dozens of government troops armed with machetes and rifles. Mr. Zakharov, standing nearby, said the Russian forces are paid under arrangements with Russia’s defense ministry. He declined to provide details.
Signs in Bangui, capital of the Central African Republic, recognize Russian military assistance.
PHOTO: BENOIT FAUCON/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
The Security Service of Ukraine, that country’s main security and counterintelligence agency, is investigating the quasi-private Russian military groups fighting in eastern Ukraine. It says many of the Russian soldiers sent to Africa fought in Ukraine with Wagner.
“It’s a convenient front,” said the security service Chief of Staff Ihor Huskov. “The geopolitical ambitions of Russia coincide with the appetites” of Mr. Putin’s inner circle, he said.
The Russian instructors have moved into the roughly 80% of the Central African Republic outside government control, according to Western security officials. As the Russians deployed, President Touadera’s government awarded mining contracts to Russian companies.
Valery Zakharov, a retired Russian security-service officer, has become a top security adviser to Central African Republic President Touadera.
PHOTO: BENOIT FAUCON/THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
In Libya, Russia’s involvement could give it a foothold in a major energy and migration hub near Europe. Libya is a large exporter of oil and natural gas to Europe, but most of its reserves—the largest in Africa and the ninth-biggest in the world—are untapped.
After Libyan dictator and Russian ally Gadhafi was deposed and killed in 2011 by Western-backed rebels, Mr. Putin said the U.S. and its allies had overstepped a U.N. mandate. A new Libyan government marginalized Russia.
The U.S. has since withdrawn from Libya and Russia has returned. Fayez al-Sarraj, Libya’s prime minister, attended the Sochi summit and discussed buying one million metric tons of Russian wheat, according to a Libyan security official.
Moscow simultaneously is helping Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who heads a rebel faction called the Libyan National Army, by printing Libyan money for his breakaway government and welcoming him aboard its aircraft carrier, according to Russian and Libyan government officials.
Gen. Haftar, a Soviet-trained former commander in Gadhafi’s military, rebelled in 2014 against Libya’s new ruler, uniting disparate militias to take control of a swath of eastern Libya. In 2018 he seized most of the country’s main oil-exporting ports. Last year, he attacked Tripoli.
The ports let Gen. Haftar control oil flows to Europe and offer a staging point for attacks on government troops. Rebels are expanding control of the region, known as the “oil crescent,” where 85% of Libya’s reserves lie. American companies long dominated the region until civil war prompted them to leave.
In the middle of last yea, Gen. Haftar’s troops brought Russian military contractors into two ports to train commandos and launch strikes, according to Libyan oil and security officials. Mr. Bashagha, the interior minister, said the Russians were Wagner employees.
“Whoever controls the area controls the oil fields,” said Mr. Bashagha, who is part of the internationally recognized government.
In December, the rebel administration of Gen. Haftar allowed a group of Russian and Belarusian businessmen to visit his eastern stronghold of Benghazi, according to an arrivals list at the city’s airport. The visitors included a Russian fuel-trading executive and managers at a Russian contractor specializing in mining and gas projects for state companies.
In Libya’s capital Tripoli, still under government control, prosecutors last summer arrested two Russian political consultants, alleging they were trying to destabilize the government and back opponents, including Gadhafi’s son and Gen. Hafter. They alleged the two men were connected to Mr. Prigozhin’s Internet Research Group, according to people close to the investigation.
The Kremlin has denied that Russian soldiers operate in Libya. Libyan officials said the private nature of Moscow’s military operations means it can deny its presence in Libya.
“Russia will say it has nothing to do with [Wagner],” said Mr. Bashagha, Libya’s interior minister. “They will say it’s a security company.”
—Ann Simmons in Moscow contributed to this article.
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https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/05/gerasimov-doctrine-russia-foreign-policy-215538
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Anna Borshchevskaya on Russia's Military Activity in the Eastern Mediterranean
by Marilyn Stern
Middle East Forum Radio
July 5, 2020
https://www.meforum.org/61185/borshchevskaya-on-russias-military-activity-in-libya
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/07/russian-election-vladimir-putin-voters-approve-constitutional-reforms/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-07-06&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart
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Moscow Under Stress on Its Periphery
Russian interests are being tested in the Caucasus and Levant.
By: Allison Fedirka
Two weeks ago, Russia concluded a constitutional referendum meant to shore up the power of the Kremlin and especially of Vladimir Putin. Under the revised constitution, which was approved by nearly 79 percent of voters, Putin can theoretically remain president until 2036 – by which time he would be in his 80s. The move came not a moment too soon: Crises involving Russia-backed partners are erupting in the Levant and the Caucasus, not to mention the long-standing war in Libya, where Russia is a key player. And as if that wasn’t enough, there are faint signs of anti-government unrest in Siberia. For a while, Russia has faced a number of serious economic problems, and we have been alert to signs of domestic destabilization. Thus, any signs of domestic trouble, not to mention events on Russia’s periphery that threaten its strategic interests and raise the likelihood of high-stakes conflicts, are quick to grab our attention when they appear on our radar.
Domestic Instability
At its core, the internal threat for Moscow concerns the government’s ability – or inability – to maintain a basic standard of living for Russians after a sharp decline due to low oil prices, sanctions and, most recently, the coronavirus pandemic. On July 11, a leading architect of the Russian economy, Alexei Kudrin, made scathing remarks about the government’s management of the economy in recent years. Kudrin called for structural and institutional reforms and highlighted how disappointing Russia’s economic growth has been since the fall of the Soviet Union, a period when output should have surged as the economy transitioned to capitalism. This was one of the harshest recent critiques of the Russian economy, but it was far from the only one. Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said that economic difficulties lie ahead for the country, and Putin himself said Russian authorities need to act more decisively and make the economy more competitive, or risk becoming mired in an economic “swamp.”
Amid the coronavirus outbreak, the Kremlin is struggling to hide the country’s growth slowdown, stubbornly low exports, rising unemployment and declining real incomes from the population. Public dissatisfaction with the socio-economic situation and government policy is rising, especially in those peripheral regions that are remote from Moscow. These regions are mostly poorer and lack the infrastructure and economic diversity of the major urban centers. State welfare programs prop up the few areas with above-average incomes. Indeed, the results of the constitutional vote showed that the Kremlin is losing support in these regions: In the Nenets Autonomous district, which receives generous state subsidies and thus has the country’s second-highest incomes, 55 percent of voters opposed the draft changes. Even farther away from Moscow, in Khabarovsk, which borders China, turnout was only 44 percent, and 36 percent of voters opposed the constitutional changes.
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Khabarovsk is interesting for other reasons as well. On July 10, the region’s governor, Sergei Furgal, was arrested in connection with the attempted murder of two businessmen in 2004 and 2005. (He pleaded not guilty.) The arrest has brought out protesters demanding the release of Furgal, who defeated candidates from Putin’s United Russia party to become governor in 2018, for several consecutive days. According to official estimates, 12,000 people rallied in support of Furgal on July 11, though unofficial estimates put the number of participants nearly three times higher. Subsequent protests have apparently not reached the same scale.
The Kremlin is no stranger to large protests, but demonstrations of this magnitude usually occur in places like Moscow or St. Petersburg. The sheer size of the July 11 protest suggests a high degree of organization and logistical support; it would have been difficult to bring out as many as 35,000 people for a completely spontaneous demonstration. The protest is also notable for its cause; typical triggers for unrest are things like wage arrears, not allegedly politically motivated arrests of local officials.
A single protest in Siberia – even several days of protests – is hardly going to destabilize Russia. However, what happened in Khabarovsk is enough of an outlier that – in combination with the country’s increasingly dire economic situation – it warrants Moscow’s attention, as well as our own.
The Caucasus
Besides domestic pressures, Russian interests are also under threat abroad. In a still-murky incident, Russian-led security forces on July 11 wounded and detained a Georgian citizen for unknown reasons in Georgian territory, near the border with South Ossetia, which Russia has occupied since 2008. Detentions by Russian forces are not uncommon in this area, but the shooting of a Georgian citizen stands out as unusually aggressive. The Kremlin itself has not commented on the incident, but it did recently complete major military drills together with units of the local army in the territory of Abkhazia, which was also invaded by Russian troops in 2008.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan has grown more antagonistic toward Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. On July 10, during a security council meeting, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan went beyond normal talking points of highlighting Armenia's claim over Nagorno-Karabakh and its strategic value to Yerevan. Pashinyan also emphasized the need to be tough on foreign powers trying to influence Armenian affairs. The next day, there was gunfire along their shared border at Tovuz, far from Nagorno-Karabakh but nonetheless a common point of dispute. Azerbaijan’s Defense Ministry accused Armenia of violating a cease-fire and targeting civilians. Armenia said the attack targeted army engineering infrastructure and technical facilities. Fighting resumed again on July 13.
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This incident is notable because of Turkey’s reaction to it. The Turkish government, normally quiet over the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, threw its support behind Azerbaijan. Armenia and Turkey are long-standing enemies, so naturally Armenia accused Turkey of provoking instability.
Because the South Caucasus is a strategic buffer zone for Russia, tensions there naturally draw in Moscow. While Russia doesn’t need to fully control the South Caucasus to maintain territorial integrity, it needs to influence the area enough to reduce the risk of threats on its border. Russia therefore tends to be a moderating force between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, working to ensure no major conflict erupts in the region. But with Turkey submitting an official position, Russia will have a harder time being the voice of reason. Turkey’s involvement would force Russia to throw its support behind Azerbaijan since siding with Armenia would squarely position Russia against Turkey. Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Moscow has already warned of the potential for the situation to escalate into a major conflict. It may come to nothing, as clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh almost always seem to, but Turkey’s mere statement will make Russia uneasy.
The Levant
Finally, there is Lebanon, which is not geographically part of the Russian periphery but part of the periphery of Syria, which is an important Russian ally and recipient of Russian security guarantees. The country is experiencing its worst economic crisis since World War I. Mass economic dislocation has shattered the middle class and has made food financially inaccessible for the majority of the population, many of whom now suffer from malnutrition. Virtually every government effort to remedy the situation has failed. If things don’t improve, the possibility of national instability, even civil war, can’t be ruled out.
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So why does this matter for Russia? Because the Eastern Mediterranean is critical to Russia, and the Levant, and Lebanon’s position in it, is critical to the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia has parlayed its presence in Syria into an attempt to restore its image as a powerful military force. Security in Lebanon and in Syria have historically been intertwined. During the Lebanese civil war, the Syrian army occupied Lebanon in 1976 to project influence, counter Lebanese and Palestinian guerilla groups that threatened the Assad regime, and act as a counterweight against Syria’s main rival, Israel. Syrian troops withdrew in 2005, but Lebanon still serves as a buffer zone, with sectarian tensions, political gridlock and economic instability that create ripe conditions for foreign influence.
As Beirut weakens, outside powers will move in to protect and advance their interests. They cannot abide the uncertainty of political instability in Lebanon nor allow one country to acquire more power there at the expense of their own. In this kind of environment, it doesn’t take much for conflict to escalate. Chaos in southern Lebanon may give Israel, for example, the opportunity it has been waiting for to move against Hezbollah. Hezbollah may see war as a better option over isolation and thus draw in Iran and Syria. The U.S. and Russia would not be able to ignore it. The degree of cooperation between Israel and Russia, while variable, would rile the United States. Turkey would have an opportunity to make a play for influence in northern Lebanon where the location lends greater access to the Mediterranean.
Maintaining control over its periphery has always been a challenge for Russia, but it’s not one it can ignore. Which puts Moscow in the position of managing four regions – one domestic, three foreign. Domestically, Russia faces a host of economic challenges. This, combined with signs of brewing public unrest, raises the possibility of regional disintegration and thus is a major threat to Moscow. Whether or not these same forces will be reckoned with through political settlements or military conflict remains to be seen.
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Forecasting Russia: Strength and Weakness
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
Our forecast for Russia, dating back to my earliest books, was two-fold: first, that Russia would reassert itself and at least appear to be a significant force facing the European Peninsula and in the Caucasus, Russia's two essential frontiers, and second, that the forces that brought the Soviet Union to its knees would continue to haunt the Russian Federation. In other words, there would be a resurrection of Russia followed by a second crisis that would tear it apart. The first forecast was accurate. We are now seeing the second unfold.
My view was that with the emergence of Vladimir Putin, an old KGB man, the perception of Russia as broken and weak after the fall of the Soviet Union would be reversed and, once reversed, that Russia would be at once overestimated and underestimated as a global power. It would confront the West enough to be seen as a threat but never enough to go to war.
Putin understood that appearing to be a threat is far safer than appearing to be weak. Other countries take advantage of the weak and are cautious around the strong. It followed that Putin would attempt to make Russia stronger and, more important, seem stronger than it was.
Evidence of this strategy abounds. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008. It repeatedly threatened to withhold vital (and notably expensive) energy supplies to strongarm Europe. It sent troops to Syria for no strategic reason. And it waged psychological warfare through social media in the hopes of weakening potential enemies.
All the while Russia remained weak, so much so that in 2014, it faced an existential crisis: the uprising in Ukraine, which Russia claimed was fomented by Western intelligence. Since the 18th century, Russia has protected itself from the European Peninsula with buffer states – the Baltics, Belarus and Ukraine. Of these, Ukraine was by far the most important. It had gained independence with the Soviet collapse, but there appeared to Moscow to be a tacit understanding that the West would not intrude on these buffer states. But it immediately did, first by integrating the Baltics into NATO and then, from Moscow’s point of view, by deposing the constitutionally elected president of Ukraine and replacing him with a Western puppet. This appears to Moscow to be a deliberate assault on Russian national security.
Putin countered the so-called Maidan Revolution by instigating a pro-Russia uprising in eastern Ukraine and by annexing Crimea, neither of which came close to reversing the revolution. Clearly Russian intelligence had not only failed to mount an effective insurgency but had also misread events in Kyiv, failing to understand the forces arrayed against it. This failure is central to the story. Intelligence services have been vital to Russia ever since it was ruled by czars. A vast country required a powerful force to control it. The Soviet Union had a superb intelligence service. By 2014, it couldn’t even manage events in a region it knew well. For a while, Russia asserted itself by using energy exports as a weapon to cow Europe, but as oil prices fell, Russia could no longer afford to continue, as it needed income to support its centralized economic system. It continued to act as a great power, and this appearance had value, but underneath it, Russia was the Soviet Union, with all the weaknesses that broke it.
After all, it wasn’t a popular uprising that felled the Soviet Union; it was the fact that it was a Third World country, heavily dependent on the export of primary commodities, particularly oil and natural gas, whose price it could not control. It was also the fact that the Soviet Union had engaged in military competition with the United States whose primary currency was expensive advanced technology. The U.S. could bear the price readily. Between falling oil prices and a large share of its economy devoted to defense, the Soviet Union simply broke under the pressure. It was never able to develop a modern economy that could effectively serve its people or win it a stable place in the international system. There were moments, such as the 1950s, where this seemed possible, but it was never to be. The Soviets had convinced the U.S. that it was a great power, and the U.S. responded as if it were. The Russian belief in the bluff turned into an agonizing Cold War, where the U.S. feared the Soviet Union so much that no effort was spared to match it. The Soviets' efforts had to go to pretending they were dangerous without fully achieving it. The question was asked at NATO: If the Russians are so powerful, when will they attack? The answer, never uttered, was that they won’t attack because they know they will lose.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a global sense that the world had entered a new age, with Russia part of it. It had abandoned its costly and dangerous Eastern European empire. It had allowed many of the Soviet republics to go their own way. It had freed itself from the burdens these countries imposed and had cleared the way for turning Russia into a modern country faithful to its own culture.
Alexei Kudrin, a former Russian finance minister who is still highly respected, provides a statistic that quantifies the problem. Since 1990, the economy has grown 30 percent, or roughly 1 percent per year. Forgetting the collapse of oil prices, or the weakness of the FSB, or any other data, this fact is staggering. Russia had been badly organized and managed before 1990. Even minimal measures should have stimulated the country’s economy for a while. That didn’t happen.
There are many reasons for this, but for me there is always the staggering reality of Russia: its size, the distances that must be traveled, the transportation system, the roads and rail lines, challenging conditions, and so on. A nation cannot grow if its products cannot readily reach its markets, nor if its producers are so spread out that it’s impossible to know what the market is demanding and providing. Russia always suffered from its wealth in space, people and products. Large nations must invent their own geography. Russia lived with its geography.
The ongoing decline in oil prices – even though they have modestly recovered – is a crisis for Russia. Moscow collects the taxes and distributes the money to the rest of the country. This pays teachers, nurses, police and most other government workers. Under Boris Yeltsin, the money didn’t come and the people suffered. This problem went away under Putin at first, but there are increasing reports that these workers aren’t being paid now. The memory of the 1990s burns in their minds, and there are the first signs of a return to that period. There are demonstrations in the Siberian town of Khabarovsk, for example, where tens of thousands have been protesting for weeks against Moscow's arrest of a popular mayor. Why he was arrested and why they are demonstrating is unknown to me, but there has to be more here than meets the eye.
The Yeltsin years recreated a Russia where the countryside was extremely poor. It was my belief that this would happen again, because it is built into the weakness of the Russian economy and the politics of distributing scarcity. I think the next phase will come, and the weaknesses will show themselves again. Bear in mind that few expected the first collapse or the apparent recovery. Russia hides itself well.
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In Russia, Mercenaries Are a Strategic Tool
Companies like the Wagner Group fill in certain security blanks.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
Belarusian intelligence has accused Russia of sending private citizens to interfere in the country’s affairs and generally engage in acts of provocation. These same citizens participated in the annexation of Crimea a few years ago and fought on Russia’s behalf in the breakaway region of Donbass, according to officials in Ukraine, who demanded their immediate extradition to Kyiv. Instead, the Belarusian government sent them back to Russia.
To no one’s surprise, the citizens were members of the infamous private military company known as the Wagner Group, which over the past few years has been involved in every international conflict strategically important to Russian interests. The case of Belarus and Ukraine – the first instance on record of Wagner operating so close to NATO’s eastern flank – underscores just how useful a political tool Wagner has become for the Kremlin.
Organization and Formalization
Private military companies are by no means unique to Russia, but Wagner has a unique Russian flavor. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant depression left thousands of Russian soldiers rudderless. They were unemployed but well trained and ready to fight, so they informally banned together in the 1990s to sell their services throughout Eurasia. By 2008, there were no fewer than a dozen private military companies in Russia. The most famous of them, the one that would serve as the blueprint for Wagner, was officially created in 2013 in response to the Syrian civil war. Known as the Slavonic Corps, the group comprised former Russian special forces whose primary task was to protect the oil fields near Deir el-Zour. This naturally led to clashes with the Islamic State.
Among the members of the Slavonic Corps was Dmitry Utkin, a former special forces commander in the GRU, Russia's military intelligence unit, more commonly referred to by his call sign, “Wagner.” Most would be arrested for mercenary activities when they came back to Russia. (The legal status of private military companies is murky. Officially they are illegal, but they are “coincidentally” deployed to areas vital to Russian interests. One of the Wagner Group’s biggest benefactors, a billionaire named Yevgeny Prigozhin with oil and mining operations in Africa and the Middle East, is tight with Russian President Vladimir Putin.) Either way, the Wagner Group returned to Syria in 2016 and cooperated closer with Russian regular forces. They are believed to have participated in the assaults on Palmyra in 2016 and 2017, and they are rumored to have fought with Syrian forces, and thus against U.S. forces, in the battle of Khasham in 2018.
The group has since expanded its reach considerably, particularly in Africa. It trains the military in Sudan, which reportedly granted mining concession agreements to a company tied to Prigozhin. It has participated in military parades in the Central African Republic, and is thought to be in Burundi as well. Its most high-profile client, of course, is Libya. The United Nations estimates that more than 1,000 Wagner members are fighting alongside the Libyan National Army, led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. The document says that mercenaries help to repair military equipment and also perform the functions of gunners, sappers and specialists in electronic warfare. Putin denies funding or supporting them; in fact, he has said explicitly that they do not represent the Russian government in any way. But curiously, Haftar met directly with Putin and Prigozhin back in 2018, and by 2019, the group was reportedly assisting in Haftar’s attempt to retake Tripoli.
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Leverage and Maneuverability
This partly illustrates the allure of Russia’s private military companies: plausible deniability. They simply don’t have the political baggage of total state affiliation, which gives Moscow political leverage and maneuverability. They are well trained, they have their own equipment and training facilities – the primary one located in Molkino in Krasnodar Krai near the Black Sea – and even have their own airfield. Yet, they are also relatively cheap on the global market. Salaries for the average soldier start at $2,000 per month but can go as high as $20,000 per month. The low end of that spectrum may seem low, but it’s higher than enlisted pay in the Russian armed services. (It should be noted that reports from 2017 suggested salaries had dropped.) Money comes from private sources, local governments that want to use their services and, allegedly, classified disbursements from the Ministry of Defense.
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So even though Moscow can claim not to use private military companies, it makes sense that it would. Groups like Wagner can secure facilities conventional militaries can’t or won’t for political purposes, and thus they are perfect for non-linear and limited-scale conflicts. (They tend to fare worse against conventional militaries.) They usually work more closely with local security forces and help to organize those forces. Moreover, military campaigns conducted between states can be complicated and logistically complex. Private companies can simplify this process. And ultimately they give Russia another contingent of forces to work with. When Putin announced plans to partially withdraw from Syria, Moscow thought it could offset the losses with private military companies.
Notably, Russia’s preference for private military companies is a relatively recent development, one ushered in by the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, which made it clear to Moscow that the Wagner Group is an effective supplementary global tool. Maintaining semi-official groups enables the Kremlin to send them into dangerous places to secure Russian companies’ interests without officially claiming responsibility. They fill out the strategic blanks, forming a sort of symbiosis between the state and the private groups whereby the state allows soldiers of fortune to earn money. In return, the state gets subordination and partial cover-up. It’s a small but important part of the Russian grand strategy. Russia will continue to use the private military companies as an instrument of its global strategy in the near future especially under Putin’s rule.
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September 14, 2020 View On Website
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The Kremlin's Unusual Silence
The problems for Russia's central government keep growing, but the leadership seems reluctant to act.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Russian President Vladimir Putin will not fly to New York this week for the 75th session of the U.N. General Assembly, reportedly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Putin’s annual television program and Q&A show, which usually happens in June but was postponed this year, also will not occur in 2020 – because of the pandemic. In general, the Russian president has limited himself lately to vague decrees and brief comments, usually in online interviews. It’s easiest for the Kremlin to blame the pandemic for Putin’s relative absence from the spotlight, but Moscow is under pressure from many directions, and the virus is just the best distraction. There’s the instability in neighboring Belarus, Russia’s most important buffer and its last remaining ally to the west. There’s the poisoning of Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny, which threatens to bring down new sanctions against the Kremlin and endangers the future of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline, which is important for the Russian economy. There are unending protests in Khabarovsk and, of course, the economic impact of COVID-19 and the fall in oil prices and consumer demand.
The pandemic has strained governments the world over, but what’s interesting about the Russian case is the government’s silence and apparent inaction in the face of not just COVID-19 but also many other challenges. All this creates the impression that the Kremlin is struggling to maintain its strength and the country’s economic stability.
Silencing, or Ignoring, Criticism
Arguably the clearest sign that something strange is happening in Russia is the apparent poisoning of Navalny last month. The 44-year-old anti-corruption activist was aboard a plane from Tomsk to Moscow on Aug. 20 when he fell violently ill, forcing the plane to make an emergency landing so that Navalny could be rushed to a hospital in Omsk. On Aug. 22, he was moved to Berlin’s Charite hospital, where specialists reported signs that Navalny had been exposed to Novichok, a deadly nerve agent that was used in the assassination attempt against Russian defector Sergei Skripal in the U.K. in 2018. For obvious reasons, accusations focused on Moscow, and Western governments began discussing new sanctions against the Kremlin.
It’s uncertain who is to blame, but there are at least two main possibilities. The first is that Moscow fears its power in the regions is weakening and authorities wanted to warn the opposition. Perhaps not coincidentally, Navalny’s poisoning and a government raid of the headquarters of the opposition United Democrats both occurred just before a general election on Sept. 13. The second possibility is that a government rival of Putin wanted to destabilize his position, since the poisoning will hurt the government’s support. In either scenario, Moscow is dealing with uncertainty that affects its ability to govern throughout Russia’s immense territory.
This is also demonstrated by the ongoing protests in the Far East city of Khabarovsk. On July 9, the former governor of the Khabarovsk region, Sergei Furgal, was arrested and sent to Moscow, where he was accused of involvement in the murders of several businessmen in the 2000s. On July 11, thousands of people turned out in Khabarovsk to protest the arrest, saying that it was politically motivated. A member of the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, Furgal was never a serious opponent of the Putin regime, but skepticism of Moscow’s intentions in Khabarovsk remains high. The emergence of protests is itself notable: This is the first time in modern Russian history that a governor accused of a criminal offense has received massive public support. Protests popped up in other cities, and they have occurred daily in Khabarovsk since they began, with help from the Russian opposition via social networks. Also notable is their durability, even though the protests are smaller than they used to be.
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Moscow’s response – or lack thereof – is also unusual. Located nearly 4,000 miles (6,000 kilometers) from Moscow, Khabarovsk is near the border with China. In theory, the stability of a border region in such a distant area should be a priority for the Kremlin. But since the arrest, the central government has been largely absent. Putin does not comment on events in the region, security forces have not suppressed the protests, and the Russian media is focused on unrest in Belarus. It’s possible that the Kremlin worries that attempting to disperse the rallies would cause greater instability and fuel greater discontent, with the potential to spread to other regions. Meanwhile, some political force – the ex-governor’s supporters or other opponents of the Kremlin – has an interest in keeping the protests going, organized and productive. Moscow’s hesitance to engage suggests that it is uncertain about its position and afraid of sparking a larger, more widespread rebellion, especially in other remote cities and regions.
The Price of Stability
Another challenge for Russia – one not of its own making – is energy prices. The Russian economy and budget are heavily dependent on oil and gas exports, but the coronavirus-induced recession has sent energy prices plummeting. The global economic recovery overall has proceeded slowly, and demand for energy hasn’t recovered. Russia’s revenues from oil exports from January to July amounted to $43.9 billion, a decline of 37.7 percent compared to the same period in 2019. Export revenues from gas fell by 51 percent. This translates into greatly reduced budget revenues for the state.
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Less revenue means less money to distribute among the population and regions, and this is an especially sensitive time, as COVID-19 has affected standards of living throughout the country. During the lockdown, more than 1.2 million Russians were left without work. At the end of the second quarter, the purchasing power of Russians for basic food products dropped to its lowest level in the past 10 years. Regions continue to develop unevenly, poverty remains an issue, and government subsidies are needed to create demand. And although the economy is not yet an inspiration for protests, a prolonged decline in living standards may exacerbate negative trends in society. The Kremlin fears that at a time when the population and economy need a boost, it will lack the funds to distribute because oil prices are expected to remain low for a while.
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In times like these when money is tight, the Kremlin typically looks to the oligarchs and heads of the largest companies to replenish the budget, and this time is no different. The heads of the largest Russian oil companies (Rosneft, Lukoil, Gazprom Neft, Tatneft and Zarubezhneft) complained to Putin about the Ministry of Finance’s plans to raise taxes on hydrocarbon production, but their concerns apparently fell on deaf ears. Russian billionaires have lost some $16.7 billion since the beginning of the year because of the pandemic, and it will get worse: The personal income tax rate of 13 percent, which has been the same for everyone for 20 years, is set to increase to 15 percent next year for those earning more than 5 million rubles (approximately $67,000).
Russia still has $177.6 billion, about 11.7 percent of gross domestic product, in its national wealth fund, but the Kremlin is determined to save what it can for tough times ahead. Without a significant increase in energy prices, Moscow’s only choice to replenish the budget is to raise taxes on the rich to redistribute to the rest of the population. This would help Putin’s popularity with the majority, but it could lead to dissatisfaction and a loss of support among the wealthy and may cause additional capital flight, which would hurt the economy.
Finally, there’s Belarus, the last Russian ally in the west and the only thing standing between U.S. troops in Poland and Russia’s borders. Protests and strikes in Belarus have continued unabated since that country’s disputed presidential election on Aug. 9 and the announcement of incumbent President Alexander Lukashenko’s victory. Labor collectives from the largest Belarusian companies have joined the action. Moscow supports Lukashenko but it is in no hurry to intervene. Russian military assistance in suppressing mass protests would mean an invasion, which, of course, would only worsen Russia’s position in international trade and would mean more severe economic sanctions, which Russia’s slowing economy may not withstand.
Russia’s territorial size is both its greatest strength and its greatest weakness. The different regions of Russia are unequal, are at different stages of economic development and are only loosely connected. A stable government, a strong security apparatus and calm borders are important for preserving the unity of this vast territory. Moscow also needs substantial buffers, as the flattened borderlands act almost as a highway to the capital for foreign armies. Buffers also create a kind of economic zone, sometimes with a large amount of resources (including labor), through which Russia can supply resources to the world market and bypass sanctions. Russia’s security and territorial integrity are a constant challenge, especially when Moscow has fewer financial resources to support the country’s poorer regions, the buffer zones are unstable and the ruling party lacks the confidence to act.
Why Russia has been relatively quiet is unclear. Putin has avoided making loud statements, leaving that to his team: Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who is in talks with Cyprus and Syria; Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, who last week brought together the defense ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; and press secretary Dmitry Peskov, who is preparing for a visit by Lukashenko. None of this means the Kremlin isn’t under pressure. More likely, it means the leadership is aware of its weaknesses and trying to hide it from Russia’s competitors.
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Russia's Endgame Isn't What You Think It Is – It's Worse
By Kim Iskyan
You probably don't realize it, but Russia is getting its way... again.
I'm not talking about a plan to infuse the U.S. water supply with vodka. Or to put a furry shapka on every American's head this winter. Or to get its guy – whoever that is – in the American White House.
Russia's agenda today is very different from its Soviet-era aim of global domination with a bread-line flavor... Back then, overrunning the world with its perverted vision of socialism – or annihilating the Earth many times over if that didn't work – seemed credible enough to be concerned about.
Russia's aspirations today are a lot more modest... yet destructive in a different way.
Since its days as a superpower, Russia's three-decade descent toward irrelevance is breathtaking. Today, the country's gross domestic product ("GDP") is smaller than that of France or Canada – and on a per-capita basis, its economic output is somewhere between Costa Rica and Malaysia. And it's falling further behind every day, with average annual economic growth of just 1% since 1990 – compared to a global average of 3.6%.
Russia's currency has lost more than half of its value relative to the U.S. dollar over the past decade. The market capitalization of its stock market amounts to less than half that of Apple.
With 145 million people, Russia has fewer people than Nigeria, Bangladesh, or Brazil. The country's most valuable asset is leaving as fast as it can... Around 2 million Russians have emigrated to the west over the past 20 years. (Many of the people I knew in Russia – from living there for nine years from 1996 to 2008 – have long since left.) The average Russian man lives about 12 years less than his counterpart in Spain.
Despite its rapid decline, Russia is still punching above its weight. Russia's "influence across the world is far-reaching and important," explained CNBC in February, pointing to its outsized role as a power broker, investor, and meddler throughout Latin America, Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. As recently as May, U.S. President Donald Trump called for Russia to rejoin the Group of 7 club of industrialized countries.
A tally of mentions in the Financial Times suggests that the world's business decision-makers (or those who write their newspaper) are deeply preoccupied with Russia... The word "Russia" has racked up 8,347 mentions in the FT over the past three years, compared with 6,247 for India – which has 10 times more people and an economy that's 70% bigger. Japan, with an economy that's three times larger, got just 8% more mentions. (By this highly scientific gauge, Donald Trump is precisely 2.45 times more important than Russia, with 20,466 mentions.)
Why Do We Even Still Talk About Russia?
With twice the landmass of the contiguous 48 U.S. states – or 25 times the size of Texas – Russia is big. By dint of occupying one-eighth of the earth's land surface (and being 70% bigger than Canada, the world's second-largest country), Russia's voice is going to be loud, even if it's the bellow of a wounded bison missing a leg.
Plus, it's the world's second-largest oil exporter and natural gas producer. Perhaps fossil fuels are the new tobacco and will eventually be taxed and regulated into oblivion. Despite needing to cough up $15 for a pack of Marlboros (hello, New York), there are still around 1 billion smokers in the world... And it will be a long time before today's wind speed matters more to financial markets, or ordinary people, than the price of oil.
We also can't forget that Russia is still the world's largest nuclear power... It can turn the Earth into Mad Max land many times over. You can't ignore the big guy who's bristling with guns and knives and nuclear hand grenades.
And there's yet another reason: Vladimir Putin. Russia's unrivaled leader since 2000, Putin is a master strategist, both within Russia and on the global stage. And despite Russia's other advantages, it's only thanks to Putin that the country has even a faint cry of relevance.
Putin solidified and has maintained power in part by playing factions within the government against each other. Would-be power players who want to earn (or stay in) his good graces do a Tony Soprano to the oppositions politicians who threaten to gain too much support – or journalists who get too close to the truth.
He's kept the country's powerful business moguls in check by making an example of a few who stepped out of line. The threat of 10 years in prison – what happened to one of them – helped motivate the others to keep their Scrooge McDuck moves (and opinions about politics) behind closed vault doors.
To further solidify his position, Putin recently pushed through changes to the constitution to ensure that he can stick around until 2036... Term limits are for wimps. He's centralized control in himself (it's called the "power vertical" in Kremlin-speak) to a degree greater than the leader of any other big country in the world.
But Putin's dictatorial power at home is a liability on the global stage... To most of the rest of the world – except for the likes of China, Brazil, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia – Putin's frosty relationship with democracy, the rule of law, and basic human rights loses Russia serious points at the global grown-ups table. And few world leaders are impressed by the manly-man image that the Putin – who stands a Tom Cruise-like 5 feet, 7 inches tall – has cultivated through shirtless horseback riding and tiger hunting photo ops.
Meddle Me This...
But despite Putin's efforts – and the country's other natural advantages – Russia's glory days are long gone. The best that Russia can do is play spoiler... And it's been gold medaling at that.
One of the few arenas where the Soviets genuinely excelled – besides waiting in lines and making toasts – was in propaganda. Since well before the 2016 elections were just a glint in Donald Trump's eye, Russia has been spraying poisonous pixie dust through its propaganda firehose all over the world.
A 2017 study found that Russia has meddled in 27 elections since 1991. Until around 2014, Russia focused mostly on other former Soviet states – in particular, in Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova.
Then, Russia's horizons widened. It intruded in elections in the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Malta, the Netherlands, and elsewhere. It poked its nose into the Brexit vote in 2015... Italy's constitutional referendum... the Catalonia independence referendum... France's elections... and others.
And then there's the big borscht... Russia's (supposed) heavy involvement in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections – evidence of which Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell characterized as "indisputable" in July of 2018.
Russia isn't alone in wanting to influence what happens in other countries' elections. Governments in upwards of 70 countries have orchestrated political disinformation campaigns abroad, to interfere, distort opposing views, and discredit opponents. (Facebook was the most frequently used social network used to spread disinformation.)
But Russia has elevated meddling in other countries' affairs to an art form...
Russia has pioneered new and unwelcome ways of disseminating propaganda. Russia explored, exploited, and exported a new array of weapons – troll farms, fake news, fake Facebook accounts, leaked e-mails, fake WikiLeak documents, and cyberattacks on voting registration systems, for starters – that today occupy a prominent place in the toolbox of every self-respecting propagandist.
And in terms of bang for buck, propaganda is a lot more effective than your father's kind of war. Why bother with blood and gore if you can hardwire into the brains of the enemy? The cost of a handful of F-35 fighter jets ($94 million to $122 million per unit) – or Russian MiG-35s ($50 million each) – can fund a lot of Internet trolls, Facebook ads, and other light but lethal weapons in the propaganda wars.
Has Russia's propaganda worked? Judging by the success of its campaigns (which may not be the best indicator), it doesn't look like it...
The University of Toronto researchers found that of the 11 cases of Russian interference in the affairs of its post-Soviet world in 1991 to 2014, Russia got its way just four times. In the next three years – when it focused on elections outside the former Soviet Union – the side that Russia was rooting for won in nine of 16 elections.
"It's not at all clear that Russia's efforts made any difference," the study's authors concluded. And just three election results can be partly attributed to Russian efforts.
But the bigger question is whether Russia cares much about whether Scotland is independent, or Macedonia's name, or who is elected prime minister of the Netherlands or Sweden... or who is president of the United States.
Except for the rare cases Russia has a direct economic interest (in, say, an oil pipeline), it's usually indifferent to the outcome of most of the elections in which it inserts itself.
Russia (and Putin) Crave Relevance
It's a long fall from being a superpower to struggling just to be in the conversation... As Irish dramatist Oscar Wilde said, "There is only one thing in life worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about."
The quick way for Russia to get attention – and as any adolescent will tell you, bad attention is better than none at all – is disruption. And Russia goes for the jugular, to undercut the foundations of democracy, by de-legitimizing elections and the institutions they support.
"Russian disinformation has evolved from its earlier objective of elevating preferred candidates and platforms to a greater focus on discrediting elections and institutions entirely," explained U.S.-based think tank Center for Strategic and International Studies in July.
In other words, it doesn't matter who wins or loses – for Putin's Russia, success is defined by how much havoc it can wreak... by dragging democracies down to their level.
According to geopolitics media company Gzero...
The Kremlin is less concerned with the outcome of any single vote than with more generally sowing doubts about the integrity of elections and political institutions in the West. So far, it's working. Until governments in targeted countries find a way to hit the right Russian state officials and their backers exactly where it most hurts, Russian meddling will continue – in the 2020 U.S. elections and beyond.
What's more, the strategy isn't going to change. Putin has survived four U.S. presidents – and any number of strategic re-sets, policy shifts, approach redirects, blueprint redesigns, and relationship talks with his American counterparts.
Regardless of who is in the American White House, Russia will continue to sow the seeds of chaos – because if it can't be on top, it can at least play the spoiler. Meanwhile, Russian meddling, in elections in the U.S. and elsewhere, will become more sophisticated... and more damaging.
That's bad news for western democracies and institutions – which are already under fire from the inside in many countries.
And if you start to doubt it all yourself – well, Vladimir Putin might be cracking a small smile somewhere deep inside the Kremlin.
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October 13, 2020 View On Website
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In Search of a Solution to Russia’s Strategic Problem
By: George Friedman
Russian President Vladimir Putin described the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest geopolitical catastrophe in history. Though it may not be true of all of history, it is certainly true of modern Russian history, because it cost Russia what it needs most: strategic depth. Until 1989, Russia’s western border was effectively in central Germany. The Caucasus shielded Russia from the south. Central Asia was a vast buffer against South Asia and potentially China. The Russian heartland, in other words, was secure from every direction.
The fall of the Soviet Union pulled its western border back behind the Baltics, Ukraine and Belarus. Russia retained the North Caucasus but lost the South Caucasus – Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia. Central Asia broke down into independent states. This contraction of Russia represented not only a diminution of size but a decreased distance between potential enemies.
Russia inevitably sought to redraw the borders before a serious threat emerged. That no serious threat existed gave Russia some time. But for a country like Russia, insecurity can manifest quickly. Germany went from being a national wreck to an existential threat in less than a decade. The Russians had to increase their strategic depth, but they had to do so without triggering the attack they feared before their depth was increased.
We have seen three events in recent months – one in Belarus, one in the South Caucasus, one in Kyrgyzstan – that together encompass portions of the borderlands Russia lost. To be clear, it is always possible to see three disconnected events connected by logic, and to assume that this logic has anything to do with Russia’s strategic problem. Coincidences abound in history and these three events do not even constitute a perfect coincidence. Even so, where coincidences are accidents that appear to be deliberate, it is easy to dismiss deliberately connected events as simple coincidence. The answer to this is to simply note that a coincidence has occurred, and that regardless of intent by anyone, a coincidence could have the same consequence as an intentional event.
In Belarus, a key buffer on the North European Plain, longtime President Alexander Lukashenko was reelected in what many describe as an illegitimate election in August. Protests against the results have gone on more or less ever since. Russia’s relationship with Lukashenko is complicated – he tries to balance between Russia and the West when he can – but Lukashenko could hardly be described as pro-West. He and Moscow have their differences, but Moscow has always been very influential in Minsk and thus has always had an imperfect solution to its strategic dilemma to the west. If Lukashenko were replaced with someone more antagonistic toward Russia or more sympathetic to the West, it could effectively move NATO, Poland and the
Americans farther east, relegating cities such as Smolensk to border towns.
In Kyrgyzstan, which sits between Russia and China, there is similar political unrest. Here, too, an election has resulted in claims of fraud and large-scale demonstrations. The Russians have some military facilities there, but the most important point is that it provides a buffer between Russia and China. Russia and China are not currently at odds, but they fought each other as recently as the 1960s. Though that was 60 years ago, geopolitics tends to repeat itself, and whatever current interests might guide them, both are old hands at the shifts of history, and neither wants the other to have an advantage. It’s unclear whether the Belarusian playbook will work here, but Moscow has a stake in what happens, and given the likelihood that an arbiter will be needed, involvement would not be surprising.
In the South Caucasus, a war has broken out between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed enclave governed by ethnic Armenians inside Azerbaijan. Broadly speaking, Azerbaijan is backed as before by Turkey, a country with whom Azerbaijan has an ethnic affinity, while Armenia is supported by Russia. But the conflict is much more complicated than that. For one thing, Azerbaijan has important relations with Russia that it cannot afford to sever. For another, Russian intelligence would surely have been aware of war preparations in Azerbaijan and so would have advised them to back off given Moscow’s relations with Armenia. That didn’t happen. Last, Russia has noted that the treaty it has with Armenia does not include Nagorno-Karabakh and that therefore Moscow has no obligation to intervene militarily on Armenia’s side. The Russians are clearly using the war to increase their influence with Azerbaijan, the most powerful and wealthy country in the South Caucasus. (Moscow helped to broker a cease-fire, but it quickly fell apart.) Without Russia, Armenia has few options. Georgia, which was invaded by Russia in 2008, won’t be much help, and the United States, which helped Georgia in said war, will likely choose to abstain.
(click to enlarge)
By appearing to shift their support from Armenia to Azerbaijan or, more precisely, bringing them both into the Russian orbit, the Russians solve a vital strategic problem. First, it helps to secure the South Caucasus, which, second only to Eastern Europe, is the path most likely taken by potential invaders. Second, by increasing control of the South Caucasus, the North Caucasus are made more secure. Of course, Russia already controls the North Caucasus and maintains a strong line of defense there, but Chechnya and Dagestan are home to militant Islamist movements, which Moscow claims are supported by the U.S. through intermediaries from the South Caucasus. True or not, Moscow isn’t taking any chances.
So we see events in Russia’s western and southern frontiers playing out in such a way that the geopolitical catastrophe Putin spoke of is being rectified. There are no tanks rumbling in either direction, but the politics of the situation appear to be heading that way. Of course, all of this may be coincidence. But it’s interesting to note the process that coincidence or calculation seems to have put in motion. But the Russians aren’t fools, and with Armenia and Azerbaijan aligning with Russia and Turkey excluded from the game, Georgia is isolated, and a repeat of 2008 would undermine the subtlety of the Russian move.
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April 5, 2021
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The Arc of Instability in Eastern Europe
The question now is whether, when and how Russia will continue collecting territory.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
It’s no secret that President Vladimir Putin, taking pages from the playbooks of Russian leaders of yore, is trying to secure strategic depth. Much of that depth naturally lies in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, which have been contested since at least the 16th century as Russia began to reclaim lands of Kievan Rus. Stalin continued to incorporate these territories before and after World War II, and in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed, they became vast borderlands from the Baltics to Central Asia comprising newly independent states.
Russia’s latest attempts to recreate its buffer zone have created an arc of instability from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus. Many of these states were already unstable, of course, and Russian revanchism has only made things worse. The question now is whether, when and how Russia will continue collecting territory.
Existing Instability
To briefly recap Eastern European instability: The region has been essentially dissolved three times in the past few hundred years. The first was when Eastern Slavs lost Kievan Rus, a loose federation stretching from present-day Ukraine to present-day western Russia. The second time was when Moscow partially lost its control over Eastern Europe in 1917. The third and greatest happened in 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. In 2014 or so, modern Russia returned to the idea of rolling back some of the geopolitical “successes” of the West, creating a line of confrontation with the West in Ukraine, Moldova, Crimea and the Caucasus.
Four main factors contributed to Russia’s success in reclaiming lands it holds as its own: an international order that favored the geopolitically ambitious; political instability in the areas it meant to reclaim; the emergence of domestic groups in these countries that want to be part of Russia; and a strong military. Notably, actual military invasion has rarely been Moscow’s preferred course of action. It tends to rely on a mix of other tactics. For example, in Moldova, Belarus and Armenia, Moscow relied heavily on pro-Russia groups and on regional geopolitical factors. In Georgia, Moscow worked hard to maintain close relations with the Orthodox Church and conservative groups. Elsewhere, it has leveraged its role as diplomatic mediator to gain a foothold. Russia believes that resolving the Ukraine issue would resolve geopolitical tensions in the entire region. (It isn’t resolved, and it didn’t.)
Turning Point
The turning point for the entire region happened late last year, starting with the Belarusian presidential election held last August. Pro-Russia incumbent Alexander Lukashenko won in what many considered a sham election. Partly with Russia’s help, Lukashenko fought off protesters by redirecting their anger and undermining their resources.
Then, in late September, war broke out in Nagorno-Karabakh, a disputed territory de facto managed by ethnic Armenians located entirely inside Azerbaijan. Moscow helped negotiate an end to hostilities, and in doing so made Armenia much more beholden to it. Its generally pro-West prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, is now fighting for his political life as pro-Russia officials reap the benefits. Moreover, the war’s resolution established a Russian military presence in the Caucasus through its deployment of peacekeepers. It’s also important to note that the West did not resolve the crisis. Washington either couldn’t or wouldn’t, leaving Russia and its historical competitor Turkey as the guarantors of regional security.
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A few days later, on Sept. 31, Georgia held parliamentary elections. The results were disappointing for opposition parties, which refused to recognize the results and abstained from any political dialogue with the ruling party. Now they are demanding new elections. The incident has put the West in a tough position. It has tried but failed to manage the crisis – odd, considering both sides in Georgia are generally pro-NATO and pro-EU. The West’s failure has given Russia the tools to further undermine democracy and stability in the country. Moscow can, and does, discredit Western influence and legitimacy and provides support for various groups. For Moscow, it will be important to see if things deteriorate further and, if they do, whether they lead to the emergence of non-democratic groups, since that would also complicate ties between Tbilisi and the West.
Then there is Moldova, a country with a population of 2.6 million that is likewise in the throes of instability. Last November, the country held presidential elections in which pro-West candidate Maia Sandu won over pro-Russia candidate Igor Dodon. Yet Dodon and pro-Russia forces have a majority in parliament, and they have vehemently resisted Sandu’s attempt to consolidate control. Naturally, Russia keeps a close eye on Moldova. Moscow would like to see strong and effective pro-Russia policy, but the country is too geographically isolated for Russia to intervene even if it wanted to. (This might be possible only if Moscow establishes control over southern Ukraine.)
Finally, there is Ukraine, where three distinct and important trends have emerged. First, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has failed to deliver on his promise to stabilize Donbass, the breakaway territory in the east. Russia expected that he would be at least partially successful, perhaps by creating a new grey zone or frozen conflict like in Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. But the situation has only grown worse. Second, local elections returned Ukraine to the pre-Maidan revolution era, at least somewhat. Pro-Russia forces made serious gains in regional parliaments, the biggest of which were in the so-called region of “Novorossiya,” which Russia considers extremely important. Third, Zelenskiy started to prosecute pro-Russia oligarchs and to close pro-Russia TV channels and newspapers despite the fact that such measures would be considered undemocratic in any country.
Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
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Ukraine is a unique challenge for Russia. It is vitally important, but Moscow won’t simply invade; it considers much of the local population to be part of “Russian civilization,” and it would be immediately opposed by the West. Both Russia and the West would like to minimize direct contact there.
In short, within the past six months, Russia has achieved serious successes in Belarus and Armenia. It helped the Lukashenko government survive against well-organized democratic protests, and military integration is at historic new levels. It managed to increase its military presence in the South Caucasus by keeping Nagorno-Karabakh under Armenian control. (And it did so without the participation of the West.) Relations with Yerevan and Baku remain stable for now. In Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine, however, the situation is less certain. Russia would like to use Georgia against the West, but the most it can hope to achieve there is a normalization of relations in the next few years. In Moldova, Moscow would like to see a friendly political regime, ready to maintain a status quo and avoiding any joint anti-Russia actions together with Ukraine. The arc of instability, for now, is here to stay. The bigger danger, however, is that this arc could extend from the political to the military realm, especially in Ukraine.
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Vlad knows that the Kidsniffer McAlzheimers and the Ho and their stringpullers in the shadows can't/won't stand up to him.
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But, , , but , , , but , , , he called Putin a killer!
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June 8, 2021
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Russia as a Developing Nation
By: George Friedman\
Richard Moore, who heads Britain’s foreign intelligence service, or MI6, was quoted in the Sunday Times as saying that “Russia is an objectively weakening power in economic and demographic terms.’’ In President Vladimir Putin, the statement touched a nerve.
Responding to a question about the statement at the St. Petersburg International Forum, he said:
“You mentioned that the new head of MI6 gave such assessments, but he is new and a young leader in that sense. I think he will gain experience, and he will change his assessments. This is first. Second - if Russia is a weakening power, then why worry? If this is the case, keep calm and don't worry about this, and don't deteriorate Russian-British relation. And if you don't interfere, then a trend that is gaining strength will continue. Great Britain is among the few countries in Europe, and in the world, with which we have maintained a good pace of development of economic ties. Even during the past pandemic year, when our trade volume shrank with many countries in the world, with Great Britain it rose by 54%. This is a record high figure. So, if you don’t interfere, then everything will be all right and probably, with the help of mutual trade, from a weakening country Russia will transform into a thriving state. We would very much like for Russian-British relations to facilitate this process.”
The statement reflects several possibilities. One is that his comments were mistranslated. The problem is that I can’t find any denial of the translation. Another is that he was being sarcastic. Though tempting, I think Putin is savvy enough to know that sarcasm from a world leader doesn’t usually translate well. Given that I think Moore’s assessment is correct, and the point made is that Moore should be more supportive of British-Russian trade relations, Putin seemed to be conceding the point: that he recognized Russia’s real and ongoing economic decline and the need for robust trade with Britain.
I laid out my model for Russia in “The Next 100 Years,” which I wrote in 2007 and was published in January 2009. I argued that Russia would have to become more aggressive in its efforts to contain Western incursions into the buffer spaces of the former Soviet Union. The first step of that process was the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, a relatively mild event. The overthrow of the pro-Russia government in Ukraine a few years later, and its replacement by a pro-West regime, created a fundamental shift in Moscow that is being played out now in Belarus, the South Caucasus, Moldova and of course Ukraine itself. In my analysis then and now, Russia could not accept the geographic and political realities that the fall of the Soviet Union created and would become increasingly aggressive within the former Soviet Union and in a more limited sense globally, as in Syria.
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The problem Russia would have is the problem encountered by the Soviet Union. As politico-military actions increased, the cost of defense spiraled. That spiraling cost collided with the fact that Russia failed to create a modern economy. The center of gravity of Russia’s economy is the production and sale of energy – exports account for about 30 percent of Russia’s gross domestic product, and about 40 percent of its exports are energy – but it doesn’t control the price of energy or the associated whims of the market, which can inflict major damage on the economy.
This is what broke the Soviet Union. On one hand, it had to finance a massive military capability. On the other hand, a large part of its economy derived from the export of a single commodity. This is the definition of a developing economy: dependence on a single commodity. The Soviets had a developing economy while paying for a developed military. This limited the possibility of economic development outside of defense and energy, and limited social development.
The same fundamental process is underway today. Geopolitically, Russia had to transform its military from the rubble of the 1990s into a force capable of restoring its former borders (at least effectively if not formally) and cope with a possible response from the United States. At the same time, its ability to create a balanced modern economy was limited by the outflow of capital, thanks to the rise of the oligarchs and the arrested development of a large, technically proficient middle class. Russia never had the breathing room needed to first build a modern economy and then deal with geopolitics. It has been forced to resort to the old standby – energy – whose pricing is Russia’s great unknown.
In “The Next 100 Years,” I forecast a period in which Russia would become more assertive, followed by a period of increased economic weakness and social disappointment. The fall of the Soviet Union failed to deliver what Russia has always longed to be: a modern European country. It remains a significant military power but one that is not strong enough to impose its will by direct force because it cannot alienate countries like Britain that could deny it access to their markets. Like the Soviets of the 1980s, the Russians are trapped between geopolitical necessity and economic reality, and in my opinion, we are entering a period in which the contradiction will be less and less sustainable.
Putin obviously understands as much, and he understands that the countries that matter to him understand as much too. He had to dismiss Moore, the head of MI6, as an inexperienced kid but could not deny anxieties over the possibility of declining trade with Britain. He may have intended to sound sarcastic, but he could not avoid expressing the truth. Russia needs a robust economy to pursue its geopolitical imperatives, but it doesn’t have one. And it can’t afford MI6 making life harder for it. But MI6 is not Russia’s problem; economic reality is its problem.
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June 10, 2021
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Brief: Russia’s Eastward Turn
Ahead of next week's Geneva summit, Moscow is holding its largest Pacific drills since the days of the Soviet Union.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Russia is following the trend and looking east, hoping to solidify its position on the Northern Sea Route and defend its remote eastern borders, some of which are still the subject of disputes with Japan. In a declaration of its eastern focus, Moscow is gradually building up, modernizing and training its Pacific Fleet.
Russian Pacific Fleet Naval Assets
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What Happened: As many as 20 surface warships and submarines as well as approximately 20 aircraft from Russia’s Pacific Fleet started exercises in the central Pacific. Participating ships include the Varyag missile cruiser, the Admiral Panteleyev anti-submarine ship and the Marshal Shaposhnikov frigate, and the aircraft include Tu-142MZ anti-submarine planes and MiG-31BM fighter-interceptors, among others. According to Russian media, it’s Russia’s largest Pacific exercise since the Soviet Union. A former chief of the Russian navy’s General Staff said the drills were unprecedented in scale and were taking place far from coastal support infrastructure.
Bottom Line: In less than a week, Russian President Vladimir Putin will sit down in Geneva with U.S. President Joe Biden. It’s impossible to separate these unprecedented drills from the wider context of that visit. Moscow is signaling its might and its determination to have a seat at the table in the Asia-Pacific region.
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The Geopolitics of Climate Change: Russia’s Paradigm Shift
undefined and Senior VP of Strategic Analysis
Rodger Baker
Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
8 MIN READJun 30, 2021 | 10:00 GMT
A view of Russia’s northernmost military base on the island of Alexandra Land on May 17, 2021.
A view of Russia’s northernmost military base on the island of Alexandra Land on May 17, 2021.
(MAXIME POPOV/AFP via Getty Images)
Editor’s Note: This is part of an occasional series exploring the geopolitical and strategic implications of climate change.
The U.S. Defense Department is increasingly considering climate change in its assessments of future threats and challenges. In numerous reports, climate change implications are often characterized as “threat multipliers” — that is, elements that exacerbate existing trends or instabilities. But there are aspects of climate change that have even deeper implications by changing either the physical geography of particular spaces or their perceived relative significance. These are the geopolitical impacts, ranging from shifts in critical natural resources to the radical transformation of the Arctic.
Changes in climate patterns alter humanity’s interaction with geography directly and indirectly. There are immediate physical impacts, like shifts in land use, water availability, coastlines and soil stability. And there are also secondary impacts, like technological developments to adapt to or alter the physical environment, changes in migration patterns, or new competition over routes and resources.
National power — whether measured in economic opportunity, human capital or military strength — has long been shaped and influenced by geography. Natural resources, however, are not distributed evenly across the globe, nor is arable land, natural transportation routes or conducive conditions. Geography is not deterministic, but it clearly provides uneven opportunities and challenges around the globe. And today we are seeing climate change potentially alter fundamental geopolitical structures, with the Russian Arctic at the forefront.
A New Arctic Emerges
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious impacts of climate change can be seen in the Arctic. A May report by the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme (AMAP) recognized that the Arctic is warming three times faster than the rest of the globe, even faster than reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) only a few years ago. With less ice protecting shorelines, winter storm erosion is eating away at coastal villages. Arctic and near-arctic fish stocks are moving to adapt to changing water temperatures. Arctic fires are becoming more frequent and covering greater areas. Thawing permafrost is undermining existing infrastructure around human settlements, military installations, and critical energy and mineral projects. Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR), meanwhile, is opening nearly year-round, with increased access even without icebreakers.The U.S. military has taken note of these impacts on its airstrips, radars and missile defense installations in Alaska. Russia, too, has stepped up the modernization of its Arctic defense facilities, and Moscow, as the new Chair of the Arctic Council, is emphasizing managed resource exploitation in the Arctic.
A Map Showing Arctic Sea Ice and Shipping Corridors
Both countries, along with NATO, are increasing military exercises and naval patrols in the Arctic, both for national security and in recognition of the likely increase in search and rescue and disaster response in much more accessible seas. But beyond these reactive aspects, there is a deeper geostrategic change underway — a fundamental restructuring of Russia’s strategic position.
The Thawing Eurasian Heartland
Modern Western geostrategic thought pays homage to British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder’s observations at the turn of the last century on the inherent insularity of a Eurasian “Heartland,” as well as on Mackinder and American geopolitician Nicholas Spykman’s considerations of the competition between traditional continental and maritime powers. Mackinder’s primary observation was that the core heartland of Eurasia was largely impenetrable to sea power, but could serve as a base of resources and manpower that, when brought together under a single power, would then be able to exert its power beyond the continent to the surrounding seas. Spykman emphasized that the clash between maritime powers and continental powers would take place where they met along the coastal periphery, or what he called the Rimland.
A Map Showing Russia's Major Rivers and Population Density
Key to the Eurasian heartland concept was the idea that the region had limited access by sea, but could maintain robust internal lines of communication, particularly with the advent of rail. This heartland was protected by strategic depth (something the French and Germans both discovered at different times in their drives toward Moscow), and was shielded along its entire northern frontier by ice. The rivers of the heartland also drained into inland seas, or into the inaccessible Arctic — limiting their use as internal transit corridors, but also as routes of maritime access and invasion.
These ideas shaped U.S. strategic thinking in its intervention in World War II, as well as its containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. And they remain alive today, as the United States sees China’s Belt and Road Initiative as just the latest attempt by a Eurasian continental power to connect Eurasia and Africa and harness its inherent resources and strength.
A Shift in Russia’s Strategic Perspective
Despite the interest in Arctic and Far East resources, Russia has traditionally oriented away from its icy Arctic frontier, pushing either west toward Europe, south toward the Middle East and India, or east toward the Pacific coast. This has included attempts to access alternative sea routes and resources, as Russia’s naval reach is geographically constrained by bottlenecks in the Baltic and Black Seas or by Japan along the Pacific coast.
A more open and less frozen Arctic fundamentally alters Russia’s geography. It provides greater access to critical energy and mineral resources and, most significantly, opens a vast new maritime frontier. Moscow has placed the Arctic at center stage in its future economic development. Russia is investing in the infrastructure necessary to monitor and control the NSR. It has also announced plans for new rail links connecting its Arctic frontier to the core of Russia west of the Urals, and has launched an incentive drive to coax more internal migration into the Arctic and Far East regions.
A Mixed Blessing
Moscow has rapidly rebuilt its long depleted Cold War defense architecture along the Northern frontier, recognizing that access to the seas is not just a benefit, but a potential threat. Despite new efforts, Russia still has a minimal population in the Arctic, a poorly developed transportation infrastructure to link the Russian core to its Arctic frontier, and sees this newly open Northern flank as a strategic vulnerability. Moscow’s attempts to control all shipping through the NSR is but one additional response to this mixed blessing of an open Arctic.
From a geopolitical perspective, a Russia that now has an extensive coastline is a fundamentally different Russia than ever encountered in history. If Moscow is able to connect its Arctic frontier to its traditional core and take advantage of both the resources and the routes, it can begin to mitigate the traditional Western containment strategies, opening the path for a new dynamic in Russian strategic thought.
Rarely does geography change so quickly and so radically across such a broad space. A man-made example would be the opening of the Panama Canal, a transformative geopolitical event that allowed the United States to be not just a trans-continental power, but a two-ocean power. The opening of the Arctic provides similar new strategic opportunities for Russia if it is able to develop the infrastructure along its new maritime frontier. Already Moscow is building transshipment ports at each end of the NSR to better facilitate trans-Arctic transit and establish Russia in control of a key alternative link between Asia and Europe. The warming climate also opens the possibility for shifting land use in the Russian Far East, in addition to expanded resource extraction.
Great Power Competition
But it also creates new risks for Russia by opening maritime access to its competitors and opponents across a long and unprotected coast. Russian and Chinese cooperation in developing Russia’s Arctic energy infrastructure is tainted by differences in views on the use of the NSR. Russia considers the NSR internal waters, subject to Russian control and transit fees, while China considers it international waters, open to free passage. And Beijing is also exploring ways to sail further north, bypassing Russia’s NSR altogether.
China’s growing interest in the Arctic, coupled with Russia’s expanded military facilities, have also triggered responsive attention and actions in Europe and the United States. With the deployment of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter to supplement the F-22, Alaska is emerging as the largest concentration of fifth-generation fighters in the world. The U.S. Army is also reshaping its Arctic strategy, stepping up Cold Weather training. And the U.S. Navy is slowly resuming Arctic patrols as well. In addition, the United States is stepping up joint bilateral and multilateral training and exercises in Arctic areas with Canada and Europe, as well as with its Pacific partners. Renewed calls to keep the Arctic a “zone of peace” are complicated by the physical realities of climate change in the Arctic, and by national responses.
As attention to the Arctic increases, Russia is faced with a new strategic reality. It must shift its traditional southward focus and secure its newly open northern flank, while also trying to encourage internal population migration and fund infrastructure to facilitate connectivity and resource development. Russia’s relations with the West remain strained, and its strategic partnership with China hides underlying distrust and a growing imbalance of power in Beijing’s favor. Russia’s new need for more robust naval capabilities will compete with its longstanding risks along its extensive land borders. How Moscow manages these competing geopolitical realities will determine whether the opening of the Arctic is a new opportunity for Russia to reshape its future, or a new risk that leaves Moscow vulnerable as the world changes around it.
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https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2021/07/information-warfare-looms-larger-russias-new-security-strategy/183717/
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November 23, 2021
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Russia’s Move
By: George Friedman
Russia is not a trustful country – for good reason. Germany invaded it twice in the 20th century, France invaded it once in the 19th century, and Sweden once in the 18th century. These were not the nibbling incursions that Europe was used to, but deep penetrations meant to capture the Russian heartland and permanently subordinate it. Each century saw an assault on Russia that threatened its existence. It’s hard to forget something like that, and it’s hard for Russia not to be suspicious of moves on its periphery. There is nothing in Russian history to cause its leaders to think otherwise.
This attitude makes Russia a threat to its neighbors. The West saw the collapse of the Soviet Union as Russia simply giving independence to foreign countries. The Russians, stunned by what had happened, were prepared to view it this way as well. Moscow assumed the best from the West. It assumed that the newly independent countries would be neutral and would therefore not be a threat to Russia. The dynamics of history are not so orderly, and over time the Ukrainian government and Russia drifted closer. This threatened to undermine the Western vision of the post-Soviet world – as well as the expectation of many Ukrainians.
Just 24 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a revolution in Ukraine toppled the country’s pro-Russian government. From the Western (and particularly the American) standpoint, Ukraine was an independent nation – its affairs had nothing to do with Russia. Russia had a corrupt and repressive regime, and as part of the American moral project, the U.S. would support those who rose up against that regime and claimed their democratic rights. Russia saw things differently. From its perspective, the overthrown government was the legally elected government of Ukraine, and the United States (and others) had engineered a coup in order to impose a pro-Western government. In so doing, the United States capitalized on the collapse of the Soviet Union to take control of Ukraine. For scale, Poltava, Ukraine, where the Russians halted the Swedish advance in the 18th century, was only 500 miles (800 kilometers) from Moscow. The actual distance from the Ukrainian border to Moscow was substantially less than this.
Conflict in Eastern Ukraine
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Whatever the Americans thought they were doing, the Russians saw this as violating Russia’s right to national security, using the pretense of encouraging democracy to threaten Russia. From the American point of view, Ukraine had the right to national self-determination. From the Russian point of view, it did not have the right to pose an existential threat to Russia. From a geopolitical point of view, the American intent didn’t matter. Intentions change, and a pro-American Ukraine was merely a new chapter in a long story of Russian insecurity. Russia had survived previous invasions by putting distance between an invader and Moscow. All of the previous centuries’ invasions failed because invaders had to traverse so much territory that a summer invasion would end in the Russian winter. With Ukraine an American “puppet,” that distance is dramatically reduced, the buffer zone dissolved. What had guarded Russia for centuries no longer guarded it.
Russia's Buffer Zones
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For Russia, this was the tipping point of the post-Soviet era. Ukraine was a critical element of Russia’s defense, but it wasn’t the only element. The main line of attack into Russia is the North European Plain, which stretches from France almost to Moscow. The Soviet Union’s western frontier was Belarus and was anchored on its border with Poland.
A second, more difficult line of attack into Russia is through the Caucasus, which separate Russia from Turkey, Iran and their allies. The Soviets controlled the massive North Caucasus mountains, including Chechnya and Dagestan. Though they formed a solid barrier against the south, they were populated and thus potentially destabilized by Islamist militants. The South Caucasus (Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia), formerly part of the Soviet Union, is also an important buffer.
A third line of attack lay in Central Asia. The countries of the region pose no threat to Russia themselves, but the withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan has muddied the waters. There is a real threat of spillover violence from Islamists, and the U.S. continues to seek air bases in the region to support limited operations in Afghanistan. For Russia, Central Asia is thus important to secure.
To the east, there is the border with China. Russia shares an interest with China in blocking the United States, but there is a deep historic distrust between the two countries. The Russians had previously invaded China and Manchuria. The Soviets considered bombing Lop Nur, China’s nuclear weapon center, and approached the United States in collaborating on the operation. There were serious border conflicts between China and the Soviet Union in the 1960s, including a major battle along the Ussuri River. Mao was hostile to the Soviet Union. The entente between the United States and China in the 1970s and 1980s was directed against Russia. Given this history, The Chinese-Russian border is a place of vulnerability.
In other words, Russia is surrounded by vulnerabilities. So it has developed a soft approach to deal with them. It does not send in tanks; it uses political and economic problems to increase its influence. Thus is the case in Belarus, where the instability under President Alexander Lukashenko allows Russia to increase its power and destabilize the border with Poland. In Central Asia, it uses economic relations and the tension between Central Asian states to increase its influence. In the South Caucasus, it has inserted peacekeepers to maintain a truce between Azerbaijan and Armenia, giving it various avenues for leverage. It maintains good relations with China of course, but both remain wary of the other.
The North European Plain, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Chinese border are all vital. But the central issue for Russia is Ukraine. Ukraine is where the United States has, from the Russian point of view, sunk its claws. Russia can manage Belarus, but it cannot exert soft power in Ukraine because of the potential for American intervention. There are rumors of a Russian invasion in the coming weeks, but real invasions are not announced. On the other hand, invasions you do not want to launch (because you could lose) should be announced. It becomes a psychological weapon to try to force a settlement in which Russia holds a strong veto on internal processes.
It should be remembered that Russia is facing a bunch of complex and dangerous challenges on its borders. Any one of them might spin out of control. And like all nations, Russia has limited bandwidth. Moscow is clearly trying to move sequentially, rather than simultaneously, but that assumes it has time. And since the U.S. is unlikely to act, time may well be on Moscow’s side. But Russian fears feed on themselves and can cause imprudent actions. And most important, in managing regions that host enemies, a defining crisis can arrive without invitation.
Russia, from its point of view, has to at least mitigate the threats of the Soviet era. So the pressures on Russia are great, but there are plenty of opportunities to act. Russia tends to move deliberately, but reality might not give it the option. The Americans are, among other things, unpredictable these days.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-kazakhstan-crisis-much-bigger-deal-western-media-letting?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=406
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https://www.realclearworld.com/articles/2022/01/06/russia_struggles_to_secure_its_rapidly_changing_eastern_frontier_810878.html?fbclid=IwAR2nVitVjBnikXDUrpGowSLKIARkOmBuZq6tY0OPwk4ZM4FIb-PQ6kpvIII
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THE INTERPRETER
For Putin, Propping Up Allies Is Turning Into a Perilous Bargain
The Russian leader is fighting fires on multiple fronts, illustrating the danger of his strategy of relying on force to aid his autocratic neighbors.
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A state media photo of President Vladimir V. Putin attending an emergency meeting on Monday of the Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to discuss the situation in Kazakhstan.
A state media photo of President Vladimir V. Putin attending an emergency meeting on Monday of the Council of the Collective Security Treaty Organization to discuss the situation in Kazakhstan.Credit...Alexey Nikolsky/Sputnik, via Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
Max Fisher
By Max Fisher
Jan. 13, 2022, 3:00 a.m. ET
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From Eastern Europe to the oil fields of Central Asia, President Vladimir V. Putin is straining to maintain a sphere of influence that will keep the forces of history at bay.
The Russian leader’s allies, perched atop former Soviet republics, are growing old in office or face rising discontent. The bulwarks they have provided against the expanding frontiers of democracy and Western military power look increasingly shaky.
So Mr. Putin is relying more on brute force to hold it all together: preparing a possible invasion of Ukraine to keep it out of NATO, sending troops to Kazakhstan to suppress protests and threatening to do the same in Belarus.
Coercing allies is hardly unusual for great or regional powers. The Soviet Union, whose loss Mr. Putin often laments, sent tanks into Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. Still, it bonded its empire through Communism, which instilled a common mission and a sense of existential conflict with the capitalist West.
Now, with capitalism and at least pretensions of democracy the norm on both sides of the old Iron Curtain, there is little to justify fealty to Moscow beyond the shared desire of post-Soviet strongmen to help one another cling to office.
“There’s no real ideological glue to hold together this motley alliance of people with very different interests,” said Timothy M. Frye, a Columbia University political scientist.
Mr. Putin’s sphere of influence, for all the trouble it causes the West, is increasingly a cage of his own making. The more that he relies on force to prop up aging, unpopular autocrats on his periphery, the more besieged his alliance becomes, both by dissent at home and Western pressure abroad.
As a result, the very threats that Mr. Putin hoped to avert are instead growing. Ukraine is rushing into the West’s arms. Provocations by Belarus, rooted in its crackdown on rising dissent, are uniting Europe against its pro-Moscow leader. And protesters in long-stable Kazakhstan are demanding change.
Mr. Putin has sought to turn his reactive escalations into a strength at home, portraying his interventions into those countries’ problems as reclaiming Soviet greatness.
But a tepid public reaction, as well as the Kremlin’s recent crackdowns on civil society and political rivals, Dr. Frye said, indicated that “the usual narratives that Putin has used to shore up his rule are just not working as well.”
Imposing Loyalty
Mr. Putin’s fear of democratic encroachment is often traced to the so-called color revolution democratic uprisings that swept several former Soviet republics in the 2000s. He and his deputies still speak often of those events, usually as Western plots to subvert Russian power.
But Mr. Putin’s response did not crystallize until 2012, when he cracked down violently on protests against him in Russia. Many of the demonstrators belonged to the Russian middle class that had once widely backed him. This elevated hard-liners within his administration, while also leading Mr. Putin to shift his power base to security services.
The Kremlin, increasingly hawkish and nationalistic, even paranoid, settled on a strategy of propping up neighboring leaders who would control dissent and oppose the West.
As a result, Mr. Putin came to believe that only leaders who look like him — autocratic strongmen — could be trusted to keep the dangers of democracy and Western influence at bay.
Any others would have to be forced into loyalty.
After Ukrainian protesters ejected their country’s pro-Moscow president in 2014, Mr. Putin did not seek to persuade newly empowered Ukrainian voters to align with Moscow. Rather, hoping to strong-arm Ukrainian leaders into obedience, Russia invaded and annexed one part of Ukraine and sponsored separatists in another.
So far, this strategy has largely backfired. Western powers increased their support for Ukraine, and Ukrainian voters, once divided over relations with Russia, turned sharply against it. But Mr. Putin, perhaps unable to see a neighboring democracy as anything other than a threat, has only escalated his efforts, and is now threatening a major invasion of Ukraine.
This may well forestall overt alignment between Ukraine and the West, or even force Washington to redouble its acknowledgment of Russian interests there. But one danger for Mr. Putin is that it may not work forever and, once failed, could see yet another former Soviet republic join the European institutions that he insists are a threat to him.
A Shrinking Circle
Mr. Putin’s reliance on fellow strongmen has proved nearly as risky.
Strongman-ruled countries, which concentrate power in one person’s hands at the expense of governing institutions, tend to be more unstable, more corrupt and less economically effective, all of which deepen public dissatisfaction.
The dangers of this can be seen in Kazakhstan, where a carefully planned transition from one leader to the next broke down into violent unrest.
Understand the Protests in Kazakhstan
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What’s happening? Protests in Kazakhstan incited by anger over surging fuel prices have intensified into deadly clashes over the future direction of the autocratic Central Asian country. Here’s what to know about how the protests started and why they matter:
What led to the protests? The protests began when the government lifted price caps for liquefied petroleum gas, a low-carbon fuel that many Kazakhs use to power their cars. But the frustration among the people runs deep in regards to social and economic disparities.
What do the protesters want? The demands of the demonstrators have expanded in scope from lower fuel prices to a broader political liberalization by seeking to oust the autocratic forces that have ruled Kazakhstan without any substantial opposition since 1991.
Why does the unrest matter outside this region? Until now, the oil-rich country has been regarded as a pillar of political and economic stability in an unstable region. The protests are also significant for Vladimir Putin, who views Kazakhstan as part of Russia’s sphere of influence.
How has the government responded? President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called the protesters “a band of terrorists,” declared Kazakhstan under attack and asked the Russian-led military alliance to intervene. Officials have instituted a state of emergency and shut off internet access.
Mr. Putin sent a Russian-led force of 2,500 troops to Kazakhstan to help put down the turmoil, at a time when tensions with Ukraine and Belarus were already simmering. It has been an illustration of the perilous bargain holding Mr. Putin and his allies together, in which they are essentially obligated to guarantee one another’s rule by force.
Strongman leaders are also likelier to start conflicts and likelier to lose them, Erica Frantz, a Michigan State University scholar of authoritarianism, said she has found in her research.
“Personalists don’t have to bargain over policy, and lack of accountability leads to riskier behavior,” she said, using a formal term for such leaders.
While their fear of democracy makes them useful allies to Mr. Putin, the downsides of their rule increasingly bedevil his informal alliance.
“Provocations are what we would expect. We’d also expect some of his moves to be bad choices,” Dr. Frantz said.
Even with democracy’s global travails, it has nonetheless remained widely accepted since the Cold War’s end, beyond a handful of countries like China or Cuba, as the default, forcing even unabashed dictators to at least pretend at democracy.
The result is a circle of pro-Moscow strongmen who frequently struggle to persuade their citizens why it is necessary to accept fewer freedoms than those in neighboring countries.
Belarus exemplifies the dangers. Last year, as dissent rose over the government’s failures to address the pandemic, the president’s escalating crackdowns became a source of diplomatic conflict with the rest of Europe, which ensnared Mr. Putin.
Some Belarusian opposition activists, aware of Russia’s influence, signaled their openness to working with Moscow. But, in what may be a reflection of the Kremlin’s narrow insistence on familiar autocrats, for all their missteps, it has ignored their outreach.
Much as with Ukraine, Mr. Putin is left with a strategy in Belarus or Kazakhstan of ever-escalating coercion, albeit conducted through his allies in office.
These cycles, of shoring up a sphere of influence built on distrust and intimidation, can take on a logic of their own. So the strategy is pursued even when it appears likely to produce the opposite of Mr. Putin’s hoped-for results: both inviting the very threats he fears and eroding the alliance on which he has rested so much of his future.
“It will certainly produce more militarization of the alliance’s eastern flank,” Emma Ashford, a researcher at the Atlantic Council research group wrote of NATO’s likely response to Russia’s threats against Ukraine. “Just because we think it’s a stupid, self-defeating move on the part of Russia doesn’t mean they won’t do it.”
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Putin Is Waging War on Europe
His officials and media supporters have started talking openly about ‘military confrontation.’
By Bernard-Henri Lévy
Jan. 18, 2022 6:22 pm ET
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Russian guards on the street in Almaty, Kazakhstan, Jan. 12
PHOTO: RUSSIAN DEFENCE MINISTRY PRESS S/SHUTTERSTOCK
Paris
The West is obsessed by the pandemic. International politics has all but disappeared from the public conversation, so that few people seem concerned by the imperial ambitions of the new Russia.
I refer to the ferocious repression in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and the images of Russian tanks there, eerily similar to those in Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968. And to the 150,000 Russian troops massed near the border with Ukraine, holding the Europeans of Kyiv’s Freedom Square at gunpoint. And to the draft “treaty” delivered to the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on Dec. 17, a document that Françoise Thom, in an article in Desk Russie, reveals to be, in Moscow’s eyes, a veritable ultimatum.
Ms. Thom quotes Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Grushko as saying that if the U.S. and NATO fail to meet Moscow’s demands, they will face “a military-technical alternative” and will see “the continent” become “the theater of a military confrontation.” Gen. Andrey Kartapolov, a former vice minister of defense, raises the possibility of “a pre-emptive strike.” Of Russia’s firing of Zircon hypersonic cruise missiles on Dec. 24, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said he hoped they would make the Dec. 17 proposal “more convincing.”
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Never before have Russian officials expressed themselves publicly this way. Vladimir Mojegov, whom an article in French on the Russian website Sputnik calls a “political analyst and Americanist,” jokes that the same Zircon missiles are “more reliable allies” for Russia, that they can “crack a destroyer like a nut,” and that they are capable of “shooting at unwieldy aircraft carriers like a pistol at a can.” The pro-Putin Svobodnaya Pressa asserted that if NATO is enlarged, Russia “will bury Europe and two-thirds of the United States in half an hour.”
This rising extremism only half-surprises me.
I have feared its coming since August 2013, when President Obama, in Syria, gave the signal to retreat and ushered in a world without America.
I took its full measure in Amsterdam in 2019 during a public debate with Alexander Dugin, one of Mr. Putin’s ideologues and a proponent of neo-Eurasianism.
But it would be good if this extremism hit home with high-ranking European officials who continue to see Russia as a peaceful neighbor surrounded by ill-behaved Westerners, or Mr. Putin as a leader trying simply to defend his right to his personal space, his lebensraum, his cordon sanitaire.
It would be very good if the sleepwalkers in France, America and the rest of the world would wake and hear Russian military expert Konstantin Sivkov musing about Russia’s “nuclear potential” to “physically eliminate” Europe and explaining that, at the end of this hypothetical nuclear war, “there will be . . . almost no survivors.”
There remain, among supposedly enlightened Western thinkers, many fools who would accept the annexation of Crimea to avoid the annexation of Ukraine, and then the invasion of Ukraine to prevent an invasion of the Balkans, followed by the subjugation of the Balkans to ward off the Finlandization of the Baltic states, the neutralization of Poland, and even the placing under Russian tutelage of the great states of Western Europe. This is all reminiscent of the appeasement that produced the 1938 Munich Pact.
Mr. Putin has declared war on Europe, and the West. It is a cold war, a war deferred, with an Iron Curtain falling (for the moment) along the Ukrainian frontline. But it is a war all the same.
Its instigator now bears in history’s eyes the immense responsibility of having broken the taboo against war, which has preserved the safety of the European Continent twice devastated by world war. During the 80-odd days leading up to the presidential election in France, there should be no issue more pressing than this programmatic kidnapping, as Milan Kundera might put it, by one of our worst enemies.
Mr. Lévy is author of “The Will to See: Dispatches From a World of Misery and Hope.”
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February 21, 2022
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Russia Flexes, but Not in Ukraine
History suggests Moscow will soon perform a show of strength somewhere inconsequential.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Though the crisis in Ukraine is far from over, many are already asking whether Russia’s decision not to go to war is a geopolitical defeat or victory. If things stay the course, it’ll be hard to call it a success; so far, Russia has emboldened its enemies, breathed new life into NATO, and risked the imposition of more sanctions on an already shaky economy. Russia wants the world to think of it as it thinks of itself – as a great power – so rather than admit defeat, Moscow will almost certainly try something else to flex its muscles. It will play to its strengths: having a seasoned and well-equipped army and engaging with countries that, unlike Europe, don’t really care about Ukraine. Most important, it will want to do something cheaply and inconsequentially, and preferably somewhere far away where it has had more success than it has had in Ukraine.
Enter Syria
Enter Syria. Russia has fought in concert with government forces and pro-government militias since September 2015. Paired with combat operations, it was a diplomatic mission whose express purpose was to show that Moscow can influence events far from its borders. The plan largely worked. Despite stark differences with Western governments operating in theater, Russia was able to make itself indispensable to negotiations, cooperate with erstwhile enemies like Turkey, prop up allies like Syria, and mitigate Israeli action.
This is why on Feb. 15, the day before the supposed invasion of Ukraine would begin, Russia’s defense minister was in Syria, where he was to inspect a Russian naval exercise in the Eastern Mediterranean. That same day, Russian Tu-22M3 and MiG-31K long-range aviation aircraft were not preparing for an offensive in Ukraine; they were relocated to the Khmeimim airfield to participate in the same naval drills. (Indeed, Russian warships have been all over the Mediterranean for several weeks.) Russia also renewed its demand for the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Syria, and next week will host talks with the Syrian foreign minister about the prospects for a political settlement of the Syrian crisis.
Russian Bases in Syria
(click to enlarge)
To be clear, Russia isn’t about to undertake a serious military operation here. Any war-like scenario threatens Russia’s position in the region, which is fairly modest anyway, and there’s been no activity in Syria recently that would suggest the country is headed for the kinds of territorial changes, refugee outflows or large-scale destruction that has been typical of the civil war there in years past. Moreover, Russia’s presence in Syria is limited by others involved in the conflict. Iran is more invested and Turkey more militarily active in Syria, while the Gulf states, led by the United Arab Emirates, appear interested in rebuilding the country.
Then there is Israel, which continues to attack Syria despite Russian requests not to, and the U.S., which is in no hurry to heed Russian demands to withdraw, and in fact may be reviving Iran nuclear talks. At the same time, Russia understands that there are other players who have enough power and leverage not to take Russia's requests seriously.
Russian activity in Syria therefore looks like little more than another reminder to everyone else that it is still there and still powerful enough to influence conflicts far from its borders. (This also explains the test launches of ballistic and cruise missiles on Feb. 19 under the personal leadership of President Vladimir Putin. These exercises traditionally include the launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile at the Kura test site in Kamchatka, but this time Russia launched Kinzhal hypersonic missiles at an unnamed location, as ships and submarines of the Northern and Black Sea fleets launched Kalibr cruise missiles and Zircon hypersonic missiles. These demonstrations, like the spasm of activity in Syria, are Russia flexing its muscles.)
The Economic Front
Similarly, Russia is loudly advertising interstate contracts and agreements to shore up its credentials as a powerful trade and economic partner, one that can get along fine without Europe. In February, Russia was particularly emphatic about Putin’s visit to China during the Olympic Games, where Putin received the support of Beijing, including in economic and energy matters, which would offset some of the losses from the Nord Stream 2 natural gas pipeline.
The Kremlin also welcomed a delegation from Latin America, including Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and Argentine President Alberto Fernandez, at the height of the invasion hysteria. Moscow went out of its way to note that, unlike Putin's meetings with European leaders, negotiations took place without maintaining social distance. Putin and Bolsonaro even shook hands before the talks, and Putin said Argentina is one of Russia's key partners in South America.
But this, too, is artificial. There are notable limits to how much these countries can and will cooperate. Sino-Russian cooperation is tenuous as best. So long as there are divergent interests in the Russian Far East, competition in Central Asia, a refusal to share important technologies, and extremely selective investment, Russia and China will be at odds. Though relations between Russia and Latin America are much more dynamic, especially in the agricultural sector, neither one is the other’s most important trade partner. Trade relations with Europe aren’t going away.
Imports to Russia by Region
(click to enlarge)
Exports from Russia by Region
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It’s imperative for Russia to preserve and enhance its influence in its western borderlands, and part of that strategy is making itself seem stronger and more capable than it is. History suggests that Moscow will continue to demonstrate more military equipment in different parts of the world without actually using it, especially in Syria, and will discuss economic cooperation with other countries without actually having significant competitive advantages.
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Why Putin Is Outfoxing the West
Russia’s president is willing to take risks his opponents would never consider.
By Walter Russell Mead
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Feb. 21, 2022 4:23 pm ET
As Western leaders struggle to respond to Vladimir Putin’s unexpectedly dramatic challenge to the post-Cold War order in Europe, the record so far is mixed. The West has assembled something approaching a united stance on the limits of the concessions it is prepared to make and on the nature of the sanctions it is willing to impose should Mr. Putin choose war. Neither hyperactive grandstanding in Paris nor phlegmatic passivity from Berlin has prevented the emergence of a common Western position. This is an accomplishment for which the Biden administration deserves credit.
Yet this is a defensive accomplishment, not a decisive one. As Mr. Putin demonstrated in his speech Monday, the Russian president is still in the driver’s seat, and it is his decisions, not ours, that will shape the next stage of the confrontation. Russia, a power that Western leaders mocked and derided for decades (“a gas station masquerading as a country,” as Sen. John McCain once put it), has seized the diplomatic and military initiative in Europe, and the West is, so far, powerless to do anything about it. We wring our hands, offer Mr. Putin off-ramps, and hope that our carefully hedged descriptions of the sanctions we are prepared to impose will change his mind.
At best, we’ve improvised a quick and dirty response to a strategic surprise, but we are very far from having a serious Russia policy and it is all too likely at this point that Mr. Putin will continue to outmaneuver his Western rivals and produce new surprises from his magician’s hat.
The West has two problems in countering Mr. Putin. The first is a problem of will. The West does not want a confrontation with Russia and in any crisis the goal remains to calm things down. That basic approach not only makes appeasement an attractive option whenever difficulties appear; it prevents us from thinking proactively. When Russia stops bothering us, we stop thinking about Russia.
The second is a problem of imagination. Western leaders still do not understand Mr. Putin. Most of them see that he is not just another colorless timeserver who thinks that appointing a record number of female economists to the board of his central bank constitutes a historic accomplishment. They are beginning to see that he is in quest of bigger game and that he means what he says about reassembling the Soviet Union and reviving Russian power. But they have not yet really fathomed the gulf between Mr. Putin’s world and their own—and until they do, he will continue to confound their expectations and disrupt their agendas.
Mr. Putin is, first and foremost, a gambler who is accustomed to taking large risks against long odds with a cool head. He is not infallible by any means, but he has years of experience in taking calculated risks, defying the odds, and imposing his will on stronger opponents. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, he can surprise and outmaneuver his opponents because he is willing to assume risks they would never consider, and so to attack in times and ways they can neither imagine nor plan for.
Beyond that, Mr. Putin is a Soviet nostalgist. He is the product of a system in which power produced truth and truth reinforced power. Soviet power rested on lies that state power imposed on society as unquestionable truths. If Comrade Stalin said that the sun was green and the sky was pink, his ability to impose such outrageous falsities on a captive society only demonstrated and reinforced the extent of his power. Exposing Mr. Putin as, by our standards, a liar does not weaken him at home or, in his view, in Ukraine.
In the same way, accusing Mr. Putin, even accurately, of planning or committing atrocities may weaken him among human-rights activists in the West, but it may strengthen him at home and in Ukraine. Stalin’s well-earned reputation for utter ruthlessness did not undercut his power. Letting the world know that Mr. Putin has a kill list for Ukraine is more likely, Mr. Putin may believe, to reduce resistance to his rule in Ukraine than to boost it.
Mr. Putin is an immensely skilled ruler, the most formidable Russian figure since Stalin, but he has his problems, too. Russian power remains limited by material and demographic constraints—and the rise of China is a geopolitical factor that no ruler in the Kremlin can permanently afford to ignore. If Western leaders can overcome their posthistorical parochialism and develop coherent strategies for the actual world as opposed to the world of their dreams, effectively countering Vladimir Putin is an eminently achievable goal, though in no way a simple or a trivial one.
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https://www.firstpost.com/world/why-does-russia-want-ukraine-so-badly-heres-what-a-geography-book-tells-us-10391451.html?fbclid=IwAR2sP2F53JzoJ1eWRXb-fHiaeBgUfRwzaSyZaEZVfHU5EONvvpDZZDVI8zM
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https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2022/02/21/putin-ukraine-invasion-kremlin-support/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F361f92d%2F621518689d2fda34e7a28be3%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F18%2F70%2F621518689d2fda34e7a28be3
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https://alexberenson.substack.com/p/what-if-its-a-coup-in-slow-motion/comments?token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwiXyI6IjlSZmZUIiwiaWF0IjoxNjQ2MTkzMTYxLCJleHAiOjE2NDYxOTY3NjEsImlzcyI6InB1Yi0zNjMwODAiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.UFzTgavkpcPqV9xj8vpX8SqUWeod1Fw3Zgg81iDGALI&s=r
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https://alexberenson.substack.com/p/what-if-its-a-coup-in-slow-motion/comments?token=eyJ1c2VyX2lkIjo1ODg4MTI0MCwiXyI6IjlSZmZUIiwiaWF0IjoxNjQ2MTkzMTYxLCJleHAiOjE2NDYxOTY3NjEsImlzcyI6InB1Yi0zNjMwODAiLCJzdWIiOiJwb3N0LXJlYWN0aW9uIn0.UFzTgavkpcPqV9xj8vpX8SqUWeod1Fw3Zgg81iDGALI&s=r
We all better pray he is incorrect. All this jabbering about Putin being unbalanced reminds me of the American coup where the ORANGE MAN BAD! was supposed to be crazy, AND a Putin-puppet.
Most likely a CIA psyop dutifully parroted by the state media here.
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What are the prospects for a coup?
Is there convoy not moving because of high level military resistance to going in?
What happens to Russian nukes in the event thereof?
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Strategic Logic and Political Ideology: Rethinking Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
undefined and Senior VP of Strategic Analysis
Rodger Baker
Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
13 MIN READMar 2, 2022 | 17:31 GMT
A Russian soldier stands next to a poster showing a map of Russia during military drills in Siberia.
A Russian soldier stands next to a poster showing a map of Russia during military drills in Siberia.
(MLADEN ANTONOV/AFP via Getty Images)
Author’s Note: I was wrong about Ukraine. I concluded that the Russians would constrain their activity to the east of the Dnieper River. I am proud to say that my colleagues at RANE challenged my assessment, as our team built a robust set of scenarios, and refused to rule out Moscow taking a maximalist position on Ukraine. The central reason for my miscalculation was that I emphasized strategic logic and failed to adequately consider political ideology. This often works, but individuals, not logic, are the ultimate decision-makers. Political ideology can at times grow so strong that it becomes a reality in itself — a factor just as significant as physical territory, balance of forces, economics or demographics. As an analyst, it is vital to not only accept a missed call, but to seek to understand and learn from it. Below is an initial review of my error, and some thoughts to improve future analysis.
Logic and Ideology
Russia’s three-front invasion of Ukraine, and Kyiv’s unpreparedness despite weeks of Western warnings, highlight a key risk in strategic analysis — that is, failing to appreciate how political ideology can at times bypass strategic logic. There was no pressing need for Russia to take a maximalist position on Ukraine at this time. Ukraine's membership in NATO was at least a decade out. Arms sales and shipments to Ukraine were not sufficient to embolden Kyiv to try and retake the breakaway republics in the east. Russia’s perceived threat from Ukraine was a longstanding one, but one that had no compelling reason to need to be solved now, particularly through such a costly and risky method as Moscow chose. But strategic logic can be subsumed by political ideology, clouding the overall strategic assessment and skewing the risk vs. reward ratio. In Russia’s case, the repeated idea that an independent Ukraine is both a historical anomaly and a fundamental threat to Russian security can become so strong that it becomes a reality in itself.
Russia is not the only country susceptible to letting ideology cloud strategy. The U.S. decision to de-Baathify Iraq after the 2003 invasion is a glaring example of ideology shaping policy despite the strategic reality on the ground. While it may have been noble from an ideological point of view, it removed most experienced bureaucrats. U.S. planners failed to accept the structural reality of Iraq, and the risks of effectively isolating the Sunni population while assuming the previously marginalized Shiite and Kurdish populations would embrace them. The result was the rise of the Islamic State and ongoing political instability nearly two decades later. The United States similarly allowed political ideology to shape operations in Afghanistan, long after the initial strategic reason for the invasion had been neutralized. In the end, there was an ignominious exit, and the return of the Taliban to power.
It is not that political ideology is bad. It defines nations and cultures. But when a focus on ideology leads to a failure to understand and consider the underlying strategic reality, policies often fail spectacularly. This was the warning of British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder in his 1919 book Democratic Ideals and Reality, written at the close of World War I. Mackinder warned the victorious allies that if they allowed their ideological zeal to shape the post-war settlement, they risked setting the stage for a repeat of the war. He was, unfortunately, correct. But Mackinder, in his study of power and nations, didn’t decry democratic ideology; he accepted it as an important factor to consider in assessing future risk. And he applied a similar methodology in assessing the constraints and compulsions of the losing side. One of my colleagues at the Mackinder Forum, an international group of geopoliticians, noted to me that Mackinder both juxtaposed the concepts of ideology and reality in Democratic Ideals and Reality, and showed how ideology could become a geopolitical fact or, in other words, its own reality.
Framing Russia’s Ukraine Challenge
In assessing Moscow’s decision to launch a full invasion of Ukraine, ideology is the missing element — the one that explains Russia’s willingness to conduct a militarily, politically and economically risky operation without any pressing geopolitical need. From a strategic point of view, a Western-oriented Ukraine is a potential threat to Russia. Even if unlikely to occur for many years, the chance of Ukraine in NATO would further encircle European Russia to the west and south. From Moscow’s perspective, Ukraine is a potential dagger aimed at the soft underbelly of Russia. Moscow had similar concerns about Georgia, and in 2008 invaded the country to undermine any attempt by NATO to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. In Belarus, Moscow was much more successful in using political and economic connections to ultimately draw the country firmly into Russia’s orbit.
In Ukraine, Moscow also relied for years on political and economic tools to shape Ukrainian politics. Moscow felt that lever slipping away during the 2004 Orange Revolution, and lost with the 2014 Euromaidan revolution. Later that year in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and supported eastern Ukraine’s breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk republics. While these actions didn’t lead to a political revolution in Ukraine or the return of Russian influence, it did further undermine Kyiv’s applicability for NATO membership, effectively addressing a key Russian security concern.
This makes Russia’s current war unexpected — not due to a lack of intelligence declassified and shared by the United States, but from a strategic perspective. It is a Russian imperative to prevent NATO from expanding into Ukraine. This could be done through political manipulation in Kyiv, the “Finlandization” of Ukraine, or a further expansion of the buffer space in eastern Ukraine. It could also be accomplished through brute force, with Russia overthrowing the Ukrainian government and putting in place a puppet regime. But the other options are significantly less costly, less risky, and have a higher chance of success.
Lower and Higher Risk Options
Moscow may have felt it lost the ability to manipulate Ukrainian politics, but it could still have recognized the breakaway republics in the country’s eastern Donbas region and pushed the contested buffer space further west to include the whole of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts or other areas of eastern Ukraine with a relatively high proportion of ethnic Russians. Russia could have used recognition of the breakaway republics as justification to advance into eastern Ukraine, seizing territory as it pushed westward to gain more buffer territory without launching a full-scale invasion in the rest of the country. In this scenario, Russian troops in Belarus would serve as a looming threat to Kyiv, forcing Ukraine to keep forces north of the city and unable to assist in the fighting in the east. In the end, Moscow would allow Ukraine to sue for peace, and in a political settlement expand the independent republics and ensure a demilitarized buffer zone. Russia may have even been able to get a promise from Ukraine to give up its NATO dreams.
Constraining Russian activity to the east of the Dnieper would likely have kept Europe internally divided over the appropriate level of economic, military and diplomatic response. It would have also reduced the likelihood of significant NATO forces moving further east, along with the risk of Finland (and perhaps Sweden) discussing potential NATO membership. Without some pressing need to make a move at this time, the strategic logic for a limited invasion would appear to have been the preferable option. It would not have completely eliminated any future shift in Ukraine’s security relationships that could one day challenge Russia, but it’s unlikely NATO would seriously consider expansion into a divided country — particularly one where doing so would trigger an immediate Russian military response. Over the years, the United States and especially Western Europe have loudly voiced calls for democracy in Ukraine and the country’s future Western orientation. But on the ground, U.S. and European leaders have remained extremely cautious, limiting key weapons transfers to Kyiv and seeking to avoid risking direct conflict with Russia.
Russia instead chose the maximalist option of invading Ukraine in a bid to significantly degrade the Ukrainian military, and potentially sieging Kyiv to force a political realignment, all while engaging in significant fighting in eastern Ukraine to expand the breakaway republics. This has triggered a rapid maximalist response from Europe, the United States and beyond, at least in regards to geoeconomic and diplomatic tools. Western nations are also stepping up key arms transfers to Ukraine, though they continue to refrain from actively intervening militarily. Russia’s new deals with China and moves to build up additional foreign exchange reserves over at least the last six months indicate Moscow had to have expected the wide-ranging sanctions.
But for that mitigation strategy to work, Russia needs to quickly achieve its goals in Ukraine — namely, degrading Ukrainian military capacity, expanding the buffer space around the breakaway republics, and pressuring the government in Kyiv to abandon dreams of EU and NATO membership — with at least some veneer of political legitimacy.
Toward that end, Russia’s invasion has included the formal recognition of the self-determination of the two new republics, a formal agreement to allow Russian troops in their territory, and a formal Russian vote to allow the deployment of forces abroad. For Russia to have any hope of easing sanctions and its isolation after the conflict, it will need some sort of internationally recognized legitimate treaty or agreement with the Ukrainian government. At this point, however, it’s unclear whether even that would help Russia recover access to the international financial system.
Political Beliefs and Decision Making
There are two factors that may have contributed to Moscow's decision to take such a high-risk operation for only minimal additional strategic benefit over much lower-risk operations. First is that Russia saw a brief window of opportunity shaped by high oil prices, continued Western social and political divisions due to COVID-19 policies, Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, and the U.S. focus on China. That may have given Russia confidence that there was little chance of a military response by NATO. But even without those factors, it was highly unlikely the Western security alliance would have physically intervened in Ukraine. The second and more likely factor is that political ideology in Moscow has ossified and become something concrete, rather than a nationalistic rallying point that can be turned up and down at will. Russian leaders see not merely the need for Ukraine to be a buffer space between East and West, but that Ukraine (like Belarus) needs to be re-integrated into a broader Russian sphere of influence as the first step in pushing the NATO frontier back from the Russian borders.
In looking at leadership and ideology, this is where one could point to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin has issued several papers and speeches on Ukraine, including his interpretation of Russia’s history with the country and the idea that Ukraine effectively has no right to independence from Russia. To some, this suggests that Putin is just a crazy megalomaniac bent on the restoration of the Soviet Union. But Putin’s line of reasoning is not his alone — it is longstanding in post-Soviet Russia and is often used as a political tool to shape perceptions. Further, in a country as large and complex as Russia, it is hard to believe that the mere whims of a single individual can dominate all decisions. Yes, Putin has more individual power and agency than a democratically elected official in the West may have, but the Russian government and military have plenty of structural constraints that limit a single individual’s ability to always get their way, particularly when the stakes are so high.
Assessing political leadership requires initially looking at them as rational, though rationality is situational. Putin’s ideology is not his alone. And that ideology has taken hold — enough to begin reshaping the perception of risk and reward from a full-on invasion of Ukraine. Russian political ideology has masked the underlying strategic reality that seizing Ukraine is unlikely to lead to the capitulation of NATO. Instead, it is likely to have the opposite effect, reigniting NATO’s sense of purpose by identifying a clear and present danger. From an ideological perspective, Moscow may “need” Ukraine back in the fold. But from a strategic perspective, a buffer space in eastern Ukraine provides Russia with security and leaves NATO divided. Eastern European nations and the Baltics may emphasize the Russian threat, but their further flung counterparts in Western Europe would see constrained Russian moves as a continuation of the status quo. Differing regional perspectives would prevail, and that would contribute to Russia’s strategic security.
Ideological Actions With Real-World Consequences
By allowing ideology to supersede strategic logic, Russia now finds itself in a dangerous position. If it cannot force a rapid political settlement with Ukraine, ensuring neutrality and perhaps the independence of eastern Ukraine, it risks getting bogged down in a much longer war — one where attrition may well favor the Ukrainians, particularly as weapons flow in from NATO. Russia would fail to gain its political ends from such a drawn-out conflict, and would also find itself increasingly economically and politically isolated. A prolonged war with Ukraine would strain Russia’s relations with China, which has important ties with Kyiv and relies on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as key components of its Belt and Road transportation corridor to Europe. In short, all of the risks that strategic logic highlighted, that led me and others to expect Moscow to pursue more modest goals, remain realities that Russia must face.
In assessing the likely paths countries may take, looking at constraints and compulsions, at capability and capacity, help shape the picture of strategic logic. What are the imperatives? How does time change the relative weight of each factor? What are the likely responses of others? What makes now the time to act or refrain from action? But this impersonal approach has its limitations because, in the end, it is not logic that shapes the future, but decisions made by people. And political ideology can and does color the less personal strategic logic people use to justify their choices.
Global leaders who fail to grasp the underlying realities of a situation and allow political ideology to exceed strategic logic often make decisions that yield unexpected and undesired outcomes. And for those of us analyzing these decisions, failing to appreciate the potential weight of political ideology will lead to incorrect forecasts.
Using impersonal logic cannot alone predict the behavior of geopolitical actors, but it can reveal the baseline reality within which actions are taken. It may not change the decision, but it can expose the chances of success.
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What are the prospects for a coup?
Is there convoy not moving because of high level military resistance to going in?
What happens to Russian nukes in the event thereof?
I think at this point talk of a coup is very premature. It’s hard to be sure, especially with the fog of war, but fuel is always a constraint on military mobility.
Better tha devil you know. If Putin were removed, would it be better or worse? It’s one thing to remove Saddam, it’s another thing when we are talking about the world’s largest nuclear arsenal under an unknown subject’s control.
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Strategic Logic and Political Ideology: Rethinking Russia's Invasion of Ukraine
undefined and Senior VP of Strategic Analysis
Rodger Baker
Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor
13 MIN READMar 2, 2022 | 17:31 GMT
A Russian soldier stands next to a poster showing a map of Russia during military drills in Siberia.
A Russian soldier stands next to a poster showing a map of Russia during military drills in Siberia.
(MLADEN ANTONOV/AFP via Getty Images)
Author’s Note: I was wrong about Ukraine. I concluded that the Russians would constrain their activity to the east of the Dnieper River. I am proud to say that my colleagues at RANE challenged my assessment, as our team built a robust set of scenarios, and refused to rule out Moscow taking a maximalist position on Ukraine. The central reason for my miscalculation was that I emphasized strategic logic and failed to adequately consider political ideology. This often works, but individuals, not logic, are the ultimate decision-makers. Political ideology can at times grow so strong that it becomes a reality in itself — a factor just as significant as physical territory, balance of forces, economics or demographics. As an analyst, it is vital to not only accept a missed call, but to seek to understand and learn from it. Below is an initial review of my error, and some thoughts to improve future analysis.
Logic and Ideology
Russia’s three-front invasion of Ukraine, and Kyiv’s unpreparedness despite weeks of Western warnings, highlight a key risk in strategic analysis — that is, failing to appreciate how political ideology can at times bypass strategic logic. There was no pressing need for Russia to take a maximalist position on Ukraine at this time. Ukraine's membership in NATO was at least a decade out. Arms sales and shipments to Ukraine were not sufficient to embolden Kyiv to try and retake the breakaway republics in the east. Russia’s perceived threat from Ukraine was a longstanding one, but one that had no compelling reason to need to be solved now, particularly through such a costly and risky method as Moscow chose. But strategic logic can be subsumed by political ideology, clouding the overall strategic assessment and skewing the risk vs. reward ratio. In Russia’s case, the repeated idea that an independent Ukraine is both a historical anomaly and a fundamental threat to Russian security can become so strong that it becomes a reality in itself.
Russia is not the only country susceptible to letting ideology cloud strategy. The U.S. decision to de-Baathify Iraq after the 2003 invasion is a glaring example of ideology shaping policy despite the strategic reality on the ground. While it may have been noble from an ideological point of view, it removed most experienced bureaucrats. U.S. planners failed to accept the structural reality of Iraq, and the risks of effectively isolating the Sunni population while assuming the previously marginalized Shiite and Kurdish populations would embrace them. The result was the rise of the Islamic State and ongoing political instability nearly two decades later. The United States similarly allowed political ideology to shape operations in Afghanistan, long after the initial strategic reason for the invasion had been neutralized. In the end, there was an ignominious exit, and the return of the Taliban to power.
It is not that political ideology is bad. It defines nations and cultures. But when a focus on ideology leads to a failure to understand and consider the underlying strategic reality, policies often fail spectacularly. This was the warning of British geographer Sir Halford J. Mackinder in his 1919 book Democratic Ideals and Reality, written at the close of World War I. Mackinder warned the victorious allies that if they allowed their ideological zeal to shape the post-war settlement, they risked setting the stage for a repeat of the war. He was, unfortunately, correct. But Mackinder, in his study of power and nations, didn’t decry democratic ideology; he accepted it as an important factor to consider in assessing future risk. And he applied a similar methodology in assessing the constraints and compulsions of the losing side. One of my colleagues at the Mackinder Forum, an international group of geopoliticians, noted to me that Mackinder both juxtaposed the concepts of ideology and reality in Democratic Ideals and Reality, and showed how ideology could become a geopolitical fact or, in other words, its own reality.
Framing Russia’s Ukraine Challenge
In assessing Moscow’s decision to launch a full invasion of Ukraine, ideology is the missing element — the one that explains Russia’s willingness to conduct a militarily, politically and economically risky operation without any pressing geopolitical need. From a strategic point of view, a Western-oriented Ukraine is a potential threat to Russia. Even if unlikely to occur for many years, the chance of Ukraine in NATO would further encircle European Russia to the west and south. From Moscow’s perspective, Ukraine is a potential dagger aimed at the soft underbelly of Russia. Moscow had similar concerns about Georgia, and in 2008 invaded the country to undermine any attempt by NATO to gain a foothold in the Caucasus. In Belarus, Moscow was much more successful in using political and economic connections to ultimately draw the country firmly into Russia’s orbit.
In Ukraine, Moscow also relied for years on political and economic tools to shape Ukrainian politics. Moscow felt that lever slipping away during the 2004 Orange Revolution, and lost with the 2014 Euromaidan revolution. Later that year in 2014, Russia annexed Crimea and supported eastern Ukraine’s breakaway Donetsk and Luhansk republics. While these actions didn’t lead to a political revolution in Ukraine or the return of Russian influence, it did further undermine Kyiv’s applicability for NATO membership, effectively addressing a key Russian security concern.
This makes Russia’s current war unexpected — not due to a lack of intelligence declassified and shared by the United States, but from a strategic perspective. It is a Russian imperative to prevent NATO from expanding into Ukraine. This could be done through political manipulation in Kyiv, the “Finlandization” of Ukraine, or a further expansion of the buffer space in eastern Ukraine. It could also be accomplished through brute force, with Russia overthrowing the Ukrainian government and putting in place a puppet regime. But the other options are significantly less costly, less risky, and have a higher chance of success.
Lower and Higher Risk Options
Moscow may have felt it lost the ability to manipulate Ukrainian politics, but it could still have recognized the breakaway republics in the country’s eastern Donbas region and pushed the contested buffer space further west to include the whole of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts or other areas of eastern Ukraine with a relatively high proportion of ethnic Russians. Russia could have used recognition of the breakaway republics as justification to advance into eastern Ukraine, seizing territory as it pushed westward to gain more buffer territory without launching a full-scale invasion in the rest of the country. In this scenario, Russian troops in Belarus would serve as a looming threat to Kyiv, forcing Ukraine to keep forces north of the city and unable to assist in the fighting in the east. In the end, Moscow would allow Ukraine to sue for peace, and in a political settlement expand the independent republics and ensure a demilitarized buffer zone. Russia may have even been able to get a promise from Ukraine to give up its NATO dreams.
Constraining Russian activity to the east of the Dnieper would likely have kept Europe internally divided over the appropriate level of economic, military and diplomatic response. It would have also reduced the likelihood of significant NATO forces moving further east, along with the risk of Finland (and perhaps Sweden) discussing potential NATO membership. Without some pressing need to make a move at this time, the strategic logic for a limited invasion would appear to have been the preferable option. It would not have completely eliminated any future shift in Ukraine’s security relationships that could one day challenge Russia, but it’s unlikely NATO would seriously consider expansion into a divided country — particularly one where doing so would trigger an immediate Russian military response. Over the years, the United States and especially Western Europe have loudly voiced calls for democracy in Ukraine and the country’s future Western orientation. But on the ground, U.S. and European leaders have remained extremely cautious, limiting key weapons transfers to Kyiv and seeking to avoid risking direct conflict with Russia.
Russia instead chose the maximalist option of invading Ukraine in a bid to significantly degrade the Ukrainian military, and potentially sieging Kyiv to force a political realignment, all while engaging in significant fighting in eastern Ukraine to expand the breakaway republics. This has triggered a rapid maximalist response from Europe, the United States and beyond, at least in regards to geoeconomic and diplomatic tools. Western nations are also stepping up key arms transfers to Ukraine, though they continue to refrain from actively intervening militarily. Russia’s new deals with China and moves to build up additional foreign exchange reserves over at least the last six months indicate Moscow had to have expected the wide-ranging sanctions.
But for that mitigation strategy to work, Russia needs to quickly achieve its goals in Ukraine — namely, degrading Ukrainian military capacity, expanding the buffer space around the breakaway republics, and pressuring the government in Kyiv to abandon dreams of EU and NATO membership — with at least some veneer of political legitimacy.
Toward that end, Russia’s invasion has included the formal recognition of the self-determination of the two new republics, a formal agreement to allow Russian troops in their territory, and a formal Russian vote to allow the deployment of forces abroad. For Russia to have any hope of easing sanctions and its isolation after the conflict, it will need some sort of internationally recognized legitimate treaty or agreement with the Ukrainian government. At this point, however, it’s unclear whether even that would help Russia recover access to the international financial system.
Political Beliefs and Decision Making
There are two factors that may have contributed to Moscow's decision to take such a high-risk operation for only minimal additional strategic benefit over much lower-risk operations. First is that Russia saw a brief window of opportunity shaped by high oil prices, continued Western social and political divisions due to COVID-19 policies, Europe’s dependence on Russian energy, and the U.S. focus on China. That may have given Russia confidence that there was little chance of a military response by NATO. But even without those factors, it was highly unlikely the Western security alliance would have physically intervened in Ukraine. The second and more likely factor is that political ideology in Moscow has ossified and become something concrete, rather than a nationalistic rallying point that can be turned up and down at will. Russian leaders see not merely the need for Ukraine to be a buffer space between East and West, but that Ukraine (like Belarus) needs to be re-integrated into a broader Russian sphere of influence as the first step in pushing the NATO frontier back from the Russian borders.
In looking at leadership and ideology, this is where one could point to Russian President Vladimir Putin. Putin has issued several papers and speeches on Ukraine, including his interpretation of Russia’s history with the country and the idea that Ukraine effectively has no right to independence from Russia. To some, this suggests that Putin is just a crazy megalomaniac bent on the restoration of the Soviet Union. But Putin’s line of reasoning is not his alone — it is longstanding in post-Soviet Russia and is often used as a political tool to shape perceptions. Further, in a country as large and complex as Russia, it is hard to believe that the mere whims of a single individual can dominate all decisions. Yes, Putin has more individual power and agency than a democratically elected official in the West may have, but the Russian government and military have plenty of structural constraints that limit a single individual’s ability to always get their way, particularly when the stakes are so high.
Assessing political leadership requires initially looking at them as rational, though rationality is situational. Putin’s ideology is not his alone. And that ideology has taken hold — enough to begin reshaping the perception of risk and reward from a full-on invasion of Ukraine. Russian political ideology has masked the underlying strategic reality that seizing Ukraine is unlikely to lead to the capitulation of NATO. Instead, it is likely to have the opposite effect, reigniting NATO’s sense of purpose by identifying a clear and present danger. From an ideological perspective, Moscow may “need” Ukraine back in the fold. But from a strategic perspective, a buffer space in eastern Ukraine provides Russia with security and leaves NATO divided. Eastern European nations and the Baltics may emphasize the Russian threat, but their further flung counterparts in Western Europe would see constrained Russian moves as a continuation of the status quo. Differing regional perspectives would prevail, and that would contribute to Russia’s strategic security.
Ideological Actions With Real-World Consequences
By allowing ideology to supersede strategic logic, Russia now finds itself in a dangerous position. If it cannot force a rapid political settlement with Ukraine, ensuring neutrality and perhaps the independence of eastern Ukraine, it risks getting bogged down in a much longer war — one where attrition may well favor the Ukrainians, particularly as weapons flow in from NATO. Russia would fail to gain its political ends from such a drawn-out conflict, and would also find itself increasingly economically and politically isolated. A prolonged war with Ukraine would strain Russia’s relations with China, which has important ties with Kyiv and relies on Russia, Ukraine and Belarus as key components of its Belt and Road transportation corridor to Europe. In short, all of the risks that strategic logic highlighted, that led me and others to expect Moscow to pursue more modest goals, remain realities that Russia must face.
In assessing the likely paths countries may take, looking at constraints and compulsions, at capability and capacity, help shape the picture of strategic logic. What are the imperatives? How does time change the relative weight of each factor? What are the likely responses of others? What makes now the time to act or refrain from action? But this impersonal approach has its limitations because, in the end, it is not logic that shapes the future, but decisions made by people. And political ideology can and does color the less personal strategic logic people use to justify their choices.
Global leaders who fail to grasp the underlying realities of a situation and allow political ideology to exceed strategic logic often make decisions that yield unexpected and undesired outcomes. And for those of us analyzing these decisions, failing to appreciate the potential weight of political ideology will lead to incorrect forecasts.
Using impersonal logic cannot alone predict the behavior of geopolitical actors, but it can reveal the baseline reality within which actions are taken. It may not change the decision, but it can expose the chances of success.
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Premature? Maybe and maybe not.
Things are not going to plan, the backlash is very strong, with heavy domestic Russian consequences, and then there is this:
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Doctrine raises risk of nuke use against U.S.
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s veiled threats to use his nuclear arsenal if the West comes to Ukraine’s aid in the current fighting highlight a new military doctrine called “escalate to deescalate,” which calls on the military to resort to nuclear weapons more rapidly in conflicts. U.S. officials have expressed concern that the doctrine opens a pathway for using “low-yield” nuclear strikes in conflicts when a nation’s conventional forces are stymied, as appears to be happening for Russia just over one week into its military operation in Ukraine.
Adm. Charles Richard, commander of U.S. Strategic Command, said he is concerned about the Russian nuclear escalate-to-deescalate policy.
“Actually, it may be thought of more as ‘escalate to win,’” Adm. Richard said during a Senate hearing in April.
The doctrine, combined with Russia’s large arsenal of nonstrategic warheads, prompted the Trump administration to convert some U.S. missiles into low-yield nuclear strike weapons, including the W76-2 warhead deployed on submarinelaunched ballistic missiles, in 2020.
The Biden administration is conducting a nuclear posture review, and anti-nuclear advocates are said to be arguing in favor of giving up the smaller nuclear arms. Still, analysts say, Mr. Putin’s threats announced Sunday could alter the debate as the U.S. and NATO allies rush to supply Kyiv.
Russia has stockpiled an estimated 2,000 or more tactical nuclear weapons that are not covered by arms treaties. By contrast, the United States has several hundred low-yield arms.
Russia’s tactical nuclear warheads can be fired from short-range Iskander ballistic missiles and from the SSC-8, a ground-launched cruise missile built and deployed in violation of the Intermediate- Range Nuclear Forces Treaty that led President Trump to scuttle the pact.
The road-mobile SSC-8 has a range of more than 1,500 miles and can strike targets throughout Europe from bases in Russia. The Iskander, also road-mobile with a range of 310 miles, has been deployed in Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave between Lithuania and Poland.
It is not clear how Russia would conduct tactical nuclear strikes. Tactical nuclear attacks most likely would involve strikes on targets in regions of Ukraine that are most resistant to the Russian military advance.
Any nuclear strike on a NATO country would trigger massive commensurate retaliatory nuclear attacks on Russia and a major nuclear conflagration, but Ukraine is not a member of the alliance and Mr. Biden has repeatedly said U.S. and NATO troops won’t join the fight.
The Russian leader made the saberrattling nuclear threat during a speech announcing military operations against Ukraine last week. Any nation interfering with or threatening Russia and its people during the fighting will face a response with “consequences you have never seen,” he said.
“We are ready for any turn of events. All necessary decisions in this regard have been made. I hope that I will be heard,” Mr. Putin said Feb. 24 in remarks widely interpreted as a veiled threat of nuclear retaliation.
Three days later, Mr. Putin publicly ordered Russian nuclear forces on a higher “special” state of alert. The Russian Defense Ministry said Monday that nuclear missile forces and fleets in the north and Pacific had been placed on enhanced combat readiness, Interfax reported. Russian nuclear missile submarines also conducted exercises in the Barents Sea, and mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles conducted maneuvers in Siberia, The Associated Press reported.
A senior Pentagon official said Tuesday that intelligence agencies were closely monitoring Moscow’s nuclear forces for signs of increased alert but added, “We’ve seen nothing at this time that would give us any less comfort or confidence in our own strategic deterrence posture.”
The White House and NATO officials have said they are not raising their nuclear alert status in response to Mr. Putin’s order, a sign that they think Mr. Putin may not be committed to acting on his words.
Hans M. Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert with the Federation of American Scientists, said Mr. Putin’s threat appears mainly rhetorical.
“At this stage, it doesn’t seem to be more than words,” he said. “As far as I’ve heard, U.S. hasn’t seen any significant changes on the ground.”
Other analysts disagree. Mark Schneider, a former Pentagon nuclear policy official, said nuclear attacks in Ukraine are unlikely because Russia has overwhelming conventional military power. The Ukrainian military and reserve, militia and paramilitary forces “do not present lucrative nuclear targets as massed forces military formations,” he said.
However, nuclear attacks on Europe and ultimately the United States are risks if the conflict spins out of control and Russia finds itself in direct battle with NATO forces.
Russia announced the nuclear escalation policy in 2003 and demonstrated the use of tactical nuclear arms in exercises last month. In the exercises, the Russian military practiced using several advanced nonstrategic nuclear missile systems, including two types of hypersonic weapons that conducted practice strikes on Europe, Mr. Schneider said.
Unlike overall strategic doctrine, Russia’s plans for limited nuclear strikes are contained in secret policy documents, but U.S. military commanders have openly discussed the dangerous implications of the shift for years.
Lt. Gen. Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, said in 2017 that Russia is not only “the only country that I know of that has this concept of ‘escalate to terminate’ or ‘escalate to deescalate,’ but they do have that built into their operational concept.
“We’ve seen them exercise that idea, and it’s really kind of a dangerous idea,” Gen. Stewart said.
Mr. Schneider said Mr. Putin issued a decree to the Russian navy to embrace “escalate to deescalate” in naval warfare.
“While I doubt Putin will employ nuclear weapons this time, the Biden administration’s weak response to Russian aggression is increasing the chance it will happen,” Mr. Schneider said.
With the United States and other Western nuclear powers refraining from raising their alert levels in response to his threats, Mr. Putin could calculate that he is operating from a position of strength, increasing the likelihood that the crisis will escalate and allow him to make greater demands for Western concessions, Mr. Schneider said.
Fiona Hill, a Russia expert who served in the Trump White House, said Mr. Putin’s threat and raising of the nuclear forces alert status made “very clear that [the nuclear option] is on the table.”
“The thing about Putin is, if he has an instrument, he wants to use it. Why have it if you can’t?” Ms. Hill told Politico. “So if anybody thinks that Putin wouldn’t use something that he’s got that is unusual and cruel, think again. Every time you think, ‘No, he wouldn’t, would he?’ Well, yes, he would. And he wants us to know that, of course.”
A report by the National Institute for Public Policy said the escalation policy reflects Mr. Putin’s view that nuclear arms are essential to restoring Russian power after the breakup of the Soviet Union. To that end, Moscow has built several types of new strategic weapons, including a nuclear-powered cruise missile, hypersonic strike vehicles and an underwater drone with a massive nuclear warhead.
“Should deterrence fail, Russia envisions the potential first use of nuclear weapons to demonstrate resolve and escalate a conflict much higher than an adversary would be willing to accept, thereby terminating the conflict,” the report said.
In 2016, Army Gen. Curtis Scaparrotti, then NATO commander, told Congress: “Russian doctrine states that tactical nuclear weapons may be used in a conventional response scenario. This is alarming, and it underscores why our country’s nuclear forces and NATO’s continue to be a vital component of our deterrence.”
Three years later, the general told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the Russian nonstrategic warhead stockpile bolstered Moscow’s mistaken belief in the use of limited nuclear strikes. The strikes would “provide Russia a coercive advantage in crises and at lower levels of conflict,” Gen. Scaparrotti said.
The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review called for bolstering U.S. nuclear forces with low-yield weapons as a means of closing what the military calls a gap on the escalation “ladder” of conflict. Low-yield arms are aimed at reinforcing deterrence against Russia’s tactical nuclear doctrine, Gen. Scaparrotti said.
Adm. Richard, the Strategic Command leader, said Russia’s pursuit of nonstrategic nuclear missiles and warheads is evidence that Moscow plans to use those weapons in a conflict it is losing.
The deployment of the low-yield U.S. missile “successfully improved deterrence against that very strategy,” he said.
Under the Biden administration, the discussion of the escalate-to-deescalate debate has been muted.
Arms control advocates within the administration have argued that Russia’s destabilizing escalation policy is not part of its formal military doctrine. Russia issued a vague nuclear deterrence statement in 2020 saying nuclear arms have two roles: to prevent the escalation of hostilities and to allow for the termination of the conflict on conditions acceptable to Russia and its allies.
Dmitri Trenin, director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, said the statement does not fully clarify whether escalateto- deescalate is official doctrine. As for specific conditions on the use of nuclear weapons, the Russian statement includes language that says nuclear arms could be used against conventional forces if the existence of the state is in danger, Mr. Trenin said.
In April, Air Force Gen. Tod Wolters, commander of the European Command, repeated Gen. Scaparrotti’s concern that Russia’s use of nonstrategic weapons in a crisis remains a concern.
Gen. Wolters made no mention of the new doctrine and instead referred to Mr. Biden’s June agreement with Mr. Putin to hold strategic stability talks where U.S. concerns could be raised. The talks were to set the stage for renewed arms control negotiations but ended up as a forum for Russian complaints about NATO. The U.S. administration called off the talks after the Russian invasion of Ukraine last week, Foreign Policy reported.
In the weeks before the Ukraine invasion, the Biden administration sought to head off Moscow by offering to negotiate limits on missile deployments and other measures. The proposal for arms talks was outlined in a leaked NATO document revealing that the United States refrained from deploying nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe under the NATO-Russia Founding Act but could deploy them there in response to military aggression.
“Further Russian increases to force posture or further aggression against Ukraine will force the United States and our allies to strengthen our defensive posture,” said the document, dated Dec. 17 and first published in Spain’s El Pais newspaper.
U.S. intelligence officials revealed Russia’s construction of large numbers of underground nuclear command bunkers starting in 2016, suggesting a strategy of trying to survive a nuclear exchange. Dozens of bunkers detected in Moscow and across the country appeared similar to command and control complexes built during the Cold War under the Soviet Union.
Moscow also built an underground subway in the late 1990s from the residence of then-President Boris Yeltsin outside Moscow to a leadership command center
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March 18, 2022
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Will Russia Return to Its Old Strategy?
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
After Russia invaded Ukraine, I explained why I didn’t think it would and laid out my reasoning in a subsequent column. I have been writing for years about how Russia would try to take control of Ukraine, something Moscow is wont to do in areas it sees as its sphere of influence, especially those that give it strategic depth against its adversaries in the West. I just didn’t think this invasion, in this moment, would be the way it would. You can read my mea culpa here.
I was certainly wrong in the prediction, but if I can claim a morsel of credit, I was to some degree right in that it shouldn’t invade, certainly not according to the war plan that seemed to be in place at the time. The invasion consisted of tanks that ran out of fuel, infantry that got bogged down in firefights with Ukrainian infantry, pointless attacks on non-combatants, and so on.
This is not to excuse my mistake; it’s my job to understand a nation’s intentions, and I didn’t. I assumed that Moscow would pursue a soft coup strategy in Ukraine as it had in Belarus and, to a lesser extent, in the South Caucasus, rather than engage in direct warfare there. It seems as though Russian leaders were blind to the obvious.
However, there is evidence to suggest Russia may be trying to change its strategy. There are reports, for example, of Syrian reinforcements in Ukraine sent to support Russia as Russia had supported the Syrian government. Indeed, stories of Russian efforts to recruit mercenaries abound, even if there is little evidence that they have arrived, or will arrive, to bolster Russia’s offenses. So either Russia is very short on troops, or troops are being held back to provide security in Russia. A good friend of mine in Poland told me that by his estimates, Moscow has already committed 80 percent of its effective combat forces. Ordinarily, I would find this claim absurd, except it’s in Russia’s best interests now to put the conflict to rest as quickly as possible, and it doesn’t seem to have the manpower to do so.
Meanwhile, there are peace negotiations underway involving Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who has indicated that progress has been made. The deal on the table is that Ukraine will agree to be neutral – that is, stay out of NATO. But since Ukraine was not about to join NATO anyway, this might mean that Ukraine would not buy arms from the West. Either the demands are more extreme than Lavrov wants to publicly say, or the Russians are extremely eager to end the war. Given open dissent in Russia, and President Vladimir Putin’s open raging at critics, this may well be the case.
But this takes us back to my original point about Russia controlling Ukraine. Russia must have Ukraine as a buffer, and it can’t simply accept its full sovereignty. Using direct military force, particularly the way Russia has so far, can’t achieve that. What can achieve that, as has been the case elsewhere, is a soft coup strategy. Of course, that strategy assumes the target nation isn’t filled with fear of and loathing for Russia. Belarus, for example, was extremely friendly with Russia already. But feelings between nations change, sometimes quickly, and Ukraine is as divided politically as all countries are, and is therefore subject to external manipulation.
In the meantime, Russia may be able to pacify Ukraine, but it will take more force and more time, even as the economic sanctions against Russia take their toll and the Russian public openly denounces the war. China won’t bail Russia out – it doesn’t really want to, and it has its own troubles besides – and mercenaries won’t be up to the task.
But Ukraine is too important to Russian national security to let it succumb entirely to the West, so Russia’s strategy must be to bring the war to a close, allow time to pass, and try to create conditions for a soft coup. In other words, Moscow will try what has succeeded elsewhere.
That is the logic, but Russia, having underestimated Ukrainian resistance and overestimated its own power, may be seeing a different reality. And with Putin claiming that a fifth column is operating in Russia, a different game may be afoot.
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If Putin died tomorrow — or he became incapacitated — the current prime minister would become acting president. The current prime minster is Mikhail Mishustin, a man likely selected for that job because he has no ambition to replace Putin or a willingness to disagree with him. He spent a decade as the head of the Russian equivalent of the IRS: “As a career bureaucrat who has been in charge of Russia’s taxes for the past 10 years, Mishustin has always kept a low profile and stayed away from politics. He doesn’t belong to a political party and in rare interviews prefers to talk about innovations in tax administration.” During Putin’s cabinet meeting right before the invasion of Ukraine, Mishustin seemed uncomfortable, but did not object to anything Putin said. You almost have to feel sorry for the guy; one moment he’s running the tax-collection system, and two years later, he’s riding shotgun to a madman launching the biggest land war in Europe since World War II.
According to the Russian constitution, after the president dies, an election to replace him should be called within 90 days. Mishustin would be eligible to run, but he doesn’t seem like a man with a burning hunger to run a nuclear-armed state that is now a global pariah and on its way to becoming an economic basket case.
Putin has no natural successor; in Russian politics, having a natural heir apparent is apparently akin to inviting betrayal and a coup. But whoever replaced Putin isn’t likely to have a dramatically different geopolitical worldview from his predecessor.
John Deni is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute. He observed in the Wall Street Journal a few days ago that, “If Mr. Putin were removed in a coup, whoever replaces him would face the same domestic political incentives and disincentives, which would likely lead to a continuation of Russia’s confrontational approach to the West.”
Deni blames it on geography:
Sitting as Russia does at the crossroads of Eurasia, its borders have for centuries been the object of rivalry and conflict with neighbors to the west, east and south. By one estimate, since 1800 Russia has experienced an invasion from its west about once every 33 years on average.
The result has been a nearly permanent sense of weakness and insecurity within Russia. That has fueled a domestic political environment in which those who pursue confrontation and opposition in foreign policy — whether czars, Politburo chairmen or presidents — tend to realize greater political success than those who favor cooperation and integration.
Russia feels vulnerable and threatened, and so it seek to avert those threats by taking a bellicose stance toward its neighbors. The great irony is that no one in Eastern Europe has any interest in invading and conquering Russia. Germany was happy buying Russia’s oil and natural gas. Ukraine was happy trading with Russia. War is always a tragedy, but this one was particularly unneeded.
The only person on Earth who really wanted this war was the man who had the authority to start it
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On the War in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova Tread Carefully
Both countries must be careful not to bend too far toward the Russian or Western camp.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine spreads westward toward the strategic port city of Odessa, concerns are growing that Moscow will soon turn its sights to Ukraine’s western neighbor, Moldova. These fears intensified after a rally – meant to mark eight years since Russia’s annexation of Crimea – in a Moscow stadium last Friday where attendees sang patriotic songs including “Made in the USSR,” which opens with the line: “Ukraine and Crimea, Belarus and Moldova, it’s all my country.”
The event likely also raised eyebrows in Georgia. As the only EU and NATO aspiring country in the Caucasus – a region that’s also mentioned in “Made in the USSR” – Georgia shares the same concerns as Moldova, but for different reasons. It doesn’t share a border with Ukraine, but Georgia has very real memories of Russia’s invasion and de facto takeover of two separatist regions in 2008.
After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, Georgia and Moldova intensified their efforts to build closer ties to Brussels, especially given that both countries have Russian-backed breakaway regions – Trans-Dniester in Moldova and South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia. Last May, the two countries together with Ukraine formed the Association Trio, aimed at developing closer economic relations with the European Union, a priority for all three countries considering their long-standing dependence on the Russian economy as former Soviet states. Within days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, they also applied for fast-track EU membership. They were previously seen as unlikely candidates because of Russia’s occupation of part of their territories, but given recent events, Brussels is now more willing to consider their accession. Moldova and Georgia, knowing that membership is a long way off, are hoping the bloc will help them manage the influx of refugees from Ukraine.
They’re also worried that they will be Moscow’s next target and are thus trying to strike a balance between Russia and the West. For example, they’ve refused to apply the same sanctions that Western countries imposed after the war began in an effort to not seem too embedded in the Western camp. But Georgia and Moldova have different reasons for following this path – and different positions on the war in Ukraine.
Georgia
As a country sandwiched in between much larger powers, Georgia’s fate is very much tied to what happens in the rest of Eurasia. When a regional power on either side of this vast region pushes for more influence, as Russia is doing now, Georgia feels threatened and will seek to ally with the regional power’s competitors. This is why Georgia’s only possible way to escape Russia’s advances is to push the U.S., EU and NATO for economic, military and political support. But considering that their priorities lie elsewhere, they have been hesitant to help, which has pushed Georgia to engage with the Russians to keep them at bay.
The Russo-Georgian war of 2008 signaled Russia’s intent on reclaiming its buffer zones. It also underlined Russia’s resurgence as a regional power, ending in a frozen conflict with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia essentially under Russian control. According to reports, there are about 8,000 Russian troops currently stationed in the two provinces. Both territories claimed independence in 2008, and Tbilisi responded by imposing an isolation policy against them.
Disputed Regions in Georgia
(click to enlarge)
People in both breakaway regions can apply for Russian passports at consulates opened after Moscow recognized their independence – though these passports are not recognized by either Tbilisi or the international community, making travel outside Russia impossible for people living here. In 2011-12, Tbilisi offered “status-neutral” travel documents to residents of the two regions, but the take-up was minimal given that the people’s loyalties were already firmly established.
Though Georgia hasn’t given up on its EU and NATO aspirations, it has slowly started to reengage with Russia over the past decade. In 2012, it launched a normalization process with Moscow, in part to encourage tourism and trade. Their relationship has since grown. Russia is currently Georgia’s most important export market, and Russian wheat and foodstuffs account for more than 75 percent of Georgian imports. Revenue from tourism, remittances and trade with Russia accounts for about 9 percent of Georgia’s gross domestic product.
Still, hostilities deriving from Russia’s invasion haven’t faded completely. In fact, some factions in Georgia argued that the normalization process should have been suspended in 2021 when tensions along the breakaway regions’ borders with Georgia escalated before elections. Anti-Russian sentiments increased after Russia’s most recent invasion of Ukraine when many Russians (reportedly in the 30,000 range so far) fled to Georgia because of increasing repression and economic problems at home. Most Georgians draw a distinction between Russia’s government and the Russian people, but reportedly, there were calls on social media not to welcome the Russian migrants.
The Georgian government, meanwhile, is in a tough position. Considering the strong economic ties between the two countries, Georgia can’t join the West in imposing severe sanctions on Russia. Some in Georgia even called for the country to join Russia’s equivalent to the SWIFT banking system to help the Russian economy survive its exclusion from SWIFT. But Georgians have also held rallies in support of Ukraine outside the Georgian parliament and collected humanitarian aid to be sent to Ukraine.
Moscow, however, doesn’t appear interested in invading Georgia again. In fact, it’s in Russia’s interest to maintain good relations with Georgia to block Western influence there and quash the notion that the South Caucasian country is part of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, Tbilisi needs to be careful not to cozy up to the West too much in order not to upset Moscow. As recently as March 1, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said his country would not apply for EU membership until 2024, noting that a hasty move toward joining the bloc could be counterproductive. The Georgian parliament also denied an opposition proposal to invite Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to address parliament.
The best thing Georgia can do right now is to not attract Russian attention. To do so, however, it needs to maintain its own internal stability, which will be harder to do the longer the war in Ukraine drags on. And this eventually may create friction in its relationship with Moscow.
Moldova
Moldova, meanwhile, has been somewhat keener on attracting Western support. The small, landlocked country wedged between Romania and Ukraine in the lowlands of southeastern Europe has long held conflicting loyalties. Numerous powers throughout history have sought to control this territory, which was repeatedly used as an invasion route between the Balkans and Russia. It was caught in the 19th century between the Russian and Ottoman empires, and after the end of the Cold War between the Russians and the West. In the early 1990s, it fought a war with Russian-backed separatists in Trans-Dniester, which resulted in Moscow’s de facto control over the region.
Moldova and Its Borderlands
(click to enlarge)
Russia also holds substantial economic influence over the country, in part because of Moldova’s dependence on Russian energy. Though Romania has built some infrastructure that can deliver European gas to Moldova, the country’s distribution network is still controlled by Gazprom, meaning European gas can move only as far as Russia allows it. Moldova’s electrical grid was synchronized with the Continental European Grid only on March 16, the same day as the Ukrainian electrical grid.
In addition, Moldova’s poor finances and the prevalence of the gray economy make it easy for Russian businesses to maintain a strong foothold in the Moldovan market. Both European and Russian banks operate there, and the country’s access to steel and other industrial materials coming from and through Trans-Dniester offers Russian companies cheaper and more covert access to EU markets. All these factors make it difficult for Moldova to cut ties with Russia.
Much like in Ukraine and Georgia, then, politics in Moldova are highly polarized, split between pro-Russian and pro-European factions. Strong pro-Russian camps concentrated in the capital of Chisinau, the city of Balti and the autonomous region of Gagauzian dominated politics until 2021 when a pro-European government took power.
The country never seriously considered NATO membership, but it is serious about joining the EU, partly because of its demographics: Its population has decreased by a third in 15 years, in part because of declining birth rates and in part because many are leaving for a better life in the European Union. Joining the bloc could persuade some to stay.
The war in Ukraine has brought new challenges, however. The country of roughly 2.6 million people has so far taken in 360,000 refugees, at least 120,000 of whom are still in Moldova. The EU has promised 15 million euros “to help manage the immediate crisis,” and Romania and others have also offered aid, but the Moldovan economy may not be able to cope with the crisis.
Meanwhile, Russian influence in the country doesn’t seem to be dissipating. In a recent poll conducted by BS-AXA-Center, half of respondents refused to say whether Russia or the West was responsible for the war, while about 39 percent said it was. These internal divisions will only grow as the socio-economic pain of the war intensifies.
The government therefore needs to take the opposite approach of the one adopted in Georgia. Chisinau needs all the help the West will offer to manage its internal challenges and limit the reach of the pro-Russian camp. It has no intentions of joining Western sanctions against Russia or moving closer to NATO. But in the coming months, its stability will be tested, and the only way it can manage the problem is by pressing the West for more funding.
Western countries have thus far complied. Earlier this week, Romania, Germany and France announced the creation of the “Moldova Support Platform” with the EU’s support. The initiative aims to attract international funding to help Moldova cope with its many challenges: the refugee influx, energy, finances, border management and corruption. Chisinau is also currently in talks with the International Monetary Fund for financial support. Partnerships like these will help create the impression that Moldova is to some extent shielded from Russian aggression.
But Moldova, like Georgia, will be careful not to bend too far in either direction. In both countries, stability is dependent on the way the war in Ukraine advances
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UwPMtmuuVNw
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Russian President Vladimir Putin described the Soviet Union’s collapse
in 1991 as “the greatest political
catastrophe” of the 20th century.
To those
outside of Russia it may sound like hyperbole, but to those who lived there it’s a different story. In short order, they witnessed their
government in Moscow, a power on par with
the United States for nearly five decades,
lose its footing and never fully recover. Russia became destitute, even aimless.
So traumatic was the union’s collapse that it
continues to define Russia’s identity today.
And though the country remained formidable in its near abroad, it is less capable than
it once was of securing its national interests
farther afield. To understand why this is so,
we need to begin by looking at a map.
The Geopolitics of Russia
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THE GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA
4
Indeed, Russia’s most fundamental and strategic challenge – which has both international and domestic dimensions – stems from
the country’s geography. The vast majority
of Russian territory sits between 50 degrees
and 70 degrees latitude. For perspective,
London’s latitude is about 51 degrees, Berlin’s is 52 and Ottawa’s is 45. Russia’s climate
is generally cool, and vegetation and human
life tend to inhabit areas that are below 60 degrees latitude. The heartland of Russian agriculture is in the southwest, along its borders
with Ukraine, the Caucasus and Kazakhstan.
Climate and agriculture go a long way to explain why three-quarters of the population
lives in the area between Russia’s border
with Europe and the Ural Mountains. The
country’s most critical cities, including the
seat of its government, moreover, are all
close to Europe. Russia has few rivers, and
those it does have flow mostly west, making
it difficult to transport goods domestically.
Russia offsets these natural disadvantages
by relying on railways, which further highlight the importance of the western and
southern regions. And so it is that Russia is
Geography, or the Dangers of the West
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THE GEOPOLITICS OF RUSSIA
5
disproportionately preoccupied – and imperiled – by its western reaches.
As a land power, Russia is inherently vulnerable. Its border with Europe is extremely susceptible to invasion, situated as it is on the
North European Plain. This flat expanse of
land begins in Germany and, just east of the
Carpathian Mountains, pivots southward,
opening up right on Russia’s doorstep. Historically, it has been a major thoroughfare of
western military encroachment.
Because Russia’s enemies have so often
used this invasion route, Moscow has tried
to make it more difficult for invaders to
reach its territory by pushing Russia’s borders as far west as possible. When national borders could not be extended, Moscow
established buffer zones between Russia’s
core and Europe. At the height of the Soviet
Union, Moscow enjoyed an extensive buffer
zone that stretched well into Central Europe.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, however, Russia lost most of these territories
and has been on the defensive ever since.
Consider that in 1989, St. Petersburg was
about 1,000 miles from NATO troops. Today, that distance is about 200 miles.
RUSSIA
SWEDEN
NORWAY
FINLAND
GERMANY
CZECH
REPUBLIC
DENMARK
UNITED
KINGDOM NETHERLANDS
BELGIUM
FRANCE SWITZERLAND
ITALY
SPAIN
AUSTRIA
LUXEMBOURG
GREECE
SLOVENIA
CROATIA SERBIA ALBANIA
MONTENEGRO KOSOVO
Moscow
POLAND
TURKEY
ROMANIA
BULGARIA
MOLDOVA
NORTH MACEDONIA
BOSNIA- HERZEGOVINA
ESTONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA
BELARUS
UKRAINE
CRIMEA
HUNGARY
SLOVAKIA
PORTUGAL
IRELAND
Founders (1949)
1950-2000
2000-present
NATO
Membership in Europe
100 miles
500miles
0
≈100
miles
≈1,000 miles
1949
2020
≈500 miles
2020
≈1,300 miles
1949
Source: NATO © 2021 Geopolitical Futures
A Shrinking Buffer
Black Sea
Baltic
Sea
Sea of
Azov
Mediterranean Sea
North
Sea
Caspian
Sea
St. Petersburg
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Russian geography presents an obvious
challenge: Whoever governs the country
must manage the largest country in the
world, comprising vastly different peoples,
climates, natural resources and infrastructure networks. The Russian Federation
consists of 85 federal subjects that range
in structure from autonomous regions and
republics to individual cities. As a result,
Russia is home to highly regionalized economies in which wealth and prosperity are
unevenly distributed.
Wealth is concentrated in the west, particularly in Moscow and the Central Federal District. In times of prosperity, economic disparities can be papered over, and the pressure
on high-earning districts is fairly easily relieved. But in times of economic duress, as
was the case when oil prices dropped in late
2014, the central government faces added
social pressure from the poorer districts in
the interior.
It’s little wonder, then, that Russia’s economic
development since the end of the Cold War has
been similarly uneven. The 1990s were meant
for survival, not economic growth. The reforms
of the decade were aimed at one thing: preventing Russia from reverting to communist rule.
Most Russians lived in or near poverty while
most state enterprises were privatized – at a
discount. The 1998 Russian financial crisis and
the associated protests brought about a major
A Concentration of Wealth
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change. The people were ready for stronger
government and so welcomed a stronger ruler. Enter Vladimir Putin, who endeavored to fix
the economy and then rebuild the government.
Since then, Russia’s development has been
predicated on energy exports, which in turn
have fueled budget spending and consumption.
This worked well enough when energy prices
were high. But when they fall, so too do Russian revenues. This inevitably leads to periodic
economic downturns. From 2015 to 2017, for
example, citizens protested unemployment,
wage arrears, cuts in government programs,
lower real wages, bankruptcy and general frustration with reduced standards of living. The
protests were small, but they could threaten
Putin in the long term. Now it is western sanctions that threaten Russia’s economy and, once
again, Putin must not only maintain control but
also show the people that he is responding to
their needs.
One way he has done so is to erect a two-tier economic system. He controls one tier
through his “inner circle,” which runs stateowned companies, while the other tier is
subject to free market laws. These state-run
companies constitute about one-fifth of the
Russian economy. The Russian people still
support Putin – and they may even trust
him – but they regard oligarchs and regional administrators as corrupt. The president
must weigh the needs of his people against
the needs of the companies that sustain his
economy. In 2001, he sided with the people,
leading a campaign against the oligarchs
and then taking control of media and energy
companies.
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He has also reorganized some of the state
security agencies that help maintain order.
He established the National Guard, which
unifies several domestic security forces under the direct control of the president. The
troops’ stated purpose is to protect the public order, combat extremism, guard government cargo and facilities, help protect the
border and control the arms trade. He also
installed officials loyal to his government
in important places. For instance, between
2017 and 2018, he removed 16 generals
from their posts in the Ministry of Civil Defense, Emergencies and Elimination of Consequences of National Disasters, a body
responsible for responding to civil defense,
public unrest and protests, and in the Interior Ministry, replacing them with officials he
personally selected. The dismissals primarily affected the Caucasus, the Far East and
cities within Moscow’s reach – cities where,
as recently as the end of 2017, there had
been reports of increased unrest.
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Politically, the Russian government under
Putin consolidated its power fairly early on.
Under his administration, Russian political
parties are relatively unimportant; the system favors pro-Kremlin parties. Parties that
do not support the government have little
chance of gaining seats in the Duma, the
lower house of parliament. In 2000, shortly
after assuming his first presidency, Putin actually reduced the number of parties represented in the Duma. In 2012, then-President
Dmitri Medvedev appeared to backpedal
on this move by passing a law that simplified the registration procedures for political
parties. On paper, the new legislation was
meant to open the party system to alternative interest groups. In practice, the system
remained closed.
Five political parties, all of them pro-government to a degree, currently dominate the
Duma. United Russia, Putin’s party, holds
323 of 450 seats, doing whatever Putin tells
it to do. The Communist Party (57), the Liberal Democratic Party (23), A Just Russia
(27) and New People Party (14) hold the
remaining seats. The latter four parties are
not seen as official pro-government parties
and therefore at least partly represent the
opposition. Notably, the term “opposition” is
All Politics Is Local
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used loosely; the representatives rarely defy
Putin-led initiatives. Votes cast by officials
of these parties reflect a disagreement with
United Russia and bureaucracy while simultaneously staying loyal to the president and
system. They have some mild distance from
the regime but do not outright oppose it.
Putin also consolidated political power by
purging Russian governors – an important
move, considering the relationship between
governors and members of the national government. They often work together, depend
on each other and look out for one another’s
interests. Gubernatorial elections were reintroduced in 2012, but while the law to reintroduce them was making its way through
the system, more than 20 governors were
reappointed by the Kremlin, delaying elections in these locations until 2017. Then, in
2013, Putin signed a law that permitted regional legislatures to decide between directly electing governors or having the regional
legislature select and appoint a governor
from a short list drawn up by Putin.
Regional governors, in turn, play a role in
appointing members to Russia’s Federation
Council, the upper chamber of parliament.
The council consists of two representatives
from each of Russia’s 83 federal entities. One
representative is chosen by the regional legislature and one is selected by the region’s
governor. The length of the representative’s
term varies with the federal entity. Built into
this system is a level of reciprocity between
governor and president, further enabling Putin to wield influence. He is able to ensure
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11
that a candidate gains a gubernatorial office, and in return, the governor can appoint
a pro-Kremlin member to the council. This
relationship becomes even more important
considering that the council approves presidential decrees for martial law, declares a
state of emergency, deploys troops abroad,
oversees the presidential appointment for
attorney general and decides impeachment
verdicts.
Putin has dedicated much of his political
capital and resources to consolidating his
power through reforms in various government security bodies. By rebuilding his inner
circle and revamping the power structure,
Putin has demonstrated that he needs to
extend his power network to ensure that his
decrees and policies are implemented properly and that dissenters remain silenced.
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Much of Putin’s political machinations,
though, are meant to perpetuate a myth
abroad. The myth: that Russia is as strong as
it appears. Without the ability to act as decisively as it could during the Cold War, Russia
is relegated to focusing on its own backyard.
The vulnerabilities along its western border
compel Russia to maintain a strong foothold in Ukraine and Belarus. Russia needs
these two countries to insulate it from outside threats. Though Belarus has remained
firmly within Russia’s sphere of influence in
the post-Soviet era, Ukraine has not. After
pro-Western supporters overthrew the Russia-friendly government in Kiev, Moscow
had no choice but to respond with force. In
early 2014 it seized the Crimean Peninsula
and sent troops and supplies to pro-Russia
rebels fighting in eastern Ukraine.
Crimea was annexed partly to ensure a foothold in Ukraine and partly to secure the port
of Sevastopol, home to the Black Sea Fleet.
Russia’s navy consists primarily of four main
The Focus of Its Foreign Policy
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fleets – the Northern, Baltic, Black Sea and
Pacific. The first three are all based on the
European side of Russia and are constrained
by major chokepoints that limit their access
to global waters. Since much of Russia is
landlocked, the loss or compromising of
the headquarter ports for any one of these
fleets would severely reduce Russia’s naval
power and negatively affect maritime trade.
From the Black Sea, through the Bosporus,
Russia gains access to the Mediterranean
and from there the Atlantic.
Through it all, though, Ukraine has remained
Russia’s top priority and the focus of its foreign policy. Post-Soviet Russia had neither
the resources nor the wherewithal to retake
Ukraine. Russia’s diminished power forced
Moscow to adopt a strategy of global disruption that targeted primarily at the United
States. (Their rivalry is one element of the
Cold War era that remains intact.) Moscow
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did so most visibly in Syria – where it worked
to parlay its influence in the conflict’s resolution to a more beneficial outcome with the
United States over Ukraine – though it has
also been active in Venezuela and North Korea.
For example, in mid-2013, Russia inserted
itself into the international crisis by negotiating a deal to destroy Syria’s chemical
weapons program. Later that year, the Euromaidan protests in Ukraine ousted the
Russia-friendly government in Kiev and replaced it with one that favored the West. In a
much weaker position than it was just a few
months earlier, Russia once more turned to
the conflict in Syria. After reshaping perceptions of Russian power, strengthening the
position of Assad’s forces and prompting
negotiations with the U.S., the limited Syrian
intervention largely fulfilled its strategic purpose for Russia.
Recently Russia deviated from the global
disruption strategy and invaded Ukraine.
The move revitalized NATO and the broader
US-European relationship. While the West
has not directly engaged in military action
with Russia in Ukraine, it provided significant
logistical and military support to Ukraine.
Additionally, the West applied severe sanctions against Russia, isolating the country
from much of the global economy. NATO
has also increased its troop rotations, boost
defense and deploy weapons systems
along NATO’s eastern flank. For Russia, increased NATO presence – and in particular
U.S. presence – in its backyard constitutes
a major threat.
It is a threat it cannot fully manage. More
than 30 years after the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia is still trying to find its way. In
the lives of nations, 30 years is not so long a
time, and the fall of empires tends to reverberate for years thereafter. Moreover, Russia
pandemic economic recovery now faces the
added constraints of far-reaching sanctions
This is particularly problematic in a region
as complex and dangerous as Russia’s, a
region where appearing weak can be as big
a threat as being weak. Russia must simultaneously try to appear more powerful than
it is and meticulously manage what power it
has. But real power is durable. Illusions are
ephemeral. Actions taken by weak nations
designed to make them appear stronger
nearly always fail in the long run.
Mission Statement of GPF
The mission of Geopolitical Futures is contained it its name. Geopolitical Futures understands
the world through the rigorous application of geopolitics: the political, economic, military and
geographic dimensions that are the foundation of a nation. The imperatives and constraints
contained in these define the nation. We study first the past and thereby understand the future. At its core geopolitics assumes, as does economics, that events are governed by these
impersonal forces and not by individual whim or ideology. Geopolitical Futures is rigorously
non-ideological. Our staff may have their personal beliefs, but they must check them at the
door.
We therefore strive to be objective, not merely neutral, but indifferent to the opinions swirling
around the world. We have one underlying belief, which is that liberal democracy can survive
only if there is a segment of society, which we call the learned public, who is not caught up in
the passions of the moment, but is eager to look at the world as it is, and influence the polity
toward the prudence that flows from understanding. It is this learned public we serve with the
methods we have developed. Above all, Geopolitical Futures is an intellectual undertaking, an
ongoing experiment in finding order in the apparent chaos of the world. We are a business that
lives the life of the mind.
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August 8, 2022
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Russia's New Maritime Strategy
Implementing it is easier said than done.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
On July 31, just before the start of a naval parade, President Vladimir Putin approved Russia’s new maritime doctrine, replacing one that had been in place since 2001 and amended in 2015. The new document states outright that America’s dominance of the world’s oceans is a primary threat to the Russian mainland, and more clearly outlines Russia’s economic and strategic interests with regard to the seas.
The timing is hardly coincidental. Sanctions imposed after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have negatively affected value chains and have hindered Russian trade with traditional Western partners. (Cargo turnover in Russian seaports is expected to fall by as much as 50 percent, curbing the export of coal, grain, oil products, fertilizers and liquefied natural gas in a country whose budget depends heavily on exports.) The war, and in particular the destruction of its third largest warship in April, convinced Russia that it needs to decommission its older ships in favor of more modernized ones.
The increased presence of hostile forces would worry any country, of course, but Russia is particularly sensitive to these kinds of naval matters. In fact, it’s helpful to think of Russia as a landlocked country. Despite its long maritime border and proximity to the seas, Russia does not actually have direct access to the open oceans – hence why it is so active in the Black Sea. It lost a lot of its port infrastructure, and thus a lot of its entree to trade routes, when it lost its Soviet satellite states. Put simply, Russia requires a strong naval strategy to compensate for what it lacks in maritime access, which it correctly sees as a strategic vulnerability. For Russia, being able to unlock the ocean is a way to forestall the strangulation of its economy and the isolation of its people.
Russia Seaports
(click to enlarge)
Curiously, Russia’s neighbors with a presence in the Baltic, Black and Caspian seas, as well as those oriented toward the Arctic and Pacific oceans, don’t see Russia’s new naval doctrine as a newfound threat. They understand better than most that Russia’s capacities at sea are limited, often due to internal reasons.
Purpose
The new strategy has two main purposes. The first is to clearly define Russia's zones of interest. Vital seas are those that directly influence state and socio-economic development – Russia’s territorial waters, its exclusive economic zone and its continental shelf, the Arctic basin, including the Northern Sea Route. These are the very areas that bring Russia into collision with other powers – Norway and the United States from the Arctic basin, Japan from the Sea of Okhotsk, and Turkey, Iran, some of Central Asia and much of Europe in the Caspian Sea. Areas that “significantly affect economic development” include the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, the eastern part of the Mediterranean Sea, the Baltic Sea and the Kuril Straits. Russia’s largest ports are located in the Black and Baltic seas, which are also home to the TurkStream and Nord Stream pipelines. In essence, Russia has said that the presence of other countries in these areas is a threat to which the Russian fleet will be ready to respond.
The second purpose is to define Russia’s priorities. Whereas the previous doctrine could be considered Atlantic-focused, the new one places a heavier emphasis on the Arctic and Pacific oceans. This shows that Moscow is attempting to transform Russia into a link between the two oceans, thereby avoiding isolation and, optimistically, strengthening its role as a maritime power. The Arctic Sea is particularly important to Russia because of the Northern Sea Route, which Moscow considers an opportunity to ensure competitiveness in the world market. There, the doctrine calls on Russia to intensify maritime activities in the archipelagos of Svalbard, Franz Josef Land, Novaya Zemlya and Wrangel Island, increasing its combat potential and developing the basing system for the Northern Fleet and the Pacific Fleet. It also includes the development of a shipbuilding complex and the construction of aircraft carriers in the Far East, as well as a liquefied natural gas plant there, and provides for more active development of the natural resources in the continental shelf, including an increase in the level of geological knowledge of the Sea of Japan, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Bering Sea.
For any of this to be possible, Russia will have to build more military and commercial ships and be able to send them where it needs to send them. The creation of modern large maritime transport and logistics centers on the basis of domestic seaports, according to the Kremlin’s plan, will ensure the processing of all maritime imports and exports and create conditions to compete with the port complexes of other states. The doctrine also stresses the need to create logistics networks that can facilitate the transition of vessels from one theater to another, and it beefs up the existing infrastructure in Crimea and on the coast of Krasnodar.
Constraints
Of course, it’s much easier to draw up a strategic plan than to implement it. The tacit admission of the new doctrine is that the Russian navy is in disrepair. What was a powerful fleet in the 1970s has since been relegated to the minor leagues. Moscow has not been able to regain its potential in things like transportation fishing and research despite efforts to modernize its vessels. This means that to ensure the implementation of this strategy, Russia will need to make up a lot of ground, which will take years, a lot of money and a lot of new and independent technologies.
Soviet Navy Bases in 1984
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First, Russia needs a fleet, military and civil. Its fleet is significantly inferior to that of the Soviet fleet. For comparison, in the 1980s, the navy included more than 1,300 ships, including 64 nuclear- and 15 diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines, 79 cruise missile submarines (including 63 nuclear submarines), 80 multi-purpose torpedo nuclear submarines, four aircraft carriers, 96 cruisers, and destroyers and missile frigates. Today, the navy has about 70 submarines (13 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, 27 nuclear-powered missile and torpedo submarines, 19 diesel submarines, eight special-purpose nuclear submarines and 1 diesel submarine) and more than 200 surface warships and boats (including one Soviet heavy aircraft carrier). The majority of its surface ships, although powerful, are outdated, and many need to be decommissioned.
The civil fleet is no more impressive. The Soviet research fleet consisted of more than 200 ships, including freshwater vessels. Today, there are no more than 80. The merchant fleet consists of only about 1,400 vessels (including those sailing under the Russian flag and those of Russian shipping companies registered under foreign flags) with a total tonnage of 22.3 million tons, of which 65.7 percent is operated under foreign flags. The average age of the ships is between 13 and 20 years. Unsurprisingly, the Russian fleet has an extremely low share of world cargo transportation, at roughly 0.1 percent.
Second, Russia needs independent technologies to build the fleet out. Currently, Russian shipbuilding is highly dependent on imports. Foreign components account for anywhere from 40 to 85 percent of the entire civil sector.
Finally, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, inadequate basing options and poor maintenance inflicted heavy losses on the Russian navy. This reflects two problems: a lack of funding and insufficient planning for the restructuring and reduction of the force. Limited funds and outdated shipyards make it difficult to repair large Soviet ships and construct new ones. The most optimistic scenario in the Shipbuilding Development Strategy, which runs through 2035, foresees construction of 250 sea transport vessels and more than 1,500 river-sea transport vessels. However, because of their dire financial situations, shipbuilders can meet just a fraction of their targets, including just 18 percent of demand for sea transport vessels, 6 percent for river-sea transport vessels, 8 percent for fishing fleet vessels, 11 percent for research vessels, 63 percent for icebreakers and no more than 40 percent for ships and marine equipment to develop offshore energy fields. These difficulties are gradually eroding Russia’s share of global maritime transport.
Ultimately, one of the main threats to Russia’s maritime activities is the lack of sufficient foreign bases to support operations in distant and remote areas. Russia will need time, money and technology to expand its naval presence.
Conclusion
The Russian navy is still strong regionally. And Russia continues to spend on infrastructure projects. For example, it’s committed almost 1.8 trillion rubles ($30 billion) for the development of the Northern Sea Route through 2035. Nonetheless, Russia needs greater maritime capabilities to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity. It thus needs better basing and logistics, port infrastructure, and significant investment in both the military and merchant fleets. The new doctrine is intended to do this over the long term, not to be a temporary solution to sanctions. The bigger issue is funding, and it is unclear where Russia will find the money. This will require Moscow to get creative. For instance, the doctrine mentions that Russia could prepare civilian ships and crews to convert to military purposes during wartime.
Russia needs to be a great maritime power to accomplish other important goals, like ensuring the safe operation of its offshore pipelines and environmental safety as well as developing the Northern Sea Route. This will take decades of effective management and billions of rubles in spending. In the short term, this isn’t a threat to other regional powers, but it could be over the long term. And the notion that Russia will be able to overcome extreme competition from regional powers in the near future seems unrealistic
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August 24, 2022
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Russia’s Buffer Zone May Have to Wait
Mounting challenges are forcing Moscow to moderate its war aims in Ukraine.
By: Ridvan Bari Urcosta
As the military adage goes, no plan survives contact with the enemy. No one is more cognizant of this fact right now than Russia, which has faced multiple setbacks in its offensive against Ukraine. Six months in, the situation on the ground is constantly changing, often in ways that the Kremlin didn’t expect or intend. Russia invaded Ukraine with the goal of reestablishing much-needed strategic depth on its western borders. However, as the fighting wears on, new challenges are forcing Moscow to limit its focus to securing sufficient defensive depth around core regions and chokepoints rather than seizing all of Ukraine.
Russia’s objectives in Ukraine are intertwined with its security and military concerns, which are themselves part of a broader grand strategy. Russia’s grand strategy entails achieving strategic depth along vulnerable borders. In this case, Ukraine helps fulfill the Russian need to create a larger buffer zone between itself and the West, particularly NATO states. In 2014, Moscow made a first attempt at gaining Ukrainian territory and succeeded in holding Crimea as well as establishing a strong presence in Donbas. This time around, Moscow believed that those Ukrainians who for decades voted for pro-Russian political parties would lend their support to the Russian initiative. This did not happen.
Since late February, the battleground and its realities have been forcing Russia to rethink its immediate strategic goals. The fighting has gone on longer than anticipated, and Ukraine has demonstrated it plans to continue fighting and is not yet interested in a peace agreement. With time, Ukraine will complete its training on Western-donated weapons and equipment. Russia’s most significant concern in this regard is the versatile short- and medium-range rockets that Ukraine possesses or will possess in the near future. Over the past few weeks, Ukraine has demonstrated the capability to use these rockets to strike deep into the rear of Russian forces on the offensive, including hitting weapons depots and air defense systems. This, then, compels the Russians to drive deeper into Ukrainian territory to build even more strategic depth and provide the distance for its air defense systems to react.
Additionally, Russia's challenges will only multiply and intensify with time. First, there's the West's economic and military support for Ukraine, which helps Kyiv to prolong the fighting and do so with increasingly advanced weaponry. Ukraine's asymmetric attacks with weapons like the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System, better known as HIMARS, have proved particularly problematic for Russia. On the economic front, Western sanctions against Russia led Moscow to start restricting trade and economic relationships. They also overburdened the Russian economy and resulted in the political decision to repress domestic unrest. Lastly, Russia does not appear to have overcome its logistical challenges and continues to struggle to deliver military supplies and defend its rear. All of these factors together make taking the whole of Ukraine a less feasible, more costly move.
Russia's Buffer Zones
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Russia, therefore, recalculated its military strategy toward Ukraine. First, the new strategy needed to account for Ukraine’s Western allies. Russia knew the West would side with Ukraine but miscalculated the degree to which the West would provide military and financial support and its ability to collectively engage in economic warfare. In particular, Moscow remains vigilant of U.S. and British contributions to the Ukraine war effort, particularly with the delivery of cutting-edge military hardware. At the same time, the West’s collective response made Moscow more cautious about bringing its forces right up to NATO lines. Russia does not want to engage directly with NATO, and efforts to occupy all of Ukraine would bring it dangerously close to NATO’s border, leaving little room for error. Lastly, Moscow seeks to use lessons from the war in Donbas between 2014 and 2015 to account for Ukraine’s military capability (particularly with regard to missiles) to target Russian military assets by establishing greater depth around chokepoints of strategic importance.
Russia’s new strategy entails a new list of military objectives in Ukraine. First, Russia must secure the separatist Donbas republics from the reach of Ukrainian artillery and rockets, up to 150 to 200 kilometers (roughly 90 to 125 miles). This requires establishing total control of the area from Donetsk to the city of Pavlograd near the Dnieper River. Farther south, Russia must secure the northern Crimean water canal system in the Kherson region from Ukrainian artillery and prevent the reclamation of these areas by the Ukrainian army. Russia's distance calculations here are premised on the missile range of Ukrainian and Western-provided weapons, and will thus adjust with Ukrainian capabilities.
To achieve these goals, Russia again must conduct an offensive operation and reach the line of Kryvyi Rih and Nova Odesa, and take Mykolayiv city. It is an almost impossible task for Russia currently. Relatedly, Russian forces need to control the Crimean Bridge given its essential role as an economic and military supply route to the peninsula and the Russian forces in southern Ukraine. This also means guaranteeing security over all of Crimea and keeping it free from military incidents. Currently, the closest Russian bases in Crimea are no less than 200 kilometers from areas under Ukrainian control. And finally, Russia will set its sights on the longer-term goal of securing a greater buffer zone along Ukraine’s northern regions of Sumy and Chernihiv, which are just 450 kilometers from Moscow. These regions are close to many cities that are part of the Russian ethnic heartland – like Kursk, Belgorod, Oryol and Voronezh – where Moscow does not want to lose any influence. The problem with this particular objective is that, in order to gain more than a 100-kilometer buffer zone, Moscow has to go almost to the outskirts of Kyiv, on the left bank of the Dnieper, which as the early phase of the war proved would come at a high cost.
Russia is trapped in a classic geopolitical dilemma, where mounting constraints prevent it from effectively pursuing its ultimate goal of gaining strategic depth along its western border. Moscow’s current solution is to go marginally deeper into Ukrainian territory to secure depth against missiles in strategic occupied territory, without making a play for all of Ukraine. Such an approach will leave the question of its buffer zone open-ended. But it may also provide Russia with the opportunity to consolidate the progress it has made during this round, free up resources to focus on mounting economic problems and live to fight another day. It’s only a matter of time before Russia steps up overtures for a negotiated settlement in the conflict.
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August 31, 2022
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Making Sense of Russia’s Pause in Ukraine
The Kremlin knows better than to throw too many resources at one area for long.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Its Ukraine offensive having ground to a halt, Russia’s military on Sept. 1 will start drills in an unlikely location: the Far East. Taking place at the Russian Eastern Military District’s training grounds, the Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan, Vostok 2022 will involve more than 50,000 personnel and more than 5,000 weapons and pieces of equipment, including 140 aircraft and 60 vessels. With the Ukraine war dragging on longer than anticipated, the apparent slowdown in Russian operations – beginning a few weeks ago around the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant – may be deliberate. The Kremlin may be pausing for a strategic rethink.
A state of Russia’s size, with Russia’s diverse set of neighbors, is bound to be pulled in multiple directions from time to time. Starting east and moving clockwise, Moscow faces China’s rise, terrorism and general instability in Central Asia and the Middle East, chronic war in the Caucasus, Turkey’s rise, the war in Ukraine, instability in the Balkans, and NATO’s reawakening and likely enlargement. Russia’s war in Ukraine presents opportunities for the Kremlin’s enemies as well as dissatisfied regional actors to upset the status quo in other parts of Russia’s periphery.
Russia
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Caucasus
The first region bordering Russia to destabilize since the start of the war was the Caucasus, a critical intersection between the Black and Caspian seas, and between Russia and the Middle East. Soon after the war began, Armenian and Azerbaijani representatives started making more frequent trips to Brussels, which saw an opportunity to seize the initiative from a distracted Moscow and mediate in a long-standing territorial dispute. Ultimately, though, Western activity in the region remains a distraction, and Russia still has peacekeepers there and plenty of other leverage. The other day Moscow ensured a three-way agreement among itself, Armenia and Azerbaijan was fulfilled. The deal saw Azerbaijani forces assume control from Russian peacekeepers of the city of Lachin in Nagorno-Karabakh as well as two villages in the Lachin region.
Lachin Corridor
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Middle East
In the Middle East, all eyes are on Iran, where attempts are underway to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Many senior U.S. and European officials say a deal is close and could be weeks away. This is bad news for Russian officials, for whom energy scarcity is a key piece of leverage. It would be bad news if Iranian oil and natural gas were to flood the market at the same time the West is trying to choke off Russian energy exports.
Syria is another problem spot. Following recent rocket attacks on American bases in the country, the U.S. launched airstrikes on pro-Iranian paramilitary positions in Deir el-Zour province. Israel also occasionally conducts airstrikes in Syria. And NATO member Turkey has for months threatened another military operation in northern Syria. For Russia, Syria is an important gateway to the Mediterranean and the extension of Russian influence to Africa and more remote parts of the Middle East, but there’s only so much it can do while simultaneously at war in Ukraine.
Balkans
In the Balkans, Russia, a close ally of Serbia, has watched anxiously as the West tries to sideline it. At the end of July, relations deteriorated again between Kosovo and Serbia after Pristina said it would issue entry and exit documents to Serbs at the border. The U.S. and EU stepped in to temporarily defuse the situation. The West has also scaled up weapons deliveries to Kosovo, with the U.K. sending more than 50 Javelin and NLAW anti-tank systems and announcing plans to train Kosovo soldiers on the weapons. Moreover, Western sanctions on Russian oil tanker deliveries will prevent Serbia from receiving Russian oil beginning on Nov. 1.
Central Asia
Central Asia is not as important to the U.S. and Europe as other areas, but the U.S. can still cause problems in the region for Russia. For example, Kyrgyzstan has warned that Afghan terrorist groups could in the next few months launch attacks in the region, particularly in Tajikistan. The Taliban regime is a tool for the U.S. to destabilize Central Asia, it said. Meanwhile, the Tajik government reported a tripling of drug trafficking through its territory over the past year and said terrorist groups gathering in Badakhshan, northeast Afghanistan, are a threat to itself and the region.
Russia’s concern is that the U.S. may try to step in and present itself as an alternative leader and mediator in the region. It’s a particular sore spot for the Kremlin, which has seen China and Turkey erode its economic and social influence, leaving it with only its military influence – Moscow operates bases in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – to comfortably fall back on. And already there are early signs of Western encroachment. The U.S. has significantly stepped up its cooperation with Central Asia since February. Especially concerning for Moscow was August’s Regional Cooperation 2022 exercises, which involved the U.S., Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Separately, Uzbekistan’s National Guard announced expanded military cooperation with the U.S., including the training of Uzbek military specialists.
Therefore, we should expect the Kremlin to prioritize Central Asia ties via diplomacy, joint exercises and joint initiatives. Central Asia is a large market for Russian goods and a transit hub to bypass Western sanctions, but Russia needs significant influence in the region to benefit. This is why Russian authorities spent last week at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting drawing attention to the problem. Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said Moscow is increasing its combat readiness at bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan due to the state of affairs in Afghanistan. He also announced an SCO counterterrorism exercise, Peace Mission 2023, to be held next year in Russia, and reaffirmed plans for Collective Security Treaty Organization drills in the fall in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Conclusion
Moscow didn’t expect to be tied down for so long in Ukraine, so it is natural that it might pause its operations to deal with peripheral threats. The war is seriously exhausting Russia, draining ammunition and wearing down weapons it would need to react to, for example, terrorism in Central Asia. But having learned the lessons of history, the Kremlin is making sure not to throw all its forces and attention in one direction. Russia will need to save some of its strength for the long struggle that seems to lie ahead.
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Can you guys see this?
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/SR_RussianHistory_2022.pdf?utm_source=GPF+Customers&utm_campaign=f5b7133fab-20220901_PL-RussiaSR&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_fa39571b29-f5b7133fab-264975290&mc_cid=f5b7133fab&mc_eid=415e14f76b
PS: Hat tip to GM for this interesting read:
"https://www.imetatronink.com/2022/08/the-us-is-making-russia-incredibly.html"
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"Can you guys see this?"
Yes, came right up as a 16p. PDF.
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Also,. Welcome Valerick!
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September 7, 2022
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Russia’s Objectives in Iran
Their short-term economic interests coincide despite their mutual lack of trust.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
Roughly six months in, the Russian economy has thus far managed to withstand the pressure of Western sanctions imposed as a result of the invasion of Ukraine. This is due largely to earnings from energy exports, which contribute substantially to Russia’s federal budget and national wealth fund. But Moscow also needs to consider how it can weather the storm in the long term, especially because it could face more severe sanctions in the future. It’s dependent on a number of imported goods, most notably high-tech products, to which its access is now limited, and it’s aware that even tougher sanctions could threaten its economic and political well-being. There are several ways to mitigate the effects: introducing import substitution initiatives, finding ways to skirt the sanctions, finding alternative suppliers of key imports, keeping energy exports flowing as leverage against the West, and participating in regional cooperation initiatives.
Iran can play an important role in each of these options. This explains why Moscow has been in recent months edging closer to Iran. From January to June, trade turnover between Moscow and Tehran was approximately $2.7 billion, 42.5 percent higher than in the same period a year ago. In his last meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said relations with Iran were “reaching a new qualitative level,” which could culminate in a major bilateral agreement already in the final stages of completion. Tehran is facing tough Western sanctions of its own, and it sees an opportunity to gain access to a number of technologies and the fairly large Russian market. With their short-term economic interests seemingly compatible, Russia sees a chance to pursue its broader objectives in the region, however difficult it may be.
Bilateral Trade Between Russia and Iran | 2016-2021
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Russia’s Goals
Russia has long maintained a cautious policy toward Iran, but sanctions have incentivized broader cooperation. To an extent, Moscow can learn from how Tehran has dealt with the sanctions imposed on it by the West. The restrictions on its banking and industrial sectors are similar to those applied to Russia, so Moscow may look to the Iranian example as it charts a path forward.
Moscow is searching for a partner that can provide otherwise inaccessible goods and buy some of the Russian-made products that now lack markets. Iran has been able to help fill both these gaps. For example, in mid-March, when the European Union banned steel imports from Russia and capped imports of a number of other metals, Iran immediately expressed a desire to import zinc and aluminum and to buy steel in exchange for Russia’s purchase of auto parts and gas turbines. Iran also suggested it might import more grain from Russia after becoming its second-largest grain buyer in the 2021/2022 agricultural year. In July, Iran agreed to supply aircraft components to Moscow and to provide maintenance and repairs for Russian airliners. Russia is likely interested in Iranian-made electronic control units and airbags. With Iran’s participation in the Russian MIR payment system expected soon, such transactions will only increase.
There are also benefits in the energy sector. In July, Russia’s Gazprom and Iran’s NIOC signed a memorandum of understanding on oil and gas projects worth $40 billion. Russian firms have also agreed to offer investment and technology for Iranian oil and gas projects or to participate as contractors. The Kremlin believes this might offset Russian losses if tougher sanctions are imposed or if European countries purchase energy from other suppliers. Even if Western sanctions on Iran are lifted and European investors reenter the Iranian market, Russia will have already established itself as a key partner for the Iranian energy industry, making Russian companies highly competitive with European ones.
Another target for Russia is the Iranian IT sector. Russia has a fairly developed IT sector of its own but needs more expertise on tech security, especially as cyberattacks on critical infrastructure increase. Iran has experience in this field considering it has been the target of a number of cyberattacks since 2010, making it an important player in cybersecurity technologies that help protect nuclear, military and economic facilities. The country has invested heavily in this area since the 2010 Stuxnet attack that disabled its nuclear power program. This presents an interesting opportunity for Russia because its military campaign in Ukraine is increasingly turning into a tech war. In the past six months, the number of cyberattacks on critical Russian infrastructure has grown by 50 percent and on energy and financial industries by 70 percent compared to the same period last year. The number of data leaks has increased by almost 50 percent.
In Iran, Russia also sees an opportunity to access new markets. In fact, the International North-South Transport Corridor – which connects Russia to India through Iran but bypasses the Suez Canal and seas in which NATO has a presence – is already in operation. The corridor is becoming one of the main routes for the delivery of goods from Mumbai to St. Petersburg. It comprises sea, river and rail transport, making it possible to halve the time required to deliver goods between India and Russia. (The transit time along the traditional route through the Suez Canal is between 30 and 45 days, while it takes just 15 to 24 days using the new corridor.)
North-South International Transport Corridor
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Challenges
Despite these potential opportunities, the relationship between Russia and Iran is not as close as it may seem. There are several factors that will complicate attempts to strengthen relations between them. The two countries have conflicting interests in strategically important nearby regions – namely the South Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian and the Middle East – which have long been a springboard for confrontation between regional powers. For instance, they have competing claims to resources in the Caspian Sea, and though the 2018 Convention on the Legal Status of the Caspian Sea was meant to resolve the dispute, Iran is the only country of the five states that initially signed the deal that has yet to ratify it.
In addition, Iran is in the process of trying to restore the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and Russia is wary of allying with a country that could be a competitor for energy buyers at a time when its energy exports are the target of sanctions. If Iran’s relationship with the West improves, Moscow risks losing leverage in the energy market because Iran could become an alternative for European countries that want to avoid buying Russian fuel. This would limit Russian leverage over Europe as the Ukraine war continues and, in the long term, threatens to reduce Russian influence if Iran can develop a more stable economy that no longer requires Russian cooperation or support.
Negotiations on reviving the Iran nuclear deal have resumed at an inconvenient time for Moscow. Russia, which is a signatory of the JCPOA, now finds itself in a precarious spot: On the one hand, it can’t abandon the JCPOA and risk damaging its carefully cultivated relations with Iran, and on the other hand, it can’t allow Iran to be opened for Western investment, especially in the energy industry. If a deal is reached, it's likely that Iran will resume oil exports to the West, which will bring an additional 1 million barrels of oil per day to the global market and help reduce the price of energy. The Kremlin is looking to convince Iran that a deal will eventually be reached so Iranian negotiators don’t rush to sign a less-than-favorable agreement. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the deal must be restored to its original terms, hoping the Iranians will propose amendments to the text that would again stall the talks.
It’s certainly true that the economic interests of Russia and Iran overlap more now than before the Ukraine war. Iran sees Russia as a promising market for its manufactured goods, and Russia sees Iran as a source of much-needed equipment and semi-finished products for its industries that have been cut off from their traditional suppliers. For Moscow, cooperation with Iran and participation in joint projects can also have political benefits, possibly leading to an expansion of its influence in the region. Under the current circumstances, it’s a mutually beneficial relationship. But the level of trust between the two remains low; in the long run, their interests are bound to collide.
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As I commented a few minutes ago:
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Eastern partners. During the Eastern Economic Forum, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Myanmar Prime Minister Min Aung Hlaing to discuss bilateral trade, noting that in the first half of 2022, trade between their countries had more than doubled, while Min Aung Hlaing said that Myanmar had begun to buy Russian oil products. At the same event, India and Vietnam expressed a desire to expand energy cooperation with Russia. All this makes sense: In the face of Western sanctions, the east is a good place to look for new economic partners.
Also at the forum. Relatedly, as part of an event focusing on new enterprises at the forum, Putin announced the opening of the Zabaikalsky Grain Terminal, the most powerful specialized grain railway terminal in Russia, with a throughput capacity of up to 8 million tons per year. It is expected to open new doors for Russia in Central Asia, the Middle East and China. Indeed, Russia’s Ministry of Economic Development calculated that trade turnover for the past seven months has reached an unprecedented growth of 25 percent, or roughly $93 billion. Last, Putin said that all the details had been sorted out for an agreement to move gas supplies to China through Mongolia.
Meanwhile in Ukraine. Moscow has put restrictions on the export of grain from Ukrainian ports because most shipments have gone to Europe rather than to developing countries. Only two of 87 ships, for example, were destined for Africa, which relies heavily on grain and especially wheat exports from Russia and Ukraine.
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The Danger from a Wounded Putin
On the menu today: Vladimir Putin and Russia deserve to be humiliated on an epic scale, and right now, that’s just what they’re getting, with Ukrainian forces advancing and reclaiming vast swaths of previously conquered territory. But there’s a catch to this good news for Kyiv, NATO, and the U.S., and it’s that every Russian defeat makes Putin and his cronies more desperate to salvage something out of this wide-ranging military debacle.
What Will Russia Learn?
A few weeks ago, I noted that the Russian invasion of Ukraine tended to disappear from the U.S. news cycle for weeks at a time. Some readers responded that the war had been in a stalemate, and thus had little “real news.” But the past days have brought real news, as the Ukrainian counter-offensive is picking up real momentum and regaining significant chunks of lost territory. Reuters summarizes:
Ukrainian forces kept pushing north in the Kharkiv region and advancing to its south and east, Ukraine’s army chief said on Sunday, a day after their rapid surge forward drove Russia to abandon its main bastion in the area. . . .
In the worst defeat for Moscow’s forces since they were repelled from the outskirts of the capital Kyiv in March, thousands of Russian soldiers left behind ammunition and equipment as they fled the city of Izium, which they had used as a logistics hub.
Ukraine’s chief commander, General Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, said the armed forces had regained control of more than 3,000 square km (1,158 square miles) since the start of this month.
Moscow’s almost total silence on the defeat — or any explanation for what had taken place in northeastern Ukraine — provoked significant anger among some pro-war commentators and Russian nationalists on social media. Some called on Sunday for President Vladimir Putin to make immediate changes to ensure ultimate victory in the war.
It’s not the Ukrainian boasts by themselves that are convincing; it is the Ukrainian boasts coupled with images from the front and the lack of a Russian counterargument.
In many ways, this is terrific news; the war is turning into just about the largest-scale humiliation of Vladimir Putin and Russia imaginable. Putin and the Kremlin no doubt deserve to be humiliated; the world will be a safer place if regimes from Beijing to Tehran see that an act of territorial aggression can rapidly turn into a disaster, costing fortunes in blood and treasure. (Estimates of Russian military casualties — the combined number of dead and wounded — range from 60,000 to 80,000; for perspective, the U.S. suffered 58,220 casualties during the entirety of the Vietnam War.)
Past editions of this newsletter have laid out the religious dimension of this conflict: “Putin sees himself as a saintly, heroic, messiah-like figure, smiting evil enemies and preserving all that is good and holy.” Mounting, worsening defeats might just get Putin to doubt that God is on his side.
But way back at the end of February, I asked “just how much economic devastation we want to inflict upon a country with roughly 4,500 nuclear warheads” — and a similar question can be asked about the scale of a Russian military defeat. We’re left with the same questions as at the beginning of the war. The U.S. doesn’t want Russia to win, but we would prefer the war wasn’t being fought at all. A Russia that is utterly defeated in Ukraine is a wounded dog — desperate, angry, irrational, and capable of lashing out in unpredictable ways that could turn out badly for everyone.
No less a figure than CIA director William Burns said in a speech this past April at Georgia Tech — ahem, excuse me, some folks write in and complain when I don’t call it “the Georgia Institute of Technology” — that, “given the potential desperation of President Putin and the Russian leadership, given the setbacks that they’ve faced so far militarily, none of us can take lightly the threat posed by a potential resort to tactical nuclear weapons or low-yield nuclear weapons.” At the time, he said that the CIA had seen no serious moves in that direction, and that the agency would be watching closely for any signals that this sort of devastating attack was in the works.
And as this newsletter discussed back in mid March, if Putin decides to use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, he will have the option of leaving portions of Ukraine devastated but minimally irradiated, or using the effects of an electromagnetic-pulse attack over a wide area of Ukraine to effectively destroy all kinds of electronic equipment.
Putin expected a quick and easy war that would ensure he would be remembered as “Vladimir the Great.” What does he do in the face of the prospect of being remembered as “Vladimir the Defeated”?
Contemplating some sort of nuclear action on Putin’s part, the Wall Street Journal editorial board says today that, “We hope Western leaders have been mulling how to respond, rather than thinking it can’t happen.” Dare we hope for some sort of coherent deterrence plan? Because the plan to deter the invasion didn’t amount to much.
Putin likely thinks that his forces are losing because of the aid Ukraine is receiving from NATO, and that his best shot of neutralizing NATO is to freeze central Europe this winter. Even if the Germans, Italians, French, and Poles aren’t freezing in their apartments as 2022 turns into 2023, their factories will grind to a halt under skyrocketing energy prices. Putin may well believe that by spring 2023, the largest European NATO powers will be ready to force territorial concessions upon Volodymyr Zelensky and Ukraine.
Is the Biden administration prepared for all-out energy war in Europe in the coming months? Its track record is not encouraging.
Many in the West would like to see Putin deposed; a key question would be what, if anything, Putin’s successor learned from the colossal waste of human lives in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. (Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin is the man who takes over if Putin dies, but he is in that job precisely because he has no ambitions of ever occupying the top spot.)
In Western eyes, the lessons are clear: The countries of eastern Europe must set their own destiny, remaining politically independent and choosing their own economic, geopolitical, and security alliances. Wars of conquest will never work; the combination of economic sanctions and expedited arms exports will turn any territorial occupation into a bloody quagmire. Oh, and considering the effectiveness of American-made High-Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, if you’re a foreign country’s defense ministry who happens to have a hostile neighbor, “I recommend you buy American.”
But Russia may not be willing to accept those lessons and may choose to believe some alternate narrative. Nations are made up of human beings, and human beings love to hunt for scapegoats. The Russian invasion was indeed poorly planned, with far too many over-optimistic assumptions of Ukrainian surrender. The much-hyped modernization of the Russian military may have been a giant scam with the usual Russian corruption. After Putin dies, it will be safe for Russians to openly discuss his flaws — his arrogance, his dismissal of alternate views and reliance on yes-men, his unrealistic expectations.
It is likely that in the aftermath of a Russian defeat, a lot of Russian citizens will choose to believe that they could have won, if it hadn’t been for NATO, or incompetent generals, or grifting defense contractors, or those meddling kids.
Finally, if Ukraine is on the verge of achieving a decisive victory before winter, if not winning the entire war, we can count on President Joe “minor incursion” Biden to take a victory lap. Almost everyone will forget that in early August, some unnamed Biden administration official leaked to the New York Times’ Tom Friedman that there is “deep mistrust” between Zelensky and the White House.
This administration wants to stand at arm’s length from Zelensky when the war is going badly or stuck in a stalemate, but hugs him the moment the Ukrainians start winning again.
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Russia's Mobilization Will Haunt Its Demographic and Economic Outlook
12 MIN READOct 11, 2022 | 20:44 GMT
(STRINGER/AFP via Getty Images)
Russia's mobilization will create near-term economic strains while worsening its long-term economic outlook, adding to demographic challenges and brain drain, and leading to major workforce reductions and internal migration. On Oct. 4, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu said 200,000 people had already been drafted into the armed forces as part of Russia's ''partial mobilization'' to call up 300,000 reservists with previous military experience to deploy to Ukraine. The same day, however, reports citing officials in the Russian presidential administration stated that approximately 700,000 Russians had left the country in the two weeks since the Sept. 21 announcement of the mobilization. The exodus, which has caused long lines at nearly all of Russia's land borders, has persisted amid reports that some of the freshly mobilized troops have received minimal training and poor equipment before being sent to the frontlines, and that the 300,000 figure is merely the initial target for the ''first stage'' and to be expanded in the coming months as Russia's military difficulties in Ukraine persist.
On Sept. 29, Russian President Vladimir Putin for the first time publicly acknowledged that the mobilization had not gone smoothly, claiming that widespread ''mistakes'' had been made and should be corrected. On Oct. 3, the governor of Russia's far eastern Khabarovsk region admitted that up to 50% of those who had received draft summons in the region had received them incorrectly, suggesting Russian authorities in some regions are very concerned about meeting targets and for that reason are mobilizing people who are either too confused or intimidated to resist.
Reports citing Kremlin sources have claimed that Moscow may seek to mobilize between 700,000 and one million people in the coming months, as additional manpower is likely necessary to stop further Ukrainian advances; if that succeeds, more troops will likely be needed thereafter as President Putin's ambitions will likely rise and he will seek to return to offensive operations in the Donbas or other areas of southeastern Ukraine.
Russia's mobilization will likely focus on ethnic minorities in rural areas in Russia's economically depressed regions to try to reduce public backlash. Reports in the Russian press suggest that Moscow and St. Petersburg will be disproportionately untouched by the mobilization. Authorities reportedly are aiming to mobilize as few as 20,000 soldiers in the first wave of mobilization, well below 1% of the reservists between the two cities. By contrast, rural areas — in particular, regions populated by ethnic minorities in the Caucasus, Urals and Siberia — are seeing comparatively larger mobilizations of 4% or even 5% of their reservists. Moscow likely hopes that concentrating mobilization in these more rural, far-flung regions will confine popular backlash — and combat losses — to areas outside of Russia's Northern European core and ethnic Russian populations, among whom high losses would be more likely to critically undermine support for the war. Furthermore, on Oct. 6, independent Russian investigative journalists calculated that 23 of the 26 regions with the highest proportion of recruits are those with incomes below the national average, suggesting a deliberate effort to concentrate mobilization in economic backwaters and thereby lessen the overall impact on the Russian economy.
Despite the Kremlin's efforts, the mobilization has sparked some public protests. In the southern Dagestan region, for example, demonstrations against the region's reported 13,000-man quota lasted for several days in late September and resulted in violent clashes with security forces. Smaller-scale incidents of protest and attacks on security forces have also been reported in other cities across the country. The unrest, however, has so far not resulted in any meaningful policy change and remains unlikely to do so.
Despite the Kremlin's attempts to contain blowback, mobilization will fuel near-term economic challenges. Already, the Russian government is taking on large new fiscal responsibilities and trying to reduce the economic consequences of mobilization for individuals in order to incentivize compliance with the draft. On Sept. 28, Russian legislators in the Duma passed a law freezing loan repayments, including mortgages and consumer loans, for draftees and all others serving in the war, as well as their immediate family members. As many of those currently mobilized are likely to be forced to stay in the army for many months or years, this will effectively leave those creditors (i.e. major Russian banks) with significant nonperforming loans — destabilizing banks' balance sheets, which the government may have to remedy by providing them federal assistance. This risk is accentuated by laws saying that, in the event of the death of a participant in the ''special operation'' in Ukraine, his loan obligations and those of his dependents will be terminated, making banks responsible for even more debts, fueling a private debt bubble in the country that has been growing since Russia's initial invasion of Crimea in 2014. Meanwhile, reports indicate that the mobilization is disproportionately harming Russia's transportation sector and thereby fueling inflation; delivery costs up are as much as 50% in some regions in recent days — and up to 80% since the start of the war — as truck drivers (who cannot secure exemptions from mobilization) are in short supply and increasingly needed by the Russian military because drivers of logistical vehicles have experienced significant losses.
Russia's central bank raised its interest rate to 20% at the start of the war but has since cut it to 7.5%. But between Sept. 21 (when the mobilization started) and Oct. 6, some 754.1 billion rubles (approximately $11.8 billion) were withdrawn from ATMs across Russia. This outflow of ruble deposits, combined with rising inflation, could force the central bank to stop further rate cuts and potentially even raise rates to prevent a renewed growth in inflation, further hampering Russia's economy.
In an updated forecast published on Sept. 26, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) said it now expects Russia's economy to shrink by 5.5% in 2022, marking an improvement from the 9% contraction it forecast in June. But the OECD also now expects Russia's slowdown to last longer and now projects a 4.5% contraction in 2023 compared with the 4% contraction it previously forecasted.
In August, Russia ran a current account deficit for the first time since the invasion began due to falling oil and gas prices. Russia's finance ministry forecasts that the deficit will amount to 1.7 trillion rubles in 2022 and will further increase to 3 trillion rubles (at least 2% of GDP) in 2023.
Based on statistics from Russia's central bank, independent analysts calculated on Aug. 31 that, for the first time in the history of the Russian banking system, the total overdue debt on retail loans (excluding mortgages) exceeded 1 trillion rubles (roughly $15.6 billion). Between January-July 2022, the growth rate of delinquent debt doubled in Russia — with the overall amount growing by 8% — compared with data from July 2021 to Jan. 2022. Overdue mortgage debt by the beginning of Aug. 2022 amounted to 4.8 billion rubles. On Oct. 2, a national bankruptcy moratorium that had been in place since April 1 expired, and Russian creditors have again been able to initiate insolvency proceedings against their debtors. Households' debt as a share of net disposable income in Russia has also been rising steadily in Russia since the early 2010s.
Looking farther ahead, Russia's mobilization will also worsen its demographic outlook and intensify the country's ''brain drain.'' Compared with the COVID-19 pandemic, which mostly affected older Russians, the war in Ukraine will have a much more painful and prolonged impact on Russia's population (and, in turn, its economy), as those who are being called into military service in Ukraine are disproportionately younger males in their most economically productive years. Many of these young men will likely be subsequently killed in battle, or severely wounded to the point where they're unable to have families or hold certain jobs upon returning home. The growing loss of men who may have otherwise had children and paid into the country's pension system will not only further strain Russia's labor force, but contribute to the country's declining birth rates. This will be exacerbated by the fact that hundreds of thousands of Russians who have fled the country in response to the mobilization are also disproportionately younger, better educated and wealthier.
The recruitment of 300,000 males initially targeted by the government's ''partial mobilization'' would have been manageable for the Russian labor market on its own. But in the coming weeks, at least 300,000 more Russians are estimated to either emigrate or be drafted into military service, which — combined with the roughly 700,000 Russians who have already fled the country — would represent the loss of about 1.3 million people (or at least 2% of Russia's entire workforce). If adding in those killed and wounded in the war, the irreplaceable loss to the labor force will grow even higher this year.
Since 2020, Russia's population has undergone its largest peacetime decline in recorded history, a trend that has only accelerated in the months since the start of the war. On July 29, Russia's statistics agency reported a decline of 430,000 people between January and May of this year — an average of 86,000 people a month, the fastest monthly rate ever recorded. This rate has almost doubled since 2021 and nearly tripled since 2020, according to The Moscow Times.
Russia's relations with neighboring states, meanwhile, will also become strained as those countries harbor Kremlin opponents and run out of resources to handle large immigrant populations. The mobilization is prompting a growing number of Russians to flee their home country. But for many, legally exiting Russia remains difficult, as the list of countries where Russians can enter without visas is short — and the list of countries where Russians legally stay without receiving a residence permit or other status is even shorter. Obtaining visas to Western countries can be challenging as well. Meanwhile, rents in places more accessible to Russians, such as in Kazakhstan and Georgia, are skyrocketing as spare housing runs out, which is already generating grievances from some locals. Even in places where fleeing Russians are being warmly received, locals are likely to be hesitant to support their governments — which are already stretched economically — expending large economic resources to cope with the influx of Russians, especially as winter begins. Finally, tensions may only grow as Moscow is likely to cast neighboring countries harboring large numbers of anti-Putin Russians and draft dodgers as anti-Russian, harming bilateral relations.
Kazakhstan and Georgia, in particular, have seen protests against Russian citizens entering their countries after President Putin announced the mobilization. Growing grassroots anti-Russian sentiment and public demonstrations against Russians could eventually lead to harassment of Russians, which Russian state propaganda will likely use to cast the countries as anti-Russian — further damaging bilateral relations and possibly prompting Russia to retaliate against those neighboring states.
The mobilization has led to speculation that the Kremlin is considering various further restrictions on movement within or out of the country. Such measures would be unpopular and represent a shift in Moscow's strategy, thereby making them relatively unlikely. However, if border closures were enacted, it would mark the first time Moscow has restricted emigration since the Soviet Union's strict exit visa system was scrapped.
In combination, these trends will lead to competing incentives between Russian state officials and Russian business leaders by pitting successful mobilization and economic stability against one another — resulting in a long-term reduction in the workforce and significant internal migration as people seek to avoid getting drafted. On Sept. 23, Russia's defense ministry announced that draft exemptions would be granted to citizens working in some financial organizations, as well as those working in the IT, communications and media industries. Meanwhile, Russia's energy ministry sent a letter to leaders of the country's most powerful energy, mining and ore processing companies just hours after President Putin announced the mobilization, requesting compliance with the president's order and that 100% of their employees voluntarily stop by military recruitment offices by Oct. 5. The energy ministry's order indicates how some Russian ministries are acting preemptively to demonstrate loyalty to the government by prioritizing the mobilization, while bureaucrats in other ministries are more focused on securing draft exemptions for workers in the industries they oversee and thereby preserving business continuity. Private companies face a similar choice, and many will likely protect their employees to preserve their productivity amid a labor shortage by arguing that they fall under the exempt criteria, for example by designating them as essential IT specialists. Furthermore, individual Russians will likely go to great lengths to transition into the named sectors and jobs where such exemptions are believed to exist, including by moving cities to secure such work. Meanwhile, jobs where such exemptions are rarer — for example, construction, transportation and manufacturing — will have to offer high pay and other benefits to attract or maintain employees, harming companies' profitability. Such a large shakeup to internal labor market dynamics will be further exacerbated by the overall reduction in the labor force, reducing growth prospects for decades to come. This is a major problem given that Russia's labor force has progressively declined each year since 2007, according to the World Bank. Businesses and ministries are thus caught between a rock and a hard place, wanting to show complete loyalty and support without risking their own operations.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMPTqoI3BQA
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMPTqoI3BQA
What are the Uke numbers looking like?
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMPTqoI3BQA
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November 1, 2022
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The Valdai Club
By: George Friedman
Last week, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke at the Valdai Club, a Moscow-based think tank where serious matters are discussed, and where Russian policy is frequently shaped. I was invited to speak there in December 2014, after the Maidan uprising in Ukraine. The Russians believed it was engineered by American intelligence. I argued that that’s a hard thing to pull off without widespread dissatisfaction, and that while the CIA can do many things, fueling a revolution, including feeding, watering and supplying tens of thousands of people in a small space without end, isn’t one of them. The U.S. could hand out cookies, as the assistant secretary of state for European affairs did for her own strange reason, but the Maidan uprising was mostly an organically grown rebuke of a staunchly pro-Russia president and the massive corruption that surrounded him. I said that if the uprising was the result of a coup, then it had to be the most blatant coup in history. What I meant, in a wryly sarcastic way, was that the United States did absolutely nothing to hide its enthusiastic support. Russian media took it to mean that it was, in fact, the most blatant coup in history. There’s a reason I’m not a diplomat.
The Russians believed it was a Western coup, while the Americans saw it as an expression of political independence. I think both sides were sincere. From the U.S. point of view, a democratic uprising was an appropriate outcome. From the Russian point of view, it was a first step toward destabilizing Russia. The Americans dismissed Russian concerns, of course, but the Russians could not dismiss the idea that this was all but an act of aggression. It was at this point in 2014 that the current war was set in motion.
Moscow concluded that Ukraine, under American “control,” was a threat. Eight years later, Russia launched a war intended to impose its will on Ukraine, to make clear to the region that Russia was again a great power and to demonstrate American weakness. It is increasingly unlikely that any of this will be achieved.
Nothing is impossible, but it’s far-fetched enough for Putin to redefine the terms of war, which is precisely what he tried to do during his speech at the Valdai Club. Importantly, he did not identify the United States as the key enemy; the enemy, to him, is the West writ large, which had succumbed to a corruption – new secular mores, gender fluidity and other cultural bugaboos – that it is now trying to impose on Russia. That corruption is undermining the West, and Russia is merely standing up to it, according to Putin. (There was also an explicitly religious angle to the speech.) The Russian efforts in Ukraine are therefore not the whole of the war but merely one dimension of a much broader geopolitical and cultural conflict. Being defeated in Ukraine, then, is not the same as being defeated in this larger struggle. Which makes sense if you define the war in Ukraine as a crusade against the arrogance of the West rather than a place you mean to control.
Putin has since released a statement through his spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, offering to negotiate. This follows the logic of his Valdai speech.
Peskov is Putin’s spokesman, and he holds that position because he is careful about what he says. The offer is real, but it still seems as though Putin is setting up a tough negotiation, as evidenced by efforts to block shipments of Ukrainian grain. Having completely reframed the war in Ukraine as a campaign against Western imperialism, he isn’t going to be easy to negotiate with, but that doesn’t mean he won’t negotiate at all.
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Russian urgency in Turkey … At a press conference Monday, Russian President Vladimir Putin said the natural gas hub under consideration in Turkey could be implemented fairly quickly but noted that it's difficult to work with European partners. With Russia under so many sanctions, it’s easy to understand Putin’s sense of urgency: The hub would send Russian natural gas from the Nord Stream pipelines to the Black Sea region, including Turkey, thus continuing to service much of Europe.
… and in Algeria. Algeria is expected to sign an arms deal with Russia worth $12 billion as it negotiates a framework agreement on military supplies for the next decade. Algeria is particularly interested in acquiring submarines, Su-57, Su-34 and Su-30 aircraft, as well as new air defense systems. The agreement is slated to be formalized when President Abdelmadjid Tebboune visits Moscow in December. Russia has had interests in Africa for years, but sanctions have created a more pressing need for other avenues of trade. Sending weapons to Algeria, a longtime Russian customer, certainly fits the bill.
Belarus’ role. Belarus and Russia plan to create joint combat training centers for their respective militaries. Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko has already authorized the Ministry of Defense to negotiate the agreement, but because it generally does what Russia tells it to do, it is unlikely to change anything substantial. In fact, last month Lukashenko reportedly placed Russian troops in Belarusian territory at Russia’s behest. Belarus may not be directly involved in Russia's war in Ukraine, but neither is it a bystander, so it has plenty of reason to worry about its own border security and internal stability.
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Is war in Ukraine costing Russia control of its own backyard?
By Fred Weir Special correspondent
September 28, 2022
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MOSCOW
For three decades, Russia has been struggling to manage the ongoing collapse of the USSR. Its primary goals have been to bind former Soviet republics to Moscow-led international organizations, to keep outside powers away from its backyard, and to use its considerable clout to at least freeze the many territorial and political disputes that still bedevil the region.
Now, thanks to the war in Ukraine, all of those objectives look compromised.
Tensions are spiking around the former USSR, where a massively distracted Russia seems increasingly unable to perform its usual role of regional stabilizer due to growing commitments to the war and the negative example it has set by using force to settle its own post-Soviet disputes.
WHY WE WROTE THIS
PEACE
Russia was able to impose a certain peace among the post-Soviet states for three decades through diplomacy and intimidation. But its invasion of Ukraine may have shattered that stability.
Over the past month, an armistice brokered by Russia between Armenia and Azerbaijan after a bitter war two years ago broke down as Azerbaijani forces, backed by Turkey, surged forward and attacked the recognized territory of Russian-allied Armenia. And an unresolved border dispute ignited in bloody fighting between the mountainous Central Asian republics of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, both Russian allies, leaving at least 100 people dead and a diplomatic quandary for Moscow in its wake.
Those two crises have simmered down with hastily imposed cease-fires, but those and many other potential flashpoints remain. Analysts warn that the entire post-Soviet region – never very stable – will continue to present problems for Moscow in the form of conflicts, political instability, and an increasing tendency to flirt with foreign powers to offset the influence of a Russia preoccupied with Ukraine.
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“Russian military action in Ukraine, which is not going according to its initial design, has consumed a lot of Russian resources and energy,” says Fyodor Lukyanov, editor of Russia in Global Affairs, a leading Moscow-based foreign policy journal. “Obviously different countries will use this situation to pursue their own agendas. ... A general reconfiguration of the post-Soviet space has been underway for some time. Many of these new countries need to demonstrate their sustainability as states. They are very nervous about their neighbors and their own internal stability. The Russian operation in Ukraine has given a big impetus to all such tensions and uncertainties.”
Indeed, Russian behavior in Ukraine, which is ostensibly aimed at protecting Russian-speaking populations, must worry other post-Soviet states with large ethnic Russian minorities in their midst, such as Kazakhstan, Moldova, and the Baltic States, says Andrey Kortunov, director of the Russian International Affairs Council, which is affiliated with the Foreign Ministry. “It’s not just that Russia is distracted,” he says. “Many must wonder, if it can happen in Ukraine, why not to other countries as well?”
Paul Pelosi attack highlights soaring threats of political violence
Simmering regional conflicts
The world breathed a sigh of relief three decades ago when the USSR broke up peacefully along its internal borders, which had been drawn by successive Soviet leaders largely for their own political convenience. The savage wars that had rocked the former Yugoslavia seemed to be largely avoided, and 15 new sovereign states took their place on the maps and in the United Nations. That was in large part due to the extraordinary restraint and nonviolent convictions of the last Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.
But post-imperial issues abounded, including territorial disputes and breakaway statelets in Georgia, Azerbaijan, Moldova, and even Russia itself. Large populations of ethnic Russians were left stranded beyond the borders of Russia, especially in Ukraine, the Baltic States, and Central Asia, and have been a constant source of tensions ever since.
“The problems that followed the USSR’s collapse were serious. The rules, boundaries, economic conditions that prevail in a united state turn dangerous when parts of it become separate entities. Rules and systems change,” says Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the official Institute of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Moscow. “These problems are not always resolved peacefully.”
Russia overturned any semblance of post-Soviet accord, experts say, by invading Ukraine and seeking to redraw the borders it inherited from the USSR. That sets an example to others, and also undermines Russian credibility as a mediator for other frozen conflicts in the region.
Two years ago, Russia declined to come to the assistance of its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) ally Armenia on the grounds that the attacking Azerbaijanis were only retaking their own sovereign territory that had been illegally occupied by Armenia in a post-Soviet war. Russia was able to impose a peacekeeping regime at that time, but it has all but unraveled in recent weeks as Azerbaijan moved to take more territory and even attacked Armenia proper.
As Russia struggled to reimpose the cease-fire, U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi flew to Yerevan to express her support for Armenia, and also fan the flames of Armenian outrage – that its supposed big protector, Russia, appeared to be missing in action as Armenia faced Azerbaijani aggression alone.
“Pelosi has a big Armenian American constituency, so she might have been acting in her own political interests, but she also seems to speak for the U.S.,” says Mr. Lukyanov. “It was an opportune moment to emphasize to Armenians that Russia is not a reliable patron for Armenia, and she said that explicitly in Yerevan.”
Stepan Poghosyan/Photolure/AP
Demonstrators with American and Armenian national flags gather at the Cafesjian Center for the Arts where U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi delivered her speech, in Yerevan, Armenia, Sept. 18, 2022. Ms. Pelosi called for a negotiated solution to the countries' conflict.
That situation remains exceedingly dangerous, not just because Azerbaijani ambitions have grown amid political crisis in Armenia, but also because it raises the specter of a much wider war. Turkey is Azerbaijan’s key sponsor, while Iran has mobilized forces and warned that it might intervene if Armenia’s borders should be threatened. In recent years, Iran has become an important trading partner and even something of a strategic partner for Armenia.
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“Azerbaijan is getting stronger; Armenia is growing weaker. That’s reality,” says Mr. Kortunov. “If Armenia should be in real jeopardy, Russia will have to intervene because its credibility is at stake. But it’s the worst possible moment for that, as far as Moscow is concerned. For now, diplomatic tools are being deployed.”
The danger of a wounded Russia
No matter how it turns out, Russia’s war in Ukraine is going to have a huge impact on many former Soviet countries. If Russia should lose the war, the consequences could be widespread and devastating, says Mr. Kortunov.
In 2008, Russia successfully intervened to block a Georgian military attempt to retake two pro-Russian breakaway regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, which belong to Georgia under international law.
“A lot of these suppressed conflicts will swiftly unfreeze,” he says. “Georgia has unfinished business [with those rebel regions], and a wounded Russia may not be able to exert itself next time. There is endemic unrest in other places, like Belarus, that could easily flare up again. Central Asia is a perennial problem. Russia and the CSTO were able to quickly restore stability in Kazakhstan earlier this year with a quick and limited intervention. Would it be able to repeat that in future?”
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After experiencing battlefield setbacks, Russia has doubled down on its Ukraine gamble and embarked on a “partial mobilization” that will likely bring more troops and fresh tactics to its prosecution of the war.
As of now, Mr. Kortunov adds, “Russia still intends to win in Ukraine. In that case, we will be looking at a very different set of consequences. But the changes will still be huge.”
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November 21, 2022
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Russia’s Long Game on Grain Exports
Moscow expects a more favorable environment in the coming months.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
The Black Sea grain corridor, which enabled Ukrainian food to sail from three ports, was extended for another 120 days last week, according to the presidents of Ukraine and Turkey. Russia has not said whether it will participate but did not object to the extension. Having earlier failed in a highly publicized effort to terminate the grain initiative, Moscow prefers to keep its distance from the deal so that Russian participation doesn't seem like a result of Ankara’s growing influence over Moscow. Russia’s focus now is to continue criticizing the deal while seeking opportunities to use it to advance Russian interests.
Importance of Russia’s Exports
Grain exports are an important source of power and influence for Russia. First, Russia is a prolific wheat producer, so sales abroad support the Russian economy and foreign policy goals. For years the Kremlin has been trying to boost its grain harvest and set up sustainable trade relations with wheat importers in countries in the Middle East, Africa and elsewhere. Moscow hopes these partners, craving Russian food and indifferent or hostile to Western sanctions, might support Russian strategy. Poor harvests this year in some regions due to drought or difficulty accessing energy and fertilizers may further these goals.
Top 10 World Wheat Exporters
(click to enlarge)
Second, grain provides about a third of Russia’s revenues from food exports, which is important for supporting the national budget and securing foreign currency, access to which has been limited by sanctions.
Finally, Russian farmers need to offload record-breaking production. The country’s wheat harvest reached 105 million tons this year (compared with 77.8 million tons last year), and the government expects a record total grain harvest of more than 150 million tons for the year. However, this blessing will become a curse if Russian farmers cannot get the goods to market. Shipping costs remain elevated, and Russian grain exporters have recorded difficulties chartering ships, insuring cargoes and receiving payments because of sanctions.
Gross Harvest of Agricultural Crops in Russia
(click to enlarge)
The Kremlin’s Game
The grain deal has been extended, but not without Russia receiving some concessions and signaling that its continued participation will always be in doubt. The Kremlin expects its leverage will only grow in the near future, citing several trends. First is Russia’s massive harvest and stocks of grain and wheat, which it can release at any time. Second is expectations of growing demand for Russian wheat as Ukraine’s exports decline next year because of the war. Third is instability in the energy and fertilizer markets, which may harm output in other countries and further boost demand for Russian wheat.
Finally, although demand is high right now, market sentiment is gloomier over the next several months. Major buyers like Egypt and Pakistan are experiencing financial trouble. Moreover, Russia’s temporary exit from the grain initiative sowed doubts about the arrangement’s future, leading major importers like Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia to stock up before the deal expired. The market situation may be very different when the grain deal’s extension is up for renewal again in four months.
Top Destinations for Russian Wheat
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In other words, with patience and luck, the Kremlin may be in a much stronger position for the next round of Black Sea grain negotiations. Russia still faces barriers to the export of grain and fertilizers, the Kremlin often notes, despite earlier agreements in Istanbul. After this latest round of talks, however, the West is discussing guarantees to restart Russian exports via the Togliatti-Odesa ammonia pipeline, which was halted when the war began (in September, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy expressed his opposition to restarting the pipeline), and the U.S. is rumored to be willing to ease sanctions on Russia’s state-owned Rosselkhozbank agricultural bank. France also said a corridor for the supply of Russian fertilizers to Africa via Europe had been established and could start deliveries within weeks. Moscow expects it can hold out for more such breakthroughs as market conditions develop early next year.
Strategic Patience
Russia can afford strategic patience for as long as it can satisfy its farmers. Eastern markets are too well-protected to be profitable. Farmers have almost stopped delivering grain to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and China, traditional importers, because transit tariffs on Kazakhstan’s railways are too high. According to Russian Railways, transit through Kazakhstan costs carriers as much as 3,300 rubles ($54) per ton, while a similar Russian route costs no more than 630 rubles. Russian Railways is in talks with Kazakhstan to reduce the transit tariff on agricultural products. Moscow is optimistic; stronger cooperation with Central Asia is in Russia’s interest, and some Central Asian states want access to cheaper Russian grain.
In the meantime, Moscow will distance itself from the grain deal and seek concessions, such as the easing of restrictions on fertilizer exports and payments. The near-term market outlook for Russia is positive. Over the longer term, however, eastern buyers cannot replace other markets choked off by Western- and self-imposed sanctions. With that in mind, Moscow announced an increase in the quota on grain exports to non-Eurasian Economic Union members from Feb. 15 to June 30, 2023. Until then, the Kremlin seems content to passively participate in the grain deal.
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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/essential-geopolitics-russian-threat-cable-internet-infrastructure?mc_cid=d6b220ad4b&mc_eid=de175618dc
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Putin’s New Strategy: Laying Claim to Traditional Values
Searching for allies against Ukraine, Russia now presents itself as the leader of a global culture war against moral depravity. It’s not working.
By Yaroslav Trofimov
Dec. 17, 2022 12:01 am ET
Viktor Bout, a Russian arms dealer popularly known as “the merchant of death,” warned about the mortal peril facing humanity in his first TV appearance after returning home from an American prison.
“What is happening in the West is a suicide of civilization,” said Mr. Bout, who was traded this month for detained American basketball star Brittney Griner. “Can you imagine, in American schools they teach first-graders that there are 72 genders! Not just gays and normal people, but 72!”
The message coming from Mr. Bout, who is now a hero in Moscow, and from the Kremlin itself is that only Russia can rescue the world from moral degeneration and decay. That idea, long a key element of the Kremlin’s propaganda, has now been legislated as the Russian state’s official ideology, with the targeting of gay people as one of its most sharply defined features.
A decree issued by President Vladimir Putin in November proclaimed Russia’s mission as the bastion of “traditional values” and a savior of mankind. These values, it said, must be defended as a national-security imperative by Russia’s security services. Among other measures, that means cracking down on “nontraditional sexual relations” and promoting patriotic, religious families with multiple children, under the guidance of the Orthodox Church.
This new role for Russia, Mr. Putin’s decree added, has been made necessary by “the global crisis of civilization and values that leads to humankind losing traditional spiritual and ethical waypoints and moral principles.”
The Kremlin is searching for an ideological justification as it tries to garner some international sympathy for its war against Ukraine. The invasion that Mr. Putin launched in February is going badly, with Kyiv regaining more than half of the territories that Russia seized in the first weeks of the campaign, even as Moscow keeps pounding civilian infrastructure and wrecking residential neighborhoods.
Vladimir Putin’s challenge is to find a new ideology for Russia’s imperial aims.
Ukraine retook the city of Kherson, the only Ukrainian regional capital captured by Russia this year, just a day after Mr. Putin issued his traditional-values decree. On the world stage, Moscow faces international isolation, with only Belarus and Iran providing it with material help, while the U.S. and NATO allies spend tens of billions of dollars on arms and economic assistance to Kyiv.
By inserting Russia into the ideological cleavages of the U.S. and other Western societies, Mr. Putin seeks to weaken this Western resolve and undermine Western unity, said Fiona Hill, a Russia expert at the Brookings Institution who served as White House senior director for European and Russian affairs in 2017-2019. “What he wants to do is to stoke culture wars as much as possible,” she said.
The Soviet Union, whose demise Mr. Putin has repeatedly lamented as the greatest catastrophe of the 20th century, invoked the Marxist-Leninist language of class struggle and social equality to justify its imperial designs. Even in the 1970s and 1980s, when Kremlin elites no longer believed communist ideology, those ideas were still taken at face value by millions around the world, in the West and even more so in the West’s former colonies. Mr. Putin’s challenge is to find a new ideology for Russia’s imperial aims.
“Putin and his entourage have Soviet brains, and so they try to rule Russia as if it were the Soviet Union,” said Igor Kochetkov, a Russian historian and human-rights activist who formerly headed the Russian LGBT Network group. “If before the dividing line was between socialism and capitalism, now it’s between the traditional values and what they call ‘destructive’ values.” The difference between the eras isn’t as wide as it may appear. While the Western left has been socially progressive since at least the 1960s, the Soviet Union of Mr. Putin’s youth was a deeply conservative place that locked up gay men in prison camps or psychiatric hospitals.
At times, Mr. Putin has been remarkably frank about his imperial ambitions. Earlier this year, for example, he compared himself to the 18th-century czar Peter the Great, saying that his mission, too, is to accumulate territory.
For more than a decade before the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin sought to build bridges to far-right movements in Europe and to parts of the Republican Party in the U.S.
Yet, when the Russian president announced the annexation of four Ukrainian regions in a September speech, he framed that land grab as a move forced on Russia by the need to defend its society against dangers posed by Western immorality.
“Do we want that here, in our country, in Russia, there would be parent number one and parent number two and maybe parent number three instead of mama and papa? Do we want that our children be forced since elementary school to embrace perversions that will lead to degradation and dying out? That they be taught that there are genders other than man and woman, and be proposed to change their gender?” he thundered.
Only the fight against such Western depravity, Mr. Putin added, could allow Russia to rekindle relations with the “genuine, traditional West” as well as the rest of the world that, he said, already shares these traditional values with Russia.
That message, while much more vocal today, isn’t entirely new. For more than a decade before the war in Ukraine, the Kremlin sought to build bridges to far-right movements in Europe and to parts of the Republican Party in the U.S., while maintaining the sympathies of the global far left, which still sees Mr. Putin’s regime as the successor of the Soviet struggle against American world domination.
“Putin has long been trying to become the leader of the conservative world, aware that the majority of the world’s population doesn’t approve of the LGBT agenda and actually lives in traditional societies,” said Nikolay Mitrokhin, a specialist on Russian nationalism at the University of Bremen in Germany. “He tried to replace the old communist sympathies with these conservative sympathies, and he was quite successful with this, at least until the war with Ukraine began.”
While the Kremlin has been openly courting European and American neo-Nazis, it has also painted the Ukrainian government, which is headed by a freely elected Jewish president, as a Nazi cabal—a view parroted by many on the European and American far left. “The Russians have been very canny. It doesn’t matter that they are putting out completely contradictory messages to different people,” said Ian Garner, a historian specializing in Russian propaganda at Queen’s University in Canada. “Russia taps into both angles because they’re shameless and because nothing about their ideology really makes any sense or stands up to any philosophical scrutiny.”
Russia’s record of brutality and weakness during the war in Ukraine has considerably diminished Mr. Putin’s appeal to many parts of the conservative and populist right.
Mr. Putin’s new stress on social conservatism has already paid dividends in the U.S., where a small but outspoken minority of the Republican Party bases its opposition to aiding Ukraine, in part, on cultural objections. One of these critics, Rep. Paul Gosar (R-Az.), has explained his votes by saying that Kyiv “promotes far-left ideology,” even though Ukraine is a relatively conservative country where same-sex marriage doesn’t exist and church attendance remains one of the highest in Europe.
Russia’s record of brutality and weakness during the war in Ukraine, however, has considerably diminished Mr. Putin’s appeal to many parts of the conservative and populist right. Following the 2016 election of Donald Trump, Republicans were consistently more likely than Democrats to describe Mr. Putin as a friend or ally, with 37 percent holding that view in December that year, according to polling by YouGov. But that gap disappeared amid widespread outrage following Russia’s invasion last February. The same shift occurred in Europe, where the invasion has had a more direct impact than in the U.S., triggering the influx of millions of refugees and an energy crisis.
“If you looked at statements from far-right leaders across Europe, they always said that we need a strong leader like Putin who defends our values, our civilization against the decadence of the West. It did work before the war,” said Benjamin Haddad, a French parliament member from President Emmanuel Macron’s centrist party. “But now, it’s more complicated to publicly make a case for Russia.”
Italy provides the most significant example of the break between European populists and the Kremlin. Newly elected Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, whose Brothers of Italy party traces its origins to the neo-fascist movement, successfully campaigned on an appeal to traditional values in September’s elections. However, instead of aligning with Russia, her government—which includes politicians like Matteo Salvini, the deputy prime minister who once walked on Moscow’s Red Square in a T-shirt emblazoned with Mr. Putin’s portrait—has moved to increase support for Ukraine.
“We have to distinguish Putin from the Russian people. The war on Ukraine shows that the traditional values belong to the Russian people, but not to Putin,” said Ylenja Lucaselli, a parliament member from Ms. Meloni’s party. “Those who try to limit the freedom of others and other peoples, especially through an invasion, certainly don’t have any connection to traditional values, which include the respect for others and the respect for the liberty of others.”
The Italian experience highlights Mr. Putin’s challenge in positioning Russia as the leader of the global traditional-values camp: Many political forces espousing similar views are also deeply nationalist, and they put their own countries’ interests first.
For Ms. Meloni, maintaining Italy’s alliance with the U.S. and a constructive relationship with European Union partners is much more important than signaling any ideological affinity with the Kremlin, said Daniele Albertazzi, professor of politics at the University of Surrey in England. “I have always been very skeptical of taking these culture wars too seriously. They are the icing on the cake,” he said.
In Poland, the socially conservative government has also championed what it calls “traditional values” and tightened abortion restrictions. Yet it has emerged as one of Mr. Putin’s most determined foes, breaking its previous alliance with Hungary, whose populist leader Viktor Orban has opposed sanctions on Russia and refused to provide weapons to Ukraine.
Outside the West, Mr. Putin’s self-anointed role as the leader of the traditional-values camp isn’t an easy sell either, particularly for nations that pride themselves on their own, much older cultures, like India or China.
“We have our own great civilization, we have our own great value system, which is universal,” said Vijay Chauthaiwale, head of foreign affairs at India’s ruling party, the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party. “Why should we look at everything in the context of Russia? They are doing something on their own. Why should we say something about it?”
Within Russia itself, the government’s ideology has shifted in a more restrictive direction with every setback in the war. The Russian parliament last month passed legislation extending a ban on promoting homosexual behavior to minors, instituted in 2013, to apply to all age groups. This move means that any work of literature or art with LGBT characters can be considered illegal. Russian bookstores have been forced to remove from shelves dozens of books, including one of the bestsellers of contemporary Russian literature, “Summer in a Pioneer Tie,” a novel about love between two young men in a Soviet summer camp.
“We must do everything to defend our children and those who want to live a normal life. Everything else is sin, sodomy and darkness,” said the Russian parliament’s speaker, Vyacheslav Volodin, in explaining the new law.
In a country with a population in historic decline due to low birthrates and emigration, particularly by hundreds of thousands of men afraid of being mobilized to fight in Ukraine, same-sex couples serve as a convenient scapegoat for Russia’s demographic crisis, said Mr. Kochetkov.
“Their simple explanation for why the Russians don’t proliferate is that there is a Western-imposed idea of nontraditional relations, and that if we don’t stop it, this will be the end for us,” he said. “It will be the end because who’s going to fight wars for us? After all, they keep saying, the West hates us and dreams day and night about how to conquer our tundras with all their natural resources.”
In this campaign, Russian officials have adopted decidedly eschatological tones. Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of the Chechen Republic, has long been accused by human-rights groups of waging a campaign to kidnap and assassinate gay men in his fiefdom. Now Mr. Kadyrov, a three-star general in Russia’s security services, has called for a “jihad” against Ukraine and the “Satanist democracy” of the West, which, he claimed, seizes children from traditional families and gives them away to be perverted by same-sex couples.
Former president Dmitry Medvedev, who heads Russia’s ruling party and serves as deputy head of Mr. Putin’s national-security council, is using a similar language of holy war. “Our sacred goal is to stop the supreme commander of Hell, no matter what name he is using—Satan, Lucifer or Iblis,” Mr. Medvedev wrote in a recent treatise explaining Russia’s war aims in Ukraine. Iblis is a Muslim name for the devil.
“All of this discourse is delirious for a normal person,” said Andrei Kolesnikov, a Moscow-based senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment. “They lack arguments for imposing their ideology, for justifying war, which is part of that ideology, and so now they have been forced to resort to mysticism. That’s really the final stage.”
Write to Yaroslav Trofimov at yaroslav.trofimov@wsj.com
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"Putin’s New Strategy: Laying Claim to Traditional Values
Searching for allies against Ukraine, Russia now presents itself as the leader of a global culture war against moral depravity. It’s not working."
I think this quote sums it up:
“Those who try to limit the freedom of others and other peoples, especially through an invasion, certainly don’t have any connection to traditional values, which include the respect for others and the respect for the liberty of others.”
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Putin represents the opposite of everything I understand about conservatism. He is against life, against liberty and against the pursuit of happiness. He is not just former KGB. He is current KGB. He is the evil head of a massive organized crime operation. The only I have in understanding him is to the aim of defeating him, free the Russian people and free the world of the threat he poses.
His world view matches Leftists more than than the freedom seeking right. He believes you can only enrich and empower yourself by taking from others. Tax the rich here, take from the neighbor Ukraine there.
Russian Fascism and the idea of a big central government controlling everything is the opposite of what conservatism or American creed stands for here.
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Russia’s navy … President Vladimir Putin dispatched the Adm. Gorshkov, a new class of Russian frigate armed with Zircon hypersonic missiles, on an extended voyage through the Atlantic and Indian oceans. The voyage fits with the new military doctrine Moscow adopted last year, according to which it will build up its naval fleet and enhance its presence in several regions.
… and naval exercises. Relatedly, South Africa, Russia and China announced that they will hold joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, off South African province of KwaZulu-Natal, in February. The drills are meant to develop artillery firing and air defense operations.
No rush on a gas union. Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke with Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev to discuss bilateral cooperation in a variety of areas. Tellingly, the conversation follows a meeting Putin had with Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev over energy issues. The Kremlin still intends to create a gas union among the three countries, even if it’s in no hurry to finalize political agreements that will inevitably be pressured by Western sanctions.
Israel and Russia. Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen met with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov to discuss bilateral relations and regional issues. Officially, Israel remains neutral on the war in Ukraine, declining to impose sanctions on Russia. Cohen earlier met with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who asked Cohen to pass undisclosed messages to Lavrov.
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/vladimir-putin-finally-admits-russia-faces-a-uncertain-future-he-doubts-russian-people-will-survive/ar-AA185EFQ?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=ac8c64c28101401d98245d4e6824d32b&ei=58
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https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/russia-might-have-been?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=fatoday&utm_campaign=The%20Russia%20That%20Might%20Have%20Been&utm_content=20230313&utm_term=FA%20Today%20-%20112017
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Russia: Putin Approves New Foreign Policy Concept
Mar 31, 2023 | 19:18 GMT
What Happened: Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new concept for Russia's foreign policy that claims an "era of revolutionary changes" is under way in international relations, Bloomberg reported on March 31. The concept states that the flagship project of Russia in the 21st century is the "transformation of Eurasia into a single all-continental space," and it defines the formation of a multipolar world order that replaces the current allegedly U.S.-centric world order as a "foundational task for all areas of foreign policy."
Why It Matters: The concept names the strategic course of the United States as the main threat to international stability and the main factor complicating the normalization of Russia's relations with other states, such as European states. The concept thus reflects Moscow's goals in the years ahead and reflects its primary methods for achieving them: changing U.S. foreign policy and splitting Europe from the United States by fueling war fatigue on the Continent. The document claims that Russia does not consider itself an enemy of the West and does not isolate itself from it, but this statement does not reflect Moscow's actual views and is instead intended to further its goals. Russia is defined as "a distinct country-civilization" with a rightful sphere of influence over nearby states, an approach Moscow is pushing other countries to embrace in their foreign policies.
Background: Putin first announced the new concept in November 2021, but after Russia's Security Council submitted the prepared document for discussion in January 2022, Putin sent it back for revision. Russia adopted the previous version of the concept in November 2016.
Read More:
What to Make of Xi's Russia Trip and China's Growing Involvement in Ukraine (March 22, 2023)
What's Ahead for Belarus-Russia Integration? (March 13, 2023)
For Ukraine, a Deal to Supply Western Tanks Could Unlock More Advanced Weapons (Jan. 13, 2023)
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The author here appears to be Uke and writes as such, but what catches my attention is this:
"One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers."
Given the deranged nature of the Woken Dead Prog capture of so many organs of our government and our society, this is not irrational.
===========================================
Russia’s New Foreign Policy Looks Old and Soviet
A strategy document confirms Putin’s hostility to the West and desire for something like ‘détente.’
By Maksym Skrypchenko
April 13, 2023 12:59 pm ET
Vladimir Putin signed a foreign-policy strategy document last month that signals Russia’s troubling return to Soviet-era rhetoric and objectives. The document, whose creation was occasioned by Mr. Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, offers insight into the Russian president’s mind-set and strategic goals. In particular, it reveals a persistent fixation on anti-Western sentiment and the establishment of a new geopolitical order.
One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers.
The document also plays down Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, referring to the fighting indirectly and blaming the U.S. and Europe for initiating a “new type of hybrid war.” This rhetoric contrasts with the previous strategy document, which emphasized cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine. Additionally, the document expands on Russia’s “right to self-defense,” raising concerns about further military aggression.
Russia’s newfound restraint in its language regarding China and India—despite its previously announced “no limits” partnership with Beijing and warming relations with New Delhi—highlights a cautious approach to these emerging powers. The increased attention to Latin America, the Islamic world and Africa is also new, indicating that Moscow now places greater emphasis on relations with non-Western countries. Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela get special mention, as do Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The United Arab Emirates is notable for its absence.
The document’s vision of a new security order in which European states abandon their “confrontational policies and hegemonic ambitions” reflects a long-held Soviet dream of a Europe free from American influence. It reiterates Russia’s willingness for dialogue and envisions a future in which Washington seeks more-constructive relations, reminiscent of the Soviet-era policy of “peaceful coexistence” and “détente.”
The strategy’s response to Western sanctions demonstrates Russia’s intention to circumvent economic constraints through the creation of alternative monetary and payment systems. This not only underlines Russia’s determination to resist Western pressure; it also indicates a desire to break free from the U.S.-led global economic system.
The document’s language and focus strongly indicate that it was crafted by senior Russian diplomats seeking to mirror Mr. Putin’s positions. Georgia and Moldova aren’t mentioned. Only Belarus is acknowledged among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These omissions reflect the Kremlin’s recalibration of its foreign-policy priorities and its intent to forge new alliances while playing down relations with countries that it perceives as hostile or unsupportive.
That Mr. Putin has given his seal of approval to the document raises concerns about the future trajectory of international politics and the potential for increased tensions. Moscow is signaling a deeply concerning shift in Russia’s foreign policy, revealing a resurgence of Soviet ideologies and a confrontational stance toward the West.
Mr. Skrypchenko is president of the Kyiv-based Transatlantic Dialogue Center.
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The author here appears to be Uke and writes as such, but what catches my attention is this:
"One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers."
Given the deranged nature of the Woken Dead Prog capture of so many organs of our government and our society, this is not irrational.
No it is not. When I was a kid, the Soviets could literally ok at America with envy. Now everyone looks at us in horror and disgust.
===========================================
Russia’s New Foreign Policy Looks Old and Soviet
A strategy document confirms Putin’s hostility to the West and desire for something like ‘détente.’
By Maksym Skrypchenko
April 13, 2023 12:59 pm ET
Vladimir Putin signed a foreign-policy strategy document last month that signals Russia’s troubling return to Soviet-era rhetoric and objectives. The document, whose creation was occasioned by Mr. Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, offers insight into the Russian president’s mind-set and strategic goals. In particular, it reveals a persistent fixation on anti-Western sentiment and the establishment of a new geopolitical order.
One of the most striking aspects of the new document is Russia’s self-positioning as an “original state-civilization,” distinct from the West and forming a unique “Russian world.” Propaganda terms such as “Russophobia,” “neo-Nazism,” and “collective West” appear throughout, casting the West as fundamentally hostile. The term “Anglo-Saxon states”—which had previously been used only by informal patriotic groups—has now officially entered the Russian foreign-policy lexicon and signifies a growing hostility to the U.S. and U.K. This shift suggests that Moscow is more than willing to amplify nationalist sentiments and distance itself further from Western powers.
The document also plays down Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, referring to the fighting indirectly and blaming the U.S. and Europe for initiating a “new type of hybrid war.” This rhetoric contrasts with the previous strategy document, which emphasized cultural and spiritual ties with Ukraine. Additionally, the document expands on Russia’s “right to self-defense,” raising concerns about further military aggression.
Russia’s newfound restraint in its language regarding China and India—despite its previously announced “no limits” partnership with Beijing and warming relations with New Delhi—highlights a cautious approach to these emerging powers. The increased attention to Latin America, the Islamic world and Africa is also new, indicating that Moscow now places greater emphasis on relations with non-Western countries. Brazil, Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela get special mention, as do Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The United Arab Emirates is notable for its absence.
The document’s vision of a new security order in which European states abandon their “confrontational policies and hegemonic ambitions” reflects a long-held Soviet dream of a Europe free from American influence. It reiterates Russia’s willingness for dialogue and envisions a future in which Washington seeks more-constructive relations, reminiscent of the Soviet-era policy of “peaceful coexistence” and “détente.”
The strategy’s response to Western sanctions demonstrates Russia’s intention to circumvent economic constraints through the creation of alternative monetary and payment systems. This not only underlines Russia’s determination to resist Western pressure; it also indicates a desire to break free from the U.S.-led global economic system.
The document’s language and focus strongly indicate that it was crafted by senior Russian diplomats seeking to mirror Mr. Putin’s positions. Georgia and Moldova aren’t mentioned. Only Belarus is acknowledged among members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. These omissions reflect the Kremlin’s recalibration of its foreign-policy priorities and its intent to forge new alliances while playing down relations with countries that it perceives as hostile or unsupportive.
That Mr. Putin has given his seal of approval to the document raises concerns about the future trajectory of international politics and the potential for increased tensions. Moscow is signaling a deeply concerning shift in Russia’s foreign policy, revealing a resurgence of Soviet ideologies and a confrontational stance toward the West.
Mr. Skrypchenko is president of the Kyiv-based Transatlantic Dialogue Center.
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/russian-state-tv-issues-stark-warning-over-threat-of-defeat/ar-AA1biFQt?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=5c51a3a7c7ad4e8ba2c0d8a568785aa6&ei=22
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The View From the Kremlin Isn’t All Bad
Putin has problems in Ukraine but is gaining in the Middle East, Africa and China.
Walter Russell Mead
WSJ
Aug. 28, 2023 6:04 pm ET
Not everything is going Vladimir Putin’s way. Ukraine’s counteroffensive has made gains recently, Russia’s foreign-exchange reserves are dwindling, and the Prigozhin fiasco revealed cracks in the Kremlin’s power structure. Even so, the view from the Kremlin is nowhere as gloomy as Mr. Putin’s opponents wish.
Mr. Putin’s original plans in Ukraine may have failed and left him in a difficult war of attrition, but the Ukrainians have problems of their own. U.S. and Ukrainian military officials are squabbling about who is to blame for the counteroffensive’s slow progress. With American officials warning that they are unlikely to provide Ukraine with equal or greater supplies for a second offensive next year, Mr. Putin may think he has passed “peak Ukraine” in terms of the country’s ability to resist.
Farther afield, Mr. Putin also has much to be happy about. The coup in Niger underlines the massive success that the Wagner Group has had in disrupting the Western position across Africa. This is partially about Russia gaining control over such resources as gold and uranium, and partially about creating chaotic threats to Western interests. Western policy makers are left to wrestle with migrant flows as refugees stream north, and the threat of terrorism rises as jihadist groups gain ground across the Sahel. The collapse of French and European power across Africa does more than highlight the geopolitical impotence of the European Union. It diverts American attention and resources from both Asia and Ukraine.
Mr. Putin has also put points on the board in the Middle East. Thanks to Russian support, Bashar al-Assad scoffs at American threats in Syria. Longtime American allies continue to intensify their cooperation with Russia. The United Arab Emirates defied American pressure to deepen commercial ties with Moscow. Iran is becoming thoroughly integrated into Russia’s armaments pipeline.
And China’s relationship with Russia, despite Western hopes that Xi Jinping would wash his hands of an ally turned rogue, remains strong. China is buying all the Russian oil and gas it can get its hands on, and it’s supplying significant quantities of dual-use equipment that helps Mr. Putin keep both his economy and military campaign sputtering and grinding along. China is feeding Mr. Putin’s war machine, and will likely continue to do so, regardless of what President Biden says or does.
Mr. Putin can also take heart from political developments in America. Donald Trump’s path to the Republican nomination appears open, and the chances of his returning to the White House are if anything growing. Mr. Biden has not yet provided a coherent and compelling description of his Ukraine policy that can rally the nation. Whispers from the U.S. military that flawed Ukrainian command choices are responsible for the counteroffensive’s poor results won’t strengthen public support.
READ MORE GLOBAL VIEW
Power Matters More Than DiplomacyAugust 21, 2023
Biden’s New Approach to the Middle EastAugust 14, 2023
Geopolitical Climate DenialismAugust 7, 2023
Mr. Putin’s strongest asset, as ever, remains the incoherence of the contemporary West. His Western opponents are Churchills on the podium and Chamberlains in real life. They proclaim their undying commitment to a rules-based international order that forbids territorial conquest, while quietly pressing Ukraine to accept the loss of Crimea and the Donbas. They solemnly commemorate Pride Month in Kabul while preparing the wholesale abandonment of Afghans to the Taliban. They oscillate between denouncing Saudi Arabia as a pariah state and begging for its help. They moralistically instruct the Global South to sacrifice for the common good on climate change even as they embrace protectionist policies that threaten the South’s economic future.
From Mr. Putin’s point of view, this mix of aggressive rhetoric and cautious policy making is the best of all possible American approaches. The administration’s chest thumping about American values often sounds like bullying to other countries, while the unmissable contrast between bold words and timid deeds invites contempt.
Meanwhile the incoherence of American policy is undermining the administration’s position at home. If Mr. Biden wants Ukraine to win the war against Russia, why isn’t he sending more and better weapons? If his goal is a compromise that leaves Mr. Putin with most of the territory he’s seized, why is the U.S. spending so much money for such a meager result?
Mr. Putin’s attack on Ukraine was a historic mistake, plunging Russia into a difficult and still unpredictable war. Total victory appears unlikely, and the war’s cost to Russia will be high. Moscow’s struggles in Ukraine are reducing its influence in much of the former Soviet space. In the Caucasus, Turkey and Azerbaijan are squeezing Russia’s Armenian clients—even as oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan wriggles further out of Russia’s grasp. In Central Asia, Chinese economic and political presence grows as Russia fades.
None of these developments, however, will help the West, promote democracy or disguise the reality that the Biden administration, having failed to deter Mr. Putin from launching the war, hasn’t found a path to making him lose it, or to drive him toward negotiation on reasonable terms.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CN-W_IKapmQ
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September 26, 2023
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Russia Seals Its Southern Border
By: George Friedman
Russia's focus currently is on its western front, in Ukraine and neighboring countries. There is, however, another front that concerns Russia: its southern border, which runs along and through the Caucasus Mountains. South of the mountains lie Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia.
The mountains protect a strategic area of Russia. The area northwest of the mountains leads to the Sea of Azov and the Ukrainian border near Donbas, which has been heavily contested over the years. To the northeast is the Volga River and the historical city of Stalingrad, now called Volgograd. The land north of the mountains is flat, and from Astrakhan to Crimea is about 550 miles (885 kilometers). An attack on Russia from the south would have a decided effect on Russia’s ability to execute the war in Ukraine and, in the long run, could sever critical rivers such as the Volga and the Don. Therefore, protecting the Caucasus from penetration by any hostile force is vital.
(click to enlarge)
For Russia, it is imperative that it penetrate the North Caucasus. It is almost as important as Ukraine. From the mid-1990s to the 2000s, Russia and Chechnya fought an intense war, which was an element in the rise of Vladimir Putin. Russia’s victory helped shape Putin’s thinking about borderlands. Russia also fought a war with Georgia, which had received U.S. military support.
Recently, Azerbaijan sent forces to occupy an area between itself and Armenia. Armenia is relatively poor, while Azerbaijan is rich in oil. The two countries have been hostile toward one another since independence, with tensions focused on Nagorno-Karabakh, a small region with an ethnic-Armenian population but officially part of Azerbaijan. The strategic interests are unclear, but the political issue is intense.
Historically, Russia has supported Armenia, even when trying to mediate. This has shifted. The Americans entered the region – first by supporting Georgia, and then by maintaining a careful (on both sides) relationship with Azerbaijan, but always keeping distance from Armenia. However, a new Armenian government was elected a few years ago that was cautious about the Russians. In the course of the war in Ukraine, the U.S. decided to enter into much closer relations with Armenia, which welcomed the Americans as a counterweight against Azerbaijan. But with Russia no longer a threat, and the United States lacking sufficient military force in the region, Azerbaijan occupied Nagorno-Karabakh.
This does not change the reality on the ground, but it does indicate that a level of tension and even conflict is emerging. The Russians have a substantial peacekeeping force in the region that has been quiet but could conceivably act against Armenia or, with reinforcements, revive the Georgian war. Armenia has little choice other than to negotiate a deal with the Russians or turn to the Americans. Neither choice would comfort it.
The United States wants to continue holding some capability in the area to threaten to penetrate the North Caucacus, which would be a dangerous and unlikely maneuver. The Russians are not dismissing the Americans’ willingness to do the dangerous and unlikely. A war is raging in Ukraine, and the U.S. could use another card in negotiations with the Russians. On paper it is an excellent idea, but quite insane in reality. So, the question now is whether Georgia is prepared to pull closer to the United States in return for military aid, and whether Azerbaijan is willing for the same reason. But since Azerbaijan and Russia seem suddenly linked, that’s not going to happen. Russia seems to have secured the Caucasus and turned the unlikely into the unthinkable. The U.S. has Armenia, which does not give it much credibility. Therefore, Russia has sealed, for now, its southern border
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October 16, 2023
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Russia’s Involvement in the Israel-Hamas War
Despite unfounded allegations to the contrary, Moscow is much more interested in mediation than aggression.
By: Ekaterina Zolotova
After Israel said it was at war with Hamas, several countries expressed concern over the conflict’s escalation and called on both sides to halt hostilities. One of them was Russia – despite the fact that some heads of state have accused Moscow of aiding Hamas’ initial attack on Israel, saying it would prove a useful distraction from the debacle in Ukraine. Israel itself has dismissed these allegations as purely conspiratorial, and though Russia could benefit from the conflict, it would do so only as a mediator, not an aggressor.
After all, it’s certainly true that the world has shifted its attention from Ukraine to Israel, and it’s certainly true that Russia welcomes the reprieve. The Kremlin has spent untold resources on its war effort, and it can’t afford to come out as a loser. Losing would rob Moscow of the international status it so desperately seeks, it would very likely lead to domestic discontent, and it would result in the very thing Russia sought to avoid: NATO troops close to its border. These facts have led many to believe Russia will use this moment to launch another offensive. But the opportunity isn’t as good as it appears. Russia is too deeply involved in Ukraine, and in the revitalization of economic growth in the face of labor shortages and crippling sanctions, to aid or abet either side of the Israel-Hamas war. And even if it weren’t, Russia has an interest in maintaining good relations with both parties. The worse the war gets, the harder it is for Russia to do either.
Moscow understands that one way or another, the Ukraine war will end. It understands that Ukraine isn’t its sole avenue for expanding its influence. And it understands that, given the circumstances, it needs to engage politically and economically as much as it can with countries it has good relations with.
Israel and the Palestinian Territories are just such states, and Russia continues to maintain dialogue with both accordingly. In fact, Russia’s ties to the territories are nothing short of historical. After Israel reoriented its foreign policy to the West during the Cold War, the Soviet Union supplied weapons to the Palestine Liberation Organization and trained its militants at Soviet military educational institutions. They’ve remained in contact ever since. Its support for the Palestinian Territories has contributed to its status among other Middle Eastern countries, many of which have increased trade with Russia dramatically since the onset of Western sanctions. These countries include Iran and Algeria, which also need Russian economic support in these difficult economic times. More, Islam is the second most popular religion in Russia, with many of its practitioners found in the North Caucasus, whose support the Kremlin needs to maintain stability in its southern reaches. Last, there are some 2,000 Russian citizens throughout the formal territory of the Palestinian Authority, of which 1,200 are in the Gaza Strip. This explains why President Vladimir Putin has advocated for Palestinian statehood with a capital in East Jerusalem.
Even so, Russia continues to maintain relations with Israel. Roughly 80,000 Jews live in Russia, and the Russian Jewish diaspora in Israel is likewise large. Israel was also one of the preferred destinations for Russians who fled the country after the invasion of Ukraine. In 2022, more than 37,000 people fled to Israel from Russia, and in 2023, ahead of stricter immigration laws, the number of people leaving Russia for Israel has increased sharply. In terms of foreign policy, Russia sees Israel, a nuclear power, as a stabilizing factor in the Middle East and appreciates the fact that it has abstained from the Western sanctions regime. Of the war with Hamas, Putin said that Israel is under unprecedented attack and has the right to defend its citizens.
But perhaps the most compelling evidence that Russia is not involved in the Israel-Hamas war is that, so far, Russia hasn’t really used it to its advantage. It hasn’t undertaken any new offensives, nor is there any indication that the military was on alert for anything too dramatic to happen. All it has done is try to position itself as a mediator in the conflict. In addition to calling for a cease-fire, Putin emphasized the importance of diplomatic efforts to establish a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, noting that a ground operation in Gaza would lead to dire consequences and the death of civilians.
Russia knows that the Middle East is a much higher priority for the United States than Ukraine is, and that Washington might be particularly interested in having someone else mediate so that it doesn’t get drawn back into yet another regional conflict. And unlike Russia, the U.S. doesn’t curry much favor among the Palestinian Territories anyway. Already, the Kremlin is trying to figure out how to use its position to resolve its own issues, and there are already rumors of potential dialogue between the U.S. and Russia. Last week, a working-level meeting of the Nuclear Five was held in New York with the participation of Russian representatives.
For Russia, the benefits of mediation are twofold: It helps Moscow break out of its (relative) international isolation by working with partners it otherwise wouldn’t, and it potentially helps stop the war from escalating further or from implicating other regional countries with which Russia has lucrative economic, infrastructural and logistic partnerships.
The real question is whether Moscow will have time to seize the moment, given all the problems it is juggling. The benefits are high, and there’s an opportunity cost of inaction. If the war broadens to include Russian allies, it’ll be that much more difficult for Moscow to balance its powers in the Middle East, and Russia will lose its moment