Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on March 08, 2007, 10:14:38 AM
-
This article raises some very important and very scary questions. Comments?
================
The Words None Dare Say: Nuclear War
By George Lakoff www.informationclearinghouse.info/article17220.htm
"The elimination of Natanz would be a major setback for Iran's nuclear ambitions, but the conventional weapons in the American arsenal could not insure the destruction of facilities under seventy-five feet of earth and rock, especially if they are reinforced with concrete. "-Seymour Hersh, The New Yorker, April 17, 2006
"The second concern is that if an underground laboratory is deeply buried, that can also confound conventional weapons. But the depth of the Natanz facility - reports place the ceiling roughly 30 feet underground - is not prohibitive. The American GBU-28 weapon - the so-called bunker buster - can pierce about 23 feet of concrete and 100 feet of soil. Unless the cover over the Natanz lab is almost entirely rock, bunker busters should be able to reach it. That said, some chance remains that a single strike would fail. " - Michael Levi, New York Times, April 18, 2006
03/01/07 "ich" -- - A familiar means of denying a reality is to refuse to use the words that describe that reality. A common form of propaganda is to keep reality from being described.
In such circumstances, silence and euphemism are forms of complicity both in propaganda and in the denial of reality. And the media, as well as the major presidential candidates, are now complicit.
The stories in the major media suggest that an attack against Iran is a real possibility and that the Natanz nuclear development site is the number one target. As the above quotes from two of our best sources note, military experts say that conventional "bunker-busters" such as the GBU-28 might be able to destroy the Natanz facility, especially with repeated bombings. On the other hand, they also say such iterated use of conventional weapons might not work, e.g., if the rock and earth above the facility becomes liquefied. On that supposition, a "low yield" "tactical" nuclear weapon, say, the B61-11, might be needed.
If the Bush administration, for example, were to insist on a sure "success," then the "attack" would constitute nuclear war. The words in boldface are nuclear war, that's right, nuclear war - a first strike nuclear war.
We don't know what exactly is being planned - conventional GBU-28s or nuclear B61-11s. And that is the point. Discussion needs to be open. Nuclear war is not a minor matter.
The Euphemism
As early as August 13, 2005, Bush, in Jerusalem, was asked what would happen if diplomacy failed to persuade Iran to halt its nuclear program. Bush replied, "All options are on the table." On April 18, the day after the appearance of Seymour Hersh's New Yorker report on the administration's preparations for a nuclear war against Iran, President Bush held a news conference. He was asked,
"Sir, when you talk about Iran, and you talk about how you have diplomatic efforts, you also say all options are on the table. Does that include the possibility of a nuclear strike? Is that something that your administration will plan for?"
He replied,
"All options are on the table."
The President never actually said the forbidden words "nuclear war," but he appeared to tacitly acknowledge the preparations - without further discussion.
Vice-President Dick Cheney, speaking in Australia last week, backed up the President .
"We worked with the European community and the United Nations to put together a set of policies to persuade the Iranians to give up their aspirations and resolve the matter peacefully, and that is still our preference. But I've also made the point, and the president has made the point, that all options are on the table."
Republican Presidential Candidate John McCain, on FOX News, August 14, 2005, said the same .
"For us to say that the Iranians can do whatever they want to do and we won't under any circumstances exercise a military option would be for them to have a license to do whatever they want to do ... So I think the president's comment that we won't take anything off the table was entirely appropriate."
But it's not just Republicans. Democratic Presidential candidate John Edwards, in a speech in Herzliyah, Israel, echoed Bush.
"To ensure that Iran never gets nuclear weapons, we need to keep ALL options on the table. Let me reiterate - ALL options must remain on the table."
Although, Edwards has said, when asked about this statement, that he prefers peaceful solutions and direct negotiations with Iran, he has nonetheless repeated the "all options on the table" position - making clear that he would consider starting a preventive nuclear war, but without using the fateful words.
Hillary Clinton, at an AIPAC dinner in New York, said,
"We cannot, we should not, we must not, permit Iran to build or acquire nuclear weapons, and in dealing with this threat, as I have said for a very long time, no option can be taken off the table."
Translation: Nuclear weapons can be used to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
Barack Obama, asked on 60 Minutes about using military force to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, began a discussion of his preference for diplomacy by responding, "I think we should keep all options on the table."
Bush, Cheney, McCain, Edwards, Clinton, and Obama all say indirectly that they seriously consider starting a preventive nuclear war, but will not engage in a public discussion of what that would mean. That contributes to a general denial, and the press is going along with it by a corresponding refusal to use the words.
If the consequences of nuclear war are not discussed openly, the war may happen without an appreciation of the consequences and without the public having a chance to stop it. Our job is to open that discussion.
Of course, there is a rationale for the euphemism: To scare our adversaries by making them think that we are crazy enough to do what we hint at, while not raising a public outcry. That is what happened in the lead up to the Iraq War, and the disaster of that war tells us why we must have such a discussion about Iran. Presidential candidates go along, not wanting to be thought of as interfering in on-going indirect diplomacy. That may be the conventional wisdom for candidates, but an informed, concerned public must say what candidates are advised not to say.
More Euphemisms
The euphemisms used include "tactical," "small," "mini-," and "low yield" nuclear weapons. "Tactical" contrasts with "strategic"; it refers to tactics, relatively low-level choices made in carrying out an overall strategy, but which don't affect the grand strategy. But the use of any nuclear weapons would be anything but "tactical." It would be a major world event - in Vladimir Putin's words, "lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons," making the use of more powerful nuclear weapons more likely and setting off a new arms race. The use of the word "tactical" operates to lessen their importance, to distract from the fact that their very use would constitute a nuclear war.
What is "low yield"? Perhaps the "smallest" tactical nuclear weapon we have is the B61-11, which has a dial-a-yield feature: it can yield "only" 0.3 kilotons, but can be set to yield up to 170 kilotons. The power of the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilotons. That is, a "small" bomb can yield more than 10 times the explosive power of the Hiroshima bomb. The B61-11 dropped from 40,000 feet would dig a hole 20 feet deep and then explode, send shock waves downward, leave a huge crater, and spread radiation widely. The idea that it would explode underground and be harmless to those above ground is false - and, anyway, an underground release of radiation would threaten ground water and aquifers for a long time and over a wide distance.
To use words such as "low yield" or "small" or "mini-" nuclear weapon is like speaking of being a little bit pregnant. Nuclear war is nuclear war! It crosses the moral line.
Any discussion of roadside canister bombs made in Iran justifying an attack on Iran should be put in perspective: Little canister bombs (EFPs - explosively formed projectiles) that shoot a small hot metal ball at a humvee or tank versus nuclear war.
Incidentally, the administration may be focusing on the canister bombs because it seeks to claim that the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 permits the use of military force against Iran based on its interference in Iraq. In that case, no further authorization by Congress would be needed for an attack on Iran.
The journalistic point is clear. Journalists and political leaders should not talk about an "attack." They should use the words that describe what is really at stake: nuclear war - in boldface.
Then there is the scale of the proposed attack. Military reports leaking out suggest a huge (mostly or entirely non-nuclear) airstrike on as many as 10,000 targets - a "shock and awe" attack that would destroy Iran's infrastructure the way the U.S. bombing destroyed Iraq's infrastructure. The targets would not just be "military targets." As Dan Plesch reports in the New Statesman, February 19, 2007, such an attack would wipe out Iran's military, business, and political infrastructure. Not just nuclear installations, missile launching sites, tanks, and ammunition dumps, but also airports, rail lines, highways, bridges, ports, communications centers, power grids, industrial centers, hospitals, public buildings, and even the homes of political leaders. That is what was attacked in Iraq: the "critical infrastructure." It is not just military in the traditional sense. It leaves a nation in rubble, and leads to death, maiming, disease, joblessness, impoverishment, starvation, mass refugees, lawlessness, rape, and incalculable pain and suffering. That is what the options appear to be "on the table." Is nation destruction what the American people have in mind when they acquiesce without discussion to an "attack"? Is nuclear war what the American people have in mind? An informed public must ask and the media must ask. The words must be used.
Even if the attack were limited to nuclear installations, starting a nuclear war with Iran would have terrible consequences - and not just for Iranians. First, it would strengthen the hand of the Islamic fundamentalists - exactly the opposite of the effect U.S. planners would want. It would be viewed as yet another major attack on Islam. Fundamentalist Islam is a revenge culture. If you want to recruit fundamentalist Islamists all over the world to become violent jihadists, this is the best way to do it. America would become a world pariah. Any idea of the U.S. as a peaceful nation would be destroyed. Moreover, you don't work against the spread of nuclear weapons by using those weapons. That will just make countries all over the world want nuclear weaponry all the more. Trying to stop nuclear proliferation through nuclear war is self-defeating.
As Einstein said, "You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war."
Why would the Bush administration do it? Here is what conservative strategist William Kristol wrote last summer during Israel's war with Hezbollah.
"For while Syria and Iran are enemies of Israel, they are also enemies of the United States. We have done a poor job of standing up to them and weakening them. They are now testing us more boldly than one would have thought possible a few years ago. Weakness is provocative. We have been too weak, and have allowed ourselves to be perceived as weak.
The right response is renewed strength -- in supporting the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, in standing with Israel, and in pursuing regime change in Syria and Iran. For that matter, we might consider countering this act of Iranian aggression with a military strike against Iranian nuclear facilities. Why wait? Does anyone think a nuclear Iran can be contained? That the current regime will negotiate in good faith? It would be easier to act sooner rather than later. Yes, there would be repercussions -- and they would be healthy ones, showing a strong America that has rejected further appeasement."
-Willam Kristol, Weekly Standard 7/24/06
"Renewed strength" is just the Bush strategy in Iraq. At a time when the Iraqi people want us to leave, when our national elections show that most Americans want our troops out, when 60% of Iraqis think it all right to kill Americans, Bush wants to escalate. Why? Because he is weak in America. Because he needs to show more "strength." Because if he knocks out the Iranian nuclear facilities, he can claim at least one "victory." Starting a nuclear war with Iran would really put us in a worldwide war with fundamentalist Islam. It would make real the terrorist threat he has been claiming since 9/11. It would create more fear - real fear - in America. And he believes, with much reason, that fear tends to make Americans vote for saber-rattling conservatives.
Kristol's neoconservative view that "weakness is provocative" is echoed in Iran, but by the other side. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was quoted in The New York Times of February 24, 2007 as having "vowed anew to continue enriching uranium, saying, 'If we show weakness in front of the enemies, they will increase their expectations.'" If both sides refuse to back off for fear of showing weakness, then prospects for conflict are real, despite the repeated analyses, like that of The Economist that the use of nuclear weapons against Iran would be politically and morally impossible. As one unnamed administration official has said (The New York Times, February 24, 2007), "No one has defined where the red line is that we cannot let the Iranians step over."
What we are seeing now is the conservative message machine preparing the country to accept the ideas of a nuclear war and nation destruction against Iran. The technique used is the "slippery slope." It is done by degrees. Like the proverbial frog in the pot of water - if the heat is turned up slowly the frog gets used to the heat and eventually boils to death - the American public is getting gradually acclimated to the idea of war with Iran.
* First, describe Iran as evil - part of the axis of evil. An inherently evil person will inevitably do evil things and can't be negotiated with. An entire evil nation is a threat to other nations.
* Second, describe Iran's leader as a "Hitler" who is inherently "evil" and cannot be reasoned with. Refuse to negotiate with him.
* Then repeat the lie that Iran is on the verge of having nuclear weapons - weapons of mass destruction. IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei says they are at best many years away.
* Call nuclear development "an existential threat" - a threat to our very existence.
* Then suggest a single "surgical" "attack" on Natanz and make it seem acceptable.
* Then find a reason to call the attack "self-defense" - or better protection for our troops from the EFPs, or single-shot canister bombs.
* Claim, without proof and without anyone even taking responsibility for the claim, that the Iranian government at its highest level is supplying deadly weapons to Shiite militias attacking our troops, while not mentioning the fact that Saudi Arabia is helping Sunni insurgents attacking our troops.
* Give "protecting our troops" as a reason for attacking Iran without getting new authorization from Congress. Claim that the old authorization for attacking Iraq implied doing "whatever is necessary to protect our troops" from Iranian intervention in Iraq.
* Argue that de-escalation in Iraq would "bleed" our troops, "weaken" America, and lead to defeat. This sets up escalation as a winning policy, if not in Iraq then in Iran.
* Get the press to go along with each step.
* Never mention the words "preventive nuclear war" or "national destruction." When asked, say, "All options are on the table." Keep the issue of nuclear war and its consequences from being seriously discussed by the national media.
* Intimidate Democratic presidential candidates into agreeing, without using the words, that nuclear war should be "on the table." This makes nuclear war and nation destruction bipartisan and even more acceptable.
Progressives managed to blunt the "surge" idea by telling the truth about "escalation." Nuclear war against Iran and nation destruction constitute the ultimate escalation.
The time has come to stop the attempt to make a nuclear war against Iran palatable to the American public. We do not believe that most Americans want to start a nuclear war or to impose nation destruction on the people of Iran. They might, though, be willing to support a tit-for-tat "surgical" "attack" on Natanz in retaliation for small canister bombs and to end Iran's early nuclear capacity.
It is time for America's journalists and political leaders to put two and two together, and ask the fateful question: Is the Bush administration seriously preparing for nuclear war and nation destruction? If the conventional GBU-28s will do the job, then why not take nuclear war off the table in the name of controlling the spread of nuclear weapons? If GBU-28s won't do the job, then it is all the more important to have that discussion.
This should not be a distraction from Iraq. The general issue is escalation as a policy, both in Iraq and in Iran. They are linked issues, not separate issues. We have learned from Iraq what lack of public scrutiny does.
George Lakoff is a Senior Fellow at the Rockridge Institute. Lakoff is Professor of Linguistics at the University of California, Berkeley.
-
Actually the nuclear option is the way to defeat the global jihad, but we won't act until after we've suffered a nuclear attack CONUS, and that's if we actually have a good president at that time.
-
Is it that easy?
Lets say NY or Chicago or Los Angeles or DC gets hit with a small nuke or major dirty bomb and no one (or every one!) takes credit? Whom do you think we should hit?
-
It should be made unofficially clear to our various enemy states with potential nuclear ability that if/when a nuke detonates CONUS Damascus, Tehran, Qum, P'yongyang, Mecca, Medina and large parts of Pakistan's tribal areas are going to become molten glass.
Just as we had to break Japan's will to fight, when the world's muslim population has to contemplate bowing 5 times a day towards America's newest nuclear test site it will raise theological questions that can't be answerd by islamic theology. Unless allah manages to swat down American ICBMs....
-
That seems to be a rather broad brush that would get quite a few people who really had nothing to do with it, not to mention contaminating a goodly portion of the planet on which we live for quite a long time and generally greatly irritating the neighbors downwind of the mushroom cloud.
Any chance of your narrowing it down a tad?
Or is the problem precisely that we wouldn't know who did it or where they could be found? Which then reduces us to "Kill 'em all and let God sort it out"? Is this what our strategy should be? How do you think this would play with the American people? Anyone who then saw an American abroad?
-
Since love and fear can hardly exist together, if we must choose between them, it is far safer to be feared than loved.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
If an injury has to be done to a man it should be so severe that his vengeance need not be feared.
Niccolo Machiavelli
Crafty,
It'll be done most likely by some sort of proxy group for "deniable plausibility" purposes. If nukes detonate in NYC, DC and the Long Beach port in cargo containers, do you use the CSI: Ground Zero option while the left plays the "It's all our fault" theme and the 9/11 "truthers" spin conspiracy theories and the dems discuss asking the UN for aid or do you act in a meaningful manner?
Innocents are going to die in large numbers on both sides in this war, just as they do in all wars. When we burned German and Japanese children and grandmothers to ash with conventional bombs, did the lack of fissile material really matter in any meaningful moral way?
We are not going to win this war in any way that will meet the approval of the UN, France or the ACLU. The global jihad will not be stopped with anything but overwhelming force that shatters their will to fight.
-
I have never heard of "Zee" so this must count as highly unconfirmed info-- but given AQ's recent boasts in this regard, it is worth noting:
==================================
Top Pakistan nuclear scientists in Taliban Custody: Zee News Exclusive
New Delhi, March 07: Two top nuclear scientists of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) are currently in Taliban custody. The two were working at PAEC’s facility in North West Frontier Province. Zee News investigations reveal that the two scientists were kidnapped about six months ago. To avoid international embarrassment Pakistan Government has kept this information under wraps.
According to information available with Zee News, nuclear scientists have been kidnapped by Taliban at the behest of Al-Qaeda. Further investigations reveal that Al-Qaeda may be using the expertise of the scientists to produce nuclear bombs. The two scientists are reportedly being held somewhere in Waziristan, near Afghanistan border.
In January this year Pakistan security agencies had foiled another attempt by Taliban militia to kidnap nuclear scientists. Earlier, incidents of Taliban militia stealing uranium in NWFP have already been reported. PAEC also has a uranium mining facility in NWFP.
With repeated Al Qaeda threats to the US, news of kidnapping of nuclear scientists will increase pressure on Pakistan to attack terrorist camps.
Bureau Report
-
Here's the URL:
http://zeenews.com/articles.asp?aid=358644&archisec=WOR&archisubsec
-
This is the first I have seen explicitly linking Russia's Bushehr plant and Iran's enrichment program.
RUSSIA/IRAN: Russia and Iran have begun talks that could last several days to settle financial issues related to the construction of Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, an Atomstroyexport spokesman said. The announcement came after Russian President Vladimir Putin decided to delay completion of the plant until Iran ends its uranium enrichment program.
stratfor.com
----------------
RUSSIANS: IRAN NUKE PLANT TO BE DELAYED: The state-run Russian company building Iran's first nuclear power plant said Monday that the reactor's launch will be postponed because of Iranian payment delays. Russian media reports, meanwhile, indicated that the Kremlin was growing tired of Iran's nuclear defiance in the face of U.N. Security Council sanctions, with three agencies citing an unidentified official warning Iran to cooperate and stop playing "anti-American games."
-----------------------
IRAN: Iran should make concessions to the international community regarding its nuclear program to avoid additional sanctions from the U.N. Security Council, former Iranian President Mohammed Khatami said in an interview with economic daily Sanaat va Tosee.
stratfor.com
LBN
-
Report: Dirty bomb materials still available
Government reports ‘limited progress’ securing nuclear material worldwidevar cssList = new Array();getCSS("3053751")
By Lisa Myers & the NBC News Investigative Unit
Updated: 44 minutes ago
function UpdateTimeStamp(pdt) { var n = document.getElementById("udtD"); if(pdt != '' && n && window.DateTime) { var dt = new DateTime(); pdt = dt.T2D(pdt); if(dt.GetTZ(pdt)) {n.innerHTML = dt.D2S(pdt,((''.toLowerCase()=='false')?false:true ));} } } UpdateTimeStamp('633093384142830000');
getCSS("3159408")
Lisa Myers
Senior investigative correspondent
• Profile
WASHINGTON - International inspectors working in the former Soviet republic of Georgia last summer tracked down dangerous radiological materials in an abandoned military complex.
It was an important mission. But a new report by U.S. government watchdogs says a parallel effort overseas by the U.S. Department of Energy has made only "limited progress securing many of the most dangerous sources" — waste disposal sites and abandoned generators across Russia, each with enough material for several devastating dirty bombs.
The new report by the Government Accountability Office says that DOE is doing an admirable job securing low-risk radiological sources — the proverbial low-hanging fruit — at the expense of more dangerous materials that remain vulnerable to terrorists.
“Many of the highest-risk and most dangerous sources still remain unsecured, particularly in Russia,” the GAO writes. “Specifically, 16 or 20 waste storage sites across Russia and Ukraine remain unsecured while more than 700 RTGs [radioisotope thermoelectric generators] remain operational or abandoned in Russia and are vulnerable to theft or potential misuse.”
RTGs can contain up to 250,000 curies of Strontium-90. Experts say an explosion with that amount of Strontium-90 could be dangerous.
"You would cause a significant contamination over a square mile — many, many city blocks, and with the right city blocks, Wall Street or the White House,” says Leonard S. Spector, deputy director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute. “The impact could be very devastating.”
A test explosion by U.S. scientists working at the Sandia National Labs near Albuquerque, N.M., showed how a dirty bomb works: Conventional explosives spread the radioactive material, which can contaminate large areas.
The new report says the DOE has focused most of its energies in the last three years on securing small sources of radioactive materials in Russia and abroad — largely found in medical equipment stored in doctors’ offices.
Meanwhile, the report says, major waste disposal sites sit protected by primitive fences. And more than 700 generators are vulnerable to terrorists.
"If you look at the past six months, we see, I think, an upsurge in criminal and terrorist activity using radioactive materials,” says Charles Ferguson, a science and technology fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Last year, according to the International Atomic Energy Association, there were 85 confirmed thefts or loss of nuclear or radioactive materials worldwide — mostly small amounts. Most of those have not been recovered.
Last fall, al-Qaida’s leader in Iraq called on militant scientists to create dirty bombs to be tested on U.S. bases in Iraq.
“I am disturbingly concerned about this because it can grow into a huge threat,” says Sen. Daniel Akaka, D-Hawaii, who will chair a hearing Tuesday on the issue at a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security. “These generators are sources that can be used for dirty bombs, and [they are] there for the taking. I feel that DOE is not meeting the priority of our nation in security.”
The report also criticizes the DOE for a “steady” decline in its budget for the International Radiological Threat Reduction program. It says, “[F]uture funding is uncertain because the agency places a higher priority on securing special nuclear material” than it does in protecting dirty-bomb material.
The DOE points out that the GAO report also applauds its efforts in many areas. The agency also says it has made progress, having upgraded security at 500 sites in more than 40 countries. DOE officials say they are now moving to secure more of those high-risk generators and waste sites in Russia, and that their budget request for next year represents a slight increase.
“DOE and the National Nuclear Security Administration are committed to securing and removing vulnerable radiological sources around the world,” says Andrew Bieniawski, who heads up the DOE’s Global Threat Reduction Initiative, run under the National Nuclear Security Administration.
As of January, the agency has spent approximately $120 million to secure vulnerable radiological sources, an expenditure that demonstrates a strong commitment to a program that has produced tangible results and reduced the risks of terrorists acquiring the materials to make a dirty bomb, Bieniawski said.
-
Japan, U.S.: Defense Contingencies and the Nuclear Question
Summary
Japan and the United States are developing a joint operation plan for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces to deal with contingencies. While the two sides discuss defense cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, Tokyo is preparing to question Washington on just how Japan fits under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and how that umbrella actually works. Among Japan's strategic planners, there is an evolving reassessment of Japan's defensive posture -- and the country's stance on nuclear weapons.
Analysis
Japan is reassessing its defense policies and security relationships, enhancing ties with Australia and the United States and expanding the role of the Self-Defense Forces. Tokyo also is working with Washington to draw up a Japanese-U.S. operational plan for military contingencies to smooth the coordination of military assets. As part of this overall review, Japan's Ministry of Defense is preparing to ask Washington for clarification of just how Japan falls under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, and how that umbrella actually operates.
Over the past decade, Tokyo has undertaken a major overhaul of its defense posture and evolved a very liberal interpretation of its pacifist constitution to adjust to the changing security situation in the post-Cold War world. Walls between the police and Ground Self-Defense Force or between the Coast Guard and the Maritime Self-Defense Force have fallen. Moreover, Tokyo has improved interoperability within the overall Self-Defense Forces substantially and it has launched a spy-satellite program. Japan's defense development and procurement also has been nothing if not robust, and has included the addition of in-air refueling capabilities, joining U.S. missile-defense systems, bringing additional Aegis destroyers on line, and even funding and developing a large helicopter destroyer just shy of an entry-level aircraft carrier, complete with a full-length flight deck capable of handling the vertical or short takeoff or landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter.
During that conventional reassessment, Tokyo also has started looking at the nuclear issue. As the only nation ever attacked with nuclear weapons, Japan has long held the view that it of all countries should never pursue nuclear weapons. But slowly, that view has evolved, and over time, discussion of the nuclear issue has moved from the realm of the taboo to more open debate. Former and current Japanese officials, including Foreign Minister Taro Aso, Liberal Democratic Party Policy Research Council Chairman Shoichi Nakagawa, Institute for International Policy Studies Chairman and former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone and former Japanese Defense Agency Chief Fukushiro Nukaga, have called for Japan to at least study the nuclear issue.
A recent series of articles in the right-leaning Yomiuri Shimbun also has addressed the nuclear issue from a very frank point of view, raising the question of whether, in the event of a potential nuclear confrontation with North Korea, Washington would risk its own security to protect Japan. Unmentioned, but certainly understood, were similar concerns with China.
U.S. strategic doctrine will always place U.S. interests above Japanese interests. Although Japan has developed a robust conventional defense force since losing most of its military infrastructure in and after World War II, Japan finds itself surrounded by nuclear nations: China, North Korea, Russia and the United States. Yet Japan must rely on the United States to counter any potential nuclear threat, limiting Tokyo's strategic independence.
The North Korean nuclear test in October 2006 gave Japan the public justification to re-address its nuclear status more actively, particularly in light of North Korea's missile capability. Japan has the technology for nuclear weapons, and its H2 rocket gives it a strong start on any ballistic missile program. And though it lacks the political will at present to pursue nuclear weapons, this appears to be shifting as well. What appears clear, though, is that Japanese strategic planners view the island nation's nuclear deficiency as a potential risk, and are not too confident in U.S. assurances that everything is taken care of. At a minimum, Japan wants more information and input on the mechanics of a U.S. nuclear umbrella (where are the submarines, for example, or what is the decision-making process for shifting to nuclear weapons) -- something Washington will be unlikely to provide.
Japan feels particularly vulnerable to its nuclear-armed neighbors given its very dense population centers. A recent simulation showed between 2 million and 5 million deaths if a single, 15-kiloton nuclear device were detonated over Tokyo. Few countries feel confident relying on another country for their security, particularly when -- like Japan -- they are a major economic power sitting in the middle of a potentially volatile region. Washington's decision to use diplomacy and economics with North Korea after Pyongyang's nuclear test only added to Japan's insecurities regarding Washington's reliability as a defender of Japan.
A Japanese move toward possession of nuclear weapons would in the end be quiet, following more the Israeli path than the North Korean or Indian path. Tokyo has little need or intent to carry out open tests of nuclear devices, barring a significant change in the regional security situation, but it does want to ensure its own security -- and have its own leverage in dealing with its neighbors. Though there is a long way between capability and possession, the debates in Tokyo are making quite an impression in the region, with China, South Korea and North Korea watching intently to see if Japan moves from talk to action.
stratfor.com
-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Special Dispatch Series - No. 1538
April 12, 2007 No.1538
Is it Legitimate to Use Nuclear Weapons Against the West? A Debate on An Islamist Forum
The Islamist website Al-Firdaws recently posted an article by a certain Abu Zabadi titled "Religious Grounds for [Launching] a Nuclear Attack." [1] The article, presented as a response to "recent rumors about Al-Qaeda's plan to attack the U.S. with WMDs such as a nuclear bomb," unequivocally opposes the use of WMDs by Muslims against the West, and attempts to counter the legal justifications for their use recently put forward by some prominent religious scholars affiliated with Al-Qaeda and other jihad movements. [2]
The article sparked a fierce debate among participants on the forum, with some participants supporting the author's reasoning and conclusions, and others forcefully rejecting them.
The following are the main points of Abu Zabadi's article, and excerpts from some of the responses to it.
A Nuclear Attack Results in Indiscriminate Killing, Which Is Forbidden by Islam
The author's main concern is not the legitimacy of obtaining WMDs for purposes of deterrence, but whether Islam sanctions a first-strike nuclear attack by Al-Qaeda against the U.S. or Europe. The author states that such an attack is forbidden, and presents several arguments in support of his position.
Using WMDs May Provoke U.S. WMD Counterattack
Abu Zabadi first points out that a nuclear attack results in indiscriminate killing of both innocent and guilty, which violates Allah's commandment to preserve the lives of the innocent.
Next, he dismisses the claim that the U.S. itself has used WMDs - such as phosphor bombs, cluster bombs or depleted uranium - against its enemies, which makes it legitimate to attack it with WMDs. The author states that these are conventional weapons, and that, unlike nuclear weapons, "they do not kill millions at a single strike." From a practical point of view, he adds, "using WMDs against America and its allies will provoke them... to aim a painful blow at Muslims, and this time not with conventional weapons but with WMDs." Such provocation, he states, stands in contradiction to the Prophet's conduct as attested in the Islamic tradition. "Since America and its allies are stronger than the Islamic nation," he says, "circumstances forbid us to provoke America and its allies... even if Al-Qaeda succeeds in obtaining a nuclear bomb."
"If God Wishes to Wipe America Off the Face of the Earth... The Matter Is In His Hands"
Abu Zabadi next addresses the claim that the U.S. must be destroyed because it is an immoral country that encourages corrupt behavior such as consuming alcohol and visiting brothels. He responds that a similar argument can be used to "sanction the killing of our brothers in Yemen, Egypt, and other [countries]." Pointing out that the murder rate in Yemen is very close to that of the U.S., he asks: "Are we therefore permitted to destroy Yemen... with WMDs because of [its]... moral corruption?" He concludes, "If God wishes to wipe America off the face of the earth because of its great corruption, the matter is in His hands [and not in the hands of the mujahideen]."
"If Bin Laden and His Followers Wish to Respond [to U.S. Attacks] in Kind, They Should [Confront] the Evil Troops on the Battlefield"
The author rejects the argument that killing innocent Americans can be regarded as legitimate retribution for attacks on Muslims, which some claim is sanctioned by several Koranic verses. [3] When bin Laden used this argument to justify the attack on the World Trade Center, says Abu Zabadi, he was basing his claims on a flawed understanding of the Koranic text. The Koran, he explains, permits to take revenge on a person who commits an act of aggression, but not to take revenge on his family or friends, as the verse says: "Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressors [2: 190]." He therefore concludes, "If bin Laden and his associates wish to respond [to the U.S. attacks] in kind, they should go out and [confront] the evil troops on the battlefield. However, they are not permitted to target unarmed civilians.... men, women, children and elderly people. This is... not permitted by Islamic law."
Forum Participant: The Article "Is All Distortions, It Laughs in the Faces of the Muslims"
Most of the forum participants who criticized the article took up religious arguments made in the past by prominent contemporary Islamist sheikhs (see endnote 2).
A participant calling himself Abdal Al-Sham began with a personal attack on the author, saying: "This article was not written by a Muslim... but by an American, and more specifically, by [someone from] one of their strategic centers for countering the Islamic jihad..." Regarding the content of the article, he said: "The essence of the article.... is that the U.S. bears no responsibility for the killing of Muslim children... And [even in cases] where it is proven that the U.S has killed Muslim women, children and elderly, [the article stipulates that it is permissible] to take revenge only on the one [directly] responsible for the killing... This is a distortion. [The article] laughs in Muslims' faces... It essentially [misrepresents] some of the [texts] it quotes from the Koran and the sunna..."
"The Destructive Power of the... Bombs Dropped on Afghanistan Alone Was Greater Than That of the Atomic Bomb Dropped on Hiroshima"
Abdal Al-Sham then argues against Abu Zabadi's legal reasoning: "The distinction between WMDs and conventional weapons, based on the extent of death and destruction they cause... is theoretically valid. But in reality, this distinction is false!!!... The amount of destruction... and the number of deaths to Muslim civilians - women, children, and the elderly - caused by the... conventional weapons used by the U.S. throughout its years-long Crusader war against Islam is equivalent to the [extent of death and destruction] caused by WMDs!!... The destructive power of the one-ton bombs dropped on Afghanistan alone is greater than that of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima... The ignorant writer should consider this fact!!!"
It Is Permitted to Strike the Infidels When Their Women and Children Are with Them
Abdal Al-Sham continues: "The principle of retribution in kind applies, for example, when the infidels do something that is completely forbidden to Muslims, such as mutilating corpses. It is prohibited for Muslims [to do such a thing] unless the infidels commit [this crime] against Muslims!!!... However, striking the infidels when their women and children are with them is permitted independently [of] the principle of retribution in kind."
Legally, Americans Are Considered a Single Individual
"It is clear that the elected American government..., the military and civil organizations associated with it, and [the American] nation [as a whole] legally constitute 'a single individual' when it comes to [responsibility for] the killing of women, children and the elderly... by U.S. troops in Muslim lands. This aggression is committed by every American who is [a citizen of] the United States and does not wash his hands of it or keep away from it... Legally, all of them are considered 'one individual.' An American who is against this aggression against Muslims should emigrate from America to a safe place... in order to avoid the punishment [meted out by] the Muslim mujahideen. It is not the concern of the mujahideen to distinguish him from... those Americans who do support the aggression."
Americans Have Used Biological, Chemical and Nuclear Weapons
Another forum participant supported Abdal Al-Sham's position, saying: "[WMDs] include biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, which the Americans - as admitted by their [own] judicial authorities - have used to varying degrees. The U.S. sanctions the killing of civilians day and night, and claims that it is an unavoidable [consequence] of war... It is permissible to kill the infidels..."
Another forum participant criticized Abdal Al-Sham's grasp of the religious sources and provided additional proof-texts in support of the position expressed in Abu Zabadi's article.
[1] http://alfirdaws.org/vb/showthread.php?t=28142
[2] For a summary of the arguments presented by some of these scholars, see Special Report No. 34, "Contemporary Islamist Ideology Authorizing Genocidal Murder," September 15, 2004, http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Pa...a=sr&ID=SR2504. See also Reuven Paz, "Global Jihad and WMD: Between Martyrdom and Mass Destruction," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology, 2, (2005) pp. 74-86. For a May 2003 article by Islamist Saudi Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Fahd justifying the use of WMDs, see Nasser Al-Fahd, Risalah fi hukm istikhdam aslihat al-damar al-shamil dhid al-kuffar, (May 2003): http://www.al-fhd.net/surf.php?ad=32
[3] As an example, the author cites the following verse: "Whoever commits aggression against you, you should commit aggression against him like he has committed against you" (2:194).
-
IRAN: Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani will meet with EU foreign policy chief Javier Solana on April 25 to discuss Iran's nuclear program, the ISNA news service reported. The U.N. Security Council imposed sanctions on Iran in March over Tehran's refusal to discontinue its uranium enrichment program.
RUSSIA: Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov said Russia will not send uranium enrichment centrifuges to countries that do not possess adequate expertise, including Iran, Pakistan and India. Ivanov noted Russia's commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and confirmed that China is not included on the list. Russia plans to sign agreements with China during 2007 to build the fourth phase of a uranium enrichment plant.
stratfor.com
-
Al-Qaeda plans 'Hiroshima'
April 23, 2007 12:00
Article from: </IMG>
AL-QAEDA leaders in Iraq are planning the first "large-scale" terrorist attacks on Britain and other western targets with the help of supporters in Iran, according to a leaked intelligence report.
Spy chiefs warn that one operative had said he was planning an attack on "a par with Hiroshima and Nagasaki" in an attempt to "shake the Roman throne", a reference to the West, according to The Times newspaper in the UK.
Another plot could be timed to coincide with Tony Blair stepping down as prime minister, an event described by Al-Qaeda planners as a "change in the head of the company".
The report, produced earlier this month and seen by The Sunday Times, appears to provide evidence that Al-Qaeda is active in Iran and has ambitions far beyond the improvised attacks it has been waging against British and American soldiers in Iraq.
There is no evidence of a formal relationship between Al-Qaeda, a Sunni group, and the Shi’ite regime of President Mah-moud Ahmadinejad, but experts suggest that Iran’s leaders may be turning a blind eye to the terrorist organisation’s activities," reports The Times.
The intelligence report also makes it clear that senior Al-Qaeda figures in the region have been in recent contact with operatives in Britain.
It follows revelations last year that up to 150 Britons had travelled to Iraq to fight as part of Al-Qaeda’s "foreign legion". A number are thought to have returned to the UK, after receiving terrorist training, to form sleeper cells.
The report was compiled by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) - based at MI5’s London headquarters - and provides a quarterly review of the international terror threat to Britain. It draws a distinction between Osama Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda’s core leadership, who are thought to be hiding on the Afghan-Pakistan border, and affiliated organisations elsewhere.
The document states: "While networks linked to AQ (Al-Qaeda) Core pose the greatest threat to the UK, the intelligence during this quarter has highlighted the potential threat from other areas, particularly AQI (Al-Qaeda in Iraq)."
The report continues: "Recent reporting has described AQI’s Kurdish network in Iran planning what we believe may be a large-scale attack against a western target.
"A member of this network is reportedly involved in an operation which he believes requires AQ Core authorisation. He claims the operation will be on 'a par with Hiroshima and Naga-saki' and will 'shake the Roman throne'. We assess that this operation is most likely to be a large-scale, mass casualty attack against the West."
The report says there is "no indication" this attack would specifically target Britain, "although we are aware that AQI . . . networks are active in the UK".
Analysts believe the reference to Hiroshima and Naga-saki, where more than 200,000 people died in nuclear attacks on Japan at the end of the second world war, is unlikely to be a literal boast.
"It could be just a reference to a huge explosion," said a counter-terrorist source. "They (Al-Qaeda) have got to do something soon that is radical otherwise they start losing credibility."
Despite aspiring to a nuclear capability, Al-Qaeda is not thought to have acquired weapons grade material. However, several plots involving "dirty bombs" - conventional explosive devices surrounded by radioactive material - have been foiled.
Last year Al-Qaeda’s leader in Iraq called on nuclear scientists to apply their knowledge of biological and radiological weapons to "the field of jihad".
Details of a separate plot to attack Britain, "ideally" before Blair steps down this summer, were contained in a letter written by Abdul al-Hadi al-Iraqi, an Iraqi Kurd and senior Al-Qaeda commander.
According to the JTAC document, Hadi "stressed the need to take care to ensure that the attack was successful and on a large scale". The plan was to be relayed to an Iran-based Al-Qaeda facilitator.
The Home Office declined to comment
-
Today's NY Times:
==========
WASHINGTON, May 7 — Every week, a group of experts from agencies around the government — including the C.I.A., the Pentagon, the F.B.I. and the Energy Department — meet to assess Washington’s progress toward solving a grim problem: if a terrorist set off a nuclear bomb in an American city, could the United States determine who detonated it and who provided the nuclear material?
So far, the answer is maybe.
That uncertainty lies at the center of a vigorous, but carefully cloaked, debate within the Bush administration. It focuses on how to refashion the American approach to nuclear deterrence in an attempt to counter the threat posed by terrorists who could obtain bomb-grade uranium or plutonium to make and deliver a weapon.
A previously undisclosed meeting last year of President Bush’s most senior national security advisers was the highest level discussion about how to rewrite the cold war rules. The existing approach to deterrence dates from the time when the nuclear attacks Washington worried about would be launched by missiles and bombers, which can be tracked back to a source by radar, and not carried in backpacks or hidden in cargo containers.
Among the subjects of the meeting last year was whether to issue a warning to all countries around the world that if a nuclear weapon was detonated on American soil and was traced back to any nation’s stockpiles, through nuclear forensics, the United States would hold that country “fully responsible” for the consequences of the explosion. The term “fully responsible” was left deliberately vague so that it would be unclear whether the United States would respond with a retaliatory nuclear attack, or, far more likely, a nonnuclear retaliation, whether military or diplomatic.
But that meeting of Mr. Bush’s principal national security and military advisers in May 2006 broke up with the question unresolved, according to participants. The discussion remained hung up on such complexities as whether it would be wise to threaten Iran even as diplomacy still offered at least some hope of halting Tehran’s nuclear program, and whether it was credible to issue a warning that would be heard to include countries that America considers partners and allies, like Russia or Pakistan, which are nuclear powers with far from perfect nuclear safeguards.
Then, on Oct. 9, North Korea detonated a nuclear test.
Mr. Bush responded that morning with an explicit warning to President Kim Jong-il that “transfer of nuclear weapons or material” to other countries or terrorist groups “would be considered a grave threat to the United States,” and that the North would be held “fully accountable.”
A senior American official involved in the decision, who spoke on condition of anonymity because he was discussing private national security deliberations, said, “Given the fact that they were trying to cross red lines, that they were launching missiles and that they conducted the nuclear test, we finally decided it was time.”
Mr. Bush was able to issue a credible warning, other senior officials said, in part because the International Atomic Energy Agency has a library of nuclear samples from North Korea, obtained before the agency’s inspectors were thrown out of the country, that would likely make it possible to trace an explosion back to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal. The North Koreans are fully aware, government experts believe, that the United States has access to that database of nuclear DNA.
But when it comes to other countries, many of that library’s shelves are empty. And in interviews over the past several weeks, senior American nuclear experts have said that the huge gap is one reason that the Bush administration is so far unable to make a convincing threat to terrorists or their suppliers that they will be found out.
“I believe the most likely source of the material would be from the Russian nuclear arsenal, but you shouldn’t confuse ‘likely’ with ‘certainty’ by any means,” said Scott D. Sagan, co-director of Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation, who has studied the problem known in Washington and the national nuclear laboratories as “nuclear attribution.”
Mr. Sagan noted that nuclear material in a terrorist attack might also come from Pakistan, home of the network run by Abdul Qadeer Khan, who sold nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.
The Bush administration is also finding a skeptical audience when it warns of emerging nuclear threats, since its assessments of Saddam Hussein’s nuclear capacity in advance of the 2003 invasion proved wildly off the mark. On Sunday, defending his new book during an interview on the NBC News program “Meet the Press,” George J. Tenet, the former director of central intelligence, made the case that any past errors should not blind the public to the threat of nuclear attack posed by Al Qaeda today.
“What I believe is that Al Qaeda is seeking this capability,” Mr. Tenet said.
Pakistani officials have been visiting Washington recently offering assurances that their nuclear supplies and weapons are locked down with sophisticated new technology. During a presentation at the Henry L. Stimson Center, a nonprofit organization here that studies nuclear proliferation, Lt. Col. Zafar Ali, who works in the arms control section of the Pakistani Strategic Plans Division, said that while Al Qaeda and other groups may want a nuclear weapon, “there are doubts that these organizations have the capability to fabricate a nuclear device.”
=======
He bristled at the continuing questions about Pakistan’s nuclear security, arguing that “there is no reported case of security failure subsequent to A. Q. Khan’s case” in 2004, and suggested that American concerns would be better directed at Russia.
But few experts in the Bush administration are reassured, saying that their fear is not only leakage from Pakistan, but a takeover of the government of the president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf. It is a subject they will never discuss on the record, but one that is the constant topic of study and assessment.
The issue of shaping a new policy even presents difficulties when dealing with a country like Iran, which, like North Korea, was once described by President Bush as a member of an “axis of evil.” Tehran does not yet possess nuclear weapons, and inspectors believe that it has produced only small amounts of nuclear fuel, not enough to make a bomb, and none of it bomb grade.
In the cabinet-level discussion last May, Mr. Bush’s top advisers concluded that issuing a warning to Iran might signal that the United States was preparing for the day when Iran becomes a nuclear-armed state, an impression that one former senior administration official said “is not the message we want to send.” As a result, Iran did not receive a warning similar to the one issued to North Korea, whose test made clear that it is edging into the nuclear club.
Mr. Sagan said he supported that approach, saying that if Mr. Bush issues a declaration specifically aimed at Iran, it may be heard among the most radical leaders in Tehran as a tacit acknowledgment that the United States has accepted the possibility that Iran is going to go nuclear.
“We need to distinguish between the leakage problem, where it would be inadvertent, and the provider problem, where it would be an intentional act,” said Robert S. Litwak of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and the author of “Regime Change: U.S. Strategy Through the Prism of 9/11.”
“To the provider we should say, ‘Don’t even think about it,’ and this more explicit declaratory policy can get us traction because these regimes value their own survival above all else,” Mr. Litwak said. “For the leakage problem, we don’t want to be trapped into a question of how we retaliate against Russia or Pakistan. But through calculated ambiguity, we can create incentives for the Russians and the Pakistanis to do even more in the area of safeguarding their weapons and capabilities.”
The weekly meeting of the interagency group dealing with nuclear attribution is just one part of a governmentwide effort to prepare for what might happen after a small nuclear device was detonated in an American city, just as Washington once gamed out a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union.
But it is a subject Mr. Bush and his aides have rarely referred to in public. In private, officials say, the Department of Homeland Security is trying to plan for more than a dozen scenarios — including one in which a bomb goes off, and terrorist groups then claim to have planted others in cities around the country.
While most of that planning takes place behind locked doors, officials responsible for it appeared at a workshop last month sponsored by the Preventive Defense Project, a research collaboration sponsored by Harvard and Stanford Universities.
The daylong discussion revealed major gaps in the planning. But it also demonstrated that while the first instinct of government officials after an explosion would be to figure out retaliation, “that would probably give way to an effort to seek the cooperation of a Pakistan or Russia to figure out where the stuff came from, what else was lost, and to hunt down the remaining bombs rather than punish the government that lost them,” said one of the conference’s organizers, Ashton B. Carter of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
-
Nuclear Non-Starter
By BRAHMA CHELLANEY
May 9, 2007
WSJ
The much-trumpeted 2005 civil nuclear deal between the United States and India always had one problem: the elastically worded accord itself. New Delhi, however, bears the brunt of the blame for the current deadlock. While the U.S. never hid its nonproliferation objectives, India's policy makers embraced the political deal without fully understanding its implications. Now that the technical rules of nuclear commerce are to be defined, they find it difficult to meet the demands set by the U.S. Congress.
The root of the current stalemate over the fine print rests in the new U.S. legislation, dubbed the Hyde Act, governing the deal. The U.S. wants the right to cut off all cooperation and secure the return of transferred nuclear items if India, in Washington's estimation, fails to live up to certain nonproliferation conditions, such as a ban on nuclear testing. The prohibition seeks to implicitly bind India to an international pact whose ratification the U.S. Senate rejected in 1999 -- the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Hyde Act also sets out conditions to block India from ending International Atomic Energy Agency inspections even if American fuel supplies are suspended or terminated.
While the political deal had promised India "full civil nuclear cooperation and trade," what is on offer now is restrictive cooperation, tied to the threat of reimposition of sanctions if New Delhi does not adhere to the congressionally prescribed stipulations. India, however, insists that cooperation encompass uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent fuel and heavy-water production, given that all such activities would be under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards and for peaceful purposes.
Under the deal inked in 2005, India agreed to "assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology, such as the U.S." It now complains that the Hyde Act denies it these "same benefits and advantages." However, New Delhi itself laid the groundwork for higher standards when months earlier it agreed to place 35 Indian nuclear facilities under permanent, legally irrevocable IAEA inspections -- not the token, voluntary inspections accepted by the U.S. on select facilities.
In any case, a growing perception that the U.S. was shifting the goalpost created outrage in India's Parliament. Why the shock and horror? It's simple: India embraced the U.S.-drafted deal hurriedly in July 2005 without fully grasping its significance. As Prime Minister Manhoman Singh admitted in Parliament on August 3, 2005, he received "the final draft from the U.S. side" only upon reaching Washington a day before signing. Until that point, India's negotiators had only discussed submitting "power reactors" to international inspections, not all civilian nuclear facilities. And they certainly didn't anticipate a test ban. Indeed, after signing the deal, Mr. Singh had assured Parliament that "our autonomy of decision-making will not be circumscribed in any manner."
The current deadlock could have easily been avoided. During the nine-month legislative drafting of the Hyde Act last year, India ought to have made it clear that it wouldn't allow its deal-related commitments to be expanded or turned into immutable legal obligations through the means of a U.S. domestic law. It was only after national outcry over the bill's approval by the U.S. House of Representatives that Prime Minister Singh grudgingly defined India's bottom-line: The "full" lifting of "restrictions on all aspects of cooperation" without the "introduction of extraneous" conditions. He went on warn that, "If in their final form, the U.S. legislation or the adopted Nuclear Suppliers' Group guidelines impose extraneous conditions on India, the government will draw the necessary conclusions, consistent with the commitments I have made to Parliament." That was too late to reverse the Congressional push for a tough law to govern the deal.
Last week, India's top diplomat, Foreign Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon, tried to repair some of this damage by sitting down with his U.S. counterparts in Washington. But the reality is that each government finds its negotiating space severely constricted. The Bush administration is bound by the Hyde Act passed by Congress last December, and Mr. Singh is stuck with the deal-related benchmarks he defined in Parliament last August.
Even if the follow-up bilateral agreement did not incorporate the controversial conditions, it would hardly free India from the obligations the Hyde Act seeks to enforce. The U.S. has always maintained that because such a bilateral agreement is a requirement not under international law but under U.S. law -- the Atomic Energy Act -- it cannot supersede American law. In fact, an earlier U.S.-India bilateral nuclear cooperation accord, signed in 1963, was abandoned by Washington in 1978 -- four years after the first Indian nuclear test -- simply by enacting a new domestic law that retroactively overrode the bilateral pact. That broke with impunity a guarantee to supply "timely" fuel "as needed" for India's U.S.-built Tarapur nuclear power plant near Bombay, forcing India to turn to other suppliers to keep the station running to this day. India cannot get a similar lifetime fuel-supply guarantee for the new commercial nuclear power reactors it wishes to import thanks to the Hyde Act, which also bars reprocessing and enrichment cooperation even under IAEA safeguards.
Another sticking point is India's insistence on the right -- under international safeguards -- to reprocess fuel discharged from imported reactors. The U.S. has granted such a reprocessing right to its European allies and Japan for decades. Given that the Tarapur spent fuel has continued to accumulate over the decades near Bombay, with the U.S. declining either to exercise its right to take it back or to allow India to reprocess it under IAEA inspection, New Delhi says it cannot get into a similar mess again. In fact, Washington has not compensated India for the large costs it continues to incur to store the highly radioactive spent fuel from Tarapur.
Faced with the Hyde Act's grating conditions, misgivings over the deal have begun to infiltrate the Indian establishment. The U.S. currently has 23 different bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements with partner-states but none is tied to such an overarching, country-specific domestic law. Even if the present hurdle were cleared, the deal faces more challenges in securing approval from the 45-state Nuclear Suppliers' Group and the 35-nation IAEA board.
New Delhi believes time is on its side. India's economic and strategic influence is growing, strongly positioning New Delhi to conclude a deal on terms that are fairer and more balanced than those on offer today. Its interests also demand a deal not just restricted to civil nuclear export controls, but encompassing the full range of dual-use technology controls in force against India.
The present deal, despite the good intentions behind it, seems doomed.
Mr. Chellaney, a professor of strategic studies at the privately funded Center for Policy Research in New Delhi, is the author of "Nuclear Proliferation: The U.S.-India Conflict" (Orient Longman, 1993).
-
There may be a bit of weird formatting in this piece-- substituting "?" for other punctuation.
===========
New York Times:
Atomic Agency Concludes Iran Is Stepping Up Nuclear Work
By DAVID E. SANGER
Published: May 14, 2007
VIENNA, May 14 ? Inspectors for the International Atomic Energy Agency have concluded that Iran appears to have solved most of its technological problems and is now beginning to enrich uranium on a far larger scale than before, according to the agency?s top officials.
The findings may change the calculus of diplomacy in Europe and in Washington, which aimed to force a suspension of Iran?s enrichment activities in large part to prevent it from learning how to produce weapons-grade material.
In a short-notice inspection of Iran?s operations in the main nuclear facility at Natanz on Sunday, conducted in advance of a report to the United Nations Security Council due early next week, the inspectors found that Iranian engineers were already using roughly 1,300 centrifuges and were producing fuel suitable for nuclear reactors, according to diplomats and nuclear experts here.
Until recently, the Iranians were having difficulty keeping the delicate centrifuges spinning at the tremendous speeds necessary to make nuclear fuel and were often running them empty or not at all.
Now, those roadblocks appear to have been surmounted. ?We believe they pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich,? said Mohammed ElBaradei, the director general of the energy agency, who clashed with the Bush administration four years ago when he declared that there was no evidence that Iraq had resumed its nuclear program. ?From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge. People will not like to hear it, but that?s a fact.?
It is unclear whether Iran can sustain its recent progress. Major setbacks are common in uranium enrichment, and experts say it is entirely possible that miscalculation, equipment failures or sabotage ? something the United States is believed to have attempted in the past ? could prevent the Iranian government from reaching its goal of producing fuel on what President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad of Iran boasts is ?an industrial scale.?
The material produced so far would have to undergo further enrichment before it could be transformed into bomb-grade material. To accomplish that, Iran would likely first have to evict the I.A.E.A. inspectors, as North Korea did four years ago.
Even then, it is unclear whether the Iranians have the technology to produce a weapon small enough to fit atop their missiles, a significant engineering challenge.
While the United Nations Security Council has passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend all of its nuclear activities, and it has twice imposed sanctions for Tehran?s refusal to do so, some European nations, and particularly Russia, have questioned whether the demand for suspension still makes sense.
The logic of demanding suspension is that it would delay the day that Iran gained the knowledge to produce its own nuclear fuel ? what the Israelis used to refer to as ?the point of no return.? Those favoring unconditional engagement with Iran have argued that the current strategy is creating a stalemate that the Iranians are exploiting, allowing them to make technological leaps while the Security Council steps up sanctions.
The Bush administration, in contrast, has argued that it will never negotiate while the Iranians speed ever closer to a nuclear weapons capability, saying there has to be a standstill as long as talks proceed. In a telephone interview, R. Nicholas Burns, the undersecretary of state for policy, who is implementing the Iran strategy, said that while he has not heard about the I.A.E.A.?s newest findings, they would not affect American policy.
?We?re proceeding under the assumption that there is still time for diplomacy to work,? he said, although he added that if the Iranians did not agree to suspend production by the time the leaders of the Group of 8 industrial nations meet next month, ?we will move ahead toward a third set of sanctions.?
Mr. ElBaradei has always been skeptical of that strategy, telling European foreign ministers that he doubts the Iranians will fully suspend their nuclear activities and that a face-saving way must be found to resolve the impasse.
?Quite clearly, suspension is a requirement by the Security Council and I would hope the Iranians would listen to the world community,? he said. ?But from a proliferation perspective, the fact of the matter is that one of the purposes of suspension ? keeping them from getting the knowledge ? has been overtaken by events. The focus now should be to stop them from going to industrial scale production, to allow us to do a full-court-press inspection and to be sure they remain inside the treaty.?
The report to the Security Council next Monday is expected to say that since the Iranians stopped complying in February 2006 with an agreement on broad inspections by the agency around the country, the I.A.E.A.?s understanding of ?the scope and content? of Iran?s nuclear activities has deteriorated. I
Inspectors are concerned that Iran has declined to answer a series of questions, posed more than a year ago, about information the agency received from a Pakistani nuclear engineer, Abdul Qadeer Khan. Of particular interest is a document that shows how to design the collision of two nuclear spheres ? something suitable only for producing a weapon.
The inspection conducted on Sunday took place on two hours notice, a time period so short that it appears unlikely that the Iranians could have turned on their centrifuges to impress the inspectors. According to diplomats familiar with the inspectors’ report, in addition to 1,300 working centrifuges, another 300 were being tested and appeared ready to be fed raw nuclear fuel as soon as late this week, the diplomats said. Another 300 are under construction.
“They are at the stage where they are doing one cascade a week,” said one diplomat familiar with the analysis of Iran’s activities, who declined to be identified because of the sensitivity of the information. A “cascade” has 164 centrifuges, and experts say that at this pace, Iran could have 3,000 centrifuges operating by June — enough to make one bomb’s worth of material every year. Tehran may, the diplomat said, be able to build an additional 5,000 centrifuges by the end of the year, for a total of 8,000.
The inspectors have tested the output and concluded that Iran is producing reactor-grade uranium, enriched to a little less than 5 percent purity. But that still worries American officials and experts here at the I.A.E.A. If Iran stores the uranium and later runs it through its centrifuges for another four or five months, it can raise the enrichment level to 90 percent — the level needed for a nuclear weapon.
In the arcane terminology of nuclear proliferation, that is known as a “breakout capability,” the ability to throw inspectors out of the country and then produce weapons-grade fuel, as North Korea did in 2003.
Some Bush administration officials and some nuclear experts here at the I.A.E.A. and elsewhere suspect that the Iranians may not be driving for a weapon but rather for that “breakout capability,” because that alone can serve as a nuclear deterrent. It would be a way for Iran to make clear that it could produce a bomb on short notice, without actually possessing one.
One senior European diplomat, who declined to speak for attribution, said Washington would now have to confront the question of whether it wants to keep Iran from producing any nuclear material or whether it wants to keep Tehran from gaining the ability to build a weapon on short notice.
“The key decision you have to make right now,” the diplomat said, “is that if you don’t want the breakout scenario, you would have to freeze the Iranian program at a laboratory scale. Because if you continue this stalemate, that will bring you, eventually, to a breakout capability.”
Those in the Bush administration who take a hard line on Iran make the opposite argument. They say that the only position that President Bush can take now, without appearing to be backing down, is to stick to the administration’s past argument that “not one centrifuge spins” in Iran. They argue for escalating sanctions and the threat that, if diplomacy fails, the United States could take out the nuclear facilities in a military strike.
But even inside the administration, many officials, particularly in the State Department and the Pentagon, argue that military action would prompt greater chaos in the Middle East and Iranian retribution against American forces in Iraq and possibly elsewhere. Moreover, they have argued that Iran’s enrichment facilities are still at an early enough stage that a military strike would not set the country’s program back very far. Such a strike, they argue, would only make sense once large facilities have been built.
Vice President Cheney, in an interview conducted with Fox News at the end of his trip to the Mideast, said today that Iran appears “to be determined to develop the capacity to enrich uranium in order to produce nuclear weapons.” But he issued no threats, saying simply “they ought to comply with the U.N. resolutions.”
He noted that President Bush personally made the decision to engage in talks with Iran, at the ambassadorial level, about Iran’s activities in Iraq. But those talks are supposed to specifically exclude the nuclear dispute.
-
http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-nuclear26may26,1,754545.story?coll=la-headlines-world
Arabs make plans for nuclear power
Iran's program appears to be stirring interest that some fear will lead to a scramble for atomic weapons in the volatile region.
By Bob Drogin and Borzou Daragahi, LA Times Staff Writers
May 26, 2007
VIENNA — As Iran races ahead with an illicit uranium enrichment effort, nearly a dozen other Middle East nations are moving forward on their own civilian nuclear programs. In the latest development, a team of eight U.N. experts on Friday ended a weeklong trip to Saudi Arabia to provide nuclear guidance to officials from six Persian Gulf countries.
Diplomats and analysts view the Saudi trip as the latest sign that Iran's suspected weapons program has helped spark a chain reaction of nuclear interest among its Arab rivals, which some fear will lead to a scramble for atomic weapons in the world's most volatile region.
The International Atomic Energy Agency sent the team of nuclear experts to Riyadh, the Saudi capital, to advise the Gulf Cooperation Council on building nuclear energy plants. Together, the council members — Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the seven sheikdoms of the United Arab Emirates — control nearly half the world's known oil reserves.
Other nations that have said they plan to construct civilian nuclear reactors or have sought technical assistance and advice from the IAEA, the Vienna-based United Nations nuclear watchdog agency, in the last year include Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Turkey and Yemen, as well as several North African nations.
None of the governments has disclosed plans to build nuclear weapons. But Iran's 18-year secret nuclear effort and its refusal to comply with current U.N. Security Council demands have raised concerns that the Arab world will decide it needs to counter a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. The same equipment can enrich uranium to fuel civilian reactors or, in time and with further enrichment, atomic bombs.
"There is no doubt that countries around the gulf are worried … about whether Iran is seeking nuclear weapons," Gregory L. Schulte, the U.S. representative to U.N. agencies in Vienna, said in an interview. "They're worried about whether it will prompt a nuclear arms race in the region, which would be to no one's benefit."
The United States has long supported the spread of peaceful nuclear energy under strict international safeguards. Schulte said Washington's diplomatic focus remained on stopping Iran before it could produce fuel for nuclear weapons, rather than on trying to restrict nations from developing nuclear power for generating electricity.
But those empowered to monitor and regulate civilian nuclear programs around the world are worried. Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the IAEA, warned Thursday that the surge of interest in sensitive nuclear technology raised the risk of weapons proliferation. Without singling out any nation, he cautioned that some governments might insist on enriching their own uranium to ensure a steady supply of reactor fuel.
"The concern is that by mastering the fuel cycle, countries move dangerously close to nuclear weapons capability," ElBaradei told a disarmament conference in Luxembourg.
Iran is the obvious case in point. Tehran this week defied another U.N. Security Council deadline by which it was to freeze its nuclear program. The IAEA reported that Iran instead was accelerating uranium enrichment without having yet built the reactors that would need the nuclear fuel. At the same time, the IAEA complained, Iran's diminishing cooperation had made it impossible to confirm Tehran's claims that the program is only for peaceful purposes.
That has unnerved Iran's neighbors as well as members of the Security Council.
"We have the right if the Iranians are going to insist on their right to develop their civilian nuclear program," said Mustafa Alani, a security expert at the Gulf Research Center, a think tank based in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. "We tell the Iranians, 'We have no problem with you developing civilian nuclear energy, but if you're going to turn your nuclear program into a weapons program, we'll do the same.' "
Iran sought to rally Arab support for its nuclear program at the World Economic Forum meeting of business and political leaders this month in Jordan.
"Iran will be a partner, a brotherly partner, and will share its capabilities with the people of the region," Mohammed J.A. Larijani, a former deputy foreign minister, told reporters.
Arab officials were cool to his approach, however, and openly questioned Iran's intentions.
The IAEA team's weeklong foray to Saudi Arabia followed ElBaradei's visit to the kingdom in April. The Gulf Cooperation Council plans to present the results of its study on developing nuclear plants to the leaders of council nations in the Omani capital of Muscat in December.
"They don't say it, but everyone can see that [Iran] is at least one of the reasons behind the drive to obtaining the nuclear technology," said Salem Ahmad Sahab, a professor of political science at King Abdulaziz University in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. "If the neighbors are capable of obtaining the technology, why not them?"
Officially, leaders of the Arab gulf states say they are eager to close a technology gap with Iran, as well as with Israel, which operates two civilian reactors and is widely believed to have built at least 80 nuclear warheads since the 1960s. Israel does not acknowledge its nuclear arsenal under a policy aimed at deterring regional foes while avoiding an arms race.
Advocates argue that the gulf states need nuclear energy despite their vast oil and natural gas reserves.
The region's growing economies suffer occasional summer power outages, and the parched climate makes the nations there susceptible to water shortages, which can be offset by the energy-intensive processing of seawater.
=======================
The promising future of nuclear energy in electricity generation and desalination can make it a source for meeting increasing needs," Abdulrahman Attiya, the Kuwaiti head of the Gulf Cooperation Council, told the group this week in Riyadh.
Attiya also cited long-term economic and environmental advantages to nuclear energy.
"A large part of Gulf Cooperation Council oil and gas products can be used for export in light of expected high prices and demand," he said. "It will also help to limit the increase in carbon dioxide emissions in the gulf region."
It remains unclear how many countries will carry through on ambitious and enormously expensive nuclear projects. In some cases, analysts say, the nuclear announcements may be intended for domestic prestige, and as a signal to Iran that others intend to check its emergence as a regional power. As a result, some analysts say fears of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East are overblown.
"Those who caricature what's going on as Sunni concern about a Shiite bomb are really oversimplifying the case," said Martin Malin, a nuclear expert at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, referring to Sunni Muslim-led Arab countries and Shiite Muslim-led Iran.
Aggressive international monitoring, he contended, could ensure that nuclear energy programs don't secretly morph into weapons capabilities.
"If what Jordan is really concerned about is energy, and the U.S. is concerned about weapons, all kinds of oversight can be provided," Malin said.
A Russian diplomat here similarly cautioned that Iran's influence on other nations' nuclear plans might be overstated. "I should be very cautious about any connection between these two things," he said. "We don't deny that even Iran has the right to peaceful nuclear activities."
Although enthusiasm for prospective nuclear programs appears strongest in the Middle East, governments elsewhere have displayed interest in atomic power after years of decline in the industry that followed the 1979 reactor accident at Three Mile Island in Pennsylvania and the far worse 1986 radiation leak at Chernobyl in Ukraine. About 30 countries operate nuclear reactors for energy, and that number seems certain to grow.
"There's certainly a renaissance of interest," said an IAEA official who works on the issue. "And there's likely to be a renaissance in construction over the next few decades."
IAEA officials say the largest growth in nuclear power is likely to occur in China, India, Russia, the United States and South Africa, with Argentina, Finland and France following close behind. The United States has 103 operating plants, more than any other country, and as many as 31 additional plants are under consideration or have begun the regulatory process.
And there are other nations in line. Oil-rich Nigeria and Indonesia are preparing to build nuclear plants. Belarus and Vietnam have approached the IAEA for advice. Algeria signed a deal with Russia in January on possible nuclear cooperation. Morocco and Poland are said to be considering nuclear power. Myanmar disclosed plans to purchase a Russian research reactor.
Even Sudan, one of the world's poorest countries, has expressed interest.
"When Sudan shows up, we say, 'You're in a real early stage and here's what you need. A law. Get people trained. Build roads. And so on,' " the IAEA official said.
So far, the nuclear programs around Iran are in the early planning stages. Alani, the security expert in Dubai, said most of the nations in the region were scoping out the possibilities but had made no final decisions or begun constructing facilities.
"They feel it's a right and significant move at least to put [their] foot in the door of civilian nuclear energy," he said. "It's not a race, not yet."
===============
Going nuclear
Unlike Iran, most of the countries that have recently begun exploring or setting up nuclear programs are staunch allies of the U.S., often with strong military and political ties to Washington. A sampling of some regional nations' plans:
Yemen
Seeks to join the Gulf Cooperation Council's nuclear project.
Egypt
Plans to revive a nuclear energy program it abandoned two decades ago.
Turkey
Plans to build three nuclear power plants along the Black Sea coast.
Jordan
Plans to pursue a nuclear energy program.
Tunisia
Plans to build its first nuclear power plant by 2020.
Source: Bob Drogin, Times staff writer
-
ISLAMABAD, Pakistan, June 22 — Pakistan is building a third plutonium production reactor at a major nuclear weapons center, a sign of plans to increase the nation’s nuclear arsenal significantly, a Washington group specializing in nuclear issues said Friday.
Based on satellite imagery of a reactor under construction at Khushab, about 100 miles south of the capital, Islamabad, it appeared that Pakistan would be able to build a new generation of lighter, more powerful weapons that could be more easily launched on missiles, said David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security.
The new reactor, which had not been publicly known about, is a replica of a second heavy water reactor at Khushab, Mr. Albright said in a telephone interview.
“The other two reactors at Khushab are there for weapons, and this is a duplicate of the second,” Mr. Albright said. He said he was convinced that the new reactor was intended for plutonium to be used in nuclear weapons and not for a civilian energy program.
He added that it was possible that Pakistan was pushing forward with the new reactor because the military was not satisfied that the current nuclear warheads were of sufficient power.
The more powerful weapons, which use plutonium instead of highly enriched uranium — currently Pakistan’s principal nuclear explosive material — would do greater damage to the large cities of its rival, India, which also possesses nuclear arms, Mr. Albright said.
“The trouble with the third reactor is that it seems almost provocative, especially when Pakistan doesn’t say anything, and remains ambiguous,” Mr. Albright said.
Pakistan also recently tested a cruise missile on which it could put a smaller, more lethal nuclear warhead, Mr. Albright said.
A State Department deputy spokesman, Thomas H. Casey, said, “I am not in a position to speculate on the veracity of the information in this report or the intentions of the Pakistani government.” Washington continued to discourage expansion or modernization of such weapons programs in Pakistan, he said.
A spokeswoman for Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry, Tasnim Aslam, did not confirm or deny that a new reactor was under construction.
“Pakistan has a nuclear weapons program, and we have nuclear facilities in Khushab,” she said. The site was “well known,” and “coordinates” were exchanged with India, she said.
“Regarding details of development of nuclear weapons facilities, we don’t comment on that,” Ms. Aslam said.
John D. Negroponte, the deputy secretary of state, met with the Pakistani president, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, here last weekend during a visit that reaffirmed Washington’s backing of the military leader, who is now under increasing popular pressure to return Pakistan to civilian rule.
It was not clear whether Mr. Negroponte raised the issue of the construction of the new reactor with General Musharraf.
Critics of the Bush administration’s support of General Musharraf, who is viewed by the White House as a vital partner in the fight against terrorism, assert that Pakistan has been given too easy a ride on its nuclear weapons program.
“The expansion of the Pakistani nuclear program demonstrates that the Bush policy of giving Musharraf a pass on nonproliferation is accelerating the nuclear arms race in South Asia,” said Bruce Riedel, who directed Pakistan policy at the National Security Council under President Clinton and is now at the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution in Washington.
Pakistan’s facilities at Khushab are not subject to safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency because the nation has not signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. The first reactor at the Khushab site came on line in 1998.
Maria Sultan, a Pakistan nuclear expert at the South Asian Strategic Stability Institute in Britain, said that Pakistan had embarked on an ambitious program for civilian nuclear power that involved building new reactors by 2030. The new reactor could be for either military needs or civilian power requirements, she said.
Pakistan and India, which has also not signed the nonproliferation treaty, each have enough fissile material for more than 50 nuclear weapons, and possibly 100, Mr. Albright said.
-
Defecting Iranian Intelligence General Reveals Iranian Nuclear Secrets.
Iranian general, Ali Reza Asgari, who disappeared in Istanbul last February, has defected and is being held by the United States, Yedioth Ahronot published Sunday. Asgari was considered by the US one of the top intelligence officials in Iran. His defection was made possible thanks to an intricate CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) operation, climaxing in him joining Western intelligence officers in Istanbul, who then had him and his family transferred to the US.
Asgari, who according to reports is being held in a top-secret military installation, has been able to shed a new light on much of the Iranian regime's most inner workings, especially regarding the Iranian nuclear development project. Up until now, Iran - according to known intelligence - has been building two nuclear plants, in Arak and Bushehr, and has been using centrifuges to enrich uranium. Iran, Asgari told his interrogators, is working in another stealth path, toward achieving its nuclear goal. This third method involves attempts to enrich uranium by using laser beams along with certain chemicals designed to enhance the process. These trials are held in a special weapons facility in Natanz.
This new information has those who know its details in full worried. The fact the Iranians are trying to find new ways to enrich uranium is not new onto itself, but the progress made, at least according to the information given by Asgari, is much greater than was suspected. Western intelligence agencies are now busy analyzing the information Asgari provided them with, and estimating just how long is it before Iran has a nuclear bomb.
According to a source, Iran had caught on to Asgari's defection, and had taken preventive actions to protect its intelligence assets, in anticipation of the information he may reveal. [Bergman/Middle East News/8July2007]
-
Bad Company
Before the U.S. makes a nuclear deal with India, it should insist on an end to ties with Iran.
BY BRET STEPHENS
Tuesday, July 31, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
American and Indian diplomats have now completed negotiations for the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Accord, also known as a 123 Agreement (after a section of the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act that governs such deals). The agreement, which bridges the gap between what Congress approved late last year and the conditions demanded by India's government, would allow India to purchase U.S. nuclear technology and fuel, ostensibly for civilian purposes only. Whether New Delhi abides by that commitment is another matter: India first tested a nuclear device in 1974 using plutonium it had illicitly diverted from a Canadian-built reactor--a point apparently forgotten by Undersecretary of State Nick Burns, who noted in a press conference Friday that "unlike Iran. . . . India has not violated its nuclear obligations."
But never mind. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is not the noxious Indira Gandhi, 2007 is not 1974, and there are defensible reasons to support a deal--cementing a strategic relationship between two great democracies foremost among them. But that doesn't mean any deal, under any circumstances. Nor does it mean that Mr. Burns is entitled to shade what some of those circumstances entail, especially as they relate to India's curiously solid ties to Iran.
Take the following statement by Mr. Burns: "I would disagree . . . that somehow there's a burgeoning military relationship [between India and Iran]."
Now take an item from the March 19 issue of DefenseNews, under the headline: "India, Iran Form Joint Group to Deepen Defense Ties." According to the report, the agreement, "which follows the broader strategic partnership accord the two countries signed in 2003, emerged from high-level talks held here during the March 4-9 visit of Rear Adm. Sajjad Kouchaki Badlani, commander of Iran's Navy."
Or consider this Burnsian nugget: "We've made the argument that India has not proliferated its nuclear technology, that India, in effect, outside the [Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty] system, has played by the rules. . . ."
Yet in September 2004 the U.S. imposed sanctions on Chaudhary Surendar and Y.S.R. Prasad, both former chairmen of India's state-run Nuclear Power Corporation, "for allegedly passing nuclear secrets to Tehran," according to a March 2005 report in this newspaper. Though State later dropped the sanctions on Dr. Surendar, they remain in force against Dr. Prasad, who is believed to have passed on "the technology needed to extract tritium from heavy-water nuclear reactors." Iran is currently building such a reactor in Arak; tritium can be used to boost the yields of atomic bombs. Dr. Prasad denies the charges.
That is not all. Last year, State slapped sanctions on two Indian companies for selling Iran precursor chemicals for rocket fuel and chemical weapons. In April, the Department of Justice released a 15-count indictment against two Indian individuals "on charges of supplying the Indian government with controlled technology," including "electrical components that could have applications in missile guidance and firing systems."
In an eye-opening article in the current issue of the Washington Quarterly, Christine Fair notes that "India has developed intelligence outposts in Iran, including the Indian consulate in Zahedan and a relatively new consulate in Bandar Abbas, which. . . . provides India significant power-projection advantages in any future conflict with Pakistan."
Ms. Fair, a research associate at the United States Institute of Peace, also notes that "in the past, India helped Iran develop submarine batteries that were more effective in the warm-weather Persian Gulf waters than its Russian-manufactured batteries and is planning to sell Iran the Konkurs antitank missile."
Advocates of the U.S. nuclear deal with India recognize these facts. But they argue that they are largely driven by India's need for energy, which explains the 700-mile gas pipeline being built between India and Iran. Thus, says Mr. Burns, "the agreement also gives India greater control and security over its energy supplies, making it less reliant on imports from countries . . . like Iran."
Would that this were even half-true. India's relationship with Iran is driven as much by the desire to encircle Pakistan and gain access to Afghanistan as it is by energy concerns. Then, too, nuclear power, which can only provide base load electrical demand, cannot by itself supplant the need for hydrocarbons. "Any time you increase the base load generating capacity of a country, you generally must increase the amount of peak load capacity to match it," says nonproliferation expert Henry Sokolski. "And the most efficient peak load generators are natural-gas fired." Put simply, it's hard to see how building nuclear power will reduce India's interest in Iranian natural gas.
None of this has gone unnoticed in Congress. In May, seven members of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs sent a letter to Prime Minister Singh raising concerns about the Indo-Iranian relationship. Mr. Singh received a similar letter from eight U.S. Senators, including Republican Jon Kyl and Democrat Barbara Boxer. The letters were never answered. "You can take a sledgehammer to the heads of the Indians about this issue and they still won't get it," complains a Congressional staffer.
Actually, the Indians are starting to get it. "We are aware of our responsibilities and we know the danger of an Iran with nuclear weapons," says Raminder Singh Jassal, India's deputy chief of mission in Washington. He dismisses the naval visits as "ceremonial" and insists "we know how to calibrate our relationship [with Iran] without compromising on essentials."
Maybe that's true. Or maybe the U.S. and India have different notions of what a "calibrated" relationship means. But if Congress is going to punch a hole in the NPT to accommodate India--with all the moral hazard that entails for the nonproliferation regime--it should get something in return. Getting India to drop, and drop completely, its presumptively ceremonial military ties to Iran isn't asking a lot.
Mr. Stephens is a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board. His column appears in the Journal Tuesdays.
-
U.S./INDIA: The United States and India have released the text of the 123 civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. The 22-page document, which covers nuclear technology sharing, fuel supply and security protocol, will stay in effect for 40 years and can be terminated on a year's notice if a change in the security environment occurs. The United States will help India obtain approval from the 45-member Nuclear Suppliers Group before the agreement is submitted to the U.S. Congress for approval.
stratfor.com
-
RUSSIA/IRAN: Russia has told Iran that it will not deliver fuel for Iran's Russian-built Bushehr nuclear reactor unless Tehran reveals details of its past atomic activities, an unnamed European diplomat told The Associated Press. An unnamed U.S. official reportedly said Russia is not meeting commitments with Iran regarding the reactor, delaying activation of the facility.
CHINA: China is willing to do some "creative thinking" with the international community in the Nuclear Suppliers Group on the issue of the Indian-U.S. 123 nuclear deal, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman told Press Trust of India. The statement is significantly more optimistic than past statements by the Chinese government about possible approval of the deal.
Stratfor.com
-
FRANCE: France has been working with a number of Arab states to develop peaceful nuclear programs to end the region's dependence on oil and improve relations with France, The Jerusalem Post reported, citing a French Foreign Ministry official. France has entered into a deal with Libya and has discussed creating programs with the United Arab Emirates and Algeria. The official said France has ensured the programs will be used for civilian purposes, mainly to produce drinking water by desalination.
stratfor.com
-
Ah, thanks France, that should turn out well. :roll:
-
This really inspires confidence :-P :roll: :x Somebody screwed the pooch.
By Michael Hoffman
Military Times
A B-52 bomber mistakenly loaded with five nuclear warheads flew from Minot Air Force Base, N.D, to Barksdale Air Force Base, La., on Aug. 30, resulting in an Air Force-wide investigation, according to three officers who asked not to be identified because they were not authorized to discuss the incident.
The B-52 was loaded with Advanced Cruise Missiles, part of a Defense Department effort to decommission 400 of the ACMs. But the nuclear warheads should have been removed at Minot before being transported to Barksdale, the officers said. The missiles were mounted onto the pylons of the bomber’s wings.
Advanced Cruise Missiles carry a W80-1 warhead with a yield of 5 to 150 kilotons and are specifically designed for delivery by B-52 strategic bombers.
Air Force spokesman Lt. Col. Ed Thomas said the transfer was safely conducted and the weapons were in Air Force custody and control at all times.
However, the mistake was not discovered until the B-52 landed at Barskdale, which left the warheads unaccounted for during the approximately 3-1/2 hour flight between the two bases, the officers said.
An investigation headed by Maj. Gen. Douglas Raaberg, director of Air and Space Operations at Air Combat Command Headquarters, was launched immediately to find the cause of the mistake and figure out how it could have been prevented, Thomas said.
Air Force officials wouldn’t officially specify whether nuclear weapons were involved, in accordance with long-standing Defense Department policy regarding nuclear munitions, Thomas said. However, the three officers close to the situation did confirm the warheads were nuclear.
Officials at Minot immediately conducted an inventory of its nuclear weapons after the oversight was discovered, and Thomas said he could confirm that all remaining nuclear weapons at Minot are accounted for.
“Air Force standards are very exacting when it comes to munitions handling,” he said. “The weapons were always in our custody and there was never a danger to the American public.”
At no time was there a risk for a nuclear detonation, even if the B-52 crashed on its way to Barksdale, said Steve Fetter, a former Defense Department official who worked on nuclear weapons policy in 1993-94. A crash could ignite the high explosives associated with the warhead, and possibly cause a leak of the plutonium, but the warheads’ elaborate safeguards would prevent a nuclear detonation from occurring, he said.
“The main risk would have been the way the Air Force responded to any problems with the flight because they would have handled it much differently if they would have known nuclear warheads were onboard,” he said.
The risk of the warheads falling into the hands of rogue nations or terrorists was minimal since the weapons never left the United States, according to Fetter and Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, an independent research and policy think tank in Washington, D.C.
The crews involved with the mistaken load at the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot have been temporarily decertified from performing their duties involving munitions pending corrective actions or additional training, Thomas said.
Air Combat Command will have a command-wide mission stand down Sept. 14 to review their procedures in response to this oversight, he said.
“The Air Force takes its mission to safeguard weapons seriously,” he said. “No effort will be spared to ensure that the matter is thoroughly and completely investigated.”
Source Drudge
-
See No Proliferation
Reality can't interfere with "diplomacy."
Wednesday, October 17, 2007 12:01 a.m. EDT
The silence from the Bush Administration over Israel's recent bombing of a site in Syria gets louder by the day. U.S. officials continue to look the other way, even as reports multiply that Israel and U.S. intelligence analysts believe the site was a partly constructed nuclear reactor modeled after a North Korean design.
The weekend was full of reports about these intelligence judgments, first in the U.S. media then picked up by the Israeli press. Israel's former chief of military intelligence, Major General Aharon Zeevi Farkash, called them "logical." That's the term of art people use to confirm things in Israel when they want to get around the military censors.
Meanwhile, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Israel and offered her own non-confirmation confirmation. "We're very concerned about any evidence of, any indication of, proliferation," she said, according to the New York Times. "And we're handling those in appropriate diplomatic channels." Just what you need when your enemies are caught proliferating nuclear expertise--a little more diplomacy. The world is lucky Israel preferred to act against the threat, in what seems to have been a smaller version of its 1981 attack against Iraq's Osirak reactor.
Ms. Rice went on to say that "The issues of proliferation do not affect the Palestinian-Israeli peace efforts we are making," adding that "This is the time to be extremely careful." In other words, even if North Korea is spreading nuclear weapons, she doesn't want to say so in public because it might offend a country--Syria--that is refusing even to take part in the regional Palestinian-Israeli peace conference next month. That's certainly being "careful."
Or perhaps she fears offending North Korea, which the Bush Administration has agreed to trust for finally pledging to dismantle its nuclear weapons program and disavowing proliferation. In return for that promise, the U.S. is shipping fuel oil to Pyongyang and is taking steps to remove North Korea from its list of terror states. It would certainly be inconvenient, not to say politically embarrassing, if North Korea were found to be helping Syria get a bomb amid all of this diplomacy.
All the more so given that only last year, after North Korea exploded a nuclear device, President Bush explicitly warned North Korea against such proliferation. "America's position is clear," he said at the time. "The transfer of nuclear weapons or material will be considered a grave threat to the United States." More than once, Mr. Bush added that, "We will hold North Korea fully accountable for the consequences."
Even granting some leeway in defining the words "fully accountable," they cannot mean winking at the spread of nuclear know-how to a U.S. enemy in the most dangerous corner of the world. With its continuing silence about what happened in Syria, the Bush Administration is undermining its own security credibility. More important, the see-no-evil pose is showing North Korea that it can cheat even on an agreement whose ink is barely dry--and without "consequences."
WSJ
-
Iran: Wielding its Regained Nuclear Leverage
Summary
While the United States tries to downplay Russia's Dec. 17 announcement that nuclear fuel had been delivered to Iran's Bushehr nuclear facility, Iran is brimming with confidence and making announcements about domestic uranium enrichment activity and the construction of a second nuclear power plant. Tehran has regained -- and is keeping a firm grip on -- its nuclear bargaining chip to use in negotiations with Washington, but the Bush administration's patience could be wearing thin.
Analysis
Iran has been oozing with confidence ever since Russia's Dec. 17 announcement that nuclear fuel had been delivered to Iran's Bushehr nuclear facility. After years of politically motivated delays, the Iranians finally got their hands on the key to making Bushehr operational -- and thus regained their nuclear leverage in negotiations with Washington after the recent National Intelligence Estimate essentially obliterated an Iranian nuclear weapons threat. The regained leverage lies in the unstated fact that an operational Bushehr can theoretically produce enough plutonium to make a small, crude plutonium bomb on a weekly basis if the Iranians decide to kick out inspectors and tinker with the reactor output.
Washington is doing everything in its power to downplay this latest development in Iran's nuclear saga, saying that since Russia has provided fuel (with appropriate International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards), Tehran has no reason to continue enrichment for civilian nuclear power. But the Iranians are milking the Bushehr fuel delivery for all it is worth, and in a flurry of statements Tehran is dramatically inflating the threat of its nuclear program for its own political gain.
Immediately following the Bushehr fuel delivery announcement, Atomic Energy Organization of Iran chief and Iranian Vice President Gholamreza Aghazadeh announced on state television that the Bushehr development would not stop Iran's uranium enrichment process, and that enrichment would continue at the Natanz plant in central Iran to provide enough nuclear fuel for local power plants. He went on to say that the 3,000 centrifuges allegedly operating at Natanz would be increased to 50,000. The next day, Iran announced that it had done an aerial survey of "generous amounts" of uranium deposits in central and southern Iran (although how one can spot uranium deposits from the air is a mystery).
Aghazadeh also announced Dec. 17 that Iran was building a 360-megawatt nuclear power plant in Darkhovein, south of the city of Ahvaz in the southwestern province of Khuzestan. Iran is claiming all components of this plant would be made by Iranian engineers. But while the Iranians have no doubt carefully watched Russian construction at Bushehr (and diligently taken notes), the construction of a large power generation reactor is a technically challenging undertaking that realistically requires a bit more engineering experience than looking over someone's shoulder. Even India -- a country far more advanced both in terms of an engineering base in general and nuclear experience in particular -- is still looking to Russia to build nuclear power generation facilities in its country. The Russians also strategically did not give the Iranians the benefit of learning how the reactor vessel for Bushehr was built. That crucial component was built near St. Petersburg and then shipped to Bushehr in November 2001, leaving Iran with the limited knowledge of how to insert an already-built vessel into the reactor design.
Meanwhile, Iran has reportedly had to import much of its hardware for uranium enrichment -- and that hardware, whether of domestic or foreign manufacture, does not yet appear to be of particularly high quality. That said, the reactors do not require as much fine machining precision as uranium enrichment does. The Russian light water VVER-1000 power unit design (a Russian acronym for water-cooled, water-moderated and with a roughly 1,000 megawatt capacity) now in place in Bushehr is a late Soviet design thought to be more forgiving than comparable Western designs in terms of functionality -- but without the full suite of safety features. Even if Iran lacks the capability to build this plant completely on its own, it can break ground and begin constructing the facilities whenever it wants and attempt to extract political benefits from that construction for years without making substantial forward progress with the actual reactor vessel design.
With the nuclear card back in its hand, Iran can afford to push the nuclear envelope with the United States to bolster its position in the Iraq negotiations. It comes as no surprise, then, that the Iranians seem to be dragging their feet in the talks and were likely the main impetus behind postponement of a meeting with U.S. officials in Baghdad that was scheduled to take place Dec. 18. While U.S. President George W. Bush's administration is exercising patience in dealing with Iran's nuclear stunts, that patience could soon wear thin, spelling trouble for a future settlement on Iraq.
The definition of a nuclear weapons program is highly subjective, as illustrated by the divergence in views between Israel and the United States over whether the production of fissile material represents a weapons program. The United States could easily manipulate the subjectivity of this nuclear debate for political purposes if Washington wanted to revitalize the threat of military action against the Islamic republic. A shift in the U.S. position on Iran's nuclear ambitions does not appear imminent, but it is certainly possible.
Stratfor
-
Toward a Nuclear-Free World
By GEORGE P. SHULTZ, WILLIAM J. PERRY, HENRY A. KISSINGER and SAM NUNN
January 15, 2008; Page A13
The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands.
The steps we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely available, deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.
One year ago, in an essay in this paper, we called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons, to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The interest, momentum and growing political space that has been created to address these issues over the past year has been extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all over the world.
Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for urgent action: "It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security; in fact, with every passing year they make our security more precarious."
In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating: "What we need is both a vision -- a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons -- and action -- progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak."
We have also been encouraged by additional indications of general support for this project from other former U.S. officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisors. These include: Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara and Colin Powell.
Inspired by this reaction, in October 2007, we convened veterans of the past six administrations, along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, for a conference at Stanford University's Hoover Institution. There was general agreement about the importance of the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as a guide to our thinking about nuclear policies, and about the importance of a series of steps that will pull us back from the nuclear precipice.
The U.S. and Russia, which possess close to 95% of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join.
Some steps are already in progress, such as the ongoing reductions in the number of nuclear warheads deployed on long-range, or strategic, bombers and missiles. Other near-term steps that the U.S. and Russia could take, beginning in 2008, can in and of themselves dramatically reduce nuclear dangers. They include:
• Extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991. Much has been learned about the vital task of verification from the application of these provisions. The treaty is scheduled to expire on Dec. 5, 2009. The key provisions of this treaty, including their essential monitoring and verification requirements, should be extended, and the further reductions agreed upon in the 2002 Moscow Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions should be completed as soon as possible.
• Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks. Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today's environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows in the U.S.-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.
• Discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days. Interpreting deterrence as requiring mutual assured destruction (MAD) is an obsolete policy in today's world, with the U.S. and Russia formally having declared that they are allied against terrorism and no longer perceive each other as enemies.
• Undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative multilateral ballistic-missile defense and early warning systems, as proposed by Presidents Bush and Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit meeting. This should include agreement on plans for countering missile threats to Europe, Russia and the U.S. from the Middle East, along with completion of work to establish the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow. Reducing tensions over missile defense will enhance the possibility of progress on the broader range of nuclear issues so essential to our security. Failure to do so will make broader nuclear cooperation much more difficult.
• Dramatically accelerate work to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb. There are nuclear weapons materials in more than 40 countries around the world, and there are recent reports of alleged attempts to smuggle nuclear material in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus. The U.S., Russia and other nations that have worked with the Nunn-Lugar programs, in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), should play a key role in helping to implement United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 relating to improving nuclear security -- by offering teams to assist jointly any nation in meeting its obligations under this resolution to provide for appropriate, effective security of these materials.
As Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger put it in his address at our October conference, "Mistakes are made in every other human endeavor. Why should nuclear weapons be exempt?" To underline the governor's point, on Aug. 29-30, 2007, six cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads were loaded on a U.S. Air Force plane, flown across the country and unloaded. For 36 hours, no one knew where the warheads were, or even that they were missing.
• Start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security, and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination. These smaller and more portable nuclear weapons are, given their characteristics, inviting acquisition targets for terrorist groups.
• Strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a counter to the global spread of advanced technologies. More progress in this direction is urgent, and could be achieved through requiring the application of monitoring provisions (Additional Protocols) designed by the IAEA to all signatories of the NPT.
• Adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities. This calls for a bipartisan review, first, to examine improvements over the past decade of the international monitoring system to identify and locate explosive underground nuclear tests in violation of the CTBT; and, second, to assess the technical progress made over the past decade in maintaining high confidence in the reliability, safety and effectiveness of the nation's nuclear arsenal under a test ban. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization is putting in place new monitoring stations to detect nuclear tests -- an effort the U.S should urgently support even prior to ratification.
In parallel with these steps by the U.S. and Russia, the dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations.
Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations, by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities. The government of Norway will sponsor a conference in February that will contribute to this process.
Another subject: Developing an international system to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. With the growing global interest in developing nuclear energy and the potential proliferation of nuclear enrichment capabilities, an international program should be created by advanced nuclear countries and a strengthened IAEA. The purpose should be to provide for reliable supplies of nuclear fuel, reserves of enriched uranium, infrastructure assistance, financing, and spent fuel management -- to ensure that the means to make nuclear weapons materials isn't spread around the globe.
There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations would become involved.
President Reagan's maxim of "trust but verify" should be reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials.
We should also build an international consensus on ways to deter or, when required, to respond to, secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements.
Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without the vision of moving toward zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.
In some respects, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can't get there from here. But the risks from continuing to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible.
Mr. Shultz was secretary of state from 1982 to 1989. Mr. Perry was secretary of defense from 1994 to 1997. Mr. Kissinger was secretary of state from 1973 to 1977. Mr. Nunn is former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The following participants in the Hoover-NTI conference also endorse the view in this statement: General John Abizaid, Graham Allison, Brooke Anderson, Martin Anderson, Steve Andreasen, Mike Armacost, Bruce Blair, Matt Bunn, Ashton Carter, Sidney Drell, General Vladimir Dvorkin, Bob Einhorn, Mark Fitzpatrick, James Goodby, Rose Gottemoeller, Tom Graham, David Hamburg, Siegfried Hecker, Tom Henriksen, David Holloway, Raymond Jeanloz, Ray Juzaitis, Max Kampelman, Jack Matlock, Michael McFaul, John McLaughlin, Don Oberdorfer, Pavel Podvig, William Potter, Richard Rhodes, Joan Rohlfing, Harry Rowen, Scott Sagan, Roald Sagdeev, Abe Sofaer, Richard Solomon, and Philip Zelikow
-
ElBaradei's Real Agenda
By DANIELLE PLETKA and MICHAEL RUBIN
February 25, 2008; Page A14
WSJ
On Friday, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Mohamed ElBaradei submitted a report on Iran's nuclear program to the IAEA's Board of Governors. It concluded that, barring "one major remaining issue relevant to the nature of Iran's nuclear programme" -- including a mysterious "green salt project" -- Iran's explanations of its suspicious nuclear activities "are consistent with [the IAEA's] findings [or at least] not inconsistent."
The report represents Mr. ElBaradei's best effort to whitewash Tehran's record. Earlier this month, on Iranian television, he made clear his purpose, announcing that he expected "the issue would be solved this year." And if doing so required that he do battle against the IAEA's technical experts, reverse previous conclusions about suspect programs, and allow designees of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad an unprecedented role in crafting a "work plan" that would allow the regime to receive a cleaner bill of health from the IAEA -- so be it.
Mr. ElBaradei's report culminates a career of freelancing and fecklessness which has crippled the reputation of the organization he directs. He has used his Nobel Prize to cultivate an image of a technocratic lawyer interested in peace and justice and above politics. In reality, he is a deeply political figure, animated by antipathy for the West and for Israel on what has increasingly become a single-minded crusade to rescue favored regimes from charges of proliferation.
Mr. ElBaradei assumed the directorship on Dec. 1, 1997. On his watch, but undetected by his agency, Iran constructed its covert enrichment facilities and, according to the 2007 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate, engaged in covert nuclear-weapons design. India and Pakistan detonated nuclear devices. A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani nuclear godfather, exported nuclear technology around the world.
In 2003, Libyan strongman Moammar Gadhafi confessed to an undetected weapons effort. Mr. ElBaradei's response? He rebuked the U.S. and U.K. for bypassing him. When Israel recently destroyed what many believe was a secret (also undetected) nuclear facility in Syria, Mr. ElBaradei told the New Yorker's Seymour Hersh that it is "unlikely that this building was a nuclear facility," although his agency has not physically investigated the site.
The IAEA's mission is to verify that "States comply with their commitments, under the Non-Proliferation Treaty and other non-proliferation agreements, to use nuclear material and facilities only for peaceful purposes." Yet in 2004 Mr. ElBaradei wrote in the New York Times that, "We must abandon the unworkable notion that it is morally reprehensible for some countries to pursue weapons of mass destruction, yet morally acceptable for others to rely on them for security."
IAEA technical experts have complained anonymously to the press that the latest report on Iran was revamped to suit the director's political goals. In 2004, Mr. ElBaradei sought to purge mention of Iranian attempts to purchase beryllium metal, an important component in a nuclear charge, from IAEA documents. He also left unmentioned Tehran's refusal to grant IAEA inspectors access to the Parchin military complex, where satellite imagery showed a facility seemingly designed to test and produce nuclear weapons.
The IAEA's latest report leaves unmentioned allegations by an Iranian opposition group of North Korean work on nuclear warheads at Khojir, a military research site near Tehran. It also amends previous conclusions and closes the book on questions about Iran's work on polonium 210 -- which nuclear experts suspect Iran experimented with for use as an initiator for nuclear weapons, but which the regime claims was research on radioisotope batteries. In 2004, the IAEA declared itself "somewhat uncertain regarding the plausibility of the stated purpose of the [polonium] experiments." Today it finds these explanations "consistent with the Agency's findings and with other information available."
The IAEA director seems intent on undercutting Security Council diplomacy. Just weeks after President George Bush toured the Middle East to build Arab support for pressure on Tehran, Mr. ElBaradei appeared on Egyptian television on Feb. 5 to urge Arabs in the opposite direction, insisting Iran was cooperating and should not be pressured. And as he grows more and more isolated from Western powers intent on disarming Iran, Mr. ElBaradei has found champions in the developing and Arab world. They cheer his self-imposed mission -- to hamstring U.S. efforts to constrain Iran's program, whether or not the regime is violating its non-proliferation obligations or pursuing nuclear weapons.
In working to undermine sanctions, however, Mr. ElBaradei demeans the purpose of his agency and undercuts its non-proliferation mission. He also makes military action all the more likely.
Ms. Pletka and Mr. Rubin are, respectively, vice president for and resident scholar in Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
-
Couple this with the Iranians guy continued statements that Israel's existence is close to an end and one can conclude only *one* thing. I have a feeling Israel cannot successfully destroy Iran's nuclear weapons program without US help. If a crat wins Israel can forget any chance of that.
The only hope is that the leadership of Iran will be toppled and a more moderate regime come into power. I am not real optimistic about this. It is like hoping a Gilder stock will come back from the dead.
-
We are in for some expensive lessons that we should have learned from WWII.
-
We are in for some expensive lessons that we should have learned from WWII.
Those who do not learn from history are doomed to repeat it.
-
The Adventure continues :-D
-
Pakistan nuclear staff go missing
Two employees of Pakistan's atomic energy agency have been abducted in the country's restive north-western region abutting the Afghan border, police say.
The technicians went missing on the same day as Pakistan's ambassador to Afghanistan, Tariq Azizuddin, was reportedly abducted in the same region.
Mr Azizuddin had been going overland from the city of Peshawar to Kabul.
Pakistan's north-west has witnessed fierce fighting between Islamist militants and government troops.
The pro-Taleban guerrillas declared a unilateral ceasefire last week after months of clashes with troops garrisoned there.
The workers from Pakistan's Atomic Energy Commission were on a mission to map mineral deposits in the mountains when they were kidnapped, police say.
"The technicians were going for some geological survey in the area when they were kidnapped at gunpoint along with their driver," Romail Akram, a senior police official, told Reuters news agency.
Their vehicle was intercepted by masked gunmen in the Dera Ismail Khan district, a stronghold of local militants.
"We don't know if the abductors were militants or members of some criminal gang," a local police chief, Akbar Nasir, told the AFP news agency.
He said efforts to locate the missing men had yet to yield any results.
Karzai concerned
Efforts are also continuing to locate the missing Pakistani envoy, Tariq Azizuddin.
Mr Azizuddin went missing on Monday as he was travelling overland from the Pakistani city of Peshawar to the Afghan capital, Kabul.
Afghan President Hamid Karzai said he was certain the envoy had been abducted, adding: "I hope he is safe and I hope he will be released soon."
The Khyber region has long been a base for bandits and smugglers but has seen little of the unrest linked to an uprising by Islamist militants in adjoining areas.
Pro-Taleban militants recently kidnapped more than 200 Pakistani troops in the South Waziristan region.
The soldiers were reportedly released in a prisoner exchange with Pakistani authorities.
'Protected road'
Pakistan's government has refused to confirm Mr Azizuddin has been kidnapped, saying only that he was missing.
The Pakistani embassy in Kabul said contact was lost with Mr Azizuddin at around 1045 local time (0645 GMT) on Monday.
There were reports on Pakistani television of his car going through a checkpoint without stopping.
An official of the Khyber agency tribal administration told the BBC that the ambassador went through the Khyber agency without taking a security escort that was waiting for him at the start of the tribal territory.
Correspondents say that such escorts are routinely sent with dignitaries and officials when they travel through tribal areas.
But some travellers dispense with them because they think it makes their movements more noticeable.
Mr Azizuddin is said to have previously travelled to Kabul by road, often without the tribal security escort.
The route through the agency is believed to be the shortest and quickest way between Peshawar and Kabul.
Being the main trade route, the Khyber agency road is busy in daylight hours, supplying reinforcements and to the US and Nato forces in Afghanistan. It is also one of the most protected of all the tribal roads, with a contingent of tribal police posted every 100m. The paramilitary Frontier Corps have a fort along the road.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7240414.stm
-
Bush's North Korea Nuclear Abdication
By JOHN R. BOLTON
May 8, 2008; Page A15
Despite rising Capitol Hill opposition to its North Korea policy, the Bush administration continues to find new and imaginative ways to accommodate Pyongyang's sensitivities. Meanwhile, the administration's Democratic congressional allies are urgently pushing to waive the Glenn Amendment, which bars essentially all U.S. economic and military aid to the North.
The strategic folly here is rooted in the administration's decision to focus on North Korea's plutonium supplies and stop caring what Pyongyang once did or is doing on the enriched-uranium route to nuclear weapons. That could be a fatal mistake.
In 2002, our intelligence community definitively judged that the regime was working on an industrial-scale enrichment program. Since then we have little new information, reducing the confidence level, but not changing the substantive conclusion, that the North Koreans "have and continue to operate a uranium enrichment program" – as Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell testified in February.
For the Bush administration, however, the lack of new data is an excuse to ignore the entire issue of uranium.
On plutonium, the administration seems content to seek vague statements from the North that "account" for the amount of this fissile material we think it has extracted from its Yongbyon reactor's spent fuel rods over the years. Administration briefings reveal little or no interest in how many plutonium weapons exist; whether there are other plutonium-related facilities hidden in North Korea's vast complex of underground facilities; and what the North's weapons-manufacturing capabilities are.
Proliferation? Perhaps the Bush administration's most wondrous act of magic is to make that problem disappear. The State Department argues that North Korea may have proliferated in the past, but that's all behind us. How do we know? The North Koreans have told us.
Since the reactor it helped Syria build on the Euphrates River was pulverized by the Israeli Air Force last September 6, Pyongyang's efforts at and interest in nuclear proliferation may have ceased. Even if true, that should not give us comfort: It took an act of brute military force to bring this about. One need hardly point out that this tactic is not congruent with the administration's current approach to North Korea's nuclear behavior.
More troubling is the administration's apparent treatment of the Syrian reactor as if it were the only proliferation threat in the Middle East. It is not. Iran should be top of mind as well.
It is inconceivable that Syria could work for five years or more building the clone of North Korea's Yongbyon reactor on the Euphrates without, at a minimum, Iranian acquiescence. Quite likely, Iran was involved. Tehran could well be financing Syria's purchase of reactor technology from North Korea. It could also have expected to benefit from the reactor's production of plutonium.
Indeed, Iran had much the same incentive as North Korea to hide its nuclear activities from international scrutiny. What better way to conceal proscribed work from inspectors in North Korea or Iran than to build facilities in Syria?
Iran and North Korea already have a history of cooperation in ballistic missiles – the delivery system which, if perfected, could give their weapons global reach. After the North declared a moratorium on launch testing from the Korean Peninsula in 1999, it simply ramped up cooperation with Iran's aggressive missile research and development program.
The North thus continued to benefit from launch-testing data, prior to breaking its moratorium on July 4, 2006, while also scoring a propaganda victory among the clueless for its apparent renunciation of provocative behavior in Northeast Asia. Outsourcing weapons programs is nothing new for Pyongyang.
Although our intelligence community stated publicly that the Syrian reactor was a cash transaction, its congressional briefings contained little or no supporting evidence that this was so. This is unsurprising. The Israeli raid was based on the hard physical evidence seen on the banks of the Euphrates River, not on scrutiny of documents embodying the deal.
Some friendly advice to our intelligence services: Think joint venture. Think asset diversification.
Hypothetically, what if the deal had North Korea getting a third of the plutonium produced by the Euphrates reactor, Iran a third, and Syria a third? The North benefits by maintaining open access to a plutonium supply even if Yongbyon remains frozen. Iran gets experience in reactor technologies immune from IAEA scrutiny. And Syria takes a major step toward undisclosed nuclear capabilities. Win-win-win, as that entrepreneurial proliferator A.Q. Khan might have said.
Here is the real problem. North Korean nuclear proliferation is quite likely more than a series of one-time transactions that create problems elsewhere in the world. It may very well be integral to its own nuclear weapons program.
The Bush administration can wish away these possibilities and still achieve its deal. But it cannot wish away the underlying reality, the full scope of which we simply do not know. That reality, whatever its reach, will still be there to haunt President Bush's successor and threaten international peace.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster/Threshold Editions, 2007).
See all of today's editorials and op-eds,
-
Duplicating on this thread GM's post on the Homeland Security thread:
=========================
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/14/AR2008061402032_pf.html
Smugglers Had Design For Advanced Warhead
By Joby Warrick
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, June 15, 2008; A01
An international smuggling ring that sold bomb-related parts to Libya, Iran and North Korea also managed to acquire blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon, according to a draft report by a former top U.N. arms inspector that suggests the plans could have been shared secretly with any number of countries or rogue groups.
The drawings, discovered in 2006 on computers owned by Swiss businessmen, included essential details for building a compact nuclear device that could be fitted on a type of ballistic missile used by Iran and more than a dozen developing countries, the report states.
The computer contents -- among more than 1,000 gigabytes of data seized -- were recently destroyed by Swiss authorities under the supervision of the U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, which is investigating the now-defunct smuggling ring previously led by Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan.
But U.N. officials cannot rule out the possibility that the blueprints were shared with others before their discovery, said the report's author, David Albright, a prominent nuclear weapons expert who spent four years researching the smuggling network.
"These advanced nuclear weapons designs may have long ago been sold off to some of the most treacherous regimes in the world," Albright wrote in a draft report about the blueprint's discovery. A copy of the report, expected to be published later this week, was provided to The Washington Post.
The A.Q. Khan smuggling ring was previously known to have provided Libya with design information for a nuclear bomb. But the blueprints found in 2006 are far more troubling, Albright said in his report. While Libya was given plans for an older and relatively unsophisticated weapon that was bulky and difficult to deliver, the newly discovered blueprints offered instructions for building a compact device, the report said. The lethality of such a bomb would be little enhanced, but its smaller size might allow for delivery by ballistic missile.
"To many of these countries, it's all about size and weight," Albright said in an interview. "They need to be able to fit the device on the missiles they have."
The Swiss government acknowledged this month that it destroyed nuclear-related documents, including weapons-design details, under the direction of the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency to keep them from falling into terrorists' hands. However, it has not been previously reported that the documents included hundreds of pages of specifications for a second, more advanced nuclear bomb.
"These would have been ideal for two of Khan's other major customers, Iran and North Korea," wrote Albright, now president of the Washington-based Institute for Science and International Security. "They both faced struggles in building a nuclear warhead small enough to fit atop their ballistic missiles, and these designs were for a warhead that would fit."
It is unknown whether the designs were delivered to either country, or to anyone else, Albright said.
The Pakistani government did not rebut the findings in the report but said it had cooperated extensively with U.N. investigators. "The government of Pakistan has adequately investigated allegations of nuclear proliferation by A.Q. Khan and shared the information with IAEA," Nadeem Kiani, a spokesman for the Pakistani Embassy in Washington, said yesterday. "It considers the A.Q. Khan affair to be over."
A CIA official, informed of the essential details of Albright's report, said the agency would not comment because of the extreme diplomatic and security sensitivities of the matter. In his 2007 memoir, former CIA director George Tenet acknowledged the agency's extensive involvement in tracking the Khan network over more than a decade.
Albright, a former IAEA inspector in Iraq, has published detailed analyses of the nuclear programs of numerous states, including Iran and North Korea. His institute was the first to publicly identify the location of an alleged Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israeli warplanes last September.
A design for a compact, missile-ready nuclear weapon could help an aspiring nuclear power overcome a major technical hurdle and vastly increase its options for delivery of a nuclear explosive. Such a design could theoretically help North Korea -- which detonated a nuclear device in a 2006 test -- to couple a nuclear warhead with its Nodong missile, which has a proven range of 1,300 kilometers (about 800 miles).
Iran also possesses medium-range ballistic missiles and is believed by U.S. government officials to be seeking the capability to build nuclear weapons in the future, although an assessment late last year by U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Iran had discontinued its nuclear weapons program in 2003. Weapons experts have long puzzled over whether Tehran might have previously acquired a weapons design from the Khan network, which sold the Iranian government numerous other nuclear-related items, including designs for uranium-enrichment equipment.
The computers that contained the drawings were owned by three members of the Tinner family -- brothers Marco and Urs and their father, Friedrich -- all Swiss businessmen who have been identified by U.S. and IAEA officials as key participants in Khan's nuclear black market. The smuggling ring operated from the mid-1980s until 2003, when it was exposed after a years-long probe by the U.S. and British intelligence agencies.
Khan, who apologized for his role in the smuggling network in a 2004 speech broadcast in Pakistan, was officially pardoned by President Pervez Musharraf without being formally charged with crimes. The Tinner brothers are in Swiss prisons awaiting trial on charges related to their alleged involvement in the network. They and their father are the focus of an ongoing probe by Swiss authorities, who discovered the blueprints while exploring the heavily encrypted contents of the Tinners' computers, the report said. Several published reports have asserted that Urs Tinner became an informant for U.S. intelligence before the breakup of the smuggling ring, but that has not been officially confirmed.
Switzerland shared the finding with the IAEA as well as the United States, which asked for copies of the blueprints, the report states. The IAEA has acknowledged that it oversaw the destruction of nuclear-design material by Swiss authorities in November 2007. However, IAEA officials would neither confirm nor deny the existence of a second weapons design or comment on Albright's report.
Albright, citing information provided by IAEA investigators, said the designs were similar to that of a nuclear device built by Pakistan. He contends in the report that IAEA officials confronted Pakistan's government shortly after the discovery, adding that the private reaction of government officials was astonishment. The Pakistanis "were genuinely shocked; Khan may have transferred his own country's most secret and dangerous information to foreign smugglers so that they could sell it for a profit," Albright said, relating a description of the encounter given to him by IAEA officials.
Pakistan has previously denied that Khan stole the country's weapons plans. Musharraf has not allowed IAEA experts to interview Khan, an engineer who is regarded as a national hero for his role in establishing Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. Khan, in interviews last month with The Post and several other publications, asserted that the allegations of nuclear smuggling were false.
Albright said it remains critical that investigators press Khan and others for details about how the blueprints were obtained and who might have them. Because the plans were stored electronically, they may have been copied many times, he said.
-
Following up on the preceding post:
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archive.../06/020762.php
Two stories that were in the news yesterday offer interesting opportunities for speculation. Note: what follows is exactly that, speculation.
The first comes from the Washington Post:
An international smuggling ring that sold bomb-related parts to Libya, Iran and North Korea also managed to acquire blueprints for an advanced nuclear weapon, according to a draft report by a former top U.N. arms inspector that suggests the plans could have been shared secretly with any number of countries or rogue groups. The drawings, discovered in 2006 on computers owned by Swiss businessmen, included essential details for building a compact nuclear device that could be fitted on a type of ballistic missile used by Iran and more than a dozen developing countries, the report states.
This relates to the Khan group, which, led by a Pakistani nuclear scientist, sold Pakistan's nuclear secrets to rogue nations. The significance of this new discovery (the discovery reportedly dates to 2006 but is now being made public) is that the Khan group may have sold the design for a nuclear weapon that was more advanced than previously believed--more advanced because it was small enough to fit on missiles that countries like Iran and North Korea already possess. The Post's sources say that they have no idea what countries (if any) may have received these advanced nuclear weapons designs from Khan.
It occurs to me that this story could possible be related to the controversy last winter over the NIE that claimed that Iran had abandoned its nuclear weapons program in 2003. That conclusion, trumpeted by the NIE itself, was obviously overstated: if you read the NIE, it acknowledged that Iran's work on uranium enrichment--the hardest part of nuclear weapons development--continued unabated, but claimed that Iran had stopped its "nuclear weapon design and weaponization work." Let's assume that the CIA did get information to the effect that Iran stopped its nuclear weapon design effort in 2003. Given what we now know about the "products" made available by the Khan network, isn't it possible that Iran did so because it had the weapons designs it needed? And if so, shouldn't the NIE, to the extent we place any credence in it, make us more concerned about Iran's nuclear program, rather than less so?
The second story comes from the London Times; I haven't seen it picked up in the U.S. yet. (But then, I haven't scoured the papers yet this morning.) The story's headline is arresting, even though it is supported only by implication in the article itself: "Get Osama Bin Laden before I leave office, orders George W Bush."
The TImes writes:
President George W Bush has enlisted British special forces in a final attempt to capture Osama Bin Laden before he leaves the White House. Defence and intelligence sources in Washington and London confirmed that a renewed hunt was on for the leader of the September 11 attacks. “If he [Bush] can say he has killed Saddam Hussein and captured Bin Laden, he can claim to have left the world a safer place,” said a US intelligence source. ***
One US intelligence source compared the “growing number of clandestine reconnaissance missions” inside Pakistan with those conducted in Laos and Cambodia at the height of the Vietnam war. ***
A Pentagon source said US forces were rolling up Al-Qaeda’s network in Pakistan in the hope of pushing Bin Laden towards the Afghan border, where the US military and bombers with guided missiles were lying in wait. “They are prepping for a major battle,” he said.
The main operations in Pakistan are being undertaken by Delta, the US army special operations unit, and the British SBS.
I've wondered for a long time whether we have had a better idea of bin Laden's whereabouts than has been publicly revealed, and whether we have preferred to leave him at large rather than to capture or kill him. Why could this be the case? Presumably because we have cracked the security surrounding bin Laden and have been able to acquire valuable intelligence by leaving him at large.
This may be what was going on with Mohammed Naeem Noor Khan, the Pakistani whose laptop was seized several years ago, revealing a number of al Qaeda plots. It may be that Khan was bin Laden's link to the outside world, and that bin Laden's instructions to cells around the world were being intercepted by our intelligence agencies. After Khan's capture was made public, it may be that bin Laden's new links to the outside world were likewise penetrated.
This is, as I said above, pure speculation. But the administration's success in preventing new attacks after September 11 has long suggested the possibility of an intelligence coup equal in magnitude to Enigma. If bin Laden's security was penetrated years ago, it would explain why the administration has preferred to leave him at large despite the occasional annoyance of his propaganda missives.
If the Times' report is correct, then perhaps President Bush has decided that al Qaeda is sufficiently degraded, or the intelligence recoverable through bin Laden is no longer sufficiently valuable, so that it makes sense to try to kill or capture him. No doubt President Bush would like to bequeath his successor a world free of both bin Laden and Saddam Hussein. So it's pure speculation, but for what it's worth, I wouldn't be shocked to see bin Laden killed or captured between now and January.
__________________
-
Yet more in this vein, this time from Stratfor:
The Washington Post reported on Sunday that a Pakistani-based ring led by the former head of Pakistan’s nuclear program had in its possession detailed blueprints for the construction of nuclear weapons small enough and rugged enough to be fitted to missiles. The ring, led by A.Q. Khan, has been known about for several years (it was busted in 2004). It has also been known that the ring provided nuclear technology, in the form of parts, to Libya, Iran and North Korea. What the Post has revealed is that Khan’s group also had blueprints for a usable nuclear weapon. The data were found in 2006 on a computer owned by a Swiss businessman. Therefore, the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have known about the data since then. However, according to the Post article, it is not known whether the information was given to the Iranians — which is what makes this report disturbing, to say the least.
It has been Stratfor’s position that the Iranian nuclear program ought not to be taken particularly seriously, because merely possessing enriched uranium does not give you a weapon. It might give you a device that could be detonated under careful controlled circumstances, but not a weapon that could be reliably delivered on a missile. Before that could happen, the device would have to be turned into a weapon. It would have to be miniaturized and ruggedized, able to withstand the stresses of launch, possible time in vacuum or very low air pressure and the heat of re-entry.
If the Post report is true, that is what these blueprints would provide the Iranians: knowledge of how to turn a device into a weapon. It must be remembered that a blueprint does not by itself enable you to build the weapon. A blueprint for a house would allow me to build the house, but I would need expertise in implementing the blueprint. It is not clear that the Iranians have enough expertise to follow even the most precise instructions, nor the prerequisite equipment. Knowing the kinds of materials or electronics needed to build the weapon doesn’t mean you have the facilities or engineers, in sufficient quantity, to do the job. We continue to think that the Iranians could not actually build a weapon. They lack things like sufficient quality-control engineers and technicians to get the job done. However, they might have the blueprints, and that is a huge barrier to have crossed.
But it simply isn’t clear that the Iranians actually have the blueprints. According to the author of the report, David Albright, who worked for the IAEA, “These advanced nuclear weapons designs may have long ago been sold off to some of the most treacherous regimes in the world.” He also said that Iran and North Korea “both faced struggles in building a warhead small enough to fit atop their ballistic missiles, and these designs were for a warhead that would fit.”
The United States and Israel obviously have known since 2006 that these blueprints existed. Both countries’ intelligence services clearly had one mission above all others: find out if the Iranians had received the blueprints. The fact that there is no weapon yet does not mean that the Iranians don’t have the blue prints. Even with step-by-step instructions, it would take years to build a weapon and marry it to a missile. At the same time, while it might not be known whether they have the blueprints directly, equipment acquisitions, personnel movements and facilities construction could be tracked. If the Iranians were weaponizing, from whatever data source, that likely would be noticeable.
Neither the United States nor Israel has attacked Iran. That indicates that either they know that the Iranians do not have the plans or the process of implementing them has not progressed to a stage of imperative concern. When we recall the National Intelligence Estimate’s finding on Iran’s nuclear program, it would appear not to have triggered visible movement.
But here is the problem. Intelligence is not a science. Yesterday, our view was that the Iranians do not have the know-how or facilities to build a nuclear device. Today, our view is that they might have the know-how and almost certainly do not have a viable program. That’s quite a leap in a short time. What is comforting is that the possibility that they secretly have these plans has been known about for two years and no one has attacked Iran, possibly because no one is sure what to attack. But certainly this report has reduced our comfort level a notch.
That is some set of blueprints floating around. Apart from the obvious questions, it raises some new ones. A.Q. Khan wasn’t just peddling spare parts for the hobbyist. He had in his possession, outside the Pakistani nuclear establishment, the cookbook for weapons. Is there any way that the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, which oversaw Pakistan’s nuclear program, did not know about what Khan was doing? And given that the United States and the Israelis were obsessed with Pakistan’s nuclear program, how could they have missed the fact that the head of Pakistan’s nuclear program was conducting negotiations with Libya, North Korea and Iran? It should have lit up every radar screen of every intelligence service in the world.
Until now, we didn’t much care. The stuff that Khan was delivering was not going to do much for anyone. With this revelation, our attention is, shall we say, piqued. There is something that does not add up here. How did Pakistan’s nuclear plans go walkabout and discussions get held with the most closely watched regimes in the world, and no one noticed until 2006?
-
Iran: Terrorists will get bomb
[Excerpted from Patriot Post Digest, June 13, 2008]
"Last week, Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei gave a speech in which he predicted that terrorists would obtain nuclear weapons and 'take away security from all the tyrants of the world.' He later made it clear that by 'tyrants' he meant the United States. The statement is darkly ironic, since Iran is the world’s foremost sponsor of terrorism, and the pariah state is almost certainly in pursuit of a nuclear weapon. Khamenei was quick to add that Iran could never possess or use nuclear weapons since they are against 'Islamic beliefs,' but Iran’s Islamic government has never been known for being straightforward, and the supreme leader urged his listeners to continue exporting the Islamic revolution. If anything, Khamenei’s statement could be interpreted as a warning that Iran’s nuclear weapons will not be used by the country’s military, but rather by proxy terrorist groups. Meanwhile, the international 'community' finds itself incapable of taking any real action against Iran thanks to strong opposition from China and Russia, making it likely that whoever challenges Iran militarily will do so alone.
"Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz seems willing to take that chance. Mofaz recently announced his candidacy to succeed Ehud Olmert as Israel’s leader, and should he win, he intends to deal with Iran using whatever means necessary. 'If Iran continues its nuclear weapons program, we will attack it,' Mofaz said last week. 'Other options are disappearing. The sanctions are not effective. There will be no alternative but to attack Iran in order to stop the Iranian nuclear program.' Given Israel’s expertise in destroying such programs (Osirak, Iraq in 1981 and al-Kibar, Syria in 2007), Iran would do well to heed Mr. Mofaz’s warning."
So, "Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei...predicted that terrorists would obtain nuclear weapons and 'take away security from all the tyrants of the world.' He later made it clear that by 'tyrants' he meant the United States." No, he didn't add, "...and Iran will supply those terrorists with nuclear weapons", but I'm not sure it doesn't still stand as a de facto declaration of intent. At least some Israelis aren't fooled, or worried about making a clear statement of intent of their own.
-
Hitler said what he was planning long before German troops crossed any borders, and then as now America slept.
-
And you and I and some others are the Paul Reveres "The Islamo Fascists are coming! The Islamo Fascists are coming! One if by border crossing, two if by sea, three if by air!!!"
-
Think anyone is listening? :|
-
Well 42 posts on this thread has 2888 reads at present. That averages to , , , almost 69 reads per post. Do a similar calculation on some of the other threads, and consider that this forum-- no brag just fact-- tends to attract above average IQ readership.
I think we do important work here.
-
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Is Obsolete
By JANE HARMAN
June 20, 2008; Page A11
If claims by Iran that it's building 3,000 more centrifuges to enrich nuclear fuel are true, then the Bush administration and Congress face a more serious challenge than we first thought. Even assuming that Iran intends to use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes – and there are very good reasons to doubt Iran's stated intentions – the dangers posed by unsupervised, weapons-grade material in the hands of a regime that has threatened to "wipe Israel off the map" are unacceptable.
The best course would be to persuade Iran to abandon its designs on the bomb and make its nuclear activities completely transparent to international authorities – as three United Nations Resolutions have required.
But Iran is not the only problem. Other countries may travel down the same path, waving the banner of peaceful nuclear energy. Some – including North Korea – already have, and the international system is ill-prepared to prevent wannabes.
Today's legal regime is no match for the wide dissemination of nuclear technology. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) standards are obsolete, and the growth in the sheer number of nuclear facilities world-wide has made it difficult for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to achieve its mission.
Moreover, the NPT cuts most of the world out of the nuclear weapons club. It grandfathered in states that had nuclear weapons before 1967, and said that only they could keep them. Given the skyrocketing demand for alternatives to oil, we have to expect that more countries will want to develop nuclear energy. We need a system that allows states to pursue nuclear energy but prevents them from developing nuclear weapons under the radar.
According to IAEA Director Mohammed ElBaradei, what's needed is a multinational initiative that ensures uninterrupted supplies of fuel, regardless of market disturbances or disagreements with suppliers. But the next NPT conference is scheduled for 2010. We should not wait two years to consider a new path.
In 1946, American presidential adviser Bernard Baruch called for countries to transfer ownership and control over civil nuclear activities and materials to a new international organization. Seven years later, President Dwight Eisenhower rolled parts of Baruch's plan into the "Atoms for Peace" initiative, which laid the groundwork for the IAEA. These ideas, though they advanced important goals, were never fully implemented, partly because demand for nuclear energy was low and the nuclear club was relatively small.
More recently, the Department of Energy attempted to tackle this issue by creating a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) – a blueprint for an international organization to reprocess spent nuclear fuel. Although 19 countries bought in to GNEP, it has failed to stem the spread of nuclear technology – largely because the Bush administration has treated it as a research and development initiative, and because the National Academies of Science concluded that it is dependent on technology that is unproven.
A more promising approach might be to create an international consortium of fuel centers that provide enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel, and end-to-end oversight of nuclear resources. Driven by market demand, private companies could operate facilities with IAEA oversight, and participating states would agree not to engage in independent enriching and reprocessing. Material would be purchased from the international market, thereby creating supply assurance for nations who fear being denied fuel.
This concept is a private-sector version of the International Nuclear Fuel Authority envisioned by Sens. Richard Lugar and Evan Bayh, and could borrow from the low-enriched uranium "emergency" stockpile concept proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
It differs from piecemeal ideas like Iran's 2006 offer that France create a means for production of enriched uranium in Iran, Russia's notion that all of Iran's enrichment take place on Russian soil, or the Saudi suggestion that Switzerland enrich nuclear material for the Middle East. These ideas would not advance U.S. counterproliferation goals. Instead, a comprehensive international consortium would make nuclear energy available and cost effective for countries while solving the guessing game Iran has played by denying its nuclear weapons ambitions.
Even Al Gore agrees that nuclear energy must be considered as the world reduces reliance on fossil fuels and starts to meet the energy demands of exploding populations. Some argue that the nuclear renaissance is already upon us – 23 new permit applications for nuclear reactors have been filed in the past two years in the U.S. alone, and another 150 are planned across the globe.
Iran's unsupervised nuclear program poses an existential threat to Israel and possibly other nations. While we can't take away the knowledge gained through their clandestine program, by "renting" only the amount of fuel necessary for production of peaceful nuclear energy, we may be able to convert these threats posed by Iran and future Irans into a roadmap to nuclear security for the entire world.
Ms. Harman, a Democratic congresswoman from California, is chair of the Homeland Security Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment.
-
Good to have the big picture timeline:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/635130b4-4911-11dd-9a5f-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
-
The Iran Effect
By INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted Wednesday, August 13, 2008 4:20 PM PT
Nuclear Terror: Saudi Arabia and the United Nations' nuclear "watchdog" have agreed on a "nonproliferation" pact — the prelude to a Saudi nuclear energy program. Can nuclear weapons be far behind?
As the Islamofascist regime in Iran refuses to abandon its uranium enrichment program in spite of international condemnation and economic sanctions, the Saudi kingdom's Arab News newspaper reported this week approval of an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regarding application of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
The Saudi move comes amid an explosion in interest in Mideast nuclear activities. In 2006 and 2007, at least 13 Mideast countries announced the launch or renewal of planned nuclear programs — widely viewed as easily convertible to weapons production.
Saudi Arabia has pledged in writing not to pursue enrichment or reprocessing technologies, but its past behavior strongly suggests that its royal family has long coveted nuclear weapons.
Richard L. Russell, who teaches security studies at the National Defense University and at Georgetown, has noted Saudi's secret purchase from Communist China in the 1980s of long-range CSS-2 missiles, capable of delivering a nuclear warhead.
In 1999, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz visited Pakistan's uranium enrichment and missile assembly factory in Kahuta, where he was reportedly briefed by black market nuclear arms dealer Dr. AQ Khan.
According to Akaki Dvali, a proliferation expert at the Center for Social Sciences in Tbilisi, Georgia, and senior adviser to the Georgian presidency, "it is reasonable to suspect that Khan developed ties with Riyadh, which would have been capable of paying for all kinds of nuclear-related services."
Saudi defector Mohammed al-Khilewi, who was a high-ranking official in the Saudi mission to the United Nations, charges that the Saudi royal family has been seeking nuclear weapons since 1975.
He has produced documents suggesting that the Saudi government paid as much as $5 billion during the 1970s and 1980s to the late Saddam Hussein to build a nuclear weapon, with the condition that the Saudis get some of the devices.
There are few prospects more frightening than a nuclear Middle East. For years now, the free world has neglected the sure way of nipping it in the bud: Make a top priority of uniting to do whatever it takes to stop Iran.
-
This means the Saudis do not anticipate that we/Israel will stop Iran from becoming nuclear. Oh joy.... :-(
-
Yahoo! Buzz DIGG THIS
MY SPACE GET RSS FEEDS
MSN Money Homepage
MSN Money Investing
advertisement
TODAY'S MOST POPULAR
1. Opinion: Obama Played by Chicago Rules
2. Could Bike Lanes Cause Pollution?
3. Debt Costs Stoke Fears for Freddie
4. Opinion: Talk About Audacity!
5. Wachovia Unloads Troubled Loans
MORE
PEOPLE WHO READ THIS...
Also read these stories:
People who like this also like...
We Can't Tax Our Way Out of the Entitlement Crisis18562609 By R. Glenn HubbardObama's Social Security tax increase would do little to address the fu...America Is Better Off Without Musharraf18562603 By Husain HaqqaniThe U.S. should want a nation of partners in the war on terror.Congress's Finest Hour18562607 Think of the damage they might have inflicted if they hadn't been busy proclaiming Nationa...London's Terror Bank18562611 Our British friends let the Iranians stay in business.Obama's Health-Care Tipoff18562613 The candidate lauds a government-run system.NEW! Are you on Facebook?
See what content on this site is popular with your friends! Learn more »
Your Facebook Friends Are Reading
Intel CEO Sees Strong Chip Demand17960206 Intel posted a 25% jump in net amid strong demand for portable PCs that use its chips. It ...Seen by 10 friends | Investment Banking| MITNewspapers Think Locally for Online Ads18180781 Newspaper companies have been scrambling to master the intricacies of selling online ads t...Seen by 5 friends | Day Traders| New YorkOlympic-News Wall Proves Tall but Leaky18180138 Beijing will limit Web-site access for journalists covering the Olympics, but the Games' m...Seen by 9 friends | 3 groupsPopular with people in the groups:
Facebook for UNICEFDay TradersFinance Club| ChicagoWhat's This?- closeYou're seeing a preview of SeenThis? — a Facebook application that helps you discover the latest news, videos and more by showing you what's popular with your friends — both on Facebook, and on sites like this one.
Have a Facebook account? Get recommendations for content popular with your friends by adding the SeenThis? app.
Once you've added it, look for the "Your Facebook Friends Are Reading" section in the sidebar with your name and photo above it (only you can see your photo.)
Click to add SeenThis? now »
About SeenThis? | Privacy | Feedback
Personalized Home Page Setup
Put headlines on your homepage about the companies, industries and topics that interest you most.
Russia's Nuclear Threat Is More Than Words
By GABRIEL SCHOENFELD
August 21, 2008; Page A11
What lies behind Moscow's willingness to crush Georgia with overwhelming force? Analysts have highlighted Russia's newfound economic confidence, its determination to undo its humiliation of the 1990s, and its grievances over Kosovo, U.S. missile-defense plans involving Poland and the Czech Republic, and the eastward expansion of NATO.
But there may be another major, overlooked element: Has a shift in the nuclear balance between the U.S. and Russia helped embolden the bear?
Under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which went into force in 1994, both the U.S. and the USSR made radical cuts in their strategic nuclear arsenals -- that is, in weapons of intercontinental range. The 2002 Moscow Treaty pushed the numbers down even further, until each side's strategic nuclear umbrella was pocket-size.
Yet matters are very different at the tactical, or short-range, level. Here, the U.S., acting unilaterally and with virtually no fanfare, sharply cut back its stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear warheads. As far back as 1991, the U.S. began to retire all of its nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles, artillery and antisubmarine warfare. According to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, not one of these weapons exists today. The same authoritative publication estimates that the number of tactical warheads in the U.S. arsenal has dwindled from thousands to approximately 500.
Russia has also reduced the size of its tactical nuclear arsenal, but starting from much higher levels and at a slower pace, leaving it with an estimated 5,000 such devices -- 10 times the number of tactical weapons held by the U.S. Such a disparity would be one thing if we were contending with a stable, postcommunist regime moving in the direction of democracy and integration with the West. That was the Russia we anticipated when we began our nuclear build-down. But it is not the Russia we are facing today.
Not only has Russia retained a sizable nuclear arsenal, its military and political leaders regularly engage in aggressive bluster about expanded deployment and possible use, and sometimes they go beyond bluster. Six months ago, Russia began sending cruise missile-capable Bear H bombers on sallies along the coast of Alaska.
As recently as July, the newspaper Izvestia floated the idea that Moscow would station nuclear weapons in Cuba if the U.S. went ahead with the deployment of an antiballistic missile radar in the Czech Republic and interceptors in Poland. Col. Gen. Nikolai Solovtsov, chief of Russia's strategic missile command, has openly spoken about aiming nuclear-tipped missiles at those two countries. Vladimir Putin has warned Ukraine that if it were to join NATO, "Russia will have to point its warheads at Ukrainian territory." Not long before that, Mr. Putin cheerfully described a series of ballistic-missile flight tests as "pleasant and spectacular holiday fireworks."
Such cavalier language stands in striking contrast to the restrained approach of American leaders. "I am committed to achieving a credible deterrent with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with our national security needs," said President George W. Bush in 2001, in one of his rare pronouncements on the subject. "My goal is to move quickly to reduce nuclear forces." Mr. Bush has kept his word and moved quickly. But has he moved wisely? And given the pugnacious Russia that has suddenly emerged, what is the strategic legacy that he will leave for his successor?
The Russians are steadily acquiring economic and military power, and are not afraid to use threats and force to get their way. Even as they abide by the terms of various treaties, while we are standing still they are finding ways to develop new and highly advanced ground- and submarine-based intercontinental missiles, along with modern submarines to carry and launch them.
As in the Cold War, nuclear weapons are central to the Russian geopolitical calculus. "The weak are not loved and not heard, they are insulted, and when we have [nuclear] parity they will talk to us in a different way." These words are not from the dark days of communist yore. Rather, they were uttered last year by Russia's First Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, and they perfectly capture the mentality we and Russia's neighbors are up against.
Mr. Schoenfeld is the senior editor of Commentary.
-
Strong Leads and Dead Ends in Nuclear Case Against Iran
By Dafna Linzer
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, February 8, 2006; Page A01
Iranian engineers have completed sophisticated drawings of a deep subterranean shaft, according to officials who have examined classified documents in the hands of U.S. intelligence for more than 20 months.
Complete with remote-controlled sensors to measure pressure and heat, the plans for the 400-meter tunnel appear designed for an underground atomic test that might one day announce Tehran's arrival as a nuclear power, the officials said.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...020702126.html
__________________
-
Since we are not doing anything about it why worry?
Then again it would have helped if we had real leadership that got us off dependence on the foereign oil.
Our only hope are the Iranian moderates.
Of course BO will fix it with a genius argument.
-
Ahmadinejad is "not well", oil has dropped over 50%, the Iranian economy has serious problems, Iran has a serious problem with Afg opium, and the government is not popular.
If BO gets aggro in Afg-Pak, it might be easier for the Iranians to change course with Barack Hussein Obama.
Yeah, , , right , , ,
-
Missile Defense Agency chief: Iran will soon be able to strike US, Europe with missiles
Source: http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satelli...cle%2FShowFull
The head of the Pentagon's Missile Defense Agency said Friday that Iran was not far from attaining the means of using missiles against all of Europe and against the US in five to six years, Israel Radio reported.
Lt. Gen. Henry A. Obering III was speaking in Prague in an effort to convince the Czech Parliament to approve a US missile defense installation in the country's territory.
Reply With Quote
-
Iran Said to Have Nuclear Fuel for One Weapon
By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: November 19, 2008
Iran has now produced roughly enough nuclear material to make, with added purification, a single atom bomb, according to nuclear experts analyzing the latest report from global atomic inspectors.
The figures detailing Iran’s progress were contained in a routine update on Wednesday from the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has been conducting inspections of the country’s main nuclear plant at Natanz. The report concluded that as of early this month, Iran had made 630 kilograms, or about 1,390 pounds, of low-enriched uranium.
Several experts said that was enough for a bomb, but they cautioned that the milestone was mostly symbolic, because Iran would have to take additional steps. Not only would it have to breach its international agreements and kick out the inspectors, but it would also have to further purify the fuel and put it into a warhead design — a technical advance that Western experts are unsure Iran has yet achieved.
“They clearly have enough material for a bomb,” said Richard L. Garwin, a top nuclear physicist who helped invent the hydrogen bomb and has advised Washington for decades. “They know how to do the enrichment. Whether they know how to design a bomb, well, that’s another matter.”
Iran insists that it wants only to fuel reactors for nuclear power. But many Western nations, led by the United States, suspect that its real goal is to gain the ability to make nuclear weapons.
While some Iranian officials have threatened to bar inspectors in the past, the country has made no such moves, and many experts inside the Bush administration and the I.A.E.A. believe it will avoid the risk of attempting “nuclear breakout” until it possessed a larger uranium supply.
Even so, for President-elect Barack Obama, the report underscores the magnitude of the problem that he will inherit Jan. 20: an Iranian nuclear program that has not only solved many technical problems of uranium enrichment, but that can also now credibly claim to possess enough material to make a weapon if negotiations with Europe and the United States break down.
American intelligence agencies have said Iran could make a bomb between 2009 and 2015. A national intelligence estimate made public late last year concluded that around the end of 2003, after long effort, Iran had halted work on an actual weapon. But enriching uranium, and obtaining enough material to build a weapon, is considered the most difficult part of the process.
Siegfried S. Hecker of Stanford University and a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory said the growing size of the Iranian stockpile “underscored that they are marching down the path to developing the nuclear weapons option.”
In the report to its board, the atomic agency said Iran’s main enrichment plant was now feeding uranium into about 3,800 centrifuges — machines that spin incredibly fast to enrich the element into nuclear fuel. That count is the same as in the agency’s last quarterly report, in September. Iran began installing the centrifuges in early 2007. But the new report’s total of 630 kilograms — an increase of about 150 — shows that Iran has been making progress in accumulating material to make nuclear fuel.
That uranium has been enriched to the low levels needed to fuel a nuclear reactor. To further purify it to the highly enriched state needed to fuel a nuclear warhead, Iran would have to reconfigure its centrifuges and do a couple months of additional processing, nuclear experts said.
“They have a weapon’s worth,” Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist in the nuclear program of the Natural Resources Defense Council, a private group in Washington that tracks atomic arsenals, said in an interview.
He said the amount was suitable for a relatively advanced implosion-type weapon like the one dropped on Nagasaki. Its core, he added, would be about the size of a grapefruit. He said a cruder design would require about twice as much weapon-grade fuel.
“It’s a virtual milestone,” Dr. Cochran said of Iran’s stockpile. It is not an imminent threat, he added, because the further technical work to make fuel for a bomb would tip off inspectors, the United States and other powers about “where they’re going.”
The agency’s report made no mention of the possible military implications of the size of Iran’s stockpile. And some experts said the milestone was still months away. In an analysis of the I.A.E.A. report, the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington, estimated that Iran had not yet reached the mark but would “within a few months.” It added that other analysts estimated it might take as much as a year.
Whatever the exact date, it added, “Iran is progressing” toward the ability to quickly make enough weapon-grade uranium for a warhead.
Peter D. Zimmerman, a physicist and former United States government arms scientist, cautioned that the Iranian stockpile fell slightly short of what international officials conservatively estimate as the minimum threatening amount of nuclear fuel. “They’re very close,” he said of the Iranians in an interview. “If it isn’t tomorrow, it’s soon,” probably a matter of months.
In its report, the I.A.E.A., which is based in Vienna, said Iran was working hard to roughly double its number of operating centrifuges.
A senior European diplomat close to the agency said Iran might have 6,000 centrifuges enriching uranium by the end of the year. The report also said Iran had said it intended to start installing another group of 3,000 centrifuges early next year.
The atomic energy agency said Iran was continuing to evade questions about its suspected work on nuclear warheads. In a separate report released Wednesday, the agency said, as expected, that it had found ambiguous traces of uranium at a suspected Syrian reactor site bombed by Israel last year.
“While it cannot be excluded that the building in question was intended for non-nuclear use,” the report said, the building’s features “along with the connectivity of the site to adequate pumping capacity of cooling water, are similar to what may be found in connection with a reactor site.” Syria has said the uranium came from Israeli bombs.
-
http://voanews.com/english/2008-11-19-voa1.cfm
New Report Calls Nuclear Terrorism Serious Risk
By Meredith Buel
Washington
19 November 2008
A new report says the world still faces a serious risk that terrorists could obtain a nuclear bomb and urges President-elect Barack Obama to make reducing that risk a top priority of U.S. security policy and diplomacy. VOA correspondent Meredith Buel has details from Washington.
The new report, called "Securing the Bomb 2008," says major progress has been made to reduce the danger of nuclear terrorism.
The report warns, however, there are still major gaps in these efforts and says the risk of terrorists acquiring a nuclear weapon remains unacceptably high.
The author of the report, Harvard professor Matthew Bunn, says the potential for a disastrous attack is very real.
"That would incinerate the heart of a major city," he said. "It could turn the center of Washington, D.C. or the center of Manhattan into a smoking, radioactive ruin that would be unusable for decades to come. That would have profound and catastrophic affects on our society, really reverberating around the world."
The study is the seventh annual report from Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and was commissioned by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonproliferation group based in Washington, D.C.
The report details a series of events around the world in recent years it says highlights the risk of poor security at nuclear installations.
These include an armed break-in at a South African site with hundreds of kilograms of highly enriched uranium, the arrest of a Russian colonel for soliciting bribes to overlook violations of nuclear security rules and the increasing terrorist threats amid the ongoing strife in Pakistan.
The report says the materials for a nuclear bomb exist in hundreds of buildings in dozens of countries.
Professor Bunn says there are currently about 130 research reactors around the world that still use highly enriched uranium for fuel.
"I think they are a quite serious concern because many of these facilities have very minimal security measures," he said. "Some of them are on university campuses and other locations where it is really not plausible that you would ever have the kind of security that in my view is required when you are talking about potential nuclear bomb material."
The report says there has been progress in the former Soviet Union in recent years. It says U.S.-sponsored security upgrades have been completed for 75 percent of the buildings that contain weapons-grade material and for about 65 percent of Russia's nuclear warhead sites.
The study says major issues remain, however, ranging from insider theft and corruption to chronic underinvestment in nuclear security.
The report also recommends expanding efforts to secure nuclear materials in China, India, Pakistan and South Africa.
The study contains an agenda for the next U.S. president to prevent nuclear terrorism and Professor Bunn says President-elect Barack Obama needs to accelerate efforts to combat the threat.
"They really need a comprehensive strategy to prevent nuclear terrorism, starting with locking down nuclear stockpiles all over the world, making sure that every nuclear weapon, every kilogram of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, wherever it may be, is secure and accounted for," he said.
Professor Bunn says the Obama administration should appoint a senior White House official, with direct access to the President, to supervise all efforts focused on preventing nuclear terrorism.
-
What a Single Nuclear Warhead Could Do
Why the U.S. needs a space-based missile defense against an EMP attack.By BRIAN T. KENNEDY
As severe as the global financial crisis now is, it does not pose an existential threat to the U.S. Through fits and starts we will sort out the best way to revive the country's economic engine. Mistakes can be tolerated, however painful. The same may not be true with matters of national security.
Although President George W. Bush has accomplished more in the way of missile defense than his predecessors -- including Ronald Reagan -- he will leave office with only a rudimentary system designed to stop a handful of North Korean missiles launched at our West Coast. Barack Obama will become commander in chief of a country essentially undefended against Russian, Chinese, Iranian or ship-launched terrorist missiles. This is not acceptable.
The attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, have proven how vulnerable we are. On that day, Islamic terrorists flew planes into our buildings. It is not unreasonable to believe that if they obtain nuclear weapons, they might use them to destroy us. And yet too many policy makers have rejected three basic facts about our position in the world today:
First, as the defender of the Free World, the U.S. will be the target of destruction or, more likely, strategic marginalization by Russia, China and the radical Islamic world.
Second, this marginalization and threat of destruction is possible because the U.S. is not so powerful that it can dictate military and political affairs to the world whenever it wants. The U.S. has the nuclear capability to vanquish any foe, but is not likely to use it except as a last resort.
Third, America will remain in a condition of strategic vulnerability as long as it fails to build defenses against the most powerful political and military weapons arrayed against us: ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads. Such missiles can be used to destroy our country, blackmail or paralyze us.
Any consideration of how best to provide for the common defense must begin by acknowledging these facts.
Consider Iran. For the past decade, Iran -- with the assistance of Russia, China and North Korea -- has been developing missile technology. Iranian Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani announced in 2004 their ability to mass produce the Shahab-3 missile capable of carrying a lethal payload to Israel or -- if launched from a ship -- to an American city.
The current controversy over Iran's nuclear production is really about whether it is capable of producing nuclear warheads. This possibility is made more urgent by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's statement in 2005: "Is it possible for us to witness a world without America and Zionism? But you had best know that this slogan and this goal are attainable, and surely can be achieved."
Mr. Ahmadinejad takes seriously, even if the average Iranian does not, radical Islam's goal of converting, subjugating or destroying the infidel peoples -- first and foremost the citizens of the U.S. and Israel. Even after 9/11, we appear not to take that threat seriously. We should.
Think about this scenario: An ordinary-looking freighter ship heading toward New York or Los Angeles launches a missile from its hull or from a canister lowered into the sea. It hits a densely populated area. A million people are incinerated. The ship is then sunk. No one claims responsibility. There is no firm evidence as to who sponsored the attack, and thus no one against whom to launch a counterstrike.
But as terrible as that scenario sounds, there is one that is worse. Let us say the freighter ship launches a nuclear-armed Shahab-3 missile off the coast of the U.S. and the missile explodes 300 miles over Chicago. The nuclear detonation in space creates an electromagnetic pulse (EMP).
Gamma rays from the explosion, through the Compton Effect, generate three classes of disruptive electromagnetic pulses, which permanently destroy consumer electronics, the electronics in some automobiles and, most importantly, the hundreds of large transformers that distribute power throughout the U.S. All of our lights, refrigerators, water-pumping stations, TVs and radios stop running. We have no communication and no ability to provide food and water to 300 million Americans.
This is what is referred to as an EMP attack, and such an attack would effectively throw America back technologically into the early 19th century. It would require the Iranians to be able to produce a warhead as sophisticated as we expect the Russians or the Chinese to possess. But that is certainly attainable. Common sense would suggest that, absent food and water, the number of people who could die of deprivation and as a result of social breakdown might run well into the millions.
Let us be clear. A successful EMP attack on the U.S. would have a dramatic effect on the country, to say the least. Even one that only affected part of the country would cripple the economy for years. Dropping nuclear weapons on or retaliating against whoever caused the attack would not help. And an EMP attack is not far-fetched.
Twice in the last eight years, in the Caspian Sea, the Iranians have tested their ability to launch ballistic missiles in a way to set off an EMP. The congressionally mandated EMP Commission, with some of America's finest scientists, has released its findings and issued two separate reports, the most recent in April, describing the devastating effects of such an attack on the U.S.
The only solution to this problem is a robust, multilayered missile-defense system. The most effective layer in this system is in space, using space-based interceptors that destroy an enemy warhead in its ascent phase when it is easily identifiable, slower, and has not yet deployed decoys. We know it can work from tests conducted in the early 1990s. We have the technology. What we lack is the political will to make it a reality.
An EMP attack is not one from which America could recover as we did after Pearl Harbor. Such an attack might mean the end of the United States and most likely the Free World. It is of the highest priority to have a president and policy makers not merely acknowledge the problem, but also make comprehensive missile defense a reality as soon as possible.
Mr. Kennedy is president of the Claremont Institute and a member of the Independent Working Group on Missile Defense.
-
Second post of the day:
60 Minutes story on just now. Amazing how aloof the SA government and the plant management are about this whole thing.
video of story at link:
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/11/20/60minutes/main4621623.shtml
Brazen Nuke Facility Raid An Inside Job?
Nov. 23, 2008
(CBS) The assault on Pelindaba would make quite a movie. But it's a thriller that is all too real, with consequences that might have threatened the world. It was a daring break-in at a heavily guarded nuclear plant that holds enough weapons grade uranium to build a dozen atomic bombs. The story is little known, but after months of reporting, 60 Minutes can tell the tale, for the first time, through the eyes of the one man who stopped the plot. What happened at Pelindaba is the kind of thing that keeps presidents awake at night.
Pelindaba is nestled in the African bush, not far from the capital of South Africa. It is where the former Apartheid regime secretly built nuclear weapons. In the 1990s, South Africa chose to disarm. The bombs were dismantled, but the highly enriched uranium, known as HEU - the fuel for the bombs - is still there. South Africa assures the world that Pelindaba is a fortress. But, last year, on the night of Nov. 7, it was the scene of the boldest raid ever attempted on a site holding bomb grade uranium.
"It happened just after one o’clock at night. We heard a sound inside the building," remembers Anton Gerber, who has worked at Pelindaba for 30 years and is the chief of the plant’s emergency control center.
He was in the control room when masked men broke in. "There's a crack in the door. And I looked through this and I saw this four armed gunmen entering the passages is coming straight to us in the control room."
Gerber says all four were armed.
The men had breached a 10,000 volt fence, passed security cameras, and walked three quarters of a mile to the control room that monitors alarms and responds to emergencies. Gerber called the security office, just three minutes away.
"I immediately said to them they must come and help us. We're under attack. There's four armed men inside our building. The first guy who stepped into the office, he said to me, 'Why do you phone?' He was shouting at me, 'Why do you phone? Why do you phone?'" Gerber remembers. "And I was still so surprised, you know. My first words to them, 'Is this a joke?'"
The only other employee in the control room was Ria Meiring. "And he grabbed me at my hair and pull me out. And he put a gun to my head while the other three guys were fighting with Anton," she remembers.
But the attack on the control room was just the start. A second group of gunmen, on the other side of the plant, was cutting through the fence and opened fire on a guard.
Asked if he thinks the gunmen were after the HEU, Matthew Bunn of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government tells correspondent Scott Pelley, "That's certainly the most valuable single thing that's at that site."
Bunn has studied the attack and has written a classified report for the government on atomic security. He says highly enriched uranium is extremely difficult to make, and would be worth millions of dollars on the black market. And if terrorists get a hold of it, it would not be hard to build a crude atomic bomb. "Making a nuclear bomb with highly enriched uranium basically involves slamming two pieces together at high speed. That's really all there is to it," he explains.
Asked how much highly enriched uranium a terrorist group would need to build a weapon, Bunn says, "The amount of highly enriched uranium metal would basically fit into the cans of a six pack."
And handling the material, according to Bunn, isn’t very dangerous. "Unfortunately not. Highly enriched uranium is only very weakly radioactive. You can handle it with your hands."
Pelindaba holds more than a thousand pounds of HEU, and it uses some of it to make medical products. South Africa calls the plant is a "national key point," a facility with the highest security.
"This is the first time that this has ever happened on site," says Ari Van Der Bijl, the general manager.
Van Der Bijl brought 60 Minutes to the place where the gunmen got through the electric fence.
They picked a spot in the bottom of a ravine, far below the perimeter road where the security guards would be traveling. The guards couldn’t see them from up there. Once they got to the fence, one of the men used plastic clips to raise the bottom of the fence just several inches above the ground. He spent about 20 minutes shimmying under the electrical wire and once inside, he made straight for the box that controls the electricity, and shut the whole thing down.
"So the box has an alarm on it, they disabled that. It has a communications cable to warn the security office, they cut that. And then they shut the fence down. They knew what they were doing," Pelley remarks.
"They knew what they were doing. Definitely," Van Der Bijl acknowledges.
It was a fluke that the man who stopped the plot was in the control room at all. The attack came on the night of a plant holiday party. The employee who was supposed to be on duty is a paraplegic in a wheelchair, but he got drunk. Meiring filled in at the last moment. Anton Gerber is her fiancé and he decided to keep her company. That left him facing the intruders, who came at him with an iron bar.
Why did he decide to fight the four armed gunmen?
"I don't know," Gerber says. "For the first moment, I thought maybe I must just put hands in the air and said, 'Listen, what do you want?' But I think the moment they hit me with that piece of iron, it was all over. I start fighting."
Gerber says he knocked two of them down and turned to a third man. "I grabbed him. But the moment before I can take this guy he fired the shot, you know. And I was still fighting. I didn't know that there was, he shot me through the, through the chest."
"And after they shot him, it was terrible. They hit him over and over and over and over again," Meiring remembers. "After they shot, while he was lying on the floor."
Gerber was seriously wounded, waiting for the security force. He says it should have taken about three minutes for security to respond; instead, he says it took 24.
Meiring says she wondered the entire time where security was, while she was on her knees with a gun to her head.
After they shot Gerber, the gunmen fled and had plenty of time to get away. The second team of gunmen also vanished. And it seemed that South African officials wanted to make our questions disappear as well.
"After the first team got in, what was happening with the second team?" Pelley asks.
"You are talking about teams as if they are related. We don’t think they are related," Van Der Bijl says
"If these were sophisticated terrorists, Anton Gerber wouldn't be alive to tell his tale today," says Rob Adam, the CEO of the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa. He runs Pelindaba. "I think that it was a piece of random criminality, frankly, having looked at it."
Asked what he means by "random criminality," Adam tells Pelley, "Well, I don't think that there was any concerted attack of a nuclear nature. You had one technically sophisticated individual with some friends."
Adam says he doesn't know what the intruders were after.
What does the South African government have to say? Pelley asked Ambassador Abdul Minty, one of South Africa's top officials on nuclear policy.
"So far, the evidence we have is that it was an attempt at burglary. People went to the one facility and tried to take, for example, a notebook computer which they left behind, subsequently," Minty says.
"You're not saying that the intrusion at Pelindaba was designed to take a laptop computer?" Pelley asks.
"No, no. I'm saying it was probably a burglary attempt from what evidence we have," Minty replies.
"Mr. Ambassador, the point is, what's valuable at Pelindaba? And the answer is the radiological materials. Nobody would break into a national key point in South Africa to steal office machines," Pelley points out.
"No, you know, the Pelindaba facility is off a main road. There's a lot of traffic on that road. So, if they felt that here is a facility that has gates, that has security, maybe there's something valuable," Minty says.
"Are you saying they attacked the plant not knowing what it was?" Pelley asks.
"No, I'm saying no one knows what the motivation is. So, we have to keep to the facts and the truth," Minty replies.
The facts that we know were recorded. A camera at the fence taped the intruders, but guards who were supposed to be watching the monitors didn’t report the men. A phone log that 60 Minutes has seen shows that 24 minutes passed between Gerber's call for help and the arrival of security. Gerber suspects someone in security was in on the plot. And he's suing Pelindaba.
CEO Rob Adam says it took security "a couple of minutes" to arrive, but that he doesn't have the exact figure.
"There's a lawsuit in this case, you may be aware of, that's been filed, that suggests that it was 24 minutes before the security arrived after that telephone call," Pelley points out.
"I'm aware of the allegation. We'll respond to it when we need to in court," Adam says.
"You've done an investigation. You're in charge of the plant. Did it take 24 minutes for them to get there?" Pelley asks.
"It took, in our calculation, somewhat less than that," Adam says.
"You initially said two minutes. Now we're talking 24 minutes," Pelley points out.
"I said a couple of minutes, but I understand from our analysis of the phone records that it took less than that," Adam says.
"There's a gap here, between two and 24. Can you help me narrow that gap a little bit?" Pelley asks.
"I didn't come prepared with that figure, Scott," Adam acknowledges.
But Matthew Bunn thinks it is nonsense to think this was a third-rate burglary. "These people cut through a 10,000 volt security fence. They disable sophisticated electronic intrusion detectors. They went straight to the emergency control center of the site. These people knew what kind of site they were in and knew what they were doing."
"You know, the unknown that seems to me the most worrying is why these people had so much confidence that they could take that place down," Pelley remarks.
"It does suggest that they had someone inside who was going to help them make sure that the security alarms didn't go off. And that security forces didn't respond in time," Bunn says.
To get to the uranium would have required penetrating more layers of security: fences, cameras and locks. All we can be sure of is that the gunmen had no trouble with the first fence and didn't seem worried about the obvious camera there.
Rob Adam says it has crossed their minds that the intruders had inside help. "And we put out a reward. We haven't had any takers to this point."
There have been multiple investigations, but 60 Minutes was surprised to find out that the police didn’t talk to their prime eyewitness until we showed up.
Gerber says investigators didn't talk to him for ten months.
"Doesn't seem like they wanted to hear your story," Pelley remarks.
"Yeah, that is, it is strange for me as well," Gerber says.
The U.S. government is worried. It's offering to help secure Pelindaba and convert its highly enriched uranium into a form that won't explode.
Ambassador Abdul Minty, South Africa’s nuclear policy advisor, gave 60 Minutes his government’s answer: "Why should we get rid of it when others don’t? Why are we less secure than others?"
"Because these men got so far into the plant. They got into the emergency control center. They shot a man. There was a second team waiting outside that got…into a gunfight with your security people," Pelley says.
"No, no. It's how you interpret events," Minty replies. "So we are of course concerned about it that anyone gets into it, but we have taken steps to try and prevent that in future."
The two camera operators who missed the gunmen were fired. But the investigation is stalled, leaving no clue as to who was behind the assault on Pelindaba or whether their intent was to supply uranium for a nuclear bomb.
Produced by Graham Messick and Michael Karzis
© MMVIII, CBS Interactive Inc. All Rights Reserved.
-
I watched 60 Minutes last night. The SA plant managers were lying their asses off. That was no crime of opportunity, that was a terrorist/organized crime operation.
-
By WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: December 8, 2008
In 1945, after the atomic destruction of two Japanese cities, J. Robert Oppenheimer expressed foreboding about the spread of nuclear arms.
“They are not too hard to make,” he told his colleagues on the Manhattan Project at Los Alamos, N.M. “They will be universal if people wish to make them universal.”
That sensibility, born where the atomic bomb itself was born, grew into a theory of technological inevitability. Because the laws of physics are universal, the theory went, it was just a matter of time before other bright minds and determined states joined the club. A corollary was that trying to stop proliferation was quite difficult if not futile.
But nothing, it seems, could be further from the truth. In the six decades since Oppenheimer’s warning, the nuclear club has grown to only nine members. What accounts for the slow spread? Can anything be done to reduce it further? Is there a chance for an atomic future that is brighter than the one Oppenheimer foresaw?
Two new books by three atomic insiders hold out hope. The authors shatter myths, throw light on the hidden dynamics of nuclear proliferation and suggest new ways to reduce the threat.
Neither book endorses Oppenheimer’s view that bombs are relatively easy to make. Both document national paths to acquiring nuclear weapons that have been rocky and dependent on the willingness of spies and politicians to divulge state secrets.
Thomas C. Reed, a veteran of the Livermore weapons laboratory in California and a former secretary of the Air Force, and Danny B. Stillman, former director of intelligence at Los Alamos, have teamed up in “The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and its Proliferation” to show the importance of moles, scientists with divided loyalties and — most important — the subtle and not so subtle interests of nuclear states.
“Since the birth of the nuclear age,” they write, “no nation has developed a nuclear weapon on its own, although many claim otherwise.”
Among other things, the book details how secretive aid from France and China helped spawn five more nuclear states.
It also names many conflicted scientists, including luminaries like Isidor I. Rabi. The Nobel laureate worked on the Manhattan Project in World War II and later sat on the board of governors of the Weizmann Institute of Science, a birthplace of Israel’s nuclear arms.
Secret cooperation extended to the secluded sites where nations tested their handiwork in thundering blasts. The book says, for instance, that China opened its sprawling desert test site to Pakistan, letting its client test a first bomb there on May 26, 1990.
That alone rewrites atomic history. It casts new light on the reign of Benazir Bhutto as prime minister of Pakistan and helps explain how the country was able to respond so quickly in May 1998 when India conducted five nuclear tests.
“It took only two weeks and three days for the Pakistanis to field and fire a nuclear device of their own,” the book notes.
In another disclosure, the book says China “secretly extended the hospitality of the Lop Nur nuclear test site to the French.”
The authors build their narrative on deep knowledge of the arms and intelligence worlds, including those abroad. Mr. Stillman has toured heavily guarded nuclear sites in China and Russia, and both men have developed close ties with foreign peers.
In their acknowledgments, they thank American cold warriors like Edward Teller as well as two former C.I.A. directors, saying the intelligence experts “guided our searches.”
Robert S. Norris, an atomic historian and author of “Racing for the Bomb,” an account of the Manhattan Project, praised the book for “remarkable disclosures of how nuclear knowledge was shared overtly and covertly with friends and foes.”
The book is technical in places, as when detailing the exotica of nuclear arms. But it reads like a labor of love built on two lifetimes of scientific adventure. It is due out in January from Zenith Press.
Its wide perspective reveals how states quietly shared complex machinery and secrets with one another.
All paths stem from the United States, directly or indirectly. One began with Russian spies that deeply penetrated the Manhattan Project. Stalin was so enamored of the intelligence haul, Mr. Reed and Mr. Stillman note, that his first atom bomb was an exact replica of the weapon the United States had dropped on Nagasaki.
=============
Page 2 of 3)
Moscow freely shared its atomic thefts with Mao Zedong, China’s leader. The book says that Klaus Fuchs, a Soviet spy in the Manhattan Project who was eventually caught and, in 1959, released from jail, did likewise. Upon gaining his freedom, the authors say, Fuchs gave the mastermind of Mao’s weapons program a detailed tutorial on the Nagasaki bomb. A half-decade later, China surprised the world with its first blast.
The book, in a main disclosure, discusses how China in 1982 made a policy decision to flood the developing world with atomic know-how. Its identified clients include Algeria, Pakistan and North Korea.
Alarmingly, the authors say one of China’s bombs was created as an “export design” that nearly “anybody could build.” The blueprint for the simple plan has traveled from Pakistan to Libya and, the authors say, Iran. That path is widely assumed among intelligence officials, but Tehran has repeatedly denied the charge.
The book sees a quiet repercussion of China’s proliferation policy in the Algerian desert. Built in secrecy, the reactor there now makes enough plutonium each year to fuel one atom bomb and is ringed by antiaircraft missiles, the book says.
China’s deck also held a wild card: its aid to Pakistan helped A.Q. Khan, a rogue Pakistani metallurgist who sold nuclear gear on the global black market. The authors compare Dr. Khan to “a used-car dealer” happy to sell his complex machinery to suckers who had no idea how hard it was to make fuel for a bomb.
Why did Beijing spread its atomic knowledge so freely? The authors speculate that it either wanted to strengthen the enemies of China’s enemies (for instance, Pakistan as a counterweight to India) or, more chillingly, to encourage nuclear wars or terror in foreign lands from which Beijing would emerge as the “last man standing.”
A lesser pathway involves France. The book says it drew on Manhattan Project veterans and shared intimate details of its bomb program with Israel, with whom it had substantial commercial ties. By 1959, the book says, dozens of Israeli scientists “were observing and participating in” the French program of weapons design.
The book adds that in early 1960, when France detonated its first bomb, doing so in the Algerian desert, “two nations went nuclear.” And it describes how the United States turned a blind eye to Israel’s own atomic developments. It adds that, in the autumn of 1966, Israel conducted a special, non-nuclear test “2,600 feet under the Negev desert.” The next year it built its first bomb.
Israel, in turn, shared its atomic secrets with South Africa. The book discloses that the two states exchanged some key ingredients for the making of atom bombs: tritium to South Africa, uranium to Israel. And the authors agree with military experts who hold that Israel and South Africa in 1979 jointly detonated a nuclear device in the South Atlantic near Prince Edward Island, more than one thousand miles south of Cape Town. Israel needed the test, it says, to develop a neutron bomb.
The authors charge that South Africa at one point targeted Luanda, the capital of neighboring Angola, “for a nuclear strike if peace talks failed.”
South Africa dismantled six nuclear arms in 1990 but retains much expertise. Today, the authors write, “South African technical mercenaries may be more dangerous than the underemployed scientists of the former Soviet Union” because they have no real home in Africa.
“The Bomb: A New History,” due out in January from Ecco Books, an imprint of HarperCollins, plows similar ground less deeply, but looks more widely at proliferation curbs and diplomacy. It is by Stephen M. Younger, the former head of nuclear arms at Los Alamos and former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency at the Pentagon.
Dr. Younger disparages what he calls myths suggesting that “all the secrets of nuclear weapons design are available on the Internet.” He writes that France, despite secretive aid, struggled initially to make crude bombs — a point he saw with his own eyes during a tour of a secretive French atomic museum that is closed to the public. That trouble, he says, “suggests we should doubt assertions that the information required to make a nuclear weapon is freely available.”
The two books draw on atomic history to suggest a mix of old and new ways to defuse the proliferation threat. Both see past restraints as fraying and the task as increasingly urgent
============
Page 3 of 3)
Mr. Reed and Mr. Stillman see politics — not spies or military ambitions — as the primary force in the development and spread of nuclear arms. States repeatedly stole and leaked secrets because they saw such action as in their geopolitical interest.
Beijing continues to be a major threat, they argue. While urging global responses like better intelligence, better inspections and better safeguarding of nuclear materials, they also see generational change in China as a great hope in plugging the atomic leaks.
“We must continue to support human rights within Chinese society, not just as an American export, but because it is the dream of the Tiananmen Square generation,” they write. “In time those youngsters could well prevail, and the world will be a less contentious place.”
Dr. Younger notes how political restraints and global treaties worked for decades to curb atomic proliferation, as did American assurances to its allies. “It is a tribute to American diplomacy,” he writes, “that so many countries that might otherwise have gone nuclear were convinced to remain under the nuclear umbrella of the United States.”
And he, too, emphasizes the importance of political sticks and carrots to halting and perhaps reversing the spread of nuclear arms. Iran, he says, is not fated to go nuclear.
“Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina and Brazil all flirted with nuclear programs, and all decided to abandon them,” he notes. “Nuclear proliferation is not unidirectional — given the right conditions and incentives, it is possible for a nation to give up its nuclear aspirations.”
The take-home message of both books is quite the reverse of Oppenheimer’s grim forecast. But both caution that the situation has reached a delicate stage — with a second age of nuclear proliferation close at hand — and that missteps now could hurt terribly in the future.
Mr. Reed and Mr. Stillman take their title, “The Nuclear Express,” from a 1940 radio dispatch by Edward R. Murrow , who spoke from London as the clouds of war gathered over Europe. He told of people feeling like the express train of civilization was going out of control.
The authors warn of a similar danger today and suggest that only close attention to the atomic past, as well as determined global action, can avoid “the greatest train wreck” in history.
-
Second post of the AM:
Michael Yon with an odd little tidbit:
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/sniffer.htm
Here is a rare and curious thing: an antique British WB-17 bomber flying over Afghan skies. These planes flew in the 1950s and 60s, performing top of the atmosphere reconnaissance. The U.S. Air Force retired the WB-17 decades ago. But NASA owns two, which it uses for an odd group of missions, including collecting cosmic dust from extremely high altitudes. It seems doubtful that NASA came all the way to Afghanistan to collect cosmic dust, but this would be an interesting region in which to search for traces of nuclear debris, drifting upwards from Iran, Pakistan, various Central Asian states, China, or India.
-
Iraq, Afghanistan and Guantanamo get more press, but among the most urgent national security challenges facing President-elect Obama is what to do about America's stockpile of aging nuclear weapons. No less an authority than Secretary of Defense Robert Gates calls the situation "bleak" and is urging immediate modernization.
Department of Defense
Robert Gates.
On the campaign trail, Mr. Gates's new boss appeared to take a different view. Candidate Obama said he "seeks a world without nuclear weapons" and vowed to make "the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons a central element in our nuclear policy." His woolly words have given a boost to the world disarmament movement, including last week's launch of Global Zero, the effort by Richard Branson and Queen Noor to eliminate nuclear weapons in 25 years. Naturally, they want to start with cuts in the U.S. arsenal.
But the reality of power has a way of focusing those charged with defending the U.S., and Mr. Obama will soon have to decide to modernize America's nuclear deterrent or let it continue to deteriorate. Every U.S. warhead is more than 20 years old, with some dating to the 1960s. The last test was 1992, when the U.S. adopted a unilateral test moratorium and since relied on computer modeling. Meanwhile, engineers and scientists with experience designing and building nuclear weapons are retiring or dying, and young Ph.D.s have little incentive to enter a field where innovation is taboo. The U.S. has zero production capability, beyond a few weapons in a lab.
Background Reading
COMMENTARY
A World Free of Nuclear Weapons (01/04/07)
– George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam NunnToward a Nuclear-Free World (01/15/08)
– George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger and Sam Nunn
THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
Gen. Kevin Chilton: Sounding the Nuclear Alarm (11/22/08)
– Melanie KirkpatrickWe're told Mr. Gates's alarm will be echoed soon in a report by the Congressionally mandated commission charged with reviewing the role of nuclear weapons and the overall U.S. strategic posture. The commission's chairman is William Perry, a former Clinton Defense Secretary and a close Obama adviser. Mr. Perry is also one of the "Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse," the nickname given to him, George Shultz, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn for an op-ed published in these pages last year offering a blueprint for ridding the world of nuclear weapons.
The commission's interim report is due out any day now, and the advance word is that Mr. Perry has come back to Earth. We're told the report's central finding is that the U.S. will need a nuclear deterrent for the indefinite future. A deterrent is credible, the report further notes, only if enemies believe it will work. That means modernization.
That logic ought to be obvious, but it escapes many in Congress who have stymied the Bush Administration's efforts to modernize. Britain, France, Russia and China are all updating their nuclear forces, but Mr. Bush couldn't even get Congress this year to fund so much as R&D for the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Senator Dianne Feinstein dismissed the RRW, saying "the Bush Administration's goal was to reopen the nuclear door."
In today's Opinion Journal
REVIEW & OUTLOOK
Madoff and MarketsDisarming OurselvesIran's YouTube Generation
TODAY'S COLUMNISTS
The Americas: Innocents Die in the Drug War
– Mary Anastasia O'GradyInformation Age: Internet Attacks Are a Real and Growing Problem
– L. Gordon Crovitz
COMMENTARY
Bush Blinks on the Auto Bailout
– Paul IngrassiaThe Fed Still Has Plenty of Ammunition
– Frederic S. MishkinIt's Time to Junk the Electoral College
– Jonathan SorosIn the House, similar damage has been done by Ellen Tauscher, chairman of the subcommittee on strategic weapons. Ms. Tauscher, whose California district includes the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, likes to talk about a strong nuclear deterrent while bragging about killing the RRW. She also wants to revive the unenforceable Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which the Senate rejected in 1999. Let's hope the Perry report helps with her nuclear re-education.
If Congress isn't paying attention, U.S. allies are. The U.S. provides a nuclear umbrella for 30-plus countries, including several -- Japan, Germany and South Korea, for example -- capable of developing their own nuclear weapons. If they lose confidence in Washington's ability to protect them, the Perry report notes, they'll kick off a new nuclear arms race that will spread world-wide.
In a speech this fall, Mr. Gates said "there is no way we can maintain a credible deterrent" without "resorting to testing" or "pursuing a modernization program." General Kevin Chilton, the four-star in charge of U.S. strategic forces, has also spent the past year making the case for modernization. "The time to act is now," he told a Washington audience this month.
The aging U.S. nuclear arsenal is an urgent worry. A world free of nuclear weapons is a worthy goal, shared by many Presidents, including Ronald Reagan. Until that day arrives, no U.S. President can afford to let our nuclear deterrent erode.
-
also posted in the Afg-Pak thread
This is the most detailed article (2005) I have read about the status of pak nukes...very interesting. The original report by Durrani is googleable.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/GD06Df04.html
Guarding Pakistan's nuclear estate
By Kaushik Kapisthalam
Even as media and public attention in the United States and South Asia has focused on the issue of nuclear-capable F-16 fighter jets going to Pakistan, there has been a series of interesting developments within the US regarding policy toward Pakistan's nuclear program.
Public nonchalance
Publicly, Bush administration officials have been remarkably guarded, and even nonchalant, about Pakistan's leaky nuclear program, even as one revelation after another came out regarding nuclear proliferation from Pakistan to Iran, Libya, North Korea and other unnamed countries. After exerting pressure behind the scenes on Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf, the US has quietly accepted his explanation that all proliferation acts were the responsibility of one man, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, and lent its blessings to Khan being pardoned and kept under house arrest in Pakistan.
The official Washington spin is that the administration of President George W Bush has persuaded Pakistan to end its nuclear trade once and for all and that it is better to move forward than dwell on the past.
Despite this public posture, many experts and former government officials in Washington and elsewhere are not so sanguine. Virtually every report on nuclear security from major US and Western think-tanks, such as the Carnegie Endowment, the Monterrey Institute and the Cato Institute, consistently raise the issue of the leaky nature of Pakistan's nuclear assets. The Congressional Research Service, the advisory arm of the US Congress, has issued numerous reports on Pakistan's nuclear program highlighting the need to do something. However, until recently, Bush administration officials had in effect stonewalled on this issue and avoided talking about it on or off the record, other than a few cryptic remarks on occasion.
That has slowly begun to change.
The curtain lifts?
In testimony to the Senate on March 17, Vice Admiral Lowell Jacoby, who is the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, spoke at length about the fragility of Pakistan. After the usual platitudes about Musharraf's virtues, Jacoby noted in his submitted statement, "Our assessment remains unchanged from last year. If Musharraf were assassinated or otherwise replaced, Pakistan's new leader would be less pro-US. We are concerned that extremist Islamic politicians would gain greater influence."
Interestingly, it was former presidential candidate Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts who was one of the first to talk about Pakistan's nuclear arsenal openly. In a January 2004 debate with other contenders from his Democratic Party, Kerry said that if he were elected president, he would get tough with Pakistan on nuclear safety, noting that past Pakistani leaders had lied to him and the US quite blatantly on the nuclear issue. Kerry added that failing to protect Pakistan's nuclear weapons from falling into the wrong hands was "one of the most glaring weaknesses in this [Bush] administration's entire foreign policy". More curious, Kerry said the US should work with India to make a plan for taking out Pakistan's nukes in case of an emergency. Another Democratic senator, Barack Obama of Illinois, went a step further and said the US should launch surgical strikes on Pakistan in a nuclear leak eventuality.
After the re-election of Bush, it was Kerry who once again raised the issue. During the Senate hearing to confirm Bush's appointment of Condoleezza Rice as secretary of state, Kerry had a fiery exchange with Rice, which needs to be quoted in full for readers to appreciate its significance.
Kerry: And what about any initiatives or discussions with President Musharraf and the Indians with respect to fail-safe procedures in the event - I mean, there have been two attempts on President Musharraf's life. If you were to have a successful coup in Pakistan, you could have, conceivably, nuclear weapons in the hand of a radical Islamic state automatically, overnight. And to the best of my knowledge, in all of the inquiries that I've made in the course of the last years, there is now no failsafe procedure in place to guarantee against that weaponry falling into the wrong hands.
Rice: Senator, we have noted this problem, and we are prepared to try to deal with it. I would prefer not in open session to talk about this particular issue.
Kerry:Okay. Well, I raise it again. I must say that in my private briefings as the nominee I found the answers highly unsatisfactory. And so, I press on you the notion that, without saying more, that we need to pay attention to that.
Rice: We're very aware of the problem, Senator, and we have had some discussions. But I really would prefer not to discuss that.
In essence, Kerry noted that as a presidential candidate, the US "secret plan" for Pakistan's nukes as conveyed to him was unsatisfactory. But Rice hinted that while the plan might not be perfect, the administration was working on it. There are some signs that this may already be happening.
Follow the money
In Washington it is said that all plans stay on paper until Congress appropriates funds for them. There are a variety of agencies and bureaus in the US government that deal with various aspects of the nuclear cycle. One such agency is the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
The official budget presented by the NRC for the upcoming 2006 fiscal year includes US$800,000 for "initiatives supporting nuclear safety cooperation with India and Pakistan". One Washington insider noted that while the NRC's cooperation with India was in the realm of providing advice on emergency procedures, fire safety issues and the safety of ageing plants, as well as collaborative nuclear research, the initiatives with Pakistan were likely focused on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal and its safety.
"American non-proliferation laws and international treaty commitments may severely restrict direct assistance to the safety of Pakistan's warheads and fissile material, you can wager good money that the Bush administration is not going to let global treaties to compromise American security interests," noted the insider.
The source insisted that it is highly likely that such cooperation is already under way behind the covers, but the NRC budgeting makes it possible on a larger scale with congressional oversight. One possible option is the provision of Permissive Action Links (PALs). A PAL is basically a box with sophisticated cryptography electronics inside that prevents unauthorized access to a nuclear weapon by disarming or disabling the triggering mechanism if the wrong code is entered or if the box is tampered with in any manner. PAL locks could make a nuclear warhead unusable in the wrong hands.
Interestingly, after the two successive assassination attempts on Musharraf in December 2003, NBC News reported that the US had installed PAL locks on Pakistani nuclear warheads. The report quoted former US ambassador to Pakistan Robert Oakley confirming the cooperation behind the scenes. About this time Bush was asked in a press conference whether Pakistan's nukes were secure. Bush replied, "Yes, they are secure," and changed the subject immediately.
However, not everyone agrees that providing PAL locks to Pakistan is a wise choice. Leonard Weiss, a prominent non-proliferation expert and former Senate staffer who helped author many US non-proliferation laws, feels that it is a "hoary idea" and compared it to "providing clean needles to drug addicts, thereby making proliferators seem like helpless victims of uncontrollable physiological appetites". He cautions that PALs may make it easier for a Pakistani leader to consider using a nuclear weapon. Despite this, the Washington insider tells Asia Times Online that PALs and other safety devices are likely to be in the cards for guarding Pakistan's nuclear weapons, if they are not in place already.
Damage control
It is a known fact that foreign governments use seminars and sponsored studies by private and quasi-government think-tanks to explain or elaborate on their country's policies. In recent months, many serving and retired Pakistani military officials and diplomats have launched a seemingly coordinated campaign in the US and Western strategic-policy circles. The goal of this campaign seems to be to reassure the power brokers and academics who often go on to become key players in the US and Western governments that Pakistan's nuclear estate is safe and that Pakistan will take its nuclear non-proliferation commitments seriously, after the Khan scandal.
One such effort was by retired Pakistani army Major-General Mahmud Ali Durrani at the Sandia Labs in New Mexico. It is to be noted that Sandia Labs is owned by defense contractor Lockheed Martin and is affiliated with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration. Durrani states in his report titled "Pakistan's Strategic Thinking and the Role of Nuclear Weapons" that he was able to tour many sensitive Pakistani nuclear facilities and found the safety procedures to be credible, though there was room for improvement in certain security aspects.
But not everyone who read the Durrani study was convinced. One former US security official, who did not want to be identified, told Asia Times Online that he had more questions about Pakistan's nuclear safety procedures after reading the Durrani report than before. He noted that Durrani highlighted the claim that Pakistan has a "three-man rule" for nuclear-weapon safety that it claims is superior to the "two-man rule" in practice in the US. What that means in essence is that three people are supposed to enter codes before a nuclear weapon can be deployed, but he pointed out that the three people can sometimes be at a lower level in the military hierarchy, such as the base commander and unit commander. He wondered whether that was really a safe procedure, given that Pakistan has already acknowledged that al-Qaeda has penetrated lower levels of the military forces.
The expert also highlighted that the Durrani report's stated exception to the "three-man rule" is in the case of a Pakistani air force pilot who can solely be given the full weapon-arming code in certain situations. "This is not comforting to anyone [who] does not know what those 'special situations' are and what if any fail-safes are there to prevent a rogue pilot from taking off with a nuclear weapon," the expert cautioned. It is to be noted that the Durrani report includes a sobering note about the safety of Pakistan's nuclear installations, while dismissing the possibility of Islamist radicals being on the inside. "There is an urgent need to improve the technical skills of personnel charged with the security of [Pakistan's] nuclear installations and develop an institutional security culture," the report warns. Coming from a Pakistani insider, this must be alarming to some within the US government, the expert surmised.
Making the plan
Soon after September 11, 2001, American investigative reporter Seymour Hersh wrote in The New Yorker magazine of a supposed secret US-Israeli plan to take control of Pakistan's nuclear facilities in the case of an Islamist coup there. In a book by Washington Post's Bob Woodward, President Bush is quoted as telling Musharraf that "Seymour Hersh is a liar" after the Hersh story came out. Whether the US had a secret plan for Pakistan's nukes in 2001 or not, there is evidence that the US government and Congress are beginning to accept the reality that a US military action plan is needed to prepare for taking over and managing a state-failure situation in a country that possesses mass-destruction weapons.
In a public hearing in March conducted by the US Senate's Armed Services Committee on plans for the US Army's transformation, Senator Joe Lieberman of Connecticut raised the question of whether the US military was ready for a "contingency" situation in Pakistan or Iran. In response, General Richard A Cody, the US Army's vice chief of staff, said that such questions were the ones US Army leaders "grapple with every day", without going into details. The timeframe for these plans mentioned a requirement to be ready by as early as 2007.
The US Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 directed the secretary of defense to conduct a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of the strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure and other elements of the defense program and policies with an intent of establishing a revised defense program. It is therefore interesting to note that the next QDR, planned to be released this autumn, reportedly includes plans for scenarios such as a rogue commander getting hold of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal. "The more the scenarios hit a nerve ... the more I know I am onto something," a Pentagon official working on the QDR 2005 was quoted as saying in the Wall Street Journal recently.
The significance of these hearings and the QDR plans is that the normally secretive US Defense Department does not make its ideas public for the purposes of public relations. These plans are made public to pressure Congress into releasing massive funds to the US military to be able to realize the plans. They also signify that the US considers the eventualities being planned for in the QDR to be realistic enough to happen in the next four years. Previous QDRs had plans for a conventional combat operation against the likes of Iraq. It may very well turn out that the US State Department, always sensitive to Pakistan's concerns, steps in to force the Pentagon to omit any references to Pakistan in the public QDR version, but if the Pentagon wants debate on the matter, a well-timed leak could do the trick.
Islamabad must be watching these developments with a wary eye, but any protestations it might choose to express are unlikely to deter the US from making plans to slowly yet deliberately cast a net around Pakistan's nuclear estate.
Kaushik Kapisthalam is a freelance defense and strategic affairs analyst based in the United States. He can be reached at contact@kapisthalam.com.
(Copyright 2005 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us for information on sales, syndication and republishing.)
-
By AMIR TAHERI
In the capitals of Western nations, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the man regarded as the father of the Pakistani atom bomb, is regarded as a maverick with a criminal past. In addition to his well-documented role in developing a nuclear device for Pakistan, he helped Iran and North Korea with their nuclear programs.
But since his release from house arrest a month ago, Mr. Khan has entertained a string of official visitors from across the Middle East. All come with messages of sympathy; and some governments in that region are looking to him for the knowledge and advice they need to fast track their own illicit nuclear projects.
Make no mistake: The Middle East may be on the verge of a nuclear arms race triggered by the inability of the West to stop Iran's quest for a bomb. Since Tehran's nuclear ambitions hit the headlines five years ago, 25 countries -- 10 of them in the greater Middle East -- have announced plans to build nuclear power plants for the first time.
The six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates [UAE] and Oman) set up a nuclear exploratory commission in 2007 to prepare a "strategic report" for submission to the alliance's summit later this year. But Saudi Arabia is not waiting for the report. It opened negotiations with the U.S. in 2008 to obtain "a nuclear capacity," ostensibly for "peaceful purposes."
Egypt also signed a nuclear cooperation agreement, with France, last year. Egyptian leaders make no secret of the fact that the decision to invest in a costly nuclear industry was prompted by fears of Iran. "A nuclear armed Iran with hegemonic ambitions is the greatest threat to Arab nations today," President Hosni Mubarak told the Arab summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia two weeks ago.
Last November, France concluded a similar nuclear cooperation accord with the UAE, promising to offer these oil-rich lands "a complete nuclear industry." According to the foreign ministry in Paris, the French are building a military base close to Abu Dhabi ostensibly to protect the nuclear installations against "hostile action," including the possibility of "sensitive material" being stolen by terrorist groups or smuggled to Iran.
The UAE, to be sure, has signed a cooperation agreement with the U.S. forswearing the right to enrich uranium or produce plutonium in exchange for American nuclear technology and fuel. The problem is that the UAE's commercial hub, the sheikhdom of Dubai, has been the nerve center of illicit trade with Iran for decades, according to Western and Arab intelligence. Through Dubai, stolen U.S. technology and spent fuel needed for producing raw material for nuclear weapons could be smuggled to Iran.
Qatar, the smallest GCC member by population, is also toying with the idea of creating a nuclear capability. According to the Qatari media, it is shopping around in the U.S., France, Germany and China.
Newly liberated Iraq has not been spared by the new nuclear fever. Recall the history. With help from France, Iraq developed a nuclear capacity in the late 1970s to counterbalance its demographic inferiority vis-à-vis Iran. In 1980, Israel destroyed Osirak, the French-built nuclear center close to Baghdad, but Saddam Hussein restored part of that capacity between 1988 and 1991. What he rebuilt was dismantled by the United Nations' inspectors between 1992 and 2003. But with Saddam dead and buried, some Iraqis are calling for a revival of the nation's nuclear program as a means of deterring "bullying and blackmail from the mullahs in Tehran," as parliamentarian Saleh al-Mutlaq has put it.
"A single tactical nuclear attack on Basra and Baghdad could wipe out a third of our population," a senior Iraqi official told me, on condition of anonymity. Since almost 90% of Iraqis live within 90 miles of the Iranian border, the "fear is felt in every town and village," he says.
Tehran, meanwhile, is playing an active part in proliferation. So far, Syria and Sudan have shown interest in its nuclear technology, setting up joint scientific committees with Iran, according to the official Islamic Republic News Agency. Iranian media reports say Tehran is also setting up joint programs with a number of anti-U.S. regimes in Latin America, notably Venezuela, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador, bringing proliferation to America's backyard.
According to official reports in Tehran, in 2006 and 2007 the Islamic Republic also initialed agreements with China to build 20 nuclear-power stations in Iran. The first of these stations is already under construction at Dar-Khuwayn, in the oil-rich province of Khuzestan close to the Iraqi border.
There is no doubt that the current nuclear race in the Middle East is largely prompted by the fear of a revolutionary Iran using an arsenal as a means of establishing hegemony in the region. Iran's rivals for regional leadership, especially Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, are aware of the propaganda appeal of the Islamic Republic's claim of being " the first Muslim superpower" capable of defying the West and rivaling it in scientific and technological fields. In that context, Tehran's development of long-range missiles and the Muslim world's first space satellite are considered political coups.
Mohamed al Quwaihis, a member of Saudi Arabia's appointed parliament, the Shura Council, warns of Iran's growing influence. Addressing the Shura Council earlier this month, he described Iranian interferences in Arab affairs as "overt," and claimed that Iran is "endeavoring to seduce the Gulf States, and recruit some of the citizens of these countries to work for its interests."
The Shura devoted a recent session to "the Iranian threat," insisting that unless Tehran abandoned its nuclear program, Saudi Arabia should lead the Arabs in developing their own "nuclear response." The debate came just days after the foreign ministry in Riyadh issued a report identifying the Islamic Republic's nuclear program as the "principal security threat to Arab nations."
A four-nation Arab summit held in the Saudi capital on March 11 endorsed that analysis, giving the green light for a pan-Arab quest for "a complete nuclear industry." Such a project would draw support from Pakistan, whose nuclear industry was built with Arab money. Mr. Khan and his colleagues have an opportunity to repay that debt by helping Arabs step on a ladder that could lead them to the coveted "threshold" to becoming nuclear powers in a few years' time.
Earlier this month, Mohamed ElBaradei, the retiring head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, warned that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty has become a blunt instrument in preventing a nuclear arms race. Meanwhile, the U.S., France, Russia and China are competing for nuclear contracts without developing safeguards to ensure that projects which start as peaceful undertakings are not used as cover for clandestine military activities.
The Obama administration should take the growing threat of nuclear proliferation seriously. It should try to provide leadership in forging a united response by the major powers to what could become the world's No. 1 security concern within the next few years.
Mr. Taheri's new book, "The Persian Night: Iran Under The Khomeinist Revolution," is published by Encounter Books.
-
***The Obama administration should take the growing threat of nuclear proliferation seriously. It should try to provide leadership in forging a united response by the major powers to what could become the world's No. 1 security concern within the next few years.***
Blah blah blah. :x
Why do we keep denying the obvious? we must use military force to damage their program, or in the less likely pray for some sort of regime change.
Simple talking is NOT going to work. Hasn't ten years of Iran proceeding with their program made this obvious?
God, are we weak.
-
President Obama met Russian President Dmitri Medvedev in London this week, and you'd have thought topics like the financial crisis and Iran would have more than filled the conversation. But when a U.S. President meets his Russian counterpart, the reflex left from the Cold War is always to sign another arms control deal. So here we go again.
APThe Obama Administration wants to replace the soon-to-expire 1991 START treaty with a new regime that would set a ceiling of 1,000 nuclear warheads apiece for the U.S. and Russia. That would dramatically cut the two countries' existing number of operational weapons, both strategic and nonstrategic, from a current estimated total of about 4,100 for the U.S. and 5,200 for Russia. It would also exceed the terms agreed by the Bush Administration in the 2002 Moscow Treaty, which committed each side to reduce their arsenals to between 1,700 and 2,200 strategic warheads by 2012.
As we learned in the 1970s, the devil of arms control often lies in the technical arcana of warheads and delivery systems, so we'll await the text before pronouncing judgment. But the devil of arms control also lies in the overall concept, with its implicit assumption that the weapons themselves are inherently more dangerous than the intentions of those who develop and deploy them.
We would have thought this thinking was discredited after the Second Lateran Council outlawed the use of crossbows in 1139, or after the Hague Convention of 1899 banned aerial bombardment, or after the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawed war. Nope. Mr. Obama has set the ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, and as one of his first official acts he pledged to "stop the development of new nuclear weapons."
What Mr. Obama wants to kill specifically is the Reliable Replacement Warhead, which the Bush Administration supported over Congressional opposition, and which Mr. Obama now opposes despite the support of Defense Secretary Robert Gates and the military. Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told us this week that "we do need a new warhead." When we asked about Mr. Obama's views on the warhead, the Admiral said, "You would have to ask him."
The RRW is not, in fact, a new weapon; it has been in development for several years and is based on the W89 design tested in the 1980s. It is said to be a remarkably safe and long-lasting warhead, a significant consideration given the gradual physical deterioration of the current U.S. arsenal, particularly the mainstay W76.
The irony is that Mr. Obama's opposition is making substantial reductions in the total U.S. arsenal that much riskier. In the absence of actual testing, which hasn't happened in the U.S. since 1992, the only real hedge against potentially defective weapons is a larger arsenal. Naturally, arms-control theologians are instead urging the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and ban the production of weapons grade uranium and plutonium.
The thinking here is that somehow the American example will get Russia, as well as North Korea, Pakistan and perhaps Iran, to reject nuclear weapons. In fact, a U.S. nuclear arsenal that is diminished in both quantity and quality would be an incentive for these countries to increase their nuclear inventories, since the door would suddenly be opened to reach strategic parity with the last superpower. Mr. Medvedev, for one, recently announced Russia would pursue "large-scale rearmament" of its army and navy, including nuclear arsenals.
France also plans to deploy new sea-based nuclear missiles next year, even as it reduces the overall size of its arsenal. The French understand that a credible nuclear deterrent requires modern and reliable weapons. The Obama Administration should understand that the best security for both the U.S. and the allies that rely on our nuclear umbrella lies in an unchallengeable arsenal, and not an invitation to the world's Mahmoud Ahmadinejads to compete on equal terms.
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2009/04/and-winner-is.html
SUNDAY, APRIL 05, 2009
And the Winner Is....
Maybe it's the influence of sports in our lives.
Or that human desire to measure everything in terms of who came out on top, and who got left behind.
Whatever the reason, there's no doubt that life, love and international relations are often defined in terms of winners and losers. And, with that in mind, we're pleased to announce the world leader who emerged triumphant at this weekend's EU summit in the Czech Republic.
May we have the envelope, please? (drumroll)
Taking top honors without so much as showing up, the top prize for grabbing global attention--and embarrassing the U.S. in the process--goes to Kim Jong-il of North Korea.
Think about it. With today's launch of a Tapeodong-2 long-range missile, Mr. Kim achieved a slew of political goals in less that 15 minutes--the time required for his rocket to fly from North Korea, to splashdown in the Pacific.
First, the DPRK dictator once again thumbed his nose at international convention. Virtually everyone from President Obama to Kim's Asian neighbors warned him against the missile test, but the TD-2 went off as scheduled. Did we mention that many of these same leaders still favor diplomacy as the preferred method of engaging Pyongyang?
In fact, the new U.S. envoy to the Six Party talks--aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear program--has suggested that Washington may be prepared to "overlook" the missile test, if Mr. Kim will return to the bargaining table. Fire off a long-range missile and get Washington to beg for a resumption of negotiations? That's a win-win by any one's standards.
But it gets even better. Not only did Kim Jong-il put his regime back in the global spotlight (and score an impressive propaganda victory to boot), but there's virtually no chance he'll be punished for his actions. While Mr. Obama is talking about additional sanctions, North Korea's friends on the U.N. Security Council--China and Russia--have veto power over any measures, and both are urging "restraint" in any new resolution against Pyongyang.
That means the likely "punishment" for the DPRK is another meaningless diplomatic warning. They haven't deterred North Korea in the past, and this time is no different.
While the diplomats haggle over language, Pyongyang will press on with its missile and nuclear weapons efforts. An Iranian delegation was present for today's launch, and the ICBM technology being developed in North Korea will quickly find its way to the Middle East.
By some accounts, at least one stage of the TD-2 is built in Iran, another testament to Mr. Kim's worldwide proliferation program. From Damascus to Caracas, there is no shortage of willing customers for North Korean weapons technology, including petro-states who will underwrite his development efforts.
Not bad for a guy who was supposedly on his death bed just a few months ago. You know, the same, two-bit dictator who has been written off time and time again. As we've noted before, various experts in the State Department and the intelligence community have been predicting the demise of North Korea for decades. Clearly, the DPRK's economic and political models are unsustainable. But it's naive to believe that Pyongyang will disappear anytime soon, or make significant concessions on its most important issues.
Obviously, if Kim Jong-il was the big winner this weekend, then there had to be a loser of equal proportions. Our vote goes to President Obama, who has been ignoring or downplaying the North Korean issue for more than a month. Refusing to use missile defenses to shoot down the TD-2, Mr. Obama then expressed surprise and outrage over the test. His response? Get the U.N. to pass another, empty resolution.
We would imagine that Mr. Kim is genuinely looking forward to the next four years. His country is bankrupt and millions of his citizens are starving, but suddenly, North Korea's global prospects seem particularly bright.
-
"Refusing to use missile defenses to shoot down the TD-2"
Do we know even if we really can even if BO wanted to?
I am dubious.
-
I cannot quote the source, but my understanding is that the general in charge of it said that he thought we could and that he awaited the President's order.
-
Well yes,
I saw this but I am not convinced it's not just a bluff.
U.S. Could Shoot Down Missile
2009-03-19
Top brass in the U.S. military say they can probably shoot down any North Korean missile. But will they?
Adm. Timothy Keating speaks at a meeting with the Japanese defense ministry in Tokyo, Feb. 19, 2009.
WASHINGTON—Two high-ranking U.S. military commanders say U.S. forces are prepared to shoot down any North Korean missile following a planned rocket launch in April.
"We'll be prepared to respond," the top U.S. commander in the Pacific, Adm. Timothy Keating, told a Senate panel.
He cited a "high probability'' that the United States could shoot down a North Korean missile.
I'm sure there's been a lot a contingency planning within the Pentagon."
-
By DAVID LEWIS SCHAEFER
In response to North Korea's rocket launch, President Barack Obama has committed the U.S. to reducing our supply of nuclear weapons, urged the passage of a ban on nuclear weapons testing, and through Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, proposed scaling back our missile-defense program. In short, Mr. Obama apparently believes that the chief lesson to be learned from Pyongyang's missile launch is the need for more arms-control initiatives.
As a means of reducing the dangers of nuclear proliferation and nuclear war, this makes no sense. Once a country passes a minimal threshold, there is no reason to suppose that increasing its nuclear arsenal heightens the likelihood of its use. The only means of deterring rogue states from using (or more likely, threatening to use) nuclear weapons once they have acquired them are first, the capacity to threaten a much more massive response, and second, an effective program of missile defense.
Reducing our nuclear arsenal only gives outlaw states (including China) the incentive to increase theirs, to try to rival ours. And eliminating nuclear-weapons testing reduces the reliability of our arms and hence their effectiveness as a deterrent.
Mr. Obama's flight to arms control demonstrates the persistence of a dangerous illusion of the 20th century -- the notion that reducing a democratic nation's armaments is a means of mitigating the threat of war. Here's some of the history:
- Beginning in 1906, Britain cut back an ambitious program of naval construction, begun under a previous administration, in the hope of thereby avoiding an "arms race" with Germany. But the change in British policy actually encouraged Germany's Adm. Alfred von Tirpitz to redouble his efforts to build a navy that would rival Britain's. This perception of British weakness may well have buttressed the confidence that led the Germans to launch World War I.
- The Washington Naval Conference of 1922 set limits on battleship construction by the U.S., Japan, Britain, France and Italy. But as a result, Japan instead focused on building other kinds of warships, paving the way for Pearl Harbor.
- Britain's policy of restraint in military production during the 1930s -- combined with the refusal of British and French governments to send forces to turn back Hitler's then weak army when it violated the Versailles Treaty by remilitarizing the Rhineland in 1936 -- did not placate Hitler. It only whetted the dictator's appetite, generating what Winston Churchill called the "unnecessary war," World War II, which might never have occurred had the Western allies maintained their armaments and a firm policy during the years that led up to it.
- The U.S. signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks antiballistic missile treaties with the Soviet Union in 1972, expecting they would produce a "stable" balance and ultimately a reduction in nuclear armaments. Instead the Soviets continued their race for nuclear superiority, as summed up in congressional testimony by Jimmy Carter's Defense Secretary Harold Brown in 1979: "[W]hen we build, they build. When we cut, they build." As President Ronald Reagan observed in a 1985 radio address on the Strategic Defense Initiative missile defense program the Soviets never accepted the "innocent" American notion "that being mutually vulnerable to attack was in our common interest."
- As soon as the Soviets signed the 1972 convention banning the manufacture of biological weapons, they immediately (secretly) ramped up their production of such weapons.
- The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet empire were brought about not by arms reductions, but by Reagan's unwillingness to give up work on SDI. Soviet Prime Minister Mikhail Gorbachev recognized the Soviets simply lacked the means to compete.
The likelihood that reducing America's strategic forces is going to elicit reciprocal behavior from our antagonists is nil. Nor will anything short of forceful sanctions (such as the George W. Bush administration applied, but then withdrew, against North Korean financial assets), have any effect in halting their march towards nuclear status.
In the words of the Joan Baez antiwar song from the 1960s: When will they ever learn?
Mr. Schaefer is professor of political science at College of the Holy Cross.
-
By DAVID CRAWFORD
International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors discovered traces of highly enriched uranium, a fuel that can be used to make nuclear weapons, at a site in Egypt, according to excerpts of a report by the U.N. agency.
Details of the finding, which the United Nations nuclear watchdog made up to two years ago, were contained in an annual report on worldwide activities of IAEA inspectors. The report was released to members of the IAEA board of governors on Tuesday. Excerpts were seen by the Wall Street Journal.
A Vienna-based diplomat familiar with the report's findings said traces of highly enriched uranium isotopes were found in separate samples of dust particles collected on a routine basis by agency inspectors in 2007 and 2008, at the Inshaf nuclear research facility in Egypt.
News of the discovery comes as the international community is using U.N. sanctions in an attempt to pressure Iran to abandon its nuclear fuel program, due to concerns over a potential nuclear arms race in the region.
Egyptian officials told IAEA inspectors the contamination was likely carried onto the site on equipment purchased outside Egypt. IAEA inspectors are investigating the source of the isotopes, and have yet to verify the source, the report says.
An IAEA spokesman said agency officials were not authorized to comment on the findings, which have not yet been made public. A spokeswoman for the Egyptian mission to the United Nations in New York declined to comment.
Isotopes usually remain for decades or longer on equipment and at sites where nuclear material is created or stored. The U.N. agency maintains a detailed database of isotope samples that often allows inspects to trace isotopes to the reactor or site where they were created.
-
NYT
Pakistan Is Rapidly Adding Nuclear Arms, U.S. Says
By THOM SHANKER and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: May 17, 2009
WASHINGTON — Members of Congress have been told in confidential briefings that Pakistan is rapidly adding to its nuclear arsenal even while racked by insurgency, raising questions on Capitol Hill about whether billions of dollars in proposed military aid might be diverted to Pakistan’s nuclear program.
Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, during a Senate hearing on Thursday.
Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the assessment of the expanded arsenal in a one-word answer to a question on Thursday in the midst of lengthy Senate testimony. Sitting beside Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, he was asked whether he had seen evidence of an increase in the size of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.
“Yes,” he said quickly, adding nothing, clearly cognizant of Pakistan’s sensitivity to any discussion about the country’s nuclear strategy or security.
Inside the Obama administration, some officials say, Pakistan’s drive to spend heavily on new nuclear arms has been a source of growing concern, because the country is producing more nuclear material at a time when Washington is increasingly focused on trying to assure the security of an arsenal of 80 to 100 weapons so that they will never fall into the hands of Islamic insurgents.
The administration’s effort is complicated by the fact that Pakistan is producing an unknown amount of new bomb-grade uranium and, once a series of new reactors is completed, bomb-grade plutonium for a new generation of weapons. President Obama has called for passage of a treaty that would stop all nations from producing more fissile material — the hardest part of making a nuclear weapon — but so far has said nothing in public about Pakistan’s activities.
Bruce Riedel, the Brookings Institution scholar who served as the co-author of Mr. Obama’s review of Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, reflected the administration’s concern in a recent interview, saying that Pakistan “has more terrorists per square mile than anyplace else on earth, and it has a nuclear weapons program that is growing faster than anyplace else on earth.”
Obama administration officials said that they had communicated to Congress that their intent was to assure that military aid to Pakistan was directed toward counterterrorism and not diverted. But Admiral Mullen’s public confirmation that the arsenal is increasing — a view widely held in both classified and unclassified analyses — seems certain to aggravate Congress’s discomfort.
Whether that discomfort might result in a delay or reduction in aid to Pakistan is still unclear.
The Congressional briefings have taken place in recent weeks as Pakistan has descended into further chaos and as Congress has considered proposals to spend $3 billion over the next five years to train and equip Pakistan’s military for counterinsurgency warfare. That aid would come on top of $7.5 billion in civilian assistance.
None of the proposed military assistance is directed at the nuclear program. So far, America’s aid to Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure has been limited to a $100 million classified program to help Pakistan secure its weapons and materials from seizure by Al Qaeda, the Taliban or “insiders” with insurgent loyalties.
But the billions in new proposed American aid, officials acknowledge, could free other money for Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure, at a time when Pakistani officials have expressed concern that their nuclear program is facing a budget crunch for the first time, worsened by the global economic downturn. The program employs tens of thousands of Pakistanis, including about 2,000 believed to possess “critical knowledge” about how to produce a weapon.
The dimensions of the Pakistani buildup are not fully understood. “We see them scaling up their centrifuge facilities,” said David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security, which has been monitoring Pakistan’s continued efforts to buy materials on the black market, and analyzing satellite photographs of two new plutonium reactors less than 100 miles from where Pakistani forces are currently fighting the Taliban.
“The Bush administration turned a blind eye to how this is being ramped up,” he said. “And of course, with enough pressure, all this could be preventable.”
As a matter of diplomacy, however, the buildup presents Mr. Obama with a potential conflict between two national security priorities, some aides concede. One is to win passage of a global agreement to stop the production of fissile material — the uranium or plutonium used to produce weapons. Pakistan has never agreed to any limits and is one of three countries, along with India and Israel, that never signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Yet the other imperative is a huge infusion of financial assistance into Afghanistan and Pakistan, money considered crucial to helping stabilize governments with tenuous holds on power in the face of terrorist and insurgent violence.
Senior members of Congress were already pressing for assurances from Pakistan that the American military assistance would be used to fight the insurgency, and not be siphoned off for more conventional military programs to counter Pakistan’s historic adversary, India. Official confirmation that Pakistan has accelerated expansion of its nuclear program only added to the consternation of those in Congress who were already voicing serious concern about the security of those warheads.
During a hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Thursday, Senator Jim Webb, a Virginia Democrat, veered from the budget proposal under debate to ask Admiral Mullen about public reports “that Pakistan is, at the moment, increasing its nuclear program — that it may be actually adding on to weapons systems and warheads. Do you have any evidence of that?”
It was then that Admiral Mullen responded with his one-word confirmation. Mr. Webb said Pakistan’s decision was a matter of “enormous concern,” and he added, “Do we have any type of control factors that would be built in, in terms of where future American money would be going, as it addresses what I just asked about?”
Similar concerns about seeking guarantees that American military assistance to Pakistan would be focused on battling insurgents also were expressed by Senator Carl Levin of Michigan, the committee chairman.
“Unless Pakistan’s leaders commit, in deeds and words, their country’s armed forces and security personnel to eliminating the threat from militant extremists, and unless they make it clear that they are doing so, for the sake of their own future, then no amount of assistance will be effective,” Mr. Levin said.
A spokesman for the Pakistani government contacted Friday declined to comment on whether his nation was expanding its nuclear weapons program, but said the government was “maintaining the minimum, credible deterrence capability.” He warned against linking American financial assistance to Pakistan’s actions on its weapons program.
“Conditions or sanctions on this issue did not work in the past, and this will not send a positive message to the people of Pakistan,” said the official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because his country’s nuclear program is classified.
-
Back when the Bush Administration was warning about Iran's nuclear progress, or its deadly meddling in Iraq, the typical Democratic and media response was to treat the Islamic Republic as innocent until proven guilty. This month, Democrat Robert Morgenthau supplied the proof.
In testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that was largely ignored by the media, the legendary Manhattan District Attorney opened a window on how Iran is secretly obtaining the ingredients for an arsenal of mass destruction. Mr. Morgenthau, whose recent cases have exposed illicit Iranian finance and procurement networks, has discovered what he calls "Iran's shopping list for materials related to weapons of mass destruction." They add up to "literally thousands of records."
Missile accuracy appears to be a key Iranian goal. In one of Mr. Morgenthau's cases -- the prosecution of Chinese citizen Li Fang Wei and his LIMMT company for allegedly scamming Manhattan banks to slip past sanctions on Iran -- the DA uncovered a list that included 400 sophisticated gyroscopes and 600 accelerometers. These are critical for developing accurate long-range missiles. He also found that Iran was acquiring a rare metal called tantalum, "used in those roadside bombs that are being used against our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan." So much for the media notion that Iran has played no part in killing American GIs.
Mr. Morgenthau also noted that the material shipped by LIMMT "included 15,000 kilograms of a specialized aluminum alloy used almost exclusively in long-range missile production; 1,700 kilograms of graphite cylinders used for banned electrical discharge machines which are used in converting uranium; more than 30,000 kilograms of tungsten-copper plates; 200 pieces of tungsten-copper alloy hollow cylinders, all used for missiles; 19,000 kilograms of tungsten metal powder, and 24,500 kilograms of maraging steel rods . . . especially hardened steel suitable for long-range missiles."
Lest anyone think that these materials may have innocent uses, Mr. Morgenthau added that "we have consulted with top experts in the field from MIT and from private industry and from the CIA. . . . Frankly, some of the people we've consulted are shocked by the sophistication of the equipment they're buying."
Mr. Morgenthau's information is corroborated by a staff report for the Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Democrat John Kerry, which notes that Iran is making nuclear progress on all fronts, and that it "could produce enough weapons-grade material for a bomb within six months." The committee also notes that "Iran is operating a broad network of front organizations," and that authorities suspect "some purchases for Iran's nuclear and missile programs may have come through an elaborate ruse to avoid U.S. financial sanctions on dealing with Iranian banks."
As we've reported, Lloyds bank entered into a deferred prosecution agreement in January with Mr. Morgenthau's office in which it admitted to a $300 million "stripping" scheme designed to hide the Iranian origin of banking transfers from 2001 to 2004. Several other banks are also in the crosshairs of Mr. Morgenthau and the Justice Department.
All this should put to rest any doubts about the Iranian regime's purposes and determination. As for what the U.S. should do about it, the committee report insists that "direct engagement" must be a part of American strategy, and so it seems fated to be under the Obama Administration. The least it can do is heed Mr. Morgenthau's central point about everything he's learned about Iran's nuclear progress: "It's late in the game, and we don't have a lot of time."
-
Geopolitical Diary: Doubts and Concerns About Pakistan's Nuclear Arsenal
May 19, 2009
Pakistani Information Minister Qamar Zaman Kaira on Monday denied a claim, published Sunday by The New York Times, that Pakistan was adding to its nuclear arsenal. Kaira said, “Pakistan does not need to expand its nuclear arsenal, but we want to make it clear that we will maintain a minimum nuclear deterrence that is essential for our defense and stability. We will not make any compromise.”
The Times had reported that, at a U.S. Senate committee hearing on May 14, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen had succinctly answered “yes,” without elaborating, when asked if he had seen evidence of an increase in the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
A nuclear arsenal cannot be expanded on a whim. The processes Mullen was referring to are products of years of labor to refine, modernize and expand the arsenal — work that in all likelihood has proceeded apace since before Pakistan’s 1998 tests (even if the focus after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks shifted for a time to security, safety, and command and control).
Mullen said he feels “comfortable,” based on what he knows and what the Pakistanis have told him, about the increased security measures established during the last three to four years to secure Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.
The Pakistanis are in the middle of one of their most aggressive offensives against the Taliban in and around Swat Valley, and they expect Washington to follow through with promises of $3 billion in military aid over the next five years and $7.5 billion in civilian assistance as a reward for their efforts. Since a good amount of unchecked U.S. aid to Pakistan frequently has been diverted to corporate entities for the benefit of military commanders in the past, U.S. lawmakers are naturally poking into every nook and cranny in Pakistan to see where future funds might wind up. Of course, the last thing Washington wants is for Pakistan to use U.S. money to beef up the very nuclear arsenal the United States is attempting to keep secure from jihadists.
But Pakistan has very different priorities in mind. A big part of the reason Islamabad and Washington don’t see eye-to-eye on how to manage the jihadist problem is Pakistan’s deep-seated fear of its larger and more powerful neighbor, India. While the United States is trying to keep Pakistan focused on its northwestern border with Afghanistan, where the writ of the Pakistani state is eroding at the hands of the jihadists, the Pakistani military leadership is far more concerned with keeping most troops stationed on the eastern border with India. This is a Pakistani fact of life that will not change, no matter how much the United States attempts to reassure Islamabad over India’s military intentions.
Pakistan has been playing catch-up with India since the 1947 partition. Lacking India’s geographic strategic depth, economic foundation and political cohesion, Pakistan has based its security policy on two primary pillars.
The first involves the state’s long-standing Islamization policy, which has been used as an unconventional tool to foster militants in places like Afghanistan and Kashmir, to gain allies and fend off rivals. Since Pakistan was more likely to suffer defeat in a direct military engagement with India, it increasingly relied on proxies to keep the Indians too busy putting out fires at home to seriously entertain military options against the Pakistanis.
The second pillar is rooted in Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal — a last-resort option designed to keep the Indians at bay should the militant proxies push New Delhi’s buttons too hard. Pakistan would be quantitatively and qualitatively beaten by the Indians in a military contest, and currently it can only dream of reaching nuclear parity with India. Still, the nuclear arsenal is Islamabad’s most valued defense against Indian aggression. In fact, just six months ago, Pakistan reminded India of the nuclear threat, seeking to make New Delhi reconsider any plans for military retaliation in the wake of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
With Taliban and scores of Kashmiri Islamist militants now turning on the Pakistani state, it has become all too clear that Islamabad’s first defense strategy — the militant proxy project — is coming undone. Once, this strategy both ensured the integrity of the state and reinforced Pakistan’s defense of its borders. Now, the same strategy is breaking it apart.
This is not to say that the military leadership is psychologically prepared to abolish the militant proxy strategy completely. But as the security and intelligence apparatus works to sort out the “good” militants from the “bad” militants that have turned against it, the Pakistani state naturally feels pressured to ramp up its second line of defense against India.
In all likelihood, Pakistan has been modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal for some time. Now that concerns are being raised over Pakistan’s nuclear plans and the potential diversion of U.S. funds, aid earmarks are coming into question — and Washington will experience even more difficulty in trying to deal with the Pakistanis and instill sufficient confidence in Islamabad to sustain the offensive against the Taliban. Furthermore, Washington is bound to run into complications with India, which will demand that the United States not stand idle while Pakistan expands its nuclear capability.
But as Mullen said himself, the Pakistanis “are very protective of their nuclear weapons,” and understandably so. These days, Pakistan’s concerns about securing its nuclear arsenal don’t apply only to the Indians and the jihadists. On Monday, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani said, “We want to tell the world in categoric terms that, with the blessing of God, Pakistan’s nuclear assets are safe and will remain safe. No one, no matter how powerful and influential, eyeing on our national assets, will succeed.” Gilani undoubtedly was referring to fears in his country that the United States might try to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, given sufficient cause to believe that the nuclear facilities could fall to jihadist control. As we have discussed previously, such U.S. threats were made loud and clear following the Sept. 11 attacks: Pakistan was pressured to admit U.S. Special Forces into the nuclear facilities in order to stave off a crisis with both Washington and New Delhi.
As the jihadists grow stronger, Pakistan sees another crisis approaching. It therefore will try to refine, modernize and expand its nuclear arsenal as much as it can, while it can.
-
Second post of the morning
By JOHN R. BOLTON
The curtain is about to rise again on the long-running nuclear tragicomedy, "North Korea Outwits the United States." Despite Kim Jong Il's explicit threats of another nuclear test, U.S. Special Envoy Stephen Bosworth said last week that the Obama administration is "relatively relaxed" and that "there is not a sense of crisis." They're certainly smiling in Pyongyang.
In October 2006, North Korea witnessed the incredible diplomatic success it could reap from belligerence. Its first nuclear test brought resumption of the six-party talks, which gave Kim Jong Il cover to further advance his nuclear program.
Now, Kim is poised to succeed again by following precisely the same script. In April, Pyongyang launched a Taepodong-2 missile, and National Security Council official Gary Samore recently confirmed that a second nuclear test is likely on the way. The North is set to try two U.S. reporters for "hostile acts." The state-controlled newspaper calls America "a rogue and a gangster." Kim recently expelled international monitors from the Yongbyon nuclear complex. And Pyongyang threatens to "start" enriching uranium -- a capacity it procured long ago.
A second nuclear test is by no means simply a propaganda ploy. Most experts believe that the 2006 test was flawed, producing an explosive yield well below even what the North's scientists had predicted. The scientific and military imperatives for a second test have been strong for over two years, and the potential data, experience and other advantages of further testing would be tremendous.
What the North has lacked thus far is the political opportunity to test without fatally jeopardizing its access to the six-party talks and the legitimacy they provide. Despite the State Department's seemingly unbreakable second-term hold over President Bush, another test after 2006 just might have ended the talks.
So far, the North faces no such threat from the Obama administration. Despite Pyongyang's aggression, Mr. Bosworth has reiterated that the U.S. is "committed to dialogue" and is "obviously interested in returning to a negotiating table as soon as we can." This is precisely what the North wants: America in a conciliatory mode, eager to bargain, just as Mr. Bush was after the 2006 test.
If the next nuclear explosion doesn't derail the six-party talks, Kim will rightly conclude that he faces no real danger of ever having to dismantle his weapons program. North Korea is a mysterious place, but there is no mystery about its foreign-policy tactics: They work. The real mystery is why our administrations -- Republican and Democratic -- haven't learned that their quasi-religious faith in the six-party talks is misplaced.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton recently rejected "linkage" in Russia policy as "old thinking." Disagreement in one area, she argued, shouldn't prevent working on "something else that is of overwhelming importance." Whatever the merits of linkage vis-à-vis Russia, de-linking a second North Korean nuclear test from the six-party talks simply hands Pyongyang permission to proceed.
Even worse, Iran and other aspiring nuclear proliferators will draw precisely the same conclusion: Negotiations like the six-party talks are a charade and reflect a continuing collapse of American resolve. U.S. acquiescence in a second North Korean nuclear test will likely mean that Tehran will adopt Pyongyang's successful strategy.
It's time for the Obama administration to finally put down Kim Jong Il's script. If not, we better get ready for Iran -- and others -- to go nuclear.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
-
Russia: The START Quid Pro Quo
Speaking in Vienna on Tuesday, as an Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) conference began, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov apparently linked the issue of a U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) system to that of nuclear disarmament. Lavrov said there is an obvious link between nuclear disarmament and an American BMD system in Europe, noting, “This position is shared by the presidents of our two countries.” The comments came two weeks before U.S. President Barack Obama’s scheduled meeting with his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev, in Russia, where they plan to discuss a replacement for the expiring 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Replacing START is a priority for Russia. Though the Soviets, during the Cold War, at times might have been able to match U.S. technological capabilities and industrial resources — a burden that contributed to the Soviet Union’s eventual collapse — the Russia of today most certainly cannot. Maintaining parity with the United States in strategic nuclear weaponry, even if only in appearance, is impossible without a treaty limiting the quality and type of weapons that the United States is allowed to field.
The Americans, on the other hand, have grown to rely on the nuclear treaty as a way to monitor the status of Russia’s nuclear arsenal and to enhance cooperation in curbing nuclear proliferation. This is something that the United States would prefer not to give up, but it is by no means essential. The Russians are certainly not about to distribute nuclear technology to terrorist groups that would be almost as likely to use it against St. Petersburg as they would against New York. So while monitoring the Russian arsenal is useful, it is no longer as crucial as it was during the Cold War. In short, the United States does not face a fundamental strategic threat with the expiration of the treaty, but it seems that Russia does.
Therefore, linking the START talks — currently under way in Geneva — with the BMD system is quite a gamble. STRATFOR sources in Russia first suggested in late May that an internal debate was being waged in the Kremlin over whether to make such a play. Essentially, the Kremlin is using a valuable chip to efforts to extract a big concession from the United States. For this gamble to work, Washington essentially must both believe the bluff and value the START talks as much as the Russians do.
It is not clear how the U.S. administration will respond to this. From a purely strategic point of view, Washington very well could let the treaty expire and then pressure Russia with nuclear rearmament — if not under Obama, then under a future administration — to expose just how few resources Moscow can mobilize in a parity campaign. Moscow is probably betting that Obama, already as lukewarm on the BMD system as an American president will get, is highly vested in nuclear disarmament for domestic political purposes. Nuclear disarmament is also the only issue on which Russia and the United States still have relatively good relations. It is the only point on which contact remains open, and the Russians are hoping the Americans won’t be willing to lose that.
For Russia, this might come down to sacrificing a long-term goal — strategic nuclear parity with the United States — for what the Kremlin views as the equally important, short-term goal of preventing U.S. military encroachment in Central Europe through the BMD system. U.S. military proximity to the Russian borders also could be classed as a long-term concern, but BMD in Poland and the Czech Republic is the issue that has Moscow’s attention at the moment. However, sacrificing the nuclear parity guaranteed by a bilateral treaty for what could be only a brief pause (and even that much is not guaranteed) in U.S. military expansion into Central Europe would not necessarily be a good trade. This is particularly true if the United States decides to move into Central Europe at some later date in a different way — such as establishing so-called “lily pad” bases, housing pre-positioned equipment, that can be ramped up into a proper base in times of crisis — or through other means.
This is the quandary the Kremlin has faced in debating whether to link the two issues. Thus, Lavrov’s statement, coming two weeks before the Obama-Medvedev meeting, might not be a definitive declaration of policy, but more a trial balloon to test the U.S. response.
There is another grave danger for the Kremlin in this strategy: the possibility that Washington might come to realize just how little nuclear disarmament means to it after all.
-
The Pentagon recently announced that it is repositioning ground-to-air radar and missile defenses near Hawaii in case North Korea decides to launch another long-range missile, this time toward the Aloha State. So at least 1.3 million Hawaiians will benefit from defenses that many officials in the current Administration didn't even want to build.
But what about the rest of us? It's an odd time to be cutting missile defense, as the Obama Administration is doing in its 2010 budget -- by $1.2 billion to $1.6 billion, depending on how you calculate it. Programs to defend the U.S. homeland are being pared, while those that protect our soldiers or allies are being expanded after the Pentagon decided that the near-term threat is from short-range missiles. But as North Korea and Iran show, rogue regimes aren't far from having missiles that could reach the U.S.
In case you're not convinced about the threat, consider this exchange between Arizona Republican Trent Franks and Lieutenant-General Patrick O'Reilly, head of the Missile Defense Agency, in a hearing last month at the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces:
Rep. Franks: "Do you believe that the threat from long-range missiles has increased or decreased in the last six months as it relates to the homeland here?"
Gen. O'Reilly: "Sir, I believe it has increased significantly. . . . The demonstration of capability of the Iranian ability to put a sat[ellite] into orbit, albeit small, shows that they are progressing in that technology. Additionally, the Iranians yesterday demonstrated a solid rocket motor test which is . . . disconcerting. Third, the North Koreans demonstrated . . . that they are improving in their capacity and we are very concerned about that."
Associated Press
This 2006 image provided by the U.S. Navy shows the heavy lift vessel MV Blue Marlin entering Pearl Harbor, Hawaii with the Sea Based X-Band Radar (SBX) aboard.
Among the losers in the Administration's budget are the additional interceptors planned for the ground-based program in Alaska. The number will be limited to 30 interceptor missiles located at Fort Greely in Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Also on the chopping block is the Airborne Laser, which is designed to shoot down incoming missiles in the boost phase, before they can release decoys and at a point in the missile trajectory when it would fall back down on enemy territory. This highly promising technology will be starved.
The Administration may also kill the plan for a missile defense system in Europe. The proposed system, which would place interceptors in Poland and a radar in the Czech Republic, is intended to protect Europe against Iranian missiles. As is often forgotten, it would also protect the U.S., by providing an additional layer of defense for the Eastern seaboard, which is a long way from the Alaskan defenses.
The Administration is reconsidering the European site due to opposition from Moscow, which says -- though it knows it's false -- that the European system is intended to defeat Russian missiles. In advance of Barack Obama's visit to Russia next week, there's talk of "cooperation" on missile defense, possibly by adding radars in southern Russia and Azerbaijan. From a geographical perspective, neither location would add much as an Iranian missile headed for Western Europe or the U.S. would be on the periphery of the radars' vision, at best.
Meanwhile, Moscow says that unless the Administration backtracks on missile defense, it won't agree to mutual reductions in nuclear arsenals under the START Treaty, which expires this year. Mr. Obama is eager to negotiate arms cuts. But it would be a mistake to tie decisions on missile defense to anything except what is best for the security of the U.S. and its allies.
In Congress, bipartisan efforts are afoot to restore some of the funding for missile defense. But even if more money is forthcoming, the bigger problem is the new U.S. mindset. The Obama Administration is staffed with Cold War-era arms controllers who still believe missile defense is destabilizing -- except, apparently, now that they need it for Hawaii. They also reject the essential next phase, which is to make better use of space-based systems.
Missile defense is no techno-fantasy. The U.S. has made major strides since President Bush exercised the option to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in 2001. If North Korea launches a missile toward Hawaii, the best demonstration of that ability -- and of U.S. resolve -- would be to shoot it down.
-
second post
A bipartisan congressional commission, headed by some of our most experienced national security practitioners, recently concluded that a nuclear deterrent is essential to our defense for the foreseeable future. It also recommended that urgent measures be taken to keep that deterrent safe and effective.
Unfortunately, President Barack Obama has adopted an agenda that runs counter to the commission's recommendations.
Consider the president's declaration, in a major speech this spring in Prague, of "America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons." Will such a world be peaceful and secure? It is far from self-evident.
David Klein
In the nuclear-free world that ended in 1945 there was neither peace nor security. Since then there have indeed been many wars but none has come close to the carnage that occurred regularly before the development of nuclear weapons, and none has pitted nuclear powers against each other.
Consider also that while the administration accepts the urgency of halting the spread of nuclear weapons, the policies it has embraced to reach that goal are likely to make matters worse.
Thus, in his Prague speech, Mr. Obama announced that the U.S. would "immediately and aggressively" pursue ratification of the comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The administration believes, without evidence, that ratification of the test-ban treaty will discourage other countries from developing nuclear weapons.
Which countries does it have in mind? Iran? North Korea? Syria? Countries alarmed by the nuclear ambitions of their enemies? Allies who may one day lose confidence in our nuclear umbrella?
There are good reasons why the test-ban treaty has not been ratified. The attempt to do so in 1999 failed in the Senate, mostly out of concerns about verification -- it simply is not verifiable. It also failed because of an understandable reluctance on the part of the U.S. Senate to forgo forever a test program that could in the future be of critical importance for our defense and the defense of our allies.
Robert Gates, who is now Mr. Obama's own secretary of defense, warned in a speech last October that in the absence of a nuclear modernization program, even the most modest of which Congress has repeatedly declined to fund, "[a]t a certain point, it will become impossible to keep extending the life of our arsenal, especially in light of our testing moratorium." Suppose future problems in our nuclear arsenal emerge that cannot be solved without testing? Would our predicament discourage nuclear proliferation -- or stimulate it?
For the foreseeable future, the U.S. and many of our allies rely on our nuclear deterrent. And as long as the U.S. possesses nuclear weapons, they must be -- as Mr. Obama recognized in Prague -- "safe, secure and effective." Yet his proposed 2010 budget fails to take the necessary steps to do that.
Those steps have been studied extensively by the Perry-Schlesinger Commission (named for co-chairmen William Perry, secretary of defense under President Bill Clinton, and James R. Schlesinger, secretary of defense under Presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford). Its consensus report, released in May, makes numerous recommendations to increase the funding for, and improve the effectiveness of, the deteriorating nuclear weapons laboratory complex (e.g., the Los Alamos facility in New Mexico, the Pantex plant in Texas, and the dangerously neglected Y-12 plant in Tennessee) that has become the soft underbelly of our deterrent force.
The commission also assessed the nuclear weapons infrastructure that is essential to a safe, secure and effective deterrent and declared it "in serious need of transformation." It looked at our laboratory-based scientific and technical expertise and concluded that "the intellectual infrastructure" is in "serious trouble." A major cause is woefully inadequate funding. The commission rightly argued that we must "exercise the full range of laboratory skills, including nuclear weapon design skills . . . Skills that are not exercised will atrophy." The president and the Congress must heed these recommendations.
There are some who believe that failing to invest adequately in our nuclear deterrent will move us closer to a nuclear free world. In fact, blocking crucial modernization means unilateral disarmament by unilateral obsolescence. This unilateral disarmament will only encourage nuclear proliferation, since our allies will see the danger and our adversaries the opportunity.
By neglecting -- and in some cases even opposing -- essential modernization programs, arms-control proponents are actually undermining the prospect for further reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As our nuclear weapons stockpile ages and concern about its reliability increases, we will have to compensate by retaining more nuclear weapons than would otherwise be the case. This reality will necessarily influence future arms-control negotiations, beginning with the upcoming Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty follow-on.
For these negotiations, the Russians are insisting on a false linkage between nuclear weapons and missile defenses. They are demanding that we abandon defenses against North Korean or Iranian missiles as a condition for mutual reductions in American and Russian strategic forces. As the president cuts the budget for missile defense and cedes ground to the Russians on our planned defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic, we may end up abandoning a needed defense of the U.S. and our European allies from the looming Iranian threat.
There is a fashionable notion that if only we and the Russians reduced our nuclear forces, other nations would reduce their existing arsenals or abandon plans to acquire nuclear weapons altogether. This idea, an article of faith of the "soft power" approach to halting nuclear proliferation, assumes that the nuclear ambitions of Kim Jong Il or Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be curtailed or abandoned in response to reductions in the American and Russian deterrent forces -- or that India, Pakistan or China would respond with reductions of their own.
This is dangerous, wishful thinking. If we were to approach zero nuclear weapons today, others would almost certainly try even harder to catapult to superpower status by acquiring a bomb or two. A robust American nuclear force is an essential discouragement to nuclear proliferators; a weak or uncertain force just the opposite.
George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn have, on this page, endorsed the distant goal -- about which we remain skeptical -- of a nuclear-free world. But none of them argues for getting there by neglecting our present nuclear deterrent. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission has provided a path for protecting that deterrent. Congress and the president should follow it, without delay.
Mr. Kyl is a Republican senator from Arizona. Mr. Perle, a fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, was assistant secretary of defense in the Reagan administration.
-
I wonder if Stratfor should be considering the possiblity that our President is a clueless kitty?
====================
Iran: Crisis Suspended?
IT APPEARS THAT — FOR NOW, AT LEAST — A CRISIS OVER IRAN perhaps has been delayed. Still, a number of things are not sitting right as we re-examine the situation.
To review, the P-5+1 group (the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China and Germany) set a Sept. 25 deadline for Iran to enter into serious negotiations over its nuclear program. Several days later, Israel — the country most threatened by a potentially nuclear-capable Iran — deliberately made public an agreement that it had cut with Washington: Either the West would get Iran to curb its nuclear ambitions by the end of September through diplomacy or “crippling sanctions,” or Israel’s military option would be taken into serious consideration. For Israel, this deadline certainly meant something.
” In spite of Iran’s attitude toward the deadline, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration announced Sept. 11 that it — along with the other P-5+1 powers — had accepted Tehran’s offer for unconditional talks. “
But Iran treated this deadline like the many deadlines it has circumvented in the past. First, the Iranian regime rejected the very idea of a deadline being imposed upon it. Then, more conciliatory statements were issued expressing the government’s desire to talk. Finally, just a few days before the deadline, Iran ceremoniously presented a proposal that made a mockery of Western demands. Washington made it abundantly clear that the proposal — which spoke of global nuclear disarmament, United Nations reform and everything but Iran’s nuclear program — was unsatisfactory. The Iranians evidently were not taking the deadline seriously.
But a funny thing happened over the weekend. In spite of Iran’s attitude toward the deadline, U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration announced Sept. 11 that it — along with the other P-5+1 powers — had accepted Tehran’s offer for unconditional talks. A day later, Israel — which certainly is not blind to Iran’s maneuvers — also endorsed the decision to proceed with negotiations. In an interview with Reuters, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor, who is also minister of intelligence and atomic energy, talked around the issue of the now-defunct deadline and said that “the time is now” for the world powers to respond to the Iranian nuclear threat. At the same time, Meridor emphasized that he was not referring to military action.
On the surface, it appears that Iran has danced around yet another nuclear deadline. Since it likely will take more than two weeks to organize a meeting between the P-5+1 and Iran, the sanctions deadline has effectively been defused. It’s not clear to us whether Iran actually made concessions behind the scenes to kill this deadline and stave off sanctions, but the speed with which Washington agreed to talk strikes us as odd, especially considering how much the deadline meant to Israel and the manner in which Iran appeared to have blown it off.
Israel must be watched closely in the weeks ahead. Israel’s patience for Iranian maneuvers has run out. Just as importantly, in contrast to the Obama administration, the Israelis know well that Russia is absolutely critical to any plans concerning Iran. Not only do the Russians retain the threat of selling strategic weapons to Tehran — which would complicate any future military operations against Iran’s nuclear facilities — but they have the ability to blow apart the U.S.-led sanctions regime by supplying gasoline to Iran itself, or through former Soviet surrogates like Turkmenistan. Considering how sour relations have become between Russia and the United States, the Israel can clearly see the potential for Moscow to up the ante with Washington by playing its Iran card.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu probably had all this in mind when he flew secretly to Moscow for a 14-hour visit Sept. 7, where he reportedly spoke frankly with Russia’s core leadership. According to STRATFOR sources, Netanyahu was trying to get a read on Moscow’s intentions toward Iran, but Russia’s response was not exactly comforting. Russia’s main dispute is with the United States and its apparent disregard for Moscow’s influence in the former Soviet periphery. Netanyahu apparently was told that if he wants Russia to back off on Iran, Israel will have to stay out of Russia’s way in places like Ukraine and Georgia (which have strong defense relationships with Israel) and also get Israel’s allies in Washington to start taking Russian demands more seriously.
Israel apparently got the message. Speaking on behalf of Netanyahu’s cabinet, in accepting the P-5+1 talks with Iran, Meridor said, “I don’t think Russia has an interest in a nuclear Iran. Maybe they want to be considered as a partner, not to be told what to do. I am not for or against the Russians. I am saying they are important elements. They have an important role in the world. Communism might be dead. Russia is not.”
This view starkly contrasts the message that has been put out by the Obama administration regarding Russian strength. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden, in particular, enraged the Kremlin when he essentially wrote off Russia as a power too economically and demographically challenged to pose a real threat to the West any longer. It remains to be seen whether Israel can convince Washington of Russia’s leverage over Iran.
So, we are left with several disjointed realities. The Israelis understand Russian leverage concerning Iran, and they were promised crippling sanctions against Iran by Washington. Instead, Israel appears to be getting another diplomatic song and dance from Iran to buy time for its nuclear program. It would seem, then, that Israeli concerns over Iran’s nuclear program are unlikely to be satisfied anytime soon, or by another round of diplomacy.
There are a lot of moving parts that need to be tracked in this Iran saga, but in such uncertain times — and with so much at stake — potential military maneuvers will bear considerable watching amid the political rhetoric.
-
second post of the day
Events are fast pushing Israel toward a pre-emptive military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities, probably by next spring. That strike could well fail. Or it could succeed at the price of oil at $300 a barrel, a Middle East war, and American servicemen caught in between. So why is the Obama administration doing everything it can to speed the war process along?
At July's G-8 summit in Italy, Iran was given a September deadline to start negotiations over its nuclear programs. Last week, Iran gave its answer: No.
Instead, what Tehran offered was a five-page document that was the diplomatic equivalent of a giant kiss-off. It begins by lamenting the "ungodly ways of thinking prevailing in global relations" and proceeds to offer comprehensive talks on a variety of subjects: democracy, human rights, disarmament, terrorism, "respect for the rights of nations," and other areas where Iran is a paragon. Conspicuously absent from the document is any mention of Iran's nuclear program, now at the so-called breakout point, which both Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his boss Ali Khamenei insist is not up for discussion.
What's an American president to do in the face of this nonstarter of a document? What else, but pretend it isn't a nonstarter. Talks begin Oct. 1.
All this only helps persuade Israel's skittish leadership that when President Obama calls a nuclear-armed Iran "unacceptable," he means it approximately in the same way a parent does when fecklessly reprimanding his misbehaving teenager. That impression is strengthened by Mr. Obama's decision to drop Iran from the agenda when he chairs a meeting of the U.N. Security Council on Sept. 24; by Defense Secretary Robert Gates publicly opposing military strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities; and by Russia's announcement that it will not support any further sanctions on Iran.
In sum, the conclusion among Israelis is that the Obama administration won't lift a finger to stop Iran, much less will the "international community." So Israel has pursued a different strategy, in effect seeking to goad the U.S. into stopping, or at least delaying, an Israeli attack by imposing stiff sanctions and perhaps even launching military strikes of its own.
View Full Image
Associated Press
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
.Thus, unlike Israel's air strike against Iraq's reactor in 1981 or Syria's in 2007, both of which were planned in the utmost secrecy, the Israelis have gone out of their way to advertise their fears, purposes and capabilities. They have sent warships through the Suez Canal in broad daylight and conducted widely publicized air-combat exercises at long range. They have also been unusually forthcoming in their briefings with reporters, expressing confidence at every turn that Israel can get the job done.
The problem, however, is that the administration isn't taking the bait, and one has to wonder why. Perhaps it thinks its diplomacy will work, or that it has the luxury of time, or that it can talk the Israelis out of attacking. Alternatively, it might actually want Israel to attack without inviting the perception that it has colluded with it. Or maybe it isn't really paying attention.
But Israel is paying attention. And the longer the U.S. delays playing hardball with Iran, the sooner Israel is likely to strike. A report published today by the Bipartisan Policy Center, and signed by Democrat Chuck Robb, Republican Dan Coats, and retired Gen. Charles Ward, notes that by next year Iran will "be able to produce a weapon's worth of highly enriched uranium . . . in less than two months." No less critical in determining Israel's timetable is the anticipated delivery to Iran of Russian S-300 anti-aircraft batteries: Israel will almost certainly strike before those deliveries are made, no matter whether an Iranian bomb is two months or two years away.
Such a strike may well be in Israel's best interests, though that depends entirely on whether the strike succeeds. It is certainly in America's supreme interest that Iran not acquire a genuine nuclear capability, whether of the actual or break-out variety. That goes also for the Middle East generally, which doesn't need the nuclear arms race an Iranian capability would inevitably provoke.
Then again, it is not in the U.S. interest that Israel be the instrument of Iran's disarmament. For starters, its ability to do so is iffy: Israeli strategists are quietly putting it about that even a successful attack may have to be repeated a few years down the road as Iran reconstitutes its capacity. For another thing, Iran could respond to such a strike not only against Israel itself, but also U.S targets in Iraq and the Persian Gulf.
But most importantly, it is an abdication of a superpower's responsibility to outsource matters of war and peace to another state, however closely allied. President Obama has now ceded the driver's seat on Iran policy to Prime Minister Netanyahu. He would do better to take the wheel again, keeping in mind that Iran is beyond the reach of his eloquence, and keeping in mind, too, that very useful Roman adage, Si vis pacem, para bellum.
-
Obama forcing Israel to hit Iran is what he wants. When the American public is paying 20.00 dollars a gallon for gas, it'll be "them Jews" at fault. Rev. Wright will be very proud.
-
Here's another take. What do we make of this?
=================
Obama’s UN Gambit: King of the Universe and the Polls
He’ll chair a Security Council meeting — and pander to rogue states
By Anne Bayefsky
Looking for a quick and easy boost in the polls, President Obama has decided to go to the one place where merit bears no relationship to adulation: the United Nations. On September 24, the president will take the unprecedented step of presiding over a meeting of the UN Security Council.
No American president has ever attempted to acquire the image of King of the Universe by officiating at a meeting of the UN’s highest body. But Obama apparently believes that being flanked by council-member heads of state like Col. Moammar Qaddafi — who is expected to be seated five seats to Obama’s right — will cast a sufficiently blinding spell on the American taxpayer that the perilous state of the nation’s economy, the health-care fiasco, and a summer of “post-racial” scapegoating will pale by comparison.
After all, who among us is not for world peace?
Unfortunately, however, the move represents one of the most dangerous diplomatic ploys this country has ever seen. The president didn’t just decide to chair a rare council summit; he also set the September 24 agenda — as is the prerogative of the state holding the gavel for the month. His choice, in the words of American UN Ambassador Susan Rice, speaking on September 2 at her first press briefing since the United States assumed the council presidency, is this: “The session will be focused on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament broadly, and not on any specific countries.”
This seemingly innocuous language has two profoundly disturbing features. First, UN documents indicate that the Security Council is currently dealing with over 100 issues. While “non-proliferation” is mentioned, “disarmament” is not. Similarly, a UN Secretariat compilation “forecasting the Council’s program of work” for the month of September — based on prior activities and requests — lists non-proliferation specifically in relation to Iran and North Korea and does not list disarmament. But in light of Obama’s wishes, a tailor-made subheading will likely be adopted under the existing entry “maintenance of international peace and security.” The new item will insist on simultaneous consideration of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament and make no mention of particular states.
This is no trivial technicality. The linguistic formula, which Obama’s confrere Qaddafi will undoubtedly exploit, shamelessly panders to Arab and Muslim states. It is a familiar recipe for stonewalling efforts to prevent Iran or other Muslim and Arab states from acquiring nuclear weapons until Israel is disarmed or Israel’s (unofficial) nuclear capacity is exposed and neutralized. It is also a frequent tool of those whose real goal is to stymie America’s defenses.
Second, Obama’s agenda preference indicates that he is dead-set against chairing a session on the non-proliferation issues already on the council’s plate — those that name Iran and North Korea. This stretches his “beer summit” technique to the global scale. Naming names, or identifying the actual threats to world peace, would evidently interfere with the spectacle of proclaiming affection for world peace in the abstract. The problem is that this feel-good experience will feel best of all to Iran, which has interpreted Obama’s penchant for form over substance to be a critical weakness. As a Tehran newspaper close to the regime snickered in July: “Their strategy consists of begging us to talk with them.”
At Ambassador Rice’s news briefing, she gave “an overview of the principal important meetings” to be held in September on her watch. After finishing the list of subjects without mentioning Iran or North Korea, she added: “So those are the highlights. We also have . . . three sanctions regimes that are up for regular review, chaired by the heads of the sanctions committees. We have Sudan, Iran and North Korea, and these are, I expect, likely to be uneventful and routine considerations of these various regimes.”
Even hard-boiled UN correspondents were surprised. Rice was asked to explain how the recent capture by the United Arab Emirates of containers of ammunition en route to Iran from North Korea could be construed as “uneventful and routine.” Her answer highlights the administration’s delinquency: “We are simply receiving . . . a regularly scheduled update. . . . This is not an opportunity to review or revisit the nature of either of those regimes.”
A brutalized Iranian population, yearning for democracy, has repeatedly been met by nothing but sad faces from this administration. An Iranian president installed by treachery has been legitimized by American recognition of his government, a decision that has sidelined other eminently justifiable alternatives. The leaders of this state sponsor of terrorism aim to annihilate the Jewish state and are on the verge of acquiring the means to do so. But instead of making the isolation and delegitimation of Iran the top priority for America’s turn at the council presidency, the Obama administration has taken Iran off the table at precisely the time when top decision-makers will be present.
The administration’s zeal for the front-page photo-op on September 25’s New York Times has now become a scramble to manufacture an “outcome” for the session. The president’s idea for a glorious finish was described by Ambassador Rice as some kind of joint statement declaring in part “that we are united in support for effective steps to ensure nuclear nonproliferation.”
Such a result would be breathtaking — for the audacity of claiming exactly the opposite of what it really represents. Even allied council members France and the United Kingdom are reported to be very unhappy with Obama’s no-names strategy for his September rollout.
Far from bolstering his flagging image, the president’s group-hug theory of diplomacy deserves the disdain of anyone who can separate rhetoric from reality.
— Anne Bayefsky is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and executive director of Human Rights Voices.
.To wit: Section 9 of the Constitution says:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.)
-
A friend from India comments:
In India, the buzz is that Mr. Ombaba wants to force non NPT signatory states to sign the CTBT. Expect India to do a thermonuclear fusion test, before signing the CTBT. This would have implications for Israel too. Israel would be forced to bomb Iran, before signing the treaty. Both these events have geostrategic implications.
-
So you ask what do I make of this.....
What is the nature of man? Is he flawed? Is he the noble aboriginal? The left would have you believe if left to his own man would be a genital good being. I say horsepucky. History has taught us the nature of man. Society has arisen due to the pressure this nature has placed on man. As Hobbes said, in the state of nature life would be short, nasty, and brutish.
Now we have our president running to the U.N., the house of the noble aboriginals, horsepucky..they don’t exist, to prove what an enlightened sole he is, and say can’t we all just get along. This tack will avail us nothing. "A universal and perpetual peace, it is to be feared, is in the catalogue of events, which will never exist but in the imaginations of visionary philosophers, or in the breasts of benevolent enthusiasts." ~ James Madison
We should just withdrawal from the U.N. and save our money we are going to need it.
I am tired of trying to appease and compromise with the left. This political correctness that has arisen from the philosophical views of the left are going to be the death of this country. Just because our society has worked so well people can come to these philosophical mis-conclusions does not mean that or society does not exist with other societies in the always present state of nature!!! It is not just folly but dangerous to lose sight of what lies outside the firelight of our society!
I say he has committed an impeachable offense lets not let him apologize over and over (the left don’t seem to be satisfied with that either) but impeach him! At least raise the roof till 2010 then impeach him!
Freki
-
Last update - 08:32 17/09/2009
Father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb tells just how easy it is
By Yossi Melman
Tags: Israel news
About five weeks ago, Dr. Abdul Khader Khan granted an extensive interview to a Pakistan television station. The frank interview attracted the attention of media outlets and research institutes the world over, but until now, its details have not been published in Israel.
Dr. Khan is a national hero in his country. He is the father of Pakistan's nuclear bomb. He is also the world's leading proliferator of nuclear technology, equipment and know-how. In the 1960s, he studied in Holland, where he learned how to enrich uranium with centrifuges. After India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, then prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto charged him with the secret task of developing nuclear weapons.
Khan stole the centrifuge blueprints from Holland and smuggled them to Pakistan. In the 1990s, after he finished arming Pakistan with nuclear weapons, he resigned from the civil service and began to "tend to his own backyard." He established a private company and traveled to the Middle East.
Advertisement
There, he first offered his knowledge to Algeria, Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, but was turned away. Iran and Libya, however, accepted his offer and paid him millions of dollars. He established a smuggling network that provided equipment and technology to Iran and Libya, and apparently to North Korea as well.
When Iran has a nuclear bomb, it will be mainly thanks to Khan. "He appeared on our radar," former Mossad chief Shabtai Shavit admitted to me about two and a half years ago. "But we didn't attribute the proper importance to it. That was one of our worst failures. We should have assassinated him."
When his deeds and those of his smuggling network were exposed, he was arrested in Pakistan and interrogated at length. Under pressure from the Bush administration, then Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf was forced to order him placed under house arrest, which lasted about five years. However, he was recently released.
"Nobody sought me out," Khan told the interviewer. "After the Indian nuclear test in 1974, which caused hysteria in Pakistan, I thought I had to speak to Bhutto and tell him about my ability to create a bomb. I had first-hand experience with the technology and I knew how it worked. Pakistan's technology infrastructure was nonexistent. Bhutto asked me to supervise the work."
Whose decision was it to produce the bomb?
"Bhutto's."
Where did the money come from?
"The program was not expensive. Our annual budget was $20 million to $25 million and included purchasing land, building the [centrifuge] facility in Kauta, hiring scientists and purchasing materials abroad. The overall budget over 25 years was less than half a billion dollars."
When did you develop the centrifuges?
"On April 6, 1978, we succeeded for the first time in enriching uranium."
Was this enriched uranium weapons grade?
"No, it was a low level of enrichment. But it was sufficient to make us understand that we were capable of enriching uranium."
When did you begin to believe that you had fissile material for nuclear weapons?
"We achieved 90 percent enrichment in early 1983."
And when was the bomb ready?
"In December 1984, I wrote a letter to General Zia [then president of Pakistan] and told him that the bomb was ready and we could test it with a week's advance warning."
Why did you decide at the time not to carry out a test and detonate the bomb?
"We were allies of the United States in the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. We asked Zia and his people to approve the test. But they explained that it would have harsh consequences. Because the U.S. turned a blind eye to our nuclear program so that we would support the war in Afghanistan, an opportunity was created to continue developing the program. They said the tests could be carried out at some later date."
And that's what happened. Only in 1998 did Pakistan carry out nuclear tests, in response to India's nuclear tests.
How did you set up the acquisitions network?
"Because I lived in Europe for 15 years, I was very familiar with the industry and the suppliers there. I had all their addresses. When I arrived in Pakistan, I began to purchase equipment from them. Then we started to purchase the same equipment via other countries, like Kuwait, Bahrain, Abu Dhabi, the UAE and Singapore. They [the West] couldn't keep up with us. We were always one step ahead of them."
When did you begin to produce the delivery systems?
"We planned them back in 1981, even before the bomb was ready. But General Zia did not allow us to produce them because of the war in Afghanistan. It happened only in 1988 - with the first government of Benazir Bhutto [Zulifkar's daughter]."
From whom did you acquire the missile know-how?
"From China." Later, he said, from North Korea too.
And what about Iran?
"Iran was interested in obtaining nuclear technology. And because Iran is an important Islamic country, we wanted it to have the technology. The Western countries pressured us on this issue, and it wasn't fair. If Iran can have nuclear technology, we will have a strong regional bloc that will repel international pressures. Iran's nuclear capability will neutralize Israel's power. We advised Iran to make contact with the suppliers and to purchase the equipment from them."
Are those the same as your suppliers?
"Yes. They were told that the suppliers are very reliable. The Iranian representatives met with them in Dubai."
What about Libya?
"Libya purchased the equipment from the same suppliers, who were responsible for supplying Pakistan, Iran and Libya via the same third party in Dubai."
Who was he?
"It was a company with which we made contact when we couldn't get equipment in Europe. They were Muslims from Sri Lanka."
The conclusion that emerges from the interview is that a country determined to obtain nuclear weapons will do so, even if it has poor technological infrastructure. There are enough suppliers who will secretly provide what is required. It is not overly expensive to produce nuclear weapons. It took Pakistan nine years.
Iran's situation is similar to Pakistan's. It began to enrich uranium in 2002, and today it already knows how to do it and has the quantity necessary to produce fissile material. The Iranians also already have missiles for launching a bomb.
-
**It's ok, Obama has yet to begun to appease....**
AP NewsBreak: Nuke agency says Iran can make bomb
Sep 17 01:23 PM US/Eastern
VIENNA (AP) - Experts at the world's top atomic watchdog are in agreement that Tehran has the ability to make a nuclear bomb and is on the way to developing a missile system able to carry an atomic warhead, according to a secret report seen by The Associated Press.
The document drafted by senior officials at the International Atomic Energy Agency is the clearest indication yet that the agency's leaders share Washington's views on Iran's weapon-making capabilities.
It appears to be the so-called "secret annex" on Iran's nuclear program that Washington says is being withheld by the IAEA's chief.
The document says Iran has "sufficient information" to build a bomb. It says Iran is likely to "overcome problems" on developing a delivery system.
-
Breaking News Alert
The New York Times
Fri, September 25, 2009 -- 4:12 AM ET
-----
U.S. Preparing to Accuse Iran of Concealing Nuclear Site
President Obama and the leaders of Britain and France will
accuse Iran on Friday morning of building a secret
underground plant to manufacture nuclear fuel, charging that
Iran has hidden the covert facility for years from
international weapons inspectors, according to senior
administration officials.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com?emc=na
-
Intelligence Guidance (Special Edition): Sept. 25, 2009 - Iran's Nuclear Program
September 25, 2009 | 1326 GMT
STAN HONDA/AFP/Getty Images
U.S. President Barack Obama and British Prime Minister Gordon Brown leave the summit on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons during the U.N. General Assembly Sept. 24Editor’s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
Related Special Topic Pages
Special Coverage: The Global Summits (Fall 2009)
Iran’s revelation of a second enrichment site is not critical in a military sense. The West always knew the Iranians were playing a shell game. What it does do, however, is highlight that one of the challenges of the situation is simply that Western intelligence does not know how good its intelligence is — until it is used. So the Iranians are attempting a smoke-and-mirrors strategy in the hope of deterring an attack. But they also don’t know how much the West does or does not know either.
Far more important was the decision by the leaders of the United States, the United Kingdom and France to condemn Iran’s partial unveiling of this new site, and to demonstrate clearly that the time for talks is almost over. The round of talks beginning Oct. 1 has been portrayed by the Israelis as the final round. Now the United States is publicly saying the same thing, although Obama continues to say it prefers a peaceful settlement.
There are four issues we need to drill into:
First, will the Russians come on board with gasoline sanctions in this context or do they continue their opposition? We need to reassess the Russian mood and see what their lowest possible price is for assistance.
Second, we should start seeing some overt movements by the U.S. military to spook the Iranians. This will not be the typical watch for carriers moving toward the Gulf. Between forces participating in the Iraq and Afghan conflicts, the United States already has more than what it needs to attack Iran. Watch and evaluate activities in the region itself.
Third, are there any statements out of Israel? They have been forcing this issue to a head. A lack of statements from them is ominous.
Finally, Iran has the “use it or lose it” option with mines. If they feel attack is imminent, will they use the mines? The United States must act against the mines before anything else if this is not to cause a global recession on its own.
Bottom line: If the Iranians indicate that they will not cooperate and the Russians do not budge on their opposition to imposing sanctions, then war could come suddenly — and from the United States. All the pieces for that war are already in place. It is just a question of nerve — for all parties.
-
"Bottom line: If the Iranians indicate that they will not cooperate and the Russians do not budge on their opposition to imposing sanctions, then war could come suddenly — and from the United States. All the pieces for that war are already in place."
Are you kidding?
Where in the world would Stratford conclude this?
I seriously doubt this.
Israel will have to do it alone.
-
Editor's Note:This introduces a three-part series on what sanctions against
Iran could mean for Iran, U.S.-Russian relations, Israel and the global
economy.
On Oct. 1, Iran will sit down for negotiations with six global powers - the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany. The
Western powers in the group are hoping that these talks will in some way
tame Iran's nuclear ambitions, but Iran, having already flouted a Sept. 24
deadline to negotiate, has thus far sent mixed signals on whether it will
even agree to discuss its nuclear program when it comes to the table.
This may seem like a familiar routine: the United States threatens
sanctions, Israel hints at military action, a deadline is set for Iran to
enter serious negotiations, Iran does its usual diplomatic song and dance,
another deadline passes and negotiations end in stalemate.
But whether the main stakeholders in the conflict realize it or not, things
could turn out very differently this time around.
U.S. President Barack Obama has made it clear that should the postponed
negotiations fail to produce any real results - and the Obama administration
has already conveyed that it doesn't have high hopes for the talks - then it
will have little choice but to impose "crippling sanctions" against Iran.
What makes the sanctions so "crippling" is the fact that the United States
already has a campaign under way to pressure major energy, shipping and
insurance firms to curtail their gasoline trade with Iran. Since Iran must
import at least one-third of its gasoline to meet its energy needs, such a
sanctions regime could have a devastating effect on the Iranian government
and (theoretically, at least) coerce Tehran into making real concessions on
its nuclear program.
No sanctions regime, however, is airtight - and this one is no exception.
Iran has a few limited contingency plans in place to prepare for a gasoline
deficit, but the real vulnerability in the sanctions comes from Russia. Iran
has become a major pressure point in Russia's ongoing geopolitical tussle
with the United States, and Moscow has signaled in a number of ways that it
isn't going to be shy about using its leverage with Tehran to turn the
screws on Washington. Moscow has a list of core demands that revolve around
the basic concept of the West respecting Russian influence in its former
Soviet periphery. As long as the United States continues to rebuff these
demands and write off Russia as a weak power, the Russians not only can
refuse to participate in sanctions but they can also blow the entire
sanctions regime apart. The more bogged down the United States is in the
Islamic world, after all, the more room Russia has to maneuver in the
Eurasian heartland.
The United States may have gained more room to maneuver with Russia
following a leaked announcement Sept. 16 regarding a complete revision of
U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) plans in Central Europe. The BMD
issue - which symbolizes a deep U.S. military footprint on Moscow's
doorstep - has long been a sticking point for Russia in dealing with the
United States. Russia remains unconvinced of Washington's apparent retreat
in Central Europe and has thus far refrained from changing its tune on Iran.
Instead, Russia has treated the BMD change in plans as part of a debt
Washington has owed since Russia agreed to provide the United States with
alternate transit rights for the war in Afghanistan. The atmosphere may now
be slightly more conducive for negotiations between Moscow and Washington,
but unless the United States makes a more concrete concession that
recognizes Russian hegemony in former Soviet territory, Russia will continue
to hold onto its Iran card.
Israel understands what Russia is capable of when it comes to Iran. From the
Israeli point of view, even if Iran is still years away from the bomb, a
potentially nuclear Iran poses a fundamental national security threat better
dealt with sooner rather than later - especially if Russia can prevent the
successful implementation of sanctions, and complicate any potential
military strikes against Iran by providing strategic air defense systems.
In other words, the Israelis have lost their patience with U.S.-Iranian
merry-go-round diplomacy. The Americans promised the Israelis crippling
sanctions against Iran, and if those sanctions don't happen or prove
ineffective, other options are likely to be explored that would necessarily
involve the skills and services of the U.S. military. Meanwhile, Iran -
whether faced with the threat of crippling sanctions or military strikes -
has the ability to wreak havoc on the global economy by going so far as to
mine the critical Strait of Hormuz, through which more than 40 percent of
seaborne globally traded oil passes. This is the "real" Iranian nuclear
option, if you will.
In this special series, STRATFOR examines in depth what a sanctions regime
could mean for Iran, U.S.-Russia relations, Israel and the global economy.
Part one will describe the nuts and bolts of an innovative U.S.-led
sanctions campaign and reveal the major energy firms, insurers and shippers
who are either already cutting back trade with Iran or are insulated enough
from the United States to pick up some of the slack for the Iranian regime.
Part two will discuss the array of options available for Russia to satisfy
Iran's gasoline needs and neutralize the sanctions. Russia can do so
directly by rail or sea, or it could enlist former Soviet surrogates like
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, all of which have more than enough
spare capacity to cover Iran's gasoline needs but also varying political and
economic constraints to consider. Part three will focus on Iran's likely
response to these sanctions, including its contingency plans to reduce
gasoline consumption at home and its last-resort options designed to stave
off a military strike or retaliate against one.
Come Oct. 1, the world's major powers will be engaged in a high-stakes round
of diplomacy. Israeli patience is wearing thin, Russia is prodding
Washington with the Iran issue, and Iran is looking at its options of last
resort. This geopolitical panorama does not leave Washington with many
options, especially when a number of other issues are already competing for
the administration's attention. It does, however, have the potential to
break the Iranian nuclear impasse.
-
Iran Sanctions (Special Series), Part 2: FSU Contingency Plans
Stratfor Today » September 24, 2009 | 1209 GMT
Summary
Russia has been using its relationship with Iran as leverage against the
United States. In the face of the very real possibility of sanctions
targeting Iran's gasoline imports, Russia could continue using Iran to upset
U.S. plans by supplying the Islamic republic with gasoline. However, Moscow
knows that such a move would come with a political price.
Editor's Note: This is part two in a three-part series on what sanctions
against Iran could mean for Iran, U.S.-Russian relations, Israel and the
global economy.
Analysis
PDF Version
a.. Click here to download a PDF of this report
Full Report
a.. Click here to download a PDF of the entire Iran Sanctions Series
Related Special Topic Page
a.. Special Series: Iran Sanctions
Russia, having found its strength again, has been pushing back against U.S.
influence in the former Soviet Union while the United States has been
preoccupied with its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. But even with its success
against the Western geopolitical offensive in many places on its borders,
Moscow still demands that Washington put an end to its plan to expand NATO,
drop its backing of Georgia and Ukraine, and abandon any military buildup in
Poland.
One of Russia's favorite pieces of leverage to use against the United States
has been its relationship with Iran. Since 1995, Russia has been helping
Iran build its nuclear power plant at Bushehr, though Moscow has refrained
from completing work on the plant in order to keep the issue alive and in
the Russian arsenal of threats against the United States. Russia has
continually delayed the delivery of advanced military technology to Iran,
like variants of the S-300 air defense system that would complicate a
potential military strike. Russia also has routinely blocked hard-hitting
sanctions on Iran in the U.N. Security Council. All of this has served to
bog Washington down in another Middle Eastern foreign policy dilemma while
Russia coaxes the United States into separate negotiations over Russian
interests, such as the West backing away from Russia's near abroad.
This arrangement has not only given Russia a trump card in its negotiations
with the United States; as long as Russia can use Iran against the United
States, Tehran is more capable of deflecting U.S. pressure.
But now the United States has devised a relatively robust sanctions plan
that will bypass the United Nations, so Russia will not have a chance to use
its veto power. Yet Russia could create a massive breach in the sanctions.
The new U.S. sanctions plan targets Iran's gasoline imports, which make up
at least a third of the country's consumption and most of which are shipped
to Iran through the Persian Gulf. Such a supply cut could devastate the
Iranian regime and economy, forcing Tehran to make real concessions on its
nuclear program. Venezuela, another state hostile to Washington, has offered
to step in and fill some of Iran's gasoline needs despite the sanctions, but
Venezuela's shipments to the Persian Gulf theoretically could be interrupted
by even a minor U.S. naval blockade. Therefore, if Iran is to circumvent
U.S. sanctions and get its gasoline, it will have to look closer to home.
Russia and several former Soviet states bordering Iran have one of the few
alternative supply options - sending gasoline in by rail or ship from the
north - which neither the United States nor Israel could block militarily.
Moreover, these countries have spare gasoline refining capacity.
Spare Capacity
Iran's gasoline imports fluctuate frequently but average about 176,000
barrels per day (bpd) - although the Iranians currently are importing more
than 400,000 bpd as they are stockpiling in preparation for possible
sanctions. Russia - and quite a few other former Soviet states - would be
able to fill Iran's basic import needs.
In this discussion, an understanding of gasoline refining capacity is
necessary. Every refinery typically has facilities that convert oil into
several different products, ranging from gasoline to diesel fuel to
kerosene. For most refineries in the former Soviet states, gasoline accounts
for about 10 to 15 percent of their total refining capacity. However, it is
rather simple to increase that percentage. Refineries do it frequently, such
as when gasoline inventories get built up in preparation for peak season
demand. At the higher end of refining gasoline, most refineries produce at
45 percent, but theoretically refineries can scale up gasoline production to
up to 70 to 85 percent of total refining capacity before the feedstock
becomes "over-cracked" and gasoline yield falls. Since gasoline refining can
fluctuate over such a wide range, STRATFOR will simply report the total
refining capacity for each country.
Russia is currently the world's largest oil producer (it recently surpassed
Saudi Arabia) at 9.9 million bpd. Russia exports 7.4 million bpd of that oil
in either crude or refined products, mainly to Europe. But Russia is also
one of the largest refiners in the world, with a capacity to refine 5.5
million bpd of oil products.
Russia's oil production has been declining, mainly because market demand has
slumped following an economic slowdown, but Russian refineries are still
working at about 80 percent of their capacity. Considering the size of
Russia's refining sector, increasing their refining closer to capacity could
cover Iran's basic import needs many times over.
Russia is not the only energy giant in the region. Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan
and Turkmenistan are all net crude and gasoline exporters. STRATFOR sources
have indicated that Kazakhstan is not considering any gasoline sales to
Iran, due to the large U.S. economic presence in the Central Asian country.
This leaves Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, both of which are among the top 20
global oil producers, both of which border Iran, and both of which have
plenty of spare refining capacity.
Azerbaijan currently produces about 1 million bpd of crude and has a
domestic refining capacity of 442,000 bpd. However due to a lack of global
demand, Azerbaijan is only refining at 27 percent of its capacity, leaving a
spare capacity that could cover Iran's import needs twice over. Turkmenistan
is in the same situation - producing about 195,000 bpd of crude, but only
refining at 20 percent of their 286,000 bpd capacity. This means that
Turkmenistan's spare capacity alone could easily cover Iran's import needs.
Between Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, there is plenty of spare
capacity to produce the gasoline that Iran would need in the event of
sanctions. The next issue is how to get the gasoline to Iran.
Rail Transport
The former Soviet states have a vast series of rail interconnections, and
their close proximity to Iran makes this transit option one of the most
likely. Russia's southern belt of refineries lining the northern Caspian
region is along a series of rail networks that could transport gasoline to
Iran in the matter of a few days. Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan's refineries
are along rail networks that could transport gasoline to Iran in less than a
day. A typical gasoline-carrying train in the former Soviet states is
capable of transporting approximately 40,000 barrels of gasoline. For any of
the former Soviet states to fulfill Iran's current gasoline needs, the
trains would have to be sent four or five times a day.
(click here to enlarge image)
One problem with this is that the former Soviet Union's rail network is on a
different rail gauge from most of the rest of the world - a leftover from
Soviet times, when Josef Stalin wanted to prevent any potential invader from
using the Soviet Union's rail network to sustain an offensive inside Soviet
territory. The rail gauge in Russia and the former Soviet states is 1,520
mm. Iran is on the standard 1,435 mm gauge that most of the world uses. In
the past, any cargo traveling from one of the former Soviet states by rail
would have to be off-loaded from the Russian train cars and reloaded onto
foreign cars with a different gauge - wasting days on the journey. However,
since 2003 Russia has been mass-producing rail cars with an adjustable
gauge, allowing for the gauge to be shifted in mere hours.
Due to increasing oil prices, the Russians also mass-produced liquid tank
cars, increasing their fleet from 100,000 cars to more than 230,000. Since
demand for crude and gasoline declined, most of these tank cars are sitting
idly in Russia, so there would be no shortage to send to Iran.
But for Russia to get its gasoline to Iran, it would have to go south along
the Caspian via Azerbaijan or through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and
Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan could also use the Russian rail
cars to send gasoline to Iran.
There is a problem with either Azerbaijan sending gasoline to Iran via rail
or Russia using rail connections via Azerbaijan to supply Iran: The rail
lines in the region do not actually run into Iran. Of the two rail lines
from Azerbaijan to Iran, the most extensive runs from Azerbaijan to Armenia,
to the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhchivan. This line was severely damaged
during the Nagorno-Karabakh War and remains in disrepair, so it cannot
handle any traffic. The second rail line runs along the Caspian Sea from
Russia to Iran via Azerbaijan, with multiple refineries along the way.
DigitalGlobe Inc.
A rail line near the Iran-Azerbaijan border on May 28, 2009
However, this line ends once it reaches the Iranian border; all cargo has to
be trucked into Iran. Azerbaijan has used this line to send gasoline to Iran
before, and there has been much talk about expanding the line farther into
Iran (though no progress has been made on construction). This line is
running at approximately 27 percent capacity, which means it has room for a
surge of rail cars going to Iran.
Azerbaijan's rail lines might be problematic, but Turkmenistan has rail
lines that connect with Iran's rail network. However, for Russia to send
gasoline to Iran via Turkmenistan, the trains would have to transit
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Uzbekistan's relationships with Russia and
Turkmenistan are deteriorating, and STRATFOR sources in Kazakhstan have said
the country has taken part in discussions on allowing such a transit. There
is no indication, however, that Uzbekistan has been approached about the
subject.
Shipping Options
There is also much discussion of shipping gasoline to Iran on the Caspian
Sea, which is bordered by Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan and
Iran - five countries that have continually bickered about dividing up the
sea among them.
Currently, only a nominal amount of gasoline is shipped across the Caspian,
but such shipping could be accelerated very easily as the basic technology
of ports and pipelines that ship crude oil can be quickly converted to
handle gasoline - particularly when considering the very limited
infrastructure of a port. Iran's northern port on the Caspian, Neka, for
example, can currently handle 300,000 bpd of crude. Even with a 50 percent
loss rate from a switchover, this one port could theoretically handle all of
Iran's import needs (and Neka also boasts the necessary road, rail and
pipeline infrastructure required to then distribute any imported gasoline
supplies to the rest of the country).
(click here to enlarge image)
The problem with Russia shipping gasoline to Iran is that Russia's northern
Caspian ports - Astrakhan and Makhachkala - are frozen over for more than
four months out of the year. Kazakhstan has been expanding its capacity to
ship crude and gasoline at Aktau, though Astana is not planning to fulfill
this particular supply request for political reasons.
The ports in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, however, are equipped to ship
gasoline or crude to Iran. Azerbaijan's Baku port has a 301,200 bpd liquid
cargo capacity. In 1996, Baku sent 50,000 bpd to Neka when its gasoline
exports to Russia were cut off due to war in the Caucasus. The capacity at
Turkmenistan's Turkmenbashi port is unknown; it is only known that there is
some capacity.
Iran's port at Neka can handle 300,000 bpd of liquid cargo - more than
enough to fill the Iranians' demand for gasoline. Neka also has crude and
gasoline storage, though only for 45,000 barrels.
The Russian Dilemma
Russia and the former Soviet states are clearly able to fill in Iran's
gasoline needs should the United States successfully cut off supplies. But
Moscow is weighing the political decision on whether to do so very
carefully. The Russians have said continually that they feel the United
States' new push for sanctions would not be successful, though it is Russia
itself that would prevent that success. The new sanctions are designed to
pressure the companies involved in operating in Iran, supplying Iran with
gasoline or insuring those supplies, but with Russo-U.S. relations in
decline, Russia will weigh the benefits of successfully crushing U.S.
sanctions plans against the pain any U.S. economic pressure could create.
STRATFOR sources in the region have confirmed that Russia is taking this
issue very seriously. Currently it is unclear whether Azerbaijan would take
part in defying the sanctions since the United States has such a large
economic presence in the country. Azerbaijan does have energy swap deals in
place with Iran and has also made more plans to increase other energy
supplies, like oil and natural gas, to Iran. But Baku has not made a
decision yet on the specific issue of gasoline supplies, though STRATFOR
sources have indicated that Baku has at least been included in talks with
Moscow and Ashgabat.
Turkmenistan is the more likely player to create gasoline supply contracts
with Iran. Turkmenistan is still one of the most isolated countries in the
world, despite the government's proclaimed push to change that fact. The
United States has no real leverage it can use to force the country to not
supply its neighbor with gasoline. Moreover, Turkmenistan is in a financial
crunch because Russia stopped receiving energy supplies from the Central
Asian state, and Turkmenistan is looking for a new source of income. But
Moscow has ensured that it holds enough influence over Turkmenistan in the
realms of the military and social stability to keep Ashgabat from making
such a move without its consent. Russia wants to make sure that no other
country will usurp its ability to ruin U.S. sanctions.
Overall, the decision for any of these states to deliver gasoline to Iran
comes down to Moscow. Russia is using this threat in order to pressure the
United States into recognizing its sphere of influence. This trump card
could force the United States to act against Iran militarily, as all the
U.S. "diplomatic" efforts will by then have been exhausted. Then again, if
Russia plays this card, it could also force the United States to act more
aggressively against Russia, which will have proven its willingness to
support Iran through its actions, not just its rhetoric.
-
Iran Sanctions (Special Series), Part 3: Preparing for the Worst
Stratfor Today » September 25, 2009 | 1203 GMT
Summary
Iran has long been preparing itself for U.S.-led sanctions against gasoline
imports and is confident in its ability to circumvent them. But even if the
sanctions did get Iran's attention, they would not necessarily bring it to
the negotiating table. Iran takes resistance very seriously, and while
extolling the virtues of self-sacrifice it could close the Strait of Hormuz,
which would wreak havoc on the global economy.
Editor's Note: This is part three of a three-part series on what sanctions
against Iran could mean for Iran, U.S.-Russian relations, Israel and the
global economy.
Analysis
PDF Version
a.. Click here to download a PDF of this report
Full Report
a.. Click here to download a PDF of the entire Iran Sanctions Series
Related Special Topic Page
a.. Special Series: Iran Sanctions
As the Iranian regime continued apace with its nuclear program, it
understood that it was only a matter of time before the West would aim for
its gasoline imports, a potential Achilles' heel for Iran. Although Iran may
be one of the world's top-five crude-oil producers and exporters, its rogue
reputation isn't exactly good for business. The Iranian energy industry has
been sagging under the weight of sanctions for decades as the foreign energy
majors with the technical skill Iran so badly needs wait for the
geopolitical storm clouds to clear before tapping the country's vast energy
reserves.
To contain domestic political dissent, the Iranian regime has heavily
subsidized the population's energy needs. The drawback to such a policy is
that ridiculously cheap gasoline prices (gasoline in Iran costs around 9
cents per liter) tend to fuel rapid consumption and rampant smuggling. As
Iran's population continued to grow, so did its appetite for gasoline, and
the regime has now reached a point where it simply cannot keep up with
domestic demand without importing at least one-third of its fuel.
So, while Iran's Arab rivals, such as energy heavyweight Saudi Arabia,
profited immensely from record-high crude prices in 2008, the Iranian regime
was still struggling to balance its accounts. Then came the global economic
collapse, which sliced the country's oil revenues in half. And given the
sponsorship by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) of militant and
political proxies in Iraq and Lebanon, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's
repeated raids on the country's rainy-day oil funds for his political
campaigning, and funding for the Iranian nuclear program, Tehran does not
have much cash to spare.
Unreliable Allies
Iran is not oblivious to its gasoline vulnerabilities, but it also isn't
left without options should Washington become more aggressive with its
sanctions campaign. As discussed in detail in part two of this series,
Russia - for its own strategic reasons - has developed a contingency plan,
most likely involving Russia's former Soviet surrogate, Turkmenistan, to
cover the gasoline gap should Iran start experiencing shortfalls. The
Russians are certainly not planning to do this out of the goodness of their
hearts and sincere loyalty to their allies in Tehran. On the contrary,
sabotaging Washington's sanctions regime against Tehran is yet another way
Moscow can turn the screws on the United States if the Obama administration
refuses to take seriously the Kremlin's demand that the West respect its
influence in the former Soviet sphere. Since the Obama administration backed
down recently from its Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) plans in Central
Europe, there could be more room for Russia and the United States to engage
in serious negotiations. That said, there is no guarantee that Washington
would be willing to pay the price of Russian hegemony in Eurasia in return
for Russia's cooperation on Iran, and Moscow will drive a hard bargain
before it even thinks about sacrificing its leverage with Iran.
Iran could certainly use Russia's help in maintaining its gasoline supply,
but Tehran is also quite wary of becoming that much more dependent on Moscow's
good graces for its energy security. Russia and Iran have quite a tumultuous
history (the Soviets briefly occupied Iran during World War II), and the
Iranian leadership is fearful of being abandoned by Russia should Moscow
reach some sort of compromise with Washington.
Iran's other energy-producing ally hostile to the United States is
Venezuela, which recently announced it would come to Iran's aid in the event
of sanctions and supply its Persian friends with 20,000 barrels per day
(bpd) of gasoline starting in October for an $800 million annual fee.
Beneath the revolutionary rhetoric of oppressed regimes sticking it to their
imperialist foes, this Venezuelan-Iranian energy deal is filled with holes.
For starters, Venezuela - much like Iran - is facing serious refining
problems due to mismanagement and a severe drop in foreign investment. Also
like Iran, Venezuela's populist regime heavily subsidizes its constituents
(gasoline in Venezuela is even cheaper than in Iran at 4 cents per liter),
sending consumption soaring over the past four years. While Venezuela is
currently refining around 420,000 bpd, it still needs to import gasoline to
help meet domestic demand.
Caracas could always go through a third party to supply gasoline to Iran
from a source closer to the Persian Gulf, but finding a willing supplier
could prove difficult and costly when insurance premiums and political risks
are taken into account. Moreover, should push come to shove, Washington has
substantial leverage over the Venezuelan regime given the abundance of
assets that Citgo, the refining unit of Venezuelan state oil company
Petroleos de Venezuela, has spread throughout the United States. The United
States also is the largest recipient of Venezuela's crude exports and one of
the few markets in the world with the technological capabilities to process
Venezuela's heavy crude, leaving Venezuela without much of a viable
alternative market.
Iran has already turned to China to help backfill its gasoline supply.
Latest estimates show that starting in September, China began to directly
supply up to one-third of Iran's total gasoline imports. Until now, Chinese
involvement in the gasoline trade had mostly been limited to shipping
companies. In the run-up to the Oct. 1 talks, China now has the extra
incentive to poke the United States and profit from these gasoline shipments
to Iran. After having boosted its refining capacity this year, China has
surplus gasoline to sell on the international market. In August alone China
exported 140,000 barrels of gasoline per day. Like Malaysia's Petronas,
which began supplying Iran with gasoline in August, China sees an
opportunity to profit off of Iran's gasoline trade at a time when political
tensions are rising and major energy firms, such as BP, Reliance and Total,
have already stopped or are cutting back their shipments to Iran. But Iran
may not be able to rely on Chinese aid over the long term.
China currently is in a heated trade spat with Washington over a recent U.S.
tariff on Chinese tire imports and could push back against Washington even
further by flouting the threatened sanctions regime. However, this is a
decision with major strings attached. Washington still has a great deal of
leverage over Beijing in the form of Section 421, a U.S. law that was
incorporated into China's accession agreement with the World Trade
Organization in 2001 and allows the United States to legally impose tariffs
on nearly any Chinese export until 2013. Now that Obama has put Section 421
to use in restricting tire imports, the Chinese have to think twice before
making any moves that could compel Washington to go even further in slapping
trade restrictions on China. Additionally, China is a massive energy
importer itself, so shipping any sort of energy product to the Middle East,
where its supply lines are unprotected, is something that works directly
against most of China's energy security strategies.
The United States has not yet formalized the gasoline sanctions against Iran
in the form of legislation or a U.N. Security Council resolution, and this
may be providing Beijing a limited opportunity to hit back at the United
States during the trade spat and demonstrate the limits of Beijing's
cooperation. However, Beijing will be far more cautious than Russia when it
comes to blocking sanctions against Iran and will keep a close eye on Russia's
intentions in deciding its next steps. China has long been noncommittal when
it comes to sanctions against Iran and will align itself with Russia in
forums like the U.N. Security Council to demonstrate its opposition to
punitive U.S. economic measures. Of course, if Russia folds and reaches some
sort of compromise with Washington, China will comply with the sanctions and
avoid being left in the spotlight as the sole sanctions-buster allied with
Iran.
In short, Iran has friends that it can turn to if necessary, but the
reliability of those friends is by no means guaranteed.
Fending for Itself
In the spirit of self-sufficiency, Iran has long been preparing itself for a
U.S.-led offensive against Iranian gasoline imports. Over the past two
years, as talk of gasoline sanctions intensified, Iran sought out willing
suppliers to help stockpile its gasoline reserves. Iranian gasoline
consumption currently stands at around 300,000 to 400,000 bpd, but over the
past several months, Iran has been importing well in excess of that amount
from mostly Swiss suppliers and now newcomers like Malaysia's state-owned
Petronas, which are looking to replace the energy majors that are dropping
out of the Iranian gasoline trade while political tensions are high. Iranian
and U.S. intelligence sources claim that Iran currently has at least three
months worth of gasoline needs (estimates average around 30 million barrels)
stockpiled. The director of the National Iranian Oil Refining and
Distribution Company claims Iran's gasoline storage capacity is about 15.7
million barrels, which gives Iran about four months of in-storage capacity.
Some of the surplus gasoline is sitting on tankers off Kharg Island, but the
bulk of the supply is stored on land, where it is less vulnerable to
airstrikes.
-
The Iranian government continues to make bold claims about its ability to
massively ramp up its refining capacity and become self-sufficient in
gasoline production within four years, but this is mostly hot air. Iran
simply doesn't have the capability to meet its gasoline production goals on
its own without the necessary foreign investment. And even if Iran had
willing partners in places like Central Asia, it would still need to
overcome its extreme reluctance to actually foot the bill for such projects.
It may strike some as odd that Iran has acquired a capability to develop
nuclear technology but still struggles to build and operate refineries on
its own. There are a number of reasons for this, but the simple answer is
that the technology for a nuclear program dates back to the 1930s and 1940s
and has not changed much since, while refining technology is continually
updated and Iran has been out of the global oil-and-gas mainstream for 30
years now. A nuclear weapons program requires a couple dozen or so highly
trained scientists and engineers to operate it, and these personnel can be
trained in any number of institutions around the world. On the other hand, a
permanent staff for a refinery producing around 300,000 bpd would require
some 1,200 highly trained technicians and petroleum engineers, and most of
Iran's intelligentsia - particularly the group with strong technical
skills - left the country following the Iranian Revolution. Iran's stated
energy goals are full of delusion as well as ambition.
Confronting the Subsidy Problem
Iran thus has little choice but to figure out a way to reduce gasoline
consumption at home. The Iranians started on this initiative in June 2007
when the regime implemented a rationing system. Though the move was
extremely unpopular and instigated a spate of riots in Tehran, the backlash
was swiftly contained and, according to energy industry sources, Iranian
gasoline imports dropped from 40 percent of total domestic consumption to
about 25 to 30 percent.
The next step is for the regime to start cutting untenable subsidy rates by
raising the price of gasoline. This is a plan that has long been in the
works but has been put off time and time again due to the regime's
deep-rooted fear of sparking major social unrest. This especially became a
concern following the June presidential election debacle, which gave scores
of Iranian citizens the courage to pour into the streets to voice their
dissent against Ahmadinejad. Though the protests have dramatically dwindled
in size, they continue sporadically and are a persistent irritant to the
regime. Iranian sources claim that the coming gasoline price hike will not
be that dramatic in the beginning. The government would likely continue to
subsidize domestically produced gasoline while allowing the cost of imported
gasoline to rise so it can pass along a portion of the costs to the consumer
and further dampen demand.
Besides the potential political fallout, there is another significant issue
with this gasoline price-hike plan. Since gasoline prices are heavily
subsidized in Iran and are, therefore, much cheaper than the gasoline sold
in neighboring countries, Iran has a major problem with gasoline smuggling
to these countries. Iranian sources claim that more than 750,000 barrels are
smuggled every month from Iran to Turkey, Afghanistan and Iraq, and this
puts a considerable drain on Iran's energy revenues. The smuggling rings are
run by a variety of actors, from Iranian organized crime entities linked to
the IRGC to Balochi tribesmen to Kurdish smugglers, and they are extremely
difficult for the regime to dismantle. Moreover, Iranian officials tend to
turn a blind eye to these smuggling practices in order to buy political
patronage from non-Persian minorities (Kurds, Balochis and Azeris) in the
borderlands who could otherwise cause serious trouble for the regime. With
the political situation at home particularly dicey right now, the Iranian
government will have to proceed cautiously with any future price hikes,
which are sure to be applied unevenly across the country.
Natural Gas Relief?
Iran also has an alternative-fuel plan under way that capitalizes on the
country's natural gas resources and reduces its reliance on refined crude,
but the results have so far been limited. The plan involves encouraging the
use of compressed natural gas (CNG) for Iranian motorists. Cars that can run
on CNG, which are prevalent in South Asia and Latin America, can be more
economical and environmentally friendly. In fact, the price of CNG retails
at around 4 cents per cubic meter (roughly equivalent to one liter of
gasoline). Moreover, the technology used to compress natural gas is far less
complex than that needed to refine crude. Considering that Iran is the world's
fourth-largest producer of natural gas, the switch to CNG makes sense, but
there is one big drawback. Vehicles must be modified to run on CNG, and CNG
stations would have to be built across the country. None of this would be
quick or cheap for Iran.
Nevertheless, Iran has made notable progress since kicking off its CNG plan
in 2007, when Iran Khodro Industrial Group - Iran's leading automaker -
invested $50 million in low-consumption, flexible-fuel engine production
lines. Former Iranian Oil Minister Gholam Hossein Nozari said in July that
there are currently 880 CNG stations in Iran, with plans to build an
additional 400 within the next several months. Since Iran Khodro started
ramping up production of CNG-capable vehicles, Iran has become the world's
fourth-largest CNG-vehicle producer following Argentina, Pakistan and
Brazil, according to the International Association for Natural Gas Vehicles.
As of May 2009, Iranian government officials claim the official count of
CNG-capable vehicles on the road totaled 1.4 million. The total number of
cars in Iran was estimated to be 11.7 million in 2008, according to the
Global Market Information Database. All in all, estimated fuel replacement
by CNG is currently around 7 percent of Iran's total automobile fuel
consumption, up from zero five years ago. While Iran seems to be making
steady progress in the CNG arena, it still has a way to go before the switch
to CNG would make a significant dent in the country's gasoline imports.
Responding to Pressure
When STRATFOR speaks to Iranian sources, we get the sense that the regime is
feeling fairly confident in its ability to slip the sanctions noose while
continuing to work on its nuclear program, using the same rhetoric it has
used for the past seven years to drag negotiations into a stalemate. This
continued confidence may be due to the fact that the Iranians have yet to
feel the pinch of Washington's quiet campaign against Iran's gasoline
suppliers. Though the energy majors appear to be dropping out of the Iranian
gasoline trade, the numbers we have seen indicate that Tehran is importing
surplus amounts of gasoline in preparation for tougher days to come.
However, should Iran fail to outmaneuver the P-5+1 come Oct. 1, those
tougher days could arrive sooner than it thinks.
In the weeks and months ahead, Israel will likely determine whether Iran and
the United States are headed for a collision course in the Persian Gulf. The
Israelis were promised "crippling" sanctions against Iran by the Obama
administration. If that promise goes unfulfilled, and the Iranians (as they
are expected to do) refuse to freeze their enrichment activities, the
Israelis are likely to turn to the military option and demand Washington's
cooperation. Israel understands Russia's leverage over Iran - particularly
its ability to arm the Iranians with critical defense systems and sabotage a
gasoline sanctions regime - and would rather deal decisively with the
Iranian nuclear issue while the program is still several steps away from a
critical phase.
Israel, unlike the United States, never had much faith in the sanctions to
begin with. The U.S. administration appears to be operating under the
assumption that severe sanctions against Iran will create a dire economic
situation in the country, galvanize the masses against the clerical elite
and thus coerce the regime into making significant concessions on its
nuclear program. More imaginative policymakers believe that such economic
sanctions could build on the dissent that followed the election and produce
a third front to challenge and topple the regime. But Tehran's actual
actions are unlikely to mesh nicely with Washington's preferred perception
of the regime's mindset. Iran - at least for now - has no intention of
meeting the West's demands to curb its nuclear program and takes the idea of
resistance very seriously.
A Doomsday Scenario
Israel is willing to see how the sanctions regime plays out, but it also
knows that it has a limited menu of options. If the sanctions are blown
apart with Russia's help, the Iranians will obviously feel little pressure
to negotiate seriously and the Israelis will have to turn to alternative
options. If the sanctions prove effective because of Russian cooperation, a
U.S. willingness to risk trade spats to enforce the sanctions or a
combination of the two, the Iranians will be left feeling extremely
vulnerable. However, that vulnerability would not necessarily bring Iran to
the negotiating table. On the contrary, the Iranians are more likely to turn
increasingly insular and aggressive with their nuclear ambitions. While
extolling the virtues of self-sacrifice for national solidarity, the Iranian
regime would begin to seriously threaten to use its "real" nuclear option -
closing the Strait of Hormuz with mines and its arsenal of anti-ship
missiles.
This is an option of last resort for the Iranians, but if Tehran feels
sufficiently threatened, either by sanctions or potential military strikes,
it could wreak havoc on the global economy within a matter of hours.
Setting ablaze the Strait of Hormuz would undoubtedly inflict intense pain
on the Iranian economy, but this may be a pain that the regime is willing to
bear while it watches energy prices soar and the world's industrial powers
plunge deeper into recession. At such a level of brinksmanship, the United
States would have to seriously consider a military campaign to preempt an
Iranian move to close the strait, providing Israel with an opportunity to
strike at Iran's nuclear facilities. If the United States failed to act in
time and Iran succeeded in mining this critical energy chokepoint, then the
U.S. military would have to clear the strait. Either way, the Persian Gulf
would become a war zone and the global ramifications would be immense.
This may be a doomsday scenario, but it is one of increasing credibility
given that the main players - Iran, the United States, Russia and Israel -
continue to raise the stakes in pursuing their respective national
imperatives. A number of questions remain: Will the United States put its
trade relations on the line and aggressively enforce sanctions? Will Russia
go the extra mile for Tehran and bust the sanctions regime? Can the United
States and Russia reach a strategic compromise that will leave Iran out in
the cold? Has Israel's patience regarding Iranian diplomatic maneuvers run
out? Will Iran resort to its real nuclear option and threaten the Strait of
Hormuz?
STRATFOR does not know the answers, and neither do the main stakeholders in
this saga. However, come Oct. 1 these stakeholders must begin making some
critical decisions that could dramatically alter the geopolitical landscape
-
A Mutual Commitment to Postpone a Commitment
IN THE LAST LEG OF THIS WEEK’S GLOBAL SUMMITS MARATHON, world leaders made their way to Pittsburgh for a G-20 meeting after a lively U.N. General Assembly meeting in New York drew to a close Thursday.
What the assembly lacked in substance, it certainly made up in entertainment value. Highlights included U.S. President Barack Obama chairing a rare U.N. Security Council meeting, where all members adopted a toothless resolution on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, a fashionably dressed Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi delivering a 90-minute monologue on topics ranging from sodomy to the number of U.S. warships used to invade Grenada in 1983 — and finally, a charged face-off between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Unsurprisingly, the focus has turned to the growing crisis between Israel and Iran. After a long-winded Wednesday night speech by Ahmadinejad, in which he reiterated Iran’s refusal to curb its nuclear program, Netanyahu took the podium Thursday with a forceful speech that not only condemned the Iranian regime for its denial of the Holocaust and “dangerous” polices, but also condemned the rest of the United Nations for allegedly failing to take a stand against Tehran. In a nutshell, Netanyahu was saying that, given the track record of failed or nonexistent U.N. resolutions, he does not trust the Security Council to protect Israel from an existential threat: a potentially nuclear Iran.
This message is loaded with implications. In less than a week, leaders from the P-5+1 group – made up of the five permanent U.N. Security Council states, along with Germany — will be meeting with Iranian officials to discuss the nuclear program. And so far, the Iranians have given every indication that they do not intend to concede enough to satisfy Israel’s concerns about the nuclear program. Israel therefore is left with few options – especially since it appears the wheels are already coming off the United States’ threatened sanctions regime, which would target Iran’s gasoline imports.
“Not only can Russia completely destroy the effectiveness of a U.S.-led sanctions regime, but it can provide Iran with critical weapons systems that could seriously complicate an attack against Iran down the road.”
The Israelis also understand the Russia factor. Russia is engaged in an ongoing struggle to win Washington’s recognition of its influence in the former Soviet region. So far, the United States hasn’t given Russia what it wants. Consequently, Russia continues to flaunt the leverage it has with the United States over its ties to Iran. Not only can Russia completely destroy the effectiveness of a U.S.- led sanctions regime, but it can provide Iran with critical weapons systems that could seriously complicate an attack against Iran down the road. The Israelis simply are not seeing the value in delaying much longer.
Israel therefore is leaning heavily on the United States to reach some sort of compromise with Moscow and bring the Russians in line on the Iran issue.
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev made a statement on Wednesday that might indicate that such a compromise has a chance — however slight — of happening. “I told the president of the United States that we think it necessary to help Iran make the right decision,” Medvedev said, with just the right touch of ambiguity. “As for various types of sanctions, Russia’s position is very simple, and I spoke about it recently. Sanctions rarely lead to productive results, but in some cases, the use of sanctions is inevitable. Ultimately, this is a matter of choice, and we are prepared to continue cooperating with the U.S. administration on issues relating to Iran’s peaceful nuclear program, as well as other matters.”
This is a notable shift in tone coming out of Moscow, but does not yet signify that a deal has been made between the Americans and the Russians that would alleviate the crisis over Iran. Our Russian sources are hinting that something bigger may be under way, but they also have made it clear that this is just the beginning of negotiations. One source in particular has indicated that thus far, Washington is at least considering a Russian demand to postpone the U.S. deployment of a Patriot air defense battery in Poland. In return, Moscow would stick to its pledge to delay delivery of the S-300 strategic air defense system to Iran. In essence, this would be a mutual commitment to postpone commitment to their strategic allies.
But, would that be enough to satisfy Israel?
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-
Mort Zuckerman - hardly a conservative - from sept. 24 but not 2009 - it is from 2008.
His prediction for the worsening crises in the Middle East is now fact. His reiteration of Bidne's prediction that the One would be tested is also now fact. Our enemies love our President unlike any we have ever had.
Russia is supplying our enemies while shaking the hand of the One. Chavez now want to mine uranium. N Korea and Iran are ever more confident in the weakness of the One.
There is only one choice for Israel. Let the One play out as Krauthammer calls it - the farce. Maybe that is good for Israel - let the One prove to the world that his way is the fool's way and then have more legitimacy to bomb Iran.
In any case this was written a year ago by a liberal Jewish guy:
http://www.usnews.com/articles/opinion/mzuckerman/2008/10/24/the-coming-middle-east-crisis.html
-
I can't find it now but does anyone remembr who the Roman Emperor was who said something to his enemies like,
"If you want peace we will give you peace, if you want war we will give you war, it makes NO difference to us".
That my friends is why Rome last sereral hundred years.
I doubt the caesar or emperor who said this was popular with his enemies.
Unlike today our President is beloved by ours. And that says it all.
Thank God it is Netenyahu who leads Israel and not Obama.
-
To the many challenges discussed by this article I would add rocket attacks (there's tens of thosands of them) from Lebanon by Hezbollah.
===========
By ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN
When the Israeli army’sthen-Deputy Chief of Staff Dan Halutz was asked in 2004 how far Israel would go to stop Iran's nuclear program, he replied: "2,000 kilometers," roughly the distance been the two countries.
Israel's political and military leaders have long made it clear that they are considering taking decisive military action if Iran continues to develop its nuclear program. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu warned at the United Nations this week that "the most urgent challenge facing this body is to prevent the tyrants of Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons."
Reporting by the International Atomic Energy Agency and other sources has made it clear that whether or not Iran ties all of its efforts into a formal nuclear weapons program, it has acquired all of the elements necessary to make and deliver such weapons. Just Friday, Iran confirmed that it has been developing a second uranium-enrichment facility on a military base near Qom, doing little to dispel the long-standing concerns of Britain, China, France, Germany, Russia, and the U.S. that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
View Full Image
Bryan Christie
.Iran has acquired North Korean and other nuclear weapons design data through sources like the sales network once led by the former head of Pakistan's nuclear program, A. Q. Khan. Iran has all of the technology and production and manufacturing capabilities needed for fission weapons. It has acquired the technology to make the explosives needed for a gun or implosion device, the triggering components, and the neutron initiator and reflectors. It has experimented with machine uranium and plutonium processing. It has put massive resources into a medium-range missile program that has the range payload to carry nuclear weapons and that makes no sense with conventional warheads. It has also worked on nuclear weapons designs for missile warheads. These capabilities are dispersed in many facilities in many cities and remote areas, and often into many buildings in each facility—each of which would have to be a target in an Israeli military strike.
It is far from certain that such action would be met with success. An Israeli strike on Iran would be far more challenging than the Israeli strike that destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981. An effective Israeli nuclear strike may not be possible, yet a regional nuclear arms race is a game that Iran can start, but cannot possibly win. Anyone who meets regularly with senior Israeli officials, officers and experts knows that Israel is considering military options, but considering them carefully and with an understanding that they pose serious problems and risks.
One of the fundamental problems dogging Israel, especially concerning short-ranged fighters and fighter-bombers, is distance. Iran's potential targets are between 950 and 1,400 miles from Israel, the far margin of the ranges Israeli fighters can reach, even with aerial refueling. Israel would be hard-pressed to destroy all of Iran's best-known targets. What's more, Iran has had years in which to build up covert facilities, disperse elements of its nuclear and missile programs, and develop options for recovering from such an attack.
View Full Image
Associated Press
A sign reading “Atomic Power Plant” points the way to a nuclear power plant that was built in the Persian Gulf city of Bushehr, with Russian help.
.At best, such action would delay Iran's nuclear buildup. It is more likely to provoke the country into accelerating its plans. Either way, Israel would have to contend with the fact that it has consistently had a "red light" from both the Bush and Obama administrations opposing such strikes. Any strike that overflew Arab territory or attacked a fellow Islamic state would stir the ire of neighboring Arab states, as well as Russia, China and several European states.
This might not stop Israel. Hardly a week goes by without another warning from senior Israeli officials that a military strike is possible, and that Israel cannot tolerate a nuclear-armed Iran, even though no nation has indicated it would support such action. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to threaten Israel and to deny its right to exist. At the same time, President Barack Obama is clearly committed to pursuing diplomatic options, his new initiatives and a U.N. resolution on nuclear arms control and counterproliferation, and working with our European allies, China and Russia to impose sanctions as a substitute for the use of force.
View Interactive
BATTLE STATIONS: Israel has to carefully consider its options.
.Mr. Ahmadinejad keeps denying that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons, and tries to defend Iran from both support for sanctions and any form of attack by saying that Iran will negotiate over its peaceful use of nuclear power. He offered some form of dialogue with the U.S. during his visit to the U.N. this week. While French President Nicolas Sarkozy denounced Iran's continued lack of response to the Security Council this week, and said its statements would "wipe a U.N. member state off the map," no nation has yet indicated it would support Israeli military action.
Most analyses of a possible Israeli attack focus on only three of Iran's most visible facilities: its centrifuge facilities at Natanz, its light water nuclear power reactor near Bushehr, and a heavy water reactor at Arak it could use to produce plutonium. They are all some 950 to 1,000 miles from Israel. Each of these three targets differs sharply in terms of the near-term risk it poses to Israel and its vulnerability.
The Arak facility is partially sheltered, but it does not yet have a reactor vessel and evidently will not have one until 2011. Arak will not pose a tangible threat for at least several years. The key problem Israel would face is that it would virtually have to strike it as part of any strike on the other targets, because it cannot risk waiting and being unable to carry out another set of strikes for political reasons. It also could then face an Iran with much better air defenses, much better long-range missile forces, and at least some uranium weapons.
Bushehr is a nuclear power reactor along Iran's southwestern coast in the Gulf. It is not yet operational, although it may be fueled late this year. It would take some time before it could be used to produce plutonium, and any Iranian effort to use its fuel rods for such a purpose would be easy to detect and lead Iran into an immediate political confrontation with the United Nations and other states. Bushehr also is being built and fueled by Russia—which so far has been anything but supportive of an Israeli strike and which might react to any attack by making major new arms shipments to Iran.
The centrifuge facility at Natanz is a different story. It is underground and deeply sheltered, and is defended by modern short-range Russian TOR-M surface-to-air missiles. It also, however, is the most important target Israel can fully characterize. Both Israeli and outside experts estimate that it will produce enough low enriched uranium for Iran to be able to be used in building two fission nuclear weapons by some point in 2010—although such material would have to be enriched far more to provide weapons-grade U-235.
Israel has fighters, refueling tankers and precision-guided air-to-ground weapons to strike at all of these targets—even if it flies the long-distance routes needed to avoid the most critical air defenses in neighboring Arab states. It is also far from clear that any Arab air force would risk engaging Israeli fighters. Syria, after all, did not attempt to engage Israeli fighters when they attacked the reactor being built in Syria.
In August 2003, the Israeli Air Force demonstrated the strategic capability to strike far-off targets such as Iran by flying three F-15 jets to Poland, 1,600 nautical miles away. Israel can launch and refuel two to three full squadrons of combat aircraft for a single set of strikes against Iran, and provide suitable refueling. Israel could also provide fighter escorts and has considerable electronic-warfare capability to suppress Iran's aging air defenses. It might take losses to Iran's fighters and surface-to-air missiles, but such losses would probably be limited.
Israel would, however, still face two critical problems. The first would be whether it can destroy a hardened underground facility like Natanz. The second is that a truly successful strike might have to hit far more targets over a much larger area than the three best-known sites. Iran has had years to build up covert and dispersed facilities, and is known to have dozens of other facilities associated with some aspect of its nuclear programs. Moreover, Israel would have to successfully strike at dozens of additional targets to do substantial damage to another key Iranian threat: its long-range missiles.
Experts sharply disagree as to whether the Israeli air force could do more than limited damage to the key Iranian facility at Natanz. Some feel it is too deeply underground and too hardened for Israel to have much impact. Others believe that it is more vulnerable than conventional wisdom has it, and Israel could use weapons like the GBU-28 earth-penetrating bombs it has received from the U.S. or its own penetrators, which may include a nuclear-armed variant, to permanently collapse the underground chambers.
No one knows what specialized weapons Israel may have developed on its own, but Israeli intelligence has probably given Israel good access to U.S., European, and Russian designs for more advanced weapons than the GBU-28. Therefore, the odds are that Israel can have a serious impact on Iran's three most visible nuclear targets and possibly delay Iran's efforts for several years.
The story is very different, however, when it comes to destroying the full range of Iranian capabilities. There are no meaningful unclassified estimates of Iran's total mix of nuclear facilities, but known unclassified research, reactor, and centrifuge facilities number in the dozens. It became clear just this week that Iran managed to conceal the fact it was building a second underground facility for uranium enrichment near Qom, 100 miles southwest of Tehran, and that was designed to hold 3,000 centrifuges. Iran is developing at least four variants of its centrifuges, and the more recent designs have far more capacity than most of the ones installed at Natanz.
This makes it easier to conceal chains of centrifuges in a number of small, dispersed facilities and move material from one facility to another. Iran's known centrifuge production facilities are scattered over large areas of Iran, and at least some are in Mashad in the far northeast of the country—far harder to reach than Arak, Bushehr and Natanz.
Many of Iran's known facilities present the added problem that they are located among civilian facilities and peaceful nuclear-research activities—although Israel's precision-strike capabilities may well be good enough to allow it to limit damage to nearby civilian facilities.
It is not clear that Israel can win this kind of "shell game." It is doubtful that even the U.S. knows all the potential targets, and even more doubtful that any outside power can know what each detected Iranian facility currently does—and the extent to which each can hold dispersed centrifuge facilities that Iran could use instead of Natanz to produce weapons-grade uranium. As for the other elements of Iran's nuclear programs, it has scattered throughout the country the technical and industrial facilities it could use to make the rest of fission nuclear weapons. The facilities can now be in too many places for an Israeli strike to destroy Iran's capabilities.
Israel also faces limits on its military capabilities. Strong as Israeli forces are, they lack the scale, range and other capabilities to carry out the kind of massive strike the U.S. could launch. Israel does not have the density and quality of intelligence assets necessary to reliably assess the damage done to a wide range of small and disperse targets and to detect new Iranian efforts.
Israel has enough strike-attack aircraft and fighters in inventory to carry out a series of restrikes if Iran persisted in rebuilding, but it could not refuel a large-enough force, or provide enough intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities, to keep striking Iran at anything like the necessary scale. Moreover, Israel does not have enough forces to carry out a series of restrikes if Iran persisted in creating and rebuilding new facilities, and Arab states could not repeatedly standby and let Israel penetrate their air space. Israel might also have to deal with a Russia that would be far more willing to sell Iran advanced fighters and surface-to-air missiles if Israel attacked the Russian-built reactor at Bushehr.
These problems are why a number of senior Israeli intelligence experts and military officers feel that Israel should not strike Iran, although few would recommend that Israel avoid using the threat of such strikes to help U.S. and other diplomatic efforts to persuade Iran to halt. For example, retired Brigadier General Shlomo Brom advocates, like a number of other Israeli experts, reliance on deterrence and Israel's steadily improving missile defenses.
Any Israeli attack on an Iranian nuclear target would be a very complex operation in which a relatively large number of attack aircraft and support aircraft would participate. The conclusion is that Israel could attack only a few Iranian targets—not as part of a sustainable operation over time, but as a one-time surprise operation.
The alternatives, however, are not good for Israel, the U.S., Iran's neighbors or Arab neighbors. Of course being attacked is not good for Iran. Israel could still strike, if only to try to buy a few added years of time. Iranian persistence in developing nuclear weapons could push the U.S. into launching its own strike on Iran—although either an Israeli or U.S. strike might be used by Iran's hardliners to justify an all-out nuclear arms race. Further, it is far from clear that friendly Arab Gulf states would allow the U.S. to use bases on their soil for the kind of massive strike and follow-on restrikes that the U.S. would need to suppress Iran's efforts on a lasting basis.
View Full Image
UPI/Newscom
Isfahan Uranium Conversion Facility is seen behind Imam Ali mosque just outside the city of Isfahan. This picture was taken on April 9, Iran’s recently created National Nuclear Technology Day.
.The broader problem for Iran, however, is that Israel will not wait passively as Iran develops a nuclear capability. Like several Arab states, Israel already is developing better missile and air defenses, and more-advanced forms of its Arrow ballistic missile defenses. There are reports that Israel is increasing the range-payload of its nuclear-armed missiles and is developing sea-based nuclear-armed cruise missiles for its submarines.
While Iran is larger than Israel, its population centers are so vulnerable to Israeli thermonuclear weapons that Israel already is a major "existential" threat to Iran. Moreover, provoking its Arab neighbors and Turkey into developing their nuclear capabilities, or the U.S. into offering them a nuclear umbrella targeted on Iran, could create additional threats, as well as make Iran's neighbors even more dependent on the U.S. for their security. Iran's search for nuclear-armed missiles may well unite its neighbors against it as well as create a major new nuclear threat to its survival.
-
I go to Drudgereport and I see articles about Iran's defiance, China is testing long range missle, and India is making higher grade nuclear material.
Obama and his cronies fly around the world and (as Krauthammer says while apologizing for US "wickedness") says for the thousandth time, "now we are serious", "now we will get tough", "now we will make sanctions hurt", "now we are warning Iran", etc etc.
The US has been doing this for years - it really would be laughable if not so sad and tragic.
We are headed for another world war if you ask me. This is the 1930s all over again. Our economy has crashed and we have a leadership running around appeasing our enemies all the while they continue to arm and quite frankly state exactly what they plan to do. It isn't obvious by now? We need to drop a bomb in the Gulf and let Iran know the next one is on Amedingjon's head.
I don't see any other way. If the US won't do it (One can legitimately make the argument it is not in our interest) than I guess Israel will have to - if they can).
If we don't do it we will be more than sorry in the future.
Sound crazy - it is. But continuing with talks is even more.
***Iran flexes muscle ahead of talks
An Iranian Zelzal missile is launched during a test at an unknown location in central Iran September … By Fredrik Dahl and Hossein Jaseb Fredrik Dahl And Hossein Jaseb – 33 mins ago
TEHRAN (Reuters) – Iran test-fired missiles on Monday which a commander said could reach any regional target, flexing its military muscle before crucial talks this week with major powers worried about Tehran's nuclear ambitions.
The missile drills of the elite Revolutionary Guards coincide with escalating tension in Iran's nuclear dispute with the West, after last week's disclosure by Tehran that it is building a second uranium enrichment plant.
News of the nuclear fuel facility south of Tehran added urgency to the rare meeting in Geneva on Thursday between Iranian officials and representatives of six major powers, including the United States, China and Russia.
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who says any military action against Iran would only "buy time" and stresses the need for diplomacy, mentioned possible new sanctions on banking and equipment and technology for Iran's oil and gas industry.
Iran's Foreign Ministry said there was no link between the missile maneuvers and the nuclear activities.
"This is a military drill which is deterrent in nature," spokesman Hassan Qashqavi told a news conference. "There is no connection whatsoever with the nuclear program."
Press TV said the Shahab 3, a surface-to-surface missile with a range of up to 2,000 km (1,250 miles), was "successfully" test-fired on the second day of an exercise that began on Sunday, when short and medium-range missiles were launched.
Such a range would put Israel and U.S. bases in the region within striking distance. Television footage of the launches showed missiles soaring into the sky in desert-like terrain, to shouts of Allahu Akbar (God is Greatest).
"All targets within the region, no matter where they are, will be within the range of these missiles," said General Hossein Salami, commander of the Guards' air force.
Salami said the exercise was over and had achieved its goals. "All the test-fired missiles managed to hit their targets without any errors and with precision," the forces website quoted him as saying.
WIDE CONDEMNATION
The tests sparked swift international condemnation.
British Foreign Secretary David Miliband said the missile test was "part of an annual provocation" by Iran and should not distract from the pending Geneva talks.
"On Thursday (Iran will) need to ... show that they are serious about ensuring that their civilian nuclear power program does not leak into a military program," Miliband told Britain's Sky News.
European Foreign Policy Chief Javier Solana, who will head the Western delegation in the Geneva talks, said "everything that is done in that context is a concern."
He said the aim of Thursday's talks was "engagement."
When asked what sanctions Iran should face if it failed to comply with Western demands over its nuclear program, Solana said "now is not the time to talk about that."
France called on Iran "to choose the path of cooperation and not that of confrontation by immediately ending these profoundly destabilizing activities and by immediately responding to the requests of the international community in order to reach a negotiated solution on the nuclear dossier."
Russia, meanwhile, urged restraint.
"We should not give way to emotions now," a Russian foreign ministry source told Interfax news agency. "We should try to calm down and the main thing is to launch a productive negotiations process (with Iran)."
The ministry source said the international community should wait to see what Iranian officials say at the Geneva talks before taking action.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Friday that if Iran does not cooperate at the meeting, then "other mechanisms" should be used to deal with Tehran's nuclear programme. Medvedev did not explicitly say whether Russia would support Western calls for sanctions against Iran.
The United States and its Western allies have made clear they will focus on Iran's nuclear programme at the Geneva meeting. Iran has offered wide-ranging security talks but says it will not discuss its nuclear "rights."
Washington, which suspects Iran is trying to develop nuclear bomb capability, has previously expressed concern about Tehran's missile programme. Iran, a major oil producer, says its nuclear work is solely for generating peaceful electricity.
ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS
The Pentagon chief told CNN he hoped the disclosure of the second facility would force Tehran to make concessions. "The Iranians are in a very bad spot now because of this deception, in terms of all of the great powers," Gates said.
"There obviously is the opportunity for severe additional sanctions. I think we have the time to make that work."
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said Iran must present "convincing evidence" at the Geneva meeting.
"We are going to put them to the test on October 1," Clinton told CBS' "Face the Nation. "They can open their entire system to the kind of extensive investigation that the facts call for."
Both interviews were taped before Iran started the two-day missile exercise, designed to show it is prepared to head off military attacks by foes like Israel or the United States.
Iran's state broadcaster IRIB said "upgraded" versions of Shahab 3 and another missile, Sejil, had been tested. Officials have earlier said Sejil has a range of close to 2,000 km (1,250 miles). They were powered by solid fuel, IRIB said.
Neither the United States nor its ally Israel have ruled out military action if diplomacy fails to resolve the nuclear row.
Iran has said it would respond to any attack by targeting U.S. interests in the region and Israel, as well as closing the Strait of Hormuz, a vital route for world oil supplies.
Iran's defense minister warned Israel on Monday against launching any attack on the Islamic Republic, saying it would only speed up the Jewish state's own demise.
"If this happens, which of course we do not foresee, its ultimate result would be that it expedites the Zionist regime's last breath," Ahmad Vahidi said on state television.
U.S. President Barack Obama said on Saturday the discovery of a secret nuclear plant in Iran showed a "disturbing pattern" of evasion by Tehran. He warned Iran on Friday it would face "sanctions that bite" unless it came clean.
Iran has rejected Western accusations that the plant was meant to be secret because it did not inform the U.N. nuclear watchdog as soon as plans were drawn up, saying the facility near the holy city of Qom is legal and can be inspected.
(Reporting by Tehran and Washington bureaus, Avril Ormsby in London and Conor Humphries in Moscow; writing by Samia Nakhoul; editing by Dominic Evans)***
-
BIG NEWS: Dick Cheney | Barack Obama | China | GOP | Sustainability| More...
| Logout
Log In | Sign Up
The Huffington PostSeptember 28, 2009
The other point of view from the Huffington post. Obama's strategy is "brilliant" though it may not be enough:
****The good news is that President Obama has a brilliant strategy for dealing with Iran. The bad news is that brilliance may not be enough. In a few months he could face the most severe foreign policy crisis a young president has faced since John F. Kennedy stumbled into the Bay of Pigs.
Obama has taken several steps in the past few weeks that show he is thinking strategically about how to defang Iran's nuclear threat. For one thing, Obama is trying to bring Russia on board. By announcing that he has no intention of stationing a nuclear defense system in Eastern Europe, Obama removed a significant impediment to smoother relations with Moscow. In return, he needs Moscow's cooperation in confronting Iran. He already has the support of Britain and Germany. Constructing an alliance capable of implementing tough sanctions against Tehran is the kind of multilateral diplomacy that the Bush administration scorned. Obama doesn't.
Obama's call for a nuclear-free world is also a big plus, one that, among other things, further helps refurbish America's battered image in Europe. At an election rally in Germany, the head of the liberal party, Guido Westerwelle, announced Obama's call for a nuclear-free world almost as soon as he had made it. Obama's focus on the dangers posed by nuclear weapons further exposes Tehran as an anomalous, retrograde power. The regime is on the wrong side of history. It isn't a progressive power, but a backward one that is pursuing a dangerous course that will further isolate it. Obama, after all, wants to strip the mullahs of their moolah by pushing for punitive sanctions.
But if the hardline clerics are intent on obtaining the bomb -- as opposed to the knowledge of how to construct one -- then sanctions won't be enough. Then Obama will be confronted with an Israeli government determined to attack Iranian nuclear sites. And he'll be urged to do it himself by both liberal hawks and neocons back home.
Will Obama be able to carve out some face-saving deal with Iran? Or is he heading into a major crisis? Iraq and Afghanistan may turn out to be sideshows as Obama focuses on the threat from Tehran. But so far, Obama has handled Iran perfectly with a mixture of threats and promises of cooperation.****
-
As per the NYT
Publically released opinions:
Israel: Iran has restarted weaponization.
Germany: Iran never stopped weaponization.
France: There is more going on then international inspectors say.
US: Iran has halted weaponization in 2003.
The US position is the most interesting is it not?
It is conveniently in line with undermining any pre emptive attack from Israel.
This all comes about since we did not find and prove the weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Ever since then and the political turning of the tide here in the US, W and now OBama have thrown Israel to the winds of que cera que cera.
***By William J. Broad, Mark Mazzetti and David E. Sanger
updated 11:56 p.m. ET, Mon., Sept . 28, 2009
WASHINGTON - When President Obama stood last week with the leaders of Britain and France to denounce Iran’s construction of a secret nuclear plant, the Western powers all appeared to be on the same page.
Behind their show of unity about Iran’s clandestine efforts to manufacture nuclear fuel, however, is a continuing debate among American, European and Israeli spies about a separate component of Iran’s nuclear program: its clandestine efforts to design a nuclear warhead.
The Israelis, who have delivered veiled threats of a military strike, say they believe that Iran has restarted these “weaponization” efforts, which would mark a final step in building a nuclear weapon. The Germans say they believe that the weapons work was never halted. The French have strongly suggested that independent international inspectors have more information about the weapons work than they have made public.
Meanwhile, in closed-door discussions, American spy agencies have stood firm in their conclusion that while Iran may ultimately want a bomb, the country halted work on weapons design in 2003 and probably has not restarted that effort — a judgment first made public in a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate.
The debate, in essence, is a mirror image of the intelligence dispute on the eve of the Iraq war.
This time, United States spy agencies are delivering more cautious assessments about Iran’s clandestine programs than their Western European counterparts.
The differing views color how each country perceives the imminence of the Iranian threat and how to deal with it in the coming months, including this week’s negotiations in Geneva — the first direct talks between the United States and Iran in nearly 30 years.
In the case of the plant outside Qum, designed for uranium enrichment, some nuclear experts speculate that it is only part of something larger. But a senior American official with access to intelligence about it said he believed the secret plant was itself “the big one,” but cautioned that “it’s a big country.”
This distinction has huge political consequences. If Mr. Obama can convince Israel that the exposure of the Qum plant has dealt a significant setback to the Iranian effort, he may buy some time from the Israelis.
The officials spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were discussing classified intelligence assessments.
Uranium enrichment — the process of turning raw uranium into reactor or bomb fuel — is only one part of building a nuclear weapon, though it is the most difficult step. The two remaining steps are designing and building a warhead, and building a reliable delivery system, like a ballistic missile.
American officials said that Iran halted warhead design efforts in 2003, a conclusion they reached after penetrating Iran’s computer networks and gaining access to internal government communications. This judgment became the cornerstone of the 2007 intelligence report, which drew sharp criticism from Europe and Israel, and remains the subject of intense debate.
Disagreeing with the Americans, Israeli intelligence officials say they believe that Iran restarted weapons design work in 2005 on the orders of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader. The Americans counter that the Israeli case is flimsy and circumstantial, and that the Israelis cannot document their claim.
German intelligence officials take an even harder line against Iran. They say the weapons work never stopped, a judgment made public last year in a German court case involving shipments of banned technology to Tehran. In recent interviews, German intelligence agencies declined to comment further.***
-
"US: Iran has halted weaponization in 2003."
That would be the first instance of Obama crediting Bush for a success. Unfortunately it is false.
-
Doug
This erronous conclusion was made public before OBama became President.
W very much let Israel drift in the wind at the end of his second term.
I don't think he wanted to but he was so politically destroyed by the left's attacks and falling in the polls he abandoned them.
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2009/07/20/germans-of-course-iran-kept-working-on-nuclear-weapons/
Germans: Of course Iran kept working on nuclear weapons
posted at 1:36 pm on July 20, 2009 by Ed Morrissey
When the American intelligence community reversed itself in 2007 and announced that Iran had quit working on nuclear weapons in 2003, jaws dropped around the world. George Bush’s political opponents at home and enemies around the world used it to buffalo the administration into reducing its effort to corner Tehran, but European intelligence agencies did not fall for the political kneecapping performed on Bush. At the time, British intel rejected that conclusion, and now the Wall Street Journal reports that the Germans have thoroughly debunked it:
The Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), Germany’s foreign intelligence agency, has amassed evidence of a sophisticated Iranian nuclear weapons program that continued beyond 2003. This usually classified information comes courtesy of Germany’s highest state-security court. In a 30-page legal opinion on March 26 and a May 27 press release in a case about possible illegal trading with Iran, a special national security panel of the Federal Supreme Court in Karlsruhe cites from a May 2008 BND report, saying the agency “showed comprehensively” that “development work on nuclear weapons can be observed in Iran even after 2003.”
According to the judges, the BND supplemented its findings on August 28, 2008, showing “the development of a new missile launcher and the similarities between Iran’s acquisition efforts and those of countries with already known nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea.”
It’s important to point out that this was no ordinary agency report, the kind that often consists just of open source material, hearsay and speculation. Rather, the BND submitted an “office testimony,” which consists of factual statements about the Iranian program that can be proved in a court of law. This is why, in their March 26 opinion, the judges wrote that “a preliminary assessment of the available evidence suggests that at the time of the crime [April to November 2007] nuclear weapons were being developed in Iran.” In their May press release, the judges come out even more clear, stating unequivocally that “Iran in 2007 worked on the development of nuclear weapons.”
This rises far above the level of evidence provided in the 2007 NIE. The court had to determine whether evidence presented by the German government could convict a defendant in an espionage trial, and the case rested in large part on whether the Iranians had continued to develop nuclear weapons. A lower-court ruling had tossed out the indictment, ruling that the US NIE showed that Iran had not done work on its nuclear-weapons programs during the time that the defendant had allegedly traded illegally and conducted espionage on behalf of their program. In response, the BND showed the court their evidence of continued work on the weapons program — which the court ruled sufficient to use at trial.
As the authors note, this decision calls into question yet again how the US intelligence service could have concluded otherwise. Did they not coordinate with the Germans, who have much better access to Iran than either the US or even the British? The BND says they shared these findings with the Americans prior to the publication of the NIE, but that they were ignored. Why?
It’s really not difficult to conclude that the higher echelons of American intelligence had gone to war with the Bush administration early in his presidency. The 2007 NIE was their coup de grace, making Bush impotent and giving them control over American foreign policy. It also let vital time slip past while Iran continued to develop nuclear weapons, although in the event, Europe simply rejected the NIE as faulty and proceeded along the same path that Bush had demanded. The NIE gave Russia and China political cover to block the West’s attempts to rein in the Iranians, although that would have happened anyway with other rationalizations.
Democrats are demanding a reckoning with the CIA over a program that never proceeded past the spitball stage. Republicans ought to demand a reckoning, too — over the NIE and the wool that got pulled over the eyes of Congress.
-
This is a remarkable and IMHO very important piece GM. Would you be so kind as to also post it in the Intel Matters thread as well? Thank you.
-
"This erroneous conclusion was made public before OBama became President.
W very much let Israel drift in the wind at the end of his second term."
True, thanks. It was not Obama but it was from similar forces from within Bush's own agencies that undermined any coherent response to an obvious and growing threat.
Bush let his presidency drift or end long before its term other than the amazing success of the surge in Iraq. Cheney was distanced from being a close adviser and no one with wisdom replaced him. Especially from a public relations point of view of arguing for your own policies and philosophies, Bush had quit his job by early 2005.
---
Iran stopped weaponization.
Iraq never posed a threat.
If we would just talk to the murderous thugs...
- I often wish liberals were right so we could end this tiring effort of opposing them.
-
By GARY MILHOLLIN and VALERIE LINCY
Published: September 29, 2009
Washington
The disclosure of Iran’s secret nuclear plant has changed the way the West must negotiate with Tehran. While worrisome enough on its own, the plant at Qum may well be the first peek at something far worse: a planned, or even partly completed, hidden nuclear archipelago stretching across the country.
The Qum plant doesn’t make much sense as a stand-alone bomb factory. As described by American officials, the plant would house 3,000 centrifuges, able to enrich enough uranium for one or two bombs per year. Yet at their present rate of production, 3,000 of Iran’s existing IR-1 centrifuges would take two years to fuel a single bomb and 10 years for five weapons. This is too long a time frame for the American assessment to be feasible. To build one or two bombs a year, Iran would have to quadruple the centrifuges’ present production rate. (While this feat is theoretically within the centrifuges’ design limits, it is not one Iran has shown it can achieve.)
Perhaps Iran was planning to install more efficient centrifuges at the plant, like a version of the P-2 machine used by Pakistan. These could fuel a five-bomb arsenal in just over a year. But while we know Iran has tested such machines, there is no evidence that it can make them in bulk.
Regardless of the machines used, it would take a couple of years at the front end to get them installed. Iran would be looking at three to five years of high activity at the site, during which the risk of discovery would skyrocket.
Clearly, the new plant makes more sense if it is one of many. If Iran built a second plant of the same size as the Qum operation and ran them in tandem, the production times described above could be almost halved. And if Iran had a string of such plants, it would be able to fuel a small arsenal quickly enough to reduce greatly the chance of getting caught. This would also limit the damage if one site were discovered or bombed, because its loss might not affect the others. Such a secret string of plants, however, would probably require a secret source of uranium. Intelligence agencies have been looking for such a source; the Qum discovery should be a signal to increase their efforts.
The Qum plant might also be linked to Iran’s known enrichment plant at Natanz, which is under inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Natanz has a stockpile of uranium that is already enriched partway to weapon-grade. By feeding this uranium into the new Qum plant, Iran could fuel one bomb in about seven months, even at the present low production rate. If the rate were quadrupled, as Washington is projecting, the plant could fuel a five-bomb arsenal in less than a year.
But because the Natanz plant is being watched over by international inspectors, diversion of its material would probably be detected. The question is whether Iran might chance it, deciding that its production rate was high enough to give it a nuclear deterrent before other countries could organize a response to the diversion.
Having begun the Qum plant to supply a bomb’s fuel, wouldn’t Iran also create what’s needed to produce the rest of the bomb’s components? This means laboratories to perfect nuclear weapon detonation and workshops to produce the firing sets, high-explosive lenses and other necessary parts. Although there is plenty of suspicion that such sites exist, Iran has not admitted having them.
All must be found. When talks begin in Geneva tomorrow, there should be little concern with the formerly dominant question of suspending enrichment at Natanz. Rather, Iran must be made to produce a complete map of its nuclear sites, together with a history of how each was created and provisioned.
This means getting access to scientists, records, equipment and sites. It is a lot to ask, and we may not have the leverage to get it. But anything less will provide no protection against what we now know is Iran’s determination to build the bomb.
Gary Milhollin directs the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. Valerie Lincy is the editor of Iranwatch.org.
-
I agree with Pat on many issues but not this one.
It is predictable he will pick and write about any evidence he can gather that would support his isolationist position - made a bit more complicated by his well known dislike of the "Jewish Lobby".
Question: If Iran was interested in only peaceful purpose for nuclear energy than why have it's main spokesman going around the world telling it is nearing the time Israel will be wiped out?
If it is just a bluff what is he gaining by it?
***Is Iran Nearing a Bomb?
by Patrick J. Buchanan
09/29/2009
That Iran is building a secret underground facility near the holy city of Qom, under custody of the Revolutionary Guard -- too small to be a production center for nuclear fuel, but just right for the enrichment of uranium to weapons grade -- is grounds for concern, but not panic.
Heretofore, all of Iran's nuclear facilities, even the enrichment plant at Natanz -- kept secret before exiles blew the whistle in 2002 -- have been consistent with a peaceful nuclear program.
Iran has also been on solid ground in claiming that, as signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, she has a right to enrich uranium and operate nuclear plants, as long as she complies with treaty obligations.
Under the Safeguard Agreement to the NPT, these include notification, six months before a nuclear facility goes operational.
According to U.S. officials, construction of this site began in 2006 and is only months from completion. And Tehran did not report it to the International Atomic Energy Agency until a week ago, when they were tipped the Americans were onto it and about to go public.
Iran's explanation: This facility is benign, a backup to Natanz, to enable Iran to continue enriching uranium to fuel grade, should America or Israel bomb Natanz. It is a hedge against attack. And contrary to what Barack Obama implies, the facility is designed to enrich uranium only to the 5 percent needed for nuclear fuel, not the 90 percent needed for nuclear weapons.
Still, the burden of proof is now upon Tehran.
President Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khamenei must convince IAEA inspectors this small secret facility that can house only 3,000 centrifuges has the same purpose as Natanz, which can house 58,000. Or they will be exposed as liars -- to the West, to the Russians who have served as their defense counsel and to their own people.
For while Iranians are near unanimous in backing their national right to peaceful nuclear power, they do not all want nuclear weapons. And the Ayatollah has declared, ex cathedra, that Iran is not seeking them, and possession or use of such weapons is immoral and contrary to the teachings of Islam.
If Obama is right that the secret facility is "inconsistent with a peaceful program," but compatible with a weapons program, Ayatollah Khamenei has a credibility problem the size of Andrei Gromyko's, when he assured President Kennedy there were no Soviet missiles in Cuba. And President Kennedy had the photos in his desk.
Diplomats have been called honest men sent abroad to lie for their country. But ayatollahs, as holy men, are not supposed to be descending to diplomatic duplicity.
Obama's dramatic announcement represents a coup for U.S. intelligence, but it also raises questions.
Reportedly, we have known of this Qom facility "for several years." Yet, in late 2007, the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) said that U.S. agencies had "moderate confidence" that Iran had ended any nuclear weapons program in 2003.
In August, Walter Pincus, in a Washington Post story -- "Iran Years From Fuel for Bomb, Report Says" -- wrote, "Despite Iran's progress since 2007 toward producing enriched uranium, the State Department intelligence analysts continue to think that Tehran will not be able to produce weapons-grade material before 2013."
This was the judgment of the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, based on "Iran's technical capability."
Query: If State's top intelligence analysts, this year, did not think Iran could enrich to weapons grade until 2013, had they been kept in the dark about the secret facility near Qom?
Two weeks ago, in a Web exclusive, Mark Hosenball wrote, "The U.S. intelligence community is reporting to the White House that Iran has not restarted its nuclear weapons development program, two counter-proliferation officials tell Newsweek."
The officials told the White House the conclusion of the 2007 NIE -- i.e., Iran had halted its weapons program in 2003 -- stood.
Were these two counter-proliferation officials also out of the loop on the secret site? Or did they know of it, but fail to share the sense of alarm and urgency President Obama showed last week?
Despite last week's revelation, the Obama policy of talking to Tehran makes sense. Whatever the ayatollah's intentions, IAEA inspectors have his lone ton of low-enriched uranium at Natanz under observation. To enrich it to weapons grade, it must be moved.
America's twin goals here are correct, compatible and by no means unattainable: no nukes in Iran, no war with Iran.
Bombing would unite that divided country behind a regime whose repressed people detest far more than we, as they have to live under it. Patience and perseverance, as in the Cold War, may be rewarded with the disintegration of a state that is today divided against itself.
We outlasted the Red czars. We will outlast the ayatollahs.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Buchanan is a nationally syndicated columnist and author of Churchill, Hitler, and "The Unnecessary War": How Britain Lost Its Empire and the West Lost the World, "The Death of the West,", "The Great Betrayal," "A Republic, Not an Empire" and "Where the Right Went Wrong."****
My answer to Buchanan's question is Iran is obviously working to build a bomb(s). How near it is no one seems to be sure - at least publically.
-
If you were the leader of a small country and saw how N. Korea managed to get Billions of dollars worth of "respect" wouldn't you take serious risks to get a nuclear stick?
Why did we get involved in Pakistan with $ instead of using the usual "just bomb them into the stone age" we did with other countries?
Iran sees the nuclear stuff, probably, as a means of gaining the respect they feel they lack. They do not see that it is more of a charachter issue, Korea got a couple of concessions, but is still a pariah because of charachter. Iran does not realize that a llot of their behavior is looked upon in the same light. They may not get the respect they may expect, I just hope that they do not throw the wrong type of temper tantrum. Pakistan has been trying to get turned around, but its therapy is on going, we will see.
-
Hi Rarick,
Good to have another poster.
"If you were the leader of a small country and saw how N. Korea managed to get Billions of dollars worth of "respect" wouldn't you take serious risks to get a nuclear stick?"
I agree with you.
I think Iran is pursuing nucs for this reason.
Do you think they may not really be pursuing them and just bluffing with Amendinajan's rhetoric in order to get the same respect just the same?
Apparently some seem to think so. Even Buchanan is implying this.
-
The satellite images that have been shown in the media (forget exactly where) show some serious underground construction for the enrichment process. I would not be the least bit surprised if a lot of that equipment has Iraqi and Pakistani trademarks on it.........
I doubt that they are bluffing, it is one of those thing you do not want to bluff about, the stakes are too high if the bluff gets called. Even if they do not develop a full on nuke, a dirty bomb (a bomb with a uranium powder casing?) would still cause a lot of OMG, very much like the Anthrax in the mail.
-
Why Iraqi trademarks?
I would suspect the North Koreans first and foremost.
=================
Intelligence Guidance (Special Edition): Oct. 1, 2009 - Iranian Crisis on Hold
Stratfor Today » October 1, 2009 | 1406 GMT
Editor’s Note: The following is an internal STRATFOR document produced to provide high-level guidance to our analysts. This document is not a forecast, but rather a series of guidelines for understanding and evaluating events, as well as suggestions on areas for focus.
Both the United States and Iran are attempting to avoid a deterioration to war. Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s Sept. 30 visit to Washington did not involve meeting with members of Congress, or if it did, it was only to use them as a conduit to someone more important; the wording of his spokesman makes that clear. The spokesman denied knowledge of any meeting with administration officials, not that meetings took place. At the very least, Mottaki made a major gesture in coming to Washington, and now the United States is making one in return. The reports out of Geneva are noncommittal, but no one has walked, and now the conventional wisdom is that the talks will continue into Oct. 2 and that Iran has until the end of the year to verify the non-military nature of its nuclear program. The Israelis have made it clear that they are prepared to withhold action and criticism until this phase is concluded.
Related Special Series
Special Series: Iran Sanctions
Related Special Topic Page
Special Coverage: The Iran Crisis
Logically, the Iranian goal is to initiate a set of extended negotiations in which nuclear weapons are not the only issue on the table. The more complex the negotiations, the longer they go on, the more international credibility Iran gains, and the less likely Iran is going to be forced to capitulate on the nuclear question.
For the United States, this strategy puts off the day of reckoning, and does not force a crisis this week. It also allows U.S. President Barack Obama to maintain his doctrine of engagement. There does not seem any great pressure politically on Obama to act. There is not a critical mass in Congress wanting to press the issue to the max right now. One may emerge, but if the Obama administration is skillful in shaping an apparent negotiating process, it will not emerge for a while. The key here is Israel. When Israel decides it has gone on long enough, it will pull in enough chips on Capitol Hill to create that pressure. But for right now, the people who would like to see a crisis aren’t strong enough to create one. So there is talk about disappointment, but they aren’t going to be introducing resolutions. Obama has bought time.
Diplomatically, the Israelis have backed off. This does not necessarily indicate that Israel thinks there is any chance of this working, but they do not want to be accused of sabotaging the process. If military action is taken, this also allows the United States to say it did its very best to prevent that action. Action now or down the road, the outcome today (and for some parties the very goal) is extensive talks, not a crisis.
If Iranians simply stonewall the nuclear issue, a crisis will break out. Tehran knows this, so it will raise ambiguities, such as an extended negotiation over when International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors might be permitted in, and under what circumstances. All of this comes directly from the North Korean rulebook.
The question is what might upset the applecart here. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is playing statesman, and his enemies might be motivated to destabilize the talks by leaking more information on his program. New information on the program might leak from CIA or elsewhere, increasing the pressure. Or the Israelis might do some sophisticated and deniable leaking.
For the moment, we need to watch the nuances of the talks. The participants want them to continue indefinitely in hopes of taking the issue out of crisis mode. Two things to watch for are, one, if Ahmadinejad feels compelled to gloat, and two, if the Israelis appear to feel that fruitless talks are going to go on forever. At any point, a number of players can abort the process.
The most concerned party should be Russia. Real talks are not the path the Russians wanted, even if this is the path they said they wanted. The Russians were anticipating a breakdown in the talks that they would then blame on the Americans. The Russians want the Iranians and Americans at each others’ throats, but they also need to be perceived in Europe as a reasonable player. Russian’s grand strategy is to split Europe from the United States, and particularly Germany. Part of that includes painting the Americans as warmongers. That’s hard to do if you are seen as the one that submarines talks that could have succeeded in dialing back a crisis. But this is not the same as saying they are out of the game. Their options are plentiful, they just cannot be used today.
We need to listen very carefully to the comments, leaks, and off-the-record spin of the talks when they end today, and look to see whether they go on another day. And we need to know if Mottaki has left Washington.
For the moment, this has not gone as we expected. Obama has defused the immediate crisis. He has not ended it by any means, but we are in a different timeframe, probably one running to the end of the year based on what has been said. He now has one crisis, not two (at least for now) — unless the present process blows apart in the next few hours. It seems to us that the most likely outcome at present is everyone to continuing to talk about talking.
-
second entry
October 1, 2009 | 1350 GMT
Summary
Negotiations have begun in Geneva between the P-5+1 and Iran over the Iranian nuclear program. The most important statement to emerge so far is from a U.S. assistant secretary of defense, who told a Russian news agency that Washington plans to give Iran until the end of the year to verify that its nuclear program is only civilian in nature.
Analysis
Related Special Series
Special Series: Iran Sanctions
Related Special Topic Page
Special Coverage: The Iran Crisis
Talks between Iran and the P-5+1 nations — the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, France and Germany — began Oct. 1 in the village of Genthoud, a municipality of Geneva. The morning kicked off with several plenary meetings, with time allowed for intermittent breaks that presented opportunities for more private sideline discussions with Iranian representatives.
So far it appears that Iran is providing the P-5+1 powers with plenty of fodder for discussing its nuclear program. The meetings are now expected to extend into the early evening and on into the next day. The United States has been careful to clarify that this is not the meeting where sanctions would be threatened against Iran. The Geneva meeting was designed to engage the Iranians; should that fail, subsequent meetings of the P-5+1 (without Iran) would be organized to discuss the sanctions option.
The most important statement that has come out of the summit so far is from U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Alexander Vershbow, who told Russia’s Interfax news agency that Washington plans to give Iran until the end of the year to prove that its nuclear program is only civilian in nature. “Now this process may last more than one day, but it cannot go on indefinitely,” Vershbow said. “We have agreed with our main partners that we need to see progress before the end of the year, or else we will have to shift toward tougher measures, including stronger sanctions.”
This is a slight shift from earlier U.S. (and particularly Israeli) warnings indicating that the Geneva meeting was a chance for Iran to come clean or face “crippling” sanctions. And Vershbow, in particular, is a technocrat whose word carries more weight. He has served as the U.S. ambassador to Russia, NATO and South Korea and is not prone to grandstanding.
Iran had plans all along to lengthen the negotiating track and buy more time for dialogue, but the fact that Washington is agreeing to extend the deadline could indicate one of two things: Either the United States is buying time to sort this issue out and attempt a compromise with the Russians to increase pressure on Tehran, or Iran has made a concrete offer behind the scenes that has caught the White House’s attention.
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s visit to Washington, which began Sept. 30, is key to this latter scenario. The U.S. State Department so far is downplaying the entire visit and claiming ignorance on whether Mottaki has met with U.S. officials, but Mottaki certainly did not visit the nation’s capital for a tour of the monuments. At the same time, Iran’s state-run news agency IRNA is claiming that Mottaki discussed his country’s nuclear program with two U.S. Congressmen on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, though this report has not yet been confirmed. An unnamed U.S. official also announced Oct. 1 that Washington may even be open to one-on-one talks with the Iranians.
So far it appears that the United States has found a new reason to be optimistic about the Geneva talks, but there is much more to uncover as the summit plays out. And, as always, Israel is the critical player to watch.
-
@Crafty- Iraqi Trademarks because Iraq had plenty of time to move what nuclear/ WMD stuff they had been developing before Iraqi Freedom finally kicked off. If Iraqis are willing to shift fighter aircraft to Iran, why not Nuclear goodies and other stuff? (I have seen no evidence, but would not be surprised if.....)
If my clan were going to go under, but I had some unique assets that the tribe could use- why not hand it off to another clan that could make viable use of it?
-
I understand that, but it is my understanding that in his interviews after his capture when asked why he had left the impression of having WMD when he didn't SH said that it was to bluff the Iranians. My guess would be Syria would be a more likely place to stash nasty toys.
-
From Geneva yesterday come all kinds of good diplomatic vibrations. Iran may allow U.N. inspectors into a recently unveiled uranium-enrichment plant "within two weeks." Another meeting will be held before month's end. A "freeze" on sanctions was bruited about. In an appearance at the White House, President Obama sounded sober but hopeful, calling the direct American talks with the Islamic Republic "a constructive beginning" toward "serious and meaningful engagement."
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was presumably in even better spirits at his remarkable change of fortune. A month ago, Iran's president was struggling to cement his grip on power after stealing an election and repressing nationwide protests. A week ago, the disclosure of the secret facility near Qom highlighted Iran's chronic prevarication and raised calls for more sanctions.
By yesterday, all that had changed. At the 18th-century Villa Le Saugy, Iran's representative sat among the world's powers as a respected equal. Responding to an overture from the Obama Administration, the Iranians even talked about the future of the U.N. and other nonnuclear issues. Meanwhile, Washington was "buzzing" (as one newspaper put it) that a one-day visit by Iran's foreign minister might signal more detente to come. Back in Tehran, Mr. Ahmadinejad floated a tete-a-tete with the U.S. President. In short, this engagement conferred a respectability on his regime that Mr. Ahmadinejad could only have imagined amid his vicious post-election crackdown.
The price of entry is surprisingly modest, too. Though cautious, the P5+1 (the veto-wielding Security Council members, plus Germany) welcomed signs of Iranian concessions: Inspectors at Qom, an openness to send low-enriched uranium outside Iran for enrichment, possibly suspending its own enrichment program. Mr. Ahmadinejad said the Geneva talks were "a unique opportunity" for the West.
Consider the Iranian offers in turn. Inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency won't find anything incriminating at the Qom facility. Having lied about it for years, the Iranians now have plenty of time to clean the place out. Iran's experience with the IAEA goes back to the first inspections starting in 1992, which somehow prevented the world from learning about Iran's bomb program for a decade and then only from an Iranian dissident group. A freeze on enrichment used to be the U.S. precondition for talks with Iran. Now the U.S. and Europeans say that in exchange merely for this enrichment promise, they'll freeze any additional sanctions.
Iran has timed its olive branch well. The Europeans are more frustrated with past Iranian stalling than is Washington and have started to hanker for tougher measures. Those demands will now be muted. For years, Iran has talked with the Europeans, using the time and diplomatic cover to make nuclear progress. The Obama ascendency offers the mullahs another chance, with an even more eager partner, to repeat the exercise with a far bigger potential payoff. Expect Iran to follow the North Korean model, stringing the West along, lying and wheedling, striking deals only to reneg and start over. In the end, North Korea tested a nuclear device.
On long evidence, the regime has no intention of stopping a nuclear program that would give it new power in the region, and new leverage against America. The Qom news reveals a more extensive, sophisticated and covert nuclear complex than many people, including the CIA, were willing to recognize. The facility is located on a Revolutionary Guard base, partly hidden underground and protected by air-defense missiles. Its capacity of 3,000 centrifuges is too small for civilian use but not for a weapons program. It's a good bet an archipelago of such small covert facilities is scattered around Iran.
Meanwhile, news reports this week say German and British intelligence believe Iran never stopped clandestine efforts to design a nuclear warhead. Their assumptions contradict the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate in 2007 that Iran had stopped its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and kept it frozen.
The evidence is overwhelming that the window to stop the world's leading sponsor of terrorism from acquiring a bomb is closing fast. If we are serious about doing so, the proper model isn't North Korea, but Libya. The Gadhafi regime agreed to disarm after the fall of Saddam Hussein convinced its leaders that their survival was better assured without nuclear weapons. Mr. Ahmadinejad and Iran's mullahs will only concede if they see their future the same way.
This supposed fresh start in Geneva only gives them new legitimacy, and new hope that they can have their bomb and enhanced global standing too.
-
I think I may disagree with Stratfor here. I tend to go with Krauthammer that this is all a joke, that BO is getting played, and that the Iranians have just successfully picked up several months of delay.
To threaten a punishment of really mean sanctions is meaningless-- the Russians and the Chinese won't be part of it.
By the time the Iranians stall enough that BO begins to negotiate with the Russians, Chinese, Germans (who have voraciously been doing business with Iran all along btw) many months will have passed and all that will be produced with be a fart.
================
A Delay in the Iran Crisis Timeline
THE P-5+1 MEETING was held in Geneva on Thursday. At its conclusion, U.S. President Barack Obama gave a press conference in Washington. Of all the reactions, the U.S. reaction was the most important, since the U.S. reading of the situation determines the probability of sanctions and, more important, of military action against Iran. It is clear from Obama’s press conference that neither is going to happen at the moment. Therefore, the talks weren’t a disaster.
Iran seems to have agreed to an International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) team coming in two weeks to inspect the recently disclosed uranium enrichment facility at Qom. Of course, whether Iran ends up admitting the team and what it will allow the team to see will be the issue. Iran has been a master at delaying and partially fulfilling agreements like this. Those countries that don’t want a confrontation have used this to argue that limited progress is better than no progress, and that at least some progress is being made. Iran previously has used the ambiguity of its cooperation to provide a plausible basis for those in the coalition against it that don’t want a confrontation to split from those coalition members who do. Given the high degree of unity among foreign powers that is needed for sanctions, IAEA inspections are a superb tool for Iran to use in managing the coalition arrayed against it.
Obama expressly said that delays wouldn’t work, adding that words need to be followed by actions. From the tenor of his speech, it appears that the United States has postponed the crisis but not cancelled it. At the same time, the basic framework of engagement and a long-term process of accommodation with Iran has not been violated. The United States can use ambiguities to justify pulling back from a confrontation.
” The crisis will come not from clear Iranian unwillingness to cooperate, but from ambiguity over whether Iran has cooperated.”
Obama deliberately adopted a resolute tone with a short timeline. Whatever room for maneuver he retained, his tone was extremely firm. Interestingly, his tone was sufficiently hard that how it will play in Iran is now in question. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad does not want to appear as weak or caving in. Domestically, he cannot afford to appear so easily browbeaten, having just emerged from a messy internal struggle whose losers would appreciate the opportunity to paint him as mishandling negotiations. Therefore, the tone of Obama’s statement might cause him to be more intransigent. The real issue is what happens in the next two weeks. We suspect events will be sufficiently ambiguous to allow any and all interpretations. The crisis will come not from clear Iranian unwillingness to cooperate, but from ambiguity over whether Iran has cooperated.
Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki’s decision to visit Washington on the eve of the Geneva talks and the willingness of the United States to give him a visa to do so have confused matters a bit. The visit offered a superb opportunity for high-level talks, but all sides are denying that such talks took place. According to Mottaki, he visited the Iranian interests section at the Pakistani Embassy on Sept. 30, had dinner with the staff, and left by 6 a.m. the next day. The itinerary is possible, but somehow doesn’t feel right. Perhaps it was just a symbolic concession on both sides, with Mottaki being willing to visit the capital of the Great Satan and the United States being willing to host a charter member of the Axis of Evil. It could be that simple. But given Obama’s interest in engagement, we can’t help but wonder who else Mottaki spoke to. In the end — or rather, now that the Geneva talks have gone reasonably well — it probably doesn’t matter.
There are two wild cards in this deck. The first is Israel. Israel has clearly chosen to allow this process to proceed without issuing threats. Obama is aware that he must keep the Israelis in check, and that excessive flexibility could create a loose cannon that disrupts the entire process. The other wild card is U.S. domestic politics. Congress has been obsessed with health care reform; it has had no bandwidth for foreign policy. Assuming that some resolution on health care takes place in the next couple of weeks, Congress will have that bandwidth and will start limiting Obama’s room for maneuver.
That, of course, affects Afghanistan as well as Iran. Obama’s trip to Copenhagen on Friday now appears no longer simply about getting Chicago named as a host city for the Olympics, but about meeting with some European officials — undoubtedly about the Afghanistan strategy review now under way. When Congress comes up for air, it will be raising questions on Afghanistan. The White House announced Thursday that Obama is taking another several weeks to review the strategy — and should he decide to increase forces and shift strategy, he will want to be able to demonstrate European cooperation. Going to Congress with a massive increase in U.S. forces and nothing from the Europeans would be difficult.
Therefore, we can expect intense diplomacy in the weeks leading up to the IAEA inspections at Qom, the subsequent report and the controversy that will result from the report. It is the controversy on the report that will shape the next phase of the Iran issue. The timeline has clearly slipped from September to later in the year, but the basic structure of the crisis, in our opinion, remains unchanged.
-
From Pravda on the Hudson:
Report Says Iran Has Data to Make a Nuclear Bomb
By WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER
Published: October 3, 2009
Senior staff members of the United Nations nuclear agency have concluded in a confidential analysis that Iran has acquired “sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable” atom bomb.
The report by experts in the International Atomic Energy Agency stresses in its introduction that its conclusions are tentative and subject to further confirmation of the evidence, which it says came from intelligence agencies and its own investigations.
But the report’s conclusions, described by senior European officials, go well beyond the public positions taken by several governments, including the United States.
Two years ago, American intelligence agencies published a detailed report concluding that Tehran halted its efforts to design a nuclear weapon in 2003. But in recent months, Britain has joined France, Germany and Israel in disputing that conclusion, saying the work has been resumed.
A senior American official said last week that the United States was now re-evaluating its 2007 conclusions.
The atomic agency’s report also presents evidence that beyond improving upon bomb-making information gathered from rogue nuclear experts around the world, Iran has done extensive research and testing on how to fashion the components of a weapon. It does not say how far that work has progressed.
The report, titled “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” was produced in consultation with a range of nuclear weapons experts inside and outside the agency. It draws a picture of a complex program, run by Iran’s Ministry of Defense, “aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system,” Iran’s medium-range missile, which can strike the Middle East and parts of Europe. The program, according to the report, apparently began in early 2002.
If Iran is designing a warhead, that would represent only part of the complex process of making nuclear arms. Experts say Iran has already mastered the hardest part, enriching the uranium that can be used as nuclear fuel.
While the analysis represents the judgment of the nuclear agency’s senior staff, a struggle has erupted in recent months over whether to make it public. The dispute pits the agency’s departing director, Mohamed ElBaradei, against his own staff and against foreign governments eager to intensify pressure on Iran.
Dr. ElBaradei has long been reluctant to adopt a confrontational strategy with Iran, an approach he considers counterproductive. Responding to calls for the report’s release, he has raised doubts about its completeness and reliability.
Last month, the agency issued an unusual statement cautioning it “has no concrete proof” that Iran ever sought to make nuclear arms, much less to perfect a warhead. On Saturday in India, Dr. ElBaradei was quoted as saying that “a major question” about the authenticity of the evidence kept his agency from “making any judgment at all” on whether Iran had ever sought to design a nuclear warhead.
Even so, the emerging sense in the intelligence world that Iran has solved the major nuclear design problems poses a new diplomatic challenge for President Obama and his allies as they confront Iran.
American officials say that in the direct negotiations with Iran that began last week, it will be vital to get the country to open all of its suspected sites to international inspectors. That is a long list, topped by the underground nuclear enrichment center under construction near Qum, that was revealed 10 days ago.
Iran has acknowledged that the underground facility is intended as a nuclear enrichment center, but says the fuel it makes will be used solely to produce nuclear power and medical isotopes. It was kept heavily protected, Iranian officials said, to ward off potential attacks.
Iran said last week that it would allow inspectors to visit the site this month. In the past three years, amid mounting evidence of a possible military dimension to its nuclear program, Iran has denied the agency wide access to installations, documents and personnel.
In recent weeks, there have been leaks about the internal report, perhaps intended to press Dr. ElBaradei into releasing it.
The report’s existence has been rumored for months, and The Associated Press, saying it had seen a copy, reported fragments of it in September. On Friday, more detailed excerpts appeared on the Web site of the Institute for Science and International Security, run by David Albright, a nuclear expert.
In recent interviews, a senior European official familiar with the contents of the full report described it to The New York Times. He confirmed that Mr. Albright’s excerpts were authentic. The excerpts were drawn from a 67-page version of the report written earlier this year and since revised and lengthened, the official said; its main conclusions remain unchanged.
“This is a running summary of where we are,” the official said.
“But there is some loose language,” he added, and it was “not ready for publication as an official document.”
==========
Page 2 of 2)
Most dramatically, the report says the agency “assesses that Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device” based on highly enriched uranium.
Weapons based on the principle of implosion are considered advanced models compared with the simple gun-type bomb that the United States dropped on Hiroshima. They use a blast wave from a sphere of conventional explosives to compress a ball of bomb fuel into a supercritical mass, starting the atomic chain reaction and progressing to the fiery blast. Implosion designs, compact by nature, are considered necessary for making nuclear warheads small and powerful enough to fit atop a missile.
The excerpts of the analysis also suggest the Iranians have done a wide array of research and testing to perfect nuclear arms, like making high-voltage detonators, firing test explosives and designing warheads.
The evidence underlying these conclusions is not new: Some of it was reported in a confidential presentation to many nations in early 2008 by the agency’s chief inspector, Ollie Heinonen.
Iran maintains that its scientists have never conducted research on how to make a warhead. Iranian officials say any documents to the contrary are fraudulent.
But in August, a public report to the board of the I.A.E.A. by its staff concluded that the evidence of Iran’s alleged military activity was probably genuine.
It said “the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts” about the nature of its nuclear program.
The agency’s tentative analysis also says that Iran “most likely” obtained the needed information for designing and building an implosion bomb “from external sources” and then adapted the information to its own needs.
It said nothing specific about the “external sources,” but many intelligence agencies assume that Iran obtained a bomb design from A. Q. Khan, the rogue Pakistani black marketer who sold it machines to enrich uranium. That information may have been supplemented by a Russian nuclear weapons scientist who visited Iran often, investigators say.
The I.A.E.A.’s internal report concluded that the staff believed “that non-nuclear experiments conducted in Iran would give confidence that the implosion system would function correctly.”
-
By JOHN BOLTON
The most widely touted outcome of last week's Geneva talks with Iran was the "agreement in principle" to send approximately one nuclear-weapon's worth of Iran's low enriched uranium (LEU) to Russia for enrichment to 19.75% and fabrication into fuel rods for Tehran's research reactor. President Barack Obama says the deal represents progress, a significant confidence-building measure.
In fact, the agreement constitutes another in the long string of Iranian negotiating victories over the West. Any momentum toward stricter sanctions has been dissipated, and Iran's fraudulent, repressive regime again hobnobs with the U.N. Security Council's permanent members. Consider the following problems:
• Is there a deal or isn't there? Diplomacy's three slipperiest words are "agreement in principle." Iran's Ambassador to Britain exclaimed after the talks in Geneva, "No, no!" when asked if his country had agreed to ship LEU to Russia; it had "not been discussed yet." An unnamed Iranian official said that the Geneva deal "is just based on principles. We have not agreed on any amount or any numbers." Bargaining over the deal's specifics could stretch out indefinitely.
Other issues include whether Iran will have "observers" at Russian enrichment facilities. If so, what new technologies might those observers glean? And, since Tehran's reactor is purportedly for medical purposes, will Mr. Obama deny what Iran pretends to need to refuel it in 2010?
• The "agreement" undercuts Security Council resolutions forbidding Iranian uranium enrichment. No U.S. president has been more enamored of international law and the Security Council than Mr. Obama. Yet here he is undermining the foundation of the multilateral campaign against Tehran's nuclear weapons program. In Resolution 1696, adopted July 31, 2006, the Security Council required Iran to "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development." Uranium enriched thereafter—the overwhelming bulk of Iran's admitted LEU—thus violates 1696 and later sanctions resolutions. Moreover, considering Iran's utter lack of credibility, we have no idea whether its declared LEU constitutes anything near its entire stockpile.
By endorsing Iran's use of its illegitimately enriched uranium, Mr. Obama weakens his argument that Iran must comply with its "international obligations." Indeed, the Geneva deal undercuts Mr. Obama's proposal to withhold more sanctions if Iran does not enhance its nuclear program by allowing Iran to argue that continued enrichment for all peaceful purposes should be permissible. Now Iran will oppose new sanctions and argue for repealing existing restrictions. Every other aspiring proliferator is watching how violating Security Council resolutions not only carries no penalty but provides a shortcut to international redemption.
• Raising Iran's LEU to higher enrichment levels is a step backwards. Two-thirds of the work to get 90% enriched uranium, the most efficient weapons grade, is accomplished when U235 isotope levels in natural uranium are enriched to Iran's current level of approximately 3%-5%. Further enrichment of Iran's LEU to 19.75% is a significant step in the wrong direction. This is barely under the 20% definition of weapons-grade, highly enriched uranium (HEU). Ironically, Resolution 1887, adopted while Mr. Obama presided over the Security Council last week, calls for converting HEU-based reactors like Iran's to LEU fuel precisely to lower such proliferation risks. We should be converting the Tehran reactor, not refueling it at 19.75% enrichment.
After Geneva, the administration misleadingly stated that once fashioned into fuel rods, the uranium involved could not be enriched further. This is flatly untrue. The 19.75% enriched uranium could be reconverted into uranium hexafluoride gas and quickly enriched to 90%. Iran could also "burn" its uranium fuel (including the Russian LEU available for the Bushehr reactor) and then chemically extract plutonium from the spent fuel to produce nuclear weapons.
The more sophisticated Iran's nuclear skills become, the more paths it has to manufacture nuclear weapons. The research-reactor bait-and-switch demonstrates convincingly why it cannot be trusted with fissile material under any peaceful guise. Proceeding otherwise would be winking at two decades of Iranian deception, which, unfortunately, Mr. Obama seems perfectly prepared to do.
The president also said last week that international access to the Qom nuclear site must occur within two weeks, but an administration spokesman retreated the next day, saying there was no "hard and fast deadline," and "we don't have like a drop-dead date." Of course, neither does Iran. Once again, Washington has entered the morass of negotiations with Tehran, giving Iran precious time to refine and expand its nuclear program. We are now even further from eliminating Iran's threat than before Geneva.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
-
One of my patients is a tough negotiator over medicines I suggest to him.
I complemented him and said we need you over there in Iran negotiating with them over the nukes.
He said forget the negotiations. We should just bomb them to smitherines and go over and plant the American flag.
I said that is what I mean - we need you to get the job done.
Instead we have Obama.
And we will have a nuclear weaponized Iran.
A rebirth of the Persian empire - which is what it is really all about.
-
Bolton who in my mind is the only one seaking the truth was on Fox this weekend and when asked about this loon who is head of the IAEA stated we should be grateful his term as Director is almost up. This is exactly why he said this:
****ElBaradei says nuclear Israel number one threat to Mideast: report
TEHRAN, Oct. 4 (Xinhua) -- Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Mohamed ElBaradei said Sunday that "Israel is number one threat to Middle East" with its nuclear arms, the official IRNA news agency reported.
At a joint press conference with Iran's Atomic Energy Organization chief Ali Akbar Salehi in Tehran, ElBaradei brought Israel under spotlight and said that the Tel Aviv regime has refused to allow inspections into its nuclear installations for 30years, the report said.
"Israel is the number one threat to the Middle East given the nuclear arms it possesses," ElBaradei was quoted as saying.
Israel is widely assumed to have nuclear capabilities, although it refuses to confirm or deny the allegation.
"This (possession of nuclear arms) was the cause for some proper measures to gain access to its (Israel's) power plants ... and the U.S. president has done some positive measures for the inspections to happen," said ElBaradei.
ElBaradei arrived in Iran Saturday for talks with Iranian officials over Tehran's nuclear program.
Leaders of the United States, France and Britain have condemned Iran's alleged deception to the international community involving covert activities in its new underground nuclear site.
Last month, Iran confirmed that it is building a new nuclear fuel enrichment plant near its northwestern city of Qom. In reaction, the IAEA asked Tehran to provide detailed information and access to the new nuclear facility as soon as possible.
On Sunday, ElBaradei said the UN nuclear watchdog would inspect Iran's new uranium plant near Qom on Oct. 25.*****
-
Two Leaks and the Deepening Iran Crisis
October 5, 2009
By George Friedman
Two major leaks occurred this weekend over the Iran matter.
In the first, The New York Times published an article reporting that staff at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the U.N. nuclear oversight group, had produced an unreleased report saying that Iran was much more advanced in its nuclear program than the IAEA had thought previously. According to the report, Iran now has all the data needed to design a nuclear weapon. The New York Times article added that U.S. intelligence was re-examining the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007, which had stated that Iran was not actively pursuing a nuclear weapon.
The second leak occurred in the British daily The Times, which reported that the purpose of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s highly publicized secret visit to Moscow on Sept. 7 was to provide the Russians with a list of Russian scientists and engineers working on Iran’s nuclear weapons program.
The second revelation was directly tied to the first. There were many, including STRATFOR, who felt that Iran did not have the non-nuclear disciplines needed for rapid progress toward a nuclear device. Putting the two pieces together, the presence of Russian personnel in Iran would mean that the Iranians had obtained the needed expertise from the Russians. It would also mean that the Russians were not merely a factor in whether there would be effective sanctions but also in whether and when the Iranians would obtain a nuclear weapon.
We would guess that the leak to The New York Times came from U.S. government sources, because that seems to be a prime vector of leaks from the Obama administration and because the article contained information on the NIE review. Given that National Security Adviser James Jones tended to dismiss the report on Sunday television, we would guess the report leaked from elsewhere in the administration. The Times leak could have come from multiple sources, but we have noted a tendency of the Israelis to leak through the British daily on national security issues. (The article contained substantial details on the visit and appeared written from the Israeli point of view.) Neither leak can be taken at face value, of course. But it is clear that these were deliberate leaks — people rarely risk felony charges leaking such highly classified material — and even if they were not coordinated, they delivered the same message, true or not.
The Iranian Time Frame and the Russian Role
The message was twofold. First, previous assumptions on time frames on Iran are no longer valid, and worst-case assumptions must now be assumed. The Iranians are in fact moving rapidly toward a weapon; have been extremely effective at deceiving U.S. intelligence (read, they deceived the Bush administration, but the Obama administration has figured it out); and therefore, we are moving toward a decisive moment with Iran. Second, this situation is the direct responsibility of Russian nuclear expertise. Whether this expertise came from former employees of the Russian nuclear establishment now looking for work, Russian officials assigned to Iran or unemployed scientists sent to Iran by the Russians is immaterial. The Israelis — and the Obama administration — must hold the Russians responsible for the current state of Iran’s weapons program, and by extension, Moscow bears responsibility for any actions that Israel or the United States might take to solve the problem.
We would suspect that the leaks were coordinated. From the Israeli point of view, having said publicly that they are prepared to follow the American lead and allow this phase of diplomacy to play out, there clearly had to be more going on than just last week’s Geneva talks. From the American point of view, while the Russians have indicated that participating in sanctions on gasoline imports by Iran is not out of the question, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev did not clearly state that Russia would cooperate, nor has anything been heard from Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin on the subject. The Russian leadership appears to be playing “good cop, bad cop” on the matter, and the credibility of anything they say on Iran has little weight in Washington.
It would seem to us that the United States and Israel decided to up the ante fairly dramatically in the wake of the Oct. 1 meeting with Iran in Geneva. As IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei visits Iran, massive new urgency has now been added to the issue. But we must remember that Iran knows whether it has had help from Russian scientists; that is something that can’t be bluffed. Given that this specific charge has been made — and as of Monday not challenged by Iran or Russia — indicates to us more is going on than an attempt to bluff the Iranians into concessions. Unless the two leaks together are completely bogus, and we doubt that, the United States and Israel are leaking information already well known to the Iranians. They are telling Tehran that its deception campaign has been penetrated, and by extension are telling it that it faces military action — particularly if massive sanctions are impractical because of more Russian obstruction.
If Netanyahu went to Moscow to deliver this intelligence to the Russians, the only surprise would have been the degree to which the Israelis had penetrated the program, not that the Russians were there. The Russian intelligence services are superbly competent, and keep track of stray nuclear scientists carefully. They would not be surprised by the charge, only by Israel’s knowledge of it.
This, of course leaves open an enormous question. Certainly, the Russians appear to have worked with the Iranians on some security issues and have played with the idea of providing the Iranians more substantial military equipment. But deliberately aiding Iran in building a nuclear device seems beyond Russia’s interests in two ways. First, while Russia wants to goad the United States, it does not itself really want a nuclear Iran. Second, in goading the United States, the Russians know not to go too far; helping Iran build a nuclear weapon would clearly cross a redline, triggering reactions.
A number of possible explanations present themselves. The leak to The Times might be wrong. But The Times is not a careless newspaper: It accepts leaks only from certified sources. The Russian scientists might be private citizens accepting Iranian employment. But while this is possible, Moscow is very careful about what Russian nuclear engineers do with their time. Or the Russians might be providing enough help to goad the United States but not enough to ever complete the job. Whatever the explanation, the leaks paint the Russians as more reckless than they have appeared, assuming the leaks are true.
And whatever their veracity, the leaks — the content of which clearly was discussed in detail among the P-5+1 prior to and during the Geneva meetings, regardless of how long they have been known by Western intelligence — were made for two reasons. The first was to tell the Iranians that the nuclear situation is now about to get out of hand, and that attempting to manage the negotiations through endless delays will fail because the United Nations is aware of just how far Tehran has come with its weapons program. The second was to tell Moscow that the issue is no longer whether the Russians will cooperate on sanctions, but the consequence to Russia’s relations with the United States and at least the United Kingdom, France and, most important, possibly Germany. If these leaks are true, they are game changers.
We have focused on the Iranian situation not because it is significant in itself, but because it touches on a great number of other crucial international issues. It is now entangled in the Iraqi, Afghan, Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese issues, all of them high-stakes matters. It is entangled in Russian relations with Europe and the United States. It is entangled in U.S.-European relationships and with relationships within Europe. It touches on the U.S.-Chinese relationship. It even touches on U.S. relations with Venezuela and some other Latin American countries. It is becoming the Gordian knot of international relations.
STRATFOR first focused on the Russian connection with Iran in the wake of the Iranian elections and resulting unrest, when a crowd of Rafsanjani supporters began chanting “Death to Russia,” not one of the top-10 chants in Iran. That caused us to focus on the cooperation between Russia and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on security matters. We were aware of some degree of technical cooperation on military hardware, and of course on Russian involvement in Iran’s civilian nuclear program. We were also of the view that the Iranians were unlikely to progress quickly with their nuclear program. We were not aware that Russian scientists were directly involved in Iran’s military nuclear project, which is not surprising, given that such involvement would be Iran’s single-most important state secret — and Russia’s, too.
A Question of Timing
But there is a mystery here as well. To have any impact, the Russian involvement must have been under way for years. The United States has tried to track rogue nuclear scientists and engineers — anyone who could contribute to nuclear proliferation — since the 1990s. The Israelis must have had their own program on this, too. Both countries, as well as European intelligence services, were focused on Iran’s program and the whereabouts of Russian scientists. It is hard to believe that they only just now found out. If we were to guess, we would say Russian involvement has been under way since just after the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, when the Russians decided that the United States was a direct threat to its national security.
Therefore, the decision suddenly to confront the Russians, and suddenly to leak U.N. reports — much more valuable than U.S. reports, which are easier for the Europeans to ignore — cannot simply be because the United States and Israel just obtained this information. The IAEA, hostile to the United States since the invasion of Iraq and very much under the influence of the Europeans, must have decided to shift its evaluation of Iran. But far more significant is the willingness of the Israelis first to confront the Russians and then leak about Russian involvement, something that obviously compromises Israeli sources and methods. And that means the Israelis no longer consider the preservation of their intelligence operation in Iran (or wherever it was carried out) as of the essence.
Two conclusions can be drawn. First, the Israelis no longer need to add to their knowledge of Russian involvement; they know what they need to know. And second, the Israelis do not expect Iranian development to continue much longer; otherwise, maintaining the intelligence capability would take precedence over anything else.
It follows from this that the use of this intelligence in diplomatic confrontations with Russians and in a British newspaper serves a greater purpose than the integrity of the source system. And that means that the Israelis expect a resolution in the very near future — the only reason they would have blown their penetration of the Russian-Iranian system.
Possible Outcomes
There are two possible outcomes here. The first is that having revealed the extent of the Iranian program and having revealed the Russian role in a credible British newspaper, the Israelis and the Americans (whose own leak in The New York Times underlined the growing urgency of action) are hoping that the Iranians realize that they are facing war and that the Russians realize that they are facing a massive crisis in their relations with the West. If that happens, then the Russians might pull their scientists and engineers, join in the sanctions and force the Iranians to abandon their program.
The second possibility is that the Russians will continue to play the spoiler on sanctions and will insist that they are not giving support to the Iranians. This leaves the military option, which would mean broad-based action, primarily by the United States, against Iran’s nuclear facilities. Any military operation would involve keeping the Strait of Hormuz clear, meaning naval action, and we now know that there are more nuclear facilities than previously discussed. So while the war for the most part would be confined to the air and sea, it would be extensive nonetheless.
Sanctions or war remain the two options, and which one is chosen depends on Moscow’s actions. The leaks this weekend have made clear that the United States and Israel have positioned themselves such that not much time remains. We have now moved from a view of Iran as a long-term threat to Iran as a much more immediate threat thanks to the Russians.
The least that can be said about this is that the Obama administration and Israel are trying to reshape the negotiations with the Iranians and Russians. The most that can be said is that the Americans and Israelis are preparing the public for war. Polls now indicate that more than 60 percent of the U.S. public now favors military action against Iran. From a political point of view, it has become easier for U.S. President Barack Obama to act than to not act. This, too, is being transmitted to the Iranians and Russians.
It is not clear to us that the Russians or Iranians are getting the message yet. They have convinced themselves that Obama is unlikely to act because he is weak at home and already has too many issues to juggle. This is a case where a reputation for being conciliatory actually increases the chances for war. But the leaks this weekend have strikingly limited the options and timelines of the United States and Israel. They also have put the spotlight on Obama at a time when he already is struggling with health care and Afghanistan. History is rarely considerate of presidential plans, and in this case, the leaks have started to force Obama’s hand.
-
Another piece that suggests the US is gearing up for war with Iran?
I don't see it.
If polls are correct and a majority of the American public actually support military force (I am not sure I believe this) it certainly is NOT due to anything Obama has done.
It can only be because of what he is not doing.
It can only be people are not as stupid as him and are getting tired of his endless appeasements.
We will see.
What does anyone else think about this?
-
We are watching the end of Israel and America as we knew it.
-
I don't see it either-- BO is painting us into a corner that requires action, but will puss out , , , and everyone knows it. Sanctions are a meaningless threat without the Russians and the Chinese.
I suppose one could argue that maybe he is holding off on Afg because he knows what comes with Iran, but ultimately the man is universally believed to be a pussy and that is how all players are going to play.
Edited to add this from the WSJ:
==================
NEW YORK—When American diplomats sat down for the first in a series of face-to-face talks with their Iranian counterparts last October in Geneva, few would have predicted that what began as a negotiation over Tehran's nuclear programs would wind up in a stunning demand by the Security Council that Israel give up its atomic weapons.
Yet that's just what the U.N. body did this morning, in a resolution that was as striking for the way member states voted as it was for its substance. All 10 nonpermanent members voted for the resolution, along with permanent members Russia, China and the United Kingdom. France and the United States abstained. By U.N. rules, that means the resolution passes.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad meets IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei.
.The U.S. abstention is sending shock waves through the international community, which has long been accustomed to the U.S. acting as Israel's de facto protector on the Council. It also appears to reverse a decades-old understanding between Washington and Tel Aviv that the U.S. would acquiesce in Israel's nuclear arsenal as long as that arsenal remained undeclared. The Jewish state is believed to possess as many as 200 weapons.
Tehran reacted positively to the U.S. abstention. "For a long time we have said about Mr. Obama that we see change but no improvement," said Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki. "Now we can say there has been an improvement."
The resolution calls for a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East. It also demands that Israel sign the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection. Two similar, albeit nonbinding, resolutions were approved last September by the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna.
At the time, the U.S. opposed a resolution focused on Israel but abstained from a more general motion calling for regional disarmament. "We are very pleased with the agreed approach reflected here today," said then-U.S. Ambassador to the IAEA Glyn Davies.
Since then, however, relations between the Obama administration and the government of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, never warm to begin with, have cooled dramatically. The administration accused Tel Aviv of using "disproportionate force" following a Nov. 13 Israeli aerial attack on an apparent munitions depot in Gaza City, in which more than a dozen young children were killed.
Mr. Netanyahu also provoked the administration's ire after he was inadvertently caught on an open microphone calling Mr. Obama "worse than Chamberlain." The comment followed the president's historic Dec. 21 summit meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Geneva, the first time leaders of the two countries have met since the Carter administration.
But the factors that chiefly seemed to drive the administration's decision to abstain from this morning's vote were more strategic than personal. Western negotiators have been pressing Iran to make good on its previous agreement in principle to ship its nuclear fuel to third countries so it could be rendered usable in Iran's civilian nuclear facilities. The Iranians, in turn, have been adamant that they would not do so unless progress were made on international disarmament.
"The Iranians have a point," said one senior administration official. "The U.S. can't forever be the enforcer of a double standard where Israel gets a nuclear free ride but Iran has to abide by every letter in the NPT. President Obama has put the issue of nuclear disarmament at the center of his foreign policy agenda. His credibility is at stake and so is U.S. credibility in the Muslim world. How can we tell Tehran that they're better off without nukes if we won't make the same point to our Israeli friends?"
Also factoring into the administration's thinking are reports that the Israelis are in the final stages of planning an attack on Iran's nuclear installations. Defense Secretary Robert Gates, who met with his Israeli counterpart Ehud Barak in Paris last week, has been outspoken in his opposition to such a strike. The Jerusalem Post has reported that Mr. Gates warned Mr. Barak that the U.S. would "actively stand in the way" of any Israeli strike.
"The Israelis need to look at this U.N. vote as a shot across their bow," said a senior Pentagon official. "If they want to start a shooting war with Iran, we won't have their backs on the Security Council."
An Israeli diplomat observed bitterly that Jan. 20 was the 68th anniversary of the Wannsee conference, which historians believe is where Nazi Germany planned the extermination of European Jewry. An administration spokesman said the timing of the vote was "purely coincidental."
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
-
But, but Obama wore a kippah at AIPAC.....
:roll:
-
Any buyer's remorse yet, Obama voters?
-
***The Iranians are in fact moving rapidly toward a weapon; have been extremely effective at deceiving U.S. intelligence (read, they deceived the Bush administration, but the Obama administration has figured it out***
You mean to tell me everyone was fooled by Iran until the great Obama came around to find out the truth. Is the above statement some sort of joke??
***The most that can be said is that the Americans and Israelis are preparing the public for war***
What BS spin! Oh I get it. Obama has been a resounding success for persuading the American public that *war* is necessary.
So the opinion polls are showing a majority of Americans recognize the need for a military strike and of course this is exactly what OBama has brilliantly manuevered the public to believe?
What horse crap is this?
What good is this article that suggests such outragesouly ridiculous ideas? And anyway, their numerous conclusions are all predicated on numerous assumptions and outright guesses.
I can't take this guy George Friedman seriously. He has an air of knowing what he is talking about but on closer look it is mostly BS speculation and outrageous in some opinions at that.
-
IMHO I have found GF to be one of the deepest and most perceptive observers that we have.
That said I agree with your questioning of some of his premises here.
The problem may lie in the fact that GF's model seeks to be coldly analytical and not at all partisan. As I see it, the fact of the matter is that our President is talking and taking certain steps consistent only with action-- and I have seen serious US polls that think some 70% of the American people think he is being too soft on Iran. GF HAS said that various actors doubt our President has a line that he will not allow to be crossed; as I understand GF's model it includes making such assessments.
That doesn't change the fact that we seem to have elected a clueless pussy.
-
Is the U.S. Preparing to Bomb Iran?
Is the U.S. Stepping Up Preparations for a Possible Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities?
By JONATHAN KARL
Oct. 6, 2009—
Is the U.S. stepping up preparations for a possible attack on Iran's nuclear facilities?
The Pentagon is always making plans, but based on a little-noticed funding request recently sent to Congress, the answer to that question appears to be yes.
First, some background: Back in October 2007, ABC News reported that the Pentagon had asked Congress for $88 million in the emergency Iraq/Afghanistan war funding request to develop a gargantuan bunker-busting bomb called the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). It's a 30,000-pound bomb designed to hit targets buried 200 feet below ground. Back then, the Pentagon cited an "urgent operational need" for the new weapon.
Now the Pentagon is shifting spending from other programs to fast forward the development and procurement of the Massive Ordnance Penetrator. The Pentagon comptroller sent a request to shift the funds to the House and Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees over the summer.
Click here to see a copy of the Pentagon's request, provided to ABC News.
The comptroller said the Pentagon planned to spend $19.1 million to procure four of the bombs, $28.3 million to accelerate the bomb's "development and testing", and $21 million to accelerate the integration of the bomb onto B-2 stealth bombers.
'Urgent Operational Need'
The notification was tucked inside a 93-page "reprogramming" request that included a couple hundred other more mundane items.
Why now? The notification says simply, "The Department has an Urgent Operational Need (UON) for the capability to strike hard and deeply buried targets in high threat environments. The MOP is the weapon of choice to meet the requirements of the UON." It further states that the request is endorsed by Pacific Command (which has responsibility over North Korea) and Central Command (which has responsibility over Iran).
Is the U.S. Preparing to Bomb Iran?
The request was quietly approved. On Friday, McDonnell Douglas was awarded a $51.9 million contract to provide "Massive Penetrator Ordnance Integration" on B-2 aircraft.
This is not the kind of weapon that would be particularly useful in Iraq or Afghanistan, but it is ideally suited to hit deeply buried nuclear facilities such as Natanz or Qom in Iran.
Copyright © 2009 ABC News Internet Ventures
-
Again Stratfor seems to think the US leadership is capable of military action against Iran.
Nonetheless, as is usually the case with anything from Stratfor, there is much to consider:
Russia Responds on the Iran Issue
AFTER A WEEK OF SILENCE following the Oct. 1 talks with Iran in Geneva, Russian officials issued a series of statements Tuesday. First, Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin told Itar-Tass directly that Russia intends to continue its military-technical cooperation with Iran, though within the strict framework of international laws on such matters. Borodavkin’s statement comes in response to U.S. and Israeli demands for Russia to stop supporting Iran. Later in the day, National Security Council chief Nikolai Patrushev denied a report in Britain’s Sunday Times that stated Israel had confronted Moscow with evidence that Russian scientists were aiding Iran in the development of a nuclear weapons program.
Russia has been in a tense position since the Geneva talks. Though the P-5+1 and Tehran reached a tentative agreement to allow Iran’s nuclear facilities to be inspected, under the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Washington and Tehran are still heading toward a crisis. At the heart of this crisis is Russia: It is Russia that is helping Iran with its civilian nuclear program, and Russia is the country that could undermine the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions against Iran. Moscow also occasionally raises the specter of more significant military assistance to Iran, in the form of modern strategic air defense systems like the S-300.
“If Russia was directly linked to the crisis, it would wreck Moscow’s ability to negotiate not only with the United States but with the West as a whole, including Europe.”
In the past week, a flurry of leaks has escalated tensions between the United States and Iran. There was a leak from the IAEA stating that Iran’s nuclear program is much more advanced than previously thought, as well as leaks from the United States that the government is re-examining its intelligence estimates on Iran’s program. But what was really interesting was the leak about Israel’s evidence that Russia is helping Iran with its nuclear weapons program (instead of nuclear energy for civilian purposes). This leak not only heightened the sense of an impending crisis between the United States and Iran, but also pointed a finger directly at Russia.
Yet Russia was silent for a week after the Geneva talks, and for three days after the Sunday Times reported the accusations against it. But the silence has now been broken.
The Russians took their time deciding how to respond on all fronts. As expected, Moscow denied that it was helping Iran develop a weapons program. For Russia to achieve its goal, it must be seen as supportive of Iran, but not as the cause of the turmoil between Washington and Tehran. If Russia was directly linked to the crisis, it would wreck Moscow’s ability to negotiate not only with the United States but with the West as a whole, including Europe.
While Russia distances itself from the leaked Israeli accusation, it is the statement from Borodavkin that is critical. Russia is reserving the right to continue its military relationship with Iran, despite the U.S. and Israeli demands to stop. Russia is pushing the United States into a dilemma.
Moscow sees three possible outcomes of the crisis.
First, the United States could try to cut a deal with the Russians: Washington would concede on issues in Moscow’s sphere of influence, in exchange for Russia backing away from Iran. But the United States would have to give up much more than missile defense in Europe. Russia wants control in the former Soviet sphere and in Europe.
The second possible outcome would be the United States backing down on the Iran issue, which Russia would see as a very public demonstration of Washington’s weakness.
The third possibility is that the United States would take military action against Iran and get involved in a third war in the Middle East. The Russians believe that as long as Washington is focused on Iran, it cannot also be focused on their actions.
Moscow is playing a complex and dangerous game with Iran and the United States. For the past several years, Russia has made it clear to the United States that it wanted Washington to quit meddling in its periphery and recognize Russia as the predominant Eurasian power. The United States, under the previous and current administrations, ignored Russia’s demands. Russia has proven recently — through the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, for example — that it cannot be ignored. As it seeks to push back against the United States, Moscow does not see a downside to the U.S.-Iranian crisis, except possibly one: A short, sharp air and naval campaign that hurls Iran back a generation, combined with a U.S. pullout from Iraq and Afghanistan, would leave Russia without its Iran card, and looking at an angry United States that has a very free hand.
-
Well, the analysis of the chess game Russia may or may not be playing certainly seems logical and sound.
But the following part sounds like wishful thinking especially when all I've heard from this administration is that military action would be a "disaster". And the thought of Obama allowing the specter of thousands of Iranians killed getting splashed all over international TV just seems completely antethetical to his known historical and career long liberalism and his obvious quest to be The Savior of the World (as Crafty notes, "the One"):
"A short, sharp air and naval campaign that hurls Iran back a generation, combined with a U.S. pullout from Iraq and Afghanistan, would leave Russia without its Iran card, and looking at an angry United States that has a very free hand."
I guess the only other explanation is there are some pro-Israeli hawks keeping the military option REALLY on the table and not just (as appears to me) nothing more than a simple bluff.
-
Usually I agree with Stratfor on most things, but I agree with you about the estrogen orientation of this President.
In fairness it must be said that
a) I don't sense our military chomping at the bit
b) Bush left us seriously overextended viz the Russians. For the strategy he was following IMHO it was really poor judgment to not expand our bandwith
OTOH maybe if candidate BO hadn't been such a vigorous advocate of running away from Iraq, and as President maybe if he hadn't demonstrated so much weakness and poor judgement, then maybe the Iranians, the Russians et al would be taking us more seriously.
-
Our economic problems also favor Russia. If they can manipulate things so oil prices rise it hurts us. It is in their intrests to weaken us. Our politicians are fools to think they can win Russian support in these circumstances.
-
Stratfor can be so good in their analysis and writing that it can be easy to forget that most conclusions are admittedly based on conjecture. Even within the responsible agencies and with all the security clearances, much intelligence is false and much of what is needed just doesn't exist. I think Strat is valuable so often just for asking the right questions even if their answer is just one opinion.
Maybe a military action (against Iranian nukes)would be a disaster or maybe a short, sharp air and naval campaign to set them back a generation is possible. From our point of view in the armchair, the strike now question is hypothetical - assuming that we can. But we don't know that.
With Osirak 1981, the Iraqis might not have known the Israelis could do that. With SDI, the enemy thought we could and the Americans thought we couldn't. Nuclear disarmament, forcible or negotiated is tricky business.
---
Freki, What you write about Russia is true. I would add that as an energy producer, Russia wants higher prices for oil regardless of how it affects us, and for the US as we choose to leave our energy in the ground and choose to pay enemies for energy - the price spikes that threaten our economy and our security are our own damn fault.
For China I think the situation is the opposite of Russia. They are highly dependent on the US economy, the dollar and the value of their already sunken investment.
-
I disagree Doug. China has us by the short and curlies. They couldn't build a military that could defeat ours for the amount of money they used to buy our debt. Now, they are using their financial leverage to bend us to their will. Unrestricted warfare, financial edition.
"The acme of skill is to defeat an enemy without fighting".
"He who understands himself and his opponent need not fear the outcome of a thousand battles"
Sun Tzu
-
Well not only did Arafat win the prize, the guy who was happy to see suicide bombers murder innocent travelers in ariplanes and was one of the original architects of what we now call terrorism look at who won the prize in 2005!
The one and only guy who now considers Israel's nukes to be the biggest threat to world peace!
What a joke.
So is Stardfor still thinking BO is going to bomb Iran?? They have got to be kidding. LOL the peace prize winner is going to bomb Iran's military installations. If he had any thoughts of doing so this about kills those thoughts.
Come to think of it perhaps the Russians, Chinese, or Iranians bribed those guys in Sweden.
http://nobelprizes.com/nobel/peace/peace.html
-
I corrected the wrong thread before - sorry.
eom
-
U.S.: Broadening the BMD Network
Stratfor Today » October 9, 2009 | 1347 GMT
CHOI WON-SUK/AFP/Getty Images
U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow in April 2008U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Alexander Vershbow said Ukraine has been added to the list of countries that could be included in the United States’ developing ballistic missile defense (BMD) network. The statement, given in an interview to Defense News magazine, which published Oct. 9, surprised the Russians for several reasons.
In and of itself, the Russians do not care much about the BMD program. Russia sees its long-term security guaranteed mostly by its nuclear deterrent. The U.S. BMD program in its current incarnation is expressly designed only to protect the United States from a handful of missiles from a rogue country such as Iran or North Korea; but the Russians fear that, with time and experience, the BMD program could grow into something more capable. And since Moscow, during the Cold War, was far from confident in its ability to counter American BMD (then called Star Wars), modern Russia — with fewer financial and technological resources — is doubly concerned.
But the more immediate Russian concern is not so much BMD, but Ukraine. Ukraine is integrated fully into the Russian industrial and agricultural heartland and is critical for the operation of the Russia’s transport and energy networks. Ukraine also happens to hold the populations and transport links that allow Russia to control the Caucasus, as well as lying within 300 miles of Moscow and Volgograd. With Ukraine, Russia can make a serious effort to become a major power again. Without Ukraine, it is feasible to start thinking about Russia’s (permanent) decline. Such thinking is precisely the sort of activity the Russians do not want anyone spending time on.
In fact, the Kremlin is on a bit of a roll, having recently managed to surge their influence into Germany, Azerbaijan, Turkey and even Poland. STRATFOR sees Russia’s influence growing with every passing day. In particular, Moscow believes it has Ukraine not simply locked down, but on the final path toward excising all elements of the 2004 pro-Western Orange Revolution.
So, Vershbow’s statement has really grabbed Russia’s attention. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov noted, “The statement by Alexander Vershbow was rather unexpected. In principle, he is a person who is prone to extravagancies. We would like to receive full clarification.”
Which brings us back to Vershbow himself: Former U.S. ambassador to both NATO and Russia, he knows the Russian mind as well as is possible for an American. In his new job at the Defense Department, his primary task is to try to keep Ukraine and Georgia — another sore spot with the Russians — independent.
At present, STRATFOR cannot confirm the core of Vershbow’s interview — whether Ukraine is a serious candidate for a BMD station. What we can say is that the Americans have been reaching for a means of not simply halting Russia’s rise, but eliciting Russian cooperation on containing the Iranian nuclear program. The first part of that is forcing Russia’s attention onto topics the Americans want to discuss.
“Extravagancies” or not, Vershbow is certainly a person who knows how to capture Russia’s attention.
-
Wait? I thought that the BMD system had been canceled due to budget. Is it back on the table as a negotiating point with the Russians?
-
Not quite. May I suggest rereading this thread? and perhaps the US Foreign Affairs thread?
-
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1219569/Revealed-Al-Qaeda-suspect-worked-UK-laboratory.html#
Fears Al Qaeda-linked scientist was planning nuclear attack on UK after MI5 learn he worked at top-secret British lab
By Jason Lewis and Peter Allen
Last updated at 9:36 AM on 11th October 2009
Raid scene: French police at the modest flat in Vienne where Adlene and Halim Hicheur were arrested on Thursday
A brilliant young nuclear scientist who was arrested in France last week over alleged links to Al Qaeda had worked for a top-secret British nuclear research centre.
Last night fears were growing that Dr Adlene Hicheur – who was a researcher for the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory in Oxfordshire for a year – could have been planning a nuclear attack in the UK.
The French government said yesterday that the arrest of Hicheur, 32, and his brother Dr Halim Hicheur, 25, could have averted a terrorist atrocity.
They were seized after an 18-month investigation by French anti-terrorist police hours before Adlene Hicheur was due to travel to the laboratory where he now works at, CERN, the European Organisation for Nuclear Research near Geneva.
Halim Hicheur carries out research at similar high-security scientific institutions around Europe.
The brothers’ council flat was stormed at 6am last Thursday by eight masked officers from the elite Central Directorate of Interior Intelligence (CDII), the French equivalent of MI5, and 20 armed riot officers.
With almost no noise, a spearhead unit rushed up the concrete steps leading to the cramped flat in Vienne, South-East France. A battering ram was used to break the lock and the warning ‘Armed police!’ shouted.
Large-calibre machine pistols and other weapons were aimed at those inside the flat, including the brothers’ parents and siblings.
Secret agents had been monitoring the brothers’ movements, and all their phone calls, text messages and emails were being bugged ‘in real time and minute by minute’, according to a security source.
‘It was like we were sitting on their shoulders. We knew exactly what they were saying.’
Mysteries of the universe: An aerial view of the Rutherford Appleton lab where Dr Hicheur worked
The source said that Adlene Hicheur had been ‘pinpointing nuclear targets’ but would not be more specific.
The scientists were being questioned last night at the maximum-security headquarters of the CDII on the outskirts of Paris while MI5 began trying to piece together their movements and contacts in Britain.
French Interior Minister Brice Hortefeux said both men posed such a serious threat that he had halted the long-running surveillance operation and ordered their ‘immediate’ arrest.
‘The investigation will reveal what were the objectives in France or elsewhere of these men,’ he said. ‘Maybe the inquiry will reveal that, thanks to these two arrests, the worst could have been avoided.’
Mr Hortefeux said the apparently mild-mannered, highly religious brothers were a ‘high-level threat’ who were suspected of ‘criminal activities related to a terrorist group’.
Last night, MI5 was understood to be examining their British links amid fears that they were plotting to launch a nuclear attack in the UK. A spokesman for the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory refused to release details about Adlene Hicheur’s time there.
Fears were growing that the men may have been in a position to smuggle nuclear material out of a secure lab for use in a ‘dirty bomb’ attack, or to plant explosives inside the sensitive facility.
According to European intelligence sources, MI5 had been warned that the suspects ‘are outstanding scientists who had been honing their techniques in nuclear fusion across the world.
‘There are genuine fears that they were locating terrorist targets, especially in countries like France and Britain. Their level of expertise in nuclear fusion was improving all the time, leading to the terrifying scenario of a terrorist nuclear attack.’
The arrests followed surveillance that had logged the French-Algerians’ ‘every word and every move’, including frequent visits to England.
The Mail on Sunday understands that MI5 and British police had begun their own investigation into the two men after the French provided a full breakdown of their visits to, and work in, the UK.
The police will want to question anyone who has worked with or studied alongside either man at Britain’s scientific research centres or universities.
The brothers first came to the attention of French anti-terrorist officers when their names cropped up in an investigation trying to identify French jihadists fighting Nato forces in Afghanistan.
The decision to arrest them followed the interception of internet exchanges with people identified as having links to terrorists in Algeria. The messages reportedly included information on potential targets in France and elsewhere in Europe.
The brothers’ British links included Adlene’s work for the Rutherford Appleton Laboratory, as well as research at university cities including London, Manchester, Durham, Edinburgh and St Andrews. They had also spent time studying at Ivy League universities in the US.
Adlene Hicheur is a former research fellow at the Rutherford Appleton and still visits the UK for conferences and other meetings. He and Halim are accused of compiling information about possible targets and sending it to contacts in North Africa involved with Al Qaeda Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).
The group is thought to have been behind a number of terror attacks in Algeria and has recently been linked to a call for vengeance against China for mistreatment of its Muslim minority during riots in July.
European intelligence sources said that Adlene Hicheur, who studied at Stanford University in California before moving to Oxfordshire, had expressed a ‘very strong wish to carry out attacks anywhere where Western security interests can be damaged’.
This included ‘countries like Britain and any others where Americans are well represented’, the source added, making it clear that neither brother had yet ‘carried out an attack nor put the material into place to do so’.
Adlene Hicheur is now working on analysis projects with CERN’s Large Hadron Collider. The nuclear research body said he ‘was not a full-time CERN employee’ and claimed ‘his work did not bring him into contact with anything that could be used for terrorism’.
But there is no doubt that his role would have made him useful to terrorists, especially those keen to develop a nuclear capability.
The Mail on Sunday has learned that Adlene Hicheur used to work at another atomic collider – the two-mile long Stanford Linear Accelerator (SLAC) at Stanford University in 2001.
‘Some people at the department were freaked out when they were told about the allegations against him,’ a source at the US Department of Energy said. ‘But there really is nothing to worry about because this lab conducts basic science.’
Unmarried Adlene Hicheur still lived with his elderly parents on the council estate in the working-class L’Isle district of Vienne.
‘The raid was a shock to all of us,’ said Veronique Reguillon, 48, who lives in the flat upstairs. ‘The police were in and out in a few minutes, with neither of the boys putting up any resistance.
Adlene is a quiet, studious type who never caused any trouble on the estate. He grew up here with his brother and three sisters. The family has had the same flat for 30 years.
‘His mum and dad are immigrants from Algeria and have worked hard all their lives. They are devout Muslims, with all the women in the family often wearing veils.
‘Adlene is a brilliant academic. Halim is like his brother – well-mannered, hard-working and studious. Their parents will be finding this very hard to take.’
Under French anti-terror laws, the brothers can be held for four days before being formally charged.
The antimatter bomb and the recipe for a Hollywood blockbuster
Chilling: Tom Hanks stars in the apocalyptic film Angels & Demons
The arrest of Al Qaeda suspect Dr Adlene Hicheur as he set off for his laboratory at CERN has chilling echoes of Hollywood thriller Angels & Demons, starring Tom Hanks as Professor Robert Langdon.
Based on the best-selling book by Da Vinci Code author Dan Brown, the blockbuster’s apocalyptic plot opens at CERN.
In Brown’s story, a flask containing highly dangerous antimatter is stolen from a secret physics laboratory by an underground brotherhood called The Illuminati and taken to Rome, where they plan to use it to destroy the Vatican.
If antimatter came into contact with matter, they would violently annihilate each other. But in reality, the amount needed to cause such a mighty occurrence, and the expense and difficulty of producing it, mean this proposition belongs firmly in the realms of fiction.
CERN does produce antimatter in its quest to unlock the secrets of the universe and observe the hypothetical Higgs Boson which scientists refer to as the ‘God Particle’ as it gives all matter mass.
The Large Hadron Collider, a 17-mile circular tunnel, tries to recreate conditions soon after the Big Bang 13.7billion years ago by blasting protons together at 99.99 per cent of the speed of light.
It took 20 years, 10,000 scientists, and £5billion to create, but the equipment failed soon after its launch in September last year. However, it should be operational next month.
-
"I thought that the BMD system had been canceled due to budget."
The Russians opposed missile defense sites in Czech and Poland. Obama wanted Russian cooperation on Iran. Obama canceled those sites, backstabbing our allies. Later Sec. of Defense Gates wrote that we have a much better missile defense plan in the works, unbeknown to the Czechs and Poles and likely to be again canceled later. Now Russia is allegedly upset about that and can still sabotage cooperation against Iran.
A government 2 trillion out of balance is not likely to feel constrained by a budget.
-
What??
I don't get it. No one has the cohonas to come out and say that military action is needed. Instead the talking heads all seem to take the politically correct road calling for harsher sanctions including billary. And of course we must get Russia on board. Now this from the billiary. If this does not prove that our negotiations with Russia are a total and complete failure and that Russia is playing us as are the Iranians than I don't know what does. A week ago the left in the MSM were estatic about trumpeting Obama's triumph at getting the Russians on board with sanctions. God, where is the outrage from the media at the ineptidude of this administrations policy with Iran??
How long does the US have to look like morons? Forget the goddamn Nobel Prize. Sometimes if one wants peace one has to fight for it.
Now that I have vented:
MOSCOW, October 13 (RIA Novosti) - U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said after talks with Russia's foreign minister on Tuesday that neither country is seeking to impose sanctions against Iran under the current circumstances.
Clinton said sanctions over Iran’s controversial uranium enrichment program would be premature, and that Russia was being “extremely cooperative in the work we have done together” on the issue.
Lavrov said Russia is “in principle very reserved on sanctions, as they rarely produce results.”
He said sanctions should only be used when all diplomatic means have been exhausted, and that “in the situation with Iran, this is far from the case.”
Lavrov also said the U.S. and Russia had identical positions on the issue.
“We are not asking anything of each other on Iran, because it would be ridiculous to make requests on an issue where our positions coincide,” he said.
However, Clinton said that sanctions over North Korea's nuclear program would remain in place.
"We have absolutely no intention of relaxing or offering to relax North Korean sanctions at this point whatsoever," she said.
Clinton will later meet with Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. Before her arrival in Russia as part of a European tour, Clinton had visited Switzerland, the U.K., and Ireland.
:x
-
Summary
Iran demanded Oct. 20 that France not participate in the talks on Tehran’s nuclear weapons program, claiming that Paris has not honored past agreements with the Islamic republic. The delay is just one of several that Iran has been storing up to use during the negotiations, but comes at a time when Western patience with Iranian obfuscation is wearing thin.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Page
The Iranian Nuclear Game
Negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program stalled yet again Oct. 20 in Vienna. This time, the Iranians have demanded that France, one of the parties attending the talks, now be barred because Paris has failed to honor past agreements with Tehran on delivering nuclear material. Though it comes as no surprise that the Iranians are delaying these talks again, such tactics are likely to come at a cost for Tehran this time around.
Tehran had agreed Oct. 1 to meet with France, Russia and the United States at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) headquarters in Vienna from Oct. 19 to Oct. 20 and work toward a compromise on Iran’s uranium enrichment needs.
The deal on the table going into these talks was for Iran to ship most, if not all, of its low-enriched fuel to Russia for further enrichment. From Russia, the additionally enriched fuel would be sent to France for conversion into metal fuel rods and medical isotopes and then shipped back to Tehran for either medical use or installment in a small research reactor in Tehran. The medical isotopes would provide Iran with more highly enriched fuel, but would not be in a volume or form that Iran could exploit easily for weapons use. According to this plan, the bulk of enriched fuel would essentially be taken out of Tehran’s hands, thus assuaging widespread fears that Iran would build up its stockpiles, continue to enrich and potentially achieve high levels of enrichment sufficient for use in a bomb within a year.
However, Tehran is now kicking France out of the talks, claiming that Paris has not fulfilled its commitment in delivering nuclear materials to Iran in the past. Tehran is referring to its 10 percent share in a Eurodif nuclear facility in France that has refrained from delivering enriched uranium to Iran. France, quite reasonably, has withheld the enriched uranium out of its desire to avoid an array of U.N. sanctions that bar countries and companies from trading any material, equipment or technology that could be diverted to an Iranian weapons program.
The complaint against France is part of a large volume of delaying tactics that the Iranians have held in reserve for these negotiations. Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Akbar Salehi, played good cop representing Iran on Oct. 1 in Geneva, where he struck a conciliatory tone and gave the P-5+1 group a glimmer of hope in the negotiations. Salehi then decided to stay home Oct. 19 and instead sent Ali Asghar Soltanieh, Iran’s ambassador to the IAEA, who was apparently playing bad cop in stunting the talks.
Iran is now refusing to send its enriched uranium abroad and insisting on continuing uranium enrichment at home. Moreover, Tehran is turning the original deal on its head, saying that even as Iran has the right to hold onto its low-enriched uranium, it also has the right to buy nuclear fuel (for “peaceful purposes”) from countries that have signed the Nonproliferation Treaty.
This is not exactly what the United States and its allies had in mind. Iran allegedly has about 1,400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium in its possession, and the P-5+1 was aiming to have at least 1,200 kilograms shipped abroad to get as much enriched uranium as possible out of Iran. Iran is believed to have been able to enrich its uranium only to about 5 percent — enough for civil nuclear power generation, but below the 20 percent needed to produce medical isotopes and well below the 80-90 percent required for use in a nuclear device.
The 1,400 kilograms of low-enriched uranium Iran is believed to have currently is theoretically more than enough raw material for the country to develop a nuclear device or two within a one-year time frame. However, that estimate assumes that Iran has enough technical centrifuge expertise –- and that is a big assumption -– to enrich its low-enriched uranium to the 80-90 percent threshold. It is no secret that Iran faces significant qualitative challenges in its centrifuge operations, but this is still not a risk that many countries — particularly, Israel — are willing to take. If Iran holds onto to its low-enriched uranium, it will be able to continue building stockpiles and furthering its work on centrifuge enrichment.
Iran evidently is feeling confident enough to blow off the nuclear talks for now, but it also will not be able to disregard Israel’s military maneuvers in the region. Operation Juniper Cobra — the largest-ever U.S.-Israeli biennial military exercise — is scheduled to kick off Oct. 21. The exercise, which will focus on joint ballistic missile defense capabilities, is a clear warning to Tehran that neither the Israelis nor the Americans are going to put their military preparations on hold while Iran performs its nuclear dance in Europe.
Israel will become more aggressive in demanding decisive action against Iran in the weeks ahead. The United States, meanwhile, is still struggling to keep a positive face while the diplomatic phase plays out with Iran. Rumors are circulating in Washington that a revised National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran’s nuclear program based on new intelligence gleaned from Iranian defectors will be put together and will reverse the judgment from the 2007 NIE that claimed Iran had halted its work on a nuclear weapons program as early as 2003. Though a reassessment is likely in order, politics in Washington currently dictate that the United States refrain from making any move that would provide Tehran with an excuse to walk away from the negotiating table. If, however, it appears as though Iran is walking anyway, the time may be approaching for the United States to ratchet things up again.
-
Iran Deal Would Slow Making of Nuclear Bombs Sign in to Recommend
by DAVID E. SANGER
Published: October 21, 2009
VIENNA — Iranian negotiators have agreed to a draft deal that would delay the country’s ability to build a nuclear weapon for about a year, buying more time for President Obama to search for a diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear standoff.
Under the tentative accord hammered out in international talks here, Iran agreed to ship about three-quarters of its known stockpile of nuclear fuel to Russia for conversion into a form it could use only in a peaceful nuclear reactor, participants in the negotiations said Wednesday. But the arrangement would still have to be approved by Friday in Tehran and Washington.
If Tehran’s divided leadership agrees to the accord, which Iran’s negotiators indicated was not assured, it will remove enough nuclear fuel from Iran to delay any work on a nuclear weapon until the country can replenish its stockpile of fuel, estimated to require about one year. As such, it would buy more time for Mr. Obama to try to negotiate a more comprehensive and more difficult agreement to end Iran’s production of new nuclear material.
Obama administration officials expressed cautious optimism that the agreement could increase the chances of striking a broader diplomatic accord and put off any decision about whether to address the Iranian nuclear threat by other means, including military action. In particular, the United States is seeking to convince Israel that negotiations have reduced the risk that Iran could throw out nuclear inspectors and quickly turn its reactor fuel into bomb fuel.
“There’s a part of this that’s about getting our diplomacy with Iran started, and a part that’s about convincing the Israelis that there’s no reason to drop hints that they are going to reach for a military solution,” one senior administration official said from Washington.
The Friday deadline for Iran to respond also poses a major test for its embattled leadership, one that is “intended to explore the proposition of whether Iran really wants to negotiate its way out of this problem,” in the words of one White House official.
“We want it to make it clear we’ve made bona fide offers to the Iranians,” the official said.
The agreement was conceived as a test of Iran’s intentions. Iran claims that it needs the uranium fuel it has produced — in violation of several United Nations Security Council resolutions — for peaceful purposes, citing, among other uses, the Tehran Research Reactor, which makes medical isotopes. Iran said it needed to further enrich 2,600 pounds of uranium, which amounts to three-quarters of its claimed stockpile of the fuel, for that purpose.
Under the draft agreement, Iran would ship that fuel to Russia for further enrichment, and Russia would return it to Iran in the form of metal fuel rods. Those could be used in a reactor but not a nuclear weapon. The deal would take away enough of Iran’s existing stockpile of uranium to make it difficult to produce a nuclear weapon until it has time to produce more raw fuel.
Some White House officials argue that the Bush administration, by refusing to talk to Iran, never forced its leadership to make such a choice. If Iran rejects the accord, administration officials believe, that could make it easier to get Security Council approval for harsher financial sanctions, a step that Russia and China have steadfastly resisted so far.
The same theory applies to Iran’s behavior on Sunday, when a team of atomic energy agency inspectors is to arrive for a first look at a newly revealed nuclear enrichment plant buried deep inside a mountain near the holy city of Qum. Inspectors have already asked Iran for far more than just a visit. They say they want engineering drawings, permission to interview scientists and others involved in planning the long-hidden nuclear site, and explanations about whether there are other hidden plants to feed the one at Qum with nuclear material. So far the Iranians have not responded.
Even if approved, the deal will represent only one small step toward resolving what has become one of the most complex foreign policy challenges facing Mr. Obama and the Middle East. Because Iran continues to produce nuclear fuel at a rapid clip, this accord would be only a temporary fix, though a symbolically important one.
American officials, including the head of the negotiating delegation here, Daniel B. Poneman, dodged reporters on Wednesday and declined to discuss the contents of the agreement drafted by the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Mohamed ElBaradei. He set the deadline of Friday for all sides “to give, I hope, affirmative action” to the accord, which he said was “a balanced agreement.”
Dr. ElBaradei, who is leaving his job at the end of next month, said he hoped that leaders in the West and in Tehran would “see the big picture” and approve the agreement. But his voice was tinged with doubt.
While the amount of uranium that would be exported is significant, a critical part of the agreement is the timing of the shipments. Mr. Poneman, the deputy secretary of energy, and other American officials have so far refused to discuss such issues.
“We are not going to get into the details,” said Mike Hammer, a spokesman for the National Security Council.
The energy agency’s experts said Iran would have too little fuel on hand to build a nuclear weapon for roughly a year after a shipment to Russia. But if the 2,600 pounds of fuel was shipped out of Iran in small batches instead of all at once, the experts warn, Iran would be able to replace it with new fuel almost as quickly as it leaves the country.
Also of concern is the possibility that Iran might have more nuclear fuel in its stockpile than it is letting on. The agency’s estimate that it has 3,500 pounds of low-enriched uranium “assumes that Iran has accurately declared how much fuel it possesses, and does not have a secret supply,” as one senior European diplomat put it on the sidelines of negotiations in Vienna.
Ultimately, Mr. Obama would have to get Iran to agree to give up the enrichment process as well. Otherwise, the fuel taken out of circulation in the draft accord would soon be replaced.
It was not immediately clear why a draft agreement could not be declared final. But it appeared that the Iranian delegation lacked that authority as it navigated an Iranian leadership that is clearly divided on the question of whether, and how quickly, to pursue the nuclear program.
-
One sign that an adversary isn't serious about negotiating is when it rejects even your concessions. That seemed to be the case yesterday when Iran gave signs it may turn down an offer from Russia, Europe and the U.S. to let Tehran enrich its uranium under foreign supervision outside the country. The mullahs so far won't take yes for an answer.
Tehran had previously looked set to accept the deal, which is hardly an obstacle to its nuclear program. A Democratic foreign policy shop called the National Security Network heralded the expected pact in a blast email this week as "Engagement Paying Dividends on Iran." But now Tehran may be holding out for even more concessions, as Iranian news reports suggest Iran wants to be able to buy more enriched uranium from a third country to use in a research reactor for medical use—as opposed to shipping its uranium to Russia for a roundtrip.
This may merely be the equivalent of last-minute haggling over the price of a Persian carpet, because the West's enrichment offer is already a good one for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Iran would give up one bomb's worth—about 2,600 pounds—of uranium enriched at its facility in Natanz to the low level of 3.5%. Russia would then enrich the uranium further to 19.75% and someone, most likely France, would put the uranium into fuel rods for transfer back to Iran for ostensible use in a civilian nuclear reactor. Western officials say this would delay Iran's efforts to get a bomb.
d
.There are a couple problems with this theory. With the exception of the regime, no one knows for sure how much uranium Iran possesses. Given Iran's long history of lying to the world and the discovery of covert enrichment facilities (most recently in Qom) that need uranium from somewhere, a fair guess would be that Iran has more than the 3,500 pounds it has declared to U.N. inspectors.
Meanwhile, Iran insists it won't stop enriching uranium on its own, in violation of Security Council resolutions. Aside from rewarding Iran for past misbehavior by letting it use illegally enriched uranium, this deal fails to solve the problem it is intended to solve. That's because as long as the Natanz facility continues to enrich uranium at its current rate of about 132 pounds a month, Iran will produce enough low-enriched uranium within the year for a bomb. Make Natanz more efficient and the time could be cut in half.
Claims by Western officials that Iran can't convert the uranium enriched abroad for military use are less than reassuring. Though encased in a fuel rod in France, the more highly-enriched uranium returned to Iran would be simple to extract, using something as basic as a tin snipper to force open the fuel cladding, and enrich further.
"With 19.75 enriched feed"—as opposed to the 3.5% that Iran now manages—"the level of effort or time Iran would need to make weapons grade uranium would drop very significantly," from roughly five months today "down to something slightly less than four weeks," says Henry Sokolski of the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center.
Iran may also welcome the Russian-enriched uranium because its own technology is less advanced. The October 8 edition of the trade journal Nucleonics Week reports that Iran's low-enriched uranium appears to have "impurities" that "could cause centrifuges to fail" if Iran itself tried to enrich uranium to weapons-grade—which would mean above 20% and ideally up to 90%. In this scenario, the West would be decontaminating the uranium for Iran. Along the way, Iranian scientists may also pick up clues on how to do better themselves.
The mullahs know that President Obama is eager to show diplomatic gains from his engagement strategy, and they are going to exploit that eagerness to get every possible concession. The one thing Iran has shown no desire to bargain over is its intention to become a nuclear power.
-
THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN THE IRAN SITUATION
THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT SEEMS TO HAVE REJECTED the deal on nuclear material that
appeared to be in place after the meeting with the P-5+1 countries. The deal, which
centered on Iran's willingness to send its nuclear material to another country for
processing into peaceful nuclear material, was not rejected in any irrevocable
sense. A senior lawmaker in Iran indicated on Sunday that it might still be on the
table, and Iranian media discussed possible further negotiations. Iran is known for
creating ambiguity as a bargaining tool, but officials could be seeking to gain time
rather than bargaining -- though it is less than clear to what end.
The rejection comes in conjunction with a report that Iran has experimented with
two-point implosion -- a warhead configuration that is relatively simple, but
several steps beyond first-generation nuclear devices. If true, it would mean that
Iran might be closer to a weapon than previously thought (though the principal
hurdle is still enriching uranium to sufficient purity for use in a weapon, and that
ability remains questionable). Reports suggest that the United States, and perhaps
other members of the P-5+1, has been aware of this development for some time.
"Understanding Iran’s current thinking is becoming increasingly difficult."
The experiment was discovered by inspectors from the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which means that the Iranians wanted them to discover it. Western
sources have said that the method used was a highly classified process and expressed
surprise that the Iranians would know how to do it. Clearly, the Iranians want to
show they are further along than previously thought. In that case, they should be
buying time -- but not letting the IAEA see papers. Understanding Iran’s current
thinking is becoming increasingly difficult.
Certainly the rejection of a deal and the revelation of the experiment have
ratcheted up tensions. The Russians responded, somewhat surprisingly, with a
statement from President Dmitri Medvedev that while Moscow does not want to see
sanctions imposed on Iran, "if there is no movement forward, no one is excluding
such a scenario." This is not so much a change in Russia’s position as a willingness
to increase the pressure on Tehran just days before Medvedev goes into talks with
U.S. President Barack Obama. The Iranians appeared to respond to Medvedev when
Alaeddin Boroujerdi, head of the parliament's foreign policy and national security
committee, demanded that the Russians fulfill promises and deliver the S-300
strategic air defense system, saying: "Avoiding delivery of S-300 defense system to
Iran, if that is Russia's official stance, would be a new chapter in breaking
promises by the Russians." The timing is obvious. The question is whether the
Iranians are referring only to the S-300 when they speak of broken Russian promises.
In the midst of these developments, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is
traveling to the United States to address a Jewish meeting and meet with Obama. An
administration official confirmed that Obama and Netanyahu would meet but did not
say what would be on their agenda.
Initially, the Americans refused to commit to a meeting, though the Israelis openly
said they would like one. Given tensions between the Israelis and Palestinians, the
thinking goes, the president would rather not meet with Netanyahu at the moment. Of
course, every meeting between U.S. and Israeli leaders takes place amid
Israeli-Palestinian tensions. More likely, in our minds, Obama did not want to have
to discuss the Iran question with Netanyahu. Indications are that Obama will make
and announce his position on Afghanistan this week or shortly thereafter. He wants
to announce it, we would guess, after the health care debate is finished, as he
doesn't want any political blowback on Afghanistan to undermine his flagship
domestic issue. The likely reason for the Americans' initial hesitance is that Obama
would not want to get involved with Iran just yet if he is announcing an Afghanistan
policy. He seems to be favoring a sequential approach -- in public at least.
The Iranians obviously see room for maneuvering. They have rejected the nuclear
agreement, but have not ruled out the possibility of a change in policy. They have
signaled an increased threat of weaponization, but with sufficient ambiguity to back
away from it. Russia has given something the Americans wanted, but not in any
absolute way. The Iranians responded by charging the Russians with betrayal, but not
from a member of the government -- and not in general, but specifically on the
S-300. The United States is holding its position that its patience is not endless,
without signaling the end of its patience. And the Israelis are hovering on the
sidelines, waiting.
Obama so far has kept Iran from becoming a major story. Health care and Afghanistan
have absorbed the media's attention. Thus, Obama has bought domestic space. But the
Iranians clearly will not deal without a major crisis first, and even then their
position is not clear. The Russians have not committed to anything but have made a
gesture. And the new technology Iran showed the IAEA is non-trivial. At some point
the Iran issue will become a top story, and Obama will have to take action. We
expect that to happen sooner rather than later.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
-
Obama won't act. Iran knows this. Why give up anything?
-
OURTING RUSSIA ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE?
MONDAY MARKED THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FALL of the Berlin Wall, the beginning of
the collapse of the Soviet empire. The day holds mixed feelings for Russia, although
Russian President Dmitri Medvedev was in Berlin to celebrate the anniversary. Russia
has come a long way since Nov. 9, 1989. After the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia fell into utter chaos for nearly a decade and has spent the second decade
since pulling itself back together politically, economically, and socially, and also
launching itself back onto the international stage.
One of the themes that Medvedev repeated while giving a series of interviews in
Germany was on Russia's current place within the international system -- as a
partner to European states, a counterbalance to the United States and as a mediator
within the Iranian situation.
It is this theme as mediator within the Iran negotiations that has really struck a
chord with STRATFOR, especially as so many twists in those negotiations have
occurred within the past few days -- all this leading to the question of whether
Russia is about to shift its international role within the Iran talks.
The past few days have been particularly busy for the players involved in the Iran
issue. Over the weekend, there were leaks from an International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) report stating that Iran had been experimenting with two-point implosion -- a
warhead configuration -- followed by Iran's rejection of an IAEA proposal to ship
Iran's nuclear material out of the country for enrichment, a deal that was said to
be in place after a meeting with the P-5+1 countries. Also on Monday, Iran announced
that the three hikers from the United States arrested on the Iraqi border with Iran
would be charged with espionage. With each of these issues, Iran was not only
dragging out negotiations with the West, but also raising the stakes.
"In the past, Russia has only been willing to give up its support for Iran if the
United States made large concessions, like its relationship within Russia's entire
sphere of influence -- a price Washington has not been willing to pay."
It would have been expected that Washington would come out with a new ultimatum to
Tehran, but instead announced that it was giving Iran more time to consider the
nuclear proposals. The announcement was as if the United States slammed on its
brakes on the Iran issue.
Even more baffling was that this announcement was made while Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu and Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak were in Washington to
meet with U.S. President Barack Obama and a string of security officials. The
Israelis have been relatively quiet on the Iranian nuclear issue while in
Washington, with Netanyahu saying that the international community needs to unite
against Iran, but not specifically responding to what seemed like the United States
giving Iran a free pass excusing its weekend antics.
This has led STRATFOR to question what Washington is telling the Israelis on what
the U.S. will be planning while giving Iran "more time." Other than the United
States also having its own motivations to drag out negotiations like the Iranians,
there are two options that come to mind: first would be that the United States is
planning a military intervention. The United States would not try to give many hints
if they were planning a surprise military strike, but would act as if it were still
interested in the negotiation process.
But Washington could be attempting a different option: to get Moscow to reverse its
support for Tehran.
Russia has traditionally been staunchly against sanctions on Iran. But in the last
few weeks, Moscow suddenly grew quiet. During this time, U.S., U.K. and French
officials have visited Russia to discuss the Iran issue. Moreover, STRATFOR sources
in Moscow have stated that the West has been much more vocal in the possibilities of
Western investment and cash going back into Russia, should Moscow want to be
partners with the West.
These incentives from the West have certainly given Russia something to think about.
In the past, Russia has only been willing to give up its support for Iran if the
United States made large concessions, like its relationship within Russia's entire
sphere of influence -- a price Washington has not been willing to pay. However, now
Russia may be willing to concede for a partial recognition within the sphere and the
Western cash into Russia.
Medvedev has already shown that he is open to this line of negotiations, saying that
he and Obama will be discussing Russia's economic issues as well as Iran when they
meet on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Forum this weekend in Singapore.
Now the devil will be in the details. Russia has been picky in the past in accepting
U.S. incentives, but this time there is the possibility that Russia may now be up
for purchase.
Copyright 2009 Stratfor.
-
At this point in the game, getting Russia's support on Iran isn't worth a bucket of warm spit. Obama selling out our allies in exchange for it is beyond stupid, but far from unexpected.
-
Obama can't act, the Military is too tied down with other stuff and Iran is too big. Besides, I think Iran is going to be very busy with this problem real soon:
http://www.ars.usda.gov/Ug99/ (http://www.ars.usda.gov/Ug99/)
Some text from the PDF you can download.
In 1999 however, high severities of stem rust were observed in Kenya on previously stem rust
resistant wheat lines. This new race, labeled “Pgt-Ug99”, was subsequently shown to attack
the stem rust resistance genes Sr31 and Sr38, which were previously effective resistance genes.
Since then, similar virulences have been confirmed in Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, and Iran,
indicating that this new race, or its derivatives, has spread within North Africa and into the
Middle East. Should the spatial and temporal spread of these new races follow the same
pathway as races of stripe rust caused by Puccinia striiformis, that had arisen in eastern Africa
in the 1980s and eventually moved to North America, then the new Pgt races are expected
move to the Middle East, West Africa, and South Asia within a period of approximately 10
years if not sooner. There also exists the possibility that these races may be introduced into
new areas, including North America via intentional or unintentional human-mediated activities.
For those who can't read Bureaucrat: Uganda had a breakout of Stem Rust and old crop disease that was under control since There were special bred strains of wheat that WERE immune. Not anymore, the last outbreak of this stuff was here in the US/Canada in 1950. The disease turned up in Yemen in 2006. The regular winds from Yemen can easily carry spores across the Arabian Gulf into Iran................
I realize this is kind of Hijacking the thread, but figured that is was germane to some extent since N. Korea has successfully extorted aid by playing the Nuke Card, maybe Iran thinks it can do the same?
-
Relevant stuff, but lets continue it in the Iran thread please.
-
Russia has always followed its interests in the building of the Iranian Bushehr power plant and it will never complete the project, said a parliamentary spokesman, DPA reported Nov. 16. Moscow has used the project as a tool in its dealings with the West, and Tehran will have to complete the plant itself, he said.
-
The Russian Pivot in the Iranian Nuclear Issue
FROM A CRITICAL MEETING between U.S. President Barack Obama and his Russian counterpart, Dmitri Medvedev, to an escalating proxy battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the Saudi-Yemeni border, this was a loaded weekend by STRATFOR’s geopolitical standards.
We’ll begin with the pivot of this story: U.S.-Russian relations. Obama and Medvedev sat down in Singapore for their fourth one-on-one meeting, seeking an understanding on issues deemed vital to their national security interests. The Russians, in a nutshell, want the Americans to keep out of the former Soviet periphery, which Moscow sees as its proper sphere of influence. But Moscow now has an additional favor to ask of the West.
Fundamental shifts are taking place in the Kremlin that have revealed Russia’s desire for Western investment in strategic economic sectors. A number of European and U.S. investors eagerly await Washington’s cue to re-enter the Russian market, but Washington first has to determine the geopolitical price Russia is willing to pay for this investment.
“There are a lot of moving parts to this conflict, but all appear to pivot on what actually transpires between the United States and Russia.”
A big portion of the cost will be tied to Iran. If the United States can coax Russia into abandoning support for Tehran, the Obama administration will gain valuable room to maneuver with the Israelis, and the door will open for a wider understanding between Moscow and Washington. Of course, any potential U.S.-Russia understanding will be loaded with sticking points. Medvedev has hinted at possible cooperation against Iran — saying Russia was open to exploring stronger options in dealing with Tehran, including further sanctions. But there is still much more to be discussed, and we see no clear sign that Russia is willing to fundamentally shift its position on Iran just yet.
Still, Iran has plenty to be worried about. Tehran and Moscow are perfectly capable of having a constructive relationship so long as they both face a greater threat (in this case, the United States). Should Russia and the United States come to terms, however, the strategic underpinnings of the Russian-Iranian alliance would collapse and Iran’s vulnerability would soar. With Iran’s anxiety over a Russian betrayal rising, high-level officials in Tehran are adopting a more aggressive tone against Russia.
For instance, the Joint Armed Forces chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Hassan Firouzabadi, Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi and the head of the parliament’s Foreign Policy and National Security Commission, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, have lambasted Russia in the past week for failing to supply Iran with the promised S-300 strategic air defense system. Boroujerdi even issued a veiled threat against Russia when he said, “Iran is not a country which would stop short of action in dealing with countries who fail to deliver on their promises.” It remains unclear to us what Iran actually could do to legitimately threaten Russian security and to sabotage a potential U.S.-Russian understanding, but the shift in tone is unmistakable.
Meanwhile, the Iranians hope to distract U.S. attention from Russia with a proxy war in the border region between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is exploiting an internal Yemeni conflict by supporting Shiite al-Houthi rebels, seeking to undermine neighboring Saudi Arabia’s security. In a sign that Iran is attempting to escalate tensions with the United States, Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani on Sunday accused Washington of supporting Saudi air strikes targeting the al-Houthi rebels. But Washington is taking great care to avoid acknowledging its role in this proxy battle (a role that so far involves advising the Saudi and Yemeni militaries and supplying satellite imagery of al-Houthi targets for air strikes). The Obama administration would prefer to avoid getting drawn into a crisis with Iran and would rather give the impression that the nuclear negotiations with Tehran are continuing, while it tries to reach a compromise with Russia.
The Israelis don’t appear to be completely on board with this U.S. plan. On the one hand, Israel has a common strategic interest with the United States in keeping as much distance as possible between Russia and Iran. On the other hand, Israel doesn’t want a U.S.-Russian understanding on Iran to defuse the nuclear crisis so long as Israel’s national security is not genuinely preserved. If Washington manages to secure Russian cooperation against Iran, the Obama administration would gain time and space to talk Israel down from taking more aggressive action against Iran. Israel is operating on a different timeline: It wants to lock Washington into a situation that requires more decisive U.S. action against Iran, whether that means stringent sanctions or potential military strikes.
A report by Israel Radio this weekend appears to support this hypothesis. The report quoted an unnamed Western official as saying that Iran has completely rejected a U.N.-brokered nuclear proposal, but that Obama has postponed an official announcement on the failure of the talks for internal political reasons. To the contrary, Iran has been playing a careful game with the nuclear proposal — protesting the offer publicly but also hinting at the regime’s acceptance of the deal — in order to add confusion to the negotiations and drag out the talks. Neither the United States nor Iran has confirmed or denied the Israel Radio report, which leads us to believe this is Israel’s way of trying to wrap up (what the Israelis view as) the aimless diplomatic phase of the negotiations and push the United States into more aggressive action against Iran.
There are a lot of moving parts to this conflict, but all appear to pivot on what actually transpires between the United States and Russia. The Obama-Medvedev meeting revealed a change in atmospherics toward Iran, but we — like the Iranians — are watching for signs of a real shift in Russian policy.
-
second post
Inspectors Fear Iran Is Hiding Nuclear Plants
DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD
Published: November 16, 2009
WASHINGTON — International inspectors who gained access to Iran’s newly revealed underground nuclear enrichment plant voiced strong suspicions in a report on Monday that the country was concealing other atomic facilities.
In a September 2007 photo, antiaircraft guns are seen, left center, at Iran's main plant for nuclear enrichment in Natanz.
The report was the first independent account of what was contained in the once secret plant, tunneled into the side of a mountain, and came as the Obama administration was expressing growing impatience with Iran’s slow response in nuclear negotiations.
In unusually tough language, the International Atomic Energy Agency appeared highly skeptical that Iran would have built the enrichment plant without also constructing a variety of other facilities that would give it an alternative way to produce nuclear fuel if its main centers were bombed. So far, Iran has denied that it built other hidden sites in addition to the one deep underground on a military base about 12 miles north of the holy city of Qum. The inspectors were given access to the plant late last month and reported that they had found it in “an advanced state” of construction, but that no centrifuges — the fast-spinning machines needed to make nuclear fuel — had yet been installed.
The inspectors said Iran had “provided access to all areas of the facility” and planned to complete it by 2011. They also said they had been unable to interview its director and designers.
The inspectors confirmed American and European intelligence reports that the site had been built to house about 3,000 centrifuges, enough to produce enough material for one or two nuclear weapons a year. But that is too small to be useful in the production of fuel for civilian nuclear power, which is what Iran insists is the intended purpose of the site.
The plant’s existence was revealed in September, as many as seven years after construction had begun.
The report comes just two days after President Obama, on a trip to Asia, said “we are running out of time” for Iran to sign on to a deal to ship part of its nuclear fuel out of the country. He said he would begin to plan for far more stringent economic sanctions against Tehran.
He was joined during that announcement by President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia, but Mr. Medvedev was vague about whether Russia was prepared to join in those sanctions. Mr. Obama was expected to take up the issue on Tuesday with President Hu Jintao of China, where Mr. Obama is on a state visit. China, like Russia, has historically resisted sanctions on Iran.
In its report, the agency said that Iran’s belated “declaration of the new facility reduces the level of confidence in the absence of other nuclear facilities under construction, and gives rise to questions about whether there were any other nuclear facilities in Iran which had not been declared to the agency.”
Ian C. Kelly, a spokesman for the State Department, said the report “underscores that Iran still refuses to comply fully with its international nuclear obligations.”
Both International Atomic Energy Agency officials and American and European diplomats and nuclear experts have argued that the existence of the hidden facility at Qum would make little sense unless there was a network of related covert facilities to feed it with raw nuclear fuel.
Iran denied that it had any other facilities it had failed to report to the agency. But in a letter to the nuclear inspectors, parts of which the report quoted, Iranian officials said they had been motivated to build the underground plant by “the threats of military attacks against Iran,” a reference to the belief that Israel, the United States or other Western powers might take military action against its main uranium enrichment plant at Natanz.
“The Natanz enrichment plant was among the targets threatened with military attacks,” the Iranian letter, dated Oct. 28, argued. It said that, as a result, Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization went to a little-known military authority identified as the “Passive Defense Organization” and asked for a “contingency enrichment plant.”
The mountainous site was turned over to the nuclear authorities, they said, “in the second half of 2007,” or roughly two years before Iran made its existence known. The Obama administration has said that Iran made the news public only after it had determined that the secrecy around the facility was pierced.
The date of late 2007 is significant because earlier that year Iran had unilaterally renounced an agreement it had signed with the agency to report on any planned nuclear facilities. The agency says that, in the case of Qum, Iran has violated that agreement, which the agency contends is still in force.
In fact, it appears that the construction of the underground plant began years earlier, and the inspectors’ report noted that satellite imagery shows that tunneling work began “between 2002 and 2004,” or shortly after the revelations about the existence of Natanz, which was also built underground. That construction paused in 2004, after the Iraq war began, the report indicated, but was “resumed in 2006.”
Why Iran then resumed the construction work is unclear. But in 2006, the Bush administration indicated a greater willingness to negotiate with Iran if it first complied with three United Nations Security Council resolutions to halt enrichment activity at Natanz. Iran refused, and Monday’s report indicated it now produced about 3,900 pounds of low-enriched uranium, enough for one to two weapons if it was further enriched.
Iran does not appear to be producing fuel as quickly as it could, and there are reports that it has run into technical difficulties.
But the fact that it is continuing to add to its stockpile has, in the words of one Obama administration official, “made us increasingly less interested” in the deal to ship part of Iran’s fuel out of the country temporarily, for processing into a form that could be used in a medical reactor in Tehran. The more uranium Iran produces, the official said, the less time it would take the country to replenish enough of its supplies to build a weapon, if it decided to take that step.
Because Iran continued to produce fuel despite the United Nations resolutions, President George W. Bush also authorized a covert program, focused on the Natanz site, that was intended to disrupt its enrichment activity, by attacking both the computer and electrical infrastructure around the plant.
It is not clear that any of those actions have proven successful. But the construction of an alternative plant, protected by the adjacent Iranian Revolutionary Guards base, appeared to some Western nuclear experts to constitute an Iranian effort to have a backup plan in case it lost use of the Natanz facility.
David E. Sanger reported from Washington, and William J. Broad from New York.
-
Well Iran will be more of a problem to Russia and China with those nukes. Unless Iran starts selling devices on the black market...... Then Everyone would have a problem.
-
Iran war games to defend nuclear sites.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8372985.stm
Iran has begun five days of war games to simulate attacks on its nuclear sites, state media report.
The head of Iran's air defence said the aim was to thwart aerial reconnaissance of the sites as well as air attacks.
Brigadier General Ahmad Mighani said the training would also improve cooperation among different units.
Iran has come under mounting pressure over its nuclear programme, which critics say is intended to produce nuclear weapons.
The US and Israel have not ruled out the prospect of a military attack to prevent Iran developing a nuclear weapon.
Tehran insists its programme is peaceful, and an aide to supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reportedly warned Iran would retaliate to any attack with a missile strike on Tel Aviv.
"If the enemy attacks Iran, our missiles will strike Tel Aviv," Mojhtaba Zolnoor was quoted as saying by the official Irna news agency.
Further guarantees
Brig Mighani told state media the aim of the exercises, which will cover an area of 600,000 sq km (230,000 sq miles), was "to display Iran's combat readiness and military potentials.
Iran insists that all its nuclear facilities are for energy, not military purposes
Bushehr: Nuclear power plant
Isfahan: Uranium conversion plant
Natanz: Uranium enrichment plant, 4,592 working centrifuges, with 3,716 more installed
Second enrichment plant: Existence revealed to IAEA in Sept 2009. Separate reports say it is near Qom, and not yet operational
Arak: Heavy water plant
Key nuclear sites in detail
A high-stakes game
Q&A: Iran and the nuclear issue
"Due to the threats against our nuclear facilities it is our duty to defend out nation's vital facilities," he said.
The exercises come as the UN Security Council's permanent members - Britain, China, France, Russia and the United States - plus Germany, urge Tehran to reconsider its rejection of a deal that would see some of its nuclear material being enriched outside Iran and returned as fuel rods.
The deal - brokered by the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency - envisages Iran sending about 70% of its low-enriched uranium to Russia and France, where it would be processed into fuel rods for a research reactor in Tehran.
Such a process would prevent Iran enriching uranium to the degree necessary to make a bomb, the UN says.
Iran has rejected a key part of the deal, seeking further guarantees.
The UN Security Council has called on Iran to stop uranium enrichment and has approved three rounds of sanctions - covering trade in nuclear material, as well as financial and travel restrictions.
-
I believe it was during an interview of John Bolton where it was pointed out that the Iranians have ordered and paid for anti-aircraft weapons from Russia.
It is my opinion they have absolutely no choice but to go all out to destroy to the best of their ability the Iranian nuc sites before Iran gets these weapons.
Keep an eye out for this and sell all your stock if we hear these weapons are being delivered in my opinion.
-
The Russians have been yanking the Iranians' chain, and ours, on this point for several years now.
-
"The Russians have been yanking the Iranians' chain, and ours, on this point for several years now."
I didn't realize this.
But where is the Russian's end game with this?
-
To get us to concede East Europe to its sphere again, and to control the gas supplies of Central Asia (the Georgia issue can be seen in this context).
===================
Summary
The P-5+1 group meeting in Brussels expectedly ended in stalemate while Iran hosted the Turkish foreign minister in Tabriz Nov. 20. While Iran continues to delay talks and Turkey and Russia exploit the nuclear negotiations for their own gain, Israel is laying the groundwork for more aggressive action against Iran.
Analysis
Deputy foreign ministers and their equivalents from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and China — otherwise known as the P-5+1 group — met Nov. 20 in Brussels to discuss Iran. So far, the only statement following the meeting was a joint expression of “disappointment” in Iran’s lack of response to a proposal to ship roughly 75 percent of Iran’s low-enriched uranium (LEU) abroad for further enrichment. The P-5+1 members once again called on Iran to reconsider the proposal and engage in serious negotiations. They planned to reconvene in December around Christmas.
The rather lackluster response after the meeting is not surprising. First, deputy foreign ministers typically do not have the authority to seriously weigh in on an issue of this magnitude. More importantly, the members of the P-5+1 group are in no real hurry to act. The Europeans are in no rush to participate in the U.S. Congress’s sanctions regime on Iran’s gasoline trade, the Chinese have no incentive to revise their trade relations while the others are delaying, the Russians are still working on several crucial sticking points in negotiations with the United States and the United States is trying to buy enough time to deal with Russia in order to stave off an Iran crisis. Sanctions apparently were not discussed in any meaningful detail at the meeting and, perhaps in recognition of the fact that Iran does not respond well to deadlines, no new deadlines or punitive measures were announced. As a result, the meeting in Brussels was another opportunity for bureaucrats to negotiate about further negotiations, with no real policy shifts to report.
While the P-5+1 members discussed their disappointment in Iran, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad hosted Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu in Tabriz, Iran. Notably, the Iranians requested this meeting when Iranian Vice President Mohammad Reza Rahimi met with Davutoglu at Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s inauguration in Kabul on Nov. 19. The meeting was designed to discuss the Iranian nuclear negotiations and timed to coincide with the P-5+1 meeting. Turkey, a regional power on the rise with plans to consolidate influence in the Middle East and demonstrate its utility to the West, has offered to store Iran’s enriched fuel on Turkish territory, thereby assuaging Western concerns that Iran’s LEU will be diverted toward a weapons program.
Iran is as unenthused about giving the Turks control of its LEU as it was about French and Russian offers to ship the LEU abroad. Though such proposals help Iran to stretch out the negotiations and appear cooperative when it wants to, the Iranian government is unlikely to concede on its demand to enrich and store uranium on its own soil. Iran’s latest delay tactic is to insist on the United States unfreezing Iranian assets to allow the negotiations to move forward — a point that Washington does not believe is even up for discussion unless Iran begins cooperating in the negotiations.
Turkey, meanwhile, has made several public moves to alienate Israel and prolong nuclear negotiations with the West and thus build Iran’s trust in Ankara, but Iran still has deep misgivings about Turkey’s intentions. Turkey and Iran are regional competitors, and Turkey is well in the lead. Though Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party is saying all the right things to hold Tehran’s interest, Iran cannot be confident that Turkey will be able or willing to block Israeli and/or U.S. military action against Iran.
Israel is the main player to watch. The Israeli government never believed these negotiations would elicit real Iranian cooperation and does not trust the Turks to mediate the dispute. Israel already has ruled out any further Turkish mediation in its negotiations with Syria, preferring instead to have France and Saudi Arabia facilitate the talks. The more Iran toys with the Turkish proposal to store its enriched uranium, the more the Israelis can protest to the United States behind the scenes that the negotiations will not lead to constructive results, and more aggressive action is needed. The Israelis have thus been busy running their own diplomatic course apart from the P-5+1 group. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in Paris on Nov. 11 to meet with French President Nicolas Sarkozy and will be meeting with German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle in Israel on Nov. 23-25. It remains to be seen just how effective Israel will be in encouraging these key European members to scale back their trade relations with Iran and support sanctions.
Iran’s management of the nuclear negotiations in the weeks ahead will rely heavily on what, if anything, transpires between Russia and the United States. As evidenced by Iran’s daily diatribes against Russia for stalling on the construction of the Bushehr nuclear facility and on the sale of the S-300 strategic air defense system, a major debate is under way in Tehran over the risks Ahmadinejad’s administration has incurred in relying so heavily on Russia for external support. Should Russia and the United States come to a strategic understanding, Iran would have the most to lose. Iran’s paranoia over Russia reached an unprecedented level Nov. 20 when Iranian Parliamentary Energy Commission Chairman Hamid Reza Katouzian threatened to sue the Russian agencies responsible for delaying Bushehr in an international court, depending on the results of a parliamentary investigation into the reasons behind the delay. Though the chief of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi continues citing technical reasons for the delay, there is no doubt in Iran’s, Russia’s or anyone else’s mind that the reasons are political.
-
To get us to concede East Europe to its sphere again, and to control the gas supplies of Central Asia (the Georgia issue can be seen in this context).
===================
Exactly.
-
Any signficance to the IAEA finally admitting that Iran is going for nukes?
Any significance to the Russians and, for the first time, the Chinese signing a resolution against the Iranian nuke program?
-
Any signficance to the IAEA finally admitting that Iran is going for nukes?
**No. They kept anyone in the west from acting back when something less that military action might have worked. Mission accomplished.**
Any significance to the Russians and, for the first time, the Chinese signing a resolution against the Iranian nuke program?
**About as useful as a resolution to rearrainge the deckchairs on the Titanic.**
-
Stratfor had a recent piece about how a) sanctions don't work, and that therefore b) their function is to avoid acting.
This certainly makes sense. OTOH, if we get Russia and China on board it does seem that sanctions (e.g. refined petroleum products) could generate substantial leverage.
-
China will do nothing to increase it's energy costs. Iran shutting down the Persian Gulf's oil exports would jack up the price for Russia's oil exports. Obama has already sold out Poland and the others in eastern europe in exchange for ill defined promises from Russia. Russia has already achieved it's goals in this matter.
-
By George Friedman
The Iranian government has rejected, at least for the moment, a proposal from the P-5+1 to ship the majority of its low-enriched uranium abroad for further enrichment. The group is now considering the next step in the roadmap that it laid out last April. The next step was a new round of sanctions, this time meant to be crippling. The only crippling sanction available is to cut off the supply of gasoline, since Iran imports 35 percent of its refined gasoline products. That would theoretically cripple the Iranian economy and compel the Iranians to comply with U.S. demands over the nuclear issue.
We have written extensively on the ability of sanctions to work in Iran. There is, however, a broader question, which is the general utility of sanctions in international affairs. The Iranian government said last week that sanctions don’t concern it because, historically, sanctions have not succeeded. This partly explains Iranian intransigence: The Iranians don’t feel they have anything to fear from sanctions. The question is whether the Iranian view is correct and why they would believe it — and if they are correct, why the P-5+1 would even consider imposing sanctions.
The Assumptions of Sanctions
We need to begin with a definition of sanctions. In general, sanctions are some sort of penalty imposed on a country designed to cause it sufficient pain to elicit a change in its behavior. Sanctions are intended as an alternative to war and therefore exclude violence. Thus, the entire point of sanctions, as opposed to war, is to compel changes of behavior in countries without resorting to force.
Normal sanctions are economic and come in three basic forms. First, there is seizing or freezing the assets of a country or its citizens located in another country. Second, sanctions can block the shipment of goods (or movement of people) out of the target country. Third, sanctions can block the movement of goods into a country. Minor sanctions are possible, such as placing tariffs on products imported from the target country, but those sorts of acts are focused primarily on rectifying economic imbalances and are not always driven by political interests. Thus, the United States placed tariffs on Chinese tires coming into the United States. The purpose was to get China to change its economic policies. On the other hand, placing sanctions on Iraq in the 1990s or on Sudan today are designed to achieve political and military outcomes.
It is important to consider the underlying assumptions of the decision to impose sanctions. First, there is the assumption that the target country is economically dependent in some way on the country or countries issuing the sanctions. Second, it assumes that the target country has no alternative sources for the economic activity while under sanctions. Third, it assumes that the pain caused will be sufficient to compel change. The first is relatively easy to determine and act on. The next two are far more complex.
Obviously, sanctions are an option of stronger powers toward weaker ones. It assumes that the imposition of sanctions will cause more pain to the target country than it will to the country or countries issuing sanctions, and that the target country cannot or will not use military action to counter economic sanctions. For example, the United States placed sanctions on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. It discovered that while the sanctions were hurting the Soviets, they were hurting American farmers as well. The pain was reciprocal and there was an undertone of danger if the Soviets had chosen to counter the sanctions with military force. An example of that concerned Japan in 1941. The United States halted the shipment of oil and scrap metal to Japan in an attempt to force it to reshape its policies in China and Indochina. The sanctions were crippling, as the Americans expected. However, the Japanese response was not capitulation, but Pearl Harbor.
To understand the difficulties of determining and acting on the assumptions of imposing sanctions, consider Cuba. The United States has imposed extensive economic sanctions on Cuba for years. During the first decades of the sanctions, they were relatively effective, in the sense that third countries tended to comply rather than face possible sanctions themselves from the United States. As time went on, the fear of sanctions declined. A European country might have been inclined to comply with U.S. sanctions in the 1960s or 1970s, for both political reasons and for concern over potential retaliatory sanctions from the United States. However, as the pattern of international economic activity shifted, and the perception of both Cuba and the United States changed within these countries, the political implication to comply with U.S. wishes declined, while the danger of U.S. sanctions diminished. Placing sanctions on the European Union would be mutually disastrous and the United States would not do it over Cuba, or virtually any other issue.
As a result, the sanctions the United States placed on Cuba have dramatically diminished in importance. Cuba can trade with most of the world, and other countries can invest in Cuba if they wish. The flow of American tourists is blocked, but European, Canadian and Latin American tourists who wish to go to Cuba can go. Cuba has profound economic problems, but those problems are only marginally traceable to sanctions. Indeed, the U.S. embargo has provided the Castro regime with a useful domestic explanation for its economic failures.
Limitations
This points to an interesting characteristic of sanctions. One of the potential goals of placing sanctions on a country is to generate unrest and internal opposition , forcing regime change or at least policy change. This rarely happens. Instead, the imposition of sanctions creates a sense of embattlement within the country. Two things follow from this. First, there is frequently a boost in support for the regime that might otherwise not be there. The idea that economic pain takes precedence over patriotism or concern for maintaining national sovereignty is not a theory with a great deal of empirical support. Second, the sanctions allow a regime to legitimize declaring a state of emergency — which is what sanctions intend to create — and then use that state of emergency to increase repression and decrease the opportunity for an opposition to emerge.
Consider an extreme example of sanctions during World War II, when both the Axis and Allies tried to use airpower as a means of imposing massive economic hardship on the population, thereby attempting to generate unrest and opposition to the regime. Obviously, strategic bombing is not sanctions, but it is instructive to consider them in this sense. When we look at the Battle of Britain and the strategic bombing campaigns against Germany and Japan, we find that countereconomic warfare did not produce internal opposition that the regime could not handle. Indeed, it could reasonably be argued that it increased support for the regime. It is assumed that economic hardship can generate regime change, yet even in some of the most extreme cases of economic hardship, that didn’t happen.
Imposing an effective sanctions regime on a country is difficult for two reasons. First, economic pain does not translate into political pressure. Second, creating effective economic pain normally requires a coalition. The United States is not in a position to unilaterally impose effective sanctions. In order to do that, it must act in concert with other countries that are prepared not only to announce sanctions but — and this is far more important and difficult — also to enforce them. This means that it must be in the political interest of all countries that deal with the target to impose the sanctions.
It is rarely possible to create such a coalition. Nations’ interests diverge too much. Sometimes they converge, as in South Africa prior to the end of apartheid. South Africa proved that sanctions can work if there is a coalition that does not benefit extensively from economic and political ties with the target country, and where the regime is composed of a minority within a very large sea of hostility. South Africa was a special case. The same attempt at a sanctions regime in Sudan over Darfur has failed because many countries have political or economic interests there.
It is also difficult to police the sanctions. By definition, as the sanctions are imposed, the financial returns for violating them increase. Think of U.S. drug laws as a form of sanctions. They raise the price of drugs in the United States and increase the incentives for smugglers. When a broad sanctions regime was placed on Iraq, vast amounts of money were made from legitimate and illegitimate trading with Iraq. Regardless of what a national government might say (and it may well say one thing and do another) individuals and corporations will find ways around the sanctions. Indeed, Obama’s proposed sanctions on corporations are intended precisely for this reason. As always, the issue is one of intelligence and enforcement. People can be very good at deception for large amounts of money.
The difficulty of creating effective sanctions raises the question of why they are used. The primary answer is that they allow a nation to appear to be acting effectively without enduring significant risks. Invading a country, as the United States found in Iraq, poses substantial risks. The imposition of sanctions on relatively weaker countries without the ability to counter the sanctions is much less risky. The fact that it is also far less effective is compensated for by the lowered risk.
In truth, many sanction regimes are enforced as political gestures, either for domestic political reasons, or to demonstrate serious intent on the international scene. In some cases, sanctions are a way of appearing to act so that military action can be deferred. No one expects the sanctions to change the regime or its policies, but the fact that sanctions are in place can be used as an argument against actions by other nations.
This is very much the case with Iran. No one expects Russia or China (or even many of the European states) to fully comply with a sanctions regime on gasoline. Even if they did, no one expects the flow of gasoline to be decisively cut off. There will be too many people prepared to take the risk of smuggling gasoline to Iran for that to happen. Even if the U.S. blockaded Iranian ports, the Caucasus and Central Asia are far too disorderly and the monetary rewards of smuggling are too great of an incentive to make the gasoline sanctions effective. Additionally, the imposition of sanctions will both rally the population to the regime as well as provide justification for an intense crackdown. The probability of sanctions forcing policy changes or regime change in Iran is slim.
Balancing Acquiescence and War
But sanctions have one virtue: They delay or block military action. So long as sanctions are being considered or being imposed, the argument can be made to those who want military action that it is necessary to give the sanctions time to work. Therefore, in this case, sanctions allow the United States to block any potential military actions by Israel against Iran while appearing domestically to be taking action. Should the United States wish to act, the sanctions route gives the Europeans the option of arguing that military action is premature. Furthermore, if military action took place without Russian approval while Russia was cooperating in a sanctions regime, it would have increased room to maneuver against U.S. interests in the Middle East, portraying the United States as trigger-happy.
The ultimate virtue of sanctions is that they provide a platform between acquiescence and war. The effectiveness of that platform is not nearly as important as the fact that it provides a buffer against charges of inaction and demands for further action. In Sudan, for example, no one expects sanctions to work, but their presence allows business to go on as usual while deflecting demands for more significant action.
The P-5+1 is now shaping its response to Iran. They are not even committed to the idea of sanctions. But they will move to sanctions if it appears that Israel or the United States is prepared to move aggressively. Sanctions satisfy the need to appear to be acting while avoiding the risks of action.
-
Mohamed ElBaradei caps his contentious and ultimately failed 12-year stint as head of the International Atomic Energy Agency today, having spent many years enabling Iran's nuclear bids only to condemn them in his final days in office. Mr. ElBaradei combined his rebuke of Iran with his familiar calls for more negotiation, but we'll take his belated realism about Iran as his tacit admission that Dick Cheney and John Bolton have been right all along. Let's hope the education of the Obama Administration doesn't take as long.
As if to underscore the point, yesterday the Iranian government ordered up 10 additional uranium enrichment plants on the scale of its already operational facility in Natanz, which has a planned capacity of 54,000 centrifuges. That could mean an eventual total of more than 500,000 centrifuges, or enough to enrich about 160 bombs worth of uranium each year. Whether it can ever do that is an open question, but it does give a sense of the scale of the regime's ambitions.
The decision is also a reminder of how unchastened Iran has been by President Obama's revelation in September that Iran had been building a secret 3,000 centrifuge facility near the city of Qom. The IAEA's governing board finally got around on Friday to rebuking Iran for that deception, a vote the Administration trumpeted because both Russia and China voted with the United States. But perhaps only within the Obama Administration can a symbolic gesture by the IAEA be considered a diplomatic triumph.
View Full Image
Associated Press
Mohamad ElBaradei
."Time is running out for Iran to address the international community's growing concerns about its nuclear program," White House press secretary Robert Gibbs said yesterday, but the West has said this many times before. Earlier this year, Mr. Obama said Iran had a deadline of September.
The regime scoffed at Mr. Obama after he delivered a conciliating message for the Persian New Year in March, scoffed again after he mildly criticized its post-election crackdown and killing spree in June (following days of silence), and scoffed a third time by rejecting the West's offer last month to enrich Iran's uranium for it. Yet the Administration insists the enrichment deal is still Iran's for the taking. "A few years ago [the West] said we had to completely stop all our nuclear activities," Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said last month. "Now look where we are today."
Those are the words of a man who believes he has Mr. Obama's number. And until the President, his advisers and the Europeans realize that only punitive sanctions or military strikes will force it to reconsider its nuclear ambitions, an emboldened Islamic Republic will continue to march confidently toward a bomb over the wreckage of Mohamed ElBaradei's—and Barack Obama's—best intentions.
-
from the November 20, 2009 edition - http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1120/p09s03-coop.html
The real reason Iran can't be trusted
As they confront Iran's nuclear aims, negotiators must mind the Shiite doctrine of deceit called 'taqiyya.'
By Mamoun Fandy
London
In the run-up to talks with Iran last month, many in Europe and the United States asked whether Iran would, or even could, come clean on its nuclear activities.
Should the West trust Iranian promises? The short answer is "no." But the underlying question is "Why not?"
The answer lies in Iranian belief systems – notably the doctrine of taqiyya, a difficult concept for many non-Muslims to grasp. Taqiyya is the Shiite religious rationale for concealment or dissimulation in political or worldly affairs. At one level it means that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his regime can tell themselves that they are obliged by their faith not to tell the truth.
This doctrine has not been discussed much in the West, but it should be. How should the world deal with taqiyya in Shiite Islam in the context of Iran's nuclear file?
**Read it all.**
-
Immunity Challenge
Let Americans have the smallpox and anthrax vaccines.
By Deroy Murdock
Colorado Springs — “I sleep like a baby,” says U.S. Air Force Colonel Randy Larsen (Ret). “Every three hours, I wake up screaming.”
It’s little surprise that Larsen has such trouble getting shuteye. As executive director of the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, Larsen spends his days and many nights visualizing mushroom clouds over U.S. cities and emergency rooms clogged with victims of biological attacks. Among his many solutions to America’s WMD challenges, this may be the easiest: Let Americans get immunized against smallpox and anthrax.
“Smallpox and anthrax are our two biggest biological threats,” Larsen tells journalists gathered here on November 16 by the Heritage Foundation at the El Pomar Foundation’s Penrose House. Addressing the topic “Overview of Armageddon,” Larsen adds: “Smallpox and anthrax are the only biological threats for which we have FDA-approved vaccines. We have enough smallpox vaccines for every American, but not enough anthrax vaccines even for 10 percent of our population. Once we increase that supply, we can take these two risks off the table. I would give those vaccines to my grandchildren.”
Voluntarily immunizing Americans against these two diseases would deter terrorists from plotting such biological attacks. “Terrorists never would attack Americans with polio or measles,” Larsen says, “because we vaccinate our kids against those diseases.” Even vaccinating some Americans would create “herd immunity,” whereby those who stay healthy would impede an epidemic’s progress, much as firebreaks retard advancing infernos.
“People who are immune could help respond, since they would not need to worry about getting infected,” explains Dr. Gigi Kwik Gronvall of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. “That is part of the reason why priority groups include health-care workers. They would be in contact with the infected, and their services would be needed.”
Larsen’s commission offered this sobering conclusion last December: “Unless the world community acts decisively and with great urgency, it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.”
In an October 21 progress report, this bipartisan board added: “In recent years, the United States has received strategic warnings of biological weapons use from dozens of government reports and expert panels.” It cautioned that “a one- to two-kilogram release of anthrax spores from a crop duster plane could kill more Americans than died in World War II,” specifically, 380,000. “Clean up and other economic costs could exceed $1.8 trillion.” “Dark Winter,” a June 2001 high-level simulation exercise, assumed that a covert smallpox attack would infect 3.3 million Americans, one-third fatally.
A biological attack’s psychological impact would be incalculable, especially if healthy Americans saw their smallpox-infected neighbors as contagious “enemies” to be shunned, rather than as compatriots struggling through a September 11-style onslaught.
America’s Islamofascist enemies have stayed busy in this sphere.
“I was directly in charge . . . of managing and following up on the Cell for the Production of Biological Weapons, such as anthrax and others,” Khalid Sheikh Mohammed told a Guantanamo military tribunal on March 10, 2007. KSM was the chief architect of the 9/11 massacre and al-Qaeda’s “Military Operational Commander,” as he describes himself on page 17 of the transcript.
The Commission’s crop-duster scenario was conceived after Americans discovered two Afghan anthrax laboratories. Larsen says, “This was a response to the capability they could have had if we had not gone into Afghanistan, killed or captured those people, and shut down those facilities.” Page 151 of the 9/11 Commission Report says Jemaah Islamiah agent Yazid Sufaat “would spend several months attempting to cultivate anthrax for al Qaeda in a laboratory he helped set up near the Kandahar airport.”
Interestingly enough, Sufaat was captured thanks to information that American interrogators gleaned after waterboarding KSM. Had America not dampened KSM’s nose, U.S. soldiers or civilians already might have had Sufaat’s anthrax up their nostrils.
Kuwaiti professor and terrorist sympathizer Abdallah Fahd Abd Al-Aziz Al-Nafisi gleefully discussed bioterrorism in a speech broadcast February 2 on Al-Jazeera and translated by the Middle East Media Research Institute:
Four pounds of anthrax — in a suitcase this big — carried by a fighter through tunnels from Mexico into the US, are guaranteed to kill 330,000 Americans within a single hour, if it is properly spread in population centers there. What a horrifying idea. 9/11 will be small change in comparison. Am I right? There is no need for airplanes, conspiracies, timings, and so on. One person, with the courage to carry four pounds of anthrax, will go to the White House lawn, and will spread this "confetti" all over them, and then will do these cries of joy. It will turn into a real "celebration." . . .
The Americans are afraid that the WMDs might fall into the hands of "terrorist" organizations, like al-Qaeda and others. There is good reason for the Americans' fears, because al-Qaeda used to have in the Herat region . . . it had laboratories in north Afghanistan. They have scientists, chemists, and nuclear physicists. They are nothing like they are portrayed by these mercenary journalists — backward Bedouins living in caves. No, no. By no means. This kind of talk can fool only naïve people. People who follow such things know that al-Qaeda has laboratories, just like Hezbollah. . . .
If they call someone a terrorist, say: "He's a friend of mine." Why? Because these "terrorists" are the world's most God-fearing people. They are the most honorable people in the world, the best people in the world.
Today’s dilatory federal rollout of swine-flu shots offers little confidence that government can deliver smallpox and anthrax inoculations with speed and tranquility, especially after a shocking attack turbocharged public anxiety.
Instead, these vaccines should reach thousands of hospitals, clinics, and doctors’ offices now. Americans calmly could request them during routine medical visits, rather than overwhelm government agencies amid widespread panic after thousands of citizens have fallen ill — or worse.
Al-Qaeda and other vicious killers surely have a “To Do” list of horrors they would love to hurl at us infidels. Let’s deny them at least these two potential murder weapons.
— Deroy Murdock is a New York-based columnist with the Scripps Howard News Service and a media fellow with the Hoover Institution.
National Review Online - http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=NGI4MDFhOTIwMzdhOTZhMGU5ZjhjYTMyYzczNWM0MjQ=
-
It is hard to weaponize this stuff so it has the effects of the Inhaled variety. The typical form, where you get the nasty, scabby sores on your skin, is easily traetable with regular antibiotics and would take a fair amount of time to kill you. Mearsure weeks instead of days.
Knowledge fron the Desert Storm and general NBC training when I was in the service.
-
Israel Upping the Iranian Nuclear Threat
ISRAELI BRIG. GEN. YOSSI BAIDATZ, the head of Israel’s Military Intelligence research division, told a closed session of the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee on Monday that Iran had the technical capability to build a nuclear bomb and that it would only take a political decision in Tehran to follow through with these plans. He specified that Iran had successfully enriched 1800 kg of uranium, which he claimed was enough to build more than one nuclear bomb, and that Iran had spent the past year upgrading its military arsenal with missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons that could reach Israel. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu also spoke at the same Knesset meeting, where he said that Iran had lost its legitimacy in the international community and that preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear capabilities was Israel’s central problem.
Though Iran relies heavily on denial and deception tactics to conceal the true status of its nuclear weapons program, Baidatz is likely stretching the truth a bit in describing Iran’s nuclear capabilities. There is an enormous difference between being able to enrich uranium to levels between 5 and 20 percent (what Iran is believed to be currently capable of) and enriching uranium to 80 or 90 percent, which would be considered weapons-grade highly enriched uranium (HEU). Should Iran develop the capability to produce weapons-grade HEU, it would only need a fraction of Baidatz’s claimed 1800 kg of properly enriched uranium to have sufficient raw material for a bomb. In that case, Baidatz’s claim of a political decision being the only thing keeping Iran from the bomb would carry more weight.
These statements are much more an indication of Israeli intentions in dealing with Iran than an accurate reflection of Iranian nuclear capabilities. That the statements of this closed Knesset session were leaked in the first place is particularly revealing of the message that Israel wishes to send Iran and the international community at this point in time. That message, to put it bluntly, is “time’s up.”
“Baidatz is likely stretching the truth a bit in describing Iran’s nuclear capabilities.”
Israel has kept quiet as the United States has made attempt after attempt to extend the proverbial diplomatic hand to the Iranians without success. From Israel’s point of view, the diplomatic chapter is closing this month, and the New Year, if Israel has anything to do with it, will bring a variety of unpleasantries to Iran’s doorstep, including the threat of military action.
But Israel is also operating on a different timeline than that of the United States. Whereas U.S. President Barack Obama would much rather avoid a military conflagration in the Persian Gulf while he attempts to sew up Iraq, make over the Afghanistan war and nurse the U.S. economy back to health, Israel is dealing with a matter of state survival. And that, from the Israeli point of view, takes precedence over its relationship with the United States. This statement from Baidatz is thus likely one of many signals Israel will be sending in the coming weeks to accentuate the Iranian nuclear threat.
Iran, however, still may have a few more tools up its sleeve to take some of the steam out of Israel’s pressure campaign. Obama hosted Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan at the White House Monday. Just before traveling to Washington, Erdogan hosted Saeed Jalili, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council secretary. That meeting followed a recent visit by Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmed Davutoglu to Tehran, where he delivered a proposal to store Iranian enriched uranium on Turkish soil under international safeguards. This was yet another compromise on the enrichment issue intended to ease the tension in Iran’s nuclear negotiations with the West.
It is unlikely that Iran will take Turkey’s proposal seriously, but it can certainly entertain such proposals to buy more time in negotiations and complicate any move toward sanctions or military action. Turkey, meanwhile, has a strategic interest in inserting itself as a key mediator in the Iranian nuclear dispute to not only boost its foreign policy credentials, but also stave off a crisis in its backyard. The Israelis can see through such proposals for what they are — delay tactics — and, most likely, so too can the Americans. But the Americans may not mind giving Turkish mediation a shot if it gives Washington another option to restrain Israeli action and another chance to firm up America’s currently uneasy relations with the region’s rising power: Turkey.
But how many times will Israel allow its tolerance to be tested? As long as Iran appears compromising, even on a surface level, the Russians, the Chinese and even the Europeans can skirt around sanctions talk. And as long as the sanctions haven’t been seriously attempted, Israel cannot easily claim that the sanctions have failed in order to justify military action. This is an uncomfortable space for Israel to be in, but the Iranians, Turks and even the Americans don’t exactly mind seeing Israel in a tight spot right now.
-
EmailPrinter
FriendlyShare:
facebook ↓ More.
.StumbleUponDiggTwitterYahoo! BuzzFarkRedditLinkedIndel.icio.usMySpaceSave This ↓ More.
. Text .In his Inaugural address, President Obama promised the world's dictators—with Iran plainly in mind—that he would "extend a hand if you are willing to unclench your fist." Here's a status report on the mullahs' knuckles:
• Weapons of mass destruction. On Wednesday, Iran tested a new version of its Sajjil-2 medium-range ballistic missile, a sophisticated solid-fuel model with a range of 1,200 miles—enough to target parts of Eastern Europe.
Also this week came news that Western intelligence agencies have an undated Farsi-language document titled "outlook for special neutron-related activities over the next four years." It concerns technical aspects of a neutron initiator, which is used to set off nuclear explosions and has no other practical application. The document remains unauthenticated, and Iran denies working on a nuclear weapon. But it squares with accumulating evidence, from the International Atomic Energy Agency and other sources, that Iran continues to pursue nuclear weapons design and uranium enrichment.
• Support for terrorists. Iran also continues to supply Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon with weapons and money, and there's reason to suspect the help extends to Colombia's terrorist FARC. Centcom Commander David Petraeus told ABC News Wednesday that Iran "provides a modest level of equipment, explosives and perhaps some funding to the Taliban in western Afghanistan." As for Iraq, he says, "there are daily attacks with the so-called signature weapons only made by Iran—the explosively formed projectile, forms of improvised explosive devices, etc."
• Political gestures. Isolated regimes sometimes signal their desire for better relations through seemingly small gestures: ping-pong tournaments, for instance. Tehran has taken a different tack.
On Monday, it announced that three American hikers arrested along its border with Iraq in July would be put on trial. The charge? "Suspicious aims." New charges were also brought last month against Iranian-American scholar Kian Tajbakhsh, who was already sentenced to at least 12 years in prison on espionage charges. The regime has been going after other foreign nationals, including French teacher Clotilde Reiss, who is living under house arrest in the French embassy in Tehran. Christopher Dickey notes in Newsweek that "since [President Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad took over four years ago, some 35 foreign nationals or dual nationals have been imprisoned for use as chump change in one sordid deal or another."
View Full Image
Associated Press
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.
.• Diplomacy. In October, the U.S. and its allies offered to enrich Iran's uranium in facilities outside the country, supposedly for the production of medical isotopes. The idea was that doing so would at least reduce Iran's growing stockpile of uranium and thus postpone the day when it would have enough to rapidly build a bomb.
Tehran finally came back with a counterproposal late last week, in which no uranium would leave Iranian soil. Even Hillary Clinton admits it's a nonstarter: "I don't think anyone can doubt that our outreach has produced very little in terms of any kind of positive response from the Iranians," the Secretary of State told reporters.
Given those remarks, we would have imagined that Mrs. Clinton would take it as good news that on Tuesday the House voted 412-12 in favor of a new round of unilateral sanctions on Iran. The Iran Refined Petroleum Sanctions Act would forbid any company that does energy business with Iran from having access to U.S. markets.
Instead, last week Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg wrote to Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry urging that the Senate postpone taking up the House bill. "I am concerned that this legislation, in its current form, might weaken rather than strengthen international unity and support for our efforts," wrote Mr. Steinberg.
So let's see: Iran spurns every overture from the U.S. and continues to develop WMD while abusing its neighbors. In response, the Administration, which had set a December deadline for diplomacy, now says it opposes precisely the kind of sanctions it once promised to impose if Iran didn't come clean, never mind overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress. For an explanation of why Iran's behavior remains unchanged, look no further.
-
There’s Only One Way to Stop Iran
By ALAN J. KUPERMAN
Published: December 23, 2009
PRESIDENT OBAMA should not lament but sigh in relief that Iran has rejected his nuclear deal, which was ill conceived from the start. Under the deal, which was formally offered through the United Nations, Iran was to surrender some 2,600 pounds of lightly enriched uranium (some three-quarters of its known stockpile) to Russia, and the next year get back a supply of uranium fuel sufficient to run its Tehran research reactor for three decades. The proposal did not require Iran to halt its enrichment program, despite several United Nations Security Council resolutions demanding such a moratorium.
Iran was thus to be rewarded with much-coveted reactor fuel despite violating international law. Within a year, or sooner in light of its expanding enrichment program, Iran would almost certainly have replenished and augmented its stockpile of enriched uranium, nullifying any ostensible nonproliferation benefit of the deal.
Moreover, by providing reactor fuel, the plan would have fostered proliferation in two ways. First, Iran could have continued operating its research reactor, which has helped train Iranian scientists in weapons techniques like plutonium separation. (Yes, as Iran likes to point out, the reactor also produces medical isotopes. But those can be purchased commercially from abroad, as most countries do, including the United States.) Absent the deal, Iran’s reactor will likely run out of fuel within two years, and only a half-dozen countries are able to supply fresh fuel for it. This creates significant international leverage over Iran, which should be used to compel it to halt its enrichment program.
In addition, the vast surplus of higher-enriched fuel Iran was to get under the deal would have permitted some to be diverted to its bomb program. Indeed, many experts believe that the uranium in foreign-provided fuel would be easier to enrich to weapons grade because Iran’s uranium contains impurities. Obama administration officials had claimed that delivering uranium in the form of fabricated fuel would prevent further enrichment for weapons, but this is false. Separating uranium from fuel elements so that it can be enriched further is a straightforward engineering task requiring at most a few weeks.
Thus, had the deal gone through, Iran could have benefited from a head start toward making weapons-grade 90 percent-enriched uranium (meaning that 90 percent of its makeup is the fissile isotope U-235) by starting with purified 20 percent-enriched uranium rather than its own weaker, contaminated stuff.
This raises a question: if the deal would have aided Iran’s bomb program, why did the United States propose it, and Iran reject it? The main explanation on both sides is domestic politics. President Obama wanted to blunt Republican criticism that his multilateral approach was failing to stem Iran’s nuclear program. The deal would have permitted him to claim, for a year or so, that he had defused the crisis by depriving Iran of sufficient enriched uranium to start a crash program to build one bomb.
But in reality no one ever expected Iran to do that, because such a headlong sprint is the one step most likely to provoke an international military response that could cripple the bomb program before it reaches fruition. Iran is far more likely to engage in “salami slicing” — a series of violations each too small to provoke retaliation, but that together will give it a nuclear arsenal. For example, while Iran permits international inspections at its declared enrichment plant at Natanz, it ignores United Nations demands that it close the plant, where it gains the expertise needed to produce weapons-grade uranium at other secret facilities like the nascent one recently uncovered near Qom.
In sum, the proposal would not have averted proliferation in the short run, because that risk always was low, but instead would have fostered it in the long run — a classic example of domestic politics undermining national security.
Tehran’s rejection of the deal was likewise propelled by domestic politics — including last June’s fraudulent elections and longstanding fears of Western manipulation. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad initially embraced the deal because he realized it aided Iran’s bomb program. But his domestic political opponents, whom he has tried to label as foreign agents, turned the tables by accusing him of surrendering Iran’s patrimony to the West.
=========
Page 2 of 2)
Under such domestic pressure, Mr. Ahmadinejad reneged. But Iran still wants reactor fuel, so he threatened to enrich uranium domestically to the 20 percent level. This is a bluff, because even if Iran could further enrich its impure uranium, it lacks the capacity to fabricate that uranium into fuel elements. His real aim is to compel the international community into providing the fuel without requiring Iran to surrender most of the enriched uranium it has on hand.
Indeed, Iran’s foreign minister has now proposed just that: offering to exchange a mere quarter of Iran’s enriched uranium for an immediate 10-year supply of fuel for the research reactor. This would let Iran run the reactor, retain the bulk of its enriched uranium and continue to enrich more — a bargain unacceptable even to the Obama administration.
Tehran’s rejection of the original proposal is revealing. It shows that Iran, for domestic political reasons, cannot make even temporary concessions on its bomb program, regardless of incentives or sanctions. Since peaceful carrots and sticks cannot work, and an invasion would be foolhardy, the United States faces a stark choice: military air strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities or acquiescence to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The risks of acquiescence are obvious. Iran supplies Islamist terrorist groups in violation of international embargoes. Even President Ahmadinejad’s domestic opponents support this weapons traffic. If Iran acquired a nuclear arsenal, the risks would simply be too great that it could become a neighborhood bully or provide terrorists with the ultimate weapon, an atomic bomb.
As for knocking out its nuclear plants, admittedly, aerial bombing might not work. Some Iranian facilities are buried too deeply to destroy from the air. There may also be sites that American intelligence is unaware of. And military action could backfire in various ways, including by undermining Iran’s political opposition, accelerating the bomb program or provoking retaliation against American forces and allies in the region.
But history suggests that military strikes could work. Israel’s 1981 attack on the nearly finished Osirak reactor prevented Iraq’s rapid acquisition of a plutonium-based nuclear weapon and compelled it to pursue a more gradual, uranium-based bomb program. A decade later, the Persian Gulf war uncovered and enabled the destruction of that uranium initiative, which finally deterred Saddam Hussein from further pursuit of nuclear weapons (a fact that eluded American intelligence until after the 2003 invasion). Analogously, Iran’s atomic sites might need to be bombed more than once to persuade Tehran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons.
As for the risk of military strikes undermining Iran’s opposition, history suggests that the effect would be temporary. For example, NATO’s 1999 air campaign against Yugoslavia briefly bolstered support for President Slobodan Milosevic, but a democratic opposition ousted him the next year.
Yes, Iran could retaliate by aiding America’s opponents in Iraq and Afghanistan, but it does that anyway. Iran’s leaders are discouraged from taking more aggressive action against United States forces — and should continue to be — by the fear of provoking a stronger American counter-escalation. If nothing else, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have shown that the United States military can oust regimes in weeks if it wants to.
Incentives and sanctions will not work, but air strikes could degrade and deter Iran’s bomb program at relatively little cost or risk, and therefore are worth a try. They should be precision attacks, aimed only at nuclear facilities, to remind Iran of the many other valuable sites that could be bombed if it were foolish enough to retaliate.
The final question is, who should launch the air strikes? Israel has shown an eagerness to do so if Iran does not stop enriching uranium, and some hawks in Washington favor letting Israel do the dirty work to avoid fueling anti-Americanism in the Islamic world.
But there are three compelling reasons that the United States itself should carry out the bombings. First, the Pentagon’s weapons are better than Israel’s at destroying buried facilities. Second, unlike Israel’s relatively small air force, the United States military can discourage Iranian retaliation by threatening to expand the bombing campaign. (Yes, Israel could implicitly threaten nuclear counter-retaliation, but Iran might not perceive that as credible.) Finally, because the American military has global reach, air strikes against Iran would be a strong warning to other would-be proliferators.
Negotiation to prevent nuclear proliferation is always preferable to military action. But in the face of failed diplomacy, eschewing force is tantamount to appeasement. We have reached the point where air strikes are the only plausible option with any prospect of preventing Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. Postponing military action merely provides Iran a window to expand, disperse and harden its nuclear facilities against attack. The sooner the United States takes action, the better.
-
Gah! Nasty taste, eventually we will have to kill a bunch of clerics that are dug into Iran like the Borgias were dug into the Papacy in Italy. That is going to create a nastiness that will definately cause some young Moslems in America to start their own retalitations. The government may be forced to simply tell americans to "go ahead carry whatever you wish to while this nastiness is going down", but then again it may just reasult in DHS getting more Autoritay, and we continue to slide down that slippery slope.
I do not see that we have too much of a choice. Get the small problem solved before it becomes a big one, but it is a "doesn't feel good" item that the democrats shy from. That means the "Warmonger" republicans will have to take the job, and the cycle spins.
-
There is also the issue of the growing popular resistance to the regime. How does this variable interact?
-
Who was behind the September 2001 anthrax attacks?
By: MICHAEL BARONE
Senior Political Analyst
01/01/10 6:59 PM EST
Here’s some news I missed.Edward Jay Epstein reported on December 21 that the FBI’s anthrax case has fallen apart. In 2008 the FBI declared that Dr. Bruce Ivins, who died an apparent suicide in July 2008, was the perpetrator who sent anthrax-laced letters to members of Congress and others just days after the September 11 attacks. The FBI’s investigation, apparently the most lengthy it had ever conducted, was directed primarily at scientists who had access to anthrax materials. But, Epstein reports, it turns out that Dr. Ivins did not have access to the sophisticated form of anthrax used in September 2001.
Back in October 2001 I wrote a U.S. News column arguing that a state actor may have been behind the anthrax attacks, and I blogged on the subject twice in September 2006 and again in November 2007. It seemed to me then that the anthrax attacks were overwhelmingly likely to be the product of al Qaeda or another terrorist organization, quite likely aided by a state actor, and that the FBI by concentrating its investigation on domestic scientists had been barking up the wrong tree. The announcement in 2008 that the case was solved and a domestic scientist was responsible seemed to refute my conclusions. Now Epstein’s report that the FBI’s case has fallen apart has me thinking along the same lines as I was from 2001 to 2008.
Will we ever learn who was behind the September 2001 anthrax attacks?
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/blogs/beltway-confidential/Who-was-behind-the-September-2001-anthrax-attacks-80482982.html
-
"state actor"
Does anyone know what he is talking about by this phrase?
Does this mean someone who works for the State Dept., the government in general, or an actor like J.W. Booth?
Their was a documentary about this case on one of the cable shows I don't remember which one regarding the suspect.
Colleagues and friends argued there was abosuletly no hint he was thinking along these lines.
The evidence was all circumstantial, and suggestive though not completely conclusive beyond a reasonable doubt IMO.
This guy should have had the same laywers falling all over themselves to defend the 911 bombers.
-
NYTimes.comReport an ErrorTimes Topics > People > I > Ivins, Bruce E.Sign in to Recommend
E-MAILBruce E. Ivins
Usamriid/ReutersBruce Ivins, 62, died of an apparent suicide on July 29, 2008, after learning that federal prosecutors were preparing to indict him on murder charges in the 2001 anthrax attacks that left five people dead.
To some of his longtime colleagues and neighbors, the charges against him marked a startling and inexplicable turn of events for a churchgoing, family-oriented germ researcher known for his jolly disposition.
For more than three decades, Dr. Ivans had worked with some of the world’s most dangerous pathogens and viruses, trying to find cures in case they might be used as a weapon.
Dr. Ivins, the son of a pharmacist from Lebanon, Ohio, who held a doctorate in microbiology from University of Cincinnati, spent his entire career at the elite, Army-run laboratory that conducted high-security experiments into lethal substances like anthrax and Ebola.
Read More...
He turned his attention to anthrax — putting aside research on Legionnaire’s disease and cholera — after the 1979 anthrax outbreak in the Soviet city of Sverdlovsk, which killed at least 64 after an accidental release at a military facility.
Dr. Ivins was among the scientists who benefited from the post September 11 surge in federal funding for research on potential biological weapons, as 14 of the 15 academic papers he published since late 2001 were focused on possible anthrax treatments or vaccines. He even worked on the investigation of the anthrax attacks, although this meant that he, like other scientists at the Army’s defensive biological laboratory at Fort Detrick, Md., was scrutinized as a possible suspect.
Dr. Ivins and his wife, Diane Ivins, raised two children in a modest Cape Cod home in a post-World War II neighborhood right outside Fort Detrick, and he could walk to work.
He was active in the community, volunteering with the Red Cross and serving as the musician at his Roman Catholic church. He showed off his music skills at work, too, playing songs he had written about friends who were moving to new jobs.
In the weeks before his death, Dr. Ivins’ behavior became increasingly erratic. At a group counseling session at a psychiatric center he announced that he had bought a bulletproof vest and a gun as he contemplated killing his co-workers at the nearby Army research laboratory.
-
"state actor"
Does anyone know what he is talking about by this phrase?
Does this mean someone who works for the State Dept., the government in general, or an actor like J.W. Booth?
He means the support of a nation-state, like Iraq or Syria to name a few potentials.
-
The Obama Administration continues to negotiate with the Russians over a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start), but one big question is whether it can get the result through the U.S. Senate. A group of Senators is telling the White House that it will have little or no chance of success unless it also moves ahead with nuclear-warhead modernization.
The warning comes in a recent letter from 40 Republican Senators and Independent-Democrat Joe Lieberman reminding the President of his legal responsibility under the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010 to present budget estimates for modernizing U.S. nuclear forces along with any new Start pact.
The Senators are following the suggestions of the important, but too little publicized, recommendations of last year's Perry-Schlesinger commission on the safety and operations of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. The bipartisan report noted, among other things, that the U.S. needs new warheads and nuclear research facilities. President Obama, in his utopian antinuclear mode, has opposed a new warhead despite widespread support for it at the Pentagon, from Defense Secretary Robert Gates on down.
Mr. Obama would be wise to take the warning seriously because he'll need 67 Senate votes to approve any arms-control treaty. Without modernization, it's unlikely that Senators will vote for the significant and probably unwise reductions in U.S. nuclear delivery vehicles that Mr. Obama is negotiating with the Russians.
However, we're not surprised to hear that the President is getting contrary political advice from his Vice President, Joe Biden, who is arguing that the White House should try to get the 67 votes on Start's merits alone. He wants to delay any nuclear modernization decision, holding it out as a carrot to offer Senators in return for ratifying the separate Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Senate rejected the test ban pact when Bill Clinton submitted it in 1999, but Mr. Obama hopes to do better with 60 Senate Democrats backed by his global disarmament agenda.
This wouldn't be the first time Mr. Biden has misjudged a vital security issue—recall his proposal to split Iraq into three parts. The deteriorating U.S. nuclear arsenal is emerging as a big security problem, and Start won't be an easy sell even with the money for warhead upgrades. Mr. Obama could have simply renewed the 1991 Start treaty and pocketed an early diplomatic victory. Instead, he has sought something more ambitious in support of his larger disarmament dreams, and the Russians are demanding a hard bargain in return.
.The U.S. has already agreed to steep cuts in its military arsenal, even before the Administration has come out with its Nuclear Posture Review and weapons modernization plan. Last week, Russian strongman Vladimir Putin raised the ante by saying he now wants the U.S. to abandon missile defenses as part of a new Start pact. The Obama Administration's decision to downsize missile defense sites in Poland and the Czech Republic seems to have only emboldened the Russians to push for bigger concessions.
Another issue is verification. With Start's expiration December 5, Russia has pulled inspectors from a factory that's building the next generation of Russian ICBMs and scaled back electronic monitoring—called telemetry—of missile production and movements. The U.S. is trying to undo some of this in negotiations, but Senators will want to make sure that any fix isn't merely cosmetic. If the U.S. is going to reduce its missile and warhead numbers, we need to know what the Russians have in their arsenal.
The stakes here aren't merely whether Mr. Obama can get his treaties ratified; they concern the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Mr. Obama says he wants to stop nuclear proliferation but he will only encourage it if our allies begin to believe that the U.S. arsenal is either too small or too unreliable to protect them. Japan has already raised concerns, and with Mr. Obama unable or unwilling to stop either North Korean or Iranian nuclear ambitions, such worry will only spread.
Grand speeches about a world without nuclear weapons are crowd-pleasers at the U.N., but the U.S. Senate has an obligation to inspect the fine print before it ratifies any reduction in U.S. defenses. Senators shouldn't begin to consider a smaller arsenal until the Obama Administration takes the steps to ensure that our remaining weapons will work if we need them
-
Dire Consequences
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/PhotoPopup.aspx?id=517018
-
Iran: Nuclear Scientist Killed
Stratfor Today » January 12, 2010 | 1041 GMT
AFP/Getty Images
The scene of the explosion that killed Iranian nuclear scientist Massoud Ali-Mohammadi outside his home Jan. 12 in TehranAn Iranian nuclear scientist was killed Jan. 12 in an IED explosion in the Iranian capital. According to the early details, Massoud Ali-Mohammadi was killed around 7:30 a.m. local time near his home in northern Tehran’s upscale district of Qeyterieh with a bomb that some report was hidden in a trashcan and others state was part of a booby-trapped motorcycle. Authorities in Tehran identified Ali-Mohammadi as a professor of nuclear physics at Tehran University. There are reports he may have been affiliated with the country’s controversial nuclear program, but his exact importance with respect to the nuclear program remains unclear.
This is also not the first time that an Iranian nuclear scientist has been killed in mysterious circumstances. Three years ago, a noted Iranian nuclear scientist, Ardeshir Hassanpour, was killed. At the time, STRATFOR had learned that the Israeli intelligence service Mossad was behind the assassination. Indeed, even this time around, Iranian officials have pointed fingers at the Jewish state. It is, however, too early to tell if that is the case.
Assassinations of individual scientists and even defection or kidnapping of others are not unprecedented. Furthermore, there have been bombings in recent months that have targeted senior military commanders of the country’s elite military force, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The timing of this attack (the first involving the use of an IED against a nuclear scientist), however, comes at a time of considerable domestic unrest and increasing international pressure on Iran to accept an enrichment compromise or face potential military action on the part of the United States or Israel.
Today’s attack will provide the pretext for Iranian authorities to crack down even harder on opponents at home who are already accused of collaborating with foreign enemies of the state. More importantly, it will make Tehran even more intransigent on the nuclear issue as the Islamic republic cannot be seen as caving into pressure, especially not from the West and Israel. The killing of the scientist also places considerable pressure on Iran to engage in retaliatory action.
-
Caroline Glick says the scientist in question was preparing to defect to the US and was hit pre-emptively by the Iranian regime:
http://www.pjtv.com/video/Middle_East_Update/Assassination_in_Iran%3A_What_the_MSM_Won%27t_Tell_You_About_The_Middle_East/2935/;jsessionid=abcaKBElDdUnp-ufJJNys
-
Or, Israel hit him and this is disinfo.
-
I could doubtless find a more appropriate place to post this piece, but Ritter made so much noise about WMD issue several years back that I figured this topic would best allow folks to reasses his credibility.
Sex sting in Poconos nets former chief U.N. weapons inspector
By Andrew Scott
Pocono Record Writer
January 14, 2010 12:00 AM
A former chief United Nations weapons inspector is accused of contacting what he thought was a 15-year-old girl in an Internet chat room, engaging in a sexual conversation and showing himself masturbating on a Web camera.
Scott Ritter of Delmar, N.Y., who served as chief U.N. weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991-98 and who was an outspoken critic of the second Bush administration in the run-up to the war in Iraq, is accused of contacting what turned out to be a Barrett Township police officer posing undercover as a teen girl.
Read the Affidavit of Probable Cause
WARNING: Extremely Graphic Content
The police affidavit gives the following account:
Officer Ryan Venneman was posing as 15-year-old "Emily" in an online chat room when he was contacted by someone using the name "Delmarm4fun." This person, later identified as Ritter, told "Emily" he was a 44-year-old male from Albany, N.Y.
"Emily" told Ritter she was a 15-year-old girl from the Poconos, at which point Ritter asked for a picture other than the one "Emily" had posted on her account. Ritter then sent her a link to his Web camera and began to masturbate on camera.
"Emily" asked Ritter for his cell phone number, which he provided.
Ritter again asked "Emily" how old she was. Told she was 15, Ritter said he didn't realize she was 15 and turned off his webcam, saying he didn't want to get in trouble.
Ritter told "Emily" he had been fantasizing about having sex with her, to which she replied: "Guess you turned it off ..."
Ritter then said: "You want to see it finish," reactivated his
webcam and continued masturbating and ejaculated on camera.
The online conversation occurred in February 2009, but the investigation lasted until November, when Ritter was charged, because police had to undergo the lengthy process of obtaining court orders to get Ritter's cell phone and computer information.
Ritter is awaiting his next appearance in Monroe County Common Pleas Court. He waived his right last month to a preliminary hearing and is free on $25,000 unsecured bail.
The Pocono Record's attempts to reach Ritter at his New York home and his attorney, Todd Henry, were unsuccessful.
This is not the first time Ritter has been in such trouble.
According to reports, Ritter was charged in a June 2001 Internet sex sting in New York, but that case was dismissed.
He had been charged with attempted child endangerment after arranging in an online chatroom to meet what he thought was a 16-year-old girl at a Burger King restaurant. The girl turned out to be an undercover policewoman.
Ritter said the criminal charge was a smear campaign in response to his criticizing U.S. policy in the Middle East.
The New York Post reported Ritter had been caught in a similar case involving a 14-year-old girl in April 2001, but that he was not charged.
In 1998, Ritter resigned from the United Nations Special Commission weapons inspection team and has been the most outspoken critic of U.S. policy toward Baghdad.
Ritter first made headlines in 1997 when, as a senior UNSCOM member, he was accused by Iraq of being an American spy himself. Now a consultant, he is the author of "Frontier Justice: Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Bushwhacking of America" and "Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and For All."
http://www.poconorecord.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20100114/NEWS/1140319
-
I had always theorised that the Iraqis stung him and flipped him.
-
Al Qaeda's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction
The authoritative timeline.
BY ROLF MOWATT-LARSSEN | JANUARY 25, 2010
In 1998, al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden declared that acquiring and using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was his Islamic duty -- an integral part of his jihad. Systemically, over the course of decades, he dispatched his top lieutenants to attempt to purchase or develop nuclear and biochemical WMD. He has never given up the goal; indeed, in a 2007 video, he repeated his promise to use massive weapons to upend the global status quo, destroy the capitalist hegemony, and help create an Islamic caliphate.
Since the mid-1990s, al Qaeda's WMD procurement efforts have been managed at the most senior levels, under rules of strict compartmentalization from lower levels of the organization, and with central control over possible targets and the timing of prospective attacks. The modus operandi has been top-down -- more similar to the 9/11 attacks than to more recent bottom-up efforts, like the attempted bombing of Flight 253. For instance, al Qaeda deputy chief Ayman al-Zawahiri personally shepherded the group's ultimately unsuccessful efforts to set off an anthrax attack in the United States.
Al Qaeda concentrated its efforts on nuclear devices in the run-up to the September 11, 2001 attacks. Based on the timing and nature of its WMD-related activity in the 1990s, al Qaeda hoped to use such weapons in the United States during an intensified campaign following the 9/11 attacks. There is no indication that the fundamental objectives that lie behind its WMD intent have changed over time.
Al Qaeda seems to have failed in its mission to successfully detonate WMD due to its overpowering interest in such big-casualty, big-impression attacks. The organization has not pursued simpler, cheaper, and easier-to-use technologies, like crude toxins and poisons, with anything like the same fervor. To be sure, experimentation with and training in such agents was standard fare in al Qaeda's camps in Afghanistan before 9/11. But bin Laden and his top associates left the initiative to lower-ranking planners and individual cells. Once, Zawahiri even canceled a planned attack on the New York City subway in lieu of "something better" that never materialized.
But just because "something better" has never materialized, and just because the threat of WMD terrorism has been used to political ends, does not mean that WMD are not a threat. This chronology provides the knowable extent of al Qaeda's interest in, plans to obtain, and efforts to use the world's most deadly weapons.
Timeline
1988: Osama bin Laden founds al Qaeda. Other founding members include Jamal al-Fadl, Abu Ayoub al-Iraqi, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Dr. Fadhl al-Masry.
Winter 1990 - Spring 1991: Bin Laden and his associates relocate to Khartoum, Sudan.
Feb. 26, 1993: A car bomb is detonated under the World Trade Center in New York City. According to Federal Judge Kevin Duffy, the goal of al Qaeda mastermind Ramzi Youssef was to "engulf the victims trapped in the North Trade Tower in a cloud of cyanide gas." The explosion incinerates the gas, greatly decreasing the number of casualties. Five people die.
Late 1993 - early 1994: Al Qaeda tries to acquire uranium in Sudan to use in a nuclear device. This is the first evidence of bin Laden's plans to purchase nuclear material for an improvised nuclear device.
Evidence of this attempted transaction comes from Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 and became a source for the FBI and CIA. He testifies in court that former Sudanese President Saleh Mobruk attempted to help al Qaeda acquire uranium of South African origin. Fadl says he heard later that the uranium, which al Qaeda acquired for $1.5 million and was tested in Cyprus, was "genuine."
1996: Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (which later merged into al Qaeda), is detained and released by the state security service in Russia. There is unconfirmed speculation that Zawahiri was seeking nuclear weapons or material there.
May 21, 1996: Abu Ubeida al-Banshiri, a founder of al Qaeda, dies in a ferry accident on Lake Victoria. According to testimony from senior al Qaeda officials, he was seeking nuclear material in southern Africa.
May 1996: Al Qaeda's leadership relocates to Afghanistan.
Early 1998: Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) merges with al Qaeda. Zawahiri and EIJ bring technological know-how about chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons to the more ideological al Qaeda. Zawahiri takes control of nuclear and biological weapons development for the whole organization.
Before this time, high-ranking al Qaeda members had held internal discussions about the wisdom and efficacy of pursuing chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear interests. 1998 marked the year when systematic and programmatic efforts began.
Feb. 23, 1998: Bin Laden issues a fatwa against the United States, saying, "The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -- civilians and military -- is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it."
Aug. 7, 1998: Al Qaeda initiates simultaneous suicide truck-bomb attacks at the U.S. embassies in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. At least 230 civilians, mostly locals, die. The FBI places bin Laden on its "10 most wanted" list and starts monitoring al Qaeda closely.
Aug. 20, 1998: The United States destroys the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan, based on suspicions that the plant might be producing the nerve agent VX for the Sudanese government and al Qaeda.
Dec. 24, 1998: Osama bin Laden states in an interview with Time's Rahimullah Yusufzai: "Acquiring [WMD] for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty."
1999-2001: Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan conduct basic training courses in chemical, biological, and radiological weapons for hundreds of extremists. Abu Khabab al-Masri, a chemist and top bomb-maker, and Abu Musab al-Suri (better known as Setmariam), a Spanish citizen born in Syria, conduct the training courses at the Durante and Tarnak farms.
Setmariam is captured in a raid in Pakistan on Nov. 3, 2005. The outspoken proponent of using chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in attacks against the United States tells authorities that al Qaeda had made a mistake by not utilizing WMD on Sept. 11, 2001.
Early 1999: Zawahiri recruits a midlevel Pakistani government biologist with extremist sympathies, Rauf Ahmed, to develop a biological weapons program. He is provided with a laboratory in Kandahar, Afghanistan.
Early 1999: The head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), an al Qaeda-associated militant Islamist group based in southwest Asia, introduces an ex-Malaysian Army captain and California Polytechnic State University (better known as CalPoly) graduate, Yazid Sufaat, to Zawahiri.
Zawahiri starts a second, independent, parallel program to the al Qaeda Afghanistan program, with Sufaat at the helm. Neither program knows of the existence of the other; each reports to Zawahiri independently. This collaboration between al Qaeda and JI is likely the first instance of Islamist terrorist groups jointly developing WMD.
The Afghanistan program, headed by Ahmed, acquires equipment and sets up labs. Sufaat, a more trusted JI member, focuses on developing the anthrax pathogen. He has been described as the "CEO" of al Qaeda's anthrax program.
1999-2001: Al Qaeda's Abdel Aziz al-Masri conducts nuclear-related explosive experiments in the desert. He is an explosives expert and chemical engineer by training, reportedly self-taught on things nuclear.
January 2001: Pakistani nuclear scientists with extremist sympathies create the humanitarian nongovernmental organization Umma Tameer e Nau (UTN). Bashiruddin Mahmood, the former head of Pakistan's Khushab plutonium reactor, is its chair; the former head of Pakistan's Inter-services Intelligence directorate, Hamid Gul, is on its board.
Mahmood is later forced into retirement due to concerns about his extremist sympathies and reliability. He pens controversial books predicting an imminent apocalypse, offering a radical interpretation of the Quran.
June 2001: Sufaat hosts a meeting of the 9/11 attackers in Kuala Lumpur. Sufaat provides a false Malaysian address for Zacarias Moussaoui, who was arrested shortly before 9/11, to help him travel to the United States.
Before Aug. 2001: UTN's Mahmood discreetly offers to construct chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons programs for al Qaeda and the Libyan government. The United States gathers intelligence on the offers and passes it to the Libyan intelligence service office in London. The head of the London office later confirms to the United States that Libya will have no dealings with UTN.
August 2001: Zawahiri personally inspects Ahmed's completed laboratory in Kandahar. He separately meets with Sufaat for a weeklong briefing on the reportedly successful efforts to isolate and produce a lethal strain of anthrax.
Summer 2001: Mohammed Atta, an organizer and leader of the Sept. 11 attacks, allegedly meets with WMD figures, including al Qaeda's Adnan Shukrijumah. According to the FBI, Shukrijumah cases targets in New York City for possible attacks; he is later associated with multiple nuclear and "dirty bomb" plots.
A person fitting Atta's description seeks to apply for a loan to purchase a crop duster in Florida, and is refused. After 9/11, the FBI approaches every U.S. crop duster company, searching for links to terrorists.
Summer 2001: The United States detains Abderraouf Yousef Jdey, who traveled with Moussaoui from Canada into the United States. Moussaoui is detained with crop duster manuals in his possession; Jdey has biology textbooks. They might have been involved in planning a second wave of attacks for immediately after 9/11.
Sept. 11, 2001: Nineteen members of al Qaeda board two passenger planes in the United States, hijacking them and piloting them into the two towers of the World Trade Center in New York. Nearly 3,000 die.
September 2001: Al Qaeda breaks camp. Most senior operatives and their families flee Afghanistan in anticipation of an imminent U.S. invasion.
Oct. 7, 2001: The United States launches Operation Enduring Freedom, invading Afghanistan to neutralize and destroy al Qaeda and bin Laden.
Oct. 23, 2001: Pakistani intelligence services detain a long list of UTN members and associates, at the request of the U.S. government.
Sometime this month, George Tenet, the director of the CIA, meets with President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan regarding the threat posed by UTN and the evidence that al Qaeda might be building chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs. Musharraf reportedly responds, "Men in caves can't do that."
Still, Musharraf agrees to work with the U.S. government to out and arrest Pakistani scientists cooperating with al Qaeda. Musharraf and Pakistan's intelligence services follow through with the promise.
-
1990s-2001: A nuclear weapons network run by the father of the Pakistan nuclear weapons program, Abdul Qadeer Khan, supplies Iran, North Korea, and Libya with nuclear technologies and know-how. Nuclear bomb designs are found on the computer of a European supplier working with the Khan network. Al Qaeda reportedly contacts associates of Khan for assistance with their weapons program. The Khan network rejects them, for unknown reasons.
Nov. 7, 2001: Bin Laden states in an interview with Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir, "I wish to declare that if America used chemical or nuclear weapons against us, then we may retort with chemical and nuclear weapons. We have the weapons as a deterrent."
In the same interview, Zawahiri states, "If you have $30 million, go to the black market in central Asia, contact any disgruntled Soviet scientist, and a lot of dozens of smart briefcase bombs are available. They have contacted us, we sent our people to Moscow to Tashkent to other central Asian states, and they negotiated and we purchased some suitcase bombs."
Nov. 14, 2001: U.S. President George W. Bush meets with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Crawford, Texas. Bush presents a briefing on the proliferation threat posed by UTN. Bush asks Putin if he is certain that all Russian nuclear weapons and materials are secure. Putin responds that he can only vouch for the safety of nuclear materials since he gained power.
November 2001: Pakistan arrests Mahmood and many other members of UTN. Mahmood confesses that he met with bin Laden around a campfire that summer in Pakistan. He says they discussed how al Qaeda could build a nuclear device. He drew a very rough sketch of an improvised nuclear device, but advised bin Laden that it would be too hard to develop weapons-usable materials for it. Bin Laden reportedly said, "What if I already have them?"
November 2001: A search of UTN's Kabul office produces documents containing crude chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear-related plans, including hand-written notes in Arabic and Internet-related searches.
December 2001: Malaysian authorities arrest Sufaat, the JI leader working with al Qaeda on nuclear weapons. Pakistani authorities arrest Ahmed, his Afghan counterpart, at his home in Islamabad. Ahmed confesses his involvement in the project and provides substantiating evidence.
January 2002: U.S. and Egyptian forces capture al Qaeda senior operative Ibn al-Shaykh al Libi. During interrogation by Egyptians, al Libi claims al Qaeda operatives received chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons training in Baghdad. He claims several small containers of nuclear material were smuggled into New York City by the Russian mafia. Al Libi later recants this statement.
March 2002: Russian special services assassinate Chechen leader Ibn al-Khattab, using poison, the kind of weapon he hoped to use against high-level Russian targets.
March 28, 2002: U.S. and Pakistani forces capture al Qaeda leader Abu Zubaydah in Faisalabad, Pakistan. During interrogation, he reveals a plot by an American associate of al Qaeda, Jose Padilla, to explode a "dirty bomb" in the United States. Padilla is subsequently identified and arrested in Chicago.
Spring 2002: In Khartoum, Sudan, a CIA officer meets with two senior al Qaeda associates, Mubarak al-Duri and Abu Rida Mohammed Bayazid, in a brokered arrangement. The CIA officer attempts to determine whether they were involved in al Qaeda's nuclear and biological weapons programs.
Bayazid, a founding member of al Qaeda, graduated from the University of Arizona with an advanced degree in physics. He was directly involved in al Qaeda's attempt to purchase uranium in 1993 and 1994. Al-Duri, an agronomist, also received his degree at the University of Arizona. He told the CIA officer, "Killing millions [of you] is justifiable by any means.... It is your doing. You made us what we are."
Summer 2002: Al Qaeda leaders in Saudi Arabia begin planning attacks against the royal family and Saudi oil assets. Nuclear and biological weapons-related references begin to appear in communications between top-level al Qaeda leaders and the Saudi cell.
Summer 2002: With bin Laden's blessing, al Qaeda issues two fatwas to justify an escalation of terrorism. One authorizes attacks on infidels other than Americans, including the Saudi royal family. The other justifies the use of WMD. Al Qaeda-associated extremists start to case Saudi targets, including the city of Ras al-Tanura and facilities belonging to oil giant Aramco.
June 2002: Extremists under Zarqawi's command conduct crude chemical and biological training and experiments in a remote camp, Khurmal, in northeastern Iraq. The commanders include men who served with Zarqawi at the Herat camp. Zarqawi has close ties with al Qaeda, but is an independent operator who never swore loyalty (bayat) to bin Laden.
July 10, 2002: Al Qaeda spokesman Sulayman Abu Ghayth al-Libi, under "house arrest" in Iran, says al Qaeda's fatwa justifies the use of WMD to kill four million Americans.
August 2002: CNN runs an exposé on al Qaeda's late-1990s experiments with crude toxins and poisons. Abu Khabab al-Masri led the gruesome efforts, testing the lethality of cyanide creams, ricin, mustard, sarin, and botulinum. A tape shows al Qaeda associates gassing dogs to death. Al-Masri later laments that his students did not take the training to heart by using the toxic weapons in terrorist attacks.
September - December 2002: Zarqawi associates infiltrate Turkey, Britain, Spain, Italy, France, Sweden, Germany, and other countries. They begin coordinating and planning ricin and cyanide attacks via a loose association of cells.
Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney receive briefings on the Zarqawi network's activities and plans to attack with poisons and toxins. Over the course of several briefings, U.S. knowledge of the extent of the network grows from a handful of terrorists in one country to dozens of extremists in 30 countries.
Jan. 5, 2003: In a bloody raid on a safehouse, Britain arrests seven extremists plotting to use ricin poison on the London Underground. This represents the first in a wave of arrests of Zarqawi-network terrorists in Britain, continental Europe, and beyond. The arrests confirm intelligence reports, producing forensic evidence of planning for crude-poison and toxin attacks.
January - March 2003: Zarqawi-associated operatives are arrested, disrupting ricin and cyanide attacks, in Britain, Spain, Italy, and France.
Feb. 5, 2003: U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell gives a speech to the U.N. Security Council, naming the Herat camp leadership, including Zarqawi. He identifies poison-attack cells across Europe.
February - March 2003: Zarqawi returns to Baghdad to prepare for an insurgency to meet the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
March 1, 2003: 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) is captured in Pakistan. Confronted with the evidence found during the raid, KSM confirms some details of al Qaeda's nuclear and biological weapons programs. He later recants some of his testimony.
March 2003: Zawahiri calls off an attack that had been planned against the New York City subway system, in lieu of "something better." Al Qaeda associates from Bahrain had cased the subway system in December 2002 and planned an attack with a homemade cyanogen gas-releasing device called a "mobtaker."
March-May 2003: Al Qaeda Saudi senior operative Abu Bakr communicates with Iran-based al Qaeda senior members, including the chief of operations. They plan to purchase three "Russian nuclear devices." An unidentified Pakistan specialist is enlisted to verify the goods.
May 21, 2003: Radical Saudi cleric Nasir al-Fahd writes a fatwa justifying the use of WMD. Another radical cleric, Ali al-Khudair, endorses it.
May 28, 2003: The Saudi intelligence agency makes a series of arrests in a campaign to neutralize al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and eliminate its capacity to mount attacks. Al-Fahd is arrested. Cyanide is found in an al Qaeda safehouse in Riyadh.
June 26, 2003: An Armenian citizen, Garik Dadayan, is caught with 170 grams of highly enriched uranium on the Georgia-Armenia border. This is allegedly a sample of a larger cache, due to be sold to an unknown customer, possibly in the Middle East.
Aug. 13, 2003: Riduan Isamuddin, the head of JI, is arrested. He provides confirmation of his role in the anthrax program.
After August 2003, it is not possible to extend the chronology without excluding considerable information that is sensitive or classified. Even though the passage of time has enabled more of the story of al Qaeda's WMD efforts to be told, much detail remains too sensitive to reveal, even in the years covered by this chronology. It is not the author's intent to reveal information that might frustrate efforts to identify and neutralize al Qaeda's ongoing efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction. Rather, it is his hope that an accurate portrayal of a compact period in the recent past would enable the reader to develop an understanding of the intensity of al Qaeda's interest in WMD, as well as an appreciation for the U.S. government's response to it.
Save over 50% when you subscribe to FP.
AFP/Getty Images
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen is a senior fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Prior to his appointment at Harvard, he led the government's efforts at the Department of Energy and the Central Intelligence Agency to find and track potential nuclear terrorists and to prevent a nuclear terrorist attack on the U.S. An expanded version of this introduction and timeline are available here.
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/25/al_qaedas_pursuit_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction
-
Seems like it is just a matter of time doesn't it?
Iran will start the race in the Middle East I guess.
Everyone wants to be the big kid on the block.
I always felt Indians felt some shame in the poverty and third world status of their country.
Lets not think nucs will not be a source of "pride".
What is the answer?
****Associated Press Writer Muneeza Naqvi, Associated Press Writer – Sun Feb 7, 7:39 am ET
NEW DELHI – India again successfully test-fired a nuclear-capable missile Sunday that can hit targets across much of Asia and the Middle East, a defense ministry press release said.
It was the fourth test of the Agni III missile, the statement added. The first attempt in 2006 failed, but the last two tests were successful.
"The Agni III missile tested for the full range, hit the target with pinpoint accuracy and met all the mission objectives," the press release added.
India's current arsenal of missiles is largely intended for confronting archrival Pakistan. The Agni III, in contrast, is India's longest-range missile, designed to reach 3,000 kilometers (1,900 miles) — putting China's major cities well into range, as well as Middle Eastern targets.
India's homegrown missile arsenal already includes the short-range Prithvi ballistic missile, the medium-range Akash, the anti-tank Nag and the supersonic Brahmos missile, developed jointly with Russia.
The missile was launched from Wheeler Island off the eastern state of Orissa on Sunday morning.
The test appeared unlikely to significantly raise tensions in the region.
Nuclear-armed neighbors India and Pakistan usually notify each other ahead of such missile launches, in keeping with an agreement between the two nations. India and Pakistan have fought three wars since they gained independence from Britain in 1947.
The two sides began talks aimed at resolving their differences over the Himalayan region of Kashmir and other disputes in 2004. India put the peace process on hold soon after terrorist attacks in Mumbai in November 2008, which India blamed on the Pakistan-based militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba.
India recently offered to restart peace talks, though Pakistan has yet to formally accept.****
-
The Jihadist CBRN Threat
February 10, 2010
By Scott Stewart
In an interview aired Feb. 7 on CNN, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said she considers weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in the hands of an international terrorist group to be the largest threat faced by the United States today, even bigger than the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. “The biggest nightmare that many of us have is that one of these terrorist member organizations within this syndicate of terror will get their hands on a weapon of mass destruction,” Clinton said. In referring to the al Qaeda network, Clinton noted that it is “unfortunately a very committed, clever, diabolical group of terrorists who are always looking for weaknesses and openings.”
Clinton’s comments came on the heels of a presentation by U.S. Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. In his Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community on Feb. 2, Blair noted that, although counterterrorism actions have dealt a significant blow to al Qaeda’s near-term efforts to develop a sophisticated chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) attack capability, the U.S. intelligence community judges that the group is still intent on acquiring the capability. Blair also stated the obvious when he said that if al Qaeda were able to develop CBRN weapons and had the operatives to use them it would do so.
All this talk about al Qaeda and WMD has caused a number of STRATFOR clients, readers and even friends and family members to ask for our assessment of this very worrisome issue. So, we thought it would be an opportune time to update our readers on the topic.
Realities Shaping the Playing Field
To begin a discussion of jihadists and WMD, it is first important to briefly re-cap STRATFOR’s assessment of al Qaeda and the broader jihadist movement. It is our assessment that the first layer of the jihadist movement, the al Qaeda core group, has been hit heavily by the efforts of the United States and its allies in the aftermath of 9/11. Due to the military, financial, diplomatic, intelligence and law enforcement operations conducted against the core group, it is now a far smaller and more insular organization than it once was and is largely confined geographically to the Afghan-Pakistani border. Having lost much of its operational ability, the al Qaeda core is now involved primarily in the ideological struggle (which it seems to be losing at the present time).
The second layer in the jihadist realm consists of regional terrorist or insurgent groups that have adopted the jihadist ideology. Some of these have taken up the al Qaeda banner, such as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and we refer to them as al Qaeda franchise groups. Other groups may adopt some or all of al Qaeda’s jihadist ideology and cooperate with the core group, but they will maintain their independence for a variety of reasons. In recent years, these groups have assumed the mantle of leadership for the jihadist movement on the physical battlefield.
The third (and broadest) component of the jihadist movement is composed of grassroots jihadists. These are individuals or small groups of people located across the globe who are inspired by the al Qaeda core and the franchise groups but who may have little or no actual connection to these groups. By their very nature, the grassroots jihadists are the hardest of these three components to identify and target and, as a result, are able to move with more freedom than members of the al Qaeda core or the regional franchises.
As long as the ideology of jihadism exists, and jihadists at any of these three layers embrace the philosophy of attacking the “far enemy,” there will be a threat of attacks by jihadists against the United States. The types of attacks they are capable of conducting, however, depend on their intent and capability. Generally speaking, the capability of the operatives associated with the al Qaeda core is the highest and the capability of grassroots operatives is the lowest. Certainly, many grassroots operatives think big and would love to conduct a large, devastating attack, but their grandiose plans often come to naught for lack of experience and terrorist tradecraft.
Although the American public has long anticipated a follow-on attack to 9/11, most of the attacks directed against the United States since 9/11 have failed. In addition to incompetence and poor tradecraft, one of the contributing factors to these failures is the nature of the targets. Many strategic targets are large and well-constructed, and therefore hard to destroy. In other words, just because a strategic target is attacked does not mean the attack has succeeded. Indeed, many such attacks have failed. Even when a plot against a strategic target is successfully executed, it might not produce the desired results and would therefore be considered a failure. For example, the detonation of a massive truck bomb in a parking garage of the World Trade Center in 1993 failed to achieve the jihadists’ aims of toppling the two towers and producing mass casualties, or of causing a major U.S. foreign policy shift.
Many strategic targets, such as embassies, are well protected against conventional attacks. Their large standoff distances and physical security measures (like substantial perimeter walls) protect them from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), while these and other security measures make it difficult to cause significant damage to them using smaller IEDs or small arms.
To overcome these obstacles, jihadists have been forced to look at alternate means of attack. Al Qaeda’s use of large, fully fueled passenger aircraft as guided missiles is a great example of this, though it must be noted that once that tactic became known, it ceased to be viable (as United Airlines Flight 93 demonstrated). Today, there is little chance that a flight crew and passengers of an aircraft would allow it to be seized by a small group of hijackers.
CBRN
Al Qaeda has long plotted ways to overcome security measures and launch strategic strikes with CBRN weapons. In addition to the many public pronouncements the group has made about its desire to obtain and use such weapons, we know al Qaeda has developed crude methods for producing chemical and biological weapons and included such tactics in its encyclopedia of jihad and terrorist training courses.
However, as STRATFOR has repeatedly pointed out, chemical and biological weapons are expensive and difficult to use and have proved to be largely ineffective in real-world applications. A comparison of the Aum Shinrikyo chemical and biological attacks in Tokyo with the March 2004 jihadist attacks in Madrid clearly demonstrates that explosives are far cheaper, easier to use and more effective in killing people. The failure by jihadists in Iraq to use chlorine effectively in their attacks also underscores the problem of using improvised chemical weapons. These problems were also apparent to the al Qaeda leadership, which scrapped a plot to use improvised chemical weapons in the New York subway system due to concerns that the weapons would be ineffective. The pressure jihadist groups are under would also make it very difficult for them to develop a chemical or biological weapons facility, even if they possessed the financial and human resources required to launch such a program.
Of course, it is not unimaginable for al Qaeda or other jihadists to think outside the box and attack a chemical storage site or tanker car, or use such bulk chemicals to attack another target — much as the 9/11 hijackers used passenger- and fuel-laden aircraft to attack their targets. However, while an attack using deadly bulk chemicals could kill many people, most would be evacuated before they could receive a lethal dose, as past industrial accidents have demonstrated. Therefore, such an attack would be messy but would be more likely to cause mass panic and evacuations than mass casualties. Still, it would be a far more substantial attack than the previous subway plot using improvised chemical weapons.
A similar case can be made against the effectiveness of an attack involving a radiological dispersion device (RDD), sometimes called a “dirty bomb.” While RDDs are easy to deploy — so simple that we are surprised one has not already been used within the United States — it is very difficult to immediately administer a lethal dose of radiation to victims. Therefore, the “bomb” part of a dirty bomb would likely kill more people than the device’s “dirty,” or radiological, component. However, use of an RDD would result in mass panic and evacuations and could require a lengthy and expensive decontamination process. Because of this, we refer to RDDs as “weapons of mass disruption” rather than weapons of mass destruction.
The bottom line is that a nuclear device is the only element of the CBRN threat that can be relied upon to create mass casualties and guarantee the success of a strategic strike. However, a nuclear device is also by far the hardest of the CBRN weapons to obtain or manufacture and therefore the least likely to be used. Given the pressure that al Qaeda and its regional franchise groups are under in the post-9/11 world, it is simply not possible for them to begin a weapons program intended to design and build a nuclear device. Unlike countries such as North Korea and Iran, jihadists simply do not have the resources or the secure territory on which to build such facilities. Even with money and secure facilities, it is still a long and difficult endeavor to create a nuclear weapons program — as is evident in the efforts of North Korea and Iran. This means that jihadists would be forced to obtain an entire nuclear device from a country that did have a nuclear weapons program, or fissile material such as highly enriched uranium (enriched to 80 percent or higher of the fissile isotope U-235) that they could use to build a crude, gun-type nuclear weapon.
Indeed, we know from al Qaeda defectors like Jamal al-Fadl that al Qaeda attempted to obtain fissile material as long ago as 1994. The organization was duped by some of the scammers who were roaming the globe attempting to sell bogus material following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Several U.S. government agencies were duped in similar scams.
Black-market sales of military-grade radioactive materials spiked following the collapse of the Soviet Union as criminal elements descended on abandoned Russian nuclear facilities in search of a quick buck. In subsequent years the Russian government, in conjunction with various international agencies and the U.S. government, clamped down on the sale of Soviet-era radioactive materials. U.S. aid to Russia in the form of so-called “nonproliferation assistance” — money paid to destroy or adequately secure such nuclear and radiological material — increased dramatically following 9/11. In 2009, the U.S. Congress authorized around $1.2 billion for U.S. programs that provide nonproliferation and threat reduction assistance to the former Soviet Union. Such programs have resulted in a considerable amount of fissile material being taken off the market and removed from vulnerable storage sites, and have made it far harder to obtain fissile material today than it was in 1990 or even 2000.
Another complication to consider is that jihadists are not the only parties who are in the market for nuclear weapons or fissile material. In addition to counterproliferation programs that offer to pay money for fissile materials, countries like Iran and North Korea would likely be quick to purchase such items, and they have the resources to do so, unlike jihadist groups, which are financially strapped.
Some commentators have said they believe al Qaeda has had nuclear weapons for years but has been waiting to activate them at the “right time.” Others claim these weapons are pre-positioned inside U.S. cities. STRATFOR’s position is that if al Qaeda had such weapons prior to 9/11, it would have used them instead of conducting the airline attack. Even if the group had succeeded in obtaining a nuclear weapon after 9/11, it would have used it by now rather than simply sitting on it and running the risk of it being seized.
There is also the question of state assistance to terrorist groups, but the actions of the jihadist movement since 9/11 have served to steadily turn once quietly supportive (or ambivalent) states against the movement. Saudi Arabia declared war on jihadists in 2003 and countries such as Yemen, Pakistan and Indonesia have recently gone on the offensive. Indeed, in his Feb. 2 presentation to the Senate committee, Blair said: “We do not know of any states deliberately providing CBRN assistance to terrorist groups. Although terrorist groups and individuals have sought out scientists with applicable expertise, we have no corroborated reporting that indicates such experts have advanced terrorist CBRN capability.” Blair also noted that, “We and many in the international community are especially concerned about the potential for terrorists to gain access to WMD-related materials or technology.”
Clearly, any state that considered providing WMD to jihadists would have to worry about blow-back from countries that would be targeted by that material (such as the United States and Russia). With jihadists having declared war on the governments of countries in which they operate, officials in a position to provide CBRN to those jihadists would also have ample reason to be concerned about the materials being used against their own governments.
Efforts to counter the proliferation of nuclear materials and technology will certainly continue for the foreseeable future, especially efforts to ensure that governments with nuclear weapons programs do not provide weapons or fissile material to jihadist groups. While the chance of such a terrorist attack is remote, the devastation one could cause means that it must be carefully guarded against.
-
For Israel the threat are probably the opposite.
Israel is screwed.
Iran's regimes intentions could not be more clear.
Could a miracle occur and there be a topple of the present regime?
Otherwise war is the only way Jews in Israel will survive IMO.
Again the world idles while Jew haters prepare for war with fanatical arming.
Where are you now Soros? Of all people.
-
Some profound implications here:
U.S. successfully tests airborne laser on missile
6:52am EST
WASHINGTON (Reuters) - A U.S. high-powered airborne laser weapon shot down a ballistic missile in the first successful test of a futuristic directed energy weapon, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said on Friday.
The agency said in a statement the test took place at 8:44 p.m. PST (11:44 p.m. EST) on Thursday /0444 GMT on Friday) at Point Mugu's Naval Air Warfare Center-Weapons Division Sea Range off Ventura in central California.
"The Missile Defense Agency demonstrated the potential use of directed energy to defend against ballistic missiles when the Airborne Laser Testbed (ALTB) successfully destroyed a boosting ballistic missile" the agency said.
The high-powered Airborne Laser system is being developed by Boeing Co., the prime contractor, and the U.S. Missile Defense Agency.
Boeing produces the airframe, a modified 747 jumbo jet, while Northrop Grumman supplies the higher-energy laser and Lockheed Martin is developing the beam and fire control systems.
"This was the first directed energy lethal intercept demonstration against a liquid-fuel boosting ballistic missile target from an airborne platform," the agency added.
The airborne laser weapon successfully underwent its first in-flight test against a target missile back in August. During that test, Boeing said the modified 747-400F aircraft took off from Edwards Air Force Base and used its infrared sensors to find a target missile launched from San Nicolas Island, California.
The plane's battle management system issued engagement and target location instructions to the laser's fire control system, which tracked the target and fired a test laser at the missile. Instruments on the missile verified the system had hit its mark, Boeing said.
The airborne laser weapon is aimed at deterring enemy missile attacks and providing the U.S. military with the ability to engage all classes of ballistic missiles at the speed of light while they are in the boost phase of flight.
"The revolutionary use of directed energy is very attractive for missile defense, with the potential to attack multiple targets at the speed of light, at a range of hundreds of kilometers (miles), and at a low cost per intercept attempt compared to current technologies," the U.S. Missile Defense Agency said.
(Reporting by Jim Wolf and David Alexander, Editing by Sandra Maler)
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE61B18C20100212?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A%20reuters%2FtopNews%20%28News%20%2F%20US%20%2F%20Top%20News%29
-
WASHINGTON — As President Obama begins making final decisions on a broad new nuclear strategy for the United States, senior aides say he will permanently reduce America’s arsenal by thousands of weapons. But the administration has rejected proposals that the United States declare it would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, aides said.
Mr. Obama’s new strategy — which would annul or reverse several initiatives by the Bush administration — will be contained in a nearly completed document called the Nuclear Posture Review, which all presidents undertake. Aides said Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates will present Mr. Obama with several options on Monday to address unresolved issues in that document, which have been hotly debated within the administration.
First among them is the question of whether, and how, to narrow the circumstances under which the United States will declare it might use nuclear weapons — a key element of nuclear deterrence since the cold war.
Mr. Obama’s decisions on nuclear weapons come as conflicting pressures in his defense policy are intensifying. His critics argue that his embrace of a new movement to eliminate nuclear weapons around the world is naïve and dangerous, especially at a time of new nuclear threats, particularly from Iran and North Korea. But many of his supporters fear that over the past year he has moved too cautiously, and worry that he will retain the existing American policy by leaving open the possibility that the United States might use nuclear weapons in response to a biological or chemical attack, perhaps against a nation that does not possess a nuclear arsenal.
That is one of the central debates Mr. Obama must resolve in the next few weeks, his aides say.
Many elements of the new strategy have already been completed, according to senior administration and military officials who have been involved in more than a half-dozen Situation Room debates about it, and outside strategists consulted by the White House.
As described by those officials, the new strategy commits the United States to developing no new nuclear weapons, including the nuclear bunker-busters advocated by the Bush administration. But Mr. Obama has already announced that he will spend billions of dollars more on updating America’s weapons laboratories to assure the reliability of what he intends to be a much smaller arsenal. Increased confidence in the reliability of American weapons, Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. said in a speech in February, would make elimination of “redundant” nuclear weapons possible.
“It will be clear in the document that there will be very dramatic reductions — in the thousands — as relates to the stockpile,” according to one senior administration official whom the White House authorized to discuss the issue this weekend. Much of that would come from the retirement of large numbers of weapons now kept in storage.
Other officials, not officially allowed to speak on the issue, say that in back-channel discussions with allies, the administration has also been quietly broaching the question of whether to withdraw American tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, where they provide more political reassurance than actual defense. Those weapons are now believed to be in Germany, Italy, Belgium, Turkey and the Netherlands.
At the same time, the new document will steer the United States toward more non-nuclear defenses. It relies more heavily on missile defense, much of it arrayed within striking distance of the Persian Gulf, focused on the emerging threat from Iran. Mr. Obama’s recently published Quadrennial Defense Review also includes support for a new class of non-nuclear weapons, called “Prompt Global Strike,” that could be fired from the United States and hit a target anywhere in less than an hour.
The idea, officials say, would be to give the president a non-nuclear option for, say, a large strike on the leadership of Al Qaeda in the mountains of Pakistan, or a pre-emptive attack on an impending missile launch from North Korea. But under Mr. Obama’s strategy, the missiles would be based at new sites around the United States that might even be open to inspection, so that Russia and China would know that a missile launched from those sites was not nuclear — to avoid having them place their own nuclear forces on high alert.
But the big question confronting Mr. Obama is how he will describe the purpose of America’s nuclear arsenal. It is far more than just an academic debate.
Some leading Democrats, led by Senator Dianne Feinstein of California, chairwoman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, have asked Mr. Obama to declare that the “sole purpose” of the country’s nuclear arsenal is to deter nuclear attack. “We’re under considerable pressure on this one within our own party,” one of Mr. Obama’s national security advisers said recently.
But inside the Pentagon and among many officials in the White House, Mr. Obama has been urged to retain more ambiguous wording — declaring that deterring nuclear attack is the primary purpose of the American arsenal, not the only one. That would leave open the option of using nuclear weapons against foes that might threaten the United States with biological or chemical weapons or transfer nuclear material to terrorists.
===========
Page 2 of 2)
Any compromise wording that leaves in place elements of the Bush-era pre-emption policy, or suggests the United States could use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear adversary, would disappoint many on the left wing of his party, and some arms control advocates.
“Any declaration that deterring a nuclear attack is a ‘primary purpose’ of our arsenal leaves open the possibility that there are other purposes, and it would not reflect any reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,” said Daryl G. Kimball, the executive director of the Arms Control Association. “It wouldn’t be consistent with what the president said in his speech in Prague” a year ago, when he laid out an ambitious vision for moving toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.
Mr. Obama’s base has already complained in recent months that he has failed to break from Bush era national security policy in some fundamental ways. They cite, for example, his stepped-up use of drones to strike suspected terrorists in Pakistan and his failure to close the Guantánamo Bay detention facility by January as Mr. Obama had promised.
While Mr. Obama ended financing last year for a new nuclear warhead sought by the Bush administration, the new strategy goes further. It commits Mr. Obama to developing no new nuclear weapons, including a low-yield, deeply-burrowing nuclear warhead that the Pentagon sought to strike buried targets, like the nuclear facilities in North Korea and Iran. Mr. Obama, officials said, has determined he could not stop other countries from seeking new weapons if the United States was doing the same.
Still, some of Mr. Obama’s critics in his own party say the change is symbolic because he is spending more to improve old weapons.
At the center of the new strategy is a renewed focus on arms control and nonproliferation agreements, which were largely dismissed by the Bush administration. That includes an effort to win passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was defeated during the Clinton administration and faces huge hurdles in the Senate, and revisions of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty to close loopholes that critics say have been exploited by Iran and North Korea.
Mr. Obama’s reliance on new, non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike weapons is bound to be contentious. As described by advocates within the Pentagon and in the military, the new weapons could achieve the effects of a nuclear weapon, without turning a conventional war into a nuclear one. As a result, the administration believes it could create a new form of deterrence — a way to contain countries that possess or hope to develop nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, without resorting to a nuclear option.
-
Summary
U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates and President Barack Obama are debating the final details of the latest U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), which informs a broad spectrum of Pentagon plans, March 1. Though the fundamental strategic balance is unlikely to change, the NPR and the ongoing negotiations with Russia over a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty will bear considerable watching.
Analysis
U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates is meeting with President Barack Obama on March 1 to discuss final options for the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The NPR has seen several delays and was previously slated to be released alongside the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and Ballistic Missile Defense Review on Feb. 1. Now expected to be released mid-March, the NPR is almost certainly largely complete, with the final issues being hammered out between the state and defense departments and the White House.
There reportedly has been some disagreement between the Pentagon and the White House over the review, centered on a draft that the White House criticized as too much of a continuation of the status quo. The precise details of what Gates and Obama are discussing March 1 are currently unclear, but it appears to be the White House’s intention to press the Pentagon on wording about the circumstances under which the United States might consider using nuclear weapons and on warhead reductions. Though the exact scale of those reductions remains unclear, the White House appears to be pushing for more of a seminal document and less of the status quo. But large reductions will have to come from somewhere other than the operationally deployed arsenal.
The operationally deployed arsenal is thought to have already been reduced to below 2,200 strategic warheads in conformity with the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), signed in Moscow in 2002. The bulk of any further reductions in the arsenal are expected to come mostly from weapons held in reserve in storage. While the exact size and composition of the operationally deployed strategic deterrent and reserve stockpile poses some technical questions, most of the fat has already been trimmed from the operationally deployed arsenal, and large reductions beyond the 1,700-2,200 warheads stipulated by SORT seem unlikely at this point.
The 1,700-2,200 figure supposedly originated in the Pentagon in the first place, representing a figure the military felt comfortable with. Negotiations with Moscow on a replacement for the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which lapsed in December 2009, are taking place concurrently with the NPR discussions. Further reductions in the size of the U.S. arsenal per the NPR are unlikely to impress Moscow, which is happy with a largely symbolic reduction below the SORT-stipulated numbers. Negotiators on the START replacement already reportedly have settled on around 1,600 operationally deployed warheads — a figure both the Pentagon and the Kremlin likely are comfortable with.
Russia is watching the U.S. NPR process closely, but not for a shift on warhead numbers. Issues likely to be in the final NPR — continued emphasis on ballistic missile defenses (BMD), which Russia opposes; Russia’s perception of the precise language of the circumstances under which Washington will consider using nuclear weapons and increasing emphasis on non-nuclear deterrence capabilities that, in the Kremlin’s eyes, would alter the strategic balance — will affect START negotiations as well. Russia is not simply waiting on the NPR to put ink to paper; there remain important areas of disagreement, like the U.S. BMD systems specifically slated for former Warsaw Pact countries and the availability of test and telemetry data on new weapon systems (which Russia is developing, but the United States is not).
And yet the NPR is also something of a non-issue. At the end of the day, the United States will retain the most robust and reliable nuclear deterrent in the world, and publicly released nuclear doctrine aside, will retain the ability to use nuclear weapons at its discretion when its national interests are threatened.
Both the United States and Russia have an interest in sustaining a bilateral, long-term nuclear arms control regime. The NPR will support that, and despite some points to still be settled, a START replacement is likely to be inked eventually as well.
-
Breaking News Alert
The New York Times
Mon, April 05, 2010 -- 8:15 PM ET
-----
Obama Limits When U.S. Can Use Nuclear Weapons
WASHINGTON -- President Obama said Monday that he was
revamping American nuclear strategy to substantially narrow
the conditions under which the United States would use
nuclear weapons, even in self defense.
The strategy eliminates much of the ambiguity that has
deliberately existed in American nuclear policy since the
opening days of the Cold War. For the first time, the United
States is explicitly committing not to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear states that are in compliance with the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, even if they attacked the
United States with biological or chemical weapons, or
launched a crippling cyberattack.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com?emc=na
-
And thus the Obama doctrine of pre-emptive surrender is born. Yay.
-
(http://www.dansdecals.com/images/ebay/BumperStickers/MissMeYet-Bush.jpg)
-
By JONATHAN WEISMAN And PETER SPIEGEL
WASHINGTON—The Obama administration will release a new national nuclear-weapons strategy Tuesday that makes only modest changes to U.S. nuclear forces, leaving intact the longstanding U.S. threat to use nuclear weapons first, even against non-nuclear nations.
View Full Image
Getty Images
The Obama administration will release a new national nuclear-weapons strategy Tuesday that makes only modest changes to U.S. nuclear forces.
.But the new policy will narrow potential U.S. nuclear targets, and for the first time makes explicit the goal of making deterrence of a nuclear strike the "sole objective" of U.S. nuclear weapons, a senior Obama administration official said Monday.
Also for the first time, nations complying with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations that attack the U.S. or its allies with chemical or biological weapons will no longer be threatened with nuclear retaliation, the official said. But the president will make clear they would "face the prospect of a devastating conventional attack," the official said.
The document, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, is the first rethinking of the U.S. nuclear strategy since President George W. Bush released his revised policies three months after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks. It does offer clearer assurances that non-nuclear nations complying with nuclear proliferation accords will not be targeted, and it moves toward additional safeguards against accidental nuclear launches. But more dramatic changes, contemplated just weeks ago, were shelved after President Barack Obama secured a nuclear arms-control treaty with Russia that will shape the U.S. arsenal for the next decade.
Journal Community
Vote: Should the U.S. declare it will not use nuclear weapons first?
.The release of the review will kick off a lengthy series of defense-policy events that Mr. Obama hopes will further his aims of countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons and materials, and of isolating Iran.
On Thursday, he and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will sign a treaty cutting deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals by 30%.
Meanwhile, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said Tuesday that Russia reserves the right to withdraw from its new arms-control treaty with the U.S. if it decides the planned U.S. missile-defense shield threatens its security, the Associated Press reported. Mr. Lavrov said Russia will issue a statement outlining the terms for such a withdrawal after Messrs. Obama and Medvedev sign the treaty, AP reported.
"Russia will have the right to opt out of the treaty if qualitative and quantitative parameters of the U.S. strategic missile defense begin to significantly effect the efficiency of Russian strategic nuclear forces," Mr. Lavrov told the AP.
Next week, more than 40 heads of state convene in Washington for a summit on counter-proliferation, which will lead to efforts at the United Nations to tighten economic sanctions against Iran to choke off its nuclear ambitions. Next month, Mr. Obama will try to use the first U.N. review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in five years to toughen the treaty and isolate two of its scofflaws, Iran and North Korea.
"Release of nuclear posture review will set the stage," said a U.S. official involved in proliferation issues.
To many arms-control advocates, the review is likely to be a disappointment. "It's a status quo document, I think, in virtually every respect," said Bruce Blair, president of World Security Institute and co-coordinator of Global Zero, a disarmament group.
With Senate approval needed for the pact with Russia to cut nuclear arsenals, administration officials did not want to commit to dramatic changes in nuclear policy that opponents could use to build opposition to the treaty, Mr. Blair said. Republican Senate aides said they expected a document they could embrace.
But the administration official said the "adjustments" in the U.S. position narrow any contingencies for a nuclear strike. The document will say "there remains a narrow range of contingencies in which the option of using nuclear weapons can play a role in deterring large-scale conventional, chemical or biological attack," he said. But it will add that Washington "will continue to move" toward "making nuclear deterrence the sole objective" of the arsenal. The adjective "sole" has become a key measurement in diplomatic circles where U.S. nuclear forces have long been seen as an impediment to stopping nuclear proliferation.
The document will more clearly say the U.S. will not attack non-nuclear nations that have signed and are complying with the U.N. nonproliferation treaty, according to officials familiar with it. That effectively narrows the potential U.S. nuclear targets to the eight declared nuclear powers, as well as Iran and possibly Syria, said Joseph Cirincione, president of the Ploughshares Fund, an arms-control group. U.S. officials consider those two nations to be not fully compliant with the nonproliferation treaty.
The nuclear strategy will not take U.S. nuclear weapons off submarines, bombers and missiles that could fire them at a moment's notice. But the administration will recommend changes to the nuclear command structure that would make accidental launches more unlikely, officials said. They will also call for fortifying U.S. nuclear launch systems, so military officials would not believe they have to launch a nuclear strike out of fear that an incoming attack would destroy the U.S. response capacity.
For the first time, the strategy makes counter-proliferation the highest priority of nuclear policy makers.
The new strategy will emphasize reducing reliance on the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence, and will commit to accelerating the deployment of non-nuclear deterrent capabilities, such as missile defenses and the forward deployment of U.S. forces to trouble spots.
But the administration backed away from language that its allies in the arms-control community believed they would secure. Officials considered detailing their goals for the next round of arms talks with Russia, including controls on battlefield tactical nuclear weapons, dismantling mothballed warheads and reducing total deployments to 1,000 warheads a side, down from the 1,550 limit in the new treaty. But the new doctrine will not contain such specifics, nor will it adopt language threatening nuclear attack only against nuclear threats.
"The United States should be able to clearly state that the only purpose we hold nuclear weapons for is to deter the use of nuclear weapons," said Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association. "There is no conventional threat out there that we cannot counter with our overwhelming conventional forces."
—Jay Solomon contributed to this article.
Write to Jonathan Weisman at jonathan.weisman@wsj.com and Peter Spiegel at peter.spiegel@wsj.com
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2010/04/disarming-america.html
Tuesday, April 06, 2010
Disarming America
It's bad enough that President Obama is about to sign a new START agreement with Russia--an accord that is little more than a gift to Moscow. But Mr. Obama is now making matters far worse with his "Nuclear Posture Review," which further weakens our deterrent capabilities.
Previewing his new policy for the court stenographers at The New York Times, the president set limits on how the U.S. might use nuclear weapons, even in self-defense. Mr. Obama said the United States would commit "to not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that adhere to non-proliferation treaties--even if those countries attack the U.S. with chemical or biological weapons."
While stopping short of a "no first use" policy, the Obama doctrine clearly constrains our potential employment of nuclear weapons. In his interview with the Times, the president said one of his goals is to "move towards less emphasis on nuclear weapons, to make sure that our conventional weapons capability is an effective deterrent in all but the most extreme circumstances.”
Some of those "circumstances" could include rogue states like Iran and North Korea. Mr. Obama's policy makes exceptions for those adversaries. Pyongyang has already demonstrated a limited nuclear capability while Iran is working actively to develop nuclear weapons. The President says our revised posture will "set an example" for the rest of the world, and persuade more nations to curb their nuclear programs.
It's tempting to ask just how well that example is working. North Korea has threatened both the U.S. and South Korea with nuclear attacks, and even shared their technology with Syria. Apparently, Pyongyang is unconcerned about our "example," or the potential for American nuclear retaliation. And the pace of Iran's nuclear program has only accelerated over the past year, suggesting that Iran has little fear of the administration and its nuclear policies.
But the decline in our nuclear forces goes well beyond our political statements, and how they play in places like Iran and North Korea. Mr. Obama is telegraphing how he would use nuclear weapons, eliminating the policy "ambiguity" that has kept enemies guessing--and served us well--for more than 60 years.
Equally distressing, President Obama remains committed to a continuing erosion in our nuclear capabilities. As former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Gaffney observes:
I believe that the most alarming aspect of the Obama denuclearization program, however, is its explicit renunciation of new U.S. nuclear weapons — an outcome that required the president to overrule his own defense secretary. Even if there were no new START treaty, no further movement on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and no new wooly-headed declaratory policies, the mere fact that the United States will fail to reverse the steady obsolescence of its deterrent — and the atrophying of the skilled workforce needed to sustain it — will ineluctably achieve what is transparently President Obama’s ultimate goal: a world without American nuclear weapons.
Given the outlines of Mr. Obama's policy, it's hard to disagree. Not only will our nuclear forces grow smaller in the coming years, they will also become less capable, with the president mandating a "procurement holiday" for that category of weapons, and the infrastructure and produces them.
Additionally, the newly-negotiated Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will take a further toll on our deterrent capabilities, by cutting the number of warheads (to 1,500 for both the U.S. and Russia) and placing limits on delivery systems. By agreeing to that provision, Mr. Obama and his security team essentially traded away an American strength.
Two decades after the Cold War ended, the U.S. is the only global power with a true nuclear "triad," consisting of land-based ICBMs, sub-launched ballistic missiles and long-range nuclear bombers. Reaching treaty goals means the United States will surrender some of its advantage in those latter categories. Russia, on the other hand, has only a token ballistic missile fleet and a handful of long-range bombers. Clearly, the U.S. must make most of the cuts to comply with the new agreement.
It's also worth noting that some of the American bombers facing elimination are dual-capable systems, designed for nuclear strike missions and extended-range conventional sorties. Writing at the American Thinker, Thomas Lifson speculates that Russia's real goal wasn't a reduction in nuclear weapons, but rather, a decrease in our global, precision-strike capabilities. With fewer dual-capable bombers in the inventory, it will be more difficult to mount "shock and awe" campaigns in the future and inject U.S. power in areas that Moscow wants to dominate.
No matter how you slice it, the new START agreement (and Mr. Obama's revised nuclear posture statement) are bad policy, pure and simple. After a year in the Oval Office, the commander-in-chief still has a myopic view of the world, believing that nuclear weapons can simply be wished or negotiated away. In reality, President Obama is sewing the seeds of a new arms race. Allies in eastern Europe and the Far East (think Taiwan) that have long counted on the American nuclear umbrella will now be tempted to developed their own weapons, deducing (correctly) that the U.S. may be unwilling or unable to protect them.
Sad to say, but the new treaty and nuclear posture statement represent the worst security policy since the United States signed the Kellogg-Briand pact back in 1928. That was the agreement that "prohibited war as an instrument of national policy," except in matters of self-defense. You know how that one worked out.
-
Agreed.
-
WASHINGTON — Three months ago, American intelligence officials examining satellite photographs of Pakistani nuclear facilities saw the first wisps of steam from the cooling towers of a new nuclear reactor. It was one of three plants being constructed to make fuel for a second generation of nuclear arms.
The message of those photos was clear: While Pakistan struggles to make sure its weapons and nuclear labs are not vulnerable to attack by Al Qaeda, the country is getting ready to greatly expand its production of weapons-grade fuel.
The Pakistanis insist that they have no choice. A nuclear deal that India signed with the United States during the Bush administration ended a long moratorium on providing India with the fuel and technology for desperately needed nuclear power plants.
Now, as critics of the arrangement point out, the agreement frees up older facilities that India can devote to making its own new generation of weapons, escalating one arms race even as President Obama and President Dmitri A. Medvedev of Russia sign accords to shrink arsenals built during the cold war.
Mr. Obama met with the leaders of India and Pakistan on Sunday, a day ahead of a two-day Washington gathering with 47 nations devoted to the question of how to keep nuclear materials out of the hands of terrorists. In remarks to reporters about the summit meeting, Mr. Obama called the possibility of a terrorist organization obtaining a nuclear weapon “the single biggest threat to U.S. security, both short-term, medium-term and long-term.”
The summit meeting is the largest gathering of world leaders called by an American president since Franklin D. Roosevelt organized the 1945 meeting in San Francisco that created the United Nations. (He died two weeks before the session opened.) But for all its symbolism and ceremony, this meeting has quite limited goals: seeking ways to better secure existing supplies of bomb-usable plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The problem that India and Pakistan represent, though, is deliberately not on the agenda.
“President Obama is focusing high-level attention on the threat that already exists out there, and that’s tremendously important,” said Sam Nunn, the former Democratic senator from Georgia who has devoted himself to safeguarding global stockpiles of weapons material — enough, by some estimates, to build more than 100,000 atom bombs. “But the fact is that new production adds greatly to the problem.”
Nowhere is that truer than Pakistan, where two Taliban insurgencies and Al Qaeda coexist with the world’s fastest-growing nuclear arsenal. According to a senior American official, Mr. Obama used his private meeting Sunday afternoon with Yousaf Raza Gilani, Pakistan’s newly empowered prime minister, to “express disappointment” that Pakistan is blocking the opening of negotiations on a treaty that would halt production of new nuclear material around the world.
Experts say accelerated production in Pakistan translates into much increased risk.
“The challenges are getting greater — the increasing extremism, the increasing instability, the increasing material,” said Rolf Mowatt-Larssen of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, who as a C.I.A. officer and then head of the Energy Department’s intelligence unit ran much of the effort to understand Al Qaeda’s nuclear ambitions.
“That’s going to complicate efforts to make sure nothing leaks,” he said. “The trends mean the Pakistani authorities have a greater challenge.”
Few subjects are more delicate in Washington. In an interview last Monday, Mr. Obama avoided a question about his progress in building on a five-year, $100 million Bush administration program to safeguard Pakistan’s arms and materials.
“I feel confident that Pakistan has secured its nuclear weapons,” Mr. Obama said. “I am concerned about nuclear security all around the world, not just in Pakistan but everywhere.” He added, “One of my biggest concerns has to do with the loose nuclear materials that are still floating out there.”
Taking up the Pakistan-India arms race at the summit meeting, administration officials say, would be “too politically divisive.”
“We’re focusing on protecting existing nuclear material, because we think that’s what everyone can agree on,” one senior administration official said in an interview on Friday. To press countries to cut off production of new weapons-grade material, he said, “would take us into questions of proliferation, nuclear-free zones and nuclear disarmament on which there is no agreement.”
Mr. Obama said he expected “some very specific commitments” from world leaders.
“Our expectation is not that there’s just some vague, gauzy statement about us not wanting to see loose nuclear materials,” he said. “We anticipate a communiqué that spells out very clearly, here’s how we’re going to achieve locking down all the nuclear materials over the next four years, with very specific steps in order to assure that.”
Those efforts began at the end of the cold war, 20 years ago. Today officials are more sanguine about the former Soviet stockpiles and the focus is now wider. Last month, American experts removed weapons-grade material from earthquake-damaged Chile.
===========
The summit meeting will aim to generate the political will so that other nations and Mr. Obama’s own administration can create a surge of financial and technical support that will bring his four-year plan to fruition.
“It’s doable but hard,” said Matthew Bunn, a nuclear expert at Harvard. “It’s not easy to overcome secrecy, complacency, sovereignty and bureaucracy.”
Mr. Obama plans to open the summit meeting with a discussion of the scope of the terrorist threat. The big challenge, Mr. Mowatt-Larssen said, is to get world leaders to understand “that it’s a low-probability, but not a no-probability, event that requires urgent action.”
For instance, in late 2007, four gunmen attacked a South African site that held enough highly enriched uranium for a dozen atomic bombs. The attackers breached a 10,000-volt security fence, knocked out detection systems and broke into the emergency control room before coming under assault. They escaped.
During the presidential campaign, Mr. Obama promised to “increase funding by $1 billion a year to ensure that within four years, the essential ingredients of nuclear weapons are removed from all the world’s most vulnerable sites and effective, lasting security measures are instituted for all remaining sites.”
In Mr. Obama’s first year, though, financing for better nuclear controls fell by $25 million, about 2 percent.
“The Obama administration got off to an unimpressive start,” Mr. Bunn wrote in his most recent update of “Securing the Bomb,” a survey to be published Monday by the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a nonprofit advocacy group that Mr. Nunn helped found in Washington. But he added that its proposed budget for the 2011 fiscal year calls for a 31 percent increase.
The next phase in Mr. Obama’s arms-control plan is to get countries to agree to a treaty that would end the production of new bomb fuel. Pakistan has led the opposition, and it is building two new reactors for making weapons-grade plutonium, and one plant for salvaging plutonium from old reactor fuel.
Last month, the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington, reported that the first reactor was emitting steam. That suggests, said Paul Brannan, a senior institute analyst, that the “reactor is at least at some state of initial operation.”
Asked about the production, Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, said, “Pakistan looks forward to working with the international community to find the balance between our national security and our contributions to international nonproliferation efforts.”
In private, Pakistani officials insist that the new plants are needed because India has the power to mount a lightning invasion with conventional forces.
India, too, is making new weapons-grade plutonium, in plants exempted under the agreement with the Bush administration from inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency. (Neither Pakistan nor India has signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.)
The Obama administration has endorsed the Bush-era agreement. Last month, the White House took the next step, approving an accord that allows India to build two new reprocessing plants. While that fuel is for civilian use, critics say it frees older plants to make weapons fuel.
“The Indian relationship is a very important one,” said Mr. Nunn, who influenced Mr. Obama’s decision to endorse a goal of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. But he said that during the Bush years, “I would have insisted that we negotiate to stop their production of weapons fuel. Sometimes in Washington, we have a hard time distinguishing between the important and the vital.”
-
WILL ISRAEL STRIKE BY AUGUST?
Russia has just announced that it intends to allow the Iranian nuclear reactor facility located in Bushehr (near the Persian Gulf) to go live in August. This is an ominous development. Now Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu has a fateful decision to make. Will he order a preemptive military strike against all of Iran’s nuclear sites before August when the Bushehr site becomes “hot”? His mentor, Menachem Begin, ordered an Israeli air strike against Saddam Hussein’s Osirik nuclear reactor in Iraq before it went hot in 1981. Netanyahu wants the world to act with decisive unity to stop Iran from getting the Bomb. But that is increasingly unlikely. The Obama administration is no longer calling for “crippling sanctions,” and even if they were, it appears to be too late for sanctions to be effective. U.S. officials — including Defense Secretary Robert Gates — says Iran could have the Bomb by next year. German intelligence thinks it could be sooner. We need to pray for peace, but prepare for war.
-
http://www.ocregister.com/opinion/nuclear-244432-obama-summit.html
Mark Steyn: Obama's nuke summit dangerously delusional
In years to come – assuming, for the purposes of argument, there are any years to come – scholars will look back at President Barack Obama's Nuclear Security Summit and marvel. For once, the cheap comparisons with 1930s appeasement barely suffice: To be sure, in 1933, the great powers were meeting in Geneva and holding utopian arms-control talks even as Hitler was taking office in Berlin. But it's difficult to imagine Neville Chamberlain in 1938 hosting a conference on the dangers of rearmament, and inviting America, France, Brazil, Liberia and Thailand ...but not even mentioning Germany.
Yet that's what Obama just did: He held a nuclear gabfest in 2010, the biggest meeting of world leaders on American soil since the founding of the United Nations 65 years ago – and Iran wasn't on the agenda.
**Read it all.**
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2010/04/17/nyt-secret-gates-memo-warns-that-u-s-has-no-strategy-for-dealing-with-a-nuclear-iran/
I'm sure this will all turn out well, right Obama voters?
-
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9da5b930-4aed-11df-a7ff-00144feab49a.html
Saudi Arabia announces nuclear centre
By Abeer Allam in Riyadh
Published: April 18 2010 14:37 | Last updated: April 18 2010 14:37
Saudi Arabia, the world’s largest oil supplier, is set to establish a civilian nuclear and renewable energy centre to help meet increasing demand for power as the country pushes forward with economic expansion plans.
The official Saudi press agency said on Saturday that the new centre, the King Abdullah City for Nuclear and Renewable Energy, would be based in Riyadh and would be led by Hashim Abdullah Yamani, a former commerce and trade minister.
-
BOLTON: Folding our nuclear umbrella
By John R. Bolton
Although media coverage of President Obama's unfolding nuclear policy has focused on its implications for the United States, it is no less important to understand its effects on America's friends and allies. The New START arms control treaty with Russia, the administration's nuclear posture review, the recent Washington nuclear security summit, and the uncertainty surrounding May's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference are all reverberating in capitals worldwide.
Bad as Obama policies are for America, they are equally dangerous for friends who have relied for decades on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a foundation of their own national security strategies. As Washington's capabilities decline and as it narrows the circumstances when it will use nuclear weapons, allies are asking hard questions about whether the U.S. nuclear umbrella will continue to provide the protection it has previously.
Many allies see clearly that our mutual global adversaries have no intention of reducing their own nuclear programs in imitation of Mr. Obama. Our friends accordingly feel increasingly insecure. If Washington will not continue to hold the nuclear umbrella that has provided strategic stability for so long, other countries will begin making divergent decisions about how to protect themselves, including, for some, the possibility of seeking their own nuclear weapons.
Within the administration, there are strong advocates for America pledging "no first use" of nuclear weapons. Although the nuclear posture review "only" expanded "negative security assurances" somewhat, there is little doubt that "no first use" is alive and well in internal administration councils. These self-imposed constraints on the use of nuclear weapons reinforce the allies' concern that Mr. Obama has forgotten the central Cold War lesson about the U.S. nuclear deterrent. There was never any doubt that a Soviet attack through the Fulda Gap into Western Europe would have swept through NATO forces, possibly all the way to the English Channel. Thus, the threat of U.S. nuclear retaliation against such an attack - an unambiguous case of a U.S. first use of nuclear weapons - was precisely what was needed to keep Soviet forces on their side of the Iron Curtain.
The risks come not only from the Obama administration's nuclear policies. By canceling the Polish and Czech missile defense sites, the president signaled that he has less than full faith in the concept of a U.S. national missile defense capability. Moreover, and equally important, Russia and others quickly interpreted the decision not to construct the Eastern European facilities as Washington backing down in response to Russian threats. At a minimum, Mr. Obama showed that he was prepared to use U.S. missile defense as a bargaining chip, exactly the misguided policy option President Reagan consistently and emphatically rejected. If America's homeland remains vulnerable, its willingness to risk confrontation with an opponent will be substantially reduced. In such circumstances, U.S. allies could not count on the threat of nuclear retaliation by Washington in the event of aggression, as they could in the Cold War.
Accordingly, Europeans should be very worried that they are increasingly on their own to face the re-emerging threat of Russian belligerence. Because the New START treaty does not limit tactical nuclear weapons, Europe, simply because of geographic proximity, is most vulnerable to Russia's advantage in that category. It is thus highly ironic that some NATO countries have recently called for removing the last U.S. tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, which will simply enhance Russia's existing lead. Moreover, because the conflict in Afghanistan has opened new fissures in NATO, Europe must ponder whether the aging alliance can renew its original focus on defending against Moscow.
In the Pacific, concerns are equally acute, especially in Japan. Faced with the unambiguous reality of China expanding and modernizing its nuclear and conventional military capabilities, and with North Korea as a nuclear weapons state, Japan inevitably faces the question of whether it needs its own nuclear deterrent. U.S. ambivalence on missile defense only heightens Tokyo's concerns, given its proximity to ballistic missile threats from the East Asian mainland. South Korea, Taiwan and Australia, among others, also share Japan's concern, each according to its own circumstances.
Thus, while there unquestionably are variations among America's allies about the precise implications of Mr. Obama's global withdrawal from U.S. strategic nuclear dominance, the overall direction is not in doubt. U.S. decline leaves the allies feeling increasingly on their own, uncertain about Washington's commitment and steadfastness and facing difficult decisions about how to guarantee their own security. Ironically, therefore, it is America's friends that might increase nuclear proliferation, not just their mortal foes. This is the reality created by the retreat of nuclear America, the exact opposite of the Obama administration's benign optimism, namely that reducing U.S. capability would encourage others to do the same.
John R. Bolton, a former ambassador to the U.N., is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
-
By JOHN BOLTON
Negotiations grind on toward a fourth U.N. Security Council sanctions resolution against Iran's nuclear weapons program, even as President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrives in New York to address the Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference. Sanctions advocates acknowledge that the Security Council's ultimate product will do no more than marginally impede Iran's progress.
In Congress, sanctions legislation also creaks along, but that too is simply going through the motions. Russia and China have already rejected key proposals to restrict Iran's access to international financial markets and choke off its importation of refined petroleum products, which domestically are in short supply. Any new U.S. legislation will be ignored and evaded, thus rendering it largely symbolic. Even so, President Obama has opposed the legislation, arguing that unilateral U.S. action could derail his Security Council efforts.
The further pursuit of sanctions is tantamount to doing nothing. Advocating such policies only benefits Iran by providing it cover for continued progress toward its nuclear objective. It creates the comforting illusion of "doing something." Just as "diplomacy" previously afforded Iran the time and legitimacy it needed, sanctions talk now does the same.
Speculating about regime change stopping Iran's nuclear program in time is also a distraction. The Islamic Revolution's iron fist, and willingness to use it against dissenters (who are currently in disarray), means we cannot know whether or when the regime may fall. Long-term efforts at regime change, desirable as they are, will not soon enough prevent Iran from creating nuclear weapons with the ensuing risk of further regional proliferation.
We therefore face a stark, unattractive reality. There are only two options: Iran gets nuclear weapons, or someone uses pre-emptive military force to break Iran's nuclear fuel cycle and paralyze its program, at least temporarily.
There is no possibility the Obama administration will use force, despite its confused and ever-changing formulation about the military option always being "on the table." That leaves Israel, which the administration is implicitly threatening not to resupply with airplanes and weapons lost in attacking Iran—thereby rendering Israel vulnerable to potential retaliation from Hezbollah and Hamas.
It is hard to conclude anything except that the Obama administration is resigned to Iran possessing nuclear weapons. While U.S. policy makers will not welcome that outcome, they certainly hope as a corollary that Iran can be contained and deterred. Since they have ruled out the only immediate alternative, military force, they are doubtless now busy preparing to make lemonade out of this pile of lemons.
President Obama's likely containment/deterrence strategy will feature security assurances to neighboring countries and promises of American retaliation if Iran uses its nuclear weapons. Unfortunately for this seemingly muscular rhetoric, the simple fact of Iran possessing nuclear weapons would alone dramatically and irreparably alter the Middle East balance of power. Iran does not actually have to use its capabilities to enhance either its regional or global leverage.
Facile analogies to Cold War deterrence rest on the dubious, unproven belief that Iran's nuclear calculus will approximate the Soviet Union's. Iran's theocratic regime and the high value placed on life in the hereafter makes this an exceedingly dangerous assumption.
Even if containment and deterrence might be more successful against Iran than just suggested, nuclear proliferation doesn't stop with Tehran. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Turkey and perhaps others will surely seek, and very swiftly, their own nuclear weapons in response. Thus, we would imminently face a multipolar nuclear Middle East waiting only for someone to launch first or transfer weapons to terrorists. Ironically, such an attack might well involve Israel only as an innocent bystander, at least initially.
We should recognize that an Israeli use of military force would be neither precipitate nor disproportionate, but only a last resort in anticipatory self-defense. Arab governments already understand that logic and largely share it themselves. Such a strike would advance both Israel's and America's security interests, and also those of the Arab states.
Nonetheless, the intellectual case for that strike must be better understood in advance by the American public and Congress in order to ensure a sympathetic reaction by Washington. Absent Israeli action, no one should base their future plans on anything except coping with a nuclear Iran.
Mr. Bolton, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, is the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations" (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
-
WSJ:
UNITED NATIONS — The Obama administration for the first time made public the extent of the U.S.'s atomic weapons arsenal, as the U.S. and Iran dueled for the international backing of their strategic agendas.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad both addressed a special U.N. conference on the global nuclear nonproliferation regime Monday as Washington pushes for a new round of sanctions against Iran for its nuclear work.
Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Ahmadinejad sought to define the other nation's nuclear capability as the principal threat to international stability. The Iranian president charged Washington with leading a skewed international system that seeks to deny peaceful nuclear power to developing nations while allowing allies such as Israel to stockpile atomic arms.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad slams U.S. nuclear policy and denies his nation is seeking atomic weapons. Plus, the market rallies on news of a major airline merger and BP begins drilling a relief well in the hopes of stopping the oil from continuing to spill into the Gulf of Mexico.
."The first atomic weapons were produced and used by the United States," Mr. Ahmadinejad said in a 35-minute morning speech laced with religious imagery and idioms. "This seemed … to provide the United States and its allies with the upper hand. However, it became the main source of the development and spread of nuclear weapons."
Mrs. Clinton followed in the afternoon by declaring, to the surprise of some delegates, that the U.S. was announcing the size of its nuclear arsenal, as well as the number of atomic weapons it has destroyed from its arsenal; the Pentagon announced the figures in a news conference on Monday.
View Full Image
Getty Images
Opponents to Ahmadinejad's regime protested outside the U.N.
.U.S. officials have been working for almost a year to undercut Tehran's charges about Washington's nuclear threat by bringing both transparency to the U.S. program as well as by reducing its numbers. In April, the U.S. and Russia signed a Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty that lowers the numbers of deployed American and Russian nuclear weapons to their lowest levels since the 1950s. The U.S. also hosted a nuclear security conference in Washington last month.
"So for those who doubt that the U.S. will do its part on disarmament: This is our record—these are our commitments—and they send a clear signal." Mrs. Clinton told the conference.
The Pentagon said the U.S. had a total of 5,113 nuclear warheads in its stockpile as of Sept. 30, plus a few thousand more that had been retired but still needed to be dismantled. Between fiscal years 1994 and 2009, the U.S. dismanted 8,748 nuclear warheads. At its peak at the end of fiscal year 1967, the U.S. had 31,255 warheads, the Pentagon said.
It was the first time the U.S. has disclosed those figures, which had been previously regarded as highly classified. A senior defense official said at a Pentagon briefing that the stockpile had been reduced by 75% since 1989 and roughly 84% since 1967.
Also on Monday, Mrs. Clinton said Washington will continue to increase funding and technical support for countries pursuing civilian nuclear power while adhering to safeguards that prevent the development of military applications.
After Mr. Ahmadinejad had charged the U.S. with double standards by tacitly supporting Israel's assumed nuclear program, Mrs. Clinton said the Obama administration supported a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Mideast once progress is made in pushing forward the Arab-Israeli peace process. She added that the administration would support such zones in Africa and the South Pacific.
The Obama administration is in the final stages of a global push to enact new sanctions on Iran for its nuclear work. Mrs. Clinton on Monday met nations seen as still on the fence on the sanctions issue, such as Brazil. And President Barack Obama released a statement claiming the course of Iran's nuclear work could define whether the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the subject of the monthlong U.N. conference, survives into the 21st century. The NPT holds existing weapons states to reduce their arms and other countries not to pursue them.
Related Video
U.S. and U.K. Step Out as Ahmadinejad Speak
The Ticking Clock on Iran Nukes (04/22/10)
Iran Launches War Games (04/22/10)
Ahmadinejad Criticizes Obama's Nuclear Proposal (04/07/10)
Iran, U.S. Battle in Shadows of Afghan Offensive (03/25/10)
.Further Reading
John Bolton: Get Ready for Nuclear Iran
Metropolis: Who Protects Ahmadinejad in NYC?
U.S. Revises Mideast-Arms Tack
Complete Coverage: WSJ.com/Mideast
.Mr. Ahmadinejad, in his speech, called for a vast remaking of the global institutions guarding the development of nuclear technologies, while denying his own nation was seeking atomic weapons.
British, American and French diplomats walked out of his speech in quick succession about 10 minutes into its delivery.
The U.S. release of nuclear data reverses decades of Cold War doctrine that concluded that the U.S.'s national security could be threatened if Washington's adversaries knew the size and status of its nuclear arsenal. China and Russia have made similar arguments in denying U.S. calls for them to provide greater transparency.
The U.S.'s nuclear program has been regularly tracked by specialty websites. Some voiced little surprise with the released numbers.
The release of the nuclear data was vigorously debated inside the White House and Pentagon, according to U.S. officials. Mrs. Clinton stressed Monday that the conclusion was that it served the U.S.'s national security interests by placing the issue of transparency back on the shoulders of nations such as Iran and North Korea.
View Slideshow
Chris Hondros/Getty Images
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad addressed the conference on the enforcement of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty Monday.
.More photos and interactive graphics
.Conservative critics quickly attacked the release of the nuclear data. "From a strategic standpoint I think the problem is that it becomes yet another ax to grind against the United States: You have X and we only have Y, and … we are not going to disarm until you have Y," said Danielle Pletka, vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington think tank. "It puts us at parity with other countries, which we are not."
-
The headline to the story should read "Obama gives classified information to enemies".
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2010/05/04/wh-reveals-exact-number-of-us-nuclear-warheads/comment-page-1/#comments
Hey, I've got a good idea! Let's elect someone to the presidency that wouldn't survive vetting for even a low level security clearance. What's the worst that could happen?
-
What a fiasco. That's the first word that comes to mind watching Mahmoud Ahmadinejad raise his arms yesterday with the leaders of Turkey and Brazil to celebrate a new atomic pact that instantly made irrelevant 16 months of President Obama's "diplomacy." The deal is a political coup for Tehran and possibly delivers the coup de grace to the West's half-hearted efforts to stop Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb.
Full credit for this debacle goes to the Obama Administration and its hapless diplomatic strategy. Last October, nine months into its engagement with Tehran, the White House concocted a plan to transfer some of Iran's uranium stock abroad for enrichment. If the West couldn't stop Iran's program, the thinking was that maybe this scheme would delay it. The Iranians played coy, then refused to accept the offer.
But Mr. Obama doesn't take no for an answer from rogue regimes, and so he kept the offer on the table. As the U.S. finally seemed ready to go to the U.N. Security Council for more sanctions, the Iranians chose yesterday to accept the deal on their own limited terms while enlisting the Brazilians and Turks as enablers and political shields. "Diplomacy emerged victorious today," declared Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, turning Mr. Obama's own most important foreign-policy principle against him.
The double embarrassment is that the U.S. had encouraged Lula's diplomacy as a step toward winning his support for U.N. sanctions. Brazil is currently one of the nonpermanent, rotating members of the Security Council, and the U.S. has wanted a unanimous U.N. vote. Instead, Lula used the opening to triangulate his own diplomatic solution. In her first game of high-stakes diplomatic poker, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is leaving the table dressed only in a barrel.
So instead of the U.S. and Europe backing Iran into a corner this spring, Mr. Ahmadinejad has backed Mr. Obama into one. America's discomfort is obvious. In its statement yesterday, the White House strained to "acknowledge the efforts" by Turkey and Brazil while noting "Iran's repeated failure to live up to its own commitments." The White House also sought to point out differences between yesterday's pact and the original October agreements on uranium transfers.
Good luck drawing those distinctions with the Chinese or Russians, who will now be less likely to agree even to weak sanctions. Having played so prominent a role in last October's talks with Iran, the U.S. can't easily disassociate itself from something broadly in line with that framework.
Under the terms unveiled yesterday, Iran said it would send 1,200 kilograms (2,646 lbs.) of low-enriched uranium to Turkey within a month, and no more than a year later get back 120 kilograms enriched from somewhere else abroad. This makes even less sense than the flawed October deal. In the intervening seven months, Iran has kicked its enrichment activities into higher gear. Its estimated total stock has gone to 2,300 kilograms from 1,500 kilograms last autumn, and its stated enrichment goal has gone to 20% from 3.5%.
If the West accepts this deal, Iran would be allowed to keep enriching uranium in contravention of previous U.N. resolutions. Removing 1,200 kilograms will leave Iran with still enough low-enriched stock to make a bomb, and once uranium is enriched up to 20% it is technically easier to get to bomb-capable enrichment levels.
Only last week, diplomats at the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency reported that Iran has increased the number of centrifuges it is using to enrich uranium. According to Western intelligence estimates, Iran continues to acquire key nuclear components, such as trigger mechanisms for bombs. Tehran says it wants to build additional uranium enrichment plants. The CIA recently reported that Iran tripled its stockpile of uranium last year and moved "toward self-sufficiency in the production of nuclear missiles." Yesterday's deal will have no impact on these illicit activities.
The deal will, however, make it nearly impossible to disrupt Iran's nuclear program short of military action. The U.N. is certainly a dead end. After 16 months of his extended hand and after downplaying support for Iran's democratic opposition, Mr. Obama now faces an Iran much closer to a bomb and less diplomatically isolated than when President Bush left office.
Israel will have to seriously consider its military options. Such a confrontation is far more likely thanks to the diplomatic double-cross of Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Brazil's Lula, and especially to a U.S. President whose diplomacy has succeeded mainly in persuading the world's rogues that he lacks the determination to stop their destructive ambitions.
-
Remember how the left mocked and derided Reagan's quest for an anti-missle defense capability and came up with the name "star wars"?
Here is the guy who the Bamster has as his weapons aquisitions Czar mocking Reagan in 1984. Of course the Bamster is now expecting Israeli's to put their lives on the line by relying on technology all started by Reagan in 2010.
Now Bamster and his crew are in charge and now it is a good thing.
****Obama "weapons Czar" said Reagan's Star Wars a pipe dream
PA Times | 9/4/09 | Pissant
Posted on Friday, September 04, 2009 6:12:30 PM by pissant
In a Tom Wicker NY Times story reprinted in the St Petersberg Times on May 12, 1984 (1), Obama's pencil necked Weapons Czar, Ashton Carter, is quoted as declaring that Reagan's "Star Wars" (SDI) was nothing but a pipe dream. Apparently, Mr. Carter - the man with the oh so appropriate last name - was the author of a report during his stint at MIT that sought to put the kabosh on Reagan's plans for missile defenses.
The Democrats in the house cooked up a group called the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment that issued a scathing report denouncing the efficacy of missile defenses, basing their conclusions on Carter's work.
In his report, Carter stated: "A consensus of the informed members of the defense technical community that the prospect of a successful missile defense was so remote that it should not serve as the basis for public expectation or national policy".
Of course, unlike Reagan, idiots like Ashton Carter did not know that Reagan intended to bankrupt the USSR in a race for missile defenses as well as lay the groundwork for fully functional systems.
But surely Mr. Carter was fully cured of his naivete by the time he was hired on as under secretary of Defense by Slick Willie? Well it turns out that he also was one of the prime architects for the deal with the North Korean commies to halt their nuclear programs in 1994 (2).
So it looks like Obama's czar is batting .000.
At laest one positive thing came from Mr. Carter's supposed expertise. It convinced Walter Mondale to run on a platform opposing SDI (3). ROFL.****
-
CCP:
The irony there is extraordinary.
===========
All:
We'll need to see the actual agreement before passing judgment I suppose, but ultimately, as we have noted here all along, sanctions are more a tactic to keep Israel from acting than a genuine strategy for stopping Iran from going nuclear. Still, if there is anything of this sanctions agreement, it will be interesting to see how, given its editorial which I posted earlier this morning, the WSJ reacts.
Marc
----------------
Breaking News Alert
The New York Times
Tue, May 18, 2010 -- 10:39 AM ET
-----
Clinton Says U.S., China and Russia Have Deal on New Iran Sanctions
The Obama administration announced Tuesday morning that it
has struck a deal with other major powers, including Russia
and China, to impose new sanctions on Iran, a sharp
repudiation of the deal Tehran offered just a day before to
ship its nuclear fuel out of the country.
"We have reached agreement on a strong draft with the
cooperation of both Russia and China," Secretary of State
Hillary Rodham Clinton told a Senate committee. "We plan to
circulate that draft resolution to the entire Security
Council today. And let me say, Mr. Chairman, I think this
announcement is as convincing an answer to the efforts
undertaken in Tehran over the last few days as any we could
provide."
The announcement came just a day after Iran said it would
ship roughly half of its nuclear fuel to Turkey in a bid to
assuage concerns about its program.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com?emc=na
-
Woof,
I duno. www.msnbc.msn.com/id/37819059/ns/world_news-asiapacific
P.C.
-
Animation showing location and area of every nuclear explosion. Starts slow, but picks up; I was surprised by the number.
http://www.wimp.com/nuclearexplosions/
-
From The American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/08/ten_reasons_to_love_the_bomb.html
August 06, 2010
Ten Reasons to Love the Bomb
By J.R. Dunn
Sixty-five years after Hiroshima and Nagasaki, we still have not arrived at a true measure of the atomic weapon.
Through a constant drumbeat -- in large part coming from the left -- nuclear weapons have become our culture's dominant symbol of fear. This is understandable. The photos of the atomic bombings were among the most foreboding ever taken. Few who have contemplated them have not paused to think what their own town might look like after such an attack.
But fear of nuclear weapons has shifted to the metaphysical, attaining something of the aura of absolute evil that Satan and his legions held in the medieval mind. They are referred to in the singular, as "The Bomb," as if only one exists, in some awful, majestic, Platonic isolation. They are spoken of as supernatural entities, beyond rational control or comprehension, operating in some mystical twilight on the far side of Mordor. They are given powers and capabilities beyond that of any known device. It often appears as a given that a single explosion could utterly destroy civilization from one pole to the other. For these reasons, consideration of the nuclear question remains clouded by horror and awe.
Amid all this, it has become difficult to grasp the simple fact that nuclear weapons have benefits -- that they may well be, in Ray Bradbury's words, "The most blessed invention ever devised." But such benefits do exist, as the record clearly shows.
1) The A-bomb Shut Down WWII
It's not necessary to reopen the perennial argument as to whether the atomic bombings were necessary to defeat Japan to acknowledge that they brought the war to an abrupt halt. On August 6, it was going strong. By August 14, it was over.
WWII had been in progress for six years (closer to eleven, if you were Chinese). It had killed something on the order of 65 million people, a bloodletting unmatched in recorded history. Killing was still going on throughout the territory still occupied by Japan. As August 1945 began, people were dying at the rate of 20,000 a week.
There was no sign that it would stop any time soon. The Japanese refusal to surrender is a historical fact. Their commitment to fight to the last drop of blood is undeniable. (Anyone who doubts this is advised to read Something Like an Autobiography, the memoirs of the master filmmaker Akira Kurosawa, who was told, along with all other Japanese, that when the U.S. invasion came, they were to march to the sea and fling themselves on the advancing troops in the "honorable death of the hundred million." Kurosawa loathed Japanese imperialism. He hated the militarists. He was sick of the war. But still, he said, "I probably would have gone.")
The atomic bombs ended this -- not through destructiveness (the March incendiary raids against Tokyo killed more people than Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined), but by shock. The Japanese military was in the midst of explaining to Emperor Hirohito why the U.S. could have built no more than one bomb when word of the Nagasaki strike arrived. "How many bombs did you say there were?" the emperor reportedly asked.
In the stunned silence following the atomic raids, the voice of reason could be heard at last. No other weapon could have accomplished this.
2) Nuclear Weapons Stopped Stalin in his Tracks
"A weapon to frighten schoolteachers." That was Stalin's opinion of the atomic bomb...which must mean that Stalin was a schoolteacher, since it certainly frightened him.
Stalin's postwar plans were clear -- to keep his army intact and in the middle of Western Europe, to wait until the war-weary Western Allies cut their occupation forces to the bone, and then to make his move one deep, dark night, sweeping the rest of the pieces -- Western Germany, Austria, France, the Low Countries -- off the table and into his capacious tunic pockets.
He announced several times that he was seriously cutting Soviet occupation forces. This never happened. The Hungarian takeover, the Czech coup, and the Berlin blockade increased tensions to the breaking point. Stalin was clearly probing to see how far he could go. What stopped him? Not American or British occupation forces, which were derisory. One element alone: that schoolteacher's nightmare, the atomic bomb.
Stalin grew impatient as he got older. According to Russian historians, he had finalized a war plan by the time of his death, scheduled for early 1954. But it is doubtful that the Politburo, along with the Soviet military, would have allowed it to proceed. They knew better, were well aware of the consequences, and knew who would have to live with them. To paraphrase Samuel Johnson, "Nothing concentrates a man's mind so wonderfully as the knowledge that he is to be A-bombed in a fortnight."
3) Atomic Bombs Helped Expose Communist Activity in the U.S.
It's unlikely that the Soviets would have risked their carefully constructed U.S. spy network for anything less than the atomic bomb. But cracking the Manhattan Project required use of all resources. The NKVD threw everybody available at the program -- Klaus Fuchs, Bruno Pontecorvo, Theodore Hall, Allen Nunn May, the still unidentified "Perseus," and, of the course, the Rosenberg ring. When this effort began to unravel, it went completely, exposing agents not even directly connected to the atomic effort and leaving very little of use to the Soviets. When espionage efforts were renewed, it was using professional agents, as opposed to the eager Communist Party volunteers of the '30s and '40s.
Nothing revealed the treachery and untrustworthiness of American communists more than their willingness to turn the A-bomb secret over to the Soviets. Previously, Americans had responded to communists with bewildered shrugs. After the Rosenberg revelations, this was transformed to healthy contempt and fear. The American Communist Party never recovered.
4) Nukes Kept the Cold War from going Hot
There were numerous occasions -- the recurrent Berlin confrontations; the wars in Korea and Vietnam; crises in Yugoslavia, Laos, Cuba, and the Taiwan Straits -- when the Cold War could have bubbled over into open conflict. This would have been a conflict that, given only conventional weapons, might have taken on the character of a Thirty Years' War, with dozens of states destroyed and millions of lives consumed.
Nuclear weapons negated any such outcome. Nukes are not dreadnoughts. If you lose a fleet, you still have your country. When the bombs start falling, you have no guarantee of anything. National leaders considered the odds and decided to wait for another day. That day never came.
5) Atomic Weapons Created Doubt about the Scientific Establishment
This was a subtle but far-reaching effect. Prior to the atomic bomb, scientists were widely viewed as a modern priesthood, dedicated to knowledge and truth, beyond any taint of ambition or corruption. The A-bomb cut them down to size. Enamored of the program when it was merely a technical possibility, many scientists turned against the reality, protesting its use against Japan. These actions puzzled and annoyed a public relieved to see an end to the war. When it developed that no small number of these same humanitarians had been involved in the Soviet espionage program, the figure of scientist as high priest vanished forever, replaced by the image of the erratic malcontent who needed to be watched closely.
This is a good thing. In a democracy, no group or profession should be viewed as clerisy, much less as something along the lines of a priesthood. In the 20th century, scientists were beginning to encroach on the social and political spheres, insisting that their techniques of procedural reductionism were superior to such sloppy practices as democracy (a tendency not yet extinct, as global warming and embryonic stem cells clearly reveal). Blinkered arrogance has brought down many a social class. The atomic bomb went a long way toward saving scientists from themselves.
6) Nuclear Weapons Guarantee the Survival of Israel
Like the United States, Israel is an exceptional nation, the only state founded under the aspect of redemption. The Holocaust rendered the establishment of Israel a necessity. As a small state outnumbered both by national entities and in population, Israel required weaponry both unavailable to its enemies and capable of effectively deterring them. Atomic weapons alone met these requirements. The rebirth of virulent anti-Semitism worldwide over the past decade has underlined the necessity of such weapons. As the homeland of the sole people that the modern world attempted to annihilate, Israel has a right to these weapons that no other state possesses.
7) Nuclear Weapons Reveal Left-Wing Hypocrisy
The left loathes all nuclear weapons -- as long as they belong to the United States.
Throughout the lengthy history of left-wing antinuclear activities, which stretches from the late 1950s to our day, a single target has existed -- the United States. All protests and efforts are aimed at the U.S. and no other country.
The Nuclear Freeze movement of the early 1980s can serve as an example. The USSR had fielded two new nuclear missiles, the SS-19, a weapon useful only as a city-destroyer, and the SS-20, a mobile system targeting Western Europe. The Reagan administration planned to deploy the Pershing II mobile system along with ground-launched cruise missiles to Europe, as well as an advanced new silo-based ICBM, the Peacekeeper (known at the time as the "MX").
As was true of virtually every Reagan initiative, the plan sparked massive protests, demanding the implementation of a "nuclear freeze" -- a formal promise not to construct or emplace any further nuclear systems. This was backed by the standard run of college students; politicians such as Les AuCoin, who repeatedly misrepresented the status of Soviet weapons; and Dr. Carl Sagan, a well-known scientist, who constructed an entire bogus theory, "nuclear winter," to back the campaign. It was understood at the time (and even reported by The New York Times) that the entire movement was financed, coordinated, and overseen by the KGB.
Nuclear freeze required absolutely nothing of the Soviets. The SS-19 and SS-20 systems would remain in operation. Only U.S. weapon systems would be affected, giving the USSR a permanent advantage and possibly ending NATO as a meaningful political and military entity.
Fortunately, Reagan let the air out of the nuclear freeze wagon by introducing the Strategic Defense Initiative, better known as "Star Wars," a national defensive system against nuclear attack. The utterly horrified Soviets immediately shifted their resources to meet this new threat. Deprived of Soviet money and guidance, the freeze movement collapsed, its only accomplishment a vastly increased level of mistrust and contempt for left-wing activities among the general public.
The same attitude survives today. While Barack Obama is eager to eliminate the sole nuclear weapons within his power -- those of the U.S. -- his efforts against the infinitely more dangerous threat of an Iranian nuclear force can be defined as futile to nonexistent at best.
8. Nuclear Weapons Underline the Magnanimity of the United States
The U.S. could have become the New Rome after WWII, an unmatched power ruling the globe through force and terror. We could have answered Stalin's belligerence with flights of bombers headed east, and then demanded that the nations of the world behold the wreckage of a blazing, irradiated Russia while awaiting their orders from Washington.
But it would have been no good, because we'd eventually have suffered the fate of Rome as well. We had better things to do -- setting out on an attempt to build something like a truly decent society, with which we remain involved to this day, despite throwbacks like Obama. (Really, his ideas are so 19th century -- he should wear high collars and a pince-nez.) In ages to come, this will not be forgotten. If the decent society eventually becomes universal, it will look back on the U.S. with admiration. If not, if we see a return to international medievalism, it will be regarded with bewilderment. Either way, the U.S. will be known for all time as the nation which held absolute power and refused to use it. I, for one, am proud of this.
9) Nuclear Weapons Are an Oddly Rational Weapon
The curious thing about nuclear weapons is that while the concept is simplicity itself -- just get enough pure U235 or Pu239 and bang them together -- the details are excruciating and difficult to master. Uranium or Plutonium must be located, mined, and refined. Weapons must be designed, built, and tested -- all of which leave signs that are easily traced by an effective intelligence service. It's next to impossible to sneak one through (though Pakistan's A.Q. Khan, with aid from the Clinton administration, came close).
It's easy to imagine a process or device that could be simply designed, easily constructed, and capable of horrendous damage. In fact, we don't have to imagine it; we can simply point to biological and chemical weapons. But neither possesses the potency of nuclear weapons, which inhabit a pinnacle of their own. So no simple deterrent to nukes exists -- they stand alone. This goes a long way toward keeping the peace.
10) They Are an Incredible Human Achievement -- on More Levels Than One
The ability to create such a thing, to actually tap into and utilize one of the basic forces of the universe -- the binding energy of the nucleus -- is astonishing in and of itself.
But even more breathtaking is the undeniable evidence of our wisdom in not using this power. Throughout the Yalta Period, we were inundated with predictions that universal destruction was inevitable, if not imminent -- that humanity would find its apotheosis scrabbling amidst glowing ruins for the last can of baked beans. Books, articles, television shows, and film after film -- Fail-Safe, Dr. Strangelove, A Boy and his Dog, Threads, The Day After, Testament -- all retailed the same despairing vision. (Well, Kubrick at least made it look like fun.)
It never happened. Looking back, we can see that it was never going to happen. Human beings are simply not as perverse, foolish, and self-destructive as the modernist temperament insists. That humanity could harness such a power and then decide not to utilize it says something very profound, and in no small way impressive, about the human animal. It's a curious truth that despite their contraventions, both religious and secular belief systems are gripped by the myth of man's origin as a killer -- the murder of Abel by Cain on the one hand, and other represented by 2001's Moonwatcher, whose first use of a tool is to turn it into a weapon.
But the years since 1945 have shown us that the killer ape is not the alpha and omega of the human story. We have stepped away from our bloody origins; we are no longer slaves of murderous instinct. We learn from our errors and missteps. So hope does exist both for the project of civilization and the human mission in a cold and lonely universe. Without the burden of atomic weapons, we might not know this. Knowledge leads to greater knowledge, and from this process, we occasionally attain wisdom.
J.R. Dunn is consulting editor of American Thinker and will edit the forthcoming Military Thinker.
-
MOSCOW (Reuters) - Russia accused the U.S. on Saturday of breaching its obligations over the non proliferation of weapons, a sign of strained relations between the two powers.
The charge came after a new arms control treaty between the U.S. and Russia suffered a setback this week when the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee delayed a ratification vote until mid-September.
Russia said it had successfully test fired two ballistic missiles from Barents Sea on Friday, Interfax news agency reported, in another sign of muscle-flexing from Moscow.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said on its web site the U.S. had been in breach of several arms-related treaties including the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 1) and a treaty on conventional weapons.
"During the START 1 period, the U.S. failed to resolve Russia's concerns over how this treaty was being fulfilled," the ministry said, citing a long list of what it called irregularities, including a U.S. failure to provide information on ballistic missiles trials.
In Washington, the State Department dismissed the accusation. "We have met our obligations under START." a spokeswoman said.
Russia also accused the U.S. of preventing international supervision of its compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.
The ministry also said secret information from the U.S. Los Alamos nuclear weapons lab had ended up at the hands of a drug dealing gang in 2006.
"The peculiarity of the incident was that, unlike in several other such cases -- when nuclear secrets were obtained by foreign intelligence services -- now they were found by police with a criminal group connected to the drug trade." it said.
The ministry also said checks conducted by a U.S. government body in July 2010 revealed that several institutions dealing with viruses had failed to provide enough security measures to prevent an intruder from entering their facilities.
The Foreign Ministry also alleged that some 1,500 sources of ionizing radiation were lost in the U.S. between 1996 and 2001.
"In 2004, it was revealed that Pacific Gas and Electric Company lost three segments of wasted fuel rods, used at Hamboldt Bay nuclear power station." it said in the 11-page report.
The documents also castigates the U.S. for research into biological weapons and smallpox.
Last month saw the only major U.S.- Russian spy trade since the end of the Cold War, despite a seemingly warning trend in relations between President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.
Obama has cast the new treaty, which commits the former Cold War foes to reducing deployed nuclear weapons by about 30 percent, as a first step toward his goal of a world without nuclear weapons.
(Reporting by Vladimir Soldatkin; Editing by Philippa Fletcher)
P.C.
-
Ohoh, time for a new "reset" button!
-
Gauging the Threat of an Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack
September 9, 2010
By Scott Stewart and Nate Hughes
Over the past decade there has been an ongoing debate over the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to modern civilization. This debate has been the most heated perhaps in the United States, where the commission appointed by Congress to assess the threat to the United States warned of the dangers posed by EMP in reports released in 2004 and 2008. The commission also called for a national commitment to address the EMP threat by hardening the national infrastructure.
There is little doubt that efforts by the United States to harden infrastructure against EMP — and its ability to manage critical infrastructure manually in the event of an EMP attack — have been eroded in recent decades as the Cold War ended and the threat of nuclear conflict with Russia lessened. This is also true of the U.S. military, which has spent little time contemplating such scenarios in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union. The cost of remedying the situation, especially retrofitting older systems rather than simply regulating that new systems be better hardened, is immense. And as with any issue involving massive amounts of money, the debate over guarding against EMP has become quite politicized in recent years.
We have long avoided writing on this topic for precisely that reason. However, as the debate over the EMP threat has continued, a great deal of discussion about the threat has appeared in the media. Many STRATFOR readers have asked for our take on the threat, and we thought it might be helpful to dispassionately discuss the tactical elements involved in such an attack and the various actors that could conduct one. The following is our assessment of the likelihood of an EMP attack against the United States.
Defining Electromagnetic Pulse
EMP can be generated from natural sources such as lightning or solar storms interacting with the earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetic field. It can also be artificially created using a nuclear weapon or a variety of non-nuclear devices. It has long been proven that EMP can disable electronics. Its ability to do so has been demonstrated by solar storms, lightning strikes and atmospheric nuclear explosions before the ban on such tests. The effect has also been recreated by EMP simulators designed to reproduce the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear device and study how the phenomenon impacts various kinds of electrical and electronic devices such as power grids, telecommunications and computer systems, both civilian and military.
The effects of an EMP — both tactical and strategic — have the potential to be quite significant, but they are also quite uncertain. Such widespread effects can be created during a high-altitude nuclear detonation (generally above 30 kilometers, or about 18 miles). This widespread EMP effect is referred to as high-altitude EMP or HEMP. Test data from actual high-altitude nuclear explosions is extremely limited. Only the United States and the Soviet Union conducted atmospheric nuclear tests above 20 kilometers and, combined, they carried out fewer than 20 actual tests.
As late as 1962 — a year before the Partial Test Ban Treaty went into effect, prohibiting its signatories from conducting aboveground test detonations and ending atmospheric tests — scientists were surprised by the HEMP effect. During a July 1962 atmospheric nuclear test called “Starfish Prime,” which took place 400 kilometers above Johnston Island in the Pacific, electrical and electronic systems were damaged in Hawaii, some 1,400 kilometers away. The Starfish Prime test was not designed to study HEMP, and the effect on Hawaii, which was so far from ground zero, startled U.S. scientists.
High-altitude nuclear testing effectively ended before the parameters and effects of HEMP were well understood. The limited body of knowledge that was gained from these tests remains a highly classified matter in both the United States and Russia. Consequently, it is difficult to speak intelligently about EMP or publicly debate the precise nature of its effects in the open-source arena.
The importance of the EMP threat should not be understated. There is no doubt that the impact of a HEMP attack would be significant. But any actor plotting such an attack would be dealing with immense uncertainties — not only about the ideal altitude at which to detonate the device based on its design and yield in order to maximize its effect but also about the nature of those effects and just how devastating they could be.
Non-nuclear devices that create an EMP-like effect, such as high-power microwave (HPM) devices, have been developed by several countries, including the United States. The most capable of these devices are thought to have significant tactical utility and more powerful variants may be able to achieve effects more than a kilometer away. But at the present time, such weapons do not appear to be able to create an EMP effect large enough to affect a city, much less an entire country. Because of this, we will confine our discussion of the EMP threat to HEMP caused by a nuclear detonation, which also happens to be the most prevalent scenario appearing in the media.
Attack Scenarios
In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, as discussed in many media reports, a nuclear weapon (probably in the megaton range) would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers somewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise at a third of this altitude. Only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.)
The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s, when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some attack scenarios against the United States.
However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such an attack against the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating.
Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including opportunity cost — to the developing country. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on.
In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.
Rogue Actors
One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia or China but from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to accomplish its mission without leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist group loads a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order to get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike. This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key coastline or continental strike.
When we consider this scenario, we must first acknowledge that it faces the same obstacles as any other nuclear weapon employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop its own nuclear weapons program. It is also highly unlikely that a nation that has devoted significant effort and treasure to develop a nuclear weapon would entrust such a weapon to an outside organization. Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified and would pay a heavy price for such an attack (there has been a large investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). Lastly, as noted above, a nuclear weapon is seen as a deterrent by countries such as North Korea or Iran, which seek such weapons to protect themselves from invasion, not to use them offensively. While a group like al Qaeda would likely use a nuclear device if it could obtain one, we doubt that other groups such as Hezbollah would. Hezbollah has a known base of operations in Lebanon that could be hit in a counterstrike and would therefore be less willing to risk an attack that could be traced back to it.
Also, such a scenario would require not a crude nuclear device but a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead. The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that required to construct a crude device. A warhead must be far more compact than a primitive device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and electronics and physics packages capable of withstanding the force of an ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the heat and force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed. Designing a functional warhead takes considerable advances in several fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy and explosives technology, and overseeing it all must be a high-end quality assurance capability. Because of this, it is our estimation that it would be far simpler for a terrorist group looking to conduct a nuclear attack to do so using a crude device than it would be using a sophisticated warhead — although we assess the risk of any non-state actor obtaining a nuclear capability of any kind, crude or sophisticated, as extraordinarily unlikely.
But even if a terrorist organization were somehow able to obtain a functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating the warhead to a missile it was not designed for and then getting it to launch and detonate properly would be far more daunting than it would appear at first glance. Additionally, the process of fueling a liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship using an improvised launcher would also be very challenging. (North Korea, Iran and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology, which uses volatile, corrosive and toxic fuels.)
Such a scenario is challenging enough, even before the uncertainty of achieving the desired HEMP effect is taken into account. This is just the kind of complexity and uncertainty that well-trained terrorist operatives seek to avoid in an operation. Besides, a ground-level nuclear detonation in a city such as New York or Washington would be more likely to cause the type of terror, death and physical destruction that is sought in a terrorist attack than could be achieved by generally non-lethal EMP.
Make no mistake: EMP is real. Modern civilization depends heavily on electronics and the electrical grid for a wide range of vital functions, and this is truer in the United States than in most other countries. Because of this, a HEMP attack or a substantial geomagnetic storm could have a dramatic impact on modern life in the affected area. However, as we’ve discussed, the EMP threat has been around for more than half a century and there are a number of technical and practical variables that make a HEMP attack using a nuclear warhead highly unlikely.
When considering the EMP threat, it is important to recognize that it exists amid a myriad other threats, including related threats such as nuclear warfare and targeted, small-scale HPM attacks. They also include threats posed by conventional warfare and conventional weapons such as man-portable air-defense systems, terrorism, cyberwarfare attacks against critical infrastructure, chemical and biological attacks — even natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and tsunamis.
The world is a dangerous place, full of potential threats. Some things are more likely to occur than others, and there is only a limited amount of funding to monitor, harden against, and try to prevent, prepare for and manage them all. When one attempts to defend against everything, the practical result is that one defends against nothing. Clear-sighted, well-grounded and rational prioritization of threats is essential to the effective defense of the homeland.
Hardening national infrastructure against EMP and HPM is undoubtedly important, and there are very real weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in America’s critical infrastructure — not to mention civil society. But each dollar spent on these efforts must be balanced against a dollar not spent on, for example, port security, which we believe is a far more likely and far more consequential vector for nuclear attack by a rogue state or non-state actor.
-
Well this hardly inspires confidence, or deterrence:
Failure Shuts Down Squadron of Nuclear Missiles
OCT 26 2010, 4:36 PM ET19
President Obama was briefed this morning on an engineering power failure at F.E. Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming that took 50 nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), one-ninth of the U.S. missile stockpile, temporarily offline on Saturday.
The base is a main locus of the United States' strategic nuclear forces. The 90th Missile Wing, headquartered there, controls 150 Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic nuclear missiles. They're on full-time alert and are housed in a variety of bunkers across the base.
On Saturday morning, according to people briefed on what happened, a squadron of ICBMs suddenly dropped down into what's known as "LF Down" status, meaning that the missileers in their bunkers could no longer communicate with the missiles themselves. LF Down status also means that various security protocols built into the missile delivery system, like intrusion alarms and warhead separation alarms, were offline. In LF Down status, the missiles are still technically launch-able, but they can only be controlled by an airborne command and control platform like the Boeing E-6 NAOC "Kneecap" aircraft, or perhaps the TACAMO fleet, which is primarily used to communicate with nuclear submarines. Had the country been placed on a higher state of nuclear alert, those platforms would be operating automatically.
According to the official, engineers believe that a launch control center computer (LCC), responsible for a package of five missiles, began to "ping" out of sequence, resulting in a surge of "noise" through the system. The LCCs interrogate each missile in sequence, so if they begin to send signals out when they're not supposed to, receivers on the missiles themselves will notice this and send out error codes.
Since LCCs ping out of sequence on occasion, missileers tried quick fixes. But as more and more missiles began to display error settings, they decided to take off-line all five LCCs that the malfunctioning center was connected to. That left 50 missiles in the dark. The missileers then restarted one of the LCCs, which began to normally interrogate the missile transceiver. Three other LCCs were successfully restarted. The suspect LCC remains off-line.
Commanders at the Air Force Base sent warning notices to colleagues at the country's two other nuclear missile command centers, as well as the to the National Military Command Center in Washington. At that point, they did not know what was causing the failure, and they did not know whether other missile systems were experiencing similar symptoms.
According to the official, engineers discovered that similar hardware failures had triggered a similar cascading failure 12 years ago at Minot AFB in North Dakota and Malmstrom AFB in Montana. That piece of hardware is the prime suspect.
The defense official said that there had not been a power failure, though the official acknowledged that that explanation had made its way through public affairs channels. Engineers working on the system presented a draft of their initial findings late this afternoon, the official said.
An administration official, speaking about the president's ability to control nuclear forces, said: "At no time did the president's ability decrease," an administration official said. "
Still, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, was immediately notified on Saturday, and he, in turn, briefed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates.
"We've never had something as big as this happen," a military officer who was briefed on the incident said. Occasionally, one or two might blink out, the officer said, and several warheads are routinely out of service for maintenance. At an extreme, "[w]e can deal with maybe 5, 6, or 7 at a time, but we've never lost complete command and control and functionality of 50 ICBMs."
The military contends that command and control -- "C2" in their parlance -- was not lost.
An Air Force spokesperson, Christy Nolta, said the power failure lasted less than an hour. "There was a temporary interruption and the missiles themselves were always protected by multiple, redundant, safety, security and command and control features. At no time was there any danger to the public," she said.
Another military official said the failure triggered an emergency inspection protocol, and sentries were dispatched to verify in person that all of the missiles were safe and properly protected.
When on alert, the missiles are the property of the U.S. Strategic Command, which controls all nuclear forces. When not on alert status, the missiles belong to the Global Strike Command.
A White House spokesperson referred questions about the incident to the Office of the Secretary of Defense and to the Air Force. A spokesperson for the Global Strike Command did not immediately respond to questions.
The cause of the failure remains unknown, although it is suspected to be a breach of underground cables deep beneath the base, according to a senior military official.
It is next to impossible for these systems to be hacked, so the military does not believe the incident was caused by malicious actors. A half dozen individual silos were affected by Saturday's failure.
There are about 450 ICBMs in America's nuclear arsenal, some of them bearing multiple warheads. 150 are based at Minot and about 150 are housed at Malmstrom AFB in Montana. The chessboard of nuclear deterrence, a game-theory-like intellectual contraption that dates from the Cold War, is predicated upon those missiles being able to target specific threat locations across the world. If a squadron goes down, that means other missiles have to pick up the slack. The new START treaty would reduce the number of these missiles by 30 percent, but the cuts are predicated upon the health of the current nuclear stockpile, from warhead to delivery system to command and control.
An administration official said that "to make too much out of this would be to sensationalize it. It's not that big of a deal. Everything worked as planned."
Senate Republicans have been pressing Senate Democrats to spend more money ensuring the current strategic nuclear arsenal, which dates to the early 1980s, is ready to go. The treaty requires the vote of two-thirds of the Senate to be ratified.
In 2008, Gates fired the Secretary of the Air Force and its chief of staff after a series of incidents suggested to Gates that the service wasn't taking its nuclear duties seriously enough. At one point, a B-52 bomber flew across the continental U.S. without realizing that its nuclear weapons were "hot."
National Journal's Megan Scully contacted a spokesperson for Sen. Jon Kyl, a top GOP critic of START, who said that "We don't know what happened and why." The spokesperson refused to comment on "media reports."
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/10/power-failure-shuts-down-sqaudron-of-icbms/65207/
-
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/world/americas/top-general-says-bill-clinton-lost-code-for-nuclear-launch/article1768224/
The U.S. government's procedures for launching nuclear missiles are supposed to be airtight: the codes for unleashing the atomic might of the world's largest superpower are kept locked in a briefcase carried by an aide who accompanies the president at all times.
The codes for opening the briefcase, in turn, are inscribed on a plastic card carried by the president.
So what if that precious piece of plastic – nicknamed “the biscuit” in the bizarre jargon of the Secret Service – goes missing?
That's exactly what happened in 2000, during the administration of president Bill Clinton, writes General Hugh Shelton, the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
According to the Daily Telegraph and several other media outlets around the world, General Shelton's new memoir, Without Hesitation: The Odyssey of an American Warrior, reveals that no one could find the codes for several months in 2000. An aide finally admitted they had been lost.
“The codes were actually missing for months,” he wrote. “That's a big deal – a gargantuan deal.”
Perhaps more surprisingly, it may not have been the first time Mr. Clinton misplaced the free world's most important set of numbers.
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Patterson, one of the people tasked with toting the briefcase during Mr. Clinton's presidency, wrote in his own book seven years ago that the forgetful POTUS misplaced the card – which he apparently kept in his pants pockets with his credit cards – on two occasions.
The first time, he left it in the White House when he went to play a round of golf; the second time, in early 1998, aides turned the White House upside-down, and searched the president's clothes without finding them.
-
This piece of the blindingly obvious is notable only for who wrote it.
Dangerous Nuclear Illusions
By ROGER COHEN
Published: November 11, 2010
LONDON — A world without nuclear weapons sounds nice, but of course that was the world that brought us World War I and World War II. If you like the sound of that, the touchy-feely “Global Zero” bandwagon is probably for you.
I’m an optimist in general but a pessimist when it comes to nations’ shifting pursuit of their interests. Humans, not states, have consciences. President Barack Obama’s commitment in his 2009 Prague speech “to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons” was a fine sentiment but a political mistake.
The idea went down well with the Norwegians, who awarded Obama a Nobel Peace Prize he should not have accepted, but overall this prospective peace blossom has wilted faster than a flower in the Scandinavian night.
(A neophyte president should question whether a peace Nobel is in any way compromising — apart from examining the merits, which were dubious.)
There were two sides to Obama’s embrace of a nuclear-free world. The first was the “vision,” as Michèle Flournoy, his under secretary for defense policy, described it recently to the Halifax International Security Forum. It was a form of utopian idealism, as Obama half-acknowledged by saying he would “perhaps” not see the end of nukes in his lifetime.
Visions are nice — Marx had one of classless societies. They can also be dangerous. Helmut Schmidt, the former German chancellor, famously remarked that people who have them should see a doctor.
The danger was that Obama, very early in his presidency, would be perceived as weak or unrealistic by rivals such as China or enemies like Iran, despite his commitment, for “as long as these weapons exist,” to “maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary.”
That perception of weakness has taken hold, reinforced by his academic-seminar approach to an Afghan surge now just seven months away from being reversed.
The second aspect of the nuclear “vision” was strategic. The idea was that it would give the United States moral leverage in persuading nations to reduce their nuclear arsenals or abandon nuclear ambitions. It would also advance U.S. nonproliferation efforts designed, among other things, to ensure no terrorists ever acquire nukes. The most dangerous aspect of the 21st-century world is the potential ability of smaller and smaller groups to do greater and greater harm.
Here the results have been mixed at best. Flournoy acknowledged that “the example that the U.S. sets probably won’t impact Iran or North Korea directly.” China continues to pursue the expansion and refinement of its nuclear arsenal. France, with its beloved “force de frappe,” was always publicly skeptical and privately contemptuous. Its recent defense accord with Britain was interesting for its inclusion of nuclear cooperation and for Prime Minister David Cameron’s statement that “we will always retain an independent nuclear deterrent.” Note the “always.”
Only with Russia was clear headway made. A new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty signed earlier this year awaits Senate ratification. It would slash U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals to their lowest level in a half-century. It’s compatible with America’s defense needs and should be ratified.
But the “Global Zero” idea is an unhelpful distraction because it inclines Republicans to believe Obama is not serious about maintaining and modernizing America’s nuclear arsenal. Senator Jeff Sessions, Republican of Alabama, said of the goal of a nuclear-free world: “I think it’s a dangerous concept to get into our minds — I talked with some Russians recently, and they scoffed at the idea.”
That’s a fair guide to Republican thinking; and there will be 47, not 41, Republicans in the new Senate, as well as a Tea-Party-revved Republican majority in the House. New Start’s best hope is in the lame-duck Senate. But Obama is going to have to turn the page, dump aloofness for horse-trading, airy-fairy ideals for the politics of the possible, and realize “interconnectedness” is not just the state of the world but also the way things get done in Washington.
As for nonproliferation efforts, they remain stymied by contradictions that a review conference this year did little to resolve. Three states with weapons have refused to sign the nonproliferation treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan. With all three, the United States winks at noncompliance, in the Israeli case through a secret “understanding” struck in 1969. Of course this is not lost on the likes of Iran. The case of North Korea, which renounced the nonproliferation treaty in 2003, has reinforced impressions of American inconsistency.
Perhaps Japan makes clearest why “Global Zero” is a stillborn idea. As the nation of Hiroshima, it has always pushed hard for disarmament. But as the nation facing North Korean nuclear testing and missiles, as well as an ever-stronger Chinese nuclear arsenal, it clings to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. Idealism will not keep it safe.
Obama can’t renounce “Global Zero;” that would be silly. But he should pretend he never said it. His remake for 2012 demands more of Chicago and less of Oslo. Perhaps even Benjamin Netanyahu, who has treated the president with sublime contempt since his September White House visit, would take note.
-
Looks good, but I don't have the 55 minutes it would take to watch it. Would you be so kind as to give a summary?
-
Iranian Anti-Stuxnet Progammer Assassinated
Ralph Alter
Like Butch Cassidy and the Sundance Kid, the Iranian mullah-ocracy and their pint-sized front man must be looking over their shoulders at the havoc being brought to their nuclear program and asking themselves: "Who are those guys?"
Who are they, indeed. Since a yet to be unmasked cyper-sleuth first slipped the Stuxnet virus into the servers controlling the enrichment process for the Iranian nuclear development program, we haven't seen a week go by without fresh reports of de-stabilization. While the Iranians have acknowledged the presence of the cyberbomb and suggested that the United States might be the source, it seems that any intelligence system employing the likes of Valerie Plame would be incapable of something so cunningly brilliant. The plant certainly seems like a piece of Israeli handiwork. Other indigenous Iranian dissident groups including the Baluchian liberation movement, Jundallah, are also considered as possible sources, however unlikely.
The mullahs are determined to get their nuclear enrichment back on track and are allocating considerable resources to ferreting out the perpetrators and counter-programming to eliminate the Stuxnet virus. To this end, the regime had organized a team of its best experts to combat the cyber warfare. At the helm of the program, Iran placed Professor Majid Shahriari, the nation's top expert on computer coding.
On Monday, Shariari was assassinated on a North Tehran street as a motorcyclist filled his car with bullets. Initial reports indicated a bomb was attached to his vehicle by the cyclist, but photos of the vehicle show bullet holes rather than explosive damage. A second Iranian nuclear scientist, Professor Feredoun Abbassi-Davani, and his wife survived a similar motorcycle attack. The violent attacks took place in the center of the Iranian security zone, amidst several secret nuclear labs. This would suggest that whoever is behind the latest disruptions is quite capable of bypassing heavy Iranian security and has outstanding sources of intelligence.
The world owes its gratitude to the yet unnamed intelligence service that continues to dog the Iranians. Under the current administration our American intelligence umbrella is weakened and ineffectual. We have a President more interested in hobbling our Israeli allies while providing foreign aid to the Palestinians than in providing our nation with security. Thank God that forces of good and common sense remain active in the pursuit of global security.
Ralph Alter is a regular contributor to the American Thinker.
Page Printed from: http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2010/11/iranian_antistuxnet_progammer_1.html at November 30, 2010 - 12:50:49 PM CST
-
My money is on Shlomo Walnuts. :-D
-
Looks like BO is going to get the treaty passed :x :cry: with the help of over ten Republicans :cry: :x and much of the Republican internationalist establishment (Bush 1, Kissinger, Sowcroft, etc) Madness that such a serious agreement is getting rammed through, virtually unread. WHY NOT WAIT THREE OR FOUR WEEKS UNTIL CONGRESS RECONVENES?
Apparently the Russians read the deal as meaning we are not allowed to increase our anti-missile capabilities and if we do they will withdraw. So, if some other threat develops, , , , Frank Gaffney, a long-time serious player in this area notes that Russia and Iran are working with Venezuela to capacitate it with missiles and nuclear , , , ahem , , , power. If Venezuela starts up with missiles similar to those that Iran already has that can reach Europe, then any effort on our part to develop a defensive capability must then be done at the cost of disrupting our agreement with the Russians-- upon whom BO currently relies for allowing transit of supplies to our effort in Afhanistan and whom BO begs not to capacitate Iran with nukes and anti-aircrafty capabilities.
These things deserve serious study and conversation, but as is so often the case Republican defections are our undoing , , , :cry:
-
Maybe the missed translation of Hillary's Russian Reset button actually came out as 'kowtow'. (credit below) I would note that this week the Polish government has issued a deep distrust of the Russian report on the crash that killed all their leaders while the Obamaites and RINOs like Dick Lugar are saying trust this adversary in a treaty where the preamble doesn't even match the contents of the document.
Nothing should prevent missile defense.
Funny they would rush this while at least the public doesn't even know who just launched a missile off the coast of California?
--------------------
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/nilegardiner/100069140/new-start-treaty-the-obama-administration-is-dancing-to-moscow%E2%80%99s-tune/
New START Treaty: The Obama Administration is dancing to Moscow’s tune
By Nile Gardiner World Last updated: December 21st, 2010
Russia likes the new START treaty (Photo: Reuters)
When Hillary Clinton famously announced Washington’s new “reset” policy towards Russia, she really meant to say “kowtow”. Because whenever Moscow makes a demand the Obama Administration obediently follows. The Russians hated the Bush Administration’s plans for Third Site missile defences in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the Obama team dutifully dropped them last year in what can only be described as an appalling surrender to a major strategic adversary. Now with the New START Treaty, the Obama presidency is pushing an agreement that the increasingly repressive regime in Russia thinks is absolutely wonderful.
And Moscow has every reason to like it. As I noted in a previous post, the treaty fundamentally undercuts US national security by giving Russia a huge say over American plans for a global missile defence system:
Simply put, the New START Treaty is a staggeringly bad deal for the United States, and an extraordinarily good one for Vladimir Putin’s increasingly hostile and authoritarian Russia. President Obama needs to respect the will of the American electorate and allow the new Senate to vote on the Treaty, and fully scrutinise and debate the details of an agreement which, if ratified in its current form, will dramatically undercut America’s global missile defences. The White House is pressing for another monumental surrender to Moscow which will only strengthen the hand of a key US adversary.
Further confirmation that the Russians are clearly in the driving seat, and can’t wait to get this agreement ratified, was provided in astonishing fashion yesterday by Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who warned the US Senate to fall in line and drop any talk of amending the treaty. The last time I checked, Lavrov wasn’t elected by the American people, but he clearly thinks he can tell them what to do. According to the BBC:
Russia has warned US lawmakers that any change to the new nuclear arms disarmament treaty between the two countries could destroy the pact. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said the New Start treaty “cannot be reopened, becoming the subject of new negotiations” according to remarks reported by Interfax news agency. Republicans in the US Senate have recently pushed to change its wording. Two-thirds of the 100 US senators must back the treaty for it to be ratified.
“The Start agreement, which was drafted on the basis of strict parity, completely meets the national interests of both Russia and the United States,” Mr Lavrov told Interfax. “It cannot be reopened, becoming the subject of new negotiations,” he added.
The White House’s response should be to tell the Russian government to mind its own business, and be prepared to renegotiate the treaty, but unfortunately the Obama presidency is simply content to move its feet to Moscow’s tune like a dancing bear at a St. Petersburg circus. This is all deeply humiliating for the most powerful nation on earth. US lawmakers should recognise this farce for what it is: the humiliating appeasement of a deeply unpleasant and hostile regime that is actively working against US interests and security on the world stage.
-
The democrats and rinos can't be trusted with national security?
Who could have seen that coming?? :roll:
-
So, we had to sign it by the year's end or they would be upset even though they had not approved it themselves? :roll: :x
========================
The U.S. Senate ratified the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (known as START) by a 71-26 vote Dec. 22. The agreement reduces the deployed strategic warheads of each country to 1,550. The treaty has received intense attention during the past week, as it was unclear if the Senate could even get enough votes to discuss the issue — though many Republicans in the U.S. government have blasted the agreement since its arrangement between Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama in April.
The START Treaty has been a bellwether of relations between Moscow and Washington. In the spring, it was a sign of warming sentiments between the countries. Since then, Russia and the United States have struck a slew of compromises on issues like sanctions against Iran and U.S. investment in Russia’s modernization efforts. However, Moscow has publicly stated over the past few months that if START was not signed by the end of the year, it would consider relations between Russia and the United States as cooling. Thus, Obama has been trying to pressure those standing in the treaty’s way — mainly Republicans — to sign.
As Russia has watched the Senate debate the treaty, it has been most concerned about the possible addition of amendments that would increase U.S. inspections, lower the cap on nuclear weapons or even add topics not really relevant to the treaty, like the U.S. moving forward on ballistic missile defense. (WTF?!?)This last issue is the most important to Russia, as it would most likely put U.S. defense on Russia’s doorstep. On Dec. 21, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov warned that any such amendment would be a deal-breaker, since the treaty cannot be opened up to new negotiations. (It shoudl also be quite important to us!!!)
The treaty passed by the Senate does not have any of these non-binding amendments, but it does have addendums regarding the Senate’s concerns. The addendums have no bearing on the treaty itself, but the question remains of how Russia will view the addendums. Since they are not actual amendments to the treaty, Russia likely will sign START within weeks, as the treaty has already been debated in the State Duma. But the Russian Foreign Ministry has already announced that it will have to take a fresh look at what the U.S. Senate actually ratified.
Read more: U.S. Senate Ratifies START Treaty | STRATFOR
-
Pakistani Nuclear Arms Pose Challenge to U.S. Policy
By DAVID E. SANGER and ERIC SCHMITT
Published: January 31, 2011
WASHINGTON — New American intelligence assessments have concluded that Pakistan has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal since President Obama came to office, and that it is building the capability to surge ahead in the production of nuclear-weapons material, putting it on a path to overtake Britain as the world’s fifth largest nuclear weapons power.
For the Obama administration, the assessment poses a direct challenge to a central element of the president’s national security strategy, the reduction of nuclear stockpiles around the world. Pakistan’s determination to add considerably to its arsenal — mostly to deter India — has also become yet another irritant in its often testy relationship with Washington, particularly as Pakistan seeks to block Mr. Obama’s renewed efforts to negotiate a global treaty that would ban the production of new nuclear material.
The United States keeps its estimates of foreign nuclear weapons stockpiles secret, and Pakistan goes to great lengths to hide both the number and location of its weapons. It is particularly wary of the United States, which Pakistan’s military fears has plans to seize the arsenal if it was judged to be at risk of falling into the hands of extremists. Such secrecy makes accurate estimates difficult.
But the most recent estimates, according to officials and outsiders familiar with the American assessments, suggest that the number of deployed weapons now ranges from the mid-90s to more than 110. When Mr. Obama came to office, his aides were told that the arsenal “was in the mid-to-high 70s,” according to one official who had been briefed at the time, though estimates ranged from 60 to 90.
“We’ve seen a consistent, constant buildup in their inventory, but it hasn’t been a sudden rapid rise,” a senior American military official said. “We’re very, very well aware of what they’re doing.”
White House officials share the assessment that the increase in actual weapons has been what one termed “slow and steady.”
But the bigger worry is the production of nuclear materials. Based on the latest estimates of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, an outside group that estimates worldwide nuclear production, experts say Pakistan has now produced enough material for 40 to 100 additional weapons, including a new class of plutonium bombs. If those estimates are correct — and some government officials regard them as high — it would put Pakistan on a par with long-established nuclear powers.
“If not now, Pakistan will soon have the fifth largest nuclear arsenal in the world, surpassing the United Kingdom,” said Bruce Riedel, a former C.I.A. officer and the author of “Deadly Embrace: Pakistan, America, and the Future of Global Jihad.”
“And judging by the new nuclear reactors that are coming online and the pace of production, Pakistan is on a course to be the fourth largest nuclear weapons state in the world, ahead of France,” he said. The United States, Russia and China are the three largest nuclear weapons states.
Mr. Riedel conducted the first review of Pakistan and Afghanistan policy for President Obama in early 2009.
Pakistan’s arsenal of deployed weapons is considered secure, a point the White House reiterated last week while declining to answer questions about its new estimates. The United States has spent more than $100 million helping the country build fences, install sensor systems and train personnel to handle the weapons. But senior officials remain deeply concerned that weapons-usable fuel, which is kept in laboratories and storage centers, is more vulnerable and could be diverted by insiders in Pakistan’s vast nuclear complex.
In State Department cables released by WikiLeaks late last year, Anne Patterson, then the American ambassador to Pakistan, wrote of concerns that nuclear material in Pakistan’s laboratories was vulnerable to slow theft from insiders. The cables also revealed an American effort to deny its ally technology that it could use to upgrade its arsenal to plutonium weapons.
“The biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk — the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on,” said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard scholar who compiles an annual report called “Securing the Bomb” for the group Nuclear Threat Initiative. “All but one of the real thefts” of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, he said, “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities — that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”
==========
On Monday, The Washington Post, citing nongovernment analysts, said Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal now numbered more than 100 deployed weapons. In interviews over the past three weeks, government officials from several countries, including India, which has an interest in raising the alarm about Pakistani capability, provided glimpses of their own estimates.
Almost all, however, said their real concern was not the weapons, but the increase in the production of material, especially plutonium. Pakistan is completing work on a large new plutonium production reactor, which will greatly increase its ability to produce a powerful new generation of weapons, but also defies Mr. Obama’s initiative to halt the production of weapons-grade material.
Nuclear projects are managed by the Pakistani military, but the country’s top civilian leaders are, on paper, part of the nuclear chain of command. Last year, Pakistan’s prime minister visited the new plutonium reactor at Kushab, suggesting at least some level of knowledge about the program. “We think the civilians are fully in the loop,” one senior Obama administration official said.
Still, it is unclear how Pakistan is financing the new weapons production, at a time of extraordinary financial stress in the country. “What does Pakistan need with that many nuclear weapons, especially given the state of the country’s economy?” said one foreign official who is familiar with the country’s plans, but agreed to discuss the classified program if granted anonymity.
“The country already has more than enough weapons for an effective deterrent against India,” the official said. “This is just for the generals to say they have more than India.”
American officials have been careful not to discuss Pakistan’s arsenal in public, for fear of further inflaming tensions and fueling Pakistani fears that the United States was figuring how to secure the weapons in an emergency, or a government collapse. But in November Mr. Obama’s top nuclear adviser, Gary Samore, criticized Pakistan for seeking to block talks on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which, if negotiated and adopted, could threaten Pakistan’s program.
In interviews last year, senior Pakistani officials said that they were infuriated by the deal Washington struck to provide civilian nuclear fuel to India, charging it had freed up India’s homemade fuel to produce new weapons. As a result, they said, they had no choice but to boost their own production and oppose any treaty that would cut into their ability to match India’s arsenal.
In a statement in December, the Pakistan’s National Command Authority, which overseas the arsenal, said that it “rejects any effort to undermine its strategic deterrence,” adding, “Pakistan will not be a party to any approach that is prejudicial to its legitimate national security interests.”
Tommy Vietor, a spokesman for the National Security Council, said Friday that Mr. Obama remained “confident” about the security of Pakistani weapons, and said he “continues to encourage all nations to support the commencement of negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.” Other officials say efforts are now under way to find a way to start negotiations in new forums, away from Pakistani influence.
A senior Pakistani military officer declined Monday to confirm the size of his country’s nuclear arsenal or the describe rates of production, saying that information was classified.
“People are getting unduly concerned about the size of our stockpile,” said the officer, who was not authorized to speak publicly. “What we have is a credible, minimum nuclear deterrent. It’s a bare minimum.”
-
http://hotair.com/archives/2011/02/01/wikileaks-doc-al-qaeda-on-the-brink-of-a-dirty-bomb-feds-seeking-missing-911-suspects/
Wikileaks doc: Al Qaeda on the brink of a dirty bomb, feds seeking missing 9/11 suspects
posted at 9:12 pm on February 1, 2011 by Allahpundit
Drudge is giving this banner treatment but I’m not sure why. Of course Al Qaeda is on the brink of a dirty bomb. Their comrades-in-arms in the Taliban are the jihadist proxy of one of the world’s biggest nuclear proliferators, aren’t they? If the filthbags in Pakistani intelligence want Al Qaeda to have nuclear material, they’ll find a way to smuggle some out of the state supply, I’m sure. In fact, according to a new piece in the NYT, Pakistan’s practically swimming in fissile material these days. Never mind the dirty bombs; how long before AQ or Lashkar e-Taiba or some other arm of Pakistan’s terror apparatus has itself a fully-functioning atomic weapon?
New American intelligence assessments have concluded that Pakistan has steadily expanded its nuclear arsenal since President Obama came to office, and that it is building the capability to surge ahead in the production of nuclear-weapons material, putting it on a path to overtake Britain as the world’s fifth largest nuclear weapons power…
“We’ve seen a consistent, constant buildup in their inventory, but it hasn’t been a sudden rapid rise,” a senior American military official said. “We’re very, very well aware of what they’re doing.”…
But the bigger worry is the production of nuclear materials. Based on the latest estimates of the International Panel on Fissile Materials, an outside group that estimates worldwide nuclear production, experts say Pakistan has now produced enough material for 40 to 100 additional weapons, including a new class of plutonium bombs. If those estimates are correct — and some government officials regard them as high — it would put Pakistan on a par with long-established nuclear powers…
“The biggest concern of major production, to my mind, is theft from the places where the material is being handled in bulk — the plants that produce it, convert it to metal, fabricate it into bomb parts, and so on,” said Matthew Bunn, a Harvard scholar who compiles an annual report called “Securing the Bomb” for the group Nuclear Threat Initiative. “All but one of the real thefts” of highly enriched uranium and plutonium, he said, “were insider thefts from bulk-handling facilities — that’s where you can squirrel a little bit away without the loss being detected.”
Read the story being touted by Drudge and you’ll see that most of the Wikileaks docs come from 2009, which is already a different world from what’s happening in Pakistan today. Why they’re ramping up nuke production now, especially with their economy teetering, remains obscure, but according to one foreign analyst it’s simply to boast some sort of numerical advantage over their longtime nemesis India. Or maybe it’s a form of insurance against state collapse: The west will never let Pakistan crumble since it knows the consequences of letting influential lunatics in the government make off with the nuclear crown jewels. It’s precisely because Al Qaeda is perpetually on the brink of having a dirty bomb or something worse that we’re forced to be conciliatory with these cretins at all.
The other Wikileaks story being passed around tonight is more interesting and more inscrutable. Via the Telegraph, apparently there was a team of verrrry suspicious men from Qatar making some verrrry suspicious moves around the country right before 9/11. Among the remarkable coincidences: Possible surveillance of the World Trade Center shortly before the attack, “pilot-type uniforms” seen in their room by hotel housekeepers, and the fact that they were scheduled to fly from L.A. to D.C. on September 10 aboard the very same plane that ended up being steered into the Pentagon the next morning. (They ended up flying to London instead.) I’ve read the piece twice and still can’t decipher what the plot might have been. Were they going to try to use the uniforms to get past airport security somehow? No other 9/11 cell used that M.O. Were they going to plant weapons on the plane for the hijackers in D.C. to use the next morning? Again, there’s no evidence that any other cell had help like that. Maybe they were prepared to pull a hijacking of their own? But in that case, why’d they bug out to London instead of following through? All theories welcome.
-
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1356645/A-weapon-mass-destruction-U-S--Shock-confession-Customs-officer.html
Coverup or no big deal?
-
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5sSnxge6BGA&feature=player_embedded[/youtube]
Hmmmmm......
-
http://www.10news.com/video/26827497/index.html
The raw video is even more telling. CPB will never let this guy in front of the press ever again.
-
http://formerspook.blogspot.com/2011/02/wmds-in-america.html
Monday, February 14, 2011
WMDs in America?
Call it the non-story of the week. It generated a fair amount of buzz in Southern California, but if you live outside the region, you probably didn't hear a word about it, unless you frequent Big Journalism and other media watchdog sites.
Here's what happened: last week, KGTV, the ABC affiliate in San Diego, aired a story on port security. It's a timely topic; not only is the city home to the nation's second-largest naval base, it's also a major hub for shipping activity. Dozens of giant container ships dock at San Diego's port facilities each month.
KGTV's investigation, by reporter Mitch Blacher, included an interview with Al Hallor, the assistant port director and a senior official with Customs and Border Protection. When Blacher asked about efforts to detect WMD in the San Diego area. From the KGTV website:
"So, specifically, you're looking for the dirty bomb? You're looking for the nuclear device?" asked Blacher.
"Correct. Weapons of mass effect," Hallor said.
"You ever found one?" asked Blacher.
"Not at this location," Hallor said.
"But they have found them?" asked Blacher.
"Yes," said Hallor.
"You never found one in San Diego though?" Blacher asked.
"I would say at the port of San Diego we have not," Hallor said.
"Have you found one in San Diego?" Blacher asked.
The interview was interrupted before Hallor was able to answer the question.
Bob McCarty of BigJournalism.com has the video, and it's definitely worth a look. A p.r. flack from CBP is present during the interview, though off-camera. Watch Hallor's reaction when Blacher asks about the discovery of "Weapons of Mass Effect" at U.S. ports. Mr. Hallor clearly pauses--and looks towards the public affairs officer--before finally acknowledging the discovery. Then, when KGTV's Blacher tried to learn if such weapons have been found in San Diego, the public relations flack brings the interview to a sudden end.
Customs and Border Protection later released a statement saying that Hallor "misspoke," although it took them three weeks to offer that explanation.
CBP has not specifically had any incidents with nuclear devices or nuclear materials at our ports of entry. CBP is an all-threats agency. The purpose of many security measures is to prevent threats from ever materializing by being prepared for them. And, we must be prepared to stop threats in whatever form they do materialize at the border, whether it’s an individual or cargo arriving by land, air, or sea. Regardless of what the contraband or threat is, we’re being smart, evaluating, and focusing in on anything or anyone that is potentially high-risk.
The agency has not said why it refused to let Hallor answer the question, why it terminated the interview, or why its clarification was so long in coming. But whatever the reason, the agency didn't do itself any favors, and the entire incident has only raised new questions.
First, let's take CBP at its word and assume that Mr. Hallor was wrong when he answered Blacher's question. How could a senior homeland security official--the assistant director of the Port of San Diego--get it so wrong. Clearly, weapons of mass effects covers a lot of territory, but you've either found them coming into the country--or you haven't. Based on his answer, Hallor apparently knew of a WME/WMD discovery and tried to affirm that--until the public relations officer effectively silenced him.
On the other hand, if Mr. Hallor mis-characterized another incident as a WME/WMD find, that doesn't exactly inspire confidence, either. Someone in his position has at least a SECRET security clearance, meaning Hallor has access to a wide variety of intelligence information pertaining to homeland security threats. Additionally, we don't suppose the CBP official has a history of making things up, either. Obviously, something in Hallor's experience or knowledge base triggered the affirmative response to Blacher's question.
Finally, if Mr. Hallor was truly mistaken, why did it take CBP so long to issue their clarification?If there have been no WMD/WME discoveries, the agency should have issued a statement immediately, and not wait three weeks to respond. You'd also think CBP would have provided more details. For example, the thwarted Times Square car bomb plot was an attempted WME attack. Was that what Mr. Hallor was referring to? If so, the feds should have been more clear in explaining the official's remarks.
To be fair, CBP's delayed explanation isn't totally beyond disbelief. Had WMD/WME been found in a U.S. port, it's likely the discovery would have been leaked almost immediately--and not disclosed casually to a local TV reporter in San Diego. But that's about the only scenario that lends credence to CBP's version of events. And with that scenario, you must accept that one of the principal homeland security officers in San Diego County is clueless on one of the most important issues facing his organization. Otherwise, why would he make a statement with no basis in fact?
On the other hand, maybe Mr. Hallor was being a little too candid. That theory raises all sorts of questions that remain unanswered, such as what was found, where and how it was being shipped into America.
This much we know: Al Qaida has a long-standing interest in WMD. Their capabilities in that area have improved modestly in those areas in recent years, despite severe damage inflicted on their leadership and fund-raising operations--essential elements in any WMD/WME attacks. We also know there was a major WMD operation in the Atlanta area late last year, with the feds stopping all trucks on I-20 during rush hour, and running them through a radiation scanner. Sources told WSB-TV the activity was "real world" and not a drill, though various spokesmen later tried to "walk back" that remark. Sounds like the same p.r. tactic recently attempted in San Diego.
One more point. It's probably unrelated (at least, that's what the government flacks would have you believe), but this recent item also caught our eye: early last month, the Federal Communications Commission announced plans to test Presidential Alerts in the near future.
As an agency official told Federal News Radio in Washington:
"The primary goal is to provide the President with a mechanism to communicate with the American public during times of national emergency," said Lisa Fowlkes (Deputy Chief of the FCC's Homeland Security Bureau). The change, she said, is that prior to last week's order there was no rule in place to call for or allow a test from top to bottom.
Fowlkes said, "There's never been a test from top to bottom where it's issued by FEMA and it goes straight down to all the different levels of EAS to the American public. So this is a way for us to glean, okay, if there were an actual emergency and the federal government needed to activate the Presidential EAS, making sure that it actually works the way it's designed to."
Now that there's a rule in place, the next challenges are going to be working with all the stakeholders on timing of the test and to reach out to the public so they understand it's a test and not a real emergency, Fowlkes said.
To someone who spent years in radio (before having the good sense to join the military) this announcement was stunning. Broadcasters have worked with the FCC for years on the Emergency Alert System (EAS) and its predecessor, the Emergency Broadcast System or EBS. There was always some provision for the president (or the national command authority) to provide information through the system in the event of a cataclysmic event. But for more than 50 years, no one saw a need to test the presidential capabilities, despite nuclear dangers during the Cold War, and real-world events like 9-11.
And what sort of event might warrant activation of the Presidential EAS? How about a domestic terror attack, using weapons of mass destruction or a weapon of mass effect?
-
With the Middle East roiling, the alarming news about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons buildup has gotten far too little attention. The Times recently reported that American intelligence agencies believe Pakistan has between 95 and more than 110 deployed nuclear weapons, up from the mid-to-high 70s just two years ago.
Related
Times Topic: PakistanPakistan can’t feed its people, educate its children, or defeat insurgents without billions of dollars in foreign aid. Yet, with China’s help, it is now building a fourth nuclear reactor to produce more weapons fuel.
Even without that reactor, experts say, it has already manufactured enough fuel for 40 to 100 additional weapons. That means Pakistan — which claims to want a minimal credible deterrent — could soon possess the world’s fifth-largest arsenal, behind the United States, Russia, France and China but ahead of Britain and India. Washington and Moscow, with thousands of nuclear weapons each, still have the most weapons by far, but at least they are making serious reductions.
Washington could threaten to suspend billions of dollars of American aid if Islamabad does not restrain its nuclear appetites. But that would hugely complicate efforts in Afghanistan and could destabilize Pakistan.
The truth is there is no easy way to stop the buildup, or that of India and China. Slowing and reversing that arms race is essential for regional and global security. Washington must look for points of leverage and make this one of its strategic priorities.
The ultimate nightmare, of course, is that the extremists will topple Pakistan’s government and get their hands on the nuclear weapons. We also don’t rest easy contemplating the weakness of Pakistan’s civilian leadership, the power of its army and the bitterness of the country’s rivalry with nuclear-armed India.
The army claims to need more nuclear weapons to deter India’s superior conventional arsenal. It seems incapable of understanding that the real threat comes from the Taliban and other extremists.
The biggest game-changer would be for Pakistan and India to normalize diplomatic and economic relations. The two sides recently agreed to resume bilateral talks suspended after the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai. There is a long way to go.
India insists that it won’t accept an outside broker. There is a lot the Obama administration can do quietly to press the countries to work to settle differences over Afghanistan and the disputed region of Kashmir. Pakistan must do a lot more to stop insurgents who target India.
Washington also needs to urge the two militaries to start talking, and urge the two governments to begin exploring ways to lessen the danger of an accidental nuclear war — with more effective hotlines and data exchanges — with a long-term goal of arms-control negotiations.
Washington and its allies must also continue to look for ways to get Pakistan to stop blocking negotiations on a global ban on fissile material production.
The world, especially this part of the world, is a dangerous enough place these days. It certainly doesn’t need any more nuclear weapons.
-
"Gee, if only we could Pakistan to pinkie-promise not to nuke India, it'd all be swell".
-
I disagree Doug. China has us by the short and curlies. They couldn't build a military that could defeat ours for the amount of money they used to buy our debt. Now, they are using their financial leverage to bend us to their will. Unrestricted warfare, financial edition.
"The acme of skill is to defeat an enemy without fighting".
"He who understands himself and his opponent need not fear the outcome of a thousand battles"
Sun Tzu
http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=CNG.ae2d2f54b4997246bb7b180d2736bac1.e1&show_article=1
Cables show China used debt holdings to press US
Feb 21 04:45 PM US/Eastern
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, shown here in 2003, publicly stated his concern...
Leaked diplomatic cables vividly show China's willingness to translate its massive holdings of US debt into political influence on issues ranging from Taiwan's sovereignty to Washington's financial policy.
China's clout -- gleaned from its nearly $900 billion stack of US debt -- has been widely commented on in the United States, but sensitive cables show just how much influence Beijing has and how keen Washington is to address its rival's concerns.
An October 2008 cable, released by WikiLeaks, showed a senior Chinese official linking questions about much-needed Chinese investment to sensitive military sales to Taiwan.
Amid the panic of Lehman Brothers' collapse and the ensuing liquidity crunch, Liu Jiahua, an official who then helped manage China's foreign reserves, was "non-committal on the possible resumption of lending."
Instead, "Liu -- citing an Internet discussion forum -- said that as in the United States, the Chinese leadership must pay close attention to public opinion in forming policies," according to the memo.
-
http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/A/AS_MALAYSIA_SEIZED_CARGO?SITE=VTBEN&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT
-
By MICHAEL OREN
America and its allies, empowered by the United Nations and the Arab League, are interceding militarily in Libya. But would that action have been delayed or even precluded if Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi had access to nuclear weapons? No doubt Gadhafi is asking himself that same question.
Gadhafi unilaterally forfeited his nuclear weapons program by 2004, turning over uranium-enriching centrifuges and warhead designs. A dictator like him—capable of ordering the murders of 259 civilians aboard Pan Am Flight 103 and countless others in many countries including his own—would not easily concede the ultimate weapon. Gadhafi did so because he believed he was less secure with the bomb than he would be after relinquishing it. He feared that the U.S., which had recently invaded Iraq, would deal with him much as it had Saddam Hussein.
A similar fear, many intelligence experts in the U.S. and elsewhere believe, impelled the Iranian regime to suspend its own nuclear weapons program in 2003. According to these analysts, the program resumed only when the threat of military intervention receded. It continues to make steady progress today.
The Iranian regime is the pre- eminent sponsor of terror in the world, a danger to pro-Western states, and the enemy of its own people who strive for democracy. It poses all of these hazards without nuclear weapons. Imagine the catastrophes it could inflict with them.
And if Iran acquires the bomb, other Middle Eastern states will also pursue nuclear capabilities, transforming the entire region into a tinderbox. The global enthusiasm recently sparked by Arab protesters demanding freedoms would likely have been limited if Middle Eastern autocrats had nuclear arsenals. Under such circumstances, the question would be not only which side—the ruled or the rulers—gains ascendancy in the Middle East, but who controls the keys and the codes.
The efforts to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons have been obscured by the dramatic images emanating from the region, but the upheaval makes that campaign all the more critical. While cynically shooting its own dissidents, the Iranian regime is calling for the overthrow of other Middle Eastern governments and exploiting the disorder to extend its influence.
In Lebanon, Iran has installed a puppet government and gained a strategic foothold on the eastern Mediterranean—an achievement of historic gravity. Triumphantly, Iranian warships for the first time passed through the Suez Canal and maneuvered off the Syrian coast. Iran has also stepped up arms supplies to Hezbollah and Hamas, as revealed by Israel's recent interception of the freighter Victoria laden with Iranian missiles. And last week Iran welcomed—or perhaps instigated—the firing of some 100 rockets and mortar shells into Israel from Gaza.
All the while, Iran has remained the target of international sanctions designed to dissuade it from pursuing military nuclear capabilities. These strictures have affected Iran's economy, but they have yet to significantly slow the country's nuclear program or dampen its leaders' appetite for atomic weapons. In spite of some technical difficulties, according to International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Yukiya Amano, Iran is enriching uranium "steadily, constantly."
America's policy, like Israel's, is that "all options are on the table." We know that only a credible threat of military intervention can convince nondemocratic regimes to abandon their pursuit of nuclear weapons. Sanctions alone are unlikely to prove effective unless backed by measures capable of convincing the Iranian regime that the military option is real. It is the very threat of such force that reduces the danger that it will ever have to be used.
The critical question then becomes: Does anybody in Tehran believe that all options are truly on the table today? Based on Iran's brazen pronouncements, the answer appears to be no. And while the allied intercession in Libya may send a message of determination to Iran, it might also stoke the Iranian regime's desire to become a nuclear power and so avoid Gadhafi's fate. For that reason it is especially vital now to substantiate the "all options" policy.
Now is the moment to dissuade the Iranian regime from obtaining a nuclear weapon that might deter any Libya-like intervention or provide the ayatollahs with a doomsday option. If Gadhafi had not surrendered his centrifuges in 2004 and he were now surrounded in his bunker with nothing left but a button, would he push it?
-
Editorial
Time for Plan BPublished: April 20, 2011
Recommend
Twitter
E-Mail
Print
Reprints
Share
Close
LinkedinDiggMixxMySpacePermalink. A 14-year effort to negotiate an international treaty banning the production of nuclear weapons fuel is getting nowhere. Under the terms of the United Nations’ Conference on Disarmament, all 65 participants must agree. Pakistan, which is racing to develop the world’s fifth largest arsenal, is refusing to let the talks move forward.
It is clearly time for a new approach. So we are encouraged that the Obama administration has begun discussing with Britain and France and others the possibility of negotiating a ban outside the conference, much like the 2008 convention on cluster munitions and the 1997 land-mine treaty. While the United States, Russia and China still are not signatories — they should be — many others are, and the two agreements are credited with greatly diminishing, although not eliminating, the use of both weapons.
Russia and China, which must be part of any fissile material ban, are resisting the idea of ad hoc negotiations. They should tell Pakistan to let the conference do its job, or they should accept the alternative. China has particular influence as Pakistan’s longtime supplier of nuclear technology, including a fourth reactor for producing even more nuclear fuel.
Islamabad dug in its heels after the George W. Bush administration persuaded the international community to lift a ban on civilian nuclear trade with India. The ban remains in place for Pakistan.
India, unlike Pakistan, isn’t a serious proliferation risk. Still, the deal was deeply flawed. It did not require India — estimated to have at least 100 nuclear warheads — to halt fissile material production. And now that New Delhi can buy foreign uranium for its power reactors it can husband its domestic uranium for weapons.
Islamabad argues that the fissile material ban would further lock in a military advantage for India. Pakistan already has 95 or more deployed nuclear weapons, up from the mid- to high-70s two years ago. It should be less fixated on India and more focused on using scarce resources to educate its children and battle home-grown extremists. Along with the test ban treaty (which the Senate still must ratify), getting countries to stop producing fissile material is essential for curbing the world’s most lethal weapons. A ban would give the United States and others more leverage to pressure North Korea and Iran to abandon their nuclear efforts. Serious negotiations need to start now.
-
Uh-huh. And we have leverage for these negotiations? :roll:
-
I've not seen this elsewhere and in a sane world with a reasonably patriotic media it would be everywhere , , ,
==========================
http://townhall.com/columnists/cliffmay/2011/04/21/trust_the_russians/page/full/
Were there an award for the worst idea produced in Washington in recent days, there would be many worthy competitors, but I think I’d put my money on this one: Granting Russians the power to tell Americans whether we can or cannot shoot down missiles flying toward their intended victims.
Who would even consider such an idea? The Obama Administration -- or so it appears. In response, last week, 39 Republican Senators sent the President a strongly worded letter requesting his assurance, in writing, that he will not give Russia such “red-button” rights. The letter asks for reassurance, as well, that the Administration will not give Russia access to American missile defense information “including early warning, detection, tracking, targeting, and telemetry data, sensors or common operational picture data, or American hit-to-kill missile defense technology.”
Here’s how this came about: In recent months, the Obama administration, as part of its policy to “re-set” U.S. relations with Russia, has offered to integrate the Kremlin into both the American and the NATO ballistic missile defense systems. Last month, Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher said the Administration is “eager to begin a joint analysis, joint exercises, and sharing of early warning data that could form the basis for a cooperative missile defense system.”
This month, Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov, said his government was inclined to favor such cooperation but would “insist on only one thing … a red button push to start an anti-missile …” To 39 Republican senators, this sounded like an outrageous demand. How this sounded to President Obama and his national security team remains unclear.
In their letter, the Republican senators, led by Senator Mark Kirk (R-Ill), make this larger point: “No American President should ever allow a foreign nation to dictate when or how the United State defends our country and our allies. In our view, any agreement that would allow Russia to influence the defense of the United States or our allies, to say nothing of a ‘red button’ or veto, would constitute a failure of leadership.”
They note, too, that Russia “has not halted its support for nuclear infrastructure or sophisticated arms of states such as Iran and Syria.” Finally, the senators ask the President to “share with Congress the materials on U.S. missile defense cooperation that have been provided to Russia, which heretofore the Departments of State and Defense have refused to provide.”
Senator Kirk also drafted a memo providing “context” for what he fears is the Administration’s eagerness to reveal to the Kremlin “some of our country’s most sensitive technology, collection assets and real-time intelligence.”
“Admitting the Russians into the most important and time-sensitive parts of our nation’s defense,” the memo argues, “is extremely risky and could present a fatal vulnerability… Providing Russia any access to US sensitive data would undermine the national security of the United States.”
Kirk lists a dozen recent cases of Russian espionage targeting the U.S. and about the same number of instances of Russian collaboration with Iran’s efforts to develop ballistic missiles. In addition, as “part of its assistance to Iran in building the Bushehr nuclear reactor, Russia has trained some 1,500 Iranian nuclear engineers, according to the Congressional Research Service.”
So to be clear: Russia is helping Iran develop nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them to its enemies – America, the “Great Satan” tops that list – while simultaneously “insisting” the US give Russian officials – for example, former KGB officer Vladimir Putin -- the power to decide whether Americans can defend themselves and their allies from Iranian attacks.
If President Obama sees such ideas as ludicrous, if this is not at all where he’s heading, he should say so. A brief letter would do. At least 39 Senators will be anxiously checking their mailboxes.
One addendum: In 1995, Lowell Wood, a respected astrophysicist involved with the Strategic Defense Initiation and affiliated with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, proposed a rather different model of international cooperation: “a world-wide missile defense based on space-based interceptors in which each of the sponsoring nations could independently elect to cause the system to block a missile launch coming from anywhere and headed to anywhere, but no nation could defeat or delay operation of the system if another nation had authorized it.”
In other words, all the participating nations would have the right to defend themselves – none would have a finger on a “red button” that would leave a target defenseless. This good idea – a global, space-based anti-missile umbrella -- won no awards at the time. Memo to the President: Why not revive it?
-
"Obama is awesome"
-
Associated Press
VIENNA—The U.S. and its allies pushed ahead Wednesday with efforts to bring Syria before the United Nations Security Council for failure to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency, despite opposition from China and Russia.
Separately, U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron said that Britain and France will put forward a resolution at the U.N. condemning the crackdown in Syria.
A draft of a resolution obtained by The Associated Press finds Syria in "non-compliance with its obligations" with IAEA requirements to allow inspectors access to all nuclear facilities to ensure they are not being used for military purposes.
The draft criticizes Syria's lack of cooperation with "repeated requests for access" by the U.N. nuclear agency to information about a facility at Dair Alzour that appears to have been a nuclear reactor capable of producing plutonium, which is used to arm nuclear weapons. The site was destroyed in 2007.
The draft was circulated Wednesday to the 35 ministers who serve on the IAEA's board of governors to be discussed and put to vote. It needs majority approval from the board before it can be sent to the Security Council.
The IAEA has tried in vain since 2008 to follow up on strong evidence that the Dair Alzour site, bombed in 2007 by Israeli warplanes, was a nearly finished reactor built with North Korea's help.
Drawing on a May 24 report by IAEA chief Yukiya Amano, the resolution expresses "serious concern" over what it calls "Syria's lack of cooperation with the IAEA director general's repeated requests for access to additional information and locations as well as Syria's refusal to engage substantively with the agency on the nature of the Dair Alzour site."
Some nations have expressed misgivings about bringing Syria before the Security Council over an unresolved nuclear issue while there is a nationwide crackdown on a revolt against President Bashar Assad, but diplomats have indicated that a majority should be possible.
But without China and Russia the question remains whether that is enough, given the power of those nations to veto any measures that come before the Security Council.
In Britain, Mr. Cameron told the House of Commons that the U.K. and France wish to condemn the repression by Mr. Assad's government.
Mr. Cameron told lawmakers that the resolution before the Security Council will be focused on "demanding accountability and humanitarian action."
He said that if "anyone votes against that resolution or tries to veto it, that should be on their conscience."
Activists say Syria's nationwide crackdown on the revolt against Mr. Assad's regime has killed more than 1,300 Syrians.
-
http://finance.townhall.com/columnists/bobbeauprez/2011/09/24/iran_at_our_doorstep_-_part_ii,_the_emp_threat/page/full/
In Part I of this series, "Iran at our Doorstep," published in the August issue of A Line of Sight, I documented Iran's continued quest to develop a nuclear weapon. Additionally, I explained the Iran-Venezuela-Russia alliance currently constructing a military missile base on the extreme northern coast of Venezuela well within reach of many heavily populated U.S. cities. The publicly stated purpose of building the base is to provide the capability for Venezuela to launch missiles at "Iran's enemies."
Subsequently on September 4 we published contributing editor Major General Paul Vallely's article summarizing the release by the United Nation's IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) of a "restricted report" regarding Iran's continued nuclear activity. Consistent with the documentation shared on these pages last month, the U.N. nuclear agency said it is "increasingly concerned" by a stream of "extensive and comprehensive" intelligence coming from "many member states" suggesting that Iran continues to work secretly on developing a nuclear payload for a missile and other components of a nuclear weapons program.
General Vallely now serves as Chairman of Stand Up America, a private organization that includes numerous former military and intelligence community experts and analysts. In his September 4 article, Vallely wrote, "SUA believes strongly that Iran now possesses low yield nuclear war heads that can be mounted on the Shehab missile and deployed on the oceans in container ships with the Russian provided Club K missile launch system." The General went on to explain that Iran's objective is to "launch EMP (electro-magnetic pulse) weapons on U.S. Coastal cities and freeze our national grid systems."
A June, 2011 RAND report agreed with Vallely's analysis. According to RAND senior defense policy analyst Gregory S. Jones, Tehran's nuclear program has progressed to the point that "it will take around two months for the Iranian regime to produce the 20kg of uranium enriched to 90 percent required for the production of a nuclear warhead."
The window may have slammed shut on the opportunity to prevent Iran from going nuclear.
Americans are increasingly concerned about the vulnerability to a cyber-attack. On a personal level, that could involve the hacking into one's personal financial or other identity information. A cyber-attack could also escalate to a much larger scale of a corporate or large network cyber-theft, and certainly a cyber-attack that penetrated our various government, military or national security agencies could be catastrophic.
But, an EMP attack would be even far more destructive and life threatening. For those unfamiliar, one of America's most experience terrorism experts, RP Eddy, offers this layman's definition: "An EMP is a result of a nuclear explosion, or of another weapon, that releases a wave of electrons that will fry every electronic gizmo or tool that civilization needs to survive." Among his lengthy and distinguished credentials, Eddy served the Clinton Administration on the National Security Council as the Director of Counterterroism, and following the 9/11 attacks founded the Center of Tactical Counterterrorism in New York.
This isn't just theoretical or "Hollywood" fantasy. A quick search will yield a large library full of information and warnings about EMPs dating back over many decades. The U.S. found out about EMPs somewhat by accident during the World War II era when some of our own planes were affected by our own nuclear weapons tests. Although no nation has deployed an EMP, it is commonly accepted that many developed nations have such weapons. Since the technology required is considerably less sophisticated than advanced nuclear weaponry, experts believe that nations with developing nuclear capabilities and terrorist organizations may find EMPs far too appealing.
In a 2009 interview with Fox News, Eddy explained that part of the appeal to perceived lesser powers is that an EMP is far easier to build than a traditional nuclear weapon in part because it doesn't have to be as accurate nor as long range. And there are far too many bargain priced aged missiles lying around that can be picked on the cheap and nukes galore, too. Most estimates put the Russian stockpile alone of old and new nukes at more than 10,000. Eddy also referenced the ability to launch an EMP from a "floating barge" – the same Club K Russian weapons technology that looks like a common semi-truck trailer highlighted by Vallely in his September 4 article, and now being marketed to the world.
The above graphic is from 1997 congressional testimony, and it has been repeatedly referenced since that time to demonstrate that a single explosion sufficiently high in the atmosphere could paralyze the entire North American continent. As Eddy explains, an EMP attack would "fry" everything electric, and the "power grid would be out for months." Not only would our cell phones and computers not work, neither would hospital systems, air traffic control, food production and refrigeration, manufacturing, distribution of goods and services, financial transactions and records….you get the picture.
Frank Gaffney is a former Assistant Secretary of Defense and was in charge of Nuclear Forces and Arms Control Policy at the Pentagon under President Reagan. Currently, Gaffney is President of the Center for Security Policy. His warning of the potential devastation from an EMP attack is terrifying. "Within a year of that attack, nine out of 10 Americans would be dead, because we can't support a population of the present size in urban centers and the like without electricity," he says. "And that is exactly what I believe the Iranians are working towards."
Senator Jon Kyl, previously the Chairman and now Ranking Republican on the Senate Judiciary's Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security, is deeply concerned about the vulnerability to an EMP attack. He says that it "is one of only a few ways that the United States could be defeated by its enemies – terrorist or otherwise. And it is probably the easiest."
"A terrorist organization might have trouble putting a nuclear warhead on target with a Scud, but it would be much easier to simply launch and detonate in the atmosphere," Kyl wrote in the Washington Post. "No need for risk and difficulty of trying to smuggle a nuclear weapon over the border or hit a particular city. Just launch a cheap missile from a freighter in international waters – al Qaida is believed to own about 80 such vessels – and make sure to get it a few miles in the air."
In addition to the 9/11 Commission charged with review and making recommendations following the 9/11 attacks, the government established The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack. The Commission released their first report in 2004, about the same time as the 9/11 Commission, and a subsequent report in 2008. Unfortunately, only a few politicians like Sen. Kyl even paid attention. In fact, there have been at least six national commissions as well as the government commissions to issue reports on the threat of EMP. But, virtually all of the warnings and recommendations of the experts have been ignored. "Congress has merely deliberated it, but has not taken substantive action," according to the Heritage Foundation. "The Administration and federal agencies remain mostly ambivalent."
One of the most damning indictments of the 9/11 Commission's findings was a "failure of imagination." America couldn't imagine that we were vulnerable to a terrorist attack inside our border on the scale of 9/11. Have we allowed our imaginations to fall asleep again?
As threatening as an EMP attack is, there is also a great deal that can be done. The EMP Commission says the "appropriate national-level approach should balance prevention, protection, and recovery." Both comprehensive reports by the Commission contain specific recommendations to accomplish that balanced strategic approach. Unfortunately, we have done virtually nothing while the capabilities of our adversaries continue to advance.
James Carafano, the National Defense and Homeland Security expert at the Heritage Foundation offers this straightforward agenda:
1. Fund comprehensive missile defense
2. Develop a National Recovery Plan and a plan to respond to severe space emergencies.
3. Require more research on the EMP Threat.
Carafano also voices a frustration that echoes across the pages of the EMP Commission's 2008 report. "Simply recognizing the EMP threat would go a long way toward better preparing America for the unthinkable."
It has been ten years since the 9/11 attacks, and America has not suffered another significant attack on the homeland during the decade. Our national bravado and the passage of time cause us to not dwell on the unknown nor take seriously "death to America" pledges by tyrants like Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. If as the experts warn, a single EMP attack could put America "back to the 19th century," do we not need to be vigilant?
In addition to a complacency developed from extended relative peace, by ignoring our increasing national security vulnerabilities and the capabilities of our enemies, America presented a target that was exploited by our enemies on 9/11. We have done much in the last ten years to prevent terrorists from flying planes into buildings, again, but are we ignoring an even bigger threat?
Iran either already has or is rapidly developing weapons technologies capable of great damage to America and our allies. In addition, the regime is expanding influence globally, particularly in South and Central America that further threatens our national security and global balance of power. In the coming weeks, we will expose more of the extended threatening web that the Iranians are weaving, and why it can neither be ignored nor tolerated.
Bob Beauprez
Bob Beauprez is a former Member of Congress and is currently the editor-in-chief of A Line of Sight, an online policy resource. Prior to serving in Congress, Mr. Beauprez was a dairy farmer and community banker. He and his wife Claudia reside in Lafayette, Colorado. You may contact him at: http://bobbeauprez.com/contact/
-
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3297/israeli-drones-may-target-iranian-nuke-sites
-
By JAMSHEED K. CHOKSY
Why, despite the growing danger posed by Iran's nuclear program, have the United States and other nations restricted themselves to negotiations, economic sanctions and electronic intrusions? None of those tactics has been particularly effective or produced enduring changes.
The main argument against military action is that it would set Iran's nuclear program back only a few years, and that Tehran would retaliate directly and via surrogates, drawing the U.S. into another unwinnable war. Many fear also that Iranians will rally behind their regime with nationalist fervor, dashing hope of regime change for decades and turning Iran's largely pro-Western population against the West once again, to the mullahs' great benefit.
These concerns are based on worst-case scenarios that assume Iran has the resources to rebuild quickly, to retaliate without being thwarted, and to get the average Iranian to rally behind a regime hated for its violent oppression of dissent, stifling social codes, economic failures and isolationist policies. Yet Iran's government is already weakened by very public infighting between its much disliked ruling factions.
We should not conclude that a nuclear Iran is inevitable. Instead we should think about another way of confronting the threat. The real goal of air strikes should be not only to target Iran's nuclear facilities but to cripple the ayatollahs' ability to protect themselves from popular overthrow.
The mass uprisings in 2009—known as the Green Revolution—have dissipated because few protesters saw any hope of mustering the force necessary to defeat the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Basij paramilitary forces who brutally enforce Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's authority. Yet dissatisfaction and resentment still run deep across all social groups and economic ranks, even among civil-service bureaucrats, rank-and-file military men, and elected officials.
This means Western air strikes should hit other military production facilities and the bases of the IRGC and Basij. A foreign takedown of those enforcers would give Iran's population the opportunity to rise again. As a popular Tehrani female rapper notes: "No regime can hang on through intimidation and violence. We are ready and waiting. The regime thinks it has put out the fire. We are the burning coals under the ashes."
The IRGC's claims that it can retaliate significantly are largely bluster. The Iranian Navy's fast boats and midget submarines in the Persian Gulf could be eliminated through pinpoint strikes, as could army artillery batteries along the Strait of Hormuz—thereby removing any threat to the region's maritime trade, including crude oil shipments.
While the nuclear program may not be completely destroyed, sufficient damage will occur so even facilities deep underground would require several years of restoration. Most importantly, once the power of the Basij and the IRGC to enforce the regime's will upon the people has been seriously compromised, it would not be surprising to see large segments of Iran's population casting off the theocratic yoke.
The Libyan rebellion's successful ouster of a 42-year dictatorial elite is but one example of successful regime change. Another is the ongoing attempt by Syrians to end a nearly half-century dictatorship. A few months ago, few would have believed those revolutions would occur. Moreover, an Iranian uprising will be directed against Islamists, not by them. Were Iran's theocrats gravely weakened or swept away, Iran's sponsorship of terrorists and dictatorships would come to a halt—making groups like Hamas and Hezbollah, and leaders like Bashar al-Assad, Kim Jong Il and Hugo Chávez more vulnerable.
A new Iranian nation would require economic aid and political guidance—from the U.S. and Europe—to develop representational governance. That would be a worthwhile investment. Crucially, even if a post-theocratic Iranian state gradually rebuilds its military and resumes its nuclear program, the weapons would not be in the hands of a regime so hostile to much of the world.
Regime change remains the best option for defusing the ayatollahs' nuclear threat, and it can best be achieved by the Iranian people themselves. Disabling the theocracy's machinery of repression would leave it vulnerable to popular revolt. Through such decisive actions, the U.S. and its allies could help Iranians bring the populist uprising of 2009 to a fitting culmination.
Mr. Choksy is professor of Iranian studies, senior fellow of the Center on American and Global Security, and former director of the Middle Eastern studies program at Indiana University.
-
North Korea, a terrible dictatorship whom I don't trust at all and has again ratcheted up the threats, has proven nuclear weapons yet no one has talked about taking them out.
Pakistan, our "ally", but frankly I put on nearly the same level as Iran has nuclear weapons, and again, no one has talked about taking them out.
Yet Iran, where we have the most to lose, i.e. disruption of oil and therefore our economy and the world's economy, discussions are being held to to bomb them and/or sanction a physical attack.
What's the upside, for America (this is not an Israeli discussion) to participate? And if there is a reason, doesn't it apply to Korea and Pakistan as well?
-
Well, some of us here HAVE been discussing action against Pakistan.
As for the Norks, the answer is two fold, they are too hard a nut to crack and-- I am open to correction here-- they are not plotting to wipe out the Sorks or anyone else.
-
Iran has been waging a war against the US since 1979. Until 9/11, Iran's proxy warfare construct, Hezbollah had killed more Americans than any other terrorist entity. You think they wouldn't consider a nuke attack against us? This is a nation that glories in bloody martyrdom and jihad and chants "Death to the Great Satan", meaning us.
-
Let's do nothing while Iran finishes up it's nuclear program.....
http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=08a28e1c-6ece-4134-ba8e-e706d703401b&p=1
Ahmadinejad's demons
National Post ·
During the Iran-Iraq War, the Ayatollah Khomeini imported 500,000 small plastic keys from Taiwan. The trinkets were meant to be inspirational. After Iraq invaded in September, 1980, it had quickly become clear that Iran's forces were no match for Saddam Hussein's professional, well-armed military. To compensate for their disadvantage, Khomeini sent Iranian children, some as young as 12 years old, to the front lines. There, they marched in formation across minefields toward the enemy, clearing a path with their bodies. Before every mission, one of the Taiwanese keys would be hung around each child's neck. It was supposed to open the gates to paradise for them.
These children who marched to their deaths were part of the Basiji, a mass movement created by Khomeini in 1979. This volunteer militia went enthusiastically, and by the thousands, to their own destruction. According to one veteran of the Iran-Iraq War, "It was sometimes like a race. Even without the commander's orders, everyone wanted to be first."
The sacrifice of the Basiji was ghastly. And yet, today, it is a source of growing pride. Since the end of hostilities against Iraq in 1988, the Basiji have grown both in numbers and influence. They have been deployed, above all, as a vice squad to enforce religious law in Iran, and their elite "special units" have been used as shock troops against anti-government forces. Last year, they formed the potent core of the political base that propelled Mahmoud Ahmadinejad -- a man who reportedly served as a Basij instructor during the Iran-Iraq War -- to the presidency.
Ahmadinejad revels in his alliance with the Basiji. He regularly appears in public wearing a black-and-white Basij scarf, and, in his speeches, he routinely praises "Basij power." Ahmadinejad's ascendance on the shoulders of the Basiji means that the Iranian Revolution, launched almost three decades ago, has entered a new and disturbing phase. A younger generation of Iranians, whose worldviews were forged in the atrocities of the Iran-Iraq War, have come to power, wielding a more fervently ideological approach to politics than their predecessors.
Most Basiji came from the countryside and were often illiterate. When their training was done, each Basiji received a blood-red headband that designated him a volunteer for martyrdom.
The chief combat tactic employed by the Basiji was the human wave attack, whereby barely armed children and teenagers would move continuously toward the enemy in perfectly straight rows. It did not matter whether they fell to enemy fire or detonated the mines with their bodies. Once a path to the Iraqi forces had been opened up, Iranian commanders would send in their more valuable and skilled Revolutionary Guard troops.
"They come toward our positions in huge hordes with their fists swinging," one Iraqi officer complained in the summer of 1982. "You can shoot down the first wave and then the second. But at some point the corpses are piling up in front of you, and all you want to do is scream and throw away your weapon. Those are human beings, after all!"
Why did the Basiji volunteer for such duty? Most were recruited by members of the Revolutionary Guards, which commanded the Basiji. These "special educators" would visit schools and handpick their martyrs from the paramilitary exercises in which all Iranian youth were required to participate. Propaganda films -- like the 1986 TV film A Contribution to the War -- praised this alliance between students and the regime, and undermined those parents who tried to save their children's lives.
In 1982, the German weekly Der Spiegel documented the story of a 12-year-old boy named Hossein, who enlisted with the Basiji despite having polio: "One day, some unknown imams turned up in the village. They called the whole population to the plaza in front of the police station, and they announced that they came with good news: The Islamic Army of Iran had been chosen to liberate the holy city Al-Quds -- Jerusalem -- from the infidels .... The local mullah had decided that every family with children would have to furnish one soldier of God. Because Hossein was the most easily expendable for his family, and because, in light of his illness, he could in any case not expect much happiness in this life, he was chosen by his father to represent the family in the struggle." (Of the 20 children that went into battle with Hossein, only he and two others survived.)
At the beginning of the war, Iran's ruling mullahs did not send human beings into the minefields, but rather animals: donkeys, horses and dogs. But the tactic proved useless: "After a few donkeys had been blown up, the rest ran off in terror," Mostafa Arki reports in his book Eight Years of War in the Middle East.
The donkeys reacted normally -- fear of death is natural. The Basiji, on the other hand, marched fearlessly to their deaths. The curious slogans that they chanted while entering the battlefields are of note: "Against the Yazid of our time!"; "Hussein's caravan is moving on!"; "A new Karbala awaits us!"
Yazid, Hussein, Karbala -- these are all references to the founding myth of Shia Islam. In the late seventh century, Islam was split between those loyal to the Caliph Yazid -- the predecessors of Sunni Islam -- and the founders of Shia Islam, who thought that the Imam Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, should govern the Muslims. In 680, Hussein led an uprising against the "illegitimate" caliph, but he was betrayed. On the plain of Karbala, Yazid's forces attacked Hussein and his entourage and killed them. Hussein's corpse bore the marks of 33 lance punctures and 34 blows of the sword.
His head was cut off and his body was trampled by horses. Ever since, the martyrdom of Hussein has formed the core of Shia theology, and the Ashura Festival that commemorates his death is Shiism's holiest day. On that day, men beat themselves with their fists or flagellate themselves with iron chains to approximate Hussein's sufferings.
At times throughout the centuries, the ritual has grown obscenely violent. In his study Crowds and Power, Elias Canetti recounts a first-hand report of the Ashura Festival as it occurred in mid-19th-century Tehran:
"500,000 people, in the grip of delirium, cover their heads with ashes and beat their foreheads against the ground. They want to subject themselves voluntarily to torments: to commit suicide en masse, to mutilate themselves with refinement ... Hundreds of men in white shirts come by, their faces ecstatically raised toward the sky. Of these, several will be dead this evening."
During the Iran-Iraq War, Khomeini took this inward-directed fervour and channelled it toward the external enemy. He transformed the passive lamentation into active protest. He made the Battle of Karbala the prototype of any fight against tyranny. On the one hand, the scoundrel Yazid, now in the form of Saddam Hussein; on the other, the Prophet's grandson, Hussein, for whose suffering the time of Shia revenge had finally come.
The power of this story was reinforced by a theological twist that Khomeini gave it. According to Khomeini, life is worthless and death is the beginning of genuine existence. This latter world is accessible to martyrs: Their death is no death, but merely the transition from this world to the world beyond, where they will live on eternally and in splendour.
Military victories are secondary, Khomeini explained in September, 1980. The Basiji must "understand that he is a 'soldier of God' for whom it is not so much the outcome of the conflict as the mere participation in it that provides fulfilment and gratification."
For those whose courage still waned in the face of death, the regime put on a show. A mysterious horseman on a magnificent steed would suddenly appear on the front lines. His face -- covered in phosphorus -- would shine. His costume was that of a medieval prince.
A child soldier, Reza Behrouzi, whose story was documented in 1985 by the French writer Freidoune Sehabjam, reported that the soldiers reacted with a mixture of panic and rapture: "Everyone wanted to run toward the horseman. But he drove them away. 'Don't come to me!' he shouted, 'Charge into battle against the infidels! ... Revenge the death of our Imam Hussein and strike down the progeny of Yazid!' "
The mysterious apparition who was able to trigger such emotions is the "hidden imam," a mythical figure who influences Ahmadinejad to this day.
The Shia call all the male descendants of the Prophet Muhammad "imams" and ascribe to them a quasi-divine status. Hussein, who was killed at Karbala by Yazid, was the third Imam. His son and grandson were the fourth and fifth. At the end of this line, there is the "Twelfth Imam," who is named Muhammad.
Some call him the Mahdi (the "divinely guided one"). He was born in 869, the only son of the eleventh Imam. In 874, he disappeared without a trace, thereby bringing Muhammad's lineage to a close. In Shia mythology, however, the Twelfth Imam survived. The Shia believe that he merely withdrew from public view when he was five and that he will emerge from his "occultation" in order to liberate the world from evil.
In Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey, V. S. Naipaul described seeing posters in post-Revolutionary Tehran bearing motifs similar to those of Maoist China: crowds, for instance, with rifles and machine guns raised in the air as if in greeting. The posters always bore the same phrase: "Twelfth imam, we are waiting for you."
According to Shia tradition, legitimate Islamic rule can only be established following the twelfth imam's reappearance.
Khomeini, however, had no intention of waiting. He vested the myth with an entirely new sense: The Twelfth Imam will emerge only when the believers have vanquished evil. To speed up the Mahdi's return, Muslims had to shake off their torpor and fight.
It was this culture that nurtured Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's worldview. Born outside Tehran in 1956, the son of blacksmith, he trained as a civil engineer and, during the Iran-Iraq War, he joined the Revolutionary Guards.
His biography remains strangely elliptical. Did he play a role in the 1979 takeover of the U.S. Embassy, as some charge? What exactly did he do during the war? We have no definite answers.
We do know that after the war's end, he served as the governor of Ardebil Province and as an organizer of Ansar-e Hezbollah, a radical gang of violent Islamic vigilantes. After becoming mayor of Tehran in April, 2003, Ahmadinejad used his position to build up a strong network of radical Islamic fundamentalists. It was in that role that he won his reputation -- and popularity -- as a hardliner devoted to rolling back the liberal reforms of then-President Muhammad Khatami.
Ahmadinejad positioned himself as the leader of a "second revolution" to eradicate corruption and Western influences from Iranian society. And the Basiji, whose numbers had grown dramatically since the end of the Iran-Iraq War, embraced him.
Recruited from the more conservative and impoverished parts of the population, the Basiji fall under the direction of -- and swear absolute loyalty to -- the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, Khomeini's successor. During Ahmadinejad's run for the presidency in 2005, the millions of Basiji -- in every Iranian town, neighbourhood, and mosque -- became his unofficial campaign workers.
As Basij ideology and influence enjoy a renaissance under Ahmadinejad, the movement's belief in the virtues of violent self-sacrifice remains intact. Since 2004, the mobilization of Iranians for suicide brigades has intensified, with recruits being trained for foreign missions. Thus, a special military unit has been created bearing the name "Commando of Voluntary Martyrs." According to its own statistics, this force has so far recruited some 52,000 Iranians to the suicidal cause. It aims to form a "martyrdom unit" in every Iranian province.
The Basiji's cult of self-destruction would be chilling in any country. In the context of the Iranian nuclear program, however, its obsession with martyrdom amounts to a lit fuse. Nowadays, Basiji are sent not into the desert, but rather into the laboratory. Basij students are encouraged to enroll in technical and scientific disciplines. According to a spokesperson for the Revolutionary Guard, the aim is to use the "technical factor" in order to augment "national security."
What exactly does that mean? Consider that in December, 2001, former Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani explained that "the use of even one nuclear bomb inside Israel will destroy everything." On the other hand, if Israel responded with its own nuclear weapons, it "will only harm the Islamic world. It is not irrational to contemplate such an eventuality."
Rafsanjani thus spelled out a macabre cost-benefit analysis. It might not be possible to destroy Israel without suffering retaliation. But, for Islam, the level of damage Israel could inflict is bearable -- only 100,000 or so additional martyrs for Islam.
And Rafsanjani is a member of the moderate, pragmatic wing of the Iranian Revolution; he believes that any conflict ought to have a "worthwhile" outcome. Ahmadinejad, by contrast, is predisposed toward apocalyptic thinking. In one of his first TV interviews after being elected president, he enthused: "Is there an art that is more beautiful, more divine, more eternal than the art of the martyr's death?" In September, 2005, he concluded his first speech before the United Nations by imploring God to bring about the return of the Twelfth Imam.
A politics pursued in alliance with a supernatural force is necessarily unpredictable. Why should an Iranian president engage in pragmatic politics when his assumption is that, in three or four years, the saviour will appear? If the messiah is coming, why compromise? That is why, up to now, Ahmadinejad has pursued confrontational policies with evident pleasure.
The history of the Basiji shows that we must expect monstrosities from the current Iranian regime. Already, what began in the early 1980s with the clearing of minefields by human detonators has spread throughout the Middle East, as suicide bombing has become the terrorist tactic of choice. And the Basiji who once upon a time wandered the desert armed only with a walking stick is today working as a chemist in a uranium enrichment facility.
- Matthias Kuntzel is a political scientist in Hamburg, Germany and author of Djihad und Judenhass (Jihad and Jew-Hatred).
-
Well, some of us here HAVE been discussing action against Pakistan.
As for the Norks, the answer is two fold, they are too hard a nut to crack and-- I am open to correction here-- they are not plotting to wipe out the Sorks or anyone else.
I have read with interest comments on Pakistan (I've said before I particularly enjoy Ya's comments), but frankly I doubt if we will do anything nor does it seem on a national scale are we discussing doing anything.
As for Korea, yes, they are a hard nut to crack, however the rhetoric seems to go up and down. The North has promised to wipe out the South plus a few nearby allies of ours. Just this week.
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57330909/n-korea-threatens-south-with-sea-of-fire/
And while GM points out, "Iran has been waging a war against the US since 1979." I don't think they have killed one American on American soil. Nor do they have the delivery system to do so.
And "proxy" is not the same... as Iran attacking America.
That said, the world would be better off if Korea, Pakistan and Iran didn't have WMD. Frankly, I wish China and Russia didn't have nuclear weapons either. But I'm not sure it's in America's interest to physically attack (diplomacy and sanctions are fine) any of them, including Iran. The cost to America would be prohibitive. And the direct threat to America is minimal.
-
The logic of Mutually Assured Destruction works with the Russians and Chinese. I'm quite a bit less sure about that with the Ayatollahs and Mullahs see e.g. GM's post immediately prior to yours for but one example.
Agreed that Team Baraq is not likely to do anything about Pakistan, nor would your man Huntsman :-P. Newt just might though :-D Agreed that little has been done (apart from here and the sources YA cites) to persuade and prepare the political will necessary to act viz Pakistan--indeed I have been arguing here for several years that our policy is incoherent-- my point was that we here are not being inconsistent with regard to this.
-
Conservatives here voiced quite a bit of support for John Bolton's view advising strikes against N.K. nukes as well as stopping Iran. The N.K. threat is different and more complicated because of having its big brother China on the doorstep, not to mention you can see the home of the Russian Pacific Fleet from North Korea's northern-most coastal border. Who is Iran's big brother keeping them contained, the new government of Iraq?? Pakistan is its own unique case and I hope we are working through all the options of when and how to take action and contain its dangers. I don't see how recent failures of our policies toward NK and Pak make failure in Iran more desirable.
In the history of the world in our lifetimes, Israel struck a Saddam reactor in Ozarik 1981 and a 'military site' in Syria in 2007 and the French played a lead role in deposing Kadafy. Not much else ever happens in non-proliferation enforcement or tyrant/terrorist abatement without the U.S. taking the lead or unilateral role.
A similar line of defeatist thinking was used in the unsuccessful argument against deposing Saddam Hussein, we shouldn't take down Saddam because we did nothing here and nothing there around the globe. That logic escapes me. How does our inaction or failure in N.K, Pakistan or anywhere else help with the question facing us right now, what is the right thing to do about the threat posed by Iran who according to most reports is about to become a real nuclear power right now under our watch.
"I don't think they [Iran] have killed one American on American soil." And this: "the direct threat to America is minimal".
Inventing a category to find them innocent and why is there a qualifier on the threat to America?! If they are our enemy by their choosing, co-conspiring in thousands of American deaths and causing a war to be years longer than it needed to be, they are a threat. If they are developing nuclear and extending the range of delivery systems as a declared enemy of the United States, they are a threat. If they earned the distinction of being the world's number one state sponsor of terrorism, they are a threat. If their delivery systems could hit locations where we have security agreements, they are a threat. These security relationships were formed precisely with this thinking in mind: we will not wait ever again for enemies to land on our shores to begin our action. GM already wrote: "Iran has been waging a war against the US since 1979". I would add that if they choose to be our enemy and act on it, then the feeling is necessarily mutual. There should be a price to pay for being an active and declared enemy of the United States. Having your nuclear proliferation facilities taken out in air strikes seems like a pretty natural consequence to supporting a war effort against the US while declaring yourselves a new nuclear power to be dealt with. To not do so is what sends the message of weakness that makes the next war more likely and more costly.
Stopping Iran at this point IS a step forward in stopping N.K., just as vice versa would have been - using the same logic presented - why aren't we treating them the same. Stopping both programs is a step forward in focusing attention on larger threats inside Pakistan. To allow threats to grow and develop right while we have reason, justification and perhaps opportunity to take action is exactly what has landed us in this triple threat situation, IMHO.
-
"To allow threats to grow and develop right while we have reason, justification and perhaps opportunity to take action is exactly what has landed us in this triple threat situation, IMHO."
Bolton was on a few days ago and agreed that if Iran gets nucs so will S. Arabia, Turkey, Egypt go after them.
It doesn't seem like anyone knows if Israel can do it or not. Only Israel knows what it has and only Iran knows what it has.
Didn't the nuclear holocaust in the movie "The Day After" start with nuclear devices going off in the Middle East?
I remember not being able to sleep that night after watching the movie.
The doctrine of mutually assured destruction doesn't fit this situation like it did between USA USSR when we had two superpowers with more rational leaders and more or less equal capability.
Now we have disprotionate foes.
-
4th Generation nuclear war games with people who believe in death more than life.
What could go wrong?
-
4th Generation nuclear war games with people who believe in death more than life.
What could go wrong?
Don't worry, JDN has pointed out that because Iran has never nuked the US before, it's proof it'll never happen in the future as well.
-
4th Generation nuclear war games with people who believe in death more than life.
What could go wrong?
Don't worry, JDN has pointed out that because Iran has never nuked the US before, it's proof it'll never happen in the future as well.
http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/iran-showed-al-qaeda-how-bomb-embassies_610943.html?nopager=1
Iran Showed Al Qaeda How to Bomb Embassies
9:45 AM, Dec 3, 2011 • By THOMAS JOSCELYN
In a little noticed ruling on Monday, November 28, a Washington, D.C. district court found that both Iran and Sudan were culpable for al Qaeda’s 1998 embassy bombings. As is typical in state sponsorship of terrorism cases, neither Iran nor Sudan answered the plaintiffs’ accusations. But in a 45-page decision, Judge John D. Bates issued a default judgment. The court found that the “government of the Islamic Republic of Iran…has a long history of providing material aid and support to terrorist organizations including al Qaeda,” which “claimed responsibility for the August 7, 1998 embassy bombings.”
Judge Bates continued (citations omitted, emphasis added):
Iran had been the preeminent state sponsor of terrorism against United States interests for decades. Throughout the 1990s – at least – Iran regarded al Qaeda as a useful tool to destabilize U.S. interests. As discussed in detail below, the government of Iran aided, abetted and conspired with Hezbollah, Osama bin Laden, and al Qaeda to launch large-scale bombing attacks against the United States by utilizing the sophisticated delivery mechanism of powerful suicide truck bombs. Hezbollah, a terrorist organization based principally in Lebanon, had utilized this type of bomb in the devastating 1983 attacks on the U.S. embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon. Prior to their meetings with Iranian officials and agents, Bin Laden and al Qaeda did not possess the technical expertise required to carry out the embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. The Iranian defendants, through Hezbollah, provided explosives training to Bin Laden and al Qaeda and rendered direct assistance to al Qaeda operatives. Hence, for the reasons discussed below the Iranian defendants provided material aid and support to al Qaeda for the 1998 embassy bombings and are liable for damages suffered by the plaintiffs.
The court further explained (citations omitted, emphasis added):
Following the meetings that took place between representatives of Hezbollah and al Qaeda in Sudan in the early to mid-1990s, Hezbollah and Iran agreed to provide advanced training to a number of al Qaeda members, including shura council members, at Hezbollah training camps in South Lebanon. Saif al-Adel, the head of al Qaeda security, trained in Hezbollah camps. During this time period, several other senior al Qaeda operatives trained in Iran and in Hezbollah training camps in Lebanon. After one of the training sessions at a Lebanese Hezbollah camp, al Qaeda operatives connected to the Nairobi bombing, including a financier and a bomb-maker, returned to Sudan with videotapes and manuals “specifically about how to blow up large buildings.”
None of this should come as a surprise. In Iran’s Proxy War Against America (PDF), I summarized the evidence demonstrating Iran’s and Hezbollah’s complicity in the 1998 embassy bombings.
Federal prosecutors in the Clinton administration found Iran’s hand in the embassy bombings as they prepared to try some of the terrorists responsible. They even included the relationship with Iran and Hezbollah in their original indictments of al Qaeda.
In his plea hearing before a New York court in 2000, Ali Mohamed – the al Qaeda operative who was responsible for performing surveillance used for the bombings – testified that he set up the security for a meeting between bin Laden and Hezbollah’s terror master, Imad Mugniyah. “I arranged security for a meeting in the Sudan between Mugniyah, Hezbollah’s chief, and bin Laden,” Mohamed told the court. (My profile of Mugniyah and his ties to al Qaeda, published after his death in 2008, can be read here.)
Mohamed also confirmed that Hezbollah and Iran provided explosives training to al Qaeda. “Hezbollah provided explosives training for al Qaeda and [Egyptian Islamic] Jihad,” Mohamed explained. “Iran supplied Egyptian Jihad with weapons.”
Mohamed was forthcoming about al Qaeda’s rationale for seeking Iran’s and Hezbollah’s assistance:
And the objective of all this, just to attack any Western target in the Middle East, to force the government of the Western countries just to pull out from the Middle East. . . .Based on the Marine explosion in Beirut in 1984 [sic: 1983] and the American pull-out from Beirut, they will be the same method, to force the United States to pull out from Saudi Arabia.
Jamal al Fadl, an al Qaeda operative who was privy to some of al Qaeda’s most sensitive secrets, conversed with his fellow al Qaeda members about Iran’s and Hezbollah’s explosives training, which included take-home videotapes so that al Qaeda’s operatives would not forget what they learned. Al Fadl told federal prosecutors, “I saw one of the tapes, and he [another al Qaeda operative] tell me they train about how to explosives big buildings.”
When the 9/11 Commission investigated the embassy bombings years later, it also found Iran’s and Hezbollah’s hands in the attack. See, in particular, pages 61 and 68 of the commission’s final report.
To recap: A D.C. district court, Clinton-era prosecutors, and the 9/11 Commission have all found that al Qaeda received assistance from Iran and Hezbollah in executing the 1998 embassy bombings. The bombings were al Qaeda’s most successful attack prior to September 11, 2001.
And yet, many in the foreign policy establishment pretend that Iran and al Qaeda are either incapable of collusion or opposed to one another in some meaningful sense. The truth is that they have long cooperated against America.
Thomas Joscelyn is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
**I can already anticipate "But those were conventional explosives".....
-
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4157460,00.html
'Saudi Arabia may join nuclear arms race'
Ex-spy chief says Saudi Arabia to consider acquiring atom weapons to match region rivals Israel, Iran
AFP Published: 12.05.11, 19:15 / Israel News
Saudi Arabia may consider acquiring nuclear weapons to match regional rivals Israel and Iran, its former intelligence chief Prince Turki al-Faisal said on Monday.
"Our efforts and those of the world have failed to convince Israel to abandon its weapons of mass destruction, as well as Iran... therefore it is our duty towards our nation and people to consider all possible options, including the possession of these weapons," Faisal told a security forum in Riyadh.
Related stories:
'Iran's missile program suffered serious setback'
Iran sanctions pose legal conundrum for expats
'We'll give up nukes if Iran does same'
"A (nuclear) disaster befalling one of us would affect us all," said Faisal.
Israel is widely held to possess hundreds of nuclear missiles, which it neither confirms nor denies, while the West accuses Iran of seeking an atomic bomb, a charge the Islamic Republic rejects.
Riyadh, which has repeatedly voiced fears about the nuclear threat posed by Shiite-dominated Iran and denounced Israel's atomic capacity, has stepped up efforts to develop its own nuclear power for "peaceful use."
Abdul Ghani Malibari, coordinator at the Saudi civil nuclear agency, said in June that Riyadh plans to build 16 civilian nuclear reactors in the next two decades at a cost of 300 billion riyals ($80 billion).
He said the Sunni kingdom would launch an international invitation to tender for the reactors to be used in power generation and desalination in the desert kingdom.
The United Nations has imposed successive packages of sanctions against Tehran over its refusal to suspend uranium enrichment. Those measures have been backed up by unilateral Western sanctions.
-
Pasting PC's post here as well:
THE SQUARE AXIS: CUBA//IRAN/IRAQ/CHINA
By Manuel Cereijo
IRAN
Dr. Miyar Barruecos, El Chomi. Dr. Luis Herrera. Cuba and Iran.
Since 1990, Cuba and Iran have cooperated in the development of weapons of massive destruction. Dr. Miyar Barruecos, physician, very close to Castro, has been the force behind the throne in this alliance. Dr. Luis Herrera, from the CIGB, and one of the main scientists in the development of the CIGB and the biological weapon programs in Cuba, has been the operator, the facilitator, in the massive and huge cooperation between Cuba and Iran.
Cuba just finished, May 2001, the construction of a Biotechnology Center in Teheran. Cuba served as the source of technology, selling of equipment, and project management for the Center.
Iran has bought the best fruits of the CIGB, recombinant protein production technologies in yeast and Escherichia coli, as well as the large scale purification protocols for both soluble and insoluble proteins synthesized in or excreted by them.Iran can use these technologies to create bioweapons of massive destruction.
Iran, with Cuba's assistance, is capable of producing the bacteria known as Pseudomonas. The pathogen is not usually lethal to humans, however, produces partial paralysis for a period of time, and therefore but is an excellent battlefield weapon.
Sprayed from a single airplane flying over enemy lines, it can immobilized an entire division or incapacitate special forces hiding in rugged terrain otherwise inaccessible to regular army troops-precisely the kind of terrain in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and similar terrorist regions.
Besides Cuban scientists, at least there are about ten scientists from the Biopreparat Russian Center working in Iran. The New York Times reported in December 1998 that the Iranian government dispatched a few scientific advisors attached to the office of the presidency in Moscow to recruit former scientists from the Russian program.
In May, 1997, more than one hundred scientists from Russian laboratories, including Vector and Obolensk, attended a Biotechnology Trade Fair in Teheran. Iranians visited Vector, In Russia, a number of times, and had been actively promoting exchanges. A vial of freeze-dried powder takes up less space than a pack of cigarettes and is easy to smuggle past an inattentive security guard.
The Soviet Union spent decades building institutes and training centers in Iran and Cuba. For many years, the Soviet Union organized courses in genetic engineering and molecular biology for scientists from Cuba and Iran. Some forty scientists from both countries were trained annually.
In 1997 Russia was reported to be negotiating a lucrative deal with Iran and Cuba for the sale of cultivation equipment including fermenters, reactors, and air purifying machinery.
A report submitted by the U.S. Office of Technological Assessment to hearings at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in late 1995 identified 17 countries believed to possess biological weapons. Among them: Cuba and Iran.
The Cuba/Iran alliance posses a real threat to the national security of the United States.
IRAQ
Dr. Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra. The main coordinator of the alliance.
Viruses and bacteria can be obtained from more than fifteen hundred microbe banks around the world. The international scientific community depends on this network for medical research and for the exchange of information vital to the fight against disease.
According to American biowarfare experts, Iraq obtained some of its most lethal strains of anthrax from the American Type Culture Collection in Rockville, Maryland, one of the world's largest libraries of microorganisms. For $35 they also pick up strains of tularemia and Venezuelan equine encephalitis, once targeted for weaponization at Fort Detrick, United States.
Iraq was also given by the CDC the West Nile virus in the late 1980s. At the same type, the CDC gave Cuba the St. Louis encephalitis virus, very similar to the West Nile virus. Since the 1980s, Cuba and Iraq established very close relations. This was partially due to Dr. Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra, a well known orthopedic surgeon, who has operated on Hussein's knee, and also has treated other members of his family, including one of his sons.
By early 1990s, Iraq had provided Cuba with anthrax, for its further development. A report submitted by the U.S. Office of Technological Assessment to hearings at the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations in late 1995 identified seventeen countries believed to posses biological weapons-Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Iraq, Taiwan, Syria, Israel, China, Egypt, Vietnam, Laos Bulgaria, India, South Africa, Russia, and Cuba.
At the time Saddam Hussein's son-in-law, Hussein Kamel, defected in 1995, he not only denounced Iraq activities in these weapons of massive destruction, but also the close relationship of Iraq, first with the former Soviet Union, and presently with Cuba. Yury Kalinin , one of the most important persons in Russia's biological development, visited Cuba in 1990 to establish in Cuba the Biocen, a Center very similar to Russia's Biopreparat. He acknowledged at the time, the involvement of Cuba in biological weapon development. Some 25 Cuban scientists were periodically trained in the Soviet Union from 1986 to 1992.
Furthermore, Cuba has advanced tremendously in the area of nano-technology, an essential tool in the development of bio-weapons, and computer related technology. Fidel Castro Diaz Balart, Castro's oldest son, and former head of Cuba's nuclear program, visited India and Iraq to strengthen collaboration on this vital area.
Castro visited the Jawaharlal Nehru Center for Advanced Scientific Research (JNCASSR) in October, 2000. Cuba and India agreed in collaboration on areas like biotechnology, tropical medicine, nano technology and computational technology.
Prof. V. Krishnan, JNCASR President said Cuba had tremendous advancement in biotechnology and nanotechnology. After his visit to India. Castro Diaz Balart visited Iraq and Iran.
The Cuba/Iraq cooperation is the most important threat faced by the United States in this fight against terrorism.
CHINA
The fall of communism has not reduced the level or amount of espionage and other serious intelligence activity conducted against the United States. The targets have not changed at all: there is still a deadly serious foreign interest, and mainly from the new China/Cuba consortium, in traditional intelligence activities such as penetrating the U.S. intelligence community, collecting classified information on U.S. military defense systems, and purloining the latest advances in the nation's science and technology sector.
There is also a growing importance in maintaining the integrity of the country;s information infrastructure. Our growing dependence on computer networks and telecommunications has made the U.S. increasingly vulnerable to possible cyber attacks against such targets as military war rooms, power plants, telephone networks, air traffic control centers and banks. China and Cuba have increased their cooperation in this area through the Bejucal base in Cuba, as well as in Wajay (near Bejucal), and Santiago de Cuba. On these bases they use technologically sophisticated equipment, as well as new intelligence methodologies that makes it more difficult, or impossible for U.S. intelligence agencies to monitor or detect.
The international terrorism threat can be divided into three general categories. Each poses a serious and distinct threat, and each has a presence already in the United States. The most important category is the state sponsored threat. This category, according to the FBI, includes the following countries: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Sudan, Lybia, Cuba, North Korea. Put simply, these nations view terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. In view of this list, we need to evaluate the recent trip made by Fidel Castro.
There are three main areas of concern for us in the new and dangerous axis formed by China and Cuba: radio frequency weapons, computer technology, missile capabilities. The problem with the Chinese Cuban rapprochement is that it is driven by by mutual hostility towards the United States.
Radio frequency weapons are a new radical class of weapons. Radio frequency weapons can utilize either high energy radio frequency (HERF), or low energy radio frequency(LERF) technology. HERF is advanced technology. It is based on concentrating large amounts of RF EM energy in within a small space, narrow frequency range, and a very short period of time. The result is an overpowering RF EM impulse capable of causing substantial damage to electronic components.
LERF utilizes relatively low energy, which is spread over a wide frequency spectrum. It can be no less effective in disrupting normal functioning of computers as HERF due to the wider range of frequencies it occupies. LERF does not require time compression neither high tech components. LERF impact on computers and computer networks could be devastating. The computer would go into a random output mode, that is, it is impossible to predict what the computer would do. A back up computer will not solve the problem either. One example of LERF use was the KGB's manipulation of the United States Embassy security system in Moscow in the late 80s.
Worldwide proliferation in RF weapons has increased dramatically in the last five years. The collapse of the Soviet Union is probably the most significant factor contributing to this increase in attention and concern about proliferation. The KGB has split into independent parts. One of them is referred to as FAPSI. It has been partially privatized. Spin-off companies have been created, with very attractive golden parachutes for the high officers. FAPSI, or its spin-off companies have been heavily involved in China and Cuba in RF technology, as well as computer technology.
China, PRC, has stolen design information on the United States most advanced thermonuclear weapons. The stolen information includes classified information on:
Seven U.S. thermonuclear warheads, including every currently deployed thermonuclear warhead in the U.S. ballistic missile arsenal
Classified design information for an enhanced radiation weapon (neutron bomb), which neither the USA , nor any other country has yet deployed
Classified information on state of the art reentry vehicles, and warheads, such as the W-88, a miniaturized, tapered warhead, which is the most sophisticated nuclear weapon the United States has ever built.
These and other classified information have been obtained in the last 20 years. However, the now presence in Cuba, with the use of the Bejucal base, and the proximity to the United States, makes the China/Cuba new axis a very serious threat to this nation. In 1993, a Cuban nuclear engineer, and high officer of the Cuban Intelligence military apparatus, was awarded a one year stance at Sandia National Labs, Albuquerque, doing research on Physical protection of nuclear facilities and materials. The officer is, since 1999, in exile in the United States.
The PRC has acquired also technology on high performance computers(HPC). HPCs are needed for the design and testing of advanced nuclear weapons. The PRC has targeted the U.S. nuclear test data for espionage collection. This can be accomplished through the facilities in Cuba.
China'new venture in Cuba will:
Enhance China's military capability
Jeopardize U.S. national security interests
Pose a direct threat to the United States
END
Manuel Cereijo
INGMCA@aol.com
Éste y otros excelentes artículos del mismo AUTOR aparecen en la REVISTA GUARACABUYA con dirección electrónica de:
www.amigospais-guaracabuya.org
Si usted no es miembro de nuestra lista de distribución y quiere agregarse favor de ir a:
http://lists.guaracabuya.org/mailman/listinfo/lista y favor de seguir las instrucciones.
If you are not a member of our mailing list and wish to be included, please go to the following link:
http://lists.guaracabuya.org/mailman/listinfo/lista and follow the instructions.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
P.C.
-
Quote from: G M on June 06, 2008, 01:59:30 PM
A headline from the future with President Obama: "The Sunni-Shia Nuclear Arms Race Escalates".
I wonder how much gas will be then....
http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/10/10369793-report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb
Report: Saudi Arabia to buy nukes if Iran tests A-bomb
Mustafa Ozer / AFP - Getty Images, file
Saudi special forces take part in a military parade in the holy city of Mecca on November 10, 2010.
By msnbc.com staff, NBC News and news services
Saudia Arabia would move quickly to acquire nuclear weapons if Iran successfully tests an atomic bomb, according to a report.
Citing an unidentified Saudi Arabian source, the Times newspaper in the U.K. (which operates behind a paywall) said that the kingdom would seek to buy ready-made warheads and also begin its own program to enrich weapons-grade uranium.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The paper suggested that Pakistan was the country most likely to supply Saudi Arabia with weapons, saying Western officials were convinced there was an understanding between the countries to do so if the security situation in the Persian Gulf gets worse. Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have denied such an arrangement exists.
Iran, which follows the Shiite branch of Islam, and Sunni Saudi Arabia are major regional rivals.
The Times described its source for the story as a "senior Saudi," but gave no other details.
Israel uses MEK terror group to kill Iran's nuclear scientists, US officials say
Mohammad Javad Larijani, a senior aide to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, describes what Iranian leaders believe is a close relationship between Israel's secret service, the Mossad, and the People's Mujahedin of Iran, or MEK, which is considered a terrorist organization by the United States.
"There is no intention currently to pursue a unilateral military nuclear program, but the dynamics will change immediately if the Iranians develop their own nuclear capability," the source told the newspaper. "Politically, it would be completely unacceptable to have Iran with a nuclear capability and not the kingdom."
It also cited an unnamed Western official as saying that Saudi Arabia would ask Pakistan to honor the alleged agreement "the next day" after any Iranian nuclear bomb test.
The U.S. and other nations suspect that Iran is using its civilian nuclear work as a cover for a weapons program, but Iran insists that its nuclear ambitions are strictly peaceful. The U.S. has used sanctions and diplomacy to pressure Iran on the issue, but has long refused to rule out military action saying that all options are on the table. Israel is also believed to be contemplating a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities.
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta now believes there's a strong possibility that Israel will attack Iran in an attempt to thwart Tehran's nuclear ambitions, according to U.S. officials. NBC's Richard Engel reports.
In a statement issued Friday by the Pakistan Embassy in Saudi Arabia, Ambassador Mohammed Naeem Khan was quoted as saying that "each Pakistani considers (the) security of Saudi Arabia as his personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country.
In January this year, Saudi Arabia's former ambassador to the U.S., Prince Turki al-Faisal, said in an interview with The Associated Press that unless a zone free of weapons of mass destruction was created in the Mideast there would "inevitably" be a nuclear arms race, and "that's not going to be in the favor of anybody."
He stressed that the Gulf states were committed not to acquire WMD.
"But we're not the only players in town. You have Turkey. You have Iraq which has a track record of wanting to go nuclear. You have Egypt. They had a very vibrant nuclear energy program from the 1960s. You have Syria. You have other players in the area that could open Pandora's box," the Saudi prince told The AP.
Iran envoy: We could hit US forces anywhere in world if attacked
Asked whether Saudi Arabia would maintain its commitment against acquiring WMD, Turki said: "What I suggest for Saudi Arabia and for the other Gulf states ... is that we must study carefully all the options, including the option of acquiring weapons of mass destruction. We can't simply leave it for somebody else to decide for us."
Turki is also a former Saudi intelligence chief and remains an influential member of the Saudi royal family.
Turki said the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council should guarantee a nuclear security umbrella for Mideast countries that join a nuclear-free zone — and impose "military sanctions" against countries seen to be developing nuclear weapons.
"I think that's a better way of going at this issue of nuclear enrichment of uranium, or preventing Iran from acquiring weapons of mass destruction," he said in the AP interview.
In October, the U.S. claimed that agents linked to Iran's Qud's Force, an elite wing of the Revolutionary Guard, were involved in a plot to kill Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the U.S., Adel Al-Jubeir. Iran said the claims were "baseless."
'Meddling'
Turki said in November that there was "ample and heinous" evidence that Iran was behind the alleged plot. He added that the evidence "indicates the depths of depravity and unreason to which the (Mahmoud) Ahmadinejad regime has sunk."
Turki called the plot "the tip of the iceberg," saying Iran was "meddling" in the affairs of many other countries, including Lebanon, Turkey, Pakistan and especially Iraq.
The Saudi government has also accused a terror cell linked to Iran of plotting to blow up its embassy in Bahrain, as well as the causeway linking the island kingdom to Saudi Arabia.
In a secret diplomatic cable made public by WikiLeaks, Saudi King Abdullah allegedly urged Washington to strike at Iran and "cut off the head of the snake."
Turki dismissed the cable in November, telling reporters that Saudi Arabia supported sanctions and diplomatic pressure against Iran but not a military strike.
He said military action would only stiffen Iran's resolve, rally support for the regime and at best delay, but not halt, the nuclear program. "Such an act I think would be foolish, and to undertake it I think would be tragic," he said.
The Associated Press, NBC News and msnbc.com staff contributed to this report.
-
Any comments on the 80% cuts in our nukes trial balloons being floated by Team Baraq?
-
Any comments on the 80% cuts in our nukes trial balloons being floated by Team Baraq?
His attempt to destroy this country is going as planned....
-
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/fearful-of-nuclear-iran-the-real-wmd-nightmare-syria
Fearful of a nuclear Iran? The real WMD nightmare is Syria
By Charles P. Blair | 1 March 2012
Article Highlights
■Syria has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapons programs in the world and may also possess offensive biological weapons.
■Longstanding terrorist groups and newly arrived Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters from Iraq have been active in Syria during that country's recent insurgency.
■The United States and regional powers -- including Saudi Arabia and Iran -- need to start planning now to keep Syria's WMD out of terrorist hands if the Assad regime falls.
As possible military action against Iran's suspected nuclear weapons program looms large in the public arena, far more international concern should be directed toward Syria and its weapons of mass destruction. When the Syrian uprising began more than a year ago, few predicted the regime of President Bashar al-Assad would ever teeter toward collapse. Now, though, the demise of Damascus's current leadership appears inevitable, and Syria's revolution will likely be an unpredictable, protracted, and grim affair. Some see similarities with Libya's civil war, during which persistent fears revolved around terrorist seizure of Libyan chemical weapons, or the Qaddafi regime's use of them against insurgents. Those fears turned out to be unfounded.
But the Libyan chemical stockpile consisted of several tons of aging mustard gas leaking from a half-dozen canisters that would have been impossible to utilize as weapons. Syria likely has one of the largest and most sophisticated chemical weapon programs in the world. Moreover, Syria may also possess an offensive biological weapons capability that Libya did not.
While it is uncertain whether the Syrian regime would consider using WMD against its domestic opponents, Syrian insurgents, unlike many of their Libyan counterparts, are increasingly sectarian and radicalized; indeed, many observers fear the uprising is being "hijacked" by jihadists. Terrorist groups active in the Syrian uprising have already demonstrated little compunction about the acquisition and use of WMD. In short, should Syria devolve into full-blown civil-war, the security of its WMD should be of profound concern, as sectarian insurgents and Islamist terrorist groups may stand poised to seize chemical and perhaps even biological weapons.
Read it all.
-
Note the man's background at the end of the article.
By REUEL MARC GERECHT
In recent speeches, interviews and private meetings, President Obama has been trying hard to dissuade Israel from bombing Iran's nuclear facilities. All along, however, he's actually made it much easier for Israel to attack. The capabilities and will of Israel's military remain unclear, but the critical parts of the administration's Iran policy (plus the behavior of the Islamic Republic's ruler, Ali Khamenei) have combined to encourage the Israelis to strike.
Public statements define a president's diplomacy, and in front of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee this month Mr. Obama intensely affirmed "Israel's sovereign right to make its own decisions about what is required to meet its security needs." He added that "no Israeli government can tolerate a nuclear weapon in the hands of a regime that denies the Holocaust, threatens to wipe Israel off the map, and sponsors terrorist groups committed to Israel's destruction."
By so framing the Iranian nuclear debate, the president has forced a spotlight on two things that his administration has wanted to leave vague: the efficacy of sanctions and the quality of American intelligence on Tehran's nuclear program. The Israelis are sure to draw attention to both in the coming months.
Enlarge Image
CloseGetty Images
President Barack Obama (right) talks with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as they walk along the Colonnade of the White House, March 5.
.Given Mr. Khamanei's rejection of engagement, Mr. Obama has backed sanctions because they are the only plausible alternative to war or surrender. Ditto Congress, which has been the real driver of sanctions. But the timeline for economic coercion to work has always depended on Israeli or American military capabilities and the quality of Western intelligence. Neither factor engenders much patience.
Even the U.S. Air Force might have difficulty demolishing (with conventional explosives) the buried-beneath-a-mountain Fordow nuclear site near Qom, where the Iranian regime has been installing uranium-enrichment centrifuges. In Israel, Mr. Netanyahu and his hawkish defense minister, Ehud Barak, may have waited too long to raid this now-functioning facility; steady Iranian progress there certainly means that the Israelis must strike within months if they are serious about pre-emption.
Although the Iranian regime dreads new Western sanctions against its central bank, and especially the ejection of the Islamic Republic from the Swift international banking consortium, Tehran still has a huge advantage concerning time. Iran made around $79 billion last year from the sale of oil. Whatever the cost of its nuclear program, the regime has surely spent the vast majority of the monies required to deliver a nuclear weapon, and Tehran certainly still has the few billions required to finish producing highly enriched uranium, triggering devices, and warheads for its ballistic missiles.
Sanctions that cannot starve the nuclear program could still conceivably collapse the Iranian economy, bringing on political chaos that paralyzes the nuclear program. But if we have learned anything from the past 60 years of sanctioning nasty regimes, it is that modern authoritarian states have considerable resilience and a high threshold of pain.
Many Iran observers would like to believe that sanctions could rapidly exacerbate divisions within the regime and thereby force Tehran to negotiate an end to possible nuclear weaponization. But this scenario beggars the Iranian revolutionary identity. Mr. Khamenei has shown no willingness to halt the program. Commanders of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, who are handpicked by the supreme leader and now control much of the Iranian economy and oversee "atomic research," have not even hinted they differ with Mr. Khamenei on the nuclear question.
The sanctions-political-chaos-nuclear-paralysis scenario envisions either the supreme leader or the Revolutionary Guards abandoning nukes just when they are within grasp. To verify the cessation of the nuclear-weapons quest, so the theory goes, these men would allow the unfettered inspection of all nuclear and military sites by the International Atomic Energy Agency. In other words, everything Mr. Khamenei and his praetorians have worked for since 1979—the independence and pre-eminence of the Islamic Republic among Muslim states in its battle against the "world-devouring," "Islam-debasing" United States—would be for naught.
The supreme leader and his allies are acutely sensitive to the age-old Persian conception of haybat, the awe required to rule. Those who still believe in the revolution are obviously more ruthless than those who want change (hence 2009, when security forces brutalized the pro-democracy Green Movement). Whoever might want to compromise on the nuclear issue within Iran's ruling elite surely lives in fear of those who don't.
Mr. Khamenei hasn't allowed the Revolutionary Guards to expand their economic reach because he wants them to be rich—it's because he wants them to be powerful. Iran's ruling elite are in a better position to survive sanctions today than they were when President George W. Bush described them as part of an axis of evil in 2002. Sanctions are a good tool to deny Tehran resources, but as a tool to stop nuclear weapons they aren't particularly menacing. They may now have become primarily a means to stop the Israelis, not the Iranians, from achieving their desired ends.
Under presidential pressure, the CIA's traditional sentiments toward Israel—suspicion laced with hostility—have likely been forced underground. Sharing intelligence has probably become de rigueur. The Israelis (like the British and the French) now undoubtedly know what we know about the Iranian nuclear program.
It's an excellent bet that the Israelis now know that the CIA probably has no sources inside the upper reaches of the Iranian scientific establishment, Mr. Khamenei's inner circle, or the Revolutionary Guards' nuclear brigade. They know whether the National Security Agency has reliably penetrated Iran's nuclear communications, and how Iran has improved its cybersecurity since Stuxnet.
The Israelis surely know that when the administration says it has "no evidence" that Mr. Khamenei has decided to build a nuclear weapon, this really means that Washington has no solid information. That is, Washington is guessing—most likely in the spirit of the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, which willfully downplayed Tehran's nuclear progress.
Because of his multilateral openness with our allies, Mr. Obama has likely guaranteed that the Western intelligence consensus on the Islamic Republic's nuclear program will default to what the Israelis and French have always said is most critical to weaponization: How many centrifuges do the Iranians have running, and are they trying to hide them or put them deep underground?
The Israeli cabinet reportedly still hasn't had the great debate about launching a pre-emptive strike. Democracies always temporize when confronted with war. But that discussion is coming soon and Barack Obama—who, despite his improving efforts at bellicosity, just doesn't seem like a man who would choose war with another Muslim nation—has most likely helped Messrs. Netanyahu and Barak make the case for military action.
Mr. Gerecht, a former Iranian-targets officer in the CIA's clandestine service, is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
-
By JON KYL
When President Obama beseeched the Russian president to give him "space" until after the November election to deal with Moscow's concerns about U.S. missile defenses, it was with his larger objective of a world without nuclear weapons in mind. In explaining his remarks, the president said: "I want to reduce our nuclear stockpiles; and one of the barriers to doing that is building trust and cooperation around missile-defense issues."
It appears the president is willing to compromise our own missile-defense capabilities to secure Russian support for another round of nuclear-arms reductions. To accomplish that, he may have to ignore or circumvent commitments he made to Congress to secure support for the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (Start)—among them, that he would deploy all four phases of planned U.S. missile-defense systems for Europe, and that he would modernize the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system for the protection of the U.S. homeland.
The president's re-election prospects could suffer if concessions on these systems were to be openly discussed before the election.
The Russians have made clear their concern about the range and speed of U.S. missile-defense interceptors planned for deployment later this decade, as well as American plans to base those interceptors in Poland, in Romania, and on naval vessels. In particular, the Russians decry the development of the SM-3 block IIB missile, which is planned for deployment at the beginning of the next decade. This potential missile would be the only U.S. theater missile-defense system capable of catching intercontinental-range Iranian missiles, making it important for the defense of our homeland.
Russia also wants increased involvement in actual operation of NATO missile defenses and would not want to see expansion and improvement of our existing national missile-defense system (which already has been curtailed by the president).
It is questionable whether concessions on missile defense would induce Russia to further reduce its nuclear arsenal. Unlike the U.S., Russia maintains a robust nuclear warhead production capability, and its national security strategy is to increase reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia is also modernizing ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
In addition to worrying about our missile-defense capability, the American people should question the assumptions behind the president's quest to reduce the number of nuclear weapons well below New Start Treaty levels. While in South Korea last month, President Obama said that he "can say with confidence that we have more nuclear weapons than we need."
U.S. military planners don't necessarily share that view. During Senate hearings in 2010 on the New Start Treaty, the then-Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Gen. Kevin Chilton testified that, "I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed today to provide the deterrent."
Would the world be safer and more peaceful if the U.S. had fewer nuclear weapons? Is the current nuclear balance unstable? Are there incentives to strike first during a crisis? Are there pressures to increase the numbers of nuclear arms? Do our allies worry about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella?
The answer to all of these questions is "no." Yet very low numbers of deployed nuclear weapons, as the president appears to have in mind, could engender instability. Lower numbers of U.S. and Russian nuclear forces could encourage China and other nations to seek equivalence. Our allies would be less certain about American nuclear guarantees, and they would then have an incentive to develop their own nuclear arsenals.
Very low numbers could prove destabilizing during a crisis, when even small amounts of cheating could tip the balance. With a very small nuclear arsenal, we would be less able to respond quickly to new threats and strategic challenges. It is far from certain that the supposed benefits of the additional reductions favored by the president outweigh the risks of lower numbers in our nuclear stockpile.
As the president has noted, any new arms-control treaty would have to be supported by the Senate. His failure to request full funding to modernize our nuclear weapons laboratories—another pledge he made to secure ratification of New Start—is another reason his proposals would be met with strong skepticism in the Senate.
As he said on his recent trip to South Korea, President Obama believes that, because we are "the only nation ever to use nuclear weapons," we now have a "moral obligation" to pursue nuclear disarmament. In fact, the United States used two atomic weapons to end World War II in order to fulfill a moral obligation to save the lives of perhaps a million American GIs.
Today, the federal government has no higher moral obligation than to protect the American people and to help ensure the human race never again experiences the ruin and destruction of the wars that occurred before the advent of nuclear weapons. Supporting a robust nuclear deterrent and an effective missile defense is a moral obligation for all those who are entrusted with ensuring our nation's security.
Mr. Kyl is a Republican senator from Arizona.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303816504577311601745664294.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_LEFTTopOpinion
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/world/cartwright-key-retired-general-backs-large-us-nuclear-reduction.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120516
Former Commander of U.S. Nuclear Forces Calls for Large Cut in WarheadsBy THOM SHANKER
Published: May 15, 2012
WASHINGTON — Gen. James E. Cartwright, the retired vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former commander of the United States’ nuclear forces, is adding his voice to those who are calling for a drastic reduction in the number of nuclear warheads below the levels set by agreements with Russia.
General Cartwright said that the United States’ nuclear deterrence could be guaranteed with a total arsenal of 900 warheads, and with only half of them deployed at any one time. Even those in the field would be taken off hair triggers, requiring 24 to 72 hours for launching, to reduce the chance of accidental war.
That arsenal would be a significant cut from the current agreement to limit Russia and the United States to 1,550 deployed warheads each, down from 2,200, within six years. Under the New Start agreement, thousands more warheads can be kept in storage as a backup force, and the restrictions do not apply to hundreds of short-range nuclear weapons in the American and Russian arsenals.
“The world has changed, but the current arsenal carries the baggage of the cold war,” General Cartwright said in an interview. “There is the baggage of significant numbers in reserve. There is the baggage of a nuclear stockpile beyond our needs. What is it we’re really trying to deter? Our current arsenal does not address the threats of the 21st century.”
The proposals are contained in a report to be issued Wednesday by Global Zero, a nuclear policy organization, signed by General Cartwright and several senior national security figures, including Richard Burt, a former chief nuclear arms negotiator; Chuck Hagel, a former Republican senator from Nebraska; Thomas R. Pickering, a former ambassador to Russia; and Gen. John J. Sheehan, who held senior NATO positions before retiring from active duty.
General Cartwright’s leading role in the study is expected to give heft to the proposals; he was the top officer at the United States Strategic Command, overseeing the entire nuclear arsenal. The report’s proposals also may help shape the election-year debate on national security.
President Obama has pronounced a goal of eliminating nuclear weapons, but the specific steps and timetable remain aspirational.
Pentagon officials have drawn up options for the president, ranging from an arsenal that remains at New Start levels to one with 300 to 400 warheads. But officials emphasized that this internal review was still under way and that no decisions had been made.
In March, Republicans criticized Mr. Obama after he was overheard telling his Russian counterpart during a nuclear terrorism conference in South Korea that he would have more flexibility to deal with Moscow’s concerns on arms control after the November election.
Among the striking Global Zero proposals is one to eliminate outright the fixed, land-based intercontinental nuclear missiles that form one leg of the three-part nuclear arsenal, and instead rely solely on submarines, which are nearly impossible to detect, and long-range bombers, which can be summoned back from an attack should a crisis ease. The proposal calls for 360 warheads deployed aboard submarines and 90 gravity bombs aboard strike aircraft, and calls on Russia also to limit its arsenal to 900 warheads.
Given the low likelihood of a huge nuclear exchange with Russia or China, General Cartwright said, these steep reductions in the American arsenal are necessary if the United States wants credibility to urge restraints on the weapons programs of smaller nuclear powers like India and Pakistan — and on potentially emerging nuclear states like Iran and North Korea.
General Cartwright said that countries like India and Pakistan viewed their weapons more as a shield to protect their sovereignty than as a sword to be used in conflict. They and some potentially emerging nuclear powers ignore Washington’s calls for curbing their nuclear aspirations, saying that the United States is guilty of hypocrisy because it maintains a huge arsenal.
“A significant number of countries are not part of the dialogue” on reducing nuclear weapons, he said. And as more nuclear weapons are held by more nations — whose arsenals are not guarded by the layers of high-tech security systems in place over American weapons — the greater the opportunity for them to fall into the hands of terrorists, General Cartwright noted.
The Global Zero study also says that the large reductions make sense in a time of constrained Pentagon spending. The delivery systems in the American nuclear arsenal are nearing the end of their service life at nearly the same time, presenting a bill of hundreds of billions of dollars just as the Defense Department must cut spending.
Bruce Blair, who directed the study and is a co-founder of Global Zero, said that decisions should be made soon on nuclear arms reductions, so that money is not wasted on weapons programs that should be eliminated.
Mr. Blair said that land-based intercontinental missiles “have no role to play any longer.” In fixed silos, they are vulnerable to targeting. And the study includes maps to show that America’s land-based missile force would have to fly over Russia to reach potential nuclear adversaries like North Korea or Iran. That route “risks confusing Russia with ambiguous attack indications and triggering nuclear retaliation,” he said.
The report emphasizes the importance of missile defense in bolstering American deterrence in an era of smaller offensive nuclear arsenals.
-
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3580/tehran-west-caving-on-iranian-nuclear-program
Tehran: West Caving on Iranian Nuclear Program
by Joel Himelfarb • May 16, 2012 at 11:06 am
http://www.investigativeproject.org/3580/tehran-west-caving-on-iranian-nuclear-program
Iranian and United Nations officials claimed to have made progress in negotiations over Tehran's nuclear program on Tuesday. But initial reports have provided little substantive information beyond an announcement that representatives of the Iranian regime and the U.N.'s International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will meet again next week in Vienna, Austria.
Iranian officials waxed optimistic, claiming the West is coming to terms with the inevitability of Iran's nuclear program. In a New York Times interview, Hamidreza Taraghi, an adviser to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, bragged that Tehran had managed to skew the current nuclear negotiations in its favor by making uranium enrichment (a potential path to nuclear weapons) a reality that the West cannot stop.
Taraghi told the Times that Iran had convinced the West of the importance of a fatwa against the possession of nuclear weapons that Khamenei issued. Iranian officials emphasized that edict during last month's negotiations in Istanbul.
American officials countered that they brought up Khamenei's fatwa in an effort to provide the Iranians a "face-saving" way to reach a compromise. But Iranian negotiators left Istanbul believing they had prevailed. "We have managed to get our rights," Taraghi said. "All that remains is a debate over the percentage of enrichment."
That may be posturing. But a new analysis by Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies suggests the Islamist regime has good reason to believe it has the upper hand in the nuclear standoff.
The IAEA's own reports show "that Iran has moved far beyond the point where it lacked the technology base to produce nuclear weapons," Cordesman writes. "Iran has pursued every major area of nuclear weapons development, (and) has carried out programs that have already given it every component of a weapon except fissile material." Moreover, "there is strong evidence that it has carried out programs to integrate a nuclear warhead on [to] its missiles."
Cordesman finds that Iran's nuclear efforts are diversified and can be concealed from international inspectors. Even if it were to suspend uranium enrichment, Tehran could "pursue nuclear weapons development through a range of compartmented and easily concealable programs without a formal weapons program."
Even if Tehran agreed to controls on its current enrichment facilities or saw them destroyed in a military strike, it would not necessarily put an end to the regime's nuclear capability. It "would take an amazing amount of intelligence access to prevent" Iran from creating replacement enrichment facilities if its existing programs were destroyed in bombing raids, Cordesman writes.
In short, "Iran could appear to agree to arms control or appear to have had its programs destroyed and still go on creating better future enrichment capability."
Read the full article here.
continued
-
Alan Dershowitz: The Message Obama Should Have Sent
Forget about a 'red line.' Try a warning to Iran in black-and-white..
By ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ
On Monday in New York, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad promised that Israel will be "eliminated," a variation on his previous threats to the nation's existence. He was in town for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly, a gathering that reliably sees leaders issuing pronouncements that, even if not new, at least are given a bigger stage. On Tuesday, the first day of the gathering, President Obama delivered a speech that also struck familiar notes, including the statement that "a nuclear-armed Iran is not a challenge that can be contained." He moved no closer to giving a signal of what he might consider an intolerable development in Iran's advance toward a nuclear weapon.
For months, U.S. and Israeli officials have debated whether Mr. Obama should publicly announce a "red line" that, if crossed by Iran, would prompt an American military response. Announcing such a threshold publicly or privately might be helpful, but it may not be necessary for the president to specify what would constitute such a red line (a certain degree of uranium enrichment, for example, or other evidence of weaponization).
Instead, Mr. Obama has another good option: Tell the Iranian leadership that under no circumstances will it ever be permitted to develop or acquire nuclear weapons, and that the U.S. is prepared to take decisive military action to make sure of this.
Such a statement wouldn't tip the president's hand regarding a precise red line, but it would send a clear message that Iran's efforts to develop nuclear weapons are futile and ultimately will lead to disaster for Iran's rulers.
Mr. Obama's prior statements—that containing a nuclear Iran is not an option; that a country committed to wiping Israel off the map, promoting terrorism and arming Hezbollah and Syria can't be allowed to have nukes—have been strong. But Iran's leadership still doesn't seem to believe that an American military option really is on the table.
Iran's skepticism is understandable in light of some Obama administration rhetoric. This week the president himself characterized Israeli concern over Iran and threats of military action as mere "noise." Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has repeatedly and emphatically outlined the dangers of military action against Iran, and this month Vice President Joe Biden criticized Mitt Romney for being "ready to go to war" with Iran.
Being ready for war with Iran, after all, might be the only way to deter that country from going nuclear.
Were Mr. Obama to affirm America's dedication to blocking Iran's nuclear ambitions through military force if necessary, he would maintain his flexibility to act while putting pressure on Iran's mullahs. He would not be acknowledging, as some fear, that the combination of sanctions and diplomacy is failing. Rather, he would make this combination more effective by convincing Iran's leaders that there is no good reason for them to continue bringing the economic pain of international sanctions onto their country. The message is that their sanctions-provoking projects are pointless because the U.S. will never allow Iran to become a nuclear power.
A policy of sanctions, diplomacy and an absolute dedication to the use of force if necessary has a far better chance of working than sanctions and diplomacy alone. Sanctions have certainly made life difficult in Iran, at least for the general population, but they haven't slowed the regime's nuclear march. Meanwhile, Israeli leaders have been forced to consider unilateral action in the absence of America's clear commitment to stopping Iran before it's too late.
There are many ways to communicate American preparedness, including by increased military planning and exercises. But there is no substitute for a firm commitment, unambiguously stated by a president whose subordinates do nothing to blur the message and, if anything, signal a steely resolve.
There are those who argue that an American president should never make a threat that he may not want to carry out. But President Obama has already committed his administration to preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, which necessarily means employing the military option if all else fails. He has also told the world that he does not bluff. If that is true, then there is no downside to his stating U.S. policy and intentions explicitly.
Mr. Dershowitz is a law professor at Harvard. His latest book is "Trials of Zion" (Grand Central Publishing, 2010).
-
Mr. Dershowitz assumes that Buraq doesn't want a nuclear Iran.
-
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5T5CF1jhTg&feature=youtu.be
-
Hat tip to BD; posting this here in addition to his posting of it on the Iran thread:
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2012/11/27/diagram-suggests-iran-working-on-explosive-more-than-triple-force-hiroshima/
-
Reliability unknown:
http://www.radicalislam.org/analysis/more-secret-nuclear-sites-discovered-iran/#fm
More Secret Nuclear Sites Discovered in Iran
Thu, November 29, 2012
by: Reza Khalili
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)'s chief inspector Herman Nackaerts & Iran's IAEA ambassador Ali Asghar Soltanieh (R) (Photo: Reuters)Just as the latest International Atomic Energy Agency report increased alarm about Iran’s illicit nuclear program, now comes word that the Islamic regime has created even more secret nuclear sites.
The IAEA report indicated that not only has Iran completed installation of 2,784 centrifuges at Fordow, the previous secret site deep in a mountain believed to be immune to air strikes, but also could within days increase output of highly enriched uranium to the 20-percent level, well on the way to nuclear weapons.
Iran has started to feed uranium hexafluoride gas into four new cascades, increasing the number of centrifuges at Fordow from 700 to 1,400, therefore doubling its output of highly enriched uranium and cutting the time needed for having enough high-enriched material for one nuclear bomb. The regime already has enough low-enriched uranium for six nuclear bombs if further enriched.
However, according to a source within the engineering department of the Revolutionary Guards, the regime is working on its nuclear bomb program from several secret sites unknown to the world.
One such site, the source said, is in the outskirts of the small city of Shahrokhabad in Kerman Province.
Kerman, known for its deposits of copper and coal, also has uranium ore deposits, the source said, and is as high a quality as the deposits at Gachin near the city of Bandar Abbas, which the regime has long used for its yellow cake supply. The regime, with its need for yellow cake, not only has explored various sites within Iran but as far away as Venezuela and Bolivia. Both of those countries have close ties with Iran, and both have vast uranium deposits.
The new site, under the control of the Revolutionary Guards, is code-named “Fateh1.” Fateh in Farsi means victorious. The site’s official name is the Martyred Bahonar Training center, but it is used as a front for regime’s nuclear activity. A six foot wall surrounds the site, on top of it are iron bars and on top of them barbed wires.
According to the source, the uranium ore at the new site is processed into yellow cake then converted to uranium hexafluoride, which is then fed into centrifuges to produce enriched uranium.
It is unclear at this time if the conversion of the yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride is done at the new site or sent to the Isfahan uranium conversion facility, but the source said activities at the site point to underground facilities within the site, covered with dirt or a special rolled asphalt to camouflage its activities from satellites. This is similar to what the regime has done at other sites – enriching uranium at underground facilities.
The source added that the site, surrounded by security towers and barbed wire, is under heavy Revolutionary Guard control, with checks at the entrance and security posts within the facility.
The Guard commander of this operation, according to the source, is Col. Habibollah Sanatgar, who reports directly to the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, headed by Fereydon Abbasi, though all coordination is under the supervision of Mohsen Fakhrizadeh-Mahabadi, the father of Iran’s nuclear bomb program. The source added that another facility not far from the site is involved in plutonium work.
Peter Vincent Pry, formerly with the CIA and now executive director of the Task Force on National and Homeland Security, a congressional advisory board, regards the discovery of another Iranian underground nuclear site as ominous.
“Reliable sources in recent months appear to have disclosed two more previously unknown facilities serving Iran’s nuclear program,” Pry said. “Moreover, the sources have provided some credible evidence that at least one of these facilities is actively engaged in nuclear weaponization. If any of these allegations is even partially true, the whole timeline for Iran developing a nuclear weapon must be recalculated. The advent of a nuclear-armed Iran is much nearer than assumed by the Obama administration.”
Pry warned that the United States cannot afford to let Iran, the leading sponsor of international terrorism, develop even a single nuclear weapon.
“The congressional EMP Commission warned that Iran could launch a nuclear-armed short-range missile off a ship to inflict an EMP (electromagnetic pulse) catastrophe on the United States using just a single warhead,” Pry cautioned. “The EMP attack would collapse the national electric grid and all the critical infrastructures that support modern civilization and the lives of 300 million Americans. Iran has practiced making exactly such a ship-launched EMP attack and has openly written about making an EMP attack to eliminate the United States.”
Exclusive reports by WND on Oct. 8 and Nov. 1 revealed that Iran is operating another nuclear site at which scientists are testing a neutron detonator and implosion system for a nuclear bomb as well as on a nuclear warhead design and enrichment to weaponization levels.
The 5+1 group has requested new talks with Iran over the nuclear impasse. The Islamic regime has hinted about freezing nuclear enrichment to the 20-percent level in exchange for removal of all sanctions, guarantees on providing the country with high-enriched uranium and acceptance of the regime’s full rights to nuclear energy. Such a deal would allow the country’s thousands of centrifuges to continue to enrich to the 5-percent level.
Regardless of the outcome of any further negotiations, the source said, the Islamic regime, with work at many secret sites, is very close to obtaining the bomb.
Reza Kahlili is a pseudonym for a former CIA operative in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and author of the award winning book “A Time to Betray” (Simon & Schuster, 2010). He serves on the Task Force on National and Homeland Security and the advisory board of the Foundation for Democracy in Iran (FDI).
-
And where is the serious Rep response to this? , , ,
==============================
Obama's Nuclear Fantasy The president is setting the stage for a world with more nukes in the wrong hands
By BRET STEPHENS
WSJ
As a young Soviet military officer, Viktor Esin was stationed in Cuba during the October 1962 crisis, where he had release authority over a nuclear-tipped missile targeting New York. On his first visit to Manhattan in December, I made sure to thank him for not obliterating our city.
Gen. Esin rose to become chief of staff for the Strategic Rocket Forces, and he is now a professor at the Russian Academy of Military Science. So what's been on his mind lately? Mainly the stealthy rise of China to a position of nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. "All in all, they may have 850 warheads ready to launch," he says. "Other warheads are kept in storage and intended to be employed in an emergency." He estimates the total size of the Chinese arsenal at between 1,600 and 1,800 warheads.
That is something to bear in mind as the Obama administration seeks to slash the U.S. arsenal to about 1,000 strategic warheads. That would be well below the ceiling of 1,550 warheads stipulated by the 2010 New Start Treaty. The administration also wants to spend less than the $80 billion it promised on modernizing America's rusting nuclear-weapons infrastructure.
On the strength of that promise 13 Republican senators gave President Obama the votes he needed to ratify New Start. Suckers! Now the president means to dispense with the Senate altogether, either by imposing the cuts unilaterally or by means of an informal agreement with Vladimir Putin. This is what Mr. Obama meant in telling Dmitry Medvedev last year that he would have "more flexibility" after re-election.
But what, you ask, is so frightening about having "only" 1,000 nuclear weapons? Surely that is more than enough to turn any conceivable adversary Paleolithic. Won't we remain more or less at parity with the Russians, and far ahead of everyone else?
It all depends on China. It is an article of faith among the arms-control community that Beijing subscribes to a theory of "minimum means of reprisal" and has long kept its arsenal more or less flat in the range of 240-400 warheads. Yet that is a speculative, dated and unverified figure, and China has spent the last decade embarked on a massive military buildup. Isn't it just possible that Beijing has been building up its nuclear forces, too?
When I broached this theory in an October 2011 column—noting that the U.S. had, in fact, underestimated the size of the Soviet arsenal by a factor of two at the end of the Cold War—I was attacked for being needlessly alarmist. But one man who shares that alarm is Gen. Esin. In July 2012, he notes, the Chinese tested an intermediate-range DF-25 missile, which Russia carefully tracked.
"In the final stage the missile had three shifts in trajectory, dropping one [warhead] at each shift," he notes. "It's solid evidence of a MIRV [multiple warhead] test." A month later, the Chinese launched a new long-range, MIRV-capable missile, this time from a submarine.
The general runs through additional evidence of China's nuclear strides. But what should really get the attention of U.S. military planners are his observations of how Russia might react. "If China doesn't stop, Russia will consider abandoning the INF Treaty," he warns. "Russia cannot afford not taking this factor into account."
The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in 1987 by Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev, is a cornerstone of the settlement that ended the Cold War. If Russia abandons it and begins building a new generation of intermediate-range missiles, the U.S. would either have to follow suit or lose parity with Moscow. We'd be off to the nuclear races once again.
And not just with Moscow. As North Korea gears up for a third nuclear test, South Korea is eager to begin recycling plutonium—ostensibly for peaceful purposes, in reality as a nuclear hedge against its neighbors.
Then there is Japan, which is scheduled to bring on line a reprocessing plant at Rokkasho later this year. As nuclear expert Henry Sokolski notes, "the plant will produce eight tons of nuclear weapons usable plutonium each year (enough for 1,000 to 2,000 Hiroshima-sized bombs) at a time when Japan has no nuclear reactors to burn the material."
Like the South Koreans, the Japanese don't want a nuclear arsenal: They have lived peacefully under the nuclear umbrella of the United States for nearly seven decades. But as that umbrella shrinks, it covers fewer countries. Those left out will look to deploy umbrellas of their own. "The U.S. has obligations on extended deterrence in Asia," Gen. Esin says. "The problem has to be at the forefront, not avoided."
President Obama has often said that he wants to live in a world without nuclear weapons. Who wouldn't? Even Gen. Esin is a "Global Zero" signatory. But the real choice isn't between more nuclear weapons or fewer. It is between a world of fewer U.S. nuclear weapons and more nuclear states, or the opposite. In his idealism, the president is setting the stage for a more nuclearized world.
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
-
Buraq gutting our nuclear and non-nuclear military isn't accidental or because of a lack of understanding.
-
"And where is the serious Rep response to this? , , ,"
SOTU Republican response is tonight immediately following the President. Hopefully opposition to unilateral disarmament is in it.
Nearly all Republicans are strongly pro-defense. Where is response of sane and responsible Democrats and independents to weakening the United States and making the world more dangerous?
-
The Coming Nuclear Breakout
As the U.S. deterrent fades, atomic weapons are poised to proliferate..
President Obama came to office in 2009 promising to negotiate with America's enemies and create a world without nuclear weapons. Four years later, North Korea is threatening America with nuclear attack, Iran is closer to its own atomic arsenal, and the world is edging ever closer to a dangerous new era of nuclear proliferation. The promises and the reality are connected.
The latest talks between the West and Iran failed this weekend, with no immediate plans for another round. The negotiations by now follow a pattern in which the U.S. makes concessions that Iran rejects, followed by more concessions that Iran also rejects, and so on as Tehran plays for time.
North Korea, meanwhile, has moved medium-range missiles to its east coast in preparation for what is expected to be another launch as early as this week. This follows its third nuclear test and an explicit government authorization to strike U.S. targets with nuclear weapons. South Korea and Japan are in the direct line of fire.
The U.S. responded at first with a modest show of deterrent force (B-2 bombers, Aegis cruisers), but lately it has downplayed the threat and even cancelled a U.S. missile test lest it discomfit the North's young dictator Kim Jong Eun. U.S. policy now seems to be to beg China one more time to do something about its client state. This is worth trying given that China has a new senior leadership, but the public nature of U.S. pleading (see the weekend's newspapers) also projects weakness.
This anti-proliferation failure, in turn, has friends and allies increasingly wondering if they need their own nuclear deterrent. Chung Mong-joon, a prominent member of South Korea's ruling party, has called for the U.S. to return tactical nuclear weapons to the peninsula. George H.W. Bush withdrew them from South Korea in 1991 in a gesture to stop North Korea from going nuclear.
"Some say that the U.S. nuclear umbrella is a torn umbrella. If so, we need to repair it," Mr. Chung said in February, adding that if the U.S. refuses South Korea should develop its own nuclear weapons. A recent poll found that 66% of South Koreans support a home-grown deterrent.
The South Korean government says it has no such plans, but it's no coincidence that it is now pressing the U.S. for permission to produce its own nuclear fuel. While the supposed rationale is civilian use, the ability to enrich uranium and reprocess spent fuel is also a step toward making a bomb if South Korea ever chooses to.
That kind of talk is watched closely in Japan, which has refrained from getting its own bomb under the U.S. umbrella and the legacy of World War II. Few politicians are making the case for a Japanese bomb other than the nationalist Shintaro Ishihara, but that will change if the North keeps expanding its arsenal or the South goes nuclear. Japan already has a reprocessing facility that will soon be producing tons of weapons-usable plutonium.
Likewise in the Middle East, Iran's march to the bomb has other countries preparing the ground for their own nuclear breakout. Saudi Arabia has announced plans to build 16 reactors—precisely the number that nuclear inspectors say it would need for both civilian and military use. The world's largest oil exporter does not need nuclear power for electricity.
Neither does the United Arab Emirates, which is nonetheless building a nuclear power plant only a few hundred miles from Iran. The UAE has promised not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent fuel, and in return the U.S. is providing technical advice on the plant. But few expect that promise to stand if Iran gets the bomb.
Elsewhere in the region, Syria tried to import a nuclear-energy capacity until Israel blew it up in 2007 (despite the disapproval of then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice). Turkey and Egypt are also likely to seek their own nuclear deterrent if Iran isn't stopped.
***
All of this is occurring even as Mr. Obama has pursued the most aggressive nuclear arms control agenda since the 1970s—or more likely because of it. In April 2009, the President famously declared that reducing U.S. nuclear stockpiles "will then give us a greater moral authority to say to Iran, don't develop a nuclear weapon; to say to North Korea, don't proliferate nuclear weapons."
Mr. Obama has since cut the U.S. arsenal in the Start treaty with Russia and he's negotiating more reductions that he may not submit for Senate ratification. None of this "moral authority" has had the least deterrent effect on Iran or North Korea.
The truth is the opposite. The world can see the U.S. has acquiesced in North Korea's weapons program and lacks the will to stop Iran. It can see the U.S. is shrinking its own nuclear capacity through arms control, even as rogue threats grow. And it can see the U.S. is ambivalent about its allies getting nuclear weapons even as it does little to shore up the U.S. umbrella or allied defenses.
Above all, the world can hear Mr. Obama declare for domestic American audiences that "the tide of war is receding" despite the growing evidence to the contrary. On present trend, the President who promised to rid the world of nuclear weapons is setting the stage for their greatest proliferation since the dawn of the atomic age.
-
Chemical Weapons and Consequences
Syria calls President Obama's bluff on WMD..
'As President of the United States, I don't bluff." So President Obama famously said in March 2012, warning Iranian leaders that he would not allow them to acquire nuclear weapons. Those are words Iranian leaders surely have in mind as they watch to see if Mr. Obama was bluffing about the warning the President has repeatedly delivered against the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime in Syria.
"I've made it clear to Bashar al-Assad and all who follow his orders: We will not tolerate the use of chemical weapons against the Syrian people, or the transfer of those weapons to terrorists," Mr. Obama said last month. "The world is watching; we will hold you accountable."
Or not. On Thursday, the White House confirmed in a letter to Senators John McCain and Carl Levin that the U.S. intelligence community now believes "the Syrian regime has used chemical weapons on a small scale in Syria, specifically the chemical agent sarin." That comports with similar claims by the French, British and Israel.
As for the accountability Mr. Obama promised, that's much less clear. The White House letter also said that "We are currently pressing for a comprehensive United Nations investigation that can credibly evaluate the evidence and establish what took place."
To recap: In a world in which there are few limits on war's brutality, chemical weapons have since World War I largely been the exception. Yet now there is growing evidence that Mr. Assad is the first known leader to use chemical weapons since Saddam Hussein murdered his own people in the Kurdish city of Halabja in 1988. The Syrian attack violates red lines Mr. Obama personally laid down. And now the Administration will . . . go to the U.N.?
At Turtle Bay, the U.S. will need permission from Syria's protectors in Moscow and Beijing merely to begin an investigation. If such a probe does get launched, it is unlikely ever to reach the site of the attacks in safety. At which point—several months, if not years, down the road—proof of the attacks will be all-but impossible to come by. Surely Mr. Obama and his military advisers know that it is impossible to gather from a battlefield the kind of proof needed beyond a reasonable doubt in a courtroom.
This message about American bluffing won't be lost on Iran, which has refused to bend on its nuclear program despite claims by Secretary of State John Kerry that time is running out. It also won't be lost on Israeli leaders, who can't afford to let Syria's chemical stockpiles spread to its other enemies in the region.
The growing strength within the Syrian insurgency of the al Nusra Front—now an official franchise of al Qaeda—means the chances of chemical weapons falling into the hands of jihadists has never been greater. Israel will have to consider its own military options to secure the stockpiles if the U.S. won't act, and that would run the risk of further regional escalation.
Mr. Obama has strived mightily to avoid intervening in Syria, despite his repeated demands that Mr. Assad "must go." The Administration's U.N. gambit looks like one more way to avoid doing something it promised it would do if chemical weapons were used. Presidents who are exposed as bluffers tend to have their bluff called again and again, with ever more dangerous consequences.
-
Do You Feel Lucky? The Threat of EMP
Frank Gaffney - March 22, 2013 - www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org
In 1987, Ronald Reagan mused that, if the world were about to be devastated by an alien force – perhaps a collision with a large asteroid, peoples of all nations, ideological persuasions and political parties would come together to save the planet and our civilization. We may be about to test that proposition.
At the moment, no asteroid is known to be hurtling our way. But a naturally occurring phenomenon is, one that may be as fatal for modern industrial societies and for the quality of life they have made possible – thanks principally to electrification. The technical term for this threat is geomagnetically induced currents (GMIC) generated by the coronal mass ejections (CMEs) that laymen call solar eruptions or flaring.
Think of it as “space weather.” And there is a strong possibility that some of the heaviest such weather in hundreds of years is headed our way.
GMIC engenders intense bursts of electromagnetic energy. No fewer than five studies mandated by the executive or legislative branches have confirmed that such electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is lethal for the electronic devices, computers and transformers that power everything in our 21st Century society. Since these things are generally unprotected against EMP – whether naturally occurring or man-induced, they would almost certainly be damaged or destroyed. The U.S. electrical grid could, as a result, be down for many months, and probably years.
We know that this EMP-precipitated effect could also be achieved by the detonation of a nuclear weapon high over the United States. And actual or potential enemies of this country – notably Russia, China, North Korea and Iran – understand our acute vulnerability in this area, and have taken steps to exploit it.
“Catastrophic” is a term often used to describe the repercussions for our country of the cascading shut-down, first of the key elements of the grid, then inexorably, all of the electricity-dependent infrastructures that make possible life as we know it in this country. That would include those that enable: access to and distribution of food, water, fuel and heat; telecommunications; finance; transportation; sewage treatment and cooling of nuclear power plants.
President Reagan’s Science Advisor, Dr. William Graham, who chaired a blue-ribbon congressional commission on the EMP threat, has calculated that within a year of the U.S. electrical grid being devastated by such a phenomenon, nine out of ten Americans would be dead.
Did that get your attention? Or, as Dirty Harry would say, do you feel lucky?
Unfortunately, we have no way to prevent such an event – any more than we could if we knew an asteroid were headed our way. Persisting in our present state of vulnerability is an invitation to disaster, if not at the hands of some foe, then as a result of the cycle of intense solar storms in which we now find ourselves.
The good news is that there are practical and affordable steps we can take to mitigate these threats, if only we have the will and the wit to adopt them before we are hit by heavy space weather or its man-caused counterpart.
The present danger and our options for defending against it will be the subject of an extraordinary conference in Washington this week: the Electric Infrastructure Security Summit. Many of the nation’s foremost authorities on EMP will participate, including: bipartisan champions of this issue in Congress; nuclear physicists and other experts; executive branch officials from the Federal Electric Regulatory Commission (FERC) and Department of Homeland Security; and representatives from the quasi-governmental North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and from the utilities industry.
The single biggest challenge to date has been the lack of public awareness of the EMP peril. This is particularly ironic since a television program envisioning life in America after the lights go out, NBC’s “Revolution,” has been quite popular. But most viewers seem to think the precipitating event is the stuff of science fiction. An intensive effort is needed now to disabuse them of this comforting, but unfounded notion, and to enlist them in the corrective actions that are necessary on an urgent, bipartisan and nation-wide basis.
To that end, some discernible progress is being made. For example, on May 16th, at the instigation of Federal Energy Regulatory Commissioner Cheryl LaFleur, the FERC issued a final rule that, in the words of the trade publication Power Magazine, “orders the North American Electric Reliability Corporation to develop, by the end of the year, reliability standards that address the impact of geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) on the nation’s bulk power system.”
The Maine state legislature is poised to adopt legislation that would require the FERC to submit a plan by the end of June to insulate Maine’s grid from that of the rest of the Northeastern states and harden it against EMP. This measure could serve as model for similar state-level initiatives elsewhere and help catalyze counterpart legislation at the federal level along the lines of that introduced in the last session of Congress by Representatives Trent Franks (R-AZ) and Yvette Clarke (D-NY), dubbed the Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage (SHIELD) Act.
Important and necessary as these measures are, they are not sufficient to contend fully with the urgent threat our country is now facing. We are on a collision course for catastrophe of a magnitude, if not exactly of a kind, with that that could be inflicted by the kind of dangerous asteroid President Reagan envisioned decades ago. There is simply no time to waste in joining forces and implementing the steps needed to ensure we are not counting on luck to keep America’s lights on.
-
Aaaccckkk!
-
OPINION | 30 May 2013
> http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424127887324412604578514991636761274-lMyQjAxMTAzMDAwMTEwNDEyWj.html
>
> *Our Endangered Nuclear Weaponeers*
> /No more nukes means no more experts, and their talents have kept us
> safe./
> By J. Douglas Beason
>
> It takes a nuclear weaponeer to stop a nuclear weaponeer. And I should
> know.
>
> In the 1990s, I designed nuclear bombs at Lawrence Livermore National
> Laboratory. In the 2000s at Los Alamos, I ran one of the largest
> programs to reduce the threat of weapons of mass destruction,
> directing hundreds of professionals who had worked for decades on all
> aspects of nuclear weapons. The background, experience and judgment of
> these weaponeers were responsible for successfully mitigating and
> preventing various nuclear threats, details of which are still classified.
>
> The U.S. is now in danger of forever losing this talent that keeps the
> nation safe. That is a disturbing development, because the threat
> isn't going away. Iran is producing enriched uranium, North Korea in
> February detonated its third nuclear weapon since 2006, and terrorists
> continually seek this ultimate capability. The risk endures and is
> growing.
>
> Policy luminaries such as former Defense Secretary William Perry and
> former Secretary of State George Shultz have called for the
> elimination of nuclear weapons, and the Obama administration embraces
> this goal. In a perfect world with complete transparency, a
> nuclear-free planet would be the ideal for ensuring peace.
>
> But the world has pursued quixotic goals before and has repeatedly
> found that the genie can't be stuffed back in its bottle. The
> Versailles Treaty of 1919 and the Geneva Protocols of 1925 outlawed
> the use of chemical weapons. But this year, even after President Obama
> established a very clear red line, Syria used chemical weapons against
> its own citizens.
>
> In 1980 the World Health Organization announced that it had eradicated
> smallpox. But the U.S. and Russia still hold small quantities of the
> virus in reserve to make vaccines if needed. The concern is that
> terrorists will weaponize the virus. Smallpox has been all but zeroed
> out, yet the world can't afford to lose its ability to combat the disease.
>
> Today, Russia stockpiles the greatest number of nuclear weapons on the
> planet. A handful of other countries—some allies of America, some
> not—have their own nuclear capability. Yet the Obama administration's
> strategy is to drive the U.S. stockpile to zero. The reasoning is that
> by reducing the country's weapons and its nuclear complex—people,
> resources and infrastructure—the U.S. will lead the way in reducing
> the nuclear threat. Others will then follow.
>
> Aside from the inconvenient fact that others don't always adhere to
> treaties, there is a major problem in this calculus. The people who
> design, build and maintain America's nuclear weapons are the only ones
> who have the expertise to anticipate and deter the nuclear threats
> that adversaries dream up. They're the same men and women who build
> the sensors that can detect nuclear explosions from space. And they're
> the same professionals who know whether to "cut the red or blue wire"
> in a terrorist device.
>
> When dealing with a threat this serious, we can't afford to have
> second-rate talent hastily trained in nearly forgotten methods. That's
> why the esoteric knowledge these first-string weaponeers
> possess—gained over decades working on nuclear weapons—is invaluable.
>
> First-stringers have intimate knowledge of the materials and
> manufacturing processes to construct a nuclear bomb. They know how
> adversaries clandestinely store their weapons; how adversaries
> transport them, first within their own country, then across borders;
> and how adversaries hide a weapon's emissions so they can't be
> detected. Most important, first-stringers know how to stop a nuclear
> detonation.
>
> To eradicate the nuclear threat, America needs to employ the world's
> best nuclear weaponeers. And although it seems paradoxical, the only
> way to do that is to maintain a nuclear stockpile—perhaps a small one,
> but a real one. We can't rely on models, simulations or non-nuclear
> substitutes to give first-stringers experience. There are too many
> subtleties involved with nuclear weapons to take a chance.
>
> Zeroing out the U.S. nuclear stockpile means also zeroing out the
> nuclear-talent stockpile, with potentially catastrophic results.
>
> Dr. Beason, a retired Air Force colonel, was the associate laboratory
> director for threat reduction at the Los Alamos National Laboratory in
> New Mexico and is now chief scientist of Air Force Space Command. The
> views expressed are his own and do not represent the U. S. Air Force.
-
*Nuclear Terror in the Middle East*
*Lethality Beyond the Pale*
By Nick Turse
In those first minutes, they’ll be stunned. Eyes fixed in a thousand-yard
stare, nerve endings numbed. They’ll just stand there. Soon, you’ll notice
that they are holding their arms out at a 45-degree angle. Your eyes will
be drawn to their hands and you’ll think you mind is playing tricks. But it
won’t be. Their fingers will start to resemble stalactites, seeming to melt
toward the ground. And it won’t be long until the screaming begins.
Shrieking. Moaning. Tens of thousands of victims at once. They’ll be
standing amid a sea of shattered concrete and glass, a wasteland punctuated
by the shells of buildings, orphaned walls, stairways leading nowhere.
This could be Tehran, or what’s left of it, just after an Israeli nuclear
strike.
Iranian cities -- owing to geography, climate, building construction, and
population densities -- are particularly vulnerable to nuclear attack,
according to a new
study<http://www.conflictandhealth.com/content/7/1/10/abstract>,
“Nuclear War Between Israel and Iran: Lethality Beyond the Pale,” published
in the journal *Conflict & Health* by researchers from the University of
Georgia and Harvard University. It is the first publicly released
scientific assessment of what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might
actually mean for people in the region.
Its scenarios are staggering. An Israeli attack on the Iranian capital of
Tehran using five 500-kiloton weapons would, the study estimates, kill
seven million people -- 86% of the population -- and leave close to 800,000
wounded. A strike with five 250-kiloton weapons would kill an estimated
5.6 million and injure 1.6 million, according to predictions made using an
advanced software package designed to calculate mass casualties from a
nuclear detonation.
Estimates of the civilian toll in other Iranian cities are even more
horrendous. A nuclear assault on the city of* *Arak, the site of a heavy
water
plant<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2013/feb/27/iran-nuclear-arak-heavy-water>
central
to Iran’s nuclear program, would potentially kill 93% of its 424,000
residents. Three 100-kiloton nuclear weapons hitting the Persian Gulf
port<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/901492.stm> of
Bandar Abbas would slaughter an estimated 94% of its 468,000 citizens,
leaving just 1% of the population uninjured. A multi-weapon strike on
Kermanshah, a Kurdish
city<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4751923.stm> with
a population of 752,000, would result in an almost unfathomable 99.9%
casualty rate.
Cham Dallas, the director of the Institute for Health Management and Mass
Destruction Defense at the University of Georgia and lead author of the
study, says that the projections are the most catastrophic he’s seen in
more than 30 years<http://www.ncdp.mailman.columbia.edu/daythree/day3bios.html>
analyzing
weapons of mass destruction* *and their potential effects. “The fatality
rates are the highest of any nuke simulation I’ve ever done,” he told me by
phone from the nuclear disaster zone in Fukushima, Japan, where he was
doing research. “It’s the perfect storm for high fatality rates.”
Israel has never confirmed or denied possessing nuclear weapons, but is
widely
known<http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/barak-no-threat-to-israel-s-policy-of-nuclear-ambiguity-1.289438>
to
have up to several
hundred<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/138224/uri-bar-joseph/why-israel-should-trade-its-nukes>
nuclear
warheads in its arsenal. Iran has no nuclear weapons and its leaders claim
that its nuclear program is for peaceful civilian purposes only. Published
reports
suggest<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/world/middleeast/iran-intelligence-crisis-showed-difficulty-of-assessing-nuclear-data.html?_r=0>
that
American intelligence agencies and Israel’s intelligence service are in
agreement: Iran suspended its nuclear weapons development program in 2003.
Dallas and his colleagues nonetheless ran simulations for potential Iranian
nuclear strikes on the Israeli cities of Beer Sheva, Haifa, and Tel Aviv
using much smaller 15-kiloton weapons, similar in strength to those
dropped<http://www.cnn.com/2013/02/11/world/asia/north-korea-seismic-disturbance>
by
the United States on the Japanese cities of
Hiroshima<http://books.google.com/books?id=-ZXXISjFn08C&pg=PA65&dq=hiroshima+bomb+kilotons&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NCSIUbjlIqvb4AP7vIDIAw&ved=0CE8Q6AEwBzgK#v=onepage&q=hiroshima%20bomb%20kilotons&f=false>
and
Nagasaki in August 1945. Their analyses suggest that, in Beer Shiva, half
of the population of 209,000 would be killed and one-sixth injured. Haifa
would see similar casualty ratios, including 40,000 trauma victims. A
strike on Tel Aviv with two 15-kiloton weapons would potentially slaughter
17% of the population -- nearly 230,000 people. Close to 150,000 residents
would likely be injured.
These forecasts, like those for Iranian cities, are difficult even for
experts to assess. “Obviously,* *accurate predictions of casualty and
fatality estimates are next to impossible to obtain,” says Dr. Glen
Reeves<http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CEMQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.usuhs.mil%2Fafrri%2Foutreach%2Fpdf%2FDTRA-TR-12-33.pdf&ei=r2eAUe3_BcjA4AOjm4B4&usg=AFQjCNH5sHVqAXwxcfyFktcWd7ZCrNbk5Q&sig2=WAjxAI1Mr2DlBy1jiQ-tgQ&bvm=bv.45645>,
a longtime consultant on the medical effects of
radiation<http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/amsus/zmm/2010/00000175/00000012/art00022>
for
the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction Agency, who was not
involved in the research. “I think their estimates are probably high but
not impossibly so.”
According to Paul
Carroll<http://www.ploughshares.org/who-we-are/staff/paul-carroll> of
the Ploughshares Fund, a San Francisco-based foundation that advocates for
nuclear disarmament, “the results would be catastrophic” if major Iranian
cities were attacked with modern nuclear weapons. “I don’t see 75%
[fatality rates as] being out of the question,” says Carroll, after
factoring in the longer-term effects of radiation sickness, burns, and a
devastated medical infrastructure.* *
According to Dallas and his colleagues, the marked disparity between
estimated fatalities in Israel and Iran can be explained by a number of
factors. As a start, Israel is presumed to have extremely
powerful<http://csis.org/files/publication/130408_Iran_Gulf_Mil_Bal_II.pdf>
nuclear
weapons and sophisticated delivery capabilities including long-range
Jericho missiles, land-based cruise missiles, submarine-launched missiles,
and advanced aircraft with precision targeting technology.
The nature of Iranian cities also makes them exceptionally vulnerable to
nuclear attack, according to the *Conflict & Health* study. Tehran, for
instance, is home to 50% of Iran’s industry, 30% of its public sector
workers, and 50 colleges and universities. As a result, 12
million<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/07/world/middleeast/us-ratchets-up-an-economic-war-against-tehran.html?pagewanted=all>
people live in or near the capital, most of them clustered in its core.
Like most Iranian cities, Tehran has little urban sprawl, meaning residents
tend to live and work in areas that would be subject to maximum devastation
and would suffer high percentages of fatalities due to trauma as well
as thermal
burns <http://www.remm.nlm.gov/flashburn2.htm> caused by the flash of heat
from an explosion.
Iran’s topography, specifically mountains around cities, would obstruct the
dissipation of the blast and heat from a nuclear explosion, intensifying
the effects. Climatic conditions, especially high concentrations of
airborne dust, would likely exacerbate thermal and radiation casualties as
well as wound infections.
*Nuclear Horror: Then and Now*
The first nuclear attack on a civilian population center, the U.S. strike on
Hiroshima<http://inapcache.boston.com/universal/site_graphics/blogs/bigpicture/hiroshima_08_05/h29_19773763.jpg>,
left that city “uniformly and extensively devastated,” according to a
study<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/65.pdf>
carried
out in the wake of the attacks by the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey.
“Practically the entire densely or moderately built-up portion of the city
was leveled by blast and swept by fire... The surprise, the collapse of
many buildings, and the conflagration contributed to an unprecedented
casualty rate.” At the time, local health authorities reported that 60% of
immediate deaths were due to flash or flame burns and medical investigators
estimated that 15%-20% of the deaths were caused by radiation.
Witnesses “stated that people who were in the open directly under the
explosion of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin was charred
dark brown or black and that they died within a few minutes or hours,”
according to the 1946
report<http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/bomb/large/documents/pdfs/65.pdf>.
“Among the survivors, the burned areas of the skin showed evidence of burns
almost immediately after the explosion. At first there was marked redness,
and other evidence of thermal burns appeared within the next few minutes or
hours.”
Many
victims<http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/virtual/VirtualMuseum_e/exhibit_e/exh1202_e/exh120204_e.html>
kept
their arms outstretched
<http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/hiroshima.htm> because
it was too
painful<http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/kids/KPSH_E/hiroshima_e/sadako_e/subcontents_e/08higai_2_e.html>
to
allow them to hang at their sides and rub against their bodies. One
survivorrecalled<http://www.asahi.com/hibakusha/english/hiroshima/h00-00014-2e.html>
seeing
victims “with both arms so severely burned that all the skin was hanging
from their arms down to their
nails<http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/BPW/english/14.html>,
and others having
facesswollen<http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/dam/assets/120614033216-hiroshima-burn-victim-horizontal-gallery.jpg>
like
bread, losing their eyesight. It was like ghosts walking in procession…
Some jumped into a river because of their serious burns. The river was
filled with the wounded and blood.”
The number of fatalities at Hiroshima has been
estimated<http://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/1-4020-4956-0_15>
at
140,000<http://books.google.com/books?id=SC4X1muvigYC&pg=PA200&dq=hiroshima+nagasaki+death+toll,+140,000&hl=en&sa=X&ei=neqIUcXHOKvC4APSnYH4AQ&ved=0CC4Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=hiroshima%20nagasaki%20death%20toll%2C%20140%2C000&f=false>.
A nuclear attack on Nagasaki three days later is thought to have killed
70,000. Today, according to Dallas, 15-kiloton nuclear weapons of the type
used on Japan are referred to by experts as “firecracker nukes” due to
their relative weakness.
In addition to killing more than 5.5 million people, a strike on Tehran
involving five 250-kiloton weapons -- each of them 16 times more powerful
than the
bomb<http://books.google.com/books?id=-ZXXISjFn08C&pg=PA65&dq=hiroshima+bomb+kilotons&hl=en&sa=X&ei=NCSIUbjlIqvb4AP7vIDIAw&ved=0CE8Q6AEwBzgK#v=onepage&q=hiroshima%20bomb%20kilotons&f=false>
dropped
on Hiroshima -- would result in an estimated 803,000 third-degree burn
victims, with close to 300,000 others suffering second degree burns, and
750,000 to 880,000 people severely exposed to radiation. “Those people with
thermal burns over most of their bodies we can’t help,” says Dallas. “Most
of these people are not going to survive… there is no saving them. They’ll
be in intense agony.” As you move out further from the site of the blast,
he says, “it actually gets worse. As the damage decreases, the pain
increases, because you’re not numb.”
In a best case scenario, there would be 1,000 critically injured victims
for every surviving doctor but “it will probably be worse,” according to
Dallas. Whatever remains of Tehran’s healthcare system will be inundated
with an estimated 1.5 million trauma sufferers. In a feat of
understatement, the researchers report that survivors “presenting with
combined injuries including either thermal burns or radiation poisoning are
unlikely to have favorable outcomes.”
Iranian government officials did not respond to a request for information
about how Tehran would cope in the event of a nuclear attack. When asked
if the U.S. military could provide humanitarian aid to Iran after such a
strike, a spokesman for Central Command, whose area of responsibility
includes the Middle East, was circumspect. “U.S. Central Command plans for
a wide range of contingencies to be prepared to provide options to the
Secretary of Defense and the President,” he told this reporter. But Frederick
Burkle <http://hhi.harvard.edu/frederick_m_burkle>, a senior fellow at the
Harvard Humanitarian Initiative and Harvard University’s School of Public
Health, as well as a coauthor of the just-published article, is emphatic
that the U.S. military could not cope with the scale of the problem. “I
must also say that no country or international body is prepared to offer
the assistance that would be needed,” he told me.* *
Dallas and his team spent five years working on their study*.* Their
predictions were generated using a declassified version of a software
package developed for the Defense Department’s Defense Threat Reduction
Agency, as well as other complementary software applications. According to
Glen Reeves, the software used fails to account for many of the vagaries
and irregularities of an urban environment. These, he says, would mitigate
some of the harmful effects. Examples would be buildings or cars providing
protection from flash burns. He notes, however, that built-up areas can
also exacerbate the number of deaths and injuries. Blast effects far
weaker than what would be necessary to injure the lungs can, for instance,
topple a house. “Your office building can collapse… before your eardrums
pop!” notes Reeves.
The new study provides the only available scientific predictions to date
about what a nuclear attack in the Middle East might actually mean.
Dallas, who was previously the director of the Center for Mass Destruction
Defense at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, is quick to
point out that the study received no U.S. government funding or oversight.
“No one wanted this research to happen,” he adds.
*Rattling Sabers and Nuclear Denial*
Frederick Burkle <http://hhi.harvard.edu/frederick_m_burkle> points out
that, today, discussions about nuclear weapons in the Middle East almost
exclusively center on whether or not Iran will produce an atomic bomb
instead of “focusing on ensuring that there are options for them to embrace
an alternate sense of security.” He warns that the repercussions may be
grave. “The longer this goes on the more we empower that singular thinking
both within Iran and Israel.”
Even if Iran were someday to build several small nuclear weapons, their
utility would be limited. After all,
analysts<http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/28/us-israel-iran-lines-idUSBRE93R03520130428>
note
that Israel would be capable of launching a post-attack response which
would simply devastate Iran. Right now, Israel is the
only<http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/04/30/uk-nuclear-npt-egypt-idUKBRE93T0KZ20130430>
nuclear-armed
state in the Middle East. Yet a preemptive Israeli nuclear strike against
Iran also seems an
unlikely<http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/26/oukwd-uk-nuclear-iran-israel-nukes-idAFLDE62O2HI20100326>prospect
to most experts.
“Currently, there is little chance of a true nuclear war between the two
nations,” according to Paul Carroll of the Ploughshares Fund. Israel, he
points out, would be unlikely to use nuclear weapons unless its very
survival were at stake. “However, Israel’s rhetoric about red lines and the
threat of a nuclear Iran are something we need to worry about,” he told me
recently by email. “A military strike to defeat Iran’s nuclear capacity
would A) not work B) ensure that Iran WOULD then pursue a bomb (something
they have not clearly decided to do yet) and C) risk a regional war.”
Cham Dallas sees the threat in even starker terms. “The Iranians and the
Israelis are both committed to conflict,” he told me. He isn’t alone in
voicing concern. “What will we do if Israel threatens Tehran with nuclear
obliteration?... A nuclear battle in the Middle East, one-sided or not,
would be the most destabilizing military event since Pearl Harbor,” wrote
Pulitzer Prize-winning national security reporter Tim Weiner in a recent
op-ed<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-24/modern-nuclear-war-deterrence-begins-with-nuke-locks.html>
for
Bloomberg News. “Our military commanders know a thousand ways in which a
war could start between Israel and Iran… No one has ever fought a nuclear
war, however. No one knows how to end one.”
The Middle East is hardly the only site of potential nuclear catastrophe.
Today, according <http://ploughshares.org/world-nuclear-stockpile-report> to
the Ploughshares Fund, there are an estimated 17,300 nuclear weapons in the
world. Russia reportedly has the most with 8,500; North Korea, the fewest
with less than 10. Donald Cook, the administrator for defense programs at
the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, recently confirmed that
the United States
possesses<http://blogs.fas.org/security/2013/02/stockpilereduction/>
around
4,700 nuclear warheads. Other nuclear powers include rivals India and
Pakistan, which stood on the
brink<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=98443922>
of nuclear
war<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-23/world/38745105_1_depsang-chinese-troops-border>
in
2002. (Just this year, Indian government officials
warned<http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/world/asia/indian-officials-advise-preparations-for-possible-war.html>
residents
of Kashmir, the divided territory claimed by both nations, to prepare for a
possible nuclear war.) Recently, India and nuclear-armed neighbor China,
which went to
war<http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/10/28/how-china-fights-lessons-from-the-1962-sino-indian-war.html>
with
each other in the 1960s, again found themselves on the verge of a
crisis<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/2-week-chinese-incursion-into-indian-territory-leaves-asian-powerhouses-on-verge-of-crisis/2013/05/02/3f496560-b2e3-11e2-9fb1-62de9581c946_story.html>
due
to a border dispute in a remote area of the
Himalayas<http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-04-23/world/38745105_1_depsang-chinese-troops-border>
.
In a world awash in nuclear weapons, saber-rattling, brinkmanship, erratic
behavior, miscalculations, technological errors, or errors in judgment
could lead to a nuclear detonation and suffering on an almost unimaginable
scale, perhaps nowhere more so than in Iran. “Not only would the immediate
impacts be devastating, but the lingering effects and our ability to deal
with them would be far more difficult than a 9/11 or earthquake/tsunami
event,” notes Paul Carroll. Radiation could turn areas of a country into
no-go zones; healthcare infrastructure would be crippled or totally
destroyed; and depending on climatic conditions and the prevailing winds,
whole regions might have their agriculture poisoned. “One large bomb could
do this, let alone a handful, say, in a South Asian conflict,” he told me.
“I do believe that the longer we have these weapons and the more there are,
the greater the chances that we will experience either an intentional
attack (state-based or terrorist) or an accident,” Carroll wrote in his
email. “In many ways, we’ve been lucky since 1945. There have been some
very close calls. But our luck won’t hold forever.”
Cham Dallas says there is an urgent need to grapple with the prospect of
nuclear attacks, not later, but now. “There are going to be other big
public health issues in the twenty-first century, but in the first third,
this is it. It’s a freight train coming down the tracks,” he told me.
“People don’t want to face this. They’re in denial.”
-
The Obama Age of Proliferation
While the President dreams, nuclear weapons spread.
'We may no longer live in fear of global annihilation," President Obama declared on Wednesday, "but so long as nuclear weapons exist, we are not truly safe." He's right about the last point, because even as the President offers new dreams of U.S. nuclear disarmament, the world is entering a new proliferation age.
Mr. Obama returned this week to Berlin to give his long-promised speech laying out his plans to rid the world of nuclear weapons. His idea is to remove those weapons initially and primarily from American hands. North Korea and Iran each got a single line in his speech, which is at least more than he gave to China, which is investing heavily in the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Nukes in the hands of terrorists? Mr. Obama said he'll hold a summit on that one in 2016.
Give Mr. Obama points for consistency. Since his college days at Columbia in the 1980s, he has argued for American disarmament and arms-control treaties. When he last issued a call for a nuclear-free world on European soil four years ago in Prague, the Norwegian Nobel Committee rewarded him with a peace prize.
Enlarge Image
image
image
AFP/Getty Images
President Obama in a bilateral meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday.
This week he announced that the U.S. could "maintain a strong and credible strategic deterrent" with a third fewer strategic nuclear weapons, or about 1,000 in all. He also called for "bold" cuts in tactical nukes in Europe without offering specifics, which suggests that was mostly for show.
He said he'll work on reducing U.S. stockpiles through "negotiated cuts" with Russia. Whenever this Administration negotiates with Russia, beware. But there's another danger. President Obama left the door open to unilateral U.S. reductions, possibly without Congressional approval.
The Berlin initiative is the long-promised follow-up to the 2010 New Start accord with Russia, which brought down stockpiles of warheads, missiles and bombers. In his speech this week, President Obama urged everyone to "move beyond Cold War nuclear postures." But is there anything that evokes the Cold War more than arms control with Moscow?
Even the Kremlin isn't likely to embrace this new offer. "We cannot endlessly negotiate with the United States the reduction and limitation of nuclear arms while some other countries are strengthening their nuclear and missile capabilities," Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov told Russian radio last month. By "some others," he means China.
Good point. Bilateral negotiations are an anachronism. Before the Cold War powers cut any deeper, how about some clarity about the size of the Chinese arsenal and its intentions? Beijing hides its warheads and missiles in tunnels and has the industrial wherewithal to build many more quickly. The Pentagon thinks the Chinese have up to 400 nuclear warheads, which sounds low. The Pakistanis possess more than 100.
The Russians are terrified of a rising Chinese military on their long southern border. Beijing likely has 1,800 bombs and warheads, the former commander of Russia's Strategic Forces told the military journalist Bill Gertz last year. Whether this number is accurate or not, the Russians think it is. They're reluctant to give away any more of their rusting strategic long-range arsenal. Forget about any progress on thinning Russia's formidable stockpile (size unknown) of shorter-range tactical weapons.
Yet engaging in arms talks could give the Kremlin fresh leverage over America's missiles defenses. The Russians have wanted to kill the program since Ronald Reagan made it a priority, and they have found a weakness in President Obama's dreams of disarmament. To get New Start, the White House in 2009 cancelled plans for a missile defense site in Poland that would protect the U.S. against an Iranian ICBM.
Mr. Obama is literally pleading with Moscow to strike another arms deal, which underscores the surreal nature of his vision. He handed the Kremlin reams of classified data about American missile defense, supposedly to allay fears that U.S. defenses will weaken Russia's nuclear deterrent. Invoking executive powers, the Pentagon and State Department rebuffed requests by Congress to specify the information shared with Russia to see if it might have jeopardized U.S. security.
Even if Russia won't go along, Mr. Obama's new nuclear strategy says the U.S. has more warheads, missiles and submarines than it needs. The White House can invoke this conclusion to prune the arsenal through budget cuts or executive orders. This way he can also impose changes to America's missile defenses sought by the Russians without direct Congressional approval.
Meanwhile in the real world, North Korea adds to its nuclear arsenal and tests weapons with impunity. Iran marches ahead toward its atomic capability despite U.N. sanctions. Their neighbors in Asia and the Middle East watch and get ready to build or buy their own weapons in response. The legacy of the President who dreams of nuclear disarmament is likely to be a world with far more weapons and more nuclear powers.
-
http://nuclearsecrecy.com/nukemap/
See the extent of damage of a nuclear explosion!
-
http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/24/the-unresolved-mystery-of-syrias-iraqi-chemical-weapons/?_r=0
I am cynical enough to wonder if this plays a role in Baraq not wanting to seize Syrian WMD , , , or even accept them from the FSA (I heard a mid-east NSC guy tell FOX that the FSA, should it capture Assad chems, had promised to destroy them, that the agreement with the FSA did not require them to turn over the chems to the US. I am guessing that in our experts hands, there would be a goodly chance of scientifically determining their provenance.
-
Summary
While plans for the destruction of Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles take shape, the magnitude of the operation should not be overlooked. The effort will take years, will not wholly eliminate the threat of chemical weapons' use in the near term and will be fraught with risk.
Analysis
The United States and Russia have given the Syrian regime until Sept. 21 to produce a complete list of its chemical agents and munitions types as well as the locations of storage, production and research and development facilities. In the existing plan, international inspectors will enter Syria by November for an initial assessment and to destroy all mixing and filling equipment for chemical weapons. Every component of the chemical weapons program is supposed to be destroyed or out of the country by mid-2014.
Destruction Process
Following the standard for chemical weapons disposal, the weapons must be incinerated in order to ensure their complete destruction in a safe and efficient manner. This is done at a permanent facility or in a specially designed mobile unit. There are other means of disposing of the chemical weapons -- for example, burying them in the desert -- but any of these other approaches could have an impact on the surrounding environment and populations and could result in serious political backlash.
Major Chemical Weapons Sites in Syria
Incineration of chemical weapons is not as simple as pouring barrels of material into an incinerator operating at maximum capacity; it is a long and technical process of separating the chemical agent from its container or munitions and destroying it, then safely destroying anything that contained the material, including unexploded ordnance. Furthermore, anything that could hold chemical weapons must at least be inspected to determine whether it was ever used. Any such item will likely be destroyed either way. In the case of munitions that contain or have contained chemical weapons, the process can be extremely laborious because they can be decades old and in some form of decay and may be unstable. This process requires specialists and specific equipment, time, security and money.
Options for Securing Syria's Chemical Weapons
One option for the international community to secure the Syrian regime's chemical weapons would be for Damascus to voluntarily turn over all of its weapons, moving them to a collection point near a border or to a port, where international personnel could assume control and then ship them to a secure place for storage and destruction. The advantage of this scenario is that it would reduce the number of personnel put in harm's way and that all of the specialists could be concentrated in a single area, limiting the need for multiple teams and simplifying security. It would be possible to have only a few hundred specialists handling incoming material at a port in a relatively secure part of the country, such as the port of Tartus.
However, this scenario would require a considerable amount of trust to be placed in the regime of Bashar al Assad because there would be no way to verify that all of the regime's chemical weapons had been delivered. In addition, the sheer logistics of moving 1,000 or so tons of dangerous material across Syria from dispersed storage areas is daunting and in some cases would be fraught with risk, such as from the sites that are besieged by rebel forces, necessitating their cooperation. Finally, there would need to be international actors willing and able to ship the material and others willing and able to receive it, store it and destroy it in their territory.
On the opposite end of the spectrum would be a full-scale incursion, in which armed personnel would be sent to every known storage, research or production site to protect them from the rebels and the regime. In a brief to the U.S. Congress, plans crafted by the U.S. Department of Defense estimated that at least 75,000 combat troops would be needed on the ground for this option. That figure does not account for the number of personnel and assets required to support the ground force in maneuver.
This option is tantamount to invasion and occupation, but it would primarily focus on chemical weapon sites. Specialists required for the disposal would be in the thousands; this is where the bulk of international assistance would be required. As combat soldiers sat on sites, teams of specialists could move about and carefully destroy the weapons. While this could be an international operation, the scale, sophistication and prowess required to do it would mean that the United States would dominate all facets of the operation, at least initially.
The size and composition of this force would enable it to have unilateral movement through the country. It would not need nearly as much cooperation from al Assad's forces as the previous option and would be the best method of verifying the destruction of the largest portion of the chemical weapons arsenal. It would also ensure the best access to sites that are contested or besieged, since this unit could force itself into place. This option would also secure the weapons in place and would alleviate the need to expose them to the danger of transportation.
At the same time, the risks involved in this scenario are high. Personnel would be dispersed over a large geographic area in the middle of a combat zone. They would need to be supplied, so convoys and airlifts, which are vulnerable to ambush, would be constant. Even under ideal circumstances, this operation would take months or likely years to accomplish, and the costs would be very high.
A variation on this option would be to secure the weapons with an initial influx of ground troops but then consolidate the seized materials at either a protected central facility or a site for shipment out of the country. The goal would be to reduce the time in which significant numbers of personnel are in the country. Aside from the hazards of transportation in such a scenario, an international intervention to seize the sites would likely cause the outright collapse of the Syrian regime, thus placing the responsibility for post-al Assad Syria on the intervening force.
The Middle Ground
There are other options between the extremes already detailed. The two main scenarios would be to either insert weapons inspectors and chemical weapons destruction technicians under the protection of the Syrian military or to dispatch the inspectors and technicians with a U.N.-backed armed protection force. Previous weapons inspectors, such as former chief U.N. weapons inspector David Kay, have estimated that some 2,000 inspectors would be needed for a Syria mission.
In the first option, deploying specialists under the protection of the Syrian regime, there would be significant risks, and the complete cooperation of the regime to ensure the experts' safety would be paramount. It would be difficult for a number of countries to consider sending inspectors under such conditions. On the other hand, sending inspectors alongside armed U.N. protection would likely encounter objections from the regime, and there would be considerable risks of instigating firefights with regime or rebel forces in incidents in which chemical weapons facilities were located in disputed territory.
A variation of these options would be to establish a central protected facility from which a security force could be deployed to secure one stockpile at a time and return it to the protected facility. (In this case, a smaller force would focus on each site individually, whereas in the scenario described above, a larger force would seize all chemical weapons sites before moving them to a central location.) This option would depend on a certain amount of cooperation from al Assad's regime, and although fewer personnel would be at risk, it would take much longer to accomplish and would leave unsecured portions of the chemical weapons arsenal exposed to attack or use. The smaller team would also have a much more difficult time gaining access to contested sites or territory and would struggle to verify the total portion of the arsenal that had been destroyed.
All of these options come with some form of political cost. No matter which course is pursued, destruction of the stockpiles cannot comprehensively be verified, there will always be personnel at risk and there will always be the chance that chemical weapons will still be used despite the efforts underway. Any country that chooses to participate will be at risk of being undermined because the process will be expensive and will take years to realistically accomplish.
Read more: Destroying Syria's Chemical Weapons | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/world/middleeast/irans-leaders-signal-effort-at-new-thaw.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20130919
-
http://news.yahoo.com/atom-bomb-nearly-exploded-over-north-carolina-1961-230654850.html
-
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/lanl-history.pdf
!!!!!!!!!
-
BD: Nice find, though at 107 pages some of us may appreciate a summary by you :lol:
-
http://www.clarionproject.org/news/have-concessions-iran-made-emp-attack-more-likely
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/world/europe/us-says-russia-tested-missile-despite-treaty.html?nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20140130&_r=0
-
Dancing in the Nuclear Dark
How will we know when Iran sprints toward a bomb?
By
Bret Stephens
Feb. 3, 2014 7:50 p.m. ET
Where do federal government reports go once they've been published and (lightly) chewed over by second-tier officials, congressional staffers and think-tank wonks? I picture them being packed into crates and stored in some vast warehouse, like the Ark of the Covenant in the last scene of "Indiana Jones."
Every now and again, however, some of these reports are worth rescuing from premature burial.
So it is with the "Assessment of Nuclear Monitoring and Verification Technologies," the soporific title given to a report published last month by the Pentagon's Defense Science Board. The report is long on phrases like "adaptable holistic methodologies" and "institutionalized interagency planning processes." But at its heart it makes three timely and terrifying claims.
First, we are entering a second nuclear age.
Second, the history of nuclear proliferation is no guide to the future.
Third, our ability to detect nuclear breakout—the point at which a regime decides to go for a bomb—is not good.
On the first point, consider: Last year Japan and Turkey signed a nuclear cooperation deal, which at Turkish insistence included "a provision allowing Turkey to enrich uranium and extract plutonium, a potential material for nuclear weapons," according to the Asahi Shimbun newspaper. Japan, for its part, hopes to open a $21 billion reprocessing center at Rokkasho later this year, which will be"capable of producing nine tons of weapons-usable plutonium annually . . . enough to build as many as 2,000 bombs," according to a report in this newspaper. The Saudis are openly warning the administration that they will get a bomb if Iran's nuclear programs aren't stopped: Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal speaks of the kingdom's "arrangement with Pakistan." Seoul is pressing Washington to allow it to build uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing facilities, a request Washington is resisting.
Think of that: The administration is prepared to consent to an Iranian "right to enrich" but will not extend the same privilege to South Korea, an ally of more than 60 years. It isn't fun being friends with America these days.
On the second point, here's the board's discomfiting takeaway: "The pathways to proliferation are expanding. Networks of cooperation among countries that would otherwise have little reason to do so, such as the A.Q. Khan network or the Syria-North Korea and Iran-North Korea collaborations, cannot be considered isolated events. Moreover, the growth in nuclear power world-wide offers more opportunity for 'leakage' and/or hiding small programs."
And that may not be the worst of it. At least A.Q. Khan was working for a Pakistani government over which the U.S. could exercise leverage. But what leverage does Washington have over "Office 99," which handles Pyongyang's proliferation networks? What leverage would we have with Tehran should one of its nuclear scientists go rogue?
In the Iranian nuclear negotiations the administration is assuming that a regime as famously fractious as the Islamic Republic will nonetheless maintain rigid controls over its nuclear assets. Why is that assumption good?
Finally, there is the matter of nuclear detection. In his 2012 debate with Paul Ryan, Joe Biden insisted that the Iranians "are a good way away" from a bomb and that "we'll know if they start the process of building a weapon."
The report junks that claim. "The observables are limited, typically ambiguous, and part of a high-clutter environment of unrelated activities," it notes. "At low levels associated with small or nascent [nuclear] programs, key observables are easily masked."
Bottom line: We are dancing in the nuclear dark.
Now the administration is pressing for an agreement with Iran based on the conceit that the intelligence community will give policy makers ample warning before the mullahs sprint for a nuclear weapon. That is not true. Iran could surprise the world with a nuclear test at least as easily as India did in 1998, when the intelligence community gave the Clinton administration zero warning that New Delhi was about to set off a bomb—and a South Asian arms race. That failure is especially notable given that India, unlike Iran, is an open society.
Yet even that's not the essence of the problem. "You can't correct for bad policy with excellent intelligence," says Henry Sokolski of the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Center. U.S. intelligence may or may not be able to provide this administration with the necessary facts at the right time. But Joe Biden and John Kerry are not going to give this president the necessary will to do the right thing.
"The actual or threatened acquisition of nuclear weapons by more actors, for a range of different reasons, is emerging in numbers not seen since the first two decades of the Cold War," the board warns. "Many of these actors are hostile to the U.S. and its allies, and they do not appear to be bound by established norms nor deterred by traditional means."
How fitting that this is happening on the watch of Barack Obama, the man who chases the dream of a world without nuclear weapons.
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
-
Putin Invades, Obama Dismantles
The U.S. rushes to obey a nuclear arms treaty while Russia cheats.
April 8, 2014 7:20 p.m. ET
John Kerry told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Tuesday that "Russian provocateurs" had infiltrated eastern Ukraine in order to foment "an illegal and illegitimate effort to destabilize a sovereign state and create a contrived crisis." Also on Tuesday, the Pentagon announced steep cuts to U.S. nuclear forces, four years ahead of schedule, in accordance with the 2010 New Start treaty with Russia.
At this point in Barack Obama's Presidency we should be used to the mental whiplash. But we still feel concussed.
So let's slow down and follow the thread. Russia has seized Crimea and has 50,000 troops as a potential invasion force on the border with eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin is also abrogating the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, in which Kiev agreed to give up its nuclear arsenal—at the time the third largest in the world—in exchange for guarantees of its territorial integrity from Russia, the U.S. and U.K. That memorandum has now proved to be as much of a scrap of paper to the Kremlin as Belgium's neutrality was to Berlin in the summer of 1914.
The Kremlin is also violating the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which bans the testing, production and possession of nuclear missiles with a range between 310 and 3,400 miles. Russia has tested at least three missiles—the R-500 cruise missile, the RS-26 ballistic missile and the Iskander-M semi-ballistic missile—that run afoul of the proscribed range limits.
The Obama Administration has suspected for years that Vladimir Putin was violating the INF Treaty, which supporters hail as the triumph of arms control. The Russians were boasting of their new missile capabilities in open-source literature as far back as 2007. Yet as defense analysts Keith Payne and Mark Schneider noted in these pages in February, "since 2009, the current administration's unclassified arms-control compliance reports to Congress have been mum on the Russian INF Treaty noncompliance."
Opinion Video
At a minimum, Congress should call on Rose Gottemoeller, confirmed last month as under secretary of state for arms control over strenuous objections from Florida Senator Marco Rubio, to explain what the Administration knew, and what it disclosed, about Moscow's INF violations when she negotiated New Start.
Ms. Gottemoeller has been publicly noncommittal on this point, perhaps because she knew New Start would never have won a two-thirds Senate majority if Russia's INF cheating had been widely known. The episode reminds us of why people like former Arizona Senator Jon Kyl were right to oppose the ratification of New Start.
Which brings us to the Administration's announcement on cutting U.S. nuclear forces to levels specified by New Start four years before the treaty's 2018 compliance deadline. The news comes a few days after Hans Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists reported that "Russia has increased its counted deployed strategic nuclear forces over the past six months." Yet at the same time America's stockpile of warheads and launchers has declined.
Mr. Obama has dismissed Russia as a regional power, but he is maneuvering the U.S. closer to a position of absolute nuclear inferiority to Russia. The imbalance becomes even worse when one counts tactical nuclear weapons, where Russia has a four-to-one numerical advantage over the U.S.
To the surprise of defense analysts, the Pentagon will make the sharpest cuts in the submarine and bomber legs of the nuclear triad, while mostly preserving the silo-based Minuteman ICBMs. This means that the U.S. will maintain a stationary, and vulnerable, nuclear force on the ground while largely dismantling what remains of our second-strike capability at sea and in the air. A crucial part of deterrence is convincing an adversary that you can survive a first strike. It does not help U.S. security to dismantle the most survivable part of the U.S. arsenal.
It's fashionable in the West to dismiss this as "Cold War thinking," but it appears that Vladimir Putin hasn't given up on such thinking or he wouldn't be investing in new nuclear delivery systems.
***
Cold War or no, recent events are providing daily reminders that the great-power rivalries of previous centuries are far from over. They have also offered the grim lesson that nations that forsake their nuclear deterrent, as Ukraine did, do so at considerable peril. After the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the Senate refused to ratify Jimmy Carter's SALT II Treaty. Any serious response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine should include a formal and public U.S. demarche about Russian cheating on the INF treaty, while promising to withdraw from New Start if the cheating continues.
Nuclear arsenals aside, the timing of Mr. Obama's nuclear dismantling couldn't be worse as Mr. Putin contemplates his next moves in Ukraine and sizes up a possible Western response. Someone said recently that Mr. Putin plays chess while Mr. Obama plays checkers, but that's unfair to the noble game of checkers.
-
Checkers, chess, if only he played to win...
-
The Mideast Missile Race
The Saudis parade ballistic missiles for the first time.
May 1, 2014 6:56 p.m. ET
Saudi Arabia's rulers capped a large military exercise on Tuesday by publicly parading their ballistic missiles for the first time. The King of Bahrain, the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, Kuwait's Defense Minister and the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff were also in attendance, according to Jane's Defense Weekly. Don't think they weren't trying to send a message.
The weapon on display was the DF-3, a 1960s-era Chinese missile with a range of 1,500 miles and a 4,400-pound payload. The missiles aren't known for accuracy, but parading them at all is a signal that the Kingdom can strike an adversary far outside its borders. Tehran is some 800 miles from the Saudi capital of Riyadh. The Saudis haven't disclosed how many of the DF-3 missiles they have, but Jane's reports that the number is believed to be between 30 and 120.
The missile display is one more sign of the Middle East arms race that is already well underway. As the U.S. retreats from the region, and Iran advances to the edge of acquiring a nuclear weapon, the Saudis no longer trust U.S. security guarantees. They are looking to arm themselves lest Iran use what everyone will understand is a nuclear-breakout capacity to demand concessions from its neighbors.
Ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads will become the preferred method of deterrence. The Saudis have broadcast their close ties to their fellow Sunni Muslims in Pakistan who already have a nuclear weapon. They will be able to buy warheads if they want to. Egypt, Turkey and perhaps some other Gulf states will inevitably try to acquire their own nuclear deterrent as well, with the missiles to deliver it.
Americans—and President Obama's strategists—may want to believe that this isn't our problem. But a world of proliferating ballistic missiles and nuclear powers will become our problem soon enough.
-
I'm sure Lurch will negotiate this problem away.
Smart power!
-
http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2014/05/was_an_emp_attack_just_tested_on_the_united_states.html
-
Thanks for that GM, EMP may well be the cutting edge of coming conflicts. Certainly we are woefully unprepared and such an attack could be quite devastating.
-
Thanks for that GM, EMP may well be the cutting edge of coming conflicts. Certainly we are woefully unprepared and such an attack could be quite devastating.
Our grid is woefully vulnerable and without it, the loss of life incredible.
-
http://www.blog.standforisrael.org/articles/russia-may-build-more-nuclear-reactors-for-iran?sm=Blog&s_src=FB&s_subsrc=NFS1400XXEXXX
-
Iran Is Providing Information on Its Detonators, Atomic Agency Says
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROADMAY 23, 2014
WASHINGTON — For six years, international nuclear inspectors have been demanding that Iran turn over evidence of experiments that they suspect could have been part of a secret effort to solve the complex science of detonating a nuclear weapon.
On Friday, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the monitoring arm of the United Nations, said that it was finally beginning to see the information it had long sought — but that Iran insisted that the detonators were for non-nuclear purposes.
The disclosure was buried in a report by the atomic agency that detailed major progress Iran had made in diluting most of its stockpile of medium-enriched uranium, nuclear fuel that the West has long feared could be converted relatively quickly into weapons-grade material. Getting Iran to dilute that uranium was perhaps the biggest single accomplishment of the interim deal struck last year, creating room for the current negotiations, which hit their first major roadblock last week.
While there were no details in the report about what data Iran had supplied on what are called “exploding bridge wire detonators,” the disclosure that a substantive discussion had begun with the agency suggested a significant change in tactics in Tehran. For years Iranian officials have refused to answer questions about what the agency blandly calls “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s program. The Iranians have claimed the queries are based on what they call Western fabrications of evidence and lies propagated by the C.I.A.
But inside American and European intelligence agencies, the detonator issue is just one of many questions about a suspected secret weapons-design program buried inside university laboratories and institutes. The suspicions were heightened nearly a decade ago, when evidence emerged from a laptop computer smuggled out of the country by an Iranian scientist recruited by Western intelligence agencies. The data he provided included diagrams, videos and other results that appeared to strongly suggest interest in weapons design.
While much of the work ended in 2003, there are disagreements in the intelligence agencies of different countries about whether, and how intensely, it was resumed. The negotiations over the evidence of weapons work have been taking place on a separate track from the talks between Iran and the major powers about its nuclear enrichment program. While the atomic agency inspectors are permitted to visit fuel production areas daily, the Iranians continue to block access to the scientist that the United States, Israel and others say ran many of the main weapons-research operations, Mohsen Fakrizadeh.
Some other Iranian researchers believed involved in the program have been assassinated in recent years, in operations that have been attributed to Israel. Israeli officials have never confirmed or denied responsibility.
The atomic agency’s report was issued at a moment when negotiators have reached a roadblock with Iran over how much it is willing to dismantle its nuclear fuel-making infrastructure. American officials want Iran to reduce the number of centrifuges — the machines that purify uranium — to around 4,000 from the current 19,000. The Iranians want to expand the number, over time, to roughly 50,000, saying they need such capacity to produce fuel for civilian reactors yet to be built.
In the meantime, though, Iran is complying with all the elements of its interim agreement. The report of the atomic agency, issued from its Vienna headquarters to member states, showed that Iran had “halted nuclear activities in the areas of greatest proliferation concern and rolled back its program in other key areas,” said an analysis from the Arms Control Association, an advocacy group in Washington.
The detonators that Iran began discussing with the atomic agency were invented during the Manhattan Project, the American-led effort to build the first atomic bomb during World War II. The detonators are similar to blasting caps: an electric current fires them off. But they use a much higher voltage and the timing of the explosion can be far more precise, allowing a number to fire more or less simultaneously.
While they are used in nuclear devices, they are also essential in mining and rocketry, as well as explosive welding and metal forming. The atomic agency said that at a May 20 meeting Iran had provided “additional information and explanations,” including documents, to substantiate its claim that it had tested the detonators for “a civilian application.”
The detonators are one of seven different technologies the atomic agency said, in a 2011 report, that Iran was believed to have investigated.
The report said the agency was assessing Iran’s information. “It is important,” the report added, “that Iran continues to engage with the agency to resolve all outstanding issues” related to the nuclear program.
-
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2014/0801/Is-US-vulnerable-to-EMP-attack-A-doomsday-warning-and-its-skeptics-video
-
Thanks for that BD. This is a subject that deserves our attention IMHO.
-
The Growing Threat From an EMP Attack
A nuclear device detonated above the U.S. could kill millions, and we've done almost nothing to prepare.
By R. James Woolsey And Peter Vincent Pry
Aug. 12, 2014 7:14 p.m. ET
WSJ
In a recent letter to investors, billionaire hedge-fund manager Paul Singer warned that an electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, is "the most significant threat" to the U.S. and our allies in the world. He's right. Our food and water supplies, communications, banking, hospitals, law enforcement, etc., all depend on the electric grid. Yet until recently little attention has been paid to the ease of generating EMPs by detonating a nuclear weapon in orbit above the U.S., and thus bringing our civilization to a cold, dark halt.
Recent declassification of EMP studies by the U.S. government has begun to draw attention to this dire threat. Rogue nations such as North Korea (and possibly Iran) will soon match Russia and China and have the primary ingredients for an EMP attack: simple ballistic missiles such as Scuds that could be launched from a freighter near our shores; space-launch vehicles able to loft low-earth-orbit satellites; and simple low-yield nuclear weapons that can generate gamma rays and fireballs.
The much neglected 2004 and 2008 reports by the congressional EMP Commission—only now garnering increased public attention—warn that "terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or a military base, they may gain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them—or threatening their use—in an EMP attack."
Enlarge Image
Bloomberg
The EMP Commission reports that: "China and Russia have considered limited nuclear-attack options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ EMP as the primary or sole means of attack." The report further warns that: "designs for variants of such weapons may have been illicitly trafficked for a quarter-century."
During the Cold War, Russia designed an orbiting nuclear warhead resembling a satellite and peaceful space-launch vehicle called a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System. It would use a trajectory that does not approach the U.S. from the north, where our sensors and few modest ballistic-missile defenses are located, but rather from the south. The nuclear weapon would be detonated in orbit, perhaps during its first orbit, destroying much of the U.S. electric grid with a single explosion high above North America.
In 2004, the EMP Commission met with senior Russian military personnel who warned that Russian scientists had been recruited by North Korea to help develop its nuclear arsenal as well as EMP-attack capabilities. In December 2012, the North Koreans successfully orbited a satellite, the KSM-3, compatible with the size and weight of a small nuclear warhead. The trajectory of the KSM-3 had the characteristics for delivery of a surprise nuclear EMP attack against the U.S.
What would a successful EMP attack look like? The EMP Commission, in 2008, estimated that within 12 months of a nationwide blackout, up to 90% of the U.S. population could possibly perish from starvation, disease and societal breakdown.
In 2009 the congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, whose co-chairmen were former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and James Schlesinger, concurred with the findings of the EMP Commission and urged immediate action to protect the electric grid. Studies by the National Academy of Sciences, the Department of Energy, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the National Intelligence Council reached similar conclusions.
What to do?
Surge arrestors, faraday cages and other devices that prevent EMP from damaging electronics, as well micro-grids that are inherently less susceptible to EMP, have been used by the Defense Department for more than 50 years to protect crucial military installations and strategic forces. These can be adapted to protect civilian infrastructure as well. The cost of protecting the national electric grid, according to a 2008 EMP Commission estimate, would be about $2 billion—roughly what the U.S. gives each year in foreign aid to Pakistan.
Last year President Obama signed an executive order to guard critical infrastructure against cyberattacks. But so far this administration doesn't seem to grasp the urgency of the EMP threat. However, in a rare display of bipartisanship, Congress is addressing the threat. In June 2013, Rep. Trent Franks (R., Ariz.) and Rep. Yvette Clark (D., N.Y.) introduced the Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from Lethal Damage, or Shield, Act. Unfortunately, the legislation is stalled in the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
In October 2013, Rep. Franks and Rep. Pete Sessions (R., Texas) introduced the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. CIPA directs the Department of Homeland Security to adopt a new National Planning Scenario focused on federal, state and local emergency planning, training and resource allocation for survival and recovery from an EMP catastrophe. Yet this important legislation hasn't come to a vote either.
What is lacking in Washington is a sense of urgency. Lawmakers and the administration need to move rapidly to build resilience into our electric grid and defend against an EMP attack that could deliver a devastating blow to the U.S. economy and the American people. Congress should pass and the president should sign into law the Shield Act and CIPA as soon as possible. Literally millions of American lives could depend on it.
Mr. Woolsey is chairman of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former director of the CIA.Mr. Pry served on the EMP Commission, in the CIA, and is the author of "Electric Armageddon" (CreateSpace, 2013).
-
http://online.wsj.com/articles/watchdog-says-chlorine-gas-used-as-a-chemical-weapon-in-syria-1410362440
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/us/us-ramping-up-major-renewal-in-nuclear-arms.html?emc=edit_th_20140922&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
-
The Senate and Iran’s Bomb
Obama rejects a role for Congress that it has long played on arms control.
Feb. 6, 2015 6:47 p.m. ET
The ghost of Scoop Jackson is hovering over the Obama Administration’s troubles with the Senate and its nuclear negotiations with Iran. Senator Henry M. “Scoop” Jackson, a respected national-security Democrat from Washington state, was often a thorn in the side of Presidents who were negotiating arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. President Obama wishes Senate critics such as Democrat Robert Menendez and Republican Bob Corker would simply get their noses out of the deal. This President needs a history lesson: Senate involvement in arms-control agreements goes back at least 50 years.
Threatening vetoes of anything the Senate sends him on Iran, President Obama seems to think his job is to negotiate nuclear arms agreements unilaterally, while the Senate’s job is to keep its mouth shut.
It was never thus.
The idea of nuclear-arms agreements negotiated by an Administration with little or no input from Congress is a relatively recent phenomenon. The Clinton Administration unilaterally negotiated the 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea to stop its construction of nuclear reactors. The George W. Bush Administration followed, producing five sets of Six-Party Talks with North Korea. They all fell apart because the North Koreans cheated by continuing to test nuclear devices and develop missiles capable of delivering a bomb.
The Obama negotiation with Iran is called P5+1, which asks everyone to believe that the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany, can be trusted to put Iran’s nuclear genie to sleep. That arms-control model may appeal to the Nobel Peace Prize committee, but it should not impress U.S. Senators.
The Senate’s experience with nuclear-arms control dates at least to the Kennedy Presidency in 1963 and the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which emerged after eight years of negotiations with the Soviet Union. Like virtually all Soviet-era arms agreements, that deal was a formal treaty and subject to the Constitution’s treaty-making process: The President may commit the U.S. to a treaty with the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate. The Senate ratified the Kennedy test ban 80-19.
With a few exceptions, that public process was followed for decades. The agreements were openly debated by Senators with input, pro and con, by national-security specialists from inside and outside the government.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was negotiated during the Johnson Presidency and ratified under Richard Nixon in 1969. Nixon then undertook negotiations for the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). That produced the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, which the Senate ratified 88-2. SALT I never became a formal, permanent treaty. It was a temporary deal, lasting five years, and Nixon submitted it to Congress for approval by votes in both the Senate and House.
President Obama’s Iran deal sounds like Nixon’s temporary interim SALT accord. But while Nixon understood the need to get Congress’s formal approval, the Obama White House refuses to note even the existence of Mr. Corker’s proposed up-or-down vote on an Iran deal.
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 and amid the Iranian hostage crisis, President Carter withdrew the SALT II treaty with the Soviets, knowing the Senate would never ratify it. During the Reagan years, Senators were preoccupied with nuclear verification and compliance. How, the Senators asked, would we know if the Soviets were cheating, and what would we do about it if they did cheat?
As the Reagan team pressed in 1987 for ratification of the INF treaty on medium-range nuclear weapons, Senator Sam Nunn, then the Democratic chairman of the Armed Services Committee, said, “We are going to have a major debate on verification, in the context of both this agreement and the next one.” Leading national-security figures testified in hearings, all of it covered and debated in major newspapers and television. It was a valuable exercise in American governance. The Senate ratified INF in May 1988, 93-5.
George H.W. Bush concluded the START treaty on longer-range nuclear weapons in 1991, which the Senate also ratified, as it did START II in 1996 under Bill Clinton.
Barack Obama’s Iran project is the outlier in the history of arms control. His insistence that no one may interfere in his negotiations has only increased misgivings in Congress about the details. If Mr. Obama were pursuing the traditional route to gain approval of an Iran agreement, exposing it to formal public debate and a vote, there would have been no need for Speaker John Boehner to invite Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to address Congress.
Details matter. The Defense Intelligence Agency in its annual threat assessment last February said, “In addition to its growing missile and rocket inventories, Iran is seeking to enhance lethality and effectiveness of existing systems with improvements in accuracy and warhead designs.”
Missile delivery systems and warhead design were make-or-break issues during arms agreements with the Soviet Union. In Mr. Obama’s negotiations with Iran, they are virtually non-subjects.
***
Senators Menendez, Corker and Mark Kirk have led the effort for more accountability on an Iranian arms deal. President Obama’s response is a threat to veto any advice or consent the Senate may enact that doesn’t simply assent to whatever he signs. What an irony that his unilateral point man is former Senate Foreign Relations Chairman John Kerry .
This new Senate needs to re-establish its traditional role in letting the American people know what is in—and what is not in—these deals with the next generation of nations seeking nuclear bombs.
Popular on WSJ
-
http://pamelageller.com/2015/02/washpost-exposes-obamas-disastrous-iran-nuclear-weapons-deal-point-by-horrible-point.html/
-
GENEVA—The U.S. and Iran are exploring a nuclear deal that would keep Tehran from amassing enough material to make a bomb for at least a decade, but could then allow it to gradually build up its capabilities again.
Such a deal would represent a significant compromise by the U.S., which had sought to restrain Tehran’s nuclear activities for as long as 20 years. Tehran has insisted on no more than a 10-year freeze.
The possible compromise on the table appears closer to Tehran’s timeline. While it would add some years in which the Iranian nuclear program continues to be closely monitored and constrained, Iran would be able to increase its capacity to enrich uranium, and thus get closer to bomb-making capability again.
Critics in Congress and in Israel quickly attacked the prospect of a 10-year time frame as inadequate.
After four days of talks in Geneva, a senior U.S. official on Monday said there had been welcome progress toward a deal, while giving no specifics about its timeline.
The U.S. has been pushing for a freeze that would establish a period of time during which Iran would remain at least 12 months away from being able to fuel an atomic bomb—a so-called breakout period. Asked if Iran must accept that breakout period through the lifetime of an accord, the person signaled that may not be necessary.
“We have always said that we would have a one-year breakout time for a double-digit number of years and that remains the case,” the official said.
That suggests a period of as little as 10 years. When pressed, the official declined to elaborate. Such a compromise could allow Iran to portray the major restrictions on its nuclear program at home as lasting only 10 years—an upper limit Iranian officials have mentioned before. Iran says its nuclear program is a purely civilian, peaceful one.
It also could break the impasse over how many centrifuges—machines for enriching uranium—Tehran would be allowed under a deal. If Iran can expand its activities, it could start with fewer centrifuges and then be allowed to operate more over time. The U.S. and its global partners could argue that Tehran’s activities will remain under significant international oversight and with some constraints for much longer.
U.S. lawmakers have said they’re going to closely scrutinize any agreement with Tehran and try to force a vote in Congress on it. A deal that allows Tehran to maintain a sizable capacity to enrich uranium, and to eventually be freed to pursue a broader nuclear program, is expected to face fierce opposition. The Obama administration maintains that it doesn’t need congressional approval for the deal because it isn’t a treaty, although Congress would have to vote to lift some of the sanctions it has imposed on Iran over the years.
Sen. Bob Corker (R., Tenn.) said in an interview that a 10-year time frame wasn’t long enough to truly curb Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.
“If you’re going to do all of this and then just end up with a 10-year agreement, you just really haven’t accomplished near what people had hoped,” said Mr. Corker, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
Such a time frame would be “very concerning,” he added. “About the time they’re beginning to do what they should be doing, they’d be out from under the regime.”
The Israeli government has been a leading critic of the talks, which Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu on Sunday warned were destined to end in a “dangerous” deal.
On Monday, Israeli Intelligence Minister Yuval Steinitz said Israel considers the negotiations “totally unsatisfactory” because it would allow Iran to be “extremely close” to a “dangerous breakout program.” Referring to the latest suggested compromise, he said, “for a 10-year delay [in Iran’s nuclear program] you are sacrificing the future of Israel and the U.S., and the future of the world.”
Mr. Netanyahu will travel to Washington next week to make his case against the diplomacy. He is due to deliver a speech to Congress on March 3, at the same time U.S. and Iranian diplomats will be back in Europe seeking to advance work on a deal. The two sides are aiming to complete a framework deal by late March and have a full, detailed agreement by a June 30 deadline.
U.S. lawmakers have threatened to impose fresh sanctions on Iran if the March deadline is missed—a step that could scuttle the diplomacy.
The talks in Geneva were attended by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and, for the first time, by U.S. Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz. They met Sunday evening and Monday with Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif and the head of Iran’s atomic agency Ali Akbar Salehi.
Both sides said the expansion of the negotiations to other top-level officials aimed at cutting through the remaining complex issues.
“These were very serious, useful and constructive discussions. We have made some progress though we still have a long way to go,” the senior U.S. official said.
Mr. Zarif was quoted by Iranian state media as saying: “We have made progress on some topics to some extent, but there is still a long way to go before reaching a final deal.”
Russia’s deputy foreign minister and chief Iran negotiator, Sergei Ryabkov, reflected a palpable sense of optimism around the decade long talks. “Confidence is growing a deal can be reached,” he said.
Iran negotiates over the future of its nuclear program with the U.S., France, the U.K., Germany, Russia and China.
Western officials said a phased structure could apply in other areas as well, such as when international sanctions on Iran will be lifted, or when Iran could resume nuclear research. Still, Western diplomats insisted that real differences remained.
The concerns about Iran’s research work are a threat to any agreement on the enrichment issue. If Tehran is able to develop far more powerful centrifuges, Iran would be able to produce enough nuclear material for a bomb in less than a year.
“The U.S. has gone a long way” toward accepting Iran’s position, said David Albright, who heads the Institute for Science and International Security, a think tank that has advised Congress. “If they don’t address these issues in some way, then this deal isn’t doable.”
—Joshua Mitnick in Tel Aviv and Michael R. Crittenden in Washington contributed to this article.
Write to Laurence Norman at laurence.norman@wsj.com
Popular on WSJ
-
First if anyone actually believes it will take Iran 10 yrs to get a bomb must not have been reading the news the last 10 yrs.
If anyone thinks we will be able to contain them for 10 yrs must also have not been reading anything the last decade.
This reminds me of the handling of our economy. Keep throwing money at the debt and hope we can keep pushing off the inevitable because something totally unforeseen or unexpected will miraculously come out of know where to save us.
Nonetheless the Dem party will naturally rally round their guy to promote this as some sort of gigantic ingenious breakthrough giving the Nobel Peace Prize winner infinite praise and a earned monument in the pantheon of the world's great leaders.
-
https://consortiumnews.com/2012/06/06/bush-blocked-iran-nuke-deal/
-
White House-Netanyahu Rift Isn’t Over the Speech, but the Deal
By Gerald F. Seib
Updated Feb. 27, 2015 2:55 p.m. ET
WSJ
As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu heads to Washington for a controversial speech to Congress next week, the immediate problem isn’t that he and the Obama administration disagree. At the moment, the problem actually is that they seem to agree on this: As things stand now, the Israeli leader is virtually certain to oppose and try to block the deal the U.S. is negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program.
That is a change, and a significant one, from just a few months ago, when it seemed possible there could be a negotiated deal that both Mr. Netanyahu and President Barack Obama could embrace, if not exactly love. This change is why Mr. Netanyahu thinks it’s worth undermining his entire relationship with an American president by making a speech the White House didn’t know about and fumed about once it became known. And it’s why the White House has taken on Mr. Netanyahu so directly.
In short, the real sticking point isn’t the speech; the sticking point is the deal.
All of which raises a broader question: Does it have to be this way, or is there still hope of closing the rift? Despite all the tension, the possibility of common ground may not have disappeared entirely.
But first consider the immediate situation in Washington, where the controversy in coming days will be more about a speech rather than the substance of the Iran question. By now, the saga is well known. Republican House Speaker John Boehner went around the Democratic White House to invite Mr. Netanyahu to speak to a joint session of Congress about the threat from Iran. The speech will come two weeks before Mr. Netanyahu is running for a new term at home, and three weeks before the deadline for the talks the U.S. and five other world powers are holding with Iran over a possible deal to curb its nuclear program.
The White House was miffed. Very. But not, as is commonly assumed, simply because the speech represented a breach of diplomatic protocol, in which world leaders deal with each other rather than through their countries’ respective opposition parties.
The deeper cause for concern within the administration was a feeling that the speech means Mr. Netanyahu has concluded that there is no version of the deal currently being negotiated with Iran that he can endorse—and that he is embarked on a strategy of using his strong connections with Republicans in Congress to find a way to use the legislative branch to block an agreement negotiated by the executive branch.
“He’s advocating against any deal. That’s just not diplomacy,” a senior administration official said. “And he’s not putting forward an alternative deal.”
Little that Mr. Netanyahu has done in recent weeks suggests otherwise. He said this week that it appears the “world powers” negotiating with Iran “have given up” on their commitment to stop Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
In a nutshell, here’s the substantive disagreement. The administration believes the deal it’s negotiating will reduce Iran’s capacity to enrich uranium so much that Tehran’s leaders would need a year to break out of the agreement and produce enough fissile material to build a bomb—sufficient time to allow the U.S. and its allies to stop any such breakout. Mr. Netanyahu thinks that the residual enrichment capability granted Iran would still leave it as a threshold nuclear state, and would in any case be too large to adequately monitor and inspect with any certainty.
There was a time, not long ago, when Mr. Netanyahu appeared to be pleased enough with the economic pressure the U.S. and the West were putting on Iran that he thought it might produce a deal he considered good enough. By all appearances, that’s what has changed.
Is there any alternative to this impasse? Dennis Ross, a Middle East diplomat under several American presidents, including Mr. Obama, thinks there might be. He suggests a new kind of anywhere, any-time inspections regime, enshrined in both a deal and legislation passed by Congress. If that legislation also mandated explicit consequences for Iranian violations, including use of military force, it might create the kind of American assurance Mr. Netanyahu could accept.
“There is a way to bridge the difference,” Mr. Ross says. Next week, though, that may be hard to see.
Write to Gerald F. Seib at jerry.seib@wsj.com
Popular on WSJ
-
second post
WSJ
Iran on the Nuclear Edge
Official leaks suggest the U.S. is making ever more concessions.
Secretary of State John Kerry testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, Feb. 25, 2015, before the House Appropriations subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies. ENLARGE
Secretary of State John Kerry testifies on Capitol Hill in Washington, Wednesday, Feb. 25, 2015, before the House Appropriations subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Agencies. Photo: Associated Press
Feb. 27, 2015 6:44 p.m. ET
4 COMMENTS
Secretary of State John Kerry told Congress this week that no one should pre-judge a nuclear deal with Iran because only the negotiators know what’s in it. But the truth is that the framework of an accord has been emerging thanks to Administration leaks to friendly journalists. The leaks suggest the U.S. has already given away so much that any deal on current terms will put Iran on the cusp of nuclear-power status.
The latest startling detail is Monday’s leak that the U.S. has conceded to Iran’s demand that an agreement would last as little as a decade, perhaps with an additional five-year phase-out. After that Iran would be allowed to build its uranium enrichment capabilities to whatever size it wants. In theory it would be forbidden from building nuclear weapons, but by then all sanctions would have long ago been lifted and Iran would have the capability to enrich on an industrial scale.
On Wednesday Mr. Kerry denied that a deal would include the 10-year sunset, though he offered no details. We would have more sympathy for his desire for secrecy if the Administration were not simultaneously leaking to its media Boswells while insisting that Congress should have no say over whatever agreement emerges.
The sunset clause fits the larger story of how far the U.S. and its allies have come to satisfy Iran’s demands. The Administration originally insisted that Iran should not be able to enrich uranium at all. Later it mooted a symbolic enrichment capacity of perhaps 500 centrifuges. Last July people close to the White House began talking about 3,000. By October the Los Angeles Times reported that Mr. Kerry had raised the ceiling to 4,000.
Now it’s 6,000, and the Administration line is that the number doesn’t matter; only advanced centrifuges count. While quality does matter, quantity can have a quality all its own. The point is that Iran will be allowed to retain what amounts to a nuclear-weapons industrial capacity rather than dismantle all of it as the U.S. first demanded.
Mr. Kerry also says that any deal will have intrusive inspections, yet he has a habit of ignoring Iran’s noncompliance with agreements it has already signed. Last November he insisted that “Iran has lived up” to its commitments under the 2013 interim nuclear agreement.
Yet even then Iran was testing advanced centrifuge models in violation of the agreement, according to a report from the nonpartisan Institute for Science and International Security. In December the U.N. Security Council noted that Iran continued to purchase illicit materials for its reactor in Arak, a heavy-water facility that gives Tehran a path to a plutonium-based bomb.
The International Atomic Energy Agency reported last week that Iran was continuing to stonewall the U.N. nuclear watchdog about the “possible military dimensions” of its nuclear program. On Tuesday an exiled Iranian opposition group that first disclosed the existence of Tehran’s illicit nuclear sites in 2002 claimed it had uncovered another illicit enrichment site near Tehran called “Lavizan-3.” The charge isn’t proven, but Iran’s record of building secret nuclear facilities is a matter of public record.
As for the idea that the IAEA or Western intelligence agencies could properly monitor Iran’s compliance, a report last year from the Pentagon’s Defense Science Board is doubtful. “At low levels associated with small or nascent [nuclear] programs, key observables are easily masked,” the board noted.
This is significant since the Administration insists that any deal will give the U.S. at least one year to detect and stop an Iranian “breakout” effort to build a bomb. Iran’s ballistic missile programs aren’t even part of the negotiations, though there is no reason to build such missiles other than to deliver a bomb.
The Administration’s emerging justification for these concessions, also coming in leaks, is that a nuclear accord will become the basis for a broader rapprochement with Iran that will stabilize the Middle East. As President Obama said in December, Iran can be “a very successful regional power.”
That is some gamble on a regime that continues to sponsor terrorist groups around the world, prop up the Assad regime in Syria, use proxies to overthrow the Yemen government, jail U.S. reporter Jason Rezaian on trumped-up espionage charges, and this week blew up a mock U.S. aircraft carrier in naval exercises near the Strait of Hormuz.
***
Given how bad this deal is shaping up to be, it’s not surprising that U.S. allies are speaking out against it. “We prefer a collapse of the diplomatic process to a bad deal,” one Arab official told the Journal last week. Saudi Arabia has also made clear that it might acquire nuclear capabilities in response—precisely the kind of proliferation Mr. Obama has vowed to prevent.
No wonder many in Congress want to hear Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu next week. They look at all of this public evidence and understandably fear that the U.S. is walking into a new era of nuclear proliferation with eyes wide shut.
Popular on WSJ
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/414515/fatal-flaw-iran-deal-charles-krauthammer?utm_campaign=trueAnthem%3A+Trending+Content&utm_content=54f0a99c15bb3b5305000001&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=facebook
-
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/terence-p-jeffrey/ayatollah-tells-air-force-we-enriched-uranium-20-commanders-death-0
CNSNews.com) - In a speech delivered last month to commanders and other personnel in the Iranian Air Force, whom he described as “officials who have very sensitive occupations,” Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—Iran’s Supreme Leader and commander in chief—boasted that Iran had enriched uranium to the 20-percent level.
At the same time, the Supreme Leader noted that his government had agreed to shut down its production of 20-percent enriched uranium “for a while” in its effort to reach a deal with United States and other foreign powers that would include lifting the sanctions now imposed on his country.
“It was a very great achievement to produce 20-percent uranium,” the ayatollah told a Feb. 8 Iranian Air Force gathering, according to a transcript posted on his website.
“Those who are experts on this matter know that producing 20 percent from 5 percent is much more significant than producing uranium which is higher than 20 percent,” he said. “However, our youth and our committed scientists did so.”
A report published last month by the Congressional Research Service explains why Iran’s efforts to produce uranium enriched to the 20 percent level is a problem.
“LEU used in nuclear power reactors typically contains less than 5% uranium-235,” said CRS, “research reactor fuel can be made using 20% uranium-235; HEU used in nuclear weapons typically contains about 90% uranium-235.”
“Iran’s production of LEU enriched to the 20% level has caused concern because such production requires approximately 90% of the effort necessary to produce weapons-grade HEU, which, as noted, contains approximately 90% uranium-235,” said CRS.
“Tehran argues that it is enriching uranium for use as fuel in nuclear power reactors and nuclear research reactors,” said CRS.
In his speech to the Air Force commanders, the ayatollah followed his assertion that Iran had been able to enrich uranium to the 20 percent level by accusing the U.S. and its allies of being “greedy” in negotiations for a nuclear deal and asserting that the “Iranian nation will not submit to greed and tyranny.”
The audience of Air Force commanders and other personnel responded to this with a chant, according to an English-language transcript produced by BBC Worldwide Monitoring and available through Nexis.
“Allah Akbar [God is great],” they chanted, according to the BBC transcript. “Khamenei is the leader. Death to the enemies of the leadership. Death to America. Death to England. Death to hypocrites. Death to Israel.”
Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has testified in Congress that Iran has the technical capability to build a nuclear weapon and that whether it does so will be personally decided by Ayatollah Khamenei.
“Clearly, Tehran has the scientific, technical and industrial capacity to produce them, so the central issue is its political will to do so,” Clapper told the Senate Armed Services Committee on April 18, 2013. “Such a decision, we believe, will be made by the Supreme Leader, and at this point we don't know if he'll eventually decide to build nuclear weapons.”
Then-Armed Services Chairman Carl Levin asked Clapper: “Have they made a decision, in your assessment, to produce nuclear weapons?”
“They have not,” said Clapper. “We continue to hold that they have not yet made that decision. And that decision would be made singly by the Supreme Leader.”
Clapper echoed this assessment in another Senate Armed Services Committee hearing held last week.
“Iran will face many of the same decision points in 2015 as it did in 2014,” he said. “Foremost is whether the Supreme Leader will agree to a nuclear deal. He wants sanctions relief but, at the same time, to preserve his options on nuclear capabilities.”
“We believe the supreme leader would be the ultimate decision maker here,” Clapper said. “As far as we know, he's not made a decision to go for a nuclear weapon.
“I do think they certainly want to preserve options across the capabilities it would take to build one,” Clapper said. “But right now they don't have one, and have not made that decision.”
At a background briefing sponsored by the White House on Sept. 25, 2009, “senior administration officials” explained that Iran had twice been caught secretly constructing a facility for enriching uranium—first at Natanz and then at Qom. One of the officials at this briefing explained why the administration believed the second facility appeared particularly designed to produce enriched uranium not for peaceful use but for a weapon.
“[T]he Iranian nuclear issue first became public back in 2002, when it was revealed that Iran was building a secret underground enrichment facility, which we now know as the Natanz facility,” a senior administration official said at that briefing. “Once the Iranians were caught building the secret underground enrichment facility with centrifuge machines in it, they were forced to declare the facility, to allow the IAEA inspectors to inspect the facility and to place it under safeguards.”
“So the obvious option for Iran would be to build another secret underground enrichment facility, and our intelligence services, working in very close cooperation with our allies, for the past several years have been looking for such a facility,” said the senior administration official. “And not surprisingly, we found one. So we have known for some time now that Iran was building a second underground enrichment facility. And as the president mentioned this morning, it's located [at Fordo] near the city of Qom, a very heavily protected, very heavily disguised facility.”
“Our information is that the facility is designed to hold about 3,000 centrifuge machines,” said this senior administration official. “Now, that's not a large enough number to make any sense from a commercial standpoint. It cannot produce a significant quantity of low-enriched uranium. But if you want to use the facility in order to produce a small amount of weapons-grade uranium, enough for a bomb or two a year, it's the right size. And our information is that the Iranians began this facility with the intent that it be secret, and therefore giving them an option of producing weapons-grade uranium without the international community knowing about it.”
Another problematic Iranian nuclear project is a heavy-water reactor it is building at Arak.
“Iran is constructing a heavy water-moderated reactor at Arak, which, according to Tehran, is intended to produce radioisotopes for medical use,” said the CRS report published last month.
“The Arak reactor is a proliferation concern because heavy water reactors produce spent fuel containing plutonium better suited for nuclear weapons than plutonium produced by light water moderated reactors,” said the CRS report.
In his speech last month to his Air Force commanders, Ayatollah Khamenei first stressed that he supported a nuclear deal that is “workable.” He then went on to praise Iran’s achievement in enriching uranium to the 20 percent level and hailed the construction of the Arak reactor and the Fordo uranium enrichment facilty.
“I want to say that first of all, I consent to an agreement that is workable,” said the ayatollah, according to the translation of his speech posted on his official website. “Of course, I do not mean a bad agreement. The Americans constantly repeat, 'We believe that making no agreement is better than making a bad one.' We too have the same opinion. We too believe that making no agreement is better than making an agreement that is to the disadvantage of national interests, one that leads to the humiliation of the great and magnificent people of Iran.”
In mentioning that the Arak and Fordo facilities had been closed—which was done as part of the temporary agreement (or “Joint Plan of Action”) that Iran made with the United States, France, the United Kingdom, German, Russia and China, the ayatollah stressed that these facilities were closed “for now”---according to the translation posted on his own website.
“The Iranian side has done whatever it could to reach an agreement,” the ayatollah said. “It has done many things: it has stopped developing enrichment machines. Well, it deemed it necessary to stop these machines for a while. It has stopped producing 20-percent uranium which is a very great feat. It was a very great achievement to produce 20-percent uranium.”
“Those who are experts on this matter know that producing 20 percent from 5 percent is much more significant than producing uranium which is higher than 20 percent,” said the ayatollah. “However, our youth and our committed scientists did so.
"In any case," he said, "the Iranian side stopped this because negotiations required it. The Iranians have closed the Arak Factory--which was a very great achievement and a very important innovation in the area of technology--for now. They have closed--for now--Fordo which is one of the best innovations made by our domestic forces for the sake of ensuring the security of our centrifuges. They have achieved so many great tasks. Therefore, the Iranian side has acted in a reasonable way. It has acted according to the requirements of negotiation."
Toward the end of his speech, the ayatollah indicated that his over-arching goal is to have sanctions lifted from Iran.
“Everything that is done is for the sake of taking the weapon and option of sanctions away from the enemy's hands,” he said.
“However, if they fail to make such an agreement, the people of Iran, officials, the honorable administration and others have many different options,” the ayatollah said.
“By Allah's favor,” he said, “the people of Iran will show on the 22nd of Bahman, that those who want to humiliate the people of Iran will face their counterblow.”
According to the BBC, 22nd of Bahman—or February 11—is the anniversary of the Iranian Revolution.
At this point in the BBC transcript of the speech, the audience of Iranian Air Force commanders and other personnel repeated the chant they had made earlier in the speech: “Allah Akbar. Khamenei is the Leader. Death to the enemies of the leadership. Death to America. Death to England. Death to hypocrites. Death to Israel.”
-
If it isn't obvious by now that there is only one way to stop them?
-
If it isn't obvious by now that there is only one way to stop them?
Our president doesn't want to stop them.
-
The Senate’s Iran Distraction
Republicans should focus on persuading the American people.
March 9, 2015 7:39 p.m. ET
43 COMMENTS
President Obama ’s looming nuclear deal with Iran may be the security blunder of the young century, and Congress should vote on it. Which is why it’s too bad that Republican Senators took their eye off that ball on Monday with a letter to the government of Iran.
Forty-seven of the 54 GOP Senators signed the open letter addressed to “the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” The letter explained to Tehran’s non-democratic rulers that “under our Constitution,” while the President negotiates international agreements, “Congress plays the significant role of ratifying them.”
Mr. Obama predictably denounced the letter as an attempt to undermine the talks, which are reaching their third deadline. “I think it’s somewhat ironic to see some members of Congress wanting to make common cause with the hardliners in Iran,” he told reporters. “It’s an unusual coalition.”
Equating elected Senators with the Revolutionary Guard Corps is itself a political stunt, but that’s how Mr. Obama plays. He also partly brought this intervention on himself by freezing out Congress and declaring that he’ll veto any attempt to vote on the pact. As usual, he wants to rule by executive fiat.
The problem with the GOP letter is that it’s a distraction from what should be the main political goal of persuading the American people. Democratic votes will be needed if the pact is going to be stopped, and even to get the 67 votes to override a veto of the Corker-Menendez bill to require such a vote. Monday’s letter lets Mr. Obama change the subject to charge that Republicans are playing politics as he tries to make it harder for Democrats to vote for Corker-Menendez.
The security stakes couldn’t be higher if Mr. Obama enables a new age of nuclear proliferation, and Republicans need to keep focused on a critique of the deal’s substance. Giving Mr. Obama a meaningless letter to shoot at detracts from that debate.
Popular on WSJ
-
Someone called into the Mark Levin radio broadcast and brought up an excellent point. The US government has severe restrictions on peaceful use of nuclear power here in our country yet they support the use of nuclear power in Iran.
Anyone see a contradiction?
-
Someone called into the Mark Levin radio broadcast and brought up an excellent point. The US government has severe restrictions on peaceful use of nuclear power here in our country yet they support the use of nuclear power in Iran.
Anyone see a contradiction?
Isn't that a great observation!
-
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif called the open letter from 47 U.S. Republican senators to Iranian leaders on the nuclear negotiations a “propaganda ploy” and suggested the senators do not understand the U.S. Constitution.
The Iranian foreign ministry posted a summary of Zarif’s comments on the letter, paraphrasing him expressing astonishment that lawmakers would write to leaders of a foreign country:
He pointed out that from reading the open letter, it seems that the authors not only do not understand international law, but are not fully cognizant of the nuances of their own Constitution when it comes to presidential powers in the conduct of foreign policy.
“In our view, this letter has no legal value and is mostly a propaganda ploy,” Zarif said.
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif arrives to the Iraqi capital Baghdad on February 24, 2015 to hold a press conference with Arab country's officials. (Sabah Arar/AFP/Getty Images)
Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif arrives in the Iraqi capital of Baghdad, Feb. 24, 2015. (Sabah Arar/AFP/Getty Images)
The foreign minister said that “according to international law, Congress may not modify the terms of the agreement at any time as they claim, and if Congress adopts any measure to impede its implementation, it will have committed a material breach of U.S. obligations.”
“The authors may not fully understand that in international law, governments represent the entirety of their respective states, are responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, are required to fulfill the obligations they undertake with other states and may not invoke their internal law as justification for failure to perform their international obligations,” Zarif said.
“Change of administration does not in any way relieve the next administration from international obligations undertaken by its predecessor in a possible agreement about Iran’s peaceful nuclear program,” he said. “I wish to enlighten the authors that if the next administration revokes any agreement with the ‘stroke of a pen,’ as they boast, it will have simply committed a blatant violation of international law.”
The foreign minister referred to the senators as one of the “political pressure groups.”
“It is very interesting that while negotiations are still in progress and while no agreement has been reached, some political pressure groups are so afraid even of the prospect of an agreement that they resort to unconventional methods, unprecedented in diplomatic history,” Zarif said, according to the foreign ministry.
Almost half the Senate and nearly every Republican on Monday placed their name on the letter warning Iranian leaders that it’s the role of Congress to approve international treaties, and that any executive agreement reached could be undone by the next president.
“We will consider any agreement regarding your nuclear-weapons program that is not approved by the Congress as nothing more than an executive agreement between President Obama and Ayatollah Khamenei,” they wrote in the letter to Iran. “The next president could revoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen and future Congresses could modify the terms of the agreement at any time.”
President Barack Obama on Monday accused those who signed the letter of making “common cause” with Iranian hardliners.
“I think it’s somewhat ironic to see some members of Congress wanting to make common cause with the hardliners in Iran,” Obama said.
Vice President Joe Biden on Monday night issued a statement blasting the Republicans, saying the letter was “expressly designed to undercut a sitting president in the midst of sensitive international negotiations” and “beneath the dignity” of the Senate.
-
Nuclear Deterrence Is Relevant Again
Geopolitical Diary
March 13, 2015 | 01:11 GMT
Text Size
Print
U.S. Adm. William Gortney, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, warned Congress in written testimony Thursday of the threat posed by Russian bombers and missiles. Having written yesterday about the uncertainty in Moscow surrounding the status of Russian President Vladimir Putin, we deemed it worthwhile to consider Gortney's testimony more seriously than we might under other circumstances.
Gortney wrote: "Russian heavy bombers flew more out-of-area patrols in 2014 than in any year since the Cold War. We have also witnessed improved interoperability between Russian long-range aviation and other elements of the Russian military, including air and maritime intelligence collection platforms positioned to monitor NORAD responses." The patrols help to train Russian air crews, but some are "clearly intended to underscore Moscow's global reach and communicate its displeasure with Western policies, particularly with regard to Ukraine."
"Russia is progressing toward its goal of deploying long-range, conventionally-armed cruise missiles with ever increasing stand-off launch distances on its heavy bombers, submarines and surface combatants," Gortney said. "Should these trends continue, over time NORAD will face increased risk in our ability to defend North America against Russian air, maritime, and cruise missile threats."
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
We are again focusing on the changing concerns and rhetoric of all parties. Statements such as this would have been unthinkable a few years ago. While we understand that the head of NORAD is charged with monitoring the threats — and that may distort his outlook — and while we accept that testimony to Congress involves the important matter of the budget, it is still important to take this statement seriously.
The question is how seriously? The Russians still have their nuclear capability from the Cold War. We will assume that at least some, perhaps most, of the missiles and warheads have been maintained in operational condition. In any case, the Russians retain a nuclear intercontinental ballistic missile capability, and can strike the United States, with the only counter being a strike on Russia.
A Russian Foreign Ministry official reminded the world of this fact in a comment to Russian media outlet Interfax on Wednesday. Referencing Moscow's right to deploy nuclear weapons in Crimea, Mikhail Ulyanov, head of the ministry's Department on Arms Control, said, "I don't know if there are nuclear weapons there now. I don't know about any plans, but in principle Russia can do it."
It has long been taken for granted that the nuclear balance was not relevant, and indeed it hasn't been. During the Cold War, the most likely scenario for the use of nuclear weapons would have been that the Soviets would have attacked Germany, overwhelming it and moving toward the channel ports. With no conventional option for the United States in response, the United States would have lived up to its pledge to protect Europe with nuclear weapons.
There were other scenarios for nuclear war, including the spasmodic launching of all missiles in each arsenal. That was unlikely, however, because it invoked mutual assured destruction. It was never clear to us why a nuclear strike at the Soviet Union would have stopped a Soviet advance, or why it would not have triggered a spasmodic Russian strike. Indeed, it was never clear that the United States would have used nuclear weapons under any circumstances. Charles de Gaulle used to argue that the United States could not be relied on to risk American cities to protect Europe. He may well have been right.
For Russia's part, there were also discussions of using nuclear weapons to facilitate a conventional advance. Russian ground forces during the Cold War practiced intensively, and in fact still do occasionally, on operating in contaminated areas following a nuclear strike that would have severely weakened enemy positions. In such a case, of course, a conventional conflict would quickly have escalated by inviting a nuclear response from the United States.
The point of it all was that the Soviets could not be certain of what the Americans would do in response to a nuclear strike, so the U.S. nuclear threat served, along with other factors, to deter a Soviet invasion. The Russians are now concerned, rightly or wrongly, that a U.S. presence in Ukraine might threaten Russia's territorial integrity. The U.S. response — that the United States does not intend to insert massive force into Ukraine in the first place, and in the second place does not intend to invade Russia — does not soothe Russian war planners. They see the United States much as the United States sees Russia: unpredictable, ruthless and dangerous.
To assure themselves that they can deter the United States, particularly given their conventional weaknesses, they have several times publicly reminded the Americans that in engaging Russia, they are engaging a peer nuclear adversary. The various missions that Gortney has cited simply represent an extension of that capability.
We have come a long way to reach the point where Russia chooses to assert its strategic nuclear capability, and where the commander of NORAD regards this capability as a significant risk. But the point is that we have come far indeed in the past year. For the Russians, the overthrow of the government in Ukraine was a threat to their national security. What the Russians did in Ukraine is seen as a threat at least to U.S. interests.
In the old Cold War, both sides used their nuclear capability to check conventional conflicts. The Russians at this point appear to be at least calling attention to their nuclear capability. Unconnected to this, to be sure, is Putin's odd absence. In a world where nuclear threats are returning to prominence, the disappearance of one side's commander-in-chief is more worrisome than it would be at other times.
-
Why the ‘Nuclear Utopians’ Are Wrong
Unilaterally reducing or eliminating America’s nuclear arsenal will not make the world a safer place.
An unarmed Trident II D5 missile launches from USS Nevada. ENLARGE
An unarmed Trident II D5 missile launches from USS Nevada. Photo: Getty Images/Stocktrek Images
By
Keith B. Payne
March 15, 2015 6:17 p.m. ET
135 COMMENTS
A debate over the future of the U.S. nuclear arsenal is at a pivotal moment. Last month the Obama administration proposed a budget that calls for modernization of the “nuclear triad” of missiles, submarines and bombers. This is crucial because since the end of the Cold War the U.S. nuclear arsenal has been cut by 80% and after decades of neglect each leg of the triad is aging.
Nevertheless, the Defense Department’s $15.9 billion nuclear modernization budget for fiscal year 2016, up slightly from 2015, has met strong disapproval from analysts and others whom I call nuclear utopians. This group insists that the U.S. should delay or skip modernization, make further deep reductions in the U.S. nuclear arsenal, or even eliminate it.
By contrast, nuclear realists believe that, given the belligerence of Russia and China and their buildup of nuclear forces, prudence now demands that the U.S. modernize and make no further reductions below those already scheduled in the 2010 New Start Treaty. The congressional defense-budget hearings now under way will have far-reaching implications for U.S. national security and international order.
Nuclear utopians tend to believe that international cooperation, not nuclear deterrence, has prevented nuclear war since World War II. As Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. undersecretary of state for arms control, claimed in a speech last month: “We have been spared that fate because we created an intricate and essential system of treaties, laws and agreements.” The U.S. can lead the world toward nuclear reductions, the utopian thinking goes, by showing that Washington no longer relies on nuclear weapons and seeks no new capabilities.
This U.S. example, says George Perkovich of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, will “induce parallel” behavior in others. But if the U.S. attributes continuing value to nuclear weapons by maintaining its arsenal, says Stephen Young of the Union of Concerned Scientists, “other countries will be more inclined to seek” them. In short, the U.S. cannot expect others to forgo nuclear weapons if it retains them.
Nuclear realists respond that the U.S. already has cut its tactical nuclear weapons from a few thousand in 1991 to a few hundred today, while deployed strategic nuclear weapons have been cut to roughly 1,600 accountable weapons from an estimated 9,000 in 1992, with more reductions planned under New Start. Robert Joseph, a former undersecretary of state for arms control, notes that these reductions “appear to have had no moderating effect on Russian, Chinese or North Korean nuclear programs. Neither have U.S. reductions led to any effective strengthening of international nonproliferation efforts.”
Realists point out that foreign leaders base their decisions about nuclear weaponry largely on their perceived strategic needs, not in response to U.S. disarmament. Thus a close review of India by S. Paul Kapur, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, concluded that “Indian leaders do not seek to emulate U.S. nuclear behavior; they formulate policy based primarily on their assessment of the security threats facing India.”
The same self-interested calculation is true for those nuclear and aspiring nuclear states that are of security concern to the U.S. They seek nuclear weapons to coerce their neighbors, including U.S. allies, and to counter U.S. conventional forces to gain a free hand to press their regional military ambitions.
Moreover, many U.S. allies have given up the nuclear option because America protects them with a “nuclear umbrella.” Some allies, including the Japanese and South Koreans, have said that if the U.S. nuclear umbrella loses credibility, they may consider getting their own. Further U.S. reductions may thus inspire nuclear proliferation.
Nuclear utopians and realists also perceive international relations differently. Utopians see an orderly system that functions predictably and increasingly amicably. Based on this perception they make two confident predictions.
The first is that U.S. deterrence will work reliably even with a relatively small nuclear arsenal, or even nuclear zero. In 2010 the authors of an essay in Foreign Affairs predicted confidently that a U.S. capability to retaliate “against only ten cities” would be adequate to deter Russia.
A second prediction is that differences between the U.S. and Russia or China will be resolved without regard to nuclear threats or capabilities. The 2012 report by the Global Zero Commission claimed that, “The risk of nuclear confrontation between the United States and either Russia or China belongs to the past, not the future.”
Nuclear realists have no confidence in these predictions. Before the nuclear age, great powers periodically came into intense conflict, and deterrence relying on conventional forces failed to prevent catastrophic wars. Since 1945, however, a powerful U.S. nuclear arsenal appears to have had a decisive effect in deterring the outbreak of World War III and containing regional crises and conflicts. Further deep U.S. reductions now would likely increase the risks of war, possibly including nuclear war.
Today as for millennia, international relations are fluid, unpredictable and dangerous. Russia’s shocking aggression in Europe is a cold reminder of this reality. In January prominent Russian journalist Alexander Golts warned, “The West has forgotten how it had used nuclear deterrence to coexist with the Soviet Union. Now it will have to open up that playbook once more.”
Further erosion of the U.S. nuclear arsenal would take decades to reverse, create fear among key allies, and inspire foes to challenge an America that appears less able to deter conflicts, nuclear or otherwise, in the hard times ahead. These are the stakes in the current debate over nuclear modernization.
Mr. Payne is the director of the Graduate School of Defense and Strategic Studies at Missouri State University, and a former deputy assistant secretary of defense.
-
Second post
Obama’s Iran Jam
The White House wants the U.N. to vote but not the U.S. Congress.
March 15, 2015 6:44 p.m. ET
WSJ
One unfortunate side effect of last week’s letter from 47 GOP Senators to Iran is that it has helped the White House and its media friends obscure the far more important story—the degree to which President Obama is trying to prevent Congress from playing any meaningful role in assessing his one-man Iran deal.
Administration officials are huffing about Arkansas Senator Tom Cotton’s “unconstitutional” letter, but it’s only a letter and Congress has the right to free speech. If a mere letter from a minority of the Senate has the power to scuttle a deal with Iran, as Mr. Obama suggests it might, then maybe the deal is too fragile to be worth doing.
The real constitutional outlier here is Mr. Obama’s attempt to jam Congress so it’s irrelevant. That’s clear from a remarkable exchange of letters between Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker and White House chief of staff Denis McDonough.
Mr. Corker wrote March 12 asking the President to clarify comments by Vice President Joe Biden and others that an Iran deal could “take effect without congressional approval.” He also asked about media reports that “your administration is contemplating taking an agreement, or aspects of it, to the United Nations Security Council for a vote,” while threatening to veto legislation that would require Congress to vote.
Mr. McDonough replied for the President on the weekend in a letter that can only be described as an affront to Congress’s constitutional prerogatives. The chief of staff asked Mr. Corker to further delay his bipartisan legislation that would require a Senate vote within 60 days on any Iran deal. “The legislation would potentially prevent any deal from succeeding by suggesting that Congress must vote to ‘approve’ any deal, and by removing existing sanctions waiver authorities that have already been granted to the President,” he wrote.
So Mr. McDonough says Congress has “a role to play,” whatever that is, as long as it doesn’t interfere with what Mr. Obama wants. And once Congress grants Mr. Obama a waiver, it can never take that away even if Congress concludes that the President is misusing it.
The larger context here is that Mr. Obama is trying to make his Iran deal a fait accompli before Congress has any say. His plan is to strike a deal and submit it to the U.N. Security Council for approval, hemming in Congress. He’ll then waive some Iran sanctions on his own, while arguing that anyone who opposes the deal wants war.
Mr. McDonough’s letter includes a long list of previous agreements that “do not require congressional approval.” But the examples he cites are either minor accords or have had substantial bipartisan support. There is no precedent in the nuclear era for a President negotiating such a major arms-control accord without Congressional assent.
Mr. Obama might have avoided this showdown with Congress if he hadn’t treated America’s elected representatives as little more than a public nuisance. His minions have disclosed more details of the Iran talks to the media than to Congress. It’s little wonder that few Members of either party trust his negotiating skill or security judgment.
Mr. Corker has 65 supporters for his legislation, and he has already delayed it through March 24 at the request of Democrats. If he delays it any more, he risks conceding Mr. Obama’s desire to make Congress the irrelevant equivalent of the Iranian parliament.
-
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2015/03/how-barack-obama-undercut-bush-administrations-nuclear-negotiations-with-iran.php
-
It has been an Iranian tradition since 1979 to end Friday prayers with chants of "Death to America!"
In a purely rational world, that would be all one needed to know that Iran is not a reliable negotiating partner. Alas, we do not live in such a world. But there's more evidence. Iran, according to our State Department, has been the chief exporter of terrorism for the last three decades. It has worked closely with al-Qaida, facilitating its attacks on America and our allies. Most of the Sept. 11 hijackers traveled through Iran with the help of the Iranian government. U.S. judges have ruled that Iran was an accomplice in the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa and the Sept. 11 attacks. During the Iraq war, Iran was responsible for numerous American deaths.
And it's not like any of this is ancient history. Indeed, in 2012, the Treasury Department designated the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security as a major promoter of terrorism and violator of human rights.
Right now, via its brutal proxies, Iran is manipulating events on the ground in four Arab capitals -- Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa. Whatever success there has been against the Islamic State in Saddam Hussein's hometown of Tikrit has been thanks to Iranian advisors operating in Iraq and the Shiite Muslim militias they control. On Sunday's "Meet the Press," retired Adm. Mike Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said he fears Iran more than Islamic State.
So, obviously, the greatest villain in the world today is ... Sen. Tom Cotton (R-Ark.). He led the effort to get 46 other senators to sign a letter to the Iranian government explaining that any deal with Iran would require congressional approval.
The New York Daily News branded them all "TRAITORS" on its front page. Isn't it amazing how even vaguely questioning the patriotism of liberals is an outrage beyond the borders of acceptable debate, but branding 47 GOP senators "traitors" is treated as at least forgivable bombast? Retired Maj. Gen. Paul Eaton told the Washington Post they aren't traitors, they're merely "mutinous," revealing Eaton's shocking ignorance of our constitutional structure. Yes, Obama is the commander in chief of the armed forces, but he is not the commander in chief of the co-equal legislative branch.
Petitions are circling to have the senators carted off to jail under the Logan Act -- which bars unauthorized citizens from negotiating with foreign governments -- a ridiculously antiquated law that would never survive Supreme Court scrutiny today.
Moreover, if the Logan Act were taken seriously, many of the lions of the Democratic Party, including Ted Kennedy, Patrick Leahy, Nancy Pelosi and Robert Byrd, would have ended their careers behind bars. Why, John Kerry -- who recently denounced the Cotton letter as "unconstitutional" -- could show Cotton around the federal penitentiary, given Kerry's egregious meddling in Nicaragua during the Reagan administration.
Now, I should say that I think the senators made a mistake. They should have written an open letter to President Obama. The Iranians would still have gotten the message, but the White House and the punditocracy would have found it more difficult to rationalize their insane hissy fit. And contrary to countless outlets reporting that the Republicans "sent" this letter to the ayatollahs, they didn't send it anywhere. It was posted on Cotton's website.
The more important point here is that no one disagrees with the content of the letter because it is accurate. The White House had to admit that Cotton was right; the deal as it stands would be a "nonbinding" agreement. And, therefore, as the letter explains, "The next president could revoke such an executive agreement with the stroke of a pen."
(In fact, Obama did pretty much exactly that with an agreement struck between Israel and the United States about settlement growth in Palestinian territories.)
This premature admission is politically inconvenient for the Obama administration because it wants to get the United Nations to approve the deal, making it a fait accompli. It hoped to get to that point without anyone noticing.
The Cotton letter is not mutinous or traitorous or unconstitutional. It is inconvenient, and apparently being inconvenient in the age of Obama is all it takes to be called unpatriotic.
-
I recall not long ago when dissent was the highest form of patriotism. Or so we were told.
-
*Subject: **US Reveals Israel's Nuclear Program*
*_US Declassifies Document Revealing Israel's Nuclear Program_*
Obama revenge for Netanyahu's Congress talk? 1987 report on Israel's
top secret nuclear program released in unprecedented move.
By Ari Yashar, Matt Wanderman
First Publish: 3/25/2015, 8:00 PM
In a development that has largely been missed by mainstream media, the
Pentagon early last month quietly declassified a Department of Defense
top-secret document detailing Israel's nuclear program, a highly
covert topic that Israel has never formally announced to avoid a
regional nuclear arms race, and which the US until now has respected
by remaining silent.
But by publishing the declassified document from 1987, the */US
reportedly breached the silent agreement to keep quiet on Israel's
nuclear powers for the first time ever, detailing the nuclear program
in great depth./*
The timing of the revelation is highly suspect, given that it came
as*_tensions spiraled out of control_*
<http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/193109>between Prime
Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and US President Barack Obama ahead of
Netanyahu's March 3 address in Congress, in which he warned against
the dangers of Iran's nuclear program and how the deal being formed on
that program leaves the Islamic regime with nuclear breakout
capabilities.
Another highly suspicious aspect of the document is that while the
Pentagon saw fit to declassify sections on Israel's sensitive nuclear
program, it _kept sections on Italy, France, West Germany and other
NATO countries classified_, with those sections blocked out in the
document.
The 386-page report entitled "Critical Technological Assessment in
Israel and NATO Nations" gives a detailed description of how Israel
advanced its military technology and developed its nuclear
infrastructure and research in the 1970s and 1980s.
Israel is "developing the kind of codes which will enable them to make
hydrogen bombs. That is, codes which detail fission and fusion
processes on a microscopic and macroscopic level," reveals the report,
stating that in the 1980s Israelis were reaching the ability to create
bombs considered a thousand times more powerful than atom bombs.
The revelation marks a first in which the US published in a document a
description of how Israel attained hydrogen bombs.
The report also notes research laboratories in Israel "are equivalent
to our Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore and Oak Ridge National
Laboratories," the key labs in developing America's nuclear arsenal.
Israel's nuclear infrastructure is "an almost exact parallel of the
capability currently existing at our National Laboratories," it adds.
"As far as nuclear technology is concerned the Israelis are roughly
where the U.S. was in the fission weapon field in about 1955 to 1960,"
the report reveals, noting a time frame just after America tested its
first hydrogen bomb.
Institute for Defense Analysis, a federally funded agency operating
under the Pentagon, penned the report back in 1987.
Aside from nuclear capabilities, the report revealed Israel at the
time had "a totally integrated effort in systems development
throughout the nation," with electronic combat all in one "integrated
system, not separated systems for the Army, Navy and Air Force." It
even acknowledged that in some cases, Israeli military technology "is
more advanced than in the U.S."
Declassifying the report comes at a sensitive timing as noted above,
and given that the process to have it published was started three
years ago, that timing is seen as having been the choice of the
American government.
US journalist Grant Smith petitioned to have the report published
based on the Freedom of Information Act. Initially the Pentagon took
its time answering, leading Smith to sue, and a District Court judge
to order the Pentagon to respond to the request.
Smith, who heads the Institute for Research: Middle East Policy,
reportedly said he thinks this is the first time the US government has
officially confirmed that Israel is a nuclear power, a status that
Israel has long been widely known to have despite being undeclared.
-
Second post
http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2015/03/25/iran-refuses-to-sign-written-nuclear-deal/
-
http://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-militia-chief.../
The commander of the Basij militia of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said that “erasing Israel off the map” is “nonnegotiable,” according to an Israel Radio report Tuesday.
Get The Times of Israel's Daily Edition by email
and never miss our top stories Free Sign up!
Militia chief Mohammad Reza Naqdi also threatened Saudi Arabia, saying that the offensive it is leading in Yemen “will have a fate like the fate of Saddam Hussein.”
Naqdi’s comments were made public as Iran and six world powers prepared Tuesday to issue a general statement agreeing to continue nuclear negotiations in a new phase aimed at reaching a comprehensive accord by the end of June.
In 2014, Naqdi said Iran was stepping up efforts to arm West Bank Palestinians for battle against Israel, adding the move would lead to Israel’s annihilation, Iran’s Fars news agency reported.
“Arming the West Bank has started and weapons will be supplied to the people of this region,” Naqdi said.
“The Zionists should know that the next war won’t be confined to the present borders and the Mujahedeen will push them back,” he added. Naqdi claimed that much of Hamas’s arsenal, training and technical knowhow in the summer conflict with Israel was supplied by Iran.
The Basij is a religious volunteer force established in 1979 by the country’s revolutionary leaders, and has served as a moral police and to suppress dissent.
In January, a draft law that would give greater powers to the Basij to enforce women’s compulsory wearing of the veil was ruled unconstitutional.
The force holds annual maneuvers, sometimes with regular Iran units.
Jonathan Beck and AFP contributed to this report.
-
In the Iran Talks, Does a Missed Deadline Matter?
Geopolitical Diary
April 1, 2015 | 22:11 GMT
Text Size
Print
The Obama administration has slipped past self-imposed deadlines and minced words over red lines before. Although certainly an embarrassment for the White House, another missed deadline in the seemingly never-ending Iran nuclear negotiations — which stretched beyond the latest deadline of March 31 — may not matter much in the end.
From Iran's point of view, it was a deadline to be exploited, not one to fret over. Iranian leaders, including Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, had expressed misgivings about a framework agreement, insisting that the deal is not done until all core issues are resolved in a final deal. The White House imposed the March deadline to prove to Congress that enough progress was being made to hold off on sanctions. Still, a dodged deadline and a diluted progress report are unlikely to calm dissenters in Congress. Even if a bill calling for additional sanctions in the event of a violation of an agreement makes its way through Congress, it will be vetoed in the Oval Office. Congress overturning that veto is a less likely prospect.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Ironically, the U.S. congressmen vehemently threatening more sanctions are working in Iran's favor in this stage of the negotiating process. The more effort the U.S. negotiating team has to put into keeping Iran at the table, the more leverage Iran has in the talks. So, as the plethora of leaks on Monday all pointed toward the drafting of an agreement, Tehran strategically dropped a bombshell at the last minute. It said that while it would agree to reduce the number of operational centrifuges to 6,000 — going against the supreme leader's earlier demand for at least 10,000 centrifuges to remain in operation — it would pull back on an earlier concession to ship its low-enriched nuclear fuel to Russia.
This is a classic negotiating tactic: One party throws up a flare, panic ensues and once all sides return to the table, any further concessions from the instigator appear that much more generous. The next three months will be filled with such twists as the window for negotiations narrows.
In Iran's neighborhood, states like Saudi Arabia do not have the luxury of betting against the United States and Iran and have to prepare for the worst. The developing U.S.-Iranian relationship is what has driven Saudi Arabia into action in leading its Sunni allies against Iran across multiple fronts, with Yemen now in the spotlight.
Israel may also be upset at the United States for negotiating what it considers a bad deal with Iran, but it cannot deny that the upsurge in Sunni determination to contain Iran is a good thing. For example, Sudan's recruitment into the Saudi-led alliance had been months in the making, but the end result is that Iran has lost a critical conduit to supply arms to militant groups like Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad through supply routes that run from Port Sudan up through the Sinai Peninsula to the Gaza Strip. So long as Hamas struggles to replenish its weapons, including long-range rocket components, Israel has less to worry about.
Egypt is another beneficiary of the Saudi-led "Decisive Storm" operation. The White House never abandoned its close relationship with Cairo, but it became entangled politically by branding the deposal of former Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi a coup and demanding steps toward democracy before resuming aid. While the United States was trying to maintain its political correctness, Russia took the opportunity to court Egypt with military and energy deals, trying to broadcast the message that Washington's role had been filled in the Middle East.
Cairo simply used the attention from Moscow to bargain with Washington, waiting for the politics to become conducive enough to normalize relations with the United States with the understanding that a relationship with Washington would matter much more than one with Moscow. Egypt has yet to reschedule its elections, yet its participation in the Yemen operation gave the White House the justification it needed to show that Cairo is still a key Arab ally worthy of a dozen F-16 fighter jets that are now being delivered.
Much will be made of a missed deadline in Lausanne. Doubts will be cast over a potential agreement. But it is important to keep some perspective. This deadline over an interim agreement did not mean much to Iran in the first place. Progress, however uneven, is being made in the nuclear negotiations, and a U.S.-Iranian understanding is already having reverberations across the region.
-
second post
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/416309/shadow-munich-haunts-iran-negotiations-victor-davis-hanson
-
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/04/iran-deal-kerry-flawed-negotiations-close-116623_full.html#.VR3hay5UWAi
-
Share
Chronology: The Evolution of an Iranian Nuclear Deal
Analysis
April 3, 2015 | 08:59 GMT
Print
Text Size
Iranian women sitting in a car flash the "V for Victory" sign as they celebrate on Valiasr street in northern Tehran, April 2. (ATTA KENARE/AFP/Getty Images)
Analysis
Editor's Note: In light of the announcement that Iran and the six world powers reached a framework deal after double overtime negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, this chronology includes some of the pivotal analyses identifying the steps toward an eventual accord. The April 2 deal paves the way for a binding agreement in three months, once the finer details have been worked out.
Kicking Over the Table in the Middle East
April 2, 2015: The United States and Iran, along with other members of the Western negotiating coalition, reached an agreement whose end point will be Iran's monitored abandonment of any ambition to build nuclear weapons, coupled with the end of sanctions on Iran's economy. It is not a final agreement. That will take until at least June 30. There are also powerful forces in Iran and the United States that oppose the agreement and might undermine it. And in the end, neither side is certain to live up the deal. Nevertheless, there has been an agreement between the Great Satan and a charter member of the Axis of Evil, and that matters. But it matters less for what it says about Iran's nuclear program, or economic sanctions, than for how it affects the regional balance of power, a subject we wrote on in this week's Geopolitical Weekly.
Iran Reaches an Agreement With the West
April 2, 2015: After double overtime negotiations in Lausanne, Iran and the six world powers announced a framework deal that largely covers the key sticking points of a nuclear agreement, leaving the technical details to be worked out over the next three months. Though there are several critical ambiguities in the joint statement, on the whole this statement is highly favorable to Iran. The careful wording was designed to enable Iranian President Hassan Rouhani to sell this deal at home and could help stave off U.S. congressional dissent in the months leading up to the June 30 deadline — though this deal will not depend on congressional approval for implementation.
Washington Turns Mistrust Into a Virtue in Negotiations
Feb. 4, 2015: More than two weeks after Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif took a 15-minute stroll in Geneva with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, Iran's hard-line journalists and politicians are still lambasting the foreign minister for the seemingly innocuous move. As parliament grilled him, Zarif defended himself by arguing he had just taken a midnight flight followed by five hours of intense negotiations and needed fresh air. His opponents, however, charged him with "trampling the blood of martyrs" and of displaying a level of intimacy appropriate only for lovers or "partners of international thievery."
A Financially Stressed Rouhani Takes on His Opponents
Jan. 13, 2015: The coming week will be an important one for Iran's relations with the United States. With just six weeks to go before the deadline in the nuclear negotiations, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif will travel to Geneva to meet with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on Jan. 14. The two will discuss ways to speed up the negotiating process, and then U.S. and Iranian negotiating teams will spend Jan. 15-17 working out technical details of the agreement. Finally, on Jan. 18, Iran will meet with the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany to round out this stage of the negotiation.
Iran's Presidential Camp Goes on the Offensive
Jan. 5, 2015: Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has managed to undermine his right-wing opponents, who primarily are led by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. This progress could mature into a more sustainable lead for Rouhani's pragmatic conservatives, provided the president can demonstrate that his policy of negotiating with the United States has strengthened the Islamic republic. If Rouhani fails to show progress, his present gains will dissipate, and Iran's conservatives could also resurge.
Stratfor's 2015 Annual Forecast
Jan. 12, 2015: An understanding between Washington and Tehran will endure this year and Iran will maintain limits on enrichment activity while the United States gradually eases sanctions, relying principally on executive power to do so. Lower oil prices will constrain Iran, as will the prospect of Iran becoming a more politically viable energy alternative to Russia. These limits will help underpin this negotiation. However, the political complexities surrounding this process, along with technical constraints, mean the Iranian energy sector is unlikely to see a revival this year that significantly increases the amount of Iranian oil on the market.
The U.S.-Iran Talks Transcend the Nuclear Issue
Nov. 24, 2014: The second deadline to reach a final agreement on Iran's controversial nuclear program has expired, with both Iran and the six world powers agreeing on a second extension that gives them seven months to reach a comprehensive agreement. The United States and Iran were not expected to reach a final agreement by the Nov. 24 deadline. What is more important is that the negotiations have reached a point where both sides have an interest in continuing discussions until they reach a settlement. In the long run, the nuclear issue is not as important for either side as the regional dynamics are.
Stratfor's Third-Quarter Forecast
July 8, 2014: Iran and Western powers face a looming deadline to either reach a negotiated settlement on Iran's nuclear program or agree to continue negotiations. We do not expect Iran and the P-5+1 group (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) to reach a final agreement by the initial deadline of July 20, but both sides will demonstrate enough progress in the negotiations to continue to work toward a comprehensive settlement. U.S. President Barack Obama will rely on his executive authority to reduce sanctions pressure on Iran, including relaxing enforcement of current trade and financial sanctions, in order to help Tehran's negotiating team maintain enough leeway within Iran to continue talks. Iranian energy exports could grow slowly toward the end of the quarter as Iran and its large Asian customers take advantage of the minor sanctions relief, but we still do not expect a wholesale lifting of oil sanctions on Iran or significant Western investment into Iran's energy sector this year.
In Nuclear Talks, Iran Resists Russian Advances
July 2, 2014: As foreign diplomats arrived in Vienna on July 2 for the sixth round of talks between representatives of Iran and P-5+1 countries, key sticking points remained unresolved. Ahead of the July 20 deadline, the most important topics are the future of Iran's uranium enrichment program, concerns about the heavy-water plutonium reactor in Arak and the extent to which the United States and the European Union will roll back sanctions. The P-5+1 is composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China and Germany, but it is Russia that will be the key player to watch as the talks progress. Moscow wants to improve its relationship with Iran to undermine the potential new balance of power in the Middle East, a balance that would free up U.S. resources and allow Washington to counter Russian influence. While recent Russian outreaches to the Iranians are unlikely to prevent a transitional agreement with Washington in the coming weeks, Iran will continue to exploit the U.S.-Russia split to enhance its negotiating position against the United States.
The Meaning of Iran
Jan. 29, 2014: The nuclear talks with Iran have two meanings. For those highly skeptical of the process the talks are, or should be, about nuclear weapons — and about preventing Iran from obtaining them. For the Obama administration, which is committed to the process, the nuclear issue is partly a pretext, something that must be finessed, in order to reach a strategic understanding with Iran.
Could a Detente With the U.S. Change Iran?
Jan. 23, 2014: The preliminary agreement over Iran's nuclear program is nearing implementation. But for all that has been said about how a rapprochement will affect bilateral ties, it is worth noting how it will affect each country individually. Since September, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has often said he wants to repair ties with the United States. This is partly because the stakes are higher for the Islamic republic, which could change fundamentally if Tehran normalized relations with Washington.
Strategic Reversal: The United States, Iran and the Middle East
Jan. 5, 2014: Efforts to achieve a comprehensive agreement between Iran and the United States will remain at center stage in 2014. Stratfor founder and Chairman George Friedman predicted this outcome in Chapter 7 of his 2011 book, The Next Decade. To give our subscribers a more comprehensive look at the geopolitical realities that produced the current state of affairs and that will continue to steer the detente process, Stratfor republishes that chapter in its entirety.
Detainees as a Bargaining Chip in U.S.-Iranian Negotiations
Dec. 19, 2013: The resurfacing in Iranian and U.S. media of the case of missing U.S. citizen Robert Levinson offers a small but revealing snapshot of the ongoing thaw of ties between Washington and Tehran. In a news conference Dec. 17, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham reiterated Iran's claim that Levinson is no longer in the country. Afkham went on to mention Iran's concern over Iranian detainees in the United States — a sign that Tehran may be pursuing a prisoner swap with Washington as part of broader negotiations.
Next Steps for the U.S.-Iran Deal
Nov. 25, 2013: What was unthinkable for many people over many years happened in the early hours of Nov. 24 in Geneva: The United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran struck a deal. After a decadelong struggle, the two reached an accord that seeks to ensure that Iran's nuclear program remains a civilian one. It is a preliminary deal, and both sides face months of work to batten down domestic opposition, build convincing mechanisms to assure compliance and unthread complicated global sanctions.
U.S., Iran: Why They Will Now Likely Negotiate
Aug. 2, 2013: Diplomatic relations between Tehran and Washington will improve after Iran's new president assumes office Aug. 4, ending months of speculation over whether Iran and Washington will find accommodation in their nuclear standoff. In fact, in recent weeks both sides have expressed interest in resuming bilateral nuclear talks. Those talks never took place simply because Iran never had to participate in them. Its economy was in decent shape despite the sanctions, its regional geopolitical position had been secure and its domestic political environment was in disarray. But now things are different. Tehran is devoting an unsustainable amount of resources to Syrian President Bashar al Assad in his fight against the Syrian rebellion. And while economic sanctions have not yet forced Iran to the negotiating table, Iranian leaders will likely choose to engage the United States voluntarily to forestall further economic decline. The inauguration of President-elect Hassan Rouhani provides an ideal opportunity for them to do so.
Iran Lays the Groundwork for Negotiations
Nov. 6, 2012: In a press conference Saturday night, Iranian lawmaker Mohammad Hassan Asafari spoke about Tehran's willingness to suspend its efforts to enrich uranium to 20 percent. Saudi-owned Al Arabiya apparently misquoted Asafari, reporting that Iran had suspended uranium enrichment as a goodwill gesture ahead of the yet-to-be-scheduled resumption of the P-5+1 (the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany) nuclear talks with Iran. On Sunday, however, Asafari clarified on the English-language website of Iran's state-owned Press TV that the country had in fact not halted 20 percent enrichment, but he maintained that Tehran — in exchange for an easing of economic sanctions — would accept enriched uranium from abroad to supply its five-megawatt Tehran Research Reactor for civilian use.
Timing Is Critical for Nuclear Talks
Oct. 23, 2012: Emerging conditions have created a framework for serious negotiations to develop between Iran and the United States. The dialogue would not only address the issue of Iran's nuclear program but also include broader issues, such as Syria and Afghanistan, and the core issue of what level of recognition the United States is willing to give to an Iranian sphere of influence in the region. Over the past several weeks, Stratfor has carefully tracked the signs pointing to this dialogue as Iran — using Turkey as a facilitator — has attempted to feel out a dialogue with Washington. The pieces appear to be falling in place, but there is still the matter of getting past the U.S. election before any bold moves are attempted by either side to carry the conversation forward.
Iran's Nuclear Program and Its Nuclear Option
Nov. 8, 2011: Details and specifics of the forthcoming International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) report on the Iranian nuclear program continued to leak out over the weekend, with the formal report expected later this week. The growing rhetoric about Iran — including talk from certain Israeli and American corners about an air campaign against Iran — had already begun to intensify in anticipation of the report, which will say more explicitly than previous IAEA assessments that Iran is indeed actively pursuing a nuclear weaponization program.
Thinking About the Unthinkable: A U.S.-Iranian Deal
March 1, 2010: The United States apparently has reached the point where it must either accept that Iran will develop nuclear weapons at some point if it wishes, or take military action to prevent this. There is a third strategy, however: Washington can seek to redefine the Iranian question. As we have no idea what leaders on either side are thinking, exploring this represents an exercise in geopolitical theory. Let's begin with the two apparent stark choices.
-
http://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-could-destroy-irans-electric-network/#ixzz3WJ77oU58
-
WASHINGTON — Negotiators at the nuclear talks in Switzerland emerged from marathon talks on Thursday with a surprisingly detailed outline of the agreement they now must work to finalize by the end of June.
But one problem is that there are two versions.
The only joint document issued publicly was a statement from Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran’s foreign minister, and Federica Mogherini, the European Union foreign policy chief, that was all of seven paragraphs.
The statement listed about a dozen “parameters” that are to guide the next three months of talks, including the commitment that Iran’s Natanz installation will be the only location at which uranium is enriched during the life of the agreement.
But the United States and Iran have also made public more detailed accounts of their agreements in Lausanne, and those accounts underscore their expectations for what the final accord should say.
A careful review shows that there is considerable overlap between the two accounts, but also some noteworthy differences — which have raised the question of whether the two sides are entirely on the same page, especially on the question of how quickly sanctions are to be removed. The American and Iranian statements also do not clarify some critical issues, such as precisely what sort of research Iran will be allowed to undertake on advanced centrifuges during the first 10 years of the accord.
“This is just a work in progress, and those differences in fact sheets indicate the challenges ahead,” said Olli Heinonen, the former deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Obama administration officials insist that there is no dispute on what was agreed behind closed doors. But to avoid time-consuming deliberations on what would be said publicly, the two sides decided during Wednesday’s all-night discussions that each would issue its own statement.
American officials acknowledge that they did not inform the Iranians in advance of all the “parameters” the United States would make public in an effort to lock in progress made so far, as well as to strengthen the White House’s case against any move by members of Congress to impose more sanctions against Iran.
“We talked to them and told them that we would have to say some things,” said a senior administration official who could not be identified under the protocol for briefing reporters. “We didn’t show them the paper. We didn’t show them the whole list.”
The official acknowledged that it was “understood that we had different narratives, but we wouldn’t contradict each other.”
No sooner were the negotiations over on Thursday, however, than Mr. Zarif posted to Twitter a message that dismissed the five-page set of American parameters as “spin.”
In an appearance on Iranian state television Saturday, Mr. Zarif kept up that refrain, saying that Iran had formally complained to Secretary of State John Kerry that the measures listed in the American statement were “in contradiction” to what had actually been accepted in Lausanne.
Mr. Zarif, however, did not challenge any nuclear provisions in the American document. Instead, he complained that the paper had been drawn up under Israeli and congressional pressure, and he restated Iran’s insistence on fast sanctions relief, including the need to “terminate,” not just suspend, European Union sanctions.
David Albright, the president of the Institute for Science and International Security and an expert who has closely monitored the nuclear talks, said that Mr. Zarif and President Hassan Rouhani of Iran may be engaged in their own spin to camouflage the significance of the concessions they made.
“Iran conceded a considerable amount in this deal, and Zarif and Rouhani may want to break the news back home slowly,” Mr. Albright said.
Assuming that was the Iranians’ motivation, Mr. Albright noted a potential downside to the tactics.
“When negotiations resume, Iran may believe it created additional room to backtrack on its commitments, assuming the U.S. is right about what was agreed in the room,” he added.
A review of the dueling American and Iranian statements show that they differ in some important respects. The American statement says that Iran has agreed to shrink its stockpile of uranium to 300 kilograms, a commitment the Iranian statement does not mention.
The Iranian statement emphasizes that nuclear cooperation between Iran and the six world powers that negotiated the agreement will grow, including in the construction of nuclear power plants, research reactors and the use of isotopes for medical research. That potential cooperation is not mentioned in the American statement.
The American statement says that Iran will be barred from using its advanced centrifuges to produce uranium for at least 10 years. Before those 10 years are up, Iran will be able to conduct some “limited” research on the centrifuges. The Iranian version omits the word “limited.”
In other cases, the two sides agree on some measures, but explain the implications very differently. In an important compromise, Iran will be allowed to convert its Fordo underground nuclear installation to a science and technology center.
In explaining this provision, the American statement notes that almost two-thirds of the centrifuges at Fordo will be removed and that none of those that remain will be used to enrich uranium for 15 years. The provision, Obama administration officials assert, carries no serious risk for the United States but will enable the Iranians to save face.
The Iranian statement stresses that the deal means that more than 1,000 of the centrifuges will be kept there, though it suggests only several hundred will be in operation to produce industrial or medical isotopes. As reported by Iranian journalists, Abbas Araqchi, the country’s deputy foreign minister, said that the modifications made at the Fordo installation could be rapidly reversed if the United States did not hold up its end of the deal.
The starkest differences between the American and Iranians accounts concern the pace at which punishing economic sanctions against Iran are to be removed. The Iranian text says that when the agreement is implemented, the sanctions will “immediately” be canceled.
American officials have described sanctions relief as more of a step-by-step process tied to Iranian efforts to carry out the accord.
“We fully expected them to emphasize things that are helpful in terms of selling this at home,” said a second Obama administration official, who was granted anonymity to discuss the deliberations. “We believe that everything in our document will not need to be renegotiated.”
But with three months of hard bargaining ahead, some experts worry that the lack of an agreed-upon, detailed public framework can only complicate the negotiations — and may even invite the Iranians to try to relitigate the terms of the Lausanne deal.
“I think it is a troubling development,” said Ray Takeyh, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, who has been critical of the Obama administration’s handling of the talks. “They will exploit all ambiguities with creative interpretations.”
-
http://modernsurvivalblog.com/current-events-economics-politics/emp-weapons/
-
Baraq admits Iran goes nuke in 13 years.
-
The Iran Deal and Its Consequences
Mixing shrewd diplomacy with defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has turned the negotiation on its head.
By Henry Kissinger And George P. Shultz
Updated April 7, 2015 7:38 p.m. ET
508 COMMENTS
The announced framework for an agreement on Iran’s nuclear program has the potential to generate a seminal national debate. Advocates exult over the nuclear constraints it would impose on Iran. Critics question the verifiability of these constraints and their longer-term impact on regional and world stability. The historic significance of the agreement and indeed its sustainability depend on whether these emotions, valid by themselves, can be reconciled.
Debate regarding technical details of the deal has thus far inhibited the soul-searching necessary regarding its deeper implications. For 20 years, three presidents of both major parties proclaimed that an Iranian nuclear weapon was contrary to American and global interests—and that they were prepared to use force to prevent it. Yet negotiations that began 12 years ago as an international effort to prevent an Iranian capability to develop a nuclear arsenal are ending with an agreement that concedes this very capability, albeit short of its full capacity in the first 10 years.
Opinion Journal Video
Editorial Page Editor Paul Gigot on President Obama’s preference to cut Congress out of the Iran nuclear deal, and the implications for future Congresses. Photo credit: Getty Images.
Mixing shrewd diplomacy with open defiance of U.N. resolutions, Iran has gradually turned the negotiation on its head. Iran’s centrifuges have multiplied from about 100 at the beginning of the negotiation to almost 20,000 today. The threat of war now constrains the West more than Iran. While Iran treated the mere fact of its willingness to negotiate as a concession, the West has felt compelled to break every deadlock with a new proposal. In the process, the Iranian program has reached a point officially described as being within two to three months of building a nuclear weapon. Under the proposed agreement, for 10 years Iran will never be further than one year from a nuclear weapon and, after a decade, will be significantly closer.
Inspections and Enforcement
The president deserves respect for the commitment with which he has pursued the objective of reducing nuclear peril, as does Secretary of State John Kerry for the persistence, patience and ingenuity with which he has striven to impose significant constraints on Iran’s nuclear program.
Progress has been made on shrinking the size of Iran’s enriched stockpile, confining the enrichment of uranium to one facility, and limiting aspects of the enrichment process. Still, the ultimate significance of the framework will depend on its verifiability and enforceability.
Negotiating the final agreement will be extremely challenging. For one thing, no official text has yet been published. The so-called framework represents a unilateral American interpretation. Some of its clauses have been dismissed by the principal Iranian negotiator as “spin.” A joint EU-Iran statement differs in important respects, especially with regard to the lifting of sanctions and permitted research and development.
Comparable ambiguities apply to the one-year window for a presumed Iranian breakout. Emerging at a relatively late stage in the negotiation, this concept replaced the previous baseline—that Iran might be permitted a technical capacity compatible with a plausible civilian nuclear program. The new approach complicates verification and makes it more political because of the vagueness of the criteria.
Under the new approach, Iran permanently gives up none of its equipment, facilities or fissile product to achieve the proposed constraints. It only places them under temporary restriction and safeguard—amounting in many cases to a seal at the door of a depot or periodic visits by inspectors to declared sites. The physical magnitude of the effort is daunting. Is the International Atomic Energy Agency technically, and in terms of human resources, up to so complex and vast an assignment?
In a large country with multiple facilities and ample experience in nuclear concealment, violations will be inherently difficult to detect. Devising theoretical models of inspection is one thing. Enforcing compliance, week after week, despite competing international crises and domestic distractions, is another. Any report of a violation is likely to prompt debate over its significance—or even calls for new talks with Tehran to explore the issue. The experience of Iran’s work on a heavy-water reactor during the “interim agreement” period—when suspect activity was identified but played down in the interest of a positive negotiating atmosphere—is not encouraging.
Compounding the difficulty is the unlikelihood that breakout will be a clear-cut event. More likely it will occur, if it does, via the gradual accumulation of ambiguous evasions.
When inevitable disagreements arise over the scope and intrusiveness of inspections, on what criteria are we prepared to insist and up to what point? If evidence is imperfect, who bears the burden of proof? What process will be followed to resolve the matter swiftly?
The agreement’s primary enforcement mechanism, the threat of renewed sanctions, emphasizes a broad-based asymmetry, which provides Iran permanent relief from sanctions in exchange for temporary restraints on Iranian conduct. Undertaking the “snap-back” of sanctions is unlikely to be as clear or as automatic as the phrase implies. Iran is in a position to violate the agreement by executive decision. Restoring the most effective sanctions will require coordinated international action. In countries that had reluctantly joined in previous rounds, the demands of public and commercial opinion will militate against automatic or even prompt “snap-back.” If the follow-on process does not unambiguously define the term, an attempt to reimpose sanctions risks primarily isolating America, not Iran.
The gradual expiration of the framework agreement, beginning in a decade, will enable Iran to become a significant nuclear, industrial and military power after that time—in the scope and sophistication of its nuclear program and its latent capacity to weaponize at a time of its choosing. Limits on Iran’s research and development have not been publicly disclosed (or perhaps agreed). Therefore Iran will be in a position to bolster its advanced nuclear technology during the period of the agreement and rapidly deploy more advanced centrifuges—of at least five times the capacity of the current model—after the agreement expires or is broken.
The follow-on negotiations must carefully address a number of key issues, including the mechanism for reducing Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium from 10,000 to 300 kilograms, the scale of uranium enrichment after 10 years, and the IAEA’s concerns regarding previous Iranian weapons efforts. The ability to resolve these and similar issues should determine the decision over whether or when the U.S. might still walk away from the negotiations.
The Framework Agreement and Long-Term Deterrence
Even when these issues are resolved, another set of problems emerges because the negotiating process has created its own realities. The interim agreement accepted Iranian enrichment; the new agreement makes it an integral part of the architecture. For the U.S., a decade-long restriction on Iran’s nuclear capacity is a possibly hopeful interlude. For Iran’s neighbors—who perceive their imperatives in terms of millennial rivalries—it is a dangerous prelude to an even more dangerous permanent fact of life. Some of the chief actors in the Middle East are likely to view the U.S. as willing to concede a nuclear military capability to the country they consider their principal threat. Several will insist on at least an equivalent capability. Saudi Arabia has signaled that it will enter the lists; others are likely to follow. In that sense, the implications of the negotiation are irreversible.
If the Middle East is “proliferated” and becomes host to a plethora of nuclear-threshold states, several in mortal rivalry with each other, on what concept of nuclear deterrence or strategic stability will international security be based? Traditional theories of deterrence assumed a series of bilateral equations. Do we now envision an interlocking series of rivalries, with each new nuclear program counterbalancing others in the region?
Previous thinking on nuclear strategy also assumed the existence of stable state actors. Among the original nuclear powers, geographic distances and the relatively large size of programs combined with moral revulsion to make surprise attack all but inconceivable. How will these doctrines translate into a region where sponsorship of nonstate proxies is common, the state structure is under assault, and death on behalf of jihad is a kind of fulfillment?
Some have suggested the U.S. can dissuade Iran’s neighbors from developing individual deterrent capacities by extending an American nuclear umbrella to them. But how will these guarantees be defined? What factors will govern their implementation? Are the guarantees extended against the use of nuclear weapons—or against any military attack, conventional or nuclear? Is it the domination by Iran that we oppose or the method for achieving it? What if nuclear weapons are employed as psychological blackmail? And how will such guarantees be expressed, or reconciled with public opinion and constitutional practices?
Regional Order
For some, the greatest value in an agreement lies in the prospect of an end, or at least a moderation, of Iran’s 3½ decades of militant hostility to the West and established international institutions, and an opportunity to draw Iran into an effort to stabilize the Middle East. Having both served in government during a period of American-Iranian strategic alignment and experienced its benefits for both countries as well as the Middle East, we would greatly welcome such an outcome. Iran is a significant national state with a historic culture, a fierce national identity, and a relatively youthful, educated population; its re-emergence as a partner would be a consequential event.
But partnership in what task? Cooperation is not an exercise in good feeling; it presupposes congruent definitions of stability. There exists no current evidence that Iran and the U.S. are remotely near such an understanding. Even while combating common enemies, such as ISIS, Iran has declined to embrace common objectives. Iran’s representatives (including its Supreme Leader) continue to profess a revolutionary anti-Western concept of international order; domestically, some senior Iranians describe nuclear negotiations as a form of jihad by other means.
The final stages of the nuclear talks have coincided with Iran’s intensified efforts to expand and entrench its power in neighboring states. Iranian or Iranian client forces are now the pre-eminent military or political element in multiple Arab countries, operating beyond the control of national authorities. With the recent addition of Yemen as a battlefield, Tehran occupies positions along all of the Middle East’s strategic waterways and encircles archrival Saudi Arabia, an American ally. Unless political restraint is linked to nuclear restraint, an agreement freeing Iran from sanctions risks empowering Iran’s hegemonic efforts.
Some have argued that these concerns are secondary, since the nuclear deal is a way station toward the eventual domestic transformation of Iran. But what gives us the confidence that we will prove more astute at predicting Iran’s domestic course than Vietnam’s, Afghanistan’s, Iraq’s, Syria’s, Egypt’s or Libya’s?
Absent the linkage between nuclear and political restraint, America’s traditional allies will conclude that the U.S. has traded temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony. They will increasingly look to create their own nuclear balances and, if necessary, call in other powers to sustain their integrity. Does America still hope to arrest the region’s trends toward sectarian upheaval, state collapse and the disequilibrium of power tilting toward Tehran, or do we now accept this as an irremediable aspect of the regional balance?
Some advocates have suggested that the agreement can serve as a way to dissociate America from Middle East conflicts, culminating in the military retreat from the region initiated by the current administration. As Sunni states gear up to resist a new Shiite empire, the opposite is likely to be the case. The Middle East will not stabilize itself, nor will a balance of power naturally assert itself out of Iranian-Sunni competition. (Even if that were our aim, traditional balance of power theory suggests the need to bolster the weaker side, not the rising or expanding power.) Beyond stability, it is in America’s strategic interest to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war and its catastrophic consequences. Nuclear arms must not be permitted to turn into conventional weapons. The passions of the region allied with weapons of mass destruction may impel deepening American involvement.
If the world is to be spared even worse turmoil, the U.S. must develop a strategic doctrine for the region. Stability requires an active American role. For Iran to be a valuable member of the international community, the prerequisite is that it accepts restraint on its ability to destabilize the Middle East and challenge the broader international order.
Until clarity on an American strategic political concept is reached, the projected nuclear agreement will reinforce, not resolve, the world’s challenges in the region. Rather than enabling American disengagement from the Middle East, the nuclear framework is more likely to necessitate deepening involvement there—on complex new terms. History will not do our work for us; it helps only those who seek to help themselves.
Messrs. Kissinger and Shultz are former secretaries of state.
Popular on WSJ
-
http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/12017#.VSYFBS5UWAg
http://www.newenglishreview.org/blog_direct_link.cfm/blog_id/38837/
===========================================
New footage from the Israeli Navy showcases the most advanced submarine in the IDF's arsenal: the Dolphin-class INS Tanin (Crocodile). The nuclear-capable submarine boasts an array of sophisticated weaponry, as well as the latest in intelligence-gathering technology. It stands at a whopping 68 meters long, compared to 57.3 meters on average for other submarines. "The submarine will receive more long-term missions, and for a greater amount of time, than submarines" the IDF possesses, one navy officer explained, adding that as a result the Navy had "extended by several days our ability to operate silently and secretly in enemy territory." The submarine's commander, Lieutenant Colonel "G", echoed those sentiments, adding that as a result of the sensitive nature of the missions it will be undertaking only the most elite navy personnel will be operating it. "Even the smallest mistake by a soldier could foil the mission in the best-case scenario, and in the worst case reveal the submarine and leave it vulnerable to attack," he said.
Sailors worked closely with the defense ministry, intelligence agencies, the air force and other elite IDF units, he added. Commander of Haifa naval base General David Salamah explained the importance of Israel's submarine fleet to national security. Israel's submarines regularly operate "deep within enemy territory", he noted. "We are talking about a major upgrade to the navy and the entire IDF, in the face of the challenges posed to the State of Israel."
==============================================
http://modernsurvivalblog.com/current-events-economics-politics/emp-weapons/
http://allenwestrepublic.com/2015/03/20/report-iran-prepared-for-nuclear-emp-attack-on-us/
http://news.yahoo.com/us-aerospace-command-moving-comms-gear-back-cold-015320113.html
-
y
Bret Stephens
April 13, 2015 7:33 p.m. ET
137 COMMENTS
Sometime in the 1990s I began to understand the Clinton way of lying, and why it was so successful. To you and me, the Clinton lies were statements demonstrably at variance with the truth, and therefore wrong and shameful. But to the initiated they were an invitation to an intoxicating secret knowledge.
What was this knowledge? That the lying was for the greater good, usually to fend off some form of Republican malevolence. What was so intoxicating? That the initiated were smart enough to see through it all. Why be scandalized when they could be amused? Why moralize when they could collude?
It always works. We are hardly a month past Hillary Clinton’s Server-gate press conference, in which she served up whoppers faster than a Burger King burger flipper—lies large and small, venial and potentially criminal, and all of them quickly found out. Emails to Bill, who never emails? The convenience of one device, despite having more than one device?
It doesn’t matter. Now Mrs. Clinton is running for president, and only a simpleton would fail to appreciate that the higher mendacity is a recommendation for the highest office. In the right hands, the thinking goes, lying can be a positive good—as political moisturizer and diplomatic lubricant.
***
What the Clintons pioneered—the brazen lie, coyly delivered and knowingly accepted—has become something more than the M.O. of one power couple. It has become the liberal way of lying.
Consider this column’s favorite subject: the Iran deal. An honest president might sell the current deal roughly as follows.
“My fellow Americans, the deal we have negotiated will not, I am afraid, prevent Iran from getting a bomb, should its leaders decide to build one. And eventually they will. Fatwa or no fatwa, everything we know about their nuclear program tells us it is geared toward building a bomb. And frankly, if you lived in a neighborhood like theirs—70 million Shiites surrounded by hundreds of millions of Sunnis—you’d want a bomb, too.
“Yes, we could, in theory, stop Iran from getting the bomb. Sanctions won’t do it. Extreme privation didn’t stop Maoist China or Bhutto’s Pakistan or Kim’s North Korea from building a bomb. It won’t stop Iran, either.
“Airstrikes? They would set Iran back by a few years. But even in a best-case scenario, the Iranians would be back at it before long, and they’d keep trying until they got a bomb or we got regime change.
“Fellow Americans, how many of you want to raise your hands for more Mideast regime change?
“So here’s the deal with my deal: It never was about cutting off Iran’s pathways to a bomb. Let’s just say that was an aspiration. It’s about managing, and maybe slowing, the process by which they get one.
“I know that’s not what you thought I’ve been saying these past few years—all that stuff about all options being on the table and me not bluffing and no deal being better than a bad deal. I said this for political expedience, or as a way of palliating restive Saudis and Israelis. You feed the dogs their bone.
“But if you’d been listening attentively, you would have heard the qualifier ‘on my watch’ added to my promises that Iran would not get the bomb. And what happens after I leave office? Hopefully, the Supreme Leader will be replaced by a new leader cut from better cloth. Hopefully, too, this marathon diplomacy will open new patterns of U.S.-Iranian cooperation. But if neither thing happens we’d be no worse off than we are today.
“That’s why getting a deal, any deal, is more important than the deal’s particulars when it comes to sanctions relief, inspections protocols and so on. The details only matter insofar as they make the political medicine go down. What counts is that we’re sitting at the table together, speaking.”
***
A speech along these lines would have the virtues of intellectual integrity and political honesty. It would improve the quality, and perhaps the tenor, of our foreign-policy discussions. The argument might well lose—the U.S. tool kit of coercion is not so bare, the benefit of diplomacy isn’t so great, the threat of a nuclear Iran isn’t so manageable and Americans aren’t that eager to roll over for the ayatollah. But at least we would have a worthwhile debate.
Question for Mrs. Clinton: Does she think the U.S. should gently midwife Iran’s nuclear birth or violently abort it? If she wants to be president, our former top diplomat could honor us with a detailed answer.
In the meantime, let’s simply note what the liberal way of lying has achieved. We are on the cusp of reaching the most consequential foreign-policy decision of our generation. We have a deal whose basic terms neither side can agree on. We have a president whose goals aren’t what he said they were, and whose motives he has kept veiled from the public.
Maybe the ayatollah will give him his deal, and those with the secret knowledge will cheer. As for the rest of us: Haven’t we learned that we’re too stupid to know what’s for our own good?
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
Popular on WSJ
-
Russian Missiles for the Ayatollah
Vladimir Putin blows a raspberry at Obama.
April 13, 2015 7:15 p.m. ET
WSJ
Vladimir Putin blew a geopolitical raspberry at the Obama Administration on Monday by authorizing the sale of Russia’s S-300 missile system to Iran. The Kremlin is offering the mullahs an air-defense capability so sophisticated that it would render Iran’s nuclear installations far more difficult and costly to attack should Tehran seek to build a bomb.
Feeling better about that Iranian nuclear deal now?
The origins of this Russian sideswipe go back to 2007, when Moscow and Tehran signed an $800 million contract for delivery of five S-300 squadrons. But in 2010 then-President Dmitry Medvedev stopped the sale under pressure from the U.S. and Israel. The United Nations Security Council the same year passed an arms-embargo resolution barring the sale of major conventional systems to the Tehran regime.
That resolution is still in effect, but the Kremlin no longer feels like abiding by it. With the latest negotiating deadline passed and without any nuclear agreement in place, Moscow will dispatch the S-300s “promptly” to the Islamic Republic, according to the Russian Defense Ministry.
So much for the White House hope that the West could cordon off Russia’s aggression against Ukraine while working with Mr. Putin on other matters. Russia and the West could disagree about Crimea and eastern Ukraine, the thinking went, but Washington could still solicit the Kremlin’s cooperation on the Iranian nuclear crisis.
State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki dismissed news in February that Russia’s state-run weapons conglomerate Rostec had offered Tehran the Antey-2500—an upgraded version of the S-300 system. “It’s just some reports,” she said. White House spokesman Josh Earnest similarly boasted in March of how “international unanimity of opinion has been critical to our ability to apply pressure to Iran.”
Now Mr. Obama wants to delegate responsibility for enforcing his nuclear deal with Iran to the United Nations, which means that the Russians will have a say—and a veto—there, too. Think of this missile sale as a taste of what’s to come.
Popular on WSJ
-
April 19, 2015 5:36 p.m. ET
951 COMMENTS
Give Ayatollah Ali Khamenei credit for knowing his opposition. Two weeks ago the Supreme Leader declared that Western sanctions had to be lifted immediately as a condition of a nuclear deal. And sure enough, on Friday President Obama said Iran would get significant sanctions relief immediately upon signing a deal.
The Ayatollah knows that Mr. Obama wants an agreement with Iran so much that there’s almost no concession the President won’t make. So why not keep asking for more?
***
Keep in mind that the talks began with the U.S. and its European partners demanding that Iran dismantle its nuclear program. But to persuade the Ayatollah to accept the recent “framework” accord, Mr. Obama has already conceded that Iran can keep enriching uranium, that it can maintain 5,060 centrifuges to do the enriching, that its enriched-uranium stockpiles can stay inside Iran, that the once-concealed facilities at Fordow and Arak can stay open (albeit in altered form), and that Iran can continue doing research on advanced centrifuges.
All of these concessions are contrary to previous U.S. positions, and we’re no doubt missing a few. But none of that was enough for the Ayatollah, who quickly asserted two new deal-breaking objections: immediate sanctions relief, and no inspections under any circumstances of Iran’s military sites.
The White House has insisted that sanctions relief would be phased out based on Iranian compliance with the accord. Iranian negotiators quickly denied they had agreed to any such thing. At first White House spokesman Josh Earnest dismissed this as mere face-saving domestic politicking inside Iran. But then the Ayatollah weighed in with his demand for immediate sanctions relief, adding to reinforce the goodwill that the Obama Administration was “lying” and had “devilish” intentions.
On Friday Mr. Obama nonetheless turned the other cheek and suggested a compromise on sanctions relief is likely. White House sources whispered to reporters that the immediate windfall to Iran could be between $30 billion and $50 billion from access to frozen offshore Iranian accounts.
Mr. Obama even suggested at a press conference that sanctions relief wasn’t really that large an issue as long as the U.S. could reimpose sanctions if Iran cheats. “Our main concern here is making sure that if Iran doesn’t abide by its agreement that we don’t have to jump through a whole bunch of hoops in order to reinstate sanctions,” the President said. He added that this “will require some creative negotiations.”
It sure will. How “snap-back” sanctions would work is far from clear. The U.S. framework summary concedes that charges of cheating would go to a so far unspecified “dispute resolution process” that sounds like some kind of international committee.
That surely means foot-dragging by West Europeans who won’t want to interfere with their new commercial business with Iran, and it probably gives Russia and China an opportunity to take Iran’s side. As former secretaries of state Henry Kissinger and George Shultz argued recently on these pages, the U.S. would then be the isolated nation, not Iran.
The word “snap-back” in any such arrangement is spin to sell a deal, not a realistic description of the process. Mr. Obama nonetheless said on Friday that “I’m confident” the negotiations on sanctions “will be successful.” Look for more U.S. concessions on sanctions as the June deadline approaches.
As for inspections, a senior commander in Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps reiterated Sunday that all military sites are off-limits. Iran’s news agency reported that General Hossein Salami, the Guards’ deputy leader, said such inspections would be “selling out” to the enemy. “Iran will not become a paradise of spies. We will not roll out the red carpet for the enemy,” he said.
This contradicts the U.S. summary of the framework accord, which claims that U.N. inspectors would have access to any “suspicious sites.” It didn’t say only non-military suspicious sites. Mr. Obama has already conceded that the inspectors would need Iran’s permission to visit certain sites, rather than having on-demand and immediate access. If military sites are off-limits, then those sites are where Iran would do the cheating when it wants to. The entire inspections regime would be an act of Western self-deception.
These latest events reinforce a conclusion that the Iranian talks are heading toward a deal that confers Western blessing on Iran as a nuclear-threshold state. Tehran will retain the facilities and means to develop a bomb at the moment of its choosing. The main question now is how many more concessions the Ayatollah will squeeze from a U.S. President he believes is desperate for a deal.
Popular on WSJ
-
China Making Some Missiles More Powerful
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROADMAY 16, 2015
WASHINGTON — After decades of maintaining a minimal nuclear force, China has re-engineered many of its long-range ballistic missiles to carry multiple warheads, a step that federal officials and policy analysts say appears designed to give pause to the United States as it prepares to deploy more robust missile defenses in the Pacific.
What makes China’s decision particularly notable is that the technology of miniaturizing warheads and putting three or more atop a single missile has been in Chinese hands for decades. But a succession of Chinese leaders deliberately let it sit unused; they were not interested in getting into the kind of arms race that characterized the Cold War nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Now, however, President Xi Jinping appears to have altered course, at the same moment that he is building military airfields on disputed islands in the South China Sea, declaring exclusive Chinese “air defense identification zones,” sending Chinese submarines through the Persian Gulf for the first time and creating a powerful new arsenal of cyberweapons.
Many of those steps have taken American officials by surprise and have become evidence of the challenge the Obama administration faces in dealing with China, in particular after American intelligence agencies had predicted that Mr. Xi would focus on economic development and follow the path of his predecessor, who advocated the country’s “peaceful rise.”
Secretary of State John Kerry arrived in Beijing on Saturday to discuss a variety of security and economic issues of concern to the United States, although it remained unclear whether this development with the missiles, which officials describe as recent, was on his agenda.
American officials say that, so far, China has declined to engage in talks on the decision to begin deploying multiple nuclear warheads atop its ballistic missiles.
“The United States would like to have a discussion of the broader issues of nuclear modernization and ballistic missile defense with China,” said Phillip C. Saunders, director of the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs at National Defense University, a Pentagon-funded academic institution attended by many of the military’s next cadre of senior commanders.
“The Chinese have been reluctant to have that discussion in official channels,” Mr. Saunders said, although he and other experts have engaged in unofficial conversations with their Chinese counterparts on the warhead issue.
Beijing’s new nuclear program was reported deep inside the annual Pentagon report to Congress about Chinese military capabilities, disclosing a development that poses a dilemma for the Obama administration, which has never talked publicly about these Chinese nuclear advances.
President Obama is under more pressure than ever to deploy missile defense systems in the Pacific, although American policy officially states that those interceptors are to counter North Korea, not China. At the same time, the president is trying to find a way to signal that he will resist Chinese efforts to intimidate its neighbors, including some of Washington’s closest allies, and to keep the United States out of the Western Pacific.
Already, there is talk in the Pentagon of speeding up the missile defense effort and of sending military ships into international waters near the disputed islands, to make it clear that the United States will insist on free navigation even in areas that China is claiming as its exclusive zone.
Hans M. Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists, a policy research group in Washington, called the new deployments of Chinese warheads “a bad day for nuclear constraint.”
“China’s little force is slowly getting a little bigger,” he said, “and its limited capabilities are slowly getting a little better.”
To American officials, the Chinese move fits into a rapid transformation of their strategy under Mr. Xi, now considered one of the most powerful leaders since Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping. Vivid photographs, which were released recently, of Chinese efforts to reclaim land on disputed islands in the South China Sea and immediately build airfields on them, underscored for White House policy makers and military planners the speed and intensity of Mr. Xi’s determination to push potential competitors out into the mid-Pacific.
That has involved building aircraft carriers and submarines to create an overall force that could pose a credible challenge to the United States in the event of a regional crisis. Some of China’s military modernization program has been aimed directly at America’s technological advantage. China has sought technologies to block American surveillance and communications satellites, and its major investments in cybertechnology — and probes and attacks on American computer networks — are viewed by American officials as a way to both steal intellectual property and prepare for future conflict.
The upgrade to the nuclear forces fits into that strategy.
“This is obviously part of an effort to prepare for long-term competition with the United States,” said Ashley J. Tellis, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace who was a senior national security official in the George W. Bush administration. “The Chinese are always fearful of American nuclear advantage.”
American nuclear forces today outnumber China’s by eight to one. The choice of which nuclear missiles to upgrade was notable, Mr. Tellis said, because China chose “one of few that can unambiguously reach the United States.”
The United States pioneered multiple warheads early in the Cold War. The move was more threatening than simply adding arms. In theory, one missile could release warheads that adjusted their flight paths so each zoomed toward a different target.
The term for the technical advance — multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle, or MIRV — became one of the Cold War’s most dreaded fixtures. It embodied the horrors of overkill and unthinkable slaughter. Each re-entry vehicle was a miniaturized hydrogen bomb. Each, by definition, was many times more destructive than the crude atomic weapon that leveled Hiroshima.
In 1999, during the Clinton administration, Republicans in Congress charged that Chinese spies had stolen the secrets of H-bomb miniaturization. But intelligence agencies noted Beijing’s restraint.
“For 20 years,” the C.I.A. reported, “China has had the technical capability to develop” missiles with multiple warheads and could, if so desired, upgrade its missile forces with MIRVs “in a few years.”
The calculus shifted in 2004, when the Bush administration began deploying a ground-based antimissile system in Alaska and California. Early in 2013, the Obama administration, worrying about North Korean nuclear advances, ordered an upgrade. It called for the interceptors to increase in number to 44 from 30.
While administration officials emphasized that Chinese missiles were not in the system’s cross hairs, they acknowledged that the growing number of interceptors might shatter at least some of Beijing’s warheads.
Today, analysts see China’s addition of multiple warheads as at least partly a response to Washington’s antimissile strides. “They’re doing it,” Mr. Kristensen of the Federation of American Scientists said, “to make sure they could get through the ballistic missile defenses.”
The Pentagon report, released on May 8, said that Beijing’s most powerful weapon now bore MIRV warheads. The intercontinental ballistic missile is known as the DF-5 (for Dong Feng, or East Wind). The Pentagon has said that China has about 20 in underground silos.
Private analysts said each upgraded DF-5 had probably received three warheads and that the advances might span half the missile force. If so, the number of warheads China can fire from that weapon at the United States has increased to about 40 from 20.
“It’s been a long time coming,” said Jeffrey Lewis, an expert on Chinese nuclear forces at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey. In an interview, he emphasized that even fewer of the DF-5s might have received the upgrade.
Early last week, Mr. Kristensen posted a public report on the missile intelligence.
Beijing’s new membership in “the MIRV club,” he said, “strains the credibility of China’s official assurance that it only wants a minimum nuclear deterrent and is not part of a nuclear arms race.”
-
By
Lindsey Graham
May 17, 2015 5:53 p.m. ET
141 COMMENTS
The Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act is now on its way to the White House for a reluctant signature by President Obama. He was forced to accept, by overwhelming votes in both chambers, Congress’s constitutional role in reviewing any nuclear deal with Iran and the lifting of any congressionally imposed sanctions. Now the hardest work begins.
The president must either negotiate an agreement that will permanently prevent an untrustworthy Iranian regime from acquiring nuclear weapons—or walk away. If he instead commits to a plan that will lead to a nuclear Iran, Congress must stop it.
Iran is the greatest sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East and the world. It is openly committed to the destruction of Israel. It sits at the nexus of nearly every major global threat: the Syrian crisis, the rise of ISIS, the resurgence of al Qaeda, the crisis in Iraq that threatens gains won with U.S. blood, the chaos in Yemen that is adding to the threat of an all-out regional war, and renewed weapons trade with Russia’s Vladimir Putin.
To allow this pariah nation to acquire nuclear weapons and the ability to deploy them against us and our allies—and to share them with radical Islamic organizations—would constitute an incalculable threat to our national security and an existential threat to Israel. It would set off a nuclear-arms race that would virtually guarantee a regional war with global implications.
Alarmingly, our negotiators and the Iranians have offered wildly differing interpretations of the negotiated framework. On every principle, Iran insists it will never accept our terms. Serious questions remain about how this deal can prevent a nuclear Iran.
Will international sanctions be lifted before proof that Iran is in compliance? How and when would sanctions be restored if there are violations? Can we have a good faith agreement with a regime that for decades has lied and cheated, and still has never come clean about its past efforts to weaponize nuclear technology? Will Iran be required to demonstrate changed behavior—with respect to its nuclear ambitions and its sponsorship of terrorism?
I am proposing eight principles to ensure we get the right answers and achieve a sound, enforceable deal.
• Iran must not be allowed an enrichment capability greater than the practical needs to supply one commercial reactor. The Iranians should have access to peaceful nuclear power, but the infrastructure should be aligned to support the needs of a single nuclear reactor.
• Closure of all hardened and formerly secret sites. Iran must come clean on all outstanding issues raised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), particularly concerning the possible military dimensions of Iran’s civilian nuclear program. The history of Iran’s nuclear program has been marked by deception. Sites like Fordow have no role in an Iranian civilian program. Iran must account for the full inventory of centrifuges, production facilities for components, the total number of components, assembly workshops and storage depots for centrifuges.
• Anytime, anywhere inspections of all Iranian military and nonmilitary facilities. Iran shouldn’t have veto power over when inspectors visit its facilities, including the ability of independent parties to monitor and report on Iran’s compliance.
• Sanctions relief and access to funds currently in escrow must be phased in and fully conditioned on IAEA certification that Iran is in full compliance and has demonstrated sustained compliance over time. Allowing Iran access to these tens of billions of dollars in funds before it has fulfilled its portion of the agreement is unacceptable.
• There must be an explicit process for the “snapback” re-imposition of sanctions if Iran violates the deal. It took years to impose the sanctions, which brought Iran to the negotiating table.
• Iran must not be allowed to conduct research and development on advanced centrifuges. Mastery of this technology will allow Iran to reduce its breakout time toward a nuclear weapon.
• Removal of all enriched uranium from Iran. There is no need for Iran to possess a large stockpile of low enriched uranium or any highly enriched uranium. With the exception of the small amounts enriched to 3.5% that will be created as part of Iran’s civilian enrichment process, all enriched uranium must be shipped out of Iran.
• Certification by the president that, before any restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program are lifted, Iran has changed its aggressive behavior in the region and no longer meets the qualifications to be designated a state sponsor of terrorism.
These eight principles have bipartisan support and largely reflect President Obama’s negotiating position at the start of the process (demonstrating how far he has strayed from his original intentions). Adhering to these eight principles will ensure that Iran never acquires nuclear weapons or has the means to spread nuclear technology to radical Islamic groups.
Above all, they will reassert American leadership in the Middle East, and preserve our national security, and the security of Israel and other allies in the region. Any deal that does not adhere to them will fail, with dire consequences for global security.
Mr. Graham, a Republican, is a U.S. senator from South Carolina.
Popular on WSJ
There are 141 comments.
All comments will display your real name. Read our commenting rules.
NewestOldestReader Recommended
Peter Maggio
Peter Maggio 7 minutes ago
I wonder. Is Lindsey Graham a warmonger because he was teased all his life about his first name?
Flag ButtonShare
Robert Grow
Robert Grow 26 minutes ago
Obama and his many fans want a planet where power is more evenly distributed, and western nations, particularly the US, no longer can exercise dominance. We need to empathize more with the aspirations of the third world and the Islamic world. We also need to accept responsibility for our many sins and do penance. If this means the destruction of our country, well, we had it coming. It's what our fellow Americans voted for, twice!
The next election can't come soon enough, but there's no guarantee much will change.
Flag ButtonShare
1
William Schmauss
William Schmauss 28 minutes ago
And Senator, what are you going to do when the Iranians don't agree, or agree and then cheat as they have on everything else? Are you willing to bomb their sites or help the Israelis bomb them? Invade? exactly how are you going to stop them, as sure as the sun comes up tomorrow they will never willingly let go of their nuclear ambitions.
Flag ButtonShare
-
Everything Is Awesome, Mideast Edition
It takes a special innocence to imagine that the chaos unfolding in the Middle East can be put right.
By Bret Stephens
May 18, 2015 7:08 p.m. ET
WSJ
Ben Rhodes, President Obama’s deputy national security adviser, has been offering a reassuring view of the Iranian nuclear deal in the face of some Arab skepticism. “If you can diplomatically and peacefully resolve the nuclear issue in a way that prevents Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon,” he told reporters last week, “we believe that will lead to a much more stable region.” Mr. Rhodes also contends that with a deal “there will be no need to see [a] regional arms race.”
So what’s more frightening: That Mr. Rhodes believes what he’s saying? Or that he does not?
Just for Mr. Rhodes’s benefit, here’s a refresher course on stability and the arms race in the Middle East since April 2, 2015, the day Mr. Obama announced his framework nuclear agreement with Iran.
April 2: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif immediately accuses the U.S. of “spin” and contradicts Mr. Obama’s key claims regarding the terms of the deal.
April 12: A Swedish think tank reports that Saudi Arabia registered the biggest increase in defense spending in the world.
April 13: Moscow says it will deliver the S-300 air-defense system to Tehran. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei later boasts that the U.S. “can’t do a damn thing” militarily against Iran.
April 14: Iran announces agreements with Russia and China to build additional nuclear reactors.
April 17: Iran dispatches an armed convoy of ships, believed to be destined to resupply pro-Iranian Houthi rebels in Yemen in contravention of a U.N. arms embargo. The convoy turns back after the U.S. deploys an aircraft carrier to the region to shadow the ships.
April 20: Jason Rezaian, the American-born Washington Post reporter imprisoned in Iran since July, is charged with espionage, “collaborating with hostile governments” and “propaganda against the establishment.”
April 20: The British government informs the U.N. panel monitoring sanctions on Iran that it “is aware of an active Iranian nuclear procurement network” associated with two Iranian companies that are under international sanctions.
April 22: Saudi Arabia resumes airstrikes in Yemen despite administration pressure to maintain a cease fire.
April 28: Iran seizes the 837-foot long Maersk Tigris, a Marshall Islands flagged cargo ship with 34 sailors aboard, as it transits the Strait of Hormuz along an internationally recognized route. The ship is released a week later after Maersk pays a fine of $163,000.
April 29: Former Saudi Intelligence Minister Turki al Faisal tells a conference in Seoul that the kingdom will match Iran’s nuclear capabilities with its own. “Whatever the Iranians have, we will have, too.” The prince also accuses Mr. Obama of going “behind the backs of the traditional allies to strike the deal.”
May 8: Reuters reports that inspectors have discovered traces of sarin gas at an undeclared military research site near Damascus. The report puts paid to administration boasts that its diplomacy effectively solved the Syrian chemical crisis.
May 11: Saudi Arabia’s King Salman withdraws from the Arab summit meeting with Mr. Obama. The king of Bahrain follows suit, preferring instead to attend a horse show with Britain’s Queen Elizabeth.
May 13: Reuters reports “the Czech Republic blocked an attempted purchase by Iran this year of a large shipment of sensitive technology usable for nuclear enrichment after false documentation raised suspicions.”
May 14: Iranian patrol boats fire upon a Singapore-flagged oil tanker with machine guns as it transits the Strait of Hormuz. The ship makes it safely to Dubai.
May 17: Citing senior U.S. officials, the Sunday Times reports that “Saudi Arabia has taken the ‘strategic decision’ to acquire ‘off-the-shelf’ atomic weapons from Pakistan.”
Also on May 17, Islamic State fighters in Iraq seize the city of Ramadi, the capital of Anbar Province. This is after Mr. Obama crowed in February that “our coalition is on the offensive, ISIL is on the defensive, and ISIL is going to lose.” Now the Iraqi government will turn to Shiite paramilitaries under Iranian control to try to retake the city, further turning the Baghdad government into an Iranian satrap.
***
I recount these events not just to illustrate the distance between Ben Rhodes’s concept of reality and reality itself. It’s also a question of speed. The Middle East, along with our position in it, is unraveling at an astonishing pace. Reckless drivers often don’t notice how fast they’re going until they’re about to crash.
We are near the point where there will be no walking back the mistakes we have made. No walking away from them, either. It takes a special innocence to imagine that nothing in life is irreversible, that everything can be put right, that fanaticism yields to reason and facts yield to wishes, and that the arc of Mideast history bends toward justice.
Ben Rhodes, and the administration he represents and typifies, is special.
Write to bstephens@wsj.com
-
It is getting so bad that we are to the soft side of the French :roll: :x :x
http://www.timesofisrael.com/france-wont-sign-iran-deal-without-military-site-inspections/
-
http://twitchy.com/2015/05/26/marie-harf-promoted-to-senior-advisor-will-focus-on-negotiations-with-iran/
-
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2015/06/02/world/middleeast/irans-nuclear-stockpile-grows-complicating-negotiations.html?nytmobile=0&_r=0&referrer
-
http://www.dickmorris.com/iran-now-wants-everything-dick-morris-tv-lunch-alert/?utm_source=dmreports&utm_medium=dmreports&utm_campaign=dmreports
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/us-could-lift-sanctions-before-iran-accounting.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1
:cry: :cry: :x
-
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/world/us-could-lift-sanctions-before-iran-accounting.html?partner=rss&emc=rss&_r=1
:cry: :cry: :x
Why, it's almost as if Obama wants a nuclear Iran.
Who could have foreseen this?
-
http://www.clarionproject.org/analysis/10-ways-iran-has-gutted-nuclear-deal#
-
second post
http://www.foxnews.com/.../emps-how-to-detect-blast-that.../
http://pamelageller.com/.../iran-endorses-nuclear-emp.../
http://spectrum.ieee.org/.../electromagnetic-warfare-is-here
-
third post:
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/420707/iran-nuclear-deal-obama-sanctions-inspections-capitulates?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=Jolt&utm_campaign=Best%20of%207%2F4
-
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/07/meet-the-democrats-who-can-make-or-break-obamas-nuclear-deal/
-
http://www.breitbart.com/video/2015/07/28/kerry-we-dont-have-access-to-the-actual-agreement-on-iran-side-deals/
-
http://conservativetribune.com/leaked-copy-iran-deal-shocking/?utm_source=Facebook&utm_medium=TPNNPages&utm_content=2015-07-29
-
By Paul McLeary with Adam Rawnsley
Remember Pakistan’s nukes? While the world has remained focused on the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs, a new report shows that Pakistan has been steadily building its nuclear capabilities, as well. The country is likely building as many as 20 nuclear warheads annually, and if it keeps going at this rate, it could boast the world’s third-largest nuclear stockpile within a decade.
Islamabad has amassed a large stockpile of highly enriched uranium over the years, which could allow it to rapidly produce a number of low-yield nuclear devices, a report due out Thursday by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Stimson Center concludes. The news should be sobering for Pakistan’s neighbor and chief rival India, which is slightly behind Pakistan in the number of nuclear warheads it possesses. Most analysts peg Pakistan’s arsenal at about 120 nuclear warheads, while India has about 100. Overall, Pakistan is on pace to be able to field 350 nuclear weapons in the next 10 years, the report concludes.
-
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2015/08/31/for-the-record-a-nuclear-iran-would-immediately-become-a-threat-to-americans/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Firewire%20-%20HORIZON%208-31-15%20FINAL&utm_term=Firewire
-
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-says-finds-unexpectedly-high-uranium-104622948.html
-
https://ca.news.yahoo.com/iran-says-finds-unexpectedly-high-uranium-104622948.html
Totally peaceful uranium. Nothing to worry about.
-
Wanna bet that Obama and Kerry knew about the uranium?
-
Wanna bet that Obama and Kerry knew about the uranium?
Doesn't matter. The only thing they care about is the side deal where Iran doesn't nuke anyone until Buraq Hussein is out of office.
-
A U.S.-Russian Arms Treaty Could Be in Trouble
Analysis
September 28, 2015 | 09:15 GMT Print
Text Size
U.S. President Ronald Reagan (R) and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev (L) signing a treaty eliminating U.S. and Soviet intermediate- and short-range nuclear missiles in Washington, D.C. in December 1987. (-/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
Russia is feeling increasingly limited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty as the United States continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal and develop its ballistic missile defenses. The United States also finds the treaty constraining, but neither Moscow nor Washington wants to be the first to withdraw from the pact.
Analysis
Russia on Sept. 23 criticized the United States' planned deployment of upgraded B61-12 guided nuclear bombs to Germany, once again raising the threat of withdrawing from the 1987 INF treaty as a response to U.S. moves. The INF bans ground-based nuclear or conventional intermediate-range missiles (500 to 5,500 kilometers, or 300 to 3,400 miles). Though the U.S. deployment of B61-12 nuclear weapons to Germany does not violate the INF treaty, Moscow is increasingly viewing the pact as a limitation.
The INF pact is a cornerstone arms control treaty between the United States and Russia that halted a destabilizing buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe during the 1980s. However, the treaty also constrained both U.S. and Russian options. Even as influential camps in the United States and Russia fear the treaty's dissolution and a return to a dangerous arms race in Europe, other voices in both countries desiring to abandon or revise it are growing louder.
The INF treaty has especially restricted U.S. policy in East Asia, forcing the United States to rely on air- and sea-launched missiles to counter China's vast and growing land-based missile arsenal. The Russians are even more concerned with the INF, because the treaty places them at a disadvantage relative to the United States in missile defense and modernized scalable nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, the INF, as a bilateral treaty between the United States and Russia, does not stop countries around Russia such as China, India and North Korea from developing intermediate-range nuclear weapons. Unlike the continental United States, which is beyond the range of these missiles, Russia has to factor in these potential threats even as the New START Treaty limits its strategic nuclear arsenal (in any case largely aimed at the United States).
Frustrated by the INF treaty but fearing its dissolution, the United States and Russia have sought to find ways around it. Russia may have already breached the INF pact with the development of the R-500 ground-based cruise missile, as well as the testing of the SS-27 Mod 2 intercontinental ballistic missile at ranges prohibited by the INF treaty. The United States has also pursued other avenues to overcome the treaty's limitations, expanding its sea-launched missile arsenal, building up missile defenses and pursuing Prompt Global Strike technology that makes up for a longer-ranged strike envelope with high speed and accuracy.
Russia and the United States are each hesitant to be the first to withdraw from the INF pact, but it is clear that the treaty as a whole is weakening as time passes. Threats of withdrawal from the treaty, especially from Moscow, are becoming more common, and it may be just a matter of time until the treaty is effectively terminated or heavily revised. The demise of the foundational arms control treaty may give both sides more military options, but it will undoubtedly exacerbate an already tense relationship between Moscow and Washington.
-
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Expert-Khameneis-letter-to-Rouhani-voids-deal-430056
-
With as many as 120 warheads, Pakistan could in a decade become the world’s third-ranked nuclear power, behind the United States and Russia, but ahead of China, France and Britain. Its arsenal is growing faster than any other country’s, and it has become even more lethal in recent years with the addition of small tactical nuclear weapons that can hit India and longer-range nuclear missiles that can reach farther.
Stories from Our Advertisers
These are unsettling truths. The fact that Pakistan is also home to a slew of extremist groups, some of which are backed by a paranoid security establishment obsessed with India, only adds to the dangers it presents for South Asia and, indeed, the entire world.
Persuading Pakistan to rein in its nuclear weapons program should be an international priority. The major world powers spent two years negotiating an agreement to restrain the nuclear ambitions of Iran, which doesn’t have a single nuclear weapon. Yet there has been no comparable investment of effort in Pakistan, which, along with India, has so far refused to consider any limits at all.
The Obama administration has begun to address this complicated issue with greater urgency and imagination, even though the odds of success seem small. The recent meeting at the White House on Oct. 22 between President Obama and Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan appears to have gone nowhere. Yet it would be wrong not to keep trying, especially at a time of heightened tensions between Pakistan and India over Kashmir and terrorism.
What’s new about the administration’s approach is that instead of treating the situation as essentially hopeless, it is now casting about for the elements of a possible deal in which each side would get something it wants. For the West, that means restraint by Pakistan and greater compliance with international rules for halting the spread of nuclear technology. For Pakistan, that means some acceptance in the family of nuclear powers and access to technology.
At the moment, Pakistan is a pariah in the nuclear sphere to all but China; it has been punished internationally ever since it followed India’s example and tested a weapon in 1998. Pakistan has done itself no favors by refusing to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and by giving nuclear know-how to bad actors like North Korea. Yet, it is seeking treatment equal to that given to India by the West.
For decades, India was also penalized for developing nuclear weapons. But attitudes shifted in 2008 when the United States, seeking better relations with one of the world’s fastest-growing economies as a counterweight to China, gave India a pass and signed a generous nuclear cooperation deal that allowed New Delhi to buy American nuclear energy technology.
Continue reading the main story
Sign Up for the Opinion Today Newsletter
Every weekday, get thought-provoking commentary from Op-Ed columnists, The Times editorial board and contributing writers from around the world.
Continue reading the main story
Recent Comments
Fakkir 7 minutes ago
If you had a nuclear armed behemoth like India you will definitely want nukes too. Saying Pakistan has to simply submit to India is not...
Mayngram 7 minutes ago
Nuclear Pakistan may be the real reason for continued U.S. presence in Afghanistan. If that is indeed the case, it would be appropriate for...
Aamir mumtaz 7 minutes ago
The article takes a very shallow and one sided view of the issues. Pakistan is not looking for NSG membership or help to acquire it....
See All Comments Write a comment
American officials say they are not offering Pakistan an India-like deal, which would face stiff opposition in Congress, but are discussing what Pakistan needs to do to justify American support for its membership in the 48-nation Nuclear Supplier Group, which governs trade in nuclear fuel and technology.
As a first step, one American official said, Pakistan would have to stop pursuing tactical nuclear weapons, which are more likely to be used in a conflict with India and could more easily fall into the hands of terrorists, and halt development of long-range missiles. Pakistan should also sign the treaty banning nuclear weapons tests.
Such moves would undoubtedly be in Pakistan’s long-term interest. It cannot provide adequate services for its citizens because it spends about 25 percent of its budget on defense. Pakistan’s army, whose chief of staff is due to visit Washington this month, says it needs still more nuclear weapons to counter India’s conventional arsenal.
The competition with India, which is adding to its own nuclear arsenal, is a losing game, and countries like China, a Pakistan ally, should be pushing Pakistan to accept that. Meanwhile, Narendra Modi, India’s prime minister, has done nothing to engage Islamabad on security issues, and he also bears responsibility for current tensions. The nuclear arms race in South Asia, which is growing more intense, demands far greater international attention.
-
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/12/18850/fuel-nuclear-bomb-hands-unknown-black-marketeer-russia-us-officials-say
-
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/427619/state-department-iran-deal-not-legally-binding-signed
-
A highly reliable and unusually well-informed friend tells me this is plausible:
http://www.tomgrossmedia.com/mideastdispatches/archives/001577.html
-
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/stop-iran-now/2015/12/20/07ca2936-a4f7-11e5-9c4e-be37f66848bb_story.html?wpmm=1&wpisrc=nl_headlines
-
http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/naval/submarines/2015/11/13/russia-leaks-dirty-bomb-submarine-drone-state-tv-broadcast/75710806/
-
http://www.jpost.com/page.aspx?pageid=7&articleid=442087
-
The Rogue-State Nuclear Missile Threat
North Korea can now threaten most of the continental U.S.
Feb. 11, 2016 7:45 p.m. ET
92 COMMENTS
Americans have been focused on New Hampshire and Iowa, but spare a thought for Los Angeles, Denver and Chicago. Those are among the cities within range of the intercontinental ballistic missile tested Sunday by North Korea. Toledo and Pittsburgh are still slightly out of range, but at least 120 million Americans with the wrong zip codes could soon be targets of Kim Jong Un.
Welcome to the era of the rogue-state ICBM. North Korea’s portly young dictator is often played for laughs, but before he rose to power in 2011 Pyongyang had never successfully put a satellite into orbit, a major technical step toward mastering long-range missile delivery. Now it has done so twice, a disturbing complement to its four nuclear tests, the latest of which was last month.
***
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches a long range rocket launch on February 7. ENLARGE
North Korean leader Kim Jong Un watches a long range rocket launch on February 7. Photo: Reuters
“We assess that they have the capability to reach the [U.S.] homeland with a nuclear weapon from a rocket,” U.S. Admiral Bill Gortney of the North American Aerospace Defense Command said in October, echoing warnings from the Defense Intelligence Agency and the U.S. commander in South Korea. Such assessments are necessarily speculative given the opacity of the Hermit Kingdom and the complexities of miniaturizing and delivering warheads, but the trend is ominous.
Though last month’s nuclear test had too small a yield to be the hydrogen-bomb success that Pyongyang claims, it may have included components of an H-bomb and advanced its miniaturization capabilities. Sunday’s launch appears to have carried twice the payload of Pyongyang’s previous effort, in 2012, which established a missile range of 10,000 kilometers, enough to hit Chicago. If Kim extends his range to 13,000 kilometers, he’d threaten the entire continental U.S.
Other rogues are following suit. Iran recently conducted two ballistic-missile launches in violation of its recent nuclear deal. These are a “deliberate message of defiance,” U.S. intelligence chief Jim Clapper told Congress Tuesday, adding that Tehran has launched 140 times since a United Nations resolution banned launches in 2010. Mr. Clapper also revealed that North Korea recently expanded plutonium production.
All of this vindicates the long campaign for missile defense. Ronald Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative helped win the Cold War, and North Korea is precisely the threat that continued to justify the cause after the Soviet Union’s collapse. The Union of Concerned Scientists, Joe Biden, John Kerry and other arms-control theologians fought it at every turn, while the Clinton Administration dragged its feet. “I don’t support a missile defense system,” Barack Obama said in 2001 as a young lawyer, repeating dogma that would have kept the U.S. defenseless.
You can thank the George W. Bush Administration for the defenses that exist, including long-range missile interceptors in Alaska and California, Aegis systems aboard U.S. Navy warships and a diverse network of radar and satellite sensors. The U.S. was due to place interceptors in Poland and X-Band radar in the Czech Republic, but in 2009 President Obama and Hillary Clinton scrapped those plans as a “reset” gift to Vladimir Putin.
Team Obama also cut 14 of the 44 interceptors planned for Alaska and Hawaii, ceased development of the Multiple Kill Vehicle (an interceptor with multiple warheads) and defunded the two systems focused on destroying missiles in their early “boost” phase, when they are slowest and easier to hit. By 2013 even Mr. Obama partially realized his error, so the Administration expanded radar and short-range interceptors in Asia and recommitted to the 14 interceptors for the U.S. West Coast. It now appears poised to install sophisticated Thaad antimissile batteries in South Korea.
Yet the Administration has failed to support a third East Coast site (to protect against Iranian and Russian threats) and provide adequate funding. Budgets are down about 25% from the Bush Administration’s roughly $10 billion a year. Mr. Obama’s final budget proposal released Tuesday would cut another $800 million from the Missile Defense Agency, nearly 10% from last year’s total.
This investment isn’t commensurate with the growing threat of intercontinental nuclear attack. “We’re ready 24 hours a day if he’s dumb enough to shoot something at us,” Admiral Gortney has said of Kim Jong Un, but any miss would be catastrophic. U.S. success in 72 of 89 antimissile tests since 2001 is an impressive rebuke to those who ridicule missile defense as “Star Wars.” But a 100% interception rate won’t happen without engineering advances and presidential leadership.
The overarching lesson of North Korea is the folly of arms control, starting with the 1994 Agreed Framework that first tried to buy off Pyongyang with energy and food aid. The U.S. would be safer today if it had moved to topple the Kim regime before it got the bomb. But having failed to act when the costs were lower, it is now necessary to buttress defenses in East Asia and the U.S. in what is fast becoming a new age of nuclear and missile proliferation.
-
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/02/22/for-the-record-is-iran-working-toward-an-emp-strike/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Firewire%20-%20HORIZON%202-22-16%20FINAL&utm_term=Firewire
-
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2016/02/22/for-the-record-is-iran-working-toward-an-emp-strike/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Firewire%20-%20HORIZON%202-22-16%20FINAL&utm_term=Firewire
Partners in peace !
-
Allah be praised that Baraq and Kerry negotiated that deal!
-
http://www.businessinsider.com/9-facts-about-the-uss-backpack-nukes-2014-2
-
http://patriotpost.us/posts/41156
-
http://patriotpost.us/posts/41156
It's not a bug, it's a feature.
-
Haven't had a chance to look at this yet, but posting it here for my future reference.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kKIPCnLaUYk&ebc=ANyPxKpaW4UzCG-SaM-C42AiEH5SOT4hFhgJZJjq_oZTE7110j8WNP_CKGr7AD53wyDzSx7-47-QOw6OLUJ0UWJL13P2nzEenw
-
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/29/belgiums-failed-state-is-guarding-americas-nuclear-weapons/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*Editors%20Picks
:-o :-o :-o
-
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/03/29/belgiums-failed-state-is-guarding-americas-nuclear-weapons/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campaign&utm_term=*Editors%20Picks
:-o :-o :-o
We need to pull our forces out of Europe anyway.
-
Seriously?
-
Seriously?
Yes. Not one more cent for defending a suicidal culture.
-
Seriously?
Yes. Not one more cent for defending a suicidal culture.
We don't only defend places like Europe and Israel for their benefit.
-
http://www.spacedaily.com/reports/Russias_New_ICBM_Sarmat_can_penetrate_defense_shield_wipe_out_Texas_999.html
-
Seriously?
Yes. Not one more cent for defending a suicidal culture.
We don't only defend places like Europe and Israel for their benefit.
No point in wasting resources on europe as they let themselves become eurostan.
-
You may speak too soon , , ,
http://www.reuters.tv/8uF/2016/05/12/u-s-missile-shield-goes-live-infuriates-russia
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SUuOskX3z7U&feature=youtu.be
-
Great video. Exactly so.
-
http://www.jpost.com/Jerusalem-Report/The-Iran-nuclear-deal-One-year-on-457447
-
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/07/18/secret-document-iran-nuclear-constraints/87256214/
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani waves to the crowd at the Azadi stadium in Kermansheh, west of Iran, on July 17, 2016. EPA/PRESIDENCY OF IRAN / HANDOUT HANDOUT EDITORIAL USE ONLY ORG XMIT: ABD01(Photo: Presidency of Iran / Handout, EPA)
VIENNA (AP) — A document obtained by The Associated Press shows that key restrictions on Iran's nuclear program will ease in slightly more than a decade, halving the time Tehran would need to build a bomb.
The document is the only secret text linked to last year's agreement between Iran and six foreign powers. It says that after a period between 11 to 13 years, Iran can replace its 5,060 inefficient centrifuges with up to 3,500 advanced machines.
Since those are five times as efficient, the time Iran would need to make a weapon would drop from a year to six months.
Iran says its enrichment is peaceful, but the program could be used for nuclear warheads.
Two diplomats providing the information Monday demanded anonymity because they weren't authorized to do so.
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/military-warns-nuclear-policy-change/
-
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-andreasen-nuclear-weapons-turkey-20160811-snap-story.html
-
A very interesting point!
Question, what are their theoretical targets and what are the solutions for alternate delivery?
-
http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/jcpoa-exemptions-revealed
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/state-letter-reveals-plan-u-s-legal-commitment-unratified-nuclear-treaty/
-
Please post in Sovereignty thread as well.
-
North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test Friday, following three missile tests on Monday and about 20 so far this year. The accelerating pace of the Kim Jong Un regime’s nuclear and missile testing shows its determination to threaten Japan, South Korea and the U.S. homeland with nuclear weapons. The question is whether the West is capable of a more determined response.
Every nuclear test leaves forensic clues, and analysts are suggesting this was Pyongyang’s most successful, with an apparent yield of 10 kilotons. This is the North’s second test this year, suggesting it has an ample supply of nuclear material from its restarted plutonium reactor and enriched uranium.
The North said it tested a miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be placed on a missile. True or not, we know its scientists had access to a Chinese design for a partially miniaturized weapon through the proliferation network of Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan. The U.S. believes the North already has small enough warheads to fit on short-range missiles aimed at South Korea.
The North’s workhorse Nodong missile now has a range of more than 600 miles. In June it launched a medium-range Musudan missile from a road-mobile launcher, which makes it hard to detect and destroy. North Korea recently launched a missile from a submarine into the Sea of Japan at a range of 300 miles. This means Pyongyang now has a second-strike capability if the world tried a preventive attack to destroy its nuclear weapons.
A growing worry for the U.S. is the North’s new KN-08 intercontinental missile with the range to hit Chicago. In February the North used a similar rocket to launch a small satellite into space. Significant challenges remain, including a warhead that could withstand the vibration and temperature changes of a long-range missile flight. But the North has repeatedly solved technical problems more quickly than expected.
All of this means the window to prevent the North from becoming a global nuclear menace is closing while the proliferation risks are growing. The North has cooperated with Iran on missile development in the past and may share its nuclear secrets.
Right on cue, the world’s powers condemned the missile launch. And President Obama promised “additional significant steps, including new sanctions to demonstrate to North Korea that there are consequences to its unlawful and dangerous actions.”
Yada, yada, yada. Why should Kim and company fear such words?
Sanctions get passed as a ritual but are never enforced enough to matter. Earlier this year China began to enforce new sanctions, but Beijing let trade with the North resume after Seoul decided in July to deploy the U.S. Thaad missile-defense system. Only sanctions that imperil the regime will force the North to freeze its nuclear program, and Beijing has never been willing to risk undermining its client state.
Meanwhile, the U.S. won’t even use secondary sanctions against Chinese entities trading with the North. A February U.N. report identified dozens of Chinese firms linked to blacklisted North Korean entities and detailed how the Bank of China allegedly facilitated $40 million in deceptive wire transfers for a Pyongyang-linked client. Cutting off such firms from the global financial system could deter others from trading with the North.
But for that to happen Mr. Obama would have to behave differently than he has for eight years. The result is that the next American President will inherit one more grave and growing threat to Western security.
-
I have repeatedly banged the table around here that one of the worst things that Obama has done is to bring an end to the era of nuclear non-proliferation.
Though I find the following unfair in some respects to Trump, on the whole it is an intelligent discussion of a matter of profound importance to our national security. I was unaware of just how bad our trajectory is viz the Chinese and Russians is.
Also, I would note that there is no discussion of the Iran and North Korea. I would note that as Iran develops its' ICBMs, it continues to move forward with its nuke program. Even if it should turn out it is sort of respecting the Obama-Kerry deal (which expires in what, 12 years?) it seems logical to me to assume they are off-shoring their efforts to a joint venture with North Korea.
--------------------------------------------------------
by Mark Helprin
Sept. 23, 2016 6:11 p.m. ET
189 COMMENTS
Even should nuclear brinkmanship not result in Armageddon, it can lead to abject defeat and a complete reordering of the international system. The extraordinarily complicated and consequential management of American nuclear policy rests upon the shoulders of those we elevate to the highest offices. Unfortunately, President Obama’s transparent hostility to America’s foundational principles and defensive powers is coupled with a dim and faddish understanding of nuclear realities. His successor will be no less ill-equipped.
Hillary Clinton’s robotic compulsion to power renders her immune to either respect for truth or clearheaded consideration of urgent problems. Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of state once said that he was “pure act” (meaning action). Hillary Clinton is “pure lie” (meaning lie), with whatever intellectual power she possesses hopelessly enslaved to reflexive deviousness.
Donald Trump, surprised that nuclear weapons are inappropriate to counterinsurgency, has a long history of irrepressible urges and tropisms. Rather like the crazy boy-emperors after the fall of the Roman Republic, he may have problems with impulse control—and an uncontrolled, ill-formed, perpetually fragmented mind.
None of these perhaps three worst people in the Western Hemisphere, and few of their deplorable underlings, are alive to the gravest danger. Which is neither Islamic State, terrorism, the imprisoned economy, nor even the erosion of our national character, though all are of crucial importance.
The gravest danger we face is fast-approaching nuclear instability. Many believe it is possible safely to arrive at nuclear zero. It is not. Enough warheads to bring any country to its knees can fit in a space volumetrically equivalent to a Manhattan studio apartment. Try to find that in the vastness of Russia, China, or Iran. Even ICBMs and their transporter-erector-launchers can easily be concealed in warehouses, tunnels and caves. Nuclear weapons age out, but, thanks to supercomputing, reliable replacements can be manufactured with only minor physical testing. Unaccounted fissile material sloshing around the world can, with admitted difficulty, be fashioned into weapons. And when rogue states such as North Korea and Iran build their bombs, our response has been either impotence or a ticket to ride.
Nor do nuclear reductions lead to increased safety. Quite apart from encouraging proliferation by enabling every medium power in the world to aim for nuclear parity with the critically reduced U.S. arsenal, reductions create instability. The fewer targets, the more possible a (counter-force) first strike to eliminate an enemy’s retaliatory capacity. Nuclear stability depends, inter alia, upon deep reserves that make a successful first strike impossible to assure. The fewer warheads and the higher the ratio of warheads to delivery vehicles, the more dangerous and unstable.
Consider two nations, each with 10 warheads on each of 10 missiles. One’s first strike with five warheads tasked per the other’s missiles would leave the aggressor with an arsenal sufficient for a (counter-value) strike against the now disarmed opponent’s cities. Our deterrent is not now as concentrated as in the illustration, but by placing up to two-thirds of our strategic warheads in just 14 submarines; consolidating bomber bases; and entertaining former Defense Secretary William Perry’s recommendation to do away with the 450 missiles in the land-based leg of the Nuclear Triad, we are moving that way.
Supposedly salutary reductions are based upon an incorrect understanding of nuclear sufficiency: i.e., if X number of weapons is sufficient to inflict unacceptable costs upon an enemy, no more than X are needed. But we don’t define sufficiency, the adversary does, and the definition varies according to culture; history; the temperament, sanity, or miscalculation of leadership; domestic politics; forms of government, and other factors, some unknown. For this reason, the much maligned concept of overkill is a major contributor to stability, in that, if we have it, an enemy is less likely to calculate that we lack sufficiency. Further, if our forces are calibrated to sufficiency, then presumably the most minor degradation will render them insufficient.
Nor is it safe to mirror-image willingness to go nuclear. Every nuclear state has its own threshold, and one cannot assume that concessions in strategic forces will obviate nuclear use in response to conventional warfare, which was Soviet doctrine for decades and is a Russian predilection now.
Ballistic missile defense is opposed and starved on the assumption that it would shield one’s territory after striking first, and would therefore tempt an enemy to strike before the shield was deployed. As its opponents assert, hermetic shielding is impossible, and if only 10 of 1,500 warheads were to hit American cities, the cost would be unacceptable. But no competent nuclear strategist ever believed that, other than protecting cities from accidental launch or rogue states, ballistic missile defense is anything but a means of protecting our retaliatory capacity, making a counter-force first strike of no use, and thus increasing stability.
In a nuclear world, unsentimental and often counterintuitive analysis is necessary. As the genie will not be forced back into the lamp, the heart of the matter is balance and deterrence. But this successful dynamic of 70 years is about to be destroyed. Those whom the French call our “responsibles” have addressed the nuclear calculus—in terms of sufficiency, control regimes, and foreign policy—only toward Russia, as if China, a nuclear power for decades, did not exist. While it is true that to begin with its nuclear arsenal was de minimis, in the past 15 years China has increased its land-based ICBMs by more than 300%, its sea-based by more than 400%. Depending upon the configuration of its missiles, China can rain up to several hundred warheads upon the U.S.
As we shrink our nuclear forces and fail to introduce new types, China is doing the opposite, increasing them numerically and forging ahead of us in various technologies (quantum communications, super computers, maneuverable hypersonic re-entry vehicles), some of which we have forsworn, such as road-mobile missiles, which in survivability and range put to shame our Minuteman IIIs.
Because China’s nuclear weapons infrastructure is in part housed in 3,000 miles of tunnels opaque to American intelligence, we cannot know the exact velocity and extent of its buildup. Why does the Obama administration, worshipful of nuclear agreements, completely ignore the nuclear dimension of the world’s fastest rising major power, with which the United States and allies engage in military jockeying almost every day on multiple fronts? Lulled to believe that nuclear catastrophe died with the Cold War, America is blind to rising dragons.
And then we have Russia, which ignores limitations the Obama administration strives to exceed. According to its own careless or defiant admissions, Russia cheats in virtually every area of nuclear weapons: deploying missiles that by treaty supposedly no longer exist; illegally converting anti-aircraft and ballistic missile defense systems to dual-capable nuclear strike; developing new types of nuclear cruise missiles for ships and aircraft; keeping more missiles on alert than allowed; and retaining battlefield tactical nukes.
Further, in the almost complete absence of its own “soft power,” Russia frequently hints at nuclear first use. All this comports with historical Soviet/Russian doctrine and conduct; is an important element of Putinesque tactics for reclaiming the Near Abroad; and dovetails perfectly with Mr. Obama’s advocacy of no first use, unreciprocated U.S. reductions and abandonment of nuclear modernization. Which in turn pair nicely with Donald Trump’s declaration that he would defend NATO countries only if they made good on decades of burden-sharing delinquency.
Russia deploys about 150 more nuclear warheads than the U.S. Intensively modernizing, it finds ways to augment its totals via undisguised cheating. Bound by no numerical or qualitative limits, China speeds its strategic development. To cripple U.S. retaliatory capability, an enemy would have to destroy only four or five submarines at sea, two sub bases, half a dozen bomber bases, and 450 missile silos.
Russia has 49 attack submarines, China 65, with which to track and kill American nuclear missile subs under way. Were either to build or cheat to 5,000 warheads (the U.S. once had more than 30,000) and two-thirds reached their targets, four warheads could strike each aim point, with 2,000 left to hold hostage American cities and industry. China and Russia are far less dense and developed than the U.S., and it would take more strikes for us to hold them at risk than vice versa, a further indictment of reliance upon sufficiency calculations and symmetrical reductions.
Russia dreams publicly of its former hold on Eastern Europe and cannot but see opportunity in a disintegrating European Union and faltering NATO. China annexes the South China Sea and looks to South Korea, Japan and Australasia as future subordinates. Given the degradation of U.S. and allied conventional forces previously able to hold such ambitions in check, critical confrontations are bound to occur. When they do occur, and if without American reaction, China or Russia have continued to augment their strategic forces to the point of vast superiority where one or both consider a first strike feasible, we may see nuclear brinkmanship (or worse) in which the United States—startled from sleep and suddenly disabused of the myth of sufficiency—might have to capitulate, allowing totalitarian dictatorships to dominate the world.
Current trajectories point in exactly this direction, but in regard to such things Donald Trump hasn’t the foggiest, and, frankly, Hillary Clinton, like the president, doesn’t give a damn.
The way to avoid such a tragedy is to bring China into a nuclear control regime or answer its refusal with our own proportional increases and modernization. And to make sure that both our nuclear and conventional forces are strong, up-to-date, and survivable enough to deter the militant ambitions of the two great powers rising with daring vengeance from what they regard as the shame of their oppression.
Mr. Helprin, a senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, is the author of “Winter’s Tale,” “A Soldier of the Great War” and the forthcoming novel “Paris in the Present Tense.”
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-studied-future-japan-nuclear-arsenal-war-china/
-
For the record, I do not think this piece describes Trump's position fairly or accurately. That said, he does need to get clearer in his thinking and articulation than he has been so far. This is quite important.
With Trump, Asia’s Nuclear Crisis Expands
Next to North Korea and fearing U.S. abandonment, South Korea and Japan weigh their own options.
In this June 23, 2016, file photo, people watch a TV news channel airing an image of North Korea's ballistic missile launch published in North Korea's Rodong Sinmun newspaper at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea. ENLARGE
In this June 23, 2016, file photo, people watch a TV news channel airing an image of North Korea's ballistic missile launch published in North Korea's Rodong Sinmun newspaper at the Seoul Railway Station in Seoul, South Korea. Photo: Associated Press
By David Feith
Nov. 10, 2016 12:10 p.m. ET
4 COMMENTS
Seoul
The nuclear crisis in Northeast Asia was bound to be one of the most dangerous challenges facing the next U.S. president, no matter who won on Tuesday. With Donald Trump’s surprise victory, though, it could metastasize in dramatic ways: If you thought North Korea’s nuclear march was disconcerting, consider that South Korea and Japan may now pursue nuclear programs of their own, raising the risks and stakes of war not only with North Korea but China too.
Mr. Trump repeatedly endorsed such a nuclear proliferation cascade on the campaign trail. “At some point we have to say—you know what?—we’re better off if Japan protects itself against this maniac in North Korea, we’re better off, frankly, if South Korea is going to start to protect itself,” he said. This was a corollary to his threats to pull U.S. troops from Japan and South Korea, where they’ve helped secure peace for more than six decades, if those countries don’t start spending dramatically more on their own defense.
It’s possible Mr. Trump will drop his enthusiasm for South Korean and Japanese nuclearization upon entering the Oval Office. His campaign advisers tended to ignore the subject in public statements, likely a reflection of the decades-old bipartisan consensus against nuclear proliferation in Washington. But as with other issues, the approach of President Trump will depend on who he brings into the White House for advice, and whether he listens to them.
Cheong Seong-chang will be calling for South Korean nuclearization either way. Speaking in Seoul last week, before America voted, the soft-spoken scholar and former government advisor argued that his country needs nukes to defend itself, that a majority of his countrymen agree, and that skeptics in government will embrace the view sooner or later. Sooner if a Trump administration backs it, he says, but within a decade regardless.
Two months ago Mr. Cheong and other security, diplomatic and engineering experts launched the Nuclear Research Group for Korea to study Seoul’s options. A similar group was established in the early 1990s, he says, but disbanded within a few years “under heavy social pressure” because it was “politically incorrect” to broach the nuclear issue. Today that taboo is gone.
Since January North Korea has conducted two nuclear tests, its fourth and fifth overall, and likely moved closer to a hydrogen-bomb capability that threatens to “wipe out all of Seoul,” Mr. Cheong notes. It has also tested more than 20 ballistic missiles, at least one of which could threaten the U.S. homeland, and completed its first successful submarine and road-mobile launches. Analysts figure it could have 100 bombs by 2020, before the first Trump term is up.
Mr. Cheong argues that at this point North Korea won’t let its nuclear program be rolled back diplomatically, “no matter how many sanctions we impose.” China’s policy of protecting its ally from collapse “will remain unchanged.” And when Pyongyang inevitably acquires a credible capability to hit the U.S. with nuclear-tipped missiles, “the U.S. will have no choice but to come to the negotiating table” and sue for peace.
This will yield, “if not a total abandonment of South Korea,” then a bargain aimed at mere containment: “If North Korea has 50 nuclear weapons, and promises not to build any more, and to suspend missile tests, the U.S. will strike a deal.” Tensions between Pyongyang and Washington may cool, he says, “but South Korea will continue to be held hostage.”
Hence the need to go nuclear. South Korea’s civilian nuclear infrastructure—24 plants providing 30% of the country’s energy—could be used to produce 5,000 bombs worth of fissile material, Mr. Cheong says, dwarfing Pyongyang’s capability. Embracing the necessary technologies, including plutonium reprocessing, could be “the game-changer that will enable South Korea to manage North Korean problems.”
It would also “be consistent with U.S. security interests,” Mr. Cheong says, and “contain the nuclear issue within the boundary of the Korean Peninsula.” These are the claims that put him most at odds with longstanding thinking in Washington, where leaders generally fear that South Korea going nuclear could shatter the U.S.-South Korean alliance, spark a war with the North and trigger follow-on nuclearization in Japan and maybe Taiwan—developments China is liable to protest with military force.
Mr. Cheong thinks certain compromises can make it all work. Seoul would go nuclear but also engage Pyongyang economically and diplomatically, assuring Kim Jong Un that no one seeks his demise. Seoul would build only as many bombs as needed to have an edge (“if the North has 30, we have 40, for example”). And Seoul would ask the U.S. to “co-manage” its arsenal, preserving the bilateral alliance while assuring China and Russia that South Koreans have ultimate control over the weapons.
Japan may indeed seek to go nuclear, Mr. Cheong acknowledges, but it too could placate its rivals by keeping its arsenal small and co-managed. “The U.S. should assure China that Japan will not build more than a certain number of nuclear weapons large enough to counter the North Korean threat,” allowing China to “maintain its nuclear advantage over other Asian countries.” Taiwan, for its part, has to sit on its hands.
Such prescriptions seem rather tidy given all the uncertainties and dangers involved, and for years Seoul and Washington could dismiss them as non-starters. Even as majorities of South Koreans have told pollsters since the 1990s that they support nuclearization, policy makers in both capitals have been overwhelmingly opposed. That may no longer be so.
Several potential candidates in South Korea’s looming presidential election back nuclearization, including former National Assembly floor leader Won Yoo-cheol and Nam Kyung-pil, governor of the country’s most populous province. Mr. Cheong, who acknowledges that “experts and technocrats have tended to be against going nuclear,” says that officials have privately expressed greater interest since Pyongyang’s latest nuclear test in September. Once Pyongyang completes a hydrogen bomb, he says, “many experts will switch their views.”
Then there’s Donald Trump. If he sticks to supporting South Korean and Japanese nuclearization, he might as well hold a bonfire of traditional U.S. nonproliferation dogmas on the White House lawn.
Even if he reverses course, though, his record of denigrating U.S. allies has already made South Koreans and others more fearful of abandonment and therefore more likely to hedge their bets and consider going nuclear, despite the costs. Mr. Trump reportedly had a good phone call with South Korea’s president Wednesday night, but it’s no surprise that headlines this week in Seoul are blaring about “shock” and “panic.”
As Mr. Cheong predicted last week: A Trump presidency “will reshape the security landscape of Northeast Asia.”
Mr. Feith is a Journal editorial writer based in Hong Kong.
-
Summary
A long-embattled arms control pact signed by Moscow and Washington in 1987 took its biggest hit yet this month. On Feb. 14, allegations emerged that the Russians had deployed operational units equipped with missiles that violate the landmark Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF). In response, three U.S. senators introduced the INF Preservation Act, which among other measures calls for the United States to develop its own prohibited missiles. The precarious state of the treaty adds urgency to questions about the potential consequences of its demise, particularly since both countries have growing incentives to abandon the pact. Withdrawal by either Moscow or Washington would compel a rapid buildup of short- and medium-range missiles by both militaries, a surge of investment in missile defense, and a boost to U.S. capabilities in the Western Pacific.
Analysis
When the Soviet Union and the United States signed the INF treaty, it effectively ended a destabilizing buildup of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with short to intermediate ranges, defined as 500-5,500 kilometers (311-3,418 miles). Since then, nearly 3,000 missiles have been eliminated — most of which would have been deployed on the European continent — making the INF a foundational arms control agreement credited with slowing the arms race between Russia and the United States. Outright withdrawal from the treaty by either government would severely hamper future arms control efforts and accelerate an already-intensifying arms race focused on nuclear modernization.
The Treaty Hampers Russia More
For all the problems that would arise with the treaty's demise, Russian and U.S. defense planners have some reasons to look forward to its end. For example, a buildup of land-based intermediate-range missiles would enhance Russian defenses against an increasingly powerful Chinese military on the China-Russia border. It would also give Russia options in the event that the United States expands its already substantial advantage in the development of hypersonic weapons, which travel at least five times the speed of sound. Perhaps most important, boosting its arsenal of short- to intermediate-range missiles based on land could help Russia redress its considerable airpower disadvantage relative to the United States and NATO.
Indeed, the INF has hampered Russia's long-range conventional strike capabilities more than the United States'. This is because Washington has built up a sizable arsenal of long-range land-attack missiles over the past decades. These air- and sea-launched missiles, when combined with the U.S. stealth bomber and fighter advantages, give Washington a much greater capability to conduct long-range strikes, including deep inside Russian territory. Development of land-based intermediate-range missiles would help Russia narrow this imbalance. For example, given the range and punching power of the missiles, Russia could threaten NATO air bases across Europe — just as China's missile program has given it the ability to strike U.S. bases in the Western Pacific.
Withdrawal from the INF would also boost Russia's nuclear deterrence capabilities. Ever since Washington withdrew from the U.S.-Russia Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in 2002, Moscow has become increasingly concerned about U.S. missile defense development. Building an arsenal of nuclear-tipped intermediate-range missiles would allow the Russians to retarget practically all their intercontinental ballistic missiles — which are limited in number by New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) — against the continental United States. This would help guarantee Russia's ability to respond in the event of a nuclear strike.
However, any surge in Russian and U.S. development of land-based intermediate range missiles would be accompanied by greater investment in missile defense. With an eye on potential threats from countries such as Iran and North Korea, the United States has already been pouring substantial resources into the development of systems including the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense anti-ballistic missile system (THAAD) and various variants of the SM-3 interceptor missiles. This would intensify if Russia began a rapid buildup of short- and intermediate-range missiles — especially since ballistic missile defenses are significantly more effective against shorter-range weapons.
The U.S. Eyes the Western Pacific
Though the INF treaty limits Russia more than the United States, Washington has its own problems with the pact — particularly in the Western Pacific. Long-range land-attack cruise and ballistic missiles are critical to any U.S. war-fighting scenario in East Asia, particularly given the vast distances that would be involved in regional operations. While the INF treaty has limited the United States to fielding air- and sea-launched missiles of short to intermediate range, the Chinese have been free to build up a vast arsenal of land-based versions of the missiles. From launching points across the Chinese mainland, Beijing could concentrate crippling strikes on the sparse number of available U.S. airfields in the region — an asymmetric advantage the Chinese have focused heavily on exploiting over the past decades to make up for U.S. superiority in other areas. If the INF treaty were to be abandoned, the United States would likely move quickly to build up its own land-based missile batteries to redress this disadvantage.
The fate of the INF treaty has not yet been sealed. In fact, the United States and Russia could leverage the arms control portfolio to further talks on other issues, as they have done with arms control talks in the past. But the factors threatening the treaty have been gaining strength in both countries for decades.
Today, Washington is unlikely to seriously consider halting its ballistic missile development, and the U.S. Congress will not easily agree to curtail ongoing nuclear modernization programs — two areas where continued U.S. progress will heighten Moscow's interest in abandoning the INF treaty. Meanwhile, the rise of China has similarly complicated the fate of a treaty, which was designed with a bipolar Cold War framework in mind. Beijing will be exceedingly reluctant to limit development of its own land-based short- and intermediate-range missiles, given its heavy reliance on the arsenal.
Thus, at minimum, the INF treaty will be violated more frequently, but its demise is a very real possibility. The consequences would be vast, affecting everything from future arms control efforts to technological investments and weapons buildups.
-
http://nationalinterest.org/blog/russias-nuclear-missile-death-train-arriving-2019-19581
-
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/04/24/obama-iran-nuclear-deal-prisoner-release-236966
Obama’s hidden Iran deal giveaway
www.politico.com
By dropping charges against major arms targets, the administration infuriated Justice Department officials — and undermined its own counterproliferation task forces.
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-4440812/Obama-dropped-charges-against-arms-smugglers-Iran-deal.html
-
https://www.nytimes.com/video/world/middleeast/100000005063944/syria-chemical-attack-russia.html?emc=edit_ta_20170427&nl=top-stories&nlid=49641193&ref=cta
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/intel-report-iran-refining-nuke-delivery-system-flagrant-violation-ban/
-
http://freebeacon.com/national-security/intel-report-iran-refining-nuke-delivery-system-flagrant-violation-ban/
(http://insider.foxnews.com/sites/insider.foxnews.com/files/styles/780/public/sailors.jpg?itok=ERjTHM45)
http://insider.foxnews.com/sites/insider.foxnews.com/files/styles/780/public/sailors.jpg?itok=ERjTHM45
Who is going to stop them?
-
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/15/un-agency-helps-north-korea-with-patent-application-for-banned-nerve-gas-chemical.html
:cry: :cry: :cry: :x :x :x :x :x :x
-
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2017/05/15/un-agency-helps-north-korea-with-patent-application-for-banned-nerve-gas-chemical.html
:cry: :cry: :cry: :x :x :x :x :x :x
Shocking!
Not!!!
-
http://aevnmont.free.fr/SACH-BOOKS/Petrochemistry/Handbook%20of%20Hazardous%20Materials%20Spills%20Technology/Part%20VIII.%20Perspectives%20on%20Specific%20Chemicals/39.%20Sodium%20Cyanide.pdf
I recall from my forensic science days potassium cyanide smells to some people like bitter almonds and sodium is odorless and more dangerous
Of course Kim is using to mine for gold. :roll:
How much did UN officials get pain? bunch of slobs......
-
By Asher Orkaby
June 4, 2017 3:37 p.m. ET
34 COMMENTS
When Syrian forces launched a chemical attack on the town of Khan Sheikhoun two months ago, no one was watching more closely than Israel’s military elite. Of all the existential threats their country fears, chemical weapons rank high on the list. In 1967 Israeli fear of a chemical attack helped spark the Six Day War, the most transformative conflict in the modern history of the Middle East. Continued use of chemical weapons in Syria poses a similar threat to Israeli security—and may foreshadow another regional war.
The first country to use chemical weapons in the Middle East was Egypt. During the 1960s, President Gamal Abdel Nasser deployed poison-gas bombs during the North Yemen Civil War. Unknown to the Egyptians, Israel had obtained a front-row seat to study their military capabilities.
The conflict involved the Yemen Arab Republic, founded in 1962 after a coup d’état deposed the country’s religious monarch, Imam Muhammad al-Badr. Egypt took the republican side, sending mechanized and heavily armed battalions to aid the revolutionaries.
The monarchist northern tribal militias, aided by a cadre of British and French mercenaries, took shelter in the country’s mountainous highlands. The problem was finding a way to resupply their position. After concluding that an air resupply was vital, the mercenaries began searching for an ally willing to orchestrate airlifts into hostile and unfamiliar territory. In the end they turned to Israel, the only country with something substantial to gain from an extended guerrilla war against Egypt.
Between 1964 and 1966, the Israeli Air Force flew 14 missions to Yemen, airlifting vital weapons and supplies to beleaguered tribal outposts. Although the identity of the supplier was a closely guarded secret, these airlifts constituted an important physical and psychological lift for the tribal militias.
In exchange, Israel received well-informed intelligence from its own pilots and British mercenaries on the ground. The Israelis’ main contact was Neil McLean, a former Special Air Service soldier and member of the British Parliament. McLean passed to Israel details of Egypt’s military activity, even samples of its chemical weapons.
The Egyptian Air Force had been dropping the poison-gas bombs, targeting militias hiding in a network of caves, with increasing frequency and precision. This news alarmed Israelis, many of whom had lost family and friends to Hitler’s poison-gas chambers only two decades earlier. They were haunted by the prospect of a similar fate befalling them in a gas attack on Tel Aviv or another Israeli city. A sense of looming existential threat pervaded Israeli society, down to the local school district. In one emergency meeting in May 1967, teachers debated security protocols. In the event of an air-raid siren, should students be ushered into the basement bunkers? Or would climbing to the rooftops be better for escaping poison gas?
The fear of a chemical attack undoubtedly factored into Israel’s decision to attack Egypt’s air force pre-emptively on June 5, 1967. Over five hours Israel destroyed 300 Egyptian planes and disabled 18 airfields, eliminating the short-term threat of chemical warfare. But the long-term danger has remained.
There is a clear parallel to the current conflict in Syria. What made the 1960s crisis in Yemen so dangerous was that the international community did not respond to Egypt’s use of chemical weapons. The Yemeni civil war was waved off as merely an intra-Arab conflict. Without visible international assurances that chemical warfare would not be tolerated, Israel in 1967 felt compelled to eliminate the threat before it arrived.
In the barrage of Tomahawk missiles President Trump launched against Syria in April, the U.S. provided some response to the latest chemical attack. Failure to follow up this show of force with collective international action—making clear to Israel that further chemical warfare is off the table—may push the Middle East toward another destructive regional war.
Mr. Orkaby, a research fellow at Harvard’s Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations Department, is the author of “Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962-68,” out next month from Oxford University Press.
-
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-missile-defense-imperative-1498425131
-
Looks like we have another lurker on the forum :lol:
http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/238409/north-korea-and-iran-weapons-of-mass-destruction?utm_source=tabletmagazinelist&utm_campaign=02ea17d165-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_06_27&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_c308bf8edb-02ea17d165-207194629
-
https://www.aol.com/article/news/2017/05/25/if-a-nuclear-bomb-explodes-nearby-heres-why-you-should-never-get-in-a-car/22109354/?ncid=txtlnkusaolp00001389&a_dgi=aolshare_facebook
-
second post:
The Terrible Magic of Atomic Weapons
Aug 2, 2017
By George Friedman
On Aug. 2, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima. The U.S. remains the only country to have ever used nuclear weapons. As part of our project to review major World War II battles, I will examine the reasoning on both sides that led to the use of this weapon.
The Japanese had entered the war because of the effectiveness of U.S. economic sanctions imposed after the Japanese had invaded Indochina. As an industrial power devoid of its own resources, Japan had to import nearly all of its resources, mostly from Indochina and the Dutch East Indies.
The United States feared that Japan, after dominating the Western Pacific, would soon threaten its interests in the central and eastern Pacific. Japan had treaty agreements with France and the Netherlands guaranteeing shipments of commodities. When both were overrun by Germany, it became uncertain who would control their Pacific colonies, and Japan could not live with that uncertainty. When the U.S. tried to restrict Japan’s access to certain resources in order to limit Japanese expansion, Japan had a choice: It could continue expanding and face war with the United States, or it could allow itself to become completely dependent on the United States for access to minerals.
The United States saw Japan as an international outlaw that needed to be heeled by peaceful sanctions. The Japanese saw the United States as using sanctions to crush Japan’s economy. The result was war.
U.S. and Japanese Goals
The United States had two strategic goals. The first was to disrupt Japanese access to Southeast Asia supplies without invading the Dutch East Indies or Indochina. This meant intense submarine warfare. The second goal was to bring itself into range of Japan so that it could conduct a strategic bombing campaign. By 1945, the submarine campaign had dramatically reduced the flow of supplies, and the capture of Saipan and Tinian had brought B-29s within range of Japan.
The Japanese strategy strategic goal in 1945 was to prevent the occupation of the Japanese homeland and retain the existing regime, particularly the position of the emperor. The primary strategy for this was to create a defensive system that would potentially impose unacceptable casualties on the United States.
During the Pacific campaigns, the Japanese had learned that American pre-invasion bombing and bombardment were of limited value. The U.S. succeeded by forcing land battles that had high casualty rates but low casualty totals, relative to other battles in World War II, since these battles were comparatively small. This worked in the Gilberts, the Marianas and the Marshalls. What this proved, however, was that the U.S. would incur a high casualty rate in an invasion of Japan, which would require a substantially larger force.
The U.S. Navy suffered the greatest casualties due to the kamikazes. The Japanese strategy therefore focused on using the kamikazes to attack the Navy and on forcing battles of attrition by layering forces, including civilians, into the interior. Although this imposed catastrophic casualties on the Japanese – estimates say a quarter million died in Okinawa – American troops also suffered severe casualties.
(click to enlarge)
The Japanese were betting on asymmetry of interest. They were fighting for their homeland and for a regime that was far from delegitimized. The Americans were fighting for an increasingly marginal goal – dismantling the Japanese regime. The Japanese believed that the U.S. would give up first and agree to a truce rather than requiring Japan’s unconditional surrender.
This was a reasonable assumption given that the United States’ most experienced troops were already exhausted from war in North Africa, Italy, France and Germany, and its most seasoned Marines had been fighting since Guadalcanal. If the U.S. did invade Japan, the troops that would be sent were the draftees from 1944 and 1945 who were inexperienced and not yet blooded. Instead, the U.S. hoped that bombing and submarine warfare would have forced capitulation.
It hadn’t. Most cities were devastated, and the condition of the economy had reduced the country to penury. But the Japanese wouldn’t capitulate. While they did send out peace feelers, they didn’t include an offer to surrender – merely an offer to negotiate a settlement. The agreement among the Allies was that only unconditional surrender was acceptable, since the U.S. did not want a repeat of Versailles after World War I. They wanted to end Japanese expansion, and a prolonged negotiation would have exacerbated the ongoing bloodshed in China. Besides, Japan had already lost credibility with respect to peace negotiations, as it had previously been engaged in such talks while its fleet was preparing for Pearl Harbor. The argument for a negotiated settlement was not nearly as obvious then as it is now.
The Atomic Project
Still, the U.S. was caught in a bind. It couldn’t afford the potential costs of invading, and it also couldn’t accept anything less than total capitulation, which the Japanese weren’t willing to offer. It was this strategic situation that led to the use of atomic bombs. The atomic project was driven by German scientists and those who feared that Germany would develop a nuclear weapon. But the Germans didn’t have the resources necessary to both define the concept and create the weapon; only the U.S. was capable of such a massive undertaking during the war. But the Americans were unaware of the limitations of the German program and therefore launched the Manhattan Project, the U.S program to develop an atomic bomb.
Years later, some would argue that the United States dropped the bomb to frighten the Soviets or keep them out of Japan. But the Soviets couldn’t have invaded Japan anyway; they lacked the capability to send a massive number of troops there. The Soviets, moreover, already knew about the bomb, although the U.S. didn’t realize that at the time. If the U.S. wanted to impress the Soviets, it had many ways to do it that didn’t involve bombing Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
A boy floats a candle-lit paper lantern on the river in front of the Atomic Bomb Dome during 70th anniversary activities, commemorating the atomic bombing of Hiroshima on Aug. 6, 2015. Photo by Chris McGrath/Getty Images
The first test of the bomb took place in July 1945, in the midst of the American strategic conundrum. Would the country accept the cost of occupying Japan when it would turn out that there was a potential alternative to massive American casualties? It’s unclear what Harry Truman would have done if the bomb wasn’t an option, but he would have been pilloried had he invaded or had he not. The country, the troops included, was tired of war and wasn’t willing to pay the cost of invasion. But a peace treaty that allowed the Japanese regime to stay intact would have left the fundamental issues that started the war unsettled. This is not an argument as to which side was more just. It is simply to say that a peace treaty wouldn’t have been a conclusive end to the war.
It was clear that the Japanese leadership was prepared to accept the destruction of cities, and that the population was not prepared to rise against the regime. The Americans therefore believed that the Japanese were not prepared to surrender, which in retrospect was true. The Japanese view was that the U.S. either wouldn’t invade or, if it did, would face casualties that would cause it to accept a peace treaty.
But the atomic bomb presented another potential scenario. Although Japanese cities had faced devastating attacks before, this threat was different because a single bomb could do the damage of a thousand. Moreover, the extent of the casualties from an atomic bomb was still unclear, in part due to the uncertainty of injury caused by nuclear fallout. But the Americans were focused on the psychological effect it would have. While the Bombing of Tokyo had a devastating impact, the means of death was not a mystery.
The atomic bomb worked terrible magic. The suddenness and totality of the strike created a unique sense of helplessness. It was instantaneous, and it came from nowhere. There were some in the pro-war faction who argued that the bomb used on Hiroshima was simply another massive air attack and not a new weapon. The deaths and destruction were, from their point of view, bearable because it was part of a known pattern.
They refused to surrender. Some even attempted a coup, which came close to success. But for some leaders, Hiroshima immediately tipped the balance to surrender. But capitulation only came after Nagasaki and after the U.S. acknowledged that the emperor would remain as a figurehead, causing him to shift his position.
Ultimately, the atomic bomb ended the war, partly because of the psychological shock and partly because Japan realized that the bomb could be used against Japanese defensive forces massed to face a potential invasion. We can only speculate how many American casualties or how many more Chinese casualties this move prevented.
A Sobering Effect
Eight other nations have acquired nuclear weapons: the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, China, Israel, India, Pakistan and South Africa. (South Africa has subsequently given up these weapons.) North Korea has developed nuclear devices but it’s unclear whether it has a deliverable nuclear weapon. None of these countries has used their weapons, though some have found themselves in circumstances where using them would have made sense. Some, particularly Mao’s China, raved about what they would do with nuclear weapons once they had them. But they didn’t end up doing what they said they would do. In a sense, they aren’t weapons designed to fight armies. (Tactical nukes might be an exception, although they have also not been used.) They seem to have a sobering effect.
The question today is whether the magic of these weapons might sober North Korea or Iran. Some argue that it would sober North Korea, the more immediate and more important case. Human history, and specifically the 20th century, are filled with nations that committed acts of political depravity – but not, even in the case of Stalin or Mao, nuclear depravity. The problem is that it’s hard to build a national policy on the assumption that nuclear weapons moderate the depraved.
In making the decision to use a nuclear weapon, the U.S. faced some tough choices. It had to balance its moral responsibility to American troops and those who were still being slaughtered by the Japanese against the lives of those who would be killed in a nuclear attack. But the idea that Japan was ready to surrender is a myth. It was ready to negotiation a peace deal; it wouldn’t accept unconditional surrender. This could have opened the door to another war, allowing the slaughter of Americans who had already fought and survived a long war.
But it did deeply sober the United States. It opened an abyss the U.S. and all the other nuclear powers looked into and recoiled from. Their use may well have prevented a global nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But will the sobering effect of nuclear weapons extend to other countries like North Korea? Or will a nuclear North Korea embrace the abyss? This is not a geopolitical question as much as a psychological one.
The post The Terrible Magic of Atomic Weapons appeared first on Geopolitics | Geopolitical Futures.
-
https://pjmedia.com/trending/2017/08/06/the-secret-history-of-hiroshima-supports-trump-on-nuclear-weapons/
-
http://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2017/08/04/surviving_a_nuclear_attack_111968.html
-
I have pounded the table around here for identifying that the Iran deal also meant an end to the era of nuclear non-proliferation:
Nuclear Missiles Over Tokyo
Accepting a nuclear North Korea probably means a nuclear Japan.
A South Korean watches a broadcast on North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch in Seoul, South Korea, Aug. 2.
A South Korean watches a broadcast on North Korea's latest ballistic missile launch in Seoul, South Korea, Aug. 2. Photo: heon-ky/epa-efe/rex/shutterstock/EPA/Shutterstock
By The Editorial Board
Aug. 29, 2017 7:09 p.m. ET
46 COMMENTS
Residents of northern Japan awoke Tuesday to sirens and cellphone warnings to take cover as a North Korean rocket flew overhead. The intermediate-range missile test will further roil the politics of security in Northeast Asia and is another prod toward Japan acquiring its own nuclear deterrent.
Pyongyang tested long-range missiles over Japan in 1998 and 2009, claiming they were satellite launches. The first shocked Japanese and led to cooperation with the U.S. on theater missile defense. After the second, Tokyo curtailed the North’s funding sources within Japan’s ethnic Korean community. Tuesday’s launch is even more threatening because U.S. and allied intelligence agencies assess that North Korea now has the ability to hit Japan with a miniaturized nuclear warhead mounted on a missile.
Much of Japan is protected by its own missile defenses as well as systems operated by U.S. forces in the region. Japan also recently deployed four Patriot PAC-3 missile-defense batteries to the west of the country, but these didn’t cover the northern island of Hokkaido overflown by Tuesday’s missile.
–– ADVERTISEMENT ––
Japan’s ultimate security is the U.S. defense and nuclear umbrella, with its treaty guarantee that the U.S. will respond if Japan is attacked. But the logic of deterrence depends on having a rational actor as an adversary, and rationality can’t be guaranteed in North Korea. Its recent development of an ICBM capable of hitting the U.S. mainland also changes the equation. If North Korea attacked Tokyo and the U.S. responded with an attack on Pyongyang, U.S. cities might then be endangered.
Japanese leaders have long resisted building their own nuclear arsenal, but that could change if they conclude America isn’t reliable in a crisis. Or Japanese may simply decide they can’t have their survival depend on even a faithful ally’s judgment. Some Japanese politicians are already talking about their own nuclear deterrent. And while public opinion currently opposes nuclear weapons, fear could change minds. Japan has enough plutonium from its civilian nuclear reactors for more than 1,000 nuclear warheads, and it has the know-how to build them in months.
This prospect should alarm China, which would suddenly face a nuclear-armed regional rival. The U.S. also has a strong interest in preventing a nuclear Japan, not least because South Korea might soon follow. East Asia would join the Middle East in a new era of nuclear proliferation, with grave risks to world order. This is one reason that acquiescing to a North Korea with nuclear missiles is so dangerous.
Yet this is the line now peddled by former Obama National Security Adviser Susan Rice and former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, who says the U.S. must begin “accepting it and trying to cap it or control it.” Having said for eight years that a nuclear North is unacceptable, they now say that President Trump and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe had better get used to it.
But “control it” how? North Korea has made clear it won’t negotiate away its nuclear program. The U.S. can threaten mutual-assured destruction, but Tuesday’s missile test over Japan shows how North Korea will use its nuclear threat to coerce and divide the U.S. and its allies. Accepting a nuclear North Korea means accepting a far more dangerous world.
Appeared in the August 30, 2017, print edition.
-
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/North-Koreas-ultimatum-to-America-504213
-
Give Japan And South Korea The Bomb
By DICK MORRIS
Published on DickMorris.com on September 20, 2017
On May 6, 1981, New York Times columnist Drew Middleton explained the rationale behind French president Charles de Gaulle's decision to develop France's own nuclear weapons rather than rely on those of the U.S. or U.K. He wrote that "General de Gaulle believed that the United States would not use its nuclear weapons if faced with a choice between the destruction of Western Europe and a Soviet-American missile exchange. His argument was that the United States would not risk New York or Detroit to save Hamburg or Lyons."
The same logic, of course, applied to Russia. The Kremlin could have no clear idea of whether an American president would trade New York for Lyons, but clearly a French president wouldn't think twice before pushing the button in retaliation for a nuclear strike on Lyons.
The logic of deterrence relies on mutually ASSURED destruction (MAD). Any doubt or ambiguity will fuel the megalomania and delusions of a Hitler or a Kim Jong-un.
Now, we must apply de Gaulle's logic to the dilemma of how to deter North Korea. Again, we come to the question: Will an American president strike North Korea with nuclear weapons in retaliation for an attack on Seoul or Tokyo? We don't know the answer and Kim certainly doesn't. And so, it now makes abundant sense to arm his two likely targets -- Japan and South Korea -- with the capacity to retaliate with nuclear weapons whatever the American president decides to do. Only then will Kim know that if he uses his atomic weapons against either country, he has literally bought into assured destruction of him and his own nation.
When Donald Trump proposed this solution during the campaign, he was hooted down. But circumstances have now come around to the point where we have to give his proposal a green light.
Some argue that giving the bomb to non-nuclear countries opens the door for everybody to get a bomb. As a practical matter, that door may already be open.
But why do we only allow our enemies to get the bomb and keep our friends from getting it?
Seventy years into the nuclear age, we have learned two things:
1. Any nation that wants to get the bomb badly enough will be able to get it.
2. Only mutually assured destruction can guarantee that the bomb is never used.
How much more evidence do we need?
Neither Japan nor South Korea will be thrilled to get nuclear weapons. Understandably, Japan's experience in having been attacked twice with atomic weapons makes it averse to such armament. And South Korea just voted for a "peace" candidate whose politics are founded in wishful thinking.
But eventually, both nations will likely see the logic and arm themselves with our assistance.
And, when both have nuclear weapons, we can expect a radical de-escalation in Kim's wild threats and rhetoric. We can also rest secure the nuclear weapons will not be used.
-
http://www.askaprepper.com/nuclear-protection-supplies/
-
NATO Launches its Main Nuclear Drill, Showcasing Its Defenses
‘Steadfast Noon’ takes place at air bases in Germany and Belgium where the U.S. stores nukes
By Julian E. Barnes
Oct. 16, 2017 8:07 a.m. ET
BRUSSELS—NATO kicked off its annual nuclear exercise on Monday with drills in Germany and Belgium, as the alliance seeks to showcase its nuclear deterrent but avoid accusations of saber rattling.
The exercise, called “Steadfast Noon,” is taking place at two air bases where the U.S. stores nuclear weapons in Europe: Kleine Brogel in Belgium and Büchel in Germany.
In the face of North Korean tests and Russian drills, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has been highlighting its nuclear defenses, with a visit by alliance ambassadors to a U.K. ballistic missile-armed submarine base in September. NATO has also taken a strong stance against the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty, saying it will remain a nuclear-armed alliance as long as these weapons exist elsewhere.
NATO’s nuclear drills remain sensitive; the alliance omits Steadfast Noon from many lists of its exercises. NATO officials won’t publicly confirm the nature of the exercise, but privately acknowledge it is the main nuclear deterrent drill.
An official said nuclear exercises remained a “delicate balancing act among allies,” with some countries uncomfortable with public discussions and others wanting acknowledgment of the deterrent’s importance. The official said continuing these annual preparations was vital, especially as geopolitical concerns increase.
Russia conducted a nuclear exercise at the end of its Zapad military drills in September, which included the test firing of a ballistic missile. North Korea’s nuclear threats have also prompted NATO ambassadors to condemn Pyongyang’s actions.
Uncertainty in Europe over U.S. President Donald Trump’s commitment to NATO, as well as the coming British withdrawal from the European Union, has generated concern among some security experts about the future of western nuclear deterrence.
“This is why it is so important that NATO continues with its classic nuclear planning structure, including these exercises,” said Jan Techau, director of the Holbrooke Forum for the Study of Diplomacy in Berlin. “It is important to send out the message of continuity and reliability, because that is what deterrence is based on.”
NATO officials would only say the exercise involved aircraft from across the alliance. In addition to Belgium and Germany, Poland has participated in Steadfast Noon since Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.
A NATO military official said the scenario involves a “fictional scenario.”
Both the U.S. and NATO have a policy of not commenting on their nuclear weapons. According to a Congressional Research Service report, the U.S. keeps about 150 B61 nuclear weapons at six bases in five European countries. The B61 is a 700-pound unguided gravity bomb that has a variable yield of up to 340 kilotons that can be carried by both tactical fighter aircraft and strategic bombers.
The U.S. deployed nuclear weapons to Europe during the Cold War to offset the conventional military superiority of the Soviet Union. While NATO now has the conventional edge over Russia, the weapons remain a deterrent and are meant as a visible reminder of the U.S. commitment to the alliance, according to current and former U.S. officials.
Military officials say nuclear weapons carried by aircraft remain an important part of deterrence, because the U.S. and its allies can show unity and resolve by prepping aircraft for a nuclear mission, raising the defense readiness condition, but stopping short of using the weapons.
The Obama administration said further cuts to the B61 arsenal in Europe would only come if Russia cut its stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons and removal of the weapons requires the agreement of all NATO allies.
-
http://gatesofvienna.net/2017/10/a-bang-followed-by-whimpering-and-silence/
A Bang Followed by Whimpering… and Silence
Posted on October 18, 2017 by Dymphna
EMP blast
Gotta love The Swamp. Now that North Korea (probably) has the capability to fire a missile into our airspace, TPTB have shut down the one governmental organization with the ability to do anything testicular to deter the Fat Boy driving the looming disaster.
Did you think NoKo is going to do something fissionable with its missiles and is going to simply try to “bomb” us? Well, it would seem that’s the intention, but the real problem is the payload on their missiles. All they need is one EMP detonated in our skies (over the East Coast, where lies most of our outdated electrical infrastructure) to send the continent back to say, 1850…and that will mean ninety percent of our population gone within six months or less. One can envision the follow-up: a leisurely walk-through by China. It would be easy-peasy to sort through the pieces of what remained of Canada and the United States.
From The Center for Security Policy [with my emphases — D]:
Inexplicably, just when we need the country’s most knowledgeable and influential minds advising about how to protect against a potentially imminent, nation-ending peril, the Congressional Electromagnetic Pulse Threat Commission is being shut down.
For seventeen years under the leadership of President Reagan’s Science Advisor, Dr. William Graham, this blue-ribbon panel has warned that we had to protect our electric grid from just the sorts of EMP attacks North Korea is now threatening to unleash upon us. Successive administrations and the electric utilities have shamefully failed to heed those warnings and take corrective action.
Consequently, we could experience on a national scale the sort of devastating, protracted blackouts now afflicting Puerto Rico. President Trump should give Dr. Graham and his team a new mandate as a presidential commission to oversee the immediate implementation of their recommendations.
This disaster happened at the end of September, while the MSM dithered away on their fiddles about the eeevil Trump. Meanwhile, two men who served on the panel appeared in front of this subcommittee to get the views of the panel into the permanent record, i.e. the Congressional Record. If/when it all goes down, their warnings will still exist, if anyone can access them after an EMP explosion:
STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
DR. WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, CHAIRMAN
DR. PETER VINCENT PRY, CHIEF OF STAFF
COMMISSION TO ASSESS THE THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES FROM
ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE (EMP) ATTACK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY HEARING
“EMPTY THREAT OR SERIOUS DANGER:
ASSESSING NORTH KOREA’S RISK TO THE HOMELAND”
Here is an excerpt from that “Statement For the Record” [any emphases are mine — D. The footnotes, which have been omitted here, can be found in the pdf linked at the end of this post]:
During the Cold War, major efforts were undertaken by the Department of Defense to assure that the U.S. national command authority and U.S. strategic forces could survive and operate after an EMP attack. However, no major efforts were then thought necessary to protect critical national infrastructures, relying on nuclear deterrence to protect them. With the development of small nuclear arsenals and long-range missiles by new, radical U.S. adversaries, beginning with North Korea, the threat of a nuclear EMP attack against the U.S. becomes one of the few ways that such a country could inflict devastating damage to the United States. It is critical, therefore, that the U.S. national leadership address the EMP threat as a critical and existential issue, and give a high priority to assuring the leadership is engaged and the necessary steps are taken to protect the country from EMP.
By way of background, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack was established by Congress in 2001 to advise the Congress, the President, Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the U.S. Government on the nuclear EMP threat to military systems and civilian critical infrastructures.The EMP Commission was re-established in 2015 with its charter broadened to include natural EMP from solar storms, all manmade EMP threats, cyber-attack, sabotage and Combined-Arms Cyber Warfare. The EMP Commission charter gives it access to all relevant classified and unclassified data and the power to levy analysis upon the Department of Defense.
On September 30, 2017, the Department of Defense, after withholding a significant part of the monies allocated by Congress to support the work of the EMP Commission for the entirety of 2016, terminated funding the EMP Commission. In the same month, North Korea detonated an H-Bomb that it plausibly describes as capable of “super-powerful EMP” attack and released a technical report “The EMP Might of Nuclear Weapons” accurately describing what Russia and China call a “Super-EMP” weapon.
Neither the Department of Defense nor the Department of Homeland Security has asked Congress to continue the EMP Commission. The House version of the National Defense Authorization Act includes a provision that would replace the existing EMP Commission with new Commissioners. Yet the existing EMP Commission comprises the nation’s foremost experts who have been officially or unofficially continuously engaged trying to advance national EMP preparedness for 17 years.
And today, as the EMP Commission has long warned, the nation faces a potentially imminent and existential threat of nuclear EMP attack from North Korea. Recent events have proven the EMP Commission’s critics wrong about other highly important aspects of the nuclear missile threat from North Korea:
Just six months ago, most experts thought North Korea’s nuclear arsenal was primitive, some academics claiming it had as few as [six] A-Bombs. Now the intelligence community reportedly estimates North Korea has [sixty] nuclear weapons.
Just six months ago, most experts thought North Korea’s ICBMs were fake, or if real could not strike the U.S. mainland. Now the intelligence community reportedly estimates North Korea’s ICBMs can strike Denver and Chicago, and perhaps the entire United States.
Just six months ago, most experts thought North Korea was many years away from an H-Bomb. Now it appears North Korea has H-Bombs comparable to sophisticated U.S. two-stage thermonuclear weapons.
Just six months ago, most experts claimed North Korean ICBMs could not miniaturize an A-Bomb or design a reentry vehicle for missile delivery. Now the intelligence community reportedly assesses North Korea has miniaturized nuclear weapons and has developed reentry vehicles for missile delivery, including by ICBMs that can strike the U.S.
After massive intelligence failures grossly underestimating North Korea’s long-range missile capabilities, [its] number of nuclear weapons, warhead miniaturization, and proximity to an H-Bomb, the biggest North Korean threat to the U.S. remains unacknowledged — a nuclear EMP attack.
North Korea confirmed the EMP Commission’s assessment by testing an H-Bomb that could make a devastating EMP attack, and in its official public statement: “The H-Bomb, the explosive power of which is adjustable from tens of kilotons to hundreds of kilotons, is a multi-functional thermonuclear weapon with great destructive power which can be detonated even at high altitudes for super-powerful EMP attack according to strategic goals.”
As noted earlier, Pyongyang also released a technical report accurately describing a “Super-EMP” weapon.
Just six months ago, some academics dismissed EMP Commission warnings and even, literally, laughed on National Public Radio at the idea North Korea could make an EMP attack.
Primitive and “Super-EMP” Nuclear Weapons are Both EMP Threats
The EMP Commission finds that even primitive, low-yield nuclear weapons are such a significant EMP threat that rogue states, like North Korea, or terrorists may well prefer using a nuclear weapon for EMP attack, instead of destroying a city: “Therefore, terrorists or state actors that possess relatively unsophisticated missiles armed with nuclear weapons may well calculate that, instead of destroying a city or military base, they may obtain the greatest political-military utility from one or a few such weapons by using them — or threatening their use — in an EMP attack.”
The EMP Commission 2004 Report warns: “Certain types of relatively low-yield nuclear weapons can be employed to generate potentially catastrophic EMP effects over wide geographic areas, and designs for variants of such weapons may have been illicitly trafficked for a quarter-century.”
In 2004, two Russian generals, both EMP experts, warned the EMP Commission that the design for Russia’s Super-EMP warhead, capable of generating high-intensity EMP fields over 100,000 volts per meter, was “accidentally” transferred to North Korea. They also said that due to “brain drain,” Russian scientists were in North Korea, as were Chinese and Pakistani scientists according to the Russians, helping with the North’s missile and nuclear weapon programs. In 2009, South Korean military intelligence told their press that Russian scientists are in North Korea helping develop an EMP nuclear weapon. In 2013, a Chinese military commentator stated North Korea has Super-EMP nuclear weapons.
Super-EMP weapons are low-yield and designed to produce not a big kinetic explosion, but rather a high level of gamma rays, which generates the high-frequency E1 EMP that is most damaging to the broadest range of electronics. North Korean nuclear tests, including the first in 2006, whose occurrence was predicted to the EMP Commission two years in advance by the two Russian EMP experts, mostly have yields consistent with the size of a Super-EMP weapon. The Russian generals’ accurate prediction about when North Korea would perform its first nuclear test, and of a yield consistent with a Super-EMP weapon, indicates their warning about a North Korean Super-EMP weapon should be taken very seriously.
EMP Threat From Satellites
While most analysts are fixated on when in the future North Korea will develop highly reliable intercontinental missiles, guidance systems, and reentry vehicles capable of striking a U.S. city, the threat here and now from EMP is largely ignored. EMP attack does not require an accurate guidance system because the area of effect, having a radius of hundreds or thousands of kilometers, is so large. No reentry vehicle is needed because the warhead is detonated at high-altitude, above the atmosphere. Missile reliability matters little because only one missile has to work to make an EMP attack against an entire nation.
North Korea could make an EMP attack against the United States by launching a short-range missile off a freighter or submarine or by lofting a warhead to 30 kilometers burst height by balloon. While such lower-altitude EMP attacks would not cover the whole U.S. mainland, as would an attack at higher-altitude (300 kilometers), even a balloon-lofted warhead detonated at 30 kilometers altitude could blackout the Eastern Electric Power Grid that supports most of the population and generates 75 percent of U.S. electricity.
Or an EMP attack might be made by a North Korean satellite, right now.
A Super-EMP weapon could be relatively small and lightweight and could fit inside North Korea’s Kwangmyongsong-3 (KMS-3) and Kwangmyongsong-4 (KMS-4) satellites. These two satellites presently orbit over the United States, and over every other nation on Earth–demonstrating, or posing, a potential EMP threat against the entire world.
North Korea’s KMS-3 and KMS-4 satellites were launched to the south on polar trajectories and passed over the United States on their first orbit. Pyongyang launched KMS-4 on February 7, 2017, shortly after its fourth illegal nuclear test on January 6, that began the present protracted nuclear crisis with North Korea.
The south polar trajectory of KMS-3 and KMS-4 evades U.S. Ballistic Missile Early Warning Radars and National Missile Defenses, resembling a Russian secret weapon developed during the Cold War, called the Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that would have used a nuclear-armed satellite to make a surprise EMP attack on the United States.
Ambassador Henry Cooper, former Director of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative and a preeminent expert on missile defenses and space weapons, has written numerous articles warning about the potential North Korean EMP threat from their satellites. For example, on September 20, 2016, Ambassador Cooper wrote:
U.S. ballistic missile defense (BMD) interceptors are designed to intercept a few North Korean ICBMs that approach the United States over the North Polar region. But current U.S. BMD systems are not arranged to defend against even a single ICBM that approaches the United States from over the South Polar region, which is the direction toward which North Korea launches its satellites…This is not a new idea. The Soviets pioneered and tested just such a specific capability decades ago — we call it a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS)…So, North Korea doesn’t need an ICBM to create this existential threat. It could use its demonstrated satellite launcher to carry a nuclear weapon over the South Polar region and detonate it…over the United States to create a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse (HEMP)…The result could be to shut down the U.S. electric power grid for an indefinite period, leading to the death within a year of up to 90 percent of all Americans — as the EMP Commission testified over eight years ago.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
This is the link to the whole report, fourteen pages long, which was read into the Congressional Record. Takes about twenty minutes to skim.
Here’s the website for The Oversight and Management Efficiency Subcommittee. Scroll down the list of members to see if your Congressman is on that committee. Better yet, write your own Congressman and tell him to get going on this critical issue. He doesn’t have to be a member of that subcommittee to nudge it forward. While you’re at it, send a tweet to Trump.
That commission was extant and active for seventeen years. Yet for some strange reason, it’s been disbanded now that we have two irrational actors on the world stage capable of bringing us to a neck-breaking halt.
At least Maine seems to be aware and active about the problem. Whether it’s past the initial stages of deciding what to do is hard to say, but its preliminary actions show the way forward for other states. States don’t have to wait for the Federal behemoth to move toward safety. They could even act regionally in a co-operative. This is especially important for our vulnerable northeastern corridor.
Here’s where you can find the contact information for your Congressional representative. It would be a good idea to lean on your state representatives, too. Send their assistants the pdf.
This time we can’t say we didn’t see it coming.
-
http://www.askaprepper.com/usaf-developed-new-bomb-creates-general-darkness-champ/
Electromagnetic pulse attacks are one of the most alarming threats facing the western world.
There are two reasons for that:
#1. The damage the attack would actually do, would be extreme. Look around you at all the things you use every day. How many of them contain electronics? An EMP attack would destroy them all – and it would also destroy most of the infrastructure you rely on. Utilities, traffic signals, the railways and much more would all be wrecked by electromagnetic pulse. So, using such a weapon against the aging and overly-taxed United States power grid could quickly wreak havoc and ultimately cause millions of deaths in America.
Related: 5 Things You Need to Do When There’ll Be No Rule of Law
#2. The second reason is that, politically, they’re a weapon that’s very easy to use for blackmail. After all, an EMP attack on the USA wouldn’t directly kill anyone. As the famous Don Cheadle noted in the ever-relevant Ocean’s 11, this new weapon “is a bomb — but without the bomb”.
So, sure, thousands of people would die as transportation, medical and water purification systems failed, but nobody would be killed by the actual weapon. Would the USA be able, politically, to retaliate with a nuclear strike when the enemy had “only” detonated a weapon in space, a couple of hundred miles above the country? After all, the explosion wouldn’t even be in US airspace – that ends at an altitude of 50 miles. Would Congress agree to incinerate North Korean cities in reply to a “soft” attack like an EMP? In a sane world they would, because a big EMP would do more damage to the USA than actually nuking a single decent-sized city would, but the indirect nature of an EMP attack makes it a gray area.
Related: Affordable Vehicles That Can Survive an EMP
Unfortunately the risk of an EMP attack by a rogue state, especially North Korea, is increasing fast. In fact Pyongyang announced in September that they’ve developed a weapon that’s suitable for using as a high-altitude EMP, and they’ve made enough technological progress recently that this claim has to be taken seriously.
Now, experts reporting to the House Committee on Homeland Security are urging the federal government to develop its own EMP capability as a deterrent. If the USA could reply in kind to an EMP attack, instead of having to escalate to nuclear strikes on actual ground targets, a potential attacker will know that a counterstrike is almost inevitable.
What’s caused this is the realization that, when it comes to North Korea’s nuclear arsenal, most people have been seriously underestimating the threat. The Pentagon now think the Stalinist regime already has around 60 nuclear warheads, and can reach the USA with them. So far, North Korea doesn’t have a missile capable of reaching the contiguous states, and even if they developed one it wouldn’t have the accuracy to hit even a large target like a city. The problem is, if they opted for an EMP attack, that doesn’t matter.
emp military manual
DoD Technical Report – EMP Handbook for Air Force Communications Service
To devastate a huge chunk of the USA with an EMP, all the North Koreans have to do is get a warhead to detonate somewhere in a target area hundreds of miles across. That doesn’t need much in the way of technology to achieve. Building a rocket capable of carrying the warhead is a brute-force problem; it’s just a matter of packing enough fuel into a big enough steel tube, and there’s no need for sophisticated guidance systems. As long as the rocket can be relied on to go in the right direction, a clockwork timer is literally good enough.
Even worse, they wouldn’t necessarily even need a big rocket. A nuclear-armed satellite could be launched into low Earth orbit, then commanded to detonate as it passed over the USA. Alternatively, weapons could be suspended from balloons and released so high-altitude winds would carry them across North America. Warheads could even be launched by SCUD-type missiles from commercial ships off the US coast, to explode at high altitude several hundred miles inland. There are lots of options; what matters is that, however the attack was launched, it would be devastating.
Related: Emergency Bag to Keep in Your Car in Case of an EMP
It wouldn’t be hard for the USA to develop its own EMP capability, allowing any country that attacked in this way to get a rapid dose of its own medicine. In fact, a software edit would probably allow current strategic weapons – Trident II sub-launched missiles or Minuteman-III ICBMs – to detonate a warhead at high altitude. Modifying warheads to create a much greater EMP effect wouldn’t be much harder; the USA already knows how to do that. It’s most likely that modified weapons would be launched by Trident, which can carry up to twelve warheads – that would allow an attacker to be blanketed with relatively small weapons, each devastating electronics and power cables over a radius of hundreds of miles.
If the Pentagon decides to build this capability the chances of a hostile nation launching an EMP attack at the USA go way down; it might be politically risky for a president to nuke another country in response to a “non-lethal” attack on infrastructure, but nobody can complain if the USA retaliates like for like.
The problem is, it might take years for even the simplest weapons program to work its way through the Washington bureaucracy, so even if a decision was made tomorrow there isn’t much chance of the capability existing before about 2023 at the earliest – and a deterrent doesn’t work until the weapons actually exist. But it might come to life sooner than everyone expects. Keep reading…
If the North Koreans know that the USA can’t retaliate with EMP weapons now, but will be able to in a few years, they might just be tempted to get their attack in before America can reply to it. That’s quite a low risk strategy; if they launch a successful EMP it’s going to delay the US program by years, or maybe kill it off altogether – it depends how much damage their attack does. This isn’t a reason to not build an American EMP weapon; the risk exists already, and the USA has to be able to deter it. What it does mean is that there’s a trade-off; the USA has to accept a higher risk of EMP attack for a few years, in exchange for it dropping sharply once the country is able to reply in kind.
Related: How To Make A Tin Can Directional WiFi Antenna to Extend your Communication after an EMP
What the US government has to do is identify the simplest way to build an EMP capability – even if it’s not perfect – and get it into service as fast as possible. Then a better one can be developed, if necessary. What we have to do is take another look at the precautions we’ve taken against EMP and make sure they’re up to the job – because the risk of an attack looks like it’s quite a bit higher than it seemed to be just a few months ago.
But given the last few years’ international and national rise of turmoils, the US together with the private company Boeing, had decided to “bring to life” such an weapon that would make an EMP attack actually a preventable homeland security catastrophe. So, after years of discussions and failed experiments, Boeing has announced that it successfully tested an electromagnetic pulse missile capable of disabling electronics without affecting structures. The Counter-electronics High-powered Advanced Missile Project (CHAMP) was tested by a Boeing Phantom Works/U.S. Air Force Research Laboratory Directed Energy Directorate team on October 16 at the Utah Test and Training Range. This American military project is an attempt to develop a device with all the power of a nuclear weapon but without the death and destruction to people and infrastructure that such a weapon causes. Theoretically, the new missile system would pinpoint buildings and knock out their electrical grids, plunging the target into darkness and general disconnectedness.
-
War, Nuclear War and the Law
Nov. 20, 2017 Senators are asking the right questions but of the wrong people.
By George Friedman
The U.S. Senate held hearings last week on the president’s authority to use nuclear weapons. The trigger for the hearings was the North Korea situation, and the fear among some that President Donald Trump might launch a reckless nuclear attack against the North Koreans. The question senators were asking was what the power of the president was to initiate nuclear war unilaterally.
This has long been a burning question, but one that has been intentionally ignored for decades. But this question involves not only the use of nuclear weapons, but the president’s authority to initiate all kinds of war without congressional approval. The Constitution states that the president is commander in chief of the armed forces. It also says that Congress has the power to declare war. On the surface, this seems a fairly clear system. The president is in command of the military; however, the authority to go to war rests with Congress.
But throughout U.S. history, presidents have taken it upon themselves to initiate conflicts, particularly minor ones. And since World War II, this has even extended to major conflicts. During this time, the United States has engaged in some conflicts without issuing a formal declaration of war – which must be approved by Congress. Without this formal declaration, congressional approval is unnecessary. The first major war that the U.S. fought without a declaration of war was Korea. President Harry Truman argued that U.S. engagement in the war was a police action authorized by the United Nations. The United States joined the United Nations by a treaty that had been approved by Congress; therefore, he argued, Congress had given its approval to engage in war in Korea by agreeing to join the United Nations, which authorized military action.
Sen. Bob Corker (C) (R-TN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, confers with Sen. Ron Johnson (R) (R-WI) during a committee hearing on Nov. 14, 2017, in Washington. WIN MCNAMEE/Getty Images
The logic seems to me a bit tortuous, but the judiciary and Congress accepted it. This opened the door for U.S engagement in undeclared wars that were not authorized by the United Nations. Vietnam was fought without a declaration of war, although Congress passed a resolution after the incident in the Gulf of Tonkin that President Lyndon Johnson interpreted as congressional authorization for U.S. involvement. The resolution authorized the president to use any means necessary to protect U.S. forces from attack in Southeast Asia. (It should be noted that U.S. forces had been deployed in the area and were engaged in combat before the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.) In addition, no declaration of war was issued in the war in Afghanistan, the wars in Iraq, or any of the lesser wars that have been fought in recent years, from Libya to Syria to Niger and so on.
The argument in all of these operations was that the Constitution is vague on the requirement of a declaration of war, and that the president’s position as commander in chief gives him the power to wage war; congressional approval of funding for these operations was sufficient. Presidents didn’t want declarations of war because, in general, they did not want the public to think of a minor intervention as war. Johnson wanted to minimize the significance of what he was doing for political reasons. By the time President George W. Bush decided to invade Afghanistan, declarations of war seemed obsolete. The courts deemed this a political matter between the other two branches of government; Congress didn’t call a vote to declare war, which was its prerogative; and the public seemed to accept it.
Nuclear weapons added to the complexity of the situation. During the Cold War, there would have been no more than 30 minutes’ warning before a Soviet missile would land in the U.S., so asking for a declaration of war was impossible. If the president felt he had to launch a pre-emptive attack, going to Congress first would obviously remove the element of surprise. The president therefore had sole authority to respond to a nuclear attack or to initiate an attack. During the Cuban missile crisis, the president did not ask for authorization from Congress to initiate a nuclear strike, which might have been necessary depending on intelligence about Soviet intentions. It was simply assumed he had that power.
The president has had the practical authority since World War II to send troops into combat at his discretion and to use nuclear weapons at will. Last week’s congressional inquiry was odd in that the senators were asking questions of military men that should be asked of Congress. They asked generals if they would obey an illegal order given by the president, implying that a presidential decision to act militarily might be illegal. And this raises another important question: What actions ordered by the president would be considered illegal? It should be the role not of generals but of Congress to define what is legal and what isn’t.
The situation they are addressing has been in place for over 70 years, but Congress has consistently acquiesced, setting precedent after precedent. This is not a question about Donald Trump’s suitability to make decisions about war, but rather about Congress’ lack of insistence on declarations of war as prerequisites for engagement in combat. In the case of nuclear war, Congress could have required that congressional leaders be informed that nuclear weapons might be used and that these leaders must authorize the launch of such weapons.
In any case, the hearings are skirting the real issue, which is that since World War II the president has usurped Congress’ responsibility for war making, or, to put it another way, Congress has been abdicating its responsibility. At this point, the long practice has been that the president can act militarily at will. And the military must obey the commander in chief in any legal order. It’s hard to see that a president’s order as commander in chief can be illegal, unless it would represent a war crime. Is striking a North Korean nuclear facility a war crime? Congress should answer that question.
All the strategies that Congress has adopted to avoid or minimize its role in going to war emerge from the narrow question of who may order a nuclear attack. The Constitution specifically mentions declarations of war, and these declarations have an authority and unmistakable significance that mere resolutions lack. But then Congress enjoyed the ambiguity involved in resolutions and in avoiding responsibility for nuclear war. Its interest in the subject now is appropriate, but Congress’ desire to shift responsibility for war to the president is the issue that ought to be the focus of the hearings.
-
America’s Alarmingly Archaic Arsenal
The U.S. nuclear deterrent has kept the peace for years. If it withers, it will keep the peace no longer.
America’s Alarmingly Archaic Arsenal
Mark Helprin
Jan. 3, 2018 7:04 p.m. ET
The Trump administration’s recently unveiled National Security Strategy is an excellent and overdue statement of intent. But unless it is ruthlessly prioritized, political and budgetary realities will make it little more than a wish list. And in regard to nuclear weapons, it hardly departs from the insufficient Obama -era policy of replacing old equipment rather than modifying each element of the nuclear triad to meet new challenges.
National survival depends on many factors: the economy, civil peace, constitutional fidelity, education, research, and military strength across the board. Each has a different timeline and resiliency. Nuclear forces, on the other hand, may have a catastrophically short timeline combined with by far the greatest immediate effect.
Alone of all crucial elements, the failure of America’s nuclear deterrent is capable of bringing instant destruction or unavoidable subjugation, as the deterrent’s unarrested decline will lead to either the opportunity for an enemy first strike or the surrender of the U.S. on every foreign front and eventually at home.
Believers in total nuclear abolition fail to recognize that if they are successful, covert possession of just a score of warheads could mean world mastery. And though they, like everyone else, are routinely deterred (from telling off the boss or driving against the flow of traffic), they fail to extend their understanding to nuclear deterrence. They seem as well not to grasp that whereas numerical reduction from tens of thousands of warheads would reduce the chances of accident, below a certain point it would tempt an aggressor by elevating the potential of a successful first strike. Nor do they allow that Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran—which have through their conduct of war and in suppressing their populations callously sacrificed more than 100 million of their own people—subscribe to permissive nuclear doctrines and thresholds radically different from our own.
The Obama administration understood nuclear rejuvenation to mean merely updating old systems rather than changing the architecture of the deterrent to match Russia’s and China’s programs, as well as advances in technology. Given that short of abject surrender the sole means of preventing nuclear war is maintaining the potential to inflict unacceptable damage upon an enemy and/or shield one’s country from such damage, what are our resources, and against what are they arrayed?
The “nuclear triad” commonly referred to is rather a pentad, its land, air, and sea legs joined by missile defense and the survivability of national infrastructure. America’s land leg comprises static, silo-based missiles, which (other than in the potentially catastrophic launch-on-warning posture) are vulnerable not only to nuclear strike, but, with soon-to-come millimeter accuracy, even to conventional warheads. Russia, China, and North Korea have road-mobile missiles (and Russia, additional rail-based ones), making their land legs more survivable and in the case of tunnel systems—of which we have none and China has 3,000 miles—unaddressable and uncountable.
The U.S. air leg consists of ancient bombers and outdated standoff cruise missiles, both vulnerable to Russian and Chinese air defense, along with only 20 penetrating bombers, the B-2. To boot, the planes are concentrated on only a handful of insufficiently hardened bases.
Our sea-based nuclear force, the least-vulnerable leg, for many years included 41 ballistic-missile submarines, SSBNs. These dwindled to 18, then 14, and, with the new Columbia class set to enter service beginning only in 2031, a planned 12. A maximum of six at sea at any one time will face 100 Russian and Chinese hunter-killer subs. At the same time, the oceans are surrendering their opacity to space surveillance and Russian nonacoustic tracking. Even a deeply running sub disturbs the chemical and sea-life balance in ways that via upwelling leave a track upon the surface.
Russia is moving to 13 SSBNs with high-capacity missiles that carry many maneuverable warheads; China, with 4 SSBNs, is only beginning to build. A possible new dimension is Russia’s announced, but as yet unseen, autonomous stealth undersea nuclear vehicle, capable of targeting the high percentage of U.S. population, industry, and infrastructure on the coasts. We have no such weapon and Russia presents no similar vulnerability.
American ballistic-missile defense is severely underdeveloped due to ideological opposition and the misunderstanding of its purpose, which is to protect population and infrastructure as much as possible but, because many warheads will get through, primarily to shield retaliatory capacity so as to make a successful enemy first strike impossible—thus increasing stability rather than decreasing it, as its critics wrongly believe. Starved of money and innovation, missile defense has been confined to midcourse interception, when boost-phase and terminal intercept are also needed. Merely intending this without sufficient funding is useless. As for national resilience, the U.S. long ago gave up any form of civil defense, while Russia and China have not. This reinforces their ideas of nuclear utility, weakens our deterrence, and makes the nuclear calculus that much more unstable.
Beyond these particulars are the erosion of the American nuclear-weapons complex and the larger defense-industrial base; the dangerous mismatch of nuclear doctrines and perceptions; the sulfurous fuse of North Korea and Iran; Russian “tactical” nuclear weapons that outnumber U.S. counterparts 10 to 1; Russian programs suggesting that it is working toward the capacity for nuclear “breakout”; 2,600 currently deployed Russian strategic warheads as opposed to America’s 1,590; and consistent and brazen Russian treaty violations.
The addition of China as a major nuclear power now presents an analogy to the three-body problem in physics, in which three variables acting upon one another create an unpredictable and unstable system. That is but one reason why China must either be brought into an arms-control regime with the U.S. and Russia or forced by its refusal to show its hand for all the world to see. It is inexplicable that the U.S. government and arms-control enthusiasts have both failed to address the fact that China, the third major nuclear power, is totally unconstrained.
All the above is only a précis of a long-developing peril that, though difficult to see upon the surface, day by day strengthens the chances of Armageddon or capitulation. The only way to face it is objectively and without fear, and the only solution (requiring just a tiny fraction of gross domestic product) is to correct the shortcomings and right the balances.
America’s powerful deterrent has kept the nuclear peace all these years. If it withers, it will keep the peace no longer. The nuclear problem has no adequate superlatives. As great as all other concerns may be, they must yield to it. For the force to be confronted is the breaker of nations and the destroyer of worlds.
Mr. Helprin, a senior fellow of the Claremont Institute, is author of “Paris in the Present Tense” (Overlook, 2017).
-
for now
http://www.nationalreview.com/article/455454/why-trump-extended-iran-nuclear-deal-timing-north-korea
-
On Saturday, Hawaiians were startled and frightened by a civil defense warning that missiles were on the way and that it was not a drill but the real thing.
After 38 minutes of frantically trying to find safe cover (some families on Oahu drove to the opposite side of the island to seek shelter in caves in order to try to survive the expected nuclear blast), Hawaiians were told the whole thing was a mistake, and there was no imminent missile attack.
Of course, Hawaiians were furious at their state government for this frightening accident.
Much attention was paid to the one state employee who mistakenly selected the wrong computer option during a routine drill following a shift change. Washington was glad that Hawaiian Governor David Ige took responsibility at the state level.
However, all this blame casting and acceptance misses the real warning inherent in this accidental event: Imagine that the warning had been real. Imagine that there had been one or more missiles equipped with nuclear warheads on the way.
Are we confident we could defend Oahu, the U.S. Pacific Command, and all the people on the Hawaiian Islands?
Current ballistic missile defense involves launching ship- or land-based interceptor missiles to shoot down a ballistic missile in flight. This has been likened to shooting a bullet with a bullet.
I fear that our defense system could handle no more than two or three missiles before becoming saturated.
In fact, we would need three or four defensive anti-missile launches per each incoming offensive to have reasonable confidence that Honolulu would be safe. To make this defensive challenge even more complex, the North Koreans, like the Chinese and the Russians, are working to develop a submarine-launched missile.
So while the fact that Hawaiians were frightened by a false alarm is upsetting, our real concern should be ensuring we can keep American cities from being hit by nuclear missiles. Today, our anti-ballistic missile systems are much too weak, and our anti-cruise missile systems are virtually non-existent.
We have been trapped by political timidity, the liberal fantasy that space can be kept free of weapons, and a defense bureaucracy-large corporation-lobbyist complex that wants to focus spending on obsolete programs, using outmoded technologies.
I am extremely worried that we are going to lose one or more American cities in the next decade or two, if we do not improve our defensive capabilities. The loss of life will be almost unendurable. The loss of our freedoms in a very dangerous world will be horrifying.
The requirement that we retaliate forcefully and with comparable nuclear weapons will compound the loss of lives horrendously.
Having an effective defense against any attack has become one of the highest national priorities; however, we have neither a visionary proposal, a practical implementation system, nor a communications program to get the public and the Congress to support such an enormous undertaking. Yet, the failure to act boldly and decisively could eventually lead to the loss of millions of American lives.
We have a precedent for thinking boldly about missile defense. President Ronald Reagan proposed a comprehensive missile defense system, which included a space-based missile defense system, in his 1983 Strategic Defense Initiative. At the time, our current ballistic missile defense system was in the developmental phase.
Today, we have the potential to build a substantial missile defense system that would dramatically increase the safety of the American people.
In the three and a half decades since President Reagan offered a bold, visionary way to break out of the nuclear nightmare, the technologies have improved dramatically.
The Cray-2, which was released two years after Reagan’s proposal and was believed to be the fastest machine in at the time, had the processing power of an iPhone 4.
With this exponential increase in computing power and the emergence of reusable launch vehicles for space, the potential to field a space-based system is real and eminently rational. However, the military procurement system and current missile defense bureaucracy are incapable of rapid development and innovation at the speed we need to offset threats from North Korea, Iran, and other dangerous regimes.
President Trump should propose a Space Defense Implementation Command with lean procurement rules and entrepreneurial hiring and firing capability. It should operate like Silicon Valley, rather than K Street. The President should make an Oval Office address describing the genuine threat and the horror of what would have occurred if the Hawaiian alert had been real.
He should challenge members of Congress to fully fund a multiyear space combat missile defense system precisely as they would a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
To save American cities, we need stability in funding, reliability in management, and consistent political support built around saving millions of American lives. Additionally, the Air Force should establish a Space Combat Command designed to wage and win wars in space.
It is abundantly clear that our potential adversaries know how much we rely on space-based assets for communications and intelligence. It is also clear that if we entered a war with any of these regimes, they would intend to kill or cripple our systems while protecting and – if necessary – renewing their own.
It took only 15 years to go from the Wright Brothers’ first airplane flight to massive military use of air power in World War I.
For the last 61 years (dating from the Soviet launch of Sputnik), we have avoided confronting the reality that space is a domain which will inevitably become an arena for conflict fully as much as land, sea, air, or cyber. We need to bring security-focused thinking, doctrines, war games, and technologies to bear to defend American interests in space and Americans wherever they are.
Millions of lives could be at stake.
The loss of 2,996 lives on September 11, 2001 launched a series of wars which have left 6,948 Americans dead and more than 52,000 wounded over 16 years. At the same time, the United States has spent $7.6 trillion. If fewer than 3,000 casualties galvanized this explosion of effort, what should we be prepared to do to save Oahu’s more than 953,000 residents, the U.S. military personnel assigned there, and the thousands of visiting tourists?
This is what would have been at risk if the Hawaiian alert had been real. Next time it may be.
The time to act is now – before a disaster.
Your Friend,
Newt
-
Israel vs. Iraq's reactor:
https://www.israelvideonetwork.com/the-crazy-story-how-israel-stopped-saddam-husseins-nuke-program/?omhide=true
Strong rhetorical point about the Nork reactor in Syria was located in territory later controlled by ISIS
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=40&v=zizjv2UDpYo
-
To Counter Russia, U.S. Signals Nuclear Arms Are Back in a Big Way
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROADFEB. 4, 2018
When President Trump called on Congress to modernize the nuclear arsenal, he did not mention the rationale: that Russia has accelerated a dangerous game. Credit Al Drago for The New York Times
WASHINGTON — A treaty committing the United States and Russia to keep their long-range nuclear arsenals at the lowest levels since early in the Cold War goes into full effect on Monday. When it was signed eight years ago, President Barack Obama expressed hope that it would be a small first step toward deeper reductions, and ultimately a world without nuclear weapons.
Now, that optimism has been reversed. A new nuclear policy issued by the Trump administration on Friday, which vows to counter a rush by the Russians to modernize their forces even while staying within the treaty limits, is touching off a new kind of nuclear arms race. This one is based less on numbers of weapons and more on novel tactics and technologies, meant to outwit and outmaneuver the other side.
The Pentagon envisions a new age in which nuclear weapons are back in a big way — its strategy bristles with plans for new low-yield nuclear weapons that advocates say are needed to match Russian advances and critics warn will be too tempting for a president to use. The result is that the nuclear-arms limits that go into effect on Monday now look more like the final stop after three decades of reductions than a way station to further cuts.
Yet when President Trump called on Congress to “modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal” in his State of the Union address last week, he did not mention his administration’s rationale: that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has accelerated a dangerous game that the United States must match, even if the price tag soars above $1.2 trillion. That is the latest estimate from the Congressional Budget Office, one that many experts think is low by a half-trillion dollars.
Mr. Trump barely mentioned Mr. Putin in the speech and said nothing about Russia’s nuclear buildup. His reluctance to talk about Russia and its leader during his campaign and first year in office — and his refusal to impose sanctions on Russia mandated by Congress — has fueled suspicions about what lies behind his persistently friendly stance toward Mr. Putin.
In the State of the Union speech, the president focused far more on North Korea and on battling terrorism, even though his defense secretary, Jim Mattis, had announced just days ago that “great power competition — not terrorism — is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.”
In contrast to the president’s address, the report issued on Friday, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, focuses intensely on Russia. It describes Mr. Putin as forcing America’s hand to rebuild the nuclear force, as has a series of other documents produced by Mr. Trump’s National Security Council and his Pentagon.
The report contains a sharp warning about a new Russian-made autonomous nuclear torpedo that — while not in violation of the terms of the treaty, known as New Start — appears designed to cross the Pacific undetected and release a deadly cloud of radioactivity that would leave large parts of the West Coast uninhabitable.
It also explicitly rejects Mr. Obama’s commitment to make nuclear weapons a diminishing part of American defenses. The limit on warheads — 1,500 deployable weapons — that goes into effect on Monday expires in 2021, and the nuclear review shows no enthusiasm about its chances for renewal.
The report describes future arms control agreements as “difficult to envision” in a world “that is characterized by nuclear-armed states seeking to change borders and overturn existing norms,” and in particular by Russian violations of a series of other arms-limitation treaties.
“Past assumptions that our capability to produce nuclear weapons would not be necessary and that we could permit the required infrastructure to age into obsolescence have proven to be mistaken,” it argues. “It is now clear that the United States must have sufficient research, design, development and production capacity to support the sustainment and replacement of its nuclear forces.”
The new policy was applauded by establishment Republican defense experts, including some who have shuddered at Mr. Trump’s threats to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, but have worried that he was insufficiently focused on Russia’s nuclear modernization.
“Obama’s theory was that we will lead the way in reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons and everyone else will do the same,” said Franklin C. Miller, a nuclear expert who served in the George W. Bush administration and was an informal consultant to Pentagon officials who drafted the new policy. “It didn’t work out that way. The Russians have been fielding systems while we haven’t, and our first new system won’t be ready until 2026 or 2027.”
“This is a very mainstream nuclear policy,” Mr. Miller said of the document, arguing that new low-yield atomic weapons would deter Mr. Putin and make nuclear war less likely, rather than offer new temptations to Mr. Trump. “Nothing in it deserves the criticism it has received.”
A senior administration official, who would discuss the policy only on the condition of anonymity, said Mr. Trump had been briefed on the new nuclear approach, but was leaving the details to Mr. Mattis and to his national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster. The president, the official said, was primarily concerned about staying ahead in any nuclear race with Russia, and to a lesser degree with China.
Even Mr. Trump’s harshest critics concede that the United States must take steps as Russia and China have invested heavily in modernizing their forces, making them more lethal. The administration’s new strategy describes the Russian buildup in detail, documenting how Moscow is making “multiple upgrades” to its force of strategic bombers, as well as long-range missiles based at sea and on land. Russia is also developing, it adds, “at least two new intercontinental-range systems,” as well as the autonomous torpedo.
Russia has violated another treaty, the United States argues, that covers intermediate-range missiles, and is “building a large, diverse and modern” set of shorter-range weapons with less powerful warheads that “are not accountable under the New Start treaty.” Yet Mr. Trump has not publicly complained about the alleged treaty violation or the new weapons.
Though members of the Obama administration were highly critical of the Trump administration document, there is little question that Mr. Obama paved the way for the modernization policy. He agreed to a $70 billion makeover of American nuclear laboratories as the price for Senate approval of the 2010 New Start.
The new document calls for far more spending — a program that at a minimum will cost $1.2 trillion over 30 years, without inflation taken into account. Most of that money would go to new generations of bombers and new submarines, and a rebuilding of the land-based nuclear missile force that still dots giant fields across the West.
While those systems are the most vulnerable to attack, and the most decrepit part of the force, they are also among the most politically popular in Congress, because they provide jobs in rural areas.
In some cases, Mr. Trump’s plan speeds ahead with nuclear arms that Mr. Obama had endorsed, such as a new generation of nuclear cruise missiles. The low-flying weapons, when dropped from a bomber, hug the ground to avoid enemy radars and air defenses.
Other weapons, though, are completely new. For example, the policy calls for “the rapid development” of a cruise missile that would be fired from submarines, then become airborne before reaching its target. Mr. Obama had eliminated an older version.
It also calls for the development of a low-yield warhead for some of the nation’s submarine ballistic missiles — part of a broader effort to expand the credible options “for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack.” But critics of the low-yield weapons say they blur the line between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, making their use more likely.
Andrew C. Weber, an assistant defense secretary during the Obama administration who directed oversight of the nation’s nuclear arsenal, called the new plan a dangerous folly that would make nuclear war more likely.
“We’re simply mirroring the reckless Russian doctrine,” he said. “We can already deter any strike. We have plenty of low-yield weapons. The new plan is a fiction created to justify the making of new nuclear arms. They’ll just increase the potential for their use and for miscalculation. The administration’s logic is Kafkaesque.”
One of the most controversial elements of the new strategy is a section that declares that the United States might use nuclear weapons to respond to a devastating, but non-nuclear, attack on critical infrastructure — the power grid or cellphone networks, for example.
All of the new or repurposed warheads would come from the National Nuclear Security Administration, an arm of the Energy Department that officials say is already stretched thin.
“We’re pretty much at capacity in terms of people,” Frank G. Klotz was quoted as saying after retiring last month as the agency’s head. “We’re pretty much at capacity in terms of the materials that we need to do this work. And pretty much at capacity in terms of hours in the day at our facilities.”
-
Funny how Trump keeps doing things that aren't in Russia's best interest.
To Counter Russia, U.S. Signals Nuclear Arms Are Back in a Big Way
By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROADFEB. 4, 2018
When President Trump called on Congress to modernize the nuclear arsenal, he did not mention the rationale: that Russia has accelerated a dangerous game. Credit Al Drago for The New York Times
WASHINGTON — A treaty committing the United States and Russia to keep their long-range nuclear arsenals at the lowest levels since early in the Cold War goes into full effect on Monday. When it was signed eight years ago, President Barack Obama expressed hope that it would be a small first step toward deeper reductions, and ultimately a world without nuclear weapons.
Now, that optimism has been reversed. A new nuclear policy issued by the Trump administration on Friday, which vows to counter a rush by the Russians to modernize their forces even while staying within the treaty limits, is touching off a new kind of nuclear arms race. This one is based less on numbers of weapons and more on novel tactics and technologies, meant to outwit and outmaneuver the other side.
The Pentagon envisions a new age in which nuclear weapons are back in a big way — its strategy bristles with plans for new low-yield nuclear weapons that advocates say are needed to match Russian advances and critics warn will be too tempting for a president to use. The result is that the nuclear-arms limits that go into effect on Monday now look more like the final stop after three decades of reductions than a way station to further cuts.
Yet when President Trump called on Congress to “modernize and rebuild our nuclear arsenal” in his State of the Union address last week, he did not mention his administration’s rationale: that President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has accelerated a dangerous game that the United States must match, even if the price tag soars above $1.2 trillion. That is the latest estimate from the Congressional Budget Office, one that many experts think is low by a half-trillion dollars.
Mr. Trump barely mentioned Mr. Putin in the speech and said nothing about Russia’s nuclear buildup. His reluctance to talk about Russia and its leader during his campaign and first year in office — and his refusal to impose sanctions on Russia mandated by Congress — has fueled suspicions about what lies behind his persistently friendly stance toward Mr. Putin.
In the State of the Union speech, the president focused far more on North Korea and on battling terrorism, even though his defense secretary, Jim Mattis, had announced just days ago that “great power competition — not terrorism — is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.”
In contrast to the president’s address, the report issued on Friday, known as the Nuclear Posture Review, focuses intensely on Russia. It describes Mr. Putin as forcing America’s hand to rebuild the nuclear force, as has a series of other documents produced by Mr. Trump’s National Security Council and his Pentagon.
The report contains a sharp warning about a new Russian-made autonomous nuclear torpedo that — while not in violation of the terms of the treaty, known as New Start — appears designed to cross the Pacific undetected and release a deadly cloud of radioactivity that would leave large parts of the West Coast uninhabitable.
It also explicitly rejects Mr. Obama’s commitment to make nuclear weapons a diminishing part of American defenses. The limit on warheads — 1,500 deployable weapons — that goes into effect on Monday expires in 2021, and the nuclear review shows no enthusiasm about its chances for renewal.
The report describes future arms control agreements as “difficult to envision” in a world “that is characterized by nuclear-armed states seeking to change borders and overturn existing norms,” and in particular by Russian violations of a series of other arms-limitation treaties.
“Past assumptions that our capability to produce nuclear weapons would not be necessary and that we could permit the required infrastructure to age into obsolescence have proven to be mistaken,” it argues. “It is now clear that the United States must have sufficient research, design, development and production capacity to support the sustainment and replacement of its nuclear forces.”
The new policy was applauded by establishment Republican defense experts, including some who have shuddered at Mr. Trump’s threats to use nuclear weapons against North Korea, but have worried that he was insufficiently focused on Russia’s nuclear modernization.
“Obama’s theory was that we will lead the way in reducing our reliance on nuclear weapons and everyone else will do the same,” said Franklin C. Miller, a nuclear expert who served in the George W. Bush administration and was an informal consultant to Pentagon officials who drafted the new policy. “It didn’t work out that way. The Russians have been fielding systems while we haven’t, and our first new system won’t be ready until 2026 or 2027.”
“This is a very mainstream nuclear policy,” Mr. Miller said of the document, arguing that new low-yield atomic weapons would deter Mr. Putin and make nuclear war less likely, rather than offer new temptations to Mr. Trump. “Nothing in it deserves the criticism it has received.”
A senior administration official, who would discuss the policy only on the condition of anonymity, said Mr. Trump had been briefed on the new nuclear approach, but was leaving the details to Mr. Mattis and to his national security adviser, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster. The president, the official said, was primarily concerned about staying ahead in any nuclear race with Russia, and to a lesser degree with China.
Even Mr. Trump’s harshest critics concede that the United States must take steps as Russia and China have invested heavily in modernizing their forces, making them more lethal. The administration’s new strategy describes the Russian buildup in detail, documenting how Moscow is making “multiple upgrades” to its force of strategic bombers, as well as long-range missiles based at sea and on land. Russia is also developing, it adds, “at least two new intercontinental-range systems,” as well as the autonomous torpedo.
Russia has violated another treaty, the United States argues, that covers intermediate-range missiles, and is “building a large, diverse and modern” set of shorter-range weapons with less powerful warheads that “are not accountable under the New Start treaty.” Yet Mr. Trump has not publicly complained about the alleged treaty violation or the new weapons.
Though members of the Obama administration were highly critical of the Trump administration document, there is little question that Mr. Obama paved the way for the modernization policy. He agreed to a $70 billion makeover of American nuclear laboratories as the price for Senate approval of the 2010 New Start.
The new document calls for far more spending — a program that at a minimum will cost $1.2 trillion over 30 years, without inflation taken into account. Most of that money would go to new generations of bombers and new submarines, and a rebuilding of the land-based nuclear missile force that still dots giant fields across the West.
While those systems are the most vulnerable to attack, and the most decrepit part of the force, they are also among the most politically popular in Congress, because they provide jobs in rural areas.
In some cases, Mr. Trump’s plan speeds ahead with nuclear arms that Mr. Obama had endorsed, such as a new generation of nuclear cruise missiles. The low-flying weapons, when dropped from a bomber, hug the ground to avoid enemy radars and air defenses.
Other weapons, though, are completely new. For example, the policy calls for “the rapid development” of a cruise missile that would be fired from submarines, then become airborne before reaching its target. Mr. Obama had eliminated an older version.
It also calls for the development of a low-yield warhead for some of the nation’s submarine ballistic missiles — part of a broader effort to expand the credible options “for responding to nuclear or non-nuclear strategic attack.” But critics of the low-yield weapons say they blur the line between nuclear and non-nuclear weapons, making their use more likely.
Andrew C. Weber, an assistant defense secretary during the Obama administration who directed oversight of the nation’s nuclear arsenal, called the new plan a dangerous folly that would make nuclear war more likely.
“We’re simply mirroring the reckless Russian doctrine,” he said. “We can already deter any strike. We have plenty of low-yield weapons. The new plan is a fiction created to justify the making of new nuclear arms. They’ll just increase the potential for their use and for miscalculation. The administration’s logic is Kafkaesque.”
One of the most controversial elements of the new strategy is a section that declares that the United States might use nuclear weapons to respond to a devastating, but non-nuclear, attack on critical infrastructure — the power grid or cellphone networks, for example.
All of the new or repurposed warheads would come from the National Nuclear Security Administration, an arm of the Energy Department that officials say is already stretched thin.
“We’re pretty much at capacity in terms of people,” Frank G. Klotz was quoted as saying after retiring last month as the agency’s head. “We’re pretty much at capacity in terms of the materials that we need to do this work. And pretty much at capacity in terms of hours in the day at our facilities.”
-
"Funny how Trump keeps doing things that aren't in Russia's best interest."
yes and bizarre logic comparing Trump to McCarthy when it is the *LEFt* accusing him or anyone near him of colluding with Putin anytime they are within a mile of anyone or anything Russian!
Yet the media runs with this nonsense
-
"Funny how Trump keeps doing things that aren't in Russia's best interest."
yes and bizarre logic comparing Trump to McCarthy when it is the *LEFt* accusing him or anyone near him of colluding with Putin anytime they are within a mile of anyone or anything Russian!
Yet the media runs with this nonsense
-------------------------------------------------------------------
That's right. They are the accusers. All we have seen of collusion so far is evidence that Democrats were working with foreign agents, the intel community and media to interfere with the results of an election.
Projection: Of what the Left accuses, assume they are doing it.
-
Putin Unveils Nuclear Weapons He Claims Could Breach U.S. Defenses
Russian leader sharpens rhetoric against West, raising prospect of a new arms race with the U.S.
By Thomas Grove and
James Marson
Updated March 1, 2018 9:43 a.m. ET
80 COMMENTS
MOSCOW—Russia has developed new nuclear weapons capable of penetrating U.S. air-defense systems, Russian President Vladimir Putin said Thursday, sharpening rhetoric against the West and raising the prospect of a new arms race with Washington.
In his annual state of the union address, Mr. Putin boasted that Russia possesses newly developed intercontinental-ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and even underwater drones. In tones recalling the Cold War, the Russian president made his case that the country deserves a place among the world’s military superpowers.
“Efforts to contain Russia have failed,” he said to Russia’s political elite gathered in the Kremlin’s St. George’s Hall, speaking before a large screen displaying images of the new weapons.
Mr. Putin has reasserted Moscow’s presence on the world stage in recent years by invading and annexing part of Ukraine and sending his military to support Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, steering Russia into its deepest confrontation with the West since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has placed sanctions on Russia over its military interventions in Ukraine and alleged interference in the 2016 presidential election. Russia denies such meddling.
Russia has angered the West most recently by its airstrikes in Syria, which have continued despite a cease-fire mandated by the United Nations. Opposition activists and Western officials have accused Russia of indiscriminate bombing of civilian areas, which Moscow denies.
Mr. Putin, who is almost certain to be elected to another six-year term in a presidential ballot on March 18, started his speech Thursday by talking up plans to improve the country’s economy, saying Russia needed to improve average life expectancy and raise people out of poverty.
He then launched into a half-hour presentation of Russia’s new weapons systems, peppered with criticism of the West’s purported lack of respect toward Russia.
The U.S., he said, had exploited Russia’s economic, political and military weakness after the collapse of the Soviet Union to ignore Moscow’s views, including by moving the North Atlantic Treaty Organization closer to Russia’s borders.
“No one listened to us. Listen to us now,” he said.
Mr. Putin said the Syria campaign had allowed the military to show off the results of a modernization program he launched in 2011. “The whole world knows the names of our newest airplanes, submarines, air-defense systems,” he said.
Among the weapons displayed on screens behind him was a new Sarmat intercontinental-missile system that Mr. Putin said is capable of reaching any point on the globe and will be introduced into Russia’s arsenal as soon as next year. He said the weapons would defeat a U.S. missile-defense system that has been the target of frequent criticism by Moscow.
Mr. Putin said that Russia had carried out a successful test launch at the end of last year of cruise missile with a nuclear-powered engine that gave it unlimited range. Amid applause from the audience, a video showing a computerized image of a missile fired from northern Russia flying south across the Atlantic Ocean while evading air defenses, then circling the southern tip of South America before heading north toward the U.S.
Mr. Putin said that Russia would consider any nuclear attack on its allies an attack on Russia and would launch an immediate response.
“We’re not threatening anyone,” Mr. Putin said. “Russia’s growing military might is a reliable guarantee of peace on our planet because it ensures the strategic balance in the world.”
Ivan Konovalov, an independent defense analyst in Moscow, said the speech demonstrated how quickly Russia’s arms industry is developing.
“It is developing some of the best weapons in the world, and the United States, if they want to maintain parity, has to answer the challenge quickly,” he said.
The Trump administration had warned in a review of U.S. nuclear posture in February that Russia, along with China, was moving to modernize and expand its nuclear weapons program in a bid to “return to Great Power competition.”
“Russia’s strategic nuclear modernization has increased...and provides Russia with the ability to rapidly expand its deployed warhead numbers,” the Pentagon report said.
It noted improvements to “legacy” nuclear systems as well as newer warheads and launchers, including the drones, which the report termed a “new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered, undersea autonomous torpedo.”
The U.S. in the report outlined possible diplomatic, economic and military responses, saying the U.S. is reviewing “military concepts and options for conventional, groundlaunched, intermediate-range missile systems.”
=========================================
GPF:
Russia: Russian President Vladimir Putin gave a fiery State of the Nation address on March 1 in which he acknowledged Russia’s socio-economic issues but highlighted Russian military technological advances. Among the many new weapons Putin claims Russia has produced, the one that caught our attention is the intercontinental hypersonic missile. The most recent data available suggests Russia’s defense budget was about 4.2 percent of gross domestic product in 2017, hardly enough to make the kind of military and technological advances Putin claims to have made. We need to look into which weapons Putin talked about and what, if any, evidence there is that these weapons exist. What is the price for each of these systems?
-
second post
The Legal Case for Striking North Korea First
Does the necessity of self-defense leave ‘no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation’?
By John Bolton
Feb. 28, 2018 6:59 p.m. ET
45 COMMENTS
The Winter Olympics’ closing ceremonies also concluded North Korea’s propaganda effort to divert attention from its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programs. And although President Trump announced more economic sanctions against Pyongyang last week, he also bluntly presaged “Phase Two” of U.S. action against the Kim regime, which “may be a very rough thing.”
CIA Director Mike Pompeo said in January that Pyongyang was within “a handful of months” of being able to deliver nuclear warheads to the U.S. How long must America wait before it acts to eliminate that threat?
Pre-emption opponents argue that action is not justified because Pyongyang does not constitute an “imminent threat.” They are wrong. The threat is imminent, and the case against pre-emption rests on the misinterpretation of a standard that derives from prenuclear, pre-ballistic-missile times. Given the gaps in U.S. intelligence about North Korea, we should not wait until the very last minute. That would risk striking after the North has deliverable nuclear weapons, a much more dangerous situation.
In assessing the timing of pre-emptive attacks, the classic formulation is Daniel Webster’s test of “necessity.” British forces in 1837 invaded U.S. territory to destroy the steamboat Caroline, which Canadian rebels had used to transport weapons into Ontario.
Webster asserted that Britain failed to show that “the necessity of self-defense was instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment of deliberation.” Pre-emption opponents would argue that Britain should have waited until the Caroline reached Canada before attacking.
Would an American strike today against North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program violate Webster’s necessity test? Clearly not. Necessity in the nuclear and ballistic-missile age is simply different than in the age of steam. What was once remote is now, as a practical matter, near; what was previously time-consuming to deliver can now arrive in minutes; and the level of destructiveness of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons is infinitely greater than that of the steamship Caroline’s weapons cargo.
Timing and distance have long been recognized as surrogate measures defining the seriousness of military threats, thereby serving as criteria to justify pre-emptive political or military actions. In the days of sail, maritime states were recognized as controlling territorial waters (above and below the surface) for three nautical miles out to sea. In the early 18th century, that was the farthest distance cannonballs could reach, hence defining a state’s outer defense perimeter. While some states asserted broader maritime claims, the three-mile limit was widely accepted in Europe.
Technological developments inevitably challenged maritime-state defenses. Over time, many nations extended their territorial claims, but the U.S. adhered to the three-mile limit until World War II. After proclaiming U.S. neutrality in 1939, in large measure to limit the activities of belligerent-power warships and submarines in our waters, President Franklin D. Roosevelt quickly realized the three-mile limit was an invitation for aggression. German submarines were sinking ships off the coast within sight of Boston and New York.
In May 1941, Roosevelt told the Pan-American Union that “if the Axis Powers fail to gain control of the seas, then they are certainly defeated.” He explained that our defenses had “to relate . . . to the lightning speed of modern warfare.” He scoffed at those waiting “until bombs actually drop in the streets” of U.S. cities: “Our Bunker Hill of tomorrow may be several thousand miles from Boston.” Accordingly, over time, Roosevelt vastly extended America’s “waters of self defense” to include Greenland, Iceland and even parts of West Africa.
Similarly in 1988, President Reagan unilaterally extended U.S. territorial waters from three to 12 miles. Reagan’s executive order cited U.S. national security and other significant interests in this expansion, and administration officials underlined that a major rationale was making it harder for Soviet spy ships to gather information.
In short, both Roosevelt and Reagan acted unilaterally to adjust to new realities. They did not reify time and distance, or confuse the concrete for the existential. They adjusted the measures to reality, not the reverse.
Although the Caroline criteria are often cited in pre-emption debates, they are merely customary international law, which is interpreted and modified in light of changing state practice. In contemporary times, Israel has already twice struck nuclear-weapons programs in hostile states: destroying the Osirak reactor outside Baghdad in 1981 and a Syrian reactor being built by North Koreans in 2007.
This is how we should think today about the threat of nuclear warheads delivered by ballistic missiles. In 1837 Britain unleashed pre-emptive “fire and fury” against a wooden steamboat. It is perfectly legitimate for the United States to respond to the current “necessity” posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons by striking first.
Mr. Bolton is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and author of “Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the United Nations and Abroad” (Simon & Schuster, 2007).
-
Third post
y Ian Talley
Updated Feb. 27, 2018 5:00 p.m. ET
131 COMMENTS
WASHINGTON—North Korea shipped 50 tons of supplies to Syria for use in building what is suspected to be an industrial-scale chemical weapons factory, according to intelligence information cited in a confidential United Nations report.
A Chinese trading firm working on behalf of Pyongyang made five shipments in late 2016 and early 2017 of high-heat, acid-resistant tiles, stainless-steel pipes and valves to Damascus, the report said, citing them as evidence that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is paying North Korea to help his country produce chemical arms.
The shipments are part of a steady stream of weapons-related sales by Pyongyang to Syria and to Mr. Assad’s patron, Iran, estimated by some experts to be worth several billion dollars a year.
U.S. officials recently warned Syria of a possible military response to the regime’s increased use of chemical weapons against civilians. The Syrian American Medical Society, a relief organization, says the regime has launched at least three such attacks so far this year. Damascus denies using chemical weapons.
Even as an international-sanctions noose tightens around North Korea, Syria’s conflict has been a windfall for its leader, Kim Jong Un. Such illicit revenues undercut Washington’s “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign against North Korea with the aim of thwarting its nuclear-weapons program.
Trump administration officials say if sanctions don’t get Mr. Kim to denuclearize, the U.S. may resort to military action.
The U.N. report, which hasn’t been publicly released, detailed evidence and intelligence from several member states. Syria’s Scientific Studies and Research Center, or SSRC, the Assad-backed group responsible for developing chemical and other weapons of mass destruction, paid Pyongyang’s primary arms dealer, Korea Mining Development Trading Corporation, for the materials through a series of front companies, according to the confidential report, which was reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.
One of those firms works for an SSRC-controlled entity that the U.S. Treasury says has been used in the past to buy missile and rocket propellants and parts for Syria’s SCUD missile program.
China told the U.N. investigators it had no evidence that one of its companies was doing business with North Korea’s primary arms dealer. It didn’t deny the sales to Syria in the U.N. report, however, and said it was open to investigating those alleged connections to North Korea if investigators provided more evidence.
Pyongyang, which has resorted to a range of sanctions-evasion strategies, likely makes the largest chunk of its illicit money from proliferation, according to Bruce Bechtol, a former senior Defense Intelligence Agency officer specializing in northeast Asia. Sales have long been concentrated in the Middle East, especially Iran and Syria, and Africa, he said.
A U.N. chemical-weapons expert holding a plastic bag containing samples from the site of an alleged chemical-weapons attack in the Ain Tarma neighborhood of Damascus in August 2013.
A U.N. chemical-weapons expert holding a plastic bag containing samples from the site of an alleged chemical-weapons attack in the Ain Tarma neighborhood of Damascus in August 2013. Photo: stringer/Reuters
While Washington has secured more stringent policing of North Korea’s sanctions evasion in many areas of the world, including China, it has struggled to shut down North Korea’s proliferation of weapons.
Larry Niksch, a former U.S. Congressional Research Service expert on Asia, estimates North Korea’s revenue from cooperation with Tehran on nuclear and missile technology, arms sales and provisions to Iran-backed terror groups Hamas and Hezbollah totaled $2 billion to $3 billion a year in the last decade.
The Syrian war has been a particular boon for North Korea, said Mr. Bechtol and others. Some analysts question, however, whether it is possible to put a dollar figure on North Korean arms sales, saying so little is known about production costs and the terms of illicit contracts.
–– ADVERTISEMENT ––
Iran isn’t only a primary buyer of North Korean arms and weapons technology, analysts say, but is also bankrolling Syria’s purchases.
Steady oil prices and a wind-down in sanctions against Iran since the 2015 nuclear deal have given the country’s clerical government a fresh influx of revenue—cash that U.S. officials say Tehran is funneling toward its allies throughout the region.
A Syrian boy holding an oxygen mask over the face of an infant at a makeshift hospital following a reported gas attack last month on the rebel-held town of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus.
A Syrian boy holding an oxygen mask over the face of an infant at a makeshift hospital following a reported gas attack last month on the rebel-held town of Douma on the outskirts of Damascus. Photo: hasan mohamed/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
Besides Syria, Mr. Bechtol cites evidence of North Korean arms sales to the insurgent Houthi militia in Yemen, as well as interdicted shipments destined for Iranian-backed Hezbollah in Lebanon. Pyongyang also sells to a host of other countries, including sub-Saharan dictatorships, and to Myanmar’s ballistic-missile program, according to U.S. and U.N. reports.
The latest details of the North Korean-Syrian military venture reflect decadeslong ties between Pyongyang and Damascus, dating to their shared Cold-War patronage under the Soviet Union. Pyongyang helped build the Syrian nuclear reactor that was destroyed by Israeli midnight strikes in September 2007. That facility was thought to be a near duplicate of North Korea’s Yongbyon reactor.
In their confidential report, U.N. investigators identified more than 40 shipments of material for use in arms production and other banned weapon programs from North Korea to Syria’s unconventional weapons group. The last one was sent just a few weeks ago, the investigators wrote.
Related Video
Is Syria the Most Dangerous Place on Earth?
There may be no country in the world that is more volatile than Syria right now, with the U.S., Turkey, Israel, Iran and Russia all with military interests in the area. WSJ's Gerald F. Seib explains why Syria has remained such a combustible mix. Photo: Getty
North Korean technicians with specialized knowledge of chemical and ballistic-missile technology have repeatedly visited Syria over the last two years, according to intelligence reports provided to the U.N. In August 2016, a North Korean technical delegation to Syria discussed the procurement of special valves and thermometers known to be used in chemical-weapons programs, according to those reports. A range of technicians with expertise in long-range radar, missiles, tanks and other military equipment also have been found operating over the last two years in Sudan, Mozambique, Uganda, and Myanmar.
“DPRK technicians continue to operate at chemical weapons and missile facilities at Barzeh Adra and Hama” in Syria, the U.N. investigators say, using an abbreviation for North Korea’s official name.
Syria told U.N. investigators there were no North Korea technicians in the country, adding that the only North Koreans present were working in the fields of gymnastics and athletics.
Mr. Niksch says North Korea is likely also selling Iran the technical data from its recent missile tests. Such consulting services—including weapons training, extending the lifespan of its missiles and improving guidance systems—“indicates that North Korea continues to earn huge sums of money from its proliferation activities in the Middle East,” Mr. Niksch said.
While it earns billions from the Middle East, North Korea’s estimated costs for intercontinental-ballistic missile tests are much lower. Vipin Narang, a top nuclear expert at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, says each launch likely costs less than the $30 million India pays for each of its launches.
“There‘s no question that broad sanctions are not going to reduce their liquidity to fund this program,” Mr. Narang said. “They are sitting on a pile of cash, where each missile is a drop in the bucket.”
Given North Korea’s advances in weapons technology, many question whether the Trump administration’s pressure campaign can succeed.
“The bar is now so much higher to convince North Korea to roll things back,” said Anthony Ruggiero, a former U.S. Treasury official now at the Washington-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies.
Mr. Ruggiero has long advocated a stronger sanctions regime against Pyongyang. “Now I don’t know if it will work,” he said.
Write to Ian Talley at ian.talley@wsj.com
-
http://www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/dubowitz-mark-the-pyongyang-tehran-axis/
-
Demographic, climatic, economic and technological pressures over the next several decades will force key countries in the Middle East and North Africa to gradually expand and diversify their electric power grids.
Advances in competing technologies and high costs will put nuclear power at a disadvantage compared with other electricity-generating options. Even so, countries in the region will continue to pursue nuclear power given its accompanying political prestige.
The window for regional powers to develop unrestricted nuclear programs is closing fast. Economic realities will weaken their arguments for civilian nuclear power, allowing global powers to justify asserting more control over the expansion of nuclear programs in the region.
The Middle East and North Africa sit at a crucial intersection of energy economics and security concerns. The region's growing populations and economies are using more electricity, and some key countries are seeking to diversify their electrical grids by reducing their reliance on generation fueled by oil and natural gas. Nuclear power factors in as a prominent part of the region's strategy to move away from fossil fuel. But advances in other energy technologies and the controversies surrounding Iran's nuclear program are complicating the regional pursuit of nuclear power. The U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and reinstated sanctions could push Tehran toward resuming its enrichment of nuclear fuel, sharpening questions about the justifications that other countries in the region use for pursuing nuclear power. While the desire to develop nuclear power in the Middle East and North Africa is alive and well, the associated costs, the rise of more affordable renewable alternatives, and security and proliferation concerns mean the window for the widespread development of nuclear energy there is slowly closing.
The Big Picture
For nuclear power in the Middle East and North Africa, the implications of the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the regional responses to Iran's potential re-emergence as a nuclear power cannot be ignored. As regional powers seek to establish their own nuclear programs, the influence of alternative technologies will bring the political and security concerns associated with nuclear technology to the forefront.
See The Future of Energy
A Tale of Two Uses
Nuclear technology has always had a civilian side and a military side. Clearly, there's a difference between a peaceful, civilian-led nuclear energy program and one used to develop nuclear weapons. But the civilian and military sides share processes that inextricably link them and that have profound security and proliferation implications. Countries with end-to-end nuclear programs — that is, programs that include processing, enrichment and reprocessing capabilities — may insist their intentions are peaceful, but the dual-use nature of the technology puts them closer to producing enough nuclear material to build a weapon should they decide to take that route.
Throughout much of the world, nuclear power is struggling to compete economically; the capital costs are high, and lengthy construction delays plague most ongoing nuclear projects. As storage technologies improve, and as the use of smart and distributed power grids increases, the argument countries make for why they want to develop a civilian nuclear program becomes weaker, raising questions about motives and making it even more difficult for them to justify to global powers the need for them to develop an end-to-end nuclear program. Political control over nuclear proliferation may be slipping as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty weakens, but economic realities will help limit nuclear expansion just the same.
A graphic showing projected population growth in the Middle East and North Africa
Demand on the Rise
The demand for electricity in the Middle East and North Africa is climbing, driven by rising population, economic growth, the increasing use of energy-intensive water desalination technologies and other factors. The German engineering and manufacturing conglomerate Siemens estimates that power demand in the Middle East will increase by more than 3 percent annually through 2035 and that the region will need to add more than 275 gigawatts of capacity — more than double what is now installed. To meet the rising demand, many nations in the region are undertaking expansion and modernization of their electrical grids with plans that stretch well into the second half of the century. The need to add electricity production capacity is coming at a time of technological flux and as a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon, seek to diversify their power sectors away from oil-fueled generation as part of their own long-term efforts to ensure their future energy security.
A graphic showing current and projected power generation capacity in the Middle East.
While natural gas will remain the largest fuel source for electricity in the region, generation powered by renewables and nuclear is poised to play a more prominent role. Those two modes of power production don't directly compete in a traditional electrical grid, but advancing technology and changes in grid makeup will bring them into closer proximity.
When both capital costs and variable costs such as fuel are factored in, nuclear power generally struggles to compete economically with natural gas, wind and solar power — though it might make sense in some cases. Nuclear power's advantage is its ability to provide baseload power — it produces electricity at a constant, continuous level. Some other forms of generation — renewables, in particular — would need to be paired with storage or a baseload plant to meet demand on a constant basis.
A chart showing power plant generation capacities by fuel type in select countries in the Middle East and North Africa.
Improvements in efficiency technologies, the declining cost of energy storage, the development of smart grids and the increased use of decentralized grids (especially in the developing world) will combine to minimize baseload requirements, leaving traditional nuclear power behind. While new technology, such as small, modular reactors, could play a role in making nuclear energy more competitive, the industry likely will be forced to play catch-up to some degree.
And though nuclear power's contribution to regional electrical grids is expected to rise over the next 20 years, its declining economic competitiveness means there is a narrow window for countries to exploit nuclear power's role in diversifying energy grids to support the development of domestic nuclear programs that may have a more nefarious dual use.
Renewables' Gain Could Mean Nuclear's Loss
As in much of the rest of the world, renewable energy in the Middle East and North Africa is becoming more affordable. In fact, some of the lowest solar energy costs in the world are in the Middle East. Both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have ambitious solar power programs and are seeking to develop the industry domestically. Morocco, with cooperation from some Saudi companies, is also pursuing solar. Wind power also remains cheap for the region as a whole. Nuclear power programs, or at the very least the construction of nuclear power plants, are another way that many nations in the region are using to move their electricity production away from oil. Nuclear power projects are at various stages of development throughout the region, including in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The United Arab Emirates is the furthest along; though delays have plagued its construction, the country's first nuclear power plant is moving toward a start-up date in late 2019 or early 2020.
A chart comparing the cost to generate electricity by different energy options.
Resource-rich Saudi Arabia is also taking steps toward building out its own nuclear program. Many energy experts have identified it as the country in the region to watch with regard to nuclear development. As part of its sweeping reform program, Riyadh is experimenting with changing its energy mix, which overwhelmingly relies on burning natural gas and oil to generate electricity. Saudi Arabia is worried about its relationship with the United States as its oil influence declines. At the same time, the United States wants to keep a lever of influence over Riyadh, and nuclear aid is one way to do this. However, concerns over security motives are unlikely to abate, and once the nuclear-friendly administration of U.S. President Donald Trump leaves office, the nuclear power lever may not remain as attractive. As the economic argument for nuclear development loses its punch over the next 10 to 20 years, ultimately the breadth of the Saudi program will be a key indicator of U.S. willingness to accept the justification of peaceful programs.
Economic Viability
At present, the nonproliferation treaty, which promotes the peaceful use of nuclear technology, appears to be weakening. With China and Russia willing to export nuclear technology and perhaps aid in the development of nuclear programs, and with the current White House supportive of nuclear development, countries like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are seizing the moment to build their own programs. But as the viability of renewables and accompanying storage rises, nuclear's economic competitiveness is poised to decline. As the economic case for civil nuclear programs weakens, they will become politically more difficult to justify for purely peaceful purposes, especially if there are plans to privatize the grid.
Inherent security threats and proliferation risks will prompt close scrutiny of nuclear programs in the Middle East and North Africa. Countries that want to develop their own programs face a closing window of opportunity to do so, with the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia best positioned to take advantage of the fading moment. While Egypt, Jordan and other countries may choose to pursue nuclear power on select occasions, they likely would do so by seeking help from Russia, China, the United States, Japan or South Korea, but any attempts to develop their own programs will face limits. As nuclear power's economic viability decreases, so will the effectiveness of a country's argument that it be allowed to pursue a nuclear program without the threat of international repercussions. And those repercussions likely will fall along already established lines of the great power competition. Looking beyond the next decade, the United States will be more likely to use the economic argument to push against the development of new nuclear programs, while China and Russia will fall back on highlighting the national prestige that nuclear programs can bestow on a country.
Regardless of the economics, nuclear power as status symbol will retain its allure.
-
If the developed world was serious about CO2 emissions, they would make greater use of nuclear power. Where non-proliferation is the concern and in third world countries, a foreign contractor could construct and operate the plant.
"Nuclear power's advantage is its ability to provide baseload power — it produces electricity at a constant, continuous level."
And solar and wind are not; they are useful only as a supplement above baseload when there is sun or wind.
You can't economically run a factory or an air conditioner or a refrigerator off of battery stored or unreliable power.
If solar and wind are cheaper or no more expensive (a lie), why do electric rates keep going up with their implementation?
-
By George Friedman
The US Threatens Russia Over Missiles
Washington claims Moscow violated an arms control treaty.
The United States has threatened to pre-emptively strike Russian missiles aimed at Europe. Its stated justification is that the missiles in question are medium range and thus in violation of a 1987 anti-missile treaty. They were initially singled out in the treaty because they could be rapidly prepared for launch and arrive on target with minimal or no warning time. That meant that it could knock out European retaliatory capability, undermining the deterrent effect of Europe-based systems.
Washington’s ambassador to NATO, Kay Bailey Hutchison, said the U.S. remained committed to finding a diplomatic solution but was prepared to consider a military strike if Russian development of the medium-range system continued. She made it clear that the onus of diplomacy would fall on Washington’s European allies. Presumably, this means Germany, which has a somewhat functional relationship with Russia. U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis said he would address the issue with his NATO counterparts tomorrow.
The U.S. has expressed concern about these missiles before, but this is the first time it has threatened to destroy them. It’s unclear what a pre-emptive strike would involve, but it’s safe to assume Russia would consider it an act of provocation and could escalate conflict accordingly.
Our initial reaction is that it is a test of NATO. Most of the U.S. comments appear to be directed not at Russia but at its European allies, many of which, Washington believes, have been overly permissive about Russian missiles. If NATO is content to allow what the U.S. claims are violations of a Russian treaty commitment, then it says a lot about NATO. The U.S. has made military action contingent on the failure of the diplomatic route. And here, the U.S. expects the Europeans to take the lead. In a sense, the U.S. is trying to force Europe to take this seriously. And it’s reminding its allies that it won’t shrink from unilateral action, however unlikely the prospect may be.
Russia’s intentions are difficult to parse. The threat posed by these missiles does change the balance of power in Europe somewhat. Russia seemed to think that apart from the expected rhetoric from the U.S., and absent anachronized notions of nuclear deterrence, nothing would happen. From the American point of view, a treaty violation is significant. But the incident raises perhaps an even more important question: If the Russians see the nuclear balance as archaic and threats to Europe as outmoded, then why is it deploying this missile? The development of the missile likely indicates that the Russians do not see this as archaic. For the U.S., threatening to strike the Russian sites is meant to galvanize the Europeans and drive home the fact that in geopolitics, nothing is archaic.
-
Back in the low energy prior administration, referring to missile defenses in Europe a Russian commander said: "A decision to use destructive force pre-emptively will be taken if the situation worsens," and "The deployment of new strike weapons in Russia's south and northwest – including of Iskander systems in Kaliningrad – is one of our possible options for destroying the system's European infrastructure,"
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/russia/9243954/Russia-threatens-Nato-with-military-strikes-over-missile-defence-system.html)
Tit for tat.
-
What Happened
In a speech on Oct. 2 in Brussels, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison demanded that Russia return to complying with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty or else the United States would be forced to develop its own non-INF-compliant weapons to match Russian capabilities. In response, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that "It seems that people who make such statements do not realize the level of their responsibility and the danger of aggressive rhetoric."
Some Background on the INF
The INF Treaty is a key arms control pact between the United States and Russia that halted a destabilizing buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe during the 1980s. The pact served as a cornerstone in efforts to end the Cold War. Recently, however, the United States has accused Russia of developing, testing and deploying a type of cruise missile that violates the limits set by the INF, and Moscow in turn has accused Washington of deploying drones and missile launchers that violate the terms of the treaty.
Over the past year, the United States has tried various tactics to get Russia to comply with the treaty. Washington has sanctioned Russian officials and tried to pressure Moscow by deploying tactical nuclear weapons aboard its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The U.S. Congress has also passed legislation that would pave the way for the development of a missile that, if fielded, would violate the INF treaty. None of these measures appear to have worked yet; the United States and its NATO allies insist that the Russians are still in violation of the treaty.
Why It Matters
Hutchinson's statements show that the White House is clearly determined to follow Congress' lead in considering the deployment of U.S. missiles that violate the INF. The first open INF violations from both the United States and Russia will likely lead to many more violations that could kill the already fragile treaty. The demise of the INF would further catalyze a budding and potentially highly destabilizing arms race between the United States and peer competitors Russia and China. It would also be deeply alarming to Washington's European allies, who would once again sit between Russian and U.S. intermediate range nuclear missile arsenals, just as they did during the Cold War.
An additional concern is that an ugly fight over the status of the INF could spill over into negotiations for the renewal of the other big global nuclear arms control treaty: the New START treaty, which limits the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons and launchers. Unlike the INF, New START is nominally on much surer ground, as Russia and the United States both already have so many strategic nuclear weapons that there are few major incentives to violate it. However, mistrust from the demise of the INF could potentially erode New START anyway. This outcome, although unlikely for now, would lead to a far more serious arms race than is currently taking place.
-
What Happened
In a speech on Oct. 2 in Brussels, U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison demanded that Russia return to complying with the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty or else the United States would be forced to develop its own non-INF-compliant weapons to match Russian capabilities. In response, Russian Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said that "It seems that people who make such statements do not realize the level of their responsibility and the danger of aggressive rhetoric."
Some Background on the INF
The INF Treaty is a key arms control pact between the United States and Russia that halted a destabilizing buildup of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe during the 1980s. The pact served as a cornerstone in efforts to end the Cold War. Recently, however, the United States has accused Russia of developing, testing and deploying a type of cruise missile that violates the limits set by the INF, and Moscow in turn has accused Washington of deploying drones and missile launchers that violate the terms of the treaty.
Over the past year, the United States has tried various tactics to get Russia to comply with the treaty. Washington has sanctioned Russian officials and tried to pressure Moscow by deploying tactical nuclear weapons aboard its submarine-launched ballistic missiles. The U.S. Congress has also passed legislation that would pave the way for the development of a missile that, if fielded, would violate the INF treaty. None of these measures appear to have worked yet; the United States and its NATO allies insist that the Russians are still in violation of the treaty.
Why It Matters
Hutchinson's statements show that the White House is clearly determined to follow Congress' lead in considering the deployment of U.S. missiles that violate the INF. The first open INF violations from both the United States and Russia will likely lead to many more violations that could kill the already fragile treaty. The demise of the INF would further catalyze a budding and potentially highly destabilizing arms race between the United States and peer competitors Russia and China. It would also be deeply alarming to Washington's European allies, who would once again sit between Russian and U.S. intermediate range nuclear missile arsenals, just as they did during the Cold War.
An additional concern is that an ugly fight over the status of the INF could spill over into negotiations for the renewal of the other big global nuclear arms control treaty: the New START treaty, which limits the number of U.S. and Russian deployed strategic nuclear weapons and launchers. Unlike the INF, New START is nominally on much surer ground, as Russia and the United States both already have so many strategic nuclear weapons that there are few major incentives to violate it. However, mistrust from the demise of the INF could potentially erode New START anyway. This outcome, although unlikely for now, would lead to a far more serious arms race than is currently taking place.
Strange, I was told that Trump and Putin were BFF’s! How can there be tension?
-
Like hitting a bullet with a bullet (in space). The U.S. military conducted its second successful test in as many months of the new SM-3 Block IIA missile interceptor on Tuesday, shooting down an intermediate-range ballistic missile from an Aegis Ashore battery in Hawaii. Two previous tests in 2017 and 2018 failed, and the SM-3 Block IIA could substantially bolster U.S. missile shields in Eastern Europe and the Western Pacific. (The interceptor is being jointly developed with Japan.) But the implications of advancements in missile defense are difficult to gauge for two reasons: One, missile defense is expensive and extremely difficult, especially against longer-range missiles, and these tests are typically conducted in conditions optimized for success. Two, missile defense systems don’t always lead to stability, and they certainly don’t put an end to costly arms races. Rather, they’re just as likely to convince the countries they’re intended to contain (such as China, North Korea and Russia) to double down on developing missiles that are harder to shoot down. Moscow, for example, is citing U.S. missile defense installations on its periphery as justification for its continued testing of new missiles that violate the beleaguered Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
-
What Happened: The Russian military presented its 9M729 ground-launched cruise missile — the weapon at the center of a dispute between Moscow and Washington — to a crowd of Russian and foreign officials on Jan. 23. With the show and tell, the Kremlin is aiming to demonstrate that the missile is not, as the United States has claimed, in violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Russian officials said the 9M729 cruise missile, also known as the SSC-8, has a range of just 500 kilometers, which is within the restrictions imposed by the INF Treaty.
(VASILY MAXIMOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Why it Matters: Russia made the presentation of the 9M729 after the country's negotiators offered to provide the United States with more details as to why the missile did not infringe upon the INF Treaty, only for the United States to politely decline. Russia's case rests on a single number on an infographic that claims the range of the missile is less than 500 kilometers, but the United States has claimed that the missile traveled beyond this distance — which would violate the INF Treaty — during initial tests in 2010-2011.
The presentation appears to be part of Russia's broader information operations campaign geared toward the U.S. public and European states. The gambit also follows a joint session at the Russia-NATO contact group earlier this week, as well as conversations between delegates from Moscow and European leaders, to convince everyone that the Russian military are not, in fact, breaking INF rules.
The 9M729, produced by Russian arms manufacturer NPO Novator, has been central to Washington's argument that Russia is not playing by the rules of the INF Treaty. If Russia doesn't meet a February deadline to comply with U.S. demands, the United States will pull out of the agreement.
(VASILY MAXIMOV/AFP/Getty Images)
Background/Context: As a result of alleged Russian violations of the INF Treaty, the United States has threatened to pull out of the pact unless Moscow fully adheres to the agreement by a Washington-imposed deadline in February. With negotiations so far proving to be unsuccessful, it appears that Washington will finally abandon the pact come next month.
-
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-history-of-a-cold-war-missile-treaty-11549030496?tesla=y&mod=article_inline
-
https://clarionproject.org/cia-iran-nuclear-deal/
-
In Germany, a Cold War Deal to Host U.S. Nuclear Weapons Is Now in Question
Debate about U.S. nuclear weapons in Germany flares up for the first time since the 1980s
By Bojan Pancevski
Feb. 12, 2019 8:00 a.m. ET
BERLIN—German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s ruling partners are reconsidering their support for a decadesold arrangement that puts Germany under the U.S. nuclear shield, a development that could further undermine the country’s already-tense relationship with the Trump administration.
The center-left Social Democrats, or SPD, have appointed a commission to re-evaluate their positions on strategic, foreign and security policy, including the merits of “nuclear sharing,” a Cold War-era agreement under which German warplanes would be used to launch U.S. nuclear weapons in case of a Russian attack on Europe, a senior party official said.
The deliberations came partly as a result of President Trump’s withdrawal from a treaty with Russia that regulates the presence of nuclear missiles in Europe, according to SPD officials. The U.S. plans to withdraw from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty after accusing Russia of violating it for years.
After Mr. Trump’s repeated criticism of the military alliance and its members, the SPD move shows NATO’s cohesion is now also under threat from a backlash among center-left forces in Europe that had long stopped questioning the alliance.
Ms. Merkel’s party is continuing to back the agreement. Nevertheless, a decision by its junior coalition partner to oppose nuclear sharing would be momentous, putting into question an institution that is as old as Germany’s 1955 membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
Consecutive U.S. administrations have criticized Germany for what they called insufficient military spending, but the dispute has escalated under Mr. Trump, who has put Berlin under notice to boost its defense budget.
Parties critical of Mr. Trump tap a rich political vein in Germany. A 2018 Pew Research Center survey for the Munich Security Conference, a global security forum, showed only 10% of Germans thought the U.S. president was doing the right thing regarding world affairs, compared with 35% for Russian President Vladimir Putin and 30% for Chinese President Xi Jinping.
Newsletter Sign-up
The appointment of the SPD commission will also put additional stress on Ms. Merkel’s fractious coalition. The chancellor’s conservatives back higher military expenditure and want to renew the ailing German air force with an order of U.S.-made aircraft that are certified to carry U.S. nuclear weapons. Leading SPD figures have said they would block the purchase of up to 45 Boeing Co.-made F/A-18 jets recently proposed by Ms. Merkel’s defense minister.
A spokesman for Ms. Merkel said the government would continue to back nuclear sharing, adding that it saw “no reason to debate this aspect of NATO deterrence. We continue to fully support the defensive nuclear strategy of NATO.”
A NATO spokeswoman said the alliance relied on the capabilities and infrastructure of its members in Europe. “Allied aircraft supporting NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission are central to this effort and we welcome the broadest possible participation in our nuclear burden-sharing arrangements,” she added.
Asked about the policy review, U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard A. Grenell said, “NATO’s nuclear forces are there for deterrence and defense. This is a commitment the alliance has made together. Germany should live up to its commitment.”
Germany is part of NATO’s so-called nuclear-sharing agreement that goes back to the 1950s. While exact numbers are secret, experts believe U.S. has around 180 B61 tactical nuclear bombs on the continent—some 20 in Germany and the rest spread across Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey.
“We don’t think that the nuclear-sharing agreement is fit for the times anymore,” said Ralf Stegner, vice chairman of the SPD, following a meeting of the party leadership on Monday. He said the SPD was extremely unlikely to support the F/A-18 purchase.
The procurement would be a key step in maintaining nuclear sharing in coming decades. The only aircraft in the German fleet currently certified by the U.S. to carry nuclear weapons are the German-made Tornados. But some of those are 40 years old and are being retired.
Mr. Stegner added that the mounting U.S. pressure on Germany meant that the country was headed toward a fundamental debate about nuclear armament and military spending of a kind that hadn’t taken place since 1982, when a rebellion within the SPD over the stationing of nuclear weapons in Europe contributed to the ouster of Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.
“Nuclear sharing doesn’t necessarily mean we need to host nuclear weapons,” said Rolf Mützenich, the SPD’s deputy floor leader and speaker on defense policy. Mr. Mützenich said Germany could follow the example of Canada, a NATO ally that doesn’t keep U.S. nuclear weapons on its soil.
Mr. Mützenich said he believed a majority of SPD lawmakers would reject any proposal to purchase new U.S. aircraft, partly because of the large cost. Growing animosity between NATO and Russia and the likelihood of a renewed arms race were all arguments against nuclear sharing, Mr. Mützenich added.
The looming dispute about military doctrine, military spending and procurement is just one of many now rocking Ms. Merkel’s coalition—a government many analysts think could unravel as early as this year.
Peter Beyer, Ms. Merkel’s coordinator for trans-Atlantic cooperation and a member of her conservative party, said nuclear sharing was indispensable. Failure to revamp Germany’s aging fleet of nuclear-capable bombers would make a farce of the country’s commitment to the NATO nuclear deterrent, he said.
“How we can get Putin to disarm if we fail to confront him in any way,” Mr. Beyer said. “This does not help peace but creates instability. Our allies, including the smaller states in Europe, would then have to wonder whether they can still rely on Germany.”
Write to Bojan Pancevski at bojan.pancevski@wsj.com
-
By George Friedman
Putin, Khrushchev and the Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis
Putin has invoked the crisis to revive the perception of Russia as a superpower.
In October 1964, Leonid Brezhnev, Alexei Kosygin and Nikolai Podgorny removed Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev from office, supposedly because of Khrushchev’s “harebrained schemes.” Most have assumed that this referred to Khrushchev’s plan to turn Siberia into an agricultural heartland, but I have always believed it actually referred to his attempt to slip missiles into Cuba. Given how that plan ended, it would be a logical fit. It is therefore fascinating that Russian President Vladimir Putin announced last week that he’s ready for another Cuban missile crisis if the United States decides to deploy medium-range missiles in Europe. Given his comments, it’s important that we understand how the crisis unfolded and its relevance, if any, to what’s happening today.
During the 1960 presidential election, John F. Kennedy sought to discredit the Eisenhower administration by claiming that the Soviet Union’s missile capabilities exceeded those of the United States. The claim was a lie; the U.S. had a substantial lead in deployed missiles and was rapidly deploying nuclear submarines. The U.S. also had an enormous advantage in strategic bombers; the Soviets had only a small number of Bear strategic bombers, which were far inferior to the American B-52s.
Indeed, the U.S. would have an overwhelming advantage in a nuclear exchange. That, combined with its satellite imagery capabilities, meant the U.S. could theoretically launch a first strike on the Soviet Union’s relatively small missile force and render it useless. Theory and practice are very different things. Still, in the Soviets’ worst-case scenario, the U.S. might launch such an attack and force a Soviet surrender. The Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile capability was limited, and the Soviets needed an interim weapon that could guarantee a counterstrike against the U.S. regardless of how successful a U.S. first strike would be. The solution was to put intermediate-range nuclear weapons within range of the United States, and the only possible location was Cuba.
The whole strategy rested on smuggling the missiles in and making them operable before the U.S. could detect them. It was in many ways a harebrained scheme because not only was detection possible but the U.S. response was utterly unpredictable. The U.S. might determine that other installations existed and launch a sudden and powerful attack to destroy them. Moreover, the need for this deterrent was dubious. True, the U.S. had a strategic advantage over the Soviets, but using it in a first strike would be an enormous risk. Given the Bay of Pigs fiasco, Kennedy didn’t have much confidence in U.S. intelligence, and certainly not enough to bet the house on a first strike.
Robert F. Kennedy and others have portrayed the crisis as a showdown between two equal powers that was managed with diplomatic brilliance to avoid a disastrous end. However, transcripts of meetings held by the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, which advised John F. Kennedy during the crisis, tell a very different story (see Sheldon Stern’s “The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory” for more details). Certainly, it was a serious episode, but it did not put humanity in danger of nuclear annihilation.
In terms of the nuclear balance, the Soviets had a very weak hand. That’s why they tried to slip missiles into Cuba. The U.S. was running heel-and-toe surveillance on Cuba so the chances of the missiles not being detected by U-2s or human intelligence were low. Once detected, Khrushchev had to back down for the same reason he tried the maneuver in the first place: The Soviets were weak.
The Kennedy narrative of the crisis was that Khrushchev capitulated just before a U.S. invasion. In reality, both sides understood that, unless Khrushchev was nuts, the game was over the minute Kennedy announced the blockade of Cuba following the discovery of Soviet missiles. Indeed, Khrushchev did back down in return for a clever offer to withdraw obsolete U.S. missiles from Turkey and Italy (though the offer was only revealed at a later date). The fact was that Khrushchev had no choice but to capitulate.
Few have acknowledged, however, that Khrushchev won a huge point in his handling of the crisis. For the heroic narrative of the Kennedy brothers to work, they could not admit the truth – that U.S. nuclear capabilities far exceeded those of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had to be treated as a peer with enormous strength that was compelled to back down not by superior force but by the skills of the negotiators. If they acknowledged that there was no missile gap, and that the Soviets could not match U.S. nuclear power, then the crisis would no longer be seen as a stunning moment in history.
The Kennedy administration needed the heroic tale and therefore had to give something of extraordinary value to Khrushchev: the myth that the Soviet Union could stand toe to toe with the United States on nuclear capabilities. (The Soviets would become peers to the U.S. later on, but they were not in the 1960s.) The Soviets wanted this acknowledgment for three reasons. First, the American public would force caution on U.S. politicians. Second, other powers, especially those in Europe, would question the reliability of the U.S. security umbrella. Third, the Soviet public, enthralled by Sputnik and Yuri Gagarin, would believe they were witnessing another Soviet triumph. Yes, the Soviets conceded, but they could write that off as simple prudence. Every self-congratulatory memoir written by in the U.S. about the crisis reinforced the notion that the Soviet Union was a nuclear peer. Obviously, no one in his right might would risk nuclear annihilation over such trivia, but then no one actually did.
(click to enlarge)
I do not know if this is what Khrushchev intended or if it was the result of unexpected political needs in the U.S., but I suspect the latter. Khrushchev likely wasn’t clever enough to have planned this scenario the way it played out. But regardless, Kennedy kept the missile gap story in place and conceded equality to the Soviets.
Which brings me to Putin’s recent comments on the Cuban missile crisis. At the moment, Russia is in no way a military challenge to the United States. Any U.S. medium-range missiles stationed in Europe would be meant as a deterrent or possibly used in case of a Russian incursion into Ukraine. It’s unlikely tensions there would escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. And that’s what makes it so attractive to Putin. Putin wants a showdown with the U.S. because it could end with the U.S. treating Russia as a dangerous peer and U.S. allies increasing their importance by maximizing the Russian risk. At a time when your own hand is weak, having your opponent declare you dangerous and powerful is a huge gift. The Soviets received this gift once before. Putin, faced with economic problems at home, a lackluster performance in Ukraine and a growing force to Russia’s west, may be looking to receive it again.
Khrushchev didn’t fully understand the game. But Putin does. He must take the world to an imaginary nuclear brink that will force a negotiation, if in nothing but appearance. The world will breathe a sigh of relief when it ends. And every deputy at the U.S. National Security Council will dine out for the rest of their life on how close the U.S. came to the abyss and how brilliantly the U.S. worked to avoid war with a fearsome superpower. And with that, the thing Putin has always decried, the geopolitical disaster of 1991, can be reversed. But considering that Khrushchev was ousted for such harebrained schemes, the downside could be political oblivion.
-
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/02/india-pakistan-crisis-has-lessons-trump-and-kim/155196/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
-
February 10, 2013
The man who saved the world... 50 years ago, at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis, second-in-command Vasilli Arkhipov of the Soviet submarine B-59 refused to agree with his Captain's order to launch nuclear torpedos against US warships and setting off what might well have been a terminal superpower nuclear war.
The US had been dropping depth charges near the submarine in an attempt to force it to surface, unaware it was carrying nuclear arms. The Soviet officers, who had lost radio contact with Moscow, concluded that World War 3 had begun, and two of the officers agreed to 'blast the warships out of the water'. Arkhipov refused to agree - unanimous consent of three officers was required - and thanks to him, we are here to talk about it.
His story is finally being told - the BBC is airing a documentary on it.
Raise a glass to Vasilli Arkhipov - the Man Who Saved the World.
-
I remember this story .
And it was just around that time Kruschev backed down and pulled the nucs out of Cuba.
Later it was revealed Kennedy also backed down and removed nucs in Western Europe I believe.
The latter was apparently covered up so JFK could stick his chest out to the public.
-
The missiles that were removed were in Turkey IIRC.
-
I found the description of the underlying issues here interesting, with thoughts that I had not previously considered.
==========================================
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/technological-path-out-missile-defense-security-dilemma/155641/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
A Technological Path Out of the Missile-Defense Security Dilemma
U.S. Army Cpl. Rogelio Argueta, Patriot Launching Station Enhanced Operator-Maintainer, assigned with Task Force Talon, 94th Army Air and Missile Defense Command gives commands, during a practice missile reload at Andersen Air Force Base, Feb. 6, 2019.
By Brian Dunn Read bio
March 19, 2019
As boost-phase defenses become viable, they could reduce the destabilizing effects of longer-ranged defenses on great-power relationships.
It is a curious feature of nuclear strategy that anti-missile systems that deter rogue states also destabilize relations among major powers. But new technology, combined with intensive diplomacy, may offer a way out of this trap.
Let’s start with reviewing how ABM systems are destabilizing. An ideal mutually-assured-destruction scenario — forgive the absurdity — confers no advantages to the nation that shoots first. Sure, a first strike might knock out a good number of nuclear installations, but the remaining arsenal would still be more than capable of delivering annihilation. This means decision-making under pressure is relatively straightforward: don’t fire nuclear weapons first. No matter how suspicious you are of your enemy, restraint always offers a chance for survival. A first strike guarantees your own destruction.
However, when you throw ABM systems into the mix, the situation grows considerably murkier. With sufficient defenses, a nation might just be able to stop (or at least blunt) a weakened second strike. This changes the calculus completely. If confronted with a possible enemy strike, leaders may feel they have no choice but to fire pre-emptively and take their chances at defending against a second strike: “Nuclear war should be avoided, but if you’re going to have one it’s best to shoot first.”
This logic led Nixon and Brezhnev to sign the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, limiting the number of anti-ICBM missiles to a paltry 100 each. Three decades later, George W. Bush withdrew from the agreement, citing the (then-potential) threat from North Korea and (still-only-potentially) Iran. If Pyongyang could develop long-range missiles, then it could invade South Korea while threatening a nuclear strike on the U.S. mainland. Would the United States risk Los Angeles or San Francisco to come to Seoul’s aid? Bush argued that ABMs were needed to protect the United States and allies alike.
Related: Let’s Walk This Through: If North Korea Launches An ICBM, Then…
Related: Missile Defense Review Calls for Protecting US From Cruise Missiles
Related: Pentagon to Study Putting Anti-Missile Laser Weapons in Space
But as these systems deployed — THAAD to South Korea, Aegis Ashore to Europe, Ground Based Midcourse Defense to Alaska and California, and the Navy’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense on the world’s oceans — China and Russia grew increasingly alarmed. These systems may be primarily aimed at North Korea and Iran, but with enough improvement, they might eventually be used to stop (or blunt) a superpower’s second strike.
Russia’s concerns can be seen in its recent proliferation efforts. It has recently announced new hypersonic missiles that can theoretically penetrate any missile defenses and deployed 9M729 missiles on land, violating the INF treaty. China will likely also look to bolster its arsenal if it sees its nuclear forces as increasingly ineffective against U.S. missile defense schemes. So, by seeking to protect itself against smaller, hostile states, the United States is igniting an arms race among the more powerful nuclear states. Or is there another way?
Today’s missile defenses target incoming weapons in their midcourse or terminal phases, thanks largely to technical challenges that have ruled out interception during the boost phase. This phase only lasts a short time, so the interceptors must be positioned close to the launch area and ready to fire instantly.
Don't Miss
An Aug. 12, 2017, image shows a white supremacist carrying a NAZI flag into the entrance to Emancipation Park in Charlottesville, Va.
National Security Pros, It’s Time to Talk About Right-Wing Extremism
Mr. David L. Norquist, performing the duties of the U.S. deputy secretary of defense, speaks about the fiscal year 2020 defense budget during a press briefing at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., March 12, 2019.
2020 Budget Request Reveals Slow Shift Toward Great Power War
What comes after Putin? Assessing the future of US-Russian relations
Russian President Vladimir Putin, center, delivers a state-of-the-nation address in Moscow, Russia, Wednesday, Feb. 20, 2019.
‘Chaos Serves Putin’s Interest’: A Veteran Diplomat Takes Stock
USS Harry S. Truman arrives at Naval Station Norfolk in Norfolk, Va., Wednesday, July 13, 2016, after supporting missions over Iraq and Syria.
Does USS Truman’s Early Retirement Herald a New War on Carriers?
Related podcast
However, with recent advances in laser technology and networked communications, viable boost-phase defense is within reach. Lockheed is slated to deliver a 60-150-kilowatt laser for integration with the Aegis system by 2020. An earlier 30-kilowatt model has shown the ability to shoot down drones and disable a truck from a mile away. Indeed, the Defense Department’s 2019 Missile Defense Review says, “Developing scalable, efficient, and compact high energy laser technology holds the potential to provide a future cost-effective capability to destroy boosting missiles in the early part of the trajectory.” Lasers have the advantage of near-instantaneous time to target and are not limited by the number and cost of interceptors. Also mentioned is the possibility of arming F-35s with interceptors, made possible by the improving network-centric coordination of targeting information across multiple platforms.
Boost-phase defenses help solve at least one tactical problem: MIRVs, or Multiple Independently-Targetable Reentry Vehicles, long the bane of ABM developers. Within a few minutes of launch, a MIRV-equipped missile can send its warheads and dummies off on different trajectories. The best way to deal with this is to hit the missile before one target becomes ten.
But boost-phase defenses offer a key strategic advantage as well. They can, and indeed must, be placed close to their targets. Their batteries would be able to intercept North Korean missiles but not launches from deep within mainland China and unlike current forward-deployed regional systems, they can have verifiably limited ranges. China is currently up-in-arms over the deployment of THAAD in South Korea, while Russia is livid about the placement of Aegis batteries in Romania and Poland. As terminal-phase and midcourse-phase systems, these are inherently long-range. THAAD interceptors have a range of over 200 kilometers, while an Aegis-fired SM-6 can fly as many as 240 kilometers. The THAAD-ER and SM-6 IIB upgrades only extend these ranges. On the other hand, a Sidewinder fired from an F-35 has a maximum range of about 35 kilometers. For the foreseeable future, atmospheric lasers will be similarly short-ranged.
This also provides a solution to China’s other gripe with the placement of THAAD: that the accompanying radar system penetrates deep into Chinese airspace. Large radar ranges are a necessary component of any midcourse or terminal-phase system. If THAAD is going to intercept a ballistic missile 200 kilometers out, then it needs to launch the interceptor long before then, and it will need to acquire the missile even further out. As such, the AN/TPY-2 radar that accompanies the THAAD system has an estimated range of at least 1,000 kilometers, which could reach from Seoul to Beijing and would allow the United States to monitor all activity in that part of Chinese airspace. However, boost-phase defenses work on the principle of targeting missiles inside a predetermined area. Therefore, they can use less powerful, more localized radars focused just on North Korean ICBM sites rather than the whole region.
But a technology change alone isn’t enough to extract the United States from its security dilemma; that will require trust and communication. U.S. officials must take the initiative to convince Russia and China that these systems are not aimed at them. Boost-phase defense provides the technical basis for this, but it must be accompanied by openness and transparency. This could include allowing inspections of missile defense installations to verify their short-ranged nature. Unfortunately, current diplomatic trust is not high, as shown by the collapse of the INF treaty. The situation is further hindered by statements such as President Trump’s words at the Missile Defense Review rollout: “Our goal is simple. To ensure that we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States anywhere, anytime, anyplace.”
As ABM technology improves, especially the effectiveness of lasers, the United States would do well to focus on localized, surface-based, boost-phase defenses rather than attempting to build a massive Reagan-style missile defense scheme that would serve only to destabilize the current world order. This will provide an effective defense against current and future rogue states, while maintaining the status quo among the major nuclear powers.
-
Defeating A Real Nuclear Threat
In 2014, during the Syrian civil war, ISIS occupied a site in the Syrian desert which once held a nuclear weapons facility. It reportedly had been built for the Syrians with North Korean help. If that reactor had been there, ISIS might have had a capability to inflict terrifyingly massive casualties.
However, seven years earlier, in September 2007, Israel launched a secret air attack against this obscure site in the Syrian desert called Deir es-Zoir. The reactor building was called al-Kibar.
Without that Israeli destruction of this Syrian-North Korean project, the world possibly would have had to deal with a nuclear armed ISIS and become a much more dangerous place.
The amazing story of how the Israelis discovered the secret site, figured out it was a nuclear reactor, connected the North Koreans to the project, and then decided to destroy it is a non-fiction story worthy of Daniel Silva’s great novels.
Yaakov Katz, editor in chief of the Jerusalem Post, has spent years pulling together the Israeli, American, Syrian, and North Korean pieces of this amazing story. His book, Shadow Strike: Inside Israel’s Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power is one of the most compelling stories I have read in a long time.
The Syrian dictator, Bashar al-Assad, had picked a remote, obscure, and unnoticed part of the Syrian desert to set up a bold (and illegal) project with the help of North Koreans. To this day we do not know if the North Koreans were building a reactor for the Syrians or if the Syrians were allowing the North Koreans to build a reactor for themselves with the payment to Syria being a few nuclear bombs once the reactor was up and running.
This was a remarkable decision by Assad and by the North Koreans. After the American invasion of Iraq and the Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi’s decision to turn over his entire nuclear program (which was much bigger and further along than either the Americans or the Israelis had expected) Assad was running a real risk by building a secret program.
The North Koreans were in the middle of the Six Power talks about disarming their own nuclear program, and yet here they were breaking the most fundamental rule about nuclear weapons –they were helping another country develop a secret program.
Because the Israelis had been shocked by the degree to which they had been ignorant of the Libyan nuclear program, they began reviewing all of their intelligence about nuclear activities – especially in Syria and Iran.
The key breakthrough came when the head of the Syrian Atomic Energy Commission visited Vienna. In an operation worthy of a Silva or Ian Fleming novel, Mossad, the Israeli intelligence agency, entered his hotel room, downloaded the contents of his laptop, and planted a bug to monitor it.
For people who wonder about security measures, this is a useful tale. It turned out the Syrian physicist had been taking pictures of the building at al-Kibar – including a picture with the North Korean physicist who was helping with their nuclear weapons program.
From the minute the image surfaced Israel faced a crisis.
Israeli doctrine was to never again accept the risk of a holocaust in which millions of Jews could die. When the Iraqis built a nuclear facility near Baghdad, Israel bombed it in 1981. Then Prime Minister Menachem Begin explained to the world that Israel would never accept an enemy possessing a nuclear weapon. They would always preemptively destroy it. This became known as the Begin Doctrine.
Prime Minister Ehud Olmert knew he would have to destroy the Syrian reactor before it went online and began creating radioactive material. However, he also knew he had to convince the United States that it was a nuclear facility and therefore unacceptable. He actually hoped that maybe the Americans would decide to destroy it.
The portions of the book that describe the dance in Washington are as fascinating as the scenes in Israel.
President George W. Bush is sympathetic but faced with wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, he was hesitant about taking on a third Muslim country. The American national security establishment was split between those who wanted to pursue diplomacy and those who believed, in the end, the reactor had to be destroyed before it became operational. Only Vice President Cheney had intuited for years that there was a North Korean-Syrian relationship, and only Cheney was adamant about the need to destroy it.
Katz has an enormous range of sources and has written a remarkable story.
Anyone interested in national security in an increasingly dangerous world would learn a lot by reading this extraordinary book.
Your Friend,
Newt
-
second post
https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/05/everyones-nuclear-weapons-are-getting-less-predictable-and-more-dangerous/157052/?oref=defense_one_breaking_nl
-
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/enewetak-atoll-dome-un-antonio-guterres-concerns-marshall-islands-structure-leaking-radioactive-material-pacific/?fbclid=IwAR0newIDK4JvosXsVcj0vwAsAH-fk3FyoVuWGZGCG9x8QNGoVM8EPbzldJ4
-
https://futurism.com/the-byte/bioweapons-kill-people-specific-dna?fbclid=IwAR2WtjbitQpoPXzmPrGwYQDiI8NcSzOaZLj8zz_C2hCR5oR0ESKUid7Oabc
-
https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/18/551792129/stanislav-petrov-the-man-who-saved-the-world-dies-at-77?utm_source=facebook.com&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=npr&utm_term=nprnews&utm_content=20170918&fbclid=IwAR0NkPZ-cIitEIxglZksrzcPLVcNKyuzvxgVbZMeDkoPVPWyIgeZEZqAlY4
-
https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/is-nuclear-power-worth-the-risk?source=EDT_NYR_EDIT_NEWSLETTER_0_imagenewsletter_Daily_ZZ&utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Daily_122319&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d3fa3f92a40469e2d85c&cndid=50142053&esrc=&mbid=&utm_term=TNY_Daily
-
https://getpocket.com/explore/item/the-war-game-that-could-have-ended-the-world
-
Hypersonic Missiles Are a Game Changer
No existing defenses can stop such weapons — which is why everyone wants them.
By Steven Simon
Mr. Simon is an analyst at the Quincy Institute and teaches international relations at Colby College.
Jan. 2, 2020
Last week, President Vladimir Putin of Russia announced the deployment of the Avangard, among the first in a new class of missiles capable of reaching hypersonic velocity — something no missile can currently achieve, aside from an ICBM during reentry.
Such weapons have long been an object of desire by Russian, Chinese and American military leaders, for obvious reasons: Launched from any of these countries, they could reach any other within minutes. No existing defenses, in the United States or elsewhere, can intercept a missile that can move so fast while maneuvering unpredictably.
Whether or not the Avangard can do what Mr. Putin says, the United States is rushing to match it. We could soon find ourselves in a new arms race as deadly as the Cold War — and at a time when the world’s arms control efforts look like relics of an inscrutable past and the effort to renew the most important of them, a new START agreement, is foundering.
Hypersonics represent an apotheosis of sorts for many warfare theorists and practitioners, who have long contended that air power alone can have a decisive effect in a conflict. They have always been wrong. The allies lost about 100,000 aircrew members in an attempt to destroy German industry and the popular will to fight during World War II, but the war in Europe was won with boots on the ground.
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
In Asia, the war was won at sea, though surrender was purchased with atomic weapons, delivered by long-range bombers. This seemed to vindicate the role of air power, at least until the superpowers concluded that such destructive weapons could not really be used to fight a war. Their primary strategic role devolved to deterring the other side from using its nuclear bombs in a vast, self-canceling enterprise. If strategic air forces did come into play, it would only be to ensure mutual destruction.
ImageAn image from the Russian Defense Ministry showing an intercontinental ballistic missile launch.
An image from the Russian Defense Ministry showing an intercontinental ballistic missile launch.Credit...Russian Defense Ministry Press Service, via Associated Press
Hypersonic weapons, at long last, appear poised to fulfill the promise of air power. In an era when the use of ground troops has proved costly, unpopular and generally ineffective, and where threats might be real but not necessarily “strategic,” they are a godsend: missiles whose accuracy minimizes the risk of collateral damage, pose no risk to aircrews, are unstoppable and phenomenally accurate, can yield an impact equal to five to ten tons of high explosive with no warhead at all yet be capable of delivering a nuclear bomb, and can reach nearly every coordinate on the surface of the earth within 30 minutes. Death from the air, guaranteed on-time delivery.
The United States has been developing its own hypersonic program, under the project name Prompt Global Strike. But the Russians got there first because they’ve made hypersonics a priority: They offset Russia’s inability to sustain an expansive high-tech military infrastructure, and they represent a direct response to George W. Bush’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. Mr. Bush withdrew presumably so America could develop stronger defenses against a nuclear attack; with the Avangard in its arsenal, Russia doesn’t have to worry too much about penetrating whatever defenses the American military had in mind.
It gets worse. China, India, France and others are all developing similar weapons. The age of hypersonics, when even medium-size powers can deliver unstoppable damage on an American (or Russian, or Chinese) city, is a whole new game.
Editors’ Picks
Martin Scorsese Is Letting Go
‘We Stood Up to Allow a Man and a Woman to Get to Their Seats’
Living as Myself, at Last
Continue reading the main story
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
For starters, hypersonics change the way we think about crisis management. Suppose the United States detected an adversary’s launch of a missile — or mistakenly thought it had detected a launch, as American authorities had actually done in January 2018. At a moment like this, the stakes are high, and the time frame for decision making is extremely compressed. Throw in exhaustion, intense emotions and uncertainty about the other side’s intentions, and you have a seriously volatile situation.
If the contending parties are armed with hypersonic missiles, the time frame for deciding what to do is even shorter, and the uncertainty about what your enemy is targeting and the nature of an incoming warhead — is it nuclear or conventional? — is virtually total. In such a situation, the overwhelming incentive is to shoot first. Think of two gunslingers in a dark room.
Moreover, hypersonics are a weaponized moral hazard for states with a taste for intervention, because they erase barriers to picking fights. Is an adversary building something that might be a weapons factory? Is there an individual in an unfriendly country who cannot be apprehended? What if the former commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Qassem Soleimani, visits Baghdad for a meeting and you know the address? The temptations to use hypersonic missiles will be many.
Hypersonics also push us toward a slippery slope. They blur the line between conventional and strategic weapons, and their easy, justifiable use — say, to kill a single terrorist leader in a crowded city — could make it easier to accept their widespread use, with much more destructive consequences.
Hypersonics might look like just a zoomier version of existing weapons, but in fact they are game-changing. When the United States used nuclear weapons against Japan, they were thought to be a dramatic advance on bombs already in use, even those used to generate firestorms that had already devoured the cities of Germany and Japan. It was not until later that they were understood to be categorically different and ultimately too destructive to use.
If past is prologue, deployment of the systems is going to take place well before their ramifications are fully understood. By 1950, as the Chinese Army was overrunning American and South Korean forces, the Truman administration had already grasped the dilemmas intrinsic to nuclear weapons; the Soviet detonation of a hydrogen bomb a few years later drove the lesson home. But between the exuberance of acquiring a new military capability and the sobering realization of its dangers, there is plenty of opportunity to use them.
As someone who worked on counterterrorism on the National Security Council staff, I feel my pulse racing just to consider these possibilities. I’ve been in too many situations where I know hypersonics would have been compellingly presented as the best possible response. The allure of such a weapon would be nearly irresistible.
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
The biggest threat from hypersonics is that they come at a time when the world’s arm control treaties are falling apart. We need a multilateral agreement to limit hypersonic arsenals and their use, but unfortunately, the United States, which would have to take the lead in orchestrating the negotiation of such an agreement, is uninterested in any deals that might tie its hands.
President Trump, who declared that trade wars are easy to win, has also welcomed an arms race on the grounds that the United States would beat all comers. Congress has only rarely approved arms control treaties — and with the Senate in Republican hands, it seems scarcely likely that an agreement limiting hypersonic weapons would find favor.
Beyond American politics, the multilateral nature of an agreement would in itself impose obstacles, because of the number of countries that would need to be involved and the frictions between them. Such agreements have been hammered out in the relatively recent past, including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Missile Technology Control Regime, which imposed both range and payload limitations on a variety of missiles. But those already seem part of a different era, when the world agreed on the importance of investing in arms control.
For the time being, it’s more likely that with the Avangard’s debut, other countries will want this capability for themselves. As national programs gain momentum, the development, acquisition, fielding and, ultimately, use of these systems will become very difficult, if not impossible, to stop.
As at the dawn of the nuclear era, when the advent of nuclear weapons became intertwined with an emerging Cold War, a new and radical development in military technology is emerging just as post-Cold War realities give way to new ones. We need to channel the wisdom of the prudent arms controllers of the Cold War, who understood the urgent need to control weapons with terrifying implications.
Steven Simon is an analyst at the Quincy Institute, professor of the practice of international relations at Colby College and a co-author of “Our Separate Ways: The Struggle for the Future of the U.S.-Israel Alliance,” was senior director for the Middle East and North Africa on the National Security Council from 2011 to 2012 and for counterterrorism from 1995 to 1999.
The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips. And here’s our email: letters@nytimes.com.
Follow The New York Times Opinion section on Facebook, Twitter (@NYTopinion) and Instagram.
Correction: Jan. 2, 2020
An earlier version of this article misidentified the treaty from which Donald Trump withdrew the United States. It was the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, not the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
-
In Turkey, the Road to Proliferation Goes Through a Military Base
6 MINS READ
Jan 21, 2020 | 09:30 GMT
Aircraft prepare to take off from Turkey's Incirlik Air Base, home of Turkey's 10th Tanker Base Command, on Oct. 17, 2019.
For the United States, the military fallout of having to leave Incirlik Air Base might not be too severe -- unlike the political ramifications.
(IBRAHIM ERIKAN/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
Turkey has threatened to expel the United States from key bases in Turkey if their bilateral ties deteriorate further amid possible U.S. sanctions against Ankara.
While the loss of the Incirlik and Kurecik facilities in Turkey would be disruptive to Washington, it could find alternative locations elsewhere in the region.
The biggest ramification of such an expulsion could be that it prompts Turkey to pursue a nuclear weapons program.
The United States has troops scattered at bases throughout the Middle East, but few are as significant today as its facilities in Turkey — at least in terms of their political significance, if not their military function. Last month, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to retaliate against any U.S. sanctions on Turkey by, among other measures, expelling the United States from Incirlik Air Base and closing down the Kurecik radar base. From an American military standpoint, losing Incirlik and Kurecik wouldn't be the end of the world, as Washington could easily find alternative locations elsewhere in the Middle East. However an explusion, if it happens, could have far-reaching consequences, potentially even precipitating a Turkish nuclear arms program — which could touch off a race for atomic weapons around the region.
The Big Picture
A potential fissure between Turkey, a powerful member of NATO, and the United States could pave the way for a complete transformation of the geopolitical map in the Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean — particularly in the event of one of the most radical potential outcomes: Turkey's pursuit of a nuclear weapon.
See Turkey's Resurgence
A Base With a Long History
Incirlik has been synonymous with the U.S. military presence in Turkey since the start of the Cold War. The United States initially used the air base, which the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers built near the Mediterranean coast in the early 1950s, to conduct strategic reconnaissance missions and other intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and its allies before turning the facility into a key air transportation and training site. More recently, Incirlik provided a base for aerial refueling during the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and a stopover for U.S. troops rotating home from the Iraq war. Today, Incirlik is the main U.S. base for air missions against the Islamic State. Kurecik, meanwhile, was established in 2012 in eastern Anatolia, deploying the AN/TPY-2 radar as part of NATO's early-warning system against potential Iranian ballistic missile attacks on Europe.
Given the importance of Incirlik and Kurecik, the United States would be loath to lose the bases — especially as the country is struggling to continue its fight against the Islamic State at a time when it is facing potential expulsion from Iraq, which would complicate any efforts to maintain its presence in Syria. What's more, tensions with Iran are hardly subsiding, raising the importance of the wider ballistic missile defense network protecting Europe.
Even so, Incirlik and Kurecik are not irreplaceable. The United States has numerous allies in the Middle East that would be happy to offer up air bases as alternatives, including Jordan, from which U.S. aircraft would be only marginally farther from the areas in Syria that are within the immediate proximity of Incirlik. Washington also has alternatives in Europe, such as Greece, which is already negotiating with the United States to expand the U.S. Air Force presence there. As for Kurecik, the United States could mitigate its loss by conducting additional patrols with destroyers armed with ballistic missile defenses in the eastern Mediterranean and Black Sea until another replacement site is built in Eastern Europe.
Nuclear Fallout
The fallout of the loss of the bases, instead, would be more political. If Turkey kicks the United States out, for instance, the countries' fissure would almost certainly widen. More pertinent, however, is the nuclear question. Throughout the Cold War and since, Washington has managed to kill two birds with one stone. It has both extended nuclear deterrence to NATO allies like Turkey by protecting it with the B61 U.S. nuclear bombs stationed at Incirlik and, in the process, countered nuclear proliferation by dissuading partners like Turkey from pursuing their own nuclear weapons programs.
Ankara might well calculate that, in the event of a de facto divorce from the United States and the potential emergence of more nuclear powers in the neighborhood, the pros of atomic weapons outweigh the cons.
While there is some doubt as to how up to date Turkey's fighter pilots are with their training and ability to deploy these weapons (the United States could allow Turkish fighter jets to arm themselves with some of the approximately 50 nuclear bombs currently at Incirlik if an outside power ever seriously threatened the country with atomic weapons), there is little doubt that the presence of the weapons in Turkey gives Ankara strong reassurance about its wider security. By taking away the nuclear umbrella, however, Washington could spur Ankara to pursue its own atomic weapons, especially at a time when Turkey is at loggerheads with Israel (a nuclear power), Iran could restart its own nuclear program and Saudi Arabia has floated the idea of developing its own bomb too. As it is, Erdogan has long criticized the notion that nuclear-armed states would deign to forbid Turkey from obtaining its own nuclear weapons.
Without question, Turkey would come under significant economic and political pressure if it were to push ahead with any plans to develop its own nuclear deterrent, but Ankara might well calculate that, in the event of a de facto divorce from the United States and the potential emergence of more nuclear powers in the neighborhood, the pros of an atomic weapons program outweigh the cons. Naturally, such a decision would have other severe ramifications; for one, NATO could expel Turkey from the alliance, while it could also galvanize other countries, such as Greece, to pursue their own programs, thereby further destabilizing the region's fragile balance.
More broadly, the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Incirlik during a messy, U.S.-Turkish breakup could drive other U.S. allies under the American nuclear umbrella to question the long-term viability of their own special arrangements with Washington. The circumstances of the U.S. withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Incirlik might not stain the United States' reliability, but it could feed into increasing calls for nuclear self-autonomy in places like South Korea that are facing a growing nuclear threat amid worries about the future of the American military presence in their country. What this all suggests is that what happens at Incirlik isn't likely to stay at Incirlik.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/feb/4/pentagon-deploys-new-submarine-launched-nuclear-we/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=evening&utm_term=evening&utm_content=evening&bt_ee=lEQTM9JUJ21mM726SynqDl9%2BBhLNm2ClcVl7W59FnY%2B948cwYDVqPI7EB%2BT8XZ10&bt_ts=1580937154174
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/feb/13/trump-revamps-nuclear-arsenal-respond-russia-tacti/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=manual&utm_campaign=evening&utm_term=evening&utm_content=evening&bt_ee=BfphNieaxOFmMxrUsDVgEah%2F%2Fuj0ZIVGATMsDn4d5pXwG4rmk8F0RCMr7HdlbgM3&bt_ts=1581714673892
-
https://news.usni.org/2020/02/18/navy-confirms-global-strike-hypersonic-weapon-will-first-deploy-on-virginia-attack-subs
-
Iran Sharply Accelerates its Uranium Enrichment
4 MINS READ
Mar 3, 2020 | 20:25 GMT
The Big Picture
Iran's higher than expected leap in LEU accumulation brings forward the time frame at which it will have enough LEU for a breakout. Iran has meanwhile stonewalled IAEA efforts to inspect other suspect sites that might help inform it of past nuclear activities. The lack of development on advanced centrifuges, however, makes the LEU accumulation rate less alarming than it could have been.
What Happened
The International Atomic Energy Agency distributed its quarterly report on Iran's nuclear activities to member governments March 3, including a second document detailing Iran's alleged stonewalling of IAEA efforts to resolve questions about past nuclear activities. This is the first report since Iran took the position that it is not obligated to provide the IAEA with access to three sites that have not been inspected before. During an inspection in 2019, the IAEA found traces of uranium at Iran's Turquz Abad site. The IAEA also reported that Iranian officials have indicated they will deny access to additional sites.
The report also showed that Iran had increased its stockpile of low enriched uranium (LEU) from 372 kilograms in early November to 1,021 kilograms at present, with monthly production rising to about 170 kilograms per month. Part of this acceleration came from the reactivation of two cascades of IR-1 centrifuges at the hardened Fordow facility. Some additional production capacity also has come from advanced centrifuges at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz. Not all of the current LEU production is at the maximum 4.5 percent U-235 level, however; some of it is as low as 3 percent.
Why It Matters
The acceleration of enrichment beyond what most observers had previously expected means the point when the United States or Israel might begin to consider preventive military action to stop Iran's nuclear activities has drawn closer. Iran will now achieve enough LEU to make one device sooner, no later than April now. Based on rough calculations assuming current throughput capacity and Iran's ability to reactivate some additional IR-2 centrifuges it is not using at present, the current breakout time — or the time that would be needed to produce enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for one warhead if Iran began processing LEU to HEU — is now probably around four to six months.
The leap in LEU accumulation will reignite the debate in the United States and Israel about where exactly the red line should be, and what can be done to slow Iran's progress.
This report did not, however, contain evidence of breakthroughs on advanced centrifuges. Iran continues to perform research on a number of new models, but has not deployed anything beyond one cascade of IR-6s. It has not added more machines as powerful, or more powerful, than the IR-6 beyond what we knew was possible based on the last IAEA report in November 2019. Evidence of breakthroughs on the development of even more advanced machines or preparations for the deployment of additional IR-6 cascades, combined with having enough LEU for one device, would raise immediate alarms for the United States and Israel due to the potential for an extremely short breakout time of below two months; the new IAEA report does not suggest such a crisis is imminent.
Still, the leap in LEU accumulation will reignite the debate in the United States and Israel about where exactly the red line should be, and what can be done to slow Iran's progress. The high percentage of time Iran's centrifuges are operational indicates that any covert efforts by the United States, Israel or others to take them offline are not very effective. (There is no evidence in this report pointing to a new Stuxnet-like operation.)
U.S. pressure on the Europeans to bring the issue back to the U.N. Security Council and trigger a "snapback" of Security Council sanctions is likely to increase. But this is unlikely to trigger an immediate change of policy on Iran's part. Recent comments by U.S. officials have hinted that the United States will not seek to invoke snapback before the expiration of the Security Council sanctions on conventional arms sales to Iran lapses in October.
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cr98gE88W60
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cr98gE88W60
Glad they totally won't working on that in the Wuhan BSL-4 lab!
-
https://www.wsj.com/articles/possible-chinese-nuclear-testing-stirs-u-s-concern-11586970435
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/16293/china-seeds-biological-attack
-
Hiroshima and Moral Revisionism
Thoughts in and around geopolitics.
By: George Friedman
Last week marked the 75th anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the first of two strikes on the Japanese mainland that forever changed the face of war. Since they effectively meant the end of World War II, the bombings were met in much of the world with joy. That general view discounted the death of Japanese and focused instead on the lives the bombings supposedly saved, an attitude owing partly to the attack on Pearl Harbor and partly to the idea that the Japanese were especially barbaric in the Pacific theater. As all people do at all times, we loved our own more than we loved others.
Three arguments were made against the strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, that the Japanese were prepared to surrender anyway; second, that fears of U.S. casualties in Japan were exaggerated; and third, that the bomb was not dropped to defeat Japan but to intimidate the Russians. All are plausible but none stands up to serious scrutiny.
The Japanese were never going to agree to unconditional surrender, as was demanded by the Potsdam Agreement. Recall that in the day prior to the final surrender and after the atomic attack, elements of the Japanese army attempted a coup to block the surrender. It’s true that they had approached the Soviets and Sweden to resolve the war, but Moscow rejected the idea, and the efforts in Sweden were made by officials that didn’t speak for the Japanese government. The goal, in any case, was to achieve some sort of armistice. Moreover, the Japanese had been engaged in negotiations when they attacked Pearl Harbor, so there was some natural distrust in Washington as to their intentions. Japan meanwhile still occupied large swaths of China, where it killed between 15 million and 20 million people. The violence there continued as Tokyo never seriously discussed withdrawal.
No one knows how many would have been killed in an invasion of Japan. There was a strong case that enormous casualties would have been incurred based on Okinawa, where resistance was brutal. In other places it was less so. To dismiss the fears of American deaths is, I believe, unreasonable. The U.S. had as its primary goal the defeat of Japan at the lowest possible cost to American lives. It had the moral right and obligation to take all radical measures to minimize American casualties.
Last, the United States was not trying to intimidate the Soviets. At the Potsdam Conference, President Harry S. Truman, who had just been informed that the tests in New Mexico were successful, approached Josef Stalin to discuss a major new weapon the U.S. had developed. Stalin wasn’t interested. In retrospect, Stalin’s decision to avoid the discussion made sense. Soviet intelligence had penetrated the Manhattan Project and already knew that the bomb worked. If the U.S. used the weapon to intimidate the Soviets, then Truman would likely not have brought up the subject. He could have intimidated the Soviets easily in many other ways. The charge linked to a claim that the U.S. started the Cold War and initiated it with Hiroshima. This charge is unsupportable.
The dispute over the propriety of Hiroshima and Nagasaki arose neither during nor immediately after the war, when Americans were grateful for the fact that they and their loved ones would not have to fight in Japan. It arose during the Vietnam war. The bomb was taken by a political faction as a symbol of American imperial cruelty. Those who opposed the war tended to demonize the use of atomic weapons, while those who supported the war saw it as a necessary and just action. The debate has subsided since Vietnam, of course, but there is still a sense of illegitimacy of the bombing, and it was born from a struggle for political power by a faction opposed to the Vietnam War that meant to shame the American victory.
The critics' goal was to delegitimize an event that had overjoyed Americans and, in doing so, delegitimize the American experience in World War II. What had been seen as the essence of morality was now presented as the essence of immorality.
The generation of new moral standards that render the past evil, and therefore the society that emerged from it as corrupt, is common enough. But it uses a past that cannot be revised to carry out political agendas of the moment. Few thought in 1945 that Hiroshima was immoral; fewer would have believed that anyone could think it immoral. The revenge of the past, of course, is anticipating how critics will be judged by their descendants. The anti-war movement of the baby boomers will likely face its own judgment when they are no longer alive to defend themselves.
-
U.S., Russia: What to Make of Washington's Reversal on New START
3 MINS READ
Sep 23, 2020 | 21:23 GMT
The success of the White House’s attempt to score a pre-election foreign policy win by shifting its position in favor of a temporary New START extension will depend on Russia playing along. But Washington’s long-term goal of expanding the nuclear arms control treaty to a trilateral framework still rests entirely on China. In an interview with daily Russian newspaper Kommersant published on Sept. 21, U.S. Special Presidential Envoy for Arms Control Marshall Billingslea said the United States was now open to extending the arms agreement it signed with Moscow in 2010, which is currently set to expire on Feb. 5, but by no more than five years. Washington will only agree to such an extension, however, if Russian President Vladimir Putin agrees to either a joint statement or memorandum of intent (MOI) outlining the framework of a successor treaty with U.S. President Donald Trump prior to the November presidential election. Despite expressing some resistance to the new offer, Russian government officials and legislators have continued to talk in favor of extending New START, even if it’s for less than the five-year period described within the treaty.
The Trump administration initially held off negotiations on a New START extension, despite repeated Russian efforts to guarantee the treaty’s continuation.
U.S. and Russian negotiators failed to make any progress during a July meeting in Geneva due to Washington’s continued insistence on Chinese participation.
Knowing the treaty will likely be extended regardless of whether Trump is re-elected, Russia’s response will depend more on its willingness to grant him a policy win ahead of the ballot, rather Moscow’s future interests in nuclear arms control. Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden has an overall more hawkish stance on Russia compared with Trump, though he’s stated he would still approve an extension of New START if he were elected. And negotiations over the conditions attached to the newly offered extension could also continue under a second-term Trump administration. Pragmatic calculations related to the impact on and from U.S. elections, as opposed to the actual content of negotiations on future arms control, will thus likely define Russia’s decision on whether to accept the U.S. ultimatum.
Russia’s acceptance of the U.S. ultimatum, however, would hold little more than symbolic value in the United States’ greater quest to include China in the treaty’s next iteration. Given China’s continued refusal to take part in negotiations on nuclear arms control, the United States is now looking for Moscow to provide commitments to the idea of trilateral arms control via its proposed MOI between Putin and Trump. But such a Russian statement on intent to involve China will do little to change Beijing’s actual calculus on the matter, as China still has nothing to gain from entering a treaty that would limit its efforts to expand its arsenal of 300 nuclear warheads, which pales in comparison to the 6,000 warheads that Russia and the United States each possess.
-
https://www.breitbart.com/asia/2020/11/11/report-north-korea-estimated-have-60-nuclear-warheads/
-
That's just fg great.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/nov/12/china-expanding-nuclear-arms-plants-revealed/
-
Opinion Commentary
Joe Biden’s Early Test From Moscow and Beijing
An expiring arms-control deal is a chance to address hypersonics and make China come to the table.
By John Bolton
Jan. 17, 2021 4:48 pm ET
President-elect Joe Biden’s advisers have been signaling that they will rely on arms-control agreements with Russia to reduce the Defense Department budget. This is no surprise from a new, liberal administration promising dramatically increased domestic spending. Yet a second Trump term might have been little better. Eager to indulge in Covid-19 stimulus spending and convinced of Pentagon mismanagement, even under his own appointees, Mr. Trump was easy prey for Senator Rand Paul.
But reliance on arms-control deals with Russia is a fool’s paradise. Whatever relatively small near-term fiscal savings might accrue will be outweighed in the long term by increased threats not only from Moscow, but also from Beijing and rogue states aspiring to become nuclear powers.
Mr. Biden’s first arms-control decision will be whether and for how long to extend the New Start treaty. It expires Feb. 5, but can be extended for up to five more years, in whole or in part. The threat of the treaty’s expiration should be negotiating leverage for the U.S., but Mr. Biden appears certain to extend it in some form. Vladimir Putin recently proposed a one-year extension, perhaps worried he had received no signals from the president-elect. Mr. Biden should offer six months, thus keeping the heat on, and showing that his team will be more than stenographers for Moscow’s diplomats.
The hard policy questions are still the ones Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev and I discussed in August 2018, continued by Marshall Billingslea until the 2020 election rendered Mr. Trump a lame duck. Whether and how seriously Mr. Biden’s negotiators address these issues will determine whether a revised New Start agreement has any chance of being approved by the constitutionally required two-thirds Senate majority.
New Start has three broad substantive defects: It omits tactical nuclear weapons; it is technologically outdated and doesn’t address developments like hypersonic weapons; and China is not a signatory.
The existing deal doesn’t cover tactical nuclear weapons—those generally intended for battlefield use, as opposed to strategic nuclear weapons, typically more powerful and longer-range, intended for targets in the enemy’s homeland or other essential locations. During the 2010 ratification debate, this omission persuaded two-thirds of Republican senators to vote against the treaty. The global tactical-weapons threat has not eased in the intervening 10 years. Further Russian deployments, typically associated with violations of other treaty constraints on delivery vehicles, and significant increases in China’s tactical nuclear arsenals are serious and continuing.
Even Russian officials acknowledge that capabilities such as hypersonic glide-missile technology weren’t contemplated in New Start and should be addressed. Moscow and Beijing are both ahead of Washington in operational deployment of hypersonics and other advanced technologies. It would be strategic and budgetary malpractice if Mr. Biden believed he could count on Russia’s treaty compliance, let alone China’s, to prevent the U.S. from falling even further behind in this vital field.
Russia is willing to include China in negotiations about New Start’s successor, but Moscow has nonetheless so far accepted Beijing’s demurral that its current strategic nuclear arsenal is too small to warrant participating. But that is precisely the point: Is the U.S. supposed to wait until China reaches its comfort level of strategic warheads, and only then commence negotiations about reducing its capabilities? Contemporary arms control isn’t a serious effort if China is a bystander. To assuage Beijing’s concerns, the administration should invite Paris and London to join the talks. All five legitimate nuclear-weapons states would thus be involved, depriving China of ground to complain.
Mr. Biden’s advisers also seem open to Russia’s desire to revive the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, from which America withdrew in 2019. Whether through a new agreement or by incorporation into a revised Start framework, resurrecting the INF is dangerous. Russian overtures and promises to resolve compliance issues, worth as much as earlier Russian pledges, may appeal to those focused on Europe. But Europe is a secondary consideration. The impetus for INF withdrawal was that it didn’t bind China—the bulk of whose ballistic-missile inventory would violate the treaty—nor the likes of Iran and North Korea. Russia’s noncompliance, China’s absence, and the rogue-state proliferators meant that the U.S. was the only country in the world actually complying with INF limits. Beijing’s surging rearmament won’t stop because of resumed U.S.-Russian constraints on launchers, but that reinforces why China must be included in any follow-on New Start.
These are heavy-duty questions. This is not Mr. Biden’s first arms-control rodeo, but what he does and how he does it could define both his presidency’s ideological direction and its competence.
Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the U.N., 2005-06.
-
oe Biden’s Old Russia Start
He criticizes Putin on Navalny but offers a gift on nuclear arms control.
By The Editorial Board
Feb. 1, 2021 6:36 pm ET
SAVE
PRINT
TEXT
23
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then Vice President Joe Biden during their meeting in Moscow, March 10, 2011.
PHOTO: ALEXEY DRUZHININ/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Donald Trump went easy on Russia and Vladimir Putin rhetorically while supporting tougher policies than his predecessor. Now President Biden is taking the opposite approach. At least that’s the early message from the Administration’s first decision on arms control and its response to Russia’s growing domestic protests.
On Sunday Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he is “deeply disturbed by the violent crackdown” on Russian protesters and the arrests of thousands demanding the release of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Mr. Blinken said Russians are fed up with “corruption” and “autocracy” and added that Mr. Biden delivered a similar message in a phone call with Mr. Putin.
Good to hear, but the Administration sent a very different signal by embracing an unconditional five-year extension of the New Start nuclear arms treaty, which Mr. Putin made formal on Friday. The accord is a classic 20th century arms-control treaty that was inadequate when it came into force a decade ago.
New Start limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and bombs at 1,550. It also caps the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. The deal would have expired Feb. 5, but Mr. Biden took the longest extension possible.
This squanders useful diplomatic work by the Trump Administration. While Washington withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Open Skies treaties, which Russia was violating, it tried to negotiate a shorter extension to New Start last year.
Talks began in earnest after Washington demonstrated that it wasn’t afraid of walking away from bad arms-control deals, including the Iran nuclear accord. The U.S.sought improved verification, provisions to address technological developments and a plan for future negotiations to include China. Both sides came close to signing an interim, one-year extension last year before talks were overtaken by the presidential election.
“The New Start treaty is in the national security interests of the United States,” White House press secretary Jen Psaki said recently. “This extension makes even more sense when the relationship with Russia is adversarial.” The opposite is true. Arms-control works best between trustworthy governments, not with adversaries like Russia willing to cheat.
Former Trump national security adviser John Bolton recently called for a six-month extension, which would have provided time to address issues like tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles. Victoria Nuland, Mr. Biden’s nominee for the third-highest State Department post, last year suggested a one- or two-year extension.
“Washington should not grant Moscow what it wants most,” she wrote, “a free rollover of New START without any negotiations to address Russia’s recent investments in short- and medium-range nuclear weapons systems and new conventional weapons.” Yet that’s exactly what Mr. Biden has granted.
This is an echo of the Obama Administration Russia policy of criticizing Mr. Putin while refusing to sell lethal arms to Ukraine. Mr. Blinken said the U.S. is reviewing how to respond to Mr. Navalny’s arrest and didn’t rule out more sanctions. After its needless unilateral concession on New Start, Mr. Putin won’t be impressed by critical words alone.
-
Buying the Biden Crime Family was the best money they ever spent.
oe Biden’s Old Russia Start
He criticizes Putin on Navalny but offers a gift on nuclear arms control.
By The Editorial Board
Feb. 1, 2021 6:36 pm ET
SAVE
PRINT
TEXT
23
Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin shakes hands with then Vice President Joe Biden during their meeting in Moscow, March 10, 2011.
PHOTO: ALEXEY DRUZHININ/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Donald Trump went easy on Russia and Vladimir Putin rhetorically while supporting tougher policies than his predecessor. Now President Biden is taking the opposite approach. At least that’s the early message from the Administration’s first decision on arms control and its response to Russia’s growing domestic protests.
On Sunday Secretary of State Antony Blinken said he is “deeply disturbed by the violent crackdown” on Russian protesters and the arrests of thousands demanding the release of jailed opposition leader Alexei Navalny. Mr. Blinken said Russians are fed up with “corruption” and “autocracy” and added that Mr. Biden delivered a similar message in a phone call with Mr. Putin.
Good to hear, but the Administration sent a very different signal by embracing an unconditional five-year extension of the New Start nuclear arms treaty, which Mr. Putin made formal on Friday. The accord is a classic 20th century arms-control treaty that was inadequate when it came into force a decade ago.
New Start limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and bombs at 1,550. It also caps the deployment of intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched missiles and nuclear-equipped heavy bombers. The deal would have expired Feb. 5, but Mr. Biden took the longest extension possible.
This squanders useful diplomatic work by the Trump Administration. While Washington withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) and Open Skies treaties, which Russia was violating, it tried to negotiate a shorter extension to New Start last year.
Talks began in earnest after Washington demonstrated that it wasn’t afraid of walking away from bad arms-control deals, including the Iran nuclear accord. The U.S.sought improved verification, provisions to address technological developments and a plan for future negotiations to include China. Both sides came close to signing an interim, one-year extension last year before talks were overtaken by the presidential election.
“The New Start treaty is in the national security interests of the United States,” White House press secretary Jen Psaki said recently. “This extension makes even more sense when the relationship with Russia is adversarial.” The opposite is true. Arms-control works best between trustworthy governments, not with adversaries like Russia willing to cheat.
Former Trump national security adviser John Bolton recently called for a six-month extension, which would have provided time to address issues like tactical nuclear weapons and hypersonic missiles. Victoria Nuland, Mr. Biden’s nominee for the third-highest State Department post, last year suggested a one- or two-year extension.
“Washington should not grant Moscow what it wants most,” she wrote, “a free rollover of New START without any negotiations to address Russia’s recent investments in short- and medium-range nuclear weapons systems and new conventional weapons.” Yet that’s exactly what Mr. Biden has granted.
This is an echo of the Obama Administration Russia policy of criticizing Mr. Putin while refusing to sell lethal arms to Ukraine. Mr. Blinken said the U.S. is reviewing how to respond to Mr. Navalny’s arrest and didn’t rule out more sanctions. After its needless unilateral concession on New Start, Mr. Putin won’t be impressed by critical words alone.
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17048/china-gene-editing?fbclid=IwAR2iprtMXRvbJG-mHzmwfiJoGIs_sJYV5HHUyKpY_1aPYVerLl3yJplC7Tg
-
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/01/genetic-modification-could-protect-soldiers-chemical-weapons
-
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/03/new-icbm-legacy-system-and-should-be-cancelled/172619/
-
‘Red Line’ Review: The Calculus Didn’t Change
U.S. diplomacy didn’t stop Bashar al-Assad from murdering Syrians with chemical weapons. It only gave him cover.
A poison-hazard sign in the Syrian town of Khan Sheikhoun on April 5, 2017.
PHOTO: OGUN DURU/ANADOLU AGENCY/GETTY IMAGES
By John Bolton
March 15, 2021 6:35 pm ET
SAVE
PRINT
TEXT
10
Barack Obama’s 2013 deal to destroy Syria’s chemical weapons was touted at the time as proof that arms-control diplomacy can avert peril without resorting to force. The deal proved many things, but not that. It allowed Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to escape from the consequences of his own malfeasance. It also showed rogue states and terrorists how to survive, and Iran and Russia how to play America. The losers: Syria’s people, America’s credibility, and Middle Eastern peace and security.
President Biden yearns to rejoin his former boss’s Iran nuclear-weapons deal, which was under intense negotiation as the Syria drama unfolded. Before he does that, he may wish to read Joby Warrick’s “Red Line: The Unraveling of Syria and America’s Race to Destroy the Most Dangerous Arsenal in the World.” This study, by a longtime national security reporter at the Washington Post, has important implications for countering proliferation generally.
Syria’s military precipitated the 2013 crisis by bombing Moadamiyeh, outside Damascus, with sarin, a deadly nerve agent, killing over 1,400 people. United Nations Secretary General Ban Ki-moon called the attack “the worst use of weapons of mass destruction in the twenty-first century.” Fortunately a U.N. inspection team was in Damascus to investigate reports of prior chemical-weapons strikes and so brought international attention to it.
How would Mr. Obama respond? In 2011 he had said, “Assad must go.” But despite substantial assistance to anti-government rebels, Mr. Assad remained in power. Then, in August 2012, Mr. Obama casually observed that “a red line for us is we start seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my calculus.”
NEWSLETTER SIGN-UP
Books
Be the first to find out what's new and what's good. Get the weekend book reviews before the weekend.
PREVIEW
SUBSCRIBE
Not by much. Although Mr. Obama considered responding militarily, he hesitated. He was “uneasy” after German chancellor Angela Merkel urged caution and British prime minister David Cameron lost a House of Commons vote that eliminated Britain as a partner. Trying to shift responsibility, Mr. Obama sought congressional approval, which he didn’t need and didn’t get anyway. At hand were the makings of a humiliating debacle.
PHOTO: WSJ
RED LINE
By Joby Warrick
Doubleday, 346 pages, $29.95
Secretary of State John Kerry saw no diplomatic path for Mr. Assad to surrender or destroy his chemical weapons, saying on Sept. 9 that “he’s not about to do it.” But Mr. Assad did it—albeit not as a result of U.S. negotiations. Although the facts are unclear, the Syrian dictator had delegated authority to use chemicals to his generals, meaning the Moadamiyeh attack might have been ordered without considering the proximity of U.N. inspectors or even knowledge of Mr. Obama’s “red line.” Mr. Assad rapidly concluded he had made a terrible mistake and agreed to a deal.
Moscow applied pressure but clearly never intended to jettison Mr. Assad. Two years later, Russia significantly increased its air presence at Syria’s Khmeimim air base, complementing its nearby Tartus naval facility. Mr. Obama was again surprised. “Oh God, they’re getting ready to go in. They’re not going to let Assad lose,” said one adviser. Mr. Kerry, having been told that Russian planes were deploying to Syria, remarked cluelessly that “the level and type [of aircraft] represents basically force protection.” He was wrong. If the Russians only wanted to protect their assets, they could have kept them at home.
Mr. Assad didn’t surrender everything. In 2015, following the destruction of Syria’s declared chemical-weapons materials, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons investigators found indications in Syria’s records that Mr. Assad may have concealed assets. This is critical. The OPCW and the U.N. depended on what Syria declared; they had little capability to gather additional evidence, and foreign intelligence in Syria was obviously inadequate. Mr. Warrick enumerates not only sarin, but considerable amounts of other nerve agents and toxic chemicals that went unaccounted for.
Mr. Assad simply switched chemicals. Instead of using sarin, the regime carried out scores, perhaps hundreds, of strikes using chlorine, not explicitly banned by the Chemical Weapons Convention but nonetheless used as an asphyxiant, which the Convention generically prohibited. This was, as Mr. Warrick puts it, “a perfect loophole.” Said one expert, “It’s brilliant . . . Low-casualty, but psychologically effective.”
Mr. Assad, Mr. Warrick demonstrates, was not “chastened or deterred.” At Khan Sheikhoun, in April 2017, Syria’s military again used sarin, proving either that it still had the nerve agent or had resumed production of it. President Trump’s military retaliation was inadequate. Mr. Assad subsequently used chlorine, striking several times, including a significant attack in Douma, one year later. After a confused internal debate, Mr. Trump retaliated again. He had learned nothing about Syria, Iran or Russia, concluding instead that the U.S. ought to withdraw its forces from the region completely, which he tried unsuccessfully to do for two years.
It is therefore wrong to conclude, as Mr. Obama’s admirers still do, that successful diplomacy ended Mr. Assad’s chemical-weapons threat. Mr. Warrick acknowledges that “ultimately neither president succeeded in changing Assad’s behavior or shortening Syria’s war.” The Syria case proves that mere physical destruction of mass-destruction weapons and materials is insufficient. While Syria (or Iran) possesses the knowledge and ability to produce them, it can always rebuild what it “destroys.”
Iran emerged victorious from two presidents’ failures against Mr. Assad’s chemical bellicosity. For America, Mr. Assad is not the central threat; the real menace is Tehran, which has emerged even more dominant inside Syria, buttressing its arc of control from Iran through Iraq, Syria and Lebanon to the Mediterranean. The mullahs almost certainly saw Mr. Obama’s hesitancy to use force in Syria as fear of undercutting the ongoing Iran nuclear negotiations. They correctly surmised that the American president wanted a nuclear deal more than he wanted to guarantee eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons.
The ayatollahs now watching Mr. Biden can discern this desire anew. Messrs. Obama and Biden both proceed, despite their denials, as if deals themselves are the objectives, not whether they are effective or ineffective. Their blinkered focus on the “deal” is very Trumpian, and correspondingly damaging to American national security. That is the real lesson.
Mr. Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the U.N., served as national security adviser from April 2018 to September 2019.
Copyright ©2020 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved. 87990cbe856818d5eddac44c7b1cdeb8
Appeared in the March 16, 2021, print edition as 'The Calculus Didn’
-
https://www.foxnews.com/world/top-state-official-coronavirus-bioweapon-accident
-
https://www.hudson.org/experts/1299-david-asher
the LEFT -->>>
he must be a racist, white supremacist, proud boy, maga, conspiracy theorist, orange hair cultist, pig!
pay him no mind!
To think our greatest doctor Fauci was sending them money
this would be the most perfect illustration how they make total fools and idiots of us
thanks Brock/and his dull dim witted protege :x
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17191/china-what-to-do-about-it?fbclid=IwAR1oE1Bwc6UkhNaBwKgqjUflttHcvJwNsCUO0s-2ppQL1I3P4elotcWOdJk
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17191/china-what-to-do-about-it?fbclid=IwAR1oE1Bwc6UkhNaBwKgqjUflttHcvJwNsCUO0s-2ppQL1I3P4elotcWOdJk
An important read. China plays the long game, and plays to win.
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17191/china-what-to-do-about-it?fbclid=IwAR1oE1Bwc6UkhNaBwKgqjUflttHcvJwNsCUO0s-2ppQL1I3P4elotcWOdJk
An important read. China plays the long game, and plays to win.
Yes.
"If you want to find the largest collection of genetic information of Americans, you do not go to America. You go to Beijing."
- Wake . Up. People. The communist regime of China is not your friend and is not an innocent storefront on the edge of tbe Pacific. The Hitler analogies fail because China is so much more powerful.
-
The rapidity of change in the evolution of war is turning a lot of our previous strengths into Maginot Lines.
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17191/china-what-to-do-about-it?fbclid=IwAR1oE1Bwc6UkhNaBwKgqjUflttHcvJwNsCUO0s-2ppQL1I3P4elotcWOdJk
An important read. China plays the long game, and plays to win.
Yes.
"If you want to find the largest collection of genetic information of Americans, you do not go to America. You go to Beijing."
- Wake . Up. People. The communist regime of China is not your friend and is not an innocent storefront on the edge of tbe Pacific. The Hitler analogies fail because China is so much more powerful.
https://visiontimes.com/2020/10/07/a-chinese-defector-exposes-beijings-bioweapons-program.html
In May, a senior U.S. official revealed that China was working on developing bioweapons that can target people based on their ethnicity. He expressed worries that Beijing might conduct biological experiments on ethnic minorities. China has even admitted to such a possibility. Back in 2017, a publication released by the Chinese military categorized biology as a new warfare domain. It also suggested that future wars could involve genetic attacks.
In 1972, leaders from more than 180 nations established the biological weapons convention according to which the development of such weapons was banned. However, there are serious concerns that several countries are not abiding by the restrictions. At least 6 nations are believed to be currently invested in bioweapon programs — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. In 2015, U.S. intelligence classified gene editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction. The fact that you can create viruses that only affect specific races or ethnicities makes such weapons even scarier.
-
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/069/324/137/original/5d3642fd780d11bd.jpg)
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17191/china-what-to-do-about-it?fbclid=IwAR1oE1Bwc6UkhNaBwKgqjUflttHcvJwNsCUO0s-2ppQL1I3P4elotcWOdJk
An important read. China plays the long game, and plays to win.
Yes.
"If you want to find the largest collection of genetic information of Americans, you do not go to America. You go to Beijing."
- Wake . Up. People. The communist regime of China is not your friend and is not an innocent storefront on the edge of tbe Pacific. The Hitler analogies fail because China is so much more powerful.
https://visiontimes.com/2020/10/07/a-chinese-defector-exposes-beijings-bioweapons-program.html
In May, a senior U.S. official revealed that China was working on developing bioweapons that can target people based on their ethnicity. He expressed worries that Beijing might conduct biological experiments on ethnic minorities. China has even admitted to such a possibility. Back in 2017, a publication released by the Chinese military categorized biology as a new warfare domain. It also suggested that future wars could involve genetic attacks.
In 1972, leaders from more than 180 nations established the biological weapons convention according to which the development of such weapons was banned. However, there are serious concerns that several countries are not abiding by the restrictions. At least 6 nations are believed to be currently invested in bioweapon programs — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. In 2015, U.S. intelligence classified gene editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction. The fact that you can create viruses that only affect specific races or ethnicities makes such weapons even scarier.
-
GM:
Your VisionTimes post brings to mind the serious interview on youtube presumably in Mandarin with subtitles in front of an auditorium audience in China that I posted a few years back only to find it deleted when I went back to it recently wherein the Chinese scientist discussed quite seriously being able to target by ethnicity.
-
Just imagine what the PRC could do if they had a million people with Caucasian DNA in their genetic makeup to test an ethnic bioweapon upon...
GM:
Your VisionTimes post brings to mind the serious interview on youtube presumably in Mandarin with subtitles in front of an auditorium audience in China that I posted a few years back only to find it deleted when I went back to it recently wherein the Chinese scientist discussed quite seriously being able to target by ethnicity.
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/us-strategic-command-issues-random-warning-over-nuclear-strike-enemys-least-bad-option
-
our enemies
taking advantage of and flaming our domestic political problems
sometime soon we may look like those scenes in War of the Worlds were society just falls apart
-
our enemies
taking advantage of and flaming our domestic political problems
sometime soon we may look like those scenes in War of the Worlds were society just falls apart
It has fallen apart. Just running on inertia now.
-
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=bae9e860486c225ccfb13c91df6a0252_60929c0b_6d25b5f&selDate=20210505&goTo=B03&artid=0&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=washingtontimes-E-Editions&utm_source=washingtontimes&utm_content=Read-Button
-
VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: Mysterious Origins Of COVID-19 Raise Some Alarming Possibilities
hanson-covid-20210617
Sipa USA
VICTOR DAVIS HANSON
CONTRIBUTOR
June 17, 2021
9:43 AM ET
FONT SIZE:
For over a year, the American establishment and media have ostracized anyone who dared to connect the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic with the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Then, suddenly and without apologies for their past demagoguery, “journalists” and “experts” conceded that the Wuhan lab may well have been the most likely genesis.
Why the abrupt change?
For one thing, Donald Trump is no longer president.
There is now no need for progressives to declare everything that Trump once asserted as truth to be a lie. That includes Trump’s insistence that the Wuhan lab, not a wet market full of sliced-up bats, was the source of the outbreak.
The recent release of Dr. Anthony Fauci’s emails, along with new information about the gain-of-function research, make it clear that U.S. taxpayer dollars were being funneled to the Chinese for coronavirus research in Wuhan.
So now what?
We are left with a number of lose-lose scenarios regarding China’s efforts to lie about the origins of COVID-19.
Will China continually deny what is appearing to be undeniable? Perhaps. We should remember that this is a country with a Communist Party hierarchy that once killed many millions of its own citizens under Mao Zedong, and with a current apparat that has put 1 million Muslim Uyghurs into internment camps.
A stonewalling China likely will conclude that the risk of appearing guilty for causing one of the greatest “natural” global disasters in a century is not nearly as destructive to its interests as admitting it.
Will China then wait us out, denying the obvious facts, until weary Americans move onto another of their media frenzies?
Or, could China confess that the virus was birthed in the Wuhan lab but claim its appearance was a “joint” effort with the United States? The Chinese could insist that combined efforts with the U.S. were aimed at finding a “cure” for coronavirus epidemics, and thus China should not be blamed — or at least not solely blamed.
China could claim that it, too, was misled by its own sloppy researchers. It might even assert that its prior code of silence was meant to shield the role of U.S. funders of what turned into a pandemic disaster.
Americans then would end up wondering to what degree our own doctors and institutions not only lied to us throughout the crisis but, in some bizarre way, may have shared responsibility for engineering the virus.
Or, Chinese officials could privately wink and nod to our intelligence and military communities that their researchers were in fact pursuing “legitimate” viral gain-of-function research when a terrible Chernobyl-like accident took place. They might unofficially remind our officials that such things have also happened at Bhopal, Three Mile Island and Fukushima.
In back channels, Beijing might express regret over the resulting global economic catastrophe, the millions dead, the even more millions sickened, the billions of lives harmed by the lockdown, and the 2020-2021 American political, economic, social and cultural meltdown.
China additionally might lament its “mistaken” lack of transparency and the “confusion” that accounted for misleading the world. And yet, China would still smile and promise off the record that such an unforeseen disaster would never, ever happen again.
We tend to block out the unthinkable. It’s possible more information could leak out that the virus was a weaponized creation of civilian virologists and the Chinese military. How the virus escaped would not be clear, but millions the world over would suspect the worst of any involvement of the Chinese military.
In all these scenarios, we are left with the suspicion that an embryonic engineered virus was mysteriously released, doing more damage to the Western world than any weapon deliberately employed since World War II. And we will become terrified that it could happen again. More importantly, we still have no idea what to do: whether to act in a punitive or deterrent fashion, or both or neither.
Washington strategists are no doubt gaming all these rumors and unthinkables.
Many Americans are naively hopeful that COVID-19 was a one-off, laboratory accident. But some are terrified that it was a proto-bioweapon that, regardless of whether it was accidentally released, became a “never let a crisis go to waste” moment.
Victor Davis Hanson is a distinguished fellow of the Center for American Greatness.
-
quote author=Crafty_Dog
VICTOR DAVIS HANSON: Mysterious Origins Of COVID-19 Raise Some Alarming Possibilities
hanson-covid-20210617
Prof. Hanson is so good that I hate to pull out pieces for comment when it is the whole piece that makes the point. But, two small (?) points:
He mentions one million Uyghurs held in internment camps. If this is accepted fact, couldn't the world, led by Pres. Biden, boycott the Olympics on a condition, free the Uyghurs, and actually effect change?
In one of the possible scenarios, "a terrible Chernobyl-like accident took place".
Interesting point. Chernobyl taught us nothing we didn't already know about nuclear energy safety. What it taught us was that autocratic, totalitarian, dictatorships have the worst safety and environmental practices and results on earth, meaning that moving in that direction does not make us safer or cleaner.
What say China envier Thomas Friedman NYT about origins of Covid? Big powerful autocratic government had all the ownership and 'regulatory' power to keep this from happening with any level of safeguards they wanted - and they didn't. Just like Chernobyl.
-
https://defensivetraininggroup.blogspot.com/2021/06/miles-guo-20-june-2021-warning-to-west.html
-
https://pjmedia.com/news-and-politics/matt-margolis/2021/06/28/report-china-discussed-making-bioweapons-targeting-specific-races-n1457765
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17191/china-what-to-do-about-it?fbclid=IwAR1oE1Bwc6UkhNaBwKgqjUflttHcvJwNsCUO0s-2ppQL1I3P4elotcWOdJk
An important read. China plays the long game, and plays to win.
Yes.
"If you want to find the largest collection of genetic information of Americans, you do not go to America. You go to Beijing."
- Wake . Up. People. The communist regime of China is not your friend and is not an innocent storefront on the edge of tbe Pacific. The Hitler analogies fail because China is so much more powerful.
https://visiontimes.com/2020/10/07/a-chinese-defector-exposes-beijings-bioweapons-program.html
In May, a senior U.S. official revealed that China was working on developing bioweapons that can target people based on their ethnicity. He expressed worries that Beijing might conduct biological experiments on ethnic minorities. China has even admitted to such a possibility. Back in 2017, a publication released by the Chinese military categorized biology as a new warfare domain. It also suggested that future wars could involve genetic attacks.
In 1972, leaders from more than 180 nations established the biological weapons convention according to which the development of such weapons was banned. However, there are serious concerns that several countries are not abiding by the restrictions. At least 6 nations are believed to be currently invested in bioweapon programs — China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Iraq, and Libya. In 2015, U.S. intelligence classified gene editing as a potential weapon of mass destruction. The fact that you can create viruses that only affect specific races or ethnicities makes such weapons even scarier.
-
YES!!!!!!!!!
I posted a clip some years back of a Chinese scientist discussing exactly this in Mandarin (i.e. he/they thought outsiders would not hear/understand) with subtitles. When I went back for a it some months ago it had been deleted.
LET's STAY ON THIS.
-
YES!!!!!!!!!
I posted a clip some years back of a Chinese scientist discussing exactly this in Mandarin (i.e. he/they thought outsiders would not hear/understand) with subtitles. When I went back for a it some months ago it had been deleted.
LET's STAY ON THIS.
https://rumble.com/vit28b-chinese-researcher-talks-about-creating-bioweapons-to-target-certain-geneti.html
-
GREAT FIND.
This could be the same guy as the one in the long clip I reference, but here he is more coy.
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-isnt-us-preparing-emp-war-rest-world
-
China’s Nuclear Silos and the Arms-Control Fantasy
The Cold War is over, and Beijing is determined to amass an arsenal worthy of a superpower.
By Matthew Kroenig
July 7, 2021 6:17 pm ET
SAVE
PRINT
TEXT
New satellite images published recently reveal that China is building more than 100 new nuclear missile silos in its western desert. Many American arms-control proponents, including the researchers who made the discovery and the Washington Post editorial board, immediately blamed China’s actions on U.S. nuclear modernization plans and recommended that Washington make an arms-control deal with China to address this nuclear threat. This is both the wrong diagnosis and the wrong solution.
China is engaging in a massive nuclear-arms buildup as part of its broader strategy to challenge the U.S.-led rules-based international system, and the U.S. will need to respond by updating its nuclear program to defend itself and the free world.
For decades, China possessed a modest nuclear arsenal of a few hundred weapons. Unlike the U.S. and the Soviet Union, China never built a large nuclear arsenal during the Cold War, because the country’s nuclear doctrine promised never to use nuclear weapons first and called for a minimal force capable of retaliating against enemy attack.
U.S. defense strategists, however, long feared that China would eventually try to compete with the U.S. nuclear arsenal. They believed that as China became a geopolitical superpower, its leaders would eventually pursue a superpower nuclear arsenal.
That is exactly what we are seeing today. The new missile silos in the desert are part of a Chinese nuclear buildup that includes new submarines, bombers, and ballistic and hypersonic missiles. U.S. defense officials, including Commander of U.S. Strategic Command Charles A. Richard, have publicly testified that China’s nuclear arsenal will double, if not triple or quadruple, within the decade. This buildup could make China a nuclear peer with the U.S. and Russia, which each maintain no more than 1,550 strategic nuclear weapons, per New Start Treaty limits.
China’s buildup threatens all major U.S. defense and deterrence goals. It makes it harder for the Pentagon to deter Chinese strategic attacks and coercion and to maintain a favorable balance of power and assure allies in the Indo-Pacific.
This means that for the first time in history, the U.S. will have to contend with two adversaries with substantial nuclear arsenals. Sizing the U.S. nuclear force for parity with Russia and treating China as a lesser power will no longer work.
The arms-control proponents say we should not panic and that these new silos are meant only to ensure that China’s nuclear weapons can survive a U.S. nuclear first strike. They say the solution is arms-control talks with Beijing.
This doesn’t make sense. The U.S. has drastically cut the size of its nuclear arsenal since the end of the Cold War, and President Biden has promised to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national-security policy. If Beijing were worried about a U.S. first strike, it would put nuclear weapons on mobile missiles and submarines, which are harder for the Pentagon to find and destroy. China’s new fixed silos, in contrast, are relatively easy targets, but they do improve China’s ability to threaten a first strike against its opponents.
Arms-control talks with China, attempted unsuccessfully during both the Obama and Trump administrations, are unlikely to work any better for Mr. Biden. China’s nuclear buildup is intended to undermine U.S. defenses in the Indo-Pacific, break America’s regional alliances, and project China as a superpower.
To counter this challenge, the U.S. will need to strengthen its nuclear arsenal. It should continue with the bipartisan plans to modernize U.S. nuclear weapons. In addition, the Pentagon should study whether it can meet its deterrence requirements with existing stockpile numbers, or whether an increase beyond New Start limits is necessary.
Arms control can be pursued, but we have to be realistic. China has no history of negotiating constraints on its nuclear forces and it is unlikely to start now, during a massive expansion of its program.
Since the end of World War II, America’s nuclear forces have been the backbone of the U.S. alliance system and the rules-based international system. China is building new nuclear forces to tear those systems down. By strengthening its arsenal, the U.S. can fend off China’s challenge and provide the free world with continued peace and stability.
Mr. Kroenig is a professor of government at Georgetown and the deputy director of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center. He served as a senior policy adviser for nuclear and missile-defense policy in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2017-21.
-
".New satellite images published recently reveal that China is building more than 100 new nuclear missile silos in its western desert."
will this not lead to India following suit?
-
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2021/08/chinas-new-missile-fields-are-just-part-pla-rocket-forces-growth/184442/
-
https://washingtontimes-dc.newsmemory.com/?token=eb4f952e15b4d3f75ef5ccf30bf118fe_6141f443_6d25b5f&selDate=20210915
-
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1143400/china-conducted-biological-attack-on-the-world
-
https://notthebee.com/article/china-spent-105-million-on-pcr-tests-just-months-before-first-confirmed-covid-case-?utm_source=jeeng
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2021/oct/6/us-cutting-nuclear-warhead-stockpile-despite-major/
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/22/us/politics/china-genetic-data-collection.html
https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2021/10/chinas-military-declares-biotechnology-warfare-fundamental-guiding-principle/?fbclid=IwAR1KmNwBvY8huJfjflpjHeUdvOzRlmKTucRp-KCnYHW_6KYlPC3J8WK5zZM
-
can't pull up NYT article
not about to subscribe
-
U.S. Warns of Efforts by China to Collect Genetic Data
The National Counterintelligence and Security Center said American companies needed to better secure critical technologies as Beijing seeks to dominate the so-called bioeconomy.
Chinese gene firm BGI Group building in Beijing, in March. It developed a neonatal genetic test with the Chinese military that had enabled it to collect information from millions of people around the world.
Chinese gene firm BGI Group building in Beijing, in March. It developed a neonatal genetic test with the Chinese military that had enabled it to collect information from millions of people around the world.Credit...Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters
Julian E. Barnes
By Julian E. Barnes
Oct. 22, 2021
BETHESDA, Md. — Chinese firms are collecting genetic data from around the world, part of an effort by the Chinese government and companies to develop the world’s largest bio-database, American intelligence officials reported on Friday.
The National Counterintelligence and Security Center said in a new paper that the United States needed to better secure critical technologies including artificial intelligence, quantum computing, semiconductors and other technologies related to the so-called bioeconomy.
China and other countries are trying to dominate these technologies, and are using both legal and illegal means to acquire American know how, said Michael Orlando, the acting director of the counterintelligence center, an arm of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.
The American private sector has long been in the cross hairs of China and other countries trying to steal American technology and intellectual property. Other countries like Russia also remain a threat, but the economic might of China makes it the biggest threat, officials said.
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
China believes dominating these areas will give it an economic edge, and American companies are also investing heavily. Artificial intelligence and machine learning hold the promise to revolutionize many aspects of life, including military operations. Quantum computing will allow countries to break the toughest encryption that exists today, and semiconductors are vital not just for computers but many consumer products.
But officials are now also stressing the intersection of technology and genetic and biological research as an area of competition and espionage. Edward You, who is the national counterintelligence officer for emerging and disruptive technologies, said the Chinese government was collecting medical, health and genetic data around the world. The country that builds the best database of information will have an edge on developing cures for future pandemics, and China already has an advantage, he said.
Dig deeper into the moment.
Special offer: Subscribe for $1 a week.
Beijing has a track record of misusing genetic data, the counterintelligence center said, citing a 2019 New York Times report on how China uses genetic tests to track members of the Uyghurs, a predominantly Muslim minority group.
Citing a Reuters report, Mr. You said a Chinese company, BGI, had developed a neonatal genetic test with the Chinese military that had enabled it to collect information from millions of people around the world. The firm gained a foothold in the United States in 2013, when it purchased an American genomics firm.
BGI now has contracts and partnerships with health institutions across the United States, intelligence officials said. The company provides cheap genomic sequencing and gets access to genomic data. Last year, the Commerce Department penalized some of the company’s subsidiaries for providing genetic analysis that was used in Beijing’s campaign against the Uyghurs.
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
Mr. You said as a result the genetic data of some Americans could be “transferred to the Chinese government.”
The counterintelligence center also highlighted investments by WuXi, which bought a Pfizer manufacturing plant in China, announced a production facility in Massachusetts and made an investment in 2015 in 23andMe, the consumer genetics company.
“They are developing the world’s largest bio database,” Mr. You said of the Chinese government efforts. “Once they have access to your genetic data, it’s not something you can change like a pin code.”
Image
People purchasing DNA kits at the 23andMe booth at the RootsTech annual genealogical event in Salt Lake City in 2019.
People purchasing DNA kits at the 23andMe booth at the RootsTech annual genealogical event in Salt Lake City in 2019.Credit...George Frey/Reuters
But 23andMe said that fears of China stealing its data were misplaced.
WuXi has a less than 1 percent investment in 23andMe and has never received any customer data, Jacquie Cooke Haggarty, the company’s deputy general counsel, said in a statement. No data has ever been shared with a Chinese-owned company and no investor has access to the data, she said.
Sign Up for On Politics A guide to the political news cycle, cutting through the spin and delivering clarity from the chaos. Get it sent to your inbox.
“All of our testing is performed and has always been performed in U.S.-based laboratories,” she said.
The company also said it stored information about names and contact information separate from its genetic data. The company follows the highest encryption standards and tests its defenses daily, she said.
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
Mr. Orlando said he was not arguing for decoupling the Chinese and American economies, but said the center was trying to warn companies of the risks of working with Chinese firms under the strict control of the government in Beijing.
“We aren’t telling people to decouple, but if you are going to do business in China, be smart about it,” Mr. Orlando said.
Though China is seeking a broad array of commercial data, the biggest threat is to the high-tech industries Beijing has said it wants to dominate in the decades to come.
American and European officials have long said China steals intellectual property, makes cheaper versions of products, puts western competitors out of business, and then dominates the market. That is a pattern China has followed in solar panels, for example.
“These technologies are critical and we cannot let what happened to other industries happen here,” Mr. Orlando said.
In recent years, the F.B.I. and the counterintelligence center have stepped up broad warnings to businesses and universities about Chinese attempts to steal American technology. Some of those overtures have been greeted skeptically, particularly at universities that believe the U.S. government may be trying to limit the number of Chinese students that study at American universities.
While the U.S. government can review many acquisitions of American companies by Chinese ones, other Chinese investments are harder to regulate. Mr. Orlando said an American company partnering with a Chinese one should take steps to protect its data.
“It’s all about the data,” Mr. You said. “There are national security implications we have to understand.”
Julian E. Barnes is a national security reporter based in Washington, covering the intelligence agencies. Before joining The Times in 2018, he wrote about security matters for The Wall Street Journal. @julianbarnes • Facebook
A version of this article appears in print on Oct. 23, 2021, Section A, Page 9 of the New York edition with the headline: U.S. Warns of Plan by the Chinese to Collect Genetic Data From Around the World. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
More in Science
Youghiogheny River in Friendsville, in Garrett County, Maryland, on the western end of the state.
J. Stephen Conn, via Flickr
Bye, Maryland? Lawmakers in 3 Counties Float a Plan to Secede From the State.
Oct. 22
Continue reading the main story
Michael Ellis was appointed general counsel to the National Security Agency in the final days of the Trump administration.
NBC
Report Finds No Wrongdoing in Hiring of Trump Loyalist as N.S.A.’s Top Lawyer
Oct. 21
President Biden said during a CNN town hall event with Anderson Cooper on Thursday that he was open to ending the use of the filibuster in order to pass voting rights legislation.
Tom Brenner for The New York Times
Biden Is Open to Scrapping Filibuster for Voting Rights Bill ‘and Maybe More’
Oct. 21
Editors’ Picks
Trisha Krauss
Inside the World of Buy Nothing, Where Dryer Lint Is a Hot Commodity
Oct. 22
Rebecca Hall
Carly Zavala for The New York Times
The Secret Toll of Racial Ambiguity
Oct. 20
Most Popular
The Best Workout for Middle-Aged Bodies
Shopping for Swing-Arm Lamps
Justice Department Asks Supreme Court to Block Texas Abortion Law
The ‘TikTok Necklace’ Sparks a Vivienne Westwood Renaissance
Vanessa Bryant, in Deposition, Describes Learning of Deaths of Kobe and Gianna
Meet the New Owners of the Wu-Tang Clan’s One-of-a-Kind Album
Can We Have Healthy Conversations Online?
Alec Baldwin Film Set Had Previous Accidental Gun Discharges, Crew Members Say
‘Needle Spiking’ of Women in Britain Stirs Alarm Over New Kind of Assault
Opinion: I Was Wrong About Donald Trump
ADVERTISEMENT
Continue reading the main story
Special Offer. Subscribe and enjoy unlimited articles with Basic Digital Access.
Special Offer. Subscribe and enjoy unlimited articles with Basic Digital Access.
Enjoy unlimited digital access.
$4.25 $1/week
Billed as $17 $4 every 4 weeks for one year
You are purchasing a Basic Digital Access Subscription. You will be automatically charged $4 every 28 days for one year, and $17.00 every 28 days thereafter. Your subscription will continue until you cancel. By subscribing, you are accepting the Terms of Service, Privacy Policy, and Terms of Sale.
SUBSCRIBE NOW
Site Index
Go to Home Page »
NEWS
OPINION
ARTS
LIVING
LISTINGS & MORE
Site Information Navigation
© 2021 The New York Times Company
NYTCoContact UsAccessibilityWork with usAdvertiseT Brand StudioYour Ad ChoicesPrivacy PolicyTerms of ServiceTerms of Sale
-
https://notthebee.com/article/gulp-a-top-us-general-says-the-country-has-a-lot-of-catching-up-to-do-to-chinas-incredibly-aggressive-missile-program?utm_source=jeeng
-
https://patriotpost.us/articles/84738-is-nuclear-power-in-our-future-2021-12-08?mailing_id=6330&utm_medium=email&utm_source=pp.email.6330&utm_campaign=digest&utm_content=body
-
https://amgreatness.com/2021/12/21/mixed-messaging-from-u-s-government-on-chinas-biological-weapons-program/
====================
====================
New’ Chinese Military Paper on Weaponizing Coronaviruses—West Should Respond With Defensive Decoupling and End to STEM Cooperation With China
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
May 9, 2021 Updated: June 2, 2021 biggersmaller Print
Commentary
On May 7, The Australian revealed the existence of a Chinese military paper from 2015 that discusses the weaponization of SARS coronaviruses. COVID-19 is the disease caused by a SARS coronavirus called SARS-CoV-2.
Given 6.9 million COVID-19 deaths globally and counting, such military-scientific musings are the height of irresponsibility and should be decisively countered through new sanctions against China’s science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) researchers.
In the paper, Chinese military scientists and senior Chinese “public health” officials predict that World War III, if it comes, will be decided by new biological weapons. We are no longer in the age of gunpowder or nuclear weapons. The future of war is biological, they argue.
The document is consistent with significant prior evidence of offensive Chinese biowarfare research that can access technologies such as gene-editing and viral “gain-of-function” (GOF) processes. Chinese military researchers have also shown an interest in bioweapon genetic targeting. A specific ethnic genetic attack technology would be a biological weapon that targets a specific ethnicity. Gene-editing, such as CRISPR technology, could facilitate such targeting.
GOF produces new viruses that are more transmissible and lethal than their progenitors, for example, the use of an avian influenza virus to evolve, in the lab, to a virus that can infect humans. If China can put these technologies together, and has the will to do so, it could design a killer virus that only infects a particular race that China considers to be an enemy.
As recently as June 2020, the U.S. Department of State (DoS) expressed concern (pdf) that China was violating the Biological [and Toxin] Weapons Convention (BWC or BTWC) of 1984 through research into dual-use technologies. In 2005, DoS alleged that “China maintains some elements of an offensive [biological weapons] capability in violation of its BTWC obligations.” DoS made similar charges in 2010, 2012, and 2014. The 2019 report stated that “information indicates that the People’s Republic of China engaged during the reporting period in biological activities with potential dual-use applications, which raises concerns regarding its compliance with the BWC.”
The 2020 report was more specific, about “compliance concerns with respect to Chinese military medical institutions’ toxin research and development because of the potential dual-use applications and their potential as a biological threat,” and stated that China had an offensive biological warfare (BW) program from the early 1950s to at least the late 1980s. The report noted that China hadn’t acknowledged the BW program, or provided evidence of its dismantling.
The newly discovered Chinese military paper is titled “The Unnatural Origin of SARS and New Species of Man-Made Viruses as Genetic Bioweapons.” Eighteen authors at the highest levels of China’s military and academic hierarchy wrote the 263-page paper. It was obtained by DoS in May 2020 and independently authenticated by digital forensics specialist Robert Potter. Additional details of the paper will be published in Sharri Markson’s September book on the origins of COVID-19, “What Really Happened in Wuhan” (HarperCollins).
The Chinese military study describes SARS coronaviruses as providing a basis for a “new era of genetic weapons,” according to its authors, that can be “artificially manipulated into an emerging human disease virus, then weaponized and unleashed in a way never seen before.”
It claims that “following developments in other scientific fields, there have been major advances in the delivery of biological agents.” It continues, “For example, the new-found ability to freeze-dry micro-organisms has made it possible to store biological agents and aerosolize them during attacks.”
Epoch Times Photo
The P4 laboratory (L) on the campus of the Wuhan Institute of Virology in Wuhan, Hubei Province, China, on May 27, 2020. (Hector Retamal/AFP via Getty Images)
The document notes that a sudden flood of patients into hospitals during a biological weapons attack “could cause the enemy’s medical system to collapse.”
In the study, the Chinese military examines optimal conditions for the release of a biological weapon.
“Bioweapon attacks are best conducted during dawn, dusk, night or cloudy weather because intense sunlight can damage the pathogens,” according to the document. “Biological agents should be released during dry weather. Rain or snow can cause the aerosol particles to precipitate. A stable wind direction is desirable so that the aerosol can float into the target area.”
Analysts are increasingly wary of China’s biowarfare programs, and potential leakage of U.S. and allied STEM research that could serve as enablers.
“Chinese military researchers have closely examined American initiatives and international advancements, which have seemed to inform and inspire the direction of developments underway in China today,” according to Elsa Kania at the Center for a New American Security, and consultant Wilson VornDick. “So too, at a time when Chinese universities and enterprises are pursuing investment and expanding global research collaborations in such fields, it is important that their foreign partners remain cognizant of the interests and involvements of their counterparts.
“For instance, although biomedical research involves numerous promising applications in medicine and therapeutics, there are also reasons for concern about some of the ethical and security externalities of these research engagements.”
In another article on the weaponization of biotech, Kania and VornDick warn that “the lack of transparency and uncertainty of ethical considerations in China’s research initiatives raise the risks of technological surprise.”
My read: Watch out for a surprise bioattack from China.
Given revelations about the latest Chinese biowarfare paper, along with China’s criminal behavior related to COVID-19, genocide against the Uyghurs, highly aggressive military stance toward the United States and allies, national strategy of civil-military fusion, dangerous new technologies of gene-targeting, and facile theft of foreign technology, one must conclude that the United States and allies should act more decisively to defend ourselves.
The Chinese military, and the exploding economy from which it acquires strength, both depend upon STEM and trade that they obtain from the United States and allies. Continued STEM cooperation with China should therefore be immediately suspended. Decreasing imports from China would impose a logical consequence, and send a message, by constricting their economy.
Until China demonstrates a significant improvement in its ethics and transparency, cooperation with China’s STEM academics and business people, including STEM undergraduates, graduate students, professors, and scientists, should be banned by law in the United States, the European Union, Japan, India, Brazil, and among our broader circles of allies.
Epoch Times Photo
President Donald Trump signs trade sanctions against China in the Diplomatic Reception Room of the White House on March 22, 2018. (Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images)
But if we sanction China’s STEM, make sure it doesn’t simply flow elsewhere, or advance in isolation beyond allied science. Regulation of science in China is generally less demanding, and so China’s military science could progress at a faster rate than allied science, through for example unethical forms of human experimentation. Note that five clinical trials of CRISPR gene-editing technologies are currently underway at China’s military hospitals.
STEM sanctions against China should have been implemented in 2005, when DoS first found evidence of an offensive biological weapons capability in violation of the BWC. Continuing to cooperate more than 15 years later, when China’s STEM research can be used to build offensive biological weapons that likely target the United States and allies, is irresponsible and unethical.
Knowing that China’s intentions are in part illegal or even genocidal should make those who transfer STEM, willingly or unwillingly, culpable and criminally negligent.
Let’s not wait for a surprise bioattack. Shut down China’s bioweapons programs now, by defensively decoupling from, and thereby minimizing, the country’s STEM infrastructure. Add maximum economic and political pressure, to nudge China toward much-needed democratization. Only when the country democratizes should we allow it back into the international system.
Playing Mr. Nice Guy and tip-toeing around existential threats to America and democracy from genocidal technologies through elision, euphemism, technocratic language, and an illogical belief in political change in Beijing through the self-serving economic and scientific engagement of individuals and corporations, is no longer acceptable. We need the United States and allies to defensively decouple, and quickly.
Anders Corr has a bachelor’s/master’s in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. He authored “The Concentration of Power” (forthcoming in 2021) and “No Trespassing,” and edited “Great Powers, Grand Strategies.”
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Anders Corr
Anders Corr
Following
Anders Corr has a bachelor's/master's in political science from Yale University (2001) and a doctorate in government from Harvard University (2008). He is a principal at Corr Analytics Inc., publisher of the Journal of Political Risk, and has conducted extensive research in North America, Europe, and Asia. His latest books are “The Concentration of Power: Institutionalization, Hierarchy, and Hegemony” (2021) and “Great Powers, Grand Strategies: the New Game in the South China Sea" (2018).
-
China’s Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Against the World
Bradley A. Thayer
Bradley A. Thayer
December 22, 2021 Updated: December 22, 2021 biggersmaller Print
Commentary
Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons were considered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during the Cold War. Later, radiological weapons were generally considered to be another form of WMD.
Each of these weapons had a horrific effect: they could kill large numbers of people and so norms prohibiting their use were established and have mostly held. Nuclear weapons have not been used since 1945, and biological weapons not used since the Japanese military’s Unit 731 employed them in China against civilians and other allied prisoners of war during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).
While chemical weapons were used in Syria’s civil war, there has not been widespread use of chemicals or toxins in interstate warfare since World War I and Italy’s employment in Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Ethiopian War from 1935 to 1936. Despite allegations of their use and their considerable stockpiles, WMD were not used by the superpowers during the Cold War or after.
Each of these examples was conscious and deliberate employment by a state. But the world should also consider the effect of covert or inadvertent use of WMD, or employment due to negligence and, thus, a violation of a state’s duty to police its territory and its responsibility for what occurs within its borders.
These forms of WMD use should also be prohibited with the strongest sanctions enacted if the norm is violated. It is time to update the world’s understanding of WMD to acknowledge that WMD have been employed de facto and without repercussions. One example of this was the 1979 anthrax leak from a military research facility in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union. Over 66 Soviet citizens were killed by their own government and scores more made ill. The Soviets were never held to account for this inadvertent WMD use. Nor were they for another, more infamous case—the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster. The legacy of which remains.
Despite common perception, WMDs are being used now against the United States by China. Beijing has conducted a current and far more disastrous use of WMD than the United States’ Soviet enemy.
Opioid Epidemic
First, the opioid epidemic has killed and disrupted the lives of tens of millions in the United States alone. Rather than an epidemic, it should be considered a chemical weapons attack. Precursor chemicals are shipped from China to the cartels to Mexico to be transported into the United States and around the world. The Chinese regime, firms, and the cartels should be held to account for employment of WMD. Immediate sanctions and other punishments should be employed against them and China itself for its unwillingness to police its territory, govern its export, and thus provide implicit approval of WMD use against America.
Second Largest Border Meth Bust in History
U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers at the Otay Mesa commercial facility seized more than 3,100 pounds of methamphetamine, fentanyl powder, fentanyl pills, and heroin on Oct. 9, 2020. (DEA)
COVID-19
Second, the COVID-19 pandemic is a case of covert or inadvertent use of WMD by the Chinese regime against its own citizens, the United States, and the rest of the world. Thus far, over 5 million people have died, millions have lasting health effects from the virus, tens of millions more have been made ill, and there has been major and sustained disruption to people’s lives, wellbeing, mental health, safety, education, and employment. Profound and lasting political, psychological, physiological, and economic effects also must be factored into account.
The Chinese regime has gotten away with two major uses of WMD with catastrophic effects on the world without penalty or even acknowledgment of WMD employment. Such use compels sanctions and sterner measures to punish Beijing and to deter future use. Regrettably, this has not happened due to the absence of awareness and the concern by many with an interest in China that these actions not be recognized for what they are.
The unwillingness to perceive the Chinese regime’s actions as WMD employment allows the continuation of the business as usual approach toward the regime by its supporters around the world, in the American elite, including on Wall Street, the U.S. political system, and the media.
To acknowledge communist China’s use of WMD would compel the recognition that it is the world’s most dangerous regime due to its intent and capabilities, as well as the world’s greatest violator of international law and norms.
To address this, much needs to be accomplished. Three steps must be taken forthwith.
First, the global media must call them for what they are: WMD attacks against civilians. This stark fact must be repeated until the world identifies these as WMD attacks that require a response.
Second, rather than focusing solely on nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons use, the norm of WMD effect and consequence must be adopted by governments, inter-governmental organizations like the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations, and China held to account by them for its use of WMD. If a state releases a pandemic by design or not, it has employed a WMD against the world, and so is culpable for the consequences and must be punished to deter future use.
Third, the U.S. government should call the attacks as WMD and trigger the full force of the government to combat the consequences of both attacks. The opioid WMD attack should be treated with equivalent energy of response as the COVID-19 WMD attack. Sanctions must be imposed upon the regime for their use against the United States and reparations made to the world’s victims. Compensation from Chinese assets in the United States and globally would be a start. The prohibition of investment in China by U.S. or other entities would be a second step. Banning Chinese entities from U.S. financial or other markets would be a third.
Strong measures are needed as not sanctioning Beijing for its WMD violations encourages it to continue its actions and to break additional norms, including against nuclear use. The Chinese regime owes the world compensation and the international community is going to have to compel payment of the debt.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
-
China’s Cooperation With Russia Puts Future Nuclear Arms Control in Doubt
Chinese regime's nuclear arsenal is rapidly growing
Joseph V. Micallef
Joseph V. Micallef
January 22, 2022 Updated: January 22, 2022biggersmaller Print
0:00
12:14
1
News Analysis
Ever since the 1960s, the United States and the Soviet Union, and later the United States and Russia, have worked to both limit the overall number of nuclear weapons as well as the type of nuclear weapons each side deployed. Progress was steady, though often characterized as one of two steps forward and one step back.
U.S. concerns over Russia’s compliance with past arms control agreements, China’s plans to substantially expand its nuclear arsenal, the developing quasi-military alliance between Russia and China, and the development of hypersonic missile technology are now threatening to potentially upend past agreements and will make negotiating future nuclear arms control treaties far more difficult.
US-Soviet-Russian Nuclear Arms Control Agreements
Between 1972 and 2011, the United States negotiated eight nuclear arms control agreements with the Soviet Union and, after 1989, with Russia. SALT I and START I limited the number of nuclear warhead delivery vehicles each side could deploy.
SALT I also limited the number of anti-ballistic missiles each side could have, although the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002. The proposed SALT II treaty was never ratified but both sides generally lived within its terms.
Starting with START I and then continuing with START II, the United States and the Soviet Union also moved to limit the number of warheads. The maximum number of warheads was progressively reduced to 6,000 and then to 3,000-3,500 in Start II. The proposed START III agreement was anticipated to bring the number of deployed warheads down to 2,000-2,500, but the negotiations never occurred.
The SORT and New START agreements, negotiated by the Bush and Obama administrations, respectively, were intended to further reduce the number of strategic delivery systems to 700 vehicles and to reduce the number of warheads to 1,550. On Feb. 3, 2021, the Biden administration agreed to extend the New START treaty for an additional five years, to Feb. 5, 2026.
In addition, in 1987 the two countries agreed to eliminate all ground-launched, nuclear-armed, intermediate-range ballistic and cruise missiles (INF Treaty), with ranges from 300 to 3,300 miles. In addition to the United States and Russia, the former Soviet states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan were also parties to the INF agreement.
The Trump administration terminated U.S. participation in the INF Treaty on Feb. 2, 2019, and formally withdrew on Aug. 2, 2019, based on charges of Russian noncompliance, for example, cheating as well as concerns about the buildup of Chinese intermediate-range nuclear weapons.
Specifically, critics charged, the 9M729 (NATO designation SSC-X-8 “Screwdriver”) ground-launched, intermediate-range cruise missile, which Russia began testing in 2014 and deploying in 2018, had a range of between 300 and 3,400 miles. The missile could carry either conventional or nuclear warheads. Since then, Moscow has announced that it is developing a nuclear-powered, nuclear-armed cruise missile, designated the 9M730 Burevestnik (Russian for Petrel), of virtually unlimited range.
In July 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden ordered the Department of Defense to conduct a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). The practice of commissioning NPRs began with the Clinton administration and has continued under subsequent presidents. The review takes approximately a year to carry out and is chaired by the Secretary of Defense. The result of the Biden administration’s NPR is expected shortly. In the interim, Team Biden has come under increasing pressure to forswear first use of nuclear weapons and to redouble efforts with Russia to further reduce nuclear arms.
China did not participate in the nuclear arms control negotiations conducted by the United States with the Soviet Union and then Russia. Until about 10 years ago, according to a report by the Federation of American Scientists, it was estimated that China had around 200-250 nuclear warheads; of which 75-100 were on intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, half of which could reach the United States, and the balance in short-range ballistic missiles slated for use as theater nuclear weapons. These missiles would primarily be deployed against targets in the Pacific and Asian regions and in particular against U.S. Naval forces in the Western Pacific, especially in the South and East China Seas.
When the Trump administration withdrew from the INF Treaty, it made clear that any further treaties limiting theater nuclear weapons would have to include China as well. China in turn declared that it had no interest in participating in such negotiations.
China’s Growing Nuclear Arsenal and Hypersonic Weapons
Over the last several years, there has been mounting evidence that Beijing is orchestrating a significant expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal. Last year satellite imagery revealed that China was constructing approximately 250 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in three new locations: 229 new silos in Yumen and Hami in northwestern China, and another 29 new silos at Hanggin Banner in Inner Mongolia.
Epoch Times Photo
China’s DF-41 nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missiles are seen during a military parade at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, on Oct. 1, 2019. (Greg Baker/AFP via Getty Images)
According to the latest Pentagon estimates, China probably has around 100 ICBMs, some of which are capable of carrying multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The existing ICBM force is both silo-based and mobile. According to Pentagon sources, China could double its ICBM force by 2025 and could have 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.
Even more concerning, are recent Chinese tests of a hypersonic glide weapon. In July 2022, China put into orbit a nuclear capable hypersonic glider that subsequently reentered the atmosphere traveling at a speed of five times the speed of sound, approximately 3,800 miles per hour, and was able to maneuver on its way to its designated target. Russia has tested a similar reentry vehicle, the Avantgard. The U.S. program is still in its testing phase and is designed for conventional warheads.
Their name notwithstanding, hypersonic glide vehicles do not travel significantly faster than a conventional ICBM. The threat they pose is that they are far more maneuverable and are better able to evade ballistic missile defense systems. Essentially, they combine the speed of ballistic missiles with the maneuverability of cruise missiles.
Moreover, by first going into low earth orbit and then reentering the atmosphere, hypersonic gliders could attack on any trajectory. Most American ballistic missile defense systems assume that a missile attack on the United States would come from the north, over the North Pole, and are oriented accordingly.
Russia-China Military Cooperation
Russia and China have not signed a formal defense alliance and are unlikely to do so. Nonetheless, their foreign and military policies are demonstrating a growing degree of coordination and cooperation.
In 2018, China participated in Russia’s annual defense exercise. In 2019, they carried out joint bomber patrols near Japan and the Korean Peninsula. Later that year, their two navies held joint naval drills in the Sea of Japan. Since then, the pace of joint military exercises has continued to increase.
In August 2021, for example, Russian and Chinese troops conducted joint exercises in the Ningxia region of north-central China under a joint Russian-Chinese command and control structure. The exercise involved more than 13,000 troops, thousands of vehicles, and hundreds of aircraft and mobile artillery. In October, the two countries carried out joint naval drills of Russia’s Pacific coastline.
Russia has been Beijing’s chief armament supplier. Since 2014, China has purchased Russia’s latest S-400 anti-aircraft defense system. China has also ordered Russian-made SU-35 (NATO designation Flanker-E) air defense fighters.
According to a Wall Street Journal report, Russia President Vladimir Putin has confirmed that Russia is assisting China with an anti-missile early warning system and that the two countries were collaborating on an advanced submarine design.
In turn, China has become Russia’s primary supplier of advanced computer chips, following the imposition of economic sanctions on Moscow for its seizure of Crimea. In October 2021, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced, after years of careful neutrality on the topic, that “Taiwan was part of China.”
Space has become another area of burgeoning cooperation, some of it with military ramifications, between Russia and China. In 2019, China National Space Administration (CNSA) and Roscosmos, the Russian Space Agency, announced they would coordinate the lunar missions of Chang’e and Luna-Resurs-1.
Russia’s space technology is increasingly obsolete, and Moscow has been turning to Beijing for assistance in its modernization. The two countries are jointly working together to develop a new heavy rocket technology. They are also cooperating in the development of anti-satellite weapons, even though such weapons threaten each other’s satellite networks.
Epoch Times Photo
A Long March 3B rocket carrying the Beidou-3GEO3 satellite lifts off from the Xichang Satellite Launch Center in Xichang, southwestern China’s Sichuan Province on June 23, 2020. (STR/AFP via Getty Images)
The Chinese Beidou and Russian Glonass are highly complementary and together form a system with 59 satellites capable of competing with the U.S. Global Position System (GPS).
There are plenty of points of contention between Moscow and Beijing. Russia is a major arms supplier to both India and Vietnam, two countries that are increasingly at odds with China. Beijing’s efforts to expand its influence in central Asia, and to draw those countries into its economic orbit, run counter to Moscow’s political and economic objectives in the region. Nonetheless, the United States cannot discount the possibility that Russian military moves in the Baltic republics or Ukraine could be coordinated by comparable Chinese actions in the South China Sea or against Taiwan.
The Future of Arms Control Agreements
The evolution of hypersonic reentry vehicles will erode the capabilities of anti-missile defense systems at a time when the breadth of the nuclear arsenal faced by the United States is greater than it has been in a generation.
Although Beijing and Moscow are not formally allied to one another, they are both trying to increase their leverage against the United States by emphasizing their willingness to cooperate militarily and support each other politically and economically. It’s not clear if this cooperation will rise to the level of coordinating military actions, but it very well could.
From the standpoint of nuclear arms control, Washington will increasingly have to weigh the dilemma that nuclear parity with Russia and China would put it at a distinct disadvantage if those two countries were to act in tandem, however unlikely that scenario may appear at the moment.
Neither Russia nor China are likely to accept an agreement that gives the United States parity against their combined nuclear forces. Likewise, America will not abandon the goal of nuclear parity, which has been the foundation of its prior nuclear arms control agreements, by allowing Russia and China to collectively have a nuclear force greater than that of the United States. Under these conditions, it’s hard to see how further progress in reducing nuclear arms is possible.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
Joseph V. Micallef
Joseph V. Micallef
Follow
Joseph V. Micallef is a historian, bestselling author, syndicated columnist, war correspondent, and private equity investor. He holds a master's degree from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and was a Fulbright fellow at the Italian Institute of International Affairs. He has been a commentator for several broadcast venues and media outlets and has also written several books on military history and world affairs. His latest book, "Leadership in an Opaque Future," is forthcoming. Micallef is also a noted judge of wines and spirits and authored a bestselling book on Scotch whisky.
-
Chinese Military-Linked Firm Gathers American DNA, Provides COVID Tests
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
February 2, 2022 Updated: February 3, 2022biggersmaller Print
News Analysis
China is “developing the world’s largest bio database,” said Edward You, who is the U.S. national counterintelligence officer for Emerging and Disruptive Technologies. “Once they have access to your genetic data, it’s not something you can change like a pin code.”
Racing to dominate the bioeconomy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is compiling a massive database of medical, health, and genetic information from people around the world, including Americans.
The CCP enlists the help of private companies to aid in gathering genetic data, which can be combined with top military supercomputing capabilities, to discover genetic weaknesses in a population. Bioweapons can then be developed, which prey on these weaknesses. As part of Beijing’s military-civil fusion policy, Chinese scientists, along with the military, have been conducting research in the areas of brain science, gene editing, and the creation of artificial genomes.
Similar research could be used to enhance the performance of Chinese soldiers. BGI Group, formerly Beijing Genomics Institute, is the leader of the CCP’s genome project, as well as one of the leading producers of COVID-19 tests. BGI also has ties to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to a Jan. 30 report by Reuters.
BGI operates the largest pig cloning project in the world. After manipulating generations of pig DNA, intentionally producing pigs that are smaller or larger, more susceptible to certain diseases, or less susceptible to others, the CCP is zeroing in on the ability to produce “super soldiers.” Among the projects currently underway is BGI’s attempt to make China’s Han ethnic soldiers less susceptible to altitude sickness.
BGI’s current chief infectious disease scientist, Chen Weijun, was among the first scientists to sequence COVID-19, taking samples from a military hospital in Wuhan. He is also credited with the patent on the BGI test kits, which have been distributed around the world, including in the United States. Four of BGI’s researchers have been affiliated with the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), under China’s Central Military Commission, which is headed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The NUDT has been blacklisted by the United States as a threat to national security.
Under Xi, private technology companies have been increasingly integrated into military-related research. In 2021, BGI offered to set up COVID test centers in the United States. But U.S. security officials warned that test centers would allow China to gain access to American DNA, as the swabs have genetic material on them. According to Mike Orlando, the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, no U.S. states agreed, but at least 18 other countries allowed BGI to establish test centers. Additionally, BGI test kits were sent to 180 nations.
The logo of Chinese gene firm BGI Group
The logo of Chinese gene firm BGI Group is seen at its building in Beijing, China, on March 25, 2021. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)
Chinese medical testing companies regularly use DNA collected from test subjects for other research. Human rights groups say the CCP is using the data for security purposes such as identifying and tracking Uyghur Muslims. Furthermore, Chinese police are trying to amass samples of DNA from the country’s 700 million males, to keep track of future criminals.
Home ancestry tests are another way that the Chinese regime is obtaining DNA from Americans. The U.S. military has warned soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to avoid companies such as Ancestry and 23andMe, which have ties to China. An estimated 50 million Americans have already paid to have their saliva tested for their DNA ancestry, according to Bill Evanina, former director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
Chinese firm Wu Xi Biologics bought a Pfizer manufacturing plant in China, and established a production facility in Massachusetts. In 2015, the firm also bought a stake in 23andMe. Wu Xi Biologics now has locations in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, as well as a drug plant in Delaware, which was built with a state grant.
BGI Group earns part of its revenue by selling genetic sequencing services to universities and health systems around the world. The company has also been purchasing U.S. genomics firms since 2013, and now has multiple partnerships with U.S. companies involved in gene sequencing. In each of these arrangements, BGI gains access to genetic data. Under China’s National Intelligence Law, all data obtained by Chinese companies, even abroad, must be turned over to the CCP, upon request.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) warned that Chinese firms invest in U.S. companies in the hopes of gaining access to U.S. data. Last year, CFIUS blocked a Chinese firm from purchasing a California fertility clinic, which was located in close proximity to six U.S. military bases. The concern was that not only would the CCP gain access to the genetic data of U.S. soldiers, but also of their unborn children.
In spite of the obvious dangers, this year, the Biden administration signed a $1.3 billion deal with iHealth Labs, a unit of the Chinese firm Andon Health Co., for home COVID test kits. It is part of the administration’s initiative to provide 1 billion free rapid COVID-19 tests to Americans.
The Winter Olympics will provide a perfect opportunity for DNA data gathering. Olympic athletes and coaches will be subjected to daily COVID tests, while media personnel and other attendees will also be tested on a regular basis. This means that the CCP will have the genetic material of every person who attends the Games. Attendees will also be required to download a government-approved health app, which has been proven to have security flaws. Internet security experts warn that the app will be able to gather user data, which, combined with genetic information, can be fed into China’s massive artificial intelligence and genome projects.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
-
DNA targeted bioweapons, coming soon...
Chinese Military-Linked Firm Gathers American DNA, Provides COVID Tests
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
February 2, 2022 Updated: February 3, 2022biggersmaller Print
News Analysis
China is “developing the world’s largest bio database,” said Edward You, who is the U.S. national counterintelligence officer for Emerging and Disruptive Technologies. “Once they have access to your genetic data, it’s not something you can change like a pin code.”
Racing to dominate the bioeconomy, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is compiling a massive database of medical, health, and genetic information from people around the world, including Americans.
The CCP enlists the help of private companies to aid in gathering genetic data, which can be combined with top military supercomputing capabilities, to discover genetic weaknesses in a population. Bioweapons can then be developed, which prey on these weaknesses. As part of Beijing’s military-civil fusion policy, Chinese scientists, along with the military, have been conducting research in the areas of brain science, gene editing, and the creation of artificial genomes.
Similar research could be used to enhance the performance of Chinese soldiers. BGI Group, formerly Beijing Genomics Institute, is the leader of the CCP’s genome project, as well as one of the leading producers of COVID-19 tests. BGI also has ties to China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to a Jan. 30 report by Reuters.
BGI operates the largest pig cloning project in the world. After manipulating generations of pig DNA, intentionally producing pigs that are smaller or larger, more susceptible to certain diseases, or less susceptible to others, the CCP is zeroing in on the ability to produce “super soldiers.” Among the projects currently underway is BGI’s attempt to make China’s Han ethnic soldiers less susceptible to altitude sickness.
BGI’s current chief infectious disease scientist, Chen Weijun, was among the first scientists to sequence COVID-19, taking samples from a military hospital in Wuhan. He is also credited with the patent on the BGI test kits, which have been distributed around the world, including in the United States. Four of BGI’s researchers have been affiliated with the National University of Defence Technology (NUDT), under China’s Central Military Commission, which is headed by Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The NUDT has been blacklisted by the United States as a threat to national security.
Under Xi, private technology companies have been increasingly integrated into military-related research. In 2021, BGI offered to set up COVID test centers in the United States. But U.S. security officials warned that test centers would allow China to gain access to American DNA, as the swabs have genetic material on them. According to Mike Orlando, the head of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center, no U.S. states agreed, but at least 18 other countries allowed BGI to establish test centers. Additionally, BGI test kits were sent to 180 nations.
The logo of Chinese gene firm BGI Group
The logo of Chinese gene firm BGI Group is seen at its building in Beijing, China, on March 25, 2021. (Carlos Garcia Rawlins/Reuters)
Chinese medical testing companies regularly use DNA collected from test subjects for other research. Human rights groups say the CCP is using the data for security purposes such as identifying and tracking Uyghur Muslims. Furthermore, Chinese police are trying to amass samples of DNA from the country’s 700 million males, to keep track of future criminals.
Home ancestry tests are another way that the Chinese regime is obtaining DNA from Americans. The U.S. military has warned soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines to avoid companies such as Ancestry and 23andMe, which have ties to China. An estimated 50 million Americans have already paid to have their saliva tested for their DNA ancestry, according to Bill Evanina, former director of the U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center.
Chinese firm Wu Xi Biologics bought a Pfizer manufacturing plant in China, and established a production facility in Massachusetts. In 2015, the firm also bought a stake in 23andMe. Wu Xi Biologics now has locations in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, as well as a drug plant in Delaware, which was built with a state grant.
BGI Group earns part of its revenue by selling genetic sequencing services to universities and health systems around the world. The company has also been purchasing U.S. genomics firms since 2013, and now has multiple partnerships with U.S. companies involved in gene sequencing. In each of these arrangements, BGI gains access to genetic data. Under China’s National Intelligence Law, all data obtained by Chinese companies, even abroad, must be turned over to the CCP, upon request.
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) warned that Chinese firms invest in U.S. companies in the hopes of gaining access to U.S. data. Last year, CFIUS blocked a Chinese firm from purchasing a California fertility clinic, which was located in close proximity to six U.S. military bases. The concern was that not only would the CCP gain access to the genetic data of U.S. soldiers, but also of their unborn children.
In spite of the obvious dangers, this year, the Biden administration signed a $1.3 billion deal with iHealth Labs, a unit of the Chinese firm Andon Health Co., for home COVID test kits. It is part of the administration’s initiative to provide 1 billion free rapid COVID-19 tests to Americans.
The Winter Olympics will provide a perfect opportunity for DNA data gathering. Olympic athletes and coaches will be subjected to daily COVID tests, while media personnel and other attendees will also be tested on a regular basis. This means that the CCP will have the genetic material of every person who attends the Games. Attendees will also be required to download a government-approved health app, which has been proven to have security flaws. Internet security experts warn that the app will be able to gather user data, which, combined with genetic information, can be fed into China’s massive artificial intelligence and genome projects.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
-
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/news/russia-programs/2022-03-04/memoriam-col-gen-ret-evgeny-maslin-1937-2022?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=12bc7c4d-1e2d-492a-ab65-7672b0f1a9a1
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/mar/8/dni-china-engaged-largest-nuclear-buildup-history-/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=morning&utm_term=newsletter&utm_content=morning&bt_ee=C20xP9eenPFMrc9%2F0CmviiIV3PS7wXrII94p8niurVS%2B%2Fxv2DAfBW3cS9xykBjtV&bt_ts=1646822742467
-
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/07/16/location-us-nuclear-weapons-europe-accidentally-revealed-report-nato-body/?fbclid=IwAR0yse18lk6M2mJTq4HMUF9Ge_qFfzM6nWC6n0MW2tNQoSdR751DqYLK__8
-
second
==============
Tucker had an outstanding rampage last light on this:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-is-protecting-biological-research-facilities-in-ukraine-from-russia-official_4325948.html?utm_source=Morningbrief&utm_campaign=mb-2022-03-10&utm_medium=email&est=R9w5Pmg48GOcBGO2gbJh%2FA4d8uHX1mGs200QZ8eXaKFCTttaf32JEN9J06Zlh4LEKzuL
-
second
==============
Tucker had an outstanding rampage last light on this:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-is-protecting-biological-research-facilities-in-ukraine-from-russia-official_4325948.html?utm_source=Morningbrief&utm_campaign=mb-2022-03-10&utm_medium=email&est=R9w5Pmg48GOcBGO2gbJh%2FA4d8uHX1mGs200QZ8eXaKFCTttaf32JEN9J06Zlh4LEKzuL
"Weber told PolitiFact that the CTR Program “has provided technical support to the Ukrainian Ministry of Health since 2005 to improve public health laboratories” and that the mission of the health labs “is analogous to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.” The labs “have recently played an important role in stopping the spread of COVID-19,” he said."
The CDC also had an important role in funding Covid's creation!
-
second
==============
Tucker had an outstanding rampage last light on this:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-is-protecting-biological-research-facilities-in-ukraine-from-russia-official_4325948.html?utm_source=Morningbrief&utm_campaign=mb-2022-03-10&utm_medium=email&est=R9w5Pmg48GOcBGO2gbJh%2FA4d8uHX1mGs200QZ8eXaKFCTttaf32JEN9J06Zlh4LEKzuL
Jack Posobiec:
It’s so wild to watch Tucker do a whole hour tonight explaining why we need answers on the biolabs in Ukraine and then Sean Hannity and Jen Griffin come on and say everyone needs to shut up about biolabs in Ukraine or they are Putin lovers
-
second
==============
Tucker had an outstanding rampage last light on this:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-is-protecting-biological-research-facilities-in-ukraine-from-russia-official_4325948.html?utm_source=Morningbrief&utm_campaign=mb-2022-03-10&utm_medium=email&est=R9w5Pmg48GOcBGO2gbJh%2FA4d8uHX1mGs200QZ8eXaKFCTttaf32JEN9J06Zlh4LEKzuL
Jack Posobiec:
It’s so wild to watch Tucker do a whole hour tonight explaining why we need answers on the biolabs in Ukraine and then Sean Hannity and Jen Griffin come on and say everyone needs to shut up about biolabs in Ukraine or they are Putin lovers
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg)
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/greenwald-slays-fact-checkers-after-nulands-ukraine-biolab-bombshell?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=532
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AugzqXPYaOc
-
http://acecomments.mu.nu/?post=398166
Deep State Embed at Fox.
second
==============
Tucker had an outstanding rampage last light on this:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/us-is-protecting-biological-research-facilities-in-ukraine-from-russia-official_4325948.html?utm_source=Morningbrief&utm_campaign=mb-2022-03-10&utm_medium=email&est=R9w5Pmg48GOcBGO2gbJh%2FA4d8uHX1mGs200QZ8eXaKFCTttaf32JEN9J06Zlh4LEKzuL
Jack Posobiec:
It’s so wild to watch Tucker do a whole hour tonight explaining why we need answers on the biolabs in Ukraine and then Sean Hannity and Jen Griffin come on and say everyone needs to shut up about biolabs in Ukraine or they are Putin lovers
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg)
-
Tucker continued to strongly disparage the line of analysis below tonight;
===========
Unfounded Russian Claims of Biological Weapons Research in Ukraine Stir Fears of Wider Risk
Western officials are concerned the accusations could serve as a pretext for Moscow to unleash chemical or biological weapons
Russia has raised pressure on Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol with more-dangerous conventional weapons; a street in Mariupol on Thursday.
PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By William Mauldin
Follow
March 10, 2022 2:18 pm ET
Russian officials accused the U.S. of funding biowarfare efforts in Ukraine, drawing concern from Western officials who fear that a crescendo of allegations about weapons of mass destruction could serve as a pretext for Russia to unleash chemical or biological weapons itself.
The Russian Defense Ministry on Thursday said that a U.S. defense agency funded research into bat coronaviruses in Ukraine and the country’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said that “these were not peaceful experiments.”
On Wednesday, the White House rejected such accusations, saying allegations over the use of biological or chemical weapons could mark efforts by the Russians to lay the groundwork for their use in the Ukraine conflict.
White House press secretary Jen Psaki said that similar allegations about work on a chemical weapons program in Ukraine “have been debunked,” adding that the claim is “an example of the types of false pretexts we have been warning the Russians would invent.”
Western officials increasingly worry that such accusations are a sign that Moscow, which has raised pressure on Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol with more-dangerous conventional weapons, is growing more willing to resort to using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in Ukraine.
A senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization official said Wednesday there are serious concerns that Russia—which has struggled to make headway in its assault on Ukraine—is setting the stage to use chemical weapons in the country.
On Thursday, the Russian Defense Ministry said Washington has been supporting research that could allow the spread of diseases through wild birds migrating between Russia and Ukraine, adding that “biolaboratories set up and funded in Ukraine have been experimenting with bat coronavirus samples.”
It said that the U.S. was planning to do work there in 2022 on pathogens affecting birds, reptiles and bats, as well as possible research related to African swine fever and anthrax.
“We have sent an official query on how it can be explained and we will demand to get a reply,” Mr. Lavrov said in talks with his Ukrainian and Turkish counterparts in Antalya, Turkey. “As to them using these weapons, I don’t have information like that, but these were not peaceful experiments.”
The U.S. has said that the defense agency blamed by Russia, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and its Biological Threat Reduction Program, seeks to “counter the threat of outbreaks—deliberate, accidental or natural—of the world’s most dangerous infectious diseases.”
Separately, the U.S. has supplied four mobile labs to Ukraine that were used to help control the spread of Covid-19 in the country.
The U.S. helped upgrade some labs in Ukraine to biosafety level 2, or BSL-2, according to the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. Labs with that biosafety level typically handle disease samples that aren’t particularly hazardous, such as HIV and the bacteria that cause staph infections.
Ukraine isn’t believed to have any BSL-4 labs, which are highly secure facilities that research the most infectious and dangerous pathogens, such as the Ebola virus, according to research cited by U.S. health agencies.
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said on Thursday that the U.S. does “not believe that Ukraine is pursuing biological or nuclear weapons,” adding that the Washington has provided biosafety assistance in the past to Ukraine, which she says operates about a dozen labs focused on biodefense and public-health responses rather than offensive weaponry.
Ms. Psaki said that the U.S. is in full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention “and does not develop or possess such weapons anywhere.” Russia has a documented record of using chemical weapons, she said.
Moscow has also accused Kyiv of seeking to produce nuclear weapons.
The international agency that monitors nuclear programs denied that Ukraine is seeking to produce such arms. Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Concerns over a nuclear incident have risen as Russian and Ukrainian forces clash around nuclear-energy sites.
In 2018, the State Department issued a report to Congress that said Russia had failed to show that it has halted the use of chemical and biological weapons, a determination that paved the way for sanctions against the Kremlin and entities under its control.
Moscow has supported the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which used chemical weapons against the civilian population during the country’s civil war.
“Putin is very comfortable fighting dirty, including in Syria,” said Sophia Gaston, director of the British Foreign Policy Group, a London think tank. “For him, this is really about laying the groundwork to show that if he is using chemical or biological weapons, he can just claim in the international community that he is just matching weapons from the other side—which is a complete falsification.”
-
second
Russia Sees Gold in Ukraine’s Nuclear Plants
The takeover of Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhya could be worth hundreds of millions of dollars to Putin’s economy.
By Jeffrey S. Merrifield
March 10, 2022 6:44 pm ET
An unappreciated motive for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is that Kyiv was positioning itself to break from its longtime Russian nuclear suppliers, as the U.S. was encroaching on Russia’s largest nuclear export market.
At the beginning of the conflict, Russian tanks rolled through the Chernobyl site, kicking up dust and increasing radiation levels. Eight days later, the invaders seized the six-unit nuclear power plant in the town of Zaporizhzhya, 700 miles away.
By taking over Chernobyl, Russia gives itself control of the disposal of its spent fuel, which it can store in canisters at the site or ship to a reprocessing facility in Russia. Either way, this represents hundreds of millions of dollars for Rosatom, the Russian state-owned nuclear enterprise.
The shift could displace Holtec, an American designer and maker of dry-storage canister technologies for used nuclear fuel. In 2007 State Specialized Enterprise Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant authorized Holtec to build a facility to store for 100 years the 22,000 used fuel assemblies from Chernobyl. The project was intended to allow Ukraine to store this fuel safely without shipping it back to Russia for reprocessing. The processing and storage facility was completed in 2020, and Holtec and SSE Chernobyl were loading the canisters to be stored when the war began on Feb. 24.
Further, Ukraine has 15 operating nuclear reactors at four sites, including Zaporizhzhya, that the Russians designed and built. That is the largest number of such plants built by Russians outside their own country. Beginning in 2005, however, the American company Westinghouse emerged as a competitor to the Russian nuclear supplier, Atomstroyexport, owned by Rosatom. At the time of the invasion, Westinghouse supplied fuel to six of the 15 nuclear reactors and could displace the Russians in all of them. The U.S. government had been highly supportive of this effort, and these fuel contracts represented hundreds of millions of dollars in yearly lost sales to Atomstroyexport. By seizing the nuclear plants, Russia is able to retake the market for Ukrainian nuclear fuel.
Most important, Westinghouse, with support from the U.S., was in a position to build nuclear reactors in Ukraine over the next two decades. On Aug. 31, 2021, Energy Secretary Jennifer Granholm and her Ukrainian counterpart, Herman Halushchenko, signed a strategic cooperation agreement to build five nuclear units with a value, according to the World Nuclear Association, of more than $30 billion.
On Nov. 22, Patrick Fragman and Petro Kotin, the CEOs, respectively, of Westinghouse and Energoatom, the Ukrainian state-owned utility, signed a contract to build the first Westinghouse AP1000 nuclear unit in the city of Khmelnitsky, where two Russian-built nuclear units currently operate. The plan was to use the site of a Russian-designed nuclear reactor that had been left about one-third complete in 1990—as well as parts from a canceled American nuclear project in South Carolina. The goal, Mr. Kotin said, was 24 gigawatts of nuclear capability by 2040.
The timing is telling. In November 2021, Ukraine’s leaders signed a deal with Westinghouse to start construction on what they hoped would be at least five nuclear units—the first tranche of a program that could more than double the number of plants in the country, with a potential total value approaching $100 billion. Ukraine clearly intended that Russia receive none of that business.
Mr. Merrifield was a commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1998-2007. He is global energy section leader for the Pillsbury Law Firm and represents nuclear utilities, suppliers and technology developers.
-
Tucker is quite correct to do so.
Tucker continued to strongly disparage the line of analysis below tonight;
===========
Unfounded Russian Claims of Biological Weapons Research in Ukraine Stir Fears of Wider Risk
Western officials are concerned the accusations could serve as a pretext for Moscow to unleash chemical or biological weapons
Russia has raised pressure on Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol with more-dangerous conventional weapons; a street in Mariupol on Thursday.
PHOTO: EVGENIY MALOLETKA/ASSOCIATED PRESS
By William Mauldin
Follow
March 10, 2022 2:18 pm ET
Russian officials accused the U.S. of funding biowarfare efforts in Ukraine, drawing concern from Western officials who fear that a crescendo of allegations about weapons of mass destruction could serve as a pretext for Russia to unleash chemical or biological weapons itself.
The Russian Defense Ministry on Thursday said that a U.S. defense agency funded research into bat coronaviruses in Ukraine and the country’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, said that “these were not peaceful experiments.”
On Wednesday, the White House rejected such accusations, saying allegations over the use of biological or chemical weapons could mark efforts by the Russians to lay the groundwork for their use in the Ukraine conflict.
White House press secretary Jen Psaki said that similar allegations about work on a chemical weapons program in Ukraine “have been debunked,” adding that the claim is “an example of the types of false pretexts we have been warning the Russians would invent.”
Western officials increasingly worry that such accusations are a sign that Moscow, which has raised pressure on Ukrainian cities such as Mariupol with more-dangerous conventional weapons, is growing more willing to resort to using nuclear, biological or chemical weapons in Ukraine.
A senior North Atlantic Treaty Organization official said Wednesday there are serious concerns that Russia—which has struggled to make headway in its assault on Ukraine—is setting the stage to use chemical weapons in the country.
On Thursday, the Russian Defense Ministry said Washington has been supporting research that could allow the spread of diseases through wild birds migrating between Russia and Ukraine, adding that “biolaboratories set up and funded in Ukraine have been experimenting with bat coronavirus samples.”
It said that the U.S. was planning to do work there in 2022 on pathogens affecting birds, reptiles and bats, as well as possible research related to African swine fever and anthrax.
“We have sent an official query on how it can be explained and we will demand to get a reply,” Mr. Lavrov said in talks with his Ukrainian and Turkish counterparts in Antalya, Turkey. “As to them using these weapons, I don’t have information like that, but these were not peaceful experiments.”
The U.S. has said that the defense agency blamed by Russia, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and its Biological Threat Reduction Program, seeks to “counter the threat of outbreaks—deliberate, accidental or natural—of the world’s most dangerous infectious diseases.”
Separately, the U.S. has supplied four mobile labs to Ukraine that were used to help control the spread of Covid-19 in the country.
The U.S. helped upgrade some labs in Ukraine to biosafety level 2, or BSL-2, according to the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine. Labs with that biosafety level typically handle disease samples that aren’t particularly hazardous, such as HIV and the bacteria that cause staph infections.
Ukraine isn’t believed to have any BSL-4 labs, which are highly secure facilities that research the most infectious and dangerous pathogens, such as the Ebola virus, according to research cited by U.S. health agencies.
Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines said on Thursday that the U.S. does “not believe that Ukraine is pursuing biological or nuclear weapons,” adding that the Washington has provided biosafety assistance in the past to Ukraine, which she says operates about a dozen labs focused on biodefense and public-health responses rather than offensive weaponry.
Ms. Psaki said that the U.S. is in full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention “and does not develop or possess such weapons anywhere.” Russia has a documented record of using chemical weapons, she said.
Moscow has also accused Kyiv of seeking to produce nuclear weapons.
The international agency that monitors nuclear programs denied that Ukraine is seeking to produce such arms. Ukraine gave up nuclear weapons after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Concerns over a nuclear incident have risen as Russian and Ukrainian forces clash around nuclear-energy sites.
In 2018, the State Department issued a report to Congress that said Russia had failed to show that it has halted the use of chemical and biological weapons, a determination that paved the way for sanctions against the Kremlin and entities under its control.
Moscow has supported the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, which used chemical weapons against the civilian population during the country’s civil war.
“Putin is very comfortable fighting dirty, including in Syria,” said Sophia Gaston, director of the British Foreign Policy Group, a London think tank. “For him, this is really about laying the groundwork to show that if he is using chemical or biological weapons, he can just claim in the international community that he is just matching weapons from the other side—which is a complete falsification.”
-
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/ukraines-bio-lab-security-is-becoming-an-issue/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20220309&utm_term=Jolt-Smart
-
I'm just glad that the USG would never lie to us. They'd NEVER outsource Gain Of Function to sketchy labs well outside US jurisdiction!
https://www.nationalreview.com/the-morning-jolt/ukraines-bio-lab-security-is-becoming-an-issue/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=MJ_20220309&utm_term=Jolt-Smart
-
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1829314/list-of-ukraine-biolabs-documents-removed-by-us-embassy
-
People with nothing to hide ALWAYS do this!
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1829314/list-of-ukraine-biolabs-documents-removed-by-us-embassy
-
https://hannity.com/media-room/where-theres-smoke-theres-hunter-biden-firm-rosemont-seneca-invested-in-ukrainian-biolabs/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=where-theres-smoke-theres-hunter-biden-firm-rosemont-seneca-invested-in-ukrainian-biolabs
-
https://rwmalonemd.substack.com/p/ukraine-biolab-watchtower?fbclid=IwAR3Iyi9kG5sTKJcX_HhQwKMMae2wPvC9qsGwfw0kOU7T8XGoVF_dp7rA6bw&s=r
-
Robin is part of a FB chat group of which I am a member, and he has impressed me. Strong background in interesting things. I have asked Webmaster Bob to register him here for our forum. He is a busy man, but I hope he will find us worthy of his time.
He has been kind enough to put together the following for us:
=============================
A lot of OMG!!! Is circulating regarding U.S. funded biolabs in Ukraine and elsewhere. Some context is
needed if we are to sort through the conflicting reports and the issues.
In 1991 the Nunn-Lugar Act set up a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program to secure and prevent the
spread of Soviet weapons of mass destruction as the USSR dissolved. These included nuclear bombs and
materials, but also chemical and biological agents.
By the early 2000s this took on a particular urgency, as former Soviet researchers were becoming
destitute and materials were migrating to the black economy from their labs. Jihadi and other groups
were particularly interested in the possible uses to which these agents and materials might be put.
Terror-associated groups were found scouting out c.f. the NY City water supply, among other potential
vectors for a covert attack.
At the center of the CTR program from the American side was and is the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency – the U.S. counterWMD agency. It had evolved from the previous Defense Nuclear Agency as
‘WMD’ expanded beyond nukes to include chemical, biological, and radiological contamination agents.
Fast forward to the 2009 flu pandemic. I was at DTRA from 2009-2010 managing a basic research grant
program in the new mathematics related to complex adaptive networked systems. One of the teams
funded by my program and NIH produced a highly accurate model of the H1N1 swine flu spread and
identified how to interrupt the pandemic.
The H1N1 variant of that year started among swine herds in Asia and was highly transmissible to and
between humans. It spread rapidly, including by air travel which had become common and inexpensive
by then. H1N1 was the virus that also had caused millions of deaths in the 1918 flu pandemic – and that
caused Russia’s 2007 pandemic as well.
But there was another flu virus circulating in 2009, and it also was a major concern. The H5N1 avian flu
– “bird flu” – was only a few small mutations away from being easily human to human transmissible.
When humans did contract it, it was often very severe and could be quite deadly.
So here’s the challenge. How do you defend against such a virus, whether naturally mutated or
engineered in a lab? Keep in mind that the USSR had more than a few biolabs actively working on bio
weapons. (Remember the anthrax leak in the 1970s? Yeah, from that major Soviet lab just east of the
Urals. Remember the jihadi attempts to use anthrax as WMD against the West after 9/11? Hmmm …..)
At a minimum, you need to be able to detect biological agents, know which ones are serious threats,
and know how to defend against them or respond to them. And if you don’t want them being sold in the
black economy – which by 2010 was larger than all of the national economies in the world put together
– then you might want to figure out how to help researchers in former Soviet republics put food on their
tables.
That’s the origin and purpose for which biolabs in Ukraine, Georgia, etc. were funded by the U.S.
I can’t speak to how that purpose might have evolved since my time at DTRA. I can attest that the
chem/bio people I knew there were very focused on detection and defense – the terrorism / rogue state
threat was real.
When WMD equaled nuclear bombs in the possession of only a handful of countries capable of creating
and delivering them, counterWMD’s scope was clear. But biological agents – natural or weaponized –
blur the boundaries between WMD defense, the creation of bio weapons, and civilian medical research
almost irredeemably. As we push back on the likes of Anthony Fauci, keep in mind that there are also
honest people seriously focused on legitimate detection and defense against them, here and elsewhere.
- Robin Burk
-
Now, about those biolabs.
Back in the good old days the Soviet Union ran a large biological weapons program. Sometimes bad things happened with that program, notably in 1979, when an anthrax leak from a laboratory in Sverdlovsk killed about 100 civilians. The Soviets lied — shocker, I know — and blamed “tainted meat” for the deaths.
Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union collapsed. The end of history, the triumph of democratic capitalism, yadda yadda yadda, yabba-dabba-doo. Meanwhile all those biological weapons labs (and nuclear labs too), and the scientists who worked for them, were now the property of a defunct and bankrupt state.
Which made them our problem.
Basically, we had to figure out a way to put a bunch of proud scientists on welfare so they wouldn’t be tempted to sell their services to the highest bidder. We actually worked with the Russians to de-enrich the uranium in their nuclear warheads for a while, which was a pretty cool program.
—
Figuring out how to pay off the bioweapons guys was trickier.
You can’t de-enrich anthrax, and those offensive biological weapons programs weren’t supposed to be happening anyway. In 1972 we and the Soviets had agreed to ban them. Instead, we paid to upgrade the security at the labs and found ways for scientists to keep studying pathogens and chasing potential outbreaks - not just in the Ukraine, but all over the former Soviet Union, and then in other countries too.
As the Defense Threat Reduction Agency explains:
These efforts include facilitating the construction or renovation of more than 100 laboratory and storage facilities and coordinating more than 300 cooperative research projects aimed at safely studying, detecting, and diagnosing especially dangerous pathogens.
SOURCE
The boys at the Pentagon call this “defense in depth” - meaning, better to catch the nasties over there than over here.
None of this was illegal, or hidden, though some of the details of the programs were classified. And it’s been successful, more or less. You can tell from all the people who didn’t die in the great anthrax attack of 2019 that didn’t happen.
(Meanwhile, even as we spent billions to keep ourselves safe from foreign scientists, Tony Fauci and the boys pushed gain-of-function research to turn harmless coronaviruses into mortal threats, but that’s a story for another day. The call is coming from inside the house…)
Nor did the Russians have any problem with this long-running effort. Until now. Why now?
Come on, do I even need to explain?
You may have noticed the Kremlin’s lil adventure in Ukraine is not going exactly as planned. The Ukrainians are not cooperating with the first Russian excuse for the war, that Vladimir’s men needed to liberate Ukraine from its Jewish president and his evil Nazi army (say it fast and it makes even less sense!).
Now the Russians need a new excuse for their war and its crimes. It doesn’t have to be a good excuse, it just has to be something they and the Chinese can say that is a little less absurd than Zelensky drinks the blood of Russian children morning noon and night (they may yet get there).
Thus the talk of biolabs and bioweapons, which forces the media to explain that Ukrainian labs weren’t actually doing… whatever it is the Russians are hinting they were doing. The Russian argument works particularly well because the same media outlets now truthfully explaining that Ukraine isn’t cooking up anthrax spent the last two years claiming Sars-Cov-2 didn’t leak from a Chinese lab. Which doesn’t help their credibility.
However. I didn’t spend the last two years claiming Sars-Cov-2 didn’t leak from a Chinese lab. And I am telling you, scout’s honor, this is nonsense.
Don’t fall for it. Yes, the media is desperate for an excuse to ignore Covid going forward, and that’s one reason they are devoting so much attention to Ukraine - but the war is real, and it’s a pure power grab the likes of which Europe has not seen in some time.
Everyone is bad but some people are worse.
-
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10605417/Russian-biologist-turns-Putins-propaganda-machine-insisting-claims-Ukrainian-biowarfare-labs.html?fbclid=IwAR3KkqOJobul0VDLl2x7oMRzirniKsyCWWKQwQ5yp91CR9DlB2fibLvyBTU
-
https://twitter.com/RealGeorgeWebb1/status/1504327754317242369?cxt=HHwWgoC53emHueApAAAA
-
With anyone else this would sound seriously tin foil , , ,
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1868053/suspect-hint-of-us-creating-casus-belli
-
While hosting Xi for dinner at Mar a Lago, between the main course and desert President Trump sent 40 Tomahawks up the Russki ass in Syria for use of chem weapons. What should President Biden do if Russia uses chem weapons in Ukraine?
================================
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/03/19/russia-chemical-weapons-ukraine/?utm_campaign=wp_post_most&utm_medium=email&utm_source=newsletter&wpisrc=nl_most&carta-url=https%3A%2F%2Fs2.washingtonpost.com%2Fcar-ln-tr%2F365a289%2F6236068b3e6ed13ade2db8d4%2F61cdf026ae7e8a4ac205b2b3%2F9%2F70%2F6236068b3e6ed13ade2db8d4
A legacy of ‘secrecy and deception’: Why Russia clings to an outlawed chemical arsenal
By Joby Warrick
On July 12, 2018, British scientists gathered at a restricted military base for a first look at the weapon used in a bizarre murder attempt a few weeks before. The device was a perfume bottle, tossed away by the assailants as they fled the country, and containing less than a tablespoon of a liquid so deadly that it could only be handled with heavy rubber gloves and hazmat gear.
Investigators already suspected that the weapon was of Russian origin — the intended victim was a Russian ex-spy living in England, and the attackers were identified as military intelligence operatives from Moscow. The surprise, as the examination unfolded, was the sheer potency of the oily fluid inside the vial. It was enough poison, the scientists calculated, to wipe out a small town: the equivalent of thousands of lethal doses.
This was Novichok, a powerful nerve agent invented by Russia. Just a year earlier, in 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin had declared to the world that his country no longer possessed such chemical weapons. U.S. and British intelligence officials believed at the time that Putin was lying, and here, in a laboratory in southern England, was tangible proof. Russia had secretly preserved at least some of its arsenal of poisons, and it clearly was willing to use them — including on foreign soil.
Four years later, insights from the probe into the attempted assassination of defector Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, England, are helping to fuel worries that Russian chemical weapons could soon turn up in yet another country, with far graver consequences. The Biden administration has repeatedly warned that Russia, frustrated with the faltering progress of its 3-week-old invasion of Ukraine, may be preparing to use chemical weapons against Ukrainian troops, political leaders or even ordinary civilians in an effort to regain momentum and seize control of key cities.
While the nature of those preparations is not publicly known, current and former U.S. and NATO officials say Russia has long possessed an array of chemical weapons, which it retains in defiance of international treaties and despite years of Russian promises and pronouncements. Moreover, senior Russian leaders appear to regard chemical weapons as a legitimate tool for achieving a variety of goals, from eliminating political foes to subduing armed opponents, officials and weapons experts say. Russia denies possessing chemical weapons, and the Kremlin has accused Kyiv and Washington of plotting to use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine.
The Russian embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment.
Inside Russia’s propaganda bubble: Where a war isn’t a war
“The Skripal case was the smoking gun,” said Andrew C. Weber, a top nonproliferation official for the Pentagon during the Obama administration and an expert on Russia’s weapons of mass destruction programs. “Russia used chemical weapons, in peacetime, in a foreign country. The thought that they might now use chemical weapons in Ukraine is entirely rational.”
Russia had been laying the groundwork for such operations for decades, current and former U.S. officials said in interviews.
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia joined the United States and 191 other countries in signing the Chemical Weapon Convention, which outlaws the stockpiling and use of substances such as Novichok. Beginning in the early 2000s, Moscow destroyed 40,000 metric tons of chemical munitions — ostensibly its entire arsenal — in special incinerators built with help from U.S. taxpayers.
But not everything was destroyed, U.S. officials and analysts say. Military laboratories that produced nerve agents such Novichok and sarin continue to function, and Russian weapons scientists have been allowed to pursue new weapons research under a treaty loophole that permits the production of small amounts of chemical weapons for defensive purposes, such as calibrating detection equipment.
Russia continued to work on Novichok after the Cold War, an effort that accelerated in the 2010s and culminated with the use of an enhanced variant of the same nerve agent in assassination attempts against two Kremlin foes — Skripal, in 2018, and Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny in 2020 — and likely against at least three other opposition figures inside Russia, current and former intelligence officials say.
Meanwhile, Moscow also became heavily invested in protecting Syria, its closest Middle East ally, after the Syrian army used chemical weapons against opposition-held towns and villages in that country’s civil war. Despite initially supporting international efforts to eliminate Syria’s vast arsenal of nerve agents in 2013, Putin repeatedly blocked efforts to punish Syrian President Bashar al-Assad when he switched to using chlorine — the common industrial chemical used to clean drinking water — in deadly gas attacks against the rebels.
In Syria, chlorine gas became Assad’s go-to weapon for clearing rebels out of their urban strongholds. Because chlorine is widely available, Syria frequently blamed the rebels themselves, accusing them of gassing their own neighborhoods in “false-flag” attacks to win sympathy and support from the West. The claims were repeated and amplified by Russian officials in social media and before world bodies, including the United Nations.
The tactic was denounced at the time as cruel and cynical, but it at least partly succeeded. Syria has largely prevailed against the rebels, and Russia’s false-flags claims gained credence among Moscow’s allies and sowed confusion elsewhere.
Years later, Assad still has avoided any accountability for his actions, and Russia has absorbed a powerful lesson on how chemical weapons can be used to defeat even a highly motivated, heavily entrenched urban foe, said Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a retired British military officer who commanded NATO’s rapid-reaction battalion for defense against chemical, biological and nuclear weapons.
“If you have no morals or scruples, you would use chemicals, because they can be a morbidly great weapon, as we saw in Syria,” de Bretton-Gordon said. “When you’re fighting amid rubble, bombs and bullets have a limited affect. But gas is a different story.”
A steward of Russia’s chemical weapons program
The center of Russia’s chemical-weapons universe — past and present — is an industrial complex in Shikhany, a small town on the west bank of the Volga River, just upstream from the city of Saratov. In Soviet times, Shikhany was a “closed” military city, sealed off from foreign visitors because of the highly secretive nature of the research that occurred there.
A network of labs and factories in Shikhany once produced much of the Soviet Union’s vast chemical-weapons arsenal, including sarin and VX, another nerve agent, as well as an experimental compound called Novichok, Russian for “new fellow.”
During the final years of communist rule, the complex was directed by Lt. Gen. Anatoly Kuntsevich, an owlish man who critics colorfully dubbed “General Gas.” In later years, Kuntsevich would work with Americans in dismantling parts of the Soviet Union’s chemical weapons complex, while also — according to Russian prosecutors — providing advice and equipment to Syrian officials who were secretly constructing chemical-weapons factories of their own.
Kuntsevich oversaw what was then the world’s largest stockpile of chemicals, building on a military program that dated back to the Czarist era and underwent a massive upgrade at the start of the Cold War. When Soviet occupying forces in Germany discovered that the Nazis had invented new types of chemical weapons called nerve agents, the Russians dismantled entire German chemical factories and reassembled them in places like Shikhany.
In the Cold War arms race, Moscow and Washington sought to out-compete one another in building the biggest and best arsenals of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. But as the conflict ended, both countries agreed to limit their nuclear stockpiles and to begin the costly process of scrapping their biological and chemical weapons and production centers altogether. The CIA would later conclude that Russia’s self-reported inventory of chemical weapons was incomplete, with several known types of munitions omitted from the list.
The invention of sarin was an accident. A German scientist was trying to kill bugs.
The destruction of Russia’s declared chemical arsenal officially ended in 2017, with Putin himself presiding over the ceremonial destruction of the last chemical warhead by remote video link. Putin seized on the moment to chide the United States, where a decades-long, multibillion-dollar destruction program was slowed by regulatory delays. The last U.S. weapons are set to be destroyed next year.
“We expect that Russia’s efforts … will serve as an example for other countries,” Putin said in remarks at the ceremony. He accused Washington of “not carrying out its obligations when it comes to the time frame of destroying chemical weapons.”
Yet, even as he spoke, U.S. intelligence agencies assessed that Russian scientists were continuing research into new chemical weapons. In August 2020, the Trump administration imposed economic “blacklist” sanctions against three Russian research facilities because of what it said was ongoing work on chemical weapons. Among then was Russia’s 33rd Central Research and Testing Institute, the main military laboratory at Shikhany.
The Biden administration added new sanctions in 2021, and expanded the list to include additional facilities in Moscow and St. Petersburg. The White House also named individual Russians, including military and intelligence officials, as having connections to the assassination attempts against Skripal and Navalny.
“Russia has been in longtime noncompliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention,” a senior State Department official said, repeating the essential conclusion reached by multiple U.S. agencies with insight into ongoing work at Shikhany and other research facilities. “Russia’s noncompliance is manifest in far more than just Novichok use.”
The official, like other U.S. and NATO officials interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss U.S. assessments of Russia’s weapons programs. Other U.S. officials and diplomats described ongoing research, production and testing activities by Russia, including at Shikhany.
Whether Russia possesses a standing arsenal of battlefield-ready chemical munitions is not publicly known, but such stockpiles are no longer necessary, given Russia’s capacity to manufacture significant amounts of chemical weapons quickly, if they decide to, the officials said. Key weapons facilities have been reconfigured over the past decade for production-on-demand, they said.
“They can make hundreds of kilograms of nerve agent fairly quickly,” said John Gilbert, who oversaw U.S. inspection teams in Russia under a Defense Department program that helped Moscow dismantle its Cold War chemical arsenal. “It could happen in a matter of double-digit days.”
The facilities at Shikhany have traditionally lacked the technical sophistication and safety systems common to industrial chemical plants in the West. The Pentagon’s teams visited poorly guarded Russian storage buildings in which huge quantities of nerve agents were kept in rail cars with their wheels removed. The task of periodically checking the liquids was typically carried out by a young Russian who climbed on top of the tanks with a dipstick.
Yet, the Soviet Union’s chemical engineers knew their craft, and some clearly were unhappy to see the fruits of decades of labor reduced to incinerator soot, Gilbert said.
“There was a lot of hesitation, just as there was among Army chemical corps troops in this country,” Gilbert said. “To some, it was as if their whole life was being invalidated. And they didn’t like it.”
‘Gray warfare’
Ultimately, it was Novichok that served as a bridge between the old Soviet chemical weapon program and the Kremlin’s evolving, 21st century ambitions. Developed at Shikhany in the waning years of the Soviet empire, it was Russia’s deadliest nerve agent, and a carefully guarded state secret.
Novichok’s distinctive chemical formula differed from that of other known nerve agents, and because of this, Novichok was initially omitted from the Chemical Weapons Convention’s list of banned substances. Russia could thus continue to tinker with the new weapon without technically violating their treaty obligations, said Gregory Koblentz, a biological and chemical weapons expert and director of the Biodefense Graduate Program at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government.
Kremlin officials at that time also believed that Novichok could not be detected in standard forensics tests used by Western governments. That made Novichok a perfect murder weapon: an ideal choice for use in clandestine assassination attempts by Russia’s intelligence services.
“Russia didn't just inherit the Soviet chemical weapons arsenal; they also inherited the secrecy and deception that surrounded the program,” Koblentz said.
Inside the transfer of foreign military equipment to Ukrainian soldiers
After the decision to target Skripal — a turncoat spy who was particularly reviled by Putin — two military intelligence operatives were dispatched to the defector’s new home in Salisbury, England, with about a third of an ounce of Novichok concealed inside a modified perfume bottle. Skripal was severely stricken, along with his daughter, Yulia, and a local police officer, but all three recovered after aggressive treatment by British doctors using atropine, an nerve-agent antidote.
The would-be assassins carelessly discarded the perfume vial — an unthinkable blunder for professional hit men. The bottle was later found by a British man who was undergoing treatment for drug addiction. The man gave the bottle to his girlfriend, who died after dabbing a bit of the odorless liquid on her wrist.
Moscow denied any involvement in the attempted murder, and instead promoted false narratives claiming that others were behind the attack, including possibly Britain itself. But as the investigation was underway, Dutch police disrupted an alleged plot by a different set of Russian operatives to hack into computers of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Hague-based international watchdog that was in the process of examining samples of the poison used against Skripal.
Two years later, a reformulated Novichok weapon was used in another high-profile assassination attempt. This time the attack occurred inside Russia, and the target was Navalny, Putin’s most vociferous political foe. Navalny survived, but only after being allowed to fly to Berlin for medical treatment. Four different laboratories ultimately confirmed that Navalny had been poisoned with Novichok.
The Kremlin again denied any role in the attack, suggesting publicly that Germany or another Western country was responsible.
The question — still unsettled, and the subject of a furious debate inside the U.S. intelligence community — is whether the Kremlin believed that the use of its signature poison would be detected, or whether the two assassination attempts against prominent Putin foes were a deliberate effort to send a message.
In any case, the attacks revealed Putin’s willingness to engage in what Weber, the former Pentagon official, describes as a kind “gray warfare” using an unconventional and highly lethal weapon.
“We know about battlefield use of chemical weapons, and we know the stuff that terrorists do, and now there’s this: a state-sponsored, covert delivery of a weapon of mass destruction,” Weber said. “This is a new category, and we need to pay attention.”
Up to now, each of Russia’s known attempts to use chemicals weapons have been accompanied by a public-relations offensive, of a very particular sort. After the Skripal and Navlany attacks, Moscow dispatched top Russian officials to the United Nations and other prominent venues, armed with vigorous denials and concocted stories that sought to deflect blame. The false narratives were then repeated on state-run Russian media and recycled on social media platforms, including in the West.
Indeed, for Russia — just as with its similarly accused ally, Syria — the official denial campaigns are often as complex and elaborate as the attacks themselves. U.S. officials say a pretense of deniability appears to be important to Moscow, regardless of the strength of the evidence pointing to Russia’s guilt.
People stand in front of damaged buildings, in the town of Douma, the site of a suspected chemical weapons attack, near Damascus, Syria, on April 16, 2018. (Hassan Ammar/AP)
For that reason, many officials and experts believe that Russia may try to cloak its involvement in any future chemical weapons attack in Ukraine. Rather than using signature Russian nerve agents such as Novichok, it might resort to using anhydrous ammonia or chlorine — two substances that are readily available in an industrial country such as Ukraine.
Chlorine was used as chemical weapon in World War I. Although far less lethal than sarin or Novichok, chlorine can be effective in driving urban defenders from their barricades, as the Assad government discovered during Syria’s civil war. After giving up the bulk of its sarin stockpile in 2014, Assad used chlorine bombs dozens of times, as a siege weapon against entrenched fighters, or a psychological weapon against civilians in villages sympathetic to the rebels.
On Thursday, Secretary of State Antony Blinken suggested that such an attack by Russia may be coming, accusing Moscow of “setting the stage to use a chemical weapon, and then falsely blame Ukraine to justify escalating its attacks on the Ukrainian people.”
Any chemical attack could cause hundreds of casualties and possibly alter the course of the war. But achieving a true breakthrough would probably require large quantities of chemicals, making Ukraine the venue for the first large-scale use of such weapons since World War I, Maj. Gen. Mick Ryan, an Australian army officer and adjunct scholar at the Modern War Institute at the U.S. Military Academy, said in a Twitter post.
“If we think the war is already horrific, we haven’t seen the worst of it,” Ryan wrote. If it happens, he added, “the US President and NATO will have a very hard choice to make.”
-
https://www.dailywire.com/news/military-convoy-carrying-up-to-6-nuclear-warheads-spotted-on-move-in-europe-as-ukraine-war-rages-on-report?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=benshapiro&fbclid=IwAR3KIrVT83j6pNi33QdW-ojamXWw5xTeAKmDOXXZi4GAitb3g67ra6mmibw
-
How Putin Exploits America’s Fear of Nuclear War
The U.S. has better global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities than Russia.
By David C. Gompert
March 22, 2022 6:21 pm ET
WSJ
Americans shudder at the mention of nuclear war, especially by Vladimir Putin. This reaction is understandable—civilization is at stake—but it can obscure thinking about whether and how nuclear war between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might begin and proceed. Absent an informed assessment of this grave matter, U.S. policy makers likely would be gripped by visceral fear and avoid any action that could heighten the risk of nuclear war. Mr. Putin is showing he can manipulate these fears and thus avoid strong Western responses to his war crimes.
Russian doctrine on nuclear war is clear: Moscow has said it would consider initiating nuclear hostilities if Russian soil is attacked by nonnuclear weapons or the existence of the Russian state is in danger. Mr. Putin’s public statements since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirm this. He hasn’t said Russia would resort to nuclear weapons if NATO were to intervene in defense of Ukraine. Rather, he has restated that the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons would be “threats to our country.” Mr. Putin says NATO intervention in Ukraine could escalate to nuclear war, but not that Russia would use nuclear weapons in reaction to such intervention.
A NATO attack on Russian territory in the course of intervention in Ukraine could trigger Russian use of nuclear weapons. But NATO has sufficient military superiority that it doesn’t need to attack Russian territory to help Ukraine defeat Russia. This isn’t to recommend such intervention; rather, it is to question the logic that such intervention would set off a nuclear conflict.
Yet voices of authority have reinforced the perception that direct NATO-Russia hostilities would result in Russian use of nuclear weapons. The U.N. secretary-general has said as much. In recent congressional testimony, U.S. intelligence bosses said the danger of nuclear war would increase if NATO forces entered Ukraine yet failed to explain that Russian doctrine regarding attacks on Russia itself as the threshold to initiate nuclear war.
This doesn’t mean that Mr. Putin can’t use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He has a numerical advantage over NATO in tactical nuclear weapons. Yet there are three powerful inhibitions against doing so. First, as we see daily, Russian forces are capable of leveling Ukrainian cities with nonnuclear weapons, though it would take longer. Second, Russia would become a permanent global outcast if it used nuclear weapons against Ukrainian cities. Third and most important, if Russia used nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Ukraine or against NATO members, it could face nuclear retaliation by the U.S. as well as the U.K. and France.
The point isn’t that the U.S. can ignore the danger of nuclear war, but rather that Russia has at least as much to fear as NATO does—a reality that is clouded by Mr. Putin’s brazen threats and Washington’s palpable fear. Russian military strategists believe the U.S. has exceptional, multilayered capabilities for such a contingency. U.S. global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are far better than Russia’s. These could be used to direct nonnuclear strikes with global reach and pinpoint accuracy against Russia’s retaliatory (“second strike”) nuclear forces. The U.S. also has more survivable, accurate and reliable offensive nuclear forces that could further decimate Russia’s strategic deterrent on the ground. Whatever Russian missiles survive such disarming strikes would be picked off by U.S. missile defense systems, or so the Russians believe.
Western hysteria about Mr. Putin’s willingness to use nuclear weapons has been compounded by the suspicion that he has a screw loose. Yet there has been no authoritative diagnosis that Mr. Putin’s psychiatric state would cause him to use nuclear weapons despite the danger of Russia’s annihilation in retaliation. When U.S. intelligence chiefs testify that Mr. Putin is mad, they mean angry, not insane. There is also an impression in the West that Mr. Putin has complete control over the release of nuclear weapons. He doesn’t. While his approval to launch is required, he has no way to act over the opposition of his top generals.
This isn’t to say that U.S. policy makers and intelligence chiefs should ignore the possibility that any direct hostilities between the U.S. and Russia could increase the risk of nuclear war. Rather, it is to say that Russia should be at least as fearful as America is. The more the U.S. falls for Mr. Putin’s nuclear messaging, and the more we signal that the U.S. dreads nuclear war more than Russia does, the less restrained Mr. Putin will be in Ukraine, and the more Ukrainian lives will be lost.
Mr. Gompert served as acting director of national intelligence, 2009-10.
-
No one with an IQ above room temperature trusts the geniuses behind the endless cascade of failures, foreign and domestic since the election was stolen. The crew that can’t distinguish between a man and a woman without the assistance of a biologist isn’t up to playing nuclear brinkmanship games with the future of humanity in the balance.
How Putin Exploits America’s Fear of Nuclear War
The U.S. has better global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities than Russia.
By David C. Gompert
March 22, 2022 6:21 pm ET
WSJ
Americans shudder at the mention of nuclear war, especially by Vladimir Putin. This reaction is understandable—civilization is at stake—but it can obscure thinking about whether and how nuclear war between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might begin and proceed. Absent an informed assessment of this grave matter, U.S. policy makers likely would be gripped by visceral fear and avoid any action that could heighten the risk of nuclear war. Mr. Putin is showing he can manipulate these fears and thus avoid strong Western responses to his war crimes.
Russian doctrine on nuclear war is clear: Moscow has said it would consider initiating nuclear hostilities if Russian soil is attacked by nonnuclear weapons or the existence of the Russian state is in danger. Mr. Putin’s public statements since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirm this. He hasn’t said Russia would resort to nuclear weapons if NATO were to intervene in defense of Ukraine. Rather, he has restated that the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons would be “threats to our country.” Mr. Putin says NATO intervention in Ukraine could escalate to nuclear war, but not that Russia would use nuclear weapons in reaction to such intervention.
A NATO attack on Russian territory in the course of intervention in Ukraine could trigger Russian use of nuclear weapons. But NATO has sufficient military superiority that it doesn’t need to attack Russian territory to help Ukraine defeat Russia. This isn’t to recommend such intervention; rather, it is to question the logic that such intervention would set off a nuclear conflict.
Yet voices of authority have reinforced the perception that direct NATO-Russia hostilities would result in Russian use of nuclear weapons. The U.N. secretary-general has said as much. In recent congressional testimony, U.S. intelligence bosses said the danger of nuclear war would increase if NATO forces entered Ukraine yet failed to explain that Russian doctrine regarding attacks on Russia itself as the threshold to initiate nuclear war.
This doesn’t mean that Mr. Putin can’t use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He has a numerical advantage over NATO in tactical nuclear weapons. Yet there are three powerful inhibitions against doing so. First, as we see daily, Russian forces are capable of leveling Ukrainian cities with nonnuclear weapons, though it would take longer. Second, Russia would become a permanent global outcast if it used nuclear weapons against Ukrainian cities. Third and most important, if Russia used nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Ukraine or against NATO members, it could face nuclear retaliation by the U.S. as well as the U.K. and France.
The point isn’t that the U.S. can ignore the danger of nuclear war, but rather that Russia has at least as much to fear as NATO does—a reality that is clouded by Mr. Putin’s brazen threats and Washington’s palpable fear. Russian military strategists believe the U.S. has exceptional, multilayered capabilities for such a contingency. U.S. global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are far better than Russia’s. These could be used to direct nonnuclear strikes with global reach and pinpoint accuracy against Russia’s retaliatory (“second strike”) nuclear forces. The U.S. also has more survivable, accurate and reliable offensive nuclear forces that could further decimate Russia’s strategic deterrent on the ground. Whatever Russian missiles survive such disarming strikes would be picked off by U.S. missile defense systems, or so the Russians believe.
Western hysteria about Mr. Putin’s willingness to use nuclear weapons has been compounded by the suspicion that he has a screw loose. Yet there has been no authoritative diagnosis that Mr. Putin’s psychiatric state would cause him to use nuclear weapons despite the danger of Russia’s annihilation in retaliation. When U.S. intelligence chiefs testify that Mr. Putin is mad, they mean angry, not insane. There is also an impression in the West that Mr. Putin has complete control over the release of nuclear weapons. He doesn’t. While his approval to launch is required, he has no way to act over the opposition of his top generals.
This isn’t to say that U.S. policy makers and intelligence chiefs should ignore the possibility that any direct hostilities between the U.S. and Russia could increase the risk of nuclear war. Rather, it is to say that Russia should be at least as fearful as America is. The more the U.S. falls for Mr. Putin’s nuclear messaging, and the more we signal that the U.S. dreads nuclear war more than Russia does, the less restrained Mr. Putin will be in Ukraine, and the more Ukrainian lives will be lost.
Mr. Gompert served as acting director of national intelligence, 2009-10.
-
https://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2022/03/23/joe-biden-and-world-war-iii-for-dummies-n1583519
No one with an IQ above room temperature trusts the geniuses behind the endless cascade of failures, foreign and domestic since the election was stolen. The crew that can’t distinguish between a man and a woman without the assistance of a biologist isn’t up to playing nuclear brinkmanship games with the future of humanity in the balance.
How Putin Exploits America’s Fear of Nuclear War
The U.S. has better global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities than Russia.
By David C. Gompert
March 22, 2022 6:21 pm ET
WSJ
Americans shudder at the mention of nuclear war, especially by Vladimir Putin. This reaction is understandable—civilization is at stake—but it can obscure thinking about whether and how nuclear war between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might begin and proceed. Absent an informed assessment of this grave matter, U.S. policy makers likely would be gripped by visceral fear and avoid any action that could heighten the risk of nuclear war. Mr. Putin is showing he can manipulate these fears and thus avoid strong Western responses to his war crimes.
Russian doctrine on nuclear war is clear: Moscow has said it would consider initiating nuclear hostilities if Russian soil is attacked by nonnuclear weapons or the existence of the Russian state is in danger. Mr. Putin’s public statements since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirm this. He hasn’t said Russia would resort to nuclear weapons if NATO were to intervene in defense of Ukraine. Rather, he has restated that the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons would be “threats to our country.” Mr. Putin says NATO intervention in Ukraine could escalate to nuclear war, but not that Russia would use nuclear weapons in reaction to such intervention.
A NATO attack on Russian territory in the course of intervention in Ukraine could trigger Russian use of nuclear weapons. But NATO has sufficient military superiority that it doesn’t need to attack Russian territory to help Ukraine defeat Russia. This isn’t to recommend such intervention; rather, it is to question the logic that such intervention would set off a nuclear conflict.
Yet voices of authority have reinforced the perception that direct NATO-Russia hostilities would result in Russian use of nuclear weapons. The U.N. secretary-general has said as much. In recent congressional testimony, U.S. intelligence bosses said the danger of nuclear war would increase if NATO forces entered Ukraine yet failed to explain that Russian doctrine regarding attacks on Russia itself as the threshold to initiate nuclear war.
This doesn’t mean that Mr. Putin can’t use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He has a numerical advantage over NATO in tactical nuclear weapons. Yet there are three powerful inhibitions against doing so. First, as we see daily, Russian forces are capable of leveling Ukrainian cities with nonnuclear weapons, though it would take longer. Second, Russia would become a permanent global outcast if it used nuclear weapons against Ukrainian cities. Third and most important, if Russia used nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Ukraine or against NATO members, it could face nuclear retaliation by the U.S. as well as the U.K. and France.
The point isn’t that the U.S. can ignore the danger of nuclear war, but rather that Russia has at least as much to fear as NATO does—a reality that is clouded by Mr. Putin’s brazen threats and Washington’s palpable fear. Russian military strategists believe the U.S. has exceptional, multilayered capabilities for such a contingency. U.S. global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are far better than Russia’s. These could be used to direct nonnuclear strikes with global reach and pinpoint accuracy against Russia’s retaliatory (“second strike”) nuclear forces. The U.S. also has more survivable, accurate and reliable offensive nuclear forces that could further decimate Russia’s strategic deterrent on the ground. Whatever Russian missiles survive such disarming strikes would be picked off by U.S. missile defense systems, or so the Russians believe.
Western hysteria about Mr. Putin’s willingness to use nuclear weapons has been compounded by the suspicion that he has a screw loose. Yet there has been no authoritative diagnosis that Mr. Putin’s psychiatric state would cause him to use nuclear weapons despite the danger of Russia’s annihilation in retaliation. When U.S. intelligence chiefs testify that Mr. Putin is mad, they mean angry, not insane. There is also an impression in the West that Mr. Putin has complete control over the release of nuclear weapons. He doesn’t. While his approval to launch is required, he has no way to act over the opposition of his top generals.
This isn’t to say that U.S. policy makers and intelligence chiefs should ignore the possibility that any direct hostilities between the U.S. and Russia could increase the risk of nuclear war. Rather, it is to say that Russia should be at least as fearful as America is. The more the U.S. falls for Mr. Putin’s nuclear messaging, and the more we signal that the U.S. dreads nuclear war more than Russia does, the less restrained Mr. Putin will be in Ukraine, and the more Ukrainian lives will be lost.
Mr. Gompert served as acting director of national intelligence, 2009-10.
-
"https://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2022/03/23/joe-biden-and-world-war-iii-for-dummies-n1583519"
I can hear the name calling and insults being hurled now
over this
he is an apologist for Putin
he is weak
etc etc.........
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/military/here-are-all-latest-news-and-developments-ukraine-war-march-23
What could possibly go wrong?
https://pjmedia.com/vodkapundit/2022/03/23/joe-biden-and-world-war-iii-for-dummies-n1583519
No one with an IQ above room temperature trusts the geniuses behind the endless cascade of failures, foreign and domestic since the election was stolen. The crew that can’t distinguish between a man and a woman without the assistance of a biologist isn’t up to playing nuclear brinkmanship games with the future of humanity in the balance.
How Putin Exploits America’s Fear of Nuclear War
The U.S. has better global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities than Russia.
By David C. Gompert
March 22, 2022 6:21 pm ET
WSJ
Americans shudder at the mention of nuclear war, especially by Vladimir Putin. This reaction is understandable—civilization is at stake—but it can obscure thinking about whether and how nuclear war between Russia and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might begin and proceed. Absent an informed assessment of this grave matter, U.S. policy makers likely would be gripped by visceral fear and avoid any action that could heighten the risk of nuclear war. Mr. Putin is showing he can manipulate these fears and thus avoid strong Western responses to his war crimes.
Russian doctrine on nuclear war is clear: Moscow has said it would consider initiating nuclear hostilities if Russian soil is attacked by nonnuclear weapons or the existence of the Russian state is in danger. Mr. Putin’s public statements since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine confirm this. He hasn’t said Russia would resort to nuclear weapons if NATO were to intervene in defense of Ukraine. Rather, he has restated that the threshold for Russian use of nuclear weapons would be “threats to our country.” Mr. Putin says NATO intervention in Ukraine could escalate to nuclear war, but not that Russia would use nuclear weapons in reaction to such intervention.
A NATO attack on Russian territory in the course of intervention in Ukraine could trigger Russian use of nuclear weapons. But NATO has sufficient military superiority that it doesn’t need to attack Russian territory to help Ukraine defeat Russia. This isn’t to recommend such intervention; rather, it is to question the logic that such intervention would set off a nuclear conflict.
Yet voices of authority have reinforced the perception that direct NATO-Russia hostilities would result in Russian use of nuclear weapons. The U.N. secretary-general has said as much. In recent congressional testimony, U.S. intelligence bosses said the danger of nuclear war would increase if NATO forces entered Ukraine yet failed to explain that Russian doctrine regarding attacks on Russia itself as the threshold to initiate nuclear war.
This doesn’t mean that Mr. Putin can’t use nuclear weapons in Ukraine. He has a numerical advantage over NATO in tactical nuclear weapons. Yet there are three powerful inhibitions against doing so. First, as we see daily, Russian forces are capable of leveling Ukrainian cities with nonnuclear weapons, though it would take longer. Second, Russia would become a permanent global outcast if it used nuclear weapons against Ukrainian cities. Third and most important, if Russia used nuclear weapons against NATO forces in Ukraine or against NATO members, it could face nuclear retaliation by the U.S. as well as the U.K. and France.
The point isn’t that the U.S. can ignore the danger of nuclear war, but rather that Russia has at least as much to fear as NATO does—a reality that is clouded by Mr. Putin’s brazen threats and Washington’s palpable fear. Russian military strategists believe the U.S. has exceptional, multilayered capabilities for such a contingency. U.S. global intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities are far better than Russia’s. These could be used to direct nonnuclear strikes with global reach and pinpoint accuracy against Russia’s retaliatory (“second strike”) nuclear forces. The U.S. also has more survivable, accurate and reliable offensive nuclear forces that could further decimate Russia’s strategic deterrent on the ground. Whatever Russian missiles survive such disarming strikes would be picked off by U.S. missile defense systems, or so the Russians believe.
Western hysteria about Mr. Putin’s willingness to use nuclear weapons has been compounded by the suspicion that he has a screw loose. Yet there has been no authoritative diagnosis that Mr. Putin’s psychiatric state would cause him to use nuclear weapons despite the danger of Russia’s annihilation in retaliation. When U.S. intelligence chiefs testify that Mr. Putin is mad, they mean angry, not insane. There is also an impression in the West that Mr. Putin has complete control over the release of nuclear weapons. He doesn’t. While his approval to launch is required, he has no way to act over the opposition of his top generals.
This isn’t to say that U.S. policy makers and intelligence chiefs should ignore the possibility that any direct hostilities between the U.S. and Russia could increase the risk of nuclear war. Rather, it is to say that Russia should be at least as fearful as America is. The more the U.S. falls for Mr. Putin’s nuclear messaging, and the more we signal that the U.S. dreads nuclear war more than Russia does, the less restrained Mr. Putin will be in Ukraine, and the more Ukrainian lives will be lost.
Mr. Gompert served as acting director of national intelligence, 2009-10.
-
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/03/deter-russias-use-chemical-weapons-ukraine/363597/
-
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/27/opinion/nuclear-weapons-ukraine.html?unlocked_article_code=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACEIPuonUktbfqYhkS1UZBCbSRdkhrxqAwv7Sy7gxj2W7MyWcUTFE1KEIAJKJ-kHAI6p_Yt95lxKqeOh8Cp59Dvpj0r0YeEV3VwijppbDycUPLixlpNz2VGhthNeQAug2tG-xNTH8eO4lm-Xm4ELfajW-S7WfhSN6XHttqZJkdlyg3XYalOySQqMuhI4Ijbp2DYt6RDwAeCCLo_Ltbh1_M9-MZR3YgRIkD6AbAXqA2I7BtM9TNVlaGlnET3hg4Gsj6No6ONkfPqf3KxBIa9MMd4h9hw-ECAiLs4MjmATL&referringSource=articleShare
-
We are on the razor’s edge.
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/27/opinion/nuclear-weapons-ukraine.html?unlocked_article_code=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACEIPuonUktbfqYhkS1UZBCbSRdkhrxqAwv7Sy7gxj2W7MyWcUTFE1KEIAJKJ-kHAI6p_Yt95lxKqeOh8Cp59Dvpj0r0YeEV3VwijppbDycUPLixlpNz2VGhthNeQAug2tG-xNTH8eO4lm-Xm4ELfajW-S7WfhSN6XHttqZJkdlyg3XYalOySQqMuhI4Ijbp2DYt6RDwAeCCLo_Ltbh1_M9-MZR3YgRIkD6AbAXqA2I7BtM9TNVlaGlnET3hg4Gsj6No6ONkfPqf3KxBIa9MMd4h9hw-ECAiLs4MjmATL&referringSource=articleShare
-
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2022-03-28/natos-european-nuclear-deterrent-b61-bomb?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=7faacaff-ff5c-4bc0-99c8-120025a04524
-
‘No Offensive Biologic Weapons’ in Ukrainian Biolabs: Pentagon
By Katabella Roberts April 4, 2022 Updated: April 4, 2022biggersmaller Print
There are “no offensive biologic weapons” in the Ukrainian laboratories that the United States has been funding, a Pentagon official told Congress on April 1.
Deborah Rosenbaum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs, told the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations on April 1 that there are “unequivocally … no offensive biologic weapons in the Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved with.”
The Pentagon funds labs in Ukraine through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a support agency within the Department of Defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. and Ukrainian officials both say the labs seek to prevent bioweapons and pathogens.
According to a Pentagon fact sheet released in March (pdf), since 2005, the United States has “invested approximately $200 million in Ukraine … supporting 46 Ukrainian laboratories, health facilities, and diagnostic sites.”
The Biological Threat Reduction Program has “improved Ukraine’s biological safety, security, and surveillance for both human and animal health,” according to the fact sheet.
However, Russia has, in recent months, accused the U.S.-funded laboratories in Ukraine of developing biological warfare weapons. Such allegations were being aired on Russian state-run media even before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.
The Russian Ministry of Defense issued a March 6 statement on Telegram accusing Ukraine of having destroyed disease-causing pathogens being studied at a lab in Ukraine that the ministry said is funded by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Russia’s allegations regarding the biological laboratories appeared to be repeated by the Chinese regime on March 7.
The World Health Organization stated in March that it advised the Ministry of Health in Ukraine to destroy “high-threat pathogens to prevent any potential spills.”
But analysts believe that the narrative being pushed by the Kremlin is part of its plan to create a false-flag operation in an attempt to justify using chemical weapons operations in Ukraine itself.
Rosenbaum told officials on April 1 that “the department remains very concerned about the ability to get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S. public, as well as certainly our allies and the rest of the world.”
“So one of the things that the department has been doing—and this is particularly related to the public health laboratories in Ukraine that is being tragically used by the Russians as a potential for a false flag operation—from the White House on down to the Defense Department, as well as Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we have to be able to communicate accurate information out about this and the work that has been underway,” she said.
Robert Pope, director of the DTRA’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, told the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in February that the labs might contain Soviet-era bioweapons and warned that the conflict in Ukraine could accidentally lead to the release of dangerous disease-causing pathogens.
“I think the Russians know enough about the kinds of pathogens that are stored in biological research laboratories that I don’t think they would deliberately target a laboratory,” Pope said. “But what I do have concerns about is that they would … be accidentally damaged during this Russian invasion.”
Rosenbaum made her comments shortly after White House press secretary Jen Psaki cautioned officials to be on the lookout “for Russia to possibly use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine or to create a false flag operation using them.”
The White House’s concerns also have been repeated by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the UK’s Ministry of Defense, which said last month that it had “seen no evidence to support” the accusations made by Russia.
-
So, just "defensive biologic weapons' then?
:roll:
‘No Offensive Biologic Weapons’ in Ukrainian Biolabs: Pentagon
By Katabella Roberts April 4, 2022 Updated: April 4, 2022biggersmaller Print
There are “no offensive biologic weapons” in the Ukrainian laboratories that the United States has been funding, a Pentagon official told Congress on April 1.
Deborah Rosenbaum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs, told the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations on April 1 that there are “unequivocally … no offensive biologic weapons in the Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved with.”
The Pentagon funds labs in Ukraine through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a support agency within the Department of Defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. and Ukrainian officials both say the labs seek to prevent bioweapons and pathogens.
According to a Pentagon fact sheet released in March (pdf), since 2005, the United States has “invested approximately $200 million in Ukraine … supporting 46 Ukrainian laboratories, health facilities, and diagnostic sites.”
The Biological Threat Reduction Program has “improved Ukraine’s biological safety, security, and surveillance for both human and animal health,” according to the fact sheet.
However, Russia has, in recent months, accused the U.S.-funded laboratories in Ukraine of developing biological warfare weapons. Such allegations were being aired on Russian state-run media even before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.
The Russian Ministry of Defense issued a March 6 statement on Telegram accusing Ukraine of having destroyed disease-causing pathogens being studied at a lab in Ukraine that the ministry said is funded by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Russia’s allegations regarding the biological laboratories appeared to be repeated by the Chinese regime on March 7.
The World Health Organization stated in March that it advised the Ministry of Health in Ukraine to destroy “high-threat pathogens to prevent any potential spills.”
But analysts believe that the narrative being pushed by the Kremlin is part of its plan to create a false-flag operation in an attempt to justify using chemical weapons operations in Ukraine itself.
Rosenbaum told officials on April 1 that “the department remains very concerned about the ability to get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S. public, as well as certainly our allies and the rest of the world.”
“So one of the things that the department has been doing—and this is particularly related to the public health laboratories in Ukraine that is being tragically used by the Russians as a potential for a false flag operation—from the White House on down to the Defense Department, as well as Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we have to be able to communicate accurate information out about this and the work that has been underway,” she said.
Robert Pope, director of the DTRA’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, told the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in February that the labs might contain Soviet-era bioweapons and warned that the conflict in Ukraine could accidentally lead to the release of dangerous disease-causing pathogens.
“I think the Russians know enough about the kinds of pathogens that are stored in biological research laboratories that I don’t think they would deliberately target a laboratory,” Pope said. “But what I do have concerns about is that they would … be accidentally damaged during this Russian invasion.”
Rosenbaum made her comments shortly after White House press secretary Jen Psaki cautioned officials to be on the lookout “for Russia to possibly use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine or to create a false flag operation using them.”
The White House’s concerns also have been repeated by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the UK’s Ministry of Defense, which said last month that it had “seen no evidence to support” the accusations made by Russia.
-
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg)
So, just "defensive biologic weapons' then?
:roll:
‘No Offensive Biologic Weapons’ in Ukrainian Biolabs: Pentagon
By Katabella Roberts April 4, 2022 Updated: April 4, 2022biggersmaller Print
There are “no offensive biologic weapons” in the Ukrainian laboratories that the United States has been funding, a Pentagon official told Congress on April 1.
Deborah Rosenbaum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs, told the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations on April 1 that there are “unequivocally … no offensive biologic weapons in the Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved with.”
The Pentagon funds labs in Ukraine through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a support agency within the Department of Defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. and Ukrainian officials both say the labs seek to prevent bioweapons and pathogens.
According to a Pentagon fact sheet released in March (pdf), since 2005, the United States has “invested approximately $200 million in Ukraine … supporting 46 Ukrainian laboratories, health facilities, and diagnostic sites.”
The Biological Threat Reduction Program has “improved Ukraine’s biological safety, security, and surveillance for both human and animal health,” according to the fact sheet.
However, Russia has, in recent months, accused the U.S.-funded laboratories in Ukraine of developing biological warfare weapons. Such allegations were being aired on Russian state-run media even before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.
The Russian Ministry of Defense issued a March 6 statement on Telegram accusing Ukraine of having destroyed disease-causing pathogens being studied at a lab in Ukraine that the ministry said is funded by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Russia’s allegations regarding the biological laboratories appeared to be repeated by the Chinese regime on March 7.
The World Health Organization stated in March that it advised the Ministry of Health in Ukraine to destroy “high-threat pathogens to prevent any potential spills.”
But analysts believe that the narrative being pushed by the Kremlin is part of its plan to create a false-flag operation in an attempt to justify using chemical weapons operations in Ukraine itself.
Rosenbaum told officials on April 1 that “the department remains very concerned about the ability to get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S. public, as well as certainly our allies and the rest of the world.”
“So one of the things that the department has been doing—and this is particularly related to the public health laboratories in Ukraine that is being tragically used by the Russians as a potential for a false flag operation—from the White House on down to the Defense Department, as well as Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we have to be able to communicate accurate information out about this and the work that has been underway,” she said.
Robert Pope, director of the DTRA’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, told the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in February that the labs might contain Soviet-era bioweapons and warned that the conflict in Ukraine could accidentally lead to the release of dangerous disease-causing pathogens.
“I think the Russians know enough about the kinds of pathogens that are stored in biological research laboratories that I don’t think they would deliberately target a laboratory,” Pope said. “But what I do have concerns about is that they would … be accidentally damaged during this Russian invasion.”
Rosenbaum made her comments shortly after White House press secretary Jen Psaki cautioned officials to be on the lookout “for Russia to possibly use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine or to create a false flag operation using them.”
The White House’s concerns also have been repeated by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the UK’s Ministry of Defense, which said last month that it had “seen no evidence to support” the accusations made by Russia.
-
MILITARY
Pentagon axing its only nuclear gravity bomb
Retirement motivated by review of strategic weapons policy
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Pentagon will eliminate the sole nuclear gravity bomb in the U.S. strategic weapons arsenal capable of blasting deeply buried underground structures as part of the Biden administration’s review of strategic weapons policy, according to U.S. officials.
The retirement of the B83 bomb, a megaton-class weapon delivered by B-2 stealth bombers, was disclosed to Congress last month as part of the Biden administration’s classified nuclear posture review, a major reassessment of strategic forces and their employment. The bomb is “costly to maintain and of increasingly limited value,” a senior defense official told The Washington Times.
The decision to cancel the weapon carries what defense officials say is the increasing challenge for U.S. planners to deter nuclear adversaries such as China, North Korea and Russia. All three states are expanding their nuclear forces with the addition of new strategic weapons and warheads.
“The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) considered the need to hold at risk adversary hard and deeply buried targets,” the defense official said. “In reviewing the diminishing role of the B83-1
in accomplishing this task, the NPR concluded that this weapon should be retired.”
Supporters of the B83 say it is still needed for deterring China, which has built a vast network of underground tunnels estimated to be 3,000 milessnaking throughout the country. The tunnel system, dubbed the “Underground Great Wall,” is used for producing and storing China’s growing nuclear arsenal.
In addition to the B83, the administration’s proposed budget cancels plans for a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, known as SLCM-N. Defense sources said both the retirement of the B83 and canceling the SLCM-N were opposed by U.S. Strategic Commander Adm. Charles Richard.
Adm. Richard, the senior military leader in charge of nuclear forces, listed the B83 bomb as one of several weapons needed to be kept in the arsenal to maintain nuclear deterrence until a replacement weapon is identified.
Rep. Doug Lamborn, the top Republican on the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, said the Pentagon decision to scrap the bomb was as a “needless, self-inflicted wound” for U.S. strategic deterrence.
“This is a bad decision because it takes away one option we have in our tool kit that keeps potential adversaries guessing,” Mr. Lamborn said in an interview.
The B83 is the sole weapon capable of addressing certain threats and targets “that can’t be dealt with any other way,” the Colorado Republican added.
Mr. Lamborn said Republicans will seek to reverse the B83 retirement by inserting language in this year’s national defense authorization bill that requires the military to maintain the bomb, noting there is bipartisan support for the initiative.
Deterring nuclear threats is increasingly difficult.
“We keep reducing the number and type of our nuclear weapons, while China and Russia are increasing and modernizing the number and type of their weapons,” Mr. Lamborn said. “At the end of the day we need a stronger nuclear defense posture, and we need to reject this particular NPR.”
A congressional defense aide said the administration “does not have a plan to replace” the B83. Instead, a study will be conducted in the future to determine how best to get at deeply buried targets, the main mission of the B83, the aide said.
“They have no plan to replace it with either a nuclear or conventional weapon and readily admit that they are assuming risk in this space,” the aide said.
Compounding the problem, Chinese, North Korean, Russian and potentially Iranian military forces are moving more of their nuclear forces and warheads into hardened underground structures that the B83 is designed to counter.
Retiring the bomb will not save large amounts of money. The cost of refurbishing and extending the life of the weapon is estimated to be between $100 million and $200 million. That amount is relatively small considering the administration is engaged in a major modernization of U.S. nuclear forces costing about $1.2 trillion over the next 30 years.
Last year’s budget sought $50 million for B83 life extension.
Initially, the Pentagon considered replacing the B83 with another nuclear gravity bomb known as the B61-12. That bomb has some of the ground-penetrating capabilities of the B83. But the B61-12 is unable to match its explosive power.
The B83 has an estimated yield of 1.2 megatons, or the equivalent of 1.2 million tons of TNT.
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Tod D. Wolters told a House hearing last week he agreed with Adm. Richard on the need to keep both the B83 and the SLCM-N, since the “multiple options exacerbate the challenge for potential enemies against us.” Gen. Wolters said he was not consulted by the Pentagon planners on the decision to eliminate the B83, despite being in charge of NATO’s nuclear forces deterring Russian nuclear threats.
The nuclear posture review was sent to Congress late last month in classifi ed form. A senior defense official told reporters that the still-secret review includes a direction from policymakers to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in American defense strategy.
The review “underscores our commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and reestablishing our leadership in arms control,” a Pentagon fact sheet states. “We will continue to emphasize strategic stability, seek to avoid costly arms races, and facilitate risk reduction and arms control arrangements where possible.”
But the shift come as a time when U.S. analysts believe China is engaged in what Adm. Richard, the Stratcom commander, has called “strategic breakout” with a major expansion of its nuclear forces, which have long been overshadowed by those held by the U.S. and Russia. In addition to its large underground nuclear complex, Beijing recently began building three large missile fields in western China for the new, 10-warhead DF-41 long-range missile, in addition to adding scores of new road- and rail-mobile ICBMs to its arsenal.
The DF-41s will boost China’s strategic warhead arsenal from about 200 to as many as 1,500 warheads.
North Korea has built several longrange missiles capable of hitting the U.S. and is estimated to have nuclear warheads small enough to be carried by the missiles.
Russia is building several new strategic weapons, including a nuclearpowered cruise missile, nuclear-tipped hypersonic glide vehicles and a megaton- warhead underwater drone. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly hinted at being ready to use the Kremlin’s nuclear might if NATO allies try to intervene in the fighting in Ukraine. In 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies reported that Russia was building dozens of deep underground nuclear facilities. The construction suggested Moscow is preparing for a future nuclear conflict. Russia also built a large underground strategic command post at Kosvinsky Mountain, located in the Ural Mountains about 850 miles east of Moscow. Underground Russian leadership compounds have been identified at Voronovo, about 46 miles south of Moscow and Sharapova, 34 miles from the capital.
The administration has linked both the nuclear posture review and a missile defense review to a new national defense strategy. However, sources acknowledge that the defense strategy has had to be revised in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
A fact sheet on the national defense strategy identifies “integrated deterrence” as the Pentagon’s main strategy, combining military power with other elements of national power and networks of alliances to protect the homeland. But the still-vague integrated deterrence failed to prevent the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
“They’ve put their pens down on the national security strategy given that integrated deterrence didn’t work in Ukraine,” a defense source said.
Rep. Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Republican and member of the Armed Services Committee, said the Pentagon’s plan for integrated deterrence “failed in Ukraine,” even though the NATO alliance has been unified by the attack on Kyiv.
“The fact remains … that we attempted to deter an invasion of Ukraine, largely using non-military instruments of national power, and that attempt failed,” he said.
Mr. Putin may not have been deterred by any means, Mr. Gallagher acknowledged, “but integrated deterrence as conceptualized by the Pentagon and as implemented in the specific case of Ukraine, as a matter of fact, failed.”
Patty-Jane Geller, a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, said the administration’s new nuclear policies have weakened deterrence by reverting to policies of the Obama administration.
“Mr. Biden’s decision to announce the reduced role of U.S. nuclear weapons as war wages along NATO’s borders could also cause allies to question the administration’s assurance that it will live up to its extended deterrence commitments,” she stated in a Washington Times oped. “In the face of some of the greatest threats to national security, the U.S. must show strength.
-
We still dominate in transgender awareness training and surgery!
MILITARY
Pentagon axing its only nuclear gravity bomb
Retirement motivated by review of strategic weapons policy
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
The Pentagon will eliminate the sole nuclear gravity bomb in the U.S. strategic weapons arsenal capable of blasting deeply buried underground structures as part of the Biden administration’s review of strategic weapons policy, according to U.S. officials.
The retirement of the B83 bomb, a megaton-class weapon delivered by B-2 stealth bombers, was disclosed to Congress last month as part of the Biden administration’s classified nuclear posture review, a major reassessment of strategic forces and their employment. The bomb is “costly to maintain and of increasingly limited value,” a senior defense official told The Washington Times.
The decision to cancel the weapon carries what defense officials say is the increasing challenge for U.S. planners to deter nuclear adversaries such as China, North Korea and Russia. All three states are expanding their nuclear forces with the addition of new strategic weapons and warheads.
“The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) considered the need to hold at risk adversary hard and deeply buried targets,” the defense official said. “In reviewing the diminishing role of the B83-1
in accomplishing this task, the NPR concluded that this weapon should be retired.”
Supporters of the B83 say it is still needed for deterring China, which has built a vast network of underground tunnels estimated to be 3,000 milessnaking throughout the country. The tunnel system, dubbed the “Underground Great Wall,” is used for producing and storing China’s growing nuclear arsenal.
In addition to the B83, the administration’s proposed budget cancels plans for a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile, known as SLCM-N. Defense sources said both the retirement of the B83 and canceling the SLCM-N were opposed by U.S. Strategic Commander Adm. Charles Richard.
Adm. Richard, the senior military leader in charge of nuclear forces, listed the B83 bomb as one of several weapons needed to be kept in the arsenal to maintain nuclear deterrence until a replacement weapon is identified.
Rep. Doug Lamborn, the top Republican on the House Armed Services strategic forces subcommittee, said the Pentagon decision to scrap the bomb was as a “needless, self-inflicted wound” for U.S. strategic deterrence.
“This is a bad decision because it takes away one option we have in our tool kit that keeps potential adversaries guessing,” Mr. Lamborn said in an interview.
The B83 is the sole weapon capable of addressing certain threats and targets “that can’t be dealt with any other way,” the Colorado Republican added.
Mr. Lamborn said Republicans will seek to reverse the B83 retirement by inserting language in this year’s national defense authorization bill that requires the military to maintain the bomb, noting there is bipartisan support for the initiative.
Deterring nuclear threats is increasingly difficult.
“We keep reducing the number and type of our nuclear weapons, while China and Russia are increasing and modernizing the number and type of their weapons,” Mr. Lamborn said. “At the end of the day we need a stronger nuclear defense posture, and we need to reject this particular NPR.”
A congressional defense aide said the administration “does not have a plan to replace” the B83. Instead, a study will be conducted in the future to determine how best to get at deeply buried targets, the main mission of the B83, the aide said.
“They have no plan to replace it with either a nuclear or conventional weapon and readily admit that they are assuming risk in this space,” the aide said.
Compounding the problem, Chinese, North Korean, Russian and potentially Iranian military forces are moving more of their nuclear forces and warheads into hardened underground structures that the B83 is designed to counter.
Retiring the bomb will not save large amounts of money. The cost of refurbishing and extending the life of the weapon is estimated to be between $100 million and $200 million. That amount is relatively small considering the administration is engaged in a major modernization of U.S. nuclear forces costing about $1.2 trillion over the next 30 years.
Last year’s budget sought $50 million for B83 life extension.
Initially, the Pentagon considered replacing the B83 with another nuclear gravity bomb known as the B61-12. That bomb has some of the ground-penetrating capabilities of the B83. But the B61-12 is unable to match its explosive power.
The B83 has an estimated yield of 1.2 megatons, or the equivalent of 1.2 million tons of TNT.
NATO Supreme Allied Commander Gen. Tod D. Wolters told a House hearing last week he agreed with Adm. Richard on the need to keep both the B83 and the SLCM-N, since the “multiple options exacerbate the challenge for potential enemies against us.” Gen. Wolters said he was not consulted by the Pentagon planners on the decision to eliminate the B83, despite being in charge of NATO’s nuclear forces deterring Russian nuclear threats.
The nuclear posture review was sent to Congress late last month in classifi ed form. A senior defense official told reporters that the still-secret review includes a direction from policymakers to diminish the role of nuclear weapons in American defense strategy.
The review “underscores our commitment to reducing the role of nuclear weapons and reestablishing our leadership in arms control,” a Pentagon fact sheet states. “We will continue to emphasize strategic stability, seek to avoid costly arms races, and facilitate risk reduction and arms control arrangements where possible.”
But the shift come as a time when U.S. analysts believe China is engaged in what Adm. Richard, the Stratcom commander, has called “strategic breakout” with a major expansion of its nuclear forces, which have long been overshadowed by those held by the U.S. and Russia. In addition to its large underground nuclear complex, Beijing recently began building three large missile fields in western China for the new, 10-warhead DF-41 long-range missile, in addition to adding scores of new road- and rail-mobile ICBMs to its arsenal.
The DF-41s will boost China’s strategic warhead arsenal from about 200 to as many as 1,500 warheads.
North Korea has built several longrange missiles capable of hitting the U.S. and is estimated to have nuclear warheads small enough to be carried by the missiles.
Russia is building several new strategic weapons, including a nuclearpowered cruise missile, nuclear-tipped hypersonic glide vehicles and a megaton- warhead underwater drone. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly hinted at being ready to use the Kremlin’s nuclear might if NATO allies try to intervene in the fighting in Ukraine. In 2016, U.S. intelligence agencies reported that Russia was building dozens of deep underground nuclear facilities. The construction suggested Moscow is preparing for a future nuclear conflict. Russia also built a large underground strategic command post at Kosvinsky Mountain, located in the Ural Mountains about 850 miles east of Moscow. Underground Russian leadership compounds have been identified at Voronovo, about 46 miles south of Moscow and Sharapova, 34 miles from the capital.
The administration has linked both the nuclear posture review and a missile defense review to a new national defense strategy. However, sources acknowledge that the defense strategy has had to be revised in the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
A fact sheet on the national defense strategy identifies “integrated deterrence” as the Pentagon’s main strategy, combining military power with other elements of national power and networks of alliances to protect the homeland. But the still-vague integrated deterrence failed to prevent the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
“They’ve put their pens down on the national security strategy given that integrated deterrence didn’t work in Ukraine,” a defense source said.
Rep. Mike Gallagher, Wisconsin Republican and member of the Armed Services Committee, said the Pentagon’s plan for integrated deterrence “failed in Ukraine,” even though the NATO alliance has been unified by the attack on Kyiv.
“The fact remains … that we attempted to deter an invasion of Ukraine, largely using non-military instruments of national power, and that attempt failed,” he said.
Mr. Putin may not have been deterred by any means, Mr. Gallagher acknowledged, “but integrated deterrence as conceptualized by the Pentagon and as implemented in the specific case of Ukraine, as a matter of fact, failed.”
Patty-Jane Geller, a policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, said the administration’s new nuclear policies have weakened deterrence by reverting to policies of the Obama administration.
“Mr. Biden’s decision to announce the reduced role of U.S. nuclear weapons as war wages along NATO’s borders could also cause allies to question the administration’s assurance that it will live up to its extended deterrence commitments,” she stated in a Washington Times oped. “In the face of some of the greatest threats to national security, the U.S. must show strength.
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-developing-nuclear-arsenal-for-global-domination-expert_4411954.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-04-21&utm_medium=email&est=Bco10LM0g6Gv3yQIAOa8bpfiGOb6FzbTq3lB%2BV9GMkzNmwtwvyCABGP2%2B0XlKwYe8d0k
-
Outdated Nuclear Treaties Heighten the Risk of Nuclear War
U.S. policy makers have lost sight of the crucial link between arms control and deterrence.
By Franklin C. Miller
April 21, 2022 6:19 pm ET
U.S. nuclear deterrence policy and U.S. nuclear arms-control policy have become dangerously disconnected.
Longstanding deterrence policy requires that the U.S. have sufficient capacity to target what potential enemy leaders value most. Arms control is supposed to augment deterrence by limiting, and if possible reducing, the threats while allowing the U.S. to deploy a force that deters an attack on America or our allies. The policies were tightly linked throughout the closing decades of the Cold War, providing the U.S. and its allies with a credible deterrent and producing the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties, known as Start 1 and Start 2, which were signed in 1991 and 1993 respectively and reduced the levels of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons.
Today the U.S. is bound by the “New Start Treaty,” an accord signed in 2010, a time when Russia was seen as a competitor rather than a threat, and China was hardly a factor. The world is different now: darker, more dangerous and getting worse.
The Biden administration’s 2021 Interim National Security Strategic Guidance notes starkly that “both Beijing and Moscow have invested heavily in efforts meant to check U.S. strengths and prevent us from defending our interests and allies around the world” and describes China as “increasingly assertive” and Russia as “destabilizing.” That was before the invasion of Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling.
New Start limits the U.S. and Russia to 1,550 accountable traditional strategic nuclear weapons each. Since the treaty’s signing Russia has deployed between 2,000 and 2,500 modern shorter-range nuclear systems—the weapons Mr. Putin would use for a nuclear escalation in Ukraine. New Start doesn’t constrain these, nor does it cover “nontraditional” strategic nuclear weapons, such as the Poseidon transoceanic nuclear torpedo, which Russia also has.
Meantime, China’s nuclear arsenal has grown significantly, and is projected to grow much larger. In 2011 Beijing was estimated to have about 20 single-warhead intercontinental ballistic missiles, another 100 or so shorter-range nuclear missiles, and no operational ballistic-missile submarines. Today Beijing has nearly 100 ICBMs, many carrying multiple warheads and some that are road-mobile, and is building silos for several hundred more. The Chinese navy has six ballistic-missile subs, and the Chinese air force is equipping long-range bombers with an innovative air-to-surface ballistic missile. A large and growing force of nuclear-capable short- and medium-range missiles supports China’s strategic nuclear forces.
Simple logic and arithmetic make clear that the 1,550 accountable warhead cap agreed on in 2010 is inadequate to deal with the growth in Russia’s strategic and nonstrategic nuclear forces, let alone the vast increase in China’s nuclear arsenal. Since effective deterrence requires targeting what potential enemy leaders value, we must be able to threaten, separately and in combination, both Russia’s and China’s key assets—including their leaders’ ability to command and control the state, their military forces, and the industrial potential to sustain war. New Start constrains U.S. forces below the levels needed in the near future to accomplish this. Arms control, rather than augmenting our ability to deter, is undercutting it.
Fortunately, with the U.S. strategic-forces modernization finally about to begin fielding new forces, Washington is in a position to reset the table, as it was in the 1980s when the Reagan administration began its nuclear-triad modernization effort.
To do so, however, the Biden administration needs to recognize some new realities. The numerical cap of New Start won’t serve U.S. national-security interests in a world with two nuclear peer states as potential enemies—a first in the nuclear age. Because of the growth of Russian shorter-range nuclear forces in the past 10 years, New Start no longer serves U.S. security interests even in a bilateral U.S.-Russian context.
The administration should provide a year’s notice of U.S. intent to exit the treaty to preserve American national interests. That in turn presents two alternatives:
If the U.S.-Russian arms-control dialogue survives Mr. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine—a big if—and assuming Mr. Putin doesn’t detonate a nuclear weapon, the administration could propose a new U.S.-Russian treaty with a ceiling of 3,000 to 3,500 total nuclear weapons for each side. This would limit the threats to our allies and homeland and also permit a U.S. strategic nuclear capability that would deter both Russia and China. (Including China in a trilateral nuclear arms-control accord is unrealistic. China has rejected participation in such talks as well as the transparency and verification vital to a successful treaty.)
If a new arms-control dialogue is politically unacceptable, the Biden administration should exit New Start after a year and begin building toward the 3,000 to 3,500 force levels to maintain a credible deterrent against Moscow and Beijing. Many members of the Western arms-control community would complain of a “new arms race.”
But as former Defense Secretary Ash Carter has observed, that race is already under way; the U.S. simply isn’t running. Russia and China have been increasing their new nuclear systems for a decade while the first products of the U.S. triad-modernization program won’t be deployed until the mid-2020s. Critics will claim raising the 1,550 limit will send the wrong signal—but continuing to turn a blind eye to the nontraditional and shorter-range Russian systems sends a much worse signal.
Finally, the critics will assert that these steps will hurt arms control. But arms control isn’t an end in itself; it is a means to enhance stability. The major reductions in U.S. and Russian strategic arms in 1989-1992 and again in 2002 weren’t designed to create arms reductions for reductions’ sake but were justified by what the U.S. believed we needed to deter the threats of those times. Times and threats have changed, and our first responsibility must be to ensure we can deter both today’s threats and those of tomorrow.
Mr. Miller served for three decades as a senior nuclear policy and arms control official in the Pentagon and on the National Security Council staff.
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-would-support-russia-even-if-it-used-tactical-nuclear-weapons-in-ukraine-war-former-defense-official_4421153.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-04-23&utm_medium=email&est=8KauzQOtuX9AHptLa6BJupZ4bEj9urylE8jOUlwfQi1dfR32y%2BK6kucjIONjCRH%2BQHmA
-
https://metro.co.uk/2022/04/22/russias-electromagnetic-attack-on-starlink-failed-spectacularly-16516830/?fbclid=IwAR2Xr_uqRSTYvmDYzDbdLlJKVhEuQl6y71zNQQA1Bci9dXXiKEvWdymoyPw
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18506/russia-china-nuclear-escalation
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18531/eu-biden-iran-mullahs
-
India's expanding capabilities. India’s Strategic Forces Command announced that it successfully tested a nuclear-capable medium-range ballistic missile on Monday. The Agni-IV ballistic missile has multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, meaning one missile can carry multiple warheads, each capable of hitting a different target. It can strike up to 4,000 kilometers (2,500 miles) away, enabling it to reach targets in China and Pakistan.
-
Thinking About the Unthinkable in Ukraine
What Happens if Putin Goes Nuclear?
By Richard K. Betts
July 4, 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/2022-07-04/thinking-about-unthinkable-ukraine
As the war in Ukraine rages on, Russian President Vladimir Putin has engaged in nuclear saber rattling. “Whoever tries to impede us, let alone create threats for our country and its people, must know that the Russian response will be immediate and lead to the consequences you have never seen in history,” Putin declared in February in the first of many statements warning of a potential nuclear strike. For the most part, Western observers have dismissed this talk as idle chest-thumping. After all, whichever side fired nuclear weapons first would be taking a very risky gamble: betting that its opponent would not retaliate in an equal or more damaging way. That is why the odds are very low that sane leaders would actually start a process of trading blows that could end in the destruction of their own countries. When it comes to nuclear weapons, however, very low odds are not good enough.
Planning for the potential that Russia would use nuclear weapons is imperative; the danger would be greatest if the war were to turn decisively in Ukraine’s favor. That is the only situation in which the Russians’ incentive to take that awesome risk would be plausible, in an attempt to prevent defeat by shocking Ukraine and its NATO supporters into standing down. The Russians might do this by setting off one or a few tactical nuclear weapons against Ukrainian forces or by triggering a symbolic explosion over an empty area.
There are three general options within which U.S. policymakers would find a variation to respond to a Russian nuclear attack against Ukraine. The United States could opt to rhetorically decry a nuclear detonation but do nothing militarily. It could unleash nuclear weapons of its own. Or it could refrain from a nuclear counterattack but enter the war directly with large-scale conventional airstrikes and the mobilization of ground forces. All those alternatives are bad because no low-risk options exist for coping with the end of the nuclear taboo. A conventional war response is the least bad of the three because it avoids the higher risks of either the weaker or the stronger options.
COMPETITION IN RISK
For the past three decades, U.S. policymakers have paid scant attention to the potential dynamics of nuclear escalation. During the Cold War, in contrast, the question was at the center of strategic debate. Back then, it was NATO that relied in principle on the option of deliberate escalation—beginning with the limited use of tactical nuclear weapons—as a way to halt a Soviet invasion. This strategy was controversial, but it was adopted because the West believed its conventional forces to be inferior to the Warsaw Pact’s. Today, with the balance of forces reversed since the Cold War, the current Russian doctrine of “escalate to deescalate” mimics NATO’s Cold War “flexible response” concept.
NATO promoted the policy of flexible response rhetorically, but the idea was always shaky strategically. The actual contingency plans it generated never commanded consensus simply because initiating the use of nuclear weapons risked tit-for-tat exchanges that could culminate in an apocalyptic unlimited war. As J. Michael Legge, a former participant in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group, noted in a 1983 study for the RAND Corporation, the group could not reach agreement on specific follow-on options beyond an initial symbolic “demonstration shot” for psychological effect, for fear that Moscow could always match them or up the ante. Today, it is hoped that this old dilemma will deter Moscow from unleashing the nuclear genie in the first place.
But NATO policymakers should not bank on Moscow’s restraint. Putin has more at stake in the war than Ukraine’s nuclear-armed supporters outside the country do, and he could bet that in a pinch, Washington would be less willing to play Russian roulette than he is. He could play the madman and apply nuclear shock as an acceptable risk for ending the war on Russian terms.
LEVELS OF ESCALATION
As NATO confronts the possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons, the first question it needs to answer is whether that eventuality should constitute a real redline for the West. In other words, would a Russian nuclear attack trigger NATO’s shift from merely supplying Ukraine to engaging directly in combat itself? A Russian rationale for tactical nuclear weapons use would be as much to frighten NATO away from crossing that line as to coerce Ukraine into surrender. If a few Russian nuclear weapons do not provoke the United States into direct combat, Moscow will have a green light to use even more such weapons and crush Ukraine quickly.
If the challenge that is now only hypothetical actually arrives, entering a nuclearized war could easily strike Americans as an experiment they do not want to run. For that reason, there is a very real possibility that policymakers would wind up with the weakest option: rant about the unthinkable barbarity of the Russian action and implement whatever unused economic sanctions are still available but do nothing militarily. This would signal that Moscow has complete freedom of action militarily, including the further use of nuclear weapons to wipe out Ukrainian defenses, essentially conceding a Russian victory. As dishonorable as submission sounds to hawks in advance, if the time actually comes, it will have the strong appeal to Americans, because it would avoid the ultimate risk of national suicide.
A nuclearized war could easily strike Americans as an experiment they do not want to run.
That immediate appeal has to be balanced by the longer-term risks that would balloon from setting the epochal precedent that initiating a nuclear attack pays off. If the West is not to back away—or, more important, if it wants to deter Putin from the nuclear gambit in the first place—governments need to indicate as credibly as possible that Russian nuclear use would provoke NATO, not cow it.
If NATO decides it would strike back on Ukraine’s behalf, then more questions arise: whether to also fire nuclear weapons and, if so, how. The most prevalent notion is an eye-for-an-eye nuclear counterattack destroying Russian targets comparable to the ones the original Russian attack had hit. This is the option that occurs intuitively, but it is unattractive because it invites slow-motion exchanges in which neither side gives up and both ultimately end up devastated.
Alternatively, Washington could respond with nuclear strikes on a larger scale than the Russian first use, threatening disproportionate losses to Moscow if it tries further limited nuclear attacks. There are several problems with this heftier option. For one, if used against Russian forces inside Ukraine, U.S. nuclear weapons would inflict collateral damage on its own clients. This is not a new problem. During the Cold War, strategists critical of relying on tactical nuclear weapons to counter invading Soviet forces quipped, “In Germany, the towns are only two kilotons apart.” Using nuclear weapons instead against targets inside Russia would intensify the danger of triggering unlimited war.
A second problem with back-and-forth tactical nuclear shots is that Russia would be at an advantage because it possesses more tactical nuclear weapons than the United States does. That asymmetry would require U.S. policymakers to resort sooner to so-called strategic forces (intercontinental missiles or bombers) to keep the upper hand. That, in turn, would risk unleashing the all-out mutual destruction of the major powers’ homelands. Thus, both the tit-for-tat and the disproportionate retaliatory options pose dauntingly high risks.
A less dangerous option would be to respond to a nuclear attack by launching an air campaign with conventional munitions alone against Russian military targets and mobilizing ground forces for potential deployment into the battle in Ukraine. This would be coupled with two strong public declarations. First, to dampen views of this low-level option as weak, NATO policymakers would emphasize that modern precision technology makes tactical nuclear weapons unnecessary for effectively striking targets that used to be considered vulnerable only to undiscriminating weapons of mass destruction. That would frame Russia’s resort to nuclear strikes as further evidence not only of its barbarism but of its military backwardness. Direct entry into the war at the conventional level would not neutralize panic in the West. But it would mean that Russia would be faced with the prospect of combat against a NATO that was substantially superior in nonnuclear forces, backed by a nuclear retaliatory capability, and less likely to remain restrained if Russia turned its nuclear strikes against U.S. rather than Ukrainian forces. The second important message to emphasize would be that any subsequent Russian nuclear use would trigger American nuclear retaliation.
This conventional option is hardly attractive. Direct war between the major powers that starts at any level risks escalation to mass destruction. Such a strategy would appear weaker than retaliation in kind and would worsen the Russians’ desperation about losing rather than relieve it, thus leaving their original motive for escalation in place along with the possibility that they would double down and use even more nuclear weapons. That would make it imperative to couple the NATO military response with an offer of settlement terms that includes as many cosmetic concessions as possible to give Russia some pretense of peace with honor. The main virtue of the conventional option is simply that it would not be as risky as either the weaker do-nothing or the stronger nuclear options.
THE WEST'S DILEMMA
In the event of a Russian nuclear detonation, NATO will have two conflicting aims. On the one hand, the alliance will want to negate any strategic benefit Moscow could gain from the detonation; on the other, it will want to avoid further escalation. This dilemma underlines the obvious imperative of maximizing Moscow’s disincentives to go nuclear in the first place.
To that end, NATO should not only pose credible threats of retaliation but also cultivate support from third parties that Putin wants to keep from joining the Western opposition. So far, Moscow has been buoyed by the refusal of China, India, and other countries to fully join the economic sanctions campaign imposed by the West. These fence sitters, however, have a stake in maintaining the nuclear taboo. They might be persuaded to declare that their continued economic collaboration with Russia is contingent on it refraining from the use of nuclear weapons. As a declaration about a still hypothetical eventuality, the neutral countries could see this as a low-cost gesture, a way to keep the West off their backs by addressing a situation they don’t expect to occur.
Washington will always keep declared threats and strategy vague enough to provide flexibility and escape hatches. Still, any further nuclear saber rattling by Putin should prompt simple but forceful reminders from Washington of what Putin knows but might otherwise convince himself the West has forgotten: Russia is utterly vulnerable to nuclear retaliation, and as generations of thinkers and practitioners on both sides have reiterated, a nuclear war has no winner.
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-has-infiltrated-americas-virus-labs-to-feed-its-biowarfare-programs-lawrence-sellin_4581950.html
-
https://nypost.com/2022/07/09/covid-wont-be-the-last-epidemic-china-helps-spread/?fbclid=IwAR3UEg_uR-sbD7e1EferS7jbr0B4xXv5nFaazVTgbeY4dWeP6qBR45e9m30
-
China Advances Its Biowarfare Program Through Infiltration of US Virus Labs: Retired US Army Colonel
By Ella Kietlinska and Joshua Philipp July 15, 2022 Updated: July 15, 2022biggersmaller Print
ET
Chinese scientists, with military links, infiltrate American virology research institutions and feed the research results to the Chinese military to benefit China’s development of biological weapons, said retired U.S. Army Reserve colonel Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D.
In China, there is no difference between military and civilian research, and in 2016 the Chinese regime even mandated the fusion of both types of research even if they are carried out by different institutions, Sellin said in a recent interview on EpochTV’s “Crossroads” program.
Play Video
“China’s biological warfare program exists at three levels.”
“The first level is the secret military level and this is composed of military research centers and military hospitals.”
“The second layer, which is fused to the first layer, are China’s universities, their so-called civilian research centers like the Wuhan Institute of Virology, and also some of the biotech companies in China.”
The third level is comprised of international universities and research labs, he said.
The second level, civilian research, accesses this third level and then feeds the results from the collaboration on international programs between Chinese scientists residing abroad and local scientists, back into the first level—the military level, Sellin explained.
The collaboration on research between American institutions and Chinese institutions started in 1979 with the agreement signed by then-President Jimmy Carter and the Chinese regime leader Deng Xiaoping, which allowed Chinese scientists to come to the United States to study and work, Sellin said.
Many in the first wave of Chinese scientists who came to the United States to get trained were from the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the Chinese military, he said. Some of them stayed in the United States, even becoming permanent residents or citizens, he added.
“During this time, they maintain collaboration with scientists in mainland China, including scientists from the People’s Liberation Army, so I call it scientific chain migration. Those in the initial wave, who established themselves in laboratories in the United States began inviting other scientists from China, again, from the People’s Liberation Army and also other research centers in China, to the United States.”
“Over the last 30 years, they’ve created a critical mass of scientists who continue to work with scientists back in mainland China.”
Some research of certain scientists with the dual U.S.–China affiliation has been funded by The National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), headed by Dr. Anthony Fauci, said Sellin, who previously worked at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
This dual affiliation is often stated in their publications in scientific journals, he said.
For example, Shibo Jiang conducted a study with another Chinese scientist, which was directly funded by the Chinese government and a private Chinese biotech company, while Shibo Jiang was also funded by NIAID to conduct U.S. biodefense research, Sellin said in his newsletter.
In 2014, Shibo Jiang co-authored a scientific paper as an affiliate of both the Key Lab of Molecular Virology of the Shanghai Medical College and the Kimball Research Institute of the New York Blood Center.
“One of the hotbeds of China’s infiltration of U.S. universities is the University of Texas Medical Branch in Galveston, which also has a U.S. defense research center there and a level four biosecurity lab as well.”
“There have been many Chinese scientists, some of whom came from the People’s Liberation Army, who have worked there.”
The Galveston National Laboratory was conceived and funded in 2003 by Fauci’s NIAID in response to biothreats that emerged in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. It began collaborating with the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) in 2013 on training WIV scientists and conducting joint research programs.
There are also Chinese scientists with ties to the Chinese military working in the U.S. military scientific institutions doing research in various fields, and holding very sensitive positions, Sellin said. “It’s been going on for years.” He questioned two people in authority about this situation but had not received any response.
Those scientists maintain contact with scientific institutions in China, visit China, and give presentations at universities there, Sellin said.
A worker inside the P4 laboratory in Wuhan, capital of Hubei Province, China, on Feb. 23, 2017. (Johannes Eisele/AFP via Getty Images)
“There’s a spectrum of biological weapons,” some of which are very lethal while others less so, Sellin explained. According to Chinese military doctrine, biological weapons, which are highly infectious but with low lethality, can be used in pre-war conditions “to debilitate a society or to debilitate another military.”
The COVID-19 virus is a prototypical biological weapon that China has been trying to develop since 2004, Sellin said.
COVID-19 is a disease caused by the CCP (Chinese Communist Party) virus, commonly known as the novel coronavirus.
Chinese military documents also state “that these weapons should be designed, such that you have plausible deniability, that the presence of these viruses can be blamed on nature,” he said. “That’s the whole story of the COVID-19 virus. … The research that China’s doing, even the publicly available research, points back to a biological warfare program.”
“China is waging a war against the United States, and COVID-19 was a type of biological weapon that was designed for pre-war conditions.”
Regardless of whether its release was accidental or intentional, it debilitated the United States economy for two years, and caused enormous disruption and social discord in the country, Sellin said. The country is weakened, which “allows China to take advantage of the situation in a war-like state,” he added.
“I think China’s military learned a great deal about our response to [the COVID-19 pandemic] or our lack of response to it, and the effect it had on our society.” 23:06
Since the Chinese regime plans “to take over the world,” it also works on much more lethal viruses as well, which can cause death rates of up to 70 or 80 percent of the population, Sellin said. “They are developing a wide variety of biological weapons to be used under certain circumstances.”
“The American taxpayers are actually funding China’s research programs” to the point that one can think of America’s virus research programs today as merely an extension of Chinese programs, in particular, their biological warfare program,” Sellin said.
In 2018, Peter Daszak of the EcoHealth Alliance and Zheng-Li Shi of the Wuhan Institute of Virology, dubbed the “bat woman,” submitted, along with two other scientists, an application for a research grant to the U.S. Department of Defense’s Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Sellin said.
He said that the description of proposed research in that application “reads like a recipe for creating COVID-19.”
The application was rejected by DARPA because it involved dangerous “gain of function” experiments that would create new human-infecting viruses, and the research had the clear potential for dual use within a bioweapons development,” Sellin wrote. “DARPA, however, left the door open for partial funding.”
“Gain of function research is defined as when a naturally-occurring virus is genetically or otherwise manipulated to make it either more contagious, more lethal, or both.”
The National Institutes of Health (NIH), admitted in a letter that it funded gain-of-function experiments at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, according to Jeff Carlson and Hans Mahncke, hosts of “Truth Over News” on EpochTV.
Sellin said that he considers the 2018 research application the “smoking gun” of the laboratory origin of the COVID-19 virus because the experiments described in the application include the insertion of a furin protease cleavage site into new viruses that would be created in these experiments.
This furin protease cleavage site does not exist in any virus from which the COVID-19 virus could have evolved, Sellin said. “It is unnatural insertion into COVID-19.”
The furin protease cleavage site is a very small structure in the virus that facilitates its infectivity and lethality, Sellin explained.
-
Expanding at ‘breathtaking pace’
Admiral: China’s nuclear arms push a rising challenge
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China is expanding its nuclear forces at a “breathtaking” pace, the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command warned in urging for strengthened U.S. nuclear deterrence against the danger.
Adm. Charles Richard, meeting with reporters at the command’s annual conference on deterrence Thursday, said it was still unclear how far and how fast China is preparing to go with its nuclear arsenal, but that the challenge posed by Beijing was real and growing.
“The threat posed to this nation, our allies from China is expanding at a breathtaking pace,” the admiral said. “We don’t know where that’s going to wind up.” In May, Adm. Richard told the Senate Armed Services Committee that two years ago, “a great debate” was held on whether China would double its nuclear warheads by 2029. That doubling already has taken place, he told lawmakers, and further expansion is continuing.
In response to a question from The Washington Times on the shifting balance of nuclear forces, Adm. Richard said the new three-way standoff between the United States, China and Russia highlights the need to develop a new integrated deterrence policy.
“No one knows with certainty where this is going, and this is why I’m calling for a more frequent examination of our capability, capacity and posture, so that we can execute our strategy as the threat evolves,” he said.
Asked what needs to be done, the commander said he has great confidence in the current nuclear deterrent strategy and is “very comfortable” with the current U.S. nuclear posture.
The addition of 360 ICBM silos in western China is the “biggest and most visible” element of the buildup, along with the doubling of the number of road-mobile DF-31 missiles, he said. The People’s Liberation Army also has deployed a “true air leg” of its strategic forces with H-6N nuclear bombers armed with air-launched ballistic missiles.
Also, the Jin-class nuclear missile submarine force can launch attacks from protected “bastions” in the South China Sea and more missile submarines are being built.
As the PLA builds a nuclear warning system, Chinese strategy is shifting from retaliatory strikes to “launch-on-warning,” Adm. Richard said. The readiness of Chinese nuclear forces also has been increased, and shorter-range nuclear missiles also have been deployed. Those missiles would not be needed “in a true minimum-deterrent, no-first-use policy” that China claims it has been pursuing, he said.
The test last year of a new polar-orbiting hypersonic missile provides Chinese nuclear forces with an unlimited range strike weapon that can launch nuclear attacks “from any azimuth … with great performance,” he said. “No nation in history has ever demonstrated that capability.”
Russia also is “in a similar category” as a nuclear threat to the U.S., “and then there’s North Korea, potentially others,” the four-star admiral said.
The shift from the decades- long U.S.-Russia bilateral standoff to a three- or four-way confrontation with nuclear powers is driving the U.S. modernization of nuclear forces.
U.S. defense officials say the likely weapon system for the new missile silos Beijing is building is the new DF-41 intercontinental ballistic missile, which can carry up to 10 multiple nuclear warheads. Intelligence estimates say China’s nuclear warhead stockpile, estimated to be around 250 warheads, will increase to as many as 1,000 warheads in the next eight years.
Adm. Richard has said the Biden administration’s highly anticipated policy review on nuclear forces, the Nuclear Posture Review, will be released by the Pentagon shortly. Defense sources said the unclassified posture review outlining the administration’s approach to nuclear weapons was to be released earlier this year, but was pulled back following the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February and the threats of nuclear attack made by President Vladimir Putin.
Adm. Richard said the Russian leader’s “thinly veiled nuclear saber-rattling” was unprecedented.
“I’m not sure we have ever had rhetoric like that in history,” he said. “I can’t remember an event in the Cold War even where you had that level of rhetoric, and I think it points to the reality of the threat that we face and the necessity for us in our allies, to not only take concrete steps with our deterrence forces, but to think through the theories on how we’re going to accomplish it.”
The U.S. government is also engaged in a major buildup of nuclear forces which have grown obsolete and in need of repair through years of neglect. Between 2021 and 2030, the Pentagon is expected to spend $634 billion on new weapons, missiles, submarines and bombers to modernize deterrent forces.
But the Biden administration has also announced publicly that it wants to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, taking up a policy set in motion during the Obama administration. That policy has been criticized by Republicans in Congress who say more needs to be done to strengthen deterrence when nuclear threats from China, Russia and North Korea are on the rise.
Adm. Richard said he “applauds and encourages” administration efforts to pursue arms control talks.
“All parties have got to comply, it has to be verifiable, but anything that limits the threat to us and our allies is a good thing,” Adm. Richard said. “And if done correctly it lowers the threat to everybody, it’s good for everyone that’s involved. That’s the advantage or benefit of joining into that.”
The State Department is leading efforts to hold arms talks, but negotiations with Moscow were cut off after the Ukraine invasion and China has refused to engage in strategic arms talks, despite its signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that calls on all signatories to reduce their arsenals through negotiations.
Adm. Richard said the military needs to regularly review the nuclear weapons and capabilities that will be needed for executing the strategy outlined in the nuclear posture review.
“I’m pretty confident that we’re going to go down that path inside the Department of Defense,” he said.
The four-star admiral said reports that Chinese telecommunications gear located near U.S. nuclear bases highlight the threat to command and control systems used for waging nuclear war, but added, “Our nation’s nuclear command and control has never been in a more resilient, reliable [or] robust alignment than it is today,” he said
-
https://rumble.com/v1eo92h-doc-makes-room-go-silent-with-testimony-on-chinas-gain-of-function-research.html?mref=22lbp&mc=56yab&fbclid=IwAR3_wjcBSPgcQLj2l8yU45dyMdYaP76AFtVNuLfY0rg8Ag6Fr7SBlp81lxE
-
This tracks closely what we have been saying here:
=====================================
COVID-19 Was CCP ‘Biological Warfare,’ New Research Group Says
By Jackson Elliott August 5, 2022 Updated: August 6, 2022biggersmaller Print
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used COVID-19 for biological warfare, according to a new report by nine experts with the Center for Security Policy (CSP).
Generals, medical experts, and foreign policy experts including former House Intelligence Committee Chairman Pete Hoekstra and former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Lieutenant General William “Jerry” Boykin contributed to the report, which is available in book form on Amazon.
The report, titled “The CCP is at War with America,” stated that there is no evidence COVID-19 was a natural virus, arguing that there is significant evidence it came from a CCP lab. It also stated that the CCP deliberately allowed the virus to spread worldwide by allowing international flights while locking down movement within China.
The CSP describes the report as an “exercise in competitive analysis that strongly challenges the Director of National Intelligence’s September 2021 conclusion.”
The Plague War
U.S. intelligence experts in 2021 concluded that they might never know for certain where COVID-19 came from. But the CSP put the blame squarely on the Chinese communist regime.
“The preponderance of evidence indicates that SARS-CoV-2 was lab-manufactured,” the report stated. “In any event, Beijing acted with murderous intent in spreading the disease beyond China’s borders.”
As proof of these claims, the report pointed to genetic features of COVID-19 not found in natural viruses. It noted that China’s military has a biological warfare program.
Finally, it highlighted that the Chinese regime restricted internal travel to stop the spread of COVID-19 but kept its international borders open. At the same time, it bought up global supplies of personal protective gear.
Even if the original release of the virus was an accident, its worldwide spread was intentional, the report stated. The likely motive was to ensure that the rest of the world would be set back economically by the virus to the same degree China would be.
“Xi’s regime clearly saw the imperative need to ensure that it would not suffer economic privation alone, to the advantage of its enemies, especially the United States,” the report read. “Actively spreading the virus was, thus, a means of waging economic warfare, and the Chinese Communists applied themselves to doing so with a vengeance.”
According to the report, the CCP worked to spread its COVID-19 quarantine policies around the world so it could weather the pandemic at an advantage. The damage COVID-19 measures did to America’s economy put the CCP ahead.
“A principal beneficiary of such economic trauma would be the Chinese Communist Party,” the report read.
Weapons of Choice
The report also stated that the Chinese regime has a history of biological warfare. In the early 1990s, Chinese general Chi Haotian told China’s biological weapons program that it should depopulate America so China could take it over, according to the report. But China kept these plans secret.
“Right now, it is not the time to openly break with [America],” the general said. “Our reform and opening to the outside world still rely on their capital and technology.”
Biological weapons could be China’s road to world domination, the report stated. Chinese military journals have openly published articles about genetically-targeted biological warfare. China has collected genetic profiles of foreigners while keeping a close guard on the genetic profiles of Chinese people, it added.
“If Chinese scientists succeed in designing pathogens targeting only foreigners, the next germ, virus, or microbe from China could end non-Chinese societies,” the report stated.
“Xi will be the first supremo to possess a weapon making worldwide Chinese rule possible,” it read.
The report suggested that COVID-19 fatalities outside China should be considered “murder victims.”
The paper offered several conclusions. These include that the CCP and any who colluded with it must be held accountable for the pandemic’s results; the government shouldn’t impose vaccine mandates on the vulnerable; the United States should develop deterrents against Chinese bioweapons; and future medical health measures shouldn’t follow Chinese totalitarian lockdown advice.
“We must never again allow our constitutional freedoms to be denied on the pretext of a public health emergency, especially at the insistence of foreign powers, let alone our mortal enemy,” the report stated.
-
CHINA
Wuhan lab worked on much deadlier virus deemed ‘bioterrorism agent’
BY BILL GERTZ THE WASHINGTON TIMES
China’s Wuhan Institute of Virology, where the COVID-19 pandemic may have started, conducted work on a deadlier virus with a 60% lethality rate, according to recent Senate testimony.
Steven Quay, a medical doctor, told the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs subcommittee on emerging threats that the Wuhan institute carried out synthetic biology research on the Nipah virus genome in December 2019, around the time the first COVID-19 cases surfaced in Wuhan. Scientists are divided over whether the coronavirus that causes COVID-19 emerged naturally through animals or can be traced to a leak or accident at the Wuhan facility.
“The Nipah virus was in an infectious clone format,” Dr. Quay testified. “Nipah is a BSL-4 level pathogen and a CDCdesignated bioterrorism agent. This is the most dangerous gain-of-function research I have ever encountered. We should assume this research continues to this day at the WIV.”
If confirmed, China’s research on Nipah could violate the Biological Weapons Convention, which Beijing has signed, that prohibits work on agents that can be used as bioweapons.
Nipah is smaller than the virus behind COVID-19, known as SARS-CoV-2, and is less transmissible.
“But it is one of the deadliest viruses, with a 60% lethality,” said Dr. Quay, chief executive officer of Atossa Therapeutics, a Seattle-based pharmaceutical company.
“This is 60 times deadlier than SARS2,” he said, using the shortened term for the virus behind COVID-19. “The lab where the human specimens were processed is not the highest-level biosafety lab, BSL-4, but was in the BSL-2 or -3 facility.”
Dr. Quay said he did not know why Chinese researchers were working on the Nipah virus, “but a laboratory-acquired infection with a modified Nipah virus would make the COVID-19 pandemic look like a walk in the park.”
Unlike SARS-CoV-2, Nipah is unable to spread in the air. Still, if the research produced an aerosolized version of the virus, it could cause a deadlier pandemic, Dr. Quay testified.
In an interview, Dr. Quay said he discovered the Wuhan study on Nipah in Chinese research data mistakenly posted on GenBank, a U.S.-based repository for DNA sequencing information. Mr. Quay said the danger in China’s work on Nipah is that it could become aerosolized and cause mass death.
“The Black Plague in Europe was a 20% lethal event, and it set society back 250 years,” he said. A Nipah pandemic would “set us back over a millennium, in my estimate.”
Spokespeople for the State Department, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the National Institutes of Health and the Chinese Embassy did not respond to requests for comment.
According to the CDC website, Nipah was discovered in 1999 during a natural outbreak in Malaysia and Singapore. The virus spreads through bodily fluids. Symptoms of infection include fever, headache, nausea and vomiting, and shortness of breath. Severe symptoms can leave the victim confused or in a coma. “Death can occur in as many as 80% of cases,” the center said on its website.
The CDC lists Nipah as an emerging pathogen and “bioterrorism agent” that “could be engineered for mass dissemination in the future,” based on availability, ease of production and dissemination, and high mortality rate.
The State Department’s latest annual report on arms compliance states that China “continued to engage in activities with dual-use applications, which raise concerns regarding its compliance with Article I of the [Biological Weapons Convention].” That article deals with work on bioweapons. For the past two years, China’s government has canceled meetings with U.S. officials to discuss American concerns about compliance with the biological weapons treaty.
The State Department said in a fact sheet released during the Trump administration’s last days that U.S. intelligence concluded that the Wuhan Institute of Virology had engaged in secret military work.
“Despite the WIV presenting itself as a civilian institution, the United States has determined that the WIV has collaborated on publications and secret projects with China’s military,” the report said. It noted classified research and laboratory animal experiments for the People’s Liberation Army since at least 2017.
The Chinese research on Nipah was disclosed Aug. 3 during a Senate hearing on gain-of-function research, including China’s work at the Wuhan institute in making bat viruses more transmissible to humans to study their properties.
Dr. Quay and two other experts, Richard H. Ebright, director of the Rutgers University Waksman Institute of Microbiology, and Kevin M. Esvelt, a biochemist at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, warned that unregulated gain-of-function research poses pandemic threats.
Dr. Ebright said all research that involves making viruses more infectious should be halted.
“Gain-of-function research of concern can advance scientific understanding, but gain-of-function research of concern has no civilian practical applications,” he said. “In particular, gainof- function research of concern is not needed for and does not contribute to the development of vaccines and drugs.”
Dr. Esvelt said the U.S. Agency for International Development and NIH have funded research to find or create novel pandemic-capable viruses in laboratories around the world. Both agencies hope to prevent natural pandemics but “seek to identify viruses that could kill as many people as a nuclear weapon,” he said.
Well-meaning health experts “never considered that these advances in technology, which are continuing, plus a list of pandemic-capable viruses, would allow a single skilled terrorist to unleash more pandemics at once than would naturally occur in a century,” Dr. Esvelt said.
Sen. Rand Paul, the Kentucky Republican who co-chaired the hearing, said the subcommittee was seeking answers to the origin of the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan in December 2019.
“I maintain that the techniques that the [National Institutes of Health] funded in Wuhan to create enhanced pathogens may have or could have been used to create COVID-19,” Mr. Paul said. It was the first hearing in Congress on gain-of-function research, a possible source of the pandemic, Mr. Paul said. A second theory is that the virus jumped from a wild animal to a human at a Wuhan market. U.S. intelligence agencies say they cannot conclusively prove either theory.
Dr. Quay said there is no dispositive evidence that the pandemic began as a spillover of a natural virus in a market.
“All evidence is consistent with a laboratory-acquired infection,” he said.
Two scientific studies published last month said the virus began as a “spillover” event from Wuhan’s Huanan seafood market, where wild animals were sold as food.
The COVID-19 virus “has features consistent with synthetic biology gainof- function research,” Dr. Quay said. He specifically cited two features of the virus that affect its ability to bind to human cells. Proponents of the lab leak theory also argue that, in the early months of the pandemic, no animal was found to be infected with SARS-CoV-2 anywhere, including the Wuhan market.
Features of the evolving virus place “the first human infection in the fall of 2019, long before the December market cases,” he said. “The American people deserve to know how this pandemic started and to know if the NIH funded research that may have caused this pandemic.”
The Chinese government has refused to cooperate in investigating the origin of the pandemic.
During the hearing, it was disclosed that in September 2019, three months before the COVID-19 outbreak was declared, the Wuhan Institute of Virology removed a website that listed 21,000 viruses
-
HEALTH VIEWPOINTS
New Virus Breakout Raises Question of Bioterrorism
BY XIAOXU SEAN LIN AND HEALTH 1+1 TIMEAUGUST 21, 2022 PRINT
Recently, the discovery of “Langya virus” in Shandong and Henan provinces of China has quickly attracted the attention of medical experts around the world. The virus is a type of zoonotic henipavirus and 35 people have been identified to be infected with this Langya virus since 2019 in these two provinces in China.
Notably, this virus is related to the Mojiang virus—found in the infamous Mojian Caves where the bat-borne coronavirus most similar to the SARS-CoV-2 was discovered.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology has become very interested in henipaviruses as of late, taking great pains to obtain and reconstruct the Nipah virus, which is not even a threat in China.
What does this all mean, and what is going on inside of China’s military labs?
What Is the ‘Langya Virus’? What Are Its Symptoms?
Langya virus is part of the henipavirus family. Other henipaviruses include the Nipah virus, which has received extensive attention and is known for its high mortality rate, and the Hendra virus and Mojiang virus.
Henipavirus is a genus of negative-stranded RNA viruses with a lipid membrane on their surface. This membrane is easily damaged in a dry environment, so henipaviruses are not primarily transmitted through the respiratory tract, but through direct contact with infected people or animals or contact with their feces.
According to an article published on August 4, 2022 in The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), the Langya virus has caused at least 35 infections in Henan and Shandong, China, and the report did not mention any related death case. Among all the patients, 26 people were infected with the Langya virus only, and nine others were infected with other pathogens at the same time.
All 26 patients with the Langya virus infection have experienced fever. Their probability of suffering from anorexia, coughing, weakness, muscle pain and leukopenia are as large as 50 percent. In addition, liver function impairment, thrombocytopenia, and headaches are also common symptoms of the Langya viral infection.
This report also mentioned that live Lanya virus was isolated from a patient’s sample and full genome sequence was characterized. The phylogenetic analysis based on the L gene homology indicated that the Langya virus was the closest to Mojiang virus, but not Nipah or Hendra virus, the two more commonly known henipaviruses.
Mojiang Virus: Henipavirus From a Mysterious Mine in Yunnan, China
The Mojiang virus was found in an infamous abandoned mine in Mojiang County, Yunnan province, China.
This mine in Yunnan first attracted attention in 2012, when six miners working inside it contracted severe pneumonia of unknown origin, and three of them died.
Furthermore, researchers discovered the Mojiang virus from rats in the mine.
In 2013, virologist Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology discovered the coronavirus RaTG13 from bats in the Mojiang mine–the closest known relative to the new coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, with a 96 percent similarity between the two, and the Mojiang mine gained quite a bit of fame as a result.
This mine resembles a “cave of viruses,” harboring these two dangerous viruses in different hosts: coronaviruses in bats, and Mojiang virus in rodents. There are still many questions remain unanswered about this mysterious cave: what happened to the other three miners who had unknown pneumonia but did not die? Did they have any other coinfections with other viruses? After Mojiang virus was identified, did those miners’ samples get retested for any potential zoonotic infection from Mojiang virus? What is unique in this cave that makes it like a hub of emerging pathogens?
However, for scientists and journalists, the mine in Yunnan has become a “black hole of no information.” Due to so-called political sensitivity, the Chinese communist regime has prevented any scientist or journalist from going there to investigate. For instance, a group of reporters from the Associated Press were followed by several plainclothes police vehicles while trying to enter the mine for investigation, and they were blocked from entering it. Another group of researchers who managed to take samples from the mine had them all confiscated.
In addition to the discovery of the coronavirus and Mojiang virus, the Chinese military and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) seem to be very interested in another henipavirus–the Nipah virus. Is WIV working on Nipah virus as a biological weapon candidate?
Recently, a renowned scientist pointed out that WIV might still be conducting genetic research on the Nipah virus.
Dr. Steven Quay, CEO of Atossa Therapeutics, Inc. (a clinical-stage pharmaceutical company), is a highly experienced physician and scientist who has published more than 300 articles and holds over 80 patents. Dr. Quay is particularly concerned about the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and has published articles suggesting that all indirect evidence so far suggests that this new coronavirus is very likely to have come from a laboratory.
On August 3, 2022, Dr. Quay testified before the U.S. Senate that his analysis of the original genetic sequencing raw data published by the WIV for the SARS-CoV-2 virus contained contaminated sequences. If the laboratory’s genetic sequencing equipment was not cleaned sufficiently between sequencing runs, trace amounts of its components would be left on the equipment from previous runs, and the next sample might then become contaminated by the previous sample.
Dr. Quay had discovered that the original raw data of the SARS-CoV-2 virus study contained part of the genome sequences of the Nipah virus, and somegene sequences were relatively complete. In addition, it also contains part of the vector sequences that are used for synthetic biology. Therefore, Dr. Quay suspected that WIV might be working on the restructuring or engineering of an infectious clone of Nipah virus strain, which is a highly lethal and very dangerous virus.
This was not just a speculation as WIV’s strong interest in Nipah virus was found in another very unusual incident:
In 2019, a very accomplished microbial virologist at the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, secretly sent samples of the Ebola virus and Nipah virus to WIV after stealing them from her workplace. After her crime was exposed, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conducted an investigation, and Dr. Qiu was fired from her job.
The Nipah virus, which was obtained at great cost by the Wuhan Institute of Virology, is a very dangerous virus that has caused multiple outbreaks mainly in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and it can kill up to 90 percent of the infected population in certain outbreaks.
Bats are very active in tropical and subtropical regions, and the main natural host of the Nipah virus are fruit bats. Bats can also transmit the virus to other large animals, such as horses and pigs.
China does not currently face the threat of the Nipah virus, and there is no urgent need to develop a vaccine for it. So why is WIV so interested in the Nipah virus? This is an alarming question.
The CDC has placed the Nipah virus on the list of “Bioterrorism Agents” and classified it as a Category C pathogen—a virus with the potential to be engineered into a biological weapon.
Before the outbreak of COVID-19, the website of WIV even listed a “military management division.” This suggested that WIV is not just merely a collaborator for the People’s Liberation Army. Military operation was part of the whole WIV operation even before Xi Jinping launched nation-wide Military-Civil fusion transformation for many institutes.
Although China joined the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984, it is suspected that it might not have stopped its research on biological and chemical weapons.
A Military Field-Testing of Dangerous Pathogens?
Indeed, the discovery of the Langya virus also showed elements of military involvement.
The key authors to that report are Drs. Li-Qun Fang and Wei Liu, whose institutional affiliation was shown to be “Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology (BIME)”. However, BIME is actually the same entity as “Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, under People’s Liberation Army.” In addition, in the supplementary materials of this report, it was clearly indicated that the PLA’s 990 Military Hospital in Henan province was involved in this study. And the report indicated that 34 out of the 35 patients were local farmers. Why were the farmers’ samples analyzed in a military hospital as part of a sentinel surveillance program?
Moreover, although the report indicated that those 35 patients infected with Langya virus were identified during “sentinel febrile illness surveillance.” It is very unusual to report the discovery and isolation of a live henipavirus with significant delay of two years. The discovery of henipavirus should be very alarming news in the public health aspect, and should have been reported in 2019. Meanwhile, among the 35 patients, six patients were found to be co-infected with severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome virus (SFTSV) , and two patients were found to be co-infected with Hantaan virus.
The SFTSV and Hantaan virus are highly infectious viruses that could lead to severe viral hemorrhage and their outbreaks in China are very rare events. So, in this so-called “sentinel febrile illness surveillance,” this group of military scientists identified three dangerous pathogens at one time, and several of them were co-infected with two rare pathogens? How likely would this happen in a natural situation? And in regular sentinel febrile illness surveillance, these viruses would not be listed in the regular screening procedure.
Notably, all three viruses, Langya, SFTSV, and Hantaan viruses, can all infect rodents. So, this study appears to be a targeted surveillance project to look for zoonotic infections transmitted by rodents. Would it be possible that this study was a test of these dangerous pathogens and see which one was more prone to cause human infection? With the involvement of a military hospital and scientists from PLA, would it be possible that this was a field release of multiple dangerous pathogens followed by field screening of rodents and potential human infections caused by infected rodents? Was this part of a bioweapon program?
Of course, we don’t have any direct evidence. And of course, this speculation could be wrong if SFTSV and Hantaan virus infections have become endemic in Shandong or Henan province in recent years. But if not, this could serve as an alarm for national security experts, beyond being a reasonable speculation.
Such Virus Research Endangers the Health of Mankind and Needs to Be Called Off
Following the COVID-19 outbreak, there has been a growing concern about the risks associated with research into viruses.
As aforementioned, the scientists and journalists attempting to enter the Mojiang mine to investigate are now being blocked on the grounds of “political sensitivity.” However, if this series of events directly endangers the health of all humans, then this should not be considered a mere political issue.
At this stage, various viruses, bacteria, and other public health crises are already posing a great threat to people. On this basis, some organizations are still conducting daring research, such as modifying human genes and/or viral genes, and using various synthetic biology means to assemble new viruses and bacteria.
These dangerous studies have been glorified as a way to better understand pathogens and develop vaccines and drugs.
However, during the process, people may have created more dangerous pathogens that further threaten the health of the human race. An outbreak of a dangerous pathogen, whether from natural zoonotic infection, or laboratory leak incident, or a release of biological weapon, can become a major global disaster, as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated.
Therefore, we need to be more stringent in monitoring, controlling, or prohibiting such dangerous research.
In the process of promoting the development of biotechnology, we must first guard the most basic medical ethics and the ethics of researchers.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times. Epoch Health welcomes professional discussion and friendly debate. To submit an opinion piece, please follow these guidelines and submit through our form here.
-
I wonder how many American tax payer dollars helped create this.
HEALTH VIEWPOINTS
New Virus Breakout Raises Question of Bioterrorism
BY XIAOXU SEAN LIN AND HEALTH 1+1 TIMEAUGUST 21, 2022 PRINT
Recently, the discovery of “Langya virus” in Shandong and Henan provinces of China has quickly attracted the attention of medical experts around the world. The virus is a type of zoonotic henipavirus and 35 people have been identified to be infected with this Langya virus since 2019 in these two provinces in China.
Notably, this virus is related to the Mojiang virus—found in the infamous Mojian Caves where the bat-borne coronavirus most similar to the SARS-CoV-2 was discovered.
The Wuhan Institute of Virology has become very interested in henipaviruses as of late, taking great pains to obtain and reconstruct the Nipah virus, which is not even a threat in China.
What does this all mean, and what is going on inside of China’s military labs?
What Is the ‘Langya Virus’? What Are Its Symptoms?
Langya virus is part of the henipavirus family. Other henipaviruses include the Nipah virus, which has received extensive attention and is known for its high mortality rate, and the Hendra virus and Mojiang virus.
Henipavirus is a genus of negative-stranded RNA viruses with a lipid membrane on their surface. This membrane is easily damaged in a dry environment, so henipaviruses are not primarily transmitted through the respiratory tract, but through direct contact with infected people or animals or contact with their feces.
According to an article published on August 4, 2022 in The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM), the Langya virus has caused at least 35 infections in Henan and Shandong, China, and the report did not mention any related death case. Among all the patients, 26 people were infected with the Langya virus only, and nine others were infected with other pathogens at the same time.
All 26 patients with the Langya virus infection have experienced fever. Their probability of suffering from anorexia, coughing, weakness, muscle pain and leukopenia are as large as 50 percent. In addition, liver function impairment, thrombocytopenia, and headaches are also common symptoms of the Langya viral infection.
This report also mentioned that live Lanya virus was isolated from a patient’s sample and full genome sequence was characterized. The phylogenetic analysis based on the L gene homology indicated that the Langya virus was the closest to Mojiang virus, but not Nipah or Hendra virus, the two more commonly known henipaviruses.
Mojiang Virus: Henipavirus From a Mysterious Mine in Yunnan, China
The Mojiang virus was found in an infamous abandoned mine in Mojiang County, Yunnan province, China.
This mine in Yunnan first attracted attention in 2012, when six miners working inside it contracted severe pneumonia of unknown origin, and three of them died.
Furthermore, researchers discovered the Mojiang virus from rats in the mine.
In 2013, virologist Shi Zhengli of the Wuhan Institute of Virology discovered the coronavirus RaTG13 from bats in the Mojiang mine–the closest known relative to the new coronavirus SARS-CoV-2, with a 96 percent similarity between the two, and the Mojiang mine gained quite a bit of fame as a result.
This mine resembles a “cave of viruses,” harboring these two dangerous viruses in different hosts: coronaviruses in bats, and Mojiang virus in rodents. There are still many questions remain unanswered about this mysterious cave: what happened to the other three miners who had unknown pneumonia but did not die? Did they have any other coinfections with other viruses? After Mojiang virus was identified, did those miners’ samples get retested for any potential zoonotic infection from Mojiang virus? What is unique in this cave that makes it like a hub of emerging pathogens?
However, for scientists and journalists, the mine in Yunnan has become a “black hole of no information.” Due to so-called political sensitivity, the Chinese communist regime has prevented any scientist or journalist from going there to investigate. For instance, a group of reporters from the Associated Press were followed by several plainclothes police vehicles while trying to enter the mine for investigation, and they were blocked from entering it. Another group of researchers who managed to take samples from the mine had them all confiscated.
In addition to the discovery of the coronavirus and Mojiang virus, the Chinese military and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) seem to be very interested in another henipavirus–the Nipah virus. Is WIV working on Nipah virus as a biological weapon candidate?
Recently, a renowned scientist pointed out that WIV might still be conducting genetic research on the Nipah virus.
Dr. Steven Quay, CEO of Atossa Therapeutics, Inc. (a clinical-stage pharmaceutical company), is a highly experienced physician and scientist who has published more than 300 articles and holds over 80 patents. Dr. Quay is particularly concerned about the origin of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and has published articles suggesting that all indirect evidence so far suggests that this new coronavirus is very likely to have come from a laboratory.
On August 3, 2022, Dr. Quay testified before the U.S. Senate that his analysis of the original genetic sequencing raw data published by the WIV for the SARS-CoV-2 virus contained contaminated sequences. If the laboratory’s genetic sequencing equipment was not cleaned sufficiently between sequencing runs, trace amounts of its components would be left on the equipment from previous runs, and the next sample might then become contaminated by the previous sample.
Dr. Quay had discovered that the original raw data of the SARS-CoV-2 virus study contained part of the genome sequences of the Nipah virus, and somegene sequences were relatively complete. In addition, it also contains part of the vector sequences that are used for synthetic biology. Therefore, Dr. Quay suspected that WIV might be working on the restructuring or engineering of an infectious clone of Nipah virus strain, which is a highly lethal and very dangerous virus.
This was not just a speculation as WIV’s strong interest in Nipah virus was found in another very unusual incident:
In 2019, a very accomplished microbial virologist at the Canadian National Microbiology Laboratory, Dr. Xiangguo Qiu, secretly sent samples of the Ebola virus and Nipah virus to WIV after stealing them from her workplace. After her crime was exposed, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conducted an investigation, and Dr. Qiu was fired from her job.
The Nipah virus, which was obtained at great cost by the Wuhan Institute of Virology, is a very dangerous virus that has caused multiple outbreaks mainly in South Asia and Southeast Asia, and it can kill up to 90 percent of the infected population in certain outbreaks.
Bats are very active in tropical and subtropical regions, and the main natural host of the Nipah virus are fruit bats. Bats can also transmit the virus to other large animals, such as horses and pigs.
China does not currently face the threat of the Nipah virus, and there is no urgent need to develop a vaccine for it. So why is WIV so interested in the Nipah virus? This is an alarming question.
The CDC has placed the Nipah virus on the list of “Bioterrorism Agents” and classified it as a Category C pathogen—a virus with the potential to be engineered into a biological weapon.
Before the outbreak of COVID-19, the website of WIV even listed a “military management division.” This suggested that WIV is not just merely a collaborator for the People’s Liberation Army. Military operation was part of the whole WIV operation even before Xi Jinping launched nation-wide Military-Civil fusion transformation for many institutes.
Although China joined the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984, it is suspected that it might not have stopped its research on biological and chemical weapons.
A Military Field-Testing of Dangerous Pathogens?
Indeed, the discovery of the Langya virus also showed elements of military involvement.
The key authors to that report are Drs. Li-Qun Fang and Wei Liu, whose institutional affiliation was shown to be “Beijing Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology (BIME)”. However, BIME is actually the same entity as “Institute of Microbiology and Epidemiology, Academy of Military Medical Sciences, under People’s Liberation Army.” In addition, in the supplementary materials of this report, it was clearly indicated that the PLA’s 990 Military Hospital in Henan province was involved in this study. And the report indicated that 34 out of the 35 patients were local farmers. Why were the farmers’ samples analyzed in a military hospital as part of a sentinel surveillance program?
Moreover, although the report indicated that those 35 patients infected with Langya virus were identified during “sentinel febrile illness surveillance.” It is very unusual to report the discovery and isolation of a live henipavirus with significant delay of two years. The discovery of henipavirus should be very alarming news in the public health aspect, and should have been reported in 2019. Meanwhile, among the 35 patients, six patients were found to be co-infected with severe fever with thrombocytopenia syndrome virus (SFTSV) , and two patients were found to be co-infected with Hantaan virus.
The SFTSV and Hantaan virus are highly infectious viruses that could lead to severe viral hemorrhage and their outbreaks in China are very rare events. So, in this so-called “sentinel febrile illness surveillance,” this group of military scientists identified three dangerous pathogens at one time, and several of them were co-infected with two rare pathogens? How likely would this happen in a natural situation? And in regular sentinel febrile illness surveillance, these viruses would not be listed in the regular screening procedure.
Notably, all three viruses, Langya, SFTSV, and Hantaan viruses, can all infect rodents. So, this study appears to be a targeted surveillance project to look for zoonotic infections transmitted by rodents. Would it be possible that this study was a test of these dangerous pathogens and see which one was more prone to cause human infection? With the involvement of a military hospital and scientists from PLA, would it be possible that this was a field release of multiple dangerous pathogens followed by field screening of rodents and potential human infections caused by infected rodents? Was this part of a bioweapon program?
Of course, we don’t have any direct evidence. And of course, this speculation could be wrong if SFTSV and Hantaan virus infections have become endemic in Shandong or Henan province in recent years. But if not, this could serve as an alarm for national security experts, beyond being a reasonable speculation.
Such Virus Research Endangers the Health of Mankind and Needs to Be Called Off
Following the COVID-19 outbreak, there has been a growing concern about the risks associated with research into viruses.
As aforementioned, the scientists and journalists attempting to enter the Mojiang mine to investigate are now being blocked on the grounds of “political sensitivity.” However, if this series of events directly endangers the health of all humans, then this should not be considered a mere political issue.
At this stage, various viruses, bacteria, and other public health crises are already posing a great threat to people. On this basis, some organizations are still conducting daring research, such as modifying human genes and/or viral genes, and using various synthetic biology means to assemble new viruses and bacteria.
These dangerous studies have been glorified as a way to better understand pathogens and develop vaccines and drugs.
However, during the process, people may have created more dangerous pathogens that further threaten the health of the human race. An outbreak of a dangerous pathogen, whether from natural zoonotic infection, or laboratory leak incident, or a release of biological weapon, can become a major global disaster, as the COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated.
Therefore, we need to be more stringent in monitoring, controlling, or prohibiting such dangerous research.
In the process of promoting the development of biotechnology, we must first guard the most basic medical ethics and the ethics of researchers.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times. Epoch Health welcomes professional discussion and friendly debate. To submit an opinion piece, please follow these guidelines and submit through our form here.
-
August 22, 2022
View On Website
Open as PDF
In Ukraine, Buying Time With Nuclear Concerns
Everyone understands how dangerous it is to fight near nuclear power plants, but that won’t stop Moscow or Kyiv from using it to their advantage.
By: Antonia Colibasanu
Fighting has escalated over the past few weeks near Zaporizhzhia, home to a Ukrainian nuclear power plant that has effectively been converted into a Russian military base. It’s the largest nuclear plant on the Continent, and though only two of the six reactors are functioning, the International Atomic Energy Agency appealed for maximum military restraint in the area and has requested the safe passage of IAEA technicians to conduct safety, security and safeguards operations at the site.
On Aug. 19, French President Emmanuel Macron spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin on the phone to discuss the situation, after which Putin reportedly agreed to send IAEA experts, albeit through Ukrainian territory, not Russian. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, having already spoke to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, pledged to discuss Zaporizhzhia with Putin as well. It seems everyone is rightly worried about the chance of a nuclear accident.
Ukraine and Russia have accused each other of compromising the nuclear power plant. In a press release, Putin accused the Ukrainian military of "systematic shelling" of the facility and said the attacks created the “danger of a large-scale catastrophe that could lead to radiation contamination of vast territories.” Ukraine blames Moscow for deploying heavy weaponry on site.
Regardless of who is responsible, there is a broad understanding that the situation should not be taken lightly. On Aug. 19, Russia reportedly told workers at the plant not to show up to work – without specifying when they can return. Earlier in the week, Romania sent more than a million potassium iodide pills to Moldova to pre-empt possible radiation poisoning. In addition to Moldova, reports suggest Romania, Poland, Bulgaria and Hungary could all be in the path of radioactive fallout.
Areas Effected by Possible Nuclear Explosion
(click to enlarge)
Indeed, the consequences of an accident could be severe. Though Zaporizhzhia’s two functioning reactors are well protected and, as such, are unlikely to be bombed directly, attacks on fuel storage sites or other infrastructure could release radioactive material which, according to expert reports, could travel several hundred miles, depending on the material's quality and density and on the vagaries of the wind. In other words, the fallout could stretch well beyond Ukraine.
Wind Direction, Friday August 19, 2022
(click to enlarge)
The concern is real, but the timing is odd. Reports about intensified fighting in the area near Zaporizhzhia came after reports of mysterious explosions Aug. 9 at the Saki air base in Crimea, which could mark a major shift in the war. Satellite imagery shows that at least nine planes were destroyed in the explosions, and though Russia claimed it to be accidental, many believe it was an attack by Ukrainian forces. (The government in Kyiv has yet to confirm as much.) If Kyiv was indeed responsible, that means it is able to strike targets some 200 kilometers (125 miles) behind the front line – something Moscow had not expected. Material damage aside, the attacks – if it was an attack – would devastate Russian morale and contravene Russian propaganda. Notably, the explosions came one day after the United States promised to supply Ukraine with $1 billion worth of weapons.
As interesting, the reporting around Saki and Zaporizhzhia came as the war was more or less at a standstill. After capturing Luhansk, the Russian army hasn’t gained more than 7 miles of ground along the 620-mile front between Kharkiv and Kherson in nearly a month and a half. The Ukrainian counteroffensive to retake Kherson, meanwhile, has been going on for two months but has yet to retake the city.
U.S. weaponry, particularly the M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), seems to have played a role in halting Russian operations. Moscow has had to totally restructure its logistics to supply the men in the field, which has slowed its advances. But Moscow had plenty of logistical problems before the HIMARS appeared, so it’s unclear whether its army will be able to resume its advance after it rebuilds its lines – or how effective it will be if it does – especially with even more U.S. weapons flooding into Ukraine.
Still, U.S. hardware can take Ukraine only so fair. Kyiv doesn’t quite have enough weaponry to retake areas such as Kherson, and even if it did, it doesn’t have the training or expertise to optimize the weapons it receives. For example, Kyiv may have received long-range, high-precision missile systems from the U.S. and Great Britain in recent weeks, but it could manage only to incapacitate the major bridges over the Dnipro River near Kherson, forcing Russia to resort to ferries to transport its equipment. For Ukraine, this is better than nothing, but it’s a far cry from being able to assault, subdue and control a city like Kherson.
All this means that, though both have been constrained in how much they can do for now, they are less limited in the long term – Ukraine with its new weapons and Russia with its reformed logistics and supply lines. With no sign of a peace agreement in the works, both sides are unhappy with the status quo, and both would thus welcome disrupting the current stalemate in their favor. This will result in one of two possibilities: a frozen conflict, which is bad for both sides, or an escalation, which neither wants right now, preferring instead to regroup and reorganize.
A nuclear accident – or the sheer prospect of one – would certainly give them the pause they are looking for. Allowing nuclear experts to inspect the facilities at Zaporizhzhia wouldn’t advance the cause of long-term peace – if anything, it would only help Russia and Ukraine take a beat before gearing up for a subsequent round of fighting. Of course, there’s no guarantee that the presence of third-party inspectors – if they manage to get in at all – will halt hostilities entirely. But both Russia and Ukraine have an interest in buying time, and both understand how catastrophic a nuclear accident could be. But that’s no comfort to them or to nearby residents who realize the obvious: that armed conflict around a nuclear power plant necessarily increases the chances that an accident will occur, no matter how sincere the belligerents are in avoiding one.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/aug/9/chinas-wuhan-institute-studied-deadly-bioterrorism/
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-creates-digital-twin-of-americans-cybersecurity-expert_4713756.html?utm_source=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2022-09-07&utm_medium=email&est=UD3HmbDhVOGgYT%2BcNR95lM9DCXxJHHfqH0czuTklvKVQp6ohrj7xuuNT%2BWx4ddPhvrsp
China Creates ‘Digital Twin’ of Americans: Cybersecurity Expert
By Hannah Ng and Tiffany Meier September 6, 2022 Updated: September 6, 2022biggersmaller Print
As reports have emerged that Chinese military-linked firms gather American DNA, these firms are now capable of creating digital replicas of Americans, according to John Mills, former director of cybersecurity policy, strategy, and international affairs at the Department of Defense.
“They have the capacity to create these complex models of each of us. They’re making digital twins of us,” Mills told the “China in Focus” program on NTD News, sister media outlet of The Epoch Times.
Digital Twins
He pointed to BGI Group, formerly Beijing Genomics Institute, which is the leader of the CCP’s genome project, as well as a leading producer of COVID-19 tests.
In 2017, the company’s leader boasted that it had reached an industrial level of success in progressing through genetic reform and gene editing, to gene synthesizing, and mass-producing multiple viruses, bacteria, and large yeasts.
“They can do all kinds of nefarious things with no constraint or loss. They have our data.” That data could be used to tailor a follow-up virus to target certain non-Han ethnicities, Mills warned.
Mills referred to Beijing’s military-civil fusion policy, calling Chinese companies “extensions of state security, state intelligence.”
That includes every Chinese company and every company that is incorporated in China, even if it is American in origin, he stressed. “They are the eyes and the ears and the collectors.”
That means when Americans give information to these companies, their data is essentially going to Chinese intelligence, Mills said.
“So they know about every one of us … I would presume that I have a file in China,” he added.
BGI Targets American Researchers
Mills raised further concerns about BGI’s group’s record of targeting distinguished American researchers.
“They have a long history of targeting some of our best researchers … there is a proven track record that almost immediately veers into national security concerns with China,” he noted.
The cybersecurity expert pointed to Chinese recruitment programs such as the “thousand talents plan,” allegedly to lure foreign academics to work in China, a process that facilitates the transfer of technology and know-how to the regime.
“China was just using money to essentially buy off professors and academics. So they have a very active program to go after our intellectual property, and essentially, to co-opt some of our leading researchers,” he said.
Mills referred to the Biden administration’s canceling of the “China Initiative” launched by the Trump administration in 2018 to combat the Chinese regime’s state-sponsored espionage and theft of trade secrets, calling the move “ridiculous and silly.”
“It’s going to [take] many years for … the CCP to demonstrate they can be trusted in these circles because right now, all the evidence is leaning against them,” he said.
Americans, Safeguard Your Medical Records
In his opinion, Americans, especially those related to the government sector, should not do DNA tests. Furthermore, he suggested that Americans closely safeguard their medical records.
“Be aware that anything you do digitally … is being vacuumed up,” he warned.
Mills urged the U.S. government to blacklist Chinese entities like BGI Group and ban them from operating in America, citing the national security risk.
“I think it’s very unwise to let them in because it is just like biological warfare,” he said.
“We need to be extremely, extremely concerned,” because data collected by DNA tests is key information for biological warfare, Mills added.”We have to look at that as a threat.”
“This is feeding them. They look at that as the strategic, commanding heights of the showdown with the West, mainly America,” he said.
Antonio Graceffo and Jennifer Bateman contributed to this report.
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/vice-director-of-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology-revealed-to-be-chinese-communist-party-official-in-charge-of-biosafety_4751505.html?utm_source=News&src_src=News&utm_campaign=breaking-2022-09-25-2&src_cmp=breaking-2022-09-25-2&utm_medium=email&est=J3epRLU4QtOgFob7Mx80m8Za%2FfUE4TAdX8fMBEk1g4P%2FRL7CCgvqnigrhZcwMS54nsLG
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJOLGXCk9GE&t=44s
-
New: China's leader indirectly warned Russia against using nuclear weapons, according to a readout from Chinese state-run media, Xinhua, following a visit by German Chancellor Olaf Scholz on Friday. Without mentioning Putin or Russia, Xinhua said the two leaders "jointly oppose the use of, or threats to use, nuclear weapons"; and world leaders should "advocate that nuclear weapons cannot be used, a nuclear war cannot be waged, in order to prevent a nuclear crisis...on the Eurasian continent," according to translations provided by Politico, Bloomberg, and Reuters.
-
https://nypost.com/2022/11/11/russia-possibly-tried-and-failed-to-test-nuclear-torpedo/?fbclid=IwAR0ZnLBN5iT_r0rrQSFj-H_E2olaP4ujSl2XbJKd8mPMGbSmYPGC4yyrt28
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oRLON3ddZIw
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=frAEmhqdLFs
-
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/covid-origins-may-have-been-tied-chinas-bioweapons-program-gop-report?fbclid=IwAR3GbW0SG-pA161Ba2U6QpCNcAGXGNAec7xprEOD23XQExs8SAi0-SscImc
-
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unit_731
HT to CCP
============
Japanese war crimes on Chinese and Russians
The US apparently allowed them to cover it up.
I never heard of this:
"During the final months of World War II, codenamed Cherry Blossoms at Night, the plan of Unit 731 was to use kamikaze pilots to infest San Diego, California, with the plague.[39] The plan was scheduled to launch on 22 September 1945, but Japan surrendered five weeks earlier.[40][41][42][43]"
Doesn't mean the government would have approved this though.
-
China Had Biological Weapons Ambitions Long Before Pandemic: House Intelligence Committee Member
By Hannah Ng and Steve Lance December 26, 2022 Updated: December 26, 2022biggersmaller Print
0:00
6:30
1
China had made clear its biological weapons ambitions long before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, according to Rep. Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio), a member of the House Intelligence Committee.
Wenstrup together with Republicans on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) released a report (pdf) on the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic on Dec. 14.
“Our State Department has put things out over the past, even going back to 2005, that China is interested in offensive bioweapons,” Wenstrup told the “Capitol Report” program on NTD, the sister media outlet of the Epoch Times, on Dec. 16.
The lawmaker singled out the work of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s Fifth Institute of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), the military’s top medical research body.
“In 2005, the U.S. State Department publicly stated the U.S. assessment that China also operates an offensive biological weapons program, specifically identifying two Chinese entities as likely involved, one of which is the Fifth Institute. In a 2006 declaration of compliance with the Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, China acknowledged that the Fifth Institute specifically conducts research on SARS coronaviruses,” the report reads.
Epoch Times Photo
Doctor and Congressman Brad Wenstrup (R-Ohio) interview with NTD Capitol Report April 2, 2022.
Wenstrup also took note of the book titled “The Unnatural Origin of SARS and New Species of Artificial Humanized Viruses as Genetic Weapons,” released by AMMS in 2015.
“The book described how to create weaponized chimeric SARS coronaviruses, the potentially broader scope for their use compared to traditional bioweapons, and the benefits of being able to plausibly deny that such chimeric coronaviruses were artificially created rather than naturally occurring,” the report states.
The congressman, who is also a medical doctor, said that the military research institute had also collaborated with the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the body at the center of the lab leak theory of the pandemic origins.
Wenstrup said there were “published articles with scientists from the Fifth Institute, as well as the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV) … combining their military with their other areas of research.”
He further pointed to a scientist with the PLA’s Fifth Institute, General Zhou Yusen, who had reportedly worked with the WIV for years prior to the pandemic.
According to Wenstrup, Zhou was “heavy into the gain of function type research or chimeric research.”
“Notably, in the spring of 2020, as global COVID-19 cases surpassed 7 million and COVID-19 deaths surpassed 400,000, General Zhou reportedly died under mysterious circumstances,” according to the GOP report.
Challenging the Intelligence Community
The lawmaker noted that an update to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI)’s declassified assessment (pdf) of the origins of COVID-19 released in October 2021 did not address important information that indicates the Chinese regime’s interest in offensive bioweapons.
“The declassified updated assessment also failed to address the AMMS’ publicly stated interest in the development of engineered coronaviruses for biological weapons purposes,” the GOP report states.
“The IC [intelligence community] should be transparent regarding what it does or does not know regarding the relationship between the PLA’s Fifth Institute of the Academy of Military Medical Sciences (AMMS), which China has publicly admitted conducts bioweapons research and coronavirus experiments, and the WI,” the report continues.
Wenstrup specifically pointed to Zhou’s death under questionable circumstances, saying “We want to know what the intelligence community knows about his work, and also about his untimely death and the circumstances around that.”
Lack of Cooperation
The lawmaker highlighted that China has consistently failed to cooperate with investigations into the origins of COVID-19.
“When they finally did let people come to China, they really didn’t let them into the lab and to see everything. As a matter of fact, they [investigation group] had to be held in quarantine for one or two weeks before they even got to have a conversation,” he said, referring to a team of World Health Organization-recruited scientists who visited China in early 2021 to probe the pandemic origins.
“And interestingly, the only person they would allow from America was a gentleman named Peter Daszak, who was with EcoHealth Alliance, who was getting NIH [National Institutes of Health] funding, and then working with the Chinese on coronavirus type of research,” he added.
Daszak is the president of EcoHealth Alliance, a New York-based nonprofit that has drawn considerable scrutiny over funneling federal funding to the WIV for research on coronaviruses, which some experts say amounted to gain-of-function research.
Given the history of collaboration between Daszak and WIV, Wenstrup said there was potential for bias.
Further Investigation
Wenstrup said that the committee would continue to probe the pandemic origins, especially after the Republicans take the gavel in the new year.
“We hope to move forward from here and bring people forward that have been involved with [the Wuhan] Institute of Virology, and any other people that have done this type of science and get their opinions and get knowledge,” he said.
“These are always the concerns when it comes to weapons. So we need to continue to delve in that direction. And as the Intelligence Committee, we have the responsibility of oversight and to be aware of the national security threats that may be out there,” he added.
It’s important to get to the bottom of this question so as to prevent future pandemics from emerging, the congressman said.
“As a physician, I can tell you this is important because we have to know about lab security around the world and for our own sake; we also have to do more to make sure that we are prepared if something like this should ever happen again,” he said.
The Epoch Times has reached out to Eco Health Alliance and and ODNI for comments.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jan/3/chinas-nuclear-forces-built-part-us-technology/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=o5AljGT9f7rhs6IvBRMy1RXkHLtkuPxPUMMBXaw3l3%2BcTgceCwHJXY0c%2FJN7iWNC&bt_ts=1672766194718
-
"Beijing’s rapid buildup of nuclear forces has been assisted by American nuclear and missile technology obtained by Chinese spies and through U.S. space and nuclear cooperation in the 1990s, according to a review of Chinese technology records and internal U.S. government documents."
:x
-
"Beijing’s rapid buildup of nuclear forces has been assisted by American nuclear and missile technology obtained by Chinese spies and through U.S. space and nuclear cooperation in the 1990s, according to a review of Chinese technology records and internal U.S. government documents."
:x
Begs the question, if we were trying to destroy our country and its place in the world, isn't this the exact course we would take?
-
https://www.usnews.com/news/world-report/articles/2023-01-04/russia-to-sail-hypersonic-missiles-into-atlantic-ocean-in-clear-affront-to-u-s?fbclid=IwAR3BD0vxIF5XOhfI7P4J-433e_NP7apANe7LGJlcntNK7I-mWbj7IgXTvqM
"Clear affront"?!?
What hubris!!!
-
CCP Wants to Infect the World as It Rejects International Travel Curbs, Conceals COVID Data: Gordon Chang
By Dorothy Li and Jan Jekielek January 6, 2023 Updated: January 7, 2023biggersmaller Print
As a deadly new virus first emerged in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in late 2019, the regime downplayed the severity of the virus and concealed the true scale of the outbreak.
It wasn’t until late January 2020 that Chinese officials disclosed that the mysterious virus was caple of transmitting between humans. The delay in public warning allowed the disease to develop into a global pandemic: By the time Wuhan was locked down, cases had already been reported in the United States, Thailand, and several other countries.
Related Coverage
CCP Wants to Infect the World as It Rejects International Travel Curbs, Conceals COVID Data: Gordon ChangTimeline of Chinese Regime’s Coverup of COVID-19 Outbreak
To contain the virus’ advance, dozens of nations imposed travel restrictions on Chinese visitors around February 2020. The regime, in response, lashed out at countries taking precautionary measures, with the foreign ministry accusing these nations were “sowing panic,” even though a swath of China had shut down.
“You put those two things together, and it means they deliberately spread this disease beyond its borders,” said Gordon Chang, author and a senior fellow of Gatestone Institute.
“The reason why we need that context is because we’re seeing something similar today. As this disease … is ripping through China, they are now opening up the doors to Chinese leaving [the] country for tourism. And they are not sharing sequencing. They’re not telling the world what’s actually going on in China right now,” the China expert said in a recent interview with EpochTV’s “American Thought Leaders” program, due to premiere on Jan. 7 at 7:30 p.m. ET.
Epoch Times Photo
Gordon Chang, China analyst and author of “The Coming Collapse of China,” in New York City on Jan. 3, 2023. (Samira Bouaou/The Epoch Times)
His comment came as the regime becomes increasingly angry at countries requiring travelers from China to take COVID tests, measures taken before the regime reopened the country’s border on Jan. 6.
“We will take corresponding measures based on the principle of reciprocity according to different situations,” China’s foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning said Tuesday.
China is battling with a massive outbreak that has yet to peak. The World Health Organization is appealing for transparency, saying China’s official tallies are underreporting the actual scale of the outbreak.
China’s top health body stopped publishing daily infections and has acknowledged only a handful of deaths during the current outbreak. But as many as 248 million people, or 18 percent of the country’s population, were estimated to have caught the virus between Dec. 1 to 20, according to a memo from the health regulator’s internal meeting leaked online and confirmed by news outlets. Local officials and domestic health experts estimated the infection rate likely exceeded 50 percent in multiple provinces and reached 80 percent in Beijing.
Amid the explosive outbreak, the lack of reliable data has stoked global concerns, particularly regarding the possibility of a new, more dangerous variant circulating in the country.
Epoch Times Photo
Travelers of a flight from China enter the COVID-19 testing center of the Paris-Charles-de-Gaulle airport in Roissy, outside Paris, on January 1, 2023. (Julien De Rosa/AFP via Getty Images)
The United States and over a dozen nations now require a negative COVID test result for visitors from China. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention said the measure is to impede the spread of COVID on American soil, given “the lack of adequate and transparent epidemiological and viral genomic sequence data.” The agency is now considering measures like sampling wastewater from flights from China to track potential new variants.
Such responses, according to Chang, were not enough if the regime was once again seeking to “deliberately” infect the world.
“That’s entirely wrong. I mean, if China is doing this again, and it’s clear that they are, then we should not be allowing arrivals in from China until we know what the devil is going on,” he said.
Reasons for Abandonment of Zero-COVID
Since the initial lockdown of Wuhan, the regime had vowed to eliminate every infection among communities through repeated testings, swift lockdowns, prolonged quarantine, and digital surveillance. By mid-Octorber, when Chinese leader Xi Jinping claimed an unprecedented third term in office during the 20th Party congress, he doubled down on the communist-style campaign, known as zero-COVID, despite growing the economic and human toll.
Then, following historic nationwide protests in late November, the regime abruptly reversed the course and scrapped most of the zero-COVID policy.
In reality, the long-held strategy was already under strain ahead of the reversal, Chang noted.
“The World Health Organization actually said that the virus was surging through China before the lockdowns were lifted on Dec. 7, so that they were saying the lifting of the lockdowns didn’t cause the surge because it was already there,” the analyst said.
“When you start looking at the data … we’re seeing that there really were infections, and now it is just completely out of control,” he said. The COVID crisis set off even before the protests. Official daily infections was surging from 3,837 new cases on Nov. 5, to nearly 40,000 on Nov. 27, a record high of cases prompting more local controls. Though the official figures are still likely a vast undercount given the communist regime’s practice of covering up data that may tarnish its image.
Epoch Times Photo
Protesters shout slogans during a protest against the Chinese Communist Party’s strict zero COVID measures in Beijing, China, on Nov. 28, 2022. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
From Nov. 26, rare protests against the draconian curbs erupted in major cities and prominent university campuses across the nation. Some young demonstrators in Shanghai went even further, calling Xi and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to step down.
That bold voice “frightened the Communist Party,” said Chang. “That means that the mood was revolutionary.”
Beyond the widespread anger, the fight against COVID has taken a heavy toll on the economy. The daily testings and constant tracing of close contacts over the prior three years have drained local finances and hammered the country’s shaky economy, Chang said.
As COVID outbreaks kept repeating, the implementation of the costly approach was “just not possible anymore for the party,” he said. “They just didn’t have the resources to do it.”
Mounting economic costs, a slowing economy, a rapid COVID surge despite tightened lockdowns, combined with the biggest display of public discontent in decades, finally pushed the regime to relinquish the zero-COVID policy long championed by the CCP, according to Chang.
“Those four reasons are essentially why the Communist Party didn’t change its policies on Dec. 7, it just capitulated to the disease. This is the collapse of Communist Party policy.”
COVID ‘Conquered Communism’
Outbreaks are now spreading unabated through the nation’s 1.4 billion population with low natural immunity after three years of strict lockdowns, leaving ill-prepared hospitals inundated with patients and crematoriums overloaded with bodies, essentially a reprise of what happened in Wuhan and other Chineses cities in early 2020.
The chaotic scenes reveal the “communist party policy was a failure,” Chang said.
Related Coverage
CCP Wants to Infect the World as It Rejects International Travel Curbs, Conceals COVID Data: Gordon Chang‘Whether You Live or Die, No One Cares’: Chinese Left Helpless Amid COVID Crisis
The anti-COVID campaign originated from a Chinese communist ideology that humans are over heaven. “Battling with heaven is endless joy, fighting with the earth is endless joy, and struggling with humanity is endless joy,” Mao Zedong, the first leader of the CCP, claimed.
“Mao talked about conquering nature, well Xi Jinping obviously thought he could conquer the disease,” Chang said.
“We saw the Communist Party, despite its great efforts, was not able to stop this. And that’s why we’re having just unfolding tragedy in China right now.
“And eventually the disease conquered communism.”
===========
Also see
https://www.theepochtimes.com/mkt_app/china-deliberately-pushing-citizens-to-get-covid-19-to-reach-herd-immunity-microbiologist_4964539.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-01-06&src_cmp=uschina-2023-01-06&utm_medium=email&est=MUWv7w%2BbKUCMUR%2BF6xGIaMqRwk8EtAh1w8JCO7ap9GTctjk7wgx8wqeTVjHWOFP%2BCm6i
-
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1620592699450732544.html
https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/system/media_attachments/files/101/128/041/original/0b67177410e4ca6c.jpg)
So, just "defensive biologic weapons' then?
:roll:
‘No Offensive Biologic Weapons’ in Ukrainian Biolabs: Pentagon
By Katabella Roberts April 4, 2022 Updated: April 4, 2022biggersmaller Print
There are “no offensive biologic weapons” in the Ukrainian laboratories that the United States has been funding, a Pentagon official told Congress on April 1.
Deborah Rosenbaum, assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical, and biological defense programs, told the House Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations on April 1 that there are “unequivocally … no offensive biologic weapons in the Ukraine laboratories that the United States has been involved with.”
The Pentagon funds labs in Ukraine through its Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), a support agency within the Department of Defense for countering weapons of mass destruction, and U.S. and Ukrainian officials both say the labs seek to prevent bioweapons and pathogens.
According to a Pentagon fact sheet released in March (pdf), since 2005, the United States has “invested approximately $200 million in Ukraine … supporting 46 Ukrainian laboratories, health facilities, and diagnostic sites.”
The Biological Threat Reduction Program has “improved Ukraine’s biological safety, security, and surveillance for both human and animal health,” according to the fact sheet.
However, Russia has, in recent months, accused the U.S.-funded laboratories in Ukraine of developing biological warfare weapons. Such allegations were being aired on Russian state-run media even before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine on Feb. 24.
The Russian Ministry of Defense issued a March 6 statement on Telegram accusing Ukraine of having destroyed disease-causing pathogens being studied at a lab in Ukraine that the ministry said is funded by the U.S. Department of Defense.
Russia’s allegations regarding the biological laboratories appeared to be repeated by the Chinese regime on March 7.
The World Health Organization stated in March that it advised the Ministry of Health in Ukraine to destroy “high-threat pathogens to prevent any potential spills.”
But analysts believe that the narrative being pushed by the Kremlin is part of its plan to create a false-flag operation in an attempt to justify using chemical weapons operations in Ukraine itself.
Rosenbaum told officials on April 1 that “the department remains very concerned about the ability to get accurate and transparent information out to the U.S. public, as well as certainly our allies and the rest of the world.”
“So one of the things that the department has been doing—and this is particularly related to the public health laboratories in Ukraine that is being tragically used by the Russians as a potential for a false flag operation—from the White House on down to the Defense Department, as well as Department of State, as well as all of the vehicles that we have to be able to communicate accurate information out about this and the work that has been underway,” she said.
Robert Pope, director of the DTRA’s Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, told the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in February that the labs might contain Soviet-era bioweapons and warned that the conflict in Ukraine could accidentally lead to the release of dangerous disease-causing pathogens.
“I think the Russians know enough about the kinds of pathogens that are stored in biological research laboratories that I don’t think they would deliberately target a laboratory,” Pope said. “But what I do have concerns about is that they would … be accidentally damaged during this Russian invasion.”
Rosenbaum made her comments shortly after White House press secretary Jen Psaki cautioned officials to be on the lookout “for Russia to possibly use chemical or biological weapons in Ukraine or to create a false flag operation using them.”
The White House’s concerns also have been repeated by NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg and the UK’s Ministry of Defense, which said last month that it had “seen no evidence to support” the accusations made by Russia.
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-now-has-more-icbm-launchers-than-the-us-lawmaker-confirms_5040894.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-02-08&src_cmp=uschina-2023-02-08&utm_medium=email&est=XSJwEYxg9y675iqIi7YKy7QIWYPgpZQaL7HkOUlo8%2Fk1xxp2n7UlRzgFZO3s%2F74c8D0e
====================================
====================================
WSJ
The China ICBM Launcher Gap
Another sign of Beijing’s growing nuclear ambitions.
By The Editorial BoardFollow
Updated Feb. 7, 2023 6:49 pm ET
Another day, another story about China’s advancing military power. This one comes in a notice to Congress that the People’s Liberation Army has more land-based intercontinental missile launchers than the U.S.
The U.S. Strategic Command, which oversees U.S. nuclear forces, told the Senate and House Armed Services committees in a Jan. 26 notice that China has now built more fixed and mobile ICBM launchers than the U.S. The mobile point is important because the launchers can move and hide. Soviet mobile launchers were a U.S. preoccupation during the Cold War.
The news doesn’t mean China has surpassed the U.S. in total nuclear weapons. The U.S. nuclear force is a triad of air, land- and sea-based missiles and bombs. Many of the Chinese silos are also still empty, U.S. officials say. But China is rapidly building its nuclear force so that it will soon reach parity with Russia and the U.S.
The latter two countries are bound by the New Start treaty that puts limits on the total number of warheads, though the U.S. recently said Russia is refusing to admit U.S. inspectors as set by the treaty. China isn’t a party to New Start and it has refused all Washington entreaties, in both the Trump and Biden Administrations, to join talks to expand the treaty.
All of this underscores the urgent need to pick up the pace of U.S. nuclear modernization, both in warheads and delivery systems. Deterrence is growing more complicated, but it begins with a robust, modern U.S. arsenal.
-
https://www.frontpagemag.com/big-pharma-covertly-menaces-the-populace-with-mutations/
-
Whoa. So many threats on so many fronts to keep track of , , , :x :x :x
-
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/403151.php
Good thing we don’t produce food in Ohio!
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/pete-buttigieg-and-chernobyl-in-ohio
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/pete-buttigieg-and-chernobyl-in-ohio
https://amp.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/sep/10/epa-head-wrong-911-air-safe-new-york-christine-todd-whitman
Whoops!
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/pete-buttigieg-and-chernobyl-in-ohio
https://dcenquirer.com/as-ohio-train-derailment-disaster-continues-two-more-trains-derail-across-the-country-coincidence-or-systemic-oversight/
Nice how an area with lots of un-ClotShotted Amish gets bathed with carcinogens.
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/pete-buttigieg-and-chernobyl-in-ohio
https://dcenquirer.com/as-ohio-train-derailment-disaster-continues-two-more-trains-derail-across-the-country-coincidence-or-systemic-oversight/
Nice how an area with lots of un-ClotShotted Amish gets bathed with carcinogens.
https://dailycaller.com/2023/02/13/tucker-carlson-derailment-ohio-biden-buttigieg/
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/sitrep-update-on-east-palestine-ohio
-
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/cuban-missile-crisis-nuclear-vault/2023-02-16/jupiter-missiles-and-endgame-cuban?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=f4d03e5d-5134-481a-9e4f-05ea014acaa2
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/sitrep-update-on-east-palestine-ohio
https://twitter.com/nicksortor/status/1626327835668320256
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/sitrep-update-on-east-palestine-ohio
https://twitter.com/nicksortor/status/1626327835668320256
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/580/049/original/8d8fe8e6b26913ac.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/580/049/original/8d8fe8e6b26913ac.jpg)
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/sitrep-update-on-east-palestine-ohio
https://twitter.com/nicksortor/status/1626327835668320256
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/580/049/original/8d8fe8e6b26913ac.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/580/049/original/8d8fe8e6b26913ac.jpg)
https://www.dailywire.com/news/they-should-be-willing-to-drink-it-epa-says-water-is-safe-after-ohio-train-crash-j-d-vance-invites-him-to-take-a-sip
Drink the water.
-
https://ace.mu.nu/archives/403214.php#403214
-
DC_Draino:
Railways are governed by federal law
A toxic cloud affecting multiple states falls under federal jurisdiction
The chemical burn required Dept. of Transportation & EPA approval & likely got final sign-off by Biden
Now you know why they’re ignoring this crisis
It’s their fault.
-
(https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/38d7d4985c72c10c.png)
-
(https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/38d7d4985c72c10c.png)
https://theconservativetreehouse.com/blog/2023/02/18/strange-stuff-two-weeks-after-east-palestine-toxic-chemical-spill-epa-administrator-tells-cnn-site-not-safe-for-epa-workers/
-
What is the URL for that meme?
-
https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1626411810869096450
-
https://twitter.com/ElijahSchaffer/status/1626411810869096450
https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/11/health/ohio-train-derailment-white-noise/index.html
Predictive programming?
-
https://andmagazine.substack.com/p/pete-buttigieg-and-chernobyl-in-ohio
https://dcenquirer.com/as-ohio-train-derailment-disaster-continues-two-more-trains-derail-across-the-country-coincidence-or-systemic-oversight/
Nice how an area with lots of un-ClotShotted Amish gets bathed with carcinogens.
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/735/210/original/cbbaa5ea83e1a484.jpeg
(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/127/735/210/original/cbbaa5ea83e1a484.jpeg)
-
What is the URL for that meme?
https://westernrifleshooters.us/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/38d7d4985c72c10c.png
-
TY
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=og020FMLMCc
-
https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/128/247/700/original/d01515fd37476915.jpg
(https://media.gab.com/cdn-cgi/image/width=1050,quality=100,fit=scale-down/system/media_attachments/files/128/247/700/original/d01515fd37476915.jpg)
-
Not quite sure what is the best thread for that.
It certainly sounds possible, but what is the actual source for it?
-
https://www.theepochtimes.com/china-accelerating-nuclear-armament-without-any-transparency-nato-chief_5203210.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-04-19&src_cmp=uschina-2023-04-19&utm_medium=email&est=XuFg8LFwhc3BKjwYldACeX%2FjSz5DeoveFD4Q6W1t4PNkAH4lh2rHB60AF6niv0o3CbY3
-
https://www.oann.com/newsroom/who-warns-of-huge-biological-risk-after-lab-seized-in-sudan/
-
https://www.oann.com/newsroom/who-warns-of-huge-biological-risk-after-lab-seized-in-sudan/
I’m glad the OGUS would never us things live this as “cover for action” for releasing the next bio weapon!
-
https://www.oann.com/newsroom/who-warns-of-huge-biological-risk-after-lab-seized-in-sudan/
I’m glad the OGUS would never us things live this as “cover for action” for releasing the next bio weapon!
(https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgcxE7UgUsrtiJ7B9YTT6Ro-TcXU7xgcZtb6ctLX9gjAL_fO_ZYFMBn5MpqtuDTvK245IuAgtItSrDrUXXf5oCnNKkRIimN2V9_V_xZdsQONCj44VkROh3SvA7ThV2R-4G0KlNOan6dp98olT7yGZ6OB-l0Ary8Pxl4cqZKl-ZOsCAk1aNzrXlUB8wIHw/s539/sudanlab.JPG)
A LEVEL 4 Biolab. WTF?!?
-
https://twitter.com/DrLiMengYAN1/status/1654723227074297858
-
https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/nuclear-vault/2023-06-06/nuclear-weapons-and-law-war?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=00ca7179-c802-4db6-98b2-69273062fe58
-
Nuclear build-up. Nuclear powers are modernizing their arsenals and increasing the number of deployed nuclear warheads, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). As of January, the U.S. increased its number of deployed warheads to 1,770 from 1,744 a year earlier, and Russia went to 1,674 from 1,588. Over the same stretch, China’s nuclear arsenal increased to 410 warheads from 350.
-
June 16, 2023
View On Website
Open as PDF
Growing Nuclear Arsenals
China's arsenal may match America's and Russia's by 2030.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Nuclear Weapons 2023
(click to enlarge)
Amid the war in Ukraine and intensifying geopolitical competition, the world’s nuclear powers are scaling up and modernizing their arsenals. The countries with the most nuclear warheads deployed are the United States and Russia. Together, they possess close to 90 percent of all nukes. In 2022, Russia deployed an additional 86 nuclear warheads, bringing its total to 1,674. The U.S. added 26 – a reversal of its longstanding downward trend – giving it a total of 1,770 deployed warheads.
However, China is trying to catch up. Its nuclear arsenal grew to 410 from 350 last year, and according to SIPRI, it may catch up with the Russians and Americans by the end of the decade. At the same time, the major powers are reducing transparency about their nuclear weapons, and Moscow and Washington suspended dialogue on strategic stability. Nevertheless, the number of nuclear weapons around the world is well below past decades and is not growing significantly. In addition, the U.S. and Russia remain committed to avoiding armed confrontation – and especially nuclear escalation.
-
https://twitter.com/Michael_Yon/status/1670153403815567361
-
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/4185291/biological-warfare-and-ogus-deeply-involved-with-ccp-https-twitter-com-drlimengyan1-status-167
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GaD8qEWJglY&t=285s
-
World War III Will Be Fought With Viruses
A two-front biological and cyber attack could lead to a U.S. defeat before we know what hit us.
By Richard A. Muller
July 6, 2023 6:08 pm ET
Vladimir Putin’s losses in Ukraine and the rebellion of the Wagner Group have increased the chances that the Russian president will lash out and expand the 17-month-old conflict. But World War III may not be what you expect. The current paradigm of escalating nuclear conflict was articulated 60 years ago by physicist Herman Kahn, founder of the Hudson institute, but other technologies have come a long way since then. Conventional guns, bombs, missiles or troops may not figure in World War III at all. Biological and computer viruses are likely to be the weapon of choice.
Covid wasn’t a deliberate attack, but it quickly and successfully damaged the American economy. Any nation thinking of using a deadly virus as a weapon of war would first need to immunize its own people, perhaps under the guise of a flu vaccination. Long-term population-level immunity would require the virus be sufficiently optimized, before release, to reduce the probability of further mutation.
The novel coronavirus was sufficiently optimized so that no serious mutations occurred for nine months. The Delta variant appeared in India in October 2020. A weaponized virus would also need to incorporate an immune suppression gene—Covid had ORF8—that reduces early symptoms, facilitating spread by asymptomatic carriers. For a covert attack to be successful, the virus would need to be released not in the country of origin but in the target country, perhaps near a biological facility so the world would falsely conclude it came as a leak from a surreptitious domestic program.
Recall that early Covid panic came from Italy’s inability to care for all of its infected patients. Thus, for maximum disruption, the second thrust of any aggression might be a cyber attack on hospitals, perhaps disguised as ransomware. Again, the trick would be to make it seem as if the attack were originating outside the aggressor’s country. In other contexts this is called a “false flag” operation. The target country might not even recognize it as part of a two-front, synergistic attack of biological and computer viruses.
Ransomware could simultaneously target energy grids, power plants, factories, refineries, trains, airlines, shipping, banking, water supplies, sewage-treatment plants and more. But hospitals would be the most salient targets. Avoiding obvious military targets would enhance the illusion that World War III hadn’t begun. The attacker or attackers might falsely claim their own systems are also under siege. Misdirection can be more effective than a smoke screen.
This isn’t some far-fetched disaster scenario cooked up by Hollywood screenwriters. Biological and cyber viruses have been, in a sense, field tested. The great value to the attacker of a two-pronged biological and cyber attack is the possibility of achieving destructive goals while keeping the whole operation covert.
Deterring such an attack will require a clear, credible and articulated promise to respond to aggression. It can’t be covert. If China, Russia or both attacked the U.S. this way, how would we react? Policy makers need to come up with an answer. An economic embargo seems suboptimal. Many would interpret nuclear retaliation as disproportionate. Developing a retaliatory virus would take time, and responding this way would clearly violate the Biological Weapons Convention.
Defense matters too. It is essential to be able to develop vaccines rapidly using a viral backbone so that they can be retargeted with minimal additional testing. Hospitals and other critical infrastructure need to harden their cyber defenses.
If deterrence fails and an attack takes place, correctly identifying the perpetrator has to be the first priority. This may or may not be easy, but retaliating against the wrong actor risks making an already bad situation worse. Reopening the Covid-19 origin investigation would provide good practice. Confiscation of the foreign assets of the attacking nation could be effective. A strong cyberattack capability aimed at the enemy’s military and industry is key. Hospitals should be spared, lest the victim of an attack appear to become the aggressor and lose the moral high ground.
There are many reasons why an adversary may want to launch a covert attack on the U.S. economy. America’s leaders need to take seriously the prospect that their country could be defeated without being invaded or even knowing it is under attack. The way to deter such an attack is to convince potentially hostile actors that success is impossible and the consequences for the attacker will be swift and severe. The U.S. needs to make it clear that its commitments to North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies, Ukraine, Taiwan and others won’t waver even if the American economy falters.
Mr. Muller served as a Jason National Security adviser for 34 years. He is a professor of physics emeritus at the University of California, Berkeley. His books include “Physics for Future Presidents” and “Energy for Future Presidents.”
-
https://twitter.com/rawsalerts/status/1680073339488927745
https://michaelyon.substack.com/p/protective-masks?utm_source=substack&publication_id=459345&post_id=135051403&utm_medium=email&utm_content=share&triggerShare=true&isFreemail=true
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/ive-never-seen-anything-mysterious-chinese-bio-lab-discovered-remote-california-city?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1703
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/aug/2/inside-ring-cyber-nuclear-strikes-target-us-infras/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=ZpYPULKmRXT%2BZotmJs5LECJ7uX1F%2BIqQq6hdMj113nIXqH08yjhdO82C0gDDILwH&bt_ts=1691000087244
-
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19858/prestige-biotech-china
-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AdtLxlttrHg
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/political/newsom-funded-chinese-covid-lab-known-bidens-fda?utm_source=&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=1733
https://twitter.com/THATJennCheng/status/1687663235049328640?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1687663235049328640%7Ctwgr%5E562f3aa0d8edc10329158e402454dbe26bd25150%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.zerohedge.com%2Fpolitical%2Fnewsom-funded-chinese-covid-lab-known-bidens-fda%3Futm_source%3Dutm_medium%3Demailutm_campaign%3D1733
-
https://marketrealist.com/company-industry-overviews/who-owns-23andme/?fbclid=IwAR2clCgunj-xR5YrjYDnIenpnml5fMP9yGP4xRno046vhc0MObWUvBuVCSs
-
Improving global response to lab-based threats
U.S. and other countries should strengthen Biological Weapons Convention
By Richard Weitz
On Aug. 17, the Department of Defense released its updated Biodefense Posture Review designed to achieve “a resilient total force that deters the use of bioweapons, rapidly responds to natural outbreaks, and minimizes the global risk of laboratory accidents.”
The Biodefense Posture Review and other authoritative U.S. and foreign government strategies emphasize that countering these threats requires comprehensive international deterrence and defense measures.
Meanwhile, global representatives are meeting this month in Geneva in a complementary effort to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention, or BWC. The convention is a vital international security tool.
When it went into force in 1975, the BWC was the first multilateral treaty to ban an entire class of weapons of mass destruction.
Adherents commit not to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, transfer or employ offensive biological weapons. Any biological research activity should be intended only for peaceful purposes.
Until recently, the urgent need to fight COVID-19 preoccupied such initiatives, but now that the World Health Organization has formally declared the pandemic over, the international community should take advantage of this respite to augment global defenses against future biological threats.
Although most governments have joined the BWC, several have yet to accede to the convention.
Some states have encountered challenges in fulfilling all their national obligations.
Meanwhile, the United States remains concerned that some countries have undeclared biological weapons programs. Terrorists have also employed bacteria, viruses, and other harmful agents.
The advancement of biological science and emerging technologies — such as gene editing, gain-of-function studies, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, synthetic biology, nanotechnology, 3D printing and advanced robotics — facilitates their acquiring biological weapons.
In addition, governments can maintain small quantities of dangerous pathogens to develop countermeasures against them, creating a loophole for weapons research.
Most problematically, many modern biotechnologies are “dual use” — applicable for military as well as civilian purposes.
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the BWC lacks a dedicated body to monitor and enforce compliance. Past efforts to establish a mandatory verification regime were unsuccessful.
Governments that suspect a violation can only call for consultations to resolve disputes or appeal to the U.N. secretary-general and Security Council to investigate.
Furthermore, the BWC has only a small Implementation Support Unit, based at the Geneva branch of the U.N. Office for Disarmament Affairs, to help administer the treaty.
Unlike the International Atomic Energy Agency or the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, which have thousands of employees and million-dollar budgets, the Implementation Support Unit has a small staff and a minuscule budget.
The international community has struggled to manage these challenges to the BWC. One innovative solution comes from Kazakhstan, whose government has long been a global nonproliferation leader.
Soon after recovering its independence in 1991, Kazakhstan eliminated the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal it inherited from the Soviet Union, acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and joined the Central Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone.
At Kazakhstan’s initiative, the U.N. General Assembly declared Aug. 29 the International Day Against Nuclear Tests. In cooperation with the IAEA, Kazakhstan recently became the first country to establish a low enriched uranium bank to discourage the proliferation of capabilities that can make nuclear weapons.
Kazakhstan has sought to apply its nuclear nonproliferation experience to counter biological threats.
Upon gaining independence, Kazakhstan acceded to the BWC and dismantled the massive biological weapons infrastructure the Soviet government constructed on its territory.
The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction Program provided extensive financial and technical aid to help eliminate or convert these facilities to engage in defensive research, including developing local COVID-19 tests.
The U.S. Defense Department and Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Health still conduct regular discussions and programs to counter biological dangers.
In his speech to the U.N. General Assembly in September 2020, Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev proposed creating an International Agency for Biological Safety.
The agency aims to help the BWC, U.N., and other bodies keep biological research peaceful and transparent; improve global health and safety; build state capacity; accelerate the development of vaccines and biological countermeasures; establish more inclusive export control mechanisms; expand international trust and cooperation through improved accessibility of confidence-building measures, known as CBMs; and maintain a database of potential assistance to states threatened by biological attack. The Agency for Biological Safety would overcome other critical BWC gaps. For example, while countries can share information about their biological activities through CBMs such as detailed questionnaires, these submissions are voluntary and underused. If the safety agency could provide for regular review of these CBMs and analyze their aggregate data, member governments would have a better understanding of the state of BWC implementation. The agency could also support further initiatives — such as societal means of verification, voluntary peer reviews, and AI-assisted training and open-source data mining — to increase global surveillance and make states more confident about receiving international assistance.
Early detection of natural, accidental and deliberate biological threats is imperative for mounting effective defenses.
The agency could also counter the kind of disinformation that has poisoned discussions of COVID-19 by supporting a more institutionalized and frequent international review of biological developments.
That Kazakhstan has decent relations with Russia, China and the United States should help the proposal overcome the power divisions that have impeded recent progress on other nonproliferation initiatives.
The Biodefense Posture Review correctly highlights the imperative of enhancing U.S. and allied defenses against biological threats. The United States and other countries should also consider initiatives to strengthen the BWC and other nonproliferation structures.
Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/aug/26/study-warns-chinese-nanotechnology-fueling-advance/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=EaQYdNaSeRgNCP60dFpWAZ5j41qOPbQeg9JgVlEsaWt15WK7893Yhvq2Xr%2Fcz73x&bt_ts=1693217338139
-
In other nuclear-related news this week, central Europe's wild boar population is radioactive, and researchers now say it's not because of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, but a residue of Cold War nuclear weapons tests. Those tests are still affecting the soil in areas around Germany's state of Bavaria. The BBC has more, here.
-
https://survival-situation.com/news/disturbing-california-biolab-shrouded-in-mystery-as-china-links-emerge/
-
https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/4625019/tuberculosis-is-one-of-the-worst-diseases-known-to-mankind-killed-more-people-even-than-communism
-
https://www.zerohedge.com/medical/highly-likely-chinas-batwoman-warns-new-covid-outbreak
-
https://survival-situation.com/prepping-survival/russia-to-conduct-first-nationwide-nuclear-attack-drill/
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/oct/12/bipartisan-hill-panel-warns-us-nuclear-forces-will/?utm_source=Boomtrain&utm_medium=subscriber&utm_campaign=newsalert&utm_content=newsalert&utm_term=newsalert&bt_ee=ESNZR3p%2FZVz7zTm5NW%2FffGloHeEXf4F7vLYFSeqsqigTdWFZXiE81LHsFZ7XSkDU&bt_ts=1697140396923
-
I'd want a bit more info before going totally agog, but on the face of it this looks way too cozy.
https://www.frontpagemag.com/ex-employee-of-hamas-ally-worked-as-pentagon-special-assistant-for-nuclear-chemical-and-biological-programs/?fbclid=IwAR0seCuUnMO5gWsrj2Lwmp0o3BG5hFeNurirwG4hLNd6C06p3rbwCuPeY4o
-
well we had one CIA head who as congressman was for a one world government - > Panetta
We had another CIA head who was a member of the socialist party - > Brennan
how such people get to the top of the CIA is very odd.
-
Anyone else wonder at the bizarre topic being brought up every minute on all the MSM about
this concept of the "rules of war"?
the concept to me is such an oxymoron just on its' premise.
yeah I know Geneva etc. blah blah
-
Hat tip BBG:
https://www.theepochtimes.com/article/behind-a-secret-chinese-biolab-in-california-a-global-web-of-connections-5498112?utm_source=ref_share&utm_campaign=facebook&rs=SHRNCMMW&fbclid=IwAR3xoDQ_uCQiJXCH0ljuLWISPkk5ukvxa7mn0rIakfP0wy8wvSu2tQJv66o
Behind a Secret Chinese Biolab in California, a Global Web of Connections
Chinese companies related to the biolab have a troubling history in the United States, Canada, Hong Kong, and a handful of other countries.
Behind a Secret Chinese Biolab in California, a Global Web of Connections
A collage of the biolab in Reedley, Calif., on July 31, 2023. (Fresno County Public Health Department/Judicial Watch, Nathan Su/The Epoch Times, Courtesy of City of Reedley)
By Steve Ispas, Lear Zhou
|
Oct 19, 2023
Updated:
Oct 19, 2023
Note: This article has been updated to include details of the Oct. 19 arrest of Jia Bei "Jesse" Zhu.
The discovery of a black market Chinese biolab operating in California, and the subsequent investigation into it, has exposed a tangled web of shell companies obscuring ownership and loopholes that caused delays in cleanup and informing the public.
The public found out in March about a secret biolab operating in a warehouse in Reedley, California, about 25 miles southeast of Fresno.
But the warehouse and its biological hazards were discovered months earlier, on Dec. 19, 2022, by Jesalyn Harper, a code enforcement officer with the City of Reedley Fire Department.
Responding to an anonymous tip about the supposedly vacant warehouse, Ms. Harper discovered thousands of vials of bacterial and viral agents, including coronavirus, chlamydia, E. coli, streptococcus pneumonia, HIV, hepatitis, herpes, rubella, and malaria.
The business, operated by Prestige Biotech Inc., was also packaging and mailing out COVID-19 and pregnancy test kits, as well as housing nearly 1,000 lab mice.
A map illustration shows the location of the biolab in Reedley, Calif. (Illustration by The Epoch Times, Nathan Su/The Epoch Times, Shutterstock)
A map illustration shows the location of the biolab in Reedley, Calif. (Illustration by The Epoch Times, Nathan Su/The Epoch Times, Shutterstock)
Ms. Harper reported her findings to the City of Reedley, which contacted the FBI on the same day. But there was no single authority that could deal with all of the pathogens, chemicals, and biological hazards.
Eventually, a maze of agencies got involved in the investigation and cleanup, including city, county, and state authorities, as well as federal agencies such as the FBI, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The Biolab Discovery
The warehouse, located at 850 I Street in Reedley, was built in the 1950s mainly as a food packing plant. Trucks would drive up to the alcove area in front of the roll-up doors to load up.
More Articles
IN-DEPTH: More Details on Black Market Chinese Biolab Surface as Politicians Point Fingers
IN-DEPTH: More Details on Black Market Chinese Biolab Surface as Politicians Point Fingers
Black Market Biolab Uncovered in California Linked to China
Black Market Biolab Uncovered in California Linked to China
After Ms. Harper received the anonymous complaint about vehicles parked in the alcove, she went to investigate and also noticed a garden hose going into the building via a door being propped open—a potential plumbing violation.
Ms. Harper told The Epoch Times that she knocked at the door and saw three people boxing up pregnancy tests. One of them spoke no English, while the other two spoke very broken English.
At the beginning, Ms. Harper said the trio were very cooperative, but as she walked to the southern part of the building they became deflective.
"What do you do with the mice?" she recalled asking.
"We use the mice for experiments," they replied.
"What kind of experiments?"
"Oh, I don’t know, we just give them water."
"What’s in the refrigerators?"
"Just stuff for making the tests."
As Ms. Harper asked more specific questions, she said the staff answered less and less, pushing for her to leave. Once she saw labels on the fridges such as "blood," "HIV," she realized it was a potentially hazardous environment and left the building.
Jesalyn Harper, a code enforcement officer with the City of Reedley Fire Department. (Courtesy of Jesalyn Harper)
Jesalyn Harper, a code enforcement officer with the City of Reedley Fire Department. (Courtesy of Jesalyn Harper)
She reported her discovery to City of Reedley officials, who contacted the FBI immediately and met with them two days later, on Dec. 21, 2022.
The FBI took all of January 2023 to investigate and finally deemed the warehouse safe for city employees in early February.
When Reedley city officials returned to the warehouse on March 3 with an inspection warrant, they reported that no items had been removed from the lab, although some additional items had been stored since December.
Who's in Charge?
For Ms. Harper, the process was just beginning. She began to work with the state and county to determine which organizations needed to be involved.
“We had to look at these labs and break them down component by component and see who had the authority for each component," Ms. Harper told The Epoch Times.
"For example, the California Department of Public Health would have authority over medical devices like pregnancy tests; DTSC [the Department of Toxic Substance Control] would have oversight over some of the chemicals, possibly how they were being used."
Experts in medical waste and environmental health were brought in to address the items in the refrigerators, medical waste, human waste, blood, and used pregnancy tests.
The EPA and FDA were also involved, and both agencies retained some of the documentation and paperwork found in the lab.
Each item had to be dealt with separately—each drawer, each box, each container, each refrigerator, and each pallet had to be looked at by various departments depending on what was found.
Meanwhile, Ms. Harper had been feeding and watering the lab mice found onsite while she and other city officials were figuring out who had authority.
They discovered on March 16 that no one in the U.S. government clearly has regulatory authority over lab mice, so Ms. Harper used the California Health and Safety Code that references animal cruelty to obtain a warrant. A veterinarian then recommended to have the mice humanely euthanized, which took place after obtaining the requisite permit on April 12.
image-5513057
Nearly 1,000 mice were kept for experimentation, 178 of which were already dead due to the rancid conditions. The mice had resorted to “cannibalism,” in which the more dominant rodents ripped the hair and skin of inferior ones. (Fresno County Public Health Department/Judicial Watch)
All other biologicals were removed by July 8, after an abatement warrant was authorized by the Superior Court of California–Fresno County. All other assets were moved during the first two weeks of August.
An emergency ordinance, No. 2023-008, passed at the Reedley City Council meeting on Sept. 12 temporarily placed a ban on the establishment of warehousing and laboratories with biosafety levels 2 through 4 within the city limits. The City of San Carlos in the Bay Area has a similar ban.
"I’ve had a lot of sleepless nights knowing there is no one out there looking for these labs. This could be happening all over the United States," Ms. Harper said.
"It's been an eye-opening experience, realizing the many cracks in our government for these types of organizations to fall through, and also realizing that the government is not our first line of defense."
Ms. Harper said these types of under-the-radar entities can purchase "a lot of chemicals and a lot of biologicals easily and no one is watching over them to make sure they know what they are doing."
"We have to make sure these labs are not able to come here until there is oversight," she said.
Who Owns the Secret Lab?
The biolab in Reedley is owned by Prestige Biotech Inc., but a closer look into a complex network of companies and employees, including Prestige, all ultimately lead back to Jia Bei "Jesse" Zhu, a Chinese national with a Canadian passport.
Just hours after this article was published on Oct. 19, Mr. Zhu was arrested in California and charged with manufacturing and distributing misbranded medical devices and for making false statements to the FDA. A sealed indictment had been filed on Oct. 18.
Mr. Zhu faces a maximum of three years in prison for the misbranding charge and five years for the false statements charge according to the U.S. Attorney's office for the Eastern District of California.
According to court documents, between December 2020 and March 2023, Mr. Zhu and others allegedly manufactured, imported, sold, and distributed hundreds of thousands of COVID-19 and other test kits in the United States and China. They did so through the companies Universal Meditech Inc. and Prestige Biotech Inc. without proper authorization.
“As part of his scheme, the defendant changed his name, the names of his companies, and their locations,” said U.S. Attorney Philip A. Talbert.
The criminal complaint alleges that during the investigation, Mr. Zhu made several false statements to FDA officials, including using a false name and falsely representing his knowledge about the company's activities.
City of Reedley staff were told by Prestige Biotech president Yao Xiuqin that his company had taken over the warehouse—including the biological materials, samples, and lab mice—from Universal Meditech Inc. after the latter claimed bankruptcy, according to a court document filed on June 15.
Prestige Biotech is the main creditor of Universal Meditech.
Public records show that Prestige Biotech was first registered in Nevada to Wang Zhaolin (also known as Lynn Warner) on April 3, 2019, before current company president Mr. Yao, who’s based in China, took over on May 28, 2021.
Universal Meditech was established in Tulare, California, on Nov. 25, 2015, naming Mr. Zhu as CEO. The company obtained a California business license on March 20, 2019.
"Universal Meditech was started by a group of Canadian and Chinese investors and specializes in research, development and assembly of diagnostic test kits used in dairy cattle reproduction," said Paul Saldana, who was president and CEO of the Tulare County Economic and Development Center in 2015, according to Visalia Times Delta.
image-5513061
image-5513062
(Left) The interior of a biolab in Reedley, Calif., on July 31, 2023. (Courtesy of City of Reedley) (Right) During the pandemic Universal Meditech Inc. switched from a cattle reproduction related business to producing pregnancy test kits and COVID-19 test kits. (Tiziana Fabi/AFP via Getty Images)
Shortly after the pandemic started in March 2020, Universal Meditech switched from a cattle reproduction-related business to producing pregnancy test kits and COVID-19 test kits.
In August 2020, a fire broke out at the company's Fresno location and a subsequent environmental health inspector’s visit found that Universal Meditech didn't have a hazardous materials plan for storing ethanol in the warehouse.
Current documents filed with the California secretary of state don't show Mr. Zhu as CEO of Universal Meditech anymore, instead naming Wang Xiaoxiao as CEO, chief financial officer, and secretary, with an address in south central Fresno.
Another name connected to Universal Meditech and many other similar companies is Wang Zhaoyan, who’s also known as Wang Yan.
Ms. Wang is listed as president of Universal Meditech in an online business directory, and The Epoch Times obtained a plumbing permit issued to Ms. Wang of Universal Meditech from the City of Tulare in 2016. An FDA filings report for Universal Meditech also lists Ms. Wang as the "official correspondent."
Ms. Wang is also a principal in another California-based company, Superior Meditech Investments LLC, and an officer or managing member for three other related companies based in Nevada—PBI Diagnostic Laboratory LLC, Medi-Source LLC, and David Destiny Discovery LLC.
She’s also listed as executive director and general manager for a company in Qingdao, China, called Ai De Biopharmaceutical Industry (Qingdao) Co. Ltd.
The general manager for Ai De Biopharmaceutical is also the president for Prestige Biotech (the secret biolab in Reedley that bailed out Universal Meditech), according to California and Nevada business filings and a Chinese company directory.
All of the executives and all the companies eventually lead back to Mr. Zhu, the Chinese man with a Canadian passport.
(Left) 1155 E. North Ave. Suite 101, Fresno, Calif., 83725, is an address used by Advanced Meditech LLC in business filings, but appears to have a new tenant, “Bella” on Sept. 23, 2023. (Ping Chen/The Epoch Times). (Right) 1320 E. Fortune Ave. Suite 102 Fresno, Calif., 93725, is an address used by Advanced Meditech LLC in business filings, but appears to be an empty building, on Sept. 23, 2023. (Ping Chen/The Epoch Times)
(Left) 1155 E. North Ave. Suite 101, Fresno, Calif., 83725, is an address used by Advanced Meditech LLC in business filings, but appears to have a new tenant, “Bella” on Sept. 23, 2023. (Ping Chen/The Epoch Times). (Right) 1320 E. Fortune Ave. Suite 102 Fresno, Calif., 93725, is an address used by Advanced Meditech LLC in business filings, but appears to be an empty building, on Sept. 23, 2023. (Ping Chen/The Epoch Times)
Mr. Zhu and several of his companies have been mired in legal battles stretching from Canada to Hong Kong to the United States since 2008.
In September 2010, Mr. Zhu filed a proof of claim as "the owner" of Ai De Biopharmaceutical in a bankruptcy proceeding for yet another of his companies, JingJing Genetics Inc.
"The sole shareholder of Ai De is a British Virgin Island company (Unique Way Technology Limited) which, in turn, is owned by IND, which is owned by Zhu," according to a 2016 ruling by the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Canada.
Ai De Biopharmaceutical's street address in Qingdao is the same as other Chinese medical firms such as Qingdao Guangdi Packaging Material and Ai De Diagnostic. According to import records, most of these firms have shipped medical supplies to Universal Meditech and Prestige Biotech.
Mr. Zhu resigned from his positions of chairman of the board and general manager at Ai De Biopharmaceutical in November 2018, according to Chinese documents.
The Epoch Times called several numbers for Ai De Biopharmaceutical's headquarters in China, but the numbers have been disconnected or are no longer in service.
Jessie Zhu's Operations
Mr. Zhu was born in China in 1961 and obtained a Bachelor of Science degree from the Beijing University Medical Department in 1984 and a master's degree from the Peking Union Medical College Hospital in 1988. He went on to conduct bio research at the University of British Columbia in Canada, according to Sina Finance.
In 1991, Mr. Zhu established IND Dairytech Ltd in Vancouver and became chairman of the board.
In the late 1990s, Mr. Zhu flew a dozen Holstein cattle (a breed known for high milk production) from Quebec to Beijing to enhance milk production in China, where it was in great need.
A decade later, Mr. Zhu's focus switched to breeding technologies. Rather than transporting cattle to China, IND Dairytech began sending Holstein semen and embryos in an effort to develop cattle herds.
Primarily serving customers in Canada, IND Dairytech was listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange in 2008, delisted in 2011, and acquired shortly afterward by IND Lifetech, another company controlled by Mr. Zhu.
image-5513065
JingJing Genetics' principals in 2012 were ordered to pay $6.2 million to XY for allegedly stealing the latter's technology to manufacture and sell sexed semen for “non-human mammals” such as cattle. (Indranil Mukherjee/AFP via Getty Images)
The Chinese characters of "Ai De" are also in the upper left corner of IND Lifetech's logo.
Not long after IND Lifetech acquired IND Dairytech, it changed its name to JingJing Genetics, still based in Canada and controlled by Mr. Zhu.
In 2008, JingJing Genetics was sued by XY LLC, a Colorado-based company that claimed damages for "conspiracy, deceit, breach of confidence, breach of contract, and inducing breach of contract."
XY had developed the technology to "choose the sex of the offspring using sexed semen or sexed embryos" for "non-human mammals, including cattle, horses, pigs, and endangered species," according to an online statement.
The company was "the master licensee in control of all sperm sorting in non-human mammals worldwide."
JingJing Genetics was allegedly stealing XY’s technology to manufacture and sell bovine sexed semen, but without the strict controls required from a licensee.
The case was decided in 2012, with the judge ruling against JingJing Genetics for violating intellectual property agreements.
image-5513313
JingJing’s three principals at the time—Mr. Zhu, Selen Cui Feng Zhou, and Jin Tang—were found liable for "civil fraud and conspiracy to cause economic injury" and were ordered to pay CA$8.5 million (US$6.2 million) to XY, according to a statement at the time.
Canadian Judge Stephen Kelleher also issued JingJing and its principals a permanent injunction from using the so-called cytometer technology that analyzes and sorts cells for choosing the sex of the offspring.
However, days after the judge's ruling, XY received information that Mr. Zhu had set up a new company, Fraser Biomedical Inc., "for the purpose of secretly producing sexed semen using XY’s technology," according to a report by the Canadian Broadcast Network.
Judge Kelleher subsequently found Mr. Zhu in contempt for nonpayment of the CA$8.5 million and in 2015 sentenced him to jail for six months. But Mr. Zhu had fled Canada in 2014, and The Epoch Times was unable to find evidence that he has ever returned.
While ruling in another British Columbia Supreme Court case involving Mr. Zhu and his many companies, Justice Shelley Fitzpatrick said, "Zhu’s counsel indicated to me that Zhu is afraid of setting foot in this jurisdiction for fear that he will be arrested," according to court documents.
In that case, Judge Fitzpatrick ruled in 2016 that Mr. Zhu and his employees were to pay an additional CA$330 million (US$242 million) to XY for continued conspiracy to obtain intellectual property and confidential information.
"It is difficult to express the degree and scope of Zhu's wrongdoing in relation to his concerted plan and actions to steal XY’s Confidential Information for his own financial ends," Judge Fitzpatrick wrote in her ruling.
Court documents show transcripts from messenger app WeChat between Mr. Zhu and Mr. Xu from 2014. The messages reveal that Mr. Zhu’s goal was "total bankruptcy" for XY.
"If the new system is swiftly marketed, causing the overall sexed semen production cost to fall by twice as much, how do you think they are going to live from now on? ... So I propose using about 3 years in making [XY] collapse or be acquired cheaply," Mr. Zhu wrote in a text to Mr. Xu in May 2014.
"At the most opportune time, to acquire [XY] using the best price should be our basic strategy. Before that, we shall engage in attrition with them, drag them on as much as possible, drag them down, to let them feel all the time the sword of Damocles is on their heads. For this, we have already designed a comprehensive operational scheme."
image-5513073
image-5513074
(Left)The interior of the biolab. (Courtesy of City of Reedley) (Right) Thousands of vials of bacterial and viral agents were discovered at the biolab. (Fresno County Public Health Department/Judicial Watch)
An email exchange from April 2011 was also highlighted in the 2016 ruling.
In an email to Mr. Tang and Mr. Zhu, Mr. Xu wrote, “Well it seems American imperialism is very cunning, suggest to make an imitation one,” clearly referring to XY.
Mr. Zhu replied, "The law is strong, but the outlaws are ten times stronger."
In her ruling, Judge Fitzpatrick said: "The evidence makes clear that all of these defendants each played a part in the overall plan to steal XY’s confidential information for their own use by various means.
"This was all done for the benefit of the IND Group.
"As an overarching comment, it is difficult to express the degree and scope of Zhu’s wrongdoing in relation to his concerted plan and actions to steal XY’s confidential information."
Hong Kong Connection
In 2014, two years after the British Columbia Supreme Court ruling against JingJing Genetics, XY still hadn't received the CA$8.5 million in damages. In further pursuit of the damages, XY sued another company controlled by Mr. Zhu—this time in Hong Kong.
XY sought to access its damages from the defendant's frozen HSBC bank account connected to yet another company controlled by Mr. Zhu, Grand Network Technology Co. Ltd (GNT).
An example of a page from court documents on the case among XY, Mr. Zhu, and Grand Network Technology. (Vlex)
An example of a page from court documents on the case among XY, Mr. Zhu, and Grand Network Technology. (Vlex)
GNT was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands in 2000 and then registered as a private company in Hong Kong in 2014, according to court documents.
Peter Wang and another man were appointed as GNT's first directors and major shareholders, as they were also employed by companies within IND Group, the group of companies controlled by Mr. Zhu with operations in Canada and China. Peter Wang is Mr. Zhu's brother-in-law.
Although still marked as “active” in Hong Kong's company directory, GNT appears to be a shell company, as no website, services, or contacts are listed.
Mr. Zhu and GNT appealed the case in Hong Kong on two grounds: one was jurisdiction-related, and the other was that Mr. Zhu didn't own GNT.
The onus was put on XY to litigate that Mr. Zhu controlled GNT, which caused lengthy delays in the case.
During the trial, IND employees testified that they didn't know who their actual employer was and that they were moved around between companies without knowledge or consent while keeping the same roles. They only knew they had been transferred when they received their paycheck from another company.
They regarded all the various companies involved as one group—the IND Group—all owned and controlled by Mr. Zhu. Employee testimony revealed that Mr. Zhu instructed an accounting manager in the IND Group to transfer money out of IND LifeTech Group Ltd to GNT’s account to "avoid execution by XY."
According to testimony from James Yunjian Yang—a former IND office manager from 1999 to 2014—several offshoot companies operated in the United States.
Mr. Yang was involved in developing businesses in California, Australia, and Uruguay. Specifically, in Uruguay, where Mr. Yang set up IND Lifetech Uruguay, Mr. Zhu asked him to be a director of this new company.
Mr. Yang asked for a secondary position, as he didn't want to take full responsibility, according to his testimony. As a result, a consultant, Edward Richard, agreed to be a shareholder. Mr. Yang, despite owning 95 percent of the company on paper, said he always considered Mr. Zhu the owner.
A 2016 ruling in Hong Kong revealed that although Mr. Zhu had never been a shareholder or director of GNT, he ultimately controlled the company. The ruling dismissed GNT's appeal against freezing its bank account to pay XY.
"The evidence reinforces a good arguable case that although Jesse Zhu has never been a director or shareholder of GNT, he controlled or owned GNT," the court document states.
"Although the various companies appear to have been set up for different purposes, they were, from Mr. Zhu’s point of view, interchangeable as his wishes dictated."
GNT's jurisdiction appeal was decided earlier this year, on May 16. A Hong Kong justice ruling to dismiss GNT’s appeal in favor of XY, which was reported as a rare win for a foreign plaintiff with no operations or assets in Hong Kong.
image-5513068
A search on the Vlex legal intelligence platform for "Jessie Jia Bei Zhu" returns 27 legal cases—19 in Canada, seven in Hong Kong, and one in the United States (Wisconsin).
A search for "Universal Meditech Inc." returned 132 legal cases in 10 countries—116 in the United States—while "Prestige Biotech" returned 53 cases in four countries, of which 31 are in the United States.
The Epoch Times contacted Prestige Biotech, Universal Meditech, Jesse Zhu, and Wang Zhaoyan for this article, but received no response.
The Epoch Times reached out to XY and its parent company, Sexing Technologies, but didn't receive a response by press time.
Back to Reedley
Recently, Universal Meditech—which had given over its biolab contents to Prestige Biotech—was set to move to a new location near the Fresno Yosemite International Airport, according to local media outlet GV Wire.
Ms. Harper, the City of Reedley code enforcer, said that after reports of the issues the city was having surfaced during the Reedley investigation, Fresno officials denied the proposal for the new location, and Universal's lease was canceled.
The FDA issued a warning on Aug. 11 regarding test kits manufactured by Universal Meditech, and on Aug. 31, Universal Meditech announced that it was going out of business and issued a recall of all its products, including the COVID-19 test kits.
Universal Meditech has announced that it was going out of business and issued a recall announcement of all its products. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration)
Universal Meditech has announced that it was going out of business and issued a recall announcement of all its products. (U.S. Food and Drug Administration)
On Sept. 13, the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party issued its first-ever subpoena to gather evidence in its investigation into the Reedley biolab.
"It is deeply disturbing that a Chinese company set up a clandestine facility in small-town America that contained, per the CDC, ‘at least 20 potentially infectious agents’ like HIV and the deadliest known form of malaria," said Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-Wis.), chair of the committee.
Responding to the subpoena, Reedley officials turned over thousands of pages of documents, hundreds of photos, and hours of video.
The FBI replied to an Epoch Times inquiry about the investigation, saying: "The Reedley matter is being handled by local Fresno County officials. In keeping with long-standing policy, the FBI has neither confirmed nor denied any investigation and has not commented on this matter."
Ms. Harper said she's had a lot of sleepless nights since discovering the secret biolab.
"I'm sitting at home, and I'm thinking, 'Gosh, you know, this is happening here in Reedley, this could be happening all across the United States,'" she told The Epoch Times.
"It keeps you up at night, knowing that there's no one out there looking for these labs. And even if we do find them, a city or county could get frustrated to the point that they just tell them, 'OK, here's a notice, move out,' and then it just moves on to the next city."
-
Both Parties Can Agree on America’s Nuclear Peril
To deter threats from China and Russia, the U.S. needs to modernize and recapitalize its arsenal.
By John Bolton
Oct. 25, 2023 12:52 pm ET
‘Unanimous” and “bipartisan” outcomes are rare in today’s Washington. “America’s Strategic Posture,” the recent report from the congressional commission on U.S. nuclear capabilities and defense strategies, merits those laurels. Led by Madelyn Creedon, a senior Clinton and Obama administration official, and former Sen. Jon Kyl, a Republican, the commissioners prepared a 145-page report that warrants urgent review by anyone seeking a safe future for America.
The bottom line is that the U.S. faces “two nuclear peer adversaries for the first time” in a rapidly expanding threat environment. Maintaining and improving our nuclear-deterrence force against China and Russia will require significant effort. Since the nuclear era began, Washington’s thinking, strategizing and budgeting have assumed only one significant nuclear threat. Rogue-state capabilities weren’t insignificant, and nuclear-capable allies were a plus, but the bipolar standoff with Moscow always mattered most. With China now forming a tripolar nuclear world, bipolar deterrence calculations, strategy and nuclear hardware are simply inapposite.
Days after the paper’s release, the Pentagon published its own finding that a tripolar nuclear scenario effectively exists, well ahead of our predictions. This reality raises questions that demand strategic responses. Will the U.S. face entirely separate Chinese and Russian threats, or will Moscow and Beijing act in coordination? What do two peer nuclear foes mean for U.S. pre-emptive or second-strike capabilities? How many new targets in China—or elsewhere—must we now put at risk?
Precise estimates of force requirements and budget levels are currently impracticable, although significant growth in nuclear weapons and delivery systems is inevitable. Our capabilities and the entire nuclear-enterprise infrastructure needs modernization, upgrading and recapitalization to meet the Sino-Russian threat. In Oct. 19 Senate testimony, Mr. Kyl estimated total new costs for such a project to be 5% of the Pentagon and Energy Department budgets, in large part because of political leaders’ sustained failure to modernize nuclear capabilities.
“America’s Strategic Posture” reaffirms the logic of maintaining the nuclear triad of delivery systems: ground-based missiles, long-range bombers and ballistic-missile submarines. The triad undergirds deterrence by “presenting an intractable targeting problem for adversaries.”
Nuclear-force resilience is more crucial when facing threats from two adversaries, not one. To help fashion the structure and size of the future nuclear force, the report identifies strategic principles from which to derive military requirements. That includes maintaining an assured second-strike capability and directing nuclear strategy at what Moscow and Beijing prize most: their leaders and the security institutions keeping them in power. The commission emphasizes that America “should continue the practice and policy of not directly targeting civilian populations.”
Naive isolationist elements in both parties will argue that the U.S. can address the new nuclear environment through arms-control agreements. That is a distant dream. Further strategic-arms treaties are essentially irrelevant and dangerous unless and until the U.S. has “a strategy to address the two-nuclear-peer threat environment” and its “related force requirements are established,” the commission says. Without knowing what we need, we can hardly start negotiating it away.
While the U.S. modernizes, upgrades and enlarges its capabilities, the commission encourages interim improvements, such as potentially and swiftly reconverting B-52s rendered incapable of carrying nuclear weapons under the New Start Treaty, to sustain the deterrent force during this vulnerable transition. We must hedge against delays due to unpredictable, incrementally funded appropriations, particularly the common—and harmful—practice of using continuing resolutions.
America’s aging nuclear weapons and inadequate life-extension programs cast doubt on the stockpile’s reliability and safety. To be credible, a deterrent must satisfy the “always/never rule”: “Nuclear weapons must always work when they are supposed to, and never detonate when they are not supposed to.” At some point within a few years, the U.S. will need to conduct underground nuclear tests. Even highly sophisticated simulations aren’t enough.
Finally, the commissioners emphasize nonnuclear capabilities, particularly “integrated air-and-missile defense systems” for homeland and theater-focused protection. The report may at last end the debate on “deterrence by denial,” the core purpose of strategic and tactical missile defenses. The commission recommends national missile-defense systems “that can deter and defeat coercive attacks by Russia and China,” Ronald Reagan’s seminal vision.
“America’s Strategic Posture” covers many other issues, but mark these words: unanimous and bipartisan. This isn’t congressional performance art; it’s a fire bell in the night.
Mr. Bolton is author of “The Room Where It Happened: A White House Memoir.” He served as the president’s national security adviser, 2018-19, and ambassador to the United Nations, 2005-06.
-
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/nov/30/china-defense-report-links-high-altitude-spy-ballo/
-
Castle BRAVO at 70:
The Worst Nuclear Test in U.S. History
Heavy Fallout from Test Sickened People on Marshall Island Atolls and Japanese Fishermen on Lucky Dragon
Blast Equivalent to 1,000 Hiroshimas Vaporized 10 Million Tons of Coral, Sand and Water
“No Place to Hide”: 1954 Model Overlaid Bravo’s Fallout on Northeastern U.S.
U.S. Weapons Designer: “We Didn’t Know What the Hell We Were Doing”
Washington, D.C., February 29, 2024 - Seventy years ago, the U.S. government air-dropped a massive thermonuclear weapon on Bikini Atoll in the Marshall Islands in what turned out to be the largest nuclear test in U.S. history. The Bravo detonation in the Castle test series had an explosive yield of 15 megatons—1,000 times that of the weapon that destroyed Hiroshima and nearly three times the six megatons that its planners estimated. The detonation vaporized some ten million tons of sand, coral and water that turned into a 100-mile-wide fallout cloud spewing radioactive debris on the inhabitants of Marshall Island atolls, U.S. military personnel, and Japanese fishermen aboard the Lucky Dragon. Bravo’s fallout necessitated the evacuation of over 230 people from Rongelap, Rongerik, and Utirik atolls (all part of the U.S. trusteeship for the Marshall Islands), including 28 U.S. military personnel. The immediate health effects were serious and long-lasting, and Rongelap became uninhabitable.
To mark this calamitous event, the National Security Archive today features a selection of key documents on the Bravo test collected from three sources: the Department of Energy’s OpenNet database, Alex Wellerstein’s reconstruction of DOE’s vanished Marshall Islands Nuclear Document Database (MINDD), and from State Department records at the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration (NARA).
Included in this update of an Electronic Briefing Book published ten years ago, on the 60th anniversary of the Bravo test, are several films of the Bravo shot, including a U.S. Air Force film report from the commander of Joint Task Force 7, the unit that conducted the Castle Series. That film includes footage of both the Bravo detonation and the evacuation of U.S. personnel and Marshall Islanders in the wake of the test.
Other noteworthy documents in this posting include:
Early reports of radioactive contamination on nearby atolls and on the decisions, days later, to evacuate Rongelap, Utirik and Rongerik.
The secret directive establishing “Project 4.1,” the group charged with producing a “Study of Response of Human Beings Exposed to Significant Beta and Gamma Radiation Due to Fallout from High Yield Weapons.”
Japanese government accounts of the Lucky Dragon (Fukuryu Maru) incident.
An audio recording and transcript of the 31 March 1954 press conference where AEC Chair Lewis Strauss said that an H-bomb could “take out a city … destroy a city.”
The May 1954 petition by Marshall Islanders for an end to nuclear tests in the area.
U.S. Embassy Tokyo telegrams on Bravo’s adverse impact for U.S.-Japanese relations.
Internal U.S. government deliberations over providing compensation to the Japanese government and to Marshall Islanders for losses incurred due to nuclear testing.
Documents concerning the delay in returning inhabitants to Rongelap Atoll because of unsafe conditions.
U.S. government studies from 1954 and 1955 on the radiation and fallout effects of Castle Bravo.
The proceedings of an October 1967 conference sponsored by the Defense Atomic Support Agency on “selected effects of general war,” including reflections and assessments by individuals involved in the initial response to the Bravo crisis.
A comprehensive Defense Threat Reduction Agency report from 2013 on Castle Bravo exposing “legends and lore” about the test.
-
America’s Strategic Posture Is Slouching
We’ve let our nuclear force atrophy while Moscow and Beijing have expanded theirs and gone on offense.
By Jon Kyl
March 20, 2024 5:11 pm ET
Thinking about war is unpleasant, and preparing for it is expensive. It isn’t surprising that many policymakers prefer to spend their time and energy hoping for peace. But there’s a cruel paradox: If we’re negligent in anticipating and preparing for military threats, we will be less capable of conducting successful diplomacy, achieving disarmament agreements and harvesting economic fruit. Ignoring the potential for war increases its chances of happening, as well as the danger of our defeat.
With these thoughts in mind, the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States took on its congressionally mandated task of assessing how well the U.S. is positioned to deal with military threats over the coming decades. The commission is composed of 12 experts appointed by bipartisan congressional leadership in 2022. Brookings Institution fellow Madelyn R. Creedon was its chairwoman, and I was its vice chairman.
Together we submitted a unanimous report to Congress in October 2023 with 131 findings and 81 recommendations for how the U.S. can enhance its ability to deter war with China and Russia. Congress would do well to consider our conclusions during the next several weeks as it prepares to write the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act and following appropriations bills.
The U.S. is facing a historically unique global threat environment. Washington is on the cusp of having two nuclear peer adversaries—in Beijing and Moscow—each with ambitions to disrupt the international status quo, by force if necessary. We didn’t expect this and thus are unprepared to respond to it.
Two developments drove the commission’s assessment of our nation’s strategic posture. First, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. allowed its nuclear force to atrophy. At the time we considered Russia to be a competitor, not an adversary, and China a less serious challenge.
Second is the rapid modernization of Russia’s nuclear forces and China’s military breakout. Beijing intends to create a nuclear triad—land-, sea- and air-based nuclear delivery systems—that it hopes will match that of Russia and the U.S. by 2035.
Washington has struggled to modernize its nuclear forces in response to the Russian threat. Worse, the commission found, we have barely begun to develop plans to deal with the new Chinese threat. That is unacceptable, as Russia continues to maul Ukraine and China contemplates an invasion of Taiwan. The U.S. must urgently modernize our strategic deterrent to deal with both threats.
This means being able to produce more nuclear weapons if necessary and more “delivery vehicles”—missiles, bombers and submarines—than currently planned. This isn’t, as some critics have claimed, a call for a new “arms race.” The commission simply acknowledged that Russia and China have already embarked on an unprecedented military buildup, which, if unaddressed, will neutralize the strategic deterrent to prevent nuclear war on which the U.S. has relied since the end of World War II.
Rebuilding our capacity won’t be easy. The U.S. no longer has the advantage of an unrivaled industrial base. We lack a workforce skilled in critical areas, from shipbuilders to nuclear scientists. Supply-chain deficiencies have placed great stress on delivery schedules of new weapons.
While the commission didn’t attempt to calculate the costs of its recommendations, defense spending will obviously have to increase. Every recent defense secretary and Joint Chiefs chairman has said that the U.S. strategic deterrent, underpinned by our nuclear force, is the military’s first priority. As such, the U.S. can afford to fund our recommended modernization. The nuclear-force component is only a sliver of our overall defense budget—or, as the Congressional Budget Office noted, some 7.5% of the total 10-year cost of the president’s 2023 defense budget submission. The U.S. can muster additional spending, especially if the president and congressional leadership take the case to the American people—another recommendation of our report.
The U.S. government’s first responsibility is to protect the American people—particularly from nuclear annihilation. To do so, Washington needs conventional and nuclear forces strong enough that no adversary would ever be tempted to attack. As the commission concluded: “The challenges are unmistakable; the problems are urgent; the steps are needed now.”
Mr. Kyl is vice chairman of the Strategic Posture Commission. A Republican, he served as a U.S. senator from Arizona, 1995-2013 and 2018.