Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on March 10, 2008, 09:05:11 AM
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Woof All:
Although the Spanish language forum has various threads for politics and economics in Latin America, this forum has only a thread specificallty on Mexico-US and one on Venezuela. Latin America was my region of specialization for my International Relations major in college, and I have retained my interest in the region, particularly Mexico. So, with this thread we begin a catch all thread for anything in the region wihich is not Mexico or Venezuela:
Marc
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WSJ
The Chávez Democrats
March 10, 2008; Page A14
What is it about Democrats and Hugo Chávez? Even as the Venezuelan strongman was threatening war last week against Colombia, Congress was threatening to hand him a huge strategic victory by spurning Colombia's free trade overtures to the U.S.
This isn't the first time Democrats have come to Mr. Chávez's aid, but it would be the most destructive. The Venezuelan is engaged in a high-stakes competition over the political and economic direction of Latin America. He wants the region to follow his path of ever greater state control of the economy, while assisting U.S. enemies wherever he can. He's already won converts in Bolivia and Ecuador, and he came far too close for American comfort in Mexico's election last year.
Meanwhile, Colombian President Álvaro Uribe is embracing greater economic and political freedom. He has bravely assisted the U.S fight against narco-traffickers, and he now wants to link his country more closely to America with a free-trade accord. As a strategic matter, to reject Colombia's offer now would tell everyone in Latin America that it is far more dangerous to trust America than it is to trash it.
Yet Democrats on Capitol Hill are doing their best to help Mr. Chávez prevail against Mr. Uribe. Even as Mr. Chávez was doing his war dance, Senate Finance Chairman Max Baucus was warning the White House not to send the Colombia deal to the Hill for a vote without the permission of Democratic leaders. He was seconded by Ways and Means Chairman Charlie Rangel, who told Congress Daily that "they don't have the votes for it, it's not going to come on the floor," adding that "what they [the White House] don't understand it's not the facts on the ground, it's the politics that's in the air."
Mr. Rangel is right about the politics. No matter what U.S. strategic interests may be in Colombia, this is an election year in America. And Democrats don't want to upset their union and anti-trade allies. The problem is that the time available to pass anything this year is growing short. The closer the election gets, the more leverage protectionists have to run out the clock on the Bush Presidency. The deal has the support of a bipartisan majority in the Senate, and probably also in the House. Sooner or later the White House will have to force the issue.
Our guess is that Messrs. Baucus and Rangel understand the stakes and privately favor the accord. The bottleneck is Speaker Nancy Pelosi, who is refusing to allow a vote under pressure from her left-wing Members. These Democrats deride any link between Hugo Chávez and trade as a "scare tactic," as if greater economic prosperity had no political consequences. "President Bush's recent fear-mongering on trade shows just how desperate he is to deliver one final victory for multinational corporations," declared Illinois Democrat Phil Hare, who is one of Ms. Pelosi's main trade policy deputies.
These are the same Democrats who preach the virtues of "soft power" and diplomacy, while deriding Mr. Bush for being too quick to use military force. But trade is a classic form of soft power that would expand U.S. and Latin ties in a web of commercial interests. More than 8,000 U.S. companies currently export to Colombia, nearly 85% of which are small and medium-sized firms. Colombia is already the largest South American market for U.S. farm products, and the pact would open Colombia to new competition and entrepreneurship.
Which brings us back to Mr. Chávez and his many Democratic friends. Connecticut Senator Chris Dodd's early support helped the strongman consolidate his power. Former President Jimmy Carter blessed Mr. Chávez's August 2004 recall victory, despite evidence of fraud. And then there are the many House Democrats, current and former, who have accepted discount oil from Venezuela and then distributed it in the U.S. to boost their own political fortunes. Joseph P. Kennedy II and Massachusetts Congressman Bill Delahunt have been especially cozy with Venezuela's oil company. If Democrats spurn free trade with Colombia, these Democratic ties with Mr. Chávez will deserve more political scrutiny.
Senators Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama are both competing for union support. But if they wanted to demonstrate their own Presidential qualities, they'd be privately telling Ms. Pelosi to pass the Colombia pact while Mr. Bush is still in office. That would spare either one of them from having to spend political capital to pass it next year.
Instead, both say they oppose the deal on grounds that Mr. Uribe has not done more to protect "trade unionists." In fact, Mr. Uribe has done more to reduce violence in Colombia than any modern leader in Bogotá. The real question for Democrats is whether they're going to choose Colombia -- or Hugo Chávez.
See all of today's editorials and op-eds, plus video commentary, on Opinion Journal.
And add your comments to the Opinion Journal forum.
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The FARC Files
By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
March 10, 2008; Page A14
Colombia's precision air strike 10 days ago, on a guerrilla camp across the border in Ecuador, killed rebel leader Raúl Reyes. That was big. But the capture of his computer may turn out to be a far more important development in Colombia's struggle to preserve its democracy.
Reyes was the No. 2 leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, which has been at war with the Colombian government for more than four decades. His violent demise is a fitting end to a life devoted to masterminding atrocities against civilians. But the computer records expose new details of the terrorist strategy to bring down the government of Colombian President Álvaro Uribe, including a far greater degree of collaboration between the FARC and four Latin heads of government than had been previously known. In addition to Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, they are President Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Nicaragua's President Daniel Ortega and Bolivian President Evo Morales.
AP
A face-to-face encounter between Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Colombian President Álvaro Uribe at last week's Rio Group Summit.
Mr. Chávez is said to have been visibly distressed when told of the death of Reyes, a man he clearly admired. He also may have realized that he played a role in his hero's death, since it was later reported that the Colombian military had located the camp by intercepting a phone call to Reyes from the Venezuelan president.
Mr. Chávez rapidly ordered 10 battalions to the Colombian border. Should the Colombian military cross into Venezuela in search of FARC, he warned, it would mean war. That may have seemed like an unnecessary act of machismo. But the Colombia military has long claimed that the FARC uses both Ecuador and Venezuela as safe havens. Now it had shown that it wasn't afraid to act on that information.
There is a third explanation for Mr. Chávez's panic when he learned of the strike: He was alarmed about the possibility that his links with Reyes would be exposed. Sure enough, when the Colombian national police retrieved Reyes's body from Ecuador, it also brought back several computers from the camp. Documents on those laptops show that Mr. Chávez and Reyes were not only ideological comrades, but also business partners and political allies in the effort to wrest power from Mr. Uribe.
The tactical discussions found in the documents are hair-raising enough. They show that the FARC busies itself with securing arms and explosives, selling cocaine, and otherwise financing its terrorism operations through crime. In a memo last month, for example, a rebel leader discussed the FARC's efforts to secure 50 kilos of uranium, which it hoped to sell to generate income. In the same note, there is a reference to "a man who supplies me material for the explosive we are preparing, his name is Belisario and he lives in Bogotá . . ."
Though it is far from clear, Colombian national police speculated from this that a dirty bomb could be in the making. An April 2007 letter to the FARC secretariat lays out the terrorists' effort to acquire missiles from Lebanon. When Viktor Bout, allegedly one of the world's most notorious arms traffickers, was arrested in Thailand on Thursday, the Spanish-language press reported that he was located thanks to the Reyes computer files.
The maneuvers of thugs seeking power are no surprise. The more significant revelation is the relationship between the FARC and Mr. Chávez, Mr. Correa, Mr. Morales and Mr. Ortega. All four, it turns out, support FARC violence and treachery against Mr. Uribe.
According to the documents, Mr. Chávez's friendship with the FARC dates back at least as far as 1992, when he was in jail for an attempted coup d'etat in Venezuela and the FARC sent him $150,000. Now he is returning the favor, by financing the terrorist group with perhaps as much as $300 million. But money is the least important of the Chávez gifts. He is also using his presidential credentials on behalf of the FARC.
The FARC puts a lot of effort toward discrediting Mr. Uribe in the court of world opinion. A September letter from a rebel commander to "secretariat comrades" reads: "As to the manifesto, I suggest adding the border policy and making it public by all means possible to see if we can stop all the world from supporting uribismo [the agenda of Mr. Uribe] in the October elections." He then proposes a "clandestine" meeting between one rebel and Mr. Chávez in Caracas to discuss "our political-military project." Mr. Chávez, the rebels say in a later document, suggested that the FARC videotape any Colombian military strikes in the jungle for propaganda purposes.
In January, FARC leader Manuel Marulanda (aka "Sureshot") wrote to Mr. Chávez: "You can imagine the happiness that you have awoken in all the leaders, guerrillas, the Bolivarian Movement of New Colombia [and] the Clandestine Communist Party with the plan you put forth . . . to ask for the analysis and approval of recognizing the FARC as a belligerent [therefore legitimate] force."
The documents also show why it was a good idea for Colombia not to ask Ecuador for permission before moving against the FARC camp -- even though in the past it had done so when tangling with the rebels at the border. A January memo reports on a FARC meeting with the Ecuadorean minister of security, who said that Mr. Correa is "interested in official relations with the FARC" and has decided not to aid Colombia against the rebels. "For [Ecuador] the FARC is an insurgent organization of the people, with social and political proposals that it understands," the memo reads.
It also says Mr. Correa plans to increase commercial and political relations with North Korea, and that he requests that one of the FARC's hostages be released to him next time, so as to "boost his political efforts." A Feb. 28 letter from Reyes summarizes a meeting with an emissary of Mr. Correa: "He explained the proposal of Plan Ecuador, which seeks to counteract the damaging effects of Plan Colombia [the joint U.S.-Colombian effort against terrorism]."
Where do Bolivia and Nicaragua fit into this collaborative effort? An Oct. 4 letter from a rebel to FARC leader Marulanda reports that a Venezuelan minister has agreed that if there is a FARC summit, "Chávez would come with Ortega, Evo and Correa." All three, the letter said, are with Chávez to the death.
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I'm not sure if this article goes in this thread but I'll put in here. All I can say is I was shocked when I heard this.... but at the same time I shouldn't be surprised.
Five Cuban soccer players defect in U.S.: report
Links to this article
Reuters
Wednesday, March 12, 2008; 11:12 PM
MIAMI (Reuters) - Five members of the Cuban Under-23 national soccer team have defected in the United States while visiting the country for an Olympic qualifier, local media said on Wednesday.
A report on the Web site of the Miami Herald newspaper said the players abandoned their team after a match against the United States near Tampa Bay, Florida, on Tuesday night. The match ended in a 1-1 draw.
Team captain Yenier Bermudez, goalkeeper Jose Manuel Miranda, defender Erlys Garcia Baro, midfielder Yordany Alvarez and defender Loanni Prieto hatched the plan back in Cuba but told no one. Not even their families knew of their intent to defect, the Miami Herald said.
It said they spent Wednesday in Lake Worth, a town near Palm Beach about an hour's drive north of Miami, while trying to figure out how to begin a new life away from their communist-ruled homeland.
In a telephone interview with the Herald on Wednesday night, Bermudez was quoted as saying he and his teammates were feeling hopeful.
"We knew when we got to the United States what our plan was. It's something the five of us talked about a lot, so we were ready when the time came," he said.
"Of course, we're nervous because we're young, have no family here, and we don't yet know the way of life here, but we hope the Cuban and American communities will help us get started," Bermudez added.
The Herald said the five planned to seek political asylum in the coming days, and then begin their quest for jobs in professional soccer.
"Of course, my heart will be in Cuba with my family, but I want to have the freedom to better my life, to play professional soccer, to be the best I can be, and for that we had to make this sacrifice," Bermudez was quoted as saying
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Attention - Captainccs (sorry, I did not know where to post; further, unfortunately, I don't speak Spanish so I cannot go to the Spanish forum)
And while we may disagree sometimes, you seem bright and often have good opinions, so...
You said today;
It is important to stress that the people of Palestine elected HAMAS, they back HAMAS, and therefore they are as responsible as HAMAS for the suffering they are inflicting on themselves.
Change the words; insert Chavez where you say Hamas.
Now I am not saying that Chavez is a terrorist (?), nor nearly as terrible as the Hamas, but... to be honest I am not a big fan of the guy. Yet he was freely elected (and trying hard it seems for
another (illegal) term. But my point is that he was freely elected. I mean I don't like Bush for numerous reasons, but I respect him and respect the office. And of course, he was freely elected
and reelected and despite the polls, gracefully with honor will retire this month. If you have time, could you enlighten me as to why Chavez was freely elected and again reelected? Maybe you are a fan of his?
Or maybe not, but I don't get it. I am told (my good friend of mine is Ecuadorian) that Venezuela is a rich and beautiful country; why elect and reelect a guy like this??? I am not looking for a fight; only education.
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Hugo Chávez's coalition-building efforts suffered a setback yesterday when the Honduran military sent its president packing for abusing the nation's constitution.
It seems that President Mel Zelaya miscalculated when he tried to emulate the success of his good friend Hugo in reshaping the Honduran Constitution to his liking.
But Honduras is not out of the Venezuelan woods yet. Yesterday the Central American country was being pressured to restore the authoritarian Mr. Zelaya by the likes of Fidel Castro, Daniel Ortega, Hillary Clinton and, of course, Hugo himself. The Organization of American States, having ignored Mr. Zelaya's abuses, also wants him back in power. It will be a miracle if Honduran patriots can hold their ground.
Associated Press
That Mr. Zelaya acted as if he were above the law, there is no doubt. While Honduran law allows for a constitutional rewrite, the power to open that door does not lie with the president. A constituent assembly can only be called through a national referendum approved by its Congress.
But Mr. Zelaya declared the vote on his own and had Mr. Chávez ship him the necessary ballots from Venezuela. The Supreme Court ruled his referendum unconstitutional, and it instructed the military not to carry out the logistics of the vote as it normally would do.
The top military commander, Gen. Romeo Vásquez Velásquez, told the president that he would have to comply. Mr. Zelaya promptly fired him. The Supreme Court ordered him reinstated. Mr. Zelaya refused.
Calculating that some critical mass of Hondurans would take his side, the president decided he would run the referendum himself. So on Thursday he led a mob that broke into the military installation where the ballots from Venezuela were being stored and then had his supporters distribute them in defiance of the Supreme Court's order.
The attorney general had already made clear that the referendum was illegal, and he further announced that he would prosecute anyone involved in carrying it out. Yesterday, Mr. Zelaya was arrested by the military and is now in exile in Costa Rica.
It remains to be seen what Mr. Zelaya's next move will be. It's not surprising that chavistas throughout the region are claiming that he was victim of a military coup. They want to hide the fact that the military was acting on a court order to defend the rule of law and the constitution, and that the Congress asserted itself for that purpose, too.
Mrs. Clinton has piled on as well. Yesterday she accused Honduras of violating "the precepts of the Interamerican Democratic Charter" and said it "should be condemned by all." Fidel Castro did just that. Mr. Chávez pledged to overthrow the new government.
Honduras is fighting back by strictly following the constitution. The Honduran Congress met in emergency session yesterday and designated its president as the interim executive as stipulated in Honduran law. It also said that presidential elections set for November will go forward. The Supreme Court later said that the military acted on its orders. It also said that when Mr. Zelaya realized that he was going to be prosecuted for his illegal behavior, he agreed to an offer to resign in exchange for safe passage out of the country. Mr. Zelaya denies it.
Many Hondurans are going to be celebrating Mr. Zelaya's foreign excursion. Street protests against his heavy-handed tactics had already begun last week. On Friday a large number of military reservists took their turn. "We won't go backwards," one sign said. "We want to live in peace, freedom and development."
Besides opposition from the Congress, the Supreme Court, the electoral tribunal and the attorney general, the president had also become persona non grata with the Catholic Church and numerous evangelical church leaders. On Thursday evening his own party in Congress sponsored a resolution to investigate whether he is mentally unfit to remain in office.
For Hondurans who still remember military dictatorship, Mr. Zelaya also has another strike against him: He keeps rotten company. Earlier this month he hosted an OAS general assembly and led the effort, along side OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, to bring Cuba back into the supposedly democratic organization.
The OAS response is no surprise. Former Argentine Ambassador to the U.N. Emilio Cárdenas told me on Saturday that he was concerned that "the OAS under Insulza has not taken seriously the so-called 'democratic charter.' It seems to believe that only military 'coups' can challenge democracy. The truth is that democracy can be challenged from within, as the experiences of Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and now Honduras, prove." A less-kind interpretation of Mr. Insulza's judgment is that he doesn't mind the Chávez-style coup.
The struggle against chavismo has never been about left-right politics. It is about defending the independence of institutions that keep presidents from becoming dictators. This crisis clearly delineates the problem. In failing to come to the aid of checks and balances, Mrs. Clinton and Mr. Insulza expose their true colors.
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The trend toward socialism is growing throughout the world. The 1980's saw the pendulum of political opinion swing to the right with the fall of the USSR. Now I fear it is swing back the other way! The loss of freedom around the world and the associated suffering will only increase until the people once again learn the hard lessons of the past. The real tragedy of this trend is it is stronger in the USA than ever before, the check of a free country championing the cause of freedom is not in place anymore. Case in point is the government's response to Iran and President Zelaya's attempt to subvert the constitution of Honduras.
Freki
By PAUL KIERNAN, JOSE DE CORDOBA and JAY SOLOMON
TEGUCIGALPA, Honduras -- Honduran soldiers rousted President Manuel Zelaya from his bed and exiled him at gunpoint Sunday to Costa Rica, halting his controversial plan to stay in power but spurring fresh concerns about democratic rule across Latin America.
Honduran soldiers blocked a street near the residence of Honduran President Manuel Zelaya in Tegucigalpa on Sunday.
"I was awakened by shots, and the yells of my guards, who resisted for about 20 minutes," Mr. Zelaya said, describing the predawn raid of his home to reporters at the San José airport in Costa Rica, where he was flown against his will. "I came out in my pajamas, I'm still in my pajamas....When (the soldiers) came in, they pointed their guns at me and told me they would shoot if I didn't put down my cellphone."
Mr. Zelaya called the action a kidnapping, and said he was still president of Honduras. The U.S. and other countries condemned the coup. President Barack Obama said he was "deeply concerned" and called on all political actors in Honduras to "respect democratic norms." Venezuela President Hugo Chávez, an ally of the Honduran president and frequent nemesis of the U.S., said he would consider it an ''act of war" if there were hostilities against his diplomats. "I have put the armed forces of Venezuela on alert," Mr. Chávez said.
Central American leaders called a summit including the ousted president for Monday in Managua, Nicaragua to deal with the crisis, and the U.N. General Asembly planned to meet.
In Honduras, television stations were off the air, electricity was out in parts of the capital, and military jets streaked overhead, recalling Latin America's long history of military coups and dictatorships.
Later in the afternoon, Honduras's Congress formally removed Mr. Zelaya from the presidency and named congressional leader Roberto Micheletti as his successor until the end of Mr. Zelaya's term in January. Mr. Micheletti and others said they were the defenders, not opponents, of democratic rule.
"What was done here was a democratic act," Mr. Micheletti, who was sworn in as president Sunday afternoon, said to an ovation. "Our constitution continues to be relevant, our democracy continues to live."
Supporters of Honduras's President Manuel Zelaya demonstrate in front of a tire bonfire in Tegucigalpa.
Mr. Micheletti is a member of Mr. Zelaya's Liberal party. But he had opposed his plans for a referendum that could have led to overturning the constitution's ban on re-election, allowing Mr. Zelaya to potentially stay in power past January, when his term ends.
Mr. Zelaya has been locked in a growing confrontation with his country's Congress, courts, and military over his plans for the referendum -- planned for Sunday -- that would have asked voters whether they want to scrap the constitution, which the president says benefits the country's elites.
Honduras' Supreme Court had ruled the vote was illegal and the military had refused to take its usual role of distributing ballots, but Mr. Zelaya fired the chief of the army last week and pledged to press ahead.
There were no reports of violence Sunday, but tensions were high. Soldiers surrounded the presidential palace, keeping at bay a group of several hundred protesters who gathered to support the ousted president. The demonstrators burned tires and chanted slogans in favor of Mr. Zelaya. A 9 p.m. curfew was imposed, but in the evening the protesters, many carrying sticks and rocks, began adding chain-link fences to the burning tires as barricades to try to block the military from moving to break up the demonstrations.
"I love Zelaya, he's a good president," said Esther Ortiz, a 46 year old doctor, as she helped block off a street by the palace. "The oligarchy is just mad because Zelaya raised the minimum wage."
Honduras, one of Latin America's poorest countries, was a staging area for the U.S.-backed Nicaraguan Contra rebels during the 1980s. The country of about eight million people subsists on exports of bananas, shrimp, coffee, apparel and remittances from Hondurans in the U.S.
The Obama administration and members of the Organization of American States had worked for weeks to try to avert any moves to overthrow President Zelaya, said senior U.S. officials. Washington's ambassador to Honduras, Hugo Llorens, sought to facilitate a dialogue between the president's office, the Honduran parliament and the military.
The efforts accelerated over the weekend, as Washington grew increasingly alarmed.
Honduran President Overthrown
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Soldiers stormed the house of leftist President Manuel Zelaya in a predawn raid Sunday, arresting him and removing him from power amid a growing crisis over Mr. Zelaya's plans to try to get re-elected. Video courtesy Fox News.
"The players decided, in the end, not to listen to our message," said one U.S. official involved in the diplomacy. On Sunday, the U.S. embassy here tried repeatedly to contact the Honduran military directly, but was rebuffed. Washington called the removal of President Zelaya a coup and said it wouldn't recognize any other leader.
The U.S. stand was unpopular with Honduran deputies. One congressman, Toribio Aguilera, got a burst of prolonged applause from his colleagues when he urged the U.S. ambassador to reconsider his stand. Mr. Aguilera said the U.S. didn't understand the danger that Mr. Zelaya and his friendships with Mr. Chavez and Cuba's retired dictator Fidel Castro posed.
Retired Honduran Gen. Daniel López Carballo justified the move against the president, telling CNN that if the military hadn't acted, Mr. Chávez would eventually be running Honduras by proxy. It was a common view Sunday.
"There was no coup d'etat in Honduras," wrote Mariela Colindres, a 21-year-old Honduran who is studying at Indiana University, in an email. "An official who was subverting legality and had violated the Constitution was removed. Everything was done legally and this does not imply a rupture in the constitutional order."
The U.S. has a controversial history of backing coups in Latin America. It began promoting democracy strongly after the end of the Cold War, but in 2002 it hesitated in condemning a brief coup against Mr. Chávez and was sharply criticized by other Latin nations. Mr. Chávez came back to power and radicalized his posture against the U.S. Since then, he periodically claims the U.S. wants to oust him in a coup.
Mr. Zelaya's move to try to stay in power through the ballot box has become increasingly common in Latin America. Other leftist Latin American leaders like Venezuela's Mr. Chavez, Ecuador's Rafael Correa and Bolivia's Evo Morales have used referendums for a similar purpose. The temptation to stay in power isn't limited to leftists, either: Colombia's right-wing President Alváro Uribe is trying to change the constitution to allow him a third term.
At a Sunday news conference in Costa Rica, Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, ousted at gunpoint by the army hours earlier, denounced his exile as a kidnapping.
Latin America analysts said the Honduran coup will complicate President Obama's efforts to re-engage a region where anti-Americanism has flourished in recent years. They said Mr. Chavez is likely to seize on the crisis to depict Central America as under attack by capitalist forces.
As a result, analysts said Mr. Obama will need to aggressively call for the reinstatement of President Zelaya, despite U.S. concerns that he is seeking to mirror Mr. Chavez's campaign to secure limitless rule.
"It's very important for the U.S. to come out against the coup and make the point that the U.S. supports democracy unequivocally," said Kevin Casas-Zamora, Costa Rica's former vice president and a senior fellow at Washington's Brookings Institution. "This would prevent Chavez from stealing the show."
Mr. Casas-Zamora and other regional analysts said the coup raised questions about just how much influence Washington actually has in Central America, given the Obama administration's failed effort to avert it.
Both sides of the Honduras crisis traded allegations on Sunday. The secretary of Honduras' congress, José Alfredo Saavedra, showed reporters what he said was a resignation letter signed by Mr. Zelaya. The letter cited the crisis and "insuperable health problems" in resigning. Mr. Zelaya said the letter was a fake.
The ousted president called on unions, workers and peasant and indigenous organizations to demonstrate peacefully for his return. "I ask the people of Honduras to be calm, but for them to defend their democracy and rights," he said.
Write to Paul Kiernan at paul.kiernan@dowjones.com, José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com and Jay Solomon at jay.solomon@wsj.com
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Honduran President Manuel Zelaya was detained by military forces in the early hours of June 28, transported to a military base just outside Tegucigalpa and flown to Costa Rica on a military aircraft.
In a media interview from Costa Rica, where he is reportedly seeking asylum, Zelaya called his ouster a “kidnapping” and called on his supporters to resist the action peacefully. Zelaya supporters burned tires in front of the presidential palace to protest his ouster, and there were reports of security forces using tear gas to dispel protesters.
In a brief radio announcement, the Honduran Supreme Court said it ordered the army to remove the president to “defend the rule of law.” The Honduran Congress is expected to approve the president of Congress, Roberto Micheletti, to serve as interim president, and presidential elections slated for Nov. 29 will proceed on schedule, according to the country’s electoral court.
The details of Zelaya’s expulsion to Costa Rica are unclear, but Zelaya’s comments and his transportation on a military aircraft suggest he was forced to go there. It isn’t clear if the terms of his expulsion require him to stay in Costa Rica and not seek refuge with allies in Nicaragua, El Salvador or Venezuela. In response to the military action, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez announced he would take steps to “defeat” the coup against Zelaya, while the government of Ecuador announced it would not recognize the interim government of Honduras.
Zelaya’s ouster is not, in and of itself, necessarily a significant event. While there hasn’t been a coup in Latin America for some time, such an event is not exactly unheard of. There have been initial protests, and the next several days should show the extent to which Zelaya is supported by the populace. There could be marches and unrest among his supporters, particularly rural laborers and unions. One early flash point could be the military’s seizing materials for a referendum on possible constitutional reforms scheduled for June 28 — it was this referendum that triggered the army’s move against Zelaya, after the Supreme Court declared the reforms unconstitutional.
The question is whether Venezuela or other allies of the left-leaning Zelaya act on their pledges to resist the coup, and how those actions manifest themselves. While there were rumors (from possibly biased sources) of the movement of Venezuelans and Nicaraguans into Honduras in recent days, at the moment there does not appear to be any physical action being taken by Zelaya’s allies. This situation, however, will need to be closely monitored in the coming days and weeks.
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Well chavez ,castro and obama have all stated their verbal support of the imprisoned zelaya.
boyo
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Attention - Captainccs (sorry, I did not know where to post; further, unfortunately, I don't speak Spanish so I cannot go to the Spanish forum)
And while we may disagree sometimes, you seem bright and often have good opinions, so...
Hello JDN!
Sorry about not replying sooner but I only found out about this thread today.
You said today;
It is important to stress that the people of Palestine elected HAMAS, they back HAMAS, and therefore they are as responsible as HAMAS for the suffering they are inflicting on themselves.
Change the words; insert Chavez where you say Hamas.
So true. So sad!
Now I am not saying that Chavez is a terrorist (?), nor nearly as terrible as the Hamas, but... to be honest I am not a big fan of the guy. Yet he was freely elected (and trying hard it seems for
another (illegal) term. But my point is that he was freely elected. I mean I don't like Bush for numerous reasons, but I respect him and respect the office. And of course, he was freely elected
and reelected and despite the polls, gracefully with honor will retire this month. If you have time, could you enlighten me as to why Chavez was freely elected and again reelected? Maybe you are a fan of his?
Or maybe not, but I don't get it. I am told (my good friend of mine is Ecuadorian) that Venezuela is a rich and beautiful country; why elect and reelect a guy like this??? I am not looking for a fight; only education.
I am most definitively not a fan of Chavez.
Chavez got elected in 1998 because president Caldera gave him a pardon and let him out of jail. He should still be in jail for the coup he staged in 1992.
Chavez got elected in 1998 because for 45 years the so called "democracy" ruined the country and people were looking for a Messiah. There was this idea that a military man might be the saviour based on the very successful government of General Marcos Perez Jimenez from 1948 to 1958. While I definitively approved of Perez Jimenez I was not ready for a military government and I told my friends as much when they talked about the benefits of a coup. There are no quick solutions.
The first Chavez election is easy to understand, people were sick and tired of the status quo. Important national figures like Arturo Uslar Pietri were proposing non-democratic solutions. Our democracy was a mess but slowly improving but in the end it died. You might want to read:
Uslar Pietri, Venezuelan Democracy's Undertaker (http://www.softwaretimes.com/files/uslar%20pietri,%20venezuelan%20d.html)
By the time people realized that they didn't want Chavez, the damage was done: the military was purged, the congress was packed by Chavez allies as was the supreme court. Elections were rigged. People who signed for the recall referendum were blacklisted. Chavez used the oil wealth to illegally promote himself. The opposition news channels were shut down. Opposition reporters were persecuted or murdered. And the tale of woes goes on.
Venezuela is a rich and beautiful country but more important, Venezuelans are a lovely and noble people. On our marina website I have collected cruising logs by people who have visited our country. I think you'll find it interesting reading:
Bahia Redonda Cruising Logs (http://bahiaredonda.com/ip/cruising-logs.php)
By necessity the above is just a very brief synopsis but I think it paints a true picture.
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Geopolitical Diary: Venezuela and the Honduran Coup
June 29, 2009
Military forces arrested Honduran President Manuel Zelaya at his home early Sunday morning, marking a sea change for the country. Prior to the coup, Zelaya had been attempting to call a national referendum on whether to change the constitution. Though Zelaya still had backing from many leftist organizations in the country, he lacked the support of the Congress, the Supreme Court and the military — all of which maintained that his actions were unconstitutional. His decision to go forward with the referendum in the face of such strong opposition pushed the situation to a climax, ending with his exile to Costa Rica.
The situation has prompted howls of objections, particularly from leftist leaders in Latin America — with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez at the forefront. Though Chavez’s promises of a military response following the arrest of Zelaya — a fellow leftist — have made headlines, his ability and will to intervene are both extremely constrained. Chavez himself has mentioned limits to his willingness to intervene in the situation, declaring that hostilities would be inevitable if the Honduran military violated the sanctity of the Venezuelan embassy or murdered the Venezuelan ambassador.
Chavez likes to link Venezuela to any and all leftist leaders in the region and to rattle sabers when any of those leaders are threatened. The Honduran coup, however, is deeply entrenched in domestic politics, and Chavez’s ability to take serious action is limited by uncertainties in the political situation he faces in Venezuela. Just as in a 2008 incident between Colombia and Ecuador (when Colombian forces crossed the border in pursuit of members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia), Chavez can make statements but is not able to put substantial forces into play.
There have been isolated and unsubstantiated reports that Venezuelan and Nicaraguan personnel might have been supporting Zelaya in Honduras as hostilities were intensifying, but there is nothing to suggest that any kind of meaningful troop presence or interference was a factor in the day’s events. Indeed, sources in Venezuela have revealed that even Venezuelan military personnel lack confidence in the country’s ability to leverage the troop transport aircraft that would be required to establish a meaningful force in Honduras.
Because even Chavez is unable to intervene effectively, the situation in Honduras remains localized. The military immediately turned control of the country over to the Congress, which appointed its leader as the interim head of state. Therefore, it does not seem likely that this situation will turn into a military grab for power — a fact that should bring sighs of relief to a region where the destructive military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s are remembered well.
This also should not be read as a symbolic or tide-turning failure of the Latin American left, which is far from being a united ideological bloc. With center-leftists leading successful regimes in Brazil and Chile, the myth of a rising, unified wave of extreme leftism in Latin America is just that. Though the coup in Honduras could invigorate opposition movements in leftist-led countries throughout the region — particularly in countries like Venezuela, which are experiencing serious economic difficulties due both to populist excesses and the troubled global economy — it should not be taken as a part of a larger trend. If other governments in Latin America fall, it will be a result of their own spiraling, domestic dramas rather than a domino effect from Sunday’s events in relatively isolated Honduras.
The fact is that regional cohesion in Latin America is very difficult to achieve. With massive geographic barriers separating Latin American countries and the economic challenges facing each leader, there are enormous obstacles to functional cooperation and pressing concerns to attend to at home. Ultimately, the challenges facing Latin American countries in 2009 might lead to military intervention, as in Honduras. But regime stability very often depends on domestic factors — and all the leftist alliances in the world cannot save a leader who rejects the authority of every other branch of his government.
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Many foreign observers are condemning the ouster of Honduran President Mel Zelaya, a supporter of Hugo Chavez, as a "military coup." But can it be a coup when the Honduran military acted on the orders of the nation's Supreme Court, the step was backed by the nation's attorney general, and the man replacing Mr. Zelaya and elected in emergency session by that nation's Congress is a member of the former president's own political party?
Mr. Zelaya had sacked General Romeo Vasquez, head of the country's armed forces, after he refused to use his troops to provide logistical support for a referendum designed to let Mr. Zelaya escape the country's one-term limit on presidents. Both the referendum and the firing of the military chief have been declared illegal by the Honduran Supreme Court. Nonetheless, Mr. Zelaya intended yesterday to use ballots printed in Venezuela to conduct the vote anyway.
All this will be familiar to members of Honduras' legislature, who vividly recall how Mr. Chavez in Venezuela adopted similar means to hijack his country's democracy and economy. Elected a decade ago, Mr. Chavez held a Constituent Assembly and changed the constitution to enhance his power and subvert the country's governing institutions. Mr. Zelaya made it clear that he wished to do the same in Honduras and that the referendum was the first step in installing a new constitution that would enhance his powers and allow him to run for re-election.
No one likes to see a nation's military in the streets, especially in a continent with such painful memories of military rule. But Honduras is clearly a different situation. Members of Mr. Zelaya's own party in Congress voted last week to declare him unfit for his office. Given his refusal to leave, who else was going to enforce the orders of the nation's other branches of government?
--John Fund
WSJ
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Nelson Bocaranda is a Venezuelan news commentator frequently on the money with his "Runrunes." On Twitter:
"Anótenlo:Poco a poco cambia percepción "golpe" hondureño.Ni Europa ni USA bloquearán.IFotos izquierda radical junto a Zelaya réstanle apoyo"
"OJO: Washington,México,Ottawa,NYC ,Londres y Madrid intensifican conversaciones telefónicas para evaluar caso Honduras con visión NO GOLPE"
"A favor del nuevo gobierno que CONSTITUCION no se violó tras sacar a Zelaya quien promocionó a Micheletti hace 1 año como presidenciable"
"Cristina Kirchner acaba de anunciar que acompañara a Zelaya en su regreso.Chávez la llamó para que sirviera -como mujer- de amparo al grupo"
This promises to be an interesting showdown. In Venezuela we had the misfortune of allowing Jimmy Carter to call a stolen referendum "fair." With Zelaya cooler heads might just realize that what Honduras did was quite legal when they deposed a president who was breaking the law even after being told that he was breaking the law.
The issue is that the Constitution of Honduras says that there is no presidential reelection and that this clause cannot be amended. This clause is what makes the referendum called by Zelaya subversive! The referendum is anti-constitutional.
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As military "coups" go, the one this weekend in Honduras was strangely, well, democratic. The military didn't oust President Manuel Zelaya on its own but instead followed an order of the Supreme Court. It also quickly turned power over to the president of the Honduran Congress, a man from the same party as Mr. Zelaya. The legislature and legal authorities all remain intact.
We mention these not so small details because they are being overlooked as the world, including the U.S. President, denounces tiny Honduras in a way that it never has, say, Iran. President Obama is joining the U.N., Fidel Castro, Hugo Chávez and other model democrats in demanding that Mr. Zelaya be allowed to return from exile and restored to power. Maybe it's time to sort the real from the phony Latin American democrats.
Associated Press
People against the return of ousted Honduras President Manuel Zelaya participate in a rally at the central park in Tegucigalpa, Tuesday, June 30, 2009.
The situation is messy, and we think the Hondurans would have been smarter -- and better off -- not sending Mr. Zelaya into exile at dawn. Mr. Zelaya was pressing ahead with a nonbinding referendum to demand a constitutional rewrite to let him seek a second four-year term. The attorney general and Honduran courts declared the vote illegal and warned he'd be prosecuted if he followed through. Mr. Zelaya persisted, even leading a violent mob last week to seize and distribute ballots imported from Venezuela. However, the proper constitutional route was to impeach Mr. Zelaya and then arrest him for violating the law.
Yet the events in Honduras also need to be understood in the context of Latin America's decade of chavismo. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez was democratically elected in 1998, but he has since used every lever of power, legal and extralegal, to subvert democracy. He first ordered a rewrite of the constitution that allowed his simple majority in the national assembly grant him the power to rule by decree for one year and to control the judiciary.
In 2004 he packed the Supreme Court with 32 justices from 20. Any judge who rules against his interests can be fired. He made the electoral tribunal that oversees elections his own political tool, denying opposition requests to inspect voter rolls and oversee vote counts. The once politically independent oil company now hires only Chávez allies, and independent television stations have had their licenses revoked.
Mr. Chávez has also exported this brand of one-man-one-vote-once democracy throughout the region. He's succeeded to varying degrees in Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina and Nicaragua, where his allies have stretched the law and tried to dominate the media and the courts. Mexico escaped in 2006 when Felipe Calderón linked his leftwing opponent to chavismo and barely won the presidency.
In Honduras Mr. Chávez funneled Veneuzelan oil money to help Mr. Zelaya win in 2005, and Mr. Zelaya has veered increasingly left in his four-year term. The Honduran constitution limits presidents to a single term, which is scheduled to end in January. Mr. Zelaya was using the extralegal referendum as an act of political intimidation to force the Congress to allow a rewrite of the constitution so he could retain power. The opposition had pledged to boycott the vote, which meant that Mr. Zelaya would have won by a landslide.
Such populist intimidation has worked elsewhere in the region, and Hondurans are understandably afraid that, backed by Chávez agents and money, it could lead to similar antidemocratic subversion there. In Tegucigalpa yesterday, thousands demonstrated against Mr. Zelaya, and new deputy foreign minister Marta Lorena Casco told the crowd that "Chávez consumed Venezuela, then Bolivia, after that Ecuador and Nicaragua, but in Honduras that didn't happen."
It's no accident that Mr. Chávez is now leading the charge to have Mr. Zelaya reinstated, and on Monday the Honduran traveled to a leftwing summit in Managua in one of Mr. Chávez's planes. The U.N. and Organization of American States are also threatening the tiny nation with ostracism and other punishment if it doesn't readmit him. Meanwhile, the new Honduran government is saying it will arrest Mr. Zelaya if he returns. This may be the best legal outcome, but it also runs the risk of destabilizing the country. We recall when the Clinton Administration restored Bertrand Aristide to Haiti, only to have the country descend into anarchy.
As for the Obama Administration, it seems eager to "meddle" in Honduras in a way Mr. Obama claimed was counterproductive in Iran. Yet the stolen election in Iran was a far clearer subversion of democracy than the coup in Honduras. As a candidate, Mr. Obama often scored George W. Bush's foreign policy by saying democracy requires more than an election -- a free press, for example, civil society and the rule of law rather than rule by the mob. It's a point worth recalling before Mr. Obama hands a political victory to the forces of chavismo in Latin America
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Chavez seen behind unrest in Peru
By Kelly Hearn (Contact) | Monday, July 6, 2009
QUILLABAMBA, Peru | A national strike by thousands of rain-forest Indians is spawning accusations of a proxy war involving Venezuela and an emboldened peasant movement seeking to undermine Peru's pro-U.S. president.
For more than two months, thousands of natives have been protesting land reforms issued by President Alan Garcia. The laws -- required by a U.S.-Peru Free Trade Agreement -- open vast tracts of rain forest to private energy and agriculture investment.
In April, natives angered by the new laws donned war paint and grabbed spears, overran roads and rivers, seized control of jungle oil facilities and blocked rural airports.
Mr. Garcia initially said that the protesters would not force his hand. But he backtracked after a June 5 confrontation in the oil-rich Amazon region of Bagua left more than 30 police and protesters dead.
Congress voted down two of the laws on June 18, handing Mr. Garcia a defeat and the natives a new sense of power.
Mr. Garcia, who appoints the prime minister, also has agreed to name a replacement for Prime Minister Yehude Simon. On Friday, Mr. Simon said he planned to step down this week in response to criticism of the government's handling of the protests, Reuters news agency reported. Mr. Simon had indicated in mid-June that he would resign, but had not set a date.
Human rights groups say dozens of protesters were killed or are missing and are not accounted for in the official toll.
Opposition parties have blamed Mr. Simon for the violence. He was appointed in October after a corruption scandal led to a major government reshuffle.
His resignation would force the entire Cabinet to offer to step down, but Mr. Garcia is not expected to replace heads of key departments, such as the Finance Ministry. Mr. Garcia has not yet indicated who would replace Mr. Simon.
The conflict has threatened to slow Mr. Garcia's push to attract billions of dollars in foreign investment.
Critics say the president's investor-friendly policies have not done enough to lift incomes in a country where 36 percent of a population of 29 million live in poverty.
Still, many here have questioned how rain-forest peasants, who live hand to mouth, found the resources to strike for weeks.
Fingers have been pointing at Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who has been promoting socialist policies in this strategic region known for cocaine and energy resources.
Peruvian Congressman Edgar Nunez told The Washington Times last month that the congressional committee he heads has hard evidence that Mr. Chavez funded protesters through a network of grass-roots groups called "casas de ALBA." He declined to describe the evidence, saying only that investigations are ongoing.
Venezuela's government denies supporting the network.
Mr. Garcia, however, has accused his former presidential rival and Chavez acolyte, Ollanta Humala, of working with Venezuela's president to convince Indians to carry out what many in Peru see as acts of domestic terrorism.
Mr. Humala narrowly lost the presidency to Mr. Garcia in 2006. He embraced a Chavez-style populist platform including promises to nationalize oil, gas and mining. He is set to make another presidential run in 2011.
"Its obvious that the natives are being manipulated," said Roberto Ugarte, owner of a hotel not far from Cuzco, a major tourist attraction. "And its obvious that Chavez and Humala are involved. Our economy is working well, and now they want to change it."
Alvaro Vargas-Llosa, a senior fellow at the Washington-based Independent Institute, agreed.
"I give credibility to claims that they are involved," he said.
"Past experience shows that Humala, and more widely, the Chavez government, are heavily involved in efforts to destabilize outlying provinces and further an anti-democratic cause based on vaguely nationalist and very anti-democratic ideas."
Many say that Perus estimated 500,000 natives -- increasingly hemmed in and clamoring for their share of Amazonian oil and gas projects -- have found new organizations and resolve that will help Mr. Humala.
"This is the first time Indians have worked together and made a change," said Vincent Alagon, a Peruvian peasant who was interviewed recently standing near a flaming effigy of Mr. Garcia in the jungle town of Quillabama. "Alan Garcia is a murderer and a thief. We will make Humala president."
Mr. Vargas-Llosa said that natives are being manipulated and lack the organization and national agenda needed to make real political change.
"Natives have long been ignored by a government, so they respond when people come around with offers to help," he said. The protesters are being "bamboozled."
He added, "What these people really want is the opposite of what Chavez and Humala stand for. They want to own things, to exploit the rain forest themselves and to have property rights."
He said the Garcia presidency wont be the same following the protests.
"For the remainder of his term, he will have to take a defensive posture rather than a proactive one," Mr. Vargas-Llosa said.
Emboldened natives are likely to keep up demands for schools, roads, clinics and a seat at the oil-and-gas table.
While Mr. Humalas National Party has denied giving funding to protesters, many Peruvians - especially wealthy elites - think that Humala loyalists help protesters by dipping into local government checkbooks made fat by oil and natural-gas royalties.
For example, in the town of Quillabamba, native political organizers from an Indian federation called COMARU were openly given rides in government vehicles.
On June 11, a truck bearing a regional government seal carried native protesters to a planning meeting near the Urubamba River town of Ivochote in southeastern Peru.
Prohibited by a pending state of emergency, the meeting was held in a remote building where participants laid plans to take over a pumping facility on a natural-gas pipeline on June 15. The action was canceled at the last minute owing to progress in government negotiations.
The mayor of Convencion, which receives millions of dollars in royalties from the U.S.-backed Camisea Natural Gas Project, is a Humala loyalist named Hernan de la Torre. Mr. la Torre did not show up at a scheduled interview this month and failed to answer questions left on his voicemail about the government vehicles.
http://washingtontimes.com/news/2009/jul/06/peru-indians-demands-seen-as-stoked-by-chavez/print/
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http://www.daybydaycartoon.com/2009/07/03/
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"North Korea launches a missile and it takes Barack Obama and the UN five days to respond. Iran holds fraudulent elections, kills protesters and it takes weeks before Barack Obama can stand up and say that he is 'concerned' about the situation. Then the people of Honduras try to uphold their constitution and laws of the land from being trampled by a Chavez-wanna be and it takes Barack Obama one day to proclaim that this was not a legal coup." --radio talk-show host Neal Boortz
"There was an attempted coup in Honduras, but it was Zelaya who initiated it, not his opponents." --columnist Mona Charen
"If Honduras is hung out to dry, if America suspends trade and economic aid, the forces arrayed against liberty in Latin America will have won a major victory. On the other hand, if Honduras is not abandoned now, those Iran-supporting, America-hating, liberty-loathing forces will have suffered a major defeat." --columnist Dennis Prager
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By DAVID LUHNOW, JOSé DE CóRDOBA AND NICHOLAS CASEY
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
In the tile-roofed presidential palace near downtown Tegucigalpa, a man sits behind a long wooden desk claiming to be the country’s president. But in the eyes of the international community, Roberto Micheletti took charge through an old-fashioned coup.
Nearly two weeks ago, on June 28, his predecessor, Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, was rousted from bed by soldiers and sent out of the country in his pajamas. Mr. Micheletti, next in line for the presidency as head of congress, was sworn in later that day.
Tied to wealthy business interests and brought to power by the military, the provisional government brings back memories of the coup in which Chilean Augusto Pinochet tore down the Socialist project of Salvador Allende in 1973. On the streets of Tegucigalpa nowadays, some protesters have scrawled graffiti that merges the names of Mr. Pinochet and their new, unelected leader: “Pinocheletti.”
In Mr. Micheletti’s take on events, it was his government who avoided another, slow-motion coup—by Mr. Zelaya himself. Mr. Micheletti’s supporters say Mr. Zelaya was a dictator in the making, a modern-day caudillo, or strongman, who wanted to rewrite Honduran law to stay in power, perhaps indefinitely.
To understand what is happening in Honduras today, it helps to know a bit more about Latin America’s long love affair with caudillos, how these larger-than-life but power-hungry men damaged their countries, and why so many people are terrified that they are making a comeback.
Some argue that Latin America’s single most important—and colorful—contribution to political science is the caudillo. A Spanish word, caudillo is derived from the Latin capitellum or small head, and refers to a military or political leader. Spain’s Gen. Francisco Franco, adopted the title Caudillo de España por la Gracia de Dios (by the Grace of God) and ruled the nation from the end of the Spanish Civil War in 1939 until his death in 1975.
Caudillismo is so deeply rooted it has spawned its own literary genre. Discerning readers see Fidel Castro as the model for the aging, cow-obsessed strongman in Gabriel García Márquez’s “The Autumn of the Patriarch,” who wanders alone dragging his outsize testicles over the floors of his presidential palace. Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa, in his novel “The Feast of the Goat,” portrayed the precariousness of life in the Dominican Republic under the rule of the predatory and brutal right-wing caudillo, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.
The cast of caudillos in Latin American history includes such characters as Antonio López de Santa Anna, who was Mexico’s president on seven separate occasions in the mid-1800s. He signed away Texas’ independence from Mexico after being captured the day after the Battle of San Jacinto in 1836, and once buried a leg he lost in battle with full military honors.
Caudillos come in all ideological stripes. Mr. Pinochet, whose famous photograph in sinister dark glasses was taken soon after his coup, became the iconic image of the right-wing Latin American military dictator. These days, most caudillos are leftist. Mr. Castro, el Comandante or el Caballo (the Horse), has the dubious distinction of being the longest-lived caudillo in Latin American history, owing his record-breaking stretch in power more to caudillismo than Marxismo. He’s passed on the torch to Hugo Chávez, the populist caudillo from Caracas, Venezuela.
Caudillos first arose in the difficult birth of Latin American republics from Spanish colonies. Most were landowners or military men who had their own private armies. Because the wars of independence in the early 19th century destroyed most institutions of Spanish colonial rule, the governments in these new states were too weak to resist takeover. In some cases, young states couldn’t raise enough money for a standing army.
Many of Latin America’s most famous caudillos became dictators. But as Latin American societies evolved and political arenas became more important than military battlegrounds in the mid- to late-1800s, caudillos became politicians. While a dictator usually relies on brute force to keep power, modern caudillos use a combination of personal magnetism, patronage—and sometimes, selective brute force.
In Latin America, the strength of the caudillo weakened the region’s institutions. Political parties centered on caudillos often collapsed after the caudillo’s death and never professionalized. As a result, Latin Americans seem perennially ready to trust their fate to a providential “man on horseback” who comes to their nation’s rescue, rather than on the ability of the nation’s institutions to provide security and prosperity.
Outsize personality—and outright megalomania—is a common characteristic of caudillos. In the 18th century, José Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia, who ruled Paraguay for a quarter-century, shut the country off from the outside world, appointing himself head of the country’s Catholic Church and taking the title of El Supremo, providing material for yet another great Latin American novel, Augusto Roa Bastos’s “Yo, el Supremo.”
In the 20th century, few had bigger egos than Rafael Trujillo, who ruled the Dominican Republic from 1930 to 1961. Known as El Jefe, Mr. Trujillo took power at age 38, wearing a sash with the motto Dios y Trujillo, or “God and Trujillo.” Even churches were forced to emblazon the motto. A few years later, the capital, Santo Domingo, was renamed Ciudad Trujillo. Fond of wearing comic-opera military uniforms with 18th-century-style plumed hats, Mr. Trujillo was as brutal as he was outlandish, murdering thousands of Haitian immigrants as well as torturing and killing political opponents; he fed some of them to the sharks.
While arms made the man in the 19th century, in the 20th, most caudillos have been careful to present themselves as champions of the people, wrapped either in the mantle of revolution—like Fidel Castro—or in that of democracy. Argentina’s Juan Domingo Perón used populism to endear himself to the nation’s poor, known as descamisados, or “shirtless ones.”
Even today, Perónismo, the movement created by Mr. Perón and his wife Eva—who combined glamour and handouts to the poor to become a secular saint venerated by Argentines—is still the dominant political current in Argentina. The legacy of Mr. Perón’s free-spending populist philosophy has led Argentina into periodic economic crises. When prices for Argentine exports like beef are high, for instance, Perónist governments have spent the windfall like a drunken sailor, leading to a cash crunch when prices eventually head south.
Mr. Perón, like many other caudillos, sought additional legitimacy by preserving the forms of democracy, if only on paper. He won presidential elections, but his regime was hardly democratic: Perónists controlled the legislature, the courts, the bureaucracy, labor unions and the media. Anyone who got too far out of line faced arbitrary arrest.
Even the Dominican Republic’s brutal Mr. Trujillo made a big show of not running for re-election in 1938 to observe democratic principles, although he continued to be the country’s de facto leader and later returned to win two more elections, in 1942 and 1947. In 1952, he stepped aside in favor of his brother and again continued to call the shots until his assassination in 1961.
On June 28, the Honduran president was forced out of the country in his pajamas, after he pushed for a referendum that would amend the constitution to allow him to run for re-election.
The Honduran head of congress was sworn in as Mr. Zelaya’s replacement immediately after Mr. Zelaya’s ouster. He has vowed to hold already scheduled elections in November and to hand over power in January.
The Bolivian president, a former leader of a militant coca leaf growers’ union, won a referendum that allowed him to rewrite the constitution, overturning a ban on re-election.
As far as the U.S. was concerned, the cause of democracy in Latin America often took a back seat to fighting Communism during the Cold War. For years, the U.S. either looked the other way or supported coups with the aim of preventing the spread of Communism in the hemisphere. Military coups became almost ritual. In the 1970s, Honduras endured so many coups that the capital was jokingly called Tegucigolpe, for the Spanish word golpe, or coup.
The end of the Cold War radically changed politics in Latin America. As civil wars and guerrilla insurrections in Central America ran out of steam, pampered military establishments suffered deep budget cuts. The U.S. and the rest of the world made it clear that coups would not be tolerated anymore. The Organization of American States, which represents 34 countries throughout the hemisphere, adopted a democracy clause in its charter in 2001. By that point, Cuba remained as the only non-democracy.
While democracy has spread throughout Latin America, caudillos never vanish, they just adapt to changing times. Gone is the old-fashioned military coup, replaced with a new strategy for power that could be called “coup by stealth,” or “coup by democratic means.”
The primary architect of this new blueprint is Mr. Chávez, a strongman with one foot grounded in the past and the other firmly placed in the future of caudillismo. In 1992, Mr. Chávez, then a lieutenant colonel with a mish-mash of leftist, nationalist and fascist ideas, led an old-fashioned coup in an attempt to overthrow the government of Carlos Andrés Pérez. It failed, and Mr. Chávez was jailed.
Upon release, he was persuaded to forgo the bullet for the ballot box. In 1998, he was elected president, riding a wave of popular disgust against the deep corruption of the country’s existing political parties and institutions. In a nation where institutions never developed because of caudillos, another “man on horseback” had come to save the country. Once in power, he moved to insure he would never leave.
Using the tools of democracy—referendums and elections—Mr. Chávez has subverted democracy and become a new, modern caudillo. He has won referendums over the years that have allowed him to rewrite the constitution, twice, to his specifications, including ending constitutional restrictions on term limits, thus allowing him to run for re-election indefinitely. He has gutted the courts, shut down and gagged the media and purged the army; he exercises total control over the congress. Venezuela still holds elections, but it is far from a full democracy.
Mr. Chávez shares with old caudillos a military background, a populist bent and a cult of personality. He is a mixture of messianic preacher, traditional authoritarian Latin American military man and utopian dreamer with notions of “21st-Century Socialism.” Even after a decade in power marked by rampant spending, corruption and crime, Mr. Chávez maintains a strong, almost mystical bond with many of Venezuela’s poor, who see in him a reflection of themselves.
Mr. Chavez has publicly said he plans to stay in power until 2019, 2021 or 2030.
The Chávez blueprint for power is now being imitated by other caudillos in the making. Bolivian President Evo Morales, a former leader of a militant coca leaf growers’ union who led street riots that helped topple two Bolivian leaders, also won a referendum that allowed him to rewrite the constitution. One change: overturning a ban on re-election. Ecuador’s Rafael Correa has used a constitutional rewrite to get term limits lifted, too. Both men used populism and disappointment with existing political parties to cast themselves as their nation’s saviors.
When democracy took root in Latin America in the 1980s and ’90s, nearly every country opted to bar re-election as a way to ensure caudillos would never return. These restrictions have been chipped away, by right-wing leaders, too. In Colombia, conservative president Álvaro Uribe has already changed the constitution once to get re-elected and is mulling a third term now.
Honduras, weary of a parade of generals who overstayed their welcome, was among the Latin nations that barred re-election when it ended military dictatorships and became a democracy in 1981. Since then, nearly every sitting president has toyed with the idea of re-election. None has pushed the idea more openly than Mr. Zelaya.
The son of a conservative rancher, Mr. Zelaya took power four years ago as a centrist. In the past two years, the Stetson-hat-wearing, ballad-singing president has hewn increasingly to the left, finding a soulmate in Mr. Chávez. The Venezuelan president began shipping Honduras cut-rate oil, and Honduras responded by joining Mr. Chávez’s regional trade and political pact, which also includes Venezuela, Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador and Nicaragua.
He then took another page from the Chávez blueprint, pushing for a referendum and constitutional rewrite on re-election. The country’s courts, congress and other institutions lined up against Mr. Zelaya, but he vowed to challenge them all, with the people at his back. Shortly before his ouster, when the army refused to take part in the election, the president led a mob to a nearby base to seize the ballots.
Did all this make Mr. Zelaya a caudillo in the making? The world may never know because the Honduran power brokers decided not to take any chances. In booting out Mr. Zelaya at gunpoint, they showed what little faith they had in the country’s institutions to check Mr. Zelaya’s ambitions.
Some argue they acted rashly. “The Pinochets of the world supported the type of people who sent Zelaya out in his pajamas,” says Peter Kornbluh, an analyst at the National Security Archive, a Washington nonprofit, and author of books on dictators including Messrs. Pinochet and Castro. In ousting a democratically elected leader, the Honduran establishment strayed further from democracy than Mr. Zelaya did in attempting to stay, he says.
While the provisional president, Mr. Micheletti, has taken power in an undemocratic fashion, few Hondurans worry that he will want to stay on. Mr. Micheletti has vowed to hold already-scheduled elections in November, hand over power in January and limit his own presidential aspirations to six months in power.
Angel Nuñez, a 30-year-old Tegucigalpa taxi driver, thinks Mr. Micheletti did the right thing. “Zelaya wanted this place to be Cuba, he wanted absolute power in this country,” he says. Pushing the ex-president aside was the only way to stop “a man who got to thinking he was above the law.”
Domingo Díaz, a 63-year-old social worker, says he’s lived through so many Central American takeovers he’s lost both his count and his interest in them. “No one respected the law,” he said on a recent rainy day. “History will repeat itself,” he says, “but this time I don’t fear it.”
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By DAVID LUHNOW, JOSé DE CóRDOBA AND NICHOLAS CASEY
Tegucigalpa, Honduras
To understand what is happening in Honduras today, it helps to know a bit more about Latin America’s long love affair with caudillos, how these larger-than-life but power-hungry men damaged their countries, and why so many people are terrified that they are making a comeback.
Let's not forget that the three most important "Caudillos" of the 20th century were not Latin Americans. They were the German-Austrian Fuhrer, Adolph Hitler; the Italian Duce, Benito Mussolini and the longest lived one, the Spanish "Caudillo," Francisco Franco por la gracia de dios.
Let's also not forget that many Latin American Caudillos had the full backing of American administrations: Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a.k.a. Chapita, was FDR's SOB. Fulgencio Batista of Cuba had the full backing of America. The CIA helped depose Allende and put Pinochet on the throne (rumors have it that Fidel Castro had Allende murdered when he showed a willingness to talk to the enemy). Now Chavez and Zelaya seems to be Obama's SOBs even though they are not even pro-American.
While most of the Caudillos were "larger-than-life but power-hungry men [who] damaged their countries" not all did. In 1928 Juan Vicente Gomez, the Venezuelan Caudillo, was seen as harmful by the Venezuelan Left. Modern writers see Gomez as the man who unified Venezuela by suppressing the minor war-lords who were tearing the country apart. Gomez was also a very skillful international diplomat who turned the British gun boats away by stealth and who kept Venezuela neutral during WWI. One of the best government Venezuela has had in the 20th Century was by "dictator" General Marcos Perez Jimenez. He was replaced by the so called "democracy" that led to the election of Hugo Chavez Frias.
When people see elections they assume democracy. It often is very far from democracy. From 1958 to 1998 what we had in Venezuela was a party dictatorship where we didn't elect our representatives at all, we just ratified the ones proposed by the various parties. The downside of this process is that the representatives are not beholden to the people but to the party hacks who make up the lists. It is no wonder then that when CAP managed to gain not only the presidency but majorities in both houses of our Congress, the Congress abdicated its law making powers and allowed CAP to govern by presidential decree.
The irony is that the same people who thought it was a wonderful idea with CAP think it is quite horrible when Chavez does the exact same thing!
Understanding Caudillos is just a small part of the story. Caudillos, be they right, left or center, will do away with separation of powers and will rule as autocrats and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Obama should not be backing Caudillos just because they were democratically elected. Would Obama back Hitler today? I believe an important precedent was set at the Nuremberg trials, following orders (or the established order) was not admissible as a defense. The American Independence itself was the breaking of the established order, the colonials disobeyed the law of their own sovereign. This is why the knee-jerk reaction of reinstating someone just because at one point he was elected is nor a good idea at all.
Without a doubt, Franco was the smartest of the three European Caudillos of the 20th century. There is a story of Hitler, Mussolini and Franco signing a joint declaration. Hitler signs first, "Adolph Hitler, God's envoy." Mussolini, not willing to be upstaged signs "Benito Mussolini, God's true envoy." Franco is the last one to sign: "Francisco Franco, I didn't send anyone!"
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"Let's also not forget that many Latin American Caudillos had the full backing of American administrations: Rafael Leonidas Trujillo, a.k.a. Chapita, was FDR's SOB. Fulgencio Batista of Cuba had the full backing of America. The CIA helped depose Allende and put Pinochet on the throne (rumors have it that Fidel Castro had Allende murdered when he showed a willingness to talk to the enemy). Now Chavez and Zelaya seems to be Obama's SOBs even though they are not even pro-American."
Never in question. As for Allende, he won with 36% of the vote and IIRC within 18 months created 1,000% inflation :-o :-o :-o in pursuit of his marxist goals. A man like that tends to have LOTS of enemies.
As for Chavez, to me it makes more sense to say that BO is his bitch than Chavez his SOB-- and that Zelaya's , , , gratitude runs towards Chavez, not BO.
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In a perfect world former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya would be in jail in his own country right now, awaiting trial. The Honduran attorney general has charged him with deliberately violating Honduran law and the Supreme Court ordered his arrest in Tegucigalpa on June 28.
But the Honduran military whisked him out of the country, to Costa Rica, when it executed the court's order.
His expulsion has given his supporters ammunition to allege that he was treated unlawfully. Now he is an international hero of the left. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Cuban dictator Raúl Castro, and Venezuela's Hugo Chávez are all insisting that he be restored to power. This demand is baseless. Mr. Zelaya's detention was legal, as was his official removal from office by Congress.
If there is anything debatable about the crisis it is the question of whether the government can defend the expulsion of the president. In fact it had good reasons for that move and they are worth Mrs. Clinton's attention if she is interested in defending democracy.
Besides eagerly trampling the constitution, Mr. Zelaya had demonstrated that he was ready to employ the violent tactics of chavismo to hang onto power. The decision to pack him off immediately was taken in the interest of protecting both constitutional order and human life.
Associated Press
Two incidents earlier this year make the case. The first occurred in January when the country was preparing to name a new 15-seat Supreme Court, as it does every seven years. An independent board made up of members of civil society had nominated 45 candidates. From that list, Congress was to choose the new judges.
Mr. Zelaya had his own nominees in mind, including the wife of a minister, and their names were not on the list. So he set about to pressure the legislature. On the day of the vote he militarized the area around the Congress and press reports say a group of the president's men, including the minister of defense, went to the Congress uninvited to turn up the heat. The head of the legislature had to call security to have the defense minister removed.
In the end Congress held its ground and Mr. Zelaya retreated. But the message had been sent: The president was willing to use force against other institutions.
In May there was an equally scary threat to peace issued by the Zelaya camp as the president illegally pushed for a plebiscite on rewriting the constitution. Since the executive branch is not permitted to call for such a vote, the attorney general had announced that he intended to enforce the law against Mr. Zelaya.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
A week later some 100 agitators, wielding machetes, descended on the attorney general's office. "We have come to defend this country's second founding," the group's leader reportedly said. "If we are denied it, we will resort to national insurrection."
These experiences frightened Hondurans because they strongly suggested that Mr. Zelaya, who had already aligned himself with Mr. Chávez, was now emulating the Venezuelan's power-grab. Other Chávez protégés -- in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua -- have done the same, refusing to accept checks on their power, making use of mobs and seeking to undermine institutions.
It was this fondness for intimidation that prompted Mr. Zelaya's exile. Honduras was worried that if he stayed in the country after his arrest his supporters would foment violence to try to bring down the interim government and restore him to power.
It wouldn't be a first. Bolivia's President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada was removed in 2003 using just such tactics. Antigovernment militants, trained by Peruvian terrorists and financed by Venezuela and by drug money from the Colombian rebel group FARC, had laid siege to La Paz. As the city ran short on supplies, Mr. Sánchez de Lozada issued a decree to have armed guards accompany food and fuel trucks. The rebels, who had dynamite and weapons, clashed with the guards. Sixty people died. The president was pressured to step down.
Mr. Sánchez de Lozada told me by telephone last week that he only presented a letter of resignation to the Bolivian Congress when the U.S. threatened to cut off aid if he left the country without doing so. He signed under duress but the letter was then used by the international community to endorse what was in effect a brutal Venezuelan-directed overthrow of the democracy.
The fact that the Organization of American States and the U.S. never defended the Bolivian democracy cannot be lost on the Hondurans or the chavistas. You can bet that Venezuela will try to orchestrate similar troubles in an attempt to bring condemnation to the new Honduran government. Honduran patriots have better odds against that strategy with Mr. Zelaya out of the country, even if Washington and the OAS don't approve.
Write to O'Grady@wsj.com
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I see that Hillary made a phone call to the Honduran president telling him he better negotiate with the wannabe strongman that they threw out or we will cut off all sorts of aid.
I'm so glad we elected His Glibness and no longer interfere in the internal affairs of other countries.
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Had there been an OAS back in 1776, the 13 colonies would have been ordered to reinstate King George III.
@captainccs (http://twitter.com/captainccs/status/2765353418) Twitter
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Video explaining why Zelaya was removed:
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=maMA3PTYoZE[/youtube]
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From Petrostate To Narcostate
By INVESTOR'S BUSINESS DAILY | Posted Friday, July 24, 2009 4:20 PM PT
Hemisphere: A congressional report released last week left little doubt that Venezuela's Hugo Chavez is turning his country into a narcotraffickers' paradise. So why isn't Venezuela an international pariah?
A new report released last Monday, "U.S. Counternarcotics Cooperation With Venezuela Has Declined," by the Government Accountability Office, offers the harshest assessment yet about Venezuela's rising role in Latin America's drug trade.
The GAO said that state corruption, Chavez's aid to Colombia's FARC guerrillas, and Venezuela's refusal to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement agencies add up to trouble — an outlaw narcostate in the making and trouble for the U.S. on the horizon.
"The findings of this report have heightened my concern that Venezuela's failure to cooperate with the United States on drug interdiction is related to corruption in that country's government," said Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Ind., who commissioned the report.
No kidding. But instead of taking the natural course of action from such a report and treating Venezuela like a dank, despicable narcostate it deserves to be treated as, the U.S. is going out of its way to make nice with Chavez, restoring diplomatic ties as of July 1, in the mere hopes that dialogue will persuade him to cut it out.
That misreads the situation, because what's happening isn't a consequence of weakness — it's a result of will.
For one thing, this isn't about a few low-level Venezuelan officials on the take from traffickers.
The GAO report says that Venezuela's government corruption is worst at the top. Three top Chavista officials, including a former interior minister and a sitting chief of military intelligence, were named as actual drug "kingpins."
The report also warned systematic corruption in Chavez's National Guard, which controls airports and seaports, is the U.S.' biggest worry. That too links to the top.
Chavista officials in the past had used oil money to reward cronies and ensure loyalty. As the oil cash dries up, it's being replaced with illegal drug cash.
The GAO report cites low-level officials pleading with U.S. investigators for more drug cooperation, but their pleas have been rebuffed by Chavez's men at the top.
As a result, cocaine trafficking through Venezuela has surged fourfold over the last five years, along with criminal chaos in Venezuela's streets and countryside.
That's a problem for us and every country in the region as the cash and corruption have spread.
Already, all the countries in ALBA, Chavez's alliance of ruined democracies, show signs of infection. Bolivia has had its U.S. trading privileges cut off for noncooperation in the drug war. Its coca output is on the rise.
Ecuador's President Rafael Correa has just been named on a new FARC tape captured by Colombian police as taking payoffs from the terrorists.
Honduras' deposed leader, Mel Zelaya, has been accused by the government that threw him out of having ties with traffickers. It doesn't help that Honduras is a lily pad for traffickers moving contraband from Venezuela to the U.S.
Then there's Chavez's own ties to narcoterror. A captured computer from FARC chieftain Raul Reyes in 2008 revealed that Chavez offered FARC $300 million in oil cash, plus safe haven, passports, and medical care.
To date, Chavez has suffered no consequences for this aid to drug-dealing terrorists who now control 60% of Colombia's cocaine trade.
It's part of a disturbing pattern. Based on the inaction following each new revelation about Chavez's drug involvement, there are never any consequences.
In the past, the U.S. cut narcostates off at the knees, fast. In 1994, when the new president of Colombia, Ernesto Samper, was caught on tape taking cash from the Cali Cartel, the U.S. ended aid and treated him as a pariah.
When Panamanian strongman Manuel Noriega cut a money-laundering deal with the Medellin Cartel in 1989, the U.S. sent in the Marines.
That's what makes this unwillingness to confront Chavez so strange. If nothing is done, we'll pay for it.
The U.S. will set up three to five de facto military bases in Colombia in coming years, largely to fight the cocaine trade Chavez fuels.
It's not a sign of confidence. It's a hunkering down for war based on ineffective policy. It would be far better to quit pretending Chavez is a small "d" democrat who can be negotiated with, and take stronger action now.
This would sure beat a war. But it has to start with a reality check about Venezuela's metamorphosis into a dangerous narcostate.
http://www.ibdeditorial.com/IBDArticles.aspx?id=333327767981821
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Video: Hillary surprised to discover would-be Honduran dictator is “reckless”
POSTED AT 9:15 PM ON JULY 24, 2009 BY ALLAHPUNDIT
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Yeah, turns out that the Chavez stooge who was going to rig an illegal national referendum to extend his term his president — the stooge we’re supporting — isn’t above strolling across the border and back into Honduras despite the risk that poses of inciting a civil war. Which isn’t the first time he’s tried to make a dramatic, potentially catastrophic return from exile. I guess we should be rooting for him. He’s our guy, no?
I’m assuming Hillary’s statement here is a none-too-subtle signal that they’re inching away from backing Zelaya going forward, but with The One, who knows? Exit question: Between the ObamaCare meltdown, Gatesgate, and now this reminder of one of his worst foreign policy decisions so far, is this the toughest week Obama’s had as president? Has any other week even been close?
Hillary video here (http://hotair.com/archives/2009/07/24/video-hillary-surprised-to-discover-would-be-honduran-dictator-is-reckless/)
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The Path Forward for Honduras
Zelaya’s removal from office was a triumph for the rule of law.
By ROBERTO MICHELETTI
One of America’s most loyal Latin American allies—Honduras—has been in the midst of a constitutional crisis that threatens its democracy. Sadly, key undisputed facts regarding the crisis have often been ignored by America’s leaders, at least during the earliest days of the crisis.
In recent days, the rhetoric from allies of former President Manuel Zelaya has also dominated media reporting in the U.S. The worst distortion is the repetition of the false statement that Mr. Zelaya was removed from office by the military and for being a “reformer.” The truth is that he was removed by a democratically elected civilian government because the independent judicial and legislative branches of our government found that he had violated our laws and constitution.
Let’s review some fundamental facts that cannot be disputed:
• The Supreme Court, by a 15-0 vote, found that Mr. Zelaya had acted illegally by proceeding with an unconstitutional “referendum,” and it ordered the Armed Forces to arrest him. The military executed the arrest order of the Supreme Court because it was the appropriate agency to do so under Honduran law.
• Eight of the 15 votes on the Supreme Court were cast by members of Mr. Zelaya’s own Liberal Party. Strange that the pro-Zelaya propagandists who talk about the rule of law forget to mention the unanimous Supreme Court decision with a majority from Mr. Zelaya’s own party. Thus, Mr. Zelaya’s arrest was at the instigation of Honduran’s constitutional and civilian authorities—not the military.
• The Honduran Congress voted overwhelmingly in support of removing Mr. Zelaya. The vote included a majority of members of Mr. Zelaya’s Liberal Party.
• Independent government and religious leaders and institutions—including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, the Administrative Law Tribunal, the independent Human Rights Ombudsman, four-out-of-five political parties, the two major presidential candidates of the Liberal and National Parties, and Honduras’s Catholic Cardinal—all agreed that Mr. Zelaya had acted illegally.
• The constitution expressly states in Article 239 that any president who seeks to amend the constitution and extend his term is automatically disqualified and is no longer president. There is no express provision for an impeachment process in the Honduran constitution. But the Supreme Court’s unanimous decision affirmed that Mr. Zelaya was attempting to extend his term with his illegal referendum. Thus, at the time of his arrest he was no longer—as a matter of law, as far as the Supreme Court was concerned—president of Honduras.
• Days before his arrest, Mr. Zelaya had his chief of staff illegally withdraw millions of dollars in cash from the Central Bank of Honduras.
• A day or so before his arrest, Mr. Zelaya led a violent mob to overrun an Air Force base to seize referendum ballots that had been shipped into Honduras by Hugo Chávez’s Venezuelan government.
• I succeeded Mr. Zelaya under the Honduran constitution’s order of succession (our vice president had resigned before all of this began so that he could run for president). This is and has always been an entirely civilian government. The military was ordered by an entirely civilian Supreme Court to arrest Mr. Zelaya. His removal was ordered by an entirely civilian and elected Congress. To suggest that Mr. Zelaya was ousted by means of a military coup is demonstrably false.
Regarding the decision to expel Mr. Zelaya from the country the evening of June 28 without a trial, reasonable people can believe the situation could have been handled differently. But it is also necessary to understand the decision in the context of genuine fear of Mr. Zelaya’s proven willingness to violate the law and to engage in mob-led violence.
The way forward is to work with Costa Rican President Oscar Arias. He is proposing ways to ensure that Mr. Zelaya complies with Honduras’s laws and its constitution and allows the people of Honduras to elect a new president in the regularly scheduled Nov. 29 elections (or perhaps earlier, if the date is moved up as President Arias has suggested and as Honduran law allows).
If all parties reach agreement to allow Mr. Zelaya to return to Honduras—a big “if”—we believe that he cannot be trusted to comply with the law and therefore it is our position that he must be prosecuted with full due process.
President Arias’s proposal for a moratorium on prosecution of all parties may be considered, but our Supreme Court has indicated that such a proposal presents serious legal problems under our constitution.
Like America, our constitutional democracy has three co-equal and independent branches of government—a fact that Mr. Zelaya ignored when he openly defied the positions of both the Supreme Court and Congress. But we are ready to continue discussions once the Supreme Court, the attorney general and Congress analyze President Arias’s proposal. That proposal has been turned over to them so that they can review provisions that impact their legal authority. Once we know their legal positions we will proceed accordingly.
The Honduran people must have confidence that their Congress is a co-equal branch of government. They must be assured that the rule of law in Honduras applies to everyone, even their president, and that their Supreme Court’s orders will not be dismissed and swept aside by other nations as inconvenient obstacles.
Meanwhile, the other elements of the Arias proposal, especially the establishment of a Truth Commission to make findings of fact and international enforcement mechanisms to ensure Mr. Zelaya complies with the agreement, are worthy of serious consideration.
Mr. Zelaya’s irresponsible attempt on Friday afternoon to cross the border into Honduras before President Arias has obtained agreement from all parties—an attempt that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton appropriately described as “reckless”—was just another example of why Mr. Zelaya cannot be trusted to keep his word.
Regardless of what happens, the worst thing the U.S. can do is to impose economic sanctions that would primarily hurt the poorest people in Honduras. Rather than impose sanctions, the U.S. should continue the wise policies of Mrs. Clinton. She is supporting President Arias’s efforts to mediate the issues. The goal is a peaceful solution that is consistent with Honduran law in a civil society where even the president is not above the law.
Mr. Micheletti, previously the president of the Honduran Congress, became president of Honduras upon the departure of Manuel Zelaya. He is a member of the Liberal Party, the same party as Mr. Zelaya.
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204886304574311083177158174.html?mod=googlenews_wsj
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Miami Herald Editorial
Hugo Chávez's temper tantrums aren't fooling anyone
OUR OPINION: Tale of Swedish weapons shows Chávez link to FARC guerrillas
Over the years, Venezuela's Hugo Chávez has displayed a predictable pattern of behavior whenever one of his hare-brained schemes goes awry: The clearer the evidence of wrongdoing, the more false indignation he exhibits and the louder he complains.
No wonder, then, that he is throwing another diplomatic tantrum over the exposure of his connections to Colombia's leftist guerrillas, known by the acronym FARC. Weapons recovered from the FARC by Colombia's armed forces have been traced to Sweden, which sold them to Venezuela in the 1980s.
Sweden wants an explanation. The Swedish-made anti-tank AT-4 weapons were sold to Venezuela with the clear understanding that the government would be the ``end user'' -- i.e., that they would not be passed on to anyone else.
Mr. Chávez's reaction has been to recall his ambassador from Colombia and threaten economic reprisals against that country. He claims the whole thing is a set-up designed to embarrass his government.
If that were the case, it could be determined readily enough: Allow Swedish investigators to inspect the weapons and have Mr. Chávez order responsible officials in his government to answer questions about the arms trail. We won't hold our breath.
The connections between the Chávez government and the FARC have been clear ever since the discovery of documents taken from guerrilla computers last year. On the basis of that evidence, the U.S. Treasury Department has accused three top Chávez government officials of helping the FARC with weapons, finances and drug-trafficking.
This episode adds to the growing body of evidence that Mr. Chávez's government is in league with the FARC. His temper tantrums aren't fooling anybody.
http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/editorials/story/1163410.html
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Chavez Closes Down Broadcasters in War Against Venezuela Media
"What we are witnessing is the most comprehensive assault on free speech in Venezuela since Chavez came to power," said Jose Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. "With the exception of Cuba, Venezuela is the only country in the region that shows such flagrant disregard for universal standards of freedom of expression."
By Jeremy Morgan
Latin American Herald Tribune staff
CARACAS – Any doubts that the government was determined to crack the whip and gain the upper hand in its war with the more independently-minded private media were dispelled by an abrupt order from Infrastructure and Housing Minister Diosdado Cabello on Friday evening.
Cabello announced that 34 broadcasting stations, mainly radio but also a few television transmission centers, were to be shut down because President Hugo Chávez’s government was revoking their licences.
At the breakfast hour the following day, the stations went off the air amid a widespread assumption that they’d never be heard from again – or at least as long as El Comandante (as friend and foe alike refer to him, albeit from very different perspectives) is in residence at the presidential palace, Miraflores.
Cabello controls the National Telecommunications Commission (Conatel), which had sent out the necessary notices of closure following his announcement. The stations duly went off the air, most of them playing the national anthem as they saw themselves out.
Some stations announced that they would continue on the Internet, which the government is likely to find much more difficult to control. That said, the number of households equipped with computers and access to the Internet in Venezuela is relatively small – and more or less non-existent among the poorer classes who make up the ballast of Chávez’s power base.
The president of the National College of Journalists, William Echeverria, said that broadcasters could continue if they adopted a creative approach. “Here, they can close a radio transmitter but they can’t close down a different way of thinking,” he declared. “Who is the Venezuelan state to determine which radio station one should listen to?”
Cabello’s order had a partial effect on Globovisión, the privately-owned 24-hour news station which has long been at odds with the Chávez regime, and as such, has become the target of increasingly hostile actions on behalf of by the government. Chávez himself has openly threatened to close the channel, but so far has yet to do so.
Globovisión President Guillermo Zuloaga, who faces trial on charges including “generic usury” after a raid in which a fleet of cars was found at a residence he owns in east Caracas, said the government was “trying to shut up information.”
Zuloaga went on to suggest that Cabello’s measure was not in accordance with the Bolivarian Constitution adopted by referendum at Chávez’s behest in 1999, and he warned that closing down broadcasters and other steps taken by the government wouldn’t work in the end.
“Sooner or later, all these acts will be punished in one way or another,” Zuloaga said. “If this is a government with popular support, why are they trying to shut down the news instead of promoting it?”
Beatriz Adrían, a journalist at Globovisión, said five of the channel’s transmission stations had been affected by Conatel’s instruction, which had been delivered that morning. Information was being distorted from day to day, she said, calling on the citizenry to make its feelings known.
A few hours after the stations had shut, the National College of Journalists duly issued a statement calling on the people to protest against the government’s “despotic decision.” But the journalists were already a bit behind the curve on this story.
Not long after midnight Friday, reports coming into the capital spoke of sporadic, small-scale protests in the states of Zulia and Mérida, and a gathering outside CNB, a radio station in a middle class district of the capital. Some people in Chuao banged saucepans.
Unsurprisingly, it was journalists and broadcasters who held center stage during the early protests. Radio veteran Raiza Instúriz de Belfort took a particularly gloomy view.
“We’re in a dictatorship, they’re shutting us up,” she declared. “The future is pretty Black. I think freedom of expression already isn’t going to exist.” And then she added: “We will continue defending Venezuelan democracy as we have up to this moment.”
There was a poignant moment from Laura Castellanos, a journalist who said it was the second time her media workplace had been closed by the government. She once worked for Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), a private channel whose licence was abruptly revoked by Chávez in 2007.
“I’ve got two children,” she said. “What do I do now? They already shut RCTV, and now CNB. As you have to look for food, so do we and every time they shut the door to us.”
Opposition leaders got into the act on Saturday morning. Metropolitan Mayor Antonio Ledezma – who’s had more than his fair share of trouble at the hands of the government since he won office by ousting the ruling United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) at the elections last November – said the closure order showed that the president was fearful of freedom of expression.
Instead, Ledezma continued, what the government should be doing was attending to serious issues such as problems in the state health system. Closing down broadcasters wasn’t going to stop the Venezuelans from “commenting about the disgrace” at maternity clinics, he said.
The liberal conservative party, Primero Justicia, picked up this last point, calling on the government to “dedicate its time to improving the quality of life of the Venezuelans,” claiming that the closure would affect all the people.
Carlos Melo, a former oil industry employee who was sacked for his role in the two-month strike orchestrated by the Opposition against Chávez around the turn of 2002-03, condemned the enforced shut-down as a “dictatorial, anti-democratic process.”
Andrés Velásquez of Causa R, a small leftist party that once briefly sided with Chávez, went more than one step further. He called Cabello’s move “an act of fascism.”
Opposition Mayor Gerardo Blyde of the Baruta municipality in the south of the city laid into what he called “a certain blow against freedom of expression.” He pointed to the coincidence between the timing of the closure order and the hurried passage of the Media Crimes Law through a second debate on Friday.
The Radio Broadcasting Chamber questioned the procedure used to close down the stations. This had consisted solely of an order from Cabello, and as this left no right to defense it violated the law, the chamber argued.
International human rights organizations were also appalled. "What we are witnessing is the most comprehensive assault on free speech in Venezuela since Chavez came to power," said Jose Miguel Vivanco, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. "With the exception of Cuba, Venezuela is the only country in the region that shows such flagrant disregard for universal standards of freedom of expression."
A polling company did a snap survey and claimed that 84% of its sample had been against shutting down broadcasters. Within the total, it added, 67% of the president’s own supporters or chavistas felt the same way.
http://www.laht.com/article.asp?ArticleId=340546&CategoryId=10718
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Chavez accused of gagging media
There is a video worth watching at this BBC website (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8180109.stm)
Venezuelan opposition groups have protested against a decision to take 34 radio stations off the air, calling it an attack on freedom of speech.
As the stations stopped broadcasting on Saturday, staff said the move was aimed at giving more space to media that support President Hugo Chavez.
More than 200 other radio stations are expected to close in coming weeks.
The government says the stations are in breach of the rules for failing to hand in their registration papers on time.
The move to close the stations comes as the arguments over control of the media in Venezuela are becoming increasingly bitter, the BBC's Will Grant reports from the Venezuelan capital Caracas.
This week a tough new media law was proposed under which journalists could be imprisoned for publishing "harmful" material.
The opposition mayor of Caracas, Antonio Ledezma, said the closure of the stations showed the government was "scared of freedom of expression".
Opposition politician Juan Carlos Caldera said the government had "turned into a mutilator of rights".
But Diosdado Cabello, head of the national regulator and public works minister, said there was no evidence that the closures were against the law, adding that they were part of efforts to make the media more democratic.
"When we - the national government, the revolutionary government - took the decision to democratise the radio-electrical spectrum... we were speaking seriously," he said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8180109.stm
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U.S. Decides Not to Impose Sanctions on Honduras
By DAVID LUHNOW and JOSE DE CORDOBA
The U.S., in an apparent softening of its support for ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, won't impose economic sanctions on Honduras and has yet to decide whether Mr. Zelaya's removal from office constitutes a coup.
A letter from the State Department to Sen. Richard Lugar, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, states that the U.S. "energetically" opposes Mr. Zelaya's June 28 ouster. But the letter also expresses the harshest criticism yet of Mr. Zelaya's own actions that preceded his removal from office, including trying to change Honduras's constitution to potentially stay in power.
"We energetically condemn the actions of June 28. We also recognize that President Zelaya's insistence on undertaking provocative actions contributed to the polarization of Honduran society and led to a confrontation that unleashed the events that led to his removal," Richard Verma, the assistant secretary for legislative affairs, said in the letter, reviewed Tuesday by The Wall Street Journal.
The letter went on to say that U.S. policy wasn't aimed at supporting one person in particular, a reference to Mr. Zelaya, but to supporting the Honduran people's aspirations for democracy.
With Washington unwilling to take drastic steps such as sanctions to restore Mr. Zelaya to power, it seems increasingly unlikely that the leftist politician will return to his seat, analysts said. Honduras's interim government, backed by much of the country's establishment and middle class, appears unwilling to have Mr. Zelaya back, and Washington seems in no mood to force the issue.
"In Honduras, Washington's wavering will be seen as a sign that the government can wait it out until the elections and that the costs they are bearing for international isolation, while considerable, are preferable to the risks of allowing Zelaya to return, even for a limited time and with his authority curtailed," said Michael Shifter at the Inter-American Dialogue, a nonpartisan think tank on hemispheric affairs in Washington.
A State Department spokesman, who was unaware of the letter to Mr. Lugar's office, said "there has been no decision to soften the policy on Honduras." He added that the administration still supports a return of Mr. Zelaya to power, as called for in the mediation plan by Costa Rica's President Oscar Arias. The Supreme Court of Honduras has ruled that Mr. Zelaya's return as president would be illegal.
Analysts said the administration is staking out a middle ground, sending a message to Latin America that coups are unacceptable while not giving too much support to Mr. Zelaya, whose close relationship to Venezuela's populist leader Hugo Chávez has raised hackles among U.S. Republicans. Elected as a centrist, Mr. Zelaya took a sharp left turn in the past two years and became an outspoken critic of U.S. policy.
Sen. Lugar had asked the administration to explain its policy on the Honduran political crisis, warning that otherwise the Senate might delay confirmation of the top Latin America post in the State Department.
"I'm glad to see the State Department is finally beginning to walk back its support for Manuel Zelaya and admit that his 'provocative' actions were responsible for his removal," said Sen. Jim DeMint, another Republican member of the foreign relations committee.
A spokesman for Mr. DeMint said the move wasn't enough for the senator to lift his hold on the confirmation hearings for Arturo Valenzuela to become assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs.
Write to David Luhnow at david.luhnow@wsj.com and Jose de Cordoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124952525314809919.html
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Hugo Chávez took a break last week from lobbying Washington on behalf of deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya to travel to Quito, Ecuador, for a meeting of South American heads of state.
There he launched a virulent assault on the U.S. military, reiterated his commitment to spreading revolution in the region, and threatened the continent with war. Mr. Zelaya was by his side.
The Venezuelan's tirade against the U.S. and its ally Colombia raised the question yet again of what the U.S. could possibly be thinking in pushing Honduras to reinstate Mr. Zelaya. He was removed from office by the Honduran Congress in June because he violated the country's constitution and willfully incited mob violence.
But that's not the only thing that made him unpopular at home. He also had become an important ally of Mr. Chávez and was quite obviously being coached to copy the Chávez power grab in Venezuela by undermining Honduras's institutional checks and balances.
If Honduras has been able to neutralize Mr. Chávez, it's something to celebrate. A Chávez-style takeover of institutions in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua has quashed political pluralism, free speech and minority rights in those countries. There is now a heavy presence of Cuban state intelligence throughout the Venezuelan empire. Mr. Zelaya literally has become a fellow traveler of Mr. Chávez, leaving no doubts about the course he would put Honduras on if given the chance.
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Getty Images
Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez salutes Raul Castro while Argentine President Cristina Kirchner looks on in Caracas, Venezuela, Aug. 11.
.Among the theories making the rounds about Mr. Obama's motivations in trying to force Honduras to take Mr. Zelaya back, there is the hypothesis that this administration is tacking hard to the left. Mr. Obama has expressed the same views on Honduras as Sen. John Kerry (D., Mass.), who holds that the interim government must be forced to reinstate Mr. Zelaya and who has, over more than two decades in office, consistently allied himself with socialist causes in Latin America.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.As a U.S. senator, Mr. Kerry has the luxury of treating Latin America like his playground, as Democrats have done for decades, foisting on it ideas that Americans reject. Venezuelans still recall how Connecticut's Chris Dodd played the role of chief Chávez cheerleader in the Senate while the strongman was consolidating power.
But Mr. Obama is the president and commander in chief, and millions of people in this hemisphere are counting on the U.S. to stand up to Venezuelan aggression. Playing footsie under the table with Mr. Chávez on Honduras while the Venezuelan is threatening the peace isn't going to fly in a hemisphere that prefers liberty over tyranny.
Both Colombian and U.S. officials allege that the Venezuelan National Guard and high-ranking members of Mr. Chávez's government are in cahoots with criminal enterprises that run drugs in South America. The evidence suggests an alliance between the terrorist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the largest exporter of cocaine from that country—and members of Mr. Chávez's cabinet. There is also evidence in documents and video captured from the FARC that the rebels have influence at high levels of the Ecuadoran government.
The cocaine business is a big revenue raiser for the terrorist organization and for its business partners on the continent. This is why Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has agreed to allow U.S. drug-surveillance planes to use Colombian military bases.
In Quito, Mr. Chávez flew into a rage about that agreement. "The U.S. is the most warlike government in the world," he told his South American peers and Mr. Zelaya. "The Yankee military pays no mind to its president," he said, artfully exempting Barack Obama from blame. "In Colombia [the U.S. military] has immunity. They can rape women, they can kill and they can destroy in every direction. You can't do anything to them. It's horrible."
The military-bases agreement is far more limited than what Mr. Chávez claimed, but he wasn't about to miss an opportunity to ratchet up the tension. "The winds of war are starting to blow," he warned.
His counterparts didn't buy it. Colombia was not condemned in Quito, largely because key members of the group didn't want their own sovereign decisions subject to continental review. But Mr. Chávez is not going away. He has pledged to continue with efforts to destabilize surviving democracies.
Honduras remains a target. Argentina is also in his sights. In an interview with the Argentine daily La Nación, he spoke of his alliance with Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner. "We are going to work to reinforce the Caracas-Buenos Aires axis, which is a central axis," Mr. Chávez said. "Like the Caracas-Quito axis, the Caracas-Buenos Aires axis is fundamental for the integration."
The U.S. war on drugs has been a colossal failure because of the large cocaine market in the U.S. The tragedy—beyond the violence it creates—is that criminal enterprises, flourishing because of U.S. customers, wreak havoc on frail institutions. That's bad enough. But the Obama administration pours salt in that gaping wound by refusing to support the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement our ally has asked for, and now by backing Mr. Chávez's Honduran pawn.
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The Venezuelan's tirade against the U.S. and its ally Colombia raised the question yet again of what the U.S. could possibly be thinking in pushing Honduras to reinstate Mr. Zelaya. He was removed from office by the Honduran Congress in June because he violated the country's constitution and willfully incited mob violence.
I think Ms. Clinton misplaced her thinking cap a long time ago... :lol:
The cocaine business is a big revenue raiser for the terrorist organization and for its business partners on the continent. This is why Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has agreed to allow U.S. drug-surveillance planes to use Colombian military bases.
Legalize drugs and the problem goes away. Have Americans learned nothing from Prohibition?
As it is, the War on Drugs fuels the drug trade.
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Hugo Chávez took a break last week from lobbying Washington on behalf of deposed Honduran President Manuel Zelaya to travel to Quito, Ecuador, for a meeting of South American heads of state.
There he launched a virulent assault on the U.S. military, reiterated his commitment to spreading revolution in the region, and threatened the continent with war. Mr. Zelaya was by his side.
The Venezuelan's tirade against the U.S. and its ally Colombia raised the question yet again of what the U.S. could possibly be thinking in pushing Honduras to reinstate Mr. Zelaya. He was removed from office by the Honduran Congress in June because he violated the country's constitution and willfully incited mob violence.
But that's not the only thing that made him unpopular at home. He also had become an important ally of Mr. Chávez and was quite obviously being coached to copy the Chávez power grab in Venezuela by undermining Honduras's institutional checks and balances.
If Honduras has been able to neutralize Mr. Chávez, it's something to celebrate. A Chávez-style takeover of institutions in Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua has quashed political pluralism, free speech and minority rights in those countries. There is now a heavy presence of Cuban state intelligence throughout the Venezuelan empire. Mr. Zelaya literally has become a fellow traveler of Mr. Chávez, leaving no doubts about the course he would put Honduras on if given the chance.
Among the theories making the rounds about Mr. Obama's motivations in trying to force Honduras to take Mr. Zelaya back, there is the hypothesis that this administration is tacking hard to the left. Mr. Obama has expressed the same views on Honduras as Sen. John Kerry (D., Mass.), who holds that the interim government must be forced to reinstate Mr. Zelaya and who has, over more than two decades in office, consistently allied himself with socialist causes in Latin America.
As a U.S. senator, Mr. Kerry has the luxury of treating Latin America like his playground, as Democrats have done for decades, foisting on it ideas that Americans reject. Venezuelans still recall how Connecticut's Chris Dodd played the role of chief Chávez cheerleader in the Senate while the strongman was consolidating power.
But Mr. Obama is the president and commander in chief, and millions of people in this hemisphere are counting on the U.S. to stand up to Venezuelan aggression. Playing footsie under the table with Mr. Chávez on Honduras while the Venezuelan is threatening the peace isn't going to fly in a hemisphere that prefers liberty over tyranny.
Both Colombian and U.S. officials allege that the Venezuelan National Guard and high-ranking members of Mr. Chávez's government are in cahoots with criminal enterprises that run drugs in South America. The evidence suggests an alliance between the terrorist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)—the largest exporter of cocaine from that country—and members of Mr. Chávez's cabinet. There is also evidence in documents and video captured from the FARC that the rebels have influence at high levels of the Ecuadoran government.
The cocaine business is a big revenue raiser for the terrorist organization and for its business partners on the continent. This is why Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has agreed to allow U.S. drug-surveillance planes to use Colombian military bases.
In Quito, Mr. Chávez flew into a rage about that agreement. "The U.S. is the most warlike government in the world," he told his South American peers and Mr. Zelaya. "The Yankee military pays no mind to its president," he said, artfully exempting Barack Obama from blame. "In Colombia [the U.S. military] has immunity. They can rape women, they can kill and they can destroy in every direction. You can't do anything to them. It's horrible."
The military-bases agreement is far more limited than what Mr. Chávez claimed, but he wasn't about to miss an opportunity to ratchet up the tension. "The winds of war are starting to blow," he warned.
His counterparts didn't buy it. Colombia was not condemned in Quito, largely because key members of the group didn't want their own sovereign decisions subject to continental review. But Mr. Chávez is not going away. He has pledged to continue with efforts to destabilize surviving democracies.
Honduras remains a target. Argentina is also in his sights. In an interview with the Argentine daily La Nación, he spoke of his alliance with Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner. "We are going to work to reinforce the Caracas-Buenos Aires axis, which is a central axis," Mr. Chávez said. "Like the Caracas-Quito axis, the Caracas-Buenos Aires axis is fundamental for the integration."
The U.S. war on drugs has been a colossal failure because of the large cocaine market in the U.S. The tragedy—beyond the violence it creates—is that criminal enterprises, flourishing because of U.S. customers, wreak havoc on frail institutions. That's bad enough. But the Obama administration pours salt in that gaping wound by refusing to support the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement our ally has asked for, and now by backing Mr. Chávez's Honduran pawn.
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In light of Glenn Beck's report of the FCC Czar referring to Chavez"s "wonderful revolution" (or something like that) the following is subject to sinister interpretations , , ,
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If the Obama administration were a flotilla of ships, it might be sending out an SOS right about now. ObamaCare has hit the political equivalent of an iceberg. And last week the president’s international prestige was broadsided by the Scots, who set free the Lockerbie bomber without the least consideration of American concerns. Mr. Obama’s campaign promise of restoring common sense to budget management is sleeping with the fishes.
This administration needs a win. Or more accurately, it can't bear another loss right now. Most especially it can't afford to be defeated by the government of a puny Central American country that doesn't seem to know its place in the world and dares to defy the imperial orders of Uncle Sam.
I'm referring, of course, to Honduras, which despite two months of intense pressure from Washington is still refusing to reinstate Manuel Zelaya, its deposed president. Last week the administration took off the gloves and sent a message that it would use everything it has to break the neck of the Honduran democracy. Its bullying might work. But it will never be able to brag about what it has done.
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Reuters
Supporters of Honduran President Roberto Micheletti (August 24.). The U.S. continues to implement punitive measures against the country.
.The most recent example of the Obama-style Good Neighbor Policy was the announcement last week that visa services for Hondurans are suspended indefinitely, and that some $135 million in bilateral aid might be cut. But these are only the public examples of its hardball tactics. Much nastier stuff is going on behind the scenes, practiced by a presidency that once promised the American people greater transparency and a less interventionist foreign policy.
To recap, the Honduran military in June executed a Supreme Court arrest warrant against Mr. Zelaya for trying to hold a referendum on whether he should be able to run for a second term. Article 239 of the Honduran constitution states that any president who tries for a second term automatically loses the privilege of his office. By insisting that Mr. Zelaya be returned to power, the U.S. is trying to force Honduras to violate its own constitution.
It is also asking Hondurans to risk the fate of Venezuela. They know how Venezuela's Hugo Chávez went from being democratically elected the first time, in 1998, to making himself dictator for life. He did it by destroying his country's institutional checks and balances. When Mr. Zelaya moved to do the same in Honduras, the nation cut him off at the pass.
For Mr. Chávez, Mr. Zelaya's return to power is crucial. The Venezuelan is actively spreading his Marxist gospel around the region and Mr. Zelaya was his man in Tegucigalpa.
The Honduran push-back is a major setback for Caracas. That's why Mr. Chávez has mobilized the Latin left to demand Mr. Zelaya's return. Last week, Dominican Republic President Leonel Fernández joined the fray, calling for Honduras to be kicked out of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (Cafta). Mr. Fernandez is a close friend of Mr. Chávez and a beneficiary of Venezuela's oil-for-obedience program in the Caribbean.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.Mr. Obama apparently wants in on this leftie-fest. He ran for president, in essence, against George W. Bush. Mr. Bush was unpopular in socialist circles. This administration wants to show that it can be cool with Mr. Chávez and friends.
Mr. Obama's methods are decidedly uncool. Prominent Hondurans, including leading members of the business community, complain that a State Department official has been pressuring them to push the interim government to accept the return of Mr. Zelaya to power.
When I asked the State Department whether it was employing such dirty tricks a spokeswoman would only say the U.S. has been "encouraging all members of civil society to support the San Jose 'accord'"—which calls for Mr. Zelaya to be restored to power. Perhaps something was lost in the translation but threats to use U.S. power against a small, poor nation hardly qualify as encouragement.
Elsewhere in the region there are reports that U.S. officials have been calling Latin governments to demand that they support the U.S. position. When I asked State whether that was true, a spokeswoman would not answer the question. She would only say that the U.S. is "cooperating with the [Organization of American States] and [Costa Rican President] Oscar Arias to support the San José accord."
In other words, though it won't admit to coercion, it is fully engaged in arm-twisting at the OAS in order to advance its agenda.
This not only seems unfair to the Honduran democracy but it also seems to contradict an earlier U.S. position. In a letter to Sen. Richard Lugar on Aug. 4, the State Department claimed that its "strategy for engagement is not based on any particular politician or individual" but rather finding "a "resolution that best serves the Honduran people and their democratic aspirations."
A lot of Hondurans believe that the U.S. isn't using its brass knuckles to serve their "democratic aspirations" at all, but the quite-opposite aspirations of a neighborhood thug.
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"The Supreme Court of Honduras has constitutional and statutory authority to hear cases against the President of the Republic and many other high officers of the State, to adjudicate and enforce judgments, and to request the assistance of the public forces to enforce its rulings."
—Congressional Research Service, August 2009
Ever since Manuel Zelaya was removed from the Honduran presidency by that country's Supreme Court and Congress on June 28 for violations of the constitution, the Obama administration has insisted, without any legal basis, that the incident amounts to a "coup d'état" and must be reversed. President Obama has dealt harshly with Honduras, and Americans have been asked to trust their president's proclamations.
Now a report filed at the Library of Congress by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) provides what the administration has not offered, a serious legal review of the facts. "Available sources indicate that the judicial and legislative branches applied constitutional and statutory law in the case against President Zelaya in a manner that was judged by the Honduran authorities from both branches of the government to be in accordance with the Honduran legal system," writes CRS senior foreign law specialist Norma C. Gutierrez in her report.
Do the facts matter? Fat chance. The administration is standing by its "coup" charge and 10 days ago, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton went so far as to sanction the country's independent judiciary. The U.S. won't say why, but its clear the court's sin is rejecting a U.S.-backed proposal to restore Mr. Zelaya to power.
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Martin Kozlowski
.The upshot is that the U.S. is trying to force Honduras to violate its own constitution and is also using its international political heft to try to interfere with the country's independent judiciary.
Hondurans are worried about what this pressure is doing to their country. Mr. Zelaya's violent supporters are emboldened by the U.S. position. They deface some homes and shops with graffiti and throw stones and home-made bombs into others, and whenever the police try to stop them, they howl about their "human rights."
But it may be that Americans should be even more concerned about the heavy-handedness, without legal justification, emanating from the executive branch in Washington. What does it say about Mr. Obama's respect for the separation of powers that he would instruct Mrs. Clinton to punish an independent court because it did not issue the ruling he wanted?
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.Since June 28, the U.S. has been pressuring Honduras to put Mr. Zelaya back in the presidency. But neither Mrs. Clinton's spurious "rule of law" claims or the tire iron handed her by Mr. Obama to use against this little country have been effective in convincing the Honduran judiciary that it ought to abandon its constitution.
It seems that Mrs. Clinton is peeved with the court because it ruled that restoring Mr. Zelaya to power under a proposal drafted by Costa Rican President Oscar Arias is unconstitutional. Thus, the State Department decided that in defense of the rule of law it would penalize the members of the Supreme Court for their interpretation of their constitution. Fourteen justices had their U.S. visas pulled.
Since the U.S. already had yanked the visa of the 15th member of the court, the one who signed the arrest warrant for Mr. Zelaya, this action completed Mrs. Clinton's assault on the independence of a foreign democracy's highest court. The lesson, presumably, is that judges in small foreign nations are required to accept America's interpretation of their own laws.
Thousands of readers have written to me asking how all this can happen in the U.S., where democratic principles have been recognized since the nation's founding. Many readers have written that they are "ashamed" of the U.S. and have asked, in effect, "How can I help Honduras?" A more pertinent question may turn out to be, how can they help their own country?
In its actions toward Honduras, the Obama administration is demonstrating contempt for the fundamentals of democracy. Legal scholars are clear on this. "Judicial independence is a central component of any democracy and is crucial to separation of powers, the rule of law and human rights," writes Ahron Barak, the former president of the Supreme Court of Israel and a prominent legal scholar, in his compelling 2006 book, "The Judge in a Democracy."
"The purpose of the separation of powers is to strengthen freedom and prevent the concentration of power in the hands of one government actor in a manner likely to harm the freedom of the individual," Mr. Barak explains—almost as if he is writing about Honduras.
He also warns prophetically about the Chávez style of democracy that has destroyed Venezuela and that Hondurans say they were trying to avoid in their own country. "Democracy is entitled to defend itself from those who seek to use it in order to destroy its very existence," he writes. Americans ought to ask themselves why the Obama administration doesn't seem to agree.
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It seems there really is no rest for the weary Hondurans. Nearly three months after the country's major legal institutions determined that former President Manual Zelaya had committed treason with his Hugo Chavez-esque grab for power, the tiny nation is still being pressured to allow Zelaya to resume his role as leader.
Now, Zelaya, likely aided by Venezuela's Chavez, has snuck back into the Honduran capitol of Tegucigalpa where, from the safety of the Brazilian embassy, he has called for his supporters to converge on the city with "peaceful" demonstrations. And they have done so, despite interim President Roberto Micheletti's declaration of a curfew, roadblocks and a closed airport. Meanwhile, Zelaya bizarrely complains of assassination attempts by "Israeli mercenaries" who he claims are using toxic gases and high-frequency radiation to torture him. Apparently, the "gas" has gone to his head.
The Obama administration has repeatedly ignored Honduras' right to self-determination with measures that make the Left's cry of "American imperialism" during the Bush years seem like child's play. The U.S. State Department has cut off vital aid to Honduras and has denied its citizens U.S. visas, all to make it bend to the will of Obama, Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro. "It is imperative that dialogue begin," Hillary Clinton declared, and "that there be a channel of communication between President Zelaya and the de facto regime in Honduras." Memo to Hillary: Zelaya is no longer president, his legal term in office has expired, and the "de facto regime" is a legitimate transitional government until elections can take place.
Regardless, the U.S. State Department has declared that it will not recognize the outcome of the upcoming elections on Nov. 29 unless Zelaya is returned to power.
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Sometimes I ask myself if Hitler wasn't right when he wanted to finish with that race, through the famous holocaust, because if there are people that are harmful to this country, they are the Jews, the Israelites.
David Romero Ellner
Executive Director
Radio Globo, Honduras, Sept. 25, 2009
Meet one of Honduras's most vocal advocates for the return of deposed president Manuel Zelaya to office. He's not your average radio jock. He started in Honduran politics as a radical activist and was one of the founders of the hard-left People's Revolutionary Union, which had links to Honduran terrorists in 1980s. A few years ago he was convicted and served time in prison for raping his own daughter.
Today Mr. Romero Ellner is pure zelayista, hungry for power and not ashamed to say so. This explains why he has joined Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and Mr. Zelaya in targeting Jews. Mr. Chávez has allied himself with Iran to further his ability to rule unchecked in the hemisphere. He hosts Hezbollah terrorists and seeks Iranian help to become a nuclear power. He and his acolytes cement their ties to Iranian dictator Mahmoud Ahmadinejad by echoing his anti-Semitic rants.
The Honduras debate is not really about Honduras. It is about whether it is possible to stop the spread of chavismo and all it implies, including nuclear proliferation and terrorism in Latin America. Most troubling is the unflinching support for Mr. Zelaya from President Barack Obama and Democratic Sen. John Kerry—despite the Law Library of Congress review that shows that Mr. Zelaya's removal from office was legal, and the clear evidence that he is Mr. Chávez's man in Tegucigalpa. On Thursday, Mr. Kerry took the unprecedented step of trying to block a fact-finding mission to Honduras by Republican Sen. Jim DeMint, who is resisting Mr. Obama's efforts to restore Mr. Zelaya to power.
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Associated Press
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez embraces Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
.Mr. Zelaya, recall, was arrested, deposed and deported on June 28 because he violated the Honduran Constitution. He snuck back into the country on Sept. 21 and found refuge at the Brazilian Embassy in the capital. Mr. Romero Ellner's calumny against Jews was a follow-up to Mr. Zelaya's claim that he was being "subjected to high-frequency radiation" from outside the embassy and that he thought "Israeli mercenaries" were behind it.
The verbal attack on Jews from a zelayista is consistent with a pattern emerging in the region. Take what's been going on in Venezuela. In the earliest years of Chávez rule, a Venezuelan friend, who is a Christian, confessed his fears to me. "In his speech, he always tries to create hate between groups of people," my friend told me. "He loves hate speech."
For a decade, Venezuelans have been force-fed the strongman's view of economic nationalism laced with this divisive language. Venezuelans are encouraged to seek revenge against their neighbors. Crime has skyrocketed.
The Jewish community has been targeted as Mr. Chávez's relationship with Mr. Ahmadinejad has blossomed. In 2004, I reported on a police raid at a Jewish school for young children in Caracas. The pretext was a "tip" that the school was storing weapons. No weapons were found, but the community was terrorized.
In recent years, Venezuela and Iran have signed joint ventures estimated to be worth $20 billion. There are similar pacts, estimated at $10 billion, between Iran and Venezuelan satellite, Bolivia. Both South American countries accused Israel of genocide in Gaza in 2008 and cut diplomatic ties. Mr. Chávez's tirades against Israel during that time emboldened his street thugs. In January 2009, vandals broke into a temple in Caracas and desecrated the sacred space with graffiti calling for the death of Jews.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau recently gave a speech to the Brookings Institution in which he said "Iran and Venezuela are beyond the courting phase. We know they are creating a cozy financial, political and military partnership, and that both countries have strong ties to Hezbollah and Hamas."
Iran has courted Honduras as well. When Mr. Zelaya was still in power, the Honduran press reported that his foreign minister Patricia Rodas met with high-ranking Iranian officials in Mexico City. That raised plenty of eyebrows in Central America.
Neither Venezuela nor Honduras has any history of anti-Semitism. But with Mr. Chávez importing Mr. Ahmadinejad's despicable ideology and methods, an assault on the Jewish community goes with the territory.
Honduras recognizes that it was a mistake to deport Mr. Zelaya after he was arrested. But it argues that fears of zelayista extremism and use of violence as a political tool in the months leading up to June 28 provoked desperation. Mr. Romero Ellner—whose radio station was closed down by the government last week—provided exhibit A with his remarks. If the U.S. State Department is opposed to the exile, let it call for Mr. Zelaya to be put on trial now that he is back in Honduras. It has no grounds to demand that democratic Honduras restore an anti-Semitic rabble rouser to power.
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This is a long vid ,24mins. It has interviews with the current President and Supreme court Justice of Honduras that are well worth hearing. Come November 29th things will heat up in Honduras.
PJTV Video: "Obama and Chavez and Castro, Oh My. The Truth About the Honduran Coup & Our President's Wrong Move"
http://www.pjtv.com/v/2497
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The BO Administration's policy on Honduras is so wrong and so stupid as to challenge the assumption of good faith. :x
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I was watching a PJTV vid about Mark Lloyd, Obama's diversity czar, who praised Chavez's democratic revolution. The man was drooling over Chavez and his seizing of the media in Venezuela. This is indicative of the atmosphere in the white house. Honduras is in real trouble with Obama's administration and the people who voted them in should be ashamed.
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I hope the Tea Parties and the Town Hall Meetings will lead to throwing out the bums. Apparently Obama is far down in the opinion polls already.
I have watched American politics from a distance for over 50 years and never before have I sensed such a revolutionary fervor in America. Obama had the bad luck of getting elected just as the American taxpayer was being robbed blind to pay for the excesses of the fat cat Wall Street bankers. Don't get me wrong, I'm a free market capitalist through and through but there is no excuse for the abuse the financial system was subjected to by these Wall Street bankers aided and abetted by their cartel, the Fed.
As Crafty Dog knows, most of my investments are in the American stock market so that, while not an American taxpayer, I still have a large vested interest in the well-being of the American economy. Also, no friend of Chavez can ever be a friend of mine. It is utterly disgusting to see Obama in bed with Chavez, Morales, Correa, Zelaya, Castro and Ortega. These people are the scum of Latin America.
But I have faith, as Winston Churchill said: "You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried everything else."
Denny Schlesinger
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Honduras: More fitting with his professed foreign policy philosophy, that the U.S. doesn't have all the answers, would have been wise to not comment on Honduras instead of taking the wrong side and making things worse.
"...while not an American taxpayer..." - Denny, don't worry, most people here don't pay US taxes either. :-(
The Winston Churchill quote is just perfect ("You can always count on Americans to do the right thing - after they've tried everything else.") - People were ready for hope and change but not necessarily choosing the sharp left turn that they got.
"It is utterly disgusting to see Obama in bed with Chavez, Morales, Correa, Zelaya, Castro and Ortega. These people are the scum of Latin America." - Add Rev. Wright, Bill Ayers, Van Jones, Valerie Jarrett and the ACORN organization to the foreign friends list and people should get a feel for where the guy is coming from, as well-meaning as he might be. I wish more people here were clear on that.
After the Obama exuberance finishes winding down we are really only returning to an evenly and more angrily divided nation IMHO.
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By JIM DEMINT
Tegucigalpa
In the last three months, much has been made of a supposed military "coup" that whisked former Honduran President Manuel Zelaya from power and the supposed chaos it has created.
After visiting Tegucigalpa last week and meeting with a cross section of leaders from Honduras's government, business community, and civil society, I can report there is no chaos there. There is, however, chaos to spare in the Obama administration's policy toward our poor and loyal allies in Honduras.
That policy was set in a snap decision the day Mr. Zelaya was removed from office, without a full assessment of either the facts or reliable legal analysis of the constitutional provisions at issue. Three months later, it remains in force, despite mounting evidence of its moral and legal incoherence.
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Associated Press
Honduras's ousted President Manuel Zelaya
.While in Honduras, I spoke to dozens of Hondurans, from nonpartisan members of civil society to former Zelaya political allies, from Supreme Court judges to presidential candidates and even personal friends of Mr. Zelaya. Each relayed stories of a man changed and corrupted by power. The evidence of Mr. Zelaya's abuses of presidential power—and his illegal attempts to rewrite the Honduran Constitution, a la Hugo Chávez—is not only overwhelming but uncontroverted.
As all strong democracies do after cleansing themselves of usurpers, Honduras has moved on.
The presidential election is on schedule for Nov. 29. Under Honduras's one-term-limit, Mr. Zelaya could not have sought re-election anyway. Current President Roberto Micheletti—who was installed after Mr. Zelaya's removal, per the Honduran Constitution—is not on the ballot either. The presidential candidates were nominated in primary elections almost a year ago, and all of them—including Mr. Zelaya's former vice president—expect the elections to be free, fair and transparent, as has every Honduran election for a generation.
Indeed, the desire to move beyond the Zelaya era was almost universal in our meetings. Almost.
In a day packed with meetings, we met only one person in Honduras who opposed Mr. Zelaya's ouster, who wishes his return, and who mystifyingly rejects the legitimacy of the November elections: U.S. Ambassador Hugo Llorens.
When I asked Ambassador Llorens why the U.S. government insists on labeling what appears to the entire country to be the constitutional removal of Mr. Zelaya a "coup," he urged me to read the legal opinion drafted by the State Department's top lawyer, Harold Koh. As it happens, I have asked to see Mr. Koh's report before and since my trip, but all requests to publicly disclose it have been denied.
On the other hand, the only thorough examination of the facts to date—conducted by a senior analyst at the Law Library of Congress—confirms the legality and constitutionality of Mr. Zelaya's ouster. (It's on the Internet here .)
Unlike the Obama administration's snap decision after June 28, the Law Library report is grounded in the facts of the case and the intricacies of Honduran constitutional law. So persuasive is the report that after its release, the New Republic's James Kirchick concluded in an Oct. 3 article that President Obama's hastily decided Honduras policy is now "a mistake in search of a rationale."
The Hondurans I met agree. All everyone seemed to want was a chance to make their case, or at least an independent review of the facts.
So far, the Obama administration has ignored these requests and instead has repeatedly doubled down. It's revoked the U.S. travel visas of President Micheletti, his government and private citizens, and refuses to talk to the government in Tegucigalpa. It's frozen desperately needed financial assistance to one of the poorest and friendliest U.S. allies in the region. It won't release the legal basis for its insistence on Mr. Zelaya's restoration to power. Nor has it explained why it's setting aside America's longstanding policy of supporting free elections to settle these kinds of disputes.
But these elections are the only way out—a fact even the Obama administration must see. The Honduran constitution prohibits Zelaya's return to power. The election date is set by law for Nov. 29. The elections will be monitored by international observers and overseen by an apolitical body, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, whose impartiality and independence has been roundly praised, even by Ambassador Llorens.
America's Founding Fathers—like the framers of Honduras's own constitution—believed strong institutions were necessary to defend freedom and democracy from the ambitions of would-be tyrants and dictators. Faced by Mr. Zelaya's attempted usurpations, the institutions of Honduran democracy performed as designed, and as our own Founding Fathers would have hoped.
Hondurans are therefore left scratching their heads. They know why Hugo Chávez, Daniel Ortega and the Castro brothers oppose free elections and the removal of would-be dictators, but they can't understand why the Obama administration does.
They're not the only ones.
Mr. DeMint, a Republican senator from South Carolina, is a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
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What Does the State Department Not Want Us to Know about Honduras?
Posted by Ian Vasquez
Senator Jim DeMint from South Carolina recently traveled to Honduras and found—no surprise—a peaceful country and broad support for the ouster of President Zelaya among members of civil society, the supreme court, political parties and others. In an op-ed in this weekend’s Wall Street Journal, DeMint describes his trip in light of Washington’s continuing support of Zelaya and its condemnation of what it calls a “coup.” U.S. policy is mystifying since the ousted president’s removal from office was a rare example in Latin America of an institutional defense of democracy as envisioned by the constitution and interpreted by the Supreme Court that ruled that the president be removed. (For independent opinions on the case, see here and here.)
However, the Senator reports a legal analysis at the State Department prepared by its top lawyer that apparently has informed Washington’s policy but that has not been made public nor even released to DeMint despite his repeated requests. In the interest of democracy and transparency, the State Department should immediately release its legal report. Maybe then we (which includes much of the hemisphere) will be less mystified about what is driving Washington policy toward Honduras. Or at least we’ll have a better insight on the administration’s understanding of democracy.
http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/2009/10/13/what-does-the-state-department-not-want-us-to-know-about-honduras/
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If Honduras manages to preserve its democracy despite U.S. pressure to abandon it, the tiny Central American country may wind up thanking Nicaragua's Danny Ortega, of all people.
Last week, President Ortega inadvertently provided the best defense yet of the Honduran decision this summer to remove Manuel Zelaya from the presidency. Nicaragua has a one-term limit for presidents, and Mr. Ortega's term expires in 2011. However, the Nicaraguan doesn't want to leave, and so he asked the Sandinista-controlled Supreme Court to overturn the constitutional ban on his re-election.
Last week the court's constitutional panel obliged him. The Nicaraguan press reported that the vote was held before three opposition judges could reach the chamber in time for the session. Three alternative judges, all Sandinistas, took their place and the court gave Mr. Ortega the green light. Mr. Ortega has decreed that the ruling cannot be appealed.
This is classic strong-man stuff on Hugo Chávez's Venezuela model. Mr. Ortega's approval rating is in the low-30% range and he'd have a hard time winning a fair election against a united opposition. But he controls the nation's electoral council, and in the 2008 municipal races—the most important elected checks on the president—the council refused to provide a transparent accounting of the vote tally. It also blocked international and local observers, and the vote was marred by claims of widespread fraud. The international community watched all this but did nothing. And now Mr. Ortega is taking the next chavista step toward indefinite rule.
Hondurans deposed Mr. Zelaya because he was showing similar designs on changing their constitution to be able to run again and stay in power. Hondurans have to live in Mr. Ortega's neighborhood, and their action against Mr. Zelaya may well have saved them from Nicaragua's fate.
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No doubt we can look forward to strong denunciations from our President and our Secretary of State.
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Disturbing article Crafty
From the hip.......we have problems brewing...the next war just maybe down south...or maybe the war in the east will spill into the south. Just look to who chaves is buddying up with to see where this is going. Our government is encouraging this fester. One of the real dangers lies with the communist strongmen ties to the drug trade and our nonexistent border here in Texas and the south. Mexico is terrible now but will crumble if drugs are pumped into it through easy access enabled by these strongmen.
Freki
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The US continues its meddling ways against Honduran democracy and in alliance with Chavez's ally/pawn. WTF?
Stratfor:
Honduras: The U.S. Brokers a Deal
Stratfor Today » October 30, 2009 | 1525 GMT
ORLANDO SIERRA/AFP/Getty Images
Ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya (L) and U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon on Oct. 30 after talksAfter months of political deadlock, interim Honduran President Roberto Micheletti and ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya came to a compromise late on Oct. 29. The agreement represents a breakthrough for the two parties and for international mediation led (in this round) by the United States, which had sent U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon to the Central American nation to help hammer out a compromise.
According to Micheletti, the concord has eight points of agreement, which include turning control of the armed forces over to the Supreme Electoral Council, guaranteeing international and domestic recognition of presidential elections scheduled for Nov. 29 and the elimination of all sanctions against Honduras by foreign powers. The deal also grants the possibility that Zelaya could return to office and finish the last three months of his term.
While the deal looks solid on the surface, the details have left room for maneuvering. Essentially, in order to return, Zelaya will have to be approved by both the Supreme Court and the Congress -- two bodies that resoundingly rejected him and supported his ouster in the first place. Even if Zelaya does get back into the presidential position, it appears that he will not have command of the military. These weakened powers are likely why Zelaya hopes that he will gain congressional approval (not to mention the collective need for an end to the imbroglio), and it may indeed be sufficient.
It would appear that this agreement has allowed Zelaya to save face while still guaranteeing the validity of the upcoming election that was critical for the interim government, and that the United States had threatened not to recognize. But there are stumbling blocks ahead. If Zelaya fails to be approved by the Congress and the Supreme Court, it is possible that things will not go as planned, with the state's stability in the balance.
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Unless something monumental happens in the Western Hemisphere in the next 31 days, the big regional story for 2009 will be how tiny Honduras managed to beat back the colonial aspirations of its most powerful neighbors and preserve its constitution.
Yesterday's elections for president and Congress, held as scheduled and without incident, were the crowning achievement of that struggle.
National Party candidate Porfirio Lobo was the favorite to win in pre-election polls. Yet the name of the victor is almost beside the point. The completion of these elections is a national triumph in itself and a win for all people who yearn for liberty.
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Getty Images
Casting a vote in Tegucigalpa, Nov. 29
.The fact that the U.S. has said it will recognize their legitimacy shows that this reality eventually made its way to the White House. If not Hugo Chávez's Waterloo, Honduras's stand at least marks a major setback for the Venezuelan strongman's expansionist agenda.
The losers in this drama also include Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Spain, which all did their level best to block the election. Egged on by their zeal, militants inside Honduras took to exploding small bombs around the country in the weeks leading to the vote. They hoped that terror might damp turnout and delegitimize the process. They failed. Yesterday's civic participation appeared to be at least as good as it was in the last presidential election. Some polling stations reportedly even ran short, for a time, of the indelible ink used to mark voter pinkies.
Latin socialists tried to discredit Honduran democracy as part of their effort to force the reinstatement of deposed President Manuel Zelaya. Both sides knew that if that happened the electoral process would be in jeopardy.
Mr. Zelaya had already showed his hand when he organized a mob to try to carry out a June 28 popular referendum so that he could cancel the elections and remain in office. That was unlawful, and he was arrested by order of the Supreme Court and later removed from power by Congress for violating the constitution.
It is less well-known that as president, according to an electoral-council official I interviewed in Tegucigalpa two weeks ago, Mr. Zelaya had refused to transfer the budgeted funds—as required by law—to the council for its preparatory work. In other words, he didn't want a free election.
Mr. Chávez didn't want one either. During the Zelaya government the country had become a member of Mr. Chávez's Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), which includes Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua. If power changed hands, Honduran membership would be at risk.
Last week a government official told me that Honduran intelligence has learned that Mr. Zelaya had made preparations to welcome all the ALBA presidents to the country the night of his planned June referendum. Food for a 10,000-strong blowout celebration, the official added, was on order.
ALBA has quite a bit of clout at the Organization of American States (OAS) these days, and it hasn't been hard for Mr. Chávez to control Secretary General José Miguel Insulza. The Chilean socialist desperately wants to be re-elected to his OAS post in 2010. Only a month before Mr. Zelaya was deposed, Mr. Insulza led the effort to lift the OAS membership ban on Cuba. When Mr. Zelaya was deposed, Mr. Insulza dutifully took up his instructions sent from Caracas to quash Honduran sovereignty.
Unfortunately for him, the leftist claims that Honduras could not hold fair elections flew in the face of the facts. First, the candidates were chosen in November 2008 primaries with observers from the OAS, which judged the process to be "transparent and participative." Second, all the presidential candidates—save one from a small party on the extreme left—wanted the elections to go forward. Third, though Mr. Insulza insisted on calling the removal of Mr. Zelaya a "military coup," the military had never taken charge of the government. And finally, the independent electoral tribunal, chosen by congress before Mr. Zelaya was removed, was continuing with the steps required to fulfill its constitutional mandate to conduct the vote. In the aftermath of the elections Mr. Insulza, who insisted that the group would not recognize the results, presides over a discredited OAS.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.At least the Obama administration figured out, after four months, that it had blundered. It deserves credit for realizing that elections were the best way forward, and for promising to recognize the outcome despite enormous pressure from Brazil and Venezuela. President Obama came to office intent on a foreign policy of multilateralism. Perhaps this experience will teach him that freedom does indeed have enemies.
Almost 400 foreign observers from Japan, Europe, Latin America and the U.S. traveled to Honduras for yesterday's elections. Peru, Costa Rica, Panama, the German parliament and Japan will also recognize the vote. The outpouring of international support demonstrates that Hondurans were never as alone these past five months as they thought. A good part of the world backs their desire to save their democracy from chavismo and to live in liberty.
Write to: O'Grady@wsj.com
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Honduras' Way Out
Americas: If anything proved there never was a crisis in Honduras, it was the peaceful, purposeful, high-participation election there Sunday. Against all odds, Hondurans showed the way out with democracy.
Elections in distressed countries are often dramatic events — think of El Salvador's long voting lines in 1994 at the end of its civil war as voters desperately sought democracy, or the bullets Colombians defied from FARC terrorists who vowed to mow down voters in 2002, not to mention the spectacular elation of purple fingers at the first elections in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Honduras' election Sunday wasn't like that.
Although the turnout, at 62%, was 20% higher than the last election, it was an otherwise calm, serious, almost boring event. European Parliament observers called it transparent. It above all illustrated that elections are nothing new to Hondurans, whose constitutional democracy has been firmly in place since 1982.
Still, this was no ordinary election. It was a blazing star lighting the way out of a complicated crisis completely created from abroad.
Leaders of leftist and anti-democratic states led by Hugo Chavez's Venezuela besieged the tiny country with a legitimacy crisis for five months, falsely painting the ordinary workings of the Honduran constitution as a military coup. They demanded the return of ex-president Mel Zelaya, a Chavez ally thrown out on June 28 for illegally trying to extend his term, prohibited by the constitution.
They got their pals in the Organization of American States to suspend the tiny country as a nondemocracy and make it a pariah.
They also created chaos: smuggling in the exiled Zelaya to Brazil's embassy in Tegucigalpa to whip up mobs in orgies of looting.
The pro-Zelaya groups set off trash can bombs and fired Russian grenade launchers at the Supreme Court ahead of the election to discourage participation. They're also suspected of killing relatives of Honduran officials in the government to create terror.
The U.S. went along with this for a couple of months, cutting $30 million in aid, pulling visas of Honduran officials, instituting a travel advisory, and threatening to not recognize the Nov. 29 election. It sided with the tyrannical multilateralism led by Hugo Chavez, not with the democracy of small, struggling nations.
But not even U.S. sanctions could break the Hondurans.
To win back goodwill, they accepted an Oct. 30 deal brokered by the U.S. and Costa Rica that left open the possibility Zelaya might be allowed to return, but left the decision to Honduran government.
But their biggest impact came in the calm, serious election they held, devoid of any big scandals. This is what democracies do.
The U.S., to its credit, is now supporting it. That realism began earlier than generally reported, with an Aug. 4 State Department letter to Sen. Richard Lugar of Indiana. Our sources say it was crafted by then-Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Shannon, who laid out the U.S. role: a "negotiated solution" (signed Oct. 30), no "crippling economic sanctions" and a strategy "not based on supporting any particular politician or individual."
Mixed signals from the National Security Council and political appointees at State obscured the U.S. shift. But now the U.S. is about to to endorse the election as fair, in essence reversing its earlier stance.
That's realism and it's accompanied by a growing stream of nations also embracing it: Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, and Peru, followed by Germany, Japan, France, the Czech Republic, and Poland.
There also are signals that Spain, Russia and China will follow, and a State Department source says they are expected aboard soon.
It all leaves Chavez and his Bolivarian vassal states, as well as Brazil and Argentina, politically isolated. As they vow not to accept the election without Zelaya, they're watching their allies peel away.
Now, they face diplomatic irrelevance. After all, if they can't accept Honduras' democratic election with a completely new president in the most peaceful of democratic transitions, then what do they want? And whose election is it?
All of this is happening for one reason: Hondurans insisted on standing by their constitution — both in ousting Zelaya and bringing in a new president to replace him. They should be proud for standing up for the rule of law, a rare thing these days. And they did it their way, with great courage that will be remembered.
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=513847&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3a+EditorialRss+(Editorial+RSS)
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By SUSAN KAUFMAN PURCELL
Until recently, the Obama administration assumed that Brazil and the United States were natural allies who shared many foreign policy interests, particularly in Latin America. Brazil, after all, is a friendly democracy with a growing market economy and Western cultural values.
It will soon be the fifth largest economy in the world. It recently discovered billions of barrels of petroleum in the deep waters off its coast and is an agricultural powerhouse. It has also made significant progress in eradicating poverty. It therefore seemed only natural to expect that as Brazil became "more like us," it would seek to play a more active and constructive role in this hemisphere, and that U.S. and Brazilian political and security interests would largely coincide.
This now seems like wishful thinking. On a number of important political and security issues, Washington and Brasilia recently have not seen eye to eye. Nor has Brazil shown much leadership in tackling the important political and security challenges facing the region.
One example is Brazil's role in UNASUR (Union of South American Nations). At a September meeting in Quito focused on regional security issues, topics not discussed included the multibillion-dollar arms race in the region, the granting of sanctuary and other forms of aid by Venezuela to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Colombian narco-guerrilla group, and the growing nuclear cooperation between Iran and Venezuela. Instead, Brazil joined UNASUR in criticizing Colombia for having agreed to allow the U.S. to use seven of its military bases for counterterrorist and counter narcotics activities inside Colombia.
The fact that Colombia has been under attack by an armed guerrilla group supported by some members of the Union was not considered relevant to the organization's decision to criticize Colombia for seeking help from Washington. Furthermore, none of the democratic countries in South America, including Brazil, has offered military or even rhetorical support to besieged Colombia.
Another example is Brazil's changing position concerning the importance of democratic governance. Both Brazil and the U.S. initially opposed the Honduran military's removal from office of the democratically elected president, Manuel Zelaya, despite the fact that Mr. Zelaya had violated Honduras's constitution.
Brazil's interest in democracy in Honduras does not, however, extend to Cuba. Only weeks earlier, Brazil voted in the Organization of American States to lift the membership ban on Cuba—a country that has not held a democratic election in 50 years. This decision contradicted the organization's democratic charter.
Brazil also has never tried to mobilize support against Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez's use of democratic institutions to systematically destroy that country's democracy. On the contrary, Brazil's President Lula da Silva is supporting Venezuela's efforts to join Mercosur (a South American customs union), despite rules that limit membership to democratic countries.
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Associated Press
Brazilian President Lula da Silva, right, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
.Finally, there is the issue of Brazil's apparent lack of concern regarding Iran's increasing penetration into Latin America through Venezuela. There are now weekly flights between Caracas and Tehran that bring passengers and cargo into Venezuela without any customs or immigration controls. Venezuela has also signed agreements with Iran for transferring nuclear technology, and there is speculation it is giving Iran access to Venezuelan uranium deposits.
Instead of expressing concern over Iran's activities in Latin America, Brazil is drawing closer to Tehran and hopes to expand its $2 billion bilateral trade to $10 billion in the near future. President Lula recently hosted President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Brazil. He reiterated his support for Iran's right to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses, while insisting that there is no evidence that Iran is developing nuclear weapons.
Several conclusions can be drawn from Brazil's behavior. First, Brazil wants to prevent the U.S. from expanding its military involvement in South America, which Brazil regards as its sphere of influence. Second, Brazil much prefers working within multilateral institutions, rather than acting unilaterally.
Within these institutions, Brazil seeks to integrate all regional players, achieve consensus and avoid conflict and fragmentation—all worthy goals. But these are procedural, rather than substantive, goals.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.Stated differently, Brazil's multilateral efforts in the region seem to value the appearance of leadership over finding real solutions to the growing political and security threats facing Latin America. These conclusions do not imply that the U.S. and Brazil have no overlapping interests, or that they cannot work together to solve particular regional or even global issues. They do mean Washington may need to rethink its assumptions regarding the extent to which Brazil can be relied on to deal with political and security problems in Latin America in ways that are also compatible with U.S. interests.
Ms. Purcell is the director of the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.
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Did Ms. Susan Kaufman Purcell think Brazil would be an American puppy dog? If so, she certainly does not know or understand Brazil.
Brazil is and has always been Brazil centric. As far as they are concerned, Brazil is the center of the Universe.
I want to share a personal story. I was in Rio, I think it was 1975, for a sailing championship. By a strange coincidence, they discovered offshore oil for the first time and it was sensational news for them. As I was riding down the elevator the next morning, a very excited lift-boy asked me if I had heard the great news. Yes, I had. Then he asked me where I was from. Venezuela. Did we have oil? Yes, we did. But enough to be self sufficient?
It's not as if venezuela was half way around the world away from Brazil, we share many miles of border. Yet this lift-boy was totally clueless about us, about the fact that, back then, Venezuela was a major oil producer and oil exporter. As far as Brazilians are concerned, the Maracana stadium is the greatest in Brazil and Brazil is the greatest in the World.
Maracana stadium Rio de Janeiro (http://images.google.com/images?hl=en&client=safari&rls=en&um=1&newwindow=1&sa=1&q=maracana+stadium+rio+de+janeiro&aq=0&oq=Maracana+stadium&aqi=g1&start=0)
As for Brazil's support of democracy in Honduras, that's pure hogwash! Lula was defending fellow socialist, fellow traveler Zelaya, not democracy. Why some Americans think everyone thinks like they do is quite beyond me. They should travel more, get to know the real world.
Denny Schlesinger
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No argument from me.
The Obama-Clinton policy on Honduras has been unusually incompetent and/or malicious.
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Crafty:
The following article is not only about Brazil/Latin America so you might want to post it elsewhere but it says pretty much the same as i did, worldwide democracies are not necessarily American puppy dogs:
America is losing the free world
By Gideon Rachman
Published: January 5 2010 02:00 | Last updated: January 5 2010 02:00
Ever since 1945, the US has regarded itself as the leader of the "free world". But the Obama administration is facing an unexpected and unwelcome development in global politics. Four of the biggest and most strategically important democracies in the developing world - Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey - are increasingly at odds with American foreign policy. Rather than siding with the US on the big international issues, they are just as likely to line up with authoritarian powers such as China and Iran.
The US has been slow to pick up on this development, perhaps because it seems so surprising and unnatural. Most Americans assume that fellow democracies will share their values and opinions on international affairs. During the last presidential election campaign, John McCain, the Republican candidate, called for the formation of a global alliance of democracies to push back against authoritarian powers. Some of President Barack Obama's senior advisers have also written enthusiastically about an international league of democracies.
But the assumption that the world's democracies will naturally stick together is proving unfounded. The latest example came during the Copenhagen climate summit. On the last day of the talks, the Americans tried to fix up one-to-one meetings between Mr Obama and the leaders of South Africa, Brazil and India - but failed each time. The Indians even said that their prime minister, Manmohan Singh, had already left for the airport.
So Mr Obama must have felt something of a chump when he arrived for a last-minute meeting with Wen Jiabao, the Chinese prime minister, only to find him already deep in negotiations with the leaders of none other than Brazil, South Africa and India. Symbolically, the leaders had to squeeze up to make space for the American president around the table.
There was more than symbolism at work. In Copenhagen, Brazil, South Africa and India decided that their status as developing nations was more important than their status as democracies. Like the Chinese, they argued that it is fundamentally unjust to cap the greenhouse gas emissions of poor countries at a lower level than the emissions of the US or the European Union; all the more so since the industrialised west is responsible for the great bulk of the carbon dioxide already in the atmosphere.
Revealingly, both Brazilian and Chinese leaders have made the same pointed joke - likening the US to a rich man who, after gorging himself at a banquet, then invites the neighbours in for coffee and asks them to split the bill.
If climate change were an isolated example, it might be dismissed as an important but anomalous issue that is almost designed to split countries along rich-poor lines. But, in fact, if you look at Brazil, South Africa, India and Turkey - the four most important democracies in Latin America, Africa, Asia and the greater Middle East - it is clear that none of them can be counted as a reliable ally of the US, or of a broader "community of democracies".
In the past year, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has cut a lucrative oil deal with China, spoken warmly of Hugo Chávez, president of Venezuela, and congratulated Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad on his "victory" in the Iranian presidential election, while welcoming him on a state visit to Brazil.
During a two-year stint on the United Nations Security Council from 2006, the South Africans routinely joined China and Russia in blocking resolutions on human rights and protecting authoritarian regimes such as Zimbabwe, Uzbekistan and Iran.
Turkey, once regarded as a crucial American ally in the cold war and then trumpeted as the only example of a secular, pro-western, Muslim democracy, is also no longer a reliable partner for the west. Ever since the US-led invasion of Iraq, opinion polls there have shown very high levels of anti-Americanism. The mildly Islamist AKP government has engaged with America's regional enemies - including Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran - and alarmed the Americans by taking an increasingly hostile attitude to Israel.
India's leaders do seem to cherish the idea that they have a "special relationship" with the US. But even the Indians regularly line up against the Americans on a range of international issues, from climate change to the Doha round of trade negotiations and the pursuit of sanctions against Iran or Burma.
So what is going on? The answer is that Brazil, South Africa, Turkey and India are all countries whose identities as democracies are now being balanced - or even trumped - by their identities as developing nations that are not part of the white, rich, western world. All four countries have ruling parties that see themselves as champions of social justice at home and a more equitable global order overseas. Brazil's Workers' party, India's Congress party, Turkey's AKP and South Africa's African National Congress have all adapted to globalisation - but they all retain traces of the old suspicions of global capitalism and of the US.
Mr Obama is seen as a huge improvement on George W. Bush - but he is still an American president. As emerging global powers and developing nations, Brazil, India, South Africa and Turkey may often feel they have more in common with a rising China than with the democratic US.
gideon.rachman@ft.com
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/cd24b6ac-f999-11de-8085-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=ebe33f66-57aa-11dc-8c65-0000779fd2ac,print=yes.html
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Interesting piece. May I ask that you post it on the US Foreign Affairs thread? I'd like to respond with some George Friedman based thoughts on Geopolitics.
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Denny: "Brazil is and has always been Brazil centric. As far as they are concerned, Brazil is the center of the Universe." - Same is true for Green Bay Packer fans, so maybe that lesson applies to some extent any direction we travel.
"Did Ms. Susan Kaufman Purcell think Brazil would be an American puppy dog? If so, she certainly does not know or understand Brazil."
From my point of view no one expects a lapdog or even an ally, just wishfully thinking that an independent democratic process far away might look at same or similar facts and come up with similar viewpoints and strategies. But we can't get it right here, so our expectations elsewhere should be not much more than a curiosity, at least until they start partnering with our enemies.
Brazil congratulated Ahmadinejad, but the US under Bush with Sec. Powell using election observer Jimmy Carter wrongly congratulated Chavez. More recently, as pointed out, we sided wrong in Honduras.
Still I favor the association of democracies. To the extent that we all disagree, then the meetings could end without big press conferences or emissions treaties, but at least the participants would have some legitimacy.
ps. Are you still sailing?
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Still I favor the association of democracies. To the extent that we all disagree, then the meetings could end without big press conferences or emissions treaties, but at least the participants would have some legitimacy.
ps. Are you still sailing?
There is much more to democracy than voting. We elected Chavez and the Germans elected Hitler, neither honored democracy. They used to vote in Cuba and in the Soviet Union but that does not make them democratic. Democracy is more a mental state than a set of rules. American democracy at this juncture looks rather weak. FDR used to say that democracy is the art of muddling through and Churchill said that democracy is the worst possible system of government except for all the other that have been tried.
Honduras is an interesting case. Their elected president did something that called for his removal. In a more stable democracy he would have been impeached like Nixon was. The powers that be got nervous and did not follow procedure to the letter mostly out of fear of foreign intervention. Chavez had gained an ally in Zelaya and he was know to be a dangerous man. So the military packed Zelaya off to Costa Rica in his pajamas.
What is a foreign power to do? Chavez immediately denounced a coup because it was to his advantage to do so. On the other hand, Obama was in no rush. Obama could have put the issue on the back burner after issuing a statement that they were considering the case. That would have given him time to do whatever was in the American interest. Instead, he has egg all over his and Ms. Clinton's face. Rank amateurs!
How is that different from his insulting the Cambridge cop in the Gates case? Another amateurish action.
But getting back to important issues, no I have not sailed for several years. I sold my boat and now I navigate the World Wide Web. I'm the webmaster of our marina's website:
http://bahiaredonda.com/
also available en español:
http://bahiaredonda.com.ve/
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Thanks Denny, all valid points. The vote fraud thread here alone would probably boot the US out of the hypothetical democracies group. Maybe the members of this club for the consent of the governed should be judged by whether they are moving toward or away from these ideals rather than by the name of their system, and that could be a way of exposing or sanctioning elected leaders for shutting down democratic systems. My hopes for this type of group are small, just a small step to try to diffuse the power of the thugs and cleptocrats with no legitimacy trying to establish world government at the UN.
I recall a Chavez election where the exit polls were 40-60 against him and the 'official' results were 60-40 for him, a 40 point swing. My reaction was that the problem lied also with the 40 percent who actually voted for corruption, as much as it was the highly expected cheat. As a tennis competitor, I know you avoid losing by one or two errors or a bad line call only by not letting your match get that close. 40% voting for Chavez was enough to create the confusion he needed to steal that election and still have the result honored. On a different scale, same goes for the 60th D-Senator in the US; a 0.1% cheat only worked because of the nearly 50% who chose him legitimately.
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In another Latin America story...
Deep secrets of economic growth
January 6, 2010 (powerlineblog.com)
In an excellent editorial on December 4, Investor's Business Daily reported that Chile was expected to win entry to OECD's club of developed countries by December 15 -- "a great affirmation for a once-poor nation that pulled itself up by trusting markets." (The OECD followed up as expected on December 15.)
Chile is the first country in South America to win the honor. For Chileans, it symbolizes exit from the ranks of the Third World to the First. "For the rest of us," IBD writes, "it's a stunning example of how embracing free markets and free trade brings prosperity." It's an example that we could use in the United States right about now.
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Great success story:
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2010/0105/Latin-America-s-surprise-rising-economic-star-Peru
Latin America's surprise rising economic star: Peru
Peru's growth rate – 9.8 percent – was one of the fastest last year. It's poised to break with neighbors Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador with its center-left but pro-business governments.
By Matthew Clark / January 5, 2010
Lima, Peru
Often overlooked as a player in the global economy, Peru is determined to prove that it’s more than just llamas, bowler hats, and Macchu Picchu.
Its 9.8 percent growth rate last year was one of the world’s fastest. And record commodities prices, coupled with China’s insatiable demand for raw materials, are helping the mineral-rich nation weather the financial crisis better than most other countries in the region.
Now, Peru predicts that the construction of a new road between its Pacific coast and Brazil will replace the Panama Canal as the main passage for trade between rising superpower China and the agricultural juggernaut – adding a full percentage point to Peru’s gross domestic product. Add to that new oil and gas projects worth billions of dollars, and you’ve got a country poised for a giant leap.
Not since the height of the Spanish Empire, after Francisco Pizarro subdued Incan Emperor Atahualpa during his quest for the mythical golden city of El Dorado, has Peru been better positioned to play a key role on the world stage. But the country has long been dogged by a “resource curse” – vast reserves of gold, silver, tin, iron, zinc, and copper that have sparked more turmoil than development. Now the question is whether Peru – pound for pound, one of the world’s richest countries in terms of resources – can avoid repeating mistakes that have stunted its growth in the past.
The country has experienced decades of extreme left-wing and right-wing authoritarian governments and a brutal leftist insurgency waged by the Shining Path. But Peru’s past two pro-business, yet center-left governments have steered the country toward record economic growth, greater transparency, and rapid decentralization. The result: Peru has matured politically to the point where analysts – and investors – are beginning to talk about another regional powerhouse creeping up alongside Brazil.
“South America in general, and Peru in particular, are the region and country of the future,” says Francisco Sagasti, a senior associate at FORO, a development think tank based in Lima. “We’ve tried every macroeconomic model, and we’ve learned from our mistakes. No one is pushing for nationalization here. Everyone here knows that you have to have sensible economic policies from top to bottom.”
Indeed, Peruvians of all walks of life seem to agree that the country is not likely to follow its Andean neighbors Bolivia and Ecuador toward the “21st century socialism” of Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez. They’ve been there, done that. And, although President Alan Garcia’s approval rating now hovers near 30 percent, few quibble with the fact that Peru has enjoyed an average annual economic growth rate of 7 percent since 2003 or that per capita income has doubled and poverty plummeted from 50 percent to 35 percent in roughly the same time.
Peru’s ruling classes are almost giddy with excitement. “Latin America has the opportunity to be a major player like never before,” says former center-left President Alejandro Toledo, the country’s first indigenous leader and who is widely expected to be a top candidate again when Peru votes in a little over a year. “Peru is a hub for Pacific countries and China’s coming like a bulldozer.”
Barriers to a boom
But Peru’s rapid ascent is not a given. In some of its historically neglected mountain and jungle areas, social unrest lurks just beneath the surface, ready to thwart progress if people in those regions don’t feel more a part of the economic boom.
In June, clashes between indigenous protesters and armed forces killed more than 30 in the worst political violence since the Shining Path’s campaign of terror in the 1990s.
Native groups say the confrontation, which led to the resignation of Peru’s prime minister and the exile of a top indigenous leader, took place because the government refused to consult them before opening up their ancestral lands to oil and gas exploration.
Peru’s Congress quickly repealed two decrees by President Garcia that were aimed at opening wide swaths of the Peruvian Amazon to logging, dams, and oil drilling, and Garcia admitted that his failure to properly consult with indigenous groups on these matters was a mistake. Still, Garcia remains committed to the energy exploration that he and many others believe is crucial for the development of the nation. With half of the country identifying as indigenous, such conflicts are likely to come up again.
“Peru is very geographically fragmented,” says Mr. Toledo, explaining that Peru’s Andes are difficult to access and that two-thirds of the country is road-swallowing Amazonian jungle. “That’s its beauty, but also its challenge.”
The country is now in a race to spread decisionmaking power and largess from its recent boom to long-neglected rural areas.
“One of the weak points of [Peru’s economic] growth is that the interior of the country has been left behind,” says Epifanio Baca, the coordinator of the Citizen Watch Program, which has spent more than 20 years monitoring mining in Peru.
But that’s changing.
Mr. Baca says that one of the most important developments in the past few years is that the tax on mining has increased from 7 percent to 30 percent, and that half of that tax revenue is sent to Peru’s regional governments.
The fact that 15 percent of extractive industry earnings now goes to regional governments is hailed as Exhibit A in Peru’s aggressive moves to decentralize power away from Lima.
“Decentralization is vital, because [rural Peruvians] see effective governance and improvement of life at the national level – in Lima – but they don’t see it where they are,” says Vito Verna, who monitors social conflicts at the national ombudsman’s office.
Mr. Verna’s office, which was created earlier this year, keeps an eye on nearly 300 simmering local conflicts, almost half of which are related to mining, oil, or gas activities. The office plays the role of mediator in any conflict in which all the stakeholders have asked for dialogue.
“A year ago, only 25 percent of conflicts had dialogue. Now 50 percent have dialogue,” he says. “Peruvian society is evolving. Now, people who’ve historically been discriminated against are more a part of things.”
But as the central government devolves power from Lima, where one-third of the population lives, it’s finding that many regional governmental officials don’t have needed management skills.
“Competency training for regional officials is now vital,” says Verna’s boss and head of the ombudsman’s office, Eduardo Vega Luna.
And then there’s corruption. As regional budgets have exploded, so have the number of graft allegations against local and regional officials.
Still, by most accounts, there’s been tremendous progress on government accountability.
“Corruption affects all levels of government, but Peru has moved forward,” says Baca, of the Citizen Watch Program. “Any citizen can now see how money is being spent on a month-to-month basis.”
Peru is the only country in Latin America to sign on to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), which was started in 2002 by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair to enable citizens to more closely monitor the flows of money from energy and mining companies to the host country’s local, regional, and federal government.
The goal of the initiative is to combat the government corruption that has plagued resource-rich countries, often leading to social unrest and deadly armed conflict.
Baca has been instrumental in coordinating efforts to independently audit willing oil, gas, and mining companies and ensure that payments by companies to the different branches of government – and revenues received by government – are widely publicized for any interested party to read.
A steep learning curve
Peru is nearing the end of the two-year process to become certified as completely EITI-compliant. It would be only the third such country.
The progress on transparency and accountability is “encouraging,” says Cynthia Sanborn, director of the research center at Pacific University in Lima. “There’s more learning from mistakes.”
But is Peru learning quickly enough?
During a visit to Peru earlier in December, Brazil’s president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, signed 11 cooperation deals, mostly on trade and energy. Peru’s Garcia urged the scores of top-flight business leaders that accompanied Lula to invest his country.
“I’m deeply convinced that our peoples’ union and the road integration of our ports, flights, and trade will allow [us] to achieve both a very high level of well-being and [the] social justice we are all fighting for,” assured Garcia.
Coming months and years will reveal whether Peru’s political reforms will keep the “social justice” side of that equation on pace with its lightning-fast growth.
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The Honduran Congress ratified interim President Roberto Micheletti’s decision to leave the Venezuelan-sponsored Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) on Jan. 12. This domestically significant move signals a reversal of the policies of ousted Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, who had built economic and political ties to Venezuela, which was part of his opponents’ motivation behind the June 2009 ouster. However, Honduran dependence on imported fuels means legislators will attempt to keep an oil import initiative implemented under Zelaya intact for now.
The decision to exit ALBA was approved by 122 of 128 congress members, with the six opposing votes coming from five leftist Democratic Unity (UD) legislators and a single National Innovation and Unity Party-Social Democratic Party (PINU-SD) member. ALBA financial aid to Honduras will be terminated as a result of the withdrawal, including $185 million earmarked for social programs to be returned Venezuela. Honduras will keep a donation of 100 tractors. After the congressional vote, an official said Honduras will not dismantle existing crude oil supply agreements with Venezuela under the Petrocaribe oil supply alliance, of which Honduras became a member in March 2008. Petrocaribe offers crude oil to member states, allowing them to cover up to 60 percent of payments up front with shipments of goods.
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez suspended oil shipments to Honduras, which reportedly totaled 20,000 barrels per day, in July 2009 after demanding Zelaya’s reinstatement. Honduran legislators have made it clear that they expect oil shipments purchased from Venezuela with Petrocaribe credits prior to the political crisis will still be supplied, despite the Venezuelan cutoff — but this situation places any resumption of oil shipments firmly at Venezuela’s discretion. After Zelaya’s ouster, Honduran officials claimed that a rupture with Petrocaribe would not cause fuel shortages in Honduras, saying Mexico and other Caribbean nations could become alternate suppliers. Officials said there had been fuel supply problems before the political crisis, but the interruption of Venezuelan shipments does not seem to have caused significant problems.
The Honduran decision seems likely to heighten already-simmering tensions between the politically isolated Central American nation and ALBA members, particularly Venezuela and Nicaragua. ALBA members have yet to recognize the interim government, and the Honduran rejection of ALBA seems likely to sustain this polarization for the foreseeable future. The decision signals a firm shift away from relations with Venezuela, for now, and reflects the interim Honduran government’s continuing rejection of outside political interference.
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The Washington Post
How Hugo Chavez's revolution crumbled
By Jackson Diehl
Monday, January 25, 2010
While the world has been preoccupied with the crisis in Haiti, Latin America has quietly passed through a tipping point in the ideological conflict that has polarized the region -- and paralyzed U.S. diplomacy -- for most of the past decade.
The result boils down to this: Hugo Chávez's "socialism for the 21st century" has been defeated and is on its way to collapse.
During the past two weeks, just before and after the earthquake outside Port-au-Prince, the following happened: Chávez was forced to devalue the Venezuelan currency, and impose and then revoke massive power cuts in the Venezuelan capital as the country reeled from recession, double-digit inflation and the possible collapse of the national power grid. In Honduras, a seven-month crisis triggered by the attempt of a Chávez client to rupture the constitutional order quietly ended with a deal that will send him into exile even as a democratically elected moderate is sworn in as president.
Last but not least, a presidential election in Chile, the region's most successful economy, produced the first victory by a right-wing candidate since dictator Augusto Pinochet was forced from office two decades ago. Sebastián Piñera, the industrialist and champion of free markets who won, has already done something that no leader from Chile or most other Latin American nations has been willing to do in recent years: stand up to Chávez.
Venezuela is "not a democracy," Piñera said during his campaign. He also said, "Two great models have been shaped in Latin America: One of them led by people like Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Castro in Cuba and Ortega in Nicaragua. . . . I definitely think the second model is best for Chile. And that's the model we are going to follow: democracy, rule of law, freedom of expression, alternation of power without caudillismo."
Piñera was only stating the obvious -- but it was more than his Socialist predecessor, Michelle Bachelet, or Brazil's Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva has been willing to say openly. That silence hamstrung the Bush and the Obama administrations, which felt, rightly or wrongly, that they should not be alone in pointing out Chávez's assault on democracy. Piñera has now provided Washington an opportunity to raise its voice about Venezuelan human rights violations.
He has done it at a moment when Chávez is already reeling from diplomatic blows. Honduras is one. Though the country is tiny, the power struggle between its established political elite and Chávez acolyte Manuel Zelaya turned into a regional battle between supporters and opponents of the Chávez left -- with Brazil and other leftist democracies straddling the middle.
The outcome is a victory for the United States, which was virtually the only country that backed the democratic election that broke the impasse. Honduras is the end of Chávez's crusade to export his revolution to other countries. Bolivia and Nicaragua will remain his only sure allies. Brazil's Lula, whose tolerance of Chávez has tarnished his bid to become a global statesman, will leave office at the end of this year; polls show his party's nominee trailing a more conservative candidate.
Haiti only deepens Chávez's hole. As the world watches, the United States is directing a massive humanitarian operation, and Haitians are literally cheering the arrival of U.S. Marines. Chávez has no way to reconcile those images with his central propaganda message to Latin Americans, which is that the United States is an "empire" and an evil force in the region.
Then there is the meltdown Chávez faces at home. Despite the recovery in oil prices, the Venezuelan economy is deep in recession and continues to sink even as the rest of Latin America recovers. Economists guess inflation could rise to 60 percent in the coming months. Meanwhile, due to a drought, the country is threatened with the shutdown of a hydroelectric plant that supplies 70 percent of its electricity. And Chávez's failure to invest in new plants means there is no backup. There is also the crime epidemic -- homicides have tripled since Chávez took office, making Caracas one of the world's most dangerous cities. At a recent baseball game a sign in the crowd read: "3 Strikes-Lights-Water-Insecurity/President You Struck Out."
Chávez's thugs beat up those baseball fans. The man himself is ranting about the U.S. "occupation" of Haiti; his state television even claimed that the U.S. Navy caused the earthquake using a new secret weapon. On Sunday his government ordered cable networks to drop an opposition-minded television channel.
But Chavez's approval ratings are still sinking: They've dropped to below 50 percent in Venezuela and to 34 percent in the rest of the region. The caudillo has survived a lot of bad news before and may well survive this. But the turning point in the battle between authoritarian populism and liberal democracy in Latin America has passed -- and Chávez has lost.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/24/AR2010012402379.html?hpid=opinionsbox1
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Wonderful news!!!!! :-D Thanks Captainccs!
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Unfortunately the guy is still there. Today a student died from gunshot wounds. Mérida, which is a student state, is in an uprising. Three or four high ranking Chavistas quit the government.
Too much going on tonight in Venezuela to blog without emotions (Mostly Pictures) (http://devilsexcrement.com/2010/01/25/too-much-going-on-tonight-in-venezuela-to-blog-without-emotions/)
Like Yogy said, it ain't over until its over.
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This post is quite long and full of pictures so I did not copy it, just took an excerpt.
SATURDAY, JANUARY 30, 2010
Chavez Removes the Mask: It Will Be Dictatorship or Freedom
A Political Meltdown in Venezuela?
Things are heating up in Venezuela in ways we have not seen before. After revoking the broadcast license for independent television station RCTV in 2007, which removed it from the public airwaves in 2008, Hugo Chavez has now forced Venezuelan cable television services to cease providing the RCTV channel to their subscribers, along with numerous other stations he regards as threatening to his regime. This comes on the heels of his closure of some 150 radio stations who did not offer what he deems to be the proper level of support for his policies. Protests have sprouted up all over the country, though the strongest have been very large student-led demonstrations in Caracas and also in the western state of Merida, as police and national guard units have violently responded to what appears to verge on a mass uprising. There have been at least two deaths thus far, but the situation threatens to take a turn for the worse, particularly in Merida, where a new phenomenon has emerged within the Venezuelan resistance.
Read the rest at:
http://stjacquesonline.blogspot.com/2010/01/chavez-removes-mask-it-will-be.html
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Very interesting Capt. In your opinion, what comes next?
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Very interesting Capt. In your opinion, what comes next?
I don't know.
In Latin America we have democracy the military willing. It is not democracy because for one it is contingent on military permission and when they do allow it, it is more party dictatorship than the will of the people. The clearest sign are the opening words of our Constitution. Yours says:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,[1] promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
By contrast, our says
The Congress of the Republic of Venezuela ... in representation of the Venezuelan people, for whom it invokes the protection of God Almighty...
The word "bolivariano" is missing because I'm quoting the constitution of 1961, our fourth one. Some countries change constitutions like some women change shoes. But it's not on a whim, the new constitution is always designed to cement the power of whoever happens to be in command. It might have been written in our name but not necessarily expressing our wishes as free people. One of our presidents stated publicly, while in office, that laws were like women, designed to be raped (violadas).
Party dictatorship is further implemented by the way the voting is organized. While some posts are voted on by name half of congress and other legislatures are elected by lists (down from 100% in 1958) giving the parties that make up the lists inordinate power taking away from the ordinary people the right to nominate the people who they think are best. By the time the voting comes around, the travesty has already taken place. Only recently have we come around to using primaries and they are not always used. Anyone who doubts the need and benefits of checks and balances should study Latin American politics. (My preferred system is gridlock so that no party can do too much damage. I'm an anarchist at heart, a right wing anarchist, not a socialist anarchist.)
Our protest and revolutions are also surreal. We protest Monday to Friday but spend the weekend at the beach. Our street protest ended just in time so that people could go and watch the baseball finals. I have heard this story, probably apocryphal: "Once a revolution was attacking the presidential palace in Buenos Aires from the park across the street. This, of course, created a traffic snarl. Every once in a while the shooting would stop to let the cars go through. Once traffic was relieved, the shooting would continue."
Dictators, for the most part, are long lived, Fidel Castro holds the world's record for longest living dictator. The secret is getting the job early in life because most of them die of old age. Mussolini, Hitler, "Chapita" Trujillo and Saddam Hussein are the exceptions. Back in 2002, when people were optimistic that we would get rid of Chavez soon, I collected information about all the dictators that came to mind and history reveals that they have staying power. Recently I read an article about this issue. The conclusion was that any dictatorship that shows any signs of weakness is doomed but the really cruel ones survive the longest. I have yet to see weakness in Chavez's repression of the people. In addition to the police and the National Guard, Chavez has his personal Círculos Bolivarianos, the modern equivalent to Hitler's Brown Shirts, organized killers.
At one time I believed that the military would not allow a Chavez militia to displace them and there was a push-back but Chavez managed to purge the armed forces and they are now subservient to the Castros of Cuba. They have even adopted the Cuban slogan: "Patria, Socialismo o Muerte." Dying is not what most Venezuelans want to do.
Rómulo Betancourt, the first elected president after the fall of Perez Jimenez, knew that democracy's biggest enemy was the military. To fend them off he devised the "Bozal de Arepa" policy (arepa is the local cornmeal bread)
(http://www.venezuelatuya.com/cocina/imagenes/arepa4.jpg) (http://www.bigfatsandwich.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/arepa-sandwich.jpg)
I'm getting hungry!
The idea was to buy them off. It worked until it stopped working, Chavez had bigger ambitions.
While there are cracks in the Chavista ranks, that does not mean the end of the regime. Dictators usually just purge the dissenters, who are either murdered, jailed, exiled or sidelined in some other way. The military has been taken over by Cuba so I don't see how they would revolt against Chavez any time soon. Peaceful protests do not remove dictators and neither do rigged elections. The National Electoral Council is firmly in Chavez's hands. Besides, the opposition is still fragmented with no true leader. We don't trust the pre-Chavez politicians who we blame for Chavez's ascent to power. The newer generation is not quite mature yet.
Crafty: I'm an optimist but I'm also a realist and the deck is stacked against the people.
Denny Schlesinger
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In Venezuela there are no human rights and if Chavez has his way, there will be even less.
Chavez rejects report citing rights violations
AP – Venezuela's President Hugo Chavez speaks during a press conference at the Miraflores Palace in Caracas, …
By CHRISTOPHER TOOTHAKER, Associated Press Writer – 1 hr 8 mins ago
CARACAS, Venezuela – President Hugo Chavez said Thursday that Venezuela should boycott the Organization of American States' human rights body, saying the panel wrongly accused his government of political repression.
Chavez took issue with a report issued this week by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which cited widespread human rights violations in Venezuela. The socialist leader called the 300-page report "pure garbage" and described the commission's president, Santiago Canton, as "excrement."
"We should prepare to denounce the agreement in which Venezuela joined ... this terrible Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and leave it," Chavez said during a televised address.
Local rights activists applauded the account issued by the rights committee, saying it sheds light on widespread rights abuses.
The report released Wednesday at OAS headquarters in Washington complains of a lack of independence for Venezuela's judiciary, the closing of news media outlets that are critical of the government, and political discrimination and repression under Chavez.
"We don't recognize the commission as an impartial institution," said Gabriela Ramirez, the Venezuelan government's top rights guarantor. Ramirez said the report incorrectly concludes that "the Venezuelan state threatens democracy and human rights."
The report condemned the procedures for appointing and removing judges, saying the regulations "lack the safeguards necessary to prevent other branches of government from undermining the Supreme Court's independence."
Government opponents have long complained that the Supreme Court — whose members are appointed by the predominantly pro-Chavez National Assembly — has been packed with the president's allies, giving him nearly unlimited power. Chavez denies holding sway over justices.
The OAS commission also called attention to an increase in sanctions against news media, singling out the case of Globovision, a television news network that is fiercely critical of Chavez.
Globovision has been repeatedly fined for allegedly violating broadcast regulations, and Chavez has threatened to shutter the network.
"It is of particular concern," the rights commission said, "that in several of these cases, the investigations and administrative procedures began after the highest authorities of the state called on public agencies to take action against Globovision and other media outlets that are independent and critical of the government."
The report strongly condemned what it called "a trend toward the use of criminal charges to punish people exercising their right to demonstrate or protest against government policies," adding that more than 2,200 people have been indicted on criminal charges stemming from their participation in protests in recent years.
Carlos Correa, a leader of the Venezuelan human rights group Espacio Publico, welcomed the report. "It makes the violations that are occurring in Venezuela more visible" and should attract the attention of the international community, he said.
The report carries more weight than statements from independent rights watchdogs, because it "comes from an institution made up of the hemisphere's own states," Correa added.
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100225/ap_on_re_la_am_ca/lt_venezuela_rights_report
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Cuba's Doctor Abuse
Posted 06:47 PM ET
Health Care: Remember Cuba's vaunted medical missionaries — those who treated the poor abroad for nothing, supposedly out of selfless motives? A lawsuit shows they were nothing but a communist slave racket.
It ought to bear a few lessons for our own country as the role of doctors in the health care debate drags on.
Back in 1963, Cuban dictator Fidel Castro launched a much-praised initiative to share Cuba's medical doctors with the poor around the world. The idea, of course, was to appear to be acting on higher motives than the profit-driven doctors in free societies. It was small scale and propaganda-oriented.
But in 2003, Castro went big, and shipped 20,000 doctors and nurses to Venezuela's jungles and slums to treat the poor, doing the work "selfish" private-sector doctors wouldn't. Hugo Chavez touted this line and the mainstream media followed.
Now the ugly facts are getting out about what that really meant: indentured servitude to pay off the debts of a bankrupt regime.
This week, seven escaped doctors and a nurse filed a 139-page complaint in Miami under the RICO and Alien Tort acts describing just how Cuba's oil-for-doctors deal came to mean slavery.
The Cuban medics were forced to work seven days a week, under 60-patient daily quotas, in crime-riddled places with no freedom of movement. Cuban military guards known as "Committees of Health" acted as slave catchers to ensure they didn't flee.
Doctors earned about $180 a month, a salary so low many had to beg for food and water from Venezuelans until they could escape.
What they endured wasn't just bad conditions common inside Cuba. The doctors were instruments of a money-making racket to benefit the very Castro regime that has ruined Cuba's economy.
"They were told 'your work is more important to Cuba than even its sugar industry,'" their attorney, Leonardo Canton, told IBD.
That's because their labor was tied to an exchange: Castro took 100,000 barrels of oil each day from Venezuela's state oil company in exchange for uncompensated Cuban labor.
Most of the oil was then sold for hard currency, bringing in cash. Cuba also charged Venezuela $30 per patient visit, meaning a $1,000 daily haul per doctor. But the doctors never saw any of it.
In a situation like this, it's pretty obvious that when the state gets involved in medical care — telling doctors whom they can serve, what they can charge and what they can treat — it doesn't take long for slavery to result. The Cuban government has told other doctors, such as surgeon Hilda Molina, that her brain "is the property of the state" as reason to control her travel.
That ought to be lesson to those who seek to reform medical care in the U.S. on the backs of doctors. Free medical care is never free.
http://www.investors.com/NewsAndAnalysis/Article.aspx?id=522289
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A Change of Course in Cuba and Venezuela?
September 21, 2010
By George Friedman and Reva Bhalla
Strange statements are coming out of Cuba these days. Fidel Castro, in the course of a five-hour interview in late August, reportedly told Jeffrey Goldberg of The Atlantic and Julia Sweig of the Council on Foreign Relations that “the Cuban model doesn’t even work for us anymore.”
Once that statement hit the headlines, Castro backtracked. Dressed in military uniform for the first time in four years (which we suspect was his way of signaling that he was not abandoning the revolution), he delivered a rare, 35-minute speech Sept. 3 to students at the University of Havana. In addition to spending several minutes on STRATFOR’s Iran analysis, Castro addressed his earlier statement on the Cuban model, saying he was “accurately quoted but misinterpreted” and suggesting that the economic model doesn’t work anymore but that the revolution lives on.
Castro, now 84, may be old, but he still seems to have his wits about him. We don’t know whether he was grossly misinterpreted by the reporter during the earlier interview, was acknowledging the futility of the Cuban model and/or was dropping hints of a policy shift. Regardless of what he did or did not say, Castro’s reported statement on the weakness of the revolution was by no means revolutionary.
Sustaining the Revolution
There is little hiding the fact that Cuba’s socialist economy has run out of steam. The more interesting question is whether the Cuban leader is prepared to acknowledge this fact and what he is prepared to do about it. Castro wants his revolution to outlive him. To do so, he must maintain a balance between power and wealth. For decades, his method of maintaining power has been to monopolize the island’s sources of wealth. All foreign direct investment in Cuba must be authorized by the government, the most important sectors of the economy are off-limits to investors, foreign investors cannot actually own the land or facilities in which they invest, the state has the right to seize foreign assets at any time and foreign investors must turn to the government for decisions on hiring, firing and paying workers. Under such conditions, the Cuban leadership has the ultimate say on the social welfare of its citizens and has used that control to secure loyalty and, more important, neutralize political dissent.
But that control has come at a cost: For the revolution to survive — and maintain both a large security apparatus and an expensive and inefficient social welfare system — it must have sufficient private investment that the state can control. That private investment has not been forthcoming, and so the state, unable to cope with the stresses of the economy, has had to increasingly concern itself with the viability of the regime. Since Soviet subsidies for Cuba (roughly $5 billion per year) expired in the early 1990s, Cuba has been seeking an injection of capital to generate income while still trying to leave the capitalists out of the equation in order to maintain control. There is no easy way to resolve this paradox, and the problem for Castro in his advanced age is that he is running out of time.
Many Cubans, including Castro, blame the island’s economic turmoil on the U.S. embargo, a politically charged vestige of the Cold War days when Cuba, under Soviet patronage, actually posed a clear and present danger to the United States. There is a great irony built into this complaint. Castro’s revolution was built on the foundation that trade with the imperialists was responsible for Cuba’s economic turmoil. Now, it is the supposed lack of such trade that is paralyzing the Cuban economy. History can be glossed over at politically opportune times, but it cannot so easily be forgotten.
What many seem to overlook is how Cuba, in spite of the embargo, is still able to receive goods from Europe, Canada, Latin America and elsewhere — it is the state-run system at home that remains crippled and unable to supply the island’s 11 million inhabitants. And even if U.S.-Cuban trade were to be restored, there is no guarantee that Cuba’s economic wounds would be healed. There are a host of other tourist resorts and sugar and tobacco exporters lining the Caribbean coastlines aside from Cuba, which has largely missed the boat in realizing its economic potential. In other words, the roots of Cuba’s economic troubles lie in Cuba, not the United States.
But Cuba is in the midst of a political transition, and Fidel will eventually pass the revolution on to his (not much) younger brother, Raul. If Fidel is the charismatic revolutionary, able to sustain a romanticized political ideology for decades in spite of its inherent contradictions, Raul is the bureaucratic functionary whose primary purpose at this point is to preserve the regime that his brother founded. This poses a serious dilemma for 79-year-old Raul. Not only does he lack the charisma of his older brother, he also lacks a strong external patron to make Cuba relevant beyond Cuba itself.
It must be remembered that the geographic location of Cuba, which straddles both the Yucatan Channel and Straits of Florida, gives it the potential to cripple the Port of New Orleans, the United States’ historical economic outlet to the world. If these two trade avenues were blocked, Gulf Coast ports like New Orleans and Houston would be, too, and U.S. agricultural and mineral exports and imports would plummet.
Cuba has been able to pose such a threat and thus carry geopolitical weight only when under the influence of a more powerful U.S. adversary such as the Soviet Union. Though the Castros maintain relations with many of their Cold War allies, there is no middle, much less great, power right now with the attention span or the will to subsidize Cuba. Havana is thus largely on its own, and in its loneliness it now appears to be reaching out to the United States for a solution that may not hold much promise.
While Fidel has been making statements, Raul has been fleshing out a new economic strategy for Cuba, one that will lay off 500,000 workers — 10 percent of the island’s workforce. The idea is to develop private cooperatives to ease a tremendous burden on the state and have implementation of this plan in progress by March 2011. This is an ambitious deadline considering that Cuba has little to no private industry to speak of to absorb these state workers. The feasibility of the proposed reforms, however, is not as interesting as the message of political reconciliation embedded in the plan. Alongside talk of Raul’s economic reforms, Cuba has been making what appear to be political gestures to Washington through the release of political prisoners. But these gestures are unlikely to be enough to capture Washington’s attention, especially when Cuba is neither a significant geopolitical threat nor a great economic opportunity in the eyes of the United States. Cuba needs something more, and that something could be found in Venezuela.
The Cuban-Venezuelan Relationship
Cuba and Venezuela face very similar geographic constraints. Both are relatively small countries with long Caribbean coastlines and primarily resource-extractive economies. While Venezuela’s mountainous and jungle-covered borderlands to the south largely deny the country any meaningful economic integration with its neighbors, Cuba sits in a sea of small economies similar to its own. As a result, neither country has good options in its immediate neighborhood for meaningful economic integration save for the dominant Atlantic power, i.e., the United States. In dealing with the United States, Cuba and Venezuela basically have two options: either align with the United States or seek out an alliance with a more powerful, external adversary to the United States.
Both countries have swung between these two extremes. Prior to the 1959 revolution, the United States dominated Cuba politically and economically, and although relations between the two countries began to deteriorate shortly thereafter, there were still notable attempts to cooperate until Soviet subsidies took hold and episodes like the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco sunk the relationship. Likewise, until the 2002 coup attempt against Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, Venezuela had long maintained a close, mutually beneficial relationship with the United States. With U.S. urging, Venezuela flooded the markets with oil and busted the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, helping bring about the fall of the Soviet Union. That energy cooperation continued with the U.S. sale of Citgo in the 1990s to Venezuela’s state oil firm PDVSA, a deal designed to hardwire Venezuela into the U.S. energy markets. Venezuela obtained a guaranteed market for its low-grade crude, which it couldn’t sell to other countries, while the United States acquired an energy source close to home.
For most of the past decade, Cuba and Venezuela have found themselves in a unique position. Both now have adversarial relationships with the United States, and both lack strong allies to help them fend off the United States. As a result, Cuba and Venezuela have drawn closer together, with Cuba relying on Venezuela primarily for energy and Venezuela turning to Cuba for its security expertise.
In trying to rebuild its stature in the region, Cuba has taken advantage of the Venezuelan regime’s rising political and economic insecurities as it set about entrenching itself in nearly all sectors of the Venezuelan state. Cuban advisers, trainers and protectors can be found everywhere from the upper echelons of Venezuela’s military and intelligence apparatus to the ports and factories. Therefore, Cuba has significant influence over a Venezuela that is currently struggling under the weight of stagflation, a precarious economic condition that has been fueled by an elaborate money-laundering racket now gripping the key sectors of the state-run economy. With the country’s electricity, food, energy and metals sectors in the most critical shape, power outages, food shortages and alarmingly low production levels overall are becoming more difficult for the regime to both contain and conceal. This might explain why we are now seeing reports of the Venezuelan regime deploying military and militia forces with greater frequency, not only to the streets but also to the dams, power plants, warehouses, food silos and distribution centers.
Venezuela’s open-door policy to Cuba was intended to bolster the regime’s security, but Cuba’s pervasiveness in Venezuela’s government, security apparatus and economy can also become a threat, especially if Cuba shifts its orientation back toward the United States. Cuba may now be in a position to use its influence in Venezuela to gain leverage in its relationship with the United States.
Washington’s Venezuela Problem
The list of U.S. complaints against Venezuela goes well beyond Chavez’s diatribes against Washington. Venezuela’s aggressive nationalization drive, contributions to narco-trafficking (in alleged negligence and complicity) and suspected support for Colombian rebel groups have all factored into the United States’ soured relationship with Venezuela. More recently, the United States has watched with growing concern as Venezuela has enhanced its relationships with Russia, China and, especially, Iran. Venezuela is believed to have served as a haven of sorts for the Iranians to circumvent sanctions, launder money and facilitate the movement of militant proxies. The important thing to note here is that, while Cuba lacks allies that are adversarial to the United States, Venezuela has them in abundance.
For the United States to take a real interest in signals from Havana, it will likely want to see Cuba exercise its influence in Venezuela. More precisely, it will want to see whether Cuba can influence Venezuela’s relationship with Iran.
We therefore find it interesting that Fidel Castro has been making moves recently that portray him as an advocate for the Jews in opposition to the Iranian regime. Castro invited Goldberg, an influential member of the Jewish lobby in the United States, to his hacienda for an interview in which he spent a great deal of time criticizing Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for his insensitivity to the Jewish people and their history. “I don’t think anyone has been slandered more than the Jews,” Castro said. “I would say much more than the Muslims. They have been slandered much more than the Muslims because they are blamed and slandered for everything. No one blames the Muslims for anything.” He added: “The Jews have lived an existence that is much harder than ours. There is nothing that compares to the Holocaust.” Then, Castro asked Goldberg and Sweig to accompany him to a private dolphin show at the National Aquarium of Cuba in Havana. They were joined by local Jewish leader Adela Dworin, whom Castro kissed in front of the cameras.
Following Fidel’s uncharacteristically pro-Jewish remarks, Chavez, who has echoed his Iranian ally’s vituperative stance against Israel, held a meeting with leaders of Venezuela’s Jewish community on Sept. 18 in which he reportedly discussed their concerns about anti-Semitic remarks in the media and their request for Venezuela to re-establish diplomatic relations with Israel. That same week, Venezuela’s state-run Conviasa Airlines, which has had an unusually high number of accidents and engine failures in recent days, cancelled its popular Tuesday roundtrip flight route from Caracas to Damascus to Tehran. This is a flight route frequented by Iranian, Lebanese, Syrian and Venezuelan businessmen and officials (along with other sorts trying to appear as ordinary businessmen). The route has come under heavy scrutiny by the United States due to a reinvigorated U.S. sanctions campaign against Iran and U.S. concerns over Hezbollah transit through Latin America. When STRATFOR inquired about the flight cancellations, we were told by the airline that the cancellations were due to maintenance issues but that flights from Caracas to Damascus would be re-routed through Madrid. The Iran leg of the route, at least for now, is out of operation. Whether Cuba is intending to reshape Venezuela’s relationship with Iran and whether these Venezuelan moves were taken from Cuban cues is unknown to us, but we find them notable nonetheless.
A Chinese Lifeline for Caracas?
Each of these seemingly disparate developments does not make much sense on its own. When looked at together, however, a complex picture begins to form, one in which Cuba, slowly and carefully, is trying to shift its orientation toward the United States while the Venezuelan regime’s vulnerabilities increase as a result. An insecure and economically troubled Venezuela will need strong allies looking for levers against the United States. Russia will sign a defense deal here and there with Venezuela, but it has much bigger priorities in Eurasia. Iran is useful for hurling threats against the United States, but it has serious economic troubles of its own that rival even those of Venezuela. China so far appears to be the most promising fit, although that relationship carries its fair share of complications.
China and Venezuela have signed a deal for Beijing to loan $20 billion to Caracas in exchange for crude-oil shipments and stakes in Venezuelan oil fields. The two are also discussing multibillion-dollar deals that would entail China investing in critical areas, such as Venezuela’s dilapidated electricity grid. China doesn’t have much interest in paying the exorbitant cost of shipping low-grade Venezuelan crude halfway around the world, but it is interested in technology to develop and produce low-grade crude. In many ways, China is presenting itself as the lifeline to the Venezuelan regime. Whether all these deals reach fruition remains a big question, and how far Beijing intends to go in this relationship with Caracas will matter greatly to the United States. A Chinese willingness to go beyond quid pro quo deals and subsidize Venezuela could lead to Chinese investments threatening existing U.S. energy assets in Venezuela, potentially giving Beijing leverage against Washington in the U.S. backyard. But subsidizing countries is not cheap, and China has not yet shown a willingness to take a more confrontational stance with the United States over Venezuela.
After claiming to have received the first $4 billion installment of the $20 billion loan from China, Chavez said China is lending the money because “China knows that this revolution is here to stay.” Like Cuba, Venezuela may not have the economic heft to back up its revolutionary zeal, but it is finding useful friends of the revolution in China. In this time of need, Venezuela’s challenge lies in finding allies willing to cross the threshold from economic partner to strategic patron.
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:-o :-o :evil: :-D
By MERCEDES ALVARO And ROBERT KOZAK
QUITO—Ecuador declared a state of emergency on Thursday as protests by police and some members of the military led to nationwide unrest, accusations of a coup d'etat, and the dramatic rescue by army troops of the country's president, who was holed up in a hospital after being tear-gassed by police.
Police Strike in Ecuador
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Dolores Ochoa/Associated Press
A police officer demonstrated next to a bonfire in Quito.
The troubles seemed to tilt dangerously when police protesting cuts to their benefits surrounded a hospital where President Rafael Correa was being treated after inhaling tear gas during an earlier visit to a police barracks. Mr. Correa's office said the police would not allow him to leave the hospital and were holding him hostage.
The showdown came to a dramatic climax as night fell, with soldiers clashing with police and storming the hospital. Minutes later, amid a barrage of gunfire broadcast live on Ecuadorean television, the army emerged with Mr. Correa safe and sound.
On Friday morning, the local press reported that the chief of Ecuador's national police had resigned. Mr. Correa vowed to push ahead with further purges in the police force saying that there would be "neither pardons nor forgetting" for what he deemed a failed attempt to oust him Thursday. Ecuador's attorney general said he had begun an investigation into the incident.
Reports said there had been at least one death, that of a police officer participating in the rescue. There several dozen were wounded in the fiefight, including a cameraman for Ecuadorian television.
Mr. Correa, a leftist and close ally of Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez, had said earlier in the day that the unrest was an attempted coup d'etat, and blamed former president Lucio Gutierrez of being responsible for the troubles. Last year, Mr. Correa handily won a second term against his Mr. Gutierrez, a retired army colonel who was president from 2003 to 2005. But Mr. Gutierrez claimed that he was victim of a "monstrous fraud" and has since remained a vocal opponent of Mr. Correa's government.
The trouble began early Thursday when some members of the military and national police walked off the job, protesting wage cuts proposed by the government. Members of Ecuador's air force stormed the international airport in Quito and blocked the runway.
Ecuadorean President Correa is attacked by protesters as unrest grips the nation. Video courtesy of Reuters.
Ecuador President Rafael Correa stands defiant in the face of an attempted coup, following unrest brought on by unpopular austerity measures. Video courtesy of Reuters.
Protests quickly spread to other cities, leading to roadblocks and rioting. Banks were closed after several were robbed. In the country's two other principal cities, Guayaquil and Cuenca, police took over government buildings, burned tires and set off tear gas, according to local media reports.
After Mr. Correa was freed by the military, he lashed out at the police who staged the protests.
"These police – and not all of them, because we saw what was happening – rose up not to fight against a tyrannical government, not against an invasion by a foreign enemy, but to protect their benefits," Mr. Correa said after being freed, addressing supporters who had gathered in Quito's central square to celebrate his release.
His supporters also lashed out against Mr. Gutierrez, chanting "Lucio, murderer." Mr. Correa, hearing the chants, nodded, and said "that's right."
Mr. Gutierrez denied the accusations and said Mr. Correa was partly behind a coup attempt against Mr. Gutierrez's government years ago.
The unrest stemmed from a series of legal changes that came into effect Wednesday night after the opposition in the Ecuadorean Congress failed to pass changes that would have modified a law sent by President Correa to the legislature. Failure to pass the modifications meant that the law, which slows salary increases for police and the military, went into effect. Mr. Correa has been a principal backer of the overhaul, saying salaries have ballooned in recent years.
Earlier in the day, Mr. Correa's government declared a state of emergency for five days, mobilizing the armed forces that weren't on strike. Mr. Correa called the protests an attempted coup, which caused expressions of concern from several Latin American nations, as well as the U.S.
The country's top military leaders, however, didn't appear to be backing the protests: The chairman of Ecuador's joint chiefs of staff said the armed forces backed Mr. Correa. That became clear when troops freed the president later in the day.
Critics of Mr. Correa said he had exaggerated earlier in the day by calling this a coup attempt. Rubén Darío Buitrón, an editor with El Comercio, a leading Quito newspaper, said that no coup was under way and that the government was spinning the protests in order to gain support.
"It is a media show and things have been exaggerated by the government in order to make it look like a victim," he said, adding that the problems originated from low-ranking officers, not from any group of military generals wishing to take control.
The unrest is significant in a nation plagued by political instability, where no president has finished a full term since 1996. A number of presidents since then have been pushed out following unrest in the streets.
Analysts said Mr. Correa could use the crisis to further consolidate power. On Thursday, Mr. Correa said he was seriously considering dissolving Congress. Under Ecuador's constitution, however, that would mean he would have to call new elections for both the parliament and for his job as president.
"President Correa's uncompromising style, and today's press statements, suggest the president will not easily back down from what is turning into the most serious political crisis of his mandate," said Goldman Sachs economist Alberto Ramos in a research note.
So far Mr. Correa, a U.S.-trained economist, has avoided the pitfalls of his predecessors. The president, who has pushed through a new constitution and boosted the government's stake in the local oil industry, appeals to many poor in Ecuador. But Mr. Correa is also facing strained public-sector finances, in part because of a shutoff of much international funding since his government defaulted on a series of sovereign bonds. He has been pushing through legislation by decree recently instead of relying on congressional approval, which has met with disapproval from various sectors of the cutbacks being implemented.
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Venezuelan National Assembly Elections: Turning Back Totalitarian Dictatorship?
Go to the original (http://bigpeace.com/jkalosha/2010/10/01/venezuelan-national-assembly-elections-turning-back-totalitarian-dictatorship/) and read the comments!
Posted by José Kalosha Oct 1st 2010 at 5:23 am in Cuba, Latin America, Politics | Comments (36)
28 Sept, Wall Street Journal:
“Venezuela’s Chavez Loses Key Vote”; 28 Sept Guantanamo, Cuba, (Solvision) (http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704654004575517720045294924.html)
“Fidel Castro Classifies the Venezuelan legislative elections as victories to the Bolivarian Revolution and its leader: Hugo Chavez.” (http://www.solvision.co.cu/english/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1477:fidel-castro-classifies-venezuelan-elections-as-victorious&catid=2:nacionales&Itemid=118)
With the September, 2010, Venezuelan Congressional elections there is no middle ground- you either believe decisively Chavez won or you believe the Chavez Opposition won. The stark reality is Hugo Chavez’s grip on Venezuela has never been tighter. His goal is a totalitarian dictatorship.
Chavez has been Venezuelan president since 1998. Now he has tight control of the Venezuelan levers of power. In addition to the Presidency, Chavez controls the secret police, the military, the judiciary, the banking system, and increasing control of the media. He controls the 30 or 40 thousand Cubans, many DGI intelligence and military officers, he has stationed in Venezuela.
In 2005 the Opposition boycotted the perceived corrupt National Assembly election and Chavez received 149 seats out of 167 seats with the Opposition receiving 18 seats. In the current election Chavez’s Party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), support in the Congress fell from 149 seats to 98 seats. He has lost the key two-thirds majority. He gerrymandered the election districts so he won majority of the seats, but most important, he lost the popular vote 48% for PSUV to 52% for the Opposition. The Opposition notes this is a great moral victory, but moral victories mean little to Chavez. Although he has lost the two-thirds majority, Chavez will continue to have the two-thirds majority for the next three months. In the “Lame Duck” secession he will pass as much of his Socialist Bolivarian agenda as possible. He will probably attempt to create his appointed Communal Councils, which will continue to reduce power of elected state and municipal bodies. He will try to rule by Decree, totally by passing the Congress. In 2008 when the Opposition won state and mayoral races, he stripped them of actual power by creating a new level of his appointed bureaucrats.
The Chavez model is the Castro Cuban Socialist/Communist Revolution. Chavez’s actual announced goal is to be a Ruler for Life, like his mentor Fidel Castro. What Chavez is enacting is a Cuban Economic Revolution in slow motion. The difference is that when Castro took power Che Guevara signed death certificates to shoot at least two thousand Cubans; Castro sent tens of thousands to prison; and he forced hundreds of thousands in exile. Venezuela is not Cuba. Chavez cannot apply the Che Guevara “Castro or Death” mandate. Castro expropriated all the sources of wealth in Cuba; consequently today, decades later, the Cuban economy has totally collapsed. Castro in late September announced he will fire 500,000 state employees, which is probably an under estimate. Sadly, many of these State employees only earned from 20 to 30 pesos a month. Yet Chavez is moving ahead to follow the Cuban economic model, which will result in a destroyed Venezuelan economy.
The Opposition views this election as the start of the 2012 Presidential Election. Chavez will also view this as a wake up call for his 2012 re-election. He will do everything possible to prevent the at least 18 national anti-Chavez political parties from uniting behind an effective presidential candidate. Currently there is no charismatic Opposition candidate who will be a certain or probable anti-Chavez victor.
What Venezuela can expect will be more political arrests; more business expropriation; increased corruption; increased public safety criminal violence; falling oil production; more virulent anti-US rhetoric; failing infrastructure; falling food production; and increased foreign debts defaults. He will continue to attack personally the Roman Catholic Cardinal. Currency and export controls will tighten and the black market will increase. Chavez has nationalized most of the oil industry, including firing thousands of PDVSA experienced employees, replacing them with inexperienced, but loyal employees. Opposition groups claim the Chavez regime is a conduit for a massive drug trade. Chavez gives support and safe haven to international terrorists groups, especially those fighting in Colombia. He has threatened war with Colombia. A great concern is his military build up including jet fighters, tanks, an AK-47 factory, etc. The Opposition notes that the Ahmadinejad regime in Iran and Chavez are closely linked after numerous personal visits to and from Tehran and Caracas. There may be as much as $30 billion in the Caracas-Tehran business Axis. The Opposition asks the key issue- will Chavez seek nuclear weapons from Iran when Iran develops nuclear weapons in the near future? For more details Google “Chavez nuclear weapons.” According to some sources, which Chavez denies, Venezuela is a source of uranium for Iran. Chavez repeated stated goal is a united Gran Colombia, which would include hegemony over Colombia, Panama, Trinidad, and Ecuador. Chavez is an active member of the Latin American radical support organization “Foro de Sao Paulo.”
Chavez for the present wants to project an international image as an elected populist. In reality Chavez is a danger to his nation; his neighboring nations; and the entire region. The September, 2010, National Assembly elections are a small bump in the road to a brutal Chavez totalitarian Bolivarian dictatorship. The Chavez goal is to destroy democracy and become a totalitarian Dictator for Life.
http://bigpeace.com/jkalosha/2010/10/01/venezuelan-national-assembly-elections-turning-back-totalitarian-dictatorship/
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Please note that this editorial is not from some right wing pamphlet. It is The Washington Post no less.
How Chávez lost the popular vote -- and won by a landslide
Friday, October 1, 2010
HUGO CHÁVEZ must be feeling grateful to the number-crunchers who helped him redraw Venezuela's congressional districts. The strongman turned last weekend's National Assembly election into a referendum on himself; he inundated the country with propaganda via the state-controlled media and even refilled government food stores. The result was an unmistakable rebuff. On a day of heavy turnout, 52 percent of voters chose opposition parties, vs. 48 percent for Mr. Chávez's Socialists.
In a normal democratic country -- even in Venezuela itself up until this year -- that outcome would have produced something close to a tie between government and non-government deputies in the congress. Instead, thanks to the blatant gerrymandering he ordered, Mr. Chávez probably will have 98 seats, compared with 67 for the main opposition coalition and a small leftist party. That allowed the caudillo to claim victory in a news conference, during which he heaped abuse on a reporter who dared to ask about the discrepancy between votes and seats.
Mr. Chávez, however, didn't deliver the victory address he had planned from the balcony of the presidential palace -- an encouraging sign that he grasps the election's real implications. In addition to the popular repudiation, the result means that beginning in December, Mr. Chávez should no longer have the ability to rule by decree or to appoint supreme court justices and members of the electoral authority without the opposition's consent. He also faces the threat that his announced plan to rule Venezuela for at least another decade will be interrupted in 2012, when a presidential election is due that should be decided by majority vote.
There was good reason for Mr. Chávez's loss: Alone in Latin America, Venezuela is still deep in recession, and it leads the hemisphere in inflation and violent crime. A normal democratic leader might respond by correcting errant or highly unpopular policies, such as Mr. Chávez's steady nationalization of the economy or his import of Cuban advisers and intelligence operatives. His record, however, suggests that the president will merely step up his attacks on opposition leaders and journalists -- a number of whom have been imprisoned or driven into exile -- and seek to circumvent the new checks on his power.
Mr. Chávez's apologists will be pointing to the congressional vote as proof that he still leads a democracy. But in democracies, elections produce consequences in line with the results. In Mr. Chávez's Venezuela, they usually lead to less democracy.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/09/30/AR2010093006194.html
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Denny, That is some serious gerrymandering! That is a quite a good breakthrough here for the Washington Post to get the story straight after a previous election where the Bush administration took the word of Jimmy Carter and advice of Colin Powell and accepted a stolen election. Still I am shocked by the fact that 48% think the Chavez path is acceptable. Margin of victory matters. It makes it harder to steal elections as we learned here where my newest senator is the same Al Franken that we defeated on election night.
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President Obama's trip to Brazil, Chile and El Salvador this week, while war rages in Libya, has been sharply criticized as proof of dangerous detachment from a world that badly needs U.S. leadership.
Yet there is a case to be made for going—to Brazil anyway. Arguably Santiago and San Salvador could have been postponed. Chile is already a stable ally and the stop in El Salvador, to mouth platitudes about hemispheric security while Central America is going up in narco-trafficking flames, only highlights the futility of the U.S. war on drugs.
Going to Brasilia to meet with Workers' Party President Dilma Rousseff on Saturday, on the other hand, was important.
Unfortunately, Mr. Obama discredited his trip even before it began by peddling it as a trade mission to create jobs and boost the U.S. economy. With those goals in mind, he would have been better off staying home and lobbying Congress to drop the 54 cents per gallon tariff on Brazilian sugar ethanol, and to end all U.S. subsidies on cotton, which have been ruled illegal by the World Trade Organization in a case brought by Brazil. Or he could have sent the Colombia and Panama free trade agreements to the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue, where they would be easily ratified.
Let's face it: Mr. Obama's reputation as a protectionist precedes him. If he believes otherwise, our silver-tongued president has a tin ear.
As to the good reason for such a trip, consider the shared geopolitical interests between the U.S. and the biggest democracy in Latin America. Although former President Lula da Silva, also from the Workers' Party, did almost nothing to deregulate a mostly unfree economy over his eight years in office, he did manage to respect the central bank reforms carried out by his predecessor, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. As a result, after decades of inflationary chaos caused by central bank financing of government deficits, Brazil has now had vastly improved price stability for more than a decade. Ending the cycle of repeated devaluations is enabling the formation of a substantial middle class, and it is shaping a nation that increasingly wants to be part of the modern, global economy.
Millions of Brazilians climbing out of poverty is something to celebrate. But it is troubling when the leadership of a formerly isolated sleeping giant announces that it seeks alliances with tyrants. That's what was happening during Lula's time in office.
Lula had a thing for thugs. Given his roots in the left-wing labor movement, his soft spot for Cuba's Fidel Castro was understandable. But his decision to act as a flack for Iran's Mahmoud Ahmadinejad on the world stage was not. Fortunately, it was ineffective. On the other hand, his support for Hugo Chávez—who is antidemocratic at home and supports Colombian terrorists beyond his borders—damaged multilateral efforts to contain the Venezuelan menace.
Now Ms. Rousseff wants to shape a new foreign policy that, while far from aligning itself with the U.S., is not so likely to actively pursue dictators and authoritarians. The U.S. should nurture this effort. In the struggle for hemispheric stability, Brazil is a crucial player.
As president, Ms. Rousseff, who was once a member of a Marxist guerrilla group, was expected to be further to the ideological left than her predecessor and just as dangerously populist. But so far she has proven pragmatic. Whereas the charismatic Lula was fond of the limelight, she keeps a low profile. When she does speak, she is serious and measured. Lula complained loudly about media criticism and wanted to clamp down on press freedom. Ms. Rousseff has rejected the idea.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.It is an old Brazilian tradition to reserve the foreign ministry for the country's crackpot left. That and the time-tested Brazilian ambition to defeat U.S. hegemony in the region is one way to explain the support for despots under Lula. Brazil also has valuable commercial contracts in Venezuela. But Ms. Rousseff seems to have decided that Lula's approach was counterproductive, especially to Brazil's goal of winning a permanent seat on the U.N.'s Security Council.
Shortly after she won the election runoff last Oct. 31, she began criticizing the human rights records of Iran and Cuba, something Lula never had the courage to do. Another important, though subtle, signal is the way in which Ms. Rousseff seems to be distancing herself from Mr. Chávez and his cohorts.
If Brazil is seeking rapprochement with the U.S., it is a welcome development for the entire hemisphere. As an ally on the fundamentals, like opposition to torture in Cuban jails, Brazil could be part of a long-awaited regional push to denounce human rights abuses. It might also come in handy next year when Venezuela holds presidential elections. Mr. Chávez has said that even if he loses, he won't step down, and the commander of the army has agreed.
That could make for a situation not unlike what is unfolding in Libya today. If the U.S. and Brazil are singing from the same hymn book, it will help. It's only too bad the commander in chief who was starting a war didn't have the good sense to return home after the meeting in Brasilia.
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Peruvian national-socialist Ollanta Humala and his center-right populist
rival Keiko Fujimori have finally agreed to a televised debate ahead of the
June 5 presidential runoff election. Perhaps the May 29 event will reveal
how genuinely committed each candidate is to preserving, refining and
strengthening the fragile democratic capitalism that has been moving the
country out of poverty for the past decade. This is, after all, the crucial
question for Peruvian voters.
Liberalization has been good for Peru. Its gross-domestic-product growth
averaged about 6.5% annually from 2002-2010. Poverty is half what it was 20
years ago. The government has opened markets, increased property-rights
protection, improved transparency in the state's fiscal accounts, and
restrained spending.
This success has helped sustain the case for Latin American freedom at a
time when Venezuela's Hugo Chávez and the Colombian terrorist group FARC are
using money, weapons and ideological outreach to try to overthrow democracy
and outlaw private property across the continent. Revolutionary ideals have
met with some success among the region's most vulnerable populations. Mr.
Chávez's Bolivarian movement was instrumental in bringing the antidemocratic
Evo Morales to power in Bolivia. Internal FARC documents indicate the
guerrillas helped finance the presidential campaign of Ecuadoran caudillo
Rafael Correa. In all three countries civil liberties, including free speech
and due process, have been dramatically abridged.
View Full Image
REUTERS
Peruvian presidential candidates Keiko Fujimori and Ollanta Humala
Peru has mostly kept these destructive forces at bay. But the risk of a
revolutionary uprising, particularly in the southern sierra, remains real.
Discontent simmers in Peru's significant indigenous communities, where
people are less likely to be beneficiaries of economic modernization, and
where state inefficiency and corruption translate into abysmal public
services. Centuries of racial tension also persist in these areas, and the
U.S. war on drugs in the face of steady American demand has further
alienated the population.
This is the target market of Mr. Chávez, and it is also the stronghold for
Mr. Humala's national-socialist Gana Peru party.
A recent special-client report, "The Possibility of an Insurrection in the
Southern Andes" by the Peruvian security-consulting firm Peace Keeping
Solutions (PKS), lists 14 "acts of insurrection" since 2004, including one
led by Mr. Humala's brother Antauro on Jan. 1, 2005, that was supported at
the time by the candidate. The report points out that while Mr. Chávez's
political structures have played a role in fomenting this unrest, chavismo
"doesn't explain the existence of leftist and nationalist ideas among 40% or
more of the Peruvian population." That, PKS maintains, is a result of
ideological forces within national universities, professional organizations,
the Peruvian military and some political parties.
Chavismo has a limited capacity to "organize insurrection" in Peru, PKS
says. But that capacity is strengthened by the state's failure to counteract
radicalism. The army is "indifferent, bordering on complicity," the National
Intelligence Agency is "inefficient," police administration is deficient,
and police intelligence is starved for resources. Meanwhile, there has been
"a permissive attitude" in the prime minister's office and at times
cooperation with militant activists from regional authorities.
Mr. Humala's history is tied up in all this. He is an ex-army officer who
has built his political career by tapping into the resentment of the
disenfranchised with demagogic speeches against liberal economics and
threats of violence against the establishment. Mr. Humala even attempted his
own military coup in 2000, and there are credible allegations that he took
money from Mr. Chávez in his 2006 presidential bid.
Last week he tried to distance himself from this past by publicly swearing
on a Bible to refrain from dismantling the country's democratic institutions
if elected. His critics howled that it was pure theater and no more
believable than the recent rewrite of his policy agenda. The old one, dated
December 2010, was a 198-page anti-market, national-socialist rant. The new
one is eight pages of promises to "combat corruption," "reestablish public
ethics," and lay down the rule of law. It is as if Mr. Humala was knocked
off his horse on the road from Puno.
Either that or he has agreed to an image makeover so he can get elected. The
latter seems more likely. Nevertheless, he is being helped by a few Peruvian
elites who appear less enamored of him than they are obsessed with hatred
for Keiko Fujimori's father, former president Alberto Fujimori. Her defeat,
it seems, would be their long-sought revenge for his authoritarian style.
How else to explain so-called free-market types backing a national-socialist
who six months ago was pledging to eviscerate the liberal economic model?
Ms. Fujimori has a heavy responsibility to defend the measures that have
improved Peru's living standards and to explain how she would deepen
reforms. A lot is riding on how well she does in the debate. If the only
motivated voters come election day are those with scores to settle against
her father, the country is in deep trouble.
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Peru has been a rare Latin American success story, a growing economy in an Andes region deteriorating under left-wing populism. Peruvians have now taken a big gamble with that success by electing their own Peronist manque, in the form of national-socialist candidate Ollanta Humala. We'll soon find out how far left his turn will be.
Mr. Humala narrowly defeated Keiko Fujimori, the daughter of former President Alberto Fujimori, who began Peru's economic reform from 1990 to 2000. His government ended hyperinflation and improved property rights and fiscal accountability. Peru's economic growth averaged 6.5% a year from 2002 to 2010, and poverty is half what it was 20 years ago. But growth can often be taken for granted, and Mr. Humala tarred Ms. Fujimori with some of the rougher law and order practices that her father used to defeat Communist rebels.
The question now is which Mr. Humala will decide to govern in Lima. Until about two months ago he opposed the kind of democratic capitalism that has made Peruvians better off. In 2000, Comandante Humala, as he is sometimes known, led an unsuccessful military coup against the democratically elected Mr. Fujimori. In 2005 his brother Antauro led his own coup, which Mr. Humala endorsed from his post at the time as Peru's military attaché in Seoul.
Those incidents may seem like ancient history, but Mr. Humala's 198-page original party platform, dated December 2010, was in the same mold. It referred to market economics as "predatory" and called for the nationalization of strategic "activities." It also railed against "a foreign economic minority" that exploits natural resources and promised to "revise" free trade agreements that "oppose the exercise of our sovereign will." One of those trade deals is with the U.S.
Yet when Mr. Humala found himself in a runoff against Ms. Fujimori, he had some new advisers generate a more moderate, less detailed agenda. This agenda promised stable prices and responsible fiscal policy. It includes socialist vows to redistribute wealth and start a national airline, but it also promises to promote the rule of law, respect the division of government power and "reestablish public ethics and combat corruption and the squandering of public funds."
This pledge to govern with "honesty" seems to have been a deciding factor for many who associated Ms. Fujimori's father with graft. On election night, as it began to look like Mr. Humala had won, his spokesman told the world that private property would be respected.
Perhaps it will. The last decade has seen two kinds of left-wing populists come to power in Latin America. Those in the mold of Hugo Chávez—in Ecuador, Nicaragua and Bolivia—have politicized their economies and undermined democratic institutions to enhance their power. On the other hand, Brazil's Lula da Silva and Peru's current President Alan Garcia also had hard-left resumes, but they came to understand that free markets and property rights are crucial for growth that reduces poverty. Mr. Humala will now make his choice.
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http://www.mexidata.info/id2933.html
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http://southernpulse.com/_webapp_3945793/Ungoverned_Spaces_Part_II,_Cities
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After last month's debt-ceiling debacle, a critical mass of President Obama's harshest critics have gone from calling him socialism's evil genius to tagging him as merely a clueless community organizer who is in over his head.
Yet while the haggling over spending exposed many of the president's weaknesses, it seems a mistake to underestimate his collectivist instincts. It may be true that if he cannot accomplish what he wants by decree, he loses interest fast. But it also remains evident that his worldview is largely aligned with the eternal struggle for an all-powerful state.
Observe U.S. foreign policy in Latin America over the last two and a half years: In particular, consider how Honduras took a beating from the Obama administration over its decision to remove a law-breaking leftist president in 2009, while Ecuador is getting little pushback from Washington as it steps ever closer to dictatorship.
This contradiction became pronounced last month when Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa, an ally of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, used his control of the judiciary to win a lawsuit against a columnist and three directors of the Ecuadoran daily El Universo. They will have to pay him a total of $42 million, and each has been sentenced to three years in jail.
View Full Image
Reutuers
Ecuador's President Rafael Correa
.Mr. Obama's State Department is treating the Ecuadoran incident gingerly. It issued a brief statement on the importance of a free press and said that it "join the Inter American Press Association, the Committee to Protect Journalists, and others in expressing concern over the sentence in the El Universo case." There will be an appeal, and State said it "will closely follow the process." Yet with democracy in peril, that is downright timid—not to mention a little late—compared to the fury unleashed against Honduras two years ago.
In 2009, Honduras fought to save its democracy by removing then-President Manuel Zelaya, who had used street violence to try to extend his tenure in violation of his country's constitution. The Obama administration responded by pulling the travel visas of Honduras's Supreme Court judges, human rights ombudsman and members of Congress. It suspended most U.S. aid and supported the suspension of Honduras from the Organization of American States (OAS), which resulted in the cutoff of aid from international financial institutions.
As with Mr. Zelaya, the administration has given Mr. Correa a wide berth, despite his antidemocratic practices. Since he took office in 2007, he has used both state power and mob violence to enforce his will whenever other branches of government do not cooperate with his agenda. And he has used his primitive definition of democracy—majority rules—to destroy his opponents, stifle dissent and consolidate power.
In a May referendum that Mr. Correa organized, he asked voters, among other things, to give him control of the judiciary and the power to bar owners of media companies from engaging in other businesses. The narrow approval he won portends the end of pluralism in his country.
The president of a democracy might at least pretend to respect the independence of the judicial branch, but Mr. Correa has never bothered with appearances. "Yes, we want to put our hands in the court," he said in January as he prepared the country for the referendum.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.His determination to silence his media critics has been more overt, as the El Universo case demonstrates. The column in question called the president "a dictator" and challenged his claim that he was a victim of "a coup" in September 2009 when he went to a police barracks during a strike. Yet what most agitated Mr. Correa—and what he sued for—was the suggestion that he could be held accountable for giving the order to fire on the hospital across the street from the barracks, as part of his "coup" charade.
In a democracy, opinions are part of free speech and the president's attorney never showed that the columnist had lied. Moreover, the government has classified most documents related to the incident, and a report from the military command that says that Mr. Correa gave the order to fire was not permitted as evidence in the case.
With his court victory, Mr. Correa has established that those who cross him should expect to be financially ruined. Radio and television stations also have been reminded that the government controls the renewal of their licenses.
When I called the OAS press office for a statement on the travesty in Ecuador, the person who came to the phone would only say that the OAS has "no comment." It is hardly surprising. The credibility of that institution has been destroyed because, in the absence of U.S. leadership, Mr. Chávez and company have taken it over. OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza, a washed-up Chilean Socialist, bends to every whim of his chavista task masters.
This brings us back to the question of where Mr. Obama's sympathies lie. A good clue can be found by comparing the aggression launched against Tegucigalpa with the timidity of the policy toward Quito.
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"Fernandez...vows to continue current policies that include a strong state hand in the economy, hefty energy and transportation subsidies and trade protectionism. She is enjoying approval ratings of more than 60 percent"
And second place is a socialist.
One more place where freedom is not on the ballot?
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http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/09/us-argentina-election-idUSTRE7980TM20111009
Argentine President Cristina Fernandez has a massive lead over opponents two weeks before a presidential election and looks set to win more than 50 percent of the vote, two polls showed on Sunday.
Fernandez's support now stands at 53.2 percent, according to the latest monthly survey by local pollsters Management & Fit showed. That puts her more than 40 points ahead of her nearest rival
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Aren't they cute?
Jaime Bayly - chavez maricon del siglo XXI
[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4EGqA8e1oLM[/youtube]
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Region - Small Arms Survey: Central America is the most violent region in the world
The Small Arms Survey declared during a presentation on 27 October 2011 at the United Nations in Geneva that Central America is the most violent region in the world. The study, conducted from 2004-2009, showed that there are 29 murders per 100,000 inhabitants, and Central Americans are more likely to die a violent death than those countries at war. El Salvador showed the highest murder rate with 62 per 100,000 inhabitants, while Honduras and Guatemala showed 49 murders per 100,000 inhabitants.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/06/world/americas/us-turns-its-focus-on-drug-smuggling-in-honduras.html?_r=1&nl=todaysheadlines&emc=edit_th_20120506
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Imperialists Gang Up on Paraguay After the small democracy constitutionally removes its president, Chávez and Castro call it a coup. Canada recognizes the new president; the U.S. is missing in action.
By MARY ANASTASIA O'GRADY
Paraguay may not have a lot going for it. But it does have this: a chief justice on the high court who is not intimidated by the left when asked to uphold the constitution. I know lots of people who wish they lived in a country like that.
The recent Paraguayan Supreme Court ruling, which unanimously allowed the lawful congressional impeachment of President Fernando Lugo on June 22 to go forward, was not without risk of special-interest backlash. But in making the decision, the top judge on the court's constitutional panel used the law as the guide, not a political weathervane.
Well, never mind the legal mumbo-jumbo. Latin America's imperialist powers do not approve. Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, Cuba's Raúl Castro and the presidents of Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Argentina—all members of Mr. Chávez's Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (aka ALBA)—are calling it a "coup." And they are working feverishly to isolate the small landlocked country in retribution.
Cuba is also providing comic relief. It recalled its ambassador to Paraguay because it said Havana would not "recognize any authority that does not emanate from legitimate suffrage and the exercise of sovereignty on the part of the Paraguayan people."
So what's really going on in Paraguay and why should anyone care? Let's take the second part of that question first. After 9/11, U.S. intelligence devoted a significant amount of attention to Paraguay's "triple-border" area with Brazil and Argentina, because of its heavy Middle Eastern population and its reputation for lawlessness. At the time experts fretted that it was, or could become, an Islamic terrorist hotbed.
Where the U.S. sees the potential for crisis, Mr. Chávez sees opportunity. He wants to make Paraguay a satellite of his Bolivarian revolution—which seeks the destabilization and destruction of weak democracies through violence. Mr. Chávez also has a special relationship with Iran, and Bolivarian control of Paraguay would benefit both parties.
Mr. Lugo, who took office in 2008, was supposed to be Mr. Chávez's foot in the Paraguayan door. But the former Catholic bishop was a man without a party, and he never accumulated the power necessary to carry out his mentor's designs. Of the five charges brought against him in the impeachment process, two alleged support for violent land invasions by landless-peasant movements, and one accused him of fomenting radical left-wing politics inside the army barracks. A fourth said he had broken the law by signing an international agreement without getting it first ratified by Congress.
Yet in judging the question of a "coup" it is not Mr. Lugo's alleged crimes that ought to matter but whether the process was legal. Clearly it was.
When Paraguay designed its 1992 constitution after almost four decades of dictatorship, it sought a way to constrain the power of the chief executive. It did so with Article 225, which allows Congress to unseat the president for "poor performance of his duties" after a two-thirds majority vote in the lower house and in the senate. And so it was that a lower house vote of 76-1 and a senate vote of 39-4 ended Mr. Lugo's term. The country's vice president, Federico Franco, was elevated to the presidency as prescribed by law. The Supreme Court later found that Congress was within its rights.
The Americas in the News
Get the latest information in Spanish from The Wall Street Journal's Americas page.
.The Paraguayan congress has been a thorn in Mr. Chávez's side for years. Besides thwarting Mr. Lugo's revolutionary work, it has used its veto within the Southern Cone customs union Mercosur to block Venezuela's membership. Now Mr. Chávez has his revenge. After lobbying to get Paraguay suspended from Mercosur, Venezuela was allowed to join last week. This is a violation of the group's rules, because all such decisions require unanimous consent. But who cares? That's just more legal mumbo-jumbo.
There was a day when this kind of bullying by undemocratic thugs in the region would have been met with solidarity from free republics. And there has been some. Canada, Germany, Spain and the Vatican have all recognized President Franco. But missing, conspicuously, from the list are the U.S., Colombia and Brazil.
Colombia might be forgiven since President Juan Manuel Santos, living next door to Venezuela, seems to be afraid of Hugo Chávez and has to accept that the U.S. is no longer a reliable ally. But Brazil calling it a coup is disgraceful. The country of the future keeps saying it wants to be in charge on the South American continent but when it gets a chance to lead, it defers to the Venezuelan firebrand.
The U.S. isn't much better. The State Department says it is taking a multilateral approach. It is not calling it a coup but has stopped short of recognizing President Franco because it is concerned about the rapidity of the process. This shouldn't matter because Article 225 doesn't specify any preparation period for the trial. But then who reads constitutions in the U.S. anymore? That's just legal mumbo-jumbo.
Write to O'Grady@wsj.com
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By JUAN WILLIAMS
April's Sixth Summit of the Americas generated salacious headlines about Secret Service agents and prostitutes. There was less attention to news that will have lasting impact on regional economies—the struggle over U.S. opposition to inviting Fidel Castro and Cuba to join the summit. The president of Ecuador boycotted the summit because of the U.S. stand. The presidents of Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua are threatening to boycott the next one.
There is a temptation for U.S. policy makers to just give in on inviting Cuba. Fidel Castro is old and in poor health. The Cold War is over. Despite the official U.S. ban on travel to Cuba, American academics and tourists romanticize Cuba's revolutionary past and visit in growing numbers.
But it will be a mistake for the U.S. to welcome a nondemocratic nation run by a dictatorship to join the summit, which was first held in Washington in 1994 and brings together leaders from North, Central and South America and the Caribbean. Economic growth in Latin America—a region that is the U.S.'s fastest-growing trade partner—is at risk if dictators are welcomed as legitimate leaders.
Enlarge Image
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Fidel Castro in Havana in February
.Secure markets are necessary for successful trade policy, and investment cannot take root when dictators can usurp property rights. Real, vigorous trade also leads to global investors and an educated workforce—all of which threaten dictators' power. That is why the U.S. stance on Cuba is so important for the region.
This spring brought a personal reminder of how important it is. I was born in Panama, in a poor city, Colon. For my birthday this year, I walked around there for the first time since my mother brought three children, including me (as a 4-year-old), to Brooklyn, N.Y. No joke, we came to this country as added freight on a banana boat.
I was never quite sure why I waited so long to go back to Colon. My wife and sons also accompanied me and, ever wiser than his old man, my youngest son, Raffi, said my reluctance to visit might have had something to do with the fear of the intense, ugly poverty that eats up people.
There is a lot to fear about Colon. Crime and drugs are common. People live camped out on balconies. Huge bugs and vermin scurry down trash-strewn streets. I visited the apartment building where my mother took me as a newborn. It now looks like a jail: Iron gates cover individual apartment doors to stop robbery.
The Panamanian economy is growing but not fast enough to lift the people of Colon out of this crushing poverty. There's a widespread belief there that the government has given up on the city and would just as soon bulldoze whole sections so they can rebuild on top of the ruins. In fact, Panama has less poverty than most Latin nations. But even here economic hopelessness has a history of being a breeding ground for dictators playing to the frustrations of the poor.
The reason my father insisted that my mother take the children out of Panama in the 1950s was fear of a Castro-like, populist dictator, Arnulfo Arias. A Nazi supporter during World War II, Arias later took businesses away from U.S. and European investors by insisting on Panamanian ownership. He profited from stoking racial antagonism against Asian and black immigrants who built the canal and made Panama a center of international trade. Arias even tried to divest black West Indians, such as my father, of Panamanian citizenship.
Panamanian dictators Omar Torrijos and Manuel Noriega followed Arias's phony populist politics to enrich themselves. Noriega's corrupt regime encouraged the drug trade even as he denounced capitalism.
The U.S. Panama free trade agreement passed by Congress last year lowered tariffs to create new investment opportunities for American businesses. The agreement helps Panama by improving the local job market and it helps the U.S. by opening markets to American goods.
Even in Colon, with all of its problems, people see hope in capitalism. The local economy is helped by the commerce that comes with sitting on one end of the Panama Canal Zone. That free-trade zone is the largest free port in the Western Hemisphere and the second-largest in the world.
My life's major turn away from poverty came thanks to my father's vision of his children escaping a despot like Arias. That dream of a better life is alive throughout Latin America. To romanticize any dictator is to kill those dreams by condemning poor kids in Latin America, like me, to tyrants and the burden of limited education and economic opportunity.
When we Americans have the opportunity to help neighbors prosper while standing for freedom, we ought to take it. Global capitalism and defiance of dictators are not mutually exclusive ideas. In fact, they work best when they work together.
Mr. Williams is a political analyst for Fox News and a columnist for the Hill.
A version of this article appeared July 3, 2012, on page A15 in the U.S. edition of The Wall Street
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The Source of American Power by Robert D. Kaplan and Karen Hooper
July 18, 2012 | 0901 GMT
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Stratfor
By Robert D. Kaplan and Karen Hooper
American geopolitical power historically has its source not in Europe or Asia but in the Greater Caribbean. The Greater Caribbean is the world from Yorktown to the Guianas; that is, from the mid-Atlantic states to the jungles of northern South America. The Western Hemisphere, as the Dutch-American strategist Nicholas J. Spykman explained in 1942, is not divided between North and South America. It is divided between the latitudes north of the great barrier of the Amazonian jungle and the latitudes south of it. In other words, from a geopolitical point of view, Venezuela is not a South American country at all. It is a Caribbean country: Most of its population of 28.8 million lives in the north along the Caribbean Sea, secure from the jungles to the south.
While the headlines today are about the Middle East and Asia, for many U.S. presidents from the early 19th century to the early 20th century, foreign policy crises centered on the Greater Caribbean. It was a 100-year process for the young United States to truly wrest control of the Greater Caribbean from European powers. The Greater Caribbean -- the Gulf of Mexico plus the Caribbean proper -- is, in fact, a blue water territorial extension of the continental United States. Influence over it allowed for the building of the Panama Canal at the beginning of the 20th century. Once the United States could take the Greater Caribbean for granted, America became the hegemon of the Western Hemisphere, with only the Canadian Arctic and the southern cone of South America (including the shadow zones of Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru) truly beyond the security belt carved out by the U.S. Navy in the West Indies. And with the Western Hemisphere under its domination, the United States was henceforth able to affect the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere. The American victories in the two world wars and the Cold War were originally built on the geopolitics of the Greater Caribbean.
But as distances have collapsed in a more crowded world increasingly united by technology, the Greater Caribbean has again come into play. It would be an exaggeration to say that the United States is losing control of the region. Indeed, the U.S. Coast Guard on its own is basically able to manage it, while the U.S. Navy is deployed for the most part elsewhere in the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific. Nevertheless, this is now a region beset by massive drug smuggling from Mexico and Central America into the United States and by a robust Chinese commercial presence in the Panama Canal and Venezuela, among other places. Meanwhile, the anomaly of a communist Cuba still staggers on, though arguably that is a problem that could have been effectively dealt with decades ago by a less ideological U.S. foreign policy.
Moreover, for two decades the United States has had to deal with partial state failure in Colombia, followed by the ascent of anti-American radicalism on the part of the government in Venezuela. Venezuela and Colombia are demographic and regional powerhouses in their own right, whose politics have themselves been partly subsumed by the drug trade. Each state is now in an important stage of political transition, with repercussions for America's position in the Western Hemisphere. The stakes are particularly high because of the widening of the Panama Canal in 2014, which will increase global maritime traffic from Colombia and Venezuela all the way north to America's Gulf Coast.
At the moment, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez may be dying. His colon cancer has spread to his bones, according to some reports. In power since 1999, Chavez has brought Venezuela far over to the anti-American left of the ideological spectrum, making ostentatious alliances with Iran, Russia and China. He is planning to run for re-election in October. If he is re-elected, and then dies, or if he dies at any point, Venezuela could be thrown into chaos, partly because of the way his strongman-style rule has eviscerated Venezuela's political institutions. This makes Venezuela, with its soaring crime rate, fundamentally unstable. Under Chavez, Venezuela is operating economically within a narrow margin of error. The country is severely politically estranged from the United States, even as half of its oil, mainly for geographical reasons, is exported to the United States. And because investment in the energy sector has slowed -- because of domestic nationalizations -- Venezuela is pumping only 2.4 million barrels of oil per day compared to 3.2 million barrels a decade ago. Venezuela's national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela, has suffered a concurrent decline in efficiency, with a skyrocketing payroll and increasing diversion of oil revenue to finance social projects.
Venezuela badly needs capital to develop the sour and heavy crude oil fields near the Orinoco River in the country's jungled interior, given that output from lighter and sweeter deposits near the Caribbean city of Maracaibo have peaked. But negotiations with the Americans for a new bilateral understanding will be difficult because of Venezuela's complicity with the drug trade and its record of expropriating assets from U.S. companies.
In other words, Venezuela's present strategic direction, marked by hostility to Washington and bad relationships with foreign investors, is probably unsustainable. If Chavez is succeeded not by chaos but rather by current opposition leader Henrique Capriles Radonski, than we can expect a milder version of the current anti-American populism mixed with a more business-friendly climate. Yet another possibility is rule by Foreign Minister Nicholas Maduro, who would in the short run continue Chavez's policies but would face the same economic and structural constraints that have built up under the Chavez administration.
All possible successors are aware that Chavez has been popular with the poor and lower-middle class, a large percentage of the population. Thus, redistributive economic policies are likely to continue, even as they may pave the country's road to further ruin. In order to afford these programs Venezuela will have to reverse the trend of declining oil production. For that, the next government will have to reverse policies that make Venezuela a chancy investment. These changes will require not only guarantees to investors but also changing key factors in the labor market, risking unrest. Despite the challenge to Venezuela's domestic political structure, without these changes, Venezuela's future looks rather bleak and dangerous.
While Venezuela lurches along the political precipice, Colombia next door -- the other giant on the Caribbean's southern rim -- looks less hopeful than it did a few years back. Alvaro Uribe, Colombia's president during most of the last decade, aligned himself closely with Washington, delivered competent and progressive social and economic policies, and hit insurgent drug armies extremely hard, taking back significant swathes of territory from the guerrillas. But the insurgents, principally the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have staged a comeback, with a focus on attacking oil installations. The FARC has essentially lost its left-wing ideology and is now mainly about drugs and territory. Colombia's current president, Juan Manuel Santos (Uribe's former defense minister), has borne the brunt of the FARC's comeback amidst the growing consolidation of criminal bands that closely resemble dismantled paramilitary organizations of the past. Santos has now sharply broken from Uribe, whose achievements are increasingly in question as corruption cases from high-level officials in his administration continue to emerge. Santos has also rhetorically shifted his foreign policy away from outright friendship with the United States and more toward accommodation with the region, especially in regards to Chavez's Venezuela and Rafael Correa's vaguely anti-American regime in Ecuador.
Thus, Washington cannot count on stability in either Colombia or Venezuela, even as Mexico's drug war continues with 50,000 deaths since 2006 -- with most of the violence in northern Mexico near the U.S. border. The United States may dominate the Greater Caribbean in terms of its conventional military power. It may dominate the Greater Caribbean in the sense that no other significant power can challenge America there. But such American power cannot guarantee stability anywhere within the region itself.
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Read more: The Source of American Power by Robert D. Kaplan and Karen Hooper | Stratfor
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Venezuela badly needs capital to develop the sour and heavy crude oil fields near the Orinoco River in the country's jungled interior....
Given the STRAFOR is supposed to know geography, I find it strange they don't know that the area where the Orinoco sand tars exist is grassland, not jungle. The jungle starts a long, long way further south:
Los Llanos: http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=los%20llanos&oe=UTF-8&um=1&ie=UTF-8&hl=en&tbm=isch&source=og&sa=N&tab=wi
In the following map, the Orinoco sand tars are marked by a blue line. Grassland is shaded light green and jungle darker green: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Orinoco_Belt
All possible successors are aware that Chavez has been popular with the poor and lower-middle class, a large percentage of the population. Thus, redistributive economic policies are likely to continue, even as they may pave the country's road to further ruin. In order to afford these programs Venezuela will have to reverse the trend of declining oil production. For that, the next government will have to reverse policies that make Venezuela a chancy investment. These changes will require not only guarantees to investors but also changing key factors in the labor market, risking unrest. Despite the challenge to Venezuela's domestic political structure, without these changes, Venezuela's future looks rather bleak and dangerous.
Dictators don't allow themselves to be voted out of power. While Chavez still has a large following many of his former allies have defected. The Bolivarian street thugs are seldom seen these days. While I certainly don't know the details, the power structure has changed. Chavez is still the top dog but his potential successors have been maneuvering to gain strength for the coming power struggle. Lower oil prices and lower crude production are taking their toll. After more than a decade the opposition has finally learned it can only have a chance united. The opposition is now behind Henrique Capriles Radonski (HCR) (Capriles: Sephardic Jews from Curaçao, Radonski: Ashkenazi Jews from Poland) who has held elected office during all the Chavez years and has been generally a well liked success. He is not associated with the old 4th Republic AD/COPEI parties.
http://www.google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=Henrique%20Capriles%20Radonski&oe=UTF-8&um=1&ie=UTF-8&hl=en&tbm=isch&source=og&sa=N&tab=wi
Polls now suggest that HCR and Chavez are tied in popularity. Whether Chavez steals the election or not is still to be seen but hopefully by now the opposition has gotten to know all the dirty tricks it can expect. Ideologically many of us are disappointed by HCR's political proposals, in effect continuing the populist economy. On the other hand, the pragmatists realize that this is needed to win the presidency. Over seventy years ago Joseph Schumpeter made a very acute observation: "Liberal democracy is not about governing but about getting elected."
But populism and socialism need not be anti-American. Pragmatic socialist governments can be quite effective and, let's face it, Venezuelans love all the American toys and goodies from McDonald's to Disneyland, Nike shoes, iPhones and much more.
Denny Schlesinger
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Henrique Capriles Radonski (HCR) (Capriles: Sephardic Jews from Curaçao, Radonski: Ashkenazi Jews from Poland)
Some may wonder why I pointed out the double Jewish roots of the opposition presidential candidate. Venezuela has been an open society since independence. In the days of the divine right of kings the Church was all powerful. To gain prestige and position you first had to bribe the church, which held the records, and then the monarch. While in the thirteen colonies the cry was "no taxation without representation," in the south people were just as tired of being exploited by the mother country. Just as some of the Founding Fathers were said to be deists, Simon Bolivar was said to be a Freemason.
The denomination with the longest history of objection to Freemasonry is the Roman Catholic Church. The objections raised by the Roman Catholic Church are based on the allegation that Masonry teaches a naturalistic deistic religion which is in conflict with Church doctrine.[72] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freemasonry
Be that as it may, several instances of public anti-church behavior by Bolivar have been recorded, the most famous one after the Caracas earthquake which a priest said was god's punishment for the independence movement: "Si la naturaleza se opone a nuestros designios, lucharemos contra ella y haremos que nos obedezca." If nature opposes our designs, we will fight against her and make her obey us. In any event, the Church's power over Venezuelan politics was broken over the years.
Bolivar needed all the help he could get to fight the Spanish. He offered slaves their freedom to joint the patriots. There are parallels in Europe where weak kings offered citizenship to minorities in exchange of allegiance to the throne. This is how Hungarian Jews gained citizenship (and assimilated). This is how the Seclers became the border guards in Romania. [As told to me by my Hungarian cousin and a Secler friend]
Chavez's class and racial warfare are an aberration in Venezuela. It gained a few ignorant or hothead followers but the population at large is as open as it always has been. Chavez has tried to play the religious angle against HCR to no avail. Compare that to the difficulty of electing a Catholic or a black president in the USA. Civil rights came to Venezuela a long time before they landed in the USA.
Denny Schlesinger
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Good to see you here again Denny. Thanks for your insider view of what's going on in V.
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http://pjmedia.com/blog/obama-doesn%e2%80%99t-understand-latin-america/?singlepage=true
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Stratfor
By Robert D. Kaplan
Chief Geopolitical Analyst
Many U.S. presidents begin their term in office vowing to pay more attention to Latin America and then fail to do so. Indeed, the first summit of a presidential term is often with the leader of Mexico, either in Mexico City or Washington. The new White House staff surely acknowledges the importance of Latin America; it is just that crises elsewhere in the world quickly get in the way. By the time an American president gets done dealing with the Middle East, East Asia and Europe, it is time for him to run for re-election, or retire, whatever the case may be. Latin America has been, once again, forgotten.
Meanwhile, the importance of Latin America to the United States continues to climb. U.S. trade with Latin America -- both in terms of imports and exports -- has grown from 18.9 percent of America's total worldwide trade to 21.6 percent over the past decade. At the same time, however, the percentage of trade between the largest Latin American economies -- Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina -- and the United States has decreased dramatically. For example, the United States accounted for nearly a quarter of Brazil's overall trade in 2002, but the figure was only 12.5 percent in 2011 -- a drop in half. And whereas three-quarters of Mexico's overall trade was with the United States in 2002, it went down to 64.2 percent in 2011. In other words, as Latin America becomes more important in economic terms to the United States, the United States becomes relatively less important to Latin America.
Europe, China and other parts of the world are clearly moving closer to Latin America in terms of trade, weakening slightly the influence Washington can wield in Latin American capitals (though Europe has been a significant trading partner of Latin America ever since Portuguese and Spanish colonialism). Concomitantly, ever since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in the early 19th century, U.S. power in Latin America has remained simply too overwhelming for the development of truly healthy bilateral relationships. Make no mistake: Anti-Americanism lives on in Latin America. Do not dismiss it as a political force. The question is, what is its practical, functional effect?
For the moment, anti-American forces seem temporarily in retreat. The eventual passing of communist leader Fidel Castro in Cuba and anti-American populist Hugo Chavez in Venezuela will rob the Latin American left of highly symbolic poles of reference, especially since economic reality will eventually push both Havana and Caracas to moderate politically. And without Castro and Chavez as points of ideological orientation, leftist regimes in Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua will see their relative diplomatic strength weakened. Ecuadorean President Rafael Correa and Bolivian President Evo Morales will try to harness a particular Latin American-style populism in the service of retaining power -- that is, using the masses against the elite. And they may continue to succeed. But without the Cuban and Venezuelan leaders as charismatic lodestars, the populism of these two other countries will have less relevance in terms of hemispheric power struggles.
Brazil, the behemoth of South America, might be expected to lead a bloc of states presenting an alternative to U.S. leadership. To be sure, Brazil is a regional power, especially with Ecuador, Bolivia, and Venezuela joining the Brazilian-Argentinian trading bloc of Mercosur. But Brazil, despite all the trendy media reports, is nevertheless hampered by corruption, a weak judicial system and most important, falling economic growth (from 7.3 percent in 2010 to 1.03 percent in 2012), even as labor costs have gone up. The first generation of reforms that accounted for the Brazilian economic miracle must now be followed by a second generation. The challenges, therefore, for Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff are immense. For the moment, the United States does not feel really threatened by Brazil and in fact is quite comfortable with Brazil taking the lead on regional initiatives. Brazil's response to Washington is one of calculated cooperation.
Meanwhile, Argentina remains a self-contained mess. The country is strangled by economic distortions because President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner's government keeps interfering in the markets to keep the costs of natural gas, electricity and other goods low for consumers. Another currency crisis looms amid rising labor unrest and limited access to international capital markets.
But perhaps the biggest trend working against a dynamic resurgence of anti-Americanism is the formation of the Pacific Alliance by Mexico, Colombia, Peru, Chile and maybe even Panama and Costa Rica. These are all countries whose organizing philosophical principle is the championing of economics over political ideology, and thus they want to take advantage of free trade with Asian markets.
In sum, the hard-core Latin American left is not only weakened by the imminent passing of Castro and Chavez, but by the domestic distractions of Brazil and Argentina and by the heightened proximity of Asian business opportunities. Were the United States and Mexico to forge an alliance based on energy cooperation and immigration reform -- with American firms able to invest in the Mexican oil sector -- you might almost imagine a distinctly pro-American dynamic in Latin America, except for the fact that Mexico's political influence in the region is both curtailed and compromised by its very proximity to the United States. Simply put, Mexico is too deeply enmeshed in its relationship with the United States to exert profound influence elsewhere in the hemisphere.
In all of these developments, there is no strong hint of the kind of crisis -- or opportunity -- that would give an American president the incentive to really concentrate on Latin America. Growing trade with the southern part of the hemisphere is an issue for business forums and the Treasury and Commerce departments; not so much for the National Security Council or the State Department. The truth is that foreign policy is driven by extreme diplomatic and military crises of the level that Latin America simply does not often provide. Yet this is not bad news for Latin America, but rather good news. Syria, for example, is important -- but it's a disaster. Chile is not important -- but it's a relative success story. Importance and success can be mutually exclusive in many cases.
If you really want to see the ironic rise of Latin America, consider Mexico: In much of the country, particularly in the north, drug cartels operate and the violence drones on there. But Mexico had the world's 14th-largest economy in 2011 according to the World Bank, and may edge higher over the next decade, even as large countries in Europe like Spain and Italy sink further into the economic and social abyss. A decade from now, even with its drug violence, Mexico could boast high-speed rail service, and deep-water harbors on both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts linked by train. The dynamism you see in certain regions of Mexico like Queretaro are contrasted with the increasing decay and depressed atmosphere of an historically great city like Rome, the capital of a country mired in crisis.
To travel from Mexico to Europe is to see how the tectonic scales of power in the world are shifting, and how Europe is losing status compared to Latin America, even as the relationship between the United States and Latin America is becoming both more organic and subtle. Hard-core anti-Americanism in Latin America will not disappear, but it might well become less relevant. And as the United States becomes increasingly energy independent, it will have less incentive to be obsessed with the Middle East and may begin to rediscover its own hemisphere.
Read more: Evolving Latin America | Stratfor
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Hard core anti Americanism in Latin America is bogus. We love MacDonalds, Levi's, iPads, Disneyland, rap and all that jazz. What the writer is missing is that a charismatic leader can sway the masses. Pit Bush II against Chavez and Bush is bush league.
Latin America does have a propensity for populism and clientelism which keeps left of center parties in power most of the time but that is not anti Americanism. Out slogan is not "American go home, leave us alone" it's
American go home, leave us a loan
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This "anti-Americanism" idea is bogus. A lot of foreign visitors come to our marina. Many use it as a base to explore Venezuela. Then they write about their experiences and publish it on the web. I have collected their "cruising logs." Read for yourselves what visitors on the ground, not in some Washington think tank, have to say about it. I stopped collecting stories in 2008 because crime, unchecked by local law enforcement, has been on the rise thanks to Chavez's mismanagement and piss poor government. Some of you might recall how Rudy Giuliani cleaned up NYC. Were New Yorkers really different before and after Giuliani? Were 8 million New Yorkers crooks or was it just poor law enforcement prior to Giuliani?
What are sailors saying about Venezuela?
http://bahiaredonda.com/ip/cruising-logs-2008.php
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Correct me if I'm wrong. Crafty Dog was originally a New Yorker. Crafty Dog took up martial arts because he saw violence on the streets against helpless people due to poor law enforcement. Generalizing that New Yorkers are violent criminals is just as wrong as saying that Latin Americans are anti-American.
When STRAFOR sticks to geopolitics they do fine. When they stray to mass psychology they are talking a bunch of bull.
Talking about trading partners, when America outsources to China, is it a surprise that Latin American also trades more with China? Does that have to do with politics or with economics? Recently I have been seeing Chinese made cars and busses in Caracas. If a Chery is cheaper than a Chevy, what would you buy, all else being equal?
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Stratfor is sometimes quite glib when it drifts outside its lane.
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Good counterpoints made by CaptCCS (Denny S), on the scene. The term anti-American to me is mostly a reminder that people around the globe don't love us as much as we think they should. ) To generalize about either Latin Americans or about US Americans sets oneself up to be at least partly wrong. To the extent that there are bad feelings anywhere, I don't know what part is aimed at people with views like mine, at people like Obama with views opposite to mine, at Americans of the past who treated them badly or just resentment aimed at success or arrogance.
My reaction reading the piece was that it isn't about what they think of us, I just hope to see them heading their own countries and economies in a good direction - toward individual freedoms, economic freedoms, free trade and to join us in opposing those who would attack us.
Latin Americans are obviously divided too. In Venezuela, what we see simplistically is that the leader who verbally attacks the US the hardest and buddies up with our enemies like Ahmedinejad wins elections. In the US, the leader who opposed the US policies the strongest, war in Iraq, economic freedom etc., also won.
Stratfor's value is mostly to stimulate thinking since most US media has virtually no coverage of other regions or geopolitical forces. Correcting their errors is important.
Strat: "the importance of Latin America to the United States continues to climb. U.S. trade with Latin America -- both in terms of imports and exports -- has grown from 18.9 percent of America's total worldwide trade to 21.6 percent over the past decade. At the same time, however, the percentage of trade between the largest Latin American economies -- Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, Brazil and Argentina -- and the United States has decreased dramatically. For example, the United States accounted for nearly a quarter of Brazil's overall trade in 2002, but the figure was only 12.5 percent in 2011 -- a drop in half. And whereas three-quarters of Mexico's overall trade was with the United States in 2002, it went down to 64.2 percent in 2011. In other words, as Latin America becomes more important in economic terms to the United States, the United States becomes relatively less important to Latin America.
Denny S: "when America outsources to China, is it a surprise that Latin American also trades more with China?"
Good point! What we no longer build or build competitively, they will no longer buy from us. They are trading more with many places and that is a good sign. Our problems (U.S.) are internal.
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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SXYEG5o1-5Q&feature=player_embedded
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Legalize drugs and be done with it. Did America learn nothing from Prohibition? Guess not!
Denny Schlesinger
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Denny:
Check out our War on Drugs thread.
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http://upstart.bizjournals.com/news-markets/international-news/portfolio/2007/09/17/Chiquita-Death-Squads.html?page=all
The firm’s lawyers have struggled to explain publicly that Chiquita had to make a choice between “life and law” and that it chose the “humanitarian” route of protecting its workers. “This company was in a bad position dealing with bad guys,” says Eric Holder, a Washington attorney representing Chiquita. “There’s absolutely no suggestion of any personal gain here. It’s not a case like Tyco, where someone is squirreling money away. No one is out buying great shower curtains.”
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jun/23/state-department-downplays-iran-role-in-latin-amer/?page=2
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Summary
China's growing economic activity and diplomatic involvement in Central America show Beijing strengthening its ties with the region, despite the United States' historical dominance there. The current presence of the Chinese government and corporations is relatively small, and Chinese strategy in Central America does not immediately threaten U.S. economic and political power in those countries. In the long term, however, China intends to use steadily increasing trade and investment to obtain access to Central America's emerging markets and gain political allies.
Analysis
China's strategy in Latin America seeks to fulfill three principal interests: securing resources abroad to maintain domestic economic growth, encouraging nations to recognize China instead of Taiwan and opening new markets for Chinese goods. For example, these objectives define the Chinese relationship with Venezuela. China has invested billions of dollars in joint ventures for oil extraction and maintained political recognition from Venezuela, while its trade relations with that country have flourished.
Central America's relationship with China differs from this because of its relative resource scarcity and deeply rooted political and economic connections to the United States. This lack of energy or mineral resources has led Chinese firms and diplomats to focus more on bilateral trade and political recognition.
The favorable geographic characteristics of the narrow Central American isthmus separating the Pacific and Atlantic oceans also stoked interest from Chinese representatives, among others, in constructing an alternate transit route to the Panama Canal. A proposed canal in Nicaragua, which has been envisioned for more than a century, would connect Nicaragua's Caribbean and Pacific coasts. In June, the Nicaraguan legislature approved a $40 billion proposal by a Hong Kong-based company to construct it. The company's owner said construction would begin in 2014 and end in 2020. The planned canal would be 286 kilometers (178 miles) long and allow ships displacing 400,000 tons to pass. Private Chinese companies have also expressed interest in studying the feasibility of proposed railroads between the Caribbean and Pacific coasts of Honduras and Colombia as alternatives to shipping cargo through the Panama Canal.
Despite reports of China's involvement in significant infrastructure projects, recognition of China and expanded trade remain the dominant issues in its relationship with Central America. China increased its trade with the region and obtained political recognition from Costa Rica by providing states with public works and economic incentives. In 2007, for example, China incentivized Costa Rica to expel Taiwanese diplomats and recognize China by offering the country a $130 million aid package and purchasing $300 million in Costa Rican bonds. Central America's relative poverty and lack of infrastructure make recognition of China a lucrative decision for regional leaders seeking financial aid. China has also increased its economic presence in Central American states more than Taiwan has, with China's exports to all nations there outpacing those of Taiwan. Costa Rica remains the only regional country to date that recognizes China, but Honduras previously expressed interest in reversing its recognition of Taiwan.
The United States' historical control of the area remains a barrier to any significant inroads by the Chinese. Central America's proximity to the world's largest importing market and U.S. political and military interventions in the region have ensured U.S. dominance.
Central America's proximity to the strategically important Gulf of Mexico makes it critical for the United States to ensure that no foreign competitor dominates that region. Central America also has traditionally acted as a buffer between the United States and any threats. During the first half of the 20th century, the United States secured Central American countries against internal political instability by conducting frequent military interventions to end conflicts and install U.S.-allied governments. After World War II, both the United States and the Soviet Union vied for ideological and material influence in the region. The result of these American efforts was its uncontested dominance of Central America and sensitivity toward potential threats from the region.
This U.S. authority discourages significant Chinese involvement in Central America. Any Chinese investment in significant infrastructure works, such as the proposed Nicaragua canal, could raise long-term political concerns in Washington. The entrenched U.S. influence in Central American political and economic systems makes such ambitious Chinese interaction with those states unlikely. Central America remains a valuable zone for U.S. strategic interests, which means Chinese influence there will likely remain focused on economic issues and modest political gains.
Read more: China's Growing Presence in Central America | Stratfor
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El Salvador's Fragile Gang Truce and Threats to Regional Peace
Analysis
July 12, 2013 | 0515 Print Text Size
An 18th Street gang member takes part in an event to surrender weapons March 9 in El Salvador. (JOSE CABEZAS/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
A steadily increasing tempo of homicides throughout El Salvador in June and July could portend an end to a fragile truce between the country's two main criminal gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18. In the year after the cease-fire took effect in March 2012, the country's murder rate -- which was then the second highest in the world after Honduras -- was reportedly cut in half. The apparent success of the truce, which was backed by the Roman Catholic Church and the Organization of American States, encouraged the Guatemalan and Honduran governments to consider striking armistice deals with gangs in their countries in hopes of similarly reducing murder rates. However, the recent surge in Salvadoran gang violence may weaken support for such crime reduction initiatives. If the tenuous peace in El Salvador indeed collapses, a rare opportunity to reduce violent criminal activity may be lost in Central America.
Analysis
The recent increase in homicides in El Salvador was punctuated by a spike at the beginning of July, when 103 people were reportedly murdered in one week. There have also been indications that Salvadoran gangs may be preparing for a future conflict, with reports suggesting that some gang members have continued acquiring firearms during the truce for later use.
El Salvador
According to local media, the increased violence may stem from when, in late May, El Salvador's newly appointed security minister, Ricardo Perdomo, withdrew from imprisoned gang leaders certain privileges, such as the right to call news conferences, that were allegedly part of the peace deal. Raul Mijango, a former guerrilla and lawmaker who helped broker the truce, said the killings increased because the jailed leaders have lost control over lower-ranking members on the streets. Whatever caused the violence, it appears to have alarmed Salvadoran officials, with Salvadoran President Mauricio Funes summoning Mijango to an emergency meeting on July 4.
The Rise of Central America's Gangs
Though Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 are present throughout North and Central America, they do not operate as monolithic entities. The gangs are organized into regional cliques, each with control of their own territory, and only loosely connected at national and international levels through financial ties and cultural identifiers.
The two major gangs, along with several smaller criminal groups, have undermined security severely in Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras since the early 1990s, when Salvadoran immigrants who had founded the gangs in Los Angeles were deported. Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18 then swelled in size -- with combined membership reaching an estimated 27,000 members in El Salvador and 100,000 throughout Central America by 2011, according to Salvadoran police estimates -- and became involved in a range of criminal enterprises, including human trafficking, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and extortion. The subsequent rise in murders, and the gangs' control of entire urban neighborhoods, turned gang-related criminality into a major political challenge for Central American governments.
The Evolution of Mexico's Cartels
As small, resource-poor countries that historically have lacked strong institutions, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras were particularly affected, and the region's expanding role as a trafficking corridor for South American cocaine exacerbated their problems. The drug trade fueled dramatic rises in crime in each country, eroding the governments' control over large areas of territory and preventing them from providing even minimal levels of security to their citizens. Crime became a major domestic and foreign policy issue for regional leaders, and the alleged involvement of the gangs in international drug trafficking networks controlled by Mexican cartels has made Central American security a concern for the United States.
Negotiations and Challenges to Peace
In search of a viable way to stem the violence, El Salvador's ruling Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front became open to striking a deal with Mara Salvatrucha and Calle 18, despite misgivings from conservative political opponents. Mijango began negotiations with the alleged approval of former Security Minister David Munguia Payes in late 2011 or early 2012. In exchange for a promise to stop the killing, government representatives reportedly agreed to transfer high-ranking gang members out of a maximum-security prison and provide financial incentives, among other rumored concessions. While the exact details of agreements remain unclear, the government apparently made similar offers to both gangs.
The initial success of the cease-fire attracted attention from gangs and religious leaders in neighboring Honduras, where jailed gang leaders indicated their willingness to reach a similar deal with the government. The Organization of American States suggested recently that a peace agreement could be reached with Guatemalan gangs by the end of 2013. But the collapse of Salvadoran truce would endanger these initiatives and possibly deny regional governments a similar means of reducing violence, regardless of what has caused the recent wave of killings.
Government leaders in all three countries -- particularly those from conservative or opposition parties that typically oppose bargaining with criminal groups -- would likely undermine future peacemaking attempts, since such leaders would consider more truces politically risky and potentially expensive. The United States, which Central American governments rely on heavily for security funding, also does not support negotiations with the gangs.
Still, there is some hope that the decentralized leadership structures of the gangs will make them willing to negotiate even if the current truce fails. Since individual cliques often operate in isolation from one another, the end of the Salvadoran cease-fire would not necessarily impact the decisions of gang leaders in Honduras or Guatemala. The concessions that could be gained in the deal may prove tempting enough to keep such groups at the negotiating table.
Read more: El Salvador's Fragile Gang Truce and Threats to Regional Peace | Stratfor
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http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/15/chinese-tycoon-plans-to-rival-panama-canal-with-40/
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http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1880.0
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http://www.conservativeactionalerts.com/2013/11/whom-is-john-kerry-representing/
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Panama Canal Expansion: The Dangers of Long-Term Delays
Analysis
January 27, 2014 | 0518 Print Text Size
Summary
Significant delays to the Panama Canal expansion project are increasingly likely as negotiations between the multinational construction consortium, Spanish financiers and Panamanian authorities drag out. The Grupo Unidos Por el Canal consortium is threatening to stop work at the end of January after already extending the previous deadline past Jan. 20. According to the Panamanian Dispute Adjudication Board, which is arbitrating the negotiations over who will cover cost overruns, a work stoppage could mean that the canal will not be completed until as late as 2020.
Because the project has been delayed once already, from an estimated completion date of 2014 to mid-2015, a postponement of a year or so would be well within the bounds of previous setbacks. How long it is delayed now will be determined by several factors, including whether the project will need a new consortium of builders and financial backers; such decisions will be shaped by ongoing negotiations between the principal stakeholders. The duration of any holdup itself will be critical in determining whether the ongoing dispute is geopolitically significant. A delay of a year or less is unlikely to have major consequences. On the other hand, a five-year delay could strain regional ports and transportation infrastructure, particularly as the United States continues to emerge from its economic downturn.
Analysis
The expansion project will enable significantly larger bulk and container ships to pass through the canal. In essence, it will improve connectivity between Asia and the eastern coasts of North America and South America by making an all-water route accessible to a wider range of ships. The U.S. Gulf Coast and trade ports in the Caribbean stand to benefit the most from the increased shipping volumes of larger ships. East coast ports that have the capacity to handle new, larger Panamax ships will be in direct competition with west coast ports and interior transportation lines for trade traffic.
These effects will be seen regardless of the timeline of the project's completion, but depending on the length of the delay, different elements of infrastructure -- particularly port and railway industries -- and their associated companies will be affected in different ways.
Necessary Modifications
Ports in the Western Hemisphere are watching the ongoing negotiations with much anticipation. Ship designs are always changing to maximize efficiency, but at this point it appears that the canal improvements will permit ships that can carry up to three times as much containerized cargo as the current Panamax ships. The maximum bulk cargo weight of standard vessels is expected to increase by roughly 50 percent, to around 120,000 metric tons. This increased capacity will give ports the opportunity to handle greater cargo volumes and generate additional revenue.
But to be ready to do that, ports will have to be modified to receive the larger post-Panamax ships, requiring hundreds of millions of dollars worth of upgrades. New Panamax ships -- with significantly larger hulls and displacement -- draw much more water than current Panamax ships. This means that ports will need to have channels and berths at least 15 meters deep. For many locations, this will require significant dredging. This is particularly true of Gulf coast ports such as Houston, which tend to be relatively shallow, but even east coast ports will have to deepen their channels and berths. For example, the Port of New York and New Jersey began dredging key channels to depths of 15 meters in 2005. The New York and New Jersey Port Authority is also raising the Bayonne Bridge by 19.5 meters to allow enough air clearance for larger tankers entering the port. The project is taking place without disrupting traffic and is expected to cost $1.29 billion.
Other ports in the Western Hemisphere have already invested or are preparing to invest in the improvements necessary to receive increasingly large ships. These include Norfolk, Va., and Savannah, Ga.; Kingston, Jamaica; Cartagena and Buenaventura in Colombia; and Suape and Santos in Brazil. These are long-term investments designed to keep the ports relevant and competitive in a global climate in which ships are becoming larger each year, regardless of the status of the Panama Canal.
For the ports that are set to complete their expansions by the mid-2015 Panama Canal benchmark, the delay could mean a longer timeframe for recouping upgrade costs. But these are large infrastructure projects requiring enormous efforts and financing. As such, they are subject to their own delays, and a hold in the completion of the canal expansion may give some of these ports more breathing room and time to complete their own improvements before the canal upgrade affects regional trade dynamics. Longer delays to increased trade volume would likely create serious financial implications for a great number of ports.
A shorter delay, however, will provide a reprieve for west coast ports in North America that are likely to become slightly less competitive once high-volume all-water routes to the east coast become viable. This is a potential boon for inland railways that transport goods from west coast ports to east coast consumers, which could see higher-than-expected demand if the expansion is delayed. The prospect of the eventual completion of the canal would reduce incentives for substantial additional infrastructure investment, meaning that a long delay of five or more years would leave North America reliant upon existing infrastructure. As the U.S. continues to recover economically, additional imports could begin to seriously strain existing infrastructure at west coast ports and railways if the Panama route does not open. South American ports, for the most part, serve localized markets and are unlikely to see these kinds of distributed risks.
A longer delay to the canal becoming fully operational would also substantially impact liquefied natural gas exports from the Gulf Coast to Asian consumer markets. Whereas the current canal is too small for most liquefied natural gas tankers, the new canal dimensions are big enough to fit the majority of the tankers currently in operation. As a result of the boom in natural gas production in the United States, the first liquefied natural gas export facility at Sabine Pass, La., is expect to come online in 2016. The majority of the export contracts being signed by prospective liquefied natural gas exporters are with Asian countries. Therefore, being able to go through the Panama Canal would be substantially more efficient than having to go around the capes of South America or Africa. Expanded capacity at the Panama Canal will also be a boon for exporters of oil derivatives on the U.S. Gulf coast.
The investment boom in Western Hemispheric ports -- as a result of the planned expansion as well as the gradual enlargement of ships in the global fleet -- has introduced a multitude of variables that will affect the eventual outcomes of the canal. Every port in North America hopes to improve its competitiveness to secure a larger share of the anticipated uplift in maritime trade. The individual financial profiles of seaports will determine their resilience in the face of a delayed Panama Canal upgrade. Looking at the maritime distribution system as a whole, however, it becomes clear that while a short delay will have a limited impact globally, a long delay could put serious stress on existing North American infrastructure.
Read more: Panama Canal Expansion: The Dangers of Long-Term Delays | Stratfor
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IIRC, we used to own and manage a canal there.
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Colonialism is over. The French and the Brits used own Suez. For that matter England used to own a big chunk of North America as did the Russians, the French, the Spanish, and the Dutch,. If you want to go back to biblical times just look at present day Middle East. There needs to be a statute of limitation on absentee ownership.
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http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-strategy/201305-putins-quiet-play-for-latin-america
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Hat tip to CCS:
American "intrusion" is both welcome and not welcome, depending on what it is and depending on who minds and who does not mind. In any case, The US is losing LatAm with Obama's extreme "flexibility."
One day's Yahoo Latin-America headlines:
Japanese PM opens LatAm tour with Mexico energy deals
Chinese president ends regional tour in cradle of Cuban Revolution
Chinese leader signs accords, wraps up Cuba visit
Chinese president backs Cuba's economic reforms
China, Venezuela deepen economic ties during visit
Cuba hopes for more investment as Chinese president arrives
China, Russia leaders seek South American inroads
Chinese leader woos Latin America with deals
Brazil, China sign several trade, business deals
Russia set to reopen Soviet-era spy post on Cuba: source
China seeks to build railways in Brazil to ship out commodities
BRICS meet South American leaders after bank deal
Putin, Kirchner seek 'multipolarity' in Argentina visit
China's leader Xi departs for South America tour
Putin signs nuclear energy deal with Argentina
Putin in Argentina, building Russian ties
Putin in Cuba, Nicaragua to rekindle Latin America ties
BRICS to launch bank, tighten Latin America ties
Putin kicks off Latin America tour with Cuba stop
Putin pledges to help Cuba explore for offshore oil
Putin in Cuba to rekindle Latin America ties
http://news.yahoo.com/latin-america/
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AS we were reminded last summer when thousands of unaccompanied children showed up on our southwestern border, the security and prosperity of Central America are inextricably linked with our own.
The economies of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras remain bogged down as the rest of the Americas surge forward. Inadequate education, institutional corruption, rampant crime and a lack of investment are holding these countries back. Six million young Central Americans are to enter the labor force in the next decade. If opportunity isn’t there for them, the entire Western Hemisphere will feel the consequences.
Confronting these challenges requires nothing less than systemic change, which we in the United States have a direct interest in helping to bring about. Toward that end, on Monday, President Obama will request from Congress $1 billion to help Central America’s leaders make the difficult reforms and investments required to address the region’s interlocking security, governance and economic challenges. That is almost three times what we generally have provided to Central America.
Last summer, as our countries worked together to stem the dangerous surge in migration, the leaders of El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras asked for additional assistance to change the climate of endemic violence and poverty that has held them back. In June, I made it clear to these leaders that the United States was ready to support them — provided they took ownership of the problem. Mr. Obama drove home this point when the leaders visited Washington in July.
And they responded. Honduras signed an agreement with Transparency International to combat corruption. Guatemala has removed senior officials suspected of corruption and aiding human trafficking. El Salvador passed a law providing new protections for investors. Working with the Inter-American Development Bank, these three countries forged a joint plan for economic and political reforms, an alliance for prosperity.
These leaders acknowledge that an enormous effort is required. We have agreed to intensify our work together in three areas.
First, security makes everything else possible. We can help stabilize neighborhoods through community-based policing, and eradicate transnational criminal networks that have turned Central America into a hotbed for drug smuggling, human trafficking and financial crime. Some communities in Guatemala and El Salvador are already seeing the benefit of United States-sponsored programs on community policing, specialized police training and youth centers similar to Boys and Girls Clubs in the United States. As I learned in crafting the 1994 United States crime bill, these programs can reduce crime.
Second, good governance begets the jobs and investment that Central America needs. Today, court systems, government contracting and tax collection are not widely perceived as transparent and fair. These countries have among the lowest effective tax rates in the hemisphere. To attract the investments required for real and lasting progress, they must collect and manage revenues effectively and transparently.
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Third, there is not enough government money, even with assistance from the United States and the international community, to address the scale of the economic need. Central American economies can grow only by attracting international investment and making a more compelling case to their citizens to invest at home. That requires clear rules and regulations; protections for investors; courts that can be trusted to adjudicate disputes fairly; serious efforts to root out corruption; protections for intellectual property; and transparency to ensure that international assistance is spent accountably and effectively.
We are ready to work with international financial institutions and the private sector to help these countries train their young people, make it easier to start a business, and ensure that local enterprises get the most out of existing free trade agreements with the United States.
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Recent Comments
Roy M. Barbee
1 minute ago
These are noble intentions and necessary changes....but the cultures of corruption in government and military in these countries will take...
Harry
1 minute ago
About time - and this Jewish family encourages the billion dollars come from the aid to Israel. Obviously the Israelis don't need it or...
Vince Luschas
1 minute ago
We should link any and all aid to the region's progress equilizing wealth -- the wealth gap, according to an article in International...
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The challenges ahead are formidable. But if the political will exists, there is no reason Central America cannot become the next great success story of the Western Hemisphere.
The region has seen this sort of transformation before. In 1999, we initiated Plan Colombia to combat drug trafficking, grinding poverty and institutional corruption — combined with a vicious insurgency — that threatened to turn Colombia into a failed state. Fifteen years later, Colombia is a nation transformed. As one of the architects of Plan Colombia in the United States Senate, I saw that the key ingredient was political will on the ground. Colombia benefited from leaders who had the courage to make significant changes regarding security, governance and human rights. Elites agreed to pay higher taxes. The Colombian government cleaned up its courts, vetted its police force and reformed its rules of commerce to open up its economy. The United States invested $9 billion over the course of Plan Colombia, with $700 million the first year. But our figures show that Colombia outspent us four to one.
The cost of investing now in a secure and prosperous Central America is modest compared with the costs of letting violence and poverty fester.
Mr. Obama has asked me to lead this new effort. For the first time, we can envision and work toward having the Americas be overwhelmingly middle class, democratic and secure.
That is why we are asking Congress to work with us. Together, we can help Central America become an embodiment of the Western Hemisphere’s remarkable rise — not an exception to it.
Joseph R. Biden Jr. is the vice president of the United States.
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Summary
The idea of a canal across Nicaragua, easing transit flows between the Pacific and the Atlantic, is as old as the country itself. But despite numerous surveys and plans across the centuries, no Nicaraguan canal has ever been shown to be economically viable for the investors. The United States, European and numerous Asian countries and companies have explored both "wet" and "dry" canals — the latter utilize rail between ports on both sides of the isthmus.
Lately a Chinese businessman has been exploring the idea. His efforts have raised similar questions to previous attempts: Is a canal in Nicaragua economically sound, environmentally responsible or even necessary, particularly given the near completion of the widening of the Panama Canal? The answers are mixed and often depend who is doing the assessment and from what perspective. The man behind the attempt, Wang Jing, may no longer be sure of the answers himself.
Analysis
Questions aside, the Nicaraguan government has approved the plans and is promoting the construction and affiliated investment. As the man at the forefront of the operation, Wang is preparing not only to have the canal dug (and managed) but also to build the affiliated infrastructure — port expansion and telecommunications projects as well as tourism and real estate deals along the canal route. Money is already flowing, environmental studies are underway, Western public relations and accounting firms have been hired, and early assessments and visits are being made to determine the cost and difficulty of buying up land along the route, often meeting opposition from locals. All the while, the cost estimates for the canal construction continue to rise; they are currently at upward of $50 billion and by some estimates are likely to reach $100 billion.
Money spent upfront on surveys and even early moves to purchase land do not mean the canal will be completed, just as the economic and environmental obstacles do not necessarily mean the canal will stall out before completion. The world is littered with hero projects that, in retrospect, perhaps would have been better left unbuilt or at least proved more costly for their investors than anticipated. But the construction and plans have raised numerous questions about who is really behind the canal project.
The Investor
Wang Jing, chairman and CEO of the Hong Kong Nicaraguan Canal Development Group (HKND), which has the contract to build, develop and manage the Nicaraguan canal, is one of China's richest men, worth some $6.6 billion according to Forbes. He has been involved in telecommunications and mineral operations, though by most accounts he owes his fortune more to good luck and timing than through connections with Beijing.
Wang established HKND in August 2012, one month after the Nicaraguan government established its Grand Interoceanic Canal Authority, which paved the way for realistic investment into a canal project. A month after it was established, HKND had a memorandum of understanding with the Nicaraguan government to conduct the feasibility study for the canal project. In June 2013, the Nicaraguan legislature formally voted to approve the construction of the canal, and within days the contract was awarded to HKND.
Wang's involvement in the canal appears to stem from a meeting with the son of Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, whom he met with either in Nicaragua or Beijing. Wang was looking to expand his telecom business into Nicaragua as part of broader global expansion, and his company, Xinwei, acquired contracts in 2013, though there has been little work reported toward fulfillment of those contracts. Rather, amid discussions with Ortega's son, Wang became enamored with the opportunity for a Nicaraguan canal that, he hoped, would carry massive bulk cargo ships from Brazil to China — ships that were too big for the Panama Canal and, incidentally, were in some cases blocked from Chinese ports because of their size and Chinese concerns for maritime shipping competitiveness.
A Nicaraguan canal may make more sense for international traders than it does for its potential investors. Though most studies argue that investors are guaranteed to lose in the canal construction, if the canal is built and managed efficiently, it does offer complementary routes for trade between Asia and the East Coast of North America, something that could interest shipping companies given the perception of unreliability of United States' West Coast ports. It also could provide speedier passage of bulk cargoes from Latin America, particularly Brazil, to Asia (read China), and as a redundant route, may ease congestion in the Panama Canal.
But the canal itself is not the only prize. Wang's vision includes the expansion of Nicaraguan ports, the establishment of new tourism venues to rival nearby Costa Rica, and the creation of new free trade zones in Nicaragua to take advantage of its location for manufacturing and distribution. With China slowly losing its place as the primary source of international low-end manufacturing, a Chinese-backed free trade zone in Nicaragua could take advantage of regional low labor costs and the nearness to larger Mexican, South American and U.S. markets. Stratfor counts Nicaragua among our so-called Post-China 16 countries, those positioned to take advantage of the changes in global manufacturing supply chains. The canal fits with the desires of Nicaragua's president, but the add-ons are potentially the more significant prize for Wang and his fellow investors.
Wang has not had an easy time drawing in the financial backing that a project of this magnitude needs. Already he has spent by some estimates more than $5 billion of his own money as well as that of his family and friends, whom he solicited early to capitalize the project. Some major state-owned enterprises have steered clear of the project, including major Chinese shipping companies (COSCO for example already has a stake in the Panama Canal). But others, particularly construction companies looking for large projects overseas, have expressed interest or engaged in a partnership with HKND, and HKND is urging those companies to become partners, bringing with them their own financing. In this way, HKND can spread the cost and potentially still profit from a canal project that others before had determined would not turn a profit.
Interestingly, despite the obvious questions about Wang and Chinese involvement, the Chinese government does not seem to be involved directly. Wang has worked somewhat outside the normal channels of Chinese political networks, and Beijing has been cautious about the project from the start. Beijing has no formal diplomatic relations with Nicaragua; rather, Nicaragua is one of the few nations left that maintains formal recognition of Taiwan. In 2012, as news of the canal construction heated up, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce cautioned Chinese companies, noting the lack of diplomatic ties in addition to border issues between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Beijing is not interested at this time in drawing Nicaragua to alter diplomatic relations to the mainland, since that would undermine Beijing's management of the Taiwan issue.
Furthermore, though Beijing has backed many economic projects in Latin America and has special economic and political relations with countries such as Venezuela, Chinese leaders are cautious about engaging in a project that clearly appears to challenge U.S. interests in the region — particularly given the high cost and minimal rewards of the Nicaraguan canal. Wang himself purportedly tried to gain U.S. backing and investment through contact with former U.S. officials, but found little support. Publicly serving U.S. officials have actually raised concerns about the project, though primarily for environmental reasons.
One of the reasons the Chinese government was cautious was the belief that the canal project would not be viable without U.S. support, or at least without avoiding U.S. opposition. With Beijing facing difficulties at home regarding its overall economy and the parallel anti-corruption campaign and consolidation of power under President Xi Jinping, there is little appetite among China's leaders to pick a fight with the United States in its own backyard over a project that appears to bring little gain while being fraught with political risk.
According to some people familiar with the situation, Wang is now having second thoughts about the entire project as well. Having already thrown in some $5 billion, however, it would be difficult for Wang and HKND to back out. Without the more active backing of the Chinese government, or at least a surge in interest by potential partners, HKND is likely to find it increasingly difficult to raise the money for the canal project. Environmental opposition will probably grow and may draw in international organizations to support the local population. And this does not even consider some of the physical obstacles of such a massive undertaking.
The Nicaraguan government has based a lot of its future economic projections on the projects related to the canal construction and affiliated investments, and that is riding on Wang's company and his ability to raise the funds and support necessary to bring the project to completion. But by most accounts, Wang does not have the political or economic backing of Beijing, certainly not formally and perhaps not at all. Perhaps the attention will shift to the affiliated development — the ports, the free trade zones and the tourism facilities. But whether the entirety of the project itself is ultimately completed, the renewed attention to a Nicaraguan canal, and to Nicaragua itself, emphasizes the changes in international attention to areas of the world picking up as the next manufacturing hubs.
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http://www.businessinsider.com/conservative-mauricio-macri-elected-argentina-president-2015-11
Argentina's new conservative president is about to turn the country on its head
BUENOS AIRES — Conservative challenger Mauricio Macri turned Argentine politics on its head on Sunday, kicking the ruling Peronist movement out of power with a promise to liberalize the ailing economy and end a culture of divisive politics.
Macri, the son of an Italian-born construction magnate, won the election by tapping into frustration over anemic growth, high inflation, and corruption
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Also see: http://scottgrannis.blogspot.com/2015/11/congratulations-argentina.html
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Argentina used to be the leading economy in Latin America based on exports and industry until Peron and his wives ruined the country. Apparently economic sanity is returning to the country. Maybe to LatAm.
A morality tale in Argentina’s debt epiphany
A newly elected president is near a deal to end Argentina’s long debt woes. The country’s 15-year saga provides a lesson for a world awash in red ink.
Christian Science Monitor By the Monitor's Editorial Board
3 hours ago
One of the world’s longest sagas over a debt default may soon be coming to end. Argentina is nearing a final deal with foreign creditors – almost 15 years after it first defaulted on nearly $100 billion that it owed. A successful conclusion to the extended legal battle could offer a morality tale for a world awash in red ink.
What is the tale? It is that Argentines decided last year to elect a new president, Mauricio Macri, who, like a returned prodigal son, has quickly begun to shed many of the country’s profligate habits and plans to abide by the obligations of global financial rules.
“We have to be a predictable and trustworthy country,” he said. “Argentina wants to have a good relationship with the whole world.”
Largely cut off from world capital markets and foreign investments, Argentina’s economy has stagnated. Mr. Macri’s election was a turning point for the resource-rich South American nation, whose wealth per capita was once on par with Canada’s. While Argentina’s 43 million people have practical economic reasons to make good on the nation’s sovereign debts, the legal drama has also helped. Many of the creditors were able to convince a United States federal judge, Thomas Griesa, to impose tough restrictions on Argentina’s assets around the world.
It also helped that Judge Griesa labeled Argentina’s actions as “immoral.” In fact, Argentina’s snub of its creditors pushed the International Monetary Fund, which helps rescue countries in financial trouble, to stiffen its rules. “No More Argentinas” become a mantra at the IMF.
The issue of morality is often woven into today’s international struggles over debt collection or debt leniency. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the European Union has pushed Greece to curb its overspending and its lapsed tax collection before receiving loan bailouts. Greece is not alone in the EU. Many European banks remain saddled with nonperforming loans, which may total more than $1 trillion. And the official debts of Italy and Portugal are still at dangerous levels.
China could be dealing with the biggest case of moral hazard in financial obligations. The debt of its corporations, most of which are state-controlled, has risen to an estimated 140 percent of China’s gross domestic product. That is about double the debt-to-GDP ratio for US corporations. The possibility of massive debt defaults in China is a major reason for the global economic slowdown.
Argentina’s final solution to its debt may be unique but the uniqueness only shows that the legal and moral rules for debt resolution are not yet set in stone. The IMF has changed its rules in recent years as each financial crisis demands specific solutions. The IMF, for example, bent its rules to help Ukraine solve its debt woes despite the country’s apparent inability to pay. The action reflected the West’s concerns about Ukraine falling under Russian control.
This month, the IMF announced it had again reassessed its debt-rescue rules. This time the agency hoped to be able to send the proper signal to any country tempted to renege on debt obligations.
Debt is a necessary tool for individuals and countries to support each other. But it also is tied to virtues such as honor and respect. “There is a moral as well as a purely economic case for the global marketplace,” says Steven Weisman , author of a new book, “The Great Tradeoff: Confronting Moral Conflicts in the Era of Globalization.” To set rules for global commerce, he adds, requires the morality of global cooperation.
As Argentina returns to the fold of international credit markets, its story should elevate the search for the best legal – and moral – standards to honor debt obligation. It shouldn’t take a country some 15 years to figure out the right course.
http://news.yahoo.com/morality-tale-argentina-debt-epiphany-225837079--politics.html
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Not real impressed with some of this but FWIW here it is:
By Reva Bhalla
Washington seems to be hitting numerous walls these days when it comes to its foreign policy. How do you preserve European institutions when each member will logically put its interests ahead of the bloc in fighting migrant waves? How do you stem a migrant crisis when the dissolution of Sykes-Picot boundaries creates massive power vacuums for militants to fill? How do you enforce a lasting cease-fire in Syria when Russia is still holding out for concessions from the West on sanctions and Ukraine? How do you get Kiev to agree to recognize elections in eastern Ukraine when the government can barely stand on its own?
It may not be a coincidence that this whirlpool of seemingly zero-sum conflicts is centered on Eurasia, a part of the world where geography tends to do a poor job of keeping competitors from clashing in terrifically violent ways. The picture looks remarkably rosier, however, when Washington looks to its south.
Left-Wing Populism in Tatters
Even if the United States can't take much of the credit, Latin America seems to be sorting itself out quite nicely. Now on the verge of returning to international bond markets, Argentina is biting the bullet of painful economic restructuring. Brazil is willing to detain even the most grandfatherly and charismatic populist of his time in the name of fighting corruption. Colombia is in the final stages of making peace with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia after more than 50 years of armed conflict. And while Caracas is burning, pragmatic Cuba has excused itself from its Bolivarian alliance duties to make nice with the United States. From Caracas to La Paz to Quito to Managua, the pink tide of left-wing populism is in tatters.
We can see why U.S. President Barack Obama chose this geopolitical backdrop for his next trip abroad. Washington finally has room to maneuver again in a region where the raw economics, as opposed to the entrails of the CIA, has done most of the dirty work in phasing out all those problematic populists who long vexed U.S. policymakers and investors alike. By supporting anti-corruption bodies, an increasingly popular foreign policy tool in Washington's kit, the United States can more subtly influence the politics of the region over time while working to strengthen institutions.
The United States also has a more favorable climate this time around to temper paranoia over a perceived return of neoliberalism. China now follows the United States as the region's second-largest trading partner and has helped enable the creation of the New Development Bank to create financing alternatives for the developing world. U.S. economic imperialism is a lot harder to argue against when China forms such a large piece of the regional trade picture.
Even the International Monetary Fund, the very embodiment of the Washington Consensus prescription of reforms that offended the social consciousness of the region and fueled populism, has seen a bit of a Keynesian resurgence since the 2008 financial crisis. The IMF has been articulating a higher tolerance for spending, the need for closer examination of social costs and the use of a wider array of fiscal tools that can be tailored to countries grappling with recession. In short, the death of populism in Latin America does not simply equate to a return of draconian economic policy prescriptions drawn up in Washington.
Human rights naturally remain a sticky subject for the White House in dealing with this region. With two Cuban-Americans in the race for the Republican presidential nomination, we will hear plenty in the days leading up to Obama's Cuba visit on how the U.S. president is an apologist for brutal regimes and how the United States should be engaging only with a democratic Cuba. While we cannot expect the United States to lift the trade embargo on Cuba any time soon in the name of human rights, we also cannot expect a U.S. president to pass up the opportunity to knock the legs out from under Venezuela's Bolivarian alliance.
Cuba, Key to Venezuela
The Castros knew before anyone that the Venezuelan regime was imploding. Cuban intelligence became pervasive in Venezuela upon the invitation of former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who decided he was better off trusting his Bolivarian brothers in Cuba than his own generals at home to safeguard his regime. With that Cuban access came direct knowledge and handling of Chavez's health up until the point of his death three years ago. Cuba could see there was no viable replacement for Chavez who could effectively manage the years of economic rot that had built up and still maintain popular support, much less maintain the subsidies to poor neighboring islands in the name of Bolivarian solidarity. Moreover, Chavez had tolerated an elaborate web of armed groups, from the barrios to the prisons, to make it too costly for any one of his rivals to challenge him. With Chavez gone, the fractured security landscape in Venezuela would become a nightmare for anyone trying to oversee a transition.
Cuba needed to create options for itself, and needed to do so while it still held some leverage with Venezuela. Washington will want the best information it can get from Havana to try to shape what will likely be a tumultuous transition in Venezuela. In other words, Venezuela was the catalyst for what was arguably an overdue normalization between Havana and Washington.
We can expect Obama to discuss at length the challenge that lies ahead in Venezuela when he visits Cuba later this month. Venezuelans have tolerated economic chaos for years, but the country is nearing its breaking point. Severe food, water and electricity shortages are now gripping Caracas, the urban core that the state always tried to prioritize when it came to distributing basic supplies to avoid triggering unrest.
Venezuelan Transition Scenarios
Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro thus far has sought to avoid and neuter the opposition in the National Assembly, but this is a stalling strategy at best, and time is running out. For this deadlock to break before social unrest gets out of hand, Maduro's removal is the first step in any transition. Venezuelan Defense Minister Padrino Lopez will likely be one of several key figures involved in a potential intervention against Maduro, so long as he has the support of the military and the cooperation of certain segments of the opposition. Careful thought is being given to try to abide by the constitution and avoid the stigma of a junta to ensure support from Venezuela's neighbors and the West. Efforts will be made to draw support from Organization of American States and UNASUR to sanction a move against Maduro. The Vatican could also signal its support for a democratic transition in Venezuela at an opportune time to help enlist the support of the masses.
But much can still go wrong in a carefully orchestrated political transition. The military could use social unrest as a trigger to intervene against Maduro, though at the risk of sparking out-of-control protests. Chavistas on the chopping block, such as former National Assembly speaker Diosdado Cabello, will meanwhile try to leverage their clout with the National Guard and armed narco groups to negotiate an exit strategy as the threat of extradition to the United States hangs over their heads.
All parties, including Cuba and the United States, want to mitigate the security fallout as best as they can. That also means a great deal of responsibility will likely fall on the military, the only institution capable of managing what could be a highly volatile transition, even if that winds up compromising human rights. The timing of the transition is also critical: The military could use social unrest as justification for intervention, but it also cannot wait long enough for street protests to overwhelm the state. There is no guarantee of constitutional outcomes when desperation is spreading in the streets.
For all its unknowns, the Venezuelan crisis and its cascading effects in the region amount to a net positive for U.S. foreign policy. The transition will be messy and there is a long restructuring ahead, but this is not a process that Washington needs to drive itself, unlike the sticky web of conflicts it faces in Eurasia. Populist leaders have run out of economic steam and the politics are simply catching up across the region. Washington just needs to go along for the ride.
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Colombians stunned their government, the world and maybe even themselves Sunday when they voted to reject a government-negotiated peace settlement with the left-wing insurgency known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). There’s a lesson here about political leadership and public trust.
The polls had predicted an easy win for President Juan Manuel Santos, who has staked his presidency on negotiating an end to 50 years of FARC terrorism. Instead a passionate “no” campaign carried the day by some 55,000 votes. The result should mark the end of the Havana pact signed by the two sides in August.
Critics are blaming the defeat on former President Álvaro Uribe, who led the opposition after having done so much to defeat the FARC during his eight years in office. But the seeds of Sunday’s defeat were planted by his successor, Mr. Santos, and the way Mr. Santos conducted the negotiations and sold the agreement.
Mr. Santos spent five years negotiating in Havana, starting in secret and then extending deadline after deadline to accommodate escalating FARC demands. Making Raúl Castro a key player in the talks hardly reassured Colombians, nor did naming Cuba and Norway as guarantors of the accord and Venezuela and Chile as sponsors.
The final 297-page deal allowed FARC guerrillas to avoid justice for their crimes; they also were to receive unelected seats in Congress and control of 31 radio stations. Colombians live next to Venezuela and they know how radicals abused the privileges of democracy to take power in Caracas.
Mr. Santos told the BBC in December that in the plebiscite “the people can say ‘no we don’t like it’ and then there is no deal.’” Asked if that meant he would “just walk away” after a defeat, Mr. Santos said, “yes, because that’s the commitment I made since the very beginning.” He added: “But I am absolutely convinced that the overwhelming majority of Colombians will support me.”
Yet on Sunday evening a stunned Mr. Santos announced that he would send his negotiating team back to Havana the next day. “I won’t give up,” he said. This broken promise that the vote would be final is precisely why Colombians didn’t trust Mr. Santos and the FARC to implement and live up to a genuine peace. They fear that Mr. Santos wants a peace deal at any price, even putting at risk Colombia’s fragile democratic institutions.
The FARC says it won’t return to the battlefield for now, but Mr. Santos’s first obligation is to protect Colombians if the guerrillas do return to terrorism, kidnapping and other crimes-for-profit. They were likely to continue their drug-trafficking even if the peace deal had passed.
President Obama had also thrown U.S. prestige behind the Havana pact, partly to secure his detente with Cuba. The U.S. has responded to the defeat by saying it respects democracy, and if that’s true it will avoid pressuring Mr. Santos to make more concessions and offer to help Colombia if the FARC returns to its murderous ways.
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In country after country people don't trust the establishment, that's why you have Trump and Brexit and a rejection of a bad deal with FARC. Expect some upsets in the upcoming EU polls.
Politics is too important to leave to politicians.
Denny Schlesinger
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Just print more money... it isn't earned, is owned by everyone, backed by nothing, and should be distributed to all.
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-10-27/venezuela-throws-towel-hyperinflation-will-print-200x-higher-denominated-bills
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Just print more money... it isn't earned, is owned by everyone, backed by nothing, and should be distributed to all.
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-10-27/venezuela-throws-towel-hyperinflation-will-print-200x-higher-denominated-bills
Good thing that could never happen here.
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Just print more money... it isn't earned, is owned by everyone, backed by nothing, and should be distributed to all.
http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-10-27/venezuela-throws-towel-hyperinflation-will-print-200x-higher-denominated-bills
Good thing that could never happen here.
Quit it.... you're making me laugh when I'm trying to keep a straight face.
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You are in the presence of a true master of deadpan snark.
:-D
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"Immersed for ten years in an endless war against drugs, Cienfuegos publicly admitted "burnout" of his troops, ordered more troops before the immensity of the task and called for a legal framework to regulate their presence in the streets.
"There is burnout"; Obviously, we are working across the country, at all times, at all times; in the mountains, in the cities," General Cienfuegos, after inaugurating a seminar on National Defense.
http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2016/10/20/mexico/1476926996_750184.html?id_externo_rsoc=fbads_ep_mx_ejerc
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DDF:
Interesting implications there.
Please note there is a thread here for Mexico and on the Spanish language forum too. Please feel free to make good use of either or both.
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http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2016/12/spanish-military-report-islamic-terrorists-operate-raise-cash-latin-america-attack-u-s/?utm_source=SilverpopMailing&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Tipsheet%201-4-17%20%281%29&utm_content=
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:-D
Dear In Focus: Panama Reader,
I had been in Panama City for about a week when I found myself with a gun pointed at me. In the span of mere seconds, I went from casually walking down the street, minding my own business, to a strange man pointing an assault rifle at me in broad daylight. For me, a Canadian, it was rather perturbing.
It happened entirely by accident. The man didn’t know me, nor did I know him or his associates. All four of them were coalesced in a circle of an abandoned concrete shell of a building that was without walls. Each faced out with their guns’ sights scanning the front and back sidewalks. Two suitcases were on the ground in the middle of them. None of them wore a uniform that might explain why they were so heavily armed.
It was all over in a few short seconds, from the instant I saw them until I figured I was safely out of their sights. Other people walked by the building, seemingly unaware of the armed men, as they were partially hidden by a makeshift fence and two running SUVs, presumably theirs.
Who those men were (private security? undercover police? drug cartels?), why they were there, what was in the suitcases, and why they had their guns pointed on everyone who happened to be walking down that sidewalk that day, I won’t ever know.
After the incident, every time I walked past that house (it was unavoidably close to my apartment), I was focused on that abandoned building. A few months later, a taller fence was built around it, completely blocking off any view inside. Who knows what goes on inside that building now? It remains undeveloped, surrounded by the regular goings-on of the city. Maybe the armed men continue to use the building for their armed meetings. It’s no matter to me, I continue to walk by on a daily basis. Out of sight, out of mind.
Those guns were the first and last I’ve ever seen in Panama, other than those of police or armored-vehicle and bank guards. Sometimes I think I hear gunshots through my open window at night, but then I see the sparkle of fireworks over the city or a broken-down taxi backfiring down the block.
The first time I saw the Panamanian National Police with their guns I was a little intimidated, though. They were cruising around in their all black uniforms and visor helmets, two per motorbike, with the back rider clutching an assault rifle. I didn’t know they were police until the next day, when a friend filled me in. Again, for a Canadian, this level of armory for a simple street cop seems more than excessive—it’s almost fear inducing. Why should they need to be so well-armed? Is crime that bad? Is the street I’m on unsafe?
Given that Panama is one of the few countries in the world without a military, it’s understandable why these police—and, importantly, their weapons—are ominously displayed. It helps instill a sense of security in the general public. It probably also keeps overly ambitious revolutionary types in check.
Perhaps it’s simply due to my Canadian-ness, that the sight of a gun in public captures my attention. Even in my hometown of Saskatoon, repeatedly ranked as Canada’s most dangerous and murderous city (with rates close to U.S. national averages), firearms aren’t generally seen or heard of. Since that first instance in Panama, I haven’t seen or heard of guns much here in Panama either.
I’m a number guy, so I looked at some data to put it in perspective, and that helped put me at ease. While the murder rate in Panama is higher than in Canada (obviously, given Canada’s is one of the lowest on the world), it is much lower than in many U.S. cities.
I never felt unsafe on my recent visit to New Orleans, where the murder rate is higher than Panama’s national rate, so why should I feel unsafe in Panama? I shouldn’t. Especially given that the areas I tend to hang around in are some of Panama’s safest. And especially given that being a gringo tourist (i.e. someone with a lot of money) means the police have an extra eye toward my safety. The odds are ever in my favor.
Of course, shootings and robberies happen every day, all over the country, but that’s true many places. Crime doesn’t only happen in bad neighborhoods or to people crossed up with the wrong crowd. Walking down the street, sitting in a classroom, a church, a theater, or even opening your front door have all been instances of murders across Canada and the United States in recent years. Bad people exist, and bad things can happen to anyone, anywhere, anytime, even where you are—right now.
So never mind the guns, you probably won’t get shot in Panama... at least, no more than you would anywhere else.
Matt Chilliak
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https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-left-sets-honduras-on-fire-1512338216
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South America’s ‘Pink Tide’ in Transition
Mar 8, 2018
By Allison Fedirka
Leftist governments are staging a comeback in South America, right? The talk surrounding upcoming elections throughout the continent seems to suggest they are. Nostalgia for the days of economic prosperity in Brazil has lent credence to the notion that former president Luis Inacio Lula da Silva will run for president again. In Argentina, unpopular and painful economic reforms championed by President Mauricio Macri have breathed new life into rumors that citizens would prefer the populist policies of the previous administration. Other examples abound, but suffice it to say, the “pink tide” – South America’s peculiar brand of leftism – is in vogue again.
Or is it? It’s true that the left is alive and well. But the pink tide began to recede in 2015, and despite statements to the contrary, it’s still on its way out, not on its way in.
One Extreme to the Other
The pink tide came to be in the early 21st century. South America leaders mixed elements of populism and socialism into their governments. They lauded the working class, maintained a presence in many aspects of the daily lives of their subjects and regulated the economy. It was not a return to red communism; it was a paler shade of socialism. Hence the name pink tide.
The rise of the left was a result of two things: disillusionment with the ruling governments and higher commodity prices. The political climate of the time gave governments a mandate to more actively try to improve their citizens’ quality of life, renew economic activity and buck the country that so often told them what to do: the United States. Higher commodity prices gave these governments the money to fund large-scale social programs and spurred economic growth. With strong public and economic backing, leftist governments grew more popular, taking hold just about everywhere except Colombia.
But this newfound fervor would not last. Indeed, the political history of the past century suggests that countries tend to swing from one political extreme to the other. Policies that reflect whichever mode of government is in place are felt most acutely in economic management, and their economies depend largely on commodities.
Indeed, commodities – particularly metals, grains and more recently, oil – are the ties that bind South America to the rest of the world. In the 1920s, the region traded openly and primarily with the U.S. and Europe. Commodity prices tanked when the stock market crashed in 1929, and countries began to seek other ways to nurture their economies. World War II complicated things for these countries, since South America traditionally purchased finished manufactured goods from Europe and the U.S. With their industries going offline or reverting to the production of wartime materials, the region had limited access to manufactured goods, and what did arrive was extremely expensive.
It was during this time that countries of the region began to look inward for solutions. They subsequently adopted import substitution models to manage their economies. This model requires a strong hand to regulate the import of finished goods, provide production subsides to increase domestic consumption and devise other programs that facilitate the development of national industry. But the model never fully performed as advertised. Instead, it led to high government spending, debt and distorted markets. This continued into the heady days of the Cold War in the 1970s. Afraid that this would give communism a foothold in the Western Hemisphere, the United States countered leftist movements at nearly every turn, exiling, imprisoning or killing their members. The movements weakened accordingly.
By the time the Cold War ended in 1991, right-wing governments began to assume power throughout the region. Many South American economies had been in a precarious state. They were very far in debt, which they had trouble servicing, and in need of loans and investment. In what became known as the Washington Consensus, institutions such as the U.S. Treasury Department, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank encouraged and promoted the adoption of fiscal reforms, privatization, market deregulation and opening to trade and investment in exchange for loans and investments. They honored the end of the agreement, but they were ultimately unsuccessful in transforming their economies. The right-wing, U.S.-friendly governments soon fell out of favor.
Conditions were ripe for a return to the left, a return we now call the pink tide. The era lasted roughly 10 years, which, uncoincidentally, were years of high commodities prices. It ended near the end of 2015.
Transitions
After that, open-market, internationalist, reformist governments came to power in several countries with center-left governments – most notably Argentina, Brazil and Peru. The trend continued last year in Chile, where right-leaning former president Sebastian Pinera was re-elected for a second term.
Few countries have been able to withstand the swing to the right. In 2017, Ecuador elected as president Lenin Moreno, who had served as vice president under President Rafael Correa. Correa himself was a leftist, but Moreno has already distinguished himself from his predecessor. He inherited an economy in disarray after the collapse of oil prices, so he adopted new fiscal policies and a more pragmatic approach to managing the economy rather than continuing with hefty government spending and protectionism. He has also tried to align the economy with global markets by re-negotiating the country’s previously preferential oil contracts with China.
Bolivia held out a little longer than others, mostly because Bolivia’s economy managed to grow despite low commodity prices. Its primary commodity is natural gas – which accounts for about half the country’s exports – and the price of gas remained high when oil tanked in 2014. (It started to decline only toward the end of 2015.) The public didn’t start to turn against President Evo Morales until 2016. There had always been opposition to his rule, but the opposition gained a lot of momentum when Morales’ traditional allies in Venezuela and Brazil, preoccupied as they were with their own problems, were no longer strong enough to support him. The opposition held a referendum that banned Morales from seeking re-election in 2019, though the Supreme Court would not uphold the results. Protests subsequently broke out, and though Morales is still in power, the rising social discontent, the declining natural gas production and ideological isolation are challenging the government’s hold on power.
Then there is Venezuela, where government this month announced that presidential elections will be held in May, after the initial April 22 date was rejected by opposition parties. Mounting pressures are pushing the country toward some solution that involves the end of the current leftist regime headed by Nicolas Maduro. The most recent dialogue with the opposition has failed, and neighboring Colombia and Brazil have both beefed up border security to help prevent any more spillover of desperate populations moving to border towns and depleting supplies meant for the local populations. Later this month the government will also start the first phases of its cryptocurrency, designed to help circumvent the U.S. sanctions that are restricting the government’s (and the national oil company’s) ability to conduct business and to access imports and U.S. dollars. Colombia already wants to propose a financial recovery plan for Venezuela that would be in line with carefully opening and deregulating the economy. Meanwhile, the United States has not ruled out further oil sanctions against Venezuela.
At GPF, we are not in the business of predicting elections; we are in the business of predicting geopolitical trends. So while we can’t say exactly when Venezuela and Bolivia will succumb to the pressures that felled their neighbors, we can say that eventually they probably will. After all, political transitions do not happen overnight.
The post South America’s ‘Pink Tide’ in Transition appeared first on Geopolitical Futures.
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By Allison Fedirka
Media coverage of Central America has tended to focus on drug cartels, organized crime and migrants fleeing violence in their home countries. But this focus reflects as much the political climate in the United States as it does the actual threats emanating from the region. Since the end of the Cold War, Central America has been a region the U.S. could largely ignore, but as it comes into its own – establishing more stable, if still at times shaky, political institutions and trade partnerships – its ability to affect more formidable countries to its north is increasing. This situation, combined with the political climate in the U.S., could result in growing interest in Central America from outside players.
Cold War Battlefield
Central America’s importance to the global system has ebbed and flowed over time. Central American countries made their geopolitical debut at the turn of the 20th century. By this point the U.S. – having survived a civil war and won wars against Mexico and Spain – had secured its status as North America’s uncontested power. In practice, this meant the United States had the capability not only to keep foreign powers out of the Western Hemisphere but also to expand the perimeter of its influence. In Central America, the U.S. employed a variety of methods to do so, including military interventions, supporting independence movements, buying up major infrastructure and monopolizing national economies through private businesses. But the onset of World War I brought a decisive end to major U.S. intervention in the region (at least for the moment). The U.S. had more pressing threats elsewhere, and the dominance it had already established in Central America meant that it could take a more hands-off role. It left behind economies dominated by monopolies, largely uneducated labor forces and unreliable political institutions.
But with the beginning of the Cold War, Central America once again became a region the U.S. wanted to control. Central America’s proximity to the U.S. makes it an area of potential vulnerability for the United States. The Soviet Union realized this and tried to spread its political ideology there, turning the United States’ own backyard into a Cold War battlefield. The U.S. response ranged from direct intervention to indirect support for political coups. When the Cold War ended, Central America no longer posed a threat to the U.S., and thus Washington’s interest waned.
Today, Central American countries continue to struggle to integrate into the global system, much the same as the countries of Eastern Europe, another Cold War battleground. U.S. intervention in Central America during that era led to hostilities, including civil wars, that resulted in political and economic instability across the region. But like Eastern Europe, these countries entered into a period of reconstruction. This process has garnered less attention than the turmoil of the Cold War era because there was no competition between outside powers and the stakes therefore were much lower.
The region is still trying to recover from this strife and establish its own political systems, but progress is slow. As recently as 2009, Honduras experienced a coup, and notably not one that was engineered by the United States. More recently, a wave of protests following President Juan Orlando Hernandez’s second electoral win last November resulted in calls for a national dialogue to try to restore peace mediated by a third party. (The leading three candidates to act as moderators are former presidents of Mexico, Guatemala and Chile.) There has also been an increase in the production of coca, the plant from which cocaine is manufactured.
Costa Rica has seen an increase in drug trafficking, and there have been calls for the government to develop a national security agenda, which critics say is lacking. The newly elected Costa Rican government will likely struggle to govern once it takes office in May, having already had to reach across party lines for help. In El Salvador, security remains the primary challenge. The country never fully achieved peace and security after the end of its civil war, which the U.S. contributed to through its military support of the government. In the first quarter of 2018, homicides in El Salvador totaled 939, an increase of 14 percent compared to last year.
Hard to Ignore
But free from Cold War ideological divisions, the countries of the region are now able to re-evaluate their allegiances with external powers and form partnerships of their own accord. Honduras has started talks to join the Pacific Alliance, a Mexico-led Latin American trade bloc. Panama and Costa Rica are on their way to full membership in the group. Panama also recently signed a free trade agreement with China, and China’s overall share of Central American trade has been steadily rising in recent years. Guatemala and Mexico have increased border cooperation to deal with security threats.
Nicaragua is potentially the most dynamic country of the region. The government of Daniel Ortega, who has been president since 2007, has pushed populist policies roughly resembling those in Venezuela, Russia and China. Nicaragua has managed to pursue a leftist agenda despite being so close to the U.S. geographically because it has received strong political backing and, to a lesser degree, economic and security support from all three countries, which have in turn used their support for Nicaragua as an indirect way to defy the U.S. With Venezuela’s economy in free fall and Russia’s and China’s economies slowing down, Nicaragua will be forced to reconsider its allegiances.
These changes are compounded by two new trends in North America: growing violence from Mexican drug trafficking organizations and the rise of nationalism in the United States. These developments have led the U.S. to pay increasing attention to events in Central America. Washington recently deployed the National Guard to the Mexican border in response to a caravan of Central American migrants in Mexico headed for the border. The U.S. has also tried to stem the production and trade of drugs in the region. This response was the United States’ way of trying to limit the effects of rising violence from reaching its doorstep, using the least amount of effort possible while leaving the burden of having to actually manage the problem to Mexico.
But the most important threat facing the United States from this region is not immigration or drug trafficking but the fact that Central America is trying to shape its destiny on its own terms – not on U.S. terms. Central American countries are in the process of building political institutions, trade relationships and international partnerships that will shape their future for decades to come, and they’re doing so without the United States, for the first time in a long time. In some cases, this will lead to stronger ties with countries like Mexico. In others, it may give China or Russia a boost in the region. Washington’s interest in Central America is still far from what it was at its peak, but the U.S. will in the future see it as a region increasingly difficult to ignore.
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Its Breitbart, so read with cautious eye:
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2018/04/18/experts-iran-hezbollah-radicalized-thousands-latin-americans/
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Its Breitbart, so read with cautious eye:
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2018/04/18/experts-iran-hezbollah-radicalized-thousands-latin-americans/
Nothing new here, they've been doing this for decades.
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to tarnish Trump on the 4th. This "news" obviously held to be splashed across the sinister* wing media outlets:
https://www.yahoo.com/news/us-official-trump-pressed-aides-venezuela-invasion-044213413.html
I have news for the LWM. Venezuelan people could only pray for an US invasion now to help them . Was Panama better off with Noriega or Grenada with the Marxists in charge?
* Latin sinister is left
dexter is right
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I can easily imagine him wondering "Why not?" AND enjoying freaking people out with the question :-D
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I can easily imagine him wondering "Why not?" AND enjoying freaking people out with the question :-D
[Trump allegedly asking advisers about invading Venezuela.]
Even if the right answer is to sit back in our comfort and watch this human tragedy transpire, as leader of the free world, how do you not at least ask the question, what can we do?
Giving food and giving money [to the brutal, ruling kleptocrats] does not fix the problem. Maybe nothing else from the outside solves it either. I don't know.
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By Allison Fedirka
The United States’ current policy toward Central America is pretty simple: increase border security to stem uncontrolled migration flows and offload as much responsibility as it can to Mexico. It offers some Central American countries basic security cooperation when it has to, but otherwise, Washington prefers to keep its distance. If Nicaragua stays on its current course, distance may not be a luxury the U.S. can afford for much longer.
Sudden Descent
Given how quickly Nicaragua’s security situation deteriorated, it’s easy to have missed – or to have forgotten – how it got as bad as it is. And it’s bad: Nearly three months in, the protests and violence show no signs of abating. They began on April 18, when President Daniel Ortega moved forward with plans to increase the contributions of workers and employers into the beleaguered social security system. The International Monetary Fund has been warning the government in Managua for more than a year that its social security system is dangerously low on funds as a result of years of mismanagement. After the first few days of unrest, Ortega reversed course, but it was too late to put the lid back on. Anti-Ortega groups had already seized on the controversial reforms to spark nationwide, anti-government protests. Students and pensioners have been joined by business groups, Ortega’s political opponents and nongovernmental organizations, each promoting its own cause but united in their opposition to the government.
(click to enlarge)
The protesters haven’t accomplished their objective of ending the Ortega administration, but they have succeeded in sending the economy on a nosedive. Before the protests started, the IMF projected 4.3 percent economic growth for Nicaragua. The country’s central bank was more optimistic, forecasting growth of 4.5-5 percent for 2018. At the end of May, however, the central bank revised its projection down to 3-3.5 percent. On June 29, the bank’s president dropped expectations further, to just 1 percent growth. The bank also noted that foreign direct investment in the first quarter had fallen 27 percent year-on-year to a mere $322.3 million, and it revised projected unemployment to 6 percent from 3.7 percent to account for an estimated 85,000 lost jobs.
Those are the optimistic assessments. The Nicaraguan Foundation for Economic and Social Development released in June an updated assessment of the country’s economic losses in the event the protests continued. It concluded that 215,000 jobs had already been lost – 2.5 times the central bank’s estimate. It also reported that in the best-case scenario (i.e., the crisis gets resolved by the end of July), the Nicaraguan economy would still contract 0.3 percent this year, and economic losses would total approximately $637.9 million. In the worst-case scenario (i.e., the crisis continues throughout the end of the year), the study estimated that the economy would contract 5.6 percent and see up to $1.4 billion in losses.
All indications right now suggest that the protesters won’t back down, the government won’t resign and the economy will continue to deteriorate. Several attempts at dialogue have ended in failure. The protesters have called for early elections, but the opposition has not yet presented a viable alternative to Ortega – and on Saturday, Ortega ruled out elections anyway. With dialogue and democracy off the table, one of the only options that remains is force. Here, too, there is stalemate.
The government has unleashed paramilitary groups on the protesters, but the protesters have proved resilient. A political organization known as the Broad Front for Democracy called on the military to disarm the paramilitary forces, but those calls have been ignored and likely will continue to be. But neither will the military put its thumb on the scales to defend Ortega. The Nicaraguan military was professionalized during the 1990s and is legally bound to the country’s constitution, not its president. Ortega has tried to politicize the armed forces since taking office in 2007. He favored loyalists for promotions, increased the presidency’s authority over the military and allowed officers to hold executive branch posts. He also bought loyalty with pay raises – something made more difficult since then by government austerity measures. Nevertheless, the institution of the armed forces has held steady and has respected the boundaries when it comes to domestic affairs. So long as Ortega has paramilitary groups policing demonstrators, this arrangement works.
Containment
Nicaragua’s descent into chaos makes the population vulnerable to lawlessness, particularly gang activity and drug trafficking, and encourages mass migration. The U.S. has generally been able to overlook Nicaragua, focusing its attention instead on containing migration from the Northern Triangle countries: Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. These countries have poor economies, a high prevalence of gangs and complicated recent histories fraught with violence. Nicaragua has largely been an exception, with minimal drug trafficking and a budding basic manufacturing sector.
(click to enlarge)
Though there hasn’t yet been an exodus from Nicaragua, neighboring Costa Rica has observed an influx of refugees. Their numbers will only grow the longer the instability lasts. And Costa Rica – which is dealing with its own financial problems as well as an increase in drug trafficking through its territory – is in no position to handle a flood of refugees. It is a long-standing U.S. ally that relies heavily on the U.S. for security. It would expect Washington to provide some assistance should things get worse, and failure to do so would damage a critical U.S. relationship in the region.
Bilateral cooperation between the U.S. and Nicaragua has been minimal. The ideological differences are strong, and the U.S. doesn’t approve of the Ortega administration’s alliances with Cuba and Venezuela. Instead, the U.S. approach toward Ortega has been similar to its policy toward the Nicolas Maduro government in Venezuela. During his recent visit to Latin America, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence called on Central American countries to work to solve the problems in Nicaragua, and on July 5, the U.S. placed sanctions on three key Nicaraguan security and political officials. (This comes less than a month after a dozen opposition senators from Nicaragua asked President Donald Trump to apply sanctions on governing officials.)
These measures alone will not bring down the Ortega government, and that is fine with Washington. The U.S. does not want to devote an abundance of resources to deal with the issue. It understands the potential for Nicaragua to further exacerbate the problems the U.S. confronts when dealing with Central America. Washington will avoid any decisive action unless it’s absolutely forced to act. In the meantime, it will encourage regional actors to assume responsibility and will gradually apply diplomatic and economic pressure on the Ortega government. The most important element of U.S. strategy toward Nicaragua isn’t that the Ortega government is demolished – it’s that whatever happens is controlled.
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Walter Russell Mead
https://outline.com/jWkmbF
Things are not going well in the hemisphere. Good analysis.
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Highlights
Thousands of Honduran migrants planning to request asylum at the U.S.-Mexico border will put the Honduran government in a difficult political situation with the White House.
The Honduran political opposition may continue encouraging migrant groups to emigrate northward as a political tool to pressure the administration of Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez.
The White House will keep threatening to cut foreign assistance to Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. However, the power to reduce or eliminate assistance rests with Congress, which will be reluctant to do so.
Even if Congress agrees to major reductions in foreign aid, such a move could backfire for the Trump administration by spurring Central American governments to cozy up to China diplomatically in search of foreign assistance.
An estimated 7,000 Central American migrants making their way through Mexico toward the United States have become a prominent headline in the daily news cycle. The Central Americans intend to request asylum when they finally reach the U.S. border with Mexico, most likely in Texas' Rio Grande Valley. In response, U.S. President Donald Trump has threatened to cut assistance to Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador, the three countries where most of the migrants come from.
The Big Picture
A majority of immigrants caught trying to illegally cross the U.S.-Mexico border come from Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. Now, a group of thousands of mostly Honduran migrants hope to cross Mexico to request asylum in the United States. This public show of mass migration is fodder for daily political rhetoric in the United States and Central America, but its significance goes beyond the immediate U.S. debate over immigration. Latin American countries could easily be drawn into the broader confrontation between China and Washington over trade, military competition and global influence.
See Crossing Borders
With U.S. midterm congressional elections less than two weeks away, it's no surprise that Trump, who made securing the U.S.-Mexico border a central part of his administration, has seized on the migrant caravan to rally his political base. But the caravan's significance stretches beyond Trump's desire to shore up electoral support or his administration's attempts to reduce illegal immigration and the number of asylum claims in the United States. The caravan is a product of the unstable internal politics and poverty in Honduras, where the majority of the migrants originated. Former left-wing Honduran legislator Bartolo Fuentes is a key organizer of the caravan, which has led to unverified claims that the Honduran leftist opposition led by former President Manuel Zelaya is behind the effort to encourage such public displays of emigration to the United States.
Migration as a Political Tool
The claim that Honduran opposition figures helped promote migration to the United States may be unverified but it is plausible. Since the country's contested election in November 2017, the opposition in Honduras remains divided between the leftist Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) and the more moderate Liberal Party of Honduras. However, Libre politicians may have discovered that emigration can be used to force a crisis with Washington to put pressure on the government of President Juan Orlando Hernandez. The movement of migrants through Mexico will also test the Mexican government's relationship with Washington, particularly if the White House feels Mexico's security forces are not doing enough to block or disperse the group.
The economic and social conditions in Honduras make emigration to the United States — almost always illegally — seem a viable path to economic advancement and an escape from security threats. About 65 percent of Hondurans live below their country's poverty line. The minimum wage is around $370 a month, but nearly half the working-age population is not employed by legally established, tax-paying businesses and often does not make minimum wage. High crime spurred by endemic drug trafficking and gang turf wars also makes daily activities, such as travel to work, risky for some Hondurans. In rural areas, drought conditions can drive food scarcity and extreme poverty, both of which are currently on the rise and may be further exacerbated by a forecast El Nino year. Similar conditions prevail in Guatemala and El Salvador, the other two countries where caravan members originated.
Regardless of whether Fuentes and Zelaya coordinated this effort, the caravan presents a thorny political problem for the Honduran government, and other caravans could form and leave from the country. Hernandez cannot easily crack down on migrant caravans without inviting public discontent against his government. Trying to stop migrant caravans on roads heading west toward Guatemala risks violent confrontations with the migrants, which in turn would likely affect the government's approval ratings. The Hernandez government may increase border security, but such moves may not prevent people from taking secondary routes.
A graphic showing the number of people detained or turned away at the U.S.-Mexico border.
Threatening to Cut Foreign Assistance
Regardless of the constraints on the Hernandez administration, the public nature of migrant caravans makes them a prominent political issue for the Trump administration. However, Trump faces his own political constraints. Lack of congressional funding thus far has thwarted the president's plans to erect extensive physical barriers where migrants frequently cross. Nor has the White House been able to get significantly greater funding for immigration enforcement measures, such as the hiring of thousands of new Customs and Border Protection and Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents. Trump's election created uncertainty among would-be migrants and their smugglers in late 2016 and into 2017, leading to a temporary lull in migration. But that uncertainty dissipated as the constraints to Trump's border enforcement plans have increased, and migrant flows are again on the rise. Still, illegal migration into the United States is well below its historic highs of nearly 20 years ago, when authorities detained about 1.6 million Mexicans at the southern border alone.
A chart showing U.S.-Central American economic ties.
Threatening to cut off foreign assistance to Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador is one tool Trump will keep using to try to force Central American governments to curb illegal migration. But temporarily or permanently reducing foreign assistance to Central American nations also requires congressional approval, without which there is little the White House can do to make Trump's threats stick. Congress and government agencies such as the Department of Defense and the Drug Enforcement Administration would be reluctant to agree to such a policy change out of concern it would harm counternarcotics cooperation with Central American governments.
Cutting U.S. assistance to Central America would risk unintended consequences. It could spur Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador to seek more aid from China, where assistance would come with fewer political strings attached. Such a turn toward China most likely would be preceded by Honduras and Guatemala ending their diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. The White House confrontation with China over trade, military competition and political influence affects Central America as well, where the U.S. government has tried to pressure Honduras and Guatemala to continue to recognize Taiwan. But El Salvador already has revoked its recognition of Taiwan in favor of China. In September, the Hernandez insinuated that reduced U.S. foreign assistance could prompt Honduras to change its recognition of Taiwan.
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What We’re Reading: Uprisings in Central America, Life During Wartime
Weekly reviews of what’s on our bookshelves.
What We're Reading
GPF Staff |November 13, 2018
Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central America
By Walter LaFeber
George Washington was elected president of the United States in 1789, but it would be more than 100 years before a sitting U.S. head of state ventured outside his country’s borders for a diplomatic visit. That it was Teddy Roosevelt should come as no surprise, given his carefully curated reputation as a khaki-clad Man of the World. Also unsurprising was his destination. He could have gone to the United Kingdom, a country with which the U.S. had tangled diplomatically, and sometimes martially, ever since it gained independence. He could have gone to Spain, against which the United States had just won a war that we now know paved the way for U.S. dominance for decades to come. He could have gone to visit any great power, but he didn’t. He went to Panama – to observe the progress of the Panama Canal, a symbol of U.S. geopolitical power and, in time, a major contributor to it.
Roosevelt’s stewardship of the Panama Canal is well-known. But the U.S. was interested in the region, and in the prospects of an isthmian canal there, long before he became president. Thomas Jefferson wrote about the importance of Central America as early as the 1780s. He considered it a natural extension of the new American domain, the southern reach of what expansionists in the U.S. would later call Manifest Destiny.
If you’re a Founding Father, the sense of ownership is somewhat natural. As Walter LaFeber writes in “Inevitable Revolutions,” his excellent account of U.S.-Central American affairs, Washington, D.C., is closer to El Salvador than it is to San Francisco. Early leaders understood how the region could unlock their country’s trade potential. And, indeed, by the 1980s, when the book was first published, more than “two-thirds of all U.S. trade and the nation’s oil imports, as well as many strategic minerals, depend[ed] on the Caribbean sea lanes bordered by the five Central American nations.” (Such strategic considerations also touch on the United States’ obsession with Cuba.)
Which is to say that the canal’s construction was not the reason the U.S. was interested in Central America, or why it became powerful there. Its interest and subsequent power there were the reasons the canal was built.
There’s plenty more to say about U.S. interests beyond the canal – in fact, LaFeber doesn’t dwell on the canal for very long – but focusing solely on those ignores the moral context of the region’s modern history. And here is where LaFeber excels. Because U.S. leaders identified the strategic value of Central America early, the region became an early target of Washington’s imperial ambitions. First came the Monroe Doctrine, which, however toothless it was initially, laid the foundation for subsequent policies with much more bite. The Roosevelt Corollary, Taft’s dollar diplomacy, Wilson’s declaration on Latin America, the Good Neighbor Policy – all of them, each in its unique way, armored U.S. interests against Central American interests. It was a zero-sum game that the U.S. never really lost, some notable setbacks notwithstanding.
Through these policies, the United States tethered Central American nations to its own prerogatives. Once Washington solidified its position over the British and Germans, these countries became single-crop agrarian economies that depended almost entirely on U.S. markets. They received loans from Wall Street and Washington and from no one else. They imported most of their food from the U.S. And when anything compromised U.S. interests – for example, a leader, democratically elected or otherwise, who wanted to tip the scales away from the oligarchs who were the instruments of Washington’s policies – the U.S. would support insurrections against the usurper or simply intervene. As time went on, Washington preferred the former over the latter, but as LaFeber notes, between 1898 and 1920, U.S. Marines entered the Caribbean region no fewer than 20 times. (This is to say nothing of U.S. activity during the Cold War.)
The case of Honduras was especially instructive. In LaFeber’s words, the country was “less a nation than a customs house surrounded by adventurers.” Northern Honduras was effectively annexed to foreign corporate interests. Enterprising banana companies arrived around 1900, bought up the best tracts of land, built their own railroads, established their own banking systems and capitalized on the corruption of local government officials. The owners declined to share with the rest of Honduras the fruits of their prosperity.
After so many similar situations played out throughout the region, it’s little wonder that LaFeber regards the revolutions that ensued as inevitable. He writes: “Unable to deal with the products of its own system, reconcile the contradiction between its professed ideals and its century-old foreign policy, or work with other nations to resolve these dilemmas, the United States … has resorted to force.” Students of geopolitics know that the use of force often begets more force. Uprisings, then, were not incidental to the system that created and governed Central America; they were a consequence of it. The system was instrumental in making the United States the power it is today. Yet that power came at a cost – not just to the Central American nations that suffered the system, but also to the superpower that still has to deal with its repercussions.
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https://thehill.com/policy/international/418096-former-reagan-secretary-of-state-says-us-should-work-to-end-violence
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New twist on old theory "
legalize drugs and remove the criminal profit motive
and viola cartels are gone
The new twist is his proposition that this will reduce or stop the illegals walking over here. Actually may make it worse,
The cartels will find other ways to make money and send over more people
And what about all the people flooding here from nations elsewhere? Like Asian Caribbean, Middle East Africa and Europeans who are coming here by the millions.
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I've always had tremendous respect for George Schultz, a truly fine American of deep and broad experience; I'm always glad to hear from him.
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I've always had tremendous respect for George Schultz, a truly fine American of deep and broad experience; I'm always glad to hear from him.
Agree. He was there in Reykjavik when Reagan stood up to the Soviet Union, but I don't know what to make of his suggestion here. I am fine with drug decriminalization but I don't know what that solves.
If you legalize or decriminalize personal use but not mass distribution, aren't you monetizing the supply gangs? If you legalize everything, what happens to the pharmacy industry? Heroin and meth become street legal but Lipitor and Plavex stay under medical industry embargo?
We face choices as a society. With the liberty to do anything comes the burden to take responsibility for the costs of our actions. Conversely, as we move toward public healthcare, we move away from the freedom of take personal risks. I like liberty with personal responsibility but as a society we are headed swiftly in the other direction. Are we seriously going to ban soda but legalize cocaine?
Check with G M but I don't think marijuana legalization made organized crime disappear. And there was no real legalization, never is. The consumer level pot industry moved to the government directed sector. Drugs not legalized, sales greater than what is allowed and the transactions outside of the tax system are all still criminal activities - the domain of organized, national and international gangs.
Drug demand in the US is not going down. To take the money out of Latin American drug crime we would have to make the domestic supply of previously illegal drugs cheap, plentiful and easy to buy. Think opioid crisis. That is not what the public wants nor the direction we are headed so it will not be an easy answer for Latin America.
The answer for Latin America (IMHO) comes from concepts like George Gilder's 'Wealth and Poverty' and the Heritage Freedom index. The illegal drug trade dominates an economy when real economic opportunities are missing. Poverty is the lack of wealth, not something of itself. You can only study poverty by studying wealth and seeing which of its foundations are missing. Every year the Heritage Foundation studies and ranks the countries around the world for economic freedom and every year these countries come up lacking.
Heritage Freedom Index, Country Rankings:
73. Guatemala
75. El Slavador
94. Honduras
https://www.heritage.org/index/ranking
They don't want our advice. They don't want our economic system. But they want to come here and bring with them the failure they fled. There are at least 72 countries where they could go for ideas to improvement their economic freedom and standard of living.
Here's one.
Chile is ranked 20th in economic freedom, per capita income = US$24,000
Honduras is ranked 94th, per capita income = US$ 4,600. The correlation is undeniable up and down the list.
How about we export economic freedom instead of legalizing human destruction.
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https://www.elpasotimes.com/story/news/crime/2016/08/07/human-trafficking-among-mexicos-lucrative-crimes/88270930/
Human trafficking among Mexico's lucrative crimes
Lorena Figueroa, El Paso Times Published 4:28 p.m. MT Aug. 7, 2016 | Updated 11:13 p.m. MT Aug. 7, 2016
JUAREZ — After drug trafficking, human trafficking in México is the illicit activity that generates the most money for criminal groups, according to a high-ranked official of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.
“It gives organized crime more revenue than human smuggling and gun trafficking,” said Mariana Alegret Cendejas, regional officer of International Cooperation of the UNODC, at a conference designed to prevent and combat human trafficking.
Considered a form of modern slavery, human trafficking involves the use of force, fraud or coercion to obtain some type of labor, involuntary servitude or commercial sex. It differs from human smuggling, which centers on the illegal importation of people into a country, officials said.
Mexican and U.S. officials, as well as representatives from area organizations, gathered in Juárez last week to learn about human trafficking and share information on how to fight it. The week-long conference was organized by the Inter-institutional Committee against Human Trafficking, which comprises representatives from the three levels of government and nonprofit groups.
Human trafficking generates more than $2.4 billion in revenues worldwide, Alegret Cendejas said, citing findings from the Global Report on Trafficking in Person 2014, the most recent report the UNODC has published. The report, released every two years, is based on the findings of 128 countries, including Mexico.
Alegret Cendejas said she did not have specific numbers for México.
However, it is estimated that human trafficking earns criminal groups about $42 million every year, according to a recent news report by Excelsior, a national Mexican newspaper.
The vast majority of human trafficking survivors are Mexican nationals, according to the report. Figures show that 352 of the 755 victims reported between 2010-13 were from Mexico. The rest of the victims were from countries from Central America, Western Europe, South and Eastern Asia, Alegret Cendejas said.
“In Mexico, domestic human trafficking is more prevalent because it mostly happens within the victims’ close circles,” she explained.
According to the report, a growing trend is forced labor, which experts said is difficult to identify and report despite accounting for 48 percent of all human trafficking cases in Mexico.
Forced labor is mostly seen in farms, construction sites, and mining and manufacturing plants, Alegret Cenejdas said.
Another trend that is growing at “alarming rates” is the number of children trafficked, she said.
In 2013, there were 107 children reported as victims of trafficking, compared to 51 in 2010, according to the report. More than half of those children were girls.
“Children who have access to Internet are the most vulnerable to fall victims of trafficking, aside from the indigenous, disabled and returned migrants,” Alegret Cendejas said.
She said that children are easily lured to become domestic servants or sexual slaves. Young girls, for example, are commonly persuaded by boyfriends to get into the world of commercial sex, she added.
Alegret Cendejas urged the Mexican government to implement policies to protect vulnerable groups from human trafficking through campaigns directed to each particular group.
Meanwhile, UNODC is working with Mexico to create an awareness campaign, expected to be launched in early 2017, she said.
The agency is also working with Mexican law enforcement agencies to give them more tools to fight human trafficking.
Mexico is one of the few countries that has a federal anti-trafficking law. The law prohibits all forms of human trafficking, prescribing penalties of up to 30 years.
“The result of this law has been a better understanding of the problem and an increase in reported human trafficking cases,” Wilfrido Campbell Saavedra, head of the National Institute of Migration in Chihuahua, said in a previous interview. The institute coordinates the committee that organized the conference.
He said there have been only 19 convictions in the state of Chihuahua since 2004. There have been no convictions in new cases or arrests so far in 2016, he added.
In Mexico, 86 traffickers were convicted, including some for forced labor, in 2015, according to the U.S. Department of State's Trafficking in Persons 2016 report.
They received sentences ranging from 15 to 58 years in prison, the report said, which was based on news reports.
That number, however, is only a fraction of the 578 individuals prosecuted in 2015 in Mexico, the report said.
A factor behind the low rate of human-trafficking arrests and convictions is the complex relationship between a victim and the perpetrator, which can hamper the victim's ability to seek help, officials said.
Lorena Figueroa may be reached at 546-6129; lfigueroa@elpasotimes.com; @LFigueroaEPT on Twitter.
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Legalize it to break up the gangs?
No.
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Honduran President’s Brother Charged for Trafficking Tons of Drugs with Help of National Police & Politicians
As the migrant caravan that originated in Honduras treks north, the brother of that country’s president—a former lawmaker in the Central American nation—has been arrested and indicted in the U.S. on drug and weapons charges. His name is Juan Antonio Hernandez and he is the younger brother of Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez, who has blamed leftist interests for manipulating migrants to destabilize the country.
The younger Hernandez is a former member of the National Congress of Honduras and the feds say he’s a bigtime drug trafficker who has moved tons of cocaine through the region in the last decade with the help of Honduran politicians and law enforcement officials.
A few days ago, Hernandez was arrested in Miami, Florida and this week he was charged in federal court with conspiring to import cocaine into the United States, weapons offenses involving the use and possession of machine guns and destructive devices and making false statements to federal agents.
The case is being tried in a Manhattan, New York federal court and has been assigned to U.S. District Judge P. Kevin Castel, a George W. Bush appointee, according to a statement issued by the Justice Department. Manhattan’s top federal prosecutor says Hernandez was involved in all stages of trafficking multi tons of U.S.-bound cocaine through Honduras. The president’s younger sibling also arranged machine gun toting security for cocaine shipments, bribed law enforcement officials for sensitive information to protect drug shipments and solicited large bribes from major drug traffickers.
The former Honduran legislator and his criminal associates teamed up with some of the world’s deadliest transitional criminal networks in Mexico and Colombia, according to federal authorities, to flood American streets with illicit drugs.
“From at least in or about 2004, up to and including in or about 2016, multiple drug-trafficking organizations in Honduras and elsewhere worked together, and with support from certain prominent public and private individuals, including Honduran politicians and law enforcement officials, to receive multi-ton loads of cocaine sent to Honduras from, among other places, Colombia via air and maritime routes, and to transport the drugs westward in Honduras toward the border with Guatemala and eventually to the United States,” according to the federal indictment. “For protection from official interference, and in order to facilitate the safe passage through Honduras of multi-hundred-kilogram loads of cocaine, drug traffickers paid bribes to public officials, including certain members of the National Congress of Honduras.”
Not only did Hernandez work with large-scale drug traffickers in Colombia, Honduras and Mexico to import cocaine into the U.S., he was also involved in processing, receiving, transporting, and distributing multi-ton loads of cocaine that arrived in Honduras via planes, go-fast vessels and a submarine. He also had access to cocaine laboratories in Honduras and Colombia, where some of the drug was stamped with his initials.
“Hernandez also coordinated and, at times, participated in providing heavily armed security for cocaine shipments transported within Honduras, including by members of the Honduran National Police and drug traffickers armed with, among other weapons, machineguns,” the indictment states. The feds include a specific incident in which Hernandez and his drug trafficking cohorts collaborated with Honduran law enforcement and government entities.
This case helps illustrates the dire security issues created by crime infestation and rampant drug trafficking in Central America at a time when thousands of migrants from that region are demanding asylum in the U.S. Judicial Watch traveled to the Guatemalan-Honduran border to cover the caravan when it first left the northern Honduran city of San Pedro Sula. Besides gang members and mobs of young angry men, the caravan consisted of Africans, Bangladeshis, Sri Lankans and Indians.
Guatemalan officials confirmed that the “elaborately planned” movement is benefiting human smugglers and bringing disturbing numbers of violent gang members and other criminal elements through the country, into Mexico and possibly the U.S. One high-level Guatemalan government operative told Judicial Watch “MS-13 gang members have been detained and coyotes (human smugglers) are joining the march with clients who pay to get smuggled into the United States.”
With evidence from federal authorities that Honduran government and law enforcement officials are complicit in a major drug trafficking operation run by the president’s own brother, there’s no telling the level of criminals making their way north in the caravan.
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Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World
By Peter Chapman
When we define geopolitics, we love to say it’s the study of people in place. Is that pretentious? A little. Reductive? Sure. Vague? Absolutely. But it’s probably as good a rendition as you’ll find of a discipline that defies strict categorization. Today, “people in place” has come to mean the nation-state, though by now we all know that it’s not such a simple matter, that nations don’t always fit into one category. Borders are arbitrary, communities are imagined, and nonstate actors – whether they’re stateless nations such as the Kurds or transnational jihadists such as the Islamic State – compel and constrain behavior just as much as nation-states do. And while we don’t ordinarily think of businesses in the same way, “Bananas: How the United Fruit Company Shaped the World” suggests that maybe we should.
Its author, Peter Chapman, who writes for the Financial Times, does well to explain the history of bananas and the banana trade, and in doing so, he gives this peculiar fruit the same treatment Mark Kurlansky gave salt, albeit on a much smaller scale. Make no mistake – this book is about one company, the men who built it and, to a lesser degree, the people who lived in its shadow. As Chapman notes, comparisons are inevitably drawn between United Fruit and the British East India Company, which, on the lawless seas of the 1700s, became a profiteering racket in all but name. United Fruit, after all, had its own fleet, and it had effectively created its own empire in the less-governed areas of Central America into which U.S. political influence couldn’t always reach. But Chapman suggests more accurate comparisons were found in the U.S. itself. United Fruit, he argues, was every bit the robber baron enterprise that the railroad, oil and steel industries were in the late 1800s. The only difference was that legislation eventually tamed those industries. The same was never really true for United Fruit and its baron, Minor Keith, the “Cecil Rhodes of Central America,” an “apple-headed little man with the eyes of a fanatic.” The company monopolized at will and solidified its power nearly with impunity.
And United Fruit was powerful. It brought down governments it didn’t like. It supported insurgencies. It used its monopoly early and often to threaten governments that dared to defy it. It dispensed with competitors in ways considered unscrupulous even at the time. It forged secret partnerships with other companies to circumvent antitrust laws. It killed strikers and organizers. It made educational material (read: propaganda) for American schoolchildren. Perhaps most telling, Keith himself married into Costa Rica’s first family.
If this is beginning to sound like the behavior of a bona fide nation-state, it should. Sometimes United Fruit’s interests aligned with Washington’s, and when they did, the two were willing partners. When they didn’t, they went against each other. Replace the name “United Fruit” with that of virtually any country in the world, and you would call it diplomacy.
For all its subject matter, “Bananas” is actually a pretty light read, fast and almost fun at times. Chapman laces the story with personal anecdotes, often citing titans of Latin American literature, such as Gabriel Garcia Marquez, some of whom were directly affected by United Fruit and its discontents. The company it once was is gone now.
Through years of financial decline, mergers and suicide, United Fruit transformed into Chiquita Brands International, and the path it charted resembles that of the banana itself, which is said to be on its way to extinction. If it does die out, it’ll be an ignominious end for what was once the world’s fourth-biggest food staple. That’s probably little comfort to the countries that were stunted by its trade.
Cole Altom, managing editor
Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America's Soul
By Michael Reid
After many decades of isolation and U.S. domination, Latin America finally seems to have a chance to become a major player on the global stage. Latin American countries are expanding their trade and economic ties with countries beyond the region, including China and Russia, which are becoming more and more invested in the area. Still, the United States’ presence there remains strong, and Latin America still sits, for the most part, on the periphery of global events, as it continues to focus on problems closer to home. This tendency is due in part to the fact that, for more than a decade and a half, Latin American countries have been undergoing reforms that contributed to a sense of uncertainty and to slower economic development. More recently, drug trafficking and migration driven by violence and poverty have threatened to destabilize the region.
But to understand what’s happening in the region now, you need to first understand how it got where it is today. “Forgotten Continent: The Battle for Latin America’s Soul” by Michael Reid is a good place to start. Published over a decade ago, the book doesn’t deal with the significant events of the past 10 years – including the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, the political scandals in Brazil, the economic disarray in Venezuela and the impact of the 2008 financial crisis on Latin America. (There is, however, an updated edition of the book, published just last year, that addresses some of these more recent issues.)
I listened to the audio version of the original edition, and truth be told, I found it a bit hard to follow. The book covers a lot of Latin American history from the early 1800s on, and it was difficult to absorb. I needed to listen to several parts more than once to digest all the information. The book is also disorganized at times – the author moves quickly from country to country and from topic to topic, making it hard to connect the dots, especially if you’re listening to the audiobook.
But “Forgotten Continent” does offer a lot of deep political, economic and historical analysis of a region that is often overlooked. Latin America is home to over half a billion people. It’s neither extremely poor nor extremely rich, yet it has the world’s largest reserves of arable land, minerals and some of the most important energy resources. It’s often left out of discussions about the global system or foreign affairs, but considering that its problems have the potential to spill over into the world’s sole superpower, that may not be true for much longer. Either way, “Forgotten Continent” is a valuable read for anyone interested in the history of this region.
Ekaterina Zolotova, analyst
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https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/how-climate-change-is-fuelling-the-us-border-crisis?utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Daily_040319&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d3fa3f92a40469e2d85c&user_id=50142053&esrc=&utm_term=TNY_Daily
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https://www.newyorker.com/news/dispatch/the-epidemic-of-debt-plaguing-central-american-migrants?utm_campaign=aud-dev&utm_source=nl&utm_brand=tny&utm_mailing=TNY_Daily_040419&utm_medium=email&bxid=5be9d3fa3f92a40469e2d85c&user_id=50142053&esrc=&utm_term=TNY_Daily
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https://www.sfgate.com/news/crime/article/Peru-s-ex-President-Alan-Garc-a-shoots-himself-13774231.php?fbclid=IwAR01BcyWV587zTcxyqofSbE1Ay3KaH5Ufk5K5JdltX8XuB-QQY163jfbuf0
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Russian warnings for Latin America. The head of Russia’s military intelligence is sounding the alarm in the Western Hemisphere. He said militants affiliated with al-Qaida and the Islamic State are allegedly operating in Latin America, where they have begun to raise money and establish training camps. (It’s an old talking point, but it’s not without its merits – the region is home to a variety of militant groups that engage in illegal activities, and they aren’t above working with other criminal or even terrorist groups.) He also said the U.S. may be plotting to overthrow the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua after it removes Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro from power. Not for nothing: The Russian Interior Ministry will provide anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics training to Nicaraguan police.
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Panama’s new president. Hailing from Panama’s center-left Democratic Revolutionary Party, Laurentino Cortizo appears to have won Panama’s presidential elections, though final results will be certified on Thursday and the margin between Cortizo and second-place candidate Romulo Roux is fewer than 40,000 votes. (Roux has already asked for a recount.) Cortizo’s victory would be good news for U.S. interests in Panama and the region. China has tried to boost relations with the strategically located linchpin between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, but Cortizo is on record as saying that Panama needs to improve its relationship with the United States and more heavily scrutinize Chinese investment in Panama. He also, however, said Washington needed to pay more attention to Central America if it didn’t want other countries like China to increase their footprint there.
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In Honduras, a Political Crisis Could Fuel Migration
A tire fire burns at the doors to the outer entrance of the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa on May 31, 2019.
(ORLANDO SIERRA/AFP/Getty Images)
Highlights
Government decrees authorizing labor force readjustments in the education and health sectors have sparked ongoing protests against Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez.
The country has few major transportation routes, so even small protests can have an outsized effect on the economy.
The security situation in Honduras will rapidly deteriorate if the protest wave continues to gain momentum, and the economy will suffer — something that could send more migrants north within months.
Editor's Note: This security-focused assessment is one of many such analyses found at Stratfor Threat Lens, a unique protective intelligence product designed with corporate security leaders in mind. Threat Lens enables industry professionals and organizations to anticipate, identify, measure and mitigate emerging threats to people, assets and intellectual property the world over. Threat Lens is the only unified solution that analyzes and forecasts security risk from a holistic perspective, bringing all the most relevant global insights into a single, interactive threat dashboard.
Protests continued June 5 in various parts of Honduras, including Tegucigalpa and San Pedro Sula after June 2 incidents in which protesters set fire to 62 trucks and shipping containers on trucks headed to Puerto Castilla for export to the United States, La Prensa reported. In the June 2 incident, protesters closed a bridge on the CA-13 highway, forcing trucks to stop near the village of Guadalupe Carney. On May 31, protesters in the capital of Tegucigalpa burned tires outside the exterior entrance leading to the visa appointment waiting room at the U.S. Embassy. The fire left scorch marks to the exterior stone wall, but did little damage before being extinguished.
The Big Picture
As Honduras nears the 10-year anniversary of the removal of President Manuel Zelaya, its current president, Juan Orlando Hernandez, now sees opposition to his governance surging into the streets. Should the current wave of protests in the Central American country gain momentum and turn into a lengthy insurrection against its president, it could send more Honduran migrants north toward the United States, with implications for that country and its southern neighbor, Mexico.
See Security Challenges in Latin America
Honduran government decrees authorizing labor force readjustments in the education and health sectors drove the protests. But even though Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez promised June 3 to reverse them, the protests have spread to a broader cross section of the political left.
These demonstrations are the latest chapter in the long-running series of left-wing protests against the Hernandez government. His government won a highly contested election in November 2017, which the left accused him of rigging. Frequent corruption cases involving the president's associates have dragged down his approval ratings since he took office in 2013, and U.S. law enforcement agencies reportedly are investigating allegations of cocaine trafficking against him.
Demonstrations in Honduras can be highly violent and often involve property damage or loss of life when protesters go after the drivers of vehicles stopped at roadblocks. They have also damaged businesses in marches through San Pedro Sula, Tegucigalpa, El Progreso and La Ceiba.
The security situation in Honduras will rapidly deteriorate if the protest wave continues to gain momentum, and could send more migrants north within months.
The targeting of U.S. interests by left-wing protesters is not surprising given U.S. support for the Hernandez government. Other foreign countries and companies seen as supportive of the government could also be targeted or sustain unintended damage from public unrest. If the demonstrations grow, they could interfere with supply chains and hurt foreign companies with personnel and facilities inside the country. Since the country has few major transportation routes, even relatively small protests can cut off major logistical corridors and lead to food and fuel shortages.
The protests could continue to June 28, the 10th anniversary of the 2009 Honduran coup. They could even gain momentum and turn into a lengthy insurrection against the president. The security situation in Honduras will rapidly deteriorate if the protest wave continues to gain momentum, and could send more migrants north within months. An even more depressed Honduran economy will keep pushing people abroad, and the logical place they would go to find low-wage jobs is the United States. This in turn could prompt the United States to put even more pressure on Mexico, whether in the form of tariffs or other measures, to stem migration from Central America.
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Highlights
Mexico has promised the United States it will reduce the surge in migration across their shared border under threat of U.S. tariffs.
The number of Hondurans seeking asylum or employment in the United States will likely remain stubbornly high amid persistent political and economic instability there.
The United States will use any continued migrant surge fueled by Honduran unrest to try to extract concessions from the Mexican government, which will, in turn, try to delay making them — if it can.
Though Central Americans for years have accounted for an increasing percentage of overall migrants crossing the U.S. border illegally, their numbers grew dramatically in early 2019. In May 2019 alone, about 130,000 people were arrested trying to cross the border. The composition of migrant flows also shifted, with the number of individuals in families apprehended at the border by U.S. authorities growing from 105,000 during all of 2018 to almost 330,000 during the first five months of 2019. Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador are currently the main sources of illegal immigration to the United States that pass illegally through Mexico. Honduras is the second-largest source of migrants entering the U.S. illegally.
The Big Picture
A deal in June with Mexico to reduce the number of immigrants crossing illegally into the United States caused the White House to back off from a threat to slap tariffs on imports from Mexico. Under the deal, Mexico agreed to step up its efforts to prevent migrants from crossing its territory to the U.S. border. But with swelling unrest in Honduras likely to worsen the economy and spark more migration through Mexico to the United States, Washington may well return to its tariff threat.
A Migrant Surge Spawns a Tariff Threat
In May, U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to enact tariffs of up to 25 percent on all Mexican imports within months unless Mexico took immediate steps to reduce illegal migration from Central America through its territory. Almost certainly intended as a negotiating tactic to help the Trump administration further its aims on curbing illegal immigration, the threat would have had major consequences for Mexico's economy had tariffs been enacted.
A line graph showing apprehensions at the southern U.S. border
To stave off economic damage, the Mexican government agreed in June to deploy 15,000 troops to reinforce key crossing points along the U.S.-Mexico border and to send 5,000 troops to guard the Guatemala-Mexico border, a key crossing point for Central Americans entering Mexico. The two nations agreed that if migrant apprehensions on the U.S. side of the border weren't significantly reduced by early September, then talks on additional measures to curb illegal immigration would begin.
A line graph showing people detained or turned away at the U.S.-Mexico border
Nearly a month after deferring tariffs against Mexico, the Trump administration is likely crafting its response to the new Mexican security measures. The White House demanded that Mexico reduce migrant crossings so that Customs and Border Protections arrests on the U.S. side of the border fall to around 20,000 per month. The Trump administration probably settled on this number because it would equal the record-low number of arrests seen in late 2016 and early 2017. It is unlikely, however, that this number will decline to anywhere near this amount within three months.
Unrest in Honduras Will Fuel the Migrant Surge
Honduras will become a major contributing factor complicating Mexico's ongoing negotiations over immigration with the United States. The roots of that instability are the 2009 coup against former President Manuel Zelaya and a closely contested 2017 presidential election, compounded by drought and crop failure. Throughout May and June, Honduras' left-wing public sector health and education unions and Zelaya's Liberty and Refoundation Party (Libre) mounted extensive nationwide protests against President Juan Orlando Hernandez and his ruling National Party. The protesters are not trying to overthrow Hernandez, whose power bases, such as the army and police, remain loyal to him. Instead, Libre is trying to position itself as a viable contender for power in Honduras' November 2021 presidential election. Hernandez is an increasingly unpopular figure, with high-profile corruption cases and frequent blackouts in major cities such as Tegucigalpa, the capital, and San Pedro Sula diminishing his low approval rating.
Libre and its political allies are largely focused on pressuring the president and showing their strength through street demonstrations and roadblocks. The opposition can mount such protests for months at a time, though their intensity ebbs and flows. Numerous triggers for renewed left-wing protests exist, such as ongoing corruption scandals and often heavy-handed police tactics with protesters.
The White House could use rising or even steady migration driven by Honduran unrest to press Mexico to accept a "safe third country" agreement or else be slapped with tariffs.
Such demonstrations will disrupt the flow of goods, fuel and laborers between virtually all major cities in the country. Lengthy demonstrations will also hit key exports such as textiles and automotive wiring harnesses. Extensive disruptions to daily life will cause greater economic pain for the country's informal labor force, which accounts for around half of all laborers. The informal labor force depends on untaxed, largely menial labor and is largely employed in the service industry. Prolonged demonstrations will exacerbate the already-heavy incentives for informal laborers to leave the country. So as protests stifle economic activity, they will drive more migrants north.
The trend of rising migration is likely to develop in late 2019 and early 2020, just as Mexico is again trying to deflect the threat of tariffs from the United States. At their next meeting with White House officials, representatives of the Mexican government will likely tout achievements made in sealing the border and deploying a long-term security presence there, deterring more and more migrants. The White House meanwhile will likely make additional demands of Mexico, the most important of which will be that Mexico sign a "safe third country" agreement with the United States, which will designate Mexico a safe place for migrants seeking asylum and make it difficult for them to request asylum in the United States, and will likely threaten Mexico with tariffs again if it does not.
The Mexican government will try to delay agreeing to such a deal until after the November 2020 U.S. presidential election in case Trump loses and the subsequent president decouples trade policy with Mexico from the question of illegal immigration. But Mexico may not be able to delay making concessions to the United States until then if the pace of illegal border crossings swells too quickly.
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Argentina: Latin America's New Leader in Counterterrorism
by Joseph M. Humire
The Gatestone Institute
July 17, 2019
https://www.meforum.org/58965/argentina-latin-americas-new-leader-in-counterterrorism
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https://www.meforum.org/59350/humire-momentum-vs-iran-in-latin-america?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=885cc76cb5-MEF_radio_humire_2019_09_15_10_04&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-885cc76cb5-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-885cc76cb5-33691909&mc_cid=885cc76cb5&mc_eid=9627475d7f
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Chilean Capitalism on Trial
Market policies have been successful. So why are people taking to the streets?
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Oct. 27, 2019 4:41 pm ET
Opinion: Chile’s Capitalism Is Under Attack
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Opinion: Chile’s Capitalism Is Under Attack
Opinion: Chile’s Capitalism Is Under Attack
On October 19, 2019, Chilean President Sebastian Piñera declared a state of emergency to protect property and human life as protests and riots rocked the country. Image: Fernando Bizerra Jr/Zuma Press
At press time it was too early to call a winner in Argentina’s presidential election Sunday. But Peronist Alberto Fernández and his vice-presidential running mate, former President Cristina Kirchner, were widely expected to defeat the re-election bid of center-right President Mauricio Macri.
Primary results in August indicated that voters blame the incumbent for high inflation, the rising cost of public services and anemic economic growth. Yet a Fernández-Kirchner win implies a return to the left-wing populism that has long undermined Argentine living standards. Mrs. Kirchner’s government (2007-2015) was notoriously corrupt and used its power to deny due process to its political enemies.
Mr. Macri made many mistakes, but he aimed for a more market-oriented economy and to restore the rule of law. His loss could turn out to be bad news for millions of Argentines who yearn for greater freedom.
Yet no one expects Argentina’s center-right, if it loses, to go rampaging through the streets, burning cars, stealing, blocking roads and destroying public transportation. That kind of politics is the specialty of the left. It has been on display this month in Chile, where left-wing terrorists savaged Santiago and cities around the country with violence.
This happened in a nation that, as the newspaper La Tercera reported on Oct. 5, has seen the poverty rate fall below 9%, down from 68% in 1990. Income inequality has also been coming down.
There is still plenty of work to do. But civilized societies settle questions of governance at the ballot box and through independent institutions, not with firebombs. So why is the democratically elected Chilean President Sebastián Piñera back on his heels, with little support from “democrats” in the media, academia and politics, after weeks of violence in the nation’s streets? It’s a double standard that deserves attention.
The uprising in Chile began Oct. 7 when groups of students in Santiago jumped subway turnstiles to protest a fare increase. In the days that followed, peaceful protests and further incidents of lawlessness spread throughout the country. On Saturday over a million demonstrators poured into the streets of Santiago to voice grievances—reportedly everything from the high cost of living to income inequality and climate change.
Yet it is unlikely that the eyes of the world would be on Chile if not for the perpetrators of violence, who took advantage of the moment to wreak havoc and demand a new constitution. Subway stations were destroyed, and supermarkets and other stores were looted and burned. Some 18 people died, most of them caught in fires during the looting.
Mr. Piñera was forced to declare a state of emergency and put the army on the street to protect property and life. But empathy isn’t the president’s strong suit, and in the absence of an effective communications team the narrative is now controlled by his adversaries.
The central government already subsidizes nearly half the public transportation fare in Santiago. What’s more, student fares didn’t go up. The independent commission charged with setting the prices announced an increase of 3.75% for peak riders on the metro; off-peak fares were reduced.
Fare increases are never popular. But the hard left has spent years planting socialism in the Chilean psyche via secondary schools, universities, the media and politics.
Even as the country has grown richer than any of its neighbors by defending private property, competition and the rule of law, Chileans marinate in anticapitalist propaganda. The millennials who poured into the streets to promote class warfare reflect that influence.
The Chilean right has largely abandoned its obligation to engage in the battle of ideas in the public square. Mr. Piñera isn’t an economic liberal and makes no attempt to defend the morality of the market. He hasn’t even reversed the antigrowth policies of his predecessor, Socialist Michelle Bachelet. Chileans have one side of the story pounded into their heads. As living standards rise, so do expectations. When reality doesn’t keep up, the ground is already fertile for socialists to plow.
The violence has another explanation. To chalk it up to spontaneity requires the suspension of disbelief. As one intelligence official in the region told me Friday: “It takes a lot of money to move this number of people and to engage them in this level of violence.” The explosive devices used, he said, were “far more sophisticated than Molotov cocktails.”
Foreign subversives are suspected of playing a key role, with Cuba and Venezuela at the top of the list. The São Paulo Forum, a group of hard-left socialists put together by Fidel Castro in 1990 after the fall of the Berlin Wall, espouses this radicalism.
The actual list of assailants, we don’t know. But Chile has been hit by a well-organized enemy out to bring down the democratic government. That’s something that should alarm all free societies in the region.
Write to O’Grady@wsj.com.
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second post
Argentina’s Peronist Repeat
The ill-governed nation hands the government back to the left.
By Editorial Board
Oct. 28, 2019 7:29 am ET
Presidential candidate Alberto Fernandez celebrates his victory after election results in Buenos Aires, Argentina October 27, 2019. Photo: agustin marcarian/Reuters
The cliche is that democracies get the government they deserve, but we’re not sure Argentina deserves the left-wing government it elected Sunday. Argentines routed incumbent Mauricio Macri, but in electing Alberto Fernández as the next President and Cristina Kirchner as Vice President they are trusting the same Peronist Party that has ruined the economy before.
Mr. Macri inherited a mess from Mrs. Kirchner, who was President from 2007-2015 following four years of her husband’s rule. Inflation was rampant, and the rule of law debased as the Kirchners confiscated foreign assets. The Kirchners put their domestic adversaries in jail and tried to silence the press.
Yet Mr. Macri was never able to turn the economy around. He tried to be a political conciliator and refused to engage in reprisals. He freed the exchange rate, lifted capital controls, and resolved a longstanding dispute with international creditors who had refused to accept haircuts on government bonds.
But his policy of gradual economic reform wasn’t enough to fix deep-seated fiscal and structural problems. In 2015 government spending as a percentage of gross domestic product was nearly double what it was throughout the second half of the 20th century. Yet Mr. Macri never took on spending or inflexible labor laws in any serious way, and the pressure for high taxes remained.
To attract investment, Argentina also needed to restore confidence in the peso. Yet the money base grew rapidly, and the central bank was forced to prop up the currency with high interest rates. Inflation for 2017 was about 25%.
A rising price level continued to erode the living standards of the Argentine middle class even as the country’s private and public debts increased. An historic drought in the southern hemisphere in the summer of 2017-2018 didn’t help by damaging all-important agricultural exports.
In May 2018 Mr. Macri went to the International Monetary Fund for a $50 billion standby loan, which was unpopular at home and didn’t reassure anyone abroad. By September 2018 the peso had lost half its value from the start of the year. The peso fell again when Mr. Macri lost the first round of presidential voting in this year’s August primary. Inflation jumped as Argentines fled pesos for dollars. Mr. Macri rejected as too risky economic advice to control inflation by dollarizing the economy, and now he finds himself out of power and his country at even greater risk of left-wing policies.
The Peronists campaigned largely against Mr. Macri’s record, but their trademark is more of the same: spend-and-tax policies, onerous labor regulation and easy money. The party does have a wing that is more pragmatic than the Kirchner left if Mr. Fernández can maintain enough political control. Another difference this time is that Mr. Fernández is courting the Chinese as creditors instead of the IMF. The Argentine left is anti-American, but as Malaysia and other countries have learned, China’s terms are hardly generous.
We wish Argentines the best, but whoever said insanity was doing the same thing over and expecting better results might have had this once prosperous nation in mind.
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Could There Be a Cold War Reboot in Latin America?
Scott Stewart
Scott Stewart
VP of Tactical Analysis, Stratfor
8 MINS READ
Nov 26, 2019 | 09:00 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
Russia is working with former Soviet allies in Latin America to undermine U.S. influence and distract Washington from Moscow's activities elsewhere.
In doing so, Moscow is using online propaganda to stoke the anti-government rhetoric now fueling protests in Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia.
Russia will likely deploy similar tactics to weaken other U.S.-allied governments in Latin America, placing Western businesses and organizations operating in the region increasingly at risk.
South America is again in flames. A wave of anti-government protests has ravaged the streets of Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia and Colombia in recent months. Such chaos, of course, isn't new to the region. From the 1960s to the 1990s, terrorist and insurgent groups instigated a series of vicious Cold War proxy battles. But in this iteration, which I'm calling the "Cold War 2.0" in Latin America, it's not armed proxy groups in play but already existing social tensions that Moscow is adeptly weaponizing to sabotage Western power structures in the region.
Indeed, with threats to Russia's periphery more daunting than ever, it can be argued that the Cold War never really ended for Moscow. But regardless of whether Russia's current actions in Latin America constitute a second Cold War, or if they're instead merely a reinvigoration of the original struggle, it's apparent that many of the same actors are actively involved in the unfolding unrest in Washington's backyard — and largely, for the same reasons.
The Big Picture
U.S. efforts to stem Russia's influence in its borderlands have compelled Moscow to reassert its geopolitical heft around the world. In Latin America, this can be evidenced by Russia's attempts to protect the Venezuelan government from the U.S.-backed opposition movement, while working to dismantle more Western-allied governments elsewhere in the region.
The Soviet Legacy in Latin America
In its push to establish a global communist utopia, the Soviet Union encouraged exporting its revolution abroad to "liberate" workers around the world. But as the United States and its allies banded together to contain communist expansion, the Soviet Union began to feel threatened by the alliance structures that surrounded it, as well as the presence of U.S. troops and weapons on its periphery. In response, the Soviets embraced the Cuban Revolution and attempted to place nuclear missiles in Cuba — a gambit that ultimately led to the Cuban Missile Crisis. But even after the Soviets removed their missiles from Cuba, they continued to use the island as a beachhead in the Western Hemisphere from which to expand their influence from Canada to Chile — supporting communist parties in the Americas, while also training, financing and arming a host of Marxist terrorist and insurgent groups across the region.
Moscow's efforts in South and Central America, in particular, were largely conducted through their battle-hardened Cuban allies, as evidenced by the revolutionary Ernesto "Che" Guevara's ill-fated foray into Bolivia in the late 1960s. The Soviets viewed such activities as a way to not only expand world communism, but to counter U.S. anti-communist efforts elsewhere. By creating problems in Washington's own backyard, Soviet actions also helped distract the United States and its resources from those other efforts. Growing communist influence in the region embroiled the U.S. government in a series of efforts that involved high-profile events such as the 1954 coup in Guatemala; the failed 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba; the 1973 coup in Chile; and support for the Nicaraguan Contras in the 1980s.
Russia's Current Activities
Fast forward to the present, however, and the U.S. threat to Russian influence has only become more acute. The peripheral security buffer that once protected Russia from Europe has significantly eroded following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Former Warsaw Pact member states such as Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania have since become NATO members, as have the former Soviet-occupied Baltic states of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania.
Growing fears of entrapment in Russia ultimately paved the way for the rise of President Vladimir Putin in 2000. But despite Putin's promises of restoring the country's past power, Russia's strategic buffer has continued to take hits. The fall of pro-Russian leaders in Ukraine in the wake of the 2014 Maidan protests and the 2005 Orange Revolution, in particular, have only ratcheted up Russian unease. To help offset the loss of such a crucial borderland, Putin has annexed Crimea and invaded southeastern Ukraine. But Russia still undoubtedly feels the sting of having lost the strategic depth of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Bloc that had long shielded the country's soft underbelly.
Instead of arming Marxist groups with weapons, this time Moscow's arming anti-government protesters with rhetoric to counter U.S. interests in Latin America.
The loosening grasp on its borderlands is now again compelling Russia to resort to its old tricks in Latin America. This has notably included propping up Nicolas Maduro's failing regime in Venezuela over the past year with the help of Moscow's Cuban partners. Cuba has been a key security partner of Venezuelan regimes since shortly after former Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez came to power in 1999. The vast web of Cuban intelligence operators and assets that has infiltrated Venezuelan society since then have informed the Maduro regime about potential threats while keeping the opposition divided and squabbling. Meanwhile, Russia's financial, military and technical intelligence support — not to mention the close protection from Russian military contractors — have been critical to the Maduro regime in recent years as well. In fact, I would go so far as to say that Maduro would have long been ousted had it not been for Russia's and Cuba's help.
But the activities of Russia and its Cuban partners in Latin America are not limited to Venezuela. On Nov. 13, officials arrested four Cubans in Bolivia for allegedly financing anti-government protests in support of the country's former socialist president, Evo Morales. An ally of the Russian-backed Maduro regime, Morales was forced to seek refuge in Mexico after his victory in an apparently fixed election sparked widespread protests. In recent weeks, the Organization of American States (OAS) has also accused Cuba and Venezuela of helping instigate the anti-government protests in Ecuador, Chile and Colombia. Just as the Soviets bankrolled Cuban paramilitary efforts in Latin America during the first Cold War, it is clear that Russia is still funding these efforts, as both Cuba and Venezuela are severely cash-strapped and could not conduct these external operations alone.
Using Social Angst for Political Gain
The Soviets and Russians have had ample experience using protests to undermine their Western opponents' place in power. In the United States, there's evidence of Moscow's hand in both the anti-war protests of the 1960s and anti-nuclear protests of the 1980s, as well as the anti-hydraulic fracturing movement and the Occupy Movement in more recent years. And, of course, there's Russia's intervention in the 2016 Brexit referendum followed by the U.S. presidential election that same year.
Indeed, over the decades, Russia has become increasingly adept at tapping into very real social sentiments and issues to achieve its own political goals. In concert with its Cuban and Venezuelan allies, Russia has proven adept at amplifying the tension along very real social fault lines within these countries. Russia is not simply fabricating issues underpinning the unrest out of thin air; rather, it's simply providing the "spark" to ignite the underlying economic and social grievances that have quietly been brewing just beneath the surface in these countries for years.
Russia also now has vast experience using social media to disperse disinformation on the internet, just as it did ahead of the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom and the U.S. presidential election in 2016. In recent years, Moscow has also deployed similar online propaganda campaigns in Germany, Ukraine and the Baltic states. And there are signs it's attempting to do the same ahead of the next U.S. election in 2020. We can thus expect to see these disinformation tools used elsewhere in the region to support socialist allies and oppose governments that are democratic, more free-market-oriented or otherwise allied with the United States.
Foreign Stakeholders in the Crosshairs
Given the socialist, anarchist and anti-capitalist bent of many of the anti-government movements, protesters have unsurprisingly already begun targeting commercial interests in the region. More than 100 stores owned by Walmart's subsidiary in Chile, for example, have so far been looted and burned amid escalating anti-capitalist demonstrations in the country. As protests rage on across the continent, U.S. and European businesses operating in these countries will likely continue to be targeted, including potentially mining and energy companies, hotels, banks and airline offices. U.S. diplomatic facilities and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) operating in the region could also come under fire. A number of businesses and NGOs have already pulled their personnel out of Bolivia following the U.S. Department of State's recent travel warning, which also urged American citizens living there to leave.
Given Russia's imperative to undermine growing U.S. influence closer home, as well as globally, Moscow will do everything in its power to ensure the protests continue apace right outside Washington's door. Businesses and organizations across South America will thus need to closely monitor the dynamics of the unrest in Latin America as it evolves and potentially escalates in the coming weeks. Otherwise, they may soon find themselves caught in the crossfire of another Cold War proxy battle.
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https://www.insightcrime.org/news/analysis/gamechangers-2019-top-10-criminal-groups/
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June 17, 2020 View On Website
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Latin America’s Place in the World
The region operates on its own timeline.
By: Allison Fedirka
Whether they like it or not, most countries are drawn into the international system in one way or another. For this reason, introducing the concept of “international insertion” into the study of international relations may seem redundant or unnecessary. But it plays an important role in the study of Latin America’s international relations, in particular, because it helps explain the region’s geopolitical realities, which are founded in its place at the periphery of the global system.
The concept involves identifying the ways in which a country can become more involved in the global system. In geopolitics, not all countries are created equal; some are more powerful than others, but the behavior of all is governed by their attempts to acquire and maintain power. Powerful states that are able drive the global system are considered the center of gravity, and weak states that do not have the means to influence the global system exist on the periphery, orbiting around the center. Geography determines whether a country is part of the periphery or the center because these are the things that determine a country’s power potential. Although technological advances have offered countries ways to overcome their limitations, many Latin American states remain on the margins of the geopolitical system.
This is because the region operates on its own geopolitical timeline. Equally important is the power dynamic that has been hardwired into these states over time. Geography may have placed these countries in the periphery, but their political, economic and military conditions, developed over long periods of time, have kept them there.
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Defining Latin American History
With these principles in mind, we can begin to deconstruct Latin America’s geopolitical history by first defining time periods and then studying the lasting impact of political, economic and military events that occur during these periods. There are three distinct epochs – long geopolitical cycles each consisting of different eras – in Latin American history: the pre-Columbian epoch (1000-1492), the colonial epoch (1492-1810) and the U.S. epoch (1898-present). The period from 1810 to 1898 is considered an anomalous era that does not fit into the epochs that came before or after. Each epoch also has a critical era that helped permanently shape the region.
During the pre-Columbian epoch, Latin America had well-developed civilizations that operated completely independently of the European and Asian systems. Due to the technological limitations of the time, geography significantly dictated the needs and capabilities of regions and civilizations. Nonetheless, it was during this time that indigenous civilizations in the Americas reached their peak of sophistication. This epoch’s final era, the empires era (1400-1500), saw the rapid, parallel emergence of the Aztec and Inca empires. Both empires quickly expanded by conquering and absorbing new civilizations. They served as the centers of gravity in Mesoamerica and the Pacific-Andean region and avoided major conflict because geographic barriers ensured little to no contact between them. Smaller, organized civilizations that shared a common language also existed east of the Andes in present-day Colombia, the Amazon and the Rio de la Plata Basin. But none of them achieved empire status because the landscape, resources, climate and livelihoods did not support the establishment of large cities, much less the expansion of territorial control. The arrival of Spanish conquistadors brought the pre-Columbian epoch and the empires era to an abrupt end.
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The colonial epoch marked Latin America’s first opportunity to integrate into the larger global system. But the arrival of the Europeans did not immediately open up the region to the world. Rather, Latin America interacted with just two European powers – the Spanish and the Portuguese – which sought to maintain exclusive control over their newfound territories, particularly with regard to trade. Viceroys were allowed to trade directly with the European colonial power that controlled these territories for most of the epoch. The ruling powers continued to expand their control over local civilizations, imported African slaves and incorporated them into their empires either by using them for labor or through social and marital links.
The final era in this epoch – the Bourbon era (1714-1810) – had the most lasting impact. After the War of the Spanish Succession, Spain quickly moved to recover its position as a European power. To do so, the crown introduced a series of changes that would become known as the Bourbon reforms. Many of these reforms focused on Spain’s relationship with the colonies and were aimed at reducing the power of local populations, consolidating control and optimizing earnings. This led to administrative reforms that established the general borders that roughly represent the region’s nations today. The reforms finally allowed for trade among Spanish colonies – rather than just between Spain and the colonies – but not with areas outside of the Spanish empire. So even though the barriers between the Eastern and Western hemispheres had been broken, Spain’s centralization of power and trade restrictions limited Latin America’s global interaction. Despite the opportunity to integrate into the larger global system, it failed to do so. Resentment over these reforms sowed the seeds of the independence movement that would later grip the region.
The independence and accommodation era is an anomaly because it marks a unique period in which no single power (or two combined powers) dominated the region. While it’s true that transitions between epochs are often opaque, a unique characteristic in Latin American epochs is the presence of a dominating power. But during this era, no prevailing power existed, and neither the U.S. nor the Europeans could control the region.
Latin American countries faced three challenges during this time. The first was potential resettlement by European powers.
Spain had launched a handful of failed attempts to regain territory, Brazil remained a monarchy and France tried to replace the Mexican government multiple times. European recolonization, therefore, could not be ruled out. The second challenge was establishing territorial boundaries with neighboring countries. As fledgling nations tried to consolidate control over their territory, war between the newly formed states was always a possibility. The third challenge was the possibility of civil war or domestic unrest, which was prevalent in all these countries as interests and visions for the future clashed. Ultimately, this meant that Latin American countries were unable to establish regional power centers and were left relatively weak compared to their counterparts in the north.
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The arrival of the U.S. epoch marked the return of domination by a power that would regulate the region’s interaction with the rest of the world. In 1898, the U.S. emerged as the Western Hemisphere’s regional power. It had established full access to the Pacific coast, settled its border with Mexico, unified after a civil war and expelled Spain from the Caribbean. Most important, it had developed a world-class navy that enabled the country to defend coastal approaches, intimidate foreign aggressors and enforce its foreign policy, including the Monroe Doctrine, which until this point had about as much weight as the paper it was written on.
This epoch kicked off with the Roosevelt era (1898-1945), so named for the strong influence Theodore Roosevelt had over it. It was characterized by aggressive U.S. military posturing and involvement in the region in order to keep European powers out of the Western Hemisphere and establish U.S. dominance. Its highlights include U.S. intimidation of German vessels away from Venezuela, support for Panama’s independence, building of the Panama Canal, dominance over Cuba through measures like the Platt Amendment, military expeditions in to Mexico, and waging the Banana Wars across Central America and the Caribbean.
After this era, U.S. power continued to grow, creating more constraints on the region’s behavior. The U.S. presented the entire Western Hemisphere as its sphere of influence, limiting its interaction with outside powers and further isolating the region from the world.
Out of Synch
Latin America’s geopolitical time scale does not synch with the global cycle. The first global epoch started in 1492, with the European discovery of the Americas and forays into Africa and Asia, and ended in 1992. Europe was the center of gravity (indeed, it is known as the European epoch) as different European countries took turns at the seat of power. For Latin America, however, the age of “global opening” during this time remained fairly limited to interactions with Spain and Portugal.
Latin America’s colonial epoch coincided with much of the European epoch but not all of it and ended about 100 years earlier. During the independence era, the region was far too consumed with problems at home and abroad to join the global system from a position a strength. In the 20th century, the distinction between the global and Latin American epochs persisted but became subtler after the Roosevelt era. Latin America’s U.S. epoch predates the North America epoch (1992-present) by roughly 100 years. And appears to generally coincide because of the shared trait of U.S. domination. However, the epochs follow different time scales and are measured differently (regional vs. global).
That Latin America’s cycles do not align with those of the rest of the world makes it incredibly hard for the region to tap into the global system. Latin America was operating on its own geopolitical timetable prior to European arrival, and the colonial period failed to fully bring the region into the global system and synch its cycles with those of the rest of the world. Latin American epochs tend to feature one or two powers that overwhelm the countries or civilizations of the region and limit their ability to interact with other regions, reinforcing the geographic limitations that have relegated this part of the world to the periphery. And so far, technology has not been enough to bring it into the fold.
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September 23, 2020 View On Website
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Washington’s New Economic Strategy in Latin America
Nearshoring is as much a geopolitical issue as an economic one.
By: Allison Fedirka
A few weeks ago, the head of the U.S. National Security Council – not a State Department official, as would normally be the protocol – introduced the Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework, Washington’s new economic strategy for its half of the world, while in Miami. Then, for the first time ever, Washington successfully lobbied the Inter-American Development Bank to take on a U.S. official as its head – a position typically reserved for non-U.S. and non-Brazilian members who have less voting power in the bank. Later still, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made history as the first secretary to visit Suriname and Guyana.
Developments such as these belie the ordinarily passive approach the U.S. takes to managing relations with its southern neighbors. Washington has long held the upper hand and so has rarely needed to tinker with a system that works in its favor. But as it debuts its new economic strategy for the region, it will resurrect memories for countries that have been hurt by these kinds of initiatives in the past. The U.S. may see new-found potential in its relationship with Latin America, but the same cannot necessarily be said for Latin America.
A National Security Issue
The increase in the United States’ commercial interest in Latin America owes largely to a shift in focus from military conflict in the Middle East to economic conflict with China (and, to a lesser extent, Russia).
The U.S.-China trade war has changed supply chain security from a purely economic issue to a national security issue. In short, China’s role as a global manufacturing hub – especially for medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, microchips and other electronics – is now considered a threat. Consequently, Washington has begun to consider new locations for U.S. companies whose factories are currently in China. With its geographic proximity, relatively cheap labor force and firmly established ties, Latin America is an obvious candidate.
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The potential relocation of factories is as much a geopolitical question as it is an economic one. Companies generally go where it makes the most economic sense, but when there are geopolitical interests at stake, it is up to the governments to create incentives and frameworks that compel other actors to produce the desired results.
Washington’s latest hemisphere-wide economic initiative, Back to the Americas, means to address mutual economic-security needs, most notably by relocating U.S. manufacturing companies to Latin America. The relocation would be supported by U.S. investments in infrastructure in host countries that would, in theory, drive economic growth. At the end of July, Mauricio Claver-Carone, then the White House senior director for Western Hemisphere affairs and now the IDB president, said that up to $50 billion in investments could enter the region through Back to the Americas through the participation of four U.S. government departments as well as the U.S. Agency for International Development, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation and the Export-Import Bank. It builds on the Growth in the Americas initiative, which launched in 2018 and expanded its scope in December 2019 to focus largely on using private sector investment in infrastructure projects to create new jobs and increase economic growth. A key component to achieving these goals is the reduction of regulatory, legal, procurement and market barriers to investment by host country governments.
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The timing is hardly coincidental: China has steadily enlarged its economic footprint in Latin America over the past two decades. Beijing used the region to help meet its demand for hydrocarbons, metals and food supplies. From 2000 to 2019, Chinese trade with the region grew from $12 billion to nearly $315 billion. It is currently the top trade partner of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru and Argentina. (In every country except Argentina, China replaced the U.S.) According to the Inter-American Dialogue, Chinese state loans to the region exceeded $140 billion from 2005 to 2019, though the amounts have significantly dropped since 2015. China has also made substantial investments in mining and agriculture, power generation, utilities and infrastructure, though again the pace has slowed over the past three years.
The Back to the Americas initiative aims to preserve the U.S. foothold in the region and keep foreign competition at bay. The recently announced Western Hemisphere Strategic Framework, however, rests on five pillars: securing the homeland, advancing economic growth, promoting democracy and the rule of law, countering foreign influence and strengthening alliances with like-minded partners. Relocating manufacturing to the Americas not only takes the supply chain out of China’s hands but also helps diversify it. The finished products made for U.S. consumption may also allow the U.S. to regain some of the space it has lost to China in Latin America. If Washington can encourage Latin American countries to create environments conducive to U.S. interests by giving them money, there may be less need for Chinese financing and more transparency with financial activities, and these countries can more easily access funding from northern financial institutions.
What Washington Has to Offer
But U.S. ambitions will face several obstacles. Local governments may find themselves in the uncomfortable scenario of having to choose between Beijing or Washington, including over how they adopt 5G technologies. Many will seek a balance that will allow them to reap the benefits of siding with one without alienating the other.
Unlike China, the U.S. doesn’t have state-owned enterprises that can do its bidding, or seemingly endless discretionary spending for overseas projects. There will be some funding by the U.S. government along with additional money from places like the IDB, which contributes about $12 billion in infrastructure funding annually, but private enterprise will play a greater role. The U.S. government can incentivize companies, but it can’t force them to participate in its plans. Companies could simply decide the market isn’t right for them.
More importantly, the U.S. strategy requires buy-in from participating countries. This is why it contains provisions that may meet the region’s needs. By targeting infrastructure projects, the U.S. is effectively addressing the long-standing economic development challenge of huge infrastructure investment gaps faced by every country in the region. A 2019 study by the IDB estimated that the region’s infrastructure investment gap is the equivalent of 2.5 percent of gross domestic product (roughly $150 billion) per year. U.S. investments alone can’t solve these problems, but neither can the host countries without large outside capital injections, which U.S. companies can offer.
Infrastructure development also addresses the region’s interest in improving its overall trade competitiveness. Poor transportation and logistics facilities play a major role in raising the price of domestically produced goods to the point that they struggle to compete in global markets.
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Furthermore, the focus on manufacturing aims to diversify the region’s economic activity away from natural resource extraction. Reducing dependence on commodities would inoculate local economies to price shocks and potentially lead to higher-value goods being produced.
Not every Latin American country has the same relationship with the U.S., of course, and those most likely to participate will be countries that have traditionally allied with the U.S. or whose economies are too integrated with the U.S. not to participate. Panama and Costa Rica, for example, are already working to address domestic regulatory measures to meet U.S. requirements, while Ecuador admitted it has an economic need to enact reforms that will facilitate economic cooperation with the U.S.
The poster child for what this initiative could look like in practice is Colombia, which is predisposed to keep a close relationship with the U.S. and has already thrown its support behind the project. Colombia’s ambassador to the U.S. openly acknowledged that Bogota wants to benefit from U.S. nearshoring efforts and welcomes it as an opportunity to reindustrialize. In some ways, it has been preparing all year. In February, the government launched a new national logistics policy that focuses on reducing logistics costs by simplifying bureaucratic procedures and improving road and fluvial transportation infrastructure. The objective of the plan is to incentivize foreign direct investment, boost exports and create economic opportunities. This was followed in the summer by new tax breaks and other measures to attract up to $11.5 billion in non-hydrocarbon foreign direct investment by 2022. In direct response to Back to the Americas, ProColombia has conducted a targeted campaign to identify companies interested in moving to Colombia from China.
Concerns
The U.S. has a long and complicated history with Latin America when it comes to cooperation, particularly when geopolitical agendas are so closely tied to economic ones. There is a camp that looks at increased U.S. interest in the region with skepticism. Though they share a desire to see value-added goods hold a greater share of exports, they believe the U.S. manufacturing initiative runs the risk of producing low-value-added exports by exploiting local workforces. There is also concern that increased trade with the U.S. could render the region a depository for U.S. goods. Similar initiatives in the past have damaged domestic industries in the region, prompting governments to pursue costly import substitution schemes and to impose strict regulatory environments to prop up local industry and employment.
The other major issue is that there are strings attached. The U.S. government and companies alike will be looking for certain security and political guarantees from their partners. Ultimately, the ability to offer attractive investment environments to U.S. investors will fall to the Latin American governments themselves. Past instances where countries in the region have carried out reforms to participate in U.S.-supported economic programs ended poorly. For example, President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress purported to enhance economic cooperation to improve Latin America’s per capita GDP, establish democratic governments, achieve price stability, enact land reform and improve other economic and social planning. Washington spent $1.4 billion annually from 1962 to 1967 on this program but failed to produce the desired economic development. Similarly, the Washington Consensus was introduced to the region to help solve the debt crisis and boost growth. It required countries to implement northern-formulated, structural economic reforms that clashed with many of the region’s political and social systems. This led to its failure and rejection, most notably in Argentina.
Hence why this is as much a geopolitical initiative as an economic one. The economic question can be answered only after there are clear sectors, projects and numbers to work with. The current economic environment favors the U.S., but complicated pasts are hard to overlook. All governments will also have to evaluate participation in these plans against national needs. The fact that the U.S. has renewed interest in the region has geopolitical significance considering the U.S. has managed to muscle through its agenda but not with strong results.
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Biden’s Troubling Latin Agenda
Funding for political activism and abortion won’t create jobs in the region.
By Mary Anastasia O’Grady
Feb. 7, 2021 4:16 pm ET
When developed countries support equality before the law and property rights in poor countries, the left labels them imperialists. But use U.S. taxpayers’ resources to promote the termination of unborn life in poor countries, and progressives call it “health” spending. A similar language game is played when international socialists organize political factions under the banner of “democracy” to consolidate power.
Abortion and democratic socialism are two causes the Biden administration plans to champion in the Northern Triangle of Central America—Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador. Sovereignty, respect for local cultural norms, and the economic aspirations of millions of have-nots have never been high ideals in Washington. But now the condescending ideologues are resupplied. The problem is likely to get worse.
Latin Americans have reason to distrust President Biden, who had special responsibility for the region during the Obama administration. One notable disaster in that time was Colombia’s surrender to the narco-trafficking group FARC. The agreement was cooked up in Havana with U.S. help. Colombians rejected it in a referendum, but then-President Juan Manuel Santos pushed it through anyway, with backing from Team Obama.
FARC leaders got amnesty and unelected seats in Congress, but the agreement has been a disaster for the South American nation. The cocaine business has exploded anew, FARC honchos have been caught in drug deals, and coca-growing regions are again immersed in bloody conflict. The discredited Mr. Santos has been reduced to lobbying the U.S. to take Havana off its list of state sponsors of terrorism.
In Central America, Biden administration foreign-policy makers want to reproduce a version of the United Nations’ International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (a k a CIGIG) that would span all three countries in the Northern Triangle.
Helping countries develop independent, transparent and accountable institutions is a worthy foreign-policy goal. But CICIG was none of that.
The commission prosecuted some criminals. But without checks, Commissioner Iván Velásquez gained absolute power and used it to unleash a reign of terror against Guatemalan society. What was billed as a way to help the country fight organized crime and build a credible judicial system was weaponized by the left. James Comey’s FBI going after Trump supporters had nothing on Mr. Velásquez. The most corrupt entrepreneurs and politicians stayed out of jail by cheering his misdeeds.
CICIG abuses gained international attention when lawyers for the Russian migrant family of Igor Bitkov, whom it targeted, testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing in Washington in 2018. They told of the gross mistreatment of the family, allegedly at the behest of Vladimir Putin.
Mr. Biden, who claimed to be an expert on CICIG, never condemned the collapse of due process or the cruelty the commission used to force confessions. He never even spoke up for the Bitkovs, whose 3-year-old son was thrown into an orphanage when they were jailed.
Guatemalans deserve an accounting. Instead Biden stenographers in the media are busy sanitizing his role in the CICIG story. The Bitkov family, still stuck in the corrupt Guatemalan legal system, remains a symbol of the dearth of empathy inside the Beltway.
But Joe cares deeply about the region—or so we are told. He will prove it now by pumping $4 billion into a variety of Northern Triangle social and activist political organizations. It won’t generate jobs beyond the aid industry.
An equally important agenda item for Mr. Biden is the export of abortion to the developing world. To that end, on his eighth day in office he signed an executive decree to allow U.S. taxpayer dollars to fund abortion providers operating overseas. This from the guy who pledges dignity for poor nations.
Plenty of Americans object. In a January Marist poll 77% of respondents said they oppose U.S. financing to “support abortion in other countries,” well above the 53% who said they are pro-life.
Some of these Americans may have an innate sense of respect for other cultures. In the developing world there is a strong belief that abortion doesn’t only take a life but that taking away the rights of the unborn undermines the ethical foundations of society.
This creed is captured in a recent “Culture of Life Africa” video. The 16-minute production features people across the continent pleading with Mr. Biden not to bring abortion to their shores. Honduras recently passed a constitutional amendment (requiring four-fifths approval in two different legislative sessions) prohibiting abortion.
In Honduras and many other poor countries where abortion remains illegal, organizations like International Planned Parenthood can now use U.S. government funds to promote their industry. Mr. Biden doesn’t need to share the moral convictions of pro-life nations. But his contempt for their views is troubling.
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MEXICO CITY—U.S. prosecutors are investigating the president of Honduras for accepting bribes to protect drug traffickers who shipped tons of cocaine to the U.S., according to a court filing.
The latest filing came in the criminal case of an alleged Honduran drug trafficker, Geovanny Fuentes Ramirez, who prosecutors say paid President Juan Orlando Hernández large bribes to fund the Honduran leader’s 2013 presidential campaign in exchange for protection of his drug business.
While the Honduran leader has been implicated in several drug trials in the U.S., the filing marks the first time American prosecutors have made public that they are investigating the president.
The Honduran government denied the allegations. “The claim that Pres. Hernández supposedly accepted drug money from a Geovanny Daniel Fuentes Ramírez, or gave protection or coordination to drug traffickers is 100% false,” said Honduras’ government Twitter account. The allegations, the government said, were “based on lies of confessed criminals who seek revenge or to reduce their sentences.”
Mr. Hernández wasn’t named in the court filing by name. Rather, he was described as CC-4, or co-conspirator four, in a court document filed late Friday in the Southern District of New York.
The document said the U.S. investigation was targeting “high-ranking officials, such as CC-4,” identified as the brother of Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández, the president’s younger brother. The younger Hernández is awaiting sentencing in New York after being convicted in 2019 of trafficking 200 tons of cocaine to the U.S.
President Hernández, who was also named as an unindicted co-conspirator in his brother’s trial, hasn’t been charged with any crime.
One of the poorest countries in the hemisphere, Honduras poses a difficult challenge for the Biden administration. The new administration says it wants to focus on lowering corruption and improving the rule of law as part of a drive to lower illegal migration from the so-called Northern Triangle countries of Central America—Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador.
As part of the policy, the Biden administration has promised to commit some $4 billion to spur economic development and fight the root causes of migration. But the case of Mr. Hernandez shows how difficult it will be to tackle issues like corruption.
“The Juan Orlando Hernández case is the most challenging example faced by the administration in implementing its signature policy,” said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank. “At the end of the day, you need good partners to implement those plans.”
During the Trump administration, allegations about corruption in Mr. Hernández’s administration took a back seat to the issue of migration, in which the Honduran government was seen as a strong partner in trying to deter waves of migration, say analysts and some U.S. officials.
“There was this laserlike focus on the migration issue,” in Central America that came at the expense of corruption and governance problems, a veteran U.S. State Department Latin America official said in a recent interview.
Dealing with the allegations against President Hernández will be a priority for the Biden administration, the former official said. He noted there is currently talk in the administration of creating a special envoy who would pay close attention to Central America.
In a prior filing in the same case involving the alleged Honduran trafficker, Mr. Fuentes Ramírez, prosecutors said Mr. Hernández had told the alleged trafficker that “he [the president] wanted to shove the drugs right up the noses of the gringos.”
The newly introduced court documents say the Honduran government has provided only “limited records” sought by the U.S. in the case of the president’s brother, Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández. Honduras hasn’t honored requests for the extradition of other charged co-conspirators and potential witnesses against the president and Mr. Fuentes Ramirez, U.S. prosecutors say.
In exchange for large bribes, the president promised to protect Mr. Fuentes Ramirez from arrest and extradition, prosecutors said. The president also promised to help Mr. Fuentes Ramírez, who was arrested in Miami last year, to transport cocaine with the help of the Honduran armed forces, prosecutors said. The court filing alleges the president instructed Mr. Fuentes Ramírez to work with the president’s brother, Juan Antonio Hernández.
Mr. Hernández was elected president in 2013 and was re-elected in 2017 amid widespread allegations of fraud which generated weeks of street protests. He is expected to finish his term in January 2022.
Write to José de Córdoba at jose.decordoba@wsj.com
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"As part of the policy, the Biden administration has promised to commit some $4 billion to spur economic development and fight the root causes of migration. But the case of Mr. Hernandez shows how difficult it will be to tackle issues like corruption."
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"As part of the policy, the Biden administration has promised to commit some $4 billion to spur economic development and fight the root causes of migration. But the case of Mr. Hernandez shows how difficult it will be to tackle issues like corruption."
:roll:
Biden tackling corruption. Here we go again.
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March 19, 2021
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Foreign Investment in Latin America
Investment in the region has been trending down for about a decade.
By: Geopolitical Futures
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For emerging and developing economies, foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in financing major development projects and growing their economies. This is especially true of Latin America. FDI into Latin America hit historical highs between 2011 and 2012, totaling almost $220 billion and accounting for 14 percent of the global total. But since then, FDI has been trending downward, and in 2019 it dropped by 7.8 percent. The trend wasn’t universal: While Argentina (43.9 percent), Mexico (22 percent) and Brazil (11.5 percent) saw large drops in 2019 compared to 2018, Colombia and Peru saw FDI increases of 24.1 percent and 37.1 percent, respectively.
Final figures for 2020 are not yet available, but FDI plummeted as countries struggled with the economic consequences of pandemic-induced lockdowns. Colombia and Brazil saw large drops in the first half of 2020, with respective declines of 50 percent and 45 percent, or $8.86 billion and $37.26 billion. Argentina and Chile also experienced significant declines. But Peru suffered the worst, with FDI dropping by 72 percent, to approximately $7.3 billion. Mexico fared better, with foreign investment dropping by only 6 percent, to $24.66 billion. Continued low FDI has been forecast for 2021, a trend that is expected to reverse only in 2022.
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March 31, 2021
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Brief: Russian Influence in the Caribbean
With such a sensitive history, the U.S. is ever mindful when Russia engages the region.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: For the United States, the Caribbean Basin plays a critical role in securing maritime access that serves its commercial and defense purposes. Though Washington has been the unquestioned regional power for some time, there have been a few instances in which it has felt threatened enough to act there. (Remember the Cuban missile crisis?) With such a sensitive history, the U.S. is ever mindful when Russia engages the region.
What Happened: Russia’s deputy prime minister is leading a high-level delegation on a two-country tour of the Caribbean. On Tuesday, he met with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro in Caracas, where they signed 12 agreements on cooperation in 20 strategic areas. He also held conversations with Venezuela’s vice president and oil minister. On Wednesday, he arrived in Cuba for the 18th Session of the Cuba-Russia Intergovernmental Commission in Havana. The two sides will discuss the economy, financing, energy, transportation, agriculture, heath and communications.
Bottom Line: When it comes to agreements such as those signed in Venezuela – and those potentially signed later in Cuba – the devil is in the details, which haven’t yet been made public. Russia keeps close ties with Cuba and proved its ability to work with Venezuela on strategic areas such as military and energy. It’s unclear to what extent these agreements will change or strengthen that cooperation in concrete terms. But it’s quite clear that Washington will try to figure out if it means greater Russian influence in its backyard.
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April 20, 2021
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Brief: Russian Plane Violates Colombian Airspace
It may have been a surveillance mission or a warning.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: Russia has long been eager to expand its influence in Latin America, but the region’s distance from Moscow and proximity to the United States mean it has historically been under American influence, with few opportunities for Russia to break through. Nonetheless, the Kremlin’s activities in the region can still cause alarm in Washington and among U.S. allies, a fact Moscow is keen to exploit, especially at a time when the situation on Russia’s own borders is tense and Western pressure on the country is high.
What Happened: Colombia’s Defense Ministry said it scrambled fighter jets to intercept a Russian Il-96 that had flown from Moscow with no specific destination. The plane’s tail number is assigned to Russia’s Federal Security Service, and according to some sources it had permission to fly over Colombian waters, but it veered off course and into Colombian airspace. The plane promptly responded to Colombian calls to leave its airspace. After the incident, the Colombian Foreign Ministry delivered a note of protest to Russia’s ambassador. The foreign minister said Bogota wanted guarantees from Moscow that it would not repeat these “serious and systematic violations of Colombia’s airspace.”
Bottom Line: Similar violations of Colombian airspace by Russian aircraft occurred in 2013, 2019 and 2020, but relations between Russia and the West are particularly bad right now. The Kremlin may have been trying with this incident to remind the U.S. of its presence in Latin America. This may also have been a reconnaissance flight for the benefit of the Venezuelan government, a Kremlin ally with a fraught border situation with Colombia. Neither scenario would please Washington.
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Uruguay in the Spotlight
It’s not every day that this small nation gets drawn into the geopolitical fray, but here we are.
By: Allison Fedirka
After a comparatively hands-off approach to Latin America after the Cold War, the United States is in the process of reengaging with the region. What that engagement looks like depends on geostrategic locations, especially in the South Atlantic, and especially with countries that have already made gestures to suggest an opening for improved ties. No other country than Uruguay fits the bill.
Their new courtship started earlier this month. On April 6, the head of U.S. Southern Command paid a two-day visit to Uruguay – the first of its kind in five years. A week later, the U.S. National Security Council’s senior director for the Western Hemisphere, Juan Gonzalez, and the Department of State’s acting assistant secretary for Western Hemisphere affairs, Julie Chung, did the same. They met with the president, the foreign minister, the interior minister, the defense minister and the head of the Secretariat of Strategic State Intelligence. Gonzalez said the two sides agreed to plan a new meeting in Washington at an unspecified date, suggesting the U.S., which has no shortage of problems and challenges, is interested in making the time for tiny Uruguay.
Its value to the U.S. lies in its geography. Uruguay covers only about 68,000 square miles and has a population of just 3.5 million people, who reside mostly in the capital of Montevideo and along the Rio de la Plata coastline. The country is flat and full of fertile soil but, unlike many of its neighbors, lacks the mineral deposits so many other countries lust after. (This helps explain why Europeans originally declined to settle there.) What Uruguay brings to the table is not what is inside the country’s borders but the borders themselves. The Uruguay River empties into the Rio de la Plata at nearly the same point as the Paraguay River, giving its inland territories access to the Atlantic Ocean. In total, Uruguay’s coastline measures 410 miles and its continental shelf 350 nautical miles. This gives a small country, nestled between regional giants Brazil and Argentina, an outsized reach into the South Atlantic.
Uruguay Continental Shelf
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Uruguay’s position as a buffer state between those two giants makes it attractive to outside powers looking for a partner. Since the arrival of Europeans in the early 1500s, Uruguay has passed back and forth between Spanish and Portuguese hands several times. The country’s flat land and lack of any natural barriers made fighting easy but made establishing clear lines of defense extremely difficult. Even after Argentina and Brazil became independent, fighting for control over Uruguay lasted until Lord John Ponsonby had the idea to create a state and end the fighting. To this day, much of Uruguay’s foreign strategy is based off that balancing act between its two stronger neighbors.
Uruguay
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Outside powers often take advantage of this situation. Third-party interest in Uruguay goes back to the country’s foundation. Fighting between Argentina and Brazil came to a close thanks to mediation by the United Kingdom. The U.K. was seen as an acceptable mediator because it had supported the independence movements in South America and opposed the former colonial powers of Spain and Portugal. A newly independent state helped establish peace in a region with which the U.K. could increase trade and to which it could sell goods. The creation of Uruguay meant the U.K. could access Montevideo, a major commercial hub along South America’s Atlantic Coast, without having to directly engage with the more powerful Argentine and Brazilian governments. Uruguay still serves as an alternative entryway into South America that sidesteps Argentina and Brazil. This position can be useful to an outsider seeking to secure its presence in the region.
As the U.S. tries to shore up influence in the Western Hemisphere in the face of competition from other powers, it will need to address the South Atlantic. Washington faces some logistical challenges for monitoring and policing South Atlantic waters due to its sheer size and distance. Having a reliable partner in the region would help immensely by essentially expanding the reach of U.S. operations.
Uruguay’s location and stability are perfect in that regard. Brazil’s size makes it hard for bilateral agendas and priorities to align, not to mention that Brazil’s political crises make it difficult to build on any strategic partnerships at this time. Argentina is fraught with economic uncertainty and social unrest, and is increasingly flirtatious with China. But Uruguay has plenty going for it. The country is one of the most politically and economically stable countries in South America. But it’s not so well off that it wouldn’t want to benefit from more U.S. engagement, particularly given the economic problems facing its major trade partners Brazil and Argentina.
On the security front, the concept of U.S.-Uruguayan cooperation is not new. As the U.S. started to become a power at the beginning of the 20th century, it started to use its Navy to lay claim to the Western Hemisphere and discourage European interference. However, the Navy was also used to help regulate conflicts among Latin American countries. In 1904, for example, Uruguay’s president asked the U.S. to send warships to dissuade Argentina from moving against the sitting government. In 1940, the U.S. floated the idea of establishing a military base in Laguna del Sauce. Strong opposition in Uruguay, which feared Brazilian and Argentine responses to a U.S. base, quickly killed the idea. A subsequent attempt to resurrect it in 1944 also failed. Instead, the U.S. ushered in the Inter-American Reciprocal Assistance Treaty, which served as a collective security pact among its signatories, including Uruguay. This was followed by a 1952 security agreement between Uruguay and the U.S. that still serves as the legal blueprint for current cooperation. Over the past decade, there have been several calls in Uruguay to modernize its defense agreements with the U.S. to better reflect the post-Cold War world. Now that the U.S. has shown an interest in Uruguay, the calls may only grow louder.
The indications from Washington suggest reengagement will feature support for Uruguayan-led security efforts. The most immediate threat the U.S. faces in the South Atlantic is Chinese involvement in infrastructure projects and the presence of Chinese fishing fleets. The U.S. already expressed its concern on both scores, though given its fraught history in the Cold War, it’s hard to believe the U.S. will be allowed to build bases there. Better, according to the SOUTHCOM commander, to keep things light, with forces able to come and go quickly with the help of partners. He also suggested that SOUTHCOM increase its intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capacity in the region and tie it to improved security cooperation with partner nations.
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There may also be an added economic component. In a subtle nod, the White House declared a Pan American Day earlier this month. The name harkens back to a concept the U.S. formally introduced to the region in 1890 through the First International Conference of American States. (It would later evolve into the Pan-American Union and then the Organization of American States.) The initial purpose of this mechanism was to promote and facilitate trade within the Americas by collecting and disseminating information concerned with production, commerce and customs law. The overarching strategy behind it was the economic well-being of the Americas and keeping southern countries disinterested in outside powers. An economic component would further help curb Chinese influence in the region.
More broadly, the United States' development of closer ties to Uruguay serves as a litmus test for its reengagement with the Western Hemisphere. On the security front, the U.S. needs a sort of blueprint for engaging with the region beyond counter-narcotics operations and in a way that does not create a backlash against the U.S. The timing also opens the possibility of revisiting existing security agreements by creating an environment in which these countries can increase ever so slightly their requirements for cooperation given that, this time, Washington is approaching them and not the other way around.
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https://amgreatness.com/2021/05/02/latin-americas-salvation-cant-be-in-exporting-its-people/
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May 12, 2021
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Colombia: A Canary in a Coal Mine?
Latin American governments can no longer ignore the problems they had pre-pandemic.
By: Allison Fedirka
Over the past year, the COVID-19 pandemic has understandably commanded the world’s attention. So it was sometimes easy to forget that every country on every continent had its fair share of social, political and economic problems, but now that the pandemic is becoming more manageable for many (though, tragically, not all), countries can no longer ignore them. Not only did they not go away, in many cases the pandemic and its associated countermeasures made their problems worse. Social unrest has been particularly hard to mollify; doing so typically requires either financial measures a government cannot currently afford or structural changes it cannot hope to pass quickly.
Take Colombia. The recent wave of protests there is in some ways an extension of those that were essentially put on hold when the pandemic hit. Among the grievances were communal violence, the peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia rebel group, corruption, poverty and so on. Not being able to gather in public, demonstrators weren’t able to demonstrate, creating a false sense of security for the government, even as it failed to address the protesters’ concerns.
As far as protest culture goes, Latin America is something of a connoisseur. Public demonstration is a trusted tool for citizens and politicians alike to air their views, issue demands and pressure their audience into negotiation. The demands of protesters can vary greatly, from getting a bonus welfare payment to negotiating better wages to serious or frivolous social causes. Yet the effective protests that the government can address tend to share a common element: a clear group of participants with a clear demand that can be met through a specific course of action. What makes the latest protests in Colombia distinct is that the protesters have used the government’s latest tax proposal as a springboard to take issue with socio-economic structures of the country more broadly. In that sense, the government is having to do more than recover from a pandemic; it’s having to reassess essential economic and political relationships with the society it governs.
What Happened
In the final weeks of 2020, Bogota confirmed plans to introduce major tax reforms in 2021 to stabilize and ignite growth in the economy. One of the main goals of the reforms was to reduce fiscal gaps and ensure the country’s capacity to service debt. It satisfied the government’s need to maintain investor confidence in markets and ensure economic stability. (Credit rating agencies and other financial institutions had made statements saying Colombia’s investment grade status could be at risk without fiscal reform.) Foreign direct investment, after all, plays an important role in the Colombian economy. The middle and working classes, however, felt differently. They believed the higher taxes and reduced discounts created a greater burden on middle-class and poorer citizens and not enough burden on the wealthy. Nationwide protests erupted April 28 and have continued ever since.
Foreign Direct Investment in Colombia
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Inflation Rates in Colombia
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But the protests were never really about the tax reforms. If they were, protesters may have gone home when the government withdrew the bill on Monday. (It’s points like this that protests in Latin America tend to calm down.) But they didn’t. They continued to rally, compelling Bogota to dispatch security forces to maintain order in urban areas and eliminate blockades to allow for the free passage of cargo, and persuading President Ivan Duque to invite representatives from the opposition, private business and local governments to talk about the reforms and reshape them going forward. But complaints from across the political spectrum came forward. Some were concrete, others abstract, but there was no designated leader and no organizing body to unify the demands. It’s become nearly impossible for the government to resolve the protests effectively or quickly.
The dominant rhetoric around the demonstrations also hints at something deeper. Naturally, people from various parties have blamed different groups for infiltrating the protests and instigating violence. Such accusations are common practice in Latin America – and sometimes they’re even true. More telling, though, are two comments by leading politicians from opposing sides of the aisle. On the conservative end, former President Alvaro Uribe called on people to resist the “dissipated molecular revolution,” a term adopted by conservative academics in the region to explain dynamics observed in Latin American protests. It makes two main points: First, that political groups gradually change how individuals think and lead them to reject existing shared societal values. Second, protests bring the state to a point of extreme disorder such that the government has an excuse for a strong security response.
The voice on the other end of the political spectrum is opposition leader Gustavo Petro, who said that the protests mark the beginning of the end of neoliberalism in Colombia. The next phase, he says, will be marked by repression.
Both comments suggest that a large segment of the population now questions the neoliberal economic model in place, and new ideas are emerging. The significance of this claim should not be overlooked. A state’s ideas about the domestic economy are intimately linked to its politics, and thus its foreign and trade policies.
Hard Road Ahead
This is hardly Colombia’s only deep-rooted issue. The country’s politics and security services are still adjusting to the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The war with the FARC lasted more than 50 years and left countless scars on society, and a piece of paper alone doesn’t translate into political and social harmony. In addition, the government is still in talks with the National Liberation Army, and it’s still combating dissident FARC groups that remain active in the black market and drug trade.
There’s also the decade long deterioration of the Venezuelan state and economy, which acts as a drain on the Colombian government’s attention and resources and has sucked the region into the U.S.-Russian power struggle. Finally, Bogota must prepare its economy, which has benefited greatly from the production and export of hydrocarbons, for a world of moderate oil prices and transition toward renewables. For better or worse, addressing these issues requires a break with the status quo.
A restructuring of the government’s relationship with society doesn’t have to be catastrophic. Take Chile, which started a similar process in fall 2019. A decision to raise metro fares sparked mass violent protests across the country, followed by a series of government concessions and reforms. The process included major issues, like restructuring military funding, and culminated in the initiation of a process to change the country’s Pinochet-era constitution. Chile still has social and economic issues to address, but unlike Venezuela, its history illuminates a path for remaking the social contract without complete collapse or complete rejection of current models. It will take time before it’s clear whether Colombia can do the same.
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Not to worry, Co-Prez Kommiela is on the case!
May 24, 2021
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Reengaging the Northern Triangle
Washington can’t ignore the overtures China is making in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatemala.
By: Allison Fedirka
In recent years, there’s been a periodic and predictable exchange between the United States and the Northern Triangle countries – Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. A group of immigrants heads north to the U.S. to escape poverty and insecurity, whereupon U.S. policymakers argue either that the immigrants should be stopped in their tracks or that conditions should be improved in their home countries so that they don’t need to migrate in the first place. This rote episode inevitably falls into the background of international affairs, only to resurface a few months later when another “caravan” forms. Occasionally, some security assistance or added consular support would be introduced, but nothing really happens that alters the relationship between the U.S. and the Northern Triangle or that upsets the regional balance of power.
But the status quo is beginning to change, however slowly. Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala certainly continue to call for greater cooperation and funding from Washington, but they are also entertaining overtures from China, a tactic Washington will be unable to ignore.
Obsession
The United States has a long-standing obsession with Central America. Presidents since the mid-1800s have prioritized having a strong U.S. presence there. It’s why the U.S. spearheaded the construction of the Panama Canal and why it paid so much attention to the region during the Cold War. The obsession, of course, stems from Central America’s geostrategic value. The countries form the western flank of the Caribbean basin. They occupy a place where the North American landmass narrows, greatly reducing the distance between the Pacific and Atlantic coasts. (Most of the countries here are bicoastal.) Control and influence over this region and its maritime approach remain critical to U.S. strategy for securing its maritime borders.
Consequently, rivals seeking to unnerve or agitate the United States look to Central America as a point of vulnerability. The Soviets certainly did so during the Cold War, which was a much hotter conflict for the region than the name implies. Indeed, Central America served as a brutal front for fighting between the two global powers. The U.S. kicked things off in 1954 by supporting a coup in Guatemala, though the primary years of action did not occur until the 1980s when domestic political unrest created an opening for the Soviets. What followed was 36 years of civil unrest in Guatemala, 12 years of civil war in El Salvador and the U.S. using Honduras as a staging ground for troops that participated in 12 years of fighting during Nicaragua’s revolution. The details vary by country, but the results were the same: structural economic damages, a poor security atmosphere that rewarded illegal behavior and weak political institutions monopolized by elites.
This is precisely why so many migrants are so eager to flee to the United States, and it’s precisely why China is uniquely able to capitalize. The U.S. and the Northern Triangle broadly understand that investment and aid are necessary to improve socio-economic conditions, but they don’t agree on how much or where it should go, and there are often strings attached. For example, Northern Triangle countries are currently seeking as much as $30 billion in financing, yet Washington’s most recent offer was just $4 billion and was accompanied by calls for political and economic reforms. Washington believes it cannot trust that the funds will be used effectively. (Its concern isn’t entirely misplaced. The U.S. has open court cases against top Guatemalan officials for corruption and top Honduran officials for drug trafficking, and lawmakers are debating how to respond to the El Salvadorian legislature’s vote to replace five supreme court judges and the attorney general. This makes it hard for both sides to engage in good faith.)
A Few Grand Gestures
The U.S. has had little reason to change its approach to the Northern Triangle – that is, until China began to court the region more earnestly and vice versa. Washington has been particularly worried about El Salvador. In 2018, the government decided to recognize China over Taiwan, when Beijing expressed an interest in developing La Union port. More recently, when the president removed the supreme court judges, Washington sent an envoy to San Salvador who was ignored by the president. More, a week later, the legislature ratified an agreement with China for the construction of a stadium, library and water treatment facility. Vaccine diplomacy has also been put in play with several shipments of China's Sinopharm delivered to El Salvador.
Washington has fewer options to manage the situation now than it did during the Cold War, when the specter of communism “justified” all sorts of sordid behavior. (Indeed, over the years, details of U.S. actions and operations in the Americas during the Cold War have come to light and clearly show its role in the violence and instability in the region.) Being too heavy-handed will only alienate the region and likely push it further into China’s sphere of influence. Even using clandestine approaches through civil society groups and nongovernmental organizations is difficult. Previous attempts to leverage aid programs as a solution have been pursued by U.S. presidents from John F. Kennedy to Barack Obama, and all of them failed.
Foreign Direct Investment | Central America
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Constraints such as these have led many to propose that the U.S. increase trade, near-shoring and general economic engagement with the Northern Triangle. Crucially, these proposals intersect with the broader U.S.-China trade war. The U.S. already has the upper hand in trade with these countries, all of which have moderate to high dependencies on exports. They’re attractive candidates for near-shoring activities, especially given their close proximity and relatively cheap labor, but security is a strong impediment. Additional financial firepower could also be acquired by leveraging relationships with Taiwan, which values the diplomatic recognition it has received from Guatemala and Honduras.
Northern Triangle Trade Trends
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It’s a bit of a double-edged sword. But putting trade and economic projects at the fore plays directly into the broader U.S.-China trade and economic wars. There’s been lots of hype about increased Chinese presence in Latin America, but the degree and type of influence vary drastically by location. Northern Triangle countries have few natural resources that would be attractive to China. And Beijing’s push for shifting manufacturing production to higher-tech, value-added goods would not find many buyers in the region. Even so, China is a giant market that could offer preferable terms to increase its share of trade, which is relatively small in these countries, and gain space in their economies.
Notably, China has become a bit more judicious with the types of infrastructure projects it invests in. But given the strategic value of these countries to the U.S., the geopolitical gains could well make up for any financial losses. There is, of course, the traditional danger of a country getting caught in a debt trap, but tomorrow’s problems would not be enough to discourage the Northern Triangle from today’s gains. China’s ability to conduct business in legal gray areas is compatible with the patronage systems still employed by Northern Triangle countries, thereby allowing them another source through which to funnel money to support networks. There also exists the longer-term potential threat of China introducing a digital footprint in these countries by helping develop surveillance technology or telecommunications systems.
The U.S. faces a pressing need to consider how it wants to reengage the Northern Triangle in light of this competition. Right now, Washington holds the upper hand on the economic front and is the dominant hemispheric security power. However, China is more than capable of undermining Washington’s position with just a few grand gestures. Beijing’s foothold in the region is small for now, but it’s too strategically valuable not to be at least targeted, especially considering that the U.S. threshold for tolerating risk there is so low.
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Beware shiny object syndrome over Taiwan
China is eroding American influence in the Western Hemisphere
By Tom Basile
Communist China’s military and rhetorical escalation against Taiwan is testing the Biden Administration’s response to America’s most dangerous geopolitical adversary. While speculation runs rampant about President Xi Jinping’s next move and breathless commentators discuss the possibility of war over the island nation, the CCP continues advancing a truly global strategy.
America has ‘shiny object syndrome’ when it comes to foreign policy, and China knows it. Our media outlets love the intrigue and suspense of a possible US-China standoff. Our hapless politicians never miss an opportunity to fixate on a single issue while ignoring broader perspectives and bigger problems.
For all the talk about Taiwan, there is little discussion or action over China’s incursions into the Western Hemisphere, where the CCP is eroding American influence right in our backyard.
We’re used to thinking about communist power in this hemisphere as isolated in places like Cuba or Venezuela. The Chinese have quietly changed that, doing things that never make a Presidential debate or the nightly news. Their military power, debt-trap diplomacy, and economic coercion are spreading like a virus.
In July, former Costa Rican President Luis Guillermo Solís cautioned in an op-ed that “Central America seems particularly fertile ground for Chinese expansion.” He warned of the Chinese capitalizing on the region’s division between the Nicaraguan dictatorship, compromised states like Guatemala and Honduras, El Salvador teetering on the brink of autocracy, and the effects of COVID-19 and systemic issues in several other nations.
Since 2007, Chinese private and state investment in Central America has amounted to more than $2.3 billion in Mexico, $2 billion in Costa Rica, and $500 million in Panama. The Chinese are dumping money into Honduras, Guatemala and this year announced a $550 million infrastructure deal with El Salvador.
On the telecom front, Huawei controls 37% of the cellular market in Costa Rica and is also a major player in Belize. China does not separate business and political objectives. Even so-called private enterprises are utilized to advance political agendas.
Moving into South America, the People’s Liberation Army has constructed and controls a space command center in Argentina. According to Reuters, the station played a “key role in China’s landing of a spacecraft on the dark side of the moon” in 2019. Argentina signed a cooperation agreement in 2015 that could lead to the CCP building military bases there.
Both Columbia and Peru have purchased Chinese military hardware, and the new Marxist regime in Peru is likely to strengthen ties with Beijing.
Among China’s principal goals is controlling strategic minerals. They’ve made large investments in ownership of lithium mines critical to producing electric vehicles, renewable energy, and wearable tech. China is also investing in the energy sector in Chile, Brazil, and Peru.
China recently announced a massive all-cash deal involving a lithium brine operation in Argentina amounting to more than $770 million. In each of these scenarios, whether the CCP’s activities involve mining, energy, military, or aid in the form of loans or grants, the regime is buying influence even with traditional US allies. Certainly, there are signs of structural cracks in the China juggernaut: mounting debt, lower productivity, and an energy crisis. But the Biden administration shouldn’t expect that to impact China’s global strategy. Unlike Soviet Russia, China has bought a lot of friends to help them weather the storm and grow their influence, even as economic growth slows with Mr. Xi’s tightening grip on society.
The United States leaned into its anti-Soviet, anti-communist strategy during the first Cold War, and it needs to do the same now. Taiwan may be a sexy story for our digital age soothsayers, but it’s one shiny object. A weak Joe Biden and Washington in disarray will continue to ignore the CCP’s reach at their own peril. So far, we’ve been like a moth to a flame, unaware of the mortal danger that lies ahead.
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Ultimately this flaw of this piece is that it takes seriously the "deal with the root causes" meme. That said there are a number of relevant observations in this piece-- principally in its description of the problems.
November 1, 2021
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A Long-Term US Strategy for Latin America
The pandemic created unprecedented problems in the region at a time when Washington’s ability to help is severely constrained.
By: Allison Fedirka
When U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken admitted last month that the U.S. had a mixed record on improving civilian security in Latin American countries, the region did a double-take. Security cooperation, even direct intervention, has been the cornerstone of U.S. engagement with Latin America. When it works, it’s a low-cost approach that leaves spare resources and energy for Washington to project power across the globe. But the economic and social disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has wreaked havoc across the region, interacting with existing security threats to pose new challenges to the United States. The U.S. is responding with a new approach that also emphasizes social and economic development projects, which it hopes will not only reduce immediate security threats but also support longer-term goals like reducing power vacuums, strengthening the region’s economic ties with the U.S., and securing the U.S.-aligned regime structure.
Past the Tipping Point
Nearly all the countries in Latin America were poorly equipped to deal with the pandemic. Large segments of the population lacked access to adequate health care; few workers could perform their jobs remotely; and governments lacked the funds for massive social spending or recovery projects. The region’s economy contracted nearly 8 percent in 2020 – well above the 3 percent global average – and economists expect it will take nearly a decade to recover. Making matters worse, many of these countries were facing severe socio-economic difficulties even before the pandemic, like organized crime, forced displacement, lack of formal employment and natural disasters. The pandemic pushed many states past the tipping point.
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Latin American governments’ difficulties meeting the needs of their population had three major consequences. First, organized crime groups stepped in to ensure economic activity, food distribution and other public needs, especially in remote areas. These groups also offered employment opportunities at a time when jobs were hard to come by. As organized crime gained a stronger hold in these areas, attacks on local communities, turf wars and displacement increased. Second, public trust in government was severely damaged. Nearly all leaders in the region saw their popularity drop, with several facing calls for impeachment. With their power diminished and populations disgruntled, politicians became vulnerable to the influence of foreign powers offering economic relief or political support.
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Finally, migration pressures in three separate areas overflowed and collided in Central America, en route to the United States. The Northern Triangle region (El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras) is most familiar to Americans because of its prominence during the Trump administration. A second wave involves people from Hispaniola fleeing Haiti’s latest political crisis. There are also migrating Haitians who previously settled in South America, primarily Brazil and Chile, after the 2010 earthquake. Deteriorating conditions in those countries have pushed the migrants north toward the United States. Finally, Venezuelans have been leaving their country in droves in recent years. Many of them settled in Colombia, but with Bogota saying it cannot host any more and other governments in the region prioritizing their own citizens, many Venezuelan migrants are now looking to make the trek north as well.
The simultaneous occurrence of increased migration, stronger organized crime and regionwide political instability poses a formidable security threat to the United States. Though elements of this activity have always been present to some degree in the region, the current magnitude and scope go well beyond previous levels. An adequate U.S. security response would require a massive mobilization of resources at a time when the U.S. is trying to reduce military commitments, manage an unprecedented economic recovery and unify a deeply divided public. Furthermore, these types of operations provide only short-term relief at best. Washington needs a strategy that also addresses long-term threats while minimizing costs.
A New Approach
In recent weeks, the U.S. government has signaled a shift in its engagement strategy with Latin America that integrates a much stronger socio-economic focus to complement security efforts. The first clue came in early October when Mexican officials announced the end of the Merida Initiative, the linchpin policy for U.S.-Mexican security cooperation, and the start of a new stage of cooperation. Shortly thereafter the two countries held their High-Level Security Dialogue, which ended with a joint statement declaring the decision to take a more holistic approach to security. The parties pledged more indirect efforts like working with at-risk youth, reducing drug use and jointly combating arms trafficking. Mexico City had long lobbied for this approach, but Washington had resisted.
Similarly, on Oct. 25, the U.S. government announced a new strategy for combating drug trafficking in Colombia. The objective is to strengthen the government’s presence in rural communities, support the incomes of legal businesses and eliminate coca production. There are other indications of a shift in U.S. strategy in other parts of Latin America. During an Oct. 20 speech in Quito, Blinken said the U.S. had focused too much on addressing the symptoms of organized crime and relied too much on working with security forces rather than addressing root causes. Many communities have come to rely on organized crime to stimulate economic activity. It’s difficult to convince people to leave organized crime without providing them an alternative source of income, especially when their former “employer” relies on violence to keep people in check. The Biden administration wants to correct this, Blinken said, and to create economic opportunities that will weaken organized crime over time.
Migration is another area where a security-focused approach may provide temporary relief but not a permanent solution. People leave their countries for many reasons. Addressing physical insecurity and political turmoil must be part of the solution, but unless the economic situation improves, those problems will invariably return.
Foreign Threats
A final element of Washington’s new approach has less to do with Latin American instability itself than with what hostile powers could do with it. In June, the U.S. said fighting corruption, both domestically and internationally, was a core interest for U.S. national security. Corruption and authoritarian government go hand in hand, Washington argues, and undemocratic regimes divert resources away from economic growth. This is directly relevant to the post-pandemic economic and political landscape in Latin America.
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Disillusionment with Latin American governments’ inability to deal with the pandemic’s fallout has added fuel to preexisting questions about democratic governance. This trend poses a long-term threat to the U.S., which promotes and relies on democratic regimes worldwide. It also raises the possibility that governments in the region will look to nondemocratic powers like Russia or China for assistance if that gives them a better chance of holding on to power. By stressing the links between corruption, economic development and democracy, Washington is trying to make the case for like-minded, pro-U.S. governments in the region.
Funding plays a critical role in any economic development project, and for that the U.S. has relied on its International Development Finance Corp. Washington set up the DFC in late 2018 as part of its response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. In Latin America, DFC efforts have focused primarily on providing financing for small and midsized businesses. The DFC can also invest in large infrastructure projects, and it encourages the participation of foreign partners.
Its strength is also a potential weakness: its dependence on private-sector cooperation to execute development projects. The DFC offers longer investment horizons, U.S. government funding upfront, protection against currency inconvertibility, and insurance against expropriation and political violence, all in an effort to attract investors. Without private participation, the DFC lacks the funds to make a serious difference in Latin American economies. The potential benefit of this model, however, is that it allows U.S. companies to gradually increase their presence in Latin America, boosting economic growth in a sustainable way while reinforcing long-term economic ties with the United States.
By giving socio-economic development a more prominent role in U.S. strategy toward Latin America, the U.S. is redefining how it engages with the hemisphere. Security operations will always be needed to deal with immediate threats, but a sustainable approach requires attention to the underlying causes of instability and violence. Doing so now, before the scale of the threats is too great or the costs too high, is key to Washington’s continued ability to project power around the globe.
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Grey zone skirmish with the PRC
At stake: Control of the Panama Canal
By Ron MacCammon
A growing U.S.-People’s Republic of China (PRC) gray zone skirmish in Panama could have real national security implications for the United States. In the next few months, there are significant port and canal decisions that will be a bellwether gauging if China can continue to outmaneuver the United States in Latin America through its use of soft power, incentive-based bargaining, and the argument of a declining America. At stake is strategic control of the Panama Canal.
The port decision focuses on Hutchison Whampoa and its 25-year port concession set to expire in January 2022. Hutchison is a Chinese multinational, Fortune 500 conglomerate with a ports and related services division operating in 26 countries. They also manage five of the 10 busiest container ports in the world. While China does not operate the canal, Hutchison manages the ports of Balboa and Cristobal on both sides of the isthmus and the concession for Margarita Island, Panama’s largest Atlantic port. Hutchison is rumored to have deep ties spanning decades with Beijing.
The canal decision centers on a 50-year concession for a new water management system. This system will address the increasingly constrained water levels caused by drought and overuse that have worried canal officials for years. Multiple PRC companies have expressed interest in this project. With these two contracts, China would have an enormous lever of power to affect transshipment cargo operations. Beijing could use these companies as political agents to disrupt canal operations during a hot gray zone confrontation, exerting strategic control over this critical maritime chokepoint.
Panama has always been a small country with an oversized profile because of the canal and its long history with the United States. The canal bridges the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. It has been the force behind Panama’s emergence as a maritime and air logistics hub with a substantial global banking and services center. It is still relevant after more than a century in operation and factors in around 6% of international trade. The United States is the top customer, with 68% of canal traffic beginning or ending at a U.S. port, while China is 16%. The U.S., via treaty with Panama, guarantees permanent neutrality of the canal, with fair access for all nations and nondiscriminatory tolls. With that in mind, the PRC maneuvers carefully, but it is emboldened.
Panama robustly turned toward China during the presidency of Juan Carlos Varela (2014-2019).
Panama broke diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2017. It fully embraced the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the PRC’s global infrastructure development strategy that invests in countries to expand Chinese economic and political influence. In Panama, many infrastructure projects were proposed during the Varela years, including a 4th bridge across the canal, a high-speed rail system to the interior, and a cruise terminal. From the outset, questions were raised about contract transparency and the necessity of some projects. Corrupt payments to Varela officials once only whispered allegations are now openly accepted as matter-of-fact.
The Chinese BRI template for Latin America is well established: they get major infrastructure projects approved with inflated costs through a process designed to be opaque and enable fraud and corruption. Lax enforcement of key provisions is a program hallmark as labor stipulations, costs and timelines are rarely upheld. By the time the actual costs and beneficiaries surface, the government that signed the deal is out of office. The new government finds the projects do not generate the promised benefits, and the country is more deeply in debt.
Panama, like many nations, has a history of highlevel corruption. It seems each administration seeks new and innovative ways to monetize their time in office. With Laurentino Cortizo and the return of the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 2019 after a decade in political exile, relations with China have cooled. Many projects envisioned have been canceled or restructured. This has been primarily attributed to the impact of Covid-19 on the Panamanian economy. Still, there is noise members of the Cortizo administration have been attempting to renegotiate the terms of some contracts in their favor. The PRD is the party of Omar and Martin Torrijos, of Balbina Herrera and Ernesto Perez Balladares. They are the party of the canal treaty, and the government deposed during the U.S. 1989 invasion. They know how to find an advantage, but even some ‘old’ PRD members find the ‘new’ PRD tactics unseemly.
Many Panamanian elites are U.S.-educated, and the cultural ties between the countries are strong. Still, there is concern about the Biden administration and whether the U.S. can keep its historic leadership role. The U.S. open borders policy has resulted in thousands of migrants pushing through Panama. Many Panamanians are tired of the daily news coverage of migrants begging for food and water, the increase in petty crimes and the draining of already scarce public resources to support their crossing. The Afghan debacle, the cultural chaos, and the overall perception of weak U.S. leadership contrast negatively with an aggressive China open for business. Panama also knows there are other countries courting BRI projects, and Panama has few other realistic options for financing their infrastructure projects. With the disruption of global supply chains from COVID-19, increased shipping costs, and the PRC’s formidable drive to invest in Panamanian infrastructure, the significance of these pending decisions has only increased for the United States. A broad-based engagement strategy that advances both U.S. and Panamanian interests are needed, or the Chinese will look like the better option. None of this is news. In recent years, many frank assessments have been published highlighting Chinese maneuvering in Panama, but the Biden administration continues to project indifference, and their policies lack relevancy. For example, some Panamanian officials quietly expressed doubts about the sincerity of a recent high-level U.S. delegation. They described meetings as full of tired rhetoric and typical promises, which is not a good sign. So time is short, and decisions are pending. Real diplomacy is needed to reassure a traditional partner, or we could wake up one morning wondering how strategic control of the Panama Canal was lost to the People’s Republic of China.
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/1358007/significant-for-us-security
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WSJ
The outcome will also determine whether the small Central American nation continues to recognize Taiwan or switches allegiance to China, as promised by Ms. Castro.
Ms. Castro, who represents the Libre party, is the wife of Manuel “Mel” Zelaya, a controversial former Honduran president. The military in 2009 ousted Mr. Zelaya, who was then an ally of Venezuela’s strongman Hugo Chávez, after he tried to change the constitution to allow re-election, a move they feared would lead him to stay in power for good.
When Mr. Hernández was elected in 2012, however, he changed the constitution and subsequently ran for re-election.
Many voters were in the mood for change. Poverty has soared to a record 74% of the population in 2021 from 59% in 2019. The economy contracted 9% in 2020, the result of the pandemic and the devastation caused by back-to-back hurricanes, Eta and Iota, which hit the country in November 2020.
“I voted for Xiomara Castro because I think she can change this country,” said Bernardo Paredes, a vegetable seller and father of four children in a working-class suburb near San Pedro Sula, the country’s second-largest city. “These last few years have been difficult. We saw a lot of corruption and increased poverty.”
U.S. officials had been worried about the election following the 2017 vote, when election agency officials suspended the count for 36 hours after initial returns showed Mr. Hernández losing. He eventually won, but many Hondurans believe the vote was rigged.
Honduras has since made changes to its system for counting votes.
Mr. Asfura, who is mayor of the nation’s capital, Tegucigalpa, was dogged by allegations of corruption. In 2020, anticorruption prosecutors accused him and another politician of diverting $1.2 million in public funds. But a higher court, controlled by allies of the ruling party, shelved the case, citing procedural errors. He has denied the charges.
As the candidate of the National Party, Mr. Asfura was also burdened by his ties to Mr. Hernández, whom U.S. prosecutors in court papers say turned Honduras into a sanctuary for drug smugglers who paid millions of dollars in bribes in exchange for protection by Honduras’s government. Mr. Hernández’s brother Juan Antonio was found guilty of drug trafficking in New York and is now serving a life sentence in prison.
Mr. Hernández has denied any involvement in drug smuggling and says the accusations are the work of criminals seeking revenge or reduced sentences.
Poverty has soared to a record 74% of the population in 2021 from 59% in 2019; voters in Tegucigalpa on Sunday.
PHOTO: MOISES CASTILLO/ASSOCIATED PRESS
Ms. Castro has vowed to work with the United Nations to tackle corruption in Honduras. In recent years, the country set up an agency staffed with some outside prosecutors trained by the Organization for American States, but Honduran politicians ended its mandate after prosecutors brought several high-profile cases against officials.
She has also vowed to use referendums for major policy decisions, a tool that other leftist governments in the region have used to consolidate power.
“They don’t respect private property,” said Bernabé Cruz, an 86-year-old merchant who voted for the National Party. “I spent about 30 years selling on the streets of downtown San Pedro Sula to have a business in which I have invested $41,000.”
The National Party sought to paint Ms. Castro as a radical who would turn Honduras into another Venezuela. But many in Honduras’s business class and the Catholic Church, fed up with corruption, went against the ruling party, say analysts.
Before the vote, Msgr. Ángel Garachana, president of the Episcopal Conference of Honduras, called on Hondurans to “vote to kick out established networks of corruption.”
Ms. Castro’s call to establish diplomatic relations with mainland China would end Honduras’s long diplomatic alliance with Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province. Honduras is only one of 15 countries that retain formal ties with Taipei. Taiwan’s government has said it would respect the outcome, but called on Hondurans to be wary of what it called false promises by China for economic aid. The U.S. has also pressed Honduras to keep its ties to Taiwan.
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N GEOPOLITICS
In Chile, a Political Revolution 30 Years in the Making
9 MIN READDec 2, 2021 | 21:00 GMT
A protester holds a piece of cloth reading "New Constitution or Nothing" during a demonstration in Santiago, Chile, on Oct. 22, 2019.
A protester holds a piece of cloth reading "New Constitution or Nothing" during a demonstration in Santiago, Chile, on Oct. 22, 2019.
(PEDRO UGARTE/AFP via Getty Images)
For over 30 years, Chile’s predictable politics and free-market economics have made it a beacon of stability in an often turbulent region. Recent developments, however, suggest that may soon change.
In May, Chileans elected a left-wing body to draft the country’s new constitution — a concession offered by the government after massive demonstrations in 2019 saw calls for social and political change. And on Dec. 19, Chileans will head back to the polls to elect either a solidly left- or right-wing president after more moderate candidates were eliminated in the first round of the presidential vote on Nov. 21.
The polarized presidential race, along with the ratification of a new constitution (and the appointment of a heavily slanted assembly to draft it), reflects the extent to which Chilean politics have changed in recent years. But this shift has been a long time coming.
30 Years of Centrist Politics
Chile transitioned to democracy in March 1990 with the election of President Patricio Aylwin, ending the 17-year reign of General Augusto Pinochet’s repressive military dictatorship. Aylwin kept the 1980 constitution, which favors private sector procurement of infrastructure projects and social services. He also continued economic liberalization and fiscal discipline, which began under the Pinochet regime with heavy influence from U.S. economic schools of thought. Aylwin led a coalition of center-left political parties that would go on to govern Chile for 24 of the past 31 years.
In response to growing left-wing influence in Alwyn’s coalition, Chilean politics shifted to the center-right in 2010, seeing pro-business Sebastian Pinera elected for two separate presidential terms in 2010 and 2018. During this period, Chile’s political spectrum oscillated between center-right and center-left coalitions, with the former promoting free-market ideals and the latter implementing social programs benefiting the poor and the growing middle-class. The dominance of the two centrist blocs kept Chile’s political risk relatively low, as neither was interested in fundamentally changing the pro-market policies that had helped fuel the country’s rapid economic growth following the ousting of the military dictatorship.
Chile’s GDP grew an average of 5% per year between 1990-2020. With fiscally disciplined governments at the helm, the Chilean economy benefited from low public-sector debt and low inflation rates. Leveraging its long coastline and access to Pacific markets, the country signed free trade agreements with global economic powerhouses such as the United States and China. Foreign capital also flowed into the country to take advantage of the abundant copper supply. Domestic investment, meanwhile, flourished under government subsidies.
During this three-decade boom, Chile’s middle class grew and its poverty rate fell from 40% to 10%. But many still felt that the country’s free-market system was essentially unequal, as the windfall of foreign investment largely benefited the wealthy while increasing the cost of living for everyone else.
The Chilean government sold land and water rights to private firms and placed the country’s pension system, healthcare and education sectors under the care of the private sector — which charged sky-high service fees. Exorbitant out-of-pocket health and education bills, in turn, drove many middle-class Chileans into massive debt — fueling fears that they may end up living in poverty like their parents.
The Breaking Point
Beginning in 2009, a series of widely publicized scandals over price-fixing of basic necessities like chicken and toilet paper sullied Chileans’ views on private sector dominance. The scandals also contributed to the growing perception that the country was being ruled by a corrupt political elite. Student groups and blue-collar workers protested over perceived societal inequalities, while Mapuche Indigenous collectives began to organize to reclaim their ancestral lands from foreign firms.
Student protests over a subway price hike and police violence served as the catalyst for
massive nationwide demonstrations that began in October 2019 and lasted up until early 2020. Chile’s protest movement saw violent clashes between the country’s militarized police force and protesters, damage to critical infrastructure and the looting of shops and businesses. Over 1.5 million people, just under 10% of Chile’s population, attended a protest on Oct. 25, 2019, calling for the resignation of President Sebastian Piñera.
Though the protests were originally organized by youth leaders, several subsets of society joined, including Indigenous groups. Members of the now-large Chilean middle class also took to the streets, frustrated at paying premium rates for road and water use.
Chile’s Mapuche Peoples
Despite making up 12% of Chile’s population, the Indigenous Mapuche peoples are not formally recognized by the current constitution or the state. Their presence in the country has contributed to societal divides along racial lines. The private sector’s continued refusal to sign over land rights has pushed the Mapuche to resort to violence against business infrastructure, specifically the logging industry.
To quell the protests, the Chilean Congress approved a referendum to rewrite the country’s constitution in October 2020. During the referendum campaign, the anti-establishment left took advantage of the public's discontent to push a message of societal change and a broadened social safety net, growing a following among youth and the middle class.
While protests came to a stop, societal tensions remained strong. Chile’s economy shrunk 5.8% in 2020 amid the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, exacerbating the existing inequalities. The upper class was able to continue working remotely, while the nearly 6 million Chileans with informal jobs in the service sector (most of whom middle- and low-wage workers) struggled to make ends meet.
Against this backdrop, Chilean voters appointed a left-wing body to draft the new constitution in May 2021, fueling fears among the business class about the country’s economic future. In the face of a constitutional rewrite, center-right voters have also grown more extreme in their commitment to protecting Chile’s free-market principles.
One Country, Two Visions
In the aftermath of the pandemic, Chile has seen two political movements on opposite ends of the spectrum gain significant public backing. On the left, the student and Indigenous leaders have become prominent political figures, pulling the ideology of the Concertacion coalition further from the center. And on the right, many voters have abandoned the traditional center-right coalition in favor of the far-right Republican Party, which defends pro-business policy and is starkly against immigration.
These developments are representative of two competing visions for Chile’s future. The first is the leftist dream of a country where the government would provide an expansive safety net by reallocating services such as education, health care and the pension system into the public sector — even if it means greater global isolation and less foreign investment. Funding this vision would require raising taxes and tariffs on industry at the risk of violating several free trade agreements (most notably the Trans-Pacific Partnership) and prompting global powers like China to reduce their reliance on the country’s exports. Ownership of Chile’s natural resources — including water and land rights — would also be restored to the state and Indigenous communities, stripping private firms of these assets.
The right-wing's dream, by contrast, is of a country that remains globally open to business but closed to immigrants. Under this vision, social services and land rights would remain in the hands of private firms, which would ensure Chile retains its liberalized trade and global economic reach. Additionally, the state would increase security measures in an effort to combat the growing influence of regional criminal groups in the country. Chile would also adopt nationalistic policies, including stricter immigration laws, as Chileans seek to protect their jobs and resources from regional waves of migrants. Politicians would likely acquiesce on some social issues, such as formally recognizing Mapuche Indigenous and ensuring gender parity among leadership, but would refrain from substantive action to reallocate resources.
An Uncertain Future
This clash of visions will be on full display during the Dec. 19 presidential runoff election, with Gabriel Boric from the “Apruebo Dignidad” (I Approve Dignity) coalition representing the left-wing’s dream of expanded social services funded by corporate taxes, and Jose Antonio Kast from the Republican Party representing the right-wing’s dream of a free-market economy with fewer illegal immigrants.
But regardless of who wins the presidential race, the proposed constitution is likely to fall in line with the leftist vision for Chile, given the ideological composition of the body currently drafting it.
The new constitution, which the assembly is expected to unveil in late 2022, will probably strip away many private sector benefits and address pressing issues of Indigenous representation, land and water rights. After the draft is ready, Chile will then hold a final referendum to reject or approve the draft. This will provide another trigger for political clashes, as the extreme-right camp will likely rally against the ratification of the draft, in favor of keeping the Pinochet-era constitution and its private-sector protections.
Households, companies and investors in Chile — once one of the most stable countries in South America — will increasingly find themselves in the throes of uncertainty.
These upcoming events portend a period of political and social instability in Chile with increased economic and security risks. The country’s growing polarization will make it harder for politicians to reach agreements, which will almost certainly disrupt and potentially stall the policymaking process. In the short term, this is likely to pose an increased threat to the country’s macroeconomic policy and demonstrations will heighten the threat of the country’s security outlook. Political polarization may also inhibit lawmakers’ ability to face long-term challenges such as ensuring sustainable economic growth and adapting to endemic COVID-19. It could threaten the country’s ability to take full advantage of the global energy transition as well, as the growing threat of climate change increases global demand for Chile’s abundant copper and lithium resources, which are key to electric vehicle production. But legislative gridlock resulting from clashes between increasingly polarized left- and right-wing politicians may threaten Chile’s ability to move up the value chain beyond raw materials exports.
Chile will also likely see the reemergence of frequent protests as the two visions compete. Should the far-right gain political prominence (by, for example, Kast winning the presidential election), the country’s far-left student movement and Indigenous groups are likely to reignite nationwide demonstrations. And if the new leftist politicians are unable to deliver policy or collaborate often with centrists, Chile’s extreme-left anarchist, Marxist and Indigenous groups are likely to increase the frequency of targeted attacks against the state and industry — furthering the country’s instability. As a result, households, companies and investors in Chile — once one of the most stable countries in South America — will increasingly find themselves in the throes of uncertainty.
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December 6, 2021
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The US-China Competition in Central America: Key Countries
Washington and Beijing will take a targeted approach that focuses on their strengths.
By: Allison Fedirka
The competition between the United States and China for influence over Central America and the Caribbean isn’t exactly news, and the reason for the competition is pretty well established. But what often gets overlooked in the discussion, especially when the region is incorrectly lumped together as one big grouping, is how the competition will unfold. The U.S. and China will take a targeted approach that focuses on a few select countries and plays to their respective strengths. It’ll be an uneven competition, to say the least.
The Caribbean
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China, of course, is constrained by distance and a less established political history with the region, so it has a smaller margin of error. As important, its domestic economy is in a precarious state. While the government has managed to stave off crisis, it faces growing pressure in this balancing act. Beijing understands that it must wield its financial influence judiciously, as evidenced by the decision of China’s top two policy banks not to sign new financing commitments with Latin American governments last year. With an eye to getting the most bang for its buck, Beijing will focus on strategic telecommunications and port projects that align directly with its strategic objectives.
But it must be careful. China doesn’t want to do so much that it provokes a security response from the U.S. Beijing has worked to improve institutional ties with several militaries in the region, but its steps in this regard have been small and incremental, laying the groundwork for future cooperation and intelligence collection opportunities.
For its part, the U.S. has always maintained a strategy that integrates the regional economies with its own, especially by addressing macroeconomic development and nation-building. Washington has been trying, for example, to revitalize the Dominican Republic-Central America free trade agreement by working closely with foreign governments and U.S. businesses, which also play a vital role in the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), a key mechanism Washington uses to give loans and fund major projects in these countries. These efforts also align with U.S. near-shoring initiatives, business standards and best practices.
The strategy meets Washington’s strategic needs, shares the financial burden with the private sector and creates a structure for long-term economic leverage in the region. But notably, the U.S. has little choice in the matter: A lack of economic development is one of the biggest drivers behind violence and migration in the region. It’s a security issue the U.S. must address regardless of Chinese activities.
U.S. DFC Projects in Latin America, 2019-2021
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Though China and the U.S. are the principals in this particular competition, it’s the regional countries largely setting the terms of engagement. They know that the U.S. needs them in its camp because losing control of the region means losing control of the ability to project power farther afield. They also know that China (correctly) sees them as a bridge between the Pacific and Atlantic whose maritime and transportation hubs facilitate Chinese access to world markets. They also help Beijing keep a closer watch on U.S. activities.
For Central American and Caribbean countries, it’s a question of survival. They are generally poor, underdeveloped countries that require outside assistance. With their deep pockets, the U.S. and China are ideal benefactors in that regard. But the individual governments in the region set the terms for engagement and price of participation, and define the areas where help is needed.
Different Categories
The countries that will play a role in the competition can be roughly grouped together into five sets that are determined by their existing ties with the U.S. and the opportunity they present to China: Panama and Costa Rica; Nicaragua and Cuba; Guatemala; Honduras and El Salvador; and Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.
Panama and Costa Rica have deeply rooted economic and security ties with the U.S. They also stand out for their relative stability, development and economic status. Washington prioritizes closer ties with them compared with the others, largely because of the Panama Canal. These long-standing ties make the U.S. well-equipped to secure its influence and to push back on China. In Costa Rica, China has executed some highway projects but has struggled to win bids for other endeavors. Some, such as a planned oil refinery, have been scrapped altogether. China also has limitations in Panama. Two major Chinese banks – ICBC and Bank of China – operate in Panama, and Chinese businesses have grown their presence near the canal and special economic zones, but the Panamanian government canceled a $4.1 billion Chinese-funded high-speed rail project and insisted on redefining the parameters for FTA negotiations.
On the opposite end of the spectrum are Nicaragua and Cuba. The U.S. isn’t especially close to either of them, has sanctions against them and, as a result, has minimal influence over them. Russia is the main foreign influence in both countries, though China has notably grown its presence in Cuba, particularly in the telecommunications sector. (Three Chinese companies – Huawei, ZTE and TP-Link – control all Cuban internet.) China also funded the primary undersea cable connecting Cuba to South America via Venezuela, established an artificial intelligence center on the island and shared its security systems designed to monitor and crack down on public dissent. These tools make it difficult for the U.S. to support opisthion forces inside Cuba and pose a potential security threat via electronic monitoring.
Guatemala is in its own category, characterized as it is by a relatively low level of Chinese involvement. Relations with the U.S. and Mexico dominate Guatemala’s foreign and domestic agendas. The country is one of Washington’s main partners for migration security efforts, a tool that can be used to pressure Mexico for similar cooperation when needed. At the moment, the U.S. and Mexico are actively cooperating on development efforts in Central America. Mexico views its relationship with Guatemala as critical for addressing migrant flow and faces the added challenge of a porous border that the central government has struggled to control. These two relationships, though complicated and problematic at times, are critical to Guatemala’s existence, leaving China precious little space to act.
Honduras and El Salvador are the two countries most in play for influence. Both have contentious relations with the U.S. over differences in security, rule of law and politics, and their distance farther south makes them less critical to migration and security operations. More important, they’re far more open to China. The recent election of Xiomara Castro as Honduras’s next president put potential ties with China in focus. Castro has pledged to open diplomatic relations with Beijing (even if one of her vice presidents walked her statements back some). This marks the start of many back-and-forth signals as Honduras seeks concessions from its more powerful suitors. Influence early in the Castro government matters because it will soon fill key posts in various institutions, including multiple Supreme Court judges, come 2023. The U.S. has increased diplomatic visits, used private business to build favor with the Honduran business community and has dangled $4 billion to aid in development projects pending assurances on corruption. Huawei is present in Honduras, and China has worked on two hydroelectric projects in Honduras. However, there is still much space for China to grow.
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Importantly, the U.S. has recently lost political ground to China in El Salvador. Ties between the two have been on a steady decline since Nayib Bukele became president. Now the U.S. relies heavily on Mexico-Northern Triangle cooperation to influence El Salvador. China has used the momentum from this friction to build its presence. It’s a major player in the country’s telecommunications industry and is developing La Union port with an accompanying special economic zone. The port raises concerns over hosting Chinese vessels and setting terms to potentially freeze out U.S. and European companies. Washington’s worst-case scenario is for China to use the port to create a foothold in the region and as a base for building out influence elsewhere. If China has good ties with El Salvador and Honduras, it could theoretically pursue the construction of a dry canal from the Atlantic to the Pacific wholly under its control, or so the thinking goes.
Then there is Jamaica and the Dominican Republic, which have decent ties with the U.S. but are equally open to economic cooperation with China. (Their location in the Caribbean make them slightly harder for China to access since there’s no direct access from the Pacific.) In Jamaica, China’s most notable gains include the China Merchants Port Holdings acquisition in 2020 of the Kingston container port and Chinese company JISCO’s purchase of the Alpart bauxite mine.
The U.S. has prioritized energy supplies and countering China in telecommunication efforts. For years, Washington has been trying to help find sources of affordable energy for both countries. The U.S. persuaded the Jamaican government to sign a declaration on 5G cooperation that respects open market competition and the rule of law. The U.S. satellite internet company Viasat announced a joint project with the Central America Bottling Corp (CBC) to provide low-cost internet to remote communities in Latin America. CBC will help distribute the necessary small satellites to create the hot spots. Jamaica (and Guatemala) will be the first beneficiaries, with others to follow.
Northern Triangle Trade Trends
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What to Watch For
For now, the U.S. seems to have the upper hand. It’s still the dominant trade partner for most countries in the region and the leading source of foreign direct investment. Execution is also proving a challenge for China whose state-owned enterprises and banks deliver on only a fraction of the promised projects. From 2002 to 2018, only about half of the 150 transportation infrastructure projects China pledged to have interests in had entered construction. Still, so long as China makes its overtures, the U.S. will have to respond with initiatives of its own. Washington can’t shut China out of the region entirely, but it can curb Chinese influence in strategic and sensitive areas.
A few upcoming events will gauge the progress of each side in the months ahead. In Honduras, the U.S. military has a forward operating location at the Palmerola airport, which will begin operating as a commercial international airport in the coming months. Some (not all) in President-elect Castro’s party have called for the expulsion of the FOL. Any moves to change its status is an opportunity for China. In mid-January, the Panamanian government will decide whether to grant a concession to Cristobal Port to Hutchison Ports PCC, a subsidiary of a Hong Kong-based holdings company. The company asked for an extension of the contract, but Panama City has the option to open a bidding process, which would signal a nod to the U.S. if Panama goes with the latter.
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Honduras: Incoming Government Reneges on Diplomatic Switch From Taiwan to China
2 MIN READDec 3, 2021 | 19:45 GMT
What Happened: Salvador Nasralla, one of Honduras’ three incoming vice presidents, stated that Honduras would not seek to switch diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China in order to maintain close trade relations with the United States, South China Morning Post reported Dec. 2.
Why It Matters: Incoming Honduran President Xiomara Castro’s original campaign platform included a diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China, so Nasralla’s remarks likely reflect disagreement between high-level officials in the incoming Honduran government. The United States is also likely to court Castro with proposals for cooperation in exchange for retaining relations with Taipei, likely pushing for more investment and economic development programs.
Background: In mid-October, Honduras’s two strongest-polling political parties – the Liberty and Refoundation Party and the Savior Party of Honduras – announced an alliance to support Castro’s presidential bid in the country’s Nov. 28 election. This agreement effectively ended Nasralla’s own presidential bid and made him one of three vice presidents in exchange for his party’s support for Castro.
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https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2021/12/10/beyond_the_border_crisis_a_red_curtain_stretches_southward_146860.html
How does anyone vote for their country to go the way of Venezuela!?
I guess we could ask voters here that too.
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U.S. Accuses El Salvador’s Government of Cutting a Deal With Gangs
U.S. Treasury imposes sanctions on two Salvadoran government officials for their alleged participation in secret talks with imprisoned MS-13 and 18th Street gang leaders
The U.S. Treasury said it was imposing sanctions on Osiris Luna, El Salvador’s deputy justice minister and prisons director, for participating in the secret negotiations.
PHOTO: RODRIGO SURA/SHUTTERSTOCK
By Santiago Pérez
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The administration of El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele secretly negotiated a truce with the imprisoned leaders of the country’s top criminal gangs in exchange for financial and prison benefits, including sex workers and cellphones, the U.S. Treasury said on Wednesday.
The accusation by the U.S. government is the latest sign of rising tension with the impoverished Central American nation, where rampant violence and endemic poverty have led to mass migration to the U.S.
Salvadoran gangs also have an extensive presence in U.S. communities, according to the U.S. government, which has criticized Mr. Bukele’s measures to cement power by weakening institutions and the rule of law.
The U.S. Treasury said it was imposing sanctions on Osiris Luna, El Salvador’s deputy justice minister and prisons director, and Carlos Marroquín, head of a welfare agency, for their participation in the secret negotiations.
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The government “provided financial incentives to Salvadoran gangs MS-13 and 18th Street Gang (Barrio 18) to ensure that incidents of gang violence and the number of confirmed homicides remained low,” the U.S. Treasury said in a statement.
As part of the secret deal, the gangs “received privileges for gang leadership incarcerated in Salvadoran prisons, such as the provision of mobile phones and prostitutes,” the Treasury said.
The deal also secured the gang’s political support for Mr. Bukele’s ruling party in midterm elections earlier this year, the Treasury added.
Mr. Bukele denied the accusations on Twitter. “How can they put out such an obvious lie without anyone questioning them?” he said in a post.
A spokesman for Mr. Bukele didn’t respond to a request for comment. Messrs. Luna and Marroquín couldn’t be reached for comment.
The U.S. sanctions block all property and financial interests that Messrs. Luna and Marroquin have in the U.S. and U.S. citizens are prohibited from any transactions with them.
The 40-year-old Mr. Bukele, who enjoys high approval ratings, has denied reports by the local news publication El Faro that his administration negotiated with gangs to cut down on homicides, which have fallen sharply during his time in office.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/mkt_morningbrief/china-using-loans-in-latin-america-to-push-political-military-objectives_4167337.html?utm_source=Morningbrief&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=mb-2021-12-21&mktids=2bdde08b16c7a21df6eb275cc6129cac&est=rqwG6l3sEei1Yi0irhq8WJg9nGQotG64PSs2vFni9m9ffGDvhtQDNkHTfCy1GAoP02yi
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18050/china-latin-america
That datum about China's % of Ecuadorean debt caught my atttention.
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THINKING ABOUT CHINA
US and China Compete for Influence Through Law Enforcement in Latin America
Antonio Graceffo
Antonio Graceffo
December 24, 2021 Updated: December 24, 2021 biggersmaller Print
News Analysis
Latin America is the new frontline in the battle for influence between the United States and the Chinese regime.
The current threat includes the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) law enforcement partnership program in the developing world, particularly, Latin America.
The CCP’s international law enforcement cooperation (LEC) consists of providing materials, equipment, inexpensive digital tools, training to foreign police officers, as well as consultation on judicial legislation. Focusing on the developing world, these programs include installing Xinjiang-style surveillance systems.
Through LEC, autocratic regimes are partnering with the CCP to increase their surveillance and social control over their own people. The program may not pose an immediate or direct threat to the United States, but it does pose a threat to the development of democracy and the maintenance of freedoms throughout the developing world.
This trend is particularly worrying in Latin America, as it brings CCP surveillance right to the U.S. southern border and Caribbean coast. For this reason, the commander of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Craig Faller, identified China as the greatest threat to U.S. interests.
In its 2008 and 2016 Latin America policy white papers, Beijing stressed the importance of “judicial and police cooperation.” At the 2019-2021 forum for China and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), the CCP prioritized fighting organized crime and corruption. The increasing presence of Chinese companies in the region, as well as international crime such as drug and human trafficking, have become pretexts for the CCP to get more involved with local law enforcement and security forces.
Chinese organized criminal gangs expanding in Latin America have motivated local governments to organize joint operations with Chinese counterparts. In June 2010, Brazil’s Secretary of Justice Romeu Tuma Júnior was fired for being an agent of the “Chinese mafia.” In 2016, Chinese security forces cooperated with local authorities in Argentina to counter the Chinese triad Pi Xiu. Similar cooperation has taken place in Panama and other nations, as well.
Increased Chinese investment has positioned a growing number of Chinese people and business interests in dangerous places. The CCP public-private partnership structure provides government support for private firms, which makes the country richer.
Apart from financial subsidies and soft loans from state-owned banks, this support extends to physical security. Consequently, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and security forces conduct training, preparing to engage on foreign soil to rescue citizens or to protect Chinese businesses. Chinese petroleum and mining firms operate in remote regions of often war-torn or unstable countries, sometimes encroaching on indigenous land, making them vulnerable to violent attacks or kidnaping for ransom. The PLA had to intervene when Chinese workers were attacked in South Sudan. In Yemen and Libya, the PLA had to evacuate Chinese citizens. These types of risks also exist in Venezuela and other parts of Latin America, such as when Chinese oil projects came under attack in northern Ecuador.
As part of the LEC, Chinese companies have donated police vehicles and equipment to countries in Latin America, particularly in the Caribbean. In the Colón Free Trade Zone in Panama, Huawei’s “Safe City Technology” has been installed, including facial recognition cameras, similar to those used to oppress the Uyghurs in China’s Xinjiang region. ZTE has helped Venezuela control its populace through smart ID cards. A team of ZTE employees is now stationed in CANTV, the Venezuelan state-run telecommunications company. Argentina decided to buy surveillance tech from ZTE.
Epoch Times Photo
A display for facial recognition and artificial intelligence on monitors at Huawei’s Bantian campus in Shenzhen, China, on April 26, 2019. (Kevin Frayer/Getty Images)
In 2017, China sold 51 Chery Tiggo armored vehicles to the Uruguayan national police, and donated two Marcopolo omnibuses and 10 armored trucks. China also provided the police with 4,000 surveillance system components, 1,000 of which were deployed on the Brazilian border. The rest went to the capital, Montevideo, as part of the national response system. In addition to surveillance technology, Uruguay is also deploying Chinese biometric systems. Chinese security products now make up 53 percent of the Uruguayan market.
Through international police exchanges and training, the CCP strives to “normalize” technology-based social control systems. Addressing the 86th Interpol General Assembly, CCP leader Xi Jinping said that the Chinese model is a more efficient system that should be used for global security and social management.
Non-democratic actors are following China’s lead, adopting a cybersecurity law that is modeled after Beijing’s. Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro regime also used Chinese training and technology to build a social management system. Since 2008, 80 countries have adopted China’s domestic surveillance tools.
The dissemination of the CCP’s security model throughout the world is having a negative impact on human rights and rule of law, as well as the security of U.S. citizens at home and abroad. In order to counter the negative influence of the CCP’s international law enforcement cooperation, the U.S. State Department has offered the International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs). The goal of the State Department academies is to enhance the skills of foreign criminal justice partners of the United States, as well as improve coordination in combating international crime.
The Academy’s vision is to enhance democracy by supporting the rule of law, and to use improved legislation and law enforcement to better the functioning of free markets in order to maintain social, political, and economic stability. Over the past 20 years, 60,000 officers from 85 different countries have graduated from ILEAs.
While the U.S. State Department is offering a high-quality law enforcement alternative, partnership with China is often accompanied by loans, grants, and investments—making the battle for influence all the more difficult.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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December 27, 2021
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Chile’s New President and the Polarization of South America
Has the pandemic turned the region left again?
By: Allison Fedirka
Last week, Chile held a presidential election that featured two candidates on absolute opposite ends of the political spectrum. On the far right was Jose Antonio Kast, a law-and-order type politician who stands for free markets and opposes abortion and illegal immigration. He was defeated in the second round by Gabriel Boric, the first far-left candidate to win the presidency in 50 years. And though the contest may seem unusual, it actually encapsulates a broader trend in South America already taking place: a return to greater polarization in its politics. In a region where political ideology, economic models and foreign policy alignment are intricately linked, this trend reshapes the landscape as the U.S., China and others vie for influence there – even if economic constraints help temper extreme swings.
Dead Consensus
The COVID-19 pandemic hurt Latin America worse than most other regions. The region accounts for just over 8 percent of the global population, but as of the end of 2021, it accounted for approximately 18 percent of confirmed cases worldwide and 30 percent of deaths. Poor health infrastructure, insufficient vaccine availability and the inability of much of the labor force to work online conspired to wreck the region. A third of registered jobs lost globally were from Latin America, and the regional average loss of income was double the global average. Inflation in the region’s five largest economies is also outpacing the average inflation rate of emerging economies. Unsurprisingly, poverty is at a 12-year high, and extreme poverty at a 20-year high. Economic and development gains from the past decade have been wiped out in the past two years. The International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development and other institutions believe South America won’t rise to pre-pandemic economic levels until 2023-24 at the earliest.
More, wealth distribution has only gotten worse as the pandemic increased inequality, reduced the size of the middle class and made it harder to access basic goods. A problem for any region, wealth distribution has been particularly contentious here since the colonial era. Residual class systems, restricted upward mobility and so on are ultimately the basis for the region’s characteristic fluctuation between two economic models – one favoring a conservative, business-forward and free market framework, and one favoring strong public spending, support for the lower class and a pervasive government presence. Extreme economic disruption often requires an extreme solution, and in this part of the world this has tended to engender greater political-economic polarization.
It’s difficult to overstate how dramatically colonialism affected – and in some ways still affects – the region’s political identity. After independence, its countries had no industrial capacity for producing finished goods. They lost their largest trading partners (their colonizers), and they incurred monstrous debt from funding their wars for freedom. And though they were able to secure flexible financing from European powers happy to stick it to Spain, their trade relationships remained largely unchanged: They provided raw materials for Europe, which in turn sold them finished goods. It was a neo-colonial arrangement that favored political leaders and business elites, often at the expense of the peasants and working class.
South America’s dependence on raw materials, with their wildly volatile markets, paved the way for its penchant for government intervention. Any time commodity prices crater, it’s bad for regional governments, but the stock market crash in 1929 was especially pivotal. Then came World War II. With northern industries going offline or reverting to the production of wartime materials, South America had less access to manufactured goods, and what did arrive was extremely expensive. Regional governments thus had to look for new ways to grow their economies, and in their search, most began to look inward and adopt import substitution models, which require a strong hand of the state to regulate the import of finished goods, provide production subsidies to spur domestic consumption and devise other programs that facilitate the development of national industry.
Heavy-handed economic governance and market manipulation were antithetical to the new U.S.-imposed economic order in the wake of World War II. That order introduced strong ideological and political alignment to a new global economic order, particularly related to debt. Formulated at Bretton Woods, the new system helped regulate exchange rates, curtail speculative capital flows, promote foreign direct investment and discourage the formation of closed, controlled trade blocs. Even after the Bretton Woods system formally ended, its key institutions – the IMF and the World Bank – are still in place and thus allow Washington to continue to influence global economic policy, funding and general affairs. The IMF currently serves as the lender of last resort to countries in an effort to help stabilize the global economy. (The reception of funds is often conditional on meeting IMF criteria, which often align with U.S. views. The World Bank serves as a major source of development assistance to middle-low and low-income countries.)
So if South American countries are unduly reliant on debt to develop their economies, and if the U.S. is disproportionately influential in international lending, then the U.S. holds a fair amount of sway over the economies of the region. In the debt crisis of the 1980s, for example, U.S.-led institutions such as the U.S. Treasury Department and IMF offered a solution: the adoption of fiscal reforms, privatization, market deregulation and free-market trade in exchange for loans and investments in what was known as the Washington Consensus. It became clear that the region’s political and economic institutions were not as developed as those prescribing the policies, which naturally failed to yield the same results. Critics in the countries argued the policies did more harm than good, and in some cases, the economic and social pressure pushed governments out of power.
Compounding the issue was that the Washington Consensus coincided with the end of the Cold War and thus aligned the economic, political and foreign policies of the U.S. and Latin America. So when these countries rejected the Washington Consensus economic model, they de facto rejected their alignment with Washington, giving way to a wave of anti-U.S. sentiment at the turn of the century. Fifteen or so years later, there were signs that the so-called Pink Tide was receding as more pro-market, pro-U.S. leaders were elected into office. The pandemic interrupted this cycle between the left and right in Latin America, creating extreme economic problems and general rejection of any government (independent of political alignment) in charge during the past two years.
New Competition
Thanks to the pandemic, South American governments have to do more to stabilize their economies with less. In short, they can’t support vulnerable populations and spur needed economic growth, so they must rely on private business, trade partners and foreign investment. Other things such as cargo availability and pricing are out of their hands.
All of this comes as the U.S. is reengaging the region. In the wake of the Cold War, Washington was the undisputed power in the Western Hemisphere; no other country was making significant moves in the region. This is now changing. Migration from the northern triangle, near-shoring initiatives, and Chinese and Russian advances (particularly economic) into the region have forced the U.S. to pay greater attention to Latin America.
This new competition for influence during an economic downturn presents some opportunities for these regional governments. Economic competition by outside powers means countries are able to seek better terms for economic deals. For governments that rely on outside money, this is a good position to be in. There are, however, some constraints in what they can do. First, most countries can’t afford to completely alienate themselves from the U.S. or China. They may seek better terms, but most will be unwilling to put all their eggs in one basket. At the same time, outside powers like the U.S. often tie economic arrangements to political and ideological alignment. It’s hard to sell lenders on expensive packages of welfare spending.
When push comes to shove, many South American leaders find themselves taking a more measured approach because they have to. Ecuador’s President Lenin Moreno abandoned the hardline tactics for economic opportunity. Peru’s President Pedro Castillo has been unable to govern at all, let alone enact his ambitious reforms. Chile’s new president will find himself in a similar situation.
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Nicaragua seizes former Taiwan embassy and gives it to China
Outgoing diplomats wanted to donate to church
ASSOCIATED PRESS
MANAGUA, NICARAGUA | The Nicaraguan government has seized the former embassy and diplomatic offices of Taiwan, saying they belong to China.
President Daniel Ortega’s government broke off relations with Taiwan this month, saying it would recognize only the mainland government.
Before departing, Taiwanese diplomats attempted to donate the properties to the Roman Catholic archdiocese of Managua.
But Mr. Ortega’s government said late Sunday that any such donation would be invalid and that the building in an upscale Managua neighborhood belongs to China.
The Nicaraguan Attorney General’s Office said in a statement that Taiwan’s attempted donation of the building was a “manuever and subterfuge to take what doesn’t belong to them.”
Taiwan’s Foreign Relations Ministry condemned the “gravely illegal actions of the Ortega regime,” saying the Nicaraguan government had violated standard procedures by giving Taiwanese diplomats just two weeks to get out of the country.
It said Taiwan “also condemns the arbitrary obstruction by the Nicaraguan government of the symbolic sale of its property to the Nicaraguan Catholic church.”
Msgr. Carlos Aviles, vicar of the archdiocese of Managua, told the La Prensa newspaper that a Taiwanese diplomat had offered the church the property, saying, “I told him there was no problem, but the transfer was still in the legal process.”
The Central American country said in early December it would officially recognize only China, which claims self-ruled Taiwan as part of its territory.
“There is only one China,” the Nicaraguan government said in a statement announcing the change. “The People’s Republic of China is the only legitimate government that represents all China, and Taiwan is an inalienable part of the Chinese territory.”
The move increased Taiwan’s diplomatic isolation on the international stage, even as the island has stepped up official exchanges with countries such as Lithuania and Slovakia, which do not formally recognize Taiwan as a country. Now, Taiwan has 14 formal diplomatic allies remaining.
China has been poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies over the past few years, reducing the number of countries that recognize the democratic island as a sovereign nation. China is against Taiwan representing itself in global forums or in diplomacy. The Solomon Islands chose to recognize China in 2019, cutting diplomatic ties with Taiwan.
Taiwan depicts itself as a defender of democracy, while Ortega was reelected in November in what the White House called a “pantomime election.”
“The arbitrary imprisonment of nearly 40 opposition figures since May, including seven potential presidential candidates, and the blocking of political parties from participation rigged the outcome well before election day,” U.S. President Joe Biden said in a statement in November.
Nicaragua established diplomatic relations with Taiwan in the 1990s, when President Violeta Chamorro assumed power after defeating Ortega’s Sandinista movement at the polls. Ortega, who was elected back to to power in 2007, had maintained ties with Taipei until now.
Nicaragua President Daniel Ortega’s government cut off relations with Taiwan this month and is only recognizing the Chinese government. ASSOCIATED PRESS
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https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-10364663/China-plots-Latin-America-new-action-plan.html
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Gateway to Latin America. Argentine President Alberto Fernandez met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on Thursday. They discussed cooperation on health, science, technology and infrastructure, according to the Argentine ambassador to Russia. Fernandez said he hoped Argentina would become Russia’s gateway to Latin America. He will next travel to China for a meeting with President Xi Jinping. On Tuesday, Argentina’s National Committee of Atomic Energy announced it signed a contract with China National Nuclear Corp. for the construction of a nuclear power plant in Buenos Aires province.
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Is Russia’s Renewed Outreach to Latin America All for Show?
4 MIN READFeb 10, 2022 | 20:33 GMT
People walk past a mural of the Venezuelan and Russian flags that reads "Together we will defeat COVID-19" in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 4, 2021.
People walk past a mural of the Venezuelan and Russian flags that reads "Together we will defeat COVID-19" in Caracas, Venezuela, on March 4, 2021.
(YURI CORTEZ/AFP via Getty Images)
Despite its renewed outreach to Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela in recent weeks, Russia remains unlikely to significantly increase its economic and military cooperation with these countries due to Moscow’s secondary interest in Latin America. On Feb. 9, Nicaragua’s government announced the beginning of negotiations to implement energy, medical and nuclear projects with Russia’s state-owned nuclear corporation Rosatom. The announcement comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin held three separate phone calls with Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel, Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega and Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro between Jan. 23-26 to discuss boosting strategic cooperation in areas including the economy, education and defense. Amid the growing standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine, a top Russian diplomat also recently suggested that Moscow could send a military deployment to Cuba and Venezuela if the United States continues to expand its military presence in Eastern Europe.
When asked on Jan. 14, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov also stated that Russia could neither confirm nor exclude the possibility of Russia placing troops in Latin America, after Putin previously stated he would take unspecified military measures if the United States and its allies failed to heed Moscow’s requests concerning military cooperation in Ukraine.
To mitigate the impact of their isolation from global markets, the governments of Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela will likely seek to increase their economic ties with Russia. But they will remain more hesitant toward significantly ramping up defense cooperation. The Cuban, Nicaraguan and Venezuelan governments will probably advocate for increased trade relations with Moscow and increased Russian investment in an effort to improve their economic conditions and increase internal stability against domestic and foreign challenges. However, these Latin American regimes will likely seek to limit the scope of any new defense cooperation for fear of weakening their sovereignty and internal autonomy.
Over the years, the United States has imposed a trade embargo on Cuba and heavy sanctions on Venezuela’s oil-driven economy. Washington has yet to impose sanctions targeting Nicaragua’s economy, but in response to the country’s deteriorating democracy under President Ortega, the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden has threatened to enact such sanctions in coordination with the European Union and Canada, as well as push Nicaragua out of the Central American Free Trade Agreement.
Nicaragua and Venezuela are among the many Latin American countries that have either purchased or received donations of Russia’s Sputnik V COVID-19 vaccine for their national inoculation efforts.
On Feb. 9, Colombian President Ivan Duque asked Moscow to reassure Bogota that its military assistance to Venezuela will not be used against Colombia. High-ranking members of Venezuela’s army have also voiced concerns in private forums that the presence of Russian troops would undermine the country’s sovereignty.
Russia, for its part, will likely continue cooperation with Latin American authoritarian regimes to counteract what it perceives as the United States’ growing presence in Ukraine and other countries the Kremlin views as under its sphere of influence by demonstrating it can do the same with countries in Washington’s backyard. Russia will likely maintain bilateral relations with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela — using public military stunts as retaliatory measures against the United States and NATO’s collaboration with Ukraine. To maintain a low-cost form of leverage against the United States, Moscow will also likely keep hinting at the possibility of deeper cooperation with these countries through formal agreements on defense issues.
In December 2018, two Russian bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons landed in Venezuela as a show of military support for Maduro’s regime, which at the time was fending off mounting pressure from the U.S.-backed opposition movement.
But Russia’s efforts to preserve its influence in Latin America will likely remain modest overall, as Moscow lacks the will and the resources to significantly expand its presence in a region of the world where it does not have key geopolitical interests. Russia ultimately does not view Cuba, Venezuela and Nicaragua — which are located on the other side of the world — the same way it does countries within its periphery like Belarus, which it supports financially and politically. The Kremlin is thus unlikely to significantly increase trade relations or financial assistance to governments in Latin America. But without significant financial aid from Moscow, regional authoritarian regimes are also unlikely to risk triggering more sanctions and pressure from the West by allowing Russian troops or strategic weapons systems to be deployed to their countries.
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ay 11, 2022
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Latin America in a Time of Transition
The political pendulum is swinging left at a time when options are shrinking.
By: Allison Fedirka
The world is in a transition period, leaving the post-Cold War era, which began in 1991, and entering a new era. This transition period is characterized by volatility and uncertainty about what’s to come. The four main actors governing the geopolitical system – the U.S., China, Russia and Europe – are experiencing dramatic changes that will ripple across the globe. No corner of the world will be spared, and this includes oft-overlooked regions like Latin America, where the political struggle between left and right is affecting the region’s alignment with the world powers.
Geopolitical Timeframes
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In America’s Shadow
Latin America’s worldview is shaped by its proximity to the U.S. and its history of colonization and wars for independence. The colonial period marked the moment when Latin America was connected with the rest of the global system, particularly Europe at the time. The hierarchical structure of Spain’s colonial system and its exploitation of its colonies’ resources created highly stratified societies, where wealth and power were concentrated in the hands of a small upper class. Since the beginning of the struggle for independence, when elites tended to favor the status quo and the poorer populace supported independence, these socio-economic divisions have been cemented in Latin American politics. The competition between the wealthy business class and the poorer working class created distinct, opposing political movements and a tendency for political leadership to flip-flop dramatically between right and left. Even in the post-Cold War period, characterized by integration and globalization, the region’s two largest trade blocs, Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance, have been shaped and divided by opposing attitudes toward global trade.
Latin America's Largest Trading Blocs
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Located squarely in the U.S. sphere of influence and peripheral to most Northern Hemisphere dynamics, Latin America rarely dictates or triggers events of global import. However, its actions influence the U.S. to some degree because of its proximity. Washington must attend to instability and insecurity anywhere in the Western Hemisphere, lest a crisis emerges that diverts U.S. resources and reduces its ability to project power abroad. Conversely, this gives hostile powers an interest in using Latin America to pressure or distract the United States.
Since the start of the 20th century, the U.S. has set the conditions for engagement with the Western Hemisphere. This was when the U.S. emerged as the uncontested hemispheric power, with secure borders, a blue water navy, an industrialized economy, accumulated wealth and access to world markets. For the first half of the century, the U.S. took an extremely hands-on approach to controlling hemispheric affairs and regulating the presence of outsiders. When the Cold War began, Latin America experienced a resurgence of labor unions, socialist parties and popular action coalitions. The Western Hemisphere was divided along the same U.S.-Soviet ideological lines, resulting in targeted, covert American interventions in the hemisphere. With the Soviet Union’s fall, however, the U.S. was able to divert its attention elsewhere, leaving Latin America largely on its own. Eventually, this opened the region to the influence of outside powers, namely China and Russia.
The New Era
As we move into this new era, it’s prudent to consider how Latin America’s left-right political pendulum will manifest and what it could mean for U.S. engagement. Many of the region’s political institutions, financial frameworks and political parties emerged from the realities of the Cold War and post-Cold War settings. Many of its democracies didn’t come into existence until the late 20th century, after the fall of military regimes. This transition phase coincides with political discussion in Latin America about the need to modernize institutions; Chile, for example, wants to update its Pinochet-era constitution. It’s also a moment when the first generations born into democracy are making up a larger and larger share of the voting population and are seeking political renovation or reinvention.
Politically, a new flavor of the progressive left appears to be taking root. This pendulum swing generated and continues to generate concern in the U.S. and among those on the right in Latin America that the region is falling back into anti-American and anti-market attitudes. However, these fears are unfounded. The new left faces a fundamentally different reality compared with the left that took the region by storm at the start of the 21st century. The previous left was characterized by radicalism, nationalism, rejection of the neoliberal economic order and an emphasis on the struggles of the masses. It funded its ambitious government programs with revenues from a commodity supercycle. The new left, however, is a product of the region’s political evolution, pandemic fallout and broader geopolitical shifts taking place globally. Its focus is narrower: on supporting the youth population, environmentalism, gender equality and tackling wealth inequality through structural reform.
Meanwhile, there’s a general disenchantment with politics throughout the region. The old left failed to make good on its promises and struggled with unfavorable economic conditions. Countries that followed those years by electing right-leaning governments tried to restore economic balance and prosperity after the commodity boom, but structural changes require time and political capital that are scarce during a crisis. Then the pandemic came. It wrecked economies and governments that lacked the resources to weather the storm. The region now faces another lost decade, and people are looking for new solutions.
The new left faces an electorate with high expectations for its governments and their ability to improve voters’ material well-being. However, slowing growth or recessions and dollar-denominated debt limit the ability of governments to meet their demands. The current commodity boom does little to reduce their financial strain. Though a momentary influx of revenue is possible, the boom is the result of trade imbalances, supply chain disruptions and geopolitical volatility, all of which make the mid-to-long-term prospects uncertain at best. Whoever is in power will need to devise solutions based on a new market reality that is still not clear, and in a way that satisfies public demands.
On the international front, the U.S. is again shifting its approach to engagement, this time focusing on economics. It's shifting away from its post-Cold War practice of frequent military interventionism (which paid relatively little attention to Latin America) to a strategy based on economic coercion and cooperation. Washington is increasingly engaged in economic warfare, including in its approach toward Latin America. The U.S. has also taken note of Russia’s and China’s increased presence in the hemisphere, and is engaging the region economically, where it has the upper hand over its rivals. Washington’s goal is to reduce foreign influence and align the region with the U.S. agenda through economic carrots or sticks, depending on the country. This strategy complements Latin America’s response to the end of the post-Cold War era, namely, a renewed focus on shared prosperity. Instead of pursuing regional agendas or integration, Latin American countries are acting more independently, which opens room for them to redefine bilateral relations with the U.S. and others.
The question is what the intersection of the region’s political shifts and U.S. behavior will look like in practice. In the past two eras, their placement on the political spectrum determined whether Latin American countries were pro- or anti-U.S. The new left, however, could be different. This version is not as radical or ideologically driven as its predecessors. It looks to be taking a more pragmatic approach to meeting economic and social needs. Further, whichever way a given country goes, its political and economic room to maneuver is small and shrinking at the moment.
The proposal and the implementation of reforms are not the same thing, and early indications are that any emerging left-wing leaders will not radicalize if elected. In Chile, the Constitutional Assembly rejected some more extreme government proposals, like stringent environmental protection measures in the mining sector, a major driver of growth. Other far-reaching measures risk rejection during an upcoming public referendum. Political opposition has blocked Peru’s president, Pedro Castillo, from delivering any major changes. Separately, there appears to be a loosening of foreign alignments. In Honduras, President Xiomara Castro is improving relations with the U.S. and has opted for continued ties with Taiwan over closer relations with China. Argentine President Alberto Fernandez is also showing more openness to doing business with the U.S., despite strong ties with China.
Latin America’s new left is rising as the world enters uncharted territory. In many ways, it will have less room to maneuver, but opportunities – especially in foreign alignments – can always be found during transitional periods
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they are not excited and may not show up if invited
and hey why is not Cuba Nicaragua and Venezuela not being considered to attend says Sanders from Barbados
https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/11/biden-americas-summit-boycott-threats-00031717
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2124246/incredible-that-us-media-not-covering-the-likely-attack-near-panama-canal
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New American order. The Organization of American States has exhausted its utility in the current global climate, Mexico’s foreign minister said. He said new regional tendencies are emerging and called for the creation of a working group to build a new regional order that is mutually beneficial and upholds noninterventionist principles.
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June 10, 2022
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Exerting Economic Influence in Latin America
China has become the top trading partner for certain countries but the U.S. is still the largest source of investment.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Competition for Influence in Latin America
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In recent years, the U.S. has leaned more heavily on using economic engagement and economic warfare to exert influence over other countries. In Latin America, Washington’s marquee policies in that regard are the Cuba embargo and the running sanctions on Venezuela. But it also pursues a lower-profile, parallel strategy in the Western Hemisphere. Through the International Development Finance Corporation, the U.S. provides direct funding for various development projects and assurances to private U.S. businesses Washington would like to have more involved in the region. The primary purpose in this region is to foster the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, as well as local-level infrastructure work.
Though the U.S. is Latin America’s largest trade partner writ large, there are countries in which China has an edge. These include Brazil, Peru and Chile, where China has bought up soy, cooper and China. U.S. trade with top partners such as Colombia, Ecuador and Mexico consists more of manufactured goods, and while U.S. foreign direct investment into the region still surpasses China’s. It’s notable, however, that China used financing and loans to exert its influence in Latin America for much of the 21st century but in the past few years has started to focus more on mergers and acquisitions instead.
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https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/colombia-election-petro-victory-hernandez-b2104701.html
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June 20, 2022
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No Break With the US After Colombian Election
But Bogota is mindful of the potential for a longer-term change in U.S. policy.
By: Allison Fedirka
Colombia has elected a new president, and the moment of truth has arrived. The most remarkable thing about the Colombian election was not the result but the electorate’s rejection of the political mainstream. Two anti-establishment candidates – leftist Gustavo Petro of Humane Colombia and Rodolfo Hernandez of the right-wing League of Anti-Corruption Governors – emerged from the May 29 runoff, signaling Colombian voters’ loss of faith in the political status quo.
Like much of the world, Colombia is undergoing a profound socio-political transition, with potential effects for the Caribbean region and U.S. foreign policy. In the lead-up to the runoff, U.S. political and business leaders fretted over the impact a victory by the leftist Petro might have on economic relations or the impact a victory by Hernandez would have on U.S. security cooperation. In both cases, there was concern the new leader in Bogota might pursue a rapprochement with Venezuela and distance itself from Washington. Interestingly, Colombia itself worries that the U.S. and Venezuela might reconcile and leave it out in the cold.
In truth, all three states face constraints that will prevent either the U.S. or Colombia from straying too far from the other. Bogota, however, remains mindful of the potential for a longer-term shift in U.S. policy.
Winds of Change
Colombia is vital for stability and security in the Caribbean and parts of South America. Deeply rooted strategic interests have bound Bogota and Washington together since the early 19th century. Three large mountain ranges and valleys make it difficult for the Colombian state to enforce its writ in every corner of the country, let alone connect them. Lawlessness is rampant in rural areas, where local economies are underdeveloped. To confront this challenge, Bogota needs a strong partner, and it has traditionally relied on Washington for security and financial support.
Social Leaders and Human Rights Defenders Assassinated in Colombia
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The U.S. priority is defending its place as the hegemon of the Caribbean. Though the U.S. dominates the northern rim of the Caribbean on its own, having an ally along the southern rim helps it secure the sea. Of course, Colombia benefits from a stable Caribbean as well. Colombia also provides a strong foothold for the U.S. to engage with the rest of South America. Most notably, it has proved to be an essential ally in the U.S. effort to counter and isolate Nicolas Maduro’s regime in Venezuela.
The war in Ukraine renewed U.S. interest in repairing relations with Venezuela. Forced to expend more and more resources on the conflict and countering Western sanctions, Russia’s ability to continue to prop up the Maduro regime has waned, creating an opportunity the U.S. could exploit. At the same time, the urgent U.S. interest in getting more oil onto international markets gives Washington an excuse to back down from its staunch anti-Maduro stance and engage with the regime. Washington has held direct talks with the regime, supports the resumption of a national dialogue between the regime and the (skeptical) political opposition, and has loosened oil sanctions on Venezuela to permit limited exports to Spain and Italy. Realistically, given the level of disrepair in Venezuela’s oil industry after years of mismanagement, a larger removal of sanctions would do little to immediately put significant additional quantities of oil on the market. Additionally, Venezuelan crude oil is heavy and requires special refining capabilities. Nevertheless, the current environment is the most conducive to a U.S.-Venezuelan reconciliation in years, and Washington’s interest in edging out Russia, China and Iran for influence in Venezuela compels it to cautiously move forward.
Colombia is understandably alarmed by indications of a U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement. Washington needs a strong partner on the southern rim of the Caribbean basin, and the two South American neighbors are both in valuable locations. Colombia’s roughly 1,400-kilometer (870-mile) Pacific coastline and proximity to the Panama Canal give it the superior position, but it lacks reliable infrastructure connecting its Atlantic and Pacific areas, and the U.S. already has strong ties with Panama. Bogota is also worried about having to compete with Caracas for public and private funding from the United States. Any significant U.S.-Venezuelan rapprochement would eventually include costly humanitarian and reconstruction efforts and would open up attractive private investment opportunities in Venezuela. As a major beneficiary of U.S. funding and investment, Colombia does not want competition, especially not from next door.
Domestic Agenda
In addition to these unfavorable international circumstances, President-elect Gustavo Petro also must address three interconnected regional and domestic issues: relations with Venezuela, peace agreements with narco-terrorist groups and an inclusive economic recovery. As a candidate, Petro expressed his desire to restore diplomatic relations with the Maduro regime as a first step toward normalization. (Relations soured in 2019 when Colombia threw its full support behind Juan Guaido, Maduro’s challenger for president.) Both candidates recognized Colombia’s need to get Venezuela’s help controlling migration and combating illicit cross-border trade. A new administration from a party outside the mainstream provides the opportunity for a political reset.
Illegal Trade and Activity on the Colombian-Venezuelan Border
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Both candidates also agreed on the need to fully implement the 2016 peace deal with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and to open negotiations with other armed groups, such as the National Liberation Army (ELN). Even after the peace agreement with FARC, which ended a decades-long conflict and dismantled the group, organized crime, militancy and violence continue to plague the countryside. Many armed criminal groups find refuge and a thriving illicit trade across the border in Venezuela, meaning Caracas’ support will be needed to combat them.
It’s essential for Colombia to reduce organized crime not only for security reasons but also to attract mostly U.S. investment, which is needed to help the economic recovery. Petro’s economic agenda includes weaning the Colombian economy off natural resource exports and closing the wealth gap.
Tough Road Ahead
Colombia wants to shape the conditions under which any U.S.-Venezuelan reconciliation occurs, but its ability to affect U.S. policy in the region is limited. At the peak of the 2019 opposition movement in Venezuela, Colombia played a critical role in the U.S. strategy. But as that movement died out, so did Bogota’s immediate importance to Washington. A worst-case scenario for Colombia would see the U.S. inadvertently empowering the Maduro regime or ushering in a violent political transition, either of which would be very threatening to Colombia’s security. And yet Bogota can’t risk alienating Washington; the U.S. remains Colombia’s top trade partner, and U.S. private investors are its main source of foreign capital.
For its part, the U.S. can’t just swap Colombia for Venezuela. Regime change in Caracas is still a U.S. priority, and every sanctions waiver it issues is a lifeline to the Maduro regime. The U.S. can loosen the strings only so much before having to step back lest it empowers the regime it wants to see end. There are currently no signs Maduro is willing to step aside or hold fair elections. The foreign influence of non-U.S. powers in Venezuela has dipped, but it’s still a strategically valuable partner from which U.S. enemies like Russia and Iran can frustrate Washington. The U.S. would pay a high price to convince Venezuela to break these ties.
Venezuela’s openness to improved ties with the U.S. will depend on how Russia emerges from the Ukraine conflict. To a lesser degree, the outcome of Iran nuclear talks will also matter. Venezuela’s critical need right now is market access so it can revive its economy. Russia and Iran help facilitate Venezuela’s oil trade. Russian and Venezuelan officials met during the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum last week to discuss payment systems to circumvent sanctions, and Iranian ships have been providing regular crude shipments and some oil tankers. While this helps Venezuela stay afloat, neither partner can provide enough support to help it repair its economy. U.S. aid, investment and market access are currently the most promising options for Venezuela’s economic revival. Improving relations with Colombia is one way the Maduro regime could secure U.S. help.
Colombia, too, would like to improve relations with Venezuela. However, this conflicts with Bogota’s need to maintain good ties with Washington and continue receiving economic and security support. Likewise, the U.S. has no good alternatives for its Caribbean strategy. In other words, concerns over a U.S.-Colombia split are overstated.
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Iran's Infiltration of Latin American Politics Complicates "Aeroterror" Flight Investigations
by Maria Zuppello
Special to IPT News
June 29, 2022
https://www.investigativeproject.org/9205/iran-infiltration-of-latin-american-politics
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/18641/latin-america-china
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China’s Stimulus Spending Will Buoy South America’s Mining Exports
8 MIN READJul 14, 2022 | 21:42 GMT
A miner works at the Kiara copper mine in Chile on June 22, 2021.
A miner works at the Kiara copper mine in Chile on June 22, 2021.
(GLENN ARCOS/AFP via Getty Images)
Chinese stimulus measures will likely ensure sustained demand for copper and iron ore despite the global economic downturn, enabling South American exporters such as Chile, Peru and Brazil to maintain high social spending and stabilize their governments. The Chinese government is estimated to spend over 3 trillion $450 billion in stimulus spending in the second half of 2022, including $75 billion in infrastructure funding, $160 billion in pledged State Council lending, and roughly $220 billion in possible advanced issuances of 2023 special purpose bonds quotas to local governments. The stimulus measures will mainly be directed towards infrastructure, including projects in the clean energy, transportation and information technology sectors.
China’s stimulus initiatives will likely maintain demand for copper and iron ore even as large economies, including China itself, enter into a period of slower economic growth. Western countries are currently experiencing high energy and food prices, which will lead to a reduction in domestic consumption and low economic growth. Even a mild recession in developed countries would likely result in a contraction of tourism, remittances and other forms of capital investment into South American economies, threatening their economies. However, China’s stimulus measures are likely to maintain government and private sector spending on initiatives that require significant amounts of metals and minerals, which many South American countries produce. This demand will probably remain steady even if the Chinese economy slows down, as the government will be incentivized to release more stimulus in an effort to bolster growth, which will benefit South American countries' exports of raw materials and somewhat mitigate the impact of the Western economic slowdown.
Disruptions and sanctions related to the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war are driving inflation to above 8% in heavily industrialized countries, such as Europe and North America, with the energy and agricultural sectors being among the most impacted.
China accounted for 54% of the world's copper consumption and imported 70% of global iron ore exports in 2020. As copper is the preferred metal for electrical wiring, it is in high demand in China, where companies use it for wiring in real estate, clean electricity projects and the industrial sector. Similarly, iron ore is converted into steel and used to build infrastructure and housing.
The price of copper and iron ore has risen substantially over the previous 18 months due to high demand in the construction and electrical industries following the COVID-19 slowdown, which initially depressed demand.
While Chinese stimulus is likely to maintain a baseline demand for copper and iron ore, the government’s efforts to curb the spread of COVID-19 could lead to fluctuations in demand. China has been undertaking an aggressive strategy to curb the spread of COVID-19, which led to months-long lockdowns in Shanghai and Jilin, along with dozens of other industrial and commercial hubs across the country. In recent weeks, China’s “zero-COVID” policy has led to decreased demand for South American metals and minerals as the commencement of the latest round of infrastructure activity was delayed. Though most lockdowns in Shanghai and elsewhere have been lifted, China’s continued zero-COVID policy and the emergence of a more contagious variant of Omicron, BA.5, increases the likelihood of new lockdowns and subsequent dips in demand for copper and iron ore, creating continued risk for South American exporters.
China’s copper imports decreased 17.2% in 2021 compared with record imports in 2020. While the first quarter of 2022 saw an increase of 2.6% when compared with the previous quarter, copper imports were down 8.8% in March when lockdowns were implemented. 55% of China’s copper imports come from Chile and Peru.
For iron ore, Chinese imports reduced 3.9% year-on-year in 2021 and 8.5% in the first quarter of 2022 compared with the first quarter of 2021. Brazil is China’s second-largest source of iron ore imports, after Australia.
In Chile, continued Chinese demand for copper could finance President Gabriel Boric’s campaign promise of increased social spending, and potentially the implementation of a new constitution. Copper exports are the backbone of Chile’s economy, accounting for roughly 10% of the country’s GDP and a majority of its export revenue. The government of President Gabriel Boric was elected on a platform that promised sweeping structural changes and now faces growing popular demand for increased state financing, including curbing high global food and fuel prices as well as debt forgiveness programs. The administration will likely rely heavily on export revenues from the copper sector to fund increased social welfare spending, even amid a potential global economic downturn. Additionally, Chile will vote on a new constitution on Sept. 4 that would demand increased public spending to guarantee people’s access to water and healthcare. Efforts to increase taxation of copper companies amid strong Chinese demand for the metal could serve as a crucial funding source for increased social welfare spending. However, any potential fluctuations in Chinese demand due to renewed COVID-19 lockdowns could limit the availability of that cash flow. This could force the Boric administration to issue abnormally large amounts of public debt to pay for the increased social services that Chileans are demanding, which would, in turn, constrict future spending.
Chilean Finance Minister Mario Marcel proposed a tax reform on July 1 seeking to increase royalties on companies producing over 50,000 tonnes of copper per year in an effort to fund expanded social programs. The increased royalties include a 1% to 2% tax for companies that produce between 50,000 and 200,000 tonnes of copper each year, and up to 4% tax on companies that annually produce upwards of 200,000 tonnes.
If approved in a Sept. 4 referendum, Chile’s constitution will increase environmental regulations on mining companies. The proposed draft also strengthens land rights for Indigenous groups, which could add another factor that would negatively impact mining operations near Indigenous communities.
In Peru, Chinese demand for copper could help the government avoid amassing large amounts of public debt while implementing food and fuel subsidies, potentially helping to stabilize the government. Peru is the world’s second-largest exporter of copper, which accounts for 4% of the country’s GDP. President Pedro Castillo’s government has faced widespread anti-inflation demonstrations in recent months and is under mounting pressure to decrease the price of food and fuels. These demands will likely only rise should Western nations enter into a recessionary period and result in decreased tourism to Peru from the world’s wealthiest countries, which would likely heavily impact the South American country’s economy. Sustained Chinese demand for Peruvian copper coupled with the metal’s high price is likely to help Peru’s government address demand for increased spending without the need to take on large amounts of foreign debt. Fiscal responsibility will likely help maintain investor confidence in the country, further insulating the Peruvian economy from the potential effects of a Western-driven recession. The export revenue from copper may also enable Castillo to ensure his political survival amid congressional attempts to oust him, using the funding to lower the cost of essential goods.
The rising cost of living in Peru spurred a strike and protest movement in early April, followed by a transit worker strike in late June. Protesters installed roadblocks that disrupted traffic nationwide during both strikes. The inflation-induced unrest in recent months has also seen looting in rural areas and the deaths of at least two civilians.
Peru's constitution allows the legislature to impeach a sitting president with a majority vote for various reasons, including a vague clause that allows the legislature to declare the presidency vacant if the current occupant suffers from permanent ''physical or moral incapacity.'' Since taking office in July 2021, Castillo has already faced two congressional impeachment votes.
In Brazil, the government will use sustained Chinese demand for iron ore to increase cash transfers and social spending, potentially decreasing the reliance on foreign debt. Brazil is China’s second-largest source of the mineral behind Australia, and is reliant on continued Chinese demand — exports of the mineral comprise just under 3% of Brazil’s GDP in 2021. In recent years, Brazil has struggled to fund its high fiscal spending due to the spread of COVID-19 and demand for a state-sponsored cash transfer program, amassing a large public debt. Both leading candidates running in Brazil’s October presidential election have pledged to increase social spending via a cash-transfer program and poverty alleviation initiatives. This means Brazil will almost certainly see increased public spending regardless of who wins. Sustained Chinese demand for the mineral could help provide some funding for expanded social services, especially if Brazil’s Congress lifts the country’s constitutionally-mandated spending cap as legislators appear keen to do. Additionally, export revenue from iron ore could potentially give the state additional revenue that would reduce the need to borrow in debt markets. But sporadic decreases in demand for iron ore due to China’s COVID-19 lockdowns make this less likely.
Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro and former Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva are the two frontrunners for the country’s October presidential elections. Bolsonaro has championed a cash-transfer program called Auxilio Brasil that both candidates have promised to maintain, despite a constitutionally-mandated spending cap.
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The Geopolitics of Argentina: The Superpower That Wasn’t
undefined and Director of Analysis at RANE
Adriano Bosoni
Director of Analysis at RANE, Stratfor
10 MIN READAug 8, 2022 | 18:17 GMT
Protesters wave an Argentine flag at an anti-government rally in Buenos Aires on July 9, 2022.
Protesters wave an Argentine flag at an anti-government rally in Buenos Aires on July 9, 2022.
(LUIS ROBAYO/AFP via Getty Images)
On Aug. 3, the Argentine government appointed its third economy minister in roughly a month, a testimony to the country’s seemingly never-ending saga of political volatility and economic decay. The new minister’s challenges are daunting: handle skyrocketing inflation amid dangerously low levels of central bank reserves, resurrect a fragile debt restructuring deal with the International Monetary Fund, restructure a massive network of subsidies and welfare payments that drains state revenue, and convince foreign investors that Argentina is a reliable country to do business. Like his predecessors, the new minister will probably fail to meet these challenges, prolonging the political, economic and social factors that have kept Argentina from reaching its full potential.
Argentina’s perennial cycles of economic turbulence are particularly baffling if we consider that, from a geopolitical perspective, the country has a lot going for it. In fact, Argentina shares many geographic and strategic commonalities with much more prosperous and stable countries like the United States and Australia, including a vast and resource-rich territory, protection from external aggression, and access to a large network of rivers and oceans that facilitate trade, along with a growing, educated and multicultural population. Argentina also has a legal and political system that (at least on paper) ensures a division of power, protects private property and promotes free markets. And yet, Argentina went from being one of the ten largest economies in the world at the beginning of the 20th century to barely making it to the top 30 at the beginning of the 21st century. While the reasons for Argentina’s economic decline are manifold, two stand out: the progressive erosion of the rule of law under both military and democratic governments, and the destructive expansion of populism.
An Advantageous Geography
While geography alone does not fully explain why a country should be prosperous, it is a good place to start thinking about why it could. Argentina is one of the world’s ten largest countries by territory and faces no significant threats of foreign aggression, a luxury that most other countries do not enjoy. The Andes, one of the world’s highest mountain ranges, protect Argentina’s entire western border and make an invasion from Chile virtually impossible. To the country’s south, there’s the vast South Ocean and almost uninhabited Antarctica. And to its east, there’s the Atlantic Ocean, which separates most of Argentina from the rest of the world, while the Rio de la Plata (the widest river in the world) offers enough buffer from potential aggression from neighboring Uruguay.
With three of its four borders secured, the main threats to Argentina’s territorial integrity come from the north, which explains why most of its post-independence wars in the second half of the 19th century (including with Brazil and Paraguay) took place in this area. But even in this case, Argentina’s northern borders are very far from its main population and economic hubs in the center of the country. These geographic features enabled Argentina to build a state after gaining independence from Spain in the early 19th century, and significantly expand its territory (including the conquest of Patagonia, a feat similar to the United States’ expansion to the west around the same time) without facing any meaningful external threats. Another benefit of this geography (and the lack of major quarrels with its neighbors) is that modern Argentina can afford to keep a very modest military budget, which frees up state resources to spend in other areas.
In addition to protection from external aggression, Argentina’s large territory offers significant natural resources that make it self-sufficient in two crucial areas: food and energy. The Pampas region in central Argentina has some of the most fertile lands on the planet, putting the country in a privileged position to produce massive amounts of food and other commodities. A large network of rivers, most notably the Rio de la Plata and its many affluents, and direct access to the Atlantic Ocean have traditionally made it cheap for Argentina to export its products. Argentina also has significant oil, natural gas and shale oil reserves, which makes Buenos Aires less exposed to global energy shocks compared with other import-reliant countries.
Argentina’s demography should also be conducive to economic growth: Like virtually every other country, Argentina’s fertility rate has fallen in recent decades. But it’s still above 2.1 births per woman, the so-called "replacement level" needed to maintain population stability (by contrast, fertility rates in countries like Spain or Italy are below 1.3). This means that Argentina’s population will continue to grow in the coming decades, and that while the country will still face the demographic challenges of an aging and shrinking workforce (and a potentially unsustainable welfare state), it will do so much later than most Western countries. Argentina also has lax immigration laws and a long history of welcoming foreigners, which means that "importing" workers to help offset its demographic decline will not be as politically risky for Argentina as it is in places like Europe.
A Weak Rule of Law
Argentina’s unprecedented economic decline reveals why advantageous geography alone is not enough to build a prosperous country. Some of Argentina’s problems can be traced back to its colonial roots. The Spanish colonizers left an uneven distribution of wealth (as lands were concentrated in few hands), an economic model based on the extraction of commodities with little to no incentive for private entrepreneurship (especially in manufacturing), a tradition of opaque decision-making from often corrupt political leaders, and a tendency for local warlords (or "caudillos") to resort to violence to pursue their political agendas.
Argentine leaders in the 19th century failed to solve most of these problems, and the transition to a sovereign republic left many of the economic and political structures of the colonial era virtually unchanged. These shortcomings became particularly acute in the mid-20th century when a series of coups led to military dictatorships that consolidated violence as a viable way to access and preserve power, abolished democratic institutions and severely weakened the rule of law while systematically violating human rights. Most of Argentina’s democratic governments in the late 20th century and early 21st century were only slightly better, as they circumvented, colluded with, or coerced the country’s legislative and judicial branches and used the state as a vehicle to benefit themselves and their political, social and economic allies.
This institutional weakness has impeded Argentina’s economic development and explains many of the country’s current problems. The absence of an independent and transparent judiciary that ensures everyone plays by the same rules has created an environment where property rights and contracts are selectively enforced (Argentina has a tendency to nationalize and sometimes expropriate everything from private companies to people’s bank savings; the government defaulting on its sovereign debt has also become a national sport.) This further contributes to a weak rule of law and creates inherent risks for both companies and households, which, in turn, undermines economic development by deterring investment and consumption.
Similarly, corruption prevents the laws of the economy from working freely and fosters an uneven distribution of wealth by concentrating economic resources in the hands of corrupt business elites and the public officials who back them. This has also given way to a large informal economy (which employs roughly half of Argentine workers), as companies and households often choose to perform their activities off the books because of selective control from the authorities or excessive taxation. As a result, Argentina’s formal economy has failed to reach anywhere close to its full potential.
In such a volatile political and economic context, it’s no surprise that Argentine governments tend to make abrupt policy changes that make it almost impossible for companies and households to plan long-term by forcing them to adapt quickly to ever-changing rules.
This highly uncertain policy environment tends to produce frequent economic crises by undermining domestic and foreign trust in both the Argentine economy and the Argentine government’s ability to control the situation. In response to those crises, the country’s leaders in Buenos Aires repeatedly make hasty decisions to try to turn things around (as most recently evidenced by the appointment of three economy ministers this past month), which, more often than not, exacerbates the fundamental challenges hindering Argentina’s progress by only casting more doubt about the country’s political and economic stability.
The Perils of Populism
But while Argentina’s weak rule of law and uncertain policy environment certainly haven’t helped, the expansion of populism is perhaps most to blame for the country’s enduring economic malaise.
Echoing similar trends that were taking place in other parts of the world at the time, in the 1940s former Argentine president Juan Peron realized that there were massive political gains to be made from extending economic benefits to the large sectors of the population that had been hitherto neglected by previous Argentine governments. In the decades since, most of Argentina’s governments (the majority of which have been led by Peronists, with the party winning 10 of the 15 presidential elections that took place between 1946 and 2019) have based their power on an ever-increasing network of clientelism and patronage that keeps a vast sector of the population dependent on assistance from the state to cover their basic needs.
The main goal of this system is to secure a critical mass of support from voters in presidential and congressional elections. With the false pretext of helping those in need, most Argentine governments in recent decades have kept large sectors of the population dependent on the state, to make sure that they kept voting for the leaders that guaranteed the continuity of the patronage system. But populism is expensive, which explains why expansionary fiscal and monetary policy frequently results in very high levels of inflation amid deep fiscal deficits; and corrupt and inefficient governments are unreliable, which also explains Argentina’s frequently high borrowing costs in debt markets and the never-ending saga of financial crises and sovereign defaults.
In their book "Why Nations Fail," Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that "poor countries are poor because those who have power make choices that create poverty. They get it wrong not by mistake or ignorance but on purpose." This is painfully true for Argentina, a country where conscious political decisions and mismanagement are directly to blame for its economic decline. For about a century, Argentine governments have resorted to clientelism, corruption and authoritarianism, which has progressively weakened the rule of law, hindered economic development and increased poverty.
The problem is that once populism takes over a country, ending it or at least removing its most pernicious aspects becomes extremely difficult. Each month, roughly half of Argentina’s population currently receives direct payments from the state in one way or another. The government also subsidizes key services and goods, like energy and transportation, for most of the population. Even if done progressively, the lifting of these welfare payments and subsidies would almost certainly result in widespread social unrest and violence that would oust the government that lifted them. This means that even if the system’s shortcomings are evident, present and future Argentine governments will remain reluctant to change (let alone end) it.
Even if, as most opinion polls suggest, the conservative opposition defeats the incumbent Peronists in the presidential elections in October 2023, the new government will struggle to turn things around. Populism has built a time bomb at the heart of the Argentine economy that is virtually impossible to dismantle, which will likely perpetuate (and perhaps worsen) the country’s vicious cycle of political instability and economic volatility, regardless of a geopolitical context that should ensure prosperity.
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"The Geopolitics of Argentina: The Superpower That Wasn’t"
It's an interesting case study. They ought to be a smaller US of the southern hemisphere. Instead they have one eighth the GDP per capita of an underperforming US.
Rather than model our success, we copy their failures.
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Mexico should be a wealthy nation as well.
"The Geopolitics of Argentina: The Superpower That Wasn’t"
It's an interesting case study. They ought to be a smaller US of the southern hemisphere. Instead they have one eighth the GDP per capita of an underperforming US.
Rather than model our success, we copy their failures.
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Mexico should be a wealthy nation as well.
Right. And Africa, and so on.
Basic prosperity in the 21st century is not rocket science. Yet we do everything we can to avoid it.
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Mexican dictator president Porfirio Diaz (1870-1910)
"Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States."
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Mexican dictator president Porfirio Diaz (1870-1910)
"Poor Mexico! So far from God and so close to the United States."
The US is always their favorite scapegoat, while they ignore their cultural pathologies that result in the narco-state sh*thole they created.
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Competing in South America. Uruguay’s legislature ratified a defense agreement with China that entails cooperation on international peacekeeping operations and in matters related to science, technology and military equipment, and counterterrorism. Meanwhile, the U.S. State Department approved a $74 million sale to Brazil of 33 Javelin anti-tank weapons and 222 missiles, as well as training and logistical support.
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Nicaragua: U.S. Considers Halting Imports of Nicaraguan Goods
2 MIN READAug 31, 2022 | 18:50 GMT
What Happened: The U.S. Biden administration reportedly is considering blocking imports from Nicaragua due to objections to increasingly authoritarian actions by Nicaragua's government, Voice of America reported Aug. 30. Washington would intend the block to limit finances for President Daniel Ortega's regime.
Why It Matters: Nicaragua exports more goods to the United States than it does to any other nation, so if the United States follows through on the import block, it would take a significant toll on Nicaragua's economy. However, the U.S. government has not issued an official statement that indicates a block on Nicaraguan imports is forthcoming, so it is possible that the Biden administration does not intend to take such steps. Even so, the Ortega government could interpret reporting on the potential block as inflammatory and increase anti-American rhetoric and/or take retaliatory actions over the coming weeks. Further retaliation is possible in the event that the United States actually restricts imports. Imports from Nicaragua account for only a small portion of total U.S. imports, but restrictions could lead to short-term increases in costs for products previously sourced from Nicaragua, including clothing, precious metals, meat, coffee, sugar and machinery.
Background: In recent months, the Ortega government has imprisoned opposition politicians, students and journalists, while also shutting down hundreds of nongovernmental organizations. The government also recently targeted individuals in the private sector, arresting the president and vice president of the country's main business federation and charging them with the crime of "conspiracy to undermine national integrity."
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Argentina: Without Subsidies, Energy Bills Will Rise Over 140%
1 MIN READAug 31, 2022 | 16:48 GMT
What Happened: Three specialists estimate that the Argentine government's efforts to cut public sector spending would increase households' electricity bills by 140% and that those who receive no subsidies under the new scheme likely would see their electricity bills rise by 170%, Clarin reported Aug. 30.
Why It Matters: The effects of reduced electricity subsidies likely will increase turnout for existing anti-government demonstrations, which will hurt the government's reelection efforts in 2023. There is a chance that such public discontent will push the government to abandon its efforts to reduce electricity subsidies, which would, in turn, jeopardize the country's deal with the International Monetary Fund.
Background: As part of a February restructuring deal with the IMF, Argentina's main concession was to decrease its energy subsidies in the near term (which totaled $11 billion in 2021) by creating a sliding scale in which the wealthy pay the full price of their energy bills while the poor pay only a portion.
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https://www.nationalreview.com/news/chiles-voters-reject-far-left-constitution/?utm_source=email&utm_medium=breaking&utm_campaign=newstrack&utm_term=28953489
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19130/latin-america-china-backyard
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Strange that Latin America doesn't want US meddling and interference - but openly accepts China's.
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Easy to understand. This is a great chance for politicos to get rich.
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As This Latin American Country Falls Apart, China Looks on Anxiously
John Mac GhlionnJohn Mac Ghlionn December 21, 2022 Updated: December 21, 2022biggersmaller Print
On first inspection, Peru and China, 11,000 miles apart, appear to have very little in common. However, the two countries share a very close history.
As the academic Justina Hwang has noted, in the space of 25 years, between 1849 and 1874, more than 100,000 unskilled workers, many of them from China, arrived in Peru. Having recently abolished slavery, Peru was amid a worker shortage. This allowed “the importation of an indentured workforce of Chinese laborers in order to meet Peruvian need for labor,” wrote Hwang.
Fast forward to 2022, and Peru is home to around 60,000 Chinese people. Some researchers suggest that the Chinese community is much higher, possibly exceeding 1 million. If accurate, this means for every 33 people, there is one of Chinese descent. Besides sharing strong historical and demographic ties, China and Peru also share an incredibly close economic bond. However, as Peru falls deeper into crisis, its relationship with China is sure to be tested.
On Dec. 14, the South American country announced a nationwide state of emergency. The announcement, which granted police officers special powers and largely prevented people from assembling on the streets, came after a week of violent protests that, as Reuters reported, have resulted in at least eight deaths.
The protests came shortly after the former president, Pedro Castillo, was ousted from office and arrested after illegally trying to dissolve the country’s Congress. As tensions continue to flare, the world watches on with bated breath. One imagines that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is particularly perturbed by the goings on in the Andean state.
Epoch Times Photo
Supporters of Peru’s ousted President Pedro Castillo participate in a protest at the Plaza de Armas in Cusco, Peru, on Dec. 20, 2022. (Martin Bernetti/AFP via Getty Images)
In July 2021, during his first week in office, Castillo wasted no time in reaching out to China, a crucial commercial partner of Peru. Home to some of the largest copper mines in the world, Peru exports large quantities of this mineral, arguably the world’s most important, to China. In fact, China is now the largest purchaser of Peruvian copper, by far. The CCP doesn’t just purchase inordinate amounts of copper from Peru but also sends miners there to extract the valuable metal. This has been the case for years.
A number of Chinese-backed consortiums now own Peruvian copper mines. Worryingly, aided by a compliant Peruvian regime, they appear to have benefited from the use of exploitative practices. Over the past year and a half, China has undoubtedly benefited from Castillo’s presidency. Castillo and Chinese leader Xi Jinping appear to have positive feelings for each other. After being sworn into office, Castillo chose Beijing as his first embassy to visit. He was welcomed with open arms by Xi.
Some 18 months on, however, the friendship is being tested. Castillo is no longer in power. There is a new sheriff in town. Her name is Dina Boluarte, Peru’s first female president. The 60-year-old announced that her first task would be “to take action against corruption. This cancer has to be extirpated from the country.”
If the CCP isn’t concerned with Boularte’s promise, it should be.
After all, CCP-backed loggers play a key role in Peru’s illegal timber market. In exchange for secret payments, as InSight Crime’s Mark Wilson has discussed in great detail, Peruvian officials have granted Chinese timber firms logging concessions and generous transport permits. One of the beneficiaries of the bribes is a man named Xiadong Ji Wu, a Chinese owner of at least five logging companies based in Peru. As Wilson noted, certain “fraudulent Chinese companies” appear to be “directly corrupting officials in Peru to facilitate the illegal timber trade.”
A member of China’s infamous Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) since 2019, Peru has witnessed a string of multi-billion-dollar investments from China, mostly in the mining and energy sectors. In Peru’s mining sector alone, it is estimated that Chinese firms have invested at least $10.4 billion.
China is also heavily invested in other aspects of Peruvian society. A recent Freedom House report highlights how Beijing controls Peru’s media, greatly influencing what stories are and aren’t covered and what narratives are and aren’t permitted. Furthermore, the Chinese embassy, situated in Lima, the capital city of Peru, stands accused of acting “aggressively” and intimidating Peruvian citizens who dare to speak about Taiwan respectfully.
Does Boularte have what it takes to address the many ways in which the CCP has infiltrated her home country? In truth, only time will tell. It is clear that communist China has significantly benefited from weak leadership in Peru.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19292/iran-latin-america
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January 11, 2023
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A Propaganda War in Latin America
U.S. rivals are frustrating its strategy through social media disinformation.
By: Allison Fedirka
As recession looms, the Ukraine war continues without resolution, and China tries to open up after months of lockdowns, Latin America has uncharacteristically made headlines lately. Last month in Peru, the legislature removed its president from office. Later in Bolivia, opposition protests shut down major transit routes in Santa Cruz province, which accounts for nearly a third of the country’s area. More recently, supporters of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro stormed and vandalized several government buildings in Brasilia.
In a region where political unrest rarely affects the world at large, the latest bouts of instability are more consequential: Discontent driven by political anxieties is a ripe environment for U.S. adversaries to use propaganda and social media campaigns to undermine Washington’s efforts to bring these areas more firmly under its control.
Indeed, many expect social unrest to intensify in 2023. Lags in economic recovery and rising costs of living have given rise to broad, intense and well-populated protests even by the standards of Latin America, where protesting is all but a national pastime. Nearly a third of the region lives in poverty, and impoverished households now rely more on social assistance and less on labor income than they did before the pandemic. Labor recovery remains slow, characterized by an increase in informal jobs. Inflation has already reduced household purchasing power, with private consumption slowing in the second half of 2022. The region’s economic growth is expected to slow from 3.7 percent last year to a mere 1.3 percent this year, according to estimates from the U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Distribution of the Population by Income Strata, 2022
(click to enlarge)
The region’s economies, governments and citizens are ill-equipped to face another year of economic hardship. Latin American governments are no longer in pandemic-induced crisis mode, and their populations are now holding them accountable for the aftermath. This is all the more worrisome as governments remain constrained over the amount of fiscal spending they do to solve their economic woes and grapple with high debt, especially since there is notable risk of further currency depreciation. A volatile global economy has made governments more risk-averse and has slowed capital inflows to the region. The call for a change in political office and leadership is increasingly more commonplace.
This kind of environment plays to the strengths of Russia and China – namely, social media propaganda. Both use Latin America’s proximity to the United States to create problems in Washington. Until recently, both engaged on the economic front to gain more influence in the region. Russia targeted strategic industries like energy, while China used financing and mergers and acquisitions to occupy roles in important infrastructure and natural resource projects. Both, however, now face major economic constraints that force them to use other tools. Social media propaganda – a lower-cost option that still gives Russia and China reach into the region despite the long physical distances – is the obvious choice. In addition to having world-renowned expertise in the field, they already have established hubs in the region, most notably in Venezuela, which has sought surveillance equipment and capabilities from China and Russia in an effort to monitor and control the domestic population. Unsurprisingly, the groundwork for their respective campaigns has already been laid.
Latin America’s social instability makes it vulnerable to such propaganda. Citizens in the region are more online than the norm; 75 percent have internet access, 10 percentage points above the global average. About 85 percent of Latin American internet users get their news online, and of those almost 70 percent read news via social media. Nearly half of internet users in the region go on to share this news with others. The absence of oversight and regulation makes social media the ideal entry point for U.S. rivals looking to disseminate anti-U.S. propaganda and exacerbate instability.
Social Media and News | Latin America
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This is a challenge for Washington, which after years of neglect recently renewed efforts to grow and assert its influence in the Western Hemisphere. A key element of the U.S. strategy in Latin America is to encourage private investment, but unrest and uncertainty threaten that agenda. Without investment, the region’s economic recovery will sputter, and informal and illicit enterprises will grow in attractiveness. This, in turn, challenges U.S. efforts to combat organized crime in the region.
Finally, Washington is not well-equipped to counter anti-U.S. propaganda. Latin America has not forgotten the United States’ history of intervention, its support for unpopular regimes and its economic model – which it imposed on the region, creating significant hardship. U.S. efforts to rehabilitate its reputation will have to overcome anti-American social media campaigns. The U.S. can monitor social media for propaganda, but it lacks the tools to control social media posts, especially abroad. Just last year, during the Colombian presidential election, Washington warned that Moscow was using social media to boost Gustavo Petro, who won.
Moscow and Beijing cannot compete directly with the U.S. for influence in Latin America. They can, however, use their expertise in online disinformation to foster unrest and anti-Americanism. This will make it difficult for the U.S. to achieve its objectives and improve its standing in the region, and will benefit Russia and China in the short term.
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Iranian Navy Expands Operations in Latin American Waters
by Maria Zuppello
Special to IPT News
January 26, 2023
https://www.investigativeproject.org/9304/iranian-navy-expands-operations-in-latin-american
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February 22, 2023
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Bolivia Looks to China to Develop Its Lithium
Chinese firms give La Paz its best chance to capitalize on the green transition.
By: Allison Fedirka
The green energy transition is driving a global race for lithium. Countries sitting on large deposits of “white gold” suddenly find themselves with an exceptional opportunity. The prime example is Bolivia, home to the world’s largest deposits of lithium. The government in La Paz hopes this bounty will lift the country toward a more prosperous and equitable future. However, the window presented by the surge in green investment will not last forever. Facing a make-or-break moment, Bolivia has started to reform its lithium strategy and is partnering with China.
Bolivia's Geography
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Old and New Challenges
Lithium is a critical input in rechargeable batteries found in day-to-day items like laptops, cellphones and electric vehicles. It also has applications for storing hydrogen for use as a fuel and making alloys for aircraft. States’ intensifying focus on the green transition pushed up global consumption of lithium by 41 percent in 2022, to an estimated 134,000 tons from 95,000 tons in 2021. The primary driver is the EV market, specifically its need for lithium-ion batteries. As a result, lithium hydroxide and carbonate prices on the London Metals Exchange surged in December and now sit at $76,200 per ton, more than 10 times the price just two years earlier.
Battery-Grade Lithium Prices
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On paper, Bolivia is uniquely positioned to capitalize on the lithium craze. Three lithium salt flats – Uyuni, Coipasa and Pastos Grande – in the country’s southwest hold 21 million tons across an area nearly the size of Connecticut, according to a 2022 U.S. Geological Survey report. This makes Bolivia the largest source of the world’s estimated 89 million tons of lithium.
Global Lithium Resources
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But although Bolivia has massive lithium potential, it also has a long history of government interference in natural resource extraction. Much of this can be traced back to colonialism and the country’s loss of land in the early days of independence. During the colonial era, the city of Potosi was a hub for silver mining. The Spanish forced indigenous communities to labor in the mines and shipped the silver directly to Spain. Naturally, La Paz and indigenous communities are determined to avoid repeating this experience. Further, after Bolivia split from Peru in 1839 it lost nearly half its territory to neighbors, including areas with nitrate deposits, rubber trees and potentially oil. As a result, Bolivia is extremely protective of its natural resources. In the past, it has nationalized its hydrocarbons, lithium tin, silver, electricity and telecommunications, among others.
Bolivia's Lost Ground
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However, Bolivia’s state-run companies have struggled to turn its resource wealth into economic development. It primarily extracts lithium via evaporation ponds, a technique from the 1960s. Because of the inefficiencies of the process, the government recovers at best about 40 percent of its lithium. The result has been underwhelming: In the past five years, Bolivia produced just 1,400 tons of lithium. For reference, 2022 global supply totaled 600,000 tons.
The risk for Bolivia is that the demand boom and soaring prices will not last long enough for it to get its supplies to market. Industry estimates say it will take up to a decade for lithium supply to catch up with demand, at which point prices are expected to stabilize. Additionally, scientists are already hunting for the next transformative technology in energy storage, from recycling lithium to tapping into the battery potential of bromine and graphite. It takes approximately 5-10 years for new mines to come online and 1-2 years to build battery factories. This means Bolivia has a narrow and closing window to modernize its lithium production, and this assumes no major disruptions, such as a drastic decline in Chinese demand.
La Paz must overcome several challenges to reach its lithium output potential. First, it needs access to the latest technology to make production more efficient and cost-effective. It is faster and easier to import these insights from foreign companies than it is to develop them domestically. Second, it needs to find skilled labor. A well-established oil and gas industry could prove useful, as the skills are generally transferrable. Finally, and most difficult, Bolivia must overcome political infighting and indigenous unrest to establish a regulatory framework that investors trust.
To address these challenges, Bolivia abandoned plans to restrict lithium production to national firms. Instead, it copied its oil and gas strategy, where the government must own at least 51 percent of a given project, with the rest open to foreign firms. Opening to foreign competition gives Bolivia access to the latest technology and reduces financial risk for Bolivia, which spent an estimated $1.2 billion on developing its lithium over the past decade with little to show for it.
Chinese Partnership
Bolivia is betting on China to bring about its lithium transformation. In January, Bolivia’s state-run lithium company Yacimientos de Litio Bolivianos (YLP) signed a deal with Chinese conglomerate CBC worth more than $1 billion. CBC comprises Beijing’s lithium powerhouses: CATL, the world’s leading lithium battery maker; BRUNP, the leader of lithium battery recycling; and CMOC, the premier producer of a variety of minerals. The agreement calls for the construction of a direct extraction of lithium plant in Potosi and another in Oruro. (YLP also plans to open a lithium carbonate facility this year with the capacity to produce 15,000 tons annually.) Direct extraction of lithium, or DEL, is the latest extraction technology. It is both cleaner and more efficient than the process Bolivia currently uses. The Chinese conglomerate will assume all the financial risk for the first six months of engineering and feasibility studies, as well as production projections.
For La Paz, partnering with Beijing was the obvious choice. Chinese companies face fewer government limits on their activities and thus can move quickly on financing, scientific studies and due diligence. Chinese firms are also comfortable operating in areas with opaque regulatory frameworks and intrusive governments. And they are accustomed to weathering indigenous resistance to resource extraction, as evidenced by China’s operations at Las Bombas in Peru. Finally, China can greatly support Bolivia’s ambition to move up the lithium-based export value chain. China is a major supplier of anodes and cathodes, which Bolivia will need to become a battery producer.
For Bolivia and China, it’s a win-win. Bolivia gets funding and technology, while China gets access to and influence over approximately one-fifth of the world’s lithium reserves. At the same time, the partnership is a setback for Western efforts to bolster their own green industrial capabilities and cut reliance on China. Western investors initially showed interest in Bolivia’s lithium deposits but were deterred by the nationalization risk, political instability and the logistical complexities of exporting the metal from a landlocked country. The U.S. appears to have accepted that China will control about half the world’s lithium markets. So long as there are other areas for the U.S. and partners to compete for supply, they will accept La Paz’s alignment with Beijing and focus their efforts on less risky locales.
Bolivia’s government set a goal of producing its own lithium-ion batteries by 2025. Experts in Potosi predict it will be more like 2030. Either timeline is ambitious given Bolivia’s starting point and the scale of the competition. Partnering with China offers no guarantees, but it does give Bolivia its best shot to cash in on its lithium.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19477/iran-brazil-panama-canal-china
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3820294/china-slowly-taking-panama
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3824556/strategic-importance-of-panama
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3824231/panama-big-week-in-darien-gap-unfolding
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Chiquita’s Bagman: Key Intermediary Sentenced in Paramilitary Payments Case
Taxi Driver Given Checks, Delivered Banana Company Cash to Armed Groups
Imprisonment of Financial Go-Between Highlights Continuing Impunity for Senior Officials
Paramilitary Chief Darío Laíno Among Those Paid by Chiquita
Washington, D.C., April 18, 2023 – A Colombian taxi driver who last month was handed a 36-month prison sentence for his part in secretly delivering cash payments from Chiquita Brands International to a right-wing “paramilitary” organization played a more extensive role in the scheme than has been reported and was a key intermediary in the 1990s between the multinational fruit company and practically every major armed actor in Colombia’s conflict, according to internal documents and other material published today from the National Security Archive’s Chiquita Papers collection.
The conviction and imprisonment of Luis Alberto Agudelo Jiménez, a relatively low-level operative for Chiquita’s Colombia-based security staff, is a reminder that, despite mountains of evidence from its own archives, not a single Chiquita executive or manager has been penalized for authorizing and organizing millions of dollars in payments to groups responsible for scores of human rights violations, including massacres, homicides, and forced disappearances that produced thousands of victims.
As one of Chiquita’s primary go-betweens with armed groups, Agudelo transferred thousands of dollars in payments not just paramilitaries, as has been widely reported, but also to leftist insurgent groups and a variety of Colombian military units, according to the records published today.
The records included in this new briefing book suggest that the former banana company bagman could be instrumental in helping Colombian authorities understand the roles of company officials still under investigation in connection with paramilitary human rights violations and of Colombian military officers who encouraged and facilitated those relationships. Agudelo could help prosecutors construct a more detailed timeline of when and why the various groups were paid, provide information about the secret procedures Chiquita used to conceal the payments, and identify who his contacts were in the paramilitaries, the military, Chiquita, and the guerrilla groups.
Most significantly, Agudelo may be able to help authorities better understand the nature of the company’s agreements with the groups, including any benefits that the company received through quid pro quo “transactions” with both leftist insurgents and rightist paramilitary forces. He may also be able to explain to authorities evidence, revealed today for the first time, of links between Chiquita and former paramilitary finance chief Darío Laíno, who last year was sentenced to 32 years in prison for helping to fund paramilitary operations.
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Latin America tour. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov arrived in Brasilia for talks with Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. Lavrov extended an invitation to Lula to the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum in June. The Russian minister will also visit Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba on the same trip. Moscow is looking to expand cooperation with its international partners as it faces the fallout of tough Western sanctions. However, its presence in the United States’ traditional sphere of influence will likely irritate Washington.
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Energy cooperation. The oil ministers of Iran and Venezuela signed a series of agreements to increase bilateral cooperation in the energy sector. The deals focus on developing oil and gas fields, reconstructing Venezuela’s oil refineries and modernizing related infrastructure. The ministers also agreed on terms for the trade of oil, gas condensate and petroleum products.
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/why-are-us-military-personnel-heading-peru
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/analysis-ccp-poised-to-expand-security-footprint-in-latin-america-with-new-port-in-argentina_5376143.html?utm_source=Goodevening&src_src=Goodevening&utm_campaign=gv-2023-07-10&src_cmp=gv-2023-07-10&utm_medium=email
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Backlash. The Argentine government and Bolivian opposition figures are demanding an explanation after reports emerged that the Bolivian government signed a defense agreement with Iran. Argentina is particularly sensitive about any engagement with Tehran, which Argentine authorities accuse of being involved in the bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires in 1994. On Monday, Argentina’s Foreign Ministry asked the Bolivian Embassy in Buenos Aires for details on its security talks with Iran. Bolivia’s opposition also submitted a written request to the government demanding information about the scope of the reported agreement.
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Iranian drones. Bolivian Defense Minister Edmundo Novillo confirmed reports that the country is interested in Iranian drones to monitor its borders and combat drug trafficking. Iranian state-owned media had said the countries’ defense chiefs last week signed a memorandum of understanding on defense and security, but Novillo, responding to petitions for information from Bolivian opposition lawmakers and the Argentine government, downplayed the agreement’s significance. Nearby, Venezuela has long worked with Iran on its drone program.
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July 26, 2023
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For the US, Fentanyl Is All About China
Washington hopes Mexico and Colombia will see the drug trade the same way.
By: Allison Fedirka
While many governments around the world are focused on securing supply chains, there’s at least one the U.S. government desperately wants to break up: the fentanyl supply chain. Nearly a dozen U.S. government agencies are working together to choke off illicit flows of the drug. In addition to saving American lives, Washington wants to reduce insecurity in Latin America and highlight China’s role in the fentanyl trade to introduce an anti-China element into its security cooperation, particularly with Mexico and Colombia.
China’s rapid growth has over the past two decades helped it develop its economic influence in Latin America – aided in no small part by the absence of a U.S. counter-strategy. At first, Washington saw Beijing’s growing presence as simple economic diversification, and thus no threat to hemispheric security or U.S. security and military relationships with Latin America. Only recently has the U.S. started to see China’s commercial activities in the region as a potential threat, especially as it relates to U.S. access to rare earth elements and the security of allies’ ports and 5G technology.
At the same time, China’s economy is in secular decline. This slowdown, combined with the United States’ drive to decouple supply chains from China, is naturally steering Mexico back toward its northern neighbor. Mexico is an obvious destination for multinational firms that want to manufacture close to the U.S. market at a relatively low cost. For its part, Colombia – for years a beneficiary of Chinese trade and investment – has gotten closer to Beijing politically since the inauguration in 2022 of President Gustavo Petro. However, it too is questioning the future of Chinese foreign investment and trade, leading it to consider alternatives such as the United States.
But Washington doesn’t want to be an alternative patron; it wants to rebuild its influence while eroding that of China. To that end, it needs a wedge, and the consumption of fentanyl is a prime issue. In the U.S. alone, overdose deaths as a result of fentanyl use have skyrocketed over the past eight years to almost 110,000 in 2022. The opioid epidemic cost the U.S. economy $1.5 trillion in 2020 alone, according to estimates from the U.S. Congress’ Joint Economic Committee, while the Council on Foreign Relations calculates that it has removed more than 6 million people from the workforce.
(click to enlarge)
Consumption is less of a concern in Mexico and Colombia, but that’s beginning to change. However, the more immediate concern in those countries is production and the insecurity and corruption that tend to accompany the drug trade. Due to its low production costs and synthetic nature, fentanyl production can be scaled up rapidly. Two Mexican cartels, Sinaloa and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel, have a monopoly on the U.S.-Mexico fentanyl trade. The Sinaloa cartel is also considering opening operations in Colombia, including starting fentanyl “kitchens,” sourcing input materials and potentially building networks within the health care sector to tap into Colombia’s legal stream of the drug.
Chinese companies provide nearly all the precursor materials for fentanyl production in the Western Hemisphere. Not only that, but at least four Chinese companies offer information on optimizing fentanyl manufacturing, including providing customers with ingredients, advice on substitute ingredients, instructions on mixing and access to chemists. Other Chinese companies provide false labels on shipments and/or ship chemicals without keeping customer records.
Steps of Illicit Synthetic Drug Production
(click to enlarge)
Fentanyl is a profitable business. A single fake pill laced with fentanyl may cost 10 cents to make but will sell for $10 on the street. Chinese criminal groups and the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels have pooled their extensive money laundering experience, using mirror transfers, trade-based money laundering and bulk cash movements to facilitate the exchange of foreign currency. As an added bonus, this practice helps streamline the purchase of precursor chemicals.
Now, however, the U.S. government and partners are fighting back. In February, the Biden administration engaged Mexico, Colombia and Ecuador to collaborate against the growing availability and lethality of illegal drugs containing fentanyl. In March, Mexico’s president wrote to his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, seeking help stemming the flow of fentanyl to North America. (Beijing denied any wrongdoing.) In April, the U.S. charged four leading members of the Sinaloa cartel linked to the fentanyl trade. And in May, the Mexican president said his country’s navy had intercepted a container from Qingdao, China, that contained 75 pounds of packages with traces of fentanyl and methamphetamine. The U.S. also sanctioned seven Chinese companies and six individuals accused of exporting tablet presses to Mexico. Last month, the U.S. Justice Department filed criminal charges against four Chinese chemical manufacturers and eight individuals accused of illegally trafficking precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl. In spite of these developments, the head of the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration said recently that she wants to see more cooperation from Mexico.
Fentanyl Flow to the United States, 2019
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In Colombia, cocaine has become a secondary concern because it is less lethal and less profitable than fentanyl. Earlier this month, the U.S. Embassy in Bogota said it was indefinitely suspending its monitoring of coca crops in Colombia and would not produce its annual report on Colombia and cocaine. The embassy explained that U.N. reports made its work redundant and that observation satellites were needed for other purposes. (Colombia’s justice minister said he did not expect the decision to jeopardize U.S. funding for anti-drug and other programs.) Meanwhile, U.S. agencies reportedly coordinated with Colombian authorities earlier this year to arrest Sinaloa cartel members who were attempting to develop the fentanyl industry in Colombia.
The Colombian and Mexican governments agree on the need to change their anti-drug strategies. In Bogota, the Petro administration wants to move away from punitive, prohibitionist and militarized policies and instead target illicit profits, money laundering, large traffickers and mafias. Calling the war on drugs a failure, Petro said the same mistakes should not be repeated with fentanyl. Similarly, Mexico’s government wants to focus on economic development and youth outreach to reduce incentives for joining criminal organizations. The two presidents plan to meet in early September to discuss new anti-drug strategies. Talks will focus on youth prevention and socio-economic development. They also plan to address the challenge of synthetic drugs and the importance of adjusting interdiction, prevention and rehabilitation to meet new realities and social needs.
Many of these efforts will require the support of and collaboration with the U.S., which until recently was reluctant to link drug trafficking and economic development. The key question is whether Mexico City and Bogota will get on board with Washington’s anti-China approach. The answer may depend on whether the U.S. is prepared to align its anti-drug initiatives with new strategies taking shape in Mexico and Colombia
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CHILE’S COUP at 50
Kissinger Briefed Nixon on Failed 1970 CIA Plot to Block Allende Presidency
Chilean Military “Pretty Incompetent Bunch,” Kissinger Told President
Archive Book PINOCHET DESCLASIFICADO Reveals CIA’S “Exhaustive Debriefing” of Chilean Media Mogul Who Sought Coup Backing; Secret Meeting with Nixon
Military Plotters Wanted “Assurances They Would Not Be Abandoned and Ostracized”
As 50th Anniversary Nears, Chilean Government Seeks Still-Secret U.S. Documents on Overthrow of Allende
Washington, D.C., August 8, 2023 - As the commander in chief of the Chilean army, Gen. René Schneider, lay dying in a hospital after being shot in a CIA-backed coup plot in October 1970, President Nixon placed a phone call to his national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to ask, “What is happening in Chile?” according to a transcript of their conversation posted today by the National Security Archive. Kissinger told the President that the CIA-backed plot to block Socialist president-elect Salvador Allende from being inaugurated—an operation ordered by Nixon five weeks earlier—had not succeeded. The Chilean military turned out to be “a pretty incompetent bunch,” according to Kissinger, having failed to seize power after the removal of Gen. Schneider, Chile’s top pro-constitution officer.
“There’s been a turn for the worse,” Kissinger explained, referring to the Schneider assassination, “but it hasn’t triggered anything else. The next move should have been a government takeover, but that hasn’t happened.”
“The [congressional] election is tomorrow and the inauguration is [November] third,” Kissinger informed Nixon. “What they could have done is prevent the Congress from meeting. But that hasn’t been done. It’s close, but it’s probably too late.”
Obtained by the National Security Archive through legal and FOIA efforts, the Kissinger-Nixon “telcon” was published for the first time last week in Pinochet Desclasificado: Los Archivos Secretos de Estados Unidos Sobre Chile, a revised, 50th-anniversary, Chilean edition of Archive analyst Peter Kornbluh’s book, The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability.
Today’s posting also includes newly available U.S. records on the role of Chilean media mogul Agustín Edwards in assisting the initial CIA coup plotting in the days following Salvador Allende’s dramatic election in September 1970. Internal White House scheduling records obtained by Kornbluh for the book provide concrete proof of a secret, September 15, 1970, meeting between Edwards and President Nixon in the Oval Office—an encounter never acknowledged by Edwards, who died in 2017. The posting also features a top secret report from CIA director Richard Helms to Kissinger on the agency’s “exhaustive debriefing” of Edwards on potential coup plotters and requirements for the military to move.
As the 50th anniversary of the coup approaches on September 11, the Chilean government of Gabriel Boric has publicly called on the Biden Administration to release still-secret U.S. records relating to the coup. “We still don’t know what President Nixon saw on his desk the morning of the military coup,” said Chile’s ambassador to Washington, Juan Gabriel Valdés, in a recent interview with EFE, the Spanish news agency. “There are details that remain of interest to [Chileans], that are important for us to reconstruct our own history.”
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A Far-Right Candidate Takes the Lead in Argentina's Presidential Race
Aug 14, 2023 | 21:34 GMT
Far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei waves after delivering a speech at his headquarters in Buenos Aires on Aug. 13, 2023.
Far-right presidential candidate Javier Milei waves at supporters at his headquarters in Buenos Aires on Aug. 13, 2023, following his strong performance in Argentina's primary election.
(ALEJANDRO PAGNI/AFP via Getty Images)
In Argentina, far-right libertarian candidate Javier Milei's surprisingly strong performance in the presidential primary will increase financial volatility in the coming weeks, deterring investment while raising the risk of a panic-induced bank run. The anti-establishment candidate who has promised to overhaul Argentina's economic and political systems unexpectedly came out on top in the country's open presidential primary on Aug. 13. With 96% of the ballots counted, Milei from the Libertarian Party came away 30.6% of the vote, beating out the candidates from the conservative Juntos por el Cambio coalition (who secured a combined 28.7% of the vote) and the candidates from the ruling leftist Union por la Patria coalition (who secured a combined 27%). Milei, who ran uncontested for his Libertarian Party's presidential nomination, will compete against the Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) nominee Patricia Bullrich and the Union por la Patria (UP) nominee Sergio Massa in Argentina's Oct. 22 presidential election. The outcome of the primary vote portends a close, three-way race that will likely go to a runoff in November, as no candidate appears set to reach the threshold needed to win the presidency outright in October.
A political newcomer, Javier Milei is the wildcard candidate who was only elected to the lower house of Argentina's Congress in 2021. He has attracted voters disenchanted with the mainstream political parties by denouncing the ''political caste,'' and has also proposed radical changes like shuttering the country's central bank, replacing the Argentine peso with the U.S. dollar, and drastically cutting public spending.
Argentina's former security minister Patricia Bullrich won JxC's nomination after defeating Buenos Aires Mayor Horacio Rodriguez Larreta in the coalition's primary. Bullrich has promised to cut public spending, make labor laws more flexible, and reduce taxes and regulations within the first 100 days of her tenure, seeking to quickly implement her pro-business reforms.
As polls had predicted, leftist Economy Minister Sergio Massa cinched UP's nomination after winning the ruling bloc's primary by a wide margin. A career politician, Massa was appointed Economy Minister in August 2022 with the main promise of reducing Argentina's inflation and avoiding a worsening of the country's economic crisis. Despite these promises, inflation in the country has continued to rise during his tenure.
Since voting in primary elections is mandatory in Argentina, the results of primaries have historically served as a strong indicator of the outcome of general elections. In both 2011 and 2019, the candidate who obtained the most votes in the presidential primary went on to win the presidency. However, in 2015, the candidate who secured the most votes in the primary won the most votes in the first round of the presidential election, though lost in the second round.
According to Argentina's electoral rules, if no presidential candidate obtains at least 45% of the vote in the Oct. 22 election (or 40% of the vote with a 10-point lead over the next candidate), the presidential race will advance to a run-off between the top two candidates on Nov. 19.
Milei's surprise lead in the primary reflects voters' strong anti-establishment sentiment amid Argentina's worsening economic crisis. Argentina's headline inflation is expected to reach 145% by the end of 2023. The ongoing cost of living crisis has hit Argentine households particularly hard, with food inflation set to reach 110% in the same timeframe. Meanwhile, the peso's unofficial exchange rate is nearly double the official exchange rate, which has drained the country's chronically-low foreign currency reserves since Argentina's central bank sells millions of dollars every day. In the wake of the Aug. 13 primary, the government also devalued Argentina's currency by 18%, which will further eat into households' peso-denominated savings. Against this backdrop, Milei's promises of sweeping change appear to have resonated among the growing number of Argentines struggling to make ends meet, with roughly 40% of the country's population estimated to be living in poverty.
The International Monetary Fund now expects Argentina's economy to expand by a mere 0.2% in 2023 amid the country's weakening currency, falling foreign currency reserves, increasing poverty rate, and struggle to tamp down on rampant inflation.
In the second half of 2022, 39.2% of Argentina's population was living in poverty, up from 36.5% in the first six months of the year. That figure is believed to have only increased since then due to the country's growing economic crisis.
On Aug. 14, the government devalued Argentina's currency to 350 pesos per U.S. dollar. But the official exchange rate has since further dropped to 365 pesos per dollar, signaling that the central bank has few other options to defend the country's currency. The peso's unofficial valuation, meanwhile, is much lower, with the currency trading at 685 pesos per dollar on the black market as of Aug. 14 (the black market is a key source of U.S. dollars for millions of Argentinians and is thus often viewed as a more accurate representation of the peso's true value).
The shock primary election will likely amplify concerns about the economic implications of a potential Milei presidency, which could slow new investment into the country and, in an escalatory scenario, trigger a run on Argentine banks. Conservative JxC candidate Bullrich and leftist UP candidate Rodriguez still have a decent chance of winning the presidency. But Milei's stronger-than-expected performance in the primary will nonetheless stir more anxiety among investors, citizens and businesses by suggesting that he and his radical policy agenda stand a serious chance of being elected later this year, which will increase financial volatility in the coming weeks. Even if Milei wins, his Libertarian Party is all but certain to secure only a small minority in Congress in concurrent legislative elections on Oct. 22, which would leave him unable to carry out most of his agenda unless he reaches a deal with UP or JxC (though such a deal would likely force him to scale back his proposals). But while this legislative check would likely keep Milei from following through on the bulk of his campaign promises, concerns about what such a presidency would mean for the economy would still almost certainly see investors press pause on starting new projects in Argentina. This would likely slow growth in the country's crucial mining and hydrocarbon industries (especially as the country pushes for new investment in its shale fields), along with its budding start-up culture. Given Milei's support for dollarization, such uncertainty also risks eventually triggering a run on Argentine banks, as households and companies may scramble to swap their pesos for U.S. dollars to avoid being potentially forced to do so when the exchange rate is less favorable. While such a mass manic remains unlikely for now, if the outcome of the Oct. 22 election confirms that Milei is indeed poised to become Argentina's next president, it will increase the risk of a full bank run that forces the outgoing government to further devalue the peso and impose even stricter capital controls (including a prolonged bank holiday to prevent savers from withdrawing their money).
In the aftermath of the primary election, Argentina's dollar bonds were trading about 10% lower on Aug. 14, highlighting investors' concerns about a potential Milei presidency.
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Middle-Class Revolt in Argentina
Voters turn to an outsider who wants to close the central bank.
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Aug. 14, 2023 6:38 pm ET
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Argentine far-right libertarian economist and presidential candidate Javier Milei speaks while celebrating the results of the primary elections in Buenos Aires, Aug. 13 PHOTO: ALEJANDRO PAGNI/AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE/GETTY IMAGES
Inflation is the thief of middle-class prosperity, and in Argentina prices are rising by more than 115%. So it shouldn’t be a great surprise that Argentines on Sunday gave the most votes to presidential candidate Javier Milei, an outsider promising to close the central bank and replace the peso with the dollar.
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Argentina, once prosperous but degraded by Peronist socialism, is bracing for another currency crisis and owes $44 billion to the International Monetary Fund. The economy is stalled. On Monday the peso fell more than 13% in the black market, and the central bank moved its official exchange rate to 350 to the dollar, a 22% devaluation. The effective rate of 28-day government paper is now 209%, according to Goldman Sachs. Who wouldn’t yearn for dollar assets in that economy?
Mr. Milei, who holds a seat in Congress, wasn’t challenged in his primary bid for the nomination of the La Libertad Avanza (Liberty Advances) party. But since all candidates are on the multiparty primary ballot every four years and voting is technically mandatory, the exercise is widely considered to be a dry run of the first round of the presidential election.
Pollsters had Mr. Milei getting around 20%, but they underestimated popular resentment. He won more than 30% of the vote and finished first in 16 of the country’s 24 provinces.
Two candidates of the ruling Peronist party together received less than 27%, which shows how unpopular the government is. Two candidates vying for the nomination of the center-right opposition coalition Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) received 28%. Patricia Bullrich won the Juntos race but had been expected to do much better than her 17%. She’s tough on crime, an important issue. But her stint in the failed government of center-right Mauricio Macri (2015-2019) may have limited her upside.
The international press is portraying Mr. Milei as a crazy populist, and there’s no doubt he’s disdainful of Argentina’s political establishment—left and right. He draws large crowds of young Argentines and rails against the “entire political caste, stupid and useless.”
Mr. Milei is an economist who favors limited government and blames Argentina’s economic problems on suffocating taxation, hyper-regulation, special-interest subsidies and protectionism. He wants to open markets, cut public spending, end capital controls and privatize state-owned enterprises. He’s also a social conservative, but his appeal stems largely from his rage against the establishment.
With international reserves in net-negative territory, the next president will inherit an economic mess. If the prospect of a Milei presidency willing to break with the status quo excites a third of voters, it also raises questions about Mr. Milei’s ability to govern if he wins. His party has only two seats in Congress, which means he’d need to work with some of those he is lambasting now.
Much can happen between now and the first election round on Oct. 22. But Mr. Milei’s showing has sent a message to Buenos Aires—and the world—that the Argentine middle class may no longer accept a status quo that robs them of the fruits of their labor.
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****The [US] media would like you to know that Javier Milei, the upstart candidate who improbably won Argentina’s presidential primary this week, is a “Trump admirer,” “right-wing populist,” “far-right outsider,” “far-right populist,” “rightist,” “far-right libertarian,” a “radical” — and did they mention he’s on the “far right”?***
Thus we know he is probably a good candidate. :wink:
https://patriotpost.us/opinion/99798-the-best-presidential-candidate-in-the-world-is-running-in-argentina-2023-08-18
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Communist China Helps Itself to Ecuador
by Robert Williams • August 29, 2023 at 6:00 am
"We are basically being plundered. There are no words. There are no words to describe this tragedy.... China took control of the natural resources. They control the hydroelectric plants, they control the oil, a large part of mining, and they control political power. We've been colonized. Again." — Fernando Villavicencio, Ecuadorean investigative journalist and presidential candidate in the award-winning 2022 documentary, This Stolen Country of Mine.
From 2007 to 2017, Villavicencio, who was a leading critic of the country's sellout to China and government corruption, investigated the corruption and China dealings of left-wing Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who effectively sold the country and its rich resources to China. In 2020, Correa was sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison for corruption but had already fled to Belgium. Today, China is Ecuador's largest creditor.
n March 2023, Honduras cut ties with Taiwan and established diplomatic ties with China in order to handle its enormous debt and need for investments.
Even more disturbing is the fact that China's activities in Latin America amount to a significant security threat against US interests.
"What concerns me as a Combatant Commander is the myriad of ways in which the PRC is spreading its malign influence, wielding its economic might, and conducting gray zone activities to expand its military and political access and influence... The PRC is investing in critical infrastructure, including deep-water ports, cyber, and space facilities which can have a potential dual use for malign commercial and military activities. In any potential global conflict, the PRC could leverage strategic regional ports to restrict U.S. naval and commercial ship access. This is a strategic risk that we can't accept or ignore... This is a decisive decade and our actions or inactions regarding the PRC will have ramifications for decades to come." — General Laura Jane Richardson, Commander of the US Southern Command, to the House Armed Services Committee regarding her concerns over China's activities in Latin America. Those include China's recent financing of a $3 billion container port in Peru, and the establishment of a space monitoring station near the Strait of Magellan. March 8, 2023.
"We are basically being plundered. There are no words. There are no words to describe this tragedy. They [China] have control of the natural resources." — Ecuadorean investigative journalist and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio, who was assassinated on August 9, 2023. Ecuador is just one of the Latin American countries that China is colonizing and exploiting. Pictured: A pipeline and a gas flare stack belonging to Chinese oil company PetroOriental, near the indigenous Amazon rainforest village of Miwuaguno in Ecuador, on December 10, 2020. (Photo by Cristina Vega Rhor/AFP via Getty Images)
"We are basically being plundered. There are no words. There are no words to describe this tragedy. They [China] have control of the natural resources," said Ecuadorean investigative journalist and presidential candidate Fernando Villavicencio in the award-winning 2022 documentary, This Stolen Country of Mine. "China took control of the natural resources. They control the hydroelectric plants, they control the oil, a large part of mining, and they control political power. We've been colonized. Again."
From 2007 to 2017, Villavicencio, who was a leading critic of the country's sellout to China and government corruption, investigated the corruption and China dealings of left-wing Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, who effectively sold the country and its rich resources to China. In 2020, Correa was sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison for corruption, but had already fled to Belgium. Today, China is Ecuador's largest creditor.
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https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/peru/2023-08-28/perus-truth-and-reconciliation-commission-20-years-later?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=74be1beb-0580-4591-910b-36a9771c82c7
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Milestone. China and Nicaragua signed a free trade agreement on Thursday. China’s Ministry of Commerce described it as a milestone in bilateral trade and economic relations. Negotiations on the deal, which removes barriers to trade in goods and services and investment, began in July 2022.
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How Record Migration Will Impact Central America
Sep 12, 2023 | 18:17 GMT
(LUIS ACOSTA/AFP via Getty Images)
Record-breaking migration across Central America is straining government resources and increasing organized crime; as governments struggle to effectively respond, political tensions, supply chain disruptions and safety threats could rise over the next year. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights reported Sept. 5 that the Darien Gap between Panama and Colombia has seen more than 330,000 migrant crossings so far in 2023, the highest number of annual crossings ever recorded. As migrants have moved north through Central America, countries have reported a surge in migrant encampments. In Costa Rica, migrants unable to afford the bus fare to travel north to the Nicaraguan border have congregated on the border of Panama, leading authorities to declare a state of emergency in the region. Migrant arrivals in Honduras reached record levels in July and August, the majority of them arriving through the eastern border with Nicaragua. Mexico has already seen elevated numbers of migrants reach the country, with authorities in July apprehending more than 70,000 migrants in a single month for the first time, more than double the country's reported apprehensions in July 2022.
The regional drivers for migration — poor economic conditions, insecurity and government repression — remain pronounced throughout the region. According to data from the Mexican Refugee Aid Commission, most asylum requests in Mexico in 2023 have come from Haitians, Hondurans, Cubans, Salvadorans and Venezuelans.
Nearly 250,000 people crossed the Darien Gap in all of 2022, nearly double the 133,000 crossings in 2021.
In August, Costa Rican authorities reported that between 2,000 and 3,000 migrants were entering the country daily from Panama through the Paso Canoas border crossing, up from 13,248 in all of April 2023.
The surge in migration has strained government resources in transit countries, subsequently increasing the presence of criminal groups engaged in human trafficking. Transit countries in Central America historically have not experienced the brunt of regional migration given that migrants move through the region's countries as quickly as possible on their way to the U.S. border. With the exception of their approach to refugees from neighboring Nicaragua, Costa Rican authorities have typically managed regional migration by easing migrant travel and preventing buildups in cities and near border crossings rather than by providing long-term humanitarian assistance. In recent months, however, Costa Rica's transportation infrastructure has been unable to meet the elevated demand amid record-high migration, leading to increased encampments that local authorities have proved unprepared to handle. Throughout the region, strained transportation and humanitarian resources have made migrants increasingly desperate, raising their vulnerability to human trafficking organizations that transport migrants through countries and smuggle them across borders, often through unsafe means. These groups include major transnational criminal organizations like El Salvador's MS-13, Mexico's Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion, and Colombia's Gulf Clan. Though these groups have long had a transnational presence, they have typically focused their operations on securing drug routes and seizing control of territories with businesses worth extorting. With the increased profits possible from the record-high number of migrants, groups have increased activities in areas where they previously did not have extensive operations.
The Southern Mexican state of Chiapas has historically been a low-crime state, but in recent years has seen increased violence alongside a buildup in migrant encampments near the Guatemala border. The Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion and the Sinaloa Cartel have clashed with each other and smaller local groups to gain control of human trafficking routes, resulting in shootings and bombings near Mexico-Guatemala border crossings.
With migration potentially rising further next year, governments will continue to struggle to combat its effects, creating political, supply chain and safety challenges. As conditions in migrants' countries of origin show few signs of significant improvements, migration is likely to remain elevated or even increase next year. Amid persistent high migration, governments throughout Central America will be unable to provide enough support for migrants to safely transit their countries. In some cases, governments may face pressure to decrease funding for programs as local residents' frustration with surging migrant populations increases. As countries across the region face food insecurity and inflation challenges (including Guatemala and Honduras), political and funding limitations may prevent improvements to programs for migrants. Governments may also consider increasing border security measures, with Panamanian officials noting in August that they are overwhelmed and weighing the possibility of closing the land border with Colombia. As the countries have no official road crossing, however, it is unclear how this could be accomplished. Such measures would likely extend wait times at official border crossings, but the region's largely porous borders mean that such efforts would have little effect on migration levels and instead could drive even more migrants to use human trafficking groups. As human trafficking groups expand their presence, crime may increase in areas unequipped to handle it, creating safety risks for businesses and travelers throughout the region, with the potential for attacks to occur in the vicinity of border crossings, delaying regional supply chains and raising operational and insurance costs. Creating additional supply chain concerns, cargo drivers throughout the region have previously referenced safety concerns during labor actions, and a further increase in the targeting of cargo trucks (which are commonly used in human trafficking operations) may lead to further disruptive trucker strikes.
Truckers in Chile and Mexico have referenced poor safety conditions for drivers during protests over the last year. In Chile, protesters explicitly blamed Venezuelan migrant encampments in the country's north for violent crime targeting cargo drivers, resulting in violent clashes in January 2022 and disruptive blockades in November 2022.
One of the countries where residents could express frustration with migration policies is Costa Rica, which is experiencing its most violent year on record. Citizens and opposition political figures may criticize the diversion of resources to migrants stranded at the country's southern border, rather than to security forces to combat threats to Costa Ricans.
The increase in migration may create diplomatic tensions. Nicaragua, for example, makes little effort to cooperate with other governments on migration, an issue that may further isolate the government of President Daniel Ortega from his Central American neighbors. Panama has also previously criticized the Colombian government for not collaborating on efforts to reduce Darien Gap crossings.
As locals' frustration with increased migrant encampments worsens, protests against migrants, xenophobic attacks and a long-term rise in the popularity of far-right and anti-immigration political figures are possible. Migrants themselves may also become increasingly frustrated with the lack of humanitarian support and the increased price of legitimate transportation options, with the potential for protests in cities, at border crossings and near migrant processing facilities
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September 14, 2023
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Colombia and Mexico Push a New Drug Control Strategy
Their collaboration could force the U.S. to adjust or risk losing influence.
By: Allison Fedirka
Mexico and Colombia are jointly adjusting their anti-drug policy, with potential implications for the regional power balance and relations with the United States. For a long time, an emphasis on security and order has dominated the countries’ policies toward drug trafficking. However, a new focus on social welfare and economic development is gaining prominence in both capitals and in the wider region, fueled by a shared sense that the previous approach has failed. Mexico and Colombia also hope that by targeting the root causes of the drug problem, they can revitalize their economies, which are still staggering from the pandemic. In the bigger picture, the leaders hope to position their countries for a more volatile global environment, where countries like theirs in the Global South can exert greater influence within and beyond their borders.
A Demilitarized Approach
Earlier this month, Colombia hosted a conference for Latin American and Caribbean countries dedicated to this new anti-drug framework. It emphasized the need to refocus on tackling major transnational crime groups and implement demand-reducing social welfare policies. Gustavo Petro, the Colombian president, and Mexican President Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador said the region’s drug problem indicated a health and social crisis. Continuing down the path of a militarized counternarcotics approach, Petro warned, would lead to more failed states and perhaps the death of democracy in the region.
For Mexico and Colombia, the matter is existential. After years of rising production, Colombia is now the world’s leading coca producer. Mexican cartels dominate the cocaine supply chain from start to finish, even overseeing and directly participating in production inside of Colombia. The illicit proceeds from the drug trade enable the cartels to capture political power in remote communities where the central government’s writ is limited – a common feature in both countries. Petro and Lopez Obrador hope that by promoting the development of the legal economy, they can reassert the state’s authority in these communities and eventually excise the cartels.
Cocaine Market Indicators in Colombia
(click to enlarge)
In addition to economic development, Mexico and Colombia want to shift more responsibility for addressing the drug problem from the military to civilian institutions. In many Latin American countries, the armed forces are heavily involved in domestic security and fighting organized crime. The U.S. often trains, exchanges intelligence and conducts operations with these militaries and other law enforcement bodies to reduce the northward drug flow. Enforcement will remain a priority, but Petro and Lopez Obrador hope that by elevating the role of government bodies tasked with public health, education, etc., they can create more areas for cross-border collaboration in the drug war. For example, Mexico’s Agency for International Development Cooperation is working with the Colombian government to implement development-focused counternarcotics programs like Sembrando Vida (Sowing Life) and Jovenes Construyendo el Futuro (Youth Building the Future).
Having reached consensus on a new approach, the next challenge for Mexico and Colombia is implementation. For starters, both governments lack sufficient financing to truly transform life in affected communities. The drug trade exists because it is so profitable, and legitimate business – especially in rural communities – is rarely as lucrative. The twin plagues of official corruption and mismanagement will also complicate implementation.
Cocaine Seizures in the Western Hemisphere
(click to enlarge)
In the past, domestic opposition has also hindered attempts to move away from the militarized approach to drugs. However, this time the Colombian government appears to have bipartisan support. For example, Petro’s predecessor and political opposite, Ivan Duque, said recently that the “war on drugs” had failed and called for a public health approach to reduce demand. He also said the U.S. and European Union should open their agriculture markets to give Colombian farmers viable alternatives to coca cultivation. With elections scheduled for June 2024, Mexican politics are more erratic, but Colombia at least has come to see counternarcotics policy not as a political issue but as a national emergency.
The Biggest Consumer
Any changes in counternarcotics strategy in Latin America and the Caribbean will inevitably affect the United States. For one thing, Washington’s regional policy is tailored to the law and order approach. Most U.S. collaboration with the countries of the region in the fight against drug trafficking occurs through its law enforcement bodies. Moreover, the U.S. typically prefers to work with Mexico and Colombia separately, via bilateral arrangements such as the Merida Initiative or Plan Colombia.
But the drug trade knows no borders. Mexico’s cartels dominate global cocaine distribution and directly control the coca supply chain in Colombia. And as the Western Hemisphere’s largest producers of fentanyl and cocaine, respectively, Mexico and Colombia are strong candidates to lead a regional anti-drug initiative. By combining their voices, they stand a better chance of convincing the U.S. to accommodate their health- and development-centric strategy. A joint approach may also boost them in confronting the U.S. over its contributions to the drug problem, namely through the supply of guns and the highest drug consumption in the world.
(click to enlarge)
Success could have broader implications for bilateral and regional relations. Historically, Bogota has been Washington’s preferred partner in the region because of its strategic location and ability to counterbalance Mexico. But U.S. and Colombian interests are not as closely aligned as they once were, particularly with regard to the political crisis in Venezuela, where Washington shares neither Bogota’s urgency nor its strategy. At the same time, Mexico is offering cooperation that is more attuned to Colombia’s immediate needs. A strong Mexican-Colombian alliance, should one emerge, would shake the region and could lead to the formation of a coalition in the Caribbean capable of challenging U.S. interests.
Mexico and Colombia do not want to stop collaborating with the U.S. against drug trafficking, and in fact U.S. public and private capital would be invaluable aids for their economic development plans. Rather, they want to force Washington to engage on their terms. Bogota and Mexico City need to promote development in marginalized areas of their countries – for political and socio-economic reasons but also to exploit the opportunities presented by the global supply chain realignment. In reality, this is more important for both countries. Effective cooperation to crush the drug trade – while too important to ignore – is a means to an end.
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The Appeal (and Perils) of Crime Crackdowns in Latin America, Part 1
Sep 27, 2023 | 16:24 GMT
Soldiers conduct a patrol on July 22, 2023, in the Salvadorean municipality of Colon, where the MS-13 gang reportedly remains active.
Soldiers conduct a patrol on July 22, 2023, in the Salvadorean municipality of Colon.
(MARVIN RECINOS/AFP via Getty Images)
Editor's Note: This is the first of a two-part series that looks at El Salvador's fight against crime and why it's been so successful, as well as the implications and risks of other Latin American countries exploring similar strategies.
With the success of El Salvador's counter-crime state of emergency in decreasing the country's homicide rate to its lowest in history, similar measures have become attractive throughout Latin America, though extensive implementation would likely see only limited success, instead creating operational, safety and reputational risks for the region. In March 2022, Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele imposed a state of emergency to combat violent crime, with a focus on the country's two largest criminal groups, Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) and Barrio 18. A massive crackdown on organized crime under the state of emergency led to a dramatic drop in the country's homicide rate, making it one of the safest countries in the region. Seeing El Salvador's success, in November 2022, Honduran President Xiomara Castro implemented a similar (albeit significantly less extensive) state of emergency to combat violent crime and extortion. Elsewhere in the region, elected officials and political candidates have called for the implementation of security tactics utilized by the Bukele administration, including mass incarceration, military presence in policing forces and targeted neighborhood-specific operations against cartel activity.
In 2015, El Salvador's homicide rate peaked at 103 homicides per 100,000 people, making it among the most deadly countries in the world. Over the following years, violence gradually decreased to levels on par with regional neighbors, before stabilizing in 2021 at 17.58 homicides per 100,000 people. In 2022, following the implementation of the state of emergency, that rate fell by more than 50% to 7.8 homicides per 100,000 people. Although the reliability of Salvadoran government crime statistics is unclear, interviews of residents of formerly high-crime neighborhoods have confirmed this improvement.
In Colombia, Diego Molano and Jaime Arizabaleta — candidates for the mayors of Bogota and Cali, respectively (though Arizabaleta has since withdrawn) — have proposed building prisons inspired by those that El Salvador has constructed in recent years if they win the regional elections on Oct. 29.
In Ecuador, businessman Jan Topic (who lost in the first round of the country's election on Aug. 20) promised to carry out a ''Bukele-style'' crackdown in addition to the construction of more prisons.
In Guatemala, Sandra Torres — the leader of the country's second-largest party, National Unity of Hope, and runner-up in the August presidential election — has also promised to emulate Bukele's security strategy, calling for the militarization of prisons.
In Peru, following a surge in crime, Lima Mayor Rafael Lopez Aliaga of the right-wing Popular Renewal party called for the implementation of Bukele-style measures as well, and for tanks to patrol the streets of the capital.
Continuing violence in Honduras nearly a year into the country's crime crackdown demonstrates that success is not guaranteed. Honduras' state of emergency shares many qualities with El Salvador's crackdown, including the regular deployment of additional police officers and army forces to high crime areas, the imposition of lockdowns and curfews, and limitations on citizens' constitutional rights. However, ten months into its implementation, Honduras' crackdown has done little to decrease crime risks. Some operations have successfully decreased violence in specific neighborhoods, and anecdotal reports indicate residents of some high-crime areas do feel safer, but nationwide crime levels remain elevated and in some ways have escalated. For example, violence in Honduran prisons has worsened significantly, with repeated massacres and riots. This limited success indicates challenges to replicating El Salvador's successful state of emergency elsewhere in the region.
In April, prisoners at the National Penitentiary in Tamara, Honduras, temporarily seized control of the facility, leading authorities to give control of the prisons to the military.
Honduras has been the most violent country in Central America since El Salvador's homicide rate fell below it in 2019. Homicides in the country dropped to 35.8 per 100,000 people in 2022 from 41.7 per 100,000 people in 2021.
Understanding El Salvador's Success
A key component of El Salvador's war on crime was the severity of the state of emergency, which suspended due process in the legal system. A significant, long-standing hurdle to combating organized crime throughout Latin America is the prevalence of police and government corruption. Corrupt practices among police officers, military members, and local and federal government officials enable criminal groups to entrench themselves in communities, evade capture, and expand criminal enterprises. This is the result of limited policy safeguards preventing corruption, low pay for government positions, and regular bribery and/or threats against officials. These risks have long been present in El Salvador, with the Bukele administration itself allegedly engaged in negotiations with the country's gangs prior to implementing the state of emergency. Continuing allegations of government corruption call into question how El Salvador has managed to overcome this challenge. One compelling explanation is that ''mano dura'' (iron-fisted) measures under the state of emergency have left little room for criminal groups to maneuver. Mass arrests and the abandonment of due process in the legal system may mean that members of Barrio 18 and MS-13 have not had the opportunity to bribe or threaten officials. Military deployment to high-crime areas has also overcome local alliances between police officers and gang members. Honduran police reported arresting 4,033 people between December 2022 and May 2023, with 81% ultimately released due to a lack of evidence; meanwhile, in El Salvador, over 70,000 people have been arrested, with only 6,000 people released. Approximately 2% of the country's adult population is currently in prison, many of whom human rights groups allege are innocent. Corruption in El Salvador persists, but the lack of due process and decreased opportunities for gangs to threaten or bribe police officers have overcome constraints from official corruption on counter-crime operations.
Transparency International's 2022 Corruption Perceptions Index gives El Salvador a low score of 33 out of 100 (in which a score of 100 indicates low levels of corruption). Meanwhile, Honduras has a score of 23, Ecuador has a score of 36, and Colombia has a score of 39.
In a recent example of the scale of El Salvador's localized gang crackdowns, on Aug. 1, authorities sent 7,000 soldiers and 1,000 police officers to the rural Cabanas province in response to a shooting attack that wounded two officers.
This level of implementation of counter-crime measures has only been possible because of Bukele's high popularity and minimal policy limitations. Since Bukele took office in 2019, his approval rating has never dropped below 80%, typically staying between 85% and 92%, which is rare for a Latin American leader. This level of support has given him the leeway to take controversial steps to combat organized crime, as a less popular political figure would have to consider how their political opponents may criticize such actions. But while Salvadoran opposition parties and human rights activists have criticized the state of emergency, mass public approval for the crackdown limits political risks to Bukele. Relatedly, Bukele's New Ideas party retains a significant majority in the Legislative Assembly, and his administration has stacked the judicial system with friendly judges, effectively eliminating the potential for legal challenges to the state of emergency. In comparison, Honduran President Xiomara Castro's Libre party has only 50 out of 128 seats in the country's National Congress, recently preventing her government from gaining congressional approval for a new attorney general. Other governments in the region face similar restrictions on how states of emergency can be implemented, limiting their ability to impose measures similar to those in El Salvador.
Finally, El Salvador's high population density benefits counter-crime operations, potentially making the state of emergency unreplicable in other countries in the region. El Salvador has a population density of 307 people per square kilometer, making it the most densely populated country in Latin America (excluding the Caribbean). The next most densely populated country is Guatemala, with a population density of 129 per square kilometer. El Salvador's population density has historically fueled crime, with the country's crowded, impoverished neighborhoods providing bases for Barrio 18 and MS-13 operations. But this population density has also aided counter-crime efforts over the last year, as deployments to high-crime areas include a significantly larger number of residents (and therefore criminals) than an operation in a similarly sized area in neighboring Honduras. Such operations create significant safety risks for residents and disrupt daily life in affected neighborhoods for days, but still enable authorities to arrest targeted criminal cells. In addition, many countries in Latin America have vast, underpopulated regions where criminal groups can operate with lower risks of disruption by security forces. For example, Colombia's Amazon basin regions have long provided space for guerilla groups to evade authorities. Ecuador, Peru, Chile and Brazil face similar challenges. Therefore, even if such countries were institutionally and politically able to implement a state of emergency to the same degree as El Salvador, they may struggle to achieve the same level of success.
Honduras has a population density of 95 people per square kilometer. Mexico's population density is 66 people per square kilometer, while Colombia's is 47 people per square kilometer.
Up next: The Appeal (and Perils) of Crime Crackdowns in Latin America, Part 2
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The Appeal (and Perils) of Crime Crackdowns in Latin America, Part 2
Sep 28, 2023 | 14:14 GMT
Salvadoran security forces move a second group of 2,000 detainees overnight to the mega-prison Terrorist Confinement Center on March 15, 2023, in Tecoluca, El Salvador.
Salvadoran security forces move a second group of 2,000 detainees overnight to the mega-prison Terrorist Confinement Center on March 15, 2023, in Tecoluca, El Salvador.
(Photo by Handout/Presidencia El Salvador via Getty Images)
Editor's Note: This is the second installment of a two-part series exploring El Salvador's fight against crime and its impact on the region. In the first part, we examined El Salvador's strategy and the reasons behind its success. Part two focuses on the risks other Latin American countries will face if they implement similar strategies.
The political and potential economic benefits of El Salvador's state of emergency may inspire other regional governments to implement similar measures, which could create new safety, reputational and migratory risks. If other Latin American countries implement counter-crime states of emergency, even to a lesser extent than El Salvador, criminal groups would likely retaliate against government security forces, leading to bursts of violence that include public shootouts and bombings. El Salvador experienced these security impacts in the weeks following the state of emergency's implementation, though violence declined as the number of arrests spiked over subsequent months. However, if other countries' states of emergency are less successful, elevated crime rates could persist for months or years, creating safety risks for local residents and businesses operating in the region.
Additionally, strict states of emergency could raise human rights concerns and create reputational and logistical challenges across the region. If more countries and regions implement similar tactics to that of El Salvador's Bukele administration, such as mass incarceration and mass trials, they will likely draw criticism from human rights organizations and foreign countries. As military personnel often police the populace during states of emergency, there are likely to be additional concerns over police militarization. Therefore, these tactics could lead to increased reputational risks for companies operating in the region, particularly if security conditions do not substantially improve as a result of the measures. Such measures could also raise concerns of authoritarianism, as governments could use (or be perceived as using) measures from states of emergency to quash dissent and limit opposition. This could spur criticism and even sanctions from international powers such as the United States and the European Union. In El Salvador, such international responses have so far been minimal, but this risk may escalate over the coming years. Companies operating in sanctioned countries may experience logistical and compliance challenges that cause financial harm.
Relations between the United States and El Salvador have deteriorated under the state of emergency, with the U.S. Biden administration imposing sanctions on officials close to Salvadoran President Nayib Bukele under the Magnitsky Act in December 2022. However, these measures have scarcely impacted the Salvadoran government.
The United States previously sanctioned Nicaragua over authoritarianism and repression under the government of President Daniel Ortega. Sanctions included limiting Nicaraguan sugar exports to the United States and issuing an executive order allowing limitations on exports from Nicaragua's mining sector.
Mass Arrests and Human Rights Trade-Offs
El Salvador's success has come at the expense of civil liberties and due process. The nationwide state of emergency allows authorities to suspend constitutional rights, including limiting freedom of movement, intercepting communications and making arrests without warrants. Human rights organizations including Amnesty International have repeatedly alleged that authorities often arrest individuals with no indication that they are involved in crime in order to meet arrest quotas. For example, officers have reportedly arbitrarily arrested detainees, many of them minors, for living in poor, crime-ridden neighborhoods and having tattoos (a quality traditionally associated with organized crime in El Salvador), resulting in the arrest of more than 72,000 people since March 2022. Mass arrests have necessitated the construction of a 40,000-person capacity prison, and authorities recently began conducting collective trials for thousands of people at a time. Reports have also alleged extrajudicial killings, inhumane conditions in the country's prisons and torture.
Finally, states of emergency could increase regional migration, raising criminal activity and spurring border disruptions. The state of emergency in El Salvador has placed poor Salvadorans (particularly men) at risk of arbitrary arrest, leading many to leave the country. If mass arbitrary arrests occur during counter-crime operations in other countries, similar increases in migration could occur. Elevated migration would raise regional crime risks, as criminal groups would increase their presence in areas with high migrant encampments to target migrants for human trafficking and extortion. In addition, the United States and Mexico would likely try to deter any northward increases in migration, which would likely lead to supply chain disruptions, including within Mexico and at the U.S.-Mexico border.
Texas Gov. Greg Abbott increased inspections at the U.S.-Mexico border in April 2022 and May 2023.
In September, Mexican freight company Ferromex suspended some of its northbound cargo train operations due to safety concerns as the number of migrants attempting to ride the trains north spiked.
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Must be easier said than done.
but it would help our neighbor's economies, reduce poverty and hopefully the need to flock north .
It would also reduce or eradicate the reliance on China
Reduce the distance of the supply chain
https://hbr.org/2021/06/the-case-for-a-pan-american-manufacturing-ecosystem
The only obvious downside is it would still ship jobs overseas but still seems better .
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MY:
https://michaelyon.substack.com/p/pan-american-suicide
"Panama’s location is strategically vital for various reasons such as Canal, and pathway to South America. Panama is one of the most vital terrains on earth.
"Costa Rica is on Silk Road 2.0 and will be taken. The land and sea will not be left to Panamanians, or anyone else who cannot defend and operate it. Panamanians and indigenous will be swept aside by storms and global currents beyond comprehension of most Americans, Europeans, and Panamanians.
"Netherlands and others also being swept away. Places like Ukraine and Israel are nothing under force of these currents.
"Texas does not have a border.
"The US Government is pumping millions of incompatibles into our aquarium. While the highly-vaxxed US military concentrates on foreign, concocted wars, core Americans are scheduled for genocide.
USA has no border."
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https://oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/China-has-strong-incentive-to-widen-Panama-Canal.pdf
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https://www.nationalreview.com/news/anarcho-capitalist-javier-milei-elected-president-in-argentina/
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https://www.nationalreview.com/news/anarcho-capitalist-javier-milei-elected-president-in-argentina/
Cato:
https://www.cato.org/blog/mileis-remarkable-victory-argentina-paves-way-dollar-zone
The potential is now there to start reversing 8 decades of failure.
Too bad to go to the (US) dollar right while we are abandoning it.
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When there’s no real alternative, there’s no problem, as the saying goes. And that may be the logic of Argentina voters on Sunday who rejected the catastrophe of Peronist rule in favor of impulsive and charismatic outsider Javier Milei, who promised what for Argentina is the radical change of free-market economics.
Mr. Milei, a Congressman and self-described libertarian, won the Presidency in a rout with 56% of the vote to 44%. He defeated Sergio Massa, the incumbent economic minister and architect of the policies that have produced runaway inflation, declining living standards, a government shedding foreign reserves, and the worst economic crisis in decades.
“Today we begin the reconstruction of Argentina,” Mr. Milei said Sunday night. “If we do not move quickly with the structural changes that Argentina needs, we are heading towards the worst crisis in our history.”
He’s not exaggerating. Inflation is running at 143%, the peso has lost some 90% of its value against the U.S. dollar on the black market, and the middle class is increasingly impoverished. This is the result of industrial policy, export taxes, capital controls, rigid labor markets, uncontrolled government spending and the political abuse of the central bank to monetize the spending. This policy mix fails wherever it’s tried, but Argentines keep giving it another chance until it blows up again.
Mr. Massa tried to buy the election with handouts to voters, as the Peronists always do. He and the international media stigmatized Mr. Milei as a crazy radical who is akin to Donald Trump. The leftist leaders in the rest of Latin America—Mexico, Brazil and Colombia—hinted that Mr. Milei meant a return to fascism.
The comparisons to Mr. Trump are especially inapt. Mr. Milei is a free trader and believes in sound money. Mr. Trump is a protectionist who wants higher border taxes and demanded low interest rates as President.
None of the attacks worked. Mr. Milei had finished second to Mr. Massa in the first round election, but he was able to consolidate the vote from the center-right candidate, who had finished third, to win the runoff.
Mr. Milei will now get his chance to clean up the mess, and this will be harder than winning the election. The Peronists control the largest faction in the Argentine Congress and will oppose him every step along the way. Some of his proposals lack detail. He says he’ll dollarize the economy, which could work if there are enough dollar reserves to manage the transition. He wants to abolish the central bank, but it isn’t clear what would replace it.
The President-elect is a political movement unto himself, and he will have to form a coalition with conservative and centrist politicians in Congress. Known for his often caustic and insulting rhetoric, Mr. Milei electrified Argentina’s desperate younger generation with his candor. But now he will have to show he can moderate his persona or risk wasting his great opportunity.
The stakes are high for Argentina’s 46 million people, who have suffered from more misrule over a century than most other nations. But they are also high for those who believe in Mr. Milei’s campaign theme of “freedom” and economic liberty.
If he fails in his reform efforts through incompetence or vainglory, he could discredit market policies in Argentina, which could put the Peronists back in power. Mr. Milei has given his country new promise of better days, and let’s hope he is capable enough to deliver.
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https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book/chile/2023-11-22/pinochet-dictatorship-declassified-confessions-dina-hit-man?eType=EmailBlastContent&eId=598e5250-e651-4dca-ae66-3c5b809009cf
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https://www.creators.com/read/ben-shapiro/11/23/why-the-media-despise-javier-milei
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called "FAR RIGHT" threat by the LEFT and mentions of Hitler come up on CNN MSNBC when his name is mentioned
VISITS GRAVE OF FAMOUS RABBI IN NYC:
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/11/27/photos-argentinas-javier-milei-visits-the-ohel-gravesite-of-lubavitcher-rebbe-before-meeting-u-s-officials/
[JUST LIKE HITLER WOULD HAVE DONE :roll: :wink:]
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called "FAR RIGHT" threat by the LEFT and mentions of Hitler come up on CNN MSNBC when his name is mentioned
VISITS GRAVE OF FAMOUS RABBI IN NYC:
https://www.breitbart.com/politics/2023/11/27/photos-argentinas-javier-milei-visits-the-ohel-gravesite-of-lubavitcher-rebbe-before-meeting-u-s-officials/
[JUST LIKE HITLER WOULD HAVE DONE :roll: :wink:]
We very much need (shouldn't need) to straighten out which side of the political spectrum is or leans fascist.
The individual liberty, limited government side of it is the opposite of fascist!
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https://notthebee.com/article/argentinas-new-libertarian-president-javier-milei-immediately-cuts-number-of-cabinet-members-in-half-after-taking-office?utm_source=Not+The+Bee+Newsletter&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=12122023
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Chinese tanks. Chinese arms manufacturer Norinco presented a plan to produce VT4 main battle tanks for the Colombian armed forces. During a visit to Colombia earlier this month, a delegation from the firm proposed supplying the country with a wide range of armored vehicles, including MBTs, light tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery units and mine-resistant armored vehicles.
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December 28, 2023
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Argentina’s New President Takes a Gamble
In a country accustomed to heavy government intervention in the economy, Javier Milei’s reforms are raising eyebrows.
By: Allison Fedirka
Argentine President Javier Milei entered office less than three weeks ago, but already he has introduced a raft of changes beyond the house cleaning typical of any new government. He has said his administration aims to revamp Argentina's institutional and legal frameworks. Though many of the reforms so far relate to the economy, they’re only the first steps in Milei’s plan to rebuild Argentina and eliminate the structural problems that have plagued the country for over a generation.
Milei wasted no time in making drastic changes to the economy in his first days in office. His government slashed the artificially high official exchange rate for the peso, reducing it from around 400 pesos to the dollar to 800 overnight. The government also auctioned approximately 2.96 trillion pesos' ($3.7 billion) worth of treasury debt denominated in the local currency to help clear the central bank’s balance sheet of short-term arrears held by local creditors. The move is seen as a precursor to removing currency controls and an initial step toward “dollarizing” the economy. Economy Minister Luis Caputo also announced steep cuts to energy subsidies for consumers. Such subsidies were a thorn in the side for many previous governments, but the fear of popular backlash prevented past leaders from tackling the issue. Caputo also cut budgets for social programs and dismissed recently hired public sector employees.
Argentina's Economic Contractions of More Than 10%
(click to enlarge)
Deposits Abroad, Argentina vs Latin America
(click to enlarge)
But the president’s mega-decree introduced on Dec. 21 has garnered the most attention. The executive order, known as a “necessity and urgency” decree, consists of 366 articles that would revamp 41 economic rules with the aim of deregulating markets, encouraging competition, reducing government intervention in the economy and simplifying the relationship between the private and public sectors. It focuses heavily on removing price distortions, eliminating price fixing and removing barriers to international trade. It also opens opportunities for wider use of foreign currency in the domestic market, particularly the real estate sector. The changes further aim to attract foreign investment, including by opening up state companies for privatization, removing restrictions on land purchases, guaranteeing payment for contracts in foreign currencies and eliminating costs in the mining sector.
However, many have questioned the constitutionality of the decree, saying it oversteps the president’s powers. It’s important to note that necessity and urgency decrees are nothing new in modern Argentine politics. The 1994 constitution formally included them in the country’s legal framework, indicating the measure should be used only when “exceptional circumstances make it impossible to follow ordinary procedures.” (The National Congress can revoke these decrees, but it would require substantial support from both chambers.) Since 1994, presidents have issued 979 of these special measures. (By comparison, only 25 emergency decrees were passed between 1853 and 1983.) Former President Nestor Kirchner, who held office from 2003 to 2007, held the record with 236 decrees. But some legal experts argue that the measure oversteps the powers afforded to the president. Since last week, members of the opposition have threatened to repeal the decree, and average Argentinians have taken to the streets to show their disapproval.
Presidential Use of Decrees of Necessity and Urgency
(click to enlarge)
But Milei was apparently prepared for the backlash. He immediately followed his announcement of the decree with a call for an extraordinary session of congress between Dec. 26 to Jan. 31. In addition, the first three of 11 initiatives the administration put before congress introduced economic changes that cannot be executed by decree, such as changes to tax rules. By doing this, the government wanted to show that it wasn’t relying solely on executive orders to implement its agenda. Furthermore, some of the decree articles and proposed initiatives reflect ideas supported by other leading politicians. For example, the decree prohibits people from blocking or occupying establishments that are considered essential, a measure that echoes the anti-protest proposals presented by Patricia Bullrich, a first-round presidential candidate. Another initiative presented to congress would reverse reductions in personal income taxes for many workers, a move presidential candidate Sergio Massa promoted during his campaign. By including proposals from other parties, Milei aims to split the opposition and gain more supporters for his agenda.
Milei is also trying to manage discontent from three social groups: agricultural laborers, the white-collar middle class and unionized industrial workers. All three have been at the center of major public unrest since Argentina’s return to democracy in 1983. In general, the agricultural sector has responded positively to the announced reforms, in part because currency devaluation would enable them to earn more in pesos for their exports, which are priced in dollars. However, many middle-class Argentinians fear losing their rent-controlled apartments when leases are up for renewal and having less disposable income as their costs rise. Labor unions, meanwhile, have taken issue with possible changes to income taxes and labor rules that extend the trial period for new hires and make it easier to terminate workers during their probation. They have also voiced concerns about anticipated job losses related to the government’s cost-cutting measures. This includes construction workers who could lose work as the government spends less money on infrastructure and other projects.
But many of the nation’s leaders over the past 30 years faced anti-government protests. No matter who won the election in October, social unrest was bound to happen at some point. Milei so far appears to have protected the government’s relationship with the agricultural sector, which will play a critical role in the first half of 2024 as farmers sell off crops to bring in U.S. dollars. He also appears intent on using a tried-and-true strategy of dividing various labor and social groups over specific issues. While this won’t eliminate opposition to his plan, it will reduce it.
The latest initiatives brought before congress have given the strongest indication of Milei’s intentions beyond the economic reforms. He’s asked congress to consider proposals to modify the functions of the state, the voting system, and procedures for appointments and promotions. The goal is to root out corruption, curb the patronage system and reduce the size of the government. About half of the 11 initiatives relate to ending double taxation for people living in Argentina who are citizens of Japan, China, the United Arab Emirates, Luxembourg and Turkey. They also reform rules for signing international treaties and authorizing international travel for the president.
The government has kept a close watch on reactions from foreign governments and investors to the proposed changes. Brazil has expressed concern over the potential impact on the Mercosur trading bloc. Similarly, China seems wary about the ideological shift in the Argentine government and the impact it could have on trade. Beijing threatened to suspend a $6.5 billion currency swap agreement with Argentina to push Milei to make clear his desire to continue to engage with China. The new government has asked President Xi Jinping not to suspend the agreement and designated a new ambassador to Beijing. Argentina’s reforms aim to send a message that it’s open for business with all foreign investors, but the problem for countries like Brazil and China is that they fear they could become less competitive in the Argentine market and, particularly for Brazil, lose foreign investment to Argentina because of its market-friendly changes.
Even if congress doesn’t derail the changes, it will be several months before they show any results. For Milei, success will mean implementing the reforms and managing the accompanying social unrest. If he succeeds, the government will be able to relieve pressure on the national budget, attract investment and bring in much-needed foreign capital. If he fails, Argentina’s economic malaise will only worsen.
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if Trump wins ----->>>
DJT and JM ==== BFF!
Trump & Javier Milei
It would be great to have a S. America country become our best friends.
I read their economy is suffering from inflation again.
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Suspects held over alleged Argentina parcel plot
3rd January 2024, 11:29 CST
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By Vanessa Buschschlüter
BBC News
Twitter/@PatoBullrich
Argentina's security minister released a blurred photo of one of the suspects
Police in Argentina have arrested three men from Lebanon and Syria suspected of planning a "terrorist act" in the South American country.
They had booked into a hotel near the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires and were reportedly waiting for the arrival of a large parcel from Yemen.
The city is currently hosting the Pan-American Maccabiah Games, which brings together thousands of Jewish athletes.
Argentina is home to Latin America's largest Jewish community.
Security Minister Patricia Bullrich said the government had received information from the US and Israel about a potential threat to the Maccabiah Games.
"Three people suspected of belonging to terrorist cells are being investigated," she wrote on X, formerly known as Twitter.
Speaking to reporters, she said the three men were arrested on 30 December.
"There was particular information which worried us, and that was that they had rented [rooms] in a hotel which is no more than two blocks from the Israeli embassy."
She added that while the men had arrived on different flights "they are linked". The minister also said the suspects were waiting for a parcel to be delivered from Yemen.
The security ministry described the parcel as "an international shipment" which it said weighed 35kg (77lb). They did not specify what the contents may have been.
The Jewish community of Buenos Aires has been the target of two deadly bomb attacks in the past.
In 1992, 29 people died when a suicide bomber drove a lorry loaded with explosives into the Israeli embassy.
But the most deadly attack happened in 1994, when 85 people were killed in the bombing of the Amia Jewish cultural centre in the capital.
Argentina accused Lebanon's Hezbollah of being behind both attacks, which the Islamist group denied.
Security experts believe Hezbollah, which is backed by Iran, has been active on the border between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay.
Two months ago, Brazil said it had foiled an attack on its soil following the arrest in São Paulo of two men suspected of being linked to Hezbollah.
The group is considered a terrorist organisation by the UK, the US, Argentina, Israel and Gulf Arab countries among others.
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https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2024/01/10/what-is-going-on-in-ecuador-n2633415
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This is totally sad
with the darn gangs in Latin America!
they are terrorists and should be dealt as such.
Agree with military response
This is beyond simple policing:
https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/once-peaceful-ecuador-enters-a-new-era-we-are-in-a-state-of-war/ar-AA1mLOXV
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Just had an interesting conversation in the gym yesterday with a woman. She and her husband were in El Salvador for bitcoin reasons (and him for the surfing too haha).
I asked about the crime rate, MS-13 etc.
"No worries" she replied. The President had had the army throw all of them in jail.
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"No worries" she replied. The President had had the army throw all of them in jail."
:-D :-D :-D
I have had numerous patients from these countries over the yrs.
A couple who were patients of mine said they left El Salvador and told me something like,
"they are killing children in school buses "; they felt they had to leave.
This would have been over 10 y ago.
I am sure they were illegal but never asked. One worked for the hospital . They were very gentle kind and polite. I miss them......
Can Ecuador do the same?
I guess we will find out.
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Back in the mid-70s when I was getting my International Relations degree from U of PA with Latin America being my region of specialization I remember this about El Salvador:
a) super high population density;
b) population growth rate of 3.5%. Due to the wonders of compounding, this meant half the population was 15 or under- and far more people looking to enter the labor force than could be absorbed. It seems logical to infer that MS-13 arose in part out of such things.
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https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2024/01/10/what-is-going-on-in-ecuador-n2633415
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/5132534/usg-has-gone-gangster
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Election interference . They do it in Guatemala? I know they do it here. :wink:
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Forecasting national behavior is built on continuums. One continuum is a nation’s history. Another is our analytic method. Simply looking at nations will not provide a systematic forecast. The method, no matter how tested in the past, cannot produce one. Only a grasp of history, filtered through a forecasting method tested consistently and repeatedly, will yield a realistic forecast. We don’t look at a nation’s every issue; we focus on the issues that reveal patterns and indicate change. Thus, our forecasts will look at the past before they look at the future.
Background
For decades, Latin American countries have oscillated between two distinct political ideologies often categorized as the right and the left. This fluctuation goes much deeper than politics; it’s woven into the region’s social and economic fabric and has been for centuries. In the colonial era, people who held wealth and administrative power in Latin American nations favored remaining close to Spain and generally resisted independence, which threatened their status. Over time, this group evolved into the political right, which generally supports free-market economics, represents wealthier classes and prioritizes relations with the U.S. and the West. The modern left, meanwhile, evolved from working-class colonists and laborers, who spearheaded the independence movement and advocated for more autonomy, rights and government support for the people. Today, the left also supports a stronger role for government and is more open to partnerships with non-Western nations.
Colonial governance systems, coupled with the region’s geographic barriers, laid the groundwork for the poverty, corruption and organized crime endemic to the region. Among the top factors that contributed to these conditions were political systems that kept wealth and power concentrated in the upper classes. The economic dependence on natural resources and exports further deepened the disparity, resulting in a pronounced rural-urban divide. Wealth became concentrated in urban areas, while rural communities grew increasingly underdeveloped and lacked access to basic services. The political seesawing also contributed to the region’s frequent economic, social and political instability. Governments were unable to reach certain corners of their countries due to geographic obstacles, creating power vacuums that were often filled by organized crime groups, which were able to meet the needs of people who felt left behind by the state.
More recently, a number of global developments have posed serious challenges for Latin American countries. The COVID-19 pandemic hit the region’s economies hard, and governments had limited resources with which to stimulate a recovery. Poverty levels rose, and criminal enterprises thrived. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza intensified the strains on the global economy by disrupting markets and limiting capital available for foreign investment, including in Latin America. The prolonged economic malaise exposed governments’ shortcomings while increasing migratory pressure, allowing organized crime to flourish and weakening people’s ability to lift themselves out of poverty.
Forecast and Conclusions
In Latin America, 2024 will be defined by the pursuit of structural economic reforms. Top among the driving forces of these reforms will be the rising demand for the region’s top commodity exports: agricultural products, metals, minerals and energy. Governments will want to cash in on this opportunity by creating an environment in which foreign investors want to spend their cash. Another motivation is improving economic conditions for the people and businesses that operate in these countries in order to address long-standing security issues.
Governments alone don’t have the financial capacity to stimulate enough economic growth to make a difference in the business or security environments, so the participation of foreign companies, consumers and investors will be key. But inspiring investor confidence and securing much-needed funds from these actors requires governments to pursue structural reforms.
They will manifest in the region’s politics, economy and society in different ways. This year, they will have a clear political dimension as governments try to pass legislation and other measures to implement changes and pursue their reform agendas. Non-traditional parties and new voices will lead the debate on the best path forward. Since the benefits of structural reforms come slowly, governments will in the short term prioritize international trade by diversifying their trade portfolios and tapping into as many markets as possible. There will be a preference, however, for advanced economies in the Americas as well as in markets in South Asia and East Asia. As governments do their best to woo investors, multilateral institutions could help bridge the gap in capital. Governments will also promote entrepreneurship and innovation to leverage the region’s technological potential.
There will also be a renewed focus on the relationship between governments and security forces, particularly the national police and military. The reforms won’t be universally supported, so we expect to see some social unrest. The ability to contain protests will be key to implementing the changes and showing investors that social stability in Latin America is possible.
No single event will indicate the accuracy of this forecast, but several developments will act as signposts throughout the year. They include the return or expansion of foreign corporate operations to the region, foreign investment inflows, the opening of new trade offices, an increase in the number of start-ups, and domestic security reforms. A decade from now, 2024 will be seen as the year that jumpstarted structural change in Latin America.
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Good article
not quite specific but leads me in the right direction to a question I ponder.
Why is it US companies are unable or unwilling to invest and utilize cheaper labor in the America rather then going to China and Asia?
Is it crime, is it the population is not educated enough, is it taxation too high, is it instability of governments or governmental obstacles to foreign investment, or other reasons such as poor roads communications lack of internet access etc.?
Just think of the benefits to us if businesses invested in C and S America and helped develop their economies, which might reduce crime and bring the benefits of cheaper labor closer to home and away from China , reduce illegal immigration etc.
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https://twitter.com/LauraLoomer/status/1758671117340811671?fbclid=IwAR0J4-J_rzP-08b_1fTHX7A98heovk_B8BdY2Sf4KK3NeD0II0BBGWmEAIc&mibextid=xfxF2i
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(1) CHINA BUILDING STRATEGIC FOOTPRINT IN U.S. BACKYARD: During a House hearing yesterday, House Armed Services Committee chair Mike Rogers (R-AL) said a Chinese-built “mega port” in Peru is “just the latest effort… to displace American influence and build a strategic footprint in our backyard.”
Rogers added that 25 of the 31 countries in U.S. Southern Command’s (SOUTHCOM) area of responsibility (AOR) have welcomed Chinese infrastructure development, and 22 countries have formally joined China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
SOUTHCOM commander General Laura Richardson said she is concerned that China could use “enabling infrastructure” investments in Latin America, including deepwater ports, space, and telecommunications projects, for military purposes.
Why It Matters: China cannot project force globally but is engaging in a strategy to project influence into the Western Hemisphere. China could use port infrastructure in the SOUTHCOM AOR to disrupt shipping supply chains in the event of a conflict with the United States.
Chinese acquisitions of critical mineral sources in SOUTHCOM would also likely be used to disrupt critical mineral supply chains vital to U.S. defense production. – R.C.