Fire Hydrant of Freedom
Politics, Religion, Science, Culture and Humanities => Politics & Religion => Topic started by: Crafty_Dog on July 28, 2008, 05:33:39 PM
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About time India gets its own thread!
We kick it off with a piece from today's WSJ:
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India's Counterterrorism Failings
By SADANAND DHUME
FROM TODAY'S WALL STREET JOURNAL ASIA
July 29, 2008
In recent years few countries have changed their public image as dramatically as India. But though pictures of starving peasants and rutted roads have given way to those of svelte supermodels and bustling call centers, in at least one respect India remains more a basketcase than a potential great power. As Friday's bomb blasts in India's software capital, Bangalore, and Saturday's in the industrial city of Ahmedabad show, India is singularly ill-equipped to deal with the scourge of terrorism.
Reuters
Too little, too late: Forensic personnel inspect the site of a bomb blast in Ahmedabad on Sunday, July 27, 2008.
The Bangalore and Ahmedabad bombings, which killed one and 49 people respectively and cumulatively wounded more than 200, are only the most recent in a spate of attacks. In the past two years terrorists have targeted the northern city of Jaipur, the high-tech hub Hyderabad, the temple town of Varanasi and India's financial capital, Mumbai.
Officials have pinned the most recent attacks on Indian Mujahedeen, a homegrown group linked to the Bangladesh-based Harkat-ul Jihad-al-Islami and the banned Students Islamic Movement of India. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh -- carved out of British India to create a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims -- give shelter and succor to terrorists. But the fact that the most recent attacks were carried out by a made-in-India group shows it's about time that India comes to terms with its own counterterrorism failings.
Among India's worst mistakes is that instead of uniting behind the minimal goal of providing security for all citizens, India's constantly bickering politicians have played football with counterterrorism policy. In 2004, one of the first acts in office of the ruling Congress-led coalition government -- at the time supported by Communist allies -- was to scrap a national terrorism law that allowed for enhanced witness protection and extended detention of suspects in terrorism cases. This had the twin effects of demoralizing law enforcement agencies and signaling to terrorists that the Indian state lacked fight. The paucity of arrests and convictions in the string of bombings that have followed have only strengthened this perception. For its part, the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party has stalled the creation of a much-needed federal antiterrorism force.
The problem is that India's counterterrorism effort falls between two stools. As a democracy, it cannot adopt the heavy-handed but effective measures favored by, say, Russia or China. At the same time, India lacks the sophisticated intelligence and law enforcement capacities that allow European countries such as France, Spain and, of late, even Britain to safeguard individual rights and yet uncover terrorist plots before they are executed.
Yet although this may be an explanation, it's hardly an excuse given that other countries have surmounted their own counterterrorism hurdles. Even Indonesia, a Muslim-majority nation where public sympathy for terrorism in the name of Islam runs deeper than it does in India, has done an infinitely better job of protecting its citizens. Thanks largely to Detachment 88, a special police unit equipped and trained by Australia and the U.S., it has been nearly three years since the last major terrorist strike on Indonesian soil.
Ultimately, though, terrorism is only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. The larger question is whether India's Muslims will embrace modernity like so many of their Turkish, Tunisian and Indonesian co-religionists, or reject it like increasing numbers of their militant cousins in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
On this front too India's leaders have failed to get to the heart of the matter. The country tends to exercise a hands-off approach to its 140-million-strong Muslim community. Unlike in Europe or America, Muslims in India are governed by Shariah law in matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. This parallel legal system slows integration into the national mainstream and perpetuates backward practices such as polygamy and the neglect of education for girls. The result has been a disaffected minority, largely lacking the skills to compete in a modern economy and susceptible to calls for violence in the name of faith.
If India is to live up to its potential -- and indeed to its hype -- it must embrace both the short-term goal of upgrading its counterterrorism capability and the long-term goal of modernizing and mainstreaming its Muslims.
India's Muslims have enriched national life in countless ways. The vast majority, like people of any faith, are nonviolent. But contrary to popular belief, Indian Muslims have not been immune to the rising global tide of orthodox practice and militant politics. Indian doctors played a role in last year's failed attacks in London and Glasgow. At home, Muslim groups have assaulted critics such as the exiled Bangladeshi author Taslima Nasreen. A survey by the distinguished Pakistani scholar Akbar Ahmed revealed that most educated Indian Muslims view as role models the late Islamist ideologue Abul Ala Maududi, the 19th century Muslim supremacist Sayyed Ahmad Khan, and an influential Bombay-based cleric named Zakir Naik, who eulogizes Osama bin Laden and calls for Shariah for all Indians.
India's Muslims hardly have a monopoly on either violence or obscurantism. Nonetheless the challenges they face are particularly acute. Will the community be forward-looking, eager to seize new economic opportunities, and at peace with a rapidly changing world? Or will it forsake the future for an idealized past, foster a culture of grievance that condones violence, and view globalization as a mortal threat? Depending on the answer, the Bangalore and Ahmedabad bombings are either a passing event or a dark harbinger of things to come.
Mr. Dhume is a fellow at the Asia Society in Washington D.C., and the author of "My Friend the Fanatic: Travels with an Indonesian Islamist" (Text Publishing, 2008).
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Both Pakistan and Bangladesh -- carved out of British India to create a homeland for the subcontinent's Muslims -- give shelter and succor to terrorists. But the fact that the most recent attacks were carried out by a made-in-India group shows it's about time that India comes to terms with its own counterterrorism failings.
Do you see the trend here, the Bosnia, Philippines - new muslim home land in outer islands, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Jordan, Chechnya............ the list goes on. Anyone catch the trend yet?
The trend is countries that never existed until muslims blew up enough innocent people that they were given a "home land", they have continued to blow stuff up be enough is never enough.
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http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,24091819-2703,00.html
Fear grows over India car terror
Bruce Loudon, South Asia correspondent | July 29, 2008
TWO cars packed with explosives and bomb-making equipment were found yesterday in the Indian city of Surat, where 92 per cent of the world's diamonds are cut and polished, as fears mounted that jihadis have begun a campaign attacking targets of international significance.
Bomb disposal experts dismantled both bombs in cars that had been abandoned in the city, but officials said there was intelligence showing extremists were "trying to cause as much chaos and bloodshed as possible to further the cause ofjihad".
Anti-terror squads swooped on an apartment in an upmarket part of Mumbai, pinpointed as the origin of a 14-page manifesto issued by an organisation known as Indian Mujaheddin following the bomb blasts in Ahmedabad, in Gujarat.
Police said the apartment was rented to two Americans who had denied any involvement in the email, which, "in the name of Allah", proclaimed "the terror of death" and was sent to several Indian news channels.
Investigators are looking at the possibility that the Americans' personal computers were hacked to send the incendiary document, which analysts say gives the clearest indication yet of the thinking behind the wave of bomb attacks.
The document, written in English, insists Indian Mujaheddin is a home-grown organisation, and asks the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba organisation, which is close to Pakistan's ISI spy agency and linked to al-Qa'ida, not to claim responsibility for bomb attacks carried out in its name.
Indian intelligence experts believe Indian Mujaheddin is the al-Qa'ida-linked Students Islamic Movement of India in a new guise, rebadging itself as Indian rather than a puppet of the ISI.
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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/msid-3307797,prtpage-1.cms
Al-Qaida tech used in Bangalore, Surat bombs
31 Jul 2008, 0021 hrs IST, Vishwa Mohan ,TNN
NEW DELHI: Al-Qaida may not have a presence in India but its footprint was visible in the bombs used in Bangalore and Surat, according to intelligence officials. ( Watch )
For the first time in India, Integrated Circuit (IC) chips were used to assemble bombs in Bangalore and Surat — a technique perfected by the Qaida-linked Indonesian terror group Jemaah Islamiyah (JI). Besides using the technique to bomb different places in Indonesia, JI — which aims to establish Islamic state in southeast Asia — has also exported it to Philippines where terrorists have used it effectively in a number of incidents. ( See Ninan’s cartoon )
Referring to the technique being put to use in India, intelligence officials said some local terrorists could have visited Indonesia for training via Bangladesh — a fact which the Special Task Force (STF) of Uttar Pradesh police had first got wind of during interrogation of Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operatives last year.
"Links of LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) with Al Qaida is not a secret, and this leads to strong possibility of linkages of their Indian modules with JI in southeast Asia," said an official, adding that the IC explosive device — similar to the ones used by JI — found in Bangalore and Surat had only confirmed the suspicion.
While the jehadis were successful in their first attempt to use IC explosive devices in Bangalore on July 25, they could not make a similar impact three days later in Surat, where the chips used in the bombs had some fault.
None of the bombs in Surat exploded, averting another disaster. "It indicates origin of consignments from two different places for Bangalore and Surat — even though it could be the handiwork of a single group using different terror modules," said a senior official of the National Security Guard (NSG) which has sent its forensic experts to Gujarat.
The bombs in Ahmedabad were, however, of a different make. Timer devices were used there and the design was strikingly similar to those used to bomb courts in three UP cities — Varanasi, Faizabad and Lucknow — in November last year and in Jaipur on May 13 this year. Incidentally, a group calling itself Indian Mujahideen claimed responsibility for all three attacks by sending emails to media organisations prior to the blasts.
"Different modus operandi followed in these three cities and in Bangalore and Surat should not be misconstrued as it being the handiwork of different groups," a senior intelligence officer said.
He added that the timing of operations in Bangalore, Ahmedabad and Surat was an indication of meticulous planning and conspiracy by a single command structure from across the border which used different modules in different Indian cities comprising local contacts.
vishwa.mohan@timesgroup.com
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http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/01/world/asia/01pstan.html?_r=2&hp=&oref=slogin&pagewanted=print
August 1, 2008
Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say
By MARK MAZZETTI and ERIC SCHMITT
WASHINGTON — American intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, according to United States government officials.
The conclusion was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region.
The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
Concerns about the role played by Pakistani intelligence not only has strained relations between the United States and Pakistan, a longtime ally, but also has fanned tensions between Pakistan and its archrival, India. Within days of the bombings, Indian officials accused the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI, of helping to orchestrate the attack in Kabul, which killed 54, including an Indian defense attaché.
This week, Pakistani troops clashed with Indian forces in the contested region of Kashmir, threatening to fray an uneasy cease-fire that has held since November 2003.
The New York Times reported this week that a top Central Intelligence Agency official traveled to Pakistan this month to confront senior Pakistani officials with information about support provided by members of the ISI to militant groups. It had not been known that American intelligence agencies concluded that elements of Pakistani intelligence provided direct support for the attack in Kabul.
American officials said that the communications were intercepted before the July 7 bombing, and that the C.I.A. emissary, Stephen R. Kappes, the agency’s deputy director, had been ordered to Islamabad, Pakistan’s capital, even before the attack. The intercepts were not detailed enough to warn of any specific attack.
The government officials were guarded in describing the new evidence and would not say specifically what kind of assistance the ISI officers provided to the militants. They said that the ISI officers had not been renegades, indicating that their actions might have been authorized by superiors.
“It confirmed some suspicions that I think were widely held,” one State Department official with knowledge of Afghanistan issues said of the intercepted communications. “It was sort of this ‘aha’ moment. There was a sense that there was finally direct proof.”
The information linking the ISI to the bombing of the Indian Embassy was described in interviews by several American officials with knowledge of the intelligence. Some of the officials expressed anger that elements of Pakistan’s government seemed to be directly aiding violence in Afghanistan that had included attacks on American troops.
Some American officials have begun to suggest that Pakistan is no longer a fully reliable American partner and to advocate some unilateral American action against militants based in the tribal areas.
The ISI has long maintained ties to militant groups in the tribal areas, in part to court allies it can use to contain Afghanistan’s power. In recent years, Pakistan’s government has also been concerned about India’s growing influence inside Afghanistan, including New Delhi’s close ties to the government of Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president.
American officials say they believe that the embassy attack was probably carried out by members of a network led by Maulavi Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose alliance with Al Qaeda and its affiliates has allowed the terrorist network to rebuild in the tribal areas.
American and Pakistani officials have now acknowledged that President Bush on Monday confronted Pakistan’s prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, about the divided loyalties of the ISI.
Pakistan’s defense minister, Chaudhry Ahmed Mukhtar, told a Pakistani television network on Wednesday that Mr. Bush asked senior Pakistani officials this week, “ ‘Who is in control of ISI?’ ” and asked about leaked information that tipped militants to surveillance efforts by Western intelligence services.
Pakistan’s new civilian government is wrestling with these very issues, and there is concern in Washington that the civilian leaders will be unable to end a longstanding relationship between members of the ISI and militants associated with Al Qaeda.
Spokesmen for the White House and the C.I.A. declined to comment for this article. Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, did not return a call seeking comment.
Further underscoring the tension between Pakistan and its Western allies, Britain’s senior military officer said in Washington on Thursday that an American and British program to help train Pakistan’s Frontier Corps in the tribal areas had been delayed while Pakistan’s military and civilian officials sorted out details about the program’s goals.
Britain and the United States had each offered to send about two dozen military trainers to Pakistan later this summer to train Pakistani Army officers who in turn would instruct the Frontier Corps paramilitary forces.
But the British officer, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, said the program had been temporarily delayed. “We don’t yet have a firm start date,” he told a small group of reporters. “We’re ready to go.”
The bombing of the Indian Embassy helped to set off a new deterioration in relations between India and Pakistan.
This week, Indian and Pakistani soldiers fired at each other across the Kashmir frontier for more than 12 hours overnight Monday, in what the Indian Army called the most serious violation of a five-year-old cease-fire agreement. The nightlong battle came after one Indian soldier and four Pakistanis were killed along the border between sections of Kashmir that are controlled by India and by Pakistan.
Indian officials say they are equally worried about what is happening on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border because they say the insurgents who are facing off with India in Kashmir and those who target Afghanistan are related and can keep both borders burning at the same time.
India and Afghanistan share close political, cultural and economic ties, and India maintains an active intelligence network in Afghanistan, all of which has drawn suspicion from Pakistani officials.
When asked Thursday about whether the ISI and Pakistani military remained loyal to the country’s civilian government, Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, sidestepped the question. “That’s probably something the government of Pakistan ought to speak to,” Admiral Mullen told reporters at the Pentagon.
Jalaluddin Haqqani, the militia commander, battled Soviet troops during the 1980s and has had a long and complicated relationship with the C.I.A. He was among a group of fighters who received arms and millions of dollars from the C.I.A. during that period, but his allegiance with Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda during the following decade led the United States to sever the relationship.
Mr. Haqqani and his sons now run a network that Western intelligence services say they believe is responsible for a campaign of violence throughout Afghanistan, including the Indian Embassy bombing and an attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul earlier this year.
David Rohde contributed reporting from New York, and Somini Sengupta from New Delhi.
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"Pak does this everytime... the US raises heat on them!..like clockwork!. This is a subtle reminder to the rest of the world that they better coddle Pak...or they may initiate a nuclear confrontation with India. Unfortunately, their story line is wearing thin...and with Mush gone, Pak will come under increasing pressure to control the ISI....X."
Pak does it again, fires at Indian troops from across LoC
Agencies
Posted online: Saturday, August 02, 2008 at 1523 hrs Print Email
Jammu, August 2:: An Indian military post was targeted from across the Line of Control yet again despite New Delhi asking Islamabad not to vitiate the atmosphere between the two countries by repeatedly violating the ceasefire.
"There was firing on an Indian post along LoC in 12 Brigade area of Uri sector in Baramulla district of Kashmir Valley yesterday," defence sources said.
At least 15 to 16 small arms firing targeted the ward post, but the Indian troops did not retaliate and no casualties were reported, they said.
"We are investigating if it was ceasefire violation. Militants may have targeted troops on this side to push in armed ultras," they said.
In a major violation of the five-year-old ceasefire along the LoC, 15 Pakistani soldiers crossed into the Indian territory on July 28 and opened fire in the Kupwara sector killing an Indian jawan.
The two sides held a flag meeting in a bid to ease tension the next day after the two sides exchanged fire for 16 hours.
A spurt in such incidents in recent days prompted External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee to raise the issue with his Pakistani counterpart Shah Mehmood Qureshi on the sidelines of the SAARC Summit in Colombo but Islamabad played them down as 'minor incidents' which can be dealt with at military level.
Pakistan troops have violated the 2003 Indo-Pak border truce 20 times in 2008 in Samba, Krishnagati, Mendhar, Rajouri, Poonch, Sabzian, Tangdhar, Uri, Teetwal, Kupwara and Baramulla areas of Jammu and Kashmir.
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I'm not sure a ground offensive from India might not be a good thing. It might force a reality check in Pak.
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Now waiting for JDN to insist this attack in Mumbai has nothing to do with islam, and is all Bush's fault anyway.
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Now waiting for JDN to insist this attack in Mumbai has nothing to do with islam, and is all Bush's fault anyway.
Don't know, don't care but isn't it always Bush's fault? :-D
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JDN-- Did you miss this
Prayers for the region
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1227702333602&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
104 killed in Mumbai terror rampage
Nov. 26, 2008
Associated Press , THE JERUSALEM POST
A trickle of bodies and hostages emerged from a luxury hotel Thursday as Indian commandos tried to free people trapped by suspected Muslim militants who attacked at least 10 targets in India's financial capital of Mumbai, killing 104 people.
More than 300 were also wounded in the highly coordinated attacks Wednesday night by bands of gunmen who invaded two five star hotels, a popular restaurant, a crowded train station, the Chabad House and at least five other sites, armed with assault rifles, hand grenades and explosives.
A previously unknown Islamic terrorist group claimed responsibility for the carnage, the latest in a series of nationwide terror attacks over the past three years that have dented India's image as an industrious nation galloping toward prosperity.
Prime Minister Manmohan Singh blamed "external forces."
"The well-planned and well-orchestrated attacks, probably with external linkages, were intended to create a sense of panic, by choosing high profile targets and indiscriminately killing foreigners," he said in address to the nation.
Among the dead were at least one Australian, a Japanese and a British national, said Pradeep Indulkar, a senior government official of Maharashtra state, whose capital is Mumbai. An Italian and a German were also killed, according to their foreign ministries.
Police said 104 people were killed and 314 injured. Officials said eight militants were also killed.
The most high-profile target was the Taj Mahal Palace and Tower hotel, a landmark of Mumbai luxury since 1903, and a favorite watering hole of the city's elite.
Police loudspeakers declared a curfew around the Taj Mahal hotel Thursday afternoon, and black-clad commandos ran into the building as fresh gunshots rang out from the area.
Soldiers outside the hotel said the operation would take a long time as forces were moving slowly, from room to room, looking for gunmen and traps.
In the afternoon, bodies and hostages slowly emerged from the building. At least three bodies, covered in white cloth, were wheeled out.
Throughout the day, explosions and gunfire were heard and toward dusk flames again blossomed from a window of the Taj.
About a dozen people, including foreigners, were also evacuated from the hotel and whisked into a waiting ambulance. Several of them carried small pieces of luggage. One older man was carried into the ambulance by police.
The attackers, dressed in black shirts and jeans, had stormed into the hotel at about 9:45 p.m. and opened fire indiscriminately.
"I was in the main lobby and there was all of a sudden a lot of firing outside," said Sajjad Karim, part of a delegation of European lawmakers visiting Mumbai before a European Union-India summit.
Suddenly "another gunmen appeared in front of us, carrying machine gun-type weapons. And he just started firing at us ... I just turned and ran in the opposite direction," he told The Associated Press over his mobile phone.
The shooting was followed by a series of explosions that set fire to parts of the century-old edifice on Mumbai's waterfront.
Screams were heard and black smoke and flames billowed, continuing to burn until dawn.
Dalbir Bains, who runs a lingerie shop in Mumbai, was about to eat her steak by the pool at the hotel when she heard the sound of gunfire. She said she ran upstairs, taking refuge in the Sea Lounge restaurant, with about 50 other people.
They huddled beneath tables in the dark, trying to remain as quiet as possible while explosions were going off.
"We were trying not to draw attention to ourselves," she said. The group managed to escape before dawn.
The gunmen also seized the Mumbai headquarters of the ultra-orthodox Jewish outreach group Chabad Lubavitch and attacked the Oberoi Hotel, another five-star landmark.
The gunmen appeared to be holed up inside all three buildings on Thursday, nearly 18 hours later, holding foreign and local hostages, as Indian commandos surrounded the buildings.
Among those foreigners held captive were Israelis, Americans, British, Italians, Swedes, Canadians, Yemenis, New Zealanders, Spaniards, Turks and a Singaporean.
"We're going to catch them dead or alive," Maharashtra Home Minister R. R. Patil told reporters. "An attack on Mumbai is an attack on the rest of the country."
Gunfire and explosions were heard from the Taj Mahal, the Oberoi and the Chabad facility.
At the nearby Oberoi hotel, soldiers could be seen on the roof of neighboring buildings. A banner hung out of one window read "save us." From the road, no one could be seen inside the room.
At least three top Indian police officers - including the chief of the anti-terror squad - were among those killed, said and A.N. Roy, a top police official.
The attackers appeared to have been targeting Britons and Americans.
Alex Chamberlain, a British citizen who was dining at the Oberoi, told Sky News television that a gunman ushered 30 to 40 people from the restaurant into a stairway and, speaking in Hindi or Urdu, ordered everyone to put up their hands.
"They were talking about British and Americans specifically. There was an Italian guy, who, you know, they said: 'Where are you from?" and he said he's from Italy and they said 'fine' and they left him alone. And I thought: 'Fine, they're going to shoot me if they ask me anything - and thank God they didn't," he said.
Chamberlain said he managed to sli
p away as the patrons were forced to walk up stairs, but he thought much of the group was being held hostage.
The United States and Pakistan were among the countries that condemned the attacks.
In Washington, White House press secretary Dana Perino said the U.S. "condemns this terrorist attack and we will continue to stand with the people of India in this time of tragedy."
The motive for the onslaught was not immediately clear, but Mumbai has frequently been targeted in terrorist attacks blamed on Islamic extremists, including a series of bombings in July 2006 that killed 187 people.
Magnus Ranstorp, a terrorism specialist with the Swedish National Defense College, said there are "very strong suspicions" that the coordinated Mumbai attacks have a link to al-Qaida.
He said the fact that Britons and Americans were singled out is one indicator, along with the coordinated style of the attacks.
"There have been a lot of warnings about India lately and there are very strong suspicions of a link to al-Qaida."
Later Thursday, the Indian navy said its forces were boarding a cargo vessel suspected of ties to the attacks.
Navy spokesman Capt. Manohar Nambiar said Thursday that the ship, the MV Alpha, had recently come to Mumbai from Karachi, Pakistan.
The navy has "located the ship and now we are in the process of boarding it and searching it," he said. Earlier, Indian media showed pictures of black and yellow rubber dinghies found by the shore, apparently used by the gunmen to reach the area.
Mumbai, on the western coast of India overlooking the Arabian Sea, is home to splendid Victorian architecture built during the British Raj and is one of the most populated cities in the world with some 18 million crammed into shantytowns, high rises and crumbling mansions.
An Indian media report said a previously unknown group calling itself the Deccan Mujahideen claimed responsibility for the attacks in e-mails to several media outlets. There was no way to verify that claim.
Among the other places attacked was the 19th century Chhatrapati Shivaji railroad station - a beautiful example of Victorian Gothic architecture - where gunmen sprayed bullets into the crowded terminal, leaving the floor splattered with blood.
"They just fired randomly at people and then ran away. In seconds, people fell to the ground," said Nasim Inam, a witness.
Other gunmen attacked Leopold's restaurant, a landmark popular with foreigners, and the police headquarters in southern Mumbai, the area where most of the attacks took place. Gunmen also attacked Cama and Albless Hospital and G.T. Hospital, though it was not immediately clear if anyone was killed.
India has been wracked by bomb attacks the past three years, which police blame on Muslim terrorists intent on destabilizing this largely Hindu country. Nearly 700 people have died.
Since May, a terrorist group calling itself the Indian Mujahideen has taken credit for a string of blasts that killed more than 130 people. The most recent was in September, when explosions struck a park and crowded shopping areas in the capital, New Delhi, killing 21 people and wounding about 100.
Relations between Hindus, who make up more than 80 percent of India's 1 billion population, and Muslims, who make up about 14 percent, have sporadically erupted into bouts of sectarian violence since British-ruled India was split into independent India and Pakistan in 1947.
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The M.O. is classic al qaeda.
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Now waiting for JDN to insist this attack in Mumbai has nothing to do with islam, and is all Bush's fault anyway.
Don't know, don't care but isn't it always Bush's fault? :-D
JDN-- Did you miss this
No Rachel, I am aware; the attack is truly tragic and no question, the attack does seem to have been instigated by Muslim extremists. Thankfully,
the Indian Rescue Team as GM pointed out seems to be doing a very capable job in such a difficult and terrible situation.
My inappropriate flippant comment was only a quick response to GM's goading comment. I was tired, I had no interest in debating,
but that is no excuse for me to make light of such a tragedy.
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Timely and gracious. Forward.
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Red Alert: Possible Geopolitical Consequences of the Mumbai Attacks (Open Access)
Stratfor Today » November 27, 2008 | 0434 GMT
PAL PILLAI/AFP/Getty Images
A fire in the dome of the Taj Hotel in Mumbai on Nov. 26Summary
If the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai were carried out by Islamist militants as it appears, the Indian government will have little choice, politically speaking, but to blame them on Pakistan. That will in turn spark a crisis between the two nuclear rivals that will draw the United States into the fray.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Page
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
At this point the situation on the ground in Mumbai remains unclear following the militant attacks of Nov. 26. But in order to understand the geopolitical significance of what is going on, it is necessary to begin looking beyond this event at what will follow. Though the situation is still in motion, the likely consequences of the attack are less murky.
We will begin by assuming that the attackers are Islamist militant groups operating in India, possibly with some level of outside support from Pakistan. We can also see quite clearly that this was a carefully planned, well-executed attack.
Given this, the Indian government has two choices. First, it can simply say that the perpetrators are a domestic group. In that case, it will be held accountable for a failure of enormous proportions in security and law enforcement. It will be charged with being unable to protect the public. On the other hand, it can link the attack to an outside power: Pakistan. In that case it can hold a nation-state responsible for the attack, and can use the crisis atmosphere to strengthen the government’s internal position by invoking nationalism. Politically this is a much preferable outcome for the Indian government, and so it is the most likely course of action. This is not to say that there are no outside powers involved — simply that, regardless of the ground truth, the Indian government will claim there were.
That, in turn, will plunge India and Pakistan into the worst crisis they have had since 2002. If the Pakistanis are understood to be responsible for the attack, then the Indians must hold them responsible, and that means they will have to take action in retaliation — otherwise, the Indian government’s domestic credibility will plunge. The shape of the crisis, then, will consist of demands that the Pakistanis take immediate steps to suppress Islamist radicals across the board, but particularly in Kashmir. New Delhi will demand that this action be immediate and public. This demand will come parallel to U.S. demands for the same actions, and threats by incoming U.S. President Barack Obama to force greater cooperation from Pakistan.
If that happens, Pakistan will find itself in a nutcracker. On the one side, the Indians will be threatening action — deliberately vague but menacing — along with the Americans. This will be even more intense if it turns out, as currently seems likely, that Americans and Europeans were being held hostage (or worse) in the two hotels that were attacked. If the attacks are traced to Pakistan, American demands will escalate well in advance of inauguration day.
There is a precedent for this. In 2002 there was an attack on the Indian parliament in Mumbai by Islamist militants linked to Pakistan. A near-nuclear confrontation took place between India and Pakistan, in which the United States brokered a stand-down in return for intensified Pakistani pressure on the Islamists. The crisis helped redefine the Pakistani position on Islamist radicals in Pakistan.
In the current iteration, the demands will be even more intense. The Indians and Americans will have a joint interest in forcing the Pakistani government to act decisively and immediately. The Pakistani government has warned that such pressure could destabilize Pakistan. The Indians will not be in a position to moderate their position, and the Americans will see the situation as an opportunity to extract major concessions. Thus the crisis will directly intersect U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan.
It is not clear the degree to which the Pakistani government can control the situation. But the Indians will have no choice but to be assertive, and the United States will move along the same line. Whether it is the current government in India that reacts, or one that succeeds doesn’t matter. Either way, India is under enormous pressure to respond. Therefore the events point to a serious crisis not simply between Pakistan and India, but within Pakistan as well, with the government caught between foreign powers and domestic realities. Given the circumstances, massive destabilization is possible — never a good thing with a nuclear power.
This is thinking far ahead of the curve, and is based on an assumption of the truth of something we don’t know for certain yet, which is that the attackers were Muslims and that the Pakistanis will not be able to demonstrate categorically that they weren’t involved. Since we suspect they were Muslims, and since we doubt the Pakistanis can be categorical and convincing enough to thwart Indian demands, we suspect that we will be deep into a crisis within the next few days, very shortly after the situation on the ground clarifies itself.
stratfor
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Massacre in Mumbai: BRITISH gunmen seized in commando raid as death toll hits more than 140
By Justin Davenport , Rashid Razaq and Nicola Boden
Last updated at 2:08 PM on 28th November 2008
British-born Pakistanis among arrested militants
Commandos storm strongholds to rescue hostages
Death toll hits 143 as another 24 bodies found in hotel
At least five dead hostages found in Jewish Centre
Bystanders wounded in crossfire at Taj hotel siege
British-born Pakistanis were among the Mumbai terrorists, Indian government sources claimed today, as the death toll rose to more than 140.
Two Britons were among eight gunmen captured by commandos after they stormed two hotels and a Jewish centre to free hostages, the city's chief minister said.
Vilasrao Deshmukh also revealed that up to 25 terrorists were responsible for the series of bomb blasts and shootings that targeted tourists and foreign interests.
Sieges in the Indian city were still ongoing today in dramatic stand-offs at the three buildings. Some hostages emerged unharmed but inside were scenes of carnage.
Calm: One of the young gunmen with his weapon, looking for more victims. Indian authorities say two of the arrested militants were British-born Pakistanis
At the luxury Oberoi Hotel, brought back under control this morning when commandos shot dead two militants, another 24 bodies were found.
Their discovery takes the total death toll to 143. Only one is confirmed as British so far but there are fears this may rise. At least another 300 people were wounded.
Hundreds of other traumatised guests were rescued from their rooms there and at the five-star Taj Mahal hotel but still the fighting did not cease.
At the Taj, commandos were still engaged in a prolonged shootout with militants. Four bystanders were reported wounded in the crossfire.
Indian forces launched grenades at the walls. Inside, at least one terrorist was believed to be holed up in a ballroom.
Commandos also stormed the Nariman House Jewish centre where some of the militants were believed to be hiding to find the dead bodies of at least five hostages.
Around 20 masked officers had dropped onto the building from helicopters on to the roof this morning covered by heavy fire in what was dubbed Operation Black Tornado.
After hours of heavy fighting, a massive explosion ripped through the building, blowing out windows in the surrounding houses. Gunfire and smaller explosions followed before Indian authorities appeared to have control.
Blast: Police throw a grenade into the Taj Mahal hotel as they desperately try to control a militant. Below, officers on guard outside
Across at the Oberoi, traumatised guests were struggling to absorb their ordeal. Many had been locked in their rooms terrified for 41 hours while the gunmen rampaged.
Today, around 100 were rescued after two militants were shot dead. One man was clutching a tiny baby in his arms.
British lawyer Mark Abell emerged with a beaming smile, saying: 'I'm going home, I'm going to see my wife. '
The 51-year-old told how he had spent the night listening to gunshots and explosions and described the scene of 'carnage' when he was eventually led to safety by troops saying 'there was blood and guts everywhere'.
'I was supposed to be working in Delhi but I think I have had more than my fair share of my business trip so I am looking forward to going home to see my family,' he said.
Rescued: A British man is led to safety from the Oberoi Trident Hotel today and below, another guest emerges clutching a tiny baby
A number of the hostages were airline staff still wearing their Lufthansa and Air France uniforms when they emerged from the building.
As they came out some carried luggage with Canadian flags, and two women were dressed in black abayas, traditional Muslim women's garments.ever, at the Taj Mahal hotel today.
Indian police thought they had secured the huge Taj hotel last night after intense fighting but it restarted hours later and was ongoing this afternoon.
Earlier, one commando revealed he had seen around 50 bodies littering the Taj hotel floor after special officers stormed the building and rescued hundreds of guests.
Clad in black, with a mask covering his face, the unit chief said: 'There was blood all over the bodies. The bodies were strewn here and there and we had to be careful as we entered the building to avoid further bloodshed of innocent civilians.'
The terrorists had seemed like young, ordinary men but had clearly been very well trained, he said.
'They were wearing T-shirts, just ordinary looking, but they have definitely been trained to use weapons. There is no way they could handle such weapons without being taught how to.'
Air rescue: A commando drops to the roof of Mumbai's Jewish centre and below, officers span out ready to storm the building
Nine terrorists are thought to have been shot dead in gun battles across Mumbai as police and special forces tried to regain control of the city.
Between six and eight were still holed-up in the two luxury hotels and the Jewish centre this morning but two were then shot dead at the Oberoi.
Three arrested at the Taj Mahal have been officially identified as a Pakistani national and two Indians. Another is reported to be a Mauritian national.
They arrived in the city by sea before fanning out to at least 10 locations. Dinghies were found moored at a jetty by the famous Gateway to India monument.
Today, coast guard officials said they could have hijacked an Indian trawler to drop them off after finding an abandoned boat drifting near the shore.
The captain's dead body was found inside the vessel, along with communications equipment.
Dressed in jeans and T-shirts and heavily armed, they then headed for the city - India's financial centre - and started firing indiscriminately.
It is thought they gained entrance to the hotels by pretending to be staff and hotel guests, according to reports.
Indian authorities have not released any details about the two Britons and the Foreign Office has refused to confirm Indian television reports.
Security services in Britain are now examining images of the gunmen in an effort to identify them.
Gordon Brown said he would be speaking to the Indian Prime Minister again today but warned that it was 'too early' to reach any conclusions about British involvement.
India's High Commissioner Shiv Shankar Mukherjee also said today: 'I have seen nothing more than what is in the media and that is based on speculation. i will wait for the investigation to produce some hard facts.'
A team of Scotland Yard anti-terrorist detectives and negotiators are now on their way to Mumbai to assist in the investigation.
Indian commandos have recovered credit cards and the militants' ID cards as well as seizing a vast arsenal of grenades, AK-47 magazines, shells and knives.
Desperate: A hostage at the Oberoi peeks out of his window during the siege
A previously unknown Islamic group, Deccan Mujahideen, has claimed responsibility for the attacks but terror experts believe is is linked to Al Qaeda.
It is known that dozens of British-born Pakistanis have travelled to Pakistan to train in its camps in recent years.
One security source said recently: 'The camps are full and many of the people inside are Brits.'
Last night, there was speculation that a British Al Qaeda suspect reportedly killed by a U.S. missile strike in Pakistan last weekend may have helped plot the attacks.
Rashid Rauf was among five killed in a missile attack in a tribal area in North Waziristan on Saturday.
Security sources believe that at the time of his death Rauf had been planning a major attack on Western targets.
Met officers were also interviewing passengers returning from Mumbai as they stepped off planes at Heathrow.
There was speculation last night that England cricketers could have been an intended target of the terrorists.
It emerged that some of the team had been due to stay in Mumbai, most likely the Taj Mahal, on Wednesday evening before a late decision was made to switch training to Bangalore.
Shocked player Michael Vaughan said: 'I don't know why it was switched but we could have been there in one of those hotels when they were attacked.
'All our white Test kit is in one of the rooms at the Taj Mahal hotel: All our pads and clothes for the Test series and our blazers and caps and ties. That's how close the danger is.'
The England team will fly back to Britain today.
On the hunt: Two baby-faced gunman brandishing automatic weapons
The bloody drama had begun on Wednesday night when young men carrying guns on their shoulders and hatred in their hearts slipped ashore in Mumbai from a 'mother ship' and fanned out into the city.
Their targets were:
The Oberoi Hotel, in the commercial district. Its restaurant was bustling with diners, many of them tourists;
Also attacked was the Leopold restaurant, a haunt of the city's art crowd. As the fanatics sprayed the packed cafe, diners fled in terror;
Some of the worst scenes were at the major railway station. As they entered the Gothic Chatrapati Shivaji Terminus, once named after Queen Victoria, the gunmen were smiling. With an astonishing air of casualness, the terrorists started to shoot. Within seconds the concourse was a bloodbath. People lay screaming on the floor;
A further prestigious target was the 105-year-old Taj Mahal Palace and Tower Hotel;
More hostages were taken at the nearby Chabad House, headquarters for an ultra-orthodox Jewish group. A rabbi was among those held.
About 15 police officers were killed, including the head of Mumbai's anti-terrorism unit.
India's prime minister Manmohan-Singh has blamed militant groups based outside the country - usually meaning Pakistan - raising fears of renewed tensions between the two nuclear-armed rivals. Pakistan condemned the attacks.
Massacre: Blood splatters the floor at the train station where travellers were slaughtered. Below, two of the baby-faced gunmen
The attack on the train station had echoes of previous terror outrages.
In July 2006 more than 180 people were killed in seven bomb explosions at railway stations and on trains in Mumbai that were blamed on Islamist militants.
On Wednesday night, in a city that works late, droves of homebound commuters stood waiting for trains when the terrorists started to shoot.
Briefcases, shopping bags and suitcases were simply dropped and abandoned in the rush for shelter. Pools of blood trickled over the polished stone floor.
The Jewish centre was attacked at about 10pm. A gunman inside the building phoned an Indian television channel to offer talks with the government for the release of hostages.
He complained about abuses in Kashmir, over which India and Pakistan have fought two of their three wars.
From 10.30pm into the early hours, the terrorists continued their co- ordinated rampage through the city.
At the Mazagoan Dockyard, three people died in a large explosion in a taxi driving along the approach road.
The Mumbai police HQ, in the southern part of the city, came under fire, as did two hospitals, the CAMA and GT.
Hostages: Rabbi Gabriel Holtzberg and his wife Rivka were believed to be inside the Jewish centre. Reports say no hostages inside survived
Also attacked was the Metro Adlabs cinema, a 70-year-old art deco landmark that has become a red carpet theatre for the Bollywood industry. It shows many English language films and is a popular spot for Western tourists.
Mr Brown said the attacks had been met by 'shock and outrage' around the world and pledged all possible UK support for the Indian authorities.
He said: 'This is the loss of innocent lives, people just going about their daily business. We've got to do everything we can now to help.'
But firebrand British-based Muslim preacher Anjem Choudhary backed the terrorists and said any Britons killed or held hostage were legitimate targets because they should not have gone to India.
Choudhary, right-hand man to preacher of hate Omar Bakri, said Britain and America is at war with the Muslim world and their citizens must keep off the battlefield.
'Muslims are being killed in Pakistan, Iraq and Afghanistan every day through acts of atrocity against them. But the media only report events like Mumbai.'
Worried friends or relatives should call the Foreign Office's emergency line on 0207 008 0000.
A map shows the locations of the bombings across Mumbai
Find this story at www.dailymail.co.uk/news/worldnews/article-1089711/Massacre-Mumbai-BRITISH-gunmen-seized-commando-raid-death-toll-hits-140.html
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The Long War Journal: Analysis: Mumbai attack differs from past terror strikes
Written by Bill Roggio on November 28, 2008 12:31 AM to The Long War Journal
Available online at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/11/analysis_mumbai_atta.php
Click image to view an interactive graphic showing the attacks in Mumbai. Created by The New York Times.
Almost two days after terrorists attacked the Indian financial hub of Mumbai, the Indian military is still working to root out the remnants of the assault teams at two hotels and a Jewish center. More than 125 people, including six foreigners, have been killed and 327 more have been wounded. The number is expected to go up, as Indian commandos have recovered an additional 30 dead at the Taj Mahal hotel as fighting has resumed.
The Mumbai attack is uniquely different from past terror strikes carried out by Islamic terrorists. Instead of one or more bombings at distinct sites, the Mumbai attackers struck throughout the city using military tactics. Instead of one or more bombings carried out over a short period of time, Mumbai is entering its third day of crisis.
An attack of this nature cannot be thrown together overnight. It requires planned, scouting, financing, training, and a support network to aid the fighters. Initial reports indicate the attacks originated from Pakistan, the hub of jihadi activity in South Asia. Few local terror groups have the capacity to pull of an attack such as this.
While it is early to know exactly what happened in Mumbai as the fog of war still blankets the city, multiple press reports from India allow for a general picture to be painted. An estimated 12 to 25 terrorists are believed to have entered Mumbai by sea. After landing, he attack teams initiated a battle at a police station, then fanned across the city to attack the soft underbelly of hotels, cafes, cinemas, and hospitals. Civilians were gunned down and taken hostage, while terrorists looked for people carrying foreign passports.
Preparation
While the exact size of the assault force and the support cells is still not known, police estimate about 25 gunmen were involved in the attack. The number of members of the supporting cells that provide financing, training, transportation, and other services could be two to four times this number. Operational security for such a large unit, or grouping of cells, is difficult to maintain and requires organization and discipline.
To pull off an attack of this magnitude, it requires months of training, planning, and on-site reconnaissance. Indian officials have stated that the terrorists set up "advance control rooms" at the Taj Mahal and Trident (Oberoi) hotels, and conducted a significant amount of reconnaissance prior to executing the attack. If the news about the "control rooms" is accurate, these rooms may also have served as weapons and ammunition caches for the assault teams to replenish after conducting the first half of the operation.
A terrorist outside the train station in Mumbai.
The planners of the Mumbai attack appear to have chosen able military-aged males. Witnesses have described the men as young and fit. Some of the gunmen appear to have been well trained; some have been credited with having good marksmanship and other military skills.
A witness who saw one of the teams land by sea described the gunmen as "in their 20s, fair-skinned and tall, clad in jeans and jackets." He saw "eight young men stepping out of the raft, two at a time. They jumped into the waters, and picked up a haversack. They bent down again, and came up carrying two more haversacks, one in each hand."
An Indian official claimed the attackers used "sophisticated weapons," however this may be an overstatement. Reports indicate the gunmen used automatic rifles, hand grenades, and some machineguns, as well as several car bombs. The terrorists did not have sophisticated weapons such as anti-aircraft missiles to attack helicopters supporting Indian counterterrorism forces.
Getting to Mumbai
One of the more intriguing aspects of the attack is how the teams entered Mumbai. Reports indicate at least two of the assault teams arrived from outside the city by sea around 9 p.m. local time. Indian officials believe most if not all of the attackers entered Mumbai via sea.
Indian Coast Guard, Navy, Mumbai maritime police, and customs units have scoured the waters off Mumbai in search of a "mother ship" that transported one or more smaller Gemini inflatable boats used by the attackers. A witness saw one of the craft land in Colaba in southern Mumbai and disgorge eight to 10 fighters.
Two ships that have been boarded are strongly suspected of being involved in the attacks: the Kuber, an Indian fishing boat, and the MV Alpha, a Vietnamese cargo ship. Both ships appear to have been directly involved. The Kuber was hijacked on Nov. 13, and its captain was found murdered. Four crewmen are reported to be still missing.
Indian security officials found what they believe is evidence linking the boat to the attack, as well as linking the attackers to Pakistan. "A GPS map of south Mumbai was found along with a satellite phone on the ship, Coast Guard officials confirmed," The Times of India reported. "There were reports that this phone was used to make calls to Karachi immediately before the shootings began in Mumbai."
Indian police also detained three terrorists from the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba, a terror group closely allied with al Qaeda. The three men are said to be Pakistani nationals, and claimed to have been part of a 12-man team that launched from the MV Alpha. They said the MV Alpha departed from Karachi.
Another Indian official said that it is "suspected that the Pakistan Marine Agency helped the terrorists hijack the trawler (the Kuber)," although this has not been confirmed. Another unconfirmed report indicated the Kuber originated from Karachi, Pakistan.
The attack
After landing in Colaba, the terrorists moved north and attacked the Colaba police station, possibly as a single unit. The attack on the police command and control node disrupted the police response and pinned down police units.
The Mumbai police paid a heavy price. Early in the fight, the attackers killed the chief of Mumbai's Anti-terrorism Squad and two other senior officials. At least 14 police were reported to have been killed during fighting throughout the city.
From the Colaba police station, the assault force broke up into smaller teams and fanned out to hit secondary targets throughout Mumbai. At least one police van was hijacked and the terrorists drove around the city, firing automatic weapons from the truck at random targets.
In all, 10 locations, including the police station, were attacked. The assault teams struck at vital centers where foreigners were likely to congregate: the five-star Taj Mahal and Trident hotels, the Nariman House (an orthodox Jewish center), the Cama hospital, the CSP train station, a cinema, and a cafe were all struck almost simultaneously. Two Taxis were also blown up near the airport in the north and the docks in the southern part of the city.
At the Taj, Trident, and Nariman House, several bombs or hand grenades were tossed into the lobbies and in other areas. The Taj Mahal Hotel was set on fire due to the blasts.
Gunmen opened fire indiscriminately in the hotel lobbies and at the cafe, cinema, train station, and the Jewish center. At the hotels, gunmen then sought out foreigners holding American, British, and Israeli passports.
More than 200 hostages were reported to have been held at the Taj and scores more at the Trident and the Jewish center. Mumbai was under siege as police and counterterrorism officials struggled to regain control of the city.
The counterattack
Police appear to have regained control of the situation at the CSP train station, cafe, and cinema relatively quickly, however they were unable to handle the hostage situation at the hotels, the hospital, and the Jewish center. Police officials admitted they were “overwhelmed” by the attacks and unable to contain the fighting.
After a delay, more than 200 National Security Guards commandos and a number of elite Naval commandos, as well as an unknown number of Army forces were deployed to Mumbai. The hotels, the hospital, and the Jewish center were surrounded as the special operations forces prepared to assault the buildings.
Commandos are in the process of clearing the Taj and the Trident in room-by-room searches. Some of the rooms are reported to have been rigged with explosives. Several National Security Guards commandos have been reported to have been killed or wounded in the fighting. Indian forces are also storming the Jewish Center after air assaulting soldiers into the complex. Curiously, it does not appear the terrorists have executed hostages once they were taken.
At this time, police said seven terrorist have been killed and nine have been detained. Several more are still thought to be hiding in the Taj and Trident hotels, and the Jewish center.
Indian Mujahideen claimed responsibility
In an e-mail to local news stations, a group called the Deccan Mujahideen, or Indian Mujahideen, has claimed responsibility for the Mumbai strike. While the Indian Mujahideen’s role in the attack has yet to be confirmed, at least two of the terrorists fighting in Mumbai indicated they were linked to Islamic terrorists.
One of the terrorists phoned a news station demanding jihadis be released from jail in exchange for prisoners. "We want all Mujahideens held in India released and only after that we will release the people," a man named Sahadullah told a media outlet. "Release all the Mujahideens, and Muslims living in India should not be troubled."
Another terrorist named Imran phoned a TV station and spoke in Urdu in what is believed to be a Kashmiri accent. "Ask the government to talk to us and we will release the hostages," he said. "Are you aware how many people have been killed in Kashmir? Are you aware how your army has killed Muslims? Are you aware how many of them have been killed in Kashmir this week?"
The Indian Mujahideen has taken credit for several recent mass-casualty attacks in India. The group claimed credit for the July 25 and 26 bombings in Ahmedabad and Bangalore. At least 36 Indians were killed and more than 120 were wounded in the attacks. The Indian Mujahideen took credit for the Sept. 13 attacks in New Delhi that resulted in 18 killed and more than 90 wounded. The group also claimed credit for the bombings in Jaipur last May (60 killed, more than 200 wounded), and bombings in Uttar Pradesh in November 2007 (14 killed, 50 wounded).
In several of those attacks, an Indian Mujahideen operative who calls himself Arbi Hindi e-mailed the media to claim responsibility. Arbi Hindi's real name is Abdul Subhan Qureshi, an Indian national who is believed to be behind many of the recent terror attacks inside India. Qureshi, a computer expert, is believed to have trained hundreds of recruits to conduct terror attacks in India. He is often called India’s Osama bin Laden.
Indian intelligence believes the Indian Mujahideen is a front group created by the Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Harkat ul Jihad al Islami. The Indian Mujahideen was created to confuse investigators and cover the tracks of the Students' Islamic Movement of India, or SIMI, a radical Islamist movement, according to Indian intelligence.
The Lashkar-e-Taiba and the Harkat ul Jihad al Islami receive support from Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence to destabilize India and wage war in Kashmir. Both of these terror groups are local al Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan and conduct attacks in India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. The Indian “occupation” of Kashmir helped spawn these groups.
Reports indicate signals intelligence has linked the attackers back to Pakistan. Intelligence services are said to have intercepted the terrorists' conversations via satellite phone. The men spoke in Punjabi and used Pakistani phrases.
Indian politicians have been quick to point the finger at Pakistan. Gujarat state Chief Minister Narendra Modi accused Pakistan of allowing terrorists to use its soil as a terror launchpad. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh blamed terror groups backed by India's "neighbors," a reference to Pakistan. Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee said "elements in Pakistan" were behind the Mumbai attacks.
A unique attack
The Mumbai attack differs from previous terror attacks launched by Islamic terror groups. Al Qaeda and other terror groups have not used multiple assault teams to attack multiple targets simultaneously in a major city outside of a war zone.
Al Qaeda and allied groups have conducted complex military assaults on military and non-military targets in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Chechnya, Somalia, Algeria, and Pakistan. But these are countries that are actively in a state of war or emerging from a recent war, where resources and established fighting units already exist.
Al Qaeda has also used the combination of a suicide attack to breach an outer wall followed by one or more assault teams on military bases in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, as well as at the US embassy in Yemen. But again, these attacks are focused on a single target, and again occur where the resources and manpower is available.
Previous terror attacks in non-war zone countries such as India, London, Spain, the United States, Jordan, Morocco, and Egypt have consisted of suicide or conventional bombings on one or more critical soft targets such as hotels, resorts, cafes, rail stations, trains, and in the case of the Sept. 11 attack, planes used as suicide bombs.
The only attack similar to the Mumbai strike is the assault on the Indian Parliament by the Jaish-e-Mohammed, aided by the Lashkar-e-Taiba, in December 2001. A team of Jaish-e-Mohammed fighters attempted to storm the parliament building while in a session was held. A combination of mishaps by the terrorists and the quick reaction of security guards blunted the attack.
The Mumbai attack is something different. Foreign assault teams that likely trained and originated from outside the country infiltrated a major city to conduct multiple attacks on carefully chosen targets. The primary weapon was the gunman, not the suicide bomber. The attack itself has paralyzed a city of 18 million. And two days after the attack began, Indian forces are still working to root out the terror teams.
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http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.2756280942
India: Al-Qaeda websites rejoice over Mumbai attacks
Mumbai, 27 Nov. (AKI) - Al-Qaeda websites on Thursday were swamped with messages from people who were celebrating the devastating Mumbai attacks which have left over 100 people dead and 281 injured. "Oh Allah, destroy the Hindus and do it in the worst of ways," was one of the comments that appeared on Islamist forums on the Internet immediately after the attacks.
"The battle that is underway in Mumbai is a battle for Allah between its servants and the infidels," said another message published on the al-Falluja forum.
Several Al-Qaeda sites also posted several pictures of the victims in Mumbai and provocative statements.
Some media reports are saying that a group calling itself Deccan Mujahideen has claimed responsibility for the coordinated attacks, but this has not yet been confirmed.
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November 29, 2008 | 0627 GMT
Pakistan will not send the director-general to India, as had been announced earlier by Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani,
but will send a representative in his place instead, Pakistani media
reported Nov. 28, citing sources within the prime minister's office. Gilani
had announced plans to send the ISI chief, Lt.-Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha, to
assist with the Mumbai attacks investigation, following a conversation with
Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh.
However, Gilani apparently irked the establishment in Islamabad by
consulting neither the army nor the Foreign Ministry before making that
decision. Army chief Gen. Ashfaq Kayani subsequently notified Pakistani
President Asif Ali Zardari that Pasha would not be dispatched to India. Many
within Pakistan's military feel it would be humiliating to allow an official
of this stature to be summoned by the Indian government -- especially when
Singh's administration appears to be using some Indian media to generate
perceptions that it is taking a tough line with Pakistan. The Congress-led
coalition government in New Delhi is under political pressure from the
opposition, hard-line Bharatiya Janata Party and needs to show a firm
response to the attacks.
For New Delhi, creating perceptions that it had ordered Islamabad to send
the ISI chief to assist investigators was one way of achieving this goal,
but the visit also was intended as a way of gleaning intelligence on
Islamist militant groups. The Pakistanis would prefer not to rush into such
an undertaking. Sending an ISI representative instead of the
director-general himself is Islamabad's way of limiting pressure it faces
from New Delhi.
While a potentially serious international crisis is brewing with India, the
Mumbai attacks seem to have exacerbated civil-military tensions within
Pakistan also. It is no secret that the military establishment has been
uneasy since Pakistan People's Party leader Asif Ali Zardari became
president in early September. And the reversal of Gilani's announcement on
Nov. 28 marked the third time in only four months that military intervention
has forced the government to backtrack on issues involving the ISI.
In July, the government announced that the ISI directorate had been
placed under the control of the Interior Ministry. Within 24 hours, the PPP
reversed course, following an angry response from the military.
Earlier this week, Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi said the ISI's
political wing had been dismantled. Again, within 24 hours, reports emerged
contradicting the statement - saying that the section was very much in
existence and had merely been made inactive.
These incidents notwithstanding, the civilian government remains persistent
- and at this juncture, it may have raised the stakes. While the world was
focused on the Mumbai attacks and their aftermath, Gilani announced Nov. 28
that his government would disband the National Security Council (NSC) -
created by former President Pervez Musharraf as a way of formalizing the
military's oversight of Pakistan's parliament and government. The 13-member
body comprises the president, prime minister, Senate chairman, National
Assembly speaker, the opposition leader in the National Assembly, the chief
ministers of Pakistan's four provinces, the chairman of the joint chiefs of
staff committee, and the chiefs of staff of the army, air force and navy.
By dissolving the NSC, the government likely is trying to eliminate the
military's ability to interfere in decision-making processes. The logic runs
that Pakistan's political, economic and security turmoil already has
undermined the military's position, and getting rid of the NSC would make it
more difficult for the military to control the government. The civilian
government's efforts to alter the civil-military balance, however, easily
could backfire: If the army -- the true power holding Pakistan together -
finds itself pressed on both the domestic and foreign policy fronts, it
could opt to send the PPP government packing.
An India-Pakistan crisis stemming from the Mumbai attacks is expected to
lead to instability in Pakistan. But it seems as though the crisis on the
domestic front may be developing parallel to that on the eastern border.
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WARNING - GRAPHIC CONTENT
http://www.boston.com/bigpicture/2008/11/mumbai_under_attack.html
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**I expect the jewish females hostages suffered very deliberately sadistic sexual assaults, including the use of foreign objects, as is standard jihadi procedure for the treatment of hostages.**
Doctors shocked at hostages's torture
Krishnakumar P and Vicky Nanjappa in Mumbai | November 30, 2008 | 19:53 IST
They said that just one look at the bodies of the dead hostages as well as terrorists showed it was a battle of attrition that was fought over three days at the Oberoi and the Taj hotels in Mumbai.
Doctors working in a hospital where all the bodies, including that of the terrorists, were taken said they had not seen anything like this in their lives.
"Bombay has a long history of terror. I have seen bodies of riot victims, gang war and previous terror attacks like bomb blasts. But this was entirely different. It was shocking and disturbing," a doctor said.
Asked what was different about the victims of the incident, another doctor said: "It was very strange. I have seen so many dead bodies in my life, and was yet traumatised. A bomb blast victim's body might have been torn apart and could be a very disturbing sight. But the bodies of the victims in this attack bore such signs about the kind of violence of urban warfare that I am still unable to put my thoughts to words," he said.
Asked specifically if he was talking of torture marks, he said: "It was apparent that most of the dead were tortured. What shocked me were the telltale signs showing clearly how the hostages were executed in cold blood," one doctor said.
The other doctor, who had also conducted the post-mortem of the victims, said: "Of all the bodies, the Israeli victims bore the maximum torture marks. It was clear that they were killed on the 26th itself. It was obvious that they were tied up and tortured before they were killed. It was so bad that I do not want to go over the details even in my head again," he said.
Corroborating the doctors' claims about torture was the information that the Intelligence Bureau had about the terror plan. "During his interrogation, Ajmal Kamal said they were specifically asked to target the foreigners, especially the Israelis," an IB source said.
It is also said that the Israeli hostages were killed on the first day as keeping them hostage for too long would have focused too much international attention. "They also might have feared the chances of Israeli security agencies taking over the operations at the Nariman House," he reasoned.
On the other hand, there is enough to suggest that the terrorists also did not meet a clean, death.
The doctors who conducted the post mortem said the bodies of the terrorists were beyond recognition. "Their faces were beyond recognition."
There was no way of identifying them," he said. Asked how, if this is the case, they knew the bodies were indeed those of the terrorists, he said: "The security forces that brought the bodies told us that those were the bodies of the terrorists," he said, adding there was no other way they could have identified the bodies.
An intelligence agency source added: "One of the terrorists was shot through either eye."
A senior National Security Guard officer, who had earlier explained the operation in detail to rediff.com, said the commandos went all out after they ascertained that there were no more hostages left. When asked if the commandos attempted to capture them alive at that stage, he replied: "Unko bachana kaun chahega (Who will want to save them)?"
URL for this article:
http://www.rediff.com///news/2008/nov/30mumterror-doctors-shocked-at-hostagess-torture.htm
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Strategic Motivations for the Mumbai Attack
December 1, 2008
By George Friedman
Related Special Topic Page
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
Last Wednesday evening, a group of Islamist operatives carried out a complex terror operation in the Indian city of Mumbai. The attack was not complex because of the weapons used or its size, but in the apparent training, multiple methods of approaching the city and excellent operational security and discipline in the final phases of the operation, when the last remaining attackers held out in the Taj Mahal hotel for several days. The operational goal of the attack clearly was to cause as many casualties as possible, particularly among Jews and well-to-do guests of five-star hotels. But attacks on various other targets, from railroad stations to hospitals, indicate that the more general purpose was to spread terror in a major Indian city.
While it is not clear precisely who carried out the Mumbai attack, two separate units apparently were involved. One group, possibly consisting of Indian Muslims, was established in Mumbai ahead of the attacks. The second group appears to have just arrived. It traveled via ship from Karachi, Pakistan, later hijacked a small Indian vessel to get past Indian coastal patrols, and ultimately landed near Mumbai.
Extensive preparations apparently had been made, including surveillance of the targets. So while the precise number of attackers remains unclear, the attack clearly was well-planned and well-executed.
Evidence and logic suggest that radical Pakistani Islamists carried out the attack. These groups have a highly complex and deliberately amorphous structure. Rather than being centrally controlled, ad hoc teams are created with links to one or more groups. Conceivably, they might have lacked links to any group, but this is hard to believe. Too much planning and training were involved in this attack for it to have been conceived by a bunch of guys in a garage. While precisely which radical Pakistani Islamist group or groups were involved is unknown, the Mumbai attack appears to have originated in Pakistan. It could have been linked to al Qaeda prime or its various franchises and/or to Kashmiri insurgents.
More important than the question of the exact group that carried out the attack, however, is the attackers’ strategic end. There is a tendency to regard terror attacks as ends in themselves, carried out simply for the sake of spreading terror. In the highly politicized atmosphere of Pakistan’s radical Islamist factions, however, terror frequently has a more sophisticated and strategic purpose. Whoever invested the time and took the risk in organizing this attack had a reason to do so. Let’s work backward to that reason by examining the logical outcomes following this attack.
An End to New Delhi’s Restraint
The most striking aspect of the Mumbai attack is the challenge it presents to the Indian government — a challenge almost impossible for New Delhi to ignore. A December 2001 Islamist attack on the Indian parliament triggered an intense confrontation between India and Pakistan. Since then, New Delhi has not responded in a dramatic fashion to numerous Islamist attacks against India that were traceable to Pakistan. The Mumbai attack, by contrast, aimed to force a response from New Delhi by being so grievous that any Indian government showing only a muted reaction to it would fall.
India’s restrained response to Islamist attacks (even those originating in Pakistan) in recent years has come about because New Delhi has understood that, for a host of reasons, Islamabad has been unable to control radical Pakistani Islamist groups. India did not want war with Pakistan; it felt it had more important issues to deal with. New Delhi therefore accepted Islamabad’s assurances that Pakistan would do its best to curb terror attacks, and after suitable posturing, allowed tensions originating from Islamist attacks to pass.
This time, however, the attackers struck in such a way that New Delhi couldn’t allow the incident to pass. As one might expect, public opinion in India is shifting from stunned to furious. India’s Congress party-led government is politically weak and nearing the end of its life span. It lacks the political power to ignore the attack, even if it were inclined to do so. If it ignored the attack, it would fall, and a more intensely nationalist government would take its place. It is therefore very difficult to imagine circumstances under which the Indians could respond to this attack in the same manner they have to recent Islamist attacks.
What the Indians actually will do is not clear. In 2001-2002, New Delhi responded to the attack on the Indian parliament by moving forces close to the Pakistani border and the Line of Control that separates Indian- and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, engaging in artillery duels along the front, and bringing its nuclear forces to a high level of alert. The Pakistanis made a similar response. Whether India ever actually intended to attack Pakistan remains unclear, but either way, New Delhi created an intense crisis in Pakistan.
The U.S. and the Indo-Pakistani Crisis
The United States used this crisis for its own ends. Having just completed the first phase of its campaign in Afghanistan, Washington was intensely pressuring Pakistan’s then-Musharraf government to expand cooperation with the United States; purge its intelligence organization, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), of radical Islamists; and crack down on al Qaeda and the Taliban in the Afghan-Pakistani border region. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf had been reluctant to cooperate with Washington, as doing so inevitably would spark a massive domestic backlash against his government.
The crisis with India produced an opening for the United States. Eager to get India to stand down from the crisis, the Pakistanis looked to the Americans to mediate. And the price for U.S. mediation was increased cooperation from Pakistan with the United States. The Indians, not eager for war, backed down from the crisis after guarantees that Islamabad would impose stronger controls on Islamist groups in Kashmir.
In 2001-2002, the Indo-Pakistani crisis played into American hands. In 2008, the new Indo-Pakistani crisis might play differently. The United States recently has demanded increased Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border. Meanwhile, President-elect Barack Obama has stated his intention to focus on Afghanistan and pressure the Pakistanis.
Therefore, one of Islamabad’s first responses to the new Indo-Pakistani crisis was to announce that if the Indians increased their forces along Pakistan’s eastern border, Pakistan would be forced to withdraw 100,000 troops from its western border with Afghanistan. In other words, threats from India would cause Pakistan to dramatically reduce its cooperation with the United States in the Afghan war. The Indian foreign minister is flying to the United States to meet with Obama; obviously, this matter will be discussed among others.
We expect the United States to pressure India not to create a crisis, in order to avoid this outcome. As we have said, the problem is that it is unclear whether politically the Indians can afford restraint. At the very least, New Delhi must demand that the Pakistani government take steps to make the ISI and Pakistan’s other internal security apparatus more effective. Even if the Indians concede that there was no ISI involvement in the attack, they will argue that the ISI is incapable of stopping such attacks. They will demand a purge and reform of the ISI as a sign of Pakistani commitment. Barring that, New Delhi will move troops to the Indo-Pakistani frontier to intimidate Pakistan and placate Indian public opinion.
Dilemmas for Islamabad, New Delhi and Washington
At that point, Islamabad will have a serious problem. The Pakistani government is even weaker than the Indian government. Pakistan’s civilian regime does not control the Pakistani military, and therefore does not control the ISI. The civilians can’t decide to transform Pakistani security, and the military is not inclined to make this transformation. (Pakistan’s military has had ample opportunity to do so if it wished.)
Pakistan faces the challenge, just one among many, that its civilian and even military leadership lack the ability to reach deep into the ISI and security services to transform them. In some ways, these agencies operate under their own rules. Add to this the reality that the ISI and security forces — even if they are acting more assertively, as Islamabad claims — are demonstrably incapable of controlling radical Islamists in Pakistan. If they were capable, the attack on Mumbai would have been thwarted in Pakistan. The simple reality is that in Pakistan’s case, the will to make this transformation does not seem to be present, and even if it were, the ability to suppress terror attacks isn’t there.
The United States might well want to limit New Delhi’s response. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is on her way to India to discuss just this. But the politics of India’s situation make it unlikely that the Indians can do anything more than listen. It is more than simply a political issue for New Delhi; the Indians have no reason to believe that the Mumbai operation was one of a kind. Further operations like the Mumbai attack might well be planned. Unless the Pakistanis shift their posture inside Pakistan, India has no way of knowing whether other such attacks can be stymied. The Indians will be sympathetic to Washington’s plight in Afghanistan and the need to keep Pakistani troops at the Afghan border. But New Delhi will need something that the Americans — and in fact the Pakistanis — can’t deliver: a guarantee that there will be no more attacks like this one.
The Indian government cannot chance inaction. It probably would fall if it did. Moreover, in the event of inactivity and another attack, Indian public opinion probably will swing to an uncontrollable extreme. If an attack takes place but India has moved toward crisis posture with Pakistan, at least no one can argue that the Indian government remained passive in the face of threats to national security. Therefore, India is likely to refuse American requests for restraint.
It is possible that New Delhi will make a radical proposal to Rice, however. Given that the Pakistani government is incapable of exercising control in its own country, and given that Pakistan now represents a threat to both U.S. and Indian national security, the Indians might suggest a joint operation with the Americans against Pakistan.
What that joint operation might entail is uncertain, but regardless, this is something that Rice would reject out of hand and that Obama would reject in January 2009. Pakistan has a huge population and nuclear weapons, and the last thing Bush or Obama wants is to practice nation-building in Pakistan. The Indians, of course, will anticipate this response. The truth is that New Delhi itself does not want to engage deep in Pakistan to strike at militant training camps and other Islamist sites. That would be a nightmare. But if Rice shows up with a request for Indian restraint and no concrete proposal — or willingness to entertain a proposal — for solving the Pakistani problem, India will be able to refuse on the grounds that the Americans are asking India to absorb a risk (more Mumbai-style attacks) without the United States’ willingness to share in the risk.
Setting the Stage for a New Indo-Pakistani Confrontation
That will set the stage for another Indo-Pakistani confrontation. India will push forces forward all along the Indo-Pakistani frontier, move its nuclear forces to an alert level, begin shelling Pakistan, and perhaps — given the seriousness of the situation — attack short distances into Pakistan and even carry out airstrikes deep in Pakistan. India will demand greater transparency for New Delhi in Pakistani intelligence operations. The Indians will not want to occupy Pakistan; they will want to occupy Pakistan’s security apparatus.
Naturally, the Pakistanis will refuse that. There is no way they can give India, their main adversary, insight into Pakistani intelligence operations. But without that access, India has no reason to trust Pakistan. This will leave the Indians in an odd position: They will be in a near-war posture, but will have made no demands of Pakistan that Islamabad can reasonably deliver and that would benefit India. In one sense, India will be gesturing. In another sense, India will be trapped by making a gesture on which Pakistan cannot deliver. The situation thus could get out of hand.
In the meantime, the Pakistanis certainly will withdraw forces from western Pakistan and deploy them in eastern Pakistan. That will mean that one leg of the Petraeus and Obama plans would collapse. Washington’s expectation of greater Pakistani cooperation along the Afghan border will disappear along with the troops. This will free the Taliban from whatever limits the Pakistani army had placed on it. The Taliban’s ability to fight would increase, while the motivation for any of the Taliban to enter talks — as Afghan President Hamid Karzai has suggested — would decline. U.S. forces, already stretched to the limit, would face an increasingly difficult situation, while pressure on al Qaeda in the tribal areas would decrease.
Now, step back and consider the situation the Mumbai attackers have created. First, the Indian government faces an internal political crisis driving it toward a confrontation it didn’t plan on. Second, the minimum Pakistani response to a renewed Indo-Pakistani crisis will be withdrawing forces from western Pakistan, thereby strengthening the Taliban and securing al Qaeda. Third, sufficient pressure on Pakistan’s civilian government could cause it to collapse, opening the door to a military-Islamist government — or it could see Pakistan collapse into chaos, giving Islamists security in various regions and an opportunity to reshape Pakistan. Finally, the United States’ situation in Afghanistan has now become enormously more complex.
By staging an attack the Indian government can’t ignore, the Mumbai attackers have set in motion an existential crisis for Pakistan. The reality of Pakistan cannot be transformed, trapped as the country is between the United States and India. Almost every evolution from this point forward benefits Islamists. Strategically, the attack on Mumbai was a precise blow struck to achieve uncertain but favorable political outcomes for the Islamists.
Rice’s trip to India now becomes the crucial next step. She wants Indian restraint. She does not want the western Pakistani border to collapse. But she cannot guarantee what India must have: assurance of no further terror attacks on India originating in Pakistan. Without that, India must do something. No Indian government could survive without some kind of action. So it is up to Rice, in one of her last acts as secretary of state, to come up with a miraculous solution to head off a final, catastrophic crisis for the Bush administration — and a defining first crisis for the new Obama administration. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld once said that the enemy gets a vote. The Islamists cast their ballot in Mumbai.
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Summary
Despite demands from India in the wake of the Nov. 26 militant attacks on Mumbai, Pakistan is unlikely to be able to shift troops around to please New Delhi (or Washington, for that matter). Islamabad’s military capacity was already extremely constrained before the attacks and has only become more limited.
Pakistani daily The News reported Dec. 1 that Pakistan’s military is monitoring the border with India closely and has not detected any mobilization of Indian troops in the wake of the Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai. Meanwhile, Press Trust of India quoted an Indian army official saying no orders for mobilization have been given, and the Indian External Affairs Ministry rebutted television reports that said the Indian-Pakistani cease-fire was being suspended.
As tensions mount between India and Pakistan over the Mumbai attacks — in which at least some of the attackers apparently arrived by boat from Karachi — the possibility has loomed of increased troop deployments along the border shared by the two South Asian rivals. Meanwhile, an assertive New Delhi, with little choice but to react strongly to the attacks, appears likely to demand increased Pakistani operations in Kashmir to control militancy there, while the incoming U.S. administration will be placing even more demands on Islamabad in the war against jihadists along the Afghan-Pakistani border.
Pakistan, however, is in a military bind. It is already stretched thin and does not have the resources to fulfill its core mission while also taking on other operations to placate India and the United States — meaning New Delhi and Washington are likely to be disappointed.
Before the attacks in Mumbai, the Pakistani military was already overwhelmed with four major operational demands, none of which has gone away:
Defend the border with India, being prepared for possible conventional Indian military aggression.
Combat the home-grown Taliban insurgency raging across the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Pashtun districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP).
Combat a much lower-intensity — but nonetheless very real — mounting insurgency in the southwestern province of Baluchistan.
Provide heightened military security in Islamabad and other major urban centers in order to defend against an uptick in radical Islamist suicide bombings domestically.
(Further compounding things, ethnic clashes and rioting broke out in Karachi on Nov. 28, with scores of people being killed on a daily basis. Though the army itself has not yet been called in — paramilitary units are currently attempting to rein in the situation — Karachi-based V Corps is closely monitoring the potential need for military force.)
Strategically, defending the border with India is the military’s paramount objective because it represents the most direct existential threat. Pakistan’s 550,000-strong force is only half the size of the active Indian army, and New Delhi also fields technologically superior hardware, from the latest Russian T-90 main battle tanks to the modern Su-30MKI “Flanker” fighter. As such, Pakistan is very hesitant to pull away military units from this mission. (Islamabad has committed resources to the jihadist fight along the western border only under immense U.S. pressure. Currently centered around Swat in the NWFP, this mission has been complicated as U.S. airstrikes by unmanned aerial vehicles have inched ever deeper into Pakistani territory.)
(Click to enlarge map)
Looking at the Indian border, Pakistan is most vulnerable in the open lowlands of Punjab. Not only does this region offer little in the way of terrain features that would impede the movement of large mechanized formations, there is little distance at this point between the Indian border and the Pakistani heartland — where most of the population resides along with Pakistan’s core industrial and agricultural sectors. The more barren terrain of the southern border along Sindh province is also vulnerable, but it is also more distant from the core population areas that Pakistan needs to defend. The mountainous Kashmir region, while it is the most disputed area of the border, is also extremely difficult terrain that favors the defense.
With almost no strategic depth to insulate its core from any potential Indian attack, Pakistan maintains six of its nine Corps formations in Punjab. This includes offensive “Strike” Corps (I and II) designed to make pre-emptive thrusts into Indian territory in the event of war in an attempt to acquire breathing room and leverage for subsequent negotiations. At times of increasing tension with India, the overarching military imperative for Islamabad becomes the conventional reinforcement of these six corps. This would have to come at the expense of other missions such as those that Washington and New Delhi would like to see. Indeed, Pakistan already suggested as much when it told commanders in Afghanistan that it would have to withdraw forces from the western theater in the event of a crisis with India.
But Pakistan’s problems run deeper than its military’s myriad and conflicting responsibilities. The civilian government is weak at an extremely challenging point in the country’s history — when an undercurrent of radical Islamist leanings is on the rise and the country’s intelligence service, the ISI, is infiltrated by both jihadist and Taliban elements. Even if it had more freedom of action, the military could hope to do little more than keep a lid on these deepening crises. If the Pakistani army was unable to muster the resources for the demands being placed on it before the Mumbai attacks, it is unlikely to be able to meet the demands of a hostile India and a new U.S. administration.
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y GEETA ANAND, MATTHEW ROSENBERG, YAROSLAV TROFIMOV and ZAHID HUSSAIN
MUMBAI -- India has accused a senior leader of the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba of orchestrating last week's terror attacks that killed at least 172 people here, and demanded the Pakistani government turn him over and take action against the group.
Just two days before hitting the city, the group of 10 terrorists who ravaged India's financial capital communicated with Yusuf Muzammil and four other Lashkar leaders via a satellite phone that they left behind on a fishing trawler they hijacked to get to Mumbai, a senior Mumbai police official told The Wall Street Journal. The entire group also underwent rigorous training in a Lashkar-e-Taiba camp in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, the official said.
More on the Attacks
Complete Coverage: Terror in MumbaiEyewitness: 'Five Weapons Pointed at My Chest'Video: Indian Stars Hold Mumbai VigilVideo: Gunfight FootageMr. Muzammil had earlier been in touch with an Indian Muslim extremist who scoped out Mumbai locations for possible attack before he was arrested early this year, said another senior Indian police official. The Indian man, Faheem Ahmed Ansari, had in his possession layouts drawn up for the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower hotel and Mumbai's main railway station, both prime targets of last week's attack, the police official said.
Mr. Ansari, who also made sketches and maps of locations in southern Mumbai that weren't attacked, had met Mr. Muzammil and trained at the same Lashkar camp as the terrorists in last week's attack, an official said.
U.S. officials agreed that Mr. Muzammil was a focus of their attention in the attacks, though they stopped short of calling him the mastermind. "That is a name that is definitely on the radar screen," a U.S. counterterrorism official said.
Information gathered in the probe also continues to point to a connection to Lashkar-e-Taiba, that official said. Along with a confession from the one gunman captured in the attacks, officials cited phone calls intercepted by satellite during the attacks that connected the assailants to members of Lashkar-e-Taiba in Pakistan, and the recovered satellite phone from the boat.
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STANDING WATCH: Police on Tuesday guard Mumbai's main rail station, a target of last week's terror attack -- plotted, India says, by a Pakistani militant.
It also emerged Tuesday that U.S. authorities had warned Indian officials of a pending attack by sea. Hasan Gafoor, Mumbai police commissioner, told reporters there was a general warning issued in September that hotels could be targeted as well, after the bombing of the Marriot Hotel in Islamabad.
Two militants arrested in early 2007 also told police officials then that they were part of a band of eight Lashkar members who slipped into India by boat from Karachi, Pakistan, and made their way to Mumbai, an Indian police official in Kashmir said in an interview Tuesday. The group broke into pairs -- just as last week's attackers did -- and made their way north using safehouses provided by local sympathizers, the police official said.
The evidence cited by investigators is giving fresh ammunition to the Indian government, which has long tried to pressure Pakistan into cracking down on Lashkar-e-Taiba. India claims the group enjoys support from elements of the Pakistani intelligence agency. Pakistan denies that and outlawed the organization in 2002, but has done little to curtail its operations.
Mr. Muzammil's name is on a list of people -- numbering about 20 in all -- that India gave Pakistan earlier this week, demanding their immediate extradition, a senior Pakistani official told the Journal. The official said Pakistan was examining India's list of suspects and has assured New Delhi that action would be taken against them if there is evidence of involvement in the attacks.
Any move by the shaky civilian government of Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari against Lashkar-e-Taiba could create a huge backlash, however, particularly from Islamic groups, said a senior official in Pakistan. On Tuesday, Pakistani Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani convened a meeting of all of the country's political parties in the capital to develop a joint response to Indian demands for extradition.
"The government of Pakistan has offered a joint investigation mechanism and we are ready to compose such a team which will help the investigation," Pakistan's Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi said in a televised statement. Mr. Qureshi, however, declined to say whether Pakistan would hand over any of those sought by India.
The Mumbai attacks have ratcheted up tensions between the two nuclear-armed neighbors, who have been exchanging verbal fire for the past several days and sparking fears of a conflict. U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is scheduled to arrive in India Wednesday, as is Mike Mullen, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Indian authorities say evidence highlights how Lashkar has broadened its operations to include recruitment of both Indian and Pakistani Muslim extremists.
Lashkar-e-Taiba -- literally Army of the Good -- has been implicated by Indian officials in several recent terrorist attacks on Indian soil. The group initially focused on fighting the Indian army in the disputed state of Kashmir. Over the years, it has expanded its cause into the rest of India and aims to establish Islamic rule.
India has told Pakistan that the latest attacks in Mumbai were masterminded by Mr. Muzammil, aided by others in Lashkar's senior ranks including an operative named Asrar Shah, according to a senior Pakistani official. Mr. Muzammil, a Pakistani in his mid-30s, became head of Lashkar-e-Taiba's anti-Indian planning cell some three months ago, according to Dipankar Banerjee, director of the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, an independent think tank in New Delhi. Indian authorities believe he is in Pakistan but officials there haven't acknowledged that.
India also claims the attacks were approved by Hafiz Muhammed Saeed, the Pakistani official said. Mr. Saeed is the head of Jamaat-ud-Dawa, the parent organization of the Lashkar group. Mr. Saeed, who is free in Pakistan, denied the accusations. "India has always accused me without any evidence," he told Pakistan's GEO News television channel.
Indian investigators -- helped in part by the testimony of the one terrorist they captured alive, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab -- say they now possess solid proof. "We have made substantial progress in the investigation," said A.N. Roy, director general of the State Police of Maharashtra, where Mumbai is located.
According to Mumbai police chief Hasan Gafoor, Mr. Kasab told interrogators that he and fellow gunmen spent between a year and 18 months in a Lashkar-e-Taiba camp.
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An armed policeman guards the Victoria Terminus station on Tuesday in Mumbai.
The 10 militants left Pakistan's port city of Karachi on Nov. 23 aboard a ship called the Al Husseini, which also carried a crew of seven, another senior police official said. Investigators believe that all the 10 gunmen were Pakistani because they spoke Punjabi or Punjabi-accented Urdu.
When they entered Indian waters, the terrorists hijacked a fishing trawler called the Kuber and took its five crew members prisoner. The terrorists transferred four of them to the Al Husseini and they were subsequently killed, police believe. The terrorists kept the Kuber's lead crewman alive and sailed close to Mumbai.
The terrorists abandoned the Kuber in haste, fearing detection by an approaching vessel, the senior police official said. In the process, they forgot their satellite phone on the Kuber. Investigators found in the call log the numbers of five people, including Mr. Muzammil, two of his deputies and his personal aide, the senior police official said. Indian officials had already intercepted phone conversations made while the terrorists were traveling to Mumbai.
Indian Muslim leaders are skeptical of Lashkar's reach into India. But police say Lashkar has increasingly sought contacts and recruits among Indian extremists. In October, for instance, five Muslims from the southern state of Kerala were recruited into Lashkar-e-Taiba and traveled to the Indian part of Kashmir, according to T.K. Vinod Kumar, Kerala's deputy inspector-general of police. They tried to cross the line of control that runs between India and Pakistan and reach training camps on the Pakistani side.
Four among the group were killed in a firefight with the Indian military during that attempt. The fifth, construction worker Abdul Jabbar, was arrested two weeks ago, Mr. Kumar says.
Unlike other Pakistani-based jihadist organizations, Lashkar draws its recruits across a broad social spectrum, from universities as well as among unemployed youths. The majority come from Punjab; Mr. Kasab used to live in the Punjabi village of Faridkot, according to Indian investigators.
In March 2007 when two militants were arrested in the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir, the pair told police that Lashkar was looking to start slipping people into India from the sea to avoid heavily guarded land borders. The sea also provided a winter route to Kashmir for Lashkar members, when high mountain passes crossing to India's part of the state are often blanketed by deep snow.
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New template for terror?
Mumbai attacks' sophistication shows need for new approach to defenses, experts say.
By Mark Sappenfield | Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor
from the December 3, 2008 edition
New Delhi - Sixty hours in Mumbai have begun to change the calculus of global terrorism.
New reports suggest that both Indian and American intelligence agencies had foreseen the threat to Mumbai (formerly Bombay). Yet the manner of the attack – with 10 heavily armed, highly trained fighters clinically fanning out across the city – meant that no "police force anywhere would have been prepared to counter this type of operation," says Bruce Hoffman, a terrorism analyst at Georgetown University in Washington.
Armed sieges are not a new terrorist tactic, but never before has one been used to such effect. Some experts suggest this could be the most sophisticated terrorist attack since 9/11. Now, other militants might consider copycat operations – and the world's cities will have to be ready for them.
"It was not so much of a success in terms of people killed – it was more the publicity they got for three days, and their ability to project the Indian state ... as helpless," says B. Raman, former head of counterterrorism for Indian top intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW). "Others will want to repeat it," he predicts.
Indians' anger toward their government continued to mount Tuesday as several reports indicated that there was specific intelligence pointing to an attack on Mumbai from the sea – the way the terrorists entered the city.
On Sept. 18 and 24, RAW intercepted two satellite phone calls in which a member of the Pakistani militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba discussed an operation that would attack Mumbai by boat, according to the Hindustan Times, an Indian newspaper. One call mentioned the Taj Mahal Hotel, where the last fighter was killed Saturday.
Moreover, a US counterterrorism official told CNN Tuesday that "the United States warned the Indian government about a potential maritime attack against Mumbai at least a month before last week's massacre in Mumbai."
President Bush is diverting Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice from a meeting of NATO foreign ministers in Brussels this week to visit India. She is expected to arrive in New Delhi Wednesday.
India now feels confident it has established a link between the attackers and elements in Pakistan, perhaps Lashkar-e-Taiba. India is now demanding that Pakistan extradite 20 people – including the head of Lashkar-e-Taiba – which India's foreign minister, Pranab Mukherjee, called a "fugitive from Indian law." Pakistan is considering the request.
Significantly, Mr. Mukherjee says India is not currently considering the use of force against Pakistan. US officials were concerned that India might deploy more troops to its northern border, as it did after an attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001. Pakistan would have countered by pulling troops away from the fight against militants on the Afghan border.
That India felt the need to dismiss such an option is a measure of how deeply the country has been shaken by last week's attacks. Purely by the numbers, the attacks were barely more lethal than a series of bombings that hit Mumbai on July 11, 2006, killing 186. The current death toll from the latest attacks is 188. But newspapers and commentators here have repeatedly called this India's worst terrorist attack primarily because of the way it unfolded.
The paroxysm of the bombings was replaced by 60 hours of uncertainty. The militants moved through the city with military precision, killing as they headed toward three rendezvous points – the Taj and Oberoi hotels and Nariman House, a Jewish community center.
In fact, during the fight for the Taj, Indian commandos expressed grudging admiration for the terrorists. They admitted that the terrorists knew the hotel better than the commandos did themselves, and they fought more like soldiers than terrorists.
Employing only guns and grenades, "the individual tactics they used were not that sophisticated," says John Harrison, a terrorism analyst at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore. "But how they put them all together showed a tremendous amount of strategic thinking."
The simpler parts of the operation are easily copied. Terrorists in Kashmir, for instance, have long used similar sieges, albeit on a much smaller scale. "I believe this will become the new popular terrorist tactic since no police force in the world is prepared for ... such an attack," says Georgetown Professor Hoffman by e-mail.
He says that even an attack as complicated as the one in Mumbai could be reproduced. It is "very replicable – provided you have the training facilities, skilled trainers, time, and the ability to engage in pre-op [operation] planning and preparation," Hoffman says.
Others disagree, saying the Mumbai attack, with its multiple targets and coordinated movements, was more akin to 9/11, requiring such exhaustive preparation that it cannot be repeated easily.
"The complexity and scale might not be replicable elsewhere," says Professor Harrison, of Singapore.
The proficiency of the Mumbai terrorists has led to questions about Indian authorities' insistence that there were only 10 people involved. But Harrison says the figure "is very plausible," citing how a few terrorists at the 1972 Munich Olympics held off security forces for hours.
In a hotel like the Taj, "it is incredibly difficult for urban commandos to get control of a situation," he says.
Police have since revealed that the militants booby-trapped dead bodies with hand grenades to slow the commandos' progress. They set fires to add to the confusion. They even took cocaine, police reported, so that they could stay awake for 60 hours straight.
It seems likely, however, that the fighters had help in some form from local contacts – perhaps scouting sites or gathering information, experts say. The Indian police say they have not dismissed that possibility.
Their difficulties in coming to grips with the attacks as they happened will now become a global lesson, says Hoffman. Police worldwide will have to match terrorists' rising sophistication – from rescuing hostages quickly to knowing the layout of all potential targets.
"Police forces will have to prepare for more than one major operation," he says.
Find this article at:
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/1203/p01s03-wosc.html
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U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was set to arrive in New Delhi on Wednesday, and then reportedly will make her way to Islamabad, in an attempt to calm tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbors following the attacks in Mumbai. It appears that Rice will be carrying a message of restraint for the Indians. Ahead of her trip, White House spokeswoman Dana Perino made a point of saying that “the United States doesn’t believe Pakistan’s government was involved in the attacks, and the Bush administration trusts Pakistan to investigate the issue … We have no reason not to [trust Pakistan] right now.” In other words: Hold your horses, India — Washington is in no mood for a crisis to break out on the Indo-Pakistani border right now.
Washington’s desire for restraint is understandable. The United States is shifting its military focus from Iraq to Afghanistan. For counterterrorism efforts to succeed in that theater, the United States needs to ensure, at the very least, that the Pakistani state is intact. But with a weak and fractured government, a military and intelligence establishment that has lost control, a spreading jihadist insurgency and an economy on the brink of bankruptcy, Pakistan is not in good shape. A military confrontation on its eastern border easily could be the straw that breaks the camel’s back in Islamabad, thereby frustrating U.S. military operations in the region and creating an even more fertile environment for jihadist activities in Pakistan, Afghanistan, India and the wider world.
While the Indians will hear out the Americans and discuss various avenues of cooperation, including U.S. assistance in training and equipping Indian security forces, New Delhi is highly unlikely to accede to Washington’s request for calm and restraint. India just experienced its own 9/11. After an attack of such magnitude, the government has no choice but to respond, and that response inevitably will be felt in Pakistan. This is not only politically driven: Though the Indian government needs to demonstrate that it is taking action against this threat, it also has a core national security interest in ensuring that an attack like that in Mumbai cannot be repeated.
The Indians are not about to subordinate their freedom to maneuver to the Americans. Doing so would violate a long-standing policy of non-alignment practiced in New Delhi. Given its geography — buffered by the Indian Ocean to the south, jungles to the east, the Himalayas to the north and desert to the west — India is both insulated and strategically placed between the oil-rich Islamic world and the Far East. This has enabled New Delhi to pursue a largely independent foreign policy and play a balancing role between great powers, such as Russia and the United States. New Delhi will resist getting locked into any strategic alignment. (This is precisely why getting the civilian nuclear deal with the United States passed in New Delhi was such a laborious and noisy affair, as politicians feared the deal would compromise India’s independence in foreign relations.)
The U.S. need for restraint and the Indian need for action, therefore, inevitably will clash. But that will not necessarily stop the Indians from taking steps against Pakistan.
There have been several public indications already that New Delhi is making a concerted effort to build a case against the Pakistanis without appearing hasty or rash.
Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee told NDTV on Tuesday that while he would not comment on military action, “every sovereign country has its right to protect its territorial integrity and take appropriate action as and when it feels necessary.” Later in the day, Mumbai Police Commissioner Hasan Gafoor gave a press conference in which he said that a group of 10 militants involved in the Mumbai attacks came from Karachi, and that the one suspect captured alive admitted to being a Pakistani from Punjab. Stratfor also is getting indications that the Indian Intelligence Bureau is disseminating more detailed information to Washington — making a special point of reaching out to President-elect Barack Obama’s advisers — to emphasize the Pakistan link in these attacks. So far, Obama has remained relatively ambiguous on the matter. However, on Monday, when asked whether India has the right to “take out” high-value targets inside Pakistan with or without Islamabad’s permission — similar to the precedent the United States has set by launching its own operations along the Pakistani-Afghan border — Obama said that as a sovereign state, India has the right to protect itself.
In all likelihood, a contingency plan has already been decided and set into motion by the upper echelons of the Indian government. Such a plan would take several days at least to implement, giving the Indians some time to try and exhaust their diplomatic options. This might explain why the Indians are being careful with their statements — reiterating the Pakistan link but leaving open a window for diplomatic reconciliation if (and only if) Pakistan cracks down on those elements of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency that purportedly were involved in the attacks. The Pakistanis are likely sensing Indian military preparations and are putting out feelers to exculpate the Pakistani state. One such feeler made its way to the Asia Times Online: A writer believed to have close links to the ISI described how a rogue node of the ISI in Karachi approved the Mumbai operation, after the initial ISI plot was “hijacked” by Kashmiri Islamist militants who had linked up with al Qaeda. The Pakistanis know that India is prepared to raise these claims and are attempting to put distance between the state and the ISI rogues. The best that Islamabad can hope for is that the United States — acting on its own interests in the region — will be able to restrain India from taking military action against Pakistan.
This sets up an interesting dynamic in which the intent of each player will not necessarily match up with the results of its actions. Washington’s intent right now is to restrain India, but India will not allow itself to be held back by the United States. The Pakistanis’ intent may be to crack down on rogue ISI elements and stave off a military confrontation with the Indians, but it is doubtful that Islamabad even has the capability to do so — and it cannot depend fully on the United States to constrain New Delhi. The Indians’ intent is to coerce the Pakistanis into suppressing militants and regaining control over ISI rogues, but political and social pressures are building within India to respond aggressively. The diplomatic maneuvers will continue in coming days, but objective forces are slowly pushing New Delhi, Islamabad and Washington toward a crisis.
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http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6378603
Mumbai: Where are the 14 Other Pakistani-Trained Terrorists?
Captured Gunman Says Only 10 of 24 Were Sent to Mumbai; Concern for New Delhi
By LEN TEPPER, RICHARD ESPOSITO, and BRIAN ROSS
December 3, 2008—
The lone gunman captured alive in Mumbai has told interrogators only 10 of the 24 young men in his year-long terrorist training course were sent to Mumbai last week, leaving 14 still in Pakistan, ready to strike again, law enforcement and security sources tell ABCNews.com.
Security officials say they have been warned by Indian and U.S. officials that a second attack on the Indian capital city New Delhi is possible.
U.S. officials say the captured gunman's account corroborates other intelligence that points to the role of the Pakistani-based Lashkar e Taiba, a group affiliated with al Qaeda that opposes Indian rule over the disputed state of Kashmir.
U.S. counter-terrorism officials say Lashkar e Taiba's ability to operate with impunity inside Pakistan is one reason U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice has warned Pakistan "this is a time for complete, absolute, total transparency and cooperation."
A warning issued by U.S. intelligence agencies to Indian officials in mid-October suggests the U.S. may know the precise location of the training camps or headquarters in Pakistan, according to sources in the intelligence community.
"There's going to have be retaliation, but it could be a while," said former CIA intelligence officer John Kiriakou, an ABC News consultant.
"The location of those bases is the worst kept secret in South Asia, but by now they probably have been abandoned," he said.
Mohammad Ajmal Amir Iman, 21, captured by police at Mumbai's main train station, reportedly told interrogators he began training for last week's deadly attack in late 2007 along with 23 other recruits to Lashkar e Taiba, a terror group affiliated with al Qaeda.
He reportedly described four, three-month training segments at locations in Pakistan: physical fitness, running, weapons and explosives and sea maneuvers.
Gunmen Were Trained Terrorists
The captured terrorist described his trainers as former Pakistani military officers, including one who was known as Cha-Cha, or Uncle.
Indian officials say his account is corroborated by evidence recovered from the group's boats and from intercepted satellite phone conversations that have been recovered from data files.
The officials say they have now heard one conversation in which a gunman is heard telling Lashkar e Taiba headquarters, "We finished off the four goats," a reference to the murder of four crewmen on the boat hijacked by the attackers in Indian waters.
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Thursday, Dec. 4, 2008
Mumbai terrorist attacks are a wakeup call
By HARSH V. PANT
LONDON — India was a victim of terrorism long before the twin towers in New York collapsed on Sept. 11, 2001. But as the global "war on terror" continues, India has experienced increasingly lethal terrorism. The sheer scale, scope and audacity of the latest attacks in Mumbai put them in a different category from earlier terrorist incidents, but it would be a mistake to suggest that they were India's 9/11. To do so would miss the underlying issues that have allowed such horrific attacks to take place.
India, in many ways, faces a unique set of challenges in dealing with terrorism. First, it has a structural problem as it is located in one of the world's most dangerous neighborhoods — South Asia — which is now the epicenter of Islamist radicalism. The vast tribal areas in Pakistan, which have never been under the effective control of any Pakistani government since independence, have become a breeding ground for Islamist radicals.
Driven out of Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion and the overthrow of Taliban, the Islamist extremists have found a new haven in the Pakistani tribal belt. From there they are wreaking havoc in Afghanistan and beyond, and their radical Islamist ideology is penetrating far and wide.
India cannot expect to remain immune from such influences. Though the Indian government likes to showcase the fact that very few Indian Muslims have become radicalized, most of the terror attacks in India in the last few years have involved homegrown radicals.
Second, and most significantly, India has a political problem. There is no political consensus across the political spectrum on how best to fight terrorism and extremism. The Bharatiya Janata Party is interested in making terrorism a primarily Muslim issue so as to generate votes from the Hindus. The Congress Party, on the other hand, has not allowed an open discourse on Islamist extremism to take place for fear of offending Muslim sensibilities.
Such vote-bank politics have created an environment in which political and religious polarization has been so complete that an effective action against terrorism becomes impossible to accomplish. India is stuck between the grave incompetence of the present government and the cynical political opportunism of the opposition parties.
The Indian government's "antiterror" stance has repeatedly been shown ineffective. Not only have the terrorists continued to attack India at regular intervals with impunity — not a single major terrorist case has been solved in the past four years. At a time when India needs effective institutional capacity to fight ever-more sophisticated terror networks, Indian police and intelligence services are demoralized to an unprecedented degree.
The blatant communalizing of the process under which the security forces were forced to call off searches and interrogations for fear of offending this or that community has led them to become risk-averse.
Still, India's security forces are making an effort, as shown by the large number of security personnel who die year after year fighting extremists. But the Indian government's inability and/or unwillingness to face up to the security threat and firmly counter it might end up making such sacrifices meaningless.
Today the legitimacy of the Indian state is being questioned not only by groups on the margins of Indian society and polity but also by mainstream political parties. As long as India's response to terrorism is characterized by a shameless appeal along religious lines with political parties trying to consolidate their vote banks instead of coming together to fight the menace, India will continue to be viewed as a soft target by its adversaries and Indians will continue to fight terrorists in their streets.
Evidence suggests that the terrorists who attacked Mumbai received training in Pakistan and were members of Lashkar-e-Taiba, a militant Islamist organization that operates from the tribal areas of Pakistan and has perpetrated a series of attacks on India. The Pakistani government denies this, but the disarray in Pakistan poses challenges for India.
If the Pakistani security establishment was involved in these attacks, then they underline Pakistan's unwillingness to desist from using terror as an instrument of state policy. If however, these attacks happened without the knowledge of Pakistani establishment, then they underline an inability of the Pakistani government to control the groups that it created in the first place.
India can talk tough but what military options it has vis-a-vis Pakistan are unclear. What it can do is strengthen its defenses and strengthen its antiterror laws. But this would require a political leap of faith.
The attacks on Mumbai will be India's 9/11 only if they wake the Indian political establishment from its slumber and help develop a national consensus on how to effectively tackle the menace of terrorism that threatens India.
Harsh V. Pant teaches at King's College London.
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JDN,
Does this mean you've woken up to the threat of the global jihad?
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http://counterterrorismblog.org/2008/12/print/after_mumbai_deciphering_the_h.php
December 4, 2008
After Mumbai: Deciphering the Horizons
By Walid Phares
As the crisis between India and Pakistan is drawing the attention of the international community and the diplomatic efforts of the United States, public opinion has shown an increased interest in the Jihadi agenda in India. In this regard the Counter Terrorism community is focusing on analyzing the long term strategic agenda of the Terror forces involved in the attack. Today's panel discussion in Congress at the invitation of the Counter Terrorism Foundation opened several perspectives in projecting the next stage of the conflict. The minutes of this briefing will be useful to the growing debate about Post Mumbai. Following is a short piece published initially by Fox News.com today, raising some of the issues I discussed at the panel in Congress this morning.
Mumbai’s “bloody week” has ended with shock and awe in India and around the world. Since 9/11, and even before, the jihadists have been leaping from one massacre to another, scarring democracies and civil societies with their violent imprints.
From New York and Washington to Madrid and London; from Beslan and Baghdad to Islamabad and Bali, the seekers of a Taliban-like “Caliphate” continue to adapt their tactics and while staying the course. No civilization or continent has escaped their designs.
But after Mumbai, one has to expect more and worse. Let’s look at what’s on the the horizon:
1) Urban Jihad is Open for Business
My initial assessment of the Mumbai terror attacks leads me to predict that the Mumbai model is now a frame of reference for copycats. These attack can unfortunately happen again, in India, in the region and around the globe. “Urban jihad,” the termed I’ve used in my last three books and in recent op-ed pieces, is a combination of terror activities by Salafists or other adherents of Jihadism aimed at shocking, paralyzing, and seizing part of a city or neighborhood.
The goal of “urban jihad” is to take the battle inside the cities of the enemy, in this case India. But the Beslan school massacre in Russia in September 2004, the terror attacks in Saudi Arabia in November, 2003 the multiple killings in Iraq, Afghanistan and Algeria, as well as the similar scenarios in Israel over several decades, tell us that this form of urban terrorism is now open for business. In the near future I will make more predictions jihadi copycats worldwide.
2) Real Jihadi Claims Beyond Kashmir
Interestingly, the jihadi propaganda machine reacted instantly to the attacks by invoking the issue of Kashmir. So did many in the international media. But the reality is -- using the words of the jihadists -- the goals have mutated and now extend beyond the classical ethnic conflict in Kashmir. The aim is now to establish a Taliban state covering half of India, all of Pakistan and also Afghanistan. It is more the Caliphate then self-determination that the terrorists seek.
3) Trans-Regional Forces Trump Local Forces
As I write, many experts and authorities on terror have been trying to determine if the Mumbai “perpetrators” are the Pakistan-based Laskar e Taiba, the Indian Mujahideen, Taliban inspired factions or simply Al Qaeda. Strategically, we don’t need to wonder too much: all four of these groups are all part of the same web. It’s a web that stretches from Kabul to Mumbai: these are the subcontinent’s jihadists. Decisions are made at a high level with coordination between the big bosses and terrorist actions are carried out by the designated organizations, teams, and cells. The rest is left for our media and commentators to guess and juggle. While it is very useful from an intelligence perspective to determine the chain of command and the entity directly involved in the Mumbai terror attacks, from a global perspective it is important for the public and decision makers from around the world to realize that the three south Asian democracies are all threatened by the same enemy, appearing in different shapes and showing multiple faces.
4) Preempting the Forthcoming Offensive in Afghanistan
Beyond the investigation regarding the Mumbai attackers and their networks, it is equally important for strategic planners inside NATO to read the attacks as a preemptive strike against the forthcoming reinforcement of U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan. It seems to me that the Mumbai attack, and possibly the other attacks that may follow, are actions designed to break down precarious relationships between the three democratic governments in that region and to weaken the efforts promised by President-elect Obama against Al Qaeda and its regional allies in 2009.
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Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies and the author of The Confrontation: Winning the War against Future Jihad
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Geopolitical Diary: Too Little, Too Late for Pakistan?
December 8, 2008
Amid growing pressure from both India and the United States, Pakistani security forces began raiding camps and offices belonging to Islamist militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) in and around Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistani-administered Kashmir, on Sunday. The Pakistanis allegedly detained members of LeT and its front organization, Jamaat-ud-Dawah. Islamabad desperately needs a break from the pressure that has been building since the United States — the only potential restraint on Indian retaliation over the Mumbai attacks — issued sharp warnings about the need for the government to clamp down on Islamist radicals operating within its borders.
Pakistan is trying to demonstrate its commitment to cooperation with India. Yet its attempts to control what happens on Pakistani soil appear increasingly feeble.
India, for one, is unlikely to be satisfied by Sunday’s arrests. There is no reason at the moment to believe that the targeted sites hosted a significant number of militants, or that any of those who were apprehended are of any value in ensuring India’s security. It is even possible that the militants who once operated in these locations got out before the raids, rendering the strikes a purely symbolic action.
India anticipated, and to an extent designed, this outcome. New Delhi’s demands following the Mumbai attacks were that Pakistan hand over some 20 individuals whom Indian intelligence agencies had pinpointed as threats to national security. The Indians knew that the Pakistanis — unwilling to suffer the embarrassment and political cost of handing over such high-value targets under pressure — were unlikely to comply. Pakistan’s refusal to turn over the people on India’s most-wanted list gives India better justification in taking matters into its own hands.
In India, the pressure is building — within the government, the opposition and the public — to take decisive military action, commensurate with the threat non-state actors pose to national security. Potential military strategies available to New Delhi range from air strikes to a naval blockade of Pakistan’s most significant port, Karachi. Notably, Indian military officials have canceled events on their calendars — including a high-profile annual military parade to be held on Republic Day in late January, fueling speculation that the armed forces expect to be preoccupied somehow during that time.
Meanwhile, New Delhi is preparing to embark on a campaign of diplomacy that will last through the coming week, hoping to convince the world that the Mumbai attacks can be traced back to Pakistani nationals who received support from rogue elements within the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency. The Indians will attempt to establish a firm legal basis for retaliatory strikes against Pakistan, while presenting evidence to the U.N. Security Council and the broader international community.
Nevertheless, India would find it extremely difficult to eradicate the Islamists through military action. The more important question is whether New Delhi can force Pakistan to take care of its own militant problem. If Islamabad can be pushed into mowing down militant groups that thrive on Pakistan’s soil and rooting out the rogue elements of the ISI, then India will be safer and total war will have been averted. But this strategy hinges on whether Pakistan has sufficient control of its interior to stop the militant groups.
The United States depends on the stability of the Pakistani state for similar reasons. Pakistan’s chief playing card is its ability to rein in militants on its side of the border and, crucially, to act as a transport route for equipment and materials needed by U.S. and NATO troops for the campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan. If these lines are cut off or disrupted, counterinsurgency operations are affected.
This brings to mind another news item from South Asia. A Taliban force numbering in the hundreds attacked a NATO facility near Peshawar, Pakistan, on Sunday and destroyed nearly 100 trucks, including Humvees, used to transport equipment for the war effort in Afghanistan. This kind of attack has happened before, and security precautions were said to have been taken, but this particular attack was conducted on a larger scale, and more brazenly, than anything seen so far. It was another telling example of how the situation in Pakistan’s northwest regions has spiraled out of Islamabad’s control, jeopardizing its commitments to Washington.
The security strategies of both India and the United States hinge on Islamabad’s ability to snuff out militant groups. The assumption behind recent U.S. and Indian moves is that, if they apply enough pressure, they can coerce Islamabad into braving the domestic political consequences it will face in cracking down on these groups. But this assumption breaks down if the Pakistani government is not capable of controlling its interior. In that case, New Delhi and Washington each have an entirely new set of complications to deal with.
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Next Steps in the Indo-Pakistani Crisis
December 8, 2008
By George Friedman
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
In an interview published this Sunday in The New York Times, we laid out a potential scenario for the current Indo-Pakistani crisis. We began with an Indian strike on Pakistan, precipitating a withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the Afghan border, resulting in intensified Taliban activity along the border and a deterioration in the U.S. position in Afghanistan, all culminating in an emboldened Iran. The scenario is not unlikely, assuming India chooses to strike.
Our argument that India is likely to strike focused, among other points, on the weakness of the current Indian government and how it is likely to fall under pressure from the opposition and the public if it does not act decisively. An unnamed Turkish diplomat involved in trying to mediate the dispute has argued that saving a government is not a good reason to go to war. That is a good argument, except that in this case, not saving the government is unlikely to prevent a war, either.
If India’s Congress party government were to fall, its replacement would be even more likely to strike at Pakistan. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), Congress’ Hindu nationalist rival, has long charged that Congress is insufficiently aggressive in combating terrorism. The BJP will argue that the Mumbai attack in part resulted from this failing. Therefore, if the Congress government does not strike, and is subsequently forced out or loses India’s upcoming elections, the new government is even more likely to strike.
It is therefore difficult to see a path that avoids Indian retaliation, and thus the emergence of at least a variation on the scenario we laid out. But the problem is not simply political: India must also do something to prevent more Mumbais. This is an issue of Indian national security, and the pressure on India’s government to do something comes from several directions.
Three Indian Views of Pakistan
The question is what an Indian strike against Pakistan, beyond placating domestic public opinion, would achieve. There are three views on this in India.
The first view holds that Pakistani officials aid and abet terrorism — in particular the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI), which serves as Pakistan’s main intelligence service. In this view, the terrorist attacks are the work of Pakistani government officials — perhaps not all of the government, but enough officials of sufficient power that the rest of the government cannot block them, and therefore the entire Pakistani government can be held accountable.
The second view holds that terrorist attacks are being carried out by Kashmiri groups that have long been fostered by the ISI but have grown increasingly autonomous since 2002 — and that the Pakistani government has deliberately failed to suppress anti-Indian operations by these groups. In this view, the ISI and related groups are either aware of these activities or willfully ignorant of them, even if ISI is not in direct control. Under this thinking, the ISI and the Pakistanis are responsible by omission, if not by commission.
The third view holds that the Pakistani government is so fragmented and weak that it has essentially lost control of Pakistan to the extent that it cannot suppress these anti-Indian groups. This view says that the army has lost control of the situation to the point where many from within the military-intelligence establishment are running rogue operations, and groups in various parts of the country simply do what they want. If this argument is pushed to its logical conclusion, Pakistan should be regarded as a state on the verge of failure, and an attack by India might precipitate further weakening, freeing radical Islamist groups from what little control there is.
The first two analyses are essentially the same. They posit that Pakistan could stop attacks on India, but chooses not to. The third is the tricky one. It rests on the premise that the Pakistani government (and in this we include the Pakistani army) is placing some restraint on the attackers. Thus, the government’s collapse would make enough difference that India should restrain itself, especially as any Indian attack would so destabilize Pakistan that it would unleash our scenario and worse. In this view, Pakistan’s civilian government has only as much power in these matters as the army is willing to allow.
The argument against attacking Pakistan therefore rests on a very thin layer of analysis. It requires the belief that Pakistan is not responsible for the attacks, that it is nonetheless restraining radical Islamists to some degree, and that an Indian attack would cause even these modest restraints to disappear. Further, it assumes that these restraints, while modest, are substantial enough to make a difference.
There is a debate in India, and in Washington, as to whether this is the case. This is why New Delhi has demanded that Pakistan turn over 20 individuals wanted by India in connection with attacks. The list doesn’t merely include Islamists, but also Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul, the former head of the ISI who has long been suspected of close ties with Islamists. (The United States apparently added Gul to the list.) Turning those individuals over would be enormously difficult politically for Pakistan. It would create a direct confrontation between Pakistan’s government and the Pakistani Islamist movement, likely sparking violence in Pakistan. Indeed, turning any Pakistani over to India, regardless of ideology, would create a massive crisis in Pakistan.
The Indian government chose to make this demand precisely because complying with it is enormously difficult for Pakistan. New Delhi is not so much demanding the 20 individuals, but rather that Pakistan take steps that will create conflict in Pakistan. If the Pakistani government is in control of the country, it should be able to weather the storm. If it can’t weather the storm, then the government is not in control of Pakistan. And if it could weather the storm but chooses not to incur the costs, then India can reasonably claim that Pakistan is prepared to export terrorism rather than endure it at home. In either event, the demand reveals things about the Pakistani reality.
The View from Islamabad
Pakistan’s evaluation, of course, is different. Islamabad does not regard itself as failed because it cannot control all radical Islamists or the Taliban. The official explanation is that the Pakistanis are doing the best they can. From the Pakistani point of view, while the Islamists ultimately might represent a threat, the threat to Pakistan and its government that would arise from a direct assault on the Islamists is a great danger not only to Pakistan, but also to the region. It is thus better for all to let the matter rest. The Islamist issue aside, Pakistan sees itself as continuing to govern the country effectively, albeit with substantial social and economic problems (as one might expect). The costs of confronting the Islamists, relative to the benefits, are therefore high.
The Pakistanis see themselves as having several effective counters against an Indian attack. The most important of these is the United States. The very first thing Islamabad said after the Mumbai attack was that a buildup of Indian forces along the Pakistani border would force Pakistan to withdraw 100,000 troops from its Afghan border. Events over the weekend, such as the attack on a NATO convoy, showed the vulnerability of NATO’s supply line across Pakistan to Afghanistan.
The Americans are fighting a difficult holding action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The United States needs the militant base camps in Pakistan and the militants’ lines of supply cut off, but the Americans lack the force to do this themselves. A withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Afghan border would pose a direct threat to American forces. Therefore, the Pakistanis expect Washington to intervene on their behalf to prevent an Indian attack. They do not believe a major Indian troop buildup will take place, and if it does, the Pakistanis do not think it will lead to substantial conflict.
There has been some talk of an Indian naval blockade against Pakistan, blocking the approaches to Pakistan’s main port of Karachi. This is an attractive strategy for India, as it plays to New Delhi’s relative naval strength. Again, the Pakistanis do not believe the Indians will do this, given that it would cut off the flow of supplies to American troops in Afghanistan. (Karachi is the main port serving U.S. forces in Afghanistan.) The line of supply in Afghanistan runs through Pakistan, and the Americans, the Pakistanis calculate, do not want anything to threaten that.
From the Pakistani point of view, the only potential military action India could take that would not meet U.S. opposition would be airstrikes. There has been talk that the Indians might launch airstrikes against Islamist training camps and bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. In Pakistan’s view, this is not a serious problem. Mounting airstrikes against training camps is harder than it might seem. The only way to achieve anything in such a facility is with area destruction weapons — for instance, using B-52s to drop ordnance over very large areas. The targets are not amenable to strike aircraft, because the payload of such aircraft is too small. It would be tough for the Indians, who don’t have strategic bombers, to hit very much. Numerous camps exist, and the Islamists can afford to lose some. As an attack, it would be more symbolic than effective.
Moreover, if the Indians did kill large numbers of radical Islamists, this would hardly pose a problem to the Pakistani government. It might even solve some of Islamabad’s problems, depending on which analysis you accept. Airstrikes would generate massive support among Pakistanis for their government so long as Islamabad remained defiant of India. Pakistan thus might even welcome Indian airstrikes against Islamist training camps.
Islamabad also views the crisis with India with an eye to the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. Any attack by India that might destabilize the Pakistani government opens at least the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear strike or, in the event of state disintegration, of Pakistani nuclear weapons falling into the hands of factional elements. If India presses too hard, New Delhi faces the unknown of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal — unless, of course, the Indians are preparing a pre-emptive nuclear attack on Pakistan, something the Pakistanis find unlikely.
All of this, of course, depends upon two unknowns. First, what is the current status of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Is it sufficiently reliable for Pakistan to count on? Second, to what extent do the Americans monitor Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities? Ever since the crisis of 2002, when American fears that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into al Qaeda’s hands were high, we have assumed that American calm about Pakistan’s nuclear facilities was based on Washington’s having achieved a level of transparency on their status. This might limit Pakistan’s freedom of action with regard to — and hence ability to rely on — its nuclear arsenal.
Notably, much of Pakistan’s analysis of the situation rests on a core assumption — namely, that the United States will choose to limit Indian options, and just as important, that the Indians would listen to Washington. India does not have the same relationship or dependence on the United States as, for example, Israel does. India historically was allied with the Soviet Union; New Delhi moved into a strategic relationship with the United States only in recent years. There is a commonality of interest between India and the United States, but not a dependency. India would not necessarily be blocked from action simply because the Americans didn’t want it to act.
As for the Americans, Pakistan’s assumption that the United States would want to limit India is unclear. Islamabad’s threat to shift 100,000 troops from the Afghan border will not easily be carried out. Pakistan’s logistical capabilities are limited. Moreover, the American objection to Pakistan’s position is that the vast majority of these troops are not engaged in controlling the border anyway, but are actually carefully staying out of the battle. Given that the Americans feel that the Pakistanis are ineffective in controlling the Afghan-Pakistani border, the shift from virtually to utterly ineffective might not constitute a serious deterioration from the United States’ point of view. Indeed, it might open the door for more aggressive operations on — and over — the Afghan-Pakistani border by American forces, perhaps by troops rapidly transferred from Iraq.
The situation of the port of Karachi is more serious, both in the ground and naval scenarios. The United States needs Karachi; it is not in a position to seize the port and the road system out of Karachi. That is a new war the United States can’t fight. At the same time, the United States has been shifting some of its logistical dependency from Pakistan to Central Asia. But this requires a degree of Russian support, which would cost Washington dearly and take time to activate. In short, India’s closing the port of Karachi by blockade, or Pakistan’s doing so as retaliation for Indian action, would hurt the United States badly.
Supply lines aside, Islamabad should not assume that the United States is eager to ensure that the Pakistani state survives. Pakistan also should not assume that the United States is impressed by the absence or presence of Pakistani troops on the Afghan border. Washington has developed severe doubts about Pakistan’s commitment and effectiveness in the Afghan-Pakistani border region, and therefore about Pakistan’s value as an ally.
Pakistan’s strongest card with the United States is the threat to block the port of Karachi. But here, too, there is a counter to Pakistan: If Pakistan closes Karachi to American shipping, either the Indian or American navy also could close it to Pakistani shipping. Karachi is Pakistan’s main export facility, and Pakistan is heavily dependent on it. If Karachi were blocked, particularly while Pakistan is undergoing a massive financial crisis, Pakistan would face disaster. Karachi is thus a double-edged sword. As long as Pakistan keeps it open to the Americans, India probably won’t block it. But should Pakistan ever close the port in response to U.S. action in the Afghan-Pakistani borderland, then Pakistan should not assume that the port will be available for its own use.
India’s Military Challenge
India faces difficulties in all of its military options. Attacks on training camps sound more effective than they are. Concentrating troops on the border is impressive only if India is prepared for a massive land war, and a naval blockade has multiple complications.
India needs a military option that demonstrates will and capability and decisively hurts the Pakistani government, all without drawing India into a nuclear exchange or costly ground war. And its response must rise above the symbolic.
We have no idea what India is thinking, but one obvious option is airstrikes directed not against training camps, but against key government installations in Islamabad. The Indian air force increasingly has been regarded as professional and capable by American pilots at Red Flag exercises in Nevada. India has modern Russian fighter jets and probably has the capability, with some losses, to penetrate deep into Pakistani territory.
India also has acquired radar and electronic warfare equipment from Israel and might have obtained some early precision-guided munitions from Russia and/or Israel. While this capability is nascent, untested and very limited, it is nonetheless likely to exist in some form.
The Indians might opt for a drawn-out diplomatic process under the theory that all military action is either ineffective or excessively risky. If it chooses the military route, New Delhi could opt for a buildup of ground troops and some limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground attacks. It also could choose airstrikes against training facilities. Each of these military options would achieve the goal of some substantial action, but none would threaten fundamental Pakistani interests. The naval blockade has complexities that could not be managed. That leaves, as a possible scenario, a significant escalation by India against targets in Pakistan’s capital.
The Indians have made it clear that the ISI is their enemy. The ISI has a building, and buildings can be destroyed, along with files and personnel. Such an aerial attack also would serve to shock the Pakistanis by representing a serious escalation. And Pakistan might find retaliation difficult, given the relative strength of its air force. India has few good choices for retaliation, and while this option is not a likely one, it is undoubtedly one that has to be considered.
It seems to us that India can avoid attacks on Pakistan only if Islamabad makes political concessions that it would find difficult to make. The cost to Pakistan of these concessions might well be greater than the benefit of avoiding conflict with India. All of India’s options are either ineffective or dangerous, but inactivity is politically and strategically the least satisfactory route for New Delhi. This circumstance is the most dangerous aspect of the current situation. In our opinion, the relative quiet at present should not be confused with the final outcome, unless Pakistan makes surprising concessions
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Great read.
What a chess match in the middle east. :|
Do not fear however, all we need are a couple of genius arguments. Bo will fix it. :wink:
Sorry SB, I couldn't resist.
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http://www.israpundit.com/2008/?p=6333#more-6333
Muslims, though small in number begin to protest terrorism
Indian Muslims, including seminary students, above, marched Sunday through the heart of Mumbai to condemn a terrorist siege on the city that ended on Nov. 29.
By ROBERT F. WORTH, NYT
MUMBAI, India — Throngs of Indian Muslims, ranging from Bollywood actors to skullcap-wearing seminary students, marched through the heart of Mumbai and several other cities on Sunday, holding up banners proclaiming their condemnation of terrorism and loyalty to the Indian state.
Muslims took part in a candlelight march last week toward the Oberoi hotel in Mumbai.
The protests, though relatively small, were the latest in a series of striking public gestures by Muslims — who have often come under suspicion after past attacks — to defensively dissociate their own grievances as a minority here from any sort of sympathy for terrorism or radical politics in the wake of the deadly assault here that ended Nov. 29.
Muslim leaders have refused to allow the bodies of the nine militants killed in the attacks to be buried in Islamic cemeteries, saying the men were not true Muslims. They also suspended the annual Dec. 6 commemoration of a 1992 riot in which Hindus destroyed a mosque, in an effort to avert communal tension. Muslim religious scholars and public figures have issued strongly worded condemnations of the attacks.
So far, their approach appears to have worked: the response has been remarkably unified, with little of the suspicion and fear that followed some previous attacks.
Hindu right-wing groups have been noticeably absent from the streets.
Although leaders of the opposition Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party have criticized the government’s handling of the crisis, they have not stirred anti-Muslim sentiment. The fact that some 40 Muslims were among the victims of the attackers may well have helped dispel any strife.
Still, many Muslims seem anxious, fearing that some of the anger unleashed by the attacks may be directed into the Hindu-Muslim violence that has often marred India’s modern history.
“It’s a pity we have to prove ourselves as Indians,” said Mohammed Siddique, a young accountant who was marching in the protest here on Sunday afternoon with his wife and mother. “But the fact is, we need to speak louder than others, to make clear that those people do not speak for our religion — and that we are not Pakistanis.”
The cluster of banners all around him, held aloft by marchers, seemed to bear out his point. Some read “Our Country’s Enemies are Our Enemies,” others, “Killers of Innocents are Enemies of Islam.” A few declared, in uncertain grammar, “Pakistan Be Declared Terrorist State.”
There were also slogans defending against the charge often made by right-wing Hindus that Muslims constitute a fifth column, easily exploited by terrorists. “Communalist and Terrorist are Cousins,” one sign read. Some of the marchers held up a sign with lines drawn through the names of various terrorist or extremist groups, including, notably, the acronym S.I.M.I.
That stands for the Students’ Islamic Movement of India, a radical group, now banned, that has come under suspicion after recent attacks. One of the men arrested earlier this year in what appears to have been a similar plot against Mumbai landmarks used to belong to the group. Unlike the most recent attackers, who are all believed to be Pakistani, four of six members of the earlier plot were Indian.
There is little doubt that jihadists — including Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistani militant group believed to be responsible for the Nov. 26-29 attacks — are seeking Indian recruits. Although such groups are rooted in the ideology of global jihad, many people fear that the Indians who join them may be motivated in part by essentially Indian grievances, like the 2002 mass killings of Muslims in the state of Gujarat that left 1,100 dead.
One of the gunmen in last month’s attacks referred to the Gujarat riots before he shot and killed a hostage at the Taj Mahal Palace & Tower hotel, apparently in an effort to identify his own cause with that of Indian Muslims.
He seems to have failed. The brutality of the attacks and the fact that many Muslims died have strengthened a sense of outrage among ordinary Muslims here, and even some sense of communal harmony, however precarious.
“After this attack, everything has changed; people now see the realities,” said Saeed Ahmed, 45, as he stood outside his stationery shop on Muhammad Ali Road, a working-class Muslim area. “This is something different from what we had before, it’s like your American 9/11. It is not about Hindus and Muslims; it is about the nation being attacked.”
Certainly, the violence has prompted many Muslims, including religious scholars, Bollywood figures and politicians, to speak out more urgently than they had in the past.
“Indian Muslims have often suffered twice: first from the terror, and then from the accusations afterward,” said Javed Akhtar, a Muslim poet and lyricist. “Perhaps because of that, they have been much more articulate and more unconditionally clear about condemning this attack.”
But many remain anxious that foreign jihadists could take advantage of the divisions in Indian society to wreak more havoc here. India’s 140 million Muslims are generally much poorer and less educated than Hindus. Although some of the very rich and many Bollywood stars are Muslim, the faith is far less well represented in the professions and the middle class. Many have bitter memories of communal riots and violence, from the 2002 killings in Gujarat all the way back to the bloodletting that accompanied the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.
“There is a very deep divide,” said Mahesh Bhatt, a well-known film producer and director who is half Muslim, half Hindu, as he sat on a plastic chair on the set of his latest film on Sunday morning, with actors strolling nearby.
“And if the foreign element is using the indigenous clay, how can justice be done?”
Mr. Bhatt, who has the baroque manner of an old-fashioned Hollywood eminence, added that he saw in the crisis a chance for India to heal the religious and social fractures that make it vulnerable.
“In every danger there is an opportunity, a chance to look at the evil within,” he said. “If you’re going to do this fight against terror, you’d better start by fortifying your own house.”
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When the majority of the Muslim world decides that the struggle is between civilization and barbarism instead of between the West and Islam, then the war can be won.
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**I expect the jewish females hostages suffered very deliberately sadistic sexual assaults, including the use of foreign objects, as is standard jihadi procedure for the treatment of hostages.**
http://littlegreenfootballs.com/link/120684_Terrorists_sexually_Humiliated_guests_before_killing_them
Once again, proven correct.
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This from orbat.com....is setting the indian defense forums in a
frenzy...dont know if it is fact or fantasy...but the writer is a
"respected" forum moderator...Yash
*India offers US 120,000 troops for Afghanistan*
We asked Mandeep "are we being used by the Indians in a psyops game to put
pressure on Pakistan?" Not that the Government of India knows we exist, but
in all the movies about the media the Editor always asks if the paper is
being played.
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Mandeep's answer, paraphrased, was this: "I don't know at what level the
offer has been made, but the Indian Army and Air Force are down to
identifying specific units, formations, and squadrons..." - details, as we
said, at Long War Journal - "...as well as discussing a specific name for
force commander, plus working on the details of pre-deployment training, so
this is a lot more elaborate than needed for a psyops game.'
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We'd prefer to discuss this after we learn more, rather than waste your
time with elaborate theories spun out of nothing ("Orbat.com's military
sources say..."). But the following points are immediately apparent.
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For the new US administration, this offer would be heaven-sent and just
making it would put the US Government in debt to the Indians - "your other
friends/allies talked, we walked." The administration could turn around to
to its own people, and say: "Americans, you complain we are carrying the
Afghan burden by ourselves, now we have a partner."
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At Orbat.com we've been constantly talking about the need for more
manpower; well, here you have a whacking big increment of manpower. With
US/Allied troops it takes one to 75% of what Orbat.com considers a minimum
force if Afghanistan is to be won.
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In one deft swoop, India forces the Americans to chose Delhi over
Islamabad. To the Indians the constant US attempt to "balance" the two
countries has been a source of serious blood pressure since the 1940s;
obviously if the Americans accept it has to be India First from now on and
Pakistan gets marginalized. Moreover, the Indians put America up the creek
without the paddle regarding Pakistan: "what is it your so-called ally is
doing, compared to what we are willing to do."
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The devious cunning of the Indian move becomes more apparent when you
consider if the US government refuses, the American people are going to get
on the Government's case: "The Indians are offering and you're still
sticking with those slimey two-timers the Pakistanis?"
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For India, offering a huge contingent takes the pressure off the Indian
government to act aggressively against Pakistan. India does not have a
launch a single sortie against Pakistan to punish it for acting against
India. Indian government can tell its own people: "What good will a pinprick
do? The Israelis have been bashing up the Palestinians for two decades, and
where are the results? What we are doing is to strike a hard blow at
Pakistan without crossing the Pakistan border and getting beat up by
everyone for provoking war."
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Plus India neatly destroys Pakistan's strategic depth objective. The
Indians have been wanting to get into the act in Afghanistan for several
years, because they know a Taliban government means more fundamentalist
pressure on Pakistan and thereby on India. But the Americans have been
refusing India help for fear of offending the Pakistanis. For India to get
into Afghanistan in force is to again change the paradigm of
Indian-Pakistani relations as happened in 1971 when India split East Bengal
from Pakistan. For the last almost 40 years India's efforts to marginalize
Pakistan have been stymied. If the US accepts the Indian offer, India gains
hugely.
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But right now a lot of American decision-makers do not care if Pakistan
is offended because they see the latter has no interest in fighting the
insurgents or helping the US against the Taliban. Once alternate supply
routes are available, US can write off Pakistan and as a consequence,
paradoxically, vastly increase its leverage in that country.
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As for Pakistani/jihadi retaliation against India or the Indian
contingent in Afghanistan, we've said before the Indians don't care. Their
point is India is squarely in the sights of the jihadis: India is already
under severe, sustained attack and unable to retaliate. As for the security
of the Indian troops, that really is the last thing the Indians are
concerned about. They want to go to Afghanistan to fight, not to protect
their troops against suicide bombers.
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Two other minor points in passing. By making this offer, India takes the
wind out of Pakistan's sails because the latter has very successful turned
the world's attention from the Bombay atrocity to getting the world to stop
escalation between India and Pakistan. Every day that goes by, India has
less diplomatic/geopolitical freedom to hit Pakistan. But if India has
offered several divisions for Afghanistan, obviously the last thing the
Indians are thinking of is attacking Pakistan - 3/4th of the Army troops (as
opposed to the CI troops) India is earmarking for Afghanistan are from the
three strike corps. So India undercuts Pakistani claims that Delhi is
preparing to attack.
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The second point we find interesting. PRC knows if Pakistan falls to the
jihadis, Sinkiang is the next target. By offering to go to Afghanistan,
India is directly helping Beijing. Which puts Beijing in a very awkward spot
as India is a big rival for influence in Asia. Not only will Indians be
helping PRC, if China does send troops to Afghanistan, Delhi will canoodle
with Washington without competition from China. The Chinese will have no
choice but to join the Afghan venture or lose influence in South and Central
Asia, and with Washington.
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To sum up: Orbat.com has been second to none in bashing the Government of
India as incompetent and impotent. But with this offer, India has overnight
changed the rules of game in South/Central Asia and struck a potentially
fatal blow at Pakistan. In the end, this could become much, much bigger by
an order of magnitude than breaking off East Pakistan in 1971.
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The preceding makes sense in the context of the following:
Geopolitical Diary: Pakistan's Nuclear Option
December 30, 2008 | 0255 GMT
It has now been more than a month since the Mumbai attacks unfolded, and India has not responded militarily in Pakistan. Some war preparations have been made and New Delhi has by no means taken the military operation off the table, but the crisis, for now, is at a lull. In an unscheduled conversation recently with his Indian counterpart, Director-General of Military Operations Lt. Gen. A. S. Sekhon, over the crisis hotline between their capitals, Pakistan’s Maj. Gen. Javed Iqbal very well might have given an overt reminder of Islamabad’s longstanding nuclear first-use policy. It is possible that India took a step back to re-evaluate its options and the consequences of direct military intervention in Pakistan.
Two nuclear-armed foes adhering to a no-first-use policy are unlikely to have a nuclear exchange. In first-use, one or both adversaries deliberately hold their nuclear weapons out as a deterrent to various forms of aggression, or as leverage when the conventional dynamics are unfavorable to them. Like NATO in Europe during the Cold War, Pakistan is simply incapable of quantitatively matching Indian demographics and conventional military forces (challenges only compounded by Islamabad’s qualitative and technological disadvantages in relation to India). Nuclear weapons are Pakistan’s ace in the hole. Consequently, Islamabad maintains an overt first-use policy, just as the United States and NATO never ruled out first-use.
Despite this, there are some very real differences between the Cold War dynamic and the current situation between India and Pakistan that are useful to highlight in assessing the likelihood of escalation:
Distance: The Americans and the Soviets were, for all intents and purposes, several thousand miles apart, despite the proximity of Alaska to Russia’s Far East. The inability to deliver meaningful conventional strikes at that distance until the waning days of the Cold War meant that any direct confrontation likely would be nuclear or result in a massive land war in Europe. In comparison, Islamabad and New Delhi are less than 500 miles apart. Dense populations, saddle both sides of the border, and the Pakistani demographic, agricultural and industrial heartland lies directly across a border from India — with no real geographic barriers to invasion. This increases the likelihood of conventional warfare and, therefore, the potential for escalation toward the nuclear realm.
Global scale: With interests around the globe, it was easy enough for the Soviet Union and the United States to challenge each other indirectly through proxies and peripheral wars, from Korea to Vietnam and Afghanistan. In the case of Pakistan and India, the historical alternatives to a massive confrontation along the Punjab border have been fighting in the mountains and on the glaciers of Kashmir, blockades of Pakistani ports, and the use of militant proxies. With military competition so close to home, the use of ballistic missiles and strike aircraft in conventional roles inevitably raises the specter of their use in the nuclear role — and when the stakes are that high, one does not have the luxury of sitting back and waiting for clarification of intent once a missile makes impact. With any launch, one must assume the worst.
Mutually assured destruction: Though Pakistan’s small, crude and low-yield arsenal could indeed be devastating, it does not threaten India with total destruction. With its own delivery systems capable of reaching every corner of Pakistan, New Delhi enjoys immense strategic depth that Islamabad cannot match with any current systems. India’s arsenal is more mature and more robust than Pakistan’s. Thus, Islamabad’s first-use policy is actually defensive in nature; it is a deterrent against Indian aggression that, in the end, Pakistan knows it could not defeat.
But first-use is also a policy of which not only the Indian military, but Indian society at large, is well aware. Delivering an explicit reminder of this issue, during a tense conversation in the midst of a crisis, would be a deliberate choice by Pakistan.
The advantage of being a nuclear power is the ability to draw a line in the sand when the going gets tough. It is hardly a guaranteed defense, but certainly will give one’s adversary pause. Ultimately, it did not deter the Chinese from moving forces into North Korea in 1950 or the Syrians and Egyptians from invading Israel in 1973 (which, at that point, was known to have nuclear weapons). In fact, it didn’t deter Pakistan from conducting a bold military operation in the 1999 Kargil war, nor did it keep India and Pakistan from coming to a near-nuclear confrontation in 2002 after an attack on the Indian parliament. And ultimately, it might not deter India now. Islamabad is probably not willing to escalate to nuclear war over a few Indian air strikes, when the price for escalation would be an inevitable and devastating nuclear reprisal from New Delhi. India can be fairly confident of this fact.
The question, now that Pakistan appears to have drawn a very clear line in the sand, is how India will respond. How will the world community move to de-escalate a crisis that no one —- not India, not Pakistan, nor anyone else —- is interested in seeing deteriorate into a nuclear exchange (however unlikely this remains in practice)?
There is a problem with a weaker nuclear power playing this card when neither its chief foe nor the world’s sole superpower has any interest in escalating nuclear tensions: The threat itself might go too far. While it could succeed in getting India to take a step back and re-evaluate, it also could drive the Indians and Americans to consider a bilateral strategic deal. Moreover, it leaves India -— and the United States —- to contemplate just how hard it might be to take the Pakistani deterrent out of the equation.
And removing a nuclear power’s nuclear power is a profoundly dangerous proposition in and of itself.
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Part 2: A Crisis in Indian-Pakistani Relations
December 18, 2008 | 1243 GMT
Summary
Islamabad has long tried to play a double game with Washington by offering piecemeal cooperation in battling jihadists while retaining its jihadist card. But this is becoming an increasingly difficult balancing act for Pakistan as the United States, and now India, after the November Mumbai attacks, lose any tolerance they once had for Pakistan’s Islamist militant franchise. Long the guarantor of state stability, the Pakistani military is now suffering from civil-military infighting, rogue intelligence operatives, a jihadist insurgency of its own and distinct disadvantages vis-à-vis its South Asian rival.
Analysis
Related Special Topic Pages
Countries In Crisis
Militant Attacks In Mumbai and Their Consequences
Related Links
Part 1: The Perils of Using Islamism to Protect the Core
The Geopolitics of India: A Shifting, Self-Contained World
Editor’s Note: This is the second part of a series on Pakistan.
The Nov. 26 attacks in Mumbai, India, that killed 163 people were carried out by a group of well-trained, die-hard militants who wanted to create a geopolitical crisis between India and Pakistan. The identities of the attackers reveal a strong link to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), a Kashmiri Islamist militant group whose roots lie in Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency, but whose weakened ties to the Pakistani state have drawn it closer to Pakistan’s thriving al Qaeda network.
While India has been quick to assign blame to Pakistan for past attacks carried out by Kashmiri Islamist militant groups, it now faces a quandary: The same groups that were under the ISI’s command and control several years earlier have increased their autonomy and spread their networks inside India. More importantly, Pakistan has more or less admitted that its military-intelligence establishment has lost control of many of these groups, leaving India and the United States to dwell over the frightening thought that rogue operations are being conducted by elements of the Pakistani security apparatus that no longer answer to the state.
The link between the Mumbai attackers and the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment might be murky, but that murkiness alone does not preclude the possibility of Indian military action against Pakistan. Washington, given its own interests in holding the Pakistani state together while it tries to conduct counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, is attempting to restrain New Delhi. But just as in the wake of the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament, India is not likely to be satisfied with the banning of a couple of militant groups and a few insincere house arrests. The diplomatic posturing continues, but the threat of war is palpable.
The India-Pakistan Rivalry
The very real possibility that India and Pakistan could soon engage in what would be their fifth war after nearly five years of peace talks is a testament to the endurance of their 60-year rivalry. The seeds of animosity were sown during the bloody 1948 partition, in which Pakistan and India split from each other along a Hindu/Muslim divide. The sorest point of contention in this subcontinental divorce centered around the Muslim-majority region of Kashmir, whose princely Hindu ruler at the time of the partition decided to join India, leading the countries to war a little more than two months after their independence. That war ended with India retaining two-thirds of Kashmir and Pakistan gaining one-third of the Himalayan territory, with the two sides separated by a Line of Control (LoC). The two rivals fought two more full-scale wars, one in 1965 in Kashmir, and another in 1971 that culminated in the secession of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh.)
Shortly after India fought an indecisive war with China in 1962, the Indian government embarked on a nuclear mission, conducting its first test in 1974. By then playing catch-up, the Pakistanis launched their own nuclear program soon after the 1971 war. The result was a full-blown nuclear arms race, with the South Asian rivals devoting a great deal of resources to developing and testing short-range and intermediate missiles. In 1998, Pakistan and India conducted a series of nuclear tests that earned international condemnation and officially nuclearized the subcontinent.
(click image to enlarge)
Once the nuclear issue was added to the equation, Pakistan became bolder in its use of Islamist militant proxies to keep India locked down. Such groups became Pakistan’s primary tool in its military confrontation, as the presence of nuclear weapons, from Pakistan’s point of view, significantly decreased the possibility of full-scale conventional war. Pakistan’s ISI also had a hand in a Sikh rebel movement in India in the 1980s, and it continues to use Bangladesh as a launchpad for backing a number of separatist movements in India’s restive northeast. In return, India would back Baluchi rebels in Pakistan’s western Baluchistan province and extend covert support to the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s.
Indian movements in Afghanistan, a country Pakistan considers a key buffer state for extending its strategic depth and guarding against invasions from the west, will always keep Islamabad on edge. When Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan was trapped in an Indian-Soviet vise, making it all the more imperative for the ISI’s support of the Afghan mujahideen to succeed in driving the Soviets back east.
Pakistan spent most of the 1990s trying to consolidate its influence in Kabul to protect its western frontier. By 2001, however, Pakistan once again started to feel the walls closing in. The 9/11 attacks, followed shortly thereafter by a Kashmiri Islamist militant attack on the Indian parliament, brought the United States and India into a tacit alliance against Pakistan. Both wanted the same thing — an end to Islamist militancy — and this time there was no Cold War paradigm to prevent New Delhi and Washington from having a broader, more strategic relationship.
This was Pakistan’s worst nightmare. The military knew Washington’s post-9/11 alliance with Islamabad was short-term and tactical in nature in order to facilitate the U.S. war in Afghanistan. They also knew that the United States was seeking a long-term strategic alliance with the Indians to sustain pressure on Pakistan, hedge against Russia and China and protect supply lines running from the oil-rich Persian Gulf. In essence, the United States felt temporarily trapped in a short-term relationship with Pakistan while in the long-run, for myriad strategic reasons, it desired an alliance with India. Pakistan has attempted to play a double game with Washington by offering piecemeal cooperation in battling the jihadists while retaining its jihadist card. But this is becoming an increasingly difficult balancing act for Pakistan, as India and the United States lose their tolerance for Pakistan’s Islamist militant franchise and the state’s loss of control over that franchise.
The Military Imbalance
Pakistan’s hope is that, given its fragile state, Washington will restrain India from engaging in military action against Pakistan that would destabilize the Indo-Pakistani border and further complicate U.S./NATO operations on Pakistan’s western frontier. But Islamabad cannot afford to become overconfident. India has a need to react to the Mumbai attacks, for political as well as national security reasons. If Pakistan is incapable or unwilling to give in to Indian demands, New Delhi will act according to its own interests, despite a U.S. appeal for restraint.
Related Links
Pakistan: Assessing Military Options
Afghanistan, Pakistan: The Battlespace of the Border
The natural geographic area for Pakistan and India to come to blows in a full-scale war is in the saddle of land across the northern Indian plain, between the Indus and Ganges river basins, where Pakistan would be able to concentrate its forces. But military action against Pakistan after the Mumbai attacks is far more likely to be limited to Pakistani-occupied Kashmir, involving some combination of airstrikes, limited artillery exchanges and tactical ground operations.
To some extent, Indian military action against Pakistan serves Islamabad’s interest in rallying a deeply wounded and divided Pakistani population around the government. Nevertheless, an Indian attack also would expose Pakistan’s profound military disadvantages vis-à-vis its South Asian rival.
Geographically speaking, India’s vast territory offers considerable strategic depth from which to conduct a war, and its large population allows it to field an army that far outnumbers that of Pakistan. Though the lack of terrain barriers along the Indian-Pakistani border is an issue for both sides, Pakistan’s core in the Punjab-Sindh heartland of the Indus River Valley deprives Islamabad of the strategic depth that India enjoys. This is why Pakistan concentrates six of its nine corps formations in Punjab, including both of its offensive “strike” corps.
Compounding its underlying geographic weaknesses are the qualitative challenges Pakistan faces in its military competition with India. Pakistan’s game of catch-up in the nuclear arms race is ongoing, and the gap is enormous. Its warhead design is still limited by rudimentary test data, while India is thought to have attempted tests of more advanced designs in 1998. And with a recent U.S. civilian nuclear deal, India can now secure a foreign supply of nuclear fuel for civilian use, thereby expanding the portion of domestic uranium resources and enrichment capability available for military purposes.
Indian delivery systems are also more advanced. Pakistan has cooperated closely with China and North Korea in nuclear weapon design and delivery system development, but India’s missile program is far more advanced than Pakistan’s. With two domestic satellite launch vehicles already in service, India’s knowledge of rocketry is far ahead of Pakistan’s, which relies largely on expanding Scud technology. And though both countries are also working on cruise missiles, India has already fielded the supersonic BrahMos cruise missile, developed in cooperation with Russia (though it is not clear whether India’s nuclear warheads are compact enough to fit into one).
(Click to enlarge map)
With mobile land-based ballistic missiles and limited quantities of delivery systems on either side, India and Pakistan are each thought to have the capacity for a second, or retaliatory, strike. This, along with fairly dense populations on both sides of the border, makes nuclear conflict especially unattractive (in addition to the obvious detractions). Still, nuclear weapons capability is yet another area where Pakistan’s disadvantage is real and significant, further absorbing Islamabad’s resources and military capability.
India’s recent military cooperation with Russia has stretched the qualitative lead even further. Specifically:
India has fielded the most modern Russian main battle tank, the T-90, and has even begun to build the tanks under license. While Pakistan fields a significant number of older but still reasonably modern and capable Russian T-80s, it is qualitatively outmatched in terms of tanks.
India’s armored formations also include more heavily armed armored fighting vehicles than those of Pakistan. (However, Pakistan fields a large number of U.S. BGM-71 TOW anti-tank missiles, including TOW systems aboard AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters, which give it an anti-armor capability that cannot be ignored.) The Indian formations are provided additional support by heavier and newer rocket artillery, including the Russian heavy 300 mm BM-30 “Smerch” system.
The Indian air force has begun to field the Russian Su-30MKI “Flanker,” one of the most modern jet fighters in the world, and has more on the way. In international exercises with the United States in Nevada known as “Red Flag,” India’s Su-30s and their pilots have been regarded as increasingly professional and capable over the years. Pakistan, meanwhile, has struggled to secure more modern F-16s from the United States in return for its counterterrorism cooperation, but even the latest F-16 is outmatched by a competently operated Su-30.
Already overwhelmed by a jihadist insurgency within its own borders, Pakistan is in no way fit to fight a full-scale war with India. The Pakistani military simply lacks the resources for internal security missions and border protection in rough, mountainous terrain in both Kashmir to the east, and along the Afghan border to the west. With more attention now being placed on the Indian threat, the jihadist strongholds in Pakistan’s northwest have more freedom to maneuver in their own operations, with Pakistani Taliban leaders even volunteering their services to the Pakistani military to fight the Indians.
Exacerbating matters is the fact that the Pakistani military, the primary instrument of the state, is in internal disarray. With military threats from India, pressure from the United States, rogue ISI operatives, civil-military infighting and a battle against jihadists whose main objective is to break the morale of Pakistan’s armed forces, command and control within the Pakistani military-intelligence establishment are breaking down.
Ethnically, religiously and territorially divided, Pakistan began as a nation in crisis. It was not until the military intervened in the early days of parliamentary democracy and established itself as the guarantor of the state’s stability that Pakistan was able to stand on its own feet. Given the current state of the military and the mounting stresses on the institution, Pakistan is showing serious signs of becoming a failed state.
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http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1230456509711&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter
Classifeye's authentication system is a boon to India's poor
Dec. 29, 2008
David Shamah , THE JERUSALEM POST
Back in the 1850s, pundits were telling would be entrepreneurs to "go west, young man." The west has long been won, though and experts agree that today the big entrepreneurial challenges are in the east - the Far East, that is, with India, in particular, seen as the new "land of opportunity." Thanks to the cheap and easy identity authentication system developed by Israeli startup Classifeye, hundreds of millions of low-income Indian residents are about to get a major push into the middle class - enhancing the world economy with new demands for goods and services, just when the developed world needs that boost most.
For generations, third world societies like India have been sharply divided along class lines, with the poor sentenced to a nearly endless poverty cycle, with children following parents as sharecroppers, subsistence workers, and service workers. It's the same in much of the Far East and Africa but surprisingly, India's poverty problem is even worse than Africa's with 828 million people, or 75.6 percent of the population of 1.1 billion, living on less than $2 a day, compared to 72.2% in sub-saharan Africa, according to figures by the World Bank. While things have improved in recent years, thanks to the "Indian miracle" led by high-tech development and international call centers, poverty is still rampant. Most of the poor live in rural areas, which often have no running water, electricity, and other basics; and experts agree that generating growth in these areas is crucial to moving the country forward and helping the poor to thrive (http://tinyurl.com/5c6hge).
If such growth could be achieved, however, the impact on India and the rest of the world would be enormous maybe enough to jumpstart the economies of the developed countries, who would rush to supply the newly relatively-affluent Indians with products and services to improve their lives. India, not having the same manufacturing or service infrastructure as China or the US, would be doing a lot of shopping abroad to satisfy the pent-up demand. With more money in circulation, economic activity goes up, lining the pockets of the poor with cash, giving more money to consumers and business alike.
Providing credit to business owners and consumers is one important way to increase economic activity. But in places like rural India, where many people have trouble even getting enough calories to subsist on, the idea of getting a bank loan is akin to taking a trip to the moon. Most peasants have no idea how to go about it, and there are no facilities in place to provide them with money anyway if any institutions were willing to do so at all. Even instituting loans using UN or government money is difficult under these circumstances.
One solution to this dilemma has been the rise of microfinancing - a system that provides credit and banking services to the rural poor, who formerly had to rely on the services of loan sharks, guaranteeing that they would remain in debt - and poor. The sums involved are small. But for many of the rural poor, an extra $100 will buy them the seeds they need to plant more crops, giving them more to sell at the market, helping their family move ahead and earning enough to pay back the loan. In India, microfinance is conducted by companies like Cashpor (http://www.cashporindia.net/), which has made thousands of loans in rural India since it was established in 1997.
Like any other bank, though, the microfinance institution - which usually sends people out into the villages and farms where their clients live and work - needs to keep accurate records, and authenticate the identity of their clients. And this is where Classifeye comes in, says company CEO Rami Cohen. Classifeye has developed software which can use a cellphone camera to conduct biometric authentication of clients via their fingerprint! Clients hold their finger up to the phone's camera, and the image gets sent back to headquarters for comparison to a bank database. Once authenticated, the client has access to the full range of banking services, just like city folk who use a bank or credit card.
Using the cellphone, cheap and portable, makes sense for authentication, says Cohen, but it was impractical until Classifeye developed its product.
"Some cellphones have been made with fingerprint scanners, but cellphone manufacturers aren't going to put a feature like that on phones unless they know someone is going to buy them and relying on hardware forces users to either buy an upgrade or do without when the technology improves. Using a software solution makes much more sense," he says.
All a client has to do, says Cohen is hold his or her finger up to the bank agent's phone (Cashpor has been using the technology for its rural clients), and wait for authentication.
"We take remote control of the phone's camera to conduct the authentication, so the process is simple and secure for the bank and the client," says Cohen.
While many governments and institutions in the west are willing to provide funds for microfinance operations, no one wants to see their money hijacked by criminals and the practical difficulty of making sure that the money is getting into the right hands has been a major reason why microfinance hasn't grown more quickly.
"What Classifeye does is solve the practical problem of 'the last mile,' making sure that the money and services get to where they are supposed to," says Cohen. "We are providing a secure terminal for customers and bankers, with a high level of security - one that's almost impossible to compromises, since it's based on the precise science of biometrics. As a result, more money can get into the hands of the poor, and even the small amounts involved in microfinancing transactions can make a big difference."
Right now, Cohen says, some 100 million poor people are part of microfinancing networks and by 2015 that number could reach a billion.
It's a prime market, and with it's unique solution, Cohen hopes to be able to capture a good chunk of the business. Besides the deal with Cashpor, which has 350,000 customers (Cashpor is working towards expanding that number to 500,000), Classifeye is working to close deals with other large microfinancers, so that in the coming months, as many as one million poor Indians will be able to do their banking via Classifeye's authentication system. That impresses wary investors, who, having been burned badly in recent months, are being very conservative in their investments.
"Having spoken to investors - VC's and angels - in the US in the past month, I have seen a lot of interest in what we are doing," Cohen says.
Investors realize that India is a where the action is going to be and with Classifeye already having a foot and a half in the door (besides its Har Hotzvim headquarters, Classifeye has an operations center in Bangalore), the company's technology may turn into a major weapon in India's war on poverty.
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http://www.dnaindia.com/report.asp?newsid=1218869&pageid=0
Nariman House, not Taj, was the prime target on 26/11
Somendra Sharma
Think 26/11, and images of the carnage at the Taj come to mind. But the terrorists themselves were in no doubt that Nariman House was the prime focus. For this was the place which housed a Jewish centre, and the fanatics from Pakistan were clear that they wanted to send a message to the world from there.
The Mumbai crime branch, which is investigating the terror attacks, has found that the terrorists’ handlers in Pakistan were clear this operation should not fail under any circumstances. The rest of the operations — at the Taj, Oberoi and Chhattrapati Shivaji Terminus — were intended to amplify the effect.
A senior police official, told DNA on condition of anonymity, that the interrogation of Mohammed Amir Iman Ajmal (aka Kasab) revealed as much. Just before entering the city, the terrorists’ team leader, Ismail Khan, briefed them once again about their targets. “But Khan briefed Imran Babar, alias Abu Akasha, and Nasir, alias Abu Umer, intensely on what to do at Nariman House,” the officer said.
When asked during interrogation why Nariman House was specifically targetted, Ajmal reportedly told the police they wanted to sent a message to Jews across the world by attacking the ultra orthodox synagogue.
According to the statement by Ajmal, Khan told Babar and Nasir that even if the others failed in their operation, they both could not afford to. “The Nariman House operation has to be a success,” the officer said, quoting from Ajmal’s statement.
“Khan also said that as far as Nariman House was concerned, there should not be even a minimal glitch in finding it and capturing it,” the officer quoted Ajmal as saying.
After the dinghy carrying the 10 terrorists reached Mumbai at the Macchimar colony opposite Badhwar Park in Cuffe Parade, it was decided that no bombs would be planted in the taxi to be used to reach Nariman House.
“The idea,” according to the police officer, “was that if Babar and Nasir got delayed in locating and entering Nariman House, the bomb in the taxi may explode even before they entered their target.”
The officer further quoted Ajmal’s confession as indicating the Nariman House killers may have either lost their way or took their time entering the building to avoid failure.
The dinghy reached Cuffe Parade around 8.30pm, but Babar and Nasir entered
Nariman House at around 10pm. This means they took around one- and-a-half hour to locate and enter Nariman House,” the officer said. Anyone who knows Colaba would have got there in 15-20 minutes.
Another aspect which indicates that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) did not want the Nariman House operation to fail was Fahim Ansari’s revelation to the crime branch. Ansari, who was arrested for his alleged involvement in the bomb blasts at a CRPF camp in Lucknow in January last year, told the police that Nariman House was also surveyed by him last year. Interestingly, Ansari did not reveal this detail when he was arrested by the Uttar Pradesh police in February last year.
“Ansari told us that he did not divulge this information earlier because it would have jeopardised the most important operation of the LeT. He had also been warned by the LeT that Nariman House was their most secret operation and must not be compromised at any cost,” the officer said.
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http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story.html?id=1152101
Transcripts of phone conversations between Mumbai terrorists
National Post Published: Wednesday, January 07, 2009
Transcripts published by the Indian newspaper The Hindu make it apparent the six handlers involved in the Mumbai attacks were closely monitoring events in Mumbai through the live TV coverage that went on non-stop for 60 hours.
"There are three ministers and one secretary of the cabinet in your hotel. We don't know in which room," a Pakistan-based caller tells a terrorist at the Taj at 3:10 a.m. on Nov. 27.
"Oh! That is good news" It is the icing on the cake!," he replies.
"Find those three-four persons and then get whatever you want from India," he is instructed.
"Pray that we find them," he answers.
At the Oberoi at 3:53 a.m., a handler phones and says: "Brother Abdul [Bada Abdul Rehman], the media is comparing your action to 9/11. One senior police official has been killed."
Abdul Rehman: "We are on the 10th/11th floor. We have five hostages."
Caller 2 (Kafa): "Everything is being recorded by the media. Inflict the maximum damage. Keep fighting. Don't be taken alive."
Caller: "Kill all hostages, except the two Muslims. Keep your phone switched on so that we can hear the gunfire."
Fahad Ullah: "We have three foreigners, including women from Singapore and China."
Caller: "Kill them."
The dossier then notes the telephone intercept records the "voices of Fahad Ullah and Bada Abdul Rehman directing hostages to stand in a line, and telling two Muslims to stand aside. Sound of gunfire. Cheering voices in background. Kafa hands telephone to another handler, Wasi Zarar, who says, "Fahad, find the way to go downstairs."
At Nariman House at 7:45 p.m., Wasi Zarar tells a terrorist: "Keep in mind that hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their safety. If you are still threatened, then don't saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages. Immediately kill them."
He adds, "The Army claims to have done the work without any hostage being harmed. Another thing: Israel has made a request through diplomatic channels to save the hostages. If the hostages are killed, it will spoil relations between India and Israel."
"So be it, God willing," the terrorist replies.
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http://www.hindu.com/nic/dossier.htm
This is a scanned copy of the 69-page dossier of material stemming from the ongoing investigation into the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 26-29, 2008 that was handed over by India to Pakistan on January 5, 2009.
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I went to post India's evidence against Pakistan and saw that GM already got to it 2 days ago. Again: http://www.hindu.com/nic/dossier.htm
Here are a few excerpts from intercepted telephone conversations between the terrorists and their handlers in Pakistan that gives a good feel for the outside coordination of the terrorists - from powerlineblog.com. Highly recommended reading if you want a glimpse inside their warped minds.
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Caller [to the terrorists in the Taj Majal Hotel]: Greetings! There are three Ministers and one Secretary of the Cabinet in your hotel. We don't know in which room.
Receiver: Oh! That is good news! It is the icing on the cake.
Caller: Find those 3-4 persons and then get whatever you want from India.
Receiver: Pray that we find them.
Caller: Do one thing. Throw one or two grenades on the Navy and police teams, which are outside.
This one is between a Pakistani controller and one of the terrorists who attacked Chabad House:
Caller: Greetings. What did the Major General say?
Receiver: Greetings. The Major General directed us to do what we like. We should not worry. The operation has to be concluded tomorrow morning. Pray to God. Keep two magazines and three grenades aside, and expend the rest of your ammunition.
This one is between a terrorist at the Oberoi Hotel and a Pakistani handler:
Caller: Brother Abdul. The media is comparing your action to 9/11. One senior police officer has been killed.
Abdul Rehman: We are on the 10th/11th floor. We have five hostages.
Caller 2 (Kafa): Everything is being recorded by the media. Inflict the maximum damage. Keep fighting. Don't be taken alive.
Caller: Kill all hostages, except the two Muslims. Keep your phone switched on so that we can hear the gunfire.
Fahadullah: We have three foreigners including women. From Singapore and China.
Caller: Kill them.
(Voices of Fahadullah and Abdul Rehman directing hostages to stand in a line, and telling two Muslims to stand aside. Sound of gunfire. Cheering voices heard in background.)
From the Taj Mahal Hotel:
Caller: How many hostages do you have?
Receiver: We have one from Belgium. We have killed him. There was one chap from Bangalore. He could be controlled only with a lot of effort.
Caller: I hope there is no Muslim amongst them?
Receiver: No, none.
Finally, this conversation between a terrorist at Chabad House and his superior in Pakistan:
Wassi: Keep in mind that the hostages are of use only as long as you do not come under fire because of their safety. If you are still threatened, then don't saddle yourself with the burden of the hostages, immediately kill them.
Receiver: Yes, we shall do accordingly, God willing.
Wassi: The Army claims to have done the work without any hostage being harmed. Another thing; Israel has made a request through diplomatic channels to save the hostages. If the hostages are killed, it will spoil relations between India and Israel.
Receiver: So be it, God willing.
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I'm sure there must be some good reason why the evil incarnate that was revealed in the Mumbai attack, and the information that has emerged subsequently about Pakistan's role in it, did not give rise to world-wide protests and demonstrations. Offhand, though, I can't think what it might be. - John Hinderacker, Powerline
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Geopolitical Diary: India's Afghanistan Option
January 22, 2009 | 0142 GMT
Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee said at a conference in New Delhi on Wednesday that Pakistan is still sponsoring international terrorism and must be disciplined. India has reiterated this message on a near daily basis ever since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks, yet the only disciplinary action it has taken has been limited to mere rhetoric.
There is no question that the Mumbai attacks outraged India's decision-makers, the vast majority of whom maintain that there are clear and identifiable links between the perpetrators of the attack and the Pakistani military establishment. As far as New Delhi is concerned, the Islamist militant proxies that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency has long supported are still well within the military's reach, and could be reined in if Islamabad actually had the will to do so.
With the blame cast on Pakistan, in the wake of the attacks, India prepared for military action, ranging from surgical strikes and hot-pursuit operations in Pakistani-administered Kashmir to a full-scale war. Pakistan soon grew nervous and started redeploying its troops from the Afghan border in the west to the eastern border with India. At that point, Pakistan's best hope was to pressure the United States into holding India back, which it did by reminding Washington of the risk it would incur to its supply lines in Pakistan – which are critical to fighting the war in Afghanistan — if the Pakistanis were faced with the need to confront a military threat from India.
But it wasn't just U.S. pressure that could restrain India. The Indians knew themselves that they lacked any good options for responding forcefully against Pakistan. Limited strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir would be mainly of symbolic value, given that many of the militant assets there had already had time to relocate. And any such strike likely would end up working in Pakistan's favor; the local population, united by an Indian threat, would have good reason to rally behind the Pakistani military and government.
Any plans India might have had to go beyond a limited war in Kashmir did not have the full support of the military — particularly the army, which lacked confidence in its capabilities and felt that stalemate was a far more likely outcome than victory. Indian policymakers also had to deal with the uncomfortable possibility that the militants who carried out the Mumbai attacks likely had the intent of pulling India into a military confrontation with Pakistan. The more Pakistan destabilized, the more room jihadists in the region would have to maneuver. Any large-scale military action by India could be seen as playing into the militants' hands –- and could intensify the jihadist focus on India for further attacks.
In short, India's hands were tied post-Mumbai, and as New Delhi spent time debating among bad options and more bad options, the window of opportunity to strike in the wake of the attacks (when international outrage against Pakistan was highest) had soon passed.
But this is not to say that India is left without any options. On the contrary, India is keeping open the option of hot-pursuit strikes in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, and is moving forward with plans for covert operations inside Pakistan to target militant networks. The Indians also are cognizant of the fact that a follow-on attack would require them to take some level of military action. But there is another pressure tactic the Indians are throwing around, one that involves India stretching beyond Pakistan into the war-torn territory of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan is essentially the extension of Pakistan's western buffer against foreign threats. Without a foothold in Kabul, Pakistan runs the risk of being sandwiched between a hostile power to its west and its main rival, India, to the east — a position it remembers well from the Cold War days when the Soviet Union, then allied with India, invaded Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan has to rely heavily on its Pashtun ties to Afghanistan to secure its western frontier.
India knows what makes the Pakistanis jumpy, and has spent recent years steadily upping its involvement in reconstruction work in Afghanistan to make good with Kabul, which currently has a very shaky relationship with the Pakistanis over the insurgency plaguing the country. So far, India has not ventured beyond its $86 million reconstruction commitment to Afghanistan, but has been throwing around the rather contentious idea of sending troops to the country to help with fighting the insurgency.
This would be a gigantic step for India to take, and one that would make the Pakistanis jump through the roof. India is extremely wary of deploying forces beyond its border. (It learned the pains of counterinsurgency the hard way when it got pulled into a bloody war of attrition with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in the late 1980s.) New Delhi prefers to keep to itself in most foreign policy matters, particularly when it comes to fighting other nations' wars. But sources in Indian defense circles say there are serious discussions going on among the political and military leadership over the Afghan option. Even Indian army chief Gen. Deepak Kapoor publicly raised the possibility Jan. 14 when he said in a conference, "Changing our strategic policy towards Kabul in terms of raising military stakes is one of the factors that is to be determined politically."
Kapoor was being careful in wording his statement, essentially saying it is up to the politicians to give the military orders to deploy. But he was also deliberate in his message to Pakistan: If Islamabad continues to push India through its array of Islamist militant proxies, India could end up making a strategic decision to break through a few foreign policy barriers and shoulder some of the security burden on Pakistan's western frontier. At a time when U.S. tolerance for Pakistan is wearing dangerously thin, and when the United States and India are exploring deeper, long-term and more strategic ties, this type of adversarial encirclement is a threat that potentially could shake Pakistan to its core.
That is, if India actually follows through. As mentioned earlier, this would require a major leap in Indian foreign policy — not to mention arrangements to coordinate and integrate Indian military efforts in Afghanistan with U.S. and NATO operations. And there is currently no indication that the discussions are anywhere near an implementation stage.
Also, the United States would probably prefer that India keep things as they are for now. An Indian military presence in Afghanistan would make a juicy target for jihadists in the region, and it would give Pakistan all the more incentive to redirect and intensify the insurgency in Afghanistan, putting both the United States and India in an even stickier situation.
However, the threat of sending Indian troops to Afghanistan does a decent job in keeping Pakistan off balance. And, at least for the moment, that is what New Delhi and Washington want to intimidate Pakistan into giving up its militant proxy activities. Time will only tell if the Indians actually put the Afghan option into practice, but the Pakistanis are certainly keeping watch.
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http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/
Can Pakistan Survive ?
This essay begins with quotations from essentially non-Indian sources to buttress the arguments that follow and assert that these arguments do not reflect a preconceived notion about Pakistan but depict a stark reality that many perceptive Pakistanis also see today. And they worry about the future of their country. We too should be concerned about the fate of a neighbour who has been consistently hostile to India, has been internationally delinquent and in the process has become economically weak, with a weak middle class a polity in disarray and now has a highly Islamised Army in control not only of the country but also the nuclear button. The mosaic of quotations from Pakistani, American and British authors will indicate the problems that confront Pakistan and its neighbours.
"If the British Commonwealth and the USA are to be in a position to defend their vital interests in the Middle East, then the best and most stable area from which to conduct this defence is from Pakistan territory. Pakistan is the keystone of the strategic arch of the wide and vulnerable waters of the Indian Ocean." Cited by Narendra Singh Sarila in his book 'The Untold Story of India's Partition' from an unsigned British memorandum dated May 19 1948 – 'The Strategic and Political Importance of Pakistan in the Event of a War with the USSR'. (These were from Mountbatten Papers, Hartley Library, Southampton).
Commenting on Pakistan's early days, Owen Bennett Jones in his book "Pakistan-Eye of the Storm " (2002) said "Even if the vast majority of Pakistan's first generation of politicians were firmly in the modernist camp it is significant that they tried to avoid a direct confrontation with the Islamic radicals. Faced with growing challenges from Baloch, Sindhi, Pukhtoon and Bengali nationalists, even the most secular leaders found it was expedient to appeal to Islam so as to foster a sense of Pakistani unity. In doing so, the politicians established a trend which has been a feature of Pakistani politics ever since." "The fate of Pakistan will affect the entire world. Will Pakistan's military continue to use the mullahs to achieve its short term political and military goals? Will the sectarian killers – created by the ISI – get involved in sectarian crimes in other countries, for example in Iraq, further destabilising the country? Will terrorists continue to see Pakistan as a hospitable place of refuge? If Pakistan is to be saved from a Taliban-like future, and the rest of the world saved from future Dr Khans, it will have to make accommodations with India on Kashmir and stop flirting with the mullahs. It will have to spend less of its national income on defence and more on educating its youth. It will require that a true democracy take hold. But none of this will happen, Abbas warns, without the assistance of the United States. After all, the U. S. government helped to design and fund the strategy of employing violent Islamist cadres to serve as "volunteer" fighters in a war that seemed critically important at that time, but left those cadres to their own devices once they were no longer important for achieving U. S. strategic goals. The idea of international jihad – which was promoted by the United States and Pakistan when it was expedient, took hold and spread, ultimately resulting in deadly terrorist crimes throughout Asia as well as the September 11 strikes.....Mr Abbas warns of a frightening future – one in which extremists gain more military support and more military might; and tensions between India and Pakistan continue to rise...." Jessica Stern, in her foreword to Hassan Abbas's book 'Pakistan Drift into Extremism – Allah, the Army and America's War on Terror' 2005.
Abbas himself sounds rather concerned when he says in the concluding chapter of this book, "The Pakistan Army dare not confront them, [Islamists] knowing their strength and suspecting that they have many sympathisers, if not supporters, within its own ranks. It was therefore considered more feasible for the Army to continue to direct its energies in the battle zone of Kashmir rather than to face the jihadis.......No one knows has a clear idea about the exact numbers, but their potential capability resides in the subconscious of those in authority, and this stays there because the reality of it is too hard to confront. Their funding will not dry up because thousands of Pakistanis and Arabs believe in them and contribute to them."
Former adviser to Benazir Bhutto and the present Pak Ambassador to the U.S. Hussain Haqqani had made some very perceptive comments in his book 'Pakistan-Between the Mosque and Military' (2005). Haqqani observed "Pakistan's military historically has been willing to adjust its priorities to fit within the parameters of immediate U. S. global concerns. It has done this to ensure the flow of military and economic aid from the United States, which Pakistan considers necessary for its struggle for survival and its competition with India. Pakistan's relations with the United States have been part of the Pakistani military's policy tripod that emphasises Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state's foreign policy and an alliance with the United States as a means to defray the costs of Pakistan's massive military expenditures. These policy precepts have served to encourage extremist Islamism, which in the past few years have been a source of threat to both U.S. interests and global security."
Haqqani adds "America's alliance with Pakistan, or rather with the Pakistani military, has had three significant consequences for Pakistan. First, because the U.S. military sees Pakistan in the context of its Middle East strategy, Pakistan has become more oriented toward the Middle East even though it is geographically and historically a part of South Asia. Second, the intermittent flow of U.S. military and economic assistance has encouraged Pakistan's military leaders to overestimate their power potential. This in turn has contributed to their reluctance to accept normal relations with India even after learning through repeated misadventures that Pakistan can, at best hold India to a draw in military conflict and cannot defeat it. Third, the ability to secure military and economic aid by fitting into the current paradigm of American policy has made Pakistan into a rentier state, albeit one that lives off the rents for its strategic location."
Two other observations by Haqqani are important. He says, "Contrary to the U.S. assumption that aid translates into leverage, Pakistan's military has always managed to take the aid without ever fully giving the United States what it desires." Further, "Unless Islamabad's objectives are redefined to focus on economic prosperity and popular participation in governance – which the military as an institution remains reluctant to do – the state will continue to turn to Islam as a national unifier."
Amir Mir, in his book 'The True Face of the Jihadis', (2004) writes "The Pakistani Army became a politicised army in the very first decade of the creation of Pakistan.....The politicisation of the Pakistan Army has led to a further spread of Islamic fundamentalism --- a phenomenon that has found fertile ground in Pakistan primarily due to socio-economic reasons. Large masses of the urban and rural poor, with no avenues for economic advancement, are being drawn to fundamentalism. As the soldiery of the army is largely drawn from the rural and urban masses, it would be well nigh impossible for it not to be infected with the virus of Islamic fundamentalism being propagated thousands of deeni madrassas across Pakistan. During the Zia ul Haq regime, the composition of the Pakistan Army was changed at the expense of the urbanised, Westernised looking middle class and upper class elite and preference in officers' commissions was given to the rural educated generation with strong leanings towards conservative Islam. This large body of Islamist officers, commissioned during the Zia ul Haq regime, forms the backbone of the present day Pakistan Army, and its members have since moved up the ranks....The resentment within the Army is believed to be two levels: among junior officers who view with contempt General Musharraf's attempts at getting the army to combat rather than abet Islamic militancy, and among the upper echelons where Musharraf finds himself pitted against a few of his senior generals."
Later in the book, Mir says, "While the US may feel that it has achieved a great success in convincing Musharraf to make a U-turn on the Taliban, and on stopping the inexorable tide of hate-filled messages put out by the Deobandhi and Ahle Hadith seminaries, the real question is whether the Pakistan government will change its long term policy and stop supporting jihad. The Pakistan defence for its slow progress is that madrassa reform is difficult and dangerous, so it may take a while. The problem with that argument is that the longer the madrassas operate as they do, the fewer people there will be in Pakistan who would support such a change."
Shuja Nawaz, author of the book "Crossed Swords: Pakistan Army and the Wars Within" while on a visit to the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi in May 2008 said "The young officer cadre in Pakistan army today is conservative and ritualistic, not necessarily radical. But the influences of Zia's Islamisation continue to bedevil the armed forces."
In his book 'Gateway to Terrorism' (2003), Mohammed Amir Rana describes the jihadi culture "During the course of the last two decades, thirty thousand Pakistani youth have died in Afghanistan and Kashmir, two thousand sectarian clashes have taken place and twelve lakh youth have taken part in the activities of jihadi and religious organisations.....In consequence, Pakistan got neither Kabul nor Srinagar, but was itself saddled with terrorism." Rana adds, "During the first phase of her rule, when Benazir Bhutto had visited Muzaffarabad, ISI briefed her about the Hurriyat movement in Occupied Kashmir and recommended status quo in the Kashmir policy. Benazir Bhutto approved of the policy and the future plan. No one ever thought of changing the character and style of ISI before 11 September 2001. ISI and the governments working under its influence gave a fillip to the jihadi culture. The raw material(s) for jihad were collected from two sources: religious madrassas (and) students of government colleges and schools."
"Lashkar-e-Tayyaba will ultimately plant the flag of Islam on Delhi, Tell Aviv and Washington,' according to Lashkar leader Hafiz Saeed speaking in 1998. Ten years later in October 2008 the same Hafiz Saeed said "India understands only the language of jihad."
In a subsequent book 'The Seeds of Terrorism' published in 2005, Rana says "In an interview in Newsweek in March 2000, the President of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf, said: "I cannot pressurise the Taliban to arrest Osama bin Laden. The Taliban lead a free country." The jihadi weekly, Zarb-e-Momin (Karachi) published an extract from that interview. It quoted the president as saying "No jihadi organisation in Pakistan is involved in terrorism. They are now working against India in occupied Kashmir after completing their jihad against Russia in Afghanistan."
The Daily Times in its edition of March 6 2004 quotes former ISI Chief Javed Ashraf Qazi as saying "We must not be afraid of admitting that Jaish (-e-Mohammed) was involved in the deaths of thousands of innocent Kashmiris, bombing the Indian Parliament, Daniel Pearl's murder and attempts on President Musharraf's life." And the talkative General Musharraf's pronouncement that "If we find a solution on Kashmir with India, all jehadi organisations have to pack up" (The News August 10, 2004) was in effect an admission of Pakistani involvement in the violence in Kashmir.
The concluding sentences of Owen Bennett Jones book are even more telling "If General Musharraf is to transform his vision of Pakistani society into a reality he will need great reserves of political will and a more effective bureaucracy. He has neither. And while he still believes that the Pakistan army is the solution to the country's problems, he shows no signs of accepting that, in fact, it is part of the problem."
Dr Ayesha Siddiqa in her book "Military Inc-Inside Pakistan's Military Economy" (2007) describes the Pak Army's hold the best. "The fragility of Pakistan's political system, however, cannot be understood without probing into the military's political stakes. The fundamental question here is whether the Army will ever withdraw from power. Why would Pakistan's armed forces, or for that matter any military that has developed deep economic stakes, transfer real power to the political class? The country is representative of states where politically powerful militaries exercise control of the state and society through establishing their hegemony. This is done through penetrating the state, the society and the economy. The penetration into the society and economy establishes the defence establishment's hegemonic control of the state. Financial autonomy, economic penetration and political power ae interrelated and are part of a vicious cycle.
She goes on, "Today the Pakistan military's internal economy is extensive, and has turned the armed forces into one of the dominant economic players. The most noticeable and popular component of Milbus relates to the business of the four welfare foundations: the Fauji Foundation, the Army Welfare Trust, Shaheen Foundation, and Bahria Foundation. These foundations are subsidiaries of the defence establishment, employing both military and civilian personnel. The businesses are very diverse in nature, ranging from smaller scale ventures such as bakeries, farms, schools and private security firms to corporate enterprises such as commercial banks, insurance companies, radio and television channels, fertiliser, cement and cereal manufacturing plants and insurance businesses. Operations vary from toll collecting on highways to gas stations, shopping malls and to other similar ventures." Further, .... "there are a variety of benefits provided to retired personnel in the form of urban and rural land or employment and business openings. The grant of state land is a case of diverting the country's resources to individuals for profit."..... "Over the past 59 years of the state's history, the army has experienced direct power four times, and learnt to negotiate authority when not directly in control of the government.... As a result the political and civil society institutions remain weak."
Dr Siddiqa also says, "Stephen P Cohen also mentions an elite partnership in his latest 'The Idea of Pakistan.' He is of the view that the country is basically controlled by a small but 'culturally and socially intertwined elite', comprising about 500 people who form part of the establishment. Belonging to different subgroups, these people are known for their loyalty to the 'core principles' of a central state. These key principles include safeguarding the interests of the dominant classes."
This is the most telling commentary "Today no other country on earth is arguably more dangerous than Pakistan. It has everything Osama bin Laden could ask for: political instability, a crusted network of radical Islamists, an abundance of angry young anti-western recruits, secluded training areas, access to state of the art electronic technology regular air service to the west and security services that don't always do what they are supposed to do." Newsweek, January 2008.
This is the mosaic as seen by Pakistani, British and US commentators. Now the narrative of what has happened and what might happen next.
Pakistan's problems began in the beginning. The country was created by a group of elitists on behalf of Muslims who eventually did not leave India for the new homeland and was formed for a people that did not really ask for a new homeland. From its early days, Pakistani rulers denied their new country's Indo-Gangetic past and promised its people a glorious Islamic future with its moorings away from 'Hindu' India. Fearful of being dominated or of being overpowered by a larger India seen as irreconciled to the partition, Pakistan's leaders relied on Islam and an image of non-India to try and establish an identity. Pakistan's population had to be cleansed of everything Indian and hatred and fear of the Hindu was the common idiom. Being non-Indian was being a Pakistani and soon being Islamic was being a good Pakistani.
Governance was first taken away from the educated migrants from UP and Bihar by the Punjabi feudals who came with a particular Islamic mindset from eastern Punjab and their feelings of insecurity. Eventually this was taken over by the Punjabi army with a special vehemence and tenacity. Over time, Pakistan's USP became its ability to be a nuisance in the neighbourhood while being a client-state of distant powers. It was this military and economic sustenance from friends that gave Pakistani rulers a false sense of power and invincibility backed by their religion.
While the Indian leadership of the day set about giving its people a written Constitution, in Pakistan the twin pillars of governance were the Army and Islam. Punjabi feudalism to the exclusion of almost everyone else did not help either. Over the years this problem has only accentuated with the mullah, intolerant of any deviation today, interprets the Islamic tenets in a narrow sectarian sense that excludes women – half the country's population -- from equal treatment. He also seeks to exclude other sects from similar benefits, earthly or otherworldly. The Army by training treats any adherence to alternative opinion as disobedience at best and treason most of the time. Equality and dissent are the essential ingredients of democracy but Pakistan's twin pillars discouraged both. Protection and military assistance was sought from the US by being rendering assistance for its strategic goals.
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With all its institutions of legitimate governance trampled beyond recognition, Pakistan today is a country with a murky past and uncertain future. There are many in India who still believe that Pakistan has changed and that there is a genuine desire for peace and that India should now sit down and solve all problems with Pakistan. The truth is that the change in Pakistan has been towards more and not less, Islamisation. Pakistan is not a moderate Islamic state. It is ruled by the mullah-military alliance neither of who understand secularism or democracy. From early days Islam was a higher ideal than nationalism. Created in the name of Islam, Pakistani leaders took recourse to Islam in danger almost from the very beginning. Even the Bengali language riots of 1952 were countered with Islamic slogans and stress on their Islamic identity. From then it was an incremental move which after 1971 became a common goal for the Army and the mullahs. The former wanted to balkanise in India as revenge and the latter wanted to establish caliphates in Hindu India.
However, Pakistan today is facing a bigger crisis than it did in 1971. At that time, Pakistan could blame its predicament on enemy India and this acted as a unifying factor. There was a fall back in West Pakistan and Z. A. Bhutto was able to consolidate the fragmented country. In 1971, the Pak Army had not been Islamised; it was only Punjabised. Today's Pakistan Army is Islamised and its motto Iman (faith), taqwa (piety), Jehad fis'billah (Jehad in the Name of Allah) is intact. Today, Pakistan cannot blame India for its multiple sclerosis and it has no fall back. And that is the danger.
The blow back then, is in Pakistan. The concentration on jehad and military rule has cost that country enormously in economic terms. The pursuit of jihad has damaged its already weak civil society, irreparably hurt generations of bright young men and women who have had to go without a reasonable education or hope for a respectable employment opportunity in a country where science and humanities have been subverted to Islamic teachings. The country now lives perpetually on the dole and handouts from the IMF; there is no industry worth the name.
In today's Pakistan there are other fault lines too. The Baloch struggle continues. It is not about preserving the Sardari system of the Bugtis, Marris and the Mengals. The struggle is about basic rights — economic and political — because the revolt is all over Balochistan and not restricted to these three tribal areas. The second reality is that FATA , which was the launching pad for many of the campaigns in the jehad against the Soviets in Afghanistan, is today prime Taliban country — and continuing to grow in depth and area. This would be of considerable concern to persons like Gen Mahmud Ali Durrani, the Pak NSA who is credited to have remarked "I hope the Taliban and Pushtun nationalism don't merge. If that happens, we've had it and we're on the verge of it." Third, Pakistan is now 'jehadised'.
There was a time when the jehadis and the fundamentalists were the fringe elements and the civil society of Lahore and Karachi was the mainstream. The fear is that this may not be so any more. It is the civil society that has increasingly become the fringe and jehadi mindset now the mainstream. Gen Zia is considered the father of Pakistani Islamisation but it must be remembered that Islamisation was possible because there was receptivity to the idea. Every setback that the Pakistan Army had at the hands of the Indians was interpreted to mean that Islamic tenets were not being properly followed. Every defeat for the Army also meant that it was strengthened further. Thus both Islam and the Army grew stronger together. Jihad became a favourite weapon of the Pak Army who did not have to fight the Indian enemy themselves and let the jihadis do this fighting at much lower rates. The only problem now is that, as Sushant Sareen says, "The bottom line is that instead of the Pakistan Army exercising control over its jihadist assets, the army itself has become an asset of the jihadis." The Pakistani Army can hardly say it is fighting for the defence of Islam against those every Islamists who are also defending Islam.
Pakistan is a country that has been run by a self-seeking warrior class that has always felt that it has been ordained as Protectors of the Realm and Defenders of the Faith. They have been helped by a pliable and self-serving elite consisting of the bureaucracy and judiciary, the feudals of the Punjab, and most of the politicians. The corporate interests of the Pakistan Army cover almost every activity of the country's economy. The Pak Army, for instance, runs the Fauji Foundation, established as a charity for retired military personnel. Over time it has become a mammoth organisation with multiple interests and worth about Rs (Pak) 9000 crores a few years ago and growing. In addition, the Army Welfare Trust deals dabbles and controls varied economic and financial interests including the Askari Commercial Bank, which has been run by a very understanding kind of management many of whom had earlier served in the Bank of Credit and Commerce International. The Trust's assets are estimated to be about Rs 18000 crores. Apart from this, the National Logistics Cell and the Frontier Works Organisation which monopolise government contracts in the transport and construction sectors. Accounting rules are flexible and transfer of funds from the defence budget quite routine. It is the collective corporate interest of the Armed Forces that is at stake in any arrangement that appears to diminish the role of the Army. A peace deal with India threatens to do precisely that.
There are many in India, Pakistan and the West who remain in a state of denial about the march of Islamic forces in Pakistan. The manner in which various issues involving the Islamists have been handled in Pakistan by Pakistanis -- with hesitation and extreme circumspection and under compulsion are some of the symptoms of the disease and of what is happening in Pakistan. Islamic radicalism is today backed by the gun of both the radicals and the Army. There are believed to be 18 million unlicensed weapons in the country and the estimates of possible extremists trained in extremist universities vary from 225,000 to 650,000. It is apparent that the Army cannot take action against the very fundamentalists and extremists and also rely on them for survival. Yet unless the Pakistan Army moves beyond looking for patchwork solutions to ensure its own primacy and decides to eradicate this menace, a spectre of total radicalism haunts Pakistan.
The Taliban takeover in the FATA is now being replicated in the rest of the NWFP. Large tracts the valley of Swat, Pakistan's idyllic tourist spot, are today under Taliban control. There are reports of other districts of NWFP like Dir coming increasingly under Taliban dominance. The Army's attempts to oust them have failed. It is obvious that in the eyes of many especially the Pushtuns, the Pakistan army has been fighting an unpopular war in FATA against the Taliban. It was far easier for the Pakistan establishment to switch the mood and generate an anti-India fever following the Mumbai massacres. The manner in which the hunted Baitullah Mehsud became a patriot was alarmingly easy. This only underscores the fact that it is easier in Pakistan to be anti-Indian than being anti-Taliban.
Tribal loyalties, which are quite often trans-border, the Pushtun code of conduct and religious sentiments have become intertwined in the province. Recruitment among the devoutly religious locals is easy for the Taliban. The morale of the government forces is low and they are unwilling to fight fellow Muslims. There have been desertions. The Pakistani army brought up on a single threat perception, is ill-equipped to play a counter-insurgency role. Besides, it would need local intelligence which will not be available to Punjabi troops operating in the absence of Pushtun troops. It will take years for the Pakistan army to cover this gap and, meanwhile, a Punjabi-Pushtun animus could set in.
The manner in which Pakistan was allowed to go nuclear, acquire warheads and trade in nuclear technologies by successive regimes is a tragic testimony to failure of policy or mindless pursuit of self-interest. And almost simultaneously, Pakistan was allowed or even encouraged to become jehadi. Pakistan's hopelessly misconstrued policies have only converted the unemployed young of Pakistan into terrorists who have now returned as unemployable jehadis to haunt their former masters.
This now leaves the world petrified about Islamist terrorists armed with nuclear weapons. Statements from Washington and Islamabad have tried to assuage this fear. This evades the larger issue that the Pakistani state has systematically proliferated for decades which constitutes by far the bigger danger. Pakistan has continued to harbour criminals like Dawood Ibrahim, Masood Akhtar, Omar Sheikh and has denied their presence is indicative of a criminal and irresponsible mindset.
There is more to follow with an impatient Washington unable to control Afghanistan now contemplates active intervention in Pakistan, something that will further inflame passion in the country. Yet the Taliban advance eastward into the NWFP and beyond must be rolled back but how does Islamabad organise retreat from a mindset that is far more pervasive than is imagined.
The entire episode of the Mumbai massacres and the manner in which the Pakistani leadership has behaved only indicates the extent to which that state can act without any responsibility. The extent of state involvement in this terror attack is obvious. This means that the state of Pakistan, despite being a basket economic case and dependent on doles, is either consciously willing to be the delinquent or is unable to control elements within its own apparatus. This leads to the conclusion that if this is so then the state, which in Pakistan is the Army, has lost control. Therefore, it follows that if the state has lost control over parts of its territory and has also begun to lose control of its instruments, then the state is spinning out of control. It is a failing state.
This is not going to happen in isolation. The US and China have huge real estate interests in Pakistan. The US has its energy security interests as well as strategic interests of keeping the Russians and Iran in check. Supplies to Afghanistan in the current war have been through Pakistan and should that need to change then the alternative routes lie through the Caspian Sea running overland via Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. This would naturally bring in greater American presence into Central Asia and add to Russian discomfiture. China remains interested in Pakistan as a means of access to the Arabian Sea through Gwadar, to outflank India and ultimately to be able to take on the Americans in the region.
It increasingly appears that the Pakistan Army that is not going to be able to solve the problem and, paradoxically, the longer it lasts the more it hurts that country. The core issue in Pakistan today is not India or Kashmir. The core issue is the collective corporate interest of the Pakistani Army derived as a war dividend. The arrival of Zardari as a civilian president on the scene has not changed the basic reality.
Unfortunately, if neither the Army nor the Taliban retreat, we are staring at an abyss as Pakistan is consumed by its own creations – jehad and Taliban.
Source : Eternal India , January 2009 Issue
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Want to defeat the Talibs in Afghanistan? Kill the head of the snake. It's Pakistan's ISI.
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Having seen some material coming out of India, I share considerable sympathy with that line of analysis.
Given our lack of conceptual clarity on the basics and/or even who the players are, are we up to a strategy that essentially calls for the disintegration of the Islamic nuclear state of Pakistan?
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We aren't under this administration. When things get bad enough, we'll do what has to be done. Thankfully, the last president built bridges with India. They are a vital ally for what faces us.
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More interesting stuff from the Indian POV:
With friend's comments:
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Considering that the war is now moving to AF-PAK arena...it behooves us to familiarize oneself with the region. Here's a link to a citizen's power point presentation, which has some interesting maps being debated on the sub continent. Its easier to see them with the full screen mode
http://www.slideshare.net/rajaram.muthukrishnan/national-security-national-interests-implications-presentation?type=presentation
The feeling in Indian circles (wishful thinking ?) is that we must achieve a PIP (Peaceful Implosion of Pak), as opposed to a Violent Implosion of Pak...which seems to be ongoing. There is no clarity yet on US tactics or strategy...but there are elections planned in AFG, and India. I expect 2009 to be interesting...
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http://soodvikram.blogspot.com/
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**I expect the jewish females hostages suffered very deliberately sadistic sexual assaults, including the use of foreign objects, as is standard jihadi procedure for the treatment of hostages.**
http://littlegreenfootballs.com/link/120684_Terrorists_sexually_Humiliated_guests_before_killing_them
Once again, proven correct.
Symposium: Islamic Terror and Sexual Mutilation
By Jamie Glazov
FrontPageMagazine.com | Friday, February 13, 2009
During the horrifying siege of the Taj Mahal Hotel, the Islamic terrorists sexually humiliated and mutilated the guests before shooting them dead. Why? Frontpage has assembled a distinguished panel to discuss this question with us today. Our guests are:
Dr. Joanie Lachkar, a licensed Marriage and Family therapist in private practice in Brentwood and Tarzana, California, who teaches psychoanalysis and is the author of How to Talk to a Narcissist (2007), The Many Faces of Abuse: Treating the Emotional Abuse of High -Functioning Women (1998), and The Narcissistic/Borderline Couple: A Psychoanalytic Perspective on Marital Treatment (1992). Dr. Lachkar speaks nationally and recently presented, "The Psychopathology of Terrorism" at the International Psychohistorical Association. She is an affiliate member of the Southern California Psychoanalytic Institute, an adjunct professor at Mount Saint Mary's College, a psychohistorian, and is on the editorial board of the Journal of Emotional Abuse.
Dr. David Gutmann, emeritus professor of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences at Northwestern University Medical School in Chicago.
Dr. Phyllis Chesler, an Emerita Professor of Psychology and Women's Studies at City University of New York , a psychotherapist, and the author of thirteen books including, Women and Madness, The New Anti-Semitism, and The Death of Feminism in which she describes how Islamic gender apartheid has been penetrating the West. She has written about her captivity in Afghanistan for Frontpage Magazine. She has a blogsite and may be reached through her website: phyllis-chesler.com.
and
Dr. Nancy Kobrin, a psycho-analyst, Arabist, and counter-terrorism expert.
FP: Dr. Joanie Lachkar, Dr. David Gutmann, Dr. Phyllis Chesler and Dr. Nancy Kobrin, welcome to Frontpage Symposium.
Dr. Gutmann, let’s begin with you.
How do you see this sexual humiliation and mutilation that the Islamic terrorists perpetrated at Mumbai? This is a repetitive pattern when it comes to Islamic violence against infidels. How does one interpret this pathology?
Gutmann: The torture, mutilation and murders documented recently in Mumbai are certainly not limited to Kashmiri Jihadists. During the Israeli War of Independence Jewish fighters, including female soldiers captured by Arab irregulars, were routinely tortured and mutilated in the most obscene ways (by contrast, water-boarding would have furnished a pleasant interlude), and IDF officers warned their troops against being taken alive.
I cannot know what passions motivated the Mumbai torturers, but given that they are Islamists, and given that their savage practices matched those of the Palestinian Muslim guerrillas, we may assume that they shared the Palestinian’s sadism, as well as the psychology underlying that perversion.
The Palestinians, along with the majority of Arab males, belong to what has been called a “Shame” culture, in that they are quick to feel humiliated, and equally quick to defend against the sense of insult - usually by gross denial of their shameful condition, by projection of the humiliated condition onto others, or by massive retaliation against the insulting party. Thus, the Palestinians, who ran away from inferior Jewish forces during the Independence War, and who have never recovered from the shame of that self-imposed defeat, have vigorously exercised all of these contra-humiliation tactics: By claiming that they were forced out of their homes by superior Jewish forces, they deny that they ran away; by mutilating the bodies of their Jewish captives, the Palestinians metaphorically rob them of their manhood; and by launching suicide attacks against Jews they retaliate massively against the Israeli conqueror.
The Koran does not call for the torture and mutilation of captives, and so Islam per se cannot be held directly responsible for the Mumbai horrors; but Islam does sponsor, more than any other religion, the Shame cultures which in their turn sanction these terrible rituals. Again, I am assuming that, like the Palestinians, the Mumbai Jihadists are members of a shame culture, and that we can understand their actions from that perspective.
Psychologically speaking, torture and mutilation followed by murder as practiced most recently in Mumbai are the most complex of the shame-dispelling procedures, in that they expunge shame at the cost of incurring guilt: Even the most hardened terrorist will likely feel some qualms of guilt as he mutilates the body of a still living young woman. But for the members of a Shame culture, the feeling of humiliation is the most traumatic, and heavy prices are willingly paid to be rid of it. The aim of torture is to reveal the cowardice and femininity of the foe, and in so doing to export the torturer’s hidden shames onto the enemy, while co-opting his store of courage and hardihood – the masculinity – that he has given up, screamed away, under the knife. The enemy’s terror, castration and invaginated wounds confirm the torturer’s successful projection of his own covert and shameful womanliness and/or homosexuality: “Clearly, he and not me, is actually the woman.” In the murder which – as in Mumbai - follows this projection, the Jihadist kills off the qualities that he despises, now conveniently discovered in the person of the other: “This coward deserves nothing but death.”
Unfortunately, diagnosing the aggravated Shame syndrome will not lead to a cure. The Jihadists, whether in Mumbai or Palestine, can only be killed or jailed.
Chesler: Hello everyone, I am honored to join you.
First, we have no specific details about the torture or sexualized mutilation in Mumbai. The only article that addressed this, but only briefly, is the Mumbai Mirror. The photograph is not clear nor does the reporter, Santosh Mishra, give us any specific data. In the past month, only one Indian doctor was quoted, over and over again, saying that what he saw was "horrifying" and that he's never seen anything like it. For example:
“Doctors working in a hospital where all the bodies, including that of the terrorists, were taken said they had not seen anything like this in their lives.
Asked what was different about the victims of the incident, another doctor said: "It was very strange. I have seen so many dead bodies in my life, and was yet traumatised. A bomb blast victim's body might have been torn apart and could be a very disturbing sight. But the bodies of the victims in this attack bore such signs about the kind of violence of urban warfare that I am still unable to put my thoughts to words," he said.”
The other doctor, who had also conducted the post-mortem of the victims, said: "Of all the bodies, the Israeli victims bore the maximum torture marks. It was clear that they were killed on the 26th itself. It was obvious that they were tied up and tortured before they were killed. It was so bad that I do not want to go over the details even in my head again," he said.”
This refusal, or perhaps inability, (of the physicians, police, counter-terrorism officials, family members--possibly the media), to provide us with full forensic details is understandable but frustrating but it also functions as another kind of terrorism. We are free to imagine "the worst" -- but not based on an actual forensic report with specific details.
I wonder if it is wise to engage in psycho-analytic elaborate deep psycho-analytic depth based on what we know in general about Arab, Muslim, male, and terrorist culture which runs the gamut from how they themselves are reared from infancy coupled with the ways in which sexual repression and indoctrination into terrorism jointly operate in terms of torture.
We have just learned two more things in terms of Mumbai and Al-Qaeda. First, that Jews were the highest-priority target in Mumbai. And, that Al-Qaeda has been using child pornography and pedophile sites to safely communicate with each other.
Therefore, based on this recent and additional information, I agree with Dr. Gutmann that central Asia has become Arabized and "Palestinianized." This means that the tribal/collective mentality which engages in the "unspoken" forms of sexualized child abuse (this includes the anal rape of both male and female children), can and does lead to adult paranoia, imagined "slights," savage scapegoating, the practice of human sacrifice and in the need for perpetual revenge to cleanse the real and imagined "shame."
But, these are behaviors that Arabs and Muslims engage in towards their own families and peoples. We need to understand how such normatively pathological groups then "cleanse" themselves of dishonor differently by attacking infidel groups, especially infidel women.
I think Dr. Gutmann's discussion of the Jew as "woman" is very good as is his understanding that the infidel must first be "feminized," by means of torture in order for the terrorist's shame to be "cleansed." I am sure that Dr. Kobrin will have quite a lot to say about this.
One last point: Some of this terrible behavior is not only confined to the Arabian Peninsula or to modern-era terrorism. I would bet that the Afghans taught Bin Laden a thing or two in Afghanistan. For example: an Afghan acquaintance recently related the following story to me:
Back in the 1940s, a close friend of his father's left Kabul for Kandahar. He set up shop as a mullah. He may have been teaching some local women to read or lending books to those who could already do so. One night, his door flies open, and, without a word, three Pushtun men knife him to death in front of his wife and three children, cut his body up into very small pieces, load them into two burlap bags and disappear into the night. His widow flees with her children and seeks asylum and justice in Kabul. Here is what the chief of police told her: He said that yes, he could send some men. The fighting would be close and fierce, he would have to lose some men in order to capture even one of the three murderers. But, he pointed out, were that to happen, the widow's days would be numbered, as would the days of her three children. They would be dead in days. He advised her to "let it go." And she did.
My point: Tribes are savage and atavistic in how they treat their "own." We need more specific forensic information about the torture and sexual mutilation in Bombay/Mumbai in order to psycho-analyze the tragic crime scene.
Kobrin: I want to thank FrontPage and you, Jamie, for intuitively picking up on the need to discussion the imagery of terrorism via the subject of mutilation. The mass media over-focuses on “the talk” of the terrorists and not their “walk.” The media doesn’t question “how they [perpetrators] perform tasks and take action” (p. 66) to borrow Dan Korem’s analogy (cf. his excellent book The Rage of the Random Actor).
This is not to say that the mass media doesn’t get off on the gruesome imagery – they just don’t bother or attempt to understand its symbolic communication. Perhaps because it is too terrorizing so that the media forms an identification with the aggressor. The media hypes the sadomasochism. Hence the media engages in mass mediated passive terrorism. There must be a way that the media can be held accountable for this. I don’t know but Korem rightly notes that the media acts as an accelerant for the perpetrators. (p. 75)
Yes, it is very frustrating not to have access to the forensics and that is crucial. My hope though is that with this unique symposium those who are working in the forensics of terrorism will be willing to explore this symbolic communication, a kind of pantomime that these terrorists unwittingly reveal to us through this horrific mutilation and the making of body parts. It is the result of a shame honor environment as Phyllis and David rightly note. Troubling too is that there is a Palestinization of violence. The ummah is a fused regressed group which engages in passive terrorism by not setting limits with their terrorists and engage in abusive child-rearing practices. Halim Barakat wrote that the Arab family is a miniature of Arab society.
In shame honor families the symbiotic tie to the mother is suffocating. Sudhir Kakar, a Delhi psychoanalyst, writes about large extended families which remind me of Palestinian families: “. . .the frequent comings and goings of other adults in an extended family can also make children clutch to their own parents, especially the mother with marked intensity as they seek to establish intimacy, enduring and trusting relationship in their inner representational worlds – to establish object constancy. . .” The Color of Violence: Cultural Identities, Religion, and Conflict, p. 93.
Their rage is against their internal mothers, which they project out and into their unwitting victims. The body parts are a symbolic representation of an unintegrated picture of their mothers – part objects of her body left over from very early childhood. They feel persecuted by her because they are not permitted to separate and they are treated as objects by their mothers because of the female’s devalued status. Oddly mutilation is their attempt to seek intimacy.
The mutilation takes us deeper into their internal disturbed lives. To go there we need the brilliant work of Abby Stein, a professor of criminology at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, who devotes a section of her book Prologue to Violence: Child Abuse, Dissociation and Crime, on the mutilation of objects pgs. 54-55. We can speculate by drawing on FBI profiling for serial killers that they have some kind of a sexual perversion. Mutilation expresses rage that can not be satiated by murder.
You might wonder – well these poor Jewish people did to deserve such a brutal death. Indeed the victims of the Mumbai Massacre did nothing wrong but in the eyes of the terrorists and because it is their projection – “. . ..essentially safe figures [i.e. the victims] can radiate menace while ostensibly posing no real threat to psychic integrity.”
Since Stein says it better than I can, I quote at length and pass the baton on to my esteemed colleagues in this symposium for further comment:
“Guilt forms but, instead of leading to mourning and concern, it leads to an even greater feeling of persecution. As regret grows, the victim seems to be rebuking the criminal, especially the partially perceived eyes that transmit blame and musts be existed. The threatening symbol [i.e. the mother] is concretized so that it seems agentic; only obliteration will suffice. Through mutilation, or other kinds of overkill, any chance that the abuser will revive is eliminated; the imagined persecutor is somehow deader than dead. Mutilation is the ultimate evidence of partialization; the victim is cut up to match the internal picture that the offender has of him: a tongue that scolds, hands that pinion and pilfer, feet that abandon, eyes that see all or naught.” P. 55
Lachkar: I would like to start by asking the panel: why don't terrorists just kill their captives? Why do they need to mutilate or cut off their heads? Most photos were too gruesome for Western broadcast to view, but the Arab world had them displayed throughout.
To expand on Kobrin's theme about symbolic communication, I agree that the rage toward the "internal mother" becomes a symbolic enactment of projected rage via mutilation fantasies .e.g, strewn/severed/mutilated body parts as we just witnessed in Mumbai. I would like to refer to this process as the "unmentalized experience." Terrorists are enacting some kind of unconscious fantasy by translocating their rage, their anger, their shame (Aar), their humiliation, their envy and states of deprivation onto others. According to Melanie Klein, it is an unconscious defense mechanism which allows the "projector" to rid the psyche of its unwanted parts by projecting them externally, hence the "external enemy."
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The goal of the projector is to make the "projectee" feel the pain they feel. This is what I have referred to in many of my earlier articles as a collective group unconscious fantasy. In psychoanalytic terms this is known as projective identification, a most useful concept with patients who exhibit primitive defenses, but also helpful in understanding horrific crimes and torturous acts committed on innocent victims by terrorist militant organizations. I believe the answer lies in this concept and is applicable to such groups as Hamas who share similar characteristics. To state this more bluntly: I collectively diagnose them as having a severe malignant borderline personality disorder.
It all comes down to victimization. Using innocent women and children as human shields is a good example. Muslims have learned the art of how to evoke world sympathy. "Look what the bad Americans and Israeli's have done to us. They have destroyed our mosques and schools." The LA Times has even been coerced to referring to them as "Courageous Victims (1/8/08, p1). Al Jazeera uses such phrases as "war crimes" and Palestinian Holocaust." This resorts back to the primitive mind because Arabs have been brainwashed through dogmatic verses paralyzing the capacity to think.
Victimization is the outcome of projective identification that which strips the psyche of all rational thought, the capacity to think, action without critical thinking (Taqlid). "So I will cut off the Rabbi's head so he won't be able think, (the Talmudic mind), and cut off his penis so he won't make more babies (envy as the replacement for thought). "Now you can go to hell and show the devil how you have sinned (Israeli analyst Ronit Brautbar, personal communication). One could say there is a clash of logic, "Inshallah" (the will of Allah), and the other by reason. This can explain why Islam holds a double standard. "You can't make fun of Mohammad but we can make buffoons out of your Rabbis (not only make fun of but mutilate them.)"
According to Klein, all children have murderous and mutilation fantasies, the difference is that as the child evolves the child learns the difference between the fantasy and the act itself. In other words, it is one thing to fantasize about cutting up mother's breast or daddy's penis (as did her children do in play therapy with dolls), but it is another thing to actually do it. I believe O.J. Simpson is a good example of this. I believe this is what is meant by "primitive defenses" or the primitive mind.
This brings our attention to the whole enigma that Islam is allegedly a religion of peace. Why would the terrorists sexually humiliate the guests before killing them? An example of this lies in the concept of peace. Islam has become a political ideology more than a religion. What most people don't realize is that what peace may mean to a Westerner or an Israeli has a different meaning to a Muslim. Peace in the generic terms means "peace." To an Arab it means "honor" (sharaf). Honor means to save face which ultimately leads to revenge and retaliation at any cost.
I completely agree with Guttman's analysis as he associates these savage acts to Palestinian shame and perversion which lurks behind an entire "shame culture," or what Chesler aptly refers to as "cleansing." What I might like to add to the mix is how perversion is inextricably linked to sadism and erotic voyeurism. Robert Stoller (1975) in Hostility of Sex explains how the voyeur derives pleasure through hostility, revenge and being in complete control.
They know how to play the shame/blame game. The Muslim ego never admits to defeat, even if they lose they pretend they won or else blame the Americans or the West. To preserve the group's identity away from shame the preservation of self becomes a more pervasive force than life itself. In sum, terrorism is designed not only to brutalize their victims but also to threaten our freedom, our democracy and our safety. Thus we have beheadings and mutilated genitals.
Gutmann: My co-contributors have added much to our understanding of the motivations driving the Mumbai (and other) Islamic terrorists. But as has been pointed out, there is a limit to what even the most sensitive clinicians can infer from data that lacks forensic detail and personal information.
So I will switch my focus from questions of motive, to questions of prevention.
If, as has been suggested, Islamic terrorism is a product of an Islamic culture devoted to overcoming the sense of humiliation, then how – short of allowing ourselves to be humiliated by the Jihadists – can we Americans, Jews and Europeans of the Democratic West defeat the extremists without adding to the sense of shame that fuelled the sadistic rage of Mumbai?
Not an easy task: the Islamists hoard their shame: they still remember, bitterly, the crusades, and their loss of Spanish Andalucia to the Catholics in the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, the United States has successfully fought and tamed Shame/Honor societies in the past. The Confederacy, the Germans, the Japanese, the Italians, all paradigm Shame/Honor societies, were all overcome in total wars, and all became either part of our nation, or our trusted Democratic allies. And it now begins to appear that Iraq and perhaps Afghanistan will join their company.
There appears to be a uniquely American approach to war – one combining ruthlessness and mercy - that can lead to such unexpectedly good outcomes. Thus, as with the Germans and Japanese in WWII, we first ruthlessly firebombed and A-bombed their cities, destroyed their air forces, sank their fleets, demanded unconditional surrender, and decapitated their wartime leadership. But then, against all precedents, as victors we did not pilfer their industry, turn their men into slaves or their women into whores. Instead, in peace-time we showed a quality of mercy that could not have been predicted from our practice of total war - the mercy that a humiliated enemy would not expect from a triumphant conqueror. Thus, we sponsored the rise of hitherto suppressed moderate leaders, we helped to rebuild the enemy’s shattered cities; and under the Marshall Plan we encouraged their economies to the point where the Germans and Japanese became, for awhile, our major competitors for world markets.
Perhaps, and more important, we may have changed the cultural bases of Japanese and German self-esteem, away from shame-avoidant systems based on autocratic rule over inferiors and women, to a system in which self-esteem is based on tangible accomplishments in the market-place of goods and ideas.
Unfortunately, in bringing about such benign outcomes, total war is as important as mercy and must precede it. The warriors of a Shame/Honor society must be crushed militarily, before they are ready to appreciate, and to respond to, the healing quality of mercy.
Chesler: I love Kobrin's references and how she uses them. I agree with the concept that "mutilation expresses rage that cannot be satiated by murder" and that it renders the "imagined persecutor" as "deader than dead."
I also very much like what Lakhar says, especially that "Arabs have been brainwashed through dogmatic verses paralyzing the capacity to think." I think we all agree that a "shame and honor" culture means that the "shamed" or "humiliated" children (and brainwashed adults) will perpetually be seeking "honor," over and over again. Gutmann is right to want to switch to prevention.
Alas, it is too late to prevent what is already upon the West in Europe. The Intifada of 2000 has gone global in a frightening, almost "sudden" kind of way. From their perches at the universities and the UN, the Muslim mobs have taken to the streets. Gaza is global. The same kind of Muslim mob that accounts for the intimidation and murder of most other Muslims--is now unleashed in Europe and on North American campuses and political demonstrations.
If Europe does not immediately deport the radical mullahs and their faithful followers they really are doomed. And, if North America allows them entry (via sermons on al-Jazeera, satellite television, poisonous academics) then we too will find ourselves increasingly at risk. There are only 5-8 million Muslims in America as compared to 30-50 million Muslims in Europe. Of course, America should remain a safe haven for Muslim and ex-Muslim dissidents, feminists and secularists but I no longer think we can afford to "tolerate" the intolerant, to "negotiate" with the sadistic death-eaters.
The idea that President Obama has already dispatched George Mitchell -- not to solve the crises in Darfur or Congo--but in Gaza -- fills me with sorrow. We now know that no more than 600, mainly Hamas terrorists, died while fighting in Gaza, and that very few civilians died. We also know that Israel kept Gaza supplied with humanitarian aid--something America and our allies did not do during the bombing of Dresden, Berlin, Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
The Dalai Lama recently admitted that "non-violence" against terrorism is useless and will not work because their minds are "closed." One cannot negotiate with closed minds.
I agree with Gutmann in terms of his analogy to how World War Two was won. The de-programming that has to take place cannot even begin until the West has won the day militarily and economically.
Kobrin: I agree with Gutmann in his view wanting to shift us away from mere discussion to that of prevention. Understanding the root causes helps us think more clearly about what needs to be done.
For example, understanding the shame-honor aspect that runs throughout Islamic ideologies and death like fusional imagery dovetailing with tribe and clan cultures, the combination reinforces a concept known in psychoanalytic terms as splitting, i.e. thinking in terms of good and bad, black and white, love and hate thinking -- which promotes hatred and violence because there is no room for areas in between.
With shame and blame comes the inability to think. A closed mind, instilled in early childhood, leads to deprivation, which in turn leads to envy. which then leads to revenge and retaliation at all costs -- even self-sacrifice.
This kind of closed mind has an insatiable reservoir of rage at its core, the likes of which engages in the theme of our symposium – mutilation. This kind of perversion has no boundaries and it profusely bonds and fuses with its victims through mutilation and murder.
Now I will turn to prevention. One way that I have learned well from Lachkar is that when you are in such a hostile environment where the blaming and the threats are non-stop, boundaries maintain safety. Is this not too the ultimate function of war? Establishing a firm boundary. You have to draw a line in the sand and defend it. Hamas still needs to be brought to its knees as well as Hezbollah. The entire culture has to be rebuilt as Gutmann rightly suggests.
Chesler opens the next avenue which must be explored more systematically and that is the media – what to do with it and how should we counter a media that is now identified with the aggressor? What are our options? As Nacos has written, we have mass mediated terrorism. One might refer to this as covert terrorism. Terrorism that is implicit, so most people do not recognize its destructive nature. That is why scapegoating occurs so frequently.
We are now all connected and attached via its imagery. Lachkar points out though that there is a difference between what American news carries concerning images and Arab news channels. It seems that so much more needs to be understood. Indeed some would argue that our attachment to the internet and the media especially during a terrorist attack like Mumbai is addictive in nature and I would argue, expresses a kind of traumatic bonding concerning our mothers. This is the hidden realm of our own terrors, which we share in common with the terrorists. This is how the terrorists speak to us even though we may not know Arabic. They speak in a nonverbal language which I call Desperanto. We get hooked into their terrors as human beings.
As I have said before terrorists don’t have a normative sense of intimacy; their intimacy is violence, blood, mass murder, hysteria of suicide, threats, etc. While this region is foreboding to most, it is key to dismantling the blunt force of terrorism. It is also the "gift of terror" to expand upon the work of Gavin De Becker's Gift of Fear. We have the potential to turn the tables on the terrorists and to call their bluff, even though the work is deadly and serious.
Lachkar: I am very much impressed with Guttman's courage and bravado that although he values our contributors’ psychological insights and motivations, his focus moves the attention to prevention. I agree and appreciate his hard core stance that one must create strong hard-line boundaries or as Chesler reminds us: that even the Dalai Lama admits that "non-violence" against terrorism is useless."
So where do prevention and psychology meet? I believe they go together. Before we "prevent" we must "understand." Kobrin focuses on the early internal mother as a symbolic representation of projected rage via sadism and mutilation fantasies. I expand the notion to the idea that all children have sadistic and mutilation fantasies, and eventually evolve learning the difference between an act of "doing" from an act of "thinking about doing."
Knowing how to play the shame/blame game leads to what I refer to as a collective ego dysfunctionality -- with all the components of victimization, envy and distortions in thinking, judgment and perception, and a media that knows how to manipulate public opinion.
The transparent nature of the Muslim culture must be exposed. For example, when confronted about human rights abuse, the Muslim world often turns it around claiming human rights is a Western concept and not applicable to the Muslim world. How about educating young Muslim potential terrorist recruits, lonely isolated young men who get seduced and enticed into the brotherhood as they are met with warm welcoming embraces, let alone good food, hospitality, music and promises belonging to assuage their isolation and endless feelings of desolation? Finally, I conclude with what I mentioned in our last symposium: we must train and instil worldwide peace counsellors throughout the world, providing education and insights along with cultural events (music, dance, art etc.)
FP: Dr. Joanie Lachkar, Dr. David Gutmann, Dr. Phyllis Chesler and Dr. Nancy Kobrin, thank you for joining Frontpage Symposium.
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Ummm , , , why is this good post , , , in this thread? :? :lol:
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The Mumbai hostages were sexually assaulted and mutilated.
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A point that is rather tangential to the subject of this piece I'm thinking , , , how about here
http://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=1661.msg19700#msg19700
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For those intertested in Af-Pak-India affairs two perceptive sites...which have a good track record...
http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2009/02/waziristan_taliban_a.php
http://www.orbat.com/
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Top nuclear expert missing in India
One of India's leading nuclear scientists has gone missing in mysterious circumstances provoking fears he has been kidnapped for classified information
By Barney Henderson in Mumbai
Published: 5:13PM BST 12 Jun 2009
Lokanathan Mahalingam had access to some of the country's most sensitive nuclear information and the government has ordered an inquiry into his disappearance.
Mr Mahalingam, 47, worked at the Kaiga Atomic Power Station in Karnataka, close to Project Seabird, a major military base.
He went for a walk early on Monday morning and has not been seen since.
Authorities are not yet sure whether his disappearance poses a security threat and the Indian Intelligence Bureau is investigating whether he has been eaten by leopards, committed suicide, disappeared wilfully or been kidnapped.
Colleagues said that Mr Mahalingam, who works in the simulator training division of the nuclear power plant, is an introvert with few friends but no enemies.
A manhunt is under way in the 1000 acres of dense forest of the Western Ghats that surrounds the Kaiga plant.
Police played down the threat to classified information, but they have not ruled out the possibility that Mr Mahalingam has been kidnapped by a group attempting to sabotage the plant.
Five years ago, a heavily armed gang attempted to kidnap an official from India's Nuclear Power Corporation in the same forest, but he managed to escape.
"The investigation is being handled at a very high level due to the sensitive nature of the case," an investigating officer said. "At the moment it is a complete mystery and we are looking at every possibility.
"There are man-eating leopards in the jungle so that is a possibility and we are of course looking into whether he has been kidnapped too. There are four separate teams searching for clues and we hope to make a breakthrough soon."
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-in-India.html
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From a well regarded friend in India in response to my forwarding the previous post to him:
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Unless, there is a big cover up...it seems that there is not much to worry, no one is talking about a possible kidnapping.
"Mr Mahalingam is a fairly low level employee who was moved to HR and training duties because he was not found appropriate for placement elsewhere. Mr Mahalingam trains some apprentices and others who work at the power plant.
Mr Mahalingam worked at the Kaiga Atomic Power Station in Karnataka. This facility is used solely for power generation and is not the repository of any state or atomic secrets. Its a profit center for the NPCIL which is headquartered in Bombay. Most of the Kaiga activities are controlled from there, like from any headquarters.
"Top nuclear expert missing in India" is a motivated and prejudiced media hype that is being perpetrated by interested parties ( US and our good neighbors, both pakis and the chinks.) and our very own DDM (desi dork media) who is definitely being paid off.
Top nuclear expert is not something that even Mr Mahalingam would describe himself, even in his wildest dreams.
He was, in an earlier posting also found "missing" for a number of days and created a similar controversy. On his return, he claimed that he had gone to seek spiritual solace.
Let us hope that he finds the solace that he seeks and soon so that he can return to his family at the earliest."
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U.S. Accuses Pakistan of Altering Missiles
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August 30, 2009
U.S. Accuses Pakistan of Altering Missiles
By ERIC SCHMITT and DAVID E. SANGER
WASHINGTON
The United States has accused Pakistan of illegally modifying American-made missiles to expand its capability to strike land targets, a potential threat to India, according to senior administration and Congressional officials.
The charge, which set off a new outbreak of tensions between the United States and Pakistan, was made in an unpublicized diplomatic protest in late June to Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani and other top Pakistani officials.
The accusation comes at a particularly delicate time, when the administration is asking Congress to approve $7.5 billion in aid to Pakistan over the next five years, and when Washington is pressing a reluctant Pakistani military to focus its attentions on fighting the Taliban, rather than expanding its nuclear and conventional forces aimed at India.
While American officials say that the weapon in the latest dispute is a conventional one — based on the Harpoon antiship missiles that were sold to Pakistan by the Reagan administration as a defensive weapon in the cold war — the subtext of the argument is growing concern about the speed with which Pakistan is developing new generations of both conventional and nuclear weapons.
“There’s a concerted effort to get these guys to slow down,” one senior administration official said. “Their energies are misdirected.”
At issue is the detection by American intelligence agencies of a suspicious missile test on April 23 — a test never announced by the Pakistanis — that appeared to give the country a new offensive weapon.
American military and intelligence officials say they suspect that Pakistan has modified the Harpoon antiship missiles that the United States sold the country in the 1980s, a move that would be a violation of the Arms Control Export Act. Pakistan has denied the charge, saying it developed the missile itself. The United States has also accused Pakistan of modifying American-made P-3C aircraft for land-attack missions, another violation of United States law that the Obama administration has protested.
Whatever their origin, the missiles would be a significant new entry into Pakistan’s arsenal against India. They would enable Pakistan’s small navy to strike targets on land, complementing the sizable land-based missile arsenal that Pakistan has developed. That, in turn, would be likely to spur another round of an arms race with India that the United States has been trying, unsuccessfully, to halt. “The focus of our concern is that this is a potential unauthorized modification of a maritime antiship defensive capability to an offensive land-attack missile,” said another senior administration official, who also spoke on the condition of anonymity because the matter involves classified information.
“The potential for proliferation and end-use violations are things we watch very closely,” the official added. “When we have concerns, we act aggressively.”
A senior Pakistani official, also speaking on the condition of anonymity because the interchanges with Washington have been both delicate and highly classified, said the American accusation was “incorrect.” The official said that the missile tested was developed by Pakistan, just as it had modified North Korean designs to build a range of land-based missiles that could strike India. He said that Pakistan had taken the unusual step of agreeing to allow American officials to inspect the country’s Harpoon inventory to prove that it had not violated the law, a step that administration officials praised.
Some experts are also skeptical of the American claims. Robert Hewson, editor of Jane’s Air-Launched Weapons, a yearbook and Web-based data service, said the Harpoon missile did not have the necessary range for a land-attack missile, which would lend credibility to Pakistani claims that they are developing their own new missile. Moreover, he said, Pakistan already has more modern land-attack missiles that it developed itself or acquired from China.
“They’re beyond the need to reverse-engineer old U.S. kit,” Mr. Hewson said in a telephone interview. “They’re more sophisticated than that.” Mr. Hewson said the ship-to-shore missile that Pakistan was testing was part of a concerted effort to develop an array of conventional missiles that could be fired from the air, land or sea to address India’s much more formidable conventional missile arsenal.
The dispute highlights the level of mistrust that remains between the United States and a Pakistani military that American officials like to portray as an increasingly reliable partner in the effort to root out the forces of the Taliban and Al Qaeda on Pakistani territory. A central element of the American effort has been to get the military refocused on the internal threat facing the country, rather than on threat the country believes it still faces from India.
Pakistani officials have insisted that they are making that shift. But the evidence continues to point to heavy investments in both nuclear and conventional weapons that experts say have no utility in the battle against insurgents.
Over the years, the United States has provided a total of 165 Harpoon missiles to Pakistan, including 37 of the older-model weapons that were delivered from 1985 to 1988, said Charles Taylor, a spokesman for the Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
The country’s nuclear arsenal is expanding faster than any other nation’s. In May, Pakistan conducted a test firing of its Babur medium-range cruise missile, a weapon that military experts say could potentially be tipped with a nuclear warhead. The test was conducted on May 6, during a visit to Washington by President Asif Ali Zardari, but was not made public by Pakistani officials until three days after the meetings had ended to avoid upsetting the talks. While it may be technically possible to arm the Harpoons with small nuclear weapons, outside experts say it would probably not be necessary.
Before Congress departed for its summer recess, administration officials briefed crucial legislators on the protest to Pakistan. The dispute has the potential to delay or possibly even derail the legislation to provide Pakistan with $7.5 billion in civilian aid over five years; lawmakers are scheduled to vote on the aid package when they return from their recess next month.
The legislation is sponsored by Senators John Kerry of Massachusetts and Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, the top Democrat and Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as Representative Howard L. Berman, a California Democrat who leads the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Congressional aides are now reconciling House and Senate versions of the legislation.
Frederick Jones, a spokesman for Mr. Kerry, declined to comment on the details of the dispute citing its classified nature but suggested that the pending multifaceted aid bill would clear Congress “in a few weeks” and would help cooperation between the two countries.
“There have been irritants in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in the past and there will be in the future,” Mr. Jones said in a statement, noting that the pending legislation would provide President Obama “with new tools to address troubling behavior.”
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/30/wo...ef=global-home
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Bear mauls, kills two high-ranking separatists hiding in cave in Kashmir
By Ethan Sacks
DAILY NEWS STAFF WRITER
Originally Published:Tuesday, November 3rd 2009, 10:35 AM
Updated: Tuesday, November 3rd 2009, 10:35 AM
Mustafa/GettyA Himilayan Black bear like this one mauled two Muslim separatists in Kashmir, police said.
A group of Muslim separatists in Kashmir picked the wrong cave for a hideout.
A police spokesman said an angry bear mauled two high-ranking Hizbul Mujahideen commanders who had set up camp inside its cave in the southern part of the Indian-run state, the Hindustan Times reported.
Though the men were armed with AK-47 machine guns, "the attack seems to have been so violent that both the militants got no chance to fire back at the wild animal," the spokesman, Col. JS Brar, told the Indian newspaper.
Two other militants were injured by the Himilayan black bear, but managed to escape and make their way to a nearby village for help, the BBC reported.
One of the dead men was later identified as Siafullah, the insurgency group's district commander.
Police believe it's the first such mauling of its kind since Muslim separatists launched their 1989 campaign against Indian rule in 1989.
Ironically, wild animal populations like bears and leopards have flourished since the armed conflict intensified - a fact attributed to the absence of poachers in areas of heavy fighting, the BBC reported.
Read more: http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/2009/11/03/2009-11-03_bear_mauls_kills_two_highranking_muslim_separatists_hiding_out_in_cave_in_kashmi.html?print=1&page=all#ixzz0VuzbOjGq
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Pakistan, India: Nuclear Rivalry on the Subcontinent
Stratfor Today » November 25, 2009 | 1516 GMT
ASIF HASSAN/AFP/Getty Images
Pakistani ballistic missiles on display in Karachi in November 2008Summary
Pakistan and India have been locked in a bitter regional rivalry since their partition into separate entities on the Indian subcontinent in 1947. Three wars and a nuclear arms race later, the two countries are miles apart in terms of strategic capability. India had a head start in developing nuclear weapons and thus has more confidence in their utility, while Pakistan remains geopolitically exposed and vulnerable — with a greater need for a nuclear deterrent.
Analysis
Related Links
The Geopolitics of India: A Shifting, Self-Contained World
Part 1: The Perils of Using Islamism to Protect the Core
Part 2: A Crisis in Indian-Pakistani Relations
Part 3: Making It on Its Own
Nuclear Weapons: Devices and Deliverable Warheads
Nuclear Weapons: The Question of Relevance in the 21st Century
Nuclear Weapons: Terrorism and the Nonstate Actor
The North Korean Nuclear Test and Geopolitical Reality
Debunking Myths About Nuclear Weapons and Terrorism
Related Special Topic Page
Special Series: Countries In Crisis
In August, a pair of independent U.S. nuclear experts estimated that Pakistan had 70 to 90 nuclear warheads in its arsenal, an increase over their 2007 estimate of 60 weapons. But it was only in a follow-on publication of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists released Nov. 10 that the latest figure appeared, along with the estimate of the size of India’s arsenal — a lower figure of 60 to 80 warheads (the last full assessment of India’s arsenal was published in 2008). The report was picked up a week later in the Indian press, on the heels of an article in the Nov. 16 issue of The New Yorker on Pakistani nuclear security.
These are only the most recent high points in the ongoing media clamor over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the status of nuclear forces on the subcontinent and a pending Bush-era civilian nuclear deal between India and the United States (Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh arrived in Washington on Nov. 22 to discuss the deal). But the latest figures on the size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal are only estimates and provide little perspective on the more complex underlying issues. While STRATFOR continues to examine and closely monitor Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, we thought it timely and appropriate to focus now on the realities of the nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent.
A Brief History
India tested its first nuclear device in 1974, but it began planning to construct the facility in which to reprocess the plutonium that would ultimately produce the fissile material for that test in 1964. By comparison, Pakistan’s program began in earnest in 1972, following the country’s devastating defeat by India in 1971 that resulted in the loss of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). But even though the program was initiated, much needed to be done to consolidate control over the country and reconstitute the military in the wake of that conflict. In other words, when Pakistan began its nuclear program, India was already nearing completion of its first full-scale nuclear device.
Nevertheless, then-Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made it clear following India’s 1974 nuclear test that Pakistan would develop a nuclear weapon even if the Pakistani people had to eat grass. Perhaps no other statement better reflects Pakistan’s determination to develop and maintain a nuclear deterrent against India.
From its 1974 test until 1998, India had nearly a quarter century to learn from the data and experience that came from the test and to focus on refining the design of its warheads. By the time the two countries faced off with a spate of nuclear tests in 1998, India had a series of second-generation warheads — and what was reported to be a crude thermonuclear configuration — ready to go. The relative maturity of India’s program given its previous experience and the comparative wealth of intellectual, human and fiscal resources that New Delhi enjoyed meant that India was in a position to take a much greater leap forward in terms of nuclear weapons sophistication in 1998 than Pakistan was.
The Challenge of Nuclear Weapons
Despite this comparative advantage, however, India’s five 1998 tests saw only one or two clear, full-scale nuclear detonations. The larger detonation, estimated to have been in the 12-25 kiloton range (i.e., from just smaller than the Hiroshima bomb to just larger than the Nagasaki bomb), is thought to have been the crude thermonuclear design — experts suggest that the second stage may have failed to ignite. India claims a yield roughly three times that which was measured and that several of the remaining tests were intended to have subkiloton yields. The fact is, in the nearly half century since India began making plans to reprocess plutonium for weapons purposes, it has not demonstrated a full-scale weapons test indicative of destructive power beyond that of the basic implosion device used against Nagasaki in 1945.
No doubt India has deployed nuclear weapons that are considerably smaller in size and more efficient than those first American designs from 1945. And it has no doubt adjusted its weapons designs based on the 1998 test data. But India’s position today as a nuclear power serves as a reminder of the challenges of weaponization. Even relatively crude and simple nuclear warhead configurations are incredibly complex, involving highly sophisticated metallurgy, explosives, quality assurance and hardened and reliable circuitry. Having a high degree of confidence that these weapons will work as designed in a crisis when they reach their target is no small matter. After hasty assembly and dispersal, a warhead will experience a wide range of extremes in terms of acceleration, vibration and temperature during the delivery process.
PRAKASH SINGH/AFP/Getty Images
India’s Agni II medium-range ballistic missileTo attain a high degree of confidence, engineers must have an experimental understanding of their warhead designs and configurations that is as close as possible to an understanding of the weapon in its operational environment. Much “subcritical” and other non-nuclear testing can be done, but until these complex and sophisticated designs are validated through actual testing, only relatively small and conservative tweaks are likely to make it into final production weapons.
As a point of comparison, the United States has carried out more than 1,000 nuclear tests over the years, the Soviet Union more than 700. It is on this basis and with this background that the world’s most modern and sophisticated nuclear weapons have been built. A modern and capable country hardly needs hundreds of nuclear tests to build a credible nuclear deterrent, but India’s dearth of testing experience and data is a pivotal constraint on the complexity and sophistication of its deployed arsenal.
And Pakistan suffers from even more profound constraints. The country is geopolitically fractious and fragile. It must expend a great deal of effort to control peripheral territories and dissident populations while mustering enormous resources to build and maintain a standing army to defend Punjab — the country’s core — from India’s qualitatively and quantitatively superior military. Meanwhile, its economy requires considerable capital investment merely to function. For a country like Pakistan to build and field a nuclear arsenal at all is an impressive achievement.
But the existence of a Pakistani nuclear arsenal must first be understood as a testament to the disadvantages Pakistan faces in its rivalry with India. The intensity of this rivalry, even in times of relative tranquility, is difficult to overstate. It is the omnipresence of India and the Pakistani fear of Indian aggression — perhaps the one thing that all the ethnic and religious groups in Pakistan can agree on — that has made the immense investment in the nuclear arsenal over the course of decades possible.
And at the end of the day, no matter what Pakistan does to further develop its nuclear program, as long as the fundamental dynamics that define the rivalry on the subcontinent persist, Pakistan is unlikely to ever catch up with India. India started its program earlier and enjoyed a considerable lead in terms of testing, and it continues to work diligently to maintain that lead. And this gap is one India has a strong incentive to maintain by continuing its own program development, which means that Pakistan must work frantically simply to prevent the gap from getting any wider.
Though Pakistan reportedly obtained some nuclear test data from China (which was probably old test data) and some designs (which also may have come from China) for the configuration of nuclear warheads, the real trick was the application of this data. Testing data is far more applicable to the arsenal of the country of origin and has only limited applicability to a foreign country independently developing its own arsenal. One country’s test data also does not validate another country’s manufacturing or quality assurance processes. Because of this, even if Pakistan received test data from a number of other countries, it would not give Pakistan the boost it needed to surpass India.
Similarly, blueprints for proven weapons designs are certainly helpful, but it is the testing of indigenously manufactured versions that really validates a country’s attempts to re-create or modify the designs. In the case of both outside weapons designs and testing data, it is the application of foreign data or other assistance and subsequent validation that really matters.
This application began with Pakistan’s six tests in 1998. Only two produced yields in the kiloton range, and neither reached even the low threshold of the roughly 16 kilotons of the Hiroshima bomb. (Pakistan claims that several were intended to be subkiloton tests.) Though Pakistan undoubtedly learned a great deal from these tests, it has not had the opportunity — as India has had — to subject lessons learned from those tests to a second round.
Correlation of Forces
This is not to say that the nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent is not the most dynamic and fast-paced in the world today. It is. And this certainly is not to say that the programs of both countries are not advancing at a considerable pace. They are. But while estimates of the size of their nuclear arsenals may spark some international concern or have some geopolitical significance, they tell us next to nothing about the strategic military balance on the subcontinent. This is because each country approaches the issue of maintaining its nuclear arsenal from a very different perspective.
India enjoys considerable strategic depth and holds the advantage in terms of the range of its delivery systems. Its qualitative and quantitative advantages extend to the conventional battlefield, and its core is not immediately vulnerable to conventional Pakistani aggression. In short, it has more time to react and can store some of its weapons outside of Pakistan’s reach, meaning that New Delhi can feel more secure with fewer weapons.
Every weapon in Pakistan, by comparison, is within range of India’s arsenal. Indian forces poised on the Pakistani border are also poised on the Punjabi core, the demographic, industrial, agricultural and geographic heartland of Pakistan. Pakistan must have more nuclear weapons to account for attrition of its arsenal and also to react on the battlefield to overwhelming conventional Indian force. Islamabad does not enjoy the luxury of time that New Delhi does. Similarly, Pakistan has far more reason to be concerned about the reliability and operational performance of its weapons in combat, which means that for each target or operational need it must dedicate additional bombs to account for that uncertainty.
Pakistan’s strategic disadvantages, in other words, present a substantial need for nuclear weapons. On the other hand, India enjoys considerably more room to maneuver, allowing it to rely less on its nuclear arsenal for its strategic security. Given (in all likelihood) India’s considerably higher degree of confidence in its weapons, its ideal nuclear strength may actually be less than Pakistan’s.
In any case, debating the precise status of the arsenals when the details of each are a matter of national security — and especially when estimates place them so close together — is largely academic. What is knowable about the strategic balance between India and Pakistan is defined by clear constraints and geopolitical realities. Despite progress in developing the Pakistani arsenal, nothing in the last decade has altered the fundamental realities of the nuclear rivalry on the subcontinent.
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Summary
Rumors are circulating on the Indian subcontinent over the reported presence of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Pakistani-administered Kashmir, ostensibly to provide protection for aid and construction workers. STRATFOR sources in the area have indicated that these reports are overblown, but China’s growing reassertion of territorial claims in the region will not go ignored by India and will give New Delhi and Washington another cause for cooperation. The prospect of greater U.S.-Indian defense cooperation and waning U.S. interest in Afghanistan will meanwhile drive Pakistan closer to China, creating a series of self-perpetuating threats on the subcontinent.
Analysis
U.S. Pacific Command head Adm. Robert F. Willard is on a two-day visit to India to meet with the Indian defense leadership Sept. 9-10. Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony will follow up his meetings with Willard when he meets with U.S. defense leaders in Washington at the end of September. With an arduous war being fought in Afghanistan and India’s fears growing over Pakistan-based militancy, there is no shortage of issues for the two sides to discuss. But there is one additional topic of discussion that is now elevating in importance: Chinese military moves on the Indian subcontinent.
Allegations over a major increase of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops in northern Kashmir have been circulating over the past several weeks, with an Op-Ed in The New York Times claiming that as many as 7,000 to 11,000 PLA troops have flooded into the northern part of Pakistani-administered Kashmir, known as the Gilgit-Baltistan region. This is an area through which China has been rebuilding the Karakoram Highway, which connects the Chinese region of Xinjiang by road and rail to Pakistan’s Chinese-built and funded ports on the Arabian Sea. Though Chinese engineers have been working on this infrastructure for some time, new reports suggest that several thousand PLA troops are stationed on the Khunjerab Pass on the Xinjiang border to provide security to the Karakoram Highway construction crews. Handfuls of militants have been suspected of transiting this region in the past to travel between Central Asia, Afghanistan and China’s Xinjiang province, and Chinese construction crews in Pakistan have been targeted a number of times by jihadists in Pakistan and Afghanistan. That said, a large Chinese troop presence in the region is likely to serve a larger purpose than simply stand-by protection for Chinese workers.
(click here to enlarge image)
Pakistan responded by describing the reports as fabricated and said a small Chinese presence was in the area to provide humanitarian assistance in the ongoing flood relief effort. Chinese state media also discussed recently how the Chinese government was shipping emergency aid to Pakistan via Kashgar, Xinjiang province, through the Khunjerab Pass to the Sost dry port in northern Pakistan. India expressed its concern over the reports of Chinese troops in Pakistan-administered Kashmir, said it was working to independently verify the claims, and then claimed to confirm at least 1,000 PLA troops had entered the region.
Such claims of troop deployments in the region are often exaggerated for various political aims, and these latest reports are no exception. STRATFOR is in the process of verifying the exact number of PLA troops in and around Pakistani-administered Gilgit-Baltistan and what percentage of those are combat troops. STRATFOR sources reported that a convoy of approximately 110 Chinese trucks recently delivered some 2,000 metric tons of mostly food aid through the Khunjerab Pass to the Gojal Valley, an area devastated by recent flooding and landslides. Chinese Bridges and Roads Co. (CBRC) has been working on expanding the Karakoram Highway for the past three years and has roughly 700 Chinese laborers and engineers working on the project. The highway expansion is expected to be completed by 2013, but the deadline is likely to be extended as a result of recent flooding.
Though STRATFOR’s on-ground reports so far track closest with the Chinese claims of flood relief operations, such relief and construction work can also provide useful cover for a more gradual buildup and sustained military presence in the region. This prospect is on the minds of many U.S. and Indian defense officials who would not be pleased with the idea of China reinforcing military support for Pakistan through overland supply routes.
Motives Behind the Buildup
Though Pakistan has reacted defiantly to the rumors, Islamabad has much to gain from merely having the rumor out in the open. Pakistan’s geopolitical vulnerability cannot be overstated. The country already faces a host of internally wrenching issues but must also contend with the fact that the Pakistani heartland in the Indus River Valley sits near the border with Pakistan’s much bigger and more powerful Indian rival, denying Islamabad any meaningful strategic depth to adequately defend itself. Pakistan is thus on an interminable search for a reliable, external power patron for its security, and its preferred choice is the United States, which has the military might and economic heft to buttress Pakistani defenses. However, Washington must maintain a delicate balance on the subcontinent, moving between its deepening partnership with India and keeping Pakistan on life support to avoid having India become the unchallenged South Asian hegemon.
Though Pakistan will do whatever it can to hold U.S. interest in an alliance with Islamabad — and keeping the militant threat alive is very much a part of that calculus — it will more often than not be left feeling betrayed by its allies in Washington. With U.S. patience wearing thin on Afghanistan, talk of a U.S. betrayal is naturally creeping up again among Pakistani policymakers as Pakistan fears that a U.S. withdrawal from the region will leave Pakistan with little to defend against India, a massive militant mess to clean up and a weaker hand in Afghanistan. China, while unwilling to put its neck out for Pakistan and provoke retaliation by India, provides Islamabad with a vital military backup that Pakistan can not only use to elicit more defense support against the Indians, but also to capture Washington’s attention with a reminder that a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan could open the door for Chinese military expansion in South Asia.
Chinese motives in the Kashmir affair are more complex. Even before the rumors, India and China were diplomatically sparring over the Chinese government’s recent refusal to issue a visa to a senior Indian army general on grounds that his command includes Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. Such diplomatic flare-ups have become more frequent over the past couple of years, as China has used visa issuances in disputed territory in Kashmir and in Arunachal Pradesh along the northern Indian border to assert its territorial claims while trying to discredit Indian claims. Even beyond Kashmir, China has injected life into its territorial claims throughout the East and South China seas, much to the consternation of the Pacific Rim states.
China’s renewed assertiveness in these disputed territories can be explained in large part by the country’s resource acquisition strategy. As China has scaled up its efforts to scour the globe for energy resources to sustain its elephantine economy, it has increasingly sought to develop a military that can safeguard vital supply lines running through the Indian Ocean basin to and from the Persian Gulf. Building the Karakoram Highway through Kashmir, for example, allows China to substantially cut down the time it takes to transit supplies between the Pakistani coast and China’s western front.
China’s increasing reliance on the military to secure its supply lines for commercial interests, along with other trends, has thus given the PLA a much more prominent say in Chinese policymaking in recent years. This trend has been reinforced by the Chinese government’s need to modernize the military and meet its growing budgetary needs following a large-scale recentralization effort in the 1990s that stripped the PLA of much of its business interests. Over the past decade, the PLA has taken a more prominent role in maintaining internal stability — including responses to natural disasters, riots and other disturbances — while increasing its participation in international peacekeeping efforts. As the PLA’s clout has grown in recent years, Chinese military officials have gone from remaining virtually silent on political affairs to becoming commentators for the Chinese state press on issues concerning Chinese foreign policy.
The PLA’s political influence could also be factoring into the rising political tensions in Kashmir. After all, China’s naval expansion into the Indian Ocean basin for its primarily commercial interests has inevitably driven the modernization and expansion of the Indian navy, a process the United States supports out of its own interest to hedge against China. By both asserting its claims to territory in Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir and raising the prospect of more robust Chinese military support for Pakistan, the Chinese military can benefit from having India’s military focus on ground forces, which require a great deal of resources to maintain a large troop presence in rough terrain, while reducing the amount of attention and resources the Indian military can give to its naval modernization plans.
The Indian Response
There may be a number of commercial, political and military factors contributing to China’s military extensions into South Asia, but India is not as interested in the multifaceted purposes behind China’s moves as it is in the actual movement of troops along the Indian border. From the Indian point of view, the Chinese military is building up naval assets and fortifying its alliance with Pakistan to hem in India. However remote the possibility may be of another futile ground war with China (recall the Sino-Indian war of 1962) across the world’s roughest mountainous terrain, India is unlikely to downplay any notable shifts in China’s military disposition and infrastructure development in the region. India’s traditional response is to highlight the levers it holds with Tibet, which is crucial buffer territory for the Chinese. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s recent visit with the Dalai Lama was certainly not lost on Beijing. Chinese media have already reported recently that India is reinforcing its troop presence in Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh, which flanks the Tibetan plateau. Singh also recently warned that India would have to “take adequate precautions” against Chinese “pinpricks” in Jammu and Kashmir, while maintaining hope of peaceful dialogue.
The Chinese relief work in the area so far does not appear to have reached the level of criticality that would prompt India to reinforce its troop presence in Kashmir. However, tensions are continuing to escalate in the region and any meaningful shift in India’s troop disposition would carry significant military implications for the wider region.
India has been attempting at least symbolically to lower its war posture with Pakistan and better manage its territorial claims by reducing its troop presence in select parts of Indian-administered Kashmir. If India is instead compelled to beef up its military presence in the region in reaction to Sino-Pakistani defense cooperation, Pakistan will be tempted to respond in kind, creating another set of issues for the United States to try to manage on the subcontinent. Washington has faced a persistent struggle in trying to convince Pakistan’s military to focus on the counterinsurgency effort in Pakistan and Afghanistan and leave it to the United States to ensure the Indian threat remains in check. Though the Pakistani security establishment is gradually adjusting its threat matrix to acknowledge the war right now is at home and not with India, Pakistan’s troop disposition remains largely unchanged, with 147,000 troops devoted to the counterinsurgency effort in northwestern Pakistan and roughly 150,000 troops in standard deployment formation along the eastern border with India.
The United States, like India, is keeping a watchful eye on China’s military movements on the subcontinent, providing another reason for the two to collaborate more closely on military affairs. Willard was quoted by the Indian state press Sept. 10 as saying that “any change in military relations or military maneuvers by China that raises concerns of India” could fall within U.S. Pacific Command’s area of responsibility, while also maintaining this is an issue for the Indian military to handle on its own. Though the United States is being exceedingly cautious in defining its role in this affair, it cannot avoid the fact that every time U.S. and Indian defense officials get together to discuss Pakistan and China, Islamabad’s fears of a U.S.-Indian military partnership are reinforced, drawing the Pakistanis closer to China. This combination of insecurities is creating a self-perpetuating threat matrix on the subcontinent with implications for U.S., Indian, Chinese and Pakistani defense strategy.
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Guro Marc as i'm reading this post it's funny because yesterday we received in our federal court house 6 Chinese, two women and 2 males. It is not very common to see them crossing the border, since all federal cases come to us they were there. Anyways just curios about it.
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Sorry 2 females and 4 males. sorry im tired... :-D
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Sometimes we overlook the essential little things....
In the race to build advanced industrial and military products, China has a key advantage: the world's biggest reserves of rare earth minerals that are essential to many of these products.
Full article:
http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20100909mr.html
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Yup.
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Absolutely correct JDN.
And a hat tip from me to GM for having spotted this a ways back. I am up over 50% in TIE and MCP thanks to his having drawn this to my attention :-D :-D :-D
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I just reread the Stratfor piece I posted in this thread on the 10th and there is a lot there worthy of consideration. One thought of many: Strong alliance with India seems to make sense in many ways.
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President Bush did a lot to develop ties with India. Our current resident of the white house has done his best to undo those improved relations.
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Woof,
I have said for a long time that if there is a nuclear war in our lifetime it will take place in this area.
P.C.
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GM:
That is true, including strengthening nuclear relations even though India is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Agreement.
PC:
I suspect the Paks see their nukes as a counter to India's military superiority/numbers; my greater concern is into whose hands the Pak's nukes, technology, and/or materials may wind up.
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Woof,
You hit it on the head, the situation there is sufficiently unstable to make the hair on the back of my neck stand up when I think about it.
P.C
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As best as I can tell, our current strategy in Afg is completely untenable and we do not seem to be thinking outside the box to change it; therefore it seems to me that things may well evolve along the lines/variables that Stratfor describes. IMHO this piece deserves considerable contemplation.
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Woof,
Well the first thing we need to do is stop looking at Afghanistan as a nation with a central government and recognise it as a multi regional, tribal ruled primitive society, with an extremist Islamic bent; which it is. Secondly, after we realistically see it for what it is, stop trying to change that and start working within that society to get the stability and cooperartion that we need to secure it region by region. It would take about twenty years to get the most populated areas working together and the rest will never be controlled. So at best you could possibly have one third of the country relatively secure with the rest being a patchwork of no-man's-lands full of people that want us dead that will have to be policed by drone attacks and small level incursions till the end of time or make the point that if another threat of attack on the U.S. comes from there that since they are already in the stone age we plan to squeeze a number of them into an area where we can nuke them out of existence and be done with them.
P.C.
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I continue to entertain the possibility that solutions will entail recognizing the reality of Pashtunistan, forming alliance with India, and breakiing down the contradiction currently known as Pakistan while bringing central Asian gas down to the sea.
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Woof,
I believe the status quo will only be broken by a major conflict that results in the deaths of millions.
P.C. :cry:
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Civilian Unrest, Not Militancy, in Indian-Controlled Kashmir
Indian authorities deployed thousands of additional federal police personnel across the Kashmir Valley on Tuesday to enforce a curfew, and all flights to Srinagar, the summer capital of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, were canceled due to security fears. The move comes a day after 18 protesters were killed in police shootings — the worst violence in three months of protests in the region. Indian Defense Minister A.K. Antony called the situation “very serious” and said that an all-party meeting would be held in New Delhi on Wednesday. After the meeting, Antony said, the government will decide whether to partially lift a 20-year-old emergency law that many in Kashmir despise: the Armed Forces Special Powers Act, which protects army and paramilitary troops from prosecution and gives them sweeping powers to open fire, detain suspects and confiscate property.
Unrest involving the Muslim majority community in the Kashmir Valley region in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir is not new. Demonstrations by the Muslim community opposing Indian rule in the region have been routine in recent years but were contained by Indian authorities. The latest wave of protests, however, is being described as the worst unrest since the beginning of the uprising in 1989. Certainly, the current round of protests is the longest period of street agitation in the region, and its staying power has forced the Indian government to acknowledge that the situation is no longer business as usual.
“The current unrest in Kashmir is clearly not the handiwork of Islamist militants; it is quite the contrary.”
The region of Kashmir normally is seen as the main point of contention in the historic conflict between South Asia’s two nuclear rivals, India and Pakistan. Within this context, the key issue is seen as Pakistani-backed Islamist militant groups fighting India in Kashmir and in areas far south of the western Himalayan region. Even though the insurgency that broke out in Indian-administered Kashmir in the late 1980s and early 1990s was an indigenous phenomenon, it very quickly became an issue of Pakistani-sponsored Islamist militancy.
The Pakistani-backed militancy reached a climax in the mini-war between India and Pakistan during the summer of 1999 in the Kargil region along the line of control dividing Indian- and Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir. The Pakistani move to try to capture territory on the Indian side of the border failed, and then the post-Sept. 11 global atmosphere made it increasingly difficult for Pakistan to use its Islamist militant proxies against India, particularly in Kashmir. By 2007, Pakistan was in the throes of a domestic insurgency waged by Islamist militants. Then, in November 2008, elements affiliated with the one of the largest Pakistan-based Kashmiri Islamist militant groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, staged attacks in the Indian financial hub, Mumbai.
The Mumbai attacks brought India and Pakistan very close to war, which was avoided via mediation by the United States. More importantly, though, it became clear to Islamabad that not only could it no longer back militants staging attacks in India, it also had to make sure that militants acting independent of the Pakistani state were curbed. Otherwise, it was risking war with India.
Within months of the Mumbai crisis, the Pakistanis were forced into a position where they had to mount a major counterinsurgency offensive in their own northwestern areas that had come under the control of Taliban rebels. As a result, Islamabad is no longer employing militancy as its main tool against India. In fact, Indian officials are saying that Pakistan has changed its strategy and, rather than backing militant groups, is stoking civilian unrest — which brings us back to the problem in Kashmir.
The current unrest in Kashmir is clearly not the handiwork of Islamist militants; it is quite the contrary. There are mass protests and rioting that is much harder to control than militancy. Militant activity can easily be painted as a foreign-backed (read Pakistani-backed) threat, which India achieved rather successfully by containing the militancy in Kashmir. But public agitation, which is indigenous in nature, is not easily dismissed as a Pakistani-backed movement. Furthermore, a violent military response to militant attacks is easier to justify than a violent response to civilian unrest.
Of course, Pakistan is exploiting the issue to its advantage, but that is very different from actually engineering the unrest from the ground up. This explains New Delhi’s concern and the dilemma it faces. India will have to address a new, more sophisticated threat to its authority in Kashmir with a new, more sophisticated response. Pakistan will have an advantage in Kashmir in the meantime. India also faces international pressure over Kashmir, because the crackdowns make India look bad, yet New Delhi has been trying not to internationalize the conflict since it wants to deal with Kashmir on its own terms.
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----- Original Message -----
From:
Sent: Saturday, September 18, 2010 4:39 AM
Subject: fak-ap solution ?
An Afghan bone for Obama to chew on
By M K Bhadrakumar
When Robert Blackwill, who was former United States secretary of state Condoleezza Rice's deputy as national security adviser and George W Bush's presidential envoy to Iraq, took the podium at the International Institute of Strategic Studies think-tank in London on Monday to present his "Plan B" on Afghanistan, readers of the Wall Street Journal would have wondered what was afoot.
Blackwill is wired deep into the bowels of the US establishment, especially the Pentagon headed by Robert Gates. And the IISS prides itself as having been "hugely influential in setting the intellectual structures for managing the Cold War". Thus, the setting on Monday was perfect.
Blackwill has remarkable credentials to undertake exploratory
voyages into the trajectory of US foreign policy. In a memorable opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal in March 2005 titled "A New Deal for New Delhi", he accurately predicted the blossoming of the US-India strategic partnership. He wrote:
The US should integrate India into the evolving global non-proliferation regime as a friendly nuclear weapons state ... Why should the US want to check India's missile capability in ways that could lead to China's permanent nuclear dominance over democratic India? ... We should sell advanced weaponry to India ... Given the strategic challenges ahead, the US should want the Indian armed forces to be equipped with the best weapons systems ... To make this happen, the US has to become a reliable long-term supplier, including through co-production and licensed manufacture arrangements.
Blackwill's construct almost verbatim did become US policy. Again, in December 2007 he penned a most thoughtful article titled "Forgive Russia, Confront Iran". He wrote:
To engage Russia, we need to substantially change our current policy approach to Moscow ... This is not to underrate the difficulties of interacting with Moscow on its external policies and its often-raw pursuit of power politics and spheres of influence ... But there are strategic priorities, substantive trade-offs and creative compromises that Western governments should consider. The West needs to adopt tactical flexibility and moderate compromise with Moscow.
Again, he hit the bull's eye in anticipating the US's reset with Russia. So, an interesting question arises: Is he sprinting indefatigably toward a hat-trick?
There can be no two opinions that the crisis situation in Afghanistan demands out-of-the-box thinking. Blackwill's radically original mind has come up with an intellectual construct when hardly 10 weeks are left for US President Barack Obama to take the plunge into his Afghanistan strategy review.
Blackwill foresees that the US's Afghan counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy is unlikely to succeed and an accommodation of the Taliban in its strongholds becomes inevitable in the near future. The current indications are that the process is already underway. (See Taliban and US get down to talks Asia Times Online, September 10, 2010.)
The Blackwill plan probes the downstream of this "accommodation". Blackwill flatly rules out a rapid withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan as that would be a "strategic calamity" for regional stability, would hand over a tremendous propaganda victory to the world syndicate of Islamist radicals, would "profoundly undermine" the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and would be seen as a failure of US leadership and strategic resolve.
Therefore, he proposes as a US policy goal a rationalization of the tangled, uneven Afghan battlefield so that it becomes more level and predictable and far less bloody, and enforcement of the game can come under new ground rules.
Prima facie, it appears scandalous as a plan calling for the "partition" of Afghanistan, but in actuality it is something else. In short, US forces should vacate the Taliban's historic strongholds in the Pashtun south and east and should relocate to the northern, central and western regions inhabited by non-Pashtun tribes.
Blackwill suggests the US should "enlist" the Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras to do more of the anti-Taliban resistance, instead of COIN. And the US should only take recourse to massive air power and the use of special forces if contingencies arise to meet any residual threats from the Taliban after their politicalaccommodation in their strongholds.
A striking aspect of the Blackwill plan is that it is rooted in Afghan history and politics, the regional milieu and the interplay of global politics. Since 1761, Afghanistan has survived essentially as a loose-knit federation of ethnic groups under Kabul's notional leadership. The plan taps into the interplay of ethnicity in Afghan politics. The political reality today is that the Taliban have come to be the best-organized Afghan group and they are disinterested in a genuinely broad-based power-sharing arrangement in Kabul.
Unsurprisingly, the non-Pashtun groups feel uneasy. Their fears are not without justification insofar as the erstwhile anti-Taliban Northern Alliance has disintegrated and regional powers that are opposed to the Taliban, such as Russia, Iran and India, have such vastly divergent policy objectives (and priorities) that they cannot join hands, leave alone finance or equip another anti-Taliban resistance.
The Kabul government headed by President Hamid Karzai is far too weak to perform such a role. (Blackwill, curiously, doesn't visualize Karzai surviving.) According to Blackwill's plan, the US offers itself as the bulwark against an outright Taliban takeover. It envisages the US using decisive force against any Taliban attempt to expand beyond its Pashtun strongholds in the south and east, and to this end it promises security to non-Pashtun groups.
If it works, the plan could be a geopolitical coup for the US. It quintessentially means the US would hand over to the Taliban (which is heavily under the influence of the Pakistani military) the south and east bordering Pakistan while US forces would relocate to the regions bordering Central Asia and Iran.
The US would be extricating itself from fighting and bloodshed, while at the same time perpetuating its military presence in the region to provide a security guarantee to the weak Kabul government and as a bulwark against anarchy and extremism - on the pattern in Iraq.
The US's and NATO's profile as real-time providers of regional security and stability can only boost their influence in Central Asian capitals.
Seemingly recent random "happenings" mesh with Blackwill's plan, including:
A base to be built for US special forces in Mazar-i-Sharif.
The expansion of the air bases at Bagram and Shindand.
The overhaul of the massive Soviet-era air base in Termez by the US and NATO.
An agreement between the German Bundeswehr and the Uzbek government regarding Termez as a stop-off point for NATO military flights.
Fresh deployments of US special forces in Kunduz.
The US's parleys with non-Pashtun leaders in Berlin.
Mounting pressure on Hamid Karzai's brother Ahmed Wali Karzai to vacate Kandahar
(Blackwill said in an interview with the British Telegraph newspaper last week, "How many people really believe that Kandahar is central to Western civilization? We did not go to Afghanistan to control Kandahar.")
As a seasoned diplomat, Blackwill argues that China and Russia will choose to be stakeholders in an enterprise in which Washington underwrites Central Asia's security. True, China and Russia will be hard-pressed to contest the US's open-ended military presence in Afghanistan that is on the face of it projected as the unfinished business of the "war on terrorism". Central Asian states will be delighted at the prospect of the US joining the fight against creeping Islamism from Afghanistan.
The Blackwill plan brilliantly turns around the Taliban's ascendancy since 2005, which had occurred under Pakistani tutelage and, in retrospect, thanks to US passivity.
Blackwill admits that his plan "would allow Washington to focus on four issues more vital to its national interests: the rise of Chinese power, the Iranian nuclear program, nuclear terrorism and the future of Iraq".
Without suffering a strategic defeat, the US would be able to extricate itself from the war while the drop in war casualties would placate US opinion so that a long-term troop presence (as in Iraq) at the level of 50,000 or so would become sustainable. This was exactly what General David Petraeus, now the top US man in Afghanistan, achieved in Iraq.
Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
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Want to defeat the Talibs in Afghanistan? Kill the head of the snake. It's Pakistan's ISI.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/oct/18/pakistan-isi-mumbai-terror-attacks
Pakistan's powerful intelligence services were heavily involved in preparations for the Mumbai terrorist attacks of November 2008, according to classified Indian government documents obtained by the Guardian.
A 109-page report into the interrogation of key suspect David Headley, a Pakistani-American militant arrested last year and detained in the US, makes detailed claims of ISI support for the bombings.
Under questioning, Headley described dozens of meetings between officers of the main Pakistani military intelligence service, the ISI, and senior militants from the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) group responsible for the Mumbai attacks.
He claims a key motivation for the ISI in aiding the attacks was to bolster militant organisations with strong links to the Pakistani state and security establishment who were being marginalised by more extreme radical groups.
Headley, who undertook surveillance of the targets in Mumbai for the operation, claims that at least two of his missions were partly paid for by the ISI and that he regularly reported to the spy agency. However, the documents suggest that supervision of the militants by the ISI was often chaotic and that the most senior officers of the agency may have been unaware at least of the scale and ambition of the operation before it was launched.
More than 160 people were killed by militants from LeT who arrived by sea to attack luxury hotels, a Jewish centre, a café, a hospital and the main railway station in Mumbai, the Indian commercial capital. Casualties included citizens from 25 countries, including four Americans killed and seven Britons injured. The attacks dominated media for days and badly damaged already poor Indian-Pakistan relations.
European and American security services now fear that LeT, which has thousands of militants, runs dozens of training camps and has extensive logistic networks overseas, is moving from what has been a largely regional agenda – focused on the disputed Himalayan former princely state of Kashmir – to a global agenda involving strikes against the west or western interests. The documents suggest the fierce internal argument within the organisation over its strategic direction is being won by hardliners.
Headley, interviewed over 34 hours by Indian investigators in America in June, described how "a debate had begun among the terrorist outfits" and "a clash of ideology" leading to "splits".
"The aggression and commitment to jihad shown by several splinter groups in Afghanistan influenced many committed fighters to leave [LeT]," Headley said. "I understand this compelled the LeT to consider a spectacular terrorist strike in India."
Headley, who changed his name from Daood Gilani, told the investigators that the ISI hoped the Mumbai attack would slow or stop growing "integration" between groups active in Kashmir, with whom the agency had maintained a long relationship, and "Taliban-based outfits" in Pakistan and Afghanistan which were a threat to the Pakistani state.
"The ISI … had no ambiguity in understanding the necessity to strike India," Headley is reported to have said. The aim of the agency was "controlling further split in the Kashmir-based outfits, providing them a sense of achievement and shifting … the theatre of violence from the domestic soil of Pakistan to India."
Headley describes meeting once with a "Colonel Kamran" from the military intelligence service and having a series of meetings with a "Major Iqbal" and a "Major Sameer Ali". A fellow conspirator was handled by a Colonel Shah, he claims. Headley also alleges that he was given $25,000 by his ISI handler to finance one of eight surveillance missions in India.
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http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-11-04/obamas-india-trip-to-save-an-alliance/
As the president hits India this weekend, he will find it is still George W. Bush country. Tunku Varadarajan on an alliance that Obama has allowed to wither on the vine.
Barack Obama’s visit to India, starting Saturday, may offer him some small respite from the drubbing that has made this week the nadir of his political life; but if he’s looking (a la Elizabeth Gilbert/Julia Roberts) for some Eastern salve for his battered soul, he isn’t going to find it in Mumbai or New Delhi. Obama will encounter a hospitable people, of course: Indians are never unkind to their guests. Why, they’re even stripping coconuts from trees that line a path he’s scheduled to walk down, lest a hard nut ping him on his un-turbanned head. But he will find little of the spontaneous warmth and genuine bonhomie that was lavished on George W. Bush when the latter visited India in 2006.
Two years after Bush’s departure from the White House, India is still Bush Country—a giant (if foreign) Red State, to use the American political taxonomy. By that I mean that the political establishment and much of the non-leftist intelligentsia still looks back with dewy-eyed fondness to the time when India’s relations with the United States flowered extravagantly under Bush. It wasn’t just a matter of securing a mold-breaking nuclear deal with Washington; it was a case of India dealing, for the first time in the uneven history of its relations with the United States, with an American president who saw India as a partner-in-civilization.
Bogged down in health care and bailouts at home, and in “Afpak” abroad, Obama has let the alliance with India wither on the vine. This has frustrated India deeply, especially as a perception came to grip New Delhi that some of Obama’s neglect was payback to India for its closeness to his predecessor. India pushed back hard and furiously at Obama’s early, tone-deaf attempt to foist Richard Holbrooke on the Indian subcontinent as some sort of “Kashmir czar,” and New Delhi has returned, to a noticeable extent, to the pre-Bush method of dealing with America: watch first, and closely; trust later, and sparingly. It is remarkable how an alliance that had seemed so electrifying—indeed, one that had all the hallmarks of a “paradigm shift” in international relations—has been so quickly squandered.
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India knows the players of Afpakia and details of their histories and interactions far better than we do. I have posted some Indian intel pieces here along the way and they always seem to me to have insight and big picture perspective that we would do well to add to our mix.
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In reading a variety of foreign writers thoughts on America, the only ones who really seemed to get us were Indian.
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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Obama-acknowledges-decline-of-US-dominance/articleshow/6885877.cms
Obama acknowledges decline of US dominance
TNN, Nov 8, 2010, 01.14am IST
MUMBAI: Implicitly acknowledging the decline of American dominance, Barack Obama on Sunday said the US was no longer in a position to "meet the rest of the world economically on our terms".
Speaking at a town hall meeting in Mumbai, he said, "I do think that one of the challenges that we are going face in the US, at a time when we are still recovering from the financial crisis is, how do we respond to some of the challenges of globalisation? The fact of the matter is that for most of my lifetime and I'll turn 50 next year - the US was such an enormously dominant economic power, we were such a large market, our industry, our technology, our manufacturing was so significant that we always met the rest of the world economically on our terms. And now because of the incredible rise of India and China and Brazil and other countries, the US remains the largest economy and the largest market, but there is real competition."
"This will keep America on its toes. America is going to have to compete. There is going to be a tug-of-war within the US between those who see globalisation as a threat and those who accept we live in a open integrated world, which has challenges and opportunities."
The US leader disagreed with those who saw globalisation as unmitigated evil. But while acknowledging that the Chindia factor had made the world flatter, he said protectionist impulses in US will get stronger if people don't see trade bringing in gains for them.
"If the American people feel that trade is just a one-way street where everybody is selling to the enormous US market but we can never sell what we make anywhere else, then the people of the US will start thinking that this is a bad deal for us and it could end up leading to a more protectionist instinct in both parties, not just among Democrats but also Republicans. So, that we have to guard against," he said.
He pointed out that America, which once traded without bothering about barriers put up by partners, could not promote trade at its own expense at a time when India and China were rising. "There has to be reciprocity in our trading relationships and if we can have those kind of conversations - fruitful, constructive conversation about how we produce win-win situations, then I think we will be fine."
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Obama Backs India for Security Council Seat
President Obama announced on Monday in New Delhi that the
United States will back India's bid for a permanent seat on
an expanded United Nations Security Council, a major policy
shift that could aggravate China, which opposes such a move.
Read More:
http://www.nytimes.com?emc=na
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China and India: Dragon vs. Elephant
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, a massive diplomatic entourage and a business delegation representing 100 firms arrived in India on Wednesday for a three-day visit. Wen began the visit by addressing concerns over the growing Sino-Indian rivalry, proclaiming that there need be no essential conflict between the Dragon and the Elephant and that Asia has room enough for both of them. After meeting with Indian Premier Manmohan Singh, Wen will travel to Pakistan, a staunch Chinese ally and Indian arch-foe, to emphasize where his deepest commitments lie.
Wen’s visit comes at a time of revived mutual suspicion. Two major incidents in particular have aggravated sore spots in the relationship. Riots in Lhasa, Tibet, in 2008 caused Beijing to worry more about breakaway tendencies in its far western province, whose exiled government is supported by New Delhi. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s continued support of various militant proxies has put the Sino-Pakistani alliance into renewed focus for New Delhi, especially in light of the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
But alongside these signal events, Beijing’s growing economic clout has led it to expand infrastructure and military installations across its western regions in an attempt to bolster its territorial claims and secure its far-flung provinces from separatist or militant influences. India has bulked up its border infrastructure and security in response. And, perhaps most novel, Beijing’s growing dependency on overseas oil and raw materials has driven it to seek land and sea pathways to the Indian Ocean through closer relations with South Asian states generally and port agreements with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Myanmar, leading India to worry it will be encircled and someday threatened by China’s navy.
Economic growth is one of the primary reasons world powers have courted India this year, with U.S. President Barack Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy already having visited. Wen’s trip is no different, and already the two sides claim to have signed nearly 50 deals worth an estimated $16 billion if actualized. But deepening economic relations have not eased tensions, especially given the growing Indian trade deficit with China (from a surplus of $832 million in 2005 to a deficit of nearly $16 billion in 2009), which Wen acknowledged on the first day of his visit needed to be improved while simultaneously asking for greater market access for Chinese exporters.
“Beijing has its mind set on gaining control of land and sea routes to the Indian Ocean and needs internal mobility in its far west to prevent separatism and fortify its borders, and these policies are driving tensions with India higher.”
While India is keen on displaying its relationship with China as far more cooperative than confrontational, a serious self-critique is developing within New Delhi over its slow reaction to Chinese moves in the Indian periphery. China’s presence may be much more visible now in places like Kashmir, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Sri Lanka, but that presence was built up methodically over several years. India, with no shortage of issues to keep itself occupied at home, is now finding that it is years behind China in countries that New Delhi would like to believe sit firmly within its sphere of influence.
In the past. India could rely on its influence in Tibet to send a warning to China. In fact, External Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna aired this threat in a meeting with his Chinese counterpart in November when he said that just as India has been sensitive to Chinese concerns over Tibet and Taiwan, Beijing too should be mindful of Indian sensitivities on Jammu and Kashmir. The problem India has now is that this warning simply does not carry as much weight as it did. China has made considerable progress in building up the necessary political, economic and military linkages into Tibet to deny the Indians opportunities to needle Beijing in critical buffer territory. Moreover, India has not been able to invest the necessary time and effort into strengthening competitive relationships in more distant places like Southeast Asia and Taiwan — and has only begun with Japan — that would deeply unsettle Beijing. In fact, a discussion is taking place within some military circles in India over how China may be deliberately playing up issues on its land borders in Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh to divert India’s attention northward while China pursues its objectives in the Indian Ocean basin, something that STRATFOR alluded to when the stapled visa issue flared up in the summer.
Yet India is not alone in its alarm. The world is increasingly looking at China not only as a source of growth, but as an independent-minded and potentially unpredictable variable in the international system. Beijing’s increasing boldness has become one of the chief talking points in foreign policy circles, extending beyond international hard bargaining over resources and into China’s conduct around its entire periphery and in international organizations. When India openly worries about China’s intentions in exercising its newly found strengths, it is joined by the likes of Japan, South Korea, Australia, a number of China’s Southeast Asian neighbors and, most important, the United States.
The problem for Beijing is that it is ultimately outnumbered, and overpowered, but its attempts to prepare against threats make it appear more threatening. Beijing sees the international coalition forming against it, and in particular fears U.S. attention will soon come to rest squarely on it and that a strategic relationship with India is part of American designs. Hence, Wen has reason to play nice with India, if only to make China appear a more benign player and not hasten India’s moves to counteract it. Nevertheless, Beijing has its mind set on gaining control of land and sea routes to the Indian Ocean and needs internal mobility in its far west to prevent separatism and fortify its borders, and these policies are driving the tensions with India higher. Thus, while India senses Chinese encirclement in South Asia, Beijing senses American encirclement, of which India is only one part. Even with modern technology, the Himalayas remain a gigantic divider. But these two states have fought a border war in the Himalayas before, so the risks are real. Regardless of growing economic cooperation, both sense a growing security threat from the other that cannot be easily allayed.
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Analyst Kamran Bokhari examines the pressure put on relations between New Delhi and Tehran due to U.S. sanctions on Iranian energy exports at a time when the looming U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has both countries concerned.
Editor’s Note: Transcripts are generated using speech-recognition technology. Therefore, STRATFOR cannot guarantee their complete accuracy.
Iran’s national security chief, Saeed Jalili, will soon be paying a visit to India, and this visit comes at a time when there is a lot happening between the two countries in terms of both bilateral relations and regional geopolitics.
Jalili’s visit to New Delhi comes at a time when relations between Iran and India are not as comfortable as they have been in recent years. The primary reason for that is that India is unable to pay Iran for the crude imports it gets from the clerical regime because of the international sanctions that have basically done away with the old mechanism that the two countries used to use in the form of a regional clearinghouse. That is an issue that has been lingering on for months and needs to be resolved.
The fact that there is this payment issue between India and Iran has allowed Saudi Arabia to enter into the dynamic where there are reports that Saudi Arabia is willing to increase its crude exports to India such that New Delhi would no longer need to import from Tehran. That issue has an unsettling effect on the Iranians even though they are just reports. Therefore this issue of the Saudi offer is likely to figure high on the agenda in the negotiations that will take place between the Iranians and the Indians. And especially now that the United States and its NATO allies are moving toward a drawdown strategy for Afghanistan, countries like India and Iran are especially concerned about their security given that the Taliban are likely to benefit from a Western military withdrawal from their country. And of course by extension, it also brings Pakistan into the equation which is a concern more so for New Delhi than it is for Tehran, but nonetheless there are shared concerns on the part of both the Iranians and the Indians and they would like to be able to prep for the coming drawdown.
Jalili’s trip will thus be about a host of issues, some long-standing, that actually bring India and Iran together, and others that are more contemporary and can become of a contentious nature because of the U.S.-led sanctions on Iran.
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STRATFOR
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July 13, 2011
RED ALERT: MULTIPLE EXPLOSIONS IN MUMBAI
Three explosions were reported in Mumbai on July 13 in the crowded Opera House,
Zaveri Bazaar and Dadar areas of the city. The explosions began around 7:10 p.m. and
occurred within minutes of each other. There are reports that a fourth bomb, likely
at the Roxy Theater, failed to detonate. Current casualty estimates indicate five
people have been killed and 100 injured thus far.
This marks the first major attack in India since the November 2008 Mumbai attacks.
Though the magnitude of these explosions has yet to be determined, this attack does
not appear to be as sophisticated as the 2008 attacks, which involved an assault
team consisting of a number of militants that coordinated 10 shooting and bombing
attacks across the city. The July 13 attack, by contrast, appears to have not
involved suicide attackers but consisted of explosives placed in a taxi, a meter box
and locations where they could be remotely detonated. This tactic is much more in
line with those used by more amateurish groups, such the Indian Mujahideen, who have
targeted crowded urban areas before.
Nonetheless, the attack comes at a critical juncture in U.S.-Pakistani relations as
the United States is trying to accelerate a withdrawal of its military forces in
Afghanistan. The 2008 Mumbai attacks revealed the extent to which traditional
Pakistan-based Islamist militant groups, such as elements from the defunct
Lashkar-e-Taiba, had collaborated with transnational jihadist elements like al Qaeda
in trying to instigate a crisis between Islamabad and New Delhi. Such a crisis would
complicate U.S.-Pakistani dealings on Afghanistan, potentially serving the interests
of al Qaeda as well as factions within Pakistan trying to derail a negotiation
between the United States and Pakistan.
Copyright 2011 STRATFOR.
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Summary
Militants detonated an improvised explosive device outside the Delhi High Court on Sept. 7. Though Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami (HUJI) claimed responsibility, the attack was more likely carried out by an undefined network composed of the remnants of regional transnational militant groups that oppose the Indian government. Someone claiming to represent HUJI said the attack was staged to demand the death sentence of a Kashmiri militant involved in the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament be revoked, and this incident may complicate plans for the Indian government, which has been reluctant to carry out the execution for fear of a militant backlash.
Analysis
An improvised explosive device (IED) went off Sept. 7 near the reception line at the High Court in New Delhi, India. More than 100 people were waiting in line between Gate 4 and Gate 5 to obtain entry passes to the court to have their cases heard. According to officials, the blast killed 11 people and wounded 76 others. No judges were among the victims. Witnesses claim a man carrying a briefcase jumped to the front of the line before the device detonated. The investigation was quickly turned over to the National Investigation Agency, established after the 2008 Mumbai attacks. A top security official said a search for the culprit is under way, and security forces are surveilling all roads out of the city.
The attack is similar to other attacks recently witnessed in India; it was not an armed assault, and it was not a suicide bombing. Rather, it was a simple attack on a soft target, more akin to groups with indigenous capabilities such as the Indian Mujahideen, which is known to have connections with other militants that are or once were part of LeT. According to an email from a purported representative of Islamist militant group Harkat-ul-Jihad e-Islami (HUJI), the attack was staged to demand the death sentence of a Kashmiri militant involved in the 2001 attack on the Indian parliament be revoked. Regardless of the veracity of that email, the claim could complicate the handling of the case by the Indian government, which has been reluctant to carry out the execution due to concerns of a possible militant backlash. Additionally, the Sept. 7 attack demonstrates a sustained level of indigenous militant capabilities, itself a worrying sign for New Delhi.
According to a police official, the blast took place outside the “controlled area” of the building at around 10:15 a.m., leaving a crater three to four meters (nine to 13 feet) deep. NDTV reported there were traces of ammonium nitrate. It is unclear whether there was a security cordon in front of the reception area or if the reception area was the first security checkpoint. What is clear is that the reception area was a softer target and thus more vulnerable to attack. (Two lawyers at the court said the scanner and the metal detector at Gate 5 had been inoperable since Sept. 6.)
Like past Indian Mujahideen attacks, the device utilized ammonium nitrate-based improvised explosives, was directed against a soft target, was concealed in a small container and left in a crowded area. It also was detonated via a timer rather than being a command-detonated suicide device. A similar attack was attempted on the same court May 25, with Indian officials later reporting the IED was a bag that contained 1.5 to 2 kilograms (3.3 to 4.4 pounds), had ammonium nitrate, a detonator attached to a timer and about 50 nails. It caused no casualties and damaged a car. In the wake of the attack, Indian media have speculated the earlier attack may have been a test case for the Sept. 7 attack, which is certainly possible, but it was more likely a failed attack.
Someone claiming to be a representative of HUJI allegedly wrote an email to the National Investigation Agency taking responsibility for the bombing, though this claim has yet to be verified. In the email, HUJI threatened to continue attacks against Indian courts if they did not revoke the death sentence of Kashmiri militant Afzal Guru, also known as Mohammad Afzal, who was convicted for his role in the attack on the Indian parliament in 2001.
It is possible that HUJI carried out the Sept. 7 attack on its own, but a more likely explanation is that local militants conducted the attack at the behest of transnational anti-Indian militants who lack the ability to conduct attacks against the India government on their own. This network is not clearly defined, but it includes HUJI, or former members of the organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed and al Qaeda. The same network was responsible for the 2011 Mumbai attacks, and it is not a centralized group or command structure; rather, it is a new coordination of groups that formally existed prior to 2001. Due to crackdowns in Pakistan, militant group dynamics in the region and disagreements over targets, it has collaborated in different ways. It appears that this network has successfully created an indigenous capability inside India.
The Afzal issue has been a contentious one in India since the Supreme Court sentenced him to death in 2004. The Indian government has been reluctant to follow through on the sentence for fear of a militant backlash. It is not yet clear if the Sept. 7 attack will cause the government to further balk at executing Afzal, given that the alleged perpetrators threatened to attack courts in the future unless it revoked the sentence. That little is known about the network that conducted the attack may add to the government’s reluctance to see the Afzal execution through.
Read more: India: Militants Attack Delhi High Court | STRATFOR
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Strategic Cooperation Between India and Afghanistan
India and Afghanistan recently signed a strategic agreement and have pledged to cooperate in security matters, with India agreeing to train Afghan forces. This prospect has been raised by Afghanistan in the past, but to this point India had refused. What explains the change in the Indian position? What role, if any, has the United States played in this deal, given U.S. caution against such cooperation in the past? How do Pakistan and China respond?
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Although this could also be posted in the Afpakia thread, I think it a better fit here.
Because I search for Truth, I must say that my initial reaction is that this is a good move by Clinton-Obama. As our YA has been educating us for some years now with his quality contributions, there is natural alliance to be made with India and this is a good step in that direction.
Especially if backed with by efforts to put a hit on Dhume, this will strengthen respect for the US in this part of the world at a time when Obama-Clinton have done so much to weaken it.
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http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303302504577325561408527258.html?mod=opinion_newsreel
By SADANAND DHUME
More than three years after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks that killed 166 people, Hafiz Muhammad Saeed has something to worry about. On Monday, the United States announced a $10 million reward for information leading to his arrest or conviction.
The 62-year-old Islamic studies professor allegedly orchestrated the attacks carried out by 10 gunmen from Lashkar-e-Taiba, or LeT, the banned terrorist group he founded in the early 1990s. Only three other wanted terrorists—including the Taliban's Mullah Omar and key al Qaeda operatives in Iran and Iraq—carry as high a price on their heads. Only al Qaeda's Ayman al-Zawahiri, worth a $25 million bounty, is deemed more valuable.
Washington's decision is overdue but nonetheless welcome. Like the Navy SEAL raid that killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan last May, it signals U.S. resolve to punish those responsible for the death of its citizens. Six Americans were among those killed in Mumbai, and LeT has also mounted attacks on U.S. forces in Afghanistan.
In South Asia, the U.S. decision marks a milestone in Washington's growing impatience with Pakistan's failure to act against terrorist groups that destabilize its neighbors and threaten the world. Pakistan's so-called deep state—the army and its spy agency, Inter-Services Intelligence—has traditionally maintained even deeper links with the LeT than with the Afghan Taliban or the Haqqani Network.
Bluntly put, Mr. Saeed is the Pakistani army's favorite jihadist. Like most members of the army, the vast majority of LeT cadres are Punjabis, members of Pakistan's dominant ethnic group. Bruce Riedel of the Brookings Institution has written about retired officers of elite army units such as the Special Services Group training LeT cadres. Both the army and the LeT recruit extensively from the same villages, and LeT training camps are often conveniently located beside army bases.
Though Pakistan ostensibly banned LeT under U.S. pressure in 2002, in reality it operates openly through its charity wing, Jamaat-ut-Dawa. Mr. Saeed has been placed under house arrest numerous times but is widely viewed as too well-connected and powerful to ever face a serious trial in Pakistan.
Enlarge Image
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Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, $10 million man.
.The reward, announced while Wendy Sherman, the third ranking State Department official, was in New Delhi, also affirms the U.S.-India relationship as the cornerstone of U.S. policy in South Asia.
Since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, U.S. experts and policy makers have developed a more sophisticated picture of LeT. Once mostly seen as a Kashmiri militant group fighting the Indian army, LeT has since morphed into a global threat. Over the years, the LeT's fingerprints have shown up as far afield as Chechnya and Virginia.
It also displays a special animus toward Jews: During the Mumbai attacks, LeT militants targeted an Israeli rabbi and his pregnant wife. But it was the 2009 arrest of Pakistani-American David Headley (also known as Daood Gilani), a key Mumbai plotter, that made the LeT's global reach, radical pan-Islamist ideology and close links to Pakistan's military and intelligence services more widely known.
At the same time, U.S. relations with Pakistan have been in a freefall. Among the causes: last year's imprisonment in Lahore of CIA contractor Raymond Davis for shooting two Pakistanis in what he claimed was self-defense, the angry Pakistani response to the bin Laden raid, an attack on the U.S. Embassy in Kabul traced to Pakistan, and a border skirmish in which the U.S. mistakenly killed 24 Pakistani soldiers.
In recent months, as a leading light of an Islamist coalition known as the Defence of Pakistan Council, Mr. Saeed has given rabble-rousing speeches across the country attacking America and promising to ensure that Pakistan does not reopen supply routes to Afghanistan shut after the border incident in November.
The public announcement of the reward effectively puts American prestige on the line. Addressing a crowded press conference in the garrison town of Rawalpindi Wednesday, Mr. Saeed mocked the U.S. "This is a laughable, absurd announcement," he said. "Here I am in front of everyone, not hiding in a cave."
This defiance creates an immediate goal: to ensure that Mr. Saeed, like the other terrorists on the U.S. list, cannot make light of his predicament. Ideally, the Pakistani government and courts will summon the will to arrest him and press charges, and the army and ISI won't stand in the way. If not, the time may eventually come to remind the good professor of the fate that befell bin Laden, Anwar al-Awlaki and scores of others who shared his ideology and methods. Either way, sooner or later Mr. Saeed and his patrons will have come to terms with South Asia's new realities.
Mr. Dhume is a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, and a columnist for WSJ.com. Follow him on Twitter @dhume01
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Very worthwhile read IMO.
India and America
Less than allies, more than friends
America and India try to define a new sort of relationship
Jun 16th 2012 | DELHI | from the print edition The Economist
“TWO cities where people rarely agree on much of anything” was how Robert Blake, an assistant secretary at the American State Department, described Washington and Delhi this month. It was a joke but, in context, was rather close to the bone. Touting a blossoming friendship, America and India still find plenty to bicker about.
His speech was looking forward to the third annual US-India “Strategic Dialogue”, which brought together senior figures from both countries in Washington, DC, on June 13th. This is a celebration of a partnership by which both countries set great store. Yet the list of issues on which they are at odds is dispiritingly long: Afghanistan, Iran, nuclear trade, climate change, market access, arms sales and more. If this is partnership, some in both capitals ask, what would rivalry look like?
The impetus seems to have gone out of a relationship in which America invested so much under George W Bush. His decision, in 2005, to press for international acceptance of India’s civil nuclear programme, ending a ban on foreign assistance imposed because of India’s refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, was meant to usher in a new era of co-operation and trust. Some of that evaporated early in the presidency of Barack Obama. India resented and successfully resisted his appointment of an envoy with a brief to meddle in India’s dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. And it was alarmed by his effort to recast relations with China, and talk of a “G2”.
In America, meanwhile, the prizes won by Mr Bush’s huge concession to India can seem at best disappointing. Indian legislation about the liability for nuclear accidents in effect closes to American companies the very market Mr Bush sacrificed so much to prise open. Disgruntlement grew last year when American firms lost their bid to supply India with 126 jetfighters—India’s biggest-ever defence contract—to European competitors. Both sides have moved on, but still, says Daniel Twining, of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, a think-tank in Washington, “even the most ebullient supporters” of the partnership in America are “a bit depressed”.
Mr Twining, who worked on the partnership in the Bush administration, says that both sides remain confident in its long-term benefits—perhaps so confident that they neglect the mundane business of actually building it. Two factors, however, are pushing America to reinvigorate ties with India. The near-collapse in its relations with Pakistan gives India an even greater significance in America’s hopes for stability in Afghanistan when most NATO troops leave in 2014. And America’s aspirations for co-operative relations with China have degenerated into a more blatant if undeclared form of strategic competition, as America rebalances its entire military posture towards Asia.
So American leaders are again talking up the India relationship. In Delhi this month Leon Panetta, the defence secretary, called India a “linchpin” of the “rebalancing” strategy. After this week’s dialogue, Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state, noted that “the strategic fundamentals of our relationship are pushing our two countries’ interests into closer convergence.”
But India fears being left in the lurch as NATO skedaddles out of Afghanistan. Its security priority is to receive credible reassurances on plans for stabilising Afghanistan and ensuring it never again becomes a Talibanised client of Pakistan.
America, for its part, wants to see India further reduce imports of oil from Iran, with which Indian leaders like to boast of their “civilisational” ties. But on the eve of the dialogue, Mrs Clinton announced that India, unlike China or even Singapore, had already done enough to earn a waiver from American sanctions.
Hopes that something concrete might emerge from the dialogue were largely invested in economics. The two sides agreed to work on a bilateral investment treaty to unlock the huge potential for co-operation. In fact the one area where ties are flourishing—the jetfighter disappointment aside —is defence. India has become the world’s largest arms importer, and American exporters are benefiting, with more than $8 billion in sales in recent years.
Overall, however, America’s economic ties with India do not come close to the huge, symbiotic relations it has with China. India itself now does more trade with China ($74 billion in 2011) than it does with America ($58 billion). American officials would like to see the balance tip more in their country’s favour.
The unstated logic in both America and India behind the drive for closer relations is as a warning to China not to overreach itself and drive them into a fully fledged military alliance. It is still far short of that—more like a mutual feeling that India and America are closer in strategic and political outlook to each other than they are to China. For that reason, America has no qualms about India’s “Look East” policy of engagement with the rest of Asia, or even with its contemplating membership of the China-led regional security grouping focused on Central Asia, the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation.
Experience elsewhere in Asia suggests that America’s confidence in the long-term strength of its partnership with India need not be shaken even if China’s economic links with India continue to outpace its own. The great paradox of Asian strategy today is that the closer countries find themselves bound up with China economically, the more they seek the reassurance of American security.
http://www.economist.com/node/21556935
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Doug:
Good find.
All:
Lets keep our eye open for more such. This alliance could be a good thing for both I am thinking.
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India-US relations is a complex topic...here's one article. This focusses on defense issues, ofcourse there's lots of other commerce that's not discussed.
http://syednazakat.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/pentagons-new-india-focus/ (http://syednazakat.wordpress.com/2012/06/26/pentagons-new-india-focus/)
Posted on June 26, 2012
America’s great plans for India, and why New Delhi’s jumpy
By Syed Nazakat in Delhi
US Defence Secretary Leon Panetta is a politician by profession and a military conjurer by necessity. He served briefly in the military, half a century ago, but his reputation has been built, almost entirely, in politics. For 16 years, he was the Democratic Congressman from his hometown, Monterey in California. Perhaps it was there that he saw India emerging. California was home to Gobind Behari Lal, the first Indian American to win the Pulitzer Prize; Bhagat S. Thind, the first Indian American to serve in the US Army, and Dalip S. Saund, the first Congressman of South Asian descent. Then there were the thousands of Indian immigrants in Silicon Valley.
Today, as the US is reviewing its defence policy after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, India has become, in Panetta’s own words, its strategic priority. Panetta’s forthcoming visit toIndia, his first as defence secretary, is part of Pentagon’s new policy to seek closer defence ties withIndia. Significantly, the visit comes just a week before the India-US strategic dialogue in Washington,D.C.
“This [India-US] partnership is top priority for the USdepartment of defence,” George Little, assistant secretary of defence for public affairs, told THE WEEK, before Panetta’s visit was officially announced. “In just one decade, there has been a rapid transformation of the US-India defence relationship into a strategic partnership between two of the pre-eminent security powers inAsia.” During his two-day visit, starting June 6, Panetta will meet Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, Defence Minister A.K. Antony and National Security Adviser Shivshankar Menon.
Panetta knows the complexities of the US-India relationship. The paths converged first after 9/11, and then the nuclear deal became the fulcrum of the changed relationship, though the process was politically painful. Today, the US identifies Indiaas a long-term strategic partner; President Barack Obama famously described it as one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century.
Dr Amer Latif, former director for south Asian affairs at Pentagon, said, “The military ties have developed into one of the most important and robust aspects of the US-India bilateral relationship. The priority towardsIndia was overdue.”
The US has identified some key areas for cooperation, such as homeland security, intelligence sharing, a joint working group on counter-terrorism, computer emergency response teams and a range of military engagements. To woo India, the UShas removed laboratories of the Defence Research and Development Organisation from the entity list. So, the DRDO can almost freely procure weapons systems from theUS, though a control regime still exits.
THE WEEK has learnt that, at a recently held defence policy group meet inDelhi, Jim Miller, Panetta’s close aide and Pentagon’s chief policy maker, proposed closer operational engagement with the Indian military. The US has proposed joint military planning exercises up to brigade level with the Indian Army and has asked India to place a senior liaison officer with the US Central Command and US Pacific Command.
As DPG meetings shun headline-grabbing rhetoric, no one, except those in the defence strategy network, paid attention to Miller’s words. “The US looks at India as an important strategic partner in the region as well as as a big and unexploited market,” said Jayadeva Ranade, former additional secretary, Research & Analysis Wing, who had a diplomatic posting in Washington, D.C. “Strategically, in the region, it would like to draw India into a partnership,” he said. “It realises that India would recoil at any suggestion of an alliance, which helps further the US strategic agenda, including retarding China from emerging either as a potent threat or as a rival to US strategic interests.”
The US Pacific Command wanted to have joint operations with the Indian Navy in humanitarian and disaster relief missions. Despite repeated American requests since 2008,Indiahas been reluctant. A senior Indian defence ministry official said though India was ready to boost defence cooperation with theUS, it was unwilling to ink operational military pacts. This time, Panetta may seek fresh discussions on the three pending military pacts—the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communication Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation (BECA).
The US has been arguing that CISMOA and BECA guarantee the use of US-made aircraft and communications systems before they hit the market. It would also give India access to sensitive C4ISR technology and increase the interoperability of Indian and American forces during joint exercises and missions. India, on the other hand, thinks the agreement is intrusive and that the US would use it to examine Indian equipment under the guise of interoperability.
More than CISMOA and BECA, it is the LSA on which both countries have sharp differences. The LSA for India is designed to give Indian and US ships and aircraft access to each other’s facilities, such as ports and airfields, for refuelling and refurbishment through a barter system. But many in the defence and political establishment suspect that the LSA will provide bases to theUSmilitary, turningIndiainto a subordinate ally.
And, the list of contentious issues is not limited to the military agreements. The US military aid to Pakistan, cooperation withIran, the use of military to topple regimes inWest Asiaand nuclear disarmament are some of the other issues. “Indiais cautious about developing operational cooperation with the US because of its political implications, both in terms of domestic politics and India’s external ties,” said Kanwal Sibal, former foreign secretary. “Indiawants to develop broad-based, mutually beneficial relations with various global power centres rather than being seen as excessively leaning towards one power centre.”
So sensitive is India that an off-the-cuff remark made by the US Pacific Command commander Admiral Robert F. Willard, about the presence of US Special Forces in India, was raised in Parliament. Antony had to reassure Parliament on May 7 that the “US has neither sought nor has the government of India approved stationing of US Special Forces personnel in any capacity in India.”
Within the defence ministry, there is growing consensus that it is in India’s interest, too, to forge a close defence partnership with theUS. The Indian Navy has benefited from the Malabar exercises with the US Navy.India has been conducting numerous naval exercises with the US, and, today, the exercise is no more limited to boarding operations.
This year, both navies were armed with guided-missile cruisers, destroyers and submarines during the 10-day long exercise in theBay of Bengal. Air defence and anti-submarine warfare was part of the exercise. TheUSfleet included the USS Carl Vinson, the Nimitz class supercarrier which carried Osama bin Laden’s body to be buried at sea.Indiaand theUShave organised over 50 military exercises in the last seven years, most of them aimed at building anti-terrorism and counter insurgency capability. With no other country has the Indian military engaged in so many joint exercises. The push in the defence trade is also a sign of growing trust and partnership.
India’s defence trade with the US has risen from virtually nil a decade ago to nearly $9 billion today. Since 2002, India has signed more than 20 deals for defence articles and services such as amphibious transport ship INS Jalashwa, UH-3H helicopters worth $92.5 million, Lockheed Martin C-130J aircraft worth $962 million (the first US military aircraft sale to India in half a century), P-8I maritime reconnaissance aircraft worth $2.1 billion, Harpoon Block-II anti-ship missiles for $170 million and C-17 Globemaster-III strategic airlift aircraft worth $4.1 billion.
More recently, the defence ministry has cleared procurement of 145 ultra-light howitzers worth $647 million for deployment on the China border. The M777, the lightest 155mm artillery gun ever, will be the first such gun to enter service with the Indian Army after the Bofors guns 27 years ago. Negotiations are now being finalised for acquiring six more C-130J, four more P-8I aircraft, Javelin anti-tank guided missiles, Jaguar aircraft engine upgrades and as well as AH-64D attack helicopters.
“Defence cooperation is not just about sales, it is about creating new linkages between our technology and business sectors,” Geoffrey R. Pyatt, principal deputy assistant secretary, bureau of south and central Asian affairs at the state department, told reporters in Washington, D.C. “Our scientists and military personnel are increasingly asking not only what they can buy, but what they can co-produce and co-develop.”
At present, the technology cooperation between India and the US is mainly in collaborative projects like naval materials, command and control technologies and material search for aeronautics. “The DRDO and theUS, at present, are not pursuing the development of any hi-technology weapons platforms,” said Gopal Bhushan, director (international cooperation), DRDO. “However, both sides are keen to gradually co-design and co-develop some systems which have strategic relevance to both countries.”
Three ventures in Hyderabad show how the defence relationship is blossoming. Some 48km from the city,USmultinational DuPont, a leading provider of armour, has an integrated ballistics facility. The first such DuPont facility inAsia, it will develop and test protective gear for Indian defence and security forces. Aviation giant Lockheed Martin and Tata have a joint venture that makes aerostructure parts for C-130 aircraft. Mahindra & Mahindra has a joint venture withUScommunications equipment major Telephonics Corporation to produce radars, surveillance systems and communication solutions.
The Pentagon’s shift towards India comes amid increasing concern in theUS ove rChina’s strategic aims, as it is investing in newer and better weapons, missile defence systems, submarines, an aircraft carrier and the development of a stealth fighter jet.
India, as a deterrence effort, is building roads, infrastructure and military capability along theChinaborder.Indiahas also deployed its front-line fighter aircraft Sukhoi Su-30MKIs in forward airbases, and has raised two Mountain Divisions there.
Former national security adviser Brajesh Mishra said that a US-India strategic partnership, though feasible, would take some time to mature and would need an organic change in the bureaucracies of both countries. And, he had a word of caution: “The Chinese are extremely worried about the growing Indo-US strategic partnership, which is necessary to safeguard our national security. The closerIndiaand theUScome, the more hostile the Chinese attitude towards India would be.”
Before his India visit, Panetta hosted China’s Defence Minister Liang Guanglie. It was the first visit to Washington by a Chinese defence minister in nine years.Chinais expected to figure prominently in Panetta’s talks in Delhi. There will also be discussions on Afghanistan, where theUSis winding down the war. Both India and theUS have signed strategic partnership withAfghanistanand the intelligence agencies of both countries are working closely onAfghanistan, though no one wants to talk about this.
Panetta, like many in the Indian defence establishment, agrees that Indian and US interests converge and collide on terrorism, China and uncertainties about the end-game in Afghanistan, in particular the deal with the Taliban brokered by Pakistan. The agreement, however, is to build a long-term relationship which will give options in the event of fundamentalists taking over the Af-Pak region, or a turn for worse on the China front. Neither of these developments is likely, but insurance policies are worth having anyway.
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http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/48391005/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/
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Indian Ocean: the new Great Game
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard Weekend Supplement
1st Sept 2012
Gushing out of the earth through narrow pipelines, oil is fated also to travel to its consumers through narrow bottlenecks. The Strait of Hormuz, just 34 kilometres wide, is the Persian Gulf exit through which supertankers haul away some 17 million barrels of oil daily. Five thousand kilometres later, at the doorstep of the oil guzzling economies of China, Japan and Indonesia, these giant vessels squeeze through the Malacca Strait, just 3 kilometres wide, leaving behind the Indian Ocean and entering the Pacific.
Global security managers lavish attention on the security of these two bottlenecks, but remain sanguine about the vast expanse of water that connect them: the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea at the mouth of the Malacca Strait. But this stretch is the bailiwick of the Indian Navy, the only major navy that operates between Qatar --- the forward headquarters of the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) --- and the contested and militarised waters of the South China Sea, beyond the Malacca Strait.
Besides keeping a watchful eye over the international shipping lanes that run through the northern Indian Ocean, the Indian Navy is also the gatekeeper of two more choke points near its offshore island chains of Lakshadweep and the Andamans. All Pacific-bound shipping from the Persian Gulf, or the Red Sea, converges on a 200 kilometres wide funnel called the Ten Degree Channel (named after its latitude) that is straddled by India’s Lakshadweep island chain. Given these islands’ strategic control over the shipping lanes, the Kochi-based South-Western Naval Command established a naval base on Lakshadweep in April this year.
Patrol vessels, aircraft and radars on this base, INS Dweeprakshak (INS stands for Indian Naval Ship, a confusing appellation, since the navy uses it for ships as well as shore bases), plays guardian angel to merchant shipping on the international shipping lane (ISL) that runs through the Ten Degree Channel. The navy seeks no compensation for keeping pirates at bay, or responding to emergencies. This comes with the turf for a regional power’s navy. And, in the event of a crisis, this positions the navy well for closing the channel to unfriendly shipping, or “enforcing a blockade” in military parlance.
In the Bay of Bengal, twelve hundred kilometres from the Indian mainland, sits another strategically priceless island chain called the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. These too dominate the international shipping lane that runs past them, through the 200-kilometre wide Six Degree Channel, before entering the Malacca Strait. Over the last two decades, India has transformed the Andamans (as the island chain is called) from a military backwater into the bristling Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC). This expanding presence, with a growing complement of naval, air and ground assets, is India’s first (and only) tri-service command, headed in rotation by three-star generals, admirals and air marshals, who report directly to the Integrated Defence Staff in New Delhi.
According to a recently retired navy fleet commander who spoke on the condition of anonymity, the Lakshadweep and Andamans give India a double stranglehold over these international shipping lanes, make it the natural master of the northern Indian Ocean. Iran’s bluster about shutting down the Strait of Hormuz can evoke scepticism, but analysts agree that the Indian Navy --- with its flotilla of 134 modern warships --- can shut down the Indian Ocean shipping lanes whenever it chooses. At stake here are not just the oil supplies of China, Japan and the ASEAN states, but also the reverse flow of exports that are crucial to these economies. All told, some 60,000 vessels move through the Strait of Malacca each year, one every nine minutes.
“A couple of submarines and a fighter squadron at Car Nicobar could easily enforce a declared blockade,” says the retired fleet commander.
Last fortnight, this capability was strengthened when India’s just-retired naval chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma (he handed charge on Friday to Admiral DK Joshi), inaugurated a naval air base, INS Baaz, at the very mouth of the Malacca Strait. This base, which will eventually have a 10,000-foot-long runway for fighter operations, is 300 kilometres closer to the Malacca Strait than Car Nicobar,.
Noted geo-strategist, Robert Kaplan, notes India’s crucial geography in this area: “India stands astride the Indian Ocean… the world’s energy interstate, the link for megaships carrying hydrocarbons from the Middle East to the consumers in the burgeoning middle-class concentrations of East Asia. India, thus, with the help of the Indian Ocean, fuses the geopolitics of the Greater Middle East with the geopolitics of East Asia — creating an increasingly unified and organic geography of conflict and competition across the navigable southern rim of Eurasia.”
But New Delhi does not intend this ocean to be a hotly contested strategic prize. Instead, oil and merchandise must flow smoothly, crucial for its growing economy. But the Indian Navy’s level statements and its rapid growth also indicate that India plans to retain local superiority over its Chinese counterpart, the People’s Liberation Army (Navy), which would allow it to counter any Chinese aggression on the Himalayan frontier with a blockade of Chinese shipping in the Indian Ocean.
The growth of the PLA(N) can hardly be matched from within the resources of the smaller Indian economy. But New Delhi believes that the PLA(N) will be increasingly preoccupied with the growing regional presence of the US Navy that is presaged by the “rebalance to the Asia Pacific region” that President Barack Obama announced earlier this year. While Obama specifically named India as a key regional partner, New Delhi has chosen a more balanced role, which would not commit India to taking sides in any confrontation.
Admiral Verma declared in New Delhi in August that, notwithstanding “major policy statements from the US, from our perspective the primary areas of interest to us is from the Malacca Strait to the (Persian/Arabian) Gulf in the west, and to the Cape of Good Hope in the south… the Pacific and the South China Sea are of concern to us, but activation in those areas is not on the cards.”
India’s quiet assumption of primacy in the Indian Ocean does not go unchallenged by regional rivals. Chinese leaders, dating back to Defence Minister Chi Haotian in 1994, have protested that, “The Indian Ocean is not India’s ocean.” But the fundamental determinants of naval power --- force levels and proximity --- suggest that China is some way from being able to challenge India in its own oceanic backyard.
Senior government sources say that the navy is being careful that its new teeth and claws do not set off alarm bells anywhere. In the 1980s, India’s acquisition of a flurry of Soviet Union warships caused regional countries like Australia and Indonesia to openly question the reason for that naval build-up. This time around, there is painstaking transparency; the navy publicly bean counts all its recent and forthcoming acquisitions.
This was evident at Admiral Verma’s farewell press conference last month. He listed out the recently inducted warships that had taken the navy’s count to 134: three Project 17 stealth frigates (INS Shivalik, Satpura and Sahyadri); two fleet tankers (INS Deepak and Shakti); one Russian 1135.6 Class stealth frigate (INS Teg); the nuclear attack submarine, INS Chakra, which has been leased from Russia; a sail training ship (INS Sudarshini); and eight water-jet Fast Attack Craft.
Another 43 warships, revealed Verma, were under construction in India. These include three Project 15A destroyers (INS Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai), being built by Mazagon Dock Ltd, Mumbai (MDL), which would start induction next year; four more similar destroyers under Project 15B; six Scorpene submarines being built at MDL; four anti-submarine warfare corvettes, being built at Garden Reach Shipbuilders & Engineers, Kolkata (GRSE), which would start entering service next year; four offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) being built by Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) would commence induction later this year; five more OPVs and two cadet training ships are being built by private shipyards. Eight landing craft are being built by GRSE for the Andamans; six new catamaran-hulled survey vessels, the first of which will join the navy this year.
Also joining the navy would be three more warships from Russia: the aircraft carrier, INS Vikramaditya (formerly the Gorshkov) would enter service this year; and two more frigates of the Teg class would join the navy’s fleet in 2013-14. All this would ensure that “over the next five years we expect to induct ships and submarines at an average rate of 5 platforms per year, provided the yards deliver as per contracted timelines,” said Verma.
All this is still insufficient to meet the navy’s Maritime Capability Perspective Plan (MCPP) target of a 160-ship force that is built around 90 capital warships, like aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Today the navy has barely half the destroyers and frigates it needs. And the 5 vessels that will be inducted each year will barely suffice to replace warships that are decommissioned after completing their 30-40 year service lives.
“Looking just at numbers conveys an over-gloomy picture,” a highly placed MoD source tells Business Standard. “Replacing a single-role frigate built in the 1960s or 1970s with a multi-role, stealth frigate that we build today is hardly a one-for-one transaction. It represents a significant accretion of capability. And so, we are looking at capabilities, not just at numbers.”
But numbers are important, especially when it comes to covering a vast maritime domain. In anti-piracy operations around the Gulf of Aden, where Indian, Chinese and Japanese warships conduct patrols in coordination with one another, India has managed to sustain a single warship on patrol. China, in contrast, sustains three, including a logistics replenishment vessel. India scrapes the bottom of its 134-ship barrel to muster warships for the range of exercises it conducts with the US, Russia, UK, France and Singapore, amongst others. The PLA(N)’s armada of more than 500 warships allows it to send vessels on lengthy deployments, such as port calls to eastern and southern African countries that front the Indian Ocean.
Realising that defence shipyards alone cannot bridge the navy’s shortfall, the MoD has encouraged shipyards like MDL and GRSE to forge joint ventures (JVs) with private shipyards that have created impressive infrastructure for building warships. These include L&T’s brand new Katupalli shipyard at Ennore, Tamil Nadu; Pipavav Defence and Offshore Engineering Co Ltd at Bhavnagar, Gujarat; and ABG Shipyard at Dahej, Gujarat. The JVs seek to marry the experience of defence shipyards with the infrastructure and entrepreneurial ability of the private sector shipyards.
Several western navies, like the UK’s Royal Navy, make up for smaller numbers by functioning in alliances, which has allowed them to concentrate on particular types of vessels (the Royal Navy focuses on anti-submarine warfare) while other partners handle other operational dimensions. With the Indian Navy determined to stay clear of alliances (“we can be a partner, but not an ally,” says a senior officer) it will be forced to find a way of putting in place the flotilla needed for policing the ocean that India increasingly considers its own.
* * * * *
AN EXPANDING FORCE
Indian Navy force multipliers
1. Sea Control
Aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, formerly the Gorshkov, will be delivered this year. Like India’s existing carrier, the INS Viraat, this floating airfield will allow the navy to impose control over a large expanse of sea, a long distance away from land bases.
2. Strategic Bases
Far-flung bases like Car Nicobar and Campbell Bay in the Andamans (pictured here), which function like unsinkable aircraft carriers, allow air power to be applied at locations very far away from the mainland. The Andaman & Nicobar Islands are 1200 km away from the mainland.
3. Blockade of Shipping
The nuclear attack submarine INS Chakra, along with 14 existing submarines and 6 Scorpenes that will come by 2018, can impose a blockade on shipping at choke points in the Indian Ocean. These include the Strait of Hormuz; Nine Degree Channel; Six Degree Channel; Malacca Strait.
4. Maritime Domain Awareness
Reconnaissance aircraft like the P8I (India has bought 8, the first of which will join the navy next year) will allow it to effectively monitor oceanic areas. India is also scouting around for 8 medium range maritime reconnaissance aircraft.
5. Land Attack
The Brahmos cruise missile, which is now standard fitment on all naval warships, provide a potent capability to attack targets that are 200-250 kilometres inland.
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India and Russia: Chances for Closer Cooperation
December 24, 2012 | 0600 GMT
Russia and India are exploring possibilities for increased cooperation as Russian President Vladimir Putin heads to New Delhi for an annual bilateral summit. Moscow and New Delhi are facing a series of challenges in their respective regions, and Russia is looking to sustain its weapons industry. There are three areas in which Russia and India might increase their cooperation.
Analysis
Russia and India's mutual history runs from competition in South Asia between czarist Russia and colonial England to Cold War-era cooperation between India and the Soviet Union. Moscow and New Delhi developed a close relationship after the United States provided weapons to Pakistan in the 1950s. The relationship intensified again following the Sino-Indian war in 1962. Even as India headed the Non-Aligned Movement during the Cold War, the Soviet Union began a heavy military investment in India that continues to this day.
Russia and India maintained ties after the fall of the Soviet Union, but the two countries have not seen any reason to expand their relations. The strategic relationship that existed occasionally during the Cold War became less important as each country focused on its own regional concerns. But developments in places like China and Afghanistan are placing new emphasis on the relationship.
Military
Over the past decade, India has surpassed China to become the largest buyer of Russian military exports. This is a consequence of India's military modernization and of China's increasing reliance on its indigenous military industry. India has recently signed a number of weapons contracts with Russia, purchasing tanks, warships and aircraft. For Moscow, the military relationship with India is critical, because the overall demand for Russian weapons is in decline.
The Indians have recently begun to diversify their arms suppliers. Arms contracts that could have gone to Russia include a major multirole fighter program contracted to the French and a couple of helicopter tenders that went to the United States. While the Russians still figure prominently in the Indian defense market, they are no longer the near-lone supplier of weapons to India. The Indians are seeking to purchase the most advanced and effective weaponry, and in some categories, Russia has a hard time competing with countries such as the United States. Furthermore, a series of delays and mishaps (especially with the Admiral Gorshkov carrier) have cast doubt on the Russians' reliability in arms transfers.
The greater competition from other weapons producers and the growing sophistication of the Indian military-industrial complex has caused the defense cooperation between India and Russia to include far more joint ventures in weapons development. This has allowed Russia to remain competitive in the Indian market, and it has also brought in much-needed Indian financing to support mutually beneficial weapons projects.
Russia and India collaborated in developing and fielding the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and the Perspective Multi-Role Fighter. So long as the Russians can offer India more than just sales, New Delhi will remain a key partner in the military-industrial field -- something Moscow needs. India, on the other hand, needs partners to help modernize its military as the country seeks to keep pace with military buildups in its neighborhood, especially in China.
Energy
India's domestic energy needs are rising fast. The International Energy Agency estimated that India would overtake Japan as the world's third-largest energy consumer by 2020. Domestic production of coal, natural gas and oil is declining due to poor management, lagging infrastructure and a complex regulatory environment. India has been trying to perfect its technical capability by participating in technically difficult projects around the world. Many of these projects have been carried out in Russia or in countries where Russia holds influence. India's Oil and Natural Gas Corp. holds a 20 percent stake in Russia's Sakhalin-I oil project and has been purchasing stakes in energy projects in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. India has hinted that it wants to create energy infrastructure connecting Central Asian energy supplies to India by routing them through Pakistan and Afghanistan, but security and political concerns decrease the chances that such a project will ever be carried out. Instead, India is focusing on existing projects to increase its expertise in energy technology.
New Delhi has renewed its focus on nuclear energy, a field in which Russia can expand its cooperation with India. Demand for nuclear energy is expected to grow nearly 400 percent in India from 2015 to 2035. Russia can build nuclear plants and provide uranium supplies. In fact, Moscow has already signed a protocol to build the third and fourth reactors at India's Kudankulam nuclear power plant, and it has offered loans to India for additional construction deals.
Afghanistan
Both Moscow and New Delhi are worried about the security situation in Afghanistan once the U.S. military withdraws. Russia is concerned that militants will move from Afghanistan into Central Asia, a region Moscow considers its sphere of influence. New Delhi worries that Afghanistan will become the center of a transnational militancy that could affect India at home, and it also worries that Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan could grow.
During the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Moscow worked closely with New Delhi in backing the Northern Alliance against the Taliban; this cooperation created lasting connections between the countries' military, intelligence and political establishments. But while Russia is looking to cooperate with India on Afghanistan, Moscow has realized a relationship with Pakistan could be more useful in this case. India probably worries this will lead to greater ties between Islamabad and Moscow. With that in mind, it is in New Delhi's benefit to maintain relations with Moscow across a broad range of issues.
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Read more: India and Russia: Chances for Closer Cooperation | Stratfor
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Marc: IMHO India is a natural ally for the US. Not only is it a democracy, it is a natural counterweight to China, and to Pakistan. In addition to the economics here, strengthening ties would be a good thing.
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India Is Ready for U.S. Natural Gas
There is ample evidence that the U.S. economy will benefit if LNG exports are increased..
By NIRUPAMA RAO
The relationship between India and the United States is vibrant and growing. Near its heart is the subject of energy—how to use and secure it in the cleanest, most efficient way possible.
The India-U.S. Energy Dialogue, established in 2005, has allowed our two countries to engage on many issues. Yet as India's energy needs continue to rise and the U.S. looks to expand the marketplace for its vast cache of energy resources, our partnership stands to be strengthened even further.
Despite the global economic slowdown, India's economy has grown at a relatively brisk pace over the past five years and India is now the world's fifth-largest energy consumer. It imports 75% of its energy (especially oil and petroleum products) today and expects to import 90% over the next decade. As a result, India is working hard to diversify its energy supplies. Still, the demand for energy keeps growing at a rate of 5%-6% annually. My country needs to secure more supplies to foster the socio-economic development of millions of our people who are still living in poverty.
Happily, the U.S. has experienced a boom in the production of natural gas. The ability to tap large formations by advanced technologies has yielded a large amount of this energy resource that achieves significant savings compared with diesel, especially when used in high-mileage heavy-duty vehicles.
Liquefied natural gas is transported more easily than other forms of energy. Significant investments, including some from India, have been made in technologies designed to harness LNG safely and efficiently and to build new facilities and ports to distribute it globally.
There is a significant potential for U.S. exports of LNG to grow exponentially. So far, however, while all terminals in the U.S. with capacity to export LNG are authorized to ship it to countries with which the U.S. has a free-trade agreement, only one—the terminal at Sabine Pass in Louisiana—has received authorization to export to non-FTA countries.
Authorization for other terminals to export LNG to those countries is currently awaiting a review by Department of Energy. As part of its own due diligence, the department commissioned a report on the domestic economic impact of increased LNG exports. The study analyzed more than 60 different macroeconomic scenarios, and under every one of them the U.S. economy would experience a net benefit if LNG exports were increased.
A boost in LNG exports would have many positive effects on both the U.S. and Indian economies. For the U.S. it would help create thousands of jobs and an expanded revenue stream for the federal government. For India, it would provide a steady, reliable supply of clean energy that will help reduce our crude oil imports from the Middle East and provide reliable energy to a greater share of our population. For both countries, which are committed to environmental sustainability, increasing the use and transport of LNG globally will help put into greater use one of the cleanest energy sources in the world.
The prospect of increased Indian investment in the U.S. natural-gas market will usher in a new era for a strong and mutually rewarding India-U.S. energy partnership. Through it, we will further consolidate our strategic ties and deepen cooperation for the benefit of millions of people in both countries.
Ms. Rao is the Indian ambassador to the United States.
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Marc: IMHO India is a natural ally for the US. Not only is it a democracy, it is a natural counterweight to China, and to Pakistan. In addition to the economics here, strengthening ties would be a good thing.
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Yes.
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http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/NEWS/newsrf.php?newsid=20100
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http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/ (http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/)
Shadow on the line
This map does not reflect India's claims or actual holding, but accurately represents the area
by Ajai Shukla and Sonia Trikha Shukla
Business Standard, 4th May 13
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Even for the most intrepid helicopter pilots of the Indian Air Force (IAF), flying a sortie to the desolate outpost of Daulat Beg Oldi on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) with China, has always meant pushing the limits. Wing Commander Abdul Hanfee, who had won a Vir Chakra for his devil-may-care flying in Siachen, would take off from the Siachen Base Camp with his Mi-17 helicopter loaded with rations and fuel and set course for Saser La, the towering 17,753-foot pass on the Karakoram range. With the helicopter rotors shuddering as they clawed through the thin air, Hanfee would look down from his cockpit as he flew over the pass, still littered with the bones of camels, ponies and human wayfarers --- the detritus of a bygone era when arbitrary frontiers had not disrupted centuries-old patterns of trade and connectivity.
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This was the Old Silk Route that connected Ladakh and Kashmir with Xinjiang --- now, like Tibet, an “autonomous region” of China. Well into the 20th century, camel caravans laden with silk, jade and hemp would set out from Yarkand and Khotan in East Turkestan, and travel to Leh and Kashmir from where they would bring back Pashmina wool, Kashmiri zafran (saffron), tea and calligraphy. After crossing the Karakoram Pass into India, the traders would leave their camels at what is now Daulat Beg Oldi, and transfer their goods onto pack ponies for the cruel journey over the Saser La into the more hospitable Shyok river valley that led on to Leh, Turtok or Srinagar. For the merchants and pilgrims who carried considerable sums in gold and silver, the treacherous Karakoram was far less hazardous than the robber bands and insecurity on the other route to Central Asia through Punjab and Afghanistan.
This isolation has defeated even the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), which has laboured for over a decade, so far unsuccessfully, to build an all-weather road over Saser La that will connect Daulat Beg Oldi (or DBO, in military phraseology) with Leh, Partapur and Kargil. The BRO has failed equally in bringing another road northwards to DBO from the Pangong Tso Lake, along the Indian side of the Line of Actual Control (LAC). Without road links to the rest of Ladakh, DBO remains an isolated enclave across the Karakoram and Ladakh ranges, dependent upon the IAF for food, fuel, ammunition and quick troop replenishments. Going there on foot involves an exhausting five-day march at altitudes that would exhaust an ibex. The military calls this enclave Sub-Sector North (SSN) and regards it as crucial for the defence of Siachen and Leh.
According to Lt Gen Kamleshwar Davar, a former commander of 3 Infantry Division under which this area comes, “SSN has major strategic value for India. If the Chinese were to come up to Saser La, our control over the Siachen Glacier would be seriously compromised since Saser La overlooks that area. SSN provides a protective buffer to the Siachen sector and also provides depth to the northeastern approaches to Leh. Furthermore, SSN is our land access to Central Asia, along the Old Silk Route through the Karakoram Pass.”
Now, India’s control over SSN is being challenged by the increasingly assertive presence of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). On Apr 15 the Indo-Tibet Border Police (ITBP), which holds and patrols SSN, discovered four Chinese tents pitched on a flat area called the Depsang Plain, with 30-40 uniformed Chinese personnel in the camp well inside the Indian side of the LAC. New Delhi was informed and the MEA contacted the Chinese Foreign Minister to activate a joint consultative mechanism that was set up in 2011 to resolve border incidents like this one. On Apr 18, the Chinese ambassador to India was called to the MEA and conveyed India’s concerns. But to little avail; in three flag meetings held on Apr 18, 23 and 30, the PLA has conveyed a simple message: its patrol has not violated the LAC; but it will withdraw if the Indian Army dismantles bunkers that it has built in two places near Chushul, in southeastern Ladakh.
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“The PLA has carefully chosen its spot. Along the entire 4,057 kilometres of the LAC, India is most isolated at DBO, being entirely reliant on airlift. In contrast, the PLA can bring an entire motorized division to the area within a day, driving along a first-rate highway,” says Major General Sheru Thapliyal, also a former 3 Division commander.
Beijing has made it clear that it has demands that must be met before it withdraws. On Thursday, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, Hua Chunying, declared: “the relevant negotiation mechanism is conducive to solving the relevant issue quickly… China and India are talking about the issue for a complete and appropriate settlement.” (emphasis ours)
Army sources protest that the Indian bunkers that China wants dismantled are deep on our side of the LAC, on the western bank side of the Indus, an area that China has never claimed even at its most acquisitive. Driving out the Chinese incursion at DBO would hardly be a problem, say top Indian commanders; a battalion, with adequate fire support could do this within minutes. But the Chinese were better placed for a build-up and would retaliate strongly. Besides, military action would dramatically escalate tensions all along the LAC, which has remained uniformly peaceful since the two countries signed the “Agreement on Peace and Tranquillity” in 1993. A series of tit-for-tat incursions all across the LAC would create a second active border for India to man around the year.
On Tuesday, Defence Minister AK Antony talked tough, suggesting that force would be employed if needed to safeguard Indian territories. Antony said, “There should not be any doubt that the country remains unanimous in its commitment to take every possible step, at all levels, to safeguard our interests.”
Brave words, but New Delhi’s top national security policymakers are not inclined to initiate a military confrontation with China, howsoever limited. That leaves the government with little choice other than diplomatic negotiations during two forthcoming high-level political meetings: foreign minister Salman Khurshid will visit Beijing on Thursday, while China’s new premier, Li Keqiang, is scheduled to visit New Delhi later this month.
Srikanth Kondapalli, a China expert in the Jawaharlal Nehru University believes that China is under pressure to resolve the crisis during Mr Khurshid’s visit to Beijing, since it needs a conducive atmosphere for Premier Li Keqiang’s visit. “The India polity is angry about China’s incursion and the opposition wants our foreign minister to cancel his visit to Beijing. If the issue festers, it would have negative implications for Premier Li Keqiang’s visit. Beijing remembers that President Hu Jintao’s visit in November 2006 had been vitiated after China’s ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi, had declared before the visit that the whole of Arunachal Pradesh was a disputed region,” says Kondapalli.
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At the root of the crisis is obvious unease in the Chinese security establishment at India’s border build-up, especially the surge in military deployment and infrastructure over the last 5-7 years. Like earlier occasions when the Indian Army enhanced its presence on the border, this time too China is making its disapproval felt.
(http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-aLNazcgIm6M/UYR4CKSg4fI/AAAAAAAAD5A/2V9Kf9kkfgM/s320/Pangong+Tso.JPG)
New Delhi first became conscious in the 1950s of the need to establish a military presence along India’s claim lines in Ladakh and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now Arunachal Pradesh). The trigger was Beijing rejection of the legitimacy of India’s consulate in Lhasa and our trade agencies in Yatung and Gyantse (in Tibet). Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru ordered a high-powered committee, presided over by Deputy Defence Minister, Major General MS Himmatsinghji, to study the problems created by China’s occupation of Tibet. The “North and North East Border Defence Committee” made the crucial (and still ignored) recommendation that military posts should move forward to India’s claim lines in tandem with the simultaneous development of administration, road communications and local infrastructure.
Instead, after belatedly discovering in 1957 that China’s newly built Western Highway from Tibet to Xinjiang ran for nearly 200 kilometres through the India-claimed Aksai Chin, a high altitude desolation that DBO is an extension of, New Delhi threw troops pell-mell into these unknown areas in what was known as the “Forward Policy”. Beijing’s insecurities, already inflamed by a massive Tibetan rebellion, were exacerbated by the suspicion that India was backing the uprising. Apprehension turned into animosity when New Delhi granted the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan refugees asylum in India in 1959. The Indian move forward thus degenerated into war by 1962. A much better prepared and equipped PLA easily overran Indian territory right down to the plains of Assam.
It took a traumatized India twenty years to decide to reoccupy the China border again. In 1975, General KV Krishna Rao submitted an “Experts Committee” report recommending military posture and border defences for the next 25 years. It called for a larger number of troops to defend the borders and for better roads to support their logistics. As the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) from 1981-83, Rao persuaded Prime Minister Indira Gandhi that twenty years of fearful holding back had to end. In 1983, the army moved forward again, deploying in strength in Tawang and Chushul.
This led to trouble again, with the Chinese aggrieved over India’s move forward. In 1986, a Chinese patrol pitched up tents in a disputed area called Wangdung, north of Tawang. A furious retaliatory build up by the Indian Army almost ended in actual hostilities, but tensions were resolved. Diplomatic engagement led to Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 visit to China. During Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Beijing in 1993, the two countries signed an “Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China Border Area,” which has led to the largely peaceful border of today.
The current crisis is triggered by India’s third border buildup. Starting from the mid-2000s, New Delhi sanctioned two Indian mountain divisions to defend Arunachal Pradesh; and the IAF activated three Sukhoi-30 fighter bases in Assam along with several units of Akash air defence batteries. Eight Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) have been refurbished, permitting forward replenishment and heliborne operations. In the works is an even greater capability in the northeast, with an armoured brigade and a mountain strike corps scheduled to take the field by 2017.
(http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-SRdGOd1qliI/UYR4oTh_QkI/AAAAAAAAD5U/hTPOICd4nK4/s320/Airfield.JPG)
Of apparently greater concern to Beijing is the growing Indian capability in Ladakh. India has moved at least two additional infantry brigades into southeastern Ladakh and an armoured brigade will become operational by 2017. ALGs have been activated in Nyoma, Fukche and DBO, with AN-32 transport aircraft now flying supplies and replenishments to these isolated outposts.
China’s discomfort will all this was conveyed last month when Beijing handed New Delhi a draft proposal to freeze troop levels and defences on the LAC, institutionalizing India’s disadvantage. While such an agreement would cap the Indian buildup, the intrusion at DBO seems to be a trial balloon for dealing with troublesome Indian positions that already exist. The intrusion has created “facts on the ground,” which can be bartered for Indian concessions around Chushul. And if this work, this method can be invoked in other sectors as well.
* * * *
Like many armies through the ages, the Indian Army finds its operational options constrained by logistics. China has understood that a comprehensive road network is the final arbiter of power in high altitude mountainous terrain. India has more troops on the border but, without a road network, the rugged Himalayas reduce those impressive divisions to isolated groups of soldiers sitting on widely separated hilltops. P Stodan, a former Indian ambassador who is from Ladakh points out, “Around Ladakh, the Chinese can move troops at 400 kilometres a day. We can do a leisurely 150-200 kilometres if we’re lucky.”
In case diplomatic negotiations do not resolve the problem this month, the next watershed in this crisis will be the onset of winter. Since the bitter conditions at DBO make it difficult for the Chinese to winter there in tents, they would have to build more weatherproof accommodation. Furthermore they would have to stock food, fuel and ammunition, for which they would need to move vehicles or helicopters. It remains to be seen if this would force India to react militarily.
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http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1258
Chinese Manoeuvres against India’s possible use of the Gilgit-Baltistan Card
Paper No. 5478 Dated 01-May-2013
By B. Raman
In an article of December 20, 2010, titled “Sino-India border row: China's bid to boost Pak 'presence' in J&K” carried by Rediff.com at http://www.rediff.com/news/column/chinas-bid-to-boost-pak-presence-in-jk/20101220.htm, I had stated as follows:
“China, which had never openly questioned the Indian estimate of the length of the common border before, is now unilaterally seeking to exclude from consideration during the border talks the dispute between India and China over the Chinese occupation of a large territory in the Ladakh sector of J&K.
“In fact, it is seeking to question India's locus standi to discuss with China the border in the J&K area in view of Pakistan's claims to this area. It is trying to bring in Pakistan as an interested party in so far as the border talks regarding the western sector are concerned.
“It wants to change the format of the border talks in order to keep it confined bilaterally to the eastern and middle sectors and expand it to a trilateral issue involving India, China and Pakistan in the western sector.
“The exclusion of the border in the J&K sector from its estimate of the total length of the border is another indication that it does not recognise India's claims of sovereignty over J&K.
“It is apparent that this is part of a well thought-out policy of unilaterally changing the ground rules of the border talks. It had earlier allegedly changed the ground rules in the eastern sector by going back on a prior understanding with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh that the border should be demarcated in such a manner as not to affect populated areas.
“It is now going back on its previous stand in the western sector by seeking to challenge India's locus standi in view of its dispute with Pakistan.
“Even at the risk of a further delay in the exercise to solve the border dispute, India should not agree to any change in the ground rules which would restrict the border talks only to the eastern and middle sectors and exclude the western sector on the ground that India has a dispute over this area with Pakistan.”
2. The Chinese manoeuvres to change the ground rules are reflected in the latest situation created by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) ( a platoon of it) in advancing 19 kms inside the hitherto perceived Line of Actual Control (LOAC) in the Dipsang area of Eastern Ladakh on April 15,2013, and staying put there in tents.
3. In the absence of any commonly accepted maps indicating a mutually accepted perception of the LOAC, the understanding as to where the LOAC lies largely depends on the differing individual perceptions of the two countries. While the Indian perceptions remain constant, the Chinese perceptions remain changing depending on its individual interest.
4. The Chinese assertion of claims of territorial sovereignty in the Eastern Ladakh area had in the past remained restricted to a few kms from the LOAC. For the first time now, it has unilaterally changed the perception by 19 kms. Whether the Chinese ultimately withdraw from this area or not, by this intrusion, Beijing is seeking to impose a change in the ground situation that had prevailed since 1962 by unilaterally imposing a new perception of the LOAC which will expand Chinese claims to Indian territory in this area.
5. At the same time, according to media reports that have not been questioned by the Government of India, the PLA is demanding India’s reversal of its reported re-activation of the advanced landing grounds at Daulat Beg Oldie, Fukche and Nyoma and suspension of India’s construction of temporary posts at Chumar and Fukche to provide shelters to patrolling Indian troops.
6. In one stroke, China is seeking to expand considerably the area over which it claims sovereignty and restrict or reduce the area over which India has been claiming sovereignty.
7. Why has China suddenly sought to activate sovereignty issues in this area and to change unilaterally hitherto accepted perceptions/claims of the LOAC? This area where the PLA has embarked on a policy of activism contrary to China’s proclamations of its interest in finding a peaceful solution to the border dispute and maintaining peace and tranquillity in the border areas has assumed importance for China in view of its proximity to the Karakoram area in the Gilgit-Baltistan area of Pakistan where the Chinese have stepped their construction activities and inducted Chinese protection troops to protect the construction teams with the acceptance of the Government of Pakistan, which has been in illegal occupation of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (POK) and Gilgit-Baltistan (GB).
8. If a confrontational situation develops between India and China, India will have two cards at its disposal--- re-activate Tibet, which will be a difficult option or make the Chinese presence in GB prohibitively costly for China just as the US made the Soviet presence in Afghanistan bloody costly for the erstwhile USSR. The second is a doable option.
9. India looks upon POK and GB as an integral part of India. The Chinese presence in that area is a violation of India’s sovereignty claims. India has strategic allies amongst the people of GB who could help it in making the Chinese presence costly. GB can provide India with the option of proxy activism in that area to make the Chinese pay for their repeated intrusions in the Ladakh area.
10. The Chinese are seeking to pre-empt possible Indian activism against Chinese presence and interests in the GB area by occupying new territory in Eastern Ladakh and keeping the Indian Army away from the vicinity of the Karakoram area.
11. Whatever be the final outcome of the present stand-off, the Chinese manoeuvres to prevent India from possibly using the GB card against them will continue. We should not lose this card and should not legitimise the Chinese presence in the GB area. We have already lost the Tibet card by accepting Tibet in writing as an integral part of China. We should not lose the GB card by succumbing to the new Chinese pressure in the areas in the proximity of the Karakoram area.
12. This may please be read in continuation of my earlier article on the India-China Border Dispute of April 23, 2013, at http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/node/1248
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Here's a post on Pak and the spread of Islam in India by an Indian nationalist poster called Rudradev. He has some interesting ideas, that I had not heard before. I have made some comments in italics, where the language might be unfamiliar to you, or underlined or made things bold..
"The essential similarities between Western feudalism (transplanted to colonized countries in the colonial era) and Islamic "Kabila (defined later)" imply that it is not only the "West" which has been a colonial entity as far as societies like ours are concerned... Islam itself is equally a foreign colonialist entity in our subcontinent, as fundamentally alien and predatory to our land, our culture and our way of life as the British or Portuguese or Dutch ever were. The atavistic howls issuing from their minarets five times a day are, indeed, cries of triumph and domination in a foreign language... the language of the colonizer shouting down the colonized.
Ramana has written extensively on the "Kabila" model... it roughly translates to "government as armed camp." Essentially there is a sultan who, with his generals and their troops, constitutes the ultimate fount of power in the political hierarchy. This is unwaveringly typical of the manner in which various political groups and dynasties have consolidated power in West and Central Asia, and North Africa, since the very advent of Islam.
The "Kabila" worked very well in the lands where Islam originated, and where it spread in the early centuries of its expansion. Why? Because the lands themselves were amenable to being governed in this form. In the deserts of West Asia, the arid mountains of Persia and the steppes to the North, the circumstances of nature favour a form of political dominance which relies on armament, maneuverability and mobility. This is because resources are scarce and concentrated in a few areas... an oasis here, a valley there. With a strong group of highly mobile armed men on horseback, you can easily forge an empire in such places. All you have to do is seize control of the few well-defined supply centers, the market centers (city states) and the trade routes between them. Most of the land is junk anyway. Once you're able to do this, and especially to destroy any civilizational affinity to pre-Islamic forms in the market centers (hence the Islamic obsession with temple breaking and idol smashing) you have, effectively, an empire. It doesn't matter if the thousands of useless square miles in between are physically under your domination or not; as long as you have no challengers in these particular small foci of power, you're an unchallenged monarch.
"Kabila" differs from European feudalism because of the emphasis on mobility... horsemen and artillery could be moved to engage a challenger in very short order. A necessary corollary of the Kabila model is un-rootedness. If you have to move fast you cannot afford to be tied down. Therefore, you do not invest in the land or the people, you see them only as objects to be controlled and squeezed for every drop of utility against the hard anvil of history. You position mullahs in population centers to be your spies, propagandists and social monitors... weeding out unorthodoxy and rebellion at the stage of ideation before it becomes necessary to smack down an armed rebellion. But ultimately you, and your apparatus of mullahs, constitute an extraordinarily parasitic, locust-like and virulent form of colonialism. This is something that Western studies of post-colonialism (with their essentially Euro-centric historiography) entirely ignore... they see the Islamic virus as something that was indigenous somehow to the lands they conquered. They do not realize that it was merely a more rapacious and less invested form of colonial imperialism.
Indeed, the more invested Muslim rulers became in their territories, the less "Islamic" they became, of necessity taking on the administrative, social and traditional trappings of pre-Islamic statehood. This made them vulnerable to "purer", mobile and less-invested Islamic conquerors. Hence the Delhi sultanate was prime fodder for Timur and Babar... Baghdad for the Mongols... and Mughal Delhi, again, for Nadir Shah. In each case the less-civilized, more predatory and more essentially savage Kabila prevailed over the more "settled" and "urbanized" Muslim state. When you do not carry the baggage of civilization or of feeling responsibility for the people you rule, you have much more maneuverability and ruthlessness at your disposal. Taking advantage of the Kabila's inherent strengths, the West was able to lead roving bands of armed Arabs in a devastatingly effective rebellion against the settled Ottomans during the 1st World War.
Why do I bring all this up with relevance to Pakistan?
As I said before... the "Kabila" system worked very well to dominate places where resources were scarce and concentrated in well-defined locations. However, it never worked quite as well in India.
That is because our Bharatvarsha(Hindi term for India) is quite unlike those lands where Islam originated and expanded in the early centuries of its being. In Bharatvarsha, the land is almost never inhospitable or forbidding. In Arabia, a band of people displaced from an oasis had two choices: submit to the peaceful orthodoxy of a triumphant Muslim conqueror, or go out into the desert and die. In India, not so. A displaced people had only to go fifty or a hundred or two hundred kilometres in any direction... and mother Bharat (India)in her generous embrace would provide fertile lands, rich orchards, abundant and plentiful fields. How many generations and what huge extents of such flights were supported by the bounty of Bharatvarsha become apparent if you study the migration of the Saraswats, originally from Kashmir... one branch traveled from there south of the Vindhyas, to Goa, and then again uprooted themselves in the face of Portuguese onslaught and proceeded to what is Dakshin Kannada in Karnataka today.
This had two effects: first, it made Indians in general indifferent to the fact of an Islamic conquest. If they took away our old fields and seized our city... well, we would just move over a little bit and build a new city, cultivate new fields. Our Gods and families are safe, let the Turk or Afghan have the old land, because there is enough for everybody if we simply adjust our location a little bit: this was how our forefathers dealt with Islamic expansion. Incidentally, this is also how we deal with Chinese encroachments!)
The second effect, of course, is that Hindu society survived, largely unscathed, as an essentially Indian identity. In Mesopotamia or Egypt, the Muslim idol-smashers and temple-breakers could effectively carry out cultural genocide because their targets were all in one place and immobile... where could you build another Baghdad or Luxor? The inheritors of the old culture had no choice but to surrender before the savagery of Islam's harbingers, and participate willingly in the extinction of their pre-Islamic cultural identities, if they wished to survive at all. In India, we would take our Gods, our families and our few possessions and head out a few more miles into the vast green hinterland and endless bounty of Bharat-mata (Hindi for mother land), who would provide lovingly for us to begin our lives over again as Hindus.
This is essentially why we were saved from being extinguished by the onslaught of Islamic colonialism... Bharatvarsha herself sheltered her children and empowered them to preserve their way of life.
Now what you have in Pakistan today is the continuance of the Kabila system. The West realized soon enough that without the depredations of Islamic colonialism that denuded the civilizational wealth of the East for nearly ten centuries, sapping the power of the old Asiatic states and erasing their very identities... without this, the West would have had a much harder time pursuing their own colonial expansions. In fact, Islamic colonialism prepares the ground for Western colonialism... a fact that remains as true today as it was before the Battle of Plassey. Hence, everyone from Olaf Caroe to Zbignew Brzezinski sees a utility for the West in maintaining Islamic Kabilas even when the armies and viceroys of the West have gone home. The Kabilas will never construct a state of sufficient power to threaten the West; but they will keep Asia weak for the day that the West might want to return, in one form or another.
THIS is why the West was so determined to see a Pakistan constructed out of a large portion of Bharatvarsha. It is also why the West has been careful to destroy any alternative sense of nationhood or state-based form of governance in the Muslim world, other than Kabila. It is why the Arab nationalists of Ba'ath Egypt (Nasser) and Iraq (Saddam) had to be deposed, and the last scion of Ba'athism, Syria's Assad, is being systematically marked for elimination today. This is the reason why Gaddaffi in Libya was ousted, and why Iran is now at the head of the list of Western targets. Meanwhile the Kabila-state of Saudi Arabia is raised to paramountcy; while in smaller GCC nations... which are essentially city-states or market-centers like the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait and Bahrain... the US itself has taken on the role of Kabila.
In Pakistan that role has been given to the Kabila known as the Pakistan Army. However, let's remember... the land which the Pakistan Army Kabila seeks to dominate is not an arid expanse with tightly localized resource concentrations, as in the territories where the Kabila model has a natural advantage. No, the land of Pakistan is the land of Bharatvarsha... all-embracing and hospitable. It is much harder for a Kabila to control and dominate this "Pakistan" than a Persia or an Iraq.
Meanwhile, to the northwest of Pakistan is Afghanistan... a prime Kabila land, where a mobile and savage army unencumbered by investment in the people can always prevail over the forces of a more settled kingdom.
What happened over the last ten years is instructive. The Kabila (Pakistan Army) deputed by the West to control and enervate Western Bharatvarsha for colonial exploitation, has failed in its task. It has succumbed to the temptations of the land it occupies... Bharatvarsha... and become more "settled" than a Kabila has any right to be. It has become invested in private enterprise, legitimate ones like textiles and agriculture as well as illegal ones such as heroin supply. The Pakistan Army remains a true Kabila in that it still does not give a damn for the people in its charge; but it has become "softer" in the style of the Lodhi who was overwhelmed by Babar, or the Abbasid Caliph who was smashed by Genghis Khan. To compensate for its softness, the Pakistan Army has overemphasized the role traditionally played by Mullahs in the Kabila system, and set up a huge, hypertrophied apparatus of highly empowered political agents to subdue the population in the name of Islam... including all our favourite Tanzeems(Paki terror groups).
The big mistake that the Soft Kabila of the Pakistan Army made was to create another Kabila... the Taliban... in an attempt to colonize and subdue the people of Afghanistan. Taliban Kabila, being a classic, mobile, hard Kabila, was able to gain control over the prime Kabila-land of Afghanistan in record time back in 1996. However, with the force of historic inevitability... they have utterly lost regard and affinity for the soft, settled Kabila of the TSPA. They see no reason why they should take orders from this decadent, less-pure Sultanate; they have enjoyed repeated military successes over the TSPA (derogatory term Terrorist State of Pak Army) over the past ten years; and worst of all, they have seen the TSPA do the bidding of the Kaffir (USA) by comfortably abetting the slaughter of Momin (muslims) perpetuated by the Americans since 2001.
As a result, not only the Taliban, but many sections of the Kabila-apparatchik mullahs (who would ordinarily remain loyal to a strong, hard-Kabila) have turned against the soft and decadent Kabila of the TSPA.
Perhaps the most curious thing is how the TSPA and the Paki elite have responded to this state of affairs. Being themselves of Bharatvarsha... they have begun to do the classic Hindoo thing! "Fine", they say, "let the fundoos have FATA/KP, after all we have much more productive land".... "fine, let them have a presence in Karachi/Quetta/Peshawar, not a blade of grass grows there"... "fine, let them expand into southern Punjab, after all we should keep them close so we can keep an eye on them." Rationalization after rationalization is articulated by these Pakis while their circle of influence shrinks; so far will our bounteous mother Bharat let them retreat into the welcoming folds of her sari that they blindfold themselves ever more tightly with her pallu (wrap of the sari dress) and convince themselves that all is well."
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Koranic concept of war, pdf
http://wolfpangloss.files.wordpress.com/2008/02/malik-quranic-concept-of-war.pdf (http://wolfpangloss.files.wordpress.com/2008/02/malik-quranic-concept-of-war.pdf)
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Looks like the Chinese have withdrawn, from Indian territory. Am sure the details will be out soon..
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Good to have you back with us YA. Thank you for these posts.
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/05/03/china_india_most_dangerous_border
From the article:
While China's motivations remain unclear, the potential implications are massive. The Sino-Indian dynamic is often seen as a sideshow to Beijing's more immediate rivalries with the United States and Japan. But more intense strategic competition between India and China would reverberate throughout the continent, exacerbating tensions in Central Asia, the Indian Ocean, and Southeast Asia. Disruptions to the Asian engine of economic growth caused by these tensions could debilitate the global economy.
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OTOH the Indians make natural allies of the US in its dealings with China :-D
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Something not appreciated in the west is that India's current political leadership, is from the preindependence era (1947). eg the Current prime minister was born in what is currently Pakistan, and eg Musharraf was born in India!. They have emotional baggage related to pak. However, as the newer generation of politicians come to power, these leaders do not have anything binding them to Pak and are infact willing to take a much harder line. As the economy improves, the newer gen of Indians, are willing to take a harder line against China too.
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An opinion from a New Delhi economist published in the Asia Times FWIW...
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/SOU-03-240513.html
Indian growth model unsustainable at best
By Kunal Kumar Kundu
NEW DELHI- The Indian economy is likely to have grown at a mere 5% in the financial year that ended in March, the lowest growth rate in a decade; investments are falling and the fault lines of Indian politics lie fully exposed.
With the government embroiled in a numerous corruption cases, leading to a sense of policy paralysis gripping the economy, business confidence has been on the wane.
India's shinning story of a decade back has lost plenty of sheen of late due to growing frustration at a rising governance deficit. The
very fact that the Indian economy is expected to grow at close to 6% during the current financial year and close to 7% in the next (a far cry from 8% to 9% growth predicted a few years back) indicates how short-term expectations have been whittled down.
However, like China, India is still considered to be one of the world's rising economic powers. But, while the Chinese growth story has the authoritarian state to thank for it, the forward march of the Indian economy has been impeded by the ineptitude of the state.
After growing at over a double-digit rate for decades, China is now on the throes of a slowdown caused by over investment and under consumption, though its state-of-the-art infrastructure can be cause for envy. India, on the other hand, suffers from woefully inadequate infrastructure as the financially challenged government cannot invest while the morally and politically challenged government fails to clear away hurdles against private investment.
Even so, there's a generally held view that by 2030, India (a supposed growth engine for the global economy) will be the world's third-largest economy while it could overtake China as the world's fastest growing major economy much sooner.
The question, therefore, is how can one of the most populous countries like India grow at a pace it has grown despite widespread corruption, inefficiency and a government that can barely be called functional?
A peek into India's growth history can, to a large extent, explain this dichotomy. Essentially, it boils down to the extent of control that the government has on the various sectors of the economy.
India leapfrogged from being an agrarian economy to a service sector led economy as entrepreneurs had to find a way to grow despite the heavy hand of government. The agriculture sector, which is under maximum government control, now accounts for a mere 14% of gross domestic product (GDP). Industry, where the government still has major control on the factors of production such as land, labor and natural resources, accounts for roughly 26% of GDP. On the other hand, the service sector, about which the government has limited knowledge and over which it has the least control, now accounts for roughly 60% of GDP.
To understand how India's entrepreneurial spirit thrives and grows despite clear governance failure, one need look no further than the cities of Gurgaon, in northwestern Haryana state, and Bangalore, to the south in Karnataka.
Gurgaon, as we know it, is barely two decades old yet houses practically every big name in the corporate world. Its buildings are designed by the world's best architects, and it has about 24 shopping malls that stock practically every international brand, eight golf courses and more than 20 outlets for luxury cars such as BMW, Audi and Volkswagen.
However, while it's a private sector success story, it is a public sector failure. The city does not have a functioning drainage system; reliable electricity or water; or any citywide system of public transportation.
The inadequacies of the government did not act as a deterrent for the private sector. To compensate for several hours of electricity blackouts, companies and real estate developers operate massive diesel generators that have the capacity to provide electricity to small towns. Private water supply flourishes as do privately dug bore wells to take care of shortages. Large number of companies employs hundreds of private buses and taxis to bridge the transportation gap.
The experience of India's IT capital Bangalore is not dissimilar. Companies such as Infosys and Wipro maintain their own fleet of vehicles to transport their employees and have huge captive power generation capacity to ensure uninterrupted service.
Gurgaon and Bangalore are good examples of how the private sector strives to keep the economy functional despite the huge governance deficit, raising the question of whether this should be the template for future economic growth?
Ideally not, since the existing growth template is not efficient enough. It can provide temporary succor but not a permanent solution. The animal spirit that was unleashed following the ushering in of economic reforms in 1991 has, by now, taken advantage of all the low hanging fruits that could be plucked.
A functional private sector and a dysfunctional public sector is the least desired recipe for sustainable growth. Fact is, only a small portion of the blame for recently plummeting growth can be directed toward external factors. The debilitating impact of the governance deficit has manifested itself in a far bigger way than anticipated.
Rising inequality, continued health and education challenges, and a tussle for ownership of factors of production are challenges that need to be addressed by well-intentioned government and the private sector.
The Indian economy cannot be service-sector driven for an indefinite period. Manufacturing has to play an equally important role to ensure a more equitable growth. For that to happen India desperately needs a government that can function and be effective. Only a concerted effort to follow this strategy can help the economy get back to the growth path that logically should be India's.
Kunal Kumar Kundu is a New Delhi-based economist.
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Slowdowns in China and India don't help us, nor does our stagnation help them.
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http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/08/30/as-gdp-slips-pm-attempts-to-restore-confidence-in-indias-economy/
India’s GDP growth for the April to June quarter was a dismal 4.4 percent, the government said today. It was the slowest rate of growth since 2009. ”It was a weaker performance than most economists had been expecting,” the BBC reports, “and was a slowdown from the first three months of the year, when growth was 4.8%.”
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Plowhorse!-Pradesh Weshindi
Slowdowns in China and India don't help us, nor does our stagnation help them.
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http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/08/30/as-gdp-slips-pm-attempts-to-restore-confidence-in-indias-economy/
India’s GDP growth for the April to June quarter was a dismal 4.4 percent, the government said today. It was the slowest rate of growth since 2009. ”It was a weaker performance than most economists had been expecting,” the BBC reports, “and was a slowdown from the first three months of the year, when growth was 4.8%.”
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y Robert D. Kaplan
A noteworthy geopolitical shift is emerging that the media have yet to report on. In future years, a sizable portion of the U.S. Navy's forces in the Middle East could be spending less time in the Persian Gulf and more time in the adjacent Indian Ocean. Manama in Bahrain will continue to be the headquarters of the Fifth Fleet. But American warships and their crews, as well as the myriad supply and repair services for them, could be increasingly focused on the brand new Omani port of Duqm, located outside the Persian Gulf on the Arabian Sea, which, in turn, forms the western half of the Indian Ocean.
High-ranking U.S. defense officials, military and civilian, have been visiting Oman and particularly Duqm of late. A few years ago, Duqm was just a blank spot on the map, facing the sea on a vast and empty coastline with its back to the desert. Now, $2 billion has been invested to build miles and miles of quays, dry docks, roads, an airfield and hotels. By the time Duqm evolves into a full-fledged city-state, $60 billion will have been spent, officials told me during a visit I made there -- a visit sponsored by the government of Oman.
Duqm is a completely artificial development that aims to be not a media, cultural or entertainment center like Doha or Dubai, but a sterile and artificially engineered logistical supply chain city of the 21st century, whose basis of existence will be purely geographical and geopolitical. Duqm has little history behind it; it will be all about trade and business. If you look at the map, Duqm lies safely outside the increasingly vulnerable and conflict-prone Persian Gulf, but close enough to take advantage of the Gulf's energy logistics trail. It is also midway across the Arabian Sea, between the growing middle classes of India and East Africa.
Key Indian Ocean Ports
Click to Enlarge
For Oman, Duqm is key to nation building, as it will further link the southwestern Omani province of Dhofar and its port of Salalah with the ports of Muscat and Sohar in northeastern Oman. For the United States, Duqm will be a partial answer to the Chinese-built port of Gwadar on the nearby coast of Pakistan. As China continues its growing involvement in Indian Ocean ports (as I documented in my 2010 book, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power), the United States will seek to preserve the balance of power in the Indian Ocean with its own military and commercial footprint. The reported new emphasis on Duqm would be a giant step toward the U.S. Navy becoming an Indian Ocean-Pacific sea force instead of an Atlantic-Pacific one, as it has been for all of its previous history. From Duqm, the U.S. Navy would still be close enough to the Persian Gulf to bomb Iran, yet without American warships being as hemmed-in and exposed to attack as they are in Bahrain. To be clear, this will be a gradual and subtle shift over time. The U.S. Navy is not deserting Bahrain and the Gulf.
For China, Duqm can be a transshipment hub for its consumer goods bound for the Indian subcontinent and East Africa -- especially for the growing markets of Tanzania and Mozambique. In other words, container ships would arrive from China, and the containers themselves would then be off-loaded at Duqm for transport on smaller ships to various points in Africa, India and the Greater Middle East. Salalah, farther southwest, already serves this purpose. But local officials maintain that there will be enough commercial sea traffic in coming decades to make Duqm viable as well. Though China has openly expressed interest in utilizing Duqm, Omani officials assured me that China will never have the influence over this new port as they have at others around the Indian Ocean.
The scale of development here is simply profound, attesting to the Indian Ocean's increasing geopolitical importance. I drove five hours across the desert from the Omani capital of Muscat to reach Duqm, with almost nothing in between but a bare-knuckled wilderness in innumerable shades of gray and little else besides goats and camels in sight. Upon arrival, I saw a 4.5-kilometer main breakwater built of reinforced concrete octopods protecting the new port, which already features mobile and rail harbor cranes, as well as rail lines already laid for future gantry cranes. Sixteen warships from the Gulf Cooperation Council sat along the pier in preparation for a live fire exercise the next day. The dry docks were filled with merchant vessels in need of repair. American Navy ships have been arriving for shore visits in greater frequency. Port authorities are planning for enhanced facilities in order to, perhaps one day, service U.S. nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines.
Officials briefed me in front of a large and detailed scale-model of Duqm as they hope it will appear years hence: composed of fisheries, an oil refinery, a transit hub for petrochemicals, a rail link, mineral-based manufacturing, a desalinization plant, a hospital, a mall, an international school, a town center and a tourist zone. Obviously, the airport here will have cargo facilities. The runway, already built, is long enough to receive flights from Europe. With 80 kilometers of virginal coastline allotted to Duqm, the new city-state could be larger than Bahrain or Singapore. And this is all just phase one -- being built from scratch and inspired only by location on the map. The very fact of Duqm, as it exists and as it is envisioned, constitutes testimony to the fact that geography will be as important to the 21st century as it was to all previous ones.
New natural gas discoveries in the desert to the rear should help service Duqm's energy needs, as a population of 67,000 is envisioned here by 2020. The new railhead will link Duqm to Muscat, Dubai and ports all the way north to Kuwait at the head of the Persian Gulf. If a rapprochement between the United States and Iran is achieved, Duqm will repair Iranian ships and be an offshore base for the burgeoning Iranian economy. If the rapprochement never materializes, Duqm, located safely outside the Gulf, will be a port of choice for merchant shipping companies that do not want their mega-ships diverted to the volatile Gulf region. Instead, they can make landfall here and potentially take deliveries of hydrocarbons by rail or pipeline from inside the Gulf.
To spur development, Duqm will have a new legal framework and will feature 100 percent foreign ownership of local businesses. Foreign companies that invest here will enjoy tax-free status and the ability to operate without currency restrictions, I was told.
Duqm's biggest advantage for the Americans is that Oman has been for decades among the most stable, well governed and least oppressive states in the Greater Middle East -- whereas the problem the Chinese have in Gwadar is that Pakistan is among the least stable and worst governed states in the Greater Middle East. Strategic geography for a port requires not just an advantageous location vis-a-vis the sea, but vis-a-vis land, too. And it is road, rail and pipeline connections from Omani ports outside the Persian Gulf -- Salalah and Sohar, as well as Duqm -- to ports inside the Gulf, from Dubai to Kuwait, that potentially make this place so attractive.
If Duqm succeeds -- still a big "if" -- it will become a great place name of the 21st century, just as Aden was in the 19th and Singapore was in the 20th. Given continued demographic growth and the theoretical prospect for economic dynamism in India and East Africa -- even as Europe hovers around zero population growth with stagnant, over-regulated economies -- the Indian Ocean, as I have been writing for years, could become the geopolitical nerve center of postmodern times. Duqm constitutes a multibillion-dollar bet that I am right.
Read more: The Indian Ocean World Order | Stratfor
Follow us: @stratfor on Twitter | Stratfor on Facebook
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Any comments or observations from YA or others?
http://www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-india-conservatives-elections-modi-20140516-story.html
India's Narendra Modi leads conservatives to election day victory
India’s conservative opposition party won national elections in a landslide, results showed Friday, riding a message of optimism and clean, business-friendly governance to a historic parliamentary majority that could profoundly change the direction of the world’s largest democracy.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/banyan/2014/05/indias-next-prime-minister-0
India aspires to become strong on the back of economic growth, more international trade, deeper global engagement
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Makes me more bullish on the rupee.
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The Tsu-NaMo (NaMo=narendra modi) wave that swept India....is a major event..after 30 years, a single party won enough seats to be the majority party. NaMo has shown that he can govern, is a hindu nationalist (so wont tolerate misbehaviour from pak or China)...and will even work with the muslims and take them along. I am quite bullish on India....YA.
‘Modi-fied’ India: Implications of BJP’s landslide win
Rajeev Sharma is a New Delhi-based journalist, author and strategic analyst. He tweets @Kishkindha and can be reached at bhootnath004@yahoo.com.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) stormed into power on Friday riding on the crest of a Narendra Modi tsunami which gave a clear majority to a single party for the first time in India for 30 years and swept the ruling Congress into oblivion.
It has become the worst-ever electoral performance by the Grand Old Party. With Modi emerging as the undisputed strong man of India, this will have its own implications for the world.
Here is my take on the specific countries and regions that are crucial for India.
South Asia/India’s Neighborhood: Modi’s emergence as the undisputed strongman in India and the sole decision-maker should make India’s smaller neighbors more cautious. Nepal and the Maldives have repeatedly cocked a snook at India during their tenure of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government headed by Manmohan Singh. Sri Lanka and Bangladesh bugged India with their own pinpricks. They could afford to do so as the UPA government was bogged down in coalition politics. This mindset should see a sea change.
Pakistan: The country’s entire leadership, particularly military, is prone to India-bashing, something that would get a fitting verbal lashing from the Modi government if such statements were to emanate from Pakistan. However, the most interesting thing to see in India-Pakistan relations will be whether Pakistani firing from across the Line of Control (LoC), which has picked up momentum in the past couple of weeks, will continue this trend. Incidentally, for the first time in its history, the BJP has won three out of six Lok Sabha seats in Jammu and Kashmir, the state which is at the core of the India-Pakistan dispute, and also the venue of the Kargil War in 1999. This in itself should be seen as a huge statement from the people of India to Pakistan.
China: Modi will be more careful when dealing with China. However, it will have to be seen whether China makes a Depsang Valley-like 16-km-deep incursion in Ladakh (Jammu and Kashmir) under a Modi-led government.
Russia, Japan: These two countries will be the most important in the entire world from the perspective of the Modi government. The Modi administration will deepen ties with both: Russia to counterbalance the United States and Japan to counterbalance China. The Modi-led India should also see a huge fillip in trade and economic ties with these two countries.
United States: Modi will go slow with the US and wait for the Americans’ overtures before taking the first step. The US has pursued a policy of denying a visa to Modi over his alleged but unproven involvement in the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, and has foolishly stuck to this policy when the entire West has changed its stance toward Modi. Obama called to say that visa will not be an issue...but it may be too late...YA
Domestic implications
The Indian election results have also come up with three trail-blazing new trends, each one auguring well for the nation of 1.2 billion people.
One: The coalition era that descended on India a quarter century ago is over, as the BJP has crossed the magic number of 272 seats in the 543-member Lok Sabha on its own and does not need any allies – pre-poll or post-poll – to run the government. However, it is another question whether Modi, after he takes over as prime minister of India in a few days, will be able to rope in the BJP’s regional allies in his government. The flip side of this is that it does not mean that it is sunset time for regional parties because parties like AIADMK (Tamil Nadu), Trinamool Congress (West Bengal) and Biju Janata Dal (Orissa) have done very well without the support of any party, national or regional.
Two: For the first time, factors like caste, creed, religion and region that have been the bane of Indian politics have been thrown by the wayside. The BJP has posted unprecedented electoral victories in states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar which are notorious for their caste and religion-based politics. Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest state in terms of population and number of MPs in the Lok Sabha, is a classic example. BJP nearly swept the state winning 71 out of 80 seats (as against just ten in the last election). The Samajwadi Party (SP) plummeted to just five seats from its previous tally of 23 seats, while the worst fate befell the Bahujan Samaj Party or BSP (previous tally: 20) which drew a blank despite having the third largest vote share. Both the SP and BSP have, for decades, thrived on parochial political considerations, such as caste and appeasement of Muslims.
Three: In Modi, India has seen for the first time the emergence of a single individual, born in the post-independence era, who is today the most powerful man in India despite humble origins. He has single-handedly outstripped the record of the previously best leader the BJP ever produced – former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. He is the only prime ministerial candidate in the history of India to have won by a margin of over 570,000 votes. Ironically, Modi, who contested his first Lok Sabha election from two constituencies, posted this feat from Vadodara in his native state of Gujarat, where the BJP won all 26 Lok Sabha seats, but he is likely to resign from this seat and retain the fiercely-contested Varanasi seat, which he won by a margin of just fifty thousand votes.
For the first time in decades, perhaps since the time of the Congress stalwart and former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, the world will be dealing with a strong leader who has a mind of his own. It will have to be seen whether Modi displays Shinzo Abe’s Abenomics or pursues hard economic decisions like Margaret Thatcher, or shows the gall to take tough strategic decisions like Vladimir Putin.
The writer is a New Delhi-based independent journalist and strategic analyst who tweets @Kishkindha
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Thinking of foreign policy and our headfake pivot to Asia, I have not heard a peep out of this administration in terms of reaching out to the new government in India. India seems like quite a good natural ally for the United States as a partial balance against unfriendliness coming out of Russia and China . Are we really in a committed, monogamous and satisfying relationship with Pakistan? Hasn't that pretty much run its course. What does Pakistan offer us for the future, compared with India, if we can't work with them both?
YA posted the following regarding Mr. Modi and his relationship with the US:
"Modi will go slow with the US and wait for the Americans’ overtures before taking the first step. The US has pursued a policy of denying a visa to Modi over his alleged but unproven involvement in the Gujarat pogrom of 2002, and has foolishly stuck to this policy when the entire West has changed its stance toward Modi. Obama called to say that visa will not be an issue...but it may be too late...YA"
Still waiting for those overtures? Not really. Unfortunately the US is mostly irrelevant to India.
A brief lookup on the incident in question:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Gujarat_riots
"In 2012, Modi was cleared of complicity in the violence by a Special Investigation Team appointed by the Supreme Court of India."
(A landslide electoral victory in a peaceful country further indicates he is cleared.)
Modi doesn't just harbor some deep, bad feelings toward the US, the new Prime Minister of the world's largest democracy is barred from visiting the US due to a suspected terror/riot incident. (While Barack Obama is co-authoring books with Bill Ayers and hobnobbing with the PLO and moderate terrorists in Syria.)
While we are doing nothing in Iran, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, Egypt, Libya and a few other hot spots around the world, and while China is accelerating its militarization and Russia is expanding its territory, you would think that between golf games we might court India a little bit for some future strategic cooperation. Just a thought.
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If we had a president interested in protecting America...
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I strongly agree that India seems a natural ally to the US in the world today.
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I strongly agree that India seems a natural ally to the US in the world today.
The ignorant cowboy Bush did a lot of bridge building with India. All that got dropped when the world citizen became president.
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I remember there was something about us helping them out with nuke tech in a way that was less than 100% IAEA approved or something like that. What else?
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I strongly agree that India seems a natural ally to the US in the world today.
If not a State Dinner, you would think our dear leader could meet him somewhere halfway for a breakfast? While Obama dithers (and golfs), others show interest in good relations with India.
A nice followup on the subject over at The American Interest:
http://www.the-american-interest.com/articles/2014/07/02/narendra-modis-path-forward/
INDIA ASCENDANT?
Narendra Modi’s Path Forward
C. RAJA MOHAN
If Narendra Modi’s landslide victory was in large measure due to the failure of the preceding Singh government, he now faces a big challenge and a huge opportunity. Here’s how he might proceed on both the economic and foreign policy fronts.
Published on July 2, 2014
In the few weeks he has been at India’s helm, after an unexpected landslide victory in the general elections, Narendra Modi has raised hopes around the world, including the United States and China, that Delhi is ready for a productive engagement with its external partners. These expectations are rooted in the nature of the mandate that Modi won, his reputation for economic pragmatism as the chief minister of Gujarat province, which he ran for more than a decade, and the structural opportunities that have long presented themselves to India on the international stage.
Modi’s predecessor, Manmohan Singh, was widely liked and respected abroad as a wise elder statesman. Singh, who had no prior foreign policy experience, instinctively understood the extraordinary opportunities that awaited India after a period of sustained high growth rates from the early 1990s, when he had launched reforms as the finance minister of the nation. His first year as Prime Minister saw the unveiling of a historic civil nuclear initiative and a new framework for defense cooperation with the United States in 2005. Equally significant were an agreement on the principles to settle a boundary dispute with China and a opening up of a back channel negotiation with Pakistan to resolve the intractable problem of Kashmir. In 2005 India joined the newly formed East Asia Summit and began to engage fully with the geopolitics of Asia, from which it had excluded itself for decades.
Singh presided over unprecedented growth rates of close to 9 percent in the middle of the past decade; the rare prospect of improving relations with both China and the United States; the resolution of India’s longstanding territorial disputes; and the reclamation of its role as a major power in Asia. There was a worldwide perception that India’s long-awaited rise was inevitable, and most major nations vied with each other to deepen ties with India.
Tragically, this rare moment in India’s international relations evaporated over the next nine years of Singh’s decade-long tenure as Prime Minister. The lack of economic reforms and the drift toward populism in the earlier years of UPA rule were compounded by the global economic crisis. India’s growth rate soon plunged to five percent and below. The political drift within the government left it unable to advance bilateral relations with major powers, including the United States. Regional initiatives toward Pakistan and China sputtered, and hopes that India would play a larger role in Asia were dampened.
If Modi’s landslide victory was in large measure due to the failure of the Singh government, he now faces a big challenge and a huge opportunity. It is indeed impossible for any leader of a large and diverse country like India to fulfil all the demands that are being made on Modi. On the other hand, the drift under Singh has left much low-hanging fruit for Modi to pluck. Even small steps that restore a sense of political purposefulness in Delhi could significantly improve India’s image and generate much space for the new government to operate on the international stage. Modi’s success in securing an absolute majority for his party after a gap of thirty years has the potential to end the prolonged rule of weak governments in Delhi. If the compulsions of coalition politics limited Delhi’s ability to make bold economic reforms and significant foreign policy initiatives, Modi has the mandate to do both.
On the economic front, Modi appears prepared to bite the bullet. The depth of Modi’s commitment to reform will be visible after his government presents the budget for the year in mid-July. Those in the West looking for wholesale privatisation or dramatic expansion of market access, however, might be disappointed. He will rather attempt to craft a reform agenda that is sustainable in the complex Indian political environment. That agenda will emphasize shoring up India’s economic fundamentals and creating the right environment for investment by domestic and foreign capital.
Modi is perhaps the most business-friendly Prime Minister India has ever had. Yet he will have to fend off the long-entrenched suspicion of the private sector within the political class, including his own party, which is full of nativists and economic populists. Even modest success on the economic front is bound to generate greater space for Modi to improve relations with India’s immediate neighbours, narrow the growing strategic gap with China, and make Delhi an important player in shaping the balance of power in Asia, the Indian Ocean, and beyond.
Modi’s unabashed celebration of India’s cultural nationalism and his reputation as a Hindu nationalist and Pakistan-basher, however, had raised concerns at home and abroad, especially in the West, that he might adopt a tough and muscular approach toward Islamabad and precipitate a military crisis. In power, though, Modi took a very different tack. He invited the leaders of the seven South Asian neighbors, including Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, to participate in his swearing-in ceremony. That all of them accepted and came on very short notice underlined the fact that India’s neighbours have long been waiting for a credible interlocutor in Delhi. Although the talks between Modi and Sharif were positive and the two sides have agreed to resume their dialogue, few expect a breakthrough. Many agreements have been negotiated but not implemented under the UPA government. These include pacts on normalization of trade relations and visa liberalization. Among other possibilities discussed were the export of electricity and diesel from India to Pakistan. If there is no major terror incident in India emanating from across the border in Pakistan, and if Sharif’s powerful army allows him to move forward, a positive phase in bilateral relations might be at hand. But these are big “ifs.”
Beyond Pakistan, Modi appears to be keen to reclaim India’s primacy in the Subcontinent. China’s emergence as the principal external player in the Subcontinent has raised concerns in the Indian strategic community. This in turn demands that India resolve disputes with its neighbors and deepen economic integration under the aegis of Delhi. There is some recognition of the latter in the Modi government’s emphasis on strengthening the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation, the main regional forum. Modi has also underlined the emphasis on neighborhood diplomacy by making tiny Bhutan his first foreign destination. His Foreign Minister, Sushma Swaraj, chose Bangladesh for her first trip abroad. Delhi’s effort to deepen ties with the neighbours over the past few years was stymied in part by opposition from provinces, such as those bordering Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The strategic community in Delhi has agonized over the federalization of Indian foreign policy, and Modi’s strong mandate promises to reverse this unfortunate tendency. While affirming Delhi’s prerogative to conduct foreign policy, Modi has promised to expand consultations with the state chief ministers and make them partners in crafting national policies. While creating more political space at home for dealing with the neighbors, Modi is expected to press them hard to show greater respect for India’s regional interests. In any case, a vigorous South Asian policy has become central to the principal strategic challenge that India faces—the rise of its giant neighbour to the North.
China’s emergence as a great power has also presented an opportunity for India in East and South East Asia. China’s growing assertiveness in its Asian territorial disputes has led many of Beijing’s neighbours to seek stronger strategic partnerships with India as part of an effort to maintain an effective balance of power in the region. One of the first foreign destinations for Modi outside of the Subcontinent will be Tokyo, where Shinzo Abe is enthusiastic about building a stronger economic and strategic partnership with Delhi. Many ASEAN nations that have been disappointed by Delhi’s inability to carve out a larger role in Asia would be pleased if Modi pursued a more vigorous diplomatic and security engagement with the region. Already, he explicitly has underlined the importance of stronger defense ties with the smaller countries of Asia and the Indian Ocean. Given his party’s strong commitment to national defense, Modi is expected to raise India’s defense spending, which had fallen below 2 percent of GDP; accelerate weapons procurement, which had stalled under the previous government; facilitate foreign direct investment in the expansion of India’s domestic defense industrial base; and step up arms exports.
China also emerges as an important factor in India’s relations with the United States as Washington copes with the rapidly changing balance of power in Asia. China, locked in a confrontation in East Asia, has been sending positive signals to India. Well before the West had taken notice of Modi, China found him a valuable economic partner in Gujarat; it laid out the red carpet for him when he travelled to Beijing some years ago. At the same time, Modi would not downplay the security threats from China. During the election campaign, Modi visited the northeastern frontier claimed by China and denounced Beijing’s “expansionist mindset.”
In power, then, Modi is outlining a twin track policy toward China. He has proclaimed a strong interest in expanding economic cooperation with China; he has agreed, for example, to set up industrial parks for Chinese investments, which would also hopefully address the problem of the expanding trade deficit with Beijing. On the security front, he is actively clearing the way for long-delayed projects to modernize the Indian military and to improve Delhi’s defenses on the disputed frontier with China. He is also reminding Beijing that he has the requisite domestic political strength to negotiate a boundary settlement with China.
As a realist, too, Modi is quite conscious of the fact that India needs a strong partnership with the United States to successfully pursue India’s economic and foreign policy interests, including the challenge of balancing China. Given that he has been denied a U.S. visa since 2005, under unproven charges that he did not do enough to stop the anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat during 2002, there is much discomfort between Modi and Washington. During the campaign, Modi had repeatedly stated that his personal issues with Washington would not be allowed to affect India’s important relationship with the United States. Overruling the widespread sentiment within his party and the strategic community that he should not travel to Washington without a formal apology from the United States on the visa issue, Modi quickly accepted an invitation from the Obama Administration for a White House meeting in September.
For his part, Modi is eager to put the past behind him and seek a productive relationship with the United States. But the Obama Administration has much work to do. For one, Washington must demonstrate genuine political warmth to Modi and assuage the deep, personal hurt on the visa issue. For another, Washington will have to recognize that India is on the cusp of significant internal change and must be prepared to make the best of it.
Modi’s arrival allows the two states to make a fresh start, to overcome the accumulated frustrations of the last few years and lay out a bold agenda for bilateral cooperation. The premises of 2005, when India and the United States took big steps toward a strategic partnership, continue to hold. A strong India makes it easier for Washington to sustain a balance of power in Asia that is favorable for America. Delhi, on the other hand, needs the full support of the United States to emerge as a great power on the world stage. A decade later, thanks to the relative weakening of both United States and India in relation to China, Washington and Delhi need each other more than ever before.
C. Raja Mohan is a distinguished fellow at the Observer Research Foundation in Delhi and the foreign affairs columnist for the Indian Express. He is a non-resident senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and a visiting professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies at the National University of Singapore. He is on the editorial board of The American Interest.
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Modi Condemns Pakistan's 'Proxy War'; Police Officer Deaths Rise in Karachi; Afghan Taliban Kill 20 Civilians Over Tax
India
PM Modi visits Kargil; condemns Pakistan's proxy war
Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited Kargil and Leh in the northern state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on Tuesday, his second visit to J&K in two months (Indian Express, NDTV, Hindustan Times). While addressing troops of the Indian Army and the Air Force in Leh, Modi strongly condemned Pakistan, and said the neighboring country "has lost the strength to fight a conventional war, but continues to engage in the proxy war of terrorism."
Dressed in traditional Ladakhi clothes, Modi said in Leh: "There was a time when Prime Ministers never visited this state. I have come here two times already, your love has drawn me here." Modi said further that his three-pronged development plan for the region was about three P's: "Prakash (electricity), Paryavaran (environment), and Paryatan (tourism)."
As the first Indian prime minister to visit the volatile Kargil region since the war in 1999, Modi inaugurated a 44-megawatt Chutak power station in Kargil and promised industrial development of the area. Modi also praised the locals and said: "The people of Kargil are very patriotic and it is inspiring for the entire country." The Kargil war in 1999 was an armed conflict between India and Pakistan, which began after Pakistani soldiers infiltrated the Indian side of the LoC, a military boundary between the Indian and Pakistani-controlled parts of Kashmir. Although New Delhi and Islamabad agreed to a truce in 2003, ceasefire violations have continued across the borders.
Sonia Gandhi: increase in communal violence under Modi
In strong criticism of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led government, Congress President Sonia Gandhi said on Tuesday that there had been an increase in communal violence in the country since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) came to power in May (Hindustan Times, IBNLive). While addressing Congress leaders in the southern state of Kerala, Gandhi said further that the BJP government's main agenda was to divide the people. Gandhi said: "During UPA [United Progressive Alliance] 1 and 2, there were hardly such instances. But in a very short span we have had nothing less than 600 incidents of communal violence in UP [Uttar Pradesh] and perhaps as many in Maharashtra. Why suddenly all these communal instances after the BJP came to power? These instances are deliberately created to divide our society on religious lines. We must condemn this."
Gandhi also criticized the Modi government for not expressing solidarity with the Palestinian people over Israel's assault on Gaza, and said: "this has muted the country's response to the suffering people and betrayed its long tradition of solidarity with the people in Palestine and the vision of two states existing side-by-side in peace and harmony." Last week, Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi had demanded a discussion over the communal violence in Lok Sabha (lower house of Parliament).
Indian minister claims Yale 'degree;' creates twitter storm
Human Resource Development Minister Smriti Irani said her statement regarding her participation at Yale University's leadership program had been "misconstrued" on Monday, a day after claiming she had a "degree from Yale University" (Washington Post, Indian Express, NDTV, Economic Times). Irani tweeted on Monday: "Unfortunate that the statement re my participation in a leadership programme and certificate thereafter was misconstrued." At an event on Saturday Irani had said: "In that kitty of mine where people call me 'anpadh' (illiterate) I do have a degree from Yale University as well which I can bring out and show how Yale celebrated my leadership capacities."
Irani, the youngest cabinet minister in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government, has been criticized for being the education minister even though she does not have a college degree. Irani has had to defend her academic background ever since she took office in May because of contradictory declarations about her education qualifications in her election affidavits in 2004 and 2014.
?Despite her clarification on Monday, Irani's statement created a storm on twitter. Congress spokesperson Priyanka Chaturvedi tweeted: "And our HRD minister forgot to mention her Yale degree in her affidavit this time. But all her affidavits have had different degrees, sigh." A post from "God" retweeted several times said: "Congratulations to Smriti Irani on Graduating from Yale in the exact same amount of time it took Me to Create the World." Another post said: "2 more days at Yale, You could've been Dr. Smriti Irani :P."
-- Neeli Shah and Jameel Khan
Pakistan
Police officer killings in Karachi on the rise
The New York Times' Zia ur-Rehman and Declan Walsh reported on Monday that Karachi's police force, which recently logged its 102nd officer death, is on track to exceed the 2013 death toll of 166 police deaths (NYT). They attribute many of the deaths to a growing Taliban presence in the city and Pakistani officials say that the guerilla war that was once fought only in northwestern Pakistan is now seeping into Karachi. "It's a very serious threat," said Ghulam Qadir Thebo, the Karachi police chief. "The Taliban are well trained and well organized, with a network that is linked to global jihad."
Stock market drops
On Tuesday, Pakistani stocks rose above 350 points to settle at the Karach Stock Exchange (KSE) benchmark 100-share index at 28, 425 (Dawn). Earlier that same day, stocks fell over 450 points in the first twelve minutes of the morning trading session. The market suffered its largest ever drop in a single day in share prices on Monday, as investors panicked about the political marches by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri on Islamabad planned for August 14.
Will Pakistan censor the kiss?
Pakistan's sweetheart (and most highly paid actress) Humaima Malik, worries that her native country won't be very receptive to her latest on-screen romance (BBC). Starring in her first Bollywood role, she will be seen on screen locking lips with Indian co-star Emraan Hashmi (who is known as the 'serial kisser' in Bollywood)(NDTV). Until recently, all kisses were censored in Pakistani cinema, but the fact that the object of her affection is Indian adds to the shock value. Many Pakistani actresses who have sought fame in Bollywood have seen backlash at home in conservative Pakistan.
Afghanistan
Afghan Taliban kill civilians over 'war tax'
Sayed Sarwar Hussaini, Kundex police spokesman, said that Taliban militants killed 20 civilians who refused to pay a "war tax" in northern Kunduz province on August 11 (RFE/RL). The Taliban shot and wounded 10 others for refusing to pay that same day. According to a Defense Ministry statement, government troops launched military operations against militants across the country on Monday and Hussaini said 16 militants were killed in these operations.
Attack kills NATO soldier
A NATO service member died in an attack in eastern Afghanistan while a roadside bombing killed three Afghan policemen in the south on Tuesday, Afghanistan officials said (AP). The U.S.-led military alliance gave no further details about the death of the service member, but the death brings the number of NATO service members who have died in Afghanistan so far this year to 51, including 38 Americans.
-- Emily Schneider
Edited by Peter Bergen
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Hat tip to our YA:
Looks like AQ is feeling envious of ISIS, what with all the beheadings...
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/Al-Qaida-announces-India-wing-renews-loyalty-to-Taliban-chief/articleshow/41640746.cms
This branch of AQ will be for south asia...
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http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/05/kashmir_afghanistan_pakistan_terrorism
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Beijing Takes a New Approach to South Asia
Geopolitical Diary
Thursday, September 11, 2014 - 18:07 Text Size Print
China is beginning to view South Asia in a different light as the region becomes more economically and strategically valuable to Beijing. From Sept. 14 to Sept. 19, Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit the Maldives, Sri Lanka and India after a stop in Tajikistan. This will make Xi the first Chinese president to visit the two island nations in nearly 30 years. Moreover, Xi's visit to India will be the first official visit between the two continental giants since Narendra Modi's government took office in May.
Interpreting China in South Asia
To some extent, the implications of China's presence in South Asia have often been outweighed by discussions of China's strategic intent, particularly regarding India. Geopolitical principles provided the explanation for these concerns, given the historical, economic and political proximity of South Asia's smaller nations to India, and given the rivalry between India and China, from disputes over their 4,000-kilometer (about 2,500 miles) land border and maritime boundaries to their competition over resources and energy. There is also Beijing's "iron" political and military relationship with Islamabad and New Delhi's ongoing search for bilateral and multilateral defense and strategic alignment with Japan, Vietnam and others, with an eye on China.
India's relative geographic isolation -- ringed by oceans and the Himalayas -- and its decadeslong foreign policy focus on its South Asian neighbors enabled China to continue to expand in its periphery, from Central Asia to Southeast Asia, with little meaningful interference from New Delhi. Despite India's allowances, however, China's South Asia strategy often lacked integral focus and remained a low priority.
Stretching along China's most restive areas, South Asia hosts the largest number of China's land neighbors and numerous important emerging economies. Yet, perhaps with the exception of Pakistan, high-level diplomatic exchanges have been rare in recent decades. Aside from a few eye-catching infrastructure projects -- especially the deep-water port facilities in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and some transport construction in individual countries -- China's investments in South Asia are far smaller than its investment portfolios in North America, Southeast Asia and, to a lesser extent, Africa.
The reasons for this are manifold. Before India began projecting power outside the region, South Asia was little more than the space between the Middle East's rich energy assets and the economic and manufacturing powers in East Asia. The region was constantly marred by political instability and internal chaos, and its limited strategic importance kept it low on China's priority list. Without substantial amounts of energy and resources -- two key priorities in China's strategy to fuel its export powerhouse -- the region is more of a long-term, gradual strategic matter than one of immediate significance. Additionally, more coherent relations with South Asian nations were often complicated by the distrust and rivalry between Beijing and New Delhi.
China's Strategic Needs
India's increasing economic heft, along with the integration of peripheral states such as Bangladesh and Sri Lanka into the global manufacturing supply chain, could change China's assessment of the region. This change comes alongside Beijing's domestic economic and strategic recalculations and the shifting perception of its global position.
In recent years, Beijing has been attempting to chip away at the low-end exports economic model and move toward higher value-added manufacturing. It has pushed aggressively to expand China's global market share in strategic industries such as automobiles, electronics and telecommunications. It has provided options for cash-strapped South Asian states seeking alternative sources of capital, trade and technology while adding to their new manufacturing base.
Xi's visit to India will bring $7 billion of investment into two industrial parks in Maharashtra and Gujarat focusing on automobiles and electricity, in addition to trade and investment agreements for pharmaceuticals and information technology services, among others. New Delhi hoped that the investment would offset its trade deficit and help India emulate its neighbor's success as a manufacturing powerhouse. Likewise, China will finalize a free trade agreement with Sri Lanka, giving Colombo free access to China's vast market. The deal will help Sri Lanka capitalize on its shift to low-end manufacturing, especially in its garment industry. The Maldives and China will sign a series of cooperation agreements ranging from tourism to trade and infrastructure construction. In short, while the South Asian nations still have a way to go to show they are viable investment destinations, and although they remain a relatively low priority for China, the region's sizable and expanding consumer market is something that Chinese investors could not neglect.
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Amid Beijing's global push, China increasingly perceives South Asia as an important component of its more comprehensive, integrated overland corridor across the Eurasian land mass that will include roads, expressways and potentially railway projects. Thus, South Asia will become more important as China pays more attention to its own underdeveloped interior regions and as Beijing's need to hedge against security risks and supply disruptions off its coast grows.
Beijing has begun shifting from its focus on individual countries in South Asia and is starting to view the region as a more integrated economic and strategic entity. A series of initiatives has been launched accordingly, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, subcomponents of Beijing's envisioned Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Road.
The centerpiece of Beijing's strategy is a more cordial relationship with New Delhi. Xi's visit will include a few landmark agreements that will allow China to assist with India's outdated railway system and potentially allow for an overland connection in the region. On many other fronts, although their competition endures, Beijing and New Delhi have appeared ready to move beyond decades of icy relations.
Notably, Xi's visit to South Asia followed a last-minute postponement of a trip to Pakistan, where domestic instability could delay $34 billion in much-needed investment deals for coal power, railways and road infrastructure. This is not to suggest that Sino-Pakistani relations are facing any challenges. Beijing simply seems to be signaling that its strong relationship with Islamabad will no longer override its desire to pursue more balanced connections in South Asia.
Read more: Beijing Takes a New Approach to South Asia | Stratfor
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http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/26/world/asia/obama-lands-in-india-with-aim-of-improving-ties.html?emc=edit_th_20150126&nl=todaysheadlines&nlid=49641193
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FWIW, Obama was the Chief Guest at India's Republic Day, he had a very well received visit.
He is trying to support India to balance China. This time, he also dropped a key tracking requirement by US for nuclear material, since the IAEA already does that and the Russians have sold many nuclear reactors to India, whereas American/Japanese companies were losing out. India has an exemplary record in not stealing or spreading nuclear tech. Also India's peaceful use reactors are under IAEA safe guards, but not the military ones, which are off limits and a bone of contention for some of the nuclear powers.
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11369547/India-Republic-Day-Barack-Obama-watches-parade-in-New-Delhi-in-pictures.html?frame=3176570
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/picturegalleries/worldnews/11369547/India-Republic-Day-Barack-Obama-watches-parade-in-New-Delhi-in-pictures.html?frame=3176570)
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This is something which seems like a good thing to me.
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This is something which seems like a good thing to me.
Agree! About 6 years late, but a good thing. With trouble in Russia, Pak, NK and China, how do you pivot to Asia without partnering with India, and Japan, and many others.
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I have mentioned Balochistan previously:
Balochistan: An Overlooked Conflict Zone
Geopolitical Diary
May 6, 2015 | 22:18 GMT
Multiple conflicts have intersected in the Southwest Asian cross-border region of Balochistan for decades. But the area does not get as much attention as other places in the Middle East and South Asia. Conflicts in the surrounding lands in Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan have overshadowed the ethnic and nationalist struggles in the region. However, China's move to create a major economic corridor through Pakistan will elevate Balochistan's geopolitical significance.
In a rare move, Pakistan's army officially accused India's foreign intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing, of promoting terrorism in Pakistan. A press release issued by the army's public relations directorate after a routine corps commanders meeting stated that the army's top brass have noticed the intelligence service's involvement in stirring terrorism in Pakistan. Reuters quoted an unnamed Pakistani official privy to the discussion in the meeting as saying that the commanders "unanimously felt" that India is providing many kinds of support to Pakistan's enemies, including the Pakistani Taliban and elements in the southern port city of Karachi or Balochistan. The official said Islamabad would soon reveal "documentary proof" of India's activities. Separately, Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Muhammad Asif, in an unusually hawkish tone, said the Research and Analysis Wing was created "to undo Pakistan and to wipe Pakistan off the map of the world."
What is a Geopolitical Diary? George Friedman Explains.
Pakistan has been particularly worried about Indian support for the armed struggle waged by ethnic separatists in the country's southwestern natural gas- and mineral-rich Balochistan province. Accusing the Indian spy agency of backing Baloch militant outfits as well as Taliban rebels and anti-state elements in Karachi in unofficial settings is a normal occurrence. However, for the country's senior defense officials to say so on the record is not routine.
These statements come within weeks of Chinese President Xi Jingping's visit to Islamabad, during which Beijing and Islamabad signed an agreement on a $46 billion infrastructure project in Pakistan. The highlight of this massive undertaking is the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor between China's western Xinjiang province and Pakistan's southern port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea. The Baloch insurgent threat is a major obstacle for this project, because a good portion of the route for this corridor runs through Balochistan. Gwadar is also located in the restive region.
In response, Islamabad is developing a new 12,000-strong security force composed of nine army battalions and six wings of civilian security forces from the paramilitary Rangers and Frontier Corps headed by a two-star general. Now more than ever, Pakistan needs to curb Baloch militancy, and it needs to ensure that the insurgents' external lifeline is choked off.
From the point of view of India, which is concerned about the Chinese investment and the threat of a stronger Sino-Pakistani relationship, the Baloch insurgency is an important tool for undermining strategic projects between its two main rivals. From Pakistan's perspective, Baloch rebels and India's support for them are not the only problem in Balochistan. This area is also a launch pad for Afghan Taliban fighters to support their strongholds across the border in southern Afghanistan.
Balochistan's areas along the border with Afghanistan and Iran are also where Islamist militants affiliated with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi have on numerous occasions attacked Shiite gatherings. Moreover, Pakistani Balochistan is also a haven for Iran's Baloch Sunni Islamist rebels who conduct attacks in Iran's Sistan and Baluchestan province. In recent months, increased activity from militant groups such as Jundallah and Jaish al-Adl forced Iran — which believes Saudi Arabia supports these groups and Pakistan tolerates them — to engage in unilateral cross-border raids on their sanctuaries. This kind of activity could escalate as Riyadh takes a more assertive stance against Tehran.
These events have created considerable tension between Islamabad and Tehran, which otherwise share concern for the threat their respective ethnic Baloch rebel groups and Islamist militants represent. So far, these conflicts have been brewing in the background and rarely make the headlines. However, Pakistani and Chinese interests in building the economic corridor will bring these issues to the forefront. Balochistan is in the process of becoming strategically important. The process will involve Pakistan, China, India and Iran, and it will intersect with the existing regional problems, of which there is no shortage.
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http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/sorry-america-india-wont-go-war-china-12415
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I think the article cited by Shashank Joshi is spot on. http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-consequences-of-the-strengthening-US-India-parternship-still-uncertain.aspx (http://www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2015/03/10/The-consequences-of-the-strengthening-US-India-parternship-still-uncertain.aspx)
India will at most provide logistical support and refueling facilities, through the so called LSA (logistics support agreement). The reasons are clear from the Indian perspective. India does not trust the USA, particularly in a conflict with its arch enemy Pakistan. Every time, we feel that relations are improving, the US takes a retrograde step. So India PURCHASED a lot of arms from the USA in recent times and confidence was rising about Indo-US relations, and then the USA, "SELLS", F-16's and missiles to pak. In reality, its a donation to Pak through the Coalition Support Funds, since Pak is a beggar nation and they cannot afford to buy anything. Over the last few decades, Pak has received billions of dollars worth of arms from the USA in the form of aid, all of which are used to hit India. Without US support, Pak would not exist.
Indians still fondly remember the relationship with Russia/USSR, the Russians always stood by their friends. See the recent Russian support to Syria and compare how the US has treated its allies. In recent times, the Indian relationship with Russia has frayed, since the quality of Russian arms is no longer topnotch and India is starting to diversify its arms sources to the USA. Russia is also moving towards China, because the US is isolating Russia. However the level of trust is still quite high with Russia. Russia has helped India build its own nuclear submarine, Russia also leases nuclear subs to India. The US incontrast, sides with Pak, and when they sell arms, insists on intrusive checks to monitor them, along with conditions to not use them against Pak. Sharing of military technology is also minimal with the USA.
India-Pak relationship is comparable to the Israeli-Palestinian relationship. To gain trust, one needs to take sides, trying to maintain balance of power between arch enemies does not earn the US any friends. The USA is hated in Pak, everyone in Pak knows its a transactional relationship, where Pakilanders frequently express the feeling, that they are treated like a used condom. OTOH, the USA is for the most part loved in India, one of the few places in the world where that is so.
India-China relationship is a balanced one. China supports Pak to needle India, but has not ever sided with the Pakis in actual conflict. India-China also have minor bouts of non-violent territorial aggression (occupying each other's territory), but no bullet has been fired in several decades, whereas mortar fire is regularly exchanged over the India-Pak border.
If the US wants India to side against China, the US needs to pick sides, by clearly favoring India over both Pak and China. I have a hard time understanding what benefit the US sees in supporting Pak over India. This concept of maintaining balance of power between arch enemies does not win the US any friends.
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Excellent post YA! Thank you for the insight.
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Yes . Interesting post. A lot going on there we don't often hear about.
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Excellent post YA! Thank you for the insight.
Yes. YA makes points we don't otherwise see from here. The US flirts with Pakistan for influence, not friendship. We gain very little for that and then we wonder why India is not with us on all matters.
(YA) "Indians still fondly remember the relationship with Russia/USSR, the Russians always stood by their friends. See the recent Russian support to Syria and compare how the US has treated its allies."
While I might question that characterization of Russia/USSR, it is important to know that is the perception elsewhere.
China dabbles with expansionism, testing the resolve of others with its island and sea disputes. But most of China's transgressions happen within its borders in terms of liberties denied and wrongful treatment of dissidents. As we see China build up its navy in particular and military overall, we wonder why they are doing that and where it will lead.
(From the article) "...to develop this point further, if China did go to war against Japan, the Philippines or Taiwan, it is obviously true that India would not send its warships straight in. But the US-India relationship could still make an important mark on any such conflict..."
If this is the threat, the world needs the full cooperation of countries like USA, India and Japan as the balance of power.
Isn't it too late to build that coalition after such a move?
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India is asking for EMALS aircraft carrier technology (electromagnetic aircraft launch technology) and the US is likely to give it. The LSA (logistics support agreement) will also be signed, this will allow the US to use Indian bases and ports for refueling etc. This acquisition may be linked with the transfer of the F-18 aircraft production line to India. The US first donated F-16's to Pak and then they offer to build either F-16 or F-18 aircraft in India!. Both of these aircraft are at the end of their developmental life, so its not the latest stuff, but it serves both India's acute aircraft needs due to depleting squadron strength as well as US interests to pressure China with aircraft carriers equipped with EMALS and F-18's. So I think, this visit will be successful. Selling F-16's to Pak, while it does not change the balance of power, leaves a bad taste in the mouth. Because Pak uses F-16's, they will not be considered for production by India...YA
http://www.voanews.com/content/carter-visits-india-amid-new-high-in-bilateral-relations/3278304.html (http://www.voanews.com/content/carter-visits-india-amid-new-high-in-bilateral-relations/3278304.html)
GOA, INDIA—
U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has arrived in India during a wave of increased cooperation with India’s military.
“We are doing things now with the Indians that could not have been imagined 10 or so years ago,” a senior defense official said.
Carter will look to improve defense technology and trade cooperation while increasing military-to-military cooperation through additional bilateral and trilateral coordinated operations.
“While these negotiations can be difficult and global competition is high, I have no doubt that in the coming years, the United States and India will embark on a landmark co-production agreement that will bring our two countries closer together and make our militaries stronger,” Carter said at a Council on Foreign Relations event Friday ahead of his departure.
Technology coordination between the two countries is focused on aircraft carrier design and the co-production of jet fighter aircraft, according to a senior defense official.
Undersecretary of Defense Frank Kendall visited New Delhi ahead of the secretary’s trip to discuss these projects.
The Indians “have an indigenous capability there,” James Clad, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and a senior advisor for the Center for Naval Analysis, told VOA. “They want to be in the rank of people with military capability that is kind of first world.”
Asia pivot
The visit aims to demonstrate the priority that the defense department has placed on the Asia-Pacific region.
Carter has touted the U.S.-India relationship as a “strategic handshake,” one that is “destined” to be among the most significant partnerships of the 21st century.
“As the United States is reaching west in its rebalance, India is reaching east in Prime Minister (Narendra) Modi’s 'Act East' policy that will bring it farther into the Indian and Pacific Oceans,” Carter said.
Clad told VOA the pivot has been a good way to formally display the “inside-our-government attitude” that gives Asia the priority many felt it deserved.
"Because we need to be enabled to focus unrelentingly on what is I think the single comprehensive challenge," Clad said, “which is the way the Chinese are coming at us.”
Carter has said the Asia pivot, however, is not aimed at any particular country and “excludes no one.” The secretary has accepted an invitation to visit China that is expected to take place later this year.
His India visit will likely ruffle feathers in (bother) neighboring China – whose aggression has caused concern in the Himalayas and the South China Sea – as well as in Pakistan, India’s rival.
Strengthening ties
Clad believes strengthening ties with Pakistan’s rival is a sensible move and “doesn’t care” if it bothers the Chinese or the Pakistanis.
“Pakistan has been an intervening drain on our resources,” Clad told VOA. “It's a country that's not really our friend. It’s a country that’s played a double and a triple game, vis-a-vis the Afghan war and all the rest of it.”
Goa, Carter’s first stop, is the home state of Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar. Senior defense officials say the visit to Goa underlies the “close, personal relationship” that Carter and Parrikar have developed.
Parrikar will show Carter several major attractions in his hometown during the visit, including St. Francis Basilica. The area is known for its sprawling coastlines and well-preserved 16th-century churches.
Carter will then head to New Delhi for talks with Prime Minister Modi and other senior officials.
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Some of the geopolitical thinking in India, vis a vis China and how the US fits in...YA
http://defenseblog-njs.blogspot.com/2016/04/indias-geo-political-compulsions-will.html?m=1 (http://defenseblog-njs.blogspot.com/2016/04/indias-geo-political-compulsions-will.html?m=1)
India’s Geo Political Compulsions Will Play A Major Role In IAF’s Jet Deal
As India identifies the next supplier to IAF, the aircraft deal has become the mother of all deals. The eventual supplier will not only enhance its influence but also reap rich financial rewards. In terms of number of aircraft, this is perhaps the single largest contract ever. India is spoilt for choices. Who is who of the major combat jet manufacturers are lining up to sell jets to India. Americans, a UK-German European consortium, French, Swedes, and Russians are all working hard to woo the Indian government.
However for India it will be a thin line between creating indigenous capability and new dependency on a foreign supplier. Combat aircraft selection starts with foreign policy. Only friendly and reliable countries are selected as eventual suppliers, and even after negotiations and aircraft delivery the job is not done. The combat jet deal ends with foreign policy. The country’s foreign office has the explicit task of remaining in the good graces of the supplier. The supplying country controls the parts supply and with exercising a quasi-veto over the country’s war making ability, greatly enhancing the selling country’s prestige and influence. For a buying country it’s a dependence on another country. No wonder fighter jet deals are often more about geo politics than pure commerce. Decisions by Indian policy makers thus will not only impact the make-up of IAF but could also reshape foreign policy. Part of that change is visible. Continued decline of Russia at the global stage has caught up on a reluctant India. In a first, Russia lost out in the last aircraft MMRCA (Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft) tender, despite the lowest bid.
Never before have the Russians not been awarded the biggest IAF contracts. Although India purchased British and French jets in the past these were small numbers. The core of the IAF are Russian jets. First time in four decades the Indian Air Force will see a non-Russian jet alongside forming the backbone of the fighter strength. India’s ties with Russia will remain strategic as substantial defense hardware will continue to be Russian for a very long. However, Russia’s monopoly in the Indian skies has undoubtedly ended. Who is replacing Russia? In the fray are the Americans, the UK and German led consortium, the French and the Swedes.
Not only are the hardware offered by each very different, so are the political and strategic ramifications. From India’s vantage point, the Swedish offer is predominantly commercial being the weakest country in terms of political and strategic value. Sweden is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council neither an economic heavyweight. Gripen jets are powered by GE engines thus not free of the sanction-prone impulses of Americans.
A partnership with Sweden will bring India little at the UNSC or other international fora. To make the Swedish offer compelling, there needs to be substantial compensation elsewhere. Like a generous offer with complete technology transfer and unprecedented buildup of Indian aviation industry. Given SAAB has declared a desire to become an Indian company, one assumes Swedes are fully aware of their options. The French Rafael offer and the UK-German led consortium with Eurofighter are better positioned as UNSC members and economic heavy weights. These countries place commercial interest’s almost equally with international politics which adds to the reliability of the historically dependable relationship. As a consequence the offers are less generous. Failing one of the key Indian criteria of development of an Indian industry. The French have already dragged their feet on producing in India or transferring significant technology.
The UK and Germany offer nothing very different. If any of these were the eventual winners, the Indian aviation industry will remain underdeveloped. The Americans are offering the greatest amount of technology transfer and manufacturing in India with either the F18 or the F16. India will achieve a longstanding goal of enhancing its ability to design combat jets and develop an indigenous manufacturing capability. The Americans seem to have the best offer and the winning hand. However this is not all. There cannot be the slightest doubt that American defense sales are just commercial. These sales are an in veritable part of American geopolitical strategy, and deals have clear political objectives. The subsequent supply of spare parts is brazenly a bona fide instrument of continued control. India developed Tejas aircraft already depends on GE engines. Selecting another American jet will dramatically reroute IAF’s lifeline from Washington effectively giving Americans a veto. Given the sanction-prone history of relations, Uncle Sam is seen as unreliable in India and is facing political opposition. This is unchartered territory which no Indian government has ever dared to navigate.
The cold math of real politics rather than platitudes should drive the future. One mitigating argument against unreliability of American policy is China. China is increasingly asserting itself as a rival to US power in Asia and beyond which is a common concern for both countries. The US needs a military counterweight, and India simply needs to upgrade to not get overwhelmed by China. After investing trillions in China over the decades, the US needs newer investment destinations. The IAF deal with jets manufactured in India not only meets but jumpstarts all the above objectives in one stroke. This is where the objectives of the two countries appear to align for the long term. It is this long term alignment of objectives that argues for reliability of American policy with India. However, while China’s emergence as an economic powerhouse is a foregone conclusion, the future of the US-China relationship is not. While Chinese dispute islands and borders, they are not exporting ideology and changing regimes.
Unlike the Soviet Union, the US is not containing China either. US continues to be one of the largest foreign investors and trading partner of China. McDonalds and KFCs dot the landscapes of Chinese cities. Early in his first term President Obama did announce an exclusive G2 club with China leaving out all other powers in the cold.
Both countries benefit from globalization and a capitalist economy. Chinese form the largest contingent of foreign students in American universities. Both countries cooperate on climate change, Iran, and North Korea. All this hardly qualifies as rivalry, at least not a black and white one. With mature leadership they can be less than rivals or keep oscillating between competition and cooperation.
America’s economic interests with China are significant and several times bigger than with India. Despite best intentions there can be no guarantee that geo political expediency will not force Americans to engage with China at the expense of India. In face of such facts, constructing India-US security cooperation on assumptions of US-China rivalry would be akin to building on shifting sand. Indian reservations on becoming a de facto American pawn in the revolving US-Chinese relationship have merit. How does India solve the dilemma of having US fighter jets without becoming a tool between America and China? Technology transfer for the jets to be manufactured in India is the answer.
Technology transfer and manufacturing in India limits ongoing dependence on US for spare parts. Anything less than building genuine India capability will be a one sided deal that increases American leverage over China but leaves India vulnerable to the much more dynamic US-Chinese relationship. Technology transfer would signal a commitment towards building India as a balancing power in Asia. It would generate confidence that India – US defense cooperation could be insulated from succumbing to short term US interests in China. Indian policy makers will do well to see the opportunity, while avoiding the traps and deliver a deal that will increase indigenous capability rather than increase countries’ dependency.
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India recently built a dam in Afghanistan, against all odds. I found this article interesting, because it shows why nation building is tough, and the collaboration that is required to get a major project done in Afgh....YA
http://thewire.in/2016/06/04/the-story-behind-herats-salma-dam-40763/ (http://thewire.in/2016/06/04/the-story-behind-herats-salma-dam-40763/)
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This week, June 23-24, India's entry into NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) will be debated. China wants its friend Pak to gain entry into NSG (Nuclear Smugglers Group). China/Turkey are the sole major objectors holding back India's entry on the pretext that Pak should also get in, and no one will allow Pak to get in. Interestingly China's record as a proliferator along with Pak is well known!
http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-says-india-candidature-not-on-nsg-meet-agenda-other-group-members-differ/story-wI6mJ2sPtyIWzzJHlPqNoK.html (http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-says-india-candidature-not-on-nsg-meet-agenda-other-group-members-differ/story-wI6mJ2sPtyIWzzJHlPqNoK.html)
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As always YA, your posts are greatly appreciated.
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Can an Ambitious India Seize the Moment?
Geopolitical Diary
January 19, 2017 | 03:37 GMT Text Size
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Broadening India's role on the world stage is an ambition that Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar (R) embraces. (PRAKASH MATHEMA/AFP/Getty Images)
The world is in a state of flux, and according to Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, that can be a good thing for a rising regional power such as India, which in many ways is primed to seize the moment and propel itself toward a greater global leadership role. Today at the Raisina Dialogue, an international conference in New Delhi, Jaishankar touted India's diplomatic successes while laying out the country's global ambitions to an audience of 250 delegates that included such leaders as British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson, head of U.S. Pacific Command Adm. Harry Harris and former Afghan President Hamid Karzai.
Many factors support a more influential global role for India. The country benefits from a relatively young population (a significant proportion of which speaks English) and has one of the fastest growing major economies in the world. Thanks to its history of multilateral engagement, it has made few enemies. What's more, India was spared the worst effects of the 2008 global financial crisis.
What is a Geopolitical Diary?
Of course, discussion of India's ambitions must be measured against the reality of its constraints. India's fiscal limitations stymie investment into the infrastructure projects it needs to spur growth. It is weighed down by an unwieldy parliamentary system that struggles to channel the demands of its billion-citizen polity into coherent policies. And it must contend with the persistent security threat from archrival Pakistan, which has prompted it to commit resources to support a strong military presence in Indian-held Kashmir, in turn undercutting the integration of South Asia's economies.
India also suffers from demographic shortcomings that limit its economic development. About 70 percent of Indians live in rural areas, and up to a quarter of the population is impoverished. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's efforts to grow India's manufacturing base and employ more of its large pool of semiskilled labor remain hamstrung by the lack of land and labor reform in the country. Even if India could implement land and labor reforms, however, it would still struggle to develop a globally competitive manufacturing sector in this era of increasing automation. For India, then, a further embrace of multilateralism could give it a path not only to compensate for those shortcomings and earn the investments it needs to bolster the economy but also to help it place a check on Pakistan.
Even as Jaishankar alluded to the uncertainty that colors New Delhi's view of U.S. intentions under President-elect Donald Trump, he sees an opportunity as the new U.S. administration takes power for India to increase its international engagement as a way to overcome its limitations. Sensing that Washington will grow more reluctant to throw itself into the affairs of distant nations, India wants to fill the vacuum by assuming a greater global leadership role of its own.
Historically, Indian policymakers have generally honored the call by Jawaharlal Nehru, the country's first prime minister, to avoid entangling alliances. But the country has grown discontented with remaining aloof. In the past year alone, it has demonstrated the scope of its vision by engaging with every major region in the world. To wit, India hosted both the India-Association of Southeast Asian Nations summit and the BRICS summit and ratified the United Nations climate change protocol in Paris. Modi addressed a joint session of the U.S. Congress in June and embarked on a four-nation tour to Africa in July. He also hosted British Prime Minister Theresa May in what was her first visit outside of the European Union since taking office, and on Jan. 26, he will host Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nuhayyan, Abu Dhabi's crown prince, as the chief guest for India's annual Republic Day parade.
Yet for all of its diplomatic fervor, India bickers over foreign policy with its northern neighbor, China. Despite protestations and support from Washington, India has been unable to persuade China to place Masood Azhar, the leader of the Pakistan-based militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad, on a U.N. blacklist. Similarly, an 11th-hour diplomatic pitch in June and support from Washington failed to earn India a vote needed from China that would have allowed it to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group, a 48-member body whose members share nuclear technology with one another. At the Raisina conference, Modi took a jab at China, saying that if Beijing wants its regional connectivity projects, including the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which runs through Kashmir, to be successful, it must respect India's sovereignty.
The prickly dynamic between the countries, in part, is a continuation of a difficult history. A lingering dispute stemming from their 1962 border war complicates any Chinese investments in infrastructure projects in South Asia, which India perceives as a form of encroachment. But beyond critical statements from New Delhi, India is limited in how it can retaliate. In addition, China's interests in denying India's diplomatic desires have more to do with its support of Pakistan. Thus, while its embrace of multilateralism is a way for India to compensate for its constraints, these international forums themselves can be constrained through the presence of China — and by extension the interests of Pakistan, which views China as its strongest ally.
During his famous speech to the Indian parliament on the eve of India's independence, Nehru said the moment rarely comes when "the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance." Over the past 70 years, India, as one of Asia's dominant powers, has sought to be the voice of the world's developing nations. Now it has the opportunity, but can it get others to listen?
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There are several parallels with the USA. India's Prime Minister Modi is someone like Trump, a popular nationalist. He let his BJP party (akin to Republican Party) to victory over the long entrenched Congress Party (akin to Democrats, founded by Nehru). The Congress was the peacenik party who could not say radical Islamic terrorism and believed in unending talks with Pak. Modi has been strong, along with his NSA, Ajit Doval who is another nationalist. For the first time India has done two officially acknowledged cross border-raids (in Myanmar and in Pak) in response to terror strikes in India. Modi initially went out of his way to be cordial to Pak, but very soon stopped all talks with them since the cross border attacks continue. The point I am trying to make is that India no longer shows the other cheek, but rather responds militarily.
The Indian NSA has said that India should not compete with China in an arms race, rather he has instead proposed that we strongly develop the missile programs. India's recent launch of its nuclear capable missile, Agni 5 has caused a lot of heart burn in China, it can now for the first time reach any part of China. Future missiles with MIRV and MARV capability are being developed. India also has the nuclear triad of air, sea and land based missiles. This has essentially neutralized the Chinese nuclear edge, which means that any future war with China will be conventional, where India feels they have the edge. China has not fought a war, I think in the last 4 decades....there is no way they can win in a conventional war with Indian forces who are battle hardened after several wars with pak and ongoing counterinsurgency ops. A war with China cannot be excluded, especially over CPEC (China-Pak Economic Corridor), which passes through Pak occupied Kashmir (territory that India claims as its own).
Both Bush and Obama had good relations with India. Bush helped with access to peaceful nuclear technology, while Obama helped with provision of military equipment and technology. Several military agreements were signed under Obama, LEMOA (sharing of military bases), as well as major defense partner status was done under Obama's watch. It is expected that Trump will also have excellent relations with India, especially since Trump is taking a hardline with China.
So yes, as the older generation of politicians (from the pre-partition era) pass away, any sympathies for Pak disappear. The new generation of politicians do not retain any soft corner for Pak. Everyone in India is gungho about the future, they know that in about 2 decades, India's economy will overtake China's. The future appears very bright. India's advantage is that except for Pak and China, it has excellent relations with the rest of the world including the Arab states.
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Ya,
Should India be part of the "Asian shift" in response to China?
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I believe India is part of the US pivot to asia. This is recognized both by the USA and India. Ash Carter the previous defense secretary was particularly helpful in this, on the Indian side there is a clear understanding to move away from Russia (since it has gotten quite chummy with China). It is not acceptable for India that Russia sells the same weapons to China. On several occasions, Russia has sided with China on geopolitical issues that concern Pak. The USA has been quite active in courting India with respect to military equipment. Both the F-16 and F-18 factory lines have been offered to India (since the F-35 is replacing F-16) along with advanced sensors on the P-8 planes. The next agreement to get signed will be CISMOA, which deals with interoperability and sharing of advanced military equipment. The USA is pushing for it aggressively, India resists it since it comes with intrusive monitoring by USA. With time the issues will be resolved. Another thing which Obama did in the last days of his presidency was to establish an India desk.
At this time, both Indian and US interests align with respect to China, both countries have strong leaders. I would be very surprised if there is not a US-China power struggle in the South China sea. Obama tolerated a lot of crap from China, Trump may not.
Below is a blog exerpt by Ajai Shukla.
Tellis tells Trump to retain Obama’s policy towards India
Possible US envoy to New Delhi says India must get assurance against China
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 21st Jan 17
As President Donald Trump’s administration and policies take shape, Ashley Tellis, whom Washington Post identifies as America’s likely next ambassador to New Delhi, has urged America’s new president to continue Presidents George W Bush and Barack Obama’s policies towards Asia, and India in particular.
Writing in the publication, Asia Policy, Tellis has recommended that Trump should “[take] the existing threats of Pakistan-supported terrorism against India more seriously, [develop] a considered strategy for aiding India in coping with Chinese assertiveness, and [persist] with the existing U.S. policy of eschewing mediation on the thorny Indo-Pakistani dispute over Jammu and Kashmir.”
New Delhi is concerned that the Trump administration might back track substantially on Obama’s “rebalance to Asia”, reducing the salience of India in US foreign policy. While campaigning, Trump had indicated he would reduce America’s superpower role of maintaining global order, allow US military intervention only to tackle direct threats to the US homeland, make military allies pick up a larger share of the bill for their own defence and reject multilateral trade pacts like the Trans Pacific Partnership, a key component of former President Barack Obama’s economic strategy in Asia.
As in New Delhi, there is concern in capitals across the Indo-Asia-Pacific about whether America’s 45th president will leave the region on its own in dealing with a rising, aggressive China.
Tellis, one of America’s most highly regarded strategists and a Mumbai-born (??) India expert who served in New Delhi a decade ago, warns the incoming administration: “An Asia in which the United States ceases by choice to behave like a preponderant power is an Asia that will inevitably become a victim of Chinese hegemony. In such circumstances, there are fewer reasons for India to seek a special strategic relation with the United States, as the partnership would not support New Delhi in coping with the threats posed by Beijing’s continuing ascendancy.”
Tellis says that President Bush devised the policy of supporting India without expecting reciprocity from New Delhi, an approach that Obama has continued. “It was anchored in the presumption that helping India expand in power and prosperity served the highest geopolitical interests of the United States in Asia and globally — namely, maintaining a balance of power that advantaged the liberal democracies”, he writes.
“Accordingly, it justified acts of extraordinary US generosity toward India, even if specific policies emanating from New Delhi did not always dovetail with Washington’s preferences.”
Tellis writes that this “calculated altruism whereby Washington continually seeks to bolster India’s national capabilities without any expectations of direct recompense” includes the US-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement, support for a permanent US Security Council seat for India, championing India’s membership of global non-proliferation regimes and relaxed access to defence and dual-use technology.
Such initiatives would reap success, says Tellis “only if the larger architectonic foundations of the bilateral relationship — centered on boosting New Delhi’s power—are fundamentally preserved, not because they happen to be favourable to India but more importantly because they serve larger U.S. grand strategic interests in Asia and beyond.”
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*****Tellis says that President Bush devised the policy of supporting India without expecting reciprocity from New Delhi, an approach that Obama has continued. “It was anchored in the presumption that helping India expand in power and prosperity served the highest geopolitical interests of the United States in Asia and globally — namely, maintaining a balance of power that advantaged the liberal democracies”, he writes.
“Accordingly, it justified acts of extraordinary US generosity toward India, even if specific policies emanating from New Delhi did not always dovetail with Washington’s preferences.”*****
This does not fit Trumpian foreign policy. He will deal in a way that gets us something concrete in return .
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Trump may well do exactly that. However the generosity of Bush/Obama was necessary to build confidence with the US leadership, which was a strongly in support of Pak. India does not ask for money (like Pak), but for technology. Previous technology denial regimes led by the US (eg after the nuclear blasts by India), had the unintended consequence of making India self sufficient in several aspects of missile technology! and space technology. Every time the west denies technology to India, they have developed it themselves, and just as the technology becomes operational, the western countries will lift the technology denial ban and ask that India buy western weapons/equipment !, this happens like clockwork.
Unless
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https://warontherocks.com/2017/01/hard-men-in-a-hard-environment-indian-special-operators-along-the-border-with-china/
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Outstanding article BD!
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Nice article, the 1962 loss to China, was due to bad political decisions and lack of strategic thinking on part of Nehru, the then PM of India. Current thinking is that this cannot and will not, be ever repeated. China will get a bloody nose, since nuclear weapons will not be used in a Sino-Indian war due to MAD. The reason for this confidence is that the Indian army is battle hardened, the Tibetan population does not support China and the Chinese havent fought a war in decades. China has good roads in the plains of Tibet, but they still have to come through the Himalayan range, where there are few roads and passes. Furthermore, the passes close due to snow for several months, that means the Chinese cannot stay for long (ie only short skirmishes are possible), for they cannot be resupplied and all exit routes back to China will close. When its not snowing, its likely raining in the North east of India, eg Cheerapunji in the east gets the highest rainfall in the world, heavy rains cause a lot of misery in the presence of heavily forested areas. So the Chinese can attack only in a short window of opportunity in the dry season....and as discussed they cannot stay for long!. One reason that India has not built roads has been, the natural protection provided by the mountain range between India and China.
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A Defining Rivalry in South Asia
Analysis
February 24, 2017 | 09:00 GMT Print
Text Size
Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held a strategic dialogue with Chinese officials in Beijing on Feb. 22 to discuss some of the issues that have strained the countries' relationship over the past year. (BIJU BORO/AFP/Getty Images)
Summary
India and China have a complicated relationship. Though the two nations — home to over one-third of the world's population — are partners in a $70 billion trade relationship, they are also rivals. As China's economic and military clout has grown, it has worked to increase its influence in South Asia, undertaking infrastructure projects in countries including Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the process, however, it has encroached on what India traditionally considers its sphere of influence. It is within this context that Indian Foreign Secretary Subrahmanyam Jaishankar kicked off a three-nation tour Feb. 18, during which he participated in India's first strategic dialogue with the Chinese government. In fact, India's relationship with China colored the whole trip: Even Jaishankar's stops in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, the other destinations on his trip, highlighted the economic and strategic competition in South Asia between the two countries.
Analysis
Over the past year, India's historically rocky relationship with China has gotten rockier. Jaishankar aimed to smooth over some of the problems by discussing militancy, India's entry into the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the disputed region of Kashmir with China's state chancellor and foreign minister. The Indian government has been frustrated by China's refusal to approve the U.N. Security Council motion to sanction Masood Azhar, founder of Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad. It is similarly vexed that China vetoed India's accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group during last year's plenary session and that Beijing is moving forward with plans to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through Pakistan-administered Kashmir. (India objects to the CPEC, part of China's One Belt, One Road initiative, because it claims that by routing the project through Pakistan's share of Kashmir, China is implicitly recognizing Pakistan's sovereignty over the contested area.) Whatever the explicit focus of the talks, the subtext was clear: Pakistan is complicating China's relationship with India.
Bizarre Foreign Policy Triangle
In fact, the growing tension between India and China in 2016 roughly coincided with the flare-up between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Pakistan is an important economic and strategic partner for China. The CPEC, which will connect China's underdeveloped Xinjiang province with Gwadar port in Pakistan's Balochistan province, will offer China another export outlet to the Arabian Sea. China recognizes, moreover, that its strategic alliance with Pakistan makes any military threat from India easier to manage for the simple fact that two nuclear powers are stronger than one. With that in mind, China started supporting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1980s.
So long as China is pursuing enhanced ties with Pakistan, it will continue to block India's requests to blacklist Azhar, admit it to the Nuclear Suppliers Group and modify the CPEC project. Beijing understands that yielding to the pleas from India and the United States to sanction Azhar, a proponent of Kashmiri secession, would hurt Pakistan's interests. Similarly, China vetoed India's accession to the Nuclear Suppliers Group in part to protest Pakistan's exclusion from the organization. (China cited India's failure to sign on to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as the official reason for its vote.) It is unlikely that Jaishankar managed to sway Beijing on any of these issues during his talks with Chinese leaders Feb. 22.
Furthermore, the matters that Jaishankar raised in the strategic dialogue are only a few of the factors straining India's relationship with China. As part of his "Make in India" campaign to boost manufacturing in his country, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced the "Neighborhood First" policy to strengthen India's trade ties with its neighboring countries. Interregional trade accounts for just 5 percent of total economic activity in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, a bloc that comprises India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, the Maldives, Bhutan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. (By comparison, trade among the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations accounts for 25 percent of the organization's trade, and EU members conduct 60 percent of their trade within the bloc.) Modi hopes to increase trade with countries in South Asia, not only for economic gain but also to counter China's economic influence in the region.
Putting the Neighborhood First
China's sway in Sri Lanka has been increasing since 2005, when it increased its military aid to the island nation's government in Colombo. The support eventually helped the Sri Lankan government win its decadeslong civil war against the Tamil Tigers in 2009. Sri Lanka returned the favor by granting China control over key port projects, including the Hambantota port and the surrounding 6,000-hectare (15,000-acre) industrial zone. But as recent protests against the project revealed, many Sri Lankans are wary of China's growing involvement in their country.
India hopes to launch infrastructure projects of its own in Sri Lanka to offset China's endeavors in the country. To that end, India's Export-Import Bank granted Colombo an $800 million loan for the Northern Railway Rehabilitation Project. The initiative is part of New Delhi's effort to help members of the ethnic Tamil community living in Sri Lanka's northern and eastern regions, many of whom are still struggling after the war. Like China, however, India will have to navigate the delicate balance between Sri Lanka's Tamil minority and its majority-Sinhalese government — a challenge Jaishankar gamely accepted on his visit to the country. Meeting with leaders of the opposition Tamil National Alliance on his first stop in Sri Lanka, Jaishankar urged them to soften their calls to join the northern and eastern provinces into a Tamil-majority province. The party has been lobbying Colombo to include the merger in the country's new constitution, which aims to balance the competing demands of Sri Lanka's various political and ethnic groups.
On the last leg of his trip, Jaishankar stopped in Bangladesh, another South Asian country where China and India are investing in infrastructure. Chinese President Xi Jinping signed $24 billion in agreements with the government in Dhaka in 2016. Among the 27 deals he clinched was an agreement for a thermal power plant in Patuakhali district. India, meanwhile, has projects of its own in Bangladesh, including the Indo-Bangla Rampal plant, a 1,320-megawatt coal-based power plant close to the Sundarbans, the world's largest mangrove forest. In addition, Modi granted Bangladesh a $2 billion line of credit during a visit to the country in 2015.
Jaishankar's visits to Sri Lanka, China and Bangladesh touched on important themes in Indian foreign policy and highlighted the areas in which they run up against China's priorities. Though Modi regards South Asia as India's neighborhood, China — which borders five countries in the region — has made it increasingly clear that it feels the same way. The mounting competition between the two powers will doubtless continue to shape South Asia's strategic and economic trajectory for decades to come.
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This is a fairly accurate article and captures the current Indian thinking vis a vis China. Something that is not captured in most contemporary articles is the mood in India is quite positive, the thinking is that India will overtake China in about 10-15 years economically. Demographics of India are better as compared to China. New Indian missiles reach all parts of China, so the military threat from China is no longer scary. The thinking is that China has not fought a war in 3-4 decades...does this generation of chinese soldiers even know how to fight anymore ? and do they want to start with India.
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This is a fairly accurate article and captures the current Indian thinking vis a vis China. Something that is not captured in most contemporary articles is the mood in India is quite positive, the thinking is that India will overtake China in about 10-15 years economically. Demographics of India are better as compared to China. New Indian missiles reach all parts of China, so the military threat from China is no longer scary. The thinking is that China has not fought a war in 3-4 decades...does this generation of chinese soldiers even know how to fight anymore ? and do they want to start with India.
That is a key question. China's last war was with Vietnam. It didn't turn out well for them. The PLA has been quite corrupt and it is hard to say how well they will perform in combat.
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This editorial from Bloomberg sums up the opportunity pretty well. Prime Minister Narandra Modi ran on economic reform, has been working to turn the tide against corruption in government, has won a large number of seats in Parliament in recent election, is poised to win his own reelection next time around, giving him an extraordinary opportunity to implement real economic reforms. India is the world's most populous democracy with relatively youthful demographics and need to create one million jobs per month. This is not a table set for splitting up a fixed size pie. Like us, they need to grow their economy, big time. And if they do, what and important development that would be for the world economy and geo-politics and US foreign policy. For another post, India is a natural ally of the US IMO but that relationship keeps getting distracted and deterred by other rivalries and forces.
"The only way to do so at the pace and scale required -- with nearly a million new job-seekers entering the market every month -- is to get private investment flowing again and to crack open India’s ossified land, labor and other factor markets."
Private investment is the key to widespread employment growth. Who knew?
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https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-03-13/modi-s-chance-to-reshape-india-s-economy
Modi's Chance to Reshape India's Economy, Bloomberg editors, MARCH 13, 2017
After his party’s triumph in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India’s largest and most politically important, Prime Minister Narendra Modi now wields greater power than any Indian leader in a generation. He will need it if he wants to continue to reshape India’s economy.
True, the results don’t drastically alter the math in the upper house of Parliament in New Delhi, where previous reform efforts have stalled, and the polls themselves were hardly a referendum on market liberalization. Yet Modi’s popularity is also inseparable from the pledge that won him office in 2014: to deliver the jobs India’s burgeoning population desperately needs (and thus far, isn’t getting). The only way to do so at the pace and scale required -- with nearly a million new job-seekers entering the market every month -- is to get private investment flowing again and to crack open India’s ossified land, labor and other factor markets.
Some of this should now be more possible at the national level. Modi could, for instance, begin cleaning up and selling off inefficient state-run banks in order to unclog the investment pipeline. The opposition Congress Party could perhaps afford to be obstructionist when swathes of the electorate had real doubts about Modi’s agenda. Facing a clear consensus in favor of good governance and faster economic development, and lacking any credible leader to rival Modi, the party will have a harder time blocking reforms.
More important, Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party now controls territories comprising more than 60 percent of India’s population. That grouping presents an ideal testing ground for difficult land and labor reforms. While some measures have been attempted thus far, they haven’t been as far-reaching or as coordinated as they could be. Modi can change that by pressing state leaders to combine their efforts and resources into a more ambitious liberalizing agenda.
None of this is to say that Modi’s recent focus on cleaning up politics and the economy isn’t worthwhile, or that smaller reforms -- opening up more sectors to foreign direct investment, say -- aren’t welcome. It’s critical that the rollout of an already approved nationwide goods-and-services tax proceed swiftly and smoothly. Modi will have to be careful, too, to keep a check on more extreme voices in the BJP, who may take the party’s electoral success as license to promote a more hard-line religious agenda.
But with this victory, and facing the great likelihood of a second term in 2019, Modi has a renewed chance to give India the future its young and eager population deserves. He needs to seize it.
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Forecast Highlights
Insurgent group Hizbul Mujahideen, with support from Pakistan, will seek to subvert former commander Zakir Musa’s breakaway faction in Kashmir.
The factionalization of the Kashmiri insurgency could benefit India’s counterinsurgency operations.
Musa’s hard-line Islamist vision and disinterest in secession will constrain his appeal in the progressive Kashmir.
During a 29-year battle against Indian sovereignty, several militant groups fighting an insurgency in the disputed region of Kashmir have risen and fallen. A recent high-level defection from the region's biggest and most active militant group, Hizbul Mujahideen, gave the militant separatist movement another jolt, exposing a divide along ideological — and generational — lines.
Until recently, Zakir Musa was a commander for Hizbul Mujahideen, which boasts some 200 fighters scattered throughout the districts adjacent to Kashmir's capital, Srinagar. On May 12, audio statements were released in which Musa disavowed both Pakistan and the fight for Kashmiri secession from India, which is the clarion call of the Kashmir struggle. He stated his desire to implement a hard-line interpretation of Islamic law in Kashmir, claiming that nationalism and democracy were not Islamic. Moreover, he threatened to behead the leaders of the All Parties Hurriyet Conference, the conglomeration of nonviolent separatist parties seeking Kashmiri secession through political means.
Hizbul Mujahideen leader Syed Salahuddin, who resides in Pakistan, immediately condemned Musa's threats and called on local commanders to clear any further pronouncements directly with him. An angered Musa quit Hizbul Mujahideen on May 13 and soon after formed his own militant outfit. On May 15, he released a video announcing his new group, saying that, though it was not affiliated with al Qaeda, he was thankful to the terrorist organization for promoting Sharia.
Hard-Line Islamism Enters the Picture
Musa's statements suggest that an element of transnational jihadism is being introduced into the Kashmir conflict and lay bare an ideological divide that has been developing between the generations of insurgents. An older generation of rebels, such as the 71-year-old Salahuddin, have focused their efforts on self-determination and ridding the area of an Indian military presence. But the jihadist, anti-Pakistan movement represented by the 22-year-old Musa may be gaining traction. Musa himself was the successor to another 22-year-old Hizbul Mujahideen commander, Burhan Wani, whose death in July 2016 triggered months of deadly protests in Srinagar and heightened tensions between India and Pakistan. Like Musa, Wani also embraced the rhetoric of jihadism, though he didn't go so far as to unlink his group from Pakistan.
If Musa's new outfit gains a measure of success, it would shift the focus of an insurgency that has long been defined by a localized Islamism that values self-determination. And both Islamabad and New Delhi would be forced to worry more about transnational jihadists, such as the Islamic State and al Qaeda, gaining a foothold in the region. Pakistan, after all, is actively warring against transnational jihadists on its western front; it doesn't want them expanding in the east as well.
Pakistan's Strategy of Subversion
Since the start of the Kashmir insurgency, Pakistan has co-opted Kashmiri militants in a strategy designed to put pressure on India in the region. But that plan almost wholly depends on Islamabad being able to exert its influence over the insurgent groups. The loss of control that Musa's defection represents poses a fundamental challenge to Pakistan and could alter the delicate balance of power in the disputed region. Salahuddin and mainline Hizbul Mujahideen members, jarred by Musa's defection, will be working to subvert his breakaway faction and will likely try to kill him and his fighters. And Pakistan will provide support for those efforts.
Pakistan is currently fighting anti-state militants in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and its spring offensive is well underway. For Islamabad, it is important to maintain the status quo in Kashmir and avoid any events that would require large numbers of Pakistani troops to be shifted to away from the FATA. That's exactly what transpired after the December 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-supported militants, after all, when a combined 1 million Indian and Pakistani troops faced off along the Line of Control in Kashmir, draining Pakistani resources at the FATA and allowing al Qaeda militants to more freely enter the semiautonomous region.
Any breakaway faction in Kashmir that espouses transnational jihadism — especially one led by Musa, who has shown no love for Pakistan — is bad for Pakistan's larger interests, and the country will be working with Hizbul Mujahideen to stamp out Musa's new group in a few ways. First, Pakistan will require Hizbul Mujahideen to tighten control over its field commanders to prevent any additional breakaway factions. Most likely, Islamabad will also provide Hizbul Mujahideen with financial, military and propaganda support, just as it did in the early 1990s when it shifted support away from the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front — which didn't support merging an independent Kashmir with Pakistan — to the newly created Hizbul Mujahideen. In that case, the group that fell out of favor ultimately renounced violence, while Hizbul Mujahideen joined a cluster of insurgent groups that waged attacks against the Indian state.
The Limits of an Islamist Vision
Beyond Islamabad's moves to stifle Musa's faction, there's another factor limiting his ability to succeed in the Kashmir Valley: his Islamist vision. The region of Kashmir has long been defined by a liberal, tolerant religious ethos driven by Sufism. Musa's calls for the region to implement a hard-line interpretation of Islamic law cuts against that grain and may make it difficult for him to attract a large following. The insurgency and separatism movements in Kashmir, while religious, have been equally driven by the goal of achieving self-determination. But Musa, who seems to be driven solely by his strict Islamism, has been vague about his interest in seeing Kashmir achieve greater autonomy and self-rule, an aspiration that most Kashmiri residents support.
New Delhi has been reluctant to remove its garrisons in Kashmir, worried that increased autonomy in the region would create more space for Pakistani intervention and galvanize other self-determination movements within India. So, while Musa may still garner support from some Kashmiri youth simply because he is fighting the Indian armed forces, his strict Islamist ideology and rejection of separatism will fundamentally limit any attempt to translate his insurgency into a meaningful political movement. Even though the majority of the region's residents are eager to push Indian forces out, the already well-established organization of Hizbul Mujahideen, which does support the popular goal of self-rule, will limit the backing that Musa's group can win.
Beyond Kashmir
Unlike Hizbul Mujahideen, however, Musa's mission isn't limited to Kashmir. He hopes to capitalize on the grievances of Muslims throughout India who have been singled out by rogue Hindu nationalists, such as India's cow vigilante groups. Both al Qaeda and the Khorasan chapter of the Islamic State share this goal, as the groups have long sought to radicalize a segment of India's 175 million Muslims. So far, however, those organizations have drawn only a handful of radicalized Indian Muslims to their cause. Though they are generally economically marginalized, Muslims in India have been sufficiently absorbed into the cultural fabric of the country's identity, and the nation's democracy provides Muslims in the Indian mainland, outside of Kashmir, opportunities to air their grievances.
Since forming his faction, Musa has reportedly added up to 15 defectors from Hizbul Mujahideen. And for Indian security forces, this division within the insurgency is a reason to maintain a cautious optimism regarding Musa's group. Already, it has claimed credit for leading Indian security forces to Hizbul Mujahideen commander Sabzar Bhat, who was killed by the troops. Any disruption in the insurgent movement, which this new breakaway faction most certain is, could make it easier for New Delhi to exercise its counterinsurgency efforts.
Though it may become further factionalized, the insurgency in Kashmir will endure as long as locals continue to chafe against the presence of Indian armed forces. And while there are a number of factors working against the success of Musa's faction, it's still possible that Musa — or perhaps another breakaway rebel commander, if Hizbul Mujahideen is unable to prevent further defections — could gain members by exploiting the perceived failures of both Kashmir's mainstream and separatist political leaders. If Musa's breakaway faction were able to achieve critical mass, it would indicate a shift in the insurgency toward a focus of transnational jihadism, which neither New Delhi nor Islamabad would welcome.
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AssessmentsAug 5, 2016
Unrest in Kashmir Sets India and Pakistan on Edge
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BTW Modi is in the US meeting Trump on Monday, very low key affair (compared to Chinese premier visit). No mention on the news channels.
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BTW Modi is in the US meeting Trump on Monday, very low key affair (compared to Chinese premier visit). No mention on the news channels.
Contingency planning, IMHO.
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I noticed that too. My guess is that both sides are feeling out a substantial upgrade in relationship.
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By Narendra Modi
June 25, 2017 5:04 p.m. ET
14 COMMENTS
Last June in my address to a joint session of the U.S. Congress, I stated that the relationship between India and America had overcome the “hesitations of history.” A year later, I return to the U.S. confident in the growing convergence between our two nations.
This confidence stems from the strength of our shared values and the stability of our systems. Our people and institutions have steadfastly viewed democratic change as an instrument for renewal and resurgence.
In an uncertain global economic landscape, our two nations stand as mutually reinforcing engines of growth and innovation. Confidence in each other’s political values and a strong belief in each other’s prosperity has enabled our engagement to grow. A vision of joint success and progress guides our partnership.
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Our bilateral trade, which already totals about $115 billion a year, is poised for a multifold increase. Indian companies are adding value to the manufacturing and services sectors in the U.S., with total investments of approximately $15 billion and a presence in more than 35 states, including in the Rust Belt. American companies have likewise fueled their global growth by investing more than $20 billion in India.
The transformation of India presents abundant commercial and investment opportunities for American businesses. The rollout of the Goods and Services Tax on July 1 will, in a single stroke, convert India into a unified, continent-sized market of 1.3 billion people. The planned 100 smart cities, the massive modernization of ports, airports, and road and rail networks, and the construction of affordable housing for all by 2022—the 75th anniversary of India’s independence—are not just promises of great urban renewal within India. These plans also showcase the enormous fruits of our relationships with enterprising U.S. partners—worth many billions of dollars over the next decade alone—together with concomitant new employment opportunities across both societies.
India’s rapidly expanding aviation needs, and our increasing demand for gas, nuclear, clean coal and renewables, are two significant areas of increasing convergence. In coming years, Indian companies will import energy in excess of $40 billion from the U.S., and more than 200 American-made aircraft will join the private Indian aviation fleet.
The combination of technology, innovation and skilled workers has helped forge an exciting digital and scientific partnership between our two countries. The creative and entrepreneurial energy of our engineers, scientists and researchers, and their free movement between both countries, continue to help India and the U.S. retain their innovation edge and maintain competitiveness in the knowledge economy.
A new layer in our engagement is our partnership for global good. Whenever India and the U.S. work together, the world reaps the benefits—be it our collaborative efforts to find affordable vaccines for rotavirus or dengue, our joint studies of gravitational waves, observations of distant planets, establishing norms for cyberspace, providing humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in the Indo-Pacific region, or training peacekeepers in Africa.
Defense is another mutually beneficial sphere of our partnership. Both India and the U.S. have an overriding interest in securing our societies, and the world, from the forces of terrorism, radical ideologies and nontraditional security threats. India has four decades’ experience in fighting terrorism, and we share the U.S. administration’s determination to defeat this scourge.
We are already working together to address the existing and emerging strategic and security challenges that affect both our nations—in Afghanistan, West Asia, the large maritime space of the Indo-Pacific, the new and unanticipated threats in cyberspace. We also share an interest in ensuring that sea lanes—critical lifelines of trade and energy—remain secure and open to all.
The logic of our strategic relationship is incontrovertible. It is further underpinned by faith in the strength of our multicultural societies that have defended our values at all costs, including the supreme sacrifices we’ve made in distant corners of the globe. The three-million-strong Indian-American community, which represents the best of both our countries, has played a crucial role in connecting and contributing to our societies.
The past two decades have been a productive journey of engagement for our mutual security and growth. I expect the next few decades to be an even more remarkable story of ambitious horizons, convergent action and shared growth.
The U.S. and India are forging a deeper and stronger partnership that extends far beyond the Beltway and the Raisina Hill. That partnership has become our privileged prerogative and our promise for our people and our world.
Mr. Modi is prime minister of India.
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Interesting eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation going on in Bhutan between India and China. The Chinese typically grab bits and pieces of territory all over the 1400 km of the Himalayas. In this instance, the territory is Bhutanese, but if grabbed would provide them a strategic advantage to capture India's Siliguri corridor (chickens neck), which if taken, cuts east India from the mainland.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-face-off-china-india-each-deploy-3000-troops/articleshow/59377716.cms (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-face-off-china-india-each-deploy-3000-troops/articleshow/59377716.cms)
Border face-off: China, India each deploy 3,000 troops
Rajat Pandit | TNN | Updated: Jun 30, 2017, 01.15 AM IST
HIGHLIGHTS
Two rival armies deployed around 3,000 troops each in a virtually eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation
Bhutan, too, has issued a demarche to China over the construction of the road
Flag meetings and other talks between the rival commanders have not worked till now
NEW DELHI: The ongoing troop face-off between India and China on the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction has emerged as the biggest such confrontation in the region in decades, with both sides continuing to pump in reinforcements to the remote border region.
Even as Army chief General Bipin Rawat reviewed the ground situation by visiting the headquarters of the 17 Mountain Division in Gangtok and 27 Mountain Division in Kalimpong on Thursday, sources said the two rival armies had strengthened their positions at the tri-junction by deploying around 3,000 troops each in a virtually eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.
The Indian Army, on its part, refused to say anything. But sources said though there had been other troop standoffs at the tri-junction over the years, the latest one at the Doka La general area was clearly the most serious.
"Both sides are as yet not willing to budge from their positions. Flag meetings and other talks between the rival commanders have not worked till now," a source said.
During his visit, General Rawat especially concentrated on the deployments of the 17 Division, which is responsible for the defence of eastern Sikkim with four brigades (each with over 3,000 soldiers) under its command.
"All top officers, including the 33 Corps and 17 Division commanders, were present during the extensive discussions. The chief will return to New Delhi on Friday morning," the source said.
Undeterred by Beijing's aggressive posturing, India has made it clear that it will not allow China to construct a motorable road till the tri-junction through the Bhutanese territory of Doklam plateau, as earlier reported by TOI.
Bhutan, too, has issued a demarche to China over the construction of the road towards its army camp at Zomplri in the Doklam plateau, asking Beijing to restore status quo by stopping work immediately.
"China is trying to build a 'Class-40 road' in the Doklam plateau that can take the weight of military vehicles weighing up to 40 tonnes, which include light battle tanks, artillery guns and the like," the source said.
Interestingly, the People's Liberation Army declared in Beijing on Thursday that it had conducted trials of a new 35-tonne tank in the plains of Tibet, though it added that "it was not targeted against any country". The Indian defence establishment is concerned at the "creeping territorial aggression" by China, which aims to progressively swallow the 269 sq km Doklam plateau to add "strategic width" to its adjoining but narrow Chumbi Valley, which juts in between Sikkim and Bhutan.
China has also been pushing Bhutan hard for the last two decades to go in for a "package deal".
1) China violated its agreement with Bhutan by altering the status quo at the border. India and Bhutan have an Eternal Treaty that covers defence and foreign affairs of Bhutan. So India has a lcus st... Read More
Under it, Beijing wants Thimphu to cede control over Doklam plateau, while it surrenders claims to the 495 sq km of territory in Jakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in northern Bhutan. But India is militarily "very sensitive" about the Doklam plateau, especially the Zomplri Ridge area because it overlooks the strategically-vulnerable Siliguri corridor or the 'Chicken's Neck' area. India has progressively strengthened its defences in the Siliguri corridor, the narrow strip of land that connects the rest of India with its north-eastern states, to stem any Chinese ingress. "But it remains a geographical vulnerability. China has constructed several feeder roads from Tibet to the border with Bhutan, and is also trying to extend its railway line in the region," the source said.
Here's another article...
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/road-building-a-direct-violation-of-pacts-bhutan/articleshow/59378188.cms
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China is a big fan of strategic salami slicing. None is this is headed in a happy direction. :oops:
Interesting eye-ball to eye-ball confrontation going on in Bhutan between India and China. The Chinese typically grab bits and pieces of territory all over the 1400 km of the Himalayas. In this instance, the territory is Bhutanese, but if grabbed would provide them a strategic advantage to capture India's Siliguri corridor (chickens neck), which if taken, cuts east India from the mainland.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-face-off-china-india-each-deploy-3000-troops/articleshow/59377716.cms (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-face-off-china-india-each-deploy-3000-troops/articleshow/59377716.cms)
Border face-off: China, India each deploy 3,000 troops
Rajat Pandit | TNN | Updated: Jun 30, 2017, 01.15 AM IST
HIGHLIGHTS
Two rival armies deployed around 3,000 troops each in a virtually eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation
Bhutan, too, has issued a demarche to China over the construction of the road
Flag meetings and other talks between the rival commanders have not worked till now
NEW DELHI: The ongoing troop face-off between India and China on the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction has emerged as the biggest such confrontation in the region in decades, with both sides continuing to pump in reinforcements to the remote border region.
Even as Army chief General Bipin Rawat reviewed the ground situation by visiting the headquarters of the 17 Mountain Division in Gangtok and 27 Mountain Division in Kalimpong on Thursday, sources said the two rival armies had strengthened their positions at the tri-junction by deploying around 3,000 troops each in a virtually eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation.
The Indian Army, on its part, refused to say anything. But sources said though there had been other troop standoffs at the tri-junction over the years, the latest one at the Doka La general area was clearly the most serious.
"Both sides are as yet not willing to budge from their positions. Flag meetings and other talks between the rival commanders have not worked till now," a source said.
During his visit, General Rawat especially concentrated on the deployments of the 17 Division, which is responsible for the defence of eastern Sikkim with four brigades (each with over 3,000 soldiers) under its command.
"All top officers, including the 33 Corps and 17 Division commanders, were present during the extensive discussions. The chief will return to New Delhi on Friday morning," the source said.
Undeterred by Beijing's aggressive posturing, India has made it clear that it will not allow China to construct a motorable road till the tri-junction through the Bhutanese territory of Doklam plateau, as earlier reported by TOI.
Bhutan, too, has issued a demarche to China over the construction of the road towards its army camp at Zomplri in the Doklam plateau, asking Beijing to restore status quo by stopping work immediately.
"China is trying to build a 'Class-40 road' in the Doklam plateau that can take the weight of military vehicles weighing up to 40 tonnes, which include light battle tanks, artillery guns and the like," the source said.
Interestingly, the People's Liberation Army declared in Beijing on Thursday that it had conducted trials of a new 35-tonne tank in the plains of Tibet, though it added that "it was not targeted against any country". The Indian defence establishment is concerned at the "creeping territorial aggression" by China, which aims to progressively swallow the 269 sq km Doklam plateau to add "strategic width" to its adjoining but narrow Chumbi Valley, which juts in between Sikkim and Bhutan.
China has also been pushing Bhutan hard for the last two decades to go in for a "package deal".
1) China violated its agreement with Bhutan by altering the status quo at the border. India and Bhutan have an Eternal Treaty that covers defence and foreign affairs of Bhutan. So India has a lcus st... Read More
Under it, Beijing wants Thimphu to cede control over Doklam plateau, while it surrenders claims to the 495 sq km of territory in Jakurlung and Pasamlung valleys in northern Bhutan. But India is militarily "very sensitive" about the Doklam plateau, especially the Zomplri Ridge area because it overlooks the strategically-vulnerable Siliguri corridor or the 'Chicken's Neck' area. India has progressively strengthened its defences in the Siliguri corridor, the narrow strip of land that connects the rest of India with its north-eastern states, to stem any Chinese ingress. "But it remains a geographical vulnerability. China has constructed several feeder roads from Tibet to the border with Bhutan, and is also trying to extend its railway line in the region," the source said.
Here's another article...
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/road-building-a-direct-violation-of-pacts-bhutan/articleshow/59378188.cms
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https://swarajyamag.com/world/border-standoff-chinese-incursions-have-a-much-deeper-and-sinister-intent (https://swarajyamag.com/world/border-standoff-chinese-incursions-have-a-much-deeper-and-sinister-intent)
Border Standoff: Chinese Incursions Have A Much Deeper And Sinister Intent
Jaideep Mazumdar
- Jul 01, 2017, 3:46 pm
An India surrounded by countries which would be proxies of China would severely limit India’s global aspirations and keep it tied down to South Asia, thus allowing China a free run in Asia and the world.
China’s aggressive actions at the tri-junction between India, Tibet and Bhutan, in the Doklam plateau of the Chumbi Valley, is no routine border incursion and poses an extremely grave security and diplomatic threat to India. China’s actions signal its intent to embark on its long-term expansionist plans in this part of Asia, and ought to send alarm bells clanging in India’s security establishment.
A brief recap of the events at the border would be in order here. China has long laid claim to the Doklam plateau that falls in west Bhutan and adjoins the Chinese-controlled Chumbi Valley of Tibet. Chumbi Valley separates Sikkim from Bhutan and hangs like a dagger over the vulnerable Chicken’s Neck, or Siliguri Corridor, that connects North East India with the rest of the country. Chumbi Valley is, however, very narrow and cannot accommodate the number of troops and military hardware China would require either in case of an offensive, or to deter India militarily.
Also, Chinese troops in Chumbi Valley suffer from a serious strategic constraint since the ridge lines along the Valley fall in Bhutan and Sikkim and Indian troops have a clear tactical advantage there. It must be remembered here that India provides military muscle to Bhutan and the Indian Army has a strong presence in that country through the IMTRAT (Indian Military Training Team) units stationed in Bhutan. Thus, Indian troops pose a serious threat to the Chinese not only from Sikkim but also from Bhutan, where they are stationed.
It was Indian soldiers who backed the Royal Bhutan Army (RBA) which confronted and challenged Chinese attempts to construct a road through Doklam. The Chinese road through Doklam plateau – a strategically vital territory of Bhutan that China falsely lays claim to – would have even touched an RBA garrison. RBA troops, backed by IMTRAT units, stopped the Chinese road construction works and Bhutan issued a demarche to China, objecting to the construction that would have altered the strategic balance in that region in China’s favour.
An incensed Beijing, thus, spoke of India violating Bhutan’s sovereignty. Indian military presence in Bhutan has long riled China and despite its best efforts, Bhutan has steadfastly remained a close friend of India.
China’s Grand Design
Standing at Beijing’s infamous Tiananmen Square, China’s notorious communist dictator Mao Tse-tung said 1953 (after the annexation of Tibet): “Xizang (Tibet) is like China’s right palm whose five fingers – Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan and NEFA (as Arunachal Pradesh was known as then) – remained severed and under the occupation of, or influence of, India. The palm is ineffective without the fingers, and so it is necessary to liberate the five fingers and rejoin them with the palm.”
That was no empty rhetoric. The Chinese, anyway, never indulge in empty rhetoric. Mao was articulating the deeply ingrained trait of expansionism among the Han Chinese, the largest ethnic group in the world. This expansionism, which has only intensified with China emerging as a global power, has brought that country in conflict with most of its neighbours. China, buoyed by successfully bullying smaller nations in its periphery into submission, wants to try out the same with India.
For China, Indian influence over Bhutan (which the Chinese maliciously allege is an Indian protectorate) is a deep irritant. China has been pressurising Bhutan, without success, to establish direct diplomatic relations with it instead of dealing with Beijing through the Chinese embassy in New Delhi. China is desperate to gain a toehold in Bhutan by opening an embassy in Thimpu. Doing so would be the first important step in increasing Chinese influence in Bhutan and weaning that country away from India’s embrace through massive financial aid and development projects.
China been successful in subverting India’s influence over Nepal, and large sections of the political establishment in Kathmandu are now openly pro-China and deeply anti-India. China has been pouring in financial and material aid to Nepal, executing massive infrastructure and power projects, and has brought Nepal into its own sphere of influence. New Delhi is, thus, wary of allowing Bhutan to open up to China.
The Chinese claims over large slices of territory in west Bhutan – Doklam, Charithang, Sinchulimpa and Dramana – have been made with twin objectives: (1) to neutralise the disadvantage its own troops face in Chumbi Valley and deny Indian troops in Bhutan access to the strategic high grounds overlooking the Valley, and (2) to force Bhutan to establish direct ties with Beijing. In fact, say sources in India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), China has already offered to defuse the tension in Doklam if Thimpu agrees to start working towards establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing and limits access of IMTRAT units to west Bhutan that adjoins Chumbi Valley.
Of the “five fingers” of the palm (Tibet), Ladakh is already under serious threat, what with half of it (Aksai Chin) being under Chinese occupation. Nepal is slowing falling to Chinese control, and China has upped the ante over Sikkim now even though it had accepted that Sikkim is an integral part of India in exchange for India reiterating its position about Tibet being an inalienable part of China. By transgressing into northeast Sikkim, China has perfidiously brought Sikkim back to the broader border dispute with India. India can now expect the Chinese to start contesting Sikkim’s ascension to India in 1975.
Map of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir (Saravask/Wikimedia Commons)Map of Ladakh, Jammu and Kashmir (Saravask/Wikimedia Commons)
China’s transgressions into Bhutan and its claim over Bhutanese territory is thus part of its grand strategy to bully and beat Bhutan into submission and wean it away from India’s influence. China has already been laying claim to Arunachal Pradesh, especially the Tawang tracts to the west of the state that People’s Liberation Army troops overran in 1962. China has stationed large number of troops and sophisticated military hardware all along the Arunachal-Tibet border. In fact, Indian military presence and physical infrastructure compares very poorly with that of China across the border not only in Arunachal but Sikkim as well.
Importance of the ‘Five Fingers’
A look at the map of Asia will show that many landlocked parts of China – the eastern areas of Xingiang, and provinces like Gansu, Qinghai, Tibet, Sichuan and Yunnan – would benefit immensely with free access to the Bay of Bengal. That can only happen if the ‘five fingers’ come under Chinese control.
China already exercises tremendous influence over a big section of Bangladesh’s political and military establishment. The pro-Pakistan Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is in the opposition now, and its ally the Jamaat-e-Islami, as well as Islamists in that country, are all closely linked to Pakistan, which is totally beholden to China. Beijing, through Pakistan and also on its own, thus wields a lot of influence over Bangladesh that offers a direct opening to the Bay of Bengal.
Chinese presence in Myanmar has increased and grown stronger and, through that country, China has also gained access to the Bay of Bengal. Even though Myanmar’s powerful generals have, of late, realised the insidious nature of Chinese presence in their country, they cannot simply shrug off the Chinese yoke that they had happily brought themselves under. India’s efforts to wean away Myanmar from China are far too sparse. And with its control over the rebellious tribes inhabiting the restive northern parts of Myanmar that are beyond the control of Myanmarese army, China automatically enjoys a lot of leverage over that country.
China’s incitement of insurgencies in North East India have to be thus seen from the prism of its expansionism. By aiding, supporting and training various militant groups of the North East and even extending safe refuge to them within its territory (the refuge granted to ULFA chief Paresh Barua being just one example), China wants to keep that part of India in turmoil and, thus, under indirect control.
In the long run, once it firmly establishes direct or indirect control over the ‘five fingers’ and rids them of Indian influence and control, China would gain a huge geo-strategic advantage over India. An India surrounded by countries which would be proxies of China would severely limit India’s global aspirations and keep it tied down to South Asia, thus allowing China a free run in Asia and the world.
New Delhi would also do well to keep in mind the fact that China’s right palm with its five fingers under Beijing’s control can also be used as a wrist to deliver a debilitating punch to India. The only way that can be countered is to meticulously follow the Chinese path of strengthening the economy, spurring growth and building up the country’s military capability. And, also, by judiciously weeding out the Chinese ‘plants’ in India’s polity.
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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-asks-china-to-retreat-from-doklam/articleshow/59462861.cms (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-asks-china-to-retreat-from-doklam/articleshow/59462861.cms)
and a little bit of humor, this is how India China fight these days, without bullets!, video is grainy and in hindi, but no translation needed. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7lsYaKUYMo (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=L7lsYaKUYMo)
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India is not backing down, inspite of multiple threats from China..YA
Sikkim stand-off: Indian troops unlikely to pull back
TNN | Updated: Jul 7, 2017, 01.10 AM IST
HIGHLIGHTS
India is not likely to consider a pullout without some clear terms being arrived at first
China's unilateral move violates agreements with India and impacts Bhutan's sovereignty
NEW DELHI: Despite rising stridency in Chinese demands that India pull back from the confrontation near the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan tri-junction, Indian troops are digging in to protect the strategic topography that is just 30 km from a hydel project and overlooks the Bengal-Assam road link.
The hydro-electric project is located at Jaldhaka river at Jhalong which is not far from the border with Bhutan and is also a bridge for crossing over to the landlocked hill kingdom. The Jaldhaka, along with Torsha river, flows into the Brahmaputra and is part of a tract of land that could come under pressure if the Chinese build the road they are planning through Doklam plateau in Bhutan.
The Siliguri corridor, and the town itself, will be vulnerable if China gets to dominate ridge lines which will allow its troops to literally sit astride Indian territory. The road to Assam also runs through the narrow strip of territory that connects West Bengal to the northeast and any threat to it can snip the surface link from Bagdogra to Guwahati.
Given the importance of holding the current alignment and preventing China from altering this to its benefit, India is not likely to consider a pullout without some clear terms being arrived at first. Though the Chinese are clearly annoyed at Indian troops stalling road work in an area that is near the tri-junction, Bhutan has strongly protested the intrusion on its territory. Even if the area is considered disputed, China's unilateral move violates agreements with India and impacts Bhutan's sovereignty.
As the full significance of the Chinese move becomes apparent, it is clear that the road project and movement of troops was more than the "usual" intrusions by which China tests India's defences and responses. The realignment of ground position was intended to grasp a decisive advantage in the region and went beyond the "needle and nibble" attempts to reset parts of the unsettled boundary between India and China.
With matters grinding to a stalemate and India holding its ground and comments, the stage could be set for more serious diplomatic engagement. Though the tough talk on part of Beijing continues, ejecting Indian troops is not an easy prospect and neither side would be keen to let matters get out of hand.
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http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2017/07/asias-colossus-threatens-tiny-state.html#more (http://strategicstudyindia.blogspot.com/2017/07/asias-colossus-threatens-tiny-state.html#more)
Asia’s colossus threatens a tiny state
BY BRAHMA CHELLANEY
Source Link
Bhutan, one of the world’s smallest nations, has protested that the Asian colossus, China, is chipping away at its territory by building a strategic highway near the Tibet-India-Bhutan trijunction in the Himalayas. Bhutan has security arrangements with India, and the construction has triggered a tense standoff between Chinese and Indian troops at the trijunction, with the Chinese state media warning of the possibility of war.
Bhutan says “China’s construction of the road inside Bhutanese territory is a direct violation” of its agreements with Beijing. China, however, has sought to obscure its aggression by blaming India for not respecting either the trijunction points or the boundary between Tibet and the Indian state of Sikkim, which is also contiguous to Bhutan.
In the way an increasingly muscular China — without firing a single shot — has waged stealth wars to change the status quo in the South and East China seas, it has been making furtive encroachments across its Himalayan frontiers with the intent to expand its control meter by meter, kilometer by kilometer. It has targeted strategic areas in particular.
If its land grab is challenged, China tends to play the victim, including accusing the other side of making a dangerous provocation. And to mask the real issue involved, it chooses to wage a furious propaganda war. Both these elements have vividly been on display in the current troop standoff at the edge of the Chumbi Valley, a Chinese-controlled zone that forms a wedge between Bhutan and Sikkim, and juts out as a dagger against a thin strip of Indian territory known as the Chicken Neck, which connects India’s northeast to the rest of the country.
In recent years, China has been upgrading its military infrastructure and deployments in this highly strategic region so that, in the event of a war, its military blitzkrieg can cut off India from its northeast. Such an invasion would also leave Bhutan completely surrounded and at China’s mercy.
INDIA-BHUTAN DEFENSE TIES
Bhutan, with a population of only 750,000, shares some of its national defense responsibilities with India under a friendship treaty. Indian troops, for example, assist the undersized Royal Bhutan Army in guarding the vulnerable portions of Bhutan’s border with China.
The 2007 Bhutan-India friendship treaty states that the two neighbors “shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests.” The 2007 pact — signed after the Himalayan kingdom introduced major political reforms to emerge as the world’s newest democracy — replaced their 1949 treaty under which Bhutan effectively was an Indian protectorate, with one of the clauses stipulating that it would be “guided by” India in its foreign policy.
Recently, after days of rising Sino-Indian tensions at the trijunction, the People’s Liberation Army on June 16 brought in heavy earth-moving equipment and began building a road through Bhutan’s Doklam Plateau, which China claims, including Sinicizing its name as Donglong. Indian troops intervened, leading to scuffles with PLA soldiers, with the ongoing standoff halting work at the 3,000-meter-high construction site.
Significantly, the standoff did not become public until June 26 when China released a complaint against India, just as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi was about to begin discussions with U.S. President Donald Trump at the White House. The statement — timed to cast a shadow over the Modi-Trump discussions and to remind Modi of the costs Beijing could impose on India for his pro-U.S. tilt — presented China as the victim by alleging that Indian troops had “intruded” into “China’s Donglong region” and halted a legitimate construction activity. It demanded India withdraw its troops or face retaliation.
This was followed by a frenzied Chinese public-relations blitzkrieg against India designed to obfuscate the real issue — the PLA’s encroachment on Bhutanese territory. Chinese officials and state media fulminated against India over the troop standoff but shied away from even mentioning Bhutan.
It was only after Bhutan’s ambassador to India publicly revealed on June 28 that his country had protested the PLA’s violation of its territorial sovereignty and demanded a return to status quo ante that Beijing finally acknowledged the involvement of a third party in the dispute. The fact that an insecure and apprehensive Bhutan (which has no diplomatic relations with China) took eight days to make public its protest to Beijing played into China’s hands.
CHINA PILES ON THE PRESSURE
The Chinese attacks on India for halting the road construction, meanwhile, are continuing. For example, the Chinese defense ministry spokesperson, alluding to India’s defeat in the 1962 war with China, asked the Indian army on June 29 to “learn from historical lessons” and to stop “clamoring for war.” The Indian defense minister, in response, said the India of today was different from the one in 1962.
The same trijunction was the scene of heavy Sino-Indian military clashes in 1967, barely five years after China’s 1962 trans-Himalayan invasion led to major Indian reverses. But unlike in 1962, the Chinese side suffered far heavier casualties in the 1967 clashes, concentrated at Nathu-la and Cho-la.
Today, to mount pressure on India, China has cut off Indian pilgrims’ historical access to a mountain-and-lake site in Tibet that is sacred to four faiths: Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism and the indigenous religion of Tibet, Bon. While Manasarovar is the world’s highest freshwater lake at 4,557 meters above sea level, Mount Kailash — the world’s legendary center — is worshipped by believers as the abode of the planet’s father and mother, the gods Shiva and Uma, and as the place where Lord Buddha manifested himself in his super-bliss form. Four important rivers of Asia, including the Indus and the Brahmaputra, originate from around this duo.
By arbitrarily halting the pilgrimages, Beijing is reminding New Delhi to review its Tibet policy. India needs to subtly reopen Tibet as an outstanding issue in order to fend off Chinese pressure. After all, China lays claim to Indian and Bhutanese territories on the basis of alleged Tibetan (not Han Chinese) links to them historically. India must start to question China’s purportedly historical claim to Tibet itself.
More broadly, by waging stealth wars to accomplish political and military objectives, China is turning into a principle source of strategic instability in Asia. The stealth wars include constructing a dispute and then setting in motion a jurisdictional creep through a steady increase in the frequency and duration of Chinese incursions — all with the intent of either establishing military control over a coveted area or pressuring the opponent to cut a deal on its terms.
This strategy of territorial creep is based not on chess, which is centered on securing a decisive victory, but on the ancient Chinese game of Go, aimed at steadily making incremental gains by outwitting the opponent through unrelenting attacks on its weak points.
China has long camouflaged offense as defense, in keeping with the ancient theorist Sun Tzu’s advice that all warfare is “based on deception.” Still, the fact that the world’s fourth largest country in area, after Russia, Canada and the United States, is seeking to nibble away at the territory of a tiny nation speaks volumes about China’s aggressive strategy of expansion.
Longtime Japan Times contributor Brahma Chellaney is a geostrategist and the author of nine books.
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This is one of the better writeups by a retd. Indian General as to whats happening at the border. Perhaps has too much detail...
https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/07/08/panag-india-china-sikkim-bhutan?utm_content=buffer4e387&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer (https://www.newslaundry.com/2017/07/08/panag-india-china-sikkim-bhutan?utm_content=buffer4e387&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer)
Looks like either both sides will withdraw, or there will be a limited skirmish where China will loose. I would watch for China to start talking peace...though at the moment they are having a hard time believing that their bullying of little Bhutan did not work!. The Chinese are finding it hard to swallow that the only 2 countries in the world who oppose their OBOR project and dominance are India and tiny Bhutan!.
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Here's an American pov, somewhat simplistic...but again things dont look good for China!
As China Threatens to Punish India, It Should Consider the Lessons of Its 1979 Invasion of Vietnam
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-threatens-punish-india-should-consider-lessons-its-gilberto?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BuMIFpYzqRAWmjHdxsv1YRg%3D%3D (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-threatens-punish-india-should-consider-lessons-its-gilberto?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BuMIFpYzqRAWmjHdxsv1YRg%3D%3D)
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Here's an American pov, somewhat simplistic...but again things dont look good for China!
As China Threatens to Punish India, It Should Consider the Lessons of Its 1979 Invasion of Vietnam
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-threatens-punish-india-should-consider-lessons-its-gilberto?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BuMIFpYzqRAWmjHdxsv1YRg%3D%3D (https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-threatens-punish-india-should-consider-lessons-its-gilberto?trk=v-feed&lipi=urn%3Ali%3Apage%3Ad_flagship3_feed%3BuMIFpYzqRAWmjHdxsv1YRg%3D%3D)
Hopefully it is limited, and hopefully the PLA get's it's ass handed to them.
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http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-row-indian-army-getting-ready-for-long-haul-in-doklam/articleshow/59512901.cms (http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/border-row-indian-army-getting-ready-for-long-haul-in-doklam/articleshow/59512901.cms)
The longer the Chinese remain in denial, the bigger their loss of face, when they are ultimately forced to withdraw. Their belligerent statements have now stopped, as reality begins to creep in. Their miscalculation was that India would not defend Bhutanese territory....YA
Border row: Indian Army getting ready for long haul in Doklam
PTI | Updated: Jul 9, 2017, 02.30 PM IST
NEW DELHI: The Indian Army is ready for a long haul+ in holding onto its position in the Doklam area+ near the Bhutan tri-junction, notwithstanding China ratcheting up rhetoric against India demanding pulling back of its troops.The Indian soldiers deployed in the disputed area have pitched their tents, in an indication that they are unlikely to retreat unless there was reciprocity from China's PLA personnel in ending the face-off at an altitude of around 10,000 feet in the Sikkim section.
A steady line of supplies is being maintained for the soldiers at the site, official sources said, signalling that Indian Army is not going to wilt under any pressure from China.
At the same time they sounded confident of finding a diplomatic solution to the dispute, citing resolution of border skirmishes in the past through diplomacy.
Though China has been aggressively asserting that it was not ready for any "compromise" and that the "ball is in India's court", the view in the security establishment here is that there cannot be any unilateral approach in defusing the tension.
Both the countries had agreed to a mechanism in 2012 to resolve border flare ups through consultations at various levels.The mechanism has not worked so far in the current case as the stand-off near the Bhutan trijunction, triggered by China's attempt to build a road in the strategically important area, has dragged on for over three weeks.
New Delhi has already conveyed to Beijing that such an action would represent a significant change of status quo with "serious" security implications for India. The road link could give China a major military advantage over India. Doka La is the Indian name for the region which Bhutan recognises as Doklam, while China claims it as part of its Donglang region.
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I agree with WRM that the recent breakthrough between India and Israel (and between India and the US) is a big, strategic deal. These are natural alliances that have been squandered by past leaders and events.
https://www.the-american-interest.com/2017/07/03/india-israel-breakthrough/
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http://ajaishukla.blogspot.com/
With Doklam negotiations under way, military believes it has emerged victor
Generals say: "In a stalemate, India will have achieved its aims" (Photo courtesy Global Times)
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 20th July 17
Senior military officials in New Delhi believe Beijing badly overplayed its hand by heating up the rhetoric over the presence of Indian soldiers in the disputed Doklam bowl, adjoining Sikkim. They say in the stalemate that has emerged, India will have achieved its aims.
The planners say that Indian forces have held the upper hand ever since they surprised Chinese troops by confronting them on behalf of Bhutan, and sticking to their position despite unprecedented aggression and threats from Beijing.
“However this plays out, China is going to lose face, since it has made its threats publicly. And India is going to come out looking like a credible and reliable partner for Bhutan”, says a general, speaking on condition of anonymity.
Asked about the possibility of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launching military operations against India, as Beijing has hinted, Indian generals are sanguine.
“There is no military mobilisation by China, nor will the Indian military mobilise unless war becomes imminent. If it comes to fighting, we are prepared to shed blood to uphold the India-Bhutan cooperation agreement. That would only raise our credibility in Thimphu’s eyes”, says a senior military planner.
“But that will not happen. The Chinese know they can achieve no military goal. They are smart enough to realise they have miscalculated badly”, he adds.
On Wednesday, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar admitted to a parliamentary panel that diplomatic negotiations are underway, both in Beijing and New Delhi, to resolve the month-old crisis.
On June 16, after Chinese road construction crews entered Doklam – an 89 square kilometre patch claimed by both Bhutan and China – Indian troops also crossed into Doklam and physically blocked Chinese road construction activity. Since then, hundreds of Indian and Chinese soldiers built up there, deployed eyeball-to-eyeball, initially igniting apprehensions of a shooting war.
Over the past week, however, as diplomatic discussions on de-escalation have moved along, Beijing’s foreign ministry spokespersons and government-controlled media have noticeably toned down the aggressive rhetoric they had earlier adopted.
Until last week, China’s foreign ministry insisted that a unilateral Indian withdrawal from Doklam was “the precondition for any meaningful dialogue between the two sides”. On June 6, Beijing threatened: “We once again urge the Indian side to immediately pull all of the troops that have crossed the boundary back to its own side before the situation gets worse with more serious consequences.”
On Tuesday, however, questioned about a briefing that China’s foreign ministry had given to diplomats in Beijing, a government spokesperson answered more benignly: “People will reach the just conclusion. If Indian wants to achieve its political purposes by sending military personnel across demarcated boundary, China urges India better not to do so.”
China’s media too is noticeably softening its stance from early June, when mouthpieces like the Global Times and Xinhua threatened India with a repeat of the 1962 military defeat. Over the weekend, China Central Television (CCTV) broadcast high-altitude, live fire exercises by a PLA brigade, without mentioning that the drills took place before the Doklam incident began.
This week, articles on the Doklam faceoff have been fewer in number. On Tuesday, after Pakistan’s “Dunya News” – a 24-hour, Urdu language television news channel –concocted news that a Chinese rocket attack in Sikkim had killed more than 150 Indian soldiers, Chinese media dismissed the report as “baseless”.
In India, even as the media keeps the spotlight on Doklam, the government is keeping a level tone. On Wednesday, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar reportedly told a parliamentary panel that hypernationalism and the media spotlight had inflated the crisis out of proportion.
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"However this plays out, China is going to lose face, since it has made its threats publicly."
I would not assume the matter is settled. In fact, with the Chinese losing face, it certainly is not.
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The Chinese have badly miscalculated this time. Their plan was to grab Bhutanese territory and gain a strategic advantage over India. All of this by the time of the coronation of emperor Xi at the August Communist Party Congress.
-Some facts, IMHO: Chinese cannot win in Doka la. They can save face by grabbing some other part of the LAC (Line of Actual Control) and then negotiating Doka la. However, once the war spreads, nothing can be predicted.
-A missile barrage wont help, China has more to loose than India, in a missile shoot out, considering that Indian missiles reach China's industrialized east coast.
-Acting thro their Pak or other proxies wont help, they have been doing it for decades!.
-Chinese shipping lanes thro the Malacca Straights are at risk.
So while the Chinese are huffing and puffing, its obvious that their bullying has not worked and their bluff has been called.
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The Chinese have badly miscalculated this time. Their plan was to grab Bhutanese territory and gain a strategic advantage over India. All of this by the time of the coronation of emperor Xi at the August Communist Party Congress.
-Some facts, IMHO: Chinese cannot win in Doka la. They can save face by grabbing some other part of the LAC (Line of Actual Control) and then negotiating Doka la. However, once the war spreads, nothing can be predicted.
-A missile barrage wont help, China has more to loose than India, in a missile shoot out, considering that Indian missiles reach China's industrialized east coast.
-Acting thro their Pak or other proxies wont help, they have been doing it for decades!.
-Chinese shipping lanes thro the Malacca Straights are at risk.
So while the Chinese are huffing and puffing, its obvious that their bullying has not worked and their bluff has been called.
And that's all good, but China isn't done, and they will reflect and learn from this.
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Yes, it may be too early for India to take a victory lap....yes, the Chinese will learn from this, which is that their days of bullying India are over. In the days of the previous spineless govt under PM ManMohan Singh (MMS), and previous Congress led govt's China was treated with kid gloves. MMS was such a coward, that he would not even visit Arunachal Pradesh an Indian State coveted by China as southern Tibet!. Under Modi, things have changed. He started off right by warmly inviting Xi to India, but during Xi's visit they occupied Indian territory which led to a standoff. After that, China has opposed India joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and vetoed the labeling of Mazhoor Azar as a paki terrorist at the UN. In response, Modi has allowed the Dalai Lama to visit Tawang (claimed by China as southern Tibet), shunned the Chinese One Belt One Road project, allowed the Tibetan flag to be raised at the border etc.
An Indo-China war will not be won by China. Reason is Tibet is too far away from the Chinese coast and their supply lines will be stretched thin. The Tibetan airfields are at 4000 m or higher which limits the bomb load that they can fly with, and acclimatization of soldiers in the thin air is a big problem. So China cannot win a conventional war, at best it would be a stalemate for two nations of 1.2 Billion population, each. Shooting missiles at each other damages China more, since their big cities are more developed.
On top of that, there are jingoistic reasons, Indian army is waiting to avenge their 1962 defeat. Subsequent skirmishes in the Bhutan/Sikkim area with China have resulted in Chinese suffering 2-3 fold higher casualties. In India the thinking is that China is a paper tiger, they make a lot of weapons, but dont have the will or experience to fight battles. Neither do they have experience with mountain war fare. Last war they fought with Vietnam did not got all too well for the Chinese. Add to that, most Chinese soldiers are the single/only sons of their parents, and their parents may have something to say when the body bags start arriving. Lastly, all the huffing and puffing is being done by the Chinese, which suggests they are the weaker party.
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"Add to that, most Chinese soldiers are the single/only sons of their parents, and their parents may have something to say when the body bags start arriving. Lastly, all the huffing and puffing is being done by the Chinese, which suggests they are the weaker party."
Yes, but that doesn't factor into the PLA's strategic thinking. PLA Generals have openly discussed that they are willing to trade 100,000 PLA troops to inflict 10,000 casualties on US forces.
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Greatly appreciate your input to our conversation YA. You bring up many points of which I was not aware.
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India’s provocation will trigger all-out confrontation on LAC
By Duo Mu
Source:Global Times Published: 2017/7/18 0:23:39 Last Updated: 2017/7/18 22:15:10
On June 16, Indian border guards crossed over the Sikkim section of the China-India border to the Chinese side, triggering a face-off with Chinese troops. India's action this time is a blatant infringement on China's sovereignty.
As the confrontation goes on, China needs to get ready for the face-off becoming a long-term situation and at the same time, needs to maintain a sense of rationality. Within China, there are voices calling for the Indian troops to be expelled immediately to safeguard the country's sovereignty, while Indian public opinion is clamoring for war with China. However, the two sides need to exercise restraint and avoid the current conflict spiraling out of control.
One important reason that prompted India triggering the border dispute this time is its worry over China's development in recent years. As two big developing countries, India and China both had a history of past colonization, and now both are enjoying fast economic growth. But China has risen quickly to be the world's No.2 economy. As time is on China's side, New Delhi is deeply concerned with China's rapid rise. Provocation at the border reflects India's worry and attempt to sound out China.
China doesn't recognize the land under the actual control of India is Indian territory. Bilateral border negotiations are still ongoing, but the atmosphere for negotiations has been poisoned by India. China doesn't advocate and tries hard to avoid a military clash with India, but China doesn't fear going to war to safeguard sovereignty either, and will make itself ready for a long-term confrontation.
According to the Indian media, Indian troops are stationed at the border area and have set up logistical support. They even claim that India will continue the confrontation with China at the Sikkim section of the China-India border until the Chinese troops withdraw. In response, China must continue strengthening border construction and speed up troop deployment and construction in the Doklam area. These are legitimate actions of a sovereign country.
The 3,500-kilometer border has never been short of disputes. Since the 1962 border war, the Indian side has repeatedly made provocations. China must be prepared for future conflicts and confrontation. China can take further countermeasures along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). If India stirs up conflicts in several spots, it must face the consequence of an all-out confrontation with China along the entire LAC.
If India plans to devote more resources in the border area, then so be it. China can engage in a competition with India over economic and military resources deployment in the border area. With growing national strength, China is capable of deploying resources in remote border areas. It is conducive to the economic growth of these regions, as well as to safeguarding integration of China's territory. Road and rail in the Tibetan area have been extended close to the border area with India, Nepal and Bhutan. It's a competition of military strength, as well as a competition of overall economic strength.
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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/07/25/china-warns-india-will-defend-territory-costs-amid-border-dispute/
China warns India it will defend territory 'at all costs' amid border dispute
Video allegedly shows Indian and Chinese soldiers pushing each other
00:29
Neil Connor, beijing
25 JULY 2017 • 5:51PM
China has stepped up its war of words with India over a tense border dispute, saying it will defend its territory “at all costs”, after a video emerged of soldiers from the two sides pushing and shoving each other.
"It is easier to shake the mountains than to shake the PLA,” Defence Ministry spokesman Wu Qian said as he reiterated the “determination” of China’s People’s Liberation Army.
Both sides have been facing off on a thin strip of land in the Himalayas bordering both countries and Bhutan.
China is constructing a road in the region which India sees a strategic threat to a narrow part of territory leading to its north eastern states which is known as the ‘chicken’s neck’.
Mr Wu also said China would conduct “targeted deployment and exercises” along the disputed border area, raising the spectre of increased military movements in the tense region.
Last week China conducted live-fire drills on the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau, and such exercises will continue if Indian troops are not withdrawn from the stand-off, Mr Wu said.
"We will preserve our sovereign territory and security interests at all costs," he said, in what is being seen as China’s strongest warning yet to New Delhi since the dispute began a month ago.
"The 90-year history of the People's Liberation Army has proven that, when it comes to safeguarding our sovereignty and territorial integrity, our capabilities keep strengthening while our determination remains firm.”
Meanwhile, a video has emerged which shows soldiers from India and China pushing each other on a grassy flatland.
The leaked clip of around 20 apparently unarmed troops was originally circulated by Indian news outlets before being picked up by Chinese media.
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The Global Times has been quite jingoistic, with threats galore. All the neighboring small countries are watching, Pak, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Srilanka, as well as those in SE Asia. India has already occupied/defended Doka La plateau (Bhutanese territory), a third country's territory for over a month now. The Chinese are getting apoplectic, they are used to making empty threats and getting away with it, they build small atolls in the Indo-China sea, or buzz US surveillance aircraft with impunity, they have not had anyone oppose them for a long time. The loss of face is tremendous, they can redeem themselves by starting a war AND winning (a tall order), a draw will damage their reputation in the neighborhood severely.
The immediate benefit to India is that China's pawn Pak is getting the message that China cannot even defend their "own" territory, so Pak can forget the Chinese coming to their aid in a war situation.
There is one more possibility that the Chinese are being very clever, and all this is a fake move, with the actual move being planned elsewhere, eg in Pak Occupied Kashmir where the CPEC project goes through. India's NSA is in China over the week end for a BRICS meeting July 27-28., but will also be discussing the standoff(even though China insists that no talks are possible, until India withdraws!). The rainy season ends in Sept, so if any action will take place it must be in the sept-oct time frame, for Nov onwards, the place is frozen for the winter. Interesting times ahead.
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As always YA, very appreciate of the informed perspective you share with us here about this tremendously under reported region.
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• India-China: Indian National Security Adviser Ajit Doval is in Beijing for a BRICS security summit. He is expected to speak with Chinese security officials on July 28 on the sidelines of this event. The meeting comes just days after Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi called on India to withdraw its troops from a disputed border area before holding any dialogue. Other reports indicate that diplomatic channels remain open and that officials from both sides are discussing this matter. We need to scrutinize the disputed area and reassess the potential for war.
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Looks like the Chinese are finally coming to their senses!, have to see if this a temporary state, or they will ratchet up tensions as soon as the NSA leaves. NSA Ajit Doval is the last and only chance for a negotiated peaceful settlement, as one of the hats he wears deals with settling the border with China. Ajit Doval has an impressive history of working for 7 years as a spy (incognito) in Pak, infiltrating terrorist organizations etc, the man is a legend in India. His speeches are worth listening to, and their clarity of thought is amazing. He is responsible for the current hardline policy against Pak, China, the surgical strikes in Pak, Myanmar etc...YA.
Beijing sends conciliatory signals after Doval's first meeting with his Chinese counterpart Yang Jiechi
Saibal Dasgupta | TNN | Updated: Jul 28, 2017, 12:33 AM IST
HIGHLIGHTS
China's official Xinhua news agency sent out a conciliatory signal before Doval's expected meeting with Xi Jinping.
It spoke of the need to enhance mutual trust as the two countries are “not born rivals”.
The comments released by Xinhua made a strong plea to avoid the possibility of a war.
BEIJING: In the first official meeting between top Indian and Chinese officials since the Doklam stand-off became public, national security adviser Ajit Doval met state councillor Yang Jiechi here on Thursday, offering the possibility of serious diplomatic efforts to deescalate the confrontation.
Yang, who as China's state councillor overseeing foreign affairs occupies a powerful position in the state council, is the Chinese nominee in the India-China special representative level dialogue with Doval. An influential post, the state councillor is a member of the state council.
Indications of how the bilateral meeting went could be gleaned by the commentary released by the official Xinhua news agency which sent out a conciliatory signal before Doval is expected to meet Chinese president Xi Jinping on Friday. It spoke of the need to enhance mutual trust as the two countries are "not born rivals".
The comments released by the official Xinhua news agency made a strong plea to avoid the possibility of a war. "Most economies, including those in the West, will find themselves negatively affected by an India-China war in a globalised and intertwined world today," it said. In Delhi, the Indian government reminded China of the agreements on peace and tranquility that go back to 1993.
Yang also held separate meetings with security officials of three other countries on the sidelines of a security dialogue of BRICS nations comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
He discussed issues concerning bilateral relations, international and regional issues and multilateral affairs with the visiting security officials, the official Xinhua news agency said.
The remarks are a contrast to the hectoring tone in the comments published in publications like Global Times that are seen to reflect the views of the government.
China's official spokespersons have accused India of trespassing into Chinese territory, ignoring India's protests that the face-off near the Sikkim-Tibet-Bhutan trijunction has been caused by unilateral attempts by China to alter the ground position.
There are signs that the two neighbours might be able to scale down tensions that have spiked due to the military muscle flexing over China's bid to build a road through a plateau in Bhutanese territory.
This is the first time in weeks that the official media ran a commentary without demanding withdrawal of Indian troops from the disputed Doklam region. China has so far been insisting that troop withdrawal is a pre-condition to a "meaningful dialogue".
Doval reached Beijing on Thursday ahead of his planned meetings with Chinese President Xi Jinping and state counsellor Yang Jiechi on Friday.
"The recent border issue between the two countries shows a lack of strategic trust on the Indian side," Xinhua said.
It is not China but a set of problems common to all developing countries like corruption, a lack of quality education and healthcare that is holding back India.
"India must understand that China wishes what's good for the Indian people and would love to see a strong India standing shoulder by shoulder with China," Xinhua, which reflects the government's thinking said, giving an emotional touch to the vexed relationship.
Doval's formal purpose of visiting Beijing is to attend a security dialogue of BRICS nations. He is expected to discuss the border standoff with Chinese leaders in separate meetings.
Chinese foreign ministry has said that bilateral meetings are usually held during BRICS meetings and indirectly confirmed meetings on the border issue with Doval.
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Forecast Highlights
India will back down from its standoff with China only if Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has room to portray the resolution as a diplomatic victory to his political constituents back home.
New Delhi won't have the means, however, to alter China's strategy in its periphery, even if it can temporarily halt construction on Beijing's road project in Bhutan.
To defend against China's encroachment, New Delhi will bolster its defensive and infrastructure capacity along its northeastern border.
The Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan serves a strategic function far greater than its small size would suggest. Situated between India and China, the country acts as a buffer separating the two powers. But mounting enmity between New Delhi and Beijing is threatening to breach that barrier.
For over a month now, Chinese and Indian troops have been locked in a standoff a few hundred feet apart near the mountain pass of Doka La along India's border with China and Bhutan. The confrontation began June 16 when Indian forces intervened to prevent Chinese soldiers and construction workers from extending a roadway through the area. Bhutan claims Doka La lies within its borders, because the pass is south of its internationally recognized boundary with India and China, known as the trijunction. China, on the other hand, asserts that the trijunction is a few miles south of Doka La at Gymachen and that the pass, consequently, falls within its territory. For New Delhi, however, recognizing Beijing's border at Gymachen would put Chinese roads — and, by extension, troops — too close for comfort to the Siliguri corridor, the narrow ribbon of territory linking mainland India with its far-flung northeastern wing. The road through Doka La would also afford China access to the Jampheri ridge, a critical high ground from which it could threaten India's supply lines.
Neither China nor India has shown any sign of budging since the faceoff near Doka La began. India, hoping to avoid a conflict, has called for both sides to back down. As the lesser power in the showdown, though, New Delhi will be hard-pressed to find a way to coerce Beijing into giving up its ambitions in Bhutan or, for that matter, its wider strategy in South Asia.
An Uneven Competition
Over the past year, diplomatic relations between New Delhi and Beijing have hit the rocks. Part of the problem is China's relationship with India's archrival, Pakistan. In deference to Islamabad, Beijing has repeatedly rebuffed New Delhi's requests to impose U.N. sanctions on Masood Azhar, a Kashmiri militant based in Pakistan who is accused of orchestrating attacks on India. China likewise has used its veto power to keep India from entering the Nuclear Suppliers Group partly out of consideration for Pakistan, whose reputation as a sponsor of terrorism has hobbled its own chances of joining the organization. In addition, Beijing has forged ahead with construction on the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) despite New Delhi's protests that the project undermines its territorial integrity by crossing through Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
Beyond raising concerns over Kashmir, a region India claims in its entirety, the CPEC also represents the growing challenge that Beijing poses to New Delhi's dominance in South Asia. The joint venture with Pakistan is just one of a host of infrastructure projects China has launched in the region as part of its Belt and Road Intiative. But as much as Beijing's activities in New Delhi's traditional sphere of influence may gall it, India simply doesn't have the means to deter China from its pursuits.
Though the two countries are about evenly matched in terms of population size, China outstrips India politically, economically and militarily. New Delhi, moreover, has more pressing matters to worry about than Beijing, from its rivalry with Islamabad to the Maoist Naxalite insurgency. In light of its limitations relative to China, India eschewed the heavy costs of interfering in the CPEC's construction, notwithstanding its fulminations. (Even the United States, whose military power exceeds that of India and China, has opted not to intervene in China's infrastructure projects, such as its undertakings in the South China Sea.) And for much the same reason, it is working to prevent a conflict from erupting in Bhutan. Negotiating a diplomatic resolution to the issue, after all, would give Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi a victory to use to his political advantage at home. By the same token, initiating hostilities ostensibly over a road could damage China's carefully crafted image as a benign hegemon trying to promote harmony through its Belt and Road endeavors.
Area of Standoff Between Chinese and Indian Troops in Bhutan
Checking the Borders
Even without the upper hand, India has managed to halt construction on the road near Doka La. But to fend off Beijing's encroachment elsewhere, New Delhi may have to get creative. India, for instance, could take to the seas to head off China's increasing influence. As Beijing's clout has steadily grown, New Delhi has come to view the Indian Ocean region as an even greater asset for its defense and has ramped up its naval activities accordingly. More recently, India has seized on the South China Sea as another strategic space in which to counteract Beijing. The South Asian country has joined the United States in calling for freedom of navigation in the contested waters over the past few years. The South China Sea has become a topic of regular discussion in India's summits with the United States, and the subject has come up in meetings with other countries, such as Australia, as well. India even staked its own claim in the South China Sea by securing exploratory rights for a block in a Vietnamese offshore oil field, a risky investment whose value lies in its location.
Apart from its maritime pursuits, New Delhi will probably focus on bolstering infrastructure along India's northeastern border with China. Poor regional connectivity would be a significant handicap for India in the event of a military confrontation with China (though, ironically, the dearth of transport infrastructure was historically intended to deprive invading Chinese forces of inroads into the country). And now that China is busy building its own roads near sensitive border areas — including a 500-kilometer (310-mile) road linking Lhasa to Yadong, a city near the trijunction — India is taking steps to improve its connectivity. Modi revived construction projects for 73 strategic regional roads that were first proposed about a decade ago, and as a result of his efforts, India inaugurated the longest bridge in the country in May. Furthermore, India recently announced plans to construct at least two tunnels to reduce travel time between Tezpur, where the army's 4 Corps is headquartered, and Tawang, a city in the state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims is part of Tibet.
Modi has also emphasized increasing military capacity near his country's border with China. On March 17, reports emerged that India had begun raising a second infantry division for its mountain strike corps, known as the 17 Corps, headquartered in West Bengal. Designed to focus on the expanse of India's northern border from Arunachal Pradesh to Ladakh, the 17 Corps reportedly is part of the Indian army's effort to shift from a threat-based force to a capability-based force. Although it will be at least two years before the new infantry is operational, the project nevertheless reflects India's push to transition to an offensive-defensive approach in securing its borders.
Having fought a punishing territorial war with China in 1962, India has little interest in embarking on another armed conflict. And so, New Delhi will keep angling for a diplomatic solution to the standoff near Doka La as it tries to find a way to discourage China from following through with its roadway project there. Both sides have reason to avoid initiating hostilities, but until they arrive at a solution that will work in Modi's favor back home, China and India will likely stay at loggerheads. The dispute offers a glimpse into the difficulties New Delhi will face in the future as it tries to counter Beijing's advance into South Asia.
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Just as China miscalculated India's response, Stratfor IMHO, misses the fact that there is a nationalist BJP govt at the helm in India, not the spineless Gandhi family. So Stratfors forecast would be correct, under Congress rule, but not under BJP (Bhartiya Janta Party). Neither does Stratfor seem to appreciate the terrain and logistics that will be required for China to win, nor the current force levels at the border. Stratfor is right in that India is the weaker party in terms of weapons and economy.
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History is full of wars that both parties miscalculated their way into.
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Are China and India on the Road to War?
Jul 31, 2017
by Allison Fedirka
In mid-June, a remote area called the Dolam plateau in the Himalayas where the boundaries of China, India and Bhutan meet made headlines when Indian and Chinese troops began a standoff over a road construction project. China conducted a live-fire exercise in the area, and there have been false reports of deaths. Diplomatic efforts are underway to de-escalate the situation, but still the risk of war has been on everyone’s mind.
The terrain and weather in the area, located in a region called Doklam, are anathema to war. And yet, almost exactly 55 years ago, China and India fought briefly over this and other contested border areas. So what is the strategic value of this seemingly obscure plateau? And would India and China really go to war again over it?
Worth Fighting For
Put two major powers next to each other, even on the world’s largest continent with buffer states between them, and they’re bound to bump heads from time to time. China and India have most often fought over Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh state, which borders China in an isolated patch of Indian territory east of what’s known as the Siliguri Corridor. The corridor is a narrow strip of land – just 17 miles (27 kilometers) wide at its narrowest point – that connects the rest of India to its northeastern states wedged between Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar and China.
(click to enlarge)
After the 1962 war between India and China – a war also over border disputes, specifically Arunachal Pradesh and Kashmir – a border known as the McMahon Line was drawn between China and Arunachal Pradesh. China withdrew its troops from the area, but it didn’t recognize India’s sovereignty over the territory. India eventually annexed the Kingdom of Sikkim, which expanded the buffer it had to defend the Siliguri Corridor, and assumed the role of protecting Bhutan.
On the surface, the origins of this latest standoff seem innocuous. It began with China’s construction of a road on the outskirts of China’s western territory. The road leads toward the Chumbi Valley, which lies in the tri-border area between China, India and Bhutan. This small area dips between the other two countries.
(click to enlarge)
As construction progressed, China tried to extend work into the Dolam plateau, which is claimed by Bhutan. India recognizes Bhutan’s claim; China does not. India and China each have over a billion people; Bhutan is smaller than the Dominican Republic and has a population of less than a million. Since it can’t stand up to its massive neighbors, Bhutan depends on India for defense. Rather than allow the road construction to continue, India sent troops to barricade the project. China sent a small number of its own troops in response, and the standoff commenced.
What makes this obscure plateau so important is its relationship to the surrounding landscape. The Dolam plateau overlooks the Chumbi Valley and would be arguably the most strategic staging area from which to defend – or attack – the Siliguri Corridor. To maintain its territorial integrity, India must control the corridor and meet any challenge to that control. For this reason, the government in New Delhi cannot tolerate the slightest Chinese presence, nor can it allow China access to Dolam – not even in the form of a road.
If China were to gain control of the Siliguri Corridor, it could cut India off from its northeastern states and stake its own claim to the territory. And this isn’t just some trivial collection of states: They host the upper half of the Brahmaputra River, which flows through Bangladesh and drains into the Indian Ocean. Whoever controls this river controls the freshwater supply and flow to Bangladesh. Assuming dominance over the Brahmaputra River would put China just a few steps from accessing the Indian Ocean via Bangladesh – by coercion, if necessary. Access to the Indian Ocean is a Chinese imperative because it would enable Beijing to bypass the many maritime chokepoints in the South China Sea and would make it much harder for the U.S. Navy to hem China in.
This is all hypothetical, of course, and won’t happen anytime soon. But conceptually it follows China’s strategy for Myanmar, where Beijing is attempting to secure access to the Indian Ocean through a series of soft power maneuvers. Like Myanmar, Bangladesh is much smaller than China. The situations aren’t perfectly analogous, however, because to influence Bangladesh, China must first conquer territory under the control of a near peer – India.
Nevertheless, this explains how China’s interest and actions in Doklam fit into its larger geopolitical imperative of reaching the Indian Ocean. Imperatives, by their nature, are always present. They don’t disappear just because a country can’t fulfill them in the present. Gaining geopolitical power requires understanding both the short and the long game.
Potential for War
The decision to wage war is never taken lightly. Aside from the moral components, a great deal of thought must go into analyzing the strategic value of the war, the logistics, and the cost and benefit. In other words, saying there is a potential for war because a few hundred troops are in a standoff is an oversimplification of what war would actually entail.
Military Situation
The first step is to understand the tactical dimensions of the situation. Reports on this standoff are imprecise – information about Indian troops has been circulated more freely than about Chinese troops in the area. At the construction site on the plateau there are believed to be about 300-400 soldiers from each side. Under normal circumstances, India maintains about 120-150 troops in the area. Estimates from early July of troop numbers in the general vicinity of Doklam were 3,000 for both sides, putting real troop levels at a little over 6,000.
Nearby in Sikkim state (the Indian state bordering Bhutan and China), India has a few thousand more troops. The 63rd Brigade in eastern Sikkim and the 112th Brigade in the north consist of about 3,000 men each. Reports also say that two battalions from the 164th Brigade have been activated and moved closer to the Chinese border. Whether these troops are counted in the estimates of Indian troop numbers stationed in the Doklam area is unclear. India also boasts three infantry mountain warfare divisions consisting of about 10,000 troops each that are on high operational readiness. Information on what types of weaponry the Indian soldiers around Doklam have is minimal.
Troop numbers on the Chinese side are much more ambiguous. The only publicized figure has been the 3,000-troop estimate. In late July, the Chinese defense minister said there were plans to strengthen the People’s Liberation Army’s deployment and increase exercises along the border, but he offered no specifics on troop numbers or timelines. What little we do know concerns the weaponry that China has in the area and comes as a result of a one-day live-fire exercise the PLA held in Tibet in mid-July. These drills included anti-tank grenades, missiles, small artillery (howitzers) and, according to rumors, a new Chinese-designed light tank. There have been no reports of aircraft or heavy artillery or vehicles in Doklam on either side.
Environment
Warfare in an area such as Doklam would ultimately require ground troops in order to capture and hold territory. Supply chain logistics and the ability to sustain troop levels then become critical not only for sustaining the fighting but also to maintain control over territory once the fighting ends. Whether this can be done depends heavily on terrain, logistics and weather. In a place like Doklam, the environmental factors make it extremely difficult and costly to wage any type of war.
(click to enlarge)
Reaching altitudes as high as 14,000 feet, the region is surrounded by mountains. Even the lowest points of the valley are at an altitude of nearly 10,000 feet. This puts tremendous physical stress on soldiers. Any troops deploying would need 8-9 days to make their way up to the full elevation and get acclimated. Fatigue and other ailments related to the altitude would be much more likely than they would on a low-level plain.
The climate is generally inhospitable. During the summer, the temperatures peak in the 50s and 60s Fahrenheit (10-15 Celsius). Now is also the rainy season. During the winter, temperatures can easily drop below zero. There are few fixed facilities and accommodations for either military. On the Indian side, established facilities can hold only 150-200 people. Additional troops would need to use makeshift facilities and tents for shelter from the elements. Maintaining the health of troops in such intense conditions is challenging, and the risk is high of health problems that could reduce a soldier’s ability to fight.
(click to enlarge)
Finally, there is the question of logistics. There are few roads in the area that lead to Doklam. Most of the roads are unpaved, and those that are paved are small or have few lanes. Anecdotes from people who have worked in the area suggest that in many cases it is easier to move through the region on foot – especially in the areas with small dirt roads – rather than deal with the complications of vehicular travel. During the rainy season, the integrity of the dirt roads cannot be guaranteed. Massive mud deposits or flooding can severely impede travel. Under these conditions, it would be a logistical nightmare to run supplies and maintain troops fighting in Doklam.
Bigger Problems
This standoff is not about to lead China and India to war in Doklam. Though both sides have strategic interests in the region, the costs of warfare would outweigh the potential gains. Regardless of which side won, the simple participation in such a war would be very costly in terms of finances, supplies, logistics and troops.
Any territory gained would be strategically valuable, but neither country is in a position to capitalize on it. In India, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is still trying to centralize government control and sustain the economy. A military conflict could compromise the progress he has made so far.
China has its own list of challenges that need to be resolved. Its impressive growth numbers paper over the gaping holes in its economy. Moreover, relations with the U.S. are tense, and there’s still the potential for military conflict on the Korean Peninsula. These issues are far more immediate and important than Doklam.
The area matters greatly to both countries, but not enough to outweigh the other issues they’re facing, and not enough to justify the costs of war.
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Doklam: the word from Ground Zero
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 4th Aug 17
On Friday, with China’s defence ministry warning New Delhi that: “restraint has its bottom line”, Indian Army officers participating in the Doklam faceoff have provided Business Standard the first detailed accounts of how the situation has evolved.
They say the Doklam bowl – which is disputed between China and Bhutan – currently has an extended, 200-metre long line of Indian infantry soldiers confronting a smaller number of Chinese border guards. Just one metre separates the two lines.
At any time, there are about 40 Chinese border guards in the disputed valley, facing off against three times that number of Indian jawans.
Backing up the Chinese front line are another 1,500 troops, a mix of border guards and regular People’s Liberation Army (PLA) soldiers. These are positioned outside the disputed Doklam area, but cross in and out of the disputed area, relieving those on the front line at regular intervals.
Indian troops standing guard in Doklam are similarly relieved by a full infantry battalion (600 troops), located in Indian territory to the west. Backing up this battalion is a full infantry brigade (2,000 troops), ready to respond to any military moves from China.
In addition, a second fully acclimatised infantry brigade, slightly further away, stands ready to respond to a crisis.
“We fortunately had two brigades training in high altitudes nearby, so we have plenty of acclimatised troops. If needed, we can muster far more forces than the Chinese in Sikkim. This would never be an area where they start something”, says a senior Indian commander.
According to these officers’, tension began in early June, when Indian forces in the vicinity observed Chinese patrols reconnoitring the track in the disputed Doklam bowl. Intelligence assessments concluded that China was going to try and extend the road towards the Jampheri Ridge, at the farthest edge of China’s claim line.
Indian commanders strongly rejected yesterday’s statement by China’s foreign ministry, which claimed that India had been notified on May 18 and June 8, “out of goodwill through the border meeting mechanism”, that China would be building a road in Doklam.
They say, the Indian army reported to Delhi that road building seemed imminent, and were granted permission to cross into Bhutan-claimed territory to stop construction.
When India crossed into Doklam and confronted the Chinese construction parties, “they were taken completely by surprise and offered no resistance”, says an officer privy to events. “These are no soldiers; they are conscripted border guards, who live in heated barracks and periodically patrol the border in vehicles. They don’t walk much”, says an Indian commander.
“Our soldiers, in contrast, live a far tougher life. In Doklam, they stand guard without moving, while the Chinese keep breaking the line and going back for cigarette breaks. Indian morale is sky-high; soldiers know they are participating in something unprecedented – crossing a border to defend an Indian ally”, says the Indian officer.
Eventually, the Chinese had to send in a political commissar, recount Indian officers. “The commissar ordered up martial music and the hoisting of Chinese flags to stiffen resolve. They clearly had problems”, he says.
In the macho manner of militaries, the Indian Army is using a large number of Sikh and Jat soldiers to man the line in Doklam – in the expectation that their height and sturdiness would intimidate the smaller Chinese.
Army officers are elated also at having kept the confrontation out of the media for a full ten days, until Beijing was forced to make the incident public. “The Chinese have always complained that India’s media is too shrill and pro-active. This time, China had to mobilise their media, because we were there on the ground and nobody knew.”
Indian soldiers also point out that China has begun building bunkers and creating defences on the border. “That’s another first. They are recognising our capability to act decisively”, says an officer.
According to a senior Indian general: “The situation in Doklam has plateaued. Militarily, the Chinese know they can do nothing here. Eventually it will have to be a negotiated withdrawal, or the Chinese will have to open a front in another sector.”
With Beijing warning on Friday that “Chinese armed forces will resolutely protect the country's territorial sovereignty and security interests”, the PLA could choose its next move anywhere on a long, 3,500-kilometre border that stretches from Ladakh to Myanmar.
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http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/infrastructure/a7984/us-woefully-unprepared-for-a-blackout-like-indias-analysis-11413652/?src=soc_fcbk
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/31/india-blackout-electricity-power-cuts
I do not buy the official explaination for the blackouts. The timing and scale seem very suspicious.
Your thoughts, Ya?
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These articles are 5 years old!. India is somewhat protected from Chinese hacks, because for the most part the country is still analog, compared to the USA where almost everything is electronic/digital and integrated. As India modernizes this willl change, but at present China cannot cause widespread disturbances. Local power shortage is pretty routine in north India (large population), especially during summers, though "load shedding" lasts only for a few hours during peak loads. Most well off houses and hospitals in cities have generator based back up power that comes up automatically. Heck until a few years ago and even now, there are tens of thousands of villages, where there is no electricity!. Modi govt is correcting these things on a war footing.
My ancesteral home in the mountains next to China (until circa 1970), had a floor made of cowdung, cooking was done using chopped wood, electricity was sporadic and the water came for a 2-3 hours only. Today the cowdung floors have gone, cooking is with gas, but electricity and water are still sporadic, and this is the situation in middle class homes near the Himalayan foothills . In the surrounding villages not much has changed even today.
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So its now about 2 months and India is still sitting pretty in Bhutan. The Chinese window for action is closing fast, by mid sept it will get too cold. Chinese have been shown to be a bully and all bluster, I am sure this is a big loss of face for Xi, just before his major Communist Party Congress. Looks like they will have to backdown quietly, after the party congress is over. Problem is this incident (loss of face) has not gone unnoticed by neighboring countries, which may actually be problematic for us in the USA. The Chinese have also been forced to act against their stooge NK in the UN, too much loss of face again, question is will they (Chinese) be forced to lash out in some way in the Indo-China sea (eg sink a small boat)? If they dont, who will take them seriously, or are the Chinese stuck with bullying small countries, while the super power USA and developing power India thumb their noses at the middle kingdom.
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China needs to act or shut up....they are making a fool of themselves...YA.
Countdown to clash with India is on: Chinese daily
IANS | Updated: Aug 10, 2017, 05:19 AM IST
BEIJING: The countdown to a military conflict between India and China has begun and New Delhi should come to its senses and withdraw troops from Doklam before it's too late, a Chinese daily said on Wednesday.
An editorial in the state-run China Daily said the "clock is ticking away".
The piece was the latest addition to hostile commentaries in the Chinese media. The newspaper said, "India will only have itself to blame" if it didn't withdraw from Doklam where its troops are locked in a stand-off with the Chinese army since mid-June. "The countdown to a clash between the two forces has begun, and the clock is ticking away the time to what seems to be an inevitable conclusion," it said. "As the stand-off... enters its seventh week, the window for a peaceful solution is closing."
China has warned India of serious consequences if Indian troops were not pulled back from Doklam, which Beijing calls Donglang and claims is its territory.
India has proposed to China to simultaneously pull back from Doklam, which India and Bhutan say belongs to Thimpu. Beijing has refused.
The newspaper said India had ignored China's stern warnings.
"Anyone with eyes to see and ears to hear will have got the message. Yet New Delhi refuses to come to its senses and pull its troops back to its own side of the border."
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Whoops! Missed the date. Knowing China's cyberwar abilities, I figured that's what they decided to do in this scenario.
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R43604.pdf
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https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/Passcode-Voices/2017/0320/How-China-is-preparing-for-cyberwar
Preparing for informationized wars
The 2015 Chinese Military Strategy White Paper states that the PLA must prepare for “informationized local wars” against technologically advanced adversaries. As a result, Chinese hackers breach Defense Department networks in order to better understand US military capabilities, accelerate the modernization of the People’s Liberation Army, and prepare of military conflict and the disruption of US forces.
Two PLA groups, Units 61938 and 61486, have reportedly stolen information from over two dozen Defense Department weapons programs, including the Patriot missile system and the US Navy’s new littoral combat ship. The most high-profile case has been the hacking of defense contractors involved in the F-35, which have forced the redesign of specialized communications and antenna arrays for the stealth aircraft. Department of Defense officials say that the most sensitive flight control data were not taken because they were stored offline, but the fuselage of China’s second stealth fighter jet, the J-31, is very similar to that of the F-35. In response to a question about attacks on defense contractors, Lieutenant General Vincent Stewart, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, told a congressional hearing, “I do not believe we are at this point losing our technological edge, but it is at risk based on some of their cyberactivities,” referring to China.
Chinese hackers also break into US networks in preparation for a potential military conflict. Chinese military analysts often write of the PLA’s need to seize information dominance at the beginning stages of a conflict with a technologically advanced adversary through cyber attacks against command and control computers as well as satellite and communication networks. The PLA would also attempt to disrupt US forces in the Western Pacific through attacks on transportation and logistics systems. Preparing for these attacks requires cyber espionage.
Chinese military writings also suggest that cyberattacks can have a deterrent effect, given American dependence on banking, telecommunication, and other critical networks. A highly disruptive or destructive attack on these networks might reduce the chances that the United States might get involved in a regional conflict. Some Chinese intrusions into critical infrastructure may intentionally leave evidence behind to act as a warning that the US homeland may not be immune to attack in the case of a conflict over Taiwan or the South China Sea.
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http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/acupuncture-warfare-chinas-cyberwar-doctrine-and-implications-for-india/
If there is another conflict with China, it can be visualised that the war will begin in cyberspace much before a single shot is fired or the first missile is launched. In fact, frequent hacking attempts, some of them successful, are ongoing on a daily basis even now when there is peace at the border
Read more at:
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/acupuncture-warfare-chinas-cyberwar-doctrine-and-implications-for-india/
These articles are 5 years old!. India is somewhat protected from Chinese hacks, because for the most part the country is still analog, compared to the USA where almost everything is electronic/digital and integrated. As India modernizes this willl change, but at present China cannot cause widespread disturbances. Local power shortage is pretty routine in north India (large population), especially during summers, though "load shedding" lasts only for a few hours during peak loads. Most well off houses and hospitals in cities have generator based back up power that comes up automatically. Heck until a few years ago and even now, there are tens of thousands of villages, where there is no electricity!. Modi govt is correcting these things on a war footing.
My ancesteral home in the mountains next to China (until circa 1970), had a floor made of cowdung, cooking was done using chopped wood, electricity was sporadic and the water came for a 2-3 hours only. Today the cowdung floors have gone, cooking is with gas, but electricity and water are still sporadic, and this is the situation in middle class homes near the Himalayan foothills . In the surrounding villages not much has changed even today.
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The drums of war continue. The media has not picked up on this, but the Chinese response to NK and on the Bhutan front are interlinked. China cannot open a front in Bhutan with the NK situation ongoing, and vice versa is also constrained to do much on their eastern sea board. Should China get involved in a war on its east, India could conceivably take back territories occupied by China (Aksai Chin etc). This is similar to the two front war threat that China and Pak pose to India....could not have happened to a nicer bully....YA.
India pumping in more soldiers, weapons on entire eastern front
Rajat Pandit | TNN | Aug 12, 2017, 12:27 AM IST
NEW DELHI: India continues to pump in additional troops and weapon systems on the entire eastern front in face of continuing belligerence from China on the Doklam standoff, even as diplomatic and military channels are being utilised in a bid to defuse the almost two-month-old crisis.
Sources said a top-level flag meeting between major-general rank officers from India and China was held at the Nathu La border personnel meeting (BPM) point in Sikkim for the first time on Friday, following failure of a similar meet between brigade commanders on August 8 to break the deadlock.
But the meeting also proved "inconclusive" with China remaining adamant that India should immediately withdraw its troops from the Bhutanese territory of Doklam near the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet tri-junction. "The Indian side held China should first remove its road construction equipment from the site. Both sides will now report back to their headquarters," said a source.
The meeting between top military officers indicates a line of communication at the ground level and efforts to exchange perceptions and possibly explore means to contain the confrontation.
The Army has steadily but stealthily moved troops to their "operational alert areas" on the borders with China in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh, while also maintaining high operational readiness of its other formations and units all along the 4,057-km long Line of Actual Control stretching from Ladakh to Arunachal, as was reported by TOI earlier.
In the eastern theatre, this primarily includes the 33 Corps headquartered in Sukna, with the 17 (Gangtok), 27 (Kalimpong) and 20 (Binnaguri) Mountain Divisions under its control. Each division has 10,000-15,000 soldiers who have undergone acclimatization for the high-altitude forward areas.
The 3 Corps (Dimapur) and 4 Corps (Tezpur), with similar infantry and mountain divisions under them, have also been activated as a precautionary move. IAF airbases in the North-East are also maintaining a high operational alert, with "combat air patrols" on a regular basis, said sources.
India's troop mobilisation comes in response to muscle-flexing by China, which has amassed troops, tanks and artillery in the Tibet Military District. "While the People's Liberation Army is showing its teeth in a bid to make us cower down, we have cranked up our caution levels," said a source.
But at the actual faceoff site located at an altitude of over 11,000-feet in Doklam, which China is keen to grab from Bhutan to add strategic depth to its narrow Chumbi Valley, there are still only 300-350 soldiers ranged against each other. The PLA has deployed another 1,500 soldiers just beyond the standoff site as part of its aggressive posture.
Defence minister ArunJaitley, incidentally, assured Lok Sabha on Friday that the Indian armed forces are geared for all contingencies, while responding to questions on Chinese troop movements in Tibet and the Army vice-chief's statement that Pakistan's indigenous defence production industry was better than India's. "Our defence forces are ready to take on any eventuality," he said, without making any specific reference to to Doklam.
In sharp contrast to China's belligerence and threats of military reprisals, through both its officials and state-controlled media, India has chosen to remain largely tight-lipped about the entire faceoff from the beginning. External affairs minister Sushma Swaraj, in fact, had recently stressed the need for both sides to mutually withdraw their troops from Doklam simultaneously.
At least two flag meetings were also held earlier between the local commanders after Indian troops had proactivelyblocked the attempt by the PLA to construct a motorable road in Doklamon June 18, but they had proved futile with both the armies refusing to budge from their positions.
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Two nuclear powers fighting with stones...looks like the Chinese are learning from the pakis (masters of stone throwing). One side is Chinese, the other is Indian, location: Pangong lake, Ladakh, India. Complete with one flying kick. All one needs is a bullet to be fired and then the balloon will be up. The frustration on the Chinese side is building up. Recently Chinese came up with a video mocking India and India did the same (Winnie da pooh). The Winnie da pooh video is classier...psyops from both sides
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ww6ppQBH03w&feature=youtu.be (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ww6ppQBH03w&feature=youtu.be)
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/18/asia/china-xinhua-india-video/index.html (http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/18/asia/china-xinhua-india-video/index.html)
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Two nuclear powers fighting with stones...looks like the Chinese are learning from the pakis (masters of stone throwing). One side is Chinese, the other is Indian, location: Pangong lake, Ladakh, India. Complete with one flying kick. All one needs is a bullet to be fired and then the balloon will be up. The frustration on the Chinese side is building up. Recently Chinese came up with a video mocking India and India did the same (Winnie da pooh). The Winnie da pooh video is classier...psyops from both sides
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ww6ppQBH03w&feature=youtu.be (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ww6ppQBH03w&feature=youtu.be)
http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/18/asia/china-xinhua-india-video/index.html (http://edition.cnn.com/2017/08/18/asia/china-xinhua-india-video/index.html)
http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-china-blog-40627855
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Sums it up...YA
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DHnOfMTUwAAmsPo.jpg)
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So Xi is changing commanders, perhaps he is not sure of his power base at the upcoming Party Congress. In China the PLA reports to the communist party! not the country!....YA
http://www.atimes.com/article/xis-men-chinas-armies-get-new-commanders// (http://www.atimes.com/article/xis-men-chinas-armies-get-new-commanders//)
All Xi’s men: China’s armies get new commanders
By ZI YANG AUGUST 22, 2017 12:53 PM (UTC+8) 1,743 3
China recently confirmed 26 new commanders in the People’s Liberation Army’s 13 group armies that saw not a single leader staying with his old unit, with most receiving postings to far away regions from their theater of command.
Why the shake up in its armed forces, the world’s largest with 2.3 million personnel, when there are conflicts brewing on China’s left and right flanks?
In April, the PLA eliminated five group armies, in keeping with its modernization plan to prune the ground force to make it a more versatile and combat-capable organization.
At present, each of China’s five theaters of command control two to three group armies. Each has combat and non-combat units divided into the following: infantry, armor, artillery, anti-aircraft warfare, anti-chemical warfare, cyber warfare, army aviation, engineer, communications, transportation, pontoon bridge construction, education and training, military hospitals, and arts troupe.
The size of a group army varies from 30,000 to 80,000 men. We know little about the new commanders besides their brief biographies, but some of the transfers are quite baffling.
For example, Major General Fan Chengcai, the new commander of the 76th group army responsible for Tibet, previously had a long career in the 14th group army of Yunnan Province, a subtropical region very different from the Roof of the World.
His comrade-in-arms, the political commissar Major General Zhang Hongbing served mostly in Henan Province, famous for its open plains. They could be experts in high-altitude, cold-weather warfare, but their background doesn’t indicate that.
There is an alternative explanation to how these decisions were made. While increasing combat effectiveness may be the long-term goal, the immediate concern of the PLA’s commander-in-chief Xi Jinping is about domestic politics.
The personnel reorganization is Xi’s attempt to curb military factionalism, better rendered in Chinese as “mountaintopism” or shantou zhuyi.
Influential Chinese military chiefs tend to build their leadership team based on personal loyalty. Turning the party’s army into their personal army, these commanders become in the words of Mao Zedong “mountaintops” that pose a challenge to the PLA’s cohesion as well as the supreme leader’s authority.
The Qing dynasty fell because a powerful general acquired total control of the New Army. Similarly, Chiang Kai-shek’s defeat on the mainland has been blamed on his failure in containing military factionalism.
The last thing Xi wants to see is collusion between generals and political opponents to derail November’s 19th party congress, when Xi will be crowned China’s paramount leader.
The last thing Xi wants to see is collusion between generals and political opponents in derailing November’s 19th party congress, when Xi will be crowned China’s paramount leader.
Since early this year, Xi has accelerated the promotion of his own generals to the PLA’s highest echelons. In July and August, Xi promoted several dozens of generals, lieutenant generals and major generals to add weight to his control.
Then, to reduce the threat from regional commanders, Xi employed Mao’s old trick of removing them from their familiar environment and away from confidants.
The brand-new unit designations for the 13 group armies, numbering from 71 to 84, also shows Xi’s ambition in tearing down existing loyalty networks and rebuilding the army entirely as his own.
Like all other armed forces, the PLA’s unit designations carry history and esprit de corps. But fresh designations convey new allegiance.
According to the PLA Daily, the number 71 represents July 1st or the Chinese Communist Party’s founding day. The message is clear here — the party leader is the PLA’s nucleus, not the regional commandants.
Although expanding combat effectiveness is the group army reform’s premier goal, the assurance of loyalty is equally important.
The great army personnel overhaul reveals Xi is taking another step towards absolute control over the PLA top brass as he prepares to strengthen his power at the 19th congress.
Follow the author on Twitter @MrZiYang.
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YA, Great post as always!
Denny S wrote this about Venezuela: "Democracy by Consent of the Military"
http://softwaretimes.com/files/democracy+by+consent+of+th.html
Totalitarianism or whatever we call the Chinese system also requires ongoing Consent of the Military. As Chinese society itself gets more and more open, the closed nature of the communist party, the ruling politburo and the military leadership up and down must get more and more challenging to keep in line.
I always wonder when the people of China will rise up and throw out the rulers. In fact it is the military, not the people, that have the power to end the regime.
Also, their perception of total invincibility is chipped away when they lose standoffs in Tibet, South China Sea or North Korea. Very interesting to hear about their own behind the scenes challenges, having to move local military leaders away from their areas of familiarity, for example.
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If the PLA were to receive a decisive ass-kicking, it might well end the PRC.
YA, Great post as always!
Denny S wrote this about Venezuela: "Democracy by Consent of the Military"
http://softwaretimes.com/files/democracy+by+consent+of+th.html
Totalitarianism or whatever we call the Chinese system also requires ongoing Consent of the Military. As Chinese society itself gets more and more open, the closed nature of the communist party, the ruling politburo and the military leadership up and down must get more and more challenging to keep in line.
I always wonder when the people of China will rise up and throw out the rulers. In fact it is the military, not the people, that have the power to end the regime.
Also, their perception of total invincibility is chipped away when they lose standoffs in Tibet, South China Sea or North Korea. Very interesting to hear about their own behind the scenes challenges, having to move local military leaders away from their areas of familiarity, for example.
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Here's an Indian pov blog post...on the PLA. https://cestmoizblog.wordpress.com/2017/08/27/peoples-liberation-army-a-history-of-valour/ (https://cestmoizblog.wordpress.com/2017/08/27/peoples-liberation-army-a-history-of-valour/)
People’s Liberation Army – A History of ‘Valour’
August 27, 2017
Huge parades, shiny ‘toys’, rows and rows of it. The President, or as he would like to be addressed – The Chairman, inspecting the troops in an open jeep with FOUR mikes, exhorting them to be loyal to him (Yes, apparently the PLA needs to be reminded of it’s obligation to be loyal to the CPC over and over again!). A shiny new aircraft carrier with beautiful introductory videos that would put Top Gun to shame. Or was it the other way round (LINK : China copied not only the music, but also the choreography of Top Gun)?
The PLA, PLAAF and PLAN are the future of warfare, as the People’s Republic of China would like us to believe. Well, there’s only one way to find out the amount of truth in this ‘fact’ – and given the sabre rattling happening on the other side of the LAC (or is it empty vessels. Let’s leave that for later), it might not be too far in the future.
But one thing that we CAN, and in fact MUST analyse is how the PLA has measured up when time has come to live up to their bombast. And there is plenty to talk about, given their ‘rich’ history of ‘valour’ too. Let us start with the PLA before the establishment of the PRC. They were actually raised as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, and continue to be so even today. Yes, China, the country doesn’t have an army. What they have is the ARMED WING OF THE CPC, enabling the CPC in ruling over China.
The PLA was raised in 1928 to help the CPC ‘struggle’ in its endeavour to establish a communist regime in China. Since almost its very inception, it found itself fighting Chiang Kai Shek’s Koumintang for the right to rule over China. This fight was, however interrupted when the Japanese showed up from across the East China Sea. This is where Mao played a masterstroke – he withdrew from the fight, preferring to let the Koumintang fight the Japanese instead. The same template carried on during the second world war too. So basically, the PLA did NOTHING for the freedom of China when occupied by the Japanese. On the contrary, as soon as the Japanese were defeated with the combined efforts of the Allies and the Koumintang, the PLA attacked a weakened Chiang Kai Shek and drove him to Taiwan.
PRC established, the PLA soon marched into Tibet. There was NO resistance worth the name. Tick first ‘victory’ for the PLA. Fast forward three more years. Gen Eisenhower marched into North Korea, threatening to reach the very doorstep of the PRC on the Yalu River. Mao committed the PLA to ensure the survival of the commie regime. The Americans were ultimately driven back to the 32nd Parallel, where they continue to be even today. This campaign was touted as a stunning victory for the PLA. But was is really a victory? Dig a bit deeper and what does one find? Waves after waves of PLA soldiers sent in to simply overwhelm the Americans by sheer numbers. No tactics. No manoeuvres. Nothing. Just keep sending them till the Americans run out of bullets to shoot them. Very smart, Mr Mao! I will let you google for the fatalities that the PLA as compared to those suffered by the Americans. It was a ‘victory’ indeed, or was it? Total lack of ingenuity. Just one resource that Mao had at his disposal aplenty – scores and scores of poor Chinese soldiers.
Less than a decade later came the 1962 war. Enough has been written about it. But still, I’ll add my own bit. As the Time Magazine wrote – ill armed, ill clad, ill trained, the only thing that the Indian Army didn’t lack was guts. The Indian army was thrust in a battle it was not prepared for. Couple that with questionable leadership and the result did NOT come as a surprise. BUT, one fact that is often left out is that wherever the local commanders did not panic, and actually LED their troops, the Indian soldier stood like a rock on his land. Till his very last breath. Names like Dhan Singh Thapa, Shaitan Singh, Jaswant Singh, Joginder Singh, Yog Raj Palta, Brahmanand Awasthi and the hundreds more. A beautiful tribute to the Indian warriors who held on to Kibithu / Walong to their last breath appeared in the Pune Newsline on 07 Nov 1999. I still retain the original paper cutting. A must read piece.
337768_270305366347108_930414856_o.jpg
The Chinese admit to fewer than 750 casualties in that war. Let us analyse that a bit. 750 casualties. Let that sink in for a moment! Here is how the Chinese fought. They got a peasants’ army to march from the plains of East / South China into the high Himalayas in September / October. That done, they told them to attack. Uphill, against a stubborn enemy. At altitudes ranging from 12 to 15,000 feet. Across a theatre ranging from Ladakh to Kibithu. And then, with the plains of Assam in sight, they called for a ceasefire and withdrew!. Back up the hills from where they’d just climbed down. Back into the icy Tibet. In the peak of winters. And less than 750 casualties? The souls of Maj Shaitan Singh and his Ahirs would be laughing their heads off .. they would have accounted for a tad more than that figure at Rezang La itself! Another ‘victory’, but at what cost once again? And what did they achieve? No new lands came their way. On the contrary, they made an eternal enemy of a large neighbour. One that has given them considerable grief on the battlefield subsequently.
Talking of grief on the LAC, the first instance came soon after 1962, at NathuLa in 1967 when Brigadier Sagat Singh ensured that his Grenadiers killed 300+ Chinese in response to they wounding their commanding officer. Soon thereafter came the incident at Chola, again in Sikkim, less than a month later wherein the Gorkhas of 7/11 GR did a repeat of that. And guess what, Sikkim has been so peaceful since then!
Two years later came the faceoff between the PLA and the Soviets at Usuri River. Close to 1000 PLA troops were accounted for by the Soviets. So alarmed was Mao that he almost vacated Peking!
Fast forward to a decade ahead. This time it was Shri Deng Xiaoping who thought he should ‘teach a lesson’ to puny Vietnam for opposing the China backed murderous Cambodian regime. He launched the much vaunted PLA to teach the said lesson to Vietnam. But no points for guessing who got taught the lesson! The PLA lost close to 200,000 soldiers, claimed a victory and moved back. Very smart of them. Just that the Vietnamese tend to disagree, though!
Next decade came another standoff with India at Sumdorong Chu. Interestingly, Wikipedia has got it in good detail. Bottomline, the PLA tried to pre-emptively occupy some areas on the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh, but got the shock of their lives when the Indian army counter mobilised with an entire brigade! Thing is, the Chinese thought that this time too, the ghost of 1962 would prevent India from responding to them. But I guess they forgot that the ghost of 1962 was more than exorcised in 1967 itself. Something similar, in fact, happened at Dolam a few months ago, a standoff which carries on still. If only the PLA could learn from THEIR OWN FCUKING HISTORY!
Then there was the ‘little’ incident in South Sudan some months ago, something that I blogged about earlier too (link at the top of this blog post), when the shiny toys failed to ‘persuade’ the PLA soldiers to hang on instead of running away in face of rag tag militias.
At the end of it, I stand firm in my belief that the PLA is all huff and puff, but no WILL to prove that it is not mere bluster. Despite the shiny toys, the Chinese Emperor’s Army is Naked! I guess they know it too, ‘coz their aim seems to be to somehow win without fighting. And they just might succeed in doing so, atleast in the South – China, nay Indo – China Sea as it has historically been called. But they ran into a stone wall in Dolam, hoping for the same template to get repeated.
To conclude all I will say is that this Indian Army is NOT the Indian Army of 1962, but the PLA soldier of today is STILL the same as the PLA soldier of 1962. He STILL cannot fight, esp when faced with a worthy enemy, and days of sacrificing him by the hundreds are gone for good.
Just my thoughts
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Looks like the lizard blinked...while Chinese media will spin this as a victory for them, fact is that China will not be constructing a road on what they claimed was their territory. They have vacated Doklam along with their bull dozers. India has succesfully protected Bhutan, stayed put for 2.5 mths at Doklam, prevented the Chinese from building a road (which was the reason why India got involved in the first place). After a long time someone showed the Chinese the limits of their power, for far too long they had gotten away with bullying small neighbors. I believe this has shattered the myth of Chinese superiority and invincibility and that they were ready to take on the United States. The neighbors are surely discussing behind close doors that China is a paper dragon. Pak will be wondering whether China will ever come to its aid in a confrontation with India, or even against the US (Trump's Afgh policy)....YA
Below is a blogpost summarizing the solution.
India and China announce end of Doklam standoff
By Ajai Shukla
Business Standard, 28th Aug 17
The 71-day military standoff at Doklam, on the tri-junction of the Indian, Chinese and Bhutanese borders, has been defused without armed confrontation and bloodshed.
In a coordinated announcement on Monday, the Indian and Chinese foreign ministries both announced that troops were disengaging at the Doklam bowl, where they have been in eyeball-to-eyeball contact since June 16, when the Indian Army moved hundreds of soldiers and two bulldozers into the disputed area to block road construction by China.
On Monday, New Delhi stated that, after weeks of diplomatic negotiations between the two countries, “expeditious disengagement of border personnel at the face-off site at Doklam has been agreed to and is on-going.”
Meanwhile, Beijing announced that “On the afternoon of August 28, the Indian side has pulled back all the trespassing personnel and equipment to the Indian side of the boundary and the Chinese personnel on the ground has (sic) verified this.”
Indian government sources say the challenge during the negotiations over withdrawal was to maintain Chinese “face”, while obtaining an assurance from Beijing that it would halt road building in the area, an activity that India’s military says compromises its defensive positions.
This issue was intelligently finessed with Beijing announcing: “China will continue to exercise its sovereignty and uphold its territorial integrity in accordance with historical conventions.” No mention was made of China’s right to build a road in Doklam.
Regional watchers have speculated whether the disengagement agreement provided for China to establish diplomatic relations with Bhutan, something that India has discouraged under the terms of a treaty between New Delhi and Thimphu. However, well-informed media sources in Thimphu deny any such quid pro quo.
India has never objected to China patrolling the Doklam bowl, which is disputed between China and Bhutan. A Chinese road, however, is regarded as an unacceptable change in the status quo, which is expressly forbidden by a 2012 agreement between Beijing and New Delhi.
In a marked change of tone from the hostility that had pervaded official Chinese statements and official media reportage since the Doklam faceoff began, Beijing’s foreign ministry spokesperson stated on Monday: “The Chinese government highly values its friendly relationship with India. We hope India can fulfill the historic agreement on the border and safeguard the stability of the border area with China.”
Even as soldiers built up on both sides towards the end of June and a barrage of strident statements emanated from Beijing, the Indian government maintained a discreet silence except for an official press release on June 30, laying down India’s version of events.
The release, entitled “Recent Developments in Doklam Area” stated that India had intervened to block Chinese road building activity after a Royal Bhutan Army patrol had tried to stop the Chinese, who were in violation of two agreements between China and Bhutan. Indicating that India had intervened at Bhutan’s behest, the release stated that Thimphu and New Delhi “have been in continuous contact through the unfolding of these developments.”
New Delhi also justified its intervention in terms of its own national interest, stating: “Such [road] construction would represent a significant change of status quo with serious security implications for India.”
This addressed the weak point in India’s argument, which was to explain why it had intervened in territory that it has no claim over. Since the crisis began, China has put pressure on Bhutan to ask Indian troops to withdraw from the Doklam bowl.
Chin had insisted throughout this crisis that Indian troops were “trespassers” into “undisputed Chinese territory”, and that they must withdraw from Doklam as a pre-condition for resolving the crisis. For most observers of Sino-Indian relations, the mutual withdrawal is a huge win for India that will significantly enhance its regional status and its standing with South Asian neighbours like Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Another feature of this crisis is Bhutan’s remarkable and consistent demonstration of support to India. Thimphu first confronted Beijing through a demarche on June 20 and then a government statement on June 29, protesting China’s road-building in Doklam and, thus, allowing India to justify its intervention. Bhutan does not value Doklam greatly but, since India believes it controls the approach to the strategic Siliguri corridor, continues to rebuff repeated Chinese offers to settle its borders with Bhutan in exchange for Doklam being ceded to China..
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Strat's take on it:
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It can be difficult to separate the important from unimportant on any given day. Reflections mean to do exactly that — by thinking about what happened today, we can consider what might happen tomorrow.
A months long standoff on top of the world is finally drawing to a close. On Aug. 28, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs released a statement saying that a "disengagement" of troops has begun on the Doklam Plateau. Doklam — a disputed territory between China and Bhutan — was the site of the confrontation between Indian and Chinese troops as India intervened there in June to halt a Chinese road construction project. India feared the road would have eased China's ability to bring troops closer to the neighboring state of Sikkim and to India's Siliguri corridor, which links the Indian mainland with its northeastern wing. The drawdown highlights how the costs of war outweighed the benefits of aggression for both sides, for now.
Still, the timing of the draw down is conspicuous. China will host the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) summit on Sept. 3. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi — who was already a no-show during China's Belt and Road Initiative summit — has not confirmed attendance. This is problematic since China would prefer to use BRICS to showcase its harmonious ties with member nations — something which Modi's absence would almost certainly undercut. So it's possible Modi used the threat of his absence as a bargaining chip to goad China into an agreement in which Indian troops backed off in exchange for China's promise to stop building its road. China confirmed neither, but India's decision to back down suggests the affirmative.
In any case, Doklam is a small part of a much bigger story. India and China share a 4,057-kilometer (2,521-mile) border known as the Line of Actual Control, and nearly all of it is in dispute. For instance, in the northwest lies Aksai Chin, a territory in Kashmir that India claims but China has administered ever since capturing it from India in 1962, when the two countries fought a short, sharp border war in which China emerged the victor. Then to the northeast is Arunachal Pradesh. China captured much of the area in 1962 but subsequently withdrew. China, however, still claims Arunachal Pradesh as "South Tibet," and Chinese troop incursions along the poorly demarcated border are not uncommon.
For India, these vulnerabilities compelled a shift in strategy. Initially, India had intentionally built few roads in the border region to blunt the movement of Chinese troops during another potential invasion. But in 1997, India instituted the China Study Group to propose the construction of border roads, partially in response to China's own infrastructure activities along the border. Many of these roads are incomplete, and Doklam has only drawn attention to their importance. Prior to the standoff, in fact, Modi had prioritized the construction of these 73 strategic roads.
India's desire to bolster infrastructure along a contested border suggests border confrontations with China will continue. This is part of the natural friction that arises when two large countries share a boundary that unfolds across the indomitable chain of the world's tallest mountains. But how that tension manifests is important to watch. A standoff is one possibility. But so are less drawn out measures such as the recent scuffle that took place near Pangong Lake in Aksai Chin. These will also continue.
The more interesting question is whether India and China can continue preventing their disputes (of which Doklam is only one part) from spilling over into other aspects of their overall relationship. So far, this compartmentalization has broadly held. For instance, the two countries issued a joint proposal calling for the World Trade Organization to banish $160 billion in farm subsidies in the United States, European Union, Canada, Japan and Switzerland. And on June 20 — after the standoff began — China's East Hope Group signed a $300 million deal to set up a solar power manufacturing plant in Gujarat, India. Finally, the navies of both countries will participate in the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in November.
But will this compartmentalization continue to hold? China's cooperation with Pakistan, in particular, has placed unique stresses on China-India relations. The advent of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, China's refusal to sanction the Pakistan-based militant Masood Azhar and China's refusal to approve India's membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group are all irritants that are compelling India to strengthen its ties with the United States and Japan, and to undermine China by promoting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. It remains to be seen whether contentions can be contained within the security sphere, or if they will work to sabotage the countries' broader relationship. So even as the Doklam standoff winds down, India and China's strategic rivalry will only ramp up.
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Nice article, with lessons for future conflicts...YA
https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/ (https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/)
China’s Coercion Playbook
China used the same playbook in Doklam as it has in other territorial disputes, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. This playbook usually involves four elements. The first step is to develop a larger or more permanent physical presence in areas where China has already has a degree of de facto control — whether that means new islands in the South China Sea or roads in the Himalayas. Using its military to build infrastructure in the Doklam area was likely an attempt to consolidate China’s control along its southwestern border, including this disputed area where it has patrolled for some time.
This consolidation usually goes hand-in-hand with the second element, coercive diplomacy. Here, China couples its threats or limited military action with diplomatic efforts designed to persuade the target state to change its policies or behavior. The strategy is to put the onus on the other side, often in a weaker position militarily, to risk confrontation over these gradual changes to the status quo. The goal is to ensure the target country does not counter China’s consolidation attempts, and ideally to compel them to engage in bilateral negotiations. It is in such talks that China can then leverage its stronger physical position to secure a favorable settlement.
China has used this model of coercive diplomacy not only against weaker claimants in the South China Sea, but also against the United States. In the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable incident, for example, it used coercive diplomacy and other elements of its playbook against U.S. maritime surveillance operations. The Doklam case carried the added enticing prospect of opening new channels of diplomatic communication — and influence — with Bhutan, with which China currently lacks formal diplomatic relations.
Third, China uses legal rhetoric and principles to present its position as legitimate and lawful, thereby staking a claim to a broader legitimizing principle in territorial disputes. In the case of Doklam, China portrayed the Indian response as a violation of Chinese sovereignty — it claimed Indian troops entered Chinese territory through the Sikkim sector of the Sino-Indian border and had been “obstructing Chinese border troop activities.” China declared its road construction was entirely lawful, designed to improve infrastructure for the local people and border patrols. China’s policy position was that the border was delimited in 1890, formally reaffirmed several times since, and reinforced by the routine presence of Chinese troops and herders. Its legal argument thus rested in part on the first element of the playbook: the physical presence that it sought to make permanent with the road at Doklam.
Lastly, China leverages its government-controlled media to highlight its narrative and issue threats. These tend to involve warnings about not underestimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people’s determination to protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far. The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for example, not to “play with fire” lest it “get burned.” They cautioned the Indian government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid miscalculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war. This is not just a war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a precursor to China’s use of force.
While other countries may also seek to impose a territorial fait accompli — such as Russia in Ukraine — China always follows its multi-pronged playbook. It consistently demonstrates a preference for ambiguity, risk manipulation and controlling the narrative to win without fighting. Any use of coercion — which involves threats and use of force — carries the risk of escalation to conflict, even if China has previously managed to resolve most of its disputes without war. How China advances its claims in South and East Asia will determine whether those regions remain peaceful and stable.
Thwarting Coercion With Denial
China’s playbook, however, did not go according to plan this time, because it did not account for India’s unexpectedly swift and assertive response to its road-building. India did not simply voice displeasure or threaten to punish China if it continued to pursue its territorial claims as the United States and Southeast Asian countries have done in the South China Sea. In those cases, China used its coercive playbook effectively, forcing its adversaries to either back down or raise the ante. And as China’s uncontested gains have shown, its adversaries have generally lacked the capabilities, and especially the political resolve, to escalate crises.
But in this situation, India thwarted China’s coercion through denial — blocking China’s attempt to seize physical control of the disputed territory. By physically denying China’s bid to change the status quo, India created a stalemate, which suited its strategic policy. It did not acquiesce to a Chinese fait accompli, and it did not have to summon the capabilities or resolve to reverse China’s position, which would have risked a general war. India was able to do this because of a local military advantage and its broader policy of standing up to China. As a result, China did not have the option of proceeding under the guise of peaceful legitimate development, per its playbook; pressing its claims on Doklam would have required it to ratchet up military pressure. The stalemate thwarted Chinese coercion — but as long as it lasted, it was pregnant with risks of escalation and conflict.
Disengagement, But Dangers Persist
The immediate risks of conflict have receded, but the border dispute remains unresolved, and the broader Sino-Indian relationship remains fraught. First, on Doklam, while China has backed down for now, its statement that “China will continue fulfilling its sovereign rights to safeguard territorial sovereignty in compliance with the stipulations of the border-related historical treaty” suggests it has not changed its position on the border tri-junction. Indeed, during the standoff, China reportedly offered financial inducements to cleave Bhutan away from its traditional relationship with India — it has other ways, and continued ambitions, to press its claims.
Second, the India-China relationship remains tense, and prone to military risk, especially if China seeks to reassert itself after a perceived slight at Doklam. This could include an incursion somewhere along the India-China Line of Actual Control — indeed, such actions have already been reported. Or China might pursue a “cross-domain” response, for example with punitive cyber attacks or threatening activity in the Indian Ocean.
Third, over the longer term, India should be wary of learning the wrong lessons from the crisis. As one of us has recently written, India has long been preoccupied with the threat of Chinese (and Pakistani) aggression on their common land border. The Doklam standoff may be remembered as even more reason for India to pour more resources into defending its land borders, at the expense of building capabilities and influence in the wider Indian Ocean region. That would only play into China’s hands. Renewed Indian concerns about its land borders will only retard its emergence as an assertive and influential regional power.
The Lessons of Doklam
With the crisis only just being de-escalated, it is too early to derive definitive lessons from Doklam. However, a few policy implications are already apparent. First, Chinese behavior in territorial disputes is more likely to be deterred by denial than by threats of punishment. China will continue the combination of consolidating its physical presence and engaging in coercive diplomacy, lawfare, and media campaigns unless it is stopped directly. This is what India did at Doklam — it directly blocked Chinese efforts to change the status quo. Denial in other areas would require different military tasks — for example, in the Indian Ocean, it may involve anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.
Second, denial strategies may be effective, but they have their limitations. Denial is inherently risky. Countering China’s playbook involves risks of escalation — which most smaller adversaries, and at times even the United States, are unwilling to accept. Moreover, denial strategies can only serve to halt adversary action, not to reverse what the adversary has already done. As Doklam shows, India could convince China not to proceed with its road-building — but China did not relinquish its claims or its established pattern of presence in the area. Denial by itself offers no pathway to politically resolving the crisis.
Third, the agreement to disengage suggests that Beijing’s position in crises can be flexible, and perhaps responsive to assertive counter-coercion. Domestic audiences, even those in autocracies, often prefer sound judgment to recklessly staying the course. If the Doklam standoff had escalated to a shooting war, anything short of a decisive victory might have put Xi Jinping in an unfavorable position at the 19th Party Congress and hurt the PLA’s image with the Chinese people. But short of that, the Chinese government was always in the position to sell Doklam as a non-event, something the decreasing domestic media coverage suggests it was preparing to do. Beijing will frame the disengagement agreement as further proof of Chinese strength, especially relative to India. As the stronger power, China could magnanimously agree to a mutual disengagement for now while reserving the right to move forward when it sees fit.
Finally, the Doklam agreement, even if it is temporary, tells us that when China confronts a significantly weaker target, such as Bhutan, it will only be deterred by the actions of a stronger third party — in this case, India. Had India not acted, China would likely have been successful in consolidating its control and extracting territorial concessions from Bhutan. Third-party involvement may not be as easy in other cases — India had a privileged position in Bhutan. Such a strategy may also have significant second-order effects. In the near term, it is potentially escalatory — China argued that India has no basis for interfering in this bilateral dispute, and had many options for escalating the crisis at a time and place of its choosing. More broadly, such third-party involvement could intensify geopolitical competition between China and other powers such as the U.S. or India, if they intercede in other countries’ disputes with China. The lesson of Doklam for the United States is that arming small states and imposing incremental costs may not be enough. Washington may have to accept the greater risks associated with intervening more directly if it hopes to counter Chinese expansion in East Asia.
Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University. She can be contacted through her website: www.orianaskylarmastro.com. Arzan Tarapore is an adjunct researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, and a PhD candidate at King’s College London.
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Wait? You mean strongly worded letters aren't enough? Unpossible!
Nice article, with lessons for future conflicts...YA
https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/ (https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/countering-chinese-coercion-the-case-of-doklam/)
China’s Coercion Playbook
China used the same playbook in Doklam as it has in other territorial disputes, especially Vietnam and the Philippines. This playbook usually involves four elements. The first step is to develop a larger or more permanent physical presence in areas where China has already has a degree of de facto control — whether that means new islands in the South China Sea or roads in the Himalayas. Using its military to build infrastructure in the Doklam area was likely an attempt to consolidate China’s control along its southwestern border, including this disputed area where it has patrolled for some time.
This consolidation usually goes hand-in-hand with the second element, coercive diplomacy. Here, China couples its threats or limited military action with diplomatic efforts designed to persuade the target state to change its policies or behavior. The strategy is to put the onus on the other side, often in a weaker position militarily, to risk confrontation over these gradual changes to the status quo. The goal is to ensure the target country does not counter China’s consolidation attempts, and ideally to compel them to engage in bilateral negotiations. It is in such talks that China can then leverage its stronger physical position to secure a favorable settlement.
China has used this model of coercive diplomacy not only against weaker claimants in the South China Sea, but also against the United States. In the 2009 U.S. Naval Ship Impeccable incident, for example, it used coercive diplomacy and other elements of its playbook against U.S. maritime surveillance operations. The Doklam case carried the added enticing prospect of opening new channels of diplomatic communication — and influence — with Bhutan, with which China currently lacks formal diplomatic relations.
Third, China uses legal rhetoric and principles to present its position as legitimate and lawful, thereby staking a claim to a broader legitimizing principle in territorial disputes. In the case of Doklam, China portrayed the Indian response as a violation of Chinese sovereignty — it claimed Indian troops entered Chinese territory through the Sikkim sector of the Sino-Indian border and had been “obstructing Chinese border troop activities.” China declared its road construction was entirely lawful, designed to improve infrastructure for the local people and border patrols. China’s policy position was that the border was delimited in 1890, formally reaffirmed several times since, and reinforced by the routine presence of Chinese troops and herders. Its legal argument thus rested in part on the first element of the playbook: the physical presence that it sought to make permanent with the road at Doklam.
Lastly, China leverages its government-controlled media to highlight its narrative and issue threats. These tend to involve warnings about not underestimating Chinese resolve and the Chinese people’s determination to protect their sovereignty just because China has restrained itself so far. The Chinese media was replete with such articles, warning India, for example, not to “play with fire” lest it “get burned.” They cautioned the Indian government not to be driven by nationalism and arrogance, to avoid miscalculation and repeating the mistakes of the 1962 war. This is not just a war of words; research shows that escalating threats in the media can be a precursor to China’s use of force.
While other countries may also seek to impose a territorial fait accompli — such as Russia in Ukraine — China always follows its multi-pronged playbook. It consistently demonstrates a preference for ambiguity, risk manipulation and controlling the narrative to win without fighting. Any use of coercion — which involves threats and use of force — carries the risk of escalation to conflict, even if China has previously managed to resolve most of its disputes without war. How China advances its claims in South and East Asia will determine whether those regions remain peaceful and stable.
Thwarting Coercion With Denial
China’s playbook, however, did not go according to plan this time, because it did not account for India’s unexpectedly swift and assertive response to its road-building. India did not simply voice displeasure or threaten to punish China if it continued to pursue its territorial claims as the United States and Southeast Asian countries have done in the South China Sea. In those cases, China used its coercive playbook effectively, forcing its adversaries to either back down or raise the ante. And as China’s uncontested gains have shown, its adversaries have generally lacked the capabilities, and especially the political resolve, to escalate crises.
But in this situation, India thwarted China’s coercion through denial — blocking China’s attempt to seize physical control of the disputed territory. By physically denying China’s bid to change the status quo, India created a stalemate, which suited its strategic policy. It did not acquiesce to a Chinese fait accompli, and it did not have to summon the capabilities or resolve to reverse China’s position, which would have risked a general war. India was able to do this because of a local military advantage and its broader policy of standing up to China. As a result, China did not have the option of proceeding under the guise of peaceful legitimate development, per its playbook; pressing its claims on Doklam would have required it to ratchet up military pressure. The stalemate thwarted Chinese coercion — but as long as it lasted, it was pregnant with risks of escalation and conflict.
Disengagement, But Dangers Persist
The immediate risks of conflict have receded, but the border dispute remains unresolved, and the broader Sino-Indian relationship remains fraught. First, on Doklam, while China has backed down for now, its statement that “China will continue fulfilling its sovereign rights to safeguard territorial sovereignty in compliance with the stipulations of the border-related historical treaty” suggests it has not changed its position on the border tri-junction. Indeed, during the standoff, China reportedly offered financial inducements to cleave Bhutan away from its traditional relationship with India — it has other ways, and continued ambitions, to press its claims.
Second, the India-China relationship remains tense, and prone to military risk, especially if China seeks to reassert itself after a perceived slight at Doklam. This could include an incursion somewhere along the India-China Line of Actual Control — indeed, such actions have already been reported. Or China might pursue a “cross-domain” response, for example with punitive cyber attacks or threatening activity in the Indian Ocean.
Third, over the longer term, India should be wary of learning the wrong lessons from the crisis. As one of us has recently written, India has long been preoccupied with the threat of Chinese (and Pakistani) aggression on their common land border. The Doklam standoff may be remembered as even more reason for India to pour more resources into defending its land borders, at the expense of building capabilities and influence in the wider Indian Ocean region. That would only play into China’s hands. Renewed Indian concerns about its land borders will only retard its emergence as an assertive and influential regional power.
The Lessons of Doklam
With the crisis only just being de-escalated, it is too early to derive definitive lessons from Doklam. However, a few policy implications are already apparent. First, Chinese behavior in territorial disputes is more likely to be deterred by denial than by threats of punishment. China will continue the combination of consolidating its physical presence and engaging in coercive diplomacy, lawfare, and media campaigns unless it is stopped directly. This is what India did at Doklam — it directly blocked Chinese efforts to change the status quo. Denial in other areas would require different military tasks — for example, in the Indian Ocean, it may involve anti-submarine warfare and maritime domain awareness.
Second, denial strategies may be effective, but they have their limitations. Denial is inherently risky. Countering China’s playbook involves risks of escalation — which most smaller adversaries, and at times even the United States, are unwilling to accept. Moreover, denial strategies can only serve to halt adversary action, not to reverse what the adversary has already done. As Doklam shows, India could convince China not to proceed with its road-building — but China did not relinquish its claims or its established pattern of presence in the area. Denial by itself offers no pathway to politically resolving the crisis.
Third, the agreement to disengage suggests that Beijing’s position in crises can be flexible, and perhaps responsive to assertive counter-coercion. Domestic audiences, even those in autocracies, often prefer sound judgment to recklessly staying the course. If the Doklam standoff had escalated to a shooting war, anything short of a decisive victory might have put Xi Jinping in an unfavorable position at the 19th Party Congress and hurt the PLA’s image with the Chinese people. But short of that, the Chinese government was always in the position to sell Doklam as a non-event, something the decreasing domestic media coverage suggests it was preparing to do. Beijing will frame the disengagement agreement as further proof of Chinese strength, especially relative to India. As the stronger power, China could magnanimously agree to a mutual disengagement for now while reserving the right to move forward when it sees fit.
Finally, the Doklam agreement, even if it is temporary, tells us that when China confronts a significantly weaker target, such as Bhutan, it will only be deterred by the actions of a stronger third party — in this case, India. Had India not acted, China would likely have been successful in consolidating its control and extracting territorial concessions from Bhutan. Third-party involvement may not be as easy in other cases — India had a privileged position in Bhutan. Such a strategy may also have significant second-order effects. In the near term, it is potentially escalatory — China argued that India has no basis for interfering in this bilateral dispute, and had many options for escalating the crisis at a time and place of its choosing. More broadly, such third-party involvement could intensify geopolitical competition between China and other powers such as the U.S. or India, if they intercede in other countries’ disputes with China. The lesson of Doklam for the United States is that arming small states and imposing incremental costs may not be enough. Washington may have to accept the greater risks associated with intervening more directly if it hopes to counter Chinese expansion in East Asia.
Oriana Skylar Mastro is an assistant professor of security studies at Georgetown University. She can be contacted through her website: www.orianaskylarmastro.com. Arzan Tarapore is an adjunct researcher at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation, and a PhD candidate at King’s College London.
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stratfor
U.S. President Donald Trump's new plan for the war in Afghanistan is huge, at least for Pakistan. So huge that on Aug. 30, for the second time in a week, Pakistani Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi chaired a meeting of the National Security Committee, arguably the highest point of coordination between civilian and military leadership in the country. The purpose of both meetings: crafting a policy response to Trump, who in his speech announcing a new Afghan strategy Aug. 21 publicly accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists. But what's almost more threatening to Pakistan is Trump's request for Pakistani archrival India to play a greater role in the war in Afghanistan.
Pakistan is not without friends. China, the country's strongest ally, has responded positively to Islamabad's overtures by highlighting Pakistan's sacrifices in the war against terrorism. On Aug. 28, China's special envoy to Afghanistan met with Pakistan's foreign secretary in Islamabad, where the pair emphasized the futility of seeking a military solution to Afghanistan in lieu of a diplomatic one. Meanwhile, Pakistan's foreign minister is delaying a meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson as he prepares a tour through China, Russia and Turkey to court more support.
Pakistani ties to the Taliban serve a strategic interest for the country by denying India a foothold in post-war Afghanistan and by countering Indian encirclement. Now, Pakistan's ties to the Taliban can also be used as a bargaining chip. Statements from Pakistan's foreign minister suggest the country may be willing to coordinate negotiations with the terrorist organization, provided the outcome is in Pakistan's interests. By dangling the carrot of negotiations, Pakistan could be able to push the United States into condemning alleged Indian human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. However, the more India's presence in Afghanistan grows, the more Pakistan will resist pushing the Taliban toward the negotiating table. Without such negotiations, Trump may lose his chance to cut a deal and find a diplomatic solution to the United States' longest war.
Stratfor
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India: Falling Short of Great Power
Aug 31, 2017
Summary
India dominates much of the subcontinent it occupies. In terms of land mass, population, economic activity and military capabilities, no other country in the region comes close. And yet, as much as India towers over the region by metrics, it cannot project power in the region proportionate to its size. In this Deep Dive, we’ll explain why this is the case and what would be required for India to reach its potential.
A Corridor to the Core
A country’s core is the area that is critical for geopolitical survival, where the key components necessary to sustain life intersect. India’s core lies within the Indo-Gangetic Plain, where the Ganges River meets the southern foothills of the Himalayas. Before independence, when colonial India included present-day Pakistan, the core extended westward to include both sides of the Indus River. The flat terrain is hospitable to settlement and agriculture, and its proximity to the Ganges ensures a freshwater supply. The humid, subtropical climate is much more hospitable than other climates found outside the plain: deserts, mountains, tropics, monsoons and arid steppes.
Strong geographic barriers fortify nearly all the boundaries of India’s core, making it difficult to attack. The Himalaya Mountains in the north and Arakan Mountains in the east clearly demarcate the region from the rest of the Asian continent. They are also difficult to traverse. Though they do not completely eliminate the possibility of attack, they make logistics and sustained fighting difficult, costly and often short-lived. To the west, the smaller Aravalli Mountains and Thar Desert protect the core by cutting off a large portion of the Indo-Gangetic Plain. To the south, the Vindhya Mountains extend up to the Chota Nagpur Plateau, creating a light land barrier. The remaining landmass below this southern line is surrounded by the Indian Ocean. Nearly every major empire to rule present-day India set up its base of power in this core area because of its hospitable climate and high degree of protection from foreign land invasion.
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But there is one place where the core is highly vulnerable to land invasion: the flat corridor between the Thar Desert and Himalayas in Punjab. As far back as Alexander the Great’s India campaign, foreign powers have exploited this land passage to invade India. The Ghaznavids, a Turkic people from Central Asia, passed through valleys in modern-day Afghanistan in the 11th and 12th centuries and invaded India through this corridor. Other great empires that ruled over India after invading through this point include the Mughals (1526-1857) and Sultanate of Delhi (1206-1526). Lesser-known Persian and Afghan dynasties like the Ghorids, Lodhis and Durranis did the same.
Looking at the rise and fall of empires in India, it becomes clear that whoever wants to command the country must first cut off this point of entry through the Thar-Himalaya corridor. Failure to do so leaves the core vulnerable to foreign threats. Present-day India had this imperative fulfilled upon gaining independence in 1947. The national borders New Delhi inherited from independence and partition cut off passage through the corridor – as much as a national border can. Though an international border is not the same as a geographic barrier, India has a means of restricting entry into the country in this area through traditional border controls. In areas where India lacks a universally recognized international boundary, fighting continues. A case in point is Kashmir, which was not included in the legally established boundaries after British rule.
Managing Diversity
Throughout its history, Indian governance was characterized by foreign rule over hundreds of small states or principalities. Muslims ruled over the Hindu majorities during the Delhi Sultanate and the Mughal Empire, and the British ended up ruling over both. Even before the sultanate, ruling Turkic peoples mixed in with the local population. Unlike the previous empires, independent India is now fully governed by its own people, and the territorial integrity of the country is largely solidified.
India’s long history as a subject of foreign empires created the government’s main domestic challenge: effectively managing the country’s extreme diversity. India has never been a truly unified country or empire. It existed as a hodgepodge of kingdoms, clans and local rulers, each with their own unique identity. During the periods of great empires, the ruling powers consolidated control over the territory by arranging some type of allegiance from each group. Past empires used extensive military force to establish, maintain and grow their presence on the subcontinent. They followed a basic framework in which the ruling power acted as an overlord of the larger territory while local monarchs, clans or community leaders had a high degree of autonomy in running daily life and state affairs.
The current shape of the Indian administration has its roots in the way the British Empire built its control over the subcontinent. When India achieved national independence, the new country needed to shore up its political identity. As a British colony, the subcontinent existed as a series of administrative provinces and princely states. The provinces had fallen under direct British rule, while the princely states were semi-sovereign territories that allied with the British government. Each of the 565 princely states that existed at the time of independence could opt in to the new nation-state if it so chose. The states formed after independence corresponded to the British administrative divisions of the territory. The partition of India and Pakistan into two separate nation-states uprooted millions of people, leading to large-scale and at times fatal communal violence. The trauma that resulted from this still lives on today and is evident in the two countries’ tense relationship. What emerged was a country whose national borders were not created by natural geographic or demographic divisions. Instead, it was a conglomeration of eclectic identities and territories accustomed to having a large degree of autonomy under one national, administrative rule.
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Much like its historic empires, modern-day India consists of many states acting autonomously, with minimal control given to the central government. India remains an unwieldy collection of semi-autonomous states and union territories. As a result, the country has maintained a diverse population over centuries. Indian states are allowed to choose their own official language, which has resulted in 22 official languages throughout the country, with many more unofficial languages widely spoken. Hindi is the predominant language group, with roughly 422 million native speakers, but outside of the Hindi core, linguistic minorities have majority status within many states. For example, Bengali is spoken natively by 83 million people and is the official language of West Bengal, Tripura, and the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Telugu, with 74 million native speakers, is the official language of Andhra Pradesh and Telangana. Many Indians are unable to effectively communicate in a shared language, which creates problems for national cohesion.
Another diversity problem for India lies in religion. Hindus are the most populous religious group in 27 states, but some provinces have majority or sizable non-Hindu populations. Islam makes up a majority in Lakshadweep and Jammu and Kashmir; it is a sizable minority in Assam (30.9%), West Bengal (25.2%), Kerala (24.7%), Uttar Pradesh (18.5%) and Bihar (16.5%). Communal violence is common. The biggest conflict was in 1947 during partition, but since then, there have been smaller-scale communal riots, such as the 1984 massacre of Sikhs. Prior to British rule, communal riots were scarce. The Muslim minority ruled over a Hindu majority almost uninterrupted from the 10th century to the 19th.
Regionalism is compounded by disparities in economic development. Wealth is far from equally distributed. According to India’s Ministry of Statistics, rich states like Maharashtra and New Delhi boast per capita net state domestic products of $2,094 and $4,376, respectively. Meanwhile, a poor state like Uttar Pradesh registers just $757 as its per capita NSDP.
Economic activity is also not equally represented throughout the country. Some regions of India have a developed services-oriented economy like Mumbai or Hyderabad, which is a major IT hub. Others have limited and unreliable access to basic infrastructure such as electricity and water. The country’s industrial sector also reflects the wide range of wealth generation in the country. There is basic textile manufacturing in Tamil Nadu state and high-value defense industry production in Karnataka state.
This divergence in economic activity and standards of living creates multiple population groups with very different needs and demands from the same government. All compete for the government’s attention and resources. Historically complicating these competing interests for the Indian government has been its limited ability to exercise control at the national level, as local government initiatives can easily usurp or bypass national ones.
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Prime Minister Narendra Modi is attempting to kill two birds with one stone by using economic reforms to centralize power and win public favor through economic growth. In an effort to crack down on black market cash and formalize the economy, the government has linked the ability to exchange cash for good currency with formally registering with the government for income taxes. The new Goods and Services Tax streamlines the tax process such that the final prices of goods are cheaper and more tax revenue ends up funneling into national accounts rather than state or local accounts. Reforms underway regarding real estate ownership and the gold market also will simultaneously formalize the economy while targeting potential business power centers or groups that could pose a challenge to the central government.
Be the Regional Hegemon
In the event that India consistently manages its unity and diversity for an extended period of time, it can begin to project outward and will set its sights on becoming the regional hegemon. This matters to India because of the country’s strategic need to secure resources and better protect its territorial integrity. But for India, hegemony demands that it be able to project influence over each of the four nation-states bordering it within the subcontinent – Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
India’s main strategic concern is its ability to maintain access to its northeastern states. These states are separated from the mainland by the Siliguri Corridor, a strip of land that at its narrowest measures just 17 miles (27 kilometers) wide and, due to its positioning with respect to the Dolam Plateau, makes it vulnerable to attack from the north. A small part of Chinese territory dips down between Nepal and Bhutan close to this corridor. Nepal and Bhutan are critical buffer states between India and China, so New Delhi and Beijing compete for influence in these countries. In the past, Indian-Chinese competition for these two territories has resulted in war. These conflicts are usually short-lived, since the mountainous terrain makes it logistically costly and difficult to sustain warfare over an extended period of time. Instead, India’s leading strategies to maintain influence in these buffer states revolve around building strong political and economic relationships.
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Control of Pakistan would help India meet two strategic objectives. The first is access to water resources from the Indus River Valley. The Indus River Valley lies in Chinese, Indian and Pakistani territory. From India’s point of view, control over Pakistan is necessary to ensure water and hydroelectricity to its northern cities.
As a question of national security, India has a strategic objective to control, or at the very least definitively subordinate, Pakistan. Since partition, relations between India and Pakistan have been antagonistic. The arrangement accentuated the Muslim-Hindu divide between the two countries. This has manifested in the form of military skirmishes and terrorist attacks against India.
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India’s relationship with Bangladesh is the most stable compared to the others. Unlike Nepal and Bhutan, Bangladesh does not directly border China. Nor does it have a neighboring power it can use to play off India. Instead, India almost entirely surrounds Bangladesh, aside from a short 169-mile border with Myanmar, of which about 130 miles are on land rather than at sea. Additionally, India controls the upper portion of the Brahmaputra River, which provides Bangladesh with a significant source of freshwater. This gives New Delhi even greater leverage over Dhaka. The relationship helps mitigate the risk to the Siliguri Corridor and provides India strategic depth. If infrastructure were better, India’s northeastern states would benefit from sea access via the Brahmaputra River through Bangladesh. Such access would also help support further economic development in these states, which are among India’s poorest. Additionally, controlling Bangladesh helps shore up India’s border with Southeast Asia. This border area is not often as dynamic or noted as India’s other borders, but the China-Burma-India theater of World War II illustrates its strategic value to India. The theater was established to prevent and push back the Japanese advancement in Asia, which at one point reached modern-day Myanmar and directly bordered British India.
Control the Indian Ocean
India also has its sights set on becoming the predominant military power in the Indian Ocean. The country has an extensive coastline stretching 4,671 miles, making it impossible to ignore surrounding waters. The Indian Ocean region, including the Bay of Bengal, Arabian Sea and Laccadive Sea, remains a strategic interest for India. New Delhi also pays close attention to areas from the Andaman Sea to the Strait of Malacca, the Gulf of Aden to the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Hormuz to the Persian Gulf. This latter group of maritime bodies represents major entry or exit points into the Indian Ocean region and coastal waters of India, and given the natural geographic defenses surrounding most of India, the coast is one of the only areas vulnerable to attack and possible invasion. British colonization of the subcontinent did begin, after all, with coastal entry into the country.
The Indian Ocean region plays a vital role in India’s economy and national security. India has a difficult time engaging in land-based trade. Generally, land-based trade has higher transportation costs than maritime trade, and this is even more true for terrain as challenging as India’s mountain ranges. Even the ancient Silk Road’s main trajectory skirted north of the Himalayas; any access points to India were secondary or tertiary branches of the main route. Because of this, India will always need to use maritime routes for trade.
It sits in the advantageous position of having access to energy imports from the Middle East and access to Asian markets for selling goods. Even Europe is a market India can tap at its convenience, thanks to the Suez Canal. Approximately 95 percent of India’s trade by volume and 70 percent by value is carried out via maritime transportation, according to India’s Ministry of Shipping.
India’s navy is in the early stages of modernization and still needs to grow and increase its capabilities before it could come close to fulfilling this imperative. India’s military has only recently become capable of providing baseline security to immediate coastal waters. But although New Delhi lacks the ability to project power into the oceans, its strategic interests mean it must monitor the ocean, even if there is little it can do to affect it. In the meantime, the country’s strategy to ensure that its security interests are being met in the region is to ally itself with strong navies from sympathetic countries like the United States, Japan and, to a lesser degree, Australia.
Conclusion
There’s no denying India’s potential to dominate and project power across the subcontinent it occupies. Reaching that potential, however, depends on the country’s ability to overcome the constraints that keep it from fulfilling its imperatives. Maintaining and managing the country’s unity in the face of so much diversity has been a challenge for all Indian governments. The current strategy to achieve this revolves around economic reforms and efforts to build nationalism, particularly among the Hindu population. The problems, tensions and national interests in the border states will persist as India tries to manage its imperatives. But the better India can manage domestic diversity, the more resources it will have at its disposal to deal with international issues. India must achieve its imperatives in succession. First, it needs to create a sense of nationhood among the people and develop a coherent economic system. Once the core of India is under a centralized authority, it can pursue its security imperatives at land and at sea.
The post India: Falling Short of Great Power appeared first on Geopolitics | Geopolitical Futures.
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I used to subscribe to Stratfor and was generally impressed with it, perhaps because I had no first hand knowledge of the topics they wrote about. Wrt India, since I know the subject matter somewhat, I find there writing quite superficial and also inaccurate. Not sure they have reporting strength on India. As an example:
"Control of Pakistan would help India meet two strategic objectives. The first is access to water resources from the Indus River Valley. The Indus River Valley lies in Chinese, Indian and Pakistani territory. From India’s point of view, control over Pakistan is necessary to ensure water and hydroelectricity to its northern cities." This is quite a misleading statement, infact India controls most of the river waters already and has been quite generous with giving Pak water as a lower riparian thro the Indus water treaty. Current thinking is that India should abrogate the treaty if Pak does not behave.
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I used to subscribe to Stratfor and was generally impressed with it, perhaps because I had no first hand knowledge of the topics they wrote about. Wrt India, since I know the subject matter somewhat, I find there writing quite superficial and also inaccurate. Not sure they have reporting strength on India. As an example:
"Control of Pakistan would help India meet two strategic objectives. The first is access to water resources from the Indus River Valley. The Indus River Valley lies in Chinese, Indian and Pakistani territory. From India’s point of view, control over Pakistan is necessary to ensure water and hydroelectricity to its northern cities." This is quite a misleading statement, infact India controls most of the river waters already and has been quite generous with giving Pak water as a lower riparian thro the Indus water treaty. Current thinking is that India should abrogate the treaty if Pak does not behave.
Your ground truth knowledge is very useful. Thanks.
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All 6 Indus valley system rivers originate or pass through Indian Kashmir before they enter Pak, 1-2 of them originate close to the border with Tibet (China). Ironically, the map is courtesy of Strat...dark green is India. If India wants they could block waters to Pak, though the flows are such that is difficult to do so without diverting the rivers. The situation is exactly reverse of what the author says, Pak is paranoid that India is choking them. Looks like the author got a bit confused with the labeling perhaps from this Strat map, (It shows the poorly placed label: Pak administered Kashmir, over Indian Kashmir)
(https://i2.wp.com/www.pmfias.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Indus-River-System-Himalayan-Rivers.jpg?resize=400%2C400)
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With the BRICS conference next week, something to lighten the atmosphere. This from the South China Post...
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9/12/17
Crossing the Line of Actual Control
A woman works in the fields of Arunachal Pradesh, a territory India controls but China claims as part of Tibet.
(SABIRMALLICK/iStock)
Pakistan's involvement in Kashmir will make it harder for India and China to resolve their disagreement over the strategically significant territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.
The enduring border dispute will further strain security ties between China and India and could spill over into other parts of their relationship.
Confrontations between the two nuclear powers will become more frequent along the Line of Actual Control as China asserts its claim to disputed territories more aggressively, and as nationalism gains traction on both sides of the border.
The Line of Actual Control (LAC), the 4,057-kilometer boundary that runs between China and India along the arc of the world's highest mountains, has caused its share of strife. Over the years, the LAC has sparked standoffs, skirmishes and war between the two expanding nuclear powers. To try to keep the peace, Beijing and New Delhi began a dialogue in 2003 called the Special Representatives Meeting on the India-China Boundary Question. Yet 19 rounds of talks later, China and India still disagree on the location of the border between them — and over which side rightfully controls the territories of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh.
Despite their enduring differences, India and China largely have managed to keep their border disputes from spilling over into other aspects of their relationship, such as trade. But that may start to change. As China forges deeper ties with India's nuclear archrival, Pakistan, and as each side of the LAC tries to emphasize its sovereignty along the contested border, New Delhi and Beijing could have a harder time avoiding conflict.
A Wolf in Sheep's Clothing?
For Beijing, control of Arunachal Pradesh boils down to a matter of national security. One of China's main geopolitical imperatives is to secure a buffer on its western flank that, along with the Pacific Ocean on the east, would protect its densely populated core territory. Annexing the Kingdom of Tibet in 1950 enabled Beijing to realize that goal, so long as it could maintain control over its western buffer by thwarting challenges to its sovereignty. The Dalai Lama presented one such challenge. The prominent monk participated in a failed uprising against Beijing in March 1959. (His role in the revolt doubtless is one of the reasons the Chinese government views the Dalai Lama not as a spiritual figure but as a separatist whom it often describes as a "wolf in sheep's clothing.") After that, he fled to India — the birthplace of Buddhism, no less — where he received a warm welcome.
The Dalai Lama's presence was a boon for India. Hosting the exiled religious leader, for example, enabled New Delhi to draw international attention to the issue of Tibetan sovereignty, a tactic it still uses today. But India's support for the Dalai Lama vexed China, all the more so because New Delhi has long held control of Arunachal Pradesh and, with it, the strategic town of Tawang. As an important site in Tibetan Buddhism, Tawang represents an essential piece of China's strategy to assert its sovereignty over Tibet. Beijing often cites the town's significance in Tibetan Buddhism to support its claim to Tawang, and it probably won't give up its quest for control of the town anytime soon. China, in fact, may be disputing India's claim to Arunachal Pradesh, a territory Beijing would likely struggle to control, as a bargaining tactic to secure Tawang. Yet considering that relinquishing the town would give China greater access to India's vulnerable Siliguri corridor, New Delhi would hardly entertain the idea.
Kashmir: The Crown of India
Along the Western reaches of the LAC, India has its own bone to pick with China in the 38,000-square kilometer territory of Aksai Chin. New Delhi claims the area as part of Kashmir, a region whose control it has contested with Pakistan, as well, ever since the Partition of 1947. Today, India's authority in Kashmir extends to the regions of Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh, collectively known as Jammu and Kashmir, while Pakistan administers two other constituent territories, Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan. (New Delhi also claims another territory, the Trans-Karakoram Tract, which Islamabad ceded to Beijing in 1963.) Recognizing China's authority over Aksai Chin is a dangerous prospect for the Indian government, since doing so could signal to Pakistan that New Delhi's claims to its portion of Kashmir were similarly negotiable. In response, Islamabad could increase the military pressure on New Delhi along the Line of Control, where India and Pakistan have been fighting intermittently for decades.
A Tale of Two Disputes
And Pakistan isn't the only factor preventing New Delhi from making a compromise in Aksai Chin. Renouncing India's claims to the region could come at a prohibitive cost for Prime Minister Narendra Modi's political career. Members of the opposition and of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party alike would condemn the action as appeasement, a sign of weakness when India is trying to establish itself as a rising global power. The country, after all, is trying to exercise greater sovereignty in its border regions by building 73 new strategic roads to serve them. At the same time, China probably won't yield to India's demands over Aksai Chin, since it knows Pakistan would oppose the gesture and since a vital road, the G219 highway, runs through the region. Beijing would give New Delhi a portion of Aksai Chin at most as part of a border negotiation.
Succession, Not Secession
Because each side administers a territory that the other claims, compromise is the only solution to the dispute along the LAC. But neither Beijing nor New Delhi has much leeway to meet the other's demands. The situation likely will become even more tense as succession looms for the 81-year-old Dalai Lama. China has promised to observe the Tibetan Buddhist traditions to find a successor, which dictate that the reincarnated Dalai Lama must be born in Tibetan territory and approved by the central government. The process could come back to haunt Beijing if the 15th Dalai Lama is born in Tawang, thereby further shifting the spiritual center of gravity in Tibetan Buddhism to India. To try to weaken Beijing's power over his successor, meanwhile, the Dalai Lama has hinted that he may opt for emanation — that is, choosing the next Dalai Lama himself — rather than reincarnation.
In the meantime, relations between India and China seem to be entering a more contentious phase. Beijing continues to test its neighbors' limits and military responsiveness by asserting control over disputed territories, including those in the South China Sea and the Doklam Plateau, more and more brazenly. As China looks to hone its own military response, it may temporarily suspend its infrastructure projects as it has in the past. But once it resumes construction on these ventures — such as the road it was trying to extend through Doklam when its latest standoff with India began — China will provoke another confrontation. And the growing nationalist movements in both countries suggest that the next border dispute is not a question of if but of when.
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Earlier this year, the leaders of Germany and India announced that they had taken their countries' relationship "to a new level." And to be sure, over the past few decades collaboration between the two has deepened on many different fronts. But Germany's interest in India isn't merely a byproduct of the Asian century, as the 21st century is now so frequently called. Rather, it has been building gradually over time, laying a sturdy foundation for the partnership that both countries are beginning to take more and more seriously.
The Trade Ties That Bind
For the most part, Indo-German relations have centered on trade and development since World War II. In 1956, the two states created the Indo-German Chamber of Commerce (IGCC), marking an important step in solidifying the links between their economies. Boasting several offices across India, the IGCC now offers a range of services including counseling on investments and market entries, courses on industrial training and the recognition of professional degrees and qualifications. It is also the largest German chamber of commerce in the world, spurring deeper cooperation between India and Germany ever forward.
A few decades after the IGCC's founding, the partners became even more closely intertwined with the establishment of the Indo-German Economic Commission in the 1980s. Created in part to lend support to Indian economic reforms, the new commission came not a moment too soon: The Soviet Union, then India's primary ally, collapsed in 1991, opening the door to the liberalization of the Indian economy. In light of these events, it is hardly surprising that Indian Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao chose Germany for his first trip abroad that year in order to promote his nation's value as a trade partner and destination for foreign investment.
Despite his efforts, Germany was more interested in focusing its attention on China and its Southeast Asian neighbors, which had opened up their economies more quickly than India and were thus better integrated into the global market. That is, at least, until a financial crisis swept across Asia in 1997. Compared with many of its eastern peers, India escaped the downturn relatively unscathed, and Germany's interest in the subcontinent began to grow. Berlin's instincts proved to be good when India, like China, became one of the fastest-growing economies in the world in the 2000s. According to the World Bank, India's gross domestic product climbed even quicker than China's in 2015-16.
This isn't to say, of course, that the relationship between the Indian and German economies is balanced. Germany is a nation based on exports that caters to the needs of an import-reliant India. As a result, it is one of New Delhi's most important trade partners. India, on the other hand, ranks only 25th among German export destinations.
But there is much room for growth on both sides. Over the past decade, India has diversified away from the onetime mainstay of its exports — natural resources — and has begun offering products that German consumers demand, particularly in the areas of engineering, chemistry and textiles. At the same time, Indian investments in Germany have jumped remarkably in recent years. Indian corporations have channeled several billion dollars into the German IT, automotive, pharmaceuticals and biotech industries, and as of last year, over 200 Indian firms — many in the software sector — had set up shop in Germany.
Creating Fertile Ground for Growth
This prospering partnership will doubtless pay off for both parties in the long run. Backed by the wealth of the German economy, India can now provide for many of the reform schemes Prime Minister Narendra Modi's administration has advocated, including the Digital India, Make in India and Skill India programs. For instance, the Make in India Mittelstand project got its start in September 2015 to encourage German Mittelstand (or small to medium-sized enterprises) to do business in India; 80 of these firms are now making their way into the Indian market.
At the same time, Indian companies' need for technology, training and know-how has risen as the country's economy has grown. Vocational education is now a top priority for the Indian government as it seeks to bridge the gap between industry and academia in order to provide various industries with more skilled labor. New Delhi has worked closely with the private sector in this regard, and India's higher education system hopes to use Germany's dual education system — a combination of theory and practice made possible by collaboration between schools and businesses — as a model for its own institutions. India's first University of Applied Sciences, designed with the German system in mind and with the help of German partners, opened in 2016, and similar projects are in the making.
Germany, for its part, has just as much to gain in exchange for its knowledge and resources. The country not only has the opportunity to invest in and profit from India's rapidly growing market, but it also gets greater access to an increasingly well-qualified workforce — something its own aging labor pool desperately needs. Conveniently, the majority of Indian students tend to pursue fields that play to Germany's strengths in manufacturing and exports, such as science, technology, engineering and mathematics. These fields are also weaknesses in the German education system, which does not produce enough qualified workers within them to meet the demands of the German economy.
Considering this rather perfect match, it's no wonder that Indian exchange students and researchers have traveled to Germany in droves over the past few years. Since 2006, the number of Indian students enrolled in German universities has nearly quadrupled to reach 13,537, nudging India up to second place on the list of countries with the most students in Germany by 2016. The two nations recently signed a partnership deal in higher education that will strengthen these ties even further by supporting joint research and collaboration between students and doctoral candidates.
By all accounts, science and technology will become a central focus of this cooperation in the years ahead. A number of Indo-German tech institutes have already sprung up since the Indo-German Committee of Science and Technology was founded in 2003, providing a space for joint research in water and waste management, land use, energy, scientific applications and innovation. Many of these institutions also coordinate with businesses and promote networking between Indian and German scientists.
New Delhi and Berlin have complemented these academic initiatives with several high-level committees, projects and working groups intended to explore issues related to science and technology. Chief among them are the biannual Indo-German Government Consultations, which began in 2011 and have since spawned 26 bilateral deals in energy, industry, vocational training, security, agriculture, science and culture. These meetings, which bring the countries' heads of state together with high-level delegations of ministers and representatives from an array of sectors, are unique: Neither India nor Germany has such prominent panels in science and technology on such a regular basis with other countries, signaling just how important they believe their budding partnership to be.
Partners of a Different Kind
Germany has even more to gain from the relationship than a boost in business. India's politics and culture more closely align with Europe's values than China's do, spurring the perception on the Continent that New Delhi may be a more reliable partner than Beijing. And with the exception of Japan, no other country on the Asian landmass more closely shares Germany's understanding of international relations and foreign policy than India. Both states value human rights, believe in international institutions and hope for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council someday — a goal on which they have worked together to craft a joint strategy. And in a world that seems to be reorienting itself toward nationalism and bilateral deals, these kinds of political affiliations will play a bigger role in shaping the decisions of nations.
India, too, has political motives for building an enduring relationship with Germany. New Delhi considers the European leader to be a source of constant stability, even when political and financial crises strike. And if India is to achieve its ambition of becoming an economic and political power capable of joining other mighty nations on the global stage, it will need partners like Germany on its side.
When India and Germany officially signed onto a strategic partnership in May 2000, it wasn't clear how strong the relationship would become. But over the past 17 years, the rather vague promise to work together more often has become a flourishing relationship that encompasses nearly every aspect of international cooperation. If the past decade is any indication of those still to come, the Indo-German partnership will be a force to be reckoned with in the not-so-distant future.
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Highlights
If India increases its involvement in Afghanistan, Pakistan will strengthen its opposition to pushing the Taliban into negotiations.
Pakistan will continue supporting the Taliban to prevent an alliance between Afghanistan and India.
Islamabad and Washington's threats against one another will limit the punitive measures both sides impose.
In the war in Afghanistan, Pakistan plays both sides. On the one hand, the country aids the United States in its fight against the Taliban. Pakistan offers NATO forces access to the port of Karachi to transit supplies to their bases in landlocked Afghanistan and tacitly allows the CIA to conduct drone strikes against militant hideouts in the semi-autonomous Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Yet on the other hand, Pakistan has nurtured the Taliban for more than 20 years. Pakistan's government in Islamabad supports the group as a means to many ends, including stabilizing Afghanistan, opening trade and energy routes to Central Asia, formalizing the Durand Line, and establishing a government in Kabul hostile to archrival India. By assisting both the United States and the Taliban throughout their nearly 16-year conflict, Pakistan has managed to benefit from an alliance with Washington, collecting over $33 billion in aid since 2002, while also pursuing its security objectives.
But the new U.S. plan for the war in Afghanistan has cast doubt on Islamabad's strategy. President Donald Trump's administration not only has threatened to crack down on Pakistan for supporting militant organizations, but it also has called on India to assume a larger role in rehabilitating Afghanistan's economy. The revised policy probably will spur Islamabad to change its approach in Afghanistan, though likely not in the way Washington intended. Instead, it will harden Pakistan's resolve against the United States and the effort to negotiate an end to the enduring war.
From Militancy to Politics
Despite the U.S. administration's admonishments, Pakistani militancy is as much a problem for Islamabad as it is for Washington. Pakistan has been working to circumscribe the militant groups operating within its borders since long before Trump rebuked the country in an address Aug. 21. In April 2016, for example, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency proposed plans to deradicalize scores of militants and bring them more under the control of the country's security apparatus. As part of that campaign, Islamabad allowed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa — a charity organization under U.N. sanctions for its links to the militant group Lashkar-e-Taiba — to form a new political party, the Milli Muslim League (MML).
Combating militancy with politics is easier said than done, though. The process has been rife with controversy, exposing the historical divide between Pakistan's military and civilian leaders. Pakistan's Interior Ministry asked the country's electoral commission to block the MML's registration over concerns that the party's ties to and ideological affinities with Lashkar-e-Taiba, the group blamed for the deadly attacks in Mumbai in 2008, would invite criticism from foreign governments. But though the MML's registration is still pending, it hasn't let administrative matters get in its way. The party's candidate, officially running as an independent, placed third in the recent special elections in Lahore, and the MML plans to participate in Pakistan's general elections next year as well.
Pakistan Picks Its Battles
The MML's emergence demonstrates the Pakistani army's commitment to addressing militancy in the country. Its priorities in this endeavor differ from those of the United States, however, and as it tackles the problem, Islamabad will continue to resist pressure to attack the militant groups Washington has targeted. In Pakistan's view, after all, all militant groups are not created equal. Groups such as the Afghan Taliban and its ally the Haqqani network help Pakistan's army advance its objectives in Afghanistan. They are assets to Islamabad's foreign policy, and the Pakistani government treats them as such. Islamabad's accommodations, moreover, discourage these groups from attacking Pakistan, enabling the country to focus its scarce resources on the organizations that pose a more serious threat to its security, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan and the Islamic State's Khorasan chapter.
Beyond these considerations, Islamabad's stance on militants also figures into its strategy toward India. Pakistan has relied on militant groups to compensate for its smaller military relative to that of its eastern rival since the partition in 1947, employing them as proxies against India while maintaining plausible deniability in the event of an attack. The policy has endured even after both countries became nuclear powers.
Considering its aims in Afghanistan, Islamabad will push back against Washington's new strategy in the war against the Taliban. Pakistan's recently appointed prime minister already has rejected Trump's suggestion that India take on a greater political or military role in Afghanistan, and pressing the idea will only strengthen Islamabad's resistance to it. At the same time, pushing the proposal will make Pakistan less likely to heed Washington's calls to try to encourage the Taliban into negotiations. (That some members of the Taliban have urged the organization to distance itself from Pakistan raises questions about how much sway Islamabad has with the militant group regardless.) The United States, of course, has various tools at its disposal to ramp up the pressure on Pakistan, including revoking the country's non-NATO major ally status, further cutting its aid package or sanctioning Islamabad. But Pakistan has its own options to make Washington think twice about taking punitive action.
U.S. Aid to Afghanistan
The Costs of War
In fact, Pakistan already has started employing some of these deterrents since Trump made his address on Afghanistan in late August. Islamabad turned down a visit from the U.S. acting assistant secretary of state for Central and South Asia, who was leading a delegation of officials eager to hash out U.S.-Pakistan coordination in Afghanistan. Pakistan's foreign minister instead embarked on a three-nation tour to China, Turkey and Iran in hopes of increasing their diplomatic support for his country. He later delayed a meeting originally scheduled for August with his U.S. counterpart, Rex Tillerson, until the week of Oct. 2. More recently, Pakistan announced that it would adopt stricter protocols on U.S. diplomats to require a mutual agreement before American officials could visit the country and to prohibit lower-ranking U.S. functionaries from meeting with high-level Pakistani officials, such as the prime minister. The country also has floated the possibility of shutting down NATO supply routes, though it probably won't follow through on the threat unless Washington first makes good on one of its own.
Since the United States began its war in Afghanistan a decade and a half ago, the conflict has defined the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Washington has encouraged Islamabad to focus on anti-militancy operations in Balochistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, two hotbeds of unrest in Pakistan, in support of the war effort. But the U.S. outreach — which includes a sizable military aid package — has given Pakistan's powerful armed forces even more influence in the country's domestic politics, yielding unintended consequences. The Pakistani military will use its sway over the country's foreign policy to keep India and Afghanistan from forging an alliance that could encircle Pakistan and threaten national security. And in the process, it will scuttle U.S. plans for drawing down its longest-running war.
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India, Afghanistan, Iran: An Indian ship containing wheat destined for Afghanistan is headed for the port of Chabahar in Iran, from where it will be transported over land to Afghanistan. This route is being touted as a way to do trade with Afghanistan without needing to go through Pakistan. We need to find out who owns the ship. This will be our first step in determining whether this move is just propaganda or whether the countries could really be setting up an alternative route that bypasses Pakistan.
• Finding: Little information is available on this shipment. India’s External Affairs Ministry spokesman confirmed that the first shipment of wheat arrived Nov. 1 at Chabahar port. It was shipped on a vessel called BEHSHAD owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines. The next step is to monitor the overland transportation of the wheat and confirm that it has crossed the Afghan border and arrived at its destination.
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• India, Russia: Russia suspects that India violated the terms of a weapons agreement and allowed the United States to visit and observe Russian submarine technology. Russian media outlet Kommersant claimed that there were technical specialists among the U.S. observers. India is the largest destination for Russian military products, receiving 38 percent of all of Russia’s arms exports. What does this allegation say about U.S.-India and Russia-India relations?
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Might be fake news...Govt of India also denies it. Looks like the French want to sell their own subs!.
https://www.rt.com/news/409722-india-russian-submarine-visit/
Also re the wheat shipment to Afghanistan, this is the first that I am reading that it may not have reached.. looks like fake news. Even pakistani media is not claiming that!
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Maps and photos in article will not print here:
China and India faced off last year in a tense military standoff on the Doklam Plateau on the disputed Line of Actual Control (LAC) high in the Himalayas. Although the impasse was temporarily resolved in late August through a negotiated drawdown, it has been clear all along that the LAC will remain a contentious border because both countries will continue to seek an advantage in this difficult terrain.
Recent reporting, particularly in the Indian press, has highlighted how India and China are bolstering their infrastructure and forces along the LAC, including through the stationing of additional ground units near the plateau. Satellite imagery acquired by Stratfor working with its partners at AllSource Analysis helps illuminate the scope of these developments by looking at the air and air defense aspects of this strengthening of forces. Specifically, the analysis looks at four critical air bases, two Chinese and two Indian, that are within range of the Doklam Plateau. The imagery confirms that both China and India are pursuing a wide-ranging strategic buildup that has only accelerated in the wake of the Aug. 27 agreement.
China, India and the Doklam Plateau: The buildup behind the scenes
The View From India
On the Indian side of the border, imagery of the Siliguri Bagdogra air base and the Hasimara Air Force Station depicts how India has moved to reinforce its air power close to the Doklam Plateau. Siliguri Bagdogra normally hosts a transport helicopter unit while Hasimara was the base for MiG-27ML ground attack aircraft until they were retired at the end of 2017. Since the Doklam crisis of mid-2017, however, the Indian Air Force has greatly increased the deployment of Su-30MKI warplanes to these air bases as can be seen from the imagery. The Su-30MKI is India's premier fighter jet, and it will soon be capable of striking land targets with the advanced BrahMos cruise missile. Furthermore, Indian reports indicate that a squadron of the recently purchased Rafale multirole fighters may soon be home-based at Hasimara. The dispatch of these top-of-the-line Indian jets and airfield improvements at both stations highlight India's determination to improve its force structure near the Doklam Plateau.
India: Hasimara Air Force Station
India: Siliguri Bagdogra air base
On the Chinese Side
An even greater level of activity is visible from imagery of the Chinese air bases near Lhasa and Shigatse. This expansion may indicate a greater buildup by the Chinese, but it could also reflect the more advanced facilities at these bases. Furthermore, unlike India, China's lack of air bases close to the LAC forces it to concentrate more of its air power at these airports.
Imagery of the two air bases shows a significant presence of fighter aircraft (which peaked in October) and a notable increase in helicopters, as well as deployments of KJ-500 airborne early warning and command aircraft, components of the HQ-9 long-range surface-to-air missile system and Soar Dragon unmanned aerial vehicles at Shigatse Peace Airport. The Chinese made a number of major airfield upgrades at Shigatse immediately after the end of the crisis. A new runaway was constructed by mid-December, nine aircraft aprons measuring 41 meters by 70 meters were built along the main taxiway and eight helipads were set up in the northeast corner of the airfield. This construction, along with the deployment of new equipment in greater numbers, highlights how China has undertaken a serious effort to improve its capabilities close to the LAC.
The imagery shows that the Chinese and Indian buildups have only accelerated in the aftermath of the Doklam crisis. Now it is only a question of time until a new flashpoint along the LAC emerges, and as the increased activity shows, both sides will have greater capabilities to bring to bear next time.
China: Shigatse Peace Airport
China: Lhasa Gonggar Airport
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India’s One Belt, One Road-Block
Jan 26, 2018
By Jacob L. Shapiro
It’s been a busy week for Indian foreign policy. In the past, that statement would have been an oxymoron. The Himalayas isolate India from developments in the rest of the world. Internal diversity makes it hard for India to govern itself, let alone to influence others (though the irony of an American writing that a few days after the U.S. government shutdown is not lost on me). The scope of India’s poverty makes China look like a uniformly rich society by comparison.
For all these reasons, India has been a minor player on the world stage in modern history. India was the “jewel in the crown” of the British Empire, a vast land of resources for the British to appropriate. The British controlled India not so much by force as by playing its diverse groups against each other. After the British left and an independent India emerged, India was a relatively insignificant actor in the Cold War, engaged in a nuclear arms race with Pakistan and fought a few skirmishes with China. Overall, though, the impact of India’s actions was confined to the Indian subcontinent.
(click to enlarge)
But now India has arrived at an unprecedented moment in its history. At home, the Bharatiya Janata Party, with its clear vision of what a united India’s interests are in the world, is in a strong position. Abroad, fear of China’s heavy-handed attempts to gain influence have many looking to India as, if not a savior, then the only counterweight to China’s demographic, economic and military heft. India is trying to make the most of this chance. Even so, the reason many Asian countries trust India to counter China is because they do not think India is as great a threat to them as China because of its fundamental weaknesses. India is limiting China at the invitation of others.
An Alternative to China
Most foreign media this week focused on Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rousing introductory speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos and on the renewed competition between China and India around Doklam. These issues aren’t especially important. Davos is a nice conference for world leaders to enjoy themselves while accomplishing nothing that will have much effect on the world. In Doklam, the geography makes the prospects of an India-China war remote at best. If China and India were to fight over a disputed border region, it would be in Nepal or Tibet; Doklam is political grandstanding.
(click to enlarge)
And there are other, more consequential areas that India is seeking to make its presence felt than Davos and Doklam. The first is in the vast buffer region between China and Russia. China covets this area, which is made up mostly of Kazakhstan and Mongolia. Beijing’s One Belt, One Road initiative is, at its core, a strategy for China to develop new markets for its excess supply of goods and raw materials and to build the prosperity of China’s vast, impoverished interior. China’s investment, however, often comes with strings attached: Chinese workers, or preferential arrangements for Chinese companies. These are strategic areas of the world that China wants to influence and even control.
India is far less ambitious. Its goals are to make money and thwart Chinese plans, which it can do merely by offering an alternative to China. On Jan. 24, the Mongolian government announced that construction on the country’s first oil refinery would begin in April – funded by India in a deal reached in 2015. Meanwhile, on Jan. 25, Kazakhstan announced plans to implement visa-free 72-hour transit for Indian citizens. Kazakhstan debuted this pilot visa regime with China, and a Kazakh government official noted that the arrangement was so successful at attracting Chinese investment that the country decided to extend it to India as well.
The same dynamic applies to Southeast Asia, where China has also pushed its One Belt, One Road initiative. For China, the most important country in the region is the Philippines because a close relationship with Manila would give Beijing access to the Pacific. India is active there too. A Philippine government official said Jan. 23 that India had pledged over $1.25 billion in investment for 2018, money that is expected to create more than 100,000 jobs in the country. For perspective, in 2016, $1.25 billion would have made India the second-largest foreign investor in the Philippines, behind the Netherlands and immediately ahead of the United States, Australia and China.
In Southeast Asia, though, India has greater ambitions. On Jan. 25, India hosted the leaders of all 10 countries that make up the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to promote “maritime security” in the region. The day before that, India announced that it had agreed with Indonesia to increase bilateral defense cooperation through joint exercises, arms deals and high-level visits of officials. This is in addition to India’s recent support for the resurrection of the Quad, an amorphous alignment of India, Japan, Australia and the U.S. whose chief goal is to limit Chinese expansion, and India’s more liberal deployment of its naval forces for military exercises on the Pacific side of the Indo-Pacific.
Dose of Reality
All this sounds impressive, and on a certain level it is, especially for a country with a history of global involvement like India’s. But these developments should not be oversold. India is hosting ASEAN leaders and throwing investment money around the region, but China’s clout is still overwhelming by comparison. China accounted for 14 percent of total ASEAN trade in 2014 and 15.2 percent in 2015 (the latest year for which stats were available). India, on the other hand, accounted for 2.7 percent in 2014 and 2.4 percent in 2015, meaning that not only is India’s share of ASEAN trade much lower than China’s, but it is decreasing. In the long term, India may well provide a balance for some of these countries, but they need a counterweight to China now, and India’s ability to help is limited.
In the past week, there was also an internal development that underscores India’s geopolitical handicap. Shiv Sena, an important political party in India’s western state of Maharashtra, announced Jan. 23 that it was breaking with the BJP in upcoming general and state elections. Shiv Sena has not indicated that it plans to withdraw from India’s coalition government, and by all accounts the breach is not ideological but political. The party supports the BJP’s vision of a united, Hindu India, even if it did not appreciate the way the BJP took Shiv Sena’s support for granted. But the deeper issue is that Shiv Sena started not as a Hindu nationalist party but as a pro-Marathi party. (Marathis are the dominant ethnic group in Maharashtra.)
Shiv Sena is not returning to its pro-Marathi roots – or at least it’s given no indication that it will. But its break with the BJP underscores just how fleeting the BJP’s level of control is. India is, after all, a democracy, and the BJP government is as susceptible to being voted out of office as any political party is in a democracy. The BJP has consolidated power at home and projected power abroad because of its strong political position, but nothing says that position must be permanent. Beneath the veneer of strength of the BJP’s governing coalition are the divisions that the British used to control India, the same divisions that have long prevented India from harnessing its demographic and economic potential.
In a sense, India’s foreign policy is still passive. The hallmark of power is not that countries will take your money and use it to build refineries, or that foreign leaders will visit and eat your food at interesting summits about maritime security. The real test of power is whether a country can make other countries do what it wants. And for all the activity involving India this past week, none of it suggests that India is amassing that kind of power. Instead, India is thwarting Chinese power. It is doing this because it wants to, but more than that, because other countries want it to. India is playing on the world stage, and that is notable – but it is playing at the invitation and with the blessing of others. It is not master of its fate.
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India Struggles With Its Strategy to Becoming a Great Power
By Sarang Shidore
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
Sarang Shidore
Sarang Shidore
Senior Global Analyst, Stratfor
Recent conflicts are raising questions about the evolution of India's strategic game plan in this fast-changing world.
India's grand strategy has evolved significantly since independence more than 70 years ago, but the country has had mixed success in achieving its objectives.
The rise of China and a dangerous impasse with Pakistan pose new challenges to New Delhi and are pushing a reluctant India into a closer partnership with the United States.
Despite key successes, India's economic problems are huge, and they remain the biggest barrier to rising to great power status.
Asia, and more specifically India, has emerged as a critical theater in a new era of great power competition. The contest between a U.S.-led alliance on one side and Russia and China on the other is reshaping India's grand strategy to becoming a world power. The world's second most populous country, which sees itself as one of humankind's great civilization-states, hopes to be secure and prosperous and one day spread its influence into all corners of the world. But recent conflict with China in the disputed Doklam area of Bhutan and with Pakistan in Kashmir has brought New Delhi's choices into sharp focus. And these conflicts are raising questions about the evolution of India's game plan in this fast-changing world.
The Big Picture
Stratfor's 2018 Second-Quarter Forecast notes that the competition between India and China will continue to play out and that the India-Pakistan rivalry will be further strained over Kashmir. This will lead India to forge a closer security partnership with the United States.
Empires, Colonialism and Partition
Geography and history have greatly influenced India's strategy and geopolitical objectives. India has long been recognized as one of the major centers of human civilization. Its size as a subcontinent, giant population and extensive diversity have given it a distinct identity in world history. However, it was rarely unified politically, except for in three periods: the Maurya, Gupta and Mughal dynasties, which each lasted roughly one to three centuries.The last of these was followed by British colonial rule, which lasted for nearly 200 years and introduced India to European norms and practices.
The arrival of European modernity led to two great ruptures in Indian history: colonialism and nationalism. Colonialism, which embodied many racist and exploitative practices, also laid the foundations of a modern nation-state. And nationalism motivated the Indian freedom struggle for a sovereign republic, with nonviolent mass resistance as its philosophy under the leadership of Mohandas Gandhi, known most prominently as Mahatma Gandhi.
Indian nationalists under Gandhi envisioned a pluralist India, but they were challenged by Muslim nationalism led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, demanding self-determination on the basis of religious identity. Differences between Indian and Muslim nationalists could not be bridged, and the gap led in 1947 to the partition of British India into two independent nation-states: India and Pakistan. In 1971 a third nation-state was born on the subcontinent when Bangladesh split off from Pakistan.
Ambitious Aspirations
Ever since independence in 1947, India has had three geopolitical objectives. Two are common to all nation-states: security and prosperity. India must physically protect the country and its 1.3 billion citizens. The South Asian nation also aims to lift many of those people out of poverty and to create a modern, wealthy society.
The third objective, however, is unique to a massive and ancient nation such as India. Acutely self-aware of its present and past, India seeks to create a world order that reflects the vitality of its civilization. In this sense, Indian aspirations parallel those of China, Europe and the United States.
Meeting these objectives requires a grand strategy, which is the way that a nation puts its resources to use in military, political, economic and other arenas to achieve its national goals. But ever since independence from Britain, constraints on resources have hampered India's highly ambitious objectives and its grand strategy. Given its beginnings as a poor and fragile post-colonial state, India had to start with basics. For the first few decades after independence, its grand strategy rested on four pillars: unity and territorial integrity, regional primacy, economic self-reliance, and non-alignment.
This strategy has evolved over time as domestic and international conditions have changed. Economic self-reliance was discarded for global integration, and non-alignment morphed into the more flexible doctrine of strategic autonomy, with a pronounced tilt toward the United States. However, both of these pillars are likely to come under pressure in the future. But unity and territorial integrity and regional primacy will persist as key elements of the strategy.
Holding it Together
India was a state before it became a nation — a situation common to many nationalist projects. Independence left India with a relatively thin government overseeing an enormously diverse population with six religions and 22 major and hundreds of minor languages. Therefore, independent India saw unity and territorial integrity as the most fundamental and essential pillar of its strategy. The challenge was particularly acute because of the wounds of partition, which had left a trail of mass slaughter in an enormous population exchange with Pakistan.
India first set out to rapidly amalgamate hundreds of monarchies left over from the British Empire. Most were small and joined voluntarily; those that did not, such as Hyderabad, were annexed. In 1961, Portuguese-ruled Goa came under Indian control. And claims by India and Pakistan on another monarchy, called Kashmir, eventually led to three wars between the two.
Unifying hundreds of millions of Indians into an overarching national identity was more challenging. India's deep commitment to democracy, federalism and pluralism was fundamentally an idealist project inspired by the freedom movement. But it was also a pragmatic approach for ensuring unification by granting its citizens participation, local control and wide latitude in expressing their cultural identities.
Defying the many predictions of its imminent demise, India has succeeded remarkably well in maintaining its unity and defeating the few secessionist challenges that have arisen. The overwhelming majority of Indians see no contradictions between their local and national identities. This was by no means an inevitable outcome; it came about because of the inclusive nature of the freedom movement and India's federal constitution. However, intermittent Hindu-Muslim tension, violence in Kashmir and insurgencies in its central forests and the northeast indicate that the unification of the homeland is incomplete.
Securing the Backyard
All great powers seek their own sphere of influence. Historically, it has been difficult for an aspiring state to become a true great power with an unfriendly or hostile backyard. India strives for regional primacy to ensure a ring of security around the country. But, fundamentally, regional primacy is also about the drive for a sphere of influence encompassing the subcontinent and the region around the Indian Ocean.
India has reacted badly to unfriendly great powers intruding in its backyard, especially when they have struck alliances with neighbors. Previously, this great power was the United States, when it formed an alliance with Pakistan during the Cold War. In recent times, the intruder has been China.
India has been largely unsuccessful in its quest for regional primacy. Though its cultural influence is strong throughout the region, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have historically maneuvered between India and an external power, most recently China. And Pakistan, a nuclear-armed power, is allied with Beijing, ruling out any possibility of bringing it into India's sphere. Only the smaller states of Bhutan, Nepal, Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles have been under India's shadow for a considerable time. But Nepal has been moving of late to triangulate between India and China, and the Maldives recently made a strategic U-turn with India watching on helplessly.
Reform, Indian-Style
In the years after independence, India's embrace of economic self-reliance initially led to some successes. Economic growth, at essentially zero for a century during colonial rule, picked up, and an industrial base was created. However, growth sputtered from the mid-1960s onward when the government doubled down on its infamous "license raj" — the high tariffs and excruciating red tape and bureaucratic control over the economy.
Reform began slowly in the 1980s but accelerated after 1991. In the years since, India has integrated substantially with global markets in key areas, has reduced tariffs to relatively low levels and has created export-driven global successes in information technology, automobiles, biotech, pharmaceuticals and select engineering goods. The post-reform gross domestic product has grown nearly fivefold to $2.4 trillion in over 25 years. The ratio of trade to GDP, a measure of global integration, has risen from about 15 percent in 1990 to peak at 56 percent in 2012. Renewable energy has expanded rapidly, as well, and the Indian diaspora, particularly in the United States, has helped kick off a startup culture back home.
However, the government has failed to create the needed jobs and to build adequate infrastructure. Agricultural distress is severe, water resources are stressed, and climate change is a gathering threat. Millions of Indian households remain undereducated, unelectrified and unhealthy. The expected dividend from having a youthful population is looking more like a demographic disaster. And many Indian businesses are seeing few gains from free trade agreements. All this is putting pressure on the country's commitment to the global-integration strategy.
A Reluctance Toward Alliances
From its inception in 1947, India saw the Cold War as a detriment to regional peace and its development. The principle of non-alignment helped carve out a third way in international politics. It was partly fueled by the idealism of the freedom movement. But lacking economic or military heft, New Delhi also saw non-alignment as a grand strategic play to enhance its influence across Asia and Africa. Anti-colonialism, nuclear disarmament and economic justice became the norm in Indian discourse.
However, the sobering reality of the Cold War caught up with India. When the dust had settled after three wars between 1962 and 1971 — one with China and two with Pakistan — India had effectively abandoned non-alignment and tilted toward the Soviet Union. In 1974, it conducted its first nuclear test, and weaponized sometime in the 1980s.
The winding down of the Cold War opened up a path for a strategic reversal, and a largely realist India now supports a flexible doctrine of strategic autonomy. It has increasingly tilted toward the United States, and that inclination is reflected in a sharp increase in defense deals, military exercises and expressions of common interests in the Indo-Pacific. But India continues to reject formal alliances and opposes foreign military bases on its soil.
And strategic autonomy is not without constraints. First, India has mostly failed to develop an indigenous defense industry, meaning that it must rely on foreign powers to equip its military. Russia remains its largest defense partner, but the United States, Israel and France are also key suppliers. Second, the shift to global economic integration has resulted in deep interdependence with other major powers.
Three Core Relationships
In the decade ahead, India's grand strategy must contend with three key countries: Pakistan, China and the United States. These relationships are also tied to the evolving global order.
Pakistan
Despite having many cultural commonalities, India's relationship with Pakistan is highly adversarial and has tremendously destructive potential. The roots of the hostility go back to colonial politics. The clash is not just over territory but also over ideology and increasingly over religion. Despite occasional bursts of progress toward a settlement, a vicious zero-sum game has come to characterize this cold war-like rivalry.
Though nuclear deterrence is a powerful damper on escalation, paradoxically it also lets Pakistan use its unconventional warfare to aid militancy in Kashmir and conduct lethal attacks, such as in Mumbai in 2008. India has generally failed to deter Pakistan in this area, and the resultant frustration is leading to more assertive tactics by New Delhi. These in turn have lowered the Pakistani threshold for nuclear use. A new crisis is extremely likely within a decade, and a major conflict entirely plausible.
China
For centuries, India and China lacked a history of conflict due to the near-impassable Himalayan barrier. But since their 1962 war, they have been strategic competitors. Overall, their rivalry is marked more by balancing games and minimally by hot conflict. China understands that India is the only nation with the population and size that could potentially challenge it in the long term. It worries about future Indian interdiction of vital energy supplies in the sea lanes of the Indian Ocean, suspects that India intends to create unrest in Tibet and is wary of greater Indo-U.S. security ties.
New Delhi on the other hand sees China as an aggressive power bent on encirclement through penetration into India's intended sphere of influence. It perceives long-standing Chinese nuclear, missile and economic assistance to Pakistan, especially with the $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, as a major strategic challenge. China has been mostly neutral in past India-Pakistan conflicts, but it may not be so the next time. Unresolved territorial disputes and incursions on its border are two other major issues. And, last but not least, a Chinese economy five times the size of India's represents a power differential that rankles.
India's four grand strategic pillars provide an unambiguous recipe on Pakistan — co-opt when possible and balance or contain if not — though the results have been decidedly mixed. However, on China the grand strategy itself leads to ambiguities. India's power is perhaps sufficient to deter China and protect the homeland, but it is insufficient for anything more. Containing China is impossible; balancing it on India's terms is extremely difficult. Engagement carries risks too. It's tricky to seek and accept membership in the Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization but block full Chinese membership in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.
India's global integration strategy too doesn't provide ready answers on China, which has become an economic behemoth. Such a strategy requires that a capital-starved India attract Chinese investment and work with Beijing's gigantic Belt and Road Initiative where it can. But fears of Chinese encirclement militate against such a compromise, and India also has to be careful to not provoke excessive Chinese opposition to its global goals.
Thus, India finds itself in an unenviable position on China. For now, it will likely muster all the friends it can, with the United States and Japan as key partners. The "Quad" — a counter to the Belt and Road Initiative being considered by Australia, the United States, India and Japan — is only an idea so far, but it has the potential to gel. Strategic ties with Vietnam and Taiwan also have a bright future. In the medium term, India's joint focus with its partners will primarily be on maritime and power projection activities in the region of the Indian Ocean.
Naval acquisitions spending, currently at 25 percent of India's defense acquisitions budget, is likely to increase, but overall defense spending is hamstrung by modest tax revenues. Therefore, the South China Sea will remain an overstretch. The Bay of Bengal, northern and coastal Myanmar and East Africa are more plausible as future arenas for Indo-Chinese friction, as are Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh. However, New Delhi will likely try to separate its security competition with Beijing from areas of mutual convergence.
The United States
Meeting the Chinese-Pakistani challenge would logically require an ally with sufficient heft. Enter the United States. If the United States were simply another great power rivaling China, India and the United States would have few problems consummating their security ties. But matters are not so simple. The United States is still the sole superpower with interests across the globe. China is the only potential rival to the United States, but they are in the most consequential bilateral economic relationship in history. This means U.S. priorities do not entirely coincide with Indian interests.
India's global integration strategy too doesn't provide ready answers on China, which has become an economic behemoth.
U.S. and Indian views do converge on the stability of the Indian Ocean region and the Indo-Pacific. But Washington has important interests in Pakistan and is hostile to Iran. The United States is also facing a coordinated global challenge from China and Russia.
However, India has deep defense ties with Russia, which, though drifting of late, will likely persist for the foreseeable future. And it needs Iran for energy and connectivity projects. New Delhi also occasionally gets anxious about an imagined grand global bargain between Washington and Beijing that sacrifices Indian concerns.
All these factors limit the formation of a comprehensive Indo-U.S. alliance. Any such alliance, however informal, also implies that India will have to accept a junior role. It will find it difficult to do so. But, as China rises, India's strategic autonomy doctrine is under steadily increasing pressure. Much will depend on the future trajectory of the
U.S.-China relationship.
Home and the World
India's grand strategy also has global objectives. While emerging as a global power is a distant dream, India still has sufficient influence to try to seek a better distribution of power in global institutions of trade, security, development, finance and climate action. India will deepen its participation in coalitions — the SCO, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum and the BRICS group, which also includes Brazil, Russia, China and South Africa — and other organizations to counter this institutional disadvantage. Brazil will be an important partner in these efforts. and India will also have to engage with China.
India will also place greater stress on its soft power, which is considerable, in order to lend legitimacy to its grand strategy. Afghanistan has been a success story in this regard. And the updated version of non-alignment's push for influence will be reflected in initiatives such as the International Solar Alliance, scholarships to India’s quality universities and greater development aid and disaster relief. But ambitious infrastructure initiatives such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor are capital-constrained and unlikely to gain much traction.
In the end, grand strategy, which relies on using its available resources to pursue national objectives, can only take India so far. Until India finds the elusive formula to achieve much greater prosperity, it will fall short in achieving its goals. Moreover, it has to do this while maintaining its unity, which in turn depends on the survival of its pluralist traditions. Ultimately, the journey to becoming a great power begins at home.
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By Phillip Orchard
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is flying to Wuhan for a weekend of soul searching with Chinese President Xi Jinping along the banks of the Yangtze. The last-minute trip is Modi’s second of three to China scheduled to take place within the span of a year. It’s also just the latest bit of high-level outreach from New Delhi to Beijing, which makes sense: Neither leader has a shortage of grievances to air with the other – and both have ample interest in preventing tit-for-tat confrontation from putting the two emerging powers on a collision course.
Over the past year, Indian and Chinese jostling for position in South Asia has picked up considerably. In July and August, Chinese and Indian forces engaged in a standoff over the disputed Doklam border region in the high Himalayas. Since then, China has continued cozying up to pro-Beijing governments in South Asian countries firmly within India’s traditional sphere of influence, from Sri Lanka to Nepal to the Maldives. China’s tool of choice in its effort has been its sprawling One Belt, One Road infrastructure initiative, with Beijing winning the rights to build strategically located deep-water ports, among other projects, throughout India’s periphery.
India sees this as an excuse for China to encircle it with de facto Chinese naval bases. (In India’s view, its fears were validated this week when China’s defense minister told his Pakistani counterpart that Beijing was ready to provide security for OBOR projects such as Pakistan’s Gwadar port.) In response, New Delhi has been sounding the alarm that participating countries risk becoming overly indebted to the Chinese, poking holes in Beijing’s narrative that OBOR is a force for the common good. India has been similarly busy in China’s backyard, deepening defense and economic cooperation with states that pose strategic problems to Beijing, such as Vietnam, the Philippines and Singapore. Most alarming to Beijing, India has joined Japan, Australia and the U.S. in taking early steps toward reviving “the Quad,” an alliance aimed at managing Chinese assertiveness and economic coercion in the broader Indo-Pacific region.
Yet, over the past three months, India has also been moving to defuse tension. New Delhi has dispatched a series of high-level officials to Beijing. It canceled a pro-Tibet conference headlined by the Dalai Lama in New Delhi. It quietly backed down after China threatened to take action to prevent India from intervening in a political crisis in the Maldives. Most notably, on April 26, it announced that it would not invite Australia to take part in major trilateral naval exercises with the U.S. and Japan in June, a setback for the Quad.
All this speaks to the uneasy trajectory of Sino-Indian relations. Realistically, neither country has much interest in duking it out for supremacy in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, as illustrated by the sense of urgency with which India has been seeking to head off a major confrontation, underlying forces are pushing the two sides into a self-perpetuating cycle of zero-sum competition anyway. And the deeper China and India sink into this spiral, the harder it will be for either side to pull out.
Unlikely Rivals
It’s a matter of course that two rising border rivals – both just beginning to get a taste for power projection – would increasingly bump up against each other as they attempt to carve out protective buffers and lock in their newfound gains. But historically, and for the most part still today, neither China nor India poses a major threat to the other’s homeland.
There is literally a huge barrier to war between the two countries. To move a substantial force between China and India, one option would be to cross the forbidding Himalayas. If, say, India were to effectively occupy Tibet, or China were to occupy Nepal, this would certainly pose a problem. But the logistics of warfare at 14,000 feet (4,300 meters) is exceedingly difficult, meaning both could feel reasonably secure with these regions existing as buffers, perhaps host to occasional shows of machismo that fall far short of risking all-out war. The other option is to sail more than 3,000 nautical miles through the turbulent waters flanking the Malay Peninsula and the Bay of Bengal. Attacking China this way is a non-starter for India. For China, it’s true that the pace of the People’s Liberation Army Navy modernization has been extraordinary, as illustrated by this week’s launch of sea trials for China’s first indigenous aircraft carrier. But China’s buildup is primarily intended to dominate its littoral waters and secure access through the first island chain, and it’s a long way from developing the combined air-sea battle capabilities needed to really challenge India from the sea.
Moreover, Beijing and New Delhi’s strategic orientations are in fundamentally different directions, in inherently poor positions to threaten the other’s critical interests farther afield. China’s core strategic problem is the series of maritime chokepoints to its east and south, which an outside naval power could use to sever China’s access to critical sea lines of communication. A powerful Indian navy could conceivably threaten Chinese oil imports from the Middle East or exports to Europe, but the Indian Ocean is vast, and India is a long way from having a navy capable of dominating critical sea lanes even if it had a reason to. India’s core strategic problem is its internal incoherence and the hostile nuclear power on its western border. If it had its way, India would mostly just be left alone to manage its internal fractures and keep Pakistan at bay.
The problem is that as China moves to address its primary strategic concerns to its east, secondary concerns to its southwest are becoming more important, making India, largely unwittingly, more of a potential threat. This is forcing India to respond in ways that further heighten the threat to China, which is forcing China to fix the Indian Ocean more firmly in its sights, which is forcing India to reach out to outside powers like the U.S., and so on. This cycle will only intensify as military developments diminish the significance of the geographic barriers that have largely preserved an uneasy peace.
Necessary Choices
China is finding little choice but to push into South Asia. It needs to find ways to bypass chokepoints in the East and South China seas, so it needs to build deep-water ports, pipelines and rail lines in India’s backyard. It’s under pressure to keep its domestic industries humming and its oligarchs happy to prevent destabilizing power struggles at home, so it needs to bribe, cajole or coerce local governments into awarding Chinese firms the rights to build them. Since it doesn’t have the trillions of dollars needed to fund the entirety of the initiative on its own, it needs to use every tool of state power at its disposal to win projects on the most favorable terms possible. Inevitably, some of these will have to be built in notoriously restive regions – some of which will become more unstable as OBOR projects exacerbate social and environmental tensions – so it needs to push for permission to use its security forces to do what security forces from weaker host states may not be able to do. And to prepare for a potential conflict that blocks its maritime chokepoints, China needs to develop the naval forces to keep its backup outlets open and counter enemy forces coming from the west – and this means it needs to establish bases and logistics facilities abroad to support them.
China has relatively little fear of India’s own military trajectory – a fact underscored regularly, including this week, by derisive commentary in Chinese state media – even if India would have a considerable home-field advantage if a conflict broke out in the Indian Ocean. But an India tightly aligned with the U.S. and its regional allies would rightfully be alarming to Beijing. Such an alliance would help make up for the dramatic shortfall in Indian capabilities, of course, while allowing India to expand its presence dramatically without taking on a long-term project of developing overseas bases and logistics facilities. A string of recent agreements with both the U.S. and France will aid in this regard. More important, it would ease the burden on the U.S. in a potential conflict with China, allowing the Americans to amass forces where needed while trusting partners like India and Australia to provide support from the flanks.
For India, the validity of China’s strategic fears is meaningless, as is the reality that China is currently too weak to project substantial power into the Indian Ocean. Whatever China’s intentions, India feels encircled by a country with a voracious appetite for power – one that happens to be arming New Delhi’s most dangerous rival and intent on building a bluewater navy – putting it at an intolerable long-term risk of a two-front war.
Still, New Delhi is caught between conflicting interests here and struggling somewhat to find its footing. It doesn’t want to push its neighbors into China’s orbit by trying to deny them the Chinese aid and investment their economies may need. But its influence with these states would suffer if it were seen as a pushover, incapable of countering Chinese coercion. Already, China has ample cause to think that if it pushes, India will be the first to back down. New Delhi needs the Quad to pose a credible deterrent and persuade China that its best interest is to rise within the established order. Yet, lately, the U.S. has proved to be something of an aloof and inconsistent security partner, and India can’t build a strategy around an outside power that may not show up in a crisis.
Thus, while neither country wants a fight, India wants it less. This will make India an exceedingly reluctant Quad partner, keen to avoid coordinated actions that make China feel backed into a corner. But it will be a Quad partner nonetheless. China can’t back down without sacrificing its core imperatives, and India’s lack of options in the matter will become increasingly apparent.
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Despite the size and importance of the massive interconnected river system China and India share (along with Nepal, Bhutan and Bangladesh), no integrated structure exists for its management, and the bilateral agreements that govern it are far from sufficient.
Political disputes, such as the 2017 standoff over the Doklam Plateau, could harm the waterways China and India share.
Unless the countries agree to institute a basinwide mechanism for water management, the river systems they both depend on will be at risk.
Nearly a year after their standoff on the Doklam Plateau began, India and China are trying to get their relationship back on track. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi met with Chinese President Xi Jinping late last month in Wuhan with just that goal in mind, and though their summit was more spectacle than substance, it was nonetheless a necessary step toward resolution. The informal meeting gave the two leaders a prime opportunity to lay aside, however briefly, their countries' long-standing differences and focus on topics of mutual concern, such as climate change, food security and natural disasters. Yet one related issue was missing from the agenda: water. If Beijing and New Delhi fail to address the matter, the repercussions will likely be devastating for the region, its inhabitants and its environment.
From Yarlung Tsangpo to Brahmaputra
Along with thousands of kilometers of disputed border, a few important waterways run between China and India. The headwaters of the Indus River, for example, originate in China. In addition, the mighty Brahmaputra River, known in China as the Yarlung Tsangpo, flows through both countries on its way to the Bay of Bengal. That waterway links up with the Meghna and Ganges rivers in Bangladesh, forming a system that carries around 138 million liters (364.6 million gallons) during the flood season — a volume more than one and a half times that of the Amazon River. But as a 2016 report by the United Nations Environment Program and its partners found, The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin is also the world's most vulnerable delta, based on more than a dozen key indicators.
Despite the size and importance of the massive interconnected river system, no basinwide integrated structure exists for its management, and the bilateral agreements that govern it are far from sufficient. Part of the problem is that China, which borders 14 countries and shares over 42 major water bodies, has refused to be a part of an institutionalized water management system. On its fast track toward development, the country has had to tackle the challenges of geography and water head on. China today has built more dams than the rest of the world combined as part of a resource management strategy designed to alleviate water scarcity in 11 of its provinces. For India, many of these constructions have downstream effects on its own water supply — especially China's South-North Water Diversion Project, which draws water from the Yarlung Tsangpo on the western line.
New Delhi, however, will have to take a balanced and strategic approach to negotiating with Beijing over the waterways they share. India, after all, has its own water management and development plans in the works, including the recently launched "National River Linking Project." Like China, it has strained relations with other neighbors over shared waters and has thrown its weight around in bilateral negotiations. As a result, India has caught flak from neighboring countries such as Bangladesh for its "hypocritical" demands of China. The Indian government probably will find working with Beijing on the water issue more useful for the region and for the future of shared waters than accusing China of infringing on its rights.
Water management depends on mutual trust and understanding.
Water Management
Beyond politics, a lack of concrete data across the river basins also muddies the waters between China and India. The two countries keep what information they do have a closely guarded secret, and in the absence of a transnational water management system, they have little legal recourse to question the other country. China in particular has struggled to balance the interests and demands of its downstream neighbors with its own national interests. It has, however, proposed diplomatic initiatives from time to time to ease tensions over shared water resources, including the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism. It also has reached an agreement with India and Bangladesh to share hydrological data about the Yarlung Tsangpo during monsoon season to alert the downstream states about possible flooding, one of the main problems in the river basin.
But water management depends in large part on mutual trust and understanding. The standoff between China and India last year on the Doklam Plateau strained their volatile relationship and, in turn, jeopardized their water security. In May 2017, China did not provide India the hydrological data as required, and though it cited technical issues, its omission nevertheless aroused suspicion in New Delhi of a political motive. A string of meetings between the two countries at various levels of government have since calmed the waters; the 11th meeting of the India-China Expert Level Mechanism on Transborder Rivers in March, moreover, ensured that Beijing would give New Delhi the necessary water data this year as usual.
Still, unless the countries agree to institute a basinwide mechanism for water management, the river systems they both depend on will be at risk. The lingering points of contention between India and China, including border disputes and Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative, will continue to spill over into their water-sharing arrangement. Historical trends indicate that water forms a small subset of the political dialogue, and it isn't likely to command much more attention anytime soon. Together with the challenges of climate change and population growth, these issues will increase the strain on the countries' water supply, public health and food security. Even so, as other countries around the world have demonstrated, cooperation is possible.
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India’s home minister is on a three-day visit to Mongolia. Which sort of makes sense: China makes a play for Nepal, India makes a play for Mongolia. The neutrality of Mongolia is a major facet of China-Russia relations. How far India can push in here is a useful gauge of Indian strengths and intentions.
India and the U.S. are reportedly preparing to sign two more bilateral military pacts that, among other things, would give India greater access to more advanced U.S. military technologies and platforms.
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The defense ministers of India and China are trying to regain each other’s confidence. China’s will soon travel to New Delhi, and India’s will take a goodwill tour of China next week. The ministers will also set up a hotline between their armies to reduce the risk of conflict breaking out. These mark the first high-level military visits since the standoff at Doklam, where it appeared the two militaries were on the brink of conflict. Token ministerial niceties aren’t enough to allay the deeply held concerns each side has of the other, but the countries appear to be setting aside their differences to manage matters at home and deal with the United States.
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https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/india-inches-closer-united-states
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https://warontherocks.com/2018/11/ten-years-after-mumbai-the-group-responsible-is-deadlier-than-ever/
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China and India pretend they’re not playing a bigger game. Several stories from the past week illustrate the precariousness of the Indo-Pacific competition. The Chinese government has denied that it used Kenya’s port in Mombasa as collateral for its funding of a rail line that will connect the port to Nairobi. This comes a week after a leaked report from Kenya’s auditor general’s office showed that, when the rail deal was struck in 2013, the Kenyan government had agreed to waive its sovereignty over the port – which China built – if it fails to repay the loan.
:-o :-o :-o :-o :-o :-o :-o :-o :-o
In Pakistan, meanwhile, the government insisted that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) — one of China’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative projects — had no military purpose. This comes a week after a New York Times report claimed Beijing and Islamabad had a secret agreement to build fighter jets and other military assets in Pakistan as part of the CPEC deal.
On Thursday, official sources in India told PTI that New Delhi is not pursuing any new military facilities in the Maldives in exchange for some $1.4 billion in assistance it provided to help Male pay back massive loans from Beijing.
Chinese and Indian aid and investment in Indo-Pacific countries shouldn’t be seen solely as sinister “debt traps” to gain military advantage. Both countries have plenty of reasons to invest there that have nothing to do with their geopolitical competition. But the fact of the matter is that strategic location is the main factor drawing outside interest to countries like Kenya, Pakistan and the Maldives. The latest round of denials from Beijing and New Delhi merely illustrates just how much both countries are concerned about managing domestic political blowback in these states — and, therefore, just how flimsy any security strategy that hinges on fleeting political influence abroad would be.
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When it comes to military spunk, no Indian politician shows it off like Narendra Modi. The prime minister sometimes dons camouflage to celebrate Diwali, the Hindu festival of lights, with troops on the borders with China and Pakistan.
While inaugurating a film museum last month, Mr. Modi greeted the audience with a catch phrase from “Uri: The Surgical Strike,” a recent Bollywood hit about a 2016 military operation in which Indian soldiers entered Pakistani-controlled territory to take out purported terrorist training camps. The prime minister often cites the episode to contrast his muscular leadership with the allegedly feckless opposition.
Unfortunately, Mr. Modi’s spending priorities do not match his rhetoric. Last week’s federal budget—a stopgap exercise before national elections this spring—underscores his habit of choosing butter over guns.
The budget promises income support for poor farmers, increased outlays for a government health-insurance scheme, tax cuts for the middle class, and pensions for workers in informal businesses. Though the $60.9 billion earmarked for defense is the most ever in absolute terms—and an 8% increase over last year—defense outlays have dipped to a modest 2.1% of gross domestic product.
That decline is made worse because much of India’s military budget is consumed by salaries for its bloated 1.4-million-strong army, rather than for buying weapons and investing in new technologies. Inflation and a weakening rupee—India imports about two-thirds of its military hardware—crimp the budget further.
For the U.S., which is cooperating more closely with New Delhi as a hedge against Beijing’s expansionism, the long-term risks of India’s tight military spending ought to cause concern. Each year India falls further behind China’s rapidly modernizing military.
“India’s aspirations are always lofty,” says Ashley Tellis, an expert on Asian geopolitics at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. “But there’s a huge disconnect with what would allow them to achieve those ambitions.”
On the surface, India’s military spending looks robust: It ranked 10th in the world in 2007, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. By 2017 it had climbed to fifth, behind the U.S., China, Saudi Arabia and Russia. India is also the world’s largest importer of arms.
Yet this may not be enough. Thanks to populist politics, defense spending has declined steadily, from 3.5% of GDP in the mid-1980s. China’s vastly larger economy allows it to allocate almost four times as much to defense as India—$228 billion in 2017.
Then there’s the quality of spending. Delhi’s Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses estimates that the approximately $14 billion India spends each year on defense-related pensions—including for civilians who work in state-owned defense companies and research organizations—exceeds what it spends on weapons. A generous pension plan enacted by the Modi government in 2015 accounts for some of the skew.
As recently as 2011, the military managed to hold personnel expenditures to 60% and leave 40% for weapons. According to IDSA, personnel costs now consume two-thirds of military spending. At the same time, the rupee has declined about 12% against the dollar over the past 13 months, meaning even less money to acquire expensive ships, aircraft and submarines from overseas. Take inflation into account and India’s generals and admirals command less resources this year than last.
“The Indian military is not getting the bang for its buck that the headline figures would suggest,” says Walter Ladwig, a military expert who teaches at King’s College in London. “The International Institute for Strategic Studies shows that India has surpassed the United Kingdom in defense spending, but meanwhile nearly 70% of the Indian army’s hardware is considered vintage.”
Increasing weapons funding will be essential if India’s defensive capabilities are to match its increasing commitments. On Mr. Modi’s watch, India has spoken more forcefully about freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and signed two long-pending agreements that make it easier to cooperate with the U.S. military. India has also helped revive the Quad, a consultative grouping of the region’s most powerful democracies—the U.S., Japan, India and Australia. Cumulative U.S. arms sales to India—virtually nonexistent two decades ago—have surpassed $18 billion.
Nobody in Washington expects New Delhi to match Beijing’s defense spending, but if India falls too far behind China, its allure as a democratic bulwark in the Indo-Pacific will diminish greatly. In India itself, policy makers will be tempted to kowtow to Beijing rather than stand up to it.
Mr. Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment believes that the next 10 to 15 years will be crucial. “For the U.S., that’s the million-dollar question,” he says. “If India continues along this path, does our bet on it become a failed bet?”
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Pak terrorist attack in India, 40 soldiers dead
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/army-to-decide-time-place-of-response-pm-modi-on-pulwama-attacks/articleshow/68017083.cms
I would not be surprised if India retaliates, elections are on the horizon and Modi is anyway a nationalist. Last time when pakis killed 18 in Uri, India launched surgical strikes on terrorist launch pads. This time 40 died, response has to be harder.
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Interesting comment today by a former admiral of great experience on Hugh Hewitt:
Sorry I did not catch his name and can't find a transcript.
'By 2060 the world will be tri-lateral with the US, China and India.'
I also think so but don't see much yet for evidence of it coming.
Note that he omitted Russia, Europe, ...
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Re: India, it is common knowledge that India will make it into the top 3 economies within a decade. I dont expect poverty to disappear...but a 10 Trillion economy is in the cards. I read somewhere, India has already overtaken France and Russia in size of economy and will overtake the UK this year.
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Thank you ya. Also it seems India should be a natural ally of the US although there always seems to be something at least partly screwing that up.
Now that we are done with Pakistan maybe that partnership can grow.
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Waiting game going on in India. Waiting to strike Pak. Problem is that this time the pakis are on high alert, so a surprise attack or even a surgical strike is difficult. Public expectations are high so a small strike will not cut it. The hope is that Modi will give orders to occupy some territory or send a few cruise missiles to terrorist headquarters.
Note: This is the first time that the pakis are not playing their nuclear card. Usually they brandish it over every small thing. This means they know punishment is coming their way.
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By one measure, purchasing power parity PPP, India already has the third largest GDP in the world.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_rankings_of_India#Economy
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Note 2: Pakis carried out a second strike at around the same time in Iran, I think 17 Iranis were killed. The Iranians are mad and this strike occured just before MBS (Mr Bone Saw) visited Pak (Pakis trying to impress their guest).
So pakis think they have their bases covered. In good books with MBS wrt to Iran and blackmailing the US about a potential Afghan withdrawal. Unfortunately, as usual their strategic brilliance (sarcasm) will show through.
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An American friend of distinguished military background who was in Pakistan in 1995 recommends this article:
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/02/india-pakistan-american-foreign-policy-south-asia/
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The article gets it right on most things, but is very simplistic. It still reeks of US arrogance, e.g. that they can ask Pak to control their jihadis and in return India will keep its missiles on their side of the border etc.
Those days are long gone, the US could never control Pak, even when US interests were threatened !, infact the OBL episode showed how pak played with the US. In India, to take revenge and hit Pak back hard is a political imperative for the Modi govt, otherwise he will lose the election. What is likely to happen is that amongst other actions, India will undertake limited strikes in POK (Pak Occupied Kashmir), which India believes is territory they have a right to, and Pak will be forced to lie low because Pak proper has not been hit, while at the same time it would result in sufficient embarrassment for the Pak generals.
In anycase, the US is also not in a position to object to India striking Pak, the US sells weapons to India and if the Indians cannot use their weapons when they want, then why buy from the US.. The Pak nuclear bluff will be called, yet again, because Indian nuclear doctrine says that use of a nuclear device on Indian troops, even on paki territory (so called use of tactical weapons against the Cold Start doctrine) will result in a devastating nuclear counter response.
What the article does not capture is the anger in India at the moment, for decades India has suffered from a policy of a 1000 cuts by Pak. This is the reason a strike is inevitable.
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As luck would have it, shortly after I posted here, India bombs Paki terror camps deep inside Khyber Pakhtunwa near Abbottabad of OBL fame. Developing story..
Note added: There seem to be two Balakots, one in pak occupied Kashmir (POK) and another in Khyber Pakhtunwa. Looks like the bombing was in POK. Also bombed Chakoti and Muzaffarabad training centers using 1000 kg precision guided bombs.
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I hope this isn’t meaningful in a Serbian Archduke sort of way.
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No worries
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/D0Tg9huW0AE3oiO.jpg)
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Dq_3uxqX0AEY3o8.jpg (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Dq_3uxqX0AEY3o8.jpg)
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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/live-updates-india-carries-out-air-strikes-on-terror-camps-in-pakistan/liveblog/68161990.cms?fbclid=IwAR16QJ7HigB8b4JRZwwEmTRL3ObzsjhQMNMUBT8KLg2stQFZVHKNjHbx5-0
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Now that the dust has settled somewhat..this strike is important for several reasons. Several sacred cows were shot down.
1. In the last Kargil war, the Indian Airforce was asked to not enter Paki territory, for fear of escalation, with threat of nuclear war.
2. In the last surgical strike (response to Uri attack, 18 killed), India entered Paki territory at 5 places to take down terrorist launching pads. India had not officially entered paki territory since 50 years!. They could not acknowledge the surgical strike, for that would be a loss of face, and hence they could not avenge it either!.
3. In the current strike, which was in response to the Pulwama terrorist attack (40 soldiers killed), India not only used airpower (a major escalation), but bombed terrorist headquarters and training facility in Pak proper. This was another sacred cow, that India would not have the guts to bomb Paki territory, only POK (which is disputed territory). Pakis had emptied out the terrorist launch pads in POK after the Pulwama attack, since they knew there would be a response. They withdrew them to a major terrorist training center in Paki territory, which we were not supposed to hit. Infact they concentrated several hundreds of them there, along with their trainers. This is a huge loss for them.
4. India has claimed that they did a "non-military (target) strike, pre-emptively". If India had bombed eg ISI HQ, that would be a military target and a declaration of war. Instead, India bombed JEM head quarters which was in an isolated location, so civilians were not hurt. Now Pak is in a bind. They have acknowledged that Indian planes entered Pak, but have not accepted that they bombed JEM HQ. They cannot accept that, because supposedly there are no terrorist HQ in Pak. They cannot even acknowledge that Indian planes entered Paki territory for more than a few minutes, for then the question becomes what was the Paki airforce doing, especially since they were all alert with their radars switched on waiting for India to strike. So if India did not really enter Pak, and did not bomb JEM HQ, since that does not exist, how can they respond ?
5. Pak is stuck, there are no terrorists in India, so they cant do an equivalent bombing raid. They cannot hit military targets, for that would be their demise and they cannot cause a major terrorist act, for that would prove they are a terrorist nation and result in an even bigger response from India. So they are now doing some artillery fire at the border and venting. It is particularly galling for pakis, since their PM, Imran Khan just 2 days ago gave a speech indicating that Pak would retaliate if India did anything. So we wait for them to respond, dont think it will happen in the near future.
6. This may just be teh initial response from India, if Pak responds militarily, expect another serious escalation from India.
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Watch the body language of the Paki war cabinet after the attack,
sheepish, deep sighs
https://twitter.com/i/status/1100358565280198656
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In yesterday's happenings, a few paki F-16's moved towards the Indian border, ostensibly to bomb a military ammo storage and army depot. They never entered India, a mig-21 (Soviet era aircraft) got involved, shot an F-16, gave chase and was shot down over POK and captured. Paki's have beat him up a bit and paraded him around for propaganda purposes. Since pakis responded by hitting military targets, expect an Indian response. Western news media for some reason are parrotting the Pak story that 2 planes were shot down. India always acknowledges its own casualties, unless the pakis are being clever by half and including their own plane in the casualty figures.
Below is a link to the air situation..Pak is nearly completely devoid of planes, India has an air-advisory on the border areas, but otherwise things are normal.
(https://www.radarbox24.com/@26.39187,75.91553,z6)
https://www.radarbox24.com/@26.39187,75.91553,z6 (https://www.radarbox24.com/@26.39187,75.91553,z6)
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https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/heavy-firing-across-line-of-control-in-poonch/articleshow/68194642.cms?fbclid=IwAR2VDOl6FPj3Wp1J5oWTGQvfplFMeAUDwcKma1alYwbsq6M6K7rhmXo-6A0
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So here's the important news:
Indian mig-21 shot down an F-16, Indian pilot who was captured is being released in the next few hours. India lost a Mig-21, Pak lost a F-16 with 2 pilots.
Looks like things are descalating, since Pakis are returning the pilot promptly. India claims goals achieved with respect to JEM, several hundred terrorists and their trainers killed.
Implications:
- A new standard has been set, i.e. India will use air force to bomb terror camps in Pak. So any significant terrorist attack will be punished even if Modi govt is not there. The public will demand it. The nuclear bogey which Pak held over India's head has been demolished.
- Unfortunately for the Pakis, a lowly Mig-21 shooting down their F-16 is bad news in several aspects. a) USA is pissed, the F-16's were stipulated for use in bombing only against their own population (taliban). b) Lockheed-Martin will be upset, now they cannot sell their F-16 line to India, and perhaps not even the "F-21"which is really a souped up F-16. India is currently looking for a partner to make fighter jets in India and Lockheed is unlikely to be a contender.
- The threat of war and another humiliating strike in Pak remains in Pak's future.
- Rumor is the pakis are browning their shalwars since Indian Mirages were able to bomb Pak and return home safely. They could very easily also bomb military GHQ.
Unless Pak plays some trick and does nor release the Indian pilot, I expect de-escalation... unless India does one more strike against other terror groups.
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Caught on the wrong foot, what will Pak do now ?
Read more at: https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panorama/caught-wrong-foot-what-will-720546.html
https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panorama/caught-wrong-foot-what-will-720546.html (https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/panorama/caught-wrong-foot-what-will-720546.html)
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India and Pakistan back away from the precipice, for now. Pakistan has released the Indian pilot of the MiG-21 that was shot down in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir on Wednesday, providing an opening for de-escalation. Pakistan reopened its airspace and said it accepted Moscow’s offer to mediate. (India hasn’t responded to the offer yet, but it’s unlikely to spurn Russia, its most important defense partner.) Notably, though, satellite images released by several sources suggest that India’s initial attack on an alleged terrorist training camp did little if any damage to the facility, undercutting India’s claims that 200-300 terrorists were killed in their sleep. To whatever extent the operation was motivated by domestic political factors (Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is facing a tough re-election fight in April and May), the apparent failure of the operation may keep public pressure high on New Delhi to demonstrate an ability to manage cross-border militant threats. But regardless of the success of the airstrikes themselves, that India launched the operation over Pakistani soil has already made an important point clear: The risk of matters escalating into nuclear war, which has deterred India from undertaking major cross-border operations following terrorist attacks in the past, won’t automatically keep India on such a short leash going forward.
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seems like every several yrs or so we read the pakistan - india tensions increasing
some threats and shouts and talk about nucs.
Then it all dies down and drops off the radar.
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Re: the satellite images, there is a lot of misinformation floating around, much has been debunked on Indian fora. The govt has not released information, but they likely will as elections near. The reason to not release such information is that the govt does not want to politicize the military and for Pak to save face. If it becomes open knowledge that Indian planes bombed Pak territory and got away with it, the paki population will demand retribution and Imran Khan the paki PM and the army would need to do something stupid. The pakis are masters at hiding their losses and dead.
Same for the downed US F-16, the implications of which have not yet been fully appreciated*. At this time the message has gone through to the Pakistani GHQ and they know what happened. This is similar to the last surgical strike, where the govt did not release any info, but then slowly it leaked later on and even a block buster movie was made and released about a month ago.
The main point of this strike as CraftyDog points out was "The risk of matters escalating into nuclear war, which has deterred India from undertaking major cross-border operations following terrorist attacks in the past, won’t automatically keep India on such a short leash going forward.". Compare with the situation during the Taj terror bombing under the Congress govt, 174 dead, 300 wounded and no response from India. Infact, now the public will expect swift retribution after any major Pak terror act, independent of the govt in power and every time the response will be harder (atleast under the Modi govt). In Bollywood mad India, Modi who speaks colloquially, recently indicated , this bombing was just the movie trailer, with the actual movie to come later. Modi and current NSA Doval are hardliners. As a side note, since Modi has been in power, he has used Indian forces 4 times, a) Surgical strike on Pak, b) Surgical strike inside Myanmar, c) Doklam standoff with China, where China backed down, d) The current Balakot bombing.
In other news: at the Line of Control (LOC), artillery firefights are ongoing, albeit with higher calibre weapons. For the moment, I consider this venting by both sides, unless something significant gets hit, at which point things will escalate again.
*
Read more at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/68229883.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
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In recent happenings: As a counter to media reports who indicate that the target was missed..
Maulana Ammar, brother of JEM Chief Masood Azhar wails immediately after the strike that their training facility and seminary was hit.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-jets-hit-school-of-jihad-says-azhars-brother-in-audio/articleshow/68238334.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-jets-hit-school-of-jihad-says-azhars-brother-in-audio/articleshow/68238334.cms)
In BBC interview with pak FM, interviewer indicates JEM magazine confirms strike on the training facility
https://youtu.be/0lxafFJLrqI
A lot of highranking JEM officials were there for graduation type speeches for the new class of recruits, paki ISI officials were present and also killed....perhaps even JEM Chief Masood Azhar (not confirmed) was halaled.
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In recent happenings: As a counter to media reports who indicate that the target was missed..
Maulana Ammar, brother of JEM Chief Masood Azhar wails immediately after the strike that their training facility and seminary was hit.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-jets-hit-school-of-jihad-says-azhars-brother-in-audio/articleshow/68238334.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/indian-jets-hit-school-of-jihad-says-azhars-brother-in-audio/articleshow/68238334.cms)
In BBC interview with pak FM, interviewer indicates JEM magazine confirms strike on the training facility
https://youtu.be/0lxafFJLrqI
A lot of highranking JEM officials were there for graduation type speeches for the new class of recruits, paki ISI officials were present and also killed....perhaps even JEM Chief Masood Azhar (not confirmed) was halaled.
Nice!
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In the Indian Elections, Voters Will Weigh Jobs Against Security
Supporters hold up flags in support of the Indian National Congress (INC) party during the launch of the party's campaign in Punjab ahead of India’s upcoming elections.
Highlights
Prime Minister Narendra Modi rode to victory in 2014 on a message of economic prosperity, but given India's lackluster job creation in recent years, that will be a difficult sell in the next election.
To fire up support for his re-election, Modi will, therefore, shift the focus of his 2019 campaign to development and national security matters.
To challenge Modi, India's opposition parties' will attempt to paint him as corrupt, though such tactics will only feed into the prime minister's narrative that the opposition platform lacks substance.
Regardless of the upcoming election's outcome, however, the next government in New Delhi will be forced to grapple with creating jobs while advancing the country's lagging industrialization.
Editor's Note: This assessment is part of a series of analyses supporting Stratfor's upcoming 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast. These assessments are designed to provide more context and in-depth analysis on key developments over the next quarter.
The defining event of the Indian political calendar is just weeks away. By May, over half a billion voters will choose 543 representatives to serve in India's lower house of parliament. The elections, which are the world's largest democratic exercise, will take place over several weeks, and the stakes are high: Narendra Modi, the most powerful Indian prime minister in a generation, is leading his incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) against a raft of opposition parties under the Indian National Congress (INC) banner, all unifying in a bid to dislodge him from power.
In 2014, the BJP's victory marked the first single-party majority in nearly three decades. And now, the party is looking to set another precedent in Indian politics by achieving successive non-Congress majority governments. But aside from having the INC as its main opponent, the environment that handed the BJP its victory five years ago bears little resemblance to the one it faces in 2019 — this will force Modi to recalibrate his campaign tactics to secure his place in power.
The Big Picture
As India prepares for national elections, Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party is fending off a tough challenge from nearly two dozen opposition parties unifying in a bid to dislodge him from power. Modi's critics argue that he is prone to corruption and has not done enough to create jobs and boost the economy. The prime minister is countering with the assertion that his mission is not yet complete, while zeroing-in on national security as a critical issue in the upcoming election, which is traditionally a strong point of the BJP's platform. Escalating tensions with Pakistan will give Modi the opportunity he needs to shore up support ahead of the election.
See India's Own Worst Enemy
That Was Then
The BJP owes its historic victory in 2014 to several factors. Numerous corruption allegations against the Indian National Congress (INC), for one, had hobbled the then-ruling party's re-election prospects after a decade in power — thereby widening the BJP's path to New Delhi by playing up an anti-corruption platform.
When it came to the two party leaders, Modi also outshined and outperformed INC President Rahul Gandhi by positioning himself as a stronger and more capable leader. Modi's campaign hinged on the message of economic prosperity — promising to bring his successes as the three-term chief minister of Gujarat, where he oversaw rapid growth and industrialization, to the national level.
Paired with this universally appealing narrative, Modi's humble origins (as the son of a tea seller) also enabled the BJP to expand from its traditional base of urban, upper-caste Hindu voters by rousing the support of more lower-caste voters. A descendant of India's Nehru-Gandhi political dynasty, Rahul Gandhi, by contrast, hailed from a long line of former prime ministers. And next to Modi, he came across as inexperienced and entitled — relying on the prestige of his namesake to win, rather than his wits.
And as a result, the 2014 election yielded a gain of 282 parliamentary seats for the BJP, along with a humiliating loss of 44 seats for the INC — dropping the INC to its lowest-ever seat count after decades as the dominating force in Indian politics.
This Is Now
But a lot has happened since the BJP's rise to power in 2014. And while Rahul Gandhi's critiques against Modi remain pointed, the political landscape otherwise bears little resemblance to the one that led him to his victory five years ago.
In 2014, Modi unveiled his "Make in India" campaign to create millions of jobs and position India as a global manufacturing hub and an attractive investment destination. Getting the campaign to work, however, has proved difficult — bolstering manufacturing jobs is challenging in a country whose lopsided transition from an agricultural-based to a services-driven economy partially skipped over industrialization.
In recent years, India has faced slowing economic growth and labor market deficiencies. With the national unemployment rate at a more than two and a half-year high at 7.2 percent, a recent survey found employment was the top concern among Indian voters. Unsurprisingly, Modi's failure to create jobs as promised represents a core concern for the BJP's election prospects.
In adjusting to this new reality, Modi has focused his 2019 campaign on development and continuity — arguing that the BJP's mission of transforming India's economy remains unfinished and that the party, therefore, deserves another term to see it through. This shift has been evidenced by some of Modi's recent trips in the country, which include inaugurating a hospital in Karnataka; launching national highways in Tamil Nada; announcing a national pension plan in Gujarat; laying the foundation stone for a temple beautification project in Uttar Pradesh; and commencing a refinery expansion project in Bihar.
But in addition to focusing on boosting development in the country, Modi will also zero-in on national security as a critical issue in the upcoming election, which is traditionally a strong point of the BJP's platform. Escalating tensions with Pakistan — which erupted in reciprocal airstrikes between the two countries in February after a militant bombing in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir — will give Modi just the opportunity he needs to rally up support ahead of the election by positioning himself as the leader best-suited to defend the nation against Islamabad and other outside threats.
While Modi's candidacy may not be as strong as it was in 2014, he will still prove difficult to beat.
Meanwhile, in an effort to take back the parliament, Rahul Gandhi and his INC party have led a monthslong campaign accusing Modi of impropriety in a French fighter jet deal worth billions. But Modi has largely floated above these allegations of corruption so far — dismissing them as the last-ditch efforts of a desperate opposition party, whose agenda contains little substance beyond a shared disdain for himself and the BJP.
India's 17th Lok Sabha elections nonetheless come at a volatile time in the country, with a rapidly expanding economy that desperately needs to produce more jobs, rising farmer angst as a result of collapsing crop prices, lagging industrialization and increasing social tensions pertaining to religion and caste. And then there is the growing threat of China's expansion into South Asia.
While Modi's candidacy may not be as strong as it was in 2014, he will still prove difficult — but not impossible — to beat. Regardless of who wins the election, though, the next Indian government will inherit a country at a crossroads. New Delhi must balance immense challenges against the tremendous possibilities afforded by a country with India's geopolitical profile. But everything hinges on the effectiveness of India's leadership and the direction the country chooses to take, and that will be decided at the ballot box in the coming weeks.
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It is expected that Modi will form the next government...hard to imagine otherwise.
On the Pak front: Low level hostilities continue, India has so far shot down 4 intruding paki drones. If the pakis mount another terror attack before the elections, things will get interesting.
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https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/what-will-follow-us-withdrawal-afghanistan/155311/ (https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2019/03/what-will-follow-us-withdrawal-afghanistan/155311/)
What Will Follow a U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan?
BY ABDULKADER SINNO
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, INDIANA UNIVERSITY, THE CONVERSATION
MARCH 6, 2019
How did we get here, and what comes next?
The United States and the Taliban may be nearing an agreement to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan after more than 17 years of conflict.
In return, the Taliban would commit to refusing access to anti-American organizations such as al-Qaida on its territory.
How did we get to this point – and what will be the consequences of such an agreement?
As a longtime scholar of Afghanistan’s wars and conflict dynamics, I suggest beginning with a bit of history.
The current conflict began when the Bush administration invaded Afghanistan a few weeks after 9/11.
It was on Afghan soil that Osama bin Laden hatched the plot to attack the U.S. The Taliban, the de facto rulers of much of Afghanistan in the wake of a bloody civil war, had given bin Laden and his supporters shelter.
Two months into the U.S. invasion, Taliban state institutions and defensive positions crumbled and the United States formed new state institutions led by Afghans who had fought the Taliban. The U.S. maintained a limited force to fight and capture al-Qaida and Taliban leaders but otherwise invested little in the Afghan economy or society.
It took the Taliban four years to reconstitute itself as an effective force of insurgents to fight the U.S. and the Afghan government, and they became stronger every year after 2004. As I explain in my research, the United States and the coalition of 42 countries it formed to defeat the resurgent Taliban was poorly organized, abusive and mismanaged.
Since 2001, the U.S.-led coalition has spent US$1 trillion dollars and committed a peak of 140,000 troops and 100,000 contractors to an unsuccessful attempt to defeat the Taliban. More than 5,000 American soldiers and contractors were killed.
Today, a U.S. force of 14,000 troops and massive U.S. Airforce assets are helping maintain the defensive positions of an Afghan government that is widely considered as one of the most corrupt in the world.
The Taliban are making territorial gains and killing hundreds of regime troops each month, and feel that they are on the cusp of victory.
Militias that recruit from the Hazara, Tajik and Uzbek minorities have rearmed in anticipation of the collapse of the regime in Kabul and fear of a coming civil war with the mostly Pushtun Taliban. Afghanistan is nearing an endgame.
What it means for the Taliban
An agreement between the Taliban and the U.S. would be an impressive accomplishment for the Taliban. From their perspective, it would be their reward for fighting the world’s strongest military power to a stalemate.
They already were rewarded by getting to negotiate directly with the United States, as they have always requested, instead of the Afghan regime which they despise. If the negotiations are successful, they would also be getting precisely what they asked for: an American withdrawal.
In return, they are making a commitment to do something they would likely have done anyway. Al-Qaida’s attack on the U.S. caused the Taliban to lose control of Afghanistan for years. They are not likely to risk having to pay that cost again once they regain control of Kabul, even if they don’t sign an agreement.
What it means for the United States
There is little hope for an outright U.S. victory over the Taliban at this point.
The remaining force of 14,000 U.S. troops is mostly meant to shore up Afghan state defenses. It is too small to reverse momentum on the battlefield. An agreement and withdrawal would therefore be attractive for those who value less military spending and stress on the military, including General John Nicholson, the previous commander of the American and NATO forces in Afghanistan.
The agreement, however, could undermine U.S. reputation in ways big and small. The Obama and Trump administrations never reversed a 2002 Bush executive order that added the Taliban to the list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists, but they have simultaneously pleaded with them to negotiate in spite of claims that Washington does not negotiate with terrorists.
It also signals U.S. weakness and inability to fight a dedicated force of insurgents. Militants elsewhere, including Islamic State leaders, could find this lesson instructive. I believe such an agreement may well be remembered as a turning point in America’s ability to successfully project its military power around the Muslim world.
An agreement could also signal that the U.S. is an unreliable ally that abandons those who side with it. The United States is involved in numerous conflicts worldwide in places as diverse as Syria and Somalia, and many of its local allies would logically recalculate their own commitments after witnessing a U.S. disengagement from Afghanistan.
What happens to the Afghan state
As I describe in my book “Organizations at War in Afghanistan,” governments tend to unravel quickly in Afghanistan when foreign support, both military and financial, ceases.
This is precisely what happened after the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan and stopped their support to the Najib regime in the early 1990s. As I report in greater detail in my book, different regime militias and military units either disintegrated, joined their erstwhile Mujahideen opponents or became independent militias.
Similarly, today’s Afghan state officials at all levels have long hedged their bets by maintaining ties with the Taliban, their nominal opponents and minority militias. If history is any indication, we can expect that entire agencies and units will either fragment or collectively join any of several strongman-led ethnic militias when the rewards of working for the regime stop outweighing the risks of facing the Taliban. Some may even defect to the Taliban. This is expected behavior in dangerous environments such as Afghanistan, where everyone is expected to have a hedging strategy for survival.
Once the state gets pulled in all directions, Afghanistan will likely degenerate into a civil war very similar to the one that the United States interrupted when it invaded in late 2001. Other countries, including Russia, Iran and India will choose sides to back. I estimate that the Taliban, with their dedicated Pakistani and Arab Gulf backers will win that conflict, just like they almost did in 2001. We may very well reach a point where we see the 17-year American occupation as merely a futile, bloody and costly interruption of the Afghan civil war.
I consider a U.S.-Taliban agreement to be no more than a face-saving measure to conclude a failed and costly American military intervention. If there is a useful lesson to be learned from this misadventure, it is that leaders of even the world’s mightiest military power need to reconsider the merits of a militarized foreign policy in the Muslim world. U.S. military interventions are stoking resentment and inflaming a perpetual transnational insurgency across Muslim countries. If it doesn’t change its course, the U.S. may very well suffer more defeats such as the one in Afghanistan and will cause even more hurt and damage in other countries along the way.
Abdulkader Sinno is an associate prof
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A major step in the death of the west.
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Ya, Good article. This was quite a bad experience for the US. I wonder what was learned.
"the United States and the coalition of 42 countries it formed to defeat the resurgent Taliban was poorly organized, abusive and mismanaged."
The US has its reputation damaged. I wonder how the other 41 countries are doing.
Maybe some of these wars are not winnable. We have the power to knock out certain centralized powers like Saddam, Khadafy. We don't have the power to make them western democracies. We don't have the stomach to either cause or take casualties. What we really wanted was for the Al Qaida, bin Laden attacks to stop and that was at least partly accomplished.
We don't want to conquer or rule anyone anywhere and maybe that is what makes these wars unwinnable.
Very bizarre to read that the US and Taliban are negotiating a treaty. Other than surrender/withdrawal, what can that mean. Still it likely is time to step back. Is there a leave behind force? Did we gain a base to attack harboring of future terrorists? Do we even want a continued presence or are we better to give them no American targets to shoot and bomb? Drone and other technologies have changed since the start of the (American) Afghan war.
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The lesson to the global jihad and others, such as China is that even with atrocities inflicted on the US Homeland, the US lacks the will to win.
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This particular convo should be in the Afpakia thread , , ,
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There is still lot of shelling etc going at the Indo-Pak border, heavy guns are being used. Internet is still down in Pak border areas, trying to hide news of the casualties. All's not well.
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There is still lot of shelling etc going at the Indo-Pak border, heavy guns are being used. Internet is still down in Pak border areas, trying to hide news of the casualties. All's not well.
:-o
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There is something odd going on in Pak. Rumors have it that they shot down their own JF-17 in error, in the Multan area which they had cordoned off for a while. They are also getting beat up badly in several areas in cross border shelling. Interestingly, in this phase neither Pak nor GOI is claiming anything.
On to the facts...India yesterday joined the club of nations with the demonstrable ability to shoot down space satellites
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-shoots-into-star-wars-club/articleshow/68605713.cms
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/pokharan-parallel-capability-was-there-but-why-test-was-key-5646174/
This was done at an altitude (low earth orbit) of 300 km, which allows the space debris to burn off as it enters back into earth. Interestingly, there is little if any mention of this in the western media. When China did it some years ago, there was a huge hue and cry.
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Stratfor and GPF mentioned it, but I haven't had the time to post.
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This was done at an altitude (low earth orbit) of 300 km, which allows the space debris to burn off as it enters back into earth. Interestingly, there is little if any mention of this in the western media. When China did it some years ago, there was a huge hue and cry.
I don't there are many in the west that see India as a threat, as opposed to China.
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Suspicious activity near the China-Bhutan border. Satellite imagery obtained by Indian news portal The Print reportedly shows new construction activity by the Chinese military near the contentious Doklam plateau. In 2017, the Indian and Chinese militaries engaged in a 72-day standoff in Doklam. According to the report, permanent structures shown in the images could serve as storage, parking or accommodations. There is also a newly constructed unpaved road leading to the structures, located just 1 mile (1.6 kilometers) from the border. There was also speculation that one of the structures may be a helicopter hanger, though no support structures have been identified. More activity was observed in Cona County, near the border in eastern Bhutan. Here, China is reportedly constructing a series of roads and bridges for transport of goods or troops stationed in the area. The report said troops numbering more than a battalion were stationed there and a tunneling facility was possibly being upgraded.
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Why America Needs New Alliances
The international order of the Cold War era no longer makes sense. But the world can’t do without U.S. leadership. Here’s a better approach.
By Yoram Hazony and
Ofir Haivry
April 5, 2019 6:30 p.m. ET
A joint U.S.-Indian army exercise in India, April 6, 2004. Photo: RAVEENDRAN/AFP/Getty Images
President Trump is often accused of creating a needless rift with America’s European allies. The secretary-general of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Jens Stoltenberg, expressed a different view Thursday when he told a joint session of Congress: “Allies must spend more on defense—this has been the clear message from President Trump, and this message is having a real impact.”
Mr. Stoltenberg’s remarks reflect a growing recognition that strategic and economic realities demand a drastic change in the way the U.S. conducts foreign policy. The unwanted cracks in the Atlantic alliance are primarily a consequence of European leaders, especially in Germany and France, wishing to continue living in a world that no longer exists. The U.S. cannot serve as the enforcer for the Europeans’ beloved “rules-based international order” any more. Even in the 1990s, it was doubtful the U.S. could indefinitely guarantee the security of all nations, paying for George H.W. Bush’s “new world order” principally with American soldiers’ lives and American taxpayers’ dollars.
Today a $22 trillion national debt and the voting public’s indifference to the dreams of world-wide liberal empire have depleted Washington’s ability to wage pricey foreign wars. At a time of escalating troubles at home, America’s estimated 800 overseas bases in 80 countries are coming to look like a bizarre misallocation of resources. And the U.S. is politically fragmented to an extent unseen in living memory, with uncertain implications in the event of a major war.
This explains why the U.S. has not sent massive, Iraq-style expeditionary forces to defend Ukraine’s integrity or impose order in Syria. If there’s trouble on Estonia’s border with Russia, would the U.S. have the will to deploy tens of thousands of soldiers on an indefinite mission 85 miles from St. Petersburg? Although Estonia joined NATO in 2004, the certainties of 15 years ago have broken down.
On paper, America has defense alliances with dozens of countries. But these are the ghosts of a rivalry with the Soviet Union that ended three decades ago, or the result of often reckless policies adopted after 9/11. These so-called allies include Turkey and Pakistan, which share neither America’s values nor its interests, and cooperate with the U.S. only when it serves their purposes. Other “allies” refuse to develop a significant capacity for self-defense, and are thus more accurately regarded as American dependencies or protectorates.
Liberal internationalists are right about one thing, however: America cannot simply turn its back on the world. Pearl Harbor and 9/11 demonstrated that the U.S. can and will be targeted on its own soil. An American strategic posture aimed at minimizing the danger from rival powers needs to focus on deterring Russia and China from wars of expansion; weakening China relative to the U.S. and thereby preventing it from attaining dominance over the world economy; and keeping smaller hostile powers such as North Korea and Iran from obtaining the capacity to attack America or other democracies.
To attain these goals, the U.S. will need a new strategy that is far less costly than anything previous administrations contemplated. Mr. Trump has taken a step in the right direction by insisting that NATO allies “pay their fair share” of the budget for defending Europe, increasing defense spending to 2% of gross domestic product in accordance with NATO treaty obligations.
But this framing of the issue doesn’t convey the problem’s true nature or its severity. The real issue is that the U.S. can no longer afford to assume responsibility for defending entire regions if the people living in them aren’t willing and able to build up their own credible military deterrent.
The U.S. has a genuine interest, for example, in preventing the democratic nations of Eastern Europe from being absorbed into an aggressive Russian imperial state. But the principal interested parties aren’t Americans. The members of the Visegrád Group—the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia—have a combined population of 64 million and a 2017 GDP of $2 trillion (about 50% of Russia’s, according to CIA estimates). The principal strategic question is therefore whether these countries are willing to do what is necessary to maintain their own national independence. If they are—at a cost that could well exceed the 2% figure devised by NATO planners—then they could eventually shed their dependent status and come to the table as allies of the kind the U.S. could actually use: strong frontline partners in deterring Russian expansion.
The same is true in other regions. Rather than carelessly accumulate dependencies, the U.S. must ask where it can develop real allies—countries that share its commitment to a world of independent nations, pursue democratic self-determination (although not necessarily liberalism) at home, and are willing to pay the price for freedom by taking primary responsibility for their own defense and shouldering the human and economic costs involved.
Nations that demonstrate a commitment to these shared values and a willingness to fight when necessary should benefit from relations that may include the supply of advanced armaments and technologies, diplomatic cover in dealing with shared enemies, preferred partnership in trade, scientific and academic cooperation, and the joint development of new technologies. Fair-weather friends and free-riding dependencies should not.
Perhaps the most important candidate for such a strategic alliance is India. Long a dormant power afflicted by poverty, socialism and an ideology of “nonalignment,” India has become one of the world’s largest and fastest-expanding economies. In contrast to the political oppression of the Chinese communist model, India has succeeded in retaining much of its religious conservatism while becoming an open and diverse country—by far the world’s most populous democracy—with a solid parliamentary system at both the federal and state levels. India is threatened by Islamist terrorism, aided by neighboring Pakistan; as well as by rapidly increasing Chinese influence, emanating from the South China Sea, the Pakistani port of Gwadar, and Djibouti, in the Horn of Africa, where the Chinese navy has established its first overseas base.
India’s values, interests and growing wealth could establish an Indo-American alliance as the central pillar of a new alignment of democratic national states in Asia, including a strengthened Japan and Australia. But New Delhi remains suspicious of American intentions, and with good reason: Rather than unequivocally bet on an Indian partnership, the U.S. continues to play all sides, haphazardly switching from confrontation to cooperation with China, and competing with Beijing for influence in fanaticism-ridden Pakistan. The rationalizations for these counterproductive policies tend to focus on Pakistan’s supposed logistical contributions to the U.S. war in Afghanistan—an example of how tactical considerations and the demands of bogus allies can stand in the way of meeting even the most pressing strategic needs.
A similar confusion characterizes America’s relationship with Turkey. A U.S. ally during the Cold War, Turkey is now an expansionist Islamist power that has assisted the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, al Qaeda and even ISIS; threatened Greece and Cyprus; sought Russian weapons; and recently expressed its willingness to attack U.S. forces in Syria. In reality, Turkey is no more an ally than Russia or China. Yet its formal status as the second-largest military in NATO guarantees that the alliance will continue to be preoccupied with pretense and make-believe, rather than the interests of democratic nations. Meanwhile, America’s most reliable Muslim allies, the Kurds, live under constant threat of Turkish invasion and massacre.
The Middle East is a difficult region, in which few players share American values and interests, although all of them—including Turkey, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and even Iran—are willing to benefit from U.S. arms, protection or cash. Here too Washington should seek alliances with national states that share at least some key values and are willing to shoulder most of the burden of defending themselves while fighting to contain Islamist radicalism. Such natural regional allies include Greece, Israel, Ethiopia and the Kurds.
A central question for a revitalized alliance of democratic nations is which way the winds will blow in Western Europe. For a generation after the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, U.S. administrations seemed willing to take responsibility for Europe’s security indefinitely. European elites grew accustomed to the idea that perpetual peace was at hand, devoting themselves to turning the EU into a borderless utopia with generous benefits for all.
But Europe has been corrupted by its dependence on the U.S. Germany, the world’s fifth-largest economic power (with a GDP larger than Russia’s), cannot field more than a handful of operational combat aircraft, tanks or submarines. Yet German leaders steadfastly resist American pressure for substantial increases in their country’s defense capabilities, telling interlocutors that the U.S. is ruining a beautiful friendship.
None of this is in America’s interest—and not only because the U.S. is stuck with the bill. When people live detached from reality, they develop all sorts of fanciful theories about how the world works. For decades, Europeans have been devising “transnationalist” fantasies to explain how their own supposed moral virtues, such as their rejection of borders, have brought them peace and prosperity. These ideas are then exported to the U.S. and the rest of the democratic world via international bodies, universities, nongovernmental organizations, multinational corporations and other channels. Having subsidized the creation of a dependent socialist paradise in Europe, the U.S. now has to watch as the EU’s influence washes over America and other nations.
For the moment, it is hard to see Germany or Spain becoming American allies in the new, more realistic sense of the term we have proposed. France is a different case, maintaining significant military capabilities and a willingness to deploy them at times. But the governments of these and other Western European countries remain ideologically committed to transferring ever-greater powers to international bodies and to the concomitant degradation of national independence. That doesn’t make them America’s enemies, but neither are they partners in defending values such as national self-determination. It is difficult to foresee circumstances under which they would be willing or able to arm themselves in keeping with the actual security needs of an emerging alliance of independent democratic nations.
The prospects are better with respect to Britain, whose defense spending is already significantly higher, and whose public asserted a desire to regain independence in the Brexit referendum of 2016. With a population of more than 65 million and a GDP of $3 trillion (75% of Russia’s), the U.K. may yet become a principal partner in a leaner but more effective security architecture for the democratic world.
Isolationists are also right about one thing: The U.S. cannot be, and should not try to be, the world’s policeman. Yet it does have a role to play in awakening democratic nations from their dependence-induced torpor, and assisting those that are willing to make the transition to a new security architecture based on self-determination and self-reliance. An alliance including the U.S., the U.K. and the frontline Eastern European nations, as well as India, Israel, Japan and Australia, among others, would be strong enough to exert sustained pressure on China, Russia and hostile Islamist groups.
Helping these democratic nations become self-reliant regional actors would reduce America’s security burden, permitting it to close far-flung military installations and making American military intervention the exception rather than the rule. At the same time, it would free American resources for the long struggle to deny China technological superiority, as well as for unforeseen emergencies that are certain to arise.
Mr. Hazony is author of “The Virtue of Nationalism.” Mr. Haivry is vice president of the Herzl Institute in Jerusalem.
Appeared in the April 6, 2019, print edition.
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Very true......in recent times, the US has become more aligned with India, not only because Trump has called recognized the duplicity of the pakis, but mostly because the US realizes that dealing with China is not an easy task. As the US cuts its role in Afghanistan, I expect the importance of the pakis to decrease and support to India vis a vis China to increase.
"India’s values, interests and growing wealth could establish an Indo-American alliance as the central pillar of a new alignment of democratic national states in Asia, including a strengthened Japan and Australia. But New Delhi remains suspicious of American intentions, and with good reason: Rather than unequivocally bet on an Indian partnership, the U.S. continues to play all sides, haphazardly switching from confrontation to cooperation with China, and competing with Beijing for influence in fanaticism-ridden Pakistan. The rationalizations for these counterproductive policies tend to focus on Pakistan’s supposed logistical contributions to the U.S. war in Afghanistan—an example of how tactical considerations and the demands of bogus allies can stand in the way of meeting even the most pressing strategic needs."
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The India-China border. At an army commanders’ meeting last week, India’s top military leaders said the country urgently needed to develop infrastructure along the Chinese border, particularly along the Line of Actual Control. The commanders discussed building a road that runs parallel to the LAC in Jammu and Kashmir state, fortifying bridges in Sikkim state to support tank and artillery transport, and constructing tunnels for the transport of fuel, oil and ammunition in Himachal Pradesh and Arunachal Pradesh. The military also wants to improve railways, and plans to station half of its new 36 Rafale jets (which will be delivered between November 2019 and April 2020) at Hasimara air base in West Bengal. The moves are in response to China’s own buildup of forces and infrastructure along the border.
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It is expected that Modi will form the next government...hard to imagine otherwise.
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Modi On Track For Repeat Victory
https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrosenberg/2019/04/16/modi-on-track-for-repeat-victory/#15693f78b039
Let's hope so and hope for a new alliance with the USA. )
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Opinion in WSJ:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/take-indias-side-america-11552430337
Take India’s Side, America
Neutrality has encouraged Pakistan’s bad behavior, and New Delhi is a natural ally for Washington.
By Elbridge Colby
March 12, 2019
The moment of maximum danger in the latest India-Pakistan conflict appears to have passed. But after a major attack by Pakistani militants on an Indian military base in Kashmir and the first Indian air strike on Pakistan proper since 1971, tensions are still smoldering between the two South Asian nuclear powers. The episode highlights the need for the U.S. to reassess its role in this volatile part of the world—and to come down firmly on India’s side.
Traditionally Washington has attempted to be a “neutral arbiter” between India and Pakistan. But neutrality may have made the problem worse rather than better. In 1999 Washington intervened to defuse the Kargil crisis. In 2001 and again in 2008, Washington leaned heavily on New Delhi not to respond more forcefully to attacks launched from Pakistani territory. This time, though, the Trump administration appeared reluctant to play referee. Washington should lock in this approach and make clear why.
Washington’s traditional neutrality has created a moral hazard for Pakistan. Islamabad could be confident that its threat of nuclear escalation, even if it didn’t intimidate New Delhi, would enlist American help in tamping down any Indian response. With this insurance policy in place, Pakistan sponsored terrorist attacks within India—in New Delhi in 2001, in Mumbai in 2008, and most recently in Indian Kashmir.
Pakistan’s leaders know that a country seen as having an itchy trigger finger is one that others treat gingerly. But a major war would be even worse for Pakistan than for India, and that includes a nuclear conflict. If Pakistan knew that it couldn’t count on U.S. diplomatic cover to pull its chestnuts out of the fire, it would be more reluctant to risk a war.
More important, continued U.S. neutrality makes little strategic sense amid America’s broader strategy. The primary geopolitical fact of the 21st century is China’s rise and its potential to dominate the Indo-Pacific, the world’s most economically dynamic region. U.S. foreign policy should be oriented toward frustrating China’s bid for hegemony in this crucial region. That means forming a coalition of states that will check Beijing.
India tops this list. Its leaders are dead set against allowing China to dominate the Indo-Pacific. While Washington and New Delhi have grown closer in recent years, Islamabad has turned toward Beijing. And as the U.S. rightly draws down its presence in neighboring Afghanistan, it needs Pakistan less.
In this context, it makes little sense for the U.S. to play neutral arbiter. Washington has a dog in this fight—and it is India. The U.S. should help broker deescalation and avoid war. But it should be more akin to U.S. peace efforts in involving Israel in the Middle East than as a disinterested bystander.
No one should take a possible war between nuclear-armed powers lightly. But if Pakistan has reason to believe the U.S. will always swoop in to insulate it from Indian counteraction, it makes war more, not less, likely. Altering those expectations will take some deft diplomacy, but the best time to start is in the wake of a crisis like the one that has—let us hope—just passed.
Mr. Colby served as deputy assistant defense secretary for strategy and force development, 2017-18.
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Looks like the religion of peace may have struck in Sri Lanka...its CNN so we may need additional confirmation.
https://twitter.com/bababanaras/status/1119962944714838016
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9 different bombs at different locations, co-ordination, high explosive use. Sri Lankan muslims do not have the skills for this. All roads lead to Pak.
Pak was expecting a terror attack on India and had already informed the world that India would attack them between April 16-20 (in response to the terror attack). Guess he was off by one day, and the attack happened in Sri Lanka where many Indians died. Attack on Indian Embassy was also part of the plan.
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/-india-preparing-another-attack-this-month-says-pakistan-foreign-minister-qureshi-1496144-2019-04-07
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Looks like all terror has links to Pak.
https://news24online.com/news/pakistan-hand-lanka-terror-attacksuicide-bomber-was-imam-who-visited-pak-national-thowheed-jamath-mastermind-dc7b3db8
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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-22/sri-lanka-muslims-had-warned-officials-about-group-behind-attack?fbclid=IwAR3evJd-hWayCUdh4cR7Ei8E_bwh_Z1tc9WPLOBkqqQu_rilhMLac_2CTTQ
Also see
https://www.wsj.com/articles/sri-lanka-makes-arrests-in-easter-bombing-attacks-11555918580?fbclid=IwAR30tEQPKdHpQVUqyHIo9fUMjlxCKAmWINWn_KZXIFZKfYxoULTewjE4Za4
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What Happened: Almost exactly 10 years after the close of its decadeslong civil war, an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks has struck Sri Lanka. Targeting Easter church services and hotels frequented by foreigners, eight blasts went off in Colombo, Negombo, Kochchikade and Batticaloa, most of which appear to have been carried out using suicide vests and shrapnel. Explosive devices were also found near Colombo's international airport and other areas, but they did not detonate.
The bombings killed at least 290 people and injured 500 others. According to official releases, the dead included 31 foreigners, with a further 14 unaccounted for. The U.S. Department of State confirmed that the dead, injured and missing included several U.S. citizens and issued a Travel Warning regarding Sri Lanka, saying additional attacks could occur there.
Why It Matters: For the first time, Sri Lanka must contend with an ongoing threat of Islamist terrorism, jeopardizing the country's vital tourist sector and much-needed foreign investment. In the near term, the nature of these attacks raises the possibility of further flare-ups in communal violence, and of emboldened Buddhist nationalist politicians and inflamed Tamil-Muslim tensions. The sitting government's failure to act on warnings about the risk of impending attacks will surely be a boon to opposition challengers in national elections later this year, including former longtime President Mahinda Rajapaksa.
The Sri Lankan government said the attackers had links to transnational groups, although the extent of these links remains unclear. The degree of sophistication in the making of the bombs indicates that the attackers did in fact have help from outside Sri Lanka, which could have come via coordination with external militant groups such as al Qaeda or the Islamic State, from Sri Lankan fighters returning from battlefields in Iraq and Syria, or from a combination of the two. (According to the Sri Lankan government, 32 nationals traveled to Syria to join the Islamic State.) Clarity on the nature of such networks, however, will have to wait for the emergence of more details about the attacks.
The Sri Lankan government said the attackers had links to transnational groups, although the extent of the links remains unclear.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam militant group carried out numerous suicide attacks throughout the 1983-2009 civil war, but none with this scope, scale or degree of coordination. Authorities have so far arrested 24 suspects in connection with the bombings, all of whom are Sri Lankan nationals. According to anonymous sources, Sri Lankan police issued an internal memo April 11 that an unspecified foreign intelligence agency had warned that hard-line Islamist group National Thowfeek Jamaath (NTJ) was planning suicide attacks on the High Commission of India in Colombo and on churches. Whether NTJ in fact was involved in the attack, however, remains unclear. A shift toward such violent tactics would mark a major departure for a group heretofore known for vandalism and hard-line rhetoric.
Context: Sri Lanka has a deep history of ethnic cleavages and intercommunal violence. Most of this has involved tensions between the majority ethnic Sinhalese Buddhists and ethnic Tamils, but the much-smaller Muslim minority (around 10 percent of the population) has found itself caught in the middle of the complex communal balance. Intensely persecuted by the Tamil Tigers during the civil war, many Muslims went abroad, and many returned with more austere forms of Wahhabi Islam to their mostly Sufi communities. Muslims have also borne the brunt of Sri Lanka's rising Buddhist nationalism, which saw Sinhalese and Muslims engage in back-and-forth riots in March 2018, as well as numerous smaller incidents of intercommunal unrest before and since.
Much like in Indonesia, Sri Lanka's Muslim community has not been particularly drawn to extremism, with Muslim groups reportedly even being the source of some of the warnings about National Thowfeek Jamaath. The country's limited pool of potential extremists and a renewed Sri Lankan government focus on counterterrorism — decades of civil war counterinsurgency and intelligence have already bolstered the country's security forces — will be a limiting factor on any jihadist militant group's ability to launch a sustained campaign of attacks.
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(https://static.toiimg.com/photo/imgsize-126913,msid-68998684/68998684.jpg)
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/is-hand-in-lanka-blasts-pics-of-3-suicide-bombers-appear-online/articleshow/68998666.cms
Pictures of the scum.
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"The bombings killed at least 290 people and injured 500 others."
Relative to the size of the countries, that is a loss of life much greater than our 9/11.
ya, yes, they are scum.
Media and Dems, the attacks were on "Easter worshippers" and tourists. "Easter worshippers"?? Strangely can't say the attack was Muslims killing Christians.
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For some reason paki airspace is not yet fully open...probably related to ongoing actions at the line of control (LOC).
https://ops.group/blog/pakistan-india/ (https://ops.group/blog/pakistan-india/)
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https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-islamic-state/islamic-state-claims-province-in-india-for-first-time-after-clash-in-kashmir-idUSKCN1SH08J?utm_source=share&utm_medium=ios_app&fbclid=IwAR0SD5PTVAAiHX8cmJ0wo1lIU73uQMdlsk4lhI8bbElA37tJ8u8_i9Fr_iM
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second post
https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3009859/gunmen-attack-luxury-hotel-pakistans-gwadar-port-city?fbclid=IwAR1k_0MbN2Zt_jsuuVmwywUgCYuKfuSuPEN392orU446-Gwe-bL80SGRdEo
Some years back YA posted a piece from an Indian intel magazine or something like that that mentioned the Baluchs and the idea of fomenting their separatism. Given the reference to them in this article this seems to have been rather prescient.
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1. Re: ISIS in Kashmir: ISIS flags are raised from time to time in Kashmir, as well as claims of making it part of the Caliphate. None of this has gained traction, because believe it or not, Kashmiris dont want ISIS. ISIS is mostly arab, there is no kashmiri kinship or cultural similarity with ISIS. Kashmir has some muslims who sympathize with pak (because of the incitement and money that flows from pak) and much kinship and cultural ties with pak.
This latest announcement may be in competition with Jaish e Mohammed (JEM) to gain recruits in Kashmir. JEM lost anywhere from a 100-300 recruits and about 15 bomb makers in the Balakot strike. Essentially, JEM has been severely degraded. China recently agreed to list Masood Azhar (JEM Chief) as a terrorist in the UN, but Masood may have already died in the Balakot strike, or severely injured. No one has seen or heard from him in the last months.
There can be the occasional ISIS recruit in Kashmir, but I dont see ISIS gaining a toe hold in Kashmir.
2. Balochistan: The govt is taking a hard-line against Pak, more stick, no carrot. Due to the elections, the Govt of India does not claim the amount of hurt that they are giving Pak. The IMF too is demanding their pound of flesh, the Belt and Road Initiative from China is getting a lot of negative publicity in Pak, as they learn of the loan details. Pak has been begging for a ceasefire as they cannot afford the daily artillery duels. Re:Balochistan, the Indian govt has not made any recent claims of providing support, but I have seen a definite uptick of violence against the Baloch by the paki army and by the Baloch against the pak army. The Baloch get their support and money from someone, very likely from India. Modi has talked about supporting the Baloch as has the current NSA Ajit Doval, no reason to doubt that money is not being given.
3. Modi talks about a New India, where India is no longer passive, always turning the other cheek and pandering to the aggressor. Both Pak and China (Doklam incident) are learning that things have changed. In the past pak would always brandish their nuclear weapons threat to prevent India from taking any action of after a terrorist attack, that line of talk has vanished.
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India Waits Warily for a U.S. Trade Salvo
A map of India is seen superimposed over the country's territory.
Highlights
The prospects of a U.S.-India trade war — which would be marked by U.S. tariffs on a wide range of Indian imports — will hinge on the outcome of a possible U.S. investigation into India's trade practices.
India, which recognizes it's a lower priority in U.S. trade negotiations, will be more likely to negotiate a trade package once a new government is formed after its national elections conclude later this month.
If India chooses to continue buying Iranian oil, it will buy a reduced amount under a rupee-based payment mechanism to avoid U.S. sanctions.
There's nothing like a common rival to bring two countries together — at least on defense. India and the United States, both eyeing China's rise with concern, are moving closer militarily. Their common strategic interest in countering China, however, does not equal an alignment on other issues: The United States is pushing India to further open its markets to American commerce, halt purchases of Iranian oil and ease recent e-commerce regulations that could impede foreign investment. The demands, in fact, have even fueled speculation that India could emerge as a new front in U.S. President Donald Trump's trade war.
The Big Picture
New Delhi has recently grown closer with Washington, but their relationship is exposing India to U.S. demands over trade barriers and Iranian oil imports. In its 2019 Second-Quarter Forecast, Stratfor noted that Prime Minister Narendra Modi would likely hold off on making any trade concessions to the United States until the results of the Indian elections are revealed later this month. Regardless, India will struggle to accommodate U.S. wishes as it balances between appeasing Washington and safeguarding its core interests, including protecting its domestic industry and preserving its partnership with Iran.
Given its limited ability to retaliate, India will seek to avoid any larger trade disputes with the United States, a vital export market. Even so, the prospects for a confrontation will ultimately depend on how the United States chooses to act.
Washington has shown it has no qualms about launching trade disputes with other Indo-Pacific partners, including Japan and South Korea. To be sure, India remains a second-tier concern amid the administration's more pressing trade issues with China, the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), Europe and Japan. But if Washington resolves these disputes — and remains unsatisfied with progress in its trade talks with New Delhi — the risk of a U.S.-India trade war will grow, hurting businesses on both sides of the divide.
Curtailing India's Favorable Access
India, which enjoyed a $24 billion trade surplus with the United States last year, benefits from the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a program that the United States initiated in the 1970s to boost trade with developing countries. In April 2018, however, the U.S. trade representative began a review of India's tariff benefits under the GSP after industry groups representing the U.S. dairy and medical devices sectors complained that Indian barriers to trade were limiting their exports. Then, last month, Trump triggered a 60-day review period in Congress to revoke India's GSP status. India has sought to accommodate U.S. interests, yet it also has core concerns that it must safeguard, particularly in its dairy industry, where reverence for cows and vegetarianism in Hinduism entails stricter requirements on the production of milk. At the same time, it wishes to cap prices on medical devices to ensure affordability.
By itself, a decision to revoke India's GSP benefits would have a minimal impact economically, raising tariffs on only about 10 percent of its exports to the United States. But the decision to pursue that course is as much about the program itself as it is about India, with the White House arguing that the GSP has outlived its usefulness. At the same time, the program has become emblematic of a broader debate playing out at the World Trade Organization, with mature economies such as the United States and the European Union on one side and developing countries such as India and China, which are seeking the right to identify as "developing" nations to justify their trade practices, on the other. Under a program like the GSP, the United States has given preferential access to U.S. markets to poor and developing countries without reciprocal access to their markets.
Nevertheless, the GSP debate marks an escalation in the U.S. trade dispute against India, as it could trigger $235 million in retaliatory tariffs from New Delhi. But a more serious escalation would occur if the U.S. trade representative launches an investigation into Indian trade practices under Section 301 of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974. If the representative determines that India is engaging in unfair trade practices, it could legally justify imposing tariffs on a wider range of the goods and services that India exports to the United States. This, naturally, would present problems for India, since the United States is its largest export destination. India, which exported $83.2 billion in goods and services to the United States last year, has already offered Washington concessions in its dairy and medical device sectors — in spite of its special sensitivities on the matter — but the measures have failed to alter the administration's course. For the moment, India is holding off on taking any further action that could upset its ally: On May 14, it moved for the eighth time to delay imposing retaliatory tariffs in an effort to keep the dispute on ice. The next move, accordingly, is Washington's.
Disputes Over Energy and E-Commerce
Energy has emerged as another area of contention between the United States and India, particularly as Washington has threatened to impose secondary sanctions against companies that buy Iranian oil. That's a problem for India, which counts Iran as a key supplier. Over its last fiscal year, which ended March 31, India imported 23 million metric tons of crude from the Islamic republic, accounting for 11 percent of its total imports (Venezuela, another Indian supplier, is also under sanctions). In November, the United States granted a sanctions waiver to a group of countries, including India, in exchange for a reduction in their imports. The four state-owned Indian firms that continued to purchase Iranian oil duly scaled back their purchases (Iranian shipments to India fell from an average of 500,000 barrels per day (bpd) year-on-year to 277,000 bpd in April).
Today, Indian firms are reported to have halted all shipments of Iranian oil — though New Delhi is negotiating with Washington to exempt shipments of some 4 million metric tons of oil already en route. And following Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif's visit to New Delhi on May 14, India has announced it will make a final decision after its new government is formed on whether to continue to import Iranian oil. If New Delhi does renew its imports, it would likely do so under a rupee-based payment mechanism in order to sidestep U.S. sanctions. Washington, in turn, would then have to decide whether to enforce oil sanctions against India or hold off as it did with sanctions targeting Russian arms customers after India signed a multibillion-dollar agreement to buy S-400 air defense systems.
So long as New Delhi is convinced that India is of secondary importance for Washington, it will delay talks on negotiating a trade package until after it forms a new government.
Finally, while e-commerce is disrupting brick-and-mortar retail operations all over the world, it's also at the heart of an intensifying clash in India between the needs of foreign investment and domestic politics. On Feb. 1, New Delhi began implementing new regulations pertaining to foreign-backed e-commerce platforms. The regulations, which Prime Minister Narendra Modi's government announced in December 2018, aim to create neutral e-commerce platforms through various means, including measures to prevent firms like Amazon India and Walmart-owned Flipkart from selling products in which they own a stake. Modi unveiled the plans ahead of India's national elections, in part because the government's demonetization campaign in 2016 and a new goods and services tax in 2017 hit small-business owners and traders hard. U.S. Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross, however, has complained that the regulations could hurt future American foreign direct investment in India.
Entering Washington's Radar
Expectations shape behavior. So long as New Delhi is convinced that India is of secondary importance for Washington, it will delay talks on negotiating a trade package until after it forms a new government following election results later this month. India's position in other trade talks — the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership with other countries in the Indo-Pacific — highlights New Delhi's approach, as it is tying the phased liberalization of tariffs to better market access for its robust information technology sector. Incidentally, the American tech sector — a favored destination for Indian IT professionals — has become another bone of contention: Trump's emphasis on hiring U.S. workers has led his administration to tighten U.S. H-1B visa policy, which complicates entry for Indian applicants, the program's biggest beneficiaries. This remains a key concern for India, so New Delhi is likely to seek assurances on this front as part of any bilateral trade package.
India will look to soothe tensions with the United States by exercising restraint in its talks as it negotiates a mutually beneficial trade package. Even as the two maintain divergent positions on commerce, their mutual rivalry with China will cultivate closer defense ties, as evidenced by joint anti-submarine warfare drills featuring Indian and U.S. P-8 aircraft in April — the same month that the administration moved to revoke India's GSP benefits. In the end, the United States and India view each other as lucrative markets with untapped potential, so any efforts to contain their disagreements will ensure that lingering opportunities — including U.S. interest in a $15 billion Indian air force contract — are not lost.
But ultimately, the fate of the countries' bilateral trade relationship rests with the United States, which has not spared other strategic allies, such as Japan and South Korea from trade threats, to say nothing of the hard line its taken on China. And as the United States moves beyond addressing its top-tier trade concerns — the USMCA, China, Europe and Japan — Washington's gaze will turn toward New Delhi. As it does, the chances of a clash over trade will only grow.
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I have a hard time believing the US will seriously try to sanction India or try to force India to completely stop Iranian oil purchases. Yes there will be a lot of chest thumping and stomping of feet on the part of Trump, but nothing substantive. The competition with China is the real battle and that will continue (even if there is a trade deal). The US will try to balance any loss of market access to China with India and a deal will be made. This will involve additional arms purchases by India and also access to Iranian oil in exchange.
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Exit polls suggest Modi will be prime minister of India. Beating of pak will continue.
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Yes. Good news.
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India: After a Big Election Win, Modi and the BJP Can Turn to Economic Challenges
(Stratfor)
The Big Picture
India, a rising military and economic power with a burgeoning population, is at a pivotal moment. It faces myriad economic challenges including sluggish job creation and lagging investments. Now, a major electoral win gives the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party and Prime Minister Narendra Modi the mandate they need to tackle the politically challenging land and labor reforms needed to unleash labor-intensive growth in Asia's third-largest economy.
What Happened
Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) earned another five years in power with a decisive victory in India's general elections. The BJP is expected to win 300 of the 542 contested seats in the Lok Sabha, the Parliament's lower house; just 272 seats were needed for a majority. The Indian National Congress meanwhile is expected to win just 50 or so seats. Modi declared victory while Congress party leader Rahul Gandhi conceded defeat.
The BJP retained its presence in its strongholds of northern and western India. This includes facing down a challenge in Uttar Pradesh, the country's most politically consequential state, where an unlikely alliance between two bitter regional rival parties failed to stop the BJP from winning a majority of the state's 80 seats. The BJP also expanded its share of seats in eastern India's West Bengal and Odisha, states dominated by powerful regional parties, though it still won only a minority of votes there. Enhancing the scope of the BJP's victory were gains by the various parties belonging to the BJP's National Democratic Alliance umbrella group, which picked up around 45 extra seats on top of the BJP's wins. The Congress-led United Progressive Alliance, which governed India for a decade until its 2014 defeat, has won around 80 seats overall, leaving a host of other parties accounting for the rest.
Why It Matters
Modi's victory points to a major shift in Indian politics. The BJP is the first party besides Congress to win back-to-back majorities in its own right. This indicates the center of gravity in Indian politics is moving away from Congress, historically the dominant political party that spearheaded the independence movement against British rule, and toward the BJP.
Modi has transformed Indian national elections from party-based to personality-based contests. By pitching himself as the kind of strong and visionary leader India needs during a pivotal moment in the country's rise, he overwhelmed the opposition, a hodgepodge of parties that lacked any similarly powerful persona to place against Modi.
The center of gravity in Indian politics is moving away from Congress, historically the dominant political party that spearheaded the independence movement against British rule, and toward the BJP.
The opposition tried to pin Modi's administration on its mixed economic record by citing slowing growth, high unemployment and unrest among farmers. But Modi commanded the narrative, convincing voters that his party's solutions to these problems were better than those offered by Congress. He also made much of the BJP's firm posture on national security in the aftermath of launching airstrikes against Pakistan in February.
Investor confidence drove a surge in India's SENSEX stock market index in anticipation of the results, breaching the 40,000 point mark for the first time, but it lost the gains just as quickly over persistent concerns about the economic challenges that will consume Modi's attention. These include resolving a liquidity crunch tied to a shadow banking crisis and lagging exports, consumption and investment. They also include the need to secure additional oil supplies amid geopolitical tensions between the United States and Iran. Modi's new majority, however, will help him navigate these economic challenges.
Background
India's general elections took place in seven phases from April 11 through May 19. They recorded a 67 percent turnout among nearly 900 million voters, an all-time high. The BJP espouses themes of Hindu nationalism and a muscular foreign policy, while Congress is perceived as a secular, center-left party deriving support from India's myriad minority groups, including the country's large Muslim population.
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Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific.
In an effort to counter China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific, India, Japan and Sri Lanka announced that they will work to together to expand the Port of Colombo. The project will involve increasing the port’s container volume and building a facility that will allow larger container ships to enter. The Port of Colombo sits on Sri Lanka’s western coast, while the Port of Hambantota, a key part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, is on the south coast. Japan and India have been increasing maritime and naval cooperation recently to limit Chinese expansion through the Indian Ocean, conducting joint naval exercises last week in the Andaman Sea.
Pakistan, too, appears to be increasing its focus on Indian Ocean naval capabilities. Its Senate Standing Committee on Defense Production said on Monday that the Gwadar port, in which China is investing heavily as part of its BRI project, would be an ideal location to build a modern shipyard, identifying 750 acres of land where it could be developed. China is also seeking additional security guarantees from Pakistan for its infrastructure projects following terror attacks that occurred there two weeks ago.
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Has a Water-Sharing Pact Between Pakistan and India Grown Stagnant?
By Ambika Vishwanath
A composite satellite image of the Indus River Delta in Pakistan, where the Indus River flows into the Arabian Sea.
(PLANET OBSERVER/Universal Images Group via Getty Images)
Contributor Perspectives offer insight, analysis and commentary from Stratfor’s Board of Contributors and guest contributors who are distinguished leaders in their fields of expertise.
Highlights
Severe water shortages and the prospect of a delayed monsoon season that fails to deliver enough rain will push water management up India's priority list.
India is unlikely to withdraw from the Indus Water Treaty, which has governed India and Pakistan's use of the rivers and tributaries of the Indus Basin for nearly 60 years, but it is more likely to increase its use of the water allotted to it, which in itself could be detrimental.
The treaty does not include China, and the tenuous nature of the relationships among India, China and Pakistan does not rule out the possibility of Beijing's involvement in the river basin.
Questions about the Indus Water Treaty's efficacy and how well it reflects current realities will become more pressing in the years ahead.
Narendra Modi's second term as Indian prime minister is underway following his Bharatiya Janata Party's landslide victory in last month's parliamentary elections, and the National Institution for Transforming India, a policy think tank of the Indian government, has released a 100-day agenda. Among the proposals for developing infrastructure and lowering India's unemployment rate, currently at an all-time high, is an emphasis on better managing the country's water resources. Water management is a controversial and touchy subject in India, but with one-third of the country in drought, water supplies in India's sixth-largest city, Chennai, running dry, and dire predictions that this year's delayed monsoon season will fail to deliver adequate rainfall totals, water management is likely to rise higher on India's priority list.
The Modi government is focused on building a network of dams and water-linkage projects, especially across northern India, to reduce the threat from China's dam-building activity on India's northeastern border and to ensure that it is effectively using the share of water allotted to it under the decades-old Indus Water Treaty before it flows into Pakistan. Adding to an escalation in tensions between India and Pakistan in February that followed a suicide attack in Kashmir were comments by Nitin Gadkari, then India's water resources minister, declaring that India would not allow excess water to flow into Pakistan and that New Delhi would work toward completely using its portion of the shared river basin, the Indus. While persistent tensions between India and Pakistan have threatened the Indus treaty, a variety of reasons explain why India is unlikely to withdraw from it and is more likely to follow through on increased usage of water, which in itself could be detrimental.
The Indus Water Treaty
For almost 60 years, India and Pakistan have shared the rivers and tributaries of the Indus Basin under the aegis of the Indus Water Treaty. Brokered by the World Bank in 1960, the Indus Water Treaty effectively split the six main rivers of the Indus Basin into geographic halves, with the three western rivers — the Indus, Jhelum and Chenab — to be used by Pakistan and the three easternmost rivers — the Ravi, Beas and Sutlej — to be used by India. Certain restrictions were placed on India as the upper riparian nation, especially with regard to storage and irrigation activity. The Permanent Indus Commission manages the treaty. Hailed as a success story, the treaty has survived numerous wars and skirmishes between the two neighbors, and while India and Pakistan have been in a permanent state of conflict over a variety of issues since 1947, no war has been fought over water.
At a time when states within India have yet to find lasting solutions to shared bodies of water, a Teesta River agreement with Bangladesh remains elusive and a treaty with China on the Brahmaputra River abides as a pipe dream, the Indus treaty is an example of how water resources can be shared through a legal framework. However, the treaty — more of a divorce settlement between India and Pakistan — represented the best arrangement possible at the time it was signed. By creating an equal division on the use of waters in the rivers of the Indus Basin and not an equitable or jointly integrated planning and management system of the entire basin, the treaty fails to safeguard the long-term rights and health of the Indus River itself. The current state of the river, stressed by the region's growing population, changes in the climate, long-pending disputes on dam-related activity and misuse of the treaty during times of war, raise the question of potential revisions to the treaty.
Right for Its Time, but Right for Now?
During times of tension between India and Pakistan, speculation arises around the possibility of India's misuse of the Indus waters as a weapon of war. After the 2001 attack on the Indian Parliament by Pakistan-based militant groups, reports suggested that then-Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee had studied the treaty's use as a potential option for retaliation, though no official stand was taken. In 2016, Modi directly referred to the Indus waters, stating that "blood and water can't flow together," in the aftermath of an attack on India's Uri army base by the Pakistani militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed. While Modi's dramatic statement could be interpreted in many ways and fed the public outcry for revenge, the Indian government remained within the confines of the Indus pact, though it decided to review and restart construction on the Tulbul navigation project on Wular Lake, which is fed by the Jhelum River. Similar strong statements were made in February when Gadkari, the water resources minister, said India would maximize the use of its share of the eastern rivers, where currently underutilized waters flow into Pakistan and to sea.
Questions about the Indus Water Treaty's efficacy and how well it reflects current realities will become more pressing in the years ahead.
While politicians and the administration might make certain statements to appease the public, it is clear that India is likely to continue to operate within the confines of the treaty. The international community, which views the pact as part of a successful conflict resolution, would see its abrogation as irresponsible. However, while the treaty might have withstood four wars, its potential misuse, existing disputes on proposed activity, and the lack of trust between Pakistan and India could lead to consequences beyond political bluster and public sentiment. Further, the treaty does not include China, which possesses the Indus headwaters. At present, China is more closely aligned with Pakistan. The tenuous nature of the relationships among India, China and Pakistan does not rule out the possibility of Beijing's involvement in the river basin. China's dam-building activity on the Tibetan Plateau is already a cause of tension on India's eastern front (Brahmaputra-Ganga Basin), and any similar activity on the Indus will affect its flow into India and Pakistan.
India uses about 95 percent of the water allotted to it under the Indus Water Treaty. To consume the remaining 5 percent — about 2 million acre-feet (2.5 billion cubic meters) — several dams and storage facilities would have to be constructed in a manner that does not violate the treaty. However, this does not consider the decrease such additional use would cause to the river's flow, which is vital to maintaining the health of the river itself. Across the entire basin, more than 90 percent of the allotted water is already used for irrigation purposes, and further activity coupled with uncertain changes in climate will place an even greater strain on the river basin.
While it would be detrimental to suggest the Indus Water Treaty be abolished, questions about its efficacy and how well it reflects current realities will become more pressing in the years ahead. Over the past five decades, discussions on certain aspects of the treaty have been resolved through dialogue and arbitration and are possible through the Permanent Indus Commission. One area of consideration for future discussion is developing a more integrated management system that safeguards the health of the Indus River and addresses the needs of growing populations, hydroelectricity and irrigation demands on both sides of the river basin. Lessons from around the world indicate that such improvement is possible, and recent testing of the waters for a revival of talks between Pakistan and India provides a potential opening for renewed discussions.
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https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/science/isro-chandrayaan-2-launch-live-updates-5828541/ (https://indianexpress.com/article/technology/science/isro-chandrayaan-2-launch-live-updates-5828541/)
India set to launch moon mission...lots of excitement in the country. Slowly catching up to the top countries.
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1. India passes law to label individuals as terrorists. This will avoid a situation where terrorist organizations can be rebranded with new name and nothing changes. Has protections against misuse.
2. It seems to work like clockwork, every time Pak gets money from IMF or US says they are indispensable, Pak starts terror operations. The Indian govt cancelled a major pilgrimage route because of finding mines and sniper rifles. Other reports suggest the line of control has been unusually hot.
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As discussed, things are getting hot, Kashmiri politicians have been placed under house arrest. Section 144 of the Indian penal code is being enforced, more troops being sent to Kashmir. 10,000 were sent a few days ago. Taliban khans plan seems to be that Trump must bring India to the table, if the USA needs a honourable exit from Afghanistan. Trump made a big mistake by offering to meditate between India and Pakistan. The US negotiation position has become complicated...as there is no way the U.S. can get Indian or Afghan support. India has not taken such tough measures in a long time. 155 mms howitzer are being used.
Indian independence day is on Aug 15, a lot of rumors floating around.
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As expected Article 370 repealed. This is HUGE. Taliban Khans plan back fires. US in a geopolitical bind, with impending visit to Afghanistan. Will expand later. Modi will go down as Indias greatest PM.
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https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/India-to-strip-Kashmir-of-autonomy-as-unrest-deepens
India to strip Kashmir of autonomy as unrest deepens
Move follows heavy troop buildup and house arrest of local politicians
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"Trump made a big mistake by offering to meditate between India and Pakistan."
you mean "let's make a DEAL" didn't work
when did the word *deal* replace treaty or agreement or plan?
Ya, what is your thoughts on recent Trump announcement that he wants us out of Afghanistan by 2020?
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Ok, I won't comment about article 370, except to say that Kashmiris will now be treated like regular Indians. The government of India spent about 4x per capita on Kashmiris as compared to on Indians. They were a pampered vote block. Poof! Pakistan which financed the separatists can't do much,as some protections have disappeared, the corrupt politicians have been made powerless. They hate it.
Pakistani game: Pakistan tries to make its conflict with India multilateral while India keeps it strictly a bilateral process. Several accords have been signed between the 2 countries, and it is pretty much settled that Kashmir is a bilateral matter....but still from time to time Pakistan rakes up the issue at the UN to gain support amongst the ummah.
US interests: the U.S. wants to get out of Afghanistan with its honor intact, but cannot do so, unless the pakis can be convinced to use their influence on the Taliban. Pakistanis know this, they also know Trump likes to make deals, and is a transactional president. They offered to help Trump, and Trump either sold India down the drain, or simply was unaware of the Indian position and offered to mediate between the two countries. In the meantime Imran Khan gets back to Pakistan and claims a victory, in that Pakistan is not a pariah anymore and Trump has promised to mediate between the two countries.
Indian situation: India was angry with the U.S. for selling out India and they had to act immediately. The repeal of 370 was planned for years (another story), but the timing to implement it was forced by events. July 22_24, IK visits Trump. yesterday a U.S. delegation was scheduled to visit Pakistan to further discuss the matter, so that Trump can sign a deal in a few months, but before the elections. Trump wants to say that he got the soldiers home, and that he made a deal with the Taliban.
Current geopolitics: Pakistan is in an uproar, IK is looking like a fool. Their military is looking stupid. They need to do something, but what can they do. Suddenly the price for Pakistani help has gone up. They will ask Trump to do what he has said, i.e. mediate on Kashmir. Trump realistically cannot do much, whole of India is behind Modi. so Trump cannot do anything, he is shown to have been bloviating and pakis don't trust him, the U.S. loses prestige.
For Pakistan to help the U.S., they wanted their pound of flesh, but now another imperative has been added. They need to respond to the happenings in Kashmir. As we know, India has been very aggressive at the LOC, the border has been hot. Pakistan does not have the resources to fight or focus on two borders, the LOC with India and the Afghanistan border. What happens if things get hot between Pakistan and Taliban and India makes a swift move into Pakistan occupied Kashmir and makes a land grab (it is Indian territory, per India). They are already doing that by capturing certain border outposts.
With 370 being made irrelevant, almost certainly govt of IndiA will put getting POK back on their election manifesto. Remember, removal of 370 has been on the BJPs election manifesto for decades. It would be ironic, if India makes a big land grab in POK, and asks the U.S. to mediate (unlikely! ).
For the U.S., Trumps loose mouth has complicated the situation.
P.S. written on a phone, so excuse the typos
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Ya,
thanks for response
I have heard some say that Al Qaeda is just as strong now , or stronger than they were pre 911 in Afghanistan.
If true then other than keeping them suppressed we accomplished little.
Do you agree?
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http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_nq78cSnol3I/TQprNipf0hI/AAAAAAAABV4/0vutpX8Y2C4/s1600/111133_whack-a-mole_cartoon.gif
You cannot eliminate them, only suppress them locally. It's an ideology. They will just move to a more hospitable location. The term inoperable cancer and metastases comes to mind. Very difficult, without serious medicine.
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Thanks YA as always for great insights.
For the reader, (correct me if wrong)
POK = Pakistan occupied Kashmir
IK = Indian Kashmir (?)
LoC = Line of Control
"Trump's loose mouth has complicated the situation."
That is unfortunate. He did not start the mess (in Afghan or Kashmir) and he did not fix it. His urge to be out of Afghan by reelection time is real. His need for Pak help with that is real. The animosity (or war) between India and Pak is real. Complicating it all, India is the most strategic and greatest potential ally to the US of them all and everything he does to appease Pak hurts that immeasurably. We cannot operate an Asian strategy where Russia and China are against us and have India against us too. This is a puzzle that has no answer that solves all of its parts.
What we accomplished in Afghanistan is not lasting and Pakistani help is not reliable. In hindsight (in Iraq too), we could have removed threats with a tenth or a hundredth of the investment in dollars, lives and blood if we had defined the mission differently. Attack and remove threats as they appear and not try to do (nation building) or whatever it was we were trying to do.
The real question is, now what? I don't know the answer and seems like no one does. We must mostly leave Afghanistan knowing we will have to come back again as order deteriorates and terror re-groups. We cannot repeat the exit mistake of Iraq where we had to come back so soon after leaving to defeat ISIS in that case. But it is crazy (in my view) to put any of this above the need to develop a positive and strategic relationship with India. If that is right, then Trump's advisers know it too, Sec. Pompeo for example, and are communicating that to India.
Trump has loose lips but the important lesson with him is watch what he does, not what he says. Mediating the dispute may be just talk - tryng to make something else happen. Hopefully they are also communicating with Modi, who fully understands the bind Trump is in, letting him know he is on India's side, not Pakistan's. There again, they want to see actions.
India has strategic value to President Trump on the continent that is half the world; Pakistan has single use value in one country and is not much help at that. Choose one.
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IK= IMRAN KHAN aka Taliban Khan.
Trump should pressure Pak and delink Kashmir, India from the discussion. Pressure points include removal from FATF grey list, move to black list. Can always provide more money, business investment. The stick would be to strangle the country and the army. Their army runs most businesses. They are begging IMF for a handout...They can't really survive for long without a handout.
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Pak is not getting much sympathy from anyone in the world. Even the taliban gave a very professional statement...telling Pak to not mix Afghani issues with India. This statement actually pulls the rug from under the pakis. I would take it to mean that the Taliban is telling the US, negotiate directly with us...and not via Pak.
Remarks by spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning the ongoing Kashmir crisis
Date: August 08, 2019in: :, Statements
Remarks by spokesman of Islamic Emirate concerning the ongoing Kashmir crisis
Reports are being published that India has revoked the autonomous status of Kashmir, sent additional troops, imposed a state of emergency and created difficulties and hardships for the resident Muslim population.
The Islamic Emirate expresses deep sadness in this regard and urges both India and Pakistan to refrain from taking steps that could pave a way for violence and complications in the region and usurp the rights of Kashmiris.
Having gained bitter experiences from war and conflict, we urge peace and use of rational pathways to solve regional issues.
We call on both involved parties, OIC, Islamic countries, the United Nations and other influential institutions to play a constructive role in preventing insecurity in Kashmir. By using your influence, encourage both sides to prevent the spread of crisis and resolve the issue in a calm and composed manner.
Linking the issue of Kashmir with that of Afghanistan by some parties will not aid in improving the crisis at hand because the issue of Afghanistan is not related nor should Afghanistan be turned into the theater of competition between other countries.
Spokesman of Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan
Zabihullah Mujahid
07/12/1440 Hijri Lunar
17/05/1398 Hijri Solar 08/08/2019 Gregorian
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Can you guys see this?
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/WG_Kashmir-Update.png?utm_source=GPF+-+Paid+Newsletter&utm_campaign=02c6c7ab3c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_08_09_09_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_72b76c0285-02c6c7ab3c-247660329
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Can you guys see this?
https://geopoliticalfutures.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/WG_Kashmir-Update.png?utm_source=GPF+-+Paid+Newsletter&utm_campaign=02c6c7ab3c-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_08_09_09_02&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_72b76c0285-02c6c7ab3c-247660329
Yes.
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Good to know!
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The removal of article 370, changes several things for Pak, that they may not yet have given thought to.
1. Previously, Indian Kashmir was considered a disputed territory by Pak and hence the term Line of Control (LOC) was used to talk about borders. The International Border (IB), referred to the border with Pak, outside of Kashmir. Much of the terror attacks and shelling was at the LOC, i.e. at disputed territory. If now Pak, shells Indian Kashmir, it will be at the IB and the consequences will be different.
2. It is almost certain, that the removal of 370, will result in rapid development of Kashmir as hotels, tourism and industry will be set up (since they can now buy property). It is not far fetched to think, that the people in current POK whose present situation is much much worse than that of Indian Kashmir, will want to merge with their brethren in Indian Kashmir and be part of a larger India. The historical term is "Akhand Bharat", which was the India which stretched upto Balochistan and Afghanistan on the west and Bangladesh to the east before the British chopped up India into smaller countries. I am betting that the next election manifesto of the BJP will have a mention of POK...also the coming speech by Modi on India's independence day from the red fort in Delhi.
3. Alternatively, at some point in the future, India may capture POK and make a path available up to Afghanistan. If that is done, the current geopolitical location of Pak becomes irrelevant as Pak is no longer necessary to provide access to Afghanistan.
4. Pakis call Kashmir their jugular vein (they are blood thirsty) and have for decades fought on the idea that Kashmir will become part of Pak...are suddenly left with no options. They cannot commit any serious terrorism (Modi responds forcefully) and cannot win a war (they are broke), world opinion is against them. Their people are asking for blood, the army appears impotent, guess what, Imran Khan might become the sacrificial goat.
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Both Pak and India's Independence days are coming soon, Aug 14/15. Imran Khan will have to do something..but what ?
(https://www.zerohedge.com/s3/files/inline-images/india-pakistan-kashmir-cartoon.jpg?itok=U7lkjanW)
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Meanwhile in POK, the usual bleating...
Kashmir Explodes Into the Streets: ‘I Am Ready to Die’
“If there's no solution, we're willing to go to war.”
By Hind Hassan, Sean Stephens, and Tim Hume
Aug 15 2019, 12:01pmShareTweet
MUZAFFARABAD, Pakistan-administered Kashmir — India marked its Independence Day Thursday with a chest-thumping celebration of its incendiary move to roll back the political autonomy of its part of the contested region of Kashmir.
But across the border in arch-rival Pakistan, the mood was anything but festive. The country declared India’s big occasion a symbolic “black day” in protest of Delhi’s decision earlier this month to unilaterally revoke its part of the Muslim-majority region’s relative self-rule.
Protests were held across Pakistan in a demonstration of public rage. Many Pakistanis believe India’s actions have reduced the region to an Indian colony.
Prime minister of Pakistan-administered Kashmir Farooq Haider Khan told VICE News that like many Kashmiris, he believed India’s move was motivated to bring about a demographic shift in the Muslim-majority region.
Becoming emotional as he spoke, he said that if the “occupation” in Indian-administered Kashmir continued, he and others on the Pakistan-administered side would be prepared to take action to help their kin on the other side of the border.
“One has to die one day, why not die to help a brother in Kashmir to get freedom from this Indian occupation?” he said, choking up. “I am ready to die.”
Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan warned Thursday of “radicalization and cycles of violence” across the Muslim world if the international community ignored the plight of the Kashmiris.
“Will [the] world silently witness another Srebrenica-type massacre & ethnic cleansing of Muslims?” Khan asked on his Twitter account, his profile picture symbolically blacked out.
In Muzaffarabad, the capital of Pakistan-administered Kashmir, about 2,000 people shouted “Modi is a dog!” and “India get out!” as they marched through the streets.
READ: What’s Article 370, and why could its end bring more violence to Kashmir?
“Where is the international community? Where is the U.N.?” Javeed Ahmed, a 50 year-old resident, said to VICE News. “The U.N.'s always asking for human rights — well, where are the human rights for the Kashmiri people?”
Ahmed said India’s unprecedented security lockdown on its side of the divided region meant those inside were completely cut off from the outside world. “All the internet is jammed there — no telephone calls, no Facebook, no way to contact them. We have no idea what's happening to them,” he said.
“If there's no solution, we're willing to go to war.”
“If there's no solution, we're willing to go to war.”
The threats conveyed the fury raging in Pakistan over India’s Aug. 5 revocation of Article 370, the constitutional provision that has guaranteed Indian-administered Kashmir political autonomy since it became part of India. The move scrapped Kashmir’s constitution and flag, effectively placing it under direct rule from New Delhi, and removed laws preventing non-Kashmiris from buying land in the region.
In a bid to quiet opposition, India’s Hindu nationalist government imposed an unprecedented security lockdown in the state. It sent in tens of thousands of troops, cut off phone and internet networks, placed Kashmiri political leaders under house arrest, and imposed strict curfews on the public.
India has attempted to justify its move in Kashmir by claiming that bringing the state deeper into the national fold will both tackle separatist militancy in the restive region and bring it greater development and prosperity. But it also satisfies a longstanding desire of Hindu nationalists.
Speaking at New Delhi’s historic Red Fort Thursday at celebrations to mark his country’s Independence Day, Prime Minister Narendra Modi trumpeted his government’s actions in Kashmir, saying his government had achieved what previous administrations had failed to do for seven decades.
“The old arrangements during the last 70 years encouraged secessionism. They gave birth to terrorism and nurtured nepotism,” said Modi. "They made the foundations of corruption and discrimination stronger.”
The Himalayan region has been a source of conflict between India and Pakistan ever since the two countries became independent in 1947. Both claim the territory in full as their own, and administer their own sections, demarcated by what’s called the Line of Control.
The nuclear-armed archrivals have fought wars over the territory, and came close once again in February after a deadly suicide bomb attack on Indian paramilitary forces by the militant group Jaish-e-Mohammed. India accused Pakistan of having a hand in the attack, but Islamabad denied any involvement.
While that incident saw the two sides trade airstrikes for the first time in decades, they eventually pulled back from the brink after Pakistan returned a captured Indian air force pilot. Now, though, with India’s sudden change to the status quo in the region, war talk has returned. On Thursday, Pakistan said three of its soldiers were killed in skirmishes along the Line of Control, and that five Indian troops were also killed, although India denied this.
Speaking in Muzaffarabad Wednesday, Pakistan’s Independence Day, Khan claimed his country’s armed forces had intelligence that India was preparing an act of aggression on Pakistani soil.
“The Pakistani army has solid information that they [India] are planning to do something in Pakistani Kashmir, and they are ready and will give a solid response,” Khan said. “The time has arrived to teach you a lesson.”
He repeatedly compared the Hindu nationalist ideology of India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to that of Nazi Germany, and raised the specter of ethnic cleansing in Kashmir.
“Narendra Modi says in his speech that ‘We'll bring prosperity to this place’,” he said. “This is identical to the time when Hitler was attacking Russia, he told them: ‘I'm coming to liberate you from communism’.”
But despite the rage and bravado, analysts say that a full-scale war remains unlikely, as both nuclear-armed powers ultimately realize it is not in their best interests. Pakistan is also pursuing a diplomatic response to the crisis, having expelled India’s High Commissioner, halted bilateral trade with India and called for an urgent meeting of the U.N. Security Council which will be held behind closed-doors Friday.
Vasuki Shastry, associate fellow at Chatham House’s Asia-Pacific program, told VICE News that Pakistan’s pursuit of a diplomatic approach, coupled with its de-escalatory approach during tensions in February, indicated that the threats were ultimately empty, although an acceleration of the proxy war — waged by Pakistan-based militant groups against Indian forces — was likely.
“None of this points in the direction of full-scale conflict,” he said.
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A few important events:
1. Two Indian ministers (Manohar Parrikh, ex defense minister and Rajnath current home minister) have hinted about a change in India's no first use nuclear doctrine. Message to Pak and China.https://www.rediff.com/news/column/rajnath-on-no-first-strike-hiss-of-the-cobra/20190817.htm (https://www.rediff.com/news/column/rajnath-on-no-first-strike-hiss-of-the-cobra/20190817.htm)
2. The end game for pak, from above link "In my opinion, there is only one possible end game: the unwinding of Pakistan into several pieces: Balochistan, Sind, Balawaristan (Gilgit, Baltistan, the rest of PoK), the Pashtun area Khyber Pakhtunwa which will merge with Afghanistan, and the rump Punjab."
3. The LOC is hot, pakis are hyperventilating in their talk shows. Some who are honest are depressed (also the defeat of their case at the UN), others are pulling their hair out in frustration. Have to see what they can do once the curfews are lifted in Kashmir. Incidentally, pakis just put Waziristan under section 144, which is what we have in Kashmir right now!. Apparently, the pashtun are not happy with pak!
4. Comparisons been made between imran khans independence day speech and Modi's. Imrans speech was all hate about jihad, Kashmir and islamism going back to the stone age. Modi's did not even mention pak, but focussed on development towards a 5 Trillion economy in 5 years.
5. India will appoint a Chief of Defense Staff, over the army, navy and airforce.
Taken together, India seems to be preparing for war in the next few years.
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I think a lot of countries involved in the region are. I note the US military seems to be all about equipping and training for a big fight with a "near peer" at this time.
A few important events:
1. Two Indian ministers (Manohar Parrikh, ex defense minister and Rajnath current home minister) have hinted about a change in India's no first use nuclear doctrine. Message to Pak and China.https://www.rediff.com/news/column/rajnath-on-no-first-strike-hiss-of-the-cobra/20190817.htm (https://www.rediff.com/news/column/rajnath-on-no-first-strike-hiss-of-the-cobra/20190817.htm)
2. The end game for pak, from above link "In my opinion, there is only one possible end game: the unwinding of Pakistan into several pieces: Balochistan, Sind, Balawaristan (Gilgit, Baltistan, the rest of PoK), the Pashtun area Khyber Pakhtunwa which will merge with Afghanistan, and the rump Punjab."
3. The LOC is hot, pakis are hyperventilating in their talk shows. Some who are honest are depressed (also the defeat of their case at the UN), others are pulling their hair out in frustration. Have to see what they can do once the curfews are lifted in Kashmir. Incidentally, pakis just put Waziristan under section 144, which is what we have in Kashmir right now!. Apparently, the pashtun are not happy with pak!
4. Comparisons been made between imran khans independence day speech and Modi's. Imrans speech was all hate about jihad, Kashmir and islamism going back to the stone age. Modi's did not even mention pak, but focussed on development towards a 5 Trillion economy in 5 years.
5. India will appoint a Chief of Defense Staff, over the army, navy and airforce.
Taken together, India seems to be preparing for war in the next few years.
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Looks like a deal is coming soon. Some paki sources reporting that too.
Trump Reviews Controversial US-Taliban Peace Deal Which Critics Call A "Betrayal"
Profile picture for user Tyler Durden
by Tyler Durden
Sat, 08/17/2019 - 22:15
Critics are calling a Trump administration plan for a rapid US force draw down in Afghanistan which involves striking a peace deal with the Taliban a "betrayal".
But administration officials have countered that this is the cost of bringing the some 14,000 US troops in Afghanistan home. Trump "has been pretty clear that he wants to bring the troops home" according to senior officials privy to ongoing negotiations.
The chief controversy behind the US-Taliban peace talks is that any deal will likely rely on the Taliban holding to counterterrorism guarantees, or that it won't attack US coalition forces; however, there's reportedly little in the impending deal which holds the Taliban to guarantees it won't attack Afghan civilians or the national army.
Via Reuters
According to CNN:
One source explained that the agreement is seen as paving the way for the US to leave the country without a high number of US casualties in the coming months.
President Trump said he had a "very good meeting in Afghanistan" in a tweet Friday, just after meeting with top national security advisers over the impending peace plan which seeks to end America's longest running war, now approaching two decades.
"Discussions centered around our ongoing negotiations and eventual peace and reconciliation agreement with the Taliban and the government of Afghanistan," a White House press spokesman said of the meeting. "The meeting went very well, and negotiations are proceeding."
“In continued close cooperation with the government of Afghanistan, we remain committed to achieving a comprehensive peace agreement, including a reduction in violence and a cease-fire, ensuring that Afghan soil is never again used to threaten the United States or her allies, and bringing Afghans together to work towards peace,” the statement said.
CNN summarizes of the deal that it's "expected to formalize a significant withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan -- from about 15,000 troops to 8,000 or 9,000 troops -- and enshrine official commitments by the Taliban to counterterrorism efforts in Afghanistan, according to the multiple sources familiar with the plan."
But there's fear that the Taliban is simply looking to remove the US military from the equation, and that once the US departs, the Taliban will have free reign to attack a greatly weakened Afghan national army.
Spearheading the dialogue has been White House special envoy Zalmay Khalilzad, who has been meeting with Taliban negotiators in Qatar for months, with a desire to strike a final deal by September 1.
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India's defense minister says talks with Pak, only on POK. For 70 years, talks were on Indian Kashmir, suddenly that topic is closed.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/if-talks-are-held-with-pakistan-it-will-now-be-on-pok-rajnath-singh/articleshow/70722672.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/if-talks-are-held-with-pakistan-it-will-now-be-on-pok-rajnath-singh/articleshow/70722672.cms)
Imran Khan is losing it.
The World must also seriously consider the safety & security of India's nuclear arsenal in the control of the fascist, racist Hindu Supremacist Modi Govt. This is an issue that impacts not just the region but the world.
— Imran Khan (@ImranKhanPTI) August 18, 2019
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https://www.jihadwatch.org/2019/08/that-fascist-racist-hindu-supremacist-and-nazi-narendra-modi (https://www.jihadwatch.org/2019/08/that-fascist-racist-hindu-supremacist-and-nazi-narendra-modi)
That “Fascist, Racist, Hindu Supremacist and Nazi” Narendra Modi
AUG 24, 2019 10:00 AM BY HUGH FITZGERALD 47 COMMENTS
What was it that Prime Minister Modi of India did in early August that was so terrible? His government announced that it had decided to scrap Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, which since 1949 had conferred a special status on the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) – the only Muslim-majority state in India — allowing it to be nearly autonomous, except in areas like foreign policy and defense. Until now J&K has been able to mostly govern itself, even having its own constitution and flag. Now its status will be that of a “union territory,” meaning that India’s central government in New Delhi will gain much more control over the area’s affairs.
This change has Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Imran Khan, foaming at the mouth. In a series of tweets on August 18, he alleged that Muslims in India were being “disenfranchised” and “RSS goons were on the rampage.” But no Muslim citizens have been “disenfranchised.” He compared the Indian government to those who ruled Nazi Germany. Khan posted: “India has been captured, as Germany had been captured by Nazis, by a fascist, racist Hindu supremacist ideology and leadership. This threatens 9 million Kashmiris under siege in IOK [Indian occupied Kashmir] for over two weeks which should have sent alarm bells ringing across the world with UN observers being sent there.”
Now let’s see. Which Muslims have been “disenfranchised” — that is, citizens deprived of the legitimate right to vote? So far, none. Are RSS (a Hindu nationalist group, Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) “goons..on the rampage”? Are Muslims being attacked all over India? Between May 2015 and December 2018, a total of 36 Muslims were killed in 12 Indian states, according to Human Rights Watch. Compare that to the 166 Hindus (and Jews) killed in the single attack by Muslim terrorists in Mumbai in 2008. Or consider that in the same period, May 2015 to December 2018, hundreds of Hindus, Sikhs, and other non-Muslims, including Indian army personnel, were killed by Muslim terrorists, some of them trained in Pakistan. Who is on the rampage? Who are the goons?
Below are eye-opening 2015-2017 statistics for terrorist incidents (those for 2018 were unavailable) in India. Most, though not all, of these incidents of terrorism, were carried out by Muslims.
Terrorist incidents in India
Year Number of incidents Deaths Injuries
2017 1000 470 702
2016 1,025 467 788
2015 884 387 649
Imran Khan claims hysterically that “the threat also extends to Pakistan, the minorities in India and in fact the very fabric of Nehru and Gandhi’s India. One can simply Google to understand the link between the Nazi ideology and ethnic cleansing and genocide ideology of the RSS-BJP [Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh-Bharatiya Janata Party] founding fathers.”
He went on to claim that Indian Muslims in India face oppression and discrimination: “Already four million Indian Muslims face detention camps and cancellation of citizenship. [The] world must take note as this genie is out of the bottle and the doctrine of hate and genocide, with RSS goons on the rampage, will spread unless the international community acts now to stop it.”
What “detention camps” for Muslims does Imran Khan have in mind? The Indian government has made plans, in the single State of Assam, to detain those migrants, many but not all of whom are Muslim, who cannot prove that they or their families were citizens before 1971. Why 1971? That was the year when war broke out in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and many Muslims fled into the Indian state of West Bengal to avoid the fighting, but never returned to Bangladesh. These are the “four million Indian Muslims” whom he claims face “cancellation of citizenship,” but who never obtained legal citizenship in the first place; they were refugees from Bangladesh who simply remained.
A comparison of how Muslims have fared in India with how Hindus have done in Pakistan and Bangladesh is revealing. Muslims constituted 9.8% of the Indian population in the 1951 census. Now the Muslim percentage of the Indian population has gone up by 50%, to 14.5%. Meanwhile, since Partition in 1949, in Pakistan (formerly West Pakistan), the Hindu population has shrunk from 15% to 1.6%. In Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan), the Hindu population has gone from 35% to 10.5%. Clearly it is Hindus, not Muslims, who are suffering.
Not content with labeling Narendra Modi a “fascist,” “racist,” and “Hindu supremacist,” Imran Khan claims that his regime is a worldwide threat: “The world must also seriously consider the safety and security of India’s nuclear arsenal in the control of the fascist, racist Hindu supremacist Modi government. This is an issue that impacts not just the region but the world.”
Prime Minister Khan shows no signs of tamping down his hysterical invective. The “fascist, racist Hindu supremacist Modi government” has done nothing more terrible than cease to allow Muslim-majority Jammu and Kashmir to exist as an autonomous state. It will now come under greater control of the national government. Modi’s move did not occur in a vacuum. It was a response to three decades of attacks on the Hindu Pandits of Kashmir by local Muslims.
Horrible things have happened in Kashmir. But the scrapping of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution is not among them. Imran Khan would have you believe that atrocities have been, and are being, committed against the Muslims, in Jammu and Kashmir. But the most telling statistic about J&K is this: in 1990, there were between 300,000 and 600,000 Kashmiri Pandits (Brahmins) in Kashmir; now there are fewer than 3,000. That is a reduction in the Hindu Pandit population of between 99 and 99.5%. What could be more damning to the Muslim case?
The killings of the helpless Pandits led those who survived to flee their ancestral homeland in Kashmir for places further south in India where, having abandoned their homes and lands, they arrived impoverished.. The story of what happened to the Kashmiri Pandits has seldom been told in the Western media. (In this respect, it is like the failure of the Western media to discuss the 900,000 Jews who from 1948 to 1951 fled pogroms in Arab lands). No one in the Western media has mentioned it even now, when Kashmir is so much in the news, with the Pakistanis and Indian Muslims raging about Prime Minister Modi’s “facist, racist, supremacist” change in the status of J&K. Perhaps now that there will be less autonomy in J&K, and likely a more robust Indian army presence, some of those Pandits will be brave enough to return.
The Indian government would do well, right now, to go firmly on the offensive. Modi himself should remind Imran Khan what happened to the Pandits of Kashmir when the Muslims exercised their autonomy in the state. The “fascist, racist, Nazi” Prime Minister Modi should also let Prime Minister Khan know how many terrorist attacks by Muslims on Hindus in India have taken place in the last few decades, and how many victims there have been. He might even remind Khan – whose howls of rage can well be imagined – and the world about the centuries of Mughal rule, during which there were 70-80 million Hindu victims of Muslim massacres. And then he might, in a final fillip to Imran Khan, he might end with this: “Prime Minister Khan, you describe me as adhering to a ‘fascist, racist, supremacist ideology.’ Given that in the Qur’an Muslims are described as ‘the best of peoples’ (3:110) and non-Muslims described as ‘the most vile of created beings,’ can you see why some might be forgiven for thinking that Islam itself is a ‘supremacist ideology’? Billions of non-Muslims would welcome your answer.”
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ECzEAthU4AUgrOI?format=png&name=small)
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Modi at 13:15 shows good chemistry with Trump. Body language is certainly positive. Not sure I have seen this kind of chemistry between Trump and another head of state.
https://youtu.be/7TZV_YQFeo8 (https://youtu.be/7TZV_YQFeo8)
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Modi at 13:15 shows good chemistry with Trump. Body language is certainly positive. Not sure I have seen this kind of chemistry between Trump and another head of state.
https://youtu.be/7TZV_YQFeo8 (https://youtu.be/7TZV_YQFeo8)
Yes! Trump is a big picture, future oriented guy who is always asking, what is in America's best interest. In the big picture going forward, US-India is the future alliance that matters.
Trump was asked if he had second thoughts on opening the trade war with China and he replied that he has second thoughts on everything. The mediation offer for Kashmir was a well intended, almost good idea. Modi helped him with his second thoughts and Trump reversed course with no damage done.
In the case of both of these leaders, the facts are on their side and that makes persuasion and negotiations so much easier. The US can be a much better partner for India than the other big players, China and Russia. And vice versa! That we have stumbled to avoid this win-win relationship for so long is just lost time.
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My daughter returned recently from business in India. Interesting place with a private sector very closely connected to the US. We've come along way since my business communications to India via telex.
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(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EDGpfPrUEAAPQRC?format=png&name=900x900)
The next pak PM will lose POK :-D
What a worthless army
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India gets cozy with Russia. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced a Russia dimension to bring together his Act East and Indo-Pacific strategies. Speaking at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok, Russia, Modi promised closer ties with Moscow. He announced a $1 billion line of credit to help Russia develop its Far East region, and the two countries signed a memorandum of understanding for the establishment of maritime communications between the ports of Chennai and Vladivostok. Modi said these moves complement his Act East policy, which aims to bolster relations between India and Southeast Asia. India has been gradually increasing cooperation with Japan, the U.S. and Australia. On Wednesday, for example, Modi met with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the forum, while India’s defense minister and his Japanese counterpart earlier this week announced progress in talks on a military logistics agreement and plans for expanded joint naval exercises, potentially in the South China Sea. New Delhi on Wednesday also announced plans to acquire 10 additional maritime surveillance aircraft from the U.S. Nonetheless, India has been reluctant to abandon its cherished long-time strategy of nonalignment, and Russia, moreover, remains India’s most important source of arms and military technology. This latest reaffirmation of its partnership with Russia as an Indo-Pacific partner is intended to sustain this balance
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Looks like Trump cancelled talks with the Taliban at Camp David. This was after the Talibs were reported to be involved in a bombing that killed American servicemen. I think this shows that peace with the taliban will be tenuous at best and will breakdown within weeks of signing any agreement. The reason that the US and also Russia were not able to defeat the Taliban was their sanctuaries in Pak. They can attack US forces and run back to safety in Pak forward areas. Conversely, Pak is fixated about influence in Afghanistan as it provides them strategic depth https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_depth (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Strategic_depth) against India, the logic being that Pak is not a very broad territory (nation) and can be easily overcome (split into two) in an Indian assault of even a few hundred miles, whereas access and friends in Afghanistan gives them territory to back into (ie Afghanistan becomes a sanctuary state for Pak army to rally from). This concept is most important to understand Pak army thinking and their insecurities, because once this is understood, eliminate the possibility of Pak gaining strategic depth, and one eliminates paki interference and interest in Afghanistan.
With India abrogating article 370, Indian kashmir is off the table in discussions with Kashmir. There are several reports that POK Kashmiris want to join with India. Pak has been settling punjabis in POKashmir to change demographics, that has not gone down well with the locals. There is also the destruction of Kashmiri culture and general mistreatment of kashmiris (same as what happened in erstwhile Bangladesh).
One view gaining ground in India is that India must take back POK (a difficult but not impossible task), such that it has a direct border with Afghanistan. The Govt of India to this day has 24 empty seats for senators from POK as per the Indian Constitution from 1947. I believe this will happen sometime in the next few years, once India has done the necessary groundwork of stabilizing Indian Kashmir and creating public awareness for reunification of Kashmir.
The point I am driving at is if Trump were to support this endeavour now (diplomatically + with some weapons support + veto support in UN against China), the afghan situation can be controlled today in a manner suitable to US interests. Trump wants Indian forces in Afghanistan to stabilize it, but that is not possible without direct supply lines through Indian territory. If India takes back POK, the geographic importance of Pak diminishes. The simple shock of losing POK will force Pak to stop providing sanctuary to taliban (as of now the pakis are raving and ranting, but can do nothing about loss of indian Kashmir). Infact, Pak will lose the durrand area to afghanistan as the next logical step, with subsequent break up of Pak (Balochistan will go first).
The taliban want power and ability to rule Afghanistan. They are not interested in terrorism against the US mainland, neither are they interested in serving as strategic depth for Pak's paranoia against India. Understanding pak fixation with strategic depth and eliminating it, is the solution to the Pak problem.
Note added: This would also disrupt China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
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VERY interesting idea YA.
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(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EEbkpQmVUAAt6AN?format=jpg&name=medium)
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Seems strange that the US govt does not say where Hamza was killed. Translation of "Killed in Af-Pak region"=Pak
Read more at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/71129369.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
"While the White House statement did not go into precise details of how he was eliminated, accounts that first surfaced on social media claimed Hamza was being escorted in a Pakistan Army Aviation flight from Islamabad Airport when the plane nosedived in a residential area near the Pakistani Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. Reports at that time said US personnel collaborated with Afghans and brought down the plan knowing it carried Hamza bin Laden."
See this previous news report: https://tribune.com.pk/story/2024227/1-17-martyr-army-aviation-aircraft-crashes-rawalpindi/ This crash was followed by immediate cordoning off, of the area and news blackout.
Hamza probably died a while ago, for some reason the US releases the news now.
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Perhaps to divert attention from the unfavorable reaction in many serious quarters to the negotiations with the Taliban and the Camp David invite?
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And the govt is protecting Pak reputation, by claiming that Hamza was killed in Af-Pak. Far too many terrorists make pak their home. Trump hopes that Pak will help get a deal with the Taliban...in this case, past is prologue.
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Just finished watching the #HowdyModi rally in Houston, estimated 50 K attendees, Trump and several members of the US govt were present. Nice chemistry between Modi and Trump. Expect a trade deal soon. Trump will pick up some voters too...he was welcomed enthusiastically. Modi said India has the cheapest data rates in the world, 0.25$/GB...perhaps a hint to the US govt about the 5G battle brewing in India with Huawei. Indian govt is unlikely to give Huawei any contracts...I am sure thats a topic of negotiation with the US.
Imran Khan is not going to like this...the beggar had to borrow a plane from Saudi Mr Bone Saw to attend the coming UNGA meeting.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EFFx-4nU8AA-ac6?format=jpg&name=medium)
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(https://images.indianexpress.com/2019/09/modi-trump-3.jpg?w=759&h=422&imflag=true)
Full house
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https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/south-asia/article/3029877/trump-and-modi-appear-together-houston-rally-courting-indian
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https://www.defenseone.com/threats/2019/10/pakistan-may-be-stumbling-toward-two-front-war/160940/?oref=defenseone_today_nl
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Pakistan’s powerful military said it supported the country’s elected government and the constitution, as tens of thousands of opposition protesters gathered in the capital demanding that Prime Minister Imran Khan’s year-old government quits by Sunday. “We believe in the law and the constitution and our support is with the democratically elected government, not with any party,” military spokesman Major General Asif Ghafoor said in comments to a television news channel late on Friday. Earlier on Friday, the opposition had demanded that cricket star-turned-politician Khan and his administration resign within two days, raising the stakes in a protest campaign that the government has denounced as a threat to democracy.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-politics-protests/pakistan-army-says-supports-elected-government-amid-major-protest-idUSKBN1XC064?il=0
[Maybe ya knows what is going on.]
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This might help...its complicated. In the article below, "establishment" is code for military...YA
Maulana Fazal ur Rahman’s long march/dharna promised a big bang in D Chowk in Islamabad but has seemingly retreated with a whimper. His obedient supporters will now partially block some roads and arteries until his demand for the prime minister’s ouster followed by fresh elections are met or, failing that, he is obliged to shift gears into Plan C, whatever that might be. This tactic will certainly keep him on the front page – albeit reduced from four columns to two and even one in due course – even if it doesn’t succeed in outing Imran Khan. But, surely, the Maulana has known this truth all along.
This brings us full circle to a set of questions we have asked from the outset: What are the real motives behind Maulana’s dharna? Why was the Maulana adamant on launching it in November? Why didn’t the PPP and PMLN join forces with him, especially since they have the most to gain from ousting Imran Khan?
A second initiative seems to have got unstuck too. That is Shahbaz Sharif’s efforts to put ailing Nawaz Sharif on a plane to London for medical treatment. But it suddenly transpires that the PTI government won’t let Nawaz Sharif out of sight without compelling him to cough up Rs 7 billion – the amount of corruption attributed to his account by two judges – that would, in effect, amount to a confession of guilt on his part. Wags say that Imran Khan has put a spoke in the “understanding” reached between Shahbaz Sharif and the “Establishment”, which would lead to the more ominous conclusion that the government is no longer on the same page with the partner who “selected” it and put it there in the first instance.
Is there a common factor that might explain these two new developments?
The Maulana has been hard on the Establishment, constantly accusing it of disrepute for aligning itself so closely with a “failed” prime minister and incompetent government. He has gone so far as to publicly accuse it of “disappearing” persons, rigging elections, selecting Imran Khan and abandoning the cause of Kashmir. In contrast, Shahbaz Sharif purrs like a kitten whenever the “Establishment” finds mention and Asif Zardari is conspicuous by his studied silence on the same subject. What is it about November and the Establishment that puts Maulana Fazal, Shahbaz Sharif and Imran Khan on high alert and compels them to tug in so many different directions and ways?
Let’s stop pussyfooting about the subject. Everyone and his aunt has been speculating for months about one issue that is dead-lined for resolution end-November when the term of the current army chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, ends. Government ministers have proclaimed that this is a non-issue since an extension in tenure for three years has already been granted to Gen Bajwa and President Arif Alvi has confirmed signing the relevant notification. Yet, for some inexplicable reason, this notification remains in the pocket of Gen Bajwa and has not been officially notified in the public domain even though a couple of journalists have been “shown” it unofficially.
Is it conceivable that Maulana Fazal ur Rahman’s behavior, no less than that of Shahbaz Sharif and Imran Khan, remains contingent on whether or not General Bajwa agrees to serve as army chief for three more years? One might imagine that the Maulana’s backers would like the business of extensions to be done away with in the larger institutional interest of the army and are hoping General Bajwa declines to accept the extension. Equally, Shahbaz Sharif and Asif Zardari are taking no chances siding with the Maulana, just in case Gen Bajwa decides to stay on as the most powerful player in the arena. But it is Imran Khan’s behavior that is both intriguing and revealing. On the one hand, he has signed away the extension; on the other, he hasn’t put it in the public domain; on the one hand, he is constantly at pains to insist that the government and Establishment are on the same page; on the other, he is clearly not on the same page as the Establishment in so far as dealing with the political opposition is concerned.
The Establishment is concerned that another Martyr – and a popular Punjabi one to boot – would severely undermine its institutional interests. It may also be concerned about the disunity in the country provoked by Imran Khan’s obsession to wipe out the leadership of the PPP and PMLN at a time when Pakistanis are heaving under the yoke of severe economic pressures and hostile regional powers may be conspiring against the country.
Has the Maulana been conveyed some assurances? Certainly, Imran Khan’s latest spanner in the works would suggest a degree of boldness that can only result from the knowledge or perception that General Bajwa has decided to go home. He would be a very foolish man to take this stance if he knew that Gen Bajwa aims to wield the stick for another three years.
Najam Sethi
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So Modi has delivered on article 370, i.e. Kashmir now has the same laws as the rest of India and no more special status and pandering. The unfinished business is getting back POK (pak Occupied Kashmir). I expect him to act on it, in this term or the next at the latest. With that in mind, India needs to get their weapons and military readiness up to speed. The previous congress governments did not allow India to modernize its military. India needs to get some key systems in place, S-400 from Russia, Rafale aircraft from France, more subs as well as acquisitions from the US. The below, should be seen with the above objective in mind.
India, US $7.5 billion defence deals for armed drones, spy planes in pipeline
2 min read . Updated: 17 Nov 2019, 06:17 PM IST
ANI
The Trump administration had approved the sale of armed drones to India in June this year
The other major deal in the pipeline is the project for the acquisition of the 10 P-8I anti-submarine warfare and long-range surveillance aircraft
Topics
Indian NavyIndian Army
NEW DELHI : Amid growing military ties between India and the United States, the Indian armed forces are moving closer towards deals for procuring American defence equipment worth over $7 billion from America, including Sea Guardian armed drones and naval spy planes.
The two projects are moving ahead separately as one of them is a tri-services project while the other is being steered by the Indian Navy.
"All the three services are collating their requirement for the Sea Guardian armed drones which will give us a strong capability in terms of high altitude long endurance unmanned aerial vehicles and also enhance our capabilities to carry out surveillance," government sources told ANI.
They said since some of the capability requirements of the three services would be different from each other, their collation would take a few months and a Letter of Request is expected to be issued to the American government for the government-to-government deal by the February-March time frame.
The Trump administration had approved the sale of armed drones to India in June this year and offered it to be equipped with required missiles and other systems.
Earlier, among the three services, only the Navy seemed to be interested in the procurement but now all the three services are showing interest in the project, the sources said.
The project is expected to cost over $4.5 billion to the defence services.
Once the Letter of Request (similar to a Request for Proposal) is issued to the American government for the deal under its Foreign Military Sales route, the American side would send the Letter of Acceptance in which it will specify the terms and conditions for the project.
The other major deal in the pipeline is the project for the acquisition of the 10 P-8I anti-submarine warfare and long-range surveillance aircraft which would be adding to the existing fleet of 12 such planes in the Indian Navy.
The sources said the project was supposed to be fielded before the Defence Acquisition Council in its last meeting but was withheld due to some reasons. "Now the proposal is expected to be put up before the DAC again in the next meeting," the sources said.
The P-8I planes are expected to cost around $3 billion. These planes would also be acquired under the FMS route once it gets final approval from the Cabinet Committee on Security headed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
In the last over one decade, India has inducted a large number of American defence hardware including Apache attack choppers, Chinook heavy-lift Helicopters, C-17 Globemaster and C-130J Super Hercules Transport aircraft, M-777 ultra-light howitzers and AN-TPQ weapon locating radars.
The two sides are also in discussions for the NASAMS air defence system for providing protection to the national capital region.
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https://www.dawn.com/news/1518960/gen-bajwas-extension-hangs-in-balance-as-cjp-suspends-govts-notification-until-tomorrow
As discussed above, it was all about whether Bajwa gets an extension.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1518960/gen-bajwas-extension-hangs-in-balance-as-cjp-suspends-govts-notification-until-tomorrow
Usually the courts are deferential to the military...looks like Bajwa will retire on Nov29.
The military commanders are upset with Bajwa for usurping a promotion, on top of that he is a ahmedi according to some.
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https://strategypage.com/military_photos/military_photos_20191122225740.aspx
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Looks like Bajwa has a 6 month extension..until they get legislation passed for his extension. Push and pull between supreme court and military.
https://www.dawn.com/news/1519326/gen-bajwa-to-stay-on-as-coas-for-6-more-months-sc
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With Protests, India’s Muslims Push Back Against Modi Government
Citizenship law is viewed as having far more impact than ruling party’s other policies affecting Muslim community
Demonstrators holding the national flag of India as they protest a new citizenship law at New Delhi's famous Jama Masjid mosque on Friday. PHOTO: DANISH SIDDIQUI/REUTERS
By Vibhuti Agarwal and Krishna Pokharel
Dec. 20, 2019 1:21 pm ET
NEW DELHI—Indian Muslims are stepping off the sidelines to join the political fray, driven by fears their status as citizens has never been more threatened and encouraged by the numbers of non-Muslims joining them in opposing a new citizenship law.
The law, which creates a simplified path to citizenship for immigrants from surrounding countries of every major South Asian faith, except Islam, has proved the last straw for some Muslims. Many had watched with concern as Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, ascendant after a sweeping election win in May, pushed through Hindu nationalist policies long advocated by his Bharatiya Janata Party.
The citizenship law is viewed by Muslims as having far more impact on them and their families than the government’s other moves, propelling many onto the streets across the country.
The BJP’s senior leadership have indicated they want to roll out a citizen registry nationally that would require all residents to produce documents. Anyone who can’t—the status for millions of poor people in India—would be at risk of being treated as an immigrant, and all those except Muslims will be able under the new law to try to naturalize.
“The constitution promises equality to everyone. Why are we being treated as second-class citizens?” said Azad Ali, a 26-year-old Muslim who sells rice dishes from a small storefront in the Sarai Jullena district in India’s capital.
Protests began last weekend shortly after India’s parliament passed the citizenship act, with students at some predominantly Muslim universities, including in the capital of New Delhi, staging protests that garnered nationwide attention. The Delhi one ended with violent images of buses being torched and demonstrators being beaten by police who chased them into libraries and bathrooms.
Protests have since spread across the country, increasingly in Muslim neighborhoods or featuring Muslims prominently amid demonstrations that were attended by many, sometimes even more, non-Muslim protesters.
Indian Muslims offer prayers during a protest against the citizenship law in New Delhi on Friday. PHOTO: RAJAT GUPTA/SHUTTERSTOCK
Two protesters were killed by police in Mangalore in southern India on Thursday and one protester died in protests in Lucknow, police in those cities said. Police in Uttar Pradesh, India’s most populous state, said late Friday night they were still investigating news reports of the death of six people in protests across the state. More than 1,000 protesters have been detained this week in New Delhi, according to police, though most were released the same day.
In New Delhi on Friday, police dispersed a demonstration of thousands trying to march from the city’s most famous mosque to the center of the capital to denounce the new law, a police spokesman said.
One of the organizers was an organization of young people claiming to champion the rights of India’s Dalit community, once known as untouchables in the Hindu caste hierarchy.
The group calls the citizenship law and the national register of citizens a “conspiracy” by the upper-caste Hindus to rob Muslims, Dalits, tribal people, economically backward castes and the religious minorities of their right to their “citizenship, jobs, education and property.”
A prominent biographer of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, an icon of modern India’s tradition of religious tolerance, was detained in protests on Thursday, while more than 1,000 scientists signed a letter in opposition to the law. Leaders of the opposition Congress party, which has historically been the political home for Muslims, have also joined in the protests.
Critics of India's new citizenship legislation, which puts some Muslim immigrants at a disadvantage, say Prime Minister Narendra Modi is undermining the country’s secular foundation. Here’s why Muslims aren’t the only Indians taking to the streets. Photo: Sajjad Hussain/AFP via Getty Images (Originally published Dec. 17, 2019)
Mr. Modi has said the new law isn’t intended to discriminate against Muslims or any other religious group and should be lauded as a humanitarian gesture toward others who are persecuted and have no where to turn. Yet he has also made pointed public comments critics believe are intended to play up the prominence of Muslims in the protests as a way to rally the BJP’s base.
India’s Muslims, which number about 200 million and make up about 14% of India’s population, have generally sought to keep a low profile as India’s largest minority group. That has been especially true over the course of this year as the BJP, which rose to power with a stridently pro-Hindu agenda, trounced Congress.
In recent months, the government banned a special form of divorce previously allowed under Islamic law and a symbol of the community’s autonomy in Hindu-majority India. In August, the BJP moved to strip India’s only Muslim-majority state, Jammu and Kashmir, of its partially autonomous status.
The passing of the new citizenship law, while it affects immigrants, is viewed by Muslims as having a broad reach within their community. India’s home minister, Amit Shah, the BJP’s head political tactician and a close Modi ally, has mentioned the law in conjunction with the BJP’s citizen registry initiative that would require every Indian to prove longstanding residency in the country.
Proving residency could be difficult for poor Indians, a category many Muslims fall within. Most poor people in India don’t record births with the government, possess clear title records for property, receive utility bills, have passports, drivers’ licenses or other identification records. Those that have gone through the bureaucracy often find the records are faulty or improperly executed.
The implementation of a citizen registry in the state of Assam, which may leave almost two million residents stateless, has caused concerns that the new citizenship law would leave Muslims who are unable to prove residency with ambiguous claims to citizenship in the only country they and generations of their families have ever lived in.
The government repeatedly issued statements this week that neither the citizenship act or any future citizen registry are intended to single out Muslims. But given the BJP’s grounding in the Hindu nationalist cause, concerns remain among Muslims.
Indeed, more Muslims say they need to speak out publicly alongside non-Muslims who share their worries that Mr. Modi’s policies are undermining constitutional protections for all religious groups.
“We never thought that we would feel so helpless and worry about our future in India,” said Naeem Khan, who moved to New Delhi from the northern state of Uttar Pradesh in 1992 and runs a travel agency to support his wife and four children. “If we don’t raise our voices now, we will be suppressed forever.”
Congress party leaders have spoken out against the new law, as well as the government’s move to forcibly strip Kashmir of its autonomy. But the party’s electoral drubbing earlier this year has eroded its clout, leaving Muslims casting about for other allies.
“The Congress party lost its say long ago. No party is a voice for us now,” said Rizwaan Ali, a 32-year-old salesman at a mobile-accessories store in New Delhi.
At the same time, the citizenship bill has upset many other Indians—students in left-wing activist organizations, academics, liberal-minded professionals, poor Hindus at the bottom of the caste hierarchy and indigenous groups—who are fearful of the erosion of India’s traditional protections for minority religious groups.
“There is a national solidarity against Citizenship Amendment Act and National Register of Citizens because together they hurt not only Muslims but also other poor sections of the society where many lack the documents to prove their Indian citizenship,” said Mohammad Razi, a 25-year-old recent law graduate who attended a protest in New Delhi on Thursday.
Write to Vibhuti Agarwal at vibhuti.agarwal@wsj.com and Krishna Pokharel at krishna.pokharel@wsj.com
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These are Congress party machinations. At Independence (partition) both Nehru and gandhi declared that hindus in muslim countries would be given citizenship if they wanted it. Muslims got their own country based on religion. Over the next 70 years the % of hindus in Pak declined from 23 % to 3 %, similar trends in Bangladesh. The CAA grants these hindu refugees citizenship. Does not affect Indian citizens (hindus or muslims). Muslims from Afghanistan, Pak, Bangladesh can apply for citizenship, but it is restricted to genuine cases of oppression, after scrutiny.
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In the meantime India will soon appoint Chief of Defense Staff
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chief-of-defence-staff-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/72954113.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/chief-of-defence-staff-all-you-need-to-know/articleshow/72954113.cms)
Things are moving towards taking back POK. In a few years, India will have new rafale fighter jets, S-400 missile defense. Lots of progress being made. With some luck, 2023 will be the year or latest in the third term for BJP. Pak will probably be at its weakest about then. Watch the frequent testing of new and old missile systems, launch of new submarines, new US heavy lift planes, attack helicopters, anti-tank guided missiles, new surveillance satellites, new border roads and tunnels. The Modi govt has implemented a whole lot of promises within the first 6 months.
Watch also the hysterical complaints from Pak to the UN!...
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Indian Twitter handles dealing with defense are abuzz since months as to the firing on the LOC and the beating that Pak is getting. Some days the entire LOC (Line of control) sees heavy shelling. Wonder how long this can go on...or when Pak breaks.
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Love having you post here YA!
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In the past, Indian thinking was to not develop border region roads, the rationale being that the outer Himalayas would provide protection from a Chinese attack. However, the Chinese started to salami slice away Indian territory and it would take weeks for the Indian army to reach the border, if they detected the Chinese salami slicing. Now, the govt has decided to improve border roads so that an effective response can be mounted against the Chinese. Such capability would be important, if India makes a bid for POK.
https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/roads-totalling-60000-km-developed-by-bro-in-2019/73010150 (https://auto.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/industry/roads-totalling-60000-km-developed-by-bro-in-2019/73010150)
Roads totalling 60,000 km developed by BRO in 2019
The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has carried out formation work on 1,123.46 km of roads, surfacing work of 2,099.58 km of roads and resurfacing work on 2,339.38 km of roads this year so far.
IANS | December 28, 2019, 22:30 IST
NewsletterA A
The organisation has also developed road infrastructure in some friendly neighbourhood countries.
The organisation has also developed road infrastructure in some friendly neighbourhood countries.
New Delhi: The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) which maintains and develops road networks across India's borders has, in 2019, constructed and developed approximately 60,000 km of roads, including a crucial 19.72 km road near Doklam, the site of the 73-day stand-off in 2017 between the Indian and Chinese armies.
The organisation has also developed road infrastructure in some friendly neighbourhood countries.
The BRO has carried out formation work on 1,123.46 km of roads, surfacing work of 2,099.58 km of roads and resurfacing work on 2,339.38 km of roads this year so far.
Apart from roads, the BRO has also developed the Maj Pmt Bridge, 19 airfields and two tunnels in difficult and remote locations near the border areas in 2019.
This year, one of the BRO's achievements was the development of the 19.72 km Bheem Base-Dokala road that helps the Indian Army reach the strategic Dokala base, which stands at the edge of the disputed Doklam plateau near Sikkim, in just 40 minutes. Earlier, it used to take seven hours.
It is an all-weather black tarred road that has no restrictions on its load carrying capacity.
When the Indian Army was engaged in a tense stand-off with the Chinese People's Liberation Army in Doklam in 2017, access to the base used to take up to seven hours on a mule track.
Read also
Major construction work on 61 border roads complete: BRO
Border Roads Organisation to construct 6 important road projects in Srinagar in 2016
The BRO is also developing an underwater tunnel across the Brahmaputra. The approval-in-principle has been accorded by the Ministry of Defence and the proposal includes two road tubes and one rail tube.
The BRO is developing the 297-km long Nimmu-Padam-Darcha (N-P-D) road. Initially in 2002, this road was conceived to be developed to single lane specification under the Prime Minister's package for Jammu and Kashmir.
However, due to various reasons including operational, during 2007 it was decided to develop this road to National Highway Double Lane specification. Out of 297 km, connectivity has been achieved for 257.55 km so far.
The BRO is also developing the Akhnoor-Poonch road, Se La tunnel on the road to Balipara, Charduar and Tawang.
The BRO was entrusted with 61 Indo-China border roads having a length of 3,346 km.
Till date, 75 per cent of the road length has been black topped and 98 per cent connected. As on date, 36 roads totalling 2,501 km have been completed.
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Stratfor Worldview
In Taiwan, China Fights the Rising Tide of Resistance
8 MINS READ
Jan 9, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen waves to supporters during a campaign rally on Jan. 7, 2020.
Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen of the ruling Democratic Progressive Party waves to supporters during a recent campaign rally ahead of the island's Jan. 11 elections.
(CHAN LONG HEI/SOPA Images/LightRocket via Getty Images)
HIGHLIGHTS
In light of the Hong Kong protests, Taiwanese voters are expected to reelect their pro-independence government on Jan. 11 -- accelerating the island’s move away from mainland China, and into the open arms of the United States....
Relations between China and Taiwan have nose-dived since the election of the island's independence-leaning president in 2016 and are now poised to plummet even further. President Tsai Ing-wen's strong defense of Taiwan's sovereignty in the face of the ongoing Hong Kong protests has helped pull her back from the brink of political death ahead of the island's Jan. 11 presidential elections. Not only is Tsai widely expected to beat the opposition Kuomintang (KMT) candidate, but the support garnered by the Hong Kong crisis has also greatly improved the prospects of her ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in concurrent legislative elections.
A victory by Tsai and the DPP would clear the way for Taiwan to continue inching toward independence with the help of the United States, even if doing so means inviting harder-line policies from China. Regardless of the election outcome, however, growing resistance against Beijing's desired "one country, two systems" arrangement — especially among Taiwan's younger generations — will confine the ability of any Taiwanese government to pursue a path toward cooperation with China for the foreseeable future.
The Big Picture
Taiwan will hold one of the most consequential elections in its history on Jan. 11. Against the backdrop of ongoing protests in Hong Kong, voters will choose between political parties with sharply diverging views on Taiwan's future relationship with mainland China. But even in the off-chance that a government friendlier to China emerges from the fray, the region's evolving economic, political and strategic realities mean cross-strait relations between Taipei and Beijing can hardly return to the previous status quo.
Reigniting a Familiar Fight
The prospect of bringing the democratic island under Chinese control has long been a sensitive and highly polarizing political issue in Taiwan. Over the past decade, however, the sovereignty debate has largely taken a backseat to economic concerns, such as Taiwan's stagnated growth, frozen wages and rising youth unemployment. With all eyes on the sluggish economy and her unpopular social policies, Tsai and the DPP were hemorrhaging support at the beginning of 2019. Indeed, Tsai's electoral prospects seemed all but doomed just six months ago, following the DPP's huge losses in 2018 local elections. Even before her opposition challengers had announced their candidacies, she was trailing by 10-30 points in almost every public opinion poll, which almost led to her defeat in the DPP's primaries. But since then, Tsai's political fortunes — and those of the DPP's — have dramatically improved alongside rising public sensitivities over Taiwanese sovereignty precipitated by the Hong Kong crisis.
The pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong over the past half-year (and Beijing's steely response to the crisis) have brought long-simmering issues over Taiwan's sovereignty and security back to the fore. Voters' renewed concerns with China's influence and perceived interference in Tawainese politics has, in turn, greatly strengthened Tsai's campaign narrative, which portrays Beijing as an existential threat to Taiwan's democracy and autonomy.
The Hong Kong protests have also showcased the weaknesses of the opposition KMT, as well as other China-friendlier parties whose credentials rest on maintaining cross-strait relations and the associated economic gains. Several months ago, the KMT seemed all but assured of gaining a majority in Taiwan's 113-seat legislature. But growing nationalist sentiment has since dimmed the party's prospects, paving the way for the DPP to secure a majority come Jan. 11 (whether alone or via a coalition) — an outcome that undoubtedly would help Tsai advance her anti-China strategy and other policy initiatives in her likely four more years in power. In addition, the highly contested nature of this year's legislative elections increases the chances for minor parties to take a bigger role in Taiwan's traditionally two-party politics.
A Prolonged Pro-Independence Push
Specifically, an extended DPP government would almost certainly expand its existing strategies to shore up Taiwan's sovereignty, bolster its defense, curb Beijing's political influence and counter its territorial claims by promoting security ties with the United States and other powers where it can. Over the DPP's past four-year term, these strategies have already placed the roughly 110-mile strait that separates Taiwan from mainland China at the center of Beijing's great power competition with Washington. And the continuation of such efforts under a reelected DPP administration would enable Taipei to align even more closely with U.S. efforts to counter China's regional influence.
This graphic shows Taiwan's exports from 2016 to 2019 and outgoing investment since 1991.
Tsai and the DPP's likely second term is also expected to accelerate the process of decoupling Taiwan's economic ties to the mainland. Taiwanese businesses in the mainland have long been a key source of China's foreign investment and a key pillar that Beijing has relied on to keep the island closer. But China's slowing economy, rising labor costs and an ongoing trade war with the United States have made it a far less attractive destination for an increasing number of the island's businesses. Further aiding the exodus of Taiwanese firms has been the DPP's renewed effort to lessen the island's broader reliance on the mainland economy by introducing incentives aimed at drawing investments back to the island and other emerging markets in Southeast Asia.
That said, the mainland still accounts for roughly 40 percent of total Taiwanese exports, as well as the majority of the island's outbound investments. Thus, the DPP's desired overhaul of Taipei's economic relationship with Beijing will be no easy feat, especially in sectors where the two have highly integrated supply chains, such as electronics and information technology. And indeed, the DPP's past attempts to reduce Taiwan's reliance on China have all largely been fruitless. This latest push, however, has so far shown real signs of impact. Between January and November 2019, Taiwanese investment in China declined by nearly half compared with the same period in 2018. And during the same period, investment into China's information technology manufacturing sector, in particular, dropped by more than 90 percent. In this, the United States has also helped ease this transition by increasingly filling Taiwan's exports where Beijing left off, leading Washington to become Taipei's second-largest trade partner in 2019 behind China.
Another Outcome?
There is, of course, a chance — albeit small — that the opposition KMT could win either the presidency or regain a legislative majority on Jan. 11. If so, a KMT government may seek to reboot economic links with the mainland. But it is unlikely to amend the decreased compatibility between both economies, as well as the growing costs of doing business in the mainland.
In contrast with the DPP, a KMT-led government can also be expected to prioritize more stable relations with mainland China by pledging to uphold its so-called One China policy. Such an approach would help stabilize cross-strait relations, as it would likely entail inviting Beijing to ease its pressure tactics and the poaching of Taipei's diplomatic allies. Caught in the tug-of-war of the U.S.-China rivalry, however, any possible KMT administration will still find it difficult to fend off Washington's push to more aggressively challenge Beijing's influence over the cross-strait balance — and likewise, a more forceful push from China for sovereignty.
Instead of bringing Taiwan to heel, Beijing's pressure campaign has seemingly solidified the prospects of a prolonged pro-independence push in Taipei.
But perhaps most importantly is the fact that rising public sensitivities over Taiwanese sovereignty will force any politician in Taipei who advocates for closer ties with China to walk a tight line, lest they are seen as submitting to Beijing's agenda and unification ambitions. Amid the ongoing unrest in Hong Kong, polls show that support for unification in Taiwan has reached an all-time low, and now falls anywhere between 5 and 10 percent. Similar to Hong Kong, the resistance in Taiwan will also be especially strong among the island's younger generations who weren't alive when Taiwan was under authoritarian rule, and thus grew up with little to no connection to the mainland. In a recent survey, nearly 60 percent of Taiwanese citizens between the ages of 20 and 34 said they supported the idea of a fully independent Taiwan. And the crackdown on the pro-democracy protesters in Hong Kong has only cemented the youth's skepticism of China's intentions in Taiwan. As this generation inevitably gains a greater voice in Taiwanese politics, Beijing will face greater resistance to its desire to link and ultimately unify the island by whatever means necessary.
Weighing Beijing's Options
But instead of bringing Taiwan to heel, Beijing's current strategy of suppressing, limiting or neutralizing perceived pro-independence forces has seemed to only solidify the prospects of prolonged anti-China policies under a reelected DPP government. Such a government would likely be split between Tsai's more moderate camps and the party's more radical pro-independence elements. Thus, should Tsai's party win by a large margin on Jan. 11, Beijing may be forced to consider moderating its current hard-line stance in order to insulate the more radical wings in Taipei. The need for foreign investment, as well as the desire to maintain Taiwan's economic reliance, may also compel Beijing to create new incentives to draw in more Taiwanese business to the mainland.
That said, Beijing is still most likely to maintain or even double down on its hard-line policies against Taipei. This, of course, will come at the risk of escalating tensions with the island and could even create a Hong Kong-like confrontation. Thus, regardless of who wins Taiwan's upcoming election, future cross-strait relations will be intertwined closely with the context of China's economic slowdown and intensifying competition with the United States, as well as the rise of Taiwan's nationalistic sentiment.
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"The prospect of bringing the democratic island under Chinese control has long been a sensitive and highly polarizing political issue in Taiwan."
- Who votes to have their sovereign island nation ceded to a totalitarian regime? How about a deal that says once all mainlanders have full freedoms, then we will consider your nice offer. Meanwhile we will be buy, build and deploy nuclear arms.
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"The prospect of bringing the democratic island under Chinese control has long been a sensitive and highly polarizing political issue in Taiwan."
- Who votes to have their sovereign island nation ceded to a totalitarian regime? How about a deal that says once all mainlanders have full freedoms, then we will consider your nice offer. Meanwhile we will be buy, build and deploy nuclear arms.
[/quote
https://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/nuclear-power-in-taiwan.aspx
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/chinas-greatest-nightmare-taiwan-armed-nuclear-weapons-80041
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New Official govt of India map of Kashmir.
(https://images.news18.com/ibnlive/uploads/2019/11/Map-of-India.png)
https://www.news18.com/news/india/govt-releases-new-map-of-india-after-reorganisation-of-jammu-and-kashmir-2371347.html (https://www.news18.com/news/india/govt-releases-new-map-of-india-after-reorganisation-of-jammu-and-kashmir-2371347.html)
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Watch Pak squeal
https://twitter.com/ImranKhanPTI/status/1218790894679339008?s=20
"As Indian Occupation forces continue to target & kill civilians across the LOC with increasing intensity & frequency, there is an urgent need for UN SC to insist India allow UNMOGIP return to IOJK-side of LOC. We fear an Indian false flag operation."
"I want to make clear to India and the international community that if India continues its military attacks killing civilians across LOC, Pakistan will find it increasingly difficult to remain an inactive observer along the LOC."
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https://www.meforum.org/60303/a-hot-winter-in-india?utm_source=Middle+East+Forum&utm_campaign=a4746451c3-MEF_Fatah_2020_01_19_04_57&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_086cfd423c-a4746451c3-33691909&goal=0_086cfd423c-a4746451c3-33691909&mc_cid=a4746451c3
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Tarek Fatah is a patriotic indian muslim..
"Dr. David Frawley, an American who has settled in India and has embraced Indian heritage like few else, put it best when he tweeted: "You cannot criticize Islam in Pakistan because it is the majority. You cannot criticize Islam in India because it is a minority. Yet you can criticize Hinduism in India because it is a majority and in Pakistan because it is a minority. Yet Hindus are said to be intolerant."
The protests are arranged by the Congress and other lefties in cities...where its always possible to drum up a crowd. I would be surprised if they continue for long..at some time the public will get tired of the shenanigans. Inspite of CAA, hundreds of pakistani and bangladeshi as well as afghan muslims have been given Indian citizenship. These have been individuals who have been oppressed in their home countries for their political views.
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HIGHLIGHTS
China’s expansion into India's neighborhood will continue to drive India’s own outreach in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific.
To strengthen India's territorial unity against Chinese threats, New Delhi is also ramping up development in the country's northeast region.
Boosting trade with Southeast Asian states, however, will partially depend on whether India can negotiate a favorable trade pact under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
India's emboldened eastern push reflects its aspiration to become one of Asia’s key military and economic powers — and the existential threat that China poses to realizing that dream. Beijing's growing influence, along with its increasingly forceful claims over disputed territories along India's border, is driving New Delhi to deepen its own political, economic and security relations in Southeast Asia and the wider Indo-Pacific under its "Act East" policy. Shortly after taking office in 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched the government initiative, which includes bolstering India's military presence and infrastructure development along its northeast border.
In addition to warding off China's imminent threat to India's territorial sovereignty, developing the country's northeastern wing — whose border with Myanmar positions it as India's gateway into Southeast Asia — has the potential to unlock new export markets for Indian trade, furthering the government's strategy of building a $5 trillion economy. Reaping those benefits, however, will first require striking a favorable trade deal with Southeast Asian states. Otherwise, India will risk falling even further behind China, whose military might, funding capacity and regional clout still far outstrip those of India's.
The Big Picture
Since taking office in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has prioritized strengthening India's relationships across Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific to counter the rise of China, which remains India's chief strategic rival and the greatest threat to its territorial sovereignty. But a lack of funding and deadlocked free trade negotiations, among other challenges, risk impeding India's ability to assert itself in a region dominated by Beijing.
See India's Own Worst Enemy
The China Factor
A major driver behind India’s Act East policy is its need to balance against China. China’s $12.2 trillion economy is nearly five times the size of India’s, which enables Beijing to subsidize a robust military expansion. It also offers the Chinese government deep pools of capital for loans and investment across Asia and Europe under its trillion-dollar Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). India worries a militarily assertive China will challenge Indian sovereignty along their disputed Himalayan boundary, including in India’s northeasternmost state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China claims as a part of Tibet (conversely, India claims Chinese-controlled Aksai Chin as a part of the greater Kashmir dispute). As mutual suspicions drive their infrastructure buildup along the border regions, future border confrontations are all but inevitable. But beyond land, China’s expansion into South Asia and the Indian Ocean under the BRI has added a maritime dimension to India’s security concerns as well, fueling New Delhi's fears of encirclement as China funds ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
Because India is the weaker military power, its concerns with China will continue to propel its desire to forge stronger security partnerships with various actors operating in the region to strike a more favorable balance of power. Since 2016, India and the United States have signed two foundational defense agreements covering basing access and encrypted communications. Washington and New Delhi have also upgraded their annual Malabar naval drills by inviting Japan — another key Indian regional partner — as a partner. Complementing these gestures, the Indian navy began year-round, mission-based deployments across seven regions in the Indian Ocean in 2017. India has increased its engagement in various regional organizations as well, including the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (which includes Thailand and Myanmar) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (which includes Singapore, Thailand and Australia). New Delhi also recently offered the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a $1 billion line of credit aimed at promoting increased "physical and digital" connectivity between India and the organization's 10 member states.
A Northeastern Front
Beyond security considerations in the Indo-Pacific, another objective of India’s Act East policy hinges on developing the country’s northeastern wing to advance India's territorial unity. Home to eight Indian states, the remote region is linked to the mainland by the roughly 11-mile wide Siliguri Corridor. During a 1962 border war, China conquered the Indian-administered regions of Aksai Chin and portions of Arunachal Pradesh before relinquishing control over the latter. To forestall another Chinese invasion, New Delhi intentionally neglected infrastructure development in the northeast for decades, stunting economic growth in the process. During that time, however, China’s growing military strength and assertion of control in its own border regions — including the road extension in Doklam that triggered a 73-day long border standoff in 2017 — has reinforced the importance of developing the region.
India has a long way to go before it can rival China's economic and military heft, though that won't keep it from trying.
Modi has long emphasized infrastructure development in the northeast. Shortly after taking office in 2014, his government created the National Highways & Infrastructure Development Corporation — an agency that oversees nearly 300 projects totaling 13,630 kilometers (8,469 miles) in national highways at a cost of about $29 billion. In recent years, New Delhi has also pushed to link India’s northeastern wing with Southeast Asia through neighboring Myanmar. This includes funding the construction of two sections and 69 bridges on the India-Myanmar-Thailand trilateral highway, as well as the development of the Sittwe Port in Myanmar to forge sea-based trade linked to West Bengal and overland routes with Mizoram. To further integrate the northeast region with the mainland, Modi’s government has quietly made moves to resolve long-running insurgencies in the region as well. After 22 years of talks, New Delhi is finally nearing a peace deal with a key faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland, a separatist group that operates in several northeast Indian states.
The Gateway to Southeast Asia
Using infrastructure to catalyze the development and integration of the northeastern wing makes eminent sense. But boosting its exports with Southeast Asia in the long term will, in part, depend on negotiating a more favorable free trade pact. Over the past decade, India's import growth has outpaced its exports with ASEAN countries, causing its politically sensitive trade deficit to more than quadruple from $5 billion in 2010-11 to nearly $22 billion in 2018-19. This is due largely to the shortcomings of the 2010 India-ASEAN trade pact, which the proposed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) could help redress by creating the world’s largest free trade zone between the 10 ASEAN states and their six free trade partners of India, China, Japan, Australia, South Korea and New Zealand.
But despite the potential benefits of joining the RCEP pact, India has hesitated to join a trade agreement that includes China for fear it would hurt domestic employment by facilitating a surge of Chinese imports. Facing pressure from various lobbies opposed to the trade pact, Modi refused to ratify the final RCEP agreement in November. India remains the key outlier, raising the possibility of an RCEP-minus-India pact — an outcome that would complicate New Delhi's efforts to boost exports and, in turn, the country's economic growth.
Amid the evolving geopolitical landscape in Southeast Asia, India's desire to counter China's rise and boost trade with Southeast Asia will continue to shape New Delhi's pursuit of its Act East policy. As Beijing builds up its own infrastructure near the border regions and more forcefully asserts its claims of sovereignty over disputed territories, New Delhi will also work to facilitate military and infrastructure build-ups in the region. But given its northern neighbor's superior military and economic heft, India still has a long way to go before it can ever rival China as Asia's leading geopolitical power.
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Thought you might like this matrimonial ad
(https://images.news18.com/ibnlive/uploads/2020/02/Untitled-design-2020-02-17T121326.088.jpg)
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Does "working girl" have the same context there as here?
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Does "working girl" have the same context there as here?
Very much doubt it.
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An effort at humor on my part :-D
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An effort at humor on my part :-D
Copy. At least he knows what he wants. Lucky for him, there are at least 6.5 million women that meet his criteria!
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https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/09/blood-and-soil-in-narendra-modis-india
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/opinion/trump-india.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage
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https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/12/09/blood-and-soil-in-narendra-modis-india
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/opinion/trump-india.html?action=click&module=Opinion&pgtype=Homepage
World's smallest violin...
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=80&v=neKeyexYikk&feature=emb_logo
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USCIRF's Biased Advocacy on India's Citizenship Law Tarnishes Its Image
by Abha Shankar
IPT News
February 26, 2020
https://www.investigativeproject.org/8318/uscirf-biased-advocacy-on-india-citizenship-law
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This is serious stuff. Lots of videos on the web, peacefuls celebrating Corona virus, talking about intentionally infecting the populace in Europe, China, USA and India. In India, incidents of peacefuls beating up healthcare workers and doctors. sad...
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EUqpCYvU8AEsPVs?format=jpg&name=900x900)
MARC: I've changed the subject line to make it easier to find.
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This is serious stuff. Lots of videos on the web, peacefuls celebrating Corona virus, talking about intentionally infecting the populace in Europe, China, USA and India. In India, incidents of peacefuls beating up healthcare workers and doctors. sad...
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EUqpCYvU8AEsPVs?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Darwin will figure in for a population with the peacefuls' typical levels of hygiene and medical care and the habit of marrying cousins.
https://www.bbc.com/news/health-14209869
Now, if it can be sexually transmitted through goats, they are in big trouble!
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India China military force comparison. China cannot win, unless they go nuclear along with MAD.
https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/strategic-postures-china-and-india-visual-guide#footnote-045 (https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/strategic-postures-china-and-india-visual-guide#footnote-045)
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Pasting YA's post on Afpakia here as well:
================
I wonder why the hurry Might even have some disinfo in the article, re:delivery time line. I dont think it takes the US 3-4 years to make 21 helicopters!.
"WASHINGTON: The Indian and US governments were in such a hurry to get sub-hunting US helicopters into the hands of the Indian navy that the Americans gave up some of their own helicopters to fill a rushed delivery early next year."
https://breakingdefense.com/2020/05/us-navy-rushes-its-sub-hunting-helicopters-to-india-eye-on-china/
A second article on delivery of Rafales
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/iaf-to-get-first-batch-of-rafale-jets-by-july-end/story-7MsrcyBC38Jq0twGHmU7zH.html
It is not too difficult to connect the dots..as to where this is leading.
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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-slams-chinas-disturbing-behaviour-at-india-border/articleshow/75857248.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-slams-chinas-disturbing-behaviour-at-india-border/articleshow/75857248.cms)
Tensions are rising again with China. Either they are doing it to support Pak, who is getting beaten up at the LOC, or they are unhappy with India's support for investigation of the Wuhan virus at WHO.
(https://static.toiimg.com/photo/imgsize-310416,msid-75859709/75859709.jpg)
(https://static.toiimg.com/photo/imgsize-323009,msid-75859909/75859909.jpg)
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The India-China standoff is not showing signs of dying down..both sides bringing in reinforcements. The current standoff is in the Pangong lake area.
(https://external-content.duckduckgo.com/iu/?u=https%3A%2F%2Ftse1.mm.bing.net%2Fth%3Fid%3DOIP.JDnxrIVXclIErD8lMdzi_QHaEJ%26pid%3DApi&f=1)
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https://legalinsurrection.com/2020/05/chinese-troops-cross-into-india-fortify-positions/
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I think China will have to back off...just like in Doklam. India is in no mood to humor the dragon.
They want India to stop building roads and infrastructure close to the border (after they have themselves done it for decades). India realized that not having border infrastructure prevented the chinese from invading india, but does not prevent salami slicing of indian territory. Also, the Chinese can reach the border in 15 min from their garrisons in the tibet plateau, whereas the lack of roads prevented India from reaching the border for days and in many cases by foot. As a result India has spent the last several years building border roads and the Chinese dont like it. This equalizes the situation.
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https://www.nationalreview.com/2020/05/a-china-india-border-clash-as-beijing-aims-for-regional-hegemony/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=NR%20Daily%20Monday%20through%20Friday%202020-05-27&utm_term=NRDaily-Smart
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India has a lot of fire power in ladakh region. Chinese will back off. They seem to miscalculate a lot. Thats what happens if you have not fought a war in decades.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EZAn598XsAAWr1B?format=jpg&name=4096x4096)
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I really would like to see the PLA get their ass handed to them.
India has a lot of fire power in ladakh region. Chinese will back off. They seem to miscalculate a lot. Thats what happens if you have not fought a war in decades.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EZAn598XsAAWr1B?format=jpg&name=4096x4096)
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The Modi govt has a muscular policy with respect to all borders. This is rattling Pak and the Chinese.
- They made articles 370 and 35 A void, effectively changing 70 years of negotiation strategy with pak. No more discussion on Indian Kashmir, only discussion on POK.
- Changed maps, reiterated claim on Aksai Chin (under Chinese occupation). Up to the early 1900's Chinese maps showed Aksai Chin as part of India, until Nehru the
peacenik let the Chinese have the territory because "not a blade of grass grows there".
- Indian Home Minister has said in parliament, India willing to lose lives over POK and Aksai Chin. Similar statements by Defense minister, foreign minister, PM etc.
- Multiple statements on bringing back POK, which has the CPEC corridor going through.
- Strong complaints about Chinese construction activities in POK and opposition to building CPEC highways in POK.
- Started showing POK as indian territory and weather for that region.
- Rapid border infrastructure development, tons of roads, tunnels, airfields, new mountain strike corps, weapons purchases and development (subs, planes, artillery).
- Multiple dams being constructed to stop flow of water to Pak (allowed under Indus water treaty) of the 3 western rivers. Once this is done, the treaty will be scrapped since
India is giving 80 % of the water to Pak of rivers that originate in India!!.
- Building dams in afghanistan to reduce water supply to Pak.
- Growing unrest on Pak's other borders, particularly Balochistan and also across the Durrand line.
- Indian LOC very, very hot. Very aggressive artillery and ATGM (anti tank guided missiles) use by India to take down pak bunkers and installations.
- The economy is bad at the moment, that is a particularly risky time wrt to war for all parties.
- Increased Indian and US pressure on pak to reign in proxies, Pak on FATF grey list, risk of blacklist.
At some point the pressures will become too much for someone and they will lash out.
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Chinese propaganda video..its played at 1.5 x or so to give a sense of urgency. Nice music too.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1266731610688405504 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1266731610688405504)
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Daily Memo: India-China Standoff Gets More Complicated
By: Geopolitical Futures
India’s frictions with its neighbors are becoming more entwined. The Pakistani and Chinese governments on Tuesday finalized an agreement on implementation of the Kohala hydroelectric power project within the framework of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a series of infrastructure projects that seeks to improve economic regionalization. The CPEC passes through Pakistan-controlled Kashmir, and the Indian government has hotly contested the project and others like it. Though many CPEC projects remain stuck in the planning phases, this one has added importance given the current border tensions between India and China.
Indian and Chinese troops have reinforced their bases along the border, and there are reports that China has begun to fly J-11 and J-7 fighter aircraft within 30-35 kilometers (19-22 miles) of India’s Ladakh region. The U.S. government has been a vocal proponent of India in the standoff. Beijing responded by advising Delhi to be careful in its dealings with the U.S. and not to get sucked into the U.S.-China trade war and worsening bilateral relations. The announcement of the Kohala project is a reminder that China can also call upon allies like Pakistan to create more problems for India. Chinese military support for Pakistan is a much bigger concern to India than anything that happens in the forbidding terrain of the Himalayas.
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Things are getting serious. The defense minister said this time things were "different" from before and India does not seek war, but will respond forcefully if needed. It turns out the Chinese got pushed back from Indian territory, and in turn they blocked one of the smaller rivers that arises in Tibet and enters India. This is a serious issue and portends trouble. This is now out in the media and no government can stay quiet.
https://theprint.in/opinion/chinese-intrusion-in-galwan-lasted-for-two-weeks-before-it-was-cleared-by-indian-troops/428658/ (https://theprint.in/opinion/chinese-intrusion-in-galwan-lasted-for-two-weeks-before-it-was-cleared-by-indian-troops/428658/)
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June 5, 2020 View On Website
Open as PDF
India-China Border Standoff
Clashes along the Line of Actual Control have prompted a show of force on both sides of the border.
By: Geopolitical Futures
(click to enlarge)
On June 6, the lieutenant generals of the Indian and Chinese armies will meet in eastern Ladakh to try to defuse border tensions that have escalated over the past four weeks. Major generals from each side recently held three rounds of talks, none of which managed to end the standoff. It started in early May when some 250 soldiers patrolling on both sides of the border clashed near Pangong Tso. The incident prompted Beijing and New Delhi to dig in further; both countries sent troops and weapons reinforcements to the Line of Actual Control where they are now at a stalemate.
Since the 1962 Sino-India War, the two countries have regularly clashed along their shared border. There are still disputes over territory in Arunachal Pradesh and Ladakh, where the current standoff is taking place. The last major confrontation in eastern Ladakh occurred in 2013. Sikkim is another region where tensions have escalated, most recently in 2017. Both countries have sought to consolidate control along the border through major infrastructure projects, such as a new road India is constructing near the LAC. Beijing and New Delhi closely watch such projects, which often become the subject of hostilities. Challenging terrain, long-term goals and economic problems at home mean neither side has an appetite for war. Still, they also don’t want to be seen as backing down, so the region will remain tense.
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Tomorrow Lt.General level border talks with China, such high level talks are a rarity on the border. India will want China to withdraw and secondly India will indicate that they will not cease border road and infrastructure construction. After that one report about China stopping waters of one river, have not seen any discussion about that in the Indian media. Might have been misinterpretation of satellite images.
At this time the Indian govt is quite clear, they dont want war, but India will not back down. China will have to withdraw, looks like their salami slicing of Indian territory will work no more.
In related news the agreement with Australia to share bases has been signed. Secondly, India is debating whether to invite Australia to military exercises between US and Japan and India, i.e. become part of the QUAD military alliance. This will depend to some extent on whether China behaves or not. This year India has taken 2 steps which the Chinese did not like, 1. Asked the WHO to investigate the origins of the Chinese virus and 2. Sent envoys to the swearing in of the Taiwanese PM.
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2. Sent envoys to the swearing in of the Taiwanese PM.
Oh, that raised some blood pressure in Beijing.
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The results of the border talks with the Chinese are not yet known. It will likely be a slow de-escalation process to save face. But below is a nice video of how the Chinese have grabbed territory over the last 60 years, when India did not have military or satellite resources. However, now the games up. There is no appetite on the Indian side to give up territory and they are willing to go to war if necessary. Even though the Chinese have overall superior military capabilities, what India has is huge public support to teach China a lesson, a patriotic battle hardened army and strong leadership. Not sure if the Chinese have won or fought any wars in the last 50 years, or whether their population has the motivation to fight India in Tibet with their supply lines stretched thin in the high Tibetan plateau avg altitude 14800 feet.
https://youtu.be/1AF4J8WL0Hg (https://youtu.be/1AF4J8WL0Hg)
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The mood in India
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EZ1z9aJUMAImL3g?format=jpg&name=medium)
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The godless chinese dont do this, but few know that hindus always worship their weapons, whether a lowly machine gun (see soldiers above) or a fighter jet (see defense minister). In India going to battle has religious connotations.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EZzo3XPWsAATdcl?format=jpg&name=small)
(https://akm-img-a-in.tosshub.com/indiatoday/images/story/201910/Rajnath.jpeg?MinUE3GguEcddtAzOXMifM2g9k7PCJ84)
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Hopes no body minds my posting these pictures for educational purposes, but it is important for folks to know why the Chinese dont stand a chance. Hindus get a bad rap for worshipping a multitude of gods and goddesses. Two important females are Kali, the destroyer of evil and Durga the goddess of war, These are worshipped in India and Nepal (land of the gurkhas, who fight for India). Best to stay on the right side of these ladies.
Kali
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Kali_by_Raja_Ravi_Varma.jpg)
Durga
(https://i.pinimg.com/originals/ea/0e/b6/ea0eb6454df27703d386d29ee91f832c.jpg)
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"Hope no body minds my posting these pictures for educational purposes..."
ya, Your posts are phenomenal, exactly why I come here, learning important things I wouldn't otherwise know.
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"Hope no body minds my posting these pictures for educational purposes..."
ya, Your posts are phenomenal, exactly why I come here, learning important things I wouldn't otherwise know.
Agreed.
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Love your posts! Carry on!
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Ya wrote:
"In India going to battle has religious connotations"
Well I always admired how India stopped Alexander the Great at its borders and put a stop to his empire expansion ~ 2300 + yrs ago.
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While we wait for official word for the outcome of the Lt.General level talks, Chinese Global Times put out this psyops video. Soldiers from the plains of China catch a commercial flight to the Tibetan plateau at 14000 feet, catch a tourist bus and are ready to fight. Enjoy.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1269806349417943042 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1269806349417943042)
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So China has agreed to with draw from 3 of the 4 locations. The 3 locations were not contested, so i wonder why they bothered to create a stand-off there. the 4th at Pangong lake is still under discussion, will take a round or more of talks.
Makes you wonder why they play these games...I can think of 2 possibilities.
1. pak is under a lot of pressure at the LOC, this was a good way to reduce pressure on pak. Interestingly, the LOC battles were even more intense these last few weeks.
2. China is concerned about India taking back POK, through which the CPEC/OBOR corridor passes. They probably want to indirectly discuss the fate of CPEC, were India to take back POK, or even flex muscles to dissuade India from doing that.
Infact, the quick backing down by China would suggest something is not right...
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So the stand-off at Pangong lake continues. China is amassing soldiers and equipment at many parts of the 4000 km. India is matching equipment and men in all sectors. On the LOC with Pakistan, the beating of Pak has increased tremendously, its an almost war like situation with pak. Essentially all fighting corps have been activated.
India has also expedited road construction, infact they have just sent over 10,000 laborers for acclamitization.
Question is what is China's end game.
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Long term: China as the global superpower.
So the stand-off at Pangong lake continues. China is amassing soldiers and equipment at many parts of the 4000 km. India is matching equipment and men in all sectors. On the LOC with Pakistan, the beating of Pak has increased tremendously, its an almost war like situation with pak. Essentially all fighting corps have been activated.
India has also expedited road construction, infact they have just sent over 10,000 laborers for acclamitization.
Question is what is China's end game.
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One cannot be a super power without fighting wars !. Japan, US, Germany, UK etc have a history of fighting wars. Chinese luck with recent wars with Vietnam or even skirmishes with India in 1967, Nathu La and Cho La is not promising. They have a huge army, fancy weapons, a lot of money. What their soldiers lack is grit and determination to win, probably because they are not fighting for their motherland, but trying to snatch other people's territories.
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https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3088973/high-roads-border-conflict-through-india-and-china
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For the last 50 years or so, no bullet has been fired on the China-India border. Only fist-fights and kung-fu. All it takes is one emotional soldier to fire the first shot and a blood bath could ensue. She Gin Ping perhaps drunk with power expects a short skirmish and victory, what will likely happen is a lot of blood shed and stalemate at best. The 4000+ km border has areas where India dominates the heights and areas where the Chinese dominate. India will capture some areas and the Chinese will do the same, they will end up exchanging territories...i.e. stalemate.
If things get really nasty, India can stop all Chinese sea traffic that must traverse the malacca straights to or from the middle east. The Indian subcontinent is a massive unsinkable aircraft carrier jutting into the Indian Ocean.
(https://i2.wp.com/www.nationsonline.org/maps/south_east_asia_map.jpg)
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Looks like I spoke too soon. Casualties on both sides, details murky. Some reports of Indian side doing a night reconnaissance on mountain heights.
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Keep us posted please!
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Daily Memo: Making Sense of India, China and North Korea
By: Geopolitical Futures
Actual deaths on the Line of Actual Control. Violent clashes broke out Monday in the Galwan Valley, a disputed area in the Himalayas on the border of India and China. Three Indian soldiers were killed when, according to China’s Foreign Ministry, they crossed into Chinese territory. India, of course, denied the claim. Details about the incident are unclear.
What we do know is that China and India have been engaged in a border standoff since the end of May. Since then, there have been multiple skirmishes followed by attempts to calm down. Remarkably, these are the first fatalities in the area (along what’s known as the Line of Actual Control) in more than 40 years — a period marked by repeated low-level clashes between the Indian and Chinese militaries. This speaks to the inherent difficulty of conducting major combat operations in one of the world’s most extreme geographic environments and the success Beijing and New Delhi have had in keeping small-scale incidents between them from escalating. (Troops stationed along the Line of Actual Control typically do not carry firearms, per protocols agreed upon by both sides.)
But even before Monday’s incident, there were signs that things were starting to change. Incidents are typically confined to a single disputed area, for example, but over the past month China has been pressing its claims in several areas across the Line of Actual Control. And infrastructure development by both sides has made it at least a little bit easier for the two militaries to flow troops and materiel to the front lines. Another major conflict in the Himalayas remains unlikely for the foreseeable future, but it’s an issue worth watching.
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Clashes on the China-India Border Presage Intensifying Competition
3 MINS READ
Jun 16, 2020 | 14:46 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
A deadly escalation between Indian and Chinese troops in the long-disputed territory of Ladakh could presage tactical and strategic escalation with major potential diplomatic, economic and political consequences for the two giants....
Three members of India's armed forces died in clashes with China's People's Liberation Army on the night of June 15 in the Galwan Valley area of Ladakh, Hindustan Times reported June 16. According to unconfirmed reports, the Chinese side also suffered an unspecified number of casualties. What caused the fighting, which involved stones and rods rather than firearms, remains unclear. Indian and Chinese officials both agreed to dialogue to deescalate matters, and India stopped short of accusing China of instigating the clashes. But a statement from China's Foreign Ministry accused Indian troops of crossing the border illegally twice and attacking Chinese personnel.
News of the clashes risks inflaming nationalist sentiment, already running particularly high amid the COVID-19 crisis, in each country. This is the first time Indian troops have died in clashes with the PLA since 1975, marking an unusual and potentially dangerous escalation in the disputed region of Ladakh and raising memories of the period of clashes up to and following the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Grassroots nationalist pressure might compel more aggressive action. But Beijing may well choose to tamp down nationalist rhetoric by closely controlling the domestic media narrative in a bid to keep its focus on its broader strategic priorities and to avoid fueling unrest.
Higher tensions and recent casualties raise the risk of additional clashes between individuals or small groups in the border area in the coming days and weeks, even if senior leadership wants to avoid them.
Even if a military deescalation on the border ensues, the underlying tactical and strategic factors driving Indian-Chinese tensions — among them the ongoing construction of military and civilian infrastructure near the disputed border — will continue. India, for example, reportedly transferred 1,600 additional workers to continue road construction in the region on June 16. Likewise, the higher tensions and recent casualties raise the risk of additional clashes between individuals or small groups in the border area in the coming days and weeks, even if senior leadership wants to avoid them.
Whether this incident leads to clashes and further escalation remains to be seen. China's growing economic and military might have changed the dynamic substantially, however, giving Beijing the confidence to assert greater control over this far-flung frontier region. As in the South China Sea, China has done so through a steady buildup of infrastructure and incremental expansion. It is not necessarily in China's strategic interest to use deadly force to achieve its aims — a move that could challenge global perceptions of a benign rising China. Instead, it may exercise restraint, ease tensions and refocus on other parts of the border. For India, the strategic calculations are tougher. China's years of incremental gains along the border present a greater dilemma. India is weaker, and China's territorial gains risk a steady erosion of its position that, if not firmly resisted, could lead to more substantial long-term losses in territory and regional influence.
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So Indian sources claiming 20 Indian soldiers dead, along with around 43 Chinese dead.
One military journalist says this is what happened.
https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1272962811656732672.html
Weapons such as this were used, by 2 nuclear powers.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EaqAzL5U0AMit3y?format=jpg&name=small)
China of course will not reveal casualties, but the above numbers and account is what military journalists are saying. The Indian govt put out this info.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EapBMKQX0AI_tci?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Govt of India is saying there will be no salami slicing.
Overall, this is a huge setback for Indo-Chinese relations. Interestingly, Modi is keeping his cards close to his chest, has not said a word in public, despite demands to speak to the nation. My guess is the Chinese have been asked to withdraw to pre-crisis position. If they refuse, there will be kinetic action. True to prior form, he will likely speak once/if action has been initiated.
If the Chinese casualties are truly twice Indian casualties, there is a chance that peace can reign if they withdraw.
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Here is Ashley Tellis from the USA who follows Indian military affairs.
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EapBMKQX0AI_tci?format=jpg&name=900x900 (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EapBMKQX0AI_tci?format=jpg&name=900x900)
Below is a nice article written 1 day before the big fight..
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/simmering-boundary-new-normal-india-china-border-part-2-67806/ (https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/simmering-boundary-new-normal-india-china-border-part-2-67806/)
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Picking this interesting piece out for further military strategy analysis:
quote author=ya
Weapons such as this were used by 2 nuclear powers.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EaqAzL5U0AMit3y?format=jpg&name=small)
Is it because both have full nuclear capability and deterrence that a conflict is fought at this level?
In US wars like Vietnam and Iraq, one side had nukes in reserve that provided zero value in deterrence because of unwillingness to use them. It makes me wonder what value weapons have that we are unwilling to use against foes who are unafraid of taking massive civilian losses.
"If the Chinese casualties are truly twice Indian casualties, there is a chance that peace can reign if they withdraw."
- Only for ego, pride and appearances sake would China care about taking 50 casualties. If they don't escalate it is because they don't want to cause the Indian response to that.
On computer maps I see dotted lines or no lines for borders in that region. Very strange to not know where one country ends and another begins. You would think both sides would benefit from a negotiated solution.
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I appreciate the role "The Walking Dead" has in this conflict.
https://www.insider.com/walking-dead-negan-bat-lucille-2018-3
Picking this interesting piece out for further military strategy analysis:
quote author=ya
Weapons such as this were used by 2 nuclear powers.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EaqAzL5U0AMit3y?format=jpg&name=small)
Is it because both have full nuclear capability and deterrence that a conflict is fought at this level?
In US wars like Vietnam and Iraq, one side had nukes in reserve that provided zero value in deterrence because of unwillingness to use them. It makes me wonder what value weapons have that we are unwilling to use against foes who are unafraid of taking massive civilian losses.
"If the Chinese casualties are truly twice Indian casualties, there is a chance that peace can reign if they withdraw."
- Only for ego, pride and appearances sake would China care about taking 50 casualties. If they don't escalate it is because they don't want to cause the Indian response to that.
On computer maps I see dotted lines or no lines for borders in that region. Very strange to not know where one country ends and another begins. You would think both sides would benefit from a negotiated solution.
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The no guns rule was enforced 2km from the LAC for the China border. It is likely going to be re-examined, as things went from pushing and shoving to rocks and iron rods and clubs with barbed wires.
The barbarity of this conflict was immense. The story is that the Lt.Generals for India/China agreed on a withdrawl by both sides. At evening the Indian CO went unarmed to confirm that withdrawl had occured with a few Indian soldiers. He found out that China had not withdrawn, infact they were constructing a structure on the Indian side. This led to an argument and he was met with a superior force, and clubbed to death. Soon thereafter, a larger Indian force came up and a free for all ensued for several hours and many Indian and Chinese soldiers were thrown down the slopes to their death.
Several published accounts indicate that this was a trap that the Indians walked into, the Chinese had numerical superiority. However, all accounts for some reason say that Chinese casualties were much higher. China has not acknowledged their casualties.
China is now making absurd claims that the Galwan area is theirs, which the Indian govt has rejected as "exaggerated and untenable".
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so not knowing the history of this area
what is your opinion about who is right or has the most legitimacy to this area
India or China?
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The area is unmarked, but the territory belonged to India after the British left in 1947 as the state of Jammu and Kashmir had joined India. I dont know the history before that, but even then it was never Chinese territory. In those days, India was resource poor and the Indian army never patrolled that area very much. It was almost 10 years later that India found out that the Chinese had constructed a road through Aksai Chin. The war of 1962 ensued, it was a war where India took a lot of casualties and lost. The Indians were not properly equipped with weapons or even warm clothes.
China occupied Aksai Chin as multiple maps from 1962 show that. The problem is that even after occupying that huge chunk of land, they have continued to nibble away Indian territory during successive weak Indian governments for the last 60 years. Infact today's map is very different from the original map after 1962 and they have continued this unopposed until last month. Now we have a nationalist government under Modi and this will stop.
China has had it relatively easy since most of their infrastructure and road construction is on the plains of Tibet, the Indian side has to deal with mountains and they did not build roads as the thinking was that the mountains were a natural barrier.
As India builds roads, the Indian side can monitor Chinese activities with satellites and can challenge them very quickly. Previously, it could take weeks to even reach the border and heavy supplies could not be transported.
So you may wonder, why we do not demarcate the border ?. China does not want to, because it can continue to nibble away territory !. China will not even exchange maps.
Below is a moving and firm speech by Modi in response to the Galwan incident. Its in Hindi, but you may appreciate his resolve and seriousness. I doubt very much the Chinese will get away with it this time. On June 19th, he is holding an All Party Meet to apprise the opposition of the situation.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1273295720729022464 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1273295720729022464)
I think India will need to respond this time, unless there is unequivocal withdrawal from the Chinese side. If India does not respond, the same will occur again and again.
The govt has started to act, the Chinese are now out of the big 5G contract as well as other construction contracts.
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https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/17/shock-and-anger-in-india-after-worst-attack-on-china-border-in-decades
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second post
Daily Memo: Clarity on the Himalayan Skirmish, More Confusion in Korea
The details of the deadly India-China brawl still aren't great, but at least it didn't involve guns.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Sticks, stones and 15,000-foot cliffs. As it turns out, the first casualties since 1975 in the India-China Himalayan standoff came not from a firefight, as assumed. (This is important, as it would have meant one or both sides had broken a mutual protocol that bars troops in the area from carrying firearms, potentially presaging a dangerous break from the historical pattern.)
Rather, it appears the mother of all brawls broke out in the disputed Galwan Valley when, at least per Indian media, Chinese troops “trapped and encircled” an Indian patrol of some 120 troops in an area China had previously agreed to vacate. The melee, which lasted some six hours, involved stones, iron rods and “nail-studded clubs.” Some of the reported 20 Indian troops who died reportedly fell to their deaths off a 15,000-foot cliff. Others died from their injuries and/or exposure as nightfall brought with it subzero temperatures. Indian media and U.S. intelligence are claiming that there were as many as 43 Chinese casualties as well, and Beijing has hinted that this was indeed the case, without confirming it. (In past conflicts, China did not provide official casualty counts for years or even decades afterward.)
The schoolyard nature of this clash will ostensibly make it easier for cooler heads to prevail than if one side or the other had broken the weapons protocol. Nevertheless, India did increase its security presence at its Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand and Kashmir borders as a precautionary measure. The two countries’ foreign ministers held talks on Wednesday, and both sides are calling for de-escalation, though neither side has hinted at a willingness to compromise on its core claims. Either way, this is your daily reminder that combat is a pitiless business (with or without modern weaponry), and geography unforgiving.
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Galwan Valley, Ladakh: A cut-paste location to help me find it on maps.
quote author=ccp
so not knowing the history of this area
what is your opinion about who is right or has the most legitimacy to this area
India or China?
(Well answered already by ya)
From where I sit, formerly secure Upper Midwest US location, China has been behaving in an expansionist mode on all fronts lately. India until Modi was not even defending its existing territories. China lies; India claims have turned out to be truthful.
The major US bias in this is that if China's expansion is the threat of our time and all our other adversaries of us lean to their side, having India as our ally (along with most of the countries of Asia and Pacific Rim) is of utmost importance.
What does China want from that region, natural resources, a trade route??
https://amp-cnn-com.cdn.ampproject.org/v/s/amp.cnn.com/cnn/2020/06/17/asia/india-china-aksai-chin-himalayas-intl-hnk/index.html?amp_js_v=a3&_gsa=1&usqp=mq331AQFKAGwASA%3D#aoh=15924884988291&referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com&_tf=From%20%251%24s&share=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.cnn.com%2F2020%2F06%2F17%2Fasia%2Findia-china-aksai-chin-himalayas-intl-hnk%2Findex.html
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[img] [http://ace.mu.nu/archives/china.jpg/img]
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June 19, 2020 View On Website
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Why the Himalayas Are Worth Fighting For
The ocean is the reason Chinese and Indian soldiers have died over this rugged, seemingly irrelevant piece of land.
By: Phillip Orchard
It says quite a bit about the sheer improbability of a major China-India war in the Himalayas that this week’s deadly clash in the Galwan Valley – which produced the first fatalities along the disputed high-altitude border since 1975 – played out the way it did. No shots were fired, no explosives detonated. Rather, it was just two nuclear powers going at it the old-fashioned way: with fists and clubs and whatever else their troops could find lying around. The 20-odd Indian soldiers and their two dozen or so Chinese counterparts who reportedly lost their lives are believed to have done so by falling off a cliff and/or into a river turgid with spring snowmelt. The unforgiving terrain impeded rescue efforts on both sides, leaving the wounded exposed to sub-zero temperatures.
Both China and India have been building out ambitious networks of roads and outposts in order to be able to bring substantial firepower to the frontline. Yet, evidently, neither side is capable of truly taming the unforgiving geography of the Himalayas to the extent needed to conduct complicated operations, much less stage an overland invasion into the other’s heartland. But this doesn’t mean that the high ground isn’t strategically important, or that the soldiers died merely in defense of national honor and abstract notions of sovereignty over barely inhabitable land. Its value just needs to be understood in the context of the broader competition between China and India.
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Big Mountains, Big Problems
The difficulty of extreme-altitude combat is hard to overstate. There are, obviously, unpredictable weather patterns, extreme temperatures and treacherous roads. With enough grit, gear and engineering, some of these obstacles can be overcome. But the Himalayas are so tall and so steep that communications breakdowns are inevitable, resupply helicopters can become useless, and commanders are stuck with the unsavory prospect of moving troops and supply convoys through an endless series of exposed chokepoints. Even in the best of circumstances, moving personnel in from the lowlands is a weekslong process. In the 1962 India-China war, for example, an estimated 15 percent of troops India rushed to the frontlines developed severe altitude sickness. A fighting force is only as good as its supply lines, and the Himalayas are a logistical nightmare.
Along the Line of Actual Control, the loosely defined border between Indian and Chinese territories, this environment creates low-level instability by putting a premium on controlling key chokepoints and areas conducive to infrastructure development. This is why many standoffs over the past decade have typically been triggered by attempts from one side or the other to build new roads or bridges. But it also creates high-level strategic stability, since the probability for escalation to an all-out conventional war is extremely low. In a way, the LAC provides a safe space for the two nuclear powers to work out their differences – to signal displeasure over unrelated issues, to please nationalists at home, to keep their armies well-trained and preoccupied with matters other than politics, and so forth – without risking catastrophe.
But there’s more at stake. China has relatively few direct strategic interests in dominating the Himalayas. It doesn’t rely on them as a trade route or consider them a source of resources (except the headwaters of its major rivers, which it comfortably controls). Still, they are valuable to China in two main ways: One is as a defense against a foreign force from meddling in Xinjiang and Tibet; keeping its buffer zones intact is a core Chinese imperative, even if India is a long way from having either the capability or reason to want to make a move on the Tibetan plateau. The second is how the Himalayas can take India’s attention away from where it can truly threaten China: the ocean.
The High Seas
India should be a maritime power. It inherited invaluable naval expertise from the British. It sits astride the world’s busiest sea lanes. It does little overland trade with any of its neighbors. Its prosperity relies on distant markets in Europe and the U.S., and, even more so, on unhindered imports of energy from the Middle East. And with a robust navy, it could exploit an immense geographic advantage over China on the high seas. China’s foremost external challenge is its own reliance on trade, most of which flows through chokepoints along the first island chain and the Strait of Malacca. Though it’s rapidly developing a bluewater navy, and though it’s investing heavily in the so-called “string of pearls” – a network of ports built along the Indian Ocean basin under the purview of the Belt and Road Initiative – China is decades away from being able to credibly threaten critical Indian supply lines. India, in contrast, is ideally positioned to do just that to China. Everything China sends to Europe and imports from the Middle East flows right by the subcontinent. And India’s superbly located Andaman and Nicobar islands to the east in the Andaman Sea theoretically enable it to shut down the mouth of the Malacca Strait – particularly in joint operations with the U.S. and/or Australia.
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The problem for India is that it’s had a devil of a time shifting resources from its army and air force to the navy. While it’s been touting grand plans for a 200-ship navy by 2027 (up from 130 today) and quietly laying the groundwork for its own “string of pearls” in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the navy is still getting just 15 percent of this year’s budget, compared to 23 percent for the air force and 56 percent for the army (the bulk of which goes to pensions). The navy’s share of the pie is actually down from 18 percent in 2012. India’s efforts to turn the Andaman and Nicobars into a major deterrent are still in the very early stages. In January, India’s chief admiral effectively admitted defeat on the navy’s shipbuilding goals. Simply put, a bluewater force can’t be built cheaply. The economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic won’t make things any easier.
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China has every intention of keeping India bogged down on land. The main way it’s doing so is through its vast military and economic support for Pakistan – support that has the added benefit of denying militants access to Xinjiang and, potentially, the development of a naval base at Gwadar or farther east. But it’s also a way to ensure that India remains overwhelmingly focused on Kashmir.
Deterring China in the Himalayas is a comparably lesser concern for India. But China doesn’t need to do a lot to ensure that New Delhi continues devoting manpower and resources to the theater. Though China cannot credibly threaten the Indian heartland from the Himalayas, it could use the high ground to destabilize certain strategically vulnerable areas of India. The disputed region in the west, for example, overlooks Pakistan. The one in the east overlooks the Siliguri Corridor – the 14-mile wide belt connecting West Bengal to India’s restive northeastern provinces – potentially giving China the leverage that comes with the ability to sever India in two. And while China also needs to prioritize the needs of the navy over those of the army, its Himalayan investments are comparatively easier to stomach. It has deeper pockets, superior infrastructure expertise, a desire to keep the People’s Liberation Army busy, and a geographic advantage from being able to stage operations from the Tibetan plateau rather than the Indian lowlands. As a result, India has always felt like it was at an inherent disadvantage. In this light, it’s notable that Chinese forces have deviated from their historical pattern by trying to pressure India in multiple disputed areas all at once, effectively tempting India to devote even more resources and manpower to the mountains.
The risk for China is that its coercion in the Himalayas encourages India to further embrace the Quad partners (the U.S., Japan and Australia) and to deepen its strategic engagement with key Southeast Asian nations such as Indonesia, Vietnam and Singapore. But this was probably inevitable since the Chinese and Indian spheres of influence increasingly overlap. China has no choice but to try to secure its interests in the Indian Ocean basin, making India feel increasingly encircled and willing to shed its cherished predilection for nonalignment. Beijing’s only real option is to find ways to prevent India from playing a meaningful role in a coalition aimed at containing China’s rise on the high seas. Brawling in the high Himalayas is one such way.
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China's attempts to discourage India from coming closer to the US, may end up India coming closer to the USA..YA
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/will-india-finally-learn-its-lesson-on-china- (https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/will-india-finally-learn-its-lesson-on-china-)
Will India finally learn its lesson on China?
Clashes between Indian and Chinese troops are shocking but nothing new. For almost twenty days, in the autumn of 1962, a handful of Indian soldiers surrounded by Chinese troops weathered incessant assaults, before being overrun in Walong, in the Namti plains; the Eastern most corner of India. No support came in 1962, from the shocked Indian government to the unprepared Indian army. A dusty stone-plaque stands there today pledging that Walong will never fall again; a pledge whose strength might soon be tested once more.
For a decade before those events, Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first socialist post-independence prime-minister, wanted to create a utopian post-colonial alliance in Asia with China. Just like modern post-colonial academics, his ideas were also completely devoid of the geopolitical realities of power, something he finally internalised after a walloping at the hands of Maoist China.
Nevertheless, this romantic idea of Pan-Asian solidarity persisted, as Nehru’s sister gave unconditional support to Chinese membership in the Security Council, even after the utter humiliation of the 1962 war, while charting a non-aligned path outside the US-Soviet rivalry. China did not return the favour.
The same utopian ideal of a Gaullist equidistance continues to haunt India, whose forces got walloped once again in a brutal medieval brawl this week which saw at least 20 Indian soldiers killed, and an unknown number of Chinese casualties. The scale of the conflict, the largest death toll in over half a century is unthinkable, especially considering that no firepower was used. But that’s not the surprising part.
For a country of 1.2 billion, the 6th largest economy, a nuclear power with one of the largest modern navies in the world, it shouldn’t be difficult for India to balance a rising China. India has open-ended offers from the Quad, a semi-formal alliance between the four largest democracies in the Asia-Pacific, to formalise the alliance. Even India’s threat of joining the Quad, of having American, Australian and Japanese troops and navies conduct joint operations in the Himalayas and Indo-Pacific, of selling Brahmos missiles to Vietnam, and jointly patrolling the South China Sea, should send a chill down the spines of the military leaders in Beijing.
And yet India has historically been the weakest link in the Quad, partly by her own design. In 2017, Admiral Sunil Lanba shot down the idea of formalising a naval alliance. 'India is the only country in the Quad with a land border with China. In case of conflict…nobody will come and hold your hand', Lanba argued. While that might be true, joining a formal alliance would have helped in forcing China to divert strategic resources and be on the back foot. It would have led to a useful exchange of real-time military intelligence and diplomatic backing in the UN. Instead, India acquiesced.
New Delhi’s antiquated strategy then is responsible for the rise of Chinese aggression, and India’s political and military class are the architects of her own humiliation. China, on the other hand, once again showed no such reticence and continued with alignments with perpetual problem-child Pakistan and the new Marxist government of Nepal in a bid to circle India.
With the latest violence, the reality of the region has shifted permanently, but it is still to be seen whether that reality is reflected in New Delhi's strategic circles.
India, as a great power, is not dependent on others for her own defence, but India is not great enough to balance China alone. Nor is going solo prudent in geopolitics. The long-dominant view in New Delhi is that China is a continental power which needs to be appeased while the Himalayas are fortified with massive long-duration infrastructure projects which will help India move troops in the event of a war. The strategy is based on the idea that there might be a massive land invasion from China. It also misreads the Chinese strategy.
China is not interested in a war, but rather slicing up parts of advantageous and defensible terrains from the South China Sea to the Himalayas. To offset that, India needs to help others carve up parts surrounding China where Beijing is weak. A naval patrolling in the South China sea, as well as profiting from arms export to Vietnam should be a good start in reestablishing deterrence.
Every romantic theory of solidarity is good until men are bludgeoned and thrown in ditches and warships rammed. Romanticism inevitably gives way to realism. This is a chance for New Delhi to unlearn romantic postcolonial theories and relearn realpolitik to facilitate an alliance to balance China. For the birthplace of Kautilya, it is criminal negligence to forget the grandest of wisdom from Kautilyan realpolitik, 'the king (or state) who is likewise situated close to the enemy, but separated from the conqueror only by the enemy, is termed the friend'. It's time for India to finally learn its lesson.
Sumantra Maitra is researcher in international relations at the university of Nottingham
WRITTEN BY
Sumantra Maitra
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Some related news:
1. Yesterday, PM Modi had an all party meet. Amazingly, except for Congress party, all parties were fully supportive of the PM in anything the govt wanted to do. The Congress was also supportive, but lets say their support was less than 100%.
PM Modi has clarified, that the current standoff occurred at Galwan because China tried to build structures on the Indian side of the LAC, even though the Lt.Gen level talks ended up discussing withdrawal by both sides. He was emphatic China will not be allowed to unilaterally change the LAC. GOI (Govt of India) admitted that during the last 60 years, 43,000 sq km. lost to Chinese!! and they want more. So far Indian govts have hidden this from the people, but now with satellite imagery, this is no longer possible.
2. Ex Army Chief and current Union Minister indicated that atleast 40 Chinese soldiers were killed and a prisoner exchange took place. Considering that the Indian soldiers were essentially ambushed, this was a good outcome.
3. Some time back, I had indicated that the water on the Galwan river appears to be blocked by China. Well its flowing again. The reasons are not fully clear, but satellite images show some Chinese bull dozer activity.
4. On June 24, Indian Defense Minister will be in Russia to attend their Victory Parade where Indian army contingents typically march. This would mean that nothing major will happen while the minister is outside the country and diplomacy is being given time to work. See item below.
5. There remains a problem at the Pangong lake. India's current LAC is at finger 4, but claims till finger 8. China's LAC is at finger 8, but claims till finger 4. In the past both sides patrolled up to their claims of the no man's land. Now China is not allowing India to patrol the area between finger 4 and 8 (about 8 linear km), in essence they have claimed about 40 sq.km territory and trying to make that the new reality. Will present more information on this area later.
(https://d18x2uyjeekruj.cloudfront.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/pt.jpg)
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Thank you for the continuing coverage YA.
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Great posts, very insightful!
Peace through strength is the first thing that comes to mind. China has been testing and finding weakness. In Modi (and in Trump) Xi has found strength in resistance.
"India has open-ended offers from the Quad, a semi-formal alliance between the four largest democracies in the Asia-Pacific, to formalise the alliance. Even India’s threat of joining the Quad, of having American, Australian and Japanese troops and navies conduct joint operations in the Himalayas and Indo-Pacific, of selling Brahmos missiles to Vietnam, and jointly patrolling the South China Sea, should send a chill down the spines of the military leaders in Beijing."
- Yes. India's independence even from the US is important but coalitions are the only effective way that China will be countered.
As the US drops from a W.H.O. that did not protect or help us, something similar needs to happen with the UN. The idea of an 'association of democracies' has been floated. By definition, Taiwan would be in and the PRC out. Putin's Russia out as well. I had not seen this Quad group mentioned before, US, India, Japan, Australia. That looks like the potential foundation for such a group in that region.
Let the UN continue as a place where dictators like Kruchev, Castro and Chavez can air their hate speech, and US ambassador's like Nikki Haley try for equal time, but downsize the US contribution to match our influence, 1 of 193. Invest our strategic energy in a different organization of the like-minded who are willing to share the burden, a NATO of the Asia Pacific. If not democracies, include all nations whose national and geopolitical interests align with the quad core countries mentioned above.
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A little bit of human angle: The 20 martyr bodies are all going back to their villages for cremation. Each of them is received by the villagers, a lot of support. Pl. see one such example. Not sure if the bollywood music has been added to the video, or it was live! but worth listening.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1274219288216301569 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1274219288216301569)
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https://taskandpurpose.com/news/india-china-himalayas-battle
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Details of the Indo-Chinese brawl are coming out
https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/06/the-armed-forces-of-india-unyeilding.html (https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/06/the-armed-forces-of-india-unyeilding.html)
China is realizing that the DBO road that India is constructing could help it take back Gilgit Baltistan and am sure that their Pak colleagues have had some input into that. The risk of war will remain high for the next 3 months or so, or until winter sets in.
Note: Article link replaced with article written by Lt.Gen, so there may be some Indian bias, but overall accurate. This what the Chinese are up against.
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Daily Memo: India and China Pull Back From the Brink
Weekly reviews of what's on our bookshelves.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Cooler heads in the Himalayas. India and China on Tuesday agreed on a set of “modalities for disengagement from all friction areas in eastern Ladakh” in the Himalayas, per a Chinese Foreign Ministry statement and unnamed Indian government sources. Few details of the pullback have been released. As we’ve discussed, the unforgiving geography of the Himalayas strictly limits on the ability of either side to escalate matters along the Line of Actual Control itself – making it relatively easy for cooler heads to prevail.
But that doesn’t mean the clashes can’t lead to indirect escalation elsewhere. India, for example, is pushing through a bevy of new restrictions on doing business with Chinese firms amid widespread public calls for a boycott targeting Chinese goods. New Delhi is reportedly reconsidering its reluctance to ban Chinese telecom giants Huawei and ZTE from its 5G buildout. On the military front, India has reportedly asked Russia – for years, India’s foremost arms supplier – to expedite deliveries of new fighter jets and S-400 missile defense systems. Either way, Chinese pressure in the Himalayas isn’t about to go away. On a related note, Nepal’s government is reportedly concerned that China’s rerouting of rivers in Tibet will lead to an expansion of Chinese territorial claims.
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Looks like talks are going on, but the position on the ground is to build more fortifications by both sides at Galwan, Pangong etc. No trust.
In other news, China is salami slicing Nepalese territory. News reports of clashes with villagers. Oli is the Nepalese PM and is a China stooge. At China s request Nepal changed their map and created a disagreement with India. A lot of money must have changed hands.
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Following Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's strong condemnation of Chinese actions at the Line of Actual (LAC) control, India is poised for a significant strategy shift in how it manages its contested border with China. The June 15 clash in the long-disputed territory of Ladakh, which marked the first time Indian troops have died at the hands of Chinese forces since 1975, has highlighted India's failure to dissuade China from attempting to permanently alter the balance of power along the border via diplomatic and confidence-building measures. This has left New Delhi more likely to pursue more confrontational options, which will undoubtedly have its risks, though India's battle-tested military may find such an escalation to its short-term advantage.
Modi Sets the Tone
On June 17, Prime Minister Modi broke his silence on the recent clash with one of the most strongly-worded statements on the Indo-China border dispute in recent years. In a televised speech, he ensured that the sacrifice of the 20 Indian soldiers who died in clash would "not be in vain," and that "nobody" could stop India from defending its "sovereignty and integrity." Modi's language was reminiscent of the rhetoric normally reserved for Pakistan, demonstrating a renewed resolve to reinforce Indian claims of territorial sovereignty, and signaling a willingness to use force if pressed. This would mark a dramatic change for India's management of its border tensions with China after nearly 30 years of relying on dialogue and deconfliction.
This shift in tone suggests New Delhi is not only willing to accelerate its own infrastructure development in the region to secure its territorial claims, but multiple bilateral agreements that have helped manage Indo-Chinese border relations may now be at risk. The military option may not be India's first choice in dealing with China, but New Delhi is now openly signaling that it will not remain restrained should China fail to adhere to their five key bilateral agreements concerning the LAC. Clearly, New Delhi needs a way to increase the cost of Chinese actions in order to dissuade further changes to the border region. But at the same time, India remains reticent to allow foreign intervention or the internationalization of its border dispute with China.
Indeed, one of India's biggest challenges in countering China has been its own policy of avoiding alliances aimed at third parties, and its constant efforts to remain non-aligned. This is, in part, driven by India's strong, post-colonial desire to do things on its own, and to avoid being the weak partner in alliances or getting involved in other countries' battles. But while this may allow India to work simultaneously with the United States, Russia and China, it also leaves India vulnerable when the bilateral balance is simply too large for New Delhi to manage alone.
Ways to Counter China
In India, the debate on ways to counter China now centers on three key areas: economic, diplomatic, and military; Each of these may require India to make a break of its post-independence policies, and each comes with inherent risks. On the economic front, it will be more difficult for New Delhi to overcome its massive trade imbalance with China. While there will be local boycotts and a reinvigorated attempt at Modi's "Make in India" campaign, New Delhi will need to look abroad for more strategic counters. Beijing currently outspends New Delhi in many of India's regional relationships, from Myanmar to Sri Lanka. To offset the infrastructure spending shaped within China's Belt and Road initiative, New Delhi will find itself needing to partner with other countries, such as the United States as well as second-tier powers Japan and Australia.
On the diplomatic front, India will also need to rely on third countries to ease Chinese pressure along the LAC. In addition to Australia and Japan, New Delhi will also likely look to strengthen its ties with Vietnam, Indonesia and Taiwan, as well as even places like Fiji, which have a large Indian population and sit in an area of expanding Chinese influence in the Pacific. Expanding these relationships will strain India's foreign policy principles of avoiding alliances. It may also threaten New Delhi's defense ties with Russia, should that become a requirement of greater cooperation with certain partners — particularly with the United States.
Modi has signaled a willingness to use force to manage border tensions with Beijing, which would mark a dramatic shift from India’s decadeslong strategy of dialogue and deconfliction.
India may use its position in the United Nations to press more openly against Chinese activities in Hong Kong, as well as in Tibet and Xinjiang. India continues to host the exiled Dalai Lama, and could step up more direct interaction with the Tibetan government in exile, though such actions would engender a fairly sharp diplomatic and economic response from Beijing. All of this, however, would come at the risk of jeopardizing New Delhi's decadeslong quest for a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, which is ultimately beholden to China's approval.
Less Talk, More Military Action
It is in the military sphere where India is likely to make the most dramatic moves, though it is also where New Delhi could face the greatest consequences. In addition to expanding cooperation with its fellow Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) members in the maritime space, which includes the United States, Japan and Australia, India will likely maintain a larger, year-round troop presence near the LAC (rather than its usual seasonal reductions in forces), and accelerate its existing infrastructure development plans in the region. India may also begin to move artillery and armor closer to the LAC, with the threat to move even closer if China continues to violate existing bilateral agreements. If the parallel of language to the Pakistan situation plays out, we could see India deploy large numbers of troops to remove Chinese structures in dispute (such as tents, outposts and roadblocks) in dispute, rather than relying on small groups. In addition, India will likely respond to any major clashes on the border with firearms, rather than sticks, thus marking a significant escalation in its decadeslong territorial dispute with China.
Such actions would not be without risk, and India, as well as China, both want to step back from increased military confrontation along the LAC, at least for now. But India's military has been involved in a steady stream of battles since the country gained its independence in 1947; its a "bloodied" force. China's People's Liberation Army, by contrast, has fought little since the 1970s, and remains untested in battle. India's threat to use force, despite the risks, is thus more believable. The Indian public has an understanding of the risk and cost of military action. China hasn't yet fully reshaped domestic acceptance of the use of force abroad, and for now, the Chinese government does not appear ready to make that transition. Beijing has very actively suppressed information about the recent deadly clash with India to avoid further stirring up nationalist tensions at home. China's military leadership also likely recognizes that any significant confrontation with Indian forces along the LAC will not be entirely one-sided in Beijing's favor.
While military action is unlikely in the near term, India will still feel compelled to make a strong physical response to the latest clash in Ladakh due to the deaths of Indian soldiers. Indeed, as evidenced by Modi's strongly-worded response, it appears the idea of reconciling and cooperating with China to reduce border tensions is off the table for the time being. This will, in turn, compel India to seriously address its core foreign policy principles — including New Delhi's historically staunch defense of its claimed neutrality in international disputes, and its reluctance to join partnerships or alliances with third countries.
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June 26, 2020 View On Website
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India Rising
The country is on the verge of becoming a major player on the world stage.
By: Allison Fedirka
India’s days as a fairly quiet giant on the world stage are coming to an end. For much of the 21st century, India has punched well below its weight in international affairs. It is the seventh-largest country in the world by area and has the second-largest population, with nearly 1.38 billion inhabitants. Considering its younger demographics, it’s on pace to soon surpass China as the largest country in the world by population. Its economy has steadily climbed in the global ranks over the past two decades and now stands as the fifth-largest. It’s a major energy consumer, and its naval potential could affect China’s power projection capabilities.
But the country has so far been unable to drive global events or influence the actions of global players like the United States, Germany, Russia and China to any substantial degree. This appears to be changing, however. The global center of gravity, both militarily and economically, is shifting from the Middle East to the Indo-Pacific, bringing India front and center in world affairs. Considering that this comes at a time when India’s relative power is increasing, it appears that the country is set to earn a more prominent role in the international system.
India’s long struggle to accrue power and project force is a result of many constraints facing the country. Located on the Indian subcontinent, India is geographically isolated from the rest of Eurasia. Water bodies line about a third of its 14,000-mile-long border, while natural barriers cover much of its land borders. The Himalayan Mountains in the north, Arakan Mountains in the east and the Thar Desert in the west buffer a large portion of the Indo-Gangetic Plain from the rest of Asia. Intense conflicts with Pakistan and the need to balance China have kept India largely focused on the subcontinent. The country’s population, meanwhile, is highly segmented by language, religion and a complicated caste system. Administratively, India’s states and union territories enjoy a high degree of autonomy and have their own regulatory systems that operate parallel to the central government. Political parties have strong roots at the state level, and national parties rely on local partners to gain influence in states and local communities. Physical isolation and intense internal divisions, therefore, have impeded India’s ability to engage with other countries from a position of strength.
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Recently, however, the government has attempted to improve India’s international standing – and this starts by centralizing power. For much of its post-independence existence, India has had a federal system in which states and union territories have been fairly autonomous. This resulted in a weaker national government and uneven development, but it was a price worth paying because decentralization was seen as the best way to keep states from separating and to keep India intact – which, after partition, was no small feat. To be able to increase its power abroad, however, a stronger central government was needed, and this required a united population and a unifying message.
Over the past six years, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi advanced a series of economic reforms aimed at developing a more coordinated, robust national economy. Modi introduced a demonetization scheme and streamlined the country’s goods and services tax system. He made several regulatory changes to try to encourage foreign investment in areas previously dominated by the state or, with the state’s help, smaller local businesses. The government is still working to clean up the country’s financial system, reforming bankruptcy procedures and loosening price controls in an effort to create a more business-friendly environment. It has also supported the development of 25 sectors – such as defense manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, textiles and automobile components – where India has a comparative advantage to attract investment and promote exports. The recent pandemic-triggered crisis served as yet another opportunity for Modi to push through reforms in agriculture, coal and privatization as part of the government’s stimulus and recovery package. At the macro level, there are signs that the moves have been somewhat successful. Since 2014, India’s economy has moved from the 10th-largest to the fifth-largest in the world. Foreign direct investment has increased from $190 billion in 2009-14 to $284 billion in 2014-19.
However, government attempts to unify the country politically and socially have proved difficult. The Modi government has promoted the concept of Hindu nationalism to rally the majority under one flag by drawing on the country’s historic ties to Hindu culture and civilizations. However, Hinduism is also a religion, and one that has clashed in the past with minority religious groups – especially Muslims, who make up 14 percent of the Indian population and are often the target of religious and social violence such as the riots in northeast Delhi earlier this year.
Last year, the government passed the Citizenship Amendment Bill, which excluded Muslims from the groups of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan eligible for citizenship in India. Under the law, Muslims who flee these countries are ineligible for citizenship because they are not considered minority groups in their countries of origin. There is also a push to implement a nationwide citizen registry by 2024. The registry would require people who live in India to prove their Indian citizenship. If they cannot, they would be considered non-citizens and face legal ramifications such as deportation and denial of services.
Both the Citizenship Amendment Bill and plans for a national registry have proved highly controversial and produced a strong political backlash against the government. Another point of controversy was the August 2019 decision to change the administrative status in Jammu and Kashmir by repealing Article 370 of the Constitution. The move paved the way for expanding the property, employment and residency rights in Jammu and Kashmir – where previously special privileges had been reserved for the majority-Muslim population – to people from other parts of India, including Hindus. Some people in the state voiced concern over a perceived government effort to encourage Hindu migration to the area in an effort to alter its demographics. (Interestingly, though India’s internal conflicts have proved difficult to overcome, throughout its brief history the emergence of an external enemy – the United Kingdom in the 1940s, China today – has helped to unite the population.)
A rapidly growing India has forced the government to prioritize issues beyond domestic divisions. The country’s booming economy relies on energy – foreign energy – to run. In recent years, India needed to secure access to more energy supplies. This, in turn, required India to develop the security infrastructure to protect its supply lines. So New Delhi began to develop its naval capabilities so that the country can move beyond coastal patrols and start projecting power into the Indian Ocean. Another element of the drive toward security self-sufficiency is the domestic production of defense equipment and reduced reliance on foreign weapons and equipment, particularly from a single source. At this point, India’s military is not self-reliant, and its navy still lacks full blue-water capabilities. But it is taking steps in the right direction.
It will need to take further steps, because the focal point of global affairs has been shifting and will continue to shift toward Asia. In particular, the United States has concentrated on China’s efforts at economic and military expansion, which inherently increases India’s strategic value to Washington. India is geographically positioned to contain China to the west, and serves as one of many alternative locations for U.S. businesses seeking to relocate out of China. Similarly, other countries keen to balance against China’s rise, like Japan and Australia, have been courting India to be closer security partners in the region. Even India’s relationship with Pakistan, a neighbor and bitter rival, is now linked to the U.S.-China dynamic, with Beijing using Islamabad as a focal point in its Belt and Road Initiative.
(click to enlarge)
Since the start of the Cold War, India has preferred nonalignment, noninterference, nonaggression and economic cooperation. This approach allowed New Delhi to engage with the world without losing its flexibility or becoming the pawn of one of the superpowers. To this day, India is reluctant to further develop the Quad alliance, even though it shares the anti-China sentiment of the other members. But in the current environment, India will see its nonalignment approach challenged given its size and growing proximity to the geopolitical center of gravity.
India is much better positioned to be an important player in the U.S.-China standoff than it was during the Cold War. Internally, the government has made important strides in military and economic development, though more work is needed. Politically and socially, the country still has significant divisions, but it’s stable and is many more decades removed from its founding. Its geographic position makes it extremely valuable to the United States. China will saber rattle along the border, but it has sizable problems internally and in its trade war with the U.S. that prevent it from acting rashly against India. Pakistan will continue its tough talk, but its inferior military and frail domestic economy are obstacles to any actions that would provoke a strong response from New Delhi. Russia’s domestic weaknesses undermine its international hand, but Moscow still provides a counterweight to Beijing and Washington. India is also an important arms buyer for Russia at a time when Moscow needs its export sector to make up for low energy prices.
India has an opportunity to take a proactive role in shaping international affairs to suit its interests. It also faces the risk that it may be forced to take a stronger stance and choose one country over another, breaking from its tradition of nonalignment. Such an event may be hard to imagine now, but the realities of the day mean it’s not impossible.
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I thought this explains the situation
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Ebg1uhYUcAAcsTE?format=jpg&name=medium)
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Looks like the thrashing by the 16 Bihar regiment at galwan is leading to some new thinking. The single child chinese princelings dont have it in them to fight.
China recruits MMA fighters for the border
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3090840/china-recruits-mma-fighters-tibet-border-militia?utm_medium=email&utm_source=mailchimp&utm_campaign=enlz-scmp_international&utm_content=20200627&MCUID=a4bd8c5c5e&MCCampaignID=a184902457&MCAccountID=3775521f5f542047246d9c827&tc=21 (https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3090840/china-recruits-mma-fighters-tibet-border-militia?utm_medium=email&utm_source=mailchimp&utm_campaign=enlz-scmp_international&utm_content=20200627&MCUID=a4bd8c5c5e&MCCampaignID=a184902457&MCAccountID=3775521f5f542047246d9c827&tc=21)
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Here's a 5 min video https://youtu.be/pWsdhIVsaG0 (https://youtu.be/pWsdhIVsaG0) explaining the geography of the Galwan region (incase someone wants to get into the broad details)
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In India, Anti-China Anger Will Bring Out Modi's Hawkish Side
Thomas Abi-Hanna
Thomas Abi-Hanna
Global Security Analyst, Stratfor
6 MINS READ
Jul 1, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
A surge of anti-China sentiment among Indian lawmakers, business leaders and voters will prompt Prime Minister Narendra Modi to take a more aggressive approach against Bejing in the wake of the two countries' recent border clash. This could include a variety of actions ranging from diplomatic moves to economic and trade measures, as well as a continued military build-up against China, which will only further ratchet up tensions between the nuclear-armed neighbors.
Tensions initially flared after a June 15 clash in Ladakh left at least 20 Indian soldiers dead, marking the deadliest confrontation between the two countries in the disputed Himalayan region since 1975.
Many figures across India's political spectrum have since called for New Delhi to cut its economic dependency on China, and for Modi to take a more assertive stance toward China in Ladakh and elsewhere.
The Ladakh clash has hardened Modi and his Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s already hawkish stance against China, which ranges from distrustful to outright hostile. The BJP and its Hindu nationalist allies have called for a more assertive approach against China for years, but such calls have substantially intensified over the past two weeks.
The general secretary of the BJP, Ram Madhav, said that India should take a similar stance against China as it does with Pakistan over disputed territory in order to defend the "sovereignty of [India's] last inch of the territory." This would mark an especially notable escalation, given that Indian and Pakistan troops frequently exchange gunfire and artillery barrages across their disputed border in Kashmir (Indian and Chinese troops, by contrast, haven't exchanged gunfire in 55 years).
A councilor for the BJP, Urgain Chodon, accused Modi of standing aside while China stole land in Ladakh, marking a relatively rare criticism of Modi from a high-standing member of his party.
Support for a more assertive approach toward China has become a rare consensus political view in Indian politics, with the opposition Indian National Congress (INC) and former high-ranking officials concurring with the BJP's hawkish rhetoric. In fact, both the BJP and INC have accused the other of not being assertive enough toward Beijing, leading to a political game of one-upmanship in anti-Chinese sentiment in which both have called for the government to use economic tools against China while also pushing back Chinese troops in Ladakh.
INC party leader Adhir Chowdhury called the border clash an act of "Chinese aggression" and that China should be repulsed "by whatever means."
In a follow-up to Chowdhury's statement, Gaurav Gogoi, a spokesman for the INC, said that India should use other forms of leverage such as trade to put additional pressure on China.
Prominent INC member Rahul Gandhi accused Modi of allowing China to capture sovereign Indian territory, calling him "Surrender Modi."
In a series of interviews with The Indian Express, former Indian diplomats called for India to build up international pressure on China in the political and economic spheres, while a former army commander also called for putting economic pressure on China.
A surge of anti-China sentiment among Indian lawmakers, business leaders and voters will prompt Prime Minister Narendra Modi to take a more aggressive approach against Bejing in the wake of the two countries' recent border clash.
An upswell of anti-China protests and rhetoric from both major trade associations and ordinary citizens in India, including calls for mass boycotts, sends a clear signal to Modi and other Indian leaders that the desire for a more assertive approach to Beijing is widely supported across Indian constituencies.
Polls taken in the aftermath of the border clash indicated that 68.3 percent of Indians saw China as a bigger enemy of India than Pakistan, India's long-time arch-rival, while nearly an identical number (68.2 percent) indicated they were willing to stop buying Chinese products.
On June 22, the Confederation of All India Traders (CAIT) held a rally in New Delhi in which they burned Chinese goods, called for a boycott of Chinese products and demanded the state governments freeze investment proposals from China.
The president of the Federation of Indian Export Organisations (FIEO) asked the Indian government to prevent the import of Chinese goods that were also made by Indians (such as appliances, cosmetics, electronics and fabrics) but stopped short of calling for a complete boycott.
The Delhi Hotel and Restaurants Owners Association (DHROA) said it would not accept Chinese guests in its hotels or guest houses, while adding it would discontinue the use of Chinese products at its hotels. (This, however, was largely a symbolic move, given that hotels in New Delhi are still closed due to COVID-19.)
Additional anti-China demonstrations were reported in New Delhi and West Bengal, among other areas in recent weeks, while residents in Ahmedabad, Gujarat threw China-made television sets out of their windows.
This wide-ranging political pressure will prompt Modi and his BJP government to use additional formal and informal economic measures against China on both federal and state levels. Modi has shown with past controversial actions, including the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomous status and the introduction of the Citizenship Amendment Act, that his decision-making process is highly influenced by domestic considerations.
While a complete boycott of Chinese goods is unfeasible given the volume of Chinese-Indian trade, India will use additional formal and informal economic measures against China on both federal and state levels.
The Indian government has already moved to add "Made in China" labels to Chinese goods, delay Chinese shipments coming into Indian ports and shut down Chinese digital applications. A government source recently told the Times of India that these moves were only the "first salvo" in New Delhi's response to China, and that India had a diverse range of other retaliatory options it planned to use against Beijing.
The state of Maharashtra also recently froze three Chinese investment proposals worth $658 million in the aftermath of the border clash.
Modi will also be incentivized to adopt a more confrontational Indian military stance in Ladakh, where India is continuing to build up its infrastructure, and could begin arming troops at the disputed border with firearms rather than sticks or other blunt weapons.
India will seek to accelerate the purchase and acquisitions of arms, defensive systems and other military equipment from a variety of suppliers including the United States and Russia in an attempt to offset its military imbalance with China.
To counterbalance Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region, Modi will look to deepen economic, military and political ties with its fellow Quadrilateral Security Dialogue members (Australia, Japan and the United States) as well — a move that would surely upset Beijing. India's strategic imperative to avoid firm alliances, however, will prevent it from becoming too close with these powers.
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India has had 3 rounds of commander level talks with the Chinese. They talk of de-escalation and withdrawl of troops in the talks, but the ground situation does not change much, infact it gets worse in some areas. The problem is that Indian military circles talk of anywhere from 30-120 Chinese casualties at Galwan, inpart because a ridge that the Chinese were standing on collapsed, sending them down to their deaths. This was an unexpected outcome and the Chinese had neither gamed the furious hand-hand fight with Indians or the large number of Chinese casualties. China cannot accept higher casualties than India and be seen to withdrawing without any concrete gains. If there is a stalemate, India wins. It is unlikely that China wants a war, because as the Galwan incident shows, wars do not always go as planned, yet they cant just withdraw, otherwise what was the point of the intrusion ?. So my guess is the withdrawal will be long and slow (until winter sets in) and both sides can withdraw under the guise of the weather (70%), or there will be a short military skirmish where the Chinese attack and quickly declare peace and withdrawal (10 %). If the Chinese are serious there is also a 10 % chance in my estimation of a two front war where Pak strikes from the west and China from the east to make territorial gains. However, the risks that this turns into a full fledged war are huge with this scenario. There is 5-10% chance that if talks do not progress, India makes the first move to capture back some territory, because the national mood is that the Chinese need to be responded to militarily, otherwise this will occur every few years.
Looks like they had recently changed the local commander (Maj.Gen Liu Lin) of the South Xinjiang military region as well as the General (Zhao Zongqi) in charge of the Chinese Western Theater Command. Both these gentlemen are close to She Gin Ping. Any new commander typically tries to show some "moves", especially since the Doklam stand-off in Bhutan did not go well for the Chinese as they withdrew without firing a bullet.
In the meantime, it looks like the Chinese are shooting themselves in the foot, this is what happens when they have not fought a proper war in decades.
- The govt has shut the Chinese out of billions of dollars in govt infrastructure contracts as well as telecom contracts. While ZTE and Huawei have not been named as yet, they are not eligible to apply for the telecom contracts.
- Indian govt has banned about 50 Chinese apps, including TikTok which has about 120 million users. Monetarily this does not affect China much, but the network effects are tremendous. This will give Indian companies a leg up to make Indian software.
- Lots of discussion to not buy Chinese goods, they are turning an entire generation of Indians against Chinese products. Many companies are promising to stop purchasing chinese products.
-India is now openly encouraging the move of companies away from China to India
- For the first time, India has started to speak out against China in world forums, recent statement on Hong Kong, envoys to Taiwan, China Virus investigation etc.
- India has been pushed out of its slumber, they are buying a lot of military weapons, in the last few days, orders have been given for about 2 fighter jet squadrons to Russia, upgrade of another 3 squadrons of Russian jets, new naval and land based missiles (Israel) and special howitzer shells to the USA. Approval of indigenous missiles and jets which was languishing has been given. The US govt has announced they will start providing training to Indian and asia-pacific nations on the F-35. Activities with the QUAD nations are being strengthened, Australia just announced a several hundred billion dollar defense investment package for Australia. The French have expedited sales of military Rafale jets, 6 coming this month, along with several modern air-missiles, Russia has already provided bombs etc and the S-400 delivery has been expedited.
The longer this goes on , the worse it gets for the Chinese.
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In the meantime, pl. enjoy Chinese driving skills., quite useful in making a quick retreat.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1276583344776642561 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1276583344776642561)
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PM Modi lands at forward military base Nimoo in Ladakh, gives a rousing patriotic speech. Message clear and loud to China. India will not accept Chinese territorial aggression, must return to status quo ante. She Gin Ping left in a bind, no face saver will be offered. Knowing that when Modi says something, he means it, China needs to rethink this fiasco. They have become used to bullying weak countries and getting their way territorially. I read somewhere that China has borders with 14 countries, but border disputes with 21!
PM has said the full military power of the nation on land, air sea, economic and diplomatic forces will be used. Several international partners have been briefed on the situation. The nation is being prepared for war, if necessary.
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Nice write up
https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/06/26/galwan-border-china-india-war-conflict/
The Galwan Killings Are the Nail in the Coffin for China and India’s Relationship
India was already uneasy with China. Now it’s furious.
BY JEFF M. SMITH | JUNE 26, 2020, 9:40 AM
For the last two months, China and India have been embroiled in a series of standoffs along their disputed Himalayan border that has become the worst crisis in Sino-Indian relations in over 50 years. In some ways, this is familiar territory: India records several hundred Chinese transgressions across the de facto border, known as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), annually, and this marks the fourth prolonged border crisis in seven years. However, the still-unfolding standoffs represent a far more novel and consequential crisis, threatening the tenuous framework that has previously prevented China-India relations from devolving into open rivalry.
It was clear from the outset this border crisis would be different. Following uncommon, but not unprecedented, reports of fistfighting between Chinese and Indian border patrols in early May, the Indian press made a dramatic revelation. The Chinese military had massed thousands of soldiers and towed artillery at multiple noncontiguous locations along the LAC where the Indian union territory of Ladakh meets Tibet, even temporarily crossing the LAC near the Galwan River in May.
What’s worse, the Chinese army was probing in sectors of the LAC, including Sikkim and the Galwan River, long considered settled by New Delhi. Perhaps most concerning, the army seemed to be trying to alter the status quo by occupying a so-called gray zone along the banks of Pangong Lake, a particularly contentious stretch of the border where the very location of the LAC is disputed.
The proximate cause of China’s border maneuvers was the subject of feverish speculation in India. Was Beijing following in the footsteps of its “all-weather friend” Pakistan by responding to New Delhi’s August 2019 decision to revoke Kashmir’s autonomous statehood? Was it objecting to new Indian restrictions on Chinese investment? Lashing out amid international pressure over the COVID-19 pandemic and growing domestic incentives to project a muscular nationalism abroad? Or should the Chinese be taken at their word? Were they, as they had done numerous times in the past, objecting to recent Indian infrastructure upgrades near the LAC by presenting it with a fait accompli? To this day that remains the most likely explanation. But if Beijing was drawing from a familiar playbook, its tactics this time appeared far more aggressive.But if Beijing was drawing from a familiar playbook, its tactics this time appeared far more aggressive.
After several inconclusive rounds of talks between local officers, senior Chinese and Indian commanders met on June 6 and agreed to ease tensions at the border. One week later, with the crisis seemingly unwinding, disaster struck. On the night of June 15, the LAC witnessed a terrible spasm of violence near the Galwan River. The rules of engagement near the LAC bar the use of live ammunition—but not brutal, medieval combat. Fighting along the narrow ridgeline of a Himalayan mountain, 20 Indian soldiers were killed. Some were beaten to death with metal rods and spiked clubs. Others literally fell, or were pushed, to their death. China hasn’t reported its own casualties, as “comparisons may trigger antagonism on both sides.”
The precise details and location of that fateful brawl remain the subject of debate, but the fight reportedly began when Indian forces approached the LAC to confirm China’s compliance with the disengagement pact. The violence erupted when the Indian patrol demanded the dismantlement of a Chinese outpost straddling the LAC on India’s side.
In the aftermath, Beijing and Delhi blamed each other for violating the LAC and initiating hostilities. Surprisingly, China also laid claim to the entire Galwan River valley, a departure from outside analysts’ prior understanding of China’s claims there. Indian External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar insisted China’s actions “reflected an intent to change the facts on the ground in violation of all our agreement.”
At the same time, both sides signaled their interest in further de-escalating the situation. Neither country has shown any interest in a wider conflict, and an 11-hour meeting between senior military commanders on June 22 focused on future steps for de-escalation. For now, the LAC near the Galwan River has fallen quiet again.
There are several catches here. First, recent reports aided by satellite imagery suggest that, far from disengaging from the site of the Galwan brawl (which either lies right on the LAC or 100 meters on India’s side, depending on the map), China appears to have substantially reinforced its position there. There are now Chinese defensive structures, shelters, trenches, and vehicles visible, as well as culverts constructed over the Galwan River “near the spot where bulldozers appeared to have stopped the flow of the waters” in May, the Indian broadcaster NDTV reported. Other reports suggest China continues to mass forces and erect structures near the LAC in other parts of the eastern sector, including the Depsang Valley.
Second, even if the two sides return to the June 6 de-escalation road map covering multiple sites at the Galwan River, Depsang, Gogra, and Hot Springs, there’s a more intractable standoff unfolding farther south, at Pangong Lake. In recent years, the banks of the lake have become a tinderbox, host to a growing number of hostile confrontations between the two sides. With no mutual agreement on the LAC there, a several-kilometer stretch along the northern bank between spits of land known as “Finger 4” and “Finger 8” became a volatile gray zone, claimed and patrolled by both sides. Notably, China has enjoyed a superior position there, having built a road through the area in 1999, while Indian soldiers are forced by inhospitable geography to patrol the contentious stretch on foot.
Last month, several hundred Chinese troops pushed west from their base near Finger 8 to a point near India’s easternmost base at Finger 4 and set up camp, erecting dozens of new structures along the way, seizing the high ground, and staking claim over the Pangong gray zone. The Indian media is now embroiled in a debate over whether China has effectively seized Indian territory while reviewing Delhi’s options to respond.
India Is Paying the Price for Neglecting its Neighbors. Narendra Modi came to power promising to prioritize relations with countries such as Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. China is taking advantage of his failure to do so.
Unsurprisingly, the Indian public is outraged. A large and growing segment of the Indian elite had already grown increasingly disenchanted with China in recent years, frustrated by Beijing’s ongoing patronage to Pakistan, its probing at the border, and its growing footprint in India’s immediate neighborhood. As a result, they have also grown increasingly desirous of a stronger partnership with the United States. Now, those calls have been amplified and joined by a broader cross-section of Indian society, including those once hopeful for a more constructive relationship with China, or at least more equidistance between Washington and Beijing. “The policy of riding on two horses – getting closer to the US without ruffling too many feathers in China – has run its course,” writes the researcher Sushant Sareen. “India will have to decide whether to reinforce a failed policy, or forge a new one which involves a much closer alliance with the US and its allies.”
For its part, the Trump administration has been largely reserved in its public commentary on the crisis. In May, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Alice Wells warned of China’s “constant aggression, the constant attempt to shift the norms, to shift what is the status quo. That has to be resisted whether it’s in the South China Sea … or whether it’s in India’s own backyard.” More recently, administration officials have made only passing references to the LAC crisis. However, this is likely less a sign of impartiality from the United States than a reflection of the Indian government’s preferences: It has traditionally cautioned Washington privately against taking too public a role in India’s disputes with China.
Over the last few decades China and India have invested considerable energy into managing their conflicts of interest and their over 2,100-mile disputed border.Over the last few decades China and India have invested considerable energy into managing their conflicts of interest and their over 2,100-mile disputed border. It’s required both sides to strike a delicate balance, competing and sparring along numerous fault lines while maintaining the veneer of comity and avoiding crossing each other’s red lines. Occasionally, Chinese actions have upset that balance, provoking a sharp response from India. That was the case when Beijing refused to issue a visa to an Indian military officer from Kashmir in 2010; when Chinese submarines surfaced in Sri Lanka in 2014; and when the Chinese military tried to extend a road into the disputed Doklam plateau in 2017. China’s latest adventure at the border hasn’t so much disrupted the balance as reset the entire equation. China’s actions, writes the Times of India’s Indrani Bagchi, “achieved precisely the opposite of what it wanted — it has pushed India into much closer partnerships with the west.”
Some analysts contend Beijing is convinced India’s history of nonalignment will prevent it from ever drawing too close to the United States. The China expert Yun Sun and others argue the opposite: that Beijing views India as a “lost cause” and that no amount of catering to Indian sensitivities will prevent it from aligning with its more natural partner in the United States. She writes: “India is believed to be strategically unreliable to begin with and China has no interest in acquiescing to India’s attempt to advance its position on territorial disputes to trade for concessions. … If a strategic friendship with India is untenable, it frees up room for tactical gains.” With China having established its own infrastructure network along the LAC, Yun believes Beijing “wants to put an end to the infrastructure arms race” and sees India’s road-building as “an attempt to stab it in the back while China was trying to deal with” growing tensions with the United States and international criticism over the COVID-19 pandemic.
Whatever China’s calculus, it should prepare for a more confrontational posture from the Indian government in the years ahead.Whatever China’s calculus, it should prepare for a more confrontational posture from the Indian government in the years ahead. Within days of the fighting, the Indian press reported Delhi will “bar Chinese companies from providing any telecom equipment to state-run telcos and may also prohibit private mobile phone operators from using gear supplied by the likes of Huawei and ZTE.”
In early June, reports suggested India is considering inviting Australia to the Japan-India-U.S. trilateral naval exercise, Malabar. Beginning June 22, Chinese imports were reportedly being stalled at key Indian ports. Meanwhile, an article in India’s largest Hindi-language newspaper urges the Modi government to “reimagine its policies on Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong” and “be prepared to exit organizations like the [Shanghai Cooperation Organization].” India will likely review its approach to the broad spectrum of policies that fall within the China portfolio, from the Quad and the Belt and Road Initiative to the South China Sea and the Dalai Lama.
In the near term, India will be seeking to return to the pre-May status quo at the LAC, including at Pangong Lake. If Beijing balks, Delhi’s immediate options to respond are limited and unpalatable. While there have been calls inside India for military retaliation and escalation, amid a global recession and pandemic Delhi will be reluctant to start a war over a few dozen kilometers of real estate not previously in its sovereign possession.
Over the long term, there’s more at stake than the fingers of Pangong Lake. And there are more effective, albeit less immediate, ways of imposing costs on China for its border adventure. India already enjoys the world’s third-largest military budget. Within a decade it will likely be the world’s most populous country, with the fourth-largest economy.
Many in China know this, which is why, despite its palpable disdain for India, Beijing has over the years sought to avoid a dramatic rupture with Delhi. But this is a new China, one where “Wolf Warrior” diplomats casually throw decades of more cautious diplomacy to the wind. It’s a China that may have forgotten what it means to win the battle but lose the war.
Jeff M. Smith is a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C. and author of Cold Peace: China-India Rivalry in the Twenty-First Century.
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- So China now has NEW border disputes with Bhutan. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-says-it-has-border-dispute-with-bhutan-too/story-TlhVkk7TwAS97DiASzBSBK.html (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/china-says-it-has-border-dispute-with-bhutan-too/story-TlhVkk7TwAS97DiASzBSBK.html)
- In connect the dots news:
1. PM Modi goes to meet the President..he does this before important events.
2. The US is sending 2-3 carrier battle groups to the Indo-China sea. In the US this is perceived as simple freedom of navigation exercise. However, in India this is believed to serve a second purpose. It keeps Chinese forces tied down on east coast of China...thus taking off pressure from Ladakh.
3. Pak is being very, very quiet. No more denunciation of Modi, considering all the activity going next to their border. Trying to keep the peace. Yes they are still sending terrorists, but that is in their DNA.
4. Pompeo has been making calls with India's neighbors, including Pak, Nepal and Sri Lanka and just signed a SOFA agreement with Sri Lanka
http://www.asiantribune.com/node/94361 (http://www.asiantribune.com/node/94361) It is clear that India is receiving US support in this fight against China.
The world is uniting against China's expansionist policies and bullying. Seeing India stand up to China has an effect on other smaller nations. Even small nations from Bhutan to ASEAN countries are speaking up https://asiatimes.com/2020/06/asean-finally-pushes-back-on-chinas-sea-claims/ (https://asiatimes.com/2020/06/asean-finally-pushes-back-on-chinas-sea-claims/)
How can China be a world power, with only Pak and NK as its friends ?
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(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EcJM_2RVcAA6Et3?format=jpg&name=large)
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After Lt.Gen level talks, now Cabinet Secretary level talks with Indian NSA in the offing.
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/delhi-explores-sr-level-talks-amid-first-tentative-signs-of-climbdown-6491847/ (https://indianexpress.com/article/india/delhi-explores-sr-level-talks-amid-first-tentative-signs-of-climbdown-6491847/)
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Looks like de-escalation is happening. Have to wait and see if they are serious. Not sure what was the point of China's move to escalate in the first place.
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Looks like de-escalation is happening. Have to wait and see if they are serious. Not sure what was the point of China's move to escalate in the first place.
Testing, probing, gathering intelligence.
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Yes, they learnt about India's resolve along with response times. But at a cost of hundreds of billions, turned the whole country against them. Not likely to get 5G/Huawei contract now. It took about 50 years to build up the trust to some extent, its now all gone.
Displeased their own veterans by not acknowledging casualties. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/29/retired-and-hurt-pla-veterans-could-become-a-force/
Overall, looks like they shot themselves in the foot.
My own theory is that the Chinese are worried that India may take Gilgit Baltistan (GB)/POK and with that goes their investment in CPEC (China Pak Economic Corridor), the corridor passes through Gilgit Baltistan, Pak and then to the Arabian sea. There have been some hints that they need some assurances regarding that. I dont think they particularly care about Pak, the value of which is declining daily and will go to zero once GB is lost by Pak.
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China has serious internal stability concerns. This will motivate much of their aggressive moves in asia.
Yes, they learnt about India's resolve along with response times. But at a cost of hundreds of billions, turned the whole country against them. Not likely to get 5G/Huawei contract now. It took about 50 years to build up the trust to some extent, its now all gone.
Displeased their own veterans by not acknowledging casualties. https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jun/29/retired-and-hurt-pla-veterans-could-become-a-force/
Overall, looks like they shot themselves in the foot.
My own theory is that the Chinese are worried that India may take Gilgit Baltistan (GB)/POK and with that goes their investment in CPEC (China Pak Economic Corridor), the corridor passes through Gilgit Baltistan, Pak and then to the Arabian sea. There have been some hints that they need some assurances regarding that. I dont think they particularly care about Pak, the value of which is declining daily and will go to zero once GB is lost by Pak.
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Update: Looks like the Chinese have withdrawn from about 3 areas, they are still debating about Pangong Lake and Depsang areas. These are high profile areas and pangong lake in particular is well known to Indian citizens. The govt has said, not even an inch will be given to Chinese. Looks like for the first time the govt is fighting back against Chinese salami slicing tactics, where they advance 2 steps forward and become magnanimous and go back one step.
The news that is circulating is that a Chinese Western Theater Command general, close to Xi wanted to show India its place after the 73 day Doklam standoff where the Chinese had to make a humiliating withdrawal. The plan was to make a quick point and the Chinese preplanned the Galwan barbed club fight, but had not expected a ferocious Indian response with a high Chinese body count. Now they are stuck in a no win situation, with serious loss of face and things getting worse for them. They have widely escalated at multiple points on the LAC, but will need to withdraw from all areas. For a super power like China, a stalemate with India is a loss of face, whereas for India its a win. Their propaganda of taking on the USA is not going to work well, if they cant even show India its place.
- India has made a lot of weapons purchases, where India was dilly-dallying before. Thanks China for upgrading Indian military stock.
- Lots of Chinese companies banned, Billions of dollars in losses
- No chance Huawei will get the 5g contract
- Higher level envoy exchange with Taiwan
- India close to asking Australia to join QUAD
- India and US exchanging military information and working closely
- Indian naval exercises near Andaman Nicobar Islands, while US exercises with 2 CBG in south china sea.
I will leave you with this picture, might give the Chinese sleepless nights.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EdMbDEOWoAERM2z?format=jpg&name=900x900)
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Some nice maps of the Pangong and Galwan areas
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/18/world/asia/china-india-border-conflict.html?auth=login-email&login=email (https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/18/world/asia/china-india-border-conflict.html?auth=login-email&login=email)
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https://www.indiandefencetimes.com/how-china-is-at-a-great-disadvantage/ (https://www.indiandefencetimes.com/how-china-is-at-a-great-disadvantage/)
Air War Over Aksai Chin: How China Is At A Great Disadvantage
By Indian Defence Times -18/07/20200
In a desperate attempt to draw away the limelight from COVID-19, China does what most autocratic governments do, ‘go to war’ with nations, least foment trouble
by Group Captain MJA Vinod
Panda’s Pandemonium
Year of Rat 2020 has not been good for the world, especially for China, a country with a Middle Kingdom mindset. I would prefer calling China as Panda rather than a Dragon. Dragon is a wrong epithet for a country which behaves in a cowardly fashion with its neighbours.
Towards the end of 2019, China unleashed Wuhan Virus aka COVID-19 upon the world. It led to huge loss of life, loss of livelihood and stress on economy in most countries. In a desperate attempt to draw away the limelight on this atrocity on the world China does what most autocratic government do, ‘go to war’ with nations, least foment trouble to take away the focus from Chinese created COVID-19.
The killing of 20 Indian soldiers of Indian Army including the Commanding Officer was one such lame attempt by the Panda. Visit of PM Narendra Modi to Leh in this aspect is an important step. Apart from the fact that it motivates the forces there, it is also a political signalling to China and the World that India is no longer going to take it as it did in the past, meekly. Panda has a big army and Air Force with a lot of reverse engineered fighters. Claims of their capability is albeit questionable. If panda decides to engage with India how can Indian Air Force swing and probably finish the battle in few days is what we are going to see.
Terrain
Terrain is going to play a major role in the war with Panda. Both for Army to Army engagements and for Air operations. Let’s see the aspects of terrain that is going to shape the battle in favour of India. Let‘s see each attribute separately.
Army to Army Contact: Panda is going to fight India at high altitudes on surface. Area of contact is going to range from 10,000 feet to 14,000 feet. To put things in perspective, normally, human beings would need additional oxygen above 10,000 feet unless he/she is acclimatized, which is a process that can take anywhere from 7-20 days depending upon the final altitude. This is not a major disadvantage for him as it is for us, because Panda’s soldiers would travel to these regions over higher altitude acclimatizing in the process.
What is really going to bake his cookie is when he uproots forces from east which is at sea level and inducts them into high altitude through air. Acclimatization timing for these soldiers is going to be so high that war would be over by then. This also means China cannot induct fresh forces from plains when his force level depletes due Air Interdiction by IAF and by India Army action. This needs to be understood by the readers clearly.
Air Bases available for Chinese Army Air Force Operations: Unlike Indian Air Force, Chinese Air Force is called PLAAF (People’s Liberation Army Air Force), yes, it’s Air Force is subservient to its Army. At higher levels it is the Army General who is going to decide how the air arm will be applied, strategically. This could well prove to be the Achilles heels for PLAAF. To add to its woes is the lack of airbase in this region. I have drawn two circles with the centre at area of force application near Aksai Chin. I have not marked Indian bases though for obvious reasons, while it is no secret.
500 km radius: At 500 km radius, which is more or less the radius that is viable for Air operations using fighters without air-air refuelling giving an over target time of 15 minutes to an hour depending on the engagement at the place of force application, in our case area near Galwan Valley. As you can see in the 500 km circle, China has only two air bases namely Hotan and Ngari Kunsa. Hotan is a proper military airfield (with no Hardened Aircraft Shelter, waiting to be cleaned up by IAF) while Ngari Kunsa is at 14,000 feet with minimal facility for Fighter Operations.
1000 km radius: I have also drawn a 1000 km radius circle from the area of force application. At a thousand km radius Kasi, Kashgar gets added to Chinese potential. Korla & Xicun which are bases either side of Bosten lake and Urumqi Air Base are situated at 1300 to 1500 km.
Indian Potential at these Distances: At these distances Indian potential is disproportionality high. In fact, the entire IAF’s might be brought to bear on Panda. For example, from these ranges IAF could launch from Srinagar, Udampur, Leh, Daulat Baig Oldie, Nyoma, Chusul, Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara, Bhatinda, Sirsa, Chandigarh, Ambala, Amritsar, Jammu, Jodpur, Jaisalmer, Utarlai, Hindon, Barielly, Agra, Gwalior etc. They all are situated at much lower altitudes which offers realisation of full potential of the aeroplanes operating from it with an exception of Airfields in Ladakh & Srinagar.
On Station time: IAF operating from above mentioned bases can take off from lower altitude with full loadout while China suffers badly due to hot and high conditions. IAF can take off from rear bases, operate over the area for at least 2X to 6X time than China and recover to a nearer base, refuel and be on business in a matter of 45 mins. While PLAAF aeroplanes need to go back 500 to 1000 km for refuelling.
Hot and High: Every degree temperature increase at high altitude airfields matters. It puts a lot of restriction on the aeroplanes. An airbus class of aeroplane can land there with full load, however at high temperature cannot take off with ¼ of the load it landed with. That is why you will see all flights to Leh or for that matter to Ngari Kunsa on the Chinese side finishes before 10.00 AM.
Use of Air to Air Refuelers: Some so called experts are Gung ho about Chinese Air-Air refuellers. To burst their bubble Air-Air refuellers are not panacea to the problem of fewer bases that Chinese has in this region. Air to Air refuellers are of two types ‘Drogue and Probe’and ‘Boom and Socket’. Boom and Socket is used only by Americans (it has remarkably high fuel transfer rate). Drogue and Probe is what rest of the world uses. Issues with this type is the fuel transfer rate is just enough to refuel 5-7 aeroplanes because China needs to launch with full fuel from a lower altitude airfield and travel a long distance to give fuel to thirsty fighters over ‘Takla Makan’ regions. Time taken for the refueler to travel, refuelling time, protection required for the refueller itself (Lest it is shot out of the sky by Indian Fighters) etc makes Air – Air refuelling options for Chinese a near impossible feat. By no means I am saying they will not do it. They will, for some special missions. But they cannot do it for day to day operations.
Chinese Army: Sitting Ducks: I make this statement with utmost responsibility. No Army operations can happen without Air Defence cover. Only Air defence cover that Chinese army can have its integral Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs). SAMs have their own issues, starting with issues of range, requirement of radar (which are susceptible to jamming) and Army’s inability to operate outside the Air Defence envelope provided by their SAMs. Do not count S-400 as integral AD weapon. S-400 is a mammoth system which can be moved but cannot be hidden. If moved forward it will be taken out by Mirage 2000 using Crystal Maze or Su-30 with Brahmos or from a Surface launched Brahmos. Chinese Army will be severely constrained in movement and operations. Once their Air Defence weapons are addressed by IAF through SEAD / DEAD (Suppression / Destruction of Enemy Air Defence) PLA will be sitting ducks for IAF to pick and target. Adding to their woes is approach to Galwan valley which provides no natural protection (it’s an open desert), making interdiction by IAF fighters and attack helicopters even easier.
Chinese Rocket Force: This used to be called Second Artillery, an independent force which has more of Surface to Surface missiles (SSM) than Rockets in them. It is called Rocket force because in Mandarin Rocket & SSM are called rockets. Imagine two things, firstly firing an SSM against any country. Target country cannot know whether it is nuclear tipped or not. Therefore, target country is free to respond the way it perceives. Taking worst case scenario, nothing stops India retaliating with its IRBM. Will China take that chance? Secondly, conventionally tipped these SSMs are what I call ‘Non Return Fighter Aeroplane’. They are as costly as a fighter aeroplane carrying a 500 kg bomb (Su 30 carries 8 tons of bombs) and they are one time use only. Will a Chinese general press the button unless he is damn sure of the target? Will he fire against a target that can move (Like aeroplanes / army forces on ground)? Will he fire against a target on whom accurate intel is not available? All these making mountain out of a mole hill by arm chair enthusiasts can’t be far from reality. These doomsday chiliasts need to study more and look at things logically.
What will be the Outcome for China?
Answer to this question is quite simple, it will be a one long graveyard from Galwan to Kashgar and Lhasa. China cannot afford fighting with India in the area that it has shown its tentacles. Xi Jinping is being advised by Generals who do not know Air War. He is being led down the garden path by generals with ambition. If push comes to shove and if the war happens, I hope they commit massive force in this region for IAF to do target practice and decimate them even before it encounters our army.
(Group Captain MJA Vinod was in charge of operations for Northeast during his tenure as CATSPAW – Command Air Tasking And Strike Planning for Aerial Warfare – in Shillong, Meghalaya. He was also conferred with Vishisht Sewa Medal by the President of India for establishing CATSPAW. He served four tenures in Northeast from Sikkim sector to the Eastern most base. He is an MPhil and a PhD scholar in international relations and strategic studies. Views expressed are personal)
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https://israelunwired.com/india-israel-alliance/
https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=47&v=G50ZKwk27fU&feature=emb_logo
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The Nature of China's Military Push Along the Indian Border
Sim Tack
Sim Tack
Senior Global Analyst , Stratfor
5 MINS READ
Jul 22, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
After many years of infrastructure development and gradual encroachment, China is accelerating efforts to secure its military presence and access to water rights along the Indian border near Ladakh. But while it appears Beijing has largely achieved this objective for now, the harsh Himalayan winter could again escalate its standoff with India by challenging China's ability to maintain a presence throughout the disputed territory.
Since early May, over 10,000 Chinese troops have flooded into the disputed area on the Indian border, as Beijing seeks to secure its border claims and access to Himalayan water resources. Over the past year, Beijing likely construed a perception that India was attempting to reinforce its border claims in Ladakh by constructing roads and bridges near the Line of Actual Control. As is the case with many other Chinese territorial claims, such as those in Arunachal Pradesh or the South China Sea, China is also seeking to establish greater strategic depth around its borders. In Ladakh specifically, this means expanding control from the open plains of Xinjiang into the much more defensible Tibetan Plateau. The further China extends its reach into this mountainous area, the tougher the military challenge of threatening its western border becomes for Beijing's opponents. Controlling the source and course of rivers that run from Ladakh also provides a great deal of environmental security for China, as the Himilayan mountains in the region are an important source of water to the areas below them on either side.
Applying Military Strength With Restraint
China has advanced its territorial claims in various disputed border areas through a practice of offensive deterrence. In Ladakh, Beijing does not appear to desire an actual military confrontation with India. Indeed, China's recent deployment of additional forces to the region has yet to translate into a direct military offensive, even after the deadly June 15 skirmish with Indian troops and the occurrence of hand-to-hand combat in a number of other recent incidents at the Galwan Valley. The scale and scope of the Chinese military presence in Ladakh are instead intended to project the capability to rapidly engage in large scale military operations if China's actions are contested.
China is defending its claims in Ladakh through a significant logistical effort, shoring up its presence while further projecting Beijing's military strength into this complex terrain. Leading up to the latest escalation, both India and China had been steadily advancing their territorial claims in the area through the construction of roads and bridges. China, in particular, has spent years gradually constructing infrastructure in the border areas that hosts its military build-up.
Over the years, China has developed a much greater network of roads and support bases to provide so-called "lines of communication" between military units and their logistics or reinforcements) in Ladakh.
China has also emphasized enabling helicopter operations through the construction of landing pads and heliports in the Himalayan region. Helicopter operations, while difficult at Himalayan altitudes, will nonetheless help expand the capacity and redundancy of Beijing's logistical reach into this complex terrain.
Pushback from India following the June 15 border clash has prompted China to withdraw forces from several forward positions in Ladakh, though these limited drawdowns have so far had little impact on China's greater military advancement in the border region. In May, China removed the "no man's land" that had separated its forces from Indian troops since the two countries' border war in 1962. As evidenced by the latest bloody skirmish, this lack of separation has, in turn, led to a much more volatile situation on the border in recent months, and India's refusal to back off eventually resulted in negotiations to re-impose a minimal buffer zone in early July. Chinese forces, however, have not withdrawn from all of their most forward positions, just those most contentious ones at Galwan Valley, Hot Springs and Pangong Lake. But even in those areas, Chinese troops still maintain a significant presence just kilometers away from Indian positions, effectively upholding Beijing's deterrent.
Dramatic changes to operating conditions this winter, however, will present a major test to China's ability to uphold its deterrent capability in Ladakh year-round. China initially launched its military push into Ladakh in May, when the region's snow- and ice-covered valleys had just started to thaw. Though still extremely challenging terrain, the summer is by far the easiest season to maneuver these mountainous areas. But as winter begins to settle in November, the entire region will once again be covered in deep snow, which will make a continued build-up of both Chinese infrastructure and troops in Ladakh difficult. Beijing may be planning to carve out several positions in the region for its troops to wait out the winter months, though freezing temperatures, icy roads and reduced visibility due to snow will still severely limit China's ability to resupply or reinforce these troops via ground or helicopter operations. This, in turn, may provide India with opportunities to exploit reduced Chinese mobility during the winter or heading into spring
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Looks like a short war is in the books...
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-refusing-to-even-discuss-pangong-tso-standoff-in-talks-1707014-2020-08-02 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/china-refusing-to-even-discuss-pangong-tso-standoff-in-talks-1707014-2020-08-02)
China refusing to even discuss Pangong Tso standoff in disengagement talks
India Today TV has learned that the Chinese reluctance that emerged in the fourth round of talks on June 14-15 has escalated now into an all-out refusal to even acknowledge the Pangong Tso situation as a friction point.
Shiv Aroor
New Delhi
August 2, 2020UPDATED: August 2, 2020 15:35 IST
China is practically refusing to discuss the standoff in Pangong Tso, with the deadlock in this friction point now deteriorating because of China simply dismissing it as a talking point. India Today TV has learned that the Chinese reluctance that emerged in the fourth round of talks on June 14-15 has escalated now into an all-out refusal to even acknowledge the Pangong Tso situation as a friction point.
China's new stance on the Pangong Tso Finger complex stand-off assumes significance considering the Chinese Army has implemented discussed disengagement protocols in full at the Galwan Valley's Patrol Point 14 and Patrol Point 15 in the Hot Springs sector just south.
Disengagement at Patrol Point 17A at the restive Gogra Post has slowed but it is China's Pangong deployment that has been of chief concern to India so far.
China's stubbornness at the talks table in even acknowledging Pangong as a friction point between the two countries is the most explicit affirmation of China's clear intent to change the lines of the pre-May status quo. The new intransigence ties in with two developments the past week.
One, the Chinese Ambassador's claim that disengagement was complete and that China was at its line in the Pangong Finger complex -- a provocative signal that there would be no further pullback. As India Today TV has reported, China's huge deployment in the disputed stretch between Finger 4-8 had been overrun by Chinese positions starting early May, with very nominal changes now visible.
Two, India Today TV has reported that China has spent the last three weeks building up in-depth areas of Pangong and activating several supply bases in Aksai Chin, capable of rushing in troops for hostile action at short notice.
The Indian Army isn't taking China's reluctance to talk on Pangong lightly and has conveyed that there can be no forward movement without a comprehensive and detailed exchange on the current situation in the Finger complex.
Today's round of the talks, the fifth so far, between the Indian Army Leh Corps Commander, Lt Gen Harinder Singh, and his Chinese counterpart, Maj Gen Lin Liu, was confirmed late last evening by the Chinese side.
Yesterday, August 1, was the People's Liberation Army (PLA) Day. In a clear sign of a chill in relations since the standoff began in early May, the traditional ceremonial India-China border personnel meeting (BPM), which takes place on PLA Day at Chushul, did not happen yesterday.
Formal greetings were extended under the Eastern Command, but there was no traditional exchange of gifts -- both because of the novel coronavirus protocols as well as the steady downward slide in military relations in the past 90 days.
Army sources have told India Today TV that the reports of Chinese troops mobilising around Lipulekh and the central sector across the border from Uttarakhand are "false and untrue", though deployments are catering for any eventuality there as well.
Apart from the Pangong deadlock, the other major topic of discussion at Sunday's disengagement talks is the Depsang issue.
In late June, India Today TV had reported on how China was looking to open a fresh front in the Depsang-DBO sectors of northern Ladakh. While Depsang frictions have festered for years, and are not directly linked to the 2020 hostile actions by China in eastern Ladakh, the fact that things have escalated there have compelled India to add Depsang to the agenda.
In Depsang, China has mobilised in larger numbers than before and is continuing to mount temporary transgressions into the Indian territory with vehicles. This has happened for years, with Indian troops usually fending them off, but the transgressions have not only increased in number this year but also strength and duration.
In the past month, the Chinese Army, enjoying far better surveillance in the area than the Indian side, has kept pinpoint tabs on the Indian troop patrols.
When Indian troop teams move out on foot, the Chinese side immediately deploys vehicular convoys to intercept the patrols and block their paths. These collisions have acquired a rhythm of their own for nearly a decade, but there is marked aggression to how the Chinese are asserting the patrol blocks in the last month.
In the last round of talks, when India had raised the Depsang issue, the Chinese had pointed an expected finger back at India, accusing the Indian Army of sending patrol teams in Chinese-held territory. In simple terms, a slow-burn faceoff in the flatlands of Depsang has been scaled up in intensity this year.
The fifth round of talks is on at Chushul, and while it is seen as positive that the two sides are still engaging at Chushul-Moldo, there is an increasing view that the Lt Gen level talks have achieved the maximum that they can at their level.
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PLA has 4 weaknesses
https://m.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-people-s-liberation-army-is-strong-but-it-has-four-weaknesses/story-4BAJhVDLbfKhq2XEczg2JK_amp.html?__twitter_impression=true (https://m.hindustantimes.com/analysis/the-people-s-liberation-army-is-strong-but-it-has-four-weaknesses/story-4BAJhVDLbfKhq2XEczg2JK_amp.html?__twitter_impression=true)
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Xi-tler, Hitler similarities, surprised how much similarity
https://youtu.be/-zPPD8lQSEk (https://youtu.be/-zPPD8lQSEk)
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"A majority, 59 per cent, believe we should go to war with China, while 34 per cent say we should not. Seventy-two per cent believe India can actually win against China with only 19 per cent believing we can’t or that ‘it will end in a stalemate’."
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20200817-enemy-number-one-1708698-2020-08-08 (https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/nation/story/20200817-enemy-number-one-1708698-2020-08-08)
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".A majority, 59 per cent, believe we should go to war with China, while 34 per cent say we should not. Seventy-two per cent believe India can actually win against China with only 19 per cent believing we can’t or that ‘it will end in a stalemate’."
:-o
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The India-China stand off has been 4 months now...both sides are preparing to stay put in the winter. During this period, India kept punishing China economically. Chinese have lost business and contracts in India. India meanwhile is trying to recover its strength from the China virus. Military preparations are going on full swing in India. On Aug 15, on India's independence day, Modi gave a speech which does not support a back down by India.
Future calibrated punishments planned for China:
- Huawei and ZTE ban
- India participates as QUAD member in naval war games
In the mean the LOC with Pak is super hot, Pak may foolishly try a small misadventure.
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l_qr-4AKM18
The PRC has things in motion.
The India-China stand off has been 4 months now...both sides are preparing to stay put in the winter. During this period, India kept punishing China economically. Chinese have lost business and contracts in India. India meanwhile is trying to recover its strength from the China virus. Military preparations are going on full swing in India. On Aug 15, on India's independence day, Modi gave a speech which does not support a back down by India.
Future calibrated punishments planned for China:
- Huawei and ZTE ban
- India participates as QUAD member in naval war games
In the mean the LOC with Pak is super hot, Pak may foolishly try a small misadventure.
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The Chinese make good videos, I give them that. :-)
In the meantime there are reports that some in CCP are unhappy with She Gin Ping...change happens slowly then suddenly
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/aug/18/china-xi-jinping-facing-widespread-opposition-in-his-own-party-claims-insider
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https://www.zerohedge.com/geopolitical/pakistani-minister-threatens-india-nuclear-attack-save-muslim-lives-national-tv
It's just 2020...
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Not to be taken seriously. He is the most ignorant of Pak ministers..has made several moronic statements re:nukes in the past. This time " He said only Muslim's would survive such a nuclear showdown."
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So China's strategy of salami slicing is to encroach inside Indian territory 3 steps and then go back 2 steps. Now again after the encroachment, China wants both sides to go back equally!. India refuses.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/india-rejects-chinas-suggestion-of-equidistant-disengagement-from-finger-area-in-ladakh/articleshow/77702782.cms
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Probably the first time, I am hearing the Indian Chief of Defense Staff, explicitly make a statement like this. Such language has been reserved for Pak.
"With diplomatic and military talks on resolving the military standoff between Indian and Chinese troops along the Line of Actual Control in Ladakh not making much headway, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat Monday said India has “military options” available, but these will be used only if talks fail.
This is the first time that a senior military officer has spoken publicly on the “transgressions by the Chinese” and the option of military force to deal with the border crisis in Ladakh."
https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-border-lac-dispute-talks-military-action-6568517/ (https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-china-border-lac-dispute-talks-military-action-6568517/)
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Chinese moves concern India. According to Indian media, the People’s Liberation Army has been continuing numerous infrastructure projects – roads, bridges, camps and helipads – behind the front lines near the Galwan Valley, where Indian and Chinese troops had their first deadly clash in decades earlier this summer. Unnamed Indian military sources say the projects suggest China intends to stick around once the annual fighting season ends in the next few months. Even if that’s the case, which seems unlikely, it’s hard to see there being much of a real threat of a major Chinese move during the winter months – if ever.
Somewhat more concerning to India, satellite images suggest China is building at least one site for surface-to-air missiles in the disputed region. Additionally, China’s foothold in neighboring Nepal also appears to be growing, with the Survey Department of the Agriculture Ministry reporting that China is occupying pockets of land in seven districts along the China-Nepal border. More concerning to China than any Indian response in the Himalayas, meanwhile, is additional evidence that its assertiveness is pushing India to accelerate development of naval and air force infrastructure in the Andaman and Nicobar islands. Indian officials are also apparently worried that China might finally be succeeding in getting Thailand to build the Kra Canal at the mouth of the Strait of Malacca. The project has been and probably still is a pipe dream, but it’s worth watching to see if the latest push is different.
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https://strategypage.com/on_point/2020082520543.aspx
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China cannot do anything in Taiwan, as long as they are facing India at the border. India would likely attack. China cannot win this 2 front war. To attack Taiwan, they need a peaceful border with India.
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".China cannot do anything in Taiwan, as long as they are facing India at the border. India would likely attack. China cannot win this 2 front war. To attack Taiwan, they need a peaceful border with India."
wow this is quite a statement
Ya , what brings you to this conclusion
and do you think India would do this to protect Taiwan or just to take advantage of the situation?
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".China cannot do anything in Taiwan, as long as they are facing India at the border. India would likely attack. China cannot win this 2 front war. To attack Taiwan, they need a peaceful border with India."
wow this is quite a statement
Ya , what brings you to this conclusion
and do you think India would do this to protect Taiwan or just to take advantage of the situation?
I am interested in ya's view also.
My thoughts:
IF China opens aggression on any front (Taiwan in this case), they should be attacked back on all fronts. In that scenario, it would be great if India uses the timing for the advantage on both fronts.
In the scenario posed recently, China starts its attack on Taiwan by striking US bases. If so, doesn't that mean all US allies worldwide join in. (Do we have allies?)
US response needs to be disproportionate. Attack Chinese military targets, as many as possible, not limited to Taiwan area. Attack from India. Wipe out their new construction in the South China Sea. Call for regime change.
Deterrence: If they expect all of this, none of it will be necessary.
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India will almost certainly (near 100%, IMHO) take advantage of the situation, if Taiwan benefits that would be great. India has for decades faced the threat of a two front war with Pak and China ganging up together as they are doing right now, and prepared for it (however imperfectly). Missing such an opportunity would be the biggest strategic blunder! and the current Modi govt is unlikely to let such an opportunity go by.
Infact my guess is India would not directly attack China but make a dash for Gilgit Baltistan and POK through which passes the CPEC. China will be in no position to defend Pak or get involved to save CPEC, nor do they have any legal rights in the matter. Once Gilgit-Baltistan is taken back, China's border access with Pak ends and China will agree to demarcate border between India and China. At that point Aksai Chin captured by China in the 1962 war and the few sq miles of current border issues will be renegotiated, perhaps exchanged in lieu of Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar which are hindu pilgrimage sites (abode of Lord Shiva per mythology). China needs Aksai Chin as an important highway G219 passes through it, for India that is just barren land and would be happy to take Mt.Kailash and Mansarovar instead.
China is aware that they could lose access to CPEC roads through POK which lead to Gwadar port (Pak) and have recently made alternate arrangements with Iran (40 billion investment) to have access to Chabahar port (Iraq) for warm water access. It is the official stated position of the BJP govt to take back POK/Gilgit-Baltistan soon.
As much as I wish that China will make a grab for Taiwan (and fail), it wont happen. Per the Indian news channels, China is being given a face saver to withdraw with their dignity intact. Many in the west have not given much attention to the Indian Chief of Defense Staff's statement, that if diplomacy with China will not work, military options are on the table. Indian military generals are very careful and never make such direct statements or empty threats. 6 Army Cmdr level talks, as well as several Foreign Secretary level talks have failed. Patience is running thin.
Based on the above thinking, China cannot attack Taiwan, unless they plan to remain a bystander while India takes back Gilgit/Baltistan. So yes, attacking Taiwan runs the risk of a difficult war, or at the very least loss of CPEC and access to POK.
China is $crewed, with whats going in the world and asia-pacific, not everyone appreciates this. Huawei is being rejected world wide, supply chains are being re-directed, new alliances are being formed. This megalomania of Xi has been very expensive and premature for the Chinese.
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I doubt the PLA has the capacity to handle a hot war with India on it's border and a hot war with the US/Taiwan/Japan and others. Vietnam could get some payback pushing into the southern Chinese provinces just to tie down additional PLA resources.
".China cannot do anything in Taiwan, as long as they are facing India at the border. India would likely attack. China cannot win this 2 front war. To attack Taiwan, they need a peaceful border with India."
wow this is quite a statement
Ya , what brings you to this conclusion
and do you think India would do this to protect Taiwan or just to take advantage of the situation?
I am interested in ya's view also.
My thoughts:
IF China opens aggression on any front (Taiwan in this case), they should be attacked back on all fronts. In that scenario, it would be great if India uses the timing for the advantage on both fronts.
In the scenario posed recently, China starts its attack on Taiwan by striking US bases. If so, doesn't that mean all US allies worldwide join in. (Do we have allies?)
US response needs to be disproportionate. Attack Chinese military targets, as many as possible, not limited to Taiwan area. Attack from India. Wipe out their new construction in the South China Sea. Call for regime change.
Deterrence: If they expect all of this, none of it will be necessary.
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If India formally recognized Taiwan and signed a mutual defense treaty, that would be a gut punch for Beijing.
India will almost certainly (near 100%, IMHO) take advantage of the situation, if Taiwan benefits that would be great. India has for decades faced the threat of a two front war with Pak and China ganging up together as they are doing right now, and prepared for it (however imperfectly). Missing such an opportunity would be the biggest strategic blunder! and the current Modi govt is unlikely to let such an opportunity go by.
Infact my guess is India would not directly attack China but make a dash for Gilgit Baltistan and POK through which passes the CPEC. China will be in no position to defend Pak or get involved to save CPEC, nor do they have any legal rights in the matter. Once Gilgit-Baltistan is taken back, China's border access with Pak ends and China will agree to demarcate border between India and China. At that point Aksai Chin captured by China in the 1962 war and the few sq miles of current border issues will be renegotiated, perhaps exchanged in lieu of Mount Kailash and Lake Mansarovar which are hindu pilgrimage sites (abode of Lord Shiva per mythology). China needs Aksai Chin as an important highway G219 passes through it, for India that is just barren land and would be happy to take Mt.Kailash and Mansarovar instead.
China is aware that they could lose access to CPEC roads through POK which lead to Gwadar port (Pak) and have recently made alternate arrangements with Iran (40 billion investment) to have access to Chabahar port (Iraq) for warm water access. It is the official stated position of the BJP govt to take back POK/Gilgit-Baltistan soon.
As much as I wish that China will make a grab for Taiwan (and fail), it wont happen. Per the Indian news channels, China is being given a face saver to withdraw with their dignity intact. Many in the west have not given much attention to the Indian Chief of Defense Staff's statement, that if diplomacy with China will not work, military options are on the table. Indian military generals are very careful and never make such direct statements or empty threats. 6 Army Cmdr level talks, as well as several Foreign Secretary level talks have failed. Patience is running thin.
Based on the above thinking, China cannot attack Taiwan, unless they plan to remain a bystander while India takes back Gilgit/Baltistan. So yes, attacking Taiwan runs the risk of a difficult war, or at the very least loss of CPEC and access to POK.
China is $crewed, with whats going in the world and asia-pacific, not everyone appreciates this. Huawei is being rejected world wide, supply chains are being re-directed, new alliances are being formed. This megalomania of Xi has been very expensive and premature for the Chinese.
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'what a great post.
"China is $crewed, with what''s going in the world and asia-pacific, not everyone appreciates this. Huawei is being rejected world wide, supply chains are being re-directed, new alliances are being formed. This megalomania of Xi has been very expensive and premature for the Chinese."
Yes. Huawei almost enabled China to take over the world. They didn't see Trump, Pompeo and Modi coming. We thought patience was their strength, but if this aggression could have waited ten years, maybe they could have passed up everyone economically and militarily first.
Now they are surrounded, and screwed.
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so the best option for dealing with the Chinese is multi-national containment
if only the Europeans would contribute more
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Looks like one more border clash with Chinese in the Chushul area, opposite Pangong Tso. News trickling in. As in Galwan more beating for Chinese from initial news.
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YA-- good stuff. The Taiwan variable is not one I had put together in my mind.
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Looks like 300-500 chinese soldiers tried to occupy some strategic heights, Indian army detected them and took the heights first, perhaps a few km in Chinese occupied territory. India now has command of much of that region. India has a few thousand soldiers of the Tibetan Special Frontier Force who participated in this. These are Tibetan exiles and sons of the soil, who have an animosity to China. They are attuned to the mountainous region, which is around 15000 feet. Rumors of Chinese prisoners and a chinese post being overrun!.
the general map of the region
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EgwOfaCWoAI7lHh?format=jpg&name=small)
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https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3099642/us-seeks-formal-alliance-similar-nato-india-japan-and-australia-state?utm_content=article&utm_medium=Social&utm_source=Facebook#Echobox=1598909439
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asian nato?
somebody read my idea on 8/30/20.
:-D
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asian nato?
somebody read my idea on 8/30/20.
:-D
Yes. Famous people reading the forum.
https://dogbrothers.com/phpBB2/index.php?topic=2134.msg125529#msg125529
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https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/how-growth-in-family-business-of-cpec-chairman-asim-bajwa-mirrors-his-rise-in-pak-army/articleshow/77864802.cms
could be the Pelosi Feinstein or Biden families
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India does its own salami slicing (probably first time ever), after the Chief of Defense Staff warned about military options and the Chinese dont like it. According to news reports, the southern side of Pangong Tso is now under Indian control and the Chinese are not liking it. They tried to recapture some heights and were pushed back.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/eastern-ladakh-on-knife-edge-army-foils-fresh-action-by-pla/articleshow/77879958.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/eastern-ladakh-on-knife-edge-army-foils-fresh-action-by-pla/articleshow/77879958.cms)
China has about 2 months to complete its offensive. From Nov onwards it is likely too late as it gets quite cold. The cold starts from the northern Tibetan plains and gradually moves south towards north India. Thus, India can hold on longer and also the spring thaw occurs first in Indian Ladakh and then moves north towards Tibet.
China is under pressure, they need to do something as they lost the heights on the south side of Pangong Tso. This is a dangerous period.
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By: Geopolitical Futures
India and Russia get close.
Several developments this week indicate the current state of Russia-India relations. First, the co-director of the Russian-Indian joint venture BrahMos said the company hopes to develop its hypersonic cruise missile by 2028. He also said that orders for the missile had increased by $1 billion in the past six months, despite the global economic uncertainty produced by the coronavirus pandemic. In addition, India said it planned to increase its purchase of Russian coking coal and anthracite from less than 1 million tons per year to 40 million tons per year (worth about $4.5 billion at current prices). Russia’s total coking coal and anthracite exports amount to 46 million tons, meaning India would be buying nearly all of Russia’s exports. Russia’s Ministry of Energy has asked for state support to help develop the southern terminal at Taman, located between the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, to help deliver the products at cost-effective prices.
Meanwhile, Russia has reportedly expressed interest in having India help produce a vaccine against COVID-19. And it was announced on Monday that India’s foreign minister plans to visit Russia in September ahead of the next Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit and on the eve of the large-scale strategic exercise called Kavkaz-2020, which will be hosted by Russia and attended by India and Pakistan. These developments are all indicators that the two countries are looking to each other for support, and indeed, New Delhi relies on Moscow for energy and collaboration on military matters, but their ties are limited by potential disapproval from both the United States, a key partner for India, and China, a strategic ally for Russia.
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With reference to above..India has indicated it will not attend the Kavkaz-20 exercises, because China and Pak are participating (official reason is due to COVID).
Here's a short Indian news video, about the sigbnificance of the recent action by Indian troops on the border.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1301123775866441728 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1301123775866441728)
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Nice article on what happened at the India -China border a week ago. There has been a paradigm shift in how India will deal with China. For years, India has been defensive wrt to Pak, with airstrikes and surgical strikes, India changed that, Pak has been relatively quiet after that. With respect to China, India has been defensive and reactive for decades. Now that has changed and the Chinese are surprised, looks like they never factored that in.
As I have said before, when going to war Indian soldiers pray to their gods. The Sudarshan Chakra is a weapon wielded by Lord Krishna, who was known only to play the flute. It is difficult to translate...the shloka referred to below, its a poetic form of Sanskrit discussed in the article below.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sudarshana_Chakra#:~:text=The%20name%20of%20the%20disc,Sudarshana%20Chakra%20a%20few%20times.
https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/indian-offensive-retake-chinese-seized-territory-hidden-story (https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news/indian-offensive-retake-chinese-seized-territory-hidden-story)
Indian offensive to retake Chinese seized territory: The hidden story
Danvir Singh
Published : September 6, 2020, 12:19 am | Updated : September 6, 2020, 2:39 PM
New Delhi: On 3 July, the Prime Minister of India arrived at Leh on a surprise visit. Flanked by his Army Chief and the Chief of Defence Staff, he was received by the Army Commander of Northern Command, Lt Gen Y.K. Joshi and the GOC 14 Corps, Lt Gen Harinder Singh. Both of them are responsible for the defence of Ladakh at strategic and operational levels, respectively.
This visit came in the backdrop of the unfortunate incident at Galwan on the night of 14-15 June. The nation was outraged. The death of 20 soldiers sent shockwaves through the country. The situation was really grim. The world was eager to hear Narendra Modi. The nightmarish thought of a repeat of 1962 was on everyone’s mind.
The Dragon appeared to be too aggressive and dangerous. He had moved up and close with 20,000 troops of the 4th Motorized Division and 6th Mechanized Division, equipped with light tanks, rockets and heavy artillery, ready to strike deep. India was caught off guard.
Soon after his arrival at Nimu, Prime Minister Modi was briefed by the Generals on the ground. Lt Gen Harinder Singh briefed him about what action the Chinese army had taken and what they were likely to do next. The Prime Minister listened to his General and somewhere during the course of the briefing he said, “I am not interested in what the Chinese have done and what they will do, I am interested in what you have done and what you will do.” The interjection was set to alter the future course.
He, after being updated, addressed the freshly inducted troops of 17 Corps acclimatizing at Nimu. These were the troops of India’s only mountain strike corps. They were inducted recently to deal with the dual threat from China and Pakistan. The PM’s message was for the world, India’s belligerent neighbour and his mighty military machine.
He quoted a shloka to convey that message. It was heard all across the globe. He said, “A brave-heart protects the motherland with the power of his weapons. This land is for the brave. Our support, strength and resolve for its defence and security are as high as the Himalayas. I can see this ability and resolve in your eyes right now. It is clearly visible on your faces. You are the heroes of the same land that has repulsed the attacks and atrocities of many invaders for thousands of years. This is our identity. We are the people who worship Lord Krishna who plays the flute. We are also the same people who follow Sudarshan Chakradhari Krishna as an ideal. With this inspiration, India has emerged stronger after every attack.”
TIME TO REWRITE HISTORY
This morale boosting massage was signalling India’s strategic intent that ran too deep. More than anyone else, they were the Indian Army Generals who were listening very carefully.
It was time to rewrite history. The unthinkable so far was to be done. It was to be an offensive action of quid pro quo into Chinese-seized territory. The Prime Minister in his address had also said that “the weak cannot initiate peace. Bravery is a precondition to peace.” The Generals were quick to understand the shifting paradigm.
From the initial stages of these border tensions, the Chinese had successfully drawn the Indian troops into various face-offs, spreading in penny packets and minor tactical manoeuvres. Indians were caught in a reactive mode. Indian troops were tied down at a number of places over wide frontages. Stretching from Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in the north to Pangong Lake in the south, this was roughly 300 kilometres in extent. The initiative was completely with the Dragon.
By early July, India had also deployed its troops from the Northern Command reserve. Soon after the Galwan clashes this Division was moved up from Himachal Pradesh, directly into the frontlines in Ladakh, thus beefing up the defences. The holding 14 Corps, however, demanded more and more troops that were ever insufficient—a typical defender’s syndrome where the troops are never enough and there is always a piece of ground left to be occupied.
But this was exactly the way Indian Army was made to behave while dealing with the Chinese, right from the 1950s onward. The debacle of 1962 had forced upon us a strong defensive mindset. India stood psychologically paralysed in the aftermath. The Chinese exploited this state and made transgressions and intrusions with impunity: an annual feature of sorts.
The differing perceptions of the LAC worked to China’s advantage. They would come forward by two steps and retreat by one; thus in five decades we lost hundreds of square kilometres to their salami slicing tactics.
STATIC DEFENCE IS A THING OF THE PAST
However, the Doklam crisis of June 2017 changed all that. The handling of this crisis with alacrity instilled the much-needed confidence into our establishment. The Chinese were dealt with firmly from a position of strength. Indians had pre-empted the PLA’s move by occupying the dominating ridge line and stalling their planned ingress. General Bipin Rawat was the Army Chief at the helm of affairs, and is now India’s first CDS.
Presently, General Manoj Mukund Naravane, Chief of Army Staff, is handling the current crisis. His vast hands-on experience in dealing with the Chinese is a blessing. Offensive plans were drawn under his watch and vetted at the highest levels. The strategy of static defence was an antiquated idea by now.
Concurrently to this planning, defences were bolstered all across the LAC. Additional divisions were mobilised, building upon the existing force levels already deployed right across to the last bend of Arunachal Pradesh.
To deny the Chinese any surprises from air, Indian Air Force was conducting round the clock airspace domination. Indian Army had also carried operational deployment of various strategic assets like the land version of Brahmos cruise missiles by the end of June. All avenues of Chinese ingress, if any, were plugged by now.
The LAC held firmly in strength, the defensive plans over land were all in place, complemented by those at sea and in the air. This seriousness and resolve beckoned India’s intention to defend every inch of her territory.
Indian Navy had also set sail into the deep blue waters of Indian Ocean. Our warships were well poised, threatening the Chinese supply lines passing through the Malaca Strait, just in case the balloon went up. In the Far East, Indian naval warships were also carrying sea manoeuvres alongside the ships of friendly world powers in the disputed waters of South China Sea. Global support had been mobilised in India’s favour.
Earlier in Ladakh, a brigade had been pulled out of the Army Headquarters’ reserve Mountain Division and brought into 14 Corps zone. The great strategic airlift by C-17 Globe Masters of Indian Air Force was executed. These gigantic machines ferried tons weapons, ammunition and logistics alongside the troop build-up throughout May and June.
On 21 May, the first brigade of this reserve arrived in Leh. Initially, they were tasked to augment the existing resources of 14 Corps in holding role. However, the Galwan incident of mid-June changed the dynamics. Since an offensive action was on the table, it was decided to bring in the rest of this Mountain Division. The air lift began soon thereafter and this Division closed in by 20 June, now armed with fresh operational mandate.
The 17 Corps, India’s sole strike corps, was fully acclimatized and prepared for any eventuality, though not to be committed at this early stage. However, the GOC 17 Corps, Lt General Sawneet Singh was given an additional task: to exercise operational control of this newly inducted crack Mountain Division. Trained to infiltrate and strike deep behind enemy lines. They were capable of turning the enemy’s defences.
By now, the reserve Division of Northern Command was also deployed, beefing up the entire defences along the LAC in Ladakh. Deployments were from the Depsang plains to the occupying heights around Galwan, providing depth to the Shyok-Dubruk-DBO road and strengthening the Dungti-Demchok corridor.
The military to military negotiations continued. A number of rounds were conducted, with each talk lasting for hours. The efforts were to amicably resolve the dispute through talks. Unfortunately, all these talks failed to make any substantial headway. In the meanwhile, our plans for a quid pro quo were in place with multiple options.
OVER OPTIMISTIC CHINA
The haplessness of the Indian establishment was also clearly manifesting with each failed talk. This in turn made the Chinese over-optimistic of their strategy. Their grand plan appeared to be to hold fast and not relent to the Indian demand of pre-April positions. The idea seemed to be to exhaust the Indian Army through the winter deployments. The huge economic cost of prolonged military mobilization was likely to prove unsustainable for a de-growing economy in these Covid times. Thus China would win this war without firing a single shot.
On our side, amongst other challenges, there was strong unhappiness in the rank and file of the Indian Army. They were unhappy in the manner they were used at Pangong and Galwan, fighting the PLA with sticks and stones.
This failed strategy had led to the death of 20 soldiers, with an equal or a greater number of casualties on the other side. The scenes of soldiers throwing stones and using clubs to defend themselves had brought a lot of embarrassment to the professional Army. It was now the time to test our tactical acumen and flex our muscles.
OFFENSIVE PLANS
In early August, this newly inducted Mountain Division was fully acclimatized. They had started to carry out reconnaissance and validate their offensive plans. These plans were so secret that even the holding formation troops were unaware of what was going on. Options were carefully drawn and diligently vetted.
By 24 August, one plan was finally given the go ahead. Simultaneously, the Chief of Defence Staff, General Bipin Rawat also cautioned the nation to stay prepared for any eventuality, even if that meant war.
At ground zero, the company commanders and platoon commanders of this elite mountain division had by now selected their routes of infiltration, identified tactical heights to be occupied and timed their paces for speedy retaking.
From the word go, the final phase of the retaking was planned to be completed in 120 minutes flat. Artillery was put in place, ready to support the infiltrating troops should the need arose. Armoured elements were well poised, ready to out-manoeuvre and destroy any PLA attempt, if they thrust into the Chushul valley. Air defence troops were also deployed with shoulder fired anti-aircraft Igla missiles, networked and coordinated to shoot down any Chinese aircraft interfering with our advancing troops.
The Chinese on their side had their mechanized Combat Team located in Spangur near Moldo. They had 33-ton T15 light tanks designed to fight a battle in this high-altitude region.
GEARED FOR ACTION
The Indian troops were fully geared for action, all ends tied, contingencies catered for and rehearsed. We were ready to strike. The objective was Spangur Bowl, an area south of Pangong and east of Chushul.
The features dominating the Spangur gap provided great tactical dominance and huge strategic advantages. Black Top, Helmet, Magar and Gurung Hills stretching right up to Rezang La were these features. Under the cover of darkness, Indian infiltrating troops moved up to the LAC, established their release points and waited for the green signal. Some troops mounted on high mobility vehicles and drove straight up to the objective—the 3 km ridgeline on the hill alongside Requin.
At the word go, these troops crossed over into the enemy claimed territory with lightning speed. The mountain division of Tibetan troops of the Special Frontier Force occupied the hill features, beating their own planned timings well under 120 minutes.
Before the break of dawn, one complete infantry brigade with over 2,000 troops was holding the heights overlooking the Spangur Bowl. Armed with French Milan anti-tank missiles and Carl Gustav rocket launchers, the Indians had literally rendered the Chinese armoured tanks at Moldo redundant and out manoeuvred. On 31August, the garrison at Moldo was virtually under siege.
Surprised and shocked, the Chinese mustered their club wielding troops and advanced towards the positions now held by the Indians. More shock was in wait. The Indians troops warned the advancing troops, but the PLA men continued with their advance. The Indians had to fire a few warning shots in the air, and this brought in new realities to the fore. The Chinese, on seeing the aggressive posture, fled, only to return a little later.
This time they came with their armoured personnel carriers, driving on their cemented road from Moldo to Rezang La. But this advance also came to a halt and was followed by a hasty retreat. The Indian troops were at a stone’s throw from the Moldo garrison, dominating each and every move of the PLA. The sight of anti-tank missiles and rocket launchers had deterred the move of the Chinese armoured personnel carrier and halted them in their tracks.
The Chinese had realised by now that they were not only outnumbered but totally out-flanked, making their position untenable. Any armed clash hereafter would prove suicidal. The annihilation of Moldo garrison was assured for the Chinese had clashes erupted. The Indians by now were firmly dug in.
The way of doing business on the borders with China has undergone a paradigm shift. In the past five decades this was the first ever offensive operation carried out against the Chinese. The initiative is now with India; the shoe is on the other foot. Having enhanced India’s negotiating power manifold, the unthinkable so far is now a new reality.
Col Danvir Singh (R) is an Associate Editor with Indian Defence Review. He commanded 9 Sikh LI and served as a Company Commander in Chushul Garrison in 2004-2005.
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Breaking norms in the Himalayas. On Monday night, the Chinese military accused Indian troops of crossing the so-called Line of Actual Control, the vaguely defined de facto border in parts of the Himalayas disputed between India and China. China also accused Indian troops of firing warning shots near the hotly contested Pangong Lake in eastern Ladakh. India on Tuesday made counteraccusations, saying it was Chinese troops who ventured across the Line of Actual Control and fired warning shots in an effort to intimidate their Indian counterparts. Tit-for-tat transgressions and low-level standoffs are nothing new in the theater, but if someone did indeed fire warning shots, it would mark the first shots fired in the area in more than two decades.
The informal ban on the use of any firearms, much less heavy weaponry, has helped keep a lid on escalation in the Himalayas for years. If the ban is scrapped, deadly incidents will be more likely, making it more difficult politically for either side to back down – even if geographic constraints continue to make another large-scale conflict in the high Himalayas nearly impossible. This comes less than a week after the Indian and Chinese defense ministers met in Moscow and ostensibly agreed to defuse tensions along the Line of Actual Control
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[Moved here.] Strange bedfellows, Islamic extremists and a country that imprisons and worse a million Muslims in their country.
[https://nypost.com/2020/08/27/china-secretly-built-hundreds-of-prison-camps-to-hold-minority-muslims/?_ga=2.144715060.1044975406.1599602349-2137530746.1593048396]
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https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Belt-and-Road/Reunified-Pakistani-Taliban-threatens-China-s-Belt-and-Road
BELT AND ROAD
Reunified Pakistani Taliban threatens China's Belt and Road
Factions regroup under an al-Qaeda umbrella with foothold near Xinjiang
September 8, 2020 15:04 JST
PESHAWAR, Pakistan -- As peace negotiations between the Afghan Taliban and the government in Kabul continue, Pakistan's leading Taliban group, which operates from Afghanistan, has announced the reunification of various breakaway factions.
Analysts believe this will cause internal security problems for Pakistan and also raise threats to projects linked to China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in the country's northwest.
"In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province's various remote areas, several Chinese development projects, mainly in the field of hydro-electricity generation and infrastructure, are going on," an Islamabad-based security official told the Nikkei Asian Review on condition of anonymity. "The Pakistan Taliban's recent reunification has increased concerns about the safety of Chinese nationals and projects."
The Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, the Hizb ul-Ahrar, and Hakeemullah Mehsud group were the three major factions in the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) until they splintered in 2014 over leadership issues. Last month, it was announced they were all getting back together, and also being joined by a faction of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, a banned sectarian group that operates in the western province of Balochistan.
As a strong ally of al-Qaeda, the TTP became an umbrella organization for militant groups after its formation in December 2007 and has been involved in numerous terror attacks.
Pakistani Taliban fighters arrested by Afghan border police were paraded before the media with their weapons in Kabul in January 2016. © Reuters
The TTP started out in Pakistan's northwestern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and in semi-autonomous tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. The terror group later expanded into other parts of the country, but was countered by a massive military operation launched in June 2014. The offensive shattered the TTP's command and control structure in tribal areas and forced the group to take sanctuary over the border in Afghanistan.
The rapidity of the TTP's reunification has surprised many. Analysts believe the various TTP splinters recognized that they would no longer be viable alone in a changing Afghanistan. In order to meet its peace talk commitment to stop harboring foreign militants, the Afghan Taliban would no longer be able to shelter the TTP.
"The self-realization of the threats for its survival in the changing political landscape of Afghanistan, and then possible pressures from the Afghan Taliban, could have played a more significant role behind this process of reunification," said Abdul Sayed, a Sweden-based researcher on Jihadi groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, told Nikkei.
The TTP reunification has alarmed China, which was already pressing Pakistan to crack down on ethnic separatist groups in Balochistan and Sindh provinces because of projects linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a prominent BRI component.
In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Chinese companies are working on several energy and infrastructure projects, including the Karakoram Highway Phase II. The Suki Kinari Hydropower Station and the Havelian Dry Port lie along the highway, which ends at the Khunjerab Pass in Gilgit-Baltistan. Over the border, it becomes China National Highway 314 leading to Urumqi, capital of the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
Old Taliban threat rekindled -- Pakistani policemen carry the flag-draped coffin in 2011 of a colleague killed by a suicide bomber past their headquarters in Peshawar. © Reuters
Increased militancy along the highway could jeopardize a key BRI link. Anti-China rhetoric has already increased immensely in TTP and al-Qaeda media. Among Baloch and Sindhi separatist groups, CPEC projects are already propaganda targets -- foreign intrusions that remind some analysts of the British East India Company's efforts in the 1850s.
"The TTP often issues detailed statements against the China state, condemning the situation faced by Chinese Muslims in their own country," said Sayed. "More importantly, targeting CPEC projects can create severe economic problems for the Pakistani state -- destabilizing it is the ultimate goal of TTP and its allied anti-state Jihadists."
In 2013 at China's request, Pakistani authorities outlawed three transitional militant groups linked to al-Qaeda -- the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and the Islamic Jihad Union. The Chinese believed they had established sanctuaries in Pakistan's tribal areas with the help of the TTP.
Although China was initially less of a concern for the TTP than U.S. and Pakistani security forces, analysts believe that some transnational actors operating in Pakistan's tribal areas have encouraged the Pakistani Taliban to target Chinese projects as retaliation for the mistreatment of Muslims in Xinjiang province by Chinese security personnel.
An ethnic Uighur woman walks in the main square of Kashgar in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. China's treatment of the Muslim minority has seriously riled the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. © Reuters
In a 2014 video message titled "Let's disturb China," Mufti Abu Zar al-Burmi, an influential al-Qaeda ideologue who is a Pakistani national of Rohingya descent, described the pullout of U.S. forces from Afghanistan as "a victory for the Taliban movement in the region." He said China would be the next target, and directed all Jihadi groups, including TTP, to carry out attacks on Chinese embassies and companies, and to kidnap or kill Chinese nationals.
The TTP has already killed and kidnapped a number of Chinese, mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces. With the TTP reunification, Pakistan security personnel have been beefing up numbers and intelligence to protect Chinese present in the region, according to security officials.
"The TTP's reunification can pose a threat in some districts of Punjab, Balochistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa as the terror group has networks in these areas," Muhamamd Amir Rana, director of the Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), an Islamabad-based think tank, told Nikkei.
In 2019, the TTP and its splinter groups were the main causes of instability, carrying out 97 terrorist attacks, mainly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Punjab and Balochistan that killed 209 people, according to a PIPS report.
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Breaking norms in the Himalayas. On Monday night, the Chinese military accused Indian troops of crossing the so-called Line of Actual Control, the vaguely defined de facto border in parts of the Himalayas disputed between India and China. China also accused Indian troops of firing warning shots near the hotly contested Pangong Lake in eastern Ladakh. India on Tuesday made counteraccusations, saying it was Chinese troops who ventured across the Line of Actual Control and fired warning shots in an effort to intimidate their Indian counterparts. Tit-for-tat transgressions and low-level standoffs are nothing new in the theater, but if someone did indeed fire warning shots, it would mark the first shots fired in the area in more than two decades.
The informal ban on the use of any firearms, much less heavy weaponry, has helped keep a lid on escalation in the Himalayas for years. If the ban is scrapped, deadly incidents will be more likely, making it more difficult politically for either side to back down – even if geographic constraints continue to make another large-scale conflict in the high Himalayas nearly impossible. This comes less than a week after the Indian and Chinese defense ministers met in Moscow and ostensibly agreed to defuse tensions along the Line of Actual Control
It would be the first time in 4.5 decades not 2 decades. Things continue to slide downhill. Pictures on the web of Chinese soldiers from yesterday spotted with hand made weapons. There is a Foreign Minister meeting in the next few days, which may be the last chance to resolve the crisis. The defense minister meeting was not fruitful, same the commander level meetings. Dont think Xi or Modi are planning to talk anytime soon. What is interesting that China has not provided any maps as to where the LAC may lie and the LAC remains undefined. So how do they know who crossed the LAC ?.
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China has progressed from barbed wires on sticks to guandaos.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EhZFVw6VkAEkxYj?format=jpg&name=medium)
(https://static.turbosquid.com/Preview/000331/708/FL/guan-dao-kwan-3d-model_DHQ.jpg)
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China's Baghdad Bob threatening India..YA
Outside forces are misreading China's desire for peace
By Hu Xijin Source: Global Times Published: 2020/9/8 22:18:40
People familiar with the frontline situation along the China-India border told me that the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has a firm control over the overall situation, and that in the event of a war, no matter how it is fought, the PLA will have the absolute certainty of defeating the Indian army. China will not lose an inch of territory along the China-India border. Chinese people can be rest assured.
Recent events have shown that China's overall deterrence has not been big enough to deter Indian troops from taking risks. The Indian side is still taking chances, misjudging and underestimating China's will to never compromise on the territorial issue. The Indian side always believes that China does not dare, will not or cannot go to war with the Indian side. Perhaps the fundamental reason is that China has not fought a war for more than 30 years and is committed to peaceful development. Some outside forces question our willingness to fight if necessary, arguing that we will compromise beyond the bottom line in order to ensure development.
Since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, China's several foreign wars were all the result of the other side's miscalculation and underestimation of China's determination to fight. Before the 1962 war, India had no fear, encroaching on China's territory and challenging the PLA, and eventually India paid a heavy price. The situation today is very close to that before the outbreak of the 1962 war. As far as I know, the frontline situation is quite tense and there is a serious possibility of direct exchange of fire between the two sides.
I have close contact with the Chinese military and I am also a former soldier, I must warn the Indian side that the PLA does not fire the first shot, but if the Indian army fires the first shot at the PLA, the consequence must be the annihilation of the Indian army on the spot. If Indian troops dare to escalate the conflict, more Indian troops will be wiped out. The Indian army, which lost 20 soldiers in a physical clash (many of them froze to death after being injured in group fights), is no match for the PLA. Yes, we have some contempt for the combat capability of the Indian army.
China really wants peaceful development, so we haven't been a war with other countries for more than 30 years, and now we find that some outside forces are misreading China's desire for peace as weakness. Many Chinese are regretfully thinking that perhaps peaceful development is not the destiny of China as a great power, and probably fighting a war to demonstrate China's determination that it "dares to fight" is the price China has to pay. I want to warn New Delhi, it should be responsible for its actions, not to force China to demonstrate its strong will by striking provocative Indian troops who repeatedly crossed the LAC.
China's policy toward India is backed by strength and if ordinary people are not afraid of Indian provocateurs, how could the PLA be intimidated by them? How can the country be weak in dealing with India? Everyone must believe that China has an upper hand over India. We have all kinds of initiatives in our hands and we will not allow India to take advantage of China, no matter it is negotiation or fighting a war.
The author is editor-in-chief of the Global Times. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn
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Another Border Clash Heightens China-India Tensions
3 MINS READ
Sep 9, 2020 | 19:16 GMT
HIGHLIGHTS
Renewed altercations between Chinese and Indian forces in the disputed region of Ladakh reflect a growing risk of military escalation as China's growing presence along the two countries' border prompts India to more assertively defend its claimed territory. China and India have accused each other of firing shots during a Sept. 7 incident south of Pangong Lake, marking the first official claims of small arms fire on the border since 1975. While the situation in Ladakh had calmed down after the deadly June 15 melee in Galwan Valley, a resurgence of tensions is now occurring in a separate area of the disputed territory. Since Aug. 29, Chinese forces have allegedly been trying to cross into Indian controlled territory in the mountainous area between Pangong and Spanggur Lakes. India reportedly deployed troops to block these Chinese incursion attempts in several separate incidents. ...
Renewed altercations between Chinese and Indian forces in the disputed region of Ladakh reflect a growing risk of military escalation as China's growing presence along the two countries' border prompts India to more assertively defend its claimed territory. China and India have accused each other of firing shots during a Sept. 7 incident south of Pangong Lake, marking the first official claims of small arms fire on the border since 1975. While the situation in Ladakh had calmed down after the deadly June 15 melee in Galwan Valley, a resurgence of tensions is now occurring in a separate area of the disputed territory. Since Aug. 29, Chinese forces have allegedly been trying to cross into Indian controlled territory in the mountainous area between Pangong and Spanggur Lakes. India reportedly deployed troops to block these Chinese incursion attempts in several separate incidents.
India's recent move to grant commanders on the border with greater freedom to respond to Chinese threats has significantly raised the risk for localized violence that could escalate beyond New Delhi's strategic intent. India's rules of engagement previously restricted the use of firearms or explosives in this disputed area, which had limited the potential for escalation into broader violence during past incidents. After the bloody border clash with Chinese forces in June, however, the Indian army provided frontline commanders with complete freedom of action to respond to Chinese incursions as they saw fit. The impact of the rule change was not immediately apparent, as both Indian and Chinese moved to de-escalate their tensions in the weeks following the Galwan Valley incident. But the new reports of the use of firearms by Indian forces and deployments of Indian tanks near the Line of Actual Control, as well as even unconfirmed claims of anti-personnel mines being used. These developments demonstrate how India's new delegation of command authority has changed the dynamics for escalation along the Chinese border.
China, meanwhile, has shown little appetite for diplomatic engagement with India and has instead broadcasted its intent to remain on the path of escalation by continuing to expand its military infrastructure along the border. Efforts to hold high-level political negotiations over the Ladakh crisis have so far failed, including Russia's attempt to bring Chinese and Indian government officials together during BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization summits Russia hosted just last week. Without a committed push for a peaceful resolution, China's ongoing efforts to build up its air bases, air defenses and other military facilities along its border with India can only be read as an attempt to continue to aggressively pursue Beijing's disputed territorial claims with New Delhi over the longer term. India has struggled to provide an answer to this mounting challenge, but it is now taking more decisive action within the border region itself through a more assertive military posture. But as evidenced by the recent claims of exchanged gunfire, such moves come with an added risk of spurring an actual military confrontation with China.
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China is caught in a bind, for decades they could just walk-in anywhere and occupy territory. This time there has been pushback. Not only that, India has occupied the dominant heights on the South side of Pangong lake. The Northern shore of the lake (Fingers 4-8) which had been occupied by China, has also had what the Indian army calls "readjustments". The Indian army now occupies higher ground than the Chinese in the fingers region. As a result, China has had to withdraw from Finger 4.
The foreign minister talks yesterday seem to not have made any progress. There are reports that the crisis is now being managed from Beijing by CCP with little operational authority to local commanders. Overall, Xi is damned if he attacks and damned if he does not!. India it seems has decided to not fire the first bullet, but is prepared for war, should the Chinese initiate it.
In a short to medium term war, India has the upper hand. In a long drawn out war China has the edge because of their greater MIC and industrial strength. Chinese have tried to reoccupy some heights but have been pushed back. The Chinese soldiers have a few choices, attack India and die immediately or go back to re-education camps and die slowly.
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https://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelpeck/2020/09/09/china-is-arming-its-soldiers-with-medieval-halberds-to-fight-india/#6734ebb25180
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Indian military has changed SOP's, medieval weapons will be responded to with bullets. Its all psyops.
There are plenty of reports of Chinese soldiers living in oxygen supported tents, food supplied by delivery drones just an app click away. All of this makes the chinese soldiers a weakling army of 19 year old conscripts. As long as men and not equipment wins wars, China will lose.
https://youtu.be/34L8ttiuSeg (https://youtu.be/34L8ttiuSeg)
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Nice article on what India did a few weeks ago. Now all the commanding heights are in Indian hands. China will take heavy casualties if they want them back.
China has their CPC meeting next year. Xi needs to show some wins, now that the whole world is angry with China for their virus. China has 3 regions to show case domination, India border, S.China sea or Taiwan. Looks like action in the S.China sea against some small country might be the only winnable option.
https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20200921-border-brinkmanship-1720877-2020-09-12 (https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/the-big-story/story/20200921-border-brinkmanship-1720877-2020-09-12)
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Bhutan is another neighbor that China wants to gobble up. Last time India saved their territory at Doklam. Not sure how much longer they can survive without merging into India..like Sikkim, which is now part of Indian states.
https://www.news18.com/news/india/amid-border-row-with-india-china-now-readies-new-expansion-plan-this-time-it-is-bhutan-2873683.html (https://www.news18.com/news/india/amid-border-row-with-india-china-now-readies-new-expansion-plan-this-time-it-is-bhutan-2873683.html)
Amid Border Row with India, China Now Readies New Expansion Plan. This Time it is Bhutan
The PLA has intruded into five areas of western Bhutan and laid claim to a new boundary extending about 40 km inside Bhutan, to the east of Chumbi Valley, diplomats based in Thimpu and New Delhi said.
NEWS18.COM NEW DELHI
LAST UPDATED: SEPTEMBER 13, 2020, 10:50 PM IST
Ahead of the 25th round of boundary talks between China and Bhutan, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is set to open a front against the Kingdom with a build-up in its western and central parts to settle the border on terms favourable to Beijing, people in the know told the Hindustan Times.
In the forthcoming negotiations, China may use transgressions and encroachments in central Bhutan by the PLA for a trade-off on already encroached areas and the Kingdom's western part, the people said. However, Bhutan has been sensitised about the PLA threat at the highest levels, they added.
India and China recently reached a five-point consensus to resolve the four-month-long military standoff in eastern Ladakh, agreeing to "quickly disengage" troops, avoid any action that could escalate tensions and take steps to restore peace along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
However, as Bhutan lies next to the Siliguri corridor, any territorial compromise by Thimpu would have an adverse effect on India's defences in the area, the report states.
In 2017, India had assisted Bhutan in holding its own against the PLA during stand-off at Doklam which lasted for 73 days. But people from India’s military, diplomatic and security establishment told HT on condition of anonymity that the PLA had not stopped testing the Indian and Bhutanese armies in the area.
Beijing's territorial claims in Bhutan include 318 sq km in the western sector and 495 sq km in the central sector. The PLA continues to build roads and construct military infrastructure to intimidate the Bhutanese Army by ways of aggressive patrolling and denial of access, the people said.
The PLA has intruded into five areas of western Bhutan and laid claim to a new boundary extending about 40 km inside Bhutan, to the east of Chumbi Valley, diplomats based in Thimpu and New Delhi said.
PLA patrols crossed the main stream of Torsa nullah (Dolong Chu) into south Doklam and asked Bhutanese herders (who were grazing their livestock) to vacate the area near Raja Rani lake on August 13 and 24, the report mentions.
Through these moves, the Chinese Army wants India and Bhutan to agree that the country's boundary extends to Gyemochen on Jhampheri ridge rather than on the Sinche la -Batang La axis, the true alignment of the trijunction. This is what Indian Army had stopped the PLA from doing in 2017.
National Security planners said PLA had increased surveillance in north Doklam by installing surveillance cameras. It continues "aggressive military technical upgradation" on the Chinese side of the contested plateau, they said.
Bhutan has asked its Army to prepare for a reaction plan by deploying additional troops to prevent PLA from coming south of Torsa nullah or unilaterally alter the disengagement lines which Beijing agreed to in Doklam in 2017.
China had also raised an objection against Bhutan's Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary (SWS) Project in June, on the contention that it was located in a disputed border area. The 750 sq km sanctuary is located in the eastern Trashigang Dzongkhag of Bhutan, and borders India and China. India may become part of this contest as the Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary abuts Arunachal Pradesh, which Beijing claims as its territory.
This new claim by China was a surprise for Thimpu as Beijing had never before claimed any land in Eastern Bhutan, analysts said. China had not even mentioned the area in the 36 years of diplomatic talks with Bhutan to resolve their boundary disputes.
Thimpu has rejected the claim and conveyed that Sakteng Wildlife Sanctuary is 'not disputed' and is a sovereign territory of Bhutan. However, China's Foreign Ministry has made an official declaration stating that “the boundary between China and Bhutan has never been delimited. There have been disputes over the eastern, central and western sectors for a long time”.
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https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/battle-chinas-hands-1502923854.html (https://www.thestatesman.com/opinion/battle-chinas-hands-1502923854.html)
A battle on China’s hands
HARSHA KAKAR | New Delhi | September 15, 2020 7:40 am
After India occupied dominating features along the Line of Actual Control, China resorted to intense propaganda warfare, threatening India with war. The levels of propaganda kept rising with each passing day. The Global Times, accused India of initiating firing and said on 8 September, “the Indian army outrageously fired warning shots at Chinese border defence patrol personnel who were attempting to negotiate, which is a serious military provocation and very vile in nature.”
Colonel Zhang Shuili, spokesperson for the Western Theatre Command of the PLA stated, “We request the Indian side to immediately stop dangerous actions, immediately withdraw cross-line personnel, strictly restrain front-line troops, and strictly investigate and punish personnel who fired shots.” This Chinese statement was released at 3 am, China time, displaying it was a desperate move and fake.
The Indian army refuted Chinese claims, stating, “In the instant case, it was China’s PLA troops who were attempting to close-in with one of our forward positions along the LAC and when dissuaded by own troops, PLA troops fired a few rounds in the air in an attempt to intimidate own troops.” The game of claims and counter claims has just begun. Since India’s offensive actions, CCP controlled Chinese media has been on an overdrive warning India of dire consequences.
Most Chinese media compared the current scenario with 1962. The Global Times stated on 8 September, “China claimed victory in the 1962 war, which should be a lesson for India. Moreover, the military capability of the PLA is not what it used to be decades ago. Now, the PLA is a modern one with information capability, systematic combat capability and joint combat capability.” Another article on the same day stated, “the PLA does not fire the first shot, but if the Indian army fires the first shot at the PLA, the consequence must be the annihilation of the Indian army on the spot. If Indian troops dare to escalate the conflict, more Indian troops will be wiped out.”
These comments appeared on social media seeking to influence the Indian public, opposition politicians and peaceniks, hoping for pressure on the government to scale back and withdraw from locations which have placed Chinese positions under threat. Currently, the only option open to China is launching assaults leading to high cost of Chinese lives.
There are many aspects which Chinese media will never mention as it would prove their propaganda fake. In 1962, Indian forces, lacking ammunition, winter clothing, artillery and air support, fought in isolated posts till the last man and last round, causing such high casualties that the Chinese were shocked and in cases had no resources to push operations ahead. These shortcomings no longer exist.
China will never mention the September 1967 Nathu La and Cho La clashes, where it suffered heavy casualties and was forced to withdraw in defeat. Nor will they declare their high casualties at Galwan, despite internal pressure, which would be embarrassing. Nor will China mention the valour and experience of Indian forces assaulting dizzying heights of Kargil and Siachen successfully.
Another fact which the CCP-controlled Chinese media will hide is that Chinese Han soldiers are at a major disadvantage in Ladakh. Sixty per cent of the Chinese army consists of conscripts recruited for a limited tenure from rural China. They join to gain benefits in future employment, not for fighting wars. These soldiers can never survive the winters of Tibet and Ladakh. Historically, the PLA sends Chinese soldiers back to mainland China from November to April every year, leaving only locally recruited Border Defence Regiments and militia to patrol the LAC.
Expecting Han Chinese soldiers to stay back and survive winters, challenging a hardened Indian army, for whom such tenures are routine is almost impossible. It is for this reason that China is not desirous of dragging the current standoff into the winter. India, on the other hand is in no rush to end the standoff, unless it concludes on its own terms. It has already begun preparing for a long haul.
Another factor is that in 1962, the PLA could accept casualties, as the nation was still to push through the one-child norm, which commenced in 1979. Nor were there multiple media networks where casualty figures were demanded. The scenario is vastly different today. Each Chinese soldier, if a bachelor, has six adults, parents and grandparents, who have pampered him and would be devastated by his loss. If married, dependents only increase. Hence, China cannot accept body bags in the manner they did in the 1960s. Despite all technology and high-end weapons, common to both sides, ultimately their soldiers would need to assault Indian defences. Further, China last fought a war with Vietnam in 1979, where it was forced to withdraw in shame.
Expecting soft, inexperienced and family-dependent troops to assault a voluntary army, comprising of battle hardened, trained soldiers is asking for the moon. Releasing Kargil and Siachen videos, as part of counter-propaganda warfare, would make the Chinese realise what the current Indian army is made of. Chinese propaganda videos of exercise firing would pale in comparison to the accurate Indian firing during the Kargil war against the heights occupied by Pakistani troops.
The major problem in the ongoing propaganda game is that global social media sites are banned in China and their own are difficult to penetrate. Obtaining a gateway into these sites and pushing forth Indian forces’ capability could impact morale of Chinese public and forces, which are currently being fed one-sided inputs. This avenue must be explored and exploited.
Within India, many are influenced by writings in Chinese statecontrolled media, which project topics determined by their CCP. On the other hand, India has no formal organisation to counter propaganda projected by the Chinese. Unless this is done, Indians would never realise the truth and continue being influenced.
The Indian army, which has encountered Chinese soldiers through the years is aware of the soft Chinese soldier and hence is prepared to maintain its presence in difficult terrain through winters. The army also knows its capabilities and ability of its forces to withstand Chinese assaults.
The writer is a retired Major-General of the Indian Army.
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Gordon Chang ...Chinese army has flopped, what China will do next.
https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-army-flops-india-what-will-xi-do-next-opinion-1531170?amp=1 (https://www.newsweek.com/chinese-army-flops-india-what-will-xi-do-next-opinion-1531170?amp=1)
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An important read, see link if you want to see maps.https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/09/sino-indian-logjam-facts-risks-options.html?m=1 (https://www.gunnersshot.com/2020/09/sino-indian-logjam-facts-risks-options.html?m=1)
SINO INDIAN LOGJAM : FACTS, RISKS, OPTIONS AND THE SUM OF ALL FEARS By Lt Gen P R Shankar (R)
Battle Indicators.‘ Global Times’ videos indicate that PLA is rehearsing for an offensive. Air Defence drills around Lhasa. Fibre optic cables being laid in Spangur. Early battle indicators. The real indicator will be dumping Artillery ammunition and build up. When that happens - real business is afoot. Till then relax or chew your nails. Notwithstanding, since the Chinese are chafing to teach us a lesson. So what is in the offing?
Hardening Defences. Indian Infantry has dug in at the heights since two weeks. The defences are hardening and getting coordinated. It means overhead protection, stocking and obstacle laying. A defensive fire plan is evolving with IAF, Artillery, Tanks and Infantry Mortars in the mix. Selected and surveyed targets would be Chinese assembly areas, routes of ingress, forming up places(FUP) for assault, enemy gun areas, hqs and more. Suffice to say that the Chinese will get a hell of a whack. The Chinese have focussed on mechanisation by rote. That is contained in their White Paper as a doctrine. They did not realise that High Altitude warfare is vastly different. Why? Simple. Difference between political and professional armies. I hope that ‘Global Times’ editor is around to photograph hilarious Chinese sergeant majors blowing whistles and trumpets to commence ferocious attacks. His story will be different now – how drones used for food are being multitasked for body bag delivery. Everyone says that China will attack and teach India a lesson. Good. Let’s do some honest analysis.
Isolation Reinforced. After Wang Yi’s visit to EU states, Germany has opted on the side of democracies in the Indo Pacific region. That was inevitable. Indonesia refused to provide any bases for the Chinese. They are now objecting to Chinese transgressions in the Natuna Seas. The spat with Australia is worsening. India and Japan have signed a defence pact. The Taiwanese have warned that any more violation of their airspace will invite retaliatory action. There are reports which say that a Sino-US armed conflict is getting more real. China is more isolated than ever. Internally , Inner Mongolia continues to fester. Tibet is getting revived. Xinjiang issue is on the verge of revival. India can help both along. Hong Kong is not out of the news. The right time to ramp up the conflict with another Nuclear Power? Great Chinese strategic thinking.
Lebensraum and Persecuted Victimhood. Before Nazi offensives and pogroms, Hitler sold the ‘Lebensraum Dream’ and the ‘Persecuted Victimhood Complex’ to Germany. Something similar is happening in China. Initially Xi Jinping sold the ‘China Dream’, pronounced a period of great strategic opportunity and started building the greatest military on earth. He brainwashed Chinese that the CCP way was the best during the Wuhan Virus crisis. Pogroms against the Uighurs are well documented. He has spoken of solidifying Tibet security and communising religion. Wayward Hong Kongers are brought in line. He pronounces that China will follow the Communist economic model come what may. He popularises himself with people by visiting them during floods. He is invoking people to overcome hardships due to denial of technologies - imported seeds for agriculture, critical components in manufacturing, dependence on oil imports, distribution of water resources and pharmaceuticals and medical equipment for an ageing population. The position of the CCP inside China is being constantly consolidated. The emerging picture - ‘Persecuted Victimhood Complex’ of China being denied and pushed into a corner by a disintegrating and inimically jealous world. External picture. China is ordained to rule the world. Only China can win - at any cost. Every one falls in line. Political, economic, diplomatic or military coercion works, always and every time. China will expand based on some mythological irredentism. ‘Aggressive Lebensraum’. The world, ravaged by the Virus from China is being herded into a corner to establish Chinese supremacy. Everything is Xi centric to rule the world. A bipolarity is emerging. Internal portrayal of being unfairly cornered and an external reality of coercively cornering everyone. Such a diabolic schism was last seen in Hitler’s Germany. Nitin Gokhale was right. The transformation to Xitler is complete. We should know who we are dealing with. “The Man Who Would Be King” not by Rudyard Kipling!
Xitlerian Concept. In the Xitlerian concept, India has no right to defend itself. It must subjugate itself to the lord and emperor of the great Chinese people. If not, be prepared for punishment. The great PLA will defend every inch of Chinese territory recently usurped from India by attacking and punishing India for India asking vacation of its territory. The Idea is to take what it wants. Force an unequal peace. Afterall, China is the greatest. Are there risks and options in this new one sided game?
Risks. There are four risks in this attempt to teach India a lesson. Firstly. With the available troops India cannot be taught a lesson. The fight will be long, hard and bloody. Everything will be at a cost. That cost will be collected by USA in the South China Sea who will not miss the opportunity. A firefight starts there. Taiwan could declare Independence. End of superpower China. Secondly, after the bloody battle, even if India is defeated, the long guerrilla campaign will start. Tibet and Xinjiang will be in flames. Srinagar Valley is only 15948 sq km. Tibet is 1.22 million sq km and Xinjiang is 1.6 million sq km. See the difference? China, of the nose bloodied, will have to commit a lot more of PLA to handle the situation on a real long term basis. Its entire global plans go for a toss. Thirdly, there are very good chances that China will be taught a lesson. In fact I am sure of it. If they start a shooting match and India finishes it, the next stop could be Rudok. That will automatically put Tibet and Xinjiang on flame. Fourthly. What happens if China cannot force victory? The saga of defeat continues. Pakistan has the best Army never to have won a war. China will compete for that honour with its rusty iron brother. Whichever way it goes, China’s dream will evaporate. Guaranteed. Risk a war? Go ahead China. BTW. When does the Nuclear factor kick in?
Options. China is reinforcing Eastern Ladakh with additional troops. The area can hold that many troops only. Any further increase will diminish returns. Secondly, mountains are good for defenders. It is difficult to dislodge entrenched defenders unless there are repeated headlong attacks. China has to also decide where to attack. North of Pangong Tso or South of it. (see picture) North of Pangong Tso offers some scope for employment of armour in the Depsang Plains. However it is a shooting match without manoeuvre space. There is a fair bit of mountainous area North of Pangong Tso also. India can play some tricks, infiltrate and reverse the situation. While it may be feasible to get hold of some territory there is a good chance of losing it too for the Chinese. The key to the whole affair will be the Chusul Gateway , South of Pangong Tso. Can China dislodge us from the strategically important Kailash Range? In an area devoid of cover and a single avenue of approach the attacker is exposed (see picture – 3d view of area beyond Spangur). Headbutting will be very costly. Results will be minimal. Of course, China can expand into other sectors further South. In which case its commitment and imbalance will expand. It will slowly be sucked in and stretched to a point when a counter offensive will happen. Where? Has to be decided between USA and India. The short point is that China is already in a trap of its own making. So far China has used Sun Tsu’s maxim of winning wars without fighting. This is one war they will have to fight to win but will lose. Want to be a superpower? Bleed a little on the battlefield.
Own Option. What should we do? Hold tight. Till winter sets in maintain a low profile. Stay vigilant. Do not get complacent. The enemy is desperate. Do some talking. Stall for time. Play the Chinese game. Two steps forward and no step back - on ground. Once winter sets in, start harassing the Chinese in the rear and spook them in the front. Imbalances and opportunities will surface. It is the first high altitude winter for his mainline force. He will suffer environmental casualties. His morale will be low. his troops will suffer disorientation. Rub it in. Incremental actions to attain tactical and strategic significance or opening up offensive options will be of great value. Create small criticalities. Change 'Status quo' in baby steps. No Hurry. Patience. Vigilance. Go for the kill. A discredited PLA will do greater damage to China. 'Soft' frontline PLA troops should be targeted. They are our 'Centre of Gravity'. Up front within reach. Mountains offer great manoeuvre space. Develop offensive options. Beyond the Kailash range there are no great obstacles or ridge lines till Rudok and the Western Highway. The Pangong Tso gives a secure flank. At some point we must go on the counter offensive. We need to generate some options to force a recoil. I might sound outlandish. However think coolly. We have their measure. Occupation of the Kailash range has opened up options. Hats off guys. Well done.
Story of India. I need to tell a story. Summer of 99. Op Vijay broke out. My regiment (all Rajputs ) was mobilised overnight from the Eastern to the Northern sector. A number of young soldiers on completion of post recruit training were posted to make good our strengths. All of them reported to Siliguri. Around a dozen of them with a couple of NCOs, retuning from leave, were despatched to join the regiment in the staging area. War rumours were abound. At Delhi railway station, two young soldiers (from neighbouring villages) gave the slip and went AWOL. They went home and told their mothers that they came on leave. One of the mothers suspected something unusual and quizzed her son. Out came the AWOL story. She gave him a couple of tight slaps, took him to the other village and told the other boy’s mother about it. She in turn slapped her son. How could they become AWOL from the regiment when the nation was at war? One village elder was entrusted to deposit these young soldiers with the unit. He brought them to me and said “ CO sahab inko maaf kar dena. In dono ka mathaon ne inke saath bahut gussa kiya. Rajputon ka be-izzati ho gaya. Desh ka Raksha karna hamara kartavya hai. Bcahhe hain. Inko asli Rajput banao aur ladai mein sabse aage le jao.” That was that and life went on. When I last visited the unit those ‘boys’ are now experienced and tough gunners and junior leaders.
The Sum of All Fears. Indian mothers will send their sons to war as a matter of IZZAT and desh ka Raksha irrespective of caste, creed, Arm or unit. Phillip Mason called it a ‘Matter of Honour’. This spirit of sacrifice is deeply ingrained in Indian blood streams even now. It was on display in Galwan. A country which has such deep rooted patriotism cannot be defeated by some soft ‘one child Chinese’. Why am I recounting this story? Have faith in our men they will deliver. The sum of all my fears is that some weak bellied and ill-informed politician or diplomat will develop cold feet and fritter away the gains during negotiation. That is our history. We felt diplomacy and international stature will guard the Sino Indian border in 1962. We gave back Haji Pir in 1965. We gave back 93000 prisoners in 1971. We even went about saving Chinese ‘face’ during Doklam despite stopping them in their tracks. How wrong were we? Totally. There is a palpable fear swirling around that some jittery character will give away everything we have gained by blood sweat and tears. ‘Status Quo Ante’ of April has lost value. The Kailash Range should not be traded at any cost. It is ‘off table’ in all negotiations. We need to look at a new status post ante. That could be Northwards into Aksai Chin! Stay tight. This is a defining fight for India. There is more on the cards. The Chinese need a lesson and we will give it to them. Rub their ‘face’ in.
Paki Preoccupation. Where are the Pakis? Aah! Paki Generals…lost half their country. Partnering with them , The USA lost its war on terror. Their advice cost the Saudis two oilfields. They are now advising Chinese. Any guesses…..? ha ha. Well these deep state worthies of the frontline nation are at their frontline at Papa John’s having a board meeting of their remunerative businesses with Dawood as special consultant. What is on their menu? Chinese! What about war fighting? That is for idiots.
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A Military Drive Spells Out China's Intent Along the Indian Border
Stratfor
5 MINS READ
Sep 22, 2020 | 10:00 GMT
China's intensified development of military infrastructure on the Indian border suggests a shift in Beijing's approach to territorial disputes, forcing New Delhi to rethink its national security posture. China is expanding and upgrading a large number of military facilities along its entire border with India as tensions continue to run high in the wake of the bloody clash between Indian and Chinese forces in June, followed by the reported exchange of gunfire in late August. New Delhi has struggled to come to terms with these recent escalations, but the new strategic reality created by Beijing's permanent infrastructure drive will nonetheless force New Delhi to shape its future defense posture around long-term outlooks of China's growing capabilities in its border regions.
China's construction drive projects a future military capability that will see long-term regional tensions with India sustained beyond the two countries' recent standoffs. The 2017 Doklam crisis appears to have shifted China's strategic objectives, with China more than doubling its total number of air bases, air defense positions, and heliports near the Indian border over the past three years. The rapid expansion of permanent Chinese military infrastructure points to intentions that span a wider timeframe than current and recent border standoffs.
Indian and Chinese forces clashed in the Doklam region in June 2017. Since then, China has started constructing at least 13 entirely new military positions near its borders with India, including three air bases, five permanent air defense positions and five heliports. Construction on four of those new heliports started only after the onset of the current Ladakh crisis in May.
These long-term developments rise above the more immediate deployments that China conducted in its previous border standoffs with India, and indicates future intent to ramp up Chinese assertive military posturing in border disputes with India.
China's strategy aims to confront India with an insurmountable challenge in territorial disputes by leaning on broad support capabilities that provide Beijing with a tremendous ability to mobilize forces into disputed border areas. Such an approach is similar to China's strategy in the South China Sea, where a buildup of permanent defense facilities supports Chinese localized military superiority and significantly raises the potential cost of military opposition to Beijing's maritime claims in the region. In applying this same strategy on the Indian border, China aims to discourage Indian resistance or military action during future border disputes by ostentatiously demonstrating its ability and intent to engage in military confrontations.
China's current emphasis on air power, in particular, also enables it to project military strength deep into the complex Himalayan terrain by exploiting existing gaps in India's capabilities. A significant portion of Beijing's recent infrastructure developments is aimed directly at strengthening its ability to project air power along the entire Indian border at a time when New Delhi itself is struggling to rebuild its air power. Additional air bases, runways and air defense sites would all help China achieve air superiority over disputed areas in future conflicts, as well as provide cover to ground movements to stake actual territorial claims.
The Chinese military is currently building four similar air defense positions within existing air bases and other facilities. This includes additional runways, as well as aircraft shelters that will help obscure the true presence of combat aircraft at these bases from observation. In addition to the development of infrastructure, China has also been deploying more air defense systems and fighter aircraft to existing facilities.
India, meanwhile, has faced repeated setbacks in its attempts to modernize its aging fighter fleet. Recent deliveries of French Rafale fighter aircraft have started to provide India some relief, but more time will be required to see indigenous production and foreign acquisitions truly rebuild the strength of India's air force.
By forcing India to respond in kind, China's aggressive strategy is leading to a greater concentration of military assets in heavily disputed areas along the border that could raise the risk of potential escalations and sustained conflict. The ongoing escalation in the Ladakh border region has started to formulate an Indian response to the broader strategic threat posed by China's ongoing military infrastructure drive. India's Ministry of Defense announced on Sept. 14 that it will build six new runways and 22 military helicopter facilities across Ladakh. While these new developments are geographically focused on the region of current tensions, Chinese activity across India's entire border will likely drive future expansions of Indian military infrastructure near disputed borders at Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh. New Delhi will also continue to upgrade its overall military capabilities, particularly in those fields where capability gaps exist vis-a-vis China, such as air power, ground-based air defenses and missile forces. Efforts by both India and China to translate these capabilities into dominance during future border disputes will increase the possibility of direct confrontations. And with strong logistical structures supporting frontline forces on both sides, such incidents could rapidly devolve into greater military engagements between the two nuclear-armed neighbors.
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/chinese-regime-weaponizes-tibets-rivers-choking-asias-water-supply-expert_3501234.html
got sample of Epoch Times via print
this article I thought interesting
seems like this news outlet might be good source of conservative news.
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I subscribe online for something like $3 a month. Definitely recommended!
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(https://cdn.japantimes.2xx.jp/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/np_file_40156-e1601024924908.jpeg)
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/09/25/commentary/world-commentary/china-paying-high-price-provoking-india/ (https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2020/09/25/commentary/world-commentary/china-paying-high-price-provoking-india/)
NEW DELHI – China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, recently declared that aggression and expansionism have never been in the Chinese nation’s “genes.” It is almost astonishing that he managed to say it with a straight face.
Aggression and expansionism obviously are not genetic traits, but they appear to be defining President Xi Jinping’s tenure. Xi, who in some ways has taken up the expansionist mantle of Mao Zedong, is attempting to implement a modern version of the tributary system that Chinese emperors used to establish authority over vassal states: Submit to the emperor, and reap the benefits of peace and trade with the empire.
For Xi, the COVID-19 pandemic — which has preoccupied the world’s governments for months — seemed like an ideal opportunity to make quick progress on his agenda. So, in April and May, he directed the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to launch furtive incursions into the icy borderlands of India’s Ladakh region, where it proceeded to establish heavily fortified encampments.
It wasn’t nearly as clever a plan as Xi probably thought. Far from entrenching China’s regional preeminence, it has intensified the pushback by Indo-Pacific powers, which have deepened their security cooperation. This includes China’s most powerful competitor, the United States, thereby escalating a bilateral strategic confrontation that has technological, economic, diplomatic, and military dimensions. The specter of international isolation and supply disruptions now looms over China, spurring Xi to announce plans to hoard mammoth quantities of mineral resources and agricultural products.
But Xi’s real miscalculation on the Himalayan border was vis-a-vis India, which has now abandoned its appeasement policy toward China. Not surprisingly, China remains committed to the PLA’s incursions, which it continues to portray as defensive: Late last month, Xi told senior officials to “solidify border defenses” and “ensure frontier security” in the Himalayan region.
India, however, is ready to fight. In June, after the PLA ambushed and killed Indian soldiers patrolling Ladakh’s Galwan Valley, a hand-to-hand confrontation led to the deaths of numerous Chinese troops — the first PLA troops killed in action outside United Nations peacekeeping operations in over four decades. Xi was so embarrassed by this outcome that, whereas India honored its 20 fallen as martyrs, China refuses to admit the precise death toll.
The truth is that, without the element of surprise, China is not equipped to dominate India in a military confrontation. And India is making sure that it will not be caught off guard again. It has now matched Chinese military deployments along the Himalayan frontier and activated its entire logistics network to transport the supplies needed to sustain the troops and equipment through the coming harsh winter.
In another blow to China, Indian special forces recently occupied strategic mountain positions overlooking key Chinese deployments on the southern side of Pangong Lake. Unlike the PLA, which prefers to encroach on undefended border areas, Indian forces carried out their operation right under China’s nose, in the midst of a major PLA buildup.
If that were not humiliating enough for China, India eagerly noted that the Special Frontier Force (SFF) that spearheaded the operation comprises Tibetan refugees. The Tibetan soldier who was killed by a landmine in the operation was honored with a well-attended military funeral.
India’s message was clear: China’s claims to Tibet, which separated India and China until Mao Zedong’s regime annexed it in 1951, are not nearly as strong as it pretends they are. Tibetans view China as a brutally repressive occupying power, and those eager to fight the occupiers flocked to the SFF, established after Mao’s 1962 war with India.
Here’s the rub: China’s claims to India’s vast Himalayan borderlands are based on their alleged historical links to Tibet. If China is merely occupying Tibet, how can it claim sovereignty over those borderlands?
In any case, Xi’s latest effort to gain control of territories that aren’t China’s to take has proved far more difficult to complete than it was to launch. As China’s actions in the South China Sea demonstrate, Xi prefers asymmetrical or hybrid warfare, which combines conventional and irregular tactics with psychological and media manipulation, disinformation, lawfare, and coercive diplomacy.
But while Xi managed to change the South China Sea’s geopolitical map without firing a shot, it seems clear that this will not work on China’s Himalayan border. Instead, Xi’s approach has placed the Sino-Indian relationship — crucial to regional stability — on a knife edge. Xi wants neither to back down nor to wage an open war, which is unlikely to yield the decisive victory he needs to restore his reputation after the border debacle.
China might have the world’s largest active-duty military force, but India’s is also massive. More important, India’s battle-hardened forces have experience in low-intensity conflicts at high altitudes; the PLA, by contrast, has had no combat experience since its disastrous 1979 invasion of Vietnam. Given this, a Sino-Indian war in the Himalayas would probably end in a stalemate, with both sides suffering heavy losses.
Xi seems to be hoping that he can simply wear India down. At a time when the Indian economy has registered its worst-ever contraction due to the still-escalating COVID-19 crisis, Xi has forced India to divert an increasing share of resources to national defense. Meanwhile, cease-fire violations by Pakistan, China’s close ally, have increased to a record high, raising the specter of a two-front war for India. As some Chinese military analysts have suggested, Xi could use America’s preoccupation with its coming presidential election to carry out a quick, localized strike against India without seeking to start a war.
But it seems less likely that India will wilt under Chinese pressure than that Xi will leave behind a legacy of costly blunders. With his Himalayan misadventure, he has provoked a powerful adversary and boxed himself into a corner.
Brahma Chellaney, professor of strategic studies at the New Delhi-based Center for Policy Research and fellow at the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, is the author of nine books, including “Asian Juggernaut,” “Water: Asia’s New Battleground” and “Water, Peace, and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis.” © Project Syndicate, 2020.
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Imran Khan, baki PM passes an eye test.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EjZDPHYVgAAXnR-?format=jpg&name=large)
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A good overview map of the region
(https://zh-prod-1cc738ca-7d3b-4a72-b792-20bd8d8fa069.storage.googleapis.com/s3fs-public/styles/inline_image_desktop/public/inline-images/Contested-desert-768x644_0_0.jpg?itok=bh9VgnOi)
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Nice overview of the Chinese claim lines in Ladakh.
https://youtu.be/l5kgfqQqVUk (https://youtu.be/l5kgfqQqVUk)
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China Moves to Freeze Its Border Dispute With India Before the Winter Does
3 MINS READ
Oct 9, 2020 | 18:52 GMT
China’s recent reassertion of its 1959 border line with India has left little room for a compromise in the two countries’ territorial dispute in Ladakh ahead of the approaching harsh winter, which will enable Beijing to both reinforce its claims in the Himalayan region come spring, as well as test Indian resolve with actions at other areas along the border. In late September, the Chinese Foreign Ministry sent a statement to the Hindustan Times confirming it still recognizes its unilateral 1959 line along the Indian border as the Line of Actual Control (LAC), which was drawn before the two countries’ war in 1962. Military officials from the two sides are set to meet Oct. 12 for the seventh round of Corps Commander talks aimed at resolving the border standoff in the eastern section of Ladakh, but China’s reassertion of the 1959 line makes any resolution difficult before the winter season sets in a month.
Though China has hinted at the 1959 line in recent years, this marks one of the clearest assertions of Beijing’s claim.
India asserts it has never recognized China’s 1959 unilateral border claim, and efforts in recent years to exchange maps to reassess claims have fallen through.
The most likely path in the near term is limited disengagement along the frontier, but there will not be a major withdrawal by Chinese or Indian forces. In addition to reinforcing their frontline forces in the western section, both countries continued infrastructure construction in the area, and there are reports Chinese forces have also moved in equipment to provide shelter and medical care for their forces through the winter. India has demanded that Chinese forces withdraw from newly-occupied territory, to which China has retorted by demanding that Indian forces first leave the high ground they have taken up in response to Chinese forward forces.
In a five-point joint statement between their foreign ministers, who met in Moscow in early September, India and China agreed that they did not want to see tensions escalate further and agreed that their forces should disengage along the disputed border.
While there is room for further de-escalation, there appears little trust or interest by either side to make any major withdrawal, for fear the other side moves first in the spring to occupy disputed territory.
With a dozen areas along the LAC in dispute, China is likely to press its sovereignty claims in different sectors come the new year. China has increased attention to its claims of national territory, whether at sea or on land, and is unlikely to back down along the Indian frontier. Even as China has pulled some forces back from their furthest extensions this year, it has maintained and reinforced positions in formerly unoccupied territory just a little ways back from its furthest forward positions. There are 12 main areas of dispute along the LAC, but only half of them have seen flare-ups in recent years. If China follows its pattern from the South China Sea, it will de-escalate in one area, only to step up pressure along another front.
In 2017, the two sides clashed further south and east, at the Doklam Plateau near Bhutan. There are concerns that the next confrontations may take place even further east, near Arunachal Pradesh.
With Arunachal Pradesh in the east administered by India but claimed by China, and Aksai Chin in the east administered by China but claimed by India, there is the possibility that China will later offer some concessions in the east in return for its forward claims in the west, though any significant territorial adjustments will be politically untenable in India.
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Stand-off now 6 months old. Chinese soldiers live in oxygen enriched barracks, while Indian soldiers rough it out. Is that a good idea ?, Chinese think Yes, India No.
https://youtu.be/YUrte_1hLM0 (https://youtu.be/YUrte_1hLM0)
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India test-fires 10 missiles in 35 days. A message is being sent to China. China knows it cannot win a conventional war in the mountains. China thinks it has an edge because if the balloon goes up, they can use their superiority in missiles to cow down India. India is messaging that may be another wrong assumption on their part. Problem with missiles is you never know is it a regular or a nuclear tipped missile heading your way.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-races-to-upgrade-its-armoury-fires-a-missile-every-4-days/story-UB5RQaMY4zVlTlYbNFR8EL.html (https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-races-to-upgrade-its-armoury-fires-a-missile-every-4-days/story-UB5RQaMY4zVlTlYbNFR8EL.html)
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Stand-off now 6 months old. Chinese soldiers live in oxygen enriched barracks, while Indian soldiers rough it out. Is that a good idea ?, Chinese think Yes, India No.
https://youtu.be/YUrte_1hLM0 (https://youtu.be/YUrte_1hLM0)
Bud Grant: no heaters on the sidelines at -20.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/nfl-live/afc-nfc-wild-card/bud-grant
I would think the middle of a battle would be the wrong time to get acclimated.
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Watch this 14 second video of a young kid saluting Indian soldiers from Ladakh, India. With a populace like this, the morale of the soldiers remains very high. Compare that with the situation of Chinese soldiers in hostile Tibet.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1315135255041302529 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1315135255041302529)
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https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/ladakh-on-a-hair-trigger-1731953-2020-10-15 (https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/ladakh-on-a-hair-trigger-1731953-2020-10-15)
" “Restoration of status quo ante is no longer beneficial to us,” says an Army official. “[Talks] should now [decide] the settlement of the international boundary.”
India had started out requesting China to go back to their April 2020 positions, since then, Chinese got more aggressive, India occupied the heights and now the tables are turned...YA
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https://stratnewsglobal.com/ladakh-standoff-india-negotiating-on-equal-terms-with-outfoxed-china/ (https://stratnewsglobal.com/ladakh-standoff-india-negotiating-on-equal-terms-with-outfoxed-china/)
Ladakh Standoff: India Negotiating On Equal Terms With Outfoxed China
Nitin A. Gokhale October 23, 2020 6minutes read
LEH, LADAKH: There is a military stalemate along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh. And China doesn’t like it.
After nearly six months of attempted military coercion, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has been unable to force the Indian military to succumb or retreat. Instead, China finds itself in a cul-de-sac. This was not how it was planned in the Central Military Commission (CMC).
As a result of the impasse, in the last two meetings at the level of Corps Commanders, there is distinct change in the Chinese attitude during discussions. The Chinese now desire to resolve the standoff as soon as possible, informed sources reveal.
What prompted the change of tune? At least three reasons are being attributed by military professionals involved in planning and executing operations on ground. One, India’s swift response and matching deployment along all the friction points in Eastern Ladakh in the first fortnight of May; two, the clash at Galwan on June 15 in which India lost 20 soldiers but China suffered a larger number of casualties and three, India’s simultaneous move to occupy strategic heights along the Kailash range in Chushul and the forbidding peaks above the Finger 4 ridge line on the north bank of Pangong Tso.
When PLA moved two of its mechanised divisions close to the LAC in early May in areas it had not deployed for decades, it certainly took the Indian Army by surprise. The quantum of Chinese forces—who moved from their annual exercise mode in Aksai Chin to an operational deployment within a short span—gave the PLA the first-mover advantage. What it had not anticipated, however, was the quick response by the Indian Army backed up by the Indian Air Force (IAF), matching deployment all along the Eastern Ladakh frontier.
In less than four days of detecting the Chinese movement, additional forces were brought in even as the existing troops stopped the Chinese ingress at various points such as PP 14, Galwan, Hot Springs and PP-17 A. The Chinese attempt to shift the LAC westward was halted in its tracks in less than a week. Only in the area between Finger 4 and Finger 8, the PLA troops managed to plonk themselves along the narrow banks of Pangong Tso. As the standoff entered its second month, tensions mounted and the violent clash at Galwan ensued. However, it was the fierce fightback by soldiers belonging to 16 Bihar, 3 Punjab and 3 Medium battalions that took the Chinese by utter surprise. The bloody encounter was the last thing that the PLA expected.
However, three distinct military actions in the last week of August that negated the advantage the Chinese had thought they had gained in surprising the Indians in early May. First, an excellent tactical ISR put in place on the southern bank of Pangong Tso enabled the Indian forces to race to the top of the peaks in the Chushul sector the moment the PLA showed an aggressive intent. In a lightning move, well-poised and fit Indian troops raced to the top to occupy tactically important peaks such as Magar Hill, Gurung Hill, Rezang La, Rechin La and Mukhpari, outmanoeuvring the Chinese on the southern bank of Pangong Tso (see map). These positions give clear line of sight into the Moldo Garrison of the PLA across the LAC. This was on the night of August 29.
(https://stratnewsglobal.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/10/8E298767-D0F3-45C8-B979-B878EC8E6DAF-1024x576.jpeg)
The next day, after a quick clearance from Delhi, Indian Army’s Northern Command also deployed T-72 tanks on some of the above mentioned peaks, once again catching the Chinese unawares. Of course, in the next few days, the PLA also moved tanks close to Indian positions in this sector. Now, in what must be a first anywhere in the world, tanks from both sides are some 400 metres apart at an altitude of 16,000-plus feet, ranged against each other, their barrels facing backwards.
Almost simultaneously with the action on August 29-30, in an operation that must surely have shaken the confidence of PLA soldiers, Indian infantry troops stealthily moved towards the higher reaches of the ridgeline known as Finger 4 from a route that is not visible from the shores of Pangong Tso. As is well known by now, the PLA had pitched tents on the banks as well as on the gentle slopes on the Finger 4 ridgeline. Indian troops climbed the peak of Finger 4 from an unused, a tougher route behind the mountain that is not visible from the shore of the lake, descended on the Chinese positions from the top to take the PLA completely by surprise. All the advantage that the Chinese thought they had gained was nullified in one go, since in the mountains, whoever occupies higher ground straightaway has the edge.
Since then, the Chinese have shown eagerness to de-escalate and disengage. In the last meeting of the Corps Commanders on October 12, the Chinese put forward a couple of proposals and so did the Indians. Details are confidential but indications are that the Chinese have gone to the extent of indicating that they do not mind restoring status quo ante at the Finger area (moving back to Finger 8) on the north bank of Pangong Tso provided India scales down its presence on the heights of Kailash range, something that India is unwilling to do so. Instead, India has proposed a sequential process which can be verified and validated at each step before moving to the final stage of de-induction of troops. India has told China it started the standoff by violating protocols on the border so only the principle of ‘first in, first out’ is applicable here. That is, the PLA must start the process of withdrawal before India can.
The next round of Corps Commanders talks is likely to happen soon. Going by the last joint statement, both sides are willing to work for a solution but India is now negotiating on equal terms, thanks to the military moves in late August.
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Today is Dussehra a major festival in Hindu India. It symbolizes the winning of good over evil, Lord Rama killing the rakshasa Ravana. Particularly symbolic wrt to China.
India does not have the 2nd Amendment, but weapons worship has a long tradition (Indian defense minister below) on this day. My family worshipped a single bolt rifle! that we had.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ElLdU8BUcAAdbXi?format=jpg&name=medium)
(https://static.toiimg.com/thumb/71475394/Dussehra.jpg?width=1200&height=900)
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"India does not have the 2nd Amendment"
You guys need to fix that.
Today is Dussehra a major festival in Hindu India. It symbolizes the winning of good over evil, Lord Rama killing the rakshasa Ravana. Particularly symbolic wrt to China.
India does not have the 2nd Amendment, but weapons worship has a long tradition (Indian defense minister below) on this day. My family worshipped a single bolt rifle! that we had.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/ElLdU8BUcAAdbXi?format=jpg&name=medium)
(https://static.toiimg.com/thumb/71475394/Dussehra.jpg?width=1200&height=900)
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On Dussehra day, Indian NSA Ajit Doval (superstar NSA) who rarely speaks in public warns China in a short but brilliant speech, Defense Minister also speaks about China and interestingly the head of RSS (a hindu right wing org) speak about the threat and response to China. Two of these are cabinet level people in Modi govt and the third is like a ideological guide for Modi. The ask is for China to withdraw. This somehow reminds me about the US Fed's governors who all come out and speak on the same topic!. The crisis is 6 months old...to save face China needs a small skirmish, before they can withdraw with dignity, but not without a bloody nose.
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Thanks to China, India invites Australia to the QUAD group and Malabar exercises. Today India signed the BECA agreement with USA. It provides transfer of detailed satellite information. This would not have happened without China's aggression, as India had resisted these for a decade.
China canceled the 8th round of talks with India, great outcome.
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October 28, 2020
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Brief: India Strengthens Its Grip in Peripheral Regions
Under the changes, any Indian, not just permanent residents, can purchase land in Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Background: One of India’s strategic challenges is that it governs a large area with extremely diverse inhabitants. The current government has tried to meet this challenge by implementing measures aimed at centralizing administrative and economic power. Peripheral regions like Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh in the distant northwest are particularly worrisome for New Delhi, as neighboring Pakistan and China contest India’s control over the regions as well as their territorial boundaries.
What Happened: India’s Ministry of Home Affairs changed a series of land laws that affect property ownership in Jammu and Kashmir as well as Ladakh. Under the changes, any Indian, not just permanent residents, can purchase land in the territories. This builds on August 2019’s changes, when the government repealed Article 370 and Article 35-A of the constitution, essentially giving the central government more control in the region. The changes require states and so-called union territories to establish real estate regulators and provide rules under which these regulators must operate. They also give the army the power to declare strategic land for operational and training purposes in the area. Longtime residents of Kashmir oppose the changes, saying they were done without coordination with the local population and that they put their property rights and culture at risk.
Bottom Line: Last year’s constitutional changes paved the way for greater central control on paper, while these latest moves show concrete steps. Hindus and other Indians will now have the opportunity to expand their influence in these areas, which have the highest concentrations of Muslims in India. This comes as India and China are facing off along their border in Ladakh and as Pakistan continues to call for India to have less control over Jammu and Kashmir. The changes also clear the way for the central government to pursue its goal of greater national integration by economically developing these areas.
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Thanks to China, India invites Australia to the QUAD group and Malabar exercises. Today India signed the BECA agreement with USA. It provides transfer of detailed satellite information. This would not have happened without China's aggression, as India had resisted these for a decade.
China canceled the 8th round of talks with India, great outcome.
The BECA agreement is a Big DEAL! YuuuUUUge!
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I am still struggling to understand what did China gain by their actions. Looks like a huge miscalculation on their part.
- India lost 20 lives, China likely around 40
- China occupied a few non-strategic heights and gained a few km, India occupied several heights, such that they have a tactical and strategic advantage.
- Over a 100 Chinese apps banned in India
- China lost several major infrastructure contracts
- Chinese investments in India are on hold, Indian public is not buying Chinese products
- India expedited border infrastructure development
- Billions of new weapons purchases done, or orders given. Traditionally, India does not spend much on the military.
- Australia invited to the QUAD grouping, military base sharing agreements with Australia
- India signed BECA the last foundational agreement, the whole process took several decades.
Militarily India and China are at a stalemate. They could not bring India to heel, the neighboring countries, incl. Pak are watching. Certainly, China is not looking like a super power, more like an aggressive thug who has not gotten his way. I am sure Pak is not impressed.
At a suitable time, India should drop the 1 China policy...
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Today it is Diwali, the Festival of Lights, the main festival of hindus all over the world. Its now about 8 months of the China-India border stand off. No trust on either side, which complicates stand down. Pak still playing games, the LOC is very hot. Modi visited the front lines and spend Diwali with the soldiers and boosted their morale. Modi master of mind game optics and subliminal messages below :-)
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/EmzCKi0XYAABiF1?format=jpg&name=360x360)
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Emxb0FLVcAAyUCO?format=jpg&name=large)
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https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/china-turns-ladakh-battleground-with-india-into-a-microwave-oven-6tlwtrtzz
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https://peckford42.wordpress.com/2020/12/09/rebel-news-trudeau-government-invited-chinese-military-to-train-in-canada-34-page-report-unveiled/
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Pulling out the big guns. The U.S. appears to be trying to speed up India’s military (especially naval) modernization drive. The U.S. Navy is reportedly giving its Indian counterpart three medium-caliber naval guns from its own inventory. India has been signing an array of bigger, longer-term deals with the U.S. and partners like France and Israel, but it’s notable to see something in the space that can actually happen quickly.
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India-China border standoff completes 9 months. No withdrawal by either side.
Indian sources claiming intercepts and reports suggests Chinese conscripts suffering tremendously in the cold. They have limited high altitude/winter experience.
India has 20 years high altitude experience from the Siachen glacier.
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Looks like some initial steps of withdrawal are starting
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lac-standoff-pla-indian-troops-begin-process-of-disengagement-but-will-be-a-long-haul/articleshow/80794596.cms
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Looks like some initial steps of withdrawal are starting
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/lac-standoff-pla-indian-troops-begin-process-of-disengagement-but-will-be-a-long-haul/articleshow/80794596.cms
China to focus on Taiwan, not war on 2 fronts. (?)
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Deal on the Himalayas. India and China reached yet another agreement on pulling back troops from the Line of Actual Control, the two countries’ tense de facto Himalayan border. The unforgiving topography of the area limits the potential for escalation, but also perpetuates low-level instability. Periodic flare-ups will continue so long as both sides continue infrastructure development near the contested zones – and so long as China has a strategic interest in keeping India focused on the front rather than its maritime domain.
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"...and so long as China has a strategic interest in keeping India focused on the front rather than its maritime domain."
- Funny that I thought the exact opposite, China wants to focus on its other front.
Wouldn't you think that conflict with China increases India's interest in militarizing its navy?
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Aug 2020:
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/1329579/india-china-latest-indian-navy-warship-ladakh-clash-world-war-3
India deploys warship to South China Sea in warning to Beijing
INDIA has deployed a warship to the South China Sea following the bloody clash with Beijing in the Ladakh region.
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The China initiated aggression on the Indian border, did not pay any dividends to them. No gain in territory, turned public opinion in India against China, lost a ton of contracts and business in India. India came closer to the US and Quad countries, India raised military spending, updated a lot of weapons, redoubled infrastructure spending at the border, increased maritime security and updated the Andaman Nicobar island commands etc. Finally, they are now forced to eat humble pie and start the withdrawal first, followed by the Indian side.
Looks like they overestimated their strengths and realized, a 2 front war with India and Taiwan was a no-win situation.
India is fully aware of its maritime strengths in the Indian Ocean, it just choses to not flex in that area. Were a mountain war to start, India could put pressure on the Malacca Straights and choke Chinese traffic. China has a lot of money, but even they would not have the resources to maintain their 1000 + mile long supply lines to the Ladakh region.
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How to contain the PRC while Xi-Den occupies the White House
1. India, Australia and Japan formally recognize the Republic of China and sign a mutual defense treaty.
2. India helps the ROC (Taiwan) become a nuclear power. No need for ICBMs, tactical nukes to incinerate an invasion fleet and return fire to the PRC is all that is required.
3. Japan can position JSDF assets in the ROC and help with air defense missions.
4. Australian forces can use decades of war fighting experience to train up ROC troops (Foreign Internal Defense).
Protecting India, Japan and Australia (And the greater Asia-Pacific) from PRC aggression starts at the shores of Taiwan.
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India does not have the financial or military heft to support Taiwan in this way. India does not even teach Pak a serious lesson, let alone China. There is a defensive mindset in India, does not want to spend on weapons...development is more important..yada yada..The question is why is the world's sole super power not doing any of this ?.
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Because our President in on the Chinese payroll and he got into office thanks to the censorship of the Goolag Oligopoly allies of the Chi Coms?
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ya: "India does not have the financial or military heft to support Taiwan in this way. India does not even teach Pak a serious lesson, let alone China. There is a defensive mindset in India, does not want to spend on weapons..."
- All true but I wonder if India's mindset about defense will be expanding given the latest standoff with China, the growing ambition and military capabilities of PRC, and the loss of ally Trump in the US.
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Yes, a new emphasis on increased military spending and preparedness is visible. As soon as China calms down, military spending will turn down. Having said that it is clear, that India will not back down due to a threat of military aggression from China. China knows, that they would have suffered great pain, in any war on the Indo-China border, which is why they were forced to sheepishly pullback their tanks first.
Like in a B movie western, China will be back again, perhaps after they have settled the Taiwan issue.
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India does not have the financial or military heft to support Taiwan in this way. India does not even teach Pak a serious lesson, let alone China. There is a defensive mindset in India, does not want to spend on weapons...development is more important..yada yada..The question is why is the world's sole super power not doing any of this ?.
All Taiwan needs is the expertise. Taiwan already has nuclear power plants and the intellectual horsepower. It wouldn't be difficult.
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Yes, a new emphasis on increased military spending and preparedness is visible. As soon as China calms down, military spending will turn down. Having said that it is clear, that India will not back down due to a threat of military aggression from China. China knows, that they would have suffered great pain, in any war on the Indo-China border, which is why they were forced to sheepishly pullback their tanks first.
Like in a B movie western, China will be back again, perhaps after they have settled the Taiwan issue.
Yes. They will push until they hit resistance. Then wait and try again.
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Deconstruction in the Himalayas. China is reportedly dismantling a bunch of military infrastructure in the part of the Himalayas where Beijing and New Delhi recently agreed to pull back troops. According to Indian media, Chinese troops have taken apart a helipad, a jetty and several structures, including observation posts.
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The Chinese soldiers are in a hurry to go back to their Oxygen enriched barracks and eat Chicken Kung pao and humble pie. :-D The disengagement is going fine so far. The agreement was to take apart all construction in the region of the Pangong Tso lake bank since April 2020, when they started their intrusions.
Interestingly India's last outpost is just before finger 4 see ITBP post in picture, from there to finger 4 there is no road and its just a single file walk way carved into the mountainside. India's claim line is till finger 8 and the Chinese have a post just after F8 called Sirijap. Chinese claim line is till F4. During the Kargil war with Pak, India moved away its forces and could not afford to raise objections to Chinese motorable road building from finger 8 to finger 4. As a result of that, Indians patrol from Finger 4 to 8 by foot, whereas the Chinese could just cruise in their humvees. Since April 2020, they were not allowing Indian patrols beyond the narrow ledge after Finger 4. Now they have had to remove the jetty as well as other posts they had created in the fingers region. The region between F4-8, will not be patrolled by both sides for the present.
(https://external-content.duckduckgo.com/iu/?u=https%3A%2F%2Fd2c7ipcroan06u.cloudfront.net%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2020%2F06%2FImage-9-BOAT-AREA-OVERVIEW.jpg&f=1&nofb=1)
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China is finally acknowledging some casualties, offering medals to 5 killed in the Galwan barbaric attack incident. Indian army general says Chinese casualties were 2x Indian casualties (around 45) Lots of meltdown in Chinese media, Indian media talking about China running away from the battlefield in Ladakh !
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April 13, 2021
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India’s Trump Card Against China
Moving into the spotlight is the strategically invaluable Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
By: Phillip Orchard
Despite its enormous potential, India is by no means an inevitable counterweight to Chinese ambitions in the Indian Ocean. The country's immense domestic needs and its preoccupation with land-based threats have prevented it from turning its attention fully to the maritime realm. And the more China races ahead with its breakneck military expansion, the harder it will be for India to catch up.
But it's a mistake to look at Indian and Chinese maritime capabilities as an apples-to-apples comparison. India doesn't need to match China destroyer for destroyer or missile for missile because India has some extraordinary geographic advantages in its favor – ones that also happen to make it particularly attractive as a partner with other powers in the region. And the strategically invaluable Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India's great trump card in its intensifying competition with China, is moving into the spotlight.
India's Point of View
For a country with more than 4,500 miles (7,200 kilometers) of coastline, India has never been particularly ambitious in the maritime sphere. This is, in part, because for much of its history it didn’t have much reason to be. Geographically, India is protected by the near-impenetrable Himalayas to its north, harsh subtropical regions to its east and deserts to the west. Its long coastline makes it vulnerable to seaborne threats, sure, but few powers have ever been capable of exploiting this vulnerability. Buffered by the vast waters of the Arabian Sea, the Bay of Bengal and the open ocean, India is blessed with abundant strategic depth when it comes to naval threats. And at any rate, any invading power would confront India’s demographic immensity, which makes direct subjugation by force nearly impossible.
That outside powers have dominated the subcontinent in centuries past is a result mainly of its internal divisions. Its primary occupiers – various Muslim dynasties from the 11th century to the 18th century and the Europeans shortly thereafter – succeeded because they managed to turn India against itself, exploiting the competition among different factions and power centers to cultivate coalitions of collaborators who would support their largely commercial objections.
As a result, India has generally focused inward since it became independent. Its viability as a modern nation-state has depended on its governments’ ability to manage internal divisions. External geopolitics, with the exceptions of the periodic blowups with Pakistan and occasional border clashes with China, took a back seat to more immediate concerns. But the demands of this endeavor are changing, as is India’s broader strategic environment, forcing New Delhi to look increasingly to the far seas.
Its most vital lifelines flow from the west. To fuel growth and development, India’s economic interests have expanded far beyond the subcontinent. The country has well over a billion mouths to feed, and sustaining the level of economic growth and modernization necessary to support this population has given India a voracious appetite for commodity imports such as energy. In 2019, around 47 percent of the total energy India consumed came from imports, including more than 80 percent of its oil supplies. As a result, the country has been quickly expanding its naval presence around critical chokepoints near the Arabian Peninsula and Horn of Africa – waters known to be teeming with pirates, rebels and explosive risks rooted in Middle Eastern rivalries.
Indian interests in eastbound sea lanes are growing too as the country seeks to boost its status as a manufacturing and export power. Already, around 40 percent of India’s trade passes through the turbulent waters of the Strait of Malacca, which has plenty of pirates of its own – and, more concerning for India, Chinese ambition. As China moves to address its own strategic concerns to the east, secondary issues to its southwest are becoming more important, making India more of a potential threat, however unwittingly, and vice versa. China needs to find ways to bypass chokepoints in the East and South China seas, so it needs to build deep-water ports, pipelines and rail lines in India’s backyard. And to prepare for a potential conflict that blocks its maritime chokepoints, it also needs to develop naval forces to keep its backup outlets open and counter enemy forces coming from the west – an effort that will require a network of bases and logistics facilities on India’s periphery to support them.
Thus, India now has good reason to fear both Chinese encirclement and Chinese domination of more distant waters on which India increasingly relies. And this means India now has very good reason to invest considerably more in developing the capabilities to secure trade routes and sustain the regional balance of power with China.
But India has had a hard time shifting resources from its army and air force to the navy. While it’s been touting grand plans for a 200-ship navy by 2027 (up from 130 today) and quietly laying the groundwork for its own “string of pearls” in the Middle East and Southeast Asia, the navy still received just 15 percent of last year’s budget, compared with 23 percent for the air force and 56 percent for the army (the bulk of which goes to pensions). The navy’s share of the pie is actually down from 18 percent in 2012. India's struggle to shift focus to the maritime realm might be one motivator behind China's moves in the Himalayas and with Pakistan. The more India stays bogged down in conflicts on land, in other words, the less it can shift focus to the sea.
The Metal Chain
China has little reason to fear India as a major threat to its interests in, say, the South China Sea or around Taiwan. But India doesn't need to achieve military parity with China to become a problem. It simply needs to leverage its geographic advantages and the growing interest in cooperation from external powers like the U.S. This puts the spotlight squarely on the strategic godsend that are India's Andaman and Nicobar Islands.
(click to enlarge)
The archipelago, featuring some 572 islands (just 38 of them inhabited) stretches from just 100 miles north of the northern tip of Indonesia's Sumatra island through the heart of the Andaman Sea toward Myanmar. The islands are, in effect, the gateway to the Strait of Malacca. In the view of Chinese defense planners, the more apt metaphor for the islands is a “metal chain.”
For India, developing the capabilities needed to threaten Chinese access to Malacca from the Indian mainland would be difficult and expensive, requiring rapid leaps forward in its submarine, aircraft carrier, air force and missile programs, as well as in India’s military logistics and surveillance capabilities. Threatening Chinese access to Malacca from the Andaman and Nicobars is more straightforward. The archipelago is the proverbial “unsinkable aircraft carrier.” Indian bases there are ideally placed for conducting surveillance operations, deploying anti-ship missiles and radar stations, stationing supply depots, refueling fighter planes, and so forth.
The islands, moreover, make India immediately attractive as a partner for powers like the U.S. that already have the capabilities to maximize their strategic value – something that could allow India to keep China at bay without breaking the bank by trying to match China’s spending on the People's Liberation Army. India’s growing ties with Australia are particularly notable in this regard, given how Australia's Cocos Islands could play a similar role in blocking Chinese egress through the Sunda and Lombok straits. The Andaman and Nicobars also could facilitate deeper military cooperation with Southeast Asian countries that historically are leery of provoking China without the ability to defend themselves. In 2018, India and Indonesia reached a tentative reciprocal access agreement giving India access to a port on the Indonesian island of Sabang, located just southeast of the southernmost Andaman and Nicobar island.
India, though, is still in the early stages of modernizing the military infrastructure enough to maximize their strategic value. At present, the islands are home to seven air and naval bases. But India began a series of much-needed improvements – for example, lengthening runways to be able to handle fighter jets or long-range reconnaissance aircraft and expanding port infrastructure to handle large warships – only over the past few years. India has also been somewhat reluctant to open up the islands to foreign partners. Reciprocal access agreements it signed with the U.S., France, Japan and Singapore in recent years, for example, reportedly did not include the Andaman and Nicobars.
But there's been a renewed sense of urgency in New Delhi to tap into the islands’ strategic potential more effectively. At the height of the crisis in the Himalayas last summer, there were several calls in Indian media to put the Andaman and Nicobars to work, and India subsequently held naval exercises around the islands to signal to China that aggression in the Himalayas could backfire in ways that could truly hurt China. In August, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi deemed the islands’ development a strategic priority and announced a new development plan. The same month, India announced the completion of a submarine optical fiber connectivity project in the area. In October, a U.S. long-range sub hunter became the first U.S. military aircraft to make a refueling pitstop. In December, India test-launched supersonic anti-ship Brahmos missiles from the islands. In March, Japan announced a $36 million grant for the development of energy storage systems on South Andaman.
Nothing will happen quickly. India's budgetary problems remain, and the pandemic isn't going to help. It's leery of giving China any more reason to try to militarize one of its Belt and Road ports on India's doorstep. There's some evidence that Indonesia and, in particular, Malaysia aren't exactly thrilled about the trajectory toward militarization of the Strait of Malacca, and India has an interest in handling Southeast Asian suspicions carefully. And India, in general, is still embracing the concept of strategic alignment with outside powers – something it historically has typically eschewed – only slowly.
Even so, on the question of whether and just how much India will emerge as a major player in the burgeoning competition over the Indo-Pacific, the Andaman and Nicobars are the center of gravity. Watch them closely.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17416/china-war-on-india
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Some may remember the Galwan incident where the Chinese treacherously attacked Indian troops with barbaric weapons. The Chinese hid their casualties. Now more details are coming out.
https://chanakyaforum.com/when-the-hunters-became-the-hunted-the-galwan-valour/ (https://chanakyaforum.com/when-the-hunters-became-the-hunted-the-galwan-valour/)
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China has added 35,000 troops to its disputed border region with India over the past 12 months, including an HQ-9 air defense system, according to Indian intelligence and military officials, the Wall Street Journal reported Friday from New Delhi.
Why this matters: "Those moves have been matched by India, which has sent tens of thousands of its own troops and advanced artillery to the region, the officials said." Though they did not say if, like China, India has "dug underground bunkers and tunnels" for its troops.
Bigger picture: "India and China have held about a dozen rounds of talks between military and diplomatic officials since the confrontation last year in an effort to de-escalate tensions. Those talks led to the pullback of troops from both sides at one friction point at Pangong Tso, a glacial lake at an altitude of about 14,000 feet." But both countries are still very keen on maintaining a foothold in the region. Read on, here.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/17547/china-mobilizing-war
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To me, it appears that China is preparing for war with Taiwan. If that happens, they dont want India to take advantage of the situation and claw back territory and hence they are upping their defenses.
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".New satellite images published recently reveal that China is building more than 100 new nuclear missile silos in its western desert."
will this not lead to India following suit?
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Not sure how accurate that news it..I have seen some alternate interpretations of that. Can we be sure that those missiles are for India ?. They would hit Indian population centers, at which point India will respond by hitting Chinese cities. Could it be they are not for use against India...
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With the new hypersonic technology , , ,
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Competition over the Himalayas. China is reportedly building a new fighter aircraft base near the so-called Line of Actual Control, the disputed de facto border in the Himalayas between China and India. The Indians, for their part, reportedly have plans for as many as four airports and 37 helipads in the westernmost parts of the disputed region.
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China realized that they could not win over India, in the last standoff. They are now correcting their weaknesses and will try again.
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Russia and India. The secretary of Russia’s security council and the national security adviser for India’s prime minister are participating in security consultations in New Delhi. Their respective governments discussed the prospects for cooperation and agreed to coordinate their approaches on Afghanistan.
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second
China and India. The Chinese military on Monday posted a video of high-altitude drills meant to simulate a battle with Indian troops in the two countries' disputed Himalayan border region. Things have been relatively quiet along what's known as the Line of Actual Control, especially compared to last summer, but the region will remain unstable until both sides back off infrastructure improvements that are making a major escalation possible
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Daily Memo: Chinese General Dies, NATO Lodges Espionage Allegations
The harsh conditions involved with high-altitude Himalayan operations may have played a role in the death.
By: Geopolitical Futures
High altitude. A Chinese general formerly in charge of China’s Western Theater Command, which oversees the disputed Himalayan border with India, reportedly died last week. The general, Zhang Xudong, stepped down from command in June, and there's some speculation that the harsh conditions involved with high-altitude Himalayan operations played a role. His replacement stepped down after just two months, also apparently due to health issues, and several other commanders are reportedly dealing with similar problems. (If true, this puts to rest speculation that the rapid succession of leadership changes reflected dissonance between the People’s Liberation Army and President Xi Jinping’s inner circle.) Bottom line: The practical difficulty of operations in the Himalayas is hard to overstate, sharply limiting the risk of a major escalation in the theater between China and India.
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This I think is a crucial reason why the Chinese withdrew, apart from the generals, the soldiers were getting knocked off too. India has been holding the heights against Pak for 20 years or so, they have it figured out (logistics, food etc). During the stand off, in a swift move, the Indians occupied several previously vacant peaks that overlooked Chinese positions. This shocked the Chinese to the core, soon therafter the withdrawals began. Furthermore, many of the Indian mountain regiments have soldiers born and brought up in the mountains or used to living at high altitudes. China imports the Hans from the plains, and it takes weeks to get acclimatized to altitude and the cold is another issue. This might also be reflected on the Chinese push to have camps all over the LAC so that soldiers get used to living there. Another factor, that the Chinese run into is that Indians feel they are fighting for their motherland with a lot of religious/cultural support for that thinking. The godless Chinese do not have that mental support.
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Yesterday, the India-China border talks ended in a stalemate. China is still on its high horse and not making any progress.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FBazdnLVUAcVu5Q?format=png&name=900x900)
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ndian drills near China. The Indian army’s 50th Parachute Brigade on Monday started a three-day airborne exercise and combat maneuvers in eastern Ladakh, close to the border with China. This is India’s first airborne exercise in the area. The drills come on the heels of India announcing the successful test of its Agni-V intermediate-range ballistic missile, which can reach China without being based in India’s northeast territory.
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This is in response to unusual behaviour on the part of China, who has positioned troops close to the border and is raising permanent structures etc. Something is not right...have to wait and see how the situation develops.
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GPF
High-altitude buildup. India over the past year or so has built at least 73 "operationally significant" pieces of infrastructure on its side of the de facto Himalayan border with China, known as the Line of Actual Control. China has been building infrastructure on its side at a similarly rapid pace. So long as both sides continue making it easier to fight in the harsh conditions of the high Himalayas, the otherwise inherently low risk of meaningful escalation in the standoff will continue to tick up. In recent days, China reportedly held a new round of high-altitude exercises.
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India's largest export to the US is CEO's.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FFbtxv8VUAQurIy?format=jpg&name=medium)
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are they all liberal Democrats?
if not we never hear about it.
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India's Chief of Defense Staff (top of the totem pole), dies in helicopter crash along with family. He was a tough general who taught Pak many a lesson. If Pak is to blame...war is in the offing.
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https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-01-28/india-boosts-naval-patrols-to-catch-china-in-crowded-global-seas?fbclid=IwAR2I0v2pKiqWv8IA6lNXcvpjBrzCn-xELPZQHeHMwsJqXawLaTk8xZpzPw4
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China ups their game on the India-Tibet border. Robotic machine guns.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1490025314008764417
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Chinese interference. China is encroaching on Nepal near their shared border, according to a Nepalese government report leaked to the BBC. The report marks the first official claim of Chinese interference in Nepalese territory by the Nepalese government. It accuses Beijing of conducting surveillance operations, restricting religious activities, limiting grazing for Nepalese farmers and attempting to construct a canal and road in Nepal.
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Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China? (theepochtimes.com)
Is India, a Close Ally of the US, About to Side With China?
April 1, 2022 Updated: April 1, 2022
According to a recent article in Asia Times, India has grown “increasingly skeptical about American policies and statesmanship.” The United States once presented a compelling picture to the world.
Today, however, the picture that the United States now presents is the opposite of convincing, according to the article. The United States has become a “battleground of tribalism and culture wars.” Once an attractive prospect, this “aging superpower” is in decline, with “dwindling influence globally.”
Because of this, India is looking elsewhere for support and potential business. By elsewhere, I mean China.
As the Asia Times piece noted, India now realizes “that it has no real partnership with the US or the European Union” and that its relationships with the two were, and still are, “transactional.”
For both the United States and the European Union, maintaining good ties with India cannot be emphasized enough. After all, India is the fastest-growing major economy in the world. Some authors argue (rather convincingly) that India will become the next great superpower. This fact is not lost on China.
Chinese state-run media Global Times recently published an intriguing piece.
“China and India,” it reads, “share common interests on many fronts.” It then went on to condemn those in “the West” who criticized India “for reportedly considering buying Russian oil at a discounted price.”
Back off, it continued, this “is India’s legitimate right.” The piece finished by calling on Beijing and New Delhi to “mend their fraught relations.”
Will New Delhi accept the invitation?
Don’t be surprised if it does.
But why would India embrace China?
Two years ago, Chinese and Indian troops began engaging in hostile face-offs at various locations along the Sino-Indian border. In June 2020, both sides engaged in hand-to-hand combat. Lives were lost. Three months later, for the first time in 45 years, both sides exchanged gunfire. Since then, tensions have been extremely high.
But, as we all know only too well, politics is a fickle business. Yesterday’s enemy has the potential to become tomorrow’s friend.
If India does embrace China, one must remember that the embrace would be borne more out of desperation than desire. China and the United States are the two biggest players on the world stage. If one begins to lose its pulling power and the other increases its own, then it’s only natural that India reconsiders where its loyalties lie.
Moreover, India now finds itself in a position of genuine power, with both Beijing and Washington knocking on its door. In the past, India was only too willing to open the door to the United States. However, times appear to be changing.
According to M K Bhadrakumar, a former Indian diplomat, Narendra Modi, India’s 14th and current prime minister, “is looking in all directions—Russia and China included—for partnerships.”
India, one must remember, has very close ties with Russia.
Vir Sanghvi, a well-respected Indian author, recently wrote the following: “When it comes to this [Ukraine] conflict, our hands are tied.”
Why?
Because “Russia is our major supplier of weapons.” Moreover, he added, it “isn’t just the arms we have ordered from the Russians. It is also spares, ammunition, and maintenance for our existing equipment. To stand against Russia would be to debilitate our armed forces. We have no real choice but to avoid criticising the Russians.”
Epoch Times PhotoIndia’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi attends a meeting with Russia’s President Vladimir Putin in New Delhi, India, on Dec. 6, 2021. (Sputnik/Mikhail Klimentyev/Kremlin via Reuters)
Xinhua, another mouthpiece of the Chinese regime, recently argued that “China-India diplomatic relations will significantly ease and enter a recovery period.” During this period, “China and India will realize the exchange of visits of diplomatic officials in a relatively short time.”
Staring into their crystal ball, the authors believe “Chinese officials will go to India first.” Shortly after, India’s foreign minister “will come to China.”
As unpalatable as the above lines may sound, India and China are neighbors. Meanwhile, the United States is situated on the other side of the world. Within the realm of social psychology, the proximity principle suggests that individuals form interpersonal relations with those close by (think flatmates, work colleagues, etc.).
In geopolitics, perhaps the proximity principle also plays a role.
The US Has Lost Its Appeal
In 2018, the scholar Gordon Adams wrote that since the end of World War II, American diplomacy “has been essential to multinational agreements on trade, climate, regional security, and arms control.” The United States could “claim to be at the center of a “rules-based international order.” Why? Because it was.
“Those days,” wrote Adams, “are gone.”
Indeed. In the four years since this piece was written, China has grown significantly stronger. On the other hand, the United States appears to have grown weaker, at least in India’s eyes.
According to the aforementioned Sanghvi, a man with his finger on India’s geopolitical pulse, up until very recently, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), India’s biggest right-wing party, spouted largely pro-U.S. philosophies.
Now, though, Modi’s party views the United States negatively. Sanghvi noted, “Joe Biden is seen as antagonistic—if not to India, then to the sort of India that Modi’s supporters want to create.”
After the disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States’ image has taken a significant beating. Today, whether you like to admit it or not, everything revolves around branding.
Online dating is an obvious example. How you present yourself to a prospective partner (or partners) matters. It matters a lot.
Similarly, LinkedIn, basically a glorified social media platform, is a place to sell your brand: your expertise, experience, etc.
The world of international politics is no different. For those who say that the United States is not a brand, you’re right. However, you’re also wrong. Definitionally speaking, the United States is nothing like Coca-Cola or IKEA, two of the most recognizable brands on the planet.
On the other hand, the United States is just like Coca-Cola and IKEA. After all, what is soft power but the ability to convince another nation (or citizens of another nation) to “buy into” your brand? It involves convincing people to “buy into” your policies and ideologies to subscribe to your vision.
The United States, once the leader in soft power, appears to have lost its edge. For this, it may very well pay a costly price. Losing India to China, once unthinkable, is a distinct possibility.
As the author Shekhar Gupta wrote just a few days ago, there’s no room for morality when it comes to India’s foreign policy stance. Instead, the only thing that matters is acting in the best interest of the Indian people. For Modi and his colleagues, this could mean embracing China and rejecting the United States.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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second post
https://asiatimes.com/2022/03/why-india-us-dont-see-eye-to-eye-on-ukraine/
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pril 18, 2022
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India’s Defiance of Washington’s Russia Strategy
New Delhi has resisted calls to stop doing business with the Russian economy.
By: Allison Fedirka
Under normal circumstances, India would have little reason to care about what happens in Ukraine. The current circumstances, however, are far from normal. The war in Ukraine has put U.S.-Indian relations back into the spotlight as Washington lobbies all of its major allies to join its economic assault on Moscow. So far, India has resisted. The U.S. wants to use the Ukraine conflict to bring India into alignment with the West on issues that don’t relate to China, but New Delhi is unwilling to impose its own sanctions on Russia and recently even agreed to purchase millions of barrels of Russian oil. Its defiance is important less because of India’s ability to prop up the Russian economy and more because of what it says about the state of U.S.-Indian relations. Still, strategic constraints will compel Washington not to take punitive measures against New Delhi for its noncompliance and to seek mutually acceptable accommodation instead.
Difficult to Manage
Alliances derive their strength from shared interests among members. For the U.S. and India, their mutual desire to contain Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific is the cornerstone of their partnership. But their lack of alignment on other issues can make it difficult to manage. For India, formalizing military or political alignments is seen as risky because the country fears that doing so could make it vulnerable. For much of India’s modern history, the sub-continent fell under the control of a foreign power. Today, the country finds itself between three major powers (Russia, China and the U.S.) and sharing borders with two formidable enemies (Pakistan and China) – all while trying to find its place as a major player in its own right within the region. And while New Delhi agrees on the importance of containing China, the U.S. and India’s distinct geographies, histories and economics result in diverging interests over secondary issues.
The Ukraine matter is a case in point. For the U.S., the Russian threat didn’t end with the Cold War, and a Russian victory in Ukraine would mean a win over the West. But India sees Russia as much less of a threat than the U.S. does. During the Cold War, Russia was a reliable trade and defense partner for India and helped keep China in check. New Delhi has a pragmatic approach to foreign relations and has managed to maintain ties with various partners without fully committing to any single one. It thus has cultivated good relations with Moscow while attempting to strengthen ties with the U.S. of late – and it’s unwilling to veer too far away from this balance.
But the war in Ukraine has complicated India’s position. The U.S. fears that India’s continued willingness to do business with Russia could undermine the U.S. strategy to force Moscow into concessions through economic isolation. India’s noncompliance can best be seen through its energy sector. Since the start of the invasion, India has been on a spending spree, buying up Russian oil at a discounted price compared to international markets. India has ordered an estimated 13 million to 14 million barrels of oil from Russia since the end of February, compared to the 16 million barrels it purchased from Russia all of last year. As the world’s third-largest oil importer, India relies on foreign supplies to meet approximately 80 percent of its needs. Though Russia supplies only 1-2 percent of the oil consumed in India, the main attraction at the moment is the low price – a key consideration given that India spent approximately $100 billion on oil imports in the last fiscal year. Under the current terms, Indian imports of Russian oil don’t violate U.S. sanctions, but Washington fears New Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian exports could prove to be an economic lifeline for Moscow.
India's Top Oil Suppliers by volume
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India has had similar problems with other energy suppliers in the past. Iran and Venezuela together accounted for 20 percent of India’s oil imports in 2016, but were both subject to U.S. sanctions in recent years. In these cases, however, Washington issued waivers that allowed India to continue importing from these countries during a transition period and increased its own energy exports to help fill the gap. The U.S. has told India that it will help support its efforts to diversify its suppliers again, but that could prove more difficult this time around. The U.S. government is currently using its strategic reserves to boost its own domestic supplies, and private companies have resisted Washington's calls to increase production. Washington’s urging of Saudi Arabia to increase production hasn’t worked either. And the U.S. has already committed to helping European markets find alternative sources, so whatever supplies it’s able to export will need to be shared among all its partners.
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To a lesser extent, the U.S. has also taken issue with India’s purchases of Russian fertilizers and defense equipment. Russia is one of the largest global suppliers of fertilizers, which are exempt from U.S. sanctions because of a global shortage and their importance in food production. Prior to its invasion of Ukraine, Russia banned the export of fertilizers through the end of June and limited the countries to which its supplies could be sent. India is among the approved destinations – though it received only 8.5 percent of its fertilizer imports by value from Russia in 2020.
Washington had concerns over India’s procurement of Russian defense equipment even before the war in Ukraine began. During the Soviet era, India acquired much of its military equipment from the USSR. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Russia is still India’s top arms supplier, accounting for just under half of all arms imports. But this figure is down from 69 percent between 2012 and 2017, as Russia’s share in India’s arms imports has steadily declined over the past decade. That’s in part because India is developing a national defense industry initiative, which will increase its self-sufficiency in arms, and recently announced it would stop importing over 100 defense-related goods from Russia by the end of this year. Notably, the U.S. has not applied the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act to India since its introduction in 2017. Under the act, any country that signs defense deals with Russia, Iran or North Korea may be subject to sanctions.
Levers and Constraints
The U.S. does have some economic levers it can use to influence India’s behavior. Trade between the two countries totaled $113.4 billion in 2021 – one-third U.S. exports to India and two-thirds U.S. imports from India – making the United States India’s largest trade partner. Exports to the U.S. account for 18.9 percent of India’s total exports and the equivalent of 3.5 percent of gross domestic product. The U.S. is also a major contributor of foreign direct investment, spending roughly $41 billion in India in 2020. In 2021, it ranked as India’s second-largest source of FDI behind Singapore. The services sector was the top beneficiary (16 percent), which includes outsourcing, R&D and tech testing. This was followed by computer software and hardware, which receives 14 percent of total FDI. For India, technology remains a top priority for trade and FDI as many of the government’s economic development initiatives rely on getting access to or funding for technology from places like the U.S. and the EU.
U.S. - India Trade
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However, the U.S. faces three strategic constraints that prevent it from bringing its full economic power to bear on India. First, its Indo-Pacific strategy for containing China requires India’s participation. And given that the U.S.-China rivalry will likely remain for years to come, Washington needs New Delhi on its side in the long term. Second, it’s in the U.S.’ interest to maintain a relatively stable and functional India to counter China. Imposing economic punishments for India’s unwillingness to toe the line on Russia could be destabilizing for New Delhi, and that would only benefit Beijing. Last, India plays an important role in the foreign policies of the U.K. and Australia – the former of which is relying on commonwealth states to boost trade to offset the economic losses from leaving the EU. Australia, meanwhile, signed an interim free trade agreement with India earlier this month. The pact, which covers over 90 percent of goods traded between the two countries, is part of Australia’s strategy to reduce its dependence on China. The U.S. wouldn’t want to do anything to weaken these relationships with India, especially because the U.K. and Australia are both members of the Five Eyes, Washington’s most important security alliance.
When it comes to trade with Russia, there’s plenty of space for the U.S. and India to find mutually acceptable accommodation. New Delhi has shown that it’s willing to work toward self-sufficiency in the defense sector, meaning its purchases of Russian military goods will diminish over time – although this will likely be a long process. Besides, Washington has already given New Delhi some leeway here by not imposing sanctions over its Russian arms purchases. India’s other main imports from Russia are fairly low and focus on strategic sectors essential to keeping the Indian economy running – i.e., fertilizers and energy. As long as this remains the case, the U.S. will tolerate the limited commercial exchange between India and Russia.
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And speaking of Russian weapons, India's air force just canceled a deal to buy 48 Russian Mi-17 helicopters from Moscow, India Today reported Saturday. Officials in New Delhi reportedly stressed that the decision has nothing to do with Russia's disastrous first few weeks of the war in Ukraine; instead, the decision allegedly centers on India's desire to make defense equipment indigenously rather than rely on facilities in Kazan, Russia, which is where Mi-17s are produced and manufactured. A bit more to that,
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also see
https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/make-in-india-iaf-mi-17-choppers-russia-1938341-2022-04-16
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Russia-India trade. Indian state-owned refineries announced plans to buy as much Russian oil as possible, assuming that big discounts and direct contracts will be offered. Meanwhile, India resumed the export of tea and food products, including rice, fruit, coffee, seafood and confectionery goods, to Russia last week. According to Indian media, these transactions are being carried out in rubles and rupees “to the extent possible.”
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https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2022/05/lawmakers-worry-pentagon-will-shortchange-indopacoms-budget-request/366378/
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So who is buying Russian stuff. Note: the USA buys more than India and Europe buys a lot. Yet they pressure India to stop buying!
(https://static.toiimg.com/thumb/imgsize-23456,msid-91143794,width-600,resizemode-4/91143794.jpg)
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May 6, 2022
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India Powers Down
Energy disruptions are threatening the country's economic recovery.
By: Geopolitical Futures
India's Heatwaves
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Although India has some of the world’s largest coal reserves, its massive power consumption means that it also must import coal to meet its energy needs. India is facing a two-part coal conundrum: supply shortages and rising prices. Oil and natural gas prices were already rising as economies across the globe came back online from the pandemic. Between the recovery and the price hikes provoked by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many countries turned to cheaper energy alternatives, including coal. This, in turn, pushed up coal prices.
The situation is concerning for the Indian economy on several fronts. April’s power demand was well above peak consumption last summer, and power plants are now in a weaker position to meet upcoming summer demand. Coal shortages and slumping inventories have created electricity shortages in major Indian cities, including New Delhi, where hospitals have been affected. Sixty percent of households in India have already experienced some level of daily power cuts. The government is making plans to increase domestic coal output and reduce coal supplies to the non-power sector. The supply cuts will affect aluminum smelters, steel mills and other industrial activities, risking the country’s economic recovery.
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Food shortage worsens...Fertilizer shortage too and Biden now wants to get tough on OPEC.
https://mishtalk.com/economics/poor-crop-estimates-aggravate-food-shortages-india-resorts-to-protectionism (https://mishtalk.com/economics/poor-crop-estimates-aggravate-food-shortages-india-resorts-to-protectionism)
https://mishtalk.com/economics/u-s-senate-passes-antitrust-bill-targeting-opec-its-ridiculous-and-ironic (https://mishtalk.com/economics/u-s-senate-passes-antitrust-bill-targeting-opec-its-ridiculous-and-ironic)
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https://twitter.com/backtolife_2022/status/1526202406316523520?s=21&t=07g0LNxX0MuhQs8c3-F6cQ
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/2175099/india-the-massive-powder-keg
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MY goes pretty fg far out there sometimes. I ran my post of yesterday by a certain Indian born and raised (now American citizen with security clearance) friend yesterday and he concurred with what MY says in the post.
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India’s Last Best Chance
Choosing the West Over Russia Could Make New Delhi a Great Power
By Lisa Curtis
May 31, 2022
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/india/2022-05-31/indias-last-best-chance
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India’s neutrality over the war in Ukraine has exposed its vulnerability. New Delhi depends on Russia for military supplies, and so, even though Russia is blatantly violating Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty in an attempt to re-create its erstwhile empire, India has opted to stay silent. It has done so even though India, as a former colony, knows all too well what it’s like to be the victim of imperialism. It has done so even though its own territorial integrity is threatened by another authoritarian power—namely, China. India, it seems, feels caught in a vise grip by Moscow.
To some extent, New Delhi’s concerns are understandable. Russian President Vladimir Putin has not been shy about cutting trade with states that condemn his invasion. But viewed more broadly, New Delhi’s approach is shortsighted and risky. It ignores the dangerous precedent that Russia’s reckless behavior is setting in other parts of the world. It provides diplomatic cover to China—Moscow’s most conspicuous international backer—to also ignore Russia’s bad behavior. And although criticizing the invasion might worsen relations with Russia, refusing to take a stand could alienate an even more powerful country: the United States.
The prospect of upsetting Washington should be particularly concerning for Indian policymakers. The United States has become one of New Delhi’s most important partners, particularly as India tries to stand up to Chinese aggression in the Himalayas. But although Washington is not happy that New Delhi has refused to condemn Russian aggression, Indian policymakers have calculated that their country is so central to U.S. efforts to counterbalance China that India will remain immune to a potential backlash. So far, they’ve been right; the United States has issued only muted criticisms of Indian neutrality. Yet Washington’s patience is not endless, and the longer Russia prosecutes its war without India changing its position, the more likely the United States will be to view India as an unreliable partner. It may not want to, but ultimately New Delhi will have to pick between Russia and the West.
It should choose the West. The United States and its allies can offer India more—diplomatically, financially, and militarily—than can Russia. They can better help New Delhi stand up to China. In the short term, this reorientation may make procurement difficult for India’s military, but Russia’s invasion has already weakened Moscow’s ability to provide India with supplies. New Delhi, then, has little to lose by throwing its lot in with the United States and Europe, and it ought to use Russia’s invasion as an opportunity to boldly shift away from Moscow.
GO WEST
When it comes to the war, India is something of an outlier among the world’s democracies. The United States, Canada, almost all of Europe, and multiple countries in Asia and the Pacific—including Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and Taiwan—have condemned and sanctioned Russia for its invasion of Ukraine. India, by contrast, has remained neutral.
Indeed, New Delhi has arguably even supported Moscow. Unlike most of the world, it has actively increased its economic ties to Russia since the war began. According to The New York Times, India’s crude oil purchases from Russia went from 33,000 barrels per day in 2021 to 300,000 barrels a day in March and then to 700,000 a day in April. Indian importers are purchasing Russian liquified natural gas on the so-called spot market at reduced prices. India’s buys are still far smaller than those made by European countries, but the latter states are working to drastically reduce their dependence on Moscow. India, by contrast, has handed Russia a possible lifeline. It’s no surprise, then, that Moscow has praised New Delhi for, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov put it, “taking this situation in the entirety of facts, not just in a one-sided way.”
For now, U.S. officials have been tolerant of India’s behavior. They understand that the country relies on Russian military hardware, and they recognize that India cannot break its dependence overnight. But there’s a difference between neutrality and support, and as Russian atrocities mount and India continues to import large amounts of Russian crude oil and gas, Washington may begin to see New Delhi as an enabler. To preserve the United States’ deepening relationship with India, U.S. policymakers will want to ensure that India is not facilitating Russia’s invasion.
They will also want New Delhi to turn to other military suppliers. If India doesn’t do so, it will become more difficult for the United States to increase its transfer of sophisticated defense technologies to New Delhi, since Washington cannot expose its high-tech equipment to Russian systems. Under the U.S. Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, India could even face economic penalties for its ties to Moscow. India recently purchased an S-400 air defense system from Russia, and unless U.S. President Joe Biden decides to waive the penalties for national security reasons, Indian officials could be hit with restrictions on access to U.S. loans from U.S. financial institutions and prohibitions on bank transactions subject to U.S. jurisdictions, among other sanctions. The White House appeared to be on a path to waive the sanctions, but that was before Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine. Now, it is no longer clear what the administration will do.
New Delhi has arguably supported Moscow.
Thankfully for Indian-U.S. relations, there are signs that India may be starting to reduce its military ties with Moscow. The country has been gradually cutting its defense imports from Russia over the last several years, and Indian media recently reported that the country has cancelled plans to upgrade its Russian Su-30 MKI fighter aircraft because the war has made it harder for Moscow to supply New Delhi with spare parts. This month, India halted negotiations with Russia to acquire ten Ka-31 airborne early warning helicopters, also over concerns about Moscow’s ability to fulfill the order. But 80 percent of the country’s current military stocks still consist of Russian-origin equipment.
For India, curtailing dependence on Russian military gear is not just the right move for moral reasons. Ultimately, it will also help advance the Indian’s military modernization goals. As Russia becomes poorer and increasingly isolated, it will be less and less able to assist the Indian military (a fact that the canceled orders illustrate). That’s because Russia will have fewer high-quality weapons to sell, and it will need to focus more on replenishing its own military stocks, particularly as it loses access to critical Western technologies. New Delhi, then, should move quickly to find other countries that manufacture spares and upgrades for Russian-made equipment. And over the long term, India should focus on building up domestic military production so that it becomes less dependent on other countries for its national defense.
CARROTS WITHOUT STICKS
India has refused to condemn Russia’s invasion for reasons beyond just its military needs. Moscow has long offered diplomatic support to India, including over the issue of Kashmir, and New Delhi is reticent to antagonize a friend. But in recent years, Russia has become far less dependable. For example, Russia has recently made overtures to Pakistan, perhaps India’s biggest antagonist. Last year, Lavrov visited Islamabad, and he pledged that Moscow would boost military cooperation and construct a $2.5 billion gas pipeline between Pakistani cities—Russia’s first major economic investment in Pakistan in 50 years.
Even more alarming for New Delhi was the release of Beijing and Moscow’s historic joint manifesto. Announced on February 4, following a meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the 5,000-plus word document heralded an era of newly deep Chinese-Russian relations. For India, this partnership could not come at a worse time. In June 2020, Beijing and New Delhi came to blows after China spent months deliberately building up its forces at several points along the Line of Actual Control that divides the two nations. The resulting fight killed 20 Indian soldiers and at least four Chinese troops—the first deaths along the disputed border since 1975.
Following the clash, New Delhi turned to Moscow for diplomatic assistance, hoping that Russia could defuse tensions and prevent an all-out conflict. Indian officials calculated that Russia had more influence and leverage with Beijing than did any other country, and that it might therefore be able to get China to step back. And Moscow did host a virtual Russia-China-India trilateral meeting of foreign ministers shortly after the fight.
Moscow has long offered support to India, and New Delhi is reticent to antagonize a friend.
But ultimately it was Washington that backed India with robust material and moral support in its time of crisis. It publicly vowed to stand with India in the country’s efforts to protect its territorial sovereignty, and it expedited the leasing of two MQ-9B surveillance drones. It gave winter military gear to Indian troops. Most important, Washington enhanced information and intelligence sharing with New Delhi. This marked a turning point in Indian-U.S. relations. Before the clash, Indian policymakers had actively debated whether India could count on the United States for support in a conflict with China. Washington’s response made it clear that the answer is yes.
In the years since, ties between the two countries have only grown stronger. The U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, released in mid-February, made clear that India plays a critical role in Washington’s efforts to compete with Beijing. The Biden administration further affirmed U.S.-Indian ties in April by hosting a 2+2 dialogue between the U.S. secretary of state, the U.S. secretary of defense, and their Indian counterparts. It added a virtual meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi at the last minute, further signaling the importance of U.S.-Indian relations.
The United States’ allies have largely followed its lead. British Prime Minister Boris Johnson made a visit to India in April to advance negotiations on a British-Indian trade deal and to streamline licensing for British military exports. Three days later, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited New Delhi, where she and Modi agreed to establish a joint trade and technology council and to resume negotiations on an EU-Indian free trade agreement.
Washington should not pressure India to criticize Russia.
These steps have all signaled to India that it is welcome to partner with the West. But if the United States wants to move New Delhi further into its camp and away from Moscow’s, it should take additional measures. Washington could give New Delhi even more access to sensitive U.S. technologies that would enhance Indian defense capabilities. It could also provide incentives to U.S. private companies to co-develop and co-produce additional high-tech military equipment in India. It might make its military gear more affordable for India. Recent media reports indicate Washington may be getting ready to take a step in this direction by providing a $500 million Foreign Military Financing package to incentivize India to purchase U.S. weapons. (Given India’s robust defense requirements, however, this is still a small amount.)
What Washington should not do is pressure India to criticize Russia. New Delhi strongly values having an independent foreign policy, and so it would bristle at being told how to act. But U.S. officials can be clear that they will offer India more help, more quickly, if the country reduces its reliance on Russian military systems.
The United States can also help woo India by encouraging the Quad to cooperate on Ukraine in policy domains where all members can agree. During the 2+2 talks, for example, Indian and U.S. officials discussed how to deal with global fuel and food shortages stemming from the war. Biden, Modi, and the Quad’s other two leaders (the prime ministers of Australia and Japan) should also discuss these brewing crises. Talking about such issues will be productive—every member of the Quad has a strong incentive in stopping famines—while avoiding excoriations of India for its neutral position on the war. India wants to be engaged, not shamed, and so this lighter approach is Washington’s best bet for bringing India’s response to the war in Ukraine into alignment with its own.
FRIENDS IN HIGH PLACES
For India, closely embracing the West may be discomforting. New Delhi has a proud tradition of strategic autonomy, and it prefers a multipolar world in which it does not have to choose between major geopolitical blocs. Beijing knows this and has been happy to play into India’s concerns. It relishes the current situation in no small part because it views the conflict as an opportunity to woo India with promises of a multipolar world while at the same time driving a wedge between New Delhi and Washington.
But India should recognize that it would be a loser in such a system. China and Russia’s version of multipolarity would make it easier for authoritarian powers with revisionist goals to redraw borders, as China hopes to do in the Himalayas. Beijing and Moscow’s manifesto should underscore these risks. As part of the document, both states criticized the U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy—which promises stronger cooperation with India.
But the best way for the country to protect itself is to not play into China’s and Russia’s hands. It is, instead, to exude strength—including by speaking out against Russian aggression, rather than being cowed by Moscow. And that means New Delhi should deepen its partnership with the United States, the country best positioned to help India achieve its great-power ambitions.
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Handle the India-U.S. Relationship With Care
The world’s largest democracy often sees things very differently than America.
By Walter Russell Mead
June 6, 2022 7:03 pm ET
Superficially, the U.S.-India relationship looks like a success. With both countries focused on China, business ties steadily deepening, and U.S.-Pakistan relations in a deep freeze, many of the old obstacles to the relationship have disappeared.
But an intense week of meetings in Bangalore and Delhi with politicians, think tankers, religious leaders and journalists made clear that while Americans and Indians share strategic and economic interests, and we both value democracy, we remain divided by important differences in values and perceptions. Unless managed carefully, these differences could derail U.S.-India cooperation at a critical time.
Americans and Indians often see the same problem in very different ways. India, for example, does not see Russia’s attack on Ukraine as a threat to world order. While Americans have been disturbed by India’s continued willingness to buy oil from Russia, Indians resent the West’s attempt to rally global support for what many here see as a largely Western problem in Ukraine. Pointing out that Europeans scarcely noticed China’s attacks on Indian frontier posts in 2020, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar told a conference in Bratislava, Slovakia, last week that “Europe has to grow out of the mindset that Europe’s problems are the world’s problems.”
More generally, Indians bristle when they sense Americans and Europeans getting together to write global rules. The more that American Wilsonians talk about a values-based international order, the more that Indians worry about Western arrogance. Many Indians want a strong Russia and, within limits, a strong China precisely to help guard against the kind of world order President Biden and many of his advisers want to build.
This is more than the postcolonial suspicion of Western intentions that India has long shared with many other non-Western countries. The Hindu nationalist movement that has replaced the long-ruling Congress Party with a new political system built around the Bharatiya Janata Party and its charismatic leader, Narendra Modi, has brought a new dynamism to Indian foreign policy. This new nationalist India wants to increase and develop Indian power, not submerge Indian sovereignty in Western-designed international institutions.
The domestic agenda of the Hindu nationalist movement can also cause problems for the U.S.-India relationship. For Hindu nationalists, the rule of the Muslim Mughal emperors, some of whom destroyed ancient Hindu temples and built mosques on their ruins, was as much a disaster as British colonialism for Indian civilization. It is not enough to send the British packing; the liberation of India means placing Hindu civilization back at the center of Indian cultural and political life. Many BJP supporters want the Indian government to defend India’s Hindu civilization and culture from Islam, Christianity and Western secular liberalism.
This form of Hindu nationalism leads to controversial policy initiatives. Tough restrictions on the ability of foreign organizations to fund civil-society groups in India threaten to disrupt the activities of American charities ranging from the Ford Foundation to the Catholic Church. Anti-conversion laws put obstacles in the path of both Christian and Muslim missionary efforts, and Hindu women wishing to marry out of the faith sometimes face severe social and governmental pressures. Communal violence, a problem in India since the days of the British raj, has risen in recent years. Indian Muslims often express fears for their personal security.
American human-rights groups have responded to these developments with increasing concern, and last week Secretary of State Antony Blinken named India as a country “where religious freedom and the rights of religious minorities are under threat.” Such statements do more to trigger anticolonial and anti-Western sentiments than to relieve minority communities. Hindu nationalism is, among other things, a demand that Indian civilization be accepted as the moral and spiritual equal of the West. America has its racial problems and mass shootings, Indians say. What gives Americans the right to tell India how to live?
These conflicts aren’t going away and will likely get worse over time. Hindu nationalism is here to stay. So are India’s communal tensions, and so too for that matter is the belief of many Americans that they have a solemn duty to tell people in other countries and cultures how to live—and to impose sanctions on those unhappy occasions when they fail to take our advice. If bilateral relations are to prosper, Indians and Americans need to find better ways to manage these chronic issues.
India and the U.S. are raucously democratic societies, and their foreign policies cannot ignore public opinion. Managing this critical relationship is never going to be easy. Building deeper ties between the two societies will help; so too will quiet, low-key conversations aimed at preventing blowups before they occur. Both sides need this relationship; we both need to focus on making it work.
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It is understandable that the US govt wants India to side with the west and the USA. The problem is that there is decades of Indian experience where the US has imposed sanctions on India, or supported Pak with weapons that kill Indians. In contrast, Russia has been a steadfast ally, though that is changing as it moves closer to China, while India moves closer to the USA. India is completely dependent on Russia for weapons and supplies, around 70 % of which are Russian in origin. Russia also shares technology that the US would never do, eg that relating to nuclear subs, it also leases nuclear powered subs to India. Even today, the US keeps threatening to put CAATSA sanctions on India for buying Russian S-400 missiles. France is another country, which has always supported India, especially with military technology and there is good mutual trust.
So things are changing slowly, my guess is it takes another decade or so before their is enough trust. Indian purchases of US weapons are increasing all the time, but it will take one obtuse move by the US to set back Indo-US relations by decades.
What the US needs to learn is that the carrot and stick (threats) approach does not work with India, it only hardens anti-US resolve. US India policy needs to be stable and ironclad (like how it was by the Russians). The second thing is that any pro Pak overtures are perceived very negatively in India. This pro Pak policy stems from the US desire to strengthen Pak, so that India does not gain an upper hand against pak. Now they do the same vis a vis China, though in this instance it benefits India. The concern is that as soon as US-China relations improve, India will be sacrificed and so full trust is never obtained.
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So India just started a new scheme to recruit youngsters into the army "Agnipath", where they are trained by army for 4 years and then a portion can join the army and the rest remain in civilian service or paramilitary. My brain is in hyperdrive speculative mode. Could this be a prelude to a war on POK/China, where it is anticipated that a lot more army trained civilians and soldiers are needed for a succesful two front war (note the problems Russia is facing with respect to lack of enough soldiers). Timing of India taking POK, could coincide with China making a move on Taiwan.
There are many other hints..connect the dots.
- China is building infrastructure near the border (incase India makes a grab for territory), when China is distracted with Taiwan.
- India is pushing for new military hardware from US and also giving rapid clearance to Indian weapons systems, planes etc.
- Indian border infrastructure is being pushed, literally on a war footing.
- It is an election promise by the Modi govt
- Pak economy has collapsed and is quite weak.
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Import boom. Indian imports of Russian commodities increased sharply in July. Russia became India’s top fertilizer supplier, while oil imports reached a record 1 million barrels per day. Imports of Russian coal and sunflower oil also grew, with Russia now India’s third largest coal supplier and 10th largest source of imports overall. India expects last month’s introduction of a new rupee settlement mechanism to help further boost its bilateral trade with Russia.
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I don’t think China has the bandwidth for a war with India while fighting over Taiwan.
So India just started a new scheme to recruit youngsters into the army "Agnipath", where they are trained by army for 4 years and then a portion can join the army and the rest remain in civilian service or paramilitary. My brain is in hyperdrive speculative mode. Could this be a prelude to a war on POK/China, where it is anticipated that a lot more army trained civilians and soldiers are needed for a succesful two front war (note the problems Russia is facing with respect to lack of enough soldiers). Timing of India taking POK, could coincide with China making a move on Taiwan.
There are many other hints..connect the dots.
- China is building infrastructure near the border (incase India makes a grab for territory), when China is distracted with Taiwan.
- India is pushing for new military hardware from US and also giving rapid clearance to Indian weapons systems, planes etc.
- Indian border infrastructure is being pushed, literally on a war footing.
- It is an election promise by the Modi govt
- Pak economy has collapsed and is quite weak.
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I have been forgetting to consider this variable.
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- I will add, that Rajnath Singh, India's Defense Minister recently gave a speech (albeit in a War memorial Setting), with certain religious allegories that POK will be India's soon. The story has been consistent from various cabinet ministers, timing likely to be before 2024 elections. Now with the strong dollar causing havoc even in India, it might give the politicians an incentive to start a war. Pak is essentially bankrupt, populace is angry and suffering, they too need a diversion. Its been a while that Pak has not created a big terror incident in India. So if China or Pak would please do the honors...
- This year the govt has started a new scheme to encourage people to have a flag in every home for Independence day (Aug 15), particularly in Kashmir. There are plenty of videos with Kashmiri adults and young kids singing Indian songs and allegiance to India. This has not happened before, infact Kashmiris only raised Pak flags in the past. All of this is to create an image for POK to join India. The Govt has also spent a ton of money to improve the situation in Kashmir, with jobs and development, violence has almost disappeared. The people of POK must support the merger and the govt is doing everything it can to show a contrast with Pak, who currently manages POK (disastrously).
I will keep documenting such changes...hopefully am reading the tea leaves correctly..
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India no longer reiterates, One-China Policy..since around 2008. Here India is taking a harder stance than the USA.
“We conveyed that if the Chinese side desired India to state the One-China policy, then it should respect a One-India principle,” said another former official.
https://island.lk/india-maintains-loud-silence-on-taiwan-crisis-its-one-china-policy/
"One India" is code for POK, Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh etc, which India claims from Pak or China. In practice, only POK can be gotten back, the rest will need negotiations.
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Good.
India no longer reiterates, One-China Policy..since around 2008. Here India is taking a harder stance than the USA.
“We conveyed that if the Chinese side desired India to state the One-China policy, then it should respect a One-India principle,” said another former official.
https://island.lk/india-maintains-loud-silence-on-taiwan-crisis-its-one-china-policy/
"One India" is code for POK, Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh etc, which India claims from Pak or China. In practice, only POK can be gotten back, the rest will need negotiations.
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Here's one more thing.
https://www.deccanherald.com/national/after-pelosi-s-visit-to-taiwan-now-india-snubs-china-on-tibet-deploys-military-chopper-to-fly-dalai-lama-in-ladakh-1135009.html
Modi also wished the Dalai Lama Happy Birthday, an activity frowned upon by China. Now the D.Lama getting to fly on military choppers!
(https://www.deccanherald.com/sites/dh/files/styles/article_detail/public/articleimages/2022/08/11/dalai-spec-1135009-1660185449.jpg?itok=93nP1XaZ)
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https://preview.redd.it/53v8srj4zaz81.jpg?width=836&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=5fa2e6339ada03d2402e055b08025c1c693c9499
(https://preview.redd.it/53v8srj4zaz81.jpg?width=836&format=pjpg&auto=webp&s=5fa2e6339ada03d2402e055b08025c1c693c9499)
Here's one more thing.
https://www.deccanherald.com/national/after-pelosi-s-visit-to-taiwan-now-india-snubs-china-on-tibet-deploys-military-chopper-to-fly-dalai-lama-in-ladakh-1135009.html
Modi also wished the Dalai Lama Happy Birthday, an activity frowned upon by China. Now the D.Lama getting to fly on military choppers!
(https://www.deccanherald.com/sites/dh/files/styles/article_detail/public/articleimages/2022/08/11/dalai-spec-1135009-1660185449.jpg?itok=93nP1XaZ)
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Ghandi is no longer revered
as per this article
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/indias-75th-anniversary-is-one-to-forget/2022/08/11/1351657e-19e6-11ed-b998-b2ab68f58468_story.html
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And this article, says "As Beijing ups pressure on Taiwan, Washington sends signal on potential 2nd front", with military exercises 60 miles from the India-China border. While I do not think India would go to war with China over Taiwan, they could make a move on POK, where China has invested heavily in the Belt and Road Initiative (aka CPEC in Pak)
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Indo-Pacific/U.S.-India-prepare-for-mountaintop-drills-near-China-border
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I found this gem in an unrelated video “That probably would include Australia, but it would certainly include India, and the Indian factor is one which Beijing does not wish to discuss openly. Even in the current war game posture against Taiwan, the PLA started moving additional forces down into the Tibetan plateau to be ready for an Indian response there. The Indian response would be massive. India has a similar force capability in many respects to the People’s Republic of China, and could move the entirety of its forces against the PRC, both on the Tibetan plateau and in the Eurasian context, but also in the Indian Ocean in a naval context,” he added."
https://youtu.be/lG0phJFEvZY
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THINKING ABOUT CHINA
Why Are China, India, and the US so Interested in Nepal?
John Mac Ghlionn
John Mac Ghlionn
August 15, 2022 Updated: August 15, 2022biggersmaller Print
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I currently reside in Nepal, a small, landlocked country. The home of Mount Everest, the world’s highest mountain peak, Nepal is known for exporting very little and importing quite a lot, with the people of Nepal relying heavily on tourism as a source of income.
Then, one wonders, why are three of the most powerful countries—China, India, and the United States—so interested in a country roughly the size of Illinois?
Nepal shares a border with India. But as the movie “Grumpy Old Men” taught us, neighbors don’t always get along. Despite linguistic, religious, and cultural similarities, India and Nepal are not on good terms. In fact, the two countries haven’t been on good terms for decades.
In recent times, the governments of both countries have clashed over the Kalapani territory, a sort of no-man’s-land that lies at the eastern border of Uttarakhand, a state in northern India crossed by the Himalayas, and Nepal’s Sudurpashchim Pradesh. Although the territory is under Indian rule, the Nepali people argue that their neighbors have stolen what’s rightfully theirs. India never tires of angering the people of Nepal, and because of this, the Nepali government has become increasingly close with their other neighbors in China. Not surprisingly, the Indian government is clearly worried about the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) growing presence in Nepal.
Epoch Times Photo
China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi (R) with Nepal’s Foreign Minister Narayan Khadka wave prior to their meeting at Singhadurbar in Kathmandu, Nepal, on March 26, 2022. (Prakash Mathema/AFP via Getty Images)
Another country that is worried about the influence of Beijing is the United States. In 2015, Nepal applied to be a part of the U.S. State Partnership Program (SPP), a joint security cooperation program between the Department of Defense (DOD) and foreign countries. Established in 1993, the program now has 77 partners around the world. In June of this year, however, Nepal’s government had a change of heart, officially communicating that the land of 30 million people was no longer interested in joining the SPP.
Why?
Some critics have argued that the SPP is closely aligned with the United States’ Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS), a tactical plan designed to address the threat from China. Nepal, it seems, has little interest in angering its Chinese neighbors. That’s because Sino-Nepalese relations are supposedly marked by reciprocity and cooperation.
Nepal is not a rich country. Its per capita income is a little over $1,000. Its infrastructure leaves a lot to be desired. Nepal needs all the investment it can get. China is only too willing to assist. Last year, Nepal received $268 million in foreign direct investment. China provided 71 percent ($188 million) of it. The question, though, is why? Why is China so interested in Nepal?
First, there is a degree of FOMO (fear of missing out). If China doesn’t get in there, the CCP fears that its two biggest rivals, India and the United States, will. Second, Nepal, firmly nestled between India and China, occupies a location of real geostrategic significance. Third, Nepal has an abundance of valuable minerals like coal, iron, copper, and limestone.
There’s also a fourth, extremely intriguing reason that explains China’s interest. As Lt. Gen. Chauhan, a commander with the Indian Army, recently noted, “the slightest stir in Nepal will have a residual effect on India and China, especially in Tibet.” Nepal is, in many ways, “the gateway to the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR).” Chauhan believes Nepal now “plays a vital role in China’s South Asia outreach and the gateway to the Indo –Gangetic Plains of India, in many ways the heartland of India.” The Chinese, he warns readers, view Nepal as “the soft underbelly of Southern Tibet and are now determined to keep it under their influence.”
Epoch Times Photo
Exiled Tibetans at an event honoring the 78th birthday of the Dalai Lama, at Manag monastery in Kathmandu, Nepal, on July 6, 2013. (Prakash Mathema/AFP/Getty Images)
This brings us to the Dalai Lama, a man synonymous with Tibet.
In 1959, when China annexed Tibet, Gyalwa Rinpoche, the 14th and current Dalai Lama, fled to the Indian city of Dharamsala. Situated on the edge of the Himalayas, the city is home to a large number of exiled Tibetans, the Dalai Lama included. Like us all, the spiritual guru is not getting any younger. He recently celebrated his 87th birthday. A successor must be chosen. The Dalai Lama has spoken about the possibility of his successor coming from a “free country.” He has also floated the idea of an “attractive” female replacement.
Naturally, the CCP has other plans. Beijing has made it abundantly clear that the Dalai Lama’s successor will be chosen by Chinese leader Xi Jinping and his colleagues. According to the Chinese foreign ministry, “the reincarnation must comply with Chinese laws and regulations, follow rituals and historic conventions.”
We now face the very real possibility of two successors being chosen—one by the Dalai Lama and one by the CCP. Contrary to popular belief, Buddha was born in Nepal, not India. If Nepal were to throw its weight behind the CCP’s candidate, it would add a veneer of credibility (albeit a very light one) to the Chinese candidate.
It’s clear to see that Nepal is a country of real significance, thus explaining why China, India, and the United States are so interested in this highly volatile, multicultural state. Nepal, it seems, is only interested in one of its suitors. As I finish writing this short piece, Narayan Khadka, Nepal’s foreign minister, is preparing to board a plane to China, much to the United States’ dismay. At a time of heightened tensions between Beijing and Washington, Kathmandu is siding with the former and shunning the latter.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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This fits in with what I have been saying...Infact, India must take back territories in POK at a minimum, were China to invade Taiwan. China would not have a great interest to interfere, since India has some legal backing for its actions, same as China has some claims over Taiwan. Once POK is taken, the CPEC/BRI corridor through Pak is broken and China would have less interest to fight India.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/pelosis-visit-spurs-chinese-discussions-on-a-two-front-crisis/
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For Sri Lanka, India's Anger Over a Chinese Ship Visit Highlights a Foreign Policy Dilemma
5 MIN READAug 29, 2022 | 20:21 GMT
China's ambassador to Sri Lanka (left) gestures upon the arrival of China's research and survey vessel, the Yuan Wang 5, at the Hambantota port on Aug. 16, 2022.
China's ambassador to Sri Lanka (left) gestures upon the arrival of China's research and survey vessel, the Yuan Wang 5, at the Hambantota port on Aug. 16, 2022.
(ISHARA S. KODIKARA/AFP via Getty Images)
A recent diplomatic spat between Sri Lanka and India over a Chinese ship highlights the extent to which Colombo's foreign policy — which is focused on securing strong ties with (and financial aid from) both Beijing and New Delhi — could become increasingly harder to sustain. A Chinese military research ship left the Sri Lankan port of Hambantota on Aug. 22 after docking there for a week. The ship's presence in the Sri Lankan port had led to a small diplomatic row between Sri Lanka and India, as New Delhi protested the arrival of a Chinese vessel with the ability to potentially survey India's underwater and maritime installations in the area. According to media reports, the Sri Lankan government considered not granting permission to the vessel under Indian pressure, which highlights Colombo's delicate balancing act between New Delhi and Beijing. The ship strolled into Indian Ocean waters before being permitted to enter the country as Sri Lanka appeared to cave under China's pressure.
The Chinese research ship Wang Yuan V was originally due to visit the port of Hambantota on Aug. 11. Sri Lanka asked China to defer the visit on Aug. 8.
China has argued the Wang Yuan V is a scientific research ship that poses no security threat to any country. However, the vessel is capable of tracking satellites and intercontinental missile launches.
The Hambantota International Port is Sri Lanka's second largest port. China Merchants Port owns a controlling stake in the port and was awarded a 99-year lease on it in 2017. India, whose bilateral relationship with China has become tenser in recent years, is concerned about China potentially using the Hambantota port for military activities as a part of Beijing's growing assertiveness in global power competition.
Sri Lanka's seemingly indecisive action reflects the dilemma it faces in order to maintain good relations with both China and India as their bilateral competition increases. Sri Lanka has traditionally been under India's sphere of influence, but over the past decade, it has moved closer to China, which has increasingly provided economic, financial and logistical support to the island nation's critical infrastructure development. Moreover, while in recent months Sri Lanka has relied on Indian credit lines for food and fuel to cope with its severe social and economic crisis, Beijing continues to be the biggest bilateral creditor for Colombo. Sri Lanka's balancing act also takes place on security issues, as Colombo has signed several defense agreements with New Delhi over the years while also seeking to avoid any moves that China would see as a provocation.
Under the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord signed in 1998, both Sri Lanka and India have pledged to prevent any action that would be a threat to each other's national security. In April 2022, India and Sri Lanka signed a series of agreements to increase maritime security cooperation in the southern Indian Ocean, including the donation of Indian military equipment to Sri Lanka. This reflects New Delhi's increasing concern about China's maritime presence in the area.
Sri Lanka has also sought to maintain close security cooperation with China. In recent years, Beijing has provided Colombo with military equipment and training. In 2014, Sri Lanka permitted Chinese nuclear submarines to dock at Colombo, despite India's objection. In 2017, however, Sri Lanka rejected another Chinese submarine's entry under Indian pressure.
While unlikely to substantially impact Sri Lanka's relations with India and China, the recent ship episode also shows how Colombo's balancing act between the two regional powers increasingly risks alienating one or both of its key financial supporters. Sri Lanka's severe social, political and economic crises means that the country will need financial support from both India and China going forward. In the coming months, Sri Lanka will try to convince China to restructure its debt to comply with the International Monetary Fund's requirements for a bailout package. Sri Lanka is also heavily reliant on India for continued fuel, food and fertilizer aid. The recent diplomatic spat regarding the Chinese ship is unlikely to alter India or China's greater calculus in regards to maintaining support to Sri Lanka, though the episode still carries a small risk of New Delhi temporarily suspending aid to Colombo in retaliation for allowing a Chinese military vessel to dock at a Sri Lankan port. This could prolong Sri Lanka's ongoing economic crisis by further impeding food production, transport and electricity generation on the island. More broadly, India and China's growing rivalry could make it increasingly tricky for Sri Lanka to maintain its balancing act between the two regional powers in which Colombo selectively turns to New Delhi and Beijing for investment and financial aid. As geopolitical competition in the wider Indo-Pacific region increases, Sri Lanka could also be under growing pressure from the United States not to move too closely to China, which could close the door to a significant source of investment and credit.
With a 10% share of its foreign debt, China is the biggest bilateral creditor of Sri Lanka.
India has provided Sri Lanka with roughly $4 billion worth of economic aid so far this year. India is also the only country that has sent fuel to Sri Lanka in recent months to help mitigate widespread energy shortages on the island.
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MY
", , , the entire South Asian human-ecosystem is collapsing. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal — these countries all surround…INDIA."
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Yes, the strength of the US$ is destroying the emerging markets as well as developed markets. In the meantime, India records a 13.5 % GDP for the quarter.
https://yourstory.com/2022/08/india-gdp-expands-135-pc-in-first-quarter-2022/amp
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Ya
13.5% wow
are Indian stocks a buy?
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I dont follow Indian stocks...but today India became the 5th largest economy in the world, displacing its colonial master UK. I would not invest abroad, due to the strength of the US $. One must wait, until the Fed pivots or cuts rates.
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A few interesting coincidences happening with the passing of Queen Eliz II, signifying the end of an era.
- India passes the UK as the 5th largest economy.
- India installs the statue of Bose a patriot, where the statue of King George V used to reside in New Delhi. @ an important site in the capital.
- Rajpath "Highway of kings" named after the british monarchs and which is the major road in New Delhi, was renamed with an Indian name.
- The Indian Navy flag has had the King George cross on it for the last 75 years, it was replaced with another national emblem.
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In the meantime the Biden admin is back to its old playbook of supporting Pak with arms. Trump stopped it in 2018, Biden restarted it, to a country which harbored Bin Laden. 9/11 is now a distant memory.
I suppose its payback for India buying oil from Russia, but this is the exact reason why the India-US relationship remains transactional. Everytime there is a step forward, sooner or later it slides back.
https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/us-approves-450-million-f-16-fleet-sustainment-programme-to-pakistan-101662610278368.html
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Important news, India-China pull back from point of contact. This is huge news. After 2 years of a tough Indian stance, both sides have agreed to essentially go back to their original positions and dismantle new structures. The Chinese realized the futility of their stance, which I can say they very rarely do, unless forced. The interesting question is why now ?.
- Taiwan in the works ?
- Just as the US tried to drive a wedge between Russia and China and draw Russia to the west, could the Chinese be interested to draw India into the Dragon-Bear relationship and drive a wedge with the USA ?.
- Modi is planning to meet Xi quite soon
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FcNjnLaacAEkx-N?format=jpg&name=medium) (https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FcIxeNLaUAA1k4u?format=jpg&name=small)
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"The Chinese realized the futility of their stance, which I can say they very rarely do, unless forced. The interesting question is why now ?
- Taiwan in the works ?" ...
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That's the question, and the only answer I can think of.
Whatever the motive was at the Indian border, it isn't as high as priority as what they have planned with Taiwan.
Xi sees a short window before the US is back under strong leadership.
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/china-could-invade-taiwan-within-next-18-months-before-next-us-presidential-election-sources
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I am not an expert on Taiwan issues, but does anyone know what might be a good season for a Chinese assault on Taiwan. If India was to make a move on POK, Nov-May can be snow bound and not convenient from an India point of view. So perversely, from a Chinese POV, thats the best time for an assault.
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I am not an expert on Taiwan issues, but does anyone know what might be a good season for a Chinese assault on Taiwan. If India was to make a move on POK, Nov-May can be snow bound and not convenient from an India point of view. So perversely, from a Chinese POV, thats the best time for an assault.
From what I recall, spring and fall are the only times the S. China Sea has conditions favorable for an amphibious operation.
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FWIW, Admiral Denny thinks that all the Chinese need to do is a naval blockade. No chips for us, and a seige for Taiwan. Our Pentagon already knows that in theater the Chinese can kick our ass fast and hard.
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But that could lead to a potential blockade of any China traffic thro the Malacca Straights. If I was She Gin Ping, to make it worth the risk, I would invade Taiwan and bear the consequences. In a few years the blockade will be lifted and we get back to business. China is too big to sanction forever. That will be his calculation, same as Putin's wrt Ukraine. The future markets are in Asia and Africa. Dont think the Dragon-Bear thinks they have a long term future with the west.
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"Dont think the Dragon-Bear thinks they have a long term future with the west."
Agree- which is why it was so stupid of us to drive Russia into China's arms.
I wish the Ukes success (and at the moment it looks like they are doing very well) but even should they succeed (and how do we define that?) as far as America is concerned, the Russian-Chinese alliance of interests is a very bad development.
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Germany next...India moving upwards. With the current situation, it could happen quickly.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FccKW6FWAAEoEnA?format=jpg&name=medium)
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India's Modi rebuked Putin, saying "today's era is not an era of war," according to public remarks Friday in Samarkand, according to Reuters. Putin reportedly responded by thanking India for buying Russian fertilizers, the sales of which "have grown more than eight fold," said the Russian leader.
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Well, it was a very mild rebuke, if at all. Below you can hear the actual video of Putin (in english) speaking to Modi, and Modi in hindi (no translation offered).
https://youtu.be/_aEzYTtPjKQ
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Note the rate of change (trajectory). At this rate and with the Ukr crisis, India will overtake Germany in a few years.
(https://cdn.statcdn.com/Infographic/images/normal/28258.jpeg)
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https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/biden-embraces-pakistan-terrorist-ties-by-brahma-chellaney-2022-09?
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Defense cooperation. The U.S. and India will codevelop new drones to help New Delhi modernize its defense capabilities and develop its defense industry, according to a senior Pentagon official. India will build the aircraft and the U.S. will help with production and development. India is highly dependent on Russia for arms, but its government and media are growing increasingly critical of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Meanwhile, responding to India’s concerns over Washington’s offer to help service Pakistan’s F-16 jets, a U.S. official said that the deal was not meant as a message to India and that it did not include any new capabilities, weapons or munitions.
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So whats happening in China...lots of rumors
https://twitter.com/i/status/1573322602784980993
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Latest rumor
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FdbnFXpXoAM52KL?format=jpg&name=medium)
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".umor has it that #XiJinping was under arrest after #CCP seniors removed him as head of PLA"
would this be on every newcast ?
:-o :-o :-o
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".umor has it that #XiJinping was under arrest after #CCP seniors removed him as head of PLA"
would this be on every newcast ?
:-o :-o :-o
There is always a lot of wishcasting about the evil dictator of the moment being removed, yet we so rarely see it. Why is that?
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Foreign Affairs is distinctly not of our orientation here, but it does cover subjects of interest that are under covered elsewhere.
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In June 2020, the Chinese and Indian militaries clashed in the Galwan Valley, a rugged and remote area along the disputed border between the two countries. Twenty Indian and at least four Chinese soldiers were killed, and debate flared about the long-term implications of the skirmishes. Some analysts believed the Sino-Indian relationship would soon return to normal, with regular high-level meetings, increased Chinese investment in India, defense exchanges, and multilateral coordination. Record-high bilateral trade and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s trip to India in March 2022 seemed to support the notion that the two countries could set aside the border dispute and keep strengthening ties. So, too, did Chinese and Indian officials’ agreement in September to pull back from confrontational positions along one of the sections of the border in the Ladakh region where the militaries had been facing off since 2020.
That appearance of rapprochement obscures real ruptures. Indian policymakers were shocked by the outbreak of the border crisis in 2020, which they blamed on Chinese aggression and which remains an ongoing source of tension and concern. India’s domestic and foreign policies have shifted in significant ways in response to the perceived threat of China, and any restoration of the prior status quo in the bilateral relationship is unlikely. For the foreseeable future, India’s approach to China has moved from what can be described as competitive engagement to one of competitive coexistence—if not “armed coexistence,” as former Indian foreign secretary Vijay Gokhale put it. Two years ago, I had suggested in Foreign Affairs that China’s actions could result in Beijing “losing India.” Now, it’s safe to say that China has lost India.
CLASHING IN THE KARAKORAM
India has perceived China as a threat since at least the late 1950s when their differences over Tibet (the Himalayan state China annexed in 1951) and their undemarcated border came to the fore. These disputes precipitated a full-blown war in 1962 that ended disastrously for India, with the loss of territory. But following a crisis in 1986–87, the border remained relatively peaceful, a state of affairs facilitated by several agreements that New Delhi and Beijing negotiated over a 25-year period. This detente also enabled broader Sino-Indian engagement, particularly in the economic and multilateral arenas. It was only after Chinese President Xi Jinping took office that the boundary situation reared up again, with military standoffs in 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2017, and with China and India also competing more intensely elsewhere, jockeying for position in South Asian countries and within international organizations.
Even given this context, events in Ladakh in 2020 did not just constitute another border spat. The violence crossed several thresholds, including the first fatalities in 45 years, and the first known shots fired in decades. The standoffs occurred at more locations, at greater scale, and over a longer period of time than in previous crises. India has accused China of violating the border agreements, and consequently Indian policymakers worry about the prospect of Chinese forces taking further military action. This breakdown of trust has long-term implications for the unsettled border and the broader relationship between the two countries.
Beijing has called for the border crisis to be set aside and for diplomatic, defense, and economic cooperation to resume now that Chinese and Indian troops have disengaged at some of the points of friction. But New Delhi has called for further disengagement—the standing down of troops from more flash points—and for de-escalation—that is, a reversal of the military and infrastructure buildups that have taken place on both sides of the border over the last two and a half years. China is unlikely to agree to the latter, and India will not unilaterally de-escalate. Moreover, India does not believe the border issue can be set aside. It sees peace and tranquility at the border as a precondition for a normal Sino-Indian relationship. Prime Minister Narendra Modi did not meet with Xi on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit in September, the first time such a meeting did not occur—a clear signal that India is not yet willing to return to business as usual with China.
The 2020 clash hardened official and public views of China in India, including among a new generation for whom the 1962 Sino-Indian war had been a distant memory. Coupled with China’s lack of transparency about the COVID-19 pandemic, the fighting on the border has left many Indians convinced that China poses an imminent and acute challenge to their country. These developments put an end to the idea that the two countries could alleviate political strains through border agreements and broader—especially economic—cooperation. They also reduced the reluctance in India, stemming from concern about provoking China, to strengthen certain kinds of military capabilities, infrastructure, and partnerships, particularly with the United States.
The appearance of rapprochement between China and India obscures real ruptures.
The perception of China as an adversarial and untrustworthy actor has, in turn, produced changes at the border that will likely outlast this crisis. Both sides have beefed up their military presence at the border, with many more forward-deployed troops—the Line of Actual Control between Indian-held and Chinese-held territories now looks more like the heavily militarized Line of Control between India and Pakistan. India has also redeployed some forces from facing Pakistan or engaging in counterinsurgency operations in northeastern India toward defending the border with China. It is building up both military and dual-purpose infrastructure across the entire border region to match Beijing’s equivalent buildup. These efforts will persist regardless of any bilateral agreement to resolve the current border crisis because India will remain concerned about further Chinese attempts to seize Indian land.
The heightened concern about China has also manifested in domestic policy. The Modi government has gone from initially seeking increased economic ties with China to imposing restrictions or extra scrutiny on a range of Chinese activities in India. It does not seek to decouple from China so much as it wants to disentangle India from China—an approach designed not to eliminate economic ties but to identify and reduce India’s vulnerabilities in critical sectors. Skeptics point to record-high bilateral trade as a measure of the failure of this approach, but India’s trade with China has grown nearly 15 percent more slowly than its trade with the rest of the world over the last year. Moreover, an accurate assessment of the approach will have to wait a few years. Indian officials have placed restrictions on Chinese investment, Chinese access to Indian public procurement contracts, and Chinese companies’ or organizations’ activities in critical economic, technology, telecommunications, civil society, and education sectors. Indian state governments and state-owned companies have suspended or withdrawn from some agreements with Chinese companies. India has banned several popular Chinese apps, including the social media platform TikTok, and excluded Chinese telecommunications companies from its 5G network. And Indian enforcement authorities are targeting Chinese companies for alleged tax or data transfer violations.
Tensions with Beijing have also driven New Delhi to try to reduce India’s economic dependence on China and take advantage of other countries’ desire to do so, as well. The Modi government has moved from criticizing trade agreements on the grounds that they adversely affected Indian businesses, farmers, and workers to exploring or signing deals with Australia, Canada, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. India is also seeking greater investment from alternate sources, not just in the West but also in the Indo-Pacific and Middle East—particularly in sectors such as solar power, pharmaceuticals, and electronics where it is trying to boost domestic production and reduce overreliance on imports from China.
On broader foreign policy choices, the border crisis has resulted in India further aligning with countries that can help strengthen its position in relation to China in the defense, economic security, and critical technology arenas. Such partners include Australia, France, Japan, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
TAKING SIDES
India has long sought to maintain its strategic autonomy, refusing to be drawn into alliances. Now, however, it is at least aligning with countries to address the threat China poses. India is willing now to cooperate more closely with the United States, even at the risk of angering China. It signed a geospatial intelligence agreement with the United States in October 2020; is conducting high-altitude exercises with the U.S. army near the Chinese-Indian border this month; has become more involved in the Indo-Pacific partnership known as the Quad (that features Australia, India, Japan, and the United States) despite Chinese and Russian objections; has participated in a range of maritime exercises with its Quad partners; signed a logistics-sharing agreement with Vietnam in June 2022; and in January 2022 reached a deal to sell BrahMos missiles (jointly developed by India and Russia) to the Philippines.
India once tiptoed around China’s sensitivities regarding perceived threats to its sovereignty. New Delhi is no longer being as deferential. Modi has publicly acknowledged calls he has made with the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan spiritual leader, a departure from his past reluctance to do so. And the Indian Air Force facilitated the Dalai Lama’s month-long visit to Ladakh in July 2022. In a departure from common practice, the Indian foreign ministry in September did not punt on a question about Xinjiang, the Muslim-majority province in the east of China. It twice noted that a UN human rights report had highlighted “the serious maltreatment of minorities” inside China. In recent weeks, the Indian government has also spoken critically about the “militarization of the Taiwan Strait,” refused to reiterate a “one China” policy (that would acknowledge Taiwan as a part of China and the People’s Republic of China as the only legal government of China) despite Beijing’s calls to do so, and urged restraint and warned against any unilateral change to the status quo after U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August.
The border crisis has also encouraged India’s more receptive view of U.S. power and presence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. In recent years, New Delhi has welcomed a U.S.-Maldivian defense agreement, permitted the refueling of an American reconnaissance aircraft in the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal, backed the U.S.-Nepalese Millennium Challenge Corporation compact that seeks to facilitate infrastructure development, and helped block Chinese attempts to sink the security partnership among Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States known as AUKUS. Moreover, India is cooperating with the United States and other partners such as Japan to offer diplomatic, security, and economic alternatives and counter growing Chinese influence in neighboring South Asian countries.
At the same time as India has drawn closer to the United States and traditional U.S. allies, its ties with China and Russia-backed groupings are stalling. The border crisis has made apparent the limitations of associations such as BRICS (featuring Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), RIC (Russia, India, and China), and the SCO. As non-Western platforms, they were useful for India when it felt ignored by the West. But today, India sees China posing a greater constraint on its regional and global interests than any Western country. Moreover, Beijing and Moscow’s efforts to reshape these associations into anti-Western platforms limit their utility for India. That does not mean India will exit these groupings—it will not want to leave a vacuum for China to fill—but it has been more concertedly deepening its own relations with countries in the “global South,” outside of any groupings with China and Russia.
NOT SO FAST
Western policymakers, however, will have to reckon with the factors that could limit the speed and extent of Indian alignment with countries such as the United States against China. For one, India prioritizes Chinese threats differently than do its partners. Even as the latter focus on maritime challenges in the Indo-Pacific, India will devote considerable attention and resources to meeting the Chinese and Pakistani challenge at its border. This continental imperative will shape India’s approach to other Indo-Pacific issues. For instance, New Delhi remains cautious about making statements about Taiwan with other countries out of a concern that they could provoke China into putting more pressure on the border or on restive Indian regions such as Kashmir and in the northeast of the country. Indian officials also do not want China to see their border dispute through the lens of U.S.-Chinese competition; Beijing’s decision to go to war with India in 1962 was motivated by its sense that New Delhi and Washington were colluding to undermine Chinese interests in Tibet.
India’s dependence on Russia as a defense trade and technology partner will also slow any swift realignment. New Delhi’s initial cautious response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine was in no small part shaped by its concerns about potential Chinese escalation at the border. New Delhi has not wanted to jeopardize its military preparedness by upsetting Russia, a key defense supplier. Moreover, it does not want to push Russia from a position of relative neutrality to China’s side in the event of another Sino-Indian crisis. New Delhi also wants to give Moscow some alternatives to partnership with Beijing to delay or even disrupt the further deepening of Sino-Russian ties.
Another impediment to India’s realignment might be if its economic and technology regulations that target China deliberately or inadvertently reinforce protectionism. This could limit Indian economic and technological cooperation with Western and Indo-Pacific partners.
India may also be slow to take the right steps to address the threat posed by China in the security and economic domains due to domestic or other security priorities. It could try to buy time (or stability) with China that could curb the pace, albeit not the trajectory, of its cooperation with like-minded partners. Indian policymakers also harbor doubts about how willing and able many of its partners will continue to be to balance against China. Moreover, the Indian debate about China might have narrowed considerably, but the debate continues about how far and fast to deepen relations with the United States, in particular, and about the balance to strike between the desire for strategic autonomy and the need for alignment.
TACKING WEST
With its 2020 actions at the border, Beijing has stalled, if not reversed, years of deepening Sino-Indian ties. It has also, counterproductively, facilitated the strengthening of Indian partnerships with many Chinese rivals. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, the Indian foreign minister, recently alluded to the broad scope of competition between the two countries, sketching a very different vision of Asia than the one proposed by Beijing. On their part, India’s partners, including the United States, have wondered to what extent India can be brought onside in an alignment against China. These countries should approach India with both pragmatism and ambition. They should have realistic expectations about what New Delhi might be able to do in the Indo-Pacific, given its border-related, regional, and domestic priorities. And they should recognize that while India will compete with China, it will not compete in exactly the same way as the United States or Japan do. But they should not have too little ambition, assuming India will reject deeper cooperation—after all, New Delhi’s traditional diffidence has turned to more willing engagement in recent years. India will steer its own ship, but it is tacking in the direction of those interested in balancing Chinese power and influence in the region and around the world.
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Re: Nepal and Chinese attempts to woo them, India has a special relationship with Nepal. While the article talked about Lumbini the birthplace of Buddha being in Nepal, there is another relationship, God Ram (one of the main God's of Hinduism), his wife Sita was from Nepal. There are many other temples etc related to hinduism in nepal. Nepalese are allowed to work in India, without visas, India also takes the Gorkhas from Nepal into the Indian army. The top Indian army General also has a corresponding title in the Nepalese army and vice-versa. Its very difficult for the Chinese to break into this arrangement, though corrupt politicians ofcourse have to be discounted. The relationship is described as Roti-Beti, which is hard to translate, but essentially its a marriage where the bride is from nepal, who provides the food to the family (husband).
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October 12, 2022
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India’s Ruling Party Is Losing Control
The BJP rode to power on Hindu nationalism in a country and region too diverse for uncompromising populism.
By: Kamran Bokhari
India’s government is facing a serious conundrum. Its continued electoral success depends on Hindu majoritarianism, but it must also maintain stability in the world’s soon-to-be most populous, diverse political economy on the planet. Through Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s two consecutive terms in office, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has energized right-wing Hindu nationalism, which has undermined social stability in the highly diverse South Asian country. Thus far, Modi has balanced between the pragmatic needs of governance and ideological commitment, but this is an untenable situation, especially with Hindutva having considerably displaced the secular character of the country. The rise of Hindu nationalism endangers regional stability – already at risk due to a severely weakened Muslim-majority state next door in Pakistan and the return to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Victims of Their Own Success
Modi’s BJP has been highly successful at winning elections given that Hindus constitute four-fifths of India’s 1.4 billion people. Retaining power in democratic politics, however, is about much more than demographic arithmetic. This is particularly the case when almost a quarter of a billion citizens are not from the majority faith – not to mention the country’s regional and linguistic differences, especially in the south, where the BJP’s brand of Hinduism faces resistance. This explains the Modi administration’s difficult balancing act, amplified by growing domestic unrest, international concerns and criticism over the decline of the country’s long-held secular democratic political tradition.
Religious Makeup of India
(click to enlarge)
The Modi government was able to defuse a recent crisis in June involving the BJP’s then-spokeswoman, Nupur Sharma, who made controversial remarks about the Prophet Muhammad. Sharma’s statements not only offended many of the country’s 200 million Muslim minority, but they also triggered public condemnation from several Muslim states, including close allies of India. Modi’s BJP was forced to do damage control, removing Sharma from her position, in order to prevent the crisis from undermining its political interests and India’s international standing. In addition, India's supreme court issued a strong reprimand, saying that Sharma’s “loose tongue has set the entire country on fire.”
The government’s efforts somewhat pacified Indian Muslims and Muslim-majority countries, most of which are close trading partners of India. However, it has triggered a debate within the BJP’s own broader ecosystem known as the “Sangh Parivar,” a constellation of right-wing Hindu nationalist social and political entities spawned by the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, the parent organization of the BJP. A popular perception within this community is that Sharma was unfairly treated for remarks that were taken out of context and were issued in response to many Muslims’ ongoing mockery of Hindu deities.
Though the situation was defused, it sheds light on how the BJP’s own ideology can be a liability for the ruling party. The elite of almost all populist parties of any ideological persuasion is far more pragmatic than its political base. What leaders say they will do before getting elected is different from how they behave once in office, where they encounter the constraints of policymaking and thus need to bridge the gap between campaign promises and actual policy deliverables. This logic tends to create internal differences within the ruling political movement where the existing leadership faces a challenge from far more hawkish elements inhabiting the next echelons.
The BJP is no exception to this rule. The Sharma incident took place amid existing tensions between the ideologues within the BJP and its broader environs and the party’s top leadership, encumbered by the imperatives of governing. The BJP’s electoral strategy pushed it toward the weaponization of Hindutva, the ideology heavily focused on reviving Hindu civilization by rolling back its Muslim heritage. This strategy created a conundrum for the BJP because it unleashed a majoritarian religious extremism, which evolved well beyond the BJP’s electoral needs and thus beyond the party’s control. A prime example of this intra-BJP schism is the chief minister of the state of Uttar Pradesh, Yogi Adityanath, a hardliner Hindu monk-turned-politician well known for whipping up anti-Muslim hysteria.
Ideologues like Adityanath, who have been loud voices for the establishment of Hindu Rashtra (Hindu State), have been responsible for the mobilization of hundreds of thousands of young militants. To this extremist lot, the actions of the BJP leadership against Sharma represent at best a weak commitment to their cause and at worse a betrayal. The move also reinforced the perception that the project of Hindu Rashtra remains vulnerable to pressures from Muslim and Islamist actors and that the Indian Muslim minority constitutes a fifth column within the Indian body politic.
Successor or Challenger?
The schisms within the BJP were hardwired into the party’s fabric. Adityanath, for example, is not originally from the party. Instead, he emerged from a more hawkish strain of Hindutva in his native Uttar Pradesh through his own political vehicle, the Hindu Yuva Vahini, and the highly influential Hindu temple he leads, known as the Gorakhnath Math. As recently as the late 2000s he clashed with the BJP when he fielded candidates against the ruling party and was instrumental in the defeat of an incumbent finance minister in the then-BJP government. Seeing his mounting influence in Uttar Pradesh, the BJP accepted Adityanath as the party leader in the state.
After nearly a decade as a lawmaker in the Indian parliament, Adityanath returned to state politics in Uttar Pradesh in 2017 when he became chief minister of the state – a position he consolidated with his reelection in March 2022. Even before his second-term victory (the first sitting chief executive of the state to win reelection since independence), Adityanath emerged as the second most popular leader in the BJP after its chief, Modi, who has been telegraphing – even if for political purposes – that the monk is his protege. At 50, Adityanath is a generation younger than the 72-year-old Indian prime minister and thus has enough time to position himself as Modi’s successor even though Modi intends to seek a third term in the 2024 elections.
Regardless of the future positions of the two men, Adityanath’s rise has the BJP establishment concerned about the ruling party’s continued ability to balance between its need to leverage religion to maintain its unique position in the Indian political landscape and to govern what will soon be the world’s largest nation. Thus far, the party has been able to do so by complementing its Hindu First ideology with a powerful political machine with deep grassroots support and a welfare economic model. But ultimately, the BJP brand is heavily reliant on exclusionary politics, which engenders religious extremism capable of upsetting India’s fragile social stability.
The BJP faces no effective national-level opponent. Its main rival, Congress, which ruled the country for 54 of its 75-year history, is a shell of its former self, given that its secular nationalist ideology has been supplanted by the BJP’s Hindutva. However, Hindutva appears to be growing beyond the ruling party’s ability to harness it for electoral purposes. This is a long-term trend that will have a direct bearing not only on India but also on the stability of the world’s most densely populated region of South Asia – an area already impacted by Muslim extremism on its western flank.
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Looks like Pakis are upset with Biden
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2382033/punjab-assembly-passes-resolution-against-bidens-nuke-remarks (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2382033/punjab-assembly-passes-resolution-against-bidens-nuke-remarks)
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Looks like Pakis are upset with Biden
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2382033/punjab-assembly-passes-resolution-against-bidens-nuke-remarks (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2382033/punjab-assembly-passes-resolution-against-bidens-nuke-remarks)
They should stop taking our debtbux in protest!
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The Indian defense minister has been commenting on taking back POK several times, most recently yesterday. The world ignores him :-), they are too busy with China, Russia, Ukr. Indian elections in 2024. I think he is waiting for China to make its move on Taiwan.
"Our aim is to implement resolution unanimously passed in Indian Parliament in 1994 to reclaim PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan:
@rajnathsingh in #Srinagar "
#Kashmir
#InfantryDay
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India Is Poised to Weather the Coming Global Economic Storm
9 MIN READOct 28, 2022 | 15:52 GMT
The Indian economy retains solid momentum and multiple advantages compared with many other lower-middle-income countries, which should enable India to emerge relatively unscathed from the impending global economic downturn and intensifying financial volatility. Following the COVID-induced recession in 2020, India's economy rebounded very strongly in 2021 and has maintained solid growth ever since. India has also overtaken China as the fastest-expanding economy among larger emerging economies. While inflation remains high in India due to global energy and food price shocks, it is not overwhelming. And while the value of India's currency has dipped, the rupee has depreciated far less than currencies in other countries due to a combination of central bank monetary tightening and foreign-exchange market intervention.
Indian real GDP growth averaged 5.5% over the past decade, fueled by solid investment and favorable demographics. According to the IMF, the economy will grow 6-7% in real terms this year and over 6% in 2023, supported by an investment ratio of over 30% of GDP. By comparison, China will only grow 3.2% due to both cyclical factors (such as extensive COVID-19 restrictions), as well as structural factors (such as Beijing's shift away from investment-intensive real estate and infrastructure-driven growth).
India's inflation will average 7% in 2022, largely due to the energy, commodity and food price shocks resulting from the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war. This is high but not excessively so by India's recent standards, with the country's consumer price inflation averaging 5.8% in 2012-2021.
The rupee is down only 10% against the U.S. dollar in 2022, much less than the currencies of advanced economies (the U.K. pound, for example, is down 16% against the dollar). This comes as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has increased its policy rate to 5.9% from 4% earlier in the year to contain inflation.
India is among the fastest-growing economies in the world's fastest-growing region. In the broader Asia-Pacific, only Vietnam and Bangladesh are currently registering higher economic growth rates, but their economies are only a fraction of the size of India's economy.
In contrast to many other emerging economies, India has relatively solid economic fundamentals. Many low-income and lower-middle-income countries are experiencing severe financial challenges as the outlook for the global economy darkens, with the IMF predicting that one-third of countries will enter a recession next year. Several teeter on the verge of financial collapse and, even if they don't collapse, many will still be forced into painful, growth-reducing macroeconomic adjustments, major debt restructurings, or both. India's financial position, however, is comparatively solid. India has an investment grade rating from all three major international credit rating agencies, implying a very low probability of sovereign default and distress. To be sure, India's government debt is high by emerging markets standards and its fiscal deficit is large. But thanks to solid nominal economic growth, the country's debt ratio is projected to stabilize, ensuring medium-term debt sustainability. India's external debt is also very low, further reducing its financial vulnerabilities. In addition, a combination of sizeable foreign exchange reserves and a flexible exchange rate affords policymakers sufficient room to adjust without causing broader economic or financial problems in case of intensifying balance-of-payments pressures. Compared with many other emerging economies, India is also much less dependent on exports and is therefore far less affected by global economic shocks.
India's government debt exceeds 80% of GDP and its fiscal deficit is nearly 10% of GDP, which is high even by emerging markets standards. But strong underlying nominal economic growth will help stabilize the debt-to-GDP ratio at current levels, meaning these higher debt and deficit figures should not weigh on India's economic outlook.
The bulk of India's government debt is denominated in local currency and held by domestic investors, which substantially reduces financial risks. Non-resident holdings of general government debt total just 5%, whereas a more typical number in other emerging markets is 30%.
The external debt-to-GDP ratio is a mere 20%, which is quite low compared to an average ratio for emerging markets of 40-50% of GDP. Further, the RBI's foreign currency reserves are roughly equivalent to India's outstanding external debt, which sharply limits external debt-related risks.
In terms of external liquidity, the current account deficit is set to increase to 3-4% of GDP this year, mainly due to higher commodity prices. However, this is more than fully financed by stable foreign direct investment flows.
Portfolio outflows driven by higher U.S. interest rates are putting some pressure on India's balance of payments, but New Delhi has more than enough financial firepower to mitigate this pressure. The RBI has been intervening in the foreign exchange market to smooth out volatility, spending roughly $100 billion year-to-date and leaving foreign-exchange reserves at a sizeable $530 billion.
India's export-to-GDP ratio is only 19%, which is significantly below the unweighted global average of 29%. It's also much lower than countries like Vietnam, where exports exceed 100% of GDP.
Adequate food stocks in the country and continued government intervention to manage high prices also reduce the threat of food insecurity and related political risks in the coming months. India's current stock of key staples like rice and sugar is adequate and the government has restricted wheat and rice exports to prevent domestic price increases and possible shortages. New Delhi has also continued to foot the fertilizer subsidy bill in the face of rising international prices to shield farmers from higher input costs. In addition, the government has maintained a free grain distribution scheme for about 500 million poor people to restrict the impact of rising prices on lower-income households. These continued subsidies will see the Indian government breach its fiscal deficit target of 6.4% of GDP by a significant margin, but the larger deficit will remain manageable as food prices have begun to fall from their peak earlier this year and India's finances remain generally strong. India's expected food security will help maintain political stability in the country, as the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) already enjoys popular support and will not be challenged by large-scale social unrest due to food inflation.
Russia's February invasion of Ukraine caused significant disruptions to global food supplies by undermining the former's ability to export its main commodity: wheat. The fallout increased global demand for Indian wheat, prompting domestic producers to ship more of their products abroad. This led to price increases in India and fueled fears of potential wheat shortages. In May, the government intervened by imposing wheat export restrictions to mitigate prices and shore up domestic supplies of the staple grain.
Beginning Sept. 9, India banned the export of broken rice (widely used for animal feed and in some places human consumption). As a preventative measure against the risk of a low yield this season due to uneven rainfall distribution, the government also raised duties on exports of other rice varieties, except for basmati rice (a key commodity that generates significant revenue),
As of Oct. 1, the Indian government had a combined stock of 51.14 million tonnes of wheat and rice, which is 65% more than the required buffer stock during this time of year, according to the Food Corporation of India. This has prompted the government to extend the free food scheme, which is aimed at enabling poor households to offset inflationary prices during the upcoming festival season, until December. On Oct. 18, the government also raised the minimum support price (the rate at which the government buys grains from the farmers) for both wheat and mustard (another key food item) by 5% and 8%, respectively. These moves are aimed at boosting production in the upcoming winter crop cycle that lasts from October to March.
Food and fertilizer subsidies represent about 10% of India's total budget expenditure, or approximately $40 billion. Revised government subsidies increase the fertilizer and food subsidy bill by approximately 50%, or about $60 billion.
Compared with some of its neighbors, India also has a lower risk of energy insecurity thanks to its diverse sourcing options, as well as its sufficient fiscal space to support imports. New Delhi's neutral stance on Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine has enabled India to import cheaper Russian crude oil since March. India will continue to source Russian oil as long as it remains an affordable way to secure domestic energy supplies, which will likely remain the case for at least several more months. However, the risk of future Western sanctions will persist amid the G-7's push to institute a price cap on Russian oil, along with the EU ban on insuring tankers that ship Russian oil (which is slated to take effect in December). To mitigate the impact of the new EU sanctions and a potential G-7 price cap, the Indian government could opt to cover the logistics costs of oil imports with Russia by paying the added shipping and insurance costs itself. Meanwhile, major state-owned oil refiners in India are also exploring long-term deals with countries like Brazil, Columbia and the United States to cope with potential supply-side disruptions in the coming months. Additionally, the government has controlled domestic fuel price rises through excise duty cuts to petroleum products and direct financial assistance to energy retailers. Comfortable levels of coal stocks will also ward off a repeat of India's 2021 energy crisis, which led to power outages in most states (with Rajasthan, Gujarat, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh being the hardest hit). With enough fiscal room to cover exigencies, along with relatively secure (and diverse) sources of imports, India's energy outlook thus remains stable at a time when many other countries are struggling to keep the lights on without going broke.
The Indian cabinet has agreed to give $2 billion in aid to oil marketing companies that have been footing the bill of high energy prices without passing them on to consumers in order to control inflation.
Indian refiners like Indian Oil Corporation have inked deals with Brazil and Colombia for long-term crude contracts to prevent major disruptions in energy supply in the coming months.
India has sufficient coal stocks, which is crucial to its energy security given that coal generates about 70% of India's electric grid.
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Pak foreign exchange reserves down to $ 7.8 Billion.
https://www.geo.tv/latest/444685-alarm-bells-ring-as-foreign-exchange-reserves-fall-below-8bn (https://www.geo.tv/latest/444685-alarm-bells-ring-as-foreign-exchange-reserves-fall-below-8bn)
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https://phys.org/news/2022-11-chinese-incursions-india-strategically.html?fbclid=IwAR3l3b--gZKPL95wnpbvNfPPadpSot-QVijQGm_NVYti0yuG76OIqTcWA_o
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https://phys.org/news/2022-11-chinese-incursions-india-strategically.html
NOVEMBER 10, 2022
Chinese incursions into India are increasing and are strategically planned, study finds
by Northwestern University
Although it is impossible to pinpoint the precise locations of the incursions, it is clear that the incursions are clustered around hot spots. These are the so-called red-zones: parts of the Line of Actual Control between China and India, where the border is not clearly defined. Credit: PLOS ONE (2022). DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0274999
Chinese incursions across India's west and central borders are not independent, random incidents that happen by mistake. Instead, these incursions are part of a strategically planned, coordinated effort in order to gain permanent control of disputed border areas, a new study has found.
Led by Northwestern University, Technical University of Delft in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Defense Academy, the authors assembled a new dataset, compiling information about Chinese incursions into India from 2006 to 2020. Then they used game theory and statistical methods to analyze the data.
The researchers found that conflicts can be separated into two distinct sectors: west/middle (the Aksai Chin region) and east (the Arunachal Pradesh region). While the researchers learned that the number of incursions are generally increasing over time, they concluded that conflicts in the east and middle sectors are part of a coordinated expansionist strategy.
By pinpointing the exact locations lying at the root of the conflict, the researchers believe deterrents could be established in these specific areas to defuse tensions along the entire border.
The study, "Rising tension in the Himalayas: A geospatial analysis of Chinese border incursions into India," will be published on Nov. 10 in the journal PLOS ONE.
"By studying the number of incursions that occurred in the west and middle sectors over time, it became obvious, statistically, that these incursions are not random," said Northwestern's V.S. Subrahmanian, the study's senior author. "The probability of randomness is very low, which suggests to us that it's a coordinated effort. When we looked at the eastern sector, however, there is much weaker evidence for coordination. Settling border disputes in specific areas could be an important first step in a step-by-step resolution of the entire conflict."
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China intruded in Indian territory (Tawang region) on Dec 9, with a force of around 300 soldiers, fist fight ensued, injuries to both sides. Withdrew later. Looks like COVID zero policy needs a distraction ?.
Addendum: First skirmish after the Galwan incident. Chinese got thrashed..is the word on the street. Hard to get official confirmation.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/Fj0jI32aAAIm72A?format=jpg&name=900x900)
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Here's a previous video from Tawang, when the Chinese jumped over the wall. Enjoy.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1602705543852101632 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1602705543852101632)
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Thanks. )
"Looks like COVID zero policy needs a distraction ?"
The Chinese totalitarians and their American counterparts have similar hypocrisies. A policy has no exceptions, except for when it doesn't suit them.
More coverage here:
https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/india-china-soldiers-tawang-clash-explained-rajnath-singh-8321880/
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In an Increasingly Multipolar World, India Maintains Its Strategic Neutrality
6 MIN READDec 13, 2022 | 20:19 GMT
A digital illustration of the Russian and Indian flags.
(Shutterstock)
Strategic calculations are driving India to preserve its close economic and security ties with Russia while also avoiding a major escalation of tensions with the West. On Dec. 2, an official from the Indian oil ministry recently announced that India would continue buying Russian oil, even after the Group of 7 (G-7) price cap on Russian crude shipments went into effect (which it did on Dec. 5). India — which has emerged as a major buyer of Russian oil over the past year — has opted not to support the price cap mechanism, despite U.S. and European efforts to convince the South Asian giant to join them in imposing more pressure on Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine.
India has become the second-largest importer of Russian crude oil after China due to discounted prices offered by Moscow. Russian oil only made up 0.2% of India's total oil imports before March, but reached more than 20% in November. About one-third of this discounted Russian oil has been imported by private players in India. However, state-run Indian agencies have also taken advantage of the lower prices. India's access to cheap Russian oil has been critical in preventing fuel price hikes in India, which has helped mitigate inflation in the country.
India has resisted calls from the United States to join the G-7 oil price cap, arguing it will maintain its neutral stance on Russia-West tensions in order to preserve India's strategic autonomy.
India's neutral position on the war in Ukraine reflects New Delhi's foreign policy of strategic autonomy, which seeks to keep balanced political, economic and security partnerships in a multipolar world. India's long strategic, defense and growing energy partnership with Russia, as well as its shift from traditional non-aligned foreign policy to self-serving strategic autonomy, explain New Delhi's stance in the conflict between the West and Russia. Since the outset of the war in Ukraine, India has maintained a neutral position and refused to directly denounce Russia's actions, both in public and through votes in the United Nations. At the same time, India has also been careful not to breach any Western sanctions on Russia, which has prevented a conflict with the West. India took the opportunity to source discounted oil from Russia as such oil exports are not yet sanctioned. New Delhi is also exploring measures like trading in rupees and rubles with Russia to bypass the international system of financial payments (SWIFT) that many Russian entities are currently banned from using.
Russia and India have enjoyed close strategic, military and economic relations since the Cold War period. Although India maintained a non-aligned position through the Cold War, a close relationship between the United States and Pakistan (India's rival) brought the former Soviet Union and India closer together. The Soviet Union was the biggest arms exporter to India, and supported the development of India's public sector-led economy before liberalization reforms in the 1990s. When the West imposed sanctions on India after its nuclear tests in 1974, the Soviet Union assisted India's civil nuclear program. The Soviet Union also supported India's war to liberate Bangladesh in the 1970s and India tacitly supported Russia's occupation of Afghanistan. More recently, India has tried to prevent a close relationship between Russia and China to balance its interests in the continent, though this objective remains mostly out of India's control.
Since the start of the war in Ukraine, India has called for the cessation of hostilities and diplomatic talks on multiple occasions. India has also abstained from many U.N. resolutions against Russia.
Despite its close ties with Russia, India also seeks to have cordial relations with the West in general and the United States in particular as a part of its balanced foreign policy. The strategic convergence to deter China's rise and influence (especially in the Indo-Pacific geopolitical construct) has resulted in strong alignment in recent years.For example, India is a member of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (also known as the ''Quad''), which also includes the United States, Japan and Australia. This group has met increasingly in recent years, with India's participation. More recently, India has also increased cooperation with the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the United States on food and energy security. U.S-India bilateral ties have grown through a close defense partnership that includes military exercises, growing arms trade, information sharing and operational cooperation, as well as growing cooperation in trade and technology.
India's balanced foreign policy is also meant to somewhat shield its economy at a time of a generalized slowdown of global economic activity. New Delhi's neutrality on the conflict in Ukraine opens opportunities for Indian businesses to expand trade ties with Russia and reduce the country's high trade deficit, as well as incentivize the use of the rupee for international trade. Not being a party to Western sanctions also ensures a regular supply of critical inputs like fertilizers and coal, which is necessary to ensure domestic food and energy security. If India eventually cannot import Russian oil due to difficulties in getting ships or insurance because of the G-7 price cap, India's strong macroeconomic fundamentals (including high foreign exchange reserves) should enable it to purchase oil at international prices. In addition to oil, India imports fertilizers and coal from Russia as well. If India manages to avoid meaningful disruptions in those imports in the coming months, its food or energy supplies will remain secure.
Between February and November 2022, Russian exports to India totaled about $29 billion, whereas Indian exports totaled only $1.9 billion. According to media reports, in November Moscow sent New Delhi a list of 500 items that Russia would want to import from India, which included various raw materials (like paper and metals). India and Russia have been working to finalize a rupee-ruble trade mechanism for a few months. Russia's Sberbank and VTB Bank have opened special ''vostro'' accounts in India (foreign bank accounts in domestic banks in domestic currency) in India. The rupee-ruble trade mechanism is not yet operational, but it will reportedly target non-oil trade between the two states.
Indian energy companies — including ONGC-Videsh Ltd, Indian Oil and Oil India are — reportedly interested in participating in Russian upstream oil projects. The exodus of Western companies in Russian energy projects is creating opportunities for India to increase its presence in hydrocarbon exploration in Russia.
In the medium-to-long term, India will seek to preserve its role as a major middle power that keeps cordial ties with the United States while also retaining a strong relationship with Russia. India's push to preserve its strategic autonomy, however, may get tricky. An overt Russian escalation in Ukraine, for example, could make New Delhi reconsider its response to Moscow's aggression against Kyiv — especially if such an escalation involves the use of nuclear weapons. India's reliance on U.S. dollar-denominated systems for financial transactions could also complicate its ability to balance between the United States and Russia, while U.S. sanctions could restrict India's access to sophisticated military technology from Russia. But absent these scenarios, New Delhi's broader relationship with Moscow will likely endure, given India's dependence on Russia for weapons and protection against national security threats (like those posed by neighboring Pakistan and China).
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https://michaelyon.locals.com/upost/3211798/indians-and-chinese-making-an-old-fashioned-irish-beat-down
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Yesterday India tested its China centric Agni 5 missile with a range of over 5000 km at full load, enough to reach all parts of China.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FkBVmtAVUAACBJT?format=jpg&name=small)
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FkCxIhcXEBActs3?format=jpg&name=small)
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India and China Clash on the Roof of the World
Austin BayAustin Bay December 16, 2022 Updated: December 18, 2022biggersmaller Print
Commentary
Chinese dictator Xi Jinping lost face when his communist regime, confronting mass and violent protests in major cities, backed off on its totalitarian “zero-tolerance” COVID-19 lockdown policies. Heavens, export dollars from an Apple iPhone factory were at risk!
Chinese protesters from Xinjiang Province to Shanghai are heroes in the global fight for freedom. At the bottom Chinese political line, Xi brutalized and incited his most powerful enemy, the Chinese people, to the point he had to terminate his hard-core domestic control policy that imprisoned millions in their homes.
Hundreds of millions of mainland Chinese noticed Supreme Leader Xi backed down. Word gets around. You can’t keep a hundred million angry people from complaining to their 200 million friends and relatives. Moreover, The Great Cyber Firewall of China is porous. Credit angry Chinese coders committed to hacking it.
Subsequently Xi did something typical of threatened dictators: he launched military forays. Striking a foreign enemy ploy to steel wobbly domestic support is an old ploy. For example, Argentine dictator Leopoldo Galtieri employed it in 1982 when he invaded the Falkland Islands. Thanks to Margaret Thatcher and the British military his foray failed.
Foray No. 1: Xi sent a score or two of jet bombers into Taiwanese airspace, or to be totally accurate, Taiwan’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ).
To be totally accurate, communist air and sea forces routinely test Taiwan and the island doesn’t exactly rate as a Chinese foreign enemy. A geostrategic contortion affects my “foreign enemy” analogy. See, the Chinese Communist Party calls Taiwan a lost Chinese territory, a province Xi has sworn to recover.
However, the Taiwanese reject the CCP’s totalitarian claim. They wish to protect their free and wealthy society from the communist dictatorship’s inherent inhumanity and destructive corruption.
To defend themselves, the Taiwanese rely on themselves and the support of allies—the United States, Japan, and Australia foremost. So, Xi has his foreign enemies behind his Taiwan foray.
However, a fourth foreign power with an interest in defending Taiwan, India, is slowly but steadily aligning with America, Japan, and Australia. India presents Xi and his clique with a 3,800-kilometer-long strategic problem.
Foray No. 2 occurred Dec. 9 when Indian and Chinese soldiers clashed on an icy slope in the Tawang sector of the mountainous border between Chinese-occupied Tibet and India’s northeastern Arunachal Pradesh state. India is building a major highway in the area, in order to improve New Delhi’s ability to defend the region.
If the geography is obscure, the stakes aren’t. The scuffle on the slope generated headlines across Asia.
Note I wrote Chinese-occupied Tibet. Communist China invaded Tibet in 1950. That was the predicate to the 1962 Sino-Indian War, which China launched and won. That war on the roof of the world is not officially over, so the hazy mountain border is called the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
In June 2020, the two Asian nuclear giants shot it out in eastern Ladakh (northeastern Himalayas). Twenty Indian soldiers died, and several Chinese soldiers were killed.
On Dec. 9? A hand-to-hand scuffle, with minor injuries.
Accidental encounter instead of Beijing muscle flexing? Maybe the LAC lacks specificity, so to speak.
I doubt it was an accident. Indian Defense Minister Rajnath Singh made the critical strategic point. China is once again using military power to try “to unilaterally change the status quo” on the border.
China plays that game in the South China Sea when it encroaches on Vietnamese, Filipino, and Malaysian territory. Beijing prefers one-on-one (bilateral) economic and military bullying.
India, however, is much more powerful. And India has friends. In 2007, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, at the behest of Japan, held its first informal meeting. The Quad consists of Japan, Australia, United States, and India. In 2007, Japan pointed out all four nations regard China as a disruptive actor in the Indo-Pacific.
A few more fights on the roof of the world and the Quad will become an alliance.
Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.
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India has moved an “unprecedented” number of troops to the disputed border with China after a clash between soldiers of the two nuclear-armed rivals. Indian foreign minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar revealed that Delhi was mobilizing thousands of troops along the mountainous 2,100-mile border, following an “encroachment” by Chinese forces that triggered a skirmish with Indian troops 12 days ago. The powers have been locked in a standoff along the border for more than two years, since China crossed the border to seize strategic positions in the disputed region of Ladakh in 2020, sparking a pitched battle that left 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese soldiers dead. “Today we have a deployment of the Indian army on the China border that we have never had. It is done in order to counter Chinese deployment, which has which has been scaled up massively since 2020,” Jaishankar said in Delhi on Monday. (Source: thetimes.co.uk)
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https://torontosun.com/opinion/columnists/fatah-near-bankrupt-pakistan-resorts-to-nuclear-sabre-rattling
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https://www.economist.com/the-world-ahead/2022/11/14/india-will-become-the-worlds-most-populous-country-in-2023?utm_medium=cpc.adword.pd&utm_source=google&ppccampaignID=17210591673&ppcadID=&utm_campaign=a.22brand_pmax&utm_content=conversion.direct-response.anonymous&gclid=Cj0KCQiAzeSdBhC4ARIsACj36uGFT2MC3-mXPRolTK45Me92MdveekI_VOQSCusa_mNGRzfrhVg1W3caApAvEALw_wcB&gclsrc=aw.ds
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Pak is effectively bankrupt, they can no longer pay their debts. Only 5.6 Billion $ in reserves, I hear debt due in 2023 is 8 billion!
https://www.dawn.com/news/1730193 (https://www.dawn.com/news/1730193)
And this article says reserves are $ 4.5 B
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2394554/pm-in-last-gasp-bid-to-revive-imf-talks (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2394554/pm-in-last-gasp-bid-to-revive-imf-talks)
It is literally imploding at this moment.
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Pak is effectively bankrupt, they can no longer pay their debts. Only 5.6 Billion $ in reserves, I hear debt due in 2023 is 8 billion!
https://www.dawn.com/news/1730193 (https://www.dawn.com/news/1730193)
And this article says reserves are $ 4.5 B
https://tribune.com.pk/story/2394554/pm-in-last-gasp-bid-to-revive-imf-talks (https://tribune.com.pk/story/2394554/pm-in-last-gasp-bid-to-revive-imf-talks)
It is literally imploding at this moment.
Is this the China Belt and Road debt where China ends up owning all the assets in the country upon default, on a path to all the assets in the world?
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/col-nagial/understanding-pakistans-china-debt-trap/
https://asiatimes.com/2021/12/pakistan-struggling-to-pay-its-debts-to-china/
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/business/pakistans-china-debt-at-6-6-billion-in-past-10-months-funds-mostly-used-on-two-nuclear-plants/articleshow/69606049.cms
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Pak has the China CPEC debt, loot by the army, general corruption at every level. They are effectively broke, but the west keeps giving them a lifeline, to keep India in check. Now Pak soldiers are being killed almost daily in Balochistan as well as by the TTP based in Afghanistan/North West Frontier Province. Much of their real estate, airports, roads etc have been effectively mortgaged to the Chinese or others.
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Gilgit/Baltistan (POK) residents demand to join India.
https://youtu.be/8NUaenPADh4 (https://youtu.be/8NUaenPADh4)
If we look at how Bangladesh was created (from E.Pakistan), the same playbook is playing out (it rhymes). Resident's are oppressed by Pak, no food, water, electricity, jobs nothing. Will demand to join India and India will oblige. India might even accept refugees from POK, as their number increases, India will move in. This year, India heads the G20 Presidency, so it will likely be 2025. May 2024 is elections and Modi will get a new 5 yr term. The writing is on the wall.
- Amazing amount of weapons are being purchased, missiles being fired, new subs, fighter air planes, heavy guns etc being purchased or manufactured. This cannot be all China centric. Something larger is afoot.
- Agniveer civil/military soldier recruitment scheme. 50,000 recruits per year! for a 4 year military training course, of which 1/4th get permanent military cadre and 3/4 are militarily trained civilians who can join the paramilitary forces. These will be needed if India intends to hold POK.
- Unrest rising in Pak, who knows if India is funding them ?
- Massive border infrastructure development against China, incase China makes a grab for Tawang monastery in a two front war.
- Gilgit area has a lot of Buddhist roots, Baltistan is mostly Shia. Even though Pak has tried to change demograhics (Sunnis), the base population is expected to be friendly.
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India has the fastest growth in the world...per IMF
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FnxIvSqacAMQQO5?format=jpg&name=small)
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Makes sense to me.
Look how pathetic those US projections are. Who voted for that kind of mediocrity / failure?
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Indian charm offensive. At India’s invitation, Afghan government officials will attend courses from the India Technical and Economic Cooperation Program, a bilateral assistance initiative focused on India's economy, regulations and history, among other things. This is despite the fact that New Delhi does not recognize the Taliban-led government in Kabul. Separately, India invited Pakistan’s defense minister and foreign minister to attend next month’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization meeting in Delhi. If Pakistan accepts, it would be the first time in 12 years that a Pakistani delegation has visited India.
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https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-cannot-win-india-himalayan-border-dispute-by-brahma-chellaney-2023-04 (https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-cannot-win-india-himalayan-border-dispute-by-brahma-chellaney-2023-04)
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The Indian defense minister has been commenting on taking back POK several times, most recently yesterday. The world ignores him :-), they are too busy with China, Russia, Ukr. Indian elections in 2024. I think he is waiting for China to make its move on Taiwan.
"Our aim is to implement resolution unanimously passed in Indian Parliament in 1994 to reclaim PoK, Gilgit and Baltistan:
@rajnathsingh in #Srinagar "
#Kashmir
#InfantryDay
It wouldn't hurt my feelings at all.
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https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/19723/kashmir-china-pakistan-turkey
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https://www.theepochtimes.com/in-depth-can-india-replace-china-as-global-manufacturing-and-economic-powerhouse_5322960.html?utm_source=China&src_src=China&utm_campaign=uschina-2023-06-14&src_cmp=uschina-2023-06-14&utm_medium=email
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June 19, 2023
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Washington’s Opportunity in India
It’s an open question whether the South Asian nation can truly be a counter to China.
By: Kamran Bokhari
India is drawing closer to the United States. After decades of being heavily dependent on Moscow for its military hardware, New Delhi is no longer sure it can count on Russia as its strategic position weakens. This shift comes as Beijing continues to intermittently clash with India along their border in the Himalayas. India has thus been forced to adjust its historic position as a nonaligned nation, but it’s an open question whether Washington can capitalize on the opportunity and promote its partnership with India to anything other than a defense alignment against China.
India and the U.S. understand the potential of the opportunity. Ahead of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Washington this week, there was a flurry of diplomatic activity from the Biden administration. Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke at the annual India Ideas Summit of the U.S.-India Business Council, while National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan traveled to New Delhi for a two-day visit. Separately, Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin was in New Delhi earlier this month to finalize a roadmap for U.S.-India defense cooperation.
The latter agreement is designed to fast-track technology cooperation and joint manufacturing in air combat, land mobility systems, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, munitions and undersea operations. A separate deal – the one with General Electric to manufacture engines to power India’s Tejas Mk 2 fighters and potentially for fifth-generation advanced medium combat aircraft – is a notable step forward in enhancing the defense partnership. That Washington is sharing cutting-edge defense technology with the world’s largest weapons importer makes it an important step in growing U.S.-India relations writ large.
More important are the geopolitical shifts driving this realignment. Throughout the Cold War, India was the leader of the nonaligned movement – a loose grouping of states that officially took neither side in the global struggle between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. But for all practical purposes, India was a Soviet ally, thanks largely to its own post-colonial left-wing predilections. That relationship is why, even today, as much as 60 percent of Indian military hardware imports come from Russia. Over the past three decades, though, India has moved away from a command-style economy and has thus diversified its weapons procurement with purchases from the United States and Europe.
But it’s easier said than done for countries operating on Russian platforms to fully untether themselves given the political, bureaucratic and technological challenges of doing so. And for a long time, India wasn’t especially interested in trying. Its threat assessment was largely shaped by its historic rivalry with Pakistan (a U.S. military patron) – which it managed with its Russian-made arsenal. That both countries became declared nuclear powers in 1998 compelled India to explore American options, but it was generally content with the gradual pace of diversification. Meanwhile, the competition with China was also in a stalemate for decades, with a few exceptions.
The regional and global strategic situation has since changed, and so too has India’s threat assessments. U.S.-Pakistani relations have withered, and Islamabad’s chronic political-economic crisis has brought the country to the verge of default. As the threat from Pakistan fades, security along the northern border with China has become more concerning as Beijing continues to encroach on the Line of Actual Control. And Russia’s campaign in Ukraine has convinced New Delhi that it cannot rely on Moscow as much as it once did.
From America’s perspective, the confluence of a weakening Russia and an aggressive China is facilitating an outcome that Washington has long sought: a strategic relationship with New Delhi. Until recently, India was happy to forge closer ties with the U.S. but nonetheless wanted to balance them against its longtime partner in Russia – hence its continued business with Moscow in the face of international sanctions. New Delhi will continue to maintain ties with Russia for some time, but it knows it needs more reliable partners going forward.
Geopolitical constraints aren’t the only thing shaping India’s shifting attitude. There are also strategic factors that will drive its behavior. India already boasts the world’s fifth-largest economy, which can grow even more if it has a stronger economic relationship with the United States. Conflicts are not simply threats that need to be countered; they also create economic opportunities.
In the case of the U.S.-China competition, Washington can benefit from stronger cooperation with India in the military sphere. But as important is whether the United States can invest in India enough to make it a legit counter to China. After all, the Chinese economic miracle owes much to U.S. investment and technology. The question is: To what extent can a similar approach be applied to India, thus reducing China from its standing as the world’s largest industrial machine?
For Washington, a multifaceted approach like this would be a far more effective way to meet the challenge posed by China than simply relying on its military or relegating its relationship with India to only defense cooperation. New Delhi would certainly benefit as well. But that scenario depends on how India itself evolves – both in terms of political stability and greater economic reforms that can attract more foreign investment. Right-wing religious nationalism that is steering India toward the path of a majoritarian illiberal democracy could arrest its development.
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second
https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2023/06/modi-preps-us-visit-mideast-leaders-study-indias-nonalignment/387576/
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American Islamists Propagate Myths of "Nazification of India" to Boycott Indian Prime Minister's Joint Address to Congress
by Abha Shankar
IPT News
June 20, 2023
https://www.investigativeproject.org/9330/american-islamists-propagate-myths
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What to Watch For as India's Modi Visits the U.S.
Jun 21, 2023 | 19:39 GMT
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's official state visit to the United States will likely see the announcement of multiple agreements that will strengthen India's domestic defense industry and bolster U.S.-India defense ties. Modi is currently in the United States for his first official state visit to the country, following high-level but non-official state visits in prior years. The June 21-24 trip will only be the third official state visit ever by an Indian prime minister, and the first since former Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's official state visit in November 2009. After attending a June 21 commemoration of International Yoga Day at the United Nations in New York, Modi landed in Washington this afternoon, where tomorrow he'll address a joint session of the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate (making him the first Indian prime minister to have given two speeches to U.S. Congress) and attend an official state dinner. During his visit, Modi is also expected to attend a private meeting in Washington, D.C., with the CEOs of the United States' top 20 companies; a luncheon at the Department of State hosted by Vice President Kamala Harris and Secretary of State Antony Blinken; and a June 23 dinner reception with members of the Indian diaspora community at the Ronald Reagan Building. Thousands of Indian Americans are reportedly expected to travel to Washington to welcome Modi and participate in various related events.
This will be the third official state visit under the Biden administration thus far, following South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol's visit in April 2023 and French President Emmanuel Macron's visit in November-December 2022.
Modi's visit underlines what the White House has described as a ''deep and close partnership between the United States and India,'' and the important role the United States sees for India in countering China's growing influence.
In preparation for Modi's trip, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin traveled to India June 4-5 and met with his Indian counterpart Rajnath Singh to discuss upgrading bilateral defense ties and to settle on a five-year roadmap for jointly developing and producing defense and critical technologies.
U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan visited India June 13-14, where he met with Modi and other officials to settle the agenda for Modi's trip to the United States and to finalize the details of reported purchasing and joint defense production agreements.
The visit comes as India and the United States are strengthening their ties amid mutual concerns over China's increased assertiveness and growing regional and global influence. India has long relied on Russia for weapons and materiel. However, Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine has threatened New Delhi's once-reliable supply of Russian arms, both by increasing risks of triggering U.S.
sanctions and prompting logistical issues that have hampered material shipments. Risks to India's arms supplies have notably also come amid worsening tensions with China, driven in part by recent clashes between the two countries' troops along their contested border, as well as China's expanded activity in the Indian Ocean (which has included frequent transits of Chinese nuclear-powered submarines). This has prompted India to accelerate years-long efforts to strengthen its domestic defense industry and diversify its foreign sources of weapons and materiel. And the United States has actively sought to support those efforts in the hopes of not only reducing India's reliance on Russia, but strengthening a partner it views as vital in countering China's growing regional and global influence (despite Washington and New Delhi's frequent misalignment on how to accomplish this). Against this backdrop, India and the United States have focused on strengthening bilateral defense cooperation and bolstering the former's domestic defense industry in recent years.
In March, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) published a report that showed that Russia was still India's largest arms supplier, but that its share of total Indian arms imports fell from 64% in 2013-2017 to 45% in 2018-2022 due to a combination of ''strong competition from other supplier states, increased Indian arms production and, since 2022, [constraints] on Russia's arms exports related to its invasion of Ukraine.''
In June 2020, at least four Chinese soldiers and 20 Indian soldiers died in a particularly intense flare-up in Galwan Valley along the Himalayan border, in what was the first fatal clash between the two sides in decades. Since then, India and China have generally sought to avoid confrontations and quickly de-escalate along their border. But sporadic border clashes have nonetheless persisted, with the most recent reportedly taking place in early December 2022 in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh.
Last month, the Wall Street Journal reported that India and China had effectively blocked mutual media access by ejecting or denying visa renewals to each other's journalists. In May, India denied visa renewals for the last two Chinese state media journalists operating in India; the move followed China's failure to renew the visas of the last four remaining Indian journalists operating in China in prior weeks.
In May 2022, President Biden and Prime Minister Modi also announced the U.S.-India initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), which focuses on bolstering cooperation in developing and producing defense and critical technologies. The agreement has since helped underpin a number of discussions on U.S.-India defense cooperation.
While it will likely take years for India to fully absolve itself from its decades-long, outsized defense reliance on Russia, Modi's visit is poised to yield multiple agreements that will strengthen India's domestic defense industry and potentially spur a more significant shift in U.S.-India relations. Although Indian imports of Russian arms have steadily decreased in recent years, more than half of India's defense equipment is reportedly still Russian-made, which means India remains heavily reliant on Russia to upgrade its current equipment. This — along with the fact that Western military equipment is comparably more expensive, and that Russian and Western systems lack interoperability — will challenge India's push to diversify its defense equipment and supply chains. India's continuing ties with Russia amid the ongoing war in Ukraine, in addition to the Modi administration's pursuit of domestic policies often criticized as undemocratic, will likely also leave some Western countries hesitant to share sensitive military technologies and limit the extent to which they're willing to deepen ties with India. And India will similarly remain wary of becoming too reliant on the United States and its Western allies, given New Delhi's pursuit of self-reliance and sensitivity to losing its strategic autonomy. But India's concern for the reliability of Russian arms supplies, combined with both Washington and New Delhi's mutual apprehension regarding China, may still be enough to overcome these long-standing constraints and realize a more distinct shift in the U.S.-India relationship. Modi's historic visit to the United States is thus still poised to see the announcement of agreements that strengthen India's domestic defense industry and pave the way for further bilateral cooperation. This could include agreements for rare technology transfers and collaboration on sensitive defense and critical technologies (like artificial intelligence, quantum computing and semiconductors) under iCET.
On his recent trip to New Delhi, U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan implied that efforts were being made to overcome long-standing constraints to closer defense ties, saying Modi's visit to the United States would see ''a number of deliverables…fundamentally designed to remove those obstacles in defense trade, in high-tech trade, in investment in each of our countries, in taking away obstacles that have stood in the way of our scientists and researchers.''
Over the past year, U.S. and Indian officials have discussed a number of agreements for India to acquire or jointly produce materiel and critical military components. This includes a reported agreement for India to purchase a number of General Atomics MQ-9B SeaGuardian unmanned aerial vehicles. In addition, both sides have reportedly worked to secure an agreement for General Electric to jointly produce its GE-F414 turbofan engine with India's Hindustan Aeronautics Limited; the engine would power India's Tejas Mark-2 fighter jets and the rest of India's future fighter jets moving forward.
Despite deepening cooperation, the United States has been frustrated by India's continued engagement with Russia in the aftermath of the Ukraine invasion, which has seen India increase its purchases of cheap Russian oil and participate in Russian-led multilateral military exercises over the past year. Critics have also pointed to reports of ongoing human rights issues in India, as well as the growth of Hindu nationalism, under the Modi administration.
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SCO enlargement and division. India chaired a virtual summit of the leaders of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), where discussions focused on Afghanistan, Ukraine and expanding cooperation among member states. At the summit, it was announced that Iran was joining the bloc and that Belarus had signed a memorandum starting its own accession process. Participants agreed that the SCO is not directed against specific third countries or organizations and that it is open to broad cooperation with them. However, in a sign of division, India reportedly opted not to sign an economic development strategy through 2030 because of the document’s frequent references to Chinese policy initiatives, such as the Global Development Initiative.
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1. As you may know, Modi was in Washington and met Elon Musk. Now Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) which is part of POK, about 28,000 sq miles is being shown as part of India. Twitter users from GB are showing their location in India and the official acct of Pak govt dealing with GB has been shut down. This is all part of building a narrative that GB belongs to India, part of the G20 meetings are being held in Indian Kashmir so that everyone can see Kashmir for themselves.
2. There are multiple videos coming out where people from GB are demanding to be merged with Indian Kashmir. A key factor is the massive development in Indian Kashmir. GB has not got nything from Pak, no food, no electricity, no hospitals, jobs, roads nothing.
3. India continues its weapons purchases with an eye on China, from the US (GE engines for planes, Reaper drones) and from France (26 naval Rafales for the aircraft carrier and 3 scorpene subs), with Germany (acquiring new subs) etc.
4. For years the Indian airforce has had an airbase in Tajikistan at Farkhor. The purpose was to put pressure on Pak and also control the Wakhan corridor which is the GB border with Afghanistan.
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/b/ba/Tajikistan_adm_location_map.svg/220px-Tajikistan_adm_location_map.svg.png)
5. India continues to have empty seats for legislators from POK in the Indian Parliament.
When India separated Bangladesh from Pak, the people of Bangladesh were fully supportive of India, once about 70% of people in GB support India, that will be the time to act. GB is mostly Shia, and Kashmiri Shia strongly support India.
In the meantime, India is building world opinion, building a pro-India narrative in GB.
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July 27, 2023
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India’s Massive Military Restructuring
New Delhi is positioning itself to meet the threat from China and be an effective security partner for the United States.
By: Kamran Bokhari
India’s strategic posture has been in a state of churn for several years now, compelling New Delhi to embark on the biggest military reorganization since the country’s founding in 1947. The South Asian giant is moving away from its historical focus on its western flank with nuclear rival Pakistan to focus on the much bigger challenges of dealing with the growing threat of conflict with China and building up its power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean basin. The need to address these emerging challenges is the principal driver behind the Indian military’s move to establish three new tri-service theater commands – i.e., centers that involve all three branches of the military (the army, air force and navy). The sheer magnitude of the military restructuring, along with the usual bureaucratic inertia, means it will be many years before the process is completed – though the country’s rapid economic growth will help propel its defense capabilities in the years to come.
India is set to launch the first of three integrated theater commands next month when the country celebrates the 76th anniversary of its independence. According to Indian media reports, the Jaipur-based Southwestern Command will focus on the western border with Pakistan. A second Lucknow-based Northern Command will focus on the increasing threats from China along the Himalayan border. The Maritime Command, meanwhile, will be headquartered in Karwar, in the southwestern state of Karnataka, and will focus on defense of the southern coast as well as power projection capabilities in the Indian Ocean basin and beyond.
India's Integrated Theater Commands
(click to enlarge)
The first two commands will be headed on a rotational basis by four-star commanders from the army and air force, while the third will be headed by a naval officer who will report directly to the country’s top military officer, the Chief of Defense Staff, a post created just four years ago. Military operations will effectively be led by these senior officers, while each of the three service chiefs will be responsible for recruitment and maintenance of their respective branches of the military. Prior to this reorganization, the military had only two tri-service commands – the Andaman and Nicobar Command, responsible for the maritime area bordering Myanmar, Thailand and Indonesia, and the Strategic Forces Command, in charge of the country’s nuclear arsenal. The new integrated platforms will be composed of 17 existing commands across the military, seven each from the army and air force and three from the navy. There are also plans for other joint commands led by three-star officers responsible for logistics, training, cyber, space, missiles and intelligence. They will report to the chief of Integrated Defense Staff under the chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
These massive changes to the structure and functionality of the Indian armed forces reflect shifts in the regional and global security situation over the past 15 years or so. India’s main security challenge from Pakistan is not what it was decades ago when the two neighbors fought four wars in 1947, 1965, 1971 and 1999. This is due largely to the emergence of social, political and economic crises that have weakened Islamabad to unprecedented levels. Its military leadership, which dominates many elements of Pakistani society and politics, has been recently trying to steer the country toward normalizing relations and trade with India. Pakistan is increasingly focused on its western flank, which in recent years has supplanted its eastern border with India as its main security threat due to the rising insurgencies led by Islamist rebels and Baloch separatists. Over the past quarter century, the threat to India from Pakistan has emanated largely from proxy Islamist non-state actors, which since the late 2000s have gone from being an asset to a major liability for Islamabad.
Still, New Delhi can’t lower its guard too much given the uncertainty surrounding the security situation in Pakistan in the long term. Meanwhile, India is also concerned about the threat from China, which has been increasingly hostile for the better part of the past decade. New Delhi faces security challenges from Beijing in three strategic sectors: the northwestern, central and northeastern regions straddling the 2,200-mile-long India-China border. This border will likely heat up as U.S.-China competition intensifies and as U.S.-India alignment grows, especially considering that India is the one area in the world where the Chinese have experience and capabilities to act militarily.
While it doesn’t face any immediate threats from the Indian Ocean, New Delhi still needs to dedicate resources to its southern flank. This will be crucial to India’s ability to become a major military ally of the United States in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Even its own imperative to move from being a regional power to a global power necessitates force projection capabilities on the maritime front. For India, maritime security has become a larger focus since Beijing launched its so-called String of Pearls strategy – a push to build military and commercial assets along the Indian Ocean. This strategy, however, has been largely unsuccessful, one reason that Beijing has been trying to keep India focused on its shared border in the Himalayas instead of its southern flank.
Ultimately, the new command structure is designed to allow India to protect against any threats from Pakistan and China, especially in the event that the two countries collude against New Delhi. It’s also aimed at preparing India for a major partnership with the United States and other allies to ensure regional security. But despite India’s projected growth in the years ahead, this will be a herculean task for the world’s fourth-largest military.
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Pak puts Imran Khan in prison for 3 years. The nation is on a death spiral.
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India is changing its penal code (British Colonial Hangover)...I think it would be important to have new laws put in to deal with any mischief Pak may do amongst Indian muslims. This is a necessary step before India makes a go for POK.
*Bill also lists new offences such as acts of secession, arm ..
Read more at:
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/102640505.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst
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Just posting a cultural snippet from India, where the army is respected very much. A young Sikh soldier comes back to his village after being inducted into the Indian Army.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1691352766764228608 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1691352766764228608)
Also, today is India's Independence day, enjoy...https://twitter.com/i/status/1691346294747328512 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1691346294747328512)
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Very nice clip with the family.
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Not much discussion of BRICS in the news, starts tomorrow. Neither is there any discussion of India potentially landing a moon rover in 2 days at the South pole. South pole is where supposedly the water is, which India identified a few years ago. Russian Lunar 25 module crashed a few days ago, they wanted to be the first to reach the S.pole. Well am going back to watching the Kardashians.
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Not much discussion of BRICS in the news, starts tomorrow. Neither is there any discussion of India potentially landing a moon rover in 2 days at the South pole. South pole is where supposedly the water is, which India identified a few years ago. Russian Lunar 25 module crashed a few days ago, they wanted to be the first to reach the S.pole. Well am going back to watching the Kardashians.
Yes I was reading a little about both. Very interesting. My thought on BRICS. If this is an organization of independent states, shouldn't they be independent of Russia and China especially, more so than of the US.
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https://news.yahoo.com/indias-chandrayaan-3-takes-moons-163549580.html
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Not much discussion of BRICS in the news, starts tomorrow. Neither is there any discussion of India potentially landing a moon rover in 2 days at the South pole. South pole is where supposedly the water is, which India identified a few years ago. Russian Lunar 25 module crashed a few days ago, they wanted to be the first to reach the S.pole. Well am going back to watching the Kardashians.
Yes I was reading a little about both. Very interesting. My thought on BRICS. If this is an organization of independent states, shouldn't they be independent of Russia and China especially, more so than of the US.
At this time BRICS + is just a big poke in the eye to the US and EU. Russia is well respected in Africa, because they never colonized it. The Europeans have a long history of colonization and looting Africa, I think they are on their way out. China provides the financial clout and African dictators and leaders love that, they can also make some money on the side, just like the Paki Generals did. India is basically there as a champion of the global south. India has a long history with Africa (eg Gandhi was in S Africa), particularly on its east coast where many Indian businesses settled. With Egypt and Iran, India has ancient cultural ties.
So BRICS+ is not much at the moment, but its economy is greater than that of the G7. 40 nations want to join...
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Slavery: The Ostentatious Hypocrisy of BRICS towards Black Africans
by Paul Trewhela • August 30, 2023 at 5:00 am
In a garish example of anti-democratic, anti-West, collective state hypocrisy, leaders from the BRICS bloc -- representing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa -- meeting in South Africa over three days last week invited four Muslim states and two others to join the bloc, while keeping total silence over the racist and Islamist massacre by heavily armed Arab militias of black African civilians being carried out in West Darfur in Sudan over the preceding weeks.
"[A]trocities pile up in Darfur after 100 days of Sudan fighting", in which "Arab militias are accused of killing lawyers, human rights monitors, doctors and non-Arab tribal leaders". — Al Jazeera, July 24, 2023.
" [The city of Al-Geneina in West Darfur] has been ethnically cleansed." — Humanitarian worker, Sky News, broadcasting scenes of thousands of desperate Sudanese refugees displaced in neighbouring Chad, August 17, 2023.
The Africa Defense Forum disclosed on May 16 that Russia's Wagner group was supervising gold-mining in Darfur, and smuggling nearly $2 billion in gold out of the country.
Yet the "great and the good" -- China's President Xi Jinping, Brazil's President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, South Africa's President Cyril Ramaphosa, with Russian President Vladimir Putin addressing the congregation by video to endorse Russia's war in Ukraine -- made no mention of this genocidal massacre.
Instead, the BRICS leaders invited states with the world's longest history of enslaving black Africans to join them.
China's Xinhua news agency reported how Iran's President Ebrahim Raisi, who attended the BRICS conference, hailed it as a "commendable step that will facilitate worldwide development while upholding principles of justice."
Justice? Raisi was deputy prosecutor general in a four-member committee codenamed the "death commission" in Iran in 1988, which was responsible for the executions of thousands of political prisoners who were loyal to a banned opposition movement, "on orders issued by Raisi and his three colleagues."
Worse, although slavery continued legally in Iran until 1929, "It never went away". — iranwire.com, April 30, 2020.
The article showed a series of photos of black African slaves in Iran, such as this one from the 1880s. — Denise Hassanzade Ajiri, "The face of African slavery in Qajar Iran – in pictures," The Guardian, January 14, 2016.
The issue of the enslavement and oppression of black Africans -- continuing to this day in Darfur and elsewhere -- is an issue suppressed by BRICS.
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That is a valid point, but this is exactly where BRICS+ differs from the west. They are not the global policeman, as the US tries to be. BRICS+ from what I understand is focused mostly on improving their economies, infrastructure etc, without falling into the IMF debt trap, or suffering from US dollar hegemony (SWIFT sanctions, strength of US $ which devastates developing countries). Trying to be the global policemen and control behaviour of individual countries is beyond the BRICS abilities or interest.
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September 1, 2023
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China, India and the Path to Escalation
Beijing’s clashes with New Delhi are part of the Chinese strategy to extract concessions from Washington.
By: Kamran Bokhari
There is growing international concern about a potential conflict between China and India over their disputed border in the Himalayas. However, the possibility of a war between the two neighbors has to be understood in the context of the increasing pressure Beijing is coming under both domestically with a faltering economy and on the foreign policy front with U.S.-led containment efforts. These circumstances could lead Beijing to become more assertive with India in an effort to extract concessions from Washington, a key partner for New Delhi.
This week, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo visited China for talks requested by her Chinese counterpart as part of Beijing’s efforts to repair relations and slow its economic downturn. But China’s recent engagements with India have been less placating. According to a Reuters report, Chinese President Xi Jinping is planning to skip the G-20 summit set to take place in New Delhi on Sept. 9-10 and will send Premier Li Qiang in his place. Xi’s absence would come just weeks after he held talks with his Indian counterpart on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in South Africa in August. Meanwhile, on Wednesday, the Chinese government released an official map showing India’s northeastern state of Arunachal Pradesh and northwestern Aksai Chin region as Chinese territory, drawing strong criticism from the Indian government.
Despite these signs of hostility, over the past few weeks senior commanders from China’s People’s Liberation Army held a series of talks with two- and three-star Indian generals to de-escalate tensions in the western Ladakh sector along the Line of Actual Control, which separates Chinese- and Indian-held territories. The flurry of meetings at the operational commander level suggested that the two sides were trying to hammer out a deal to return forces to the positions they held prior to Chinese incursions in 2020 that led to violent clashes. The timing of the talks, ahead of the Xi-Modi meeting in Johannesburg, suggested that a significant deal could have been in the works. But conflicting official accounts of what was discussed indicate that a resolution will likely not be in the offing for the foreseeable future.
The difficulty in agreeing to a resolution is a result of the fact that China and India have conflicting interests. China is increasingly at odds with the United States, while India is emerging as a close partner of Washington. In many ways, India is strategically sandwiched between the two counties. For Beijing, India is a pressure point that it can use to try to gain leverage in talks with Washington. It is, after all, the only place where China has some ability to use military power to further its strategic imperatives.
Many believe that China’s military is focused on Taiwan, a perception Beijing certainly feeds into by conducting military exercises in the waters around the self-ruled island. But the Chinese know well that their military has little combat experience, certainly none in the maritime space, meaning it would be no match for the force structure that the U.S. and its allies have put in place in the Western Pacific.
The PLA does have combat experience against India, with which it fought a war more than half a century ago. But 1962 was a very different time. India was a much weaker country than it is now and far more focused on its regional rival Pakistan, which it had fought in 1948 and would fight again. This was also the height of the Cold War, and Washington was focused on containing the Soviet Union and bogged down in Vietnam. Neither the Indians nor the Chinese were nuclear powers yet. The Chinese were thus able to seize control of a chunk of territory in the Kashmir region and in northeastern India.
In the decades that followed, Chinese and Indian forces engaged only in minor clashes (in 1975 and again in 1986-87) in Arunachal Pradesh around the time India was absorbing the disputed area. Apart from these incidents, the two neighbors remained largely conflict free. In the 1990s and 2000s, they concluded several agreements to manage their territorial disputes until a permanent settlement could be reached.
(click to enlarge)
It wasn’t until a decade ago that trouble erupted again when Chinese forces began making limited incursions at multiple points on the Indian side of their long border. Since then, there have been five noteworthy cases of Chinese troops crossing the Line of Actual Control – in 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020 and most recently last December. None of these incidents, however, involved the exchange of live fire. Even the 2020 incident, which resulted in several fatalities on both sides, involved hand-to-hand combat with clubs and rocks.
Considering the recent tensions and the firepower that both countries have deployed to their border over the past three years, an outbreak of armed hostilities is quite possible. However, the Chinese are unlikely to gain territory from such an exchange, given the difficult terrain in the Himalayas. They also know that the Indians will have close U.S. military and intelligence support in case of a conflict. Furthermore, India has far more combat experience than China because of the wars it fought with Pakistan.
Thus, the Chinese leadership understands that any conflict with India could have enormous costs, including for its economy, which is already struggling. The fallout from the war in Ukraine that Russian President Vladimir Putin is dealing with right now is not lost on Xi. The Chinese will therefore likely tread carefully to find a sweet spot between strategically poking India and avoiding a major eruption.
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India's plans on acquiring POK are moving to the next stage, where people from Gilgit Baltistan (GB) are now openly demanding that they merge with India (no doubt with covert Indian support).
https://youtu.be/sSOYk5WYX9o (https://youtu.be/sSOYk5WYX9o)
My current thinking is that the demand to merge with India will come from the people of POK and India will oblige. Much can be learnt, from the parallels of how India freed/created Bangladesh (E.Pak) and acquired the state of Sikkim. The plans will not be the same but will ryhme.
- The food crisis in POK will result in people of GB clamoring to get into India, India will oblige by opening the Kargil road (which the people are requesting), this will lead to a refugee crisis and then India takes back GB with massive public support. India will open the road for humanitarian reasons, at a time of its choosing.
- India is currently investing a lot in Indian Kashmir, and the narrative is being created and contrasted with POK where there is no development and even food, electricity, medical care, education is non-existent in POK. This year a lot of media attention was garnered with the visit of 3 Miss Worlds/Countries to Kashmir, with the possibility of a competition in Kashmir.
- Recent Indian moon mission and today's rocket to the Sun's periphery is all, garnering admiration in POK and Pak to merge with India.
- Indian general elections are in May 2024. Modi is expected to win a massive majority. If that happens, POK will be in the bulls eye for his next term.
- Economically, India is getting stronger, its expected to become the 3rd largest economy in the next 2 years.
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- To compare with the banana republic of Pak, their ex PM is in prison and being asked to give up politics and go into exile in Londonistan.
- The Pak rupee has been devalued extensively
- No food, water or electricity in Pak.
- India is talking about renegotiation of the Indus Water Treaty, which will further reduce Pak's water, India holds all the levers.
- The state of Pak economy is dire.
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India is holding the G20 Summit in New Delhi. not much coverage in the media.
Some notable points.
-Xi did not attend, probably did not want to meet Biden, or snub India or both.
- India added the African Union, about 51 countries to the G20 Group as a permanent member, just as the EU is part of the group. This improves India's relations with Africa (commodities and challenges China). Next the G20 Presidency shifts to Brazil, you can be sure Latin America will be added next.
Here's the video of Indian FM Jaishankar bringing in the African Union Head and ultimate hug with Modi
https://twitter.com/i/status/1700395154086215847
- A new land and sea route has been set up to Europe, to counter China's belt and road initiative.
- MBS from Saudi Arab is on a State Visit to India, PM of Mauritius was also accorded a lot of importance, 2 countries where China is vying for influence and the US is losing influence.
- India has for long asked for a Permanent Seat at the UNSC and China always vetoes that. Slowly, other international organizations are being developed to counter China. It is obvious that industry will shift from China and India is being built up as the alternative.
- What is very obvious is how warmly Modi greets several of the leaders of these countries, relationships are good. In recent times, France, Egypt, Saudis have given Modi perhaps their highest civilian awards !. Neither China nor the US has these relationships.
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YA:
Love having you here helping us with matters pertaining to India and its place in the world.
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In recent times, India's moon mission, sun mission, G20, current state of development in Kashmir, all of this is causing huge demands in POK to unite with India. Indian BJP leadership has started to say, that the people of POK will demand union with India and that is happening.
Religious flavored songs are being sung to unite with India (advanced stage of mutiny), these are in urdu, but they will give a flavor. https://youtu.be/I5EEhIoCMJU?t=942
There is no food, electricity, education etc. Huge protests in POK, that India should open the border at Kargil. This is a bit like the Berlin wall between East and West Germany. People in POK can see the development in Indian Kashmir. Looks like the Bangladesh model + softpower will be used to unite with POK. The army will then ensure law and order.
- At some point India will open the borders, refugees will flow to India, India will take over Bangladesh (Bangladesh model).
- If China makes a move on Taiwan, India may again use the situation to take over POK.
- Next general elections in May 2024, Modi is likely to comeback with super majorities. Apparently he has not taken a single day of vacation over the last several years !.
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wow
Ya, do you think India Pakistan union is possible?
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Not Pak, but Gilgit Baltistan loosely called Pak Occupied Kashmir (POK), which is Indian Territory per the Constitution of India and India has a strong legal basis for it. Since independence, the Parliament has empty seats for representatives from POK. Gilgit and Baltistan are the major areas that are being contested
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/84/Kashmir_region._LOC_2003626427_-_showing_sub-regions_administered_by_different_countries.jpg/800px-Kashmir_region._LOC_2003626427_-_showing_sub-regions_administered_by_different_countries.jpg).
These are Shia areas. There is a small sliver of land near Muzaffarabad so called Azad Kashmir or Free Kashmir (seen on the map, left middle side), that is Sunni and India has no interest in it, though the people from there too are protesting to join India as the 3 areas Gilgit, Baltistan and Azad Kashmir comprise POK. The map also shows Aksai Chin that China has occupied and adjacent to it is territory that Pak ceded to China, which is also Indian territory per legal documents.
To understand India's historical civilizational ties with Afghanistan, Balochistan, Tibet etc, You may want to read about Akhand Bharat (separate issue), which shows the old Indian territories, from not too long ago. (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/81/Akhand_Bharat_%28orthographic_projection%29.svg/1024px-Akhand_Bharat_%28orthographic_projection%29.svg.png)
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That was clarifying.
Thank you.
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G20 had the Japanese PM's wife dress in Indian clothes.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F5os7ImasAAfpsh?format=jpg&name=small)
Rishi Sunak, PM of UK and wife going all into Hinduism mode
IMF Pres. Giorgina C (sp ?) showing Indian dance moves.
I am seeing a move away from China.
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Somehow different from when Fidel's son from Canada did it.
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September 13, 2023
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The Viability of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
The ambitious new connectivity project will likely run aground in the Arabian Peninsula.
By: Kamran Bokhari
We live in an age of interregional connections. China’s Belt and Road Initiative, after a decade and hundreds of billions of dollars in spending, has faced significant setbacks but remains the most prominent example. Attempts to develop the Trans-Caspian International Trade Route, also known as the Middle Corridor, have gained momentum since Russia invaded Ukraine, spurring other countries to seek ways to bypass Russian territory for east-west commerce and to reduce dependency on Russian hydrocarbons. The latest connectivity corridor emerged last weekend at the G20 summit, during which the United States, India, Saudi Arabia and others signed a memorandum of understanding to establish a network of maritime and rail routes connecting the Indian subcontinent with Europe via the Middle East.
Details are scarce, but the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor will consist of rail lines and seaports linking India and Europe across the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Israel. In addition to reducing transit times for goods, the IMEC project is expected to include infrastructure for the production and transport of green hydrogen and an undersea cable to enhance telecommunications and data transfers. The most interesting aspect of the corridor came from the U.S. deputy national security adviser, who said it was not just an infrastructure project but was informed by a U.S. strategy of “turning the temperature down” in the Middle East, which historically has been a “net exporter of turbulence and insecurity.”
Proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor
(click to enlarge)
It appears the United States’ growing alignment with India is enabling Washington to stitch together four key landmasses – Europe, the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia – from the Atlantic to the Pacific. This resembles the British strategy during that empire’s heyday, when England saw the Middle East as a critical junction between it and its colonial possession of India. During the 19th and 20th centuries, the Arab world remained a strategic challenge for the United Kingdom. It is all the more so for the United States in the 21st century. As the most unstable element of the planned corridor, the Middle East will be the focal point.
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the envisioned corridor bypasses the major hot spots of the region, such as Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, which together comprise Iran’s sphere of influence. Additionally, the Levant, though a key piece of geopolitical real estate between the Arabian Peninsula and the European continent, is in disarray, especially after the Syrian civil war. This would also explain why Turkey, which is the landbridge between the Middle East and Europe, is not part of the corridor. Egypt is the other major exclusion, likely due to its economic problems, which are worsening despite several billions of dollars of financial assistance from the energy-rich Gulf Arab states just in the past 10 years of President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi’s rule.
The core component of the IMEC is Saudi Arabia, which under Mohammed bin Salman is experiencing a social and economic revolution. The crown prince’s ambitious Vision 2030 roadmap seeks to transform the country from a religiously ultraconservative kingdom heavily reliant on crude oil exports into a modern country with a diversified economy that is deeply integrated with the rest of the world. Saudi Arabia (together with the UAE) has increasingly close geoeconomic ties with India. Therefore, this project is very much in keeping with Riyadh’s imperatives.
However, the newly announced corridor has a major chokepoint: Jordan. Bordering Iraq, Syria and the Palestinian territory of the West Bank, the small Hashemite kingdom occupies a highly unstable strategic environment. Jordan’s infrastructure will also need serious upgrading, especially considering the country’s weak economy, which has been burdened by hosting more than a million Syrian refugees. But perhaps the most significant factor is the country’s proximity to the West Bank, where the meltdown of the Palestinian Authority and the growing number of Jewish settlements has created a precarious situation.
The corridor project also comes as the Biden administration has been pushing Saudi Arabia and Israel to establish formal ties. Washington and Riyadh have already agreed on the broad parameters of such a deal. It is in the Saudis’ interest to normalize relations with the Israelis, but they cannot do so at the cost of disregarding the Palestinian issue. In the past two weeks alone the Palestinian Authority has signaled that it is willing to settle for modest territorial concessions from Israel vis-a-vis the West Bank. Meanwhile, the Saudis are engaging the Palestinians over financial assistance.
Integrating the West Bank into the project would be a way for the Saudis to forge relations with Israel while also developing the corridor. The Palestinian territory sits between the Jordanian capital of Amman and the Israeli port city of Haifa, whence the second maritime segment of the corridor begins the journey through the Mediterranean to Eastern Europe. Of course, this would be a massive undertaking and would depend on an unlikely level of relative peace between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the West Bank. Even if the route bypasses the West Bank, growing political instability and polarization within Israel is its own risk.
As if all these Middle Eastern factors were not enough of an impediment, the European stretch of the corridor through the Western Balkans entails its own insecurity. The closest European destination from Israel is Greece, and to get to the wider continent the route goes through the Balkans.
Considering all the issues that would need to be addressed, the IMEC project will struggle to become a significant economic connectivity channel. For now, the corridor will likely be limited to the maritime route connecting India to the Gulf Arab states – a route that is still in many ways commercially vibrant.
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Yesterday, India lost 3 army men (Col, Major and a senior police man) in Kashmir to terrorist action from Pak. India is up in arms. Just heard a fiery speech from Modi, saying he will make Pak pay, that he has had enough, the country has had enough. Modi is not known to speak like that. He is mad as hell. Expectations of a severe response are being raised.
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In the last few weeks the rate of assassinations of Paki terrorists to include Pak funded Khalistanis in Canada, UK and of course in Pak has shot up. They are falling like flies. Indian secret agencies and Modi is getting a lot of credit for this, but ofcourse no one knows who is responsible. The Khalistanis in Canada have interpol notices on some of them, or are declared terrorists for killing innocents, plane hijacking etc that canada has for some reason given them citizenship. This has vitiated the India-Canada atmosphere.
Based on the speeches by Modi and Indian Foreign Min, India will take a hard line from now on.
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Another development...now Indian Muslims are demanding that POK be allowed to merge with India. They believe only Modi can do that. The momentum for re-unification is building...
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YA:
What do you make of the hit on the Sikh guy in Canada?
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These Khalistanis are terrorists, with a long trail of murders etc in India. Nijjar entered Canada on false pretences, using a non-Sikh name, should have never been given Canadian citizenship. They are supported by Pak's ISI. Turdeau supports them for the vote bank. It will come back to bite Canada, guaranteed. There is zero chance, they will ever get a homeland in India, their only purpose is to break harmony between hindus and sikhs in India. Modi is getting tough on these guys, their properties in India have been taken over by the govt, their visas and "green cards" to India have been cancelled.
Not clear who ordered the killing, could be the Indian govt, or a gang war. The rapid demise of multiple anti-India elements over the last few months, including Muslim and Khalistani terrorists in Pak, Canada, UK might not be a coincidence. When I see the multiple independence movements in Pak (Sindhudesh, Balochistan, Khyber belt, POK), something is happening, is being supported by someone. Oct 23 has been declared by the people of POK as the date by which Pak army must vacate POK. While I dont expect much to change on that date, it is a timepoint when the struggle will intensify as will their demand to merge with India. Indian elections are in May 2024. If Modi comes back (almost certain), things could get interesting with respect to Pak.
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Thank you.
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Here's the Khalistani leader Pannu (sitting in Canada), threatning India in his strong Punjabi accent. He is a marked man.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1711709022582387189 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1711709022582387189)
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Oct 22 is coming. Its not on anyone's radar in the west. On this day, POK will declare independence from Pak control. While much will not change that day (apart from public agitations), it will start the process of a public demand to merge with India. A mental switch will occur in the populace from Pak to India. It is obvious that India has decided to take back POK using a soft power approach, where the people demand to merge with India. They see it to their advantage with respect to India's advances in space (moon mission, solar mission), hospitals, education etc and no one wants to stay with Pak. In a few years India will be the 3rd largest economy in the world.
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ya, I really appreciate those updates.
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Yes, me too!
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So Oct 22 was celebrated as a black day in POK. In other news, Pak broke the ceasefire on the LAC (Line of Actual Control) after 3 years. the LAC represents the agreed upon border, whereas the LOC (Line of Control) is the contested border in POK.
I think China is trying to get the US embroiled in the middle east conflict, so that the US is depleted of weapons, before it makes its move on Taiwan. If the US is out of weapons, it also means that they may not have spare capacity to supply India in case India makes a move on POK and needs weapons.! This is all speculation, but considering Pak's precarious financial condition, they would not break a ceasefire agreement without Chinese backing.
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https://asiatimes.com/2023/11/india-wasting-its-youthful-demographics/
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Gilgit/Baltistan (POK) residents demand to join India.
https://youtu.be/8NUaenPADh4 (https://youtu.be/8NUaenPADh4)
If we look at how Bangladesh was created (from E.Pakistan), the same playbook is playing out (it rhymes). Resident's are oppressed by Pak, no food, water, electricity, jobs nothing. Will demand to join India and India will oblige. India might even accept refugees from POK, as their number increases, India will move in. This year, India heads the G20 Presidency, so it will likely be 2025. May 2024 is elections and Modi will get a new 5 yr term. The writing is on the wall.
- Amazing amount of weapons are being purchased, missiles being fired, new subs, fighter air planes, heavy guns etc being purchased or manufactured. This cannot be all China centric. Something larger is afoot.
- Agniveer civil/military soldier recruitment scheme. 50,000 recruits per year! for a 4 year military training course, of which 1/4th get permanent military cadre and 3/4 are militarily trained civilians who can join the paramilitary forces. These will be needed if India intends to hold POK.
- Unrest rising in Pak, who knows if India is funding them ?
- Massive border infrastructure development against China, incase China makes a grab for Tawang monastery in a two front war.
- Gilgit area has a lot of Buddhist roots, Baltistan is mostly Shia. Even though Pak has tried to change demograhics (Sunnis), the base population is expected to be friendly.
Two more datapoints.
1. There is an ongoing campaign in Pak, where their leading anti-India terrorists are being killed. This may be a preparation for when India takes POK, these elements will have been eliminated.
2. While India holds 24 seats empty in the Parliament for POK representatives, this week they passed a law whereby 1 seat is reserved and will be filled by the Governor of Kashmir by a person who migrated from POK. This will ofcourse light a fire in the POK movement and has been their demand for long.
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Yesterday, breaking news from India. The Indian Supreme Court held that the removal of Article 370 from Indian Kashmir was valid and that Kashmir is a regular part of India.
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/landmark-judgment-supreme-court-upholds-abrogation-of-article-370-says-it-was-temporary-provision/articleshow/105889393.cms (https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/landmark-judgment-supreme-court-upholds-abrogation-of-article-370-says-it-was-temporary-provision/articleshow/105889393.cms)
Under article 370 the money from the central govt would go to certain Congress affiliated political parties who had ruled Kashmir for decades, Kashmir had semi-independent status and Pak was able to create a lot of nuisance and terrorism. Naturally, the opposition was against removing article 370. Now after removal of art 370, there is massive development in Kashmir, terrorism has practically died down.
Corollary of this decision is that it applies to the whole of Kashmir, including POK. This ruling allows India to take back POK.
Comments from X https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/1734141418170663260 (https://twitter.com/KesariDhwaj/status/1734141418170663260)
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Two developments of note:
1. Pak has raised the temp across the LOC. They are sending terrorists across who have now killed a few Indian soldiers and also mutilated them. Not sure whats happening, because Pak has no appetite for a war, its broke. This must be at China's prodding, why ?.
2. Yesterday supposedly Iranian drones attacked Indian tankers, in the Indian Ocean close to Indian coast. Not sure what that's about. India has friendly relations with Iran and Russia.
Added: Dec 25. What is also noteworthy is that the Govt of India has not said a peep, no condemnation of the mutilation of soldiers nothing.
- Pak army chief visits US a few days ago, soon after it unleashes terrorists in India.
- Indian defense minister and Chief of Army staff visits the front.
- Indian foreign minister in Russia during Christmas Dec 25-29. Very unusual for the FM to travel during holidays. What could be this urgent ?
- US-India relations have gone south in recent times. Biden backed out of attending India's Republic day parade (Macron steps in). The republic day parade is considered very prestigious invite in India. Furthermore US supporting Khalistani terrorist Pannu (US-Can citizen). Pannu is a well recognized terrorist and has openly said he would bomb Indian parliament in recent days.
Time to connect the dots...
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Biden/US puts pressure on India, on what was essentially a signed deal. In recent times, things are not going well between India and USA. The thinking in India is that the US is an unreliable partner. So now, India may buy the French engine, or build a Russian 5th Gen plane.
https://idrw.org/us-puts-additional-scrutiny-on-f-414-engine-deal-for-india/ (https://idrw.org/us-puts-additional-scrutiny-on-f-414-engine-deal-for-india/)
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There is a video released by the Indian Air Force (IAF), thats gone viral. It shows the IAF landing a C-130 plane near the Pak border in mountainous terrain using terrain masking at night to make the big plane undetectable, without any runway lights, and the plane was full of Garud (airforce) commandos. The message is that they could land it also at Skardu in Gilgit Baltistan (POK) which is close to the border to capture the air-strip. At the very least, it shows capability to land troops near the border in an undetectable manner.
The red circle on the left is Gilgit Baltistan (POK) and the arrow marks the air strip.
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GDN13saaAAA1LEe?format=jpg&name=900x900)
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January 11, 2024
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2024 Annual Forecast: India’s Transformation
Domestic political strife threatens to impede India’s rapid ascent.
By: Kamran Bokhari
Forecasting national behavior is built on continuums. One continuum is a nation’s history. Another is our analytic method. Simply looking at nations will not provide a systematic forecast. The method, no matter how tested in the past, cannot produce one. Only a grasp of history, filtered through a forecasting method tested consistently and repeatedly, will yield a realistic forecast. We don’t look at a nation’s every issue; we focus on the issues that reveal patterns and indicate change. Thus, our forecasts will look at the past before they look at the future.
The stunning economic transformation of India over the past three decades is one of the most important and underappreciated implications of the end of the Cold War. For 44 years after its independence from Britain, India functioned as a command-style economy. Forced by a severe balance of payments crisis to turn to international financial institutions for assistance, the country embarked upon a path of economic liberalization in 1991. Over the next two decades, economic growth doubled to well over 6 percent per year, and the share of Indians living below the poverty line dropped from nearly half in the early 1990s to 34 percent in 2010.
India’s rise as a global geoeconomic player is the driving factor behind its emerging strategic alignment with the United States. After China, India has been the fastest growing economy for about two decades. It went from being the 11th largest economy in 2012 to the fifth largest in 2022. Last year, it overtook China as the most populous nation on the planet. Washington hopes to leverage India’s economic growth to manage the challenge it faces from a more assertive China.
However, domestic political strife threatens to impede India’s ascent. In parallel with its massive economic reforms and growth, India’s politics have transformed over the past 30 years. From independence until the 1990s, the country’s main secular left-of-center party, the Indian National Congress, faced no major challengers at the national level. For much of India’s history, it was firmly under the control of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty, which provided three generations of Indian prime ministers. But severe economic problems, coupled with a leadership crisis in the wake of two major assassinations (Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1984 and former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1992), weakened the hold of the party.
Around the same time, right-wing Hindu nationalism emerged as a significant social and political force, represented by the new Bharatiya Janata Party. Founded in 1980, the BJP went from two seats in Parliament in the 1984 elections to well over 150 when it formed its first government 12 years later. Although the Congress party played a key role in the liberalization of the economy in the 1990s and during its two stints in power from 2004 to 2014, the political culture of the country had significantly changed by the early 2010s, with religious nationalism having replaced secularism as the dominant national ideology.
Under the leadership of current Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the BJP made a roaring comeback in the 2014 elections, more than doubling its parliamentary seats. Paradoxically, however, Modi’s India has experienced faster economic growth combined with intensifying right-wing Hindu nationalism. The latter threatens to undermine the stability of the country.
Elections are slated for the spring, and the ruling BJP is expected to at least retain its majority, giving Modi a third term as chief executive. India’s economy will likely continue to surge ahead as it benefits from the diversion of Western investment away from China. And barring any unforeseen developments, Modi will probably continue to balance the economic imperatives of the state with the growth of a new Indian identity centered on the majority Hindu religion, which is key to his political success. However, over the medium to long term, the rise of Hindu nationalism could corrode the secular foundations of the state, destabilizing it in the process.
On the foreign policy front, India’s role in the international security space will continue to increase. For much of India's history, the military was tied down in South Asia by its regional rival Pakistan, but the weakening of the Pakistani state, especially in the past five years, has enabled India to look beyond the region. This trend will continue to enable India to focus on building its capabilities to deal with China on land and at sea.
Being a key partner of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region places India in the middle of the U.S.-China struggle. If Washington and Beijing are unable to reach an accommodation in the coming year, then we can expect increased conflict between the Chinese and the Indians. Meanwhile, violence in the Middle East has undermined the security of shipping in the northwestern Indian Ocean basin, forcing New Delhi to take a greater role in the region’s maritime security. This, in addition to tensions along their shared Himalayan border, could become a point of friction between the Indians and the Chinese.
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Elections ongoing in Pak at the moment. Imran Khan is in prison, but looks like he won the election. Army does not like that, so the other two parties of Nawaz and Bhutto will form a coalition. Imran stays in prison. The army gets what it wants.
Cartoon says " Never won a war, never lost an election" !
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GGEI7gGWQAAGPfI?format=jpg&name=small)
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India plays hardball, cuts UN funding by 50 %, threatens to withdrawn UN peacekeeping forces. Demands UN Security Council seat.
https://www.eurasiantimes.com/india-cuts-un-funding-expert-wants-end-to-peacekeeping/ (https://www.eurasiantimes.com/india-cuts-un-funding-expert-wants-end-to-peacekeeping/)
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Seems more than reasonable to me, but is likely to rupture stasis with regard to others.
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India will be # 3 economy in a year or two, it has the largest population in the world. Smaller countries like France and UK are Security Council members, almost sounds like a joke these days. Its within 0.2 Trillion of Germany and Japan. The only one objecting is China and interestingly from what I understand in the 50's the Permanent Council membership was offered to India and the strategically dumb PM of India, Nehru said China should take it.
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Double this yr?
https://tradingeconomics.com/india/stock-market
if one looks at the growth rate , inflation rate, unemployment rate those numbers are not good.
I keep hearing about corruption , lack of infrastructure such as roads.
Yet India seems like a sleeping giant.
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(8) 10K INDIAN TROOPS TO CHINESE BORDER: India is moving 10,000 troops to its border with China on top of the 9,000 already stationed there. Indian Chief of the Army Staff General Manoj Pande said nations are resorting to hard power to achieve political objectives.
Why It Matters: India previously announced the recruitment of these 10,000 troops to join the border police. India is bolstering its defenses while acknowledging that respect for international law is degrading and the age of “might makes right” is returning. - J.V.
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https://www.yahoo.com/news/india-conducts-first-test-flight-124859816.html
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That is worthy posting on the Nuclear War thread as well.
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/markets/america-s-new-partner-against-china-shows-off-aircraft-carriers/ar-BB1jHaWJ?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=8b4788cd57e441bdb4d9de8073460056&ei=12
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India Adds Firepower to a Missile Program Focused on China
India tested a missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, the latest advance in its homegrown Agni-V program
By
Rajesh Roy
Follow
March 11, 2024 1:49 pm ET
NEW DELHI—India has successfully conducted the maiden flight test of an indigenously developed ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said Monday, a development that enhances the country’s nuclear deterrence against rivals China and Pakistan.
The intercontinental ballistic missile called Agni-5, which in Sanskrit means “fire,” is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRV technology, that allows it to launch multiple attacks in one go across different locations, according to two senior serving government officials.
The missile technology has been under development for the past several years by state-run Defense Research and Development Organization, or DRDO. With the flight test, India has joined the league of a few elite nations such as the U.S., China, Russia and France that have this technology.
The flight test was conducted from an island in eastern India’s Odisha state, according to a statement from India’s Defense Ministry.
India has been developing and testing its Agni series of missiles for more than a decade as it looks to catch up with China’s military strength. It first tested the Agni-5 series in 2012, and since then has been adding technological advancements to it and retesting. The country has said its Agni-5 program is in line with India’s stated policy to have a credible minimum deterrence and its commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons.
In 2019, India successfully tested a missile capable of destroying a satellite in space, technology also held by only a few powers.
The surface-to-surface Agni missile is capable of striking targets of more than 5,000 kilometers, or 3,100 miles, with a high degree of accuracy. That trails the capabilities of China’s longest-range missiles.
Still, this puts Beijing and its neighborhood within the direct target range of India’s Strategic Forces Command, the dedicated tri-services nuclear force under the direct control of the prime minister, said New Delhi-based defense analyst N.C. Bipindra.
The MIRV-capable ballistic missile can target multiple strategic sites about 1,500 kilometers, or 930 miles apart, and “that is a significant nuclear strike capability for any nation to have,” he said. He added that Agni-5 development was largely focused on China, which New Delhi now views as the most serious military threat to India.
Relations between India and China have been fraught since they fought a war in 1962 over the delineation of their borders. China dominated the short but intense war, which was focused on the eastern stretch of boundary between the two countries. The war didn’t settle the matter, and much of the 2,000-mile de facto border remains in dispute.
Tensions flared up again in June 2020 following a deadly clash between Indian and Chinese security forces in the disputed Himalayan region that led to the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and four Chinese. Since then, the two countries have deployed tens of thousands of troops, as well as artillery and howitzers along their disputed border.
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I have been following Modi govt's talk and actions with respect to China and POK.
1. India is spending billions on new weapon purchases, the rate at which new contracts are being signed and weapon systems being implemented is impressive. There is a time line that they are trying to meet. All of this is China focussed, including the MIRV capability.
2. Border infrastructure, new tunnels and all weather capability at the China border is being developed massively. Huge funding upgrades have been done.
3. The Modi govt's stated goal within the next 3 years is to become the 3rd largest economy in the world, after the USA and China. India is close to overtaking Japan and Germany. This is critical. Currently, the difference between India and China in terms of economic power is huge.
4. Another important focus is to develop Indian Kashmir to world standards, such that the people of POK who watch development in in Indian Kashmir, agitate to join with India, without a bullet being fired.
Items 1-3 must happen, before India voluntarily takes POK, unless China forces India's hand by moving on Taiwan earlier.
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I love the India region updates from ya. It is SO underreported in American media.
Weird (to us) in the era or Biden, Schumer, Pelosi et al to see a leader want to build up the strength of his own country, economy and military readiness.
Meanwhile we apologize for and dismantle our own.
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Agree with Doug. We never hear anything in msm about India .
Items 1-3 must happen, before India voluntarily takes POK, unless China forces India's hand by moving on Taiwan earlier
Ya
what do you mean takes POK ? what does that stand for POK?
And force India's hand if China takes Taiwan. What would India's response be?
Is India contributing to the defense of the Taiwan strait with other Countries?
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Not Pak, but Gilgit Baltistan loosely called Pak Occupied Kashmir (POK), which is Indian Territory per the Constitution of India and India has a strong legal basis for it. Since independence, the Parliament has empty seats for representatives from POK. Gilgit and Baltistan are the major areas that are being contested
(https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/84/Kashmir_region._LOC_2003626427_-_showing_sub-regions_administered_by_different_countries.jpg/800px-Kashmir_region._LOC_2003626427_-_showing_sub-regions_administered_by_different_countries.jpg).
These are Shia areas. There is a small sliver of land near Muzaffarabad so called Azad Kashmir or Free Kashmir (seen on the map, left middle side), that is Sunni and India has no interest in it, though the people from there too are protesting to join India as the 3 areas Gilgit, Baltistan and Azad Kashmir comprise POK. The map also shows Aksai Chin that China has occupied and adjacent to it is territory that Pak ceded to China, which is also Indian territory per legal documents.
To understand India's historical civilizational ties with Afghanistan, Balochistan, Tibet etc, You may want to read about Akhand Bharat (separate issue), which shows the old Indian territories, from not too long ago. (https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/8/81/Akhand_Bharat_%28orthographic_projection%29.svg/1024px-Akhand_Bharat_%28orthographic_projection%29.svg.png)
POK stands for Pak Occupied Kashmir. Before India got Independence from the British in 1947, it was ruled by princely states and they were given a choice to either join the Union of India or Pakistan. The ruler of Kashmir chose to join India (Hindu king), so all parts of his kingdom became part of India. Due to strategic mistakes by Indian PM Nehru, Pak managed to occupy some parts of it but India has never given up its claims to it. Infact in the new parliament which was inaugurated in India last year, India re-allocated 24 seats for people of POK. India's strategy is to weaken Pak economically and strengthen itself economically and militarily incase China decides to interfere in favor of pak. Its only a matter of time, that POK will come back to India. India will then have a direct land connection to Afghanistan through the Wakhan corridor. This will cut the geopolitical importance of Pak, as well as block China's Belt and Road Initiative which goes thro POK occupied Kashmir to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea through the port of Gwadar.
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thank you
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Agree with Doug. We never hear anything in msm about India .
Items 1-3 must happen, before India voluntarily takes POK, unless China forces India's hand by moving on Taiwan earlier
Ya
what do you mean takes POK ? what does that stand for POK?
And force India's hand if China takes Taiwan. What would India's response be?
Is India contributing to the defense of the Taiwan strait with other Countries?
POK has been explained above.
India has friendly relations with Taiwan, infact they are planning on building a semiconductor factory in India. If China were to take Taiwan, India could support them through an international US lead coalition to block Chinese goods traffic through the Malacca straits. However, since China cannot fight a two front war with both Taiwan and India, India is likely to make its move for POK while China is distracted.
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wow
Ya, do you think India Pakistan union is possible?
No India does not want a Union with Pak, only POK which is still mostly Shia and provides connectivity to Afghanistan. Mainland Pak is full of wahabbi sunnis, that even the Arabs dont want. i do see Pak breaking up, Balochistan becoming free, the Pashtun areas going to Afghanistan and southern pak (Sindhudesh) becoming free. The land locked state of paki Punjab would retain all the crazies.
If India gains economic strength and China continues to gobble up portions of Bhutan, they could join India too. Their neighboring region Sikkim which is similar to Bhutan, became an Indian state.
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As an example of development, India brings F4 racing to Kashmir, while Pak still focusses on donkey racing. This excites the locals. Many universities, top hospitals, airports, malls etc opening in Kashmir these days.
https://twitter.com/i/status/1769359507820622164 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1769359507820622164)
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"since China cannot fight a two front war with both Taiwan and India, India is likely to make its move for POK while China is distracted."
- This is an important deterrent keeping or slowing China from taking Taiwan.
Maybe in a Trump second term the US will appreciate the value of having India as an ally.
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Biden admin has not been a good ally. They keep doing the things that pi$$ off Indians.
- Biden backed out of India's Republic day parade at short notice, Macron filled in. This is a parade watched by nearly all of India.
- US keeps supporting well known Khalistani terrorists, such as Pannu, the Canadian American, to keep the pressure on India and so that India behaves!.
- India recently passed a law the CAA which allows non-muslim minorities from neighboring countries to seek citizenship in India, since after the partition of India beyween India and Pak they were left behind on the wrong side. Typically, these are hindus, sikhs, parsis, christians etc, all except muslims since muslims are not oppressed in Pak, Afghanistan, Bangladesh. Ofcourse the US passed comments on it as being oppressive to muslims. This is considered ridiculous, since both Bangladesh and Pak were created on the basis of religion, so that muslims could be safe in their own homeland !. The intent of the law is to save the oppressed non-muslims living in muslim lands.
A recent exchange between Garcetti US Ambassador and Jai Shanker Foreign Minister of India.
US Ambassador to India, Eric Garcetti : "US can't give up on principles. US is concerned about CAA & closely monitoring it."
EAM S Jaishankar : "Then, I have my principles too 🔥🔥. One of my principles is an obligation to the people wronged during partition." “You remove historical contexts & make an argument, and say oh I have principles and you don't have principles" ⚡ "You reacting as if partition of India never happened" - EAM S Jaishankar roared
Here's an Indian journalist asking about the matter. The hypocrisy of the west is obvious. Fast tracking of citizenships to various minorities and ethnicities has been done multiple times in the USA and Europe. https://twitter.com/i/status/1769433752340730264 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1769433752340730264)
- Keeps pressurizing India by holding back approved weapons purchases.
Trump got along very well with Modi.
The main disagreement with the Biden admin, is India's close relationship with Russia which is time tested and not fickle like with the USA. Biden wants India to stop purchasing Russian oil, even though India processes the oil and sells it back to Europe at high price or uses oil for its own use. The Europeans need the oil, its a face saving way for them to purchase it. The US continues to trade with Russia, eg uranium and other commodities.
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Ya,
your posts are amazingly informative.
Do you have any thoughts on how Trump if elected could improve our ties and make India a closer ally (if he should hopefully win)
?
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What India craves is consistent pro India policy from the US. The US is not sure who they want to support, its fickle. On and off the US starts to support Pak or China to exert pressure on India, even though the US needs India to counter China in the Indo-Pacific.
With Trump relations were excellent, one should see the welcome that Trump got when he visited India. Trump never supported Pak and was very pro India.
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See the warm welcome that Modi got when he visited Bhutan. Its just a few minutes long. The dance in the last few minutes is an Indian dance from Modi's home state, danced by Bhutanis. This is why China can never take over Bhutan, or even Nepal (inspite the communist regime in Nepal at the moment).
https://twitter.com/i/status/1771102165530034187 (https://twitter.com/i/status/1771102165530034187)
P.S. He was awarded Bhutan's highest civilian award, this visit. Modi keeps getting highest national awards from several muslim/arab countries, even France.
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" What India craves is consistent pro India policy from the US. The US is not sure who they want to support, its fickle. On and off the US starts to support Pak or China to exert pressure on India, even though the US needs India to counter China in the Indo-Pacific."
if the US was consistently pro India would Modi reciprocate
I mean India is part of the BRIC nations trying to undermine the US dollar.
seems like Pakistan is a frenemy, we are trying to balance our interests with both ways.
Kind of like our relationship with Turkey .
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" What India craves is consistent pro India policy from the US. The US is not sure who they want to support, its fickle. On and off the US starts to support Pak or China to exert pressure on India, even though the US needs India to counter China in the Indo-Pacific."
if the US was consistently pro India would Modi reciprocate
I mean India is part of the BRIC nations trying to undermine the US dollar.
seems like Pakistan is a frenemy, we are trying to balance our interests with both ways.
Kind of like our relationship with Turkey .
The media has created a false narrative that India wants to dedollarize via BRICS. This is all fake news. Except Russia and China, no one wants to dedollarize. Infact the BRICS group is not coming out with a new currency, inspite the propaganda by the media. Infact, India has been clear, there is no BRICS currency. To know the facts, search for any Indian govt official saying that there will be a BRICS currency. The only one who can destroy the $ is the USA itself.!
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"The media has created a false narrative that India wants to dedollarize via BRICS. This is all fake news. Except Russia and China, no one wants to dedollarize. Infact the BRICS group is not coming out with a new currency, inspite the propaganda by the media. Infact, India has been clear, there is no BRICS currency. To know the facts, search for any Indian govt official saying that there will be a BRICS currency. The only one who can destroy the $ is the USA itself.!"
wow
why is the media making this up?
is this CCP propaganda?
or from other sources other political reasons?
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"The media has created a false narrative that India wants to dedollarize via BRICS. This is all fake news. Except Russia and China, no one wants to dedollarize. Infact the BRICS group is not coming out with a new currency, inspite the propaganda by the media. Infact, India has been clear, there is no BRICS currency. To know the facts, search for any Indian govt official saying that there will be a BRICS currency. The only one who can destroy the $ is the USA itself.!"
wow
why is the media making this up?
is this CCP propaganda?
or from other sources other political reasons?
The gold bugs are the main group pushing the BRICS currency narrative. Since the US keeps printing $, deficits are 34 Trillion and rising at the rate of a Trillion $ every 100 days. In other words, the value of the US $ is declining and foreigners holding US $ see the value of their holdings decline. The US dollar is very liquid, no other currency can provide that liquidity for world trade, bond holdings etc. The $ is king, the cleanest shirt in the dirty laundry. Having said that, the US $ is losing influence and there is an increasing trend to do bilateral trade in local currencies, but even this does not work well beyond a certain point. eg Russia sells India oil, India pays back in Rupees (due to US sanctions on Russia), but now Russia has billions of Rupees and does not know what to do with them since the Rupee is not a $ convertible currency (think of Chuck-e-Cheese tokens), everyone wants $ or a $ convertible currency. Now Russia is being forced to invest the Rupees in India !.
China is the other big holder of US Treasuries and they are dumping them as fast as they can (see a chart of the Chinese long term holdings of US Treasuries). US wants to go to war with China, why would China hold any US Treasuries and support the currency of an "enemy" nation.
The US is abusing its reserve currency (printing into oblivion), freezing Russian assets and pushing to give them to Ukr (this is against International law), kicking Russia out of SWIFT the international currency exchange system (international trust is lost, now the Chinese and Iranians have built their own system).
The push by the US to use frozen Russian assets for rebuilding Ukr is a smart geopolitical move by USA, this will destroy Europe! and make it a US vassal state. The frozen assets are in European banks, and international law does not allow unilateral seizure of assets, so if Europeans being broke themselves, were to give them to Ukr, they would be breaking the law and the Russian counter-retaliation would be against European assets held in Russia, i.e. Europe ends up losing its assets in Russia. This is a bit like the US blowing up the Nordstream pipeline, supposedly to hurt Russia, but it actually hurts Europe more since their economies cannot function without cheap Russian oil and now Germany is in recession. A smart way to destroy the European economy, so that Europe behaves and remains under US influence. Can you fault India for trying to stay non-aligned ?.
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Lets discuss a bit, China's problems with India.
1. Northern Land Borders: Only India and Bhutan have unsettled borders with China in the North. They dont want to settle the land borders, so that India stays distracted in the mountains and not focus on the Indian Ocean region, where lies major vulnerability for the Chinese.
2. China's Indian Ocean vulnerability Most are aware of the Malacca strait choke point, from where China's shipping lanes can be choked, all export/import of goods mostly comes to a stop, if that were to be blocked.
(https://www.pelagicodyssey.ca/SIOE1/1.jpg)
However, there are other choke points.
a) As you come out of the Malacca straits, Chinese ships have to pass to the south of the Andaman Nicobar islands (which belong to India). Its a major naval base (Andaman Nicobar command). So called 10 degree channel.
b) Recently, Maldives (muslim state on the south west of Sri Lanka)), tried to kick out India and replace them with China, forgetting that they are completely reliable on India for their economy, tourists and even fresh water!. No doubt a lot of money exchanged hands after their new President was elected. China thought they gained a major foothold in the Indian Ocean (no base as yet). Problem is that India activated a new naval base in the Minicoy islands (India owned) between Minicoy and Maldives, the so called 8 degree channel. this creates a new choke point.
c) Further north of Minicoy are major naval bases in the Lakshdweep islands (India owned), so called 9 degree channel, which is another choke point.
d) Look south of the Maldives, there lies Diego Garcia a part of the Chagos Islands, a major US base.
e) Even if Chinese subs were to cross south of these choke points, India has additional listening stations in Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius etc, These islands have many Indian origin people due to historical trade routes and relations are very close with India.
China is in no position to exert force in the Indian Ocean, unless they are dealing with small nations such as Phillipines, Vietnam etc.
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India Adds Firepower to a Missile Program Focused on China
India tested a missile capable of carrying multiple nuclear warheads, the latest advance in its homegrown Agni-V program
By
Rajesh Roy
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March 11, 2024 1:49 pm ET
NEW DELHI—India has successfully conducted the maiden flight test of an indigenously developed ballistic missile capable of carrying multiple warheads, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said Monday, a development that enhances the country’s nuclear deterrence against rivals China and Pakistan.
The intercontinental ballistic missile called Agni-5, which in Sanskrit means “fire,” is equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles, or MIRV technology, that allows it to launch multiple attacks in one go across different locations, according to two senior serving government officials.
India has been developing and testing its Agni series of missiles for more than a decade as it looks to catch up with China’s military strength. It first tested the Agni-5 series in 2012, and since then has been adding technological advancements to it and retesting. The country has said its Agni-5 program is in line with India’s stated policy to have a credible minimum deterrence and its commitment to no first-use of nuclear weapons.
In 2019, India successfully tested a missile capable of destroying a satellite in space, technology also held by only a few powers.
The surface-to-surface Agni missile is capable of striking targets of more than 5,000 kilometers, or 3,100 miles, with a high degree of accuracy. That trails the capabilities of China’s longest-range missiles.
Still, this puts Beijing and its neighborhood within the direct target range of India’s Strategic Forces Command, the dedicated tri-services nuclear force under the direct control of the prime minister, said New Delhi-based defense analyst N.C. Bipindra.
The MIRV-capable ballistic missile can target multiple strategic sites about 1,500 kilometers, or 930 miles apart, and “that is a significant nuclear strike capability for any nation to have,” he said. He added that Agni-5 development was largely focused on China, which New Delhi now views as the most serious military threat to India.
So why is MIRV capability important in the Indian context: China has an advantage in the number of nuclear warheads over India and also has access to larger kiloton nuclear bombs. MIRV capability neutralizes this edge, because each missile can carry multiple war heads (3-10), many of which will serve as decoy missiles. No body can be sure of shooting down tens of nuclear capable missiles. Expect more such tests, possibly also from submarine based missiles. The Agni V missiles brings all parts of China under missile reach. No place to hide.
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Thank you
This is stuff we never see
in the usual media
I know nothing of any of this.
You could be a guest on cable media
You could be the India/China expert equivalent to Gordon Chang.
We could all learn a lot about Asia......
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I am not so smart, just read smart people :-D but thanks.
BTW, India is undergoing general elections in May 2024. Modi is expected to sweep the polls by the largest number of seats ever. The west is still not recognizing the Modi juggernaut, for they continue to diss him. Here's a typical election song for Modi, one of many. Modi has pushed Indian nationalism and Hinduism. Many of the visuals are from holy places that Modi visits, or the huge crowds that come to see Modi.
https://youtu.be/nndR8gHEsBw (https://youtu.be/nndR8gHEsBw)
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https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-s-Indian-land-grab-has-become-a-strategic-disaster (https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/China-s-Indian-land-grab-has-become-a-strategic-disaster)
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I'm not sensing congruity between the headline and the content of that article.
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India-US relationship had a bad week. My comments in green.
"US-India partnership had a bad week. Kejriwal row (corrupt politician, possible CIA). CAA controversy (US comment on India offering citizenship to minorities in muslim countries). Biden letter to Pakistan (Biden congratulating pak PM). US embassy invites Kashmiris to Iftar party (Basically inviting anti-India elements). Jaishankar (India's Foreign Minister) says India and Russia take good care of each other."
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India-US relationship had a bad week. My comments in green.
"US-India partnership had a bad week. Kejriwal row (corrupt politician, possible CIA). CAA controversy (US comment on India offering citizenship to minorities in muslim countries). Biden letter to Pakistan (Biden congratulating pak PM). US embassy invites Kashmiris to Iftar party (Basically inviting anti-India elements). Jaishankar (India's Foreign Minister) says India and Russia take good care of each other."
Current US President can't figure out who are friends should be. Hopefully PM Modi knows we have a new President coming soon.
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Yesterday, Indian defense minister, Rajnath Singh again reiterated, that POK is ours. When asked about the timing of taking POK back, he said the when the people of POK themselves demand to merge with India. This has now been repeated several times. The strategy is clear, that India develops Indian Kashmir massively, such that the people in POK demand to merge with India. There have been several agitations already demanding that. When India is ready, the signal will be given to the people of POK to demand merger.
There have also been reports in the Guardian that India/Indian proxies have killed over 20 high level terrorists in Pak. This is the softening of Pak, so that the trouble makers are eliminated before the big move for POK. When asked about that, he did not deny it. Even Modi has recently said that we will enter the homes of Paki terrorists and kill them there.
It would not surprise me if this happens in Modi's next term. He is 73 yrs old, his term is of 5 years. I am guessing he wants to retire as the best PM of India, which will include taking back POK.
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With the election season heating up in India, everyone is waiting for the BJP (Modi's party) to issue their manifesto. The important thing is that they have completed about 90 % of the major promises made in the previous 2 election manifestos. Everyone is waiting to hear comments about POK. A second hot topic is to register all citizens (NRC bill). This would be key to preventing illegal immigration from Pak, Bangladesh, Myanmar border etc. Infact the NRC might be a pre-requisite to taking back POK, because of all the jihadis who will be trying to come in.
If anyone is interested, the 2019 manifesto is https://www.bjp.org/manifesto2019 page 11-12 has the national security aspects (all done). They talk about the CAA (Citizenship Amendment Bill) which has irked the US for no reason. This is where they give citizenship to non-muslim refugees (Indians) from India before it was partitioned (Afghanistan Pak, Bangladesh), after 75 years of independence!. Removal of article 370/35 A from Kashmir, which was thought to be "permanent" and a source of corruption and Paki interference. Since the removal of article 370, there is now peace in Kashmir, violence has died down and development is proceeding at a rapid pace.
In election rallies, Modi speaks of his "guarantee" that he will do what he says.
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https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-reacts-after-china-renames-neighbor-s-territory/ar-BB1l7JTZ?ocid=msedgntp&pc=HCTS&cvid=c40b82aef6cd4ab297e429ad045d49a0&ei=32
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This is just an attempt to needle India and keep it focussed on the land border, away from the Indo-Pacific which is China's weak point.
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The BJP released their 2024 Election Manifesto. No direct mention of POK (but that would not be a good idea, as it would give the timing away). The below national defense related items were listed.
1.Continuing Zero Tolerance towards Terrorism: This is directed at Pak. They remind the readers of 2 previous surgical strikes against Pak.
2. Theaterization of Military Commands: For better efficiency. This will help in the next big war, and is China oriented. They have to be prepared for a two front war with Pak-China, along the NW borders, Eastern borders and in the sea.
3. Robust Infrastructure along the borders. They specifically refer to India-Pak, India-China and India-Myanmar borders.
4. Reinforcing fight against drugs: This is Pak oriented, who sends a lot across their border.
5. Implementing the new Indian Penal Code: India used the old British rules, these have been updated to present times to deal with Terrorism and anti-national elements.
6.Implementation of the CAA: This is the new Citizenship act, where minorities (non muslims) of previous Indian territories (Pak, Afgh, Bangladesh) who sought shelter in India are given citizenship in India.
7. Enhance capabilities of armed forces and central armed forces (police) to deal with any threats.
8.National Forsensics Mission: To speed up crime related decisions.
9. To protect India's (Bharat) security interests in the Indian Ocean. This is China focussed.
10. Safeguarding India's Digital Sovereignty: This relates to internet based threats. India has low tolerance for misuse of FaceBook etc. Tik-Tok and tons of Chinese apps are banned.
11. Developing Robust Cybersecurity Policies.
Overall, all this is needed before we can fight China, but should the opportunity arise POK will be taken. Modi and the defense minister have said that many times. When the people of POK start demanding to merge with India, we will know its time.
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I was impressed with the understanding of India by Alexander Dugin, a Russian thinker close to Putin. His understanding of things is very close to that of the Indian mind. Have not seen any other Western commentator, and definitely no American commentator with this level of accuracy. Dugin by the way says Russia should side with China!, which may be the correct response for Russia.
https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423 (https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423)
(https://pbs.twimg.com/media/GLjtwzhWoAE2V0o?format=jpg&name=small)
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That was a very interesting read.
I will be mulling it over at length.
Given Dugin's essay, it seems on point to post this here:
https://amgreatness.com/2024/04/20/the-u-s-department-of-state-how-can-you-praise-what-you-hate/
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Wokeness is destroying America., will leave it at that!.
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https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423]https://twitter.com/Agdchan/status/1781435242865123423
Yes. VERY interesting post, especially with the endorsement of ya that he has his history and perspective essentially right.
So many angles to it. First to me is, why can't WE do that, and why don't other developing countries follow their model.
The parallels to Russia are interesting.